COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, Huff and Malveaux

Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

LAWRENCE WOOD, JR.

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1089-21-4 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX

JUNE 7, 2022

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY

James P. Fisher, Judge

David W. Walls, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.

Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Pursuant to his guilty pleas, the trial court convicted Lawrence Wood, Jr. (“appellant”) of 

one count each of felony and misdemeanor delivery of a bad check, in violation of Code § 18.2-181, 

and four counts each of felony larceny of a check, in violation of Code § 18.2-98; felony forgery of 

a check, in violation of Code § 18.2-170; felony uttering of a forged check, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-170; and felony obtaining money by false pretense, in violation of Code § 18.2-178. The 

trial court further convicted appellant of construction fraud, in violation of Code § 18.2-200.1, for 

which offense appellant had entered a plea of not guilty. On appeal, appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for construction fraud. In addition, he argues

that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence for all his convictions that exceeded 

the sentencing guidelines. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
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conviction for construction fraud and that the trial court’s imposition of sentence represents a proper 

exercise of its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. 

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 

(2016)). In doing so, we discard any of appellant’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true all 

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be 

drawn from that evidence. Id. at 473.

On January 15, 2020, Megan Smith and appellant met to discuss a renovation project at 

Smith’s Rappahannock County home. On that date, appellant and Smith wrote a proposal for 

appellant to remove a landing and steps outside Smith’s kitchen and build a sunroom with 

screened windows and sliding doors. The contract called for Smith to pay appellant $16,500 as a 

down payment on the project. Appellant “said he was a contractor,” so Smith thought he had a 

contractor’s license. Smith signed the contract on February 13, 2020, and she paid appellant 

$16,500 by check on March 3, 2020. Appellant cashed Smith’s check. 

When Smith returned home from out of town on March 17, 2020, she found that 

appellant had done nothing on the project. Smith called to ask appellant “what was going on.” 

Appellant replied that he “was working on it.”

Two weeks later, appellant and two men appeared at Smith’s home and, for one day, dug 

postholes and filled them with cement. At some point after that, appellant demolished the 

landing and steps at Smith’s home, but he performed no other work on the sunroom project. 

After learning that appellant had a reputation for not performing construction work in a 

timely manner and that he had recently been incarcerated, Smith panicked and asked appellant to 
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return her money. Appellant said, “Oh, that money is long gone,” and chuckled. When Smith 

pressed appellant further, he claimed to have receipts for materials he had purchased for the 

sunroom project using Smith’s money. Eventually, Smith learned from county officials that 

Tony Dyer, whom she did not know, was listed as the licensed contractor on her job’s building 

permit. 

Appellant had told Smith that Cherry Street Building Supply had delivered the wood and 

windows for her project to his address. Smith visited that address on May 21, 2020. Appellant’s 

landlord opened a storage facility on the property, but no building materials were inside. 

Appellant later called Smith and claimed that the materials were in a storage facility behind the 

one she had visited. Smith testified that she “found out later that there was no other storage 

facility on the property.” 

After months of repeatedly asking appellant for receipts for building materials for her 

project, Smith met with appellant and Dyer on July 24, 2020. Appellant showed Smith what he 

claimed to be a list of items purchased from Cherry Street Building Supply using Smith’s down

payment. However, the documents appellant showed Smith were not “paid receipts” but merely 

price quotations for specific materials. Cherry Street Building Supply had not delivered any 

such materials to appellant. At Smith’s insistence, appellant also produced the building permit 

application, which he had only partially completed.

On September 2, 2020, Smith told appellant that her “patience [wa]s wearing thin,” and 

she demanded to see receipts, supplies, or some form of completed work from appellant. She 

also demanded that appellant return her money, and he agreed. On September 5, 2020, appellant 

gave Smith a check for $16,500; the check was returned unpaid because the bank account upon 

which it was drawn had been closed.
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After contacting the police, Smith sent appellant a written demand for her money by 

registered mail. Appellant never repaid Smith any of her money. Smith testified that she had 

called, emailed, and texted appellant almost every day for six months, and he “was pretty good 

responding with excuses, but then he wouldn’t show up when he said he was going to.”

In finding appellant guilty of construction fraud, the trial court concluded that the 

Commonwealth had presented “a powerful case of [his] guilt with respect to all of the elements” 

of the offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years’ imprisonment for each of his 

eighteen felony convictions and twelve months in jail for his misdemeanor conviction, for a total 

of thirty-seven years of incarceration. 

This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he had 

the intent to defraud Smith.

“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it.’” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Id. (quoting Yoder v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)). “If there is evidentiary support 

for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its 

opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. 

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.

273, 288 (2017)).
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To establish the crime of construction fraud under Code § 18.2-200.1, the 

Commonwealth was required to prove, among other elements, that appellant possessed 

“fraudulent intent at the time the advance [of funds] was obtained.”1 McCary v. Commonwealth, 

42 Va. App. 119, 126 (2003). See also Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 23, 35 (2011) (“It is 

well established that to be guilty of construction fraud, the defendant must have the intent to 

defraud at the time the advance of money is received.”). “The ‘[i]ntent to defraud means that the 

defendant intends to deceive another person, and to induce such other person, in reliance upon 

such deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with 

reference to property.’” Warner v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 141, 146 (1999) (quoting 

Sylvestre v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 253, 258-59 (1990)). “In construction fraud cases, as 

in all other fraud cases, fraudulent intent can be inferred from ‘the conduct and representations of 

the defendant.’” Dennos v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 139, 145 (2014) (quoting Rader v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 325, 329 (1992)). This is so because “intent is a secret operation of 

the mind.” Austin v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 60, 66 (2012) (quoting Orr v. Commonwealth, 

229 Va. 298, 301 (1985)). “Circumstances implying fraudulent intent include a contractor’s 

false statements, . . . subsequent failure to perform the work, . . . failure to use the advanced 

funds to purchase supplies or to hire needed labor, . . . efforts to avoid communicating with the 

homeowner, . . . and refusal to return the advanced funds . . . .” Dennos, 63 Va. App. at 145-46. 

“[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact.” Brown 

v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 746, 787 (2018) (quoting Nobles v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 

548, 551 (1977)).

1 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the remaining 

elements of construction fraud under Code § 18.2-200.1. 
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“It is apparent from reason and common sense that construction fraud can occur despite 

the fact that a builder or contractor begins to perform on the contract.” Holsapple v. 

Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 601 (2003) (quoting Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App.

522, 537 (2003) (en banc)). “The relevant question is whether a builder or contractor obtained 

an advance based upon future work promised with a fraudulent intent not to perform or to 

perform only partially, not whether the contractor had performed work for which he was paid.” 

Id. at 601-02 (quoting Holsapple, 39 Va. App. at 537).

In the instant case, appellant’s actions and statements proved he intended to defraud 

Smith when he accepted her down payment. After leading her to believe that he was a licensed 

contractor, appellant reached an agreement with Smith for him to build a sunroom at her home, 

although they did not sign the agreement until a month later. On March 3, 2020, Smith gave 

appellant a check for the $16,500 down payment, which he cashed. When Smith became 

suspicious because the project was at a standstill and asked about her money, appellant chuckled 

and said the money was “long gone.” During the months that followed, appellant made 

numerous false statements to Smith about performing the job, ordering materials for the project, 

and storing the non-existent building supplies that Smith’s money had supposedly purchased. 

Although appellant dug some holes at Smith’s property and demolished the landing and steps, he 

performed no further work on the job and provided no excuse for his failure to complete the 

project. After repeated demands for return of her money, appellant gave Smith a check for the 

down payment amount, but it was returned unpaid because his bank account had been closed. 

Appellant did not respond to Smith’s written demand for a refund, and he never repaid Smith any 

of her money. Considering these facts and circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed fraudulent intent when he accepted 

Smith’s down payment and that he was guilty of construction fraud.
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B. Appellant’s Sentence

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 

thirty-seven years’ incarceration, which he contends exceeded the calculated sentencing 

guidelines. 

“We review the trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 

58 Va. App. 35, 46 (2011). “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and 

the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an 

abuse of discretion.” Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston v. 

Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)).

“The sentencing guidelines are advisory only and do not require trial courts to impose 

specific sentences.” Runyon v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). “[T]he 

recommended sentencing ranges contained in these discretionary guidelines are not binding on 

the trial judge but, rather, are mere tools to be used by the judge in fixing an appropriate sentence 

within the limitations established by the statute governing punishment for the particular crime.” 

Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461, 465 (2004). A judge’s failure to follow the 

sentencing guidelines “shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other 

post-conviction relief.” Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Accordingly, we may only consider whether the 

sentence fell outside the permissible statutory range.2 See Smith v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App.

620, 626 (1998); Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339 (1994).

2 We note that the trial court explained its reasoning for its upward departure from the 

guidelines. In reviewing appellant’s lengthy criminal record, which dated back to 1994 and 

involved numerous crimes of fraud and larceny, the court noted that appellant had prior 

convictions in Culpeper, Page, Rappahannock, Madison, Greene, Orange, Warren, Spotsylvania, 

and Frederick Counties. The court then wrote that the “[g]uidelines fail to account for [the] 

concept of restraint of longstanding predatory-style criminal behavior[,] decades long 

victimization of citizens of the Commonwealth, [and] probable future risk to innocent persons.” 
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The two-year sentences that the trial court imposed for each of appellant’s eighteen 

felony convictions, and the twelve-month sentence for the misdemeanor conviction, were each 

within the statutory ranges set by the legislature. See Code §§ 18.2-10(d) and (f), -11(a), -98, 

-170, -178, -181, and -200.1. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining appellant’s sentence, and we do not disturb the trial court’s ruling.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove appellant’s 

guilt of construction fraud and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 

appellant. However, we note that there is an apparent scrivener’s error in the trial court’s 

February 10, 2021 order accepting appellant’s guilty pleas and the September 28, 2021 

sentencing order. Both orders erroneously state that in matter CR21-17, appellant was convicted 

of uttering check #232, rather than forging check #228, as charged in the indictment. Thus, we 

affirm appellant’s convictions, but remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of 

correcting the errors in the two orders pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B).

Affirmed and remanded.