[PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUI T

________________________ No s . 14

- 14444 , 15

- 10923

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13

- cr - 20914

- CMA

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appell ee

– Cross Appellant ,
versus DAMION ST. PATRICK BASTON , a.k.a. R.A.B., a.k.a. Drac, a.k.a. “D”, a.k.a. Daddy, Defendant

– Appell ant

– Cross Appellee

.

________________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

_______________________ ( March 24, 2016 ) Before WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY , Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO , * District Judge

.

* Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 1 of 352 WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge : This appeal and cross

- appeal require us to review the convictions and sentence of Damion Baston, an international se x trafficker nicknamed “Drac” ( short for Dracula ) who sometimes dress ed up as a vampire, complete with yellow contact lenses and gold

- plated fangs

. Baston forced numerous women to prostitute for him by beating them, humiliating them , and threatening to kill them, and he pimped them around the world , from Florida to Australia to the United Arab Emirates

. Baston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for one conviction , a supplemental jury instruct ion, and the award of restitution to his victims . Those challenges fail , but the cross - appeal by the government about a refusal to award one victim increased restitution has merit. The g overnment argues that the district court erred when it refused to awar d restitution to a victim of Baston’s sex trafficking in Australia

. The district court ruled that an award of restitution for Baston’s extraterritorial conduct would exceed the power of Congress under Article I of the Constitution , U.S. Const. Art. I, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment , id. Amend. V

. To decide those issues, we must examine the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause , id. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 , a question of first impression in this Circuit , and the constitutionality of the Wil liam Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 § 223 , 18 U.S.C. § 1596 ( a ) (2) , a question of first

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 2 of 353 impression in any circuit

. We conclude that Congress has the constitutional authority to punish sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion that occurs overseas. We affirm Baston’s convictions and sentence , but we vacate his order of restitution and remand with an instruction for the district court to increase his restitution obligation

. I. BACKGROUND Baston immigrated to the United States from Jamaica in 1989

. After he was convicted of an aggravated felony , Baston was ordered removed in 1998 . But Baston illegally reentered the country by purchasing the identity of a citizen of the United States

. Under this a ssumed identity, Baston opened bank accounts, started businesses, and rented apartments in Florida. He also obtained a Florida driver’s license and a United States passport. Baston traveled the world under the assumed identity , visiting Australia, New Zeal and, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, China, and Brazil, among other places

. Baston funded his lavish lifestyle by forcing numerous women to prostitute for him. Baston learned how to be a pimp from Pimpology , a book written by Pimpin’ Ken. C onsistent with t he fifth law of Pimpology , Baston “p rey [ed] on the

w eak” by recruiting women who were sexually abused as children. See Pimpin’ Ken, Pimpology : The 48 Laws of the Game 21 (2008). Baston also forced his

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 3 of 354 victims to refer to him as “Daddy,” see id. , and took all of the money t hey earned , see id. at 20

. But Baston was not always faithful to the laws of Pimpology

. Unlike Pimpin’ Ken who rejected the use of violence, see id. at 2

– 3 , Baston punched, slapped, choked, and threaten ed to kill his victims whenever they got “ out of line. ” And his victims took those threats seriously . In addition to his Transylvanian tendencies, Baston maintained a muscular physique aided by having his victims inject him with steroids on a regular basis

. He also claim ed to be a member of the Bloods gang . K.L., an Australian, met Baston at a nightclub in Gold Coast, Australia , when she was 24 years old

. She dreamed of opening her own restaurant, and Baston offered to help her

. But K.L. soon discovered that Baston’s real business was pimping women. Baston sent K.L. to have sex with clients throughout Australia at prices he determined

. When Baston was not in Australia, he had K.L. wire her earnings to his bank account s in Miami. K.L. also prostituted for Baston in the United Arab Emirates, Florida , and Texas

. K.L. testified that Baston beat her “often” and that he threatened to hurt her and her family if she ever stopped working for him

. Baston would backhand K.L. whenever she committed any perceived slight, like failing to cook him breakfast or telling a bouncer how much money she made. One night, Baston suspected that

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 4 of 355 K.L. was cheating on him. He woke her up , punched her hard in the pelvis, threw her to the ground, and strangled her. He heated up kitchen k niv e s o ver an open flame and threatened to slit her throat. On another occasion , Baston took K.L. to the bathroom, held her against the wall by her throat, and bit her cheek until she bled. K.L. eventually escaped Baston’s control after her family contacted the A merican embassy , which refused to let her return to Baston in the United States. T.M. was 21 years old when she met Baston

. She was attending Georgia Southern University and needed money for college. She sent picture s of herself to one of Baston’s associat es, who convinced her to come to Miami to work as an
escort
. After she arrived in Miami, T.M. met Baston at a nightclub

. He convinced her to work at various strip club s in Miami , where she would meet clients and have sex with them at prices set by Baston

. T.M. also prostituted for Baston in Texas and Australia. Baston often reminded T.M. that, if she ever left him, “it wouldn’t be good” for her or her family. One night, Baston thought that T.M. was flirting too much with a client. He drove her to a secluded park and backhanded her so hard that she fell to the ground. He reminded T.M . that he could bury her in the park and no one would ever find her. On another occasion, Baston thought T.M. was being “disrespectful , ” so he wrapped a belt around her neck and m ade her beg for forgiveness while she crawled around on her hands and knees like a dog

. T.M.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 5 of 356 mustered the courage to flee from Baston when he temporarily left the country to visit Jamaica. J.R. met Baston in 2013. She was 21 years old at the time, living with her mother in Georgia and working at a Little Caesar s restaurant . But J.R. dreamed of being a model. Baston saw her modeling pictures on Instagram and began communicating with her over the Internet and phone. Baston prom ised to help her modeling career and convinced her to take a bus from Georgia to Miami . When she arrived, Baston forced her to prostitute for him at various strip clubs

. J.R. also prostituted for him in Georgia, Louisiana , Texas, Tennessee, and New York. B aston and J.R. typically stayed in hotels, most often a Marriott in Miami , and Baston advertised her services on Backpage.com. When ever J.R. was supposed to be working for Baston , she had to call him “ [ e ] very hour on the hour ” and text him regularly. If J.R. disobeyed his orders, Baston would punch her in the face. One night, Baston drov e J.R. to a secluded parking lot and told her not to “fuck with him” or he would “chop .

. . [her] body up and have [ her ] thrown in the Everglades.” On another occasion, J .R. and Baston got into an argument and, a lthough J.R. was pregnant at the time, Baston punched her in the side and threatened to stab her with a broken broom . Baston later forced J.R. to have an abortion because he “didn’t
want t o have a baby by a punk bi tch.”

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 6 of 357 Baston was arrested at his mother’s house in New York. A grand jury indicted him on 21 cou nts , including sex trafficking of K.L. by force, fraud, or coercion , 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), “ in the Southern District of Florida , Australia, the United Arab Em irates, and elsewhere ” ; sex trafficking of T.M. , id. , “ in the Southern District of Florida [] and elsewhere ”; sex trafficking of J.R. , id. , “in the Southern District of Florida[] and elsewhere ”; and several counts of money laundering , id. § 1956, based on the sex

- trafficking proceeds that Baston wired from Australia to Miami

. Baston proceeded to trial on all 21 counts. The government called several of Baston’s victims as witnesses , including K.L., T.M., and J.R

. The women testified about how they met Baston, how their relationships progressed, and how Baston used violence and coercion to force them into prostitution. They also testified about how often they prostituted for Ba ston and how much they charged their clients

. After the government present ed its case - in

- chief , Baston filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal . He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence “on the indictment as a whole” by raising specific arguments against each count

. W ith respect to the charge of sex trafficking J.R., Bast on argued that he never coerced J.R. into prostitution : she was already a prostitute when he met her , and their relationship was nothing but amicable

. The district court denied Baston’s motion.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 7 of 358 Baston called three witnesses: his sister , his mother , and himself. Baston’s defense to the counts of sex trafficking was that he did not coerce any of the victims into prostitution ; they did it freely and voluntarily. Baston argued that K.L. and T.M. , for example, prostituted in Australia because it is lega l there and they could make a lot of money doing it

. With respect to the counts of money laun dering, Baston argued in closing that “ money made in Australi a from a legal brothel is legal” so “ sending the money by

. . . wire transfer is not money laundering because there is nothing illegal about that money .” After the close of all evidence , Baston renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal “for the reasons that were previously indicated.” The district court again denied it. Before the district court instructed the jury , Baston stated that he had

“ [n]o prob lems ” with the instructions an d was “in agreement” with them. O n the second day of deliberations, the jury submitted the following note to the district court: If prostitution is legal in [A]ustralia, and money was made there by those means, would it be illegal to transfer funds abroad? Specifical[l]y the United States? Which laws are we to consider? The district court answered the jury’s question with the following supplemental instruction: With resp ect to Counts 13

– 21 [the counts of money laundering],

. . . the unlawful activity in question is the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transportation, providing, obtaining, or maintaining a person, knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force, Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 8 of 359 threats of force, fraud, coercion, or any combination of such means would be used to cause that person to engage in a commercial sex act, in violation of U.S. federal law, that is, 18 U.S.C. sections 1591 and 1596. Under U.S. law, such conduct is i llegal, even if it took place outside the United States, if the defendant was present in the United States at the time he was charged. As always, you should consider all of my instructions as a whole. Baston objected to this instruction because it “involv ed a legal interpretation of the Statutes not includ[ed in] the Jury Instructions” and “introduced new theories to the case without the Defense being given the opportunity to argue [the m].” The district court rejected these arguments

. The jury convicted Baston of all 21 counts. The district court sentenced him
to 27 years of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release . It ordered a separate hearing on restitution. T he district court ordered Baston to pay $99,270 in restitution: $78,000 to K.L ., $11,200 to T.M., and $10,070 to J.R. The district court calculated these amounts based on worksheets provided by the government, which multiplied the hours that the victims prostituted for Baston by the amounts that they charged and then subtracted the ir e stimated living expenses . The victims’ earnings were calculated based on the ir testimony from trial ; the district court did not require the victims to testify a second time at the restitution hearing

. The $78,000 award to K.L. included the money she earned while prostituting for Baston in the United States, but excluded the $400,000 she earned while

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 9 of 3510 prostituting for Baston in Australia. Baston objected that a restitution award based on conduct that occurred wholly overseas would exceed the authority of Congress under the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. The district
court sustained the objection by stating that “ the government is over reaching and seeking amounts in restitution that aren’ t suppor ted by .

. . the constituti on .” II. STANDARD S OF REVIEW Several standards of review govern t his appeal and cross

- appeal . We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo

. United States v. Hernandez , 433 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) . We review a supplemental jury inst ruction for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo whether the instruction misstated the law or misled the jury. United States v. James , 642 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2011). We review the factual findings underlying a restitution order for clear error, United States v. Washington , 434 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2006) , and we review the procedures used at the restitution hearing for abuse of discretion, United States v. James , 459 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1972)

. W e review the legality of a restitution order de novo

. United States v. Rodriguez , 751 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014)

. III. DISCUSSION We divide our discussion into two main parts

. We address Baston’s appeal first. We then address the cross - appeal by the government

.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 10 of 3511 A. Baston’ s Appe al Baston raises three arguments on appeal. First , Baston argues that the district court abused its discretion when it issued the supplemental jury instruction

. Second, Baston contends that the district court should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the government provided insufficient evidence that his trafficking of J.R. was “in or affecting interstate .

. . commerce,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). Third, he contends that the district court used unreliable testimony to calculate his restitution obligations

. We address each argument in turn. 1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Issuing the Supplemental Jury Instruction. Baston argues that the s upplemental jury instruction was an abuse of discretion for three reasons: it did not answer the jury’s question, it misled the jury, and it misstated the law. But Baston has a problem: he made none of these arguments in the district court. Because Baston is challenging the supplemental jury instruction for the first time on appeal, we review his arguments for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The government argues that we should not review Baston’s arguments at all because he affirmatively agreed to the initial jury instructions in the district court. Under the doctrine of invited error, “[w]here a party expressly accepts a jury instruction, ‘such action .

. . serve[s] to waive [his] right to challenge the accepted instruction on appeal.’” United States v. House , 684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 11 of 3512 2012) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Silvestri , 409 F.3d 1311, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). But “the issue here is the supplemental instruction given in response to the [jury’s] ques tion

— not the initial instruction[s].” United States v. Isnadin , 742 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2014). Although Baston agreed to the initial jury instructions, he did not agree to the supplemental jury instruction. Baston instead failed to object to the supplemental jury instruction on the specific grounds he raises on appeal. But “failing to object does not trigger the doctrine of invited error.” United States v. Dortch , 696 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir. 2012). When a defendant objec ts to a jury instruction in the district court, but on different grounds than the ones he raises on appeal, we review the instruction for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d). We now turn to Baston’s three challenges to the supplemental jury instruction . None identifies an abuse of discretion by the district court. “[T]he court’s supplemental instruction[] w[as] sufficiently clear and responsive to the jury’s inquiry to fall squarely within the trial court’s range of discretion in this area.” United Stat es v. Fuiman , 546 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1977). Because the district court did not err, it did not plainly err either. United States v. Franklin , 694 F.3d 1, 9 (11th Cir. 2012 )

.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 12 of 3513 a. The Supplemental Jury Instruction Answered the Jury’s Question. Baston cont ends that the supplemental jury instruction did not answer the jury’s question. “When a jury makes explicit its difficulties,” the district court “should clear them away with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States , 326 U.S. 607, 612

– 13 (1946). T he district court instructed the jury that it could convict Baston of money laundering whether or not prostitution is legal in Australia. This answer was non

- responsive, according to Baston, because the jury asked whether the legality of prostitution affecte d the charges of sex trafficking . At trial, Baston argued that he did not coerce K.L. or T.M. into prostitution; instead, they prostituted because it was legal in Australia and they could make money doing it . Baston contends that the jury wanted more infor mation about t his defense. The problem with Baston’s argument is that the jury did not ask about sex trafficking. The jury ask ed about money laundering: its note asked whether it would be “illegal to transfer funds ” to the United States “[i]f prostitution is legal in [A]ustralia[] and money was made there by those means.” (Emphases added.) And the note asked a legal question about choice of law

— “Which laws are we to consider?”

— not a factual question about the victim s ’ motive s for prostituting in Australia

. T ellingly, t he jury’s question mirrored the choice

- of

- law argument that Baston made in his closing argument.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 13 of 3514 The district court answered this question, and its answer must have been satisfactory because the jury asked no further questions about money laun dering or sex trafficking after receiving the supplemental instruction. “[T]hat there was no further inquiry after the judge’s response to the note [] indicates that the judge’s response cleared the jury’s difficulty with concrete accuracy.” United States v. Parr , 716 F.2d 796, 809 (11th Cir. 1983) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Andrew , 666 F.2d 915, 922 (5th Cir. 1982) ). The district court did not abuse its discretion by answering the question that the jury actually asked instead of the question that Baston now argues it asked. b. The Supplemental Jury Instruction Did Not Mislead the Jury. Baston argues that the supplemental jury instruction misled the jury by suggesting it no longer needed to find that Baston’s conduct was “in or af fecting”

commerce , 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), an essential element of sex trafficking. The supplemental instruction essentially erased this element, according to Baston , by not repeating it and by stating that he could be convicted so long as he “was present in the United States at the time he was charged.” We disagree. The jury was not misled by the supplemental jury instruction because the supplemental instruction said nothing about the elements of sex trafficking. As explained above, the jury’s note asked only about money laundering, and the supplemental instruction addressed only that offense. Indeed, the instruction began

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 14 of 3515 with a prefatory clause

— “With respect to Counts 13

– 21”

— that specifically referred to the counts of money laundering. The jury would not have understood the supplemental instruction as saying anything about the elements of sex trafficking. Nor did the supplemental jury instruction need to repeat the elements of sex trafficking. Although sex trafficking was the “specified unlawful activity” for the counts of money laundering, id. § 1956, “[a] conviction for money laundering does not require proof that the defendant committed the specific predicate offense, ” United States v. De La Mata , 266 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). A jury instruction on money laundering can omit the elements of the specified unlawful activity. See United States v. Martinelli , 454 F.3d 1300, 1311

– 12 (11th Cir. 2006 )

. The district court did not confuse the jury by leaving out that unnecessary information. If any confusion somehow remained , the district court eliminated it by reminding the jury to “ consider all of my instructions as a whole.” See Parr , 716 F.2d at 809 . The jury could refer to the initial jury instructions , which correctly stated the elements of sex trafficking and the requirement that Baston’s conduct be “in or affecting” commerce. Because “the district court’s additional instruction was responsive to the jury’s specific concern while prudently refocusing the jury on the instructions

. . . as a whole,” United States v. Davis , 490 F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2007), the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 15 of 3516 c. The Supplemental Jury Instruction Did Not Misstate the Law. Baston contends that t he supplemental jury instruction misstated the law because it failed to explain that he could not be convicted of sex trafficking unless he knew his conduct was in or affecting commerce. We rejected this argument in United States v. Evans , 476 F.3d 1 176 (11th Cir. 2007), where w e held that sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion does not “requir[e] knowledge by a defendant that his actions are in o r affecting interstate commerce, ” i d. at 1180 n.2 ; accord United S tates v. Phea , 755 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Sawyer , 733 F.3d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 2013). Baston contends that Evans was wrongly decided, but “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc .” United States v. Archer , 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). And Evans has not been overruled or abrogated. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion because it was “under no obligation to give a requested instruction that misstates the law.” United States v. L’Hoste , 609 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1980). Even if Evans w as wrongly decided ( which we doubt ) , Baston would still lose. As explained above, the jury’s note asked about money laundering, not sex trafficking. If the supplemental jury instruction had discussed the knowledge element of sex trafficking, it would have been nonresponsive and confusing. When

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 16 of 3517 a ju ry requests a supplemental instruction, the district court should answer “ within the specific li mits of the question presented. ” United States v. Martin , 274 F.3d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Behler , 14 F.3d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1994)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to discuss something that was irrelevant to the jury’s question. If Baston disagreed about the elements of sex trafficking, he should have objected to the ini tial jury instruction that addressed that element, not the supplemental jury instruction. 2. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Baston’s Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal. Baston contends that his co nviction of sex trafficking J.R

. was supported b y insufficient evidence. A defendant is guilty of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion if he “knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce

. . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronize s, or solicits by any means a person

. . . knowing

. . . that means of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion

. . . will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act .” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (1) (emphasis added) . Baston contends that hi s trafficking of J.R. was not “ in or affecting ” interstate commerce . The question for our review is “whether , after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found [this element] beyond a reasonable doubt .” Musacchio v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 17 of 3518 The parties dispute our standard of review. The government argues that , because Baston did not contest the commerce element in the district court , we should review his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence only for a “ manifest miscarriage of justice .” Baston contends that we should review his argument de

novo because he raised a “general ” challenge to the suffic iency of the evidence in the district court

. Neither party is correct: w e review Baston’s argument for plain

error . Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Our review is not limited to correcting a “ manifest miscarriage of justice , ” contrary to the government’s argument. That standard does not apply unless the defendant makes no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence after the close of all evidence. See United States v. House , 684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tapia , 761 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985) . Baston challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal. But our review is not de novo either, contrary to Baston’s argument. He failed to raise the specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evide nce that he now raises on appeal. O ther circuits have held that a defendant preserves all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence if he raises a “general” challenge in the district
court
. See United States v. Cooper , 654 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Spinner , 152 F.3d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Hoy , 137 F.3d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1998)

. But see United States v. Clarke , 564 F.3d 949, 953

–

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 18 of 3519 54 (8th Cir. 2009)

. W e need not decide whether those decisions are consistent wi th the law in this Circuit because , even if they are, Baston did not raise a “ general ” challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

. Although his motion for a judgment of acquittal challenge d the sufficiency of the evidence “ on the indictment as a whole , ” Baston challenged the “whole” indictment by raising specific argument s against each count

. With respect to the count of sex trafficking J.R. , Baston argued that he did not force her into prostitution ; he did not argue that his conduct was not “ in or affect ing ” commerce. When a defendant raises specific challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in the district court, but not the specific challenge he tries to raise on appeal, we review his argument for plain error. See United States v. Joseph , 709 F.3d 1 082, 1103 (11th Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Straub , 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Hunerlach , 197 F.3d 1059, 1068 (11th Cir. 1999 )

. Turning to the merits, we conclude that a rational juror could have found , beyond a reasonable doubt , that Ba ston’s trafficking of J.R. was “ in or affecting ” interstate commerce . Because there was no error, there was no plain error either. Franklin , 694 F.3d at 9

. The district court correctly denied Baston’s motion for a judgmen t of acquittal. Baston’s con duct was in commerce. The phrase “in commerce” refers to the “channels” and the “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce

. United States v.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 19 of 3520 Ballinger , 395 F.3d 1218, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

. Baston used both when he traffick ed J.R

. He communicated with her by phone , text message , and Instagram; he convinced her to cross state lines on a bus; he advertised her services

on Backpage.com; and he stayed with her in various hotels

. Any one of these is sufficient to prove th at Baston’s conduct was “in commerce.” See United States v. Daniels , 685 F.3d 1237, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012) (cell phone , interstate bus travel ); Evans , 476 F.3d at 1179 (hotels that serve interstate travelers ); United States v. Pipkins , 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 ( 11th Cir. 2004) (Internet), vacated on other grounds , 544 U.S. 902 (2005), op. reinstated , 412 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2005)

. Baston argues that none of his interstate conduct involved force, fraud, or coercion

— the actus reus of the statute

— and that his actual trafficking of J.R. occurred exclusively in Florida , b ut we disagree. Baston also trafficked J.R. in Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee, and New York

. And even if we were to assume that Baston trafficked J

. R

. exclusively in Florida , we have held that a defendant whose “illegal acts ultimately occur intrastate” still acts “in commerce” if he “ uses the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate their commission. ” Ballinger , 395 F.3d at 1226

. Baston ’s use of phones, the Internet, h otels, and bus es facilitated his trafficking of J.R. , so his conduct was “ in

commerce . ” Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 20 of 3521 Alternatively, Baston’s conduct affected commerce. The phrase “affecting commerce” is a term of art that “ ordinarily signal [s] the broadest p ermissible exercise of Cong ress’ Commerce Clause power .” Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. , 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003)

. That power reaches “ purely local activitie s that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate

commerce .” Gonzales v. Raich , 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)

. As we explained in Evans , sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion

— even when it occurs “solely in Florida”

— “ha[s] the capacity when considered in the aggregate

. . . t o frustrate Congress’ s broader regulation of interstate and f oreign economic activity. ” 476 F.3d at 1179

. Baston argues that Evans involved the sex trafficking of children , not

women , but the reasoning in Evans can not be limited to children. The statute prohibiting s ex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion is a valid exercise of Congress’s full commerce power , so the government can satisfy the commerce element in that statute by proving that the defendant’s conduct had “ a minimal effect on interstate commerce .” United States v. Rodriguez , 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000) ; accord United States v. Walls , 784 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2015)

. That standard is easily satisfied here

. Because Baston’s conduct was in commerce, it necessarily affected commerce as well. See United States v. Viscome , 144 F.3d 1365, 13 69 (11th Cir. 1998)

.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 21 of 3522 3. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err or Abuse Its Discretion in Calculating Baston’s Restitution Obligations. Baston’s final argument on appeal is that the district court used unreliable evidence to calculate his restitution obligations to K.L., J.R., and T.M

. The district
court calculate d the obligations based on the victims’ testimony at trial : it multiplied how often the victims said they worked by how much they said they charged and then subtracted their estimated living e xpenses. Bast on does not challenge the math ; i nstead, he complains that the victims’ testimony was unreliable because it was not subjected to rigorous cross

- examination

. Baston maintains that he had no occasion to cross

- examine the victims about their

earn ings at trial because the ir earnings were not relevant to his guilt or innocence

. Baston contends that the district court should have forced the victims to testify a second time at the restitution hearing so he could cross

- examine them

. This argument is me ritless

. The district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion by relying on the victims’ trial testimony

. In calculating a victim’s losses, district s court can rely on any evidence “bear ing ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’” United States v. Singletary , 649 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.21 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bernardine , 73 F.3d 1078, 1080

– 81 (11th Cir. 1996) ). That evidence includes the “proof at trial.” United States v. Hairston , 888 F.2d 1349, 1353 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). Contrary to Baston’s argument, evidence can be

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 22 of 3523 sufficiently reliable for purposes of restitution even if it was not subjected to rigorous cross

- examination. See, e.g. , id. at 1 353 (relying on hearsay evidence); In re Sealed Case , 702 F.3d 59, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ( relying on grand jury testimony). And district courts are not required to hear live testimony at every restitution hearing. See United States v. Sabhnani , 599 F.3d 215, 258

– 59 (2d Cir. 2010)

. D istrict courts have broad discretion in choosing the procedures to employ

a t a restitution hearing , “so long as the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to present his position as to matters in dispute.” United States v. Maur er , 226 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 2000) . Baston had the opportunity to challenge the victims’ testimony at trial and again at the restitution hearing , and he still has not offered any specific reason why their testimony was inaccurate or untrustworthy

. The district court committed no error

. B. The Cross

- Appeal In its cross

- appeal, the government argues that the district court erred by refusing to award an additional $400,000 in restitution to K.L. based on her prostitution in Australia. A person convicted o f sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion must pay “ the full amount of the victim’s losses

. ” 18 U.S.C. § 1593(b)(1). The full amount includes “ the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim’ s services or labor ,” id. § 1593(b)(3), including a ny money that the victim earned while prostituting for the defendant

. The government contends that the

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 23 of 3524 defendant must repay that money even if the prostitution occurred overseas because, under the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 , federal courts have “extra

- territorial jurisdiction” over sex trafficking by a nonc itizen who “ is present in the United States

. ” Id. § 1596 ( a ) (2)

. Baston argues that he does no t owe restitution to K.L. for her prostitution in Australia because the jury did not convict him of that conduct , but that argument is baffling . The indictment charged Baston with trafficking K.L. “ in

. . . Australia , ” and the jury convicted him of that offense. Plenty of evidence supported its verdict , especially K.L.’s lengthy testimony about how she prostituted for Baston in Australia

. Baston also argues that the restitution statute cannot reach his extrater ritorial

c onduct without exceeding Congress’s authority under Article I of the Cons titution

or violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although Baston frames his arguments as challenge s to the constitutionality of the restitution statute, his argume nts instead challenge t he constitutionality of section 1596(a)(2) , which confers extraterritorial jurisdiction over sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. If section 1596(a)(2) is constitutional, then the restitution statute is constitutional

. Cf. U nited States v. Belfast , 611 F.3d 783, 8 15 (11th Cir. 2010) . We first address Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 24 of 3525 Baston’s argument under Article I and then address his argument under the Due Process Clause. 1. Section 1596(a)(2) Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Authority Under Article I of the Constitution

. “T he powers of the legislature are defined , and limited ,” Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) , and “[e] very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution, ” United States v. Mo rrison , 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) . The government defends section 1596(a)(2) under the Foreign Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 , cl. 3

. Baston argues that Congress can not enact extraterritorial laws under the Foreign Commerce Clause; it can d o so only under the Offences Clause, id. cl. 10 ( granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish .

. . Offences against the Law of Nations” )

. Baston also argues that section 1596(a)(2) exceeds the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause

. He is wrong on both ac counts. Congress’s power to enact extraterritorial laws is not limited to the Offences Clause. Baston misreads our decision in United States v. Bellaizac

- Hurtado , 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) , where we held that the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act , as applied to extraterritorial drug trafficking , exceeded Congress’s authority under the Offences Clause. Id. at 1247. W e did not hold that the Offences Clause is the only power that can support an extraterritorial criminal law ; our decision was limited to the Offences Clause because the government

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 25 of 3526 failed to offer “ any alternative ground upon which the Act could be sustained as constitutional .” Id. at 1258. If the government had invoked the Foreign Commerce Clause in Bellaizac

- Hurtado , we mig ht ha ve reached a different result. C ontrary to Baston’s argument, this Court has upheld extraterritorial criminal laws under provisions of Article I other than the Offences Clause

. See,
e.g. , Belfast , 611 F.3d at 813 (Interstate Commerce Clause)

. And nothing in the Foreign Commerce Clause limits Congress’s authority to enact extraterritorial criminal laws

. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California , 509 U.S. 764, 813

– 14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“ Congress has broad power under [the Foreign Commerc e Clause], and this Court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond our terri torial boundaries where United States interests are affected. ”); Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts 606 (5th ed. 2011) ( “A fairly natural component of [the Foreign Commerce Clause ] is the power to regulate conduct that occurs outside of U.S. territory.”)

. In fact, n othing in Article I limits Congress’s power to enact extraterritorial laws. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ; United States v. Baker , 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980)

. For purposes of Article I, we ask the same question of an extraterritorial law that we ask of any law

— that is, whether it fall s within one of Congress’s enumerated powers

.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 26 of 3527 Article I gives Congress the power “[t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations , and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes

. ” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added)

. N either this Court nor the Supreme Court has thoroughly explored the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause

. But many decisions have interpreted its neighbors: the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause. For example, t he Supreme Court has cautioned that t he Int erstate Commerce Clause “must be read carefully to avoid creating a general federal authority akin to the police power.” NFIB v. Sebelius , 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012). T he Interstate Commerce Clause permits Congress to enact “ three general categories of regulation ”: Congress can “ regulate the channels of interstate

commerce ”; “ regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and
p ersons or things in interstate commerce ”; and “ regulate activities that substanti ally affect interstate c ommerce,” including “ purely local activitie s that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate

commerce. ” Raich , 545 U.S. at 16

– 17

. In contrast, t he Supreme Cour t has described the Indian Commerce Clause as a “ broad power , ” Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Rev. of N.M. , 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982), that grants Congress “plenary ” authority over Indian affairs, Cotton Petrol

. Corp. v. New Mexico , 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)

. “ The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, ” according to the Supreme Court, “ is not readily

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 27 of 3528 imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause ” because the Indian Commerce Clause does not implicate “ the unique role of the Stat es in our constitutio nal system.” Id. One way to approach the Foreign Commerce Clause is to ask whether it is more like the Inter state Commerce Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause , or something in between

. What little guidance we have from the Supreme Court establishes that the Foreign Commerce Clause provides Congress a broad power . T he Supreme Court has described the Foreign Commerce Clause , like the Indian Commerce Clause, as granting Congress a power that is “plenary , ” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States , 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933), and “broad,” United States v. Forty

- Three Gallons of Whiskey , 93 U.S. 188, 194 (1876). Also like the Indian Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause does not pose the federalism concerns that limit the scope of the Interstate Commerce Clause. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles , 441 U.S. 434, 449 n.13 (1979)

. But see United States v. a l

- Maliki , 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n unbounded reading of the Foreign Commerce Clause allows the federal government to in trude on the sovereignty of other nations

— just as a broad reading of the Interstate Commerce Clause allows it to intrude on the sovereignty of the States.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that “ the power to regulate commerce .

. . when exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when exercised as to interstate commerce.”

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 28 of 3529 Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States , 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932) ; accord Brolan v. United States , 236 U.S. 216, 218

– 19 (1915) . “Although the Constitution grants C ongress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several States’ in parallel phrases,” the Supreme Court has explained, “there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.” Japan Line , 441 U.S. at 448 (citation omitted)

. T he Supreme Court has cited James Madison, for example, id. at 448 n.12 , who described the Foreign Commerce Clause as a “great and essential power” that the Interstate Commer ce Clause merely “supplement[s], ” The Federalist No. 42 , at 2 83 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. , 1961)

. W e need not demarcate the outer bounds of the Foreign Commerce Clause in this opinion

. We can evaluate the constitutionality of section 1596(a)(2) by assuming, for the sake of argument , that the Foreign Commerce Clause has the
same scope as the Interstate Commerce Clause. In other words , Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause include s at least the power to regulate the

“ channels ” of commerce between the United States and other countries , the “instrumentalities” of commerce between the United States and other countries, and activities that have a “ substantial effect ” on commerce between the United States and other countries

. Cf. Raich , 545 U.S. at 16

– 17; a ccord United States v.

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 29 of 3530 Bollinger , 7 98 F.3d 201, 215 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pendleton , 658 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2011)

. S ection 1596(a)(2) is constitutional at the least as a regulation of activities that have a “substantial effect” on foreign commerce . Section 1596(a)(2) gives

e xtraterritorial effect to section 1591, the statute that defines the crime of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. And Congress had a “ rational basis ” to conclude that such conduct

— even when it occurs exclusively overseas

— is “ part of an economic ‘ class of activities ’ that have a substantial effect on

. . . commerce ” between the United States and other countries

. Cf. Raich , 545 U.S. at 17 , 19

. W e explained in Evans the comprehensive nature of this regulatory scheme : Section 1591 was enacted as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000

. . . . [T] he TVPA is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The TVPA criminalizes and attempts to prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human t rafficking for commercial gain. Congress recognized that human trafficking, particularly of women and children in the sex industry, “is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1); see also id. at § 7101(b)(2), (4), (9), (11). Congress found that t rafficking of persons has an aggregate economic impact on interstate and foreign commerce, id. § 7101(b)(12), and we cannot say that this finding is irrational. 476 F.3d at 1179 (footnote omitted). A ccordingly, section 1596(a)(2) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 30 of 3531 2. Section 1596(a)(2) Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause. Baston argues that section 1596(a)(2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he is a non citizen and his sex trafficking of K.L. occurred exclusively in Australia

. T he Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when it would be “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair

. ” United States v. Ibarguen

- Mosquera , 634 F.3d 13 70, 1378 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Cardales , 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999))

. The government responds that , under basic principles of due process and international law, it is fair to hold Baston accountable for trafficking K.L. in Australia. We agree with the government

. To determine whether an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction satisfies due
process , we have sometimes consulted international law , s ee , e.g. , id. ; United States v. Banjoko , 590 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 20 09) , b ut due process requires only that an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction not be ar bitrary or fundamentally unfair, a question of domestic law , s ee United States v. Davis , 905 F.2d 245, 24 8

– 4 9 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)

. Compliance with international law satisfies due process because it puts a defendant “on notice” that he could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States

. United States v. Marino

- Garcia , 679 F.2d 1373, 1384 n.19 (11th Cir. 1982) ; see also United States v. Tinoco , 304 F.3d 1088, 1110 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that compliance with

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 31 of 3532 international law is “sufficient” to satisfy due process) . But compliance with international law is not necessary to satisfy due process. S ee Hartford Fire , 509 U.S. at 815 (explaining that Congress “ clearly has constitutional authority ” to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction in violation of international law if it so chooses); Born & Rutledge, supra , at 604 (“If Congress enacts legislation in violation of [the limits of international law on legislative jurisdiction], it is well settled that U.S. courts must disregard international law and apply the domestic statute.”). It is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair to exercise extraterritorial jurisdictio n over Baston

. The Due Process Clause requires “ at least some minimal contact between a State and the regulated subject .” Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraisin g Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas County , 221 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hellenic L ines Ltd. v. Rhoditis , 398 U.S. 306, 314 n.2 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting))

. Baston’s contacts with the United States , to borrow the word the government used at oral argument , are “legion.” Baston portrayed himself

as a citizen of the United States

. He resided in Florida, where he rented property, started businesses, and opened bank accounts. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague , 449 U.S. 302, 317

– 18 (1981)

. H e was present at his mother’s home in New York when arrested

. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal

. , 4 95 U.S. 604, 61 0

– 1 5 (1990) (plurality opinion)

. Baston used a Florida driver’s license and a United States passport to facilitate his criminal activities. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz ,

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 32 of 3533 471 U.S. 462, 475

– 76 (1985)

. H e trafficked K.L. in both t he United States and Australia, and when he trafficked her in Australia, he wired the proceeds back to Miami. Cf. Watson v. Emp ’ rs Liab. Assur. Corp. , 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954)

. In short, Baston used this country as a home base and took advantage of its laws ; he cannot

now complain about being subject ed to those laws

. Alternatively, e xercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over Baston is consistent with international law. The government invokes several principles of international law, but we will discuss only one . Under the “ protective principle ” of international law, a country can enact extraterritorial criminal laws to punish conduct that “ threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions ” and “ is generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems. ” Restatement (Sec ond) of Foreign Relations Law § 33 (1) ; accord United States v. Gonzalez , 776 F.2d 931, 938

– 39 (11th Cir. 1985)

. The citizenship of the defendant is irrelevant. See Unit ed States v. Benitez , 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) . And it does not matter whether the conduct had “an actual or intended effect inside the United States ” ; “[t] he conduct may be forbidden if it has a potentially adverse effect .” Gonzalez , 776 F.2d at 9 39 (emphasis added)

. The requirements of the protective principle are satisfied here. C ountries with developed legal systems recognize sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion as a crime. As Congress has explained, “ The international

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 33 of 3534 community has repeatedly condemned slavery and involuntary servitude, violence against women, and other elements of trafficking, through declarations, treaties, and United Nations resolutions and reports.” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(23). For example, m ore than 150 countries , i ncluding Australia, have ratified the Palermo Protocol on human trafficking, which requires its participants to establish sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion a s a criminal offense. S ee Protocol t o Prevent, Suppress a nd Punish Trafficking i n Persons, Especially Women a nd Children, Supplementing t he United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime , A rts. 5 , 3 (a) , Nov. 15, 2000 , 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 , 344

– 45

. Sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion also implicates the national

se curity of the United States. The political branches, who are the experts in these matters, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project , 561 U.S. 1, 33

– 34 (2010) , have identified sex trafficking as a threat to national security. According to Congress,

“ Trafficki ng in persons

. . . is the fastest growing source of profits for organized criminal enterprises worldwide .” 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(8). Those criminal enterprises, in turn, destabilize other countries and fund terrorist groups. See id. ; White House, National S ecurity Presidential Directive/NSPD

- 22 (Dec. 16, 2002), http://www.combat

- trafficking.army.mil/documents/policy/NSPD

- 22.pdf ; National Security Council, Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security , https://www.whit ehouse.gov/admin istra tion/eop/nsc/

Case: 14-14444 Date Filed: 03/24/2016 Page: 34 of 3535 transnational

- crime/threat (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 22, 2016, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) . Sex trafficking also risks the spread of communicable diseases, see 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(11); Arthur Rizer & Sheri R. Glaser, Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Trafficking , 17 Widener L. Rev. 69, 89

– 91 (2011) , and supports underground networks that can be used to smuggle drugs, weapons, and terrorists into the United States, see R izer & Glazer, supra , at 83

– 85; Sandra Keefer, Human Trafficking and the Impact on National Security for the United States , U.S. Army War College 3

– 4 (2006) . These threats are more than sufficient to invoke the protective principle. See United States v. Sa ac , 632 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2011)

. Congress has the power to require international sex traffickers to pay restitution to their victims even when the sex trafficking occur s exclusively in another country

. Baston must pay restitution to K.L. for her p rostitution in Australia

. The district court erred when it reduced her restitution award. IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM Baston’s judgment of convictions and sentence and VACATE the order of restitution and REMAND with an instruction to increase the award of restitution for K.L.’s prostitution in Australia

.

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