## IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________



### m 00-60545

_______________



### J OY 

### B EATTIE



### ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MADISON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;



### M ADISON 

### C OUNTY 

### B OARD OF 

### E DUCATION 

### ;

B ERT 

### J ACKSON



### , IN H IS O FFICIAL C APACITY ;



### K EN 

### M C 

### C OY



### , IN H IS O FFICIAL C APACITY ;



### S HIRLEY 

### S IMMONS



### , IN H ER O FFICIAL C APACITY ;



### M ARY 

### M C 

### D ONALD



### , IN H ER O FFICIAL C APACITY ;



### L EE 

### M ILLER



### , IN H IS O FFICIAL C APACITY ;



### K EN 

### A CTON



### , IN H IS I NDIVIDUAL AND O FFICIAL C APACITIES ;



### M ARIA 

### A. J ONES



### , IN H ER I NDIVIDUAL AND O FFICIAL C APACITIES

,



### Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

_________________________ July 5, 20012

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA,

HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH,

Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Joy Beattie, an at-will employee, was fired

as a secre t ary for Madison County Schools,

allegedly in retaliation for her suppo rt of Mi

chael Kent’s candidacy for school superintendent in opposition

t o t he incumbent, Maria

Jones. Beattie sued the school district, the superintendent, the prin cipal, and the school

board members for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violation

of M ISS

. C ODE A NN

. § 23-15-871, which prohibit s certain a c tions by employers regarding

employee’s voting rights. Beattie asked for a

permanent injunction, reinstatement, punitive

damages, and compensatory damages for lost

past and future wages , mental anguish, emotional stress, and loss of reputation. The district court dismissed the state law claim without prejudice and granted summary judgment

for the defendants on the § 1983 claim on the

basis that Beattie had failed to establish a causal connection between her political activity and

her discharge, an essential element of her

§ 1983 claim. 1

Beattie appeals, contending that the district

court erred in concluding that she failed to

prove causation and erred in denying her motion to conduct additional discovery under

F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(f). We affirm. I.

From 1994-96, Beattie worked as secretary

to Mike Kent, principal of Rosa Scott Middle

School. From 1996 until her termination, she

w orked for Ken Acton, the principal of Ol d e

Towne Middle School. Beattie claims she had

no history of disciplinary problems, but school

board members indicated that p arents had

complained about he r rudeness. On April 6,

1999, Acton wrote a letter recommending her

for annual re-employment.

Later that month, Larry Roberts, a city alderman and pa r ent, came into the office and

discussed the upcoming election for school superintendent. Acton suggested a reason that

Roberts should not vote for Kent, and Beattie

interjected her opinion to the contrary. Acton

orally reprimanded Beattie and instructed her

th at as a school employee, she owed the current superintendent her loyalty. Beattie test ified in her deposition that Acton in structed

her no t to express her opinions about Kent’s

candidacy “out of

t he office or anywhere because it was perceived

. . . as coming from me

[Acton].” Acton supported Jones in the election.

In June 1999, Jones visited the school and

informed Beattie that she had heard that Beattie had made negative comments about her position on a proposed bond issue to build a new

high school. Shortly thereafter, Jones asked

Beattie to stuff envelopes for her campaign at

work, w hich Beattie did. Jones never delivered the envelopes. A few days later, Acton

drafted a letter recommending that Beattie be

transferre d “not based on Joy’s ability to do

the job but on philosophic al differences on

how a middle school should operate,” such as

her support of Who’s Who Among American

High School Students, her oppos i tion to Acton’s proposals on cheerleaders and the dance 1 See, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d

923, 932 (5th Cir. 1999) (listing elements of a First

Ame n dment retaliation claim under § 1983 as (1)

engaging in a prote cted activity; (2) suffering an

adverse employment actio n; (3) a causal connection

between t he two; and (4) the execution of a city

policy causing the adverse action)

.3

team, and her sup po rt of membership in the

Little Six Conference for the football team.

Beattie put up signs in her yard to show her

support for Kent. When Jones was campaigni ng in the neighborhood, she allegedly commented to one of Beattie’s neighbors that “Joy

Beattie has two signs in

her yard [supporting

Kent] and I’m going to her house to fi nd out

why.” Jones did not confront Beattie about

the signs.

The next Monday, Acton revised his letter

recommending Beattie’s trans fer, proposing

instead that she be r emoved. Acton sent the

memo to Jones. Beattie claims t hat all the

reasons cited in the memo for her removal occurred before the April 6 letter. Beattie believes that four days later, Acton met with a

school district attorney

, James Keith, and revised the letter to include addit ional reasons

for her termination, most notably an allegation

of a breach of confidence.

Jones presented Acton’s recommendation

to the board, which on July 19, 1999, voted

unanimously to terminate Beattie. The board

previously had discussed complaints that Beattie was rude to teachers, parents, and students.

All board me mbers testified in affidavits that

they were not aware of Beat tie’s political

a ct ivities or any alleged misconduct by Jones

and Acton and that they were neutral in t h e

campaign for superintendent. Further, they

stated that they would have terminated Beattie

without Acton’s recommendation.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo, applying the same st andard as did the

district court. E .g.

, Bos Dairy, L.C. v. United

States Dep’t of Agric.

, 209 F.3d 785, 786 (5th

Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment should be used ‘most sparingly in

. . . First Amendment

case[s]

. . . inv o lving delicate constitutional

rights, complex fact situations, disputed testimony, and questionable credib i lities.’” B enn ingfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 36 9

, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1979)). Summary judgment shoul d be granted, however,

“when the nonmoving part y fails to meet its

burden to come fo rward with facts and law

demonstrating a basis for recovery that would

support a jury verdict.” L ittle v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1071 (5th Cir. 1994) (en

banc).

III.

B eat tie contends that the district court

erred in decidin g t hat she failed to present

summary judgment evidence that her political

s peech and activities motivated her terminati o n

and therefore that the sc hool district was not

liable. She also argues that the court erred in

concluding that Acton and Jones did not cause

her adverse employment action. To prevail on

her First Amendment retaliation claim, Beattie

must show either that the school board acted

in retaliat io n or that the improper motives of

another actor can be imputed to it. 2

To prove a First Amendment retaliation

claim, Beattie must show that (1) she suffered

an “adverse employment decision”; (2) her

2 Under § 1983, Beattie may sue a local governing body, such as the school district, o r the

school board as polic y maker for the district, for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief if the

challenged action implements or executes a policy

officially adopted by that body’s officers. Neither

the school board nor the school district can be liable for the actions of Acton and Jones, if imp ermissible, under a respondeat superior the ory.

See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978).4

speech involved “a matter of public concern”;

(3) her “interest in commenting on matters of

public concern

. . . outweigh[s] t he Defendant’s interest in promoting efficiency”; and

(4) her speech motivated the adverse employment decision. H

arris v. Victoria Indep. Sch.

Dist.

, 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied 5 28 U.S. 1022 (1999). 3 The only

contested issue is causation.

To prevail, Beattie must show that she engaged in protected co nduct and that i t was a

motivating factor in her discharge. Then, the

burden shifts to defendants to show by a prepond erance of the evidence that they would

have come to the same conclu sio n in the absence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Dis t

. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429

U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Beattie has not met her

init ial burden of demonstrating that her speech

motivated her discharge.

A.

The parties do not contest that the board is

a policymaker for the school district or that the

board fired Beattie. They appear to agree that

the district may be liable for the board’s actions because the board is a policymaker for

the school district in its capacity to termi nate

employees. 4 If t he board acted in retaliation

against Beattie for her support of Kent, the

school district may be liable. Beattie’s evidenc e that the board violated

her rights is based on her assertion that she

had an ex c ellent record with no reprimands.

She believes the conversat io n with Roberts

about the upcoming election precipitated her

difficult ies a t work and that the court shoul d

infer improper motive from t he t iming of the

f iring. Moreover, she asserts that the stated

reasons f or her firing 

### S

S insubordination, disclosure of confidential information, undermining

Acton, rudeness to parents and teachers,

violating school policy, and being disloyal to

Acton 

### SS occurred befo re Acton’s initial recommendation of re-employme n t. She states,

without corroborating evidence, that the allegations of breach of confidenc e and rudeness

have no basis in fact. Thus, she contends, Acton’s real motive in changing the recommendation from a transfer to a removal (and Jones’s

real motive in accepting it) was retaliation.

Even if Beattie is correct, her reasoning

bears no relation to the school board’s liabilit y

unless either the board acted in retaliation independently or the improper motives (if proven) of Jones and Acton can be imputed to the

board. Acton and Jo nes cannot be liable independently if they did not make the final decision. 5 If, however, the board adopted the allegedly impermissible motives of Acton and

Jones through acting on

t he recommendation

or delegated its policymaking authority in the

area of at-will employment to Jones, it may be

liable.

1.

Municipal liabilit

y for constitutiona l torts

arises when the execution of an official policy

causes the injury. M

onell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] single 3 See also Sharp, 164 F.3d at 932.

4 Cf., e.g., Harris, 168 F.3d at 225 (finding that

a board’s decision to affirm a superintendent’s recomm endation to transfer a teacher was an act of

official po licy, noting that “[o]n at least two

occasions, we have held that the board of trustees

of an independent school district

. . . is a policymaker for purposes of § 1983”). 5 Beattie has abandoned all claims against Acton and Jones individually.5

action by a municipal official posse ssing final

policymaking authority regarding the action in

question cons t it utes the official policy of the

municip alit y and . . . the determination of

whether a municipal official wields final

policymaking authority regarding a particular

action constitutes a question of state l aw.”

Brady v. Fort Bend C

ounty, 1 45 F.3d 691,

698 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing McMillan v.

Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)). In

Mississippi, the school board has the power

“[t]o select all sch o o l district personnel.”

M ISS

. C ODE A NN

. § 37-7-301(p) (2000). The

question, then, is whether the board delegated

that authority to Jones.

Municipal liabilit

y attaches on ly where

the decisionmaker possesses final

authority t o est ablish municipal

authority with respect to th e acti on

ordered. The fact that a particular

o fficial 

### SS even a policymaking

official 

### SS has discretion in the exercise of

particular f

unctions does not, without

more, give rise to municipal liab i lity

based on an exercise o f t hat discretion.

The official must also be responsible for

establishing final government po l icy

respecting suc h activity before the

municipalit

y can be held liable. 12

12 Thus, for example, the County

Sheriff may have discretion to hire

and fire employe es without also

being t he count y official

responsible for establishin g county

employment policy. If this were

the case, t he Sheriff’s decisions

respecting employment would not

give rise to municipal liabilit y, although similar decisio ns with respect to law enforcement practices, over which the Sheriff i s the official policymaker, w ould g ive

rise to municipal liabilit y. Instead,

if county em

ployment policy was

set by the Board of Co u nty

Co mmis sioners, only that body’s

dec isions would provide a basis

for county liabilit y. This would be

t rue even if the Board left the

Sheriff discretion to hire and fire

emplo yees and the Sheriff

exercised that disc ret ion in an

unco nstitutional manner; the

decision to act unlawfully would

not be a decision of the Board.

Id

. (quoti ng P embaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 484 & n.12 (1986)). Beattie

argues that the board’s deference to the superintendent ’s recommendations on at-will

employment matters exhibits a delegation of

policymaking authority and suggests that this

alleged complete control over a particular area

ma kes Jones an official policymaker whose

liabilit y can be imputed to the district and the

board.

An official may be a policymaker for the

county in a particular a rea or on a particular

i ssue. 6 In B rady, we noted that discr etion

alone is not enough; the official also must create policy. The official in B rady, however, received his authority from a st a te statute that

granted him fina l policymaking power. Even

more importantly, his authority was unreview6 See Brady, 145 F.3d at 699 (internal citations

omitted) (citing City of St. Louis v. P raprotnik,

485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion) (observing that “the challenged action must have been

taken pursuant to a poli cy adopted by the official

or officials responsible under state law for making

policy in that area”)).6

able by any other body. Id. at 700. 7

The board o versaw Jones’s employment

decisions 

### SS

an indication that she may not be a

final policymaker. The mere existence of

oversight, however, is not eno ugh; the

oversight must pertain to the area of authority

in questio n. Brady, 1 45 F.3d at 701. For

example, a s u perintendent’s transfer of a

teacher to another position might be a final

policy deci si on if that action was

unreviewable, even i f the superintendent did

not have complete control over the hiring and

firing of district personnel. See id. at 701

(citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch . Dist., 4 91

U.S. 701 (1989)).

Jones presented her recommendation to the

board, which

terminated Beattie. Because the

board oversaw the precise action in question,

Jones did not have final policymaking power.

By the same analysis, Acton is not a final

policymake r : Jones oversaw each of his actions pertaining to Beattie’s discharge.

Therefore, neither the board nor the school

district is liable for t heir actions, unless their

allegedly improper motives can be imputed to the board.

2.

Even if speech on a matter of public

concern was a substantial or motivating factor

in the termination, a defendant may escape liabilit y by demonstrating that it would have taken the same action in the abse nce of the

protected conduct. M t. Healthy, 429 U.S. at

287. As explained above, Beattie must prove

a causal connection between her constitutionally-p ro t ected activity and the board’s

decision. 8 Because Acton and Jones are no t

final policymakers, Beattie must i mpute their

allegedly improper motives to the board by

demonstrating that t h e board approved both

Jones’s decision and the basis for it. 9

All board me mbers testified that they had

no i dea t hat Beattie supported Kent in the

election and that they had remained neutral in

the campaig n. They further testified to personal knowledge of complaints against Beattie,

such as those detailed in the letter

recommending her termination. The letter

maintained that Beattie refused to support

school polices and disclosed confide nt ial em7 See also Reeves v. Claibo rne County Bd. of

Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1987)

(finding a superinten dent liable for transferring a

teacher in retaliation fo r her testimony in a court

case and emphasizing the importance of oversight

by remanding for a deter mination of whether a

school board customarily deferred to the decisions

of the superintendent); Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 76 6 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (5th Cir. 1985)

(holding a governmental entity liable under § 1983

“where the policy was made by an official to whom

the governin g body had given policymaking

authority,” noting that the official’s decisions were

not subject to review), overruled on other grounds

b y Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 9 52 F.2d 119,

126 (5th Cir. 1992). 8 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 385 (1989) (req

uiring a “direct causal link

between a munic i pal policy or custom and the

alleged constitutional deprivation”); P olk Cou nty v.

Dodson, 4 54 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (holding that

“official policy mus t be ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation’ in order to establish the

liability of a government body”) (citing M onell,

436 U.S. at 694).

9 E.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (“If the authorized policymakers approved a subordinate’s

decision and the basis for it, their ratification

w ould be chargeable to the municipality bec ause

their decision is final.”).7

ployment information. 10 Beattie does not dispu t e defendants’ position that the board saw

only t his letter (not the previous draft

recommending a transfer) a nd had no actual

knowledge of her campai gn activities. 1 1 If

there is no evidence that the board knew of the

protected activity, Beattie canno t show that

the activity motivated retaliatory behavior. 12

Beattie urges that Harris controls because

there, we found a board liable under § 1983

for approvi ng a superintendent’s

recommendation; the board delegated

employment authority to the superintendent,

and in rat ifying his decision through a

grievance hearing, the board assumed liabilit y.

Harris, 1 68 F.3d at 225. During that

grievance pr o cedure, however, the board

acquired actual knowledge of the basis for the

term ination. 1 3 Without a showing that the board had actual knowledge of the alleged

improper basis of

Jo nes’s and Acton’s

recommend at ion, the board cannot be liable

for the alleged retaliation. See Cabrol, 1 06

F.3d at 108. 14

Even assuming th e board did terminate

Beat t ie in retaliation for her campaign

activit i es, it can escape liabilit y, because it

would have terminated her fo r other reasons.

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 15 Board

members testified that they would have voted

to terminate Beattie even without Acton’s

letter, based on the complaints th e y received

that she was rude to students, parents, and

teachers. Beattie offers no evidence to refute

10 Beattie allegedly discussed, with a teacher

applicant, names that had been recommended to the

board, before the board’s final decision, an d sent

an e-mail to other teachers aft e r a teacher had

resigned but before the board had had a chance to

act.

11 She does not suggest that the school policies

with which she openly disagre ed are protected

speech on matters of public concern.

12 See Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d

101 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment

for a town and mayor who terminated an employee

who had challenged a cockfighting ordinance,

because no evidence indicated that they knew about

his opposition to the ordinance).

13 Mississippi law provides t hat a terminated

employee of a school district may initiate a grievance hearing before the boardto contest his termination. M I S S

. C ODE A NN

. § 37-9-111 (2000).

Neither p arty references this procedure, so pre-

(continued...) 13 (...continued)

sumably Beatti e did not avail herself of this privilege.

14 There is a n exception to this rule where the

final policymaker’s decision is merely a “rubber

stamp.” If an employee can demonstrate that the

subordinate’s evaluation was tainted by an illegal

intent and that it had sufficient influence or leverage over the ultimate decisionmaker, the motives

of the subordinate become relevant. S ee Rios v.

Rossotti

, No. 00-50226, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS

9420, at *19 -*20 (5th Cir. 2001). Beattie

suggested that the board merely “rubber stamped”

the superintendent’s employment decisions, but she

presented no evidence to support that assertion.

15 See also Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21

(1999) (“The

government can avoid liability by

proving that it would have made the same decision

without the impermissible motiv e.”); W hite v.

South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1169

(5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]ven if we assume the exercise

of protected

first amendment activity played a

substantial part in the decision to t erminate an

employee, the termination is not unconstitutional if

the em ployee would have been terminated

anyway.”).8

these affidavits. Thus, the board’s

independent reason for her termination shields

it from liability under Mt. Healthy

. 16

B.

Beattie claims that because she was fired at

the recommendation of Acton and Jones, and

because they were retalia t ing against her for

support of a political candidate, they are independently liable. If Acton and Jones had fired

Beattie for the reason s she alleges, they may

have violated her First A m endment rights.

“[A] public employer cannot act against an

employee because of the employee’s affiliat ion

or support of a rival candidate unless the

employee’s activities in so me way adversely

affect the government’s abilit y to provide services.” Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 887

(5th Cir. 1995). 17

1.

As we have noted, Acton and Jones did not

fire Beattie directly, but merely recommended

her termination to the board, which made the

f inal decision. If Acton and Jones did not

cause the adverse employment ac tion, they

cannot be liable under § 1983, no matter how

unconstitution a l their motives. Moreover,

even if t he board adopted their

recommendation, t hat recommendation

exhibited no unconstitutional motive on its

face. Further, the evidence suggests t hat the

board fired Beattie for ind ependent reasons,

and Beattie offers nothing but her own beliefs

to the contrary

. “The Constitution requires only that an employee be placed in no worse a position than if

he had no t engaged in the conduct.” W hite,

693 F.2d at 1169. Because t he board fired

Beattie for permissible, constitutional motives

independentl

y o f Acton’s and Jones’s

recommendation, that superseding cause

shields t hem from liabilit

y.

2.

Beattie attem

pts to connect the board’s decision , by its timing, to Acton’s and Jones’s

motives. Timing alone does not create an inference that the termination is retaliatory. 18

Therefore, Beattie has not shown a causal

connection between Acton’s and Jones’ s alleged retaliatory motives and her adverse employment action. Because the board made its

ul t imate decision independently of these unproven unconstitutional aims , summary

judgment was proper.

IV.

Beattie contends that the distric t court erroneously denied her motion for additional

discovery under rul e 56(f). 1 9 We review for

16 See Gerhart v. Hayes, 2 17 F.3d 320, 322

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 573 (2000).

17 See also Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1103 (“[A]

government employer cannot retaliate against an

emplo yee for the exercise of first amendment

rights.”). 18 See Seama n v. CSPH, Inc., 1 79 F.3d 297,

301 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a re taliation

claim lacked merit where the employee mentioned

his EEOC filing minutes before his termination for

insubordination, but no other evidence suggested a

retaliatory motive); see also O’Connor v. Chicago

Tran sit Auth., 9 85 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.

1993) (“[T]he f

act that protected speech may

precede an adverse employment de cision alone does

not establish causation under Mt. Healthy.” ).

19 The rule provides:

Should it appear from th e affidavits of a

party opposing the motion that the party

(continued...)9

abuse of discretio n a decision to end

discovery. 20

Rule 56(f) motions are g enerally favored

and shoul d be liberally granted. S tearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518,

535 (5th Cir. 1999). Beattie “may not simply

rely on vague assert io ns that additional

discovery will produce needed, but unspecified

facts.” Krim, 9 89 F.2d at 1442 (internal citations omitted). She must show (1) why she

needs additional discovery and (2) how that

discovery will create a genuine issue of

material fact. Stearns, 170 F.3d at 535 (citing

Krim

, 989 F.2d at 144 2). If Beattie has not

di ligently pursued discovery, however, she is

not entitled to relief under rule 56(f). S ee

Leatherman v . Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388,

1397 (5th Cir. 1994). We need not address

whether Beattie has shown why she needs additional discovery to create a genuine issue of

material fact, because she was not diligent. I d. at 1397.

Beattie had several months, from the time

she sued, to depose the bo a rd members, who

are named defendants. She submits that she

did not depose them earlier because the parties

were in settlement negotiat i ons, but a party

suspends discovery at his own risk. She claims

she did not become aware that she needed to

depose the board members until sixt een days

before t he discovery deadline, and then the

parties could not find a

mut ually agreeable

time. She filed her rule 56(f) motion three

days after the defendants filed their motion for

summary judgment, the date at which she

alleges she first became awar e of the

contradiction in testimony. 21

D efendants explain that Beattie knew, a s

early as February 2000, when the fact was included in responses to interrogatories, that the

board had voted to terminate her and had cited

her rudeness to parents and teachers as a reason for her dismissal. Moreover, Jones stated

in deposition that board members had received

complaints ab out Beatti e. Furtherm ore,

Beattie became aware that she nee d ed to

depose school board members as early as

March 15, giving her sixteen days before the

end of discovery to seek an extension.

Instead, she waited until after defendants had

filed their motion for summary judgment. 19 (...continued)

cannot for reasons stated present by affid avit facts essential to justify the part y’s

opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained

or depositions to be taken or discovery to be

had or may make such other order as is just.

F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(f).

20 See Church of Scientolog y v. Cazares, 6 38

F.2d 1272, 1289 (5th Cir. Mar. 1981) (reviewing

decisions determining scope and effect of discovery

for abuse of discretion); Krim v. BancTexas

Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993)

(reviewing, for abuse of discretion, decisions to

preclude discovery before granting summary judgment). 21 Although Beattie claims that defendant s

, shortly before the expiration of discovery, produced documents that warrantedadditional discovery, she has not indicated with specificity how

these documents raised issues of material fact. The

district court found that they merely clarified issues

raised earlier in the depositions of Acton and Jones,

and Beattie received an extension of time to file her

response to the motion for summary judg m ent to

respond to those documents.10

Even th o ugh rule 56(f) motions should be

liberally granted, “[a] district court has broad

discretion in all discovery matters, and such

discretion will not be disturbed ordinarily unles s there are unusual circumstances showing

a clear abuse.” Kelley v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev., B.V

., 2 13 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir.)

(internal quotati on marks omitted), c ert. denied

, 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000). Al though

Beattie’s conduct during discovery does not

rise to the level disparaged in Leatherman, 22

the district court acted within its discretion in

concluding that she had not pursued discovery

diligently enough to warrant relie f under rule

56(f).

AFFIRMED.

22 In Lea t herman, plaintiffs conducted very

little discovery for more than one year before filing

their rul e 56(f) motion. L eatherman, 28 F.3d at

1397.