In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District 

DIVISION THREE

MICHELLE PETERMAN, ) ED107000

)

Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of St. Louis County

v. ) 18SL-AC08130

)

DIRECTOR OR REVENUE, )

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Honorable Richard M. Stewart

)

Respondent. ) Filed: May 21, 2019

OPINION

Michelle Peterman (“Peterman”) appeals the judgment of the circuit court of St. Louis

County sustaining the order of the Director of Revenue for the State of Missouri (“Director”)

denying her driving privileges for five years and revoking her driving license for one year. We 

affirm. 

Background

The Director denied Peterman’s driving privileges under Section 302.060.1(10)1 for a 

period of five years due to her two convictions on February 15, 2018, for driving while 

intoxicated (“DWI”). The Director also revoked Peterman’s driving privileges for a period of 

one year under Sections 302.302.1(9) and 302.304.7, after she accumulated twelve points for her 

 1 All statutory references are to RSMo. (cum. supp. 2018), unless otherwise indicated.
2

second DWI conviction. Peterman filed a Petition for Review in the circuit court under Section 

302.311, seeking reinstatement of her driving privileges. 

At the trial de novo on Peterman’s Petition, the Director submitted Exhibit A, Peterman’s 

certified Driving Record prepared by the Department of Revenue. The Driving Record listed for

the basis of its actions denying and revoking Peterman’s driving privileges two DWI convictions

in the 21st Circuit Court of St. Louis County dated February 15, 2018: one stemming from a DWI 

violation on September 24, 2011, and the other from a DWI violation on November 10, 2012. 

The driving record indicated the Director assessed Peterman 8 points for the first February 15,

2018, conviction resulting from the September 2011 DWI, and it assessed Peterman 12 points for 

the second February 15, 2018, conviction resulting from the November 2012 DWI. Peterman 

did not object to the admissibility of Exhibit A, but she argued the driving record was merely a 

summary of information and was not by itself sufficient to establish she had two DWI 

convictions. The trial court denied Peterman’s request for relief and sustained the Director’s 

five-year denial and one-year revocation of Peterman’s driving privileges. This appeal follows. 

Standard of Review

We will affirm the judgment of the trial court after a bench trial unless it is not supported 

by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or the court erroneously declared 

or applied the law. See White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307-08 (Mo. banc 2010). 

When, however, a party raises a question of statutory interpretation on appeal, this is an issue of 

law that we review de novo. See Akins v. Dir. of Revenue, 303 S.W.3d 563, 564 (Mo. banc 

2010). 

Point I
3

In her first point on appeal, Peterman argues the trial court erred in sustaining the 

Director’s order revoking her driver’s license for one year under Section 302.304 because the 

Director failed to produce sufficient evidence establishing Peterman’s underlying DWI

convictions, in that the Director failed to produce an original judgment of conviction, as was 

necessary to meet the Director’s burden. We disagree.

Section 302.304.7 provides that “[t]he director shall revoke the license and driving 

privilege of any person when the person’s driving record shows such person has accumulated 

twelve points in twelve months.” Likewise, the director is tasked with assessing points for 

various driving violations, in accordance with the statute, and Section 302.302.1(9) provides that 

the director shall assess 12 points after a conviction “[f]or the second or subsequent conviction of 

... driving while in an intoxicated condition.” Thereafter, any person aggrieved by a decision of 

the Director may file a petition for a trial de novo before the circuit court. See Section 302.311. 

At a trial de novo challenging a decision by the Director, there is a three-part burden 

shifting scheme. The driver has the initial burden of showing he or she is entitled to a driver’s 

license; once the driver meets this initial burden, the burden of production switches to the 

Director to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the driver is not qualified for 

driving privileges; and, finally, the burden shifts back to the driver to establish the facts relied on 

by the director are untrue or legally insufficient. Kinzenbaw v. Dir. of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 49, 

54 (Mo. banc 2001); Schnitzer v. Dir. of Revenue, 297 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009). 

The Director typically offers the administrative record to meet his burden. See Kinzenbaw, 62 

S.W.3d at 54; West v. Dir. of Revenue, 184 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006). 

Accordingly, here the Director had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
4

that Peterman had two DWI convictions for which she was assessed 12 points in her driving 

record. See Sections 302.302.1(9) and 302.304.7. 

At the trial de novo, the Director submitted Peterman’s Driving Record as his sole 

exhibit. Peterman’s Driving Record included a section entitled Court Convictions, which listed 

two convictions: (1) ID#01: a conviction for DWI dated February 15, 2018, in the 21st Circuit 

Court-Clayton, in St. Louis County, from a violation dated September 24, 2011, in a noncommercial vehicle, for which Peterman was assessed 08 points; and (2) ID#02: a conviction for 

DWI dated February 15, 2018, in the 21st Circuit Court-Clayton, in St. Louis County, from a 

violation dated November 10, 2012, in a non-commercial vehicle, for which Peterman was 

assessed 12 points. Peterman argues that although the Driving Record was admissible, it did not 

meet the Director’s burden of proof, in that it was insufficient to establish the underlying 

convictions because the Driving Record was not an original judgment of conviction, as required 

under Section 302.010(3), and because the Driving Record did not demonstrate the points were 

assessed after Peterman’s convictions. 

Section 302.010(3) defines conviction as: “any final conviction; ... except that when any 

conviction as a result of which points are assessed pursuant to section 302.302 is appealed, the 

term ‘conviction’ means the original judgment of conviction for the purpose of determining the 

assessment of points, and the date of final judgment affirming the conviction shall be the date 

determining the beginning of any license suspension or revocation pursuant to section 302.304.” 

Peterman argues this statute requires the Director to submit an original judgment of conviction to 

meet its burden of proof for a point revocation, raising a question of statutory interpretation, 

which we consider de novo. Akins, 303 S.W.3d at 564.
5

The principal rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent as 

reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue. Id. at 565. In determining legislative 

intent, we consider the context in which the language is used and the “problem the legislature 

sought to address with the statute’s enactment.” Wilson v. Dir. of Revenue, 873 S.W.2d 328, 329 

(Mo. App. E.D. 1994). 

The purpose of chapter 302 is to establish an administrative framework for the 

suspension or revocation of drivers’ licenses. See McMillin v. Dir. of Revenue, 520 S.W.3d 513, 

516 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). As part of this framework, the question of when to begin running 

the suspension or revocation when the driver appeals from the underlying conviction would 

frequently arise. To answer this question, Section 302.010(3) clarifies that when a driver appeals 

from any conviction that could result in the assessment of points under Section 302.302, the date 

on which the points are assessed is the “original judgment of conviction,” while the date on 

which the suspension or revocation begins is the date of the “final judgment affirming the 

conviction.” To read Section 302.010(3) as a requirement that the Director produce “the original 

judgment of conviction” in order to meet its prima facie case, as Peterman suggests, takes this 

term out of context and does not consider the problem the statute sought to address, which is to 

clarify when to begin the license suspension or revocation in the event of an appeal from the 

underlying conviction. Peterman did not appeal from her two DWI convictions on February 15, 

2018, and thus the portion of Section 302.010(3) that provides guidance on how to proceed in the 

event of an appeal is not applicable. The trial court did not err in finding the Director met his 

burden to prove Peterman had two DWI convictions, even though the Director did not produce 

an original judgment of conviction.
6

Moreover, Peterman’s argument that the Director did not show it assessed points “after” 

her convictions fails. The Director is not authorized under Section 302.302.1 to assess points 

until the driver has been convicted of a driving violation, and thus the assessment of points 

necessarily occurs after the conviction. If Peterman intends to argue the plausibility that the 

Director assessed points before her convictions, such an argument strains credulity. Moreover, 

the record is sufficiently clear that the Director assessed points after Peterman’s two convictions. 

The Driving Record listed the date of Peterman’s two court convictions for driving while 

intoxicated as February 15, 2018, and it likewise listed the date of its Department Action 

imposing a point revocation under 302.304 as April 3, 2018, which is after February 15, 2018. 

Point I is denied.

Point II

In her second point on appeal, Peterman argues the trial court erred in sustaining the 

Director’s order denying her driving privileges for five years under Section 302.060 because the 

Director’s Driving Record was not sufficient to prove Peterman’s underlying DWI convictions. 

We disagree. 

Section 302.060.1(10) provides that “[t]he director shall not issue any license and shall 

immediately deny any driving privilege ... to any person who has been convicted twice within a 

five-year period of ... driving while intoxicated.” Again, in a trial de novo under Section 

302.311 before the circuit court on a driver’s challenge to the Director’s decision revoking or 

denying driving privileges, once the driver meets her initial burden of showing she is entitled to a 

driver’s license, the burden falls to the Director to offer evidence establishing each statutory 

element necessary to support the revocation or denial on the grounds alleged. See Schnitzer, 297 

S.W.3d at 607; Brinker v. Dir. of Revenue, 363 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). There is 
7

no “presumption of validity of the director’s evidence” and the mere admission of evidence does 

not necessarily satisfy the Director’s burden of proof. See White, 321 S.W.3d at 304, 307; see 

also Stellwagon v. Dir. of Revenue, 91 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2002) (administrative record 

is sufficient to meet director’s burden of proof only when it contains facts needed to support each 

statutory element). Then, after the State’s burden is met, “it is the driver’s burden to show that 

the facts that purport to be established by the administrative record are not true or that the 

grounds for the suspension are unlawful, unconstitutional, or otherwise insufficient.” See

Kinzenbaw, 62 S.W.3d at 54-55; Schnitzer, 297 S.W.3d at 607. 

To meet its burden here, the Director had to offer evidence, based on the administrative 

record or otherwise, that Peterman had been convicted twice within a five-year period of driving 

while intoxicated for the trial court to sustain the Director’s action under Section 302.060.1(10). 

During the trial, the Director submitted only Peterman’s Driving Record, which contained an 

agency-produced summary of her court convictions. Specifically, the Driving Record listed as 

“ID#01,” Peterman’s DWI conviction dated February 15, 2018, in the 21st Circuit Court-Clayton, 

in St. Louis County, for the violation dated September 24, 2011, which had a Microfilm/Court 

Report ID of 18057T00068; and as “ID#02,” Peterman’s DWI conviction dated February 15, 

2018, in the 21st Circuit Court-Clayton, in St. Louis County, for the violation dated November 

10, 2012, which had a Microfilm/Court Report ID of 18058T00090. Peterman argues that this 

summary prepared by the Director or his employees, while admissible under Section 302.312, 

was insufficient by itself prove her underlying DWI convictions, but rather, the Director should 

also produce a copy of the convictions or court records upon which it based its summary. 

Peterman cites to no case law, nor have we discovered any, holding either that the 

administrative record must contain a copy of the conviction or court records, or that a certified 
8

Driving Record alone is insufficient to prove the existence of the underlying court convictions, 

when they are listed with sufficient specificity. Rather, the Supreme Court of Missouri in 

Stellwagon v. Director of Revenue held that the Director’s administrative record was sufficient to 

meet its prima facie burden under 302.060 even though the administrative record did not include 

a copy of the driver’s underlying court convictions. 91 S.W. at 114, 116 (administrative record 

included driving record, Director’s letters of revocation, and two uniform complaint and 

summons forms that reflected driver’s DWI convictions). 

Similarly, courts have held that “there are no specific requirements as to what 

documentary evidence is necessary to present to the trial court in order to sustain the Director’s 

initial burden of presenting a prima facie case for the revocation of a Driver’s” driving 

privileges, so long as “certain minimal information” is provided. See West, 184 S.W.3d at 581-

82 (discussing sufficiency of records for out-of-state driving convictions). The Director must 

produce information from which an aggrieved driver would have reasonable notice for the basis 

of the Director’s action and, accordingly, have the ability to appeal from or rebut any 

inaccuracies in that basis. See id. at 582 (holding evidence contained in driving record, which 

listed the court that issued the conviction as “unknown,” was insufficient to place driver on 

notice of basis of Director’s action). We presume the necessity for specificity stems from the 

third part of the burden-shifting analysis, where, after the director makes its prima facie case, the 

burden of proof shifts back to the driver to establish that the facts relied on by the director are

untrue or are legally insufficient to support the suspension of driving privileges. See Schnitzer, 

297 S.W.3d at 607. 

Here, the Director produced evidence showing the date of Peterman’s two convictions, 

the court in which she was convicted, the date of the underlying violations leading to the 
9

convictions, and the Microfilm/Court Report ID numbers. This was sufficient information to 

give Peterman notice of the basis for the Director’s actions, and would allow her to rebut any 

inaccuracies or appeal from the underlying convictions when the burden of proof shifted back to 

her. Furthermore, not only was this information theoretically sufficient to give Peterman notice, 

the record shows that she was in fact aware of the basis for the Director’s actions in denying her 

driving privileges, and she conceded the accuracy of her two convictions.

2

 Rather, her challenge 

is only to the form of the evidence, arguing the Director should be required to produce a copy of 

the convictions upon which it based its summary. Under the circumstances here, this argument 

fails.

The trial court did not err in sustaining the Director’s order denying Peterman’s driving 

privileges for five years under Section 302.060, because the Director produced sufficient 

evidence showing that Peterman had received two DWI convictions within a five-year period. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

_____________________

Robin Ransom, J.

Sherri B. Sullivan, P.J., and

James M. Dowd, J., concur.

 2 Peterman admitted at trial that she had two prior DWI convictions. Specifically, when asked if she was “the same 

Michelle Peterman that has lost her license as a result of two convictions for driving while intoxicated,” she replied, 

“yes.” And again, when asked if she had received DWIs on November 10, 2012, and September 24, 2011, she 

responded, “yes.” However, Peterman asserts on appeal that the trial court “specifically agreed not to consider” 

these admissions in determining whether the Director had produced sufficient evidence supporting its decision to 

revoke her driving privileges. While the record could be much clearer, we believe it is a fair interpretation that the 

trial court understood Peterman’s request and agreed that “[i]f the Court denies Count I and proceeds on Count II, 

the Court will separate the two.” Thus, our holding here is not based on Peterman’s admissions; rather, we find the 

Director’s summary of Peterman’s convictions prepared for the Driving Record (which included the dates of her 

DWI convictions, the court in which she was convicted, and the dates of her underlying DWI violations) was

sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find the Director proved every necessary statutory element of his 

case.
10