This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

61283

Vol. 65, No. 201

Tuesday, October 17, 2000

1William B. Schultz, et al., Public Citizen

Litigation Group and Critical Mass Energy Project,

Petition for Rulemaking, July 24, 1979, p. 10.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 140

[Docket No. PRM–140–1]

RIN 3150–AB01

Criteria for an Extraordinary Nuclear

Occurrence; Withdrawal of Proposed

Rule and Denial of Petition for

Rulemaking Submitted by the Public

Citizen Litigation Group and Critical

Mass Energy Project

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Withdrawal of a proposed rule

and denial of a petition for rulemaking.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is withdrawing a

proposed rule that would have amended

regulations concerning the criteria for

an extraordinary nuclear occurrence

(ENO) and is denying a petition for

rulemaking (PRM–140–1) submitted by

the Public Citizen Litigation Group and

the Critical Mass Energy Project on this

matter. This action is taken because the

Commission has determined that the

current criteria for determining that an

ENO has occurred are adequate and are

consistent with the intent of Congress,

and that none of the options in the

proposed rule is acceptable.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for

rulemaking, the public comments

received, and the NRC’s letters to the

petitioners are available for public

inspection or copying for a fee in the

NRC Public Document Room, located at

One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville

Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland.

These documents are also available at

the NRC’s rulemaking website at http:/

/www.ruleform.llnl.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Harry S. Tovmassian, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555–0001; 301–415–3092 (email

HST@NRC.GOV).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Petition

By letter dated July 24, 1979, the

Public Citizen Litigation Group and the

Critical Mass Energy Project petitioned

the NRC to take two actions pertaining

to a determination whether events at

nuclear reactors are ENOs within the

meaning of 10 CFR 140.81. The petition

was submitted on behalf of five

individuals who were residents of

Middletown, Pennsylvania, at the time

of the March 28, 1979, accident at the

Three Mile Island, Unit 2, nuclear

reactor (TMI–2), and who claimed that

they were harmed by that accident.

The petitioners’ first request was that

the NRC make a determination that the

March 28, 1979, accident at TMI–2 was

an ENO, within the meaning of 10 CFR

140.81. The NRC treated this portion of

the petition as a response to its request

for public comment on its July 23, 1979,

Federal Register notice (44 FR 50419) of

its decision to initiate ‘‘the making of a

determination as to whether the recent

accident at TMI–2 constitutes an

extraordinary nuclear occurrence.’’ On

April 23, 1980 (45 FR 27593), the NRC

published its finding that the accident at

TMI–2 was not an ENO. That action

constituted the Commission’s denial of

the petitioners’ request for NRC to

determine that the TMI–2 accident was

an ENO.

The petitioners further requested that,

regardless of its finding on the TMI–2

accident, the Commission alter or

amend the criteria it uses for making a

determination that an event is an ENO.

Basis for Request

If the Commission determines that a

particular accident is an ENO, persons

indemnified under the Price-Anderson

Act (Section 170.n.1.) of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),

(42 U.S.C. 2210n(1)) waive certain legal

defenses. Current NRC requirements in

10 CFR 140.81(b)(3) establish a two-part

test for making a determination that an

accident at a nuclear reactor or at a

plutonium processing or fuel fabrication

plant constitutes an ENO. This two-part

test is specifically contemplated by

Section 11.j. of the AEA. Section 11.j.

defines an ENO as an event: (1) Causing

an offsite discharge of certain

radioactive material or offsite radiation

levels that are deemed to be substantial;

and (2) that has resulted in, or probably

will result in, substantial damages to

persons or property offsite. Thus,

applying the criteria specified in 10 CFR

140.84, the NRC first must find that a

substantial offsite discharge of

radioactive material has occurred or a

substantial offsite radiation level has

resulted. Second, the NRC must make a

finding that substantial damages to

persons or property offsite have been or

probably will be incurred. If both

findings are made, the Commission then

must find that the event is an ENO.

With respect to their first request, the

petitioners cite certain occurrences as

the basis for their belief that the TMI–

2 accident should be deemed an ENO:

the evacuation of area residents with the

concomitant harm to area businesses,

large initial payments to victims,

lawsuits filed, and radiological releases.

In support of their second request that

the Commission change the criteria for

making a determination that an event is

an ENO, the petitioners state that the

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

(JCAE) ‘‘established that the purpose of

designating certain accidents as

extraordinary nuclear occurrences is to

distinguish a serious accident from an

event in which nothing untoward or

unusual occurred in the conduct of

nuclear activities.1 The petitioners

assert that the NRC has the power and

discretion to make the definition of an

ENO responsive to the circumstances

and needs of the public. Also, according

to the petitioners, accidents of far less

consequence than the one at TMI–2

could be designated as ENOs in

conformity with the legislative intent of

the Price-Anderson Act, as amended.

The petitioners believe that it is

appropriate and necessary that the

criteria for the determination of an ENO

be revised, altered, or amended to

respond effectively to those

circumstances and demonstrated needs.

Commission Response to Petition

On July 23, 1979 (44 FR 43128), the

NRC published a notice in the Federal

Register of its intent to make a

determination as to whether the TMI–2

accident was an ENO. A notice of the

filing of the petition from the Public

Citizen Litigation Group and the Critical

Mass Energy Project was published in

the Federal Register on August 28, 1979

(44 FR 50419). The notice stated that the

NRC intended to treat the petitioners’

61284 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 17, 2000 / Proposed Rules

first request (to find the TMI–2 accident

an ENO) as a response to its request for

public comment on its July 1979 notice.

The notice further stated that the

petitioners’ second request (to change

the criteria for an ENO finding) would

be treated as a petition for rulemaking.

Both the July 1979 and the August 1979

notices invited interested persons to

submit written comments or

suggestions.

Petitioners’ First Request

The NRC considered comments on the

petitioner’s first request and in response

to its July 1979 notice. For the reasons

stated in its of April 23, 1980, Federal

Register notice (45 FR 27590), the

Commission determined that the March

28, 1979, accident at TMI–2 was not an

ENO. Therefore, the petitioners’ first

request was denied.

Petitioners’ Second Request

One comment was received on the

second request, from an official of a

nuclear utility. The commenter stated

that the current criteria for determining

that an accident was an ENO were

consistent with the intent of Congress

that the waiver of certain legal defenses

triggered by an ENO determination be

limited to incidents resulting in

significant injury or loss. The

commenter also stated that lowering the

threshold for an ENO would lead to

higher premiums for insurance coverage

and could at some point endanger the

availability of this coverage.

Although the Commission agreed

with the commenter that the existing

ENO criteria are consistent with the

intent of Congress, it decided that these

criteria should be reexamined because

of difficulties in applying them after the

TMI–2 accident. The primary

difficulties cited stemmed from the fact

that: (1) One criterion is based on

‘‘objective clinical evidence of radiation

injury’’; however, tests for evidence of

such injury are not conclusive; and (2)

monetary damages were difficult, if not

impossible, to evaluate accurately in a

timely manner (e.g., lower property

values, business losses, evacuation

costs). The Commission also cited a

third difficulty with the existing ENO

determination criteria that did not relate

to problems encountered in the TMI–2

determination (i.e., the existing criteria

are numerically inconsistent with the

Environmental Protection Agencies

(EPA) Protective Action Guidelines

(PAG)).

Another factor that influenced the

Commission’s decision to reevaluate the

ENO determination criteria was that

when Congress first enacted the waiver

of defenses provisions of the PriceAnderson Act, as amended, the

conventional belief was that an accident

at a nuclear facility would be

catastrophic with large releases of

radioactive material in a short time. The

accident at TMI–2 suggested that a more

slowly developing accident could be

catastrophic enough to be considered an

ENO. Thus, the Commission decided

that it would be worthwhile to examine

whether the criteria it uses to determine

whether an accident is an ENO

adequately address a broad range of

accident scenarios.

Proposed Rule

On April 9, 1985 (50 FR 13978), the

Commission published proposed

amendments to 10 CFR Part 140 that

posed three options that were under

consideration for revised criteria for

making an ENO determination, and

solicited public comment on these

options. These options used estimates of

offsite doses and ground contamination

as indicators of ‘‘substantial releases.’’

As to ‘‘substantial damages,’’ the

options avoided the measurement

problems encountered in applying the

present criteria by focusing on costs,

which can be readily counted or

estimated. The dose limits for

‘‘substantial releases’’ were set at values

in the range of occupational dose limits

but substantially above the doses to the

general public expected from the normal

operation of NRC-licensed facilities.

Like the existing criteria, Options 1 and

2 had separate criteria for substantial

discharges of radioactive material or

substantial radiation levels offsite.

Option 1 would modify § 140.84(a) to

provide that a finding of a substantial

discharge of radioactive material or

substantial radiation level offsite should

be based on a determination ‘‘that one

or more persons offsite have been or

probably will be exposed to radiation or

radioactive materials that would result

in estimated doses’’ in excess of certain

specified limits. Option 2 had the same

dose limits of Option 1 but specified

that the finding must be that any of the

doses ‘‘were or could have been

received by a person or persons located

on or near any site boundary throughout

the duration of the accident.’’

Options 1 and 2 also differed with

respect to the threshold for ‘‘substantial

damage’’ to persons or property offsite.

One of the thresholds in Option 1

replaced the existing ‘‘substantial

damage’’ threshold of ‘‘objective clinical

evidence of physical injury from

exposure’’ with a dose-equivalent in the

range that would produce symptoms of

radiation sickness (i.e., 100 rads) in five

or more exposed persons. Option 2 had

neither the current ‘‘objective clinical

evidence of physical injury’’ threshold

nor the Option 1 threshold of a high

dose to a few people. The Option 2

threshold was that a ‘‘calculated

collective dose’’ (i.e., 100,000 personrem) has been delivered within a 50-

mile radius during the course of an

accident. Both options replaced the

present reference to the monetary value

of property damage in Criterion II of the

existing rule with effects that could be

readily assessed within a relatively

short period of time after an accident.

Such effects include tax assessments,

the number of people unemployed, and

the number of people evacuated.

Option 3 departs from the two-part

test required in the current criteria and

the other options. Rather than requiring

a Commission finding that the event

resulted or probably would result in

monetary damages exceeding certain

thresholds, this option called for

identifying conditions which had led or

could lead to injury or damages. This

option specified one set of criteria for

substantial releases and levels of

radiation offsite such that substantial

injuries or substantial damages have

resulted or will probably result. These

criteria were expressed in terms of an

integrated air dose that could be

received by an individual over a 24-

hour period in excess of 10 rads, or

radioactive contamination levels offsite

at which real and personal property are

rendered unfit for normal use.

Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

The Commission received 27 letters

commenting on the proposed rule.

Although some commenters expressed

their views about the merits of the

various options proposed, there was no

preponderance of support by the

commenters for any of the options.

Ten commenters expressed an

opinion on whether the criteria for

making a determination that an ENO

had occurred should be changed. Two

commenters recommended changing the

criteria. The Illinois Department of

Nuclear Safety said that it did not

believe that the two-pronged process of

declaring a significant release and then

determining that substantial damages

were sustained was necessary and

agreed with then-NRC Commissioner

Bernthal’s recommendation to use a

single-criterion method. The commenter

further stated that the existing process

was complicated and time consuming

and had inherent problems regarding

accuracy and subjectivity but gave no

rationale for these views. The

Mississippi State Department of Health

said that it favored Option 3 and that

any of the options were more acceptable

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 17, 2000 / Proposed Rules 61285

2For example, the Law Offices of Bishop,

Lieberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds made

comments on behalf of Boston Edison Co., Carolina

Power & Light Co., Commonwealth Edison Co,

Florida Power Corp., Middle South Services Inc.,

Ohio Edison Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light

Co., Southern California Edison Co., and Virginia

Electric & Power Co.

3Peter F. Riehm, KMC, Inc., September 6, 1985,

p. 2.

4 Joseph F. Tiernan, Baltimore Gas and Electric,

July 22, 1985, p. 2.

5Bishop et al., August 7, 1985, p. 2.

6C.B. Flynn, J.A. Chalmers, ‘‘The Social and

Economic Effects of the Accident at Three Mile

Island,’’ NUREG–CR–1215, January 1980.

than the existing rule but did not give

a basis for this view.

Eight commenters, representing

approximately 21 separate entities, 2

recommended not changing the criteria.

(Some commenters submitted the

consolidated comments from other

entities; other commenters endorsed

these consolidated comments and

submitted additional comments of their

own.) The eight commenters stated that

the existing ENO criteria were adequate

and that no changes were required.

Some commenters pointed out that the

NRC’s difficulties in applying the ENO

criteria to the TMI–2 accident arose not

from the criteria, but from the fact that

the accident was not serious enough to

meet the statutory requirements of

substantial offsite releases and

substantial offsite damages. Some

commenters also pointed out that no

change in the regulatory criteria would

relieve the Commission of the statutory

obligation to determine whether both

the offsite release and the offsite

damages were substantial, even if such

a determination proves to be difficult on

occasion.

Several commenters who opposed

changing the criteria stated that the NRC

had not adequately justified reducing

the threshold for a substantial release

finding from 20 rem to 5 rem. They

asserted that this reduction would

increase the likelihood that an event

would be declared an ENO.

Some commenters also questioned the

NRC rationale for changing the criteria

to be consistent with the EPA PAGs.

According to the commenters, these

guidelines are intended for emergency

planning purposes and to protect the

population at risk from the onset of

release of radioactivity; they were not

intended as baseline criteria for ENO

determinations.

Some commenters who opposed

changing the criteria stated that the

reduction of the dose level to sustain a

finding of a substantial offsite release of

radioactivity to 5 rem was inconsistent

with the intent of Congress, and that the

proposed rule would permit the

Commission to define as an ENO an

event near the range of radiological

exposures from anticipated occurrences

and involving doses within or near

permissible limits. One commenter

quoted the authors of the ‘‘Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy’s Report

(JAEC) Accompanying Bills to Amend

Price-Anderson Act to Provide

Immediate Financial Assistance to

Claimants and to Require Waiver of

Defenses:’’ ‘‘[T]here is no pressing need

to invoke the mechanisms and

procedures in situations which are not

exceptional and which can well be

taken care of by the traditional system

of tort law.’’ 3

Another commenter gave the

following opinion:

These proposed reductions would lower

the existing dose levels to values not much

different from the current 10 CFR 20 limits.

We believe that these level reductions

seriously lower the threshold of an ENO and

that the original purpose may be somewhat

diminished by the adoption of these reduced

limits. In the original conception of 10 CFR

140, ‘‘Congress intended that the waiver of

defenses be limited to incidents resulting in

significant injury or loss’’ and that current

ENO criteria should be consistent with this.

It is possible that the seriousness or

significance of an ENO may be lessened

somewhat by these lower criteria.4

Another commenter expressed the

same view:

The legislative history is clear that

Congress, in amending the Atomic Energy

Act to incorporate the ENO concept, wished

to establish a threshold to prevent the waiver

of defenses provision from applying in cases

‘‘where nothing untoward or unusual has

occurred in the conduct of nuclear

activities.’’ 5

Discussion

The Commission finds that the

arguments for retaining the existing

criteria are persuasive. The Commission

intended to simplify the application of

the ENO criteria, but is now convinced

by arguments of the public commenters

that none of these options would

accomplish this intent without

undermining the purposes for which the

ENO criteria were established.

In addition, section 11.j. of the AEA

indicates that the dual criteria for

findings of substantial releases and

findings of substantial damages are to be

used. Section 11.j. of the AEA has the

following passage:

The term extraordinary nuclear occurrence

means any event causing a discharge or

dispersal of source, special nuclear, or

byproduct material from its intended place of

confinement in amounts off-site, or causing

radiation levels off-site, which the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of

Energy, as appropriate, determines to be

substantial, and which the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of

Energy, as appropriate, determines has

resulted or will probably result in substantial

damages to persons off-site or property offsite. [emphasis added].

The Commission interprets this

provision to mean that the

determination that an ENO has occurred

requires findings of substantial releases

and of substantial damages.

Conclusions on Problems Cited in 1985

Federal Register Notice

With respect to the difficulties with

the ENO determination criteria cited in

the 1985 Federal Register notice

(discussed earlier), the Commission now

believes that these are not as serious as

were once thought:

(1) Experience gained as a result of

the TMI–2 accident suggests that the

Criterion II threshold, requiring

objective clinical evidence of radiation

injury (10 CFR 140.85(a)(1)) to five or

more individuals offsite, may not be as

important to an ENO determination as

the other findings in Criterion II. A

second threshold in this criterion, a

finding that $5 million or more in

damage offsite has been or probably will

be sustained (10 CFR 140.85(a)(2)),

would appear to trigger an ENO

determination before the radiation

injury finding would. After the TMI–2

accident, no deaths or injury due to the

accident were reported. However, to

date, more than $70 million has been

paid out in damages and expenses

(mostly attributable to evacuation costs).

If an accident occurred, the monetary

damage estimate would apparently

trigger the ENO determination before

the death or injury threshold did. Thus

the likelihood that the Commission

would ever need to rely solely on 10

CFR 140.85(a)(1) to make a ‘‘substantial

damages’’ to persons or property offsite

finding is very small.

(2) The difficulty in estimating

monetary damages does not seem to be

as great as previously believed. The

Commission now believes that timely

and accurate estimates of monetary

damages is possible. There exists a body

of literature in which models for

estimating such parameters and

performing relevant studies are

described. One study conducted by

Mountain West Research, Inc.,

investigated the social and economic

effects of the TMI–2 accident on the

surrounding community.6 The

Commission is confident that, should an

event meriting an ENO determination

occur again, experts from the relevant

disciplines can be assembled to estimate

61286 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 17, 2000 / Proposed Rules

7The Senate version of the bill, S–3830, was

identical.

8House Report No. 2043, supra, n.1, p. 11.

9 ’’Planning Basis for the Development of State

and Local Government Radiological Emergency

Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear

Power Plants,’’ NUREG–0396 (EPA 520/1–78–016),

December 1978, p. 3.

monetary damages. Furthermore, the

legislative history of the modifications

to the ‘‘waiver of defenses’’ provisions

of the Price-Anderson Act (where the

ENO concept was introduced) indicates

that Congress was mindful that criteria

to implement such an approach would

be difficult to apply. In its September

14, 1966, report accompanying House of

Representatives Bill No. 17685,7 the

former JCAE stated: ‘‘[T]he committee

recognizes that inclusion of the

‘extraordinary nuclear occurrence

concept’ in this bill adds very

considerably to the complexity of

implementing the proposed

legislation.’’ 8 Thus, the difficulty of

applying the criteria does not justify

changing them.

(3) The fact that existing ENO

determination criteria are not

numerically consistent with PAGs,

which was cited in the Federal Register

notice for the 1985 proposed rule, was

not seen so much as a difficulty with

applying ENO criteria to TMI–2, but,

rather was seen as a perceived

inadequacy of the ENO criteria. But the

PAGs were established with different

objectives than the ENO criteria. The

purpose of the PAGs is to reduce the

radiation exposure of the public by

setting predetermined action levels for

implementing planned protective

actions, such as evacuations. These

action levels are established with public

health and safety as the main objective.

‘‘The concept of PAGs was introduced

to radiological emergency response

planning to assist public health and

other governmental authorities in

deciding how much of a radiation

hazard in the environment constitutes a

basis for initiating emergency protective

actions.’’ 9 In contrast, as stated in 10

CFR 140.81(b), the ENO regulations set

forth the criteria which the Commission

will follow to determine whether there

has been an ENO. The Commission has

taken the position that health and safety

regulations have been conservatively

determined and for a different purpose

and are not appropriate for use as ENO

thresholds. Section 140.81(b)(1) sets

forth the scope of the ENO criteria as

follows:

The various limits in present NRC

regulations are not appropriate for direct

application in the determination of an

‘‘extraordinary nuclear occurrence’’ for they

were arrived at with other purposes in mind,

and those limits have been set at a level

which is conservatively arrived at by

incorporating a significant safety factor.

Thus, a discharge or dispersal which exceeds

the limits in NRC regulations, or in license

conditions, although possible cause for

concern, is not one which would be expected

to cause substantial injury or damage unless

it exceeds by some significant multiple the

appropriate regulatory limit. Accordingly, in

arriving at the values in the criteria to be

deemed ‘‘substantial’’ it is more appropriate

to adopt values separate from NRC health

and safety regulations, and of course, the

selection of these values will not in any way

affect such regulations.

Thus, for the reasons stated, the

Commission believes that lowering the

thresholds for ENO determinations is

not appropriate.

Summary of Commission Findings

The Commission has considered the

comments in favor of modifying the

criteria for determining that an ENO has

occurred along the lines of the options

presented in the proposed rule and

those comments in favor of retaining the

existing criteria. The Commission finds

the latter more persuasive. Specifically,

the Commission finds that:

(1) Although the existing criteria for

determining that an ENO has occurred

may be difficult to apply, they are

consistent with the intent of Congress

and need not be modified. The

Commission believes that, contrary to

the Federal Register notice for the

proposed rule, the derivation of timely

and accurate estimates of monetary

damages is possible. The Commission is

confident that, should an event meriting

an ENO determination occur again,

individuals and consulting firms with

experience in estimating evacuation

costs, changes in property values, loss of

time from work, and other parameters

can be assembled to make estimates of

monetary damages. Moreover, as

previously noted, the legislative history

of the amendments to the ‘‘waiver of

defenses’’ provisions of the PriceAnderson Act (where the ENO concept

was introduced) indicates that Congress

was mindful that criteria to implement

such an approach would be difficult to

apply. The difficulty of applying the

criteria does not justify changing them.

(2) None of the options offered by the

Commission in the 1985 proposed rule

satisfies the legislative intent of

Congress in defining an ENO. Under

Option 1, a ‘‘substantial release’’ is an

exposure to one or more persons offsite.

Option 2 specifies a ‘‘substantial

release’’ as an exposure to one or more

persons located on or near any site

boundary during the accident. However,

both options would lower the

‘‘substantial release thresholds’’ from a

whole body dose of 20 rem to 5 rem and

similarly lower individual organ

thresholds. At that level, individuals

would not normally experience

symptoms of radiation sickness. Thus, if

Option 1 or Option 2 were adopted, a

‘‘substantial release’’ determination

could be made for releases unlikely to

produce detectable radiation injuries

offsite. The rationale for lowering of the

dose limits from 20 rem to 5 rem (i.e.,

numerical consistency with EPA’s

PAGs) failed to consider the fact that the

PAGs are for initiating emergency

response actions. The PAGs have no

bearing on the dose levels at which the

‘‘waiver of defenses’’ provisions should

be invoked. Therefore, the Commission

finds that lowering ‘‘substantial

releases’’ thresholds for ENO

determinations is not warranted.

(3) As noted previously, Option 3

differs from the existing criteria and the

other two options. Option 3 relies upon

the probability that substantial injury or

damages will be the consequence of

some threshold dose exposure rate or

contamination level and eliminates the

need to estimate actual or probable

damages and injuries. For example, one

of the thresholds in Option 3 is that if

the integrated air dose to an individual

over any 24-hour period exceeds 10

rads, the Commission would find that

‘‘substantial releases’’ and ‘‘substantial

injuries’’ have probably resulted and

declare the event an ENO, even if no

injuries or damages are sustained or

projected. In effect, this option uses a

single criterion for ‘‘substantial release’’

and ‘‘substantial damage’’ and thus is

inconsistent with the two-part test for

ENO determinations defined in Section

11.j. of the AEA. Therefore, the

Commission finds that Option 3 of the

proposed rule is also not appropriate.

Commission Action

Several factors contributed to the

delay in completing the resolution of

this petition until this time. The

Commission dealt with the central

request of the petitioners (i.e., to declare

the TMI–2 accident an ENO) in a timely

fashion. The petition was received on

July 25, 1979, and the NRC published its

finding that the accident was not an

ENO in the Federal Register on April

23, 1980. In announcing its finding, the

Commission did not specifically deny

the petitioners’ request to declare the

TMI–2 accident an ENO.

The other request of the petitioners, to

modify the ENO determination criteria,

was considered to be of secondary

importance. The Commission decided to

consider this proposal but accorded it a

low priority because of resource

considerations and the existence of

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 17, 2000 / Proposed Rules 61287

higher priority rulemaking actions. In

the meantime, in light of the public

comments received, the Commission

has reexamined its reasoning for the

need for modification of the ENO

criteria and the options that it proposed

in the Federal Register notice for the

proposed rule (50 FR 13978). The

Commission also considered the

legislative history of the Price-Anderson

Act in arriving at its finding in this

matter.

Because the current criteria for

determining that an ENO has occurred

are consistent with the intent of

Congress and none of the options

proposed in the 1985 rulemaking are

deemed acceptable, the Commission

now finds that revision of these criteria

is not warranted. For these reasons, the

second request in the petition for

rulemaking (PRM–140–1) from the

Public Citizen Litigation Group and the

Critical Mass Energy Project is denied

and the April 9, 1985, proposed rule is

withdrawn.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day

of October 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 00–26642 Filed 10–16–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97–NM–201–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Dornier

Model 328–100 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to all

Dornier Model 328–100 series airplanes.

This proposal would require revising

the Airworthiness Limitations Section

of the Instructions for Continued

Airworthiness to incorporate life limits

for certain items and inspections to

detect fatigue cracking in certain

structures. This proposal is prompted by

issuance of new revisions to the Dornier

328 Airworthiness Limitations

Document. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to ensure that

fatigue cracking of certain structural

elements is detected and corrected; such

fatigue cracking could adversely affect

the structural integrity of these

airplanes.

DATES: Comments must be received by

November 16, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 97–NM–

201–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays. Comments may be

submitted via fax to (425) 227–1232.

Comments may also be sent via the

Internet using the following address: 9-

anm-nprmcomment@faa.gov. Comments

sent via fax or the Internet must contain

‘‘Docket No. 97–NM–201–AD’’ in the

subject line and need not be submitted

in triplicate. Comments sent via the

Internet as attached electronic files must

be formatted in Microsoft Word 97 for

Windows or ASCII text.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Fairchild Dornier, Dornier Luftfahrt

GmbH, P.O. Box 1103, D–82230

Wessling, Germany. This information

may be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Submit comments using the following

format:

• Organize comments issue-by-issue.

For example, discuss a request to

change the compliance time and a

request to change the service bulletin

reference as two separate issues.

• For each issue, state what specific

change to the proposed AD is being

requested.

• Include justification (e.g., reasons or

data) for each request.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 97–NM–201–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

97–NM–201–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA),

which is the airworthiness authority for

Germany, has notified the FAA that a

new Revision 13 of the Dornier 328

Airworthiness Limitations Document

(ALD), and new Temporary Revisions

(TR’s) to the ALD have been issued.

[The FAA refers to the information

included in Revision 13 of the ALD and

in the new TR documents as the

Airworthiness Limitations Section

(ALS).] These new revisions to the ALD

and TR documents affect all Dornier

Model 328–100 series airplanes. These

new revisions provide mandatory

replacement times and structural

inspection intervals approved under

section 25.571 of the Joint Aviation

Requirements and the Federal Aviation

Regulations (14 CFR 25.571). As

airplanes gain service experience, or as

results of post-certification testing and

evaluation are obtained, it may become

necessary to add additional life limits or

structural inspections in order to ensure

the continued structural integrity of the

airplane.

The LBA advises that compliance

with the tasks, intervals, and life limits

specified in Revision 13 of the ALD and

in the TR documents is required to

ensure continuing compliance with the

airworthiness standards of the type