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- rev & rem

- S LZ

20 1 2 S
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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JAMIE LOUANN FARLEE , Plaintiff and Appell ant ,

v. CLAYTON LEE FARLEE , Defendant and Appell ee .

* * * *
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT ZIEBACH COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *
THE HONORABLE JEROME A. ECKRICH, III

Judge
* * * *
PATRICIA A. MEYERS Rapid City , South Dakota Attorney for plaintiff and appell ant

. ROSE ANNE WENDELL Pier re, South Da kota Attorney for defendant and appell ee .

* * * * CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS

ON FEBRUARY 14 , 201 2
OPINION FILED 

### 03 / 21 / 12- 1

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#26106 ZINTER, Justice [¶ 1. ] After six years of marriage, Jamie and Clayton (Clay) Farlee divorced

. Jamie appeals the circuit court ’ s division of property . We reverse and remand for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law resolving the parties ’ disputes on property valuation s and whether certain property is part of the marital estate

. Facts and Procedural History [¶ 2. ] Jamie and Clay married in May 2003. Prior to the marriage, Jamie
inherited approximately $700,000. Jami e kept her inheritance in a separate bank account to which Clay did not have access . Although Jamie controlled the spending
of her inheritance , she used a substantial part of it for household expenses ,

numerous family vehicles , and recreation

. Clay enter ed the marriage as a rancher
with 156 head of cattle , a mob ile home, five acres of land, a pickup , and some debt

. During the marriage, Clay expanded his ranching operation

. Jamie raised their
three children , did the bookkeeping for the ranch , and operate d two home

- based
businesses

. [¶ 3. ] The family initially lived in Clay ’ s premarital mobile home , which was
located on Indian trust land

. 1 In 2007, Clay and Jamie b ought a modular home for $150,000 and located it on that property

. Jamie made a $1 5,000 down payment
from her inheritance , and she paid most of the mortgage payments . Clay used $10,000 in profit s from the sale of his mobile home for conc rete work around the
new home.

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. Clay is an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.#26106

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[¶ 4. ] In May 2009, the parties separated , and Jamie filed f or divorce. The parties disagreed on the value of many assets . They also disagreed whether certain

assets were marital property. One of the disagreements involved the value of the
cattle existing at the time of trial and whether they were marital proper ty

. The

court valued Clay ’ s premarital cattle herd ( 156 head ) at $125,000 . The court valued the herd existing at the time of trial (346 head) at $248,800

. The court found that
both Jamie ’ s inheritance and Clay ’ s effort contributed to the increase in the cattle
herd

. The court ruled that “ [t]he cattle are included in the marital estate with consideration given to the herd Clay owned prior to the marriage. ” (Emphasis added.) [¶ 5. ] The second disagreement involved the value of the marital home. The
circuit court found that its market value on trust land was $100,000. The court , however, also found that the home ’ s “ in

- use value ” was $150,000. The court did not
indicate which value it assigned for purposes of the property division. [¶ 6. ] The third disagreement involved the marital status of personal property that was traceable to Jamie ’ s inheritance. There is no dispute that $300,000 to $450,000 of the inheritance was unaccounted for at the time of trial.
The court noted that “ Jamie [ had] simply consumed a significant portion of inheritance without evidence of tangible benefit. ” The court did, however, trace “ the surviving remnants of [ Jamie ’ s ] inheritance to horses, tack, trailers, Jamie ’ s business inventory, vehicles, the marital re sidence, and her current home in Belle
Fourche

. ” Jamie argued that because those assets were traceable to her inheritance, they were nonmarital property. In ruling on this argument , t he court#26106

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determined that a suburban and a “ platinum horse trailer ” were non marital property. [¶ 7. ] Finally, t he parties disagreed on the value of certain personal property

. The dispute involved the value of eighty acres of land, horses, a Chevrolet pickup, a New Holland tractor, Jamie ’ s jewelry business, a four whe eler, a “ rhino , ” a deck , a flatbed trailer, generators, a portable barn, a storage shed, corral panels, a lawn mower, water tanks, and saddles and tack. The court valued the eighty acres of land, the horses, the New Holland tractor, and Jamie ’ s jewelry bu siness . The
court did not value the remaining property

. [¶ 8. ] The court granted th e divorce , divided the property , and ordered Clay to pay Jamie $48,000 to equalize the property division without indicating the total
value of the assets awarded t o Clay and Jamie. The court denied Jamie ’ s subsequent motion for reconsideration or clarification of the property division

. Jamie appeals contending that the court erred in failing to classify disputed assets
as marital or nonmarital and in failing to va lue certain marital property. “ We
review a court ’ s property division for an abuse of discretion. ” Lovejoy v. Lovejoy , 2010 S.D. 39, ¶ 16, 782 N.W.2d 669, 674.
Decision [¶ 9. ] Jamie argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing t o assign a value to the disputed marital property. She contends that this Court cannot properly review the property division for an equitable distribution without
those values. We agree. The circuit court “ must place a value upon all of the property hel d by the parties and make an equitable distribution of that property. ”#26106

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Guthmiller v. Guthmiller , 2003 S

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. 120, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d 516, 517. The “ failure to
value a marital asset constitutes an abuse of discretion and is reversible error. ” Id

. [¶ 10. ] In this case , the record reflects an unresolved $50,000 difference in the
valuation of the home. An additional unresolved $27,430 difference exists in the
valuation of the Chevrolet pickup, the four wheeler, the rhino, the deck, the flatbed trailer, t he generators, the portable barn, the storage shed, the corral panels, the lawn mower, the water tanks, and the saddles and tack. It is not enough for the circuit court to surmise that property is worth “ something ” and then distribute the property. Id

. The circuit court must set a value and that value must be “ based upon the evidence or within a reasonable range of values presented to [the court]. ”
Id. ¶ 8. The failure to value all disputed property requires a remand for the entry of
valuation findings and a reconsideration of an equitable division of the property.
Id. ; s ee also Guindon v. Guindon , 256 N.W.2d 894, 898 (S.D. 1977). [¶ 11. ] With respect to marital property, “ South Dakota is an ‘ all property state, ’ meaning all property of the ‘ di vorcing parties is subject to equitable division by the circuit court, regardless of title or origin. ’” Halbersma v. Halbersma , 2009 S.D. 98, ¶ 9, 775 N.W.2d 210, 214 (citing Endres v. Endres , 532 N.W.2d 65, 68 (S.D. 1995) (quoting Radigan v. Radigan , 465 N.W.2d 483, 486 (S.D. 1991))); see also
SDCL 25

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- 44 ( “ When a divorce is granted, the courts may make an equitable division of the property belonging to either or both, whether the title to such property is in the name of the husband or the wife. ” ). This includes inherited property, Halbersma , 2009 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 775 N.W.2d at 215, and premarital property, Muenster v. Muenster , 2009 S.D. 23, ¶ 16, 764 N.W.2d 712, 717. “ In#26106

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arriving at an equitable division of property, a circuit court must classify proper ty

as ‘ marital ’ or ‘ non - marital. ’” Halbersma , 2009 S.D. 98, ¶ 10, 775 N.W.2d at 215. [¶ 12. ] In this case, the circuit court did not clearly classify all the disputed property as marital or nonmarital

. With respect to the cattle, the court noted that

“ [t]he appreciated value of a cattle herd may be considered a marital asset even if the herd might be considered non

- marital

. ” ( Emphasis added) ( citing Bennett v. Bennett , 516 N.W.2d 672, 674 (S.D. 1994 ) )

. The court later concluded that “ the
cattle ” were marital property , and that it was giving “ consideration ” to the herd Clay owned prior to the marriage. From these rulings, we are unable to determine what cattle were classified as marital property and the meaning of the

“ consideration ” that was all owed for Clay ’ s premarital cattle

. Further , based on the

court ’ s findings and conclusions relating to property traceable to Jamie ’ s inheritance, we cannot determine why a suburban and the platinum horse trailer

were specifically classified as nonmarital p roperty while much of the remaining traceable property was not explicitly classified

. We conclude that the circuit court erred in failing to definitively rule on the parties ’ competing claims regarding all disputed marital property. See Midzak v. Midzak , 2005 S.D. 58, ¶ 24, 697 N.W.2d 733, 740 ( “ The trial court abused its discretion in not properly determining the status of all assets first as either separate or marital, and then making an equitable
distribution of all assets determined to be marital in n ature. ” ). [¶ 13. ] Because of uncertainties regarding the marital classification of all disputed property , and because we are unable to determine the circuit court ’ s valuation of all marital property, we are unable to review whether the circuit cour t#26106

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arrived at an equitable division

. 2 Consequently , we reverse and remand for
reconsideration of the property division after the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existing record clearly resolving the valuation and marital property is sues. See Edinger v. Edinger , 2006 S.D. 103, ¶ ¶ 10

- 11 , 724 N.W.2d 852,
856 (reversing and remanding because this Court was unable to duplicate the
circuit court’s property values and ascertain the reasoning for the property
division )

. Both parties ’ reque sts for appellate attorney ’s fees are denied. [¶ 14. ] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.

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. “The law requires an equitable, not necessa rily equal, division of assets.” Halbersma , 2009 S

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. 98, ¶ 7, 775 N.W.2d at 214

.