FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE DEPOT INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

DS HOLDINGS, LLC, No. 07-16788

Assignee-Appellee, D.C. No. 

v. CV-06-80356-SI

JOHN ZUCCARINI, doing business as OPINION

Country Walk,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 17, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed February 26, 2010

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, William A. Fletcher and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher

3119
COUNSEL

John Zuccarini, Pro se, Stuart, Florida, defendant-appellant.

Michael Woodrow De Vries, Latham & Watkins LLP, Costa

Mesa, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Henry M. Burgoyne III, Karl S. Kronenberger, Kronenberger

Burgoyne LLP, San Francisco, California, for the assigneeappellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

John Zuccarini is a judgment debtor who owns the rights to

many Internet domain names. DS Holdings (“DSH”) is the

assignee of the judgment against Zuccarini. DSH attempted to

levy upon Zuccarini’s domain name holdings in the Northern

District of California where VeriSign, the official registry for

all “.com” and “.net” domain names, has its headquarters. The

district court appointed a receiver to take control of and auction off some of Zuccarini’s domain names in order to satisfy

the judgment.

Zuccarini appeals, contending that the Northern District of

California is not a proper place to levy upon his domain

names and that the appointment of the receiver was therefore

improper.

We affirm.

3122 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI
I. Background

In December 2000, Office Depot obtained a judgment

against Zuccarini under the Anticybersquatting Consumer

Protection Act of 1999 (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), arising out of Zuccarini’s registration of the domain name “officdepot.com.” Office Depot was unable to collect on the

judgment and eventually assigned the judgment to DSH. 

DSH sought to levy upon some of the other domain names

owned by Zuccarini. DSH registered the judgment in the district court for the Northern District of California. DSH then

obtained a preservation order from the district court and

engaged in discovery. It learned that Zuccarini owned more

than 248 domain names registered with VeriSign, of which

more than 190 were “.com” domain names. DSH targeted the

“.com” domain names in its levy.

Some background information on the structure of the

domain name system will be helpful to the reader:

Every computer connected to the Internet has a

unique Internet Protocol (“IP”) address. IP addresses

are long strings of numbers, such as 64.233.161.147.

The Internet [domain name system] provides an

alphanumeric shorthand for IP addresses. The hierarchy of each domain name is divided by periods.

Thus, reading a domain name from right to left, the

portion of the domain name to the right of the first

period is the top-level domain (“TLD”). TLDs

include .com, .gov, .net., and .biz. Each TLD is

divided into second-level domains identified by the

designation to the left of the first period, such as “example” in “example.com” or “example.net.” . . .

Each domain name is unique and thus can only be

registered to one entity . . . .

A domain name is created when it is registered

with the appropriate registry operator. A registry

OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI 3123
operator maintains the definitive database, or registry, that associates the registered domain names with

the proper IP numbers for the respective domain

name servers. The domain name servers direct Internet queries to the related web resources. A registrant

can register a domain name only through companies

that serve as registrars for second level domain

names. Registrars accept registrations for new or

expiring domain names, connect to the appropriate

registry operator’s TLD servers to determine

whether the name is available, and register available

domain names on behalf of registrants . . . .

The majority of domain name registrations for

commercial purposes utilize the .com TLD.

Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 464

F. Supp. 2d 948, 951-53 (N.D. Cal. 2006), reversed by 567

F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2009). 

As explained in Coalition for ICANN Transparency, there

are three primary actors in the domain name system. First,

companies called “registries” operate a database (or “registry”) for all domain names within the scope of their authority.

Second, companies called “registrars” register domain names

with registries on behalf of those who own the names. Registrars maintain an ownership record for each domain name

they have registered with a registry. Action by a registrar is

needed to transfer ownership of a domain name from one registrant to another. Third, individuals and companies called

“registrants” own the domain names. Registrants interact with

the registrars, who in turn interact with the registries. 

VeriSign is the registry for the domain names “.com” and

“.net”. Id. at 953. Its headquarters are located in Mountain

View, California, in the Northern District of California. During discovery, DSH learned that the registrars for Zuccarini’s

“.com” and “.net” domain names were located in the United

3124 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI
States, Germany, and Israel. DSH filed a request in the district

court for a turnover order to compel the registrars of certain

“.com” domain names owned by Zuccarini to transfer ownership to DSH. The district court denied the request, holding

that, under California Civil Procedure Code § 699.040, it

could not order third parties to turn over property. DSH then

moved for the appointment of a receiver who would obtain

and sell the “.com” domain names in question and would use

the proceeds to satisfy the judgment. The district court

granted the motion to appoint a receiver.

Zuccarini appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(2) to entertain an appeal from an interlocutory

order appointing a receiver.

II. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion a district court order

appointing a receiver. Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter,

563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2009). We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of law, including state law. Capital

Dev. Co. v. Port of Astoria, 109 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997).

III. Discussion

DSH does not argue that the district court in the Northern

District of California has in personam jurisdiction over Zuccarini. Rather, it argues that the court has jurisdiction over

Zuccarini’s intangible property that is located, for purposes of

attachment, in the Northern District.

[1] The type of jurisdiction at issue is “type two quasi in

rem.” See Restatement (First) of Judgments § 32 (1942). Type

two quasi in rem jurisdiction is used to establish the ownership of property in a dispute unrelated to the property. Type

two quasi-in rem jurisdiction is sometimes called “attachment

jurisdiction.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 8

(1982). So far as the record in this case shows, the domain

OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI 3125
names upon which DSH seeks to levy were not involved in

the underlying litigation that led to the judgment against Zuccarini.

[2] A district court can obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction

over property situated within its geographical borders. See

Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 272 (1917);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(n)(2) (“[T]he court may assert jurisdiction

over the defendant’s assets found in the district. Jurisdiction

is acquired by seizing the assets under the circumstances and

in the manner provided by state law in that district.”). Though

“the situs of intangibles is often a matter of controversy,”

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958), quasi in

rem jurisdiction can be asserted over intangible property.

Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Due process requires a

constitutionally sufficient relationship among the defendant,

the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,

204 (1977). In an action to execute on a judgment, due process concerns are satisfied, assuming proper notice, by the

previous rendering of a judgment by a court of competent

jurisdiction. Id. at 210 n.36 (“Once it has been determined by

a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor

of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the

defendant has property, whether or not that State would have

jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.”); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai

Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Shaffer).

We have previously noted that “[s]tate law has been

applied under Rule 69(a) to garnishment, mandamus, arrest,

contempt of a party, and appointment of receivers,” when

such actions are undertaken in aid of executing on a judgment. In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Mgmt., Inc., 812 F.2d

1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Edmonston v. Sisk, 156

F.2d 300, 301 (10th Cir. 1946) (applying Rule 69(a), and state

law, to appointment of receiver in aid of an action for execu3126 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI
tion); 12 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3012 at 148-49. We now take the opportunity to explain

why this is so.

[3] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 governs procedures

on execution of a judgment and, for the most part, directs the

district court to look to state rules. The version of Rule 69(a)

relied upon by the district court provided as follows:

Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of

money shall be a writ of execution, unless the court

directs otherwise. The procedure on execution, in

proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution

shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held,

existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that

any statute of the United States governs to the extent

that it is applicable. . . .1

To paraphrase, Rule 69 provides that state law applies generally, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies. 

[4] Rule 66 governs the appointment of a receiver in federal court. It provides:

These rules govern an action in which the appoint1The rule was amended as of December 1, 2008. The updated text of the

rule is as follows: 

A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the

court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—

must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is

located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (2009). The advisory committee notes indicate

that these amendments were merely stylistic. Advisory Committee Note

(2007).

OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI 3127
ment of a receiver is sought or a receiver sues or is

sued. But the practice in administering an estate by

a receiver or a similar court-appointed officer must

accord with the historical practice in federal courts

or with a local rule. An action in which a receiver

has been appointed may be dismissed only by court

order.

The federal rules, including Rule 66, qualify as federal statutes under Rule 69(a). Bair v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav.

Ass’n, 112 F.2d 247, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1940) (applying federal

rule to Rule 69 action); see also Schneider v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 72 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (“This term

includes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since they have

the force and effect of federal statutes.”); Okla. Radio Assoc.

v. FDIC, 969 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, Rule

66 prevails over any state law to the extent it applies. However, Rule 66 does not provide a rule governing the proper

location for appointment of a receiver in aid of execution of

a judgment. Because Rule 66 does not provide a governing

rule, we look to state law. 

California Civil Procedure Code § 695.010(a) provides,

“Except as otherwise provided by law, all property of the

judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judgment.” Section 699.710 provides, inter alia, “[A]ll property

that is subject to enforcement of a money judgment . . . is subject to levy under a writ of execution to satisfy a money judgment.” Under these provisions, all property of a judgment

debtor can be used to satisfy a writ of execution.

California Civil Procedure Code § 708.620 governs the

appointment of a receiver in aid of the execution of a judgment in California state courts. It provides: 

The court may appoint a receiver to enforce the

judgment where the judgment creditor shows that,

considering the interests of both the judgment credi3128 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI
tor and the judgment debtor, the appointment of a

receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair and

orderly satisfaction of the judgment.

This rule does not indicate where a receiver over property

should be appointed. However, § 699.510(a) provides that the

appropriate place to direct a writ of execution is the county

where the levy is to be made:

[A]fter entry of a money judgment, a writ of execution shall be issued by the clerk of the court upon

application of the judgment creditor and shall be

directed to the levying officer in the county where

the levy is to be made and to any registered process

server.

[5] The combined effect of these provisions is to provide

that if the domain names are property subject to execution,

and if they are located in the Northern District of California,

that district is an appropriate location to execute judgment on

them through the appointment of a receiver. There are thus

two questions before us. First, are domain names property that

is subject to execution? Second, if so, where are the domain

names located for purposes of execution? We address these

questions in turn.

[6] First, we have already held that domain names are

intangible property under California law. Kremen v. Cohen,

337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). In Palacio Del Mar

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McMahon, 174 Cal. App. 4th

1386, 1391 (2009), a California Court of Appeal held that

domain names do not constitute property subject to a turnover

order because they cannot be taken into custody. The court in

Palacio Del Mar based its holding on a reading of California

Civil Procedure Code § 699.040, which provides that, with

respect to a turnover order, property must “be levied upon by

taking it into custody.” However, the court left open the question whether domain names constitute intangible property

OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI 3129
generally, and it cited Kremen with approval. Moreover, the

“taking it into custody” language in § 699.040 does not

appear in § 708.620, which governs the appointment of

receivers. We conclude that Kremen is still an accurate statement of California law, and that domain names are intangible

property subject to a writ of execution. 

Second, we note that “attaching a situs to intangible property is necessarily a legal fiction; therefore, the selection of a

situs for intangibles must be context-specific, embodying a

‘common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and

convenience in particular conditions.’ ” Af-Cap Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S.

Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 151 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1976)).

That is, the location of intangible property varies depending

on the purpose to be served: 

The situs may be in one place for ad valorem tax

purposes; it may be in another place for venue purposes, i.e., garnishment; it may be in more than one

place for tax purposes in certain circumstances; it

may be in still a different place when the need for

establishing its true situs is to determine whether an

overriding national concern, like the application of

the Act of State Doctrine is involved.

Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S. A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392

F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1968) (citations omitted). A single

piece of intangible property may be located in multiple places

for some purposes. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367-68

(1939). 

[7] California law says nothing specific about the location

of domain names. However, in the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Congress has addressed the question.

Under the ACPA, a trademark owner in a civil cybersquatting

action can proceed in personam against the cybersquatter. If

there is no in personam jurisdiction in any judicial district of

3130 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI
the United States, the owner may proceed in rem against the

allegedly infringing domain name. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)

(ii)(I). The ACPA provides that in rem jurisdiction over these

domain names shall be “in the judicial district in which the

domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other

domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain

name is located . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). The ACPA

also provides for the legal situs of the domain name once a

lawsuit has been filed:

In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain

name shall be deemed to have its situs in the judicial

district in which . . . the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that registered

or assigned the domain name is located . . . . 

Id. § 1125(d)(2)(C)(i); see also Mattel, Inc. v. BarbieClub.com, 310 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2002) (interpreting

these provisions). Although the current proceeding is not an

action under the ACPA, the statute is authority for the proposition that domain names are personal property located wherever the registry or the registrar are located.

Both parties make practical arguments relevant to an

appraisal of the interests of “justice and convenience.” Af-Cap

Inc., 383 F.3d at 371. Zuccarini argues that since registrars

tell the registries who owns domain names, any attachment

should be directed to registrars. Zuccarini also argues that if

the domain names under VeriSign’s control are located in the

district where VeriSign has its headquarters, every “.net” and

“.com” domain name is located in that district. 

DSH admits that instructions concerning the transfer of

ownership of domain names must go through registrars. But

it points out that the registrars are essentially intermediaries,

that the registry controls the database of all domain names,

and that any change in ownership is ultimately reflected in the

registry. Additionally, DSH points out that it would greatly

OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI 3131
impede the ability of judgment creditors to levy upon domain

names if they were required to bring suits in the many different places where registrars of the domain names are located.

[8] Given the persuasive but not controlling language of

the ACPA, and the practicalities involved in bringing suit to

execute judgments against owners of domain names, we conclude under California law that domain names are located

where the registry is located for the purpose of asserting quasi

in rem jurisdiction. Although the question is not directly

before us, we add that we see no reason why for that purpose

domain names are not also located where the relevant registrar is located.

Conclusion

[9] Because VeriSign has its headquarters in the Northern

District of California, the district court had quasi in rem jurisdiction over the domain names registered with VeriSign for

purposes of appointing a receiver to assist in executing a judgment against the owner of the names. 

AFFIRMED.

3132 OFFICE DEPOT v. ZUCCARINI