[Cite as St. George v. Celtic Bank, 2014-Ohio-5724.]

STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

EARL W. ST. GEORGE dba 

GEORGE REAL ESTATE, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

CELTIC BANK, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

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CASE NO. 14 CO 3 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from East Liverpool 

Municipal Court of Columbiana County, 

Ohio 

Case No. 2013CV100019 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Earl W. St. George – Pro-se 

46458 Y and O Rd. 

East Liverpool, Ohio 43920 

For Defendant-Appellant Attorney Peter Horvath 

38294 Industrial Park Road 

P.O. Box 501 

Lisbon, Ohio 44432 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

 

 

 Dated: December 19, 2014 
[Cite as St. George v. Celtic Bank, 2014-Ohio-5724.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Celtic Bank, appeals from an East Liverpool 

Municipal Court judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Earl St. George, on appellee’s 

claim for breach of a brokerage agreement. 

{¶2} On November 13, 2013, appellee filed a complaint in small claims court 

alleging that appellant contracted with him to list its real estate on April 22, 2013. 

The contract included a brokerage fee of six percent of the sale proceeds or a 

minimum of $2,000. On or about September 2, 2013, appellant asked appellee to 

contact a potential buyer who had previously expressed an interest in the property 

and was willing to make a $15,000 offer. Appellee alleged that on September 10, 

2013, he secured an offer from the buyer to purchase the property for $15,000 cash 

with no contingencies. Appellant declined to accept the offer due to “SBA” 

requirements. Appellant then asked appellee to sell the property at auction with a 

$7,000 reserve price and was only willing to pay appellee $500 for his efforts. 

However, appellee claimed $2,000 in damages pursuant to their aforementioned 

contract. 

{¶3} A bench trial was held on appellee’s complaint. Appellee appeared pro 

se and appellant was present only through counsel. The trial court found appellant 

breached its written contract with appellee by not paying appellee the agreed 

commission of $2,000 minimum. The court additionally found that appellant 

requested appellee to perform additional work beyond his contractual duties by listing 

and preparing the property for auction after he had presented a number of offers, 

which appellant rejected. It further found that the property sold at auction for 

thousands of dollars less than the offers secured by appellee. Finally, the court 

found appellee performed the additional duties requested by appellant without 

additional commission other than the $2,000 he was entitled to under the contract. 

Therefore, the trial court found in appellee’s favor and entered judgment for $2,000 

against appellant. 

{¶4} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 10, 2014. Because 

there was no record of the trial, appellant submitted a Statement of the Evidence 
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approved by the trial court in accordance with App.R. 9(C). 

{¶5} Appellant asserts a single assignment of error stating: 

THE FINDING OF THE COURT, WHICH IMPOSED A 

CONTRACTUAL DUTY UPON THE APPELLANT BANK, WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶6} Appellant argues it had no duty to accept any offer secured by appellee. 

It contends its only contractual obligation was to pay appellee a commission upon 

completion of a sale. Appellant also notes it is fair to assume that the contract could 

expire with nothing owed to appellee. It argues that the trial court’s interpretation of 

the contract required it to add language to the contract that appellant agreed to pay 

appellee $2,000 if appellant accepted no offers submitted by appellee. 

{¶7} Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to 

all the material elements of the case must not be reversed, as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. C .E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 

279, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus (1978). See, also, Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 223, 226, 638 N.E.2d 533 (1994). Reviewing courts must oblige every 

reasonable presumption in favor of the lower court's judgment and finding of facts. 

Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226 (citing Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 

461 N.E.2d 1273 [1984] ). In the event the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

interpretation, we must construe it consistently with the lower court's judgment. Id. 

{¶8} The evidence as set out in the approved Statement of Evidence was as 

follows. 

{¶9} The contract provided: 

1. TERM AND LISTING PRICE: Owner hereby grants Broker the 

exclusive right to sell the above property from April 20, 2013 through 

October 19, 2013 for the sum of $45,000 payable in cash upon 

closing or for such other terms or exchange as Owner may agree. 
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2. BROKERAGE FEE: Owner agrees to pay Broker a brokerage fee of 

six (6) % of the total sale price or a minimum fee of $2,000, 

whichever is greater, plus none. Owner authorizes Broker to offer 

three (3) % of the Sale Price for all Co-Broke sales. Any exceptions 

to this compensation will be disclosed to the Owner in writing. 

Owner also agrees that the brokerage fee shall be paid if Owner 

enters into an agreement within six (6) months following the term of 

this agreement or any extensions thereof to any parties to whom 

Broker or any cooperating broker has shown the property which 

results in a sale, lease or exchange of said property. However, in 

the event Owner enters into a bona fide Listing Agreement with 

another Real Estate Broker, this paragraph is null and void. Owner 

agrees to refer all prospective Buyers or Brokers who contact the 

Owner directly. 

{¶10} Under the contract, appellant is the “Owner” and appellee is the 

“Broker.” The other “comments” made at the trial were as follows. Appellant paid 

$60,000 for the property. Appellant engaged appellee to sell the property at six 

percent of the sale price or $2,000, whichever was greater. Appellee submitted an 

offer to appellant for $15,000. Appellant rejected the offer. The property was 

ultimately sold at auction for $2,500. The sale was initiated during the listing date of 

the contract. Appellee performed his contractual duties in the preparation of the 

property for sale on a number of occasions. Appellant asked appellee to have the 

property listed and sold with a local auction company, which was additional work 

beyond appellee’s contractual duties. This occurred within the listing dates. During 

the time the listing contract was in effect, appellant offered appellee $500 rather than 

the $2,000 agreed in the contract. Appellee did not accept the proposed modification 

to the written contract that was still in effect. 

{¶11} This evidence supports the trial court’s judgment of $2,000 in favor of 

appellee. The evidence demonstrated that appellant contracted with appellee to list 
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its property for a six-month period commencing April 20, 2013. Under the contract, 

appellant was to pay appellee a commission of six percent or a minimum of $2,000 

upon the sale of the property. During the listing period, appellant asked appellee to 

have the property listed, prepared for, and sold at auction. Appellee completed these 

duties, which were beyond those set out in the contract. The property sold at auction 

for $2,500. Appellant offered appellee $500, instead of the $2,000 minimum set out 

in the contract. Appellee rejected the $500. 

{¶12} This evidence clearly and competently supports the trial court’s 

judgment. In fact, there was no evidence contrary to the fact that appellant breached 

its contract with appellee by failing to pay him the agreed minimum of $2,000. 

{¶13} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶14} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

Waite, J., concurs.