IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

AND EMC CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00478-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 1 of 14
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................................1

A. The ’921 Patent....................................................................................................... 1

B. Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegations....................................................................... 2

III. LEGAL STANDARD.......................................................................................................2

A. Direct Infringement................................................................................................. 2

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement ................................................................. 3

IV. ARGUMENT....................................................................................................................4

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory 

Infringement............................................................................................................ 4

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for Indirect 

Infringement .................................................................................................... 4

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for Induced 

Infringement .................................................................................................... 5

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial 

Non-Infringing Uses for Contributory Infringement....................................... 7

V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................7

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 2 of 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

ii

Cases

Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,

620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................3, 6

Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,

No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) .....................................3, 6

Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC,

No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 2011 WL 2471299 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) ...........................4, 5

Artrip v. Ball Corp.,

735 F. App’x 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................7

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009)...................................................................................................................2

Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,

C 11–04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012)...............................................5

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)...................................................................................................................2

Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

904 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2012).....................................................................................5

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)...........................................................................................................3, 4

De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.,

2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)..........................................................................3

Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.,

No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018)..........................................6

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,

471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................6

Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,

909 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................................................................................................3

Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,

620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................3

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

563 U.S. 754 (2011)...................................................................................................................3

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 3 of 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued)

Page(s)

iii

Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,

No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019).....................................6

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,

870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................2

Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019)..............................6

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:19-cv-432 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020)..........................................................................4, 5

Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012)......................5

Xpoint Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

730 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Del. 2010)...........................................................................................5

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 4 of 14
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

iv

Abbreviation Term

’921 patent U.S. Patent No. 7,126,921

Accused Products Routers controlled by DNOS incorporating features of FTOS

Complaint or 

Compl.

Complaint (D.I. 1)

Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc. and EMC Corporation

DNOS Dell Networking Operating System

FTOS Force10 Networks’ Force10 Operating System

WSOU or Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and 

Development 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 5 of 14
1

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged—and cannot plausibly allege—indirect infringement in 

this case under any theory. Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations are based on knowledge 

of the patent only as of the date of the Complaint, which this Court has repeatedly held is 

insufficient to sustain a claim of indirect infringement. Plaintiff also completely fails to allege 

numerous other elements of induced and contributory infringement. Plaintiffs’ indirect 

infringement allegations should thus be dismissed. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The ’921 Patent

The ’921 patent, which is entitled “Packet network providing fast distribution of node 

related information and a method therefor,” relates generally to providing a method of distributing 

node related information to recover from link and node failure. See ’921 patent at 3:1–5. Plaintiff 

asserts claim 1 in the complaint:

1. A packet network having a plurality of nodes and links between the nodes, 

comprising:

a computing means for control of the nodes;

each node having a data plane means for forwarding packets between the 

nodes, the data plane means being responsive to control signals from the 

computing means; and

the data plane means comprising a means for fast propagation of node 

related information between the data plane means in each node and 

forwarding the information to the computing means in the network, 

wherein the means for fast propagation of node related information 

comprises means for fast propagation of link state information.

Id., cl. 1.

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 6 of 14
2

B. Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegations

Plaintiff accuses Defendants of direct infringement of claim 1 of the ’921 patent based on 

making, using, or selling routers controlled by the DNOS that has features from FTOS. Compl. at 

¶¶ 13, 21.

Plaintiff never expressly alleges that any third party infringes the ’921 patent. Rather, 

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations amount to three sentences that parrot some of the legal 

elements, and citations to two website links that fail to support their claims. See Compl. at ¶¶ 23–

25. These allegations lack any factual basis and fail to even allege that Defendants had knowledge 

of the patent and knowledge infringement before Plaintiff filed suit. See id. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Direct Infringement 

A complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The complaint must include more than 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must allege nonconclusory facts that make liability “plausible,” meaning the facts “allow[] the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 

2009) (“The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to 

raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each 

element of a claim.”). For a claim of patent infringement, the complaint must—at a minimum—

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 7 of 14
3

plead facts that describe how the allegedly infringing product infringes. See De La Vega v. 

Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020).

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement

To plead indirect infringement, the complaint must first plead direct infringement by a third 

party. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2017) (“A finding of direct infringement is predicate to any finding of indirect infringement[.]”); 

Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 909 F.3d 398, 407 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(same). 

For both induced and contributory infringement, Plaintiff must also plead facts to support 

an inference of each defendant’s “knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent 

infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); see Addiction 

& Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

For induced infringement, Plaintiff additionally must plead facts showing that each 

defendant “had [a] specific intent to induce the [third party’s] patent infringement.” Affinity Labs 

of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 

May 12, 2014). The “specific intent” element is “demanding” and requires more than 

“unsubstantiated assertions” or “generalized allegations” as to the intent of the alleged infringer. 

Id. at *7, *21. Specific intent requires more than knowledge of the induced acts; rather, the accused 

infringer must have “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 

For contributory infringement, Plaintiff must also plead “that the component has no 

substantial noninfringing uses, and [] that the component is a material part of the 

invention.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *8 (citing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 8 of 14
4

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims are deficient and should be dismissed. As an initial 

matter, Plaintiff has failed to plead any knowledge by Defendants of the patent, or knowledge by 

Defendants of alleged infringement, prior to the filing of this action. Plaintiff also fails to plead a 

specific intent to induce infringement. And, Plaintiff has not pled, and cannot plead, that there are 

no substantial non-infringing uses. Each of these failures independently warrants dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations. 

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for Indirect 

Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims fail because they do not plead the required 

“knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 

1926. As courts in this District have held, the knowledge requirements for indirect infringement 

require pre-suit knowledge. See Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 

2011 WL 2471299, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) (holding that reliance “on knowledge of 

[plaintiff’s] patent after the lawsuit was filed . . . is insufficient to plead the requisite knowledge 

for indirect infringement”). 

Despite this clear requirement, Plaintiff’s sole allegation of knowledge of the patent is a 

conclusory statement that “Defendants have received notice and actual or constructive knowledge 

of the ’921 patent since at least the date of service of this Complaint.” Compl. at ¶ 23 (emphasis 

added).1

 This Court has rejected identical allegations of knowledge. For example, in Parus, this 

 

1 Plaintiff’s allegation of knowledge of infringement is likewise deficient as it alleges such 

knowledge only “[s]ince at least the date of service of this Complaint.” Compl. at ¶ 25; see, e.g., 

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 

54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020) (dismissing indirect infringement claims where the only allegations 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 9 of 14
5

Court dismissed indirect infringement claims where plaintiff’s only allegation of knowledge of the 

patent was that “Defendant Apple has had knowledge of the ’431 Patent since at least the filing 

of the original complaint.” Parus, No. 6:19-cv-432, at D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.) at ¶ 44

(emphasis added); see id. at Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 

2020) (dismissing indirect infringement claims). Like the allegations in Parus, Plaintiff fails to 

allege pre-suit knowledge and thus fails to state a claim for indirect infringement. See id.; Aguirre, 

2011 WL 2471299, at *3; Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 

2d 1260, 1268–69 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Also, because notice of the patent is necessarily provided 

by a complaint, finding that a complaint provides sufficient knowledge for induced infringement 

would vitiate the Supreme Court’s holding in Global–Tech that an allegation of knowledge of the 

patent is required to state a claim for induced infringement.”).

2

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for Induced 

Infringement

Plaintiff also entirely fails to plead specific intent in support of its inducement claim. 

Allegations of specific intent require factual “‘evidence of culpable conduct, directed to 

encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct 

 

of knowledge of infringement were that “[b]y the time of trial, Defendant Apple will have known 

and intended (since receiving such notice) that their continued actions would actively induce the 

infringement of the claims of the ’431 Patent.” (D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.) at ¶ 44)).

2 Other courts similarly have held that “knowledge after filing of the present action is not 

sufficient for pleading the requisite knowledge for indirect infringement.” Xpoint Technologies, 

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (D. Del. 2010); Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. 

Garmin Int’l, Inc., C 11-04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012); Proxyconn 

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 

16, 2012); Brandywine, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (“The weight of authority addressing the 

knowledge required for indirect infringement . . . requires a plaintiff to allege that defendant had 

pre-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit.”).

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 10 of 14
6

infringer’s activities.’” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 

WL 3940952, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 

1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s allegations of specific intent amount 

to a single conclusory statement that Defendants “actively induced” others to infringe through their 

advertising, promotional materials, and website citations. See Compl. at ¶ 24.3

 Such conclusory 

allegations fail to present facts that demonstrate: (1) Defendants knew that the alleged acts would 

infringe, and (2) Defendants knew that the promotion of their products would induce or encourage 

others to infringe the Asserted Patent. See Addiction, 620 F. App’x at 938 (“[S]imply recit[ing] 

the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific intent” fails to plead “facts that would 

allow a court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific intent to induce infringement.”); 

Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7, *21 (finding “Plaintiffs generalized allegations that Toyota 

induced others to infringe the Asserted Patents through its marketing and sales tactics are [] 

insufficient”). To support specific intent, Plaintiff must include specific allegations mapping the 

advertisement or promotion to the performance of the claimed steps of the patent—i.e., “evidence 

of culpable conduct, direct to encouraging another’s infringement.” Parity, 2019 WL 3940952, at 

*2.4

Plaintiff’s inducement claim should be dismissed because the Complaint is entirely silent 

on a key requirement of induced infringement. 

 

3 Plaintiff never once alleges that these third parties actually infringed.

4 See also Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 

1455336, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (“In no way does the complaint detail how an end user 

would infringe Hypermedia’s patents by following instructions in the links provided in the 

complaint.” (emphasis in original)); Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc., No. 

CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding mere citations to 

websites were insufficient to plead specific intent). 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 11 of 14
7

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial 

Non-Infringing Uses for Contributory Infringement 

Plaintiff’s contributory infringement allegations also fail because Plaintiff did not “‘plead 

facts that allow an inference that the components sold or offered for sale have no substantial noninfringing uses.’” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not pled a lack of substantial non-infringing uses because it cannot do so. Plaintiff’s 

only allegation on these elements is a conclusory statement that repeats the legal elements. See

Compl. at ¶ 25. As the Federal Circuit held in Artrip, conclusory allegations are not enough. 735 

F. App’x at 713 (affirming dismissal of a contributory infringement claim where the “complaint 

did not plausibly assert facts to suggest that [Defendant] was aware of the patents or facts to 

suggest that the [Accused Product] it supplied had no substantial noninfringing use”). Plaintiff’s 

failure to raise a plausible inference of no substantial non-infringing uses is fatal to its contributory 

infringement claim, and as such it should be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion 

and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failure to plausibly state a claim for relief, 

without leave to amend. Pursuant to L.R. CV-7(h), Defendants request an oral hearing on the 

foregoing motion.

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 12 of 14
8

Dated: October 5, 2020 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@sheltoncoburn.com

SHELTON COBURN LLP

311 RR 620, Suite 205

Austin, TX 78734-4775 

Telephone: 512.263.2165

Facsimile: 512.263.2166 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

Kyanna Sabanoglu

ksabanoglu@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 13 of 14
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on this 5th day of October 2020, all counsel of record who 

are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document 

through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(b)(1). 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 14 of 14