Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1502-JT-97 | August 18, 2015 Page 1 of 26

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patricia Caress McMath

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of:

S.M. & M.M. (minor children)

and

M.M. (mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

August 18, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1502-JT-97

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, 

Judge

The Honorable Larry E. Bradley, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D09-1409-

JT-386 & 49D09-1409-JT-387
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Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Respondent M.M. (“Mother”) gave birth to C.S., S.M. and M.M. 

(collectively, “the Children”),1 minor children born in 2002, 2006, and 2010, 

respectively. In 2011, Appellee-Petitioner the Indiana Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging the Children were children in need of 

services (“CHINS”). Less than a month later the Children were removed from 

Mother’s care over concerns about her behavior at a psychological 

examination. Mother had visitation with the Children until late 2011, but 

visitation was suspended due to Mother’s inconsistent attendance, and she has 

not seen the Children since then. 

[2] Over the years, Mother has been evaluated many times and has been found to 

have unaddressed mental issues. Mother has not taken the steps necessary to 

address her issues. All attempts at therapy or other treatment for Mother’s 

mental health issues have ended unsuccessfully and Mother has not completed 

other ordered services. Eventually, DCS changed the permanency plan for 

Children to adoption and petitioned for the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. The juvenile court held a hearing at which a DCS Family Case Manager 

(“FCM”) and guardian ad litem (“GAL”) both testified that termination was in 

 

1

 The termination of Mother’s parental rights as to C.S. is not at issue in this appeal. Moreover, none of the 

Children’s fathers take part in this appeal. 
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the Children’s best interests. The juvenile court granted DCS’s petition to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights as to S.M. and M.M., with Mother 

executing consent to C.S.’s adoption. Mother appeals, contending that DCS 

failed to establish that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal are 

unlikely to be remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses 

a threat to Children, and that termination is in the Children’s best interests. 

Because we conclude that DCS produced ample evidence to sustain the juvenile 

court’s judgment, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother was born on June 4, 1983. Mother gave birth to C.S., S.M. and M.M., 

minor children born on October 14, 2002, August 8, 2006, and July 21, 2010, 

respectively. On January 20, 2011, Mother admitted C.S. into Valle Vista, a 

mental health treatment center, claiming that C.S. had attempted to harm or kill 

S.M, molested S.M., shook M.M., screamed uncontrollably, and killed 

animals. FCM Michelle Vasquez investigated and interviewed Mother in 

Indianapolis. Mother told Vasquez that she and the Children had left Steuben 

County because the neighbors “had been climbing on her roof, they poisoned 

her kids and that they were nailing cats to the trees.” Tr. p. 400. Mother told 

Vasquez that she intended to flee Indiana with S.M. and M.M., abandoning 

C.S., should DCS become involved. Mother told Vasquez that C.S. had 

molested S.M. twice and that she kept C.S. away from S.M. by locking her in a 

room with the windows nailed closed. During Mother’s conversation with 
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FCM Vasquez, she also related her belief that the State of Indiana was 

poisoning the water, making her and the Children sterile, causing her hair to fall 

out, and giving the Children cholera. 

[4] On January 27, 2011, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were CHINS. 

On February 11, 2011, Mother submitted to a psychological examination at 

Aspire. Mother was described by an evaluator as “very anxious, tangential, 

hyper, extremely rapid speech, hostile, and that her thought content was 

positive for grandiose delusions, positive for persecutory delusions and 

paranoia.” Ex. Vol. p. 189. The intake worker at Aspire called 911 in the belief 

that Mother was in need of emergency hospitalization. Mother fled Aspire and 

an emergency detention order was issued. On or about February 16, 2011, the 

Children were removed from Mother and have not been placed with her since. 

[5] On May 23, 2011, the juvenile court adjudged the Children to be CHINS upon 

Mother’s admission that she

has mental health issues, for which she needs assessment and 

treatment. [Mother] has been unable to address [C.S.]’s 

behavioral issues, and believes [C.S.] has mental health issues 

which she is unable to address without assistance. [Mother] has 

been unwilling in the past to accept the help offered by [DCS] to 

address these issues, but is now willing to work with [DCS] and 

seek treatment for herself and her children that is recommended 

by involved service providers, including doctors, in order to 

reunify with her children.

Ex. Vol. pp. 26-27. 

[6] On June 17, 2011, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, during which 

it ordered Mother to maintain contact with the FCM; sign any releases 
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necessary to monitor compliance; keep appointments with DCS, the GAL, and 

service providers; maintain suitable housing and income; refrain from the use of 

illegal substances; participate in home-based counseling; complete a 

psychological evaluation and comply with resulting recommendations; and visit 

with the Children. 

[7] In approximately January of 2012, Duge Butler took over as FCM. (Tr. 434). 

On September 10, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children (“TPR Petition”). The juvenile court conducted a 

hearing on the TPR Petition on January 12 and 13, 2015. 

I. Evidence Related to Mother’s Mental Health

[8] DCS presented evidence related to Mother’s prior history with child welfare 

authorities and of mental illness. On January 16, 2004, child welfare 

authorities in Idaho removed C.S. from Mother’s care due to C.S.’s failure to 

thrive and medical neglect. C.S. ultimately remained out of Mother’s care for 

approximately three years. 

[9] As part of the Idaho case, Mother was evaluated in 2004 by psychologist David 

D. DeLawyer, Ph.D. Mother related to Dr. DeLawyer that she had run away 

from an abusive home at thirteen; lived for a time with a drug dealer who 

manufactured methamphetamine; and heavily used alcohol, marijuana, and 

methamphetamine. While Dr. DeLawyer ruled out bipolar disorder, he noted 

that Mother had a history of very dysfunctional relationships, met the criteria of 

antisocial personality disorder, exhibited strong patterns of paranoid personality 
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disorder, did not accept responsibility for her situation, and had a history of 

either not understanding C.S.’s needs or simply putting hers first. Dr. 

DeLawyer noted that there was little likelihood that Mother would be able to 

make the changes necessary for her to adequately parent C.S. 

[10] In May of 2011, Mother submitted to an evaluation by clinical psychologist 

Jerome Modlik, Psy.D. Dr. Modlik determined that Mother was suffering from 

a psychiatric disorder, most likely a paranoid personality disorder; exhibited 

poor judgment in parenting; and had insight Dr. Modlik judged as “nil.” Ex. 

Vol. p. 182. Dr. Modlik recommended that (1) Mother undergo a substance 

abuse evaluation, (2) Mother receive psychological and psychiatric treatment, 

(3) DCS provide supervised visitation with the Children, (4) the family receive 

counseling, (5) records from other child services agencies who have had 

dealings with Mother be obtained, (6) Mother receive assistance in acquiring

government aid, and (7) precautions should be taken to prevent Mother from 

fleeing Indiana. 

[11] On August 8, 2013, Mother was evaluated by psychologist J. Mark Dobbs, 

Psy.D. Dr. Dobbs diagnosed Mother with post-traumatic stress disorder in 

partial remission and adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of mood and 

conduct. 

II. Compliance with Mental Health Services

[12] Mother acknowledged that the juvenile court ordered her to complete the 

recommendations of her psychological evaluation and complete intensive 
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therapy. DCS referred Mother for evaluations, home-based therapy, and 

treatment to various providers. Mother, however, made no progress in therapy, 

dispite her mental health issues being the largest obstacle to reunification. 

Mother’s four referrals to home-based therapy all closed unsuccessfully due to 

Mother’s noncompliance. Mother did not complete the therapy recommended 

by Dr. Modlik. Mother’s failure to address her mental health issues resulted in 

DCS being unable to recommend reunification and is the main barrier to 

reunification with the Children. 

[13] Mother’s home-based therapists all expressed concern with Mother’s lack of 

insight into how her behavior and mental health issues caused the Children’s 

removal and prevented reunification. Mother’s last home-based therapist, 

Elizabeth Rojek, began working with Mother in December of 2013. Rojek

found Mother to be paranoid, with thought processes that were non-logical and 

tangential. Rojek suspected that Mother “broke with reality[.]” Tr. p. 363. 

Rojek opined that, due to Mother’s lack of insight as to how her behavior was 

unsafe, her mental health issues would put the Children at risk. Mother’s 

therapy was closed in February of 2014. 

III. Visitation

[14] By June of 2011, Mother’s supervised visits with Children were at eight hours 

per week. By September of 2011, Mother began missing visits and had missed 

six by the end of October. Mother’s stories about why she missed visitation 

were inconsistent. The visitation supervisor was concerned with Mother’s 
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paranoia as being detrimental to the Children. Mother called C.S. “a rapist and 

a murderer[,]” Tr. p. 151, and believed that C.S. was the reason for DCS’s 

involvement. On November 10, 2011, the juvenile court granted DCS’s motion 

to suspend visitation with the Children, and Mother has not seen them since. 

IV. Other Evidence

[15] Children were placed in foster care in February of 2011, and S.M. is still in that 

original placement. M.M. and C.S. have been placed with their current foster 

parents since July of 2012. M.M. has integrated into her foster family, thrives 

there, and is bonded to C.S. Separation would devastate C.S. and M.M. All of 

the foster parents ensure that all three children maintain their sibling 

relationship. 

[16] S.M. has been diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome and ADHD and requires 

stability: any change “throws him off completely. His behavior changes, his 

attitude, his anger issues come up.” Tr. p. 95. S.M. receives therapy and other 

services at home and school. S.M. was, at first, destructive, but has improved 

in the foster home, due to the structure, therapies, and medications. Mother 

does not believe that medications should be used to treat Asperger’s or ADHD. 

[17] DCS recommended termination of Mother’s rights because (1) Mother has been 

unable to demonstrate that she is capable of meeting Children’s needs, (2) the 

CHINS case has been open for four years, and (3) it is important for the 

Children to know where they will be. GAL Danielle Pierson testified that 

adoption was the best permanency plan for the Children because of (1) 
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Mother’s lack of compliance with services; (2) Mother’s lack of insight; (3) 

Mother’s lack of stability dating back to the Idaho case; and (4) Mother’s 

tendency to return the Children to her parents, who, according to Mother, were 

abusive to her. FCM Butler testified that in over four years, none of the 

Children’s parents, including Mother, had demonstrated that they were capable 

of addressing their own needs “in order to ensure the health, welfare and 

stability of the children.” Tr. p. 463. DCS’s plan is for adoption, which would 

allow the Children to have permanency, and the DCS has located pre-adoptive 

homes form the Children. 

[18] On January 22, 2015, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights in C.S., S.M., and M.M., which order provides as follows:

ORDER TERMINATING THE PARENT-CHILD 

RELATIONSHIP

This matter came before the Court on January 12th and 13th, 

2015, for evidence upon a Petition for Termination of the ParentChild Relationship. Petitioner, The Indiana Department of 

Child Services, Marion County, “IDCSMC” appeared by family 

case manager Duge Butler, Jr. and by counsel, Donna Carr. 

Respondent mother [Mother] appeared in person and by counsel, 

Roberta Staten, Kevin Kolbus, and Katherine Cornelius. 

Danielle Pierson of Child Advocates, Inc. appeared in person 

and by counsel, Toby Gill. Respondent father [D.A.] failed to 

appear. Respondent father [R.M.] failed to appear. Respondent 

father [S.S.] failed to appear.

Cause of Action

The Indiana Department of Child Services, Marion County has 

brought an action to involuntarily terminate the parent-child 
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relationship between respondent parents and their respective 

children under IC 31-35-2-1 alleging:

1. The children have been found to be in need of services;

2. The children have been removed from the home of the 

parents for at least six (6) months under a disposition decree;

3. There is a reasonable probability that (a) the conditions 

that resulted in the removal of the children outside the home will 

not be remedied, (b) the reasons for the continued placement of 

the children outside the parents’ home will not be remedied, or 

(c) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat 

to the well-being of the children;

4. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best 

interests of the children;

5. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the children.

These allegations must be established true by clear and 

convincing evidence. IC 31-34-12-2. If so proved, the parentchild relationship shall be terminated. IC 31-35-2-8 (a).

Findings

Upon evidence presented, the Court now finds by clear and 

convincing evidence:

1. [Mother] is the mother of [C.S.], [S.M.] and [M.M.], 

minor children born on October 14, 2002, August 8, 2006, and 

July 21, 2010, respectively. 

2. [Mother] has executed consents for [C.S.]’s adoption.

3. [S.S.] is the father of [C.S.].

4. [R.M.] is the father of [S.M.].

5. [D.A.] is the father of [M.M.].

6. Child in Need of Services Petitions “ChINS” were filed on 

the children on January 27, 2011, under Cause Number 

49D091110JC033l8-20 after IDCSMC investigator Michelle 

Vasquez received a 310 report and interviewed [Mother] at a 
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hotel where the family were staying, finding concern over 

unreported sexual contact between [C.S.] and [S.M.], and the 

method of keeping [C.S.] away from [S.M.] by locking her

upstairs and nailing windows shut. Ms. Vasquez also had 

concerns over [Mother]’s mental health observing her rapid 

speech and thoughts “all over the place”, and [Mother]’s 

concerns about Indiana putting poison in the water making her 

sterile and the children’s hair fall out, and her neighbor’s actions 

against the family.

7. Just prior to the ChiNS case being filed, [Mother] had 

placed [C.S.] in Valle Vista Health Services for perceived 

behavior issues, including that [C.S.] shook [M.M.] and threw 

her on the floor.

8. [C.S.] was previously the subject of an Idaho Children and 

Family Services matter for three and one-half years, and was 

placed out of her mother’s care.

9. [An] [i]nitial Hearing was held on January 27, 2011, at 

which time [C.S.] was ordered detained with continued 

placement at Valle Vista and therapeutic foster care.

10. [S.M.] and [M.M.] continued placed in their mother’s care 

conditioned upon [Mother] undergoing a psychological 

evaluation and following all recommendations up to and 

including taking prescription medicines.

11. A referral was made to Adult and Child Mental Health for 

a psychological evaluation and intensive family preservation 

services.

12. [Mother] did not wish to use services within the IDCS 

providers.

13. [Mother] went to Aspire Indiana for an assessment on 

February 16, 2011. Upon presenting as manic with illogical 

thought process, it was recommended [Mother] be detained in 

the hospital. [Mother] instead left Aspire with [S.M.] and 

[M.M.] who were then detained and placed outside their 

mother’s care.
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14. On May 23, 2011, the children were found to be in need of 

services after [Mother] admitted to mental health issues for which 

she needed an assessment and treatment, and that she needed 

assistance with [C.S.]’s mental health needs.

15. Disposition for [Mother] was held on June 17, 2011, at 

which time the children’s placement continued outside the home. 

They had been removed for at least six (6) months prior to this 

termination action being filed on September 10, 2014.

16. Services ordered included completing a psychological 

evaluation and successfully complete any recommendations that 

result from the evaluation, and home based counselling. In 

addition, [Mother] was ordered to maintain weekly contact with 

the IDCSMC, sign any release needed to monitor compliance 

with services, and attend all scheduled visitations with the 

children.

17. Intensive family preservation services were closed after the 

children were removed from [Mother].

18. Home based therapy was referred in March of 2011, but 

closed due to [Mother]’s non-participation.

19. At the May 23, 2011, hearing when the children were 

found to be in need of services, [Mother] admitted that she had 

been unwilling in the past to accept the help offered by the 

Department of Child Services to address her issues. But was now 

willing to work with the Department of Child Services and seek 

treatment for herself and her children that was recommended by 

involved service providers, including doctors, in order to reunify 

with her children.

20. [Mother] did not wish to attend Adult and Child for a 

psychological evaluation and found Dr. Jerome Modlik to do the 

evaluation on May 16, 2011.

21. During the evaluation, Dr. Modlik observed [Mother]’s 

speech to be fast, seemingly pressured, and that she rambled 

incoherently or tangentially.
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22. The type of speech and thought process was observed by 

service providers and on occasion during this termination trial.

23. Dr. Modlik believed that [Mother]’s testing was consistent 

with a paranoid personality disorder, or possible paranoid 

delusional disorder. Her symptoms appeared to be associated 

with anxiety and fear.

24. [Mother] has demonstrated paranoia during the chins case 

on several occasions, not trusting agencies and agency service 

providers, audio or video taping excessively, dismissing several 

attorneys, requesting a new ChINS judge, and testifying that all 

witnesses but one deliberately lied during this termination trial.

25. Dr. Modlik reported that individuals with high scores on 

Paranoia scale are generally described as overtly suspicious, 

angry and fearful as well as hypersensitive to perceived slights 

and insults. They have a difficulty forming intimate and 

satisfying interpersonal relationships and prefer to keep people at 

a distance less they be hurt or harmed in some way.

26. [Mother]’s Paranoid personality is a very difficult 

condition to change. 

27. Dr. Modlik found that the severity of [Mother]’s disorder 

is likely to impact her capacity to parent small children to a 

greater or lesser extent, and that her difficulty with empathy for 

her children’s negative behaviors is probably the single most 

important liability affecting her capacity to effectively parent her 

children.

28. [Mother] stated she was fed up with [C.S.]’s behavior and 

she wished to consent to [C.S.]’s adoption early in the ChINS 

case at which time she was age nine.

29. [C.S.] has been diagnosed with having Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder, suffering from neglect and sexual abuse, and 

Reactive Attachment Disorder.

30. Dr. Modlik found that [Mother] made poor judgments and 

her insight was judged to be nil.
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31. Dr. Modlik’s recommendations included [Mother] 

undergo psychological and psychiatric treatment from a quality 

psychotherapeutic service.

32. In 2004, during [C.S.]’s Idaho Children and Family 

Services case, [Mother] underwent a comprehensive 

psychological evaluation at which time she was found to exhibit 

pervasive paranoid ideation and possibly mild thought 

disturbance.

33. [Mother] sought out a psychological examination from Dr. 

Dobbs on August 8, 2013. Due to information based on selfreporting only, and a lack of personality testing or objective 

testing, the results are not nearly as comprehensive as her 2004 

and 2011 evaluations.

34. [Mother] has suffered a difficult and traumatic childhood 

and adolescence.

35. Intensive psychotherapy was referred for [Mother] a 

second time in June of 2011, after Dr. Modlik’s 

recommendation. That referral was closed unsuccessfully due to 

[Mother]’s inconsistent attendance, her behavior issues during 

sessions, and lack of progress.

36. Visitation was suspended by the ChINS Court on 

November 10, 2011, based on [Mother]’s inconsistency in 

visiting, her detrimental favoring of [S.M.] during visits, and her 

lack of participation in services.

37. [Mother] has not seen her children since October of 2011.

38. A third therapy referral was made in August of 2012, 

which was also closed.

39. A clinical assessment was referred to Cummins Mental 

Health in January of 2013.

40. In December of 2013, a fourth therapy referral was made 

and Kate Rojek of Life Solutions Counseling started working 

with [Mother]. Ms. Rojek thought [Mother] was disassociated 

from reality at times and her thought process to be non-logical 

and tangential and very paranoid. [Mother] blamed [C.S.] for 
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IDCSMC involvement and focused negatively on service 

providers, including Ms. Rojek, and IDCSMC as deliberately 

sabotaging her case.

41. In February of 2014, no progress had been made toward 

the goal of [Mother] obtaining insight. Most of the therapy 

sessions were taken up with trying to re-direct [Mother]. Due to 

[Mother]’s significant mental health needs, Ms. Rojek felt that 

more intensive psychological services were needed.

42. Based on recommendations from Dr. Modlik, and 

[Mother] wanting outside agency provider help, the IDCSMC 

sought funding for [Mother] to obtain treatment from Dr. Ray at 

Meridian Psychological Associates. Funding was approved but a 

release of information was needed to monitor services prior to 

funds being released. [Mother] failed to execute a release.

43. [C.S.] and [M.M.] were placed in their current foster home 

in July of 2012. This home is pre-adoptive. [C.S.] is in therapy 

to address the trauma she sustained. [C.S.] exhibited behavior 

problems when placed in the home. Her behaviors have 

improved. Her caregivers understand [C.S.]’s diagnosis and are 

meeting all her needs, including special needs. She is no longer 

showing signs of Reactive Attachment Disorder.

44. [M.M.] has fit in with the family since her placement.

45. [C.S.] watches out for her sister, and they share a deep 

bond. Separating the two would be devastating. 

46. [S.M.] was placed in his home in early 2001. He has been 

diagnosed with Asperger’ s and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder. He receives Vyvanse and Risperdal. He exhibited 

outbursts which have become less intense and less frequent. 

[S.M.] needs routine in his schedule to maintain his behavior.

47. [Mother] does not believe [S.M.] has Asperger’s and does 

not believe he should be taking medication. 

48. [S.M.]’s current caretakers do not plan on adopting him 

due to their age. The do wish to keep meeting his needs in their 
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home until a pre-adoptive family is found. [S.M.] has been found 

to act out sexually and he is scheduled for a psychological exam.

49. The IDCSMC has family, relatives of [S.M.]’s current 

caregivers, that are wishing to adopt [S.M.], and [S.M.] knows 

them.

50. The family case manager and Guardian ad Litem believe 

that [S.M.] is an adoptable child.

51. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in [S.M.] and [M.M.]’s removal and continued 

placement outside the home will not be remedied by their 

mother. [Mother] has significant mental health issues and has 

not made any progress in addressing these issues in the four years 

since the ChINS case was filed. She continues to lack insight 

into her condition.

52. Continuation of the parent-child relationship with 

[Mother] poses a threat to the children’s well-being in that it 

would pose a barrier to obtaining permanency for them through 

an adoption when their mother is unable to parent in a safe 

manner. It would devastate [M.M.] to leave her sister and the 

caregivers she now knows as her family. The Court has major 

concerns whether [S.M.] would receive the treatment and routine 

his special needs require and if not, will his mother then treat him 

detrimentally as she did [C.S.] for negative behavior.

53. [C.S.] was found to be in need of services and disposition 

was held on [S.S.] on July 8, 2011, at which time her placement 

continued outside the home. She had been removed for at least 

six (6) months prior to this termination action being filed.

54. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the removal and continued placement of [C.S.] 

outside the home will not be remedied by her father. [S.S.] has 

not made the effort needed to commit to parenting [C.S.] by not 

wanting to participate in therapy and not participating in this 

termination case. [S.S.] last saw [C.S.] three years ago. Another 

barrier remedying conditions remains the fact that [C.S.] wants 
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no contact with her father and continues to identify him as a 

perpetrator of sex abuse on her.

55. Continuation of the parent-child relationship with [S.S.] 

poses a threat to [C.S.]’s well-being in that it would pose as a 

barrier to obtaining permanency for her through an adoption 

when her father remains seemingly uninterested to do what is 

needed. Further, [C.S.] does not want to see her father and it 

would be detrimental to separate her from her sister.

56. [S.M.] was found to be in need of services and disposition 

was held for [R.M.] on July 8, 2011, at which time [S.M.]’s 

placement remained out of home. He had been removed for at 

least six months prior to this termination action being filed.

57. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the removal and continued placement of [S.M.] 

outside the home will not be remedied by his father. [R.M.] 

continues to reside in Idaho and last saw [S.M.] in 2012. Four 

ICPCs have been denied and no services have been completed to 

address concerns of substance abuse, instability and [R.M.]’s 

criminal history. [R.M.] failed to participate in this termination 

action demonstrating his lack of concern for his son.

58. Continuation of the parent-child relationship with [R.M.] 

poses a threat to [S.M.]’s well-being in that it would be a barrier 

to obtaining permanency for [S.M.] into a family that will 

provide for all of his needs.

59. On May 23, 2011, [D.A.] waived a formal fact-finding 

hearing after [Mother] admitted to [M.M.] being in need of 

services.

60. Disposition was held for [D.A.] on June 17, 2011, at 

which time [M.M.]’s placement continued outside the home. 

She had been removed for at least six (6) months prior to this 

termination action being filed.

61. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the removal and continued placement of [M.M.] 

outside the home will not be remedied by her father. [D.A.] has 
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demonstrated he is either unable or unwilling to be a parent to 

[M.M.] by his lack of completing home based services and lack of 

visitation.

62. Continuation of the parent-child relationship with [D.A.] 

poses a threat to [M.M.]’s well-being in that it would pose a 

barrier to obtaining permanency for [M.M.] by being adopted 

into the only family she knows and with her sister.

63. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best 

interests of the children. Termination would allow them to be 

adopted into a stable and permanent home where all their needs 

will be safely met.

64. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and 

treatment of the children, that being adoption.

65. The Guardian ad Litem agrees with adoption as being the 

plan for permanency.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED : that the parent-child relationship between [S.M.] 

and [M.M.] and [Mother] is hereby terminated. The parent-child 

relationship between [C.S.] and [S.S.] is hereby terminated. The 

parent-child relationship between [S.M.] and [R.M.] is hereby 

terminated. The parent-child relationship between [M.M.] and 

[D.A.] is hereby terminated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED : that all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, 

duties and obligations, any rights to custody, parenting time or 

support, pertaining to the relationship are permanently 

terminated, including the need to consent to adoption.

Appellant’s App. pp. 24-30. 

Discussion and Decision

[19] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children. Bester v. 
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Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, 

we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued 

relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights 

when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet her responsibility as a parent. In re 

T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, 

parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s 

interest in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the 

parent-child relationship. Id. 

[20] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to 

protect the children. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the 

children’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile 

court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their 

physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[21] Mother contends that the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing

was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to S.M. and M.M. In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this 

court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In 

re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile 

court’s decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as 

here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its 
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order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. 

First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, 

second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id. 

[22] In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we 

set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly 

erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. 

Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the 

juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not 

support the judgment. Id.

[23] In order to involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights, DCS must 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that: 

(A) one (1) of the following exists:

(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six 

(6) months under a dispositional decree;

(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are 

not required, including a description of the court’s finding, the 

date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made; or

(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a county office of family and children 

or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the 

most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date 

the child is removed from the home as a result of the child 

being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent 

child;
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(B) there is a reasonable probability that:

(i) the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not 

be remedied; or

(ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

[24] Although Mother contends that she was denied the process due to her, we agree 

with DCS’s characterization of the argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the juvenile court’s decision. Specifically, Mother 

contends that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the 

conditions leading to the removal of the Children from her would not be 

remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to 

the Children, and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. 

I. Reasonable Probability that the Conditions Resulting 

in Removal Would Not be Remedied

[25] Mother contends that the record does not establish that the reasons for the 

Children’s removal would not be remedied. 

In determining whether “the conditions that resulted in the child 

[ren]’s removal ... will not be remedied,” id., we “engage in a 

two-step analysis,” [K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn 

Cnty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)]. First, 

we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we 

“determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting [In re I.A., 934 
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N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010)]) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s 

fitness “as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions,” Bester v. Lake Cty. 

Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)—

balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual 

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 

at 1231 (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). We entrust that delicate balance to the trial 

court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more 

heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. See 

K.T.K., at 1234. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to 

changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that 

parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future 

behavior.

In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (footnote omitted). 

[26] At the termination hearing, Mother acknowledged mental health issues. DCS 

presented testimony that Mother’s mental health issues were the biggest 

obstacle to reunification. Although Mother also acknowledged that she had 

been ordered to complete treatment, she admitted that she had not done so. 

Consequently, Mother has made no progress in addressing her mental health 

issues. 

[27] Mother cites several cases for the proposition that mental health issues, 

standing alone, are not a proper basis for termination of parental rights and 

argues that there was no evidence that her issues had negatively impacted the 

Children. The record does not support this argument. Mother acknowledges 

Dr. Modlik’s testimony that her lack of empathy with the Children is a liability 
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in effective parenting, that her untreated mental health issues meant that she 

needed assistance in meeting C.S.’s needs, and that visitation with the Children 

was suspended because Mother was not making progress with ordered services. 

Additionally, the trial court made unchallenged findings regarding Dr. Modlik’s 

evidence, namely that “the severity of [Mother]’s disorder is likely to impact her 

capacity to parent small children to a greater or lesser extent, and that her 

difficulty with empathy for her children’s negative behaviors is probably the 

single most important liability affecting her capacity to effectively parent her 

children.” Appellant’s App. pp. 26-27. 

[28] Moreover, Mother’s therapists were universal in their opinion that Mother’s 

lack of insight prevented reunification, and one opined that her lack of insight 

prevented her from keeping the Children safe. Rojek testified that Mother’s 

mental health issues would put the Children at risk and that without the insight 

that Mother lacked, there was no confidence that the Children would be safe in 

Mother’s care. 

[29] As far back as 2004, Mother was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder 

and exhibited strong patterns of paranoid personality disorder. Mother has 

since been evaluated for mental illness at least twice, with one evaluator 

concluding that Mother likely had a paranoid personality disorder and the 

second diagnosing her with post-traumatic stress disorder and adjustment 

disorder with mixed disturbance of mood and conduct. Despite substantial 

evidence that Mother is suffering from mental illness and that her illness 

negatively affects her ability to care for the Children, Mother has done little to 
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address the situation. Over the course of several years, Mother has made 

essentially no progress. We cannot say that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

removal are unlikely to be remedied. 

II. Parent-Child Relationship Posed a Threat to the 

Children

[30] Mother contends that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish 

that a parent-child relationship between her and the Children posed a threat to 

them. Indiana Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, 

and the juvenile court need only find either that the conditions resulting in 

removal will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the children. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. As we have already upheld the trial court’s 

conclusion that the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied, we 

need not address Mother’s argument in this regard further. 

III. Children’s Best Interests

[31] Mother also contends that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best 

interests. We are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of the 

Children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by 

DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of 

Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the 
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juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the 

children involved. Id. Furthermore, this court has previously determined that 

the testimony of a GAL regarding the children’s need for permanency supports 

a finding that termination is in the children’s best interests. In the matter of 

Y.E.C., 534 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 

[32] As Mother acknowledges, both FCM Butler and GAL Pierson recommended 

termination of Mother’s parental rights as being in the Children’s best interests. 

This evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination is in the Children’s best interests. See, e.g., In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 

766, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that testimony of GAL and family 

case manager was sufficient to sustain finding that termination was in the 

child’s best interests). Mother cites to In re Termination of Parent-Child 

Relationship of A.B., 888 N.E.2d 231, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, for 

the propositions that FCM and GAL testimony “alone may not serve as a basis 

for termination of parental rights [and a] parent’s right to his or her children 

may not be terminated solely because a better place to live exists elsewhere.” 

The juvenile court’s decision in this case did not solely depend on FCM and 

GAL testimony, however, and this proceeding is not simply a matter of finding 

a better place for the Children to live. As the juvenile court’s comprehensive 

findings demonstrate, the record is replete with evidence of Mother’s inability 

or unwillingness to be an effective parent to the Children. In the over four years 

since the Children were removed from Mother’s care, there is essentially no 

evidence of any progress whatsoever in addressing the issues that caused the 
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removal. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s 

best interests. 

[33] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.