Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices 35861 

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: 

The Army’s rules for accessing 

records, and for contesting contents and 

appealing initial agency determinations 

are contained in Army Regulation 340– 

21; 32 CFR part 505; or may be obtained 

from the system manager. 

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: 

From the individual, military and 

civilian personnel records and reports, 

civilian maritime records, U.S. Coast 

Guard, commanders and vessel masters, 

and other appropriate sources able to 

furnish relevant information. 

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM: 

None. 

[FR Doc. 2011–15272 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2011–1] 

Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment 

and Immobilization Plant 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice, recommendation. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

2286a(a)(5), the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board has made a 

recommendation to the Secretary of 

Energy concerning the safety culture at 

the Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant located at the 

Hanford site in the state of Washington. 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

July 20, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning this 

recommendation to: Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004–2901. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau 

at the address above or telephone 

number (202) 694–7000. 

Dated: June 14, 2011. 

Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman. 

RECOMMENDATION 2011–1 TO THE 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY 

Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment 

and Immobilization Plant 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5) 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As 

Amended 

Dated: June 09, 2011 

Introduction 

Secretary of Energy Notice SEN–35– 

91, Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on 

September 9, 1991, and superseding 

policy statement #2 of DOE Policy 

420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear 

Safety Policy, issued on February 8, 

2011, state that the Department of 

Energy (DOE) is committed to 

establishing and maintaining a strong 

safety culture at its nuclear facilities. 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) has determined that the 

prevailing safety culture at the Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant 

(WTP) is flawed and effectively defeats 

this Secretarial mandate. The Board’s 

investigative record demonstrates that 

both DOE and contractor project 

management behaviors reinforce a 

subculture at WTP that deters the timely 

reporting, acknowledgement, and 

ultimate resolution of technical safety 

concerns. 

Background 

In a letter to the Secretary of Energy 

dated July 27, 2010, the Board stated 

that it would investigate the health and 

safety concerns at the WTP at Hanford 

raised in a letter to the Board dated July 

16, 2010, from Dr. Walter Tamosaitis. 

The Board’s investigation focused on 

allegations raised by Dr. Tamosaitis, a 

contractor employee removed from his 

position at WTP, a construction project 

in Washington State funded by DOE and 

managed by Bechtel National, 

Incorporated (BNI). The Board’s inquiry 

did not attempt to assess the validity of 

Dr. Tamosaitis’s retaliation claim, but 

rather, as required by the Board’s 

statute, examined whether his 

allegations of a failed safety culture at 

WTP, if proven true, might reveal events 

or practices adversely affecting safety in 

the design, construction, and operation 

of this defense nuclear facility. 

The Board is required by statute to 

investigate any event or practice at a 

defense nuclear facility which it 

determines may adversely affect public 

health and safety. The Board conducted 

this investigation pursuant to its 

investigative power under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2286a(a)(2). During the course of the 

Board’s inquiry, 45 witnesses were 

interviewed and more than 30,000 pages 

of documents were examined. The 

Principal Investigator was Joel R. 

Schapira, Deputy General Counsel, 

assisted by John G. Batherson, Associate 

General Counsel, and Richard E. 

Tontodonato, Deputy Technical 

Director. The record of the investigation 

is non-public and will be preserved in 

the Office of the General Counsel’s files. 

During the period of the investigation, 

the Board held a public hearing 

regarding safety issues at WTP. During 

that hearing the Board received 

additional information related to the 

kind of safety culture concerns raised by 

Dr. Tamosaitis. Consequently, the 

investigation was expanded to review 

these new concerns. 

Secretary of Energy Notice SEN–35– 

91, Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on 

September 9, 1991, and superseding 

policy statement #2 of DOE Policy 

420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear 

Safety Policy, issued on February 8, 

2011, state that DOE is committed to 

establishing and maintaining a strong 

safety culture at its nuclear facilities. 

The investigation’s principal conclusion 

is that the prevailing safety culture at 

this project effectively defeats this 

Secretarial mandate. The investigative 

record demonstrates that both DOE and 

contractor project management 

behaviors reinforce a subculture at WTP 

that deters the timely reporting, 

acknowledgement, and ultimate 

resolution of technical safety concerns. 

A key attribute of a healthy safety 

culture as identified by DOE’s Energy 

Facility Contractors Group and 

endorsed by Deputy Secretary of Energy 

memorandum dated January 16, 2009, 

and in the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s proposed policy 

statement on safety culture (NRC–2010– 

0282, dated January 5, 2011), is that 

leaders demonstrate clear expectations 

and a commitment to safety in their 

decisions and behaviors. The Board’s 

investigation found significant failures 

by both DOE and contractor 

management to implement their roles as 

advocates for a strong safety culture. 

The record shows that the tension at 

the WTP project between organizations 

charged with technical issue resolution 

and development of safety basis scope, 

and those organizations charged with 

completing design and advancing 

construction, is unusually high. This 

unhealthy tension has rendered the 

WTP project’s formal processes to 

resolve safety issues largely ineffective. 

DOE reviews and investigations have 

failed to recognize the significance of 

this fact. Consequently, neither DOE nor 

contractor management has taken 

effective remedial action to advance the 

Secretary’s mandate to establish and 

maintain a strong safety culture at WTP. 

Taken as a whole, the investigative 

record convinces the Board that the 

safety culture at WTP is in need of 

prompt, major improvement and that 

corrective actions will only be 

successful and enduring if championed 

by the Secretary of Energy. The 

successful completion of WTP’s mission 


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35862 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices 

to remove and stabilize high-level waste 

from the tank farms is essential to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public and workers at Hanford. 

However, the flawed safety culture 

currently embedded in the project has a 

substantial probability of jeopardizing 

that mission. 

Findings 

Finding One: A Chilled Atmosphere 

Adverse to Safety Exists 

In a letter to the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (Board) dated 

July 16, 2010, Dr. Walter Tamosaitis, a 

former engineering manager at the 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant (WTP), alleged that he was 

removed from the project because he 

identified certain technical issues that 

in his view could affect safety. Dr. 

Tamosaitis also alleged that there was a 

failed safety culture at WTP. With full 

understanding that the formal claims of 

retaliation raised by Dr. Tamosaitis 

would be looked into by others, the 

Board decided that his assertions raised 

serious questions about safety culture 

and safety management at WTP. From 

late July 2010 to May 2011, the Board 

reviewed a large number of documents 

and interviewed a substantial number of 

persons, including Dr. Tamosaitis, to 

assess whether or not his allegations of 

safety issues and of a faulty safety 

culture were borne out. The Board’s 

investigation later expanded in scope to 

address matters related to the Board’s 

October 2010 public hearing at Hanford 

on safety issues at WTP. This phase of 

the investigation consisted of closed 

hearings at which sworn testimony was 

elicited from DOE and contractor 

personnel. 

The Board finds that the specific 

technical issues identified by Dr. 

Tamosaitis in his July 16, 2010, letter 

were known and tracked by the WTP 

project. In a WTP project managers’ 

meeting on July 1, 2010, Dr. Tamosaitis 

raised safety concerns related to the 

adequacy of vessel mixing, technical 

justifications for closing mixing issues, 

and other open technical issues. The 

next day he was abruptly removed from 

the project. This sent a strong message 

to other WTP project employees that 

individuals who question current 

practices or provide alternative points of 

view are not considered team players 

and will be dealt with harshly. 

The Board finds that expressions of 

technical dissent affecting safety at 

WTP, especially those affecting 

schedule or budget, were discouraged, if 

not opposed or rejected without review. 

Project management subtly, 

consistently, and effectively 

communicated to employees that 

differing professional opinions counter 

to decisions reached by management 

were not welcome and would not be 

dealt with on their merits. There is a 

firm belief among WTP project 

personnel that persisting in a dissenting 

argument can lead, as in the case of Dr. 

Tamosaitis, to the employee being 

removed from the project or reassigned 

to other duties. As of the writing of this 

finding, Dr. Tamosaitis sits in a 

basement cubicle in Richland with no 

meaningful work. His isolated physical 

placement by contractor management 

and the lack of meaningful work is seen 

by many as a constant reminder of what 

management will do to an employee 

who raises issues that might impact 

budget or schedule. 

Other examples of a failed safety 

culture include: 

• The Board heard testimony from 

several witnesses that raising safety 

issues that can add to project cost or 

delay schedule will hurt one’s career 

and reduce one’s participation on 

project teams. 

• A high ranking safety expert on the 

project testified that the expert felt next 

in line for removal after Dr. Tamosaitis 

because of the expert’s refusal to yield 

to technically unsound positions on 

matters affecting safety advanced by 

DOE and contractor managers 

responsible for design and construction 

at the WTP. This safety expert’s concern 

was validated by a senior DOE official 

in separate sworn testimony. 

• A report prepared by a 

subcontractor on the WTP project, ‘‘URS 

Report of Involvement in WTP 

Investigation,’’ discusses the ‘‘tension 

between organizations charged with 

technical issue resolution and 

development of safety basis related 

scope and those organizations charged 

with completing design and advancing 

construction. Some level of such tension 

is normal and healthy in projects of 

such scope and complexity; but at WTP, 

this tension is higher than what might 

be expected or desired. Some 

individuals whose personalities tend 

toward avoidance of conflict could view 

the organizational environment as not 

conducive to raising issues or perhaps 

even potentially suppressing some 

issues that might deter progress or that 

might add cost.’’ 

• The investigative record shows that 

the DOE Office of River Protection 

Employee Concerns program is not 

effective. One safety expert explicitly 

testified that employees would not and 

did not use the program, and believed 

that individuals running the program 

would ‘‘bury issues’’ brought to them. 

The record shows that in the removal of 

Dr. Tamosaitis, Human Resources (HR) 

for URS was interested only in 

implementing management’s demand 

that the employee be removed 

immediately. The record shows HR did 

not assert any consideration or concern 

regarding the effect the process and 

manner of his removal would have on 

the remaining workforce and the 

effectiveness of the contractor employee 

protection program required under 10 

CFR Part 708. 

• An independent review of the WTP 

safety culture performed by DOE’s 

Office of Health, Safety and Security 

(HSS) found that ‘‘a number of 

individuals have lost confidence in 

management support for safety, believe 

there is a chilled environment that 

discourages reporting of safety concerns, 

and/or are concerned about retaliation 

for reporting safety concerns. These 

concerns are not isolated and warrant 

timely management attention, including 

additional efforts to determine the 

extent of the concerns.’’ Although the 

HSS report stated that most WTP 

personnel did not share these opinions, 

the Board notes that personnel 

interviewed by HSS were escorted to 

their interviews by management. The 

Board’s record shows that involving 

management with the interviews clearly 

can inhibit the willingness of employees 

to express concerns. In its own way, 

DOE’s decision to allow management to 

be involved in the HSS investigation 

raises concerns about safety culture. 

This environment at WTP does not 

meet key attributes established by DOE’s 

Energy Facility Contractors Group, and 

endorsed by the Deputy Secretary of 

Energy, that describe a strong safety 

culture: DOE and contractor leadership 

must have a clear understanding of their 

commitment to safety; they are the 

leading advocates of safety and the 

public trust demands that they 

demonstrate their commitment in both 

word and action. The Board’s 

investigation concludes that the WTP 

project is not maintaining a safety 

conscious work environment where 

personnel feel free to raise safety 

concerns without fear of retaliation, 

intimidation, harassment, or 

discrimination. 

Finding Two: DOE and Contractor 

Management Suppress Technical 

Dissent 

The HSS review of the safety culture 

on the WTP project ‘‘indicates that BNI 

has established and implemented 

generally effective, formal processes for 

identifying, documenting, and resolving 

nuclear safety, quality, and technical 

concerns and issues raised by 

employees and for managing complex 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices 35863 

technical issues.’’ However, the Board 

finds that these processes are 

infrequently used, not universally 

trusted by the WTP project staff, 

vulnerable to pressures caused by 

budget or schedule, and are therefore 

not effective. Previous independent 

reviews, contractor surveys, 

investigations, and other efforts by DOE 

and contractors demonstrate repeated, 

continuing identification of the same 

safety culture deficiencies without 

effective resolution. 

Suppression of technical dissent is 

contrary to the principles that guide a 

high-reliability organization. It is 

essential that workers feel empowered 

to speak candidly without fear of 

retribution or criticism. In extreme 

cases, refusal to consider a different 

view of a safety issue can lead to 

catastrophic consequences. WTP is a 

complex and difficult project that is 

essential to the nation’s nuclear waste 

remediation program. Therefore, federal 

and contractor managers must make a 

special effort to foster a free and open 

atmosphere in which all competent 

opinions are judged on their technical 

merit, to sustain or improve worker and 

public safety first and foremost, and 

then evaluate potential impacts on cost 

and schedule. 

One of the primary examples of 

suppressing technical information is a 

study that was performed by BNI in July 

2009 on deposition velocity, a 

parameter used in modeling the offsite 

transport of radioactive particles for 

nuclear facility safety analyses. The 

study found that the correct value of the 

dry deposition velocity for Hanford fell 

in the range of 0.1 to 0.3 cm/sec. The 

Board’s investigation includes 

testimony by the former manager of 

DOE’s Office of River Protection and the 

DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety in 

Washington, DC, that the results of this 

study were not shared with them. 

Consequently, DOE continued to follow 

its policy requiring the WTP project to 

use a less conservative default value of 

1.0 cm/sec for dry deposition velocity. 

In the fall of 2010, the Chief of Nuclear 

Safety hired an independent consultant 

to investigate the issue. This consultant 

also found that deposition velocity fell 

in the range of 0.1 to 0.3 cm/sec, 

information that was already available 

to the project in the summer of 2009. 

Suppression of the 2009 study delayed 

the identification of properly 

conservative values for dry deposition 

velocity to use in the safety analyses 

that determine the need for safetyrelated controls for WTP facilities. Once 

this information was made available to 

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and 

Security, a technical study ensued that 

determined the need for a more 

conservative value of deposition 

velocity to serve as a default value. 

This problem also manifested itself 

when one of the expert witnesses, a 

nuclear safety professional, specifically 

asked by the Board to testify at the 

Board’s October 2010 public hearing on 

WTP safety issues, failed to support the 

DOE policy on the appropriate value for 

dry deposition velocity. This witness 

testified that using DOE’s prescribed 

default value for the dry deposition 

velocity in safety basis calculations 

could not be justified if it were known 

to be non-conservative for the Hanford 

Site. At the time of the hearing, the 

witness understood the correct value of 

deposition velocity was not being used 

in calculations of potential dose 

consequences to the public receptor and 

was unwilling to simply state the DOE 

position that a default value could be 

used or justified. The expert witness 

later testified for the record that DOE 

was fully aware of the July 2009 study 

on dry deposition velocity at the time of 

the public hearing. The expert witness’ 

testimony during the public hearing 

clashed with the position taken by 

senior management in the DOE Office of 

River Protection and by the DOE Chief 

of Nuclear Safety. 

The testimony of several witnesses 

confirms that the expert witness was 

verbally admonished by the highest 

level of DOE line management at DOE’s 

debriefing meeting following this 

session of the hearing. Although 

testimony varies on the exact details of 

the verbal interchange, it is clear that 

strong hostility was expressed toward 

the expert witness whose testimony 

strayed from DOE management’s policy 

while that individual was attempting to 

adhere to accepted professional 

standards. Testimony by a senior DOE 

official confirmed the validity of the 

expert witness’ concerns. In addition, 

the expert witness testified that they felt 

pressure to change their testimony, but 

refused to do so. 

Management behavior of this kind 

creates an atmosphere in which workers 

are reluctant to speak candidly for fear 

of retribution or criticism. Whether or 

not this behavior possibly violates 

federal law is not for the Board to 

determine; however, the Board does 

assert that fear of retribution visited on 

a competent professional for offering an 

honest opinion in a public hearing is 

incompatible with the objective of 

designing and building a safe and 

operationally sound nuclear facility and 

sustaining a healthy safety culture. 

Another example of failure to act on 

technical information in a timely 

manner concerns a report related to the 

occurrence of a potential criticality 

event at WTP. In April 2010, the WTP 

project issued a plan of action to 

address recommendations of the WTP 

Criticality Safety Support Group, 

specifically, to review historical 

information on plutonium dioxide 

(PuO2) wastes discharged by the 

Plutonium Finishing Plant to the tank 

farms. The report of the review was 

completed and submitted to the WTP 

project in August 2010. A key finding of 

the report was that the maximum PuO2

particle size of 10 microns assumed in 

WTP criticality safety analyses was not 

conservative. Instead of receiving 

immediate attention, the report 

languished without action until 

February 2011. 

Once the report was finally reviewed, 

the WTP project reached the initial 

conclusion that it may no longer be 

possible to assume that criticality in 

WTP is an incredible occurrence. (Based 

on this information, the Hanford Tank 

Farms operating contractor halted 

activities involving the affected tanks.) 

If criticality is confirmed to be credible, 

changes in the WTP criticality strategy 

will be required. This will result in 

changes to the existing safety basis and 

require an assessment of the existing 

WTP design to determine if design 

changes are required. Depending upon 

the magnitude of the criticality hazard, 

significant changes in the WTP design 

may be necessary. DOE was not 

informed of this important finding in a 

timely manner, and actions to better 

characterize the PuO2 problem were 

delayed by approximately 6 months 

because the WTP project delayed 

evaluation of the report. 

Recommendation 

Taken as a whole, the investigative 

record convinces the Board that the 

safety culture at WTP is in need of 

prompt, major improvement and that 

corrective actions will only be 

successful and enduring if championed 

by the Secretary of Energy. The Board 

recommends that the Secretary of 

Energy: 

1. Assert federal control at the highest 

level and direct, track, and validate the 

specific corrective actions to be taken to 

establish a strong safety culture within 

the WTP project consistent with DOE 

Policy 420.1 in both the contractor and 

federal workforces, 

2. Conduct an Extent of Condition 

Review to determine whether these 

safety culture weaknesses are limited to 

the WTP Project, and 

3. Conduct a non-adversarial review 

of Dr. Tamosaitis’ removal and his 

current treatment by both DOE and 


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35864 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices 

contractor management and how that is 

affecting the safety culture at WTP. 

The Board urges the Secretary to avail 

himself of the authority under the 

Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 

§ 2286d(e)) to ‘‘implement any such 

recommendation (or part of any such 

recommendation) before, on, or after the 

date on which the Secretary transmits 

the implementation plan to the Board 

under this subsection.’’ 

Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D., 

Chairman. 

[FR Doc. 2011–15146 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

Notice of Submission for OMB Review 

AGENCY: Department of Education. 

ACTION: Comment request. 

SUMMARY: The Director, Information 

Collection Clearance Division, Privacy, 

Information and Records Management 

Services, Office of Management, invites 

comments on the submission for OMB 

review as required by the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13). 

DATES: Interested persons are invited to 

submit comments on or before July 20, 

2011. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments should 

be addressed to the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Attention: Education Desk Officer, 

Office of Management and Budget, 725 

17th Street, NW., Room 10222, New 

Executive Office Building, Washington, 

DC 20503, be faxed to (202) 395–5806 or 

e-mailed to 

oira_submission@omb.eop.gov with a 

cc: to ICDocketMgr@ed.gov. Please note 

that written comments received in 

response to this notice will be 

considered public records. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995 (44 U.S.C. chapter 35) requires that 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) provide interested Federal 

agencies and the public an early 

opportunity to comment on information 

collection requests. The OMB is 

particularly interested in comments 

which: (1) Evaluate whether the 

proposed collection of information is 

necessary for the proper performance of 

the functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; (2) Evaluate the 

accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the 

burden of the proposed collection of 

information, including the validity of 

the methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and (4) Minimize the burden 

of the collection of information on those 

who are to respond, including through 

the use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Dated: June 15, 2011. 

Darrin A. King, 

Director, Information Collection Clearance 

Division, Privacy, Information and Records 

Management Services, Office of Management. 

Institute of Education Sciences 

Type of Review: Revision 

Title of Collection: National 

Assessment of Educational Progress 

(NAEP) 2012 Wave II (Grade 4/8/12 

Pilots, Grade 12 Economics, SD, ELL, 

and Special Studies) 

OMB Control Number: 1850–0790 

Agency Form Number(s): N/A 

Frequency of Responses: Once 

Affected Public: Individuals or 

household 

Total Estimated Number of Annual 

Responses: 35,955 

Total Estimated Annual Burden 

Hours: 14,603 

Abstract: The National Assessment of 

Educational Progress (NAEP) is a 

federally authorized survey of student 

achievement at grades 4, 8, and 12 in 

various subject areas, such as 

mathematics, reading, writing, science, 

U.S. history, civics, geography, 

economics, and the arts. NAEP consists 

of two assessment programs: the NAEP 

Long-Term Trend (LTT) assessment and 

the main NAEP assessment. In 2012, 

both types of assessments will be 

delivered. The approved Wave 1 

clearance package contained materials 

related to the LTT assessment. The 

Wave 2 submittal seeks approval for the 

following components of the 2012 

assessments (specifically related to the 

noncognitive, background questions): 

—Economics (national only at grade 12) 

—Writing pilot (national only at grade 4; 

computer delivered) 

—Reading pilot (national at grade 12) 

—Mathematics pilot (national at grade 

12) 

—Student Core Background pilot (at 

grades 4 and 12, and at age 13) 

—Teacher Core Background pilot (at 

grade 4, age 13) 

—School Core Background pilot (at 

grades 4 and 12,and at age 13) 

—SD and ELL worksheets—completed 

by teachers or administrators of 

students identified as SD and/or as 

ELL (both main NAEP and LTT) 

—Special Pilot Study to evaluate the 

new SD and ELL Decision Tree, based 

on the new SD and ELL policy 

established by the Governing Board 

(at ages 9 and 13 LTT) 

—Special Study to evaluate use of MP– 

3 players for administering read-aloud 

accommodations (will include 

Background Questions from 2011 

Mathematics assessment). 

Copies of the information collection 

submission for OMB review may be 

accessed from the RegInfo.gov Web site 

at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain or from the Department’s Web 

site at http://edicsweb.ed.gov, by 

selecting the ‘‘Browse Pending 

Collections’’ link and by clicking on 

link number 4643. When you access the 

information collection, click on 

‘‘Download Attachments ’’ to view. 

Written requests for information should 

be addressed to U.S. Department of 

Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, SW., 

LBJ, Washington, DC 20202–4537. 

Requests may also be electronically 

mailed to the Internet address 

ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or faxed to 202– 

401–0920. Please specify the complete 

title of the information collection and 

OMB Control Number when making 

your request. 

Individuals who use a 

telecommunications device for the deaf 

(TDD) may call the Federal Information 

Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

[FR Doc. 2011–15291 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

[CFDA 84.235M] 

Proposed Priority; Special 

Demonstration Programs—National 

Technical Assistance Projects To 

Improve Employment Outcomes for 

Individuals With Disabilities 

AGENCY: Office of Special Education and 

Rehabilitative Services, Department of 

Education. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed priority. 

SUMMARY: The Assistant Secretary for 

the Office of Special Education and 

Rehabilitative Services proposes a 

priority under the Special 

Demonstration Programs authorized 

under 303(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, as amended (the Rehabilitation 

Act). The Assistant Secretary may use 

this priority for competitions in fiscal 

year (FY) 2011 and later years. We take 

this action to focus technical assistance 

(TA) on areas of national need identified 

by the Rehabilitation Services 

Administration (RSA) through analyses 

of information obtained during 

monitoring and oversight of its grant 


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