### J-A22003- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v. DALE ROBERT MONROEAppellant No. 101 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 13, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001005-2013 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J. * 

### JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015 Appellant, Dale Robert Monroe, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered December 13, 2013, by the Honorable John S. Kennedy, Court of Common Pleas of York County. No relief is due. The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows. On December 10, 2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert Miles, was on patrol in his marked police vehicle, stationed at the Fawn Grove Boro Rutter[’]s parking lot. During his patrol he noticed a [b]lack 2008 Chevrolet Silverado parked in a parking [space] with a white male driver in the driver’s seat. Pursuant to his normal job duties, he ran a PennDOT records check which indicated that the registered owner, Dale Robert Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had a license status of DUI Suspended. The officer then pulled up the PennDOT picture of the registered owner and it matched the white male sitting in the driver seat. The

____________________________________________
* 

### Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

### J-A22003- 14

- 2 - officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the vehicle began to pull out of the Rutter’s parking lot. Upon exiting the parking lot, the officer activated his emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop. Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to the driver why he pulled him over. The driver related to the officer that he had a license, but handed him, instead, a change of address card. The driver then related that he does not have a picture license. The driver then handed the officer his oil change paper work along with his registration and insurance. While engaging the driver, the officer detected a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver’s breath and person. The driver’s eyes were also bloodshot and glassy. The driver indicated that he had not been drinking, when questioned. Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the Appellant in this case, by his passport. Appellant related that there was alcohol in one of the cup holders. Officer Miles requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. When Appellant opened the door, the officer observed an open glass bottle of Bud Light Lime in the driver['s] door cup holder that was half-full. Upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsure of his footing. Upon complete of field sobriety tests, Officer Miles placed Appellant into custody and transported him to York Hospital for a blood draw. The lab results indicated a blood alcohol content of .101, and the presence of Diazepam, Nordiazepam, and Morphone-Free in Appellant’s blood. Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/14 at 2-3 (unnumbered). Appellant was arrested and charged with four counts of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 1 

### Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended-DUI Related, 2 

### Careless Driving, 3 

### and

____________________________________________ 1 

### 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(ii) and (d)(3). 2 

### 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i).

### J-A22003- 14

- 3 -

Restriction of Alcoholic Beverages. 4 

### Appellant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to suppress physical evidence. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. A bench trial was conducted and the trial court convicted Appellant of two counts of DUI 5 

### and Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended-DUI Related. The trial court sentenced Appellant on December 13, 2013. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant argues that Officer Miles lacked both reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of the vehicle code had occurred and probable cause to believe that Appellant was driving while impaired. We have reviewed Appellant’s brief, the relevant law, the certified record, and the well-written opinion of the able trial judge, the Honorable John S. Kennedy. We find that the trial court’s opinion, filed on March 14, 2014, ably and comprehensively disposes of Appellant’s issues on appeal, with appropriate reference to the record and without legal error. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of that opinion.

(Footnote Continued)
_______________________ 3 

### 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714. 4 

### 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3809. 5 

### 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(b) and (d)(1)(ii).

### J-A22003- 14

- 4 -

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/2015Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM

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### IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION COMMONWEALTH OF No. CP-67-CR-I00S-2013 PENNSYLVANIA (,")rVS. TT'10 ;1:}O ;:r.;:2t 

### DALE R. MONROE qO -rl<J) 

### Appellant . ('1 ::r; 

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### ;;Ci.i·'- APPEARANCES: -I 

### For The Commonwealth: Duane Ramseur, Esquire**~/;** 

### For The Defendant: Jenna M. Fliszar, Esquire
STATEMENT OFLOWER COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 1925(a) OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OFAPPELLATE PROCEDURE ' 

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Appellant, Dale Monroe, was charged with four counts (4) ofDriving Under the Influence ofAlcohol or Controlled SubstanceI , Driving Under Suspension-DUI Related and Alcohol in System2
, Careless Driving3, and Restriction ofAlcoholic Beverages4

. On November 13, 2013, during a stipulated bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of Count lIS, Count

# rrr6, and Count V7,8 Appellant was sentenced on December 13, 2013, as follows: Count

# m 9, five (5) years ofintennediatepunislunent ("IP") with direction to serve

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(a)(1); §3802(b); §3802(d)(I)(ii); and §3801(d)(3). 275 Pa.C.S.A. §1543(b)(1.l)(i). 3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3714(a). 475 Pa.C.S.A. §3809(a). 5 §3802(b). 6 §3802(d)(1)(ii); 7 See supra n.2. 8 Appellant was found not guilty ofCount

### r and Count IV. Count VI and VII were withdrawn. 9 Count II and Count III merged for purposes ofsentencing.

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### IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION COMMONWEALTH OF No. CP-67-CR-I00S-2013 PENNSYLVANIA (,")rVS. TT'10 ;1:}O ;:r.;:2t 

### DALE R. MONROE qO -rl<J) 

### Appellant . ('1 ::r; 

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### ;;Ci.i·'- APPEARANCES: -I 

### For The Commonwealth: Duane Ramseur, Esquire**~/;** 

### For The Defendant: Jenna M. Fliszar, Esquire
STATEMENT OFLOWER COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 1925(a) OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OFAPPELLATE PROCEDURE ' 

### ....., tt;:;) 

## ',.,.. 3; :tl. :;;:d**~** -0 !:'l:**~** (.,Il (,..)

Appellant, Dale Monroe, was charged with four counts (4) ofDriving Under the Influence ofAlcohol or Controlled SubstanceI , Driving Under Suspension-DUI Related and Alcohol in System2
, Careless Driving3, and Restriction ofAlcoholic Beverages4

. On November 13, 2013, during a stipulated bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of Count lIS, Count

# rrr6, and Count V7,8 Appellant was sentenced on December 13, 2013, as follows: Count

# m 9, five (5) years ofintennediatepunislunent ("IP") with direction to serve

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(a)(1); §3802(b); §3802(d)(I)(ii); and §3801(d)(3). 275 Pa.C.S.A. §1543(b)(1.l)(i). 3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3714(a). 475 Pa.C.S.A. §3809(a). 5 §3802(b). 6 §3802(d)(1)(ii); 7 See supra n.2. 8 Appellant was found not guilty ofCount

### r and Count IV. Count VI and VII were withdrawn. 9 Count II and Count III merged for purposes ofsentencing.

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!.)'**~,)** , !,)' nine (9) months out-mate program followed by one year ofhouse arrests with alcohol monitoring; and Count V, ninety (90) days on out-mate concurrent with count III. Appellant received a total aggregate sentence ofnine (9) months ofout-mate followed by one year of house attests during the term ofhis IP sentence. On December 13,2013, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which was denied
on the same. On January 13, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice ofAppeal ofthis Coures verdict entered on November 13, 2013. We directed Appellant to file a 1925(b) Statement ofMatters Complained ofon Appeal. On February 4, 2014, Appellant filed his timely 1925(b) statement. We now issue the following Opinion: FACTS AND PRODECURAL HISTORY On December 10,2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert Miles, was on patrol in his marked police vehicle, stationed at the Fawn Gl'Ove Boro Rutters parking lot. (Aff. Prb. Cs. Miles,**~** 1). During his patrol he noticed a Black 2008 Chevrolet Silverado**parl~ed** in a i parking stall with a white male in the driver's seat. 

### ld. Pursuant to his normaljJb duties, he
ran a Pe1111DOT records check which indicated that the registered owner, Dale Robert Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had a license status ofDUI Suspended. 

### ld. The officer then pulled up the PennDOT picture ofthe registered owner and it matched theiwhite male sitting inthe dtiver seat. 

### ld. The officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the vehicle began to pull out ofthe Rutter's parking lot. 

### ld. Upon exiting the parking lot, the officer activated his emergencylights and conducted a traffic stop. 

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!.)'**~,)** , !,)' nine (9) months out-mate program followed by one year ofhouse arrests with alcohol monitoring; and Count V, ninety (90) days on out-mate concurrent with count III. Appellant received a total aggregate sentence ofnine (9) months ofout-mate followed by one year of house attests during the term ofhis IP sentence. On December 13,2013, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which was denied
on the same. On January 13, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice ofAppeal ofthis Coures verdict entered on November 13, 2013. We directed Appellant to file a 1925(b) Statement ofMatters Complained ofon Appeal. On February 4, 2014, Appellant filed his timely 1925(b) statement. We now issue the following Opinion: FACTS AND PRODECURAL HISTORY On December 10,2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert Miles, was on patrol in his marked police vehicle, stationed at the Fawn Grove Boro Rutters parking lot. (Aff. Prb. Cs. Miles,**~** 1). During his patrol he noticed a Black 2008 Chevrolet Silverado**parl~ed** in a i parking stall with a white male in the driver's seat. 

### ld. Pursuant to his normaljJb duties, he
ran a Pe1111DOT records check which indicated that the registered owner, Dale Robert Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had a license status ofDUI Suspended. 

### ld. The officer then pulled up the PennDOT picture ofthe registered owner and it matched theiwhite male sitting inthe dtiver seat. 

### ld. The officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the vehicle began to pull out ofthe Rutter's parking lot. 

### ld. Upon exiting the parking lot, the officer activated his emergencylights and conducted a traffic stop. 

### ld.Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM**f~'** .

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### Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to the driver why he pulled him
over. 

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### 2. The driver related to the officer that he had a license, but handed him, instead, a change ofaddress card. 

### Id. The driver then related that he does not have apicture license. 

### Id. The driver then handed the officer his oil change paper work along with his registration and insurance.ld. While engaging the driver, the officer detected a moderate odor ofan alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver's breath and 

### person.ld. The driver's eyes were also bloodshot and 

### glassy.ld. The driver indicated that he had not been drinking, when questioned.ld. Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the Appellant in this case, by his 

### passpOli.ld. at**~** 

### 3. Appellant related that there was alcohol in the one ofthe cup holders.ld. Officer Miles then requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perfonn field sobriety tests. When Appellant opened the driver door, the officer observed an open glass bottle ofBud Light Lime in the driver door cup holder that was half-full.ld. Upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsure ofhis 

### footing.ld. Upon completion ofthe field sobriety tests, Officer Miles placed Appellant into custody and transported him to York Hospital for ablood 

### draw.ld. at**~** 

### 4. The lab results indicated a blood alcohol content of.101, and the presence ofDiazepam, Nordiazepam, and Morphone-Free in Appellant's blood. 1D 

### ISSUES PRESENTED

10 The parties stipulated that ifcalled to testifY, the toxicologist would testifY that the Morphine-Free came from heroin. NT., 11113/2013 at 5:19-21.**f~'** .

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### Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to the driver why he pulled him
over. 

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### 2. The driver related to the officer that he had a license, but handed him, instead, a change ofaddress card. 

### Id. The driver then related that he does not have apicture license. 

### Id. The driver then handed the officer his oil change paper work along with his registration and insurance.ld. While engaging the driver, the officer detected a moderate odor ofan alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver's breath and 

### person.ld. The driver's eyes were also bloodshot and 

### glassy.ld. The driver indicated that he had not been drinking, when questioned.ld. Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the Appellant in this case, by his 

### passpOli.ld. at**~** 

### 3. Appellant related that there was alcohol in the one ofthe cup holders.ld. Officer Miles then requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perfonn field sobriety tests. When Appellant opened the driver door, the officer observed an open glass bottle ofBud Light Lime in the driver door cup holder that was half-full.ld. Upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsure ofhis 

### footing.ld. Upon completion ofthe field sobriety tests, Officer Miles placed Appellant into custody and transported him to York Hospital for ablood 

### draw.ld. at**~** 

### 4. The lab results indicated a blood alcohol content of.101, and the presence ofDiazepam, Nordiazepam, and Morphone-Free in Appellant's blood. 1D 

### ISSUES PRESENTED

10 The parties stipulated that ifcalled to testifY, the toxicologist would testifY that the Morphine-Free came from heroin. NT., 11113/2013 at 5:19-21.Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM**~,/** '**~**

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### Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant]'s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as aresult ofan unlawful traffic stop. More specifically, whether the officerpossessed sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion ofreasonable suspicion that amotor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic stop of [Appellant]; and II. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant] 's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as the result ofan unlawful arrest. More specifically, whether the officer possessed sufficientprobable cause to arrest [Appellant] on suspicion ofDriving Under the Influence and request ablood draw as aresult. DISCUSSION 

### A thorough and careful review ofthe record reveals that each ofthe issues raised by Appellant are without merit and thus, the instant appeal should be DENIED. 

### I. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence as a result ofan unlawful traffic stop. 

### Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the officer did not possess sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion ofreasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic stop ofAppellant. Appellant averred that, although the officer pulled up the PennDOT picture ofthe registered vehicle, the lightening was such that aproper identification ofthe driver was not possible. Appellant claims that the officer's description ofthe driver as a white male with**~,/** '**~**

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### Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant]'s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as aresult ofan unlawful traffic stop. More specifically, whether the officerpossessed sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion ofreasonable suspicion that amotor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic stop of [Appellant]; and II. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant] 's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as the result ofan unlawful arrest. More specifically, whether the officer possessed sufficientprobable cause to arrest [Appellant] on suspicion ofDriving Under the Influence and request ablood draw as aresult. DISCUSSION 

### A thorough and careful review ofthe record reveals that each ofthe issues raised by Appellant are without merit and thus, the instant appeal should be DENIED. 

### I. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence as a result ofan unlawful traffic stop. 

### Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the officer did not possess sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion ofreasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic stop ofAppellant. Appellant averred that, although the officer pulled up the PennDOT picture ofthe registered vehicle, the lightening was such that aproper identification ofthe driver was not possible. Appellant claims that the officer's description ofthe driver as a white male withCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM

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l.r !.}. dark hair was not sufficient to match the picture ofthe registered driver and, therefore, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop on the basis ofa suspended license. The standard ofreview ofa suppression court's ruling is well established in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court ofPelIDsylvania has detennined that the scope ofreview is limited to determining whether the findings offact are supported bythe record and whether the legal conclusions drawn fl.-om those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Crompton, 545 Pa. 586, 682 A.2d 286 (1996); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991). When a defendant has appealed an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we must consider onlythe evidence ofthe prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context ofthe record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529,491 A.2d 111 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S. Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). Ifthey are supported in the record, we are bound bythe facts as the suppression court found them and we may reverse the suppression court only ifthe legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error.ld. Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 2001). 

### Itis within the suppression court's sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility ofwitnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Commonwealth v. Gr(fJen, 785 A.2d 501,505. (Pa. Super. 2001). The suppression court is free to believe all, some, or none ofthe evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 

### Id. In the instant case, Appellant avers that the suppression court erred when 

### it detennined that Officer Miles had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop upon suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation, namely, driving with a suspended license. A person violates the motor vehicle code when he or she drives with a suspended license. Specifically, a person commits Driving Under**Suspension~** DUI Related and Alcohol 1/

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l.r !.}. dark hair was not sufficient to match the picture ofthe registered driver and, therefore, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop on the basis ofa suspended license. The standard ofreview ofa suppression court's ruling is well established in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court ofPelIDsylvania has detennined that the scope ofreview is limited to determining whether the findings offact are supported bythe record and whether the legal conclusions drawn fl.-om those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. Crompton, 545 Pa. 586, 682 A.2d 286 (1996); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991). When a defendant has appealed an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we must consider onlythe evidence ofthe prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context ofthe record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529,491 A.2d 111 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S. Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). Ifthey are supported in the record, we are bound bythe facts as the suppression court found them and we may reverse the suppression court only ifthe legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error.ld. Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 2001). 

### Itis within the suppression court's sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility ofwitnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Commonwealth v. Gr(fJen, 785 A.2d 501,505. (Pa. Super. 2001). The suppression court is free to believe all, some, or none ofthe evidence presented at the suppression hearing. 

### Id. In the instant case, Appellant avers that the suppression court erred when 

### it detennined that Officer Miles had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop upon suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation, namely, driving with a suspended license. A person violates the motor vehicle code when he or she drives with a suspended license. Specifically, a person commits Driving Under**Suspension~** DUI Related and AlcoholCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM



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!.)'
1 . .1,. in System, where the person has a BAC equal or greater than .02% or any amount ofa schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance, and who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway ofthis Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating privilege is suspended. 75 Pa.C,S.A. §1543(b)(1.1)(i). There are three types ofinteractions between police and a citizen: Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence has led to the development ofthree categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first ofthese is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supportedby any level ofsuspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period ofdetention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent ofan arrest. Finally, an arrest 01' "custodial detention" must be supported byprobable cause. Commonwealth v. Au, 986 A.2d 864,866-67 (Pa.Supel'.2009) (en bane), appeal granted on differentgrounds, 606 Pa. 113, 995 A.2d 349 (2010). Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012), A totality of the circumstances approach is used to determine whether or not a seizure has been executed. 

### Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111,1116 (Pa. Super. 2011)). A police officer who has reasonable suspicion that a violation ofthe motor vehicle code is occurring or has occurred may stop a vehicle for the purposes ofchecking the driver's license. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. Commonwealth v. Feezko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010). The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person ofreasonable 

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"

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1 . .1,. in System, where the person has a BAC equal or greater than .02% or any amount ofa schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance, and who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway ofthis Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating privilege is suspended. 75 Pa.C,S.A. §1543(b)(1.1)(i). There are three types ofinteractions between police and a citizen: Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence has led to the development ofthree categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first ofthese is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supportedby any level ofsuspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period ofdetention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent ofan arrest. Finally, an arrest 01' "custodial detention" must be supported byprobable cause. Commonwealth v. Au, 986 A.2d 864,866-67 (Pa.Supel'.2009) (en bane), appeal granted on differentgrounds, 606 Pa. 113, 995 A.2d 349 (2010). Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012), A totality of the circumstances approach is used to determine whether or not a seizure has been executed. 

### Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111,1116 (Pa. Super. 2011)). A police officer who has reasonable suspicion that a violation ofthe motor vehicle code is occurring or has occurred may stop a vehicle for the purposes ofchecking the driver's license. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. Commonwealth v. Feezko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010). The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person ofreasonableCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM {V'

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### caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 

### 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007). Officer Miles, in the course ofhis duties, ran the registration for Appellant's vehicle. Upon discovery that the owner ofthe vehicle's license was suspended, the officer pulled up the owner's picture through the PennDOT database. The officer then matched the description ofthe driver ofthe vehicle with that ofthe owner whose picture appeared in the PennDOT database with the status ofa suspended license due to a previous DUI. Thus, when Appellant drove out ofRutter's parking lot, the officer had to have reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation in order to effectuate a traffic stop because further investigation is required to ensure that the driver is the owner with the suspended license. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Reasonable suspicion "depends on the information possessed bypolice and its degree ofreliability in the totality of the circumstances."

### Id. at 406. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and atiiculable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, coutis must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and acknowledge that hmocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Id. 

### (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 

### 996 A.2d 473,477 (Pa. 2010». In this case, Appellant was the driver ofthe vehicle. Officer Miles ran the registration and discovered that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. In addition, Officer Miles pulled up the picture ofthe owner. In his experience as a police officer, Officer Miles {V'

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### caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 

### 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007). Officer Miles, in the course ofhis duties, ran the registration for Appellant's vehicle. Upon discovery that the owner ofthe vehicle's license was suspended, the officer pulled up the owner's picture through the PennDOT database. The officer then matched the description ofthe driver ofthe vehicle with that ofthe owner whose picture appeared in the PennDOT database with the status ofa suspended license due to a previous DUI. Thus, when Appellant drove out ofRutter's parking lot, the officer had to have reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation in order to effectuate a traffic stop because further investigation is required to ensure that the driver is the owner with the suspended license. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Reasonable suspicion "depends on the information possessed bypolice and its degree ofreliability in the totality of the circumstances."

### Id. at 406. In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and atiiculable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, coutis must also afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and acknowledge that hmocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the investigative detention. Id. 

### (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 

### 996 A.2d 473,477 (Pa. 2010». In this case, Appellant was the driver ofthe vehicle. Officer Miles ran the registration and discovered that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. In addition, Officer Miles pulled up the picture ofthe owner. In his experience as a police officer, Officer MilesCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM f'"**~**::: :
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,.r,. concluded that the driver of the vehicle matched the picture of the owner in the PennDOT database. Knowing that the appellant's license was suspended and observing the appellant drive the vehicle, the officer not only had reasonable suspicion, but had probable cause that Appellant was committing the noted infraction because the officer observed the infraction for himself and unquestionably possessed facts to warrant beliefby any reasonable person that Appellant violated the vehicle code. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence.
II. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence as a result of an unlawful arrest. Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the officer did not possess sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion ofDriving Under the Influence and to request a blood draw as a result. Appellant avers that the officer lacked any articulable reasons to arrest Appellant except for bloodshot, glassy eyes, unsteady balanceupon exiting the vehicle, odor ofalcohol, and the presence ofalcohol in the vehicle. Appellant maintains that those reasons are insufficient in themselves to rise to the level ofprobable cause for a lawful arrest. Furthennore, Appellant claims that he displayed no erratic behavior, his medical conditions could cause the unsteadiness and bloodshot eyes, and hepassed a field sobrietytest, thus probable cause did not exist that Appellant was under the influence. As discussed above, the scope ofreview for the suppression court's denial ofa motion to

j suppress is limited to detennining whether the findings offact are supported bythe record f'"**~**::: :
).""**~.,.** 

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,.r,. concluded that the driver of the vehicle matched the picture of the owner in the PennDOT database. Knowing that the appellant's license was suspended and observing the appellant drive the vehicle, the officer not only had reasonable suspicion, but had probable cause that Appellant was committing the noted infraction because the officer observed the infraction for himself and unquestionably possessed facts to warrant beliefby any reasonable person that Appellant violated the vehicle code. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence.


### II. Whether the court erred in 

### denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence as a result of an unlawful arrest. Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the officer did not possess sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion ofDriving Under the Influence and to request a blood draw as a result. Appellant avers that the officer lacked any articulable reasons to arrest Appellant except for bloodshot, glassy eyes, unsteady balanceupon exiting the vehicle, odor ofalcohol, and the presence ofalcohol in the vehicle. Appellant maintains that those reasons are insufficient in themselves to rise to the level ofprobable cause for a lawful arrest. Furthennore, Appellant claims that he displayed no erratic behavior, his medical conditions could cause the unsteadiness and bloodshot eyes, and hepassed a field sobrietytest, thus probable cause did not exist that Appellant was under the influence. As discussed above, the scope ofreview for the suppression court's denial ofa motion to

j suppress is limited to detennining whether the findings offact are supported bythe recordCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM**~:::** :

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# ",. and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Stallworth, 

### 781 A.2d at 115. In

### the instant case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop to determine ifAppellant was driving under suspension. Upon his detennination that Appellant
was driving under suspension and in the course ofthis traffic stop, Officer Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was also driving under the influence
. After conducting field sobriety tests combined with his observations ofAppellant, Officer Miles had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence, As detennined above, the officerhad reasonable suspicion, ifnot probable cause, to initiate a traffic stop ofAppellant due the officer's beliefthat he was driving with a suspended license. Thus, at the point ofthe stop and confirmation ofthe motor vehicle violation, the investigatory detention concluded. Once the primary traffic stop has concluded, however, the officer's authority to order either driver or occupant from the car is extinguished. Commonwealth 

### v. Sierra, 

### 723 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. 1999). Thus, ifsubsequently the officer directs orrequests the occupants to exit the vehicle, his show ofauthority may constitute an investigatory detention subject to arenewed showing ofreasonable suspicion. Commonwealth 

### v, Reppert, 

### 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (pa. Super. 2002), In Freeman, 

### our Supreme Court defined multiple relevant circumstances on the basis of which we may recognize the end ofa traffic stop and the commencement ofanother interaction: the existence and nature ofany prior seizure; whether there was a clear and expressed endpoint to any such prior detention; the character ofpolice presence and conduct in the encounter under review (for example-the number ofofficers, whether they were**~:::** :

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# ",. and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Stallworth, 

### 781 A.2d at 115. In

### the instant case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop to determine ifAppellant was driving under suspension. Upon his detennination that Appellant
was driving under suspension and in the course ofthis traffic stop, Officer Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was also driving under the influence
. After conducting field sobriety tests combined with his observations ofAppellant, Officer Miles had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence, As detennined above, the officerhad reasonable suspicion, ifnot probable cause, to initiate a traffic stop ofAppellant due the officer's beliefthat he was driving with a suspended license. Thus, at the point ofthe stop and confirmation ofthe motor vehicle violation, the investigatory detention concluded. Once the primary traffic stop has concluded, however, the officer's authority to order either driver or occupant from the car is extinguished. Commonwealth 

### v. Sierra, 

### 723 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. 1999). Thus, ifsubsequently the officer directs orrequests the occupants to exit the vehicle, his show ofauthority may constitute an investigatory detention subject to arenewed showing ofreasonable suspicion. Commonwealth 

### v, Reppert, 

### 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (pa. Super. 2002), In Freeman, 

### our Supreme Court defined multiple relevant circumstances on the basis of which we may recognize the end ofa traffic stop and the commencement ofanother interaction: the existence and nature ofany prior seizure; whether there was a clear and expressed endpoint to any such prior detention; the character ofpolice presence and conduct in the encounter under review (for example-the number ofofficers, whether they wereCirculated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM

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!.)' uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their movement, the content or maImer ofinterrogatories or statements, and "excesses" factors [sic] stressed bythe United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of express advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to search. 

### Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1202 (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903,906-07 (Pa. 2000)). Upon consideration ofthese circumstances we concluded that the prior traffic stop gave wayto a new interaction when Officer Miles ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle. Officer Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under the influence due to Appellant's glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell ofalcohol on his breath, and Appellant's admission ofan open container in the vehicle. At this point, Officer Miles acting under reasonable suspicion, had the authority and upon that authority did order Appellant to exit the vehicle to perfOlID field sobriety tests. During this investigation, upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. Although initially saying he could complete all ofthe field tests, Appellant failed to complete the walk-and-tum test." N.T., 

### 5/20/2013 at 11 :17-20; 12: 1-2. Upon administration ofthe 

### HON,12 Appellant showed a lack ofpursuit in both eyes and a distinctive sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. N.T. at 13:3-6. Appellant failed this field sobriety test. 13 Appellant next performed the one-leg stand. 

### Id. at 13: 19. Although he

11 Appellant indicated that he had bad knees from construction work and the pain would not allow him to complete the test. 12 Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. 13 He showed four possible clues ofintoxication out ofa possible six, which is considered to be a fail. ('" ,",',' t""



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!.)' uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their movement, the content or maImer ofinterrogatories or statements, and "excesses" factors [sic] stressed bythe United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of express advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to search. 

### Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1202 (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903,906-07 (Pa. 2000)). Upon consideration ofthese circumstances we concluded that the prior traffic stop gave wayto a new interaction when Officer Miles ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle. Officer Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under the influence due to Appellant's glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell ofalcohol on his breath, and Appellant's admission ofan open container in the vehicle. At this point, Officer Miles acting under reasonable suspicion, had the authority and upon that authority did order Appellant to exit the vehicle to perfOlID field sobriety tests. During this investigation, upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. Although initially saying he could complete all ofthe field tests, Appellant failed to complete the walk-and-tum test." N.T., 

### 5/20/2013 at 11 :17-20; 12: 1-2. Upon administration ofthe 

### HON,12 Appellant showed a lack ofpursuit in both eyes and a distinctive sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. N.T. at 13:3-6. Appellant failed this field sobriety test. 13 Appellant next performed the one-leg stand. 

### Id. at 13: 19. Although he

11 Appellant indicated that he had bad knees from construction work and the pain would not allow him to complete the test. 12 Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. 13 He showed four possible clues ofintoxication out ofa possible six, which is considered to be a fail.Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM**~:::**.:**~**.,' ,**~**

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### perfonned the test incorrectly, by counting when he put his foot down, Appellant was deemed to have passed this test. 

### ld. at 14: 1-9. Lastly, Appellant tested positive for alcohol during the PBT test. 14 

### As a result ofAppellant's performance on the field sobriety tests as well as the fact that his license was indicated to be DUI suspended combined with the officer's observations of Appellant's unsteadiness, his glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell ofalcohol on his breath, and the open container ofbeer inhis vehicle, Officer Miles, based on his training and education arrested Appellant for driving under the influence. Both the United States and Pemlsylvania Constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. To be constitutionally valid, an arrest must be based on probable cause. The existence or non-existence ofprobable cause is determined by the totality ofthe circumstances. The totality ofthe circumstances test requires a Court to detennine whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge ofthe officer at the time ofthe arrest, and ofwhich he has reasonably trustworthy infonnation, are sufficient to warrant aman of reasonable caution in 

### the beliefthat the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Smith, 

### 979 A.2d 913,916 (Pa. Super. 2009). The question we ask is not whether the officer's beliefwas "correct or more likely true than false, but rather ifthere is a probability, and not a prima facie showing, ofcriminal activity. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 

### 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009). The Superior Court has explained that, "[pJrobable cause exists where the officer has knowledge ofsufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under

14 The portable breath test had a positive result for an alcoholic beverage. Itwas a .07 percent BAC.**~:::**.:**~**.,' ,**~**

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### perfonned the test incorrectly, by counting when he put his foot down, Appellant was deemed to have passed this test. 

### ld. at 14: 1-9. Lastly, Appellant tested positive for alcohol during the PBT test. 14 

### As a result ofAppellant's performance on the field sobriety tests as well as the fact that his license was indicated to be DUI suspended combined with the officer's observations of Appellant's unsteadiness, his glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell ofalcohol on his breath, and the open container ofbeer inhis vehicle, Officer Miles, based on his training and education arrested Appellant for driving under the influence. Both the United States and Pemlsylvania Constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. To be constitutionally valid, an arrest must be based on probable cause. The existence or non-existence ofprobable cause is determined by the totality ofthe circumstances. The totality ofthe circumstances test requires a Court to detennine whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge ofthe officer at the time ofthe arrest, and ofwhich he has reasonably trustworthy infonnation, are sufficient to warrant aman of reasonable caution in 

### the beliefthat the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Smith, 

### 979 A.2d 913,916 (Pa. Super. 2009). The question we ask is not whether the officer's beliefwas "correct or more likely true than false, but rather ifthere is a probability, and not a prima facie showing, ofcriminal activity. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 

### 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009). The Superior Court has explained that, "[pJrobable cause exists where the officer has knowledge ofsufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under

14 The portable breath test had a positive result for an alcoholic beverage. Itwas a .07 percent BAC.Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM

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.." the influence ofalcohol or a controlled substance." 

### Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 2008)(citing 

### Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008)). Instantly, the record reflects that Officer Miles stopped Appellant's vehiclebased on his reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed violations ofthe Vehicle Code. When the officer spoke to Appellant, he detected classic signs ofintoxication: an odor ofalcohol together with Appellant's bloodshot and glassy eyes and admission ofan open container of beer. Then, when exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. In addition, during the field sobriety tests, Appellant stated that he was unable. to perfonn the walk-and-turn test because ofbad knees. Under the totality ofthe circumstances, Officer Miles possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI in this case as he had knowledge ofsufficient facts to warrant a beliefthat Appellant had been driving under the influence ofalcohol or a controlled substance. Thus, Appellant's claim is without merit. CONCLUSION This Court has thoroughly reviewed all ofthe relevant pleadings and transcripts in this matter. We rely on and incorporate those pleadings and transcripts, including the within Opinion as its 1925(a) Opinion in the above-captioned matter. BY THE COURT:

Date: 

### March 14,2014 l"f ;..,

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.." the influence ofalcohol or a controlled substance." 

### Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 2008)(citing 

### Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008)). Instantly, the record reflects that Officer Miles stopped Appellant's vehiclebased on his reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed violations ofthe Vehicle Code. When the officer spoke to Appellant, he detected classic signs ofintoxication: an odor ofalcohol together with Appellant's bloodshot and glassy eyes and admission ofan open container of beer. Then, when exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. In addition, during the field sobriety tests, Appellant stated that he was unable. to perfonn the walk-and-turn test because ofbad knees. Under the totality ofthe circumstances, Officer Miles possessed the requisite probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI in this case as he had knowledge ofsufficient facts to warrant a beliefthat Appellant had been driving under the influence ofalcohol or a controlled substance. Thus, Appellant's claim is without merit. CONCLUSION This Court has thoroughly reviewed all ofthe relevant pleadings and transcripts in this matter. We rely on and incorporate those pleadings and transcripts, including the within Opinion as its 1925(a) Opinion in the above-captioned matter. BY THE COURT:

Date: 

### March 14,2014