alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered January 8, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 14

- 01403

- CV

IN RE VERP INVESTMENT, LLC , Relator

Original Proceeding from the 134th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 1 4

- 03874



### O RDER Before Justices Francis and Myers 1

Before the Court is relator’s motion for rehearing. We DENY the motion without

prejudice to the filing of a new, properly supported petition for writ of mandamus

. We DENY

relator’s emergency motion for st ay.

/s/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE

1 Justice Kerry FitzGerald was a member of the panel and participated in the submission of this case and issuance of the opinion, but did not participate in the issuance of this order due to his retirement on December 31, 2014

.
1 

### Daniels, Nia (FAA)

From: Daniels, Nia (FAA)

Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2015 2:50 PM

To: 'msievers@hunton.com'

Cc: '333exemptions@faa.gov' Subject: Petition for Exemption: Duke Energy Bu siness Service, LLC (Docket No. FAA-2015-0789)



### May 28, 2015

Dear Mr. Sievers:

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket No. FAA2015-0789). This information is necessary for the Fe deral Aviation Administration (FAA) to process your petition.

 Describe the aircraft make, mode l, and type (i.e. - fixed-wing, ro torcraft, lighter-than-air) for the proposed UAS operation. The description shoul d include the maximum weight (including payload). This information can be located in the aircraft manual.

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at www.regulations.gov and submit any proprietary information to the FAA Hea dquarters or electronically via e-mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov . If you want us to process your request a ny further, we must receive the information described above by June 11, 2015. If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,

Nia Daniels Program Analyst

Nia Daniels, ARM

‐ 108

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Rulemaking, Airmen & Airspace Rules Division

800 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20591

PH: (202) 267 ‐ 7626

Fax: (202) 267 ‐ 5075 nia.daniels@faa.gov
#### JARAMILLO v. STATE.

No. 24214.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 12, 1949.

No appearance' for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for assault to murder without malice, phnishment assessed being three years in the penitentiary.

This is the second appeal. The opinions on the first appeal will be found reported in Tex.Cr.App., 204 S.W.2d 622.

From certain motions found in the transcript it appears that appellant was attempting to raise some question about the legality of the grand jury which returned the indictment, and also regarding the substitution of an indictment for the original which had been lost. These same questions were raised on the former appeal and were decided against appellant as is apparent from the opinions. That seems to have become the law of the case, and it is doubtful if the same questions would again be considered. However, waiving that point, the record now before us is such that the questions can not properly be considered for the following reasons, even if they could have again been raised. The motion for new trial was overruled on the 22d day of June, 1948, and 60 days from said date granted for filing of bills of exception. No bills of exception preserving the points sought to be raised are in the record. The court heard evidence upon the motions mentioned, and there appears in the record what is denominated a “Narrative Transcript of Testimony — Motions—Other Matters.” This document was not approved by the trial court until the Sth day of November, 1948, and was filed in the trial court the same day. It can neither be considered as a bill of exception, nor as a statement of facts heard on the motions. The 90 days allowed by statute for filing statement of facts expired on September 20, 1948.

The statement of facts on the main trial was approved on September 17, 1948, and filed in the trial court on September 18, which was within the 90 days. The evidence so brought forward has been examined and bountifully supports the verdict and judgment, and same is ordered affirmed.
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#### OWEN v. STATE.

No. 26704.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 16, 1953.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*716GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for felony theft; the punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of two years.

The indictment and all other matters of procedure appear to be regular. The record is before this court without a statement of facts or bills of exception. In the absence thereof nothing is presented for review.

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of 99 Cent Stuff,
Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the "Periodic
Report"), I, Barry Bilmes, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge the Periodic Report
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Periodic Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.

Date: April 11, 2006                             /s/ Barry Bilmes
                                                 ------------------------------
                                                     Barry Bilmes
                                                     Chief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to 99 Cent Stuff and will be retained
by 99 Cent Stuff and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.

The foregoing certification is provided solely for purposes of complying with
the provisions of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Exhibit 15.1

















Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm



Randgold Resources Limited



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference
in the Registration Statements:



| | 1. | Registration Statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-156150) pertaining to the Randgold Resources Share Option Scheme, Awards of
Restricted Stock to Non-Executive Directors, Award of Restricted Stock to D.M. Bristow, Award of Restricted Stock to G.P. Shuttleworth
and the Randgold Resources Restricted Share Scheme,
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | Registration Statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-145013) pertaining to the Randgold Resources Share Option Scheme and Restricted
Stock Awards to Non-Executive Directors, and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 3. | Registration Statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-103222) pertaining to the Randgold Resources Share Option Scheme
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



of our reports dated March 28, 2014 relating to
the consolidated financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, of Randgold Resources
Limited and its subsidiaries which appears in this Form 20-F. We also consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated
March 28, 2014 relating to the financial statement schedule, which appears in this Form 20-F.







|/s/ BDO LLP    | 
|-------------- | 
|BDO LLP        | 
|London         | 
|March 28, 2014 | 



BDO LLP is a limited
liability partnership registered in England and Wales (with registered number OC305127).
#### Frances W. Alexion et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of New York, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

November 1, 1957.

*Morris M. Mints*for plaintiffs.

*Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel,*for defendant.

Saul S. Street, J.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 112 of the Rules of Civil Practice is granted.

The building in question was classified as a one-family dwelling on March 6, 1922, and a certificate of occupancy for such use was issued on July 7,1924. In 1927 the building was changed to a business and manufacturing use without the obtaining of a certificate of occupancy for the new use. In 1937 the premises were again changed as to use and a business of raising, breeding, caring for and selling and boarding dogs was begun.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs have received notice from the building department that the use of the premises for breeding and selling dogs in a residential use district was a violation of the city ordinance, and that the defendant is prosecuting plaintiffs in a proceeding in the Court of Special Sessions. The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendant from such criminal prosecution on the ground that they have a vested right to use the premises for business in a residential use district because of the continued use of the premises through the years.

The position of the plaintiffs is untenable. They have used the premises illegally during all the time of occupancy as a *975business. The change of use of the premises from residential to business was never established.

Subdivision (b) of section 6 of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, which allows the continuance of any existing use of a lawfully established and nonconforming use is unavailable to the plaintiffs. That section reads as follows: “ Any use existing in any building or premises lawfully established subsequent to July 25, 1916, and not conforming to the regulations of the use district in which it is maintained, may be continued therein, except as provided in § 21-A or in § 21-D.”

This section applies only to a use “ lawfully established As indicated above, the manufacturing use by the plaintiffs was not lawfully established in 1927, as is also the fact with respect to the breeding and selling of dogs without a permit. Such business without a permit is illegal and a violation of section 18 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York, as is indicated by the pending prosecution which is sought to be restrained.

The plaintiffs cannot use a business that is unlawfully established for a long period of time and then claim a vested right to continue such unlawful and illegally established business.

Finally, this court will not interfere with the prosecution of criminal acts *(Kalwin Business Men’s Assn.*v. *McLaughlin,*216 App. Div. 6; *Delaney*v. *Flood,*183 N. Y. 323).

Settle order.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 92-8155

_______________

IN RE:

BOB SLAGLE,

Petitioner.

_________________________

Petition for Writ of Mandamus to

the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

_________________________

(May 11, 1992)

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

CERTIFICATE OF QUESTION

FROM COURT OF APPEALS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The underlying matter involves three redistricting cases

concerning the reapportionment of Texas's legislative and congressional districts, Terrazas v. Richards, Nos. A-91-CA-425, A-91-CA426, and A-91-CA-428 (W.D. Tex). The three-judge district court

has entered various substantive orders and judgments that effectively require the State of Texas to conduct elections under a

court-ordered, interim redistricting plan. See Terrazas v.
2

Richards, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19860 (Dec. 24, 1991). The orders

have been appealed to the United States Supreme Court and are

pending as No. 91-1270, Richards v. Terrazas, and No. 91-1546,

Slagle v. Terrazas. 

Petitioner Bob Slagle, Chairman of the Texas Democratic Party,

filed two motions asking the Honorable James Nowlin, a member of

the three-judge panel, to recuse and raised the recusal issue again

in a motion to vacate. Judge Nowlin individually denied the

motions. The petitioner also filed a motion requesting the full

three-judge court to review Judge Nowlin's failure to recuse. That

motion was not acted upon by the three-judge court; instead, Judge

Nowlin individually denied it. 

On April 1, 1992, the petitoner filed in this court, as No.

92-8155, a petition for writ of mandamus asking the court to compel

Judge Nowlin to disqualify himself from participating in the

ongoing district court proceedings. This court sua sponte has

raised the question of whether mandamus lies in the court of

appeals or instead in the Supreme Court.

QUESTION CERTIFIED

Where an individual judge, who is a member of a three-judge

district court panel, has denied a motion to disqualify him, does

a petition for writ of mandamus to compel his disqualification lie

in the United States Court of Appeals or, instead, in the United

States Supreme Court?
3

REASON FOR THE CERTIFICATE

This question is res nova. Appeals from the orders of threejudge district courts lie in the Supreme Court, but no reported

authority has considered where a petition for writ of mandamus

regarding disqualification lies. In light of the fact that appeals

on the merits in this matter are pending in the Supreme Court, the

Court may wish to address the jurisdictional issue regarding

disqualification.

QUESTION CERTIFIED.
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 32(a)





    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the filing of this Annual Report on Form 10-K of TRW
Automotive Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended December 31, 2003 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John C.
Plant, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.






Date: March 29, 2004                     /s/ John C. Plant
                                         -------------------------------------
                                         John C. Plant
                                         Chief Executive Officer and President
                                         (Principal Executive Officer)
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5360 

To exend the temporarily suspension of the duty on powdered ion exchange 

resin comprised of a copolymer of styrene, cross linked with divinyl-benzene. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 7, 2012 

Mr. DOLD (for himself and Mr. YOUNG of Indiana) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To exend the temporarily suspension of the duty on powdered 

ion exchange resin comprised of a copolymer of styrene, 

cross linked with divinyl-benzene. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. POWDERED ION EXCHANGE RESIN COMPRISED 

4 OF A COPOLYMER OF STYRENE, CROSS 

5 LINKED WITH DIVINYL-BENZENE. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.02.34 of the Har7 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

8 powdered ion exchange resin comprised of a copolymer of 

9 styrene, cross linked with divinyl-benzene) is amended by 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5360 IH

1 striking the date in the effective period column and insert2 ing ‘‘12/31/2015’’. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

4 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

5 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
[LETTERHEAD
        OF STAF*TEK]
 
 
 **PROMISSORY
        NOTE**
 TO
 GERRY
        MCILHARGEY
 
 
 $25,000.00
              December
                  28, 2006
 
 
 For
        value
        received, Staf*Tek Services, Inc. of Tulsa, Oklahoma, (herein referred to
        as
“maker”) promises to pay to the order of GERRY MCILHARGEY, (herein referred to
        as “payee”) on or before June 30, 2007 the principal sum of Twenty Five Thousand
        and No/Dollars and Two Thousand in interest for a total of Twenty Seven Thousand
        and No/Dollars.
 
 Payment
        of this note shall be as follow: One lump sum payment of $25,000.00 and $2000.00
        interest for a total of $27000.00.
 
 Maker
        may
        prepay this note in whole or in part without penalty or surcharge at any
        time
        prior to the maturity date.
 
 The
        maker
        hereby severally waives presentment for payment, notice of nonpayment, protest
        and notice to protest, and aggress that extensions of the time for payment
        may
        be granted without notice. In case of legal proceedings to collect this note,
        maker agrees to pay all court costs including reasonable attorneys’ fees to
        payee as prevailing parties in the suit.
 
 IN
        WITNESS WHEREOF, this agreement is signed the 28 th day of
        December, 2007.
 
 
 /s/
                  Shelia Hobens
              
              /s/
                  Gerry McIlhargeyShelia
                  Hobens
              
              Gerry
                  McIlhargey, President & CEOSt.
                  Joseph, Inc.4870
                  S. Lewis, Suite 250
              
              4870
                  S. Lewis St., Ste. 250Tulsa,
                  OK 74105
              
              Tulsa,
                  Oklahoma 74105
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

EARL BRADLEY

,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE

,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee. §

§

§ No. 221, 2017

§

§ Court Below

— Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§

§ Cr. ID No. 0912011155 (S)

§

§

§

Submitted: December 1, 2017

Decided: January 16 , 2018

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA

, and VAUGHN

, Justices.

O R D E R

This 16 th day of January 2018

, after careful consideration of the parties’

briefs, the record below

, and the appellant’s motion for decision en b anc , we first

conclude that the motion for decision en b anc should be denied. None of the criteria

set forth in Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure X for determination en b anc

apply here. 1 We next conclude that the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of the

appellant’s second motion for postconviction relief and denial of the appellant’s

1 Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure X provides the Chief Justice may order any matter

for determination en b anc upon the briefs or oral argument. Determination en b anc is required in

the following circumstances: (i) direct appeals and motions for postconviction relief in death

penalty cases; (ii) when a panel of the Court indicates possible disagreement; (iii) when there is a

reasonable likelihood a previous decision of the Court may be modified or overruled; (iv) when

approved by two justices; and (v) when required by Court rule or by two

- thirds vote of the General

Assembly.2

motion for judicial recusal should be affirmed on the basis of

, and for the reasons in

,

the Superior Court’ s well

- reasoned order dated May 18, 2017

. 2 Contrary to the

appellant’s contentions, his ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims

were subject to the requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2)

. 3

N OW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion for decision en banc is

DENIED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice

2 State v. Bradley , 2017 WL 2209896 (Del. May 18, 2017).

3 See Durham v. State , 2017 WL 5450746, at *2 (Del. Nov. 13, 2017) ( holding the appellant had

to satisfy the requirements of Rule 61(d ) (2) to avoid summary dismissal of his second

postconviction motion, even if he did not have a previous opportunity to raise his ineffective

assistance of postco nviction counsel claims).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-29-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-23-1995
<CASH>                                           1,493
<SECURITIES>                                    27,120
<RECEIVABLES>                                   41,031
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,293
<INVENTORY>                                     63,711
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               133,257
<PP&E>                                         115,258
<DEPRECIATION>                                  56,454
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 217,643
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,139
<BONDS>                                          8,400
<COMMON>                                         7,061
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                     152,314
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   217,643
<SALES>                                        113,883
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               113,883
<CGS>                                           79,953
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   79,953
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 398
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,881
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,691
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,190
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,190
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.02
        

</TABLE>