This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-1261 Jeremy Shane Zimmerman, petitioner, Appellant,

vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. Filed February 6, 2017 Reversed and remanded Stauber, Judge Scott County District Court File No. 70-CR-15-23903 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief A ppellate Public Defender, F. Richard Gallo, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistan t County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presid ing Judge; Worke, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N STAUBER , Judge Appellant argues that the district court e rred by refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea to failure to re gister as a predatory offend er for reasons of manifest injustice. We reverse and re mand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS Appellant Jeremy Shane Zimmerman was charged with two counts of violating predatory-offender-registration requirements between October 20, 2015, and December 17, 2015. Zimmerman, who was required to re gister as a predator y offender, informed the St. Paul Police Department (SPPD) that he was homeless and was living in a car in the Walmart parking lot in St. Paul. As required for offenders who lack a permanent address, he checked in week ly with the SPPD and on each occasion informed Officer Lynette Cherry of the SPPD that he was living in the Walmart parking lot and had no secondary address. Officer Cherry informed Detective Jim Blatzheim of the Shakopee Police Department that she believed that Zimmerman might be staying at an unregistered address in Shakopee. Detective Blatzhei m spoke with T.A.B ., who stated that Zimmerman had been staying at her home in Sh akopee a couple of times a week since his release from prison in October 2015, and was receiving mail at her address. T.A.B. provided Blatzheim with pieces of mail Zimmerman received at her address. Blatzheim also spoke with S.J.S., who is Zimmerman’s mother. S.J.S. reported that Zimmerman had stayed overnight at he r Shakopee residence and slept overnight3 there once or twice a week. When Blatzheim spoke with Zimmerman, he responded that he had only visited T.A.B. and S.J.S arou nd Thanksgiving, but ot herwise was living in his car at Walmart. Zimmerman was arrestedand charged with two predatory-offenderregistration violations. After jury selection but before tria l, Zimmerman agreed to plead guilty. Zimmerman had “second thoughts” about pleadi ng guilty, but after consulting with his attorney, he entered a guilty plea to knowingly violati ng the predatory-offenderregistration requirement or inte ntionally providing false inform ation. The district court sentenced him to the presum ptive sentence of 39 months, and imposed a ten-year conditional-release term. Soon after sentencing, Zimmerman wrot e to the district court and asked to withdraw his guilty plea. Subsequently, his counsel submitted a formal motion to withdraw based on ineffective assistance of co unsel, misrepresentation by counsel, and untimely disclosure. On June 6, 2016, th e district court issued an order denying Zimmerman’s motion to withdraw his gu ilty plea. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N “A defendant has no absolu te right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a court must permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at a ny stage of the proceedings, including after sentencing, if it is necessary to correct a mani fest injustice. Minn. R. Cr im. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d at 94. A4 guilty plea is valid if it is accu rate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. “[T]he validity of a plea presents a question of law that [an appellate court] review[s] de novo.” Id. Zimmerman challenges the accuracy of hi s guilty plea. An accurate plea ensures that the defendant is not pl eading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of at trial. Id. A plea is accurate if there is an adequate record providing a factual basis for the plea. Id. “The factual basis must es tablish sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” Munger v. State , 749 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). Zimmerman argues that the facts e licited are not sufficient to establish an accurate plea. Zimmerman pleaded guilty to knowingly violating the re gistration requirement or providing false information to the appropriate law enforcement authority in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5( a) (2014). The district cour t read the elements of the crime to Zimmerman before he entered his pl ea: (1) Zimmerman was required to register; (2) Zimmerman knowingly or intentionally vi olated a registration requirement, including failing to report to the local law enforcement authority within 24 hours after entering a jurisdiction; (3) Zimmerman’s registra tion requirement ha d not lapsed; and (4) Zimmerman acted between October 20, a nd December 17, 2015, in Scott County. The district court questioned Zimmerman to establish a factual basis for the plea. Zimmerman acknowledged that he was required to register and that he registered as homeless. Zimmerman stated, “However, out of – what viol ated this crime is I didn’t5 register for consecutive – or more than 24 ho urs while in Scott Co unty.” The following exchange to provide a factual ba sis for the plea then took place: THE COURT: Okay. So you ca me to Scott County, and you stayed at a residence in Sc ott County; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. And do you remember what – what city it was in Scott County that you stayed in? THE DEFENDANT: Shakopee, Minnesota THE COURT: Okay. And when yo u stayed there, did you go to the Shakopee Sheriff’s Depa rtment or police department within 24 hours after ente ring this jurisdiction?
THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: And you agree that at the time this happened that you were still required to register?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The factual basis elicited by the di strict court does not demonstrate that Zimmerman intentionally or knowingly viol ated the registration requirements, an essential element of the offense. “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cau se the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if succ essful, will cause that result. In addition, . . . the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make th e actor’s conduct criminal and which are set forth after th e word “intentionally.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2014). To “‘[k]now’ requires on ly that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.” Minn. Stat. § 609. 02, subd. 9(2) (2014). The above colloquy does not establis h that Zimmerman knowingly or intentionally violated6 the registration statute. Because the factua l basis does not establish the requisite mens rea, it is inadequate to support the a ccuracy of Zimmerman’s guilty plea. The state argues that it is clear from th e record that Zimmerman established a secondary address at T.A.B.’s house, but the plea does not refer to a secondary address. The elements as read by the district court rela te only to the charge of failing to register within 24 hours after entering another juri sdiction when a predatory offender has no primary address. The plea co lloquy also does not establish that Zimmerman remained in Shakopee for more than 24 hours. The district court e rred by refusing to permit him to withdraw his plea. 1
Reversed and remanded.

1 Zimmerman also challenged the district court’s imposition of a ten-year conditionalrelease term as unauthorized, when the fact s supporting the enhanced conditional-release term were not found by a sent encing jury and he did not waive his right to a sentencing jury. See State v. Her , 862 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Minn. 2015 ) (stating that a risk-level III assignment is a fact that can increase a conditional-release term beyond the statutory maximum, and, thus, a sentencing jury must fi nd that a defendant is assigned to that risk level). In light of our decision, we decline to address this issue.