alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### PALOMO v. STATE.

No. 25846.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 7, 1952.

Rehearing Denied June 18, 1952.

*211A. A. Garza, Joe Burkett, San Antonio, for appellant.

Austin F. Anderson, Cr. Dist. Atty., James C. Onion, Asst. Cr. Dist. Atty., San Antonio, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault upon an officer; the punishment, one year in jail and a fine of $500.

Appellant plead guilty in the court below without the intervention of a jury.

Appellant here contends that the punishment is cruel and unusual and that the trial court abused his discretion when he assessed such punishment without hearing evidence.

Article 518, C.C.P., reads as follows:

> “A plea of guilty in a misdemeanor case may be made either by the defendant or his counsel in open court. In such case, the defendant or his counsel may waive a jury, and the punishment may be assessed by the court, either upon or without evidence, at the discretion of the court.”

In Ex parte Bostick, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 411, 196 S.W. 531, Burton v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 334, 16 S.W.2d 828, and Ex parte Clinnard, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 460, 169 S.W.2d 181, we held that, in a misdemeanor case where the defendant enters a plea of guilty, it is not necessary to introduce evidence showing the guilt of the defendant.

It has long been the holding of this Court that “when the punishment assessed is within the limits prescribed by law, it is not ‘excessive’, and courts cannot remedy the grievance, even though of opinion that the discretion of the jury was not judiciously exercised.”- Brown v. State, 16 Tex. 122, 123.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WACHOVIA        8739 Research Drive
	Charlotte, NC 28288
SECURITIES	
 

 
**OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

	Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement      dated as of July 10, 2002, by and among Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., as Depositor, Wachovia Bank National Association, as Master Servicer, Lend Lease Asset Management L.P., as Special Servicer, LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee, and ABN AMRO Bank N.V., as Fiscal Agent, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2002 MW1 (the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

	Pursuant to Section 3.13 of this Agreement, Timothy E. Steward and Clyde M. Alexander, Directors of the Master Servicer, do hereby certify that:
-   A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from July  10, 2002 through December 31, 2002 and of its performance under the Agreement during such period has been made under our supervision; and
To the best of our knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its material obligations under this Agreement in all material   respects throughout the period April 2, 2002 through December 31, 2002;           and
The Master Servicer has received no notice regarding qualification, or    challenging the status, of any REMIC I or REMIC II as a REMIC under the REMIC Provisions or the Grantor Trust as a "Grantor Trust", for income              tax purposes under the Grantor Trust Provisions from the Internal revenue     Service or any other  governmental agency or body.

             IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Certificate as of                        the _______ day of March, 2003.

 

*Timothy E. Steward  			***Clyde M. Alexander
Timothy E. Steward, Director 			Clyde M. Alexander, Director

Wachovia Bank National Association		Wachovia Bank National Association	

(Formerly known as First Union		(Formerly known as First Union

   National Bank)				   National Bank)

 

 

 

Wachovia Securities is the trade name under which Wachovia Corporation conducts its investment banking, capital markets and institutional securities business 

through First Union Securities, Inc. ("FUSI"), member NYSE, NASD, SIPC and through other bank and non bank and broker dealer subsidiaries of Wachovia Corporation,

including Wachovia Bank, N.A. and First Union National Bank.******
Exhibit 32  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Standard Register Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 1, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Dennis L. Rediker, President and Chief Executive Officer, and I, Craig J. Brown, Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Date: August 2, 2007   /S/DENNIS L. REDIKER Dennis L. Rediker President and Chief Executive Officer   /S/ CRAIG J. BROWN Craig J. Brown Senior Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
#### ERVIN v. STATE.

No. 24346.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 13, 1949.

*462A. M. Harrison, of Paris, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty, of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Bill Ervin was assessed a penalty of a $200 fine by a jury on information charging the possession of an alcoholic beverage for sale in a dry area.

Officers went to the premises of appellant with a search warrant and found twenty-seven cans of beer iced down in a tub on the floor of the kitchen. Each can contained twelve ounces. This evidence would support a conviction but for the fact of the admission of illegal testimony, which was calculated to and probably did result in the penalty assessed.

The State’s Attorney has filed his brief in which he discusses certain of the bills of exception in the following language.

“Appellant brings forward a number of bills of exception, and by Bill No. 1 he complains at the action o'f the trial court in permitting the State to prove, over the timely objection of appellant, by the witness C. O. Shelton, that T. R. Jeffries, who was present at the time said premises were searched and purportedly drinking beer at the place, stated to the witness Shelton, We bought this beer here.’

“Likewise, the witness H. B. Stanley was permitted, over the timely objection of appellant, to testify that Charlie Irvin stated to the witness Stanley, ‘The beer belongs to Bill Ervin’; and,

“In Bill No. 3, the appellant complains that the trial court admitted in evidence, over appellant’s timely objection, a statement by the witness Troy Bussell that one Dugger and one Baker told him that they ‘bought the beer there from a black-headed girl and paid thirty-five cents a can for it.’

“Likewise, the witness H. R. Marks was also permitted, over the objection of appellant, to testify that on the occasion he went to the place with the witness Troy Bussell that Baker and Dugger told him, ‘We got the beer here,’ in answer to his question as to where they got the beer which they were drinking.

“Notwithstanding the court’s qualification to these bills, in our opinion, the testimony complained of was not admissible, and was purely hearsay, each of said statements having been made by said parties out of the presence and hearing of the appellant.”

We have examined the record and adopt the foregoing statement as correctly reflecting that portion of the record to which he refers. The court qualified these bills by saying the evidence was admitted on the theory that the statements were res gestae. Such qualifications are merely statements of the law of the case and this Court is not bound by the conclusions of the trial court on questions of law. We think he was in error.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Exhibit 99.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Restaurant Training Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending December 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Michael Hume, Treasurer, Secretary and Director of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
12th day of April, 2005.



/s/ Michael Hume
-------------------------------
Michael Hume
Treasurer, Secretary and Director
Restaurant Training Corporation
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIO CESAR OVALLE,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DOE 

C.B.P. AGENTS 1-10, DOE I.C.E. 

AGENTS 1-10,

 Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

SA-20-CV-00676-JKP

ORDER RETURNING CASE TO DISTRICT COURT

On this day, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the 

Court dismiss this case for want of prosecution. Accordingly, all matters referred to the 

Magistrate Judge have been considered and acted upon.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the above-entitled and numbered case is 

RETURNED to the District Court for all purposes.

SIGNED this 9th day of October, 2020.

ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 5:20-cv-00676-JKP Document 7 Filed 10/09/20 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-1-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                                   0
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                         64,848
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   118,746
<PP&E>                                          24,753,558
<DEPRECIATION>                                      35,233
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  25,128,258
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,798,390
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            94,749
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    25,128,258
<SALES>                                              9,756
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     9,756
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,279,087
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 435,884
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,269,331)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (1,269,331)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (1,269,331)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         (.02)


</TABLE>
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 18

- 00176

- CR

K ENDRA P HILLIANA M AXION

, Appellant

V

.

T HE S TATE OF T EXAS §

§

§

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 297th District

Court

of Tarrant County (1398848D)

July 18 , 2019

Opinion by Justice Birdwell

(en banc)

(nfp)

JUDGMENT ON EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

This court has again considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was error in the trial court’s judgment

. We strike $ 1 5 of the $555 assessed as

reparations in the judgment and modify the judgment to assess reparations of only

$540. We modify t he incorporated order to withdraw funds so that it reflects that

$ 54 0 should be withdrawn from appellant’s inmate t rust account

. It is ordered that

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified.SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Wade Birdwell

Justice Wade BirdwellOPINION INFORMATION TO PUBLISHERS



## From the Court of Appeals

Second Appe llate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

CASE DOCKET NUMBER: 02

- 18

- 00176

- CR

NAME OF CASE: KENDRA PHILLIANA MAX ION,

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

DATE OPINION FILED: JULY 18 , 2019

DATE REHEARING FILED:

TRIAL COURT: 297TH DISTRICT COURT

TRIAL COURT JUDGE: HON. DAVID C. HAGERM AN

COUNTY: TARRANT

ATTORNEY S FOR APPELLANT: ERIC LABOVITZ & KATH RYN

ELIZABETH MORROW

LABOVITZ LAW FIRM

ARLINGTON, TEXAS

ATTORNEY S FOR STATE: SHAREN WILSON, CRIMINAL

DIS TRICT ATTORNEY; JOSEPH W.

SPENCE, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CHIEF OF

POST

- CONVICTION; SHELBY

WHITE & DEREK DUMAS

, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT

ATTORNEYS

TARRANT COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEYS OFFICE

FORT WORTH, TEXAS
#### WARREN v. STATE.

No. 27086.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 26, 1954.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

J. M. Kolander, County Atty., Amarillo, Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*683WOODLEY, Judge.

The appeal is from a $100 fine for selling whisky in a wet area without a permit.

In the absence of a bond or recognizance on appeal, or a showing that appellant is in jail, we are without jurisdiction of this mis-, demeanor appeal. Braun v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 257 S.W.2d 708; Alexander v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 269 S.W.2d 682.

The appeal is dismissed.
# Materials Not Included in **Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket**

Docket Number: FAA - 2014 - 0926 Directorate Identifier: 2014NM085AD

747 - 27A2513 --- 2/4/14

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the Supplemental AD Docket 

### MA **Y BE VIEWED AT:** Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate Rules Docket 1601 Lind Ave. SW., Renton, WA 98057 425.227.1221 **DURING THE HOURS OF:** 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Form Date: 0 3/05/2008
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5710 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to establish minimum efficiency 

standards for self-contained commercial refrigerators and freezers, and 

to direct the Department of Energy to establish standards for other 

related products. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2012 

Mr. WESTMORELAND (for himself, Mr. BRALEY of Iowa, Mr. PITTS, Mr. GARRETT, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. COLE, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, 

Mr. AUSTIN SCOTT of Georgia, and Mr. KINGSTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to establish minimum efficiency standards for self-contained commercial 

refrigerators and freezers, and to direct the Department 

of Energy to establish standards for other related products. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Better Use of Refrig5 erator Regulations Act’’. 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5710 IH

1 SEC. 2. SERVICE OVER THE COUNTER, SELF-CONTAINED, 

2 MEDIUM TEMPERATURE COMMERCIAL RE3 FRIGERATORS. 

4 Section 342(c) of the Energy Policy and Conservation 

5 Act (42 U.S.C. 6313(c)) is amended— 

6 (1) in paragraph (1)— 

7 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) 

8 and (C) as subparagraphs (D) and (E), respec9 tively; and 

10 (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) 

11 the following: 

12 ‘‘(B) The term ‘(SOC-SC-M)’ means a medium 

13 temperature commercial refrigerator— 

14 ‘‘(i) with a self-contained condensing unit 

15 and equipped with sliding or hinged doors in 

16 the back intended for use by sales personnel, 

17 and with glass or other transparent material in 

18 the front for displaying merchandise; and 

19 ‘‘(ii) that has a height not greater than 66 

20 inches and is intended to serve as a counter for 

21 transactions between sales personnel and cus22 tomers. 

23 ‘‘(C) The term ‘TDA’ means the total display 

area (ft2 24 ) of the refrigerated case, as defined in Air25 Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute 

26 Standard 1200.’’; 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 5710 IH

1 (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as 

2 paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively; and 

3 (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(4) Each SOC-SC-M manufactured on or after the 

6 date which is 6 months after the date of enactment of 

7 the Better Use of Refrigerator Regulations Act shall have 

8 a total daily energy consumption (in kilowatt hours per 

9 day) of not more than 0.6 x TDA + 1.0.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
---

|EXHIBIT 13.2                                 
|---------------------------------------------
|CERTIFICATION OF                             
|CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER                      
|PURSUANT TO                                  
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,                      
|AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO                       
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Paul Mann, Chief Financial Officer of Amarc Resources Ltd.
(the "Company"), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of
my knowledge:

(i) the Annual Report on Form 20-F of
the Company for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2013 (the "Annual Report") fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) the information contained in the
Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.

|Date:  | July 29, 2013           | 
|------ | ----------------------- | 
|       |                         | 
|       | /s/ Paul Mann           | 
|       |                         | 
|By:    | Paul Mann               | 
|Title: | Chief Financial Officer | 

This written statement is being furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Company's Annual Report on Form
20-F. A signed original of this statement has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies this Annual Report on Form
20-F pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not,
except to the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by
reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it
by reference.

---
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 17, 2019

N o. 04

- 18

- 00905

- CR

Cesar Daniel RODRIGUEZ

- CRUZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 12, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 527406

Honorable Scott Roberts, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due January 3, 2019. When no brief was filed, this court notified

appellant by letter dated January 11, 2019. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2). In response to our

notice, appellant filed a motion for extension of time on January 14, 2019, requesting a thirty

- day

extension of time to file his brief. After review, we GRANT appellant’s motion and ORDER

appellant to file his brief in this court on or before February 4, 2019.

We order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on all counsel.

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 17th day of January, 2019

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### HOCHMAN v. STATE.

No. 22398.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 19, 1943.

For former opinion, see 170 S.W.2d 756.

Joe Burkett and Schlesinger, Schlesinger & Goodstein, all of San Antonio1, for appellant.

Ralph J. Noonan, Dist. Atty., of Hondo, Morriss & Morriss, of San Antonio, and Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Representatives of the State have requested leave to file second motion for rehearing and presented said motion in connection with such request.

It is insisted that our former construction of the trial court’s limitation of the use of evidence of other thefts was erroneous. We do not think so, and can see no good to be accomplished by a further discussion of the subject.

It is further urged that the record contains corroborating evidence of the accomplice witnesses sufficient to meet the requirements of the law relative to the specific charge against appellant of receiving the one sack of wool in question. In the light of the second motion we have again painstakingly reviewed the evidence. *131Our conclusions in that regard have not been altered. It would add nothing to the jurisprudence of the State to write at greater length on that point.

Regarding the legitimate use by the jury of the evidence of thefts of other wool than the one sack charged in the indictment our attention has fallen on one statement in our opinion on rehearing which was made under the impression that the evidence showed that appellant handled the wool obtained by all of said other thefts. . We misconceived the facts. The statement referred to is as follows: “ * * * in the case before us the evidence should be admitted for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge on the part of the party on trial for receiving and concealing stolen property as well as to show that the property was stolen.”

Unless we again misapprehend the evidence the quoted statement should be modified to restrict the use of other thefts of wool for the purpose of showing appellant’s guilty knowledge to the one other transaction in which appellant is claimed to have sold other stolen wool delivered to him by the thieves. Appellant in no manner handled the wool taken to San Antonio by the thieves and which was recovered before being disposed of by them. In another transaction the thieves themselves sold the stolen wool, and the only claimed connection of appellant therewith is from the testimony of the accomplice witnesses that they turned over a part of the proceeds to appellant. We find no corroborating evidence on this point.

The second motion for rehearing by the State is overruled.