IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2013-CT-00434-SCT MICHAEL JACKSON

v. ROSIE JACKSON ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/26/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TALMADGE D. LITTLEJOHN TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LUANNE STARK THOMPSON BENNIE L. JONES, JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD SHANE McCLAUGHLIN NICOLE H. McCLAUGHLIN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: LUANNE STARK THOMPSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED - 08/13/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: EN BANC. WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. T h e M o n r o e C o u n t y Chancery Court granted Rosie Jackson a d ivorce f rom h e r husband Michael on the g round of c r u e l and inhum an t reatm ent in 2012. The Court of Appeals af

f irm ed the chancellor’s judgm ent, and this Court g ranted M ichael’s petition f or writ of certiora r i

. Finding that the chancellor m a nif estly erred in his calculation of the

m arital assets a nd liabilities, we af f irm in part and reverse in part the chancellor’s j udgm ent and rem and this case f

or f urther proceedings.F ACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Michael a nd Rosie m arried in 1976, and t hey had two children together, both of whom

were em ancipated at the tim e of the instant litigation. Rosie f iled f or divorce on M ay 20, 2009, on the grounds of adultery , habitual cruel and inhum an treatm ent, and irreconcilable dif f erences. As evidence supporting h e r g r o u n d s f or d ivorce, Rosie alleged that she had learned in 2008 that Michael had engaged in extram arital sexual activity and had m olested

a c h i l d during their m arriage. R osie claim ed that Michael’s m isconduct had n egativel y i mp a cted her health and rendered her unable t o continue to perf orm her m arital duti e s . Michael denied these accusations. ¶3. Af ter a trial, the chancellor f

ound t hat Rosie had presented suf f icient proof of

habitual cruel and inhum a n treatm ent and gran ted t he divorce. T he c hancellor then d ivided the

m arital e state and awarded Rosie lum p - s u m a lim ony . Michael appealed the chancellor’s judgm ent, and the case was assigned to the Court of A ppeals. Michael raised t hree issues on appeal: “(1) the e vidence was insuf f icient to s upport a divorce on t he ground of habitual cruel and inhum an t r eatm ent, (2) the evidence relied upon by the chancellor was inadm issible, and (3) the equitable d istribution and the alim ony award were based on incorrect calculations.” Jackson v. Jackson , 2014 W L 5553539, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014). The Court of Appeals a f

f irm ed the chancellor’s judgm ent in all respects. Id. at *9. Michael then f iled a petition f or writ of c ertiorari w ith this Court, e ssentially reasserting the sam e claim s he raised bef ore the Court of Appeals. This Court granted Michael’s petition, and we now lim it our

2review to Michael’s c laim that t he chancell or m iscalculated the value of R osie’s equitable

distribution of

the m arital estate. Miss. R. App. P. 17(h).

DISCUSSION ¶4. Michael argues, as he did bef ore the Court of Appeals, that the chancellor erroneously undervalued R osie’s equitable share of t he m arital estate by counting t he value of the

m ortgage balance on the p arties’ m arital h om e against Rosie twice. Th e e q u itable distribution of m arital property upon divorce is governed by this C o u r t’s holding in Ferguson v. Ferguson , 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). In reviewing a c hancellor’s f indings concerning equitable distribution, th i s C o u r t a pplies a l im ited standard o f review. “[ T]his Court will not substitute i ts o wn j udgm ent f or that of the chancery c ourt, and the f indings of the chancery court will be overturned only when those f indings are m anif

e s tly w r o n g o r clearly erroneous, or an i ncorrect l egal standard w as a pplied.” Cuccia v. Cuccia , 90 So. 3d 1228, 1232 (Miss. 2012) (citing Bowen v. Bowen , 982 So. 2d 385, 394 (Miss. 2008)). ¶5. In the f

i nal judgm ent of

divorce, the chancellor awarded use of the m arital hom e to Rosie a nd ordered Michael t o e xecute a quitclaim deed transf erring his interest in the hom e
to R osie. The parties stipulated t hat the hom e was worth $78,000. The hom e was encum bered by a m ortgage with a balance o f $50,103, resulting in $27,897 in equity

. As part of the equitable division of m arital assets under Ferguson , the chance l lor reduced the hom e’s stipulated value by the value of the m ortgage balance and allocated o nly the hom e’s equity as an asset to Rosie. Rosie’s total share of m arital assets was valued at $31,928. Michael,

3on the other hand, received m arital assets v alued at $120,310.64. This distribution created

an $88,382.64 disparity

in f avor of Michael with respect to the distribution of assets. ¶6. The chancellor t hen d istributed the m arital debts b e t w e e n t h e p arties. T he parties’ credit card debt, totali n g $ 4 , 9 5 0 , w as allocated to Michael. The m ortgage balance on the

m arital hom e was allocated to Rosie. Accordingly , Michael’s net distribution of the m arital

estate w as valued a t $ 115,360, wh ile Rosie’s net distribution had a value of negative $18,175. Using these calculations, the chancellor f ound it a ppropriate to award R osie lumpsum alim ony “ in o rder to reach an equitable division of the m arital property .” T h e chancellor calcula ted the am ount of alim ony by equalizing Rosie’s negative net distribution with an initial award of $ 18,175 and then granting a n a dditional award of $ 39,505.32, representing half of the rem a ining net m arital assets, f or a total award of

$57,680.32. ¶7. On appeal, Michael argued that the chan c e l l o r h a d mi s c a lculated the v alue of the parties’ equitable distributions by erroneously counting the m o r t gage debt against Rosie twice – once as a reduction o n the value of t he hom e, a nd again as a separate liability

. The Court of Appeals rejected this argum ent w ithout directly a ddressing it, sim ply holding that “[ e]quitable distribution does n ot m ean equal distribution.” Jackson , 2014 W L 5553539, at *8 (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins , 67 So. 3d 5, 11 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). The Court of Appeals f ound that Michael was awarded a m ajo r i t y o f t h e a ssets and no longer had any f inancial responsibilities concerning the hom e. Id

. T hus, the Court of Appeals f

ound that the chancellor’s f

indings were supported by cre d i b le evidence and were n ot m anif estly
wrong. Id.

4¶8. W e f i nd that the Court o f A ppeals erred in af f irm ing the c hancellor’s judgm ent here,

as the chancellor m anif

estly erred in its calculation of Rosie’s equitable distribution of the

ma r i t a l estate. W hile a truly equal distribution of m arital property is n ot r equired u n d e r Ferguson , the chancellor’s equitable distribution m u st be based on correct calculations. See Ferguson , 639 So. 2 d at 927. In the instant case, i t is clear t hat t he chancellor intended f or Ro s i e to be personally responsible f or pay ing the m o rtgage on the m arital hom e , so it was appropriate f

o r him t o allocate the value of the m ortgage balance as a l iability to Rosie. However, the chancellor also included the m ortgage balance in his allocation of m arital asets by a l locating t he home ’s e quity , rather than i ts stipulated m arket value, to Rosie. Thus, Michael is c orrect that the c hancellor erroneou s l y counted t he m ortgage balance both a s a liability and as a reduction to the v alue of an asset. This double c ounting caused Rosie’s net distribution of

the m arital estate to be undervalued by $50,103. ¶9. Because t h e c h a n c e l l o r c o m m i tted a clear m athem atical error in calculating the parties’ respective equitable distributions, we m ust reverse the chancellor’s division of the

m arital estate a nd rem and this case to the chancery court f or f urther proceedings. It is also
necessary f

o r this C ourt to reverse the c h a n c e l l o r’s a ward of lum p-sum alim ony to Rosie. See G u t i e r r ez v. Gutierrez , 153 So. 3 d 703, 711 ( Miss. 2014) (“W here it is necessary to

reverse the chancery court’s division of the ma r i t a l e s tate, an accom pany ing award of alim ony s hould also be r eversed, as a reallocation o f m arital assets a nd l iabilities m a y obviate the need f

or alim o n y .”). The chancellor’s awar d o f lum p-sum alim ony was based on his incorrect determ ination that R osi e’s net distribution of the m arital estate h ad a negative

5value. On rem and, the chance l l or should revisit the distribution of the m arital assets and

liabilities. Af

ter doing so, the chancellor should reconsider an appropriate alim ony award, if necessary . CONCLUSION ¶10. The chancellor’s equitable distribution of m arital property and subsequent award of alim ony a re reversed, and this c ase is rem anded to the c hancery court f or f urther proceedings.
W e af f irm the judgm e nts of the chancery court and the Court of Appeals in all other respects. ¶11. A F F I R M E D I N P A R T , R E V E R S E D I N P A R T , A N D T H E C A S E I S REMANDED. DICKINSON A ND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, C HANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.

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