O ra l ar g u m e n t wa s h e a rd in this c a se in M a ryv ill e , B lo u n t C o u n ty , T e n n e sse e , as p a rt o f t h is C o u rt’s 1 S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n f o r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t. 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 25, 200 7 S es sio n H eard a t M ar yvil le 1



### JE REMY FLAX ET AL 

### . v. DAIML ERCHRYSLE R CORPORATIO N ET AL 

### .

Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Appeals, Midd le Sect ion

Circuit Courtfor Davidson County No. 02C-1288 Ham ilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 01768-SC-R11- CV - F iled Jul y 24, 2008

G AR Y R. W ADE , J

. , co n cu rr i n g.
Iconcur with J ustice Holder and Chief J ustice Ba rker as to the propriety of the awa rd of $5 milli on for the wrong ful death of J er em y Flax , apportioned one -half to the f ault of the DaimlerChry sler Corporation [ the “De fenda nt”] and the other one-half to L ewis Stockell. Ifurther
concur in their aff

irmance of the trial court’s reduc tion of punitive da mag es ag ainst the Def

endant reg ardingthe wrong ful death action from $65,500,000 to $13,367,345. Finally , Iag ree that the $2.5 milli on in compensatory

d am age s aw ar d edR ac h el S p arkm an fo r t h e n egl i gen ti n fl i ct i o nof emotional d i s t re ss, one-ha lf of which w as adjudg ed ag ainst the Def endant, a nd the punitive damag es of $6,632,655, all of which w as asse ssed ag ainst the Def endant, should be se t aside.

Be cause of t he lengthy trial in Davidson C ounty and a transcr ipt consisting of thousands of pag es of plea dings, te stimony , and exhibits , Icommend the a uthor, as well as the other members of thi s Co ur t f or the tim e and

e ffort ex pen ded on

re c or d r e vie w a

nd the re so lut ion

of the se mos t difficult issues. Ipart with my colleagues who join in the lead opinion only as to the viability of a
cau s e o f a ct i o n b as ed u

p o n th e po s t -s al e du ty t o wa rn
. By wa y o f e x p l an at i o n , Iwo u l d

ac kn o wl ed ge the Re state me nt ( Th ir d) of To rt s: Pr od

uc ts L ia bil ity § 10 (1 99 8) a s a

uth or ity , a s d id t

he tr ia l c ourt

. I believe, there fore , that the trial court (which, of cour se, could not have known prior to the ve rdict that the j ury would ultimately sustain the pre-sale duty to war n claim) prope rly

admitted testimony about similar acc idents taking place afte r t he sale of the 1998 Dodg e Gr and Cara van for the limited purpose of

establishing that the Def

endant ha d notice of the defe ctive seat desig n, which contr ibuted to t he de ath o f Jos hu a

F lax. F or

that r e a so n, Ise e no ne e d f or a ha rm le ss e rr or

ana ly sis

. The c omplaint included allega t i o ns that the Caravan, manuf actur ed by

the Def endant a nd operated by

J im Sparkman at the time of the acc ident, included front seats that wer e def ective a ndIn this sta te , t h e p u rp o se o f a c o m p la int is to p ro v id e no tice o f a c la im ; “m inim u m ge n e ra l f a c ts tha t wo u ld 2

s u ppor t a pot en t i al c au s e of a ct i on ” ar e n ec es s ar y
. W i ck s v
. V an der bi l t U n i v
. , M 2006- 00613- CO A- R3- CV , 2007 W L 8 5 8 7 8 0 , at * 1 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. M ar. 21 , 20 0 7 ).
-2- unrea sonably

dang erous, a

nd which posed a

dang er to a

ny children se ated di re ct ly

to the rea

r. 2 Be ca use the De fenda

nt had fa iled to issue any war nings to c onsumers of that da ng er, the re w ere alleg ations that the company was responsible for c ompensable da mag es under

the Tenne ssee Pr od uc ts L ia bil ity Ac t of 19 78 . T e nn . Co de Ann. §§ 29 -2 8- 10 1 to -1 08 (2 00 0) . M or e ov e r, Jer e my Flax, J oshua’s father, a

nd Rache l Sparkman, his mother [the “Plaintiffs”], maintained that punitive dama g e s w e re wa

rran ted because the De fe nd ant, wh o k ne w o r s ho uld

have kn own o f t

he sa fe ty defe cts, had a cted intentionally and re cklessly , by

continuing to mar

ket and se ll t h e C ar av an as particula rly safe for f amilies with children.
About three wee ks befor e the trial, the Plainti ffs filed a trial brief advoca ting jury instructions perta ining to the manuf

actur er’ s liabilit y , not only for harm cause d by a pre -sale f

ailure to wa

rn of the defe ctive seating , but a lso f or a post-sa le fa ilure to war n. More spe cifica lly , the Plaintiffs argued that a jury

cha rge on post-sale fa ilure to war n was wa rra nted bec ause ma

ny Carava n owner s had notified the De fenda

nt after 1998 about t h e poor pe rfor mance of the seats in relatively minor
acc idents. The Plaintiffs soug ht permission to int roduce as evidenc e sever al documents ar ising fr om telephone c alls to “Care s,” a ca l l -i n service offe red by the Def endant to its customers. Some 385 ins tanc e s w e re br ou g ht t o the atte nti on of the tr ia l c ourt in the pr e tr ia l pr oc e e din g s. Many of the se comp laints involved collisions into the rea r of the minivans whe re the front seats had yielded or
c oll a ps e d in a ba c kw ard

mann e r, and

a pa sse ng e r w a s in

jur e d a s a

re su lt. In s e ve ra l in sta

nc e s, children sitti ng behind the yielding seats wer e ser iously injured. F ollowing these repor ts, eng ineer s employ ed by

the Def endant inspec ted the vehic les and provide d their finding s to the company

. Shortly befor e the tria l, t h e Defendant filed a reply brief, a rguing that this st ate did not
rec og nize a post-sale duty to warn a nd citing a

n unpublished opinion f

rom the Court of Appe als as authority for that pr oposition. I ri o n v
. S un L ighting , Inc., No. M2002-00766- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL74 68 23 , at *1 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . Apr . 7 , 2 00 4) (“ Al tho ug h t he Re st ate ment (T hir d) of To rt s a do pts so me po st- sa le dutie s, Te nn e sse e ha d n ot a do pte d th os e pr ov isi on s and , in any e vent, Ms. Irion’s proof

would not trigg er those duties.” ). The Def endant further obje cted to the a dmission of the c omp la int s o n h e ars ay g ro un ds

. At the conc lusion of a pre trial hea ring , the trial cour

t held that the rulingin I rion did not prec lude the applica

tion of the most rec ent version of t he R estateme nt and per mitted an alternative claim under

the post-sale duty

to warn the ory . Be cause the t rial court conclude d that the telephone
c omp la int s a

bo ut t he se ats w e re no t to be a dmi tte d to pr ov e the tr uth of the matte r a sse rt e d, but to e sta bli shthat th e De fe nd ant h a d a de qu ate no tic e of the po te nti a l da

ng e r, thi rt

y -seve n o f t

he se c omp la int s w e re he ld t o b e a dmi ssi ble . T we lve of the c omp la int s w ere pr ior to t he Pla int if

fs ’ purcha se of the Ca

rava n. Twenty -five oc curr ed af terwa rd and, the ref

ore, w ere only rele vant to the theory of re cover

y based upon post-sa le duty to warn. At trial, this evidence was pre sented a s a par t of the Pla int if

fs ’ p roof. At the c on c lus ion of the te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt ins tr uc te d th e jur

y toT h e D ef en dan t f i l ed a mot i on f

or a n e x t r ao rdina r y a ppea l pu r s u an t t o Rul e 10 of t h e T en n es s ee Rul es of 3 A p p ell ate P ro ce d ure wit h re ga rd t o t he p o st

- sale d uty i ssue . T his m o t i o n w as d en i ed b y t he t rial co urt and , l ater, also den i ed by t h e Cour t of Appea l s
. Se e Fl ax v
. D ai m l erC hry sl er Cor p. , N o. M 2005- 01768- CO A- R3- CV , 2006 W L 3 8 1 3 6 5 5 , at * 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. D ec. 27 , 20 0 6 ).

-3- consider the complaints of t he similar ac cidents only for the limited purpose of establishing that the Def endant wa s awa

re of the potential def

ect in the se ats of the Car avan. Ultimate l y , the jury 3 de te rm ine d that the De fe nd ant fa ile d in its duty to iss ue wa rn ing s bo th pr ior to the sa le of the ve hic le
and a ft e rw ard , a

nd awa rd e d c omp e ns ator

y dama g e s.
Th e Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure a llo w f or a lte rn ativ e ple a din g s: A par ty may set forth two (2) or m ore state ments of a c laim or defe nse alter nately or hy pothetically . When two (2) or more statements are made in the a lternative a nd one (1) of them if made inde pendently would be suff

ici en t , t h e pleadingis not made ins uf fi c ie nt b y the ins uf fi c ie nc y of on e or mor e of

the a lte rn ativ e state me nts . Apa rt y may also state as ma

ny separ ate c laims or defe nses as he or she ha s, reg ardle ss of
c o n s i s t e n c y. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.05(2) (2007); B arne s v. Ba rnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn . 2006) (“ [A] lternative pleading s are expressly

permitted, re g ardle ss of consistency .”); see also Worley v. Weige l’s, I n c., 919 S.W .2d 589, 594 (Tenn. 1996) (“An alternative pleadingmay not be used a s an admission.”). L ike the trial judg e, I

believe that in these circ umstances the Plaintiffs we re e ntitled to present alternative theories of

rec overy as to duty

to warn a nd that there was mate rial evide nce to support the ver dict of the jury

as to the viability

of either claim. See Cover

v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that whether a duty to war n arises depends on the “deg ree of dange r which the problem involves and the numbe r of instanc es re ported” ).
Th e re le va

nt s e c tio n o f t

he Re state me nt p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: (a ) O ne e ng a g e d in

the bu sin e ss of sel lingor oth e rw ise dis tr ibutin gpr od uc ts i s su bje c t to lia

bil ity fo r h arm to p e rs on s o r p ro pe rt

y c a us e d b y the se lle r’ s f

a ilure to pr ov ide a wa rn inga fter th e time of

sa le or dis tr ibutio n o f a

pr od uc t if a re a so na ble p er s o ni nth e s el l er ’s p o s i t i o nwo u l d p ro v i d e s u ch a w arn i n g. (b) A r easona

ble pers on in the seller’ s position would provide a war ning a fter the time of sale if: (1) the seller knows or r easona bly should know that the product pose s a substantial risk of har

m to persons or prope rty ; and (2 ) t ho se to who m a

wa rn ingmight b e pr ov ide d c an b e ide nti fi e d an d c an r e a so na bly be assumed to be unawa

re of the risk of ha

rm; andO ne co m m ent at o r has de scr i b ed t he R est at em ent T hi rd o f T o rt s’ s um m ary of p rod uct s l i ab i l ity la w a s “t he 4

mo s t i mp ort ant deve l op ment i n t he pas t t hr ee decades f or t hos e who mus t l i ve i n t he ‘ nu t s and bo l t s ’ worl d of product l i abi l i t y l aw
. ” V i ct or E. Sch wa r t z, T h e Res t at eme n t (T h i r d) of T or t s : Pr odu ct s Li abi l i t y : A G u i de t o i t s H i g h l i g h t s , 34 T o rt & In s. L .J . 8 5 (1 9 9 8 ). T h is C o u rt h a s p re v io u sly lo o k e d to t h e R e s ta te m e n t T h ird fo r g u id a n c e a s to to rt law in T enness ee. See,e. g. , M ercer v. V and erbil t U ni v. , Inc. , 13 4 S.W

. 3 d 12 1 , 12 9 (T enn. 20 0 4 ).
-4- (3 ) a wa rn ing c an b e e ff

e c tiv e ly c omm un ic ate d to and

a c te d o n b y

tho se to who m a war ning mig ht be provided; a nd (4 ) th e ri s k o f h arm i s s u ff i ci en t l y gre at t o j u s t i fy th e b urd en o f p ro v i d i n g a w arn i n g. Restatement (Thir d) of Tor ts: P roducts L iability

§ 10. 4

In my assessment, a post-sa le duty compo rt s with both publi c policy and tra ditional tort theory . The many

jurisdictions recog nizi nga duty of post -sale failure to wa rn agree that a cla im for damag es should be p er m i t t ed when the ma nufac turer is a

war e that the pr oduct is defe ctive or
unrea sonably

dang erous a fter the sale a nd fails to take r easona

ble steps t o war

n those buy ers who have pur chase d the produc t. See, e.g ., Luv i ck v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (I owa 1999) ; Patton v. Hutchinson Wil -Rich Mfg

. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1313 (Kan. 1993); Owe ns-I llinois , Inc. v. Z enobia, 601 A.2d 633, 645-46 (Md. 1992); C omstock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (M ic h. 19 59 ); se e a lso , D ou g la s R. Ric hmo nd , E xpand ingPr od uc ts L ia bil ity : Ma nu fa c tur e rs ’ P os tSa le D u ti e s to War

n , Re tr o f it an d Re c a ll , 3 6 I d ah o L

. Re v
. 7 , 1 8 ( 1 9 9 9 )

. T h e f ir s t s tate to r e c o g n iz e the duty to warn a rising after a sale was Michigan. In a case involving defe ctive bre aks in the 1953 mod e l B uic ks , th e Mic hig an Su pr e me Court

he ld t hat a manu fa c tur e r, wh o af te r a sa le dis c ov e rs a latent def ect in its product, may

have the res p o n s i b i l i t y “to take a ll reasona ble means to c onvey eff ective w arningto those who” have already purcha sed t he product. Comst ock, 99 N.W.2d at 634. Sin c e thi s d e c isi on , a g ro wi ng numbe r of state s have re c og nize d that a manu fa c tur e r’ s r e sp on sib ili ty to tr y to p r e v e n t f

o r e s e e a b le h ar m t o it s c o n s u me r s d o e s n o t t e r mi n ate at t

h e ti me o f

th e sales transac tion. On occa sion, it i s essential for companies to a ctively

issu e “warning s about risks discovere d afte r sale . . . to pr event sig nificant ha rm to persons and proper

ty .” R estateme nt (Third) of Torts: Products L i ab i l i t y § 10, cmt. a. A post-sa le war ning r educe s “the c hance of injury by
e qu a lizin gthe a sy

mme tr y of inf or matio n b e tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s. ” Luv ic k, 58 8 N.W. 2d at 69 3. B e c a us e of its spec ialized knowledg e and f reque nt dealing s with a product, the ma nufac turer is in a f

ar be tter position t han the c onsumer to discover hidden def

ects that a

re not a ppare nt to either the buy er or seller whe n a produc t is first sold. S ee Comstock, 99 N.W.2d at 634.
The re quirements for

a post-sale duty

to warn diff

er from a pr e-sa le duty

in more wa

y s than just the tim ing of

the t ra n s ac t ion. Be cause it costs more to identify and wa rn consumer s after

the
sa le tha n b e fo re the pr od

uc t le ave s the se lle r’ s c on tr ol, se e Patto n, 86 1 P. 2d at 13 13 , a

jur y sh ou ld be re qu ir e d to c on du c t a

c os t- be ne fi t ana ly sis wh e n a sse ssi nglia bil ity . Re state me nt ( Th ir d) of To rt s: Products L iability § 10(b)( 4). Other fac tors to consider include the kind of the wa rningto be issued, the people to whom it i s to be g iven, the natur e of the industry , the degree of the potential ha rm that may result, the diffic ulty in locatingpurcha sers of the product, whe ther the w arningwill be heede dB y co ncurri ng wi t h t he m ajo ri t y , I am espec i al l y m i nd f ul t hat und er o ur co nst i t ut i o n, “t he ri ght o f t ri al by j ury 5 shal l remain i nvi o l at e. ” T enn. C o nst

. A rt

. I, § 6

. T he ri ght to t ri al b y jury has i t s o ri gi n i n t he co m m o n l aw and i n t he C ons t i t ut i on of

N ort h Car ol i na at t he t i me of t he f ormat i on an d ado pt i on of t he T enn es s ee C ons t i t ut i on i n 1796

. Pat t en v. Stat e, 42 6 S.W

. 2 d 50 3 (T enn. 19 6 8 ); G arner v. S t at e, 1 3 T enn. (5 Y er. ) 1 5 9 (1 8 3 3 ). T he ri ght to jury incl ud es t he ent i t l em ent t o have al l f act ual i ss ues res o l ved d uri ng a t ri al

. H urt v. E arnhart , 5 3 9 S.W

. 2 d 13 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 7 6 ). (c o n tinu e d ...)
-5- if g iven, the potential life of the product, the kind of product involved, and the number sold. See, e.g ., Rekab, Inc. v. Fr ank Hrube tz & Co., 274 A.2d 107 (Md. 1971); Comstock, 99 N.W.2d at 634; Cover, 461 N.E.2d at 871; Kozlowski v. J ohn E. Smit h’s S ons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915 (W is. 1979). Th e se a uth or iti e s r e c og nize that th e re is n ot “ an a bs olute c on tin

uin gduty , ye ar a ft e r ye ar, fo r a ll manufa cture rs to war

n of a new sa fety

device which eliminates potential ha zards.” Kozlowski, 275 N.W.2d at 923. Whether harm wa s fore seea ble af ter a manufa cture r k n ew or should have known of a latent defe ct is a key issue. See Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 288-89 (I owa 1994)

. As a thr esh ol d det erm inatio n o f whe the r a po st- sa le duty

may ari se in a

g ive n c a se , tr ia l c ourt s sh ou ld “ c are fu lly

e xami ne the c ir c ums tanc e s f or and a g a ins t im

po sin ga duty to pr ov ide a po st- sa le
war ning.” Restatement (Thir d) of Tor ts: P roducts L iability

§ 10 cmt. a. Considering t he manne r in which the post-sa le duty to warn ha s been de scribed by other jur isd ic tio ns , I

am pe rs ua de d th at it s f

un c tio n a nd g oa ls a re c omp lia

nt w iththe state of

tor t la w i n Tenne ssee. Consumer pr otection is alway s a priority . Fur ther, in my

view, t h e languag e of our statut e de fi nin ga

“ pr od uc t li a bil ity a c tio n” do e s no t pr e c lud e a c re dib le c la im ma de un de r a po st- sa le duty to warn. Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102 (2000) (stating that pr oduct liability actions include a

“ br e a c h o f o r f

a ilure to d isc ha

rg e a duty to w arn or ins tr uc t, whe the r n e g lig e nt, or inn oc e nt; mis re pr e se ntatio n, c on c e a lme nt, or no nd isc los ur e , wh e the r ne g lig e nt, or inn oc e nt”) (e mph a sis added)

. In this case, ther e wa s materia l evidenc e for a reasonable jury to find a post -sale duty to warn. There was testimony

as to ea ch of the four e lements . Wit h reg ard to the f irst, a re asonable juror could have deter

mined that the Def

endant, f ully awa re of the complaints from it s customers, knew or should have known that the seats in it s minivans posed a substantial risk of har m. Be cause buy ers of th e Ca r av an w o u ld h av e b e e n r e a d il y id e n ti f ia b le , an d it c an r e a s o n a

b ly b e a s s u me d that the drivers w ould not know that the seats would yield so dramatica lly in a re ar- end collision, the second
e le me nt w a s sa

tis fi e d. Se e Com sto c k, 99 N. W.2 d at 634 (i mpo sin g lia bil ity fo r p os t- sa le fa ilure to war n ag ainst an automobile manufa cture r bec ause of latent def

ects i n t h e au t omobile). The third element wa s met beca

use the De fenda

nt could have issued war

nings about the pot ential for injury to those occupa

nts located directly behind t he defec tive front seats. Four th and fina lly , considering the nature of the re ported injuries–ser ious bodily harm to childre n–a re asonable j u ro r co uld have found that “the risk of har m is sufficiently

g reat to just ify

the burde n of providinga wa rning .” As stated, it is my

view that the tria l court did not err by admitting for

notification purposes only the twenty -five similar incide nts that occurr ed aft erthe sale of the Caravan. F or this rea son, I b e l i e v e th e h ar

m l e s s e r r o r an a l ys i s i nth e l e a d

o p i n i o nw i thr e g ar d

t o th i s e v i d e n c e i s un n e c e s s ar y; otherwise, I

fully concur
. 5(

. . . con t i n u ed) 5 It guarant ees t hat t he i ss ues of f act wi l l be de t erm i ned by t welve jurors p rop erl y i nst ruct ed by t he t ri al co urt

. St at e v. G a rr iso n , 4 0 S .W .3 d 4 2 6 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 0 ); se e a lso G ro o m s v . S ta te , 4 2 6 S .W .2 d 1 7 6 (T e n n . 1 9 6 8 ). A ltho u g h no t ge n e ra lly ap p l i ca b l e to l i t i ga t i o n o f an eq uit ab l e n ature , t he right t o jury m ust no t b e h am p ere d b y co nd i t i o ns o r en cu m b ran ce s. S m yrn a v. R id le y, 7 3 0 S .W .2 d 3 1 8 ( T e n n . 1 9 8 7 ); N e e ly v . S ta te , 6 3 T e n n . ( 4 B a x t.) 1 7 4 ( 1 8 7 4 ). M o st im p o rta n tly, a j ur y ve r di ct l i mi t s t he s cope of r evi ew on appeal , as Jus t i ce H ol der has so accur at el y ac kn owl edged; t hi s cour t i s l i mi t ed t o de t erm i ni ng whet her t here i s m at eri al evi d ence t o s up p o rt t he verdict , and , i n m aki ng t hat d et erm i nat i o n, we m ust t ake t h e s t r on g es t l eg i t i mat e v i ew of a l l t h e ev i den ce i n f

av or of t h e v er di ct , a l l owi n g a l l r ea s on abl e i n f er en ce s i n i t s f

av or and dis card i ng al l i nf

erences t o t he co nt rary
. C rabtr ee M asonry C o
. v. C & R C o nst r. , Inc. , 5 7 5 S.W

. 2 d 4 (T enn. 19 7 8 ). T h e rig h t t o trial b y ju ry is to o p re c io u s to ign o re . O u r d u ty, in g e n e ra l, is to yield to the w ill o f a w e ll- info rm e d ju ry, whi ch ha s see n and hear d f i r s t

- han d t he quan t i t y and qual i t y o f t he evi dence , r at her t han conduc t an d i ndependen t r evi ew fro m a w ritten re c o rd

. T o su b stitute o u r ju d g m e n t fo r t h a t o f the ju ry d e n igr a te s the im p o rta n c e o f t h is b a sic p rin c ip le i n our s y s t em of

j ur i s pru dence

. -6- ___________________________________ GA RY R. WA DE , JUST I CE