IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

EMC CORPORATION, AND VMWARE, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00486-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 1 of 18
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 2

A. The ’360 Patent........................................................................................................2

B. The Accused Products..............................................................................................3

III. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 4

A. Direct Infringement..................................................................................................4

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement ..................................................................4

IV. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 5

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement ..........................................5

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory 

Infringement.............................................................................................................8

1. Plaintiff’s Indirect Infringement Claims Fail Without Direct 

Infringement................................................................................................ 8

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for 

Indirect Infringement .................................................................................. 8

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for 

Induced Infringement................................................................................ 10

4. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial 

Noninfringing Uses for Contributory Infringement.................................. 11

V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 12

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 2 of 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

ii

Cases

Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,

620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................5, 10

Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,

No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) ...................................5, 10

Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC,

No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 2011 WL 2471299 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) ...........................8, 9

Artrip v. Ball Corp.,

735 F. App’x 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................11

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009)...................................................................................................................4

Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,

C 11–04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012).............................................10

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)...................................................................................................................4

Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

904 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2012)...............................................................................9, 10

Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc.,

No. 2:18-CV-00300-JRG, 2018 WL 6981828 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018)................................6

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)...........................................................................................................5, 8

De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.,

2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)..........................................................................4

Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.,

No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018)........................................11

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,

471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................10

Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,

909 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................5, 8

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 3 of 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

iii

Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,

620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................5

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

563 U.S. 754 (2011)...................................................................................................................5

Horatio Wash. Depot Techs. LLC v. TOLMAR, Inc.,

No. 17-1986-LPS, 2018 WL 5669168 (D. Del. Nov. 1, 2018)..................................................6

Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,

No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019)...................................11

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,

870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..............................................................................................4, 8

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................4

Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019)......................10, 11

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 54 

(W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020).........................................................................................................9

Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012)....................10

Xpoint Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

730 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Del. 2010).........................................................................................10

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 4 of 18
1

I. INTRODUCTION

The Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to plausibly allege that Defendants Dell 

Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., EMC Corporation, and VMware, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) 

have directly and indirectly infringed the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,092,360 (the “’360 patent”), 

which relate to monitoring or testing the performance of a packet scheduler. 

Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC fails to plausibly state a claim for direct infringement 

because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ accused products meet each and every limitation 

of the claims. For instance, the claims require “comparing the monitored state” and “expected 

state” of certain recited scheduler elements or parameters, such as “whether a queue is empty or 

occupied.” Plaintiff never alleges that the accused products actually compare the “expected” and 

“monitored” states of any scheduler elements, including those specifically recited in the claims. 

At best, Plaintiff points to certain “tags” allegedly used in the products and quotes out of context 

an article that refers to a “compari[son]” of the tags “with real time.” D.I. 1 ¶ 19. But Plaintiff 

never alleges that the accused products actually use these tags to test scheduler performance, let 

alone to carry out that process specifically by comparing the “expected” and “monitored” states of 

any scheduler elements. In fact, that same article on which Plaintiff relies demonstrates precisely 

the opposite: the tags are used only for the scheduling process itself (i.e., determining the order 

by which data packets are to be transmitted), rather than testing whether a scheduler is working 

properly—the focus of the ’360 patent claims. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory indirect infringement allegations also should be dismissed. For 

instance, they are based on Defendants’ purported knowledge of the patent only as of the date of 

service of the Complaint, which repeatedly has been held insufficient to meet the Iqbal/Twombly

standard. Plaintiff also fails to allege other key legal requirements, including specific intent for 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 5 of 18
2

induced infringement and the lack of substantial noninfringing uses for contributory infringement.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The ’360 Patent

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on June 2, 2020. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants directly and 

indirectly infringe at least claim 26 of the ’360 patent. D.I. 1 ¶¶ 27–28, 30–31. Claim 26 recites:

A method of monitoring operation of a scheduler, comprising supplying said 

scheduler with data, monitoring the state of an element of said scheduler, 

comparing the monitored state with an expected state for said element, and 

outputting the result of the comparison;

wherein said scheduler comprises a computer generated model; and

wherein said scheduler is controlling the departure of data from a plurality of 

queues, and said element comprises:

an element for recording whether a queue is empty or occupied, an element 

for recording the quantity of data contained in a queue, an element identifying 

a queue from which data is to be output, and an element identifying a group 

of queues from which data is to be output.

’360 patent, 13:9–26 (emphasis added).

The ’360 patent relates to “monitoring” or testing “the performance of a scheduler” by 

“comparing the monitored state” of a scheduler “element” with an “expected state” for that 

element. Id. at 1:8–9, claim 26. The patent states that a “typical switching element for a 

communication network has”: (1) an “input interface” “for receiving and temporarily storing 

incoming data cells”; (2) an “output interface” for “transmitting the incoming data cells onto the 

next appropriate links of the communication network”; and (3) “a controller for controlling the 

transfer of data cells between the interfaces.” Id. at 1:13–19.

The controller “includes a scheduler, which is responsible for determining the order of 

queues from which data cells are transferred [from the input interface] to the output interface for 

transmission onto the network.” Id. at 1:26–29. The patent states that a scheduler has “elements” 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 6 of 18
3 

or “parameters,” and the status of these “elements” and “parameters” can be tested to ensure that 

the scheduler is working properly. See, e.g., id. at 7:64–8:66, 9:27–12:29. An example of a 

scheduler element is one that indicates whether a queue is “occupied” with data cells, or whether 

it is “empty.” Id. at 8:18–21. As depicted in Figure 3A below, an “occupied” queue typically has

a value of “1,” and an “empty” queue typically has a value of “0.” Id. 

To monitor these scheduler elements, “a computer using any suitable programming 

language” is implemented to “compare” the “expected” and “monitored” (or “detected”) states of 

the elements. Id. at 7:49–52, 6:45–61, 7:62–7:48, claim 26. If the comparison does not result in

a “match” between those two states, the monitor may “provide a result” that the scheduler is not 

working correctly. See id. at 6:58–61. For example, the “expected state” of an empty queue is the 

value “0,” and thus an error is detected if the empty queue’s “monitored state” is instead “1” (since 

a “1” typically indicates an “occupied” queue, as explained above). Id. at 9:57–10:32. 

B. The Accused Products

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ products “incorporating VMware’s VeloCloud solutions 

and vSphere software, such as Dell’s PowerEdge servers and VxRail appliances” (the “Accused 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 7 of 18
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Products”) infringe the ’360 patent claims. D.I. 1 ¶ 15. Plaintiff generally alleges that the Accused 

Products “provide functions for resource management, designated as Network I/O Control 

(NetIOC), including scheduling.” Id. ¶ 16. Other than naming “VMware’s VeloCloud solutions” 

a single time in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint, however, Plaintiff provides no factual allegations 

concerning VeloCloud’s purported infringement. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Direct Infringement

A complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The complaint must include more than 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must allege nonconclusory facts that make liability “plausible,” meaning the facts they “allow[] the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 

(5th Cir. 2009) (“The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as 

true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence 

of each element of a claim”). For a claim of patent infringement, the complaint must—at a 

minimum—plead facts that describe how the allegedly infringing product infringes. See De La 

Vega v. Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020).

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement

To plead indirect infringement, the complaint must first plead direct infringement by a third 

party. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2017) (“A finding of direct infringement is predicate to any finding of indirect infringement[.]”); 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 8 of 18
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Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 909 F.3d 398, 407 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(same). 

For both contributory and induced infringement, Plaintiff must also plead facts to support 

an inference of each defendant’s “knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent 

infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); see Addiction 

& Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

For induced infringement, Plaintiff additionally must plead facts showing that each 

defendant “had [a] specific intent to induce the [third party’s] patent infringement.” Affinity Labs 

of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 

May 12, 2014). The “specific intent” element is “demanding” and requires more than 

“unsubstantiated assertions” or “generalized allegations” as to the intent of the alleged infringer. 

Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7, 21. Specific intent requires more than knowledge of the 

induced acts; rather, the accused infringer must have “knowledge that the induced acts constitute 

patent infringement.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 

For contributory infringement, Plaintiff must also plead “that the component has no 

substantial noninfringing uses, and [] that the component is a material part of the 

invention.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *8 (citing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Direct Infringement

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the Accused Products meet each and every limitation 

of the ’360 patent claims, including the requirement that the monitoring of scheduler elements be 

achieved specifically by “comparing the monitored state” of a scheduler element “with an expected 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 9 of 18
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state for said element.” In fact, although Plaintiff names VMware’s VeloCloud as infringing in a 

single conclusory paragraph (D.I. 1 ¶ 15), the Complaint is otherwise silent as to how any aspect

of VeloCloud meets any of the claim limitations.

The Iqbal/Twombly standard requires more than a bare-bones allegation that alleged 

products, like those involving the particular technology in this case, “meet each and every element 

of at least one claim of the asserted patent.” See, e.g., Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc., No. 

2:18-CV-00300-JRG, 2018 WL 6981828, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018) (granting dismissal 

as to patent claims involving “hardware and software” technology relating to a “transaction receipt 

system,” and holding that “[w]hile screenshots may be useful in laying out a plausible allegation 

of patent infringement, Plaintiff must further allege how the screenshots meet the text of the 

exemplary claim in order to lay out sufficient factual allegations which might permit the Court to 

find that the Iqbal/Twombly standard is met.”); see also Horatio Wash. Depot Techs. LLC v. 

TOLMAR, Inc., No. 17-1986-LPS, 2018 WL 5669168, at *11 (D. Del. Nov. 1, 2018) (“In order to 

adequately plead direct (and indirect and willful) infringement, a plaintiff needs to have pleaded 

facts that plausibly indicate that the accused products contain each of the limitations found in the 

claim.” (emphasis added)). 

Here, the claim limitation requiring a comparison of the “expected” and “monitored” states

of scheduler elements is particularly significant because the applicant overcame an obviousness 

rejection and obtained allowance specifically by following the examiner’s suggestion to amend 

claim 26 (then claim 31) with this limitation. Rosenthal Decl., Ex. A (5/18/06 Response and 

Amendment) at 1, 9. Yet, in the Complaint, Plaintiff never alleges that the Accused Products meet 

this key limitation. There is no allegation that the Accused Products compare an “expected state” 

and a “monitored state” of any of the recited scheduler elements. At most, Plaintiff broadly refers 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 10 of 18
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to certain “tags” and quotes out of context a document that refers to a “compari[son]” of the tags 

“with real time.” D.I. 1 ¶ 19. But Plaintiff never alleges that these “tags” have anything to do with 

monitoring or testing whether the specifically recited scheduler elements are working properly, 

e.g., whether an empty queue is correctly indicated with a “0.” And to the extent Plaintiff asserts 

that the tags are involved in any comparison, Plaintiff does not allege that the tags are used 

specifically for the purpose of comparing “expected” and “monitored” states of scheduler elements 

as the claims require.

In fact, the article on which Plaintiff relies in the Complaint (id.) itself shows that these 

“tags” actually are not used to compare an “expected” and “monitored” states of a scheduler 

element at all. Ex. B (Billaud, J.P. et al., “hClock: Hierarchical QoS for Packet Scheduling in a 

Hypervisor,” Association for Computing Machinery, April 15–17, 2013) at 312. Instead, the tags 

are used for the scheduling process itself: determining the order by which queues will transmit 

data. Id. For instance, the article explains that the “scheduler checks to see if the smallest 

reservation tag among all queues is not higher than the current time. If that is true, the scheduling 

is done based on reservation tags” and transmission “from the queue with [the] smallest reservation 

tag is selected.” Id. The article states that, otherwise, “the scheduling is done based on share tags 

and a request from a queue with the smallest share tag is chosen.” Id. Thus, these tags have 

nothing to do with “monitoring the performance of a scheduler,” whether by comparing the 

“expected” and “monitored” states of scheduler elements or some other method. ’360 patent, 1:8–

9 (emphasis added).

Thus, because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendants have met each and every 

limitation of the ’360 patent claims, and because the documents on which Plaintiff relies in the 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 11 of 18
8

Complaint actually demonstrate the opposite, Plaintiff’s claim for direct infringement should be 

dismissed.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims are also deficient and should be dismissed. As an 

initial matter, Plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege direct infringement precludes its claims of 

induced and contributory infringement. Beyond that failing, Plaintiff has failed to plead any 

knowledge of the patent or knowledge of infringement prior to the filing of this action. Plaintiff 

also fails to plead a specific intent to induce infringement. And, Plaintiff has not pled, and cannot 

plead, that there are no substantial noninfringing uses. Each of these failures independently 

warrants dismissal of Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations. 

1. Plaintiff’s Indirect Infringement Claims Fail Without Direct 

Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations are insufficient as a matter of law as Plaintiff 

fails to plausibly allege direct infringement. See supra § IV.A. It is axiomatic that “[i]n order to 

succeed on a claim of inducement, the patentee must show, first that there has been direct 

infringement . . . .” Enplas, 909 F.3d at 407 (citations omitted); see also Intellectual Ventures, 870 

F.3d at 1329 (“A finding of direct infringement is predicate to any finding of indirect infringement 

. . . .”). As a result, Plaintiff has also failed to adequately plead its claims of induced and 

contributory infringement and these claims should be dismissed. 

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for Indirect 

Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims also fail because they do not plead the required 

“knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 

1926. As courts in this District have held, the knowledge requirements for indirect infringement 

require pre-suit knowledge. See Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 12 of 18
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2011 WL 2471299, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) (holding that reliance “on knowledge of 

[plaintiff’s] patent after the lawsuit was filed . . . is insufficient to plead the requisite knowledge 

for indirect infringement”). 

Despite this clear requirement, Plaintiff’s sole allegation of knowledge of the patent is a 

conclusory statement that “Defendants have received notice and actual or constructive knowledge 

of the ‘360 Patent since at least the date of service of this Complaint.” D.I. 1 ¶ 29 (emphasis 

added).1 This Court has rejected identical allegations of knowledge. For example, in Parus this 

Court dismissed indirect infringement claims where plaintiff’s only allegation of knowledge of the 

patent was that “Defendant Apple has had knowledge of the ’431 Patent since at least the filing 

of the original complaint.” Parus, No. 6:19-cv-432, at D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.) (emphasis 

added), ¶ 44; see id., at Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020) 

(dismissing indirect infringement claims). Like the allegations in Parus, Plaintiff fails to allege 

pre-suit knowledge and thus fails to state a claim for indirect infringement. See id.; Aguirre, 2011 

WL 2471299, at *3; Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 

1260, 1268–69 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Also, because notice of the patent is necessarily provided by a 

complaint, finding that a complaint provides sufficient knowledge for induced infringement would 

1 Plaintiff’s allegation of knowledge of infringement is likewise deficient as it alleges such 

knowledge only “[s]ince at least the date of service of this Complaint.” D.I. 1 ¶¶ 30–31; see, e.g., 

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 

54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020) (dismissing indirect infringement claims where the only allegations 

of knowledge of infringement were that “[b]y the time of trial, Defendant Apple will have known 

and intended (since receiving such notice) that their continued actions would actively induce the 

infringement of the claims of the ’431 Patent” (D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.), ¶ 44)).

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 13 of 18
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vitiate the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech that an allegation of knowledge of the patent 

is required to state a claim for induced infringement.”).2

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for Induced 

Infringement 

Plaintiff also entirely fails to plead specific intent in support of its inducement claim. 

Allegations of specific intent require factual “‘evidence of culpable conduct, directed to 

encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct 

infringer’s activities.’” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 

WL 3940952, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 

1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s allegations of specific intent amount 

to a single conclusory statement that Defendants “actively induced” others to infringe through their 

advertising and promotional materials and some website citations. See D.I. 1 ¶ 30. Such 

conclusory allegations fail to present facts that demonstrate: (1) Defendants knew that the alleged 

acts infringed, and (2) Defendants knew that the promotion of their products would induce or 

encourage others to infringe the ’360 patent. See Addiction, 620 F. App’x at 938 (“[S]imply 

recit[ing] the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific intent” fails to plead “facts that 

would allow a court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific intent to induce 

infringement.”); Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7, *21 (finding “Plaintiffs generalized 

2 Other courts similarly have held that “knowledge after filing of the present action is not 

sufficient for pleading the requisite knowledge for indirect infringement.” Xpoint Technologies, 

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (D. Del. 2010); Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. 

Garmin Int’l, Inc., C 11–04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012); 

Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012); Brandywine, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (“The weight of authority 

addressing the knowledge required for indirect infringement . . . requires a plaintiff to allege that 

defendant had pre-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit.”).

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 14 of 18
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allegations that Toyota induced others to infringe the Asserted Patents through its marketing and 

sales tactics are [] insufficient”). To support specific intent, Plaintiff must include specific 

allegations mapping the advertisement or promotion to the performance of the claimed steps of the 

patent—i.e., “evidence of culpable conduct, direct to encouraging another’s infringement.” Parity, 

2019 WL 3940952, at *2.3

Plaintiff’s inducement claim should be dismissed because the Complaint is entirely silent 

on a key requirement of induced infringement.

4. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial 

Noninfringing Uses for Contributory Infringement 

Plaintiff’s contributory infringement allegations also fail because Plaintiff did not “‘plead 

facts that allow an inference that the components sold or offered for sale have no substantial noninfringing uses.’” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not done so and cannot do so. Plaintiff’s only allegation on these elements is a 

conclusory statement that repeats the legal elements. See D.I. 1 ¶ 31. As the Federal Circuit held 

in Artrip, conclusory allegations are not enough. 735 F. App’x at 713 (affirming dismissal of a 

contributory infringement claim where the “complaint did not plausibly assert facts to suggest that 

[Defendant] was aware of the patents or facts to suggest that the [Accused Product] it supplied had 

no substantial noninfringing use”). Plaintiff’s failure to raise a plausible inference of no substantial 

3 See also Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 

1455336, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (“In no way does the complaint detail how an end user 

would infringe Hypermedia’s patents by following instructions in the links provided in the 

complaint.”) (emphasis in original); Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc., No. 

CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding mere citations to 

websites were insufficient to plead specific intent). 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 15 of 18
12

noninfringing uses and materiality is fatal to its contributory infringement claim, and as such it 

should be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion 

and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failure to plausibly state a claim for relief, 

without leave to amend. Pursuant to L.R. CV-7(h), Defendants request an oral hearing on the 

foregoing motion.

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 16 of 18
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Dated: October 5, 2020 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@sheltoncoburn.com

SHELTON COBURN LLP

311 RR 620, Suite 205

Austin, TX 78734-4775 

Telephone: 512.263.2165

Facsimile: 512.263.2166 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

Kyanna Sabanoglu

ksabanoglu@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 17 of 18
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of October 2020, the foregoing was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5(b)(1) and served via the Court’s electronic 

filing system on all counsel who have consented to electronic service:

Brett Aaron Mangrum, Attorney for WSOU

brett@etheridgelaw.com

Jeffrey Huang, Attorney for WSOU

jhuang@etheridgelaw.com

Ryan Scott Loveless, Attorney for WSOU 

ryan@etheridgelaw.com

Travis Lee Richins, Attorney for WSOU

travis@etheridgelaw.com

James L. Etheridge, Attorney for WSOU

jim@etheridgelaw.com

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 32 Filed 10/05/20 Page 18 of 18