SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2604-19

HIDDEN OAK WOODS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

P&F GIANCOLA, d/b/a 

GIANCOLA WRECKING AND 

AUTO SALES,

Defendant-Appellant, 

and

DEBRA RAINWATER, PP, AICP, 

in her capacity as Zoning Officer 

of the Township of East Brunswick,

Defendant,

and 

THE TOWNSHIP OF EAST

BRUNSWICK,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted March 24, 2021 – Decided July 26, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-2604-19

Before Judges Vernoia and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

C-000140-17.

Thomas Williamson, attorney for appellant.

Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent Hidden Oak Woods, LLC (Frank J. Petrino, 

of counsel and on the brief; Victoria D. Britton, on the 

brief). 

Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst & Doukas, LLP, 

attorneys for respondent The Township of East 

Brunswick (Michael J. Baker and Joseph D. Palombit, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Defendant P&F Giancola d/b/a Giancola Wrecking and Auto Sales

appeals from the February 19, 2020 order entered by Judge Vincent LeBlon 

granting plaintiff-respondent Hidden Oak Woods, LLC summary judgment and 

directing defendant to abate various zoning violations arising from defendant's

use of its property.1 For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. 

1

 Because no other named defendant appeals from the February 19, 2020 award 

of summary judgment, and defendant-respondent Township of East Brunswick 

joins plaintiff in asking us to affirm the February 19 order, we refer to P&F 

Giancola as defendant throughout this opinion. 
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A-2604-19

I.

Plaintiff owns approximately forty-one acres of land in the Township of 

East Brunswick (Township) that was designated for construction of an 

inclusionary development in the Township's Third Round Housing Element and 

Fair Share Plan (HEFSP). The property was rezoned from 

Industrial/Manufacturing to Multiple Dwelling Apartment, i.e., a residential 

zoning district, to accommodate a planned 275-unit development, with twenty 

percent of the units set aside for low- and moderate- income families. 

Defendant's property, also referenced in the record as the "Giancola 

property," is situated diagonally across the street from plaintiff's property. 

Defendant has owned and operated an automobile wrecking, salvage, and 

storage business since 1987, and its predecessor in title obtained a use variance 

from the Township zoning board in 1955, permitting those uses on defendant's 

property. At the time the 1955 use variance was granted, defendant's property 

was subject to the Township's 1952 zoning ordinance.

In August 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Township, Debra 

Rainwater,

2

in her capacity as Township zoning officer, and defendant, wherein 

it alleged declaratory relief should be granted in lieu of mandamus so that the 

2

 Defendant Debra Rainwater did not submit a responding brief. 
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A-2604-19

zoning officer and the Township enforced the terms and conditions of the 

Township's 1952 zoning ordinance, as well as its 1963 junkyard and current 

zoning ordinances, against defendant. Plaintiff also sought to restrain 

defendant's purported nuisances on defendant's property. 

According to plaintiff, the 1955 use variance granted to defendant's 

predecessor did not allow defendant to subsequently engage in various activities 

after it assumed ownership of the property. For example, plaintiff contended 

the 1952 zoning ordinance did not authorize, and therefore prohibited, front yard 

parking, yet defendant used its property for that purpose without securing a 

variance. Plaintiff also claimed defendant violated the 1952 zoning ordinance 

because its operations were not contained "within a building or a walled 

enclosure at least six . . . feet high." Additionally, plaintiff alleged defendant 

violated the Township's 1963 junkyard ordinance, which prohibited parking in 

the front yard and required walled enclosures to be at least eight feet high so 

defendant's junkyard would not be visible from a public street. 

Further, plaintiff asserted defendant's property violated the Township's

current zoning ordinance because the cars parked in defendant's front yard were 

"not confined within the required bounded area" even though defendant's 

building was situated less than 175 feet from the front property line, and the area 
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A-2604-19

between the parked cars and the front property line was "not screened" as 

required. Moreover, plaintiff alleged defendant violated the Township's current 

ordinance as to signage and advertising because defendant had "not applied for 

and/or received a zoning sign permit for any of the signage or advertising 

displays on" its property. Based on defendant's alleged multiple violations, 

plaintiff argued defendant was engaged in "an illegal and negligent use of [its]

. . . property" "against the public interest," which adversely affected "the 

marketability of the Inclusionary Development to be constructed on the Hidden 

Oak Property."

II.

The parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve their dispute by engaging

in settlement discussions. When negotiations failed, plaintiff moved for 

summary judgment against defendant; the Township joined in plaintiff's 

application. 

Judge LeBlon heard oral argument on plaintiff's summary judgment 

motion in September 2019. During argument, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged 

there was a question as to whether defendant's property was in a light or a heavy 

industrial zone in 1955. Plaintiff's counsel argued the issue was immaterial 

because the standards were the same for both zones, other than for front yard 
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setbacks. Thus, plaintiff's attorney represented, "for the purposes of this motion, 

we will concede . . . there is not a violation of the front yard setback." Counsel 

for plaintiff then recounted the ordinance violations outlined in its complaint 

and asked the court to "take judicial notice of the negative impact that the 

continual and long-standing zoning violations have had on the surrounding and 

neighboring properties, including Hidden Oaks." 

The Township's attorney confirmed during argument that his client agreed 

with plaintiff's position, even though the Township was a named defendant. He 

highlighted that after the 1955 use variance authorized defendant's predecessor 

to operate an auto wrecking, salvage, and storage business, defendant 

"intensified and expanded" the use of the property to include used car sales. He 

further stated that even if defendant's operations were a "preexisting 

nonconforming use, there's also evidence from the pictures that it's been 

expanded. So we don't think it's preexisting, but even if it were, clearly [it] can't 

be expanded into the front yard with used car sales going up front." Further, the 

Township concurred with plaintiff that defendant violated the Township's sign 

ordinance. 

Counsel for defendant noted the historical use of the property, remarking 

that "ever since 1955, a junkyard has been operated at this property without 
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interruption for nearly 65 years now," and that "no later than 1973, the [prior] 

owner of the property . . . was also selling used cars at the Giancola property." 

Similarly, defendant argued it had photographic evidence from 1969 and 1972 

showing "cars were parked in the front yard of the property." Further, defendant 

argued that when defendant's owners bought the property and business in 1987, 

"the building had two stories, and there were three driveways on the property." 

Moreover, defendant claimed "all necessary municipal and state licenses needed 

to operate [defendant's] business" were obtained as recently as the past year, and 

"any off-street parking on any location on the property . . . is expressly 

permitted." Further, defendant argued it had complied with the Township's 

fencing requirement, that there was no signage limitation under the 1952 

ordinance when defendant's predecessor owned the property, and the "use of the 

Giancola property . . . qualif[ied] as a best and nonconforming use because the 

use existed at a time during which . . . the 1952 ordinance[] allowed such uses. " 

Counsel added that "such vested nonconforming uses of property rights . . . 

cannot be voided or lost easily," and "[e]ven if the court were to consider [the] 

recent ordinance, and the junkyard ordinance . . . , plaintiff is still not entitled 

to summary judgment." 
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A-2604-19

III.

On January 29, 2020, in a well-reasoned and thorough opinion, Judge 

LeBlon rejected defendant's arguments and awarded plaintiff summary 

judgment; on February 19, 2020, he issued a conforming order. In his opinion, 

the judge initially noted defendant's property was in a heavy industrial zone 

under the 1952 ordinance, even though defendant asserted its property was in

the light industrial zone under that ordinance. The judge then methodically 

itemized defendant's "current and historic violations of the Township Zoning 

Code" as well as defendant's violations of its 1955 use variance. We need not 

reiterate each finding of a violation here. Instead, we cite to some of those 

violations found by the judge to demonstrate why we are persuaded there is no 

basis to disturb his summary judgment award. 

For example, the judge noted that considering defendant's property was in 

the heavy industrial zone under the 1952 ordinance, that ordinance required "a 

minimum front yard building setback of 100' from the public roadway" and 

"there has been no compliance with the 100' front yard setback." The judge 

found "a variance from this requirement was neither sought nor given at the time 

the 1955 Use Variance was granted for the Giancola Property." Because 

defendant had asserted its property was located in the light industrial zone under 
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A-2604-19

the 1952 zoning ordinance, Judge LeBlon clarified that "[t]he zoning standards 

applicable to Giancola's violations of the Township's 1952 zoning ordinance are 

the same in the light . . . and the heavy industrial zone[s] with the exception of 

front yard setbacks," but significantly, whether defendant's property was in a 

heavy or light industry zone under the 1952 ordinance was not a material fact 

sufficient to defeat summary judgment because plaintiff "concede[d], for the 

purposes of this motion only," that defendant's property was in the light 

industrial zone. Therefore, the judge determined there was "no violation of the 

front yard setback requirement . . . under the 1952 zoning ordinance" for the 

purpose of plaintiff's summary judgment application. 

Additionally, the judge determined the 1952 zoning ordinance required an 

automobile wrecking and salvage business to be conducted within a building or 

walled enclosure six feet high, yet based on aerial photographs of defendant's 

property, it was evident defendant's property was not enclosed by a six-foot wall 

or fence, "and a variance from this requirement was neither sought nor given at

the time the 1955 Use Variance was granted for the Property." 

Further, Judge LeBlon found defendant's business operations on its 

property "constituted a junkyard" under the 1963 junkyard ordinance. He 

concluded defendant was in violation of the provisions of this ordinance, "which 
10 A-2604-19

is a licensing ordinance for junkyards within the Township." The judge

explained "that when two enabling ordinances (licensing and zoning) exist, 

provisions relating to regulation of the property need not be confined to only the 

zoning ordinance." Finding the 1963 junkyard ordinance and the current zoning 

ordinance "must be construed together," the judge determined the junkyard 

ordinance did not permit front yard parking, and significantly, 

the current zoning ordinance prohibits front yard 

parking except in a limited circumstance that does not 

exist herein (i.e., if the front of the building is 175' from 

the property line, then front yard parking is permitted 

in an area bounded by a line 125' from the street and the 

front of the building screened by landscaping). 

Therefore, under both ordinances, front yard parking is 

not permitted without a variance, which Giancola has 

never applied for or received. Yet, . . . Giancola parks 

motor vehicles in the front yard up to the property line 

as well as in the Township's right of way.

Additionally, when construing the 1963 junkyard and current zoning 

ordinances together, the judge found "a uniform and solid eight-foot fence that 

screens the junkyard operations on the Giancola Property from the public streets 

is required for all junkyard operations in the Township," but defendant 

maintained a "mismatch of walls and fencing of varying heights on the Giancola 

property that does not entirely surround it and does not screen the junkyard 

operations from view." 
11 A-2604-19

The judge also concluded that under the current zoning ordinance,

defendant's property is in the Industrial/Manufacturing zone, requiring a 175-

foot setback from the front property line when facing a residential development, 

and that automobile parking in the front yard must be within the bounded area 

and 125 feet from the street. Nevertheless, defendant's property was in front of 

a residential development and its setback was not at least 175 feet. The judge 

stated "the Giancola property is parking motor vehicles only twenty-eight . . . to 

thirty-four . . . feet from the front property line and within the Township's right 

of way." Additionally, the judge found defendant violated the front yard setback 

of 100 feet for principal buildings with frontage on a street that is the boundary 

line of a residential zone. 

Further, the judge found defendant was in violation of the Township's sign

ordinance, as defendant never received authorization for approximately eight 

signs located on the property. He also found defendant's property exhibited 

"multiple flat signs," rather than one authorized flat sign, which "appear[ed] to 

exceed the fifteen percent . . . cap" "of the area of the side of the building to 

which it is attached." The judge noted that defendant conceded the 1952 zoning 

ordinance "is silent on the issue of signage, and that it did not obtain a sign

permit from the Township when it updated the signage" upon purchasing the 
12 A-2604-19

property. The judge also stated silence under the 1952 ordinance "in no way 

indicates authorization for any signage." 

Additionally, Judge LeBlon found the 1955 use variance authorized 

defendant to use the property "for an automobile wrecking, salvage, and storage 

business, and nothing else." Because the use of defendant's property intensified 

and expanded to include towing services and sales, "without a variance or other 

approval," and these "expanded and intensified uses are not permitted in the 

[Industrial/Manufacturing d]istrict where the Giancola Property is located," 

such expansions and intensifications constituted "zoning violations under the 

Township Code." The judge added, 

it is indeed nonsensical for Giancola to assert that the 

sale of used automobiles, which began after the 1955 

Use Variance was obtained for the property for 

different and limited uses (i.e., automobile wrecking, 

salvage, and storage) is a pre-existing non-conforming 

use that does not require a use variance. A property 

owner cannot add additional, non-permitted uses to a 

property after obtaining a use variance without making 

application to the local zoning board, and obtaining 

approval for, a new or expanded use variance.

After finding plaintiff was an "interested party" under N.J.S.A. 40:55D18, Judge LeBlon concluded:

[t]he aforementioned zoning violations maintained by 

[defendant] on [its] [p]roperty are an illegal use of the 

. . . [p]roperty, as well as eyesores and nuisances . . . . 
13 A-2604-19

The various zoning violations and nuisances 

maintained by [defendant] . . . interfere with 

[plaintiff's] right to equal use and enjoyment of [its] 

. . . [p]roperty and will also adversely affect the 

marketability of the inclusionary development to be 

constructed thereon during the Third Round. . . . The 

continuation of the aforesaid zoning violations and 

nuisances by [defendant] . . . adversely impacts the 

economic feasibility of [plaintiff's] inclusionary 

development and is also against the public interest. 

Accordingly, the judge determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment

and defendant was required to "remedy and abate all zoning violations and 

nuisances on . . . its [p]roperty within 30 days."

IV.

On appeal, defendant presents a mixture of novel and recycled arguments, 

many of which are unsupported by citations to the record or a legal authority 

and are presented in a conclusory fashion. Regarding the arguments newly 

raised before us, defendant contends: (1) plaintiff did not prosecute the correct 

type of action because it sought relief for violations which were "quasi-criminal 

in nature"; (2) the trial court improperly relied on "material 

misrepresentation[s]" of plaintiff's counsel; and (3) "although [defendant's] first 

attorney did not name this as a Cascade situation," "[h]e presented the idea that 
14 A-2604-19

a permitted use in a higher zone is permitted in a lower zone," and "under a 

Cascade approach," defendant did not need a variance to sell used cars. 3

We decline to reach these newly minted arguments. 

It is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts 

will decline to consider questions or issues not properly 

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such 

a presentation is available "unless the questions so 

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court 

or concern matters of great public interest."

[Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 

(1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 

N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)); see also State 

v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009) ("Appellate review 

is not limitless. The jurisdiction of appellate courts 

rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections 

critically explored on the record before the trial court 

by the parties themselves.").] 

Here, defendant's novel arguments are neither jurisdictional in nature nor do 

they substantially implicate the public interest.

Moreover, to the extent defendant argues the judge relied on a material 

misrepresentation of facts as set forth in the statement of material facts included 

3

 Defendant concedes it has offered no legal authority to support its "cascade 

zoning" argument, that "the Cascade approach has vanished and has been 

replaced by a [d]iscrete and [d]etailed [z]oning [o]rdinance," and "New Jersey 

case law currently provides that a use not expressly provided for in a variance 

is prohibited." 
15 A-2604-19

with plaintiff's summary judgment motion, we reject this contention. 

Specifically, defendant argues 

[a] reading of "Exhibit D" . . . clearly shows[] that this 

crucial document to [plaintiff's] proving the violations 

of the conditions as to the 1955 Use Variance is [not] 

the 1955 Use variance. "Exhibit D" is actually a copy 

of the incomplete [application]. It appears to be 

incomplete in that the [fourth] page . . . has [two] at the 

very top and begins with item [twelve]. This suggests 

that page [one], with items . . . [one] to [eleven], is 

missing.

 

This argument ignores that defendant admitted to facts concerning the 1955 use 

variance, both in its "response to statement of undisputed material facts" and its 

answer to the complaint. Indeed, in its "response to statement of undisputed 

material facts," defendant outright acknowledged, 

[i]n or about 1955, Giancola (or its predecessor in 

interest) was granted a use variance by the Township's 

Zoning Board of Adjustment for the operation of an 

automobile wrecking, salvage, and storage business on 

the Giancola Property (the '1955 Use Variance'). See

1955 Use Variance attached to the [certification of 

plaintiff's counsel] as Exhibit D. 

[(Emphasis added).] 

The record also reflects defendant made a similar admission in paragraph 

eighteen of its answer to plaintiff's complaint. Further, defendant admitted in 

its response to plaintiff's statement of undisputed material facts that "[a]t the 
16 A-2604-19

time the 1955 Use Variance was granted, the Giancola Property was subject to 

the Township's 1952 zoning ordinance." Given this record, plaintiff 

understandably denies it misrepresented 

facts, material or otherwise, when referring to Exhibit 

D of the Motion for Summary Judgment as the "1955 

Use Variance," but rather relied on [defendant's] own 

admissions in its Answer and its opposition to 

[plaintiff's] Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in 

the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment 

confirming that Exhibit D constituted the sum and 

substance of the use variance obtained by [defendant's] 

predecessor . . . . To put it simply, [plaintiff] could not 

have misrepresented the facts when [defendant] itself 

relied on Exhibit D to support the existence of the 1955 

Use Variance . . . . Accordingly, and contrary to 

[defendant's] newly raised arguments . . . , [plaintiff] 

did not misrepresent the nature of Exhibit D to the 

underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, 

[defendant] admitted on at least three occasions that 

Exhibit D is the essence of the 1955 Use Variance that 

its predecessor obtained for the Giancola Property.

V.

Relying on arguments previously made before Judge LeBlon, defendant 

contends: (1) plaintiff failed to establish operations at defendant's property were 

in violation of the ordinances it cited because a "nonconforming use existing at 

the time of an ordinance may be continued"; (2) plaintiff's claims about

defendant's expanded and intensified use of its property lacked specificity; (3) 

plaintiff's proofs were lacking as to defendant's alleged improper use of the 
17 A-2604-19

property for towing, the sale of used cars, parts and tires, a second-story 

addition, its proximity to the front property line, and expansion into new areas; 

(4) plaintiff failed to establish defendant was in violation of the sign ordinance;

and (5) the trial court erred in finding defendant's use of its property was a 

common law nuisance. These arguments are unavailing. 

It is well established that to balance the municipality's interest in 

amending and updating its zoning ordinances with a property owner's interest 

and right to maintain the use of its property, certain pre-existing, newly 

prohibited, nonconforming uses are permitted. Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford 

Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 68 (1998) (quoting Palatine I v. 

Planning Bd., 133 N.J. 546, 565 (1993)). Such nonconforming uses may "coexist with the ordinance that, on its face, prohibits them." Ibid. (internal 

quotations omitted). However, courts limit the scope of the nonconforming use 

so that it can conform with the current ordinance "as quickly as is compatible 

with justice." Ibid. (quoting Town of Belleville v. Parillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 

315 (1980)). To qualify for a nonconforming use, the property owner "may 

apply in writing for the issuance of a certificate certifying that the use . . . existed 

before the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use . . . 
18 A-2604-19

nonconforming." Id. at 68-69 (quoting N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68) (alterations in 

original). There is no suggestion by defendant that it followed this procedure. 

We also note that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 gives a board of adjustment 

authority to grant a variance to a property owner to depart from the regulations 

of the zoning code and permit a use which does not conform to the code. "An 

application for a use variance based on the assertion that a property is 

particularly suitable for a project requires an evaluation of whether the use, 

otherwise not permitted in the zone, . . . will promote the general welfare." Price 

v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 287 (2013). Again, defendant does not argue it 

applied for a variance to deviate from the Township's regulations regarding its 

use of its front yard for parking cars or to maintain fencing shorter than the 

eight-foot requirement outlined in the 1963 junkyard and current zoning 

ordinances. Likewise, defendant does not contest that it did not seek a variance 

for its non-conforming signs or its violation of the 100-foot setback requirement. 

Further, in challenging the summary judgment award, defendant does not 

dispute that after the 1955 use variance was granted to its predecessor, defendant 

expanded its use of the property to include additional services, and it did so 

without seeking a variance. As Judge LeBlon observed, "[a] property owner 

cannot add additional, non-permitted uses to a property after obtaining a use 
19 A-2604-19

variance without making application to the local zoning board, and obtaining 

approval for a new or expanded use variance." See Hantman v. Randolph Twp., 

58 N.J. Super. 127, 135 (App. Div. 1959) (nonconforming uses "may not be 

enlarged as of right"). 

Regarding defendant's nuisance argument, we note property owners must 

use their land in a way that avoids detriment or injury to other property owners. 

Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc., 50 N.J. Super. 127, 133 (App. Div. 

1958). Courts look to whether a property owner's activities materially and 

unreasonably interfere with another's comforts or existence "not according to 

exceptionally refined, uncommon, or luxurious habits of living, but according 

to the simple tastes and unaffected notions generally prevailing among plain 

people." Id. at 134-35 (citations omitted). Here, the record amply supports 

Judge LeBlon's finding that defendant's activities interfered with the 

marketability of plaintiff's neighboring property once plaintiff's property 

became the site of a development included in the Township’s court-approved 

Third Round HEFSP. 

When reviewing an order granting or denying summary judgment, we 

apply the same standard as the trial court. State v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 

425 (2015) (citing Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013)). In 
20 A-2604-19

considering a motion for summary judgment, "both trial and appellate courts 

must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Bauer

v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 605 n. 1 (2009) (citing R. 4:46-2(c); Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). Courts must grant summary 

judgment if the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a 

matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). Even if the pleadings show there may be an issue 

of material fact, a trial court must also look to and consider all the papers on file 

to determine if there is, in fact, a dispute. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. 

of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954). Bare conclusions from the pleadings are 

not enough to defeat a summary judgment application without factual support 

from the papers. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. American Arbitration 

Ass'n, 67 N.J. Super. 384, 399-400 (App. Div. 1961). On the other hand, 

opposing parties may show that evidentiary materials relied upon raise 

credibility issues and thus defeat a motion for summary judgment. D'Amato v. 

D'Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 114 (App. Div. 1997). In deciding a summary 

judgment motion, the trial court must only determine whether there is a genuine 

issue of material fact but should not render a decision on such issues. Brill, 142 

N.J. at 540. Issues of law are subject to the de novo standard of review, and 
21 A-2604-19

thus the trial court's determination of such issues is accorded no 

deference. Kaye v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 229 (2015) (citations omitted). 

Having reviewed the record, the parties' briefs, and applicable legal 

principles, we are satisfied we have no basis to disturb Judge LeBlon's February 

19, 2020 order, and affirm the order substantially for the reasons he expressed 

in his thoughtful and comprehensive January 29, 2020 opinion. 

To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of defendant's

remaining arguments, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.