*

Honorable Edward S. Smith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-6743.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

I.D.P., a male juvenile, W.L.G., a male juvenile, DefendantsAppellants.

Dec. 31, 1996.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Alabama. (No. 95-164-RV-S), Richard W. Vollmer, Jr.

Judge.

Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and SMITH*

, Senior

Circuit Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents two issues of first impression in this

circuit pertaining to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention Act of 1974 ("the Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042. We

must resolve: (1) whether the government's certification that an

offense committed by a juvenile presents a substantial federal

interest giving rise to federal jurisdiction is subject to judicial

review, and (2) the government's burden of proof before the

district court as to whether the interests of justice militate in

favor of a juvenile's transfer to adult status. In addition, we

must decide whether the particular facts of this case support the

district court's order that the appellants be tried as adults. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
 1

Under the Act, a "juvenile" is defined as "a person who has

not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of

proceedings and disposition under [the Act] for an alleged act of

juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his

twenty-first birthday." 18 U.S.C. § 5031. "Juvenile

delinquency," moreover, is defined as "the violation of a law of

the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth

birthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult

or a violation by such a person of section 922(x)." Id. 

On August 22, 1995, the government filed a three-count

information charging I.D.P. and W.L.G. with armed robbery of a

motor vehicle ("carjacking"), conspiracy, and use of a firearm

during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2, 5032, 371, and 924(c). It is undisputed that

both I.D.P. and W.L.G. were juveniles at the time they allegedly

committed these offenses.1 The following recitation of facts

underlying the charges against I.D.P. and W.L.G. are assumed to be

true solely for the limited purpose of this appeal: On April 20,

1995, I.D.P. and W.L.G. approached a parked truck in which two

teenagers sat. W.L.G. pulled the individual seated in the

passenger side out of the truck, while I.D.P. pointed a gun at the

driver and ordered him to get out of the truck. Shortly

thereafter, I.D.P. and W.L.G. drove the stolen vehicle to a grocery

store accompanied by another juvenile. I.D.P. and the other

juvenile went into the store, demanded money from a cashier, and

shot the cashier in the abdomen when she did not immediately accede

to their request. The cashier was pregnant at the time I.D.P. shot

her. Another cashier gave I.D.P. and his companion the money they

had demanded.

On the same date on which the information against I.D.P. and

W.L.G. was filed, the government moved to proceed against each
juvenile as an adult. Consistent with the requirements set forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the United States Attorney filed with the

district court (1) a certification stating that the offenses with

which I.D.P. and W.L.G. were charged were felonies and crimes of

violence and that there was a substantial federal interest to

warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and (2) certified

copies of each defendant's state juvenile record. I.D.P. and

W.L.G. each moved to dismiss the information for lack of federal

jurisdiction, claiming that certification was improper due to the

lack of a substantial federal interest. Following a court-ordered

psychological examination of each defendant, the court conducted a

closed hearing on each party's pending motion.

The court denied the motions to dismiss after finding not only

that the government's certification was not subject to judicial

review, but that even if the court were to review the

certification, the crime of carjacking—particularly under the

violent circumstances existing in this case—presented a substantial

federal interest.

The court next analyzed, again pursuant to the terms set forth

by federal statute, the age, social background, and psychological

maturity level of each juvenile, the nature of the offenses with

which they were charged, their respective juvenile delinquency

records, their respective responses to past treatment, and the

availability of programs designed to treat their particular

behavioral problems. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Based on its findings,

the court determined that the government had proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that the interests of justice weighed
more heavily in favor of transfer to adult status. Accordingly,

the court granted the government's motion to transfer with respect

to both I.D.P. and W.L.G.

I.D.P. and W.L.G. appeal the district court's determination

that they be tried as adults. Specifically, they contend that (1)

there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because the government's

certification erroneously characterized the carjacking offense at

issue in this case as giving rise to a "substantial federal

interest," (2) assuming certification was proper, the government

should have been required to show by clear and convincing

evidence—rather than by a preponderance of the evidence—that

transfer to adult status was proper, and (3) the district court

abused its discretion in concluding, based on the statutory factors

and the particularized facts of this case, that these individuals

should be tried as adults.

The government argues that certification is an administrative

decision that rests solely within the discretion of the Attorney

General and, therefore, is isolated from judicial review. The

government further suggests that even if we were to review the

certification, the carjacking offense that occurred in this

instance implicates a substantial federal interest sufficient to

warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Finally, the

government submits that the district court properly evaluated and

balanced the applicable statutory factors in reaching its

determination that transfer to adult status was justified with

respect to both defendants.

II. DISCUSSION
 2

The authority to certify on behalf of the Attorney General

has been delegated to the appropriate United States Attorney. 28

C.F.R. 0.57 (1995). 

 3There is, however, a statutorily prescribed exception to

this general rule involving mandatory transfer to adult status

once certification has been filed. Such automatic transfer,

As a preliminary matter, a brief overview of the applicable

provisions of the Act is necessary to our examination of the

questions presented in this appeal. To commence a juvenile

prosecution in federal district court, the Act mandates that the

government file with the court certified copies of the charged

individual's state juvenile records. In addition, the Attorney

General or her delegate2 must certify, after investigation, that

(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State

does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction

over said juvenile with respect to [the] alleged act of

juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available

programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or

(3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a

felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in

the case of the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal

jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. Here, the government chose to proceed against

both W.L.G. and I.D.P. under the third category provided by the

statute and certified to the court that "the offenses charged

against W.L.G., and I.D.P., male juveniles, are felony crimes of

violence and there is a substantial federal interest in this case

or the offenses to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction."

R2-7.

 Although the government's certification to the court is

necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction, the decision regarding

whether to transfer a juvenile to adult status ultimately rests

with the court.3

 Once the government moves for such a transfer,
which precludes any discretionary determinations by the district

court, occurs when a juvenile is alleged to have committed an

offense that (1) would be deemed a felony if committed by an

adult, (2) involved the use or attempted use of physical force,

and (3) the juvenile was previously convicted of one of the

listed felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The government does not

contend that automatic transfer applies in this instance. 

transfer is appropriate only if the court finds, after a hearing,

that a transfer would be in the interest of justice. The statute

details the considerations that the court must take into account in

reaching its decision:

Evidence of the following factors shall be considered,

and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the

record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the

interest of justice: the age and social background of the

juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and

nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the

juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological

maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the

juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of

programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. While the court is statutorily required to make

findings with respect to all enumerated factors, it remains within

the court's discretion to determine what weight to give to each

one. United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989).

Again, it is important to emphasize that the government's

certification to the court regarding the statutory classifications

necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction is distinct from—and in no

way dispositive of—the question of whether a juvenile should be

tried as an adult. See United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d

1314, 1317 n. 4 (4th Cir.1996) quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,

2d Sess. 389 n. 10) (1983) ("Only if the criteria for retaining

federal jurisdiction over a juvenile in the first instance ... are
 4

Examples of non-compliance over which the court could

exercise review might be "where the verifying party is not a

proper delegate of the Attorney General ... [or] where the

certification is not filed in a timely fashion." Id. at 1477

(citations omitted). 

met, may there then be consideration of whether Federal

prosecution, as opposed to a Federal juvenile delinquency

proceeding, is appropriate.") Before reaching the issue of whether

the district court properly concluded that the interest of justice

weighed in favor of trying W.L.G. and I.D.P. as adults, therefore,

we first must decide whether the government's certification that

endows the federal court with jurisdiction over this case is

subject to judicial review.

A. Certification

 In United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.1984), we

examined whether the Attorney General's certification necessary to

invoke federal jurisdiction under either of the first two

statutorily prescribed categories—in other words, that the state

either does not have or refuses to assume jurisdiction over a

juvenile or, in the alternative, does not have programs available

to meet the needs of juveniles—was amenable to our review. We

resolved that certification under section 5032 generally was not

reviewable. Several exceptions to this rule were explicitly noted:

We acknowledged, for instance, that a court could review a

certification for formal compliance with the statute.4 We further

established that review was proper where the juvenile had alleged

that the government had certified the action in bad faith. See id.

at 1478.

In the absence of a purely formal error on the face of the
certification or proof of bad faith on the part of the government,

we concluded that certifications made in accord with section 5032

customarily "must be accepted as final." Id. In reaching this

determination, we adopted the Second Circuit's approach to this

issue as articulated in United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857, 96 S.Ct. 107, 46 L.Ed.2d 82

(1975). In Vancier, the court's legal analysis was grounded in

part on the observation that section 5032 not only failed to set

forth standards by which the court could determine the

appropriateness of certification but also served to qualify

prosecutorial discretion rather than confer upon the courts the

power to decide in which forum to bring juvenile delinquency cases.

See Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1380-81. Moreover, we found persuasive

the Vancier court's reference to other instances in which courts

have found decisions made by the executive branch in connection

with law enforcement matters to be non-reviewable. See United

States v. C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478 (citing Vancier, 515 F.2d at 1381

(collecting cases)).

Although our decision in United States v. C.G. necessarily

guides our disposition of this case, it does not resolve entirely

the matter before us. Significantly, the statutory language at

issue here—that is, a third possible basis for federal jurisdiction

provided by the Attorney General's certification that the offense

charged involves a "substantial federal interest"—was added to

section 5032 in 1984 subsequent to our decision in United States v.

C.G. We are convinced, however, that the reasoning underlying our

decision in United States v. C.G. obtains equally with respect to
the amended language presented in this instance. The statute, as

amended, specifies that the Attorney General shall certify to the

court that "the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a

felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the

case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal

jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The statute goes on to provide

that transfer is appropriate if the court finds, after a hearing,

that such a transfer would be in the "interest of justice." Id.

More importantly, the statute sets forth explicit and detailed

factors that the court must consider in evaluating whether a

transfer would be in the interest of justice; conversely, the

statute is virtually silent regarding any standard by which the

court may or must determine the existence of a substantial federal

interest. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we

presume that this particular textual configuration by Congress was

intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104

S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ("Where Congress includes

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion.") quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472

F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972).

By the same token, it is apparent that the type of judgment

that must be exercised in deciding whether to prosecute a case in

federal court is supervisory in nature, particularly where the

interest at stake entails law enforcement concerns. See United

States v. C.G., 736 F.2d at 1478. In the context of certification
under this statute, the government's authority to ascertain the

presence of a substantial federal interest is no different from its

authority to decide whether to prosecute a case in a federal forum.

This type of decision falls squarely within the parameters of

prosecutorial discretion that previously we have held does not lend

itself to judicial intervention. See Jones v. White, 992 F.2d

1548, 1574 (11th Cir.) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)) ("[O]ur

criminal justice system accords prosecutors broad discretion as to

whom they prosecute, and ... this discretion is ill-suited to

judicial review."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 967, 114 S.Ct. 448, 126

L.Ed.2d 381 (1993). We find persuasive an illustration of the

policy nature of the "substantial federal interest" determination

offered by the district court in United States v. W.P., Jr., 898

F.Supp. 845 (M.D.Ala.1995):

[W]hile one bank robbery might involve only a small amount of

money, it could still meet § 5032's "substantial Federal

interest" requirement if it were part of a wave of bank

robberies, or if the crime of bank robbery reached a point

where it could be reasonably viewed as a national problem

comparable to "large scale drug trafficking, or significant or

willful destruction of property belonging to the United

States." An assessment of whether a single bank robbery in

this broader context is substantial enough to warrant the

exercise of federal jurisdiction would be an administrative,

not a judicial, undertaking, drawing on such subjective

assessment as the overall presence of crime, general

deterrence, and enforcement priorities.

Id. at 849 (citation omitted). See also United States v. Juvenile

Male, 915 F.Supp. 789, 793 (W.D.Va.1995) ("[T]he decision as to

whether a federal interest is substantial enough to warrant federal

jurisdiction is more administrative than judicial in nature. It

calls for an assessment as to the overall presence of crime,
 5

But see United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314,

1320-21 (4th Cir.1996) ("We find nothing in the statutory

language or legislative history that would overcome the

presumption of judicial review.... In short, we can and must

first satisfy ourselves that our jurisdiction has been properly

invoked. We do so by reviewing the stated reasons underlying the

government's decision to proceed in federal court."); United

States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 618 (8th Cir.1991) ("[W]e

reaffirm that a certification in compliance with section 5032 is

necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction under that section.... 

We now review whether this certification was in compliance with

section 5032."). While we recognize that the Fourth and Eighth

Circuits have interpreted section 5032 to require judicial review

of certifications, we believe that our decision in this case

comports with both the express language of the statute and our

own circuit precedent. 

general deterrence effects, and enforcement priorities. As a

policy matter, the U.S. Attorney's Office is in a better position

to evaluate these variables than is the court.").5

The legislative history of the amendment to section 5032 is

also instructive in aiding our resolution of this issue. The

Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report relating to the addition

of the "substantial Federal interest" language states that

"[t]his change adopts in part the recommendation of the

Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime that the

Federal Government assume original jurisdiction over Federal

Crimes by juveniles, and is substantially the same as a

provision in the Criminal Code Reform legislation approved by

the Committee in the last Congress." S.Rep. No. 225, 98th

Cong., 2nd Sess. 389 (1983) (footnote omitted).

Regarding the referenced legislation on which the current amendment

was based, the Committee report stated:

The Committee has limited the provision to the more serious

Federal felonies in the belief that the Federal government

should still defer to State authorities for less serious

offenses by juveniles. The Committee intends that the Federal

prosecutor will consider the factors set forth in section 205

... in deciding whether there is a "sufficient Federal

interest in the case." It is believed necessary to afford the

Attorney General this authority when a serious crime occurs in

which there is a special Federal interest.
 6

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gutierrez de

Martinez v. Lamagno, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d

375 (1995), does not alter our disposition of this question. 

Gutierrez de Martinez concerned the Attorney General's

certification under the Westfall Act that a defendant-employee

was acting within the scope of his employment and that the United

States, consequently, could be substituted as a defendant in a

civil action. In concluding that such certifications were

reviewable by a federal court, the Court expressly noted that its

analysis was driven largely by two compelling factors:

First, the Attorney General herself urges review,

mindful that in cases of the kind petitioners present,

the incentive of her delegate to certify is marked. 

Second, when a government official's determination of a

S.Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1179 (1981). Not only does

the report explicitly acknowledge that the legislation was designed

to afford the Attorney General the authority to decide whether a

federal interest exists but, perhaps more importantly, refers the

federal prosecutor to a different section of the bill setting forth

proposed criteria that a prosecutor should consider in deciding

whether to seek a federal prosecution. Again, as noted with

respect to the manner in which the statute ultimately was drafted,

Congress chose to leave intact an exhaustive description of

considerations to which the court must look before reaching its

decision regarding the "interest of justice," yet provided in

another statutory section factors to which the prosecutor must look

before deciding whether a "substantial federal interest" sufficient

to warrant federal jurisdiction exists in a given case. This

legislative background, coupled with the reasons previously noted,

convinces us that, absent allegations of bad faith or facial

non-compliance with the statute, judicial review of the Attorney

General's decision that a substantial federal interest exists under

section 5032 would not be appropriate.6
fact or circumstance—for example, "scope of

employment"—is dispositive of a court controversy,

federal courts generally do not hold the determination

unreviewable.

Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2231. Here, unlike the

circumstances presented in Gutierrez de Martinez, the

Attorney General does not urge review; indeed, there is no

potential conflict of interest or "incentive" of the U.S.

Attorney to certify that a juvenile should be prosecuted in

federal court. Similarly, as we have stated repeatedly, the

prosecutor's certification is not determinative of the

transfer decision and thus is not dispositive of any court

controversy over which the court should exercise review. 

Although we are mindful of the Court's admonition in

Gutierrez de Martinez that "judicial review of executive

action "will not be cut off unless there is persuasive

reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress,' "

id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2231 (quoting Abbott Laboratories

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18

L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)), we are convinced that persuasive

reasons exist to find the particular executive action at

issue in section 5032 unreviewable. 

B. Quantum of Proof

 I.D.P. and W.L.G. posit that the district court should have

required the government to prove the factors underlying its motion

to transfer to adult status by clear and convincing evidence rather

than a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude, however, that

the district court did not err in applying the preponderance

standard to its findings regarding whether the interest of justice

demanded that I.D.P. and W.L.G. be transferred and tried as adults.

It is worth noting that our conclusion is in accord with every

other circuit that has addressed and decided this issue. See,

e.g., United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1995)

(stating that "[t]he clear and convincing standard is also

incompatible with the discretionary nature of the transfer

determination, which involves balancing the often conflicting goals

of promoting juvenile rehabilitation and protecting the public
 7

See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60

L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). 

 8See Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 87 S.Ct. 483, 17

L.Ed.2d 362 (1966). 

 9See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct.

1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943). 

 10See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct.

1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 

safety."); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868 (2nd Cir.1995)

(reasoning that the clear and convincing standard would not be

required in a transfer proceeding because "[a] transfer hearing

under the JDA is not a criminal proceeding designed to explore the

defendant's guilt or innocence ... [n]or does the hearing under the

Act affect whether the defendant will be confined, either prior to

or after trial."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that

the use of the "clear and convincing" standard of proof is reserved

"to protect particularly important interests in a limited number of

civil cases," California v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454

U.S. 90, 93, 102 S.Ct. 172, 173, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981), and has

approved the use of this standard in a restricted number of cases

involving such matters as civil commitment,7

 deportation,8

denaturalization,9 and libel.10 Although we do not minimize the

importance of the interest at stake for these appellants, the

interest does not rise to the level of constitutional gravity

identified by the Court in those rare instances in which it has

found the "clear and convincing" burden of proof to be necessary.

See, e.g., Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23, 63 S.Ct. at 1335

("[The] right [of citizenship] once conferred should not be taken

away without the clearest sort of justification and proof ...
[T]his burden must be met with evidence of clear and convincing

character that when citizenship was conferred upon petitioner ...

it was not done in accordance with strict legal requirements.");

Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50, 91 S.Ct. at 1823 ("[T]he vital needs of

freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that

allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis

of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use

reasonable care would not provide adequate "breathing space' for

these great freedoms.").

Perhaps more significantly, the determination at issue in this

case has no bearing on the eventual resolution of the underlying

case. Stated differently, in deciding whether the government has

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest of

justice weighs in favor of transfer, the court solely decides

whether the defendants will be tried as juveniles or adults. It is

critical to emphasize that this determination neither influences

nor affects any issue regarding the defendants' innocence or guilt.

As we emphasized in the context of certification, the court's

findings with respect to transfer is the beginning—not the end—of

the adjudicatory process. We therefore conclude that the district

court properly required the government to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the interest of justice weighed in favor of

transfer.

C. Interest of Justice

 Both I.D.P. and W.L.G. argue that the district court erred in

its final determination that the interest of justice militated in

favor of transferring each of them to adult status. The decision
whether to transfer a juvenile to trial as an adult under section

5032 is within the sound discretion of the trial court provided the

court makes findings as to the criteria outlined in the Act.

United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989). While we

review the court's factual findings for clear error, we review the

ultimate interest-of-justice determination for abuse of discretion.

See id. at 1255.

 Here, it is undisputed that the district court conducted a

detailed examination of each of the requisite statutory factors.

Briefly, with respect to I.D.P., the court made the following

factual determinations: Prior to the events giving rise to the

instant charges, I.D.P. had experienced "numerous contacts with the

juvenile justice system." R2-23 at 18. CHINS (Child In Need of

Supervision) petitions were filed against him in July, 1988,

October, 1990, and November, 1990. In April, 1991, he received an

informal adjustment on a criminal mischief charge and in September,

1992, following another CHINS petition, was placed on probation.

In January, 1993, he was ordered to serve two week-ends at a youth

center for violating his probation. In February, 1994, he was

adjudicated delinquent for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

I.D.P. again was found in violation of probation and placed on

electronic monitoring but removed the monitoring device and ran

away. He subsequently was ordered to attend a "boot camp"

treatment program and was placed in the custody of a legal

guardian.

The court also summarized psychological evaluations showing
that I.D.P. had received various forms of counseling since the age

of five but had continued to exhibit increasingly aggressive and,

at times, violent behavior with family members. One of the mental

health professionals that evaluated I.D.P., Dr. Chudy, found

I.D.P.'s prognosis to be poor to guarded, and suggested that he

would need to be in an environment where he could both be monitored

by the legal system and receive "constructive treatment." Id. at

21. The second psychiatric counselor, Dr. Alexander, noted that

I.D.P. suffers from an "evolving personality disorder" and

indicated that the "likelihood that further treatment efforts would

be successful is minimal to non-existent." Id. at 21. The court

acknowledged, however, that Dr. Alexander had provided a somewhat

inconclusive, incomplete report. The court also found that no

treatment programs to address I.D.P.'s behavioral problems were

available within the federal juvenile system.

The court balanced these findings, as required by statute, and

concluded that the risk of harm to society posed by placing I.D.P.

in the juvenile system outweighed his chance for rehabilitation

within that system. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted

that I.D.P. had a documented history of aggressive behavior and had

not responded well to previous treatment. The court further noted

that the crimes with which I.D.P. was charged were serious. In

light of the lengthy and detailed analysis provided by the court

with respect to each of the factors it was directed to evaluate and

because the record contains adequate evidence to support the

court's findings, we cannot conclude that the court abused its

discretion in deciding that the interest of justice militated in
favor of the transfer of I.D.P. to adult status.

With respect to W.L.G., the court set forth the following

factual determinations: W.L.G. received an informal adjustment for

theft in 1990. Several months later, he again was charged with two

counts of theft. In 1991, he was charged with receiving stolen

property and placed on probation. In 1993, after a petition was

filed to revoke W.L.G.'s probation, he was committed to the custody

of a youth center. Following another probation revocation

petition, he was placed under house arrest, suspended from school

and found in violation of his curfew. In 1994, he was charged with

three burglaries and committed to the Department of Youth Services.

The same mental health professionals that evaluated I.D.P.

also evaluated W.L.G. Dr. Chudy found that W.L.G.'s prognosis

within the juvenile system was poor and that he would respond

better in a "highly structured environment." Id. at 14. Dr.

Alexander noted that W.L.G. had "cultivated his abilities as a

criminal and carries a gun with him in the community." Id. at 15.

Alexander concluded that it was unrealistic to expect that W.L.G.

could be rehabilitated by the juvenile justice system and feared

that his criminal behavior could escalate with time. The court

also observed that no attempt had been made to rehabilitate W.L.G.

within the state juvenile system and that no programs existed

within the federal juvenile system to treat his behavioral

problems.

Again, we cannot say that the findings made by the district

court are unsupported by the record. Moreover, in concluding that

adult status was appropriate in this instance, the court considered
both the seriousness and violence of the underlying charged offense

and the psychological profile of W.L.G. that emerged after two

psychological evaluations. In light of the broad deference that we

afford the district court in reaching its interest-of-justice

determination, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion.

III. CONCLUSION

I.D.P. and W.L.G. challenge the district court's order

granting the government's motion to transfer each juvenile to adult

status on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction

over this case, applied an incorrect standard of proof in

evaluating the propriety of transfer, and abused its discretion in

finding that I.D.P. and W.L.G. should be tried as adults. We

conclude that (1) the government's certification that the

underlying offenses charged in this action gave rise to a

substantial federal interest is not subject to judicial review, (2)

the court did not err in requiring the government to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the interest of justice weighed

in favor of transfer, and (3) the court did not abuse its

discretion in balancing the statutory factors required to reach its

determination that these juveniles should be tried as adults.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.