Filed 5/16/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COMMISSION ON STATE 

MANDATES,

Defendant and Respondent;

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and 

Respondents.

 D079742

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-

00009631-CU-WM-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Affirmed.

Office of County Counsel, Thomas Deak, and Walter de Lorrell III; Best 

Best & Krieger, Rebecca Andrews, and Weiland Chiang for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Juliana F. Gmur, Senior Commission Counsel, and Camille Shelton, 

Chief Legal Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney 

General, Benjamin M. Glickman and Seth E. Goldstein, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. 

I

INTRODUCTION

Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution generally

requires the State to reimburse local governments when the Legislature 

imposes a mandate on the local governments to carry out new programs or 

higher levels of service. Relying on this constitutional provision, the County 

of San Diego filed a test claim with the Commission on State Mandates 

seeking reimbursement from the State for costs the County incurs to prepare 

for, and attend, criminal proceedings known as Franklin proceedings.1 

Broadly speaking, Franklin proceedings afford youth offenders serving 

lengthy prison sentences an opportunity to introduce evidence of youthrelated factors that may be relevant when the youth offenders become eligible 

for parole many years in the future.

The Commission denied the County’s test claim. It found the costs at 

issue were not reimbursable because the laws on which the County based its

test claim—Penal Code sections 3041, 3046, 3051, and 4801, as added and 

amended by Statutes 2013, chapter 312, Statutes 2015, chapter 471, and 

Statutes 2017, chapter 684 (collectively, the Test Claim Statutes)—do not 

expressly require counties to participate in Franklin proceedings. 

Alternatively, the Commission found the County was not entitled to 

reimbursement because the Test Claim Statutes fell within an exception to 

the mandatory reimbursement requirement, which applies when a law

1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
3

changes the penalty for a crime. (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (g).) The County 

sought judicial review, but the trial court denied relief for the same reasons 

articulated by the Commission in its decision denying the test claim. 

Like the Commission and the trial court, we conclude the County is not 

entitled to mandatory reimbursement from the State because the Test Claim 

Statutes—the laws giving rise to the County’s reimbursement claim—change 

the penalties for crimes. In our view, these laws change the penalties for 

crimes because they make the vast majority of youth offenders in the State 

eligible to receive a youth offender parole hearing and, as a result, many 

youth offenders are released from prison years or even decades earlier than 

they would have been if they had served out their original sentences. Given 

our determination that the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for 

crimes, and thus fall within the statutory exception to the mandatory 

reimbursement requirement, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the 

Test Claim Statutes impose a mandate on counties to carry out a new 

program or a higher level of service.

The judgment is affirmed.

II

BACKGROUND

1. Constitutional Subvention Provisions

In 1978, voters in our State approved an initiative measure adding

Article XIII A to the California Constitution. (Prop. 13, as approved by 

voters, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978).) The measure “imposes a limit on the 

power of state and local governments to adopt and levy taxes.” (County of 

Fresno v. State of Cal. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 482, 486 (Fresno); see Dept. of 

Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 735 (Kern) 
4

[“Article XIII A (adopted by the voters in 1978 as Proposition 13), limits the 

taxing authority of state and local government.”].)

The following year, California voters approved an initiative measure 

adding Article XIII B to the California Constitution. (Prop. 4, as approved by 

voters, Special Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979).) This measure “place[d]

limitations on the ability of both state and local governments to appropriate 

funds for expenditures.” (Fresno, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 486; see Kern, supra, 

30 Cal.4th at p. 735 [“Article XIII B (adopted by the voters in 1979 as 

Proposition 4) limits the spending authority of state and local government.”].) 

Article XIII A and Article XIII B “ ‘work in tandem, together restricting 

California governments’ power both to levy and to spend for public 

purposes.’ ” (County of San Diego v. State of Cal. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 81

(San Diego).) “Their goals are ‘to protect residents from excessive taxation 

and government spending.’ ” (Ibid.)

Section 6 of Article XIII B (hereafter, section 6) is the constitutional 

provision of relevance to the current proceeding. As a general matter, and 

subject to specified exceptions, section 6 provides, “Whenever the Legislature 

or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any 

local government, the State shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse 

that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of 

service.”2 (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a).) Section 6 “preclude[s] the 

state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental 

functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill equipped’ to assume increased 

financial responsibilities because of the taxing and spending limitations that 

articles XIII A and XIII B impose.” (San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81.) 

2 “ ‘Subvention’ generally means a grant of financial aid or assistance, or 

a subsidy.” (Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 

1564, 1577.) 
5

“ ‘Essentially, the constitutional rule of state subvention provides that 

the state is required to pay for any new governmental programs, or for higher 

levels of service under existing programs, that it imposes upon local 

governmental agencies. [Citation.] This does not mean that the state is 

required to reimburse local agencies for any incidental cost that may result 

from the enactment of a state law; rather, the subvention requirement is 

restricted to governmental services which the local agency is required by 

state law to provide to its residents. [Citation.] The subvention requirement 

is intended to prevent the state from transferring the costs of government 

from itself to local agencies. [Citation.] Reimbursement is required when the 

state “freely chooses to impose on local agencies any peculiarly ‘governmental’

cost which they were not previously required to absorb.” ’ ” (County of Los 

Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 898, 906–

907.)

As noted, section 6 enumerates a handful of exceptions to its rule 

requiring reimbursement for legislative mandates. It permits, but does not 

require, reimbursement “for the following mandates: [¶] (1) Legislative 

mandates requested by the local agency affected. [¶] (2) Legislation defining a 

new crime or changing an existing definition of a crime. [¶] (3) Legislative 

mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive orders or regulations 

initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975. [¶] 

(4) Legislative mandates contained in statutes within the scope of paragraph 

(7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I [of the California Constitution].” 

(Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, the State is not 

required to reimburse local governments when a legislative mandate defines 

a new crime or changes the definition of a crime, among other circumstances.
6

2. Statutory Subvention Framework

“In 1984, the Legislature created a statutory procedure for determining 

whether a statute imposes state-mandated costs on a local agency within the 

meaning of section 6. (Gov. Code, § 17500 et seq.)” (San Diego, supra, 15 

Cal.4th at p. 81.) The statutory scheme generally compels the State to 

“reimburse each local agency and school district for all ‘costs mandated by the 

state,’ ” (Gov. Code, § 17561, subd. (a)), and it defines “[c]osts mandated by 

the state,” as “any increased costs which a local agency or school district is 

required to incur ... as a result of any statute ... which mandates a new 

program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning 

of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution,” (id., § 17514). 

One provision contained within the statutory scheme, Government 

Code section 17556, “outlines six circumstances where duties imposed by 

statute on local governments are not deemed ‘costs mandated by the state.’ ” 

(County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates (2018) 6 Cal.5th 196, 

207.) One such circumstance exists when a “statute create[s] a new crime or 

infraction, eliminate[s] a crime or infraction, or change[s] the penalty for a 

crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to 

the enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (g).)

The Commission is “charged with the responsibility of hearing and 

deciding, subject to judicial review by an administrative writ of mandate, 

claims for reimbursement made by local governments or school districts. 

(Gov. Code, § 17551.)” (San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on 

State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859, 872 (SDUSD).) An initial 

reimbursement claim filed by a local government or school district is known 

as a test claim. (Gov. Code, § 17521.) “The test claim process allows the 

claimant and other interested parties to present written evidence and 
7

testimony at a public hearing. [Citations.] Based on that evidence, the 

Commission must decide whether the challenged statute or executive order 

mandates a new program or increased level of service.” (Coast Community 

College Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800, 808 

(CCCD).) “The Commission’s adjudication of the test claim ‘governs all 

subsequent claims based on the same statute.’ ” (Department of Finance v. 

Commission on State Mandates (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 546, 553, fn. 4; see also 

SDUSD, at p. 872, fn. 10 [“a ‘test claim is like a class action—the 

Commission’s decision applies to all [local governments and] school districts 

in the state’ ”].)

“In making [its] determination, the Commission is required to address 

a series of questions. First, it must decide whether the legal provision for 

which subvention is sought compels the local agency to act or merely invites 

voluntary action. If the provision compels action, the Commission must next 

decide whether the compelled activity requires the agency to provide ‘a new 

program or higher level of service.’ [Citation.] Finally, if the Commission 

finds a statute or executive action mandates a new program or higher level of 

service, it must consider if any of the enumerated exceptions to 

reimbursement apply.” (CCCD, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 808.)

For purposes of section 6, a “program” refers to: (1) a program that 

carries out the governmental function of providing services to the public; or 

(2) a law which, to implement state policy, imposes unique requirements on 

local governments and does not apply generally to all residents and entities 

in the state. (SDUSD, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 874.) A “higher level of 

service” refers to “ ‘state mandated increases in the services provided by local 

agencies in existing ‘programs.’ ” (Ibid.) “[S]imply because a state law or 

order may increase the costs borne by local government in providing services, 
8

this does not necessarily establish that the law or order constitutes an 

increased or higher level of the resulting ‘service to the public’ under article 

XIII B, section 6, and Government Code section 17514.” (Id. at p. 877.)

3. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence

Beginning in the mid-2000’s, the U.S. Supreme Court and the 

California Supreme Court issued a series of bedrock decisions collectively 

standing for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 

of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of certain of our nation’s 

most severe penalties on juvenile offenders, without at least some 

consideration being given to the distinctive characteristics of youth that 

render juvenile offenders less culpable, as a class, than adult offenders.3

The first of these decisions was Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 

in which the U.S. Supreme Court proscribed the death penalty for defendants 

who committed their crimes when they were older than 15 but younger than 

18.4 In prohibiting the death penalty for such defendants, the Roper court 

recognized three differences between juveniles and adults, which precluded 

juveniles from being “classified among the worst offenders.” (Id. at p. 569.) 

First, “ ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are 

found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 

among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.” (Ibid.) Second, “juveniles are more 

3 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment 

states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)

4 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court previously held that the Cruel 

and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids the death 

sentence for any defendant who was under the age of 16 at the time of his or 

her offense. (Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815.)
9

vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 

including peer pressure.” (Ibid.) And third, “the character of a juvenile is not 

as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are 

more transitory, less fixed.” (Id. at p. 570.) Given these differences, the 

Roper court concluded the penological goals of the death penalty—retribution 

and deterrence—applied with lesser force to juvenile offenders compared to 

adult offenders. (Id. at pp. 571–572.) In the words of the Roper court, the 

differences between adults and juveniles are simply “too marked and well 

understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty 

despite insufficient culpability.” (Id. at pp. 572–573.)

A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Graham v. Florida

(2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham), which prohibited sentences of life in prison 

without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles convicted of 

nonhomicide crimes. Like the Roper court, the Graham court reiterated that 

“juveniles have lessened culpability” and, therefore, “they are less deserving 

of the most severe punishments.” (Graham, at p. 68.) The Graham court also 

opined on the seriousness of an LWOP sentence, describing it as “ ‘the second 

most severe penalty permitted by law.’ ” (Id. at p. 69.) It “deprives the 

convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.” (Id. at 

pp. 69–70.) Further, an LWOP sentence is “an especially harsh punishment 

for a juvenile,” since a juvenile offender “will on average serve more years 

and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” (Id. at 

p. 70.) Given the distinctive characteristics of youth, as well as the severity 

of LWOP, the court concluded the penological justifications for LWOP were 

insufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes in cases involving juvenile 

perpetrators of nonhomicide crimes. (Id. at pp. 71–75.) The court clarified 

that a state need not “guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 
10

convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” (Id. at p. 75.) But it must provide “some 

meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 

and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the 

means and mechanisms for compliance.” (Ibid.)

Not long after the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Graham decision, it

determined that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders also run 

afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, even when the offenders 

have perpetrated homicide crimes. (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460

(Miller).) As the Miller court explained, mandatory LWOP penalty schemes

“prevent the sentencer from taking account of [the] central considerations” of 

youth. (Id. at p. 474.) “By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a 

juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—

these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s 

harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 

(Ibid.) According to Miller, “[t]hat contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) 

foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on 

juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” (Ibid.)

Finally, in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, the California 

Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Graham to cases where a juvenile

convicted of a nonhomicide crime is sentenced to prison for a term of years 

that is equivalent to an LWOP sentence. The Caballero court reasoned, 

“Consistent with the high court’s holding in Graham, ... sentencing a juvenile 

offender for a nonhomicide offense to a term of years with a parole eligibility 

date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Although proper authorities may later determine that youths 

should remain incarcerated for their natural lives, the state may not deprive 
11

them at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their 

rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in the future.” (Id. at p. 268.)

4. Youth Offender Parole Hearings

In response to these watershed Eighth Amendment decisions, the 

California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.), 

which added Penal Code section 3051 and amended Penal Code sections 

3041, 3046, and 4801, effective January 1, 2014. Section 1 of the bill states,

“The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that 

provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a 

juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he 

or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the 

decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 

Cal.4th 262 and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Graham 

v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, and Miller v. Alabama (2012) 183 L.Ed.2d 407. 

... It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and 

maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity 

for release established.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)

As originally enacted, Penal Code section 3051 required the Board of 

Parole Hearings (hereafter, the Board), a state agency, to conduct parole 

hearings known as youth offender parole hearings for most juvenile offenders 

who were under the age of 18 when they committed their controlling 

offenses.5 (Former Pen. Code, § 3051, subds. (b), (d), added by Stats. 2013, 

ch. 312, § 4.) The law required the Board to hold a youth offender parole 

hearing during a juvenile offender’s 15th year of incarceration in cases where 

the offender was sentenced to a determinate sentence, during a juvenile 

5 “ ‘Controlling offense’ means the offense or enhancement for which any 

sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
12

offender’s 20th year of incarceration in cases where the offender was 

sentenced to a life term of less than 25 years to life, and during a juvenile 

offender’s 25th year of incarceration in cases where the offender was 

sentenced to 25 years to life. (Id., subd. (b)(1)–(3).)

In addition to enacting Penal Code section 3051, the bill amended 

Penal Code section 4801. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 5.) As amended, Penal Code 

section 4801 requires the Board, at a youth offender parole hearing, to “give 

great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the 

hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased 

maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 4801, subd. (c).) Penal Code section 3051, in turn, states in part: “(f)(1) In 

assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk 

assessment instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by 

licensed psychologists employed by the board and shall take into 

consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of 

adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 

increased maturity of the individual. [¶] (2) Family members, friends, school 

personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-based 

organizations with knowledge about the individual before the crime or the 

individual’s growth and maturity since the time of the crime may submit 

statements for review by the board.” (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(1), (2).)

“In 2015, the Legislature expanded [Penal Code] section 3051 to apply 

to offenders who committed crimes at the age of 23 or younger. (Former [Pen. 

Code,] § 3051, subd. (a)(1), added by Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) The 

amendment’s author cited ‘[r]ecent scientific evidence on adolescent and 

young adult development and neuroscience show[ing] that certain areas of 

the brain—particularly those affecting judgment and decision-making—do 
13

not fully develop until the early-to mid-20s.’ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 28, 2015, p. 3.)” 

(People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 776–777.)

Then, in 2017, the Legislature further amended Penal Code 

section 3051 to apply “to offenders who committed the controlling offense 

when 25 years old or younger [citation]. In addition, in the 2017 legislation 

raising the threshold age to 25, the Legislature extended youth parole 

hearings in the 25th year of incarceration to juveniles sentenced to life 

without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense committed before the 

age of 18.” (People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 282; Stats. 2017, 

ch. 684, § 1.5.)

Thus, under current law, and subject to exceptions, “ ‘an offender who 

committed a “controlling offense” under the age of 26 is entitled to a “youth 

offender parole hearing” during his or her 15th year of incarceration if he [or 

she] received a determinate sentence; during his or her 20th year of 

incarceration if he or she received a life term of less than 25 years to life; and 

during his or her 25th year of incarceration if he or she received a term of 25 

years to life. [Citation.] An offender convicted of a controlling offense 

committed before the age of 18 for which he or she was sentenced to LWOP is 

entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his or her 25th year of 

incarceration.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 194.)6

6 A youth offender parole hearing is not required for certain categories of 

youth offenders, including youth offenders who are convicted under the Three 

Strikes law or the One Strike law (for certain sex offenses), or youth offenders 

who are sentenced to LWOP for controlling offenses that are committed after 

they turn 18 years old. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (h).)
14

5. Franklin Proceedings

Soon after the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260, our Supreme 

Court decided Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, a seminal case addressing the 

interplay between the State’s youth offender parole hearing system and 

juvenile offenders’ claims of constitutional error under Miller.

In Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory term of 50 

years to life for a murder he committed at the age of 16. (Franklin, supra, 63

Cal.4th at pp. 269–272.) On appeal, he argued his sentence was the 

functional equivalent of a mandatory LWOP sentence, which he claimed was 

unconstitutional under Miller. (Franklin, at pp. 272–273.) The Franklin 

court determined that the rationale of Miller extended to cases in which a 

juvenile offender is subject to a mandatory sentence equivalent to LWOP. 

(Franklin, at p. 276.) Nonetheless, it concluded that the defendant’s 

constitutional claim was mooted by Senate Bill No. 260, which the 

Legislature passed while the appeal was pending. (Id. at pp. 276–280.) The 

court reasoned the new law “superseded [the defendant’s] sentence so that 

notwithstanding his original term of 50 years to life, he [was] eligible for a 

‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 25th year of his sentence.” (Id. at 

p. 277.) And, at the youth offender parole hearing, the Board was required by 

statute to give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth, the 

hallmark features of youth, and the defendant’s growth and increased 

maturity. (Ibid.) According to the court, the defendant was therefore 

“serving a life sentence that include[d] a meaningful opportunity for release

during his 25th year of incarceration,” not a sentence of LWOP or its 

functional equivalent. (Id. at pp. 279–280.)

Despite reaching this conclusion, the court determined the defendant 

raised “colorable concerns” that the record in his case may be incomplete or 
15

lacking mitigation information, which could in turn deprive him of a 

meaningful opportunity for release at his eventual youth offender parole 

hearing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 268–269, 282.) It observed that 

the youth offender parole system “contemplate[s] that information regarding 

the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the 

offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the 

Board’s consideration,” including statements from family members, friends, 

school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from community-based 

organizations. (Id. at pp. 283–284; see Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (f)(2).) But 

“[a]ssembling such statements ‘about the individual before the crime’ is 

typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense 

rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been 

lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or 

passed away.” (Franklin, at pp. 283–284.) Further, any psychological 

evaluations and risk assessment instruments used by the Board at a youth 

offender parole hearing must “take into consideration ... any subsequent

growth and increased maturity” of the defendant (Pen. Code, § 3051, 

subd. (f)(1))—a statutory dictate that “implies the availability of information 

about the offender when he was a juvenile.” (Franklin, at p. 284.)

Because it was unclear whether the defendant had an adequate

opportunity to put this type of information on the record at sentencing, the 

Franklin court remanded the matter for the trial court to decide whether he 

had such an opportunity and, if he did not, to receive submissions from the 

parties and testimony, if appropriate. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) 

The Franklin court determined that the defendant may, at the proceeding, 

“place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to 

cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender 
16

parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any 

evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive 

maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.” 

(Ibid.) According to the Franklin court, the goal of such a proceeding is “to 

provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the 

juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the 

offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation 

to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related factors [citation] in determining 

whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a 

serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Ibid.) 

These proceedings are commonly known as Franklin proceedings.7

Three years later, the Supreme Court issued Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 

439, which held that an otherwise-eligible youth offender is entitled to a 

Franklin proceeding, even when the youth offender’s judgment is already 

final. As the court explained, the text of the Test Claim Statutes “ ‘makes 

clear that the Legislature intended youth offender parole hearings to apply 

retrospectively, that is, to all eligible youth offenders regardless of the date of 

conviction.’ [Citation.] By a parity of reasoning, an evidence preservation 

process should apply to all youthful offenders now eligible for such a parole 

hearing.” (Id. at p. 450, italics omitted.) Further, the Cook court opined that 

the risks Franklin proceedings are intended to mitigate—namely, the loss or 

destruction of evidence bearing on youth-related factors—are present 

regardless of the finality of the youth offender’s judgment. (Ibid.)

7 A judicial officer presides over a Franklin proceeding and regulates its 

conduct, but “is not called upon to make findings of fact or render any final 

determination at the proceeding’s conclusion.” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

439, 449, fn. 3 (Cook).)
17

6. Procedural Background

In 2018, the County filed a test claim with the Commission seeking 

reimbursement from the State for costs incurred by the County when its 

district attorneys and public defenders prepare for, and attend, Franklin

proceedings. The County also sought reimbursement for costs it incurs to 

transport and house youth offenders for Franklin proceedings. The crux of 

the County’s argument was that the Test Claim Statutes mandate a new 

program or higher level of service in the form of Franklin proceedings and, 

therefore, the costs incurred by the County in connection with Franklin

proceedings are reimbursable under section 6. The County estimated 

Franklin proceedings require counties statewide to incur collective costs 

totaling between $2,750,000 and $6,375,000 per year. 

By a 6–1 vote of its members, the Commission denied the County’s test 

claim for two independent reasons. First, it found the “plain language” of the 

Test Claim Statutes does “not impose a state-mandated program on local 

agencies.” According to the Commission, the Test Claim Statutes impose 

duties on the Board, a State agency, but they do not impose activities on local 

governments. The Commission emphasized that, although “the courts have 

identified procedures to implement the [T]est [C]laim [S]tatutes,” section 6 

requires reimbursement only for legislative or agency mandates, and the

Legislature “has not enacted any laws to specify what evidence-gathering 

procedures should be afforded to youth offenders.” 

Second, as an alternative basis for denying the test claim, the 

Commission found the Test Claim Statutes changed the penalties for crimes 

and thus satisfied Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g). As noted, 

that provision states that costs are not mandated, and reimbursement from 

the State is not required, when a “statute create[s] a new crime or infraction, 
18

eliminate[s] a crime or infraction, or change[s] the penalty for a crime or 

infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to the 

enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov. Code, § 17556, sub. (g).) The 

Commission reasoned this exception applied because the Test Claim Statutes 

“capp[ed] the number of years the offender may be imprisoned before 

becoming eligible for release on parole, and all of the activities alleged in this 

case to comply with the [T]est [C]laim [S]tatutes, including the resultant 

Franklin proceedings, relate directly to the enforcement of the youthful 

offender’s underlying crime.”8

The County petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative

mandate compelling the Commission to set aside its denial of the test claim. 

After receiving written submissions from all parties, including the County, 

the Commission, and the real parties in interest,9 the trial court denied the 

County’s petition. Like the Commission, the court found reimbursement was 

unwarranted because the Test Claim Statutes “contain no mandate directed

to any local government.” The court adopted the Commission’s alternative 

basis for denying the test claim as well, finding the County was not entitled 

8 In briefing filed with the Commission, the parties raised competing

arguments concerning the applicability of Government Code section 17556, 

subdivisions (b) and (c). Those statutory provisions state that reimbursement 

from the State is not required when a “statute or executive order affirm[s] for 

the state a mandate that has been declared existing law or regulation by 

action of the courts,” (Gov. Code, § 17556, subd. (b)), or when a “statute or 

executive order imposes a requirement that is mandated by a federal law or 

regulation and results in costs mandated by the federal government” (id., 

subd. (c)). The Commission did not reach the issue of whether these 

statutory exceptions apply to the Test Claim Statutes.

9 The real parties in interest are the State of California Department of 

Finance and Betty T. Yee, in her official capacity as the California State 

Controller.
19

to reimbursement because the Test Claim Statutes changed the penalties for 

crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders. 

The County appeals the trial court’s determination.

III

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

“ ‘Courts review a decision of the Commission to determine whether it 

is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Ordinarily, when the scope 

of review in the trial court is whether the administrative decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the scope of review on appeal is the same. 

[Citation.] However, the appellate court independently reviews conclusions 

as to the meaning and effect of constitutional and statutory provisions. 

[Citation.] The question whether a statute or executive order imposes a 

mandate is a question of law.’ ” (CCCD, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 814.)

2. The Test Claim Statutes Change the Penalties for Crimes and Therefore 

Fall Within a Statutory Exception to the Reimbursement Requirement

The parties present competing arguments as to whether the Test Claim 

Statutes impose mandates on the County and other local governments to 

carry out new programs or higher levels of service. If they do impose such

mandates, the local governments may be entitled to reimbursement from the 

State for any costs they incurred as a result of the legislative mandates, 

unless an exception to the mandatory reimbursement requirement applies. 

(Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6; Gov. Code, §§ 17514, 17561, subd. (a).) If they 

do not impose such mandates, the affected local governments would not be 

entitled to mandatory reimbursement from the State.

The County asserts the Test Claim Statutes mandate Franklin 

proceedings because Franklin proceedings “derive[] from” the Test Claim 
20

Statutes. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459; see id. at p. 449 [“Franklin

authorized postjudgment proceedings to effectuate [the] intent” of the Test 

Claim Statutes].) The County claims it is compelled to prepare for, and 

attend, Franklin proceedings—and it incurs costs in the process of doing so—

because county-employed public defenders and district attorneys have nondiscretionary constitutional duties to represent their clients in critical stages 

of criminal proceedings. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)

By contrast, the Commission and the real parties in interest argue the 

Test Claim Statutes do not impose mandates on local governments; rather, 

they require the Board, a state agency, to conduct youth offender parole 

hearings. The Commission and the real parties in interest maintain that 

Franklin proceedings are judicially crafted proceedings, which the 

Legislature did not expressly mandate through the Test Claim Statutes or 

otherwise. (See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 [opining that the Legislature 

“remains free ... to specify what evidence-gathering procedures should be 

afforded to youth offenders”]; see also id. at pp. 460–461 (conc. & dis. opn. of 

Kruger, J.) [“we have never held that the specific record-preservation 

procedures we ordered in Franklin, including the opportunity to present live 

testimony, are required either by the terms of the [Test Claim S]tatutes or by 

the constitutional guarantee they are designed to implement”].)

We need not decide whether the Test Claim Statutes impose a mandate 

on local governments and, if so, whether the alleged mandate requires local 

governments to carry out a new program or a higher level of service—issues 

that present thorny questions about the very nature of Franklin proceedings. 

Assuming arguendo that the Test Claim Statutes compel local governments 

to provide a new program or a higher level of service, we conclude the 

Commission and the trial court properly denied the County’s reimbursement 
21

claim because the Test Claim Statutes fall within the exception to mandatory 

reimbursement codified in Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g).

As noted, Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g), provides, 

“The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in 

[Government Code] Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency 

or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds any one of the 

following: [¶] The statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a 

crime or infraction, or changed the penalty for a crime or infraction, but only 

for that portion of the statute relating directly to the enforcement of the 

crime or infraction.” (See also Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. (a)(2) [no 

reimbursement is required for “Legislation defining a new crime or changing 

an existing definition of a crime.”].)

The Test Claim Statutes fall within this statutory exception because 

they changed the penalties for crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders. 

Prior to the enactment of the Test Claim Statutes, youth offenders could be

subject to the same lengthy—and often mandatory—prison sentences that 

were imposed on adult offenders. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 272 

[“Once a juvenile offender is tried and convicted in criminal court, the trial 

court may be statutorily obligated to impose a lengthy sentence.”].) The Test 

Claim Statutes changed this practice for most youth offenders. Now, as a 

direct result of the Test Claim Statutes, most youth offenders are statutorily 

eligible for parole at a youth offender parole hearing conducted during the 

15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the term of 

incarceration included within the youth offender’s original sentence. (Pen. 

Code, §§ 3046, subd. (c), 3051, subds. (b), (d), 4801, subd. (c).) In practice, 

this parole eligibility ensures that some youth offenders will be released from 
22

prison years earlier, and perhaps even decades earlier, than they otherwise 

would have been but-for the Test Claim Statutes.

Thus, the Test Claim Statutes, and the youth offender parole hearing 

system established thereunder, “superseded the statutorily mandated 

sentences of inmates who ... committed their controlling offense” when they 

were under the age of 26. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Stated 

differently, the laws “effectively reform[ed] the parole eligibility date of a 

[youth] offender’s original sentence so that the longest possible term of 

incarceration before parole eligibility is 25 years.” (Id. at p. 281; see People v. 

Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125 [“section 3051 is, in part, a sentencing 

statute”]; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 205 [section 3051 

“ ‘impacts the length of sentence served.’ ”]; In re Hoze (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 

309, 315 [“For youth offenders granted parole under section 3051, the statute 

overrides their original, statutorily mandated sentences.”]; People v. Scott

(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1281 [“section 3051 has abolished de facto life 

sentences”].) By guaranteeing parole eligibility for most youth offenders, and 

overriding those offenders’ original sentences, the Test Claim Statutes 

change the penalties for crimes within the meaning of Government Code 

section 17556, subdivision (g).

The County raises four arguments as to why the Test Claim Statutes 

do not change the penalties for crimes. First, it asserts the Test Claim 

Statutes do not change the penalties for crimes because they do not vacate

youth offenders’ original sentences. It is true the Test Claim Statutes do not 

vacate youth offenders’ sentences, nor do they require resentencing 

proceedings. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278; People v. White (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238–1239.) But these facts do not mean the Test Claim 

Statutes effect no change on the penalties suffered by youth offenders. The 
23

Test Claim Statutes “change[] the manner in which the juvenile offender’s 

original sentence operates by capping the number of years that he or she may 

be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on parole. The Legislature 

has effected this change by operation of law, with no additional resentencing 

procedure required.” (Franklin, at pp. 278–279, italics added; id. at p. 281 

[“by operation of law, [the defendant] is entitled to a parole hearing and 

possible release after 25 years of incarceration”].) In short, by changing the 

manner in which the original sentences operate, and guaranteeing youth

offenders the chance to obtain release on parole, the Test Claim Statutes—by 

operation of law—alter the penalties for the crimes perpetrated by eligible 

youth offenders.

Second, the County argues the Test Claim Statutes do not change the 

penalties for the crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders because those 

penalties were changed before the Test Claim Statutes went into effect—by 

the Graham, Miller, and Caballero decisions interpreting the Eighth

Amendment. The County is mistaken. To be sure, these important Eighth 

Amendment decisions served as the impetus for the Legislature’s enactment

of the Test Claim Statutes. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; Franklin, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at p. 277.) But they did not change the penalties for any crimes. 

Even after the U.S. Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court issued 

these Eighth Amendment decisions, youth offenders in California remained 

subject to the sentences originally imposed on them, with no automatic 

statutory right to parole eligibility. Only after the Test Claim Statutes were 

enacted did eligible youth offenders automatically, and by operation of law, 

become eligible for parole. It was these legislatively-enacted statutes—not 

the Eighth Amendment judicial decisions themselves—that changed the 

penalties for the crimes perpetrated by youth offenders in our State.
24

Third, the County contends the Test Claim Statutes do not change the 

penalties for crimes because they simply implement so-called “procedural”

and “administrative” changes. This argument is without merit as well. As 

discussed above, the Test Claim Statutes guarantee parole eligibility for 

qualified youth offenders. Parole is not a mere “procedural” or 

“administrative” facet of the criminal justice system. “[P]arole is

punishment.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 976; see Samson v. 

California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 850 [“parolees are on the ‘continuum’ of stateimposed punishments”]; People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601, 609 

(Nuckles) [parole is generally “acknowledged as a form of punishment”].) In 

fact, “parole is a mandatory component of any prison sentence. ‘A sentence 

resulting in imprisonment in the state prison ... shall include a period of 

parole supervision or postrelease community supervision, unless waived ....’

([Pen. Code,] § 3000, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, a prison sentence ‘contemplates a 

period of parole, which in that respect is related to the sentence.’ ” (Nuckles, 

at p. 609.) By guaranteeing parole eligibility for all qualified youth offenders, 

the Test Claim Statutes altered the substantive punishments, i.e., the 

penalties, for the offenses perpetrated by those offenders.

Finally, the County argues reimbursement is required, at minimum, for 

costs it incurs to comply with at least one statutory provision composing the 

Test Claim Statutes—namely, Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f). The 

County argues that statutory provision does not relate directly to the 

enforcement of a crime. As stated above, reimbursement is mandatory when 

a statute changes the penalty for a crime, “but only for that portion of the 

statute relating directly to the enforcement of the crime or infraction.” (Gov. 

Code, § 17556, subd. (g).) Once more, we disagree with the County.
25

Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f), identifies the evidence that 

may be introduced and considered when the Board assesses a parole 

candidate’s growth, maturity, and overall parole suitability. (Pen. Code, 

§ 3051, subd. (f)(1), (2).) Because it dictates the evidence and information the 

Board may, or must, assess when determining a candidate’s parole 

suitability, it plays an indispensable role in the youth offender parole hearing 

scheme. Indeed, in practice, it very well may be determinative as to whether 

a given youth offender will be released on parole. Further, there can be no 

dispute that parole flows directly from the parolee’s underlying crime. (See 

Nuckles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 609 [“parole is a form of punishment accruing 

directly from the underlying conviction”]; ibid. [“Being placed on parole is a 

direct consequence of a felony conviction and prison term.”]; see also People v. 

VonWahlde (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1194 [parole “is ‘a direct and, 

pragmatically, an inexorable penal consequence’ ” of a criminal conviction].) 

Because Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (f), plays a pivotal role in the

Board’s parole determination, and parole is a direct consequence of a criminal 

conviction, we conclude section 3051, subdivision (f)—like the other statutory 

components that make up the Test Claim Statutes—directly relates to the 

enforcement of the crimes perpetrated by eligible youth offenders.

In sum, we conclude the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for 

crimes perpetrated by youth offenders who are, thanks to the Test Claim 

Statutes, now eligible for a parole hearing in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of 

incarceration. Since the Test Claim Statutes change the penalties for crimes, 

they fall within the statutory exception to the mandatory reimbursement 

requirement codified in Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g). 

And, because they are not subject to the mandatory reimbursement 
26

requirement, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the 

Commission properly denied the County’s test claim.10

IV

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on 

appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

10 In its opening brief, the County implies Government Code 

section 17556, subdivision (g) is unconstitutional because it is broader than 

section 6, subdivision (a)(2), of Article XIII B of the California Constitution, 

which creates a reimbursement exception for “[l]egislation defining a new 

crime or changing an existing definition of a crime.” However, in its reply 

brief, the County expressly disclaims that it is challenging the 

constitutionality of Government Code section 17556, subdivision (g). Because 

the County makes no argument about the constitutionality of Government 

Code section 17556, subdivision (g), we do not address the issue.