No. 85-213 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

EDWARD F. BECKER, JR., 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

-vsSANDRA L. BECKER, 

Respondent and Xespondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

James J. Sinclair, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Wright, Tolliver & Guthals; Kenneth D. Tolliver, 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted: July 12, 1985 

Decided: October 8, 1985 

Filed: oCr8 1985 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Edward F. Becker, Jr., petitioned for, and was granted, 

a dissolution of marriage and now appeals the distribution of 

property ordered by the Yellowstone County District Court. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its 

discretion in the distribution of property. We affirm. 

The husband sets forth two specific issues: 

(1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 

including in the marital estate the husband's stock in one 

corporation while excluding the wife's stock in a different 

corpora tion ? 

(2) Did the District Court err by failing to set forth 

the value of the wife's corporate stock? 

Although not stated as an issue on appeal, the husband 

also asserts that the District Court incorrectly valued his 

corporate stock. 

Ed Becker, Jr., appellant, married the respondent, 

Sandy Becker, in May 1974. They have one child. Appellant 

previously worked for his father at Recker's Glass Shop, Inc. 

(Becker, Inc.) , and earned a net monthly income of $1,717. 

Appellant was the vice-president and the shop foreman of 

Becker, Inc. His father fired him as a result of the filing 

of this divorce action. He had worked for his father for 

fourteen years. Prior to his marriage, appellant had received 

1,000 shares of Becker, Inc., from his father. After his 

marriage, he received 21,000 shares of Becker, Inc., from his 

father. Appellant was employed by Becker, Inc., at the 

various times he received these shares. He owns 42-43% of 

the stock of Becker, Inc. 
Appellant's brother, Jim, acquired stock j.n the 

corporation while he was employed there. Apparently, Jim did 

not acquire any stock after leaving the corporation. 

At the time of trial, appellant worked in the glass 

business for his brother and earned a net monthly income of 

$1,627. His job is seasonal. He has a bachelor's degree in 

business from Eastern Montana College. 

Respondent is employed as a legal secretary and earns a 

net monthly income of about $1,300. She does not have a 

college degree. During the marriage, she was given shares of 

stock in her parents' farm (the Mill Creek Farm) as part of 

her parents' estate planning efforts. Respondent testified 

that the stock has a total value of $32,725. Respondent, in 

addition to her secretarial job, took care of the house, the 

cooking and the cleaning during the marriage. 

In February 1984, appellant filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage. A non-jury trial was held in the 

case in October 1984. The District Court issued its findings 

of fact and conclusions of law in December 1984. Neither 

party objects to the dissolution of their marriage, the child 

support award, or the child custody decision. Appellant's 

only complaint is to the division of property. 

The District Court found that 21,000 shares of 

appellant's stock in Becker, Inc., were acquired during the 

marriage and while he worked for the company. The court 

concluded that those shares were thp product of the marital 

effort and should therefore be included in the marital 

estate. The court valued those 21,000 shares of stock at 

$37,841.87. The court did not include in the marital estate 

that stock given to appellant prior to the marriage. The 

court based this valuation on a financial statement of 
Eecker, Inc., which had been supplied by the company's 

certified public accountant. 

The District Court found that respondent's stock in the 

Mill Creek Farm had been given to her as a gift and was not 

earned by her. The court further found that appellant and 

respondent had not enhanced or maintained the Mill Creek Farm 

or respondent's interest in the farm. Therefore, the court 

did not include respondent's stock in the marital estate to 

be divided among the parties. The court did not assign a 

value to this stock in its findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 

are otherwise detailed and complete. 

The marital estate was valued at $159,144.27. Of this, 

respondent was awarded $74,097.40. She also received all of 

the Mil.1 Creek Farm stock, which her uncontroverted testimony 

valued at $32,725 (for a total award of $106,822.40). 

Appellant received $85,516.87 from the marital estate. He 

contends that the Becker, Inc., stock, which represents 

$37,841.87 of his total award, is actually valueless. 

As the first issue, appellant contends that the 

District Court abused its discretion by including appellant's 

stock in the marital estate while excluding respondent's 

stock. 

The standard of review is clear. 

In dividing property in a marriage 

dissolution the district court has far 

reaching discretion and its judgment will 

not be altered without a showing of clear 

abuse of discretion. The test of abuse 

of discretion is whether the trial court 

acted arbitrarily without employment of 

conscientious judgment or exceeded the 

bounds of reason resulting in substantial 

injustice. 
In Re the Marriage of Rolfe (Mont. 1985), 699 P.2d 79, 83, 42 

St.Rep. 623, 626; citing In re Marriage of Vert (Mont. 1984), 

680 P.2d 587, 41 St.Rep. 895. 

Appellant's first issue essentially raises two 

questi0n.s ; (1) whether respondent's stock should have Seen 

included in the marital estate; and (2) whether appellant's 

stock should have been included in the marital estate. As 

the trial court recognized, these are two distinct inquiries. 

Section 40-4-202, MCA, states in part: 

. . . In dividing property 

acquired . . . by gift . . . the court 

shall consider those contributions of the 

other spouse to the marriage, including: 

(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a 

homemaker; 

(b) the extent to which such 

contributions have facilitated the 

maintenance of this property . . . 

This Court has held that a district court, in 

determining the marital estate, is not required to include 

qift property given to one spouse during the marriage. Snell 

r. Snell (Mont. 1983), 668 P.2d 238, 40 St.Rep. 1359; In re 

the Marriage of Jorgenson (1979), 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 

606. In re the of Herron (1980), 186 Mont. 396, 608 

P.2d 97, set forth broad guidelines for the distribution of 

gift or bequest property. One such guideline is that: 

[i]f none of the value of the property is 

a product of contribution from the 

marital effort. [sic] the District Court 

can justifiably find that the 

non-acquiring spouse has no interest in 

the property. 

Herron, 186 Mont. at 404. 

Here, respondent received her stock in Mill Creek Farm 

as a gift under her parents' estate planning scheme. 

Moreover, neither party worked on the farm except for 
isolated odd jobs. At trial, appellant replied "absolutely 

not" when asked if he felt he had made a significant 

contribution to the farm operation. He also agreed with 

counsel's remark that appellant made no claim to any interest 

in the family farm. Under Herron, the district court could 

justifiably find that appellant had no interest in 

respondent's stock. See also Snell, 668 P.2d 238; Jorgenson, 

590 P.2d 606. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion 

in excluding respondent's stock from the marital estate. 

In contrast to respondent's acquisition of stock, 

appellant acquired his stock in Becker, Inc., when he was 

working for the company. Similarly, there is evidence that 

his brother acquired his stock in Becker, Inc.*when he worked 

for the company. His sister did not receive any stock in the 

company. These facts support a conclusion that appellant 

received the stock as compensation for working and not as a 

gift. Additionally, appellant, by working, enhanced and 

maintained the value of the stock. Finally, respondent took 

care of the family's cooking, cleaning and laundering while 

appellant was working for Becker, Inc. Under these facts, it 

was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find 

that appellant's stock was a product of the marital effort 

and should, therefore, be included in the marital estate. 

Appellant further complains that the lower court erred 

in assigning value to appellant's shares of stock. Appellant 

argues that his stock is valueless because: (1) the 

corporation leases its building and land from appellant's 

father; (2) appellant's father can liquidate the corporation 

at will; and (3) appellant has no control over the 

corporation and cannot even work for the corporation. 

However, at trial, appellant admitted that he thought the 
stock was worth something, that Recker, Inc., has a good name 

and that the company has been there for a number of years. 

The District Court, in valuing the stock, relied upon figures 

supplied by Becker, Inc.'s, accountant, F.obert A. Everson, 

CPA. The court computed the stock's value by dividing the 

value of the corporation's total assets, less liabilities, by 

the number of outstanding shares. This Court has expressly 

approved this method of valuing stock. Rurleigh v. Burleigh 

(Mont. 1982), 650 P.2d 753, 39 St.Rep. 1538. We uphold the 

trial court's valuation. 

Finally, appellant contends the lower court erred in 

not making a finding as to the value of respondent's shares 

of stock. This Court has stated that the trial court must 

determine the net worth of the parties at the time of the 

divorce. In re the Marriage of Loegering (Mont. 1984) , 689 

P.2d 260, 41 St.Rep. 1892; Beck v. Beck (Mont. 1983), 661 

P.2d 1282, 40 St.Rep. 565. That statement, however, has not 

been a rule strictly adhered to by this Court. We have also 

stated that: 

Failure to precisely set forth net worth 

of parties does not constitute abuse of 

discretion so long as the findings as a 

whole are sufficient to determine net 

worth, In Re Marriage of Nunnally (1981) , Mont., 625 P.2d 1159, 38 St.Rep. 529, and 

the findings themselves will not be 

disturbed unless a preponderance of the 

evidence clearly mandates contrary 

determinations. Cameron v. Cameron 

(1978), 179 Mont. 219, 587 P.2d 939. 

Le Prowse v. LeProwse (1982), 198 Mont. 357, 646 P.2d 526. 

In this case, it was not reversible error for the trial 

court to not assign a value to an asset not included in the 

marital estate. Here, although the court did not assign a 

value to the stock, the court clearly considered the wife's 

stock and awarded it to her. There was no dispute as to the 
stock's value. Respondent consistently admitted the stock 

was worth $32,725. Appellant does not attack this valuation. 

Thus, as in LeProwse and Nunnally, the trial court's findings 

as a whole are sufficient to determine net worth. The 

findings were otherwise complete and equitable. We hold that 

the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in the 

distribution of property. The omission of a valuation for 

respondent's stock was, at most, harmless error. What this 

Court stated in In Re the Marriage of Ziegler (Mont. 1985), 

696 P.2d 983, 987, 42 St.Rep. 298, 302, bears repeating: 

We do not wish to restrict the liberal, 

discretionary power vested in the 

district courts, by requiring rigid 

adherence to technical forms of property 

distribution orders. This Court 

recognizes that the trial court must 

evidence the basis of its ultimate 

conclusion in the findings of fact. 

However, the statutory guidelines 

promulgated in 40-4-202, MCA, were not 

designed as requisite criteria to be 

individually itemized in every property 

distribution decree. 

Affirmed . ,,"- 

,'- 

I 

Justice' 

We concur: 

Justices