[Cite as State v. Shaw, 2024-Ohio-2022.]

Atty. Vito Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor, and Atty. Shelley M. Pratt, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Christopher P. Lacich, Roth, Blair, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: May 24, 2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID A. SHAW,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 CO 0045

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 2023-CR-00026

BEFORE:

Katelyn Dickey, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

DICKEY, J.

{¶1} Appellant, David A. Shaw, appeals the judgment entry of the Columbiana 

Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion to suppress. Following the issuance of the 

judgment entry on appeal, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to one count of operating 

a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a combination of them

in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third degree. In exchange for 

Appellant’s plea, the state dismissed the sole remaining count of operating a vehicle while 

under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse or a combination of them in violation of 

R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(A), a felony of the third degree. The execution of Appellant’s 24-

month sentence has been stayed pending appeal.

{¶2} Appellant advances two assignments of error. First, Appellant contends the 

trial court’s decision concluding the state established reasonable suspicion for the traffic 

stop, in accordance with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

(“Terry”), was not supported by competent, credible evidence. Second, Appellant argues 

the trial court erred when it allowed hearsay testimony at the suppression hearing. 

Because the arresting officer established partial independent corroboration of the 

unidentified informant’s tip, and the Rules of Evidence do not apply at a suppression 

hearing, the judgment entry of the trial court overruling the motion to suppress is affirmed.

SUPPRESSION HEARING

{¶3} Jordan Reynolds, a police officer for the Village of Lisbon, was the sole 

witness at the suppression hearing. On October 23, 2022 at roughly 2:00 p.m., Officer 

Reynolds was in a marked patrol car in the parking lot of Akron Children’s Hospital 

“running radar” on vehicles traveling on N. Market Street in Lisbon, Ohio. (7/6/23 

Suppression Hrg., p. 7.) Neither Officer Reynolds nor his patrol car was equipped with a 

video camera.

{¶4} A female motorist pulled her automobile next to the driver’s side of the patrol 

car, and informed Officer Reynolds that there was a man in a truck asleep behind the 

wheel at the intersection of N. Market Street and Jerome Avenue. Within thirty seconds 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

of receiving the tip, Officer Reynolds arrived at the intersection in question, roughly a 

quarter mile away. 

{¶5} Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Reynolds pulled into a parking lot near 

the intersection and observed Appellant in the driver’s seat of a Chevy Silverado truck at 

the traffic signal. There was a female pedestrian standing in the roadway at the driver’s 

side door of Appellant’s truck.

{¶6} Officer Reynolds conceded Appellant was not asleep and the truck was 

running when Officer Reynolds arrived on the scene. However, he explained “[c]ars 

usually don’t sit in traffic with a pedestrian standing besides [sic] them on a busy main 

road.” (Id., p. 10.) Officer Reynolds testified that Appellant was obstructing traffic. 

{¶7} Officer Reynolds “pulled through [the parking lot] and looped around,” (Id., 

p. 17), then pulled behind Appellant’s truck. Although there were vehicles stopped behind 

Appellant’s truck at the traffic light, Officer Reynolds was able to pull directly behind 

Appellant’s truck. 

{¶8} Next, Officer Reynolds activated the turret lights on top of his patrol car. He 

explained at the hearing that he activated the lights to warn the surrounding vehicles that 

the patrol car was stationary. Officer Reynolds admitted Appellant was not free to leave 

the scene once the turret lights on the patrol car were illuminated due to his active 

investigation. 

{¶9} Officer Reynolds did not order Appellant to exit from the vehicle due to 

safety concerns about the heavily-trafficked area. Nevertheless, Appellant immediately 

exited the vehicle, “walked from his driver’s side, around the back of his vehicle, to the 

passenger side. He opened the door, looked around the vehicle, shut the door, and he 

started walking back [to the driver’s side].” (Id., p. 12.) Officer Reynolds testified 

Appellant was obstructing traffic when he exited the truck and walked around the vehicle, 

which was still parked in the roadway. 

{¶10} Officer Reynolds described Appellant when he was walking around his truck 

after exiting as “unsteady on his feet.” Officer Reynolds further described Appellant’s gait 

as not “a normal – normal person walk.” (Id.) At this time, Officer Reynolds exited his 

patrol car and attempted to speak with Appellant, but Appellant walked past him. Based 

on Officer Reynolds’ training and experience, he concluded Appellant was impaired. 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

{¶11} According to the incident report submitted by Officer Reynolds, he 

instructed Appellant to walk back to the patrol car for a conversation, and Appellant 

complied. While Officer Reynolds was “attempting to talk with Appellant,” the female 

pedestrian he first saw standing by the driver’s side of Appellant’s truck approached 

Officer Reynolds and said she “was in the area watching the [truck] and it was parked at 

the traffic light for three light cycles.” (Id., p. 10.)

{¶12} During the brief conversation with Appellant that followed, Officer Reynolds 

detected the strong odor of alcohol on Appellant’s person, and observed Appellant’s eyes 

were bloodshot and his speech was slurred, despite the fact that Appellant denied 

consuming any alcohol. Officer Reynolds informed Appellant that he did not believe 

Appellant had not consumed any alcoholic beverages that day, to which Appellant 

admitted he had “one or two.” (Incident Report, p. 3.) As a consequence, Officer 

Reynolds conducted field sobriety tests, which ultimately resulted in Appellant’s arrest for 

operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 

{¶13} In the July 14, 2023 judgment entry on appeal, the trial court opined Officer 

Reynolds had reasonable suspicion to initiate the Terry stop, based on “information 

gathered from two unknown citizens.” (7/14/23 J.E., p. 3.) In addition to the two 

anonymous tips, the trial court relied on Officer Reynolds’ observations at the scene, 

including the truck stopped at the intersection, the second tipster at the driver’s side 

window of the truck, the vehicles stopped behind the truck, and Appellant’s unprompted 

exit from the truck, as well as the reasonable inference that the truck had not moved 

recently. (Id., p. 5-6.) It is important to note that the trial court did not specify in its 

judgment entry when in this particular fact pattern Officer Reynolds initiated the Terry

stop.

{¶14} On September 18, 2023, Appellant entered his plea of no contest and the 

trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 24 months, which included a mandatory 

minimum jail sentence of 120 days and 20 months in a state correctional institution. 

Appellant was resentenced on September 28, 2023 after the trial court discovered the 

mandatory minimum jail sentence was 60 days, to be followed by a 22-month term of 

imprisonment in a state correctional facility. This timely appeal followed.
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL 

COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT BASED ON COMPETENT, 

CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

{¶15} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed 

question of fact and law. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence. See State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 

437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). The appellate court must decide questions of law de novo, without 

deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions. Burnside at ¶ 8. Generally, the state 

bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or seizure meets Fourth 

Amendment standards of reasonableness. Maumee v. Weisner, 1999-Ohio-68, 720 

N.E.2d 507 (1999). 

{¶16} The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops when a law 

enforcement officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 

person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 

S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see Terry, supra, at ¶ 21-22. The “reasonable 

suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of 

information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 

325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The standard takes into account “the 

totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.” Cortez, supra, at 417, 101 S.Ct. 690. 

The reasonableness of an investigatory stop is determined by considering the totality of 

the circumstances as they were known to the officer prior to the stop, together with 

reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the circumstances, bearing in mind that 

each piece of information may vary greatly in its value and degree of reliability. State v. 

Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 40, 175 N.E.3d 527, citing White, 496 U.S. 

325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 

1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

{¶17} Although a mere “hunch” does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, 

supra, at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the level of suspicion the standard requires is “considerably 

less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” and “obviously less” 

than is necessary for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 

1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Further, reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the 

possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 

744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

{¶18} The United States Supreme Court has “firmly rejected the argument ‘that 

reasonable cause for a[n investigative stop] can only be based on the officer’s personal 

observation, rather than on information supplied by another person.’ ” (Brackets sic.) 

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014), 

quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 

However, in White, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged “an anonymous tip 

alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity,” because 

“ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their 

everyday observations,” and an anonymous tipster’s veracity is “ ‘by hypothesis largely 

unknown, and unknowable.’ ” White, supra, at 329.

{¶19} When the information possessed by law enforcement before the stop stems 

solely from an informant’s tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion is limited to an 

examination of the weight and reliability due to the tip. Weisner, supra, at 299. “The 

appropriate analysis, then, is whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to 

justify the investigative stop.” Id. Factors considered “ ‘highly relevant in determining the 

value of [the informant’s] report’ ” are the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of 

knowledge. Id., quoting White, supra, at 328.

{¶20} After first identifying three types of informants – (1) anonymous informants, 

(2) known informants (someone from the criminal world who has provided previous 

reliable tips), and (3) identified citizen informants, the Ohio Supreme Court in Weisner 

recognized an anonymous informant is comparatively unreliable and generally requires 

some independent police corroboration in order to demonstrate some indicia of reliability. 

Id. at 300, citing White, supra, at 329. By contrast, an identified citizen informant may be 

highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability may be 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

unnecessary. Id. The Weisner Court cited the United State Supreme Court in Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), for the proposition that “if 

an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity – which 

if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability – [ ] rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his 

knowledge unnecessary.” Id. at 233-234.

{¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed the reliability of a face-to-face 

tip from an unidentified informant in Tidwell, supra. In that case, a police officer was 

completing an accident report in a convenience store parking lot when a customer 

standing in the doorway of the store yelled to the officer, “Hey, you need to stop that 

vehicle. That lady (Tidwell) is drunk.” The customer directed the officer’s attention to an 

SUV exiting a parking space. 

{¶22} The officer testified Tidwell backed her vehicle out of the parking space at 

an unusually slow speed, then slowly drove forward toward a heavily-trafficked road. The 

officer further observed Tidwell had a blank stare on her face. He testified that he knew

from his training and experience that a blank stare may indicate impairment, so he 

initiated an investigative stop.

{¶23} The convenience store customer was never identified. It was later reported 

by a store clerk who sold alcohol to Tidwell, that the clerk had asked the unidentified 

customer to relay the clerk’s concern about Tidwell’s condition to the officer.

{¶24} The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the convenience store customer did 

not fit neatly into one of the three tipster categories. Although the Tidwell Court 

acknowledged the officer had an opportunity to assess the customer’s reliability due to 

the face-to-face contact, the Court ultimately concluded the customer’s lack of 

identification foreclosed his classification as an identified citizen information. As a 

consequence, the Court declined to place the customer in one of the informant categories. 

{¶25} Instead, the Tidwell Court predicated the reasonableness of the 

investigative stop on the contemporaneous nature of the customer’s tip and the officer’s 

own observations of Tidwell’s impairment at the scene. Significantly, the Court rejected 

Tidwell’s argument that the officer should have attempted to further corroborate the tip 

due to the amount of traffic on the highway Tidwell was about to enter.
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

{¶26} Turning to the facts in the above-captioned appeal, Officer Reynolds 

testified that he activated his overhead lights “[w]hen [he] pulled behind the vehicle on 

Jerome Street * * * to warn traffic that * * * [the truck and the patrol car] were stopped 

there.” Further, Officer Reynolds conceded that Appellant was not free to leave the scene 

once the turret lights on the patrol car were activated due to his active investigation. 

{¶27} A traffic stop typically begins with the activation of the law enforcement 

vehicle’s overhead lights. See State v. Brown, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-09-054, 

2021-Ohio-2381, ¶ 5 (“Once the deputy began his pursuit, Brown turned quickly onto a 

different street and the deputy turned on his cruiser’s lights to initiate a traffic stop.”); State 

v. Jefferson, 5th Dist. Richland No. 18CA2, 2019-Ohio-156, ¶ 3 (“As Browne activated his 

overhead lights and began calling in the traffic stop, Jefferson backed out of the driveway 

and took off at a high rate of speed.”); State v. Wade, 3rd Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-23, 

2017-Ohio-1319, ¶ 2 (“Elliott then activated his overhead lights and began a traffic stop 

at approximately 4:05 p.m.”); State v. Lewis, 2017-Ohio-996, 86 N.E.3d 974, ¶ 10 (3rd 

Dist.) (The activation of the flashing lights and siren of patrol car is “universal sign” that 

vehicle is subject of a traffic stop.); State v. Norvet, 9th Dist. Medina No. 14CA0114-M, 

2016-Ohio-3494, ¶ 9 (“Trooper Hasler then turned on his overhead emergency lights and 

began to initiate a traffic stop.”); State v. Burgin, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010277, 2013-

Ohio-4261, ¶ 6 (“Trooper Trader began to follow Mr. Burgin, and he activated his 

overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop for following too closely.”); State v. Green, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 88234, 2007-Ohio-1713, ¶ 9 (“As the maroon truck began to pull away 

with the boat, Officer Erskine got back into his patrol car, drove approximately thirty to 

forty feet, activated his overhead lights, and initiated a traffic stop of the truck.”); State v. 

Henderson, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 19788, 2003-Ohio-6522, ¶ 5 (“Offices [sic] began 

to initiate a traffic stop on the van by turning of [sic] their overhead lights.”); and City of 

Cincinnati v. Jacobs, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C- 010279, C-010280, C-0102281, 2001 WL 

1591380, *1, (Dec. 14, 2001) (“As Jacobs began to turn southbound onto Sycamore 

Street, Officer Perkins activated his cruiser’s overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop of 

Jacobs’s car.”). Because we find the investigatory stop was initiated when Officer 

Reynolds activated the turret lights on the patrol car, only events occurring prior to the 

activation of the lights are included in our reasonable suspicion analysis. 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

{¶28} The original informant, like the informant in Tidwell, does not fall neatly into 

one of the three categories. Like the tipster in Tidwell, Officer Reynolds did not know the 

woman’s identity, however, he had the opportunity to assess her credibility because of 

the face-to-face meeting. With respect to the informant’s unidentified status, the Tidwell 

Court observed:

That the informant’s identity was unknown cannot be ignored insofar as it 

limited [the officer’s] ability to fully assess his veracity, reliability, basis of 

knowledge, and motive for coming forward. But the informant could not 

know whether his identity might later be discovered based on his face-toface contact with the police, surveillance video at the [convenience store], 

or further investigation. Even an unidentified informant who comes forward 

with accusatory information does so at some legal peril if he knowingly 

makes a false report. See R.C. 2917.32(A). An informant’s unidentified 

status does not necessarily extinguish all indicia of reliability from the 

informant’s tip given the potential for subsequent positive identification. See 

Navarette, 572 U.S. 393, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680.

Id. at 67. 

{¶29} The same is true here. The original tipster approached Officer Reynolds in 

a vehicle. Had Officer Reynolds recorded the license plate or determined her license 

plate number by way of surveillance video from the Akron Children’s Hospital parking lot, 

he could have ascertained her identity. Therefore, we find she placed herself in some 

legal peril if she knowingly made a false report. 

{¶30} Next, the Tidwell Court attributed significance to the fact that the crime was 

occurring in real time. The Court reasoned the informant “surely recognized that the 

immediate reaction he expected from ‘the officer’ would either prove him right or prove 

him wrong” therefore, “[t]he informant’s suggested knowledge of Tidwell’s present 

condition and anticipated response from the officer [ ] gave the tip some further indicia of 

reliability.” Id. at 68. Although the original informant did not provide the tip at the scene 

of the crime as in Tidwell, supra, she nonetheless provided the information in real time 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

with the expectation of an immediate reaction from Officer Reynolds. Because the 

original tip was provided within a thirty-second drive (a distance of roughly one-quarter of 

a mile) from the intersection, we attribute some further indicia of reliability to the tip.

{¶31} Finally, the Tidwell Court cited the officer’s observations at the scene –

Tidwell’s blank stare and atypically slow speed, which corroborated the informant’s tip 

that Tidwell was intoxicated, as well as the fact that Tidwell was about to enter a busy 

highway. 

{¶32} The Tidwell Court concluded:

To be sure, this tip, like the anonymous telephone tip in [Florida v.] J.L., 529 

U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 [2000] (that a young black man 

standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a 

gun), was to some extent a bare-bones assertion that identified the person 

the [convenience store] customer meant to accuse but did not divulge the 

informant’s basis of knowledge or provide any predictive information. But 

unlike the telephone tip in J.L., which a brief encounter with the subject of 

the tip would not by itself enable the officer to confirm or dispel, [the officer’s] 

brief encounter with Tidwell immediately enabled him to confirm that Tidwell 

was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated based on what he 

personally smelled, saw, and heard. The customer’s face-to-face 

contemporaneous report of alleged criminal activity occurring right before 

[the officer’s] eyes justified the investigatory response [the officer] took in 

this case.

Id. at ¶ 50. 

{¶33} The Tidwell Court predicated the existence of reasonable suspicion on “the 

unidentified customer’s tip and the officer’s own partial corroboration of that tip.” 

(Emphasis added) Id. at ¶ 54. In this appeal, Officer Reynolds arrived at the intersection 

within thirty seconds of the tip and observed a truck driven by a man at the traffic signal 

at the intersection in question. Officer Reynolds further observed a line of traffic behind 

the truck. Officer Reynolds reasonably believed Appellant had been obstructing the free 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

flow of traffic at the intersection, which likely would constitute a traffic violation. Officer 

Reynolds also witnessed an unusual situation in the middle of a “busy main road,” that is, 

a pedestrian at the driver’s side window of the truck. Officer Reynolds could have 

reasonably believed that the pedestrian had witnessed what appeared to be a sleeping 

man in a truck that had not moved, and she entered the intersection to awaken the driver. 

The foregoing inference would explain why Appellant was awake, despite the original 

tipster’s observation that he was asleep. Defense counsel argued at the hearing that the 

woman may have been standing at the driver’s side window for a purely innocuous 

reason, however an officer is not obliged to “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct” 

in order to establish reasonable suspicion. Arvizu, supra, at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744. Finally, 

we recognize Officer Reynolds, like the officer in Tidwell, was not required to further 

corroborate the tip based on his testimony that Appellant’s vehicle was on a busy main 

road. Accordingly, we find Officer Reynolds had reasonable suspicion to initiate the Terry 

stop to investigate criminal activity.

{¶34} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the state did not violate Appellant’s 

Fourth Amendment rights. Despite the fact that we rely on a narrower group of facts than 

the trial court, we find Officer Reynolds established partial independent corroboration of 

the original informant’s tip prior to initiating the stop, based on the reasonable inferences 

drawn from the circumstances that Officer Reynolds observed at the intersection. As we 

find there is competent, credible evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s 

decision overruling the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment entry of the trial court 

and we conclude that the first assignment of error has no merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED 

HEARSAY TESTIMONY INTO EVIDENCE, OVER OBJECTION, AT THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING.

{¶35} “[T]he rules of evidence do not apply at hearings to determine the 

admissibility of evidence.” State v. Henderson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0057, 

2019-Ohio-130, ¶ 11, citing Evid.R. 104(A) (preliminary questions concerning the 
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Case No. 23 CO 0045

admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court who is not bound by the rules 

of evidence, except those on privilege); Evid.R. 101(C)(1). See also United States v. 

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73, 94 S.Ct. 988, 994, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (as to hearsay 

at a suppression hearing, the Court held “the rules of evidence normally applicable in 

criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the 

admissibility of evidence”). Accordingly, we find Appellant’s second assignment of error 

has no merit.

CONCLUSION

{¶36} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entry of the trial court overruling 

Appellant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Shaw, 2024-Ohio-2022.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be 

waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.