2017 IL App (1st) 161893 

 FOURTH DIVISION

 February 23, 2017 

No. 1-16-1893 

 

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

DANIEL DOUGHERTY, ) Cook County. 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) No. 16 D 530078 

and ) 

 ) 

MEGAN DOUGHERTY, ) Honorable 

 ) Patrick T. Murphy, 

Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Ellis and Howse concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Petitioner Daniel Dougherty filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme 

Court Rule 306 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)), asking this court for the 

interlocutory review of the trial court’s temporary orders setting child support and maintenance. 

This court granted petitioner’s leave to appeal on August 23, 2016. On August 31, 2016, 

respondent Megan Dougherty filed a motion to reconsider our order granting the petition for 

leave to appeal and/or to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We took respondent’s motion with the 

case.

¶ 2 Petitioner and respondent were married in December 2004. Five minor children were 

born during the marriage. Petitioner moved out of the marital residence in December 2015. By 

agreement of the parties, respondent has possession of the marital residence, and the minor 

children live with respondent at the marital residence. 
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¶ 3 Petitioner did not file a brief on appeal within the deadline set in the case, but rather stood 

on his petition for leave to appeal as his brief. In his petition, petitioner asserted two grounds for 

appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in deviating from the child support guidelines by 

awarding respondent 57.2% of petitioner’s net income for child support without a compelling 

reason to support the deviation and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 

maintenance to respondent in the amount of $250. Petitioner has not raised any issues relating to 

the custody of the minor children.

¶ 4 Respondent maintains that this court lacks jurisdiction to review petitioner’s claims 

involving temporary child support and maintenance orders under Rule 306(a)(5). While we 

initially granted petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal, we have a duty to consider our 

jurisdiction. See Trutin v. Adam, 2016 IL App (1st) 142853, ¶ 21. “This court has an obligation 

to consider its jurisdiction at any time and should dismiss an appeal if jurisdiction is lacking.” In 

re Marriage of Tetzlaff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035 (1999). “It is well established that except as 

specifically provided in the supreme court rules, this court is without jurisdiction to review 

judgments, orders and decrees that are not final.” In re Marriage of Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d 

103, 108 (2005). 

¶ 5 The determinative question before us is whether the phrase “orders affecting the care and 

custody” refers only to orders relating to the custody of minor children. Petitioner contends that 

“care” can be interpreted to include support orders. We disagree with petitioner, and for the 

reasons that follow, hold that “care and custody” relates only to orders involving the custodial 

placement of minor children. Since the orders at issue involve temporary orders for child support 

and maintenance, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the nonfinal orders unless the orders fall 

under Rule 306(a)(5). 
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¶ 6 Rule 306(a)(5) provides, in relevant part: 

“(a) Orders Appealable by Petition. A party may petition 

for leave to appeal to the Appellate Court from the following 

orders of the trial court:

 * * * 

(5) from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody 

of or the allocation of parental responsibilities for unemancipated 

minors, if the appeal of such orders is not otherwise specifically 

provided for elsewhere in these rules ***.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) 

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 7 Supreme court rules are not “ ‘mere suggestions.’ ” In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 

(2010) (quoting People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 152 (2007)). The rules “have the force of law 

and are to be construed in the same manner as statutes.” Id. “The cardinal rule of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best evidence of 

legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and 

ordinary meaning.” In re Marriage of Turk, 2014 IL 116730, ¶ 15. 

¶ 8 It is undisputed that Rule 306(a)(5) “is the vehicle by which to seek review of 

interlocutory child custody orders.” Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 109. The question here is 

whether temporary support and maintenance orders also fall under Rule 306(a)(5), whether such 

orders are within the meaning of “interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of or the 

allocation of parental responsibilities.” Respondent contends that the language of Rule 306(a)(5) 

does not include temporary child support and maintenance orders, as the supreme court would 

have included the relevant language indicating as such. Petitioner maintains that issues of 
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support, custody, and maintenance are “irrevocably intertwined,” because the temporary child 

support orders here concern the care of the child, as does maintenance because it affects the 

financial circumstances of the custodial parent. 

¶ 9 We note the Illinois Supreme Court has long held that “ ‘The obligation of the father to 

support his children begins when the child is born and continues during the minority of the child. 

This obligation of the father to support his minor child is not affected by the decree granting a 

divorce, nor by a decree granting the care and custody of his child to his wife or some other 

suitable person.’ ” Gill v. Gill, 56 Ill. 2d 139, 143-44 (1973) (quoting Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 

104, 110 (1925)). In Gill, the supreme court reviewed an order granting support to the custodial 

mother retroactive for the years the child was a minor. In affirming the trial court, the supreme 

court recognized that “when a divorce decree provides for the custody of a child but is silent as 

to the question of child support, a mother may maintain an action against her former husband for 

moneys expended by her after the decree to support the child.” Id. at 144. While the issue before 

the court in Gill does not relate to the question before us, the use of language, specifically the 

phrase “care and custody,” as separate from support is relevant to our analysis. 

¶ 10 Additionally, we point out that the committee comment to the March 2016 amendment 

provided: 

 “The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 

Pub. Act 99-90 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 750 ILCS 5/101 et 

seq.), has changed the terms ‘Custody,’ ‘Visitation’ (as to parents) 

and ‘Removal’ to ‘Allocation of Parental Responsibilities,’ 

‘Parenting Time’ and ‘Relocation.’ These rules are being amended 

to reflect those changes. The rules utilize both ‘custody’ and 
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‘allocation of parental responsibilities’ in recognition that some 

legislative enactments covered by the rules utilize the term 

‘custody’ while the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 

Act and the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 utilize the term 

‘allocation of parental responsibilities.’ The Special Committee has 

attempted to adhere to the usage found in the applicable legislative 

enactments.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 306, Committee Comments (adopted 

Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 11 This comment explained that the coordination of the language used to be more uniform 

across the supreme court rules and corresponding statutory text, but specifically focused on the 

term “custody.” The comment did not suggest that Rule 306(a)(5) extended beyond the custody 

of minors, namely into temporary orders on child support and maintenance. 

¶ 12 Further, pursuant to Rule 306(b)(5), once a petition for leave to appeal under the rule has 

been granted “proceedings shall then be subject to the expedited procedures set forth in Rule 

311(a).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Rule 311(a) details the mandatory accelerated 

docket for “Mandatory Accelerated Disposition of Child Custody or Allocation of Parental 

Responsibilities Appeals.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Rule 311(a) states:

“The expedited procedures in this subpart shall apply to appeals 

from final orders in child custody or allocation of parental 

responsibilities cases and to interlocutory appeals in child custody 

or allocation of parental responsibilities cases from which leave to 

appeal has been granted pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5). If the appeal is 

taken from a judgment or order affecting other matters, such as 
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support, property issues or decisions affecting the rights of persons 

other than the child, the reviewing court may handle all pending 

issues using the expedited procedures in this rule, unless doing so 

will delay decision on the child custody or allocation of parental 

responsibilities appeal.” (Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a) 

(eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 13 The language of Rule 311(a) helps to clarify the matters properly raised in an 

interlocutory appeal under Rule 306(a)(5), specifically, “child custody or allocation of parental 

responsibilities.” Under Rule 311(a), an expedited interlocutory appeal under Rule 306(a)(5) 

must involve an issue relating to child custody. The rule further provides that “other matters,” 

including support, may be considered along with custody issues by the reviewing court, so long 

as the other matters do not delay a ruling on custody. We also note that the subsections of Rule 

311(a) consistently refer to an “appeal involving child custody or allocation of parental 

responsibilities.” 

¶ 14 Additionally, a committee comment for Rule 311(a) offers additional guidance. 

“Paragraph (a) was originally enacted as Rule 306A in 2004 to 

expedite the resolution of appeals affecting the care and custody of 

children. In 2010, Rule 306A was moved to paragraph (a) of this 

rule. The amendment was also intended to clarify that the rule 

addresses only the procedures to be followed in order to expedite 

disposition of child custody appeals. Importantly, this rule does not 

confer any new appeal rights or affect finality for purposes of 

appellate jurisdiction. The appealability of any order affecting 
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child custody is governed principally by Rules 301, 304, 303, and 

306. The expedited procedures set forth in paragraph (a) apply to 

all child custody appeals, whether they have been taken from final 

orders appealable as of right or interlocutory orders from which the 

court has granted leave to appeal. The goal of paragraph (a) 

remains to promote stability for not only abused and neglected 

children, but also children whose custody is an issue in dissolution 

of marriage, adoption, and other proceedings, by mandating swifter 

disposition of these appeals.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311, Committee 

Comments (adopted Feb. 26, 2010). 

¶ 15 “Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two legislative acts that address the same subject 

are considered with reference to one another, so that they may be given harmonious effect.” 

Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 24. “The doctrine is 

consistent with our acknowledgment that one of the fundamental principles of statutory 

construction is to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.” Id. Since we are to interpret 

supreme court rules the same as statutes, the doctrine of in pari materia is relevant when 

reviewing these rules governing expedited interlocutory appeals. The comment in Rule 311 

further clarifies the intent and operation of both Rule 306(a)(5) and Rule 311(a). These rules 

relate to expedited interlocutory appeals involving custody or the allocation of parental 

responsibilities. Significantly, neither rule, nor any comment suggests that a temporary support 

or maintenance order may be brought independently. We cannot read additional language into 

the rules in order to confer jurisdiction on this court. Petitioner has not cited any relevant 
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authority to support his assertion that “care” permits independent interlocutory appeals relating 

to temporary support and maintenance orders. 

¶ 16 Based on the language of Rules 306(a)(5) and 311(a), when considered together, we 

conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal. Rule 306(a)(5) does not 

provide for petitions for leave to appeal from temporary support and maintenance orders. 

Accordingly, we dismiss petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Since we have no 

jurisdiction, we do not reach the merits of petitioner’s appeal. 

¶ 17 Appeal dismissed.