2010 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

1-26-2010 

# P alme r v . H e ndr ick s
P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 06-2991

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2010

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2010 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" P alme r v . H e ndr ick s " (2010). 2010 D e cisio n s . P ape r 1961. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2010/1961P RE CE DE NT I AL
UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

____________ N o. 06- 2991

____________ W ALI P ALM ER, A ppel l ant

v.

RO Y L. HEN DR I CK S a n d PETE R H AR VEY

____________ O n A p p e a l f

ro m th e U n ited S tate s D istric t C o u rt for t he D i s t r i ct of N ew J er s ey ( D

. C

. C i vi l A ct i on N o. 04- 4455) D i s t r i ct J udge: H onor abl e Fr eda L. W ol fs on

____________ A r gued Sept ember 14, 2009
B e f o re : S L O V IT E R , F U E N T E S , an d A L D IS E R T , C irc u it

J u d g e s
. ( O pi ni on Fi l ed: J anuar y 26, 2010)

____________- 2- St ephen M

. L at i m er , E s q. ( A r gued) L oughl i n & L at i m er 131 M ai n St r eet , Sui t e 235 H acke ns ack, N J 07601
C ouns el for A ppel l ant
J ack J

. L i par i , E s q. ( A r gued) A s s i s t ant Pr os ecut or A t l ant i c C ount y Pr os ecut or ’ s O ffi cer 4997 U nami B l vd. , P. O

. B ox 2002 M ay s L andi ng, N J 08330
C ouns el for A ppel l ees

____________ OPI NI ON O F THE COURT

____________
FU E N T E S, C i r cui t J udge: In1 9 9 9 , a j u ry f

o u n dWali P alm er g u ilty o f m u ltip le cr im es re late d to a 19 98 shoo ti ng death in an A tl anti c City bar. Aft e r he uns uc c e s s ful l y a

ppe a l e d hi s c onvi c t i on, Pa l m e r s ought pos t

- c onvi c t i on r e l i e f i n the Ne w J e r s e y s t at e c ourt s , a s s e rt i ng that his att orney

had b ee n con st it

utionall y ineffecti ve. Th e New J e r s e y c ourt s de n i e d

P a l m e r ’ s p e t i t i onfo r

po s t

- c on vi c t i onr e l i e f, and Pa l m e r

the r e a ft e r

fi l e d ape t i t i on for

awr i t of habe a s c or

pus i n the Ne w J e r s e y

Di s tr i c t Court pur s uant t o 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The Di s tr i c t Court di d not c onve ne an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng and- 3- d ism issedP alm er’s p etitio n
. W e gr ant e d Pa l m e r ’ s a

ppl i c at i on for

ac e rt if icat e of app ea la bili ty as to thre e i ss ues: (1) whether Pal m er ’s tr ia l atto rn ey ren d ered in ef

f ectiv e assistan ce o f co u n sel b y f ailin g to a dvi s e Pa l m e r

of hi s r i ght

t o t e s t i fy at

tr i a l and at

as uppr e s s i on h earin g , (2 ) w h eth er h is atto rn ey w as in ef f ectiv e inf

ail in g to info rm Palm er that the c ho ic e of w h et h er to te st ify

was ulti m at el y

Palm er ’s to m ake, and (3) w hether the Dis tr ic t Cou rt sh o u ldh av e h eld an ev id en tiary h earin g to reso lv e th ese claim s. W e c onc l ude that Pa l m e r fa i l e d t o m ake a pr i m afa c i e s howi ng of the pre ju dice el em ent of his ineffecti ve as si st ance of coun se l claim s an dth at th e D istrict C o u rt d id n o t ab u se its d iscretio nin decl ining to con vene an evidenti ar y hear ing to re solve Pal m er ’s claim s. I. I n M ar ch 1998, Pal m er w as at t acke d by a gr oup of y oung m en ata bari n A tl ant i c C i t y , N ew J er s ey
. D ur i ng t he s cuff l e, Pal m er pul l ed out a n i n e - mi l l i me t e ra u t om at i c handgun a nd fi r ed t w o w i l d sho t s. O ne sho t hitt he leg o f on e of h i s at t ackers, Shaw n B r ant l ey ; t he ot her s hot hi t and ki l led Pal m er ’ s cous i n, Ju n ior (Jerry ) C o o p er, w h o h ad b ee n tr y ing to h elp P alm er. Pal m er at t empt ed t o as s i s t hi s cous i n, but w hen he r eal i zed t hat hi s cous i n w as not m ovi ng, Pal m er fl ed t he sce ne on a bi cy cl e. Pol i ce r es ponded t o t he s hoot i ng, g ather ed a de s cr i pt i on of Pal m er fr om t he w ounded B r ant l ey , and ar r es t ed Pal m er a fe w b lo c k s f ro m th e b a r. A ft er hi s ar r es t , P alm er gave s ever al i ncr i m i nat i ng s t at ement s t o t he pol i ce. H e l at er m oved, pur s uant t o M i r anda
v. A r i zona, 384 U

. S

. 436 ( 1966) , t o excl ude s om e of t he- 4- s t at ements. Pal m er di d not t es t i fydur i ng t he s uppr es s i on h e a rin g , a n d th e re c o rd is silen t a s to w h e th e r he w a n te d to t es t i fy , w hat t he cont ent s of hi s t es t i m ony w oul d have be en, and
w het her hi s at t or neydi s cus s ed w i t h hi m t he poss i bi l i t y or p ro p rie tyo f

tes tify in g
. T h e trial c o u rt e v e n tu a lly a d m itt e d m o st, bu t no t al l , of the st at em ents

. T r i al w as conduct ed bet w een J une 15 and J une 23, 1999. A ft er t he S t at e res t ed, P al m er an d his at t orney , W i l l i am s H arr i s, Es q
. , e n g a g e d i n t wo c o l l o q u i e s o n t h e r e c o r d , wh i c h b e c a me re lev a n t d u rin g th e sta te p o st-c o n v ictio n p ro c e e d in g s. F irst, once t he St at e had rest ed, t he cour t and couns el di s cus s ed
w h e th e r a ll o f

th e S tate ’s e x h ib its h a d b e e n a d m itt e d in to evi dence , aft er w hi ch t he fol l ow i ng col l oquy t ook pl ace : C O U R T : If

th e re ’s a n o v e rsig h t y o u su d d e n ly di s cover , w e ca n deal w i t h t hat

. W e’ l l t ake a re c e ss to a f

f o r d M r. H a rris to c o n su lt w ith h is c lien t. H A R R I S: T hank y ou j udge. (R ecess) (A ft er R ecess) ( W h e r e u p o n t h e f

o l l o wi n g t o o k p l a c e o u t o f t he p r e s e n c e o f

t h e j u r y) H A R R I S: W e’ r e goi ng t o r es t , j udge. C O U R T : O k a y. (A p p . 2 0 0 .) T he next d a y , b e f

o r e t h e c o u r t c h a r g e d t h e j u r y , t he- 5- fol l ow i ng ex ch ange be t w een t he cour t , defe ns e couns el , and Pal m er t ook pl ace : H A R R I S: C an I have a m om ent off t he r ecor d? C O U R T : Sur e. ( O ff Recor d) H A R R I S: Y o u r honor , I ’ d l i ke t o have y ou r ead th e d e f e n d a n t’s e lec tio n n o t to tes tify c h a rg e to m y c lien t s o th a t w e c a n m a k e a d e c isio n o n th a t. C O U R T : I’ll b e g lad to d o th a t. H A R R I S: T hank y ou. C O U R T : M r
. Pal m er , t hi s i s t he cha r ge t hat I gi ve t o the j u ry , i f y ou w i sh, and i t reads as fol l ow s. It’s th e c o n stitu tio n a l rig h t o f a d e f e n d a n t to re m a in sile n t. I c h a rg e y o u th a t y o u a re n o t to c o n sid e r f

o r a n y p u rp o se o r a n y m a n n e r in ar r i vi ng at y our ver di ct t he fa ct t hat t he def endant di d not t es t i fy , nor s houl d t hat fac t ent er i nt o y our del i ber at i ons or di s cus s i ons i n anym anneror at any t i m e. T h e defe ndant i s ent i t l ed t o have t he ju ry c o n sid e r a ll th e e v id e n c e , an d h e is e n tit led to t he pr es um pt i on of i nnocenc e eve n i f he doe s not te s tif y a s a w itn e s s
. H A R R I S: C oul d I have one s econd, J udge? ( D i s cus s i on off t he r ecor d. C ouns el confe r r i ng w ith D e f e n d a n t.) H A R R IS : W e ’re g o in g to a sk th a t y o u d o re a d it- 6- t o t h e j u r y. C O U R T : M r
. Pal m er , y ou w i s h t hat gi ven? P A L M E R : Y es. C O U R T : T h a n k y o u , I w ill. (A p p
. 2 0 7

. ) T he j uryw as char ged and, aft er del i ber at i ng, i t found P a lm e r gu ilt y o f a g g ra v a ted m a n sla u g h ter , a g g ra v a ted a s s a u lt, pos s es s i on of a w eapon for an unl aw ful pur pos e, and unl aw ful pos s es s i on of a w eapon. Pal m er w as s ubs equent l y gi ven a s ent ence o f tw ent y - t w o y ear s for t he mansl aught erconvi ct i on, a cons ecut i ve s ent ence of ei ght y ear s for t he as s aul t convi ct i on, and a c oncur r ent s ent ence of fi ve y ear s for t he w eapons convi ct i ons
. Pal m er appea l ed t he convi ct i ons and s ent ence , chal l engi ng, among ot her t hi ngs , t he admi s s i bi l i t y of t he nons uppr es s ed s t at ement s and t he s ever i t y of hi s s ent ence
. T he N e w J e rs e y A p p e lla te D iv is io n a f f ir m e d

. A ft er hi s di r ectappea l fai l ed, Pal m er fi l ed a pe t i t i on for p o st-c o n v ictio n re lief. In h is pe tit io n , P a lm e r arg u e d th a t H a rris had been con st i t uti on al l y i neff ect i ve fo r, am o ng other t hings, fai l i ng to a dvi s e hi m of hi s r i ght t o t es t i fyon hi s ow n behal f. Pal m er s ubm i t t ed w i t h hi s pet i t i on a s w or n aff i davi t t hat s t at ed:

• T h at, m y fo rm er tri al a tto rne y M r. W i l l i a ms Ha r r i s h a d n e v e r i n f o r me d me about m y r i ght t o t es t i fyp ri o r t o t r i al , or t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n n o t t o t e s t i f y w a s my decis i on t o m ake an d n ot M r. H arr i s’ s.

• Th a t , p r i o r t o g o i n g i n t o t h e c o u r t r o o m,- 7- M r
. H ar r i s had c[o] m e dow n t o t he bul l pen or hol di ng cel l ar ea i n t he cour t hous e, and I had as ked M r
. H ar r i s w hen he w as goi ng t o p u t m e on t he s t and t o t el l m y s i de of
w h a t h a p p e n e d , an d M r. H a rris h a d to ld m e t hat he w as not goi ng t o put m e on t he s ta n d o r t e s tif

y o r c a ll m e a s a w itn e s s
.

• T h at, dur i ng m y t r i al , t he J udge bega n r eadi ng s om et hi ng about m e choos i ng not to tes tify , an d sa y in g th a t I c h o se n o t to tes tify , at w h ich p o in t I a ttem p ted to resp o n d b y tel li n g M r. H arris t h at he ’s m a k in g it so u n d lik e I d o n ’t w a n t to tell m y sid e , an d M r. H a rris ta p p e d m e to h o ld
u p , an d a sk e d th e ju d g e f o r a se c o n d to s peak t o m e.

• T hat, M r. H arr i s t hen t old m e t hat, becau se he w as not us i ng m e as a w i t nes s t hat t he jud g e h as to rea d tho se th ing s to th e jury s o t h a t t h e y c a n ’ t h o l d a n y t h i n g a g a i n s t me or br i ng up any t hi ng about m e no t t aki ng t he s t and, and t hat M r
. H ar r i s at t hat poi nt s t i l l di d not expl ai n t o m e t hat I had a r i ght to tes tify o r th a t th e c h o ic e o f w h e th e r to t es t i fyw as s ol el y m i ne[] t o m ake a nd not his

.

• T hat , pr i or t o M r
. H ar r i s t el l i ng m e t hat he
w a s n o t g o in g to p u t m e o n th e s ta n d , I w as under t he i m pr es s i on t hat I w oul d get- 8- to te ll m y s id e o f

w h a t h a p p e n e d

.

• T hat, I w ou l d have t aken t he st and to t e s t i f y o n myo wn b e h a l f

t o e x p l a i n my s i de o f wha t r e a l l y h a p p e n e d i f I was al l ow ed t o do s o. ( A pp. 87a- b. ) I n s um , Pal m er arg ued t hat hi s t r i al couns el nevert ook t he t i m e t o expl ai n t o hi m t hat t he choi ce of w het her or not he w oul d t es t i fyw as for Pal m er , not H arr is, to m ake. P a lm e r a lso a rg u e d th a t th e trial re c o rd w a s in c o n c lu siv e a s to w h ethe r H arris ev er c o n v ey ed this i n fo rm ati o n an d that the ju ry char g e c o l l o q u yr e veal ed l i t t l e aboutw het her Pal m er under s t ood hi s r i ght t o t es t i fy

. A cc o rdi ngl y , Pal m er r eques t ed an evi dent i ar y hear i ng t o s ubpoena H ar r i s and devel op t he fa ct ual r ecor d. N ot abl y , Pal m er di d not s et for t h t he fac t s t o w hi ch he
w o u ld h a v e te s tif

ie d h a d h e ta k e n th e s ta n d a t h is tr ia l. T he pos t

- convi ct i on r el i ef ( “PC R ”) cour t r ej ect ed Pal m er ’ s pet i t i on w i t hout gr ant i ng an evi dent i ar y hear i ng. E m ph asi zi ng t he co l l oq uy betw een the cou rtand defe nse couns el at t he cl os e of t he St at e’ s cas e, t he PC R cour t found t hat Palm er and hi s at t or neyhad bee n aff or ded t he oppor t uni t y for H a r r i s t o c o u n s e l P a l m e r a s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t t o t e s t i f y. A d d iti o n a lly , re ly in g u p o n th e c o llo q u y b e tw e e n th e c o u rt, defe ns e couns el , and Pal m er j us t pr i or t o t he j ur y char ge, t he PC R cour t found t hat Pal m er under stoo d t hat he had a choi ce r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r t o t e s t i f y: T hen w e get t o w hat t r ans pi r es w i t h r es pectt o t he ch arg e. A n d M r. H arris say s, “Y o u r H o n o r, I’d l i ke t o have y ou r ead t he defe ndant ’ s el ect i on not t o t es t i fychar ge t o m y cl i ent s o t hat w e ca n m ake- 9- a dec i s i on on t hat

. ” So w e’ r e talking about d ef en d an t’ s elec ti o n n o t to t esti fy , the d ef en d an t’ s rig h t n o t to tes tify . Im p licit in th a t is a r ig h t to t es t i fy

. A nd t he char ge t hat w as r ead t o hi m w as t hi s : “The defe ndant i n t hi s cas e chos e not t o be a
w i t ness. ” F i rs t l i ne in t he ch arge. If y ou cho ose not t o be a w i t nes s, y o u can al s o choos e t o be a
w i t nes s
. So by t he char ge i t s el f, w hi ch w as r ead t o t h e d e fe n d a n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t wa s t o l d b y me w i t h r es pectt o hi s choi ces
. H e cho se not t o be; i m p licit in t hat i s a choo si ng t o b e. A nd t he las t s ent ence of t he cha r ge .
. . rea d s t hat , “The d e f e n d a n t is e n tit led to h a v e th e ju ry c o n sid e r a ll of t he e v i d e n c e a n d h e i s e n t i t l e d t o t he pr es um pt i on of i nno cenc e eve n i f he doe s not t es t i fyas a w i t nes s
. ” I m pl i ci t i n t hat as w el l i s t he fac t that he ca n t es t i fyas a w i t nes s
. T o s ayt hat h e w a s n e v e r t o ld th a t h e c o u ld b e a w itn e s s , I t hi nk i s beli ed byt he t r ans cr i pt i n t hi s par t i cul ar cas e. ( A pp. 47- 49. ) T he A ppel lat e D i vi s i on uphel d t hi s deci s i on “for s ubs t ant i al l y t he s am e rea sons, ” but al s o t ook not e of t he “paus es i n t he pr ocee di ngs for di s cus s i ons bet w een t r i al couns el and def endant , ” w hi ch “bel i e[] defe ndant ’ s cont ent i ons t hat he
w as unaw ar e of hi s r i gh t to t es t i fyand t hat he had no di s cus s i ons w i t h hi s at t or ney about t hat r i ght

. ” ( A pp. 32. ) T he N e w J e rs e y S u p re m e C o u rt d e n ie d c e rt if ic a tio n
. H avi ng exhaus t ed hi s s t at e cour t r emedi es , Pal m er fi l ed a h a b e a s p e t i t i on p u rs uant t o 28 U. S. C. § 2254 i n t he D i s t r i ct C our t

. I n hi s pet i t i on, Pal m er cl ai m ed t hat hi s t r i al couns el had- 10- been c ons t i t ut i onal l y i neff ect i ve; he l i kew i s e ass er t ed a host of ad d it ion al issue s n o t relev an t t o this ap p ea l. T h e D ist ri ct C o u rt deni ed t he ent i r et y of hi s peti ti on. W i t h r egar d t o t he i s s ue of Pal m er ’ s r i ght t o t es t i fy , t he D i s t r i ct C our t quot ed t he l anguage of t he PC R court , en d o rs i ng t he por t i on of t hat opi ni on t hat found t hat Pal m er under s t ood hi s r i ght t o t es t i fy , and rej ec t ed t he p et i t i on on t he g round s t hat “t he N ew Jer seyC ou rt s’ adj udi ca ti o n of t he cl ai m s di d not r es ul t i n a dec i s i on t hat w as cont r ary t o, or i nvol ved an unr eas onabl e appl i cat i on of St r i ckl and or ot her Supr eme C our t hol di ngs
. ” ( A pp. 20. ) T he C o u rt d e c lin e d to h o ld a n e v id e n tiary he a rin g a n d d e c lin e d to is s u e a c e rt if

ic a te o f a p p e a la b ility. Fi nal l y , Pal m er appea led to t hi s C our t

. W e gr ant ed a cer t i fi cat e of appea l abi l i t y w i t h r es pect t o Pal m er ’ s cl ai m s t hat hi s t r i al couns el r ender ed i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el for “( 1) fai l i ng t o advi s e A ppel l ant of hi s r i ght t o t es t i fyat t r i al and at hi s s uppr es s i on hear i ng an d ( 2) fai l i ng t o i nfor m A ppel l ant th a t th e c h o ic e w h e t h e r t o te s tif yw a s u ltim a te ly h is to m a k e .” ( A pp. 23. ) W e al s o s t at ed t hat t he par t i es “s hal l addr es s w het her t he D i st ri ct C ou rt shou l d have hel d an evident i ary heari ng to r es ol ve t hes e cl ai m s
. ” (App . 23.) II. T he D i s t r i ct C our t exer ci s ed j ur i s di ct i on pur s uant t o 28 U

. S. C. § 2 2 5 4

. W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r Pa l me r ’ s a ppeal under 28 U

. S. C

. §§ 1291 and 2253. T he A nt i

- T er r or i s m and E ffe ct i ve D eat h Penal t y A ct ofT he r el evantpr ovi s i ons of A E D PA pr ovi de: 1 ( d) A n appl i cat i on for a w r i t of habea s cor pus on behal f of a p er s on i n cus t ody pur s uant t o t he j udgm ent of a St at e cour t s hal l not b e gra nt ed
w i t h r es pect t o any cl ai m t hat w as adj udi cat ed on t he mer i t s i n St at e cour t pr ocee di ngs u nl es s t he a d j u d i c a t i o n o f

t h e c l a i m– ( 1) r es ul t ed i n a dec i s i on t hatw as cont r ar y t o, or in v o lv e d a n u n re a so n a b le a p p lica tio n o f , cle a rly es t abl i s hed Feder al l aw , as det er m i ned bythe Supr eme C our t of t he U ni t ed St at es ; or ( 2) r es ul t ed i n a dec i s i on t hat w as base d on an unr eas onabl e det er m i nat i on of t he fac t s i n l i ght of the e v iden ce p rese n ted in the S tat e c o u rt pr ocee di ng.
2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (d ).

- 11- 1 9 9 6 (“ A E D P A ” ) “ re q u ire s f e d e ra l co u rts c o llate ra lly 1
re v iew in g sta te p ro c e e d in g s to a f f o rd c o n sid e ra b le d e f

e re n c e to s t a t e c o u r t s ’ l e g a l a n d f a c t u a l d e t e r mi n a t i o n s
. ” La mbe r t v. B l ackw el l , 387 F. 3d 210, 234 ( 3d C i r
. 2004)

. Fact ual det er m i nat i ons m ade byt he s t at e cour t ar e pr es um ed t o be cor r ect , but m aybe r ebut t ed bycl earand convi nci ng evi dence

. See Si m m ons v. B ear d, 581 F. 3d 158, 165 ( 3d C i r
. 2009) ( ci t i ng 28 U

. S. C

. § 2254( e) ( 1) )

. O ur s t andar d of r evi ew i s t he s ame as t hat of t he D i s t r i ct C our t : beca us e t he D i s t r i ct C o ur t r el i ed- 12- excl u s i v e l y o n t h e s t a t e c o u r t r e c o r d a n d d i d n o t h ol d an evi dent i ar y hear i ng, our r evi ew i s pl enar y . See i d. ( ci t i ng J acobs
v . H o rn , 3 9 5 F .3 d 9 2 , 9 9 (3 d C ir . 2 0 0 5 ))

. By i t s own t e r ms , § 2 2 5 4 ( d ) o n l y a p p l i e s t o c l a i ms a lr e a d y “ a d

ju d ic a te d o n th e m e ri ts in S ta te c o u rt p ro c e e d in g s .” T hus , i f a pr oper l y pr es er v ed cl ai m w as not addr es s ed byt he s t at e cour t on t he m er i t s , t he def er ent i al s t andar ds of A E D PA do n o t app ly

. S ee A p p el v . H o rn, 2 5 0 F

. 3 d 2 0 3 , 2 1 0 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 1 ). I n s uch i ns t ance s , “t he fe der al habea s cour t m us t conduct a de nov o r e v i e w ov e r p u r e l e g a l q u e s t i o n s a n d mi x e d q u e s t i o n s of l aw and fa ct , as a cour t w oul d have done pr i or t o t he ena ct m ent of A E D PA

. ” I d. ( ci t i ng M cC andl es s v. V aughn, 172 F. 3d 255, 260 ( 3d C i r
. 1999) )

. “H ow ever , § 2254( e) ( 1) s t i l l m andat es t hat t he s t at e cour t ’ s fac tual det er m i nat i ons ar e pr es um ed cor r ect un l ess r ebu t t ed b y cl ear and co nv i ncing evidence. ” S i m m on s, 5 8 1 F .3 d a t 1 6 5 (c itin g A p p e l, 2 5 0 F .3 d a t 2 1 0 ). III . A. We addres s a t the ou ts et wh ether the Distri ct

Co urt abu s e d i t s di s c r e t i on whe n i t de ni e d Pa l m e r ’ s habe a s pe t i t i on wi thout fi r s t c onve ni ng an e vi de nt i ary he ar i ng. W e c onc l ude that be c aus e Pa l m e r ’ s pe t i t i on doe s not c ont a i n s u f

f ic i e nt

“ fa c t ua l a l l e gat i ons , whi c h, i f tr ue , woul d e nt i t l e the a

ppl i c ant to f ed eral h ab eas relief

,” th e D i s t rict C o u rt d idn o t ab u se its disc re ti on in decl ining P al m er ’s re qu es t for an evidenti ar y h earin g . S ch riro v . L an drig an , 5 5 0 U .S . 4 6 5 , 4 7 4 (2 0 0 7 ).U n d e r s e c tio n 2 2 5 4 (e )( 2 ), 2 [i ] f t he appl i canthas fai l ed t o devel op t he fact ual bas i s of a cl ai m i n S tat e cour t pr ocee di ngs , t he cour t s hal l not hol d an evi dent ia r y hear i ng on t he cl ai m unl es s t he a p p lica n t sh o w s th a t– ( A ) t he cl ai m r el i es on–

- 13- 1 . T h e D ecisio n Wh eth er to H o ld a n Evid en tia ry H ea rin g is S u b ject to th e D iscretio n o

f th e D istrict Co u rt “Pri or to AE DP A , n ew evidenti ar y hear ings [in h abea s c a s e s ] we r e req ui r e d i n s e ve r a l c i r c um s t anc e s
. ” Cam pbe l l v. Vaughn, 209 F. 3d 280, 286 ( 3d Ci r
. 2000) ( c i t i ng Towns e nd v. Sain, 372 U.S. 29 3, 3 1 3 (1 9 6 3 )) (e m ph as is in original ). We have been cle ar

that “AED PA , i n contra st , per m it s e videntiary he ar i ngs on habe a s r e vi e w, but onl y i n a lim ited num

be r of circu m stan ces.” Id . (citin g 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (e)) (em p h asis in original ). In part ic ular , a dist ri ct court i s per

m itte d to h old an ev id en tiary

h earin g o n a claim asserted in a § 2 2 5 4 p etitio nso long as such a hear ing i s no t barr ed by 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4(e) (2). Un der that s ec ti on , a

h ab ea s c ou rt

is barr ed fromho lding an ev id en tiary

h earin g u n l e s s t h e p etitio n er w as d ilig en t inh is atte m pt to develop a fact

ual bas is fo r his cl ai m

in the s tate court proceedi ng s, se e W il li am s v. Taylor, 52 9 U .S. 420 , 430 (200 0); W i l s o nv . B e ar d , 4 2 6 F

. 3 d6 5 3 , 6 6 5 ( 3 dC i r
. 2 0 0 5 ) , o r t he pe t i t i one r s at i s fi e s the c r i t e r i a s e t forth i n § 2254( e ) ( 2) ( A) and (B). 2(i) a n e w ru le o f c o n stitu tio n a l law , m a d e re tro a c tiv e to cas es on col l at era l r evi ew by t he Supr eme C our t , t hat
w as pr evi ous l y unavai l abl e; or ( i i ) a fa ct ual p redi cat e t hat coul d not have be en pr evi ous l y di s cover ed t hr ough t he exe r ci s e o f due di l i gence ; and (B ) th e f a c ts u n d e rly in g th e c laim w o u ld b e su f f icie n t to es t abl i s h by cl earand convi nci ng evi dence tha t but for cons t i t ut i onal er r or , no r eas onabl e fac t fi nder w oul d have found t he appl i cantgui l t y of t he under l y i ng offe ns e. 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (e)(2 ). The S up r e m e C o u rt h a s n o t h e l d , an d w e do not 3 sugg es t, that

a c ou rt is prec luded f

rom consider ing add it ional fact ors in dete rm ining t

he approp ri at enes s of an evidenti ar y

- 14- “In cases w h ere an ap p lican t f o r f ed eral h ab eas relief

is not barr e d fr om obt a i ni ng an e vi de nt i ary he ar i ng by

28 U. S. C. § 2254( e ) ( 2) , the de c i s i on t o gr ant s uc h ahe ar i ng re s t s i n the di s c r e t i on of the di s tr i c t

court. ” S c h riro , 5 5 0 U .S . at 4 6 8 ; se e a l s o Cam pbe l l , 209 F. 3d at

287 ( “ AEDPA, unl i k e Towns e nd and [Ke ene y

v. Tam ayo- Re y e s , 504 U. S. 1 ( 1992) ], doe s not r e qui r e that

s uc h ahe ar i ng be he l d. I ns t e a d, fe de r a l c ourt s have di s c r e t i on t o gr ant

ahe ar i ng or not

. ” )

. Al though s uc h ade c i s i on is disc re ti on ar

y , it is no t uncon st

ra ined, andSchrir o identifie s tw o relatedco ns i de r at io n s th at g u id e th e h ab eas co u rt’s ex ercise of di s c r e t i on. 3h earin g
.

- 15- Firs t, in de te rmin ing w hether or no t t o h old an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng, c ourt s s houl d “co n si de r whe the r s uc h a hear ing cou ld enable an applic ant to prov e the peti ti on ’s fact ual al le gati on s, wh ic h, if tr

ue, wou ld enti tl e the applic ant t o f eder al habeas re li ef.” S c h riro , 5 5 0 U .S . at 4 7 4

. In o th er w o rd s, co u rts c ons i de ri ng the a

ppr opr i at e ne s s of an e vi de nt i ary he ar i ng sh o u ldd eterm in e w h eth er th e p e t i tio np resen ts a p rim a f acie sh o w in g wh ich , if

p ro v en , w o u lden ab le th e p etitio n er to p rev ail on the m e r i t s of the a s s e rt e d c l a i m
. Se e , e
. g., Cam pbe l l v. Burr i s , 515 F. 3d 172, 184 ( 3d Ci r
. 2008) ; W e l l s v. Pe t s oc k, 941 F. 2d 253, 259 ( 3d Ci r
. 1991) ; Sm i th v. Fr e e m an, 892 F. 2d 331, 338 ( 3d Ci r. 1 9 8 9)

. The r e a s ons unde r l yi ng s uc h a consider at ion are se lf-e vi de nt —g i ven “AE DP A’s a c knowl e dge d pur

pos e of r e duc i ng de l ay s i n the e xe c ut i on of st at e and f

eder al cr im inal se ntence s, ” S c h riro , 5 5 0 U .S . at 475 (quo tati on m ar

ks, c it at ions, andbrac kets om itte d), a cou rt shou ld be re luct ant to conv ene an evidentiar y hear ing to exp lore th e claim s o f

a p etitio n er w h o s e p lead in g s are f actu ally insuff ic ie nt to sug g es t any

enti tl em ent t o h abea s r el ie f. See, e
. g. , C am

pbe l l , 515 F. 3d at

184 ( “ ba l d a s s e rt i ons and conclusory

al le gati on s do n ot affo rd a s uf fici ent groun d f

or an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng” ) ( quot i ng M ay

be rry v. Pe t s oc k, 821 F. 2d 1 7 9 , 1 8 5 ( 3 d C ir. 1 9 8 7 )); A n d erso nv . A tt’y G en . o f K an sas, 42 5 F .3d 8 53 , 858 -59 (10 th Cir. 20 05 ) (to warr ant an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng, ahabe a s p et i t i one r ’ s “ fa c t ua l a l l e gat i ons m ust be speci fic and part ic ular iz ed, n ot generalor conclusory”) (qu o tatio nm ark s an dcitatio no m itted ).A s an in itial m atter, w e n o te th at P alm er w as di l i gent 4 i n h is e ff

or t t o devel op t he fa ct ual bas i s of hi s i neff ect i ve

- 16- Second , “ if the r ecord refutes t he applic ant’ s fac tual al le gati on s or o ther

wise prec ludes h abea s rel ie f, a dis tr ic t c ou rt is no t r equire d to h old an evid en ti ar y hear ing.” Schr i r o, 550 U .S . at 47 4. Th at is , even if the fac tual al le gati on s i n the habeas pe t i t io n are s uffi c i e nt

t o m ake out

apr i m afa c i e c l a i m

for habeas re li ef

, a dist ri ct court m ay

decl ine t o con vene an evidenti ar y hear ing if the fact

ual a ll egat ions ar e “ contrav en ed b y th e ex istin g reco rd .” Id . (cita t i o n o m itted ); see also Cam pb el l, 20 9 F .3d at 290 . As the Suprem e C o u rt has ex plai ned, “[i]f d is tr ic t c ou rt s wer e r equire d to all ow federal habeas applic ants to develop even the m ost i nsub st anti al fact ual a l l e gatio ns i n e vi de nt i ary he ar i ngs , di s tr i c t

c ourt s woul d be f o rced t o reo p en f

actu al d isp u tes th at w ere co n clu siv ely re solved in the s tate courts .” S c h riro , 5 5 0 U .S . at 4 7 5

. With th es e t w i nco n sid eratio n s inm in d , w e tu rn to Palm er ’s peti ti on to dete rm ine whether th e Dis tr ic t Cou rt ab u sedits d iscretio n w h en it d ism issed th e p etitio nw ith o u t f irst c onve ni ng an e vi de nt i ary he ar i ng. 2. Pa lmer ’s Inadequa teAlle ga ti on s of Pre

judice Be c aus e we f

in d that the fa c t ua l a l l e gat i ons unde r l yi ng P alm er’s co n ten tio nth at h i s t rial co u n sel w as co n stitu tio n ally in ef f ectiv e are in su f

f icien t to sh o w th at h e is “en title[ d ] . . . to federal habeas re li ef,” id. at 474 , we c on cl ud e that the Distri ct Co urt’ s dec is ion n ot to ho ld an evidenti ar y hear ing was not an abus e of di s c r e t i on. 4a s s i s t a n c e c l a i m in the st at e PCRcourt, in that he subm itte d an a ffi davi t and r e que s t e d that the s t at e c ourt c onve ne ahe ar i ng on hi s c l a i m
. Se e W i l l i am s, 529 U. S. at 430; s e e a l s o Thom a s v. Ho rn, 57 0 F

. 3d10 5, 12 5 ( 3dCi r
. 20 09 ) ( “ the pe t i ti on er ’s r e que s t for an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng i n th e st at e pos t

- c onvi c t i on court, wh ic h w as denied, show [s] suf fici ent dil igence to re nd er Sectio n 22 54 (e )( 2) inapplic able ”) (c it ing T ho m as v. Varner, 4 2 8 F .3 d4 9 1 ( 3 d C ir.2 0 0 5 )). S ectio n2 2 5 4 (e)(2 ) th u s w o u ld no t h av e prec luded P al m er from ob ta ining an evidentiary h earin g b ef

o re th e D istrict C o u rt.

- 17- “ The Stric kl and [v. W as hi ngt on, 466 U

. S. 668 ( 1984) ] st andard is applic able wh en a pet it ioner c la im s his attorney was in ef f ec tiv e b y d en yin g h im

h is co n stitu tio n al rig h t to testif y .” Matyl i ns ky

v. Budge , 577 F. 3d 1 083, 1097 ( 9th Ci r
. 2009) ( c i t at i on om i tted ). T he St r i ckl and t es t has t w o pr ongs : t he pet i t i on er m us t s how ( 1) t hat couns el ’ s per for m ance w as defi ci ent , and (2) t hat t he defi ci ent per for m ance pr ej udi ced t he d e f e n s e
. Str i c kl and , 466 U

. S. at 687. T he fi r s t pr ong r equi r es a pet i t i oner t o demonst r at e t hat couns el m ade er r or s “s o s er i ous t hat couns el w as not funct i oni ng as t he ‘ couns el ’ guar ant eed t he defe ndan t b y t he Si xt h A m endment

. ” I d. ; s ee a l s o T ay l or v. H or n, 504 F

. 3 d 416, 430 ( 3d C i r
. 2007)

. St r i ckl and’ s s econd p ron g re q u ir es a p eti ti o n er to sh o w that the e rrors w ere

“ s u f f ic ie n tly se ri o u s a s to d e p ri v e th e d e f e n d a n t o f a f

a ir tr ia l, a t r i al w hos e r es ul t i s r el i abl e. ” St r i ckl and, 466 U

. S. at 687. T he p e tit io n e r “ m u st s h o w th a t th e re is a re a so n a b le p ro b a b ili tyth a t, but for couns el ’ s unpr ofes sion al er r or s , t he r es ul t of t he p ro c e e d in g w o u ld h a v e b e e n d if f e re n t.” Id . a t 6 9 4

.- 18- Pal m er ’ s pet i t i on comes up s hor t beca us e i t fai l s t o m ake an ad eq u ate sh o w ing o f p rejud ice. Se e id. at 69 7 (“[ A ] co u rt need not det er m i ne w het her couns el ’ s per for m ance w as d e f icie n t b e f

o re e x a m in in g th e p re

ju d ice su f

f e re d

. . . . If

it i s eas i er t o di s pos e of a n i neff ect i venes s cl ai m on t he gr ound of l ack of s uffi ci ent pr ej udi ce, w hi ch w e expe ct w i l l oft en be s o, th a t c o u rs e s h o u ld b e f

o llo w e d .” ). As we have no te d, Palm er ’s claim f o r in ef f ectiv e assistan ce o f

co u n sel tu rn s o nh is co n ten tio nth at h is atto rn ey f ailedto ad v ise h im

o f h is rig h t to t e s t i f y i n h i s d e f

e n s e an d f

a i l e d t o i n f

o rm h i m th at s u c h a de c i s i on wa s Pa l m e r ’ s t o m ake

. Pa l m e r ’s co nt e nt i ons concerni ng hi s at

t or ne y ’ s a l l e ge dly

de fici ent c on du ct

ar e fle shed ou t i n the affidavit Pal m er subm itte d in sup po rt

of his habea s p etitio n . Wh at is n o t f

lesh edo u t inth e p etitio n , h o w ev er, is a f ac tu a l b asis su g g estin g th at P alm er w as p rej u d icedb y h is attorney ’s al le ged con du ct . Pal m er ’s affidavit state s m er el y that h e “w o u ldh av e tak en th e stan d to testif y o n[ h is] o w nb eh alf

to e xpl a i n [hi s ] s i de o f w h at r e a l l y ha ppe ne d i f [he ha d be e n] allo w edto d o so .” (A p p . 8 7 b .) T h e b rief h e sub m ittedin s uppo rt o f

hi s a ppl i c at i on for

pos t

- c onvi c t i on r e l i e f a dds prec ious li tt le to this bare -bon es st at em en t. In a c on cl usory fa s hi on , Pa l m e r

a s s e rt s that

“ be c a us e [h e ] wa s c on t e nd i ng s e l fde fe ns e , i t wa s c r

uc i a l for hi m t o e xpl a i n hi s ve r s i on of the e ve nt s , e s pe c i a l l y [] s i nc e th e r e qui s i t e de t e rm i nat i on that the jury ha d t o m ake [] wa s ‘ di d th e p etitione r us e for c e i n the reas onabl e be l i e f that

s uc h for c e wa s ne c e s s ary t o pr e ve nt

his d eath o r serio u s i n

j u ry ,[ ’] an dth ere is n o b o dy w h o co u ld ex p lainw h at h is m en tal state w as b etter th an th e p etitio n er . . .

. ” ( A p p
. 8 7 r
. ) I ns u m , w e kn o w th at P a l m e r w i s h e dt o t e s t i f

y, an d w e know the l e ga l the ory t owar d whi c h hi s t e s t i m ony woul d have be e n di r e c t e d ( s e l f- de fe ns e ) , but we know nothi ng- 19- ab o u t th e f

acts to w h ich P alm er w o u ldh av e testif ied

. P alm er’s statedd esire to tell h is sid e o f th e sto ry an dh is c onc l us ory

i nvoc at i on of the wor ds “ s e l f- de fe ns e ” ar e not su f f icien t to sh o w “th at th e d ecisio n reach edw o u ldreaso n ab ly li kely have been diff

er ent a bsent the er

rors .” St r i c k l and, 466 U .S . at 6 9 6 . We h av e rep eated ly em p h asizedth at “b ald a s s e rt i ons and c onc l us ory a l l e gat i ons do not a ffor d as uffi c i e nt gr ound for an e vi de nt i ary he ar i ng” on a habe a s p et i t i on. Cam pbe l l , 515 F. 3d at

184 ( c i t at i on om i tt e d) ; Ze tt lem o y er v. F u l c o mer, 9 2 3 F .2 d2 8 4 , 2 9 8 (3 dC ir. 1 9 9 1 ). O th er circu its h av e lik ew ise reco g n ized th at a h ab eas p etitio n er’s n o n sp ecif ic or c onc l us ory

a l l e gat i ons of i ne ffe c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of c ouns e l do n o t co m p el d istr i c t co u rts to co n v en e ev id en tiary h earin g s in order t o d el ve in to the unela bo rate d f ac tual basi s of a habeas pe t i t i on. Se e , e
. g. , Ande r s on, 425 F. 3 d at 858- 59; Barry

v. Un it ed Stat es , 528 F.2d10 94 , 11 02 (7th Cir. 19 76 ). Palm er ’s peti ti on contai ns no fact ual m atter r egar ding Stri ckland ’s pr e ju di c e pr on g, and hi s r e fe r e nc e t o the l e ga l the or y of s e l fd ef en se is p recisely th e so rt o f u n ad o rn ed leg al co n clu sio nth at, w ith o u t sup p o rtin g f

a ctu al alleg atio n s, w e h av e co n sisten tly fo un d insuf

fici ent t o w ar ra nt an evidenti ar y hear ing. See Cam pbe l l , 515 F. 3d at 184; Ze tt l e m oy e r , 923 F. 2d at 298 n. 12; cf . B ell A tl. C o rp . v . T w o m b ly , 5 5 0 U .S . 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) (in the c i vi l pl e a di ng c on t e xt , “ c ourt s ar e no t bo un d t o a cc ept a s tr ue a l egal conclusi on couched as a fac tual al le gati on ”) (qu o tatio n s an dcitatio n s o m itted ). Zett le m oy er

is on po int. In that

ca se , the peti ti on er c ont e nde d that

an e vi de nt i ary

he ar i ng wa s ne c e s s ary

t o de ve l op the f ac ts of his ineff

ec ti ve as si st ance cl ai m , i n w hich he as se rt ed t ha th i s att o rn e y

h a df a i l e dt o c a l l w i tn e s s e s w h o w o u l dh avePa l m e r , a s the ve ry wi tne s s whos e tes t i m ony wa s not 5 pr e s e nt e d at tria l , woul d c e rt a i nl y have be e n c a

pabl e of out l i ni ng i n hi s habe a s pe t i t i on the c ont our s of the t e s t i m ony he wo uld h ave given. T his is n ot, i n o ther wo rds, a c as e i n w hich an ev id en tiary

h earin g w a s n eed edino rd er to u n earth f acts u n kn o w nto th e p etitio n er.

- 20- pr ovi de d uns pe c i fi e d t e s t i m ony r e l at e d t o hi s di m i nish edcap acity d ef en se. S ee Z ettlem o y er, 9 2 3 F .2 dat 2 9 8 . A s inth is case, th e p etitio n er in Z ettlemo y e r i d en tif ieda w itn ess w h o se te st i m on y hi s att or ne y fa i l e d t o p r e s e nt

andal e ga l theory toward wh ic h the witnes s’ s t es ti m on y wo uld h ave been di r e c t e d, but

th e pe t i t i one r

gave no i ndi c at i on of what the contents of

the t es ti m on y w o u ld have been. See i d. We ex p lain edth at th e p etitio n er h adf ailedto “set f

o rth f acts to supp ort hi s c on te ntion” and h el d that an evidentiary hear ing w as not c a l l e d for

. I d. at 298, 300- 01; s e e a l s o Cam pbe l l , 515 F. 3d at 1 8 4 (w h ere p etitio n er f

ails “to alleg e w h at th is w itn ess w o u ld have been able to say that wo uld have been of help to him ,” an e vi de nt i ary

h earing i s not

m andat e d) ; W e l l s , 941 F. 2d at 259- 6 0 . T h e sam e co n clu sio nis co m p elledh ere. B y statin g m erely that he wo uld h ave “ t a k e n t h e s t a n d t o t e s t i f y o n [ h i s ] o wn behal f t o expl ai n [hi s ] s i de of w hat r eal l y h appene d, ” ( A pp. 87b) , and t hat t hi s t es t i m ony w oul d have addr es s ed t he s ubj ect o f s e lf -d e f e n s e , P a l m er f

ailedto p resen t “f

actu al alleg atio n s, wh ic h, if tr

ue, wou ld enti tl e the applic ant t o f ed er al habeas r e l i e f” unde r

Str i c klan d’ s pr e

judi c e pr ong. Sc hr i r o, 55 0 U. S. 5
a t 4 7 4

. In O wens v. Un it ed Stat es , 483 F.3d48 , 59 (1st Cir

.- 21- 20 07 ), the court re cogn iz ed that “an att orney ’s fail ure to info rm his c li ent of his ri gh t to te st ify could b e pre

ju dici al .” Th e c ou rt e xpl a i ne d that

a“ de fe ndant ’ s t e s t i m ony c oul d be c r uc i a l i n any tr i a l , and i t c oul d be di ffi c ul t for us t o de t e rm i ne whe the r

or not a jury woul d have found hi s t e s t i m ony c r e di bl e
. ” I d. ( c i t at i ons om i tt e d)

. Thi s i s part i c ul ar l y tr ue whe n th e onl y

wi tne s s the defend ant proff

er s i s him se lf. The Su p re me Co urt has reco g n izedth at “th e m o st im p o rtan t w itn ess f

o r th e d ef en se in m any c rim ina l c a s e s i s the de fe ndant hi m s e l f. ” Roc k v. Arkans a s , 483 U. S. 44, 52 ( 1987)

. Aft e r a l l , i f the r e we r e no othe r wi tne s s e s , who woul d be i n a be tt e r pos i t i on t o a dvi s e the fact find er as to th e re levant fact s i n sup po rt of a c la im ed defense? O n th e o th er h an d , th e m ere assertio no f self -d ef en se is no t suff ic ie nt to ra is e a plausible show ing of p re j ud ic e suf f ic ie n t t o w ar

rant an evidenti ar

y hear ing. If so, e very defend ant c harg ed with ho m ic ide wou ld m ake s uch an as se rt ion. In O w ens, the c ou rt part ic ular iz ed the needed show ing w hen it s tate d that a defend ant who was not info rm ed b y co u n sel o r th e co u rt o f

h is rig h t to t e s t if

y an dw h o “w o u ld have offe r e d ge nui ne l y

e xc ul pat ory

t e s t i m ony” woul d have b een p r e j u d icedb y

th e f ailu re to h av e b een in f

o rm edo f h is ri gh t t o tes ti fy . Owens, 483 F.3dat 59 (e m ph as is added). Al though the s howi ng that ade fe ndant

m us t m ake ne e d not

be o n ero u s, it mu s t b e su f f icien tly d etailedto b e “g en u in ely e xc ul pat ory . ” I d. InN ew Jersey , th e asse r tio no f self -d ef en se “requ ires a ju ry (1) t o d is ce rn wh ether the defend ant had a s ub ject ive bel ie f at th e tim e th at d ea d l y f o rce w as n ecessary

an dth en (2 ) to d eterm in e w h eth e r t h at sub j ectiv e b elief

w as o b j ectiv ely- 22- reaso n ab le.” S tate v . Je n e w i c z , 9 4 0 A .2 d2 6 9 , 2 7 4 -7 5 (N .J. 20 08 ); se e N .J . S tat. An n. 2C :3-4. There ar e s ever al fu rther c ave at s t o thi s r

ul e , s uc h a s a duty t o r e tr e at

. Se e N. J

. St at

. Ann. 2C: 3- 4( b)

. I n thi s c a s e , i t i s “ undi s put e d that de fe ndant wa s the o n ly p erso nw h o drew an d f

ired a g u n .” (A p p
. 3 5 .) In o rd er to have be e n e nt i t l e d t o an evi de nt i ary he ar i ng, Pa l m e r

ha d the o b lig atio nto sh o w h is t e s t im o n y w o u ldh av e b een g en u in ely e xc ul pat ory

a s l ong a s i t

wa s not r e fut e d by the e xi s t i ng r e c or d. See Schri ro, 550 U.S. at

47 4. Palm er

did n ot mak e an y

such s howi ng, and i t

fol l ows that

the Court

di d not e rr i n den y i ng Pa l m e r ahe ar i ng. 3 . T h ere Is N o P resu m p tio n o f P reju dice in R igh t-to -T estify Ca ses Conc e di ng that

“ the r e c or d i s s i l e nt

ab o u t the nat

ur e of Palm er ’s prob able te st im on y ,” (App el lant’s Br. 22), Pal m er c ont e nds that he s houl d be r e l i e ve d fr om m aki ng any

s howi ng a s t o Str i c kl and’ s pr e

judi c e criteri on. Al though hi s ar gum e nt o n th is p o in t is so m ew h at m u d d led , P alm er ap p ears to su g g est that whe n c ouns e l fa i l s t o pr ope r l y ad v ise ac l i e nt

c onc e rni ng the r i ght t o t e s t i fy , s uc h de fe c t i ve pe r form anc e by c ouns e l i s not s us c e pt i bl e t o ana l y s i s unde r Str i c kl and’ s two- pr ong s t andar d, bu t i s i nste ad a “ struct

ural defect ” i n the enti re tr ia l proce ss that re qu ir es autom at ic re vers al , i rr es pect ive of p reju dice . See N ed er v . U n itedS tates, 5 2 7 U

. S

. 1 , 7 (1 9 9 9 ); see also , e.g ., Un it ed Stat es v. Go nzal ez -Lop ez , 5 48 U.S. 14 0, 14 8-49 (200 6); Br e c ht v. Abr aham s on, 507 U. S. 6 1 9 , 638 ( 1993) ; Ar i z onav. F u lm in an te, 4 9 9 U .S

. 2 7 9 , 3 0 9 -1 0 (1 9 9 1 ). B ecau se, u n d er th is the ory , Pa l m e r

wa s not r e qui r e d t o m ake an y showi ng of pr e judi c e i n or de r

t o pr e va i l on hi s c l a i m , Pa l m e r i ns i s t s that the D istrict C o u rt’s f

a i l u r e to h o ldan ev id en tiary h earin g o nh isO f co u rse, in th e co llateral rev iew co n tex t, ev en trial- 6 ty pe er rors ar e not exam ined un der the harm le ss -bey o n d -are as on able -doubt st andard em ploy ed on dire ct

re view, but ar e inst ea d revie wed u nd er

Brec ht’s m ore defere ntia l s tand ar d. See Brec ht, 507 U .S

. at62 3 (the quest ion is whether the e rr or had a“ s ubs t ant i a l and i njur i ous e ffe c t or i nflu en ce i n de t e rm i ni ng the jury ’s verdic t” ). Struct ural defect s are per se r ever si ble e ven i n habe a s c a s e s
. Se e i d. at 629- 30.

- 23- p etitio nw as an ab u se o f

d iscretio n . We d isag ree. A s anin itial m a t t e r , P alm er is certain ly co rrect to n o te that “[t]he Suprem e Cou rt

has dis ti ng uished betwee n two ty pes of c onst i t ut i ona l e rr or

that oc c ur at both tr i a l and s e nt e nc i ng:
‘ tr i a l e rr or s , ’ whi c h ar e s ubje c t t o c ons t i t ut i ona l harm l e s s e rr or an aly sis, an d‘stru ctu ral d ef ects,’ w h ich requ ire au to m atic r e ve r s a l or

va c at ur
. ” Uni t e d St at e s v. St e ve ns , 2 23 F. 3d 239, 244 ( 3d Ci r
. 2000) ( c i t i ng c a s e s ) ; s e e a l s o U n ited St at e s v. Va z qu e z , 2 7 1 F

. 3 d 9 3 , 1 0 3 ( 3 d C i r
. 2 0 0 1 )

. C e r t a i nt y pe s of cons t i t ut i ona l e rr or

ar e c ons i de r e d s tr

uc t ur a l , and s ubje c t

to au to m atic rev ersal, n o t o n ly b ecau se th ey h av e th e p o ten tial to

“ i nfe ct the e nt i r e tr i a l pr oc e s s , ” Br e c ht , 507 U. S. at 630, but b ecau se o f

“th e d if f icu lty o f assessin g th e ef

f ect o f th e erro r[ s] .” Go nzal ez -Lop ez , 54 8 U .S. at 148 -49 & n.4 (ci ti ng ca se s) . That i s , whe r e a s an e rr or

of the trial ty

pe oc c ur s “ dur i ng the pr esen t at i on of the c a s e t o the jury” and “ m ay the r e for e be qu anti tati vely

as se ss ed in th e c on te xt of other e vidence pres ente d in o rd er

to dete rm ine whether

it s a dm is si on was harm le ss beyon d a re as on able do ub t, ” Fu lm inante , 499 U.S. at 6 3 0 7 -0 8 , th e ef

f ects o f a stru ctu ral d ef

ect “are f

requ en tlyI n Cam pbe l l v. Vaughn, we de c l i ne d t o t ake apos i t i on 7 on this is sue, as ou r thre shold det er m inat ion t

hat the att orney ’s pe r form anc e wa s not

de fi c i e nt r e nde r e d the poi nt

m oot. 209 F.3dat 28 1 n .1. As i n C am

pb el l, we no te here that

Palm er “d o es n o t alleg e t h a t t h e [ S tate] d ep riv edh im o f h is rig h t to testif y ,” id ., an dw e ex p ress n o o p in io n o n th e ef f ect th at S tate p articip atio ninth e d ep riv atio nw o u ldh av e o no u r an aly sis.

- 24- in tan g ib le, d if

f icu lt to p ro v e .
. . [ o r ] can n o t b e ascertain ed .” Gonz a l e z - Lope z , 548 U. S. at 149 n. 4 ( c i t at i ons om i tt e d)

. The list o f erro rs th at co n stitu te stru ctu ral d ef ects is “v ery

lim ited ,” J ohns on v. Uni t e d St at e s , 5 2 0 U .S. 461, 468 ( 1997) , and “i ncludes c om

plet e denia l of cou nsel , bia se d j ud ges, ra ci al di s c r i m i nat i on i n s e l e ction of gr and jury , de ni a l of se lf-r epre se ntat ion at tri al , denia l o f p ub li c tri al , and[a] s e r i ous l y de fe c t i ve r e a s onabl e doubt i ns tr uc t i on. ” St e ve ns , 223 F .3 dat 2 4 4 (citin g N ed er, 5 2 7 U .S . at 7 -8 (1 9 9 9 )). We are n o t p ersu ad e d b y P alm er’s arg u m en t th at h is att or ne y ’ s a l l e ge d f

a i l ur e t o a dv i s e hi m

of hi s r i gh t t o t e s t i fy f alls w ith inth is v ery

lim itedcateg o ry

o f erro rs th at are p er se re vers ible . Fir st , e ve ry

authority

we ar e a

ware of that has a ddr e s s e d the m att e r

of c ouns e l ’ s fa i l ur e t o a dvi s e ac l i e nt of the r i ght t o t e s t i fy

ha s done so u n d er

Str i c kl and’ s two- pr ong fr am ew ork, whi c h r e qui r e s the pe t i t i one r t o “ s how that

[the de fi c i e nt c onduc t ] a c t

ua l l y ha d an a dve r s e e ffe c t on the de f en se
. ” Str i c kl and , 4 6 6 U .S . at 693; s e e , e
. g. , Hodge v.

7 Haeberl in, 579 F.3d62 7, 64 0 (6th C ir . 200 9) (“ Ho dg e’ s sp ecu latio n t h a t h is testim o n y w o u ldh av e lef

t a f av o rab le im pres si on with the jur y d o es no t dem on strate the r equire dP al m er ci t es O w ens v. U nit ed S t at es, 48 3 F

. 3d 48 (1st 8 C i r. 20 07 ), con t end i ng t hat t he F i rs t C i rcui t has ado pted a per se p r e j u d ic e ru le

. W e d o n o t

b e l i e v e th at

O w e n s s t an d s f

o r the p ro p o sitio nf

o r w h ich P alm er cites it. T h e case p l a i n ly a ddr e s s e s the s i gn i fi c anc e of pr e ju di c e in the r i gh t

- t o- t e s t i fy c ont e xt , i d. at

59- 60, and endor s es B r ow n v. A r t uz, 124 F. 3d at 8 0 , a S e c o n d C irc u it ca se th a t d isp o se d o f a rig h t-to -te stif

y c laim b y h o ld in g th a t th e p e tit io n e r’s a f f id a v it w a s in a d e q u a te to s at i s fySt r i ckl and’ s pr ej udi ce pr ong .

- 25- pr e judi c e unde r

Str i c kl an d .”); Matyl i ns ky , 577 F. 3d at 1097 ( “ T h e S tr i c k l an ds t an d ar di s a p p l i c ab l e w h e nap e t i t i o n e r c l a i ms his att orney

was i neff

ec ti ve by denying h im

his c on st it

utional r i ght t o t e s t i fy

. ” ) ( c i t i ng Me dl e y v. Runne l s , 506 F. 3d 857, 861 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 )); C a n n o n v . M u lli n , 3 8 3 F .3 d 1 1 5 2 , 1 1 7 1 (1 0 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) (s a m e ); S ay

re v . A n d erso n , 2 3 8 F .3 d6 3 1 , 6 3 5 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ) (“S ay

re’s self -serv in g co n clu so ry

statem en t th at h is te st im on y wo uld have re sult ed in an ac qu itta l, st an d in g al on e, fall s f ar short of sat is fying S tr ic kland’s pre ju dice el em ent. ”) ; Se xt on v. French , 16 3 F

. 3d87 4, 88 2 ( 4th C i r
. 19 98 ) ( “ [A ] cr im inal defend ant’ s clai m that his t ri al coun se l was co n stitu tio n a l ly

in ef f ectiv e b ecau se trial co u n sel f ailedto i nform hi m of hi s r i ght

t o t e s t i fy

. . . m us t s at i s fy the two- pr ong test estab lish ed inS trick lan d. . . .”); B r ow n v. A r t uz, 124 F. 3d 73, 80 ( 2d C i r
. 1997) ( s ame) ; U ni t ed St at es v. T eague , 953 F. 2d 1525, 1534 ( 11t h C i r
. 1992) ( s ame)

. 8 M o r e o v e r , S tr i c k l an d i t s e l f c an n o t b e r e a d t o c arve out a p rej u d ice ex cep tio nf

o r rig h t-to -testif

y cases. B y

its term s, Str i c kl and a

ppl i e s t o a l l m anne r

of i ne ffe c t i ve a s s istan ce of- 26- c ouns e l c l a i m s
. Se e Str i c kl and , 4 6 6 U .S . at 68 4 (“[W]e grante d ce rt io rari to consider the st andards by wh ic h t o jud ge a contenti on that

the Con st itu ti on re qu ir es that a c ri m inal judgm e nt be ove rt

urne d be c aus e o f the a c t ua l i ne ffe c t i ve assistan ce o f

c o u n sel.”). T h e C o urt caref u lly an dex p ressly sp ecif iedo n ly tw o categ o ries o f in ef

f ectiv e assistan ce claim s in whi c h pr e

judi c e m ay

be pr e s um e d : c a s e s of “ [a ]c t ua l or c ons tr uc t i ve de ni a l of the a s s i s t anc e of c ouns e l a l t oge the r ” and c a s e s i n whi c h “ c ouns e l i s bur de ne d by an a c t ual co n f l i c t of inte re st .” Id . at 6 9 2 . N eed less to say , n eith er categ o ry is ap p licabl e he r e
. Apart

fr om the s e two c at e gor i e s , Str i c kl and m akes cl ear , “ a c t

ua li ne ff e ct ivenes s c la im s a ll eging a defici ency i n att orne y

pe r form an ce ar e s ubje c t t o age ne r a l r e qui r e m e nt that the de fen d ant

a ffi rm at i ve l y

pr ove pr e

judi c e
. ” I d. at

693 (em p h asis ad d ed ). F in ally , P alm er’s claim

th at h is atto rn ey

f ailed to ad v ise hi m of hi s r i ght

t o t e s t i fy i n hi s own de fe ns e i s not the s ort of stru ctu ral d ef

ect f o r w h ich th e au to m atic rev e r s a l ru le is re se rved

. “[ M ]o st

consti tuti on al er

rors ” are of

the tri al ty

pe, Fu lm inante , 499 U.S. at 30 6, an d , a s the Suprem e Cou rt re ce ntly em ph as iz ed, the few errors that have been cla ss ifie d as struct ural defect s have been so cate go ri ze d bec ause the nat ure of the r i ght

at i s s ue i s s uch th at

“ the e ffe c t

of the vi ol at i on can n o t b e ascertain ed ” o nrev iew u n d er trad itio n al “h arm lesserro r stan d ard s.” G o n zalez-L o p ez, 5 4 8 U .S . at 1 4 8 , 1 4 9 n .4 (quo ti ng Vasquez v . H il le ry , 4 74 U.S. 25 4, 26 3 (19 86 )) . Hence , G o n zalez-L o p ez ex p lain s, th e v io latio no f th e S ix th Am endm ent’ s pub li c- tr ia l guarantee is consider ed a s tr uctura l d ef ect “b ecau s e ‘th e b en ef

its o f a p ub lic trial are f

requ en tly i nt angi bl e , di ffi c ul t t o pr ove , or a m att e r of c hanc e , ’ ” i d. at 149- 27- n.4 (qu oting Wal le r v. Georgia, 46 7 U .S. 39 , 4 9 n .9 (198 4)); d iscrim in ato ry

p ractices in j u ry

selectio nare stru ctu ral“ be cau se the e ff ect of the vi ol at i on c annot be a s c e rt a i ne d, ” i d. ( quot i ng Vasquez, 47 4 U .S. at 2 63 ); and the depri vati on of a defendant’s r i ght t o c ouns el of hi s or

he r c hoos i ng, the c ons e que nc e s of w h ich “are n ecessarily

u n qu an tif

iab le an din d eterm in ate,” c ons t i tu tes as tr

uc t ur a l de fe c t , i d. at

149 ( quot i ng Sul l i van v. Loui s i ana , 508 U. S. 275, 282 ( 1993)); s e e a l s o Mc Ka s kl e v. W i ggi ns , 465 U. S. 168, 177 n. 8 ( 1984) ( “ Si nc e th e r i ght of s e l f -rep resen tatio nis a rig h t th at w h en ex ercisedu su ally in c r e a s e s the l i ke l i hood of atr i a l out c om e unfavor abl e t o the defend ant, it s denia l i s not am enab le to ‘har m le ss er ror’ an aly sis.”). By c on tr a s t , ade fe nd ant ’ s t e s t i m on y ( or l a c k the r e of

) oc c ur s “ dur i ng the pr e s e nt at i on of the case to the jury” and “m ay ther efore b e q uantit at ivel y as se ss ed in the c on te xt of other evidence pres ente d .

. . .” Fu lm inante , 49 9 U.S. at 30 7-08

. In o th er w o rd s, w h en a d ef

en d an t states, “I w o u ldh av e testif iedto X , Y , an dZ , b u t my a t to rn ey w o u ldn o t p u t m e o nth e stan d ,” the s i gni fican c e of s uc h t e s t i m ony c an be e va l uat e d i n the c ont e xt of the r e m a i nde r of the e vi de nc e i n or de r t o a s s e s s the i m pa c t of the c ons t i t

ut i ona l vi ol at i on; thi s i s pr e c i s e l y the ty pe of consti tuti on al er

ror that i s am enable to conv enti on al re view in th e co n tex t o f th e trial an d ev id en ce as a w h o le. S e e i d .; Gonz a l e z - Lope z , 548 U

. S. at 150. I n c ontr a s t , whe n a d ef en d an t is, f

o r ex am p le, d en ied th e rig h t to th e atto rn ey o f h is ch o i c e , tr i e d be for e a bi a s e d judge , or de ni e d the r i g h t to re pres ent him se lf at

tr ia l, the i m

pact of the violati on defies harm le ss er

ror analy si s, beca

use any such anal y si s “ wo uld b e a spec ulat iv e i nq uiry

into wh at

m ight have occurre d in an- 28- altern ate u n iv erse.” G o n zalez-L o p ez, 5 4 8 U .S . at 1 5 0

. O f co u rse, th e d ef

en d an t’s o w n testim o n y is v ery lik ely t o be hi ghl y

i m port ant —a s we not e d above , “ the m os t i m port ant wi tne s s for the de fe ns e i n m any c r i m i na l c a s e s i s the de fe ndant hi m s e l f, ” Roc k, 483 U. S. at 52. As the Ni nth Ci r c ui t

ha s not e d, “[ a] s a g en eral m atter, it is o n ly th e m o st ex trao rd in ary o f trials inw h ich a d en ial o f

th e d ef en d an t’s rig h t to testif

y can b e said to b e h arm less b eyo n da reaso n ab le d o ub t.” M ar t i n e z v . Y lst, 95 1 F .2d 1 15 3, 11 57 (9th Cir. 19 91 ). Bu t i t i s pre ci se ly the fac t th at the c on tours of the defend ant’ s probable t es ti m on y (a s expres se d in an aff

idavit on coll at er al re view) can be ass es se d i n the c ont e xt

of the e vi de nc e a s a whol e that di s t i ngui s he s the ri gh t- to-t es ti fy

is sue f r om s t r uc t ur a ldefect s, the e ff

ec ts of wh ic h ar e i nhe r e nt l y e l us i ve , i nt angi bl e , and not s us c e pt i bl e to harm l e s s e rr or

r e vi e w. Se e Gonz a l e z - Lope z , 548 U. S. at 148, 149 n. 4. I n the abs e nc e of any Supr e m e Court author i ty t o the c ontr ary , and i n l i ght

of the unani m ous de t e rm i nat i on b y the Co urts of

A pp ea ls that

have address ed the i ss ue that St r i c kl and ’ s two - pr on g t e s t a pp l i e s i n r i gh t

- t o- t e s t i fy

c a s e s , we c o n c l u d e th at

P a l m e r w a s n o t

e x c u s e df

r o m mak i n g ap r i ma fa c i e s howi ng of pr e

judi c e i n hi s pe t i t i on f

o r pos t

- c onvi c t i on r elief

. Se e Str i c kl and , 4 6 6 U .S . at 69 3 (“[A] ct ual ineffect iv en es s c la im s a ll eging a defici ency in attorney pe r form anc e ar e s ubje c t t o age ne r a l r eq u ire m e nt that the d ef en d an t af f irm ativ ely

p ro v e p rej u d ice”). In sum , Pal m er

was r equire d to prov e p re ju dice in order to prev ai l on h is ineffecti ve as si st ance cl ai m , i d., andfact ual a l l e gat i ons of pr e

judi c e we r e thus an e s s e nt i a l c om pone nt t o a pr i m af a c i e s h o w i n g o f

h i s e n t i t l e m e n t

t o h ab e a s r e l i e f. Beca use Pal m er ’s peti ti on contai ns insuff ic ie nt fact

ual- 29- a l l e gat i ons t o de m ons tr at e hi s e nt i t l e m e nt t o r e l i e f, we c onc l ude that the Di s tr i c t

Court di d not abus e i t s di s c r e t i on i n de c l i ni ng t o c o n v e n e ane v i d e n t i ary h e ar i n g
. S e e , e
. g
. , C am p b e l l , 5 15 F .3 dat 1 8 4 ; Z ettlem o y er, 9 2 3 F .2 dat 3 0 0 -3 0 1

. B. Our de t e rm i nat i on that

Pa l m e r ’ s pe t i t i on fa i l s t o pr e s e nt apr i m afa c i e s howi ng of i ne ffe c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of c ouns e l and our de c i s i on that

the Di s tr i c t Court di d not abus e i t s di s c r e t i on w h en it d eclin edto h o ld an ev id en tiary h earin g are su f

f icien t to r e s o l v e th e r e m a i n i n g qu e s t i o nr a i s e di nth i s a p p e a l

—n am e l y, whe the r Pa l m e r ’ s att orne y

r e nde r e d i ne ffe c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of c ouns e l by

fa i l i ng t o a dvi s e Pa l m e r of hi s r i ght t o t e s t i fy and by fail ing to inf

orm Palm er that the dec is ion w as Palm er ’s to m ake. In order t o p re vail on his c la im that his att or n ey

re nd er ed co n stitu tio n ally

d ef icien t assi s t a n ce, P alm er w as requ iredto estab lish p rej u d ice b y

“s h o w [ in g ] th at [ th e d ef icien t co n du ct] a c t ua l l y ha d an a dve r s e e ffe c t

on the de fe ns e
. ” Str i c kl and , 466 U .S . at 693. Pa l m er’s pe t i t i on i s pl a i nl y i ns uffi c i e nt

t o m ake any such show ing, and, as we have explained, his st at ed desi re t o t e l l hi s s i de of the s t ory “ fa l l s far

s hort of s at i s fyi ng S trick lan d ’s p rej u d ice elem en t.” S ay re, 2 3 8 F .3 dat 6 3 5

. W e r e c ogni z e that be c aus e the s t at e c ourt s di d not de c i de the pre ju dice is sue on the m er it s, AE DP A’s defere ntia l st an dar ds do no t

a pp l y t o o ur r e s ol ut i onof

the pr e judice qu es ti on . See W igg ins v. S m it h , 5 3 9 U

. S

. 5 1 0 , 5 3 4 (20 0 3 ) (“In this cas e, our r evi ew i s not ci r cumscr i bed by a s t at e co u rt c o n c lu sio n w ith re sp e c t to p re ju d ice , as n e ith e r o f

th e sta te c o u rts b e lo w r e a c h e d th is p ro n g o f th e S trick lan d a n a ly sis .” ); s e e a l s o A p p el , 250 F. 3d at 210 ( AEDPA de fe r e nc e doe s notI n l i g h t o f o u r c o n c l u s i o n th at P a l m e r wa s not 9 pr e judi c e d by

hi s att orne y ’ s c onduc t , we do n o t a ddr e s s the P CR c ourt s ’ fa c t

ua l fi ndi ng that Pa l m e r wa s i nform e d o f h is r i ght t o t e s t i fy

. Se e Str i c kl and , 4 6 6 U .S . at 69 7 (“ I f i t i s eas i er t o di s pos e of an i neff

ect i venes s cl ai m on t he gr ound of l ack of s uffi ci ent pr ej udi ce, w hi ch w e expe ct w il l o ft en be s o, t hat cour s e s houl d be fol l ow ed .”).

- 30- apply to is sue not adju dicate d o n the m er it s by the s tate courts ). O u r d iscu ssio nh erein m ak es clear t h a t P alm er’s p etitio nis pl a i nl y i ns uffi c i e nt

t o de m ons tr at e pr e

judi c e u nde r

de novo rev iew . We th eref

o re co n clu d e th at th e D istrict C o u rt co rrectly di s m i s s e d Pa l m e r ’ s pe t i t i on. 9 IV . For the for e goi ng r e a s ons , we wi l l a ffi rm the judgm e nt o f th e D istrict C o u rt.