NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-2904

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PAVAN MAHESH VASWANI,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(A089-640-309)

Immigration Judge: Emily Farrar-Crockett

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

(November 14, 2022)

Before: HARDIMAN, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: November 15, 2022)

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OPINION*

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Pavan Vaswani petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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Board of Immigration Appeals. Vaswani contends the Board erred when it concluded that 

he failed to prove his removal would cause “extreme hardship” to his U.S.-citizen 

relatives. Because he challenges only factual and discretionary determinations, we lack 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). We will dismiss Vaswani’s petition.

I

A native and citizen of India, Vaswani entered the United States on a student visa 

in 1998 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2019, he was convicted of 

wire fraud and conspiracy, sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay 

$5.8 million in restitution. The Department of Homeland Security charged Vaswani with 

removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because his convictions were for

aggravated felonies, and an Immigration Judge found him removable. 

Vaswani later applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and 

sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), arguing that his removal 

would cause extreme hardship to his wife, two children, and mother—all U.S. citizens. 

An IJ conducted a hearing to evaluate the extreme-hardship claim, at which Vaswani and 

his wife testified. They testified that Vaswani’s wife and children would not relocate to 

India if he were removed, though his mother might. They also detailed the risks 

Vaswani’s removal would pose to the physical and mental health of his four qualifying 

relatives based on his wife’s and mother’s preexisting medical conditions and his two 

school-aged children’s anxiety. 

The IJ determined that this testimony failed to show hardships that, even when

combined, rise to the level of “extreme hardship.” So Vaswani was statutorily ineligible 
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for adjustment of status. Vaswani appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. After 

reviewing the hardships Vaswani’s wife, children, and mother would face, the Board

dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ that “the evidentiary record does not 

demonstrate that the hardships to [Vaswani’s relatives], when considered individually 

and in the aggregate, rise to the level of extreme hardship.” AR 9. Vaswani timely 

petitioned for review. 

II

Our jurisdiction over petitions for review of Board decisions is governed by 8 

U.S.C. § 1252. We lack jurisdiction here because Vaswani challenges the Board’s

discretionary hardship determination without raising any colorable constitutional or legal 

claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170–71 

(3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 

Vaswani challenges only one finding by the Board: that he failed to demonstrate

his removal will result in extreme hardship to his qualifying relatives. Vaswani sought 

relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B), which provides the Attorney General discretion to 

waive the application of certain criminal inadmissibility grounds if an alien’s removal

“would result in extreme hardship to the [alien’s] United States citizen or lawfully 

resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter.” We lack jurisdiction to review challenges to 

factual or discretionary decisions regarding § 1182(h) extreme-hardship determinations, 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022), and retain

only the “narrowly circumscribed” jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review 

“colorable constitutional claims or questions of law,” Cospito, 539 F.3d at 170 (internal 
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quotation marks and citation omitted).

Vaswani raises no colorable constitutional or legal claim; he challenges only the 

Agency’s factfinding and exercise of discretion. This challenge fails for the same reasons 

we explained in Cospito. See 539 F.3d at 170–71. There, we held that we lacked 

jurisdiction over a petition that argued the Agency gave insufficient weight to certain 

evidence, ignored other evidence, failed to adequately consider the emotional impact of 

removal, and evaluated hardships individually rather than jointly. Cospito, 539 F.3d at 

170. Vaswani’s arguments that the Agency failed to “aggregate the ordinary hardships to 

determine if they equal a determination of extreme hardship,” Vaswani Br. 10, and 

“grossly misapplied the applicable legal standard,” Vaswani Br. 22, are indistinguishable 

from those in Cospito. 

Vaswani’s framing on appeal—purporting to dispute the Board’s “statutory 

interpretation of the standard for extreme hardship” and alleging that the Board’s

“misapplication of the legal standard in question also constitutes a violation of due 

process,” Vaswani Br. 1—cannot save his petition. Vaswani “may not dress up a claim 

with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.” Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 

977 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 

Cospito, 539 F.3d at 170 (“A party cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court where none 

exists simply by attaching a particular label to the claim raised in a petition for review.”). 

Here, both the Board and IJ invoked the correct rule in concluding that he failed to show 

the hardships, “when considered individually and in the aggregate, rise to the level of 

extreme hardship.” See AR 9 (emphasis added); AR 79. Vaswani faults the Agency for 
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failing to properly apply the asserted aggregation rule, which calls into question only the 

Agency’s factfinding and discretion. 

For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review.