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Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Lash CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and 

Respondent,

v.

DASHEID KEYONTAE

LASH,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 A167156

 (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 

05001722768)

Defendant Dasheid Keyontae Lash appeals the summary 

denial of his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition to vacate his 

attempted murder conviction. We agree with Lash that the 

trial court erred by determining his eligibility for relief based 

on the information filed in December 2017, rather than the 

amended information filed in May 2019 charging Lash with 

attempted murder. We shall reverse the order and remand for 

further proceedings.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2017, the People filed an information 

against multiple defendants, including Lash and his brother, 

and charged Lash with one count of conspiracy to commit 

murder (§§ 182, 187; count 1); possession of a machine gun 

(§ 32625, subd. (a); count 6); conspiracy to commit pimping 

(§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 266h; count 8); and street terrorism 

(§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 9). The information also alleged that 

the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) 

The information was later amended on May 1, 2019 (the 

amended information), to add one count of attempted murder 

(§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 12) with an allegation that the 

crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang 

(§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The same day, Lash pleaded no contest to 

attempted murder (count 12) and to possession of a machine 

gun (count 6). Lash also admitted the gang enhancement as to 

count 12. The remaining charges were dismissed. A minute 

order was entered for the hearing at which the information 

was amended and the plea entered. We have no transcript of 

the hearing, however, so the factual basis for the plea is not 

reflected in the record. The court sentenced Lash to the 

stipulated term of 12 years, eight months in prison. 

In July 2022, Lash filed a pro se petition for resentencing 

pursuant to former section 1170.95 (current section 1172.6,

renumbered by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022). 
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The court appointed counsel for Lash. After a hearing, the 

court denied his petition at the prima facie stage. The court 

found that Lash had not established a prima facie case 

“because the charge was a conspiracy to commit murder, which 

requires a specific intent to commit murder, [and] a prima facie 

case is not made out, even though [Lash] eventually pled to the 

attempted murder.”2 Lash timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg. 

Sess. 2017–2018) amended the felony murder rule and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to 

murder, “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent 

to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony 

who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. 

Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, 

2 Below, Lash filed a joinder in his brother’s section 

1172.6 petition, which was decided prior to Lash’s petition. 

Lash’s brother, Darnell Keyon Lash, like Lash himself, was 

charged with conspiracy to commit murder in the 2017 

information and pleaded no contest to an attempted murder 

charge after the information was amended in 2019. That 

stipulated sentence in that case was 12 years in prison. The 

trial court stated at the hearing on Lash’s petition that it was 

adopting its decision from Lash’s brother’s petition. As 

respondent acknowledges, a separate panel of this Division 

reversed the court’s order in Lash’s brother’s case, finding that 

the trial court erred in determining eligibility for relief based 

on the information filed in 2017 rather than the amended 

information. (People v. Lash (July 17, 2023, A166708) 

[nonpub. opn.].) 
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§ 1, subd. (f).) The bill also established a procedure under 

former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, for eligible 

defendants to petition for resentencing. (Lewis, at p. 959.) 

Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 

No. 775 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) to clarify “that persons who 

were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a 

theory of felony murder [or] the natural [and] probable 

consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those 

persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 

2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)

A person convicted of attempted murder under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine may file a petition 

to have the conviction vacated and to be resentenced when the 

following conditions apply: “(1) A complaint, information, or 

indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the 

prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] 

(2) The petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted 

murder . . . following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a 

trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted 

of . . . attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not 

presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of 

changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute provides for appointment of 
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counsel upon receipt of a proper petition3, if so requested, and 

initial briefing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)–(c).) The trial court must 

then hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has 

established a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) 

The prima facie inquiry is “limited.” (Lewis, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court must accept the petitioner’s 

allegations as true and “should not make credibility 

determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing 

of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 974.) “If 

the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that 

the [petitioner] is ineligible for relief, the trial court may 

dismiss the petition” as a matter of law. (People v. Strong

(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) But if the court determines there 

is a prima facie showing, it must issue an order to show cause 

and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the 

attempted murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)

We review de novo whether the trial court properly 

denied the section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to 

show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)

Lash contends that the trial court erred by relying on the 

2017 information to determine his eligibility for relief for 

3 “The petition shall include all of the following: [¶] (A) A 

declaration by the petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for 

relief under this section, based on all the requirements of 

subdivision (a). [¶] (B) The superior court case number and 

year of the petitioner’s conviction. [¶] (C) Whether the 

petitioner requests the appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (b)(1)(A)–(C).)
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various reasons, and he specifically argues in his reply brief 

that the operative charging document is the amended 

information. Respondent disagrees, arguing that the 2017 

information would have been automatically reinstated had the 

parties withdrawn from, or had the court rejected, the plea, 

and Lash’s plea was not “in lieu of a trial” for attempted 

murder because the only trial he avoided was that on the 2017 

information. We agree with Lash and find respondent’s 

reliance on the 2017 information to be unpersuasive.4 

Even accepting that the information was amended in 

connection with the negotiated plea agreement, the amended 

information remains the operative charging document for 

purposes of resolving the section 1172.6 petition. “An amended 

accusatory pleading . . . supersedes the original pleading, 

which has no further effect.” (Garcia v. Superior Court (2020)

47 Cal.App.5th 631, 647; People v. Scott (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 

525, 533 [“when a pleading is amended, the original pleading is 

thereby set aside and abandoned”]; People v. Mack (1961) 

197 Cal.App.2d 574, 578 [“ ‘ “an amendatory pleading 

supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any 

function as a pleading” ’ ”]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (4th ed. 

2023) Pretrial, § 243, subd. (6).) Here, the 2017 information 

was amended to add a charge of attempted murder. At that 

4 Given our disposition, we do not address the additional 

arguments Lash raises in this appeal.
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point, the amended information was the operative pleading, 

and it included the attempted murder charge.

Respondent asserts that Lash never faced trial for 

attempted murder because that charge was only added with 

his acquiescence to effectuate the plea agreement. Citing 

People v. Superior Court (Garcia) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 256, 

and People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, respondent argues 

that, had the parties withdrawn from that agreement or had 

the court not approved it, the 2017 information would be 

automatically reinstated. We disagree.

In Garcia, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at page 258, the 

defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to first degree 

murder. But for the bargain, the prosecutor would have 

alleged special circumstances, and the defendant pleaded 

guilty to avoid the death penalty. (Id. at pp. 257–258.) After 

the judgment of conviction was reversed, the defendant 

withdrew his guilty plea, the prosecutor filed an amended 

information alleging special circumstances, and the defendant 

successfully moved to strike the new allegations. (Id. at 

p. 258.) The appellate court reversed the order striking the 

amended allegations. It explained, “Familiar and basic 

principles of law reinforced by simple justice require that when 

an accused withdraws his guilty plea the status quo ante must 

be restored. When a plea agreement has been rescinded the 

parties are placed by the law in the position each had before 

the contract was entered into. [Citation.] Here defendant 
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agreed to plead guilty to murder in order to obtain a reciprocal 

benefit: the forbearance of the prosecutor in not amending the 

information to seek the death penalty. When a defendant 

withdraws his plea, the prosecutor is no longer bound; counts 

dismissed may be restored.” (Id. at pp. 258–259.) In People v. 

Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 706–707, the court confirmed 

that when a plea is withdrawn, the court cannot “ ‘ “ ‘proceed to 

apply and enforce certain parts of the plea bargain, while 

ignoring’ others. [Citation.] Instead, the court must restore 

the parties to the status quo ante.” ’ ” In both cases, either 

counsel or the court, on its own motion, took some affirmative 

action after the plea was withdrawn; the reinstatement of the 

original charges did not happen automatically upon 

withdrawal of the plea.

Here, had the no contest plea been withdrawn or 

disapproved by the court, restoring the parties to the “status 

quo ante” would require undoing Lash’s assent to the 

amendment. Lash would then have been free to challenge the 

amendment with a section 995 motion. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B)

[information shall be set aside if defendant has been 

committed without reasonable or probable cause]; People v. 

Sherwin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1411 [purpose of a section 

995 motion to set aside accusatory pleading is to review 

sufficiency of information based upon preliminary hearing 

record].) Likewise, as noted ante, the prosecution could elect to 

proceed with the amended information, or it could move to 
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amend to restore the dismissed counts and/or to add any 

additional counts otherwise permissible under section 1009.5 

Respondent cites no authority for an exception to the general 

rule that an amended information supersedes the original 

pleading, which has no further effect (Garcia v. Superior Court, 

supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 647). Accordingly, we do not agree 

that the 2017 information would automatically have been 

reinstated and the amended information stricken upon 

withdrawal of the plea agreement.

Applying section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to the amended 

information, we conclude that Lash’s petition, on its face, 

establishes a prima facie showing of his eligibility for relief: 

The generic charge of attempted murder permitted the 

prosecution to proceed under the natural and probable 

consequences theory.6 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Das 

(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 958, 962–964 [prima facie case 

established where prosecution could have pursued attempted 

murder on a theory of aiding and abetting a gang assault, the 

natural and probable consequence of which was attempted 

5 Under section 1009, after a defendant has entered a 

plea, an information may be amended to add an offense so long 

as it is one “shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary 

examination.” 

6 Aside from respondent’s argument that 2017 

information is the operative charging document and 

establishes Lash’s ineligibility as a matter of law (an argument 

we have rejected), respondent does not otherwise contend that 

the record of conviction demonstrates Lash’s ineligibility for 

relief as a matter of law. 
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murder committed by a codefendant].) Lash accepted a plea 

offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of 

attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2).) And Lash’s 

petition includes a sufficient averment that he could not 

presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes 

to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, as the 

trial court recognized.7 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)

As Lash met the “ ‘very low’ ” prima facie bar (Lewis, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), the trial court must issue an order 

to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary 

hearing to determine whether Lash is entitled to relief. 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) On remand, with the benefit of a more 

complete record, the trial court will be able to determine 

whether Lash’s plea necessarily establishes that he is guilty of 

attempted murder based on his aiding and abetting of the 

attempted murder, rather than his aiding and abetting of a 

7 Lash filed a pro se petition averring generally that 

Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg. Sess. 2017–2018) and Senate Bill 

No. 775 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) applied to his conviction and 

afforded him relief. He also filed a joinder in his brother’s form 

petition that complied with the requirements of section 1172.6, 

subdivision (b), including the requirement of a declaration that 

petitioner is eligible for relief under that section, based on all 

the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (a). (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (b)(1)(A).) The trial court’s appointment of counsel for 

Lash shows that it concluded that his petition contained all the 

information required under section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6, 

subds. (b)(1)(A)–(C), (3).) 
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target crime for which the attempted murder was a natural 

and probable consequence.

DISPOSITION

The order summarily dismissing Lash’s petition for 

resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed. 

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.

SMILEY, J.

People v. Lash (A167156)

 Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of 

Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.