WILLIAM A. BISHOP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF TH E ESTATE OF DONNA L. BIS HOP, HIS DECEASED WI FE (“BISHOP” ), ANZUALDA BROTHERS, INC., AND JESUS E. MARINO CASTILLO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN EMPLOYEE OF ANZUALDA BROTHERS, INC. , (COLLECTIV ELY, “ANZUALDA BROTHERS”) , Appellant,

v. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE COMPANY , Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CA SE NO. 1D 14

- 0 278

_____________________________/ Opinion filed January 6, 2015. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Levy County

. William E. Davis & Robert E. Roundtree, Jr. , Judge s . Stephen A. Mari no, Jr. and Rochelle N. Wimbush of Ver Ploeg & Lumpkin , Miami; James W. Gustafson, Jr. of Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Talla hassee; and Cameron M. Kennedy of Corry & Kennedy, Tallahassee , for Appellant s . Scott A. Cole of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami , for Appellee.PER CURIAM. Undertaking communication, conduct, and steps in defense of an underlying action, heavily dependent upon the circumstances, may rise to a coverage by estoppel claim. This appeal involves an allegation an insurer made statements and undertook actions which led a business owner to be lieve she had ins urance coverage for the underlying action ; all this despite the insurer’s knowledge of facts which would have per mitted it to deny coverage. “When an insurance company assumes the defense of an action, with knowledge, actual or presumed , of facts which would have permitted it to deny coverage, it may be estopped from subsequently raising the defense of non

coverage.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 653 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Cigarette Racing Team, Inc. v. Parliament Ins. Co. , 395 So. 2d 1238, 1239

- 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “coverage by estoppel” claim requires a representation of material fact, reasonable reliance, and a detrimental change in position (i.e., prejudice) as a resu lt of the reliance. See Tome v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 125 So. 3d 864, 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. McQueen , 286 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Prejudice and whether the promisee’s reliance was reasonable are generally question s for the trier of fact. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc. , 395 So. 2d at 1239

- 40 ; see also Romo v.

2Amedex Ins. Co. , 930 So. 2d 643, 652

- 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Thor Bear, Inc. v. Crocker Mizner Park, Inc. , 648 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); FCCI Ins.
C o. v. Cayce’s Excavation, Inc. , 901 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, we do not pass on the strength of the business owner’s claims regarding the insurer’s conduct and actions or what the business owner believed afterwards. That is for the trier of fact to determine. We write only to confirm the cause of action exists, such a claim does not sound in bad faith, and here it was for the trier of fact to determine the ultimate weight to give the insurer’s conduct versus the reasonableness of the busi ness owner’s reliance. 1 We REVERSE the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer as to this count 2 and REMAND for further proceedings

. LEWIS, C.J., CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., CONCUR.

1 We not e that in the initial and reply briefs counsel for the appellants signed a “certificate of compliance” affirming he “hereby certifies that this Brief is in the Times New Roman 14

- point font and is therefore in compliance with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.210(2).” T he brief is unquestionably neither in Times New Roman 14

- point font nor Courier New 12

- point font, and therefore not in compliance with Rule 9.210(2). Rules of procedure are applicable to everyone. The rule gave counsel two options

— he selected neither. 2 As to all the other coun ts, we affirm the court’s determinations without comment. 3