J-S42038-19

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SAMUEL EADDY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2399 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 7, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001918-2010, 

CP-51-CR-0006203-2014, CP-51-CR-0009727-2011

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: Filed: August 25, 2020

Appellant, Samuel Eaddy, appeals from orders of Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) in three criminal proceedings that 

dismissed his petitions for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA).

1

 After careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA petitions here sought relief from violation of probation 

sentences imposed in two separate criminal cases, CP-51-CR-0001918-2010 

(CR-1918-2010) and CP-51-CR-0009727-2011 (CR-9727-2011), that were 

imposed following his negotiated guilty plea in a third case, CP-51-CR0006203-2014 (CR-6203-2014), and from the sentence in that third case. 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
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In CR-1918-2010, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on October 

22, 2010 to burglary,

2 graded as a second-degree felony, and was sentenced 

to 111/2 months to 23 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of 

probation. Appellant was paroled immediately following this plea and 

sentence. In CR-9727-2011, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

second-degree felony burglary, possession of an instrument of crime, and 

resisting arrest, and was sentenced on November 14, 2011 to 11/2 years to 3 

years of incarceration and 2 years of probation on the burglary conviction. No 

further penalty was imposed for the possession of an instrument of crime and 

resisting arrest convictions. Appellant committed the burglary for which he 

was convicted in CR-9727-2011 on May 3, 2011, while he was still on parole 

in CR-1918-2010. As a result of the conviction in CR-9727-2011, the trial 

court on November 14, 2011 sentenced Appellant in CR-1918-2010 to

confinement for the remainder of his backtime and 3 years of probation. 

On April 12, 2014, Appellant committed a third burglary. On June 8, 

2015, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea with respect to this burglary 

in CR-6203-2014, in which he pleaded guilty to first-degree felony burglary 

and was sentenced to 6 to 18 years’ imprisonment. Based on Appellant’s 

guilty plea in CR-6203-2014, the trial court on June 8, 2015 revoked

Appellant’s probation and sentenced him for violation of probation in CR-1918-

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).
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2010 and CR-9727-2011. In both cases, the trial court imposed sentences of

3 to 6 years of incarceration and ordered that these sentences were to run 

concurrently with respect to each other, but that they were to run 

consecutively to Appellant’s 6-to-18 year sentence in CR-6203-2014. CR1918-2010 Probation Violation Order, 6/8/15; CR-9727-2011 Probation 

Violation Order, 6/8/15; N.T., 6/8/15, at 24.

Appellant filed no post-sentence motion or appeals from any of the June 

8, 2015 judgments of sentence. On April 14, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se

PCRA petition in CR-6203-2014. Appellant did not, however, file any PCRA 

petition in CR-1918-2010 or CR-9727-2011 at that time. CR-1918-2010 

Docket Entries; CR-9727-2011 Docket Entries. On August 8, 2016, counsel

was appointed to represent Appellant with respect to his PCRA petition in CR6203-2014. PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition in CR-6203-2014

on July 30, 2017. On August 1, 2017, PCRA counsel filed PCRA petitions on 

Appellant’s behalf in CR-1918-2010 and CR-9727-2011 and filed amended 

PCRA petitions in both of those cases on August 2, 2017. 

In all three amended PCRA petitions, Appellant asserted claims that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to order a mental health evaluation prior to 

sentencing and for failing to file requested post-sentence motions and direct

appeals. On May 11, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the PCRA petitions

at which Appellant and his trial counsel testified. On August 7, 2018, the trial 

court entered orders in all three cases dismissing the PCRA petitions. The trial 
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court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the PCRA petitions in CR-1918-2010 

and CR-9727-2011 because they were not filed within the PCRA’s one-year 

time limit. Trial Court Order, 8/7/18 at 2 n.2. With respect to the PCRA 

petition in CR-6203-2014, the trial court found that Appellant did not request 

that trial counsel file any post-sentence motions or appeals and that he did 

not show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to order a mental 

health evaluation. Id. at 3; Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/18, at 4-6. 

On August 13, 2018, Appellant filed timely appeals from the dismissal 

of the PCRA petitions in all three cases.3 Appellant presents one issue for our 

review in all three appeals:

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3 Under Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), an appellant 

is required to file a separate notice of appeal in each trial court docket that he 

intends to appeal and where only a single notice of appeal is filed, the appeal 

must be quashed. Although Appellant included all three docket numbers on 

each of his notices of appeal, the record is clear that Appellant complied with 

this requirement by filing a separate notice of appeal in each docket, as each 

of the notices of appeal has a different time stamp and there are separate 

confirmations of e-filing for each docket, each of which shows a different time 

of filing. CR-1918-2010 Notice of Appeal; CR-9727-2011 Notice of Appeal; 

CR-6203-2014 Notice of Appeal; Response to Rule to Show Cause Ex. B. 

While these appeals were pending, a three-judge panel of this Court filed a 

published opinion in Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Super. 

2019), holding that the listing of multiple docket numbers in a notice of appeal 

does not comply with the requirement of separate appeals and requires that

the appeals be quashed even if the notices of appeal are filed in the records 

of each case. Id. at 1144. Shortly thereafter, the Court granted en banc

review to decide whether Walker permits only one docket number to appear 

on a notice of appeal and these appeals were held in abeyance pending the 

resolution of the issue by the Court en banc. On July 9, 2020, the Court en 

banc expressly overruled Creese’s determination that the inclusion of multiple 

docket numbers invalidates notices of appeal that are in fact filed by the 
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Did the lower court err by dismissing the Appellant's PCRA petition 

as meritless when it found that trial counsel was not ineffective 

when she failed to order a mental health evaluation prior to the 

Appellant's sentencing on the three transcripts?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Before we consider this issue, we must address whether Appellant’s 

PCRA petitions in CR-1918-2010 and CR-9727-2011 were timely filed. The 

question of whether a PCRA petition is timely is a question of law over which

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 488 (Pa. Super. 2018);

Commonwealth v. Woods, 179 A.3d 37, 42 (Pa. Super. 2017). The PCRA 

provides that “[a]ny petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The PCRA’s time limit is 

jurisdictional, and a court may not ignore it and reach the merits of the 

petition, even where the convicted defendant claims that his sentence is 

illegal. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222-23 (Pa. 1999); Pew, 

189 A.3d at 488; Woods, 179 A.3d at 42.

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appellant in each docket. Commonwealth v. J. Johnson, __ A.3d __, __, 

2020 PA Super 164, at *12 (filed July 9, 2020) (en banc). Accordingly,

because the record shows that Appellant filed a separate notice of appeal in 

each of the dockets, his appeals fully complied with Walker and are valid. J. 

Johnson, __ A.3d at __, at *11-*12; see also Commonwealth v. R. 

Johnson, __ A.3d __, __, 2020 PA Super 173, at *3-*4 (filed July 23, 2020)

(en banc). 
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Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all three cases became final on July 

8, 2015, when the thirty-day period for filing appeals from the sentences 

imposed on June 8, 2015 expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). The one-year 

period time limit for filing PCRA petitions in these cases therefore expired on 

July 8, 2016. Appellant did not, however, file any PCRA petition in either 

CR-1918-2010 or CR-9727-2011, until August 1, 2017, more than one year 

later and more than two years after his sentences in those cases became final. 

Although Appellant did file a timely PCRA petition in CR-6203-2014 in April 

2016, that filing cannot constitute a PCRA petition in CR-1918-2010 or CR9727-2011, as it bears only the CR-6203-2014 docket number, challenges 

only the conviction and 6-to-18 year sentence in that case, and does not refer 

at all to the probation revocations or 3-to-6 year violation of probation 

sentences in CR-1918-2010 and CR-9727-2011. CR-6203-2014 PCRA Petition

at 1-3. 

A PCRA petition may be filed beyond the one-year time period only if 

the convicted defendant pleads and proves one of the following three 

exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant, however, does not contend that any of 

these exceptions apply. Rather, he has alleged that his CR-1918-2010 and 

CR-9727-2011 PCRA petitions were timely solely on the basis of his timely 

April 14, 2016 PCRA petition in CR-6203-2014, which does not constitute a 

PCRA petition in either CR-1918-2010 or CR-9727-2011. CR-1918-2010 

Amended PCRA Petition at 3-4; CR-9727-2011 Amended PCRA Petition at 3-

4.

4

With respect to the dismissal of Appellant’s timely CR-6203-2014 PCRA 

petition, we review this order to determine whether the record supports the 

trial court’s findings and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth 

v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007). 

Appellant’s sole claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

order a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing. To be entitled to relief 

under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the convicted 

defendant must prove: (1) that the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; 

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4 We note that the untimeliness of Appellant’s CR-1918-2010 and CR-9727-

2011 PCRA petitions was not caused by any act or omission of his present 

PCRA counsel, as his present PCRA counsel was not appointed until after the 

one-year PCRA time limit had already expired. 
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(2) that counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable basis; and (3) that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction. Mason, 130 

A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 442 (Pa. Super. 

2018); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc). The defendant must satisfy all three elements of this test to obtain 

relief under the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706. 

The trial court correctly concluded that Appellant did not show that the 

failure to order a mental health evaluation caused him prejudice. To satisfy 

the prejudice element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

convicted defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1127; Stewart, 84 A.3d at

707. Where, as here, trial counsel’s error is a failure to provide proper 

representation with respect to the defendant’s sentencing, the prejudice 

element requires that the defendant show a reasonable probability that the 

action that counsel failed to take would have resulted in a more favorable 

sentence. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1131-32; Presley, 193 A.3d at 444-45.

Here, there was no reasonable probability that ordering a mental health 

evaluation would have resulted in a different sentence in CR-6203-2014. As 

Appellant concedes, the 6-to-18 year sentence was a negotiated sentence that 

required no evaluation of sentencing factors. Appellant’s Brief at 8, 10. 

Moreover, prior to accepting the plea and imposing sentence, the trial court 
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was provided information concerning Appellant’s serious mental health issues, 

including the fact he suffered from schizophrenia and alcoholism, had suffered 

a stroke, and was not receiving his medications. N.T., 6/8/15, at 5-8, 20-21, 

23-24. Appellant does not point to any information that a mental health 

evaluation would have provided the trial court concerning Appellant’s mental 

health or impairments beyond the information that it in fact received that 

could have caused the trial court to reject the negotiated sentence or affect 

its determination of an appropriate sentence. Appellant does not contend that 

additional information from a mental health evaluation would have caused the 

trial court to reject his guilty plea as involuntary. Indeed, Appellant does not 

assert that his plea was involuntary or seek to have his plea set aside; rather 

the only prejudice that he argues is the possible effect on his violation of 

probation sentences and the only relief that he seeks is resentencing in the 

violation of probation cases. Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. 

Because Appellant’s PCRA petitions in CR-1918-2010 and CR-9727-

2011 were untimely and Appellant failed to show that trial counsel’s alleged 

error caused him prejudice in CR-6203-2014, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

orders dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petitions.

Orders affirmed. 

Judge Ott did not participate in the consideration or decision of these 

matters. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/20