UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________ YVONNE HUNTLEY, ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 11-176 (AK) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is pending before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for [summary judgment on the issue of] Fees and Costs (“Fee Mo tion”) and Memorandum in support thereof (“Memorandum”) [10]; Defendant’s opposition to the Moti on (“Opposition”) [11]; and Plaintiff’s reply to the Opposition (“Reply”) [12]. 1 Plaintiff Yvonne Huntley (“Plaintiff’) has requested $1,207.25 in legal fees and costs, a po rtion of which is contes ted by Defendant District of Columbia (“Defendant” or “the District”) on grounds that the doc umentation supporting such claim is inadequate; the hourly rate charged by Plaintiff’s counsel is excessive and some of counsel’s billing entries are “remote” in time . (Opposition, Exh. 1 [Defendant’s chart of proposed allowable fees and reasons for fee reductions].) 2 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is the guardian of a minor child who prevailed in an administrative action brought pursuant to the Individua ls with Disabilities Educati on Act and the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Improvement Ac t ( collectively “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), a court may aw ard attorney’s fees to a parent who prevails

1 This same Fee Motion is filed in multiple cas es involving claims for attorneys’ fees and costs; the Plaintiff in this action is Yvonne Huntley.

2 Defendant’s chart entries for the three cl aims by this Plaintiff [the Superior Court captions, District Court captions, and amount s claimed] are erroneously recorded.in an IDEA proceeding. Prior to filing this civi l action, the Plaintiff participated in a January 9, 2008 due process hearing wherein the Hearing Officer determined that: . . . [DCPS’s] rejection of [counsel’s] electi on on behalf of [Plaintiff] was arbitrary and capricious. [Counsel’s] correspondence with [DCPS] put DCPS on notice that he represented Petitioner. As noted above, the Decree clearly contemplates that DCPS would work cooperatively with Petitioners ’ attorneys in fac ilitating compensatory education awards. [DCPS’s] decision to ignore [counsel’s] unamb iguous election of an MDT meeting instead of a product from the Catalog violated the specific terms and intent of the Decree. (January 10, 2008 Hearing Officer ’s Interim Order (“HOD”) at 5-6, attached to Notice of Removal [1] (emphasis in original).) The Hearing Officer inter alia ordered DCPS to “convene an MDT meeting . . . .” (HOD at 6.) The District does not contest Plaintiff’s prevaili ng party status in this case but the District does note an objection to Plainti ff’s “inadequate documentation” in the chart attached to its Opposition as Exhibit 1. The Di strict proffers no explanation fo r this objection other than its claim that the HOD in this case “appear s identical” to an HOD in another case. 3 Comparing the two HODs, this Court notes that District’s claim of “inadequate documentation” is unsupported. The two cases being compared invol ve different petitioners with different hearing dates who had similar issues considered by the same Heari ng Officer. Defendant makes no rational argument that would preclude Plaintiff in this case from r ecovering legal fees because of any similarity in the Hearing Officer’s decisions. Plaintiff originally filed her complaint for legal fees and co sts with the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of th e District of Columbia. Defendant removed this

3 Because of the previously noted errors in DCPS’s chart regarding the entries for claims by Plaintiff Yvonne Huntley, the entry regard ing “inadequate documen tation” should compare the HOD in this Hundley case to the HOD in the Flores case [Civil Action No. 11-156]. 2and other simultaneously filed cas es to this Court and the parties subsequently consented to the referral of all such cases to the undersigned Ma gistrate Judge for all purposes. The parties were directed to brief the issues in these cases in the form of mo tions for legal fees and responses thereto. II. LEGAL STANDARD The IDEA gives courts authority to award reas onable attorney’s fees to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevaili ng party. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B). An action or proceeding under IDEA includes both civil litigation in federal court and administrative litigation before hearing officers. Smith v. Roher , 954 F. Supp. 359, 362 (D.D.C. 1997); Moore v. District of Columbia , 907 F.2d 165, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 998 (1990). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests. See In re North , 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A] fee applicant bears th e burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates.”) “An award of attorneys’ fees is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case.” Smith , 954 F. Supp. at 364 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhard , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)); Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The result of this calculation is the “lodestar” amount. Smith , 954 F. Supp. at 364. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(C) states that “[f]ees aw arded under this paragr aph shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. §1415( i)(3)(C). To demonstrate a reasonable hourly rate, the fee applicant must show: an attorney’s usual billing practices; c ounsel’s skill, experience

3and reputation; as well as the prev ailing market rates in the community. Covington , 57 F.3d at 1107. The determination of a “market rate for the se rvices of a lawyer is inherently difficult” and is decided by the court in its discretion. Blum , 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested [hourly ] rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. An attorney’s usual billing rate may beconsidered the “reasonable rate” if it accords with the rates prevaili ng in the community for similar services by lawyers possessing similar skill, experience and reputation. Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia , 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C.Cir. 1993). A party moving for summary judgment on le gal fees accordingly must demonstrate prevailing party status and the r easonableness of the fees requested in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), summary judgment shall be granted if the movant shows that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Summary judgment should be grante d against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court is required to draw all justifiabl e inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor and to accept the nonmoving party’ s evidence as true. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. The nonmoving party must establish more than “the mere exis tence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. Nor may the non-moving party rely on allegations or conclusory

4statements; instead, the non-moving party is obliged to present spec ific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find it its favor. Greene v Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). III. ANALYSIS A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates Plaintiff seeks fees for the services of two la wyers and three paralegals, to be paid at the following rates: $475.00/hour for Douglas Tyrka, an attorney with 8-10 years experience during the relevant time period; $268.00 per hour for Zachary Nahass, an attorney with approximately 1-2 years experience during the relevant time period, and $146.00/$150. 00 per hour for Patrick Meehan, Yanet Scott and Camille McKenzie, w ho were paralegals with the firm Tyrka & Associates during that same period of time. 4 (Plaintiff’s Itemization of Fees/Expenses, attached to Notice of Removal [1]; Fee Motion [10], E xh. 2 [Verified Statement of Douglas Tyrka (“Tyrka”)] ¶¶ 8 -11, 15.) According to Tykra’s Verified Statement (“VerifiedStatement”), “[t]he hourly rates in the itemization are the rates Tyrk a & Associates has customarily charged.” (Exh. 2 ¶4.) Tyrka further asserts that “clients haveretained Tyrka & A ssociates with the understanding and agreement that th e client would retain full res ponsibility for all fees regardless of what was reimbursed by third partie s, at rates consistent with ‘the Laffey [M]atrix’ as adjusted per the finding in Salazar v. District of Columbia , 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000), and other cases.” (Exh. 2 ¶4.) 5 Plaintiff relies upon the rates set forth in the “enhanced” Laffey

4 The law firm’s hourly rate for paralegal charges occurring after May 31, 2008 increased from $146/hour to $150/hour, even though the “enhanced” Laffey Matrix rates increased from $146/hour to $152/hour during that same time.

5 The Laffey Matrix is “a schedule of charges ba sed on years of experience” developed in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds , 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), as modified by Save Our 5Matrix in her request for attorney’s fees but Tyrka’s Verified Statement does not indicate how frequently Plaintiff’s counsel is paid at these “enhanced” Laffey rates. 6 Nor has counsel presented affidavits attesting to the actual bill ing rates of lawyers who do similar IDEA work. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has not provided specifi c information about the nature or complexity of the IDEA administrative work performed in this case. Plaintiff asserts that in order to demonstrate prevailing market rates, she may “point to such evidence as an updated [enhanced] version of the Laffey Matrix or the U.S. Attorney’s Office [“USAO”] Matrix, or [her ] own survey of prevailing market rates in the community.” (Memorandum in support of Fee Mo tion (“Memorandum”) at 8 (citing Covington , 57 F.3d at 1109 (additional citation omitted))). In the Covington case, which involved al legations of civil rights violations, the Court of Appeal s for the D. C. Circuit did look to Laffey rates for prevailing market rates but the relevant market therein wa s “complex federal litigation,” 57 F.3d at 1110. In contrast, this case involve s IDEA litigation, which is not complex federal litigation because most if not all of the attorney’s fees in question are the result of c ounsel’s preparation for

Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel , 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Laffey Matrix was first developed based upon in formation about the prevailing rates charged for complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia, and it is maintained by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and is updated annually to reflect increases in the local Consumer Price Index. See Laffey Matrix - 2003-2012, n.3, available at: htttp://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divi dions/civil_Laffe y_Matrix_2003-2012.pdf. The “enhanced” Laffey Matrix is a schedule of fees based on the original Laffey Matrix, with adjustments to reflect increases in the national Legal Services Index, prepared by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Fee Motion, Exh.3.)

6 See generally MacClarence v. Johnson , 539 F.Supp.2d 155, 160 (D.D.C. 2008)(expressing concern that “s tandardized hourly rates ove rcompensate lawyers whose practices are contingent fee base d and therefore compensated at anhourly rate they never charge and none of their c lients could pay”). 6attendance at routine administrati ve hearings. Accordingly, the Laffey Matrix rates are inapplicable as prevailing market rates. Plaintiff additionally relies upon Rooths v District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 09- 0492, Report and Recommendati on of March 31, 2011, and Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs , Civil Action No. 06-1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8. (Fee Motion, Exhs. 5-7). 7 According to Plaintiff, in these two IDEA cases litigated in th is United States District Court, the firm’s clients received an award of fees “based on rates exactly in line with those presented here, . . . ” (Memorandum at 8.) As a preliminary matter, this Court notes th at the mere showing that a high hourly rate was approved in another case does not in and of itself establish a new market rate or prove that the new rate is reasonable. Fu rthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on Rooths v District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 09-0492, Report and Reco mmendation of March 31, 2011 at 10-11 (Fee Motion, Exh. 5), is misplaced because the trial court ultimately rejected the application of enhanced Laffey rates, applied Laffey Matrix rates as a starting poi nt, and then reduced those rates by 25%. Rooths v District of Columbia , 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2011). In Rooths , the Honorable Paul L. Friedman notedthat “[i]n this circuit, the rates contained in the Laffey Matrix are typically treated as the hi ghest rates that will be presumed to be reasonable when a court reviews a petition for statutory attorneys’ fees.” 802 F Supp. 2d 61.

7 Plaintiff relies on Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Suggs , Civil Action No. 06- 1284, Motion for Attorneys’ Fees of July 10, 2008 and Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2009 at 5-8, but this case is inapposite because there was no challenge to the reasonableness of the hours expended by counsel or th e hourly rates in that case. 7The trial court declined “to approve as reasonable the inflatedrates contained in a proposed alternative fee matrix.” Id. ; see Blackman v. District of Columbia , 677 F. Supp. 2d 169, 176 (D.D.C. 2010) (in determining prevailing market rates, the court declined to apply enhanced Laffey rates). The Rooths court further refused to apply enhanced Laffey rates, in part because it found that the “[enhanced Laffey ] matrix was generated using national statistics rather than measurements particular to the District of Columbia area.” 802 F. Supp.2d at 62 (emphasis in original); see also DL v. District of Columbia , 256 F.R.D. 239, 243 (D.D.C. 2009) (because the USAO [ Laffey ] Matrix accounts for price inflation with in the local community, it more aptly focuses on the relevant community than the [enhanced] Laffey Matrix based on the legal services index). The Rooths court commented that “[w]hile it is doubtless true that some sectors of the legal services industry have expe rienced rapid fee inflation in recent years, [it was] unconvinced that fees associated with IDEA litigation in th e District of Columbia have increased at the same rate.” 802 F. Supp. 2d at 62. Recognizing the difficulty courts encounter in determining what are reasonable legal fees, this Court agrees with the rationale set forth in Rooths, and finds that the Plaintiff’s reliance on an enhanced Laffey Matrix is unsupported because suchMatrix does not provide an accurate representation of District of Columbia legal fees applicable to IDEA cases. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that IDEA litigati on involving administrative heari ngs is the type of “complex federal litigation” encompassed by the Laffey rates. See McClam v. District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 11-381 (RMC), September 6, 2011 Memo randum Opinion at 8 (declining to apply Laffey rates in part on grounds that “IDEA cases are generally not complex [and in that case,] Plaintiffs . . . pointed to no novel issue or other complexity that tu rned this, particular IDEA case

8into a complicated piece of litigation.”) 8 Defendant’s argument against imposition of Laffey rates primarily focuses on the Rooths and McClam decisions, supra. but the Defendant also assert s that “Plaintiffs have made no serious attempt to show that rates under the Laffey Matrix are appropriate in this case or, more specifically, that Laffey rates were necessary to attract co mpetent counsel in the underlying, special education matters.” (Opposition at 13.) 9 Defendant further argues that there is no “inherent right to Laffey rates.” (Opposition at 13 (citation omitted)); see Lively v Flexible Packaging Assoc ., 930 A.2d 984, 990 (D.C. 2007) (accepting the Laffey Matrix as one legitimate means of calculating attorney’s fees and using it as a starting point instead of an automatic application). Federal courts do not automatically have to award Laffey rates but instead they can look at the complexity of the case and use their discretion to determine whether such rates are warranted. See Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc. , 397 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 2005) ( awarding fees at a rate 25% less than Laffey in a “relatively straightforward negligence suit”). This Court follows the reasoning of the Rooths case and other cases declining to apply enhanced Laffey rates. Considering that this is a straightforward case seeking IDEA legal fees, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failedto demonstrate that the hourly rates set by her

8 The McClam court acknowledged that “[f]ederal distri ct courts in this circuit disagree whether Laffey rates should be applie d in IDEA cases.” McClam Memorandum Opinion at 6 (citations omitted).

9 See Kenny A. v. Perdue , 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010) “a ‘reas onable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the represen tation of a meritorious civil rights case”); see also Lively v. Flexible Packaging Association , 930 A.2d 984, 990 (D.C. 2007) (cautioning that the goal of fee- shifting provisions is not to pr ovide counsel with a windfall but to attract competent counsel). 9counsel, which are based on enhanced Laffey rates, are reasonable. 10 Such enhanced rates do not reflect what the local legal market will bear in terms of legal fees for IDEA litigation. Using the [USAO] Laffey Matrix as a starting point for determin ation of a reasonable hourly rate, this Court determines that the hourly rate for Dougl as Tyrka [attorney with 8-10 years experience] would be $315.00; the hourly rate for Zachary Nahass [attorney with 1-2 years experience] would be $215.00, instead of $268.00, while the rate for a paralegal [Patrick Meehan, Yanet Scott and Camille McKenzie] would be$125.00/$130.00 instead of $146.00/$150.00. These rates should be further reduced however because the Laffey Matrix rates are the presumed maximum rates appropriate for “complex federal litigation,” Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d at 1103, and IDEA liti gation generally does not fall within that category. The case at issue is no exception to that general ruleinsofar as it involves a routine administrative proceeding summarized in the Hearing Officer ’s Interim Order date d January 10, 2008 (HOD [1]) and the time spent [bille d] in preparation for the hearing was nominal. (Itemization of Fees/Expenses.) In such a cas e, an hourly rate below the Laffey Matrix rates is appropriate. See Wilson v. District of Columbia , Civil Action No. 09-2258, 2011 WL 1428090, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2011) ( Laffey Matrix is “not generally applicableto IDEA cases because they are not usually complex”); A.C. ex rel. Clark v. District of Columbia , 674 F.Supp.2d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the USAO Laffey inapplicable in an IDEA cas e where “almost all of the attorney’s fees in question are the result of counsel’s preparation fo r attendance at routine administrative hearing”); Agapito v. District of Columbia , 525 F.Supp.2d 150, 155 (D.D.C.

10 By statute the Court determines the reasonabl eness of the hourly rate for the legal fees. The negotiated legal fee hourly rate between the attorney and his client may be more or less than the hourly rate set by the Court. 102007) (adjusting attorney fee awar d and declining to rely on the Laffey Matrix for these “relatively simple and straighforward IDEIA cases ”). The Court will therefore award fees at an hourly rate equal to three-quarters of the USAO Laffey Matrix rate, which is $236.00 for Tyrka; $161.00 for Nahass and $94.00/98.00 fo r Meehan, Scott and McKenzie 11 B. Challenges to Time Charges Defendant claims that some of the hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel should not be compensated because they are too remote in time as to “precludea meaningful relationship with the hearing.” (Opposition at 16, citing Czarniewy v. District of Columbia , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5161, at *11 (D.D.C. March 25, 2005)). See also Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (where administrative fee charges have no temporal proximity to the proceeding on which the ri ght to fees is based but instead appear to be administrative matters between counsel and his client, these charges are not appropriate for reimbursement). Defendant asserts that “[t]he statute does not contemplate an undefined form of ongoing representation of students [but instead] [i]t quantifies the activities for which school districts are obliged to reimburse legal represen tation to the administrative process described in 20 U.S.C. §1415. . . .” (Opposition at 16.) A review of the time sheets submitted by Plai ntiff shows that the time charges noted by counsel have sufficient temporal proximity to the date of th e HOD. Some of the time entries predate and include the due process hearing, reflecting preparation for and attendance at the hearing;

11 Defendant notes that a 25% reduction in Laffey Matrix rates brings these fees in line with its DCPS Fee Guidelines (Opposition at 15); how ever, it is not the intent of this Court to mirror the DCPS Fee Guidelines but instead to apply a percentagereduction that represents the fact that most IDEA litigation [involving admini strative proceedings] is not complex federal litigation warranting the application of Laffey Matrix rates. 11several time entries note the hearing and counsel ’s actions taken in response to the Hearing Officer’s Determination; and finally, some timeentries following the HOD reflect follow-up by counsel, including time spent ensuring HOD complian ce. This Court will not further reduce time charges based on Defendant’s claim that some charges are remote. C. Costs Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $86.00 for expenses arising from faxing ($1.00 per page). Costs for copying, faxi ng and postage are customarily in cluded in fee awards in IDEA litigation. Kaseman v. District of Columbia , 329 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28 n.7 (D.D.C. 2004). These total costs are not contested by the Defendant and will be awarded to the Plaintiff. D. Fees and Costs Awarded The amount of fees and costs requested by Pl aintiff is $ 1,207.25, which can be broken down into $1,121.25 for legal fees, and $ 86.00 for co sts. Defendant has not contested the costs. The legal fees claimed were based on . 75 hour billed at $475.00/hour; $1.75 hours billed at 268.00/hour, 1.0 hour billed at $146. 00/hour and 1.0 hour billed at $150.00/hour. This Court has determined that hourly rates based on 75% of the Laffey Matrix rate are applicable, which means that .75 hour is billed at $236. 00/hour; 1.75 hours are billed at $161.00; 1.0 hour is billed at $94.00/hour, and 1.0 hour is billed at $98.00/hour. Total fees thus equal $650.75, and total costs equal $86.00, which together total $736.75.

DATED: May 17, 2012 ________________/s/_________________ ALAN KAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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