UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CASE NO. 20-CV-00577

EPIC TECH, LLC and WINTER SKY, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNO RESOURCES, LLC,

Defendant.

/

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER

Defendant Arno Resources, LLC (“Arno Resources”), by and through undersigned 

counsel, hereby moves to dismiss or transfer the petition for declaratory relief (the “Declaratory 

Action”) filed by Plaintiffs Epic Tech, LLC and Winter Sky, LLC.

The Declaratory Action is duplicative of a suit filed by Arno Resources against them and 

other non-party defendants that is currently pending in the United States District Court of the 

Northern District of Georgia. It is also an improper anticipatory suit filed to deprive Arno 

Resources of its chosen forum and further presents the very real specter of inconsistent rulings 

given that Arno Resources’ claims against the other defendants in its suit in the Northern District 

of Georgia—who are not parties here and are likely not subject to personal jurisdiction in this 

Court—will proceed regardless of the outcome of this suit. Moreover, this Declaratory Action 

seeks adjudication of only one of many issues that will be determined in Arno Resources’ coercive 

action pending in the Northern District of Georgia—the applicability of a single affirmative 

defense to Arno Resources’ claims. Allowing this matter to proceed therefore affirmatively 

disserves judicial economy. 

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For these reasons, Epic Tech and Winter Sky’s improper, anticipatory Declaratory Action

should be either dismissed or transferred, and they should answer the complaint pending against 

them in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Arno Resources is the assignee of certain proprietary game terminal and back-end software

(the “Software”) required to operate promotional gaming applications. The Software was 

developed by Customs Game Design, Inc. (“CGD”) pursuant to a Development Agreement (the 

“Development Agreement”) with Gateway Gaming, Inc. The gaming applications developed by 

CGD were used by Gateway Gaming in terminals or game stations in physical locations in Georgia 

and throughout the United States. These terminals or game stations would present digital 

promotional games, which individuals would pay to play. These physical game stations would 

then connect to servers running the Software owned exclusively by CGD and now Arno Resources. 

To allow the games to fully function, Gateway Gaming received a non-transferrable 

perpetual worldwide license to utilize CGD’s proprietary Software required to operate the 

promotional gaming applications (the “Software”). The worldwide license was non-exclusive, 

non-transferable, and did not authorize Gateway to sub-license, sell or distribute the source code 

or Software to any third party, without written consent from CGD. CGD timely finished creating 

the promotional gaming applications.

From 2004 through 2012, CGD permitted Gateway Gaming to use its worldwide license 

under the terms of the Development Agreement. Initially, Gateway Gaming was the only licensee 

of the system and Software; and CGD transmitted updates as the development progressed pursuant 

to the terms of the Development Agreement. As it was permitted to do, CGD also licensed this 

Software to others in addition to Gateway Gaming in exchange for a percentage of revenue derived 

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from gaming machines. These third parties would receive an executable system and would not 

obtain the source code or right to sublicense CGD’s Software.

In August 2013, Gateway Gaming and Gateway Gaming’s Principals were indicted in the 

United States District Court for the District of South Carolina for money laundering and illegal 

gambling; to which they pleaded. Sometime thereafter, Gateway Gaming’s principals, Bob 

Mosely, Sr. and J.M Caldwell (“Gatweway Gaming’s Principals”) caused Gateway Gaming to 

transfer Gateway Gaming’s assets to Red Rock Investments, LLC (“Red Rock”)—including the 

non-transferrable license to use the Software—which then purportedly transferred same to Plaintiff 

Epic Tech, LLC and Frontier Software Systems, LLC (“Frontier”). Plaintiff Epic Tech, Red Rock,

and Frontier, as well as, on information and belief, Crimson Sky, LLC (“Crimson I”), Crimson 

Sky II (“Crimson II”), LLC, and Plaintiff Winter Sky (collectively, the “Corporate Parties”) are 

companies owned and controlled by Gateway Gaming’s Principals or their family members, 

including without limitation Starita Mosely, Tim Caldwell, Bob Mosley, Jr., and Erik Nordin. All 

of these companies, including Epic Tech and Winter Sky, have their principal place of business in 

Georgia, and all the individuals are wither citizens of Georgia, Florida, or South Carolina. 

The assignments constituted a fraudulent scheme by which Gateway Gaming’s Principals 

could and did continue to profit off of CGD’s Software, with the assistance of their family 

members and close associates, despite being prohibited from assigning Gateway Gaming’s license 

therein. Neither Red Rocks nor Epic Tech (and certainly the other Corporate Parties) could obtain 

an assignment of any rights under the Development Agreement absent written consent from CGD. 

Neither Red Rock nor Epic Tech or the other Corporate Parties, therefore, obtained any right to 

Gateway Gaming’s “worldwide license to use and modify all source code and documentation” 

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related to the Software or software required to operate the game terminals, including but not limited 

to the central server, game terminals, management terminals, and cashier terminals.

Nonetheless, upon information and belief, to this day, the Corporate Defendants continue 

to unlawfully use the Software and source code developed, written and licensed by CGD in the 

United States and Europe without authorization, without license and without paying CGD any 

royalty or otherwise compensating CGD for the use of the source code and Software. Even worse, 

upon information and belief, the Corporate Parties are unlawfully themselves licensing the CGD 

Software and source code to other third parties – for their own financial benefit – without obtaining 

CGD’s consent and without paying CGD any compensation for the continued unlawful use of 

CGD’s proprietary Software. 

Meanwhile, on February 28, 2017, CGD entered into a software assignment agreement 

with Arno Resources (the “Software Assignment Agreement”). Pursuant to the Software 

Assignment Agreement, CGD granted, conveyed and assigned to Arno Resources all rights, title 

and interest to the Software, including rights to bring suit arising from misuse of the Software.

Based on the misconduct detailed above, Arno Resources prepared to take legal action 

against Epic Tech, Winter Sky, Frontier, Crimson I, Crimson II, Gateway Gaming, Gateway 

Gaming’s Principals, Starita Mosley, J. Michael Caldwell, Tim Caldwell, and Erik Nordin—over 

none of whom this Court likely has personal jurisdiction. Arno Resources’ counsel prepared a

draft lawsuit against Epic Tech, Winter Sky, and these other parties asserting claims for common 

law and Georgia statutory unfair competition, unjust enrichment, violations of Georgia’s Uniform 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting a breach of contract through 

fraud, and injunctive relief. 

On May 13, 2020, Arno Resources’ counsel sent pre-suit demand letters to Epic Tech and 

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Winter Sky. The demand letters, included as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, attached a 

copy of the draft lawsuit which contained allegations mirroring those set forth above. On

Thursday, May 21, 2020, counsel for Epic Tech wrote an email to counsel for Arno Resources 

acknowledging receipt of the demand letter and asking for a copy of the attached draft complaint 

that they were unable to obtain due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Declaration of B. Brodsky, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at Ex. A.) On the following Tuesday, May 26, 2020, counsel for Epic 

Tech advised counsel for Arno Resources that he was going to review with his client and “get back 

to you with our position.” (Id.) 

Rather than follow through on their suggestion of good faith negotiations, three days later,

on Friday, May 29, 2020, Epic Tech and Winter Sky filed this Declaratory Action against Arno 

Resources in the District Court of the 261st Judicial District in and for Travis County, Texas. See

Original Petition (ECF. No. 1-1). In the Original Petition, Plaintiffs expressly concede that they 

filed this action in anticipation of Arno Resources’ suit. Id. ¶¶ 22, 28 (“Arno has sent 

communications to Plaintiffs threatening to bring a suit based on those released claims. . . A 

justiciable controversy exists based upon Arno’s recent threats of litigation, which allege violations 

of the Development Agreement, and claim ownership over the intellectual property made the 

subject of the Development Agreement.”). Plaintiffs also attached Arno Resource’s demand letter 

and draft complaint as an exhibit to the Original Petition. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 52-76.) The 

gravamen of the Declaratory Action is a request for determination of one of Epic Tech and Winter 

Sky’s expected affirmative defense to Arno Resource’s claims—they contend that they are not 

liable under a theory of accord and satisfaction based on an earlier settlement agreement between 

CGD and Gateway Gaming. 

As it intended to do if pre-suit negotiations were not fruitful—as they proved not to be—

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Arno Resources filed its complaint against Epic Tech, Winter Sty, Frontier, Crimson I, Crimon II, 

Gateway Gaming, Gateway Gaming’s Principals, Starita Mosley, J. Michael Caldwell, Tim 

Caldwell, and Erik Nordin in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

on June 17, 2020. See Arno Resources, LLC v. Epic Tech, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-02540-

CAP (N.D. Ga.) (hereafter the “Northern District of Georgia Action”), attached hereto as Exhibit 

2.

As the record makes abundantly clear – and as Epic Tech and Winter Sky readily admit in 

their Original Petition for declaratory relief – this action was filed purely in anticipation of Arno 

Resources’ Northern District of Georgia Action in an effort to wrestle away control and deprive 

Arno Resources of its chosen forum—and likely the only forum in which all defendants could be 

joined. Accordingly, based on the law discussed below, this action should be dismissed or 

transferred to the Northern District of Georgia.

ARGUMENT

A. This Action Should be Dismissed as an Improper Anticipatory Suit.

“The federal courts have long recognized that the principle of comity requires federal 

district courts—courts of coordinate jurisdiction and equal rank—to exercise care to avoid 

interference with each other's affairs.” West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local, 751 F.2d 

721, 730 (5th Cir. 1985). The general principle in the interrelation of federal district courts is to 

avoid duplicative litigation. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 

U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Federal courts should therefore try to 

avoid the waste of this duplication as well as rulings which may trench upon the authority of sister 

courts and piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result. West Gulf Maritime Ass'n, 

751 F.2d at 729. 

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The Fifth Circuit generally follows the first-to-file rule, which provides that “when related 

cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed may refuse 

to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of 

Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999). However, courts of this circuit will not apply the 

“first-to-file” rule where one party files its lawsuit “in anticipation” of an impending suit by the 

opposing party and there is substantial overlap between the two suits. Amerada Petroleum Corp. 

v. Marshall, 381 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1967). 

Moreover, courts of this circuit have consistently held that, where a declaratory judgment 

action is filed in anticipation of a lawsuit seeking coercive relief—as in this case—the declaratory 

action should be dismissed.1

 See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. M/V Capt. W.D. Cargill, 751 F.2d 

801, 804 (5th Cir. 1985) (“This Court has stated that a proper factor to consider in dismissing a 

declaratory judgment suit is whether the suit was filed in anticipation of another and therefore was 

being used for the purpose of forum-shopping.”); TK Holdings, Inc. v. Ordonez, No. 1:17-CV250-LY, 2017 WL 2923829, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017) (district courts will not “allow a party 

to secure a more favorable forum by filing an action for declaratory judgment when it has notice 

that the other party intends to file suit involving the same issues in a different forum”); Twin City 

Ins. Co. v. Key Energy Servs., Inc., No. CIV A H–09–0352, 2009 WL 1544255, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 

June 2, 2009) (“the primary reason courts have recognized the anticipatory suit exception to the 

first-to-file rule is to avoid penalizing a party that has attempted to settle a dispute out of court.”);

Paragon Indus., L.P. v. Denver Glass Mach., Inc., No. CIV.A. 3-07CV2183-M, 2008 WL 

3890495, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2008) (quoting Frank's Tong Service, Inc. v. Grey Wolf 

1 Though Plaintiffs’ action seeks declaratory relief under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, 

upon removal it is to be considered as originating under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. 

See Honey Holdings I, Ltd. v. Alfred L. Wolff, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 543, 555 (S.D. Tex. 2015).

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Drilling Co., L.P., No. H-07-637, 2007 WL 5186798, *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept.11, 2007)) (“In these

cases, deferring to the plaintiff's choice of forum “create[s] disincentives to responsible litigation 

by rewarding the winner of a race to the courthouse.”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Connetics 

Corporation, No. Civ. A. SA-04-CA0237XR, 2004 WL 2026812, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Sept.8, 

2004) (concluding that the declaratory judgment plaintiff filed suit for the improper reason of 

subverting the real plaintiff's advantage); Capco International, Inc. v. Haas Outdoors, Inc., No.

Civ. A. 3:03-CV-2127G, 2004 WL 792671, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr.9, 2004) (citing SherwinWilliams Company v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 387-89 (5th Cir. 2003)) (holding that the 

declaratory plaintiff's suit was brought “not for reasons supported by the purposes of the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, but for the improper reason of ‘subverting the real plaintiff's advantage’ 

in a forum of [the plaintiff's] choosing”) (citation omitted); Peyman v. Optobionics Merger 

Corporation, No.02-3332, 2003 WL 193443, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan.23, 2003) (quoting Great 

American Insurance Company v. Houston General Insurance Company, 735 F. Supp. 581, 586 

(S.D.N.Y. 1990)). (“[M]isuse of the Declaratory Judgment Act to gain a procedural advantage and 

preempt the forum choice of the plaintiff in the coercive action militates in favor of dismissing the 

declaratory judgment action.”).

Here, on May 13, 2020, Arno Resources’ counsel sent pre-suit demand letters to Epic Tech 

and Winter Sky. The demand letters, included as Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, attached 

a copy of the draft lawsuit which contained allegations mirroring those set forth above. On 

Thursday, May 21, 2020, counsel for Epic Tech wrote an email to counsel for Arno Resources 

acknowledging receipt of the demand letter and asking for a copy of the attached draft complaint 

that they were unable to obtain due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Declaration of B. Brodsky, 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at Ex. A.) Five days later, on the following Tuesday, May 26, 2020, 

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counsel for Epic Tech advised counsel for Arno Resources that he was going to review with his 

client and “get back to you with our position.” (Id.) Rather than follow through on their own

suggestion of good faith negotiations, Epic Tech and Winter Sky filed this Declaratory Action 

three days later. Arno Resources then filed its draft complaint in the Northern District of Georgia 

on June 17, 2020.

Numerous courts have dismissed or transferred declaratory judgment actions filed under 

precisely these circumstances as duplicative, unnecessary and improper. See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs 

Ins. Co, 751 F.2d 801 (affirming dismissal of first-filed anticipatory declaratory suit brought two 

months prior to coercive action); TK Holdings, Inc. v. Ordonez, 2017 WL 2923829, at *3 (W.D. 

Tex. July 6, 2017) (dismissing anticipatory declaratory suit before second filed action was even 

brought); Paragon Indus., L.P. v. Denver Glass Mach., Inc., 2008 WL 3890495, (transferring 

anticipatory declaratory suit); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Connetics Corporation, 2004 WL 

2026812, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Sept.8, 2004) (dismissing anticipatory declaratory suit as an improper 

attempt to deprive defendant of its choice of forum); Capco International, Inc. v. Haas Outdoors, 

Inc., 2004 WL 792671 (dismissing anticipatory declaratory suit in favor of suit filed by defendant 

a day later pending in another district court); Peyman v. Optobionics Merger Corporation, 2003 

WL 193443 (dismissing anticipatory declaratory suit in favor of suit filed by defendant a day later 

pending in another district court).

The record, and the law, is crystal clear. This declaratory judgment action filed by Epic 

Tech and Winter Sky is an improper anticipatory action, designed solely to prevent Arno 

Resources from bringing its claims against these entities and other in the forum of its choosing. 

This improper action should therefore be dismissed.

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B. The Court Should Also Decline Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Trejo Factors.

The Court should also dismiss this suit upon application of the non-exclusive “Trejo” 

factors set forth below. “In determining whether the district court acted correctly it is important to 

consider the nature of a declaratory judgment.” Mission Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 706 

F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir. 1983). “The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, confers no 

jurisdiction but is a procedural device designed to provide a new remedy to the federal court 

arsenal.” Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-240, 

(1937). “The district court, however, is not required to provide declaratory judgment relief, and it 

is a matter for the district court's sound discretion whether to decide a declaratory judgment 

action.” Id. (citations omitted). “As was stated in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North 

America, 358 F.Supp. 327, 330 (N.D.Tex.), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir.1973), the Declaratory 

Judgment Act ‘gives the court a choice, not a command.’” Id.

In St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit identified 

seven nonexclusive factors for a district court to consider in deciding whether to decide or dismiss 

a declaratory action:

(1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in controversy 

may be fully litigated;

(2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant;

(3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit;

(4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain 

precedence in time or to change forums exist;

(5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses;

(6) whether retaining the lawsuit would serve the purposes of judicial economy; 

and

(7) whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state judicial decree 

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involving the same parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state 

suit between the same parties is pending.

“In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that federal courts adjudicate claims 

within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.” 

Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2003). District courts apply 

the Trejo factors in determining whether to dismiss one pending federal suit in favor of another. 

See, e.g., Sport Supply Grp., Inc. v. R&G Prod., Inc., No. 3:08-CV-02031-O, 2009 WL 10677398, 

at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2009). Each one of these factors weighs in favor of dismissal.

As to the first factor, there is a pending action in the Northern District of Georgia in which 

all of the matters in controversy may be resolved, including the subject of the Declaratory 

Judgment Action—i.e., whether the settlement agreement between CGD and Gateway Gaming 

bars Arno Resources’ claims against Epic Tech and Winter Sky. By contrast, the instant suit will 

not address Arno Resources’ coercive claims for damages and injunctive relief, nor will it 

adjudicate Arno Resource’s claims against the ten defendants who are not parties here.

As to the second and third factors, as shown above, the instant Declaratory Action was 

plainly filed in anticipation of Arno Resource’s own lawsuit and to deprive it of its chosen forum 

in the Northern District of Georgia.

As to the fourth factor and fifth factors, the Northern District of Georgia is plainly the more 

convenient forum and it would be inequitable to deprive Arno Resources of a forum in which it is 

likely to obtain personal jurisdiction over all the defendants. The principal place of business of 

Epic Tech, Winter Sky, and the other defendants in Arno Resources’ pending suit in the Northern 

District of Georgia are have their principal places of business in the Northern District of Georgia. 

The individual defendants are all either citizens of Georgia or of Florida and South Carolina, its 

neighboring states. Upon information and belief, both specific and general personal jurisdiction 

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lies in the Georgia for all the defendants in Arno Resources’ suit. All or most documents and 

witnesses are located in the Northern District of Georgia and this is where all discovery will 

therefore take place.

As to the sixth factor, judicial economy clearly favors resolving all of Arno Resources’ 

claims against all defendants—rather than a single defense raised by two of a dozen defendants—

in one forum, the Northern District of Georgia. As Arno Resources’ suit will proceed regardless 

of whether this Court retains jurisdiction over the Declaratory Action, the risk of inconsistent result 

is manifest.

Finally, as to the seventh factor, while a state decree is not at issue, some of Arno 

Resources’ claim do arise under Georgia statutes, and a Georgia court is therefore the best forum 

for that state statute to be applied.

C. Alternatively, the Court Should Transfer this Suit to the Northern District of Georgia.

Alternatively, in the event the Court declines to dismiss this Declaratory Action, it should 

transfer the case to the Northern District of Georgia so that it can be tried along with the Northern 

District of Georgia Action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and 

witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district 

or division where it might have been brought.” The purpose of this statute is to place discretion in 

the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case 

consideration. Matosky v. Manning, No. SA-07-CV-051-WRF, 2007 WL 1512027, *2 (W.D. Tex. 

May 18, 2007). 

A district court must consider four private interest and four public interest factors when 

determining whether to grant a motion to transfer. Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp., 

358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). The private interest factors are: (1) the relative ease of access 

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to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of 

witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that 

make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203

(5th Cir. 2004). The public interest factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from 

court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the 

familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of 

unnecessary problems regarding conflict of laws or the application of foreign law. Id.

Here, with respect to the private interest factors, Epic Tech and Winter Sky both have their 

principal place of business in the Northern District of Georgia. Thus, their employees, agents, and 

principals who are likely to be witnesses and the documentation, data, and other information 

relating to their tortious misuse of Arno Resources’ intellectual property are likely situated in the 

venue of the Northern District of Georgia Action. Because of the geographic limitations of the 

Court’s subpoena power under Fed. R. Civ. 45(c), the attendance of these witnesses at trial may 

not be compelled. Perhaps most significantly, from a practical perspective, it is a complete waste 

of judicial resources to have two parallel cases proceeding at the same time, where one of the fora 

has jurisdiction over all the parties (the Northern District of Georgia Action) and the other likely 

has jurisdiction over only two (this Declaratory Action). Additionally, it is extremely wasteful for 

this Court to determine a discrete issue—whether Epic Tech and Winter Sky can avail themselves 

of an affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction—rather than having the court in the Northern 

District of Georgia Action determine this issue in the context of the larger dispute and Arno 

Resources’ coercive claims. The practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 

inexpensive therefore militate in favor of transfer to the Northern District of Georgia.

With respect to the public interest factors, the Northern District of Georgia Action (and this 

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action derivatively) turn on whether Georgia companies (owned or aided by Georgia, Florida, and 

South Carolina citizens) committed torts under Georgia law against Arno Resources. The 

Northern District of Georgia has at least the same local interest of this Court, and it also has a far 

greater familiarity with the application of its own law. The public interest is served by having the 

entire dispute decided in the Northern District of Georgia Action.

CONCLUSION

In sum, as Epic Tech and Winter Sky admit in their Original Petition, this action is an 

improper, anticipatory suit designed solely to preempt Arno Resources action against them, deny 

Arno Resources the opportunity for complete relief against all parties, and thwart Arno Resources’

choice of forum in Northern District of Georgia. For this reason, the Court should exercise its 

discretion and either dismiss or transfer this complaint for declaratory relief. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant Arno Resources respectfully moves the Court for a dismissal 

of this action or a transfer to the Northern District of Georgia, for an award of attorneys’ fees and 

costs, and for such other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

 

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Dated: June 18, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By:

/s/ Matthew R. Beatty

Michael L. Navarre, Esq.

State Bar No. 00792711

Matthew R. Beatty, Esq.

State Bar No. 24001169

BEATTY NAVARRE STRAMA PC

901 S Mo PAC Expy Ste 200 Bldg 1

Austin, TX 78746-5759

Tel.: 512-879-5050

mbeatty@bnsfirm.com

-andJustin B. Kaplan, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 33725

Elaine Kussurelis

Florida Bar No. 1019234

DIFALCO FERNANDEZ KAPLAN

777 Brickell Avenue, Suite 630

Miami, Florida 33131

Tel.: 305-569-9800

Fax: 866-569-0666

Jkaplan@dfkfirm.com

elaine@dfkfirm.com

Benjamin H. Brodsky, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 73748

Joshua Truppman, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 11795

BRODSKY FOTIU-WOJTOWICZ, PLLC

200 SE 1st Street, Suite 400

Miami, Florida 33131

Tel: 305-503-5054

Fax: 786-749-7644

bbrodsky@bfwlegal.com

joshua@bfwlegal.com

docketing@bfwlegal.com 

Case 1:20-cv-00577-LY Document 25 Filed 06/18/20 Page 15 of 16
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by Notice of 

Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF, on June 18, 2020, on all counsel or parties of record on 

the Service List below.

s/ Benjamin H. Brodsky

Benjamin H. Brodsky

SERVICE LIST

Brant C. Martin

Joseph R. Callister

Ethan A. Minshull

Jessica P. Toumani

WICK PHILLIPS GOULD & MARTIN, LLP

3131 McKinney Avenue, Suite 100

Dallas, Texas 75204

Tel: (214) 692-6200

Fax: (214) 692-6255

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

brant.martin@wickphillips.com

joseph.callister@wickphillips.com

ethan.minshull@wickphillips.com

jessica.toumani@wickphillips.com

Matthew R. Beatty, Esq.

BEATTY NAVARRE STRAMA PC

901 S Mo PAC Expy Ste 200 Bldg 1

Austin, TX 78746-5759

Tel: 512-879-5050

mbeatty@bnsfirm.com

Justin B. Kaplan, Esq.

Elaine Kussurelis

DIFALCO FERNANDEZ KAPLAN

777 Brickell Avenue, Suite 630

Miami, Florida 33131

Tel.: 305-569-9800

Fax: 866-569-0666

Jkaplan@dfkfirm.com

elaine@dfkfirm.com

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