IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., 

DELL INC., and EMC 

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-00473-ADA

Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-00476-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PUBLIC VERSION

PLAINTIFF WSOU INVESTMENT, LLC D/B/A BRAZOS LICENSING 

AND DEVELOPMENT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS FOR INTRA-DISTRICT TRANSFER OF VENUE TO AUSTIN

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 1 of 27
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND................................................................................................. 3

III. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 5

IV. ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 7

A. The First Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Brazos Would Be 

Unfairly Prejudiced By A Stay At This Late Stage Of The Cases ......................... 7

B. The Second Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Defendants Would 

Not Suffer A Clear Hardship Or Inequity Should The Cases Proceed................. 15

C. The Third Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Judicial Economy 

Warrants Denying A Stay ..................................................................................... 17

V. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

3rd Eye Surveillance, LLC v. Stealth Monitoring, Inc.,

No. 6:14-CV-162-JDL, 2015 WL 179000 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015) .......................................6

Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc.,

No. 9:07-cv-90, 2007 WL 3132606 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2007)...............................................10

Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,

856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................19

Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. C-13-4700 EMC, 2014 WL 5809053 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014).........................................6

In re Bear Creek Tech., Inc.,

No. 11-CV-721 (GMS), 2013 WL 3789471 (D. Del. July 17, 2013)......................................19

Biax Corp. v. Fujitsu Comput. Sys. Corp.,

No. 2:06-cv-364 (TJW), 2007 WL 614187 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2007) ...................................10

Brazos v. OnePlus Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.,

Case No. 6:20-cv-00952-ADA, Dkt. 109 ..................................................................................8

Brit. Telecomms. PLC v. IAC/InterActive Corp.,

No. cv-18-366-WCB, 2020 WL 5517283 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2020)........................................13

Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. Adtran, Inc.,

No. 6:15-CV-618-JRG-JDL, 2016 WL 4080802 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2016) .....................11, 14

Clinicomp Int'l, Inc. v. Cerner Corp.,

No. 17-CV-2479-GPC(BLM), 2018 WL 5617694 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018).........................18

Comcast Cable Comms. Corp. v. Finisar Corp.,

No. C 06-04206 WHA, 2007 WL 1052883 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2007).......................................6

In re Davis,

730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1984) ...............................................................................................7, 15

ESN, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

No. 5:08-cv-20, 2008 WL 6722763 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2008)..............................................11

Garmin Switzerland GmbH v. FLIR Sys., Inc.,

No. 3:17-CV-01147-SB, 2017 WL 6453346 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2017)......................................19

Guardian Technologies, LLC v. X10 Wireless Tech., Inc.,

No. 3:09–CV–0649–B, 2011 WL 308658 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2011).....................................10

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 3 of 27
iv

John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. PCT Int’l., Inc.,

No. SA–09–CV–00410–RF, 2011 WL 13175091 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2011).........................9

Jumpsport, Inc. v. Acad., Ltd.,

6:17-cv-00414-RWS, 2018 WL 10124887 (E.D. Tex July 13, 2018).....................................15

Kerr Mach. Co. v. Vulcan Indus. Holdings, LLC,

No. 6-20-cv-00200-ADA, 2021 WL 1298932 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2021)...........................5, 15

KIPB LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,

No. 2:19-cv-00056-JRG-RSP, 2019 WL 6173365 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2019).................11, 12

Kirsch Rsch. & Dev., LLC v. Tarco Specialty Prod., Inc.,

No. 6:20-CV-00318-ADA, 2021 WL 4555804 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021)........................12, 13

Lennon Image Techs., LLC v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.,

No. 2:13-CV-00235-JRG, 2014 WL 4652117 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) .......................15, 18

Longhorn HD LLC v. Netscout Systems, Inc.,

No. 2:20-cv-00349-JRG, 2022 WL 71652 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022)

................................................................................................................................10, 11, 17, 18

MacroSolve, Inc. v. Antenna Software, Inc.,

No. 6:11-CV-00287-MHS-KNM, 2013 WL 7760889 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 

2013) ........................................................................................................................................14

MicroUnity Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,

No. 2-04-CV-120 (TJW), 2005 WL 8162371 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2005) ..............................14

Multimedia Content Mgmt. LLC v. Dish Network L.L.C.,

No. 6:18-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 11706231 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2019) 

(Albright, J.).............................................................................................................................12

NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC America, Inc.,

No. 2:13–CV–1058–WCB, 2015 WL 1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015)............................13

Nidec Corp. v. LG Innotek Co., Ltd.,

No. 6:07cv108, 2009 WL 3673433 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009)...................................................9

Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC,

No. 6:05 CV 322, 2008 WL 5378040 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008), aff'd in part, 

vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 

605 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010)....................................................................................................9

Out Rage, LLC v. New Archery Prod. Corp.,

No. 11-CV-701-BBC, 2012 WL 12995533 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 9, 2012)...................................19

Oyster Optics, LLC v. Ciena Corp.,

No 4:20-CV-02354-JSW, 2021 WL 4027370 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2021)...............................19

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 4 of 27
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Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture LLC v. HTC Corp.,

No. 2:14-cv-00690-RSP, 2016 WL 3365855 (E.D. Tex. June 17, 2016)................................13

Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,

No. 2:13CV213-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 627887 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2015) ...............................11

Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 1:13-cv-0633, 2014 WL 201965 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014) ...............................................7

Roy-G-Biv Corp. v. Fanuc Ltd.,

No. 2:07–CV–418 (DF), 2009 WL 1080854 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2009)...........................17, 18

Softview, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,

No. 10–389–LPS, 2012 WL 3061027 (D. Del. July 26, 2012)................................................10

Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

356 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Tex. 2005)...............................................................................14, 17

Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,

No. 14-cv-502, 2014 WL 4271633 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2014)......................................................6

TC Tech. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

No. 6:20-CV-00899-ADA, 2021 WL 8083373 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2021).......................18, 19

TruePosition, Inc. v. Polaris Wireless, Inc.,

No. 12–646–RGA/MPT, 2013 WL 5701529 (D. Del. Oct. 21, 2013).....................................13

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Corbis Corp.,

No. 6:13-cv-942-RWS-KNM, 2015 WL 11199063 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2015) ........................13

Videoshare, LLC v. Meta Platforms Inc.,

No. 6-21-CV-00254-ADA, 2022 WL 3142622 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2022) ........................6, 10

VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:12-CV-00855-RWS, 2018 WL 398433 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2018)..................................7

YETI Coolers, LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,

No. 1:17-CV-342-RP, 2018 WL 2122868 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018)........................................6

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 101..............................................................................................................................16

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 5 of 27
Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and Development (“Brazos”) 

files this opposition to Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc. and EMC Corporation’s

(collectively, “Dell” or “Defendants”) Opposed Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of Defendants’

Motions for Intra-District Transfer of Venue to Austin (the “Motion” or “Mot.”). 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants’ motion to stay is simply an attempt to delay Brazos’s recovery. There is no 

basis on which to grant Defendants’ motion as none of the parade of horribles Defendants forecast 

if a stay is not granted will come to fruition, and staying the action would unnecessarily and unduly 

prejudice Brazos.

First, Brazos will be substantially prejudiced by an unnecessary stay pending a decision on 

Defendants’ transfer motion (which, as Brazos showed, Dkt. 51, should be denied) or, more 

significantly, pending a determination on the request for Ex Parte Reexamination (“EPR”) 

Defendants filed. Brazos has expended significant time and resources pursuing this action to 

prevent Defendants from continuing to infringe Brazos’s patents and obtain damages for the 

violations that have been going on for too long. Fact discovery is closed and claim construction 

and Markman Hearings were completed in May 2021. As shown below, delays in the pretrial and 

trial schedule in these cases have been necessitated primarily by Defendants’ inexcusable delays 

in providing Brazos with access to source code and other critical discovery. Defendants cannot 

use those delays to justify a stay that will delay Brazos’s relief indefinitely. 

Defendants moreover sat on their hands with regard to reexamination and only filed their 

requests for the EPRs on December 21, 2021 and June 3, 2022, respectively. As the average EPR 

takes approximately two years to complete (not including appeals), contrary to Defendants’ 

contention, they are not seeking a “short” stay, but rather are seeking an extended stay to delay 

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Brazos’s relief and avoid their liability. Delaying trial while Defendants continue to infringe 

Brazos’s patents and the EPR proceedings crawl along would be prejudicial to Brazos.

In contrast, contrary to Defendants’ arguments, they will not be prejudiced if a stay is 

denied because their requested intra-district transfer to Austin, even if granted (and it should not 

be) will not substantively change anything Defendants have to do to prepare for trial. Defendants 

will prepare the same summary judgment motions and present the same expert witnesses – and 

their jury instructions and voir dire will likely be identical or virtually so – regardless of whether 

this case is tried in Waco or Austin. Defendants do not even attempt to argue how anything they

will need to do to prepare for trial (other than analyzing the jury pool) will change an iota between 

the different Western District Divisions. This is especially so if this Court retains these cases even 

if it makes an intra-district transfer to Austin (which Defendants expressly do not oppose). 

Defendants will, accordingly, not be prejudiced by allowing these cases to proceed.

Moreover, a stay would not preserve judicial resources. Among other things, these cases 

have progressed substantially through much of the pretrial process, including all of fact discovery 

and claim construction, and the Court has spent considerable time and effort in overseeing them. 

Staying the cases (likely for years) stymies that progress and effectively wastes judicial resources. 

Further, judicial resources will not be saved by a stay because EPR determinations do not have 

estoppel effect. 

In addition, the Court’s recent order granting the parties’ joint motion to amend the 

scheduling order (Dkt. 206) ensures plenty of time for the Court to decide the transfer motion 

before Defendants need to analyze the jury pool or prepare their pretrial motions, regardless of 

where trial is ultimately held. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to stay should be denied.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 2, 2020, Brazos filed its original complaints, alleging Defendants’ infringement 

of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,137,144 in Case No. 6:20-cv-00473 (the “’144 patent”) and 7,565,435 in 

Case No. 6:20-cv-00476 (the “’435 patent”). (Dkt. 1.) Brazos filed amended complaints on 

October 19, 2020. (Dkt. 33.) Defendants moved for intra-district transfer on November 4, 2020 

(Dkt. No. 42). They waited 18 months after Brazos filed its original complaints to file their first 

EPR request on December 15, 2021 for the ’144 patent, and waited almost two years before filing 

their EPR request for the ’435 patent on June 3, 2022. 

In the meantime, on November 17, 2020, the Court entered a scheduling order setting forth 

the deadlines for, inter alia, claim construction, the Markman hearings, discovery and trial (trial 

was initially set for May 2, 2022). (Dkt. 50.) Brazos immediately undertook its obligations under 

that scheduling order, proceeding with claim construction, addressing Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss and to transfer, preparing for and participating in the Markman hearing on November 24, 

2021, and vigorously pursuing fact discovery (which has now closed). 

However, Brazos’s efforts to prosecute its claims were hamstrung by Defendants’

recalcitrance. Among other things, Defendants: (i) blocked Brazos’s access to and failed to 

produce critical source code relating to the accused products and initially limited Brazos’s access 

to the relevant source code. See, e.g., Dkt. 119 in the ‘473 case, Transcript of 12/9/21 Discovery 

Hearing, at 10:18-23 (Brazos counsel describing how Defendants initially only provided one 

computer for source code review, slowing that review process); (ii) refused to identify third-party 

Broadcom although it knew that Broadcom possessed critical source code; (iii) refused to designate 

Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses on several topics identified by Brazos; and (iv) provided insufficient 

responses to Brazos’s discovery requests. See generally Mar. 16, 2022 email from S. Ivan to 

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C. McCracken, et al., summarizing meet and confer in which Defendants agreed, inter alia, to 

continue to collect and produce source code, supplement interrogatory responses, produce 

additional financial information, and designate witnesses to testify on 30(b)(6) topics (Ex. 1). 

Brazos’s former counsel repeatedly inquired of Defendants as to access to the relevant 

source code. The disputes over, inter alia, that access, led the parties in November 2021 to jointly 

request that the Court amend the scheduling order to extend discovery and other deadlines, pushing 

the fact discovery deadline to May 6, 2022. (See Dkt. 111 in the ‘473 case.) Approximately one 

month later, Brazos’s current counsel replaced the Etheridge firm and undertook a comprehensive 

review of the case files. Brazos’s counsel then wrote to Defendants in February 2022, raising, 

among other things, the deficiency in source code production (see Ex. 2 at 3-5) as well as several 

other discovery deficiencies. 

Defendants’ failures to abide by their discovery obligations and their delays in complying 

with them compelled Brazos to seek relief from the Court for the production of source code (either 

from Defendants or by allowing Brazos to subpoena other parties possessing that source code) and 

the designation of corporate representatives to testify under Rule 30(b)(6), which motions the 

Court granted. See Dkt. 182 (granting in part Brazos’s request to compel the designation of 

30(b)(6) witnesses); Dkt. 167 (allowing Brazos to serve subpoenas on third-party chipmakers to 

obtain source code for the ’144 and ’435 patents). 

Brazos wasted no time, serving subpoenas on Broadcom within days of the Court’s order 

granting Brazos’s motion to take third-party discovery. (See Exs. 3 and 4.) To accommodate the 

holdup in source code review caused by Defendants’ delay in identifying Broadcom and 

Broadcom’s responses to the subpoenas, the Court extended the time to complete source code 

review from May 6, 2022 to July 1, 2022. (See Dkt. 189 at 2.) That amended scheduling order 

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 9 of 27
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expressly directed Dell to “work cooperatively with Broadcom and [Brazos] to facilitate source 

code production.” Id. That review began on June 13, 2022 (when a review room was first made 

available to Brazos) and was completed in July 2022.

The delays attendant to the parties’ discovery and other disputes – including, inter alia, the 

delay in Brazos’s access to critical source code and Defendants’ insufficient discovery responses 

– prevented Brazos from being able to proceed with expert preparation and discovery in 

accordance with the existing Scheduling Order and thus compelled the parties to request that the 

Court’s Scheduling Order be amended and the trial date be moved to December 5, 2022. (See

Dkts. 188, 189.) While fact discovery is closed, the Court’s most recent Amended Scheduling 

Order (Dkt. 206) has extended the remaining deadlines, including the close of expert discovery, 

dispositive motions and pretrial submissions, into 2023 (with trial now scheduled for July 24, 2023, 

a date the Court has indicated it is not inclined to extend further). (See Dkt. 206 in the ‘476 case.)

Meanwhile, the EPR proceedings on the ’144 and ’435 patents are in their relative infancy. 

In the ’144 patent EPR, the request for EPR was granted on February 3, 2022 and the Non-Final 

Office Action was only issued recently, on July 28, 2022. (Mot. Ex. E.) On September 28, 2022, 

Brazos filed its response to that Non-Final Office Action. (See Ex. 5.) In the ’435 patent EPR, 

there has been no office action yet. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court has held that in determining whether a stay is proper, a district court should 

consider, among other factors: (1) the potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the hardship 

and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) judicial resources. See Kerr 

Mach. Co. v. Vulcan Indus. Holdings, LLC, No. 6-20-cv-00200-ADA, 2021 WL 1298932, at *1 

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 10 of 27
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(W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2021) (citing Neodron Ltd. v. Dell Techs. Inc., No. 1-19-CV-00819-ADA, 2019 

WL 9633629, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2019)).

Whether to stay a patent case pending IPR/EPR proceedings is entirely within the court’s 

discretion. See Videoshare, LLC v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 6-21-CV-00254-ADA, 2022 WL 

3142622, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2022) (“The court has discretion in deciding whether to stay a 

case in PTO proceedings, including ex parte reexaminations”); Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. C-13-4700 EMC, 2014 WL 5809053, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014) (“[A] court is under no 

obligation to delay its own proceedings where parallel litigation is pending before the PTAB.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts should not automatically stay litigation 

based on the filing or institution of an EPR; otherwise, the patent reexamination process “would 

invite parties to unilaterally derail litigation.” See, e.g., Videoshare, 2022 WL 3142622, at *1 

(denying defendant’s motion to stay pending EPR). The proceedings can proceed in parallel 

because the two forums apply different standards and come to different legal conclusions—there 

is no conflict between an EPR proceeding and a challenge to a patent in federal court. See Straight 

Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 14-cv-502, 2014 WL 4271633, at *2 (D.N.J. 

Aug. 28, 2014). Indeed, “[i]f litigation were stayed every time a claim in suit undergoes 

reexamination, federal infringement actions would be dogged by fits and starts.” 3rd Eye 

Surveillance, LLC v. Stealth Monitoring, Inc., No. 6:14-CV-162-JDL, 2015 WL 179000, at *1 

(E.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2015); Comcast Cable Comms. Corp. v. Finisar Corp., No. C 06-04206 WHA, 

2007 WL 1052883, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2007). “Federal court calendars should not be hijacked 

in this manner.” Id. 

As a result, “the proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” YETI 

Coolers, LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-342-RP, 2018 WL 2122868, at *1 (W.D. 

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 11 of 27
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Tex. Jan. 8, 2018) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997)). The burden is high. As the 

Supreme Court has held, “only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case be compelled to 

stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” In 

re Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Specifically, the proponent has the burden to “make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in 

being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will 

work damage to someone else.” Id. Defendants cannot meet that burden here.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The First Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Brazos Would Be Unfairly

Prejudiced By A Stay At This Late Stage Of The Cases

Courts have provided guidance as to what constitutes “prejudice” under this factor, 

including “whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a tactical disadvantage to the 

nonmovant.” VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:12-CV-00855-RWS, 2018 WL 398433, at *3 (E.D. 

Tex. Jan. 12, 2018). Under this factor, “courts consider whether the timing of the request for a 

stay suggests any dilatory motive on behalf of the movant.” Id. Other factors considered in 

determining the prejudice that the Plaintiff would suffer by way of a stay include: (i) the status of 

the review proceeding; (ii) the timing of the request for stay; and (iii) the timing of the review 

request. See Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:13-cv-0633, 2014 WL 201965, at 

*4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014). Each of the above factors weighs strongly in Brazos’s favor and 

demonstrates that a stay would prejudice Brazos.

1. Defendants’ Conduct Has Delayed The Cases

Defendants’ pursuit of a stay is, in fact, nothing more than another in a long line of dilatory 

tactics. As shown above (pp. 3-5), it has been Defendants’ conduct – not Brazos’s – that has 

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necessitated pushing the trial date and other deadlines here. Brazos’s (joint) requests with 

Defendants for adjournments of the trial schedule stem from those delays and disputes, and 

Defendants’ attempt (Mot. at 10) to lay the blame for any such adjournments solely on Brazos is 

wholly disingenuous. Among other things, Defendants refer the Court to Brazos’s request for an 

extension (Dkt. 221-10), but they omit that Brazos’s request for that extension was driven by 

delays occasioned by Defendants. 

Similarly misleading, irrelevant and outrageous are Defendants’ references to other cases 

in which Brazos has been forced to request extensions of pretrial and trial scheduling. (Mot. at 11.) 

Not surprisingly, the availability of discovery and witnesses—including foreign witnesses—to sit 

for deposition in the midst of a global pandemic has caused numerous delays in many of the cases 

Brazos has brought. See, e.g., Brazos v. OnePlus Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., Case No. 6:20-

cv-00952-ADA, Dkt. 109 (extending the close of fact discovery and subsequent deadlines because 

“[s]everal international depositions in [the] case previously scheduled for July 17-22 were 

disrupted by COVID-related lockdowns put in place in Macau and related travel restrictions.”). 

Moreover, defendants in those cases – like Defendants here -- have endeavored to delay their day 

of reckoning for patent infringement as long as possible and by any means necessary. In the ZTE 

cases, for example, as the Court is well aware, delays have been occasioned by ZTE’s inexcusable 

discovery cat-and-mouse games and what the Court has described as its “excessive motion 

practice,” which “wastefully raised the cost of litigation.” See Case No. 6:22-cv-00136-ADADTG, Dkt. 25 at 12. Indeed, in all of the other cases to which Defendants refer, extensions of 

applicable pretrial and trial dates were occasioned not by Brazos’s failure to prosecute but 

defendants’ failure to adhere to their discovery obligations, failure to provide timely and complete 

access to source code and/or excessive motion practice. Every one of those delays has prejudiced 

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Brazos as the infringement of its patents has continued. In any event, and notwithstanding 

Defendants’ attempted misdirection, whether to grant a stay is a case-by-case determination and 

should be based only on the facts here, which militate against granting a stay. See John 

Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. PCT Int’l., Inc., No. SA–09–CV–00410–RF, 2011 WL 13175091, at 

*1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2011) (factors governing whether to stay pending IPR “are considered on 

a case-by-case basis”). 

2. The Pendency Of The EPRs Does Not Warrant A Stay.

Indeed, Defendants are well aware of the long delay that would be achieved from a stay –

and that is Defendants’ true goal; to delay trial and their day of reckoning as long as possible. 

USPTO statistics suggest that the average EPR reexamination period from filing to decision is 

approximately 25 months. Ex. 6 at 2. Potential appeals from any decisions on Defendants’ EPRs 

could stretch any delay several additional years. See, e.g., Nidec Corp. v. LG Innotek Co., Ltd., 

No. 6:07cv108, 2009 WL 3673433, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009) (denying stay and noting that 

“the reexamination process [including appeals] could take years to complete”); Orion IP, LLC v. 

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 6:05 CV 322, 2008 WL 5378040, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008), 

aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 

F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denying motion to stay noting: “This first initial office action is merely 

the first of many steps in the re-examination process.... If that action is adverse... [plaintiff] may 

appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and to the Federal Circuit. This process 

could take years.”). 

The EPR requests here were filed in December 2021 (only approximately 10 months ago) 

and recently, on June 3, 2022 (respectively, one-and-a-half and two years after the commencement 

of these Actions). Defendants’ protracted delays in filing these EPRs certainly do not justify 

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staying these cases now. While a non-final office action has issued in the ’144 patent EPR, no 

final decisions have been rendered in either EPR and, based on the average reexamination period, 

none are expected for approximately another year on the ’144 patent and almost two more years 

for the ’435 patent (not including appeals), i.e., likely well after the July 2023 trial date (which the 

Court has indicated it will not move, Dkt. 206 at 2). See Exs. 7, 8 (EPR Docket Sheets). That 

relatively early status of the EPR proceedings and the anticipated length of final EPR resolution, 

including potential appeals, militate against staying these actions. See Videoshare, 2022 WL 

3142622, at *2 (stay denied notwithstanding PTO’s first office action rejecting claims where stay

would not simplify issues because EPR process would not be completed until after trial); Softview, 

LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 10–389–LPS, 2012 WL 3061027, at *4 (D. Del. July 26, 2012) (denying, 

inter alia, Dell’s motion to stay because “reexamination proceedings will likely require several 

years to reach a final resolution”); Guardian Technologies, LLC v. X10 Wireless Tech., Inc., No. 

3:09–CV–0649–B, 2011 WL 308658, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2011) (denying stay pending EPR 

and rejecting contention that PTO’s initial office action rejecting all claims warranted stay because 

“[t]he Court cannot predict whether the PTO’s final determination will also reject the claims at 

issue,” a stay would delay the case for years, discovery was almost completed and trial date was 

near); see also Biax Corp. v. Fujitsu Comput. Sys. Corp., No. 2:06-cv-364 (TJW), 2007 WL 

614187, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2007) (denying stay where estimated delay was 22.6 months); 

Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., No. 9:07-cv-90, 2007 WL 3132606 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2007) 

(denying stay where estimated delay was 23.3 months). This is especially so considering that, 

notwithstanding any “preliminary,” non-final determinations here (Mot. at 2, 4, 8), the majority of 

EPRs ultimately result in claims being either confirmed or changed, but not canceled in their 

entirety. See, e.g., Longhorn HD LLC v. Netscout Systems, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00349-JRG, 2022 

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WL 71652, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022) (stay not warranted where “a single examiner at the PTO 

has initially rejected the claims at issue in an EPR”); KIPB LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 

No. 2:19-cv-00056-JRG-RSP, 2019 WL 6173365, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2019) (while “[i]t is 

not uncommon for claims to be initially rejected in the re-examination process” the majority of 

such claims are either confirmed or changed, but not rejected entirely).

Thus, contrary to Defendants’ representation that granting their motion would result only 

in a “short,” non-prejudicial stay (Mot. at 8-9), in fact they are asking the Court to stay the cases

for up to two years (not including appeals) during which time the trial process would be held in 

limbo, without any assurance that such a delay would simplify anything, prejudicing Brazos’s right 

to a timely recovery. 

The principle that “justice delayed is justice denied applies with full force to the patent 

process.” ESN, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:08-cv-20, 2008 WL 6722763, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 

20, 2008) (quoting Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and other Litigation 

Reforms Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 109th Cong. (2006)). 

This injury to Brazos is not lessened by Brazos’s status, as Defendants suggest (Mot. at 9). The 

“mere fact that [the patentee] is not currently practicing the patents does not mean that, as a matter 

of law, it is not prejudiced by a substantial delay of an imminent trial date.” Rembrandt Wireless 

Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:13CV213-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 627887, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 

Jan. 29, 2015). 

Indeed, in Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. Adtran, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-618-JRG-JDL, 2016 WL 

4080802, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2016), the court rejected this same argument by Dell: “The fact 

that [plaintiff] does not sell products that compete with Dell ... would not preclude [it] from 

experiencing prejudice if the Court granted Defendants' motion to stay.” See also Longhorn, 2022 

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WL 71652, at *2 n. 3 (rejecting argument that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by a stay where it 

was only a “patent assertion entity” and could be compensated with damages because “delaying a 

patentee’s lawsuit where the patentee is not a direct competitor is ‘far from non-prejudicial’”); 

KIPB, 2019 WL 6173365, at *3 (denying stay pending EPR and noting that “[e]ven assuming that 

[plaintiff] is a non-practicing entity and that the Parties are not competitors, [plaintiff] still has an 

interest in the timely enforcement of its patents”).

The cases Defendants cite are inapposite or support Brazos. For example, while 

Defendants rely on Multimedia Content Mgmt. LLC v. Dish Network L.L.C., No. 6:18-CV-00207-

ADA, 2019 WL 11706231 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2019) (Albright, J.), that decision directly 

undercuts Defendants’ position and supports Brazos. In Multimedia, this Court denied defendant’s 

motion to stay pending the IPR because, as here, claim construction had already occurred 

(although, unlike here, discovery had not yet begun, let alone, as here, been completed), defendant 

delayed filing its IPR and motion to stay until well after the case was filed, and the ultimate 

determination in the IPR process was speculative and would likely only issue after the scheduled 

trial. Id. at *1-3.

In Kirsch Rsch. & Dev., LLC v. Tarco Specialty Prod., Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00318-ADA, 

2021 WL 4555804 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021), the Court noted that final decisions were due in the 

reexamination proceedings only a few months from the Court’s decision. Id. at *1. Here, in 

contrast, those final decisions are likely 1-2 years away (not including appeals). And while the 

Court in Kirsch ultimately granted a stay under the facts in that case, it noted that “[a] patent holder 

has an interest in the timely enforcement of its patent right” and that this right favored denying the 

requested stay. Id. at *2. In addition, the PTAB instituted the IPR in issue and thus indicated that 

it had already “concluded that there is a reasonable likelihood” that the subject patent claims were 

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invalid. And even with that fact, the Court stated that “how strongly the instituted IPR favors stay 

may be diminished by the scope of estoppel Defendant would accept,” and it granted the stay only 

because defendant agreed to be estopped in exchange for the Court granting its motion. Id. at *3. 

Those factors simply are not present here. 

Similarly, in NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC America, Inc., No. 2:13–CV–1058–WCB, 2015 WL 

1069111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015), defendants filed their PTAB reexamination proceeding a mere 

three months after the complaint adding one of the defendants was filed, and filed their motion to 

stay pending the IPR one week after the PTAB granted the IPR. Id. at *1. In other words, unlike 

Defendants here, in NFC defendants did not dawdle for 1-2 years from filing or wait until after 

substantial work had been done in the case to file their IPR or motion to stay. And unlike here, in 

NFC plaintiff did not substantiate any dilatory conduct by defendant that it sought to further with 

its motion to stay. Id. at *3.1

Put simply, Defendants’ current attempt to use the reexamination process as a delaying 

tactic to push off trial for years should be rejected. See Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture 

LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 2:14-cv-00690-RSP, 2016 WL 3365855 , at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 17, 2016) 

(denying stay where “Defendants did not file their IPRs expeditiously and are most likely seeking 

a stay to gain a tactical advantage over [plaintiff]”); TruePosition, Inc. v. Polaris Wireless, Inc., 

 

1

In Brit. Telecomms. PLC v. IAC/InterActive Corp., No. cv-18-366-WCB, 2020 WL 5517283, at 

*7 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2020), the court granted a stay in part because Covid-related trial delays 

would likely rival delays from a stay pending the reexamination proceeding. Moreover, contrary 

to Defendants’ argument (Mot. p. 10), the court did not hold that an interest in prompt enforcement 

of patent rights is insufficient to establish prejudice, it held that that interest “standing alone” is 

insufficient. Id. at *6. But that factor, considered with Defendants’ delay in seeking both 

reexamination and a stay, as well as the advanced stage of this case, are more than enough to deny 

a stay. See also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Corbis Corp., No. 6:13-cv-942-RWS-KNM, 2015 WL 

11199063, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2015) (stay granted where discovery was incomplete and trial 

was not scheduled for another year, and, unlike here, defendant moved to stay shortly after filing 

for reexamination).

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No. 12–646–RGA/MPT, 2013 WL 5701529, at *6 (D. Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (denying stay where, 

inter alia, defendant waited until “close to the eve of claim construction briefing, and after 

substantial document discovery was conducted” to file for IPR). This is especially true where, as 

here, the movant waited long after filing for reexamination and after the Markman hearing before 

moving for a stay. See Chrimar Systems, 2016 WL 4080802, at *3 (denying Dell’s motion to stay 

where it “waited between seven and eleven months to file all of its IPR petitions, and further waited 

another two months from the filing of the last-filed IPR petition to file the [stay] motion, 

demonstrating a lack of diligence”); MacroSolve, Inc. v. Antenna Software, Inc., No. 6:11-CV00287-MHS-KNM, 2013 WL 7760889, at *1-2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (denying motion to stay 

pending EPR where defendant waited more than a year after suit was filed to file EPR, “Plaintiffs 

have an interest in the timely enforcement of their intellectual property rights,” “reexamination is 

far from complete” and “[t]he ultimate outcome [of the EPR] is unpredictable”); Soverain Software 

LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (finding “a stay would 

unduly prejudice or present a tactical disadvantage to” plaintiff when defendant “waited until this 

case was a year old and the Court had held the Markman hearing before moving for a stay”); 

MicroUnity Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 2-04-CV-120 (TJW), 2005 WL 8162371, at *2 (E.D. 

Tex. Aug. 15, 2005) (denying a stay where “Defendants [including Dell] did not file the first 

request for inter partes reexamination until ... more than one year after this case was filed.”). 

To stay the case at this stage would reward Defendants’ dilatory tactics while substantially 

prejudicing Brazos’s right to timely resolution of its infringement claims, all while Defendants 

continue to infringe Brazos’s patents. This factor weighs strongly against a stay. 

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B. The Second Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Defendants Would Not

Suffer A Clear Hardship Or Inequity Should The Cases Proceed

Defendants do not – because they cannot – show, as they must, that they will suffer a clear 

hardship or inequity should the cases proceed. See Davis, 730 F.2d at 178. The parties have 

already spent significant time and resources in completing fact discovery and claim construction 

is complete. Given that fact discovery is closed and expert discovery is underway, staying the case 

at such an advanced stage would not relieve Defendants of any material burden. See Jumpsport, 

Inc. v. Acad., Ltd., 6:17-cv-00414-RWS, 2018 WL 10124887, at *2 (E.D. Tex July 13, 2018) 

(denying a stay because it “would delay this case and Plaintiff’s enforcement of its rights” after 

the case was “already proceeding well into discovery and claim construction briefing had been 

filed”); Lennon Image Techs., LLC v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00235-JRG, 

2014 WL 4652117, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (“Given the sizable resources that the parties 

and the Court have already invested in this case, staying the case, ‘based solely on speculation of 

what might possibly happen during reexamination’...‘would be inefficient and inappropriate.’”).

Further, because Defendants “invited this added complexity by unilaterally seeking parallel 

litigation in the PTAB” years after Brazos filed its complaints, despite this Court’s efficient and 

speedy litigation process, any hardship Defendants may experience would be a self-inflicted 

wound. Kerr Machine, 2021 WL 1298932, at *2. Accordingly, allowing these cases to proceed 

to trial will provide a more complete and timely resolution of the relevant issues.

Defendants’ arguments as to their purported prejudice are unavailing. For example, while 

Defendants argue (Mot. at 6-8) that, absent a stay pending a determination on their transfer motion, 

they will suffer significant prejudice in the form of being “forced to brief and file summary 

judgment and pretrial motions, and prepare for trial” (id. at 6), as well as prepare jury instructions

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 20 of 27
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and voir dire, they do not – because they cannot – refute that all of that work will have to be done 

regardless of where trial is ultimately held and who presides over it. Indeed, Defendants do not 

identify a single argument that will be different on summary judgment, a single difference in jury 

instructions (which will be based on the remaining claims and applicable law, not the location of 

trial), a single additional or different pretrial motion they would have to file or any substantial 

differences in voir dire questions they would pose to jurors if this case is transferred to the Austin 

Division. Put simply, an intra-district transfer would change nothing of substance in terms of 

motion practice and pretrial preparation (and this is all the more so if this Court retains the case 

following any intra-district transfer, which Defendants do not oppose, see Mot. at 1, n. 3, 12). 

And, of course, now that trial has been moved to July 24, 2023 (a date the Court has 

indicated it is not inclined to extend any further, Dkt. 206 at 2), there is plenty of time for the Court 

to decide Defendants’ motion to transfer (and their motions to dismiss on subject matter 

jurisdiction grounds and under 35 U.S.C. § 101) well in advance of summary judgment and trial,

and before Defendants need to undertake any “jury studies” or “make advance arrangements 

regarding trial logistics.” Id. at 8. That extension also allows for a decision on the transfer motion 

well before dispositive motions are due, some six months from now.2 Defendants’ feigned 

 

2 Defendants’ rehashing of their transfer motion arguments (Mot. at 3, 9. N. 15), while of no 

moment to the instant motion to stay, is also misguided and based on cherry-picked selections of 

testimony. 

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concerns, including that summary judgment and pretrial motions should be decided by the 

transferee court (Mot. at 6-7) are thus simply hollow.

C. The Third Factor Weighs Against A Stay Because Judicial Economy

Warrants Denying A Stay 

Judicial economy warrants denying a stay because the case has advanced materially and 

the Court has already spent significant resources on it. The case has been pending for over two 

years and staying the case at this juncture would simply squander the Court’s efforts. See 

Longhorn, 2022 WL 71652, at *4 (stay not warranted where at the time stay motion was filed fact 

discovery was closed, expert discovery was underway and trial deadlines were set); Soverain 

Software LLC, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 662; Roy-G-Biv Corp. v. Fanuc Ltd., No. 2:07–CV–418 (DF), 

2009 WL 1080854, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2009) (finding the third factor weighed against a stay 

where claim-construction was complete and trial was six months away).

Indeed, this Court recently denied a similar motion to stay pending resolution of IPRs/EPRs 

in Brazos’s cases against ZTE, out of “concern that if [the Court] grant[s] a stay and the ex parte 

reviews run their course, not only will there be a considerable body of prosecution history that will 

then have to be accounted for but there will be ongoing documents created and additional 

document discovery, et cetera that will develop over that intervening time. And so given that, [the 

Court thinks] that it weighs in favor of denying the stay and proceeding with the case.” See

September 19, 2022 Excerpt of Transcript of Sealed Hearing Regarding ZTE’s Motion for Stay 

Pending Resolution of Post-Grant Proceedings, 28:24-29:9 (Ex. 11.) The Court accordingly held 

that “judicial economy weighs strongly in favor of allowing this case to continue given the point 

[it is] at in the case and the fact that... all [the cases were] filed in 2020... the Court definitely has 

an interest in moving its docket. So [the Court is] going to deny the stay and keep the cases 

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moving.” Id. at 29:16-23. That reasoning applies equally – if not more so – here, considering the 

advanced stage of these cases.

Further, any (hypothetical) PTAB and USPTO decision would not simplify the issues 

before this Court (Mot. at 12) because “a request for ex parte reexamination has no estoppel effect.” 

Clinicomp Int'l, Inc. v. Cerner Corp., No. 17-CV-2479-GPC(BLM), 2018 WL 5617694, at *4 

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (noting EPRs, in contrast to IPRs, do not estop a petitioner from asserting 

invalidity arguments that it could have raised during the administrative review process). See also 

Longhorn, 2022 WL 71652, at *3 n. 5 (pending EPR would not simplify issues because it has no 

estoppel effect). Further, with regard to the pending EPRs, the final decision is still speculative 

and disputable. See, e.g., Lennon Image Techs., 2014 WL 4652117, at *3 (noting that there is “no 

guarantee that the claims will be amended or cancelled during the IPR”). 

Defendants’ argument that a stay should be granted pending a decision on their transfer 

motion because pretrial work and trial preparation are future tasks (Mot. at 11-12) also is of no 

moment. As shown above, Defendants will have to undertake the same work regardless of which 

division of this District trial is held. There will be no waste of judicial or other resources from 

denial of a stay. 

Defendants’ reliance on TC Tech. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 6:20-CV-00899-ADA, 

2021 WL 8083373 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2021) is misplaced. In TC Tech., the Court noted that a 

stay was warranted because the case was “in its infancy” in that discovery had not yet commenced 

and the Markman hearing had not been held, trial was scheduled after a final determination from 

the PTO was expected, and plaintiff’s claims of prejudice were undermined by its own 8-year 

delay in bringing suit. Id. at *2-3. In addition, the patent at issue in TC Tech was expired and, 

therefore, it could not be amended, only confirmed or canceled, which increased the potential that 

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 23 of 27
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the PTO proceedings would simplify the issues, which is not the case here. Id. at *3. TC Tech. is 

thus inapposite.

Defendants’ other cases also do not support them. Garmin Switzerland GmbH v. FLIR 

Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-01147-SB, 2017 WL 6453346 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2017) specifically relied 

on the estoppel effect of an IPR (id. at *3), which, as shown, does not apply to the EPR proceedings 

at issue here. Moreover, the case on which it relied, Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 856 F.3d 

1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) was concerned with how statements made by a patent owner in an

IPR could be used in claim construction. Here, of course, claim construction is completed. See 

also Oyster Optics, LLC v. Ciena Corp., No 4:20-CV-02354-JSW, 2021 WL 4027370, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 22, 2021) (granting stay where motion was made before claim construction because 

arguments at IPR could affect claim construction); In re Bear Creek Tech., Inc., No. 11-CV-721 

(GMS), 2013 WL 3789471, at *2 (D. Del. July 17, 2013) (defendants agreed to be estopped by 

IPR proceeding determinations and litigation was “still in its early stages” in that discovery and 

claim construction had not taken place); Out Rage, LLC v. New Archery Prod. Corp., No. 11-CV701-BBC, 2012 WL 12995533, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 9, 2012) (stay granted where case was only 

four months old, discovery had just begun and defendants sought IPR shortly after case was filed). 

In short, Defendants have not shown that staying the case will promote judicial economy.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to stay should be denied in its entirety. 

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 24 of 27
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Dated: October 14, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop 

Jonathan K. Waldrop (CA Bar No. 297903) 

(Admitted in this District)

jwaldrop@kasowitz.com

Darcy L. Jones (CA Bar No. 309474) 

(Admitted in this District)

djones@kasowitz.com

Marcus A. Barber (CA Bar No. 307361)

(Admitted in this District)

mbarber@kasowitz.com

Heather S. Kim (CA Bar No. 277686)

(Admitted in this District)

hkim@kasowitz.com

John W. Downing (CA Bar No. 252850) 

(Admitted in this District)

jdowning@kasowitz.com

ThucMinh Nguyen (CA Bar No. 304382)

(Admitted in this District)

tnguyen@kasowitz.com

Chen Jia (CA Bar No. 281470)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

cjia@kasowitz.com

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 200

Redwood Shores, California 94065

Telephone: (650) 453-5170

Facsimile: (650) 453-5171

Paul G. Williams (GA Bar No. 764925)

(Admitted in this District)

pwilliams@kasowitz.com

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

1230 Peachtree Street N.E., Suite 2445

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Telephone: (404) 260-6080

Facsimile: (404) 260-6081

Joshua A. Whitehill (NY Bar No. 4766473)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

jwhitehill@kasowitz.com

Hershy Stern (NY Bar No. 4631024)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

hstern@kasowitz.com

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 25 of 27
21

Julianne Laporte (NY Bar No. 5547906)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

jlaporte@kasowitz.com

Howard L. Bressler (NY Bar No. 2487379)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

hbressler@kasowitz.com

Shelley Ivan (NY Bar No. 4338067)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

sivan@kasowitz.com

Noah P. Dorman (DC Bar No. 1779821)

(Admitted pro hac vice)

ndorman@kasowitz.com

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

1633 Broadway

New York, NY 10019

Telephone: (212) 506-1700

Facsimile: (212) 506-1800

Mark D. Siegmund (TX Bar No. 24117055)

mark@swclaw.com

Craig D. Cherry (TX Bar No. 24012419)

craig@swclaw.com

Justin Allen (TX Bar No. 24081977)

justin@swclaw.com 

STECKLER WAYNE CHERRY & LOVE 

PLLC

8416 Old McGregor Road 

Waco, TX 76712

Telephone: (254) 651-3690

Facsimile: (254) 651-3689

Gregory Phillip Love (TX Bar No. 24013060)

greg@swclaw.com

STECKLER WAYNE CHERRY & LOVE 

PLLC

107 East Main Street

Henderson, TX 75652

Telephone: (903) 212-4444

Facsimile: (903) 392-2267

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a

BRAZOS LICENSING AND

DEVELOPMENT

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 26 of 27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was served or 

delivered electronically via email to all counsel of record, on this 14th day of October 2022.

/s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop

Jonathan K. Waldrop

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG Document 227 Filed 10/25/22 Page 27 of 27