Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin L. Moyer

Moyer Law Firm, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Adam S. Willfond

Francis A. Veltri

Travelers Staff Counsel Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Erie Insurance Exchange,

Appellant-Plaintiff, 

v. 

Myron Corporation, 

Appellee-Defendant. 

June 9, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CT-2699 

Appeal from the Montgomery 

Superior Court

The Honorable Heather L. Barajas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

54D01-1907-CT-812 

Opinion by Judge Riley 

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 2 of 16

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie Insurance), appeals the trial 

court’s denial of its motion to consider Appellee-Defendant, Myron 

Corporation (Myron), as the manufacturer of a power bank charger in order to 

apply strict liability pursuant to the Indiana Product Liability Act’s domestic 

distributor exception, Ind. Code § 34-20-2-4, and the trial court’s grant of 

Myron’s motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Erie Insurance presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: 

Whether the trial court erred when it denied Erie Insurance’s motion to 

consider Myron to be the domestic distributor of a power bank charger pursuant 

to the Indiana Product Liability Act (IPLA).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On May 22, 2018, a fire occurred at the residence of Kevin and Heather 

Roberts (collectively, Roberts), located in Crawfordsville, Indiana. At the time 

of the fire, the Roberts’ home was insured under a homeowners insurance 

policy held by Erie Insurance. After tendering insurance benefits of more than 

$248,000 to Roberts for fire-related property damage, Erie Insurance filed a 

subrogation suit in July 2019 against Myron, alleging that the fire loss resulted 

from a defect in a power bank charger which was “manufactured and sold” by 

Myron. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19). Specifically, in its Complaint, Erie 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 3 of 16

Insurance advanced two claims: (1) a negligence claim, contending that Myron 

was negligent for failing to warn, inspect, or test the power bank charger; and 

(2) a claim under the IPLA, contending that Myron was strictly liable pursuant 

to the domestic distributor exception, I.C. § 34-20-2-4. 

[5] Myron is a family-owned promotional products company located in Maywood, 

New Jersey. It purchases products from suppliers, which it then resells with a 

focus on personalized business products. Myron’s customers order from its 

online catalogue, after which Myron personalizes the product with a business 

name, logo, or other customer-requested customization. Myron does not alter 

the products during this personalization process. After receiving Erie 

Insurance’s Complaint, Myron timely filed its Answer. In its Answer, Myron 

denied that it had manufactured the power bank charger and named, among its 

affirmative defenses, Shenzhen C-Star Electric Technology Company, Ltd. 

(Shenzhen), as the manufacturer of the power bank charger and as a non-party 

liable for Erie Insurance’s damages. Myron included two separate addresses in 

China for Shenzhen, along with a company website. During discovery, Myron 

clarified that it had purchased the lot of power bank chargers from NINGBO CStar Import & Export (NINGBO), located in China, and provided an address in 

China. Erie Insurance did not amend its Complaint to add Shenzhen or 

NINGBO as party-defendants. 

[6] On September 15, 2021, Erie Insurance moved the trial court for an order 

requesting it to consider Myron to be the manufacturer of the power bank 

charger under Indiana Code section 34-20-1-4 of the IPLA. In support of its 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 4 of 16

motion, Erie Insurance designated an affidavit by a senior subrogation specialist 

with Erie Insurance. The affidavit alleged that no records could be found of 

Shenzhen being registered to do business in Indiana, nor were there any records 

of the company seeking qualifications to do business in Indiana. The affidavit 

further averred that there was no evidence of Shenzhen maintaining a bank 

account, mailing address, post office box, or a telephone number in Indiana;

purchasing goods or materials in Indiana; maintaining an office, warehouse, or 

place of business in Indiana; having any employees, officers, business agents, 

directors, or representatives residing in or assigned to Indiana; being a party to 

litigation in Indiana; or selling goods directly to any party in Indiana. 

[7] On September 24, 2021, Myron filed a response in opposition to Erie 

Insurance’s motion, together with a motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict 

liability claim based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), contending that Erie 

Insurance had failed to establish that the trial court was unable to obtain 

personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen or that Myron was Shenzhen’s principal 

distributor or seller of the power bank chargers pursuant to Indiana Code 

section 34-20-1-4. On September 30, 2021, Erie Insurance responded to 

Myron’s motion, emphasizing that even though Myron was not the 

manufacturer of the power bank charger, it was still a seller of the product. Erie 

Insurance also noted that Myron had not contradicted Erie Insurance’s affidavit 

elaborating on the difficulties in obtaining service on Shenzhen. On February 

8, 2022, Myron filed a supplement to respond to Erie Insurance’s reply, which 

included an affidavit by Steve Kjekstad (Kjekstad), Myron’s vice president of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 5 of 16

supply chain. The affidavit alleged that Myron had purchased the power bank 

charger from NINGBO, who, in turn, appeared to have purchased the power 

bank charger from the manufacturer, Shenzhen. The affidavit also averred that 

Myron’s purchase did not comprise a significant percentage of Myron’s overall 

business, nor did it comprise a significant percentage of the import of the 

product overall from Shenzhen. 

[8] On February 24, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the competing 

motions. After hearing arguments, the trial court granted Erie Insurance’s 

motion to strike certain statements from Kjekstad’s affidavit. On April 24, 

2022, the trial court denied Erie Insurance’s motion to declare Myron to be the 

manufacturer of the power bank charger under the IPLA and granted Myron’s 

motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim. On October 12 through 

October 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the remaining 

negligence claim. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in 

favor of Myron. 

[9] Erie Insurance now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[10] Myron filed, and the trial court granted, a motion pursuant to Trial Rule 

12(B)(6), which allows for the dismissal of a cause for “[f]ailure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted[.]” If, while making a 12(B)(6) motion,

“matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 6 of 16

the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 

provided in Rule 56.” See T.R. 12(B). Here, both parties agree that the trial 

court, in its decision to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim, considered 

evidence and material outside the pleading. As such, Myron’s motion to 

dismiss should be converted to a motion for summary judgment under Indiana 

Trial Rule 56. See Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 989 N.E.2d 791, 795

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[11] When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same 

test as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated 

evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Sedam v. 2JR 

Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 2017). “A fact is ‘material’ if its 

resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a 

trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if 

the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” 

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The moving party bears the 

initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to 

a determinative issue. Id.

[12] Our review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, and we 

construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in favor of 

the non-moving party. T.R. 56(H); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 

(Ind. 2013). Because we review a summary judgment ruling de novo, a trial 

court’s findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the court’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 7 of 16

judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this court. 

Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). 

Additionally, we are not constrained by the claims and arguments presented to 

the trial court, and we may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory 

supported by the designated evidence. Id.

II. Indiana’s Product Liability Act

[13] Product liability actions in Indiana are governed by the IPLA, Indiana Code 

section 34-20-2-1, et. seq., which provides, in pertinent part:

a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of 

commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably 

dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s 

property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that 

product to the user or consumer if:

(1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller 

should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by 

the defective condition;

(2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product; and

(3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or 

consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in which 

the product is sold by the person sought to be held liable under 

this article.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 8 of 16

I.C. § 34-20-2-1. Actions for strict liability in tort are restricted to

manufacturers of defective products. Indeed, the statute states the restriction 

rather bluntly:

A product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability 

in tort may not be commenced or maintained against a seller of a 

product that is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition 

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer unless the seller 

is a manufacturer of the product or of the part of the product 

alleged to be defective.

I.C. § 34-20-2-3. In this regard, the statute defines a manufacturer, for purposes 

of Indiana Chapter 34-20, as “a person or an entity who designs, assembles, 

fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a 

component part of a product before the sale of the product to a user or 

consumer.” I.C. § 34-6-2-77(a). Pursuant to subsection (b), “a seller who 

discloses the name of the actual manufacturer of a product is not a 

manufacturer merely because the seller places or has placed a private label on a 

product.” I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b). 

A. Indiana Code section 34-6-2-77(b)

[14] In support of its motion to dismiss, which was converted to a summary 

judgment motion, Myron, as seller of the power bank charger, contends—for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 9 of 16

the first time on appeal1

—that it was not the manufacturer of the power bank 

charger because—as conceded by both parties—Myron personalized the power 

bank charger with a private label for promotional purposes without 

manipulating the product and named Shenzhen as the actual manufacturer in 

its Answer and Affirmative Defenses. See I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b).

[15] Notwithstanding that Myron personalized the power bank charger and 

provided Shenzhen’s contact information, in order to be exempt from the 

IPLA’s application, the statute quantified that Myron must “merely” 

personalize the product to remain characterized as a seller, and not be 

considered a manufacturer. See I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b). We note that “[t]he goal of 

statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent 

of the General Assembly.” Sanders v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., 892 N.E.2d 

1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “When construing a statute, the 

legislature’s definition of a word binds us.” United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. 

v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 716 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. 

denied. Where, as here, the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word 

its common and ordinary meaning, and, in doing so, may consult English 

language dictionaries. Id. at 1013-14. Turning to the dictionary definition, 

“mere” has been defined as “nothing more,” which appears to imply that the 

1 As conceded by Myron, Myron failed to make this claim before the trial court. However, within the 

parameters of our summary judgment review, we evaluate the parties’ claims de novo and may affirm under 

any legal theory supported by the designated evidence. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 10 of 16

only act a seller can make to the product to remain within the limited 

parameters of being defined a seller pursuant to the IPLA and not be considered 

to fall within the perceived liability-laden status of a manufacturer, is placing a 

private label on the product. See Mere, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mere (last visited May 24, 

2023). At first glance, Myron fits this description.

[16] However, this limiting statute must be read in conjunction with the more 

expansive definition of seller comprised in Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4, 

which is relied upon by Erie Insurance to bring Myron within the purview of 

the ‘manufacturer’ definition of the IPLA. See Rural Elec., 716 N.E.2d at 1014

(In seeking to give effect to the legislature’s intent, we read an act’s sections as a 

whole and strive to give effect to all of the provisions so that no part is held 

meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute). Indiana Code 

34-20-2-4 provides

If a court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a particular 

manufacturer of a product or part of a product alleged to be 

defective, then that manufacturer’s principal distributor or seller 

over whom a court may hold jurisdiction is considered the 

manufacturer of the product.

[17] As “[s]tatutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and 

should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme,”

a combined reading of Indiana code sections 34-6-2-77(b) and 34-20-2-4

indicates that even though Myron solely placed a personalization on the power 

bank charger, Myron’s status as seller may morph into the statutory 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 11 of 16

manufacturer’s status by virtue of doing more than “merely” placing a private 

label on a product. Sanders, 892 N.E.2d at 1252. A high volume of sale or 

import of a product may quantitatively be acknowledged as doing more than 

‘merely’ personalizing a product. As such, the “principal distributor or seller” 

of the product who “places a private label on a product” can be considered a 

manufacturer under the IPLA. See I.C. §§ 34-6-2-77; -20-2-4. Accordingly, we 

must analyze whether Myron may be the principal distributor or seller of the 

power bank charger.

B. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4

[18] Our supreme court has named Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4 “the domestic 

distributor exception,” and has explained that an action in strict liability can be 

maintained against a nonmanufacturer defendant only if two conditions are 

met: (1) the defendant must be a principal distributor or seller over whom the 

court can hold jurisdiction; and (2) the court must be unable to hold jurisdiction 

over the actual manufacturer. Kennedy v. Guess, 806 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ind. 

2004). If either condition is absent, then the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of 

law. Warriner v. D.C. Marshall Jeep, 962 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012), trans. denied.

[19] Thus, to defeat summary judgment in favor of Myron, Erie Insurance had the 

burden, as the nonmovant plaintiff, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of 

material fact existed as to whether Myron can be considered a manufacturer 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 12 of 16

under the domestic distributor exception.2 Finding it dispositive here, we need 

only look to the second condition of the domestic distributor exception, i.e., 

Erie Insurance needed to come forth with some evidence from which the trial 

court could reasonably infer that it would be unable to hold jurisdiction over the 

actual manufacturer, Shenzhen. Erie Insurance failed to do so.

[20] Erie Insurance never named Shenzhen as a party in its lawsuit, and it conceded 

that it never attempted to obtain service of process on Shenzhen. It appears that 

Erie Insurance did nothing other than to unilaterally decide that simply because 

Shenzhen is based in China, no Indiana trial court could exercise personal 

jurisdiction. The only evidence designated by Erie Insurance on this issue is the 

affidavit of a “senior subrogation specialist,” who baldly stated that based upon 

“a diligent search” of the “records of the Indiana Secretary of State,” it was 

discovered that Shenzhen was not registered in the State of Indiana and had no 

contact with this state. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 34-35). This was wholly 

inadequate.

[21] Our supreme court’s opinion in Kennedy is instructive on this point. The 

defendants in that case moved for summary judgment asserting that they were 

not manufacturers of the allegedly defective product as defined by the IPLA. In 

2 See, e.g., Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 781 (noting that it was the nonmovant plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate 

genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether defendants were manufacturers under the domestic 

distributor exception); see also Kesling v. Kesling, 83 N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (in summary 

judgment context, regardless of which party is the movant, the plaintiff who wishes to circumvent a general 

rule has the burden to demonstrate the applicability of an exception), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 13 of 16

response, the plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to hold the defendants in 

the lawsuit on a strict liability theory based upon the domestic distributor 

exception. Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 780-81. In support of their contention that 

the exception applied, the plaintiffs designated evidence demonstrating that 

they had unsuccessfully attempted service on the Hong Kong manufacturer. Id.

at 781. They designated their receipt of an “affirmation of non-service” 

indicating that the named foreign corporation was not at the address provided 

by the plaintiffs and “therefore service was not effected.” Id. Based on this 

evidence, the plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was “no longer in 

business and [wa]s not subject to the jurisdiction of this court leaving [the 

defendant] as principal distributor or seller.” Id. In additional support of their 

argument that there was no basis for an Indiana court to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the Hong Kong manufacturer, the Kennedy plaintiffs also 

pointed to affidavits designated by the defendants, indicating that there was no 

evidence that the foreign manufacturer had any contacts with Indiana or had 

any knowledge that its product was to be sold in Indiana. Id. Our supreme 

court determined that while this evidence, as a whole, was not “especially 

impressive,” it did create a reasonable inference that jurisdiction could not be 

obtained and it was “potent enough” to demonstrate a genuine issue of material 

fact on the question of whether the defendants could be considered 

manufacturers under the domestic distributor exception, and therefore 

summary judgment for the defendants was inappropriate. Id. See also, Kucik v. 

Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 2010 WL 2694962, *8 (N.D. Ind. July 2, 2010) (in 

which the Northern District Court of Indiana granted summary judgment to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 14 of 16

defendant in part because Kucik “presented [no] evidence that would support a 

claim that this [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction over Yamaha Motor Co. 

Ltd.,” a Japanese company. “For example, [Kucik] has not pointed to any 

attempt to serve Yamaha Motor Co. or otherwise bring them into this suit that 

proved unsuccessful. Thus, the Plaintiff has not produced evidence that is 

sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on this element of his case.”); Motorists 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mega Lion, Inc., 2019 WL 2451086, *3 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2019)

(“Plaintiff asserts that the manufacturer is Chinese, but that is hardly a 

definitive bar to personal jurisdiction.”); Sandlin v. Bell Sports, Inc., 2022 WL 

2967714, *5 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2022) (“Sandlin alleges that, because Ningbo 

Detai is based in China and has ‘no business presence in the United States,’ its 

‘sole link to Indiana is the mere fact that Bell Sports unilaterally distributed its 

products throughout Indiana’ and thus the company ‘lacks the prerequisite 

minimum contacts with the State of Indiana’ required for this [c]ourt to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over it. This conclusory statement falls short of satisfying 

her burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists on this issue.”).

[22] Accordingly, based on Kennedy, Erie Insurance needed to designate evidence to 

support a reasonable inference that the trial court would not be able to hold 

personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen in order to demonstrate a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Myron could be considered a manufacturer under 

the domestic distributor exception. See Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 782. Erie 

Insurance failed to do so. A mere affidavit averring that, in its own opinion, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 15 of 16

trial court could not obtain jurisdiction is simply not enough.3

 Summary 

judgment in favor of Myron on Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim was 

therefore appropriate.4

 

3 The jurisdiction of an Indiana court over a nonresident entity is predicated on Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A), 

which grants jurisdiction over an entity doing any business in Indiana. The purpose of the trial rule is to 

extend jurisdiction to the boundaries permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the federal Constitution. North Texas Steel Co., Inc. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 679 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ind. Ct. 

App 1997), trans. denied, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment requires that before a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have 

“certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 

95 (1945). Unlike here, if the defendant’s contacts with the state are so “continuous and systematic” that the 

defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, then the 

defendant is subject to general jurisdiction, even in causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 

L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). But if the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not “continuous and 

systematic,” like in the instant case, specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related to or 

arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967

(Ind. 2006). Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum state so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into 

court there. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A 

single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, if it 

creates a “substantial connection” with the forum state and the suit is related to that connection. 

LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967. But a defendant cannot be brought into a jurisdiction “solely as a result of 

random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Finally, if the defendant has contacts with the forum state 

sufficient for general or specific jurisdiction, due process requires that the assertion of personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant is reasonable. Id. at 477. As the substantial connection of a single act with the forum 

state is a factual matter, the question as to whether a court can hold jurisdiction over a party is a mixed 

question of fact and law, which cannot be left to a party’s unilateral decision by way of an affidavit. See 

Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 782.

4 Because we hold that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the first prong of I.C. § 34-20-2-4, we do 

not need to address Erie Insurance’s claim under the second prong, i.e., whether Myron is the principal seller 

or distributor of the power bank charger. See Warriner, 962 N.E.2d at 1267 (If either condition is absent, then 

the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023 Page 16 of 16

CONCLUSION

[23] Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that Erie Insurance failed to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact that Myron is to be considered the 

domestic distributor of a power bank charger pursuant to the IPLA.

[24] Affirmed.

[25] Altice, C.J. and Pyle, J. concur