*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2010*

Decided May 11,  2010

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐4165

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ADAM E. DAVIS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 04‐CR‐250

William C. Griesbach,

Judge.

O R D E R

Adam Davis represented himself in a jury trial at which he was charged with two

counts of making false statements to an FBI agent, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001, in relation to an

investigation of an investment‐fraud scheme. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both

counts, and the district court sentenced Davis to concurrent 60‐month terms of

imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Davis then moved for a new trial,

see FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, and the district court denied his motion.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐4165 Page 2

Still representing himself, Davis raises three frivolous arguments on appeal. First, he

asserts that the district court lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction to convict him because the

criminal‐jurisdiction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, was not lawfully enacted by the two houses of

Congress during the same legislative session. This argument is foreclosed by the enrolled‐

bill rule, which makes § 3231 “complete and unimpeachable.”  Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,

143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892); United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131, 151‐52 (2d Cir. 2009); see

United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007).

Next, Davis argues that his conviction is invalid because of the presiding judge’s bias

toward him as a pro se litigant. Davis asserts that this bias is evident from the numerous

adverse evidentiary findings he received; he also throws in an unsubstantiated accusation

that the judge bought his judgeship by making a substantial financial contribution to

George W. Bush’s first presidential campaign. But there is no evidence even remotely

suggesting bias on the judge’s part—either that he contributed any money to President

Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign or that he administered the trial in anything but an

evenhanded fashion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555‐56

(1994); United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 807 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Golant, 239 F.3d 931, 938

(7th Cir. 2001).

Finally, Davis argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to show

that the prosecution concealed evidence at trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). He reasserts that the prosecution failed to provide him with records from 29

different agencies, including unspecified classified documents and information regarding

unidentified informants. But Davis does not specify any particular evidence he should have

received, and this lack of detail dooms his Brady claim. See United States v. Warren, 454 F.3d

752, 759 (7th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.