2024 IL App (2d) 240155-U 

No. 2-24-0155 

Order filed May 31, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 23-CF-2648 

) 

DIJON P. EDWARDS, ) Honorable 

) John A. Barsanti, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in continuing defendant’s detention hearing where 

defendant requested the continuance and waived any timeliness objection. Nor did 

the trial court err in detaining defendant where the evidence supported that 

defendant fatally shot the victim and that defendant had a criminal history that 

included crimes of violence and demonstrated a disregard for court-imposed 

conditions. Therefore, we affirm.

¶ 2 Defendant, Dijon P. Edwards, appeals from the denial of his pretrial release under section 

110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). 

For the following reasons, we affirm.
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 On December 7, 2023, defendant was arrested and charged by complaint with two counts 

of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2022)), one count of armed robbery (id. § 

18-2(a)(3)), and two counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon (id.§ 24-

1.1(a)). The charges stemmed from defendant’s alleged shooting of Dontrell Cortez with a 

handgun and his taking of property (a bag and cellphone) from the person of Cortez.

¶ 5 Defendant initially appeared before the court on January 11, 2024, and the State filed its 

verified petition to deny pretrial release that same day. The court appointed a public defender to 

represent defendant. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of the verified petition, answering that 

she had reviewed it with defendant. The court asked the State if it was ready to proceed on its 

petition, and it answered yes. The court then asked defense counsel, and she answered no and 

requested a hearing on January 19, 2024. The court set defendant’s hearing for January 19.

¶ 6 At the January 19 hearing, which was before a different trial judge, a different assistant 

public defender represented defendant. The trial court initially stated that it was setting the case 

for preliminary hearing. Defense counsel responded, “Actually, Judge, we would be setting this 

for detention hearing I believe on January 31st in the afternoon.” The State confirmed this was 

correct. 

¶ 7 The trial court asked the parties if there was a “time issue” with respect to the State’s 

petition to detain, and “[i]f there is, you waive it?” Defense counsel responded that defendant 

waived any time issue. The court set the detention hearing for January 31. The written order from 

January 19, 2024, stated that defendant had waived his presence at the hearing and that “Defendant 
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waives all time issues as related to the People’s Verified Petition to Deny Defendant Pretrial 

Release.”

¶ 8 The record does not contain a report of proceedings for January 31. Instead, the court 

reporter filed an affidavit stating that a February 1, 2024, order was entered showing this case was 

continued to February 14 but that the case was never called for the record and thus there was no 

transcript to produce. The common law record does not contain a written order from January 31 

or February 1, 2024.

¶ 9 The State’s verified petition was heard on February 14, 2024, and the State admitted two 

exhibits at the hearing: defendant’s Cook County fugitive warrant for the offenses of burglary and 

probation violation committed in Wisconsin, and the State’s factual synopsis. The synopsis 

provided as follows. On October 20, 2023, officers with the Elgin Police Department responded 

to a shooting at 1245 Fleetwood Drive in Elgin. At the scene, officers found the victim, Dontrell 

Cortez, shot and deceased on the second floor. Officers recovered a 10-millimeter casing but did 

not recover any property from Cortez’s body. A witness reported hearing gunfire at the building. 

After hearing the shooting, the witness observed a pair of black males exit the building. One was 

carrying a grocery bag.

¶ 10 Officers reviewed video surveillance footage from around the building and observed two 

subjects in the footage matching the witness’s description of the two black males. 

¶ 11 Officers also reviewed nearby business video surveillance footage to view Cortez prior to

the shooting. Video footage showed Cortez arriving at the Elgin Shopping Mall that day around 5 

p.m. He was carrying a green drawstring bag and a white plastic bag, which appeared to hold 

something. Officers further observed video showing defendant and Hayes arriving at the mall, 

along with two other persons. Defendant and Hayes exited the mall with Cortez, and defendant 
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was holding a white cell phone box. Footage from another location showed that Cortez had a white 

cell phone box inside of his green bag. 

¶ 12 Around 6:16 p.m., defendant was seen on another video at 1245 Fleetwood Drive, entering 

an apartment on the second floor. He was seen exiting the apartment two minutes later, and the 

video showed him concealing an unknown item inside his jacket. At 6:19 p.m., video showed 

defendant walking up the north stairwell, where Cortez and others were located. Defendant 

returned to the second-floor apartment around 6:20 p.m. At that same time, footage showed the 

witness who reported seeing subjects matching the description of defendant and Hayes leaving the 

building, consistent with her account to police. 

¶ 13 The 911 call regarding a shooting victim was made at about 6:23 p.m. At that time, video 

showed defendant and Hayes where the witness had placed them outside of the apartment building. 

Footage obtained from the Grumpy Goat Tavern, located inside a nearby golf course clubhouse,

showed defendant and Hayes emerging from a wooded area south of Fleetwood Drive and walking 

into the clubhouse at around 6:27 p.m. Hayes was holding two white cell phone boxes. Defendant 

and Hayes changed their clothing inside the Grumpy Goat restroom, and they left the establishment 

around 6:45 p.m. in a red SUV. Officers later spoke to the owner of the SUV, who said that 

defendant had called him that night to pick him up. 

¶ 14 Hayes spoke with officers and reported that he, defendant, and Cortez returned from the 

mall to the Fleetwood Drive apartment building. Hayes observed defendant enter apartment 203 

“possibly to get some weed” to sell to Cortez. Thereafter, Hayes saw defendant return to the 

stairwell where Cortez was by himself at the bottom of the stairs, and Hayes believed a drug deal 

was taking place. A minute later, Hayes heard a gun fire. Hayes then observed defendant holding 

a small black firearm consistent with a 10-millimeter handgun. Defendant pointed the handgun at 
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Hayes and told him to come with him, and Hayes followed. As Hayes walked down the stairs, he 

saw Cortez walking up the stairs. Defendant told Hayes to grab Cortez’s green and white bag, and 

then they left the building. 

¶ 15 Cortez was found several feet away from the top of the stairs on the second-floor hallway, 

consistent with where Hayes reported last seeing him walking up the stairs.

¶ 16 Hayes further reported that he followed defendant into the woods, where defendant pulled 

out several Android cell phone boxes and gave them to Hayes to hold. Defendant then attempted 

to conceal his firearm by some trees before he and Hayes proceeded to the Grumpy Goat. 

¶ 17 The State further argued that defendant had a history of criminality in Wisconsin, where 

defendant was a resident. His history included three burglary convictions, the most recent in 2019; 

a 2016 conviction of felony intimidation of a victim with misdemeanor domestic battery; a 2017 

conviction of resisting a peace officer; a 2019 conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon; a 

2019 conviction of bail jumping; and a 2020 felony theft conviction for which defendant was on 

probation at the time of the instant alleged offense.

¶ 18 Defense counsel proffered the following at the hearing. Defendant was 25 years old and, if 

released, had a local address in Chicago suitable for house arrest. Defendant had family ties in the 

area—his sister and extended family lived in Illinois. Defendant’s sister confirmed that she would 

be able to take him to future court dates. 

¶ 19 Defense counsel continued that defendant had a seizure disorder, which required 

prescription medication to manage, but since his detention, he had not received his proper 

medication and had experienced two seizures. Due to his seizure disorder, defendant required 

placement on a bottom sleeping bunk. Due to a lack of bottom bunks available at the jail, defendant 
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had to be placed in isolation, which had affected his mental health. Further, defendant had a hearing 

tube and hearing loss in his left ear.

¶ 20 The trial court granted the State’s petition to detain. It found the proof was evident and the 

presumption great that defendant committed a number of detainable offenses, noting that there 

were witnesses to “the significant part of the offenses alleged in this matter.” The trial court found 

defendant posed a danger to the community, citing his “significant criminal history” and that he 

was currently on probation and had a fugitive warrant out for his arrest. The trial court also found 

no combination of conditions could mitigate defendant’s real and present threat to the community.

¶ 21 In the trial court’s written order, it further explained its order. As to its finding that 

defendant committed a detainable offense, the court specifically noted that witnesses had observed 

defendant with a firearm and that a witness had identified defendant as the shooter. Regarding 

defendant’s dangerousness, the court found that, in addition to defendant’s criminal history, 

defendant had armed himself and apparently committed the shooting without provocation in the 

course of an armed robbery. Last, as to conditions, the court explained that defendant had been on 

probation previously and was on probation currently, but probation conditions had not hampered 

defendant’s continued criminality.

¶ 22 Defendant timely appealed. 

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 In defendant’s notice of appeal, he raised three grounds for relief: (1) the State failed to 

prove that he committed the offenses charged; (2) the State failed to prove defendant’s 

dangerousness; and (3) the State failed to prove that no conditions could mitigate defendant’s 

dangerousness, including electronic home monitoring. 
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¶ 25 Defendant filed a memorandum in support of his appeal. Therein, he developed argument 

on the three issues raised in the notice of appeal and additionally argued that the trial court violated 

section 6.1(c)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)) by failing to hold a hearing on 

the State’s petition to detain within 48 hours of defendant’s initial appearance. Defendant argues 

that the plain language of section 6.1(c)(2) required a hearing on the State’s petition within 48 

hours even when the court granted a continuance at his initial appearance. He acknowledges that 

the issue of timeliness was not raised in the notice of appeal (nor was it objected to before the trial 

court), but he argues that the issue is reviewable under the doctrine of plain error. In support of his 

position, defendant cites People v. McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U.

¶ 26 We reject defendant’s timeliness argument. The first step in a plain-error analysis is to 

determine whether a clear and obvious error occurred (People v. Henderson, 2017 IL App (3d) 

150550, ¶ 37), and no clear and obvious error occurred because defendant clearly waived the 48-

hour window for his detention hearing. Although defendant’s January 31, 2024, hearing was 

continued without any explanation in the record, defendant had already twice requested to continue 

his detention hearing (on both January 11 and January 19, 2024) and had explicitly waived any

timeliness issues. Nothing in the record shows that he objected to a third continuation of his 

detention hearing from January 31 to February 14, 2024, and it is defendant’s duty to provide a 

sufficient record on appeal. People v. Johnson, 285 Ill. App. 3d 307, 308 (1996) (“The appellant 

has the duty to supply a sufficient record for review, and any doubts arising from the 

incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”). 

¶ 27 Importantly, defendant was detained when he waived his right to a timely hearing on the 

State’s petition and remained detained thereafter, meaning that defendant was the party who stood 

to benefit from section 6.1(c)(2)’s 48-hour timeframe. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022) 
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(“[T]he Court retains the discretion to detain or release the defendant in the time between the filing 

of the petition and the hearing.”). Both statutory and constitutional rights may be waived as long 

as the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Reid, 2014 IL App (3d) 130296, ¶ 11. 

As section 110-6.1 functions primarily to limit the denial of a defendant’s pretrial release, we see 

no issue with a detained defendant waiving at least some of section 110-6.1’s limitations, such as 

a hearing on the State’s petition to detain within 48 hours. To hold otherwise would be to disallow 

a detained defendant the choice of continued prehearing detention in order to prepare for the 

detention hearing and have a better chance at pretrial release. 

¶ 28 We also find no merit in defendant’s argument that his waiver was ineffective simply 

because it was made through counsel. Even with constitutional rights, only five decisions 

ultimately belong to a criminal defendant, such as how to plead and whether to waive a jury trial; 

all other decisions are within the purview of counsel. People v. Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d 270, 281 

(2005). Here, defense counsel was not ready to immediately proceed on the State’s petition and 

requested more time, which was reasonable in light of the defense’s eventual proffer that included 

confirmation that defendant had relatives with whom he could reside in Illinois and a sister who 

would drive him to court appearances—a proffer that tended to show that defendant, a Wisconsin 

resident, could potentially be released in Illinois.

¶ 29 Moreover, this case is readily distinguishable from defendant’s cited case law, McCarthyNelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, where the State requested a continuance and where no 

waiver issue was raised.

¶ 30 Last, even if the continuation of defendant’s detention hearing amounted to error, it would 

have amounted to invited error because defendant seeks to challenge on appeal the same 

continuation he requested below. See People v. Liekis, 2012 IL App (2d) 100774, ¶ 24 (the doctrine 
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of invited error “provides that a party may not request the court to proceed in one manner and then 

argue on appeal that the requested action was error”).

¶ 31 Turning to defendant’s arguments on the merits, he first contends that neither the proof was 

evident nor the presumption great that he committed a detainable offense because Hayes, the only 

witness to place defendant near the scene of the shooting, “had a strong motivation to implicate 

[defendant] in order to avoid prosecution.” Second, as to the real and present threat defendant 

poses, he argues that the majority of his criminal history consisted of nonviolent offenses, and that 

the State failed to present evidence beyond the current allegations that defendant was a violent 

individual. Third, he argues that the State failed to present evidence that defendant had ever 

violated electronic monitoring or a similar condition in the past. He also argues that the less 

restrictive condition of ordering him to surrender any firearms and not possess firearms would 

have been sufficient to mitigate any threat he would pose on release.

¶ 32 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 

2022). Under the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only for certain charged 

offenses. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. Here, defendant was charged with a qualifying offense. See id. 

§ 110-6.1(a)(1.5) (first-degree murder).

¶ 33 To deny a defendant pretrial release, the trial court must find that the State proved the 

following by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great 

that defendant committed a detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)); (2) defendant’s pretrial release 

posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (id. § 110-

6.1(e)(2)); and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present 

threat to the safety of any person or the community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from 

prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). We review whether the trial court’s findings were against the 
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manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13; People v. 

Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

when it is unreasonable. People v. Sims, 2022 IL App (2d) 200391, ¶ 72. We review the trial court’s 

ultimate decision regarding pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 

230317, ¶ 13. 

¶ 34 We reject defendant’s arguments. First, Hayes’s statements to the police, along with the 

other evidence in the factual synopsis, including copious references to video footage of defendant, 

Cortez, and witnesses from October 20, 2023, provided sufficient evidence that defendant shot 

Cortez. Defendant challenges Hayes’s credibility by suggesting a motivation to lie, but the trial 

court’s findings are entitled to considerable deference, and given that Hayes’s statements were 

consistent with the rest of synopsis—including where Cortez’s body was found, where defendant 

was, and who he was with at different times that day—it was reasonable for the trial court to 

believe Hayes’s statements implicating defendant as the shooter. Even a conviction may be upheld 

by the testimony of a single witness contradicted by a defendant, so long as the witness is positive 

and credible. See People v. Garza, 298 Ill. App. 3d 452, 458 (1998). 

¶ 35 Next, as to the real and present threat defendant poses, he is charged with a crime of 

violence involving a firearm (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1) (West 2022)), he has a criminal history 

that includes intimidation of a victim, domestic battery, and resisting a peace officer, in addition 

to multiple burglaries (id. § 110-6.1(g)(2)), he was known to possess or have access to weapons 

(id. § 110-6.1(g)(7)), and he was on probation at the time of the alleged offense (id. § 110-

6.1(g)(8)). As the evidence supported multiple dangerousness factors in conjunction with the 

charge of first-degree murder, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant posed a real and 

present threat to the community.
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¶ 36 Last, as to conditions of release, the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant’s 

criminal history, including his actions on probation, showed a lack of respect for court-imposed 

conditions. Defendant has been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, demonstrating that 

an order to not possess firearms is unlikely to mitigate the threat he poses to the community. 

Defendant is now accused of shooting a man in an apartment building, further demonstrating that 

limiting defendant to a residence with electronic home monitoring is no guarantee he would not 

harm someone around him. In short, the trial court reasonably concluded that no conditions would 

sufficiently mitigate the threat that defendant may gravely harm another on release.

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s pretrial release, and we 

affirm the order of the Kane County circuit court. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.