In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2504 

CHRISTOPHER BILEK,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:19-cv-08389 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge. 

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 2, 2021 — DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2021 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Christopher Bilek received two unauthorized robocalls soliciting health insurance that he alleged violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and 

the Illinois Automatic Telephone Dialing Act. Bilek sued Federal Insurance Company and Health Insurance Innovations

on a vicarious liability theory, claiming that defendants’ 
2 No. 20-2504 

agents generated the unauthorized robocalls.1 To support his 

agency allegations, Bilek alleged a web of business relationships: Federal Insurance Company contracted with Health Insurance Innovations to sell its insurance; Health Insurance Innovations hired lead generators to effectuate telemarketing; 

and the lead generators made the unauthorized robocalls that 

form the basis of Bilek’s claims here. 

Though neither Federal Insurance Company nor Health 

Insurance Innovations initiated the robocalls, Bilek sought to 

hold defendants vicariously liable for the lead generators’ unauthorized calling under three agency theories: actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification. The district court dismissed Bilek’s complaint, holding that Bilek failed to plausibly allege agency on any of these grounds. For that reason, the 

district court dismissed Bilek’s claims against Federal Insurance Company for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 

and it dismissed Health Insurance Innovations for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). We disagree. While we 

express no view on whether Bilek will ultimately succeed in

proving an agency relationship between the lead generators 

and either Federal Insurance Company or Health Insurance 

Innovations, Bilek alleges enough at the pleading stage for his 

complaint to move forward. For the reasons explained below, 

we reverse and remand. 

I 

In our review of a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, 

we accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true

1 When we refer to both Federal Insurance Company and Health Insurance Innovations, we use “defendants” for clarity.
No. 20-2504 3

and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See

Taha v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Loc. 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 

(7th Cir. 2020). The same is true in our review of a district 

court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(2), where, as here, the district court decides that motion 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Tamburo v. 

Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we accept as true Bilek’s well-pleaded

factual allegations discussed below. 

On December 21, 2019, Bilek filed a three-count complaint 

against Federal Insurance Company and Health Insurance Innovations, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act and Illinois Automatic Telephone Dialing Act. 

See 47 U.S.C. § 227; 815 ILCS § 305/30(a)(b). Bilek alleged that 

he received two unauthorized robocalls as a part of a telemarketing campaign initiated by Federal Insurance Company and 

Health Insurance Innovations to advertise and solicit Federal 

Insurance Company’s health insurance. Federal Insurance 

Company contracted with Health Insurance Innovations to 

generate business. Health Insurance Innovations, in turn, contracted with lead generators to conduct telemarketing for 

Federal Insurance Company’s health insurance. Against this

backdrop, the lead generators initiated the two robocalls to 

Bilek’s cellphone. On September 20, 2019, Bilek received the 

first such call on his cellphone. A pre-recorded message solicited health insurance and instructed Bilek to press 1 to be connected to a representative. Bilek pressed 1. Bilek was connected to a live agent who provided a quote for health insurance underwritten by Federal Insurance Company and facilitated by Health Insurance Innovations. Bilek alleged that the 

live agent he spoke with on the phone identified the insurance 

as “Chubb” health insurance, and that Chubb insurance as 
4 No. 20-2504 

referenced by the agent was “for Federal Insurance Company,” a member of the Chubb family of companies.2 

Bilek received a second call on his cellphone on September 

26, 2019. This second call played the same pre-recorded message. Bilek again pressed 1 and became connected to a live 

agent who provided a quote for Federal Insurance Company’s health insurance. Bilek alleged that he did not consent 

to either call—both of which Bilek alleged used an automated 

dialing system and prerecorded voice in violation of the 

TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and the Illinois Automatic Telephone 

Dialing Act, 815 ILCS § 305/30(a)(b). 

In his complaint, Bilek alleged that the lead generators 

acted with Federal Insurance Company’s and Health Insurance Innovations’ actual and apparent authority, and that defendants ratified the lead generators’ unauthorized 

2 In the alternative, Bilek alleges that the insurance “was for a different 

member of the ’Chubb‘ family of companies, whose identity will be identified through discovery.” Id. ¶ 20. We accept as true at the pleading stage

Bilek’s allegation that the insurance solicited was for Federal Insurance 

Company, recognizing that “we cannot expect, nor does Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8 require, a plaintiff to plead information []he could not 

access without discovery.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater 

Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 529 (7th Cir. 2015). Moreover, Federal 

Insurance Company does not challenge Bilek’s allegation as an “unsupported conclusory factual allegation[]”that is not entitled to the assumption of truth. Zablocki v. Merchants Credit Guide Co., 968 F.3d 620, 623 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). While Federal Insurance Company notes in 

its briefing that the callers did not identify Federal Insurance Company by 

name, its arguments here are premised on its contention that Bilek failed 

to plausibly allege that the unnamed callers acted as its agents. 
No. 20-2504 5

robocalling. Specifically, Federal Insurance Company gave 

Health Insurance Innovations and its lead generators authority to use its tradename, approved scripts, and proprietary 

pricing and product information. Health Insurance Innovations then provided these scripts to its lead generators. It also 

participated in calls directly by pairing lead generators with 

quotes through its online portal and emailing quotes to call 

recipients. Both defendants accepted benefits from the lead 

generators’ robocalls—Federal Insurance Company through 

the advertisement and sales of its health insurance products, 

and Health Insurance Innovations through payments for generating leads. 

Defendants each moved to dismiss Bilek’s complaint. Federal Insurance Company brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Bilek 

failed to plausibly allege an agency relationship between itself 

and the lead generators. Making the same agency arguments,

Health Insurance Innovations moved for dismissal for lack of 

personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). It argued that without alleging a plausible agency relationship, Bilek failed to 

connect Health Insurance Innovations to Illinois through the 

lead generators’ conduct.3 

The district court agreed with both defendants, finding

that Bilek failed to plausibly allege that the lead generators 

acted pursuant to a valid agency theory—actual authority, apparent authority, or ratification. On Bilek’s actual authority 

claim, the district court reasoned that Bilek failed to plausibly 

allege agency because his complaint lacked allegations of 

3 Health Insurance Innovations additionally moved for dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6), but the district court declined to reach this ground. 
6 No. 20-2504 

defendants’ control over the timing, quantity, and geographic 

location of the lead generators’ unauthorized robocalls. It next 

found Bilek’s apparent authority claims insufficient because 

he alleged only that the purported agents—not the principals—made manifestations to Bilek. Finally, the district court 

reasoned that Bilek failed to allege agency under its ratification theory because Bilek did not allege that he purchased 

health insurance from the robocalls, so according to the district court, defendants accepted no benefits from the lead generators’ unauthorized calling. 

In light of its determinations on Bilek’s three agency theories, the district court held that Bilek neither stated a claim 

against Federal Insurance Company, nor established a prima 

facie case of personal jurisdiction over Health Insurance Innovations. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Bilek’s complaint and entered final judgment in defendants’ favor. This 

appeal followed. 

II

A 

We begin our analysis with the district court’s Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal of Federal Insurance Company before turning to its dismissal of Health Insurance Innovations for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. We review a district court’s dismissal 

under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, “construing the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff[], accepting as true all 

well-pleaded facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff[‘]s favor.” Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915 

(7th Cir. 2013). Yet “we need not accept as true statements of 

law or unsupported conclusory factual allegations.” Id.
No. 20-2504 7

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) prescribes a plaintiff’s pleading standards, and it requires only that a complaint 

plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” If a complaint fails to meet 

this standard, it may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must 

plead facts to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible where a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). We have considered that “Twombly and Iqbal

require the plaintiff to ‘provid[e] some specific facts’ to support the legal claims asserted in the complaint.” McCauley v. 

City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brooks

v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). While the required 

level of specificity “is not easily quantified,” a plaintiff must

allege “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to 

present a story that holds together.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

Fundamentally, “the plausibility determination is a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotations 

omitted). 

Bilek alleged that Federal Insurance Company is liable for 

the lead generators’ unauthorized robocalling under actual 

authority, apparent authority, and ratification principles of 

agency liability. Each agency theory offers an independent basis for Federal Insurance Company’s vicarious liability. See

Dish Network, LLC, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6584 (2013) (recognizing that a defendant “may be liable for [TCPA] violations by 
8 No. 20-2504 

its representatives under a broad range of agency principles, 

under the federal common law of agency, including not only 

formal agency, but also principles of apparent authority and 

ratification”). But we need not reach all three agency theories

here. Since “[a] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) doesn’t 

permit piecemeal dismissal of parts of claims,” our inquiry is 

limited to only whether Bilek’s complaint “includes factual allegations that state a plausible claim for relief.” BBL, Inc. v. 

City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that 

unlike a motion to dismiss, summary judgment explicitly allows for the parties to move for judgment on parts of claims 

to narrow individual factual issues for trial). Bilek’s complaint

does so. By way of example, Bilek states a plausible claim for 

relief under his actual authority theory of agency liability, so

we start and end there. 

Actual authority requires that at the time of an agent’s 

conduct, “the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with 

the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal 

wishes the agent so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 

§ 2.01 (2006); see Moriarty v. Glueckert Funeral Home, Ltd., 155 

F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 1998). To prove that the lead generators 

had actual authority, Bilek ultimately must show evidence 

that (1) a principal/agent relationship exists, (2) the principal 

controlled or had the right to control the alleged agent’s conduct, and (3) the alleged conduct fell within the scope of the 

agency. See Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC, 759 F.3d 724, 

732 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Illinois law, which like federal 

common law, accords with the Restatement of Agency, Opp v. 

Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000)); 

see also Warciak v. Subway Rests., Inc., 949 F.3d 354, 357 (7th 

Cir. 2020)(“Express authority exists when a principal 
No. 20-2504 9

expressly authorizes an agent and the agent acts on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.”).

We need not—and do not—decide here whether Bilek’s 

allegations are sufficient, if true, to prove his vicarious liability claims. But we find that his allegations include enough detail to render his actual authority theory of agency liability 

plausible. Bilek’s theory of liability is clear—the lead generators acted as Federal Insurance Company’s agents, with actual authority, when they allegedly initiated robocalls to 

Bilek’s cellphone without his consent. And Bilek’s underlying

factual allegations include enough supporting detail to render

this theory plausible. Bilek alleged that the lead generators initiated robocalls that solicited Federal Insurance Company’s 

health insurance, and that Federal Insurance Company authorized the lead generators to use its approved scripts, tradename, and proprietary information in making these calls. Indeed, Bilek spoke with a lead generator directly who quoted 

him Federal Insurance Company’s health insurance. Bilek

also alleged that the lead generators were paired with these 

quotes in real time by Health Insurance Innovations—the 

company Federal Insurance Company contracted with to sell 

its insurance. Health Insurance Innovations then emailed 

quotes to call recipients and permitted the lead generators to 

enter information into its system. These alleged facts, viewed 

in the light most favorable to Bilek, support the inference that 

Federal Insurance Company authorized the lead generators 

to act on its behalf and subject to its control. See RESTATEMENT 

(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01; Warciak, 949 F.3d at 357. Bilek alleges more than a formulaic recitation of his cause of action, 

see W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 844 F.3d at 675, and he includes specific facts to support his theory of relief, see McCauley, 671 

F.3d at 616. Nothing more is required to comply with Rule 
10 No. 20-2504 

8(a)(2), nor to meet the plausibility standard articulated by 

Twombly and its progeny. 

Federal Insurance Company’s contention that Bilek’s actual authority allegations fail to meet these pleading standards is unsupported. Federal Insurance Company argues that 

Bilek failed to state a plausible agency claim to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal because his complaint lacks allegations that 

Federal Insurance Company controlled the timing, quantity, 

and geographic location of the lead generators’ robocalls. But 

allegations of minute details of the parties’ business relationship are not required to allege a plausible agency claim. See 

generally Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 

2008) (“A complaint need not allege all, or any, of the facts 

logically entailed by the claim and it certainly need not include evidence.”) (quotation omitted)). 

Further, while the right to control an agent’s actions are a 

“constant across the relationships of agency,” the “content or 

specific meaning of the right varies.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 

AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (explaining that “a person may be an 

agent although the principal lacks the right to control the full 

range of the agent’s activities”). And whether an agency relationship exists is ultimately a question of fact. See United

States v. Dish Network L.L.C., 954 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2020).

Bilek need not prove his claims at the pleading stage, and we

need not resolve the bounds of Bilek’s agency claims here. We 

decide only that Bilek alleges a plausible claim for relief. 

In a final effort to argue that Bilek’s complaint fails to assert a claim against it, Federal Insurance Company contends 

that Warciak compels dismissal of Bilek’s complaint. But Warciak is inapposite to Bilek’s allegations here. There, we affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the 
No. 20-2504 11

plaintiff’s TCPA claims seeking to hold Subway vicariously 

liable for a promotional text message sent by T-Mobile as a 

part of its “T-Mobile Tuesdays” campaign. See Warciak, 949 

F.3d at 356–57. In that campaign, T-Mobile offered free items 

from various well-known stores to its customers via text message, and the plaintiff alleged that he received one such text 

message from T-Mobile offering a free Subway sandwich. See 

id. We stopped the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against

Subway in its tracks, holding that allegations of a contract between Subway and T-Mobile—without anything else—failed 

to allege an agency relationship. See id. at 357. We rejected 

that a commercial contract between two sophisticated businesses was “tantamount to an agency relationship,” considering that “[w]hile an agency relationship can be created by contract, not all contractual relationships form an agency.” Id. 

Bilek’s complaint is easily distinguishable from Warciak

both in its level of detail and factual context. As discussed 

herein, Bilek alleges more than a barebones contractual relationship, and he does enough to plead that the lead generators 

acted with Federal Insurance Company’s actual authority.

Bilek alleges that Federal Insurance Company authorized the 

lead generators, through Health Insurance Innovations, to use 

its approved scripts, tradename, and proprietary information 

to solicit and advertise its health insurance. Indeed, Bilek received a robocall, and after pressing 1, he spoke to a lead generator who used this proprietary information to quote Federal 

Insurance Company’s health insurance. In this respect, Federal Insurance Company’s telemarketing campaign is nothing 

like T-Mobile’s text messaging promotion in Warciak. Warciak’s allegations that T-Mobile simply promoted another

business’s products through its own channels is a common 

advertising arrangement, but it in no way suggests agency. In 
12 No. 20-2504 

direct contrast, Bilek’s allegations that the lead generators

called Bilek offering to sell him health insurance and quoted 

Federal Insurance Company’s health insurance using its proprietary and pricing information suggests that they were, in 

fact, acting on Federal Insurance Company’s behalf. Unlike in 

Warciak, Bilek’s allegations here support the inference that the 

lead generators acted as Federal Insurance Company’s agents 

with actual authority. 

* * *

With a viable agency claim on its actual authority theory, 

Bilek’s complaint moves forward at this pleading stage. In 

reaching this result, we need not and do not reach Bilek’s apparent authority and ratification theories of agency liability. 

Of course, the parties may pursue discovery on these theories. 

And the parties may move for summary judgment on all or 

any part of Bilek’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this stage, 

we hold only that Bilek’s complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

B 

Turning now to the district court’s dismissal of Health Insurance Innovations, we review a district court’s dismissal for 

lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. See Matlin v. Spin Master

Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2019). When a district court 

decides a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing, as here, a plaintiff 

need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.

See Matlin, 921 F.3d at 705. “We take as true all well-pleaded 

facts alleged in the complaint and resolve any factual disputes

... in favor of the plaintiffs.” Id. (quotation and alterations 

omitted). 
No. 20-2504 13

Because Bilek’s complaint raises both federal and state law 

claims, the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Bilek’s claims under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 

U.S.C. § 1367. As to the district court’s personal jurisdiction, 

in a federal question case, “a federal court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant if either federal law or the law of 

the state in which the court sits authorizes service of process 

to that defendant.” Curry v. Revolution Labs, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 

393 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Bilek’s federal claim 

arises under the TCPA, which does not authorize nationwide 

service process in a private cause of action. See 47 U.S.C. § 227.

Therefore, “a federal court sitting in Illinois may exercise jurisdiction over the defendants in this case only if authorized 

both by Illinois law and by the United States Constitution.” 

Curry, 949 F.3d at 393 (quotation and alteration omitted). 

The Illinois long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a 

non-resident through conduct of an agent. See 735 ILCS 5/2-

209(a). In addition, § 2-209(c) provides a catch-all provision, 

permitting a court’s exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent 

permitted by the Illinois and United States Constitutions. See 

735 ILCS 5/2-209(c). Accordingly, we have held that “the Illinois long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Curry, 949 F.3d at 393 (quotation 

omitted); see Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia

Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 

2010) (“We have held that there is no operative difference between [the Illinois and federal] constitutional limits.”). Thus, 

we proceed with a federal due process analysis. See Curry, 949 

F.3d at 393. 
14 No. 20-2504 

To comport with federal due process, a defendant must 

maintain “’minimum contacts’” with the forum state such 

that “the maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Tamburo, 601 

F.3d at 701 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 

316 (1945)). When considering due process for specific personal jurisdiction, we must determine whether “(1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the forum 

state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises 

out of the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. at 702 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 

Relying on the same three agency theories invoked against 

Federal Insurance Company (actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification), Bilek asserts that the district court 

has specific personal jurisdiction over Health Insurance Innovations through the lead generators’ alleged conduct. Significantly, Health Insurance Innovations does not contest that the 

lead generators’ conduct would be independently sufficient 

to establish personal jurisdiction over the non-party callers for 

Bilek’s TCPA and IATDA claims. Thus, the question here is 

whether the lead generators’ initiation of robocalls to Bilek in 

Illinois can establish a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction over Health Insurance Innovations. Resolving this 

question turns on whether Bilek sufficiently alleges that the 

lead generators are “agents” of Health Insurance Innovations. 

Before reaching this question, however, we note that this 

circuit’s case law addressing agency in the personal jurisdiction context is limited. Bilek seeks to attribute the lead generators’ alleged conduct to Health Insurance Innovations to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Health Insurance 
No. 20-2504 15

Innovations. While plainly authorized by the Illinois longarm statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a), we have never explicitly held

the attribution of an agent’s conduct to a principal to establish

specific personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process. We hold now that it does, joining other circuits that have

recognized the same. See, e.g., Nandjou v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 

985 F.3d 135, 150 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[F]or purposes of personal 

jurisdiction, the actions of an agent may be attributed to the 

principal.”); Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, the contacts of a third-party may be imputed to the 

defendant under either an agency or alter ego theory.”); Myers

v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (same

with respect to agency).

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that an agent’s 

conduct directed at the forum state has long been considered 

pertinent in the specific personal jurisdiction context both by 

the Supreme Court and this circuit. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co.

v. Superior Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (analyzing 

whether a defendant’s marketing of a product “through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State” may show purposeful availment); New Process

Steel, L.P. v. PH GR, Inc., 107 F. App’x 641, 642 (7th Cir. 2004)

(analyzing, in an unpublished order, whether the acts of an 

agent can be used to establish personal jurisdiction over a 

principal should agency be established); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg.

Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1980) 

(finding that two visits by defendant’s agents to the forum 

state in connection with negotiating a contract established 

specific personal jurisdiction over defendant). Our consideration of an agent’s contacts in determining whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state, thus, breaks 
16 No. 20-2504 

little new ground. Considering these authorities, supported 

by the fundamental agency principle that a principal is liable 

for the wrongful acts of an agent acting within its authority, 

see Dish Network L.L.C., 954 F.3d at 976, it follows that attributing an agent’s suit-related contacts to a principal to establish specific personal jurisdiction poses no due process bar. 

We note briefly that the Supreme Court has limited the attribution of an agent’s contacts to a principal in the general 

personal jurisdiction context. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 

U.S. 117, 134–36 (2014). But Daimler does not alter our specific 

personal jurisdiction inquiry. There, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s test for attributing an agent’s contacts to a principal for general personal jurisdiction, but it nevertheless recognized that agency relationships “may be relevant to the existence of specific personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 135 

n.13. In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction addressed 

by Dailmer—arising only where a corporation’s contacts are 

so “continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at 

home in the forum State”—specific personal jurisdiction is 

“confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 

915, 919 (2011) (quotations omitted). For that purpose, attributing an agent’s actions to a principal which are intertwined 

with the very controversy at issue is consistent with the purposeful availment requirement underlying the Supreme 

Court’s specific personal jurisdiction precedent. See Burger

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474.

Here, the lead generators’ alleged conduct forms the basis 

of Bilek’s TCPA and IATDA claims. Bilek plainly alleges that 

the lead generators made the illegal phone calls to Bilek in 
No. 20-2504 17

Illinois. And just as with Federal Insurance Company, Bilek’s 

supporting agency allegations adequately allege that the lead 

generators acted with Health Insurance Innovations’ actual 

authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01; § 2.01; 

see Moriarty, 155 F.3d at 866. Bilek alleges not only that Health 

Insurance Innovations contracted with the agents directly to 

tele-market Federal Insurance Company’s health insurance, 

but that Health Insurance Innovations participated in the calls 

in real-time by pairing the agents with Federal Insurance 

Company’s health insurance quotes, emailing quotes to call 

recipients, and permitting its agents to enter information into 

its system. These well-pled factual allegations are enough to 

support an agency relationship on actual authority grounds

at the pleading stage. As a result, Bilek establishes a prima 

facie case of personal jurisdiction over Health Insurance Innovations.

Health Insurance Innovations’ arguments to the contrary

are not persuasive. Indeed, it primarily relies on the same futile arguments put forward by Federal Insurance Company: it 

contends that a plausible agency relationship is lacking because Bilek did not allege that Health Insurance Innovations 

controlled the timing, quantity, or geographic location of the 

alleged phone calls. But for the same reasons addressed with 

respect to Federal Insurance Company—which we need not 

repeat here—such allegations are not necessary to allege an 

agency relationship between the lead generators and Health 

Insurance Innovations at the pleading stage. 

Finally, Health Insurance Innovations contends that

Bilek’s allegation that it emailed quotes to call recipients 

should be disregarded because Bilek himself does not claim 

to have received an email. If anything, Health Insurance 
18 No. 20-2504 

Innovations only parses Bilek’s allegations at the margins 

here. But, in any event, this allegation is consistent with 

Bilek’s overarching agency theory—the lead generators acted 

with Health Insurance Innovations’ actual authority in making the unauthorized robocalls. In sum, Bilek alleges enough 

to show an agency relationship between the lead generators 

and Health Insurance Innovations. As a consequence, the district court erred in finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over 

Health Insurance Innovations. 

III

We REVERSE the final judgment of the district court, and 

the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.