FILED UNDER SEAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

AND EMC CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00473-ADA-DTG

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FILED UNDER SEAL

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMATION

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES .............1

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Cofimco USA Inc. v. Mosiewicz, 

2016 WL 1070854 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2016).......................................................................4

DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 

517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................3

Dutschmann v. City of Waco, 

2022 WL 837500 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2022) .......................................................................4

EMA Electromechanics, Inc. v. Siemens Corp., 

2022 WL 2759094 (W.D. Tex. July 13, 2022).............................................................. 1, 2, 4

Hoeg Corp. v. Peebles Corp., 

60 N.Y.S.3d 259 (2017).......................................................................................................4

Hometown Fin., Inc. v. U.S., 

409 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................3

Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................2

MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 

58 N.Y.S.3d 874 (N.Y. Sup. 2017).......................................................................................4

McCall v. Dretke, 

390 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2004)................................................................................................1

Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc.,

959 F.3d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................2

In re Spinnaker Indus., Inc., 

313 F. App’x 749 (6th Cir. 2008).........................................................................................4

W.C. Chapman, L.P. v. Cavazos, 

2022 WL 1558502 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2022) ......................................................................4

WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 

631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

MPEP, §301, Part V(A) (June 2020)..........................................................................................3

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Defendants’ motion demonstrated that WSOU lacks constitutional standing to assert 

the ’144 patent because of the lack of any exclusionary rights before December 22, 2017. This

deficiency deprives WSOU of constitutional standing, which was required to exist when the 

lawsuit was brought. As a consequence, this lawsuit must be dismissed.

WSOU incorrectly argues that Defendants’ argument implicates only statutory standing, 

and thus is not properly raised under Rule 12(b)(1). WSOU is wrong—the question of whether 

any exclusionary rights exist is squarely an issue of constitutional standing. 

 And, contrary to WSOU’s argument, lack of such right is a constitutional standing issue. 

This lawsuit should be dismissed.

I. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES 

Contrary to WSOU’s assertion (Opp. 10-13), whether WSOU had any exclusionary rights 

for the pertinent time period (pre-December 22, 2017) raises a question of constitutional standing. 

As constitutional standing “can be raised at any time,” WSOU’s “procedural defects” arguments 

regarding the instant motion are meritless. EMA Electromechanics, Inc. v. Siemens Corp., 2022 

WL 2759094, at *10 (W.D. Tex. July 13, 2022) (analyzing standing under Rule 12(b)(1)); McCall 

v. Dretke, 390 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).1

 

Specifically, WSOU argues that “past damages” is a question of prudential or “statutory” 

 

1 Likewise, WSOU’s argument that its standing defects can be retroactively cured, Opp. 17 n.8, 

also relies on the faulty premise that the lack of any exclusionary rights for the pertinent period is 

a statutory standing issue. As explained, however, the lack of any exclusionary rights for the 

pertinent time period is a constitutional standing problem, and thus, cannot be retroactively cured. 

EMA, 2022 WL 2759094, at *10.

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standing. Opp. 10-12. Notably, WSOU cites not a single case holding that the question of whether 

any rights exist to past damages raises only a statutory standing question. Instead, WSOU 

misconstrues the Federal Circuit’s standing cases and insists it must only allege that “(i) Brazos is

the owner of the asserted patent; (ii) Dell has infringed the asserted patent; (iii) Brazos suffered 

economic injury caused by Dell; and (iv) Brazos is entitled to recover damages.” Opp. 12. If mere 

allegation were sufficient, standing would never be an issue in any case. 2

Rather, in Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., the Federal Circuit 

confirmed that whether a party possesses any exclusionary rights for the pertinent time period is a 

constitutional standing issue, while prudential standing examines the substantiality of those rights. 

925 F.3d 1225, 1234-36 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (plaintiff had exclusionary rights and thus, constitutional 

standing—but, constraints on exercise of the rights during pertinent period meant it lacked “all 

substantial rights” and needed to join the assignor as co-plaintiff); Br. 5-6. WSOU’s sole 

argument, that it had some “exclusionary rights” when it filed its complaint, overlooks that it had 

no rights before December 22, 2017. Without exclusionary rights for that period, WSOU cannot 

show injury during that period. WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1263-67 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (constitutional standing “coterminous with” scope of exclusionary rights). 3

 

 

2

 WSOU asserts Schwendimann supports its argument that standing can be met via boilerplate 

allegations. But that case did not analyze whether a patentee’s lack of rights for the pertinent 

period posed a constitutional standing problem; it analyzed what constitutes a written assignment. 

Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 959 F.3d 1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Given 

that the Federal Circuit analyzed the written agreement, WSOU’s assertion that simply alleging 

ownership is sufficient to confer standing is wrong.

3

 WSOU’s cited cases, Opp. 17 n.8, are also inapposite. None involved the complete absence of 

any exclusionary rights for the past damages period. When there is a lack of any exclusionary 

rights for the pertinent time period, constitutional standing is implicated, and it cannot be cured by 

“agreement retroactively.” EMA, 2022 WL 2759094, at *10.

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58 N.Y.S.3d 874 (N.Y. Sup. 2017) (“[P]arty’s own subjective understanding of a contract, even if 

it makes commercial sense, is irrelevant.”).

Dated: July 18, 2022 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@winston.com

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: 214-453-6407 

Facsimile: 214-453-6400 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com 

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921 

Telephone: 415.393.8200 

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211 

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on July 18, 2022, all counsel of record who are deemed to 

have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document by e-mail. 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

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