This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. No. 30,364 9 JANELLE LEEWAY, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Charles W. Brown, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 17 Santa Fe, NM 18 Lisa Bozone, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 SUTIN, Judge. 232 Defendant appeals from a district c ourt on-the-record affirmance of her 1 metropolitan court convictions for drivi ng while intoxicated (DWI) and careless 2 driving. We issued a calendar notice pr oposing to affirm. De fendant has responded 3 with a memorandum in opposition. Afte r due consideration, we affirm. 4 Motion to Suppress 5 Defendant continues to ch allenge the metropolitan court’s denial of her motion 6 to suppress statements that she made at the scene. [MIO 7] Wewill not overturn the 7 trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if it is supported by substantial evidence. 8 See State v. Galloway , 116 N.M. 8, 9, 859 P.2d 476, 477 (Ct. App. 1993), 9 misapplication of federal law recognized in State v. Cardenas-Alvarez , 2001-NMSC10 017, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (recognizi ng misapplication of federal law, but 11 acknowledging Gallowayas “sound approach” under New Mexico Constitution). In 12 making this determination, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial 13 court’s ruling. Id. Nevertheless, we conduct a denovo review on the ultimate issue 14 concerning the reasonableness of an alleged constitutional violation. State v. Flores , 15 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 6, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1038. 16 Defendant specifically contends that she should have received Miranda 17 warnings prior to being questi oned. [MIO 7] In order to establish that an individual 18 is in custody for Miranda purposes, there must be a show ing that the individual “lacks 193 the freedom to leave to an extent equal to formal arrest” and is “in an isolated 1 environment completely controlled by law enforcement officials. ” State v. Javier M. , 2 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (internal quot ation marks and citation 3 omitted). 4 Here, Officer Sanchez testified that hewas dispatched to the scene of a car 5 accident. [MIO 2] Another officer had arrived first and had taken a bottle from the 6 vehicle. [MIO 2] Officer Sanchez testified that there were signs of an accident, with 7 damage to the vehicle. [DS 3] Officer Sanchez testified that he came into contact 8 with Defendant and observed that she had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of 9 alcohol. [MIO 3] The officer began to describe his conversation with Defendant, at 10 which time Defendant raised the Miranda objection. [MIO 3] Defendant’s objection 11 relied on Officer Sanchez’s te stimony that Defendant was not free to leave during this 12 questioning. [MIO 3] The district court ruled that New Mexico law is clear that no 13 Miranda warnings were necessary during this initial phase of an officer’s 14 investigation. [MIO 3] 15 We agree with the analysis set forth by the district court in its memorandum 16 opinion affirming the metropolitan court’s ru ling. [RP 113] Specifically, Defendant 17 was not handcuffed and had not been placed in the police car. [RP 113] Cf. State v. 18 Wilson , 2007-NMCA-111, ¶¶ 18-19, 142 N.M. 737, 169 P.3d 1184 (observing that 194 when an officer uses handcuffs, puts the susp ect in a police vehicl e, or uses force an 1 investigatory detention can amount to custody triggering the need for Miranda 2 warnings). Unlike the scenario discussed in Wilson , the facts in the present case do 3 not establish “that [s]he was restrained to the degree associated w ith a formal arrest.” 4 Id. ¶ 35. Instead, this case is similar to State v. Greyeyes , 105 N.M. 549, 551, 734 5 P.2d 789, 791 (Ct. App. 1987), where this Court stated: 6 General on-the-scene questioning or other general questi oning of citizens 7 in the fact-finding process is not considered custodial, and a person in 8 these circumstances need not be informed of his rights before being 9 questioned. The mere fact that police may have focused their 10 investigation on a defendant at the time of the interview does not raise 11 questioning to a level required to warrant Miranda warnings. 12 We are not persuaded by Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Greyeyes . [MIO 13 9-10] The fact that the accident occurred at 4:05 in the morning and that there were 14 indications that it may haveresulted from impairment did not provide the need to 15 Mirandize Defendant at this investigatory phase. Cf. State v. Snell , 2007-NMCA-113, 16 ¶¶ 6, 15-17, 142 N.M. 452, 166 P.3d 1106 (distinguishing Greyeyeswhere a defendant 17 was not simply questioned while standing inthe open, but had been questioned after 18 being placed in a police officer’s vehicle). 19 Sufficiency of the Evidence 20 Defendant continues to claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her 21 conviction for DWI. [MIO 12] A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a 225 two-step process. Initially, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 1 verdict. Then the appellatecourt must make a legal de termination of “whether the 2 evidence viewed in this manner could justif y a finding by any rational trier of fact that 3 each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 4 State v. Apodaca , 118 N.M. 762, 766, 887 P.2d 756, 760 (1994) (internal quotation 5 marks and citation omitted). 6 In order to support her conviction, th e evidence had to show that Defendant 7 drove a vehicle under the influe nce of intoxicating liquor. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8- 8 102(A) (2008) (amended 2010). Defendant admitted that sh e was driving the vehicle 9 after drinking alcohol and had been going too fast just prio r to the accident. [MIO 4] 10 Officer Sanchez testified that Defendant was impaired and failed to follow instructions 11 for the field sobriety tests. [MIO 6] Hetestified that he arrested her based on her 12 admission that she had been drinking and driving, her performance of the tests, the 13 bloodshot eyes, the bottle of alcohol, and the sm ell. [MIO 6; DS 7] Based on this, our 14 calendar notice proposed to hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 15 Defendant’s conviction. 16 In her memorandum in opposition, Defendant claims that Officer Sanchez’s 17 testimony concerning the field sobriety tests cannot be deemed as competent lay 18 opinion within the meaning of Rule 11-701 NMRA. [MIO 13-16] We decline to 196 address this argument, because it constitute s a new evidentiary issue apart from the 1 sufficiency challenge, and De fendant has not filed a mo tion to amend the docketing 2

statement. See Rule 12-208(F) NMRA. In the cont ext of the sufficiency challenge, 3 we believe that the district court, sitting as fact finder, could rely on the credibility of 4 the officer’s observations. In light of th e above-noted evidence, we conclude that 5 there was sufficient evidence presented to support Defendant’s conviction. 6 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

__________________________________ 9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

_________________________________ 12 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 13

_________________________________ 14 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 15