United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-50406

____________

Jaime Antonio Martinez, 

Petitioner—Appellant, 

versus

FNU Rosalez, Warden, 

Respondent—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:22-CV-1297

______________________________

Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jaime Antonio Martinez seeks the ability to pursue his habeas corpus 

petition in the district court. For the reasons contained herein, the district 

court’s ruling is AFFIRMED and Martinez’s motion for judicial notice is

DENIED. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 12, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

A. Facts and Procedural History

On February 10, 2006, Jaime Antonio Martinez, a United States 

citizen, was convicted in Mexico of aggravated homicide and was sentenced 

to 27 years, one month, and six days of imprisonment. 

1. Treaty Between Mexico and the United States

A bilateral international treaty between the United States and Mexico 

allows American citizens convicted of crimes in Mexico to be transferred to 

the United States to serve their sentence. See Treaty Between the United States 

of America and the United Mexican States on the Execution of Penal Sentences, 

U.S.–Mex., Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 7399 (Treaty). One of the requirements 

for a transfer is that the offense of conviction must also be an offense in the 

receiving country. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4100(b), 4101(a). Upon transfer, the United 

States Parole Commission is “tasked with converting a Mexican conviction

. . . into a parallel conviction under the laws of the United States.” Frascarelli 

v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 857 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2017). The Commission 

“does not re-sentence the transferee, nor does it revisit questions of guilt or 

innocence.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, it “determine[s] a release date

. . . as though the offender were convicted in a United States district court 

of a similar offense.” Id. at 704 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(A)). An 

appeal from the Commission’s determination is treated “as though the 

determination appealed had been a sentence imposed by a United States 

district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(2)(B).

Pursuant to the Treaty, Martinez was transferred to the United States 

two years after his Mexican conviction on March 10, 2008, to serve the 

remainder of his foreign sentence. Upon his transfer, the Commission 

determined that the offense of conviction was most like first-degree murder 

and set his release date after service of 168 months of imprisonment. In 

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November 2008, while Martinez was serving his sentence, he was convicted 

in two separate unrelated cases. As a result, he was sentenced to an additional

combined 99 months of imprisonment1

, set to begin on June 1, 2025, or the 

date of completion of his sentence under the Treaty, whichever date comes 

sooner. On April 22, 2019, Martinez completed his foreign sentence and 

began serving his combined federal sentence. 

2. Bureau of Prisons and the First Step Act

Once relocated, inmates transferred under the Treaty are in the 

Attorney General’s custody and are subject to the same laws, same 

conditions, and the same period of time imposed by the sentencing court as 

offenders convicted in a court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4102(2), 

4103, 4105(a). Acting on the Attorney General’s behalf, the Bureau of 

Prisons (BOP), is tasked with “administering” and calculating any time 

credits against a transferred prisoner’s sentence. United States v. Wilson, 503 

U.S. 329, 335 (1992). In doing so, the BOP considers time credited towards 

a sentence at the same rate as applicable to prisoners convicted in a United 

States district court. 18 U.S.C. § 4105(c)(1)–(3). 

Section 4105(c)(4) also specifies that a federal sentence imposed while 

a prisoner is serving a foreign sentence shall be aggregated with the foreign

sentence as if the foreign sentence was a federal sentence. When a federal 

“term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to 

an undischarged term of imprisonment,” those sentences are considered

“multiple terms of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). And “[m]ultiple 

terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be 

_____________________

1 The separate unrelated offenses were for possession with intent to distribute over 

five kilograms of cocaine and failure to appear for an offense committed prior to the 

issuance of his foreign conviction. These offenses and Martinez’s sentence will be referred 

to in this opinion as the “federal sentence.” 

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treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of 

imprisonment.” Id. § 3584(c). 

The First Step Act (FSA) enacted on December 21, 2018, after 

Martinez was already serving his foreign sentence, allows certain prisoners 

to participate in incentive programs and earn time credits that will be applied 

toward pre-release custody or an early transfer to supervised release. See id.

§ 3632. The statute defines a prisoner as 1) a person sentenced to 

imprisonment for a federal criminal conviction, and 2) “a person in the 

custody of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. § 3635(4). The statutory framework 

describes ineligibility factors, including “if the prisoner is serving a sentence 

for a conviction under [certain specified] provisions of law.” Id. § 

3632(d)(4)(D). There are seventy primarily federal offenses that can make a 

prisoner ineligible for FSA time credits. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D). As relevant 

here, one disqualifying conviction is “[a]ny section of chapter 51[] relating to 

homicide.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxv) (emphasis added). 

3. Denial of § 2241 Petition and Appeals.

In December 2022, Martinez filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition 

alleging that the BOP had improperly disallowed certain time credits he was 

due under the FSA and had failed to make the requisite pre-release referral. 

Martinez argues that the BOP had initially listed him as eligible for time 

credits under the FSA, switched him to ineligible, then back to eligible, and, 

finally, back again to ineligible. The stated basis for Martinez’s ineligibility 

was his foreign conviction, but Martinez argued that he had already 

completed his foreign sentence. Rosalez conceded that the BOP initially 

erred by classifying Martinez as eligible for FSA time credits and that the 

error was caused by the BOP’s classification of Martinez’s foreign sentence

as a prior sentence.

The BOP corrected that error by treating Martinez’s foreign sentence

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as one of his current, aggregated sentence obligations and that he was now 

ineligible for FSA time credits because his foreign homicide conviction was 

a disqualifying offense. Accordingly, Rosalez moved for dismissal or in the 

alternative denial of Martinez’s petition. Martinez opposed that motion and 

argued that: 1) the BOP had not aggregated his foreign sentence with his 

federal sentences, and 2) even if the BOP had aggregated those sentences, 

his foreign conviction was not a disqualifying offense under the FSA because 

the FSA’s list of disqualifying offenses did not include foreign offenses. 

A magistrate judge determined, however, that the BOP properly 

aggregated Martinez’s foreign sentence with his consecutive federal 

sentences for purposes of calculating FSA time credits. Because Martinez’s 

foreign conviction correlated to a domestic conviction for first-degree 

murder, a disqualifying offense for FSA purposes, the magistrate judge 

concluded that the BOP correctly listed him as ineligible to earn FSA time 

credits. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended granting Rosalez’s 

motion and denying Martinez’s § 2241 petition. Martinez timely filed written 

objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district 

court conducted a de novo review of the record, adopted the magistrate 

judge’s report, granted Rosalez’s motion to dismiss, and denied Martinez’s 

§ 2241 habeas petition.2 Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal on May 22, 

2023. 

Martinez proceeds pro se on appeal, arguing that he should be deemed 

eligible for FSA time credits because he is not currently serving a sentence 

for a disqualifying offense. He contends that his offense does not qualify as 

_____________________

2 Rosalez also raises an issue of ripeness. There is not a ripeness issue here since 

Martinez’s Section 2241 petition argues (whether correctly or not) that he should have 

been released in October of 2022, so the merits issue is before us. 

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first-degree murder because it was committed outside of the United States.3

In his reply brief, he also argues that his foreign sentence and federal sentence 

should not have been aggregated for FSA purposes because his foreign

sentence was completed. 

II.

A § 2241 petition is the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the 

prison authorities’ determination of the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. 

Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner does not 

need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition. 

Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

In the § 2241 context, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear 

error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. “A factual finding is not clearly 

erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. 

Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 618 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The court “may affirm the denial of habeas relief on any 

ground supported by the record.” Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th 

Cir. 2000).

A. Martinez’s Sentences Were Properly 

Aggregated.

Martinez first argues that his foreign and federal sentences were 

erroneously aggregated. Although multiple terms of imprisonment are not 

aggregated in all contexts, aggregation is explicitly applicable in the

administrative context of consolidating a prisoner’s consecutive sentences.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c); see also United States v. Chapple, 847 F.3d 227, 230 

(5th Cir. 2017) (agreeing that “§ 3584 only applies to aggregation ‘for 

_____________________

3 There is no language in the first-degree murder guidelines that state the murder 

must be committed in the United States. 

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administrative purposes’ and does not impact the court’s judicial discretion 

under [18 U.S.C.] § 3582”). Section 4105(c)(4) specifies that a federal 

sentence imposed while a prisoner is serving a foreign sentence shall be 

aggregated with the foreign sentence as if the foreign sentence was a federal 

sentence. When a federal “term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant 

who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,” those 

sentences are “multiple terms of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).

Here, Martinez’s federal sentences were imposed while he was still 

serving his foreign sentence, and all those sentences were aggregated for 

administrative purposes. Because his two federal sentences were combined 

and imposed to run consecutively to his foreign sentence, he is currently still 

serving the single, aggregated sentence based on those multiple terms of 

imprisonment when viewed in the administrative context. See id. §§ 3584(c), 

4105(c)(4).

Even though the inmate data sheet does show that Martinez’s current 

aggregated sentence consists of the terms of his federal sentences, it also lists 

his foreign sentence as one of his current obligations. This supports the 

district court’s determination that Martinez was serving an aggregated 

sentence that included his foreign sentence. We agree with the district court 

that aggregation in the administrative context under §§ 3584(c) and 

4105(c)(4) was proper for purposes of FSA time credits. Teed v. Warden 

Allenwood FCI Low, No. 23-1181, 2023 WL 4556726, 1–2 (3d Cir. July 17, 

2023) (affirming the denial of a § 2241 petition and holding that the BOP

properly determined that Teed was ineligible for FSA time credits because 

he was serving an aggregated sentence based in part on a disqualifying 

conviction for failing to register as a sex offender) (unpublished).

Martinez argues and Rosalez concedes that the FSA does not include 

foreign convictions in its list of disqualifying offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 

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4106A(a)(b)(1)(A); § 3632(d)(4)(D). Rosalez counters that, because a 

foreign sentence is converted into a federal sentence by means of the 

Commission’s determination of a similar federal offense, that similar offense 

is used to decide if the transfer prisoner is disqualified for FSA purposes. 

Even if the FSA is not viewed within that overall transfer context, we defer 

to the BOP’s reasonable interpretation of the FSA. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 

U.S. 230, 242 (2001) (holding that the BOP’s reasonable interpretation of 

the statute governs as long as it has “filled the statutory gap in a way that is 

reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design”) (internal quotations 

omitted); Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2005) (agreeing that 

BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 was permissible). 

Here, the BOP’s program statement regarding FSA time credits

states that “treaty transfer[] inmates . . . who are serving their sentence in 

Bureau custody are not eligible to earn [FSA time credits].” We hold that 

the district court correctly determined that Martinez’s foreign conviction 

was a disqualifying conviction for FSA purposes because, for administrative 

purposes, Martinez was serving a sentence that was construed as a sentence 

for first-degree murder under § 1111.4 Therefore, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s denial of Martinez’s habeas petition because his sentences were 

properly aggregated, and he was not eligible to earn FSA time credits.

_____________________

4 Martinez contends that his foreign offense cannot be equated to first-degree 

murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 because it does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of

subsection (b). His argument lacks merit because the Commission was not convicting 

Martinez of a § 1111 offense by making the transfer treaty conversion, see Frascarelli, 857 

F.3d at 705 (noting that the Commission’s conversion does not involve resentencing or 

revisiting questions of guilt or innocence). Although the inmate data sheet mistakenly lists 

his converted offense as 18 U.S.C. § 1114, such a mistake is immaterial because § 1114 is 

also a disqualifying conviction under FSA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxv).

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B. Martinez’s Motion for Judicial Notice is Denied 

as Unnecessary. 

Lastly, on July 5, 2023, Martinez filed a motion requesting judicial 

notice of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in Jones v. Garza, 

No. 4:22-CV-764, 2023 WL 3354135, (N.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2023) 

(unpublished). “[J]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 

proceeding.” Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Grp. 

Int’l, 762 F.2d 454, 461 (5th Cir.), on reh'g sub nom. Colonial Leasing of New 

England, Inc. v. Logistics Control Int’l, 770 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(d)). We “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and 

the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(c)(2). 

In Jones, the magistrate judge disagreed with the BOP’s 

determination that Jones was ineligible for FSA time credits because the 

BOP treated Jones’s conspiracy conviction as if he had been convicted of the 

underlying offense, which was a disqualifying conviction. Jones, 2023 WL 

3354135, at 3–6. That decision is not precedential and does not address the 

relevant issues in this appeal. Additionally, since Martinez’s habeas appeal 

fails on the merits, this motion is also moot. 

III.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling regarding 

Martinez’s habeas petition and his motion for judicial notice is DENIED 

AS MOOT.

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