COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Hum phreys, McCullough and Se nior Judge Bumgardner

OTIS LEE DOUGLAS, SR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2176-13-3 PER CURIAM MAY 6, 2014 LYNCHBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge (Robert R. Feagans, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Susan L. Hartman, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee. (P. Scott De Bruin, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the infant children.
Otis Lee Douglas, Sr., appellant , appeals the order terminating his residual parental rights to his three children. Appellant conten ds the trial court erred by finding sufficient evidence that (1) he was responsible for the c onditions leading to his ch ildren being placed in fost er care and th at he had not substantially complied with re quired remedial services; and (2 ) that he failed to complete recommended remedial services. Upon review of the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affi rm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. When addressing matters concerning the custody and care of a child, this Court’s paramount c onsideration is the child’ s best interests. On appeal, we presume that the trial court thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s be st interests. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in ma king decisions “necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” We w ill not disturb a trial

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - court’s factual findings on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 212, 597 S.E.2d 21 4, 217 (2004) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S. E.2d 794, 795 (1990) ) (citations omitted). “Furthermore, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the pr evailing party below and its evidence is afforded all reas onable inferences fairly deducibl e therefrom.” Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Viewed in this light, the evidence adduced at trial showed that appella nt and Jennifer Jones, the children’s mother, had a prior history of domestic violence, both having criminal convictions for assaulting the other. The family had been involved with a number of social services agencies since 2001 with allegations of physical abuse of the children, the childr en witnessing physical violence between the parents, and the children witnessing appellant selling drugs from the home. The Lynchburg Department of Social Services (the De partment) removed the thr ee children involved in this case, one daughter and two sons, from their home on Decemb er 1, 2011. The Department received an abuse complain t on November 22, 2011, that their daughter had bruises on her back. Jones admitted she had “w hooped” her daughter. Jo nes also recounted appellant sold drugs from the home and that their daughter took nude photographs of Jones to text to appellant. Once the children were in the Department’s care, they confirmed another comp laint of physical abuse against the daughter by appellant. Appellant maintained visitatio n and contact with the childr en. He attended parenting classes, substance abuse and mental health counse ling, and family partnershi p meetings. Appellant, however, refused several drug screens or alternatively tested positive for coca ine and marijuana from January to June 2012. Thereafter, appellant appeared to maintain sobriety. Visitation increased and appellant and mother continued with counseling, though they reported that they had separated after appellant filed an unlawful detainer against Jones to get he r out of the house. The- 3 - Department worked with appellant toward returning the children to his care. After three weeks of home visitations, appellant was arrested and incarcerated for distribution of cocaine. After appellant’s arrest, the Department started to work to ward returning the children to Jones’ care. The Department did an unannounced visit to Jones’ home to do a drug screen. Initially, Jones denied being in the house. Ho wever, she later admitted she was there and when the Department entered the home, they found appellant hiding in a closet. The Department later obtained recorded phone conversations that reve aled appellant and Jones were keeping their continued relationship secret, ackno wledging their contact would like ly prevent the return of the children. Appellant acknowledged at trial that he and Jones had been together so long there was no reason to change their relationship. Counselors who testified all agreed the relationship between appellant and Jones was detrimental to the welfare of the children. All three children exhibited behavioral problems when taken into foster care. All three were working with counselors who testified that once the juvenile and domestic relations district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, all three children’s behavior improved dramatically. They re spected their foster parents, began improving in and enjoying school, and treated each other and their peers appropriately. Appellant pled guilty to the distribution of co caine charge and was aw aiting sentencing at the time of the circuit court hear ing. All parties reco gnized appellant was likely to receive a significant period of incarceration based on the nature of the charge and his prior criminal record. Although appellant and the Department consider ed his adult daughter, Brittany Douglas, as a possible relative placement, the Department determin ed that arrangement was not suitable. Brittany had no job, and her only source of income was appellant and a social security check owed to another sibling for whom she was caring. However, that check was soon to be going to her grandmother because the sibling was moving to the grandparent’s care. Britta ny’s residence was also too small- 4 - for the three children, a nd it was a fire hazard from the clutter in the home. Further, appellant and Brittany were relying on unnamed fa mily to financially help Brittany care for the ch ildren, though appellant provided no sp ecific details about the viability of this prospect . The children were in foster care almost two year s by the time of the circuit court proceedings. The trial court termin ated appellant’s parental rights pu rsuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2), finding th at the conditions which le d to foster placement could not be substantially remedied to allo w for the children’s return to appellan t and that appellant had been unable or unwilling to substan tially remedy the cond itions within a reasonable peri od of time. Appellant had a history of harshly disciplining the children, exposin g them to drug dealing, physically and verbally abusing the children, and physical ly and verbally abusing Jones, sometimes in the children’s presence. Although appellant was the more “nurturing” of the two pa rents, he had a history of anger issues, depression, and an inability to control his actions, particularly around J ones. While appellant maintained contact with the children and attende d counseling, he nevertheless was maintaining a secret relationship with Jones, which by all accounts was a relationship detrimental to the well-being of the children. By the time of the circuit co urt hearing, appellant pled guilty to and was awaiting sentencing on fe lony cocaine distributio n charges and wa s likely to receive a lengthy period of incarceration. Appellant exercised poor judgment by having Na thaniel Shane Alley, a registered violent sex offender, living in the home, not realizing that circ umstance may have an adverse effect on the decision to return the chil dren to his home. Further, although appellant appeared to be maintaining his sobriety, just as he was actively working toward the return of the children, he was arrested for se lling cocaine. As the trial court noted, appe llant was in a “worse position” than he was when the children were initially taken out of his care. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a le ngthy period of time waiting to find out when, or ev en if, a parent will be capable of resu ming his or [or her] responsibilities.”- 5 - Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The record establishes the children were removed from the home in part du e to appellant’s abuse and neglect of the childr en, including physical a buse of his daughter, an d selling drugs from the home. His actions in the almost two years following their placem ent in foster care demonstrated appellant’s inability or unwillingness to substa ntially remedy the cond itions that led to the placement. Despite appellant’s claims that he co mpleted services, he was unable to show that he could apply what he had been coun seled to do. Further, all three children were thriving in foster care, showing great improvement once the parents’ rights were terminated. The evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings, and its judgment was not plainly wrong. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by termin ating appellant’s residual parental rights to the three children. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. Affirmed.