In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17–3436 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

RENEE S. PERILLO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 15-CR-202 – Richard L. Young, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 30, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 30, 2018 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Renee Perillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), and to commissioning a murder 

for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Before sentencing, Perillo moved to withdraw her plea. The district court denied 

Perillo’s motion and sentenced her to concurrent terms of 324 
2 No. 17-3436 

months for conspiracy to kidnap and 120 months for commissioning a murder for hire. The court also ordered Perillo to 

pay just under $75,000 in restitution. Perillo appeals the denial 

of her motion to withdraw her plea and the restitution order. 

Perillo’s plea agreement included a valid appellate waiver that 

covers both of these claims, however, so we dismiss her appeal. 

I. Factual & Procedural Background 

A. Criminal Conduct 

The underlying facts here sound like the plot of a mediocre novel, focused on Perillo’s relationship with her boyfriend, 

Dr. Arnaldo Trabucco, and her attempts to harm Trabucco’s 

ex-wife and the ex-wife’s divorce attorney. On May 22, 2015, 

police responded to a 911 call from the divorce attorney’s husband. Officers found Perillo and her son, Richard Perillo, hiding in the back of the caller’s SUV in Noblesville, Indiana. The 

Perillos had with them a loaded handgun, binoculars, a plastic bag, latex gloves, a knife, a rubber tourniquet, and a syringe that Perillo claimed contained heroin, but in fact contained a potentially lethal dose of succinylcholine, a paralytic. 

The police arrested Perillo and her son. They obtained a warrant to search Perillo’s car, where they found: ammunition, 

duct tape, a long blonde wig, two machetes, a tranquilizer gun 

and darts, alcohol pads, syringes, a “commando” saw, a hammer, a shovel with dirt on it, three license plates, a walking 

cane, a priest disguise, and a full-headed silicone mask depicting an elderly man’s face.

Within forty-eight hours, Trabucco bonded Perillo out of 

the county jail. Perillo fled west. She was arrested about a 

month later in Montana. When she was returned to Indiana, 
No. 17-3436 3

she was placed in a cell with Lisa Starr Ramos. According to 

the government, Perillo told Ramos about her crimes and that 

she still wanted to kill attorney Rebecca Eimerman, the person 

she had been hoping would get into the SUV where she was 

hiding on May 22 in Noblesville. Ramos contacted the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. An agent suggested that Ramos give 

Perillo the name and telephone number of a hitman named 

“Don-Don,” who was of course an undercover agent. Ramos 

agreed.

Perillo called “Don-Don” to discuss hiring him to kill 

Eimerman. She then followed up with a letter describing 

Eimerman’s appearance, vehicle, work address, and daily 

schedule. She also told “Don-Don” that the murder “should 

look like spur of the moment,” and she suggested that he “intercept her at [the] gym and take her to [the] bank” to make 

the murder look like a robbery gone wrong. 

B. Guilty Plea

In November 2015, Perillo was charged with conspiracy to 

kidnap in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c); interstate transportation of a firearm with intent to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b); and 

commissioning a murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1958. The parties negotiated a plea deal. Perillo agreed to 

plead guilty to conspiracy to kidnap and commissioning a 

murder for hire. The government agreed to dismiss the other 

charges. 

Although Perillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to kidnap, 

she maintained that her intent was actually to kill her victims. 

In the plea agreement, Perillo admitted that she drove from 
4 No. 17-3436 

Florida to Nebraska, stopping along the way to pick up her 

son and to dig a pit that her son said was intended as a grave 

for Trabucco’s ex-wife. When the Perillos could not find 

Trabucco’s ex-wife in Nebraska, they headed to Indiana, intending to kill attorney Eimerman. They brought with them 

the paralytic and firearm. Perillo also admitted that she later 

mailed the letter to the supposed hitman saying that she 

would pay him to kill Eimerman. At Perillo’s request, the plea 

language was edited to state that Ramos actually wrote a portion of the letter but that it was “adopted by Renee Perillo.” 

The district court held a hearing, engaged in a full Rule 11 

colloquy to ensure that Perillo’s guilty pleas were knowing 

and voluntary, and accepted her pleas of guilty to both 

charges. The court’s questioning covered the terms of the plea 

agreement, including the waiver of Perillo’s right to appeal 

her sentence, which was contingent on her receiving a guideline sentence. The court asked Perillo if she understood the 

appellate waiver, if she had discussed it with her attorney, and 

if she was voluntarily waiving her right to appeal. Perillo responded “yes” to all of those questions. 

About two weeks after the change of plea, Perillo’s daughter wrote a letter to the court saying that Perillo “wants to 

withdraw her plea because she feels she committed perjury,” 

that she “never wanted to plead guilty,” but that she did so 

because her attorney “pressured her into it.” In response, the 

district court allowed Perillo’s initial counsel to withdraw and 

appointed new counsel. A month later, Perillo’s new attorney 

filed a formal motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The motion 

asserted that Perillo’s first attorney had “coerced and pressured” her into pleading guilty; that “being incarcerated” had 

put her under “enormous pressure” to plead; that she had 
No. 17-3436 5

been “baited and entrapped” by Ramos; and that problems 

with her medication had left her “particularly vulnerable” to 

Ramos’s influence.

The district court held a hearing where Perillo spoke but 

offered no sworn testimony or other actual evidence. Perillo 

explained that she felt coerced into pleading by her attorney 

and that everything she had said at the colloquy “was a lie, 

and it was perjury.” She never asserted that she was actually 

innocent, but she claimed that the charges against her were 

incorrect, that she was vulnerable when she spoke with Ramos, and that Ramos and the government “set up” the 

charges against her. 

The district court listened to Perillo’s arguments and then 

reviewed her testimony from the guilty plea hearing. The 

court noted that she had been under oath in answering the 

court’s questions. The court recited her prior testimony that 

her mind was clear, that she understood the plea, that she was 

pleading voluntarily, and that she was satisfied with her attorney. The court then found that Perillo had not presented a 

“fair and just” reason to withdraw her plea and denied her 

motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) (allowing withdrawal 

of plea before sentencing for a “fair and just reason”). 

C. Sentencing

At sentencing, the court heard testimony from the intended victim about her losses. Eimerman estimated that she 

lost $74,848.71 as a result of Perillo’s conduct: $60,000 in lost 

income after her reaction to this terrifying threat prevented 

her from working for three months; $2,315.71 for medication 

and counseling; $2,533 for installation of a home security system; and $10,000 for the estimated value of her SUV, which 
6 No. 17-3436 

she had given away to a family member after the crime. Perillo’s counsel objected to paying restitution on the vehicle and 

argued that the government had not submitted sufficient documentation to support Eimerman’s lost income. Perillo did 

not object to the security system or the medical expenses. The 

district court ordered the full $74,848.71 in restitution and 

sentenced Perillo to a total of 324 months in prison, which was 

a guideline sentence. 

II. Analysis 

On appeal, Perillo challenges the denial of her motion to 

withdraw her plea and the restitution order. The government 

argues that the appellate waiver in Perillo’s plea covers both 

claims. We agree. A “voluntary and knowing waiver of an appeal is valid and must be enforced.” United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2011) (dismissing appeal based 

on waiver in plea agreement), quoting United States v. Sines, 

303 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002). Our review of Perillo’s appeal 

is foreclosed if (1) her claims fall within the scope of the appellate waiver and (2) the waiver was valid. United States v. 

Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012), citing United States v. 

Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Cole, 

569 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2009). We also noted in Alcala that 

every other circuit that has considered the question has held 

that a valid waiver of appeal can require dismissal of an appeal of denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 678 F.3d 

at 578 & n.1. Because a valid waiver covers both of Perillo’s 

claims, we dismiss her appeal. 

A. Scope of the Waiver

The first question is whether Perillo’s two claims fall 

within the scope of the appellate waiver. We review the scope 
No. 17-3436 7

of the waiver de novo. See Alcala, 678 F.3d at 577 (deciding, as 

a matter of law, the scope of defendant’s waiver). Perillo’s plea 

agreement provided: 

The defendant understands that the defendant 

has a statutory right to appeal the conviction 

and sentence imposed and the manner in which 

the sentence was determined. Acknowledging 

this right, and in exchange for the concessions 

made by the Government in this Plea Agreement, the defendant expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal the conviction imposed 

in this case on any ground, including the right 

to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further agrees that in the event the 

Court sentences the defendant to a sentence 

within the advisory guideline range as determined by the Court, or lower, then the defendant expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case on any 

ground, including the right to appeal conferred 

by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically includes all provisions of the guilty plea 

and sentence imposed, including the length and 

conditions [of] supervised release and the 

amount of any fine.

This broad language covers both claims that Perillo raises in 

this appeal. Perillo has waived her “right to appeal the conviction imposed in this case on any ground.” That waiver includes the right to challenge the denial of her motion to withdraw her plea. United States v. McGuire, 796 F.3d 712, 715 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (“When a defendant waives his right to appeal in a 
8 No. 17-3436 

plea, ‘he also waives his right to appeal a denial of his motion 

to withdraw that plea.’”), quoting Alcala, 678 F.3d at 578 (holding that “a defendant challenges his conviction when he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw a 

plea”). The appellate waiver therefore applies to Perillo’s appeal from the denial of her motion to withdraw her plea. 

Perillo also waived her right to appeal the restitution order. Perillo’s waiver applies to the “right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case on any ground,” as long as she received a sentence within the guideline range, and restitution 

is a part of a sentence. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 

499, 502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is a part of a criminal sentence, and Worden agreed not to challenge his sentence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”), citing United 

States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting 

that an “agreement waiving appeal from ‘any sentence within 

the maximum provided in Title 18’ or similar language” 

would waive right to appeal restitution order). Perillo was not 

given an above-guideline sentence. And contrary to her arguments, the waiver did not need to refer specifically to restitution in order to apply to the restitution order that was part of 

the sentence. The waiver included “all provisions of the ... 

sentence imposed.” The fact that other specific terms of the 

sentence were mentioned and restitution was not does not 

take restitution out from under the “all provisions” umbrella. 

See Worden, 646 F.3d at 502, citing Behrman, 235 F.3d at 1052. 

B. Enforceability

The next question is whether the appellate waiver in Perillo’s plea agreement is enforceable. “It is well settled that a 

defendant may waive her right to appeal.” McGuire, 796 F.3d 

at 715, citing United States v. Woolley, 123 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 
No. 17-3436 9

1997). We will enforce an appellate waiver “so long as the record clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily.” Id., quoting United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 

668 (7th Cir. 1999). To determine whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, we ask “whether, looking at the total circumstances surrounding the plea, the defendant was informed of his or her rights.” United States v. Kelly, 337 F.3d 897, 

902 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Mitchell, 58 F.3d 

1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1995). We review the district court’s factual 

findings, including whether the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily entered the plea, for clear error. United States v. 

Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying clear-error 

review to factual findings related to knowing and voluntary 

nature of plea); United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248–49 

(7th Cir. 1995) (same). 

Perillo’s main argument is that she entered the plea agreement before she knew of all available defenses. From this 

premise, she contends that her plea and the waiver it contains 

were not knowing and voluntary. She argues on appeal that 

she has a valid entrapment defense; that she did not learn 

about it until after she pleaded guilty; and that she presented 

unrebutted evidence of entrapment to the district court, 

which should have granted her motion or at least held an evidentiary hearing.1

 1 The enforceability of a plea agreement typically involves review of 

the Rule 11 colloquy to ensure that the defendant pleaded guilty voluntarily and that she was properly informed of the charges against her, the 

rights she was giving up by pleading guilty, and the terms of the plea 

agreement. Perillo does not argue that her Rule 11 colloquy was defective, 

only that she lied throughout it. The district judge reviewed the appellate 
10 No. 17-3436 

We start by noting that Perillo did not clearly raise an entrapment defense before the district court. Although Perillo 

asserted in her motion that she “was baited and entrapped by 

Ms. Ramos,” she never alleged that she was induced into commissioning a murder for hire or that she lacked predisposition 

to do it. Instead, Perillo argued that “questionable new 

charges” were filed against her based on “unfounded information from an unreliable jailhouse source.” That is not an 

entrapment defense. And when Perillo spoke to the district 

judge at the hearing on her motion to withdraw the plea, she 

never argued that the government induced her to contact the 

hitman. Her main argument was that she felt pressured into 

pleading guilty, that her attorney forced her to plead guilty, 

and that she lied when she testified otherwise at the Rule 11 

colloquy. She did tell the court that medication made her vulnerable when Ramos befriended her and that the charges 

against her were “set up” between Ramos and the FBI, but 

that is as close as she came to arguing entrapment.

Even if Perillo had gone further than she did and had asserted the elements of an entrapment defense, that alone 

would not have made her plea invalid. Perillo is correct that 

she could not knowingly and voluntarily plead unless she 

possessed “an understanding of ‘the law in relation to the 

facts,’” which includes understanding available defenses. 

United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1984), quoting 

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); see also 

United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 

2010), quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). A 

guilty plea can therefore “be involuntary if the defendant was 

 

waiver with Perillo and asked whether she understood it and voluntarily 

waived her right to appeal. Perillo said that she did.
No. 17-3436 11

not informed by his lawyer of his defenses to the criminal 

charges.” Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1984); see 

also Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (knowing plea requires that defendant have knowledge necessary to 

make “a choice among rationally understood probabilities”). 

At the same time, however, “a plea of guilty does not have 

to be perfectly informed in order to be voluntary.” Evans, 742 

F.2d at 375; see also St. Pierre v. Walls, 297 F.3d 617, 635 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (finding that “lawyers need not inform their clients 

of every possible defense, argument, or tactic”). Were the law 

otherwise, few guilty pleas could survive later challenges 

based on “buyer’s remorse” if a defendant could claim that 

there was some possible motion or theory her lawyer did not 

discuss with her first. Perillo did not need to know of every 

defense theoretically available to the charges against her. She 

needed to know only the defenses that she could plausibly 

raise, given the nature of the charges and the evidence against 

her. Entrapment was not such a defense for Perillo. She has 

not presented, and could not present, a colorable claim of an 

entrapment defense that undermines the knowing and voluntary nature of her plea. 

Entrapment has two elements: (1) that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime; and (2) that the defendant was not otherwise predisposed to engage in the criminal conduct. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 420 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (en banc). For obvious reasons, Perillo does not argue that the government entrapped her into driving from 

Florida to Indiana with a car full of suspicious and dangerous 

paraphernalia, pausing to prepare an empty grave on the way, 

stalking Eimerman for several days, and then lying in wait in 

Eimerman’s car with a loaded gun and a potentially lethal 
12 No. 17-3436 

paralytic. Perillo argues only that the government impermissibly induced her to contact a hitman once she was in jail. 

Perillo cannot plausibly argue that she lacked a predisposition to commission a murder for hire. By the time she was 

incarcerated with Ramos, Perillo had already tried to kill 

Eimerman once. And when Perillo contacted the undercover 

agent who she believed was a hitman, she did so enthusiastically. Within 11 days of Ramos’s suggestion, Perillo called the 

agent on the phone and wrote a letter providing Eimerman’s 

home address and a vague description of her workplace, describing her physical appearance and her car, and outlining 

her morning exercise routine. Perillo told the agent that the 

murder “should look like spur of the moment” and “not 

planned.” She even suggested two additional targets for murder, saying that “After Rebecca + her husband the bigger 

money will come with Pam + Tatianna,” Trabucco’s ex-wife 

and the ex-wife’s daughter. Perillo finished the letter by telling 

the agent: “I will be calling you soon to check on our progress, 

hoorah!” Perillo admitted to sending this letter in her plea 

agreement. There was not even a colorable entrapment defense here, so Perillo’s second thoughts on this basis did not 

undermine the knowing and voluntary character of her guilty 

pleas.2

One more point merits brief discussion. Perillo argues that 

United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1993), required the 

 2 Perillo argues that Ramos wrote part of the letter and that she only 

“adopted” it. This does not affect our analysis. Even if Ramos wrote some 

of the letter, Perillo did adopt it, and she provided extensive details about 

her intended victims and called the undercover agent on the phone.
No. 17-3436 13

district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the entrapment defense or to explain why it found the defense implausible. Groll is distinguishable in two critical ways. First, the 

defendant in Groll offered record evidence that supported at 

least a colorable entrapment defense. Id. at 759. Perillo has not. 

Second, the defendant in Groll pleaded guilty before “the Supreme Court decision breathing new life into the entrapment 

defense,” so the defendant’s entrapment defense did not contradict her testimony in the Rule 11 colloquy. Id. at 760, citing 

Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992). Perillo’s 

attempt to withdraw her plea, by contrast, required her to 

contradict almost everything she had told the court in the 

Rule 11 colloquy. 

Perillo knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to pursue this appeal. The appeal is DISMISSED.