1

Filed 2/25/21 In re N.P. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

In re N.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C092148

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. 

STKJVDP20190000013)

C.P., the biological father of the minor (father), appeals from the juvenile court’s 

order terminating his parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)1 He challenges the court’s finding that he was the minor’s 

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

biological father and not the minor’s presumed father. He also contends his attorney 

rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. We will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

The newborn minor N.P. came to the attention of the San Joaquin County Human 

Services Agency (Agency) in December 2018, after mother and the minor tested positive 

for amphetamines. Mother admitted using methamphetamine two months prior to the 

minor’s birth and to using four or five times during pregnancy, and she further admitted 

having obtained only limited prenatal care. Father, who mother identified as the minor’s 

biological father, stated his name appeared on the minor’s birth certificate, which he 

signed.2 Father and mother (parents) were not married. The parents were unable to 

verify they had supplies for the newborn minor or a place for themselves and the minor to 

stay. The parents signed a safety plan stating that mother would go to Central Intake to 

participate in an assessment and do whatever was recommended. However, she failed to 

do so.

The parents arranged for the maternal grandmother to care for the minor. The 

maternal grandmother informed the social worker that the parents were homeless and 

mother was using drugs. The Agency provided the maternal grandmother with resource 

family approval (RFA) information.

On January 9, 2019, the Agency filed a dependency petition on behalf of the minor 

pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging failure to protect the minor and 

failure to provide support for the minor due to the parents’ transient lifestyle. The 

petition alleged that mother identified father as the minor’s father and stated he was 

present at the minor’s birth and his name appeared on the birth certificate. The petition 

2 Father had two other children, both of whom were under the legal guardianship of 

the paternal grandmother. Mother had two other children, each of whom was in the care 

of a legal guardian.
3

further alleged father reported completing a Prop 36 drug treatment program through 

probation approximately three to four years prior to address his use of methamphetamine 

and marijuana. Father was aware of mother’s drug use and its detrimental effects on the 

minor but failed to address the problem. It was also alleged that father had a pattern of 

behavior and criminal convictions beginning in 2006 and continuing through 2018, 

placing the minor at increased risk of abuse and neglect.

At the January 10, 2019 detention hearing, the court asked father if he was present 

at the time of the minor’s birth, if he signed the birth certificate, and if he signed the 

voluntary declaration of paternity or any other documents. Father responded 

affirmatively to each of those questions. When father stated he did not bring the 

documents with him to court, the court stated, “We need to see those so we can determine 

your status.” The Agency stated father provided the same information to the social 

worker, but the Agency had not yet seen the documents. The court told father, “At this 

point you will remain as alleged father until we see the documentation,” and, “If you 

have that, please bring it in or show social worker so we can elevate your status to bio or 

presumed father. But I need to see something on that.” The court also indicated it would 

hold off on appointing counsel for father “until we get documentation.” The court later 

told father, “[W]e will have to wait on you until we get more information, the 

documentation I mentioned. As soon as we get that, we can re-visit your status so that 

you can fully participate.” The court found father to be an alleged father “until we 

receive the documentation” and ordered the minor detained with supervised visits for 

mother. At the Agency’s request, the court authorized supervised visits for father at the 

Agency’s discretion “if he provides copy of declaration of paternity.”

The parents were not present for the January 24, 2019 jurisdiction hearing and 

could not be located or served despite diligent efforts. The court was informed that father

had not yet provided a signed voluntary declaration of paternity or been appointed 
4

counsel. The court proceeded in their absence, sustaining the allegations in the petition,

and adjudging the minor a dependent of the juvenile court.

The parents participated in a January 29, 2019 child family team (CFT) meeting 

by telephone. It was determined that both parents would benefit from participating in 

services related to substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and individual 

counseling. The parents were informed that the Agency would provide them with bus 

passes to assist them in getting to those services and were asked to make an effort to 

connect with the service providers.

The February 25, 2019 disposition report stated the Agency received the 

declaration of paternity reflecting father as father of the minor. The Agency requested 

that the court elevate father’s status to biological father. The social worker had 

reportedly been unable to meet with the parents due to the parents’ failure and refusal to 

appear at scheduled appointments, answer telephone calls, or return voicemail messages 

since the CFT meeting on January 29, 2019, or to otherwise remain in contact with the 

social worker. Since providing the declaration of paternity on February 1, 2019, father

attended only two of six scheduled visits with the minor. On January 30, 2019, the minor 

was assessed and determined to be adoptable.

The report stated section 361.5, subdivision (a) applied to bypass reunification 

services to father. The Agency determined it would not be beneficial to the minor to 

provide father with services due to father’s failure to remain in contact with the Agency 

or regularly attend visitation with the minor. Father had not been responsive to the 

Agency’s requests for an interview or to discuss the case to complete family 

backgrounds. The report also noted father’s extensive criminal history involving frequent 

incarcerations, noting it was not conducive to providing a safe and stable home 

environment for the minor. Based on these circumstances, the Agency recommended the 

court bypass father for services.
5

At the February 28, 2019 disposition hearing, the court declared father to be the 

minor’s biological father and appointed counsel for him. The court ordered both parents 

to participate in drug court. Mother submitted to disposition. The court continued the 

matter as to father and ordered visitation to continue at the current schedule but noted 

visits would be reduced if missed.

At the March 14, 2019 continued disposition hearing, the court reduced the 

parents’ visits to once per week and gave the Agency discretion to increase visits.

At the contested disposition hearing on April 18, 2019, the court heard testimony 

from father, who stated he signed the declaration of paternity, held himself out as the 

minor’s father, and stayed with the minor for several days while mother remained in the 

hospital after birth. Father testified he was not allowed to have visitation with the minor 

in the beginning of the dependency case unless he brought the declaration of paternity to 

court. However, once the maternal grandmother provided the document, father was 

granted visitation. He received referrals for parenting classes and individual counseling. 

He completed orientation for the parenting class and planned to attend the first of 12 

classes that night. He met twice with his counselor. When asked whether there were any 

other services the Agency wanted him to participate in, father stated he was to “be there 

to support [mother] through her rehab or whatever they were doing with her, the New 

Directions,” but mother did not go to rehab. Father testified he already completed “my 

Prop 36, chemical dependency counseling centers, all the obstacles that I’ve done 

throughout my drug history.” Father testified he was willing to complete his parenting 

classes and counseling and participate in visits and would be working on getting a truck

driving job. He stated he was committed to participating in services even if mother did 

not, and he was willing to separate from mother if necessary. Father also testified he had 

temporary housing.

Father admitted that he never told his social worker that the maternal grandmother 

had the signed declaration of paternity. As a consequence, he did not have a formal 
6

visitation schedule for the first month and then, once the declaration was provided to the 

Agency, visits were scheduled. He admitted he was provided six informal visits in 

January but attended only two. He denied reports that he missed a visit on March 16, 

2019, and he and mother showed up over 20 minutes late on other visits.

Father testified he completed the Prop 36 drug program approximately eight years 

ago. He admitted he had a conviction for possession of a controlled substance within the 

last two and a half years and was still struggling with substance abuse. He stated he 

completed outpatient drug treatment in late 2017 or early 2018. Father claimed he was 

unaware mother was using drugs during her pregnancy even though he was with her 

“[t]he whole time.” He testified he used methamphetamine two or three months prior to 

the hearing and used marijuana the day prior. He denied the court or the Agency ever 

asked him to be assessed for substance abuse treatment. When asked what he was doing 

in terms of his drug treatment, he stated, “Staying away. Staying away from the people, 

the crowd, the acquaintances that are down there in that tent city.” He stated he was not 

going to NA meetings because he was not instructed to do so. When asked if he would 

go into residential drug treatment if the court ordered him to do so, father answered, “No. 

I will not go,” adding he would not go if it meant he would have to give up trucking 

school. He testified he would choose trucking school over getting the minor back 

because “my daughter will always be there, I guess, but my career won’t.”

Social worker Claudette Butman testified the Agency informed father “many 

times” that it would provide him with bus passes so he could avail himself of services. 

Butman informed father about the bus passes at the CFT meeting, at court appearances, 

and in a letter sent to him on March 14, 2019, but he never came to pick up the passes. 

The March 14, 2019 letter set out the referrals that were being made for services for him, 

including parenting classes and individual counseling. Butman spoke with father on the 

telephone on March 26, 2019, at which time father confirmed he received the letter but 

stated he had not yet done anything regarding those services because he was waiting for 
7

mother to engage in her services. Butman also encouraged father to engage in services at 

the January 2019 CFT meeting and every time he attended a court hearing. She 

confirmed that, during the CFT meeting, father was informed he would need to 

participate in a substance abuse treatment program, to which he was opposed.

Butman testified there was an approximate one-month delay in establishing 

paternity. However, contrary to father’s statement that the maternal grandmother was in 

possession of the paternity declaration, Butman testified the maternal grandmother stated 

the declaration was in the parents’ possession and offered to assist them in getting it to 

the Agency. At the CFT meeting in late January 2019, the parents were reminded that 

father could not participate in visitation until he provided a copy of the declaration. 

Butman testified the maternal grandmother obtained a copy of the declaration from the 

parents, scanned it, and provided it to the Agency via e-mail. Thereafter, father was not 

referred to services until March 2019 due to the time necessary to request financial 

agreements and make referrals.

The court noted father had been slow to make his appointments and engage in 

services. He had only a handful of visits and was not bonding over the first four months 

of the minor’s life. The court also noted father only seemed willing to engage as long as 

the services did not interfere with “other things that are on your plate,” and did not find 

father was fully committed to reunification or that there was a sufficient likelihood that 

father would provide stability for the minor on a regular basis. The court found a 

substantial danger to the minor if returned to father and no reasonable means by which to 

protect the minor without removal. The court further found that it would not benefit the 

minor to provide reunification services to father and bypassed services pursuant to 

section 361.5, subdivision (a). The court maintained the current visitation schedule and 

encouraged the parents to attend every visit.

The August 2019 status review report stated the parents continued to be transient, 

failed to return the social worker’s voicemails to contact her to meet and review their
8

case plan, and failed to attend scheduled visits with the minor. An absent parent locator 

revealed an address for the parents in Lodi to which the Agency sent correspondence. 

But for one attempt to contact the social worker, father otherwise failed to return 

messages or attend any of his scheduled office visits. It was unknown whether father was 

employed, and it was noted that he might be incarcerated. Both parents were inconsistent 

with visits and on July 20, 2019, due to the parents’ failure to show up on three 

consecutive occasions, visits were canceled. It was noted that father had been in and out 

of jail making his visits inconsistent. When the parents did visit, the maternal 

grandmother3supervised and noted the parents’ lack of engagement and bonding with the 

minor. She also noted the parents were often late and would leave early. Mother fell 

asleep numerous times during visits and the maternal grandmother needed to constantly 

prompt both parents on what they should do with the minor such as feeding her and 

changing her diaper. The maternal grandmother also noted that father became easily 

frustrated with the infant minor and, shortly after he was bypassed for services, stopped 

visiting the minor altogether. The social worker made attempts to re-engage the parents 

in order to restart case plan services and visits, but the parents failed to respond to 

telephone calls or make any effort to contact the social worker. The Agency noted that 

mother was again pregnant and father was the father. The Agency requested that the 

court terminate mother’s reunification services and change the permanent plan of 

reunification to adoption by the maternal grandmother.

Neither parent appeared for the August 27, 2019 review hearing. The court 

terminated mother’s reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. 

The December 2019 section 366.26 report stated the maternal grandmother 

notified the social worker that the parents were attending separate drug and alcohol 

3 The maternal grandmother’s home was approved as an RFA home on May 14, 

2019.
9

rehabilitation programs, with mother in San Jose and father in Monterey. The maternal 

grandmother had not heard from father since November 4, 2019. Mother called the 

maternal grandmother on November 18, 2019, and confirmed having recently given birth 

to her child, L.P. Mother called back on November 27, 2019, and stated she was able to 

keep her newborn as long as she remained in the rehabilitation program. The maternal 

grandmother had not heard from the mother since then. On December 11, 2019, both 

parents appeared in court and provided updated addresses. According to the maternal 

grandmother, the last visit father had with the minor was on June 22, 2019. The minor 

was assessed as adoptable on July 25, 2019. The maternal grandmother was an RFAapproved home and was committed to providing permanency for the minor through 

adoption. All of the minor’s needs were being met by the maternal grandmother and she 

was thriving in the maternal grandmother’s care. The Agency recommended termination 

of parental rights.

The March 2020 status review report stated that father told the social worker on 

January 22, 2020, that he left the drug and alcohol rehabilitation program in Monterey

because “I have remained clean” and “it was a non-vocational training program and that 

they would not assist him with finding a job.” He admitted he left the program “to move 

forward with his career,” stating he was part of the “Vocational Drug Court Training” 

and was seeking employment. He also admitted he was residing with his parents where 

he planned to remain while seeking employment. Father told the social worker his 

parents would not allow mother to stay with them because they did not “see eye to eye.” 

He confirmed he was taking care of the newborn, L.P., while mother resided at the 

Salvation Army Shelter in Lodi, but mother was welcome to see the baby as often as 

possible. The report noted that mother released herself prior to completing her drug and 

alcohol rehabilitation program because the program “was no longer working for her” and 

she wanted to be closer to her children.
10

The report noted there had been no effort on either parent’s part to visit the minor 

since July 6, 2019. On January 25, 2020, the maternal grandmother coordinated a visit at 

the maternal aunt’s house. During the visit, mother had very little interaction with the 

minor and father spent most of the visit playing games on his phone and interacting very 

little with the minor. After the visit was complete, the parents made no effort to initiate 

scheduling another visit. The maternal grandmother coordinated a second visit on 

February 8, 2020, at a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant. Again, the parents had very little 

interaction with the minor during the visit, and after the visit no further visitation was 

requested. The Agency recommended termination of parental rights.

Neither parent was present for the March 3, 2020 contested section 366.26 

hearing. Father’s counsel requested a continuance. Noting the parents set the matter as 

contested and notice was proper, the court denied the request and proceeded with the 

hearing. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was likely to 

be adopted and termination of parental rights was in the minor’s best interest. The court 

further found that none of the exceptions to adoption existed and terminated parental 

rights, ordering adoption as the permanent plan.

DISCUSSION

I

No Presumed Father Status

Father contends the juvenile court erred when it treated him as a biological father 

and did not find he rose to the status of a presumed father. As we shall explain, the claim 

lacks merit.

“An unwed father’s rights and duties under the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 

(UPA), adopted by our Legislature as Family Code section 7600 et seq., substantially 

depend on whether he is a ‘presumed father’ within the meaning of Family Code section 

7611.” (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228.) “Whether a biological father 

is a ‘presumed father’ . . . is critical to his parental rights.” (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992)
11

1 Cal.4th 816, 823.) Only “presumed fathers” are entitled to custody and reunification 

services. (In re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974, 980; In re Zacharia D. (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449.) “The statutory purpose is to distinguish between those fathers 

who have entered into some familial relationship with the mother and child and those 

who have not. [Citations.]” (In re Sabrina H. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 702, 708.)

“A presumed father is a man who meets one or more specified criteria in [Family 

Code] section 7611.” (In re P.A., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 979; see Francisco G. v. 

Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 595.) Those criteria include the following: 

the presumed parent and the child’s mother are or have ever been married and the child is 

born during the marriage or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated; the 

presumed parent and the child’s mother attempted to marry before the birth of the child; 

the presumed parent and the child’s mother marry or attempted to marry after the birth of 

the child; and the presumed parent “receives the child into their home and openly holds 

out the child as their natural child.” (Fam. Code, § 7611, subds. (a)-(d).)

Family Code section 7611 also provides that a person “is presumed to be the 

natural parent of a child” if the person meets the conditions provided in section 7570, et 

seq., which address the establishment of paternity by voluntary declaration. In particular, 

Family Code section 7573 provides that “a completed voluntary declaration of parentage 

that complies with this chapter and that has been filed with the Department of Child 

Support Services is equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child and confers on the 

declarant all rights and duties of a parent.” (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (d); see In re 

Raphael P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-723; accord, In re Liam L. (2000) 

84 Cal.App.4th 739, 747.)

Father argues the court’s refusal to make a paternity finding until he produced a 

copy of the declaration was error. Not so. Family Code section 7573 provides that a 

voluntary declaration of parentage “takes effect on the filing of the document with the 

[Agency].” (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (c); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(c) 
12

[declaration of paternity establishes parentage if it “has been executed and filed with the 

[Agency]”], italics added.) Prior to that occurring, the father is a mere biological father in 

which case the court merely has discretion to offer reunification services based on a 

finding that it would benefit the minor. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); In re Zacharia D., supra,

6 Cal.4th 435 at p. 451; In re Joshua R. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025.)

Here, father told the court on January 10, 2019, that he signed the declaration of 

paternity. However, he was unable to produce a copy of the signed document at that 

time. The court informed father he would need to bring the signed document to court or 

provide it to the Agency in order to elevate his status to presumed father and appoint 

counsel on his behalf. At the CFT meeting on January 29, 2019, father had yet to 

produce a copy of the declaration and was reminded he could not participate in visitation 

until he provided one. As father correctly notes, once a party provides “prima facie proof 

that he signed a voluntary declaration of paternity,” he is entitled to rely on the 

presumption of Evidence Code section 664 to establish that the document was properly 

filed. (In re Raphael P., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.) However, unlike the appellant 

in Raphael P. who provided prima facie evidence in the form of a copy of the birth 

certificate showing his name, father and mother claimed father signed the declaration but 

provided no such prima facie evidence to support that claim. While the court may

determine parentage based on the statements of the parents, it is not required to do so. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(e)(3).)

Father argues the court failed its duty to obtain the declaration of paternity through 

inquiry of the Agency pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(d)(2), which 

provides: “The court must direct the court clerk to prepare and transmit Parentage 

Inquiry—Juvenile (form JV-500) to the local child support agency requesting an inquiry 

regarding whether parentage has been established through any superior court order or 

judgment or through the execution and filing of a voluntary declaration under the Family 

Code.” However, any such inquiry would have been futile since the declaration of 
13

paternity was not yet filed and, as confirmed by the maternal grandmother, was in the 

parents’ possession.

In any event, the maternal grandmother eventually obtained the declaration of 

paternity from the parents and provided it to the Agency on February 1, 2019. As social 

worker Butman subsequently testified, there was an approximate one-month delay in 

establishing paternity because, contrary to father’s statement that the maternal 

grandmother was in possession of the paternity declaration, it was the parents who were 

in possession of the document and who had neither informed the Agency of that fact nor 

produced the document. The declaration was finally provided to the Agency once the 

maternal grandmother obtained it from the parents, scanned it, and e-mailed it to the 

Agency. Thereafter, on February 28, 2019, the court declared father to be the minor’s 

biological father and appointed counsel for him.

Next, father claims the fact that he executed a voluntary declaration of paternity at 

the hospital when the minor was born presumptively established that he was the minor’s 

presumed father. The fact that father executed a voluntary declaration of paternity 

entitled him to a presumption of parentage of the minor pursuant to Family Code section 

7573, subdivision (c) and California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(c). It did not entitle him 

to presumed father status. (In re Jovanni B. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1492.) 

Presumed father status is concerned with the issue of “ ‘whether a man has promptly 

come forward and demonstrated his “ ‘full commitment to his parental responsibilities—

emotional, financial, and otherwise.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.)

While father was present at the birth of the minor and signed the paternity 

declaration, he did little else to demonstrate his full commitment to his parental 

responsibilities prior thereto or throughout the dependency proceedings thereafter. For 

example, prior to the birth of the minor, father was aware of mother’s drug use but 

“look[ed] the other way” and did nothing to intervene. After the minor’s birth, father 

failed to attend court hearings, failed to appear for scheduled appointments with the 
14

social worker or answer or return her telephone calls, and failed to maintain contact with 

the social worker. He was not responsive to the Agency’s requests for an interview or to 

provide information. He continued to use drugs despite having previously completed a 

Prop 36 drug program, including using methamphetamine as recently as January or 

February 2019 and regularly using marijuana, and he admitted he was still struggling 

with substance abuse. Yet he stated with certainty that he would not go into court

ordered residential drug treatment if it meant he would have to give up trucking school 

noting, “my daughter will always be there, I guess, but my career won’t.” He eventually 

participated in drug treatment but left the program early. Father did not avail himself of 

bus passes to enable him to participate in services, and delayed participating in services 

claiming he was waiting for mother to engage in her services. Father attended only two 

of six scheduled visits with the minor early on. Thereafter, his visits were inconsistent 

and, when he did visit, the maternal grandmother noted he became easily frustrated with 

the minor and did little to engage or bond with the minor. Once father was bypassed for 

services, he stopped visiting the minor altogether.

In short, father failed to establish facts demonstrating he fully committed to his 

parental responsibility over the minor. Thus, he was, as the court determined, a 

biological father not a presumed father and, based on his lack of engagement as described 

above, the court determined it was not in the minor’s best interest to offer reunification 

services to father.

Finally, father claims he suffered prejudice because his rights to due process, 

counsel, visitation, and reunification services were delayed and ultimately denied. As 

previously discussed, father’s failure to produce the signed declaration of paternity 

resulted in an initial one-month delay. Once the maternal grandmother obtained the 

declaration from the parents and provided it to the Agency on February 1, 2019, father 

was provided visitation with the minor. He attended just two of the six scheduled visits.
15

In the interim, the parents failed to appear for the January 24, 2019 jurisdiction 

hearing and could not be located. Father argues he was denied the opportunity to contest 

jurisdiction because, even if he had been present, the court maintained he had no rights 

until he produced the declaration of paternity. Father mischaracterizes the court’s

statements. At the initial detention hearing, the court stated it needed to see the 

declaration of paternity “so we can determine your status” and father would “remain as 

alleged father until we see the documentation,” and asked father to show the signed

declaration to the social worker or bring it to court “so we can elevate your status to 

bio[logical] or presumed father.” The court also informed father it would hold off on 

appointing counsel for him “until we get documentation,” and stated it would have to 

wait until the documentation was produced so that it could “re-visit your status so that 

you can fully participate.” At no time did the court state or suggest that father had “no 

rights” unless and until he produced the declaration of paternity. Further, we will not 

speculate as to what might have occurred had father appeared at the jurisdiction hearing. 

He did not.

The parents did participate by telephone in the January 29, 2019 CFT meeting 

during which it was determined that both would benefit from participating in services 

related to substance abuse treatment, parenting, and individual counseling. The parents 

were informed that bus passes were available and were asked to make an effort to 

connect with service providers. They failed to remain in contact with the social worker, 

utilize the bus passes, appear at scheduled appointments, or answer the social worker’s 

telephone calls or return her voicemail messages.

The court declared father to be the minor’s biological father and appointed counsel 

for him on February 28, 2019. At that time, the court ordered father into drug court. The 

court further ordered father’s visitation to continue at the current schedule but noted visits 

would be reduced if missed. Visits were indeed reduced by the court on March 14, 2019, 
16

presumably due to missed appointments.

4 Social worker Butman testified that father was 

not officially referred to services until March 14, 2019, due to the time necessary to 

request financial agreements and make referrals. By March 26, 2019, father had yet to 

engage in services, telling Butman he was waiting for mother to engage in hers. Butman 

referred father to services, made bus passes available to him to get to those services, and 

encouraged father to engage in services each time she saw him. He received referrals for 

parenting classes and individual counseling, completed orientation for the parenting class, 

and met twice with his counselor. However, despite having been informed at the CFT 

meeting that he would have to participate in a substance abuse treatment program, he 

failed to engage and stated adamantly that he would not participate in court ordered 

residential substance abuse treatment if it conflicted with truck driving school. He 

continued to use marijuana regularly. He failed and refused to remain in contact with the 

Agency. He also failed to regularly attend visits with the minor and, when he did attend

(sometimes over 20 minutes late), he failed to engage or bond with the minor. Once he 

was bypassed for services, he ceased visiting the minor altogether.

The record makes plain that, after a brief delay due at least in part to father’s own 

failure to produce the signed declaration of paternity or inform the court or the Agency of 

its whereabouts, father was found to be the minor’s biological father and was appointed 

counsel and provided with reunification services and visitation. However, father 

demonstrated a lack of interest in or outright opposition to engaging in services, visiting 

or developing a bond with the minor, or participating in the dependency proceedings such 

that the court determined it was not in the minor’s best interest to provide him additional 

services and eventually terminated parental rights. We conclude there was no error.

4 The record does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the March 14, 2019 hearing.
17

II

No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Father contends his various attorneys rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance of 

counsel due to their failure to advocate for and protect his rights as a presumed father. In 

particular, he argues that, had any one of his three appointed counsel acted competently, 

he would have been recognized as the minor’s presumed father and would have received 

visits and reunification services.

A parent claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden of showing that 

counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent counsel and that

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674]; In re Emilye A. 

(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711.) The parent must also show prejudice, that is, “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, at p. 694; People v. 

Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.)

“Reviewing courts will reverse . . . on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the 

record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for 

his [or her] act or omission.” (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581.) When 

the record is silent on the reasons that counsel acted as they did, the case must be 

affirmed, “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or 

unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Pope (1979) 

23 Cal.3d 412, 426, abrogated on other grounds as acknowledged in People v. Berryman 

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) “[I]ncompetent counsel does not mean the parent 

was in fact harmed as a consequence.” (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 

1152.)
18

As previously discussed, the record does not support father’s claim that he was a 

presumed father. Thus, his counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective 

standard of reasonableness for electing not to pursue a claim of presumed parentage. 

Even assuming counsel should have done so, father cannot demonstrate that there was a 

reasonable probability of a more beneficial outcome given that father’s actions did not 

demonstrate he was fully committed to his parental responsibility over the minor and, in 

any event, he received reunification services and visitation but failed to fully or 

consistently engage in either. Father has not demonstrated that counsel’s representation 

was inadequate.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

 /s/

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

HULL, J.

 /s/

MURRAY, J.