J-S31001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: D.M.

No. 211 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0000252-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 26, 2015

This is an appeal by D.M., a non-party to the underlying dependency 

proceedings involving B.M., a minor child who is the biological relative of 

D.M. D.M. seeks to appeal from the trial court’s January 20, 2015 order 

denying her request for a transcription of a hearing conducted in the 

dependency case. For the following reasons, we conclude that the court’s 

January 20, 2015 order is not a final, appealable order. It is also not a 

collateral order that is appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313. 

Accordingly, we quash this appeal.

A brief history of the dependency proceeding involving B.M. is 

necessary to understand the order from which D.M. seeks to appeal. Berks 

County Children and Youth Services (BCCYS) became involved with B.M.’s

family in August of 2013 and, ultimately, B.M. was placed into foster care. 

In September of 2013, B.M. was adjudicated dependent and temporary legal 

custody was awarded to BCCYS with a primary goal of reunification, and a 

concurrent goal of adoption. 
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Beginning in October of 2014, D.M., who is an aunt of B.M.’s biological 

father (Father), began seeking visitation with B.M., as well as placement of 

B.M. in her home. However, on November 24, 2014, B.M.’s Guardian ad 

Litem (GAL) filed an “Emergency Motion to Suspend Visitation” between B.M. 

and D.M., as well as between B.M. and other biological family members.1 

On November 21, 2014, the trial court temporarily suspended visitation 

between B.M. and certain family members, including D.M. On November 26, 

2014, following a hearing, the court issued an order directing that the 

primary permanency goal for B.M. was adoption.

On December 12, 2014, BCCYS filed a “Motion for Determination of 

Visitation,” requesting that the trial court “make a determination regarding 

whether visitation with [D.M. and other family members] is in the best 

interests of [B.M.] and whether [B.M.] should remain in the home of [her 

foster parents].” BCCYS Motion for Determination of Visitation, 12/12/14, at 

3-4 (unnumbered). On January 8, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing 

on BCCYS’s motion (hereinafter “visitation hearing”). Ultimately, the court 

issued an order concluding that it was in B.M.’s “best interest that all 

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1 The record indicates that the impetus behind the GAL’s filing of the 

emergency motion was her concern for the safety of B.M. and her foster 

parents, after family members of B.M. created a Facebook page displaying 

photographs of B.M. and a post that seemingly threatened B.M.’s foster 

parents. 
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visitation between the child and [her] biological family members remain 

suspended at this time....” Trial Court Order, 1/13/15.2 

On January 20, 2015, D.M. filed an “Order for Transcription,” 

requesting the transcripts of the visitation hearing. That same day, the 

court issued an order denying D.M.’s petition on the basis that “parts of this 

[j]uvenile hearing were closed upon motion and safety issues weigh against 

generating a transcript in these particular circumstances....” Trial Court 

Order, 1/20/15. D.M. filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s January

20, 2015 order. On February 23, 2015, this Court issued a per curiam order 

directing D.M. to show cause why her appeal should not be quashed as 

having been taken from an interlocutory, non-appealable order. D.M. filed a 

timely response, arguing that the trial court’s January 20, 2015 order 

qualified as a collateral order, appealable as of right under Rule 313. On 

March 20, 2015, this Court issued a second per curiam order, discharging 

our February 23, 2015 show cause order and stating that, “the merits panel 

may revisit the issue and may find that the appeal is defective.” Per Curiam 

Order, 3/20/15.

____________________________________________

2

In suspending visitation, the court cited “safety concerns for the foster 

family and child, ... the high level of conflict and stress between the 

biological family and the foster family, [the fact that] visitation and contact 

negatively impact the child in tangible ways, and [because] it is clearly 

necessary for her health and well-being that [the child] experience a period 

of quiescence at this time....” Id. 
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In light of this procedural history, we will first consider whether the 

trial court’s January 20, 2015 order is appealable.

The general rule is that, unless otherwise permitted by 

statute, only appeals from final orders are subject to appellate 

review. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 72-73, 394 A.2d 542, 544-

45 (1978). A final order is one that disposes of all claims or all 

parties. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). This principle, designed to prevent 

piecemeal appeals, is subject to a narrowly construed exception 

known as the collateral order rule. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 550 Pa. 298, [306], 705 A.2d 830, 834 (1998); 

Watson v. City of Philadelphia, 665 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1995). The collateral order rule, first announced in 

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 

S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and now set forth in 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, provides that 

appeals may be taken from orders that are “[1] separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action [2] where the right 

involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the 

question presented is such that if review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). This third prong has also been interpreted to 

mean that the matter must be effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from final judgment. Johnson, supra, 705 A.2d at 832, 

citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 

2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).

Commonwealth v. Sartin, 708 A.2d 121, 122-123 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Initially, the trial court’s January 20, 2015 order is not ‘final,’ as 

defined by Rule 341(b).3 Thus, we must assess whether it satisfies the three 

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3 Rule 341(b) states:

(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any order that:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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prongs of the ‘collateral order rule.’ In regard to the first prong of that test, 

the January 20, 2015 order denying D.M. the transcript of the visitation 

hearing implicates an issue that is separable from the underlying 

dependency action. Namely, the dependency proceeding involves 

“substantive decisions affecting the child’s best interests, which is the 

polestar of all dependency proceedings.” In re J.S., 980 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). More specifically, the January 8, 2015 visitation hearing was 

conducted to determine whether visitation with D.M., as well as other family 

members, was in the best interests of B.M. See BCCYS “Motion for 

Determination of Visitation,” 12/12/14, at 3-4 (unnumbered). That issue, 

and the overarching question of B.M.’s dependency, are distinct and 

separable from D.M.’s claim that she has a right to the transcript of the 

visitation hearing. Therefore, the first prong of the collateral order doctrine 

is satisfied.

Next, we determine if the right involved in D.M.’s claim is too 

important to be denied review. D.M. avers (in her answer to our order to 

show cause why her appeal should not be quashed) that she has a 

constitutional “right to judicial records” as a member of the public, and as an 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) 

of this rule.

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). 
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“interested party.” Answer of Appallant [sic] to Order Filed by Superior 

Court, 3/6/15, at 3. 

In Sartin, a nearly identical right was asserted in an attempt to satisfy 

the collateral order rule. There, local newspapers appealed from a court 

order that “partially unsealed the transcript of a previously held in camera 

hearing....” Sartin, 708 A.2d at 121.4 In arguing that the order satisfied the 

second prong of the collateral order test, the newspapers “identified only the 

public’s right of access to judicial proceedings as the right too important to 

be denied review....” Id. at 123 (citation omitted). We disagreed that this 

right met the collateral order test, reasoning:

Admittedly, Pennsylvania courts have recognized the 

existence of the right of the public to observe the functioning of 

the criminal justice system. PG Publishing Co. v. 

Commonwealth, 532 Pa. 1, 5, 614 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1992); 

Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, supra, at 508, 530 A.2d at 

417 (1987). This right is not absolute, however, and it may be 

weighed against circumstances warranting closure of the record 

to public inspection. PG Publishing Co., supra; 

Fenstermaker, supra, at 513, 530 A.2d at 420. At the 

discretion of the trial judge and in the interest of protecting 

public as well as private interests, the public may be excluded, 

temporarily or permanently, from being present at certain 

judicial proceedings or examining the records of such 

proceedings. PG Publishing Co., supra; Hutchison v. Luddy,

417 Pa. Super. 93, 611 A.2d 1280, 1290 (1992); Katz v. Katz,

356 Pa. Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374, 1377 (1986). Thus, 

although we concede that the right of access is an important 

right, in light of the fact that it can be delayed or denied under 

____________________________________________

4 The newspapers sought to challenge the court’s order because it directed 

that the transcript be redacted of all proper names. Id. at 122.
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certain circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Newspapers' 

appeal is too important to be denied immediate review.

Sartin, 708 A.2d at 123. 

In light of Sartin, we reject D.M.’s claim that the public’s right of 

access to judicial records is too important to be denied review at this time. 

Additionally, D.M.’s assertion that she has a “personal interest” in attaining 

the record of the visitation hearing does not warrant immediate review. This 

Court has stated that “[i]n order to satisfy the second prong of the collateral 

order doctrine, it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the 

particular parties.” Spanier v. Freeh, 95 A.3d 342, 346 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). “Rather, the issue must involve rights deeply rooted in 

public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, the second prong of the collateral order doctrine is 

not satisfied in this case. 

We need not go on to examine whether the third prong of the 

collateral order test has been met, because “[a]bsent the satisfaction of all 

three prongs of [that] test, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an 

appeal of an otherwise non-final order.” Spanier, 95 A.3d at 345 (citation 

omitted). Therefore, we quash D.M.’s appeal.

Appeal quashed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/26/2015