United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 19-1639

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JEAN CARLOS TORRES-CORREA, a/k/a Jampi,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Kayatta, Lipez, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges.

Javier A. Morales-Ramos on brief for appellant. 

W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. BauzáAlmonte, Assistant United States Attorney, and Gregory B. Conner, 

Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

January 18, 2022
- 2 -

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Having participated in the armed 

robbery of a CVS pharmacy, Jean Carlos Torres-Correa was tried and 

convicted of interfering with commerce by threats or violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and § 2 ("Hobbs Act robbery"), and 

using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during and in relation to 

a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)

and § 2. He makes three claims on appeal: (1) Hobbs Act robbery 

is not a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A); (2) the 

trial court admitted video surveillance footage without proper 

authentication; and (3) the trial court improperly excluded 

impeachment evidence challenging the credibility of the 

government's cooperating witness. Finding his claims meritless,

we affirm.

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on January 13, 2017, three 

masked assailants -- later identified as Torres-Correa, I.R.,1 and 

Pablo Díaz-Ramírez -- robbed a CVS pharmacy in Caguas, Puerto Rico. 

I.R. carried a handgun, Díaz-Ramírez carried a modified AR-15, and 

Torres-Correa carried a bag to store the proceeds of the robbery.

Three people were inside the store -- a clerk, a security guard, 

and the shift supervisor, Calixto Cotto-Carrasquillo. During the 

robbery, I.R. and Díaz-Ramírez threatened the three CVS employees 

1 We refer to I.R. by his initials because he was a minor at 

the time of the offense. 
- 3 -

with their weapons, and I.R. repeatedly pistol-whipped CottoCarrasquillo. I.R., Díaz-Ramírez, and Torres-Correa fled the 

store having stolen $207 and two bottles of liquor. 

During a police interview in an unrelated investigation, 

Díaz-Ramírez confessed to the CVS robbery, and identified I.R. and 

Torres-Correa as his accomplices. Díaz-Ramírez also confessed to 

a series of additional crimes, including the robbery of a Subway 

restaurant.

Torres-Correa and Díaz-Ramírez were indicted for Hobbs 

Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), and for using, carrying, or 

possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 

(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). Díaz-Ramírez was also indicted for 

several other offenses. Torres-Correa filed a motion to dismiss 

the § 924(c) count, claiming that Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime 

of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court 

denied the motion. 

A three-day trial was held in October 2018. The 

government called three witnesses: the CVS store manager, Rene 

Alicea-Salgado, the shift supervisor, Cotto-Carrasquillo, and 

Díaz-Ramírez. Alicea-Salgado testified that on January 13, 2017,

he arrived at the store a few hours after the robbery, verified 

that the security cameras were working, and created a recording of 

the relevant video footage. He then signed and dated a CD of the 

recording. Alicea-Salgado referred to "the daily process [by 
- 4 -

which] managers have to verify that the security system is working" 

as validating a "checklist" that is provided by the store.

When the government moved to introduce the surveillance 

footage into evidence, Torres-Correa objected on the basis that 

Alicea-Salgado had not adequately explained his reference to a 

"checklist." Following Torres-Correa's objection, the court

further questioned Alicea-Salgado regarding the checklist

procedure.2 Satisfied with his answers, the court admitted the CD

containing the surveillance footage. On cross-examination, in an 

apparent reference to the process by which he had confirmed that 

the security cameras were working, Alicea-Salgado testified that 

he had verified the "checklist" the morning after the robbery. 

The next government witness, Cotto-Carrasquillo,

testified to the details of the robbery while the government played 

the surveillance video. The government's final witness, DíazRamírez, testified about the planning of the robbery and TorresCorrea's involvement. During his testimony, the government again 

played the surveillance footage, and Díaz-Ramírez described what 

happened and identified Torres-Correa in the video. Díaz-Ramírez

also acknowledged that he was testifying pursuant to a cooperation

2 Alicea-Salgado elaborated: "the checklist specifies if the 

system is working properly or not, and that is done through the 

observation of the monitors, like I specified before." AliceaSalgado also explained that he had verified that all twenty-three 

of the store's cameras were working properly.
- 5 -

agreement and that he had pleaded guilty to several other crimes

set forth in the same indictment, including a robbery at a Subway 

restaurant and other robberies and a carjacking. He did not, 

however, discuss the details of these other crimes in his direct

examination.

On cross-examination, Torres-Correa's counsel asked 

Díaz-Ramírez whether, as part of his cooperation, he had provided 

information to the government about the charges in the indictment

to which he had pleaded guilty. Díaz-Ramírez replied that he had. 

In particular, he testified about providing the government with 

information about the CVS robbery and the Subway robbery, which 

was also set forth in the indictment but was a separate count that 

did not involve Torres-Correa. Regarding the Subway robbery, DíazRamírez stated that he "didn't see all of the details" of this 

robbery but saw that his accomplices had "jumped over the counter 

in order to open the cash registers." 

Upon hearing this testimony, Torres-Correa sought to 

impeach Díaz-Ramírez by introducing a recorded interview between 

Díaz-Ramírez and the FBI. Torres-Correa claimed that, in this

video, Díaz-Ramírez had told FBI agents that "he didn't see 

anything" during the Subway robbery because he was "far away"

(i.e., outside of the restaurant), thus purportedly contradicting 

Díaz-Ramírez's trial testimony that he had seen his accomplices

jump over the counter during the robbery.
- 6 -

The government objected to the introduction of the 

video. It argued that Díaz-Ramírez's statements were not 

inconsistent, and that -- even if they were inconsistent -- the 

Subway robbery was a collateral matter of little importance to the 

case. The court sustained the objection and excluded the video, 

finding that it had no impeachment value. The court noted that 

"[e]ven if we set aside the fact that this is about another offense 

that is not the offense that [Torres-Correa is] on trial for, the 

fact is that [Díaz-Ramírez] stated upfront that he wasn't inside 

the Subway when the robbery took place." It continued: "the 

inconsistency is really too vague, because . . . the first time 

[sic] thing he said upfront is that he couldn't see well and he 

couldn't see all the details . . . . It's just a matter of degree." 

Torres-Correa also sought the court's permission to 

cross-examine Díaz-Ramírez about his mental health history, noting 

that Díaz-Ramírez had reported a schizophrenia diagnosis to the 

probation department. The court ruled that it would prohibit this 

line of questioning in the absence of a medical expert. 

Elaborating, the court said that it was inappropriate for TorresCorrea's counsel and Díaz-Ramírez to "talk[] about medical facts" 

and form "a medical hypothesis of what schizophrenia is and fit[] 

it into [the] defense" without the testimony of a medical expert. 

Since Torres-Correa did not have a medical expert, the court 

prohibited the line of questioning. 
- 7 -

At the close of the government's case, Torres-Correa

moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court denied 

the motion. Torres-Correa did not present any witnesses. 

The jury found Torres-Correa guilty on both counts. He 

was sentenced to one hundred and thirty-five months of 

incarceration. This appeal followed. 

A. Hobbs Act Robbery as a Crime of Violence

Torres-Correa argues that Hobbs Act robbery is not a 

crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c), and, thus, the court 

erred in denying his motion to dismiss the firearms offense (Count 

VI). As relevant here, § 924(c)(1)(A) applies to "any person who, 

during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . , uses or 

carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 

possesses a firearm."3 Subsection 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) requires a 

minimum sentence of seven years "if the firearm is brandished" 

during commission of the crime of violence. Section 924(c)(3)(A)

defines "crime of violence" as a felony that "has as an element 

3 The fact that Torres-Correa did not himself carry a firearm 

during the robbery is irrelevant because "the defendant does not 

need to have carried the gun himself to be liable under § 924(c)." 

United States v. Flecha-Maldonado, 373 F.3d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 

2004).
- 8 -

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

the person or property of another."4 

Torres-Correa's claim that Hobbs Act robbery is not a 

crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(3)(A) is a nonstarter. 

It is settled law in this Circuit that Hobbs Act robbery 

categorically constitutes a crime of violence. United States v. 

García-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir. 2018) ("[W]e . . . hold 

that because the offense of Hobbs Act robbery has as an element 

the use or threatened use of physical force capable of causing 

injury to a person or property, a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery 

categorically constitutes a 'crime of violence' under section 

924(c)'s force clause.").

Torres-Correa asks us to "reconsider[]" that precedent.

Of course, our panel cannot do so. United States v. Holloway, 499 

F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is axiomatic that new panels 

are bound by prior panel decisions in the absence of supervening 

authority."). Given the absence of any supervening authority from 

4 Section 924(c)(3)(B) contains another definition for "crime 

of violence" -- a felony "that by its nature, involves a 

substantial risk that physical force against the person or property 

of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 

The Supreme Court has declared that subsection to be 

unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 

2336 (2019). However, Davis did not affect the continued viability 

of the § 924(c)(3)(A) definition. See United States v. HernándezRomán, 981 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 2020).
- 9 -

the Supreme Court or an en banc panel, the district court did not 

err in refusing to dismiss the § 924(c)(3)(A) charge.

B. Surveillance Video

Torres-Correa claims that the district court erred by 

admitting surveillance footage of the robbery "without proper 

authentication." Specifically, he argues that the footage was not 

properly authenticated because the government did not introduce 

the "checklist" referenced by Alicea-Salgado, and that AliceaSalgado lacked the personal knowledge necessary to authenticate

the footage because (1) he was not present during the robbery, and 

(2) he did not view the footage until several hours after the 

robbery was completed. We review the district court's decision to 

admit evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. VázquezSoto, 939 F.3d 365, 373 (1st Cir. 2019).

Rule 901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "To 

satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item 

of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it

is." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). In applying this rule, the district 

court must evaluate "whether there is 'enough support in the record 

to warrant a reasonable person in determining that the evidence is 

what it purports to be.'" United States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 

6 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 

23 (1st Cir. 1994)). Rule 901(b) provides a non-exhaustive list 
- 10 -

of methods sufficient to authenticate evidence, including 

testimony from a witness with knowledge "that an item is what it 

is claimed to be." Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). A witness with 

knowledge may be "either a custodian or a percipient witness." 

Blanchard, 867 F.3d at 5 (quoting Paulino, 13 F.3d at 23). "This 

standard does 'not require the proponent of the evidence to rule 

out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity.'" Id.

(quoting United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 

1994)).

Alicea-Salgado's testimony that he used a "checklist" 

referred to the store's process for verifying that its security 

system was working properly. When asked whether he "reviewed . . 

. the checklist for that day?" Alicea-Salgado responded "[y]es," 

and noted that he found "[t]hat the surveillance system was working 

completely." He also testified that he checked that the system 

was working by first verifying that all of the store's twentythree security cameras were visible on its security monitor, and 

then by making recordings of the relevant security footage after 

confirming that the areas in which the robbery took place had been 

captured by the cameras. 

Thus, after confirming that the security cameras were 

working, Alicea-Salgado personally viewed the surveillance system 

footage shortly after the robbery and created the recording that 

was submitted into evidence. See Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 
- 11 -

250 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming the trial court's admission of audio 

recordings where "[b]oth deputies who recorded [the] statements 

testified about how they made the recordings"). Torres-Correa

provides no legal authority to support his claim that AliceaSalgado's mention of a "checklist" necessarily required the 

government to produce a physical document containing a checklist, 

as opposed to his testimony that he followed the procedures 

outlined above.5 Nor has Torres-Correa supported his claim that 

Alicea-Salgado could not authenticate the video because he was not 

present during the robbery.6 

Finally, even if Alicea-Salgado's testimony had not been

sufficient to authenticate the video (and it clearly was), the 

government's other witnesses, Cotto-Carrasquillo and Díaz-Ramírez, 

5 It is not clear from the record whether a physical document 

exists that memorializes the procedure followed by Alicea-Salgado. 

However, even if such a physical checklist does exist, it would 

not change the fact that the steps Alicea-Salgado performed were 

sufficient to support a finding that the video footage "is what it 

is claimed to be." Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). 

6 Torres-Correa similarly argues that Alicea-Salgado lacked 

the personal knowledge to authenticate the footage because the 

checklist "was not done by him." While Torres-Correa is correct 

that a different CVS employee verified the checklist the night 

prior to the robbery, this argument disregards Alicea-Salgado's 

testimony on cross-examination that he verified the checklist 

again shortly after the robbery. And regardless of whether or not 

Alicea-Salgado's verification that morning is properly 

characterized as using the "checklist," his actions were still 

sufficient under Rule 901(b)(1), and the fact that a different 

employee completed the checklist before the robbery is of no 

significance for the authentication determination of the court. 
- 12 -

were present during the robbery and recalled the events depicted 

in the video as it played, further supporting the authenticity of 

the footage. See Blanchard, 867 F.3d at 7 (noting that even if 

"evidence is admitted prematurely, a new trial is not warranted 

when later testimony cures the error") (quoting United States v. 

Espinal-Almeida, 699 F.3d 588, 609 (1st Cir. 2012)). 

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that Alicea-Salgado's testimony that he viewed and 

verified the surveillance footage was sufficient to allow a 

reasonable person to "determin[e] that the evidence is what it 

purports to be." Blanchard, 867 F.3d at 6 (quoting Paulino, 13 

F.3d at 23). 

C. Cross-Examination

Finally, Torres-Correa challenges the court's decision 

to exclude impeachment evidence and a line of questioning regarding 

Díaz-Ramírez, the government's cooperating witness and a coparticipant in the robbery. Specifically, Torres-Correa

challenges the exclusion of a video of Díaz-Ramírez's interview 

with the FBI and defense counsel's questions regarding DíazRamírez's schizophrenia diagnosis. These two evidentiary claims 

are also subject to review for abuse of discretion. See VázquezSoto, 939 F.3d at 373.
- 13 -

1. FBI Interview

Torres-Correa asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to admit a video of Díaz-Ramírez's interview 

with the FBI because it contradicted Díaz-Ramírez's trial

testimony. Specifically, when asked on cross-examination about 

the robbery of a Subway restaurant, Díaz-Ramírez said that he 

"didn't see all the details," but saw "when they jumped over the 

counter in order to open the cash registers." However, the video 

interview purportedly showed that Díaz-Ramírez had previously told 

FBI agents that he "didn't see anything." Torres-Correa argued 

that this inconsistency was relevant to Díaz-Ramírez's "perception 

of things," and added that "[w]hat he perceives and what he doesn't 

perceive is critical to his credibility." The government argues 

that the district court properly excluded the video because DíazRamírez's statements were not truly inconsistent and that, even if 

they were, any such inconsistency would have been a "collateral" 

matter for which Torres-Correa cannot introduce extrinsic 

evidence. 

In excluding the FBI video, the district court found

that the purported inconsistency was "just a matter of degree," 

and "too vague" to have impeachment value. From this exchange, it 

appears that the district court may have believed there was no

inconsistency in Díaz-Ramírez's statements at all. However, even 

assuming that the court acknowledged that there might be a minor
- 14 -

inconsistency, it was well within the court's discretion to exclude 

the video. Playing the FBI interview would have required immersion

in the details of an incident that was far removed from the merits 

of Torres-Correa's case, which would have risked confusing the 

jury and wasting time. See United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 

1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (extrinsic impeachment evidence was properly 

excluded as collateral because its "marginal relevance" to the 

witness's bias or motive to testify falsely would be outweighed by 

the "time and effort" required to present the testimony).

Although Torres-Correa argues that the purported 

inconsistency goes to Díaz-Ramírez's credibility, this argument

misses the point of our case law regarding collateral matters. 

The problem with introducing the FBI video is not that it would 

have been irrelevant to Díaz-Ramírez's credibility. Rather, the

problem is that the video's limited relevance to Díaz-Ramírez's 

credibility was insufficient to outweigh the danger it posed of 

confusing the jury and causing delay. See United States v. 

Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 989 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding no 

abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude 

testimony that was relevant to a witness's credibility, but only 

on a matter "immaterial" to the merits of the case); cf. United 

States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 913 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing 

the district court's broad discretion to prohibit crossexamination that would introduce into the case collateral matters 
- 15 -

that could confuse the jury, even if such examination is relevant 

to a witness's credibility or perception). The determination of 

whether a matter is collateral is "analogous to Rule 403's 

relevancy balancing test, which calls for relevant evidence to be 

excluded when its 'probative value is substantially outweighed'"

by considerations such as confusing the issues, misleading the 

jury, or wasting time. United States v. Catalán-Roman, 585 F.3d 

453, 469 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).

There was no abuse of discretion in the district court's 

decision to exclude the video. 

2. Mental Health Evidence

Lastly, Torres-Correa argues that the court abused its 

discretion when it prohibited his counsel from questioning DíazRamírez about his schizophrenia diagnosis. Torres-Correa argued 

that topics such as Díaz-Ramírez's history of medication and 

compliance with his schizophrenia treatment would be relevant to 

Díaz-Ramírez's perceptive abilities. For example, Torres-Correa

contended that "[i]f [Díaz-Ramírez] goes to the hospital and he 

has begun a treatment and he has not followed up with the 

treatment, his perception may be affected." The Court rejected 

this line of inquiry, noting that Torres-Correa was seeking to 

elicit "a medical conclusion" from a lay witness who could not 

provide answers of scientific value. As the court remarked to 

Torres-Correa's counsel, "[y]ou don't have any scientific basis 
- 16 -

for your question; nor does he, as a patient, have the knowledge 

to give an answer that has probative value. If you had an expert 

there, it would be a different story, because the expert would 

come forward with an explanation that brings light to the issue of 

the particular mental illness that you're probing into . . . . As

it stands now, this has no probative value." 

A witness's mental health may certainly be relevant for

the jury to consider in evaluating the reliability of his or her

testimony. See United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82-83 (1st 

Cir. 1992). But the trial court did not preclude questioning on 

Díaz-Ramírez's schizophrenia based on relevance. Rather, the 

trial court determined that questioning Díaz-Ramírez about his

schizophrenia would not be probative unless an expert witness were 

available to testify regarding how schizophrenia affects a 

person's perceptive abilities. 

This determination was well within the discretion of the 

district court. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701(c), a lay 

witness (like Díaz-Ramírez) cannot testify to "scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge." Rather, an opinion 

based on scientific (hence, psychiatric) knowledge may only be 
- 17 -

given by "[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education." Fed. R. Evid. 702.7

There was no abuse of discretion in the court's decision 

to condition cross-examination about Diaz's mental health history 

on the presentation of an expert witness.

Affirmed.

7 Torres-Correa briefly attempts to reframe this argument as 

a Confrontation Clause violation. Because he did not raise this 

argument at trial, it is subject to plain error review. United 

States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 107 (1st Cir. 2004). As discussed 

above, Torres-Correa has failed to show any error at all. His 

Confrontation Clause argument therefore fails.