In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 03-3060

CRESTVIEW VILLAGE APARTMENTS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 C 6913—William J. Hibbler, Judge.

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ARGUED MARCH 31, 2004—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2004

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Before BAUER, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Crestview Village Apartments

Limited Partnership (“Crestview”) appeals from the district

court’s dismissal of its claim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that the RookerFeldman doctrine, which generally prohibits federal court

review of state court judgments, precluded it from exercising

jurisdiction over Crestview’s claims. We agree and, therefore,

affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
2 No. 03-3060

I. Background

Crestview owns and manages Crestview Village

Apartments, an apartment complex in Kankakee, Illinois

bought with financing insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). According to Crestview, its tenants are primarily African American

and most receive federal housing assistance. Crestview

alleges that it has been targeted by local and federal

government officials due to the racial composition of its

tenants.

Crestview’s problems with regulators began in November

1998, when HUD cited it for failure to file required financial

statements for the years 1995 through 1997. In March 2000,

HUD filed an administrative complaint seeking civil penalties based on Crestview’s continued failure to submit the

financial statements. In February 2001, after Crestview neglected to respond to the complaint, the administrative law

judge entered a default judgment against Crestview for

$80,000.

Meanwhile, Crestview also encountered difficulties with

the City of Kankakee (the “City”). In October 1999, the City

filed a building code enforcement action against Crestview

in state court. The City later amended its complaint to include a demolition claim and a claim for unpaid sewer and

public service fees. In November 2000, when HUD learned

about the local building code violations, as charged in the

City’s complaint, it notified Crestview that, given the building’s

disrepair, it intended to initiate foreclosure proceedings

against Crestview. In March 2001, Crestview and the City

settled the state action, agreeing that Crestview would repair 378 building code violations and the City would withdraw

its demolition claims and its claim for unpaid fees. The state

court then entered an order approving the settlement.

In September 2001, Crestview filed a complaint in federal

court, naming the following parties as defendants: HUD;
No. 03-3060 3

1 HUD and its employees are referred to throughout as the

“federal defendants.”

HUD employees Margarita Maisonet, Gregory Gustin, and

Edward Hinsberger;1

 the City; Mayor Donald Green; Terry

Lewis, director of the City’s Code Enforcement; and Tony

Perry, owner of the property adjoining Crestview. Count I of

the complaint sought damages for discriminatory housing

practices pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 3613, (“FHA”). Counts II through V alleged that the defendants conspired to violate Crestview’s civil rights pursuant to

the federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,

1983, and 1985.

The district court dismissed Crestview’s complaint, finding

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the court from

exercising jurisdiction over Crestview’s claims. With respect

to the federal defendants, the district court also found that

subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, reasoning that (1)

the FHA does not provide for a right of action against the

federal defendants and (2) Crestview’s complaint alleged that

the federal defendants were doing their jobs, but §§ 1981,

1982, 1983, and 1985 do not provide a jurisdictional basis for

suits against HUD or its employees acting under the color of

federal law. The district court also alternatively noted that

even if jurisdiction existed, the claims should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

On appeal, Crestview asserts that the district court’s finding

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the court from

exercising jurisdiction was erroneous. Crestview does not,

however, challenge the district court’s separate rationale for

declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the federal defendants and accordingly, Crestview has waived its

challenge regarding the dismissal of the federal defendants.

See Duncan v. City of Wis. Dep’t of Health and Family Servs.,
4 No. 03-3060

166 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “a party must

develop any arguments it wishes this court to consider in its

appellate brief, or they will be deemed waived or abandoned”). On appeal, Crestview also asserts that, after

finding itself without jurisdiction, the district court should

not have proceeded to decide the merits of the case by

alternatively dismissing the complaint for failure to state a

claim. Finally, Crestview argues that the district court

abused its discretion by declining to grant Crestview leave

to file an amended complaint, which Crestview contends

might have cured any jurisdictional deficiencies.

II. Analysis

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first consider whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

bars the district court, and indeed this court, from exercising

subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The doctrine,

which emerged from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983),

prohibits the inferior federal courts from reviewing state

court decisions. Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court

for the State of California, 326 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2003). It

is a jurisdictional doctrine premised upon the fact that,

because federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction, lower federal courts are not authorized to review appeals from state court judgments except, of course, where

Congress has explicitly authorized such collateral review.

Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). Instead,

“only the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the

civil judgments of state courts.” Id. We review de novo a

district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Zurich, 326 F.3d at 821.

To assess whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable, “the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is
No. 03-3060 5

whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted

from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that

judgment. If the injury alleged resulted from the state court

judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower

federal courts lack jurisdiction.” Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365; see

also Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510

(7th Cir. 1996) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine asks “whether

the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment

or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.”).

Likewise, if the federal injury is “inextricably intertwined”

with the state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman bars the federal action. Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993).

But, as the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry is a difficult

one, “the crucial point is whether ‘the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.’ ” Id. at 754 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16).

For Rooker-Feldman purposes, a “state court approved

settlement agreement is a judgment or decision. . . .” 4901

Corp. v. Town of Cicero, 220 F.3d 522, 528 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000).

Each count of Crestview’s federal complaint alleges that,

as a result of a conspiracy involving defendants, it was injured in that it was “forced to defend unsubstantiated lawsuits, and excessively harsh administrative actions. . . .”

(emphasis added). Thus, in essence, Crestview is challenging

as baseless the state court order requiring Crestview to cure

the building code violations. After all, Crestview’s alleged

injury—having to defend unsubstantiated lawsuits— was only

complete after the state court entered the order and thereby

made an implicit finding that the suit was not unsubstantiated. See Garry, 82 F.3d at 1368 (finding plaintiffs’ claim that

defendants brought a state condemnation action against

them due to political retaliation barred by Rooker-Feldman,

as “the injury alleged was only complete when the state

court actually condemned the property”).

A finding by the district court that defendants did, as

Crestview alleges, conspire to bring unsubstantiated law-
6 No. 03-3060

suits would undermine the state court’s implicit holding that

the state action was justified. See Shooting Point v.

Cumming, 368 F.3d 379, 384 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that

Rooker-Feldman precluded jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim

that state transportation regulations were selectively enforced

against plaintiff, as a “district court finding of selective

enforcement . . . would clearly contravene the state court’s

[implicit] judgment” that plaintiff was “properly subject to

the [ ] regulations”). As this court has consistently made

clear, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts

from entertaining such attempts to undo state court decisions. See, e.g., Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir.

1994) (finding Rooker-Feldman prohibited §§ 1983, 1985,

and 1986 action alleging conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil

rights by initiating a foreclosure proceeding, as plaintiff

essentially sought review of “state court’s denial of his requests to intervene in the foreclosure actions”). That this

suit was cast as a civil rights action is of no consequence.

See Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754 (citation omitted) (“It is settled

that ‘a plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil

rights action.’ ”). Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s

determination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as

a jurisdictional bar to Crestview’s suit in federal court.

Having found that we, and the district court, lack jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this appeal, we decline to

consider the propriety of the district court’s alternative

conclusion that Crestview failed to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). See State of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d

474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction is the

first question in every case, and if the court concludes that

it lacks jurisdiction it must proceed no further.”).

B. The Amended Complaint

For the sake of completeness, we consider Crestview’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by declining
No. 03-3060 7

to allow Crestview leave to amend its complaint. Crestview

intimates that it could have overcome any potential jurisdictional defects had the district court granted it leave to

amend. A brief overview of the procedural history regarding

the complaint is helpful. In early December 2001, shortly

after Crestview initiated this action, the federal and the City

defendants each filed motions to dismiss Crestview’s claim.

Defendant Tony Perry, however, did not file such a motion.

The district court gave Crestview until January 10, 2002 to

respond to the motions to dismiss. On January 10, Crestview

instead filed a motion for an extension of time to file either

a response or an amended complaint. The district court

granted Crestview’s motion, extending the deadline until

January 22, 2002. On January 22, Crestview once again filed

a motion for an extension of time to respond to the motion to

dismiss by filing an amended complaint. On February 5,

2002, the court granted both motions to dismiss. The following

day, the court denied Crestview’s January 22 request for an

extension of time to respond to the motion to dismiss.

Shortly thereafter, on February 15, 2002, Crestview filed

a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

to alter or amend the judgment and seeking leave to file an

amended complaint. Crestview did not, however, attach its

proposed amended complaint or explain in its motion how it

proposed to alter the complaint. Instead, when the district

court considered Crestview’s motion at a February 28, 2002

hearing, Crestview attempted to submit its proposed

amended complaint as an exhibit to the motion to reconsider,

and the court denied its request. In an August 22, 2002

order, the district court also denied the motion to reconsider.

We review a district court’s denial of a request for leave to

amend for an abuse of discretion. Indiana Funeral Dirs. Ins.

Trust v. Trustmark Ins. Corp., 347 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir.

2003). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a

party may amend its complaint once as a matter of course

before a responsive pleading is filed. Camp v. Gregory, 67
8 No. 03-3060

2 The district court granted Perry’s motion to dismiss on July 7,

2003, citing Rooker-Feldman. Final judgment was entered in this

case the same day.

F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995). “A motion to dismiss does

not constitute a responsive pleading for purposes of Rule

15(a); thus, an order dismissing the original complaint normally does not eliminate the plaintiff’s right to amend once as

a matter of right. . . . If final judgment is entered dismissing

the case, however, the plaintiff loses that right.” Id. After

final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff may amend with

leave of the court following a motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sparrow v. Heller, 116

F.3d 204, 205 (7th Cir. 1997).

Here, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but never

filed a responsive pleading. Moreover, although the district

court (encouraged by Crestview) was under the mistaken

impression that its February 5, 2002 order dismissing the

complaint was a final order, in fact, it was not. After all,

when the Rule 59(e) motion was filed, the district court had

not yet dismissed Crestview’s claim against defendant Tony

Perry.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Given this procedural posture, Crestview’s general right to amend its complaint once

as a matter of course had not yet been extinguished when

Crestview requested leave to amend. But the right to amend

as a matter of course is not absolute. Perkins v. Silverstein,

939 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1991). Rather, a “court may

deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment fails to cure

the deficiencies in the original pleading, or could not survive

a second motion to dismiss.” Id. at 472; see also Duda v. Bd.

of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 1054, 1057

n.4 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing exception to right to amend

once as a matter of course). A contrary holding “would impose

upon the defendants and the courts the arduous task of

responding to an obviously futile gesture on the part of the

plaintiffs.” Perkins, 939 F.2d at 472.
No. 03-3060 9

Because Crestview did not attach its proposed amended

complaint to its motion for reconsideration or take the necessary steps to make its proposed amendment a part of the

record on appeal, we cannot meaningfully assess whether its

proposed amendment would have cured the deficiencies in

the original pleading. See Harris v. City of Auburn, 27 F.3d

1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he failure to tender an

amended complaint with a motion to alter judgment may

indicate a lack of diligence or good faith.”). Accordingly, we

cannot say that the district court’s denial of Crestview’s

request for leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion. To hold otherwise would allow Crestview to benefit

both from inducing the district court into believing that its

order dismissing the complaint was a final judgment and

also from not making its proposed amended complaint part

of the record on appeal. See Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Calumet

Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Ordinarily a

party will not be heard to complain about an erroneous

ruling that he himself precipitated.”).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-2-04