Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE 

COMPANY OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

v. Record No. 031515 April 23, 2004 

BETTY L. SLEIGH, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Thomas A. Fortkort, Judge 

 In this appeal from a declaratory judgment, we revisit 

the frequently-litigated question of the extent of the 

coverage provided pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured 

motorist statute, Code § 38.2-2206. 

 Betty L. Sleigh was employed by the City of Alexandria 

Police Department as a Parking Enforcement Officer. Her 

unrefuted testimony was the only evidence in the record 

concerning the facts of the case. She testified that on May 

10, 1999, she went to the 400 block of North Royal Street, in 

Alexandria, to enforce "street cleaning hours" when parking 

was prohibited by local ordinance on certain days of the week. 

Finding a car parked in violation of the ordinance, she 

stopped her police vehicle "alongside it," got out, walked to 

a position between the two vehicles, and began to write a 

citation. 

 Before Sleigh could complete the citation and place it on 

the parked car, a young woman, later identified as Crystal A. 
Gibson, ran out of a nearby building and "jumped into the 

vehicle," striking Sleigh in the arm with the driver's-side 

door as she opened it to enter the parked car. Apparently 

realizing that she had failed to bring her keys with her, 

Gibson "yelled to a woman behind us . . . bring her the keys." 

The woman produced the keys and Gibson opened the door, 

striking Sleigh a second time as she got out of the car to 

retrieve the keys. Opening the door a third time, Gibson 

"jumped back into the car" with the keys and Sleigh "kind of 

pushed the door back to defend myself." At this point, Gibson 

"started yelling" and "jumped out the door and slammed the 

door up against me . . . she come [sic] flying out of the car 

and pushed the door very, you know, really very hard, and I 

turned to move and she then pushed me where my left side went 

up against the car." Sleigh further testified that this final 

blow from Gibson's car door drove her back into the side of 

her police vehicle with such force that she sustained 

permanent back injury requiring surgery. Sleigh tried to make 

a radio call requesting "backup" but Gibson seized her radio, 

threw it to the ground, "jumped in her car and took off." 

Sleigh filed a motion for judgment against Gibson in the 

trial court to recover damages for her injuries and took the 

position that Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (the insurer) 

afforded coverage to her under the uninsured motorist 

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provisions of a policy the insurer had issued on Sleigh's 

personal automobile. The insurer brought the present motion 

for declaratory judgment against Sleigh seeking an 

adjudication that the uninsured motorist coverage provided by 

its policy does not apply to Sleigh's "altercation" with 

Gibson. It is undisputed that Sleigh was an "insured" under 

the policy and that Gibson was an "operator of an uninsured 

motor vehicle" as defined by Code § 38.2-2206 and as 

contemplated by the policy. The only dispute is whether the 

coverage applies under the facts of the case. 

The parties, by agreement, submitted the case to the 

court on Sleigh's deposition and the policy, further agreeing 

that the facts were undisputed. The court, in a letter 

opinion, ruled that the insurer's policy afforded coverage to 

Sleigh, and dismissed the motion for declaratory judgment. 

On appeal, the insurer contends that Gibson was not using 

her car as a vehicle when she struck Sleigh with the car door, 

but was rather using the car, or a part of it, as a weapon. 

The uninsured motorist clause of the policy provides: 

The Company will pay . . . all sums which the 

insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover 

as damages from the owner or operator of an 

uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 

sustained by the insured . . . caused by accident 

and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use 

of such uninsured motor vehicle. 

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The governing statute, Code § 38.2-2206, provides, in 

pertinent part, that automobile insurance policies issued in 

Virginia must contain: 

. . . provisions undertaking to pay the insured all 

sums that he is legally entitled to recover as 

damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 

motor vehicle . . . . 

The insurer contends that Gibson's use of the uninsured 

vehicle as a weapon is inconsistent with the concept of "use 

of the vehicle as a vehicle," a prerequisite to uninsured 

motorist coverage under our decisions, citing Nationwide 

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Smelser, 264 Va. 109, 114, 563 S.E.2d 

760, 763 (2002). The insurer argues that the tortfeasor's 

intent was to use the car door to inflict injury, not for the 

ordinary purposes for which the door was designed, and that 

this is determinative. 

Sleigh argues that the tortfeasor's intent is irrelevant 

because the true test is whether the uninsured vehicle was 

being employed in the ordinary manner for which it was 

designed and constructed, rather than in a manner foreign to 

its designed purpose, and whether such employment was causally 

related to the injury sustained. The trial court, after an 

extensive review of our decisions, agreed. 

 In Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 251 Va. 390, 

396-97, 469 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1996), applying similar policy 

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language, we said, "The principal focus is upon the manner in 

which the [uninsured] vehicle, whether moving or stationary, 

is being employed, not upon the activity or role of any 

assailant who may be in, upon, or around the uninsured 

vehicle." In Utica Mutual v. Travelers Indemnity, 223 Va. 

145, 147-48, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982), we found an insurer 

liable for injuries sustained by its insured's passenger as a 

result of a willful tort by an uninsured motorist who 

deliberately ran the insured's car off the road. 

Thus, it is clear that in Virginia the intent of the 

uninsured tortfeasor is irrelevant to the question of 

coverage; rather, the determinative issue is the nature of the 

employment of the uninsured vehicle. Where such a vehicle is 

employed in a manner foreign to its designed purpose, e.g., 

Lexie, supra (drive-by shooting from moving vehicle); 

Travelers Insurance Company v. LaClair, 250 Va. 368, 463 

S.E.2d 461 (1995) (shooting from behind door of stopped car, 

using it as a shield), there is no coverage under the 

uninsured motorist provisions because the resulting injury 

does not arise out of the "use" of the uninsured vehicle as a 

vehicle, but instead arises from its employment in a manner 

contemplated neither by its designers, its manufacturer, nor 

the parties to the insurance contract. 

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On the other hand, where the injury arises out of the 

employment of the uninsured vehicle in the manner for which it 

was designed and as reasonably contemplated by the parties to 

the insurance contract, coverage exists under such policies 

where there is a causal relationship between such use and 

injury sustained by the insured, regardless of the intent of 

the uninsured motorist. See, Smelser, supra (passenger in 

moving car driven by uninsured motorist reached out window and 

seized straps of purse carried by insured pedestrian; forward 

movement of uninsured car dragged victim along the pavement). 

Car doors are designed and manufactured to be opened and 

closed. It is clearly within the contemplation of the parties 

to an insurance contract that injury may sometimes be caused 

by the act of using a car door as designed, either negligently 

or willfully. Here, Gibson's use of her car door as designed 

was use of the uninsured vehicle "as a vehicle" and was 

causally related to Sleigh's injury. We agree with the trial 

court's analysis and will affirm the judgment. 

Affirmed. 

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