Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-839 | November 14, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANTS PRO SE

Samuel M. Walker

Nancy Mae Walker

Limon, Colorado

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

William H. Mullis

William H. Mullis, P.C.

Mitchell, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Samuel M. Walker and Nancy 

Mae Walker,

Appellants-Petitioners,

v.

Town of Orleans,

Appellee-Respondent.

November 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-839

Appeal from the Orange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Steven L. Owen, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

59C01-1611-MI-306

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Samuel M. Walker and Nancy Mae Walker appeal the trial court’s judgment

for the Town of Orleans (“the Town”) on the Town’s motion for costs, which 
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judgment the court entered after a bench trial. The Walkers purport to raise 

nine issues for our review, but we address only the following dispositive issue: 

whether the Walkers have carried their burden on appeal to demonstrate trial 

court error. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February of 2016, a fire severely damaged the Walkers’ two-story residence 

near the Orleans town square. Thereafter, the Town gave the Walkers notice 

that the Walkers had to clear the debris from the location, but the Walkers did 

not do so. Instead, in November, the Walkers filed a petition for injunctive 

relief against the Town. In their petition, the Walkers acknowledged that the 

Town had “proceeded under the Unsafe Building Code in an attempt to 

clear . . . the unsightly mess and debris from the burned house” and that the 

Town had “been in communication” with the Walkers “relating to the clean up 

of said property.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 7. However, the Walkers 

“wishe[d] to complete the clean up of the property” themselves without having 

to reimburse the Town for contractor work. Id. at 8.

[4] The trial court granted the Walkers’ request for a temporary restraining order 

but instructed the Walkers to “proceed and continue with debris removal and 

clearing of the property pending this matter.” Id. at 9. The Town then filed a 

counter-petition for its own injunction against the Walkers due to their 

continuing failure to clear the property. On December 2, after a hearing on 
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both petitions, the court ordered the Walkers to clear the property no later than 

December 12. The court found that, “if the property has not been certified as 

clean by counsel [for the Town by that date, the Town] may enter upon said 

property and clean. [The Town] may use city employees[ or] place the matter 

for public bid, and the costs shall be assessed to [the Walkers].” Id. at 12. The 

Walkers did not object to the court’s December 2016 instructions.

[5] Despite the court’s directives, the Walkers failed to clear the property, and the 

Town eventually hired contractors to remove the debris, level the area, and 

reseed. The Town then sought reimbursement from the Walkers by way of a 

motion for costs in the trial court. In the trial court, the Walkers objected to the 

Town’s requests for costs on the ground that the Town had not properly 

followed the process required by law for giving the Walkers notice of the 

Town’s actions; that the Town had not followed the process required by law for 

obtaining bids from contractors; and that the Town had deprived the Walkers of 

the process required by law in the manner in which the Town had cleared the 

property. The Walkers then requested that the trial court order the Town to 

pay the Walkers a money judgment of more than $57,000.

[6] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the parties’ requests. At that 

hearing, when asked whether they had complied with the court’s December 

2016 order to have the property cleared by December 12, 2016, the Walkers 

conceded that work remained to be done on that date. Tr. Vol. II at 28. The 

court then found for the Town and ordered the Walkers to reimburse the Town 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-839 | November 14, 2018 Page 4 of 7

$6,000 for costs incurred by the Town to clear the Walkers’ property. This 

appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

[7] The Walkers appeal the trial court’s judgment on the Town’s motion for costs, 

which judgment the court entered after an evidentiary hearing. We review the 

trial court’s judgment here, which is not supported by findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, under the general judgment standard. Under that 

standard, “a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory 

supported by the evidence.” J.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 

1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). A trial court’s judgment “comes to this court clothed 

with a presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the burden of proving 

that the trial court erred.” Consumer Attorney Servs., P.A. v. State, 71 N.E.3d 362, 

364 (Ind. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).

[8] The Walkers have not carried their burden on appeal to show that the trial court 

erred.1 Indeed, the “Argument” section of the Walkers’ brief on appeal is less 

than thin—it is literally a blank page. Appellants’ Br. at 9. Suffice to say that a 

blank page does not meet our appellate rules’ requirement of argument 

supported by cogent reasoning and citations to authority. Ind. Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8)(a). And it is not this Court’s place to invent arguments on behalf of 

 

1

 It is of no moment that the Walkers have proceeded pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to 

the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-839 | November 14, 2018 Page 5 of 7

the parties. See Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see 

also J.R. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 256, 258 n.1 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (declining to 

reach an issue “not raised and briefed” by the parties).

[9] And the other parts of the Walkers’ brief on appeal are not helpful. The 

Statement of the Issues asserts nine errors, with one sentence devoted to each 

assertion. The Statement of the Facts is eight sentences, which appear to 

largely repeat the Statement of the Issues. And the Summary of the Argument 

asserts, in total:

The Town over-reached its authority by removing personal 

property consisting of lumber, planking, bricks, sandstone 

stepping stones and sidewalk sections, gazebo concrete 

platform[,] and all trees, bushes, plants, to then level and seed.

All debris had been removed by appellants and basement filled 

prior to contract ratification.

Many due process steps were omitted by the Town to achieve 

[its] objective.

Appellants’ Br. at 8.

[10] We surmise that the Walkers are dissatisfied with the process the Town used to 

obtain bids, hire a contractor, remove the debris from the Walkers’ property, 

and file its notice of claim. However, at no point do the Walkers discuss the 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, which is the only 

evidence we may consider on appeal. Further, at no point do the Walkers 

discuss the effect their petition for injunctive relief had on the Town’s process. 
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Indeed, after the Walkers had filed their petition and invoked the jurisdiction of 

the court, the remainder of the process occurred under court supervision.

[11] The Walkers disregard the fact that, when they filed their petition, they 

acknowledged that the Town had, to that point, “proceeded under the Unsafe 

Building Code,” had “placed the clean up of the property out for bid 

and . . . secured a contractor,” and had “been in communication[]” with the 

Walkers. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 7-8. They disregard the fact that, in 

December of 2016, the trial court expressly authorized the Town to enter onto 

the Walkers’ property to clear it, either with the Town’s employees or with 

contractors, if the Walkers had failed to have the property cleared by December 

12, 2016. And they do not suggest on appeal that the trial court lacked the 

authority to give those instructions or that the Town’s actions were not in 

conformity with those instructions. 

[12] In sum, the Walkers have not carried their burden on appeal to demonstrate 

that the trial court erred when the court ordered the Walkers to clear the 

property by December 12, 2016. The trial court gave the Walkers notice and an 

ample opportunity to resolve the code violation. Then the court did exactly 

what the court had informed the Walkers it would do, namely, that, should 

they fail to clear the property by that date, the court would assess the Town’s 

costs for the removal of the debris, the leveling of the area, and reseeding 

against them. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[13] Affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-839 | November 14, 2018 Page 7 of 7

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.