IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 4, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEVONTA KEVON CURRY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 18-551 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

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No. W2019-00679-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant-Appellant, seventeen-year-old Devonta Kevon Curry, was transferred from 

juvenile court and convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated burglary (count one);

aggravated robbery (counts two, five, and six); especially aggravated kidnapping (counts 

three and four); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony

(count seven). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, -13-402, -13-305; 39-17-1324(a). 

Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment 

for the aggravated burglary; a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for each count of 

aggravated robbery; a concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for each count of 

especially aggravated kidnapping; and a three-year term of imprisonment for the 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to be served 

consecutively to the aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The 

concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated robbery convictions was 

ordered to be served consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for 

the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty years’

imprisonment.1 On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding each of his convictions arguing that (1) the State failed to establish his identity 

as the perpetrator of the offense; and (2) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions 

were merely incidental to the aggravated robberies in violation of State v. White, 362 

S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The Defendant also appeals the order of consecutive sentencing, 

arguing that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in classifying him as a 

dangerous offender and that the trial court failed to apply certain mitigating factors. Upon 

review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

 

1 The trial court expressly noted during the sentencing hearing and in the relevant judgment forms 

that the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction was aligned 

consecutively only to the aggravated burglary conviction and that this eight-year term of imprisonment was 

to be served concurrently to the remaining sentences.

09/17/2020
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CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS, P.J., and ALAN E. GLENN, J., joined.

George Morton Googe, District Public Defender, and Jeremy B. Epperson, Assistant Public 

Defender, for the Defendant-Appellant, Devonta Kevon Curry.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine K. Decker, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jody Pickens, District Attorney General; and Eric Wood, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Around 10:15 on the night of December 27, 2017, Shirley Wallace, the homeowner 

victim, came home to find a stranger, later identified as the Defendant, in her house, 

pointing a handgun at her face. The Defendant threatened to kill Wallace2if she did not 

give him her money; however, Wallace only had her debit card. The Defendant then 

ordered Wallace “to go into the other room” or he would kill her. Wallace did not know 

to which room he referred, but the Defendant directed her through the breakfast area and 

down the hall. He stopped her at the family game room, where Wallace observed her 

teenage granddaughter’s backpack in a chair. The Defendant emptied the backpack and 

ordered Wallace to fill it with things from the room including an Xbox, a PlayStation 

gaming system, cords, and other video games. As Wallace attempted to comply, she was 

“kind of close” to the Defendant and said, “I’m praying for you, and please don’t kill me

because I have a granddaughter to raise.” At this point, Wallace’s teenage granddaughter, 

MT, and her male, teenage friend, JH, entered the room. The Defendant pointed the gun 

at them and demanded that they remove their clothing and stay in the room. When the

Defendant finished taking their belongings, the Defendant ordered the victims to go into 

the laundry room near the garage and remain there with their hands up until he left. The 

Defendant demanded Wallace’s car keys, and when she could not find them, the male 

teenage victim gave the Defendant the keys to his car, which he had left running outside. 

The Defendant told the victims, “if they closed the [garage] door before he left, he would 

shoot through the door and kill them.” The Defendant took Wallace’s cellular phone, the 

female teenage victim’s video games, and fled the scene in the male teenage victim’s car. 

MT called the police shortly after the Defendant left and reported the robbery.

 

2 We acknowledge that we do not use titles when referring to every witness. We intend no 

disrespect in doing so. Judge John Everett Williams believes that referring to witnesses without proper

titles is disrespectful even though none is intended. He would prefer that every adult witness be referred to 

as Mr. or Mrs. or by his or her proper title.
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The next day, Officer Pinion of the Jackson Police Department (JPD) observed a 

car being driven without taillights, and as he read the tag to dispatch, he realized it was the

same car that had been reported stolen from the Wallace home invasion robbery the night 

before. The dash cam video in Officer Pinion’s vehicle, admitted as an exhibit at trial,

recorded his encounter with the Defendant. Officer Pinion narrated the video for the jury 

at trial and explained that when he signaled for the Defendant to stop the car, the Defendant 

refused and led officers on an extensive high-speed chase. The Defendant eventually drove 

to a dead-end neighborhood where two passengers in the car got out and fled on foot. 

Officer Pinion then initiated his body cam recorder, which was also admitted as an exhibit 

and narrated for the jury.3 Officer Pinion explained that the Defendant rammed a police 

car and appeared to have been stuck. However, as Officer Pinion approached the 

Defendant’s car on foot, the Defendant put his head under the dashboard of the car and 

accelerated toward Officer Pinion. Officer Pinion feared for his life, pulled his firearm,

and shot at the Defendant’s car several times. The Defendant drove past Officer Pinion, 

narrowly missing him. 

JPD Officer Terry Troutt apprehended the Defendant minutes later at a residence a 

few hundred yards away from the shooting. As Officer Troutt approached the Defendant 

on foot, the Defendant was knocking on a door to another home and told Officer Troutt he 

had been shot twice. Officer Troutt ordered him to lay on the ground until backup units 

arrived. A photograph of the Defendant on the ground was admitted into evidence at trial. 

Upon searching JH’s car, officers recovered a stolen, black handgun from the driver’s seat, 

a photograph of which was admitted at trial. Officer Troutt agreed that he did not observe 

the Defendant in the male teenage victim’s car and he did not see who placed the gun on 

the driver’s seat. 

Each victim positively identified the Defendant in a police photographic line-up and 

at trial. They also testified that the weapon used during the robbery was a black handgun. 

On December 29, 2017, Wallace was shown a photographic line-up arranged by the police, 

but she was unable to definitively identify anyone. However, when officers showed 

Wallace larger, “blown-up” versions of the same photographs, Wallace identified the 

Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. The photographic line-up as originally shown 

to Wallace and the larger versions of the same photographs were admitted as exhibits at 

trial. At the close of her testimony, she emphasized that she was certain the Defendant was 

the person who robbed her. Wallace recovered her cellphone following the Defendant’s 

arrest.

The female teenage victim testified that she was within five feet of the Defendant 

during the robbery and was able to see his face clearly. On January 2, 2018, she was shown 

 

3 The record on appeal does not include the dash cam video or the body cam video.
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a photographic line-up by the police and within “one minute” positively identified the 

Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. She testified at trial that she was “absolutely 

certain” that the Defendant was the perpetrator. She agreed that she participated in the 

photographic line-up after her grandmother had done so and that she had spoken to her 

grandmother in the intervening time. Asked further on cross-examination if she considered 

being unable to leave the house as part of the robbery process, she agreed. On re-direct 

examination, she clarified that there was “another level of fear” added to the robbery when 

the Defendant ordered her to take off her clothes. 

On December 29, 2017, the male teenage victim was shown a photographic line-up,

and he too was unable to identify anyone until the photographs were enlarged. The 

photographic line-up upon which the male victim identified the Defendant as the 

perpetrator of the offense was admitted as an exhibit at trial. The male teenage victim

testified that he felt an additional level of fear above what he would have felt in a simple 

robbery when the Defendant forced him to remove his clothes. On cross-examination, he 

conceded that he would not have felt free to leave the house, even if he still had his clothes 

on. He did not recover his car after the Defendant’s arrest because it was “completely 

totaled” and riddled with bullets. His wallet containing his identification and credit cards, 

which was inside the car at the time of the offense, was recovered and returned to him by 

the police. 

Sergeant Michael Thomas of the Jackson Police Department testified and explained 

the photographic line-up process that was conducted in this case. He said that the victims 

were shown the same set of photographs; however, the photographs were never arranged 

in the same order. He also testified that the male teenager’s cellular phone, which was 

thrown from his car window by the perpetrator during the offense, was analyzed for 

fingerprints; however, none were found. The male teen victim’s wallet was recovered near 

Medina High School on January 1, 2018, by a teacher, and turned over to the police. JPD 

Officer Chris Chestnut testified that he was present during each victims’ photographic lineup identification. The victims were in separate rooms during the process, and the 

photographs were arranged in a different order for each victim.

The Defendant did not offer any proof at trial. The record shows the trial court 

properly instructed the jury, consistently with State v. White. 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 

2012). Following deliberations, the jury convicted the Defendant as charged of aggravated 

burglary (count one), aggravated robbery (counts two, five, and six), especially aggravated 

kidnapping (counts three and four), and possession of a firearm during the commission of 

a dangerous felony (count seven). A sentencing hearing was conducted on February 14, 

2019. The only proof offered by the State was the presentence report. The record does not 

show any objections filed by the defense to the report. However, during the hearing, 

defense counsel noted that the Defendant did not agree to one of the juvenile adjudications 
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listed in the report; specifically, an aggravated burglary amended to theft on December 29, 

2015. The State did not object to excluding that adjudication from consideration in 

sentencing by the trial court. The presentence report as modified was admitted as an exhibit 

to the hearing. The trial court noted the applicable sentencing range for each of the 

offenses, and the parties agreed to the Defendant’s classification as a Range I, standard 

offender.

The pre-sentence report showed that the Defendant, age seventeen at the time of the 

offenses at issue, had been raised primarily by his mother, who had recently passed away. 

The Defendant also self-reported that he had previously lived with his father, but he left 

because he did not get along with his father’s wife. The Defendant had a good relationship 

with his brother and sister and had worked sporadically at a local tree company, a painting 

company, and a cleaning business. The report listed conflicting information regarding the 

Defendant’s education. He reported to the juvenile authorities that he last attended school 

in Nashville in 2016; however, in this report he advised that he attended a technical school 

in Jackson, Tennessee, and dropped out only after the instant arrest. The Defendant selfreported that he had been suspended “numerous times,” sent to alternative schools, and 

committed to three different youth development centers. The Defendant did not have any 

adult convictions; however, the report listed separate, pending charges of evading arrest 

with risk of death or injury, aggravated assault, and theft, stemming from the Defendant’s 

encounter with Officer Pinion. The report further showed that the Defendant had his first 

court appearance at age twelve, and it contained fourteen juvenile court adjudications 

including unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of property, disrupting meeting, criminal 

impersonation, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and a prior violation of probation

from 2013. The presentence report also contained victim impact statements from Wallace 

and her granddaughter, both of whom expressed lasting trauma from the home invasion 

robbery.4 

The trial court increased the Defendant’s sentence from the minimum in the 

applicable range because the Defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or 

criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range; the 

Defendant, before trial or sentencing, failed to comply with the conditions of 

a sentence involving release into the community; and the Defendant had no hesitation 

about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 

40-35-114(1), (8), (10). The trial court considered the Defendant’s prior juvenile 

adjudications and the instant offenses of conviction to support application of enhancement 

factor one. The court further noted the Defendant’s juvenile history report reflected “at 

least two incidences. . . that were violations of parole;” however, it gave only slight weight 

 

4 A victim impact statement of the male teen victim’s mother was also included in the report; 

however, the parties agreed not to consider it in sentencing.
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to enhancement factor eight. The trial court declined to apply factor three, that the offense 

involved more than one victim, and further declined to mitigate the Defendant’s sentence

because of his youth or lack of substantial judgment in committing the offense. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-113 (6). The court noted there was simply no evidence in support of factor 

six. The trial court expressly weighed the “catchall” mitigating factor and the fact that the 

victims were released alive against the other enhancement factors and determined that the 

Defendant was not entitled to a mitigated sentence.

The trial court imposed a sentence of five-years’ imprisonment for the aggravated 

burglary; a concurrent term of ten-years’ imprisonment for each count of aggravated 

robbery; a concurrent term of twenty-years’ imprisonment for each count of especially 

aggravated kidnapping; and three-years’ imprisonment for the possession of a firearm 

during the commission of a dangerous felony, to be served consecutively to the aggravated 

burglary as required by statute. In determining consecutive sentencing, the trial court noted 

that the Defendant had a juvenile record of extensive criminal activity, and that the 

Defendant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human 

life and had no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) (2), (4). The trial court expressly noted consecutive 

sentencing was appropriate because the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 

offenses were aggravated and the aggregate length of the sentence reasonably related to the 

offenses for which the Defendant was convicted. The trial court then ordered the 

concurrent ten-year sentence for the aggravated robbery convictions to be served 

consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated 

kidnapping convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. 

The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by a written order 

on April 12, 2019. A timely notice of appeal was filed on April 18, 2019, and this case is 

now properly before this court for review. 

ANALYSIS

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to each of his convictions, the 

Defendant contends that the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the 

offense. The Defendant additionally argues that the State failed to establish that the 

especially aggravated kidnappings offenses were not incidental to the aggravated robbery 

offenses. In response, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support each 

of the Defendant’s convictions. We agree with the State. 

“Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a 

presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that 

the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 
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S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)). 

“Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting evidence must determine 

‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). When this 

Court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled to the 

strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. 

Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 

691 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998). The standard of review 

for sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct 

or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) 

(quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact 

must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ 

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 

335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). 

Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and the 

inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury. 

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). 

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court “neither re-weighs the 

evidence nor substitutes its inferences for those drawn by the jury.” Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 

at 297 (citing State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)). 

“The identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime.” State v. Rice, 

184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 

1975)). The State has the burden of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tenn. 1998). The 

identity of the defendant as the perpetrator may be established by direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d at 793. “The 

credible testimony of one identification witness is sufficient to support a conviction if the 

witness viewed the accused under such circumstances as would permit a positive 

identification to be made.” State v. Radley, 29 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) 

(citing State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). The 

identification of the defendant as the perpetrator is a question of fact for the jury after 

considering all the relevant proof. State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005) 

(citing Strickland, 885 S.W.2d at 87). 
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In this case, each victim identified the Defendant in a photographic line-up and at 

trial. Although Wallace and the male teen victim were unable to definitively identify 

anyone from their initial smaller photographic line-up, each victim was certain of their 

identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator once the photographs were enlarged. 

Moreover, the female teen victim identified the Defendant within a minute of viewing the 

photographic line-up. At trial, each victim was certain of their in-person identification of 

the Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. The Defendant is not entitled to relief as 

to this issue.

 Next, the Defendant briefly argues that the State failed to prove that “the especially 

aggravated kidnappings were not incidental to the aggravated robberies” because the 

teenage victims testified that they did not feel free to leave despite the Defendant’s order 

for them to remove their clothing. Citing State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), 

the Defendant essentially argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions 

of especially aggravated kidnapping because the State failed to prove that the confinement

or removal of the victims was greater than necessary to commit the offenses of aggravated 

robbery.

To sustain the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, the State was 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly removed or 

confined the victims so as to interfere substantially with the victim’s liberty and that 

the removal or confinement was accomplished with a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. §§ 39-13-302(a)(1), -305(a)(1). “When jurors are called upon to determine whether 

the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of kidnapping, aggravated 

kidnapping, or especially aggravated kidnapping, trial courts should specifically require a 

determination of whether the removal or confinement is, in essence, incidental to the 

accompanying felony or, in the alternative, is significant enough, standing alone, to support 

a conviction.” White, 362 S.W.3d at 578. The Court in White set forth the following jury 

instruction, which has since become part of the pattern jury instructions, and which the trial 

court used in regard to the especially aggravated kidnapping of the male and female 

teenagers in this case:

To establish whether the defendant’s removal or confinement of 

the victim constituted a substantial interference with his or her liberty, 

the State must prove that the removal or confinement was to a greater degree 

than that necessary to commit the offense of [insert offense], which is the 

other offense charged in this case. In making this determination, you may 

consider all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including, but 

not limited to, the following factors:
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—the nature and duration of the victim’s removal or confinement by the 

defendant;

—whether the removal or confinement occurred during the commission of 

the separate offense;

—whether the interference with the victim’s liberty was inherent in the 

nature of the separate offense;

—whether the removal or confinement prevented the victim from 

summoning assistance, although the defendant need not have succeeded in 

preventing the victim from doing so;

—whether the removal or confinement reduced the defendant’s risk of 

detection, although the defendant need not have succeeded in this objective; 

and

—whether the removal or confinement created a significant danger or 

increased the victim’s risk of harm independent of that posed by the separate 

offense.

Id. at 580-81 (footnote omitted).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping. 

When the homeowner victim was unable to provide the Defendant with any money, he 

ordered her to the game room of her home and demanded that she fill the backpack with 

gaming items. As Wallace attempted to do so, the two teenage victims entered the room. 

The Defendant ordered the two teenage victims to remove their clothing and to remain in 

the game room with their hands up. After the Defendant had filled the backpack with the 

victims’ property, the Defendant forced the unclothed victims to follow him to the laundry 

room and ordered them to stay in the room until he had left. While the victims may have 

subjectively felt no more confined than they would have in a “normal robbery,” the jury 

could have reasonably inferred that the purpose of forcing the victims to disrobe was to 

prevent their summoning assistance or for the purpose of deterring any attempt to thwart 

the robbery. Accordingly, the removal or confinement of the victims was to a greater 

degree than that necessary to commit the offense of the aggravated robbery, and the 

Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

The Defendant also challenges aspects of his sentence. Specifically, the Defendant 

argues the trial court failed to consider Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-305(b)(2), 

which provides that “[i]f the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive . . . , such actions 

shall be considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.” To the 

extent the Defendant suggests that the trial court was required to reduce his sentence based 

on the language of the statute, we disagree. The record shows that the trial court properly

considered this mitigating factor in sentencing and found that it was outweighed by the 
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other enhancement factors submitted the State. The Defendant also argues, and the State 

concedes, that in ordering partial consecutive sentencing the trial court failed to make the 

necessary “dangerous offender” findings required under State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 

933, 939 (Tenn. 1995). Nevertheless, the State maintains that the order of consecutive 

sentencing was supported by the trial court’s determination that the Defendant had an 

extensive record of criminal activity. We agree with the State.

Where a defendant is convicted of one or more offenses, the trial court has discretion 

to decide whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-115(a) (2006). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held, “[T]he abuse of 

discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness, applies to 

consecutive sentencing determinations.” State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 

2013). As relevant here, a trial court may order multiple offenses to be served 

consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is an offender 

whose record of criminal activity is extensive. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b). An order 

of consecutive sentencing must also be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the 

offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1); see State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 

2002). In addition, the length of a consecutive sentence must be “no greater than that 

deserved for the offense committed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2); see Imfeld, 70 

S.W.3d at 708.

The record shows that, at age twelve, the Defendant began to amass a series of 

juvenile court adjudications including unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of property, 

disrupting meeting, criminal impersonation, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and 

a prior violation of probation. This Court has held that “an extensive criminal history, 

standing alone, is enough to justify the imposition of consecutive sentencing.” State v. 

Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (citing State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 

224, 231 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)). Accordingly, imposition of consecutive sentencing 

was proper, and the Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above authority and analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

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 CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE