1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1168

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Sheila Hamilton, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Standard Insurance Company, *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: October 19, 2007

Filed: February 27, 2008

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Before BYE, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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BYE, Circuit Judge.

Based upon and relying on a suicide exclusion clause, Standard Insurance

Company reduced the amount of death benefits paid to Sheila Hamilton under a group

insurance policy providing coverage for her deceased husband. Hamilton sued

Standard in federal district court contending a Missouri statute barring suicide

defenses for insurance policies issued to citizens of the state of Missouri should

apply. The district court1

 concluded the Missouri statute did not apply because the

policy was issued to a non-Missouri citizen in Idaho, and granted summary judgment
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in favor of Standard. Hamilton v. Standard Ins. Co., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036-38

(W.D. Mo. 2006). We affirm.

I

At all relevant times herein, Albertsons, Inc., provided its eligible employees

with life insurance benefits pursuant to an employee benefit plan governed by the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-

1461. As to benefits under the plan, Albertsons purchased a group life insurance

policy from Standard. The front page of the policy indicates it was issued in Idaho

(Albertsons is headquartered in Boise, Idaho) and lists "Albertsons Employees' Health

and Welfare Trust" as the policyholder. 

Robert Hamilton, Sheila's husband, was an Albertsons employee covered by the

plan at the time of his death on August 1, 2004. Sheila was named as the beneficiary

of Robert's benefits. Robert had basic "Plan 1" life insurance benefits in an amount

equal to twice his annual earnings, or $77,000. Beginning June 1, 2003, Robert

elected additional "Plan 2" life insurance benefits in the amount of $20,000.

Albertsons paid the premiums for the basic life insurance benefits, while Robert paid

for the optional coverage by having the premiums deducted from his paycheck.

Robert's certificate of death indicates he died as the result of a self-inflicted

gunshot wound to the chest. The Standard policy contains a suicide exclusion clause

which provides:

If your death results from suicide or other intentionally self-inflicted

injury, while sane or insane, 1 and 2 below apply.

1. The Plan 1 Life Insurance Benefit payable will be limited to 50%

of the amount of your Plan 1 Life Insurance.
2

The policy's reference to "Prior Plan" referred to the fact that Albertsons had

used a different insurance company to provide life insurance benefits under its

employee benefit plan prior to June 1, 2003. Under the Prior Plan, Robert had

coverage for Plan 1 benefits, but did not have any coverage for Plan 2 benefits.

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2. The Plan 2 Life Insurance Benefit payable will exclude the

amount of your Plan 2 Life Insurance which has not been

continuously in effect for at least 2 years on the date of your

death. In computing the 2-year period, we will include time you

were insured under the Prior Plan.2

Jt. App. 12-13.

After Robert's death, Sheila filed a claim with Standard for $77,000 in basic

Plan 1 benefits, and $20,000 in Plan 2 benefits. Pursuant to the policy's suicide

exclusion clause, Standard paid only $39,000 in basic benefits (half of $77,000

rounded to the next higher multiple of $1,000) and denied the claim for $20,000 in

Plan 2 benefits because Robert did not elect that coverage until June 1, 2003, less than

two years before his death on August 1, 2004. Standard also refunded the premiums

Robert had paid for the Plan 2 benefits between June 2003 and July 2004 (a total of

$27.30).

Sheila filed suit against Standard in federal district court. Standard moved for

summary judgment. Sheila opposed the motion arguing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.620

should be incorporated into the terms of Standard's policy and should bar Standard

from reducing her benefits under the policy's suicide exclusion clause. At the relevant

time, § 376.620 provided: 

In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any

company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be

no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown

to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured
3

Section 376.620 was amended effective August 28, 2007. The statute now

provides:

1. Any life insurance or certificate issued or delivered in this state, may

exclude or restrict liability of death as the result of suicide in the event

the insured, while sane or insane, dies as a result of suicide within one

year from the date of the issue of the policy or certificate. Any such

exclusion or restriction shall be clearly stated in the policy or certificate.

2. Any life insurance policy or certificate which contains any exclusion

or restriction under subsection 1 of this section shall also provide that in

the event the insured dies as a result of suicide within one year from the

date of issue of the policy that the insurer shall promptly refund all

premiums paid for coverage on such insured.

4

This argument was first raised in a motion for reconsideration Sheila filed after

the district court had already granted Standard's summary judgment motion.

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contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy,

and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.620 (2002).3

Although § 376.620 by its terms only applies to "policies of insurance . . .

issued . . . to a citizen of this state" and the Standard group policy was issued to a nonMissouri citizen in Idaho, Sheila argued the statute should still apply because Robert,

a Missouri citizen, was issued an individual certificate of insurance. In addition, with

respect to the optional Plan 2 benefits, Sheila argued the period of time Robert had

Plan 1 benefits under the Prior Plan should be counted towards, and satisfied, the twoyear vesting period. Finally, Sheila belatedly4

 argued § 376.620 should apply to the

Plan 2 benefits, even if it did not apply to the Plan 1 benefits, because Robert paid the

premiums for the optional coverage himself, and therefore such coverage should be

construed as a separate policy of insurance affected by § 376.620.
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The district court granted Standard's motion for summary judgment, concluding

§ 376.620 did not apply because the policy was a group policy issued to a nonMissouri citizen. The district court further concluded Sheila's claim the statute should

apply because Robert Hamilton was a Missouri citizen, and the holder of a certificate

of insurance under the group policy, was foreclosed by our decision in Perkins v.

Philadelphia Life Insurance Co., 755 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1985). Finally, the district

court held Standard did not abuse the discretion it was afforded under ERISA when

it determined the two-year vesting period had not been satisfied for the Plan 2

benefits, and rejected Sheila's belated claim the Plan 2 benefits should be construed

as a separate policy of insurance to which § 376.620 applied. Sheila filed a timely

appeal.

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standards as the district court. Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan,

458 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2006). This case involves the interpretation of a Missouri

statute, an issue we review de novo. McIntyre v. Caspari, 35 F.3d 338, 343 (8th Cir.

1994). This case also involves the interpretation of an insurance policy governed by

ERISA. In such a case, the district court applies an abuse of discretion standard to the

plan's decision if the plan administrator has discretion to interpret the terms of the

plan, Barham v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 441 F.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 2006),

a de novo standard when the plan does not grant its administrator that discretion, id.,

and a sliding scale approach somewhere between abuse of discretion and de novo

when the claimant demonstrates a serious procedural irregularity caused a serious

breach of the administrator's fiduciary duty. Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., 280

F.3d 1192, 1197 (8th Cir. 2002). "We have plenary review over the district court's

determination of the appropriate standard of review to apply to an ERISA plan's denial

of benefits." Barham, 441 F.3d at 584 (citing Tillery, 280 F.3d at 1196).
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On appeal, Sheila contends the district court erred when it determined most of

her arguments regarding the proper interpretation and application of Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 376.620 are foreclosed by our decision in Perkins. We disagree. The policy

involved here is a group insurance policy issued to a non-Missouri citizen in Idaho,

not an individual policy issued to a Missouri citizen. In Perkins, as in this case, a

certificate holder's residency differed from that of the group policy holder; we held it

was the group policyholder's residence which determined whether Mo. Rev. Stat. §

376.620 applied, not the residence of the individual certificate holder. See Perkins,

755 F.2d at 634-35 (indicating § 376.620's "issued . . . to" language refers to the

person to whom the policy is sold, which in the case of a group policy is the group

policyholder, not the holder of an individual certificate of insurance); see also Miller

v. Home Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Mo. 1980) (applying choice-of-law

principles by looking to the state where a group policy was issued to the group

policyholder, not the state where the holder of an individual certificate of insurance

resided, in order to determine whether § 376.620 applied).

In support of her position, Hamilton relies upon two district court decisions,

Nelson v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 359 F.Supp. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1973), and Moss v.

National Life and Accident Co., 385 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Those cases

involve the issue whether Missouri follows the lex loci delicti rule rather than the

most-significant-contacts test for choice-of-law purposes. This case does not turn

upon choice-of-law principles, however, but rather upon an issue of statutory

interpretation, i.e., determining what § 376.620 means when it says it only applies to

policies "issued . . . to a citizen of this state." That issue of statutory construction was

addressed in Perkins, which controls this case.

Furthermore, with respect to the argument that § 376.620 should apply not only

to policies of insurance issued to Missouri citizens, but also to certificates of insurance

issued to Missouri citizens under a group policy issued to a non-Missouri citizen, we

note the amended statute now specifically refers to both "life insurance polic[ies]" and
5

Because we would find this to be a correct interpretation of the suicide

exclusion clause even under a de novo standard of review, we decline to address any

of Sheila's arguments relating to her claim the district court erred in applying an

abuse-of-discretion standard, or her claim she should have been entitled to discovery

to uncover procedural irregularities or conflicts of interest.

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"certificate[s] issued or delivered in this state." See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.620 (1) &

(2) (effective August 28, 2007). Any reference to "certificates" is, however, notably

absent from the version of the statute before us, and we are not at liberty to disturb the

holding in Perkins. See United States v. Reynolds, 116 F.3d 328, 329 (8th Cir. 1997)

("One panel may not overrule another.").

With respect to Standard's denial of $20,000 in Plan 2 benefits, Sheila argues

in the alternative that Standard abused its discretion when it determined the suicide

exclusion clause's two-year vesting period had not been satisfied. Sheila focuses on

the clause's inclusion of "time . . . insured under the Prior Plan" in computing the twoyear period, and argues her husband's coverage for Plan 1 benefits under the Prior

Plan satisfied the two-year period, even though he did not elect any amount of Plan

2 benefits until June 1, 2003, less than two years before his death on August 1, 2004.

Another provision in the clause clearly provides, however, the Plan 2 benefits payable

"will exclude the amount of your Plan 2 Life Insurance which has not been

continuously in effect for at least 2 years on the date of your death." Jt. App. 12-13

(emphasis added). 

Assuming arguendo Robert satisfied the two-year vesting period due to the time

he had Plan 1 benefits under the Prior Plan, the ensuing calculation of the amount of

Plan 2 benefits payable would still result in no benefits being payable, because any

amount of Plan 2 benefits not in effect for at least two years are excluded. The

amount of $20,000 would be excluded because it was not an amount in effect at least

two years prior to Robert's death.5
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Finally, we reject Sheila's contention that, because Robert himself paid the

premiums for the Plan 2 benefits, such coverage should be construed as an entirely

separate contract of insurance between Robert and Standard, rather than a part of the

group policy issued to Albertsons Employees' Health and Welfare Trust (with the

result being that § 376.620 would apply because this separate "policy" was issued to

a Missouri citizen). As the district court noted, Robert's Plan 2 coverage was not a

separately issued policy, but "merely a subset of coverage under the larger plan issued

to Albertsons in Idaho." Addendum at 66. As the group policyholder, Albertsons

could have unilaterally terminated the insuring agreement even if Robert had wished

to continue coverage for Plan 2 benefits.

III

We affirm the district court.

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