COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Powell 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

RAYMONT DANTE ARMSTEAD 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1347-09-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 JULY 27, 2010 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Timothy S. Fisher, Judge 

Charles E. Haden for appellant. 

Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

The trial court found Raymont Dante Armstead guilty of providing false information to a 

law enforcement officer, driving on a suspended operator’s license, possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, Armstead contends the court should 

have suppressed most, if not all, of the incriminating evidence. He also claims the evidence was 

insufficient to support his drug convictions. Finding neither argument persuasive, we affirm. 

I. 

On appeal, we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). This principle 

requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, 

and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair 

inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 

759 (1980) (emphasis and citation omitted). 
In addition, our examination of the record “is not limited to the evidence mentioned by a 

party in trial argument or by the trial court in its ruling.” Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 

144, 147, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). In determining whether there is evidence to sustain a 

conviction, an appellate court must consider “all the evidence” admitted at trial that is contained 

in the record. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 103, 688 S.E.2d 168, 173 (2010) 

(quoting Bolden, 275 Va. at 147, 654 S.E.2d at 586). 

In July 2006, a Newport News police officer made a stop of a vehicle suspected of 

violating a city noise ordinance. Armstead was alone in the vehicle. The officer asked Armstead 

for his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Armstead said he currently held a Virginia 

driver’s license but had no type of documentary identification with him. He provided verbal 

information including a name, birth date, and social security number. The officer checked this 

information on his computer and concluded the information was likely false. 

Armstead then informed the officer he was licensed in Washington D.C. The officer 

checked this information and determined the only driver’s license associated with the name 

given had expired. Believing Armstead again provided false information, the officer informed 

him he was under arrest. 

It was impossible, however, to fill out the arrest paperwork without knowing Armstead’s 

true identity. “If there’s no I.D.,” the officer testified, “there’s no way to verify his identity.” 

Before leaving the scene, the officer decided to search the vehicle. At trial,1

 the officer 

explained: 

Q: And just for the purpose of the record, why was it you that 

[sic] placed him under arrest? 

 1

 “When affirming a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion, we consider facts 

presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial.” Testa v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 

275, 279, 685 S.E.2d 213, 215 (2009). 

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A: I believe he was giving me false information . . . someone 

giving me false information leads me to believe they have 

no intention of appearing in court, and I didn’t feel like I 

could satisfactorily fill out the summons because I didn’t 

believe with the information at the time that the subject 

would appear in court. I elected to take him in front of a 

magistrate. 

Q: Were you ultimately able to determine who he was? 

A: Yes. 

Q: How did you do that? 

A: Searched the vehicle incident to arrest and located a wallet 

with Virginia identification. 

While in the vehicle, the officer observed the remains of a marijuana cigar in an open 

ashtray and two clear plastic bags containing 5.675 grams of crack cocaine in the center console. 

Another officer later seized the drugs and placed them in evidence retention bags. 

After being advised of his Miranda rights, Armstead invoked his right to counsel. The 

officer then placed Armstead in a police vehicle for transport to the local jail. A female walked 

up to the scene claiming the vehicle belonged to her. Based on her statements, the officers 

arrested her. Watching from the police vehicle, Armstead shouted: “It’s mine, it’s mine, 

everything in the car is mine.” The officer testified Armstead “continued constantly to scream 

that from the back of the marked police unit.” 

Prior to trial, Armstead filed a written motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, 

the prosecutor argued the officer had a right to search the vehicle incident to Armstead’s arrest 

under settled law, citing among other cases, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The 

prosecutor focused on the probable cause justifying Armstead’s arrest. Armstead’s counsel 

argued the arrest was pretextual and a mere ruse to search the vehicle. 

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Judge, the argument is that the information he gave came back as a 

valid identity in Washington, D.C. and that merely we have a 

fishing expedition. The officer has some desire to search the 

vehicle and uses that pretext that initially said this or that, and “I 

just suspect that maybe he’s not who he says he is, so I’m not 

going to give him a summons,” kind of on a whim, the argument is 

he’s finding any excuse to search the vehicle, and the search 

should be declared invalid. 

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer had probable cause to 

arrest Armstead. Correctly applying then-current law, the court concluded a valid arrest ipso 

facto authorized the vehicle search. “The issue really is not what happens after the arrest,” the 

court explained, “the issue is the ability to arrest. Clearly, once the arrest is made, somebody can 

search the car.” 

At trial, Armstead testified he never shouted that everything in the vehicle belonged to 

him. He denied any knowledge of the cocaine and said the car belonged to the woman, his 

fiancée. She testified the car was hers, but said nothing about the drugs. On cross-examination, 

Armstead and his fiancée admitted they were convicted felons. 

Sitting as factfinder, the trial court rejected Armstead’s testimony and found him guilty of 

providing false identity information to a law enforcement officer in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-186.3, driving on a suspended or revoked operator’s license (second or subsequent 

offense) in violation of Code § 46.2-301, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 

Code § 18.2-248, and possession of marijuana in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1. The court 

entered final conviction and sentencing orders on May 1, 2009. 

Armstead filed a notice of appeal and, on July 13, 2009, moved the court to authorize bail 

pending appeal. At the bail hearing, Armstead’s counsel argued for the first time the search of 

the vehicle violated the rule recently adopted by Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). The 

trial court denied the request for bail pending appeal. 

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II. 

 A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS — ARIZONA v. GANT

On appeal, Armstead argues the trial court violated the rule recently announced in 

Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), when it refused to grant the motion to suppress. He 

contends we should apply Gant retroactively and doing so would necessarily require the 

application of the exclusionary rule to his case. We do not address the exclusionary rule issue2

because “the best and narrowest ground available” for decision, Kirby v. Commonwealth, 50 

Va. App. 691, 698 n.2, 653 S.E.2d 600, 603 n.2 (2007) (citation omitted), is the first premise of 

Armstead’s argument — that the trial court’s decision is inconsistent with Gant.

3

 We do not 

believe it is. 

Prior to Gant, many courts (including Virginia’s appellate courts) understood New York 

v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), to permit wholly suspicionless searches of vehicles after a valid 

arrest of a recent occupant. See Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 137 (1999); 

Cason v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 728, 530 S.E.2d 920 (2000); White v. Commonwealth, 24 

Va. App. 446, 482 S.E.2d 876 (1997). Gant rejected this broad view of Belton and limited 

vehicular searches incident to arrest to situations where (i) an unsecured arrestee is within reach 

of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, or (ii) it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant 

to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted) 

 2 See generally United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010); United 

States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009); State v. Riley, 225 P.3d 462, 465-66 

(Wash. 2010). Cf. Smith v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 30, 51, 683 S.E.2d 316, 327 (2009) 

(commenting in dicta on the absence of any mention in Gant of the good-faith exception but 

failing to note that Gant affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Belton and that no 

litigant in Gant raised the issue of good-faith immunity). 

3

 The Commonwealth contends Armstead failed to preserve the Gant issue for appeal 

under Rule 5A:18. We assume without deciding the issue has been properly preserved. 

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(emphasis added). In this respect, Gant addressed only the “circumstances unique to the vehicle 

context” arising out of a “search incident to a lawful arrest” of a recent occupant. Id.4

Here, the officer testified he believed Armstead “was giving me false information” 

concerning his identity and the status of his driver’s license. The officer’s belief was justified. 

Armstead initially claimed to possess a valid Virginia license and provided verbal information 

including a name, birth date, and social security number — which proved to be false. Armstead 

then, claiming the same identity, said he had a valid D.C. license. That, too, proved to be 

inaccurate. Throughout the encounter, Armstead insisted he had no documentation of his 

identity. These circumstances established probable cause to arrest Armstead for violating Code 

§ 18.2-186.3, which prohibits the use of false identity information to avoid summons, arrest, or 

prosecution, or to impede a criminal investigation.5

The power to arrest Armstead for providing false identity information under Code 

§18.2-186.3 authorized the officer to search the vehicle because it was “reasonable to believe” 

the vehicle “might” contain evidence of that crime, Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted), 

specifically Armstead’s true identity and his driving status. See State v. Gordon, 821 P.2d 442, 

443-44 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (“Evidence of defendant’s identity was relevant to the crime of 

giving false information to an officer. Accordingly, the search of defendant’s vehicle for 

 4 Gant left untouched a variety of “[o]ther established exceptions to the warrant 

requirement” which authorize vehicle searches “under additional circumstances when safety or 

evidentiary concerns demand.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721. Among the most prominent other

exceptions is the so-called automobile exception: “If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle 

contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 (1982), 

authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” Gant, 129 

S. Ct. at 1721; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999). This authority to 

search need not be incident to arrest or in any way related to a recent occupant. 

5 See Code § 19.2-74(A) (providing, in certain misdemeanor cases, that “the arresting 

officer shall take the name and address of such person” and release the person, when appropriate, 

only after he verifies in writing “his written promise to appear” in court at the specified time and 

place). 

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evidence of identification was proper as a search incident to arrest.”). The belief that such 

information might be in the vehicle is particularly reasonable where, as in Virginia, a vehicle 

operator must always have with him a driver’s license and vehicle registration card. See Code 

§ 46.2-104. 

Gant fully supports this reasoning by citing with approval State v. Fesler, 685 P.2d 1014, 

1017 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), as an example of a case correctly applying the narrow view of Belton. 

See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 n.8. Like our case, Fesler involved a driver arrested for driving 

without a valid license who gave false identification information to an officer. Fesler held a 

search of the driver’s vehicle, while the driver was locked in the back of the police cruiser, was 

valid because the “officer had probable cause to arrest defendant and charge him with driving 

while suspended and giving a false name.” Fesler, 685 P.2d at 1017. The vehicle search related 

“to the offense for which defendant was arrested in two ways: it would further serve to identify 

defendant and, because defendant’s knowledge he was suspended may be a pertinent 

consideration in such cases, it would further tend to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt if 

the wallet had been hidden.” Id.6

It makes no difference that the officer who arrested Armstead did not sequence his 

thinking in the order of these cascading legal principles. The offense establishing probable cause 

need not “be ‘closely related’ to, and based on the same conduct as,” the offense identified by the 

officer at the time of the defendant’s arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004); see

also Jordan v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 591, 596, 151 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1966). “Subjective 

 6 See also In re Arturo D., 38 P.3d 433, 451 (Cal. 2002) (holding that because the officer 

“was preparing to issue a traffic citation and therefore needed to learn the true identity of the 

person to be cited,” it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to search areas within a 

vehicle where identifying documentation might be expected to be found); accord United States v. 

Colclough, 549 F.2d 937, 940 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding a vehicle search “in an effort to secure 

evidence of the defendants’ identity” was valid). 

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intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 37, 639 

S.E.2d 217, 223 (2007) (holding an officer’s “subjective motivation is irrelevant” (citation 

omitted)). An officer’s “action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the 

individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] 

action.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (emphasis in original and citations 

omitted).7

In short, the officer had probable cause to arrest Armstead for providing false identity 

information in violation of Code § 18.2-186.3. It was “reasonable to believe” that Armstead’s 

vehicle “might” contain evidence of that crime. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted). 

During the officer’s valid search for evidence of Armstead’s identity, he also discovered 

marijuana in the open ashtray and cocaine in the center console. Under these circumstances, we 

hold the trial court’s denial of Armstead’s motion to suppress is not inconsistent with Gant. 

 B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Under settled principles, we review a trial court’s factfinding “with the highest degree of 

appellate deference.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 605, 608, 633 S.E.2d 229, 231 

(2006). An appellate court does not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial 

 7

 Thus, faced with a suppression motion, a court should not limit itself “to what the 

stopping officer says or to evidence of his subjective rationale,” Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 

Va. App. 577, 583 n.2, 652 S.E.2d 144, 148 n.2 (2007) (en banc) (citation omitted), but should 

look instead to what a reasonable, objective officer could have concluded from the totality of the 

circumstances. “Just as a subjective belief by the arresting officer would not establish probable 

cause where none existed, a subjective belief by the arresting officer cannot destroy probable 

cause where it exists.” United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 1991); cf. Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 665, 673, 691 S.E.2d 801, 805 (2010) (holding an “officer’s subjective 

characterization of observed conduct is not relevant to a court’s analysis concerning whether 

there is a reasonable suspicion because the Court’s review of whether there was reasonable 

suspicion involves application of an objective rather than a subjective standard” (citation 

omitted)). 

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established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 

677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)) 

(emphasis in original). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citation omitted 

and emphasis in original). 

In this case, Armstead contends no rational factfinder could conclude the evidence 

proved he possessed either the cocaine or the marijuana found in the vehicle. We disagree. 

Constructive possession of drugs can be shown by “acts, statements, or conduct of the 

accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the accused was aware of both 

the presence and character of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control.” 

Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 6, 602 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2004) (citation omitted). As 

has been often said, “in drug cases no less than any other, it ‘is axiomatic that any fact that can 

be proved by direct evidence may be proved by circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting Etherton 

v. Doe, 268 Va. 209, 212-13, 597 S.E.2d 87, 89 (2004)). Under such circumstances, the “Court 

must consider the totality of the circumstances established by the evidence.” Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 723, 735, 594 S.E.2d 305, 311 (2004) (citation omitted). 

Consequently, “occupancy of a vehicle . . . where illicit drugs are found is a circumstance 

that may be considered” with other evidence to show constructive possession. Burchette v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 435, 425 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1992). “Furthermore, proof that a 

person is in close proximity to contraband is a relevant fact” that may also be taken into account 

by the factfinder. Id.; see also Dodd v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 301, 308, 649 S.E.2d 222, 

225 (2007). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the ‘combined force of many 

concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind 

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irresistibly to a conclusion.’” Harper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 517, 521-22, 642 S.E.2d 

779, 781 (2007) (citation omitted). 

Here, the cocaine and marijuana were found in the front passenger compartment of a 

vehicle occupied solely by Armstead. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 489, 493, 

364 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1988) (“[defendant] was within arm’s reach of the cocaine” (emphasis in 

original)). The marijuana cigar was in plain view in an open ashtray. See Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 421 S.E.2d 877, 883 (1992) (en banc) (taking into account 

the open visibility of the drugs found “on the dashboard in plain view”).8 While seated in the 

police vehicle, Armstead emphatically shouted that everything in the vehicle belonged to him. 

The timing and emphasis of his shouting, a factfinder could reasonably infer, suggests Armstead 

was motivated by a desire (albeit both spontaneous and short-lived) to exculpate his fiancée from 

any inference the drugs belonged to her. 

Even though Armstead denied his earlier statements to the officer that the contents found 

within the car belonged to him, the trial court, sitting as factfinder, was at liberty to discount 

Armstead’s self-serving statements as little more than lying to “conceal his guilt,” Coleman v. 

Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25, 660 S.E.2d 687, 690 (2008) (citation omitted), and could 

treat such prevarications as “affirmative evidence of guilt,” id. (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 

277, 296 (1992)). This principle naturally follows from the broader observation that “whenever 

a witness testifies, his or her credibility becomes an issue.” Hughes v. Commonwealth, 39 

Va. App. 448, 462, 573 S.E.2d 324, 330 (2002) (citation omitted). 

 8 See also Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 451, 281 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1981) 

(taking into account that the drugs were “visible” to the defendant); Womack v. Commonwealth, 

220 Va. 5, 8, 255 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1979) (finding constructive possession, in part, based upon 

the “visibility of the drugs”); Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 9-10, 602 S.E.2d at 406 (noting the bag of 

cocaine “was in plain view”). 

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For these reasons, ample evidence supports the rationality of Armstead’s convictions for 

possessing both the marijuana and cocaine found in the vehicle.9

III. 

Because the trial court did not err by denying Armstead’s motion to suppress or by 

finding him guilty as charged, we affirm his convictions. 

 Affirmed and remanded.10

 9

 Because Armstead does not challenge the intent-to-distribute element of the offense, we 

do not address the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. 

10 The final sentencing order appears to contain a clerical error. It states the trial court 

convicted Armstead of distribution of cocaine. See App. 82. The indictment, arraignment, 

arguments at trial, and conviction order all identify the charge as possession of cocaine with 

intent to distribute. We remand the case to the trial court to address and, if appropriate, to 

remedy this apparent clerical error. See Code § 8.01-428(B).