## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

O F T E X A S

N O

. P D

- 1 8 0 1

- 1 0

E X P A R T E M I G U E L M A R T I N E Z

, A p p l i c a n t

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E E I G H T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

E L P A S O C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

, J

. , f

i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h P R IC E

, J

. , j o i n e d

.

I a g r e e t h a t d i s m i s s i n g a p p e l l a n t ’ s a p p e a l i s “ w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o h i s a b i l i t y t o f i l e

f u t u r e 1 1

. 0 7 2 w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n s i n t h i s m a t t e r

. ” I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y b e c a u s e t h e s o l u t i o n t o 1

a p p e l l a n t ’ s l e g i t i m a t e d i l e m m a i s n o t i n t u i t i v e l y o b v i o u s

. T h e s o l u t i o n i s t h i s : H e m a y f i l e

a s u b s e q u e n t w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7 2 a l l e g i n g t h e d u e

- p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n

– t h e

d e p r i v a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o a p p e a l

– t h a t h a d n o t y e t o c c u r r e d a t t h e t i m e t h a t h e f i l e d h i s

o r i g i n a l w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n

, a n d r e q u e s t r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h i s o r i g i n a l w r i t t o r e m e d y t h a t

s e c o n d p u r p o r t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r

. T h i s i s a k i n t o o u r A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7 w r i t p r o c e s s o f

Op. at 2. 1Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 2

g r a n t i n g a n o u t

- o f

- t i m e a p p e a l w h e n e i t h e r t h e a p p e l l a t e a t t o r n e y f a i l s t o p r o p e r l y f

i l e a

n o t i c e o f a p p e a l o r t h e r e i s a “ b r e a k d o w n i n t h e s y s t e m ” t h a t p r e v e n t s t h e f i l i n g o f a p r o p e r 2

n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

. 3

I

.

I n 2 0 0 3

, a p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h p o s s e s s i o n o f c o c a i n e

. H e p l e d g u i l t y t o a C l a s s

A m i s d e m e a n o r a n d w a s p l a c e d o n c o m m u n i t y s u p e r v i s i o n f o r t w o y e a r s

. H e s u c c e s s f u l l y

c o m p l e t e d h i s c o m m u n i t y s u p e r v i s i o n a n d o b t a i n e d e a r l y r e l e a s e i n 2 0 0 4

. O n M a y 2 5

, 2 0 1 0

,

a p p e l l a n t f

i l e d a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e 1 1

. 0 7 2

, a l l e g i n g t h a t h i s p l e a w a s 4

i n v o l u n t a r y b e c a u s e h i s t r i a l a t t o r n e y h a d n o t a d v i s e d h i m t h a t h i s p l e a w o u l d r e s u l t i n

See, e .g., Ex parte Smith , No. AP-76579, 2011 WL 2420314, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. 2

J une 15, 2011) ( g ranting habea s relief and per mitti ng out-of-time a

ppeal whe n trial counsel wa s

ineffe ctive for

failing to file timely

notice of a

ppeal) ; Ex parte Foster , No. AP-76467, 2011 WL

2420330, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. J une 15, 2011) ( same); Ex parte Ric hardson , No AP-76546,

2011 WL 2420330, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. May 11, 2011) (sa me) (a ll not designa ted for

publication).

See E x parte Riley , 193 S.W .3d 900, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (g ranting , via writ 3

application under

11.07, rig ht to file an out-of- time PDR because of a “br eakdow n in the sy stem”

in which def

endant’ s attorney

did not rece ive timely

notice of de cision issued by court of

appea ls); see, e .g., the following unpublished opinions: Ex parte Brown , No. AP-76577, 2011

WL 2420340, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. J une 15, 2011) ( g ranting relief under A rticle 11.07 a

nd

allowing for out-of

-time appe al when de fenda nt’s notice of a

ppeal wa s untimely

beca use of a

“bre akdown in the sy stem, rather than def icient per formanc e on the pa rt of trial or a

ppellate

counsel” ); Ex parte Lace

y , No. AP-76540 & AP-76541, 2011 WL 1734253, at *1 (Te x . Crim.

App. May

4, 2011) (g ranting relief

under A rticle 11.07 a

nd permitting out-of

-time appe al

beca use of a “bre akdown in the sy stem”; “a lthough notice s of appe al wer e sig ned and pr esente d

to the court c lerk by

counsel, the notice s were misplaced by the cour t clerk a nd not timely

filed”) ;

Ex parte M

edellin , No. AP-76475, 2011 WL 198691, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. J an. 12, 2011)

(g ranting relief

under A rticle 11.07 a

nd permitting out-of

-time appe al bec ause of

a “br eakdow n

in the sy stem” in which notice of appe al was not timely filed): Ex parte Gaspe r , No. AP-76313

& A P-76314, 2011 WL 975318, at *1 (Te x . Crim. App. March 17, 2010) (same)

.

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 11.072. 4Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 3

d e p o r t a t i o n

. T h e S t a t e f i l e d i t s a n s w e r o n J u n e 7

, a l o n g w i t h a p r o p o s e d o r d e r

. T h e t r i a l 5

j u d g e s i g n e d t h e S t a t e ’ s o r d e r o n J u n e 1 1

, b u t s h e i n a d v e r t e n t l y p l a c e d t h e s i g n e d o r d e r i n

t h e f i l e u n d e r s o m e o t h e r p a p e r s o n h e r d e s k

. A n d t h e r e i t s a t a s t h e a p p e l l a t e c l o c k s i l e n t l y

t i c k e d a w a y

.

A p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l m a d e s e v e r a l i n q u i r i e s a b o u t t h e s t a t u s o f t h e w r i t : o n J u n e 1 7

,

h e f a x e d a l e t t e r t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e q u e s t i n g a s t a t u s h e a r i n g

. O n J u n e 3 0

, h e f i l e d a d d i t i o n a l 6

a f f i d a v i t s i n s u p p o r t o f h i s r e q u e s t e d r e l i e f

. N e i t h e r t h e S t a t e n o r a p p e l l a n t k n e w t h a t t h e 7

t r i a l j u d g e h a d s i g n e d t h e o r d e r u n t i l J u l y 1 9

, w h e n t h e c o u r t c o o r d i n a t o r w e n t t h r o u g h t h e

f i l e s o n t h e j u d g e ’ s d e s k a n d f o u n d t h e m i s s i n g o r d e r

. A p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r

b y m a i l o n J u l y 2 1

. B y t h e n

, t h e t h i r t y

- d a y w i n d o w t o f i l e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l h a d l o n g e x p i r e d

,

e v e n t h o u g h a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l d i d n o t k n o w

, a n d c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y k n o w

, t h a t t h e o r d e r

h a d b e e n s i g n e d o v e r a m o n t h e a r l i e r

.

T h e v e r y n e x t d a y

, J u l y 2 2

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l s e n t t h e t r i a l j u d g e a l e t t e r r e q u e s t i n g

a h e a r i n g t o f

i n d o u t w h a t h a d g o n e a w r y

. O n A u g u s t 1 8

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e h e l d t h a t h e a r i n g 8

a n d s h e s t a t e d o n t h e r e c o r d t h a t i t w a s “ u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t t h e c o u r t w a s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e

f a c t t h a t y o u d i d n ’ t g e t n o t i c e i n t i m e t o ” f i l e t h e a p p e a l

. T h e c o u r t c o o r d i n a t o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t

See P adilla v. Kentucky , 130 S.Ct . 1473 (2010). 5

See trial c ounsel’s af

fidavit of September

23, 2010, submitt ed to the cour t of appe als in 6

explanation of his “untimely ” notice of appea l.

Id. 7

Id. 8Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 4

s h e d i d n o t a d v i s e e i t h e r t h e S t a t e o r a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e h a d s i g n e d t h e

o r d e r b e c a u s e s h e d i d n o t k n o w t h a t t h e j u d g e h a d d o n e s o u n t i l s h e w e n t h u n t i n g f o r t h e

m i s s i n g f i l e o n J u l y 1 9

. N o w a r m e d w i t h a n o f f i c i a l r e c o r d a n d a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h a t h a d

p r e v e n t e d h i m f

r o m t i m e l y f

i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, a p p e l l a n t ’ s c o u n s e l f i l e d h i s n o t i c e o f

a p p e a l i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o n A u g u s t 1 8

, t h e s a m e d a y a s t h e h e a r i n g

. 9

T h e E i g h t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s r e j e c t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s r e l i a n c e u p o n t h e m o r e l i b e r a l R u l e

3 0 6 a ( 4 ) o f t h e T e x a s R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e

, w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t “ i f n o t i c e o f j u d g m e n t i s n o t

r e c e i v e d w i t h i n t w e n t y d a y s o f s i g n i n g

, p e r i o d s f

o r a p p e l l a t e t i m e t a b l e s b e g i n t o r u n o n t h e

d a t e t h e a c t u a l n o t i c e o f j u d g m e n t i s r e c e i v e d

. ” T h i s r u l e p r o v i d e s a d u e

- p r o c e s s s a f e t y 1 0

v a l v e f o r s i t u a t i o n s s u c h a s t h i s o n e

. R u l e 3 0 6 a ( 4 )

, h o w e v e r

, a p p l i e s o n l y t o c i v i l c a s e s i n

The State a

rg ues that appe llant’s counsel c ould have f iled a motion for extension of time 9

in which to file a notice of appe al in the cour t of appe als under T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 26.3, as that

fiftee n-day

extension period did not run out unti l J uly 26, five da

y s after appellant’ s counsel

rec eived a

copy of the wr itten order. While counse l could have done that, he did not y et have any

explanation for why

he did not rec eive timely notice of the order

and no trial c ourt rec ord that

showed his lack of

neg lige nce or

culpability . I t might see m peculiar to the appellate court for an

attorney to file such a motion with the lame e x cuse, “ I don’t know why I wasn’t infor

med of the

signing of the trial c ourt’s orde r more tha n 30 day s ag o, but I wasn’t. Hone st.”

T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 306a(4) ( providing that, if, within twenty day s after

judgme nt is signed, 1 0

party has neither

rec eived notice nor ac quired a ctual notice, time pe riods beg in on date par ty

either r ece ived notice or

acquir ed ac tual notice, whiche ver oc curr ed first, but in no eve nt shall

periods beg in more than ninety day s after

orig inal judgme nt was sig ned); see I n re C.N ., 313

S.W .3d 490, 493 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pe t.) (to invoke the e x ception under Rule 306a(4)

, “‘the party

adver sely

aff ecte d is require d to prove in the trial c ourt, on sworn motion and notice,

the date on w hich the par ty or his attorney

first either r ece ived a notice of the judg ment or

acquir ed ac tual knowledg e of the signing and that this date wa s more than twe nty day s after

the

judgme nt was sig ned.’” ) (quoting T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 306a(5)) . Appellant’s c ounsel proved, in the

trial court, the date on which he rec eived a ctual notice of the sig ning of

the trial cour

t’s order and

the date tha t he re ceive d a copy of that orde r.Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 5

w h i c h m o n e y i s a t s t a k e ; i t d o e s n o t a p p l y t o c r i m i n a l c a s e s i n w h i c h f r e e d o m i s a t s t a k e

. A s

t h e E i g h t h C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a p t l y n o t e d

, t h i s C o u r t h a s n o t a d o p t e d t h a t c i v i l r u l e a n d w e a r e

e x t r e m e l y s t r i c t w h e n i t c o m e s t o t h e f i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, e v e n w h e n t h e a p p e a l i n g

p a r t y h a d n o n o t i c e t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e h a d s i g n e d a n a p p e a l a b l e o r d e r

. “ A t i m e l y n o t i c e o f 1 1

a p p e a l i s n e c e s s a r y t o i n v o k e [ t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ’ s ] j u r i s d i c t i o n

. ” 1 2

W e g r a n t e d a p p e l l a n t ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e v i e w

, w h i c h r a i s e d a s i n g l e g r o u n d

f o r r e v i e w :

T h e E i g h t h C o u r t e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g P e t i t i o n e r ’ s a p p e a l f o r w a n t o f

j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e P e t i t i o n e r t i m e l y f i l e d h i s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l

, w i t h i n t h i r t y

d a y s o f t h e d a t e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f w a s f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k

a n d w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s o f t h e d a t e t h e t r i a l c o u r t f i r s t m a d e a n y o f t h e p a r t i e s

a w a r e o f i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f

.

B u t t h e C o u r t r e

j e c t s a p p e l l a n t ’ s a r g u m e n t w i t h a c i t e t o o u r p r i o r o p i n i o n i n S t a t e v

.

R o s e n b a u m

, i n w h i c h w e h e l d t h a t a t r i a l j u d g e “ e n t e r s ” a n o r d e r w h e n h e s i g n s i t

, r e g a r d l e s s

Ex parte M

artinez , No. 08-10-00258- CR, 2010 W L 3904496, at * 3 (Te x . App.—El 1 1

Paso Oct. 6, 2010). The court of a ppeals re lied upon State ex re l. Sutton v. Bage , 822 S.W .2d 55

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992), in which this Court held that the State’s late-f iled notice of a

ppeal wa s

not effe ctive to conf

er jurisdiction on the a

ppellate c ourt eve n though the State did not have

notice of the signe d order until after the time to file notice of appe al had r un out. As Presiding

J udg e McCormick note d in dissent, “a par ty may be denie d a rig ht to appeal in any case wher e a

judge , without notice to the party , signs a n appea lable orde r which doe s not ge t filed (ente red) of

rec ord within the time require d for notice of appe al.” Sutton, 822 S.W .2d at 58 (McCormick,

P.J ., dissenting) . He is rig ht and, at lea st for a de fenda nt who has a statutory

rig ht of appe al, that

is a due-pr ocess violation. I t is also unfair to the State whe n it has a statutory rig ht of appe al,

even if the State does not literally have a constitutional “due-pr ocess” rig ht to appeal. The Court

can a nd should enac t a rule of

appellate proce dure like tha t of Rule 306a for the bene fit of both

defe ndants and the State.

Martinez , 2010 WL 3904496, at *4. 1 2Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 6

o f w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n f o r m e d o f t h a t a c t

. 1 3

I I

.

T h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t a p p e l l a n t m a y f i l e “ f u t u r e 1 1

. 0 7 2 w r i t

a p p l i c a t i o n s i n t h i s m a t t e r

. ” Y e s

, h e m a y

, b u t S e c t i o n 1 1

. 0 7 2

, § 9 ( a )

, p r o h i b i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n

o f a s u b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n “ u n l e s s t h e s u b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t s p e c i f

i c

f a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t t h e c u r r e n t c l a i m s a n d i s s u e s h a v e n o t b e e n a n d c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n

p r e s e n t e d p r e v i o u s l y i n a n o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a t i o n

. . . b e c a u s e t h e f a c t u a l o r l e g a l b a s i s f

o r t h e

c l a i m w a s u n a v a i l a b l e o n t h e d a t e t h e a p p l i c a n t f i l e d t h e p r e v i o u s a p p l i c a t i o n

. ” T h e r e f o r e

, 1 4

a p p e l l a n t m a y n o t s i m p l y r e f i l e h i s o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a t i o n a l l e g i n g a n i n v o l u n t a r y p l e a a n d

h o v e r o v e r t h e j u d g e ’ s s h o u l d e r u n t i l s h e s i g n s t h e o r d e r d e n y i n g r e l i e f s o a p p e l l a n t c a n

t i m e l y f i l e a n e w n o t i c e o f

a p p e a l a n d o b t a i n t h e a p p e a l t o w h i c h h e w a s s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d

a f t e r t h e f i r s t o r d e r w a s s i g n e d

.

B u t a p p e l l a n t m a y f

i l e a s u b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s u n d e r

S e c t i o n 1 1

. 0 7 2 a l l e g i n g t h a t h i s d u e

- p r o c e s s r i g h t t o a p p e a l t h e d e n i a l o f h i s w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n

a l l e g i n g a n i n v o l u n t a r y p l e a w a s v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e o f a “ b r e a k d o w n i n t h e s y s t e m

. ” T h e 1 5

f a c t s t h a t l e d t o t h e d e n i a l o f a p p e l l a n t ’ s r i g h t t o a p p e a l o b v i o u s l y w e r e n o t k n o w n t o h i m a t

State v. Rosenbaum , 818 S.W .2d 398, 401-03 (Te x . Crim. App. 1991) (conc luding, 1 3

never theless, that when a

trial judg e sig ns an orde r on one da y and states that it is not to be

enter ed until a later

date, that late r date controls for pur poses of filing a notice of appea l).

T E X

. C O D E C R I M

. P R O C . art. 11.072, § 9(a ). 1 4

See note 3 supra

. 1 5Martinez Concurring Opinion Page 7

t h e t i m e h e f

i l e d h i s o r i g i n a l w r i t a p p l i c a t i o n a n d

, e v e n w i t h t h e b e s t d u e d i l i g e n c e

, c o u l d n o t

h a v e b e e n k n o w n b e c a u s e t h e y h a d n o t y e t o c c u r r e d

.

T o r e m e d y t h e d u e

- p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n

, t h e t r i a l j u d g e m a y r e c o n s i d e r h e r o r i g i n a l r u l i n g

d e n y i n g r e l i e f

. S h e m a y t h e n s i g n a n e w o r d e r

– h o p e f u l l y i n o p e n c o u r t

. T h a t s i g n e d o r d e r

w i l l r e s e t t h e a p p e l l a t e t i m e t a b l e a n d p r o v i d e a p p e l l a n t w i t h h i s d u e

- p r o c e s s a n d s t a t u t o r y

r i g h t t o a p p e a l i f t h e t r i a l j u d g e d e n i e s r e l i e f

, a n d i t w i l l b e g i n t h e a p p e l l a t e t i m e t a b l e f o r t h e

S t a t e i f s h e g r a n t s r e l i e f o n r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

. 1 6

F i l e d : J u n e 2 9

, 2 0 1 1

D o N o t P u b l i s h

T E X

. R. A P P

. P. 11.072, § 8 (providing a rig ht of appe al to both the applicant a nd to the 1 6

State, depending on whether a wr it application is denied or g rante d).