United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 1, 2021*

Decided November 5, 2021 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1363 

YANANTA LUSA, **

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD 

SERVICES, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:19-cv-03928-RLY-DML 

Richard L. Young, 

Judge. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

** The plaintiff-appellant has used several variations of his name in this litigation. 

We have captioned the case in accordance with the way he signed his brief on appeal. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 21-1363 Page 2 

O R D E R 

Yananta Lusa surrendered to law enforcement in Indianapolis after an officer 

attested in a probable-cause affidavit that he had attacked his daughter’s mother. Lusa 

alleges that as a result he was unlawfully detained for several hours, blocked from 

contacting his daughter, and prosecuted for battery. He has sued the officer, the 

prosecutor, and others alleging that they violated his civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Because probable cause supported his detention and absolute immunity shields the 

prosecutor, the district court rightly dismissed his suit, and we affirm. 

We recount the facts that are relevant to the arguments Lusa presses on appeal 

and in the light most favorable to him. See Cheli v. Taylorville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 986 F.3d 

1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 2021). In December 2017 the mother of Lusa’s young daughter 

reported that Lusa had beaten her. Believing that he then faced a warrant for his arrest, 

in January 2018 Lusa traveled from Tennessee to Indianapolis to surrender to the local 

authorities. They detained him for a few hours before releasing him to face battery 

charges. Several days later while in court, Lusa asked to see the arrest warrant; he was 

shown an affidavit in which, he concedes, an officer swore out probable cause to arrest 

him for battery. Lusa says that the judge then “deceive[d]” him into signing an order 

barring him from seeing his daughter, who entered foster care for a few months. The 

prosecutor later dropped the battery charge, the no-contact order was vacated, and 

Lusa gained custody of his daughter. 

Lusa sued the officer, the prosecutor, the judge, and others, contending that his 

detention, prosecution, and separation from his daughter violated his and his 

daughter’s federal and state rights. He sued in the Middle District of Tennessee, but that 

court transferred the case to the Southern District of Indiana, where the judge granted 

the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Among other defects, the judge explained that 

Lusa’s complaint did not state valid claims. Lusa’s claim that his detention violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights failed because he affirmatively alleged that the officer 

submitted an affidavit establishing probable cause. Also, Lusa never added his 

daughter as a plaintiff; therefore, he had no standing to assert that her placement in 

foster care violated her rights. The judge also determined that the prosecutor was 

entitled to absolute immunity. (Immunity shielded the judge too, but Lusa dropped that 

claim.) Finally, Lusa had not alleged that any defendant acted with malice, so his 

malicious-prosecution claims under state law failed. 
No. 21-1363 Page 3 

On appeal Lusa contests the district judge’s reasoning that the officer’s affidavit 

of probable cause defeats his Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful detention. He 

argues for the first time on appeal that the affidavit was insufficient to justify his 

detention because it referred to the attacker only as the “father” of the victim’s child. 

Lusa points out that the victim also had a child with another man. Thus, he insists that 

the affidavit did not necessarily implicate him. 

Even if we consider this new contention, it does not undermine the judge’s 

ruling. Probable cause is present when under all of the circumstances, a reasonable 

officer could conclude that the suspect committed an offense. See Muhammad v. Pearson, 

900 F.3d 898, 908 (7th Cir. 2018). Because the affidavit identified the “father” of the 

victim’s child as the attacker and Lusa is the father of one of the victim’s children, his 

detention for a few hours following his surrender was objectively reasonable. 

“Probable” does not mean “definite.” “[W]hen the police have probable cause to arrest 

one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the 

arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.” Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971) 

(quotation marks omitted). The presence of probable cause bars any § 1983 claim for 

unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment. See Muhammad, 900 F.3d at 907. 

Because Lusa does not argue that the affidavit falls short of probable cause in any other 

way, the district court rightly dismissed the claim. 

Lusa also contends that he stated a claim for malicious prosecution. He argues 

that the prosecutor pressed charges and pressured him to agree to a plea deal despite 

knowing that he did not commit a battery. But the prosecutor is absolutely immune 

from suit because her decisions to charge and negotiate a plea agreement fall within her 

immunized prosecutorial duties. See Jones v. Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 

2021). 

We quickly dispatch a few final arguments. First, Lusa contests the Middle 

District of Tennessee’s decision to transfer the case to the Southern District of Indiana. 

But we cannot review the venue decision because Lusa did not move in the Indiana 

district court to retransfer the case. See Alexander v. Erie Ins. Exch., 982 F.2d 1153, 1156–57 

(7th Cir. 1993). Next, Lusa argues that the court never assured itself of its jurisdiction 

over the case. But he brought federal claims under § 1983, thus subject-matter 

jurisdiction was secure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Finally, Lusa continues to press claims on 

behalf of his daughter, but he never moved to add her as a plaintiff. He cannot argue 

that the district judge erred by not considering claims on behalf of a never-added party. 
No. 21-1363 Page 4 

We have considered Lusa’s remaining arguments, and none has merit. 

AFFIRMED