alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DENIED and Opinion Filed November 17, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-01217-CV 

IN RE PAUL A. PROPES, JR., Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 199th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 199-82537-08 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Nowell, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Nowell 

Before the Court is relator’s November 14, 2022 petition seeking a writ of 

mandamus compelling the trial court to respond to, hold a hearing on, and rule on 

relator’s motion for “Coram Nobis.” 

To establish a right to mandamus relief in a criminal case, the relator must 

show that the trial court violated a ministerial duty and there is no adequate remedy 

at law. In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. 

proceeding). Relator bears the burden of providing the Court with a sufficient record 

to show he is entitled to relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) 

(orig. proceeding). 
 –2– 

Relator’s petition does not comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure in numerous respects. See, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(a)–(h), (j)–(k), 

52.7(a). For instance, relator’s petition is not properly certified. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

52.3(j); In re Phillips, No. 05-21-01068-CV, 2022 WL 278240, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Jan. 31, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 

758 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding). Relator’s petition is also not 

supported by an appendix or record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A), 52.7(a)(1); 

Butler, 270 S.W.3d at 759. Without a certified petition and appendix or record, 

relator has not carried his burden. See In re Jones, No. 05-22-01113-CV, 2022 WL 

12338493, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 21, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.);

Butler, 270 S.W.3d at 758–59. 

Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. 

221217F.P05 

/Erin A. Nowell/

ERIN A. NOWELL 

JUSTICE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
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<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     54,328
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         249,066
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           248,362
<LOANS>                                        480,175
<ALLOWANCE>                                      9,005
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 859,885
<DEPOSITS>                                     607,795
<SHORT-TERM>                                    97,274
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             50,059
<LONG-TERM>                                     18,858
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             5,322
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<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          3,683
        

</TABLE>
1 The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 04-1836

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. David Rojas-Perez, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 21, 2005 Filed: June 8, 2005

___________ Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. David Rojas-Perez appeals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Rojas-Perez has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that, because the district court enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (possessing dangerous weapon in connection with drug offense), he was sentenced on charges not-2- contained in the indictment and the sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm. The pro se arguments fail. Although Rojas-Perez initially objected to the sentencing enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(1), he later withdrew his objection. He is thus foreclosed from raising issues here regarding the section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. See United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993) (claim relinquished below need not be addressed on appeal); United States v. Tulk , 171 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1999) (issue deliberately waived below is not reviewed, even for plain error). Upon careful review of the record under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we note that the district court imposed Rojas-Perez’s sentence prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). While we now know it was error to apply the federal Sentencing Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, Rojas-Perez has not demonstrated “a ‘reasonable probability,’ based on the appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have received a more favorable sentence.” SeeUnited States v. Pirani , 406 F.3d 543, 549-54 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (plain error review when mandatory-Guidelines issue not raised below; plain error review is governed by the four-part test of Olano , 507 U.S. at 732- 36). We find no other nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
**Exhibit 31.2**
**Certification under Exchange Act Rules 13a-15e and 15d-15e Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
I, Thomas F. Bradley, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Enesco Group, Inc.(the “Registrant”). 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations and cashflows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisquarterly report; 4. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15e and 15d-15e) for the Registrant andwe have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which thisquarterly report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the Registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, oris reasonably likely to materially affect , the Registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of the internal control over financialreporting, to the Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofRegistrant’s Board of Directors:
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the Registrant’s internalcontrols over financial reporting.                                                  /s/ Thomas F.  Bradley   Chief Financial Officer     
34
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 29 , 2012.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 12

- 00602

- CR

DOUGLAS MATTHEW JONE S , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 355th District Court

Hood County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR11045



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to fraudulent use of identifying information. In exchange for his guilty plea he received 5 years’ deferred adjudication probation. The State subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate. Appellant entered a plea of true to the grounds listed in the motion to adjudicate. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty
and assessed punishment at 22 months’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Dep artment of Criminal Justice . Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2

Appellant’s appointed counsel f iled a brief in which he concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
A copy of counsel’s brief was delivered to appellant. Appellant was advised of the right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response. See Stafford v. State
, 813 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). As of this date, more than forty

- five days has passed and no pro se response has been filed.
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and agree the appeal is wholly frivol ous and without merit. Further, we find no reversible error in the record.
We are not to address the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief or a pro se response when we have determined there are no arguable grounds for review. See
Bledsoe v. Sta te , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Seymore, Boyce, and McCally.
Do N ot Publish

— Tex. R. App. P

. 47.2( b).
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5009 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 1,3-Dimethyl-2- 

imidazolidinone. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 27, 2012 

Mr. BURTON of Indiana (for himself and Mr. YOUNG of Indiana) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 1,3-Dimethyl2-imidazolidinone. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 1,3-DIMETHYL-2-IMIDAZOLIDINONE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.29.26 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 1,3-Dimethyl-2-imidazolidinone) is amended by striking 

7 the date in the effective period column and inserting ‘‘12/ 

8 31/2015’’. 

9 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

10 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5009 IH

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-21-00274-CR

The STATE of Texas,

Appellant

v.

Marco Antonio GLORIA,

Appellee

From the 365th Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas

Trial Court No. 19-02-07984-MCRAJA

Honorable Amado J. Abascal, III, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 17, 2021

DISMISSED

Appellant the State of Texas has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion contains 

a certificate of service to appellee, who has not opposed the motion. Therefore, we grant the motion 

and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
#### BOWMAN v. TEXAS & NEW ORLEANS R. CO.

No. 12444.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

Nov. 20, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1953.

*168Howard J. Hendrix and Al L. Crystal, of Houston, for appellant.

Baker, Botts, Andrews & Parish and John F. Heard, of Houston, for appellee.

GRAVES, Justice.

This appeal involves the validity of a directed verdict by Judge Roy F. Campbell in favor of appellee (hereafter called “defendant”) against appellant Jean Bowman (hereafter called “plaintiff”), at the conclusion of her case, in a suit filed by her against it for personal injuries.

It arises out of the same accident as did the consolidated suit of James D. Reid and John T. Kirtley v. Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, also on appeal to this Court, as No. 12,456, in which Judge Ben F. Wilson similarly instructed a verdict for defendant.

Both cases involve a railroad crossing collision, on October 8, 1944, at approximately 3:50 a. m., in which a borrowed car, driven by Reid, with plaintiff Bowman and her “date”, Kirtley, as passengers, crashed into a stationary tank car standing across the road, under a yellow light.

Of the ten points raised by this appeal, the first seven relate to exclusion of testimony, as to other experiences of witnesses at or near the crossing, where the collision occurred. The eighth and ninth points present the question of whether the verdict directed by the Judge was erroneous, plaintiff contending that fact-issues were presented for the jury. The tenth point involves a pretrial motion by defendant to bar evidence of subsequent safety improvements, and a discussion between plaintiff’s counsel and the Trial Judge, which led to a ruling by the Judge that he would not admit testimony as to accidents before and after this collision.

In this Court, this appeal by Jean Bowman, as appellant, presents a companion cause to that of James D. Reid et al., No. 12,456, as described supra, except as to the tenth point so raised here by this appellant.

Wherefore, the two appeals, under such Nos. 12,444 and 12,456, were heard by this Court on submission together.

This Court has on this day affirmed the appeal of James D. Reid et al., in such No. 12,456, in an opinion written by Associate Justice Cody, Reid v. Texas & New Orleans R. Co., 254 S.W.2d 164.

That opinion is hereby adopted as this Court’s holding also on all the stated points in this appellant’s appeal, except her No. 10. That ruling, if error, appears to have been — ■ from a somewhat extended discussion of it between appellant’s counsel and the trial judge — clearly invited by them; hence it did not constitute reversible error. Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

The judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The undersigned, Kerry K. Nagy, President and Principal Financial Officer of Barnabus Energy, Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Barnabus Energy, Inc. for the year ended May 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Barnabus Energy, Inc..

 

| Dated: September 12, 2005 |   |                                      |
|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   | /s/ Kerry K. Nagy                         |   |
|                      |   | Kerry K. Nagy                             |
|                      |   | President and Principal Financial Officer |
|                      |   | Barnabus Energy, Inc..                    |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   |                                      |   |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                      |   |                                      |
|                           |        |                                           |  |  |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Barnabus Energy, Inc. and will be retained by Barnabus Energy, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 195 (Friday, October 6, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 59751-59752]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-25735]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[DA 00-2148; MM Docket No. 99-75; RM-9446]


Radio Broadcasting Services; Grants, Milan, NM

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission, at the request of Don Davis, former licensee 
of Station KQEO(FM), now Station KXXQ(FM), Grants, New Mexico, reallots 
Channel 264A from Grants to Milan, New Mexico as the community's second 
local aural transmisson service. See 64 FR 14423 (March 25, 1999). 
Channel 264A at Grants was downgraded from 264C2 by one-step 
application (File No. BMPH-19960226IB) granted on June 13, 1996. 
Channel 264A can be allotted to Milan in compliance with the 
Commission's minimum distance separation requirements, with respect to 
domestic allotments, at petitioner's site 5.7 kilometers (3.6 miles) 
south, at coordinates 35-07-09 North Latitude and 107-54-08 West 
Longitude.

DATES: Effective November 6, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Victoria M. McCauley, Mass Media 
Bureau, (202) 418-2180.

[[Page 59752]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a synopsis of the Commission's 
Report and Order, MM Docket No. 99-75, adopted September 13, 2000, and 
released September 22, 2000. The full text of this Commission decision 
is available for inspection and copying during normal business hours in 
the FCC Reference Center (Room 239), 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, 
DC. The complete text of this decision may also be purchased from the 
Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription Services, 
Inc., (202) 857-3800, 1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

    Radio broadcasting.

    Part 73 of title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended 
as follows:

PART 73--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334. 336.

    2. Section 73.202(b) the FM Table of Allotments under New Mexico is 
amended by removing Channel 264C2 at Grants and adding Milan, Channel 
264A.

Federal Communications Commission.
John A. Karousos,
Chief, Allocations Branch, Policy and Rules Division, Mass Media 
Bureau.
[FR Doc. 00-25735 Filed 10-5-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

 NO. AP-75,873

EX PARTE DAGMAR FEHRMANN GAHAGAN, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 995206-A IN THE 338TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted ofmanslaughter and

sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction.

Gahagan v. State, No. 01-06-062-CR (Tex. App. - Houston [1 ], delivered September 27, 2007, no st

pet.). 

Applicant contends that her appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel

failed to timely file a petition for discretionary review after agreeing to file one. Appellate counsel
GAHAGAN - 2

filed an affidavit with the trial court. Based on that affidavit, the trial court has entered findings of

fact and conclusions of law that appellate counsel failed to timely file a petition for discretionary

review after agreeing to file one. See Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time petition

for discretionary review of the judgment of the First Court of Appeals in Cause No. 01-06-062-CR

that affirmed her conviction in Case No. 995206 from the 338th Judicial District Court of Harris

County. Applicant shall file her petition for discretionary review with the First Court of Appeals

within 30 days of the date on which this Court’s mandate issues.

Delivered: March 19, 2008

Do not publish