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Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Magana CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDGAR RUIZ MAGANA,

Defendant and Appellant.

E079625

(Super.Ct.No. RIF2101539)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy J. Hollenhorst, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin, Jeremy M. Cutcher and Erica B. Esquivel for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew 

Mestman, Eric Tran and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
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A jury convicted Edgar Ruiz Magana of committing numerous sexual offenses 

against his minor daughter, Jane Doe. On appeal, he argues that the trial court 

prejudicially erred by admitting expert testimony about child sexual abuse 

accommodation syndrome. We reject the argument and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

In January 2021, when Doe was 10 years old, Doe told her cousin Denise D. that 

her father (Magana) had “sexually abused” Doe when she was younger. Denise called 

the police.

A detective assigned to investigate scheduled a forensic interview of Doe that was

conducted in mid-February 2021. The detective interviewed Magana in April. During 

the interview, the detective offered Magana an opportunity to write an apology letter to 

Doe. The detective left the room and watched Magana from an observation room. 

Magana wrote for a while and then crumpled up the piece of paper on which he was 

writing and tossed it into a trash can. The detective retrieved the letter from the trash can. 

The letter reads: “I apologize, [Doe]. I love you a lot. I’m sorry for not being 

able to defend you. You’re the engine that keeps me going and I’m glad you didn’t stay 

quiet. Don’t worry about me. You’re okay with your aunt so they can help you. I’m 

okay. I’m sorry if I did something wrong to you. I don’t . . . .”

Magana was charged by information with two counts of engaging in sexual 

intercourse or sodomy with a child under age 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)) and one 
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count of engaging in lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, 

§ 288, subd. (b)(1).)

Doe testified at trial, when she was 11 years old. A video recording of the forensic 

interview conducted the year before (when Doe was 10) was played for the jury, and a 

transcript of the interview was provided to the jury. At trial, Doe described three

incidents in which Magana touched her or made her touch him when she was between 

five and eight years old. Doe told the forensic interviewer that she remembered three 

incidents but only described the first and last incidents.

When Doe was somewhere between five and seven years old, Magana walked into 

the bathroom after Doe finished using the toilet. Magana asked Doe if she needed help

wiping, and she responded that she did. While Doe was standing and facing the mirror, 

Magana stood behind her and “pretend[ed] to wipe.” Doe felt something “hard, but 

squishy at the same time,” which Doe explained was Magana’s “private part”—the part 

of the body from which he urinated. Doe told the forensic interviewer that Magana 

attempted to put his “private” “inside her private, but since [she] was little it didn’t really, 

you know, fit.” It hurt Doe when Magana “tr[ied] to push it in.” Doe told the forensic 

interviewer that Doe’s “private” meant the part of the body from which she urinated. 

Doe testified that when Magana wiped her it felt different “on [her] private,” meaning the 

place where she “go[es] No. 2.” Doe felt something “weird on [her] bottom.” Doe yelled

“stop” because it hurt and because in the mirror she could see what Magana was doing, 

even though he “tried to hide his private from” her. Magana covered Doe’s mouth with 
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his hand and threatened to take her into the room and hit her with a belt. Magana said 

“‘I’m done,’” and he then put his belt back on and pulled up his pants.

The second incident that Doe described at trial occurred after the bathroom 

incident, but Doe could not recall her age. Doe and Magana slept in the same bedroom,

which they shared with an uncle of Doe’s, whom Doe described as “a special kid, like a 

special ed. kid.” When Doe and Magana were going to sleep, Magana told Doe to hold 

his hand. Doe complied, “but it didn’t feel like a hand” based on Doe’s experience of 

holding her dad’s hand at stores. The shape of what Doe grabbed “felt like a thumb sort 

of.” The bedroom lights were off. Doe “held it for like a couple minutes, and then—and 

then [she] let it go.” Magana did not say anything to her. Doe’s uncle was in the room 

on his bed. Doe did not tell the forensic interviewer about the incident and instead told 

the interviewer that Magana had never asked Doe to do something to his body.

The third incident occurred when Doe was seven or eight years old. All of Doe’s 

family members except her uncle had left the house to go eat. Doe’s uncle was eating in 

the kitchen. Magana grabbed Doe’s wrist and brought her into the bedroom and closed 

the door. Magana pulled Doe’s shirt up and touched and rubbed the bare skin on her

“chest area” with his hands. Magana also removed Doe’s pants and lowered her 

underwear to her knees. Magana “tried to put his private”—“[t]he one he pees with”—

“in [her] private,” meaning her “pee private.” At first, Magana and Doe were standing 

and facing each other, but then Magana backed Doe onto the bed so that she was seated 

on it, while he remained standing in front of her. Doe did not see Magana’s “private” but 
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could feel pushing and pressure “[a]round where [she] pee[s].” “It really hurt” Doe. 

Magana “just ran out” of the bedroom after Doe heard some noise outside of the 

bedroom. 

Doe was afraid and confused. During the encounter, Magana told Doe that she 

“better not tell anyone, or—or you know what’s gonna happen,” which Doe believed 

“meant that he was gonna hit [her] with the belt, like he did the first time.”

The first person that Doe told about what had happened with Magana was a 17-

year-old male cousin, who in turn told Doe to tell Denise. Doe had been talking to her 

male cousin about her parents’ divorce, and “it slipped out.” Doe had otherwise 

attempted “to be friends with” Magana because she “just wanted to forget all that 

happened.” Doe told the forensic interviewer that at some unspecified time before 

talking to her cousins, she had twice threatened to commit suicide.

In February 2021, Dr. Sophia Grant, a physician and the medical director for the 

sexual assault and forensic evaluation team at a hospital, conducted a sexual assault 

examination of Doe. Doe reported to Dr. Grant that Magana had fondled her breasts. 

Asked whether Magana had penetrated Doe’s vagina with his penis, Doe said, “‘Yes,’” 

and “‘It went in just a little.’” Doe had experienced pain. Doe told Dr. Grant that 

Magana had threatened to “‘hit [Doe] with a belt if [she] ever said anything.’”

Dr. Grant did not find any physical evidence of abuse in her examination of Doe. 

Dr. Grant explained that the lack of physical evidence was what she expected because of 

Doe’s delayed disclosure and the fact that the penetration may have been partial. 
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Dr. Grant explained that female genitals heal rapidly, so in cases involving delayed 

disclosure “it is very common to not have any sign of injury.” 

Dr. Veronica A. Thomas, Ph.D., a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for 

the prosecution. She explained that child victims of sexual assault do not always report 

abuse and that most of those who do report the abuse do not do so immediately. 

Dr. Thomas opined that delayed disclosures are common with child victims of sexual 

abuse, “especially with regard to molesting that happens over time.” Children often 

delay disclosure because the majority of children “are molested by somebody they know” 

and with whom “they have an ongoing relationship,” thus causing the victims to 

experience intense “emotional complications,” such as “[g]uilt, responsibility, sadness, 

grief, anger, [and] not being believed.”

Dr. Thomas opined that discrepant disclosures—disclosures that are inconsistent 

or evolve over time—are also common with child victims of sexual abuse. Child 

molestation victims often repress the details of the abuse because the memories are “just 

too emotionally overwhelming to understand.” Dr. Thomas also opined that child victims 

of sexual abuse commonly confuse the details of various incidents.

Magana testified on his own behalf. He claimed that he had never placed his penis 

in Doe’s vaginal area, rubbed her chest in an inappropriate manner, or attempted “to do 

any of those things that she described when she testified.” Several of Magana’s family 

members testified on his behalf.
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The jury convicted Magana on all counts. The court sentenced him to an 

aggregate sentence of 58 years to life in state prison.

DISCUSSION

Magana’s sole argument is that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting 

expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. We find no error.

A. Legal Framework

Evidence Code section 801 provides that when a witness testifies as an expert, the 

witness’s opinion testimony must be “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond 

common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” 

(Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) “‘The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether 

to admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert 

testimony meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of 

discretion.’” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 946.)

B. Relevant Proceedings

The prosecution moved in limine to admit evidence of child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome. The prosecution proffered that because of Doe’s delayed 

disclosure and the existence of “positive aspects to their relationship” with Magana, the 

testimony would dispel myths about why a child would not disclose immediately “and 

why a child may not be able to come forward with details in a manner that most would 

expect of an adult.”
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At a pretrial hearing on the motion, the judge asked the prosecutor if she was 

seeking to admit the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome testimony so that the 

expert could discuss the general behaviors of children who have been sexually abused, 

including “why sometimes children don’t report right away.” The prosecutor agreed that 

the purpose of the expert testimony was to explain delayed disclosure in child sexual 

abuse victims “as well as what a jury may perceive as self-impeaching behavior based on 

the continued familial relationship that in this case the victim and defendant have.” 

Defense counsel acknowledged that expert testimony on child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome is common in cases like this, but counsel nevertheless objected 

on the following basis: Dr. Thomas “has not been involved whatsoever in this exact case. 

So, essentially, what the proposed witness is going to do is talk in generalities about how 

sometimes this happens, but sometimes it doesn’t happen. So sometimes there is delayed 

reporting, sometimes there is not. And I agree with that. That doesn’t assist the jury in 

making any decisions. [¶] This is a–this is an area that is not subject to scientific 

analysis. There is no way to do experiments like we do in chemistry or physics. So, in 

my view, it’s pseudoscience. They come in here with an inflated degree, or I should say 

with a degree of respect and credibility that is inflated by their degree. Everyone defers 

to them, calls them doctor and so forth, they’re not scientists. [¶] This is antidotes and 

opinions. It’s like saying I’m an expert on criminology because I talk to a lot of 

criminals. It doesn’t make any sense. So I’m against it. I think that it’s pseudoscience. I 
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believe that it misleads the jury. Any information that the expert provides to the jury 

does not assist the jury in reaching a just verdict, so I object for those reasons.”

The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion and overruled defense counsel’s 

objection, reasoning that the testimony would be “extraordinarily helpful” to the jurors. 

C. Analysis

Relying on People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 (Bowker), Magana 

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Thomas’s testimony,

because the prosecution failed to carry its burden of identifying the specific myth or 

misconception harbored by the jury that the evidence was designed to rebut. The 

argument lacks merit.

Magana’s objection in the trial court to the admission of Dr. Thomas’s testimony 

was not based on the argument he is making on appeal. We consequently consider the 

argument forfeited. (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301 [“‘questions relating to 

the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific 

and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal’”].)

Even if not forfeited, the argument is unsound. In Bowker, the prosecution 

proffered expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome “to ‘assist 

the jury’ and to ‘explain [children’s] behavior.’” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 389.) Bowker held that in general such testimony is inadmissible for the purpose of 

demonstrating that a particular child has been abused, but child sexual abuse 

accommodation syndrome testimony is generally admissible “for the limited purpose of 
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disabusing the jury of misconceptions as to how child victims react to abuse.” (Id. at 

p. 392.) Bowker stated that such “evidence must be targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 

‘misconception’ suggested by the evidence” (id. at pp. 393-394), and that “it is the 

People’s burden to identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed to rebut” 

(id. at p. 394). 

Subsequent case law has held that “[i]dentifying a ‘myth’ or ‘misconception’” 

does not require “the prosecution to expressly state on the record the evidence which is 

inconsistent with the finding of molestation.” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 

1737, 1744.) Instead, “[i]t is sufficient if the victim’s credibility is placed in issue due to 

the paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation.” (Id. at pp. 1744-

1745; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449-450 (Harlan).) 

The prosecution carried that burden in the present case. In its motion and at the 

pretrial hearing, the prosecution proffered that the expert testimony on child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome was necessary because Doe had delayed reporting the abuse 

and had continued to maintain a relationship with Magana. The evidence introduced at 

trial aligned with the prosecution’s earlier proffer—the testimony showed that Doe had 

delayed reporting and maintained her relationship with Magana despite the abuse.

In Harlan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 439, the prosecution made a similar showing,

and this court held that it was sufficient to justify admission of the expert’s testimony on 

child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. (Id. at pp. 449-450.) Harlan reasoned: 

“Unlike in Bowker, [supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 385], the prosecutor here explicitly identified 
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the misconceptions about victims’ behavior, i.e., delayed disclosure and inconsistent 

statements, which the testimony was intended to rebut.” (Ibid.) Harlan is directly on 

point, and we see no reason to depart from this court’s precedent. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9.)

We accordingly conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting Dr. Thomas’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. 

(Harlan, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 450.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

FIELDS

Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.