[Cite as State v. Montgomery, 2018-Ohio-5278.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

GREGORY R. MONTGOMERY 

Defendant-Appellant 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-40 

Trial Court Case No. 1997-CR-0618 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 28th day of December, 2018. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

ANDREW P. PICKERING, Atty. Reg. No. 0068770, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

STEPHEN P. HARDWICK, Atty. Reg. No. 0062932, Assistant State of Ohio Public 

Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

TUCKER, J. 
-2- 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Gregory Montgomery appeals from the judgment entry 

of the Clark County Common Pleas Court overruling his motion to vacate post-release 

control. Montgomery contends the trial court did not properly impose post-release 

control when it sentenced him in 1998. He, thus, contends that he should not have been 

subject to post-release control following his 2017 release from prison and that the trial 

court should have granted his motion to terminate his post-release control. 

{¶ 2} Because we agree with Montgomery’s arguments, the trial court’s judgment 

denying Montgomery’s motion to vacate post-release control is reversed, and the portion 

of his sentence related to post-release control is vacated. The cause is remanded to the 

trial court to notify the Adult Parole Authority (APA) about the vacation of the post-release 

control. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} On August 25, 1998, Montgomery was convicted of one count of trafficking 

of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a felony of the fourth degree, one count of 

possession of crack cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the fifth degree, and 

one count of possession of crack cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the first 

degree subject to a mandatory prison term. A sentencing hearing was conducted the 

following day. The trial court made the finding that Montgomery was a major drug 

offender. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced Montgomery to a ten-year term on the 

first-degree felony possession count and to a nine-year prison term on the major drug 

offender designation, with the terms ordered to be served consecutively. The trial court 
-3- 

sentenced Montgomery to 17 months on the trafficking conviction and 11 months on the 

lesser degree possession charge, to be served concurrently to each other and 

concurrently to the other sentence. The trial court did not mention post-release control 

during the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 4} The trial court filed a judgment entry journalizing this decision on September 

21, 1998. The sentencing entry stated “[t]he Court has further notified the defendant that 

post release control is mandatory in this case up to a maximum of five years, as well as 

the consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by the Parole 

Board under Revised Code Section 2967.28.” Montgomery appealed, and we affirmed 

the judgment of the trial court. State v. Montgomery, 2d Dist. Clark No. 98 CA 82, 2000 

WL 331798 (Mar. 31, 2000). 

{¶ 5} In both 2009 and 2010, Montgomery filed motions for resentencing based 

upon the claim that, because the trial court used the “up to five years language” in the 

sentencing entry, the portion of the sentence imposing post-release control was void. 

Both motions were overruled by the trial court. 

{¶ 6} Montgomery was released from prison in 2017. On January 30, 2018, he 

filed a motion to vacate post-release control. By entry filed February 28, 2018, the trial 

court overruled the motion to vacate post-release control, stating that “[t]he Court 

expressly used the word ‘mandatory’ making it abundantly clear that PRC was 

mandatory.” Dkt. No. 2. 

{¶ 7} Montgomery appeals. 

II. Analysis 
-4- 

{¶ 8} Montgomery’s sole assignment of error provides as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT VACATE GREGORY 

MONTGOMERY’S VOID POSTRELEASE CONTROL. 

{¶ 9} Montgomery contends that the post-release control imposed by the trial court 

in 1998 is void. He further contends that, because he has served his prison sentence, 

the post-release control must be vacated. 

{¶ 10} A trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of post-release control at 

the sentencing hearing. State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 

700, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, 

¶ 23. If the offender has been convicted of a felony subject to mandatory post-release 

control, the trial court must advise the offender that he or she “will” be supervised. Id. ¶ 

9, citing R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and 2967.28(B). Further, the trial court must notify the 

defendant of the length of the term of supervision for each degree of felony as established 

by R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C), and that if he or she “violates that supervision * * *, the parole 

board may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated 

prison term originally imposed upon the offender.” Id. Any sentence imposed without 

proper notification is contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 8, citing Jordan at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 11} The notifications regarding post-release control must be incorporated into 

the sentencing entry. Jordan at ¶ 22. The sentencing entry must contain the following 

information: “(1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the 

duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the Adult 

Parole Authority * * * will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and 

that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the 
-5- 

offender to the consequences set forth in that statute.” Grimes at ¶ 1. 

{¶ 12} “[W]hen a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated post[-]release control 

as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside.” 

State v. Tanksley, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-80, 2016-Ohio-2963, ¶ 8, quoting State v. 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26; State v. Holdcroft, 

137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 7. If a post-release control 

provision of a sentence is determined to be void after a defendant has completed his 

prison term, the error cannot be corrected and the defendant “cannot be subjected to a 

period of post-release control.” State v. Adkins, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010-CA-69, 2011-

Ohio-2819, ¶ 13; accord Tanksley at ¶ 24. See also State v. Holdcraft, 137 Ohio St.3d 

523, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 5 (once a defendant has served his prison 

sentence, a trial court loses jurisdiction to resentence for purposes of imposing postrelease control. 

{¶ 13} This court, in State v. Singleton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27329, 2017-

Ohio-7265, addressed the factual pattern presented by Montgomery: 

The problem is not that the trial court failed to recite the word “mandatory” 

when it advised [the defendant] about post-release control. The problem 

is that the trial court advised [the defendant] at his sentencing hearing and 

in its termination entry that he faced “up to five years” of post-release 

control. This court repeatedly has held that imposing post-release control 

for “up to” a certain period of time, when post-release control is mandatory 

for that period of time, renders the post-release control portion of a 

defendant's sentence void, not merely voidable. See, e.g., State v. 
-6- 

Tanksley, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-80, 2016-Ohio-2963, ¶ 24 (“In light of 

the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's imposition of post-release 

control for Tanksley's aggravated robbery conviction is void as a result of 

the improper ‘up to’ language that is contained in the sentencing entry.”); 

State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26228, 2015-Ohio-1749, ¶ 5 (“It 

has been repeatedly held that ‘up to’ language is insufficient when postrelease control is mandatory and such error causes the post-release control 

portion of the sentence to be void.”); State v. Adkins, 2d Dist. Greene No. 

2010-CA-69, 2011-Ohio-2819, ¶ 6 (“In the present case, the trial court 

advised Adkins orally, and in its re-sentencing entry, that he was subject to 

mandatory post-release control for ‘up to’ five years. The parties agree that, 

in reality, Adkins was subject to mandatory post-release control for the 

entire five years. Logically, ‘up to’ five years also includes five years and 

could not conceivably prejudice the defendant. But, the case law is to the 

contrary. Therefore, the post-release control portion of Adkins's sentence is 

void.”). 

Id. at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 14} Neither the sentencing entry nor a transcript of the sentencing hearing has 

been included in the record before us.1 However, Montgomery attached to his motion to 

vacate copies of what purport to be a transcript of the sentencing hearing and the 

sentencing entry. The transcript reveals that the trial court did not address post-release 

 

1 We note that Montgomery, in his criminal docket statement of appeal, did request a 

summary of the docket and journal entries. Thus, the sentencing entry was properly 

requested. However, he did not request the filing of any transcripts. 
-7- 

control during the sentencing hearing, and that the sentencing entry utilizes the “up to” 

language. While neither of these issues is directly before us, we note that the State, in 

its brief, acknowledges that, pursuant to this court’s case law, the post-release control 

portion of Montgomery’s sentence was not properly imposed and is void. Further, the 

State did not contest, at the trial court level, the use of the exhibits attached to 

Montgomery’s motion. Thus, we may presume that these documents accurately reflect 

the actions taken by the trial court. 

{¶ 15} The State asks us to ignore our case law on this issue, and to “align” 

ourselves with the Tenth and Seventh District Courts of Appeals, which, according to the 

State, have held that the use of the words “up to” do not render the post-release control 

provision of a sentence void. Specifically, the State cites to State v. Maser, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 15AP-129, 2016-Ohio-211, and State v. Zechar, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 

MA 111, 2018-Ohio-3731. However, we find both of these cases to be factually 

distinguishable. 

{¶ 16} In Maser, although the trial court, at the sentencing hearing, utilized the 

words “up to” in imposing post-release control, the Court of Appeals found that the postrelease control provision was not rendered void. Id. at ¶ 16. The Court relied upon the 

fact that, during the sentencing hearing, the defendant signed a form that correctly 

informed him that he was subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-release control. 

Id. at ¶ 15. Thus, the Court determined that the totality of the circumstances indicated 

that the defendant was sufficiently notified of the post-release control terms. Id. at ¶ 16. 

Unlike the defendant in Maser, Montgomery never received a correct recitation of the 

terms of his post-release control. 
-8- 

{¶ 17} In Zechar, the Seventh District Court of Appeals noted that, while the 

sentencing entry used the “up to” language, the defendant was appropriately notified of 

the length and mandatory nature of post-release control during the sentencing hearing. 

Zechar at ¶ 19, 20. Thus, the court determined that the post-release control provision 

was not void. Id. In Montgomery’s case, the trial court did not make any reference to 

post-release control during the sentencing hearing; thus, error was committed at both the 

hearing and in the sentencing entry. . 

{¶ 18} We conclude that the trial court did not properly impose post-release 

control. Given that Montgomery has completed his sentence, the trial court cannot now 

re-impose post-release control. Accordingly, Montgomery’s sole assignment of error is 

sustained. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 19} Because we have found that Montgomery’s motion to vacate post-release 

control should have been granted, the trial court’s judgment denying the motion is 

reversed, and Montgomery’s post-release control is vacated. The cause is remanded 

for the trial court to notify the APA about the vacation of the post-release control. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Andrew P. Pickering 

Stephen P. Hardwick 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter 
-9-