UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ADRIANN BORUM, et al. , : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 16-1723 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 43 : BRENTWOOD VILLAGE, LLC, et al. , : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR C LASS C ERTIFICATION ; G RANTING P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR THE A PPOINTMENT OF C LASS C OUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Adriann Borum seeks to represent a putative class of residents of her apartment complex, Brookland Manor, whom she alleges are at risk of being displaced should Defendants proceed with their plans to red evelop the complex, or who have already been displaced in anticipation of the redevelopment. 1 The planned redevelopment will eliminate four- and fivebedroom apartments in the complex, and will reduce the number o f three-bedroom apartments as well. This policy, Ms. Borum cla ims, will have a disparate impa ct on hundreds of residents based on their familial statu s in violation of the Fair Housing Act ( “FHA”) and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). Additionally, Ms. Borum claims that Defendants h ave made discriminatory

1 One of Ms. Borum’s original c o-plaintiffs and the second named representative of the putative class, Lorretta Holloman, voluntarily dismissed her cl aims against Defendants on November 22, 2017. ECF No. 55, 56. Ms. B orum’s other co-plaint iff, ONE DC, is a community organization “comprised of members who include tenants of affor dable housing properties that are seeking to avoid displacement, preserve affordable housing, ensure fair housing, and further equitable development in D.C .” Compl. ¶ 108, ECF No. 2. The Court found that ONE DC has organizational standing to bring s uit in its prior Memorandum O pinion. See Borum v. Brentwood Village, LLC , 218 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2016).2 statements based on familial status in violation of the FHA and the DCHRA. Therefore, she has moved to certify a class of resid ents whom she believes have be en harmed or are at risk of being harmed by the proposed redevelopmen t and activities surrounding it, and for the appointment of her lawyers as counsel for tha t class. Pls.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Class Cert. & Appointment Class Counsel (“Pls.’ Mem.”) , ECF No. 43-1. For the reasons setforth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part her mo tion for class certification, and grants her motion for the appointment of class counsel.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND Defendants in this action—Bren twood Associates, L.P.; Mid-City Financial Corporation; and Edgewood Management Corporati on—plan to redev elop Brookland Manor, an affordable housing complex in the Brentw ood neighborhood of Washington, D. C. Brookland Manor currently contains 535 units, whi ch range in size from one- to five-bedroom apartments. See Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert. & Appointment C lass Counsel (“Pls.’ Mot.”), Ex . 12 at 1–2, ECF No. 43-17. Once Brookland Manor has been transformed into the new Brentwoo d Village development, the complex will contain 2,235 rental apartments and for-sale homes

. Id. at 1. While today Brookland Manor contains 75 three- bedroom apartments, 113 four- bedroom apartments, and 21 five-bedroom apartments, once De fendants have completed the red evelopment, Brentwood Village will have zero four- and f ive-bedroom apartments, and o nly 64 three-bedroom apartments. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 4 at 5–6, ECF No. 43-9. It is this planned alt eration in the composition of the complex that Ms. Borum challenges. As a resi dent of a four-bedroom apartment, which she occupies w ith her five children (two minor and three adult), she fears that once the redevelopment takes place, she will be, at best, stuck competing with 117 other3 families 2 for 64 three-bedroom units, or at worst, displaced altogether. Pls.’ Mem. at 4. Additionally, she fears that even if she wer e able to procure athree-bedroom apartment, it would be too small for her family. See Decl. Adriann Borum (“Borum Decl.”) ¶ 8–10, Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 2,
ECF No. 43-7. Defendants began the process of s eeking approval for this redev elopment in October 2014, when they submitted their appl ication for a First-Stage p lanned unit development (“PUD”) approval. See Zoning Case Records, Case No. 14-18, available at https://app.dcoz.dc.gov/Content/S earch/ViewCaseReport.aspx?case _id=14-18. The application was approved in 2015. Id. Defendants filed their applica tion for Second-Stage PUD approva l in September 2016, one month after Ms. Borum had filed this action . That application is still pending. See Zoning Case Records, Case No. 14-18A, available at https://app.dcoz.dc.gov/Content/S earch/ViewCaseReport.aspx?case _id=14-18A. Once that application has been approved, D efendants will be able to beginredeveloping the property. See generally 11 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 2408.1; see also Pls.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj.”), ECF No. 4; Decl. William Merrifiel d ¶ 9, ECF No. 4-3. Along with her complaint, Ms. Borum had filed a motion for a pr eliminary injunction asking the Court to bar “Defenda nts from filing their second-st age PUD application with the Zoning Commission.” Pls.’ Mot. P relim. Inj. at 15. Since Defend ants filed their Second-Stage application before the Court ru led on Ms. Borum’s motion for a preliminary injunction, she

2 Ms. Borum’s expert, Dr. Andrew Beveridge, defines families in two ways in his declaration: “(a) families including only head of household, co -head of household (when applicable), and minor children; and (b) families including hea d of household, co-head of household, minor children, and other non-minor family members.” Regardless of which definition the Court adopts, the re were 118 apartments in Brook land Manor housing minor children and their parents or guardians in January 2017. Decl. Andrew Beveridge (“Beveridge Decl.”) at 4, ECF No. 43-6.4 amended the relief she sought i n her reply brief and asked the Court to “preliminarily enjoin Defendants from displacing families from their homes during the adjudication of these families’ fair housing rights in this acti on.” Pls.’ Reply at 3, ECF No. 20. In response, Defendants filed amotion to dismiss on several gr ounds: lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies; lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the Younger abstention doctrine; ONE DC’s lack of standing; and failure to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16. The Court denied both motions, see Borum v. Brentwood Village, LLC , 218 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016), and ordered the commencementof “limited discovery for the purpose of exc hanging information related to the demographics of Brookland Manor residents as necessary to adjudicate a motion for class c ertification.” Scheduling Order,
ECF No. 34. With the materials from that d iscovery in hand, Ms. Borum has now moved for certification of the followi ng hybrid class under Rules 23(b)(2 ) and (b)(3): All households who reside or have resided at Brookland Manor in a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit with one or more minor chil d, and (i) have been displaced from a three-, four-, or five-bedro om unit at Brookland Manor since Oc tober 1, 2014 (the date that Defendants proposed their First Stage PUD to the Zoning Commission), or (ii) are at risk of being displaced from a thre e-, four-, or five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor. Pls.’ Mot. at 1, ECF No. 43. She a lso moved for the appointment of her legal team as class counsel. Id. at 2. For the reasons set forth be low, Ms. Borum’s motion for class certification is granted in part and denied in part, and her motion for the appo intment of class counsel is granted.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS “A district court exercises br oad discretion in deciding whethe r to permit a case to proceed as a class action.” Hartman v. Duffey , 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However,5 “Rule 23 does not set forth amere pleading standard.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Instead, a plaintiff “must affirmatively demon strate [her] compliance with the Rule—that is, [she] must be prep ared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. “Frequently that ‘rigorous a nalysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. Th at cannot be helped.” Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 351. However, “Rule 23 gr ants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification s tage. Merits questions may be c onsidered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Ru le 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Tr. Funds , 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). When appropriate, district courts m ay redefine classes or subcl asses sua sponte prior to certification. See Rule 23(c)(5); In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation , 594 F.2d 1106, 1129 n.38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Oswald , 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Santillan v. Gonzalez , 388 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Am. Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow , 65 F.R.D. 94, 107 (D. Md. 1974). Becaus e it is the plaintiff, and not the court, who bears the burden of fashioning appropriate class def initions and demonstrating that the requirements of Rule 23 are met for each, it is left to the court’s discretion t o choose whether to intervene in this way. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980). Subclasses must also satisfy all of Rule 23’s requirements in o rder to be certified. See D.L. v. District of Columbia , 713 F.3d 120, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Bynum v. District of
Columbia , 214 F.R.D. 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2003).6 IV. ANALYSIS Ms. Borum has moved for certif ication of the following hybrid class under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3): All households who reside or have resided at Brookland Manor in a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit with one or more minor chil d, and (i) have been displaced from a three-, four-, or five-bedro om unit at Brookland Manor since Oc tober 1, 2014 (the date that Defendants proposed their First Stage PUD to the Zoning Commission), or (ii) are at risk of being displaced from a thre e-, four-, or five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor.

Pls.’ Mot. at 1. For the reasons s et forth below, the Court gra nts certification of the following class under Rule 23(b): All individuals who reside at Brookland Manor in a three-, four -, or five-bedroom unit with one or more minor child, and are at risk of being displaced from a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor as a direct resu lt of the proposed redevelopmen t. A. Rule 23(a) Requirements Rule 23(a) contains four requireme nts for the certification of any class. It provides that “members of a class may sue or be sued as representative partie s on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common t o the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claim s or defenses of the class; and (4) the represent ative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These requirements are often referred to as “numerosity,” “commonality,” “typicali ty,” and “adequacy of representation.” Ms. Borum contends that she has satisfied each of Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites for her entire proposed class, and Defenda nts claim that she has satisf ied none. As explained below, the7 Court finds that Ms. Borum has not satisfied the four prerequis ites for the entire class she proposes, and therefore, her en tire class cannot be certified. But once her original class definition has been divided into two subcla sses, Ms. Borum does satisfy ea ch of the four prerequisites for the subclass of individuals w ho “are at risk of being displacedfrom a three-, four-, or fivebedroom unit at Brookland Manor.” However, she has not yet sati sfied the prerequisites for the subclass of individuals who “have been displaced from a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor since October 1, 2014 (the date that Defendants proposed their First Stage PUD to the Zoning Commission).” A nd as explained further below, this subdivision is appropriate because it will allow members of the class that the Court is already able to determine satisfies the Rule 23(a) prere quisites to proc eed to the next s tage of this litigation without undue delay . See Yaffe v. Powers , 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972) (“[U]nless a claim is pat ently frivolous, [a certifying] court should ask itself: assuming the re are important rights at stake, what is the most sensible approach to the class determination issue which can enable th e litigation to go forward with maximum effectiveness from the viewpoint of jud icial administration?”) 1. Families displaced between October 1, 2014 and the conclusi on of this litigation Ms. Borum has moved to include in her class those “who have res ided at Brookland Manor in a three-, four-, or five - bedroom unit with one of mor e minor child and . . . have been displaced from [those apartmen ts] since October 1, 2014.” Pls. ’ Mot. at 1. For those individuals she seeks damages for “monetar y costs related to moving service s or apartment brokerage fees and increased transportation cos ts to school and work.” Compl. ¶ 123. She also seeks an injunction for them, so that th ey “will have a future opportuni ty to reside at Brookland Manor or the redevelopment property in a three-, four-, and five-bedroomunit.” Id. For the other group of individuals in her proposed cla ss, those who “are at risk of be ing displaced from a three-, four-,8 or five-bedroom unit at Brookl and Manor,” she only seeks an inj unction that would eradicate the disparate impact she alleges the redevelopment plan will have o n minors and their guardians. Pls.’ Reply at 22, ECF No. 52. “The underlying theme [of class ce rtification] is flexibility; different cases call for different approaches.” Lamphere v. Brown Univ. , 553 F.2d 714, 719 (1st Cir. 1977). And while the decision whether and how to certify a class is left to the district court, in some instances “failure to limit overbroad cas es by the use of appropriate sub classes may be an abuse of discretion.” Marcello v. Regan , 574 F. Supp. 586, 591–92 (D.R.I. 1983) (citing Geraghty v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n , 579 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds , 445 U.S. 388 (1980)); see also Fink v. Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. , 772 F.2d 951, 960–61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“the reviewing court may require the district court to consider on the record the possibility of certifying subclasses”). Here, it is appropriate to cons ider those residents who have al ready been displaced or will displaced before the conclusion of this litigation as a separat e subclass because without this separation, the class Ms. Bor um has proposed would be overbroad and ineligible for certification. First, Ms. Borum has moved to include in the cla ss those individuals who have been displaced since October 1, 2014, without specifying whether ind ividuals included in that group need to have been displaced because of the redevelopment in ord er to be included. Therefore, it is impossible to tell from her proposed definition whether thos e individuals have any claims in common, as required by Rule 23(a)(2). See Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 350 (“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate th at the class members ‘have suffe red the same injury.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon , 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). Second, at this point, none of the large apartments on whi ch putative class members rely to house their families have been9 eliminated. Therefore, the cau se of displacement for any of the se putative class members will not be the mere elimination of large apartments, which is the found ational cause of the other class members’ claims. See Hartman v. Duffey , 19 F.3d 1459, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is more to a showing of commonality tha n a demonstration that class pla intiffs suffered discrimination on the basis of membership in aparticular group . . . plaintiffs must make a significant showing to permit the court to infer that members of the class suffered fr om a common policy of discrimination that pervaded all of the [defendant’s] challenge d [] decisions.”). Third, Ms. Borum seeks damages only for di splaced individuals, in order to reimburse them for the costs of their displacement. Those individuals will therefore have diffe rent interests than current residents, including Ms. Borum , who only seek an injunction tha t would grant them a greater likelihood of being able t o remain on the property. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncove r conflicts of interest between named parties and the class th ey seek to repre sent.”). Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Borum’s motion to cer tify the entire class she propo ses. As explained in Section IV.A.2, infra , once displaced individuals are removed from the class, current residents who a re at risk of displacement do sat isfy each of Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites, including comm onality and adequacy of representa tion. Therefore, in order to allow those class members who do s atisfy Rule 23(a)’s prerequis ites the opportunity to proceed with the litigati on without undue delay, the Court exercises it s discretion by s eparating Ms. Borum’s proposed class into two s ubclasses. It does this even t hough the subclass of displaced individuals does not meet the r equirements of Rule 23(a) by its elf, and therefore cannot be certified at this time.10 When deciding whether to certif y subclasses, district courts mu st ensure that each subclass satisfies the requirements of Rule 23. See D.L. v. District of Columbia , 713 F.3d 120, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Ms. Borum’s b riefing paid a great deal of attention to residents of Brookland Manor who she worries a re at risk of being displaced by the elimination of four- and five-bedroom apartments and the reduction in the number of thre e-bedroom apartments. However, her briefing paid very little attention to those resid ents who have purportedly already been displaced by Defendants’ red evelopment plans. Indeed, Ms. Borum does not point to a single individual who has been displaced due to the proposed re development since Defendants submitted their First Stage PUD to the Zoning Commission. As su ch, Ms. Borum has given no indication of how many former residents of Brookland Manor have been displaced, preventing the Court from performing any sort of numerosity analysis for that group. A class representative “must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties” to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement. Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 350. Ms. Borum has not done so here. Because Ms. Borum has not met her burden under Rule 23(a)(1), r esidents who have been displaced cannot be certifi ed as their own subclass. Ms. Borum would also like to inclu de in her class individuals w ho are currently at risk of being displaced, and are then disp laced during the pendency of this litigation, so that they might recover money damages just like former residents who have alrea dy been displaced. Compl. ¶ 123. However, by definition, none of the se individuals exist ye t. Because these individuals do not yet exist, and indeed may neve r exist, if, for example, Pla intiffs succeed in securing an injunction that allows the ent ire class to remain on the property, this subgroup cannot satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement either.11 If, however, this group does come into existence following the Court’s class certification order, or if Plaintiffs are subs equently able to identify indiv iduals who have already been displaced because of the redevelopm ent, Ms. Borum may renew her motion for certification of this subclass. But it should be noted that unless Ms. Borum has also been displaced due to the redevelopment plan by then, her injury (a risk of displacement) will not be typical to those putative class members who have at that point already been disp laced. Therefore, unless Plaintiffs have added a new named pl aintiff whose injury is typ ical of the proposed subclass, and who will be able to fairly and ade quately represent the interes ts of that class, Ms. Borum’s renewed motion for class certi fication would likely be denied then as well. 2. Families still living in th ree-, four-, or five-bedroom apa rtments The remainder of Ms. Borum’s proposed class qualifies for certi fication as a subclass. As explained below, the Court finds that a class of individuals (r ather than households) who are living in three-, four-, and five-be droom apartments that conta in minor children and their guardians and are at risk of being displaced solely due to the redevelopment’s elimination of four- and five-bedroom apartme nts and its reduction in the numb er of three-bedroom apartments satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a). a. Numerosity Ms. Borum first contends that s he has established that her pro posed class is “so numerous that joinder of all members is i mpracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); see also Pls.’ Mem. at 10. “Typically, a class in excess of 40 members is sufficiently num erous to satisfy this requirement,” Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. , 251 F.R.D. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2008), though“[t]here is no specif ic threshold that must be surpassed in order to satisfy the numero sity requirement,” Taylor v. D.C.
Water & Sewer Auth. , 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007).12 Based on the most recently available data, Ms. Borum’s expert, Dr. Andrew Beveridge, estimates that there were 118 f amilies (totaling 543 people) in three-, four-, and five-bedroom apartments in Brookland Manor in January 2017. Beveridge Decl. ¶ 9. 3 Therefore, Ms. Borum argues that the class she propos es is “so numerous that joinder would be impracticable.” Pls.’ Mem. at 10. Defendants object to M s. Borum’s claim of numerosity on several grounds, which the Court addresses in turn below.
i. Occupancy Standards Defendants spend a large portion of their opposition brief att acking the analysis of Ms. Borum’s expert, Dr. Andrew Be veridge, and his estimation of howmany individuals are at risk of being displaced by the redevelopment plan. See Defs.’ Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. Class Cert. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 9–10, 12–24, ECF No. 45. Dr . Beveridge analyzed two things in his declaration: 1) “[t]he number of family households residing in three-, four- an d five-bedroom apartments at Brookland Manor and the family c omposition of those households, ” and 2) “[t]he number of family households living at Brookl and Manor, their family compo sition, and the number of bedrooms for those family compositions required by applicable l aw and regulation.” Beveridge Decl. ¶ 3. In determining the appr opriate number of bedrooms fo r these families, Dr. Beveridge used the D.C. Housing Authority’s voucher size determination re gulations, id. ¶ 6, and found that in 2017, when excluding non-parent a dults from the equation, 81 families totaling 419 people required apartments with three bedrooms or more, and including non-parent adults, 96 families totaling 486 people did. Beveridge Decl. tbls. 5 & 7. Defendant s attack this analysis, arguing that

3 Defendants’ expert, Dr. William Clark, agrees that minor child ren and their guardians resided in 118 of Brookland Manor’s 144 three-, four-, and five -bedroom apartments in January 2017. See Decl. William Clark (“Clark Decl .”) at 4, ECF No. 44-1 (sealed ).13 Dr. Beveridge used an incorrect standard in determining how many bedrooms each family needed, thereby inflating the num ber of individuals who may be harmed by the redevelopment.
See Defs.’ Opp’n at 13. Defendants cl aim that Dr. Beveridge should have used the D.C. Housing Code’s general occupancy standar d, the DCHRA’s occupancy standa rd, or the FHA’s occupancy standard (a statement of policy). See Defs.’ Opp’n at 14–19. The question of what size apartmen t class members require base d on their family size will be crucial in determining whe ther Defendants’ redevelopmen t plan has a disparate impact on residents based on their familial status. However, requiring a determination of which occupancy standards apply to which families at this stage in the litigati on amounts to a requirement that each class member prove that the y will prevail on the merits of their claim. “The concern of Rule 23(a)(1) . . . is membership in the class, not likelihood of su ccess on the merits.” Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia , 306 F.R.D. 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) (ci ting McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:5 (11th ed. 2014) (a determination under Rule 23(a) (1) “does not entail an assessment of how many putative cl ass members ultimately will h ave meritorious claims”)). “Merits questions may be consid ered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class cert ification are satisfied.’” D.L. v. District of Columbia , 713 F.3d 120, 125–26 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Tr. Funds , 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013)). But determining that numerosity cannot be established because only a handful of class members will eventu ally prevail on the merits of their claim “puts the cart before the horse.” Lightfoot v. District of Columbia , 246 F.R.D. 326, 336 (D.D.C. 2007). “[F]or purposes of class certification, the ques tion is how many individuals fall within the class as currently defined.” Id.14 Defendants may be correct that Dr. Beveridge used the wrong st andard in determining how many bedrooms each family requires, thereby inflating the n umber of individuals who will actually be forced to move should the redevelopment proceed una ltered. But such a standard is not relevant to determining how m any families are currently liv ing in large apartments who are at risk of displacement because they will not be able to move b ack into similarly large apartments when the redevelopment is complete, as the class is “currently defined.” Id. At this point in the proceedings, Ms. Borum has demonstrated that that group, so defined, is sufficiently large to satisfy Rule 23(a )’s numerosity requirement.

ii. Non-Parental Adults Next, Defendants argue that “[t ]he class which plaintiff[] def ine[s] is overbroad and runs contrary to this Court’s admon ition because it seeks to include individuals not qualifying for familial status under the FHA and the DCHRA.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 5 . The admonition to which Defendants are referring is the sentence in a footnote in the C ourt’s prior ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc tion, in which the Court noted t hat “by a plain reading of the statutory text, the FHA protec ts only minor children living wit h parents (or similar guardians).”
Borum , 218 F. Supp. 3d. at 26 n.13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k)). It continued that “a group of people cannot talismanically rece ive protection under the FHA j ust because one of them happens to be a parent domiciled with a minor child.” Id. However, while those individuals may not “talismanically” r eceive protection unde r the FHA, they do rece ive protection when they are persons “aggrieved” under the statute, as explained below. “[I]n order to maintain a class ac tion, each member of the clas s must have standing to assert her own claims against the defendant.” Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co. , 862 F. Supp. 2d 322, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The FHA provides th at it shall be15 unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . familial status,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), or to “make, pr int, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the s ale or rental of a dwelling that indicates a ny preference, limitation, or discri mination based on . . . familial status . . . or an intention to make any s uch preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Familial status is define d as “one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with (1) aparent or another person h aving legal custody of such individual or individuals; or ( 2) the designee of such parent o r other person having such custody, with the written permission of s uch parent or other person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). One avenue of recourse for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 is fo r “aggrieved persons” to “commence a civil action in an appr opriate United States distri ct court or State c ourt not later than 2 years after the occurrenc e or the termination of an alle ged discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613. 4 An “aggrieved person” is defi ned as anyone who “(1) claims to have been injured by a discrimin atory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housi ng practice that is about to o ccur.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). The current language of the “familial status” and “aggrieved pe rson” provisions were added to the Fair Housing Act in 1988. “Congress expanded the F air Housing Act to protect against familial status discrimination in light of an express c oncern for the plight of single-parent families, young families with children, and poor families.” United States v. Branella , 972 F.

4 The DCHRA similarly provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cau se of action i n any court of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appr opriate.” D.C. Code § 2- 1403.16.16 Supp. 294, 297 (D.N.J. 1997). And “[i]n a mending the definitionof ‘aggrieved person,’ Congress intended to extend broa d standing principles to those seeking redress under the FHA. The House Judiciary Committee co mmented that the term ‘aggrieve d persons’ in the 1988 amendments ‘adopts as its definition language similar to that c ontained in . . . existing law, as modified to reaffirm the broad holdi ngs of [the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gladstone and Havens Realty ].’” Gorski v. Troy , 929 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2173, 2184 (1988)). ).
In Gladstone , the Court had held that, because Congress intended standing under the FHA “to extend to the full lim its of Art. III, the normal prude ntial rules do not a pply[.] [A]s long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result of the defen dant’s conduct, he is permitted to prove that the rights of another were infringed.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood , 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979). For example, white homeowners could ch allenge two real estate brokerage firms’ practice of “ steering” black homebuyers and wh ite homebuyers to different neighborhoods based on their race , a violation of the FHA, evenwhen the white homeowners who sued had not been steered t o a different neighborhood based on their race, but rather already lived in the neighborhood to whic h black homebuyers were being steered. Id at 111–12

. Their standing was based in “the tran sformation of their neighborhood from an integrated to a predominantly Negro community[,] depriving them of ‘the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.’” Id. The Court was persuaded that the white residents had alleged actual injury caused by the discrimination, including “ the loss of social and professional benefits,” as well as “economic in jury” in the form of the “abs olute or relative diminution in value of the individual respondents’ homes.” Id. at 115.17 As Ms. Borum points out in her reply, courts in other circuits have recognized the broad meaning of “aggrieved person” in the familial status context, and have allowed other co-residents to challenge policies that discriminate against families, simil ar to the way that white residents may challenge policies that disc riminate based on race, even wh en those white residents are not the ones being discriminated aga inst, but have still suffered aconcrete injury. See Pls.’ Reply at 18, 18 n.14. Ms. Borum alleges that put ative class members in this case, including non-parental adults living in large apartme nts with minor children and their guardians, are “at risk of being displaced from a three-, four- , or five-bedroom unit at Brookla nd Manor” by a policy that she hopes to prove has a disparate impact on individuals based on their familial status. If proven, such a risk would be a cognizable injury capable of conferring Article III standing. As such, the Court finds that non-parental adu lts living with minor childrenand their guardians in three-, four-, and five-bedroom apartment s in Brookland Manor have stan ding to sue under the FHA. And because they stand to suffer th e same injury-in-fact as the parents and minors contained within the class—displacement due to the Defendants’ redevelopm ent plan—and seek the same relief—an injunction ordering Defen dants to alter their redevel opment plan in a way that eliminates its disparate impact on families—they are properly c ounted as members of the class for the purposes of numerosity.
iii. Residents of Three-Bedroom Apartments Defendants also argue that Ms . Borum’s “inclusi[on] in the hea dcount of families living in 3BR apartments when the reco rd is uncontradicted that the Re development Plan will include at least 64 3BR apartments” is a nother “glaring deficienc[y]” i n her numerosity analysis. Defs.’ Opp’n at 7. Defendants contend tha t this is a deficiency becaus e fewer than 64 families currently occupy the 75 three-bedroom apartments at Brookland Manor, and therefore are at no risk of18 being displaced. Id. However, as Ms. Borum points out , that contention will be incor rect if “there are not enough larger apartments in the planned development to house appropriately all the families currently living at Brookland Manor.” Pls.’ Reply at 5 . In that case, “families in threebedroom apartments are at just as much risk of displacement as those in four- or five-bedroom apartments.” Id. While some families currently living in three-bedroom apartmen ts will likely be able to stay in such apartment s, and therefore will not be harm ed by Defendants’ actions, others, because they will be competing wit h families currently residing in four- and five-bedroom apartments, will be unable to move into one of the 64 new three -bedroom apartments. Even though, by Defendants’ estimate, t here were only 31 families li ving in three-bedroom apartments in 2017, the number of families that may be displaced from thei r four- or five-bedroom apartments is far larger than 33. See Beveridge Decl. tbl. 1. Thus, when the families displaced by the elimination of the four- and f ive- bedroom apartments are i ncluded in the equation, more than 64 families will be competing for three-bedroom apartments. The refore, families in threebedroom apartments also currentl y suffer a risk of displacement , and are properly included in the class.

iv. Families Whose Minor Children Have Now Turned 18 Defendants next question Ms. Bor um’s inclusion in her headcoun t of families whose children were minors on October 1, 2014 (the date the First-Sta ge PUD application was filed) or on August 26, 2016 (the date the Com plaint was filed), but have now turned 18, or will before 2020, when the anticipated next pha se of the redevelopment planproceeds. Defs.’ Opp’n at 11. Specifically, Defendants claim that 38% of the families occupyi ng large apartments as of June 2017 will no longer qualify for f amilial status protection by 2 020. Id. at 27. Ms. Borum does not respond to the contention that households with children who hav e since turned 18 and no longer19 include any minors should not be c ounted, but does point to the fact that her expert did in fact calculate the number of families with minor children occupying large apartments with data from January 2017. See Pls.’ Reply at 10. Ms. Borum explai ns that she could not calcul ate the number of households more precisely b ecause documents containing Brook land Manor residents’ birthdays were not released to he r, and therefore her expert wa s not able to calculate the number of apartments containing minor children in June 2017, or therea fter. Id. at 10 n.8. Plaintiffs must have live claims at the time of class certific ation. See Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975). Individuals l iving in apartments that no longer have minor children no longer fit within the class de finition of people residing in la rge apartments with minor children and their guardians who are at r isk of displacement. Therefore, individuals in households that no longer contain minor children c annot be counted as class member s going forward. However, Defendants have not argued that excluding the residents of hous eholds that recently housed minor children, but no longer do, from the class member count d ecreases the number of putative class members to a number below forty residents . See Barnes v. District of Columbia , 242 F.R.D. 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park , 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (numerosity presumed at forty class members). Additi onally, the number of households that aged out of the class definition between Januar y 2017 and the certification of this class is likely small, and according to Defendants’ expert , likely fewer than 45. See Clark Decl. at 6. As such, with a count of 118 apartments housing 543 people as recently as last year, the Court finds that Ms. Borum has established numerosity, even excluding those households, which are likely few in number, that no longer contain minor ch ildren.20 v. Impracticability of Joinder In order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1 )’s numerosity requirement, a class must be so numerous that joinder would be impracticab le. Defendants have argued tha t joinder in this case would not be impracticable because class members will be easily identifiable and all live in the same apartment complex. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 43–44. In support of t his argument, Defendants cite to numerous cases in which courts he ld that joinder was practicabl e where class members lived near each other and could be easily reach ed. However, Defendants’ ar gument regarding the practicability of joinde r for the most part relies on the conte ntion that the plai ntiff class is too small, when properly calculated, f or joinder to be impracticabl e. As explained above, the plaintiff class contains hundred s of individuals—far more than the minimum of forty that creates a presumption of the impr acticability of joinder. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia , 246 F.R.D. 326, 335 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Courts in this District have generallyfound that the numerosity requirement is satisfied and that joinder is impracticable wher e a proposed class has at least forty members.”) (citing Bynum v. District of Columbia , 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2003)). As explained in Coleman ex rel. Bunn , apart from the number of class members, “additional factors that courts consider in assessing the pract icability of joinder include: (1) judicial economy arising from a voidance of a multiplicity of ac tions; (2) geographic dispersion of class members; (3) size of indi vidual claims; (4) financial resources of class members; and (5) the ability of claimants to institute individual suits.” Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of
Columbia , 306 F.R.D. 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2015) (in ternal quotation marks omi tted) (citing Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (5th ed. 2014)). This case involves two claims—di sparate impact and discriminat ory statements—which can both be addressed through an i njunction. As such, adjudicat ing each class members’ claims21 together will save resources f or both the parties and the Court . And while the class members in this case are not dispersed—ind eed, they are about as geographi cally concentrated as class members can be—and can be easily i dentified, many of them lack the resources to bring a complex civil rights suit on their own. In some cases in which class members are geographically compact and not too numerous, joinder may not be impracticable. See Frazier v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 851 F.2d 1447, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (find ing that district c ourt’s decision not to certify a class of 28 individuals who all li ved “within a reasonable dist ance of the district court” was soundly within its discretion). B ut in a case such as this, wit h hundreds of class members, where many class members are low income, and many are minor children, the Court finds that to proceed through joinder rather than class action would not onlyoverly burden putative class members, but also very likely was te judicial resources. As such , the Court finds that Ms. Borum has demonstrated that the putativ e class is “so numerous that j oinder of all members is impracticable.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). b. Commonality Ms. Borum also contends that she satisfies Rule 23(a)’s common ality requirement because she is challenging a single policy or practice that has a disparate impact on Brookland Manor residents based on their fam ilial status. Pls.’ Mem. at 1 1–14. Commonality requires a finding that there are “questi ons of law or fact common to the class,” Fed. R. Ci v. R. 23(a)(2). In other words, such claims “must depend upon a common contention . . . that is capable of classwide resolution—which means that the determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes , 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Ms. Borum ar gues that since the law suit in this case is premised on the single policy of e liminating four- and five-bedroom apartments and reducing the22 number of three-bedroom apartm ents, the question of Defendants’ liability based on disparate impact analysis is conducive to class adjudication. Defendants respond that Ms. Borum has not demonstrated that all of the putative class members “suffer[ed] the same i njury.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 38 (quoti ng Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 349). They continue that “District of Columbia precedent establishes that the alleged policy or practice must affect all members of the c lass in the same way to establi sh commonality, and plaintiff, at a minimum, must offer evidence that the class members have in common the elements of those claims.” Id. (citing Parker v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 99 F. Supp. 3d 69, 80 (D.D.C. 2015)). Defendants contend that Ms. Borum has not demonstrated that all members of the putative class will be affected by the policy in the same way because the type of injury sustained by each plaintiff will be “a product of num erous factual inquiries suchas how many individuals within a particular apartment enjoy familial status protection[;] which subsidy program, if any, applies to the specific family[;] what occ upancy standard applies to the f amily[;] what size apartment is dictated by application or the co rrect occupancy standard[;] wh ether alternative apartment configuration, such as adjoini ng units, represent an effective measure to avert injury[;] and whether any particularized defe nses (as are applicable to Plain tiff Holloman) 5 apply.” Id. at 38–
39.

5 Defendants claim that prior t o her move from Brookland Manor a nd dismissal of her claims, Ms. Holloman was “in de fault of her lease due to non-pa yment of rent 28 times during her tenancy,” and had been “sent aNotice of Proposed Terminati on of Tenancy on June 6, 2017.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 30 n.27. They a lso claim that she was “i n default of her lease (should her Declaration be believed) becau se she [wa]s housing an alleged d aughter who has not been declared in her lease and in her certifications t o the landlord .” Id. “Accordingly,” they claim, “there are a myriad of potentially dispositive additional issue s applicable to Plaintiff Holloman but not common to the class which make her an inadequate class representative and may cause her to not be a tenant when this Court reaches the merits of th is controversy.” Id. The Court need not address these issues, as Ms. Holloman is no longer a tenant and has withdrawn from this lawsuit. ECF No. 55, 56.23 “As is now well recognized, the c lass action commonality criter ia are, in general, more easily met when a disparate impact rather than a disparate trea tment theory underlies a class claim.” Garcia v. Johanns , 444 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. , 628 F.2d 267, 274 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980)). While some of the is sues Defendants raise may be relevant to determ ining whether the redevelopment does have a disparate impact on residents based on their familial status, they would serve as components in the overall calculation of whether the policy has a disparat e impact. That does not change the fact that, if Ms. Borum’s claim of disparate impact is proven, all class members will hav e suffered the same injury (the risk of being displaced). See Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 349–350 (“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” (quoting
Falcon , 457 U.S. at 157)). Class members need not be identically situ ated. “[F]or purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single a common question will do.” Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the ques tion of whether this redevelo pment will have a disparate impact based on familial status is one such common question. As such, Ms. Borum has satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. c. Typicality Ms. Borum next contends that her claims are typical of all clas s members’ claims, because she “assert[s] rights under both the FHA and DCHRA base d on the systematic actions of the Defendants.” Pls.’ Mem. at 15. Defendants claim that Ms. B orum’s claim is not typical because she has yet to suffer any displacement and is not at ri sk of being displaced until at least late 2020. Defs.’ Opp’n at 36–37. Additionally, Defendants argu e that Ms. Borum’s claim is not typical of the class’s because she has “non-protected individua ls” (her adult children) living with her, and the protected individuals in her apartment (Ms. Borum and her two minor children)24 could be properly placed within a two-bedroom apartment, of whi ch there will be plenty in the redeveloped Brentwood Village. Id. at 37. Rule 23(a)(3) requires a plaintiff to show that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typi cal of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Generally, “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements . . . tend to merge.” Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 349 n.5. “Both serve as guid eposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interes ts of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Falcon , 457 U.S. at 158 n.13. Typica lity, however, derives its independent legal sig nificance from its ability to “screen out class actions in which the legal or factual position of the representatives is markedly di fferent from that of other members of the class even though common i ssues of law or fact are prese nt.” 7A Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1764 (3d ed. 2017). Here, Defendants have not demonstrated that Ms. Borum’s claims differ significantly from those of other class member s who are still residing at Bro okland Manor. The claims that she brings, and the claims that the class as a whole will bring , are claims of disparate impact and discriminatory statements under state and federal law, the reso lution of which will be subject to common proof (i.e. the policy will either have a disparate impa ct on residents based on their familial status, or it will not). And, if Defendants’ argumenta tion regarding the numerosity and commonality prongs of Rule 23(a) a re any indication, the defens es that Defendants claim apply to Ms. Borum will also be the defenses they use to defend again st the claims of other class members. Therefore, it is clear that Ms. Borum’s claims, and th e defenses she will need to25 address when this case is decided on the merits, will be typica l of the class as a whole. As such, she meets the requireme nts of Rule 23(a)(3). d. Adequacy of Representation Last, Ms. Borum contends that sh e and her attorneys “will fairl y and adequately protect the interests of the cla ss.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see Pls.’ Mem. at 16–17. “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serv es to uncover conflicts of inte rest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (citing
Falcon , 457 U.S. at 157–158, n.13). It “mandates an inquiry into the zeal and competence of the representative’s counsel and into the willingness and ability o f the representative to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect the in terests of absentees.” Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano , 717 F.2d 1451, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. , 677 F.2d 471, 488 (5th Cir. 1982)). Defendants claim that Ms. Borum has not met the adequacy requir ement for several reasons. First, they claim that Ms. Borum has a conflict of int erest with a substantial number of putative class members because there is a “significant disagree ment within the class” about whether the redevelopment shoul d go forward as currently planne d. Defs.’ Opp’n at 32. In support of this contention, Defendants submitted declarations f rom thirty putative class members expressing “support of the Redevel opment Plan” and “disapproval of the instant litigation.” Id. at 33. Defendants also submitted a letter supporting the redevelo pment plan signed by tenants of large apartments, as well as individual letters of support. Id. at 33–34. However, none of these declarations or letters make clear that the signatories or authors knew that the redevelopment woul d not contain apartments as lar ge as the ones they are currently26 living in, or that that is why Ms. Borum and DC ONE have sued. 6 Instead, the declarations vaguely mention that the signato ries support the redevelopment and oppose the litigation. See Attach. to Ex. 5 to Decl. William Casano, ECF No. 47-4. These v ague statements are consistent with the natural sentiment that the signatories oppose litigati on that will prevent them from receiving a new apartment in anewly redeveloped neighborhood, not that they are opposed to receiving a new apartment in anewly redeveloped neighborhood that also contains large apartments. The declarations simply do not indicate a conflict between the signatories’ desires and the actual relief sought by Ms. Borum. However, even if it were indisputably true that these putative class members supported the redevelopment and eliminat ion of large apartments, and therefore opposed litigation a ttempting to secure a number of l arge apartments, these putative class members’ positions would notnecessarily doom the certifi cation of this class. Defendants cite to several cas es to support their contention th at courts should not certify classes when some of the putativ e class members support the pos ition of the defendant rather than the plaintiff. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 35–36. However, in e ach of the cases cited, the interests of the named plaintiffs were deeme d to be in actual conflict with those of the dissenting class members. For example, in Shulman v. Ritzenberg , forty-seven of fifty -three class members submitted affidavits explaining, among other things, that “that they d[id] not believe plaintiff’s conduct [wa]s consistent with the best interests of the joint v entures of which they [we]re

6 Ms. Borum has also raised othe r issues with these declarations , highlighting that “there are serious questions about whe ther the declarants were provide d accurate, unbiased information when asked to sign declarations.” Pls.’ Reply at 19. She claims that some declarants now believe that the lawsuit and the declar ations were “inaccurately descri bed to them,” and that “[o]ne declarant even stated that she did not ever sign a declaration at all and had never seen the declaration until presented to he r by Plaintiffs’ counsel.” Id. at 19–20. While the Court is troubled by these accusations, it need not determine the reliab ility of these declarations at this time, as the declarations do not de monstrate a direct conflict between Ms. Borum and the declarants.27 members.” 47 F.R.D. 202, 207 (D.D.C. 1969). In Schy v. Susquehanna Corp. , 80.8% of stockholders approved of the acti on, the issuance of preferred stock for use in effectuating a merger, that plaintiff was challenging. 419 F.2d 1112, 1116–17 (7th Cir. 1970). And in Spano v. Boeing Co. , the court found that adequacy of representation had not been proven when the proposed class was defined so br oadly that it included individu als who would actually be harmed by the relief plainti ffs sought. 633 F.3d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 20 11). Mayfield v. Dalton was unique among the cases cited by Defendants, as it approved of a distri ct court’s decision to deny class certification on adequacy grounds without proof of conflict whe n there may have been “people among the broad class proposed [] who did not oppose the [chall enged policy], and who, in fact, approved of it and wished the pol icies fully enforced.” 109 F.3 d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1997). In response, Ms. Borum cites to e xamples where courts found tha t disagreement among class members did not defeat a pl aintiff’s claim of adequacy wh ere the disapproving class members’ interests were adequate ly represented by the defendant s. See Pls.’ Reply at 21–22. The Court need not decide which phi losophy should prev ail, as in th is case there does not appear to be any substantial conflict betw een Ms. Borum’s interests and the interests of other putative class members, even the ones who subm itted declarations supporting th e redevelopment. As Ms. Borum explains, she did not file s uit in order t o permanently i mpede the redevelopment of Brookland Manor, but rather to ens ure that she and other reside nts would not be displaced by the redevelopment in a way that di scriminated against them based ontheir familial status. See Pls.’ Reply at 19 n.16. As such, the only c lass members whose interes ts conflict with Ms. Borum’s would be those currently residi ng in large apartments who wish for those large apartments to be eliminated during the redevelopm ent. Since there is no evidence that any such resid ent exists, the28 Court finds that there is no substantial conflict between Ms. B orum’s interests and those of the putative class. Defendants also argue that Ms . Borum cannot serve as an adequa te representative of the class when she “lack[s] any r eal and immediate injury or threat of injury.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 28. This purported lack of a threat of injury is due to her househo ld containing sever al non-parental adults whom Defendants argue a re not entitle d to protection und er the FHA or DCHRA. Id. at 28–29. By excluding the non-covered adults, Defendants argue th at covered members of Ms. Borum’s family would be able t o fit into an apartment with two bedrooms or fewer, of which there will be plenty in the redeveloped complex. Id . In support of this conten tion, Defendants cite

to E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez , an employment discrimination case in which the Supreme Court held that plai ntiffs who had already been determi ned to lack the necessary qualifications for the employmen t at issue could not have suffe red any injury as a result of the employer’s alleged discriminator y practices, and th erefore coul d not adequately represent a class of plaintiffs challenging the discriminatory policy. 431 U.S. 3 95, 403 (1977); Defs.’ Opp’n at 31–32. However, in that case, it ha d already been determined af ter a trial on the merits, which was held prior to the debate ove r class certification, that the plaintiffs had not been harmed by the challenged policy. See Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, Inc. , No. SA-71-CA-302, 1973 WL 200, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 1973). As such, no question o f fact remained as to whether they were appropriately members of the class being considered. Here, Ms. Borum has alleged injuries under the FHA and DCHRA, b oth past (discriminatory statements) and future (displacement that disparately impacts families). These allegations are sufficient to mak e her an adequate representati ve. Whether she and the putative class may succeed on the merits of their disparate impact and d iscriminatory statement claims are29 questions to be determined on sum mary judgment or at trial, but not at the cla ss certification stage. For now, Ms. Borum has a lleged the same type of injury t o herself as she alleges will be suffered by other members of the putative class. As such, she i s an adequate representative to bring these claims on behalf of the class. And because, as expl ained above, she has met each requirement of Rule 23(a), the Cour t next turns to the question of whether she has satisfied the requirements of Rules 23(b)(2). 7 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend , 569 U.S 27, 33 (2013) (“[A] party must not only be prepared t o prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defens es, and adequacy of representation, as required by Rule 23(a),” but “must also sati sfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provis ions of Rule 23(b).” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), B. Rule 23(b)(2) Defendants argue that Ms. Borum ha s not demonstrated that her c lass meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), atype of class action that may be maintained when “the party opposing the class has acted or r efused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or co rresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see Defs.’ Opp’n at 39. “By virtue of its requirement that the plaintiffs seek to redress acommon injury . . . Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive.” Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs’, Local No. 139, AFL–CIO , 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000). “The key to the (b)(2) cla ss is ‘the

7 Ms. Borum also moved for class certification under Rule 23(b)( 3) in order to obtain damages for class members who have already been displaced or ar e displaced during the pendency of this litigation. How ever, as explained above, the C ourt treats these putative class members as a distinct subclass and denies certification of this subclass because it does not meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) . As such, the Court need not det ermine whether those groups meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).30 indivisible nature of the injunc tive or declaratory remedy warr anted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoine d or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’” Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 360 (quoting Ric hard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof , 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)). “As a corollary to this pr inciple, certification is generally ina ppropriate in actions raising sig nificant individual liability or defense issues,” Lightfoot v. Dist rict of Columbia , 273 F.R.D. 314, 329 (D.D.C. 2011), or “when each individual class member would be e ntitled to a different injunc tion or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart , 564 U.S. at 360. But “cases in the civil rights field are illustrative of the types of class actions suitable for certifi cation under (b)(2).” Taylor v. Dist. of
Columbia Water & Sewer Auth. , 241 F.R.D. 33, 47 (D.D.C. 2007) ( internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendants assert that Rule 23(b) (2)’s requirements have not be en met because, in their opinion, not all class members are similarly situated. For exam ple, Defendants argue that, occupants of three-bedroom apartments will not be impacted by t he redevelopment in the same way as residents of four- and five-bedroom apartments, nor will occupants of apartments that contain multiple small families be impacted in the same way as apartments that contain one large one. Defs.’ Opp’n at 39. Because these various class members ar e not identically situated, Defendants claim that “it cannot be concluded that any single i njunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to eac h member of the class.” Id. However, as Ms. Borum explains i n her motion for class certific ation, she is seeking an injunction that would do two things : require “Defendants to mod ify their redevelopment plan in a manner so as to eradicate dispar ate impact,” Pls.’ Reply at 22, and preclude “Defendants from making further statements that discriminate against families.” Pls.’ Mem. at 19. Ms. Borum is31 not requesting any particular rem edy as to any particular famil y. Because Ms. Borum has challenged a single policy and a s ingle set of statements, whos e harm, should liability be found, could be remedied by court orders a pplicable to all class membe rs, she has demonstrated that this suit satisfies the require ments of Rule 23(b)(2).
C. Class Counsel Ms. Borum also moves, unopposed, for the appointment for her le gal team as class counsel. See Pls.’ Mem. at 24–25. Rule 23(g) pr ovides that a court must app oint adequate class counsel to represent the class after considering : (1) the work counsel has done in i dentifying or investigating poten tial claims in this action, (2) counsel’s experience in handling cla ss actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action, (3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law, and (4) the resources counsel will comm it to representing the class. Johnson v. District of Columbia , 248 F.R.D. 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2008) (in ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ms. Borum’s l egal team, comprised of multipl e attorneys with experience in complex civil and civil rights li tigation, meets all of these r equirements. See Decl. Maureen F. Browne, ECF No. 43-3; Decl. Matth ew Handley, ECF No. 43-4. As s uch, the Court grants Ms. Borum’s motion to appoint her curre nt legal team as class couns el.

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certifi cation (ECF No. 43) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART , and Plaintiffs’ Motio n for Appointment of Class Counsel (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED . The following class is hereby CERTIFIED under Rule 23(b)(2):32 All individuals who reside at Brookland Manor in a three-, four -, or five-bedroom unit that houses one or more minor child and his o r her guardian, and are at risk of being disp laced from a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor as a direct result of t he proposed redevelopment. An order consistent with this Me morandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: February 12, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge