Present: All the Justices 

JIMMIE D. JENKINS, DIRECTOR, FAIRFAX 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS 

AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 

 OPINION BY 

 v. Record No. 092272 JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 January 13, 2011 

RAJ MEHRA, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

This appeal challenges a trial court's judgment refusing to 

hold a party in contempt after having found that the party 

failed to abide by the terms of a prior order of the court 

awarding injunctive relief. We will dismiss the appeal because 

this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the 

refusal to find civil contempt. 

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

The events culminating in this appeal originated in 2005, 

when the Fairfax County Department of Public Works and 

Environmental Services (DPWES) issued notices to Raj Mehra and 

Urvashi Mehra (the Mehras), advising them that certain 

conditions on their real property located in Fairfax County 

violated particular provisions of various Fairfax County 

ordinances.1 The notices asserted violations in regard to a 

 

1

 The specific Fairfax County ordinances at issue were the 

Chesapeake Bay Preservation Ordinance, Fairfax County Code 

§ 118-3-2(f), and the Erosion and Sediment Control Ordinance, 

Fairfax County Code § 104-1-2, in addition to Fairfax County 

Public Facilities Manual § 6-0202.4. 
drainage system on the real property and an impervious area 

greater than 18 percent of the total area of the Mehras' real 

property. In the notices, DPWES ordered the Mehras to take 

corrective actions to bring their real property into compliance 

with the relevant ordinances. 

In September 2007, Jimmie D. Jenkins, the Director of 

DPWES, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that the 

Mehras had neither complied with the notices of violation, 

requested reconsideration of DPWES' decision, nor appealed that 

decision. Jenkins requested the circuit court to declare that 

the Mehras' real property was in violation of the relevant 

Fairfax County ordinances and to issue injunctive relief 

requiring the Mehras to correct the violations on their real 

property. The circuit court entered a consent order in 

September 2008, which declared that the Mehras' real property 

was in violation of particular ordinances and directed the 

Mehras to bring their real property into compliance according to 

a schedule set forth in the consent order. 

Because the Mehras did not comply fully with the terms of 

the consent order, Jenkins filed a motion for a rule to show 

cause why the Mehras should not be held in contempt for 

violating the order. The circuit court subsequently issued a 

rule to show cause, and at a hearing on that rule, the Mehras 

stipulated that they had not performed certain actions required 

2 
by the consent order. Urvashi Mehra, however, testified that 

her husband had lost his job after the entry of the consent 

order and that a lack of funds prevented the Mehras from 

completing the work required by the order. The circuit court 

held that "the terms of the Order of September 12, 2008 have not 

been met, but that the violation is not willful and therefore 

not contemptuous." Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the 

rule to show cause. 

Jenkins filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, inter alia, 

that civil contempt does not require a finding of willfulness on 

the part of the offending party. The circuit court denied the 

motion, again finding that the Mehras' noncompliance "was not in 

bad faith or willful disobedience" of the September 2008 order. 

We awarded Jenkins this appeal, limited to two assignments 

of error. In those assignments of error, Jenkins asserts that 

the circuit court erred in dismissing the rule to show cause on 

the basis that the Mehras did not willfully violate the consent 

order because civil contempt does not require a finding of 

willfulness. Assuming arguendo that willfulness is relevant, 

Jenkins further contends the circuit court erred in refusing to 

hold the Mehras in contempt because their failure to comply with 

the consent order was "based on their own financial priorities." 

In the order awarding the appeal, this Court, sua sponte, 

directed the parties to address "whether, under the facts of 

3 
this case, the appellant [Jenkins] has standing to appeal a 

judgment of the circuit court declining to hold a party in civil 

contempt and, if so, whether the jurisdiction for appeal is 

governed by Code § 19.2-318, requiring transfer of the appeal to 

the Court of Appeals of Virginia, or by Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) or 

(B)(3)." Jenkins v. Mehra, Record No. 092272 (March 16, 2010). 

We will address only the jurisdictional issue because it is 

dispositive.2 See Parrish v. Jessee, 250 Va. 514, 520, 464 

S.E.2d 141, 145 (1995) ("Jurisdiction is always a threshold 

issue."). 

ANALYSIS 

This Court's "jurisdiction is defined by the [C]onstitution 

of the state and the laws passed in pursuance thereof." Forbes 

v. State Council, 107 Va. 853, 855, 60 S.E. 81, 81 (1908); see

also Va. Const. art. VI, § 1 (subject to certain limitations, 

the General Assembly has "the power to determine the . . . 

appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth"). The 

jurisdictional inquiry that we must undertake is twofold. We 

must first determine whether Code § 19.2-318 governs this 

 

2

 Subsequent to the parties' filing their respective briefs 

in this Court, the Mehras moved to dismiss the appeal on the 

basis that the matter is now moot because they have taken the 

required actions to comply with the consent order. In response, 

Jenkins did not specifically dispute the Mehras' assertions but, 

instead, asserted several reasons why the motion should be 

denied. Because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive, we 

will not decide the motion to dismiss. 

4 
appeal, in which case jurisdiction would lie in the Court of 

Appeals of Virginia. If we answer that question in the 

negative, then we must ascertain whether this Court has 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Code § 8.01-

670(A)(3).3

We begin our analysis by noting that "[t]he right of 

appellate review from a finding of contempt or a refusal to find 

contempt did not exist at all at common law."4 Tyler v. 

Baltimore Cnty., 259 A.2d 307, 310 (Md. 1969); see Cossart v. 

State, 14 Ark. 538, 541-42 (1854); Cooper v. People, 22 P. 790, 

795 (Colo. 1889); Hunter v. State, 6 Ind. 339, 340 (1855); New 

England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 

1944); Masonite Corp. v. International Woodworkers of Am., AFL 

CIO, 206 So. 2d 171, 177 (Miss. 1967). Rather, when not 

otherwise provided by statute, "the sole adjudication of 

contempt, and the punishment thereof, belong[ed] exclusively, 

 

3

 The provisions of Code § 8.01-670(B)(3) are not applicable 

because the order being challenged in this appeal is not 

interlocutory. See Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Board 

of Supervisors of Chesterfield Cnty., 277 Va. 293, 306, 672 

S.E.2d 870, 876 (2009). 

4

 In fact, the common law tolerated no exception to a 

court's contempt powers, rejecting even collateral attacks on 

judicial findings of contempt. See Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 

38, 43-45 (1822) (joining the English Court of Common Pleas in 

rejecting an application for a writ of habeas corpus on the 

ground that "no Court can discharge . . . a person that is in 

execution by the judgment of any other Court" for contempt 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

5 
and without interference, to each respective court." Wells v. 

Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 500, 503-04 (1871) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Van Dyke v. Superior Court of 

Gila Cnty., 211 P. 576, 588 (Ariz. 1922); Ex parte Senior, 19 

So. 652, 653 (Fla. 1896); Masonite, 206 So. 2d at 177. 

Appellate courts were thus without jurisdiction to review such 

findings. See, e.g., Onomea Sugar Co. v. Austin, 5 Haw. 604, 

606 (1888) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal of a 

finding of civil contempt); Hunter, 6 Ind. at 340 ("Courts of 

record have exclusive control over charges for contempt; and 

their conviction or acquittal is final and conclusive."); Tyler, 

259 A.2d at 311 (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal 

of a denial of contempt); State v. Little, 94 S.E. 680, 681-82 

(N.C. 1917) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal of a 

finding of criminal contempt); see generally Cooper, 22 P. at 

795 (discussing common law rule and statutory exceptions 

thereto). This general rule applied to trial court rulings with 

respect to both civil and criminal contempt. See, e.g., Austin, 

5 Haw. at 606; Sandberg, 54 N.E.2d at 917. 

Under the common law, the lack of appellate review from a 

finding of contempt or the refusal to find contempt was 

justified as necessary because 

the power of the . . . courts over contempt is 

omnipotent, and its exercise is not to be enquired 

into by any other tribunal. This is the great bulwark 

6 
established by the common law for the protection of 

courts of justice, and for the maintenance of their 

dignity, authority and efficiency, and neither in 

England nor in the United States has this unrestricted 

power been seriously questioned. 

Senior, 19 So. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

"[T]he power to punish for contempt was so absolutely essential 

to the functioning and, indeed, the existence of courts that to 

be effectual the power must be instantly available and 

inevitable to the point of not being subject to change." Tyler, 

259 A.2d at 310. To allow "a contumacious witness, juror, party 

litigant, or counsel" to challenge a finding of contempt on 

appeal would "effectually check the machinery of the court in 

its operation, and frustrate the wholesome administration of the 

law." Cossart, 14 Ark. at 541. 

The General Assembly has declared that in the Commonwealth, 

"[t]he common law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to 

the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this 

Commonwealth . . . continue[s] in full force [and is] the rule 

of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly." Code 

§ 1-200; see also Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 83-84, 695 S.E.2d 

173, 176-77 (2010). Thus, because a trial court's ruling 

regarding contempt was not appealable under the common law, we 

must determine whether the General Assembly has abrogated the 

common law rule to provide a right of appeal from contempt 

proceedings, particularly a trial court's judgment refusing to 

7 
find civil contempt. In making that determination, this Court 

must read the enactments of the General Assembly, which " 'is 

presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in 

the enactment of a statute,' " in conjunction with the common 

law, giving effect to both " 'unless it clearly appears from 

express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of 

the statute was to change the common law.' " Isbell v. 

Commercial Inv. Assocs., Inc., 273 Va. 605, 614, 644 S.E.2d 72, 

75-76 (2007) (quoting Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 215 Va. 

274, 276, 208 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1974)). Abrogation of the common 

law thus occurs only when "the legislative intent to do so is 

plainly manifested," as "there is a presumption that no change 

was intended." Id. at 613-14, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

But, even where a statute's purpose is to abrogate the 

common law, such statute is " 'to be strictly construed and not 

to be enlarged in [its] operation by construction beyond [its] 

express terms.' " Id. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting 

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 181, 142 

S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965)). Thus, " '[w]hen an enactment does not 

encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it 

abrogates the common[] law rule only to the extent that its 

terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.' " 

8 
Id. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 

Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988)).

Starting with Code § 19.2-318, its provisions, in relevant 

part, state: "From a judgment for any civil contempt of court an 

appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals. A writ of error 

shall lie from the Court of Appeals to a judgment for criminal 

contempt of court." The version of this statute in effect prior 

to the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1984 provided in 

pertinent part: "To a judgment for any civil or criminal 

contempt of court a writ of error shall lie from the Supreme 

Court of Virginia." Code § 19.2-318 (1984). 

The first two enactments of what is now Code § 19.2-318 

permitted a writ of error "in any judgment, for contempt, 

rendered by any court other than the court of appeals [now the 

Supreme Court of Virginia]." 1826 Acts ch. 18; see also 1848 

Acts ch. 120 (enacting new Title III, Chapter 24, Section 6 of 

the Criminal Code, pertaining to contempts). In addition to the 

1848 act being part of the Criminal Code, both acts stated that 

nothing therein "shall be construed to extend to any proceeding 

by attachment to compel the performance of any decree or 

judgment, or to enforce obedience thereto," i.e., the kind of 

civil contempt at issue in this appeal. 1826 Acts ch. 18; 1848 

Acts ch. 120. By enacting these provisions, the General 

Assembly "plainly manifested" an intent to abrogate the common 

9 
law to allow an appeal from a judgment for criminal contempt. 

See Isbell, 273 Va. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75. In the 1860 Code, 

the statutory provision allowing a writ of error to a judgment 

for contempt still excluded a judgment for civil contempt of the 

type at issue here: "To a judgment against a free person for a 

contempt of court, other than for the non-performance of, or 

disobedience to, a judgment, decree, or order, a writ of error 

shall lie." Code 1860, Ch. 209, § 4, p. 840 (emphasis added). 

In 1898, the General Assembly enacted a statute providing 

that in "any case of contempt[,] any judgment of conviction 

therefor may be reviewed on [a] writ of error." 1898 Acts ch. 

513; Code 1898, ch. 282, § 3768. In Trimble v. Commonwealth, 96 

Va. 818, 32 S.E. 786 (1899), this Court applied former Code 

§ 3768 to award a writ of error to a trial court's judgment for 

contempt in a matter involving custody of a child. Id. at 820, 

32 S.E. at 786. Finding that Code § 3768 allowed the appeal, 

this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 

820-21, 32 S.E. at 787. In 1904, however, the General Assembly 

repealed the portion of former Code § 3768 that allowed, on a 

writ of error, review of a judgment of conviction in "any case 

of contempt." 1904 Acts ch. 194. Following that repeal, the 

1904 Code provided, in regard to appeals from contempt 

proceedings: "To a judgment for a contempt of court, other than 

for the nonperformance of, or disobedience to, a judgment, 

10 
decree, or order, a writ of error shall lie to the supreme court 

of appeals." Code § 4053 (1904). 

That statute, in particular the language "other than for 

the non-performance of, or disobedience to, a judgment, decree, 

or order," was at issue in Forbes. There, the defendants had 

been adjudged in contempt for "disobeying, disregarding, and 

evading" a trial court's decree. Forbes, 107 Va. at 854, 60 

S.E. at 81. On appeal, this Court dismissed the writ of error 

for lack of jurisdiction under the plain language of former Code 

§ 4053 of the 1904 Code because the contempt was for disobeying 

a lawful decree of the trial court. Id. at 857-59, 60 S.E. at 

82. The Court explained that "the theory upon which section 

4053 rest[ed], in providing that a writ of error shall lie to 

this [C]ourt to all judgments for contempt other than for the 

nonperformance of or disobedience to a judgment, decree, or 

order, seems to be that in such case the parties to the cause 

should either appeal from the judgment, decree, or order, if 

they felt aggrieved by it, or, it if was a lawful decree or 

order, that it should be obeyed." Id. at 858, 60 S.E. at 82. 

Less than two months after the decision in Forbes, the 

General Assembly amended former Code § 4053 to read: "To a 

judgment for a contempt of court a writ of error shall lie to 

the supreme court of appeals." 1908 Acts ch. 194. With that 

amendment coming soon after Forbes, the General Assembly may be 

11 
understood to have intended, although it did not expressly 

state, that appeals would lie from judgments for civil contempt. 

The General Assembly made that explicit in 1979 when the 

provision was amended to state: "To a judgment for any civil or 

criminal contempt of court a writ of error shall lie from the 

Supreme Court of Virginia." 1979 Acts ch. 649. Finally, in 

1984, the General Assembly amended the statute to its current 

form. 

As this history makes clear, the provisions of Code § 19.2-

318 and its statutory predecessors, including the short-lived 

§ 3768 of Ch. 282 of the 1898 Code, abrogated the common law 

rule only with regard to judgments for contempt. Thus, the 

question remaining is whether, in the instant case, the circuit 

court's judgment refusing to find civil contempt is a "judgment 

for any civil contempt." Code § 19.2-318. 

Jenkins argues that because Code § 19.2-318 encompasses 

only "a judgment for" contempt (emphasis added) and because the 

circuit court's judgment did not find civil contempt, the 

statute does not govern this appeal. Jenkins also asserts that 

Code § 19.2-319, which allows a court to postpone the execution 

of a "judgment for any civil or criminal contempt," makes clear 

that the term "judgment for" does not include a trial court's 

refusal to hold a party in civil contempt. Jenkins argues that 

although Code § 19.2-318 does not govern the instant appeal, 

12 
this Court nevertheless has jurisdiction pursuant to Code 

§ 8.01-670(A)(3). 

The Mehras respond that Jenkins' position would result in 

the "illogical and inconsistent jurisdictional arrangement" of 

appeals from judgments holding persons in civil contempt lying 

with the Court of Appeals but appeals from judgments refusing to 

hold persons in civil contempt resting in this Court. The 

Mehras contend that an equally faithful interpretation of Code 

§ 19.2-318 is that a trial court's decision refusing to find a 

party in civil contempt is simply not appealable. However, if 

an appeal does lie from such a judgment, the Mehras contend that 

the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 

Code § 19.2-318. 

In interpreting the terms used by the General Assembly in 

Code § 19.2-318, we are bound by the plain meaning of the 

statutory language. Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 

S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008). "[I]f the language of a statute is 

unambiguous, courts may not interpret the language in a way that 

effectively holds that the General Assembly did not mean what it 

actually expressed." Id. We agree with Jenkins that Code 

§ 19.2-318 does not govern this appeal. The phrase "judgment 

for any civil contempt" plainly means a judgment holding an 

individual in civil contempt of court. If the General Assembly 

intended to create appellate jurisdiction to review a judgment 

13 
refusing to hold a person in civil contempt, it would have used 

a phrase such as "judgment concerning" or "judgment regarding" 

any civil contempt. Furthermore, the second sentence in Code 

§ 19.2-318 contains the same phrase with regard to a criminal 

contempt: "A writ of error shall lie from the Court of Appeals 

to a judgment for criminal contempt of court." (Emphasis 

added.) 

In addition, as noted by Jenkins, Code § 19.2-319 utilizes 

the same phrase in authorizing a court to postpone execution of 

a "judgment for any civil or criminal contempt." Obviously, 

postponement of a judgment refusing to hold a person in civil or 

criminal contempt is unnecessary. Moreover, the General 

Assembly has used the phrase "judgment for" in many instances 

throughout the Code in which the phrase can only mean a judgment 

awarding a certain type of relief. See, e.g., Code § 8.01-38.1 

(if punitive damages award is above statutory cap, trial judge 

is required to "enter judgment for such damages in the maximum 

amount provided by this section"); Code § 8.01-446 (requiring 

circuit court clerks to docket "any judgment for a specific 

amount of money"); Code § 8.01-460 (stating that a "judgment for 

support and maintenance" of a spouse or children is a lien on 

the obligor's real estate). "It is a common canon of statutory 

construction what when the legislature uses the same term in 

separate statutes, that term has the same meaning in each unless 

14 
the General Assembly indicates to the contrary." Commonwealth 

v. Jackson, 276 Va. 184, 194, 661 S.E.2d 810, 814 (2008). 

Thus, we conclude that Code § 19.2-318 does not provide 

appellate jurisdiction for either this Court or the Court of 

Appeals to review the judgment of the circuit court dismissing 

the rule to show cause and refusing to hold the Mehras in civil 

contempt of court. Finding no abrogation of the common law rule 

in the current or former versions of Code § 19.2-318 that would 

give the Court jurisdiction of this appeal, we turn now to Code 

§ 8.01-670(A)(3), which, according to Jenkins, allows the 

instant appeal to this Court. 

In its current form, Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) provides that 

"any person may present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme 

Court of Virginia if he believes himself aggrieved . . . [b]y a 

final judgment in any . . . civil case." The origins of that 

statute can be traced to the Revised Code of 1803, which gave 

this Court jurisdiction over "writs of error . . . to and from 

any final decree or judgment of the High Court of Chancery, 

General Court, and District Courts." 1 Rev. Code 1803, ch. 63, 

§ 14, p. 62. That provision gradually became more specific, as 

the General Assembly limited its application to civil cases. 

For example, in 1830, the General Assembly provided an appeal 

for any person "aggrieved . . . by any judgment, proceeding or 

order" of the circuit superior courts of law and chancery "in 

15 
any matter, cause or controversy, at common law, such matter, 

cause or controversy, being civil and not criminal in its 

nature, and such judgment, proceeding or order, being final." 

1831 Acts ch. 11. In the 1860 Code, the provisions dealing with 

civil appeals were codified in separate titles from those 

governing criminal appeals. See Code 1860, Tit. 51, ch. 182 

(civil cases) and Tit. 55, ch. 209 (criminal cases). The 

pertinent statute, at that time, allowed an appeal or writ of 

error "to any civil case wherein there is a final judgment, 

decree or order." Code 1860, ch. 182 § 2. The current version 

of Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) has been in existence since 1977. 1977 

Acts ch. 617. 

Considering, as we must, that the General Assembly "had the 

common law in mind" when it first gave this Court appellate 

jurisdiction to review final judgments in civil cases, we 

conclude that the current and former versions of Code § 8.01-

670(A)(3) never abrogated the common law rule with respect to an 

appeal from a trial court's judgment refusing to hold an 

individual in civil contempt. First, it does not "clearly 

appear[] from express language or by necessary implication that 

the purpose of [Code § 8.01-670(A)(3)] was to change the common 

law." Isbell, 273 Va. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75-76 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Merely stating that a party may 

appeal from "any" final judgment in a civil case does not 

16 
"plainly manifest[]," see id. at 613, 644 S.E.2d at 75, an 

intent to eliminate the "great bulwark established by the common 

law" providing that judgments in contempt proceedings were 

unassailable. Senior, 19 So. at 653 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).5 Furthermore, any suggestion that the word "any" can 

be construed as an express abrogation of the common law to allow 

an appeal from a refusal to find civil contempt is refuted by 

the history of Code § 19.2-318. 

As we have explained, Code § 19.2-318, at its inception, 

permitted a writ of error only to a judgment for criminal 

contempt and expressly excluded "any proceeding by attachment to 

compel the performance of any decree or judgment, or to enforce 

obedience thereto." 1826 Acts ch. 18. Prior to this enactment, 

however, Code § 8.01-670's predecessor was already in existence 

and allowed a writ of error "to and from any final decree or 

judgment." 1 Rev. Code 1803, ch. 63, § 14, p. 62. If the 

General Assembly intended for that language in the Code of 1803 

to abrogate the common law rule so as to allow an appeal from a 

judgment in a civil contempt proceeding, whether from a judgment 

for contempt or the opposite, the subsequent enactment of the 

1826 version of Code § 19.2-318 rendered the two statutes in 

 5

 For an example of the kind of "plain[] manifest[ation]" 

that suffices to abrogate the common law, see Doss v. Jamco, 

Inc., 254 Va. 362, 368-72, 492 S.E.2d 441, 445-47 (1997). 

17 
conflict, the former allowing an appeal from a judgment in a 

civil contempt proceeding and the latter excluding such. 

Moreover, since the 1826 version of Code § 19.2-318 was enacted, 

the former and current versions of Code §§ 8.01-670(A)(3) and 

19.2-318 have continued to co-exist and would be in conflict 

today if we construe Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to allow an appeal to 

this Court from a judgment refusing to find civil contempt. 

Code § 19.2-318, being the more specific statute because it 

explicitly addresses contempt, see Viking Enter. v. County of 

Chesterfield, 277 Va. 104, 110, 670 S.E.2d 741, 744 (2009), 

allows an appeal only from a "judgment for" civil contempt. 

Further, if we interpret Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to give this 

Court jurisdiction of the instant appeal, there would exist the 

anomaly of jurisdiction lying in the Court of Appeals from a 

judgment holding an individual in civil contempt but 

jurisdiction lying in this Court from a judgment refusing to 

find an individual in civil contempt. We do not believe the 

General Assembly intended such an anomaly. Thus, we conclude 

that the General Assembly has abrogated the common law rule that 

appellate review of contempt proceedings is not available only 

with regard to judgments "for" contempt. Consequently, the 

Court does not have jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) to 

hear this appeal. 

18 
CONCLUSION 

In sum, we conclude that it does not "clearly appear[] from 

express language or by necessary implication that the purpose of 

[Code § 8.01-670(A)(3)] was to change the common law" with 

respect to appeals from judgments refusing to find civil 

contempt. See Isbell, 273 Va. at 614, 644 S.E.2d at 75-76 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The General Assembly has 

yet to abrogate the common law rule to confer jurisdiction over 

the appeal in this case.6 While the former and current versions 

of Code § 19.2-318 abrogated the common law so as to allow 

appeals from judgments for civil contempt, this case does not 

involve an appeal from such a judgment.7

 6

 We are aware that appeals have been taken, though not to 

this Court, when a party challenged a trial court's refusal to 

hold the other party in civil contempt. See, e.g., Barnhill v. 

Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 704, 427 S.E.2d 209, 214-15 (1993); 

Wells v. Wells, 12 Va. App. 31, 36, 401 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1991); 

Willis v. Spinner, Record No. 1004-99-2, slip op. at *5 (Oct. 

19, 1999). It appears, however, that the issue of appellate 

jurisdiction was not raised in those cases. 

7

 In this case, Jenkins asked the circuit court to enforce 

its own order through the use of the court's inherent contempt 

power. See Wells, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 503. There are certain 

statutes, however, that address the power of contempt in 

specific situations. See, e.g., Code § 2.2-2635 ("Any person 

failing to comply with [a subpoena duces tecum] shall be subject 

to punishment for contempt by the court issuing the subpoena."); 

Code § 3.2-4726 ("All parties disobeying the orders or subpoenas 

of the Commissioner [of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs] are 

guilty of contempt and shall be certified to an appropriate 

court for punishment."); Code § 8.01-407(A) ("Failure to respond 

to [a summons to testify] shall be punishable by the court in 

which the proceeding is pending as for contempt."); Code § 16.1-

252(J) ("Violation of any [preliminary removal] order [in cases 

19 
For these reasons, we hold that the Court is without 

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We will therefore dismiss the 

appeal. 

Dismissed. 

 

of child abuse or neglect] issued pursuant to this section shall 

constitute contempt of court."); Code § 26-13 (Fiduciary 

refusing to file inventory after prior order "shall be deemed 

guilty of contempt of court, and be dealt with accordingly."). 

This appeal does not present, and today we do not address, 

whether a court's decision declining to exercise its contempt 

power pursuant to such provisions is reviewable on appeal. 

20