United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-30752 

____________ 

Cedric Otkins, Jr., 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Jack Gilboy, Sergeant; Barrett Pearse, Officer; William 

Roth, Officer; Joshua Deroche, Officer; Unidentified 

Parties, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 2:21-CV-1275 

______________________________ 

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

This case arises out of the arrest of Cedric Otkins, Jr. Following his 

arrest, Otkins brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

officers who participated in his detention and the search of his vehicle. The 

officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment, 

which the district court granted. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

October 5, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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precludes summary judgment as to Sergeant Jack Gilboy, we VACATE and

REMAND. However, we AFFIRM the district court’s order as it relates 

to the remaining defendants. 

I 

In July 2020, Otkins parked his car in the parking lot of the East Bank 

Bridge Park after it had closed, violating St. Charles Parish Ordinance Section 17-2. Spotting Otkins’s car, Sergeant Jack Gilboy of the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office pulled his patrol SUV behind Otkins’s vehicle to investigate. Conflicting testimony exists as to what happened next.1

 Sergeant Gilboy testified that, as he approached Otkins’ closing car door, the odor of marijuana “fann[ed]” towards him. Otkins, however, maintains that Sergeant 

Gilboy approached Otkins while he waited at the back of his vehicle, after the 

door closed. Otkins claims that, because his doors and windows were closed, 

Gilboy could not have detected marijuana. 

Sergeant Gilboy then retrieved Otkins’s driver’s license, conducted a 

computer check, and found an outstanding attachment for Otkins’s arrest. 

Gilboy then called for backup and requested a canine unit, ostensibly because 

he smelled marijuana near Otkins’s vehicle. Officers William Roth and Barrett Pearse arrived several minutes later, followed by Officer Joshua Deroche 

with a drug-detecting dog. Following an alert from the dog, officers searched 

the vehicle and found approximately twenty grams of marijuana in Otkins’s 

trunk, along with a glass smoking pipe, a digital scale, and a grinder. 

The officers then arrested Otkins. Although exact estimates vary, all 

parties agree that Otkins was arrested less than an hour after the stop began. 

_____________________ 

1

 No footage exists of Sergeant Gilboy’s initial encounter with Otkins. Sergeant 

Gilboy activated his dashcam footage when other officers arrived on scene, after their initial 

encounter concluded. 

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Otkins was charged under Louisiana law for drug possession, but his charges 

were ultimately dismissed. 

Otkins brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

officers who participated in the detention and search. He alleges that the 

officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful 

searches and seizures. The officers moved for summary judgment on 

qualified immunity, which the district court granted. Otkins appeals. 

II 

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standards as the district court.” DeVoss v. Sw. Airlines Co., 

903 F.3d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” 

if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 

2012). A dispute of fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the 

outcome of the case. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th 

Cir. 2000). 

“In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment decision, we 

must consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to 

[Otkins], drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the conclusion that 

[he] has raised a jury issue on his claims.” Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 

665 (5th Cir. 2023). 

III 

To prevail, Otkins must overcome the officers’ qualified immunity 

defense, which “includes two inquiries. The first question is whether the 

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officer violated a constitutional right. The second question is whether the 

right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” 

Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). 

“We can decide one question or both.” Id. Here, the district court decided 

only the first issue, and concluded that no genuine issues of material fact 

precluded summary judgment. As to Sergeant Gilboy, we disagree. 

The protection of the Fourth Amendment “extends to vehicle stops 

and temporary detainment of a vehicle’s occupants.” United States v. 

Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013). After lawfully stopping a driver 

for a traffic violation, an officer’s actions must be “reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances that justified the stop of the vehicle in the first 

place.” Id. (quoting United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 

2011)). The stop may last no longer than necessary to address the traffic 

violation, and constitutional authority for the seizure “ends when tasks tied 

to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). During a traffic stop, an 

officer may permissibly check the driver’s license, determine whether there 

are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspect the automobile’s 

registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 

U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979)). 

The Fourth Amendment, however, tolerates additional investigation 

unrelated to the safe and responsible operation of the vehicle if that 

investigation is supported by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal 

activity. Id. at 354-55, 358. If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of 

such activity “in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the 

stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new 

reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.” United States v. 

Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2005)). The smell of marijuana 

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emanating from a vehicle may give officers reasonable suspicion to extend the 

detention and probable cause to search the vehicle. United States v. Conley, 

No. 22-30037, 2023 WL 2327457, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (“When Trooper Langley smelled the odor of marijuana, he 

developed the necessary reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity 

to extend the detention beyond the time it took to investigate Conley’s traffic 

offense.”); United States v. Garcia, 592 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1979) (per 

curiam) (holding that reasonable suspicion “was supplied by the smell of the 

marijuana”). 

A 

We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to 

Sergeant Gilboy. The parties agree that the initial stop was lawful, but 

disagree on whether Sergeant Gilboy could have smelled marijuana, and thus, 

whether the subsequent detention was lawful. The district court concluded 

that Sergeant Gilboy had reasonable suspicion to extend the detention, 

relying on his testimony that he smelled marijuana. Otkins, however, 

contends there are genuine issues of material fact that call into question 

whether Sergeant Gilboy could have smelled marijuana. Specifically, he 

argues that there are issues concerning the timing of Otkins’s and Sergeant 

Gilboy’s exits from their vehicles, the manner of storage and location of the 

marijuana, and Sergeant Gilboy’s “inability to specify” whether the 

marijuana was raw or burnt. The district court concluded that these disputes 

were immaterial. We do not. 

Both parties agree that Otkins exited his car first. They also agree that 

Sergeant Gilboy was parked approximately fifteen feet behind Otkins. From 

there, the testimony differs. Sergeant Gilboy testified that he “smelled the 

odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle” when he was “three or four 

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feet” from it. He further explained that the odor “fann[ed]” towards him 

when Otkins closed his car door. 

Otkins, however, offered evidence that he exited his car and waited 

near the trunk, with his door and windows fully closed, for Sergeant Gilboy 

to approach. Under this version of the facts, Sergeant Gilboy was much 

farther than “three or four feet” from the Otkins’s closing door. Otkins also 

points out the improbable timeline to which Sergeant Gilboy testified. Gilboy 

testified that Otkins opened his door first, and that it took Otkins 

“[a]pproximately two seconds” to close it. In essence, then, Gilboy’s 

testimony is that he opened his door, closed it, and covered the fifteen feet 

between them within the two seconds it took Otkins to close his door, to be 

in a position to smell the “fann[ed]” odor. 

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Otkins, Sergeant Gilboy 

was up to fifteen feet away from the car door when it closed, not three. We 

agree with the district court that the dueling accounts alter the timeline by 

only a few seconds. We conclude, however, that this distinction presents a 

genuine issue of material fact. A reasonable jury could conclude that 

Sergeant Gilboy could not have smelled the odor of marijuana “fanning” 

from a distance farther than three feet, and accordingly, that he lacked 

reasonable suspicion to further detain Otkins. Summary judgment was thus 

improper as to Sergeant Gilboy.2

 See Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d 

269, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of summary judgment for 

_____________________ 

2

 The parties agree that prolonging an otherwise completed detention to conduct 

a dog sniff, absent reasonable suspicion, violates the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez v. 

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015) (holding that police may not extend an otherwise 

completed traffic stop, in order to conduct a dog sniff, absent reasonable suspicion). 

Because there is a fact issue regarding reasonable suspicion for the dog sniff here, however, 

we cannot say whether Sergeant Gilboy’s actions violated a clearly established right, and 

we must remand. 

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qualified immunity where fact issues remained regarding whether officers 

smelled marijuana). 

B 

We now turn to the responding officers. The district court concluded 

that qualified immunity applied to Officers Pearse, Roth, and Deroche, 

because Sergeant Gilboy, in its view, smelled marijuana and had reasonable 

suspicion to prolong the detention. 

Whether Sergeant Gilboy smelled marijuana, standing alone, is not 

dispositive of the lawfulness of the other officers’ action, as the district court 

suggested. Rather, the proper inquiry where an officer acts on the oral 

statements of another officer is whether “it was objectively reasonable for 

him to believe, on the basis of the statements,” that he had a sufficient basis 

for his actions. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 2009) 

(alteration omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 

1997)). In other words, Officers Pearse, Roth, and Deroche are entitled to 

qualified immunity if they “reasonably believe[d]” Sergeant Gilboy’s 

statement that he smelled marijuana. Id. 

For example, we held in Deville that a responding officer was 

qualifiedly immune because he “reasonably believe[d]” another officer’s 

oral statements that there was probable cause to arrest. Id. at 166-67. There, 

the evidence showed that the initial officer communicated the reason for the 

traffic stop to the responding officer, and no evidence showed that the 

responding officer had a “reason to disbelieve” the statements. Id. 

Accordingly, we affirmed summary judgment as to the responding officer, 

even though we reversed as to the initial officer, because fact issues called 

into question whether he, in fact, had probable cause. Id. at 166. 

So too here. The record reveals that Sergeant Gilboy communicated 

to the responding officers over the radio that he smelled marijuana when he 

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requested backup, and nothing in the record indicates that Pearse, Roth, or 

Deroche had any reason to doubt the veracity of Sergeant Gilboy’s statement. 

Otkins suggests that racial animosity played a role in the detention and 

created circumstances “conducive to lying.” Simply put, Otkins’s race has 

no bearing on whether Pearse, Roth, and Deroche reasonably believed 

Sergeant Gilboy’s statement that he smelled marijuana—which he made 

over the radio, well before the responding officers knew Otkins’s race.3

 

Otkins also offers excerpts from the officers’ discussion before arresting 

Otkins, but this too says nothing about whether they “had a reason to 

disbelieve” the “account of criminal activity from a seemingly reliable 

witnessing officer.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 167. The cited exchange concerns 

only the pending arrest, and does not reveal their views on Sergeant Gilboy’s 

statement. 

Because Otkins has not identified a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the reasonable believability of Sergeant Gilboy’s statement, 

summary judgment was proper as to these defendants. 

IV 

Having determined that genuine issues of material fact preclude 

summary judgment for qualified immunity as to Sergeant Jack Gilboy, we 

VACATE the district court’s order granting defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to him, and REMAND to the district court. 

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3

 For example, Otkins suggests that Roth’s use of the term “brother” when 

speaking to him was a “micro-aggression,” charged with racial connotations. Regardless 

of that term’s meaning, Roth’s use of it says nothing about whether he reasonably believed 

Gilboy’s radio call that he smelled marijuana. 

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However, we AFFIRM the order granting summary judgment as it relates 

to Officers Barrett Pearse, William Roth, and Joshua Deroche.4

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4

 Several unidentified persons appear on the caption as “Unidentified Parties.” 

The district court granted final judgment in favor of these unidentified parties. The 

appellate briefing, however, does not address these parties. Therefore, we do not consider 

that part of the judgment on appeal. 

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