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No. 99-476 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2000 MT 101N 

AMADO GERRY LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff and Appellants,

v.

MUSSELSHELL COUNTY; MUSSELSHELL COUNTY 

SHERIFF, G. PAUL SMITH, individually and in his official 

capacity; MUSSELSHELL COUNTY ATTORNEY JOHN 

BOHLMAN, individually and in his official capacity; and 

MUSSELSHELL COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES ORVILLE 

"BUZZ" JONES; "DUTCH" VAN SYCKEL; WANDA 

SPAULDING; and WOODROW "WOODY" WEITZEIL, 

individually and in their official capacities, 

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Musselshell,

The Honorable John McKeon, Judge presiding.

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COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Matthew J. Sisler; Sisler Law Firm, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondents:

Steve R. Milch; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich,

Billings, Montana

James D. Walen; Stacey & Walen, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: December 9, 1999 

Decided: April 20, 2000

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating 

Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title, 

Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to 

West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.

1. ¶2 Amado Lopez (Lopez) appeals from the Order entered by the Fourteenth Judicial 

District Court, Musselshell County, granting partial summary judgment to the 

defendants and dismissing several of his claims. We affirm.

2. ¶3 We rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:

3. ¶4 1. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the defendant law 

enforcement agents and dismissing all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against them related 

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to the alleged unlawful arrest and false imprisonment of Lopez?

4. ¶5 2. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to John Bohlman in 

his official capacity and dismissing all claims against him arising out of his 

prosecutorial function as the Musselshell County Attorney?

5. ¶6 3. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to John Bohlman and 

dismissing all claims against him related to his role in assisting law enforcement 

agents in arresting Lopez?

6. ¶7 4. Did the District Court err in granting partial summary judgment to the 

defendants on Lopez's conspiracy claims?

7. ¶8 5. Did the District Court err in awarding the defendants costs?

BACKGROUND

1. ¶9 In early 1995, law enforcement personnel in Musselshell County began receiving 

threats of bodily harm from Rodney Skurdal (Skurdal), a so-called "Freeman" who 

resided in a cabin south of Roundup, Montana. On February 22, 1995, FBI Special 

Agent Tommie Canady informed Musselshell County Sheriff G. Paul Smith that a 

"reliable source" told him an individual named Jacobi and others were planning to 

"kidnap and lynch a judge in Musselshell County." Sheriff Smith disseminated that 

information to his deputies, hired reserve deputies and placed law enforcement in 

Musselshell County on "heightened security." Sheriff Smith also increased security 

in the courthouse and assigned deputies to protect Judge Roy Rodeghiero and escort 

him to and from his residence.

2. ¶10 At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 3, 1995, Reserve Deputy Mike Thomas 

observed a man in the Musselshell County Courthouse whom he believed was 

performing reconnaissance prior to a possible kidnaping. Deputy Thomas described 

the individual and what he observed to Deputy Orville Jones and stated that the 

individual left the courthouse, got into a white flat-bed truck with dual tires with 

another individual and drove south on Main Street.

3. ¶11 Deputy Jones located the flat-bed truck on Main Street and noticed it had no 

rear license plate. He stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as Dale Jacobi 

(Jacobi), who did not have a driver's license. Jacobi was arrested for no driver's 

license, no current registration, and no proof of liability insurance.

4. ¶12 Deputy Jones conducted a pat-down search of Jacobi and discovered a revolver. 

The passenger in the vehicle, Frank Ellena (Ellena), met the description of the 

person Deputy Thomas had observed in the courthouse. Deputy Jones discovered 

Ellena was in possession of a pistol and arrested both men for carrying concealed 

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weapons. Jacobi and Ellena also had a two-way radio in the vehicle.

5. ¶13 Jacobi and Ellena were taken to the sheriff's office, booked and incarcerated. 

Since Jacobi and Ellena were armed and possessed a two-way radio, Sheriff Smith 

and his deputies believed there could be other people in other vehicles involved in a 

possible attempt to kidnap Judge Rodeghiero.

6. ¶14 A search of Jacobi's flat-bed truck located several weapons and ammunition, 

including four SKS assault rifles and two bandoliers of ammunition. A bundle of 

flex-cuffs, pepper spray, duct tape and sophisticated radio communication 

equipment also were recovered from the vehicle. Deputy Jones called Musselshell 

County Attorney John Bohlman (Bohlman), explained the situation and asked him 

to come to the sheriff's office and determine the charges to be filed against Jacobi 

and Ellena.

7. ¶15 Cajun James (James), Paul Stramer (Stramer) and Lopez witnessed Jacobi and 

Ellena's arrests. Stramer called John Trochmann (Trochmann) at the Skurdal cabin 

and informed him of the arrests. Stramer, James and Lopez then returned to the 

cabin.

8. ¶16 Trochmann, Mark Basque (Basque), James, Stramer and Lopez subsequently 

"left [the cabin] to go look for Dale Jacobi and Frank Ellena." At approximately 

6:00 p.m., deputies saw two vehicles containing five men park at opposite ends of 

the sheriff's office parking lot in what appeared to be an effort to block the entrance. 

One vehicle was backed into a parking space in what Deputy "Dutch" Van Syckel 

thought was preparation for a quick get-away. Deputy Van Syckel also observed at 

least one person talking on a handheld radio.

9. ¶17 James, Stramer and Lopez exited the vehicles and entered the sheriff's office. 

Prior to doing so, Stramer removed his pistol from his holster and left it in his truck. 

James entered the sheriff's office carrying a pistol in a holster.

10. ¶18 Inside, the three men requested the return of their personal property and, 

specifically, the two-way radio seized from Jacobi and Ellena. They also asked 

Deputy Van Syckel, through the security window, why Jacobi and Ellena had been 

arrested. The deputy saw Stramer's holster protruding beneath his jacket and shouted 

"I see a gun." James then revealed the pistol in his holster and Deputy Van Syckel 

shouted "I see another gun."

11. ¶19 At that point, Deputy Jones burst through the door separating the officers from 

James, Stramer and Lopez with a shotgun and Deputy Van Syckel followed with his 

handgun drawn. James, Stramer and Lopez were arrested, handcuffed and placed on 

the floor.

12. ¶20 While Deputy Wanda Spaulding guarded the three men, Deputies Jones and 

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Van Syckel investigated Trochmann and Basque who were waiting outside. 

Deputies Jones and Van Syckel subsequently arrested Trochmann and Basque and 

placed them face down on the floor of the sheriff's office with James, Stramer and 

Lopez.

13. ¶21 Bohlman had arrived at the sheriff's office before the two vehicles. When the 

two vehicles arrived in the parking lot, Deputy Jones handed Bohlman his handgun 

and Bohlman remained in an interior office of the building. Bohlman came out of 

the office after the five men were lying on the floor; Deputy Jones took his handgun 

back and gave Bohlman the shotgun. Deputy Spaulding and Bohlman were 

instructed to "cover" the men while Deputies Jones, Van Syckel and Woodrow 

Weitzeil searched them and escorted them to a holding cell.

14. ¶22 Information regarding the arrests was submitted to Bohlman and the Montana 

Attorney General's Office to determine the appropriate charges. The State of 

Montana (State) subsequently charged James, Stramer and Lopez with criminal 

syndicalism, intimidation, and tampering with evidence. Trochmann and Basque 

were charged with criminal syndicalism, intimidation by accountability, and 

attempted tampering with evidence. John Connor, Jr., of the Attorney General's 

Prosecution Services Bureau, took over the case and dismissed the charges after 

further investigation based on his decision that they could not be proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

15. ¶23 Lopez and others subsequently sued Musselshell County, Sheriff Smith, 

Deputies Jones, Van Syckel, Spaulding and Weitzeil, and Bohlman under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, and for various tort claims relating to the men's arrests. As amended, their 

complaint set forth five causes of action which are discussed as necessary below.

16. ¶24 Musselshell County, the defendant law enforcement agents--Sheriff Smith and 

Deputies Jones, Van Syckel, Spaulding and Weitzeil--and Bohlman subsequently 

moved for summary judgment and the District Court entered its order granting 

summary judgment in part and denying it in part. Lopez's remaining claims 

proceeded to trial and the jury found in the defendants' favor. Lopez appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. ¶25 We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, 

using the same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria applied by the district court. Clark v. 

Eagle Systems, Inc. (1996), 279 Mont. 279, 283, 927 P.2d 995, 997 (citations 

omitted). Under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is proper when no 

genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

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a matter of law. 

2. ¶26 The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of 

genuine issues of material fact. Clark, 279 Mont. at 283, 927 P.2d at 997 (citation 

omitted). If this burden is satisfied, the party opposing summary judgment must 

present material and substantial evidence, rather than conclusory or speculative 

statements, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Clark, 279 

Mont. at 283, 927 P.2d at 998 (citation omitted). We review a district court's 

conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Clark, 279 Mont. at 284, 

927 P.2d at 998 (citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION

1. ¶27 1. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the 

defendant law enforcement agents and dismissing all § 1983 claims against 

them related to the alleged unlawful arrest and false imprisonment of Lopez?

1. ¶The District Court concluded, on the basis of the undisputed facts, that the 

defendant law enforcement agents had probable cause to arrest and detain Lopez, 

rather than a mere suspicion of criminal activity. It expressly determined that "these 

trained officers had facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable 

person to believe an offense or offenses were being committed. One of the offenses 

reasonably believed committed included conspiracy or the planning to kidnap and 

perhaps kill a judge."

2. ¶A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if probable cause exists to 

believe the person is committing, or has committed, an offense and existing 

circumstances require immediate arrest. Section 46-6-311(1), MCA.

[P]robable cause is established if the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal 

knowledge, or related to the officer by a reliable source, are sufficient to warrant a 

reasonable person to believe that another person is committing or has committed an 

offense. A probable cause determination must be based on an assessment of all relevant 

circumstances, evaluated in light of the knowledge of a trained law enforcement officer. 

Mere suspicion on the officer's part is not enough to establish probable cause to believe a 

person has committed an offense.

State v. Williamson, 1998 MT 199, ¶ 21, 290 Mont. 321, ¶ 21, 965 P.2d 231, ¶ 21 (citations omitted). 

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Moreover, if probable cause existed for Lopez's arrest, it is "an absolute bar to a Section 1983 claim for 

unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution." See Schertz v. Waupaca County (7th 

Cir. 1989), 875 F.2d 578, 582.

1. ¶In support of their summary judgment motion, the defendant law enforcement 

agents submitted the following deposition testimony which they contended 

established the absence of genuine issues of material fact relating to probable cause 

to arrest Lopez. Agent Canady informed Sheriff Smith of a tip from a reliable source 

that someone named Jacobi and others were planning to "kidnap and lynch a judge 

in Musselshell County." In response, Sheriff Smith hired reserve officers, placed his 

department on heightened security, increased security at the courthouse and 

assigned deputies to escort Judge Rodeghiero to and from his home.

2. ¶Jacobi and Ellena were arrested--in possession of SKS assault rifles, ammunition, 

flex-cuffs, pepper spray and sophisticated radio equipment--after conducting what 

appeared to Deputy Thomas to be a reconnaissance of the courthouse. Shortly 

thereafter, telephone inquiries about the arrests began.

3. ¶Within two hours, two vehicles--containing five men--arrived and parked at 

opposite ends of the sheriff's office parking lot. One was backed into a parking 

space in what Deputy Van Syckel believed to be "preparation for a quick get-away." 

James, Stramer and Lopez entered the sheriff's office, requested the return of a radio 

seized from Jacobi and Ellena and asked why the arrests had been made. Deputy 

Van Syckel saw the bottom of a holster protruding from one of their jackets and 

a .45 semi-automatic pistol in a holster worn by another. At this point, Deputies 

Jones and Van Syckel arrested James, Stramer and Lopez.

4. ¶Based on this testimony, we conclude the defendant law enforcement agents 

established the absence of genuine issues of material fact relating to probable cause 

to arrest Lopez. The information within their personal knowledge and relayed by a 

reliable source constituted sufficient facts and circumstances to lead a reasonable 

person to believe an offense, such as conspiracy to kidnap or kill a judge, was being 

committed. See § 46-6-311(1), MCA; Williamson, at ¶ 21.

5. ¶Lopez contends, however, that Agent Canady and Sheriff Smith's testimony 

regarding the tip from a reliable source that a plan was afoot to "kidnap and lynch a 

judge in Musselshell County" was lacking in documentation. He urges this lack of 

documentation creates a factual issue as to whether or not the defendant law 

enforcement agents had knowledge of the tip. His reliance is misplaced.

6. ¶Agent Canady and Sheriff Smith's sworn testimonies are sufficient to establish the 

absence of an issue of fact relating to the tip. The burden then shifted to Lopez to 

come forward with material and substantial evidence, rather than conclusory or 

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speculative statements, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 

See Clark, 279 Mont. at 283, 927 P.2d at 998 (citation omitted). He failed to do so. 

While Lopez indicates written evidence or phone records "would substantiate (or 

not)" Agent Canady's testimony regarding the tip, it was his burden to produce such 

evidence.

7. ¶Lopez also argues that, since he was not carrying a weapon and all charges against 

him ultimately were dismissed, he committed no offense. Accordingly, he contends 

the defendant law enforcement agents mistakenly assumed and speculated about his 

involvement and this is an insufficient basis for probable cause. However, the 

existence of probable cause to arrest is premised on circumstances as they exist at 

the time, not matters determined subsequent to that time. See, e.g., § 46-6-311(1), 

MCA; Williamson, at ¶ 21. Probable cause to arrest, once it exists, is not "undone" 

by later events. See State v. Kelly (1983), 205 Mont. 417, 431, 668 P.2d 1032, 1040.

8. ¶Lopez having failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding probable 

cause, the probable cause barred § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest and false 

imprisonment. See Schertz, 875 P.2d at 582. We hold, therefore, that the District 

Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendant law enforcement 

agents and dismissing Lopez's § 1983 claims based on unlawful arrest and false 

imprisonment.

9. ¶2. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Bohlman in his 

official capacity and dismissing all claims against him arising out of his 

prosecutorial function?

1. ¶The District Court granted partial summary judgment to Bohlman and dismissed 

Lopez's claims arising out of Bohlman's prosecutorial function as the Musselshell 

County Attorney based on prosecutorial immunity. On appeal, Lopez asserts error 

only as to the court's application of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity to his 

claims against Bohlman in Bohlman's official--not individual--capacity. He cites to 

two cases for the proposition that immunities such as prosecutorial immunity are 

personal to the individual and, therefore, can be applied only to claims against a 

person in her or his individual capacity and not to official capacity claims which are, 

in essence, claims against the employing governmental units.

2. ¶The problem with Lopez's argument is that, as the defendants point out, he did not 

present it in the District Court. There, Lopez's one-paragraph response to Bohlman's 

contention that he was entitled to prosecutorial immunity was simply that Bohlman's 

"request is without merit." No legal authorities or analyses whatsoever were 

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presented on the subject of prosecutorial immunity. Nor did Lopez assert any 

distinction regarding application of the doctrine insofar as individual or official 

capacity claims were concerned.

3. ¶We generally do not consider an issue presented for the first time on appeal 

because "it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly 

on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Unified Industries, Inc. 

v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, ¶ 15, 289 Mont. 255, ¶ 15, 961 P.2d 100, ¶ 15 (citation 

omitted). Having failed to raise the issue of whether prosecutorial immunity applies 

to his official capacity claims against Bohlman in the District Court, Lopez waived 

his right to raise it on appeal.

4. ¶We hold that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Bohlman 

and dismissed all claims against him arising out of his prosecutorial function as the 

Musselshell County Attorney.

5. ¶3. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Bohlman and 

dismissing all claims related to his role in assisting law enforcement agents in 

arresting Lopez?

1. ¶The District Court granted Bohlman summary judgment and dismissed Lopez's 

claims for excessive use of force in assisting the defendant law enforcement agents 

in arresting Lopez. The court explained

the undisputed facts are that . . . at the direction of the law enforcement officers, Bohlman 

guarded the three Plaintiffs on the floor of the Sheriff's Department briefly while Deputies 

Jones and Van Syckel went to investigate the two men waiting outside in the vehicle. In 

the course of guarding these Plaintiffs, [Bohlman] may have pointed [a weapon] at 

Plaintiffs. In light of the probable cause to arrest for commission of a conspiracy offense 

and with other men waiting outside, such use of force, without more, is entirely 

reasonable. Plaintiffs failed to present any facts to show additional actions by [Bohlman] 

during their arrest. As a matter of law, [Bohlman] did not use excessive force in the arrest 

of Plaintiffs. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).

The District Court also dismissed Lopez's tort claims against Bohlman relating to 

Bohlman's actions in assisting the deputies based on the immunity set forth in § 46-6-402

(2)(b), MCA.

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1. ¶Lopez primarily contends that Bohlman is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity 

for his role in Lopez's arrest. As set forth above, however, the District Court did not 

grant summary judgment on these claims on the basis of prosecutorial immunity.

2. ¶Lopez also argues Bohlman was not justified in pointing a loaded firearm at his 

head. In this regard, he contends Bohlman was engaged in a conspiracy to deprive 

him of his constitutional right to due process of law, probable cause to arrest was 

lacking and, in any event, Bohlman's action was unreasonable.

3. ¶Claims for excessive use of force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the 

Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor (1989), 490 U.

S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 454. "[T]he 'reasonableness' 

inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the 

officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham, 

490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 456 (citation omitted).

4. ¶We need not reiterate the facts set forth above which were sufficient to establish 

probable cause to believe that Lopez was involved in a conspiracy to kidnap or kill a 

judge and which set the stage for Bohlman's actions of "covering" or even pointing a 

weapon at Lopez. In light of those facts and the circumstances facing Bohlman, his 

actions were objectively reasonable.

5. ¶Moreover, a peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of other 

persons and, in such an event, the person "is not civilly liable for any reasonable 

conduct in aid of the officer." Sections 46-6-402(1) and (2)(b), MCA. In this case, 

Deputy Jones gave Bohlman a weapon and directed him to cover the suspects while 

they were searched and placed in a holding cell. Bohlman's conduct in aiding the 

deputy at the deputy's direction was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, 

the District Court did not err in concluding that Bohlman is immune from civil 

liability pursuant to § 46-6-402(2)(b), MCA.

6. ¶We hold the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Bohlman and 

dismissed all claims related to his role in assisting law enforcement agents in 

arresting Lopez.

7. ¶4. Did the District Court err in granting partial summary judgment to the 

defendants on Lopez's conspiracy claims?

1. ¶The defendants moved for summary judgment on, and dismissal of, all the 

conspiracy claims against them. They relied on the determination by the Seventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals in Kunik v. Racine County (7th Cir. 1991), 946 F.2d 1574, 

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1580 (citation omitted), that "[a] complaint inadequately alleges conspiracy when 

the facts it alleges are vague, conclusionary and include no overt acts reasonably 

related to the promotion of the alleged conspiracy."

2. ¶The District Court made findings regarding Lopez's conspiracy claims and 

concluded that only one was supported by allegations which were not "merely 

conclusory and too vague." Accordingly, it dismissed all but one of Lopez's 

conspiracy claims.

3. ¶Lopez asserts the court erred in precluding him from presenting his claim of a 

conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment and due process rights. In this regard, 

he contends probable cause did not exist for his arrest and, as a result, he was 

inappropriately detained. Having determined above that probable cause existed for 

the arrest, we need not address this contention further.

4. ¶We hold the District Court properly granted partial summary judgment to the 

defendants on Lopez's conspiracy claims.

5. ¶5. Did the District Court err in awarding the defendants costs?

1. ¶After a trial on Lopez's remaining claims, the jury returned a verdict on April 27, 

1999, in the defendants' favor. The defendants filed and served a memorandum of 

costs and disbursements two days later and Lopez objected to the costs on May 10, 

1999. The District Court subsequently awarded the defendants their costs.

2. ¶Lopez contends that the defendants defended against the claims of six plaintiffs in 

this case and that the case was intertwined with a related action by Trochmann. We 

need not address Lopez's contention, however, because the record is clear that his 

objections to costs were not timely filed under § 25-20-502, MCA. Accordingly, 

Lopez waived his right to object to the defendants' claimed costs.

3. ¶We hold the District Court did not err in awarding the defendants costs.

4. ¶Affirmed.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER 

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/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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