W hi l e t here are t wo plai nt i f f s- ap p el l ant s, we wi l l ref er t o t he i njured p art y i n t he si ngul ar. 1

M r
. M a r t i n w a s n ot i n h i s w i fe ’ s v e h i c l e a t t h e t i me of t h e a c c i de n t

. Hi s c l a i m i s f or l os s of

c on s or t i u m. 2 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 10 , 200 4 S es sio n TERES A A. MARTIN, ET AL 

### . v. JOHNN Y L . D RIN NON Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Haw kin s County No. 5174J K ind all T. L aws on, Jud ge

No. E2003-02106-COA- R3-CV - F ILED AUGU ST 18, 2004

This liti g ation arises out of a two-vehic le collision in Hawkins County . Tere sa A. Martin (“the pla in ti f f ” ) a n d h e r h u s b a n d s u e d th e d r iv e r o f th e o th e r v e h ic le , Jo h n n y L

. D r in non (“the 1 2 defe ndant”) , seeking damag es and char g ing him with common l aw a nd statutory acts of ne g lige nce. The de fenda nt answer ed and f iled a counte rcla im. The jury returne d a ver dict, fi n ding the parties equally at fault. J udg ment was entered on the j ury ’s verdict and the tria l court denie d the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The plaintiff a ppeals, ra ising, in ef

fec t, three issues

. W e v ac at e t h e trial c ou rt ’s jud g me nt a ndre ma ndfo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Vacat ed; Case R em anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.
Phill ip L . Boy d, Roge rsville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellants, Ter esa A . Martin and Paul Martin.
J ack M. V aug hn and Da niel D. Coug hlin, King s p o r t, T ennesse e, for

the appe llee, JohnnyL . Drinnon.
OP IN ION11 : 00 p. m. t o 7 : 00 a
. m. 3
-2- I.
T h e ac ci d en t occur

red on June 29, 1999, at appr ox imately 8:00 a.m. The de fenda nt was proce eding north on State Hig hway 66, shortly

afte r completing the “g rave y ard” shift at work. The 3 plaintiff was a lso procee ding north on Highw ay 66; she was to the rea r of, a nd immediately

behind, the def endant’ s vehicle. The plaintiff testified that she w as at lea st 48 f eet in bac k of the de fenda nt’s vehicle, noting that “[i] t could’ve be en more , I don’t know.” At the s ite of the a ccide nt, northbound t ra ff i c i s limit ed to one lane as is southbound traffic . The pa rties wer e proc eeding uphill; a short distance to the north, the road be nds to the rig ht. J ust south of the acc ident scen e, t h er e is an interstate- type exit to t he rig ht off the northbound traff ic lane of Hig hway 66.
The defe ndant testified that he was moving at a spe ed of 20 to 25 mph. The pla intiff stated that her spe ed wa s 20 mph. I t was day light, and w eathe r wa s not a fac tor. The a ccide nt occu rred when the de fenda nt’s vehicle sudde nly beca me per

pendicular

to traff ic and wa s struck in the left side by the fr on t of

the pla int if

f’ s v e hic le , c a us ing e xten siv e da ma g e to bo th v e hic le s a nda lle g e dly c a us ing the pla int if

f t o s us ta in p e rs on a l in

jurie s.
II.
Th e pla int if

f t e sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt lef t Hi ghway

66 a ndpu lle d o nto the e xit, o nly to s u d d e n l y c o m e b a c k

o n t o t h e h i g h w a y:

. . . I wa s h e a de d n orth o n 6 6 a nd I wa s hea de d tow ard – y ou ha ve to c ro ss t he br idg e g oin g no rth, bu t th e re ’s a lso a n o ff -ra mp tha t e xits of f t o th e ri g ht t o g o in to t ow n o n Mai n S tr eet . Andthe ve hic le in fr o n to f m e t o o k

a r i gh tt o go t o t o wn an d I wa s s t i l l p ro ce ed i n g t o go no rth o n 6 6 w he n a ll o f a su dd e n thi s ve hic le that ha d turne d ri g ht t o g o to town whipped bac k around into m y lane and it scooted my car all the way

acr oss the southbound la ne that wa s coming toward me ,

. . . . The plaintiff insisted that the c ollisi on occur red in t he northbound lane of traf fic a nd that, afte r colliding, the vehicles “scoote d” into the southbound tra ffic la ne. The investigating of fice r testified that he found the car s in the southbound traffic lane whe n he ar rived a t the scene

. The plaintiff told the jury that she did not see a turn sig nal from the de fenda nt’s vehicle a nd did not observe any brake lights before the collision. The office r conf irmed her testimonythat she did not l e a v e a n y

s k idma rk s
. H e a ls o s tate d th a t th e r e w e r e n o s k idma rk s f r o m th e d e f

e n d a nt’s vehicle.-3-

Th e de fe nd a nt’ s v e rs ion of e ve nts wa s so me wh a t di ff e re nt. He te sti fi e d th a t he didno t e xit Hi g hw a y 66 , p oin tin g ou t th a t he wa s o n th e wa y ho me fr om w or

k a ndthat hi s n a tur a l r ou te ho me wa s to c on tin ue no rth o n 6 6. He tol d th e jury that just be fo re the a c c ide nt, he sa w a d og sta nd ing in his la ne of

tr a ff ic “ no t mo re tha n tw o o r thr e e c ar l e ng ths ” a wa y fro m hi s v e hic le . H e app lie d h is br a ke s h arda nd , o bs e rv ing no tr a ff ic pr oc e e din g so uth bo un d, he turne d sha rp ly to the le ft

to a vo id striki ng the do g . He sta te d tha t the sit e of the c oll isi on wa s in the so uth bo un d la ne . H e sa id tha t hi s ve hic le didno t mo ve a ft e r i mpa c t. H e state d th a t ha d th e pla int if f n ot c oll ide d w ith him , h e wo uld have c ompleted a U- turn and be en hea ding ba ck south on 66.
The de fenda nt testified that he d i d not see the pla intiff’s vehicle befor e the impac t. There we re no oth e r w itn e sse s to the a c c ide nt.
III

. The plaintiff r aises four issues, but two of them are fac tual assaults on the jury ’s ver dict and c a n b e state d mo re c or

re c tly a s o ne iss ue . T he pla int if f’ s is su e s r a ise the fo llo wi ng qu e sti on s:
1

. I s there materia l evidence to support the jury verdic t that the pla int if f w a s g uil ty

of the sa me de g re e of

fa ult a s th e de fe nd a nt?
2. Did the trial court commit r ever sible err or in failing to instruct the jury reg arding th e s t atut ory

violations charg ed in the plaintiff’ s c omp la int ?
3. Did t he trial c ourt err

in failing to gr ant a mistrial base d upon a comment m ade by

the def endant’ s counsel in opening statement that the plaintiff had “ settled” a claim ar ising out of an acc ident that had occur red be fore the trial of the instant c ase?
We f indthe fi rs t is su e to b e dis po sit ive of thi s a pp e a l.
I V.
When – as in the instant case – the trial court approve s the jury ’s ver dict, the ver dict cannot be succ essfully

assaulted on the f

acts unless ther e is no materia l evidence in the rec ord to support it. Fo s te rv . Amc o n I

nt ’ l. , I nc. , 62 1 S.W. 2d14 2, 14 6 ( Te nn . 1 98 1) ; S. Ry. Co. v. Sloan , 407 S.W .2d 205, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965). I t is not our prerog ative to weig h the evidence. Me mphis v . Be tti s , 5 12 S.W. 2d27 0, 27 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 4) . I f the re is ma te ri a l e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su sta in the ver dict, the trial court’s judgme nt, on the fac ts, must be affirme d.-4- V.
The de fenda nt’s theory

of def ense – a nd his theory

of off ense w ith respec t to the c ou nte rc la im –

is s e t f orth i n h is a ns we r a ndc ou nte rc la im. He a lle g e d th a t th e pla int if f w a s g uil ty of the following acts of common law neg lige nce: “she failed to ke ep a pr oper lookout; failed to ke ep her ve hicle under

proper co n t rol; failed to exerc ise due c are in the operation of a motor vehicle ; failed to take the appr opriate steps ne cessa ry to avoid this accide nt; was following the [d] efe ndant’s vehicle too c losely ; and fa iled to exercise ordinary and rea sonable car e while ope rating her ve hicle.” The de fenda nt also char g ed that the pl aintiff viol ated the following statutes: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-115 ( Driving on rig ht side of roadw ay – Ex ceptions); 55-8-120 ( Further limitations on driving to left of ce nter of r oadwa y ); 55-8-123 ( Driving on roadway s l an ed fo r traf fic); a nd 55-8-124 (F ollowing too close ly ).
As we vie w the re c or d be fo re us , we fi nd no ma te ri a l evi de nc e to s up po rt the jury ’s ve rd ic t. In f a c t , t h e r e i s a d e ar t h o f e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t i n g n e g l i g e n c e o n t h e p ar t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f

. C e r t a i n l y, there is nothing in her te stimony that would indicate she was g uiltyof any of the a cts of common law neg lige nce a lleg ed in the defe ndant’s answe r and counter claim. By the same token, there is nothing about t hat t estimony which sugg ests that the plaintiff wa s g uiltyof violating any of the statutes upon wh ic h th e de fe nd a nt r e lie s. The de fenda nt’s testimonyis also devoid of evide nce of the plaintiff’s ne g lige nce. T he de fe nd a nt s ta te d, wi tho ut e qu ivo c a tio n, that he didno t se e the pla int if f’ s v e hic le be fo re the a c c ide nt. We also note that there wer e no other ey ewitnesses to the accident. The investigating office r did not testify to any fac ts which direc t l y or infer entially show that neg lige nce on the part of the plaintiff cause d or contributed to this acc ident. Reg ardle ss of whether the defe ndant exited Highway 66 or no t, a ndre g ard le ss o f w he the r the a c c ide nt ha pp e ne d in the no rthb ou nd tr a ff ic la ne , a s te sti fi e d to by the plaintiff, or, a s the defe ndant stated, in the southbound lane, one critica l fac t is clear: that the de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le , s ud de nly a ndwi tho ut w arn ing , w a s p e r p e n d icular t o Hig hway

66. As far

as the two ca

rs ar e conc erne d, this was the initial untoward movement a nd the start of the ch ai n of events that led to the c ollisi on. The jury conclude d that the fault of the defe ndant was a cause of the acc ident, and ther e is an a bundance of evide nce to support the jury ’s obvious concl u s ion that the defe ndant lost control of his vehicle. I f the re cord r efle cts evidenc e of the plaintiff’s neg lige nce – and we are not convinced tha t it does – it is clear to us that there is no material evide nce to support a fi nd ing that th e pla int if

f w a s g uil ty

of the sa me de g re e of

fa ult a s th e de fe nd a nt.
The re al issue bef

ore us is not whethe r the plaintiff w as g uiltyof any fault; rathe r, the re al is s u e is w h e th e r th e r e is mate r ia l e v id e n c e to s u p p o r t a f in d in g th a t th e p la in ti f

f w a s g uilty of the same deg ree of fault as the defe ndant. We do not f ind suc h evidenc e. I t r esults tha t the trial court’ sW e d o no t ha v e the a u tho rity to re a llo c a te fau lt. Tur ne r v . Jor dan , 9 5 7 S.W

. 2 d 81 5 , 82 3

- 2 4 (T enn. 19 9 7 ); 4 W i ns t ead v. G oo dlark Reg’l M ed. Ct r . , I nc. , N o. M 1997- 00209- CO A- R30C V , 2000 W L 343789, at * 6 ( T en n
. Ct

. App. M

. S., f i l ed A p ri l 4, 20 0 0 ). -5- jud g me nt e nte re d o n th e jury ’s ve rd ic t mu st b e va c a te d a ndthis c a se re ma nd e d f or a ne w t ri a l. 4 Consideration of the plaintiff’ s other two issues is prete rmitted.
V I. The judg ment of the trial co u rt i s v acated and this ca se is rema nded to the trial c ourt for a new tria l. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellee, Johnny L . Drinnon.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE