J-S27018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: G.J., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 982 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000737-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: G.J., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 983 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000081-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.J., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: G.J., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 984 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000163-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.G.J.B., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: G.J., FATHER

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: No. 985 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000082-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2022

Appellant G.J. (Father) appeals from the decree and order granting the 

petitions filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services 

(DHS) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his minor children, 

J.B., born in September of 2013, and M.J., born in November of 2018,

(collectively, the Children)1 and change the Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption. Father argues that DHS failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence supporting the termination of his parental rights and failed to 

consider Children’s best interests in changing the permanency goal to 

adoption. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are well known to the parties. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 5/5/22, at 1-4. Briefly, DHS became involved with the 

family on August 8, 2018, after receiving a general protective services (GPS) 

report alleging that A.B. (Mother) had been physically abusing J.B. and his 

____________________________________________

1 M.J. and J.B. are the minor children of Father and A.B. (Mother). The

Children also have half-siblings who are not included in the instant appeal.
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older half siblings. N.T. Hr’g, 3/15/22, at 7, 20-22. From October of 2018 

through January of 2019, DHS provided in-home services for Mother. Id. at 

59. After Mother gave birth to M.J. in November of 2018, DHS received

additional reports alleging Mother’s “repeated, prolonged, or egregious failure 

to supervise” or obtain proper medical care for the Children. Id. at 55. 

Throughout the time DHS provided services to Mother, DHS did not have 

contact information for Father and had never seen him in Mother’s home. Id.

at 58-59.

On January 29, 2019, DHS obtained an order of protective custody 

(OPC) and placed the Children with Maternal Cousin. Following a shelter care 

hearing on January 31, 2019, the trial court lifted the OPC, transferred 

temporary legal custody of the Children to DHS, and maintained the Children’s 

placement with Maternal Cousin. The trial court also appointed counsel on 

Father’s behalf.

On June 6, 2019, the trial court adjudicated the Children dependent and 

transferred both the care and custody of the Children to DHS. In support of 

the Children’s permanency goal of reunification, Father was referred to 

Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for appropriate services and ordered to 

complete a parenting capacity evaluation (PCE). See Goal Change Pet., 

2/16/21, Ex. A. The court also ordered Community Umbrella Agency (CUA)

to assess Father’s home and permitted Father to attend twice weekly 

supervised visits with the Children. Id.
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On July 23, 2019, CUA held a revised single case plan (SCP) meeting. 

See Goal Change Pet., 2/16/21, Ex. A. Father’s parental objectives were to

comply with CUA services and court orders, complete a PCE, and attend ARC 

services. Id. Father did not participate in the SCP meeting. Id.

On October 10, 2019, the trial court conducted a permanency review 

hearing. Father was referred to ARC for parenting classes, ordered to comply 

with the PCE when scheduled, and provide proof of employment. See Goal 

Change Pet., 2/16/21, Ex. A. The trial court also ordered CUA to evaluate 

Father’s home within forty-eight hours. Id. Father’s twice-weekly supervised 

visitation schedule remained in place. Id. 

The trial court conducted permanency review hearings at regular 

intervals. Throughout the life of the case, Father’s SCP objectives remained 

the same. Id. At the permanency review hearing on October 27, 2020, CUA 

case manager Jasmine Jackson testified that although Father verified his 

employment status, he failed to complete ARC as ordered. N.T. Hr’g, 

10/27/20, at 13. The trial court also heard testimony that Father had stopped 

visiting or calling the Children for at least two months and that he had only 

re-engaged in visitation at the beginning of September 2020. Id. at 13-14. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it would consider 

changing the Children’s permanency goal and terminating Father’s parental 

rights at the next hearing. Id. at 65. In the interim, the trial court ordered 

Father to complete the PCE, engage in parenting classes, and continue with 

his visitation schedule. Id. at 67.
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On February 16, 2021, DHS filed petitions to change the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. See Goal Change Pet., 2/16/21. In support, 

DHS alleged that reunification with Father was inappropriate, as he had “failed

to achieve full and continuous compliance with the established SCP objectives”

and “also failed to consistently visit, plan for, and provide for [the Children] 

throughout their time in placement.” Id. at Ex. A. That same day, DHS filed 

a petition seeking involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8). See

Pet. for Involuntary Term., 2/16/21, at 1-11.

The trial court conducted virtual evidentiary hearings on April 28, 2021 

and June 1, 2021.2 DHS presented testimony from CUA case worker Jasmine 

____________________________________________

2 Blake Mammuth, Esq. served as the Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) 

throughout the proceedings and represented the Children’s best interests. 

Attorney Mammuth also represented M.J.’s legal interests. N.T. Hr’g, 

10/27/20, at 65; see In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020).

The record reflects that M.J. has extensive development delays and was 

entirely non-verbal at the time of the termination proceedings. N.T. Hr’g, 

10/27/20, at 33-35; N.T. Hr’g, 4/28/21, at 118. Because M.J. could not 

express his own preferences, the trial court did not appoint legal counsel on 

his behalf. N.T. Hr’g, 10/27/20, at 65; see In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955, 964 

(Pa. 2021) (holding that when a child’s best interests and legal interests do 

not diverge, or where the child’s legal interests cannot be ascertained, a courtappointed attorney may serve in the dual capacity of GAL and legal counsel). 

Michael Graves, Esq., served as J.B.’s legal counsel during the termination 

proceedings, and appeared at the hearings on his behalf. N.T. Hr’g, 4/28/21, 

at 8. Attorney Graves testified that J.B. appeared to understand his options, 

including adoption. N.T. Hr’g, 6/1/21, at 73. Attorney Graves stated that J.B. 

said he was “fine where he is now” in foster care and “[h]e would like to be 

adopted[,]” but also specifically stated that he wanted to maintain visitation 

with his parents and his prior caretakers. Id. at 73-74.
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Jackson, who stated that Father had failed to meet his SCP objectives. N.T. 

Hr’g, 4/28/21, at 95. With respect to parenting classes, Ms. Jackson stated 

that although Father was referred to ARC several times, the referrals were 

closed for non-participation. Id. at 92. Ms. Jackson explained that she also 

provided Father with contact information for ARC, but “he didn’t feel like he 

should have to do parenting class,” because the issues leading to the 

Children’s placement did not occur while they were in Father’s custody. Id.

at 93. Ms. Jackson testified that Father “[e]ventually [] stated that he had 

been reaching out to ARC, but that nobody was getting back to him.” Id. Ms. 

Jackson also indicated that although Father ultimately engaged with ARC, he 

did not do so until May of 2021. Id.

Ms. Jackson testified that Father completed an initial home assessment

in 2019. Id. at 94. Ms. Jackson explained that while Father’s home was “not 

structurally inappropriate,” Father’s housing was an issue because the 

Children would have had to share a bedroom with both Father and Father’s 

older child. Id. Ms. Jackson also noted that after Father was directed to 

complete another assessment, Father stated that Mother was handling the 

Children’s housing, but later said that he “might be moving,” and that he 

would let Ms. Jackson know when he was ready for a home assessment. Id. 

At the time of the termination hearing, Father’s housing requirement remained 

outstanding. Id. at 95.

With respect to visitation, Ms. Jackson testified that Father was 

consistent until 
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October of 2019, at which point he stated that his work schedule 

was a barrier and he wasn’t going to be able to attend the visits 

during the week. . . however[,] he didn’t give me the work 

schedule which I needed to verify in order to give him Saturday 

visits until January of 2020.” 

Id. at 96. Ms. Jackson explained that after visits became virtual in March of 

2020, Father completed three visits, then stated that “the Zoom wouldn’t work 

for him, at which point he didn’t have any more visits until they restarted in 

person in August of 2020.” Id. Ms. Jackson stated that although Father 

visited with the Children from August of 2020 to November of 2020, two visits 

were subsequently cancelled due to weather, two visits were cancelled 

because J.B. did not want to attend, and three visits were cancelled because 

Father either failed to confirm them or indicated that he was unable to leave 

work. Id. As a result of Father’s missed visits, Ms. Jackson stated that “[J.B.] 

was upset” and on the next scheduled visit in January of 2021, “[J.B.] said he 

didn’t want to come to because [] Father had missed the ones before.” Id. at 

97. At that time, Father told Ms. Jackson that “M.J. was a baby and there 

wasn’t a lot to do with him, so [Father] would wait [to resume visits] until 

[J.B.] wanted to join.” Id. Father did not contact DHS about visiting with the 

Children in January, February, or March of 2021. Id. at 99. Father ultimately 

contacted DHS in April of 2021 and visits resumed after J.B. agreed to attend. 

Id. 

Finally, with respect to the Children’s best interests, Ms. Jackson 

testified that M.J. had extensive developmental needs and was completely 

non-verbal at two years’ old. Id at 117-18. Ms. Jackson stated that in prior 
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conversations with Father, he indicated that he only wanted custody of J.B., 

“because he felt like [M.J.] was a baby and needed to be with [Mother].” Id. 

at 119. Ms. Jackson explained that although J.B. had become upset about 

missed visits with Father in the past, J.B. no longer “displayed any negative 

effects of not having contact with [F]ather” and would not suffer irreparable 

harm if Father’s rights were terminated. Id. at 100-101. She also stated 

because M.J. is young and has been in care for most of his life, he “hasn’t had 

time to develop a bond with [] Father” and would not suffer irreparable harm 

if Father’s rights were terminated. Id. at 102.

Although Father gave some testimony at a virtual hearing on June 1, 

2021, he experienced technical difficulties and was ultimately disconnected. 

N.T. Hr’g, 6/1/21, at 67-72. After Father’s counsel indicated that he did not 

have updated contact information for Father, the trial court found that Father

had waived his right to testify. Id. at 69-72. That same day, the trial court 

issued orders terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b), and changing the 

Children’s permanency goals to adoption.

Father subsequently appealed the trial court’s goal change and 

termination orders as to both Children. On appeal, DHS filed an application 

to remand the matter for further proceedings. On January 6, 2022, this Court 

issued an order granting DHS’s application and remanded the case to allow 

Father to testify. See Order, 1/6/22.
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The trial court conducted an in-person hearing on March 15, 2022. 

Father testified that he has a house, he loves the Children, and he wants them 

returned to his custody. N.T. Hr’g, 3/15/22, at 26. Although Father confirmed 

that he previously told Ms. Jackson that he only wanted custody of his older 

son, J.B., Father stated that he “had a change of heart” and now wanted 

custody of both children. Id. at 34. He also indicated that while he had not 

been ready to care for M.J. previously, he did have the ability to care for the 

Children and would “have [them] if [Mother] wasn’t ignorant.” Id. at 44.

When asked if he took any responsibility for the circumstances that led to the 

Children’s placement, Father stated: “It’s not on my watch. That happen[ed]

with [Mother]. It didn’t happen on my watch.” Id. at 45.

Father indicated that, prior to the Children’s removal in 2019, he was 

“hands on” with J.B., provided for the Children financially, and often had 

custody of J.B. on the weekends. Id. at 47. However, Father stated that he 

did not know M.J.’s age, date of birth, or whether M.J. had any special needs. 

Id. at 44-45. When Father was asked if he knew “anything about [M.J.],” who 

was removed from Mother’s custody as an infant, Father responded: “Nope 

because y’all got him.” Id. at 45. 

When asked to explain why he failed to complete his SCP objectives, 

Father repeatedly stated that DHS “dropped the ball.” Id. at 17, 36, 52. With 

respect to visitation, Father claimed that he showed up for visits on several 

occasions, but DHS had issues with staffing. Id. at 18. Regarding parenting 

classes, Father initially stated that he did not need parenting classes because 
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the problems that led to the Children’s placement were “the baby mom 

department.” Id. at 18. Father later claimed that he had been going to the 

classes, but he ultimately stopped going because “people [weren’t] there” and 

he was “losing money” because he had to take time off from work. Id. at 38. 

Father also stated that he decided to stay away from the Children because he 

was frustrated, stressed out, and had “been going to that circus route for two 

years and everybody [kept] assassinating [his] character.” Id. at 52. 

However, Father confirmed that he failed to complete the court-ordered 

parenting capacity evaluation. Id. at 40. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court re-entered the decrees 

terminating Father’s parental rights and the orders changing the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption.

3

 Father subsequently filed a timely notice of 

appeal. Both Father and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily 

terminating father [Father’s] parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence establishing grounds for termination under the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S. §§ 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and 

(a)(8)? 

2. Whether the trial court committed error by changing the 

[Children’s] permanency goal from reunification with the 

parent(s) to adoption without giving primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

____________________________________________

3 However, the trial court noted that Father’s parental rights were terminated 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2), and it did not include subsections 

(5) or (8).
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of the child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S. §

2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 5 (some formatting altered).

Termination of Parental Rights

Section 2511(a)(1)

Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(1) because he “never refused or failed to perform his 

parental duties” and testified at the termination hearing that “he loves [the 

Children] and that he wants to be reunited with them.” Id. at 27. Father 

asserts that although he was not the Children’s primary custodian, he “had 

been parenting and involved with [the C]hildren since their birth” and had 

“ongoingly provided for . . . and maintained a parental relationship” with them 

throughout their lives. Id. Further, Father emphasizes that “[t]he 

dependency issues that led to the children’s removal from the home and 

placement into DHS foster care arose solely from [M]other.” Id. Father also 

claims that, unlike Mother, he has no history of “neglect, mental health, 

parental abuse, [or] illegal substance abuse” and has maintained 

“independent housing and sufficient income to satisfactorily care for [the 

C]hildren without any county agency or state assistance.” Id. Therefore, 

Father concludes that “in the absence of DHS establishing and implementing 

a meaningful reunification plan for [F]ather to comply with to facilitate 

reunification, and in its failure to provide [Father] reasonable services and 

assistance to meet the objectives of that plan, DHS failed in its burden” to 
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establish clear and convincing evidence supporting the involuntary 

termination of his parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). Id.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

apply the following standard of review: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. [In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 

1190 (Pa. 2010)]. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision 

may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an 

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where 

the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist 

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own 

credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer 

to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by 

the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of 

an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).
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The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) . . . .

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Further, we “may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a).” In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 

(citation omitted). 

Section 2511(a)(1) provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 
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has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

To meet the requirements of [Section 2511(a)(1)], “the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” The court must then consider “the parent’s explanation 

for his or her conduct” and “the post-abandonment contact 

between parent and child” before moving on to analyze Section 

2511(b).

This Court has explained that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the 

development of the child.” Rather, “[p]arental duty requires that 

the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and 

not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child 

relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult

circumstances.”

In re J.T.M., 193 A.3d 403, 409 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

With respect to “parental duties,” this Court has explained:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. This affirmative duty . . . requires 

continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child. Because a child 

needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a 

parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance 

in the child’s life. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted and 

formatting altered). 
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Moreover, “[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to 

maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in 

difficult circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). “A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise 

reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining 

the parent-child relationship.” Id. (citation omitted).

Where the petitioners have presented clear and convincing evidence 

that a parent has demonstrated a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

rights or has refused or failed to perform parental duties, “the court must 

engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and 

(3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 

708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted).

Additionally, this Court has explained that

[t]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must 

be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the 

psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child 

relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity 

to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish 

his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
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Here, the trial court addressed the circumstances of Father’s efforts 

towards reunification with the Children as follows:

Ms. Jackson testified she established SCP objectives for Father and 

discussed the objectives with him. Father’s objectives were for 

him to contact ARC services for parenting[,] undergo a parenting 

capacity evaluation, undergo a home assessment, and 

employment verification. She testified [that] she made several 

referrals for parenting and also gave [Father] the contact 

information for ARC so he could call himself; however, Father did 

not attend. The referrals [Ms. Jackson] made were closed for nonparticipation. Initially, Father told [Ms. Jackson] that he didn’t 

feel like he should have to do parenting class because the incident 

with J.B. did not occur while the child was with him. Then Father 

told [Ms. Jackson] he had contacted ARC, but nobody got back to 

him. Father finally did engage in March of 2021. Ms. Jackson 

stated [that] Father never indicated to her or took any 

responsibility for the reasons his Children remained in care. He 

continued to blame the Mother.

Ms. Jackson noted Father’s home assessment was completed in 

November 2019. The home was not structurally inappropriate 

however, the issue was that [the Children] would have to share a

bedroom with Father’s other son who he has custody of. Recently,

Father told her that the Mother was taking care of housing, then 

he told her he might be moving and would let her know when to 

do a home assessment, which never occurred. At this point,

housing is an outstanding objective for Father. 

Regarding the parenting capacity evaluation (PCE), Ms. Jackson 

testified it was court ordered on [June 6,] 2019. Father had an

appointment scheduled for March 25, 2020. And they reached out

to him to a telephone number that was out of service. Therefore,

the evaluation remains an outstanding objective for Father. 

Regarding visitation, Ms. Jackson testified Father was ordered to 

do visitation twice a week for one hour, but in February 2020, 

Father requested to do once a week for two hours. Father was

consistent with visitation up until October of 2019, at which point 

he stated that his work schedule was a barrier and he wasn’t going 

to be able to attend visits during the week. However, Father never

gave her a work schedule to verify in order to give him Saturday

visits until January of 2020. Father’s visits then became virtual in
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March of 2020, and then Father completed three visits. After that

Father stopped the visiting because he said Zoom did not work for 

him and at that point, he did not have any more visits until they

restarted in person in August 2020. Since then, Father visited

until November 2020. Two visits were cancelled because of

weather, and two visits with J.B. were not held because the child

did not want to attend. Father then missed three visits because

he was unable to attend because of work. By January 2021, J.B.

stated he did not want any more visits. Father did not want to do 

visits just with M.J., so Father decided he would wait until J.B., 

wanted to rejoin the visits for the visits to restart. Visits then

restarted in April of 2021, because Father reached out to her and 

asked her to restart the visits. 

* * *

This court heard testimony from Father, who stated the Children 

were not in his care when they were injured and that he did not 

know of the injuries until months later when J.B. came to his

house. He testified that M.J. had not been born at that time and 

the arrangement he had with Mother was that he would get J.B. 

on the weekend and then drop him back with Mother. He stated

he did not get along with Mother, so he blocked her, and they did

not communicate and therefore did not see his son. Later they 

communicated again, and he began seeing his son.

* * *

Regarding the FSP objectives, Father testified he did not complete 

classes nor training because the “dropped the ball” and he was 

losing money. Father testified he did not need classes because he

does not have any of the issues that brought his Children to care. 

He stated it was “the baby mom department.” Father testified he 

never missed a court date, except the last termination hearing in 

June. It was a Zoom video and that’s why he did not show up. 

He noted he has come to hearings for two years: “I’ve been going 

to this circus show. I’ve always come here.”

Regarding visitation with [the] Children, Father testified he would 

drive to see his son and they would not have any staff or it would 

be miscommunication with other staff. He noted plenty of times 

he would go up there and they did not have anybody there so he 

could not see his son. He would complain but get no response. 

Father testified visits were not made available to him and he would 

drive up from work in New York at that time. He noted a couple 

of visits were cancelled. Father stated when a lot of things were 
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shut down, he participated in virtual visits but stated the Foster 

Mom was the problem[,] that she was acting up[, did] not pick up 

the phone and he could not communicate with her. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 17-19 (some formatting altered).

After hearing Father’s testimony at the March 15, 2022 hearing, the trial 

court explained:

So this case came back from the Superior Court to allow Father to 

offer his version of the facts. And I have two complete binders of 

notes of testimony which I have incorporated into the record which

has all of the testimony of the case workers. Specifically, notes 

of testimony 4/28/21, and 6/1/21, the two hearings that I held. 

And what I heard from father is a narrative, which he made up. 

Completely untruthful, completely self-serving, completely 

uncredible. We have a father who leaves these children. Says 

that he spent time with them yet doesn’t even know the birth date 

of his youngest child and struggled with the birth date of his oldest 

child. Didn’t do a Parenting Capacity Evaluation. Didn’t complete 

other services that were offered to him. And his excuse is, “I was 

stressed out, or I was busy working.” It’s a picture of a person 

who won’t let go but he doesn’t have the ability to parent these 

two children. They’ve been in care for thirty-eight months. I see 

the phenomena frequently. And the court reiterates its findings 

which it found earlier now having the benefit of Father’s 

testimony, which is completely made up and unbelievable. It 

doesn’t change the facts. It doesn’t change the facts of this case 

as established by the case workers at the first two hearings.

* * *

Father has this fanciful vision of him having some contact with 

these children. The facts and the reality are quite different. He 

has not been a father and will not likely be a father 

notwithstanding this idea that he’s going to care for the children. 

The Children have been cared for by the Department of Welfare. 

And he’s not paying support for the children. He says he takes 

care of them, yet the taxpayers take care of them. That’s the 

harsh reality.

N.T. Hr’g, 3/15/22, at 53-55.
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Following our review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are 

supported by competent, clear, and convincing evidence in the record, and we 

find no error in the court’s legal conclusions. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

The record reflects that, at the time of the termination hearing, the Children 

had been in DHS’s care for thirty-seven-and-a-half months. See N.T. Hr’g, 

3/15/22, at 40. Although Father has been aware of his SCP objectives 

throughout the life of the case, he has made minimal progress towards 

reunification. Specifically, in the six-month period preceding the termination 

petition, Father refused to attend parenting classes, failed to undergo a 

parenting capacity evaluation, did not complete a required housing 

assessment, and failed to maintain consistent visitation with the Children. 

Therefore, we agree with the trial court that, for a period far in excess of the 

six-month statutory minimum, Father has refused to perform his parental 

duties to the Children. See J.T.M., 193 A.3d at 409; see also B., N.M., 856 

A.2d at 855.

With respect to the explanations for his conduct, Father repeatedly 

stated that he failed to complete his SCP objectives because DHS “dropped 

the ball.” N.T. Hr’g, 3/15/22, at 17, 36, 52. Further, he claimed that he did 

not need parenting classes, he had adequate housing, and his missed visits 

with the Children were caused by DHS. Id. at 17. Finally, Father explained

that while he “wasn’t ready” to care for M.J. in the past, he was now willing 

and able to provide appropriate housing and care for the Children. Id. at 44. 
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However, in light the evidence presented by DHS at the termination hearings, 

the trial court concluded that Father’s testimony was not credible.

Finally, we note that although Father attended some visits with the 

Children throughout the life of the case and during the six-month period 

preceding the termination petition,

4 his inconsistent contact with the Children 

was insufficient to “demonstrate a serious intent . . . to recultivate a parentchild relationship” or “a willingness and capacity to undertake the parental 

role.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1119 (citations omitted). 

For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in concluding that termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(1). 

Accordingly, Father is not entitled to relief.

Section 2511(b)

Father also argues that DHS failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence to prove that termination “would meet the best interests and 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of [the Children].”

Father’s Brief at 31. In support, Father notes that “no expert, psychological 

or therapeutic evidence or testimony was presented by DHS at trial to 

establish that the permanent severing of all rights and relationship of [Father]

to his children would not cause significant detrimental effect or harm on [the 

____________________________________________

4 As noted previously, although Father attended visits with the Children from 

August until November of 2020, visitation ended after Father missed three 

scheduled visits and J.B. decided he no longer wanted to see Father. Father 

made no effort to resume those visits until April of 2021, two months after 

DHS filed the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.
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Children].” Id. Further, he claims that “[n]o credible evidence was presented 

at trial as to the potential harm and damage that may occur to [the Children]

as the result of permanently severing all relationship, contact and rights of 

them to [Father].” Id. Instead, Father asserts that DHS presented “scant 

and superfluous information on this critical issue, introduced from the nonexpert, non-psychological, non-therapeutic testimony of its social worker who 

is unqualified to give such opinion as a lay person witness.” Id. Therefore, 

Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that 

termination was in the Children’s best interests.

Section 2511(b) states in relevant part:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent . . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

This Court has explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
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In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). “Common sense dictates that courts 

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a preadoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In 

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). The question is whether the bond between the parent and the child 

“is the one worth saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable 

harm to” the child. Id. at 764. “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal 

bonding evaluation” and caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations 

of the bond. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed the Children’s best interests as follows:

Ms. Jackson testified she did not see a parent/child bond between 

Father and the Children. J.B. has not been in contact with Father

recently and he has not displayed any negative effects of not 

seeing Father. J.B. had requested not to continue visits with 

Father, but visits were restarted in April 2021. Regarding M.J.,

who has been in care since he was an infant, the child has not 

developed a bond with Father. Ms. Jackson opined that 
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reunification would not benefit the Children because of [the] lack 

of parental bond with Father and that Father has failed to comply 

with his SCP objectives. She opined the Children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated and 

it is in the Children’s best interests to be adopted.

Ms. Jackson stated the Children are currently in separate homes,

however, . . . one of the foster parents who is currently fostering 

M.J. stated once she stabilized M.J., [there is a possibility that] 

she would be willing to have [J.B. and Mother’s other child] join 

their sibling at her house. Ms. Jackson opined [that the Children] 

would benefit from positive long-term parental relationships.

On cross-examination by Blake Mammuth Esquire, GAL, Ms. 

Jackson testified that M.J., who is two years old, receives 

extensive developmental services because he is completely nonverbal. In [Ms. Jackson’s] previous conversations with Father, he 

expressed that he wanted custody of J.B. but not M.J. because he 

was a baby and needed to be with his Mother. She stated J.B., 

who is seven years old, receives trauma therapy because he is 

terrified of Mother and refers to her as a demon. Ms. Jackson has 

contact with [J.B.’s] therapist, and adoption has been discussed 

with him and [J.B.] understands. J.B. is very verbal for a child of

his age. J.B. is several grades ahead of other children because 

the schoolwork is too easy for him, and at one point they were 

talking about possibly skipping him to another grade.

* * *

This court heard credible, persuasive testimony from Mike Graves,

Esq., [J.B.’s legal counsel,] who testified he spoke to J.B. and 

explained adoption and his other options. It appeared to 

[Attorney Graves] that [J.B.] understood what adoption was and 

told him he was fine where he was now. J.B. told him he would

like to be adopted, however, he also stated that he did want to 

still have visitation with his parents and his prior caretakers.

Trial Ct. Op. at 18-19.

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights would 

best serve the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 
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welfare. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. As noted previously, the trial court 

credited Ms. Jackson’s testimony that the Children did not share a bond with 

Father and would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were 

terminated. Although Father takes issue with the lack of expert testimony, 

such evidence is not required in a termination proceeding. See Z.P., 994 A.2d 

at 1121 (holding that Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation and that caseworkers may offer their opinions and evaluations on 

whether a bond exists). Therefore, we agree with the trial court that DHS 

presented clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that termination of 

Father’s parental rights would serve the Children’s best interests. See R.N.J., 

985 A.2d at 276. Further, although Father claims that he has not had the 

chance to bond with M.J., this Court has stressed that “a child’s life cannot be 

held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and brackets omitted). For these reasons, Father 

is not entitled to relief.

Goal Change Orders

Father also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in changing 

the Children’s goal from reunification to adoption by failing to give primary 

consideration to the Children’s best interests. Father’s Brief at 31. However, 

given our disposition concerning the termination of Father’s parental rights, 

we conclude that his appeal from the goal change order is moot. See D.R.-

W., 227 A.3d at 917 (concluding that a goal change challenge is moot when 
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this Court affirms the decree terminating parental rights); see also In re 

Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “the 

effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree 

necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change [a c]hild’s 

goal to adoption” (citation omitted)). In any event, to the extent Father claims 

that the trial court failed to give primary consideration to the Children’s best 

interests, his claim is belied by the record for the reasons stated previously. 

Therefore, Father is not entitled to relief.

For these reasons, we affirm the orders changing the Children’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption and the decrees terminating 

Father’s parental rights.

Orders and decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2022