DEFENDANT’S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS PAGE 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DEBORAH LAUFER, 

Individually, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

GALTESVAR OM, LLC,

 Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-00588-RP

DEFENDANT’S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS 

Defendant Galtesvar OM, LLC (“Defendant” or “Galtesvar”) files this Motion 

to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Brief in Support 

Therof and respectfully shows the Court as follows: 

I. SUMMARY

This lawsuit is part of a judicial extortion campaign by Ms. Laufer and her 

attorneys. She has filed numerous lawsuits around the country generally alleging 

that an entity operating a hotel has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) via an allegedly non-compliant online reservation system. In this case, she 

actually complains about Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline and Agoda’s 

websites, not Defendant’s website.1 There is no allegation that Defendant’s facility or 

1 Complaint, ¶ 9.

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its own website is not compliant with the ADA. After filing the lawsuit, Ms. Laufer’s 

lawyers contacted the defendants directly and offered to settle for a $5,000 payment 

of costs and legal fees to Ms. Laufer’s attorneys. The demand is priced so that paying 

legal fees to fight the lawsuit in federal court is not economically viable.

Missing from the Complaint, however, is any concrete allegation of standing 

by Ms. Laufer. By her own admission, the Plaintiff is a resident of Pasco County, 

Florida.2 Defendant operates a Quality Inn & Suites in Carrizo Springs, Texas. 

Plaintiff does not allege that she has ever travelled to Carrizo Springs, has any reason 

to travel to Carrizo Springs, or ever intends in the future to travel to Carrizo Springs. 

Accordingly, she does not allege a sufficiently concrete injury to support 

constitutional standing.

Courts around the country have started to catch onto this scheme and have 

begun issuing sua sponte orders demanding that Ms. Laufer and her attorneys file 

briefs to support that she has actual standing to pursue an ADA claim against a hotel 

that she never had any intent to visit. For example, in the Northern District of New 

York, Judge Sannes issued an order dated May 7, 2020.

3 In this district, Magistrate 

Judge Manske issued a similar order on May 19, 2020 for the Waco Division.4

For the same reasons as courts have now begun to issue sua sponte orders to 

show cause why Plaintiff’s many lawsuits should not be dismissed for lack of 

2 Complaint, ¶ 1.

3 See Exhibit A (Northern District of New York Order dated May 7, 2020).

4 See Exhibit B (Western District of Texas (Waco Division) Order dated May 19, 2020).

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standing, Defendant in this case moves for the Court to dismiss this case pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(1).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Laufer has filed numerous lawsuits around the country generally alleging 

that an entity operating a hotel has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”). In this case, Ms. Laufer alleges non-compliant online reservation system. 

She does not actually complain about Defendant’s website; she complains that 

Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline and Agoda’s websites (the “Websites”) do not 

“comply” with the ADA; she does not really specify what the Websites failed to allow 

her to do. Complaint, ¶ 9.

After filing the lawsuit, Ms. Laufer’s attorney contacted the defendants and 

offered to settle for a $5,000 payment of costs and legal fees to him. 

Ms. Laufer only alleges standing as a “tester.” She claims that she went to 

these third-party websites and will return to the websites as her “harm.” Complaint 

¶¶ 17-28. Ms. Laufer is a resident of Pasco County, Florida. Complaint, ¶ 1.

Defendant operates a Quality Inn & Suites in Carrizo Springs, Texas. Plaintiff does 

not allege that she has ever travelled to Carrizo Springs. Plaintiff does not allege that 

she has any reason to travel to Carrizo Springs. Plaintiff does not allege that she ever 

intends in the future to travel to Carrizo Springs. 

In response to Ms. Laufer and her attorneys’ numerous lawsuits, courts have 

begun issuing sua sponte orders regarding subject-matter jurisdiction and standing. 

For example, in the Northern District of New York, Judge Sannes issued an order 

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dated May 7, 2020, noting that “Plaintiff has 29, nearly identical, cases pending 

against different defendants in the Northern District of New York.” See Exhibit A

(Order dated May 7, 2020). Judge Sannes found that “[t]here appears to be a serious 

question as to whether Plaintiff has established standing, in this, or any of her other 

cases, and thus whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these actions. 

See, e.g., Laufer v. Laxmi & Sons, LLC, 1:19-cv-01501 (BKS/ML) (Dkt. No. 15, at 7, 

May 6, 2020) (“There are no facts in the Complaint or Plaintiff’s affidavit indicating 

that she has ever traveled to Rensselaer, New York, or anywhere in New York, or 

that she has any reason to travel anywhere in New York or any reason to seek lodging 

anywhere in New York.”).” Exhibit A at 2. Judge Sannes then ordered that “before 

taking any further action in this, or any other of Plaintiff’s cases, the Court orders 

Plaintiff to submit a brief in each of the actions listed in Exhibit A, explaining why 

the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.

In this district, Magistrate Judge Manske issued a similar order on May 19, 

2020 for the Waco Division. See Exhibit B (Order dated May 19, 2020). “U.S. District 

Judge Brenda K. Sannes entered an order requiring Plaintiff to submit a brief in each 

of the 29 New York actions explaining why the complaint should not be dismissed for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court is of the opinion that a similar course 

of action is warranted with respect to Plaintiff’s cases pending before the Waco

Division.” Id. at 2.

III. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 

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based on lack of Article III standing. The Court must dismiss a cause for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction “when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional 

power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 

Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). A motion to dismiss for lack of Article III 

standing is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1). Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. 

v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011). A motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction under 12(b)(1) may be decided on: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed evidence in the record; or (3) the complaint 

supplemented by undisputed facts, plus the Court’s resolution of disputed facts. 

Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009). Unlike a 12(b)(6) motion, 

the district court is empowered to consider matters outside the Complaint and 

matters of fact that may be in dispute. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 

(5th Cir. 2001). The party asserting jurisdiction—Plaintiff—bears the burden of 

proving that jurisdiction exists. Id.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The standing doctrine concerns who may 

properly bring a suit in federal court; the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 

such standing contains three elements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560 (1992). These elements are: (1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the likelihood 

that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Croft v. Gov. of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 

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745 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). “The plaintiff, as the party 

invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these three elements.” 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Specifically, as quoted by 

Magistrate Judge Manske, “[t]he injury must be actual or imminent, not conjectural 

or hypothetical.” Exhibit B at 2 (citing McCall v. Dretke, 390 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 

2004)).

Echoing both Judge Sannes and Magistrate Judge Manske’s Orders, nothing 

in the complaint alleges any past, current or future connection with traveling through 

or to Carrizo Springs, such that she might actually need an ADA compliant room at 

Defendant’s Quality Inn & Suites. “Plaintiff seems to rely on her seemingly selfconferred status as a ‘tester’ as a means of claiming standing.” Exhibit B at 2. While 

some courts in the Western District have found “tester” plaintiffs can have standing 

in the ADA context, see, e.g. Betancourt v. Ingram Park Mall, L.P., 735 F. Supp. 2d 

587 (W.D. Tex. 2010), most courts evaluate whether future injury is probable by 

determining whether the plaintiff is likely to return to the defendant’s business. 

Deutsch v. Abijaoude, No. A-15-CV-975 LY, 2017 WL 913813, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 

7, 2017); see also Exhibit B at 3. When analyzing a plaintiff’s likelihood of return, 

courts usually consider:

(1) the proximity of the defendant’s business to the plaintiff’s residence;5

(2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of the defendant’s business;

(3) the definiteness of the plaintiff’s plans to return; and

(4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near the defendant.

5 Defendant asks the court to take judicial notice that Pasco County, Florida and Carrizo Springs, 

Texas are approximately 1,267 miles apart.

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Id. at *2-3; see also Exhibit B at 3. Plaintiff has alleged no facts to support any of 

these factors. And establishing these factors is the Plaintiff’s burden. Ramming, 281 

F.3d at 161. Accordingly, Defendant moves to dismiss this lawsuit for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate her Article III standing.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court 

grant its Motion to Dismiss and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant also 

requests all further relief in law or in equity to which they may show themselves to 

be justly entitled including a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 

July 13, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Edward J. Dennis

Edward J. Dennis

State Bar No. 24045776

jdennis@lynnllp.com

LYNN PINKER COX & HURST, LLP

2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 981-3800

Facsimile: (214) 981-3839

ATTORNEY FOR GALTESVAR OM, LLC

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DEFENDANT’S RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS PAGE 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document was served via ECF on all counsel of record this 13th day of July, 2020.

Philip Michael Cullen, III

FL State Bar No. 167853

cullenIII@aol.com

621 South Federal Highway, Suite Four

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

T: 954-462-0600

F: 954-462-1717

/s/ Edward Jason Dennis 

Edward Jason Dennis 

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