### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 08, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1652 7 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00007 -CR- 4-SPM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us LALANDAPRIC E, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f or the N orthe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (J ul y 8, 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , CA RN E S an d H U L L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: L al an daD en ar d P ri ce Jr . ple ad ed gui lty to one c ount

of c onsp ir ac y

to dis tr ibu te c ra ck

c oc ai ne , in vio la tio n of

21 U . S. C. § 84 6, a nd o ne c ount of2

po ss es si on wit h i nt en t t o d is tri bu te crac k c oc ai ne , in vi ol at io n o f 21 U.S.C. § 841( a) (1 ), ( b) (1 )( A )( iii ) an d 18 U . S. C. § 2. P ri or to se nte nc ing , P ri ce f

ile d a m otion to withdrawhis plea. T he district court denied the m otion and sentenced Pr ic e to the statut or

y m ini m um of 20 y ears inc ar ce ratio n. P ri ce appe al s, a rg uin g that the district court abused it s discretion when it denied his m otion to withdraw hi s g ui lt y pl ea.

“ W e re view a district court’ s denial of a m otion to withdrawa guilty plea for abuse of discretion.” U nited States v. N aj j ar, 283 F.3d 1306 , 1307 (11th Cir. 2002 ). “ W e w ill r ev er se adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n onam oti on t o w ith dr awonl y if it is arb it rary or u nr eas on ab le .” Id . A de fe ndant m ay

w ith dr awagui lty

ple a be fo re ase nte nc e is i m pose d if the defendant shows a “ fair and just rea son” for requesting the withdrawa l. F ed. R . Cr im . P . 11( d) (2 )( B) ( 2003 ). Apr e- se nte nc e m oti on t o w ith dr awis to b e “ lib er al ly co nstru ed . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bu ck le s, 843 F . 2d 4 69, 471 ( 11th C ir . 198 8) . “ It is w el l se ttl ed , how ev er , that the re is no a bsol ute r igh t t o w ith dr awagui lty ple a pr ior to i m posi tio n of

ase nte nc e. T he de ci sio n to a llo ww ith dr aw al is le ft to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. “ [T ] he good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’ s assertions in s uppo rt of a m otion [to withdraw ] are issues for the trial co ur t t o d eci de .” Id . at 4 72 .3

T o de te rm ine w he the r the de fe ndant h as giv enaf ai r an d j ust

r ea son fo r w ith dr aw al , the dis tr ic t c ourt e xa m ine s th e tot al ity of the c ir cu m stanc es , inc lud ing :

“ (1) w hether close assistance of counsel wa s available; (2) w hether the plea w as know ing a nd v oluntary ; ( 3) w he the r j udi ci al r es our ce s w oul d be c onse rv ed ; and (4 ) w he the r the gov er

nm en t w oul d be pr ej udi ce d if the de fe ndant w er e al low ed to withdrawhis plea.” Id. ( citations om itted). Price contends th at he should have been allowe d to withdraw his plea be ca use he m ist ak en ly

be lie ve d th at

thi rd -p ar ty c oope ratio n w oul d be a cc ep ta ble in obt aining a sentence reduction and because his lawy er w as unawar e of a m at er i al g o v ern m en twi t n es s (C i ji Pe rry) wh o co u l dco n t ra d i ctt h e g o v ern m en t ’s ca se . F or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al , P ri ce a lso a rg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e rr or

in de ny ing his m oti on w as c om poun de d be ca

use P ri ce ha d “ m ad e co lor ab le c la im s of inno cence during his plea hearing” and the district court never determ ined if Price wa s actually

innocent or if he wa s entering a best interest Alf ord-ty pe plea. See N orth C ar oli nav. A lf

or d, 400 U . S. 25, 37 S . Ct . 160 ( 1970 ). T he se c ont en tio ns fa il. Price , and po ssibl y his couns el, m istakenlythoug ht that the go vernm ent was allowing another defendant to profit from third-party

cooperation and that Price m ight p rofit from

it as we ll. T here is nothing in the plea agreem ent that PriceWe rec ognize that Price pleade d guilty pursuant to an or al plea a g ree ment and that the 1 pa rt ie s me mor ia lize d th e ir

a g re e me nt i mme diate ly

fo llo wi ngthe c ha

ng e of ple a he ari ng . T his is unimportant. Price does not a rgue that the a g ree ment he ac tually signe d was diff

ere nt from what he ha d a nti c ipate d s ignin gat th e tim e of the he ari ng . In f

a c t, b oth the g ov e rnme nt a

nd de fe ns e counsel a g ree d at the hea

ringthat Price would be signinga standa rd plea ag ree ment, and eve ry indication from the r ecor d is that he did so. 4 sig ne d to ind ic at e that thir d- party c oope ratio n w oul d be a cc ep te d. I nst ea d, the 1 agreem ent clear ly

states that the determ ination of w hether Pric e w ouldrec eive a su bs ta nt ia l as si st an ce re du ct io n was lef t t o t he so le di sc ret io n o f th e g ov ern m en t. The discre tion o f the governm ent was a lso m ade clear at the c hange of plea hearing. C ouns el for the governm ent stated: “ I w ouldlike to put on the record that the U . S. A tto rn ey ’ s of

fi ce de ci de s w he the r or

not asub stanti al a ssi stanc e m oti on i s fi le d . . . . ” P ri ce ’ s c ouns el a gr ee d th at thi s w as “ a standard

portio n of

the ple a an d co ope ratio n a gr ee m en t. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt the n a ske d P ri ce him se lf if thi s w as his unde rs tandi ng o f the a gr ee m en t, a nd P ri ce sa id i t w as . P ri ce w as not e nti tle d to withdrawhis plea agreem ent because, several m onth s after his plea, it appear ed that the gov ernm ent, in its sole discretion, wa s not go ing to file a subs tantial assistance m otion on his b ehalf. P r i c e ’s mo t i o n t o w i t h d r a wh i s p l e as t a t e s t h a th i s c o u n s e l h a dj u s tb e c o me aw ar e o f g o v ern m en twi t n es s Ci ji Pe rry an dt h at Pe rry d i s p u t ed t h e g o v ern m en t ’s fa ct ua l pr of fe r that sh e ha d lo an ed

P ri ce the c ar

that hi s c o- de fe ndant w as dr ivi ng wh en t h e t wo m en we re arre s t ed . P ri ce co n t en d s t h at h i s t ri al co u n s el ’s5

unaw ar en es s of

w itn es s P er

ry ’ s e xis te nc e m eans that he did not ha ve c los e as si st an ce o f co un se l. Tha t i s t oo m uc h o f a s tre tc h. E ve n a ssu m ing that c ouns el w as unaw ar e of thi s se em ing ly

uni m portant w itn es s be ca

use he w as ne gli ge nt i n no t r ev ie w ing the gov er nm en t’ s w itn es s li st, w e do n ot s ee howthat si ngl e ne gli ge nt a ct c oul d c an ce l ou t the c los e as sis tanc e of counsel that h e otherw ise provided. Throughout th e change of plea hearing, Pr ice confirm ed that he had consul ted his coun sel about ho w to procee d and that he had been “ extrem ely ” satisfied w ith his counsel’s r epresentation. O ne alleged oversight of a r elatively

im m aterial f act is insufficient to entitle Price to w ithdraw his plea. Finally , a s to the new issue, P rice does not argue that the district court co m m itt ed pla in e rr or

in ac ce pti ng h is p le a de spi te his c olo ra ble c la im s of inn oc en ce . I nst ea d, he a rg ue s on ly that the se c ir cu m stanc es c om poun d th e er

ro r of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of his m oti on t o w ith dr awhis ple a. B ec au se P ri ce did not a sk the dis tr ic t c ourt t o a llo whim to w ith dr awhis ple a on the se gr ound s, the dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d no t have abuse d it s di sc re tio n by not doi ng s o. Mor eo ve r, e ve n if

P ri ce ha d a ske d th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o a llo whim to withdrawhis plea on these grou nds, he would not have been entitled to do so. See Buckles, 843 F. 2d at 472 (“ A m ere declara tion o f innocence does not entit le a6

de fe ndant t o w ith dr awhis gui lty ple a. ”) . H en ce , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in n o ts u as p o n t e a l l o w i n g P r i c e t o w i t h d r a wh i s p l e ai n l i g h to f h i s c o l o r ab l e c l a i ms of in no cen ce. A r ev ie wof

the c hange of

ple a he ar ing tr an sc ri pt m ak es c le ar that the dis tr ic t c ourt w en t thr oughP ri ce ’ s r igh ts w ithhim , that P ri ce und er sto od those rights, that Price wa s satisfied with his couns el, and that—desp ite any fac tual dis put es —P ri ce pe rs ist ed in ple ad ing gui lty . P ri ce ha s no t de m onstrate d th at his unilateral expectation that third-party cooperation would benefit him or his alleged unaw ar en es s of

gov er nm en t w itn es s P er

ry tr an slate int o an un know ing or inv oluntary

ple a. A cc ep tin g th e ple a ag re em en t m ay ha ve be enaba d de ci sio n unde r the c ir cu m stanc es , but it w as ade ci sio n th at

P ri ce kno w ing ly

a nd vol unt ar ily

m ad e, a ft er

c onsu ltatio n w ithhis c ouns el a nd w ithf ull und er standi ng of the c harg es a ga ins t hi m

a nd the c onse que nc es of his ple a. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d not abus e its discretion in declin ing to allow P rice to w ithdraw that plea. AFFIRMED.