This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 75 

Miriam Aristy-Farer, et al.,

 Respondents,

 v.

State of New York, et al.,

 Appellants.

---------------------------------

New Yorkers for Students' 

Educational Rights ("NYSER"), et 

al.,

 Respondents,

 v.

State of New York, et al.,

 Appellants.

Andrew W. Amend, for appellants.

Michael A. Rebell, for respondents.

WILSON, J.:

Since 1894, the New York State Constitution has

mandated that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the

maintenance and support of a system of free common schools,

wherein all the children of this state may be educated" (Art 11,

§ 1). This Court gave contours to that right in a trilogy known

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as the "Campaign for Fiscal Equality" or "CFE" litigation. In

Campaign for Fiscal Equality v State of New York, we held that

our State Constitution1 "requires the State to offer all children

the opportunity of a sound basic education. Such an education

should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal

skills necessary to enable children to eventually function

productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving

on a jury" (86 NY2d 307, 316 [1995] [CFE I]). The sound basic

education guaranteed by the Constitution requires the State to

afford students with the "opportunity for a meaningful high

school education, one which prepares them to function

productively as civic participants" and "compete for jobs that

enable them to support themselves" (Campaign for Fiscal Equality

v State of New York, 100 NY2d 893, 908, 906 [2003] [CFE II]).

Our CFE decisions establish that "[t]here is a

constitutional floor with respect to educational adequacy . . .

[and the courts] are responsible for adjudicating the nature of

[the duty to provide a sound basic education]" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at

315). The Education Article does not guarantee "that all

educational facilities and services would be equal throughout the

state" (Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist v

Nyquist [Levittown], 57 NY2d 27, 47-48 [1982]). Instead, it

requires "a State-wide system assuring minimal acceptable

1 Any reference to "the Constitution" herein refers to our

New York State Constitution.

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facilities and services" (id. at 47). "[U]nevenness of

educational opportunity d[oes] not render the school financing

system constitutionally infirm, unless it c[an] be shown that the

system's funding inequities resulted in the deprivation of a

sound basic education" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 315). The Education

Article does not guarantee any particular level or amount of

State funding, but rather it guarantees students the opportunity

to achieve a basic level of education. 

The two actions presently before us require us to

determine whether the plaintiffs' claimed violations of the

Education Article have been sufficiently pleaded. Defendants in

both cases, collectively, are the State of New York, the

Governor, the Board of Regents, and the President of the

University of the State of New York and Commissioner of

Education. Plaintiffs in the NYSER action are individual parents

of children in a number of school districts, led by New Yorkers

for Students' Educational Rights (NYSER), an educational advocacy

group. Plaintiffs in the Aristy-Farer action are primarily

parents of New York City schoolchildren who seek to assert claims

on behalf of all similarly situated parents and children. All

plaintiffs contend that the State has violated the Education

Article by failing to provide students with a sound basic

education.

Supreme Court denied defendants' CPLR 3211 motions to

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dismiss plaintiffs' respective complaints.2 Upon defendants'

appeal, in one order, the Appellate Division modified both

Supreme Court orders and, as so modified, affirmed (143 AD3d 101,

120 [1st Dept 2016]). In the NYSER action, the Appellate

Division modified to dismiss plaintiffs' third cause of action

"except insofar as it challenges the adequacy of defendant

State's education funding accountability mechanisms" and

otherwise affirmed (id.). In the Aristy-Farer action, the

Appellate Division modified to dismiss the second and third

causes of action, leaving only the first cause of action

pending.3 The Appellate Division granted defendants in both

actions leave to appeal to this Court, to answer the certified

question: "was the order of the Supreme Court, as modified by

[the Appellate Division], properly made?"

We now hold that the NYSER plaintiffs' first and second

causes of action do not survive a motion to dismiss. With

respect to the third cause of action, defendants challenge it, as

modified by the Appellate Division, only insofar as it concerns

school districts other than New York City and Syracuse. As a

result, the third cause of action survives as to New York City

2 We refer to the "complaints." The operative pleading

document in the NYSER action is their amended complaint; for the

Aristy-Farer action, it is their second amended complaint.

3 The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs do not cross-appeal the

Appellate Division's decision, thus, the dismissal of their

second and third causes of action is not before us.

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and Syracuse. The fourth cause of action, generally alleging an

Education Article violation, is sufficiently pleaded as to New

York City and Syracuse only, and also survives defendants' motion

to dismiss. The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs do not challenge the

Appellate Division's dismissal of their second and third causes

of action, and we conclude that their remaining cause of action

should also be dismissed. 

I.

We briefly summarize the CFE litigation to provide

context. In CFE I, we held that the plaintiffs adequately

pleaded that the State had failed to provide New York City

students with a sound basic education. We noted that for those

plaintiffs to prove their case, they would "have to establish a

causal link between the present funding system and any proven

failure to provide a sound basic education to New York City

school children" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318), and later explained the

proof should include deficient "inputs" and "outputs" (CFE II,

100 NY2d at 908-909). In CFE II, we upheld the trial court's

finding that the State had failed to fund New York City schools

adequately to provide a sound basic education, and we directed

the State to "ascertain the cost of providing a sound basic

education in New York City" (id. at 930). In CFE III, we

rejected the lower courts' determinations that the State had

understated the cost of providing a sound basic education in New

York City (see Campaign for Fiscal Equality v State of New York,

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8 NY3d 14, 30 [2006] [CFE III]).

Instead, we held that the obligation to determine the

amount and allocation of funds was a peculiarly legislative

function, and the State had proffered sufficient evidence to

justify its estimate as rational. "Accordingly, we declare[d]

that the constitutionally required funding for the New York City

School District include[d] additional operating funds in the

amount of $1.93 billion" (id. at 31). In so concluding, we

emphasized our deference to the legislature in areas of education

policymaking, budget, and finance. Our decision in CFE III

terminated that litigation; no injunctive relief survives that

termination. 

II.

The NYSER plaintiffs allege that, in 2007, following

our CFE III decision, the State adopted various programs to

increase funding not only for New York City schools, as our

mandate required, but statewide. They allege that the State

accomplished this through the Budget and Reform Act of 2007

(codified at Education Law § 3602), which included a program,

Foundation Aid, that established a new formula for calculating

State aid to school districts. However, according to the NYSER

complaint, after the 2008 recession, the State froze education

spending levels, and later, reduced them. Both the NYSER and

Aristy-Farer plaintiffs allege that, in 2010, the State enacted

"Annual Professional Performance Review" (APPR) legislation,

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which required the State to withhold education aid to any

district that did not implement a plan to assess the performance

of teachers and administrators. The State enacted the APPR

legislation to receive funds under the federal "Race to the Top"

program. After New York City failed to comply in 2012, the State

withheld funds. Those allegations form the core of the current

lawsuits. 

Plaintiffs in both actions contend that the State has

violated the Education Article by failing to fund public schools

adequately, but the causes of action differ with regard to the

allegations in support thereof.4 Specifically, the NYSER

complaint contains four causes of action. First, it alleges that

defendants failed to comply with our CFE decisions by depriving

the New York City school district of the "minimum constitutional

level of funding." Second, the complaint alleges that students

in school districts throughout the state are being deprived of a

sound basic education due to defendants' failure to implement the

Budget and Reform Act of 2007, and their implementation of

various budget-cutting measures. Third, the complaint alleges

that defendants violated the Education Article by, among other

things, failing to: identify essential courses of study, develop

cost-efficient policies, undertake cost studies to determine the

cost of a sound basic education, and ensure an adequate

4 As discussed above, the Appellate Division modified the

NYSER plaintiffs' third cause of action and dismissed the AristyFarer plaintiffs' second and third causes of action. 

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accountability system for measuring education performance. 

Fourth, and finally, the complaint alleges that defendants have

failed to provide students across the state with a sound basic

education in violation of the Education Article. 

The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs focus on the State's

adoption of the APPR system, and allege that the State withheld

approximately $290 million from the New York City school

district. They assert three causes of action, alleging that:

first, the State's withholding of the $290 million denied New

York City schools funding necessary for the provision of a sound

basic education; second, the State's failure to induce school

boards and unions to agree to an APPR plan through mechanisms

other than by withholding funds was arbitrary, unreasonable, and

violated their due process rights; and third, the withholding of

funds denied them equal protection. 

III.

"In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject

to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action

under CPLR 3211(a)(7), our well-settled task is to determine

whether, 'accepting as true the factual statements of the

complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the

facts stated" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318, quoting People v New York

City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348 [1983]). Plaintiffs here are

entitled to all favorable inferences that can be drawn from their

pleadings (see id.). Thus, "[i]f we determine that plaintiffs

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are entitled to relief on any reasonable view of the facts

stated, our inquiry is complete and we must declare the complaint

legally sufficient" (id.).

IV. 

Before turning to the specific claims in each

complaint, we address the NYSER plaintiffs' contention that they

can allege statewide violations of the Education Article based on

claimed funding deficiencies without including

district-by-district facts in their pleadings. Our prior

Education Article cases have clearly and consistently stated that

the type of claims brought here must be pleaded with district

specificity to be viable.5 In Levittown, we explained that

absent allegations of "gross and glaring inadequacy," decisions

regarding the allocation of public funds for education fall

within the purview of the legislature, not the courts (57 NY2d at

48-49). 

In Reform Educ. Financing Inequities Today (REFIT) v

5 We do not foreclose the possibility that allegations

sufficient to satisfy our CFE "gross educational inadequacies"

test (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 319) could be made on a statewide basis. 

For example, if the State were to stop funding education after

elementary school, or would not allow state monies to be spent on

math education, a plaintiff might not need to allege

district-by-district inputs and outputs to challenge such

policies. Here, however, the NYSER plaintiffs do not allege the

existence of any such statewide rule or policy, but instead

contend that, in New York City, Syracuse, and various unspecified

school districts around the state, students are not receiving a

sound basic education. That claim requires fact-specific

district-by-district allegations of the deprivation of a sound

basic education (and later, proof).

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Cuomo, decided the same day as CFE I, we held that because the

plaintiffs did not claim specifically that students in their

district were receiving less than a sound basic education, but

instead attacked the gross inequality of funds available to

school districts around the state, their pleadings could not

survive a motion to dismiss (86 NY2d 279, 285 [1995] ["Giving

plaintiffs' submissions the benefit of every favorable inference,

they simply do not state a claim that these disparities have

caused students in the poorer districts to receive less than a

sound basic education, which is all that they are guaranteed by

our Constitution"]). Likewise, in Paynter v State of New York,

decided the same day as CFE II, we upheld the dismissal of the

plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a cause of action

under the Education Article. Although the plaintiffs

sufficiently pleaded "that by every measure of student

achievement [their] schools do not deliver a sound basic

education," we found their complaint deficient because they had

not "alleged that the substandard academic performance in their

school stem[med] from any lack of funds or inadequacy in the

teaching, facilities, or instrumentalities of learning" (100 NY2d

434, 438-39 [2003]). 

More recently, in New York Civil Liberties Union v

State of New York (NYCLU), we rejected plaintiffs' claims

premised on failures in individual schools, noting the importance

of pleading specific "district-wide" failures caused by

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inadequate state funding (see 4 NY3d 175, 178, 181 [2005]). In

NYCLU, we held that although the complaint alleged that "the

State of New York does not provide adequate financial resources

to afford all students throughout the state the opportunity for a

sound basic education[,] . . . even construing plaintiffs'

allegations liberally . . . the complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim" (id. at 180). "Thus, because school districts,

not individual schools, are the local units responsible for

receiving and using state funding, and the State is responsible

for providing sufficient funding to school districts, a claim

under the Education Article requires that a district-wide failure

be pleaded" (id. at 182). 

Here, plaintiffs ask us to find that they have stated a

claim in "another way," because "[d]istrict-based claims of

inadequate inputs and outputs are one, but, as this case shows,

cannot be the only, way to plead an Education Article violation"

(Pl Br at 3). Although our CFE and other Education Article

decisions do not "delineate the contours of all possible

Education Article claims" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 441), they evidence

an important underlying proposition. Because public schools are

funded through a mixture of State and local funds, and because

"the Education Article enshrined in the Constitution a

state-local partnership in which 'people with a community of

interest and a tradition of acting together to govern themselves'

make the 'basic decisions on funding and operating their own

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schools'" (Paynter, 100 NY2d at 442, quoting Levittown, 57 NY2d

at 46), it cannot ordinarily be inferred that deficiencies in

funding or educational services in one school district are

mirrored in another. Therefore, allegations of deficiencies in

one, several, or many school districts would not ordinarily serve

as sufficient allegations about others. Our CFE decisions can be

understood as a way to bring a challenge under the Education

Article even if the State's system overall is designed to provide

a sound basic education, but such challenges must be brought on a

school district level. Plaintiffs must plead some facts as to

each school district they claim falls below the constitutional

minimum. Here, drawing every inference in favor of the NYSER

plaintiffs, it is not possible to infer that all -- or even most

-- school districts in the state fall below the constitutional

floor, and plaintiffs concede that many school districts are not

deficient. 

The Appellate Division reasoned that the NYSER

plaintiffs properly pleaded a statewide claim because "actionable

deficits identified in one district will require modification of

the formula, necessarily affecting the calculation of funding for

all districts" (143 AD3d 101 at 117). That observation, while

perhaps true, provides no justification for allowing the NYSER

plaintiffs to proceed with their third and fourth causes of

action on a statewide basis. 

The NYSER plaintiffs also argue that defendants have a

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"self-executing" constitutional obligation to comply with the

Education Article, and that by requiring plaintiffs to plead

facts on a district-by-district basis, we would shift the burden

to prove a violation onto students. Of course, all members of

the Legislative and Executive branches take an oath to uphold the

constitutions of the United States and New York, and have a duty

to discharge their responsibilities faithfully (see NY Const, art

XIII, § 1). However, as with every such obligation, if a

plaintiff claims a violation, it is up to that plaintiff to prove

the violation. Moreover, in the CFE litigation, the plaintiffs

sought a variety of forms of ongoing injunctive relief as part of

the remedy for the constitutional violation. Although the trial

court ordered, inter alia, that the legislature conduct

costing-out studies every four years and determine the cost of

constitutional compliance on a district-by-district basis

statewide, we affirmed the Appellate Division's vacatur of the

former and rejected the imposition of the latter (see CFE III, 8

NY3d at 32). Thus, the very "duty" we rejected in CFE III is the

foundation of plaintiffs' argument that they should be excused

from pleading specific deficiencies and causation as to each

district in which they alleged defendants have failed to provide

a sound basic education.

Plaintiffs contend that requiring proof on a

district-by-district basis could be difficult, if not impossible,

and therefore reason they should be able to prove a statewide

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violation by adducing evidence as to some districts of their

choosing. However, our precedent requires district-specific

pleading for claims of this nature, which plaintiffs here have

set forth for New York City and Syracuse only.

V.

We now turn to the specific allegations and individual

causes of action in each pleading. 

A. The NYSER Complaint

The NYSER plaintiffs' first cause of action seeks to

hold defendants liable because they allegedly "have failed to

comply with the specific decisions and orders of the Court of

Appeals in CFE I, CFE II, and CFE III." However, that litigation

is concluded. Our CFE decisions do not presently impose any

injunctive remedy on defendants. In CFE II, we directed the

State to ascertain costs and ensure a system of accountability,

struck the lower courts' other remedial orders, and limited our

order to New York City schools. In CFE III, we repeatedly stated

that the $1.93 billion estimate proffered by the State satisfied

our mandate in CFE II. We noted that the State was not "limited

to the minimum, or 'floor,' of what it takes to provide a sound

basic education" (CFE III, 8 NY3d at 33 [Rosenblatt, J.,

concurring]). But we in no way imposed any further funding

requirements on the State. We recognized in CFE III, and

reiterate here, that "[w]e cannot 'intrude upon the policy-making

and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative

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and executive branches'" (CFE III, 8 NY3d at 28, quoting

Klosterman v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 541 [1984]). Our deference "is

especially necessary where it is the State's budget plan that is

being questioned" (id.). 

In CFE III, we expressly "reject[ed] as unnecessary"

the Appellate Division's multi-year funding directive (CFE III, 8

NY3d at 27). Likewise, we did not, as the Appellate Division

mistakenly concluded, direct that the State must increase its

spending annually by a "built-in provision for annual updating

for inflation by reference to a specified inflation index" (143

AD3d at 114). Thus, the NYSER plaintiffs' second cause of

action, based upon the State's alleged violation for failing to

comply with its own 2007 proposed funding, which exceeded the

$1.93 billion we approved in CFE III, must also be dismissed. 

Although our CFE decisions may well be valuable to the

NYSER plaintiffs in framing their case as they proceed, they

cannot state a claim based on noncompliance with orders arising

from the CFE litigation, because that litigation has ended. The

NYSER plaintiffs cannot state a claim for violation of the

Education Article by pleading that State funding levels are not

as great as they would have been under methods of calculation

proposed by the State during the CFE litigation, or contemplated

by the Budget and Reform Act of 2007, because those allegations

do not state a constitutional violation, even though those facts

may be relevant to support the NYSER plaintiffs' fourth cause of

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action.6 Furthermore, even if some injunctive provision of the

CFE litigation remained, the parties to that lawsuit -- not this

one -- would need to move for contempt in the original

proceeding. To sustain a motion for contempt, "a lawful judicial

order expressing an unequivocal mandate must have been in effect

and disobeyed. Moreover, the party to be held in contempt must

have had knowledge of the order . . . [and] prejudice to the

rights of a party to the litigation must be demonstrated" (McCain

v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]).

As to the NYSER plaintiffs' third cause of action, the

State does not appeal that portion of the Appellate Division's

decision permitting that claim to proceed, as modified, for the

New York City and Syracuse school districts. Thus, we do not

decide whether the third cause of action, limited to allegations

of a lack of accountability mechanisms, is a proper independent

cause of action. 

In their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs generally

6 The dissent evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of

our holding here, treating it as if it bars plaintiffs, in

pursuing their surviving claim, from the use of facts relating to

the prior CFE litigation and its aftermath, e.g., that "the State

failed to carry out its commitment to provide the amount of state

aid that the governor and the legislature had determined to be

necessary," or that the State "abandon[ed] those efforts." Those

facts may well be evidence in this case, but they themselves are

neither a cause of action nor the basis for enforcement of

non-existent injunctive relief. Likewise, neither our decision

today nor the CFE litigation prevents these plaintiffs -- who are

not the CFE plaintiffs -- from obtaining different relief,

including injunctive relief, if warranted based on the proof they

adduce and the findings of the lower courts.

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allege that the State defendants "have failed and are continuing

to fail to provide . . . an opportunity for a sound basic

education in violation of" the Education Article. As we have

held, "[a]n Education Article claim . . . requires a clear

articulation of the asserted failings of the State, sufficient

for the State to know what it will be expected to do should the

plaintiffs prevail" (NYCLU, 4 NY3d 175 at 180). The NYSER

plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged deficient inputs and outputs

with respect to New York City and, although in less detail,

Syracuse, that give defendants adequate notice of what a

potential remedy could require of them. In that regard, the

NYSER complaint alleges deficient inputs (a lack of qualified

teachers and principals, low levels of support staff, outdated

curricula, unsuccessful English as a Second Language programs,

overly large class sizes, lack of basic materials such as

textbooks and chalk, a reduction in after-school and summer

programs, and inadequate and unclean buildings and facilities)

with respect to Syracuse and New York City, with some degree of

specificity. The complaint further alleges deficient outputs

with respect to those school districts (poor standardized test

proficiency, high failure and drop-out rates, poor English

proficiency, and inability to meet basic requirements to gain

admission to gain admission to City or State colleges because

their high schools do not offer basic course requirements). 

The complaint also alleges a causal link between

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inadequate State funding and the failure of those two school

districts to provide a sound basic education. Just as the CFE

plaintiffs did, going forward, plaintiffs here will need to

adduce evidence at trial proving, on the basis of current data,

that the State has breached its constitutional obligation to

provide a sound basic education to students in public schools. 

Should plaintiffs be successful, it will be up to the State to

craft an appropriate response, subject to judicial review,

because the courts have "neither the authority, nor the ability,

nor the will, to micromanage education financing" (CFE II, 100

NY2d at 925).

In contrast, aside from New York City and Syracuse, the

complaint alleges merely that other unspecified districts

throughout the State have, on "average," been forced to reduce

instructional expenditures per student and have, as a result,

experienced poor student performance. The very allegations the

dissent quotes to illustrate the complaint's purported

sufficiency instead highlight its patent failure. The

allegations that "school districts on average have reduced their

instructional expenditures per pupil by approximately 7%;" that

adequate "reserves" should be "5-10% of a school district's

spending levels," but "in 2012-2013, 28 school districts had less

than 1% of their budget available;" or that "[eighty-seven]

school districts in New York State are currently in conditions of

financial stress," assert financial -- not educational --

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problems (see Levittown, 57 NY2d at 47-48 ["If what is made

available by this system (which is what is to be maintained and

supported) may properly be said to constitute an education, the

constitutional mandate is satisfied"]). The NYSER allegations do

not allege a causal relationship between the unspecified

educational deficiencies and a lack of State funding, or identify

any specific districts, such that the State might be put on

notice as to the relief sought (see CFE II, 100 NY2d at 928

[declining to order any relief or State action as to districts

other than New York City, because "(th)ere the case presented to

us, and consequently the remedy, was limited to the adequacy of

education financing for the New York City public schools, though

the State may of course address statewide issues if it

chooses"]). 

Further general allegations that "high need school

districts have been unable to comply with many state mandates and

provide their students the opportunity for a sound basic

education at the current funding levels," though at least

alleging an educational deficiency in conclusory terms, do not

indicate what or how many "high-need" districts there are, the

state mandates with which they have been unable to comply, or the

causal link we have required to be pleaded. Certainly, as the

dissent points out, "the factual allegations for New York City

and Syracuse are more robust than for the remaining districts" --

because the only school districts mentioned in the complaint

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other than those two are Buffalo, Rochester, and Yonkers, which

are mentioned, e.g., because their residents do not "directly pay

school taxes" and receive a subsidy less than the STAR payments

made to other districts, or to point out that Rochester and

Yonkers are not among the 87 school districts determined to be

"in conditions of financial stress" by the Comptroller. 

B. The Aristy-Farer Complaint

The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs argue that the State's

withholding of approximately $290 million in 2012, as a penalty

for New York City's failure to comply with the APPR program,

violated the Education Article. Their complaint focuses almost

exclusively on that penalty, and contains conclusory statements

alleging that New York City students do not receive a sound basic

education. Those conclusory allegations are insufficient to

state a claim. The Aristy-Farer complaint's first cause of

action is not viable because it does not contain any

fact-specific allegations regarding deficient inputs or outputs

in the New York City School District. The complaint does not

identify any district-specific reduction in teaching or support

staff, depletion of supplies, or inadequate learning facilities. 

Further, although the complaint makes a perfunctory reference to

graduation rates and poor testing scores, it does not causally

relate either of those allegations to input deficiencies cause by

insufficient funding. 

The Aristy-Farer complaint focuses on the State's

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withholding of approximately $290 million in 2012 as a penalty

for New York City's failure to comply with the APPR program. The

Aristy-Farer plaintiffs contend that the State's withholding

violated the Education Article. However, as noted above, the

Education Article does not mandate a particular dollar amount of

State funding, and the complaint contains no allegation of

causation linking the State's one-time withholding of $290

million and any alleged failure to provide a sound basic

education.

The Appellate Division held the first cause of action

should proceed, not because it independently contains sufficient

allegations, but because it "contains some of the same

allegations as the much more detailed NYSER Complaint regarding

inputs and outputs . . . [and because the] actions involve the

same nucleus of operative facts, have widely overlapping claims,

and have been consolidated" (143 AD3d at 119-120). As the

Appellate Division recognized, the Aristy-Farer complaint lacks

the specificity of the NYSER complaint, and its remaining cause

of action, even when read liberally, is too conclusory to survive

a motion to dismiss (see generally Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52

[2012] [allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions are not

entitled to be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss]). 

The Aristy-Farer complaint's first cause of action

lacks sufficient factual "allegations that the State somehow

fails in its obligation to provide minimally acceptable

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educational services [and therefore is] insufficient to state a

cause of action under the Education Article" (Paynter, 100 NY2d

at 441). "[F]undamentally, an Education Article claim requires

two elements: the deprivation of a sound basic education, and

causes attributable to the State" (NYCLU, 4 NY3d at 178-179). 

The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs have failed to satisfy either of

those requirements. A pleading is not an empty formality, and

the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs chose to file a separate lawsuit with

a separate theory and separate, but highly conclusory,

allegations. That the NYSER and Aristy-Farer actions were

consolidated on appeal to the Appellate Division does not relieve

either set of plaintiffs of the legal obligation to plead with

specificity, and the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs cannot rely on the

NYSER allegations to support their separate pleading. Thus, the

order of the Appellate Division permitting the Aristy-Farer

plaintiffs to proceed with their first cause of action should be

reversed. 

VI.

Conclusion

The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs have not stated any

cognizable claims, and their complaint should be dismissed in its

entirety. The NYSER plaintiffs' first and second causes of action

should be dismissed; their third cause of action, as modified by

the Appellate Division, and fourth cause of action, should

proceed as they relate to New York City and Syracuse only. 

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Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,

insofar as appealed from, should be modified in accordance with

this opinion, without costs, and, as so modified, affirmed, and

the certified question answered in the negative.

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Aristy-Farer v State of New York; NYSER v State of New York

No. 75 

RIVERA, J.(concurring in part, dissenting in part):

I agree for the reasons stated by the majority that the

Aristy-Farer complaint should be dismissed in its entirety

because it fails to plead a cognizable claim. However, because

the complaint filed by the New Yorkers for Students' Educational

Rights (NYSER) adequately pleads several causes of actions

against the State for violations of the Education Article as to

all districts, I would affirm the Appellate Division as it

relates to this action.1

I.

The State Constitution's Education Article mandates

that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and

support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the

1 The Appellate Division dismissed those parts of the third

cause of action that assert substantive due process and equal

protection challenges, because the Annual Professional

Performance Review and penalty provisions "readily pass[] the

appropriate rational basis constitutional scrutiny" (143 AD3d

101, 118 [1st Dept 2016]). The majority allows the remainder of

the third cause of action to proceed as to New York City and

Syracuse because the State does not appeal that part of the

Appellate Division's order (majority op at 16). For the reasons

I discuss, I would also allow this claim to proceed, but with

respect to all school districts in the State. 

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children of this state may be educated" (NY Const, art XI, § 1). 

This Court has interpreted that language to require "a State-wide

system assuring minimal acceptable facilities and services in

contrast to [an] unsystematized delivery of instruction" (Board

of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v Nyquist, 57 NY2d 27,

47 [1982]), and "that the opportunity for a sound basic education

be provided to all" (New York Civil Liberties Union v State of

New York, 4 NY3d 175, 178 [2005][NYCLU]). To the extent the

State's obligation involves financing public education, the Court

has not determined precisely how much money the State must spend

to comply with its constitutional mandate because such a

determination "presents issues of enormous practical and

political complexity" best left to the other branches of

government (Levittown, 57 NY2d at 38-39). However, the Court has

maintained that "it is the province of the Judicial branch to

define, and safeguard, rights provided by the New York State

Constitution, and order redress for violation of them" (Campaign

for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State, 100 NY2d 893, 925 [2003] [CFE

II]). 

The Court's decisions in the trilogy of Campaign for

Fiscal Equity (CFE) cases explain the State's financing

obligations under the Education Article and the methods by which

plaintiffs may bring claims challenging the constitutionality of

State financing. These decisions further provide the context for

the instant appeal. In the first CFE case, the Court held that a

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group of plaintiffs had pleaded a sustainable claim under the

Education Article and a valid cause of action under federal law

as provided by Title VI's implementing regulations (86 NY2d at

312 [1995] [CFE I]). The Court concluded that there is a

"constitutional floor with respect to educational adequacy" under

the Education Article, and that the Court is "responsible for

adjudicating the nature of [the State's] duty" (id. at 315). 

That "constitutional floor," "requires the State to offer all

children the opportunity of a sound basic education" (id. at

316). CFE I established that a cause of action under the

Education Article is properly stated where it alleges that

"minimally acceptable educational services and facilities are not

being provided in plaintiffs' school districts" (id. at 316). 

The Court further explained that "[a] relevant issue at this

point is whether plaintiffs can establish a correlation between

funding and educational opportunity" (id. at 318). The

plaintiffs prevailed at trial, but the Appellate Division

reversed.

On appeal, this Court concluded that the State had

deprived schoolchildren in New York City of a "sound basic

education" (CFE II, 100 NY2d at 918-919). The Court upheld the

trial court's findings that the "inputs" (teaching, facilities,

and instrumentalities of learning) were insufficient as reflected

by the deficiencies in the "outputs" (test results and both

graduation and dropout rates) (id. at 908). The Court held that

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"[r]eforms to the current system of financing school funding and

managing schools should address the shortcomings of the current

system by ensuring, as a part of that process, that every school

in New York City would have the resources necessary for providing

the opportunity for a sound basic education" and "the new scheme

should ensure a system of accountability to measure whether the

reforms actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic

education" (id. at 930). The urgency of the decision is

reflected in the Court's order granting the State nine months to

comply and develop the mandated reforms (id.).2

In accordance with the directives in CFE II, "Governor

Pataki issued an executive order creating the New York State

Commission on Education Reform, charged with recommending, to the

Executive and the Legislature, education financing and other

reforms" (Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8

NY3d 14, 21-22 [2006] [CFE III]). The Commission calculated

"sound basic education spending estimates for each school

district" and compared that figure to the amount the State had

actually spent, thereby determining "spending gaps" (id.). In

New York City, the spending gap was $1.93 billion (id. at 24). 

Supreme Court convened a Judicial Referee Panel to determine

2 Pursuant to the Court's order, the State could, and did,

adopt a statewide measure to ensure compliance with its

constitutional obligations under the Education Article to provide

a sound basic education to every public school student in the

State. 

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whether these reforms complied with CFE II (id. at 25). The

panel modified the Commission's findings, replacing some parts of

its analysis, adopting others, and ultimately determining that

the spending gap in New York City was $5.63 billion, not $1.93

billion as the State had found (id. at 26). 

On appeal in CFE III, this Court held that "Supreme

Court erred by, in effect, commissioning a de novo review of the

compliance question" (id. at 27). The Court explained that the

role of the courts is not "to determine the best way to calculate

the cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but

to determine whether the State's proposed calculation of that

cost is rational" (id.). The trial court "should have proceeded

to determine whether the state plan[] incorporated that sound

basic education expenditure in its proposed budget and would, if

enacted, ensure a system of accountability" (id. at 29-30). 

Holding that the "state budget plan had already reasonably

calculated [the cost of a sound basic education]," the Court

upheld the State's plan and "declare[d] that the constitutionally

required funding for the New York City School District includes

additional operating funds in the amount of $1.93 billion" (id.

at 31).

Here, the NYSER plaintiffs contend that the State has

not complied with its constitutional obligation under the

Education Article, as clarified by this Court in its CFE cases,

to provide adequate funding to ensure a sound basic education to

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all of New York State's public school children. Plaintiffs do

not, as the majority argues, contend that "they should be able to

prove a statewide violation by adducing evidence as to some

districts of their choosing" (majority op at 13). The core of

plaintiffs' argument is that "hundreds of thousands of students

in the City of New York and in other districts throughout the

State of New York are currently being denied the opportunity for

a sound basic education" as a result of the State's failure to

implement the legislative solutions it passed in response to the

holdings in the CFE cases. This is concededly a novel theory

because, first, it is based on the State's duty to ascertain the

"actual costs" of providing a sound basic education, and, second,

because it alleges that the State's failure has impacted students

throughout the state, not just within one or more named

districts. A fresh take on the complex and persistent problems

of educational equity and public school underfinancing does not

render the complaint deficient so long as the claims are

adequately pleaded, as they are here.

II.

On a motion to dismiss, "our well-settled task is to

determine whether, 'accepting as true the factual averments of

the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of

the facts stated'" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318 [internal citations

omitted]). Plaintiffs have the right "to seek redress, and not

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have the courthouse doors closed at the very inception of an

action, where the pleading meets a minimal standard necessary to

resist dismissal of a complaint" (Armstrong v Simon & Schuster,

Inc., 85 NY2d 373, 379 [1995]). "Whether a plaintiff can

ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus

in determining a motion to dismiss" (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs

& Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). So long as, "on any reasonable

view of the facts stated," plaintiffs are entitled to relief,

"our inquiry is complete and we must declare the complaint

legally sufficient" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318). 

"Fundamentally, an Education Article claim requires two

elements: the deprivation of a sound basic education, and causes

attributable to the State" (NYCLU, 4 NY3d at 178-179). Such a

claim "requires a clear articulation of the asserted failings of

the State, sufficient for the State to know what it will be

expected to do should the plaintiffs prevail" (id. at 180). 

In my view, plaintiffs made this threshold showing. In

the first cause of action, the NYSER plaintiffs allege that the

"State defendants have failed to comply with the specific

decisions and orders of the Court of Appeals in CFE I, CFE II,

and CFE III." In the second cause of action, they allege that

the "State defendants have failed to provide the individual

plaintiffs and numerous other students in school districts

throughout the State of New York the opportunity for a sound

basic education." In the third cause of action, plaintiffs

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allege, in part, that the State defendants have violated the

Education Article by failing to "respond appropriately to changes

in fiscal and educational conditions and to maintain a state

system of education in which all of the students receive the

opportunity for a sound basic education." Lastly, the NYSER

plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges that the State has

failed to provide students statewide with an opportunity for a

sound basic education. 

Plaintiffs support these causes of action with: (1) a

detailed account of the State's failure to implement the

statewide plan it had adopted in response to the CFE cases; and

(2) facts concerning the fiscal and educational deficiencies

across school districts. Admittedly, the factual allegations for

New York City and Syracuse are more robust than for the remaining

districts. That plaintiffs here allege extra and more specific

deficiencies in certain districts, however, does not preclude

them from claiming that the State has failed to deliver a

constitutionally adequate system statewide. Furthermore,

plaintiffs still plead facts as to all school districts, which

would entitle them to relief if true. In addition to the

allegations specific to New York City and Syracuse, plaintiffs

claim that because of extensive reduction in state aid to public

schools, "school districts on average have reduced their

instructional expenditures per pupil by approximately 7%." 

Adequate "reserves" should be "5-10% of a school district's

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spending levels," but "in 2012-2013, 28 school districts had less

than 1% of their budget available." Further, the complaint

alleges that "87 school districts in New York State are currently

in conditions of financial stress" and "[e]ven with major efforts

to eliminate inefficiencies and adopt cost-effective practices,

high need school districts have been unable to comply with many

state mandates and provide their students the opportunity for a

sound basic education at the current funding levels."

Furthermore, these claims aside, it is enough that

plaintiffs allege that, "[f]ollowing the recession of 2008, the

State failed to carry out its commitment to provide the amount of

state aid that the governor and the legislature had determined to

be necessary to provide all students the opportunity for a sound

basic education." The NYSER plaintiffs lay out a detailed

history of the CFE litigation and the various legislative

responses that the State has failed to implement. Affording the

complaint every favorable inference, as we are obliged to do at

this stage of the litigation, plaintiffs' first, second, and

fourth causes of action, and that part of the third challenging

the adequacy of the accountability mechanisms, all sufficiently

plead cognizable claims under the Education Article.

The majority's characterization of plaintiffs' claims

as overly general and unspecified (majority op at 18) is a

consequence of the majority's application of a heightened

pleading standard, and not any flaw in the complaint. The

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majority states that the NYSER complaint asserts "financial --

not educational -- problems" (majority op at 18). Yet, the

complaint alleges that students have been deprived of a sound

basic education and outlines a number of "new mandates" meant to

protect students' education that are unaffordable under current

funding levels. The majority further contends that the NYSER

complaint does "not allege a causal relationship between the

unspecified educational deficiencies and a lack of State funding,

or identify any specific districts, such that the State might be

put on notice as to the relief sought" (majority op at 18

[emphasis in original]). However, the complaint expressly

alleges that: (1) the State has failed to provide the state aid

it committed in response to the CFE decisions; and (2) that

"hundreds of thousands of students" have been denied the

opportunity for a sound basic education because of the "extensive

reductions in state aid to public schools." The clear inference

to be drawn from these allegations is that it is precisely these

State financing failures that are responsible for the educational

deficiencies alleged. As our cases make clear, at this stage of

the litigation, plaintiffs are to be accorded "the benefit of

every possible favorable inference" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83,

87 [1994]) and whether they will succeed on the merits "is not

part of the calculus" (EBC I, 5 NY3d at 19). We are concerned

only with whether plaintiffs may be afforded relief "on any

reasonable view of the facts stated," and if so, "we must declare

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the complaint legally sufficient" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318). The

majority's reading of the complaint is inconsistent with this

well-established, minimal pleading requirement (Leon, 84 NY2d at

87). Furthermore, because the complaint states clearly the

proposed remedy -- fulfillment of the State's obligation to:

(1) ascertain the amount required to provide a sound basic

education; (2) pass legislation consistent with that figure; and

then (3) abide by it, as imposed by the CFE decisions -- the

State defendants are on notice as to the relief sought, contrary

to the majority's assertion.

Although the majority maintains otherwise (majority op

at 9 n 3), its ruling essentially restricts school funding

litigation to district-by-district challenges. The majority

contends that, "[o]ur prior Education Article cases have clearly

and consistently stated that the type of claims brought here must

be pleaded with district specificity to be viable" (majority op

at 9) and "[o]ur CFE decisions can be understood as a way to

bring a challenge under the Education Article even if the State's

system overall is designed to provide a sound basic education,

but such challenges must be brought on a school district level"

(majority op at 11-12).

Our case law neither supports this narrow

interpretation of school financing challenges, nor does it

require that we adopt a pleading regime exclusively dependent on

district-specific claims. In NYCLU, the Court held that the

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complaint failed to state a cause of action because plaintiffs'

"requested relief here bypasses the districts and instead seeks

to mandate that the State provide money or other resources

directly to individual schools" (4 NY3d at 182). Contrary to the

majority's suggestion, the Court's holding in that case was

therefore not premised on the fact that plaintiffs erroneously

pleaded statewide failures, but instead on the fact that they

erroneously pleaded individual-school failures. The Court's

holding in REFIT similarly does not shut the courthouse door to

statewide claims (Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today [REFIT] v

Cuomo, 86 NY2d 279 [1995]). In that case, plaintiffs alleged an

Education Article claim on the basis of a "disparity in the

amount of money spent per pupil in property-poor as compared to

property-rich school districts" (86 NY2d at 283). Having already

held that "[t]he Education Article does not by its express terms

contain an egalitarian component," the Court was bound to

conclude that the complaint failed to state a cause of action

(id. at 284). Furthermore, the CFE cases, as with NYCLU and

REFIT, "addressed the sufficiency of the pleadings then before us

and had no occasion to delineate the contours of all possible

Education Article claims" (Paynter v State, 100 NY2d 434, 442

[2003]). Those cases were limited to their facts and do not

expressly prohibit plaintiffs here from bringing claims grounded

in violations having a statewide impact. Nor do they provide a

basis to limit the way plaintiffs articulate post-CFE school

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financing claims.

Furthermore, there is no judicial precedent for the

majority's suggestion that the State defendants would only be

bound by the CFE decisions if there had been some injunctive

relief ordered in those cases (majority op at 14). This argument

is neither relied on by the State nor discussed by the courts

below. For good reason -- the argument has no application in

this appeal. As the Court has explained, "it is the province of

the Judicial branch to define, and safeguard, rights provided by

the New York State Constitution" (CFE II, 100 NY2d at 925). When

the Court makes such a constitutional determination, the State is

bound by it, injunction or not.3 It bears repeating that a

plaintiff may -- as with any party alleging injury -- rely on our

explications of the State's constitutional obligation under the

Education Article when asserting a subsequent violation of the

law. 

III. 

School financing cases are difficult, complex, and

require expansive resources (see Michael Heise, Equal Educational

Opportunity Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance

3 The State's abandonment of its efforts to comply with the

CFE cases is therefore not solely potential evidence for a future

case, as the majority contends (majority op at 16 n 6), but is

itself a cause of action because it represents a constitutional

violation. 

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Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative

Explanation, 32 Ga L Rev 543, 580 [1998] ["the legal

operationalization of [school finance] equity, at least at the

public level involving school resources, has proven notoriously

complex and difficult"]). The CFE litigation illustrates the

challenges inherent in these cases. Beginning in 1995, the CFE

cases were litigated for over two decades, with the last of the

CFE cases being decided in 2006. The actions involved numerous

appeals and remands, and it was not until a year after the final

case was litigated that the state developed its legislative

response. In the interim, generations of children were denied

the education guaranteed by our State Constitution. Against the

tide of this Court's prior decisions, the majority's holding

makes it all but impossible to address constitutional violations

other than through burdensome piecemeal litigation. The result

will be that meritorious claims will go unfiled, due in part to a

lack of litigation resources and the inability of parents and

children to wait decades for a possible victory from which they

will never benefit directly. Yet, the stakes are high. At issue

in these cases is the constitutional guarantee to every child in

public school that the education funded by the State provides

them with the basic skills they need to participate meaningfully

in society. Education is unique because of its importance "in

maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its

deprivation on the life of the child" (Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202,

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221 [1982]). Education is the great leveler of social and

economic inequalities, and "[i]n America, education is still the

great equalizer" (Arne Duncan, US Secretary of Education, 2011). 

The Court is "responsible for adjudicating the nature"

of the State's constitutional obligations (CFE I, 86 NY2d at

315). When the Court held in CFE II that the State was required

to "ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound basic

education" (100 NY2d at 930), that mandate was not limited to the

Budget and Reform Act of 2007, it was a constitutional

requirement that survives the CFE litigation. The State was not

free to attempt compliance and then abandon those efforts. It is

for the legislature to determine how to comply with CFE, but

compliance is undeniably required. Insofar as the NYSER

complaint makes specific factual allegations that the State has

failed to comply with the Court's decisions in the CFE cases, and

as a result students have not received a sound basic education,

the claims meet the "minimal standard necessary" to survive the

State's motion to dismiss (Armstrong, 85 NY2d at 379). 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order, insofar as appealed from, modified in accordance with the

opinion herein, without costs, and, as so modified, affirmed and

certified question answered in the negative. Opinion by Judge

Wilson. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Stein, Fahey and Garcia

concur. Judge Rivera concurs in part and dissents in part in an

opinion. Judge Feinman took no part.

Decided June 27, 2017

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