J-S36029-14

2014 PA Super 250

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LOUIS I. SPIVAK

Appellant No. 2913 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered September 19, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2012-123721

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2014

Louis I. Spivak (“Spivak”) appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Montgomery County granting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s 

(“Wells Fargo”) motion for summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure 

action. We reverse and remand. We conclude that when a residential 

mortgagee delivers an Act 6 notice, commences a foreclosure action against 

a mortgagor (“first action”), discontinues that foreclosure action, and re-files 

another foreclosure action against a mortgagor for the same premises 

(“second action”), the lack of a new notice prior to the second action is fatal 

to the second action. 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On or about March 29, 2007, Spivak secured a mortgage loan from 

Trident Mortgage Company, L.P. (“Trident”) in the amount of $223,750.00 

(“Loan”). Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s New Matter, Exhibit A, Assignment 

of Mortgage, p. 1 (page number supplied). To evidence his obligation to 

repay the Loan, Spivak executed a promissory note in favor of Trident, its 

successors and assigns (the “Note”). Id. at Exhibit C, Note, pp. 1-2 (page 

numbers supplied). To secure his obligations under the Note, Spivak 

executed a purchase money mortgage (the “Mortgage”) in favor of Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as mortgagee and nominee 

for Trident, its successors and assigns, granting Trident a lien and security 

interest in the Property. Id. at Exhibit B, Mortgage, generally. On April 19, 

2007, MERS recorded the Mortgage in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds 

for Montgomery County (the “Recorder of Deeds”). 

After the Loan closing, on December 14, 2010, MERS sold the Note 

and assigned the Mortgage to Wells Fargo. See id. at Exhibit A, Assignment 

of Mortgage, p. 1 (page number supplied). On February 10, 2011, Wells 

Fargo recorded the assignment of Mortgage with the Recorder of Deeds. 

In January 2010, Spivak defaulted on his obligations due under the 

Note and Mortgage by failing to make timely payments due under the Note 

on January 1, 2010 and each month thereafter. On October 30, 2010, Wells 

Fargo sent Spivak the combined notice of intention to foreclose in 

accordance with the Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 P.S. §§ 101 et 
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seq. (“Act 6”), and the Homeowner’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance Act of 

1983, 35 P.S. §§ 1680.401c et seq. (“Act 91”) (the “Notice” or the “2010 

Notice”). See generally, Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of its Motion For 

Summary Judgment, Exhibit F, Act 91 Notice Take Action to Save Your Home 

From Foreclosure.1

 Spivak failed to cure his default under the Note and Mortgage. In 

December 2010, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure action, which it subsequently 

discontinued in 2011 due to mortgage assignment deficiencies. Appellant’s 

Brief at 7.

On May 24, 2012, Wells Fargo commenced the instant action,2its 

second in rem mortgage foreclosure action. On July 16, 2012, Spivak filed 

an answer with new matter wherein he admitted that he defaulted on his 

obligations under the Mortgage, and that Wells Fargo served him with the 

Notice in October 2010 — approximately two years earlier, before instituting 

its prior action, and before it had any ownership interest in the Note or the 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Wells Fargo sent Spivak the Notice before MERS assigned the 

mortgage to it. 

2 Act 91’s pre-foreclosure notice requirements were temporarily suspended 

from August 27, 2011 until October 2012. See 42 Pa. Bull. 5447 (Aug. 18, 

2012). During that time period, mortgagees were not required to provide 

notice under Act 91 prior to commencing a foreclosure action. Id. Wells 

Fargo commenced this action in May 2012. Spivak argues only that the 

Notice failed to comply with Act 6 presumably because Wells Fargo 

commenced this action during the time period in which Act 91 was 

suspended. See Wells Fargo’s Brief at 10, 12.
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property. See Notes 1 & 2; R.12b. On July 25, 2012, Wells Fargo filed its 

reply to the new matter.

On April 25, 2013, Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment, 

attaching a copy of the Notice along with proof of mailing of the Notice and 

the affidavit of Jeremiah Herberg, Vice President of Loan Documentation at 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (the “Affidavit”). Herberg averred that: (a) Spivak 

had defaulted on his obligations under the Mortgage by failing to make the 

monthly payments due on January 1, 2010 and thereafter, (b) Wells Fargo 

provided Spivak with the Notice in 2010, and (c) Spivak had failed to cure 

the default under the Mortgage or take the necessary steps to avoid 

foreclosure.

On May 24, 2013,3 Spivak filed a response to the motion, asserting 

that the motion should be denied because the Notice: (a) failed to accurately 

state the amounts due and owing or to properly identify the lender4and (b) 

____________________________________________

3 On June 17, 2013, Spivak filed a “Praecipe to Substitute Response”, 

attaching a revised Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in 

place of the May 24, 2013 response. Because the relevant arguments 

appeared in his original filing, the substitution is immaterial for our 

purposes.

4 Spivak also argued Wells Fargo “failed to cure the mortgage assignment 

deficiencies before filing the within foreclosure action.” Defendant’s 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 9. He has waived 

this issue by failing to raise it in this Court.

Although Spivak argued Wells Fargo was not the legal owner at the time it 

commenced the instant matter, Spivak has not argued – either in the trial 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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had not been provided to him “within the prescribed one year period 

preceding the filing of the foreclosure action.” R.186b-187b.5 Additionally, he 

argued that he was never provided a notice of intention to foreclose in 

connection with the pending foreclosure action; rather, the Notice was sent 

in connection with Wells Fargo’s prior foreclosure action. Id.

On September 19, 2013, the trial court granted summary judgment to 

Wells Fargo and entered an in rem judgment in its favor. On October 14, 

2013, Spivak filed a timely notice of appeal. On January 2, 2014, the trial 

court, without ordering Spivak to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), issued its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925(a).6

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

court or on appeal – that the 2010 Notice was deficient because Wells Fargo 

was not the legal owner at the time it sent the Notice. Accordingly, this issue 

is waived. See Irwin Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 

1099, 1103 (Pa.Super.2010) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not 

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant”).

5 As the trial court notes in its 1925(a) opinion, neither Act 6 nor Act 91 

contains a one-year notice requirement. Trial Court Opinion 1/2/2014 

(“Opinion”, at 2-3). See 35 P.S. §§ 1680.402, 1680.403; 41 P.S. §§ 403, 

404.

6 Although Spivak did not file the Designation of the Contents of the 

Reproduced Record as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2188, we decline to quash the appeal, because we have engaged in a 

meaningful review by referring to the contents of the certified record and of 

Wells Fargo’s Supplemental Reproduced Record. See, e.g., Downey v. 

Downey, 582 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa.Super.1990) (citing O’Neill v. Checker 

Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 681-82 (Pa.Super.1989)) (appellate court will 

decline to quash an appeal where effective appellate review is not precluded 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Spivak now raises the following issue for our review:

I. Whether [], Wells Fargo Bank, which previously sued 

[Spivak] in a mortgage foreclosure action which was 

voluntarily withdrawn, should be required to send a 

new Notice of Intention to Foreclose to [Spivak] prior 

to filing a second mortgage foreclosure lawsuit 

against [Spivak].

Appellant’s Brief at 4.7For the reasons that follow, we find Wells Fargo was 

required to send a new Act 6 notice to Spivak prior to commencing the 

second foreclosure action against him.

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we must 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344, 347 

(Pa.Super.2006).8“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or 

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

by the deficiencies of reproduced record). Further, Wells Fargo has not 

moved for dismissal on this basis. See Pa.R.A.P. 2188.

7 Because Spivak does not raise or brief the remaining issues discussed by 

the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion, they are waived. Famous, 4 A.3d at 

1103 (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on 

behalf of an Spivak”).

8 While post-trial motions typically are required to preserve an issue on 

appeal, no post-trial motions are permitted where a trial court grants a 

motion for summary judgment. Thus, Spivak has not waived his argument 

on appeal by appealing directly from the grant of Wells Fargo’s motion for 

summary judgment. See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 Note; Tohan v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglass Corp., 696 A.2d 1195 (Pa.Super.1997).
J-S36029-14

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result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the 

record, discretion is abused.” Roth v. Ross, 85 A.3d 590, 592-93

(Pa.Super.2014) (citing Grossi v. Travelers Pers. Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 

1163 (Pa.Super.2013)). A grant of summary judgment “presents a question 

of law, for which our scope of review is plenary.” Sevast v. Kakouras, 915

A.2d 1147, 1152 (Pa.2007) (citation omitted).

In analyzing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Spivak, and 

resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

against the moving party, Wells Fargo. Erie Ins. Exchange v. Weryha, 

931 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa.Super.2007).

Spivak argues that Act 6 requires a mortgagee to send a new Notice 

prior to commencing its second foreclosure action where it withdrew its prior 

foreclosure action.9 Spivak reasons that because Wells Fargo sent the 

____________________________________________

9 Although he failed to raise this defense in his answer to Wells Fargo’s 

complaint, see Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint with New Matter 

¶ 8, Spivak has not waived the Act 6 issue because this defense was raised 

in the answer to Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment. See Grasso 

v. Thimons, 559 A.2d 925, 929 n. 5 (Pa.Super.1989) (equitable estoppel 

issue first raised in answer to motion for summary judgment preserved for 

appeal); Adelphia Cablevision Associates of Radnor, L.P. v. University 

City Housing Company, 755 A.2d 703, 709 (Pa.Super.2000) 

(constitutional issue first raised in cross-motion for summary judgment 

preserved for appeal); Norris v. Wood, 485 A.2d 817, 819 (Pa.Super.1984) 

(constitutional issue first raised in motion for partial summary judgment 

preserved for appeal); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032; Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 8. Further, both parties have briefed the 

issue and the trial court has addressed the issue in its 1925(a) opinion. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Notice before commencing and withdrawing its prior suit, its failure to 

provide a new Notice prior to the second action “deprived [] [him] of an 

opportunity to know how much money was needed to cure the default[,] 

which is the very reason the [Notice] is required in the first place.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 7.10

Section 403 of Act 6 sets forth the pre-foreclosure notice requirements 

imposed upon residential mortgage lenders for certain residential mortgages 

as follows: 

Before any residential mortgage lender may 

accelerate the maturity of any residential 

mortgage obligation, commence any legal action 

including mortgage foreclosure to recover under 

such obligation, or take possession of any security of 

the residential mortgage debtor for such residential 

mortgage obligation, such person shall give the 

residential mortgage debtor notice of such intention 

at least thirty days in advance as provided in this 

section.

41 P.S. § 403(a) (emphasis added).

Section 403(c) of Act 6 states:

(c) The written notice shall clearly and conspicuously 

state:

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Wells Fargo did not argue waiver in its brief in support of its motion for 

summary judgment and does not argue waiver in its brief before this Court. 

See Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at IV.C.; 

Wells Fargo’s Brief, generally.

10 Wells Fargo does not dispute that Spivak falls within the definition of a 

“residential mortgage debtor,” see 41 P.S. § 101 and therefore is entitled to 

the protections of Act 6. 
J-S36029-14

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(1) The particular obligation or real estate 

security interest;

(2) The nature of the default claimed;

(3) The right of the debtor to cure the 

default as provided in section 404 of this 

act and exactly what performance 

including what sum of money, if any, 

must be tendered to cure the default;

(4) The time within which the debtor must 

cure the default;

(5) The method or methods by which the 

debtor's ownership or possession of the real 

estate may be terminated; and

(6) The right of the debtor, if any, to transfer the 

real estate to another person subject to the 

security interest or to refinance the obligation 

and of the transferee's right, if any, to cure 

the default.

41 P.S. § 403(c) (emphasis added). 

Section 404 of Act 6 permits a residential mortgage debtor to cure his 

default, “after a notice of intention to foreclose has been given pursuant to 

section 403 of this act, at any time at least one hour prior to the 

commencement of bidding at a sheriff sale or other judicial sale . . . by 

tendering the amount or performance specified in subsection (b) of this 

section.” 41 P.S. § 404(a). Statutory notice, including the amount of 

default and the debtor’s right to cure the default, is mandatory and 

must precede any action by a residential mortgage lender whereby it 

accelerates the maturity of the obligation, institutes legal action including 

foreclosure, or repossesses any security of the debtor. General Elec. 

Credit Corp. v. Slawek, 409 A.2d 420, 422-23 (Pa.Super.1979).
J-S36029-14

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Federal and state courts—in explaining and applying 

the provisions of Act 6 . . . —have consistently 

defined the Act in the following manner. Act 6 is a 

comprehensive interest and usury law with 

numerous functions, one of which is that it offers 

homeowners with residential mortgages a measure 

of protection from overly zealous residential 

mortgage lenders.

Benner v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 338, 357 (E.D.Pa.2013) 

(quoting In re Graboyes, 223 Fed.Appx. 112, 114 (3d Cir.2007)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “The comprehensive statutory scheme 

demonstrates an extensive program designed to avoid mortgage 

foreclosures.” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Seave, 554 A.2d 886, 891 

(Pa.1989)). In the residential mortgage context, Act 6 is typically raised as a 

defense to mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Id.

Remedies for a defective Act 6 notice include setting aside the 

foreclosure or denying a creditor the ability to collect an impermissible fee. 

See, e.g., In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 578, 586 (3d Cir.1989) (holding 

lender’s failure to properly send pre-foreclosure notice to debtor’s new 

address before initiating foreclosure suit gave rise to debtor’s cause of action 

for damages under Section 504 of Act 6); id. (citing In re Sharp, 24 B.R. 

817, 821 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (setting aside foreclosure where lender failed 

to determine debtor's last known address)); In re Burwell, 107 B.R. 62, 

67–68 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989) (denying creditor ability to collect property 

inspection fees on foreclosed mortgage in debtor's bankruptcy proceeding). 

“The purpose of Act 6, as shown by the cases above, is to help residential 
J-S36029-14

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homeowners reacquire property that has been lost, or to prevent the 

imminent loss of money or property, because of the impermissible actions of 

residential mortgage lenders.” Benner, 917 F.Supp.2d at 357.

On October 30, 2010, Wells Fargo provided Spivak notice under Acts 6 

and 91, which advised him of his right to cure the default by paying the 

appropriate costs at that time.11 In December 2010, Wells Fargo filed a 

foreclosure action, which it subsequently withdrew in 2011. On May 24, 

2012, Wells Fargo filed a new foreclosure action without providing Spivak a 

new Act 6 notice specifying how much he owed at that time.

The plain language of Section 403(a) of Act 6 requires a new notice 

before a second action. Section 403(a) states: “Before any residential 

mortgage lender may . . . commence any legal action including mortgage 

foreclosure to recover under [any residential mortgage obligation] . . ., such 

____________________________________________

11 The 2010 Notice stated that Spivak could cure the default before a 

sheriff’s sale by:

paying the total amount then past due, plus any late 

or other charges then due, reasonable attorney's 

fees and costs connected with the foreclosure sale 

and any other costs connected with the Sheriff’s Sale 

as specified in writing by the lender and by 

performing any other requirements under the 

mortgage.

Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of its Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit F, 

Act 91 Notice Take Action to Save Your Home From Foreclosure, p. 4 (page 

number supplied). Well Fargo itemized the total amount past due at that 

time at $14,364.23. Id. at 3.
J-S36029-14

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person shall give the residential mortgage debtor notice of such intent at 

least thirty days in advance as provided in this section.” 41 P.S. § 403(a) 

(emphasis added). Consistent with the Pennsylvania rules of statutory 

construction,12 we apply the common and approved usage of the term “any” 

to define those legal actions which cannot be commenced without a 

preceding Act 6 notice. Merriam-Webster provides that “any”, when utilized 

as an adjective, is “used to indicate a person or thing that is not particular or 

specific.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/any (last visited October 2, 2014). Merriam-Webster 

further describes its synonyms as “each” and “every.” Id. 

Under the common and approved usage, Section 403(a) of Act 6 

reads: “Before any residential mortgage lender may . . . commence [a] legal 

action including mortgage foreclosure to recover under [any residential 

mortgage obligation] . . ., such person shall give the residential mortgage 

debtor notice of such intent at least thirty days in advance as provided in 

this section.” A second foreclosure action is “[a] legal action . . . to recover 

under [a residential mortgage obligation]”; thus, the mailing of an Act 6 

notice is a prerequisite to its commencement. 

____________________________________________

12 See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (providing courts shall construe words and phrases 

according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and 

approved usage). See also Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d 396, 

401 (Pa.Super.2011) (applying common and approved usage of various 

terms to define prohibited acts under statute).
J-S36029-14

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Further, the only adjective preceding the term “legal action” in the 

statute is “any” — not “first,” “original,” or some other term providing that 

one notice is satisfactory for multiple foreclosure actions. To the contrary, 

the indefinite article “a” indicates that every mortgage foreclosure action 

must be preceded by a lender sending notice to a debtor.

The synonyms of “any” — “each” and “every” — also support our 

interpretation of Act 6. When each synonym is inserted into the statute, it 

reads: “Before any residential mortgage lender may . . . commence

[each/every] legal action including mortgage foreclosure to recover under 

[any residential mortgage obligation] . . ., such person shall give the 

residential mortgage debtor notice of such intent at least thirty days in 

advance as provided in this section.” Phrased this way, the statute does not 

distinguish between the first and second foreclosure actions: a notice is 

required before each action. 

Therefore, by including the word “any” in the Section 403(a) of Act 6, 

the legislature intended that a lender send a notice to a debtor before each 

and every foreclosure action. Only this construction gives Section 403 its 

intended meaning.

An Act 6 notice enables a financially troubled residential homeowner to 

learn exactly what sum of money is necessary to cure the mortgage default. 

Since compounded interest accrues on a mortgage loan based on the 

passage of time between the first notice and the second notice (along with 
J-S36029-14

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unpaid monthly loan payments and any additional reasonable charges), the 

sum of money necessary to cure the default at the time of the second notice 

will be greater, and likely substantially so, than the amount of money 

needed at the time of the first notice.13 Even if the amount at the time of 

the second notice is only slightly greater, this is immaterial under Act 6 

because Section 403(c)(3) affords the debtor the right to know the exact 

amount required to cure the default.14

We find further support for our construction of “any” in the persuasive 

reasoning of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania in In re Miller, 90 B.R. 762 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988):

In [In re] Mosley, [85 B.R. 942, 954 

(Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988),] we pointed out that the most 

important consideration in the notice, for purposes of 

41 P.S. § 403(c)(3), is whether the borrower can 

ascertain the precise amount due to the lender to 

____________________________________________

13 For example, in the approximately eight and a half months that passed 

between when Wells Fargo calculated the total amount due for purposes of 

its complaint in the second foreclosure action and when Wells Fargo 

calculated the interest due for purposes of its motion for summary judgment 

in the second foreclosure action, the interest due on the premises increased 

$10,019.19 from $33,493.97 to $43,513.16. Compare Plaintiff’s Complaint 

in Mortgage Foreclosure ¶ 6 with Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

Exhibit B, Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, 

p. 1 (page number supplied)).

14 Wells Fargo asserts that Spivak does not allege to have made any 

payments after the Notice was sent. See Spivak’s Brief, generally; Wells 

Fargo’s Brief at 16. We emphasize that the debtor’s actions are irrelevant to 

whether a second Act 6 notice was necessary in this case; the requirement 

for an additional notice under Act 6 flows from the statute’s purpose and 

Section 403’s mandate regarding the required information in the notice.
J-S36029-14

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cure the default at any given point in time by 

reference only to the notice. We should add that the 

important consideration in the notice, for purposes of 

41 P.S. § 403(c)(2), is whether it communicates to 

the borrower how the precise amount of the default 

claimed is calculated.

* * *

We believe that the [lender]’s failure to articulate the 

nature of the default of its arrangement with the 

[d]ebtor and its failure to explain, by any 

comprehensible ma[nn]er, how it calculated the 

default renders the notice in issue grossly violative of 

41 P.S. § 403(c)(2) and (c)(3).

Id. at 768. 

Similarly, a second notice is also necessary to effectuate Sections 

404(a) and 403(c)(4) of Act 6, which address the time period within which to 

cure the default. If the debtor is not apprised of the exact sum of money 

necessary to cure the default, Sections 403(c)(4) and 404(a) of Act 6 lack 

effect because a time period to pay serves no purpose if the debtor is not 

aware of the amount necessary to accomplish the cure. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 

1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all 

its provisions”). Here, in addition to not being advised of the exact amount 

of money necessary to cure the default, Spivak was not advised of the time 
J-S36029-14

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or manner in which to pay, because Wells Fargo advised him to pay it at a 

time when it owned neither the note nor the mortgage. See Notes 1 and 2.15

Wells Fargo’s reliance on Fish v. Pennsylvania Housing Fin. 

Agency, 931 A.2d 764 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), is misplaced. As a 

Commonwealth Court opinion, Fish is not binding on this Court, and it 

addresses the requirements of Act 91 (rather than Act 6) before the General 

Assembly amended the required content of an Act 91 notice in 2008. Act 6 

and Act 91 both relate to the notice requirements of a residential mortgagee 

seeking to institute a foreclosure action against a mortgagor. 

Act 91 requires a mortgagee who desires to foreclose to send notice to 

the mortgagor “advis[ing] the mortgagor of his delinquency . . . and that 

such mortgagor has thirty (30) days to have a face-to-face meeting with the 

mortgagee who sent the notice or a consumer credit counseling agency to 

attempt to resolve the delinquency . . . by restructuring the loan payment 

schedule or otherwise.” Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co. v. Vukman, 77 

A.3d 547, 550 (Pa.2013) (quoting 35 P.S. § 1680.403c(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis 

added), amended by P.L. 841, No. 60, § 2 (July 8, 2008)). “[T]he purpose of 

an Act 91 notice is to instruct the mortgagor of different means he may use 

____________________________________________

15 By way of illustration rather than limitation, what appears evident to us is 

that the height of overzealousness – the precise type of activity that the 

legislature enacted Act 6 to curb – is when a lender attempts to collect a 

debt it does not yet own, which is exactly what occurred in the instant 

matter. See generally 41 P.S. §§ 101 et seq.
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to resolve his arrearages in order to avoid foreclosure on his property and 

also gives him a timetable in which such means must be accomplished.” 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ex rel. Certificate Holders of Asset Backed 

Pass-through Certificates Series 2004-MCWI v. Monroe, 966 A.2d 

1140, 1142 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting Fish, 931 A.2d at 767 (citing 35 P.S. 

§ 1680.403c)).

Interpreting Act 91’s pre-foreclosure requirements in Fish, 931 A.2d at 

767, the Commonwealth Court held that a mortgagee was not required to 

send the mortgagor a new Act 91 notice of default under the Homeowner’s 

Emergency Mortgage Assistance Loan Program (“HEMAP”) after withdrawing 

its initial foreclosure action. Id. The mortgagor espoused a similar argument 

to the one here, namely that “the [mortgagee] was required to send a new 

Act 91 Notice after the prior action in foreclosure was withdrawn by 

praecipe.” Id. Rejecting this argument, the Commonwealth Court opined:

The purpose of an Act 91 notice is to instruct the 

mortgagor of different means he may use to resolve 

his arrearages in order to avoid foreclosure on his 

property and also gives him a timetable in which 

such means must be accomplished. 35 P.S. § 

1680.403c. Specifically, the Act 91 notice informs 

the mortgagor of the availability of financial 

assistance through HEMAP. 35 P.S. § 

1680.403c(b)(1). Act 91 further states that if the 

mortgagor and mortgagee reach an agreement and 

thereafter the mortgagor is again unable to make 

payment, “[t]he mortgagee shall not be required to 

send any additional notice pursuant to this article.” 

35 P.S. § 1680.403c(d).
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Id. Finding the mortgagee was not required to send another notice after 

withdrawing the first foreclosure action, the Commonwealth Court reasoned: 

. . . it does not follow that the Act 91 notice would 

have been withdrawn as well, as the Act 91 notice 

merely places a mortgagor on notice that if the 

mortgagor does nothing, a foreclosure action 

will follow. As [the mortgagor] had done nothing 

upon receipt of the Act 91 notice, it should not have 

been a surprise to him when the second foreclosure 

action was filed. The lender was not required to send 

any additional notice under Act 91.

Id. (emphasis added). 

First, we note that the Fish holding, as a “decision[] by the 

Commonwealth Court[, is] not binding on this Court . . . .” Little Mountain 

Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. S. Columbia Corp., 2014 PA Super 91, at *5 n. 14, –

–– A.3d –––– (Pa.Super.2014), reargument denied, July 8, 2014 (quoting In 

re Barnes Foundation, 74 A.3d 129, 134 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal 

denied, ––– Pa. ––––, 80 A.3d 774 (Pa.2013)) (internal quotations omitted).

Second, an Act 6 notice—unlike an Act 91 notice in 2007 (when Fish 

was decided)—does more than place a mortgagor on notice that a 

foreclosure action will follow if the mortgagor does nothing; it contains more 

detailed notice requirements, e.g., the exact amount owed to cure the 

default. Act 6’s notice requirements are consistent with its “comprehensive 

statutory scheme . . . designed to avoid foreclosures” and its broader 

purpose to “offer[] homeowners with residential mortgages a measure of 
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protection from overly zealous residential mortgage lenders.” Benner, 917 

F.Supp.2d at 357.

Third, Fish was decided before a 2008 amendment to Section 

1860.403c(b)(1) of Act 91, which added a requirement that the Act 91 

notice specify the amount of the default. See , P.L. 841, No. 60, § 2 (July 8, 

2008) (inserting “including an itemized breakdown of the total amount past 

due” in Section 1860.403c(b)(1)). Therefore, it would now be impossible to 

comply with Act 91’s notice requirements unless a lender sent a new notice.

Fourth, Fish notes that Section 1860.403c(d) of Act 91 states if the 

lender and debtor reach an agreement, and thereafter the debtor is again 

unable to make payment, another notice is not necessary. Fish, 931 A.2d at 

767 (quoting 35 P.S. § 1860.403c(d)). By its plain terms, Section 

1860.403c(d) requires a prior agreement between a debtor and lender, a 

condition absent from the present case. See 35 P.S. § 1860.403c(d).

Fifth, the stated purpose of Act 91—to provide emergency mortgage 

assistance16—is markedly different from the purpose of Act 6—to offer 

homeowners with residential mortgages a measure of protection from overly 

zealous residential mortgage lenders. See Benner, 917 F.Supp.2d at 357. 

____________________________________________

16 See Preamble to P.L. 385, No. 91 (Dec.23, 1983) (“It is the purpose of 

this act to establish a program which will, through emergency mortgage 

assistance payments, prevent widespread mortgage foreclosures and 

distress sales of homes which result from default caused by circumstances 

beyond a homeowner’s control”). 
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Under the pre-2008 version of Act 91, once a lender notifies the debtor of 

the emergency mortgage assistance programs available, a second notice 

would not serve any useful purpose because the debtor is already on notice 

of the alternative financing options available. See 35 P.S. § 1860.403c; 

Fish, 931 A.2d at 767. On the other hand, if a lender withdraws a 

foreclosure action, it only makes sense that the Act 6 notice is likewise 

withdrawn, since the debtor would need a greater amount to cure a later 

default. See 41 P.S. § 403(c)(3) (requiring notice state exact amount 

needed to cure default).

In light of the foregoing, logic dictates that it is not only practical and 

reasonable to require a second notice, but necessary to effectuate the 

debtor’s statutory right to cure the default under Act 6.17 Accordingly, Wells 

Fargo was obliged to deliver a new Act 6 notice to Spivak before proceeding 

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17 On June 22, 2012, Governor Corbett signed into law Senate Bill 1433, 

which is commonly known as Act 70 of 2012 (“Act 70”). Section 5(1) of Act 

70 states that the mortgagor must show that he or she was prejudiced by 

the mortgagee’s failure to comply with Section 1860.402c and 1860.403c of 

Act 91 for the trial court to impose a remedy. Since this decision rests on 

our interpretation of Act 6, Act 70 does not pose an impediment to our 

disposition. Even if Act 70 did apply, it would not impact our holding. The 

prejudice that Spivak suffered from Wells Fargo’s failure to furnish a second 

notice is palpable, most notably, from Spivak’s inability cure the default by 

virtue of his lack of knowledge regarding the amount necessary to do so. 

Wells Fargo had a legal obligation to provide Spivak notice of the amount 

necessary to cure the default before instituting the foreclosure action. 

Without Wells Fargo fulfilling this obligation, Spivak was unable to take 

ameliorative action to prevent foreclosure. 
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with a second foreclosure action.18 The trial court erred by overriding Act 6’s 

notice requirement and interpreting Act 6 not to require an additional notice 

under these circumstances. See Roth, 85 A.3d at 592-93 (“[I]f in reaching 

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, . . . discretion is 

abused[]”).

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2014

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18 Wells Fargo argues that requiring an additional notice under Act 6 would 

render Section 1680.403c(a) of Act 91 meaningless because notice under

Act 91 satisfies the notice requirements of Act 6. See 35 P.S. § 

1680.403c(b)(1). This is inaccurate.

Pursuant to Section 1680.403c(a) of Act 91, when both the Act 6 and Act 91 

notices are required, it is sufficient to issue a combined Act 6/91 notice. See 

35 P.S. § 1680.403c (authorizing a lender to issue a combined notice that 

contains the information required under Act 91 and Act 6). Section 

1680.403c(a), however, does not govern when only an Act 6 notice is 

required.