ELLEN S. v. KATLYN F.* (AC 38871)
Keller, Prescott and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court grantingthe plaintiff’s applicationforacivilprotection order. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly determined that there were reasonablegroundstobelievethatthe defendanthadstalkedtheplaintiff and would continue to do so in the absence of an order of protection. Held that the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s application for a civil protection order was unavailing; because the defendant failed to obtain a memorandum ofdecision from the trial court and to include it in the appendix to her brief, and the transcript of the trial court proceedings that the defendant filed with the appellate clerk did not reveal a sufficiently detailed and concise statement of the court’s findings, this court could not conclude, on the basis of the limited record before it, that the trial court committed any legal or factual error in reaching the decision that it did, as the scant record did not reflect the errors claimed by the defendant, and the trial court’s ruling therefore was entitled to the reasonable presumption that it was correct. Argued May 25—officially released August 15, 2017

Procedural History Application for a civil protective order, brought to the SuperiorCourtinthejudicialdistrictofNewLondon and tried to the court, Diana, J.;judgment granting the application, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed

. CodyA. Layton, with whom, on the brief, wasDrzislav Coric, for the appellant (defendant).Opinion PERCURIAM. The defendant, KatlynF., appealsfrom thejudgment ofthe trial court granting the application for a civil protection order filed by the plaintiff, Ellen S.1 The defendant claims that the court improperly determined ‘‘that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had stalked the plaintiff and would continue to do so in the absence of an order of protection.’’ We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following facts. On January 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed an application for an order ofcivilprotection againstthe defendant. In her application, she alleged in relevant part that she had been the victim of stalking. In her application, she described two occasions in which she was subjected to what she characterizedas ‘‘immaturebehavior’’bythe defendant. Onone occasion, the defendantyelledatherandalmost overturned a table in her direction. On the other occasion, the defendant shoved her using both hands. She alleged that other encounters had occurred, but did not provide details about them. The plaintiffrequested that the court order that the defendant (1) not assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with or stalk her; (2) stay away from her home; (3) not contact her in any manner; and (4) stay 100 yards away from her. The court granted the application and issued an ex parte civil protection order.
The court held a hearing on the application on January 19, 2016. This was ajoint hearing during which the court also considered an application for a civil restraining order against the defendant that was brought by the plaintiff’s boyfriend, the court’s denial of which is not a subject of this appeal. It was not disputedthat the plaintiff’s boyfriend is the defendant’s former boyfriend. At the hearing, the plaintiff testified with respect to four separate and distinct incidents, which occurred during an approximately three year period oftime, involving herselfand the defendant: the first incident occurred at a restaurant referred to as the Harp and Dragon in December, 2015; the second incident occurred at a restaurant referred to as Hot Rod’s in December, 2014; the third incident occurred at an establishment referred to as the Oasis Pub; and the fourth incident occurred at a friend’s house in the
summer of 2014. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s boyfriend, the defendant, and a mutual friend of the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the plaintiff’s application. The court ordered that the defendant ‘‘not assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with or stalk the [plaintiff] with regard to that matter. That order is [going to] be in effect for six months from this date

. . . .’’2 This appeal followed.
The defendant argues that, in granting the plaintiffreliefunder General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46b-16a,3 the court erroneouslyfoundthatthere were reasonable grounds to believe that she committed acts to warrant issuance of the civil protective order and that she will continueto commitsuchacts oracts designedto intimidate or retaliate against the applicant. The defendant argues that the court ‘‘erred in its interpretation of and application of the law to the facts.’’ In so doing, the defendant first argues that it is reasonable to infer that the court based its decision on a finding that she committed acts constituting stalking in the second degree
as described in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a181d,4 and, she argues, the evidence presented at the hearing did not support such a finding. Second, the defendant argues that ‘‘[n]o evidence was presented by either party that would indicate that [she] would continue to commit the acts she has been accused of.’’ The defendant asks this court to reverse the court’s judgment and to remand the case to the trial court with direction to deny the plaintiff’s application. Initially, we observe that the defendant’s appendix does not contain a copy of the trial court’s decision. ‘‘It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review. The appellant shall determine whether the entire record is complete, correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on appeal.’’ Practice Book § 61-10 (a); see also Practice Book § 60- 5 (‘‘[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to provide
anadequaterecordforreviewasprovidedin [§] 61-10’’). The appellantbearsthe responsibilityforprovidingthis court with an appendix that, in part one, ‘‘shall contain

. . . opinions or decisions of the trial court

. . . .’’ Practice Book § 67-8 (b) (1). Forreasons that shouldbe obvious, this noncompliance with the rules ofappellate procedure is an impediment to this court’s review of the defendant’sbriefaswellasthetrialcourt’s decision. Next, we observe that a copy ofthe trial court’s decision does not appear in the court file. The court’s rendering ofjudgmentinfavoroftheplaintiffinthis matter constitutes afinaljudgment. Pursuantto Practice Book § 64-1 (a), the trial court was required ‘‘[to] state its decision either orally or in writing

. . . . The court’s decision shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and the factual basis therefor. If oral, the decision shall be recorded by a court reporter, and, ifthere is an appeal, the trial court shall create a memorandum of decision for use in the appeal by ordering a transcript of the portion of the proceedings in which it stated its oral decision. The transcript of the decision shall be signed by the trial judge and filed with the clerk of the trial court.

. . .’’ Pursuantto Practice Book § 64-1 (b), ‘‘[i]fthe trialjudge fails to file a memorandum of decision or sign a transcriptofthe oraldecisioninanycase coveredbysubsection (a), the appellantmayfile withthe appellate clerka noticethatthe decisionhasnotbeenfiledincompliancewith subsection (a). The notice shall specify the trial judge involved and the date of the ruling for which no memorandum ofdecisionwas filed. The appellate clerk shall promptly notify the trialjudge of the filing of the appeal and the notice. The trial court shall thereafter comply with subsection (a).’’ Our review of the court file reflectsthatthe defendant didnot attemptto rectify the record by filing amotion pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 (b) with the appellate clerk. The defendant’s failure leaves this court without a ready means of identifying the trial court’s decision.
The defendant has failed to obtain a memorandum of decision from the court and has failed to include it in the appendix to her brief. The defendant, however, has filed with the appellate clerk a transcript from the court proceeding on January 19, 2016. In challenging the factual and legal basis of the court’s decision, the defendant cites to the transcript and refers to statements made by the court that appear in the transcript. ‘‘Whentherecorddoesnotcontaineitheramemorandum of decision or a transcribed copy of an oral decision signed by the trial court stating the reasons for its decision, this court frequently has declined to review the claims on appeal because the appellant has failed toprovidethe courtwithanadequaterecordforreview.

. . . Moreover, [t]he requirements of Practice Book § 64-1 are not met simply by filing with the appellate clerk a transcript of the entire trial court proceedings.

. . . Despite an appellant’s failure to satisfy the requirements of

. . . § 64-1, this court has, on occasion, reviewed claims of error in light of an unsigned transcript as long as the transcript contains a sufficiently detailed and concise statement ofthe trial court’s findings.’’ (Citationsomitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.) Stechel v. Foster, 125 Conn. App. 441, 445, 8 A.3d 545 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 904, 12 A.3d 572 (2011); see alsoJPMorgan ChaseBankv. Gianopoulos, 131 Conn. App. 15, 20–21, 30 A.3d 697 (court may determine that unsigned transcript contains sufficiently detailedand concise statement oftrial court’sfindings), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 947, 30 A.3d 2 (2011).
Our review of the transcript does not reveal a sufficiently detailed and concise statement of the court’s findings.5 ‘‘It is well settled that [w]e do not presume error; thetrial court’srulingis entitledtothereasonable presumption that it is correct unless the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)State

v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1, 13, 155 A.3d 730 (2017). ‘‘Our role is not to guess at possibilities

. . . but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.

. . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court

. . . any decisionmadebyus respecting [the defendant’s] claims would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Stacy B

. v. Robert S., 165 Conn. App. 374, 382, 140 A.3d 1004 (2016).
On the basis of our careful review of the limited record provided to us by the defendant, we disagree that the court committed any legal or factual error in reaching the decision that it did. The scant record before us does not reflect the errors claimed by the defendant. See, e.g., Murcia v. Geyer, 151 Conn. App. 227, 231, 93A.3d 1189 (‘‘we are constrainedto conclude,
onthebasis ofourreviewofthelimitedrecordprovided to us, that the court acted reasonably’’), cert. denied, 314Conn. 917, 100A.3d406 (2014);Lucarelliv.Freedom ofInformation Commission, 136 Conn. App. 405, 411, 46 A.3d 937 (‘‘[t]here is nothing in the record before
us from which we can conclude that court abused its discretion’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 907, 53 A.3d 222 (2012).
The judgment is affirmed.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interest of the applicant for a protective order, we decline to identify the applicant or others through whom the applicant’s identity may be ascertained.

1 The plaintiff did not file a brief in connection with this appeal. We consider the appeal on the basis of the defendant’s brief and the record.

2 The expiration ofasix month domesticviolence restraining orderissued pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15 does not render an appeal from that order moot due to adverse collateral consequences. Putman v. Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162, 164–65, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006). We apply that principle to the order of civil protection here.
3 General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46b-16a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking, as describedinsections 53a-181c, 53a-181dand53a-181e, maymake

an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section, provided such person has not obtained any other court order of protection arising out of such abuse, assault or stalking and does not qualify to seek relief under section 46b-15. ‘‘(b) The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made by the applicant under oath that includes a statement of the specific facts that form the basis for relief. Upon receipt of the application, if the allegations set forth in the affidavit meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, the court shall schedule ahearing not later than fourteen days from the date of the application. If the court is closed on the scheduled hearing date, the hearing shall be held on the next day the court is open and any
ex parte order that was issued shall remain in effect until the date of such hearing. Ifthe court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of an order under this section and will continue to commit such acts or acts designed to intimidate or retaliate against the applicant, the court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate forthe protection of the applicant. If the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an imminent danger exists to the applicant, the court may issue

an ex parte order granting such relief as it deems appropriate. In making such orders, the court, in its discretion, may considerrelevant court records ifthe records are available to the public from a clerk ofthe Superior Court

or on the Judicial Branch’s Internet web site. Such orders may include, but

are not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from: (1) Imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the applicant; and (3) entering the dwelling of the applicant. ‘‘(c) No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order maybe extendedbythe courtuponpropermotion ofthe applicant, provided

a copy ofthe motion has been served by aproper officer on the respondent,

no other order ofprotection based on the same facts and circumstances is in place and the need for protection, consistent with subsection (a) of this section, still exists.

. . .’’

4 General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-181d provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)For the purposes of this section, ‘course of conduct’ means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which aperson directly, indirectly

orthroughathirdparty, byanyaction, method, device ormeans, (1) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (2) interferes with a person’s property. ‘‘(b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when: ‘‘(1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at

a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for such person’s physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; or ‘‘(2) Suchperson intentionally, andforno legitimate purpose, engages in a
course ofconductdirectedataspecificpersonthatwouldcauseareasonable person to fear that such person’s employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) suchconductconsists ofthe actortelephoningto, appearing at or initiating communication or contact at such other person’s place of employment or business, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity.

. . .’’

5 In terms ofrelevant findings, the transcript reflects that the court stated only that the plaintiff ‘‘has sustained proof’’ and that ‘‘this is stalking.’’ The court stated that it was ‘‘concerned with some of the incidents that

. . . have occurred. I believe that the parties have been credible in describing the incidents.’’