1

Filed 8/25/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

ALAMEDA COUNTY,

Respondent;

ROBERT L. ESCOBEDO,

Real Party in Interest.

 A166559

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 20-CR-012838, 

 20-CR-012947, 20-CR-012845)

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 

seeks review by extraordinary writ of an order placing defendant Robert 

Escobedo on felony probation pursuant to a negotiated disposition. To 

effectuate the plea agreement, the superior court permitted the People to 

withdraw a pending petition for revocation of parole that CDCR filed against 

Escobedo, who was on lifetime parole when he committed his current offense. 

(Pen. Code, § 3000.1, subd. (a)(1); statutory references are to this code unless 

otherwise indicated.) CDCR challenges the authority of the superior court to 

release Escobedo pursuant to a grant of probation, instead of adjudicating 

CDCR’s parole revocation petition and returning him to prison if the court 
2

finds that he has committed a new offense. (See § 3000.08, subd. (h) (section 

3000.08(h)).) 

We conclude that because Escobedo was on lifetime parole, the superior 

court lacked authority to release him on probation after finding that he 

committed a new criminal offense. Once the court found Escobedo had 

committed another crime, it was required to remand him to the custody of 

CDCR. (§ 3000.08(h).) Accordingly, we grant CDCR’s mandate petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, a jury convicted Escobedo of second degree murder and 

discharging a firearm into an inhabited dwelling, and also found true 

sentence enhancement allegations for personal use of a firearm. (§§ 187, 

subd (a), 246, 12022.5, subd (a).) Escobedo was sentenced to an aggregate 

prison term of 19 years to life. 

In June 2016, Escobedo was released from prison and placed on parole. 

Because Escobedo’s sentence for murder included a maximum term of life 

imprisonment, he was placed on lifetime parole. (§ 3000.1, subd. (a)(1).) As a

lifetime parolee, Escobedo faced consequences for violating parole that do not 

apply to people who are on parole for a defined period. Specifically, if a court 

determines that a person who is on lifetime parole “has committed a violation 

of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the person . . . shall be 

remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of future 

parole consideration.” (§ 3000.08(h).)

On September 29, 2020, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a 

criminal complaint charging Escobedo with two counts of forcible oral 

copulation with Jane Doe (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)), and two counts of making 

criminal threats, one against Jane Doe and the other against a second victim 
3

(§ 422, subd. (a)). On September 30, the District Attorney filed a petition for 

revocation of Escobedo’s parole due to the criminal violations alleged in the 

complaint. This petition did not reflect that Escobedo was on lifetime parole, 

notwithstanding that the District Attorney used a form petition that contains 

a box to be checked when the supervised person is on lifetime parole. 

On October 1, 2020, CDCR filed a petition for revocation of Escobedo’s

parole, which did reflect Escobedo was on lifetime parole. CDCR’s petition 

was accompanied by a “Parole Violation Report” alleging that Escobedo 

violated multiple laws on September 25 and 27, 2020, during or relating to 

nonconsensual sexual encounters, specifically: oral copulation with a 

nonconsenting adult (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)); battery of a spouse (§ 273.5); 

false imprisonment (§ 236); and criminal threats (§ 422). The dates and 

descriptions of the criminal conduct in CDCR’s petition match the allegations 

in the criminal complaint filed two days earlier. CDCR alleged further that 

Escobedo violated a special condition of his parole prohibiting him from 

consuming alcohol; according to CDCR’s parole violation report, Escobedo

admitted drinking alcohol for approximately 10 days and that his alcohol 

consumption played a major role in his commission of the charged offenses. 

CDCR’s petition stated that Escobedo was subject to supervision pursuant to 

section 3000.1, and that if the court determined he violated parole, the court 

was required to remand him to the custody of CDCR. 

CDCR also reported that it considered imposing intermediate sanctions 

but deemed them inappropriate. The report documented Escobedo’s criminal 

history, which predates his murder conviction, five CDCR disciplinary 

violations Escobedo incurred while in prison, and one other parole violation 

for consuming alcohol and being drunk in public. CDCR reported that

Escobedo had been referred to specialized treatment programs in the past,
4

and another such referral would be inappropriate due to the high risk of 

recidivism and threat to public safety. 

On August 16, 2022, the superior court held a change-of-plea hearing in 

Escobedo’s criminal case. The hearing transcript references case numbers for 

three pending matters against Escobedo—the criminal case and the two 

parole revocation petitions. But when the judge requested appearances, she 

made no reference to CDCR. At the hearing, the Deputy District Attorney 

(DDA), Ms. Chavez, recited the terms of a negotiated disposition of 

Escobedo’s criminal case: He would plead guilty or no contest to one count of 

violating section 422 by making criminal threats, and would admit an 

aggravating factor of threatening or dissuading a witness. In exchange for 

his plea, Escobedo would be placed on three years of felony probation and be 

subject to a criminal protective order protecting both victims. All remaining 

counts and related enhancements would be dismissed. In addition, the 

People agreed to dismiss “two other dockets.” DDA Chavez then clarified 

that the People had agreed they would dismiss both parole revocation

petitions before Escobedo entered a new plea admitting the section 422 

felony. Defense counsel interjected that it was important to withdraw the 

petitions first, and the People agreed. Accordingly, the People made a formal 

motion to withdraw the revocation petitions, which the court granted before 

it proceeded to take Escobedo’s plea. The matter was continued until 

September for sentencing. 

On August 17, 2022, Ms. Martin, a parole agent supervisor from 

CDCR’s court compliance unit, sent an email to Judge Nixon at the Alameda 

County superior court, DDA Chavez, and Escobedo’s defense counsel. Judge 

Nixon was not the judge who took Escobedo’s change of plea and would not be 

the judge to sentence him, but Martin may have been under the 
5

misconception that Escobedo’s criminal case was assigned to Judge Nixon, as 

the purpose of her email was to share information about Escobedo’s status as 

a lifetime parolee. Martin stated that while tracking Escobedo’s cases on 

CDCR’s computer system, she noticed a sentencing hearing was scheduled, 

and that parole petitions had been “withdrawn by the DA.” Martin advised 

that because Escobedo is a “lifer parolee” subject to section 3000.1, the court 

was required to hold a good cause hearing as to both parole revocation 

petitions and, if there was good cause, to remand Escobedo to the Board of 

Parole Hearings. She stated further that “if [Escobedo is] convicted of the 

criminal charges, the Court must also remand him to the custody of CDCR 

where he will also be returned to prison, as he falls under the authority of the 

Board of Parole Hearings.” And “[t]his verbiage needs to be on the minute 

order at sentencing,” Martin continued, going into detail about how section 

3000.08(h) applied in Escobedo’s case.

On September 14, 2022, Escobedo appeared for sentencing before a 

different judge, who made a record of the fact that the court and counsel had 

discussed the case before the matter was called on the record, and that 

counsel had “enlighten[ed] the Court to some of the rationale behind the 

negotiated disposition.” Based on that unrecorded conversation, the court 

accepted the plea agreement. Following submission of the matter, Escobedo 

was sentenced in accordance with the negotiated disposition, to a suspended 

sentence for a period of three years during which he would be on felony 

probation. Near the end of the hearing, the court observed that two parole 

petitions had been withdrawn on the day Escobedo changed his plea, but 

there was no mention or acknowledgement of the fact Escobedo was on 

lifetime parole. Whether agent Martin’s email, or the information in it, ever 
6

found its way to the judge who sentenced Escobedo is unknown, and nobody 

from CDCR appeared at Escobedo’s sentencing hearing.

On November 14, 2022, CDCR, represented by the Attorney General of 

California, filed a petition in this court for writ of mandate or other 

appropriate relief, seeking review of the September 2022 order placing 

Escobedo on probation. CDCR contends it was unlawful for the superior 

court to accept a negotiated plea pursuant to which the People withdrew the 

parole revocation petitions, prays for a writ of mandate commanding the trial 

court to adjudicate those petitions, and seeks such other relief as may be just 

and appropriate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) CDCR names the 

superior court as respondent and Escobedo as the primary real party in 

interest. CDCR alleges that the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office is 

also a real party in interest, due to its representation of the People in the 

underlying criminal case against Escobedo.

After informal briefing, this court issued an order to show cause. The 

Alameda County District Attorney’s Office advises that the People decline to 

take any position regarding CDCR’s mandate petition. Escobedo, however, 

vigorously opposes the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. He 

argues that CDCR’s mandate petition should be denied without consideration 

of its merits because CDCR fails to show it has no other adequate remedy or, 

alternatively, that CDCR does not have standing to bring this writ 

proceeding. Escobedo also contends the mandate petition lacks merit because 

his plea bargain does not violate the law governing proceedings to revoke 

parole. 
7

DISCUSSION

I. Overview of Parole Revocation Law

Historically, parole revocation was solely the responsibility of the 

Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), but jurisdiction over most petitions to 

revoke parole was shifted to the superior courts in 2012, when the 

Legislature amended section 1203.2 to incorporate parole into statutes 

governing revocation of other types of statutory supervision. (People v. 

DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 647.) Currently, sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 

establish the statutory framework for parole revocation proceedings. 

(DeLeon, at p. 647.) 

CDCR supervises individuals who are placed on parole after serving 

prison sentences. (§ 3000.08, subds. (a) & (i).) Both the parole agency and 

the district attorney have statutory authority to file a petition to revoke a 

person’s parole. (§ 1203.2, subds. (a) & (b).) Some rules and procedures differ 

depending on which entity has filed a petition. (People v. Williams (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 1029, 1038 (Williams).) Importantly, the agency has a statutory 

duty to file a revocation petition if it concludes that intermediate sanctions 

are not appropriate under the circumstances. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f).) An 

agency-filed petition must be accompanied by a written report containing 

additional information about the parolee, including history and background 

information, any recommendations, and an explanation as to why 

intermediate sanctions without court intervention are inappropriate. (Ibid.; 

Cal Rules of Court, rule 4.541.) This statutory requirement to submit a 

report with a revocation petition does not apply to the district attorney. 

Instead, after the district attorney files a petition to revoke parole, the 

superior court is required to refer the petition to the parole officer for a report 
8

and to consider that written report before deciding the merits of the petition. 

(§ 1203.2, subd. (b) (section 1203.2(b)); Williams, at pp. 1039–1040.) 

Some aspects of parole revocation law apply to all inmates released on 

parole but, as we have noted, once a court finds that a lifetime parolee has 

violated conditions of parole or the law, a special rule applies. (People v. 

Wiley (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1067 (Wiley); People v. Perlas (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 826, 836 (Perlas); Williams, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) 

Generally, when a trial court finds a parole violation, it has discretion to 

modify or revoke parole or to refer the violator to a reentry court or other 

evidence-based program. (§ 3000.08, subd. (f); see also § 1203.2.) “These 

options do not exist when the court adjudicates a petition concerning a 

lifetime parolee,” however. (Williams, at p. 1040.) “[O]nce the court finds 

that a lifetime parolee has violated parole, revocation is ‘mandatory.’ ” (Ibid.

quoting Perlas, at p. 836.) This legislative mandate is codified in section 

3000.08(h), which provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law,” if the 

court determines a lifetime parolee “has committed a violation of law or 

violated his or her conditions of parole, the person on parole shall be 

remanded to the custody of [CDCR] and the jurisdiction of the [BPH] for the 

purpose of future parole consideration.” (§ 3000.08(h); see §§ 3000.1 & 3000, 

subd. (b)(4).)

With this framework in mind, we turn to the issues raised by the 

parties in this writ proceeding.

II. CDCR’s Writ Petition Is Procedurally Sound

A writ of mandate “must be issued in all cases where there is not a 

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must 

be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) 
9

A. CDCR Has No Other Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy

CDCR contends writ review is proper because it has no other adequate 

remedy to enforce section 3000.08(h), which requires that Escobedo be 

immediately returned to the custody of CDCR as a result of his recent 

criminal violation. Escobedo disputes this contention.

Because writ review is an extraordinary remedy, courts generally do 

not grant writ relief absent extraordinary circumstances. (City of Half Moon 

Bay v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 795, 803.) Pertinent factors 

include whether (1) “the party seeking the writ lacks an adequate means, 

such as direct appeal, to obtain relief,” (2) “the petitioner will suffer harm or 

prejudice which cannot be corrected on appeal,” or (3) “the petition presents 

an issue of first impression that is of general interest to the bench and bar.”

(United Health Centers of San Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 

229 Cal.App.4th 63, 74; see also Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court

(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273–1274.) We find all three circumstances 

present to varying degrees. Like the parties, we focus our discussion on the 

first two circumstances, but we note at the outset that the issue presented is 

new, and nobody disputes its importance.

The crux of Escobedo’s procedural objection to this writ proceeding is 

that CDCR purports to challenge the September 2022 sentencing order

despite the fact that it could have filed a direct appeal from the August 2022 

order that allowed the People to withdraw the parole revocation petitions 

before Escobedo changed his plea. We disagree. The record shows that 

withdrawal of both petitions was a material term of the plea agreement 

between the People and Escobedo. When asked to “state the terms and 

conditions” of the negotiated disposition, DDA Chavez explained the plea 

Escobedo would enter and terms of probation he would accept, then stated
10

that “[i]n exchange for this plea, the remaining counts and any enhancements 

will be stricken and dismissed. [¶] And . . . before he agrees to do this, we 

are dismissing two other dockets,” the two parole petitions. Dismissal or 

withdrawal of these petitions would have been important consideration for 

Escobedo’s plea, since they threatened him with mandatory return to prison. 

And because the order permitting withdrawal of those petitions was a 

material term of the negotiated disposition, it was not a final decision by the 

court in August 2022. Along with the rest of the plea agreement, the order 

could have been set aside in light of further consideration of the matter at 

any time until pronouncement of judgment in the new case. (§ 1192.5, 

subd. (c).)

Escobedo cites cases involving appeals from rulings in parole revocation 

matters, but only one precedent that involved a plea agreement. (People v. 

VonWahlde (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1187.) In VonWahlde, the trial court 

preliminarily revoked the defendant’s parole pursuant to a petition charging 

him with absconding from parole supervision and then continued the matter 

because the defendant was also facing new charges. (Id. at p. 1191.) 

Subsequently, the defendant entered a plea in the new criminal case 

pursuant to an agreement that provided for a stipulated prison term to run 

concurrently with the parole revocation case. (Ibid.) But then at the 

sentencing hearing a month later, the court ordered parole terminated

instead. Ostensibly, this was pursuant to the court’s discretion under section 

1385, since the defendant was heading to prison on the new case. (Id. at 

pp. 1192–1193.) The People could appeal this termination order as a 

postjudgment order affecting the defendant’s sentence, the VonWahlde court 

held. (Id. at pp. 1194–1195, citing § 1238, subd. (a)(5).) 
11

VonWahlde reinforces our conclusion that the order permitting the 

People to withdraw parole revocation petitions in this case was not 

immediately appealable. The VonWahlde plea agreement disposed of a 

related revocation petition by including a stipulated sentence for the parole 

violation, and the order accepting that stipulated disposition was not 

immediately appealable. Indeed, that order was subsequently changed at 

sentencing, when the VonWahlde trial court purported to terminate parole 

supervision pursuant to section 1385, and it was that final ruling that 

became the appealable order. By the same reasoning, the order permitting 

the district attorney to withdraw the revocation petitions pending against 

Escobedo pursuant to a plea agreement was not a final order. (§ 1192.5, 

subd. (c); see People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 706 [“ ‘court, upon 

sentencing, has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a 

negotiated plea’ ”].) Thus, we reject Escobedo’s contention that the August 

2022 order was immediately appealable.

We also reject Escobedo’s related argument that CDCR’s mandate 

petition was not timely filed. “As a general rule, a writ petition should be 

filed within the 60-day period that applies to appeals.” (Cal West Nurseries v. 

Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1173.) Escobedo’s contention 

that CDCR violated this rule rests on the erroneous assumption that the 

August 2022 order was immediately appealable. That order became final at 

the September 2022 hearing, when the sentencing court accepted the parties’ 

plea agreement and imposed the agreed disposition. Accordingly, CDCR 

properly seeks review of the September 2022 sentencing order, and its 

mandate petition was timely filed.

We must, therefore, decide whether a direct appeal of the September 

2022 sentencing order constitutes an adequate remedy at law, and we 
12

conclude that it does not. It is not clear who, if anyone, had the right to

appeal the order allowing the withdrawal of the revocation petitions or the 

allegedly unlawful sentence. Because the September 2022 order was part of 

the plea agreement in the new criminal case, any appeal of the order would 

presumably have to be filed in, or accompanied by the filing of, an appeal 

from the judgment in which the plea was entered. And CDCR, at least, was 

not in a position to file that appeal. 

CDCR is not a party to Escobedo’s criminal case, and the general rule is 

that only parties to a criminal action may appeal. (Crump v. Appellate 

Division of the Superior Court (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 222, 236 (Crump).) 

There is an exception when an order has an immediate, pecuniary, and 

substantial effect on a nonparty who is bound by the order. (People v.

Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 715, 720.) But, although the sentencing 

order in Escobedo’s criminal case substantially impacted CDCR, we see no

immediate pecuniary effect that would justify applying the Hernandez

exception. 

The People are a party in the criminal case, but we reject Escobedo’s 

contention that an appeal by the People provides CDCR with an adequate 

remedy. Escobedo cites several cases in which the People appealed final 

orders dismissing or otherwise disposing of a parole revocation petition that 

CDCR had filed. (Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 826; People v. Toussain

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 974; People v. Johnson (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 363

(Johnson).)1 But here, CDCR is not synonymous with the People, and this 

1 In Johnson, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th 363, another panel of this court 

reversed an order purporting to terminate the defendant’s parole supervision, 

holding that the trial court did not have statutory authority to terminate 

parole supervision. While Escobedo characterizes Johnson as an appeal by 

CDCR, and the appealed ruling was a response to a petition for revocation 
13

line of authority is inapposite. For one thing, the revocation petitions filed 

against Escobedo were withdrawn pursuant to the People’s own motion, 

which implicates the rule that “[t]he People are ordinarily bound by their 

stipulations, concessions or representations.” (People v. Mendez (1991) 234 

Cal.App.3d 1773, 1783.) Moreover, withdrawal of the petitions was 

inextricably intertwined with the negotiated disposition to grant Escobedo 

probation, and the People may not appeal from an order granting probation. 

(See § 1238, subd. (d); People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 93.) These

facts, if they do not preclude an appeal by the People, at least demonstrate 

that the People’s interests are not aligned with the interests of CDCR. We, 

thus, conclude that the first factor favors granting writ review, as we see no 

adequate means for CDCR to obtain relief through direct appeal.

We also doubt whether an appeal would provide CDCR with a 

sufficiently speedy resolution to constitute an adequate remedy. (See e.g.,

People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1296

[available remedy may be inadequate when “it is clear that [the] matter 

requires speedy resolution”].) CDCR’s revocation petition and parole 

violation report contain fact-specific evidence tending to show that Escobedo 

poses a serious risk to public safety while on probation. Escobedo’s only 

rejoinder is to argue that CDCR could simply expedite its appeal to get

prompt review of the trial court’s ruling, citing People v. Loper (2015) 60 

Cal.4th 1155. But Loper confirms that the determination whether an appeal 

provides an aggrieved party with an adequate remedy depends on “ ‘the 

filed by CDCR, the appeal itself was filed by the People on behalf of CDCR, as 

demonstrated by the case caption for the matter. Because the Johnson 

opinion reflects that the People were the appellant in that case, we deny 

CDCR’s unnecessary request for judicial notice of the court docket in the

Johnson appeal.
14

particular circumstances of that case.’ ” (Id. at p. 1167.) On the facts of this 

case, we conclude the need for a speedy resolution weighs at least modestly in 

favor of writ review. Potential harm to the public and potentially prejudicial 

impingement of CDCR’s statutory authority are additional factors supportive 

of CDCR’s request to decide this issue of first impression pursuant to a 

petition for a writ of mandate. 

Finally, as we will see, Escobedo’s attack on CDCR’s standing to bring 

this challenge confirms our view that a mandate petition is appropriate here.

B. CDCR Has Standing

Escobedo contends CDCR has failed to establish it has standing to 

bring this mandate petition because it was not a party in Escobedo’s criminal 

action, and it has no right to interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion to 

control that proceeding. We are not persuaded by these arguments.

“ ‘A petitioner must have standing in order to invoke the power of a 

court to grant writ relief.’ ” (Synergy Project Management, Inc. v. City and 

County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 21, 30.) To establish standing 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, the petition must be brought by a 

“ ‘party beneficially interested’ ” in the subject matter of the action. (Synergy,

at p. 30.) “Even though the statute refers to a ‘party,’ however, ‘it is well 

established that one who petitions for an extraordinary writ need not have 

been a party to the action below if the one seeking relief demonstrates a 

beneficial interest in the litigation or is affected by the outcome.’ ” (Ibid.) “To 

be ‘beneficially interested,’ a petitioner must generally have ‘ “some special 

interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected 

over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.” ’ ” 

(Ibid.) This interest must be “ ‘direct and substantial,’ ” requiring the 
15

petitioner to demonstrate invasion of a legally protected interest. (Id. at 

pp. 30–31 [collecting cases].) 

Here, the record shows that CDCR has a beneficial interest in the 

outcome of Escobedo’s criminal case, given the fact that Escobedo was on 

lifetime parole when the trial court permitted the People to withdraw CDCR’s 

revocation petition. The order sentencing Escobedo to probation, instead of 

remanding him to the custody of CDCR, has a direct, immediate, detrimental 

impact on CDCR’s statutory authority and obligation to supervise lifetime 

parolees. 

Escobedo cites Crump, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th 222, which reinforces our 

conclusion. In Crump, victims of a gas leak filed a writ petition seeking 

review of an order denying them restitution in an underlying criminal action 

against the gas company that failed to report the gas leak. The Crump court 

held the victims lacked standing to appeal the restitution order because they 

were not parties in the criminal action, but they did have standing to enforce 

their statutory right to restitution by seeking a writ of mandate. (Id. at 

pp. 240–242.) Indeed, the court held that an extraordinary writ proceeding 

“is particularly appropriate in circumstances where the person with the 

enforcement right is not a party to the proceeding.” (Id. at p. 241.) So, too,

here. CDCR was not a party to Escobedo’s criminal action, but the 

September 2022 judgment and sentence directly affected CDCR’s statutory 

authority to initiate a parole revocation proceeding and enforce the law 

pertaining to supervision of lifetime parolees. 

Escobedo also cites Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, which 

held that the victim of a defendant’s crime did not have standing to file a 

petition for writ of mandate challenging an order to recall the defendant’s 

sentence under former section 1170. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
16

found, among other things, that “[n]either a crime victim nor any other 

member of the public has general standing to intervene in an ongoing 

criminal proceeding.” (Dix, at p. 448; see pp. 450–451.) Thus, the court 

reasoned, “[e]xcept as specifically provided by law,” a private citizen does not 

have a personal legal interest in the outcome of a criminal action filed against 

somebody else. (Id. at p. 451.) Relatedly, the court found, “the doctrine of 

‘public interest’ standing” may not be invoked to “prevail over the public 

prosecutor’s exclusive discretion in the conduct of criminal cases.” (Ibid.) 

In contrast to the petitioner in Dix, CDCR is not a private citizen and 

does not rely on public interest standing. It is a state agency with a direct 

and substantial interest in enforcing the legislative directive that it supervise 

parolees (§ 3000, subd. (a)), including by petitioning the court to revoke 

parole in an appropriate case. (See § 3000.08, subds. (d), (f) [on finding of 

good cause that parolee has committed a violation of law or parole conditions, 

if “intermediate sanctions . . . are not appropriate, the supervising parole 

agency shall . . . petition” court to revoke parole].) While the Dix petitioner 

had no legally recognized interest in the outcome of that criminal action, 

CDCR has a legal obligation, independent of the district attorney’s, to file a 

petition to revoke parole in appropriate cases. This dual authority is an 

exception to the exclusive discretion a prosecutor usually enjoys in handling 

criminal cases, which distinguishes Dix. 

Finally, Escobedo contends CDCR abandoned its objection to the 

withdrawal of its revocation petition and forfeited its right to appellate 

review “by choosing not to attend the sentencing hearing and object in 

person” to the entry of judgment in accordance with the negotiated plea. We 

agree with Escobedo that an email sent to the court may not be a proper way 

for a party to lodge an objection to an anticipated ruling. But CDCR was not 
17

a party to Escobedo’s criminal action and the apparent purpose of the parole 

agent’s email was simply to remind the court (and the district attorney) of the 

governing law pertaining to lifetime parolees. Regardless, we conclude 

CDCR did not forfeit its right to bring this claim by failing to appear in 

Escobedo’s criminal case. As a rule, the failure to raise an issue at the 

earliest opportunity results in forfeiture of a question in a later proceeding. 

(Parmar v. Board of Equalization (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 705, 718.) But this

rule does not apply “to ‘noncurable defects of substance where the question is 

one of law,’ or to ‘matters involving the public interest or the due 

administration of justice. . . .’ ” (City of Clovis v. County of Fresno (2014) 222 

Cal.App.4th 1469, 1477; see also In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 738.) 

Moreover, forfeiture can work against either party. (See e.g., Guastello v. 

AIG Speciality Ins. Co. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 97, 105.) And ironically, 

Escobedo has forfeited his forfeiture argument by failing to flesh it out more 

fully and place it under a separate heading in his brief. (Landry v. Berryessa 

Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700 [“When an issue is 

unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed 

abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary”].)

Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of CDCR’s petition.

III. The Plea Bargain Was Unlawful

CDCR contends the People’s plea bargain with Escobedo is 

unenforceable because the trial court was required by law to adjudicate the 

parole revocation petitions and remand Escobedo to the custody of CDCR. 

Escobedo disagrees, arguing that because the petitions were withdrawn, the 

prosecution was free to negotiate a disposition that did not require Escobedo’s 

return to prison. As we shall explain, the trial court did not have the power 

to disregard section 3000.08(h) and sentence a lifetime parolee to probation. 
18

Moreover, even if DDA Chavez had authority to withdraw the revocation 

petition filed by the district attorney, she did not have unilateral authority to 

withdraw CDCR’s parole revocation petition. Accordingly, we conclude the 

plea agreement to sentence Escobedo to probation for his admitted violation 

of Penal Code section 422 is unlawful and unenforceable.

Plea bargaining has become an essential component of our criminal 

justice system, and plea bargains that have been approved by the court are 

generally enforceable under contract principles. (People v. Renfro (2004) 125 

Cal.App.4th 223, 230 (Renfro).) “The prosecution and criminal court, 

however, do not have unfettered discretion in determining the subject matter 

of a plea bargain. The court must exercise its sentencing authority in 

accordance with the Penal Code, public policy, and decisional law,” which 

means in this context that a “plea bargain is limited to ‘powers legally 

available to’ the court.” (Renfro, at p. 230, quoting § 1192.5.) 

Here, the trial court exceeded its legally available powers by placing a 

lifetime parolee on probation after finding he had committed a felony. As we 

have noted, section 3000.08(h) states that if a court determines a lifetime 

parolee has violated conditions of parole or the law, the parolee “shall” be 

remanded to the custody of CDCR and the jurisdiction of BPH. This remand 

is not optional, but follows ineluctably from the judicial finding that a 

lifetime parolee has committed a new offense. Parole is a statutorily 

mandated element of punishment, and neither the prosecution nor the 

sentencing court has authority to impose a prison sentence without parole or 

to alter the applicable period of parole established by the Legislature. 

(Renfro, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 232.) Simply stated, the “imposition 

and duration of a parole term is not a permissible subject of plea 

negotiations.” (Ibid.) This legal principle has been consistently enforced by 
19

California courts. (See e.g. In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 357 [“the length 

of a parole term is not a permissible subject of plea negotiations”]; People v. 

McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1369 [“there is no legal mechanism for 

negotiating a plea agreement containing . . . reduced time on parole”]; 

Berman v. Cate (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 885, 895 [specified parole term in a 

plea agreement is unenforceable]; Renfro, at p. 233 [same].) 

Escobedo contends that section 3000.08(h) is inapplicable—and thus 

did not limit the trial court’s authority to accept the plea agreement—because 

the petitions charging Escobedo with violating conditions of his parole were 

withdrawn before Escobedo entered his plea. According to this argument, 

section 3000.08(h) simply does not apply in the absence of a pending petition 

to revoke parole. Escobedo cites no authority supportive of this proposition, 

but he reasons that the statutory scheme contemplates a revocation petition 

must be pending in order for the court to revoke somebody’s parole and 

remand the person to the custody of CDCR. We disagree. 

Section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) expressly provides that the court may 

modify or revoke parole “[u]pon its own motion.” Escobedo acknowledges this 

provision but deems it irrelevant since the trial court did not make a motion 

to revoke Escobedo’s parole in this particular case. The pertinent fact, 

however, is that the Legislature has determined that a trial court’s power to 

revoke parole is not conditioned on either the district attorney or CDCR filing 

a revocation petition. Further, revocation of parole is mandatory in the event 

a criminal defendant is convicted of any offense, even a misdemeanor, based 

on conduct he committed while on lifetime parole. (Perlas, supra, 47 

Cal.App.5th at p. 836, citing § 3000.08(h).) And in the present case, there is 

no dispute that Escobedo was a lifetime parolee when he committed the acts 

that the court found were a felony violation of section 422. Although the 
20

court’s finding was based on a plea rather than evidence presented at a 

revocation hearing, we see no reason why that finding was insufficient to 

trigger application of section 3000.08(h) and the principle of Perlas, 

notwithstanding that the revocation petitions had ostensibly been 

withdrawn. If no revocation petition had ever been filed, section 1203.2, 

subdivision (b)(1) would have provided the court a procedural mechanism to 

comply with the statutory mandate.

The language of section 3000.08(h) is consistent with this analysis. Its

requirement that a lifetime parolee, found to have committed a new offense,

be remanded to the custody of CDCR is not conditioned on the filing or 

adjudication of any petition to revoke parole. Section 3000.08(h) codifies a 

legislative mandate that unequivocally requires, “[n]otwithstanding any 

other law,” that the court remand a lifetime parolee in such circumstances. 

(§ 3000.08(h).) The provision requires no petition to revoke parole, and no 

court order adjudicating such a petition. Section 3000.08(h) mentions 

neither. Escobedo acknowledges that section 3000.08(h) carves out an 

exception to the range of consequences otherwise available under subdivision 

(f) of section 3000.08, when a lifetime parolee is the one found to have 

committed a parole violation. (See Williams, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 

1040; Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) But he contends, with no 

authority, that subdivision (h) lies dormant absent a formal revocation

proceeding. We disagree. As with section 3000.08(h), nothing in subdivision 

(f) requires a pending petition before the court may revoke a person’s parole. 

Subdivision (f) does require CDCR to file a revocation petition in certain 

circumstances, but it does not condition the court’s power to revoke parole on 

any such petition. The court retains the power to revoke parole on its own 

motion if need be. (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).) 
21

But there is no need to deal in hypotheticals here. Even if we were to 

credit the contention that section 3000.08(h) does not come into play unless a 

formal revocation petition is pending, we would reach the same conclusion in 

the present case. Two such petitions were filed against Escobedo before he 

negotiated his plea bargain with the People. Settled authority establishes 

that the court could not dismiss those petitions in the interests of justice 

pursuant to section 1385. (Wiley, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068; Williams,

supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044.) Because section 1385 refers to the 

dismissal of an “action,” it has been found not to apply to parole revocation 

proceedings. (Wiley, at p. 1068.) These are not criminal actions, but special 

proceedings established by statute. (Perlas, at pp. 831–832.) 

We do not rule out the possibility that a workable distinction can be 

drawn between dismissing a revocation petition and allowing it to be 

withdrawn, but we know of no authority allowing a district attorney to 

withdraw a petition she did not file. The statutory scheme for adjudicating 

parole violations confers no express right to withdraw a revocation petition, 

but neither does it expressly preclude withdrawing a petition. In the face of 

this silence, Escobedo posits that the power to withdraw a revocation petition 

falls within the prosecution’s discretionary authority to control criminal 

proceedings. We reject this theory because, as noted, a parole revocation 

proceeding is not a criminal action to be prosecuted, but a special proceeding 

arising from an underlying prior conviction. (Wiley, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1067–1068; Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 831–832.) And the 

Legislature has resolved that revocation petitions are not solely the 

responsibility of the district attorney, as a parole revocation proceeding can 

also be initiated by CDCR, or even on the trial court’s own motion. (§ 1203.2.) 

If the district attorney were empowered to withdraw CDCR’s petition without 
22

CDCR’s permission, this would undermine the Legislative scheme giving the 

two agencies independent authority to initiate revocation proceedings. 

Finally, as we have discussed, the law requires CDCR to file parole revocation 

petitions in specified circumstances (§ 3000.08, subd. (f)), which were present 

here. In a case where CDCR is required to file a parole revocation petition, 

we question whether anyone—CDCR or the district attorney—has authority 

simply to withdraw that petition. For all of these reasons we conclude that,

even if DDA Chavez had authority to withdraw her own parole revocation 

petition, she had no authority to withdraw the petition that CDCR filed 

pursuant to its own statutory mandate. 

Escobedo relies heavily on Williams, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 1029 to 

argue otherwise. In that case, the district attorney filed both a complaint 

charging a lifetime parolee with two misdemeanors and a petition to revoke 

the defendant’s parole. After a contested hearing on the revocation petition, 

the court determined the defendant had committed one of the charged 

offenses and remanded him to prison pursuant to section 3000.08(h). On 

appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by refusing to obtain a 

written report from CDCR before ruling on the revocation petition. Division 

One of this court agreed, applying the plain language of section 1203.2(b), 

which requires the trial court to obtain and review a written report from the

parole agency before ruling on a parole revocation petition filed by the district 

attorney, making no exception for lifetime parolees. (Williams, at pp. 1039–

1040; see also People v. Zamudio (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 8, 15.) 

Although Williams is not directly on point, one aspect of the appellate 

court’s decision provides useful guidance. In that case, the People argued

that although section 1203.2(b) generally requires courts to obtain a written 

report from the parole agency, that requirement should not apply to lifetime 
23

parolees because the purpose of the report is to aid the court in deciding 

whether to impose an intermediate sanction, which simply is not an option 

when the violator is on lifetime parole. (Williams, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1042–1043.) The Williams court confirmed that “a trial court has no 

discretion to do anything but remand a lifetime parolee to prison once it finds 

that the person violated parole.” (Id. at p. 1042, see also p. 1040.) But it

found, among other things, that “even though the trial court may not dismiss 

a petition, or impose intermediate sanctions short of revoking parole, based 

on the parole agency’s report,” that report could potentially influence the 

prosecutor to withdraw his or her petition. (Id. at p. 1044.) The court 

reasoned that the district attorney could be prompted to reconsider its 

decision to file the revocation petition if the report disclosed, for example, 

that the parole agency would have imposed intermediate sanctions instead of 

requesting court intervention. (Id. at pp. 1044–1045.) 

Williams supports the proposition that the district attorney has 

discretion to withdraw its own petition for revocation of parole based on 

information provided by the parole agency. By parity of reasoning, the 

district attorney might also have discretion to withdraw its own revocation 

petition in order to facilitate a plea agreement. (Cf. People v. Vaesau (2023) 

__ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 Cal.App.Lexis 598] [district attorney must have 

legitimate basis for withdrawing a resentencing request].) But even if we 

assume that DDA Chavez had authority to withdraw the district attorney’s

petition, CDCR filed its own revocation petition against Escobedo, and that 

petition was supported by a CDCR report explaining the need for court 

intervention and a remand to state custody. Williams does not hold or 

intimate that the district attorney has discretion to withdraw a revocation 

petition that was filed by CDCR. And we conclude that because the statutory 
24

scheme establishes parallel tracks for CDCR and the district attorney to file 

revocation petitions, Williams should not be read to support a district 

attorney exercising independent authority to withdraw a revocation petition 

that CDCR filed.

At oral argument before this court and in postargument letter briefs, 

Escobedo developed a new theory, that in this particular case CDCR 

delegated its authority to withdraw its revocation petition to the district 

attorney. Escobedo reasons that by failing separately to appear on the 

petition, CDCR permitted the district attorney to prosecute CDCR’s petition, 

thereby ceding the power to withdraw that petition. We see several problems 

with this argument. 

Escobedo cites no statute or document to support his contention that 

the district attorney was counsel of record on CDCR’s petition here or, 

relatedly, that CDCR needs to appear through counsel after filing a 

statutorily mandated revocation petition. And there is a practical problem 

with requiring CDCR to appear at every hearing, a problem the Attorney 

General explains this way: already a parole agent or parole-agent supervisor 

appears in the Alameda County Superior Court for the weekly calendar 

where parole revocation petitions are heard, and parole agents should not 

need also “to appear at every criminal calendar in Alameda County to ensure 

prosecutors do not act ultra vires and withdraw a CDCR-initiated parole 

revocation petition without CDCR’s permission.”

Further, to the extent that the district attorney acted as counsel for 

CDCR under the facts presented here, we disagree with Escobedo that 

CDCR’s counsel had unilateral authority to withdraw the revocation petition. 

Escobedo cites Code of Civil Procedure, section 283, which codifies the 

general rule authorizing an attorney to bind his or her client “in any of the 
25

steps of an action or proceeding.” However, this rule is subject to substantive 

limitations. For example, an attorney exceeds his or her authority by 

abdicating a substantial right of the client contrary to express instructions. 

(Linsk v. Linsk (1969) 70 Cal.2d 272, 278; see Conservatorship of John L.

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 156.) Here, Ms. Martin’s email made clear that CDCR 

was of the view that both parole revocation petitions needed to be adjudicated 

and, if good cause was found, Escobedo needed to be remanded to the Board 

of Parole Hearings, so the district attorney knew it did not have CDCR’s 

approval for the course of action it was pursuing. 

Indeed, nothing in this record supports Escobedo’s factual assertion 

that CDCR delegated or ceded its authority to enforce the parole revocation 

law. As soon as the parole-agent supervisor discovered the allegedly 

unlawful plea agreement, she notified both the district attorney and the court 

about the need to comply in this case with rules applicable to lifetime 

parolees who reoffend. Accordingly, we reject Escobedo’s new theory that 

CDCR’s nonappearance in the trial court authorized the district attorney to 

withdraw CDCR’s petition.

We note, in closing, that “[d]efining offenses and prescribing 

punishments (mandatory or alternative choices) are legislative functions.” 

(People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 258.) When the court accepted 

Escobedo’s plea, it implicitly found that Escobedo violated the law while on 

lifetime parole. The court then had no choice but to impose the consequence

the Legislature has mandated in such circumstances. Notwithstanding the 

fact that the prosecutor purported to withdraw both revocation petitions, 

section 3000.08(h) required that Escobedo be returned to the custody of 

CDCR. The law simply does not authorize probation for a lifetime parolee 

who is found to have again violated the law, and therefore, neither the 
26

prosecution nor the sentencing court had authority to accept a negotiated 

disposition that placed Escobedo on probation. Accordingly, this court shall 

grant CDCR’s petition for a writ of mandate. 

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to

vacate the judgment and sentence in Escobedo’s criminal action; vacate the 

order granting the People’s motion to withdraw CDCR’s petition to revoke 

Escobedo’s parole; afford Escobedo the opportunity to withdraw his plea; and 

conduct further proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with the 

views expressed herein.

TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.

PETROU, J.

California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Superior Court (Escobedo) (A166559)
27

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Paul Delucchi

Counsel: Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, and Sara 

J. Romano, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Brian 

C. Kinney, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, 

Michael G. Lagrama, and Kathleen R. Walton, Deputy 

Attorneys General for Petitioner

No appearance for Respondent

Jonathan Soglin, and Jeremy Price, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Real Party in Interest Robert L. 

Escobedo

No appearance for Real Party in Interest the People