In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15-2295, 15-2303 & 16-3556

THORNCREEK APARTMENTS III, LLC, a foreign limited liability 

company d/b/a The Lofts at Thorncreek,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

and

THORNCREEK MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TOM MICK,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 1225 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

Nos. 15-2296, 15-2302 & 16-3555

VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee,

and
2 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

TOM MICK,

Third-Party Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee,

and

MAE BRANDON, et al.,

Third-Party Defendants/

Cross-Appellees,

v.

THORNCREEK APARTMENTS II, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

and

ATLANTIC MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 0869 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

Nos. 15-2298, 15-2304 & 16-3557

THORNCREEK APARTMENTS I, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

and

THORNCREEK MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 3

TOM MICK, individually and as Village Manager for the 

Village of Park Forest,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, et al.,

Defendants/

Cross-Appellees.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 08 C 4303 — Gary Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 18, 2017 — DECIDED MARCH 27, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. These consolidated appeals 

challenge various aspects of a judgment entered on a split 

jury verdict in a long-running dispute between the Village of 

Park Forest, Illinois, and Thorncreek Apartments, a large

housing complex located in the Village. Thorncreek accused 

village officials of engaging in a campaign of regulatory 

harassment based on personal animus against its owner and 

because many of its residents are black. Thorncreek sued the 

Village and ten officials for compensatory and punitive 

damages under several federal and state civil-rights laws.

After a 13-day trial, jurors returned a partial verdict for 

Thorncreek. The Village and its manager were found liable 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a class-of-one equal-protection 

violation, and the village manager and director of community development were found liable for conspiracy in violation 
4 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In all other respects, the jury sided 

with the defendants.

Ruling on postverdict motions, the district court tossed 

out the jury’s liability finding against the communitydevelopment director but otherwise approved the verdict 

and entered judgment accordingly. The judge also granted 

Thorncreek’s motion for prejudgment interest and attorney’s 

fees, though the award of fees was approximately one-third 

of what was requested.

Both sides appealed, raising assorted challenges to the 

judge’s posttrial rulings on damages, prejudgment interest, 

and attorney’s fees. We find no error and affirm. 

I. Background

Thorncreek is a large townhouse complex nestled in the 

Village of Park Forest, a suburb southeast of Chicago that 

straddles both Cook County and Will County. In 1989

Thorncreek was sold to Atlantic Limited Partnership XX, a 

Michigan partnership largely owned by David Clapper, its 

general partner. Clapper later reorganized the property into

three separate limited liability corporations: Thorncreek 

Apartments I, LLC; Thorncreek Apartments II, LLC; and

Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC. Each corporation operated 

a different part of the complex: Thorncreek I (“Area F”),

Thorncreek II (“Area G”), and Thorncreek III (“Area H”). We

refer to the three corporations collectively as “Thorncreek” 

unless the context requires otherwise.

In 2007 Atlantic Limited sold Thorncreek I for roughly 

$16 million. The leasing office for the entire complex was 

located in a townhouse in Area F, so the sale caused a logistical problem. Thorncreek’s management company proposed 

to relocate the leasing office to a vacant townhouse in 
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 5

Area G, which was owned and operated by Thorncreek II. 

The move required a conditional use permit, so in February 

2007 Thorncreek II applied to the Village for a permit to use 

the vacant townhouse as a business office. In the meantime,

however, Thorncreek began to conduct its business operations from the Area G townhouse without waiting for action 

on the permit application. The Village responded by citing 

Thorncreek II for zoning violations and operating without 

the required permit. 

In December 2007 the Village filed suit in state court 

against Thorncreek II and Atlantic Limited to halt the zoning 

and operating violations arising from the unpermitted 

leasing office and also to redress certain building-code 

violations. Thorncreek II removed the suit to federal court, 

but a district judge quickly sent it back to state court for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction. A later removal was successful; Thorncreek II counterclaimed against the Village and ten 

village officials raising a host of federal and state civil-rights 

violations. In February 2008 Thorncreek III filed its own 

federal lawsuit raising substantially similar claims.

Two months later Fannie Mae filed foreclosure notices 

with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds against 

Thorncreek II and III. Thorncreek blamed its predicament on 

the Village’s regulatory overreach. In July 2008 Thorncreek I 

joined the legal battle by filing its own federal suit alleging 

similar civil-rights violations.

In essence, all three suits alleged that the Village violated 

Thorncreek’s constitutional rights by denying its application 

for a business license, interfering with business operations, 

refusing to grant the application for a conditional use permit, failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally 

enforcing a building-code provision requiring electrical 
6 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

upgrades. A single district judge took charge of all three 

suits, consolidating them for summary judgment and, if 

necessary, a trial.

As originally pleaded, the case was sprawling. 

Thorncreek brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 

1985, and 1986 seeking compensatory and punitive damages 

for alleged due-process, equal-protection, and Takings

Clause violations; conspiracy; and failure to prevent a civilrights conspiracy. Thorncreek also tacked on claims under

the Illinois Civil Rights Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 23/5.

The judge trimmed the case a bit on summary judgment, 

but even as narrowed the case remained unwieldy. Three 

groups of claims were tried to a jury over 13 days: (1) § 1983 

claims against the Village and nine officials for class-of-one 

and race-based equal-protection violations; (2) claims under 

§§ 1985 and 1986 against the same nine officials for conspiracy and failure to prevent a civil-rights conspiracy; and 

(3) claims against the Village under the Illinois Civil Rights 

Act. The basic theory of the case was that the defendants

caused Thorncreek’s mortgage default and foreclosure by 

singling it out for unfair regulatory action (and inaction)

based on irrational animus against Clapper and racial bias 

against its black residents.

Thorncreek prevailed in part. The jury found the Village 

and Village Manager Tom Mick liable for a class-of-one 

equal-protection violation. The jury also found Mick and 

Larrie Kerestes, the director of community development, 

liable for conspiracy in violation of § 1985(3). The jury 

cleared the other defendants on these two claims and exonerated all defendants on the remaining claims. On the issue 

of damages, the jury awarded $2,014,000 in compensatory 

damages to Thorncreek II but only $1 in nominal damages to 
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 7

Thorncreek I and III. Finally, the jury awarded punitive 

damages against Mick and Kerestes in the amounts of $5,000 

and $1,000, respectively.

Thorncreek moved for a new trial under Rule 59(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but only on the issue of 

damages. The motion raised several claims of error. The 

judge rejected each one and denied relief. Thorncreek also 

asked for prejudgment interest on the jury’s award of compensatory damages. The judge granted that request. 

Mick and Kerestes both moved for judgment as a matter 

of law under Rule 50(b). The jury’s verdict against Kerestes 

was limited to the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, but that statute 

requires a predicate race-based or class-based equalprotection violation. Because the jury cleared all of the

defendants on the race-based equal-protection claim, the 

judge held that the verdict against Kerestes on the § 1985(3) 

claim could not stand.

Mick’s situation was different. His Rule 50(b) motion 

challenged only the jury’s finding on the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim; he did not attack the jury’s liability finding against 

him on the class-of-one equal-protection claim. So the judge 

saw no reason to disturb the verdict as to him and denied his 

motion. With these adjustments, the judge entered judgment 

on the verdict.

Thorncreek later moved for an award of attorney’s fees 

and nontaxable costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The judge 

granted the motion and awarded $430,999.25 in fees and 

$44,844.33 in costs. The award of fees was about one-third of 

what Thorncreek requested.

Both sides appealed, reprising many of the arguments 

raised in the posttrial litigation.
8 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

II. Analysis

A. Mick’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Mick challenges the denial of his motion for judgment as 

a matter of law. He argues that he deserves the same treatment as his codefendant Kerestes because the jury’s finding 

of liability on the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim is invalid without a predicate race-based or class-based equal-protection 

violation. That’s a correct statement of settled law. See, e.g.,

Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Section 

1985(3) prohibits a conspiracy to deprive another of equal 

protection under the law ... , but the conspiracy must be 

motivated by racial, or other class-based discriminatory 

animus.” (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 

(1971))). But it does not follow that Mick, like Kerestes, is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

It’s true that the jury’s verdict on the § 1985(3) claim was 

flawed as to both defendants. The jurors rejected the racebased equal-protection claim in toto, so there’s no underlying race-based equal-protection violation to support conspiracy liability under § 1985(3). But the jury found Mick

and the Village liable on Thorncreek’s § 1983 claim alleging a 

class-of-one equal-protection violation and awarded more 

than $2 million in compensatory damages. Mick did not 

challenge this part of the verdict in his Rule 50(b) motion. 

The compensatory-damages award on this claim is plainly 

sufficient to support the $5,000 punitive-damages award 

against him. So although the jury’s verdict on the § 1985(3) 

claim was defective, there’s nothing wrong with the judgment, which Mick does not otherwise challenge. The judge 

properly denied his motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 9

B. Thorncreek’s Motion for a New Trial on Damages

Thorncreek asks us to order a new trial on the limited issue of damages. Its primary argument is that the judge 

impermissibly admitted prejudicial references to Clapper’s 

wealth that influenced the jury’s assessment of damages. 

Thorncreek also attacks the jury decision to award only 

nominal damages to Thorncreek I and III. 

1. Prejudicial Evidence

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the 

jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an 

emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented.” 

United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). We review claims of evidentiary error

for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 807 (7th 

Cir. 2013). Because the trial judge is in a superior position to 

evaluate the impact of contested testimony or other evidence, we give special deference to the judge’s evidentiary 

rulings. Suggs, 374 F.3d at 516. And to warrant a new trial, 

an evidentiary error must affect the losing party’s substantial 

rights—that is, there must be a significant chance that the

flawed ruling affected the outcome of the trial. Smith, 

707 F.3d at 808.

The parties submitted some 26 or 27 motions in limine 

seeking to limit the opposition’s evidentiary submissions. 

One of Thorncreek’s pretrial motions pertained to evidence 

of Clapper’s wealth, which Thorncreek insisted should be off 

limits. The judge agreed and excluded evidence of Clapper’s 

wealth or financial status. Thorncreek maintains that the 

defense attorney violated this ruling several times, tainting 

the jury on the question of damages. The judge was not 

persuaded. Neither are we.
10 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

Thorncreek’s main complaint centers on a brief moment 

during the trial when defense counsel was cross-examining a 

witness about a phone conversation with Clapper. Counsel 

asked if the witness knew where Clapper was during the 

call. The witness replied that he was “either in his offices in 

Michigan, or he was on his boat in the Mediterranean.”

The judge instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, 

and we assume that jurors follow such instructions. Solyts v. 

Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2008). To overcome this 

presumption, the complaining party must establish “an 

overwhelming probability” that the jury was “unable to 

disregard inadmissible evidence” and also “a strong likelihood of a devastating effect from the evidence.” Turner v. 

Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 2002). Thorncreek has not 

shown that this stray snippet of testimony had any sort of 

effect—much less a devastating effect—on the jury.

Other oblique references to Clapper’s wealth occurred 

during defense counsel’s closing argument, but Thorncreek 

did not object. Ordinarily “a definitive ruling in limine

preserves an issue for appellate review, without the need for 

later objection.” Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 

1999). But that rule doesn’t apply to claimed violations of a 

judge’s in limine rulings; an objection is generally required 

to preserve appellate review of an alleged violation of a

pretrial ruling. And here the judge reminded the parties to 

object to any violations of his rulings on motions in limine

and instructed them to be specific about the grounds.

More specifically, after the witness’s “boat in the 

Mediterranean” reference, the judge called a break, made a 

record of what happened, and instructed the lawyers as 

follows:
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 11

What I’ll say in response is there were 26 or 

27 motions in limine, so -- and with some prior 

objections, the objection said, “ruling on the 

motion in limine,” and that prompts me to 

think about the motion in limine. ...

If you want to rely on a motion in limine -- a 

ruling on a motion in limine in making an objection, you’ve got to tell me because it isn’t 

like -- if we had one or two or three motions in 

limine, it would be different, but we had 26 or 

27.

... .

[Y]ou really have to state the basis for the objection when you make the objection.

... .

[I]n the future, if you do want -- both sides, if 

you want to rely on a motion in limine ruling in 

making an objection, just say, “motion in limine

ruling.” Obviously don’t get into the details of 

the motion in limine, because again, that would 

defeat the point of having the motion in limine.

The judge’s instructions could not have been clearer: To

preserve a challenge to any further violations of his rulings 

on motions in limine, the parties had to object. Thorncreek 

did not do so with respect to defense counsel’s passing 

references to Clapper’s wealth during closing argument. 

That’s a waiver. Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 657 (7th 
12 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

Cir. 2014); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 

2008).1

Thorncreek argues for the first time in its reply brief that 

we should review the unpreserved errors under the plainerror standard. Plain-error review is rarely applied in civil 

cases and is available only if “(1) exceptional circumstances 

exist[]; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur if plain error review is not applied.” Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 839 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quotation marks omitted). Thorncreek’s plain-error argument fails for multiple reasons. For starters, “arguments 

raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” Darif v. 

Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 2014). And Thorncreek has 

not shown either exceptional circumstances or a miscarriage 

of justice. Thorncreek won more than $2 million in damages, 

which suggests that the jury was not put off by any references to Clapper’s wealth.2

 

1 Thorncreek suggests that not interrupting closing argument was part of 

its own counsel’s trial strategy. Maybe so, but that doesn’t make a 

difference in the analysis. “Perhaps defendant-appellant feared that a 

contemporaneous objection would incur hostility from the jury. This 

court need not speculate as to the nature of defendant-appellant’s 

motives. Suffice it to note, however, that risky gambling tactics such as 

this are usually binding on the gambler.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care 

Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 445 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. 

Corp., 752 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). 

2 Before we leave the subject of Clapper’s wealth, we pause to note an 

additional argument Thorncreek raises, though it’s so plainly meritless 

that we could let it go unmentioned. Thorncreek takes issue with the 

highlighted parenthetical in this passage from the judge’s written 

decision on posttrial motions:

Before trial, Thorncreek moved in limine to bar, among 

other things, any references to or evidence regarding the 
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 13

Thorncreek next argues that its financial records predating 2005 should not have been admitted at trial. This 

argument rests entirely on a ruling by a magistrate judge 

concerning a discovery dispute. The magistrate judge saw a

need to limit the scope of discovery, so he ordered that 

“[e]xcept for specific interrogatories and document requests 

identified on the record, the interrogatories and document 

requests are limited to the time period of 01/01/05 to the 

present.”

But the documents at the center of Thorncreek’s argument are publicly available financial records pertaining to the 

housing complex. The defense expert incorporated this 

material into his final damages opinion, and the defense

disclosed the documents to Thorncreek about two months 

before trial, explaining that the pre-2005 public records were 

additional support for the expert’s opinion. The defense 

even offered to produce the expert for another deposition. 

Thorncreek declined the offer.

 

wealth and personal financial status of David Clapper, 

Thorncreek’s principal owner. Doc. 258. (Clapper apparently is a wealthy man. See Kaya Morgan, David 

Clapper—Success Runs Deep, http://www.island

connections.com/edit/clapper.htm (last visited May 17, 

2015), which appears to be a puff piece about Clapper 

authored by a publicist, which refers to Clapper as a 

“Michigan business tycoon,” which shows photographs of Clapper with, among others, the first President Bush, Pope John Paul II, and Kevin Nealon, and 

which was not offered or admitted into evidence at trial.) The Village did not oppose the exclusion of such evidence, Doc. 272, and the court granted the motion in 

relevant part, Doc. 377.

(Emphasis in bold added.) This harmless aside is hardly reversible error.
14 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

Thorncreek now cries foul, relying on Rule 26(a), but its 

objection is way off the mark. Rule 26(a) says that “[a]bsent a 

stipulation or a court order,” expert testimony must disclosed 

at least 90 days before the date set for trial. FED. R. CIV.

P. 26(a)(2)(D)(i) (emphasis added). Here the judge specifically allowed the defense to submit the modified expert report

two months before trial. There was no Rule 26 violation, and 

the judge did not otherwise abuse his discretion in admitting 

the publicly available pre-2005 financial records. 

2. Challenge to Nominal Damages Awards

“[W]e do not readily overturn a damage award when the 

trial court has denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.” 

Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 1992). We

will do so only “when the jury’s verdict is contrary to reason 

and the trial court’s denial of a new trial on damages is an 

abuse of discretion.” Id.

The jury awarded a substantial sum of money—more 

than $2 million—to Thorncreek II but only nominal damages 

of $1 each to Thorncreek I and III. Thorncreek insists that the 

awards are inconsistent and contrary to reason. Not so. 

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury rationally 

treated the three Thorncreek entities differently. 

Thorncreek I originally housed the apartment leasing office and was sold for roughly $16 million in 2007 before most 

of the events in question occurred. True, the sale necessitated the relocation of the business office, which spawned the 

fight over regulatory approval of the conditional use permit. 

Regardless, although Thorncreek’s expert testified that the 

$16 million price was too low, the defense expert said it was 

just right and no damages accrued. The jury was entitled to

accept the latter’s testimony.
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 15

Thorncreek II, for its part, was uniquely affected by the

run-ins with the Village. The Village unequally enforced an 

electrical-upgrade ordinance against Area G. And the 

Village sued Thorncreek II to enforce the electrical-upgrade 

ordinance and to shutter the illegal leasing office set up in 

the Area G townhouse after the sale of Thorncreek I. Finally, 

the jury heard evidence that before the foreclosure 

Thorncreek II was set to be sold to a third party and that but 

for the Village’s interference, the sale would have been 

consummated. Indeed, it appears that the jury took the 

contract value of the property and subtracted the mortgage 

amount to arrive at its compensatory-damages award.

Thorncreek III, on the other hand, was not subjected to 

harassment over electrical upgrades like Thorncreek II was, 

and it did not face an enforcement action by the Village in 

state court. The record supports the jury’s decision to treat

each Thorncreek plaintiff differently when assessing damages. The judge properly denied Thorncreek’s motion for a 

new trial.

C. Prejudgment Interest

The Village challenges the judge’s decision to award prejudgment interest on the verdict. We held long ago that 

prejudgment interest is “presumptively available to victims 

of federal law violations.” Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality 

Care–USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989). Prejudgment interest serves dual purposes: to fully compensate the 

plaintiff and to minimize a defendant’s incentive to delay. Id.

But it is not the same as punitive damages; prejudgment 

interest is not meant to penalize the party who caused the 

injury. Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger, 54 F.3d 1234, 1247 (7th 

Cir. 1995).
16 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff can’t double dip by 

providing the jury with a damages estimate that includes

interest and also moving for prejudgment interest. When a 

plaintiff provides evidence of damages that includes interest, 

the presumption flips and the judge will presume that the 

jury included the interest in its award. Id. 

The damages estimates Thorncreek submitted to the jury 

included prejudgment interest. So the judge properly started 

with the presumption that Thorncreek was not entitled to 

prejudgment interest. But he found the presumption rebutted and granted the request for prejudgment interest. We 

review that decision for abuse of discretion. First Nat’l Bank 

of Manitowoc v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 485 F.3d 971, 981 (7th Cir. 

2007). 

The judge concluded that the jury calculated its 

compensatory-damages award by simply subtracting the 

mortgage debt on Thorncreek II from its value—a figure that 

the judge said “result[ed] from simple subtraction, [and] did 

not include prejudgment interest.” In its motion for a new 

trial, the Village embraced this interpretation as a plausible 

reading of the verdict. That concession takes most of the 

wind out of the Village’s sails.

For completeness, however, we note that the jury heard 

evidence that a willing buyer offered to purchase 

Thorncreek II for $11 million. The jury also heard evidence 

that the original mortgage on Thorncreek II was $8,960,000 

and $8,466,945.55 of the principal on the mortgage remained 

unpaid. Simple subtraction results in a range of damages 

between $2,004,000 and $2,533,054.45. The actual 

compensatory-damages award—$2,014,000—fits squarely 

within that range.
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 17

Thorncreek’s expert offered an estimate of prejudgment 

interest in the range of $1,311,163 to $1,641,861. Under the 

circumstance it’s highly improbable that the jury incorporated prejudgment interest in its ultimate award, and the 

Village has not given us a good reason to think that it did. 

We see no error in the judge’s award of prejudgment interest.

D. Attorney’s Fees

For claims brought under § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The 

statute’s use of the word “may” commits the award of fees 

to the district court’s discretion. Thorncreek challenges the 

judge’s decision to substantially reduce the amount of fees it 

requested. Our review is deferential, for abuse of discretion

only. Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1999). 

The reasonableness of an award of fees is fundamentally 

determined by “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success.” 

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting Tex. State 

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 

(1989)). Ordinarily a reasonable fee is calculated under the 

lodestar method by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. 

Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 

2011). The judge performed that calculation here and 

reached a lodestar figure of $1,292,997.75.

But the lodestar figure is just the “starting point.” Estate 

of Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). And 

though it is presumptively reasonable, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex 

rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553–54 (2010), the figure may be 

excessive when “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or 
18 Nos. 15-2295, et al.

limited success,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 

(1983). In making this determination, the district court

considers the claims on which the party did not prevail, the 

size of the monetary award, and any social benefits not 

reflected in a small damages award. Estate of Enoch, 570 F.3d 

at 824.

If a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages, the “reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115.

Three factors help determine whether attorney’s fees are 

appropriate in a nominal-damages case: “(1) the difference 

between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought; 

(2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff 

prevailed; and (3) the public purpose of the litigation.” 

Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 609 (7th Cir. 2003).

The judge properly applied these general principles here.

He first noted that the jury awarded only nominal damages 

to two of the three Thorncreek entities. Thorncreek I and III

sought a combined total of $12.5 million but received a 

combined total of $2. The judge also considered that the 

issues in the litigation were primarily factual rather than 

legal. And, finally, the public purpose of the litigation was 

minimal. Though the vindication of constitutional rights is 

always important, “attorney’s fees are appropriate ... only 

when the plaintiff’s victory entails something more than 

merely a determination that a constitutional guarantee was 

infringed.” Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1994). 

The judge reasonably concluded that the necessary “something more” was missing here.

On the other hand, Thorncreek II won a substantial sum 

from the jury, though not close to what it sought. It asked for 

$8 million; the jury awarded just over $2 million. Still, it’s a 

sizeable award, and the judge properly noted the point. And 
Nos. 15-2295, et al. 19

he did not “make the mistake of limiting the fee to some 

multiple of the judgment, which would have been reversible 

error.” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014).

In the end, there is no algorithm “for adjusting a lodestar 

to reflect partial or limited success.” Id. The trial judge “has 

broad discretion to determine the appropriate reduction” 

and “is in a better position to assess ... whether a ... judgment is a spectacular success, a dismal failure, or something 

in between.” Id. Here the judge reasonably exercised his 

broad discretion to reduce the requested fees. Two of the 

three Thorncreek entities won only nominal damages. 

Thorncreek achieved a partial victory against the Village and 

Mick on a single claim but lost on all the others, and the nine 

remaining defendants were completely exonerated. 

Thorncreek sought a combined total of $20.5 million in 

damages but won a fraction of that amount, though at just 

over $2 million it’s unquestionably a substantial sum. After 

considering all the relevant factors, the judge declined to 

approve a lodestar recovery and settled on a fee award of 

approximately $475,000. That decision was sound.

AFFIRMED.