Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30093

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

NATHANIEL SINGLETON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:07-CR-20102-1

Before BENAVIDES, PRADO and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury found Nathaniel Singleton guilty of being a felon in possession of

a firearm (Count One), possession with intent to distribute approximately 39.25

grams of cocaine (Count Two), and possession of a firearm during a drug

trafficking crime (Count Three), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1)

& 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after police recovered drugs,

paraphernalia, and a loaded handgun from his vehicle during a traffic stop. The

district court imposed concurrent 120-month prison terms for Counts One and

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 22, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 09-30093

2

Two, along with a consecutive 60-month prison term for Count Three. The

district court also imposed a total of five years of supervised release. Singleton

appeals his conviction and sentence, contending that the district court erred in

overruling his motion to suppress the evidence because there was no probable

cause to prolong his detention.

On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings

for clear error and legal conclusions on Fourth Amendment issues, including

determinations regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause, de novo.

United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2008). “A factual finding

is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a

whole.” United States v. Jacquinot, 258 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001). Evidence

is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v.

Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007). All inferences are indulged in the

favor of the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. United States v.

Polk, 118 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 1997). Great deference is given to the district

court’s ability to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and judge credibility.

See United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005).

When the purposes of a valid traffic stop have been completed and an

officer has either verified or dispelled his initial suspicions, the detention must

also end “unless there is additional reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts.” United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006).

Reasonable suspicion to continue a traffic stop exists when the “detaining officer

can point to specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.”

Id. We determine reasonableness by examining the totality of the circumstances

existing at the time of the stop. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508

(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Moreover, in making a reasonableness determination,

we afford due weight to the factual inferences and deductions drawn by law

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enforcement officers, which are based on their collective experience and

specialized training. Id. at 507.

Testimony from the suppression hearing revealed that Corporal Audrey

Crawford conducted a legal stop, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),

after witnessing Singleton commit a traffic violation. During the course of

checking Singleton’s license, registration, and insurance, Corporal Crawford

observed Singleton reaching under the driver’s seat. The officer asked Singleton

to stop and to place his hands in plain sight. Singleton refused and continued

to reach under the seat. Fearing that there may be a weapon in the vehicle,

Corporal Crawford then, lawfully, asked Singleton to step out of the vehicle. See

United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 761 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that

once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, an officer may

order the driver out of the vehicle pending completion of the Terry stop).

Corporal Crawford observed that, upon exiting the vehicle, Singleton

threw something out of the passenger side window. When asked what he had

thrown, Singleton implausibly denied having thrown anything. Corporal

Crawford then escorted Singleton to the bumper of the vehicle where he

conducted an officer safety pat down search, which revealed $2800 in cash, and

continued to question Singleton on the item thrown out of the window. Mere

questioning is neither a search nor a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).

Other officers arrived on the scene within the minute and quickly located

a clear plastic baggie containing a white rock-like substance believed to be crack

cocaine. The baggie was discovered in the grassy area next to Singleton’s vehicle

in the general vicinity of where the item Corporal Crawford had seen Singleton

throw would have been expected to land. Singleton was then placed under

arrest, and the resulting search of his vehicle revealed another baggie containing

a white rock-like substance underneath the driver’s seat, a loaded handgun in

the center console, and other drug paraphernalia in the trunk. See United States

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v. Henry, 372 F.3d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that contraband from the

trunk of the vehicle was properly seized because officer had articulable

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity throughout duration of traffic stop based

on the defendant’s nervousness, inability to provide basic information, and baggy

clothing in addition to the discovery of fake identification in the defendant’s

sock).

Corporal Crawford was never able to verify his initial suspicions or resolve

the original purpose of the traffic stop, and throughout the stop, Singleton

continued to provide new, independent reasons to justify Corporal Crawford’s

reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention. Based on the totality of the

circumstances and the timing and sequence of events, the district court properly

concluded that Corporal Crawford had reasonable suspicion to detain Singleton

based on specific and articulable facts that developed during the stop. See

Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631; Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507-08. Accordingly, the

judgment is AFFIRMED.

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