IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

EMC CORPORATION, AND VMWARE, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00481-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PUBLIC VERSION

DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(1)

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 1 of 19
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.........................................................................................2

A. The Assignment History of the ’800 Patent...........................................................2

B.

..........................................................................................................2

III. WSOU BEARS THE BURDEN TO PROVE STANDING.............................................4

IV. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES .............7

A. ..................................7

B.

.........................................................................8

1.

.......................................................................8

2.

................................................................................................. 10

3. The USPTO Assignment Records Confirm 

t ......................................................................11

V. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................11

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 2 of 19
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. Epocal, Inc., 

666 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................4

Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 

625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................5, 6

Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus.,

939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991).................................................................................... 6, 7, 8

Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 

805 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................6

Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 

583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 563 U.S. 776 (2011)................................................8, 9

Bowmer v. Bowmer, 

50 N.Y.2d 288 (N.Y. 1980) ...............................................................................................11

DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 

517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................8

Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 

134 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................1

Gellman v. Telular Corp., 

2010 WL 5173213 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010) ..................................................................8, 9

Green Tech. Lighting Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 

No. 1:18-CV-01799 (PAC), 2020 WL 2036705 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020)..........................10

Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp.,

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019)........................................................................................5, 6

Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 

156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................6

Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,

95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..............................................................................................7

Moore v. Marsh, 

74 U.S. 515 (1868)..........................................................................................................6, 7

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 3 of 19
iii

Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 

499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007)............................................................................................5

Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 

1 N.Y.2d 42 (N.Y. 1956)...................................................................................................11

Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 

510 U.S. 249 (1994)............................................................................................................6

Neutron Depot, LLC v. All Web Leads, Inc.,

No. AU-16-CA-00901-SS, 2017 WL 9538893 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017)...........................2

S.O.T.A.T., Inc. v. Frank’s Int’l, Inc., 

No. 2:06 CV 523, 2008 WL 4093599 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008)..........................................7

Script Sec. Sol., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6433776 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2016)...............................5

Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 

427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................1, 4

Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 

211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000)............................................................................................8

Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 

508 F. Supp. 3d 556 (N.D. Cal. 2020)..................................................................................6

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 

2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) ........................................................................6

Wacoh Co. v. Chrysler LLC, 

No. 08-cv-456-slc, 2009 WL 36666 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2008).............................................5

WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 

631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

MPEP, §301 (June 2020).........................................................................................................11

TREATISES

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §203(c) (Am. L. Inst. 1981)...............................................11

5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1350 (3d ed. 2004)...................................5

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 4 of 19
iv

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term

’800 patent U.S. Patent No. 9,164,800 

Dell Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., EMC Corporation, and VMware, Inc.

Third 

Amendment Third Amended Patent Purchase Agreement 

PPA Patent Purchase Agreement

Wade Wade and Company 

WSOU WSOU Investments, LLC 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 5 of 19
v 

TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Document

A USPTO Reel 029191 Frame 0375 

B USPTO Reel 029191 Frame 0306 

C USPTO Reel 031658 Frame 0564

D USPTO Reel 031658 Frame 0272 

E USPTO Reel 045085 Frame 0001

F 

G 

H Etchegoyen Deposition Exhibit 8 (BRAZOS-GOOALL-0002132) 

I Etchegoyen Deposition Exhibit 9 (BRAZOS-GOOALL-0007904) 

J Excerpt from Deposition Transcript of Stuart Shanus, dated April 12, 2022

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 6 of 19
1 

Defendants move under FRCP 12(b)(1) to dismiss WSOU’s claim for past damages. 

WSOU lacks standing to bring this lawsuit for pre-assignment damages.

I. INTRODUCTION

By way of background, WSOU is an NPE founded by Craig Etchegoyen. Its primary

business is threatening and filing lawsuits based on patents that it purportedly acquired from Nokia 

and related entities such as Alcatel Lucent. *- However, WSOU never actually acquired the rights 

to sue for past infringement of the ’800 patent. This is not the first time Mr. Etchegoyen failed to 

acquire sufficient rights to patents before asserting them. In just the last two years, Uniloc0 F

1

—

another NPE founded by Mr. Etchegoyen—has had lawsuits against Apple and Google dismissed 

because it did not have exclusionary rights in the asserted patents. In light of this and other 

evidence casting doubt on WSOU’s rights in the asserted patent, Defendants repeatedly pressed 

WSOU for information related to its ability to institute and maintain this lawsuit. However, 

WSOU never produced any evidence substantiating its claims of standing. With fact discovery 

now closed and all fact depositions completed, it is clear that

This defect is jurisdictional and cannot retroactively be cured because “[s]tanding must be 

present at the time the suit is brought.” Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 975–

76 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998) (“[N]unc pro tunc assignments are not sufficient to confer retroactive standing.”); 

1

 

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 7 of 19
2 

Neutron Depot, LLC v. All Web Leads, Inc., No. AU-16-CA-00901-SS, 2017 WL 9538893, at *2, 

n.3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017) (rejecting argument that after suit was filed Plaintiff gained the 

retroactive right to sue for past infringement). As a result, the Court should dismiss WSOU’s 

claim 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Assignment History of the ’800 Patent

On December 16, 2001, the ’800 patent’s named inventors each assigned to Alcatel-Lucent 

USA and Alcatel-Lucent India LTD their respective “entire and exclusive right, title and interest 

in” the patent application that ultimately issued as the ’800 patent. Ex. A (USPTO Reel 029191 

Frame 0375), at 3; Ex. B (USPTO Reel 029191 Frame 0306), at 3. The assignments were recorded 

with the USPTO on October 25, 2012. Ex. A, at 1; Ex. B, at 1. Alcatel-Lucent USA and AlcatelLucent India LTD then assigned the ’800 patent to Alcatel Lucent. Ex. C (USPTO Reel 031658

Frame 0564); Ex. D (USPTO Reel 031658 Frame 0272). On January 18, 2018, WSOU recorded, 

at the Patent Office, an assignment of assignor’s interest from Alcatel Lucent to WSOU purporting 

to relate to the ’800 patent. Ex. E (USPTO Reel 045085 Frame 0001). The title of the assignment 

document is “SCHEDULE G1: ASSIGNMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS BY ALCATEL LUCENT.” 

Id. at 9. 

B.

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 8 of 19
3 

 

 

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 9 of 19
4 

 

 

 Id. 

 See infra 

Section IV. 

III. WSOU BEARS THE BURDEN TO PROVE STANDING

“Standing to sue is a threshold requirement in every federal action.” Sicom Sys., Ltd. v.

Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As the plaintiff, WSOU bears “the burden 

to show necessary ownership rights to support standing to sue.” Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. 

Epocal, Inc., 666 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To meet its burden, WSOU “must demonstrate

that it held enforceable title to the patent at the inception of the lawsuit” or else its infringement 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 10 of 19
5 

claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 

F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 2F

3

 These standards apply to “each claim [a plaintiff] seeks to 

press,” including for past infringement. Wacoh Co. v. Chrysler LLC, No. 08-cv-456-slc, 2009 WL 

36666, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2008).

The plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of both Article III of the U.S. Constitution 

(constitutional standing) and 35 U.S.C. § 281 (statutory standing). See, e.g., Lone Star Silicon 

Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1234–36 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Constitutional 

standing determines whether a plaintiff “may invoke the judicial power” at all, while statutory 

standing “establish[es] when a party may obtain relief under the patent laws.” Id. at 1235. To

meet the “injury in fact” requirement for constitutional standing, the plaintiff must possess 

exclusionary rights in the patent. Id. at 1234 (citing WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 

1257, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “Exclusionary rights” are “the ability to exclude others from 

practicing an invention or ‘to forgive activities that would normally be prohibited under the patent 

statutes.’” Id. (quoting Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). A 

plaintiff lacking exclusionary rights cannot have constitutional standing because no injury in fact 

can occur. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1340–41. 

Further, “the general rule is that one seeking to recover money damages for infringement 

3

 Where, as here, the standing challenge is “factual” rather than “facial,” the Court “does not 

assume the correctness of the factual allegations in the complaint. Rather, in the case of a 

factual challenge to jurisdiction, the question is whether the facts actually establish that the 

court has jurisdiction over the matter. In that setting, the burden is on the plaintiff to show

jurisdiction, and parties may offer factual evidence bearing on that question.” Script Sec. 

Sol., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6433776, at *2 (E.D. Tex.

Oct. 31, 2016) (citing 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, at 154–80 

(3d ed. 2004)). In a factual 12(b)(1) challenge, it is appropriate to consider documentary 

evidence produced in the litigation, such as the agreements referenced herein. Script Sec., 

2016 WL 6433776, at *2.

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 11 of 19
6 

of a United States patent (an action ‘at law’) must have held the legal title to the patent during the 

time of the infringement.” Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

The mere reference in an assignment to all right, title, and interest in the patent does not transfer 

the right to sue for past infringement. Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. 515, 522 (1868). “A party may 

sue for past infringement transpiring before it acquired legal title to a patent if a written assignment 

expressly grants the party a right to do so.” Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis added). Standing 

to sue for past infringement cannot be cured. See Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 

1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that a nunc pro tunc assignment cannot cure a standing 

defect existing at the time the suit was filed).

The right to sue for damages predating patent assignment is an exclusionary right because 

it provides the plaintiff with the right to exclude others from practicing the invention during that 

period (which is the legally protected interest that is harmed by an alleged infringement). Lone 

Star, 925 F.3d at 1234; WiAV Sol., 631 F.3d at 1264–65. Whether the plaintiff holds the right to 

sue for alleged infringement during that pre-assignment period is therefore a constitutional 

standing issue. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1234–35. A challenge to a plaintiff’s constitutional 

standing is properly raised under FRCP 12(b)(1). Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 508 F. Supp. 

3d 556, 564 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) (dismissing case for lack of standing). 3 F

4

 The plaintiff’s lack of constitutional

standing can be raised at any time by a defendant, or sua sponte by the Court. Nat’l Org. for 

Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994); Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 805 

F.3d 1049, 1060 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

4

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 12 of 19
7 

IV. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES

WSOU never obtained the right to sue for past damages relating to the ’800 patent.

 

A.

WSOU claims it “is the owner of all rights, title, and interest in and to the ’800 patent, 

including the right to assert all causes of action arising under the ’800 Patent and the right to any 

remedies for the infringement of the ’800 Patent.” Dkt. 35 ¶ 10 (emphasis added). But WSOU 

lacks standing to sue for past infringement of the ’800 patent 

 See Ex. E, at 9. 

 Moore, 74 

U.S. at 522; Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1579 & n.7; see also Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 

F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“As the Supreme Court stated, it is a ‘great mistake’ to ‘suppose’

that the assignment of the patent carries with it the right to sue for past infringement.”); S.O.T.A.T., 

Inc. v. Frank’s Int’l, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 523, 2008 WL 4093599, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008) 

(“It is settled law that a transfer of a right of action for past infringement must be express, and 

cannot be inferred from an assignment of the patent itself.”) (internal citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss WSOU’s 

claims for infringement before this date.

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 13 of 19
8 

B.

1.

To the extent WSOU argues that 

 

When a contract’s language is prospective and states that rights “shall be the property of 

the client” and/or that “all rights thereto will be assigned,” the contract is not a present assignment

but an agreement or promise to assign in the future. Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 

211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphases added) (citing Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1574, 1576–

81). Such a contract does not operate as an immediate assignment of legal title. Bd. of Trustees 

of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 841–42 (Fed. Cir. 

2009), aff’d, 563 U.S. 776 (2011). “To determine whether a contractual provision is a present

assignment of future rights or a promise to assign rights in the future, the language of the contract 

is dispositive.” Gellman v. Telular Corp., 2010 WL 5173213, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010); 

see also DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(“[W]e have held that whether an assignment of patent rights in an agreement such as the one in 

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 14 of 19
9 

this case is automatic, requiring no further act on the part of the assignee, or merely a promise to 

assign depends on the contractual language.”).

 

 

 Stanford, 583 F.3d at 841–42; see Gellman v. Telular Corp., 2010 WL 5173213, at *3 

(E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 941 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Because Plaintiff has not 

produced a written assignment of the patent in suit and her alternative theories create an obligation 

to assign the patent rather than an actual assignment, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate complete 

legal title to the patent-in-suit.”).5 F

6 In contrast, Schedule G1 contains the necessary present 

assignment language to make the transfer of rights in the ’800 patent and other patents immediately 

effective: “Assignor hereby assigns, transfers, and conveys unto Assignee.” Ex. E, at 9 (emphasis 

 

6

 State law generally governs who owns patent rights and on what terms. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 

841. However, whether contractual language effects a present assignment of patent rights, or an 

agreement to assign rights in the future, is a question of Federal Circuit law. Id. 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 15 of 19
10 

added). 

, WSOU would be wrong. Isolating words “flies in the 

face of the basic principle of New York contract interpretation that the Court must read the 

[contract] as a whole, and not myopically scrutinize individual words and provisions in isolation.” 

Green Tech. Lighting Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 1:18-CV-01799 (PAC), 2020 WL 

2036705, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020). 

 

2.

 

 

 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 16 of 19
11 

 Id. 

3. The USPTO Assignment Records Confirm 

Finally, only 

 Ex. E (USPTO Reel 045085 Frame 0001). It would make no sense to 

have a specific assignment execution document be filed with the USPTO if a different, privately

held document were to override it and impose different terms on the transfer. To do so would 

impair the public notice function of the USPTO assignment registration database, cause confusion 

over ownership of rights, and be prejudicial to any subsequent defendant who might be subjected 

to a claim for past damages from either or both transacting parties. See MPEP, § 301, Part V(A) 

(June 2020). 

In contract law, a more specific provision controls over a more general one. See, e.g., 

Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 294 (N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he specific provisions [of a contract]

tend to restrict the general.”); Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 42, 46–47 (N.Y. 1956) 

(“Even if there was an inconsistency between a specific provision and a general provision of a 

contract . . . the specific provision controls.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) 

(Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“[S]pecific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general 

language.”). Thus, 

* * *

V. CONCLUSION

WSOU never received the right to assert claims for infringement of the ’800 patent

WSOU has no legal right to seek relief from this Court 

to bring any claim involving the time period prior to such date. 

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 17 of 19
12 

Dated: June 8, 2022 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@winston.com

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: 214-453-6407 

Facsimile: 214-453-6400 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com 

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211 

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 18 of 19
13 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on June 8, 2022, all counsel of record who are deemed to 

have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document through the 

Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a). 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Case 6:20-cv-00481-ADA-DTG Document 195 Filed 06/14/22 Page 19 of 19