NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DAVIERRE JAY YOUNG, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0632

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-009158-003

The Honorable Robert E. Miles, Retired Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Davierre Young appeals his convictions and sentences for one 

count each of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping. After 

searching the entire record, Young’s defense counsel has identified no 

arguable question of law that is not frivolous. Therefore, in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 

(1969), defense counsel asks this Court to search the record for fundamental 

error. Young was afforded the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in 

propria persona, which he elected to do. After reviewing the record, we find 

no error. Accordingly, Young’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Young and two associates were indicted on one count each of 

armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping,

2 based on an event 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s 

verdict, with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant. State 

v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404 n.2, ¶ 2 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. Valencia, 186 

Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996)).

2 As relevant here, a person commits armed robbery if “in the course 

of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence 

and against his will,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 13-1902 (2012), “[a] person 

or an accomplice: . . . [i]s armed with a deadly weapon or a simulated 

deadly weapon; or . . . [u]ses or threatens to use a deadly weapon,” A.R.S. 

§ 13-1904(A) (2012). A person commits aggravated assault when using a 

deadly weapon to “[i]ntentionally plac[e] another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury.” A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) (2012), 

-1204(A)(2) (2012). And, a person commits kidnapping by “knowingly 

restraining another person with the intent to . . . aid in the commission of a 

felony.” A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3) (2012).
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

3

that occurred on January 7, 2012.3 All of the offenses were alleged to be 

dangerous offenses involving the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. See 

A.R.S. § 13-105(13).4

¶3 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: Early in 

the morning of November 7, 2012, R.P. was walking home from a hookah 

lounge near 19th Avenue and Osborn in Phoenix, Arizona when a dark 

SUV with a white sticker on the back windshield pulled over nearby. Three 

men exited the vehicle. One pointed a black revolver at R.P. while another

tried to punch him in the face. Ultimately, two men held R.P.’s arms and 

rifled through his pockets while the third kept the gun pointed between his 

eyes. During this time, R.P. was “in fear for [his] life.” The men took R.P.’s 

wallet and cell phone from his pockets, got back into the SUV, and drove 

northbound on 19th Avenue. Shaken, R.P. returned to the hookah lounge 

and called the police. R.P. described the three men, their vehicle, and their 

direction of travel. Another witness provided a license plate number. 

¶4 Officers located the SUV at a nearby Wal-Mart. After a short 

vehicle pursuit, the suspects crashed the SUV into a block wall at an 

apartment complex, and a police air unit flew over the scene as three 

subjects “took off running” from the vehicle. Young and his associates were 

apprehended shortly thereafter. After he was taken into custody, the man 

later identified as Young, asked: “So am I going to get booked? Or what’s 

going to happen?”

¶5 R.P. identified each of the individuals as involved in the 

robbery in separate one-on-one identifications. He described Young’s role 

in the events as holding his left arm and rifling through his left side pockets, 

which were empty. R.P. also identified the SUV crashed into the block wall 

as the vehicle the men were traveling in. 

¶6 Surveillance video from the Wal-Mart and a nearby 

convenience store showed the three men together both before and after the 

robbery. Young is seen wearing a black leather jacket and a brown rosary 

around his neck. 

 

3 Young’s associates were tried separately on these charges, as well as 

additional counts of attempted armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated 

assault, and burglary.

4 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
STATE v. YOUNG

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¶7 A black revolver was recovered from the ground near 

Young’s associates’ feet when they were arrested. The firing pin had been 

removed but was discovered nearby. Together, they were assembled into 

a functioning firearm. R.P.’s wallet, driver’s license, social security card, 

debit card, and cell phone were recovered from the SUV. The police also 

recovered a torn piece of leather jacket from the ground in the direction 

Young fled, and a brown rosary was among the personal possessions 

removed from Young at the time he was booked. 

¶8 At the close of State’s evidence, Young’s counsel moved for 

judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20,

arguing insufficient evidence to support findings that: (1) the firearm was 

functioning at the time of the events, (2) R.P. was in imminent fear of 

physical injury or death, or (3) Young had any criminal intent. The motion 

was denied. 

¶9 Young testified in his defense. He admitted he was riding in 

a dark SUV with his associates on November 7, 2012 and stopped at the 

convenience store to buy cigarettes. When the convenience store would not 

sell to them because they were underage, an associate spotted R.P. walking 

on the sidewalk and suggested they ask him to buy the cigarettes. Young 

maintained that he did not plan to rob R.P., did not know his associate had 

a firearm, and did not touch R.P. or otherwise participate in the robbery. 

Young stated he was “shocked” by the events and only got back into the car 

because he needed a ride to his grandmother’s house.

¶10 During cross-examination, the State asked Young: “Now, 

never once when you were with police did you say something like, ‘Hey, I 

wasn’t involved with this,’ did you?” The trial court sustained Young’s 

counsel’s objection that the question impermissibly commented on his prior

invocation of the right to remain silent, but denied the motion for mistrial 

on this basis. 

¶11 The jury found Young guilty as charged and determined the 

offenses were dangerous offenses as defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(13). Young 

was sentenced to slightly mitigated prison terms of nine years for the armed 

robbery and kidnapping, and six and a half years for the aggravated assault, 

with the terms to run concurrently. Young timely appealed, and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Within his supplemental brief, Young argues: (1) the one-onone identification by R.P. “was coercive and highly suggestive,” and should 
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

5

have been excluded from trial, and (2) the trial court erred in denying his 

counsel’s motion for a mistrial. Because Young did not raise these

arguments below, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 

210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). We find none.

¶13 First, although “[a]n inherently suggestive one-person showup identification procedure implicates due process,” it is nonetheless 

admissible if it is sufficiently reliable. State v. Rojo-Valenzuela, 716 Ariz. 

Adv. Rep. 7, ¶¶ 1, 7 (2015). We need not consider this issue, however, 

because during the course of his testimony at trial, Young admitted he was 

present when R.P.’s property was taken at gunpoint on November 7, 2012, 

admitted he went to the convenience store and Wal-Mart with his 

associates, and admitted he fled from the crashed SUV when pursued by 

law enforcement. Even if there were not sufficient indicia of reliability and 

other substantial evidence corroborating the on-scene identification, its 

admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Young’s 

admissions under oath that he was present during the crimes. See State v. 

White, 16 Ariz. App. 514, 516 (1972) (concluding that any error in giving the 

jury instruction regarding flight in a prosecution for escape was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant testified and admitted to the 

escape) (citing State v. Hixson, 16 Ariz. App. 251, 254 (1972)).

¶14 Second, while comment upon a defendant’s silence may be 

error, State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 529, 533 (1978), even constitutional error is not 

reversible if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 

386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Here, the State asked a single question. The defense 

objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the 

testimony. The State did not further pursue the line of questioning, nor was 

there any argument made to the jury attempting to draw any inference from 

the testimony. See State v. Peterson, 107 Ariz. 268, 270-71 (1971) (affirming 

denial of a motion for mistrial after concluding any error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt under similar circumstances); see also State v. 

Anderson, 110 Ariz. 238, 240-41 (1973) (noting a single question and answer 

regarding a defendant’s failure to tell his story to the police, standing alone 

without objection or further discussion, might not rise to the level of

reversible error). Under these circumstances, we are convinced that what 

occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not warrant a 

mistrial.

¶15 Having reviewed the entire record for reversible error, we 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300 (“An exhaustive search of the record 

has failed to produce any prejudicial error.”). Reasonable evidence was 

presented to support the jury’s verdict that Young was a “hands-on”
STATE v. YOUNG

Decision of the Court

6

participant in the armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping of 

R.P. Young not only accompanied his associates, but held R.P.’s arms and 

actively searched his pockets while an associate held a revolver to R.P.’s 

forehead.

¶16 All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. So far as the record reveals, Young 

was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was present 

at all critical stages. The jury was properly comprised of twelve jurors, and 

the record shows no evidence of jury misconduct. See A.R.S. § 21-102(B); 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a). At sentencing, Young was given an opportunity 

to speak, and the trial court stated on the record the evidence and materials 

it considered and the factors it found in imposing sentence. Additionally, 

the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits. See A.R.S. § 13-

704(A).

CONCLUSION

¶17 Young’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. After the 

filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Young’s 

representation in this appeal have ended. Defense counsel need do no more 

than inform Young of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, 

unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to 

our supreme court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 

584-85 (1984).

¶18 Young has thirty days from the date of this decision to 

proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. See Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). Upon the Court’s own motion, we grant Young thirty 

days from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for 

reconsideration.