UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____ _______________________________ ) LEWIS BOOKER , ) ) Plaintiff , ) )
v. ) Civil Action No. 19

- 2639 ( RBW ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) GOVERNMENT , ) ) Defendant

. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff , Lewis Booker , bring s this civil action against th e defendant, the District of Columbia Government ( “ the District ” ) , asserting a claim of retaliati on in vi olation of Title VII of
the C i vil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000e

- 3(a) ( “ Title VII ” )

. 1 S ee Complaint ( “ Compl. ” ) ¶

¶ 40

– 47 , ECF No. 1. C u r r e n t l y p e n d i n g b e f o r e t h e C o u r t is the Defendant District of
C o lumbi a ’ s Motion for Summary Judgment ( “ D ef. ’ s Mo t. ” or the “ District ’ s motion ” ), ECF No.
29

. Upon ca reful consideration of the parties’ s ubmiss ions, 2 the Court conclude s for the

1 The plaintiff also origin ally alleged discrimin ation based upon hi s race an d ge n der in violat ion of T itle VII, see Co mpl. ¶ ¶ 3

– 4, 32

– 39, a s well a s violatio ns of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U. S.C. § 1983, see id. ¶¶ 3

– 4

. H o wever, on November 30, 2020, the Court d ismissed the se claims , se e Order at 10 (Nov . 30, 2020), ECF No. 15, and dis missed in part Count I I of the Complai nt

— which alleges re t a liation

— “ t o the extent [that Coun t II] alleges tha t the actions enumerated in para graph [forty

- five] of the Complaint cons titute actionable cla ims of retaliation ind ependent of the plaintiff’s alle ged terminatio n [,] ” id

. at 11. Accord ingl y , the only remaining c la ims in this cas e are those alleging retal i at ion based upon the plaintiff ’ s term ination.

2 In addi tion to the fili ng s already identifie d , t he Court c onsidere d t he fo llowing subm iss ions in r e ndering its d ecision: (1) Defenda nt District of C olumbia ’ s Sta tement of Mater ial Facts as to Which There Is N o Genuine Di spute ( “ Def. ’ s Facts ” ), ECF No. 29; (2 ) the Memorandu m of P oint s and Authorities in Su pport of Defendant District of C o lumbia ’ s Moti on for Summary Ju dgment ( “ Def. ’ s Mem. ” ) , ECF No. 29 ; (3) the Plainti ff ’ s Opposition to Defendan t ’ s Mo tion for Summary Judgmen t ( “ Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n ” ), ECF No. 31; (4) the Plaintiff ’ s Stateme nt of Gen uine Issues of Mat erial Facts in Opposition to Def endant ’ s Motio n for Summary Jud gment ( “ Pl. ’ s Facts ” ), ECF No. 31

- 1; ( 5) Defend ant District of C o lumbia ’ s Reply i n Support of Its Motion f or Summary Judgment ( “ Def. ’ s Reply ” ), ECF No. 33; and (6) De f endant Dist rict of Columbia ’ s Response to Plai ntif f ’ s Statement of Gen uine Issues of Mat erial Fa cts ( “ Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ” ), ECF No. 33

- 1

.2 foll owing reasons that it must grant the District ’ s motion for summary judgment

. I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 3

T h e plainti ff “ wa s hired as a Transp ortation Plan ner by the District of Columbia Department of Transport ation ( [ ‘ ]D DOT[ ’ ]) [,] ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 1 , “ on December 10, 2000 [,] ” Pl. ’ s
Facts ¶ 1; see Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 1

. 4 “ In November 2 01 5 , [the p]laintiff was d e tailed
from [the] DDOT ’ s Policy , Planning and Sustainability Administration, later renamed the Planning and Sustainability Division ([ ‘ ]PSD[ ’ ]), to [the] DDOT ’ s Infrastructure Project Management Administration , later renamed the Infrastruct ure Pr oject Man a gement Division ([ ‘ ] IPMD[ ’ ]). ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 2. During his time with the IP MD from 2015 to 2018, the plaintiff

3 This Court ’ s Local Civil Rule 7(h ) (1) provides that “ [ e]ach motion for summary judgment shall be a ccompan ied by a st atement of material facts as to which the movi ng party conten ds ther e is no genuine i s sue ” and “ [a] n opposition to such a motion shall b e acc ompani ed by a separate concise s tatement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts a s to which i t is conte nded there ex ists a genuine issu e necessary to be litigated [.] ” L CvR 7(h)(1). Furthe rmore, th is Co urt requi res that “ [t]he p arty respo nding to a s t atement of material facts must (1) restate the movant ’ s statem ent of undisputed mate rial f act in numbered pa r agraphs, and (2) immediatel y fo llowing each
n umbered paragraph stat e the oppo nent ’ s r esponse to th e stated fact

. ” General Order for C ivil Cases B efore the Honorable Reggie B. Walton ¶ 12 (b) , ECF No. 7 (emphasis add ed). Furthermor e , u nder F ede ral Rule of Civ il Procedure 56 ( e) , where “ a par ty . . . fails to proper ly addr ess a noth er part y ’ s assertion of fac t as requir ed by Rule 56(c) , the [C]ourt may .

. . consider the fact undis puted for purposes of the motion [f or summary judgment. ] ” Fed. R . C iv. P. 56 (e) (2) ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ( det ailing procedu res governing par ties ’ asse rtions of undi sputed facts in the contex t of a moti on for summary judgment ).

H ere, altho ugh the p la intiff provided a statement of gen u ine issues of materia l facts a l ong with his oppo sition to the defenda nt ’ s mo tion , see generally Pl. ’ s Facts, the plaintif f has n ot directl y responded to any of the facts pres ent ed i n the defendant ’ s statement of facts , compare id. , with Def. ’ s Facts

. Therefore, because the plaintiff fa iled to comp ly
w ith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules , a s well as th e Court ’ s G enera l O rder, “ where [ the defendant ’ s] factual assertions are properly supported by the record, as confirm ed by the Court ’ s own inde pendent review, the Court shall treat such fact s as admitted [,] ” Ladd v. Chemonics Int ’ l , Inc. , 603 F. Supp. 2d 9 9, 105 (D.D.C. 2009), pu r suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (e) (2). According ly, the Court will draw the operative facts of this cas e from those art i c ulated by the defendant, se e generally Def. ’ s F acts, as well as f act s articulated by the plai nt if f that the de fen dant does not disput e in its resp onse to the pla intiff ’ s facts, see generally Pl. ’ s Facts; Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts.

4 The Court notes that , in the plaintiff ’ s Complaint, he is referred to both with male and female pronouns. See , e.g. , Compl. ¶ ¶ 3

– 4. However, based on the plaintiff ’ s name, as well as th e representations regarding h is gender made in the plaintiff ’ s opposition, the Court will assume that the plaintiff identifies as a ma le. See , e.g. , Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 3 (referring to the pla intiff as “ Mr. Booker ” ).3 supported the Right of Way ( [ ‘ ]ROW[ ’ ]) Program , which assisted with [the] DDOT ’ s a cquisition of [ ] property

. . . for use as part of t he pub lic right of way
an d [ ] also

. . . review [ ed ] and r e vis [ ed ] the ROW Manual, which outlines policies and procedures for completing ROW ac quisitions and transf ers[ .]
Id. ¶ 3. “ In 2018, [the p]laintiff . . . a sk[ed] that his de t ail with IPMD end and th a t he be moved
to a different division within [the] D DOT

. ” I d. ¶ 4

.

“ On November 11, 2018, [the p]laintiff submitted a n intake form with the M e tropolitan Police Depar tment ’ s [ ( ‘ MPD ’ ) Equal Employment Opportunity ( ‘ ]EEO[ ’ )] Inv e stigations

D ivision[,] ” 5 id. ¶ 3 6, initially naming DDOT supervisory employees “ Ronald Williams [ ], Margaret Crane [ ], Ravind r a Ga nvir [ ], and Sam Zimbabwe ” as individuals who had
discriminated and r etaliated again st him , Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 13; see Def. ’ s Resp. t o Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 13.

“ O n December 6, 2018, [ the p]lainti ff met with Rena e Le e , a n M PD inv estigator, and submitted

a revised intake form in which he . . . [inc luded] only [ ] Crane, a DDOT attorney, and
Zimbabwe [,] ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 37, “ DDOT ’ s Chief Project Delivery Officer, ” id. ¶ 6, “ as named

respo n dents [,] ” id. ¶ 37. Through t hi s EEO intake form, the plaintiff “ indicat ed that he was

m aking a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, and personal appearance [,] ” that he

“ had been discriminated against [,] ” and that he had f aced “ retaliat [ ion ] ” from the named

resp ondents. Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 12; s ee Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 12. Specifically, “ [i]n the [s] tatement accompanying his EEO comp laint, [ the plaintiff] explained that he had previously filed a civil rights complaint a gainst Zimbabwe, an d t hat Zimbabwe s hould n ot be i nvo lved in

per sonn e l d ecisions involving [the plaintiff]. ” Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 17; see Def. ’ s Res p. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 17. “ O n December 21, 2018, [Luisa] Nguyen, in her role as DDOT EEO Program Manager,

5 Th e MPD ’ s “ EEO O ffice conducts inves tigati ons of EEO complaints and provides resolu ti o ns ” and “ assist s sworn a nd civilian MPD em plo y ees . . . and other D [

. ] C [

. ] Gov ernment agency employees. ” Metropolitan Police Department, E qu al Employment Oppo rtunity (EEO) Office, https://mpdc.dc.gov/p ag e/equal

- employmen t

opportunity

- eeo - office (last visi ted Mar. 9, 2023).4 emailed G anvir and Will iams to i nform them t hat an EEO comp laint has been fil e d im plicating
them both [,] ” Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 21; see Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 21, and subsequently, “ [o] n or
abou t January 17, 2019, Nguyen emailed Cra ne to alert [her] that [the plain t iff] had filed an EEO complaint aga inst [her ,] ” Pl

. ’ s Facts ¶ 23 ; se e Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 23. Also , o n January 17, 2019, the M PD inv estigat or assigned to investigate the plaintiff ’s EEO complaint “issued [the p ]laintiff an exit letter and a not i f ication of his ri ght to file a for m al complaint wi th [the Distri ct of C olumbia Office of Huma n Rights ( ‘ DC ] OHR[ ’)]. ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 38. On December 10, 2018, during the time peri od in which the plaintiff was pro gressing
th rough the MPD ’ s EEO com plain t process , “ Zimbab w e . . . issued a memorandum reass ig ning [the p ]lainti f f from IP MD to PSD [,] ” cons istent with the plaintiff ’ s request that he be transf erred
to a different DDOT division. Id. ¶ 6. In this new detail, the plaintiff “ report[ed] to Anna
Ch a mberlin as his su pervisor. ” Id. B e tween January 1 7

– 19, 2019, G anvir, W i lliams, Crane, and
Chamberlin were all inv olved

— although, to var ying exte nts

— in an email exchange in which t he pla intiff was discussed. See Pl. ’ s Facts ¶¶ 24

– 26; Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶¶ 24

– 26. On
Ja nu ary 22, 2019, Chamber lin “ not iced an a pparent discrepa ncy in [t he p]laintiff ’ s reported time entry for a date when the District government had been closed due to inclement weather [,] ”
Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 9, and “ emailed Anthony Wooten , [the] DDOT ’ s snow supervisor , t o ask if [the p]lai ntiff had worked s n o w duty during the government closure[,] ” id. ¶ 10. “ After learning that
Chamberlin had contacted Wooten, [the p ]laintiff sent Chamberlin an email stating ‘ [y ]ou know the saying, “ If y o u look for trouble [,] you ’ ll f in d it [,] ” ’ ” id. ¶ 11 (second a lterati o n in original) , a

s tatement which Chamberlin “ perceived . . . to be threat ening[,] ” id. ¶ 12

. The plaintiff

“ included Chamberl [] in ’ s supervisor, Jim Sebastian, as a ‘ carbon copy ’ recipi e nt in the emai l. ”
Pl. ’ s Fact s ¶ 27; see Def. ’ s Res p. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶ 2 7.5 On February 8, 2019, the plaintiff and Williams, “ a Supervisory Civil Engineer in

IPMD [,] ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 5, and the plaintiff ’ s former supervisor, see id

. , “ e x changed emails

rega r ding [ the p]laintiff ’ s transf er of files out from t he ROW P r ogram fold e r on the IP MD share
drive on [the] DDOT ’ s server[,] ” id. ¶ 13. Ultimately, after the p laintiff “ did not commit to transferring all the files back to the IPMD share drive folder [and] i nstea d suggested having a

me eting wit h Williams’ [s] two supervisor s and a me d i ator , ” id. ¶ 15, on February 12 , 2 019, the plaintiff responded to Williams, stating: “ I have deleted all of my files fr om the ROW Program folder as I will not allow anyone to r e ceive credit for the hard wo rk John [ ] Duel, [ t he p ] laintiff’s forme r co - worke r in the ROW unit [] and I performed for
over [ three

- and

- a - half ] years. If you want to assume the role of the ROW Program coordinator for IPMD [

- ] re lated project [ s ,] then yo u can s tart your own re pository of files [,] ”
id. ¶ 16

. “ [The p]laintiff deleted files from the ROW Program folder on the IPMD share drive, including his proposed revisions to the Right of Way manual that he fe lt the agency should ha ve adopted

. ” Id. ¶ 17.
A pp r ox imately a mont h and a ha lf later , “ [ o]n March 28, 2019, [the] DDOT is sued an
Advanced Written Notice of [the p] laintiff’s proposed removal

. ” Id. ¶ 19. Chamberlin ’ s supervisor, Sebastian, “ was the propo sing offi cial and signatory of the . . . Advanced W ritten
Notice of Re moval. ” I d

. ¶ 2 0. The notice cited three base s f or the plaintiff ’ s proposed removal : (1) “Conduct prejudicial to the District of Columbia Government: Concealing, removin g, mutilating, altering [,] or destroying government r ecord s requ i red to be kept by stat ute, regul a t ion , Mayor’s Order, document hold or subpoena, or other similar requirement”; (2) “Failure/Refusal to Follow Instructions: Deliberate or malicious refusal to comply with rules, regula tions, written procedures, or pr oper s u pervisory instructions ”; and (3) “ Con duct prejudicial to the District of Columbia Government: Assaulting, fighting, threatening, attempting to inflict or inflicting bodily harm while on Distr ict property, or while on duty. ”6 Id. ¶ 21. “ T he specification f or Cause O ne detaile d [the p] laintiff ’s email correspondence with
Williams in which he said that he had deleted ‘ all of my files from the ROW Program folder [,] ’ ”
id. ¶ 22 ; “ [t] h e specification for Cause Two detailed [the p] laintiff’s ema il correspondence w ith
Willia ms in whic h he r efused to r estore all files to the IPMD share drive, culminating in his
deletion of files [,] ” id. ¶ 23; and “ [t] he specification for Cause Three detail ed [the p] laintiff’s
Janua ry 22, 2019 email to Chamberlin [,] ” id. ¶ 24. After considerin g the pro p o s ed r emov al and

supp orting documentation, “ Karen Calmeise, [the ] DDOT’s assigned hearing officer , . . . issued
a report an d recommendation on May 17, 2019, recommending that the agen cy remove [the p] laintiff based on Cause s One and Tw o
. ” Id. ¶ 26. F inally, “ [ o ] n June 6, 2019, Dorinda Floyd, [the ] DDOT’s Chief Administrative Officer, issued a Notice of Final Decision for Proposed Removal removing [the p] lain tiff from his position eff ective June 14, 2019 [,] ” i d. ¶ 27 ,

“ sustain [in g the p ] laintiff’s removal for Causes O ne an d Two [,] ” id. ¶ 29, and “ sustain [ing]
Cau se Three but f [inding] that a lesser penalty (a 14

- day suspension) would have been more appropri ate ‘ had [Cause Three] o ccurred in isolation [,] ’ ” id. ¶ 30.
B. P ro cedural B ackg round
O n September 3, 2019 , the p l ai ntiff file d h is C omplaint in this case

. See Compl. at 1. On December 13, 2019, the District filed a partial motio n to dismiss, see Defenda nt District of
Columbia ’ s P artial Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, ECF No. 8, w h ic h the Court granted
on Novemb er 30, 202 0 , see Order at 10 (Nov. 30, 2020); supra note 1. Thereafter, the District
filed i ts Answer to the Complaint on December 14, 2020 , see Answer at 1, ECF No. 16, and the
Court hel d an initial scheduling conference r e ga rding the di scovery process on January 26 , 2021 ,

se e Order at 1 (Jan. 28, 2021), ECF No. 19

. A fter the parties concluded discovery on January 1 3, 2022, see Min ute ( “ Min

. ” ) Order ( D ec. 1 , 2021 ) , ECF No. 26

- 1 , the District filed its motion for7 summary ju d gment on March 25, 2022 , s ee Def. ’ s Mot. a t 1. T he plaintiff file d h is opposition on May 11, 2022 , see Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 1 , and the District filed its reply on June 2, 2022 , see Def

. ’ s Reply at 1

. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A cour t may grant a m otion for summary ju d gment pursuan t to Fede ral Rule of Civil

Pr ocedure 56 only if “ t he r e is n o genuine d ispute as to any mate ria l fact and the movant is
entitl e d to judgment as a matter o f law. ” Fed

. R . Ci v. P. 56(a). “A f act i s mate rial if it ‘ might
affect the outcome of t h e s uit un der the gover ning law, ’ and a dis pute ab out a materia l f a c t is genuine ‘ if the evidence is such th a t a reasonable jury could retu r n a verdict f or th e nonmovi ng
par ty. ’ ” St eele v. Schafer , 535 F .3d 6 89, 69 2 (D .C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. L i ber ty
Lob by, Inc. , 477 U.S . 242, 248 (1986 )). Wh en ruling on a m o t i on f or summar y judgment, “[t]he
evid enc e of the non

- movant is to be be l ie ved, and al l jus tifiable infere nces a re to b e drawn in h is
fav o r
. ” And erso n , 47 7 U.S. at 255. “Cred ibility deter m i nation s, t he weighi ng o f the evidence,
and the drawing of l e gi t i m ate inference s fr om the facts are ju ry f unctions, not those of a judge

. . . ruling on a motion fo r summ ary ju dgm ent [

. ] ” Id. The movant h a s th e burden of d emonstrating
the abse nce of a ge n uin e issu e of materi al fac t and that the non - mo ving party “f a il [ e d ] to m ake a
sho wing sufficient to esta bli s h the existence of an elemen t e ssential to t hat p arty ’ s case, an d on
wh ich that party will bear t h e bu rd en of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Ca t ret t , 477 U .S. 317, 322 (1 986). In resp onding to a motion f o r s u m mary j udgment, the non - moving party “m ust do more than simply show tha t t here is some metap hysical doubt a s to th e materi al facts.” Matsu s h ita
El ec. In dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio C orp. , 475 U

. S. 574, 5 86 (1986). Accor dingly, the no n - movin g party “must se t f orth s pecific f acts showing that there [a r e] genuine issue[s] for tria l

. ” Anderson ,8 4 77 U. S. at 2 48 (interna l qu otation marks omitted ) . “ Th e mere existenc e of a scintilla o f
evi de nce in s u pp ort of th e [non

- mo vin g party ’ s] posi ti on
. . . [is] insuffi cie n t ” to withstand a
motion for s u mm ar y judgm ent ; rath er, “there must be [ s om e] e vidence on which the jury coul d

r eas onably f ind f or the [non

- m ov ant].” Id. at 252.
III. ANALYSIS
T h e Distr ict argue s that it is entitled to summary judgment becaus e : (1) “ [the p]la i n tiff cannot establish a prima f acie case of retaliation because there is no evidence that any prop osing
or dec iding off icial had knowledge of his protect ed activity , ” Def. ’ s Mem. at 1, and ( 2) “ [the

p ] laintiff cannot o vercome the Dis tric t ’ s legitimate , n o n - retaliatory reasons for his
termi nation[,] ” id. at 2. In response, the plaintiff ar gues that he “ ha s adduc ed sufficient facts

. . .
to not only [(1)] establish a prima f acie case of re tal i ation pursuant to T i tle VII, but also to [(2)] demons t r at e that any alleged ‘ legitimate ’ reason offered by [the D ist rict] for [ hi s ] unlawful
termi nation is purely pretextual. ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 3.
Wh en a plaintiff brings a re taliation cla im unde r T it le VII a nd re lies on ci r cumstan tial
evidenc e to e s ta bl i sh a n alleged un l awful employme n t ac t ion, as th e plaintiff does here , se e generally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n , t he Court anal y zes the claim u nder t he three

- part burde n - shifting
framewor k o f McDonnell Douglas C orp. v . Green

. See Jac kson v

. Gonzale s , 496 F. 3 d 703, 7 06 ( D .C. Ci r. 2007) (ci tin g McD onne ll Doug las C o r p. v. Green , 411 U .S. 792, 802

– 05 (1973) ) ;
Ca rney v. A m. Un iv. , 151 F.3d 1 090, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 19 98) ( “ L ike claim s of discrimination,
claims of reta lia tio n are gove r ned b y th e McDo nnell Dou g las burd en - shif t i ng sc hem e.” ). Under
th e McDonnell Douglas framework, th e plaintiff bears the initial bur den of establi s hing his or
h er prima facie case o f re taliation

. 411 U.S. at 8 02 ; see Wa lker v. Johnson , 798 F.3d 1085 , 1091 ( D

. C. C ir. 2015); see also Holcomb v . Powell , 4 3 3 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

. “ If the9 plaintiff establishes a prima facie case , a presumptio n then arises that the employer unl awfully [retal iated] against the employee [,] ” and “ [t] o rebut this pr esu mpt i on, the employer must articulate a legitimate, n o n - [retalia tory] reason for its action. ” L ewis v. District of Columbia , 653 F. Supp. 2d 64, 7 2 ( D.D.C. 2009) ( citing Tex. D ep ’ t of Cmty. Aff s
. v. Burd ine , 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).

I f the defendan t provid e s l e gitima te , non - re t aliatory r eas on s for the a d ve r se employment
acti o n at issue, “ the question whether [the plaintiff] actually made out a p r im a facie case is ‘ no longer relev a n t ’ and thus dis appear [s] and drops out of the picture. ” Br ady v . Off

. o f the
S e rgean t at A rm s , 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D. C. Cir. 2 008) ( inte rnal quotation marks omitted)

. T he plaint if f must then prove th a t t he d efendant ’ s proffered re ason was a pre text for retaliation , see
McDonnel l D ouglas , 411 U.S

. at 8 05 , by produc ing “ sufficient e v i den ce f or a re asonable jury t o
find that th e em ployer ’ s ass erted [ ] non - re tali ato ry re ason was not the actual r eas on and tha t th e

e mployer inte ntionally [ ] retaliated again st the employee [,] ” Walke r , 798 F .3d at 1092 ( inte r n a l quotation marks omi tte d)

. However, th is Cir cui t has ruled that a court “ can resolve t h at question
in favor of the e mployer based either upon the employee ’ s failure to rebut its explanation or upon the employee ’ s fai lure t o pr ove an elem ent o f [his or ] her [pri ma facie] case [

. ] ” B a ylor v

. Powell , 847 F. App ’ x 7, 8 (D

. C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. Solis , 571 F.3d 13 1 3, 1320 n.* (D.C . Cir. 2009)). Accordingl y, the Court will proce ed by (1) consider ing whe ther there is a genuine issue
of materi a l fact as to knowledge o f the pl ainti f f

’ s protect ed activity on the part of th e individuals
in vol ved in the termination of his employment , and (2) a ddressing the plain tiff ’ s argument that
the District ’ s asserted legitimate , non - re ta l iatory reason for termina t ing his empl oyment was merely pret e xtual

.10 A. Whether Official s Involved in the Termi n ation of the Plaintiff ’ s Empl o yment Knew of H is Protected Acti vity
The District argues that the plaintiff “ has offered no evidence tha t Chamberlin, his supervi s or; Sebastian, his second

- level su pervisor and the proposing official of his removal ;
Calmeise , the hearin g officer who rec o mmended his removal; or Floyd, the deciding official who finalized his removal, had any knowledge of h is 2 018 [ ] EEO complain t

. ” 6 Def. ’ s Mem. at 11.
In re spo nse, the plai ntiff argues tha t the “ District was aware o f hi s [ EEO ] complaint as of
Decem b er 1 3, 201 8, ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 1 6 , when “ Renae Lee with MPD emailed DDOT employee Luisa Nguyen . . . to notify her o f [the plaintiff ’ s] EEO complaint[,] ” id. at 10. The plaintiff also

r e lies on t he January 17

– 19 , 2019 emai l ex change in which Wil liams, Gan v ir, and Cham berlin
discussed the plaintiff after Williams and Ga nvir received notice that the plainti ff had named them as respondents in his EEO compla int. See id. at 17

– 18 ; see also P l

. ’ s Facts ¶¶ 24

– 26;
Def. ’ s Resp. to Pl. ’ s Facts ¶¶ 24

– 26

. The plai nt i ff contends that this email exchange represent ed

a “ retali atory ef fort against [h im] ” and that it “ o ccurred less than one month after Williams and
Ga n vir discovered [the plaintiff ’ s] EE O complaint against them. ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n a t 18.

“ [ T ] o esta blish a prima f a cie case of retaliation , a plaintiff must show: [(] 1) that [he or ]
she engaged in a statutori ly protected activity; [(] 2) that the employer took an adverse personnel action; and [(] 3 ) that a causal connection existed be tween the two.” McKenna v. Weinberger , 729 F.2d 783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984 )

. R egar ding the third element

— the only element that the

6 On or about November 18, 2015, the plai ntif f also “ filed a complaint wi th the [DC OHR ] alleging that he was discriminated a gainst on the basis of race duri ng his tenure in the Plann ing Division [of the ] D DOT [.] ” Def. ’ s Fa cts ¶ 31 . Fur t he rmore, the Di strict notes that “ [ the p]lain tiff also apparently su bmi tted a complaint with [ the DC ]OH R on January 31, 2019. ” Def. ’ s Mem. at 11 n.2. However, the plaintiff does not rely on either of th ese alleged complai nts as “ pro tected activ ity ” for purposes of his retaliation claim, see general ly Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n , and i ns tead cont ends that he “ has estab lis hed that he engaged in activity protect ed by Title VII in addu cing

. . . the evi dence of his November 2018 EEO Complaint ” with the MPD EEO Inve s tigations Divis ion , id. at 16. Therefore, the Court
w ill only conside r the p laintiff ’ s 2018 EEO complaint as th e alleged protected act ivity for purpos es of the plai ntiff ’ s r etaliation claim.11 District has challenged i n this case

— “ [ a] plaintiff c an establish [a] causal connection

. . . ‘ by showing that the employer h ad knowledge of th e employee ’ s protected activi t y, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity [,] ’ ” Moran v. U.S. Capitol Pol ice
Bd. , 887 F. Supp. 2d 2 3, 35 (D.D.C . 2012) (quoting Mitche l l , 759 F.2d at 86), i .e. , the

“ ‘ know ledge ’ and ‘ timing ’ requirements[,] ” id. “ T o f ulfill the knowledge requirement, the official responsible for ordering the employee ’ s adverse e mployment action must have kn own about the protected activity. ” Id. ; see , e
. g. , Clark C nt y. Sch . Dist. v. Breede n , 532 U.S. 268 , 273 (2001) (conclu d ing th at the plaintiff ha d not es tablished a prima facie case of retaliation where

“ there [was] no indication tha t ” the official who forma l ly proposed the plaintiff ’ s adverse employme n t action “ knew about [the plaintiff ’ s prot ected activity ] ” ).

H ere, alt h ough t he plaintiff correctly notes that the “ District was aware of his [ EEO ] complaint as of December 1 3, 201 8, ” Pl

. ’ s Opp ’ n at 1 6 ; see id

. , Exhibit ( “ Ex. ” ) E (Email from
Renae Lee to Luisa Nguyen (Dec. 13, 2018) ( “ D ec. 13, 20 18 E mail ” )) at 1

– 2 , ECF No. 3 1

- 6 ( re flecting an email from MPD investigator Renae Lee to DDOT EEO Program Manager Luisa Nguyen regarding the plai ntiff ’ s filing of an EE O c omplaint) , and that “ Williams [and] Ganv ir
received notice that [he] had filed an EEO complaint against them on De c ember 21, 2018, ” id.

at 17 ; see id. , Ex. F (Emai l Chain Between Lu isa Nguyen, and Ronald Williams and Ravindra
Ga nv ir ( Dec . 21 , 2018

– Jan. 3, 2019 ) ( “ Dec. 21, 2018

– Jan. 3, 2019 Email E x change ” ) ) at 5, ECF
No. 31

- 7 (reflec ting a n initial email from DDOT EEO Pro gr am Manager Lisa Nguyen to Ronald
Williams and Ravindra Ganvir stating that “ an EEO complaint ha[d] been filed that implicate[d] [the m] b oth ” ) , neither Williams and Ga nvir, nor th e District as a whole , are the rel eva nt
ind ividuals or entities for purp o ses of “ showing that [ the plaintiff ’ s ] employer had knowledge of [his] protected activity , ” Mit chell , 759 F. 2d at 8 6. See Holbrook v. Reno , 196 F.3d 255 , 26312 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (analy z i ng whether individual de cisionmake rs had knowledge of the plaintiff ’ s EEO complaint in order to determine whether “ the [Federal Bureau of Investigation ] ‘ had knowledge of her protect ed activity ’ ” (quoting Mitchell , 759 F.2d at 86)) ; Carter v. Pena , 14 F.
S upp. 2d 1, 9

– 10 (D.D. C. 1997) (dec li ning to impute knowl edge of the plaintiff ’ s filing of EEO charges agai nst his employer to the individual supervisors responsible for his adverse employment action, and finding the plaintiff failed to allege a prima faci e case of retaliation
whe re “ he ma[de ] no showing that any of t hose capable of making employment decisions had knowledge of the[] charges ” (emphasis added) ). Rather, Sebastian “ was the propo sing official and signatory of the . . . Advanced Written Notice o f Removal [,] ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 2 0 ; see D e f. ’ s
Mot. , Ex. 8 (Advance Written Notice of Proposed Removal) at 12 , ECF No. 29

- 8 ( sh owing the signature of Jim Seb astian) , a proposal w h ich was sub sequently review ed and approved first by
C almeise, see Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 26 ; Def. ’ s Mot. , Ex. 12 (Hearing Of fi c er ’ s Report/Decision) at 1 , ECF No. 29

- 12 ( showing C almeise ’ s signature on the report and rec ommendation regarding the plaintiff ’ s propos ed r emoval), and finally by Fl oyd, see Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 27 ; Def. ’ s Mot. , Ex. 13 ( N otice of Final Decision for Proposed R e mova l) at 9, ECF No. 29

- 13 (sho wing Floyd ’ s
si gnature on the final noti c e of removal)

. T h us, Sebastian , Cal meise, and Floyd are the rele vant

“ official [s] responsible for ordering the employee ’ s adverse employment ac t ion [,] ” M oran , 887 F. Supp. 2d at 35 ; s ee Clark C nty

. Sch . Dist

. , 532 U.S. at 273 (considering the official who proposed the plai ntiff ’ s a dverse employme nt action a deciding offic ial for purposes of the knowledge r equirement). 7

7 I t is possible that Chamberlin, the plaint iff ’ s supervisor at the time of his removal, als o cons tituted a de ciding
o fficial for purposes of t he know ledge requirement, unde r t h e “ cat ’ s paw ” theory , which provides t hat “ a formal decision maker may be an unwitting condu it of anothe r actor ’ s illici t m otives. ” Walker , 79 8 F .3 d at 109 5 . This is evi denced by the fact that sh e supervised and deal t wi th disc iplinary matters related t o the plaintiff , presumably report ing t hese matt ers to her super visor, Sebastian

— the official who ultimat ely propose d the pl aintiff ’ s rem oval. See generally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n , E x. I (Email Exchange Betwe en Anna Chamberlin and Le wis Boo ker (Jan. 22

– 23, 2019) (conti nu ed . . .)13 The pl ai ntiff has provided no e vi dence or suggestion that C alm eis e or Floyd knew of
his 2018 EEO complaint. See generally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n; Pl. ’ s Facts. T he plaintiff does not explici t ly

cont end that Se bastian knew of the EEO complaint, but does highlight the fact that he was

“ include d

. . . as a ‘ carbon copy ’ recip ient [,] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 12 , o f at least a portion of the email exchange between the plaintiff and Chamberlin concerning th e plaintiff ’ s time

- sheet i ssue
. See
id. , Ex. I (Email Exchange Between Anna Chamberlin and Lewis Book er (Jan . 22

– 23, 2019) ( “ Jan. 2 2

– 23 , 201 9 Email Exchange ” ) ) at 1

– 3 , E C F No. 31

- 10

. However, nothing in the content of this email exchange references the p laintiff ’ s 2018 EEO com plaint o r any oth er protected activity, but instead it consists entirely of a d iscussion rega rding one of the dis cipli nary mat ters
which formed part of the basis for the plaintiff ’ s removal. See generally id. , Ex. I (J an. 22

– 23,
2019 E mail Ex change) ( reflecting the email sent by the plaintiff to Chamberlin that Chamber lin regarded a s threate ning )

. Thus, Seba stia n ’ s incl u sion in that email exchange does not hing to
show that he had any knowledg e of the plain tiff ’ s protecte d ac tivity prior to hi s issuance of the
notic e of proposed removal. Furthermore, Sebastian maintains that he had no kn owledge that the

(. . . continued) ( “ J an. 22

– 23 Email Exchang e ” ) ) , ECF No. 31

- 10 ; Def. ’ s Mot. , Ex. 4 (Decl aration of Jim Sebastian ( “ Se bastian Decl. ” ) ) ¶¶ 10

– 16, 19

– 2 0 , ECF No. 29

- 4

. However, even if Chamberlin were considered a deci ding official for purposes of th e knowledge requireme nt, the plainti ff still has not pu t forth ev idence to show that she ha d any know ledge of the plaintiff ’ s 2018 EEO complaint. I ns t ead, the pla intiff provides bar e assertions that Chamberlin was “ conspiri ng to discipline [ him] with Ganv ir and Williams after the two had been in formed of [the plaintiff ’ s] EEO complaint against them [,] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 13, and reference s her participati o n in the Janu ary 17

– 19 , 2019 ema il exchange, which the plaint iff character i zes as both

“ disparag ing[,] ” id

. at 17

– 1 8, and the “ initiat [ion] o f Williams, Ganvir, and Chambe rl[]in ’ s retaliatory effort against [the p laintiff,] ” id. at 18. However, the email exc h ange cons pic uously lack s any re ference to the plaintiff ’ s 2018 EE O com plaint or any other protected ac tivity , see ge neral ly id. , Ex. H ( Emai l Exchange Between Rona ld W illiams, Ravindra Ganvir, and An na Chamberlin (Jan. 17

– 19 , 2019) ( “ Jan. 17

– 19, 2019 E m ail Exc h ange ” ) ) , ECF No. 31

- 9 , and the plaintiff offers no other evi dence to suggest that Chamberlin knew of the plaint iff ’ s EEO complaint, see g enerally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n. Th erefore, even if the Court were to consider Chamber lin a deciding official, the plaintiff has cle arly not met his burden to s how that she had any know ledg e of his protected activity. See Rom á n v. Castro , 149 F

. Supp. 3d 157, 172 (D.D.C. 20 1 6) (noting that , “ [ w] hile the plaintiff need not present direct evidence of the employer ’ s knowledge at the summa ry ju dgment stage, [he or] she mu st at least put forward ‘ circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support a n inference ’ of such knowledg e ” ( quoting Jone s v. Bernanke , 557 F. 3d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2009)))

.14 p laintiff “ had submit ted an EEO Intak e Form with the . . . []MPD[ ,] ” Def. ’ s Mot., Ex. 4 (De cl aration of Jim Sebastian ( “ Seba stian Decl. ” ) ) ¶ 21 , ECF No. 29

- 4 , or “ met with an M P D
EEO C o unsel or [,] ” id. , Ex. 4 (Sebastian Decl.) ¶ 22, “ b efore [he] issued [the plaintif f

’ s]
Adv anced Notice of Removal[,] ” id. , Ex. 4 (Sebastian Decl. ) ¶¶ 21

– 22.
Based on this record , the Court concludes th at t he plaintiff has not me t his burden to show a g enuine issue of material fact as to the de ciding official s ’ kno w ledg e of the plaintiff ’ s prote c t ed act ivity prior to his adverse employment action. See Rom á n v. Castro , 149 F

. Supp. 3d 157, 172 (D.D.C. 20 1 6) (noting that, “ [ w] hile the plaintiff need not present direct evidence of the employer ’ s knowledge at the summa ry ju dgment stage, [he or] she mu st at least put forward

‘ circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support a n inference ’ of such knowledg e ” ( quoting Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F. 3d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2009))). The Court could base its
de cision regarding the pla intiff ’ s retaliat ion claim o n this basis alone

. See Baylor , 847 F. App ’ x

at 8 . However, in order to fully consider the plaintiff ’ s cont enti ons , the Court will also addr ess
the plainti ff ’ s arguments offered to rebut the District ’ s legitimate, non

- r etali at ory reasons for

t ermi natin g hi s em ployment.
B. The Pla intiff ’ s Argument that the District ’ s Asserte d Legi timate, Non

- Re taliatory R e ason s for Termi nating H i s Employment Are Pretextual The plaintiff ’ s argument that the District ’ s asserted legit imate , non - re tali at ory rea son for
his re moval was pret ex t ual is threefold. First, the plaintiff contends that Williams

— who “ was
informed on December 21, 2018 , that [the plaintiff] had filed an EEO comp laint against him and
Ganvir ”

— made the alle gations which form ed the bas is for the plaint if f

’ s pro posed removal

. Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 21 ; see generally Def. ’ s Mot., Ex. 11 (Email Exchang e Between Ronald Williams
and Lew is Booker (Feb. 8

– 12, 2019 ) ( “ Feb. 8

– 12, 2019 Email Exchange ” )) , ECF No. 29

- 11 ( show ing the original exc hange betwe en Williams and th e plaint iff regarding the pl aintiff ’ s15 deletion of files) . Second, that “ [o]ne mo nth after Williams and Ga nvir began working with
Cha mberl [] in to retaliat e against [the plaintiff] for filing an EEO complaint ag ainst th em,
Will iams and Ch amberl[ ]in used two recent ev ents to in itiate [his] termi nation ” and

“ Chamberl []in even w ent as far as to leave [ out ] important exculpatory inform ation

— a promp t apology email from [the plaintiff ]

— ” in h er report s to Sebastian regarding the plain tiff ’ s
insubordination

. Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 22 . And third, that “ [the plaintiff] was not afforded the full benefits of the EEO process in lin e with the pattern or practic e of the agency at the time ” because
DDOT Director Jeff Mar ootian was never notified

. I d

. at 22

– 23.
To demonstrate that an employer’ s proffered re ason for an advers e employment action was pretextual, a plaintiff must provide evidence from which a reason able jur y could find that the employer’s reasons for acting are “unworthy of credence.” Reeves v. S an derson Plumbing
Prods

. , 530 U.S. 13 3, 143 (2000 ) (quoting Tex. De p’t o f Cmty. Aff s
. , 450 U.S. at 256 ) ; see
Hairston v. Vance

- Cooks , 773 F.3d 266, 27 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that showing pretext “requires more than simply criticizing the empl oyer’s decision[

- ]making process ”).
Fur th er more , it is no t suffici ent for a plaintiff to “show that a reason given for a[n] [ ] a ction [was] not just, or fair , or sensible [ ; ] ” nor is it sufficient to challenge “the correctness or desirability of [the] rea sons offered [

. ] ” Fischbach v. D.C. De p’ t of Corrs. , 86 F.3d 118 0, 1183 (D.C . Cir. 1996) ( internal quotation marks omitted )

. Ra t her, a plaintiff must provide evidence
from whic h “a reasonable jury could infer that the employer’s given explanation was pret extual and that this pretext sh ielde d [re taliatory] motives.” Jackson , 49 6 F.3d at 707 (citations omitted). As a preliminary matter, the Court concludes

— and the plaintiff does not ap pear to directly conte st , see Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 21 (chara cterizing the Dist rict ’ s asserte d rea son as an

“ allege d ly legi timate reason ” and an “ implaus ible explanation ” )

— that the District ’ s asserted16 reas on for its termination of the pl aintiff ’ s employmen t is a legitimate , non - re taliatory reason

. The District st ates that i t termina ted the plaintiff ’ s employ ment based upon his “ destr[uction o f ]
government records in defiance of a su pervisory official ’ s di rection that [ h e ] provide [the official] with access to those records. ” Def. ’ s Reply at 1. At the ver y least, this basi s constitu tes
insubor dination , which is a “ com monly asserted, le gitimate , non - [retal iatory] reason [] for taking
an ad verse employment a ction. ” Richardson v. Petasis , 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 11 8 (D.D.C. 2015).

T h us, having conc lud ed that the District ’ s prof fe red reason for the plaintiff ’ s removal is a legi timate , non - retaliatory re a son, the Court will consider each of the p laintiff ’ s argumen ts regarding pretext in turn.
Firs t, as to the plaint iff ’ s argument regarding Williams ’ s in volvement in forming the
basi s for the plaintiff ’ s removal, see Pl. ’ s Op p ’ n a t 21, the Court has alread y conclude d that
Williams did not cons titut e a deciding offic ial for purposes of the plaintiff ’ s retaliatio n claim.
S e e supra Section III.A. The plaint iff has also not p rovided an y evidence that Sebastian , Calmeise, or Floyd

— th e individuals w ho did cons titute dec iding officials

— were somehow

“ unw itting condu it [s] of [ Williams ’ s al leged] illici t motives [,] ” Walker , 79 8 F .3 d at 109 5 . Thus,
because Williams was not inv olved in the decision to te rm in at e the plai ntiff ’ s employment, the
fact that W i lliams was notified “ on Dec ember 21, 2018 , that [the plai ntiff] had filed an EEO

comp laint against him [,] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 21, and subsequen tly was involved in a n instan ce of
ins ubordination on the part of t he plaintiff, see Def. ’s Mot., Ex. 11 ( Feb. 8

– 12 , 2019 Email Exchange ), is ir re levant to the determination of whether the District ’ s as serted reasons for th e pla intiff ’ s termination were pretextual

. S econd, as to the plaintiff ’ s argument that Chamberlin , Williams, an d Ganvir conspired to retaliate against him , and that Chamberlin omitted “ exc u l pat ory information ” in her17 communications with Sebastian regarding the plai ntiff ’ s disciplinary matt ers , Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 22, the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidenc e from wh ich a reasonabl e jury could infer
retal iatory animus on the pa rt o f Chamberlin. S p ecifically, the communications between
Cham berlin, Williams , and Ganvir do not reference t h e plaintiff ’ s protected activity , but instead
discuss the plainti ff ’ s co ntinued engagement with the ROW progra m after being transferred out
of the pos ition in which he was tasked with wor king on that program

. See generally Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n , Ex. H ( Jan. 17

– 1 9, 2019 E m ail Exchange )

. Fu rthe rmor e, as the District correctly not es, see
Def. ’ s Reply at 8, Chamberlin di sclosed w hat the plaintiff refers to as “ excul pat ory
informa tion [,] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 22

— namely, the plaintiff ’ s subseque nt apolo gy to Ch amb erlin
after his email which she “ perc eived . . . to be threa t en i ng[,] ” Def. ’ s Facts ¶ 12

— both “ via email
to DDOT senior mana gement on January 23, 2019 , . . . and in her written s tatement about the underlying incident [ ,] ” Def

. ’ s Reply at 8. See Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n , Ex. J ( Email from Anna Chamberlin

t o Todd McIntyre (Jan. 2 3, 2 019) ( “ Jan. 23 , 2019 Em ail ” )) at 1 , ECF No. 31

- 11 (noting in a n
email in which Sebastian was car bon

- copied that th e plaintiff had apologized ) ; id. , Ex. K (Statement of Anna Chamberl in (Feb. 27, 2019) ( “ Cham berlin Statement ” ) ) at 1, ECF No. 31

- 12 ( noting t h at Chamberlin “ responded via email to [the plaintiff] that [ she] did not appreciate his threatening tone and was o nly doing [her] due diligence regardin g his reported hours ” and tha t

“ [a] few days later, h e apologized for the ema il during a meet ing betwee n him, [ ] Seba stian, and [her] ” ). Moreover, as the C o urt ha s already con cluded, the plaintiff has not provided su fficient
evidence to establish that Ch amber lin knew of the plaintif f

’ s protected activity, see supra note 6,
thus further u ndercutt ing the pla intiff ’ s conte ntion that Chamberlin ’ s actions evidence re taliatory

a nimus.18 Finally, as to the plain tiff ’ s argument that he “ was not afforded the full benefits of the EEO p rocess in line w ith the pattern or practice of the agency at the time [,] ” Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 2 2

– 23, h e has not provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer retali atory motive on
this bas is. “ An employer ’ s failure ‘ t o follow it s own regulations a nd proce dures, alone, may not
be suff icient to support ’ the conclusion that its expla nation f or t he chal lenged employment action is pretextual

. ” Fis ch bach , 86 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Jo hnson v. Le hman , 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C.
C ir. 1982)). And, “ [t]his is p articula rly so where

. . . there is n o [other] evidence that [re taliation ]
was the re ason for the [adver se empl oyment action ]. ” Johnson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. , 314 F. Supp . 3d 215, 2 20 (D.D.C. 2018). H ere, the Co urt has concluded t hat the o th er
evide nce offered by the plaintiff does not create an inferenc e of ret aliat ory m oti ve and thus, a ny
fa ilure b y the District to follo w its p olicies and procedures “ may [, based on that conclusion,

a l ready ] not be sufficient to support ” a finding of pr et ext

. Johnson , 679 F.2d at 922.

M oreo ver, the plaintiff has not cl early e stablished that the Distr ict a ctually fai led to
follow its policies a nd procedures. S pecifically, in support o f his argument, t he plaintiff cites only to the testimony of DDOT Direc to r Marootian

. See Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n at 22

– 23. However, as the
Distri ct correctly notes , see Def. ’ s Rep ly at 10, Maroot ian di d not identi fy any f ailure to follow

an official p olicy or procedure, but merely stated that “ d isc iplinary issues around questions of
dis crimination [,] ” Pl. ’ s Op p ’ n , Ex. B (Deposition of Jeff Marootia n ( “ Marootian Dep. ” )) a t 44:9

– 10, ECF No. 31

- 3, were “ [ s ] ome times [,] ” id. , Ex. B (Marootian Dep. ) at 44: 12 (emphasis added),

“ b rought t o [his ] attention [,] ” i d. , Ex. B (Marootian Dep.) at 4 4:1 1 , and that “ there were times
when

— because of the intensity [of a situation] or just because it wa s impacting . . . ot her s or [ ] a partic ular in dividual[,] ” id. , Ex. B (Marootian Dep.) at 4 7 : 17

– 19 ( emphasis added) , he might
have “ [p]otentially temporar ily reassign[ed] [ ] an individual to a different supervisor , and i n19 some cases potentially putting a n individual o n admi nistrative l ea ve[,] ” id. , Ex. B (Marootian Dep. ) at 48: 4

– 7. Far from showing the exist ence o f a conc rete pol icy or procedure , these

s tatem en ts evidence on ly some steps tha t the D DOT has “ [ s ] ome times [,] ” id. , Ex. B (Marootian Dep. ) at 4 4: 12 , taken in the past in response to e mployee disc iplinary matters, and t he plaintiff point s to no specific policy regarding the D DOT ’ s disc iplinary p rocess that would allow the
Court to co m par e his situation wit h the normal procedures of his f ormer empl oyer. See generall y
Pl. ’ s Opp ’ n ; Pl. ’ s Facts. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Co urt concludes that the pla intiff has not provide d evidence from wh ich “a reasonable jur y could infer that the [District ’ s] given explanation was pretextual and tha t this pretext s h ielded [re taliatory ] motives .” Jackson , 49 6
F.3d at 707 . Therefore, the Co urt must grant the Distric t ’ s motion and dismiss the plaintiff ’ s

r e taliation claim

. IV. C ON CLUSI ON
F o r the foregoing re as o ns, the Cour t concludes tha t it must grant th e Distric t ’ s mot ion for summary judgment

. S O ORDERED this 23rd day of J une , 20 2 3

. 8

REGGIE B. WALTON United States Dis trict Ju dg e

8 The Co u rt will con te mpora ne ousl y iss u e a n Or der con sist e nt wi th this Memorandum Opinion.