1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JAMIE HENSON and DANA 

SAUNDERS, on Behalf of Themselves and 

on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated 

Plaintiff,

V. 

STEVENS TANKER DIVISION, LLC

and STEVENS TRANSPORT, INC., 

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-cv-00158

 

 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFFS’ORIGINALCOMPLAINT

COLLECTIVE ACTION, CLASS ACTION & JURY DEMAND

1. Defendants Stevens Tanker Division, LLC and Stevens Transport, Inc.

(“Defendants”) required Plaintiffs Jamie Henson and Dana Saunders (“Plaintiffs”) to work more 

than forty hours in a workweek without overtime pay. Unfortunately, Defendants misclassified 

Plaintiffs as exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, 

et seq. and denied them pay at the rate of time and one half their regular rates of pay when they 

worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. In addition to the Plaintiffs, Defendants have

misclassified hundreds of other workers as exempt from overtime.

2. Defendants’ conduct violates the FLSA, which requires non-exempt employees to 

be compensated for all hours in excess of forty in a workweek at one and one-half times their 

regular rate. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated 

employees, Plaintiffs bring this action as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 

Members of the collective action are referred to hereinafter as the “FLSA Class Members.”

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 1 of 16
2

3. Additionally, on or about October 15, 2019, Defendants fired approximately 500 

workers without sixty (60) days of advance notice. Accordingly, this is a civil action for the 

collection of unpaid wages and benefits for sixty (60) calendar days pursuant to the Worker 

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 et seq., (the 

“WARN Act”). Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants until they were terminated as part of, 

or as result of a mass layoff or plant closing ordered by Defendants without the required statutory 

notification. As such, Defendants are liable under the WARN Act for the failure to provide the 

Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated former employees (the “WARN Class Members”) at 

least 60 days of advance written notice of termination, as required by the WARN Act.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

5. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas because a substantial portion of 

the events forming the basis of this suit occurred in this District.

6. Defendant regularly operates in this district and the Plaintiffs worked in this 

district, worked overtime in this district, and were denied pay in this district.

7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in this District because 

Defendants’ violation of the WARN Act occurred in this district.

PARTIES AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

8. Plaintiff Jamie Henson is an individual residing in Logan County, Arkansas. 

Plaintiff Henson was previously employed in Defendants’ facility located in Stockdale, Texas

and was terminated on or about October 15, 2019. Plaintiff’s written consent to this action is 

attached hereto as Exhibit “A.” 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 2 of 16
3

9. Plaintiff Dana Saunders is an individual residing in Glenn Heights, Texas. 

Plaintiff Saunders was previously employed in Defendants’ facility located in Mesquite, Texas 

and was terminated on or about October 15, 2019. Plaintiff’s written consent to this action is 

attached hereto as Exhibit “B.”

10. The “FLSA Class Members” are all current and former dispatchers and 

coordinators paid a salary without overtime pay at any time during the three-year period before 

the filing of this Complaint. 

11. The “WARN Class Members” are all employees terminated by Defendants on or 

about October 15, 2019 without 60 days advance notice. 

12. The FLSA Class Members and the WARN Class Members shall be collectively 

referred to as “Class Members.” 

13. Defendant Stevens Tanker Division, LLC is a domestic limited liability company.

Said Defendant may be served process through its registered agent Steven Aaron at 9757 

Military Parkway, Dallas, TX 75227, or wherever he may be found. 

14. Defendant Stevens Transport, Inc. is a domestic corporation. Said Defendant may 

be served process through its registered agent Steven Aaron at 9757 Military Parkway, Dallas, 

TX 75227, or wherever he may be found.

COVERAGE

15. At all material times, Defendants have been employers within the meaning of 3(d) 

of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

16. At all material times, Defendants have been an enterprise within the meaning of 

3(r) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 3 of 16
4

17. At all material times, Defendants have been an enterprise or enterprises in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 3(s)(1) of the 

FLSA because Defendants have had and continue to have employees engaged in commerce. 29 

U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).

18. Furthermore, Defendants have an annual gross business volume of not less than 

$500,000.

19. At all material times, Plaintiffs and Class Members were individual employees 

who engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 USC 

§§ 206-207.

20. Defendants are joint employers and operate as a single enterprise. Defendants 

shared the ability to directly and immediately control the essential terms and conditions of 

employment, such as hiring, firing, discipline, and supervision. Defendants jointly exercised 

managerial responsibility and substantial control over the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 

Defendants jointly controlled the terns and conditions of employment, work schedules, and set 

and determined the rates of pay for the Plaintiffs and Class Members. They also were jointly 

responsible for making the decision to deny the Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members overtime 

wages and to terminate the Plaintiffs and WARN Class Members without the required 60 days 

notice. 

21. Moreover, Defendants share some of the same officers and directors. They also 

share the same corporate office and have the same accounting and payroll operations. 

Additionally, they share control over hiring, firing, payroll, and overhead decisions. Moreover, 

the operations of the companies are inter-mingled. That is, they employ the same workers and 

have the same business purpose - to operate a transportation business for the oil and gas industry. 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 4 of 16
5

22. Furthermore, Defendants represent themselves to the general public as one 

company. They have a common management, pool their resources, and have common 

ownership. Defendants advertised together on the same website, provides the same array of 

services to their customers, and use the same business model. 

23. Based upon these facts, at all material times, Defendants have also operated as a 

“single enterprise” within the meaning of 3(r)(1) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1). That is, 

Defendants perform related activities through unified operation and common control for a 

common business purpose. See Brennan v. Arnheim and Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512, 515 (1973); 

Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1994). Additionally, based upon these facts, 

Defendants are joint employers and are jointly and severally liable for all wage and hour 

compliance, including payment of overtime and minimum wage compensation for all hours 

worked during the workweek. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a); Schultz v. Capital International 

Security, Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2006).

24. At all times material to this action, Defendants were “an employer” within the 

meaning of the WARN Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1).

25. Prior to the mass layoff or plant closing that forms the basis of this action, 

Defendants employed more than 100 employees, exclusive of part-time employees.

26. Prior to the mass layoff or plant closing that forms the basis of this action, 

Defendants employed 100 or more employees who in the aggregate worked at least 4,000 hours a 

week, exclusive of overtime hours, within the United States.

27. Upon information and belief Defendants had authority to terminate employees at 

the single site of employment.

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 5 of 16
6

28. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the WARN Class Members were “employees” 

of Defendants as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 2101.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

29. Defendants operated an oilfield services company that transported sand to various 

oil wells. 

30. Defendants operated throughout the Southwest region of the US, including in 

Texas, Louisiana, and New Mexico. 

31. Plaintiff Henson worked for Defendants as a sand coordinator. Plaintiff Henson’s 

duties included checking, inspecting, and directing incoming trucks where to park when they 

arrived at Defendants’ facility. Plaintiff Henson worked for Defendants from June 2018 to 

October 15, 2019. 

32. Plaintiff Henson was classified as exempt from overtime and thus was not paid 

overtime at the rate of time and one half his regular rate of pay when he worked more than 40 

hours in a workweek. 

33. Plaintiff Saunders worked for Defendants as a dispatcher. Plaintiff Saunders’ 

duties included directing trucks where to travel and providing them their routes. Plaintiff

Saunders worked for Defendants from September 2017 to October 15, 2019. 

34. Plaintiff Saunders was classified as exempt from overtime and thus was not paid 

overtime at the rate of time and one half her regular rate of pay when she worked more than 40 

hours in a workweek.

35. Plaintiffs regularly worked more than 40 hours in a week. In fact, Defendants

scheduled Plaintiffs to work at least 10 hours each day during the majority of the days that they

worked for the Defendants. Plaintiffs were, at times, scheduled to work on weekends in addition 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 6 of 16
7

to Monday through Friday. As a result, Plaintiffs frequently worked in excess of 40 hours per

week.

36. Additionally, the FLSA Class Members performed similar duties as the Plaintiffs. 

37. The FLSA Class Members also regularly worked more than 40 hours in a 

workweek for Defendants.

38. The FLSA Class Members also were classified as exempt from overtime and were 

not paid at the rate of time and one half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a 

workweek. 

39. Defendants paid Plaintiffs a salary. 

40. Defendants also paid the FLSA Class Members a salary. 

41. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were not paid any overtime wages. 

42. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were not exempt under the FLSA.

43. The primary duty of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members was not to supervise 

other employees or manage a customarily recognized department of Defendants’ company.

44. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members had no authority to hire or fire other 

employees.

45. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members directed trucks to specific locations, but 

did not supervise other employees or manage a customarily recognized department of 

Defendants.

46. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members had no authority or input regarding 

promoting or demoting other employees. 

47. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were field employees, not office 

employees. 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 7 of 16
8

48. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were required to follow the directions of 

the employees giving them assignments. 

49. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were not computer-systems analysts, 

computer programmers, software engineers, or other similar employees.

50. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members were not office or “white collar” 

employees. They performed manual labor work related to Defendants’ core business—i.e., 

transportation and hauling services for oil wells—not the management of Defendants’ operations.

51. The primary duty of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members did not require 

independent judgment and discretion with respect to matters of significance. 

52. The primary duty of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members related directly to 

the service that Defendants offered, not the management of the company’s operations. 

53. Despite these facts, Defendants classified the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class 

Members as exempt from overtime pay.

54. Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for whether Plaintiffs and the 

FLSA Class Members were entitled to overtime pay under the law. In particular, Defendants

operate a large, sophisticated company that knew about the requirement to pay overtime pay. 

The failure on Defendants’ part to pay overtime was intentional or a reckless disregard for the 

law. 

55. Additionally, Defendants operated their Stockdale Terminal and Mesquite 

locations with approximately 500 employees. Upon information and belief, over 350 employees 

worked at the Stockdale Terminal, including Plaintiff Henson. Upon information and belief, over 

100 employees worked at the Mesquite location, including Plaintiff Saunders. On or about 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 8 of 16
9

September 25, 2019, Plaintiffs and the WARN Class Members were notified of their termination 

to be effective October 15, 2019. 

56. As a result, over 500 employees were terminated without cause and without 60 

days notice on October 15, 2019. (See https://www.freightwaves.com/news/stevens-tankerdivision-closes-and-eliminates-586-jobs-across-texas, last visited February 7, 2020).

57. The executive vice president for Defendants stated as follows:

“It is with deep regret that I must notify you that Stevens Tanker Division will 

cease all operations on October 15, 2019. This will be a permanent closure of all 

Stevens Tanker Division business at all locations and in all divisions”

Id. 

58. This mass termination of workers at one time qualifies as a plant closing and/or 

mass layoff under the WARN Act. 

59. The WARN Act required Defendant to give Plaintiff and WARN Class Members 

at least 60 days advance written notice prior to their terminations.

60. The Plaintiffs and WARN Class Members were given approximately 20 days 

advance notice prior to their termination.

61. The Plaintiffs and the WARN Class Members also did not receive all pay owed, 

including back pay and benefits.

 COUNT ONE: VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. § 207

62. Plaintiffs incorporate all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 

63. Defendants’ practice of failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members

time-and-a-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek violates the FLSA. 29 

U.S.C. § 207. 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 9 of 16
10

64. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers 

to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its 

employees are paid are applicable to Defendants or Plaintiffs/FLSA Class Members. 

COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS FOR COUNT ONE

65. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

66. As part of their regular business practices, Defendants have engaged in a pattern, 

practice, or policy of violating the FLSA on a class wide basis, as described above.

67. Plaintiffs have actual knowledge that the FLSA Class Members have also been 

denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of 

Defendants’ misclassification of their employees. 

68. Plaintiffs’ knowledge is based on their personal work experience and through 

communications with other workers of Defendants. Plaintiffs personally worked with other 

employees who were also classified as exempt from overtime.

69. Other workers similarly situated to the Plaintiffs worked for Defendants

throughout the United States, but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their 

regular rates of pay when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours in a workweek. 

70. Although Defendants permitted and/or required FLSA Class Members to work in 

excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendants denied them full compensation for their 

hours worked over forty (40).

71. FLSA Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as 

Plaintiffs and were not paid overtime by Defendants.

72. FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the 

FLSA.

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 10 of 16
11

73. As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to Plaintiffs in terms of relevant job 

duties, pay structure, and the denial of overtime pay.

74. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation at the rate required by the 

FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on the 

personal circumstances of any FLSA Class Member.

75. The experiences of Plaintiffs, with respect to her pay, hours, and duties are typical 

of the experiences of the FLSA Class Members.

76. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each FLA Class Member 

do not prevent collective treatment.

77. All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are 

entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.

78. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the FLA Class Members, 

the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The 

claims of all FLA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a 

systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendants that caused harm to all FLA Class 

Members. 

79. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs for the FLSA Class is properly 

defined as follows: 

All current and former dispatchers and coordinators paid a 

salary without overtime pay at any time during the three-year 

period before the filing of this Complaint. 

COUNT TWO: VIOLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WORKER ADJUSTMENT 

AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT

(CLASS ACTION)

80. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the allegations set forth above.

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 11 of 16
12

81. At all times material to this action, Plaintiffs and the WARN Class Members have 

been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the federal WARN Act, 29 

U.S.C. § 2101, et seq.

82. The WARN Act regulates the notice period an employer must provide to 

employees who will be terminated due to the employer’s closing of a plant or mass layoffs. The 

WARN Act also regulates the back pay and other associated benefits an affected employee is due 

based on a violation of the required notice period.

83. Defendants are subject to the notice and back pay requirements of the WARN Act 

because they are business enterprises that employ 100 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 

2101(1)(A).

84. Defendants willfully violated the WARN Act by failing to provide the required 

notice.

85. None of the exemptions found in 29 U.S.C. § 2103 apply to Defendants. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs and WARN Class Members were entitled to receive the statutory notice 

and because they did not, they are entitled to the back pay and associated benefits the WARN 

Act guarantees. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a).

86. With respect to the allegations herein, Defendants have not acted in good faith nor 

with reasonable grounds to believe its acts and omissions were not a violation of the Act.

87. As a result of Defendants’ violation of the WARN Act, each WARN Class 

Member is entitled to recover an amount equal to the sum of: (a) his/her respective wages, 

salaries, commissions bonuses and accrued pay for holiday, vacation and personal days from the 

work days in the sixty calendar days prior to their respective terminations and pension, 401(k) 

contributions, COBRA benefits, and all other fringe benefits for sixty calendar days prior to their 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 12 of 16
13

respective terminations; and (b) his/her medical expenses incurred during the sixty-day period 

following their respective terminations that would have been covered and paid under the 

Defendant’s health insurance plan had that plan provided coverage for such period.

88. The Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the WARN Class Members for the 

violation of the WARN Act in an amount equal to the sum of or any part of the sum (a) his/her 

respective wages, salaries, commissions bonuses and accrued pay for holiday, vacation and 

personal days from the work days in the sixty calendar days prior to their respective terminations 

and pension, 401(k) contributions, COBRA benefits, and all other fringe benefits for sixty 

calendar days prior to their respective terminations; and (b) his/her medical expenses incurred 

during the sixty-day period following their respective terminations that would have been covered 

and paid under the Defendant’s health insurance plan had that plan provided coverage for such 

period.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS FOR COUNT TWO

89. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(a), (b)(1) and (3) and the WARN Act 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5).

90. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and the WARN Class 

Members. 

91. Plaintiffs seek to represent a WARN Class defined as follows:

All employees terminated by Defendants on or about October 

15, 2019 without 60 days advance notice.

92. Plaintiffs and WARN Class Members are “affected employee(s)” subject to an 

“employment loss,” as those terms are defined in the WARN Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) and 

(6).

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 13 of 16
14

93. Plaintiffs’ claim satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and 

superiority requirements of a class action.

94. The members of the class exceed 50 in number rendering joinder impracticable. 

The precise number of the WARN Class Members and their addresses are readily available from 

the records of Defendants.

95. There are common questions of fact and law as to the class that predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual class members. These questions of law and fact common 

to the class arising from Defendants’ actions include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Whether the provisions of the WARN Act apply;

b. Whether Defendants’ terminations constitute a “plant closing” and/or a “mass 

layoff” under the WARN Act;

c. Whether Defendants failed to provide the notices required by 29 U.S.C. § 

2102(b); and

d. The appropriate formula to measure damages under 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a).

96. The questions listed above predominate over any questions affecting Plaintiffs

individually or any WARN Class Member in his or her individual capacity. 

97. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this 

controversy. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that are generally applicable to 

the class as a whole. 

98. The presentation of separate actions by individual class members could create a 

risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for 

other businesses, and substantially impede or impair the ability of the WARN Class Members to 

protect their interests. 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 14 of 16
15

99. Plaintiffs are affected employees who were terminated by Defendants during the 

time period applicable to the rest of the class without the notice required by the WARN Act. 

They are proper members of the WARN Class. Plaintiffs are committed to pursuing this action 

and have retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex wage, employment, 

and class and collective action litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of 

the class and have the same interest as all of its members. 

100. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all members of the class and 

Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the absent members of the class.

101. Furthermore, class action treatment of this action is authorized and appropriate 

under the WARN Act which provides, by its terms, that a plaintiff seeking to enforce liabilities 

under the Act may do so on his own behalf and on behalf of other individuals similarly situated. 

29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5).

DAMAGES SOUGHT

102. The Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover their unpaid 

overtime compensation and liquidated damages. 

103. The Plaintiffs and WARN Class Members are entitled to recover back pay, wages, 

salaries, commissions, bonuses, accrued holiday pay, pensions, 401(k) contributions, employee 

benefits under ERISA, medical expenses, and accrued vacation pay for 60 days. 

104. The Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to recover their attorney’s fees, 

costs, and interest. 

JURY DEMAND

105. The Plaintiffs and all Class Members hereby demand trial by jury on all issues. 

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 15 of 16
16

PRAYER

106. For these reasons, Plaintiffs and all Class Members respectfully request that 

judgment be entered in their favor awarding the following relief:

a. An order designating the FLSA Class as a collective action and authorizing notice 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all FLSA Class Members to permit them join 

this action by filing a written notice of consent;

b. A judgment against Defendants awarding Plaintifff and the FLSA Class Members 

all their unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages;

c. An order awarding attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses as allowed under the 

FLSA;

d. An order certifying that this action may be maintained as a class action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

e. Compensatory damages in an amount equal to at least the amounts provided in 29 

U.S.C. § 2104(a);

f. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(6);

g. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the highest applicable rates; and

h. Such other and further relief as may be necessary and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted, 

HODGES & FOTY, L.L.P.

By: /s/ Don J. Foty

Don J. Foty

dfoty@hftrialfirm.com

Texas State Bar No. 24050022

4409 Montrose Blvd, Ste. 200

Houston, TX 77006

Telephone: (713) 523-0001

Facsimile: (713) 523-1116

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Class Members

Case 5:20-cv-00158-XR Document 1 Filed 02/07/20 Page 16 of 16