1 Filed 7/29/14 In re Z.M. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re Z.M.-R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. TIMOTHY R., Defendant and Appellant. A139514 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1000729)

I. INTRODUCTION Timothy R., minor Z.M.-R.’s father, ch allenges the denial of his petition for modification of the court’s previous orders terminating reunificatio n services and setting a permanent plan hearing. (Wel f. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26.) 1 At a combined hearing on father’s petition and the select ion of minor’s permanent plan , the juvenile court denied the petition, selected adoption as minor’s permanent plan, and terminated father’s parental rights. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his modification petition. We reject this conten tion and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
II. FACTUAL AND PROC EDURAL BACKGROUND Z.M.-R. was born May 2, 2010. At the time, her 18-year-old mother, R.M., was a dependent child living in a foster home. Pare nts had a history of do mestic violence and

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 on May 4, father reportedly hit mother in th e face, breaking her nose and blackening her eye. She was treated for her injuries at a hospital and released. On May 7, social
workers from the Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services (Bureau)
interviewed mother. Mother equivocated about whether fath er was responsible for her injuries, which occurred in the mi nor’s presence, but stated that father physically attacked her when she was six months pregnant. Mother agreed to have no further contact with father and to seek a protective restraining order against him for herself and her child. 2
A. First Petition On May 17, 2010, the Bureau filed a juvenile depe ndency petition alleging the minor came within section 300, subdivision (b) as a result of domestic violence between the parents. Mother and the Bureau stipulat ed to juvenile court jurisdiction based on father’s infliction of domestic violence requi ring medical attention on mother during her pregnancy and shortly after th e minor’s birth. The court sustained the petition on that basis at the jurisdictional hearing, which father did not attend. At the dispositional hearing on August 19, 2010, the Bureau recommended, and the court ordered, that the minor remain in mother’s care on a family maintenance plan. Father was not present, as he was incarcerated.
B. Supplemental Petition On January 7, 2011, the Bureau filed a supplemental petition (§ 387) alleging
mother had failed to enroll in a domestic viol ence treatment plan, engage in individual therapy, complete a parenting class, and “m aintain a stable and suitable residence for
herself and her child.” The minor was deta ined. Father was denied visitation. On March 2, 2011, the supplemental pe tition was amended to add allegations that
mother and father were contin uing to have contact with ea ch other, resulting in ongoing domestic violence. According to the social worker’s report, on Janua ry 15, 2011, mother

2 Mother obtained a restraining order agai nst father on March 7, 2011. It expired February 24, 2014.3 went to see father, who was staying with his mother, Ms. R., in Antioch. When she arrived, they began to kiss. Although she to ld father she did not want to have sex, she allowed him to perform oral sex on her; they had consensu al sexual intercourse until she told him she wanted him to stop because she would miss her bus. When mother tried to leave, the two got into a physical altercati on in which father stra ngled mother until she
lost consciousness and kicked her in the mouth. The police were called by Ms. R. Father ran off. Mother was cited by pol ice and driven by them to the BART station. Mother was picked up at the West Oakland BART sta tion by her sister, who called an ambulance. Mother was taken to Highland Hospital where she told a police officer she had been raped and beaten by father.
The officer arrested father for domestic violence and a probation violation at Ms. R.’s apartment. At the jail, he gave a stat ement to police in whic h he stated he asked
mother to visit him because he was con cerned about how she was coping since the
Bureau took their ch ild away. She came in through the back door and immediately grabbed a knife from the kitchen. They ha d consensual intercourse. Mother became extremely emotional about the child, and threat ened to kill herself with the knife. He stopped her from doing so. Mother stated she wa nted to fight, and hit him in the mouth. He did not hit her during the fight. He left when the police were called because he was on probation. Another officer interviewed Ms. R., who said she heard banging on her back door and noises coming from her kitche n consistent with someone rifling the utensil drawer, which contained knives. She called the po lice. She recognized mother’s voice and believed mother was trying to stab her son, based on what she heard, but she did not see anything. The police were aware there was “a long history of do cumented assaults perpetrated by [father] against [mother].” On March 14, 2011, mother pleaded no co ntest to one amended count alleging she had failed to complete her court-ordered Fam ily Maintenance Plan, and continued to have4 contact with father until Janua ry 15, 2011. The court foun d the amended count true and dismissed the remaining allegations of the supplemental petition. The disposition hearing wa s held April 18, 2011. The Bureau’s report recommended services for both parents. Th e minor, now 10 months old, was “on track developmentally,” and did not present with any mental or emotional issues at that time. She was in a licensed foster home in Contra Costa County. The disposition report noted father wa s in custody from Ja nuary 16, 2011 until March 16, 2011. He had “an extensive criminal history involving violence from November 29, 1996 to January 15, 2011.” 3 He was staying with his mother pending his enrollment in a residential program on March 31 . However, father was shot in the foot on March 30 and had to delay hi s entry into the program. Among other things, father’s case plan required him to notif y the social worker immediately of any change of address or pho ne number; initiate monthly contact with the social worker; maintain a stab le living situation for six months, attend and demonstrate progress in a county certified domestic viol ence prevention plan; vi sit with his child; engage in general counseling; and participate in a parenting education program. The case plan envisioned completion by September 30 , 2011. The court ordered supervised visitation of one hour monthly. Father made his first visit on April 7. C. Six-Month Review
The matter came on for six-month review September 19, 2011. The Bureau
recommended continued services to both parents. The minor was still in a licensed foster home in Contra Costa County. The minor, no w 16 months old, appe ared to be on track

3 The dispositional report listed “burglary, auto theft, petty theft, domestic violence, a restraining order, intent to terrorize, robbery , battery on a person, forgery, receiving stolen property, inflict corporal punishment on a spouse/cohabitant , vandalism, annoying phone call: obscene /threat, failure to pay fare on public trans it system, failure to appear after written promise, possession of an assault weapon, posse ssion of marijuana for sale, driving with a suspended license, obstructing public officer, failure to test, and false imprisonment.”5 developmentally and did not present with any mental or emotional problems. An alternative relative placement, in case mother failed to reuni fy with the minor, had been
identified. Father was currently eith er in compliance with, or making progress toward, his case plan objectives. For exam ple, he had maintained a st able living situation for six months and initiated monthly c ontact with the social work er. He had enrolled in a domestic violence/anger management program through STAND on June 29, 2011. Father had supervised visitati on with the minor twice a month, and the visits went well. He drug-tested once a month. He had been given referrals fo r parenting classes, but he had yet to provide verification of his enrollmen t. He stated he was “in favor of having [his daughter] placed with a relative until he is able to adequately provide for her.” The court adopted the Bureau’s recommendation and continued the matter for a 12-month review hearing. D. Twelve-Month Review In October 2011, mother gave birth to a son. In November 2011, father was incarcerated for some period of time on a paro le violation. Nevertheless, in a report dated October 2011, the Bureau recommended co ntinued services to both parents. The 12-month review hearing was held April 26, 2012. In advance of that hearing, in a status review report dated Ma rch 5, 2012, the Bure au initially recommended
the court terminate reunification services fo r mother and set a sec tion 366.26 permanency planning hearing. In January, mother had ex pressed a wish to give up her daughter for guardianship. Z.M.-R. resided in the home of her patern al cousin in San Joaquin County. Now 22 months old, she had been referred to the Regional Cent er on February 29, 2012 for evaluation of possible language delays. She did not present w ith any mental or emotional behaviors “outside of being in the beginning stages of the ‘Terrible Two’s.’ ”6 In February 2012, father had a expressed a wish to obtain custody of his daughter. He had consistently visited with the minor twice a month in San Joaquin County and the visits continued to go well. He stated he was taking anger management classes; however, he had yet to enroll in parenting classes and individual therapy. The social worker was “uncertain why [father] has faile d to fully engage in Case Pl an services to obtain custody of [Z.M.-R] prior to this time.” In an addendum report, the Bureau withdrew its previous recommendation for termination of reunification of services in light of mother’s change of heart; as of March 2, 2012, she no longer wished to relinquish he r daughter for a guardianship. The Bureau recommended setting an 18-month review hearing. On April 24, 2012 father reported he was currently homeless, but was attending post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) an d anger management counseling sessions through the Pittsburg Health Department. He ha d yet to enroll in a parenting class. He had last visited his daughter on April 5, havi ng been unable to coordi nate with the foster parents for a scheduled visit on April 19. The court found that exceptional circum stances and a probability the child would be returned to the physical custody of a parent warranted extending reunification
services. E. Eighteen-Month Review In a status review report dated July 9, 2012, the Bureau recommended termination of reunification services to mother and setting a section 366.26 heari ng. Z.M.-R., now 26 months old, remained in the her paternal cousin’s home in San Joaquin County. According to the social worke r, she was in good health, and “appear[ed] to be on track developmentally,” speaking in tw o to three word sentences a nd able to understand simple
directions. No mention was made of the refe rral to the Regional Center for evaluation of a possible speech delay.7 Mother, now involved with a new live-in boyfriend, was experiencing mental and emotional problems and was on the brink of losing her apartment due to frequent visits by the police after reports of domestic violence. Father had not been in contact with the Bureau during this reporting period and his current circumstances were unknown. However, his probation officer reported a warrant for his arrest had issued on May 23, 2012 for threatening the secur ity officer at his anger management program in Concord. He was dropped from the program and failed to complete it. The probation officer had
not heard from him since she ha d informed him that the warra nt was about to be issued. He had failed to comply with court orde rs; and he had partia lly complied with his visitation plan. His participation in general counseling and parenting classes, if any, was
not noted. A contested review hearing commenced August 9 and continued on August 22, September 24, November 8, November 16, November 20, and November 29, 2012. Father was present on November 20 only. At the hearings on November 16 and 20, 2012, the social worker testified she began to suspect the minor might have a language delay during the summer of 2012 because the minor did not spea k much. She though t it should be checked out further. However, no assessment had been done b ecause the current caretaker in Ceres had transportation problems. This caretaker wa s not interested in providing a permanent placement for the minor. As a result, the minor was going to be moved soon.
At the conclusion of the he aring on November 20, the court once again found that exceptional circumstances and a probability the child would be return ed to the physical custody of a parent warranted extending reunification services.
Services for father were not addressed. However, at a hearing held on November 29, 2012, the court terminat ed services to father.8 F. Twenty-Four Month Review In a status report date d January 10, 2013, the Bureau again recommended
termination of mother’s reunification services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. Mother had been expelled from her resi dence due to ongoing police involvement precipitated by mother’s violent behavior. Sh e had ceased to engage in her case plan
activities. On December 10, 2012 , the minor had been placed in a licensed foster home in San Joaquin County, where she was thriving. The foster parents were willing to adopt
the minor if mother was unabl e to reunify with her. A contested 24-month review hearing was held on February 6 and 8, 2013. The
court terminated mother’s reunification serv ices and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing
for June 2012. The court al so ordered the Bureau to a ssess the minor for speech and developmental cognitive services. Father appeared at the hearing on February 6, testif ied, and presented documentary evidence showing he had comp leted 19 sessions of STAND’s domestic violence treatment program since re-enrollin g in the program on November 21, 2012. According to STAND’s facilitator, he appe ared to be benefitting from the program. Father also reported to STAND that he had co mpleted 20 group sessions with Dr. Frank. G. Request to Change Court Orders (§ 388) On May 23, 2013, six months after his pa rental rights were terminated, father’s counsel filed a written request to reinstate father’s reunification services, vacate the section 366.26 hearing, and order the minor placed with he r paternal grandmother, Ms. R. Attached to the request was documentati on from STAND showing that father had completed a 52-week domestic violence pr ogram on April 24, 2013. According to STAND representative Olivia Pacheco, father “has been an active member of the group, he has been appropriate, open to feedback, interested in learning and has given good9 feedback to other group members. He appe ars to be making better life and relationship decisions. He appears to have benefitted from the program.” In support of the motion, counsel explaine d that after being shot in 2011, father
suffered from PTSD and needed th erapeutic intervention. His efforts to participate fully in services were adversely affected by his condition. As a consequence of the verbal argument he had with a security guard at one of his classes, his probation was violated and he spent a month in custody. He was re leased in September of 2012, but he was required to reapply for all of his case plan se rvices and medical coverage. As a result, he was not able to receive medication or therap eutic intervention until January 2013. Since then, he had been receiving both and his condition had dram atically improved, allowing him to make great strides despite not ha ving reunification services in place. He was in good standing with his proba tion and had no new in cidents of domestic
violence. He had been in a stable relations hip with his girlfriend for 18 months. The verbal argument with the secu rity guard was his only criminal incident and that had occurred a year earlier.
In addition to successfu lly completing 52 weeks of an anger management program, father was on track to receive a cer tificate for completing a parenting course the following week. He consisten tly visited with his daughte r. Father did not have a permanent residence but, as of October 20 12, he had sought pl acement at various homeless shelters, which were full. He had v ouchers that allowed him to stay at hotels pending space availability at shelters. He ha d applied for supplement al security income (SSI) and had a hearing scheduled for Septembe r 3, 2013. With SSI benefits, he would be able to obtain housing and financial assi stance. He was not living at his mother’s home, which had been the sole basis for reje ction of his mother as a relative placement for his daughter. In addition, counsel alleged the minor wa s not safe in her new placement. She had been brought to visits on mo re than one occasion “filthy a nd with sores on her body.”10 According to counsel, Z.M.-R. was not as bonded to her current caretakers as she was to father and paternal grandmother and placement with paternal grandmother while father “continue[d] to make strides” woul d be in her long-term best interest. H. Combined Section 388 and 366.26 Hearing The hearing on father’s motion to m odify orders based on a change of circumstances was held on June 10, 2013. Father testified he believed he was in a different position that day as compared to the day his services were te rminated in that he was “just more calm . . . I know what my futu re is going to be. And I’ve completed anger management class. I’ve been doing my pare nting class. I’ve been in compliance with my probation officer. I see her every w eek. I visit [Z.M.-R.] every chance I get. . . . [¶] . . . [I’m] trying to receive SSI now. Probab ly going to be getting it in September. So I feel like my life is definitely headed to wards the right direction.” In his anger management class he “learned to ols on how to deal with stress ful situations and . . . how to deal with people trying to push my buttons and . . . relax myself and count to ten. . . . I learned a lot of good stuff that ’s s definitely helped me toda y in my everyday life.” For example, he had learned to ignore it and focu s on the big picture rather than the short term when people push his buttons. He wa s still taking parenting cl asses, but he had already learned that kids are not responsible fo r their behaviors, and you had to be patient
and work with them as a loving, caring person. Father explained that he had been diag nosed with PTSD in June 2011 when he was 30 years old. He had been seeing a ther apist regularly for a year, except for a monthlong incarceration in September 2012. Fath er felt he had made “small progress” in addressing his PTSD and was taking Wellbutrin for it. He believed his PTSD had negatively affected his ability to comp lete his reunification services. Prior to his diagnosis, he did not know wh at was wrong with him. He felt suicidal, depressed, frustrated, abused, oppressed, neglected, and “j ust everything negative.” He had felt those symptoms all his life. He had been physically abused by his own father11 starting at the age of five, and had been suicid al, depressed, and afraid of his father until the age of 15. At age 15, he was incarcer ated at the California Youth Authority, where “they kind of gave me some education” and “I rea lly started getting my life back together.” His mother tried to get help, bu t in those days the police viewed domestic violence differently: “[T]he police would co me and nobody was bl eeding, nobody was cut, they leave. Just argum ent and stuff wasn’t enough.” His mother did put him in counseling when he was young, and they went to family counseling for a month when he
was 13. These negative feelings had prevented hi m from being employed in the past. He still experienced these feelings, but to a less er extent. If he did not get SSI, his second
alternative was to find work through the plastering union. However, his injury from getting shot in the leg in 20 11 prevented him from standing up for more than an hour. The injury plus post-traum atic stress kept him from be ing employed now, but he
understood he would have to do something. What had changed for him was that he was more stable now, knew where he was headed in life, knew he wanted to have Z.M.-R. in his life, did not get into trouble, and was stay ing away from people who got into trouble. With the exception of the argumen t with the security guard, father had not had any police contact since January 2011 in c onnection with Z.M.-R.’s mother. 4 He visited regularly with his daughter a nd the visits went well. She called him “Daddy”. Currently he was visiting her in Stockton. Previous ly, he had visited consistently when she was in Ceres. All of his visits were supervised.

4 Father explained he was incarcerated for a probation violation after he “got into a verbal altercation with a security guard at my anger management class.” Father arrived an hour early for the class w ith his fiancé, and the security guard accused him of having sex with her in his truck during that time. The argument did not ge t physical, nor did he raise his voice; but the security guard called th e police. Father thought it would be best for him to leave before the police arrived, and he did so. His probation was violated because it was considered a police contact, ev en though he was not there when the police arrived.12 Father believed his daught er was being physically abused and neglected in the
foster home. He had heard the foster mother was getting $2,000 a month to care for his daughter; he believed the foster mother was just taking care of his daughter for the
money. Father believed it would be in his daughte r’s best interest that he be given more time to reunify because “she wouldn’t have to worry about being dirty all the time, and she wouldn’t have to worry about somebody ju st pushing her off because they want a paycheck. I’m willing to take [Z.M.-R.] for free.” However, he did not presently have housin g. He stayed in a number of places with friends in Oakland and Pittsburg. Becaus e he was homeless, he also received shelter
vouchers when there was no room for him in the shelter. Each voucher was worth $50 for a hotel room. Since that was not enough m oney to rent a room for a week, he usually paid the voucher to one of hi s friends to let him stay ther e for a few nights. He was homeless because he did not have any income to pay rent, and he coul d not stay with his
mother because she did not wa nt him staying with her, and he did not have any other
friends or relatives who would let him live with them all the time. He could not stay with his fiancé because she already had her 17-year-old daughter, her sister, her mother, and a niece living with her. He felt th at things would chan ge when he went to court September 3 for his SSI hearing. With that income he would be able to ge t an apartment. Father was not asking for immediate plac ement of his daughter with him, but it was his intention to eventually have her placed with him onc e his housing was in place. He wanted his daughter placed with his mother temporarily until he was able to take care of her himself. However, that morning his mother had told him her apartment was
flooded.
Father cared for Z.M.-R. the first mont h after she was born, but she never lived with him in a house. She has always been car ed for by others. He has been homeless the whole time she has been a dependent.13 I. The Court’s Ruling Based on the testimony and the eviden ce, the court found that more than
reasonable efforts had been made to eval uate the paternal grandmother’s home for placement, but she had “not at all been a w illing participant in home assessment to see whether or not she would be an appropriate placement for the child.” Accordingly, the court denied father’s request to place Z.M .-R. in her home. That ruling has not been challenged on appeal. As for father’s section 388 motion, the court acknowledged that father had made some progress and agreed “it’s a changing circumstance situation.” The court also acknowledged father had particip ated in a 52-week batterer’s course. But the court found the dispute with the security guard noteworthy and father’s explanation for his probation
violation not “at all” reasonable.
The court continued: “I don’t think the Court can lose sight of the circumstances that brought this case to the Court’s attention. This is a case involving very significant issues of domestic violence, very serious injuri es and allegations of rape. [¶] So I can’t make this ruling in a vacuum. I have to look at the case how it presen ts itself. And this young girl has essentially been a dependent most of her life. And I believe, quite frankly, this case has gone on way too long. [¶] I don’ t believe it’s in the best interest of this
child to continue services to father at this time. Father remains homeless. He has no permanent residence. He has no income. He hopes he might have social security by September, he’s not sure that he will have it. If he doesn’t receive it, then he’s going to try to get a job through the union. [¶] He was raised himself in a home that had many issues of abuse . . . . [¶] So given the fact th at this is simply changing circumstances, Dad doesn’t have a home, he’s never had anything other than supervised visits, the child has
never lived with Father since she’s been cognizant of her su rroundings, I don’t find that it would be at all appropriate to grant the 388 motion. [¶] I do not think it’s in the minor’s best interest to grant that motion and offer fu rther services to Father at this time. [¶]14 Rather, I think it’s in the child ’s best interest to proceed on a permanent placement plan given what is presented to this Court. So the father’s motion is denied. [¶] I find that he has failed to meet the burden of proof as it relates to that motion.” The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that Z.M.-R. was likely to be adopted and ordered both fa ther’s and mother’s parental rights terminated. Father timely appeals from both orders.
III. DISCUSSION Under section 388, a parent may petition to modify a previously issued court order in a dependency proceeding on the basis of changed circumstan ces or new evidence. However, “[n]ot every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order. The change in circumstances mu st relate to the pur pose of the order and be such that the modification of the prior order is appropriate. [Citation.]” ( In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870, citing In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 674 [changes in parental circumstances that make reunificati on desirable may justif y modification of an
order terminati ng services].) We review a juvenile court’s order gr anting or denying a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. ( In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the juvenile court; reversal is warranted on ly when the juvenile court “exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, caprici ous or patently absurd determination. [Citation.]” ( In re A.S., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) “The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” ( In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.) Here, the minor was under the age of th ree at the time of removal. Ordinarily, when a child under the age of three year s old is removed from parental custody,
reunification services are not to exceed a six-month period. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), 366.21, subd. (e); see Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App. 4th 606, 611-612.)15 In this case, father received 18 months of reunification servic es; mother received 24
months. It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a section 38 8 petition that “alleges merely changing circumstances and would m ean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future point,” because granting such a petition “does not prom ote stability for the ch ild or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] ‘ “[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.” ’ [Citation.]” ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) Where, as here, a section 388 petition is filed “on the eve of the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing[,] the child[ ]’s inte rest in stability [is] the c ourt’s foremost concern and outweigh[s] any interest in reunification. [Citation.]” ( In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594.) “In evaluating whether the petitioner has met his or her burden to show changed circumstances, the trial court should consider (1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds betwee n the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. [Citation.]” ( In re A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612, citing In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.Ap p.4th 519, 532 ( Kimberly F. ).) The parent
must also demonstrate that th e requested modification would be in the best interests of the dependent child. The party seeking the modi fication bears the burden to prove both of those requirements by a preponderance of th e evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(C); see also In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.) Relying on the factors identified in Kimberly F. , father argues the court abused its
discretion in this case because he had resolved the sole issue that led to the dependency – namely, domestic violence – by comp leting a 52-week domestic violence/anger management course with positive comments from program staff, by refraining from16 engaging in domestic violence for two and a half years, and by avoiding contact with mother. He also argues he ha s “taken extraordinar y steps” to treat his mental health and criminal justice problems by getting counseli ng and medication on his own and by being in compliance with his proba tion for nine months.
Father takes issue with the court’s fi nding that his completion of a 52-week batterer’s program did not resolve the domestic violence issues which precipitated the dependency. The court acknowledged that fath er had “participated in,” and not merely attended, the program. The final progress re port after completion of the program rated as “good” (but not “excellent”) father’s acceptan ce of responsibility for past and present abusive behavior, behavior showing commi tment to constructive personal change, appropriate participation in group sessions showing respect for facilitators, group members, probation officers, social workers, police, and the superior court, constructive change in beliefs, and develo ping strategies to prevent reoccurrence of violent and abusive behavior. However, fath er’s awareness of using abusiv e behavior in the past and present, and his empathy for the victims of his past and present abusive behavior was merely “adequate,” while his awareness of the effects of violence on children and others was somewhere on the continuum between “adequ ate” and “good.” Taken together with the court’s rejection of father’s explanation of his run-in with the security guard (which occurred after 31 of the 52 sessions), and its skepticism about the true reason father’s probation was violated, this evidence supports a conclusion that father had yet to fully
come to terms with his violent behavior. The record supports the court’s view that father’s understanding of his past abusive behavior and its effect on family was evolving, but incomplete. Father also charges that the cour t’s decisionmaking was tainted by its consideration of the unproven allegations of rape made by mother to police and hospital personnel at the beginning of the dependency. We disagree. In our view, the court’s mention of the rape allegations does not indicate the court accepted the allegations at face17 value, but rather that the court took them – al ong with the seriousness of mother’s injuries – as indicative of the fact that “[t]his is a case involving very significant issues of domestic violence.” Given the intensity of the domestic violence involved here, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that father’s progress in ameliorating the cause of the dependency, while commendable, was not sufficient. Father also argues that his daughter’s bond to him was greater th an the bond to his
caretakers. It is true fath er had visited his daughter co nsistently when he was not incarcerated, and that she had been in the concurrent foster home for six months. However, so far as this record shows, father never visited more frequently than twice a month, and all of his visits were supervised . Z.M.-R. had never lived in his home and,
insofar as father remained hom eless, it was not reasonably likely that Z.M.-R. would be
able to live with him in the foreseeable fu ture. While there un doubtedly was a bond between father and daughter, we cannot say the juvenile c ourt abused its discretion in concluding that the parent-child bond should not inte rfere with this thre e-year-old child’s chance for a permanent adoptive home. Finally, citing In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 12 02, father argues that his indigence is not a valid basis for concluding he could not regain cu stody of his daughter. However, In re G.S.R. , supra , is distinguishable. In th at case, father was the nonoffending noncustodial parent, and the court’ s sole basis for asserting juvenile court jurisdiction was his failure to find suitable ho using due to his poverty . That is not the
case here. Furthermore, from the incep tion of this dependency in 2010, father’s case plan called for him to maintain a stable living s ituation. He has not done so since the six month review hearing in Sept ember 2011. He still was far from being able to do so, although he had developed some contingency plans for securi ng enough inco me to allow him to rent an apartment. In the meantime, the minor had b een placed in at least three foster homes in three years. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that,18 given Z.M.-R.’s urgent need for a permanent plan, father’s contin gency plans were too little, too late. We recognize father has made significa nt strides toward ov ercoming the issues that led to Z.M.-R.’s removal, and that hi s efforts are all the more commendable because
he undertook them on his own initiative and w ithout the benefit of reunification services. However, given the history of th is protracted dependency, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that fa ther’s circumstances were changing, rather than changed, and that his efforts did not outweigh the minor’s need for stability and
permanency. IV. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders denying the section 388 motion and terminating parental rights are affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Dondero, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Humes, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Banke, J.