Filed 8/27/20 Marriage of Balling and Jaramillo CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re Marriage of CHRISTINE

BALLING and JUAN MARIO 

LASERNA JARAMILLO.

 B297371

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ED039914)

CHRISTINE BALLING,

Appellant,

v.

JEAN BAPTISTE

CHOCQUEUSE, as Personal 

Representative, etc.,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Amy M. Pellman, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded.

Law Office of Herb Fox and Herb Fox for Appellant.

Law Office of Roberta L. Murawski and Roberta L. 

Murawski for Respondent.
2

Christine Balling appeals the family court’s denial of her 

request for an order setting aside the 2009 judgment of 

dissolution of her marriage to Juan Mario Laserna Jaramillo 

(Laserna), now deceased. We reverse and remand with 

instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Marriage, Dissolution and Reconciliation

Balling and Laserna were married on July 2, 2007 in 

New Hampshire. Laserna, a Colombian national, lived in Bogota, 

Colombia, and worked for the Colombian government. Balling 

moved to Colombia after the wedding, and the couple registered 

their marriage with the Colombian government in August 2007. 

At some point during the following months, the 

relationship became strained; and Balling moved to Glendale, 

California. On July 7, 2008 Balling and Laserna filed in 

LosAngeles Superior Court a joint petition for summary 

dissolution of the marriage on a form adopted for mandatory use 

by the Judicial Council (FL-800). By signing the form Balling 

and Laserna represented under penalty of perjury that neither of 

them had any interest in real property or had separate property 

in excess of $36,000. They affirmed they had exchanged all 

required financial disclosures and checked the box indicating 

they had no community assets or liabilities. The judgment of 

dissolution was entered on January 21, 2009.

Within a month of the entry of judgment, Balling and 

Laserna reconciled; and Balling moved back to Colombia in April

2009. The couple did not register the judgment of dissolution in 

Colombia because, according to Balling, they “specifically wished 

to be married in the eyes of our country of residence.” 
3

2. Laserna’s Death and Colombian Probate Proceedings

Laserna was killed in a car accident in July 2016. One year 

later the Colombian court recognized Balling and Laserna’s 

mother as Laserna’s legal heirs. Laserna’s mother passed away 

shortly after Laserna’s death. The record does not reflect who 

succeeded her as Laserna’s heir. Regardless, Balling stipulated 

to the joinder in this action of Jean Baptiste Chocqueuse, 

Laserna’s nephew, as the personal representative of the Laserna 

family’s interests. Laserna’s family has sought to have the 2009 

judgment of dissolution recognized in the Colombian courts. If 

successful, Balling asserts, this would deprive her of any claim to 

Laserna’s estate or pension.

3. Balling’s Request for Order To Set Aside the Judgment 

of Dissolution

In an effort to preserve her status in Colombia as Laserna’s 

widow, on April 5, 2018 Balling requested an order setting aside 

the 2009 judgment of dissolution based on Laserna’s breach of 

fiduciary duty, his failure to disclose assets at the time of the 

dissolution action and the parties’ ineligibility for the summary 

dissolution procedure. Balling acknowledged the court had no 

jurisdiction to apportion assets located in Colombia. However, it 

appears she sought to set aside the judgment so it could not be 

relied on to support a posthumous divorce in Colombia and/or to 

reopen the dissolution proceeding to determine whether any 

undisclosed community property existed and to recover the value 

of her share of that property.

In support of her request for order, Balling submitted 

declarations in which she explained she and Laserna had “lived 

our lives in Colombia as husband and wife in every manner.” She 
4

stated she had been covered as Laserna’s spouse under his health 

insurance policy, was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy

and had been issued spousal visas in 2012 and 2014. When 

Laserna served as a senator in the Colombian Congress from 

2010 to 2014, Balling was issued a diplomatic passport and 

shared Laserna’s protective detail. 

Balling and Laserna lived together in Colombia except for a

period (the length of which Balling did not specify) when Balling 

rented an apartment for security reasons related to her work 

with the United States Special Operations Command. However, 

Balling continued to use Laserna’s security detail during this 

time, and she slept at Laserna’s house when their schedules 

permitted. In August 2015 Balling moved to Washington, D.C. to 

pursue an executive master’s degree. Balling maintains she and 

Laserna continued their relationship while she was in 

Washington, D.C., and she planned to move back to Colombia 

after she had completed her studies. Balling acknowledged her 

relationship with Laserna was “tumultuous” but asserted they 

considered themselves to be married and neither of them ever 

dated other people.

During their relationship Balling and Laserna kept their 

finances separate, and each paid his or her own share of living 

expenses. Balling stated she had no reason to investigate 

Laserna’s finances while he was alive. She knew he had an 

interest in his family’s farm, but he had told her the farm was 

unsuccessful and may need to be sold. She was also aware 

Laserna owned the house in Bogota where they lived, but she 

stated it was in a high-crime area. Laserna had always said he 

was in debt, and Balling had no reason to believe otherwise. 
5

Balling reported that Laserna fought often with his sisters over 

family assets.

According to Balling, it was not until Laserna’s death that 

she discovered the extent of his assets. Balling alleged Laserna 

acquired significant community property assets during the time 

they were married in the United States, including approximately 

$100,000 of income; a building he purchased in December 2007 

for more than $100,000; and business investments that had

increased in value by approximately $760,000 during 2008. None 

of these assets was known to Balling when she elected to use the 

summary dissolution procedure.

In response to arguments from Chocqueuse, Balling 

acknowledged she had a retirement account in 2008 that had, 

unbeknownst to her at the time, disqualified her from using the 

summary dissolution procedure. She explained that improper 

use of the summary dissolution procedure had been a good faith 

mistake on her part because she “didn’t think that a 401-K 

counted [toward community assets] because one can’t use it.” 

She now estimates the account earned less than $20,000 during 

the time she and Laserna were legally married in the United 

States. Balling also stated Laserna was aware of the retirement 

account, and she had not withheld any information from him 

regarding her finances. 

In addition to her own declarations Balling submitted 

declarations from two of Laserna’s close friends and employees. 

Andres Restrepo Falla stated he had worked for Laserna from 

2009 until his death in 2016. The men were close friends; Falla 

viewed Laserna as a mentor. Falla said Laserna had a “difficult 

character” and anger management problems that caused 

“differences and arguing” between Balling and Laserna. 
6

However, Falla “permanently and constantly knew [Balling and 

Laserna] as a couple and spouses showing deep love and fidelity 

to each other amidst all trials.” Falla also stated Laserna had a 

“stormy and very difficult relationship with most members of his 

family.” 

Yann Serge Schonwald Gomez stated in his declaration 

that he had known Laserna since high school and had begun 

working for him in 2007. Gomez also said Laserna had anger 

management issues, and Laserna would often task Gomez with 

being the peacemaker between Laserna and Balling. According 

to Gomez, Balling threatened to leave Laserna in 2015; but in 

June 2016 she agreed to return to Colombia. Gomez also stated 

Laserna had been ill a few months before his death and had said 

he did not want his sisters to inherit his assets when he died.

4. Laserna’s Family’s Response to the Request for Order

Chocqueuse raised four arguments in opposition to 

Balling’s request for order: The request was barred by the 

applicable statute(s) of limitations; the property Balling alleged 

Laserna acquired during the marriage was not community 

property; the relationship between Balling and Laserna did not 

continue until Laserna’s death; and Balling should be estopped 

from setting aside the judgment because she also had assets 

disqualifying her from using the summary dissolution procedure.

Catalina Laserna, one of Laserna’s sisters, submitted a 

declaration opposing Balling’s request for order. She asserted 

Balling knew of Laserna’s assets before his death and stated the 

property acquired by Laserna in 2007 “was not a purchase of a 

house by [Laserna]. This was part of a series of transactions 

done by me and my siblings to redistribute properties that were 

in the family.” Contrary to Balling’s assertions, Catalina
7

Laserna said her brother and Balling had lived together only “for 

a short time” and had a “tumultuous and unhappy relationship.” 

Catalina Laserna believed her brother hired an attorney in 2015 

to have the California dissolution judgment registered in 

Colombia.

Chocqueuse also submitted a declaration opposing Balling’s 

request for order. Chocqueuse had lived in Europe for most of his 

life, but he stated he was nonetheless close with Laserna because 

he had been raised partially by Laserna’s parents and because 

there was a relatively small age difference between them. 

Chocqueuse met Balling only twice; and he understood the couple 

fought regularly, with Balling repeatedly telling Laserna she 

wanted to leave him. In 2015 Laserna told Chocqueuse he 

planned to have the California judgment recognized in Colombia. 

Laserna said the relationship was over and asked his nephew to 

introduce him to another woman.

5. The Family Court’s Denial of the Request for Order

At the court’s suggestion the parties agreed to bifurcate the 

trial and decide the limitations issues first.

Balling submitted a trial brief asserting she did not have 

actual knowledge of Laserna’s assets until after his death and 

her request for order was timely. She filed a list of 18 proposed 

trial exhibits, which included documents evidencing real estate 

transactions in Colombia, visa requests, and health and life 

insurance paperwork. She also filed a witness list naming 

six witnesses, including the individuals who had already 

submitted declarations.

Chocqueuse’s trial brief argued Balling’s request was 

untimely, Laserna had not breached any fiduciary duty, and

there was no community property subject to the court’s 
8

jurisdiction. In addition, Chocqueuse filed a motion in limine 

requesting the court “decide the equitable issues of estoppel and 

unclean hands prior to all other issues. A ruling in favor of 

[Chocqueuse] will be dispositive and prevent the need for trial on 

statute of limitations or any other issue.” Chocqueuse argued 

Balling should not be permitted to set aside a judgment she had

actively participated in obtaining and, because she had assets 

above the limit permitted for a summary dissolution, she should 

not be entitled to claim the procedure was improper. In support 

Chocqueuse relied on Evidence Code section 623, which provides, 

“Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, 

intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular 

thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation 

arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to 

contradict it.”

At a hearing on February 19, 2019 the court stated it would

first address Chocqueuse’s motion in limine.1 Balling’s attorney 

objected, arguing the trial should proceed in the agreed-upon 

order with the limitations issues being decided before any 

equitable estoppel argument was heard. The court proceeded to 

hear argument regarding estoppel. 

After hearing from counsel, the court granted the motion. 

The court explained, “The issue today is Evidence Code 623 . . . .” 

“The only evidence the court has is based on the party’s own 

admission that she knew that she had community property and 

potential other community. . . .” “Either she did it knowingly or 

1 The judge who had presided at pretrial proceedings was no 

longer available, and a different judge presided at the hearing on 

February 19, 2019.
9

fraudulently. I don’t know which. . . .” “Under the law of equity 

and under the doctrine of unclean hands . . . I am going to have to 

grant the motion in limine.” 

The court denied Balling’s counsel’s request for a statement 

of decision and dismissed the request for order.

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law2

a. Summary dissolution and its requirements

Section 2400 establishes a summary procedure permitting

parties to obtain a dissolution without a court appearance. To 

qualify, the following conditions, among others, must be met: 

There are no children of the relationship (subd. (a)(3)); the 

2 To the extent the parties have argued the set-aside 

provisions of Family Code section 2120 et seq. apply to this case, 

they are mistaken. Those sections apply “‘when either party is 

seeking to “undo” a property division judgment that adjudicated

particular assets and/or liabilities. By contrast, those statutes 

have no effect on proceedings to determine community interests 

in assets and liabilities that were unadjudicated or omitted from 

the judgment.’” (In re Marriage of Georgiou & Leslie (2013) 

218 Cal.App.4th 561, 575; see Fam. Code, § 2121, subd. (a) [“[i]n 

proceedings for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or 

for legal separation of the parties, the court may, on any terms 

that may be just, relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any part or 

parts thereof, adjudicating support or division of property, after 

the six-month time limit of Section 473 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure has run, based on the grounds, and within the time 

limits, provided in this chapter”].)

Statutory references are to the Family Code unless 

otherwise stated.
10

marriage is not more than five years in duration as of the date of 

separation (subd. (a)(4)); neither party has any interest in real 

property wherever situated (subd. (a)(5)); the total fair market 

value of community property assets, including any deferred 

compensation or retirement plan, is less than a specified amount

(subd. (a)(7)); and neither party has separate property assets in 

excess of a specified amount (subd. (a)(7)).

3

 Parties seeking 

summary dissolution are required to exchange preliminary 

declarations of disclosure pursuant to section 21044 but are not 

3 The amount specified as the threshold value of community 

or separate property disqualifying parties for summary 

dissolution is adjusted every other year by the Judicial Council to 

reflect any change in the value of the dollar. (See § 2400, 

subd. (b).) In 2008, when Balling and Laserna filed their petition 

for summary dissolution, the amount was $36,000. 

4 Section 2104 requires the parties to a dissolution 

proceeding to exchange declarations of disclosure executed under 

penalty of perjury. The declarations must include: “(1) The 

identity of all assets in which the declarant has or may have an 

interest and all liabilities for which the declarant is or may be 

liable, regardless of the charato qualifycterization of the asset or 

liability as community, quasi-community, or separate. [¶] 

(2) The declarant’s percentage of ownership in each asset and 

percentage of obligation for each liability when property is not 

solely owned by one or both of the parties. The preliminary 

declaration may also set forth the declarant’s characterization of 

each asset or liability.” (§ 2104, subd. (c).) The preliminary 

declarations must also include the declarant’s tax returns for the 

prior two years and an income and expense declaration. (§ 2104, 

subds. (a), (e).) The declarations must be served within 60 days 

of the filing of, or response to, the petition for dissolution. 

(§ 2104, subd. (f).)
11

required to exchange final declarations of disclosure pursuant to 

section 2105. (See § 2109.) The summary dissolution proceeding 

is commenced by the filing of a joint petition signed by both 

spouses and stating under penalty of perjury that the conditions 

for a summary dissolution have been met and the parties have 

exchanged the required disclosures. (See § 2401.) Six months 

after the petition is filed the court enters the judgment of 

dissolution of the marriage. (See § 2403.)

Section 2405, subdivision (a), provides that either party 

may institute an action to set aside the judgment of dissolution

on the grounds of “fraud, duress, accident, mistake, or other 

grounds recognized at law or in equity.” In addition, 

section 2405, subdivision (b), states, “The court shall set aside a 

judgment entered pursuant to Section 2403 regarding all matters 

except the status of the marriage, upon proof that the parties did 

not meet the requirements of Section 2400 at the time the 

petition was filed.” Section 2405 does not include a time limit 

within which a party must seek to set aside a summary 

dissolution judgment. (See generally In re Marriage of Baltins

(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 93 & fn. 13 [“[w]here little judicial time 

and effort have been expended, ‘“. . . the factor of judicial economy 

which otherwise weighs in favor of finality is less strong”’”].)

b. Married individuals’ fiduciary duties

Married individuals are subject to the general rules 

governing fiduciary relationships and owe one another a duty of 

the highest good faith and fair dealing. (§§ 721, subd. (b); 1100, 

subd. (e); see In re Marriage of Brewer & Federici (2001) 

93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1343-1344.) Section 1100, subdivision (e),

specifically provides, “This duty includes the obligation to make 

full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and 
12

information regarding the existence, characterization, and 

valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have 

an interest and debts for which the community is or may be 

liable.” These fiduciary duties of disclosure extend throughout 

dissolution proceedings. (See § 1100, subd. (e); see also In re 

Marriage of Georgiou & Leslie (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 561, 569.) 

Section 1101, subdivision (a), creates a right of action by 

one spouse against the other for breach of fiduciary duty when 

the breaching spouse engages in conduct that impairs the value 

of the non-breaching spouse’s interest in community property. 

Section 1101, subdivision (g), states, “Remedies for breach of the 

fiduciary duty by one spouse, including those set out in 

Sections 721 and 1100, shall include, but not be limited to, an 

award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount equal to 

50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of 

the fiduciary duty plus attorney’s fees and court costs.” (See In re 

Marriage of Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 992

[“[w]hen . . . a spouse has breached [his or] her fiduciary duty, but 

not in a manner displaying fraud, malice, or oppression . . . 

section 1101, subdivision (g), governs the applicable remedies”].)

c. Postdissolution proceedings regarding undisclosed or 

unadjudicated community property

Section 2107, subdivision (d), provides, “[I]f a court enters a 

judgment when the parties have failed to comply with all 

disclosure requirements of this chapter, the court shall set aside 

the judgment.”

5

 The failure to disclose need not amount to a 

5 Although section 2107, subdivision (d), specifies “[t]he 

failure to comply with the disclosure requirements does not 

constitute harmless error,” article VI, section 13, of the California 
13

breach of fiduciary duty. (See In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 

8 Cal.App.5th 267, 296.)

Section 2556 provides, “In a proceeding for dissolution of 

marriage . . . the court has continuing jurisdiction to award 

community estate assets or community estate liabilities to the 

parties that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment 

in the proceeding. A party may file a postjudgment motion or 

order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain 

adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or 

not adjudicated by the judgment. In these cases, the court shall 

equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated community estate 

asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause shown 

that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the 

asset or liability.” (See In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 

838, 850-851 [“‘property which is not mentioned in the pleadings 

as community property is left unadjudicated by decree of divorce, 

and is subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in 

common meanwhile’”]; In re Marriage of Huntley (2017) 

10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1059 [“a dissolution judgment does not 

Constitution prohibits setting aside a judgment based on 

procedural error absent a showing “the error complained of has 

resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” “The California Constitution 

trumps any conflicting provision of the Family Code. . . . [¶] To 

the degree, then, that section 2107, subdivision (d) is read for the 

proposition that a judgment must be set aside or a new trial 

granted solely because of a failure to exchange . . . declarations of 

disclosure, it is not consistent with our state’s Constitution.” 

(In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519, 

527; accord, In re Marriage of Kieturakis (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 

56, 92 [showing of prejudice required notwithstanding statutory 

language].)
14

affect the disposition of community property as to which the 

judgment is silent”].)

“In providing courts with continuing jurisdiction, 

section 2556 imposes no time limit on former spouses to seek to 

adjudicate omitted or unadjudicated community property after a 

dissolution judgment was entered.” (In re Marriage of Huntley, 

supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060.) In addition, section 2556 

applies even when one or both of the former spouses were aware 

of the community property at the time the dissolution judgment 

was entered. (See Huntley, at pp. 1060-1061; Huddleson v. 

Huddleson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1564, 1569.) 

d. Equitable estoppel and unclean hands

“‘Family courts are courts of equity and there is a basic 

principle of equity that one cannot take advantage of one’s own 

wrong.’” (In re Marriage of Klug (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1389, 

1403.) Accordingly, pursuant to the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel, “a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts 

if he [or she] intentionally led another to believe a particular 

circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to his [or her] 

detriment.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 

332.) This doctrine is codified in Evidence Code section 623. (See 

Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 

1346, 1359 & fn. 8.) 

Similarly, the doctrine of unclean hands serves to deny 

relief to plaintiffs who have committed the same or similar 

wrongdoing as those for which they seek relief. (See Blain v. 

Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059.) “The doctrine 

demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he [or 

she] seeks a remedy. He [or she] must come into court with clean 

hands, and keep them clean, or he [or she] will be denied relief, 
15

regardless of the merits of his [or her] claim.” (Kendall-Jackson 

Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978.)

Whether the doctrines of equitable estoppel and unclean 

hands apply is a question of fact. (See Kendall-Jackson Winery 

Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979; Feduniak 

v. California Coastal Com., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360.)

2. Standard of Review

We review de novo issues of statutory construction. (In re 

Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 311; People ex rel. 

Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) In 

construing statutes “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to ascertain 

the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the 

statute[s]. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory 

language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. 

[Citation.] If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the 

lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the 

language governs. [Citations.] If, however, the statutory terms 

are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including 

the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. 

[Citation.] In such circumstances, we ‘“select the construction 

that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the 

Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the 

general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that 

would lead to absurd consequences.”’” (Day v. City of Fontana

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272; accord, People v. Lawrence (2000) 

24 Cal.4th 219, 230.)
16

3. The Family Court Erred by Failing To Consider the 

Provisions of Applicable Statutes Before Denying 

Balling’s Request for Order 

As discussed, the family court denied Balling’s request to 

set aside the 2009 judgment of dissolution based on equitable 

estoppel (by way of Evidence Code section 623) and the doctrine 

of unclean hands. Of course, equitable principles may apply

when a party seeks to set aside a judgment of dissolution. 

(See generally In re Marriage of Klug, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1403.) However, when the Legislature has addressed a specific 

situation, a court cannot wholly ignore the statutory mandate in 

favor of equitable considerations. (See Timberline, Inc. v. 

Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368, fn. 5 [“‘“‘[r]ules of 

equity cannot be intruded in matters that are plain and fully 

covered by positive statute’”’”].)

Here, the governing statutes require the family court to set 

aside a judgment and/or adjudicate an omitted or community 

asset in certain situations even if a spouse acted with unclean 

hands. For example, as discussed, section 2405, subdivision (b), 

states the court “shall set aside” a summary dissolution judgment 

if the parties did not meet the requirements of section 2400. Use 

of the word “shall” is “unambiguous and mandatory. ‘“It is a well 

established rule of statutory construction that the word ‘shall’ 

connotes mandatory action.”’” (In re Marriage of Hokanson, 

supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 993; accord, Ramos v. Superior Court

(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729 [“[t]he Legislature’s use of the 

word ‘shall’ to describe the action to be taken by the magistrate 

means the statute is absolute”].) There is nothing in the 

language of section 2405 or case law interpreting it that would 

justify an exception if the spouse seeking to set aside a judgment 
17

acted with unclean hands. (See In re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 

90 Cal.App.4th 34, 42-43 [unclean hands defense not available to 

prevent award of penalty for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to 

section 1101, subdivision (h), which states amount “shall” be 

awarded].) 

Here, it is undisputed Balling and Laserna each had 

separate property in excess of $36,000 at the time the petition for 

summary dissolution was filed; thus, the couple did not qualify 

for a summary dissolution judgment under section 2400, 

subdivision (a)(7). Accordingly, pursuant to the unambiguous 

language of section 2405, subdivision (b), the court must set aside 

the judgment “regarding all matters except the status of the 

marriage.” The family court erred by failing to follow this 

statutory mandate.6

Chocqueuse’s final argument, that Balling cannot show she 

was prejudiced by any failure of Laserna to disclose assets 

because the family court has no jurisdiction to apportion assets 

located in Colombia, ignores the statutory remedies available to 

Balling. In addition to a set-aside of the judgment, Balling may 

be entitled to recover 50 percent of the value of any undisclosed 

community asset. (See § 1101, subd. (g).)

6 As for the remaining statutes potentially applicable to the 

facts as alleged by Balling, it is disputed whether Laserna 

breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure pursuant to 

section 1101 and failed to make disclosures pursuant to 

section 2104 or whether there were any community assets. If the 

family court were to find any of these circumstances had been 

proved, then it must impose the corresponding remedies 

mandated by sections 1101, 2107 and 2556, unless an articulated 

exception applies. 
18

DISPOSITION

The order denying the request for order to set aside the 

judgment of dissolution is reversed. On remand the family court 

shall, pursuant to section 2405, set aside the January 21, 2009

judgment of dissolution except as to the status of the marriage. 

The court shall conduct all necessary further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

DILLON, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.