UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4815

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SETH JON PAUL SLABY,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District 

Judge. (1:15-cr-00261-LMB-1)

Submitted: August 16, 2016 Decided: September 1, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Kevin R. Brehm, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Tobias D. 

Tobler, Alexander P. Berrang, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Seth Jon Paul Slaby pled guilty to being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The 

district court imposed a 21-month sentence. On appeal, Slaby 

contends that the district court procedurally erred at sentencing 

by relying on facts alleged in a letter submitted to the court by 

Slaby’s former girlfriend. We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 

(2007). A district court commits procedural error if it “select[s] 

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts[.]” Id. at 51. In 

selecting a sentence, a district court may “rely only on evidence 

with some minimal level of reliability, and the Guidelines 

themselves demand that the evidence used have ‘sufficient indicia 

of reliability to support its probable accuracy[.]’” United 

States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 393-94 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal 

citation omitted) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 6A1.3(a)). This threshold for the reliability of facts 

supporting a sentence protects a defendant’s “due process right to 

be sentenced only on information which is accurate.” United 

States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976).

At sentencing, the district court clearly stated that it was 

not considering any allegations in the letter from Slaby’s former 

girlfriend that were not also either contained in Slaby’s 
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presentence report (“PSR”) or already presented to the court during

argument on Slaby’s motion for pretrial bond. A sentencing court 

is entitled to a presumption that it is capable of disregarding 

evidence that it deems unsupported or improper. See United States 

v. Fay, 668 F.2d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that a 

sentencing court “will not be presumed to have considered something 

[it] explicitly disregarded”); see also United States v. Castro, 

413 F.2d 891, 895 n.7 (1st Cir. 1969) (“A jury may have difficulty 

in disregarding extrajudicial statements implicating a defendant.

We will not presume that a judge suffers from the same disability. 

Indeed, the presumption is to the contrary.”). 

Here, the record supports the application of this 

presumption. Slaby’s PSR reflected that he sustained two juvenile 

convictions for assault and battery as well as an adult conviction 

for assault on a law enforcement officer, and that he paid a peace 

bond to resolve another assault charge he incurred as an adult. 

Additionally, Slaby faced a pending strangulation charge stemming 

from a domestic incident and was subject to several protective 

orders of various natures in the years preceding the sentencing at 

issue. At sentencing, the district court focused on Slaby’s record 

as detailed in his PSR and his dubious explanation for possessing 

the firearm in question. In addition to stating that it was 

disregarding unsupported portions of the letter, the court never 

mentioned any of the allegations contained in the letter that did 
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not otherwise appear in Slaby’s PSR. Accordingly, the presumption 

applies and there is no basis to conclude that the district court 

relied on the unsupported factual allegations in the letter.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED