2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-15-2013

Peter Sinclair v. Citi Mortgage Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-4261

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Peter Sinclair v. Citi Mortgage Inc" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1118.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1118
DLD-120 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-4261

___________

PETER M. SINCLAIR; SALLY SINCLAIR

v.

CITI MORTGAGE, INC., Dallas, TX; Columbus, OH;

Ofallow, MO; and all its affiliates and other locations

PETER M. SINCLAIR,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 5:12-cv-00773)

District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 14, 2013

Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 15, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Peter M. Sinclair, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. 
2

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because this appeal does not present a substantial 

question, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 

10.6.

I.

In May 2007, Sinclair and his wife (collectively, “the Sinclairs”) obtained a loan from 

Wilmington Finance, Inc. and executed a mortgage securing the loan against their residence. 

Around November 2009, the Sinclairs contacted Citi Mortgage, Inc. (“Citi”), their loan 

servicer, seeking a loan modification under the federally-regulated Home Affordable 

Modification Program (“HAMP”), a foreclosure mitigation program managed jointly by the 

Department of the Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

According to Sinclair, Citi delayed and stalled the consideration of their HAMP application.

The Sinclairs filed their complaint in February 2012, alleging that Citi‟s conduct 

violated their civil rights and demanding compensation under the “government whistleblower 

program.” On April 30, 2012, Citi filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The 

Sinclairs did not respond, but filed a “Notice” requesting that the District Court either transfer 

their case to the Central District of California for inclusion in multi-district litigation (“MDL”) 

or deny the motion to dismiss and treat the matter as a class action. On November 7, 2012, the 

District Court granted Citi‟s motion to dismiss, denied the Sinclairs‟ request to transfer, and 

dismissed the Sinclairs‟ complaint with prejudice. Sinclair timely filed this appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary 

review over the District Court‟s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 
3

(3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This Court affirms a district court‟s dismissal 

for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not 

entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” McGovern v. City of 

Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). We may affirm the District Court on any basis 

supported by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

III.

We agree with the District Court that the Sinclairs‟ complaint failed to state a claim. 

First, the District Court correctly noted that the HAMP does not provide a private right of 

action. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting 

that “HAMP does not create a private federal right of action for borrowers against servicers”). 

Furthermore, although the Sinclairs ask for relief under the “government whistleblower 

program,” they never alleged entitlement to relief under a specific whistleblower protection 

statute. We agree that no whistleblower statute would apply here, as the Sinclairs are not 

employed at Citi, do not allege retaliation, and are not attacking the practices of a 

governmental entity.

Furthermore, the District Court correctly denied the Sinclairs‟ request to have their case 

transferred to the Central District of California for inclusion in MDL. Such requests must be 
4

filed with the judicial panel on MDL itself, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(ii); therefore, the District 

Court lacked authority to grant the Sinclairs‟ request. Likewise, the District Court properly 

declined to treat the Sinclairs‟ case as a class action, as “one pro se litigant cannot represent 

another,” Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654); 

see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that “it is plain 

error to permit [a litigant] who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow [plaintiffs] in a 

class action.”).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.1 See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We deny as moot 

Sinclair‟s motions for appointment of counsel and his motion for an extension of time to file a 

response to the Clerk‟s letter advising of possible summary action.

 

1

The District Court declined to provide the Sinclairs with leave to amend their complaint 

before dismissing it with prejudice. We conclude that this decision was not in error, because 

we do not see how any amendment to their complaint would save the Sinclairs‟ claims. See

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that a court should 

not dismiss pro se complaints without granting leave to amend unless “amendment would be 

inequitable or futile”).