## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
NO. P D-1929-06

STE P HON LAVELL E WALTE R, Appellant

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON AP P ELLA NT ’S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE SIX TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

BOW IE CO UN TY H ERV EY , J., fi led a dis senting opi nion in w hich Ke ller, P .J., and Keasler , J., joined .
DI S S E NT I NG OP I NI ON Irespe ctfully

dissent. Iwould decide that “blame- shifting” out-of-c ourt statements that are supported by

corr oborating circ umstances c lear ly indicating th e ir

tr u s tw o r th in e s s a r e “ g o ld s ta n d ard” statements that should not be thrown out with the dross. Adopting the approa ch set out in Dea n McCormick’s evidence treatise, the majority opinion decide s that “blame- shifting” statements that ar e within a g ener ally self-inc ulpatory narr ative do not satisfy the f ir s t- s ta g e f

o u n d a tional require ment for the “ ag ainst interest” he arsa y rule e x ception underWalter--2

Texas law. See Maj. op. at 13 n.31, 19. Thus, if a de clar ant’s out-of- court stateme nt, “Stephon and Irobbed the bank, but Stephon killed t h e b an k t eller,” is offer ed ag ainst Stephon in S tephon’s criminal prose cution for this conduc t, the statement that “Stephon killed the bank teller ” would be exclu d e d e v e n if th is s tate me n t is c le ar ly s u p p o rte d b y o th e r in d ic ia o f r e li a b il it y s uch as, f

or

e xamp le , a

vid e ota pe de pic tin g the e ve nt. Ido no t be lie ve that th is i s w hat th e dr a ft e rs of Te xas’ “ag ainst interest” he arsa

y rule e x ception intended. Idis a g re e wi th the ma

jor ity op ini on that the fe de ra l and Te xas “ a g a ins t in te re st” he ars a y ru le exceptions are “quite similar.” See Ma j. op . a t 14 n. 36 , 1 6 n .4 8. Th e se e xce pti on s ( pa rt ic ula rl y the ir second se ntence s) ar e ver y differ ent. F ED . R. E V ID . 804(b)( 3) allows admission of: A statement whic h . . . at t h e t i m e o f i ts making . . . so f ar te nded to subject the decla rant to . . . cr iminal liabili ty . . . that a reas o n ab l e p er s on in the decla rant’s position would not have made the statement unless be lieving it to be true . A s t a t e m e n t t e n d i n g t o e x p o s e t h e d e c l ar an tt o c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y and of

fered to exculpate the acc used is n ot a dmi ssi ble un le ss c or ro bo ratin g c ir c ums tanc e s c le arl y ind ic a te the tr

us tw or thi ne ss o f t

he state me nt. (Emphasis supplied). T EX . R. E V ID . 803(24) a llows admission of: A statement whic h . . . at the time of its making . . . so far tende d t o s u b

j ec t the decla rant to . . . cr iminal liabili ty . . . that a re as o n ab l e p erson in the de clar ant’s position would not have ma de the state ment unless believing it to be true. I n criminal case s, a statement tendingto expos e the de clar ant to criminal l i ab ility is not a dmi ssi ble un le ss c or

ro bo ratin g c ir c ums tanc e s c le arl y ind ic a te the tr us tw or thi ne ss of the state me nt. Th e re fo re , in ca se s like thi s, wh e n a n “ a g a ins t in te re st” ou t- of -c ourt state me nt i s o ff

e re d to inculp ate the a c c u s e d , t

h e f e d e r a l r u l e l i t e r a l ly

re qu ir e s o nly

the fi rs t- sta g e fo un datio na l r e qu ir e me nt. Thus, such a statement may be admitted under fede ral rule 804(b)( 3) without ev en co n s i d ering whether there are corr oborating circ umstances that clea rly indicate the trustworthines s o f t heWalter--3

1 Thus , a “ bla me -s ha ri ng ” state me nt, su c h a s “ Ste ph on and I robb e d th e ba

nk ,” a dmi ssi ble under f eder al rule 80 4 (b )( 3 ) i s inadmissibl e under Texas rule 803(24) unless supported by “cor roborating c ircumstance s.” Se e als o Ma j. o p. a t 21 (“ bla

me -s ha ri ng ” state me nts ina dmi ssi ble under Te x as rule 803( 24) unless supported by “cor roborating c ircumstance s”).
2 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
3 I n W illiamson , th e Sup re me Cou rt wa s c on str

uin g wh a t Co ng re ss m e ant in fede ra l r ule 804(b)( 3) by

the term “ statement,” which the Court found to be ambiguous. See W illiamson , 512 U.S. at 599- 600 (O’Connor, J .) (one meaning of “stateme nt” would make an entire g ener allyselfinc ulp a tor

y na rr a tive adm iss ibl e wh ile ano the r m e anin g “ wo uld make Rul e 80 4( b) (3 ) c ov e r o nly those dec larations or remar ks within the confession that ar e individually self-inc ulpatory ”).
4 The majo ri t y opinion asserts that “[t] hese c ourts have stated that the cor roboration re qu ir eme nt for inc ulp a tor y state me nts is n e c e ssa

ry e ith e r u nd e r t he Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on in W illiamson or the c onstitut i o n al rig ht of confr ontation.” See Ma j. o p. a t 14 n. 36 . T he Sup re me Court in W

illiamson , howeve r, expressly left open the question of wh et h er this “c orrobor ating statement. This is not so under Texas rule 803(24) , which would exclude this statement that fe dera l rule 804(b) (3) would a dmit, unless the “corr oborating circ u m stance s” sec ond-stag e foundational

re qu ir e me nt i s me t. Th is “ c or ro bo ratin g c ir c ums tanc e s” re lia bil ity -e nh anc ing fe a tur e of Te xas r ule 1 80 3( 24 ) d ir e ctl y

a dd re sse s and

c ur e s th e re lia

bil ity c on c e rn s e xpre sse d in

the va ri ou s p lur a lity opinions in W

i l l i a ms o n v. United States and justifies the adoption for Texas prac tice of D ean 2 Wigmore’ s more expansive appr oach to the a dmissibi lity of “blame-shifting ” stateme nts that are within a g ener ally

self-inc ulpatory

narr ative. See M aj

. op. at 13 n.31 (discussing the Wigmore , Mc Cor mic k and Jef

fe rs on e vid e nc e tr e a tis e s) ; see also W illiamson , 5 1 2 U

. S

. a t6 1 1

- 1 2 ( K e n n e dy, J ., concur ring in the judgme nt) (same ). 3 The majority

opinion points out that “most” fede ral c ourts have judicia l l y l egislated a “cor roborating c ircumstance s” foundational r equire ment into feder al rule 804( b)(3) for out-of -cour t “ag ainst interest” statements offe red to inc ulpate an a ccuse d. See M a j

. o p . a t1 4 n . 3 6

. A p p ar e n t l y, 4Walter--4

circ umstances” require ment should be judicially leg islated into feder al rule 804( b)(3)

. S ee , e.g., W illiamson , 512 U.S. at 605 (O’Connor, J.) (expressly leavin g o p en the que stion of “whethe r, as some Courts of Appea ls have he ld, the second s en t en ce o f Rule 804(b)(3) . . . also requir es that statements inculpating the ac cused be supported by corr oborating circ umstances” ). And it appea

rs that t h o s e fe d eral courts that have judicially leg islated this “corr oborating c ir c ums tanc e s” re qu ir e me nt i nto fe de ra l rul e 80 4( b) (3 ) have do ne so ba se d upo n the vie w that Sixth Amendment C onfrontation C lause reliability conce rns re quired it. Se e, e .g ., Un ite d S tat es v . H ar ty , 930 F.3d 1257, 1263 (7 Cir. 1991) (“c orrobor ating circ umstances” foundational re quirement wa s th ne c e ssa ry “ to p a ss c on sti tut ion a l m

u s t e r u nd e r t he Sixth A me ndme nt C on fr on ta tio n Cl a us e ” ). Th e se c on c e rns , ho wev er, are no t w e ll f ound e d in a po st- Crawf

ord v. W ashington world. Se e ge ne ra lly Crawf ord v. W ashington , 54 1 U. S. 36 (2 00 4) (r e je c tin g c on sti tut ion a l ru le se t out in pr ior Sup re me Court de c isi on s th a t adm is si on of te sti mon ia l out- of

-c ourt state me nts did

no t vi olate Sixth Amendment’s Confr ontation Clause if they had “indicia

of re liability ”). A ssum i n g that “stree t corne r” spontane ous out-of-c ourt statements like those in this case are “testimonial,” their a dmission into e vidence would not violate Confrontation Clause principles unde r Cra wfo rd if the de c lara nt i s available for c ross-examination and eve n i f t h es e statements ar e not supported by “cor roborating circ umstances.” Se e Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 59 (whe n decla rant a ppear s for c ross-e x am i n at i on at tr ia l, th e Co n f

r o n tati o nCl a

u s e p la c e s n o c o n s tr a in ts a t a ll o nth e u s e o f h is p r io r testimonial statements). Ne ither W

illiamson nor current S ix th Amendment C onfrontation C lause jurisprude nce require fede ral c ourts to judicia ll y le g islate a “ corr oborating circ umstances” require ment into feder al rule 804(b) (3).

5 I t is noteworthy

that at least two of the pre- W il li a mson fede ra l- c ourt

de c isi on s c ite d in footnote 36 of the majority opinion a ppare ntly allowed the admission into evidenc e of “blameshifting” out-of-c ourt statements supported by “cor roborating circ umstances.” See U nited States v. Cas am e nto , 887 F.2d 1141, 1171 (2 Cir. 1989); United States v. Alvare z , 584 F.2d 694, 699- 701 nd (5 Cir. 1978). th thi s is me ant t o d e mon str a te that T e xas r ule 80 4(2 3) and

fe de ra l r ule 80 4( b) (3 ), a t le a st i n th os e fede ral c ases whe re this judicia ll y le g is la te d “ c o r r o b o r a ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e s ” f o u n d a tional require ment

wo uld a pp ly , a re sim ila r e no ug h th a t W

illiamson sh ou ld be c on sid e re d p e rs ua siv e a uth or ity in

c on str uin g Te xas r

ule 80 3( 24 ). Th a t “mo st” or “ so me ” fe de ra l c ourt s h a ve jud ic ia lly le g isl a te d th is 5

“ c or ro bo ratin g c ir c ums tanc e s” fo un datio na l re qu ir e me nt i nto fe de ra l r ule 80 4( b) (3 ) d oe s n ot, in m y

v i ew, compel a conc lusion that we should follow W illiamson an d

a u t o m a t i c a l l y

e xc l u d e r e l iable “blame- shifting” statements, par ticularly sinc e t h e S upreme Court in W illiamson left open theWalter--5

6 Se e Ma j. o p. a t 21 -2 2 (“ our se c on d- sta g e fo un datio n r e qu ir e me nt t hat no state me nt a g a ins t pe na l inte re st is adm iss ibl e ‘u nle ss co rr ob or a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s cle arl y ind ic a te the tr us tw or thi ne ss of the stateme nt’ is a suffic ient g uard a g ainst the use of unr eliable ‘ blame-sha ring ’ statements” ). qu e sti on of wh e the r t

his “ c or ro bo rat in g c ir c ums tanc e s” re qu ir e me nt s ho uld be jud ic ia lly inc or po rate d in to f

e de ra l r ule 80 4( b) (3 ). I n the fi na l ana ly sis , the ma jor ity op ini on

e xclu de s r e lia

ble evidenc e without demonstrating why the “c orrobor ating circ umstances” require ment under Te x as rule 804(23) is not a sufficient guard a g ainst the use of unreliable “blame- shifting” statements when,

acc ording to the majority opinio n , i t is a sufficie nt gua rd ag ainst the use of unr eliable “ blamesh ari ng ” state me nts
. 6 A f ina l po int sh ou ld b e ma de c on c e rn ingthe pr a c tic a lit ie s o f t he Court ’s de c isi on . I t w ou ld

s e e m t h a tt h e e r

r o n e o u s a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e o f a “ b l a m e - s h i f

t i n g ” s t a t e m e n tw i l l a l m o s ta l w a ys be ha rm le ss i f thi s sta te me nt is sup po rt e d by “ c or ro bo ratin g c ir c ums tanc e s. ” Th is sho uld we ig h in favor of dec iding that Te x as rule 804( 23) should be interpre ted to pe rmit the admission of “blameshifting” statements. I t would seem more pr actica l to take into considera t i o n t h e existence of “cor roborating c ircumstance s” in dec iding whe ther a “blame- shifting” statement is admissible than
takin g the se c ir c ums tanc e s in to a c c ount i n d e c idi ngwh e the r i ts a dmi ssi on is h arm le ss. Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. H e r v e y , J

.
Filed: Oc tober 1, 2008 Pub lis h