IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

December 10, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER BRETTON BLY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County

Nos. 40589, 41543, 41544, 45070 Vanessa Jackson, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2018-00653-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Christopher Bretton Bly, Defendant, was arrested in Coffee County for two counts of

aggravated burglary, one count of theft under $500, two counts of vandalism over $1,000, 

one count of theft over $1,000, one count of theft over $500, and one count of vandalism 

under $500. Subsequent to this arrest, Defendant was incarcerated in the Tennessee 

Department of Correction (“TDOC”) for a probation violation in Wilson County. After 

Defendant completed his service on the Wilson County sentence, he pled guilty to the 

charges in Coffee County. Defendant later filed a Rule 36 motion to obtain pretrial jail 

credit on the Coffee County case, and the trial court partially granted the motion. On 

appeal, Defendant argues that he is entitled to the time he served in TDOC on the Wilson 

County probation violation as pretrial jail credit on the Coffee County case. After a 

thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgments of the trial court are 

affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Drew Justice, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Bretton Bly.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Craig Northcott, District Attorney General; and Joshua C. Powell, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

01/23/2020
- 2 -

OPINION

Factual and Procedural History

This appeal involves the timelines from three separate incidents: (1) Wilson 

county convictions for aggravated burglary (the “Wilson County case”), (2) a Coffee 

County conviction for theft (the “first Coffee County case”), and (3) additional Coffee 

County convictions in cases 41,543F (aggravated burglary, theft under $500, vandalism 

over $1,000) and 41,544F (aggravated burglary, theft over $1,000, vandalism over 

$1,000, aggravated burglary, theft over $500, and vandalism under $500) (the “second 

Coffee Count case”). The timeline as gleaned from the record is as follows:

May 19, 2014: Defendant was sentenced in the Wilson County case to four years’ 

probation.

May 28, 2014: Defendant pled guilty in the first Coffee County case and received 

a four-year suspended sentence, ordered to be served consecutive to the Wilson County 

case.

August 14-15, 2014: Defendant committed aggravated burglary while on 

probation and was arrested in the second Coffee County case.

August 29, 2014: A violation of probation warrant was issued for Defendant’s 

arrest for violating the terms of probation in the first Coffee County case. This warrant 

was executed September 3, 2014.

November 25, 2014: Defendant was sent to TDOC following the Wilson County 

probation revocation.1

September 2, 2016: Defendant’s Wilson County sentence expired.

2

May 15, 2017: The trial court issued an order revoking Defendant’s probation in 

the first Coffee County case and sentencing him to serve his four-year sentence in TDOC. 

The same day, Defendant pled guilty in the second Coffee County case and was 

sentenced to serve ten years in TDOC. The judgment form stated that Defendant’s tenyear sentence in the second Coffee County case was to be served concurrently with 

 

1

It is unclear from the record when the Wilson County warrant was filed and served. 

2 This date is mentioned in the record from the transcript of Defendant’s December 13, 2017 

hearing on his Rule 36 motion and the trial court’s February 14, 2018 Order Granting Jail Credits. This 

date is not contested by Defendant or the State on appeal.
- 3 -

Defendant’s four-year sentence in the first Coffee County case. The trial court failed to 

grant any pretrial jail credit in the original judgments. 

August 28, 2017: Defendant filed a Rule 36 motion for jail credits in the second 

Coffee County case.

December 13, 2017: The trial court held a Rule 36 motion hearing in which 

Defendant claimed that, while he was serving his sentence in TDOC on the Wilson 

County case, he was simultaneously awaiting trial in his second Coffee County case. 

Defense counsel stated, “[The Coffee County] sheriff sent [Defendant] to the TDOC to 

continue awaiting the trial in [the aggravated burglary charges in the second Coffee 

County case] and also to serve out his Wilson County sentence.” (emphasis added). 

Defendant claimed that the trial court never found the second Coffee County case to be 

consecutive to the Wilson County case, and thus, the second Coffee County case was 

concurrent to the Wilson County case “by default.” Therefore, Defendant asserted, his 

time served in TDOC on the Wilson County case should count as jail credit in the second 

Coffee County case since they were being served “concurrently.” The State responded 

that Defendant’s sentence in the Wilson County case was fully served before he entered 

pleas on the second Coffee County case. Therefore, the State contended, Tennessee Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 32 did not apply, and the trial court did not have to make a finding 

that the second Coffee County case was consecutive to the Wilson County case. The trial 

court stated, “[Defendant] should not be entitled to jail credit for that time that was spent 

in TDOC on the Wilson County case. Obviously, any other time that he spent in Coffee 

County he should get full credit for.”

February 14, 2018: In the second Coffee County case, the trial court granted some 

of Defendant’s requested jail credits and issued amended judgments. Specifically, the 

trial court granted pretrial jail credits for August 15, 2014, to November 24, 2014, and 

from September 2, 2016, to May 15, 2017. 

April 9, 2018: Defendant filed a motion to accept a late-filed notice of appeal from 

the order on the Rule 36 motion and the judgments of conviction in the first and second 

Coffee County cases.

May 4, 2018: This court granted permission to late-file an appeal of the order on 

Defendant’s Rule 36 motion but denied waiver to late-file an appeal of the judgments in 

the first and second Coffee County cases.

May 15, 2018: Defendant filed a pro se Post-Conviction Petition, claiming that he 

was denied his right to appeal the judgments of conviction in the first and second Coffee 

County cases.
- 4 -

June 28, 2018: In the second Coffee County case, the trial court again amended the 

judgments and granted pretrial jail credits for May 20, 2014, to November 24, 2014. 

Thus, the total pretrial jail credits for the second Coffee County case stood at May 20, 

2014, to November 24, 2014, and from September 2, 2016, to May 15, 2017.

November 14, 2018: The Coffee County Circuit Court granted Defendant postconviction relief in the form of a delayed direct appeal in the second Coffee County case.

November 26, 2018, Defendant filed his notice of appeal. On the same day, 

Defendant filed a motion to consolidate the direct appeal and the pending appeal from the 

denial of his Rule 36 motion. This court granted Defendant’s motion to consolidate on 

November 30, 2018.

This appeal follows.

Analysis

Defendant argues that the Wilson County case and the second Coffee County case 

were concurrent “by default” because the trial court did not specify that they were to be 

run consecutively and because none of the criteria of Tennessee Code Annotated section 

40-35-115(b) were met to justify consecutive sentencing. Thus, Defendant claims that 

because the two sentences are concurrent, the time he spent in TDOC serving his 

sentence on the Wilson County case from November 25, 2014, to September 2, 2016,

should count as pretrial jail credit in the second Coffee County case. In the alternative, 

Defendant requests that his plea be rescinded for “failure to reach a true meeting of the 

minds.”

The State responds that the pretrial jail credits Defendant seeks do not arise from 

the offenses involved in the second Coffee County case. The State argues that the trial 

court was under no obligation to determine whether the second Coffee County case was 

concurrent or consecutive to the Wilson County case because the Wilson County case 

had already expired before Defendant entered a plea in the second Coffee County case.

“When an accused is taken into custody by the state, Tennessee is required to 

credit the sentence with the time served in the jail pending arraignment and trial as well 

as the time subsequent to any conviction arising out of the original offense for which he 

was tried.” State v. Henry, 946 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-23-101(c)). “The purpose of the statute was to provide jail time credit 

prior and subsequently to conviction for indigents unable to make bond.” State v. 

Abernathy, 649 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). 
- 5 -

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(C)

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) states, in pertinent part:

(1) Multiple Sentences from One Trial. If the defendant pleads guilty or is 

convicted in one trial of more than one offense, the trial judge shall 

determine whether the sentences will be served concurrently or 

consecutively. The order shall specify the reasons for this decision and is 

reviewable on appeal. Unless it affirmatively appears that the sentences are 

consecutive, they are deemed to be concurrent.

. . . . 

(2)(A)(i) Prior Tennessee Sentence Known. If the defendant has additional 

sentences not yet fully served as the result of convictions in the same court 

or in other courts of Tennessee and if this fact is made known to the court 

prior to sentencing, the court shall recite this fact in the judgment setting 

sentence, and the sentence imposed is deemed to be concurrent with the 

prior sentence or sentences, unless it affirmatively appears that the new 

sentence being imposed is to be served consecutively to the prior sentence 

or sentences. The judgment to make the sentences consecutive or 

concurrent shall explicitly relate the judge’s reasons and is reviewable on 

appeal.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32. (emphasis added).

Here, Defendant’s sentences in the Wilson County case and the second Coffee 

County case were not concurrent because the Wilson County sentence had expired on 

September 2, 2016, prior to Defendant’s plea in the second Coffee County case on May 

15, 2017. Thus, Defendant had no sentences “not yet fully served” as a result of a 

conviction in another Tennessee court at the time he was sentenced in the second Coffee 

County case. Defendant claims that, because the trial court did not run the sentences 

consecutively, they are by default concurrent sentences. However, Rule 32(c) only 

provides two instances for default concurrent sentences when a trial court fails to make a 

finding of consecutive sentences: (1) when multiple sentences arise from one trial, and 

(2) when a prior known Tennessee sentence has not yet been fully served at the time of 

sentencing on a new charge. Neither is the case here. 
- 6 -

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115

Defendant argues that because none of the criteria in Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 40-35-115(b)3 was met, the Wilson County case and the second Coffee County 

case must be run concurrently. Part (a) of this statute reads, “[i]f a defendant is convicted 

of more than one (1) criminal offense, the court shall order sentences to run consecutively 

or concurrently as provided by the criteria in this section.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

115(a) (2017). Part (d) states that “[s]entences shall be ordered to run concurrently if the 

criteria noted in subsection (b) are not met . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(d) 

(2017) (emphasis added). Our supreme court has stated that

[i]n interpreting statutes, we are required to construe them as a whole, read 

them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and view them 

consistently with the legislative purpose. The construction must not be 

strained and must not render portions of the statute inoperative or void. We 

must seek a reasonable construction in light of the purposes, objectives, and 

spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.

State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995) (internal citations omitted).

 

3 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) provides:

The court may order sentences to run consecutively if the court finds by a preponderance of the 

evidence that:

(1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted the defendant’s life to 

criminal acts as a major source of livelihood;

(2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive;

(3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so declared by a competent 

psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant’s 

criminal conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior with 

heedless indifference to consequences;

(4) The defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human 

life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high;

(5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a 

minor with consideration of the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between 

the defendant and victim or victims, the time span of defendant's undetected sexual activity, the 

nature and scope of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to 

the victim or victims;

(6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on probation; or

(7) The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b).
- 7 -

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115 provides the criteria for a trial court 

to use to determine whether a defendant who “is convicted of more than one (1) criminal 

offense” should have the sentences run concurrently or consecutively. To read the statute 

as Defendant suggests, any time a person is convicted of an offense, he must be 

sentenced concurrently to any previously expired sentence, absent the criteria in section 

(b) or an express finding that the sentence is consecutive. Defendant’s interpretation of 

the statute is “strained,” unreasonable, and not “based on good sound reasoning.” See id.

Such a construction would also conflict with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(c)(2)(A)(i) which governs whether a new sentence should be run concurrently or 

consecutively to prior known sentences not yet fully served.

“Arises Out Of”

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-23-101(c) provides that:

The trial court shall, at the time the sentence is imposed and the 

defendant is committed to jail, the workhouse, or the state penitentiary for 

imprisonment, render the judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant 

credit on the sentence for any period of time for which the defendant was 

committed and held in the city jail or juvenile court detention prior to 

waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, or county jail or workhouse, pending 

arraignment and trial. The defendant shall also receive credit on the 

sentence for the time served in the jail, workhouse or penitentiary 

subsequent to any conviction arising out of the original offense for which 

the defendant was tried.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-101(c) (2018). “As written, the statute provides for credits 

against the sentence only if the incarceration, claimed as a basis for the credits, arises 

from the offense for which the final sentence was imposed.” State v. Earl D. Mills, No. 

E2004-01218-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1551339, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 5, 2005).

In State v. Timothy S. Bradley, a defendant was charged in two cases, one in 

Dickson County and one in Humphreys County. State v. Timothy S. Bradley, No. 01C01-

9804-CC-00165, 1999 WL 155916, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 1999). While the 

defendant was in the county jail awaiting trial on the Dickson County case, he was 

charged in the Humphreys County case on December 2, 1996. Id. After continuing to 

spend the next seven months in the Dickson County jail, the defendant pled guilty in the 

Humphreys County case on July 19, 1997. Id. The Dickson and Humphreys County 

cases were run concurrently. The defendant argued on appeal that the time he spent in

the Dickson County Jail subsequent to being charged in the Humphreys County case 

should be counted as pretrial jail credit in the Humphreys County case. Id. This court 
- 8 -

rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-23-

101(c) “only provides credit against a sentence if the reason for incarceration arises from 

the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” Id. at *2. The defendant “was being 

held in the Dickson County Jail pending trial for offenses committed in Dickson County. 

Thus, even if [the defendant] had been able to post bond . . . for the Humphreys County 

charges, he would not have been released from the Dickson County Jail.” Id. 

In the same way, even if Defendant had posted bond in the second Coffee County 

case after his transport to TDOC on the Wilson County case, he would not have been 

released from TDOC. Defendant was not being held in TDOC on the second Coffee 

County case, and thus his TDOC confinement did not “‘arise out of’ the offense” of the 

second Coffee County case. See id. Thus, he has no allowance to that time as a matter of 

right. Trigg v. State, 523 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) (stating that “when 

the time spent in jail or prison . . . ‘arises out of’ the offense for which the sentence 

against which the credit is claimed[,] such allowance becomes a matter of right.”)

Because the sentences in the Wilson County case and the second Coffee County case 

were not concurrent, and because Defendant’s time in TDOC from November 25, 2014,

to September 2, 2016, did not “arise out of” the second Coffee County case, he is not 

entitled to pretrial jail credit for that time.

Rescinding the Plea Agreement

Defendant states, “[i]f this perfectly legitimate request cannot be granted, 

[Defendant] asks that the entire plea agreement be struck and rescinded, and the 

convictions REVERSED for failure to reach a true meeting of the minds.” Defendant 

presents this alternative remedy for the first time in his appellate brief’s concluding 

paragraph. He provides no authority or argument for his contention that, absent this 

court’s grant of almost two years of pretrial jail credits, he is entitled to withdraw his 

guilty plea due to “failure to reach a true meeting of the minds.” Tennessee Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 10(b) states that “[i]ssues which are not supported by argument, 

citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in 

this court.” The argument is waived.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

____________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE