UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4549

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE PEREZ MALDONADO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00125-WO-1)

Submitted: March 14, 2011 Decided: March 31, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bryan Gates, Jr., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

John W. Stone, Jr., Acting United States Attorney, Terri-Lei 

O’Malley, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jose Perez Maldonado appeals his 150-month sentence 

imposed after pleading guilty to one count of distribution of 

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) 

(2006), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). We affirm.

Maldonado’s guilty plea arose out of his arrest after 

he was captured trying to dispose of cocaine base in a sink 

during the execution of a search warrant on the home of a codefendant. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) issued 

after the court accepted Maldonado’s guilty plea. The PSR 

indicated that with an offense level of twenty-eight and a 

criminal history category of III, Maldonado’s advisory 

Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months. However, because 

Maldonado was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum 120-month 

sentence, his advisory Guidelines range became 120 months. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Maldonado’s offense level reflected a 

downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (2009). 

After pleading guilty, but before sentencing, 

Maldonado filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Ineffective Assistance 

of Counsel.” In the motion, Maldonado stated that his attorney 

had not brought a translator to jailhouse visits, and he was 

otherwise unable to communicate with his attorney. When 

examined by the district court regarding these claims, Maldonado 
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admitted that he could communicate with his attorney without a 

translator, and that his attorney had brought a translator to at 

least one of their meetings. Maldonado maintained, however, 

that he never tried to dispose of cocaine base and that he 

merely sold powder cocaine to another dealer. The court denied 

Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the indictment, denied his motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea, allowed Maldonado’s counsel to 

withdraw, and appointed substitute counsel. 

At sentencing, the district court heard testimony from 

Detective Sergeant Tim Cameron, who allegedly encountered and 

chased Maldonado and observed him attempting to dispose of 

cocaine base, and from Maldonado himself. After hearing the 

evidence, the court concluded that Maldonado had made false 

representations to the court both regarding his “motion to 

dismiss” and during his testimony at sentencing. Accordingly, 

the court struck the two-level downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility and imposed a two-level enhancement 

for obstructing justice. Maldonado’s revised offense level was 

thirty-two, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 135 to 

168 months. The court imposed a 150-month sentence. Maldonado 

timely appealed. 

On appeal, Maldonado argues that he should have 

received the two-level adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility, and he should not have received a two-level 
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enhancement for obstructing justice. He does not assign error 

to his Fed R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy or to the district court’s 

decision to deny his motion to the extent he sought dismissal of 

his indictment or withdrawal of his guilty plea.

An appellate court reviews a sentence for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id. First, the court must assess 

whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines 

range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, 

analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n 

individualized explanation must accompany every sentence.”); 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(same). An extensive explanation is not required as long as the 

appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has 

considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United 

States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir) (quoting Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)), cert. denied, 131 S. 

Ct. 165 (2010). 
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We review a district court’s decision to deny an 

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility for clear error. 

United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007). We

“must give ‘great deference’ to the district court’s decision 

because ‘[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.’” Id.

(quoting USSG § 3E1.1 comment. (n.5)). “To earn the reduction, 

a defendant must prove to the court by a preponderance of the 

evidence ‘that he has clearly recognized and affirmatively 

accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.’” 

Id. (quoting United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 

(4th Cir. 1996)). False denials of relevant conduct can lead to 

the loss of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 

USSG § 3E1.1 comment (n.1).

We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the 

district court did not err in striking the adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility. The court concluded that 

Maldonado falsely denied relevant offense conduct and attempted 

to mislead the court to escape the consequences of his guilty 

plea. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the court’s judgment 

in this regard. 

We review for clear error a district court’s 

determination that a defendant obstructed justice. United 

States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 560 (4th Cir. 2005). According 
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to USSG § 3C1.1, a defendant’s base offense level is to be 

increased two levels for obstruction of justice if –

the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 

justice with respect to the investigation, 

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 

conviction[.]

USSG § 3C1.1. The application notes for § 3C1.1 specifically 

include perjury by the defendant and providing materially false 

information to a judge or magistrate. USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b), 

(f). For purposes of § 3C1.1, the Supreme Court has defined 

perjury as “false testimony concerning a material matter with 

the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a 

result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United 

States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Under Dunnigan, “it 

is preferable for a district court to address each element of 

the perjury in a separate and clear finding[,]” 507 U.S. at 95, 

but it is sufficient if the district court makes a determination 

“that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of 

perjury.” Id.

Once again, we have reviewed the record and decline to 

disturb the district court’s judgment. The court made a 

specific finding that Maldonado offered false testimony at 

sentencing regarding his offense conduct. Because such a 

finding is sufficient to warrant a USSG § 3C1.1 enhancement, we 
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conclude the district court did not err in imposing the 

enhancement. 

Maldonado assigns no further error to his sentence, 

and we accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED