Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . A P - 76, 167

EX PA R TE C A R L E D D I E M I LL ER , A ppl i c ant

ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. 1 0 1 0 2 2 6 - A I N T HE 2 9 9 J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT TH FROM TRAVI S CO UNTY C OCH RAN , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he c our t i n whic h M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OM ACK , J OHN S ON and H O L C O MB , JJ., joined. K EASLER , J., file d a c onc ur r ing and di sse nt ing opi nio n in whic h K ELLER , P .J., and H ERV EY , J., jo ine d.

OP IN ION In t h i s h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g , a

p p l i c an t c l a i m s t h a tb o t h h i s t r i a l an d a p p e l l a t e a t t o r

n e ys provided inef

fec tive assist an ce of counse l that prejudice d his rights. The ha beas judg e made 1 finding s of fact, conclusions of l aw, and a recommendation that this Court gra nt relief. We a cce pt the habe as judg e’s f

indings of f

act, but we disag ree with some of his le g al conclusions. Ba sed on the habe as judg e’s f

actua l findings a

nd the applica

ble law, we conclude that applicant is not entitled to r e lie f o n h is i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l c la im, bu t he is e nti tle d to re lie f o n h isMiller Pag e 2

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate c ouns e l c la im.

I

. A. F ac tu al Bac kgr ound

. Applicant, Carl Miller, was char g ed with murder f or the stabbingdeath of

Terr y Bur leson, a bai l bondsman and membe r of a motorcy cle c lub called “ The HumpingPeople.” At tria l, the

e vid e nc e was un di sp uted tha t a pp lic ant k ill e d B ur le so n. Th e on ly iss ue wa s w he the r h e did so in self-de fense

. The fif ty -y ear -old applica

nt testifie d t hat, on Saturday , Aug ust 18, 2000, he “made the rounds” to bid fa

rew ell to friends a

nd family befor e g oing home to California th e n ex t day . He followed a

friend to the A ristocrat Club, but he stay ed outside beca use he did not have the $5.00

cover char g e. He started t alking to some y oung women. Soon, Bur leson walked up, said that the

women we re w ith him, and cursed at applicant. The two men exchang ed wor ds; then Bur leson invited applicant to g o around the corne r to “talk.” J ames Clevela nd, a fr iend of B urleson’s a nd a fellow motorcycle c lub member, followe d the two men ar ound the corne r and onto a concr ete slab behind the club. Applicant and B urleson had a lrea dy begun to fig ht when Clevela nd came around the corne r. Cleveland saw

applicant “ swing ing,” and then B urleson kicke d applicant a b o u t t h re e times. Ap pli c ant a lso te sti fi e d th at B ur le so n kic ke d him tw ic e in the c he st and on c e in t he le g , c a us inghim to fall backwar d s . A p p li c an t e xp la in e d th a t h e c o u ld

n o t r u naw ay d u e to a le g b r a c e h e w o re beca use of injuries f

rom a motorcycle a ccide nt. He said that he fea red for hi s life, so he pulled out his knif e and sta bb e d B ur le so n in

the c he st a

nd he a d “ thr e e or

fo ur tim e s. ” He “ le ane d” int o Bur leson as he sta

bbed him , pushing the blade in almost three inches, pier cing Bur leson’s aor ta, venaMiller Pag e 3

The a utopsy repor t stated that Bur leson had “ acute ethanol intox ication” at the time of 2 death. cava , and hea

rt. Bur leson was una

rmed; his blood-alcohol leve l at the time of death was 0.14. Applicant and B urleson had never met befor e, and applicant kne w nothing a bout Burle son. At trial, the def

ense of fer ed sig nificant e vidence of B urleson’s c hara cter for violenc e whe n drinking 2 from four differ ent witnesses.

* Robbie Davis, who had dated Burleson more than a de cade ear lier, said that she a nd Bur leson had be en members of the same motorc y cle c lub. She testified that Bur leson wa s v ery j ea l o u s an d

b ec am e p h y s i ca l l y

v i o l en twh en h e h adb ee ndri n k i n g.

* Doug las Hurst, applicant’s former brother- in-law, testified that Burle son had a re p u t at i o nfo r v i o l en ce wh en h e h adb ee ndri n k i n g.

* Glenn Craw ford, a pplicant’s cousin, testifie d t h at h e had he ard that Burle son was “someone y ou wouldn’t want to be a round because of his temper and violenc e,” a nd t h at h e w as es p ec i al l y

v i o l en taf

t er dri n k i n g.

* L ee Arthur Thomas, who had known applicant for thirty y ear s and B urleson for ten, testified that B urleson wa s violent and “ve ry ag g ressive,” as we ll as loud and profa ne wh en h e h adb ee ndri n k i n g. On re buttal, the S tate called Deputy Dar rell Galloway , Bur leson’s best fr iend and a fellow

m em b er o f “ T h e H u mp i n g P eo p l e. ” H e s ai d t h at Bu rl es o nwa s “n i ce . He re s p ec t s p eo p l e. He ’l l go out of his way

to help y ou. And he ne ver ha rmed a ny one.” T h e j u r y r e

j e ct edap p l i ca n t ’s s el f- d ef en s e c l ai m an d

co n v i ct edh i m o f m u rd er . T h e j u d ge found the two e nhance ment para g raphs true and sente nced a pplicant to thirty

y ear s in prison. On appe al, applica

nt raised f our points of err or: (1) the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to re ject h i s s el f- d efense cla im; (2) the trial cour t’s failure to gr ant a mistrial base d on a comment by the prosec utor that applica

nt had “a shackle on his leg beca

use he murde red a

man”; (3) the tr ial court’s fa ilure to g ra

nt a ne w tri a l ba se d o n th a t pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nt; and (4 ) t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure toMiller Pag e 4

Mi lle r v . S

tate , No. 03-01-00362- CR, 2002 W L1987453, 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 6310 3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug ust 30, 2002) (not desig nated f or publication). After this Court reviewed the habea s materials a s orig inally delivere d, we r emande d the 4 c a se to t he ha be a s c ourt

to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he do c tr ine of

la c he s b arr e d a

pp lic ant’ s c la im conce rning his appellate c ounsel. The ha beas judg e conc luded that, althoug h applicant’ s a pp e llate c ouns e l ha d d ie d in 20 06 , la c he s d id n ot b ar a pp lic ant’ s c la im. g rant his motion for instructed ve rdict. The c ourt of appe als reje cted a pplicant’s cla ims and aff

irmed his conviction and sentenc e. 3 B. The App lication f or a Writof H abeas Corpus and the Habeas Judge’s F ind ings

. Applicant filed a

post-conviction applic a

ti o n f o r a wr it of habea s corpus five -and- a-ha lf y ear s afte r his conviction bec ame f inal. He c laimed that his trial counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l beca

use (1) h e “f

ai led to object to the prose cutor infor ming the jur

y that applicant wa s shackle d during trial”; and ( 2) he “ failed to pre sent t es t i mony reg ardingprior ac ts of violence committed by

the dec ease d and his companion.” He a lso claimed that his appellate counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel bec ause he “fa iled to r ai s e t h e issue that the e vidence was insufficient to prove that applicant’s 1976 burg lary conviction was f

or an of fense committed after his 1972 possession of heroin convic tion became final.” Tr ia l c ouns e l subm itt e d an a ff ida vit dis pu tin g his a lle g e d ine ff e c tiv e ne ss an d e xpla ini nghis str a te g ic de c isi on s at tr ia l. A pp e llate c ouns e l ha d d ie d a y e ar and a ha lf

be fo re a pp lic ant f ile d h is

a pp lic a tio n a

nd thu s c ou ld n ot d e fe nd

his a c tio ns or

str a te g ic de c isi on s. Th e h a b e a s ju d g e h e ld

a h e ar in g a t wh ic h tr ia l c o u n s e l a n d h is inv e s ti g a to r

te s ti f ie d

. The habea s judge then made w ritten finding s of fa ct and c o n clusions of law. He c oncluded that 4 applicant’ s trial counsel made a strateg ic decision not to object to the prosec utor’s c o m ment

conce rnin g applicant’ s shackles a nd that, in any

event, a pplicant was not pre

judiced by

thatMiller Pag e 5

466 U.S. at 687 (“This re quires showingthat counsel made err ors so serious that counse l 5 was not func tioning as the ‘counse l’ g uara nteed the de fenda

nt by the Six th Amendment.”)

. comment. The ha

beas judg e also found t hat applicant’s trial counsel was not ineffe ctive for failing t o discover a

nd offe r evide nce c oncer ning pr ior ac ts of violence by J ames Clevela

nd, who had

acc ompanied B urleson to the fig ht, and, ac cordingto applicant, had bloc ked any possible esca

pe route fr om the fig ht. We ag ree with those fac tual finding s and leg al conc lusions. The ha beas judg e found that t ri al counse l provided constitutionally ineffe ctive assistanc e beca use he f ailed to discover and offe r evide nce that Burle son had bee n convicted of misdemeanor assault in 1982 for stabbing a man named Chris H anson. The ha beas judg e conc luded that applica nt was prejudiced by this failure and recommende d that applicant be g rante d relief on this claim. The ha be a s ju dg e a lso fo un d th a t a pp lic ant’ s ap pella te a tto rn e y wa s in e ff

e c tiv e be c a

us e he fa ile d to challeng e the suff

iciency of the e vidence to prove that the enhanc ement par ag raphs we re se quential

a nd t h a t a p p l i c an t w a s t h e r e f

o r e an h a b i tu a l o f f e n d e r , s u b j e c t t o a m i n i m u m o f t w e n t y - f i v e y e a rs ’ imprisonment. T h e habe as judg e conc luded that applica nt was pre

judiced by

this failure a

nd

rec ommended that applica nt be g rante d relief

on this c laim a s well. We will thus turn to those two

c la ims a ft e r s e tti ngou t th e g e ne ra l le g a l st and ard s f or an in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im. II. A. The Le ga l St anda r d for As se ssi ng a n Ine ffec ti ve As sis ta nc e of C ouns e l C lai m . To preva il on an ineffe ctive assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. W ashington , the applicant must show t h at (1 ) counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient by

falling below an obje ctive sta nd ard of re a so na ble ne ss and (2 ) the re is a pr ob a bil ity , suf fi c ie nt to und e rm ine the c on fi de nc e in 5 the outcome, that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould haveMiller Pag e 6

Id. (“This re quires showingthat counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to depr ive the 6 defe ndant of a

fair tr ial, a trial whose result is reliable.” ). Id. at 689. 7 Id. a t 69 4; Ton g v . S

tate , 2 5 S. W.3 d 7 07 , 7 12 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) ( “ Ap pe lla nt m us t 8 prove both prong s of Strickland by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e in orde r to preva il.”). Se e J oh ns on v . S

tate , 68 S.W .3d 644, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“The rec ord does not 9 reve al def ense c ounsel' s rea sons for not objectingto the prosec utor’s comments. Given the pr e su mpt ion

of e ff e c tiv e ne ss a

nd the g re a t de fe re nc e we g ive to d e c isi on s ma de by de fe ns e counsel, we see nothingin the prese nt rec ord that would compe l us to find counsel ineff ective.” ); Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 5 7 S. W.3 d 4 36 , 4 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ) ( “ [A]n a pp e llate c ourt

‘c omm on ly will assume a strate g ic motivation if any can possibly

be imag ined,’ a

nd will not conclude the challeng ed conduc t constituted deficient pe rfor mance unless the conduc t was so outrag eous that no competent attorney

would have e ng ag ed in it.”) (quoting3 W AYN E L A F AVE E T AL ., C RI M I N A L P ROCE D U RE § 1 1. 10 © ( 2d . e d 1 99 9) ); Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“ To defe at the pre sumption of reasona ble profe ssional assistance, ‘ any alleg ation of ine ff e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be fi rm ly

fo un de d in

the re c or d, and

the re c or d mu st a ff

ir mativ e ly demonstrate the alleg ed inef fec tiveness.’” ) (inter

nal citation omitted). Sc he an e ttev . S

tate , 1 44 S.W. 3d

50 3, 51 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ) ( “ Th e ana ly sis is 10 undertaken in light of

the ‘totality

of the re prese ntation’ rathe r than by examining isolated ac ts or omissions of trial counse l.”). As we have note d, wh e n a re vie wi ngc ourt

c on sid e rs a

c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, i t must first analy

ze all alleg ations of def

icient per formanc e, dec ide whethe r counsel’s c onduct was c onstitut ionally defic ient, and, if so, then c onsider whe ther been differ ent. Courts “ must indulg e a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 6 wi d e ra n ge of reasona

ble profe ssional assistance,” and that “the challeng ed ac tion ‘might be

c o n s i d e r e d

s o u n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y. ’ ” T h e a p p l i c an tm u s tp r o v e b o t h o f t h e s e p r o n g s b y a 7 preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. When the rec ord conta ins no evidence of the re asoning behind 8

c ouns e l’ s a c tio ns , a

c ourt no rm a lly c ann ot c on c lud e that c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. 9 To deter mine whether

counsel ha s provided ef

fec tive as s i s t an ce, c ourts must consider the totality of the re prese ntatio n an d t h e par ticular c ircumstance s of ea ch ca se; we do not re strict the analy sis to an evaluation of isolated a cts or omissions of counsel. “The fac t that another attorney 10Miller Pag e 7

those specif

ic def icient ac ts or omissions , in their totality , prejudice d the def ense. Ex parte Nailor , 149 S.W .3d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Sc he an e tte , 144 S.W .3d at 509. 11 Mr. Hanson a lso stated, 12 Iwas not aw are that Bur leson was killed in Travis County in 2000 or that Carl Miller was c harg ed with his murder. N o lawy er or private inve stigator contac ted me bef ore Miller’ s trial to discuss the incident with Bur leson. Had someone contac ted me, I

would have disc ussed the incident a nd that Iconsidere d Bur leson to b e ve ry vio le nt. Iliv e d in

Tr a vis County

a nd wo uld have be e n ava ila

ble to testify at the trial ha d Ibeen se rved w ith a subpoena. may have pur sued a differe nt tactic at trial is insufficient to prove a claim of inef

fec tive assistance .” 11 Withthe se g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e s in min d, we tur

n to a pp lic ant’ s tw o c la ims

. B. App lic ant Di d No t P r ov e That His Tr ial At to r ne y Wa s Ine ffec ti ve in F ail ing to P r e se nt Te st im onyRe ga r ding th e M ur de r Vi c ti m ’s P r iorAs sa ultCo nvi c ti on. Applican t c la im s th a t h is tr ia l att o r n e y w a s c o n s ti tuti o n a ll y

d e f ic ie n t b e c a

u s e h e d id

n ot d is cover and off er e vidence of Ter

ry Bur leson’s prior c onviction for misdemea nor assa ult. Applicant

asser ts that evidence of this 1982 assault would have been a dmissibl e under Rule 404(a) (2) of

the Texas Rules of Evidence , and that the outcome of applica nt’s trial probably

would have be en differ ent had the jur

y known about the murde r victim’s eig hteen- y ear -old conviction. 1. The prior assault

. Ap pli c ant h a s p ro vid e d a

n a ff ida vit fr om C hr is H ans on , s tatin g , “ Te rr y B ur le so n s ta

bb e d me wi th a kn if e a t an a pa rtme nt c omp le x in 19 82 .” Ap pli c ant a lso inc lud e d c op ie s of the 19 82 of

fe ns e 12 repor t and the judgme nt of conviction for that assault. Acc ording to the offe nse re port, Bur leson had been making loud noises with his motorcy cle a s he drove around the apar tment complex where he and Ha nson both lived. Hanson and his brothe r we n t o u tside to tell Burleson to “knoc k it off.” B ur le so n s tart e d to fi g ht H ans on . Th e n B ur le so n pu lle d a kn if e and swun g it at H ans on , c utt inghimMiller Pag e 8

See E x parte Re ed , 2 71 S.W. 3d 69 8, 72 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ) ( “ [I ]n mo st 13 circ umstances, we will defer to and ac cept a

trial judg e’s finding s of fac t and conc lusions of law when they

are supported by

the rec ord.”)

. T EX . R. E V ID . 404(a) (2) ( “Evidenc e of a person’ s char acte r or c hara cter trait is not 14 admissible for the pur

pose of pr oving a ction in conformity there with on a par

ticular oc casion, except: . . . (2) Character of victim. I n a cr iminal case a nd subject to Rule 412, evidenc e of a pertinent c hara cter

trait of the victim of the c rime off ere d by an ac cused. . . .” ). on his e lbow and under

his left brea st. W hen Ha

nson’s brother

shot his pis tol into t he air , Bur leson ran of f and thre w his knife into the bushes. 2. Theha be as c ou rt’ s fi nd ing s. I n his factua l findings, the tr ial court stated, 8. Trial counse l did not presen t evidence that . . . the de cede nt stabbed Chris Hanson with a kn if e a t an a pa rtme nt c omp le x in A us tin in 1 98 2 a nd wa s c on vic te d o f a ssa

ult

. 9. I n re bu tta l, Tr a vis County De pu ty She ri ff Da rr e ll G a llo wa

y te sti fi e d th a t de c e de nt, his be st friend, w as pea cef

ul, law-a biding, nice , respe ctful, and “ never harme d any one.” 10. On cr oss-examination, Galloway stated that he would not believe a lady who testified that the dec edent ha d been violent to her

. 11. Trial counse l did not ask Galloway if he kne w or ha d hear d that the dec edent stabbe d Hanson and wa s c on vic te d o f a ssa

ult

. We adopt these fa ctual finding s b ec ause the y are supported by

the re cord. We do not, however ,

13 adopt the habe as cour

t’s leg al conc lusions, as they are not supported by

the law. 3. Theap

pli c ab le law

. Ap pli c ant i s in c or

re c t in c on c lud ingthat e vid e nc e of B ur le so n’ s 1 98 2 a ssa

ult on Chr is Ha ns on wo uld have be e n a dmi ssi ble un de r R ule 40 4( a )( 2) to s ho w that B ur le so n w a s th e fi rs t

14

a g g re sso r i n th is c a se . T he re wa s n o s e ri ou s d isp ute a t tr ia l th a t B ur le so n w a s in de e d th e fi rs t ag g ressor. He invited a

pplicant to g o around the corne r and fig ht. Applicant followed him. TheyMiller Pag e 9

Th e State ’s c los ingargume nt e mph a size d th is p oin t: 15 When they

g et bac k there , the fig ht does not g o well for the defe ndant. Yo u h e ard

him say –a nd [de fe ns e c ouns e l] ha s sp e nt a g oo d d e a l of

tim e in v oir dire a nd opening statements talking about the disparity betwee n the size of the two ind ivi du a ls. I t turn s o ut t hat th a t’ s n ot t

hat g re a t a

dis pa ri ty a t a ll. Ab ou t th e same heig ht. Not that totally

far off in size. And Mr. Miller tells y ou that that’s not something that rea lly

bothere d him. W hat did bother him, thoug h, was onc e that fi g ht b e g an, he ’s los ingand he ’s los ingqu ic k a

nd he ’s los ingfa st. An d s o w hat do e s h e do ? Do e s h e re tr e a t li ke a re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld have? You know, [ defe nse counse l] , when de scribing this scene, would have y ou sort of imag ine this thing havingoccur red in like a

handball cour

t. Why once you g et in that door, y ou just can’t g et out. There ’s walls eve ry wher e. I t’s seale d. Th e re ’s no thi nghe c ou ld d o, and it’ s– y ou jus t g ot t o s tay

the re . Y ou

g ot t o protec t y ourself. Today we lea rned that the handball cour t was more like a

concr ete slab f

or a baske tball where there are no walls and re treat is easily available . Would a re a so na ble pe rs on

have re tr e a te d und e r t

ho se c ir c ums tanc e s? You be t. No w, wa s h e re c e ivi ngthe thr e a t of de a dly fo rc e ? Of

c ours e no t, o f c ours e not. What he fea

red w as not serious bodily injury . What he fea

red w as not death. What he fea

red w as losing f

ace . And so he did what he’s g ood at, knife w ork. De fe ns e c ouns e l, i n tu

rn , e mph a size d th e unre a so na ble ne ss o f r e tr e a t du

ri ngthe fi g ht: Okay . So let’s ge t back to this retre at thing. I ’ve g ot this guy in front of me. H e outweig hs me 40 or 50 pounds. He ’s mad enoug h to be kicking me. . . . So here he is. He turns to retr eat. He puts his knife in his pocket, and he turns to retre at, walkingawa y . Whop. Bang . Kick. Hit. And how f ar do you thi nk he ’s g oin g to g e t? Do y ou kn owfo r a

fa c t th a t if

he tur ne d to le a ve in whateve r spac e he ha d to turn to leave that he wasn’ t goingto ge t kicked ag ain, knocked to the g round? I f he’ s g ot his back turned–now , here ’s a guy , didn’t say a wo rd , k ic ks him

.

. . . How many

of y ou would have tur

ned y our bac k on a man who’ s been kic kin g y our c he st a

nd hittin g y ou

and wa lk a wa y ? Wou ld you

do that? W e ll, y ou ’d be br a ve r t

ha n I and br a ve r t ha n M r. Mil le r t o d o th a t. Isubmit t o y ou, ladies and g entlemen, that you wouldn’t do it and that no fo u g h t

. B u r l e s o n k i c k e d an d h i t h i m . A p p l i c an t p u l l e d o u t a kn i f e an d s t a b b e d h i m . T he ho tly di spute d is su e wa s w he the r a pp lic ant h a d a

du ty to r e tr e a t be fo re us ingde a dly fo rc e a g a ins t B ur le so n, no t w he the r B ur le so n in iti a te d th e fi g ht. 15Miller Pag e 10

rea sonable pe rson in the same situation that Mr. Miller found himself in would do that at all, eve r, under

these c ircumstance s. And don’t forg et that a pe rson in the same situation is goingto include a pe rson in the same–w ith the same broke n leg that he ca n’t walk. . . . What about retre ating ? Why didn’t Mr. Miller retr eat? Well, why didn’t Mr. B urleson re treat? Why didn’t Mr. Bur leson not invite him back there ? Why didn’t Mr. Bur leson not start hitting him? Why didn’t Mr. Bur leson not start kic kin g him ? I f w e ’r e g oin g to a sk a ll o f t he se “ why

did n’ t he ” qu e sti on s. Se e Mozo n v . S

tate , 991 S.W .2d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (setting out the two 16 the or ie s f or a dmi tti nge vid e nc e of

vic tim ’s c ha

ra c te r f or vio le nc e ); se e als o F

ry v . S tate , 915 S.W .2d 554, 560-61 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1995, no pet.) (disc ussing the history and rationale for both theor ies of admitting e vidence of the victim’s cha rac ter for violence)

. Torres v. State, 71 S.W .3d 758, 760 & n.4 ( Tex. Crim . App. 2002) (e vidence of 17 victim’s prior spec ific violent ac ts may be admitted to show the re asonable ness of de fenda nt’s fe ar i f h e wa s awa

re of tho se sp e c if

ic a c ts) ; De mp se

yv . S tate , 2 6 6 S. W. 2 d

8 7 5 , 8 7 7

- 7 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1954) (prior spe cific a cts of violence by the victim offer ed by

the def endant a re admissible if (1) off

ere d to show the rea sonablene ss of defe ndant’s cla im of appre hension of dang er, a nd (2) the a cts of violence or misconduct we re know n to the defe ndant at the time of the homicide). See M ozon , 991 S.W .2d at 846 (whe n defe ndant’s cla im of self-de fense rested on a 18 pe rc e ive d d ang e r f

ro m vi c tim , d e fe nd ant c ou ld p re se nt e vid e nc e of vic tim ’s vio le nt c ha

ra c te r t o show her r easona

ble belief that forc e wa s immediately nece ssary

to protect he rself f

rom the The rule s of evidenc e per mit the defenda

nt to offer

evidenc e conc ernin g t he victim’s char acte r for

violence or

ag g ression on two separ ate theor ies when the defe ndant is char g ed with an assaultive off

ense, a s applicant wa s in this case. 16 First, the de fenda

nt may offe r re putation or opinion testimony or evidence of specific prior acts of violenc e by

the victim to show the “re asonable ness of de fenda nt’s claim of a

pprehe nsion of dang er” from the victim. This is called “communicated char acte r” beca use the de fenda

nt is aware 17 of the victim’s violent tendenc ies and perce ives a dange r posed by the vi ctim, reg ardle ss of whe ther the dang er is re al or not. This theory does not invoke Rule 404(a )(2) beca use Rule 404 bar s 18Miller Pag e 11

victim’s perc eived thre at). Se e Ha y es v . S tate , 124 S.W .3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003) 19 (evide nce of

victim’s prior assault with a wr ench w as admissible to show the re asonable ness of defe ndant’s fe ar be cause defe ndant per sonally knew of the incident, but evidenc e of a prior assault with a gun was not admissible bec ause de fenda nt had no knowledg e of it), aff’d, 161 S.W. 3d 50 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Es pin oz a v . S

tate , 9 5 1 S. W. 2 d

1 0 0 , 1 0 2 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. ref’ d) (r ever sible err or to exclude defe ndant’s evide nce of victim’s reputation for

violence when def

endant testified that he was a war e of vic tim’s violent nature ). See M

ozon , 9 91 S.W. 2d

a t 84 5; Tat ev . S

tate , 9 8 1 S. W. 2 d

1 8 9 , 1 9 2

- 9 3 & n . 5 ( T e x. 20 Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e als o Yant is v . S tate , 94 S.W . 1019, 1021 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906) (“I f there wer e thre ats of an uncommunicated char acte r, [defenda nt] could then prove the dang erous char acte r of de cea sed as a man likely

to execute such thre ats, in order that the jury

might deter mine who was most likely the ag g ressor in the dif

ficulty : both what occur

red in the w ashroom and what occur

red at the time of the killing.” ). char acte r evide nce only

when of fer ed to prove conduct in conf ormity , i.e. , th a t th e vic tima c te d in

c on fo rm ity

wi th h is v iol e nt c ha

ra c te r. He re , th e de fe nd ant i s n ot t ry ing to p ro ve th at the vic tim

a c tua lly is v iol e nt; rathe r, he is p ro vin g his ow n s e lf -d e fe ns ive state of

min d a nd the re a so na

ble ne ss of that state of

mind. 19 Ap p l i c an t d i d n o t kn o w B u r l e s o n ; h e w a s u n aw ar e o f h i s c h ar a c t e r f o r v i o l e n c e . T hu s, applicant’ s counsel did not, and could not, off er “ communicated c hara cter ” evide nce. Se c ond, a de fe nd ant m ay of fe r e vid e nc e of

the vic tim ’s c ha

ra c te r t ra it f or vio le nc e to de mon str a te that th e vic timwa s, in f a c t, the fi rs t ag g re sso r. Rul e 40 4( a )( 2) is d ir e c tly a pp lic a ble to this theory

and this use i s called “uncommunicate d char acte r” evidence beca use i t does not matter if the de fe nd ant w a s awa

re of the vic tim ’s vio le nt c ha

ra c te r. Th e c ha in o f l og ic is a s f oll ow s: a 20 witness testifies that the victim made an ag g ressive move ag ainst the defe ndant; another witness then testifies about the victim’s cha ract er fo r v i o l ence , but he may do so on ly

throug h reputation andMiller Pag e 12

See W ils on v . S tate , 7 1 S. W.3 d 3 46 , 3 50 n. 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Car so n v . S tate , 21 98 6 S. W.2 d 2 4, 27 -2 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 98 ) ( a lth ou g h th e de fe nd ant w a s e nti tle d to int ro du c e e vid e nc e of

vic tim ’s vio le nt o r a g g re ssi ve natur e to s ho w that vi c timwa s f ir st ag g ressor, he was not entitled to offe r evide nce of specific instances of

violent behavior by

the victim), rev’d on other grounds , 6 S.W. 3d 53 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). As the c ourt no te d in Carson , Texas common law was br oader and did allow the a dmission of evidence of prior specific instances to show the de cea sed’s c hara cter for violenc e. Id. at 27. See also Pe rrin v. Anderson, 78 4 F .2 d 1 04 0, 10 44 -4 5 ( 10 th C ir . 1 98 6) (i nte rp re tin g the fe de ra l r ule s) ; se e ge ne ra lly 1 S TEVE N G OODE , O L I N G UY W EL L B OR N III & M. M I CH A EL S HAR L OT , G UI DE TO T HE T EX AS R U LES O F E V I D EN CE : C I VI L AND C RI M I N A L § 404.4 (Texas Practice 2d ed. 1993); Ne well H. Blakely , Ar tic le IV

: R e le v an c

yan d I ts Li mi ts, 20 H OUS .L .R EV . 151, 195-99 (1983)

. I n Tat e , this Court ex plained how the Rules modified the common-law doc trine: 22 The Dempse

yline of ca ses stands for the proposition that reputation or spec ific ac t evidenc e is admissible to show a victim’s char acte r and de monstrate that either the def endant ha d a re asonable fea r of the vic tim, or the victim was, in fac t, the ag g ressor. H oweve r, this common law rule, a s it developed, c annot be r econc iled with the specific lang uag e of the rele vant rules of evidenc e. While Rule 404(a)( 2) allows the admission of evidenc e conc erninga victim’s cha rac ter or pe rtinent char acte r traits, Rule 405(a ) limits t he per missibl e method of pr oof to reputation or opinion testimony

. 98 1 S. W.2 d at 19 2; see also Mozon , 9 91 S.W. 2d a t 84 5; Torres , 7 1 S. W.3 d at 76 0; Davis v. Sta te , 1 04 S.W. 3d

17 7, 18 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; Carson , 986 S.W .2d at 27-28; Col e ma n v . S

tate , 935 S.W .2d 467, 470 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pe t. ref’ d). opinion testim ony

under Rule 405( a). 21 Applicant’s c ounsel proper ly offe red evidence of Burleson’s chara cter for a g g ression under Rule 404(a) (2) whe n he ca ll ed R o b b i e Davis, Doug las Hurst, Glenn Cra wford, a nd L ee A rthur Th oma s to te sti fy to B ur le so n’ s viol e nc e , esp e c ia lly wh e n dri nk ing . T he re wa s ampl e e vid e nc e in the re cord that Burle son was the f irst a g g ressor, both f

rom applicant himself and, infe rentially , from Cle ve land

wh o te sti fi e d th a t B ur le so n “ inv ite d” a pp lic ant t o g o a

ro un d to th e back of the c lub to

“ t a l k

. ” B u t , a s p o s t

- R

u l e s o p i n i o n s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y h e l d , t h e d e f e n d an tm ay not

offe r evide nce of the victim’s prior spec ific ac ts of violence to prove t he victim ’s vi olent char acte r and he nce that the

v i ct i m ac t edi nco n fo rm i t y wi t h t h at ch ar ac t er

t ra i tat t h e t i m e o f t h e as s au l t

. At t h e h ab ea s h ea ri n g, 22Miller Pag e 13

See C H RI STO PH ER B. M U ELL ER & L AI R D K I RKPA T RI CK , F ED ER A L E V I D EN CE § 103, at 23 569-70 (2d e d. 1994). In descr ibing the a nalog ous fede ral rule s, the profe ssors state, Proof of spec ific ac ts of violence by the victim toward the de fenda nt is often admissible to show hostil ity , plan, intent to inflict harm, and similar matter s. Here the argume nt i s n ot s o mu c h th a t th e a c ts s ho w c ha ra c te r, he nc e c on du c t in confor mity with char acte r, but rathe r that the a cts shed dire ct light on more pa rt ic ula r a sp e c ts o f t

he vic tim ’s ou tlo ok

or state of min d to wa

rd the de fe nd ant, and the pr oof is admissible under F RE 404(b). Se e, e .g ., Torre

s v . S tate , 117 S.W .3d 891, 896-97 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003) (def endant 24 was e ntitled to offer e vidence that, sever al day s befor e the murde r, the victim had c limbed throug h his ex -g irlfriend’ s aunt’s window a nd threatened he r and he r childre n; this evidence w as rele vant to show that the dec ease d had a spe cific motive or intent to be the first ag g ressor when he climbed throug h his ex -g irlfriend’ s bedroom window e arly one morningand the de fenda nt sh ot h im) ; se e als o H

ay es v . S tate , 161 S.W .3d 507, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) and id. at 509- 10 (K e lle r, P.J., c on c ur

ri ng ); Tat e v . S

tate , 981 S.W .2d at 193 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998) (evide nce of victim’s prior spec ific ac ts may shed lig ht on his int ent or motive in the conf rontation). applicant’ s trial counsel stated that this was his understanding of the law. He was corr ect. Under Rule 404(a) (2), a

pplicant was not e ntitled to offer e vidence of any specific prior ac ts of vio le nc e –in c lud ingB ur le so n’ s 1 98 2 a ssa ult on Chr is Hans on

–to sh ow that th e vic timwa s th e fi rs t ag g ressor. T hat use is an attempt to prove Bur leson’s conduc t in conformity with h i s violent char acte r, and it is prohibited by Rules 404(a) a

nd 405(a)

. An entire ly

separ ate r ationale supports the a dmission of evidence of the victim’s pr ior specific acts of violence when offe red for a non-cha rac ter purpose–suc h as his spe cific intent, motive for a n attack on the defe ndant, or hostility –in the particula

r ca se. This extraneous offense e vidence

23

may be a dmi ssi ble un de r Rule 40 4( b)

. Ap pli c ant doe s not sug g e st t hat th is t he or y of a dmi ssi bil ity 24 mig ht a pp ly to e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingB ur le so n’ s 1 98 2 a ssa ult

. Ap pli c ant a lso c on te nd s th a t tr ia l c ouns e l sh ou ld have dis c ov e re d an d use d ev ide nc e of thi s prior convic tion t o i mpeac h the State’s re buttal char acte r witness, Da rre ll Galloway , who was B ur le so n’ s b e st f

ri e nd . A t th e ha

be a s h e ari ng , tr ia l c ouns e l a g re e d th a t, h ad he di sco vere d th isMiller Pag e 14

Se e Mo or e v . S

tate , 143 S.W .3d 305, 313-15 (Te x . App.—Waco 2004, pet. r ef’ d ) 25 (althoug h a cha

rac ter witness may

be cr oss-examined to test the witness’s awa rene ss of rele vant specific instances of

conduct, the tr ial judge may exclude the use of pr ior specif ic instance s under Rule 403; trial judge did not abuse his discretion in re fusing to permit impeachme nt of cha rac ter witness with complainant’s prior the ft convictions bec ause the y wer e more than ten y ear s old). Sin e ga l v . S tate , 789 S.W .2d 383, 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1990, no pet.); 26 se e Mi lle r v . S

tate , 549 S.W .2d 402, 403-04 (Te x . Crim. App. 1977) (re versible e rror to allow defe ndant to be impeac hed with re mote prior convic tions, the most recent be ing twe lve y ear s old, wh e n th e re wa s n o o bv iou s b a sis fo r a dmi ssi on ); United States v. Gilliland, 58 6 F .2 d 1 38 4 ( 10 th Cir. 1978) (cha

rac ter witness may

be cr oss-examined with evidence of prior c onvictions under Rules 404(a)( 1) and 405( a), if the trial court de termines that the pr ejudicial ef fec t of the evide nce offe red to re but char acte r evide nce doe s not outweig h its probative value; c onvictions dating ba c k f ourt e e n to thi rt

y -f our y e ars we re too re mot e ); see ge nerally, D AVI D A. S CHLU ET ER & R OB E R T R. B AR TON , T EX A S R U LES O F E VI DENCE M ANUAL § 405.02[2] [e] [v] (8th ed. 2009) (“G iven the potential pre

judice of a lluding to a spe cific instanc e of c onduct, Rules 403 serve s as a re lie f v a lve fo r l imi tin g c ro ss- e xami natio n und e r r ule 40 5( a ). Th is i s p art ic ula rl y a pp ro pr iate wh e n th e a lle g e d in sta

nc e s o f c on du c t are re mot e in t ime or c ir c ums tanc e s. ” ); C H RI STO PH ER B. M U ELL ER & L AI R D K I RKPA T RI CK , F ED ER A L E V I D EN CE § 121, at 723 (2d e d. 1994) (in eva luating c ro ss- e xami natio n o f c ha ra c te r w itn e sse s w ithpr ior sp e c if ic ins tanc e s o f c on du c t, t

ri a l c ourt s should “disallow inquiry

into remote eve nts whose re levanc e is diminished to almost nothing by the passag e of time.” ). c on vic tio n, he wo uld

have a tte mpt e d to us e it i n c ro ss- e xami nin g Ga llo wa y . He admitte d th a t “ it might have ” bee n admissible. I ndeed, it “might have been” admissible, but the trial judge (who wa s not the sam e p er s o n as the ha beas judg e) c erta inly

could have excluded any “Have y ou hear d” or “Did y ou know” cross-e x amination questions ba sed on an eig hteen- y ear -old event unde r Rule 403. 25 Th e ratio na le fo r e xclu din g c ro ss- e xami natio n o f a ch ara c te r wit ne ss c on c e rn ingre mot e a c ts, e ve nts , or convic tions, is t he same as th at for e x cluding evidenc e of r emote convic tions to i mpeac h the te sti fy ingde fe nd ant: The re ason for

the adoption of the r emoteness limit ation on impeachme nt evidence is that a remote conviction i s a poor indication of t he accuse d’s present char acte r. A re mot e c on vic tio n mu st h a ve oc c ur re d at a tim e su ff

ic ie ntl y re c e nt t o hav e som e be ari ngon

the pr e se nt c re dib ili ty

of the wi tne ss. 26 Thus, althoug h it is poss ible that the trial judge might have allowed Deputy Galloway to beMiller Pag e 15

Se e W he e le r v . S

tate , 67 S.W .3d 879, 887 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 27 T EX . R. E V ID . 105. 28 Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687. 29 imp e a c he d w ithB ur le so n’ s e ig hte e n- y e ar- old c on vic tio n, it i s n ot p ro ba ble . T he tr ia l ju dg e wo uld not have e rre d in excluding such c ross-examination. There fore , applicant’ s trial counsel can not be found constitutionally

defic ient fo r failing to attempt to cross-examine the deputy with that

c on vic tio n to sh owthat G a llo wa y did no t r e a lly kn owa bo ut B ur le so n’ s c ha

ra c te r fo r p e a c e fu lne ss. F ur the r, the a ssa

ult c on vic tio n w ou ld n ot b e a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve B ur le so n’ s v iol e nt ch ara c te r, on ly to impeach Ga lloway ’s opinion of Bur leson’s pea cef ul char acte r. Applica

nt also would have be en require d to “take the witness’s answe r” and could not of fer any extrinsi c evidenc e of the conviction or deta ils of the underlying as s au l t

. Finally , the State would have been e ntitled to a limi ting 27 instruction under Rule 105 to ensure that the jury did not mis use that evide nce. 28 F ur the rm or e , a

pp lic ant h a s n ot c arr ie d h is b ur de n o f p ro of in s ho wi ngthat the fai lure to imp e a c h D e pu ty

Ga llo wa y ’s c ha ra c te r t e sti mony

wi th su ch a remote a ssa ult c on vic tio n w a s “ so serious as to depr ive the defen d ant of a fair tr ial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Applicant’s 29 counsel ha d alre ady called four chara cter witnesses t o testify to Burle son’s cha rac ter for violence. Ap pli c ant n owc la ims that th e se wi tne sse s w e re un imp re ssi ve be c a us e the y we re e ith e r “ low -l if e s” or applica

nt’s fr i en d s . T h ere fore , the jury was likely

to discount their partisan testimony . But Deputy Galloway

was B urleson’s best friend and had been the best man at his wedding , so the jury would be just a s likely to disc ount his partisan testimony as it would to discount that of applicant’s four c hara cter

witnesses. At any rate , char acte r witnesses g ener ally play a ver y small role in decidingMiller Pag e 16

Applicant noted that the pr osecutor r efe rre d to applicant’s c hara cter witnesses and 30 Bur leson’s purpor

tedly peac eful c hara cter

during her c losing a

rg ument. She stated that “Te rry Bur leson was murde red out on that va cant lot. His memory was a ssaulted her e in the cour troom. You hea rd witnesses c ome in and try to convince you, this woman who was a ppare ntly very ang ry at whate ver c ircumstance s broke up he rself a nd Terr y Bur leson, convicte d felon, fr iends of the def endant c ome in here , try

to make y ou believe that Terr y Bur leson, who ca

n’t come he re and def end himself, wa s a bad pe rson.” This wa s a ver y minor ref

ere nce in a

leng thy closing argume nt t

hat dw e lt u

po n a pp lic ant’ s u se of

a kn if e to i nte nti on a lly

kil l or c a us e se ri ou s b od ily injury to an unar

med man. I t is sim ply

not plausible to believe that the jury convicted a

pplicant of mur de r b e c a

us e of the qu a lity

or qu anti ty of the c ha ra c te r w itn e sse s. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 7; Tong v. State, 25 S.W .3d at 707, 712 (Te x . Crim. App. 31 20 00 ); Sc he an e ttev . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). the main issues at trial. Her e, it was virtually undisputed that Bur leson started the fig ht, so whether 30 he wa s or was not a violent pe rson was larg ely beside the point. The issue that the jury had to dec ide

wa s w he the r a

pp lic ant s ho uld

have re tr e a te d r a the r t

ha n s ta bb ingthe man w ho ha d k ic ke d h im. We theref ore c onclude that a

pplicant has fa iled to prove, by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, that his trial counsel wa s constitutionally defic ient and that ther e is a proba bi l i t y t h at , b u t for counsel’s unpr ofessional e rror s, applicant would likely have been found not guilty

. We deny relief 31

on his ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l c la im. C. Appli cant Has P roven That His App ellate A ttor ne y W a s I n ef f ec ti v e i n F ailin g to Challenge the S u f

f i ci en cy of Evid ence t o P rove That Applicant Was Su bjectto Sentencing as an H abitual Of fend er. I n h is s e c on d c la im, a

pp lic ant a sse rt s th a t hi s a pp e llate c ouns e l w a s c on sti tut ion a lly ine ff e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto r a ise a

po in t of erro r o n a

pp e a l c ha lle ng ingthe su ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e to prove that applicant’s f

irst enhanc ement convic tion was final bef ore he committed his second enhanc ement off

ense. H ad counse l d o n e s o , applicant would have bee n entitled to another p u n i s h m en th ea ri n g. 1. Factual background.Miller Pag e 17

Presumably

this was an enha

nceme nt para g raph a lleg ing the 1972 heroin c onviction. 32 I n its indi ctment in this case, the State a lleg ed that applica nt was convic ted of possession of

narc otics in 1972 and that, afte r that ca se became final, he was convicted of burg lary of a ha bitation in 1976. During the punish m en t h earing , applicant pled “Not true” to the two enhanc ement para g raphs, a

nd the State offe red a

penitentiary

packe t (“pe n packe t”) int o evidenc e that conta ined the judg ments for both of those of fense s. The trial judge found the enha nceme nts true and se ntence d applicant to thirty

y ear s in prison. The pe n packe ts show that applicant pled guilty to possess i o n of her oin on November 30, 1972, in Cause No. 43,765 in Travis County . That convic tion became final on November 30, 1972. Th e pe n p a c ke t a lso sh ow s th a t a pp lic ant b e g an ser

vin g his tw o- to- thr e e y e ar s e nte nc e on that he ro in conviction on Octobe r 12, 1972. The pen packe t then shows that applicant pled guilty to burg lary of a ha bitation on J uly

26, 1976, in Cause No. 50,285 in Travis County

. I n that case , the judg ment shows that the State waive d the enha nceme nt para g raph set out in the indictment. A pplicant was 32 sentenc ed to six y ear s in prison, and his sentence beg an on Jul y 15, 1976. Applicant notes that the pe n packe t did not c ontain the indictment or offe nse repor t for the burg lary judgme nt, so it is impossibl e to tell from the fac e of the burglar y judgme nt exactly

when this second offe nse was committed. At the habea s hear ing, applicant’ s trial counsel stated that he had a c opy

of the burg lary

indictment in his t rial file, and it showed that the burg lary was c ommitt ed on November

26, 1975. The State produc ed the bur g lary offe nse re port which c onfirms that date. 2. Theha be as c ou rt’ s fa c tua l fi nd

ing s. Th e ha be a s c ourt e nte re d on e c ru c ia l, un dis pu te d fa c tua l fi nd ing c on c e rn ing thi s clai m: “Appe llate counse l did not contest the leg ality of applicant’s sentenc e.” H oweve r, applica nt’sMiller Pag e 18

Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W .2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 33 Double-je opardy

principles do not bar

the State from pr oving a

pplicant’s status as a

n 34 habitual offe nder at a sec ond sentenc ing he aring

. See M onge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 729-30 (1998) ( double-

jeopar dy clause “neither

preve nts the prosec ution from seekingrevie w of a sentenc e nor r estricts the leng th of a sentenc e imposed upon re trial afte r a de fenda nt’s succe ssful a pp e a l” ); Be ll v . S

tate , 9 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d

1 7 3 , 1 7 5 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 9 ) ( o v erru l i n g Cooper , fo l l o wi n g Monge, and holdingthat double jeopar dy does not bar the State from a se cond opportunity

to present its proof of

a prior c onviction for the pur pose of se eking a cumulate d sentenc e). appellate counsel ha d died and ther efor e could not explain what reasons and strateg y he mig ht have had in not contesting the leg ality of applica

nt’s sentenc e. The ref

ore, w e re manded this ca se for the habea s judge to addre ss whether the doctrine o f l aches should bar this claim bec ause it wa s not 33 raised until more than five y ear s afte r final conviction and a lmost t wo y ear s after appellate counsel die d. On re mand , th e ha

be a s ju dg e c on c lud e d th a t la c he s d id no t bar consid e ratio n o f t his c la im beca u s e ap p l i cant’s tardiness in filing his ha beas a pplication was not ca

used by his lack of due diligenc e. Th e e vid e nc e c on ta ine d w ith in t he ha be a s r e c or d e sta

bli sh e s th e se a dd iti on a l f

a c ts: (1 ) At tr ia l, t he State did

no t pr ov e that a

pp lic ant ’s bu rgla

ry of fe ns e oc c ur

re d a ft e r h is he ro in c on vic tio n b e c a me fi na l; (2 ) Th e State no w h a s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to p ro ve that a pp lic a nt’ s b ur g lary

offense oc c ur re d a ft e r h is h e ro in c on vic tio n b e c a me fi na l. 34 The ha beas judg e also made the following conclusion of law : Had appellate counsel raised this issue, the appellate court would have va cate d the sentenc e and rema

nded for a new trial on punishment. Coo pe r v . S tate , 631 S.W .2d 508, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). We adopt this conclusion beca use it acc ords with well-settled Te x as law. 3. Theap

pli c ab le law

.Miller Pag e 19

Ex parte Santana , 2 27 S.W. 3d 70 0, 70 4- 05 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); see also Smith v. 35 Robbins , 528 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000). Evitts v. Lucey , 4 69 U. S. 3 87 , 3 94 (1 98 5) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; see also Schae tzle v. 36 Coc k re ll, 343 F.3d 440, 445 ( 5th Cir. 2003) (“Counsel nee d not raise e very nonfrivolous g round of appe al, but should inst ead pr esent solid, meritorious arguments based on dire ctly controlling pr e c e de nt. ” ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd a lte ratio ns omi tte d) ; Gray v . Gree r , 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986) (“ Gene rally , only when ig nored issues a

re c lear ly strong er tha

n those prese nted, will the presumption of eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel be ove rcome .”). Ex pa rteDa igl e , 848 S.W .2d 691, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (habe as cor pus 37 a pp lic ant w a s e nti tle d to a

ne w a pp e a l ba se d o n a

pp e llate c ouns e l’ s in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss f

or fa ili ngto raise point of e rror

on appea l conce rning trial court’ s denial of de fenda nt’s timely

reque st for jury shuf fl e , w hic h, un de r t

he n- pr e va ili nglaw, wa s a uto matic re ve rs ibl e e rr or ); see also Stallings v. United States , 536 F.3d 624, 627- 28 (7th Cir. 2008) (in dec iding whe ther a ppellate c ounsel was ineffe ctive for

failing to raise a

meritorious argument, revie wing court fir st ex amines the re cord to see whe ther the a

ppellate attorney

in fac t omitt ed sig nificant a nd obvious issues, and if so, c ourt the n c omp are s th e ne g le c te d is su e s to tho se a c tua lly ra ise d; i f t

he ig no re d is su e s a

re c le arl y strong er tha

n those raise d, appellate counsel wa s deficie nt under Strickland ). To sh owthat a

pp e llate c ouns e l w a s con st it uti on a lly ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto a sse rt

a pa rt ic ula r p oin t of er

ro r on a pp e a l, a n a pp lic ant m

us t pr ov e that ( 1) “ c ouns e l’ s d e c isi on no t to ra ise

a pa rt ic ula r po int of e rr or wa s ob

je c tiv e ly unre a so na

ble ,” and (2 ) the re is a re a so nable pr ob a bil ity that, but for counse l’s failure to raise that pa rticular issue, he would have preva iled on appea l. An 35 attorney “nee d not advanc e e v e ry

argument, reg ardle ss of merit, urg ed by the appe llant.” Howeve r, 36 if a pp e llate c ouns e l f

a ils to r a ise a

c la im that ha s in dis pu ta

ble me ri t un de r w e ll- se ttl e d la w a nd wo uld

ne c e ssa ri ly re su lt i n r e ve rs ibl e e rr or , a pp e llate c ouns e l is ine ff

e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto r a ise it. 37 The lawconce rning sufficie ncy of t he evide nce to pr ove enha nceme nt for habitual f

elony of fe nd e rs is w e ll s e ttl e d. Se c tio n 1 2. 42 (d ) o f t he Pe na l Co de re qu ir e s th e S tate to p ro ve thi s

c hr on olo g ic a l se qu e nc e of e ve nts :

“ (1 ) the fi rs t c on vic tio n b e c ome s f ina l; “(2) the offe nse lea ding to a later c onviction is commit ted;Miller Pag e 20

J or da n v . S tate , 2 5 6 S

. W

. 3 d

2 8 6 , 2 9 0 -9 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Tomlin v. 38 Sta te , 7 22 S.W. 2d

70 2, 70 5 ( Te x Crim . App . 1 98 7) ); se e als o V ald e z v . S tate , 218 S.W .3d 82, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). See Moore v . State, 802 S.W .2d 367, 372-74 (Te x . App.—Dallas 1990, pe t. ref’ d); 39 Patterson v. State, 723 S.W .2d 308, 316 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987), aff’d, 7 6 9 S. W. 2 d 9 3 8 ( T e x. Crim. App.1989). Jordan , 2 56 S.W. 3d

a t 29 2; see also Mc Crary v. State, 6 0 4 S. W. 2 d 1 1 3 , 1 1 6 ( T e x. 40 Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); W

illiams v. State, 59 6 S. W.2 d 9 03 , 9 04 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ); Hickm an v. State, 54 8 S. W.2 d 7 36 , 7 37 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 77 ); Johnson v. State, 784 S.W .2d 413, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Se e Ex pa rteDa igl e , 8 48 S.W. 2d a t 69 2; Ex parte Fe lton , 8 1 5 S. W. 2 d 7 3 3 , 7 3 6 ( T e x. 41 Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Ex

pa rteSc ott , 581 S.W .2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). “ (3 ) the late r c on vic tio n b e c ome s f ina l; “(4) the offe nse for

which the de fenda

nt presently

stands acc used is committed.” 38 I n this case, the State failed to offe r evidence of the s econd prong : it failed to prove when the burg lary of fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d. Wit ho ut evide nc e to s up po rt a fi nd ingthat th e burg lary

of fe ns e

wa s c omm itt e d a ft e r t

he he ro in c on vic tio n b e c a me fi na l, t he State ’s e vid e nc e was in su ffi cie nt t o prove a pplicant was subjec t to punishm ent as an habitual offe nder. Such a fa ilure of pr oof is not 39 subject to a ha

rmless err or ana ly sis; it is a sufficie ncy -of- evidenc e def icien cy t h at can “neve r be considere d harmless.” 40 4. Appellate counse l was nece ssarily ineffective in failing t o raise the sufficiency of evidenc e to s up po rt t hetri al c ou rt’

s fi nd ing tha t ap pli c an t wa s a n h ab itu al o ffe nd e r. Appl icant had a

“lea d pipe cinch” point of err or to raise on appea l. I f his counsel ha d challeng ed the sufficienc y of evide nce to support the ha bitual enhanc ement, he w ould have preva iled. Any objectively rea sonable attorney would have been familiar with the we ll-settled law

c on c e rn inge nh anc e me nt p ara g ra ph s and wo uld have ra ise d th is “ sure -f

ir e wi nn e r” c la im. 41Miller Pag e 21

395 U.S. 711 (1969), ov e rru le d in pa rt b yAlab am a v . S

mi th , 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 42 Th e State argue s th a t a

pp lic ant c ann ot c arr

y his burden of proof

be c a us e his a pp e llate

a tto rn e y is d e c e a se d a

nd the re fo re c ann ot e xpla in hi s st ra te g y in f a ili ngor de c lin ingto r a ise thi s issue. The S tate contends that appellate counsel mig ht have thoug ht that his other points of error , re la tin g t o t h e g u i l tp h a s e o f t r i a l , w e r e m o r e m e r i t o r i o u s . T h u s , h e r a i s e d o n l y h i s “ b e s t ” c l a i m s. That is an excellent appe llate st ra t eg y , but there is no “be tter” c laim than one that is “a lead pipe cinch.” Th e State a lso argue s th a t a pp e llate c ouns e l mi g ht h a ve de c lin e d to br ingthi s c la im b e c a us e he , li ke tr ia l c ouns e l, k

ne w that a pp lic ant’ s p ri or

c on vic tio ns re a lly

we re se qu e nti a l and that the State

rea lly could prove them in a second sentenc ing hear ing. U ndoubtedly the State ca

n and will prove the m in a ne w h e ari ng , b ut i t di d n ot d o s o in the fi rs t he ari ng , s o th e c ur re ntl y a dmi tte d e vid e nc e is leg ally insufficient to support his status as an ha bitual offende r. F ina lly , th e Stat e a lso su g g e sts that a pp e llate c ouns e l mi g ht n ot h a ve br ou g ht t his c la im beca use applica

nt’s t h i rt y -y ear

sentenc e wa s on the lower e nd of the punishment ra ng e for an habitual offe nder, a

nd applicant c ould be g iven a much longe r sentenc e upon re trial. Had a pplicant been se ntence d by

a jury , that might be a

valid considera

tion, but applicant was sente nced by the trial judge . Under North C

arolina v. Pearce , a trial judge may not incre ase a defe ndant’s prior se ntence 42

on re mand fo llo wi ngan a

pp e llate re ve rs a l of

his or ig ina l se nte nc e a ft e r a fu ll tr ia l un le ss t he inc re a se is based on (1) conduct oc curr ing a fter the first sentenc e wa s imposed or (2) new evidence of which the State wa s una

wa re and c ou ld n ot, wi th t

he e xer c ise of

du e dil ig e nc e , h a ve of

fe re d at th e fi rs tMiller Pag e 22

Id. a t 72 6; Alab am a v . S

mi th , 4 90 U. S. at 79 8; Un ite d S tates v . G oo dwi n , 457 U.S. 368, 43 374 (1982) ( presumption of judicial vindictiveness for incre asing sentenc e af

ter succ essful appe al may be over come by

objective infor

mation justi fying the incre ased se ntence ); Ho od v . S tate , 185 S.W .3d 445, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (discussing doctrine of judicial vindictiveness on rese ntencingand stating , “When a de fenda nt proves ‘that he was c onvicted, he a ppeale d and obtained a ne w trial, and that the State there afte r filed . . . a dditional enhance ments,’ the burde n sh if ts t o th e pr os e c uti on

to p ro vid e an e xplanatio n o f t he a dd iti on a l e nh anc e me nts ‘t hat is u n re l at edt o t h e d ef

en d an t ’s ex er ci s e o f h i s l ega l ri gh tt o ap p ea l

. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Ne al v . S tate , 150 S.W .3d 169, 173-74 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004)). Se e Ex pa rteDa igl e , 848 S.W .2d at 692. 44 See E x parte Fe lton , 8 15 S.W. 2d 73 3, 73 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Ex pa rteSc ott , 581 45 S.W .2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). se nte nc ing he ari ng . I t wa s pa rt ly fo r thi s r e a so n th at w e re mand e d th e c a se to t he ha be a s c ourt

–to 43 g ive the State an oppor

tunity to discover whether suc h post-sentenc ing c onduct exist ed and mig ht there fore justify

an objec tively

rea sonable a

ppellate c ounsel from ra ising a n otherwis e winning claim. The State did not offe r evidence of such post -sentenc ing bad conduct or any other e vidence supporting a

n incre ase in the se ntence afte r a succe ssful appea l. Any competent attorney

would be fa m i l i ar wi t h t h i s w e l l -s et t l edd o ct ri n e o f “ j u d i ci al v i n d i ct i v en es s ” a n d kn o w t h at t h e t ri al j u d ge could not sentenc e applica nt to a g reater ter

m of y ear s after

a succ essful appe al unless t h er e wa s objective e vidence in the rec ord to support an incr ease d sentenc e. The State’s a

rg ument conce rning plausible rea sons for declining to r aise a claim on appe al would normally preva il be cause revie wing courts must indulg e in e very possible presumption that counsel ha d a plausible strateg y , but in this case we c onclude that ther e is no plausible strateg y for failing to bring a cla im that i s n ecessarily reve rsible er

ror. Appellate c ounsel was inef fec tive. 44 45 And applica

nt has demonstrate d prejudice beca use his leg al-suff

icienc y challeng e would haveMiller Pag e 23

See E x Parte Daigle, 848 S.W .2d at 692. 46 North C

arolina v. Pearce , 3 95 U. S. at 72 6; Go od win , 4 57 U. S. 3 74 ; Hood, 185 47 S.W. 3d a t 44 8; Neal , 150 S.W .3d at 173-74. Ap pli c ant i s e nti tle d to a pp e a l on ly

the se nte nc ing

be c a us e that w a s th e on ly

re sp e c t in 48 which appe llate counse l was found to be ine ffe ctive. Ex pa rteDa igl e , 848 S.W .2d at 692. 49 preva iled o n a

p p e a l. A n d h e ma

y n o t b e g iv e n a g r e a te r s e n te n c e b y th e tr ia l ju d g e a f ter that 46

succe ssful appea l absent new , objective e vidence that would justify such an inc rea se. 47 Relief is here by

g rante d. Applicant is e ntitled to a new appea l to challeng e the suff iciency of evide nce to support his thirty -y ear sentenc e. The prope r re medy in a case such as t his is to return 48 applicant to the point at w hich he c an g ive notice of appea l. For

purposes of the Texas Rules of 49 Appellate Proc edure , all time limit s shall be ca lculated a s if the sentenc e had be en ente red on the day the mandate of this Court issues. W e hold that should applicant de sire to prosec ute an ap p ea l, he

mus t take a ff

ir mativ e ste ps to s e e that no tic e of a pp e a l is g ive n w ith in t

hir ty da y s a ft e r t he mand a te of this Court has issued. All other re quested re lief is denied.

Deliver ed: Octobe r 28, 2009 Pub lis h