NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

CORINNE O. RECTOR, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3651

)

DONALD E. RECTOR, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed January 25, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee 

County; Edward Nicholas, Judge.

Stanley R. Swartz and Susan Hartmann 

Swartz of Law Office of Stanley R. Swartz, 

Bradenton, for Appellant.

E. Blake Melhuish of E. Blake Melhuish, 

P.A., Bradenton, for Appellee.

KELLY, Judge. 

Corinne Rector, the former wife, appeals from the circuit court's order 

adopting the reports of a general magistrate and denying her amended motion for 

temporary attorney's fees to enforce the final judgment dissolving her marriage to 

Donald Rector, the former husband. We reverse. 
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The parties divorced in 1999. The final judgment of dissolution 

incorporated by reference a written marital settlement agreement (MSA). The 

provisions of the MSA relevant to this appeal provide: 

6. PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The parties' tangible and intangible personal property 

is hereby divided as follows: the husband shall keep as his 

separate property all items presently in the possession of the 

parties . . . with the exception of those items listed on the 

attached and incorporated Exhibit "A." Those items shall 

become the separate property of the Wife free from any 

claims by the Husband.[1]

. . . .

8. LIFE INSURANCE

The Husband shall keep in full force and effect life 

insurance policies upon his life in the amount of $50,000 and 

shall name the spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary. The 

Husband shall annually furnish to the Wife proof of the 

payment of premiums.

9. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

Both Husband and Wife hereby waive any right he or 

she may have now or in the future to alimony payments for 

support and/or maintenance.

10. LUMP SUM ALIMONY (INSTALLMENTS).

In order to resolve all claims the Wife may have for 

temporary and/or permanent alimony, and to balance the 

equitable distribution of the parties' joint assets, the Husband 

agrees to pay a lump sum of [$48,000] to the Wife, payable 

in monthly installments of $400. Such payments are due on 

the 5th day of each month, beginning January 5th, 1999 and 

shall continue, without interest, until paid in full. 

. . . .

1Exhibit "A," initialed by both parties, identified payment of the former 

wife's health insurance by the former husband as the former wife's separate property. 
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15. MODIFICATION.

Any agreement in modification of this Agreement shall 

be unenforceable unless in writing and signed by both 

parties.

. . . .

18. DEFAULT.

In the event either party to this Agreement defaults in 

his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall be 

liable to the non-defaulting party for all reasonable expenses 

incurred, including attorney's fees, in the enforcement of 

obligations created by this Agreement. 

In 2005, the parties entered into a joint stipulation for modification of the 

final judgment. The stipulation provided that the former husband would continue to 

maintain a $50,000 life insurance policy with the former wife as beneficiary, and that he 

would continue to pay the former wife's monthly Medicare and supplemental health 

insurance premiums in an amount up to $400. The circuit court approved the stipulation 

and retained jurisdiction in its order to enforce it. 

Thereafter, the former wife filed a motion for contempt and for 

enforcement against the former husband for not providing proof that the life insurance 

policy was in effect as required by the parties' MSA and the order on the joint 

stipulation. The former husband countered with supplemental and amended 

supplemental petitions to modify the final judgment of dissolution. He alleged that the 

parties intended the life insurance policy as security for his obligation to pay the lump 

sum of $48,000, and that this amount had been fully satisfied. The former husband also 

alleged that the order on the parties' stipulation requiring him to pay the former wife's 

medical insurance is void because it "established and obligated [him] to pay a new and 
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different alimony obligation" over which the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. 

Alternatively, the former husband argued his advanced age and lack of employment 

constituted a substantial change in circumstances which warranted termination of his 

continuing obligation to maintain the life insurance policy. 

The former wife filed an amended motion for temporary attorney's fees to 

defend against the former husband's petitions. After a hearing, the former wife's motion 

was denied. The magistrate found that "[u]nder the modification, the former husband 

was required to pay the monthly premiums of the Former Wife's Part B Medicare 

insurance policy and secure the same with the $50,000 life insurance policy from the 

Final Judgment." Further, the magistrate also found: 

The Former Husband has met his obligation as to the 

alimony and equitable distribution prior to the stipulated 

modification. In addition, the Former Wife who was the 

recipient of the alimony remarried well before the stipulated 

order of modification. 

Since the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction when 

the order approving the stipulated modification on March 8, 

2005 was granted, the court is also without jurisdiction to 

order attorney's fees to either party on the Amended 

Supplemental Petition to Modify the order approving the 

stipulated modification. 

The former wife timely filed exceptions to the magistrate's reports; the circuit court 

adopted the magistrate's reports in its orders. 

On appeal, the former wife argues that the circuit court erred in adopting 

the magistrate's report that found the court did not have jurisdiction under the terms of 

the final judgment and MSA to grant her amended motion for attorney's fees. The 

former wife also argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the former 

husband's obligation to maintain a life insurance policy was to secure the $48,000 lump 
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sum award, and by finding that the provision requiring the former husband to pay the 

former wife's health insurance was a modification of the parties' MSA. 

We agree with the former wife that the circuit court's finding that it lacked 

jurisdiction over her amended motion for temporary attorney's fees was error. The final 

judgment of dissolution reserved jurisdiction to enforce or modify the terms of the MSA. 

The MSA specifically provided for modification of the agreement if in writing and signed by 

both parties. The parties filed their 2005 joint stipulation to modify the final judgment in the 

same court that had entered the final judgment with the same case number. Thus, "[t]he 

circuit court had inherent jurisdiction to enforce the dissolution judgment." See King v. 

King, 78 So. 3d 689, 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (concluding that the trial court had 

jurisdiction to enforce a marital settlement agreement where “[t]he caption of the motion 

was substantially similar to the caption of the dissolution proceeding, and it bore the 

same case number as the case number that had been assigned to the dissolution 

proceeding” (quoting Weaver v. Hotchkiss, 972 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2008))). 

Likewise, we agree with the former wife that the circuit court erred in 

interpreting the MSA. A marital settlement agreement is a contract that is subject to 

interpretation like any other contract. Hobus v. Crandall, 972 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2007). "[A]bsent evidence of the parties' intent to the contrary, the unambiguous 

language of the agreement should be interpreted according to its plain meaning." 

Johnson v. Johnson, 848 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Here, the language 

in the MSA is clear and unambiguous. The parties agreed that the former husband would 

maintain a $50,000 life insurance policy with the former wife as beneficiary. There is no 
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provision included in the MSA stating that the life insurance was intended to secure an 

alimony or health insurance obligation, or that these obligations ceased upon the former 

wife's remarriage. And as for payment of the former wife's health insurance, this provision 

was specifically handwritten and initialed by the parties on the exhibit incorporated into the 

MSA; the parties simply modified this provision in their joint stipulation. 

Accordingly, we reverse the challenged orders and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

VILLANTI and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.