PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS i

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

SCANNING TECHNOLOGIES §

INNOVATIONS LLC, §

§ 

Plaintiff, § Case No: 6:20-cv-114-ADA

§

vs. § PATENT CASE

§

BRIGHTPEARL, INC., §

§

Defendant. §

___________________________________ §

PLAINTIFF’S OPENING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S

BRIGHTPEARL, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1

II. LEGAL STANDARD............................................................................................................ 1

III. ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................. 3

IV. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 4

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir. 2009)............................................ 2

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).............................................................................. 1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)................................................................................... 2

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555-56, 570 (2007) ....................................1, 2, 3

City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010) ........................... 2

CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation and Its Division Life Fitness, 288 F.3d 1359, 1367

(Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................................... 4

Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1204 (quoting -In)........................................................................................... 2

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed.Cir. 1990).................... 2

Hilgreave Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed.Cir. 2001)................................... 2

Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed.Cir. 1991).................................. 2

McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed.Cir. 2007) ........................................... 2

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)......................................... 1

 

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 1

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 14, 2020 STI filed its Original Complaint against Brightpearl, Inc.. 

Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 17, 2020 (Dkt No. 23). 

Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion”) on August 21, 

2020 (Dkt. No. 25).

Brightpearl’s argument is that it only makes and sells software and does not make or 

sell the hardware needed to meet the claim element of “a mobile device” comprising “a 

portable handheld housing,” a “signal processing device,” and “a visual input device.” 

Brightpearl also argues that Plaintiff has not alleged indirect infringement and that any 

amendment of the complaint would be futile.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the FAC sufficiently alleges these elements are met

and provides support in the form of publicly available information. Further, discovery could 

reveal that the claim elements are met by alternative infringement theories. The FAC serves its 

purpose of putting Brightpearl on notice of the infringement allegations against it. Drawing all 

reasonable inferences in its favor, Plaintiff has adequately pled infringement.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As opposed to a 

“heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a complaint is only required to have allegations 

sufficient to show that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 555-56, 570 (2007). Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a

context-specific task that requires the Court “to draw on its judicial experience and common 

sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). When evaluating such a motion, “the 

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 2

court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 

To state a claim of patent infringement, “a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to 

place the alleged infringer on notice as to what he must defend.” McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 

501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed.Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10). Apparatus claims 

cover what a device is, not what it does. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 

1464, 1468 (Fed.Cir. 1990). “[A]n accused device may be found to infringe if it is reasonably 

capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of noninfringing 

modes of operation.” Hilgreave Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed.Cir. 2001); 

Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Hilgreave); see also Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade 

Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed.Cir. 1991).

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard 

as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 

(5th Cir. 2009). The “inquiry focuses on the allegations in the pleadings and not whether the 

plaintiff actually has sufficient evidence to succeed on the merits.” Id.

All well-pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the 

plaintiff must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make a 

valid claim. Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s 

Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains factual content that 

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 3

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

III. ANALYSIS

STI has sufficiently alleged direct infringement of at least Claim 1. Brightpearl’s 

contention that the complaint does not sufficiently plead direct infringement is not supported by 

the FAC or the argument upon which Brightpearl’s Motion is based. STI’s First Amended 

Complaint (“Complaint”) sets forth its allegations of direct infringement in a series of paragraphs 

addressing each and every element and limitation of Claim 1 of the ‘528 Patent. STI’s 

Complaint also provides screenshots of publicly available information illustrating the existence 

of each element of Claim 1 within the accused product.

With respect to the elements allegedly not sufficiently pled, the FAC clearly accuses 

Defendant of making, selling and/or using “a mobile device” (see, e.g., FAC ¶ 25), a “portable 

handheld housing” (see, e.g., FAC ¶ 25), a “signal processing device” (see, e.g., FAC ¶ 26), and 

a “visual input device” (see, e.g., FAC 26). STI’s First Amended Complaint unquestionably 

alleges the accused product meets these elements. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 

STI, the FAC adequately alleges that the accused product meets this and every other element of 

Claim 1. Therefore, STI’s FAC meets all applicable pleading standards.

Brightpearl’s argument that the Complaint should be dismissed is that it does not make or 

sell any product that has these elements and that it only sells software. See, e.g., Motion at 3.

This ignores the fact that the FAC clearly alleges that Brighpearl uses each of the supposedly 

missing elements. Regardless of whether Brightpearl makes and sells hardware components, the 

FAC alleges “use.”

Brightpearl also seems to argue that a visual input device cannot comprise multiple 

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 4

hardware components. Motion, at 2-4. However, this is an issue for claim constructions, not a 

Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has adequately pled a theory of infringement that 

combines multiple components to result in one or more claim elements. The Federal Circuit has 

previously confirmed that multiple components in an accused device can constitute a single 

claim element. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation and Its Division Life 

Fitness, 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Also, discovery could reveal that Defendant’s product infringes under alternative 

infringement theories. Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s assertions, it is possible that an iPad 

mobile device alone meets all of the claimed elements of “a mobile device,” a “portable 

handheld housing,” a “signal processing device, and a “visual input device.” For example, an 

iPad is a “mobile device.” It has a signal processor and a portable handheld housing. It also has 

a visual input device (such as a visual input module), which can receive the visual input from a 

barcode scanner.

Brightpearl further argues that Plaintiff has not alleged indirect infringement. Plaintiff 

respectfully submits that given its allegations of direct infringement, further allegations of 

indirect infringement are not required. Nevertheless, Plaintiff notes that it could (with the 

Court’s permission) add allegations of indirect infringement if discovery bears out facts to 

support such an allegation.

IV. CONCLUSION

For at least the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion should be denied.

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PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 5

Dated: September 4, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jay Johnson

JAY JOHNSON

State Bar No. 24067322

D. BRADLEY KIZZIA

State Bar No. 11547550

KIZZIA JOHNSON, PLLC

1910 Pacific Ave., Suite 13000

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 451-0164

Fax: (214) 451-0165

jay@kjpllc.com

bkizzia@kjpllc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on September 4, 2020 I electronically filed the foregoing document 

with the clerk of the court for the U.S. District Court of Delaware, using the electronic case 

filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system sent a “Notice of Electronic Filing” 

to the attorneys of record who have consented in writing to accept this Notice as service of this 

document by electronic means. 

/s/ Jay Johnson

JAY JOHNSON

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