UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION

IKORONGO TEXAS LLC and 

IKORONGO TECHNOLOGY LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

BUMBLE TRADING LLC, 

 Defendant. 

________________________________________

IKORONGO TEXAS LLC and 

IKORONGO TECHNOLOGY LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

LG ELECTRONICS INC., and 

LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., 

 Defendants. 

________________________________________

IKORONGO TEXAS LLC and 

IKORONGO TECHNOLOGY LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

LYFT, INC., 

 Defendant. 

________________________________________

IKORONGO TEXAS LLC and 

IKORONGO TECHNOLOGY LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., 

and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, 

INC., 

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00256-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00257-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00258-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-00259-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................1 

II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION..........................................................................1 

 A. The Reissue Patents..........................................................................1 

1. “record[s/ed]” (‘450 Patent, claim 67; ‘543 Patent, claims 32, 

39, 54-57, 71-73, 75; ‘704 Patent, claims 33, 46, 48) ..........................1 

2. “collect the visited geographic location data for geographic 

location data for geographic locations visited by the location 

aware device” (‘543 Patent, claims 45-49, 51; ‘704 Patent, 

claims 46 and 48) ...................................................................2 

3. “categories” (‘450 patent, claim 67; ‘543, patent claim 46; 

 ‘704 patent, claims 36 and 37) ....................................................3 

4. “comments” (‘543 patent, claim 51)..............................................4 

5. “detection network directory” (‘704 patent, claims 33, 46, 48)...............4 

6. “recorded by the location-aware cellular phone device 

using a satellite-based location-fixing protocol and a 

detection network directory” (‘704 patent, claims 33, 46, 48) ...............8 

 7. “enabl[e/ing] definition . . .” (‘543 Patent Claims 32, 39, 46-49, 

 51, 54, 56, 72, 73, 75; ‘704 Patent Claims 33, 46, 48) 

 “enable the user to define . . .” (‘543 patent claim 56).........................9 

8. Whether the Preambles of the ‘543 Patent, Claims 

 45-49, 51, 72 and the ‘704 Patent, Claims 46 and 48 

 are Limiting........................................................................12 

9. Bumble/Lyft Only Terms: “obtain defined rights of the 

one or more other users to access the visited geographic 

location data” ('543 patent claims 55, 71); “obtaining access 

rights for one or more other users to allow for access 

to the visited geographic location data” 

(’543 patent claims 57, 70).......................................................13 

 B. ‘554 Patent (Samsung and LG only).....................................................14 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 2 of 21
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 1. “receive an identification of a geographic area” / “receiv[e/ing], 

via the user device, an identification of a geographic area” 

(‘554 patent claims 1, 17, 33) ...................................................14 

III. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................15 

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 

448 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................... 1 

Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB v. Oticon Med. AB, 

958 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................. 13 

Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 

626 F.3d 1197, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................... 2, 8 

Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 

977 F.3d 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................... 2 

Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 

175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................... 11 

Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, 

177 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................... 4 

Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 

287 F.3d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................. 12 

Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 

334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)............................................................................................. 2, 10 

Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 

299 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002)............................................................................................. 5, 10 

Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm’t Am. LLC, 

669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................. 3, 10 

TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 

790 F.3d, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................ 12 

Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 

503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................... 5 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 4 of 21
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Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 

90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)................................................................................................... 14 

Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto Sys., 

853 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................... 1, 4 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 5 of 21
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I. INTRODUCTION 

Defendants wrongly attempt to read limitations from the specification, prosecution 

history and other undisclosed locations into the claims. But as demonstrated in Ikorongo’s 

opening brief and below, Plaintiffs’ constructions most naturally align to the intrinsic evidence 

and should be adopted. 

II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 

A. The Reissue Patents 

1. “record[s/ed]” (‘450 Patent, claim 67; ‘543 Patent, claims 32, 39, 54-57, 

71-73, 75; ‘704 Patent, claims 33, 46, 48) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning “preserve[s/ed] for later reporting [or 

sharing]1”

 Defendants’ construction deviates from the plain and ordinary meaning and imports 

unrecited requirements. Defendants allege this is compelled by claim language distinct from the 

term at issue here: “[e]ach of the claims [33, 46, 48 of the ‘704 Patent] then requires the invention 

to ‘report[] information indicating the visited geographic data.’” Defs. Br. at 4. But this additional 

claim language prevents the conclusion that “record[s/ed]” inherently includes reporting. Applied

Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“different claim 

terms are presumed to have different meanings”). The importation of “reporting” into recording 

would impermissibly render superfluous the express reporting language. See Wasica Fin. GmbH 

v. Cont’l Auto Sys., 853 F.3d 1271, 1288 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“It is highly disfavored to construe 

terms in a way that renders them void, meaningless, or superfluous”). 

 Defendants next wrongly argue that “record[s/ed]” requires “later” reporting based on the 

‘704 Patent prosecution history. Defs. Br. at 4-5. First, Defendants do not even assert clear and 

1 Defendants altered their construction of this term after Plaintiffs’ opening brief. Defs. Br. at 3 

n. 2. 

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unmistakable surrender. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). Second, the prosecution history undermines Defendants’ argument. 

The Patentee did not distinguish Thomas based on timing of reporting, but instead argued 

against the three-reference combination of DeVries/Bezos/Thomas in part by noting that it does 

not disclose “recording” at all: “Thomas does not describe or suggest recording its location 

information by its mobile unit, as claim 33 requires, but instead, describes forwarding the location 

information to a monitoring server for recordation.” Op. Br., Ex. 7 at 21-22.2 In fact, Patentee 

actually cited the specification’s teaching of immediate or later reporting. Id. (quoting specification 

statement that the “device could . . . report that location immediately or later”). Defendants 

nonetheless argue that Patentee’s mention that the “claimed exemplary embodiment” operated 

such that “recorded data may be preserved and then later reported.” Id. at 22. This is not clear and 

unmistakable surrender. 

Next, Defendants present a strawman argument concerning temporary or transitory storage 

that is nowhere found in the specification or prosecution history. Defs. Br. at 5-6. There was no 

discussion of or reliance on “transitory storage” in the prosecution or the specification. 

 Defendants’ extrinsic evidence does not overcome (or refute) the intrinsic evidence. 

Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that intrinsic 

evidence has priority over inconsistent extrinsic evidence). 

Finally, Defendants offer no rationale for substituting “preserve” for “record,” which has 

a plain and ordinary meaning. See, Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that a district court is “not obligated to provide additional guidance to 

the jury” where the terms are already clear and understandable to the jury). 

2. “collect the visited geographic location data for geographic location 

data for geographic locations visited by the location-aware device” 

(‘543 Patent, claims 45-49, 51; ‘704 Patent, claims 46 and 48) 

2 Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis is added in this brief. 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 7 of 21
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Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning. “accumulate for later reporting [or sharing]3

the visited geographic location data for 

locations visited by the location-aware device”

 Defendants admit that their construction of “collect” is not the plain and ordinary meaning 

of the term, or even consistent with the term’s use in the patent. Defs. Br. at 8 n. 5 (attempting to 

limit construction of collect to this particular phrase, because collect is allegedly used differently 

elsewhere in the patent). In fact, Defendants’ “later reporting” requirement here is even more 

tenuous than in connection with “record.” They cite no prosecution history concerning “collect” 

and admit the specification does not support their argument. Id. Their position also fails for the 

reasons mentioned in the “record[s/ed]” section, supra. Finally, Defendants provide no rationale 

why the easily understood term “collect” should be replaced with “accumulate.” See, Finjan, 626 

F.3d at 1207. 

3. “categories” (‘450 patent, claim 67; ‘543, patent claim 46; ‘704 patent, 

claims 36 and 37) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning “content-based classification[s]”

 Defendants do not contest that “categories” has a plain and ordinary meaning or that 

Defendants’ construction is narrower than that meaning. Defs. Br. at 9-11. Yet Defendants ignore 

Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and do not allege 

that Patentee acted as its own lexicographer or disavowed the full scope of the claim in the 

specification or during prosecution. 

The specification demonstrates that “categories” includes but is not limited to “contentbased” categories or classifications. For example, the specification repeatedly references “content

categories.” See, e.g., ‘543 Patent at 18:22-24, 48-49.4 If the term “categories” was already limited 

3 Defendants altered their construction after Plaintiffs’ opening brief was filed. 

4 Defendants also fail to explain how their construction squares with the specification’s use of 

“location categories” instead of “content categories.” ‘543 Patent at 17:32. 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 8 of 21
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to content-based categories, the “content” modifier would be superfluous. See Wasica, 853 F.3d 

at 1288 n.10. Thus, the specification’s disclosure that access may be restricted based on “content 

categories” or “when the activity potentially accessed took place” are examples of various 

“categories.” Id. at 18:21-32. Moreover, Defendants ignore claim differentiation, as their position 

is inconsistent with claims 1, 16 and 31 of the original ‘139 Patent (independent claim 1 reciting 

“categories,” while dependent claim 16 narrows the claim to “content category;” independent 

claim 31 reciting “content category.”). See Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, 177 F.3d 968, 

971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“different words or phrases used in separate claims are presumed to 

indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope.”). 

4. “comments” (‘543 patent, claim 51) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“Written text; not solely an emoticon or 

rating”

“user-generated remarks” 

 Plaintiffs refer to their opening brief. 

5. “detection network directory” (‘704 patent, claims 33, 46, 48) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

“a network directory which reflects the 

location of wireless devices not solely based 

on cellular tower triangulation”

“third party directory that stores and provides 

the location of the location aware cellular 

phone”

 Defendants’ construction does not align with the claim language, specification or 

prosecution history and should be rejected. First, it ignores the term network in “detection network 

directory.” Second, it wrongly reads “third party” into the claim, while misconstruing the 

specification examples where “third party” modifies the location detection data – not the directory 

itself. Third, it requires the directory itself to affirmatively “provide” the location of the location 

aware cellular phone. 

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First, as described in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, the specification teaches the use of network 

items (e.g., Bluetooth access points, and sophisticated networks using fingerprinting, GPS, Loran, 

etc.). Op. Br. at 12. The detection network directory may include information that reflects the 

location of such wireless devices. Defendants ignore this language. 

 Second, Defendants’ “third party” requirement is incorrect. The particular embodiment of 

Fig. 23 does illustrate a “third party location detection network directory.” Yet, the claim language 

does not recite “third party.” ’704 Patent at Claims 33, 46, 48. Obviously, the term “detection 

network directory” is not inherently limited to “third party” arrangements or the modifier language 

would be meaningless or superfluous. Rather, Defendants are committing the “cardinal sin” of 

claim construction by seeking to import a “third party” requirement from the specification into the 

claims. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Neither the specification nor prosecution history require or permit such importation. The 

specification does not redefine the term or narrowly define all detection networks as being “third 

party.” In fact, it describes “location detection network” and “location detection service” without 

a “third party” modifier. See, e.g., ‘704 Patent at 17:20-21, 29-30. It also describes a “detection 

network directory” that “can” store third party location detection data. Id. at 4:54-55. But that 

does not mean it must or that the directory itself is “third party.”5 The prosecution history does 

not contain (and Defendants do not even allege) a clear and unmistakable disclaimer 

“constitut[ing] a clear disavowal of claim scope” such that the directory is limited to third party 

directories. Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

In any event, Defendants’ proposal is inconsistent with how “third party” is used in the 

specification. “Third party” is used exclusively to modify “location detection,” “location detection 

data,” or “data” – not the directory itself. ’704 Patent at 4:54-57; Fig. 23, elements 2312, 2356. 

While the directory could be a third party’s, the claims do not require that. Defendants ignore this 

5 It is unclear what Defendants even mean by a “third party directory,” and Ikorongo takes no 

position on what Defendants currently mean. 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 10 of 21
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point, and attempt to obfuscate it by omitting “location” from their direct quotations of the 

specification: “Figure 23 describes the detection network directory as a ‘Third Party Detection 

Network Directory.’” Defs. Br. at 14. But as noted above, the actual language is “Third Party 

Location Detection Network Directory.” Element 2356 from Figure 23 likewise provides a “third 

party location detection service” - again using the term “third party” to modify location detection, 

not “directory.” 

 Defendants’ construction is inconsistent with its own prosecution history argument. 

Defendants cite the Applicant’s explanation that “including ‘Third Party is informative in 

Applicant’s opinion because it differentiates over cell tower triangulation (which present 

application also covers), as a cellular service provider would not be considered a ‘Third Party.’” 

Defs. Br. at 14-15. This does not support Defendants’ “third party directory” requirement. Rather, 

the Applicant opined that a network directory including only location data relating to cell tower 

triangulation of a non-third party would not qualify as “Third Party data.” Op. Brief, Ex. 12 at 15. 

The specification provides examples of third party location data, such as “[w]alking in the door of 

a . . . location could trigger an interaction between a Bluetooth device and a Bluetooth access point

sponsored at the location. The Bluetooth device could learn the location visited and report the 

location immediately or later . . .” ‘704 Patent at 3:46-51. “Alternatively, the Bluetooth device 

could disclose its identity to a Bluetooth access point at a particular location and the access point 

could report the visit.” Id. at 53-55. The Bluetooth access point is not part of the cellular network, 

but rather is part of a “third party” network. In contrast to Defendants’ proposal, Ikorongo’s 

construction aligns precisely with this description by stating that the directory reflects the location 

of wireless devices “not solely based on cellular tower triangulation.” 

Third, Defendants wrongly argue that the detection network directory must “store and 

provide the location of the location aware cellular phone.” Defs. Br. at 15. In alleged support, 

Defendants cite the patent’s description that the directory “reflects location of wireless devices 

2343 . . .’” and that in the preferred embodiment “[w]ireless devices 2343 include the user’s 

location-aware cellular device.” Id. But Defendants’ construction misconstrues the language and 

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seeks to import limitations from the specification into the claim. One, “reflect[ing] location” is 

not the same thing as providing the actual location. A person’s use of the term “youse guys” might 

reflect the location of their upbringing in the North, but does not provide the exact location of their 

birth. Unlike Defendants’, Plaintiffs’ proposed construction uses the actual “reflects” language. 

Two, the fact that in an embodiment of the specification the user’s device may be included among 

other wireless devices, does not mean that directory is limited to that user’s device or must store 

its actual location. The claims are not so limited and in fact the specification describes other 

embodiments as noted above. Three, Defendants’ extra requirement that the network directory 

“provides location” only adds confusion, as the network directory need not store “location.” 

Ikorongo’s construction is more appropriate, as it accounts for the various information that 

the detection network directory may contain. To wit, the specification provides that the network 

directory contains information “such as the devices’ location address, location description, 

timestamp, and a user ID 2358.” Id. at 17:1-2. The specification’s use of the non-limiting language 

“such as” demonstrates that the information reflecting location may vary depending on whether 

location detection is achieved, e.g., using “Bluetooth, GPS, or any other location detection 

technology.” Id. at 16:56-59. While information in the network directory reflects the location of 

wireless devices, the network directory need not contain the location itself as explained above. 

This use of “reflects” was not arbitrary. While the location of a Bluetooth access point may act as 

a proxy for the location of a Bluetooth phone that detects it, a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would appreciate technically that they are not the same (e.g., the phone could be 7-30 feet away). 

Finally, Defendants mischaracterize Ikorongo’s arguments regarding the “detection 

arrangements and directories” disclosed in the specification. Defs. Br. at 15. Ikorongo has not 

argued that a “Bluetooth access point,” “sophisticated network,” or “independent service” is a 

“detection network directory” (although a “detection network directory” could be a part of a 

sophisticated network or independent service, and/or could be accessible through a Bluetooth 

access point). Id. 

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6. “recorded . . . using a satellite-based location-fixing protocol and a 

detection network directory” (‘704 patent, claims 33, 46, 48) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning “recorded by the location-aware cellular 

phone device using both a satellite-based 

location-fixing protocol and a detection 

network directory”

 This dispute centers on whether the cellular phone must actually record “each and every

geographic location visited” using “both a satellite-based location fixing protocol and a detection 

network directory” (Defendants’ position) or whether the claim requires the capability to use both. 

First, Claims 46 and 48 are apparatus claims and thus necessarily directed to capabilities 

as opposed to actual performance. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“to infringe a claim that recites capability and not actual operation, an accused 

device need only be capable of operating in the described mode.”). These claims require only that 

the computer readable medium include “software for instructing a controller to” perform the 

disputed claim language and thus must simply be capable of meeting the claim requirements. 

 Second, method claim 33 (and apparatus claims 46 and 48) merely requires that the device

doing the recording use the satellite-based location-fixing protocol and the detection network 

directory. It does not require that each location actually be recorded using both. Defendants’ 

arguments based on prosecution are inapt for the reasons discussed in Plaintiffs’ opening brief. 

Further, Defendants’ quotation at top of p. 18 is not from the office action (or even from the portion 

of the reference cited by the examiner). Defendants are creating a self-serving (and inaccurate) 

rejection. In short, Defendants are illogically arguing that Plaintiffs distinguished Thomas by 

requiring both items, while Defendants argue that Thomas teaches both items. Id. at 18. 

 Defendants’ criticize Plaintiffs’ golf score analogy for including three items. Defs. Br. at 

19. It works just as well to say that a golf score is recorded using pencil and eraser. Another 

analogy would be an explorer circumnavigating the globe using maps and celestial navigation. If 

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at sea with no view of land, the explorer cannot use maps. But closer to shore, he may use both. 

The explorer has the capability to use both, but may not be use both each time. 

7. “enabl[e/ing] definition . . .” (‘543 Patent Claims 32, 39, 46-49, 51, 54, 

56, 72, 73, 75; ‘704 Patent Claims 33, 46, 48) 

“enable the user to define . . .” (‘543 patent claim 56)6

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction 

Plain and ordinary meaning “allow[ing] the user to grant permission for 

one or more [other users/buddies] to access 

selected categories of the visited geographic 

location data”

 Defendants wrongly assert that seven different phrases that appear in 16 different 

independent claims, across two different patents all mean exactly the same thing. The claims 

are a variety of types: (1) computer readable media (CRM), (2) location aware mobile devices, and 

(3) various methods, yet Defendants insist on identical construction. 

 Defendants’ construction contains a number of infirmities and should be rejected. First, 

Defendants read into every limitation the requirement of granting permission “to access selected 

categories of the visited geographic location data.” Yet, of the 16 different claims at issue – only 

one even recites “categories.” See, ‘543 Patent Claim 46. None of the other claims recite that term. 

See, ‘543 Patent Claims 32, 39, 45, 47-49, 51, 54, 56, 72, 73, 75; ‘704 Patent Claims 33, 46, 48. 

 Moreover, claim 46 is a CRM claim that recites “enable definition of access rights for one 

or more other users to enable access to the visited geographic location data.” ‘543 Patent at 23:33-

35. This is identical to the language at issue in ‘543 Patent Claims 45 – 47, 49, 51. However, 

unlike all the other claims at issue, claim 46 goes on to further narrow this limitation by reciting 

“wherein in order to enable the definition of the access rights . . ., the software further instructs the 

controller of the location-aware device to . . . receive . . . input that defines one or more categories 

of the visited geographic location data that can be shared with the other user.” ‘543 Patent at 

6 For brevity, the full terms have been abbreviated with ellipses. The terms are listed in full in 

the opening brief. 

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23:41-49. That is, the “categories” that Defendants argue must be included in every phrase is only 

expressly recited in one of the claims. Similarly, none of the ‘704 Patent claim terms at issue 

recite “categories.” Yet dependent claim 36 (not at issue) narrows independent claim 33 (at issue) 

by expressly reciting similar “categories” language. Defendants’ theory violates the doctrine of 

claim differentiation and would render superfluous the expressly recited language of claim 46. 

 Second, Defendants read into every limitation at issue the affirmative requirement of “the 

user” granting “permission.” However, only 1 of the 16 independent claims at issue recites “the 

user” as part of the definition or enablement of rights. Compare ‘543 Claim 56 (“enable the user

to define rights . . .”). In fact, this is the only non-grammatical difference between the relevant 

terms of ‘543 claims 56 and 72, further supporting claim differentiation. 

 Defendants’ attempts to justify their construction fail. First, Defendants note that the 

specification provides examples with categories. Defs. Br. at 21-22. But Defendants point to no 

lexicography or disclaimer to support their supposed narrowing and thus cannot support their 

position. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Defendants are impermissibly reading limitations from the 

specification into the claims. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324. Defendants’ dictionary definitions serve 

them no better as they do not provide a basis to override the intrinsic evidence. Defs. Br. at 22. 

 Next, Defendants cite to various snippets of patent prosecution (often concerning claim 

language not at issue here) to attempt to bolster their position, but fail to even assert that Patentee 

used words of manifest exclusion or that there was a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer. Omega 

Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Moreover, these snippets do 

not support Defendants’ position. For example, Defendants argue that the Patentee distinguished 

the Watanabe reference in a manner that is relevant to its construction. Defs. Br. at 22-23. But 

Watanabe was wholly irrelevant. As argued during prosecution, it did not relate to geographic 

data at all (it concerned photographs) and the only possible sharing was if a user gave another user 

their user ID and password; thus the reference did not teach or suggest many limitations of ‘543 

claim 32 (which is different from the other 15 claims at issue) including a “computer-implemented 

method of sharing computer usage experiences including . . .enabling definition of rights of the 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 15 of 21
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one or more buddies to access the visited geographic location data.” Ex. A (‘543 Patent 

Prosecution, 2014-04-07 Amendment at 2, 20-23). Defendants’ arguments based on the Oliver 

reference fares no better. Patentee argued Oliver does not teach “defining access rights for other 

users to access visited geographic location data of a user.” Def. Br. at 23 quoting Ex. A at 26. 

“Selecting categories” was not mentioned at all. 

 Defendants then argue that prosecution of a different patent (RE45,351) compels its 

construction. Defs. Br. at 23. But the cited portion concerns different subject matter. For example, 

while the claims for the terms at issue are client-side devices, the cited argument concerns a claim 

to a method of operating a tracking server which provides “access to the information indicating 

the computer usage experiences of the at least one user according to the access rights defined by 

the access control information for the at least one user.” Id. Patentee argued that Stripe did not 

teach such subject matter because, inter alia, the language the examiner cited concerned 

authenticating contributors and did not address access rights to other user’s information. Defs. Ex. 

15 at 22. This argument does not shed light on or disclaim coverage for the ‘543/’704 patent claim 

limitation at issue. 

 Second, Defendants argue that each claim term at issue must require “allowing the user to

grant permission” because “someone or something” must do it. Defs. Br. at 20-21. But claims are 

not required to list every possible element or step that would be necessary or helpful in a physical 

embodiment. See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 

(“If we once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim in order to limit such claims..., 

we should never know where to stop.”). The claims certainly cover enabling the user to define the 

rights, but they are not so limited (except for claim 56). Defendants’ prosecution history argument 

also fails. Defs. Br. at 21. Initially, Defendants do not even allege disclaimer based on Demello. 

The cited prosecution history in no way requires (or even suggests) that the user must define the 

rights at issue. Rather, Patentee observed that (irrespective of who or what defined the rights) 

Demello did not teach location information of one user being shared with other users. 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 16 of 21
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 Finally, Defendants wrongly attempt to justify their “one size fits all” 16 independent 

claims approach by asserting that certain preliminary infringement contention charts rely on 

similar evidence for different claims. Defs. Br. at 24. First, claim construction should not be done 

in view of the accused product but in view of the intrinsic evidence. See Neomagic Corp. v. Trident 

Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Second, the fact that one physical 

embodiment meets different claim language in no way means that the claim language is identical. 

For example, an accused product might be a yellow diesel cab. One claim might recite a car with 

a diesel engine and a second claim might recite a livery vehicle that is painted yellow. The same 

product meets both claims, but the claims are hardly identical. 

8. Whether the Preambles of the ‘543 Patent, Claims 45-49, 51, 72 and the 

‘704 Patent, Claims 46 and 48 are Limiting 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Limiting Not Limiting

 The preamble of ‘543 Patent claim 45 recites a “non-transitory computer-readable medium 

storing software for instructing a controller of a location-aware device that is capable of being 

registered with a registration server to.” The body of the claim then recites “collect the visited 

geographic location data for geographic locations visited by the location-aware device” and 

“wherein . . . the software further instructs the controller of the location-aware device to receive 

. . .” ’543 Patent at Claim 45. The claim body thus makes clear that “the location aware device” 

is not just any such device, but “the” location aware device of the preamble, which (1) has a 

controller being instructed by the software and (2) is capable of being registered with a registration 

server. See, TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph, 790 F.3d, 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting the “claims 

do not concern just any ‘mobile unit,’ but rather [the one that is part of the destination tracking 

system of the preamble].”) 

 Defendants cite TomTom to argue that entire preamble here is not limiting, but in that case 

the other portion of the preamble (“a method for generating and updating data for use in ...”) was 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 17 of 21
13 

solely directed to intended use and did not provide antecedent basis for claim body terms. Id. at 

1322-23. Defendant’s reliance on Cochlear Bone Anchored Sols. AB v. Oticon Med. AB, 958 F.3d 

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2020) is also misplaced. The court held the disputed preamble portion non-limiting 

because it “is merely a statement of intended use of the claimed hearing aid. It identifies no 

structure . . . .” Id. at 1355. 

 Defendants wrongly assert that the preamble is “merely duplicative” of the body of the 

claim. Defs. Br. at 25. The claim body uses shorthand versions of the preamble terms (e.g., by 

reciting “the” location aware device) without repeating the full preamble language. This 

antecedent basis approach demonstrates that the preamble is limiting. 

 Defendants argue that because the limitations (1) “non-transitory computer-readable 

medium storing software for instructing a controller” and (2) “capable of being registered with a 

registration server” “are [allegedly] separable from a ‘location aware [cellular phone/mobile] 

device” those terms should not be limiting. Defs. Br. at 26-27. That is simply false. “Software,” 

and “controller” in addition to “location aware device” is recited in the bodies of the claims and 

should thus be limiting. A similar analysis is applicable to 46-49 and 51 of the ‘543 Patent. With 

respect to ‘543 claim 72, the “controller” language is recited in the body of the claim as well. 

Regarding the ‘704 patent, a similar analysis applies. The “location-aware cellular phone device” 

is recited and relied upon in the body of the claims 46 and 48. 

9. Bumble/Lyft Only Terms: “obtain defined rights of the one or more 

other users to access the visited geographic location data” ('543 patent 

claims 55, 71); “obtaining access rights for one or more other users to 

allow for access to the visited geographic location data” (’543 patent 

claims 57, 70) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed 

Construction 

Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning. “grant[ing] permission for one or more other users to 

access selected categories of the visited geographic 

location data”

 Defendants delete the “the user” requirement, but otherwise argue for the same 

construction as in Section 7 above. For the same reasons, Defendants’ construction should be 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 18 of 21
14 

rejected. For example, none of claims 55, 57, 70 or 71 recites categories, yet claim 58 expressly

limits claim 57 by reciting “the access rights . . . comprises . . . information that defines one or 

more categories . . .” Thus, claim differentiation again refutes Defendants’ position. 

B. ‘554 Patent (Samsung and LG only) 

1. “receive an identification of a geographic area” / “receiv[e/ing], via the 

user device, an identification of a geographic area” (‘554 patent claims 

1, 17, 33) 

Ikorongo’s Proposed Construction Defendants’ Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning. “receive/[ing] from a user of the user device 

an identification of a geographic area”

Defendants again seek to import limitations from the specification into the claims. This 

time wrongly (and irrelevantly) asserting that “the specification does not disclose receiving an 

identification of a geographic area from anything but a user.” Defs. Br. at 29. 

Yet, the specification teaches that “[t]he location determination function 38-1 generally 

operates to obtain the location of the device 14-1 . . . As an example, the location determination 

function may be a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver.” ‘554 Patent at 7:40-41. This 

compares nicely to the limitation in dispute: “a location determination component adapted to 

receive an identification of a geographic area.” ’554 Patent at Claim 1. The specification 

elsewhere discloses that certain media may be selected based on the current location of the user. 

See, e.g, id. at 10:33-46. 

Moreover, ‘554 Patent Claim 1 claims priority U.S. Patent No. 8,060,525, which is 

incorporated by reference. The ‘525 Patent specification discloses an embodiment that “media 

recommendation request may be sent with seed information, such as the device’s current location.” 

Ex. B, ’525 Patent at 5:6-8. In fact, the ‘525 does not expressly illustrate an embodiment for 

receiving the location any other way. Defendants’ proposed construction would exclude these 

embodiments. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 

(interpretation that excludes preferred embodiments is “rarely, if ever, correct”). 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 19 of 21
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Defendants attempt to deflect by confusion the fact that their construction of Claim 1 would 

exclude the embodiment of its dependent Claim 3. Defs. Br. at 29-30. They admit that “the 

location determination component can be adapted to determine the current location of the user” 

but argue that it must “also receive from a user of the user device an identification of a geographic 

area.” Defendants offer no cogent rationale for this position, instead constructing a strawman that 

Ikorongo’s position (of plain and ordinary meaning) “allows receiving an identification of a 

geographic area without any action by the user of the user device.” Id. at 30. Ikorongo has not 

taken that position. Instead, the claim term means what it says, and does not require the 

“identification of a geographic area” come from the user. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For at least the foregoing reasons, Ikorongo respectfully requests that the Court construe 

the disputed terms as proposed by Ikorongo. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Howard Wisnia 

HOWARD WISNIA

howard@wisnialaw.com 

WISNIA PC 

12770 High Bluff Drive, Suite 200 

San Diego, California 92130 

858.461.0989 

DEREK GILLILAND

State Bar No. 24007239 

derek@soreylaw.com 

SOREY, GILLILAND & HULL, LLP 

P.O. Box 4203 

109 W. Tyler Street 

Longview, Texas 75601 

903.212.2822 - Telephone 

903.212.2864 - Telephone

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 20 of 21
16 

KARL RUPP

State Bar No. 24035243 

krupp@nixlaw.com 

NIX PATTERSON, LLP 

Advancial Building 

1845 Woodall Rodgers Freeway, Suite 1050 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

972.831.1188 - Telephone 

972.444.0716 - Facsimile 

JEFFREY ANGELOVICH

State Bar No. 00786988 

jangelovich@nixlaw.com 

BRADLEY BECKWORTH

State Bar No. 24001710 

bbeckworth@nixlaw.com 

NICHOLAS WYSS

State Bar No. 24071459 

nwyss@nixlaw.com 

NIX PATTERSON, LLP 

3600 N. Capital of Texas Hwy, Bldg. B, Suite 350 

Austin, Texas 78746 

512.328.5333 - Telephone 

512.328.5335 - Facsimile 

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule CV-5, I hereby certify 

that, on January 8, 2021, all counsel of record who have appeared in this case are being served 

with a copy of the foregoing via the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

 /s/ Howard Wisnia 

 Howard Wisnia 

Case 6:20-cv-00259-ADA Document 56 Filed 01/08/21 Page 21 of 21