IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

AND EMC CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00477-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 1 of 14
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 1

A. The Asserted Patent ..........................................................................................................1

B. The Accused Product ........................................................................................................1

III. LEGAL STANDARD...................................................................................................... 2

A. Rule 12(b)(6).....................................................................................................................2

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement ...........................................................................2

IV. ARGUMENT................................................................................................................... 3

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory 

Infringement......................................................................................................................3

1. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite knowledge for indirect 

infringement............................................................................................................ 3

2. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite specific intent for induced 

infringement............................................................................................................ 5

3. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite lack of substantial noninfringing uses for contributory infringement......................................................... 6

V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 7

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 2 of 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

ii

Cases

Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,

620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................2, 5

Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,

No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) .................................2, 3, 5

Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC,

No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 2011 WL 2471299 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) ...........................3, 4

Artrip v. Ball Corp.,

735 Fed. Appx. 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018).........................................................................................6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009)...................................................................................................................2

Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc.,

C 11–04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012)...............................................4

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)...................................................................................................................2

Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

904 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2012).....................................................................................4

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)...........................................................................................................2, 3

De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.,

2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)..........................................................................2

Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.,

No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018)..........................................6

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.,

471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................5

Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,

620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................3

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

563 U.S. 754 (2011)...................................................................................................................3

Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,

No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019).....................................6

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 3 of 14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued)

Page(s)

iii

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................2

Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019)..........................5, 6

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc.,

No. 6:19-cv-432 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020)..............................................................................4

Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012)......................4

Xpoint Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

730 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Del. 2010)...........................................................................................4

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 4 of 14
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

iv

Abbreviation Term

’489 patent U.S. Patent No. 8,913,489

Complaint or Compl. Complaint (D.I. 1)

Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., and EMC Corporation

LAG Link Aggregate Group

MC-LAG Multi-Chassis Link Aggregate Group

VFL Virtual Fabric Link

VLT Virtual Link Trunking

WSOU or Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and 

Development

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 5 of 14
1

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged—and cannot plausibly allege—indirect infringement in 

this case, under any theory. Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations are based on knowledge 

of the patent only as of the date of the Complaint, which this Court has repeatedly held is 

insufficient to sustain a claim of indirect infringement. Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations 

should be dismissed because Plaintiff also completely fails to allege numerous other elements of 

induced and contributory infringement. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Asserted Patent

The ’489 patent generally relates to multi-chassis link aggregate group (“MC-LAG”) where 

a link aggregate group (“LAG”) is split across two physical devices. ’489 patent, Abstract. 

Although LAGs and aggregation switches were generally known, the patent contends that 

extending the LAG across two devices would provide redundancy. For the LAG to be extended 

across two devices, the ’489 patent explains that the two devices communicate via a “virtual fabric 

link” or “VFL.” Id., 6:61–67. According to the patent, if there is a failure in the VFL, the system 

will reconfigure the MC-LAG into one or more LAGs and then initiate a “spanning tree protocol” 

or “STP” on the LAGs to remap the network. Id., 17:66–18:24. Plaintiff has asserted claim 8.

B. The Accused Product

The Complaint alleges infringement by “networking switches with Virtual Link Trunking 

(VLT).” Compl. ¶ 13. Administrators can choose to enable VLT functionality to provide 

multipathing and create redundancy through increased bandwidth, enabling multiple parallel paths 

between nodes and load-balancing traffic. Id., ¶ 15. 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 6 of 14
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III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The complaint must include more than 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must allege nonconclusory facts that make liability “plausible,” meaning that they “allow[] the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 

2009) (“The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to 

raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of each 

element of a claim.”). For a claim of patent infringement, the complaint must—at a minimum—

plead facts that describe how the allegedly infringing product infringes. See De La Vega v. 

Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020).

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement

For both induced and contributory infringement, Plaintiff must plead facts to support 

“knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. 

Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); see Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. 

Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

For induced infringement, Plaintiff additionally must plead facts showing that the 

Defendant “had [a] specific intent to induce [a third party’s] patent infringement.” Affinity Labs 

of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 

May 12, 2014). The “specific intent” element is “demanding” and requires more than 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 7 of 14
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“unsubstantiated assertions” or “generalized allegations” as to the intent of the alleged infringer. 

Id. at *7, *21. Specific intent requires more than knowledge of the induced acts; rather, the accused 

infringer must have “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 

For contributory infringement, Plaintiff must also plead “that the component has no 

substantial noninfringing uses, and [] that the component is a material part of the 

invention.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *8 (citing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims are deficient and should be dismissed. Plaintiff has 

failed to plead any knowledge of the patent or knowledge of infringement prior to the filing of this 

action. Plaintiff also fails to plead a specific intent to induce infringement. And, Plaintiff has not 

pled, and cannot plead, that that there are no substantial non-infringing uses. Each of these failures 

independently warrants dismissal of Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations. 

1. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite knowledge for indirect 

infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations fail because they do not plead the required 

“knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil, 135 S. Ct. at

1926. As courts in this District have held, the knowledge requirements for indirect infringement 

require pre-suit knowledge. See Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 

2011 WL 2471299, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) (holding that reliance “on knowledge of 

[plaintiff’s] patent after the lawsuit was filed . . . is insufficient to plead the requisite knowledge 

for indirect infringement”). 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 8 of 14
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Despite this clear requirement, Plaintiff’s sole allegation of knowledge of the patent is a 

conclusory statement that “Defendants have received notice and actual or constructive knowledge 

of the ’489 Patent since at least the date of service of this Complaint.” Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis 

added).

1

 This Court has rejected identical allegations of knowledge. For example, in Parus this 

Court dismissed indirect infringement claims where plaintiff’s only allegation of knowledge of the 

patent was that “Defendant Apple has had knowledge of the ’431 Patent since at least the filing 

of the original complaint.” Parus, No. 6:19-cv-432, at D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.) ¶ 44 (emphasis 

added); see id., at Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020) 

(dismissing indirect infringement claims). Like the allegations in Parus, Plaintiff fails to allege 

pre-suit knowledge and thus fail to state a claim for indirect infringement. See id.; Aguirre, 2011 

WL 2471299, at *3; Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 

1260, 1268–69 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“Also, because notice of the patent is necessarily provided by a 

complaint, finding that a complaint provides sufficient knowledge for induced infringement would 

vitiate the Supreme Court’s holding in Global–Tech that an allegation of knowledge of the patent 

is required to state a claim for induced infringement.”).

2

1 Plaintiff’s allegations of knowledge of infringement are likewise deficient as they allege such 

knowledge only “[s]ince at least the date of service of this Complaint.” Compl. ¶ 25; see, e.g., 

Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 

54 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2020) (dismissing indirect infringement claims where the only allegations 

of knowledge of infringement were that “[b]y the time of trial, Defendant Apple will have known 

and intended (since receiving such notice) that their continued actions would actively induce the 

infringement of the claims of the ’431 Patent.” (D.I. 28 (Amended Compl.) ¶ 44)).

2 Other courts similarly have held that “knowledge after filing of the present action is not 

sufficient for pleading the requisite knowledge for indirect infringement.” Xpoint Technologies, 

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 730 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357 (D. Del. 2010); Avocet Sports Tech., Inc. v. 

Garmin Int’l, Inc., C 11–04049 JW, 2012 WL 1030031, *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012); Proxyconn 

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV 11-1681-DOC-ANX, 2012 WL 1835680, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 

16, 2012); Brandywine, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (“The weight of authority addressing the 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 9 of 14
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2. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite specific intent for induced 

infringement

Plaintiff also entirely fails to plead specific intent in support of its inducement claim. 

Allegations of specific intent require factual “‘evidence of culpable conduct, directed to 

encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct 

infringer’s activities.’” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 

WL 3940952, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 

F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)). Plaintiff’s allegations of specific intent 

amount to a single conclusory statement that Defendants “actively induced” others to infringe 

through it advertising and promotional materials and five website citations. See Compl. ¶ 24. Such 

conclusory allegations fail to present facts that demonstrate: (1) Defendants knew that the alleged 

acts infringed, and (2) Defendants knew that the promotion of their products would induce or 

encourage others to infringe the Asserted Patent. See Addiction, 620 F. App’x at 938 (“[S]imply 

recit[ing] the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific intent” fails to plead “facts that 

would allow a court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific intent to induce 

infringement.”); Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7, *21 (finding “Plaintiffs generalized 

allegations that Toyota induced others to infringe the Asserted Patents through its marketing and 

sales tactics are [] insufficient”). To support specific intent, Plaintiff must include specific 

allegations mapping the advertisement or promotion to the performance of the claimed steps of the 

knowledge required for indirect infringement . . . requires a plaintiff to allege that defendant had 

pre-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit.”).

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 10 of 14
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patent—i.e., “evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement.” 

Parity, 2019 WL 3940952, at *2.3

Plaintiff’s inducement claim should be dismissed because the Complaint is entirely silent 

on a key requirement of induced infringement.

3. Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite lack of substantial non-infringing 

uses for contributory infringement 

Plaintiff’s contributory infringement allegations also fail because Plaintiff did not “‘plead 

facts that allow an inference that the components sold or offered for sale have no substantial noninfringing uses.’” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not done so and cannot do so. Plaintiff’s only allegation on these elements is a 

conclusory statement that repeats the legal elements. See Compl. ¶ 22. As the Federal Circuit held 

in Artrip, conclusory allegations are not enough. 735 F. App’x at 713 (affirming dismissal of a 

contributory infringement claim where the “complaint did not plausibly assert facts to suggest that 

[Defendant] was aware of the patents or facts to suggest that the [Accused Product] it supplied had 

no substantial noninfringing use”). Plaintiff’s failure to raise a plausible inference of no substantial 

non-infringing uses and materiality is fatal to its contributory infringement claim, and as such it 

should be dismissed.

3 See also Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 

1455336, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (“In no way does the complaint detail how an end user 

would infringe Hypermedia’s patents by following instructions in the links provided in the 

complaint.” (emphasis in original)); Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc., No. 

CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding mere citations to 

websites were insufficient to plead specific intent). 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 11 of 14
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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion 

and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to plausibly state a claim for relief, without leave to 

amend. Pursuant to L.R. CV-7(h), Defendants request an oral hearing on the foregoing motion.

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 12 of 14
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Dated: October 5, 2020 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@sheltoncoburn.com

SHELTON COBURN LLP

311 RR 620, Suite 205

Austin, TX 78734-4775 

Telephone: 512.263.2165

Facsimile: 512.263.2166 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

Kyanna Sabanoglu

ksabanoglu@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 13 of 14
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of October 2020, the foregoing was filed 

electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5(b)(1) and served via the Court’s electronic 

filing system on all counsel who have consented to electronic service:

Brett Aaron Mangrum, Attorney for WSOU

brett@etheridgelaw.com

Jeffrey Huang, Attorney for WSOU

jhuang@etheridgelaw.com 

Ryan Scott Loveless, Attorney for WSOU 

ryan@etheridgelaw.com

Travis Lee Richins, Attorney for WSOU

travis@etheridgelaw.com 

James L. Etheridge, Attorney for WSOU

jim@etheridgelaw.com 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton 

Barry K. Shelton 

Case 6:20-cv-00477-ADA Document 31 Filed 10/05/20 Page 14 of 14