[Cite as McCafferty v. Columbus Dev. Ctr., 2009-Ohio-7173.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

FRANK W. MCCAFFERTY 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

COLUMBUS DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2009-07253-AD 

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

{¶ 1} On August 18, 2009, plaintiff, Frank W. McCafferty, an employee of 

defendant, Columbus Developmental Center (CDC), sustained body damage to his 

1994 Ford Taurus while the vehicle was parked in a parking lot located on CDC 

premises. Plaintiff’s property damage incident occurred when an uncontrolled CDC 

resident ran outside the CDC residential building, into the parking lot and kicked the left 

rear quarter panel of plaintiff’s parked car. Plaintiff implied the damage to his car was 

proximately caused by negligence on the part of CDC staff in failing to control a violent 

resident. Consequently, plaintiff filed this complaint seeking to recover $1,417.00, the 

cost of automotive repair needed resulting from the August 19, 2009 incident. The filing 

fee was paid. 

{¶ 2} A report (copy submitted) was filed with the CDC Police Department 

incident to plaintiff’s property damage occurrence. The report contained witness 

statements from Latisha N. Pace and Euleetha Pringle as well as photographs depicting 

the damage to plaintiff’s car. Pringle related she observed CDC resident Jesse D, 

become violent; throwing a coffee pot at another resident, destroying a picture that had 
been hanging on the wall of the CDC Broadview residence facility, kicking a wall, and 

then kicking another resident in the leg. Pringle noted she then saw resident Jesse D 

walk outside the residence facility and kick plaintiff’s car two times. Pace reported she 

and Pringle followed Jesse D when he ran outside the Broadview residence facility. 

Pace stated “Jesse started running and jumped and kicked staffs (plaintiff’s) car with 

both feet leaving a large dent in the rear driver side quarter panel.” Photographs of 

plaintiff’s car accompanying the report substantiate the witness statements concerning 

the damage to the left rear quarter panel of the vehicle. 

{¶ 3} Defendant filed an investigation report neither admitting nor denying 

liability in this matter. Under the heading “Position of Defendant, Columbus 

Developmental Center” defendant provided the following statements: 

{¶ 4} “The Defendant does not dispute the facts outlined by the Plaintiff. A 

resident of the Columbus Developmental Center caused damage to the Plaintiff’s 

vehicle a blue Ford Taurus bearing Ohio License plate.” The investigation file 

submitted by the Plaintiff and written by the Columbus Developmental Center Police 

Department more fully outlines the details.” 

{¶ 5} Plaintiff filed a response maintaining he has not received any payment 

from any collateral source to cover the cost of repairing his car. 

{¶ 6} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, he must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed him a duty, that it breached that 

duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy 

Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E. 2d 1088, ¶8 citing 

Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 472 

N.E. 2d 707. Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that he suffered a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s 

negligence. Barnum v. Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the 

duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes 

a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only 

a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to 

sustain such burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm.

(1945), 145 Ohio St. 198, 30 O.O. 415, 61 N.E. 2d 198, approved and followed. This 

court, as trier of fact, determines questions of proximate causation. Shinaver v. 
Szymanski (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 51, 14 OBR 446, 471 N.E. 2d 477. 

{¶ 7} “If an injury is the natural and probable consequence of a negligent act 

and it is such as should have been foreseen in the light of all the attending 

circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result of the negligence. It is not 

necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the particular injury. It is 

sufficient that his act is likely to result in an injury to someone.” Cascone v. Herb Kay 

Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 155, 160, 6 OBR 209, 451 N.E. 2d 815, quoting Neff Lumber 

Co. v. First National Bank of St. Clairsville, Admr. (1930), 122 Ohio St. 302, 309, 171 

N.E. 327. In order to prove the breach of a definable duty, plaintiff must show that the 

harm that occurred was foreseeable. Menifee, 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 15 OBR 179, 472 

N.E. 2d 707. The test for feasibility is whether a prudent person would have anticipated 

that an injury was likely to occur as a result of some action or inaction. id. 

{¶ 8} Generally there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person by 

preventing him from causing physical harm to another. Littleton v. Good Samaritan 

Hospital & Health Ctr. (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 92, 529 N.E. 2d 449. However, an 

exception to this general rule has been found when a special relationship exists 

between the actor and the third person that imposes a duty upon the actor to control the 

third person’s conduct, or when a special relationship exists between the actor and the 

other that gives to the other a right to protection. Littleton. “Such ‘a special relation’ 

exists when one takes charge of a person whom he knows or should know is likely to 

cause bodily harm to others if not controlled.” Littleton, at 92; 2 Restatement of the Law 

2d, Torts (1965) at 129, section 319; see 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, (1965) at 

123, Section 315, Comment c. Under the facts of the instant claim, the court finds the 

special relationship outlined in Littleton exists and the harm inflicted by the CDC 

resident was foreseeable under the circumstances. Consequently, defendant is liable to 

plaintiff for the damage claimed, $1,417.00, plus the $25.00 filing fee, which may be 

awarded as costs pursuant R.C. 2335.19. See Bailey v. Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction (1990), 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 19, 587 N.E. 2d 990. 

 

 

 
Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us 

FRANK W. MCCAFFERTY 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

COLUMBUS DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2009-07253-AD 

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert 

ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE

DETERMINATION

 Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth 

in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor 

of plaintiff in the amount of $1,442.00, which includes the filing fee. Court costs are 

assessed against defendant. 

 

 DANIEL R. BORCHERT 

 Deputy Clerk 

Entry cc: 

Frank W. McCafferty D. Michael Snow, Superintendent 

153 Washington Street Columbus Developmental Center 

Canal Winchester, Ohio 43110 1601 West Broad Street 

 Columbus, Ohio 43222 
RDK/laa 

10/21 

Filed 11/20/09 

Sent to S.C. reporter 3/12/10