### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No s . 15

- 2295 , 15

- 2303 & 16

- 3556
T HORNCREEK A PARTMENTS III, LLC, a foreign limited liability company d/b/a The Lofts at Thorncreek , Plaintiff

- Appellee/ Cross

- Appellant , and T HORNCREEK M ANAGEMENT , LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

T OM M ICK , Defendant

- Appellant/ Cross

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division. No. 08 C 1225

— Gary Feinerman , Judge

.

____________________
Nos. 15

- 2296, 15

- 2302 & 16

- 3555
V ILLAGE OF P ARK F OREST , Plaintiff

- Appellant/ Cross

- Appellee , a nd2 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

T OM M ICK , Third

- Party Defendant

- Appellant/ Cross

- Appellee, and M AE B RANDON , et al. , Third

- Party Defendants/ Cross

- Appellees,

v.

T HORNCREEK A PARTMENTS II, LLC, Defenda nt

- Appellee / Cross

- Appellant
, and A TLANTIC M ANAGEMENT C ORPORATION , Defendant

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 08 C 0869

— Gary Feinerman , Judge

.

____________________
Nos. 15

- 2298, 15

- 2304 & 16

- 3557
T HORNCREEK A PARTMENTS I, LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellee/ Cross

- Appellant , and T HORNCREEK M ANAGEMENT , LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.Nos. 15

- 2295, et al. 3

T OM M ICK , individually and as Village Manager for the Village of Park Forest, Defendant

- Appellant,

a nd V ILLAGE OF P ARK F OREST , et al., Defendants / Cross

- Appellees.

____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 08 C 4303

— Gary Feinerman , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED M AY 18, 2017

— D ECIDED M ARCH 2 7 , 2018

____________________

Before B AUER , E ASTERBROOK , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. Th ese consolidated appeals challenge various aspects of a judgment entered on a split jury verdict in a long

- running dispute between the Village of Park Forest, Illinois, and Thorncreek Apartments, a large housing complex located in the V illage

. Thorncreek a ccused

v illage officials of engaging in a campaign of regulatory harassment based on personal animus against its owner and because many of its residents are black. Th orncree k s ued the Village and ten officials for compensatory and punitive damages under several federal and state civil

- rights laws

. A fter a 13

- day trial , jur ors returned a partial verdict for Thorncreek . T he Village and its manager were found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a class

- of

- one equal

- protection violation , and t he village manager and director of community development were found liable for conspiracy in violation4 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) . In all other respects, the jury sided with th e defenda nts. Ruling o n postverdict motions, t he district court tossed out the jury ’ s liability finding a gainst the community

development director but otherwise approved the verdict and entered judgment accordingly

. The judge also granted Thorncreek ’ s motion for prejudgment interest and attorney ’ s fees, though the award of fees was approximately one

- third of what was requested

. Both sides appeal ed , rais ing assorted challenges to t he judge ’ s posttrial rulings on damages, prejudgment interest , a nd attorney ’ s fees. W e find no error and affirm.

I. Background
Thorncreek is a large townho us e complex nestled in the Village of Park For est, a suburb southeast of Chicago that straddles both Cook County and Will County. In 1989 Thorncreek was sold to Atlantic Limited Partnership XX, a Michigan partnership largely owned by David Clapper, its general p artner. Clapper later reorganized the property into three separate limited liability corporations: Thorncreek Apartments I , LLC ; Thorncreek Apartments II, LLC ; and Thorncreek Apartments I II , LLC

. Each corporation operated

a di fferent part of the complex: Thor ncreek I ( “ Area F ” ) , Thorncreek II ( “ Area G ” ) , and Thorncreek III (“ Area H ” ). We refer to the three corporations coll ectively as “ Thorncreek ” unless th e context requires otherwise.
In 2007 Atlantic Limited sold Thorncreek I for roughly $16 million. T h e leasing office for the entire complex was located in a townhouse in Area F, so the sale caused a logistical problem. Thorncreek ’ s management company proposed
to relocate the leasing office to a va cant town house inNos. 15

- 2295, et al. 5

Area G, which was owned and operated by Thorncreek II. The move required a conditional use permit , s o in February 2007 Thorncreek II applied to the Village for a permit to use the vacant townho use as a business office

. In the meantime , however, Thorncreek began to conduct its business operation s from the Area G townhous e without waiting for action

on the permit application

. The Village responded b y citing Thorncreek II for zoning violati ons and operating without the required permit

. In December 2007 the Village filed su it in state court against Thorncreek II and Atlantic Limited to halt the zoning and operating violation s arisin g from the unpermitted leasing office and also to redress certain building

- code violation s

. Thorncreek II remove d the suit to federal court , but a district judge quickly sent it back to state court for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. A later removal w as successful; Thorncreek II counterclaim ed against the Village and ten village officials raising a host of federal and state civil

- rights violations. In February 2008 Thorncreek III filed its own federal law suit raising substantially similar claims

. Two m onths later Fannie Mae filed foreclosure notices with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds against Thorncreek II and III. Thorncreek blamed its predicament on the Village ’ s regulatory overreach . In July 2008 Thorncreek I joined the legal battle by filing its own federal suit alleging similar civil

- rights violations. In essence, all three suits alleged that the Village violated Thorncreek ’ s constitutional rights by denying its application for a business license, interfering with business operations, refusing to grant the application for a conditional use permit , failing to issue a certificate of occupancy, and unequally enforcing a building

- code provision requiring electrical6 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

upgrade s

. A single district judge took charge of all three suits , consolidat ing them fo r summary judgment and, if necessary, a trial. As originally pleaded, t he case was sprawling

. Thorncreek brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 seeking compensatory and punitive damages for alleged due

- process, equal

- protection, and T akings Clause violations ; conspiracy ; and failure to prevent a civil

rights conspiracy. Thorncreek also tacked on claim s under the Illinois Civil Rights Act , 740 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. § 23/5.

T he judge trimmed the case a bit on summary judgment , but even as narrowed the case remained unwieldy

. T hree groups of claims were tried to a jury over 13 days: (1) § 1983 claims against the Village and nine officials for class

- of

- one and race

- based equal

- protection violations ; (2) claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 against t he same nine officials for conspiracy and failure to prevent a civil

- rights conspiracy ; and (3) c laims against the Village under the Illinois Civil Rights Act

. The basic theory of the case was that the defendants caused Thorncreek ’ s mortgage default and fo reclosure by

s ingling it out for unfair regulatory action (and inaction) based on irrational animus against Clapper and racial bias against its black residents.
Thorncreek prevailed in part . The jur y found th e Village and V illage M anager Tom Mick liable for a class

- of

- one equal

- protection violation . The jury also found M ick and Larrie Kerestes , the director of community development, liable for conspir acy in violation of § 1985(3). The jurycleared the other defendants on these two claims and exonerated al l defendants on the remaining claims. On the issue of damages, t he jury awarded $2,014,000 in compen satory damages to Thorncreek II but only $1 in nominal damages toNos. 15

- 2295, et al. 7

Thorncreek I and III

. Finally, the jur y awarded punitive damages against Mick and Kerestes in the amount s of $5,000 and $1,000 , respectively

. Thorncreek moved for a new trial under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but only on t he issue of damages . The motion rai s ed several claims of error

. T he j udge rejected each one and denie d relief

. Thorncreek also asked for prejudgment interest on the jury ’ s award of compensatory damage s . The judge granted th at request

. Mick and Kerestes both moved f or judgment as a matt er of law under Rule 50(b). The jury ’ s verdict against Kerestes was limited to the § 1985 (3) conspiracy claim , but th at statute requires a predicate race

- based or class

- based equal

protection violation . B ecause the jury cleared all of the defendants on the race

- based equal

- protection claim , the judge held t hat the verd ict against Kerestes on the § 1985(3) claim could not stand

. Mick ’ s situation was different. His Rule 50(b) motion challenged only the jury ’ s finding on the § 1985 ( 3 ) conspiracy claim ; he did not attack the jury ’ s liability finding against him on the class

- of

- one equal

- protection claim . S o the judge saw no reason to disturb the verdict as to him and denied his motion

. With th e se adjustments, the judge entered judgment on the verdict.
Thorncreek later moved for an award of attorney ’ s fees and nontaxabl e costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . The judge granted the motion and award ed $430,999.25 in fees and $44,844.33 in costs. The award of fees was about one

- third of what Thorncreek requested. Both sides appealed , reprising many of the arguments raised in the pos ttrial litigation

.8 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

II. Analysis
A

. Mick ’ s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Mick challenges the denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law

. He argues that he deserves the same treatment as his codefendant Kerestes because th e jury ’ s finding of liability on the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim is invalid w ithout a predicate race

- based or class

- based equal

- protection violation. That ’ s a correct statement of settled law. See, e.g. , Smith v. Gomez , 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) (“ Section 19 85(3) prohibits a conspiracy to deprive another of equal protection under the law

... , but the conspiracy must be motivated by racial, or other class

- based discriminatory animus. ” (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)) ) . But it does not f ollow that Mick , like Kerestes, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It ’ s t rue that the jury ’ s verdict on the § 1985(3) claim wa s flawed as to both defendants. The jur ors rejected the race

based equal

- protection claim in toto, so there ’ s no underlyi ng race

- based equal

- protection violation to support conspiracy liability under § 1985(3)

. But the jury found Mick and the Village liable on Thorncreek ’ s § 1983 claim alleging a class

- of

- one equal

- protection violation and award ed more than $2 million in compensatory damages . Mick did not challenge this part of the verdict in his Rule 50(b) motion. The compensatory

- damages award on this claim is plainly sufficient to support the $5,000 punitive

- damages award against him

. So althoug h the jury ’ s verdict o n the § 1985(3) claim was defective , the re ’ s nothing wrong with the judgment , which Mick does not otherwise challenge. The judge properly den ied his motion for judgment as a matter of law.Nos. 15

- 2295, et al. 9

B

. Thorncreek ’ s Motion for a New Trial on Da mages Thorncreek asks us to order a new trial on the limited issue of damages

. Its primary argument is that the judge impermissibly admitted prejudicial references to Clapper’s wealth that influenced the jury’s assessment of damages. Thorncreek also attacks the jury decision to award only nominal damages to Thorncreek I and III.

1. Prejudicial E vidence “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than o n the evidence presented.” United States v. Suggs , 374 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted)

. We review claims of evidentiary error for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Hunt , 707 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2013). Because the trial judge is in a superior position toevaluate the impact of contested testimony or other evidence, we give special de ference to the judge’s evidentiary rulings

. Suggs , 374 F.3d at 516. And to warrant a new trial , an evidentiary error must affect the losing party’s substa ntial rights

— that is, there must be a significant chance that the flawed ruling affected the outcome of the trial. Smith , 707 F.3d at 808.

T he parties submitted some 26 or 27 motions in limine seeking to limit the opposition’s evidentiary submissions. One of Thorncreek’s pretrial motions pertained to evidence of Clapper’s wealth, which T h orncreek insisted should be off limits. The judge agreed and exclude d evidence of Clapper’s wealth or financial status

. Thorncreek maintains that the defense attorney violated this ruling several times , tainting the jury on the question of damages. The judge was not persuaded. Neither are we.10 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

Thorncreek ’s main complain t center s on a brief moment during the trial when defense counsel was cross

- examin ing a wit ness about a phone conversation with Clapper . C ounsel asked if the witness knew where Clapper was during the call . T he witness replied that he was “ either in his offices in Michigan, or he was on his boat in the Mediterranean

. ”

T he judge instructed the j ury to disrega rd the testimony, and w e assume that jurors follow such instructions

. Solyts v. Costello , 520 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2008). To overcome this presumption, the complaining party must establish “an overwhelming probability ” that the jury was “ unable to disregard inadmissible evidence ” and also “ a strong likelihood of a devastating effect from the evidence.” Turner v. Miller , 301 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 2002). T horncreek has not shown that this stray snippet of testimony had any sort of effect

— much less a devastating effect

— on the jury. Other oblique references to Clapper’s wealth occurred during defense counsel’s closing argument, but Thorncreek did not object. Ordinarily “a definitive ruling in limine preserves an issue for appellate review, without the need for later objection.” Wilson v. Williams , 182 F.3d 562 , 563 (7th Cir. 1999). But that rule doesn’t apply to claimed violations of a judge’s in limine rulings; an objection is generally required
to preserve appellate review of an alleged violation of a pretrial ruling . And h ere the judge reminded the parties to object to any violations of his ruling s on motions in limine and instructed them to be specific about the grounds. More specifically, a fter the witness’s “boat in the Mediterr anean ” reference, the judge called a break , made a record of what happened, and instructed the lawyers as follows:Nos. 15

- 2295, et al. 11

What I’ll say in response is there were 26 or 27 motions in limine , so

-- and with some prior objections, the objection said, “ruling on the motion in limine , ” and that prompts me to think about the motion in limine

. ... If you want to rely on a motion in limine

-- a ruling on a motion in limine in making an objection, you’ve got to tell me because it isn’t like

-- if we had one or two or three motions in limine , it would be different, but we had 26 or 27.

... .[Y]ou really have to state the basis for the objection when you make the objection.

... . [I]n the future, if you do want

-- both sides, if you want to rely on a motion in limine ruling in making an objection, just say, “motion in limine ruling.” Obviously don’t get into the details of the motion in limine , because again, that would defeat the point of having the motion in limine

. The judge ’s instructions could not have been clearer: T o preserve a challenge to any further violation s of his ruling s on motions in limine, the parties had to object. Thorncreek did not do so with respect to defense counsel’s passing

r eferences to Clapper’s wealth during closing argument

. That’s a waiver

. Venson v. Altamirano , 749 F.3 d 641, 657 (7th12 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

Cir. 2014); Houskins v. Sheahan , 549 F.3d 480 , 495 (7th Cir. 2008). 1
Thorncreek argue s for the first time in its reply brief that we should review the unpreserved errors under the plain

error standard

. P lain

- error review is rarel y applied in civil

cases and is available only if “(1) exceptional circumstances exist [] ; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur if plain error review is not applied.” Willis v. Lepine , 687 F.3d 826, 839 (7th Cir. 2012) (quo tation marks omitted)

. Th orncreek’s plain

- error argument fails for multiple reasons. For starters, “ ar guments raised f or the first time in a reply brief are waived.” Darif v. Holder , 739 F.3d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 2014). And Thorncreek has not show n either e x ceptional circumstances or a miscarriage of justice. Thorncreek won more than $2 million in damages , which suggests that the jury was not put off by any re ference s to Clapper’s wealth

. 2

1 Thorncreek suggests that not interrupting closing argument was part of its own counsel ’ s trial strategy. Maybe so, but that doesn ’ t make a difference in the analysis . “ Perhaps defendant

- appellant feared that a contemporaneous objection would incur hostility from the jury. This court need not speculate as to the nature of defendant

- appellant ’ s motives. Suffice it to note, however, that risky gambling tactics such as this are usually binding on the gambler. ” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr. , 610 F.3d 434, 445 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp. , 752 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).

2 Befo re we leave the subject of Clapper’s wealth, we pause to note an additional argument Thorncreek raises , though it’s so plainly meritless that we could let it go unmentioned . Thorncreek takes issue with t he highlighted parenthetical in this passage from the judge’s written decision on posttrial motions:
Before trial, Thorncreek moved in limine to bar, among other things, any references to or evidence regarding theNos. 15

- 2295, et al. 13

Thorncreek next argues that its financial records pre

dating 2005 sh ould not have been admitted at trial. This argument rests entirely on a ruling by a magistrate judge concerning a discovery dispute

. The magistrate judge saw a need to limit the scope of discovery, so he ordered that “[e]xcept for specific interrogatories and document requests identified on the record, the interrogatories and document requests are limited to the time peri od of 01/01/05 to the present.”
But t he documents at the center of Thorncreek’s argument are publicly available financial records pertaini ng to the housing complex. The defense expert incorporated this material into his final damages opinion , and t he defense disclosed the documents to Thorncreek about two months be fore trial, explaining that the pre

- 2005 public records were additional suppor t f or the expert’s opinion

. The defense

even offer ed to produce the expert for another deposition. Thorncreek d eclined the offer.

wealth and personal financial status of David Clapper, Thorncreek’s principal owner. Doc. 258. (Clapper apparently is a wealthy man. See Kaya Morgan, David Clapper

— Success Runs Deep , http://www.island connections.com/edit/clapper.htm (last visited May 17, 2015), which appears to be a puff piece about Clapper authored by a publicist, which refers to Clapper as a“Michigan business tycoon,” which shows photographs of Clapper with, among others, the first President Bush, Pope John Paul I I, and Kevin Nealon, andwhich was not offered or admitted into evidence at trial.) The Village did not oppose the exclusion of such evidence, Doc. 272, and the court granted the motion in relevant part, Doc. 377. (Emphasis in bold added.) This harmless as ide is hardly reversible error.14 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

T h orncreek now cries foul, relying on R ule 26(a) , but its objection is way off the mark. R ule 26(a) s ays that “[ a ] bsent a stipulation or a court order , ” expert testimony must disclosed at least 90 days before the date set for trial. F ED

. R. C IV

. P

. 26(a)(2)(D)(i) ( e mphasis added )

. Here t he judge specifically allowed the defense to submit the modified expert report
two months before trial

. There was no Rule 26 violation , and
t he judge did not otherwise abuse his discretion in admitting the publicly available pre

- 2005 financial records

. 2

. Challenge to Nominal D amages Awards “[W]e do not readily overturn a damage award when the trial court has denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial

. ” Rosario v. Livaditis , 963 F.2d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 1992). W e will do so only “ when the jury’s verdict is contrary to reason and the trial court’s denial of a new trial on damages is an abuse of discretion.” Id

. The jury awarded a substantial sum of money

— more than $2 million

— to Thorncreek II but only nominal damages of $1 each to Thorncreek I and III

. Thorncreek insists that the awards are inconsi sten t and contrary to r eas on

. Not so. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, t he jury rationally treated the three Thorncreek entities differently

. Thorncreek I originally housed the apartment leasing office and was sold for roughly $16 million in 2007 b efore most of the events in question occurred . True, the sale necessitated the relocation of the business office, which spawned the fight over regulatory approval of the conditional use permit

. Regardless, although Thorncreek’s e xpert testified that the $1 6 million price was too low , the defense expert said it was just right and no damages accrued

. T he jury was entitled to accept the latter ’s testimony

.Nos. 15

- 2295, et al. 15

Thorncreek II , for its part, was unique ly affected by the

run

- ins with the Village. The Village u nequally enforced an electrical

- upgrade ordinance against Area G

. And t he Village sue d Thorncreek II to enforce the electrical

- up grade ordinance and to shutter the illegal leasing office set up in the Area G townhouse after the sale of Thorncreek I

. Finally , the j ury heard evidence that before the foreclosure Thorncreek II was set to be sold to a thir d p arty and that but for the Village’s interference, th e sale would have been

consu mmated. I ndeed , it appears that the jury took the
contract value of the property and subtracted the mort gage amount to arrive at its compensatory

- damages award

. Thorncreek III , on the other hand, was not subjected to harassment over electrical upgrades like Thorncreek II was, and it did not face an enforcement action by t he Village in state court

. The record supports the jury’s decision to treat each Thorncreek plaintiff differently when assessing damages. The judge properly denied Thorncreek’s motion for a new trial.
C

. Prejudgment Interest The Village challenges the judge ’ s decision to award prejudgment interest on the verdict . We held long ago that p rejudgment interest is “ presumptively available to victims of federal law violations. ” Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care

– USA, Inc. , 874 F.2d 431, 43 6 (7th Cir. 1989). Prejudgment i nterest serves dual purposes: to fully compensate the plaintiff and to minimize a defendant ’ s incentive to delay. Id

. But it is not the same as punitive damages; prejudgment interest is not meant to penalize the party who caused the injury. Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger , 54 F.3d 1 234, 1247 (7th Cir. 1995).16 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

A ccordingly, a prevailing plaintiff can ’ t double dip by providing the jury with a damage s estimate that include s interest and also moving for prejudgment interest. When a plaintiff provides evidence of damages that includes interest, the presumption flips and the judge will presume that the jury included the interest in its award. Id

. The damages estimates Thorncreek submitted to the jury included prejudgment interest

. So the judge properly started with the presumption that Thorncreek was not entitled to prejudgment interest. But he found th e presumption rebu tted and granted the request for prejudgment interest

. We review that decisio n for abuse of discretion. First Nat ’ l Bank of Manitowoc v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 485 F.3d 971, 981 (7th Cir. 2007).
The judge concluded that the jury calculated its compensatory

- damages award by simply subtracting the mortgage debt o n Thorncreek II from i ts value

— a figure that the judge said “ result [ed] from simple subtraction, [and] did not include prejudgment interest

. ” In its motion for a new trial, t he Village embraced this interpretation as a plausible reading of the verdict. Th at concession takes mos t of the wind out of the Village ’ s sails

. For completeness, however, we note that t he jury heard evidence that a willing buyer offered to purchase Thorncreek II for $11 million. The jury also heard evidence that the original mortgage on Thorncreek II was $8,960,000

an d $8,466,945.55 of the principal on the mortgage remained unpaid. Simple subtraction results in a range of damages between $2,004,000 and $2,533,054 .45. The actual compensatory

- damages award

— $2,014,000

— fits squarely with in that range.Nos. 15

- 2295, et al. 17

Thorncreek ’ s expert offered a n estimate of prejudgme nt interest in the range of $1,311,163 to $1,641,861. Under the circumstance i t ’ s highly i mprobable that the jury inc orporated prejudgment interest in its ultimate award , and t he Village has not give n us a good reason to think that it did

. We see no error in the judge ’ s award of prejudgment interest.
D

. Attorney ’ s Fees For claims brought under § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The statute’s use of the word “may” commits the award of fees
to the district court’s discretion . Thorncreek challenges the judge’s decisi on to substantially reduce the amount of fees it requested. Our review is deferential, for abuse of discretion only

. Khan v. Gallitano , 180 F.3d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1999).
The r easonableness of an award of fees is fundamentally determined by “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success.” Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting Tex. State Teach ers Ass’n v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989) ) . Ordinarily a reasonable fee is calculated un der the lodestar method by multiplying a reasonable hourly r ate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr. , 664 F.3d 632, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). The judge performed that calculation here and reached a l odestar figure of $1,292,997.75. But the lodestar figure is just the “starting point.” Estate of E noch v. Tienor , 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2009). A nd though it is presumptively reasonable, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 55 9 U.S. 542, 553

– 54 (2010), th e figure may be excessive when “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or18 Nos. 15

- 2295, et al.

limited success,” Hensley v. Eckerhart
, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)

. In making this determination, the district court

c onsider s the claims on which the party did not prevail, the size of the monetary award, and any social benefits not reflected in a small damages award. E state of E noch , 570 F.3d at 824.
I f a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages, the “reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar , 506 U.S. at 115. Three factors help determine whether attorney’s fees are appropriate in a nominal

- damages case : “(1) the difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public purpose of the litigation.” Johnson v. Daley , 339 F.3d 582, 609 (7th Cir. 2003)

. The judge properly applied these general principles here

. He first noted that the jury awarded only nominal damages
to two of the three Thorncreek entities. Th orncreek I and III sought a combined total of $12.5 million but received a combined total of $2 . The judge also considered that the issues in the litigation were primarily factual rather than legal. And , finally, the public purpose of the litigation was minimal . Though the vindicat ion of constitutional rights is always important, “attorney’s fees are appropriate

... only when the plaintiff’s victory entails something more than merely a determination that a constitutional guarantee was infringed.” Maul v. Constan , 23 F.3d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1994). The judge reasonably concluded that the necessary “something more” wa s missing here. On the other hand, Thorncreek II won a substantial sum from the jury , though not close to what it sought. I t asked for $8 million ; the jury awarded just over $2 million. Still, it ’s a sizeable award , and t he judge properly noted the point. AndNos. 15

- 2295, et al. 19

he did not “make the mistake of limiting the fee to some multiple of the judgment, which would have been reversible error.” Montanez v. Simon , 755 F.3d 5 47, 557 (7th Cir . 2014).
In the end , there is no algorithm “for adjusting a lodestar to reflect partial or limited success.” Id

. The trial judge “has broad discretion to determine the appropriate reduc tion” and “ is in a better position to assess

... whether a

... judgment is a spectacular success, a dismal failure, or something in between .” Id

. Here t he jud ge reasonably exercised his broad discretion to reduce the requested fees. Two of the three Thorncreek entities won only nominal damages. Thorncreek achieved a partial victo ry against the Village and Mick on a single claim but lost on all the others , and the nine remaining defendants were completely exonerated

. Thorncreek sought a combined total of $20.5 million in damages but w on a fraction of that amount, though at just over $2 million it’s unquestionably a substantial sum. After considering all the relevant factors , the judge declined to approve a lodestar recovery and settled on a fee award of approximately $475, 000

. Th at decis ion was sound.
A FFIRMED

.