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# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: June 19, 2014

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * UNPUBLISHED NATALIE ROWAN, *

* No. 10-272V Petitioner, *

* v. * Special Master Dorsey

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Excessive Fees and Costs; * Attorney’s Hourly Rate; Respondent. * Paralegal’s Hourly rate; Expert * Hourly Rate; Vague or Excessive

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Time Entries.

Patricia Ann Finn, Patricia Finn Esq., Piermont, New York, for petitioner. Darryl R. Wishard, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

I. Introduction

On May 3, 2010, Natalie Rowan (“petitioner”), filed a petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“the Program”) 2 alleging that she developed headaches, dizziness, abdominal pain, weight loss, and bronchial spasms as a result of the human papillomavirus vaccines (“HPV”) she rece ived on August 21, 2007, November 12, 2007, and July 14, 2008. Petition at 2. An entitlemen t hearing was held on January 14-16, 2014. The

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explan ation for the undersigned’s action in this case, the undersigned intends to post this decision on the website of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (Dec. 17, 2002). As provided by Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has 14 days within which to request redaction of any information furnished by that party that: (1) is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is priv ileged or confidential; or (2) includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearl y unwarranted invasion of privacy. Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the enti re decision will be available to the public. Id.

2 The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Prog ram is set forth in Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. N o. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 34 (2006) (“Vaccine Act”). All citations in th is order to individual sections of the Act are to 42 U.S.C. §300aa.2 parties requested and were granted the opportunity to file post-hearing briefs. The entitlement decision is not yet ripe for adjudication.

On March 7, 2014, petitioner filed a Motion fo r Interim Payment of Costs of Experts, Attorney’s Fees, and Related Expenses and Costs (“Motion”) to reimburse her counsel of record, Ms. Patricia Finn, for the hours and costs she ex pended on petitioner’s behalf, and for the costs petitioner has personally incurred in pursuing her petition. Motion at 1. Petitioner requests a total of $59,837.85, in attorneys’ fees, and $36,333.72, in litigation-relate d costs for a total interim award of $96,171.57. Motion at 1-2.

Respondent is not raising an obj ection to an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to petitioner in this case. However, respondent makes four objections to the amounts petitioner has requested in the Motion on th e ground that those amounts are unreasonable. Respondent’s Objections to Petitioner’s Motion for Interim Payment of Costs of Experts, Attorney’s Fees, and Related Expenses and Cost s (“Resp’t’s Resp.”), filed March 18, 2014, at 5- 10. Specifically, respondent assert s that petitioner’s a ttorneys’ asserted h ourly rates and hours

billed are excessive and unreasonabl e. Resp’t’s Resp. at 5-10. Respondent also contends that the hourly rate of petitioner’s ex pert witness, Dr. Yehuda Shoenfel d, is excessive. Id. at 11-12. Respondent further argues that Dr . Shoenfeld’s requested airfare lacks support and is excessive.

Id. at 12.

Petitioner filed a reply to respondent’s objec tions. Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Objections to Petitioner’s Motion for Interim Paym ent of Costs of Experts, Attorney’s Fees, and related Expenses and Costs (“Pe t’r’s Reply”), filed March 26, 2014. Petitioner asserted that she

had demonstrated a reasonable basis for the clai m, she would suffer an undue hardship if interim fees are not awarded, and that th e amount requested by petitioner is justified. Pet’r’s Reply at 2- 4. Petitioner did not provide any additional exhib its or evidence with her reply to respondent’s objections.

The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Analysis

The undersigned finds that petitioner is en titled to an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs because the undersigne d finds that she brought her petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis. §300a a-15(e)(1). Likewise, respondent has elected not to raise an objection at this time to petiti oner’s request for interim attorney s’ fees and costs based on the undersigned’s prior ruling awarding in terim fees and costs. See Resp’t’s Resp. at 2, fn. 2. Thus, because petitioner has establishe d she is entitled to receive attorneys’ fees and costs, the remaining issue is the amount that petitioner is entitled to.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

Petitioner “bears the bur den of establishing the hours e xpended.” Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1991) (affirming special master’s reduction of fee applicant’s hours due to inade quate recordkeeping), aff’d af ter remand, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir.3 1993) (per curiam). Reasonable attorneys’ fees are determined by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Special masters ha ve “wide discretion in determining the reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees and costs, Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and may increase or reduce the

initial fee award calcu lation based on specific findings. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. The requirement that attorneys’ fees be reasonable applies as well to costs. Perreira, 27 Fed. Cl. at 34 (“Not only must any request for attorney’s f ees be reasonable, so must any request for reimbursement of costs”).

In making reductions, a line-by-line evaluation of the fee application is not required. Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484, rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special masters may rely on their ex perience in the Program and its attorneys to

determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Id. Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use thei r prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

B. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Petitioner’s motion will be discussed in the order of respondent’s objections and petitioner’s responses to those objections.

1. The hourly rate of $400 sought for Ms. Finn and Mr. Victor

As a general rule, a reasonable hourly rate is “‘the prevailing market rate,’ defined as the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar serv ices by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896). The lodestar approach involves a two-step process. Fi rst, a court determines an “initial estimate . . . by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Avera held that the forum rate generally applies unless an atto rney has not spent the bulk of his or her time in DC on the case and the local geographic market rate for the attorney is very significantly below the DC rate. Avera at 1348-49 (ci ting Davis Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. E.P.A ., 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Second, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calcul ation of the fee award based on specific findings. Id. at 1348.

Petitioner seeks an hourly rate of $400 for her attorneys, Ms. Patricia Ann Finn and Mr. Jonathan Matthew Victor, for the hours expended from 2012 to 2014. Motion at 4. Petitioner claims that the hourly rate is calculated by usi ng the “lodestar approach taking into account the fact that petitioner’s counsel is located in a s uburb of New York City and counsel’s substantial expertise in vaccine inju ry cases.” Id.4 Respondent contends that ther e is no further support for th e reasonableness of the local hourly rate sought by petitioner. Resp’t’s Resp. at 6. Furthermore, respondent states that she is not aware of any attorney in the Vaccine Program being awarded $400.00 per hour, and that

neither Ms. Finn’s nor Mr. Victor’s experience justifies such an in flated rate. Id. Ms. Finn has been admitted to practice in New York since 2003 and Mr. Victor has been admitted to practice

in New York since 2009. Id. Mr. Victor had been practicing for less than two years at the time the petition in this case was filed. Id. Respondent asserts that the appropr iate hourly rate for Ms. Finn is $200 per hour for work performed in 2010 and 2011, and $210 per hour for work performed from 2012 to 2014. Id. at 11. Respondent asserts that an hourly rate for Mr. Victor would be less, “given that he started worki ng on petitioner’s case less than two years after

admission to the bar.” Id.

In her response, petitioner maintains that an hourly rate of $400 is justified because Ms. Finn has been practicing law for about ten years, with 80% of her cases in volving vaccine injury. Pet’r’s Reply at 3. Petitioner further argues that other attorneys ci ted by respondent “have nowhere near Ms. Finn’s experience in vaccine in jury litigation,” id., and that Mr. John F. McHugh, whose hourly rate of $335 in vaccine cases is used as a comparison, “commonly referred to as a vaccine injury attorney [] does not even have vaccine injuries listed among his areas of practice on his Mart indale profile.” Id.

First, the undersigned finds that petitioner’s counsel is entitled to the forum rate in Washington, DC, rather than the local geographic hourly rate in New York City. Pursuant to Avera, the forum rate applies unless the bulk of the attorney’s work is performed outside the

forum in a location where the atto rney’s hourly rate is very significantly lower. In Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06- 559V, 2009 WL 2568468, at *23-24 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 27, 2009), petitioner’s counsel was Mr. John F. McHugh, an attorney with 20 years of experience located in New York City. The Special Master determined that the DC forum rates applied and awarded Mr. McHugh the attorney hourly rates in the amount of $310 for 2006, $320 for 2007, $335 for 2009, and $340 for 2010 and 2011. Id.

Second, special masters may make an upward or downward departure from the initial

calculation of the fee award ba sed on specific findings. Avera at 1348. In the absence of sufficient proof, special masters may rely on th eir own experience and use their discretion to

establish a reasonable fee. See Ceballos v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2004 WL 784910, at *27. In Ceballos, an attorney with over 30 years of experien ce in Philadelphia was awarded a $250 hourly rate for 1999 to 2003. Id. at *27. In Rupert, two attorneys located in Boston and who regularly practice in the Pr ogram, were awarded hourly rate s of $250 and $210. See Rupert v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 52 Fed. Cl. 684, 688-89 (2002).

Petitioner’s argument that other attorney s in the Program do not have the same experience as she and the fact that Mr. McHugh does not list vaccine injuries in his area of expertise is not persuasive. The undersigned is not aware of using inform ation from MartindaleHubbell as the sole mechanism in determining reasonable hourly rates. And, Mr. McHugh has

had more than three times the number of cases in the Program as Ms. Finn. Petitioner also did not cite to any precedent setting forth rates that are comparable to those she seeks here.5 Petitioner also did not discuss why Mr. Victor , who has much less experience in Program cases, is also entitled to $400 per hour. The unde rsigned finds that an hourly rate of $400 for

both Ms. Finn and Mr. Vict or is excessive.

In addition, the undersigned notes that in Dimatteo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-566V, 2014 WL 1509320, at *6 (Fed. Spec. Mst r. Mar. 27, 2014), the special master awarded Ms. Finn the hourly ra te of $300 per hour, and Mr. Vi ctor was awarded $220 per hour. While not binding in this decision, the undersigne d has considered this decision in the amount that is being awarded to Ms. Finn and Mr. Victor.

After reviewing Ms. Finn’s years of experi ence, reputation, and skill, and comparing this with other attorneys with compar able factors, the undersigned fi nds that an hourly rate of $300 will reasonably reflect Ms. Finn’ s work from 2010 to 2011. Adju sted for inflation, Ms. Finn’s hourly rate from 2012 to 2014 will be $310. A reasona ble hourly rate for Mr. Victor would be $210 from 2010 to 2011 and $220 from 2012 to 2014, based on his expertise and skills.

2. JL’s Hourly Rate

Petitioner seeks an hourly rate of $175.00 for the time “JL” spent throughout the course of this matter. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 to Motion at 4-6, 9-15. Respondent objects that this rate is unreasonably high. See Resp’t’s Resp. at 10. Res pondent asserted that “JL” is believed to be Jessica Lucas. Id. Respondent furt her contends that Ms. Lucas “is not licensed to practice law in any state, and thus , she should not be awarded an atto rney rate.” Id. In addition, respondent points out that Ms. Lucas’ s “work appears to be in the natu re of paralegal work.” Id. Respondent notes that the special master in Garcia awarded para legals in New York City an hourly rate of $95. Id. (quoting Garcia v. S ec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 107-286V, 2011 WL 6941702, at *12 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 12, 2011)). Petitioner maintains that Ms. Lucas’s requested hourly rate is justified becau se she “holds a Juris Doctor and has been extensively involved in assisting Ms. Finn in vaccine injury litiga tion for the last five years.” Petitioner did not respond to res pondent’s assertions that Ms. Lucas is not licensed to practice

law in New York and that Ms. Lucas acts as a paralegal in Ms. Finn’s firm.

The undersigned finds that, pursuant to Ga rcia, $95 per hour is reasonable for work performed by Ms. Lucas in 2010 and 2011, and $100 per hour is reasonable for work performed

from 2012 to 2014. 3

3. The Number of Hours Expended

Respondent objects to four specific categor ies of invoice entrie s as “excessive, duplicative, vague, unsupported, and/or unreasonabl e.” Resp’t’s Resp. at 10-11. Petitioner did

3 Petitioner originally requested $8,837.50 tota l for Ms. Lucas’s time (50.5 hours billed at $175/hr). With the reduction in hourly rate, the new amount awar ded for Ms. Lucas’s time is 7.1 hours billed at $95/hr ($674.50), plus 43.4 hours billed at $100/ hr ($4,340) for a total of $5,014.50. This results in a reduction of $3,823.00.6 not respond to any of these objections in her re sponse. The four objec tions are discussed in

detail below.

a. Status conferences on June 3, 2010, November 10, 2010, October 5, 2011, December 12, 2011, June 5, 2012, and March 26, 2013.

In total, petitioner has requested reimbursement for 10.3 hours 4 that Ms. Finn and others spent preparing for and attendi ng status conferences on the above dates. Of these hours, 3.9 hours accounted for Ms. Finn’s work in 2010 and 2011, and 1.4 accounted for her work in 2012 and 2013; 2.8 accounted for Mr. Victor’s work in 2010 and 2011, and .9 accounted for his work in 2012 and 2013; and .8 hour accounted for Ms. Lucas’s work in 2010 and 2011, and .5 hour

accounted for her work in 2012 and 2013.

Respondent contends that “billing for multip le attorneys to attend telephone status

conferences with the court and/or intra-office co nferences was duplicative.” Resp’t’s Resp. at *12 (citing Thomas v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-309V, 2013 WL 5718948, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 26, 2013), and Krause v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 01- 93V, 2013 WL 4477431, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 20, 2012)). Petitioner offered no further explanation or proof in her response as to what the entries on these six dates were for.

The undersigned finds that the attendance of multiple attorneys and staff on these status conferences as well as in the preparation for the st atus conferences is duplicative. While in some circumstances, it may be reasonable for more than one attorney to attend and prepare for a status conference, petitioner has not pr ovided any explanation for the undersigned to evaluate whether the use of multiple attorneys and a paralegal was justified. The undersigned will compensate only Ms. Finn for attending and prepari ng for these status conferences.

b. Two attorneys and one paralegal participated in a telephone conference with petitioner on May 8, 2012.

Ms. Finn requested reimbursement for 1.2 hours that was spent on this call, including .4 hours each by Ms. Finn, Mr. Victor, and Ms. Lucas.

Respondent objects to petitioner’s counsel’s telephone conference w ith petitioner based on the same reasoning as above. Resp’t’s Resp. at 10-11. Without any explanation for billing for multiple attorneys and the paralegal to atte nd telephone status conferences, the undersigned

finds it difficult to assess whethe r this entry is reasonable.

4 1.3 hours were spent in preparation for and partic ipating in the June 3, 2010 status conference (Invoice #68); 2.8 hours were spent on the N ovember 10, 2010 status co nference (Invoice #69); 1.6 hours were spent on the Oct ober 5, 2011 status conference (Invoice #70); 1.8 hours were spent on the December 12, 2011 status conference (Invoice #70); .8 hour was spent on the June 5, 2012 status conference (Invoice #72); and 2 h ours were spent on the March 26, 2013 status conference (Invoice #75).7 The amount of time spent communicating with a client must be reasonable and “is decided on a case-by-case basis” with considerati on given to the complexity of the legal issues involved. Carter v. Sec’y of Health & Hu man Servs., No. 04-150V, 2007 WL 2241877 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 13, 2007). The burden is on petitioner to prove that the time spent communicating with the client should be compensate d. Carter, at *7 (citing Lilienthal v. City of Suffolk, 322 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (E.D. Va. 2004)). Pe titioner has failed to meet the burden of proof. The undersigned therefore will compensate only Ms. Finn for her time.

c. Ms. Finn has billed at an attorney rate for administrative tasks such as organizing medical records, scheduling status conferences and assembling documents in 2010.

Respondent contends that admi nistrative tasks such as organizing medical records, scheduling status conferences, a nd assembling documents should not be billed at an attorney rate. Resp’t’s Resp. at *11 (citing Doe/11 v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. XX-XXX, 2010 WL 529425, at *9-10 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Ja n. 29, 2010); Anderson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06-168V, 2007 WL 4527545, at *1-2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 28, 2007) (reducing the fees sought for admini strative tasks performe d by attorneys)). In Doe, the special master applied paralegal rates for the time spent by an attorney performing those tasks because

these tasks were administrative in nature. Id. at 9. The undersigned find s that applying the full amount of the attorney rate for Ms. Finn’s tim e in this category would be excessive.

In total, Ms. Finn requests reimburseme nt at an attorney rate for 4 hours 5 of work on administrative tasks in 2010. The undersigned he reby adjusts the reques ted hourly rate from $400 for administrative tasks performed by Ms. Finn and Mr. Victor to $95 an hour.

d. Ms. Finn has billed 14 hours for “LL” on December 26, 2013, for “preparation of materials for hearing.”

Respondent objects to a 14-hour billing en try by one “LL” on December 26, 2013 (as noted on Invoice # 78). Ms. Finn has offered no e xplanation in support of this billing entry.

Based on the outstanding record, the undersigne d is unable to identify “LL.” Moreover,

in the absence of a detailed e xplanation, the undersigned finds that the amount of time L.L. spent on this broad category of work is unreasonable because it is impossible to determine how LL’s work advanced petitioner’s case. Simply indicating that a huge block of time was expended is

insufficient to demonstrate reasonableness. Ms. Finn’s billing records should reflect what was done in detail. The undersigned th erefore determines th at this entry is uncompensable. This results in a reduction of $5,600 from petitioner’s Motion.

5 According to Invoices #67 and #69, Ms. Finn sp ent 2.25 hours organizing medical records on March 2, 2010, which will be billed at $95/hr ($213.75); Mr. Victor spent .8 hours on April 29, 2010 assembling pleadings, .75 organizing medi cal records on May 10, 2010, .1 hour scheduling a status conference on May 26, 2010, and .1 hour scheduling a status conference on November 2, 2010, for a total of 1.75 hrs which will be billed at $95/hr ($166.25).8 4. Dr. Shoenfeld’s Hourly Rate

Respondent objects to an award of compensa tion for the work Dr. Shoenfeld performed in this case on the ground that hi s hourly rate of $500 is excessi ve. Resp’t’s Resp. at 11-12. Respondent contends that petitioner filed no eviden ce in support of Dr. Shoenfeld’s hourly rate beyond Dr. Shoenfeld’s curriculum vitae. Id. at 11. In response, petitioner maintains that Dr. Shoenfeld’s hourly rate is reasona ble. Pet’r’s Reply. at 3. Petit ioner contends that finding an expert witness is difficult because “the vast majority of doctors support vaccination and are unwilling to provide expert testimony supportin g theories of vaccine injuries.” Id.

The reasonableness of an expert’s rate is de termined on a case-by-case basis, and it is petitioner’s burden to offer evidence for the ra te charged. See Simon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 05-914V, 2008 U.S. Claims LEX IS 67, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 21, 2008). Dr. Shoenfeld previously has been awarded an hourly rate of $350 in other vaccine cases from 2009 to 2011. See, e.g., Gruber v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 00-749V, 91 Fed. Cl. 773, 798 (2010); Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 220-21 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Valdes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-310V, at 5 (2009); Crutchfield v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-39V , 2011 WL 3806351, at *8-9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 4, 2011).

In the absence of information beyond Dr. S hoenfeld’s curriculum vitae, the undersigned finds that $400 represents a reas onable hourly rate for Dr. Shoenf eld. This results in a reduction of $4,200 from petitioner’s Motion.

The undersigned also agrees with respondent that Dr. Shoenfeld should be awarded half of his hourly rate ($200) for the 28 hours he spen t traveling. Respondent did not object to any

other entries.

5. Dr. Shoenfeld’s Airfare

Respondent objects to Dr. Shoenfeld’s $4,741.92 ai rfare cost from Tel Aviv, Israel to Washington, DC, for the hearing via Lufthansa Airlines. Respondent contends that roundtrip coach airfare was around $2,000 for the same flights taken by Dr. Shoenfeld on the same days of the week in March 2014. Resp’t’s Resp. at 12. Petitioner offered no additional explanation in her response.

Based on a review of documentation submitted by petitioner for Dr. Shoenfeld’s airfare, the undersigned finds that Dr. Shoenfeld’s airfar e is reasonable. This cost will be reimbursed.9 III. Conclusion

Attorneys’ fees and costs are awarded as follows:

1. Patricia Finn 20.6 hrs @ $300 an hour: $

__________ 6,180.00

61.8 hrs 6 @ $310 an hour: $_________19,158.00 2.25 hrs @ $ 95 an hour: $___________213.75

2. John Victor 7 hrs @ $210 an hour: $__________1,470.00 16.1 hrs @ $220 an hour: $__________3,542.00 1.75 hrs @ $ 95 an hour: $___________166.25

3. Jessica Lucas 6.3 hrs @ $95 an hour: $__________

_ 598.50 42.5 hrs @ $100 an hour: $__________4,250.00

4. LL 14 hrs @ $400 an hour: $(

________ 5,600.00) (deduction)

Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded: $_________35,578.50 Total Attorneys’ Fees Requested: $_________ 59,837.85 Difference: $_______(24,259.35)

5. Dr. Shoenfeld _42 hrs @ $400 an hour: $_________16,800.00 28 hrs @ $200 an hour: $__________5,600.00

Airfare Cost Awarded: $__________4,741.92 Other Costs: $__________ 3,591.80

Total Expert Fees and Costs Awarded: $________30,733.72 Total Expert Fees and Costs Requested: $ _______36,333.72 Difference (Reduction): $ ________(5,600.00)

Total Amount of Fees and Costs Awarded: $_________66,312.22

Total Reduction from Pe titioner’s Motion: $_______(29,859.35)

A total of $29,859.35, is reduced from petitione r’s Motion. Accordingly, a total of $66,312.22 , shall be awarded in the form of a check payable jointly to peti tioner and petitioner’s counsel, Patricia Finn.

In the absence of a motion for review file d pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of

the court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision unless a motion for

review is filed. 7

6 There was one entry for Ms. Finn billed at $175.00 an hour on Invoice #70. This rate is billed
at $310 an hour.10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey Nora Beth Dorsey Special Master

7 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties can expedite entry of judg ment by each party filing
a notice renouncing the ri ght to seek review.