UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

JENAM TECH, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

GOOGLE LLC, 

 Defendant. 

Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-00453-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PATENT CASE 

PLAINTIFF JENAM TECH, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S 

OPPOSED MOTION TO STAY PENDING TRANSFER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On January 22, 2021, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) filed an Opposed Motion to 

Stay Pending Transfer. (Dkt. No. 48.) Plaintiff Jenam Tech, LLC (“Jenam”) respectfully 

requests that the Court deny the motion because Google has not met its burden to establish that a 

clear harm or inequity will occur should this case proceed. Google has had Jenam’s 

infringement contentions since August 2020, giving it a clear advantage and ample time to 

develop its case theory and invalidity contentions. Further, Google’s dilatory tactics have 

delayed venue discovery and briefing, and consequently, the Court’s ability to render a decision 

on Google’s Opposed Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District of California (the 

“Motion to Transfer”). (See Dkt. No. 26.) Here, a stay would only compound Google’s time 

advantage, while further prejudicing Jenam. 

II. ARGUMENT 

“Whether to stay a case falls within the Court’s inherent discretional authority.” Neodron 

Ltd. v. Dell Techs., No. 1-19-CV-00819-ADA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233009, at *9 (W.D. Tex. 

Dec. 16, 2019) (denying the motion to stay). “Determining whether to issue a discretionary stay 

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calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 

balance.” Id. at *9-10 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, the proponent has the 

burden to make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward if there 

is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else.” Id. 

at *10.1

 “In determining whether a stay is proper, a district court should consider, among other 

factors, (1) the potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the hardship and inequity to the 

moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) judicial resources.” Id. at *10. 

Google’s motion should be denied because Google has not met its exacting burden. To 

begin, a stay would be highly prejudicial to Jenam, especially in light of Google’ dilatory 

practices. Google brazenly claims that “this case involves a compelling set of facts that 

demonstrates that the Northern District of California is clearly a more convenient forum.” (Dkt. 

No. 48 at 1.)2 Nothing could be further from the truth. Google’s Motion to Transfer fails to 

establish that the Northern District of California is a more convenient forum, much less clearly

so. Regardless, Google has delayed resolution of that motion. It has produced only scant venue 

discovery (including no documents despite Jenam’s repeated narrowing of its requests for 

production). Moreover, Google’s deficient venue discovery responses combined with publicly 

available information show that the majority of the factors considered under the venue transfer 

analysis either do not favor transfer or weigh against it. Google has not shown any likelihood of 

success in transfer. 

Google further misstates the facts when it asserts that Jenam’s “desire for broad venue 

discovery from Google, and its delay of several weeks in serving that discovery, has substantially 

1

 Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis in this Brief has been added. 

2

 Google’s Motion to Stay is not properly paginated. To preserve accuracy, Jenam cites to page 

numbers from the Court-stamped headings. 

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delayed briefing and a decision on the transfer motion.” (Dkt. No. 48 at 1-2.) From the time 

Jenam suggested limited venue discovery, Google acted as if it was entitled to pick and choose 

what venue discovery to accept, forcing Jenam to revise drafts of its venue discovery requests 

numerous times before even serving the discovery and then to make numerous narrowing 

concessions. Indeed, Jenam was forced to approach the Court for relief but Google has 

continued its dilatory practices by dragging out the meet and confer process requested by the 

Court. 

In contrast, Jenam has been more than forthcoming with its venue discovery responses 

and has already supplemented them (for example, after obtaining permission to reveal third 

parties’ confidential information). Yet, Google continues to press Jenam for information and 

documents that are, among other things, not responsive to Google’s requests, privileged, and in 

many instances simply irrelevant. Jenam’s position was summarized in the parties’ joint 

statement to the Court regarding venue discovery, but Google has yet to finalize its side of that 

statement and instead has continued to make new requests for additional information. Google’s 

dilatory tactics have substantially delayed, and continue to delay, the Court’s ability to render a 

decision on Google’s Motion to Transfer. Google has no basis to claim any harm at this stage. 

Most importantly, Google cannot argue that without a stay it “will suffer unnecessary 

hardship from expending resources on invalidity contentions, discovery, and claim construction . 

. . .” (Dkt. No. 48 at 2.) Jenam commenced this suit almost eight months ago, on June 1, 2020. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) Google received Jenam’s infringement contentions over five months ago, on 

August 21, 2020. Jenam narrowed the set of its asserted claims on December 4, 2020 at 

Google’s request and this Court’s guidance. In other words, Google had months upon months to 

develop its invalidity contentions and case theory. On information and belief, Google has 

already done that, as evidenced from Google’s counsel Katie Lynn Joyce’s letter to Jenam from 

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January 21, 2021. That letter, spanning five pages single-spaced, listed numerous categories of 

alleged deficiencies (including scope of the accused products, reliance on non-Google 

documents, incorporation of other versions of QUIC, QUIC’s relationship to TCP, and 

inadequate notice and patent-specific issues) and alluded to additional identified additional 

“problems” with Jenam’s infringement contentions. Thus, Google cannot claim hardship when 

all along it has had a clear time advantage over Jenam. A stay would only compound Google’s 

advantage. 

The fact that Google has had Jenam’s infringement contentions since August 21, 2020 

also shows that this case is not “in its infancy.” (Dkt. No. 48 at 2.) And Google’s arguments that 

a stay would conserve judicial resources and that a motion to transfer should be decided before 

substantive issues (id. at 2) are to no avail. Google has already expended this Court’s resources 

by bringing its unwarranted Motion to Transfer and creating a venue discovery dispute. 

Moreover, Google has moved this matter beyond the issue of transfer by, among other things, 

demanding to meet and confer with Jenam’s counsel regarding alleged deficiencies in Jenam’s 

infringement contentions and demanding that Jenam cure those alleged deficiencies. That is a 

naked attempt to gain further advantage while prolonging the litigation. 

The cases on which Google attempts to rely are inapposite and clearly distinguishable. 

Neodron, YETI, and EMC denied motions to transfer. See Neodron, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

233009; YETI Coolers, LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-342-RP, 2018 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 2806 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018); In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (denying as moot; discussing judicial economy only in the motion to transfer context). In 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Polin, 429 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1970), the district court’s decision was 

contrary to the principal of judicial economy because the district court postponed consideration 

of the motion to transfer until after the close of discovery, which is clearly not the case here. 

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Moreover, Horseshoe did not deal with a motion to stay at all, and Google’s quote concerns the 

district court’s delay in issuing a decision on the motion to transfer. See In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 

337 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003) (“For reasons not readily discernable from the record or the 

parties’ briefing, the . . . District Court waited some 13 months until July 2002, to rule on 

Horseshoe’s motion to transfer.”). Google cannot complain of delay here as it has drawn out 

venue discovery repeatedly over the past months. Jenam has not been able to file its opposition 

brief because of this delay, thus the posture of this case is vastly different than Horseshoe. 

In sum, Google has not met its burden. While a stay will certainly benefit Google, it will 

only compound the prejudice that Jenam has already suffered. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, Jenam asks that the Court deny Google’s Motion to Stay. 

Dated: February 8, 2021. Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Derek Dahlgren 

 James Lennon (Bar No. 4570) 

 Timothy Devlin (Bar. No. 4241) 

 Derek Dahlgren (admitted pro hac vice) 

 Nadiia Loizides (admitted pro hac vice) 

 Devlin Law Firm LLC 

1526 Gilpin Avenue 

 Wilmington, DE 19801 

 Telephone: (302) 449-9010 

 jlennon@devlinlawfirm.com 

 tdevlin@devlinlawfirm.com 

ddahlgren@devlinlawfirm.com 

 nloizides@devlinlawfirm.com 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

 JENAM TECH, LLC 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on February 8, 2021, I caused a copy of this document to be served 

by transmitting it via e-mail or electronic transmission to counsel of record for Defendant. 

/s/ Derek Dahlgren 

Derek Dahlgren 

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