IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Butler Area School District :

:

v. : No. 1460 C.D. 2014

:

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Appellant :

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1461 C.D. 2014

: Argued: September 11, 2017

Butler Area School District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: November 2, 2017

In these consolidated appeals under the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL),1 

we are asked whether addresses contained in property tax assessment records, that 

are public under statute

2 and case law, are protected by the right to privacy in Article 

I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as construed by our Supreme Court in 

Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) v. Department of Community & 

Economic Development, 148 A.3d 142 (Pa. 2016) (PSEA III). 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.

2

53 Pa. C.S. §8841(d).
2

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (Requester) appeals from two orders 

issued by the Butler County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) that denied access 

to addresses it requested under the RTKL. Specifically, Requester sought the 

property tax assessment list (Property List) from the Butler Area School District 

(School District), as well as its Superintendent’s home address. The Office of Open 

Records (OOR) upheld the School District’s denial of addresses of public school 

employees based on a single-judge order issued by this Court in litigation brought by 

PSEA. During the PSEA litigation, this Court enjoined OOR from ordering disclosure 

of school employees’ home addresses based on a constitutional right to privacy 

(Injunction Order). Relevant here, OOR directed the School District to redact public 

school employees’ home addresses from the Property List. Citing the Injunction 

Order, the trial court vacated OOR’s redaction order, and permitted the School District 

to withhold the entire Property List. Because the trial court erred in upholding the 

denial of accessto addresses contained in the Property List, we reverse the trial court’s 

orders and direct disclosure. 

I. Background

Relevant here, Requester submitted a RTKL request to the School 

District seeking the Superintendent’s home address3 and an unredacted copy of the 

most recent Property List. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a (Request). The 

School District denied access, citing the Injunction Order in the PSEA litigation. 

Requester timely appealed to OOR.

OOR permitted both parties to supplement the record. The School 

District submitted an affidavit of its Director of Business Services, Catherine 

 

3 During oral argument, Requester’s counsel clarified Requester no longer seeks the 

Superintendent’s home address, recognizing such a request triggers balancing under PSEA III.
3

Rodgers. R.R. at 84a (Affidavit). She attested that the property tax assessment 

records do not identify property owners’ employers. As a result, the School District 

could not redact home addresses of public school employees from the Property List.

Requester argued the Injunction Order did not bind school districts. In 

addition, it asserted the Injunction Order was contrary to this Court’s subsequent 

decisions holding home addresses were not protected by a right to privacy.4

OOR issued its final determination denying the appeal in part, 

reasoning the Injunction Order precluded it from directing access to public school 

employees’ home addresses. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (PFUR) v. Butler 

Area Sch. Dist., OOR Dkt. No. AP 2014-0777 (Final Determination). The 

Injunction Order stated in pertinent part: “The release of records maintained by 

public school districts that contain the home addresses of public school employees 

is hereby stayed until further order of this court.” R.R. at 80a (emphasis added). It 

further provided “[OOR] is enjoined from directing the release of records maintained 

by public school districts that contain the home address of public school employees 

pursuant to the [RTKL] until further order of this court.” Id. at 88a. Pursuant to the 

Injunction Order, OOR directed the School District to redact the home addresses of 

public school employees from the Property List.

Both the School District and Requester appealed to the trial court. 

Requester challenged the Final Determination for requiring redaction of public 

school employees’ addresses from the Property List. It also argued the Injunction 

 

4

In effect, PSEA III, 148 A.3d 142 (Pa. 2016), overruled our en banc decisions in Office of 

the Lieutenant Governor v. Mohn, 67 A.3d 123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) and Office of the Governor v. 

Raffle, 65 A.3d 1105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), holding there was no right to privacy in a home address.
4

Order did not govern the School District. The School District challenged OOR’s 

redaction directive, asserting impossibility of performance because the Property List 

contained no employer information.

After argument, the trial court relied on the record created before OOR. 

As to Requester’s appeal, the trial court affirmed denial of the Superintendent’s home 

address. By separate order, the trial court granted the School District’s appeal, 

vacating the part of the Final Determination requiring redaction of the Property List. 

Requester appealed both orders to this Court.

As directed by the trial court, Requester filed concise statements of the 

errors complained of on appeal under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). In its nearly identical 

Rule 1925(a) opinions, the trial court reasoned it was bound by the Injunction Order 

because it was issued by a higher court. Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 10/15/14, at 7 (Dkt. No. 

14-40163). As a consequence, the trial court permitted the School District to 

withhold the entire Property List.

After briefing, this Court scheduled the appeals for argument. 

Subsequently, our Supreme Court clarified that the 2009 injunction as to disclosure 

of public school employees’ home addresses continued as modified by the 2014 

Injunction Order. Upon Requester’s application, we stayed the matter pending the 

Supreme Court’s disposition of the PSEA litigation. 

Relevant here, our Supreme Court issued PSEA III in October 2016. In 

so doing, our Supreme Court confirmed the right to privacy construed to protect 
5

home addresses sought under the predecessor to the RTKL (Former Law5) remained 

in force as embedded in Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

This Court consolidated the appeals and requested supplemental briefs 

as to the effect of PSEA III. Requester argued PSEA III did not compel withholding 

of the Property List. The Pennsylvania NewsMedia Association submitted an amicus

curiae brief aligned with Requester’s position. The School District moved to strike

the appeals based on mootness; Requester answered. Following argument on the 

motion, this Court denied it. After argument,6the matter is ready for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Contentions

In these consolidated appeals,7 Requester argues the trial court erred in 

holding the Injunction Order enjoins the School District from disclosing home 

addresses of public school employees because the School District was not a party to 

the PSEA litigation. It contends the Injunction Order did not bind the trial court. 

Regardless, it maintains the trial court erred in extending the Injunction Order to 

protect the entire Property List. Requester emphasizes that the Property List is a 

public record under statute and case law construing the Former Law. 

 

5 Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, as amended, 65 P.S. §§66.1-66.4, repealed by Section 

3102(2)(ii) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.3102(2)(ii).

6 During argument, the School District’s counsel advised that if this Court holds the 

Property List is public, then the School District will provide it. 

7 Our review of a trial court’s order in a RTKL dispute is “limited to determining whether 

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence or whether the trial court committed an error 

of law, or an abuse of discretion in reaching its decision.” Kaplin v. Lower Merion Twp., 19 A.3d 

1209, 1213 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2011).
6

The School District counters the trial court’s opinion was in conformity 

with the Injunction Order. It argues the Injunction Order bound school districts 

because it required OOR to notify all school districts that disclosure of home 

addresses were stayed pending resolution of the PSEA litigation. It also contends 

the Injunction Order bound the trial court because this Court is a higher tribunal. 

Based on PSEA III, the School District asserts public school employees’ home 

addresses in the Property List are protected by a constitutional privacy right.

B. Analysis

“[T]he current RTKL, [compared to the Former Law] ‘significantly 

expanded public access to governmental records ... with the goal of promoting 

government transparency.’” Pa. State Police v. Grove, 161 A.3d 877, 892 (Pa. 2017) 

(quoting Levy v. Senate of Pa., 65 A.3d 361, 368 (Pa. 2013)). A “record” qualifies 

for access through the RTKL when it “documents a transaction or activity of an 

agency.” Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.102 (emphasis added); see

Highmark, Inc. v. Voltz, 163 A.3d 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). 

As a local agency, the School District has a statutory duty to “provide 

public records in accordance with [the RTKL].” Section 302 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. 

§67.302. Records in the School District’s possession are presumed “public” unless they 

are: (1) exempted by Section 708 of the RTKL; (2) protected by a privilege; or (3) 

exempted “under any other Federal or State law or regulation or judicial order or 

decree.” Section 305 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.305 (emphasis added). State statutes 
7

that designate public nature supersede the RTKL. Section 306 of the RTKL, 65P.S.

§67.306;see Highmark (holding insurance statutes protected requested information).

At the outset, we emphasize that the only record at issue in this appeal 

is the Property List.8 Requester sought a list “that show[s] each property owner’s 

name and property address for properties within the geographic confines of the 

[S]chool [D]istrict.” R.R. at 5a (bold added, italics in original). 

The School District uses the Property List to prepare tax duplicates. See

Section 677.1 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. §6-677.1.9 Although it originated 

with the county, the Property List qualifies as a record “of” the School District because 

the School District uses it to conduct agency business. See Bagwell v. Dep’t of Educ., 

76 A.3d 81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (en banc). 

1. Judicial Order

Under the RTKL, an agency may withhold a record based on a judicial 

order. Section 305(a)(3) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.305(a)(3). Here, the trial court 

relied on the Injunction Order to exempt the Property List in its entirety. In so doing, 

the trial court fell into error.

Importantly, the judicial order that forms the basis for exempting a 

record from disclosure must apply to the record at issue. Office of Dist. Att’y of Phila.

 

8 The Property List is comprised of the assessment roll of subjects of real estate taxation 

prepared by the county. Subjects of real estate taxation include homes, mobile homes/trailers, 

buildings permanently attached to land, mills and manufactories, office buildings and portions of 

structures that shelter machinery, tools or other equipment. 53 Pa. C.S. §8811. 

9 Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, 24 P.S. §6-677.1, added by

the Act of January 14, 1952, P.L. (1951) 1944.
8

v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Our examination of the language of 

the Injunction Order reveals that it pertained to the home addresses of public school 

employees only. However, there was no evidence that established the Property List 

contained public school employees’ home addresses. Indeed, the School District 

submitted evidence that it could not differentiate between the property addresses 

contained in the Property List based on employer, because employers were not 

identified. R.R. at 84a. The School District had the burden to prove the application 

of its exemption. Pure speculation as to a record’s contents is not evidence that may 

substantiate an exemption. 

The trial court cautiously, but erroneously, construed the Injunction 

Order to apply to all property addresses contained in the Property List. In so doing, 

the trial court in effect extended the Injunction Order beyond its terms. 

In addition, as OOR recognized, the Injunction Order was limited to 

home addresses only. However, there is no evidence that all property addresses 

contained in the Property List correspond to home addresses.10 Further, the School 

District asserted no grounds to protect the entire record beyond the alleged 

impossibility of redaction. Thus, the trial court had no legal basis for vacating 

OOR’s order to the extent it required redaction of certain home addresses from the 

Property List. 

In vacating OOR’s redaction requirement, the trial court did not apply

the redaction mandate under the RTKL. Section 706 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §67.706, 

provides that records shall be disclosed with the protected parts redacted. Our 

 

10 Counsel for the School District conceded during argument that she did not know whether 

the property addresses contained in the Property List corresponded to home addresses.
9

Supreme Court requires redaction to ensure that public parts of records are disclosed 

in accordance with the RTKL. See Grove; Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Seder/The 

Times Leader, 139 A.3d 165 (Pa. 2016).

Additionally, the Injunction Order bound only the parties to the PSEA

litigation. Paterra v. Charleroi Area Sch. Dist., 349 A.2d 813 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). 

The School District was not a party to, and did not otherwise participate in, the PSEA

litigation. 

In short, the trial court erred by allowing the School District to withhold

the entire Property List. However, that does not end our inquiry as the Injunction 

Order was for all intents and purposes supplanted by PSEA III.

2. PSEA III & Privacy Right

In PSEA III, our Supreme Court held the right to informational privacy 

is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It safeguards 

certain “inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and 

defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and 

reputation, and of pursuing [citizens’] own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I, §1. 

Notably, in holding public school employees enjoyed a right to privacy in their home 

addresses, the Court drew upon its precedent construing the Former Law. 

Decisions under the Former Law recognized a right to privacy inuring 

in three types of identifiers: Social Security numbers, telephone numbers and home 

addresses. See Tribune-Review Publ’g Co. v. Bodack, 961 A.2d 110 (Pa. 2008); Penn 

State Univ. v. State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 935 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2007) (PSU v. SERB); Sapp 
10

Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 12, 713 A.2d 627 

(Pa. 1998) (plurality op.); see also Times Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Michel, 633 A.2d 1233 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). In PSEA III, our Supreme Court recognized the continued 

vitality of that privacy jurisprudence under the current RTKL. 

Analyzing the scope of the right to privacy under Article I, Section 1, 

our Supreme Court explained “the right ... concerns avoiding disclosure of personal 

matters. The object of such a right is, in part, to protect an individual from revealing 

matters which could impugn his character and subject him to ridicule or 

persecution.” Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. 1992).

In Stenger, the Court noted the right is not offended when the information is rendered 

anonymous. It explained: “With no name associated with the disclosure, no 

disrepute can occur.” Id. at 800-01.

A home address is a type of information that may be considered a 

personal matter. Bodack; PSU v. SERB; Sapp Roofing. In sharp contrast, the 

Property List is a record of owners of taxable real property that has been assessed to 

generate revenue for the government. A property address contained in the Property 

List correlates to a taxable property, not necessarily to a person’s home. Even the 

mailing address a property owner provides to a taxing authority is not necessarily a 

home address. Goppelt v. City of Phila. Revenue Dep’t, 841 A.2d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2004). Thus, an address contained in the Property List is not necessarily a personal 

identifier like a personal telephone number or Social Security number, as generally 

set forth in Bodack, PSU v. SERB and Sapp Roofing.
11

Cognizant of the material differences in the information at issue, we do 

not equate home addresses of specified individuals to addresses contained in the 

Property List, that correspond to properties taxed regardless of who lives there. 

Goppelt. Accordingly, we consider a request for the Property List based on its 

content and the nature of the record. Easton Area Sch. Dist. v. Baxter, 35 A.3d 1259 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

a. Public Nature

Pennsylvania has a longstanding practice of mandating access to 

property assessment records. See Dooley v. Luzerne Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 

Appeals, 649 A.2d 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Westmoreland Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 

Appeals v. Montgomery, 321 A.2d 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974) (en banc) (recognizing 

public nature of assessment records). Dooley involved access to property 

assessment records under the Former Law. In Dooley, the requester submitted a 

RTKL request for access to the property assessment records maintained by the 

Luzerne County Board of Assessment Appeals. The County advised the requester

he could not review the assessment cards under the Former Law. Rather, he would 

have to pay $1 to purchase a copy. This Court held the assessment records were 

public and ordered the agency to make them available under the Former Law. 

Property tax assessment records are also public by statute. The 

Consolidated County Assessment Law, applicable to counties of the 4th through 8th

classes,11 provides for public inspection of the assessment rolls as follows:

 

11 Generally school taxes are levied and assessed upon all property assessed by the county 

pursuant to the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §§8801-8868. See Section 677 

of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. §6-677.
12

(1)The assessment roll shall be open to public inspection at the county 

assessment office during ordinary business hours. ...

****

(ii) The place where and time when the assessment roll will be 

open for inspection. 

(2)This subsection shall not be construed to limit the right of any 

resident of this Commonwealth to access public records in 

accordance with the [RTKL].

53 Pa. C.S. §8841(d) (emphasis added). The access provision in the Consolidated 

County Assessment Law thus supplements the RTKL. Seder, 139 A.3d at 174

(statute’s reference to RTKL shows intent to “supplement ... access,” not limit it).

As to Second Class counties, a similar property list is also public. 72 

P.S. §5452.18.12 The relevant provision provides: “Any taxpayer may, at any time 

during office hours, have access to the records of taxable property and be permitted 

to copy therefrom a list of taxable property.” Id.

The Property List is well-established as a public record to which the 

public has a right of access. Moreover, the address of an assessed property is an 

essential component of the assessment for tax purposes. In other words, as discussed 

below, a list of assessed properties is of little use without the addresses of the 

properties. Nevertheless, the public nature of the Property List does not necessarily 

conflict with an individual’s right to informational privacy under our state 

constitution. 

b. Privacy Interest

 

12 Section 18 of the Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 626.
13

Under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, an 

individual has a constitutional right to protect personal information from disclosure. 

Stenger. Certain information is categorically protected as personal, such as medical 

records. See, e.g., In re T.R., 731 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Pa. 1999) (upholding privacy of

psychiatric records); Stenger (blood donor AIDS screening tests). When the type of 

information is not categorically protected,13 privacy analysis consists of two steps. 

The first step is assessing whether the information at issue is sufficiently personal in 

nature to trigger protection as a privacy interest. The second step is weighing an

individual’s privacy interest in nondisclosure against an interest in disclosing the 

personal information. When the balance favors nondisclosure, courts enforce an 

individual’s privacy right. However, before reaching the balancing test, we must first 

discern a cognizable privacy interest in the information at issue. 

PSEA III did not analyze the personal nature of addresses generally. 

Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized that a home address, like a personal telephone 

number or Social Security number, is personal in nature based on three cases 

analyzing access under the Former Law: Bodack (as to personal telephone numbers); 

PSU v. SERB; and, Sapp Roofing (requiring redaction of personal identifiers, 

including employees’ addresses and Social Security numbers). 

In PSU v. SERB, salaries and credited service information of PSU 

employees, including Joe Paterno, were at issue. In determining whether salary 

information was sufficiently personal in nature to qualify for protection, our 

 

13 Importantly, PSEA III did not hold home addresses are categorically protected as 

personal information. Rather, the privacy interest depended on the evidentiary record. Id. at 158

(upholding privacy right based “on the facts and circumstances presented here ...”).
14

Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of the expectation that such 

information would be treated confidentially. In holding the salaries were public, it 

reasoned “[t]here can be no reasonable expectation that the Commonwealth will 

keep its finances secret from the general public.” Id. at 540. In so holding, it 

discounted the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy based on PSU’s 

confidentiality policy. Thus, the Court considered both subjective and objective 

elements in evaluating the personal nature of the information. The Court also 

emphasized that the information was submitted voluntarily. Id. (“The minute any 

individual or entity voluntarily submits any information to the Commonwealth for 

the purpose of deriving a financial benefit and acquires such benefit or a contractual 

interest therein, that information ceases to be private in nature.”).

Whether an address deserves protection as a privacy interest depends 

in part on the relationship of the address to the record requested. In Goppelt, this 

Court determined a list of off-site mailing addresses of delinquent tax properties was 

public. Importantly, there was no question that the list of property addresses was 

public. The only issue before this Court was whether the off-site mailing addresses 

of property owners were public. 

In Goppelt, we explained the mailing addresses were essential

components of records of tax delinquencies the agency was required to maintain.14 

We emphasized “it is significant that the addresses are voluntarily submitted by the 

property owners and are not necessarily their home addresses.” Id. at 606 (emphasis 

added). Further, we reasoned “significant is the fact that the General Assembly has 

 

14 Under the Former Law, a requester bore the burden of proving a record was a “public 

record” as either a minute/order/decision or an account/voucher/contract. Section 1 of the Former 

Law, 65 P.S. §66.1 (repealed).
15

legislated with regard to the board of tax revisions in each county that the address of 

a property owner must be made available when requested.” Id. We also noted an 

owner’s privacy interest in his or her mailing address was “highly speculative and 

would only apply to absent property owners who chose to provide their home 

addresses as an alternative address.” Id. 

Employing the same analysis our Supreme Court adopted in PSEA III, 

the Goppelt Court reasoned that the benefit of disclosing the off-site mailing 

addresses (i.e., addresses different than the indisputably public property address) 

outweighed any privacy interest in nondisclosure. 

Statutory considerations also influence the public nature of an address. 

This Court protected home addresses of earned income taxpayers as confidential 

identifiers in Juniata Valley School District v. Wargo, 797 A.2d 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002). There, we held that identities of individuals who paid earned income tax, and 

their home addresses, qualified as “confidential tax information” protected by the 

Local Taxpayers Bill of Rights Act (Act), 53 Pa. C.S. §8437. Ultimately, the source 

of the record containing the requested information dictated public status.

 The Act expressly protects from disclosure information obtained from 

earned income tax returns. Id. We reasoned that since home addresses were 

obtained from taxpayers’ returns, the addresses constituted “confidential tax 

information.” Wargo. Notably, Section 8438 of the Act, 53 Pa. C.S. §8438, provides 

that the subchapter does not apply to taxes on real property. Thus, the General 

Assembly expressly declined to extend confidentiality protection to real property 
16

taxes. Based on the Act, an individual had a reasonable expectation that information 

contained in a return would be kept confidential. 

At this point, neither PSEA III nor appellate decisions construing the 

Former Law have recognized that an address is personal information when it is 

unclear that the requested address correlates to an individual’s home. Goppelt. 

Thus, we consider whether a property address, as distinguished from a home address, 

is of a personal nature so as to trigger a balancing analysis.

c. Assessing Personal Nature

The foregoing appellate decisions teach us that certain factors are 

constant when evaluating a privacy interest in information. One is an individual’s 

reasonable expectation that the information is of a personal nature. PSU v. SERB. 

When information is public as a matter of statute, it is unreasonable for a person to 

expect that it is of a personal nature. Cf. Wargo. Another factor is how the agency 

obtained the information: when an individual voluntarily submits information, it 

may be disclosed, Goppelt; whereas, information obtained by an agency premised 

on statutory confidentiality is protected, see Highmark; Wargo. Also, the context

holds additional significance, as does whether the information is an essential 

component of a public record. PSU v. SERB; Sapp Roofing; Goppelt.

Applying these factors here, the Property List does not qualify as 

sufficiently personal in nature to trigger a balancing test. 
17

First and foremost, the Property List is a public record by statute. 53 

Pa. C.S. §8841(d). The statutory public nature of the information precludes a 

subjective or objective expectation that addresses contained therein are personal. In 

essence, the General Assembly already determined the necessity for access to 

property tax records outweighs any right to shield the addresses from view.

Second, the Property List shows the ownership of real property. 

Ownership of real property is not an inherently personal matter. At their core, real 

property tax records document sources of government revenue. Property addresses 

correspond to properties within a taxing district regardless of owner identity. 

Address information is integral to the Property List. Without a property address, a 

property tax assessment record is of little value. Further, addresses within the 

Property List are essential parts of tax assessment records. Such address information 

is necessary for tax assessments, which affect the public fisc. By virtue of its purpose

and context, an address contained in the Property List is public in nature.

Third, the source of the information contained in the Property List is 

not necessarily an individual. Cf. Wargo. Indeed, the real property listed in property

tax records may be owned by corporations or other entities. The constitutional right 

to informational privacy only inures to individuals. Stated differently, individuals, 

as distinct from “persons” (which may include corporations), may assert a privacy 

interest under Article I, Section 1. 

Fourth, PSEA III held that privacy jurisprudence under the Former Law 

guides which records implicate a privacy interest that warrants constitutional 
18

protection. That case law does not support a privacy interest in a property address, 

as distinguished from a home address. Goppelt; Dooley. By linking home addresses 

with personal telephone numbers and Social Security numbers, it is evident that 

applicable precedent protects personal identifiers. See Bodack; PSU v. SERB; Sapp 

Roofing. 

In sum, PSEA III does not require a longstanding public record like the 

Property List to be subjected to a balancing test. Addresses contained in the Property 

List are fundamentally different from the public school employees’ home addresses 

at issue in PSEA III. In a request for a home address of a specified individual or 

group of individuals, the address becomes a personal identifier, and a means of 

disturbing an individual in his own home. See, e.g., Hartman v. Dep’t of Conserv’n 

& Natural Res., 892 A.2d 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (protecting names and home 

addresses of snow mobile owners under Former Law). Although a request for a home 

address that is tied to an individual implicates a judicial balancing test, a request for 

the Property List does not.15

Based on statute and case law, we hold addresses contained in the 

Property List are not personal in nature. As a consequence, we discern no individual 

privacy interest in nondisclosure that may be balanced against the public interest in 

disclosure. Therefore, the trial court erred in allowing the School District to withhold 

the entire Property List.

 

15 Had we determined judicial balancing was necessary, a remand to the fact-finder would 

be necessary to weigh the interest in disclosure against the property owners’ privacy interests. See

Dep’t of Human Servs. v. PFUR, 154 A.3d 431 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc) (vacating OOR 

decision in part, remanding to allow OOR to conduct privacy balancing test); State Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 

v. Campbell, 155 A.3d 1153 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). 
19

III. Conclusion

The Property List is a public record by statute and case law. For all the 

foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s orders as to the Property List, and we 

direct the School District to disclose the Property List to Requester. 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Butler Area School District :

:

v. : No. 1460 C.D. 2014

:

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Appellant :

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1461 C.D. 2014

:

Butler Area School District :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2

nd day of November, 2017, the orders issued by the

Butler County Court of Common Pleas are REVERSED as to the requested property 

tax assessment records,16 referred to as the Property List in the foregoing opinion, 

and the Butler Area School District is ORDERED to disclose the Property List, 

without redaction, to Appellant, Pennsylvanians for Union Reform. 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

 

16 Because Appellant no longer challenges the denial of access as to the Superintendent’s 

home address, the appeal as to that information is moot. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Butler Area School District :

:

v. : No. 1460 C.D. 2014

: 

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

:

Appellant :

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, :

: 

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1461 C.D. 2014

: Argued: September 11, 2017

Butler Area School District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

DISSENTING OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: November 2, 2017

Respectfully, I dissent. The Majority’s analysis is at odds with the 

Supreme Court’s clear holding in The Pennsylvania State Education Association v. 

Department of Community and Economic Development, 148 A.3d 142 (Pa. 2016)

(PSEA III), a holding that this Court has previously construed quite differently.
MHW - 2

Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (Requester) submitted a Right-toKnow Law1

(RTKL) request to the Butler Area School District (District). Relevant 

here, the request sought an unredacted copy of the property tax assessment list.

2

 The 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.

2 The request defined “property tax assessment list” to mean a list of property assessment 

information sent by the county to the school district “showing at a minimum each property owner’s 

name and address for properties within the geographic confines of the school district.” 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a (emphasis in original). 

In its entirety, the request, R.R. at 5a-6a, sought the following information:

Request #1: The home addresses of all unionized employees 

of the school district in the possession of the Union 

representative/s that contracted to provide the services of those 

employees to the school district. See [Section 506(d)(3) of the 

RTKL,] 65 P.S. § 67.506(d)(3).

Request #2: Extracted from the school district’s 

computerized payroll or human resources systems: the full names 

and positions of all employees currently employed by the school 

district.

Request #3: Extracted from the school district’s 

computerized payroll or human resources systems: the home address 

of the Superintendent.

Request #4: The most recently received property tax 

assessment list/s in the possession of the school district (see 

definition).

Request #5: A list of the names and residency addresses of 

all persons required to pay a local earned income tax under Act 32 

of 2008 (The Local Tax Enabling Act) [Act of December 31, 1965, 

P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. §§6901-6924] to financially support 

the school district.

In whatever form it exists:
MHW - 3

District denied that request, citing the preliminary injunction issued by former Senior 

Judge Rochelle Friedman in Pennsylvania State Education Association ex rel.

Wilson v. Commonwealth, Office of Open Records, 981 A.2d 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009), aff’d, 2 A3d 558 (Pa. 2010).3 The Office of Open Records (OOR) upheld the 

District’s denial of the addresses and directed the District to redact public school 

employees’ home addresses from the list. The trial court vacated the redaction order 

and permitted the District to withhold the entire property list. Thereafter, our 

Supreme Court issued its decision in PSEA III. On appeal to this Court, Requester 

argues that the holding in PSEA III does not compel withholding of the property list. 

Reversing this Court’s en banc decision, in PSEA III our Supreme 

Court held that, in the context of a RTKL case, Article 1, Section 1 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution confers on citizens a right to informational privacy. 148 

A.3d at 150-51, 156-58. The issue before the court was whether school districts 

must disclose the home addresses of public school employees. 

 

Request #6: Evidence in the possession of a) the school 

district, and b) every employee of the school district ... showing that 

the release of the home address of each affected public school 

employee of the school district in response to the RTKL request 

would be “reasonably likely to result in a substantial and 

demonstrable risk of physical harm to or the personal security of an 

individual” (as described in Section 708(b)(1)(ii) of the RTKL).

Request #7: A copy of all collective bargaining agreements 

between the school district and all Unions (prefer .pdf files to be emailed electronically).

3 That order prohibited the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) from 

disclosing the home addresses of its members. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court without 

prejudice to any party’s right to appeal the final disposition of the matter. 
MHW - 4

Recently, in Department of Human Services v. Pennsylvanians for 

Union Reform, Inc., 154 A.3d 431 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), our Court interpreted PSEA 

III as requiring OOR to undertake a balancing test before releasing an individual’s 

home address in the context of a RTKL request. In that case, the Department of 

Human Services (DHS) appealed a final determination of the OOR that granted the 

appeal of Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (PFUR) and directed DHS to provide 

PFUR records containing the addresses of all direct care workers (DCWs). This 

Court affirmed the OOR’s determination that the list of home addresses of direct 

care workers is not exempt information under Section 708(b)(28) of the RTKL, 65 

P.S. §67.708(b)(28). Nevertheless, in accord with our Supreme Court’s decision in

PSEA III, we vacated the OOR’s final determination ordering DHS to provide the 

home addresses of direct care workers to PFUR, and we remanded the matter to the 

OOR. In doing so, we reasoned as follows:

In [PSEA III], the Supreme Court, reversing an en 

banc decision of this Court, held that Pennsylvanians 

enjoy a constitutionally-protected right of privacy in 

their home addresses. Under PSEA III, before releasing 

a home address that does not fall within an express 

exemption under the RTKL, the OOR must balance the 

individual's right to privacy in his or her home address 

against the public benefit in the dissemination of that 

information. The OOR may only order disclosure where 

the public benefit outweighs the individual privacy 

interest. PSEA III, 148 A.3d at 156-58. 

In light of PSEA III, the Court is constrained to vacate the 

portion of the Final Determination that ordered DHS to 

provide PFUR the home addresses of all DCWs and 

remand the matter to the OOR to perform the balancing 

test required under PSEA III. The right to informational 

privacy in one’s home address is grounded in, inter 

alia, Article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania 
MHW - 5

Constitution. Id. at 150-51. It is a right that belongs to 

each Pennsylvanian, that exists independent of the 

exemptions found in the RTKL, and that each agency must 

consider before disclosing personal information that falls 

within the scope of the right. In an ideal situation, we 

would rely on those who claim the right to assert it timely.

Because of the lack of meaningful procedural due 

process protections afforded to those whose private 

information is sought through the RTKL,[] that 

obligation must fall on the agencies that hold this 

information and have the wherewithal, in the context 

of the RTKL, to protect it from disclosure.

Department of Human Services v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, Inc., 154 A.3d 

at 437 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

Applying the holding in PSEA III consistently, we employed the same 

reasoning and reached a similar conclusion in State Employee Retirement System v.

Campbell, 155 A.3d 1153 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (SERS v. Campbell). In that case, the 

requester filed a RTKL request with the State Employee Retirement System (SERS) 

requesting, inter alia, a copy of the names and address of all retired SERS members 

whose home addresses are listed with SERS as being in France, Germany, Italy, 

Spain, the UK, Belgium, Sweden, or the Netherlands. SERS denied access to the 

home addresses, citing the pending appeal in PSEA III. On appeal, the OOR granted 

access to all of the home addresses sought under the request. After the OOR denied 

reconsideration, SERS appealed to this Court. 

We concluded that the matter must be remanded to the OOR to perform 

the balancing test required by PSEA III. Relevant here, we quoted from the Supreme 

Court’s decision as follows: 
MHW - 6

“[N]othing in the RTKL suggests it was ever intended 

to be used as a tool to procure personal information 

about private citizens or, in the worst sense, to be a 

generator of mailing lists. Public agencies are not 

clearinghouses of ‘bulk’ personal information otherwise 

protected by constitutional privacy rights. While the goal 

of the legislature to make more, rather than less, 

information available to public scrutiny is laudable, the 

constitutional rights of the citizens of this 

Commonwealth to be left alone remains a significant 

countervailing force.”

SERS v. Campbell, 155 A.3d at 1155-56 (quoting PSEA III, 148 A.3d at 158). As 

reflected by the above-quoted language, the mere fact that requested information, 

including home addresses, may be obtained from other sources is of no consequence 

in a RTKL analysis. Indeed, Requester’s request form identifies multiple sources 

from which home addresses are discoverable through searches of on-line databases 

by owner name. R.R. at 6a-7a. As the Supreme Court emphasized in PSEA III, that 

fact does not supersede an individual’s constitutional right to be left alone for 

purposes of requests for information under the RTKL. 148 A.3d at 158.

The Majority characterizes PSEA III as holding that public school 

employees enjoy a right to privacy in their home addresses. Majority op. at 9. 

Although the addresses of public school employees were at issue in PSEA III, the 

Supreme Court did not limit its holding to either the type of individuals or the type 

of information at issue, but pointedly and repeatedly referred to “the rights to 

informational privacy granted to our citizens.” 148 A.3d at 156 (emphasis added). 
MHW - 7

“This court, through its decisions in Sapp Roofing,

4 Penn State,5 and Bodack,6 has 

developed a body of case law requiring governmental agencies to respect the 

constitutional privacy rights of citizens when disseminating requested information. 

In such circumstances, a balancing test is required before the disclosure of any 

personal information.” 148 A.3d at 156 (emphasis added). 

Requiring governmental agencies to be mindful of citizens’ 

constitutional privacy rights implicitly acknowledges the significant distinction 

between the collection of personal information by private entities and governmental 

agencies. Citizens often volunteer personal information such as home addresses, 

telephone numbers, and email addresses to private entities in exchange for privileges

such as a credit card or a loyalty program, acknowledging that such information will 

be shared. In contrast to this voluntary conduct, the information gathered by 

governmental bodies, such as found in school, earned income tax, and property tax 

records, is required to be supplied to the government in exchange for the privileges 

of education, employment, and home ownership. 

Further, to say that all addresses on the property list may not be home 

addresses is to acknowledge that the remaining addresses indeed are home addresses. 

As the court in PSEA III unequivocally held, the discrete issue presented by a RTKL 

request for home addresses is whether the constitutional right to privacy in one’s 

 

4

Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No.12, 

713 A2d 627 (Pa. 1998). 

5 Penn State University v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 935 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2007).

6 Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v. Bodack, 961 A.2d 110 (Pa. 2008).
MHW - 8

home address is outweighed by a public benefit or interest in disclosure.7 Again, to 

resolve that issue, a balancing test must be applied. PSEA III.

I believe that the Majority’s reliance on the Consolidated County 

Assessment Law8 as authority to disclose the property list misses the mark. Where 

information qualifies as a public record under the RTKL, statutory authority for 

disclosure already exists. However, the existence of such authority does not 

complete our analysis, because “Pennsylvania courts are obliged to construe 

statutory enactments as consistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution.” PSEA III, 

 

7 As Justice Wecht observed: 

As the United States Supreme Court has observed, it may well be 

true that home addresses are publicly available through easily 

accessible sources. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 

Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468, 103 L. Ed. 2d 774 

(1989). However, “[a]n individual’s interest in controlling the 

dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not 

dissolve simply because that information may be available to the 

public in some form.” Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations 

Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500, 114 S. Ct. 1006, 127 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1994). 

Although individuals voluntarily may reveal their home addresses 

in a variety of contexts, i.e., obtaining various licenses, going to 

court, or owning property, this voluntary disclosure is legally 

distinct from and irrelevant to the question of whether a public 

employer must produce its employees’ home addresses upon 

demand. Nor is it relevant as a matter of constitutional law that 

home addresses are available in the public domain and accessible 

through internet searches or particular websites. That such 

information may be uncovered by private citizens through industry 

or skullduggery does not mean that government must employ public 

resources to assist in that activity.

148 A.3d at 161-62 (Wecht, J., concurring).

8

53 Pa. C.S. §§8801-8868.
MHW - 9

148 A.3d at 156; Harrington v. Department of Transportation, 763 A.2d 386, 393 

(Pa. 2000). As interpreted by our Supreme Court in PSEA III, the Pennsylvania 

Constitution requires a balancing test be employed before a citizen’s home address 

can be supplied in response to a RTKL request, regardless of whether the 

information may be available from another source, public or private. 

The Majority relies on Goppelt v. City of Philadelphia Revenue 

Department, 841 A.2d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), as employing the same analysis 

adopted in PSEA III. Respectfully, no decision prior to PSEA III has so clearly and 

unequivocally recognized a right to informational privacy afforded to citizens of this 

Commonwealth under Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

Moreover, in Goppelt the court did undertake the balancing test the Majority 

foregoes in this instance. And whether the court would reach the same result now is 

not a certainty.

The Majority’s conclusion that “the Property list does not qualify as 

sufficiently personal in nature to trigger a balancing test” cannot be reconciled with 

our Supreme Court’s holding in PSEA III. Additionally, the Majority’s reasoning

departs from our analysis in Department of Human Services v. Pennsylvanians for 

Union Reform, Inc., SERS v. Campbell, and Times Publishing Company, Inc. v. 

Michel, 633 A.2d 1233, 1237-39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (recognizing a right to privacy 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution and cited with approval in PSEA III). The 

request in this case indisputably seeks home addresses, and, consequently, requires 

the balancing of individuals’ rights to informational privacy against the public 

interest favoring disclosure. PSEA III. 
MHW - 10

Accordingly, consistent with our decisions in Department of Human 

Services v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, Inc. and SERS v. Campbell, I would 

remand this matter to the OOR for further consideration consistent with the Supreme 

Court’s analysis and holding in PSEA III. 

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge