IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

AND EMC CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00478-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 1 of 15
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................1

A. The ’921 Patent .........................................................................................................1

B. Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegations..........................................................................2

III. LEGAL STANDARD..........................................................................................................2

A. Direct Infringement ...................................................................................................2

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement....................................................................3

IV. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................4

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory Infringement.............4

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for Indirect Infringement ...4

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for Induced

Infringement.......................................................................................................7

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial Non-Infringing Uses 

for Contributory Infringement ...........................................................................8

V. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................8

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter,

620 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................3, 7

Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am.,

No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2014) .................................3, 4, 7

Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC,

No. SA-10-CV-0702 XR, 2011 WL 2471299 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) ...........................4, 5

Artrip v. Ball Corp.,

735 F. App’x 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................8

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009)...............................................................................................................2, 3

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)...................................................................................................................2

Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

904 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2012).....................................................................................6

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015)...........................................................................................................3, 4

De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.,

2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)..........................................................................3

Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.,

No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018)..........................................7

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,

471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..................................................................................................7

Dynamic Data Techs., LLC v. Amlogic Holdings Ltd.,

C.A. No. 19-1239-CFC, 2020 WL 4365809 (D. Del. July 30, 2020)........................................5

Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,

909 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................................................................................................3

Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,

620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................4

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 3 of 15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

iii

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,

563 U.S. 754 (2011)...................................................................................................................4

Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,

No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019).....................................7

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,

870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................3

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................3

Orlando Commc’ns LLC v. LG Elecs., Inc.,

No. 6:14-CV-1017-ORL-22, 2015 WL 1246500 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2015)............................6

Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 WL 3940952 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019)..........................7, 8

Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,

No. SACV 11-1681 DOC ANX, 2012 WL 1835680 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) ......................6

Simplivity Corp. v. Springpath, Inc.,

No. CV 4:15-13345-TSH, 2016 WL 5388951 (D. Mass. July 15, 2016)..................................6

VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp.,

C.A. No. 18-966-CFC, 2019 WL 1349468 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2019).........................................5

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)....................................................................................................................2

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term

’921 patent U.S. Patent No. 7,126,921

Accused Products Dell Networking S3048-ON, Dell Networking S4048-ON, Dell 

Networking S4810-ON, Dell Networking S6000-ON, and ESeries, C-Series, N-Series, and S-Series hardware

Amended Complaint 

or Am. Compl.

First Amended Complaint For Patent Infringement (D.I. 34)

Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., and EMC Corporation

DNOS Dell Networking Operating System

FTOS Force10 Networks’ Force10 Operating System

Original Complaint 

or Original Compl.

Original Complaint For Patent Infringement (D.I. 1)

WSOU or Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and 

Development 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 5 of 15
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged—and cannot plausibly allege—indirect infringement in 

this case, under any theory. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint alleged knowledge of the patent only 

as of the date of the Complaint, which this Court has repeatedly held is insufficient to sustain a 

claim of indirect infringement. The Amended Complaint tries—and fails—to circumvent that 

clear rule by alleging knowledge based on a complaint Plaintiff earlier filed and dismissed before 

filing the present case. Neither basis is sufficient; Plaintiff still has not adequately alleged pre-suit 

knowledge of the patent. The indirect allegations also fail to allege other requisite elements of 

induced and contributory infringement. As such, Defendants respectfully request that this case be 

dismissed. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The ’921 Patent

The ’921 patent, which is entitled “Packet network providing fast distribution of node 

related information and a method therefor,” relates generally to providing a method of distributing 

node related information to recover from link and node failure. See ’921 patent at 3:1–5. Plaintiff 

asserts claim 1 in the complaint:

1. A packet network having a plurality of nodes and links between the nodes, 

comprising:

a computing means for control of the nodes;

each node having a data plane means for forwarding packets between the 

nodes, the data plane means being responsive to control signals from the 

computing means; and

the data plane means comprising a means for fast propagation of node 

related information between the data plane means in each node and 

forwarding the information to the computing means in the network, 

wherein the means for fast propagation of node related information 

comprises means for fast propagation of link state information.

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Id., cl. 1.

B. Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegations

Plaintiff accuses Defendants of direct infringement of claim 1 of the ’921 patent based on 

making, using, or selling routers controlled by the DNOS that has features from FTOS, including 

the Dell Networking S3048-ON, Dell Networking S4048-ON, Dell Networking S4810-ON, Dell 

Networking S6000-ON, and E-Series, C-Series, N-Series, and S- Series hardware. Am. Compl. at 

¶¶ 13, 21.1

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations in its Original Complaint amounted to three 

sentences that parrot the legal elements and two website links that fail to support Plaintiff’s claims. 

See Original Compl. at ¶¶ 23–25. Those allegations completely failed to allege that Defendants 

had knowledge of the patent and knowledge of the infringement before Plaintiff filed suit. See id. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to fix the deficiencies in the Original Complaint. 

Plaintiff now alleges knowledge of the patent based on the filing, and dismissal, of an earlier 

complaint—which was not served—asserting the same patent. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 24. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Direct Infringement

A complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The complaint must include more than 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must allege non-

 1 Plaintiff’s direct infringement allegations in its Amended Complaint are identical to its 

Original Complaint. The only difference is the addition of some model numbers for the 

Accused Products. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 13; Rosenthal Decl., Ex. A (Redline comparison of 

Original and Amended Complaint).

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 7 of 15
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conclusory facts that make liability “plausible,” meaning the facts “allow[] the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (“The complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) 

(3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant evidence of 

each element of a claim.”). For a claim of patent infringement, the complaint must—at a 

minimum—plead facts that describe how the allegedly infringing product infringes. See De La 

Vega v. Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 3528411, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020).

B. Induced and Contributory Infringement

To plead indirect infringement, the complaint must first plead direct infringement by a third 

party. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 

2017) (“A finding of direct infringement is predicate to any finding of indirect infringement[.]”); 

Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 909 F.3d 398, 407 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(same). 

For both induced and contributory infringement, plaintiff must also plead facts to support 

an inference of each defendant’s “knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent 

infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); see Addiction 

& Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

For induced infringement, Plaintiff additionally must plead facts showing that each 

defendant “had [a] specific intent to induce the [third party’s] patent infringement.” Affinity Labs 

of Texas, LLC v. Toyota Motor N. Am., No. W:13-CV-365, 2014 WL 2892285, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 

May 12, 2014). The “specific intent” element is “demanding” and requires more than 

“unsubstantiated assertions” or “generalized allegations” as to the intent of the alleged infringer. 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 8 of 15
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Id. at *7, *21. Specific intent requires more than knowledge of the induced acts; rather, the accused 

infringer must have “knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). 

For contributory infringement, Plaintiff must also plead “that the component has no 

substantial noninfringing uses, and [] that the component is a material part of the 

invention.” Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *8 (citing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 

IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Induced and Contributory Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims are deficient and should be dismissed. As an initial 

matter, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead any pre-suit knowledge by Defendants of the patent, 

or pre-suit knowledge by Defendants of alleged infringement. Plaintiff also fails to plead a specific 

intent to induce infringement. And Plaintiff has not pled, and cannot plead, that there are no 

substantial non-infringing uses. Each of these failures independently warrants dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement allegations. 

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Knowledge for Indirect 

Infringement

Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims fail because they do not adequately plead the 

required “knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.” Commil USA, 

135 S. Ct. at 1926. As courts in this District have held, the knowledge requirements for indirect 

infringement require pre-suit knowledge. See Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-10-

CV-0702 XR, 2011 WL 2471299, at *3 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) (holding that reliance “on 

knowledge of [plaintiff’s] patent after the lawsuit was filed . . . is insufficient to plead the requisite 

knowledge for indirect infringement”). Moreover, this Court has held—earlier this year—that

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 9 of 15
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allegations of knowledge based on a prior filed complaint are not enough to overcome a motion to 

dismiss. See Parus Holdings Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order 

GRANTING D.I. 54 (dismissing indirect infringement claims where plaintiff’s only allegation of 

knowledge were that “Defendant Apple has had knowledge of the ’431 Patent since at least the 

filing of the original complaint” and “[b]y the time of trial, Defendant Apple will have known 

and intended (since receiving such notice) that their continued actions would actively induce the 

infringement”) (quoting D.I. 28 (Am. Compl.) at ¶ 44 (emphasis added)).

The Amended Complaint includes an erroneous footnote that attempts to distinguish 

Aguirre by asserting that “Delaware courts have since rejected this rule.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 24, n.1. 

Plaintiff’s statement that Delaware has rejected the pre-suit knowledge requirement is incorrect. 

See, e.g., VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., C.A. No. 18-966-CFC, 2019 WL 1349468, at *2 (D. Del. 

Mar. 26, 2019) (“[T]he complaint itself cannot serve as the basis for a defendant’s actionable 

knowledge.”); Dynamic Data Techs., LLC v. Amlogic Holdings Ltd., C.A. No. 19-1239-CFC, 2020 

WL 4365809, at *2 (D. Del. July 30, 2020) (“‘The purpose of a complaint is not to create a claim 

but rather to obtain relief for an existing claim. For that reason, the complaint itself cannot be the 

source of the knowledge required to sustain claims of induced infringement.’” (citation omitted)). 

In any event, this Court has expressly adopted the pre-suit knowledge requirement, and continues 

to do so. See, e.g., Parus, No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING D.I. 54. 

Despite this clear precedent, Plaintiff’s only allegations of knowledge are based on the 

filing of its prior complaint asserting the same patent, which it inexplicably dismissed: 

In May 2020, Plaintiff filed a suit against Defendants asserting 

infringement of the same patent and by the same accused products

that are asserted in this case. Plaintiff dismissed the prior suit before 

filing this suit. As a result of the prior suit, Defendants had notice 

and actual or constructive knowledge of their infringement of the 

patent-in-suit since at least May 2020, before the filing of this case. 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 10 of 15
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Further, Defendants had knowledge of their infringement of the 

patent-in-suit before the filing of this Amended Complaint.

Am. Compl. at ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Like the allegations in Parus, WSOU’s allegations of 

knowledge are limited to references to a prior filed complaint and thus fail to state a claim for 

indirect infringement. See id.; Parus, No. 6:19-cv-432, Feb. 20, 2020 Text Order GRANTING 

D.I. 54.2

 To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s May 19, 2020 complaint was never served, so it 

cannot form the basis for Defendants’ knowledge. See Rosenthal Decl., Ex. B (Docket for WSOU 

v. Dell Inc., et al., No. 6-20-cv-00409) (showing dismissal prior to service of the complaint). 

Allowing Plaintiff to avoid the pre-suit knowledge requirement by filing a complaint, voluntarily 

dismissing that complaint, and refiling the same complaint two weeks later, would be at odds with 

the knowledge requirement itself.3 And, it would elevate form over substance and encourage 

litigants to use such a tactic to essentially eviscerate the pre-suit knowledge requirement. 

Plaintiff’s failure to raise a plausible inference of pre-suit knowledge of the patent and 

knowledge of infringement is fatal to its indirect infringement claims, and as such these claims 

should be dismissed.

 2 See also Proxyconn Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV 11-1681 DOC ANX, 2012 WL 

1835680, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (“[A] complaint fails to state a claim for indirect 

patent infringement where the only allegation that purports to establish the knowledge element 

is the allegation that the complaint itself or previous complaints in the same lawsuit establish 

the defendant’s knowledge of the patent” (emphasis added)); Orlando Commc’ns LLC v. LG 

Elecs., Inc., No. 6:14-CV-1017-ORL-22, 2015 WL 1246500, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2015) 

(“‘Prior to suit’ does not mean prior to the current iteration of the Complaint.”). 

3 See, e.g., Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 

1268–69 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[B]ecause notice of the patent is necessarily provided by a 

complaint, finding that a complaint provides sufficient knowledge for induced infringement 

would vitiate the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech that an allegation of knowledge of 

the patent is required to state a claim for induced infringement.”); Simplivity Corp. v. 

Springpath, Inc., No. CV 4:15-13345-TSH, 2016 WL 5388951, at *8 (D. Mass. July 15, 2016) 

(“The suggested ‘knowledge via filing’ framework dilutes the knowledge requirement to the 

point of meaninglessness, since by virtue of being sued for infringement, a party necessarily is 

aware of the patent-in-suit.”).

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 11 of 15
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2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Specific Intent for Induced 

Infringement

Plaintiff also entirely fails to plead specific intent in support of its inducement claim. 

Allegations of specific intent require factual “‘evidence of culpable conduct, directed to 

encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct 

infringer’s activities.’” Parity Networks, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-00207-ADA, 2019 

WL 3940952, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 26, 2019) (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 

1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s allegations of specific intent amount to a single 

conclusory statement that Defendants “actively induced” others to infringe through their 

advertising, promotional materials, and some website citations. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 25. Such 

conclusory allegations fail to present facts that demonstrate: (1) Defendants knew that the alleged 

acts would infringe, and (2) Defendants knew that the promotion of their products would induce 

or encourage others to infringe the Asserted Patent. See Addiction, 620 F. App’x at 938 (“[S]imply 

recit[ing] the legal conclusion that Defendants acted with specific intent” fails to plead “facts that 

would allow a court to reasonably infer that Defendants had the specific intent to induce 

infringement.”); Affinity Labs, 2014 WL 2892285, at *7, *21 (finding Plaintiff’s “generalized 

allegations that Toyota induced others to infringe the Asserted Patents through its marketing and 

sales tactics are [] insufficient”). To support specific intent, Plaintiff must include specific 

allegations mapping the advertisement or promotion to the performance of the claimed steps of the 

patent—i.e., “evidence of culpable conduct, direct to encouraging another’s infringement.” Parity, 

2019 WL 3940952, at *2.4

 4 See also Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 

1455336, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (“In no way does the complaint detail how an end user 

would infringe Hypermedia’s patents by following instructions in the links provided in the 

complaint.” (emphasis in original)); Dodots Licensing Sols. LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc., 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 12 of 15
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Plaintiff’s inducement claim should be dismissed because the Amended Complaint is 

entirely silent on a key requirement of induced infringement.

3. Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Requisite Lack of Substantial NonInfringing Uses for Contributory Infringement 

Plaintiff’s contributory infringement allegations also fail because Plaintiff did not “‘plead 

facts that allow an inference that the components sold or offered for sale have no substantial noninfringing uses.’” Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff has not pled a lack of substantial non-infringing uses because it cannot do so. Plaintiff’s 

only allegation on these elements is a conclusory statement that repeats the legal elements. See 

Am. Compl. at ¶ 26. As the Federal Circuit held in Artrip, conclusory allegations are not enough. 

735 F. App’x at 713 (affirming dismissal of a contributory infringement claim where the 

“complaint did not plausibly assert facts to suggest that [defendant] was aware of the patents or 

facts to suggest that the [accused product] it supplied had no substantial noninfringing use”). 

Plaintiff’s failure to raise a plausible inference of no substantial non-infringing uses is fatal to its 

contributory infringement claim, and as such it should be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motion 

and dismiss Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claims in its Amended Complaint, without leave to 

amend. Pursuant to L.R. CV-7(h), Defendants request an oral hearing on the foregoing motion.

 

No. CV 18-098 (MN), 2018 WL 6629709, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 2018) (holding mere citations 

to websites were insufficient to plead specific intent). 

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 13 of 15
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Dated: October 30, 2020 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton 

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@sheltoncoburn.com

SHELTON COBURN LLP

311 RR 620, Suite 205

Austin, TX 78734-4775 

Telephone: 512.263.2165

Facsimile: 512.263.2166 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

Kyanna Sabanoglu

ksabanoglu@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00478-ADA Document 38 Filed 10/30/20 Page 14 of 15
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on October 30, 2020, all counsel of record who are deemed 

to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document through the 

Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(b)(1). 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton 

Barry K. Shelton

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