alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 30669

R.T. FAULK, III, COREY FARMS, L.L.C .; FAULK FARMS, INCORPORATED; JOANNE HODGES; RIVER VALLEY PROPERTIES; MCHENRY FARMS, L.L.C.; SHERMAN SHAW; T. P. GODWIN; WILLIAM G. NADLER; MCHENRY REALTY PARTNERSHIP

Plaintiffs

- Appellee s
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana U S D C No. 3:07

- CV

- 554

Before JOLLY, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: * This case concerns a dispute over the proposed closing of several private railroad crossings in Louisiana. The district court determined that the
railroads have a servitude , rather than fee

- simple ownership, over the land . It then certified to this court the question of whether a Louisiana statute preventing the railroads from closing the private crossings violates the

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-30669 Document: 00513152884 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/13/2015No. 13

- 30669

2 Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition on takings. We grante d the interlocutory appeal , addressed certain issues, and certified the remaining dispositive issue to the Louisiana Supreme Court pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule
XII § 1 and L A

. R EV

. S TAT

. § 13:72.1

. See Faulk v. Union Pac. R .R. Co. , 576 F. App’x 345 (5th Cir. 2014). Th at court accepted the certified question and issued
its answer on Ju ne 30 , 2015. Faulk v. Union Pac. R .R. Co. , 2015 La. LEXIS 1498 (La. June 30, 2015) (answering certified question); Faulk v. Union Pac.
R .R. Co. , 151 So. 3d 611 (La. 2014) (granting certif ication). We ordered supplemental briefing by the parties on the subject of whether any further issues remain to be resolved by this court at this point. They stated that there are not, and we agree. Accordingly, t he district court’s March 22, 2013 par tial summary judgment order certified for interlocutory appeal is AFFIRMED and the case is REMANDED for appropriate further proceedings. Case: 13-30669 Document: 00513152884 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/13/2015
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|California - Coastal Region Onshore Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Reserves Acquisitions (Million Barrels)
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|California - Coastal Region Onshore Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Reserves Acquisitions (Million Barrels)
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|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2000's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | 2     
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 154    | 0      | 2      | 39     | 46     | 0      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 0     
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 0      | 0      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
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|Release Date: 12/30/2022                                                                                                         
|Next Release Date: 12/29/2023
Final Rule: Mandatory Reporting ofPetroleum and Natural Gas SystemsMeeting DocumentationInteragency Meeting – Commentson Rule, September 2, 2010Date Staff Contact Information(Name, email, phone #)Name ofOrganization(Attach list ofall attendeesnames andemails ifpossible)Summary of Discussion(e.g., applicability, reportingrequirements, etc.)Written CommentsProvided?Did they alsosubmit to Docket?Date sent to EPACCD9/2 Suzie Kocchi,Kocchi.suzanne@epa.gov202-343-9387Agenciesattending:OMB, EPA,SBA,BOEMRE,OECCA conference call was heldto discuss interagencycomments and questions on the final rule.N/A N/A
#### Milton FISHER, D/B/A M. Fisher Furniture Co., Appellant v. FLORENCE STOVE COMPANY, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 8, 1952.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1952.

Louis Brownstein, Louisville, for appellant.

Davis, Boehl, Viser & Marcus, Louisville, for appellee.

LATIMER, Justice.

The original petition in the case of Kays v. Fisher, Ky., 250 S.W.2d 329, this day decided, was to recover for damages to property allegedly caused by fire originating from an oil furnace purchased from appellee in that action. The action was based upon alleged breach of implied warranty as to fitness.

Appellee in that action filed a cross-petition against Florence Stove Company, *156manufacturers of the stove, in which Florence Stove Company was called upon to defend the action and to hold the Milton Fisher Company harmless. Motion was made by the Florence Stove Company to quash the return of service of process. This was overruled. Motion was then made to strike the cross-petition, which also was overruled. After trial, Florence Stove Company filed motion for a directed verdict as to it which was sustained.

Having affirmed the judgment in Kays v. Fisher, it becomes unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the questions raised by appellee herein, since appellee in brief says: “The result of the trial below in dismissing Florence Stove Company from the suit was correct, regardless of the method by which it was reached, and the judgment below as to Florence Stove Company should, therefore, be affirmed. Had the result of the case been adverse to Florence Stove Company, it would have come to this Court, urging the error of the trial court in permitting such a cross-petition to be filed against it.”

The judgment is affirmed.
#### FROST et al. v. FROST et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 23, 1952.

*162W. D. Gilliam, Scottsville, for appellants.

N. F. Harper, Scottsville, for appellees.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This action was brought to quiet title to oil and mineral rights. The judgment was favorable to appellee, and appellant’s mineral deed was cancelled.

On October 9, 1946, appellee’s father, who owned several tracts of land, made conveyances to his three sons. He conveyed to appellee in fee simple approximately 104 acres. This deed was recorded on that date.

It appears that two days before, the father had undertaken to convey to appellant, his grandson, certain mineral rights in the same property conveyed to appellee. This deed was lodged for record, but it had not been signed by the grantor. Not until October 17 was it properly executed and recorded. Thereafter appellant was paid oil royalties accruing from operations on the property, until about two years later when appellee notified the oil company of his interest in the land.

It is appellant’s theory that appellee acquired knowledge of the former’s earlier abortive deed, and that by permitting appellant to collect the oil royalties, he is estopped to now claim thnt his own deed (though first executed and recorded) gives him a priority of right.

.There is no evidence that on October 9., when the conveyance was made to apr pellee, he had any knowledge that his father had attempted to make a prior conveyance to appellant. He apparently did become aware of this fact sometime later. With this knowledge, he did not assert his right to the oil royalties which were then being paid to appellant. Appellee undertakes to explain this circumstance by saying that he expected the royalties to be paid to his father during the latter’s lifetime. It was soon after his father’s death that he notified the oil company of his interest in them.

Appellant’s own testimony indicates that a controversy was developing between him and appellee over these oil royalties, rather than that the latter was acquiescing in the former’s right thereto. At any rate, we are unable to- see how appellant could have been misled to his prejudice by the inaction of appellee.

Appellee had the better legal title, and ■appellant knew or should have known this. As a practical matter, both parties should have settled the question with the grantor during his lifetime. The duty to do- so, however, rested upon appellant rather than appellee. The mere failure of the latter to insist upon the payment of oil royalties for tiwo years, in view of his explanation, was not sufficient to estop him from asserting the priority of his own deed. The Chancellor did deny appel-lee’s right to the royalties paid to< appellant before notice was^ given to the oil company.

In our opinion both the facts found and the conclusions reached by the Chancellor were correct.

The judgment is affirmed
Cite as 2014 Ark. 437



## SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-14-833 ROBERT HOLLAND APPELLANT V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE Opinion Delivered October 23, 2014 MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT AND STAY OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE
MOTION GRANTED.

PER CURIAM Appellant was found guilty of capital murder and was sentenced to death by lethal injection. An appeal from the judgment has been lodged in this court. Holland is represented by John W. Cone, a full-time public defender, who now asks that he be relieved as counsel on the ground that he is ineligible for compensation for services as appellate counsel. Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-4-1604(b)(2)(B) (Repl. 2007) provides that persons employed as full-time public defenders who are not provided a state-funded secretary are eligible to seek compensation for appellate work. Counsel affirms that he is a full-time public defender with a full-time, state-funded secretary. Under these circumstances, he is not entitled to be paid for services in this appeal, and his request to be relieved is well founded. See Williamson v. State , 2013 Ark. 1 (per curiam). We grant Cone’s motion to be relieved, and we appoint Mr. Paul J. Teufel and Ms. Charlene Davidson Henry to represent Holland. Our clerk is directed to set a new briefing schedule for the appeal.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

 v. 

ZTE CORPORATION; ZTE (USA), INC.; 

AND ZTE (TX), INC., 

Defendant. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-CV-00487-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND 

RESPONSE BRIEF DEADLINES TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Having considered the Unopposed Motion to Extend Response Brief Deadlines to 

Motions to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and 

Development (“WSOU”), the Court is of the opinion that the motion is well taken and should be 

GRANTED. It is therefore ORDERED that WSOU’s deadline to file response to Defendant’s 

Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 23, 24, 25 (corrected by Dkt. 26 and 27), is extended to November 

6, 2020.

Case 6:20-cv-00487-ADA Document 28-1 Filed 10/13/20 Page 1 of 1
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

380 

CA 10-01581 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

 

KEVIN T. STOCKER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

2900 TRANSIT ROAD LLC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE GARAS LAW FIRM, LLP, BUFFALO (JOHN C. GARAS OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

KEVIN T. STOCKER, TONAWANDA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT PRO SE. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John A.

Michalek, J.), entered March 10, 2010. The order, insofar as appealed

from, directed the Erie County Comptroller to distribute surplus funds

to the members of defendant corporation.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the motion is denied

in part in accordance with the following Memorandum: Defendant

corporation was formed for the purpose of “acquiring, developing,

operating, leasing and otherwise dealing in real estate, specifically

6024 Main Street, Williamsville, New York.” Defendant executed a

mortgage with respect to that property, which was subsequently

acquired by plaintiff, a member of defendant. Plaintiff commenced the

instant mortgage foreclosure action when defendant defaulted on the

mortgage and, following the foreclosure sale, surplus funds were

deposited with the Erie County Comptroller (Comptroller) by agreement

of the parties. Plaintiff thereafter moved, inter alia, for an order

dissolving defendant corporation and directing the Comptroller to

distribute the surplus funds pursuant to defendant’s Operating

Agreement.

As limited by its brief, defendant corporation contends that

Supreme Court erred in granting that part of plaintiff’s motion

seeking an order directing the Comptroller to distribute the surplus

funds to the members of defendant corporation in proportion to their

membership interests. We agree. The surplus funds resulting from the

foreclosure sale belong to defendant corporation (see First Fed. Sav.

& Loan Assn. of Rochester v Brown, 78 AD2d 119, 123, appeal dismissed

53 NY2d 939). 

Entered: March 25, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
PER CURIAM. 

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed April 17, 2024. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________ 

No. 3D23-1728 

Lower Tribunal No. 08-14505 

________________ 

HLHL, P.A., etc., 

Appellant, 

vs. 

Fidel Castro Ruz, etc., et al., 

Appellees. 

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice 

Butchko, Judge. 

The Hall Law Firm, P.A., and Adam S. Hall, for appellant. 

Mark Migdal & Hayden, Desiree Fernandez, and Jose M. Ferrer, 

for appellees Alfredo Villoldo and Gustavo E. Villoldo.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ. 
2

Affirmed. Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1986) 

(“In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file 

a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.”); Sinclair, 

Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 

1383, 1385 (Fla. 1983); Naftzger v. Elam, 41 So. 3d 944, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2010) (“If notice is not given before entry of the final judgment or an order 

dismissing the case, the trial court loses jurisdiction to enforce a charging 

lien in the original action.”); Central Mortg. Co. v. Callahan, 155 So. 3d 373, 

376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[R]eservation of jurisdiction must be specific.”); 

Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“It is not 

enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has 

provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive 

judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the 

tangible fruits of the services.”); Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v. Mascola, 711 So. 

2d 46, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (providing that a charging lien proceeding 

only applies when “identifiable property recovered as a result of the lawyer’s 

labors.”).
AO 458 (Rev. 06/09) Appearance of Counsel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.

Defendant

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

.

Date:

Attorney’s signature

Printed name and bar number

Address

E-mail address

Telephone number

FAX number

 Western District of Texas

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC D/B/A BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT

Plaintiff

 v. DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC, EMC 

CORPORATION, AND VMWARE, INC. 6:20-CV-00486-ADA WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC D/B/A BRAZOS LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT 12/17/2021 /s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop Jonathan K. Waldrop (CA Bar No. 297903)

Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP

333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 200

Redwood Shores, California 94065

jwaldrop@kasowitz.com (650) 453-5170 (650) 453-5171

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA Document 130 Filed 12/17/21 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL 

INC., AND EMC CORPORATION, 

Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-473-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

Please take notice that attorney Brian M. Koide of the law firm ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP, 

PLLC appears as counsel of record for Plaintiff Uniloc 2017. Mr. Koide hereby requests that all 

notices required to be given, and all papers required to be served in the above-entitled and 

numbered cause, be copied to and served upon him.

Dated: November 2, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Brian M. Koide

Brian M. Koide 

Virginia Bar No. 46,329

ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP, PLLC

2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324

Southlake, Texas 76092

Telephone: (703) 565-2852

Facsimile: (817) 887-5950 

brian@etheridgelaw.com

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA Document 38 Filed 11/02/20 Page 1 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing document was served upon all counsel of record via the 

Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on November 2, 2020.

/s/ Brian M. Koide

Brian M. Koide

Case 6:20-cv-00473-ADA Document 38 Filed 11/02/20 Page 2 of 2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Arthur Sullivan, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Calabretta, J.), rendered November 25,1987, convicting him of rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the second degree (two counts), sodomy in the first degree, sodomy in the second degree, assault in the third degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

*565The defendant argues that the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial when it was discovered that some of the jurors viewed a newspaper article and accompanying photograph reporting the events at trial the previous day. We disagree.

The Court of Appeals has observed that " '[bjecause juror misconduct can take many forms, no ironclad rule of decision is possible. In each case the facts must be examined to determine the nature of the material placed before the jury and the likelihood that prejudice would be engendered’ ” *(People v Testa,*61 NY2d 1008, 1009, citing *People v Brown,*48 NY2d 388, 394). Thus, "mere exposure to accounts in newspapers pertaining to a defendant and his conduct, without more, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of a juror’s impartiality and to warrant disqualification” *(People v Costello,*104 AD2d 947, 948). The court need not disqualify a juror if "reasonable inquiry” demonstrates that he or she can remain impartial *(People v Costello, supra).*

In the instant case, the court methodically conducted a voir dire of the jurors and each juror expressed unequivocally that the article and photograph would not affect his or her ability to remain impartial. Accordingly, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial *(see, People v Testa, supra; People v Brown,*136 AD2d 1; *People v Costello, supra).*

We also reject the defendant’s argument that the court improperly excluded testimony about his blood type. Because the prosecution made no argument regarding the blood type of the suspect, the evidence regarding the defendant’s blood type would have been irrelevant and confusing *(see, People v Brown, supra,*at 16).

In addition, we note that the court properly sentenced the defendant as a persistent felony offender *(see, People v Sailor,*65 NY2d 224, 235, *cert denied*474 US 982; *People v Sasso,*99 AD2d 558; *People v Oliver,*96 AD2d 1104, *affd*63 NY2d 973).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Harwood, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 24
- 01 83 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, vs. ISAIAH JAMES PEHRINGER,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including August 30 , 202 4 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 25 2024

07/25/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0183