NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GEORGE ALLAN LOADER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0561

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201101308

The Honorable Steven F. Conn, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Daniel DeRienzo, PLLC, Prescott Valley

By Daniel J. DeRienzo

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. LOADER 

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 George Allan Loader appeals his convictions and sentences for firstdegree murder, a Class 1 felony; misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony;

and abandonment of a dead body, a Class 5 felony. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 At trial, Loader denied killing the victim. He testified that after his 

toddler indicated the victim had molested her, he engaged in a fight with the 

victim and during that altercation, the victim grabbed a shotgun off a nearby table 

and accidentally shot himself in the neck. Loader, however, had told his sister 

shortly after the incident that he had shot the victim. Moreover, the medical 

examiner testified the butt of the shotgun was higher than the barrel when the shot 

was fired into the left side of the victim’s neck, and a firearms examiner testified 

that it took two hands for him to manipulate the gun to get it to fire.

¶3 Loader admitted dismembering the victim, dumping the body, and 

setting fire to the remains, but defended the abandonment-of-a dead-body charge 

on the basis he was guilty but insane. A psychologist testifying on Loader’s behalf 

diagnosed Loader with paranoid schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder 

and opined that Loader did not believe he was doing anything wrong by 

dismembering the victim’s body in an effort to avoid being "inappropriately . . . 

blamed for something for which he was blameless." The State’s psychiatrist 

testified, however, that Loader had admitted using methamphetamine "relatively 

heavily" in the month before the incident. The psychiatrist testified Loader 

suffered from "methamphetamine induced psychotic disorder in an active phase 

prior to incarceration," "polysubstance dependence influenced by institutional 

 

1 We view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

jury’s verdicts. See State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2 (App. 2007).
STATE v. LOADER 

Decision of the Court

3

remission," and antisocial personality disorder; and that Loader knew that the 

dismemberment was wrong when he did it.

¶4 The jury convicted Loader of the charged offenses and found that he 

committed them while on release for a prior offense. The superior court sentenced 

him to consecutive sentences of natural life for murder, ten years for misconduct 

involving weapons, and five years for abandonment of a dead body, and added 

two years to each sentence based on the jury’s finding that he was on release for a 

prior offense. Loader filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 

and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statement.

¶5 The superior court admitted a recording of Loader's sister's pretrial 

statements to police as prior inconsistent statements based on Loader’s 

suggestions in calls to her from jail that she recant and the sister’s subsequent

feigned memory loss. Loader argues the court erred because there was insufficient 

evidence his sister was feigning memory loss at trial. He also argues the court 

erred by failing to sua sponte conduct the proper legal analysis for use of the 

statements as substantive evidence of his guilt. Because Loader did not raise these 

issues in the superior court, we review them only for fundamental error. State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 304 (1995). 

Loader accordingly bears the burden of demonstrating that the court erred in 

admitting the recording, that the error was fundamental and that he was 

prejudiced thereby. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 22.

¶6 A prior statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies, the 

statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and the declarant is 

subject to cross-examination about it. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). "A claimed 

inability to recall, when disbelieved by the trial judge, may be viewed as 

inconsistent with previous statements . . . ." State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 275 (1994)

(quoting United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976)). The superior 

"court has considerable discretion in determining whether a witness’s evasive 

answers or lack of recollection may be considered inconsistent with that witness’s 

prior out-of-court statements." State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 76, ¶ 60 (2012)

(quoting State v. Salazar, 216 Ariz. 316, 319, ¶ 15 (App. 2007)).

¶7 The superior court did not abuse its considerable discretion by 

admitting the recording. Although Loader’s sister suggested that she did not 

remember precisely what Loader told her immediately after the incident because 

she had taken Ambien, Loader’s jail calls asking her to recant, coupled with her 
STATE v. LOADER 

Decision of the Court

4

apparent reluctance to testify, support the court’s conclusion that she was feigning 

her memory loss. The court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of this 

witness’s assertion that she did not remember whether Loader had told her that 

he had killed the victim (contrary to his defense at trial) or had "just chopped him 

up" (consistent with his defense at trial). See State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, 252, ¶ 

10 (App. 2007) (superior court "is in the best position to make [credibility]

determination."). Because the record supports the court’s finding that she was 

feigning memory loss, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her 

statements to police as prior inconsistent statements. See State v. Robinson, 165 

Ariz. 51, 58-59 (1990) ( superiosuperior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior 

inconsistent statement when record suggested reasons for witness to be evasive, 

even though court was uncertain whether witness simply had poor recollection).

¶8 Nor did the superior court commit fundamental error in admitting 

the prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of Loader’s guilt under 

State v. Allred, 134 Ariz. 274, 276-78 (1982). Among the factors our supreme court 

stated in that case should be considered in addressing the potential for unfair 

prejudice from the use of impeaching testimony as substantive evidence of guilt

are whether: (1) the witness being impeached denies making the statement; (2) the 

witness presenting the impeaching statement has an interest in the proceeding and 

there is no other corroboration that the statement was made; (3) other factors, such 

as age or mental incapacity, affect the reliability of the impeaching witness; (4) the 

"true purpose of the offer is substantive use of the statement rather than 

impeachment of the witness"; and (5) "the impeachment testimony is the only 

evidence of guilt." Allred, 134 Ariz. at 277. The only factor supporting preclusion 

of the impeaching statements here on grounds of unfair prejudice is that the "true 

purpose" of the offer of the statements was as substantive evidence of Loader’s 

guilt. The other factors do not support preclusion: Loader’s sister admitted 

making the statements; the impeaching statements were recorded, supplying 

independent, non-biased corroboration that the statements were made; 

circumstantial evidence supplied other evidence of Loader’s guilt; and the

reliability of the recording evidencing the impeaching statements was not at issue.

Under these circumstances, the court did not err, much less fundamentally err, in 

admitting the prior inconsistent statements.

B. Consecutive Sentences.

¶9 Loader argues that the superior court erred in imposing a 

consecutive sentence for misconduct involving weapons because the use of the 

weapon in the murder constituted a single act requiring concurrent sentences.

Because Loader did not raise this objection in the superior court, we again review 

for fundamental error only. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 22.
STATE v. LOADER 

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¶10 Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-116 provides that "[a]n act . . . which 

is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be 

punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent."

The evidence here supported a finding that the offenses of murder and misconduct 

involving weapons arose from separate and distinct acts, making consecutive 

sentences permissible under A.R.S. § 13-116. The evidence demonstrated that 

Loader fatally shot the victim in the garage with a 12-gauge shotgun. Loader, a 

convicted felon and prohibited possessor, testified that in the days before the 

shooting, he had tinkered with this shotgun trying to get it to work and finished 

putting it back together shortly before the shooting. Moreover, police executing a 

search warrant several days after the shooting found the shotgun in a chest of 

drawers in Loader’s bedroom. On this record, because separate and distinct acts

supported the murder and misconduct-involving-weapons convictions, A.R.S. § 

13-116 did not prohibit consecutive sentences.2

C. Insanity Instruction.

¶11 Loader argues the superior court incorrectly instructed the jury by 

misstating in voir dire and failing to clarify in closing instructions that insanity 

could be based on a permanent mental disorder resulting from chronic drug use, 

rather than the result of acute intoxication. Again, because Loader did not raise 

any objection in voir dire or ask for an additional instruction in closing arguments,

he bears the burden of demonstrating that the court erred, that the error was 

fundamental, and that he was prejudiced thereby. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568, 

¶ 22.

¶12 We review the adequacy of jury instructions in their entirety to 

determine if they accurately reflect the law. State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 145, ¶ 

75 (2000). The instructions must not mislead the jury. State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 

 

2 The indictments charged Loader in pertinent part with first-degree murder, 

alleged to have occurred "[o]n or between the 21st and 22nd day of November 

2011," and with misconduct involving weapons, which was alleged to have 

occurred "[o]n or between the 21st and 24th day of November 2011." The evidence 

was undisputed that Loader possessed the shotgun in the few days before 

November 21 (the date he used it to murder the victim), until it was discovered in 

his bedroom drawer on November 25. Contrary to Loader’s argument on appeal,

because the date is not an element of the offense of misconduct involving weapons, 

see A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), the jury was not required to reach a unanimous verdict 

on the date of the offense, and the court did not err in imposing consecutive 

sentences based on the undisputed evidence of multiple acts.
STATE v. LOADER 

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282, 284 (App. 1996). We review de novo whether the instructions properly state 

the law. State v. Orendain, 188 Ariz. 54, 56 (1997).

¶13 The court did not err, much less fundamentally err, in instructing the 

jury on insanity. It instructed the jury: 

You must find the defendant guilty except insane if the defendant 

proves by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the 

commission of the criminal act, he was afflicted with a mental 

disease or defect of such severity that he did not know the criminal 

act was wrong.

A mental disease or defect does not include disorders that result 

from acute voluntary intoxication, or withdrawal from alcohol or 

drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders, or impulse 

controlled [sic] disorders.

Conditions that do not constitute legal insanity include but are not 

limited to momentary, temporary conditions arising from the 

pressure of the circumstances, moral decadence, depravity or 

passion growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other 

motives in a person who does not suffer from a mental disease or 

defect or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal conduct.

This language was taken directly from statute, see A.R.S. § 13-502(A), and 

accordingly accurately stated the law and did not mislead the jury. Nor did the 

court’s outline of the test for a verdict of guilty but insane during voir dire mislead 

the jury: The court accurately conveyed the concept that acute drug intoxication 

cannot support an insanity verdict.

¶14 The failure of the court to sua sponte define "acute voluntary 

intoxication" or to clarify that a mental disease could include a mental disorder 

caused by long-term chronic use of a drug was not error, much less fundamental, 

prejudicial error on this record. The court was not required to clarify that insanity 

could be predicated on a mental disease caused by chronic long-term drug use, 

given the absence of evidence that Loader suffered from a mental disorder caused 

by chronic long-term drug use that was of such severity that he did not know what 

he was doing was wrong. Arizona courts have recognized that insanity can be 

predicated on a permanent mental disease caused by chronic long-term drug or 

alcohol abuse. See State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 334 (1974). The experts in this case 

testified that methamphetamine abuse could cause hallucinations and delusions

lasting after the abuse stops, presenting a clinical picture indistinguishable from 

that of paranoid schizophrenia. Loader’s expert testified, however, that it was 

Loader’s paranoid schizophrenia, not any chronic long-term drug use, which led 
STATE v. LOADER 

Decision of the Court

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him to think that what he was doing was not wrong. And the State’s expert 

testified that, although prior to his incarceration, Loader met the criteria to be 

diagnosed with methamphetamine-induced psychotic disorder, he believed 

Loader knew that dismembering the body was wrong. Nor were the prosecutor’s 

statements in closing argument misleading, as Loader argues on appeal: The 

prosecutor simply argued that Loader’s chronic abuse of methamphetamine could 

not support his insanity defense.

¶15 On this record, the court did not err, much less fundamentally err, in 

failing to instruct the jury that chronic long-term drug use could support an 

insanity defense.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Loader’s convictions and 

sentences.