IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ) Crim. I.D. No. 30109009 DI

) 

LESTER ANDERSON, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW – DENIED.

This 25th day of March, 2024, after having considered Lester Anderson’s

(hereinafter “Defendant”) “Motion for Certification of Question [sic] of Law”

(hereinafter the “Motion”), the State’s response in opposition and the record in the 

matter, it appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of Murder in the First

Degree on February 11, 1992.

1

 The State announced its intention not to seek capital 

punishment shortly after Indictment,2and at no time sought to reverse course. 

Defendant was then sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment on July 10, 1992.3 

Defendant filed an unsuccessful direct appeal, followed by four unsuccessful 

motions for post-conviction relief and respective appeals, among other various 

motions in the ensuing years.4

1 See Docket: State v. Lester Anderson, Criminal Action No. 2012004283, D.I. 11.

2 D.I. 9.

3 D.I. 35.

4 D.I. 18, 38, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 71, 73-75. 77, 81, 84-85, 87, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 

103, 104-105, 115-118, 129.
2. Defendant has now filed his fifth motion for post-conviction relief 

pending before the Court.5 Following that filing, Defendant, on September 11, 2023,

filed the instant Motion, which overlaps significantly with the issues raised in his 

fifth post-conviction motion.6 The State responded in opposition on November 1, 

2023.7 On November 27, 2023, Defendant replied to the State’s opposition.8

3. Defendant’s motion seeks to certify ten (10) questions of law to the 

Delaware Supreme Court in which he argues raises constitutional questions of law 

that have “not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.”9 Specifically, 

Defendant requests the following questions answered:

(1)Does Delaware’s capital sentencing scheme violate the United 

States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment whereas the Court held, in 

Powell, that Rauf [sic] is retroactive to capital and non-capital 

offenders?

(2)In light of the holding in Rauf, overruling Brice, and Cohen, does 

the application of those decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal 

statute by defining terms place a particular conduct or class of 

person covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish?

(3)Does a sentence enhancement, which increased the maximum 

authorized statutory sentence is functional equivalent of an elementbased distinction must pertain to fundamental rights that effect a 

stated class offender?

(4)Does the construction, constitutionality, or application of 11 Del. 

4209 [sic] currently define a clear distinction between a particular 

situated class of offender such as Class A 11 Del. 4205 [sic] as 

commanded by the Apprendi Rule [sic]?

(5)Delaware title 11 Criminal Code Section 4209 [sic] is the statute that 

specifies the penalties for murder first degree, which is where the 

5 D.I. 130.

6 D.I. 137.

7 D.I. 140.

8 D.I. 148.

9 D.I. 137, p. 5, ¶12.
capital sentencing procedures are codified. Does Delaware 

circumvent the protections held in In re Winship [sic] merely by 

redefining the elements that constitute different crimes, 

characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of 

punishment?

(6)Does [sic] Delaware Courts recognize Apprendi [sic] Rule...[sic] 

extending into the sentencing guidelines context in Blakely [sic] 

which a judge may impose statutory maximum sentence solely on 

the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict?

(7)Delaware legislature has by design created ambiguity in regards to 

11 Del. 636 [sic] murder first degree, if found guilty, permits a judge 

to impose a sentence upward departure from statutory class of 

conduct or person where an aggravator is considered contrast to an 

aggravator is automatic presume unconstitutional [sic]?

(8)What are the procedures to be followed in event that 11 Del. 4209 

[sic] is ruled unconstitutional that give notice prior or postdeprivation, opportunity to be heard and defend or challenge 

substantial right and to be safeguarded from State action not related 

to legitimate interest or that is unfair practice, irrational and 

arbitrary?

(9)Does an element-based distinction qualify as a specific category 

effect Fifth, Sixth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments [sic] whether a 

class of conduct or person in light of struct-down sentencing scheme 

11 Del. 4209[sic]?

(10) Whether the imposition of an increased sentence under Delaware 

law which bear [sic] upon a class of conduct or person as it relates 

to provision [sic]and/or procedures is it the inquisition of an 

aggravator that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt?10

4. Superior Court Civil Rule 75 controls the procedure for filing a motion 

for certification of questions of law. Supreme Court Rule 41 controls the procedure 

for the certification of questions of law. While this Court has the authority to certify 

a qualifying question of law,11 the Supreme Court will only accept such a 

certification where there exists “important and urgent reasons for an immediate 

10 D.I. 137

11 Del. Supr. R. 41(a)(i).
determination by [the Supreme Court] of the questions certified.”12

 Supreme Court 

Rule 41 provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which a question may be 

certified: “(i) Original question of law. The question of law is of first instance in 

this State; (ii) Conflicting decisions. The decisions of the trial courts are conflicting 

upon the question of law; (iii) Unsettled question. The question of law relates to the 

constitutionality, construction or application of a statute of this State which has not 

been, but should be, settled by the Court.”13

5. Defendant predicates his ten questions based upon the Delaware 

Supreme Court case Rauf v. State.

14

 In Rauf, the Court held Delaware’s statutory 

scheme in 11 Del. C. § 4209 as it relates to capital murder unconstitutional. In 

Powell v. State,

15

 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that its decision in Rauf is to 

be applied retroactively to all applicable persons.

6. The State, in its response in opposition, correctly points out that 

Defendant is not an applicable person. Rauf and Powell are inapplicable to 

Defendant because he was not convicted of capital murder. Defendant mistakenly

assumes that Rauf was applicable to both capital and non-capital offenders; Rauf 

very clearly only analyzes the constitutionality of the capital sentencing structure of 

11 Del. C. § 4209.

16

 In Defendant’s case, not only did the State not seek capital 

12 Del. Supr. R. 41(b)

13 Id.

14 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).

15 153 A.3d 69 (Del. 2016).

16 Rauf, 145 A.3d at 433.
punishment for Anderson, but he was also not given a sentence of death. Therefore, 

the ten questions Defendant now seeks this Court to certify are irrelevant to his case 

and pending post-conviction motion. 

7. The State is also correct in that Defendant’s Motion does not meet the 

qualifications as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 41. The questions Defendant seeks 

do not satisfy any of the listed reasons for certification. Therefore, certification is 

inappropriate.

8. The arguments raised in Defendant’s Reply to the State’s opposition,

once again, are based upon the misinterpretation of Rauf being applicable to all first 

degree murder convictions. As stated above, this is simply not the case. Defendant 

was neither convicted of capital murder, nor sentenced under the capital punishment 

scheme of 11 Del. C. § 4209, making Rauf inapplicable and an impermissible basis 

for certification here. The fact that Defendant seeks clarification for aggravating 

circumstances is irrelevant, as no aggravating circumstances were applied in 

Defendant’s case. He was sentenced to life imprisonment following a non-capital 

murder first conviction. There was never a need for any analysis of the statutory 

aggravators found in 11 Del. C. § 4209, as mandatory life imprisonment was the 

only option for Defendant’s sentencing judge. Defendant’s arguments in both his 

initial Motion and his Reply are all arguments that pertain to capital murder 

prosecutions. His was not that. 
9. As a result, Defendant’s Motion for Certification of Question of Law is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 __________________________ 

 Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

Original to Prothonotary 

cc: John Williams, Deputy Attorney General

Lester Anderson, Pro Se, SBI: 225954