1

Filed 1 1 / 23 /2 2 Conservatorship of S.H. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

Conservatorship of the Person of S.H.

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Petitioner and Respondent,

v. S.H., Objector and Appellant. A163073
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P2000157)

S.H. appeals from an order reappointing a conservator of his person with the authority to make medical treatment decisions on his behalf pursuant to the Lanterman

- Petris

- Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)

. 1 His sole contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he lacks the capacity to give informed

consent to treatment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND S.H. suffers from schizoaffective disorder. In criminal proceedings

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2

brought against him in 2018, S.H. was deemed mentally incompetent to
stan d trial, and the county conservator investigat or was ordered to initiate conservator proceedings for him in accordance with the LPS Act. On April 28, 2020 , the trial court appointed the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County (Public Guardian) as conservator of S.H.’s person , found him gravely disabled, and empowered the Public Guardian to place him in a locked facility and make medical decisions on his behalf. As that conservatorship period expired, on March 17, 2021 , the Public Guardian petitioned to be

reappo inted as conservator

. S.H. contested the petition and asked for a bench trial, which the court held on June 15 , 2021

. Two witnesses testified : psychologist and county Deputy Conservator Andrew Smith, Ph.D. , an expert in grave disability , and psychologist Jennifer Weinstein, Psy.D

. , an expert in psychology and grave disability

. Dr. Smith testified first. He was appointed as the conservator of S.H.,
whom he had known for two and a half months. They had spoken on the phone and met twice, on ce in March 2021 over Zoom , and a nother time in May 2021 in person at the secured mental health rehabilitation facility where S.H. was placed. During the two meetings, Dr. Smith assessed S.H. for grave disability.
In Dr. Smith ’s opinion, S.H. was gravely disabled. The basis of Dr. Smith’s opinion was “nuanced,” in that while S.H. gave practical responses regarding how he would obtain food, clothing, and shelter if he were out in the community , he “did not have the functionality currently to carry out those plans . . . .” As an example, Dr. Smith observed that although S.H. was able

to associate being incarcerat ed with shelter , this response “ gave [ Dr. Smith ] pause,” because prior to his incarceration , S.H. was homeless, “ living in a3

field . . . without a tent, so no real protection from the elements, and he himself had told [Dr. Smith] he wasn’t doing well.”
Dr. Smith also ob served that S.H. exhibited paranoia and blunted emotional affect. When discussing S.H.’s current placement , he was “persistent about wanting to be in an open program,” stressing he did not want oversight by others and did not want much in the way of treat ment. When asked whether his past or future behavior would affect his ability to maintain placement, S.H. became tense and upset and refused to talk. Similarly, when Dr. Smith asked about S.H.’s insight into the need for
medications , he became “surprisin gly defensive, ” stating, “ ‘I don’t wanna talk about that right now. I’ll talk about that at the court date. I just don’t want too many more questions. I want to keep some things incognito.’ ” Dr. Smith

“ use [d] the word paranoid ” to describe this reaction, “ because it did seem to be beyond and above what reasonable people might talk about in that situation, in that setting, that [he was] his conservator trying to take care of
him and make sure his needs are met . . . .” Counsel asked Dr. Smith whether S.H. had insight into his mental health disorder. Dr. Smith replied that S.H. was able to show appreciation for some of the treatment and services he had been receiving at the facility,
such as meals and staff assistance . “At the same time, he s eemed to be lacking insight into the fact that [Dr. Smith] was his conservator.” Dr. Smith also found S.H. lacked insight into his triggers and emotions in connection
with prior aggressive acts. He based this on S.H.’s responses regarding physical alterc ations that he had with other people at the facility

. S.H.
attributed one altercation to people “acting weird around him , ” and another
altercation to him having “mania. ” Dr. Smith found these responses were not “reasonable explanation[s]” for hitting someone

. Also, when during the Zoom4

meeting Dr. Smith brought up a prior sexual offense, S.H. refused to talk, stood up, and ended the meeting. Dr. Smith opined that S. H. “would not do well in an open program.” He believed S.H.’s current placement in a secured facility was appropriate because it provided intensive treatment and was equipped to respond to a

person who becomes aggressive. Dr. Smith also had concerns that if he were
not conserved , S.H. would not continue his treatment and medications and symptoms would reoccur

. Dr. Weinstein testified next

. She interviewed S.H. for grave disability
in a 35

- to

- 40

- minute meeting over Zoom in late May 2021

. After reviewing the conservator’s notes, S.H.’s medical records from his facility, and her own interview notes, Dr. Weinstein diagnosed S.H. with schizoaffective disorder, which “includes two diagnoses, a psychotic disorder, such as schizophrenia,
and a mo od disorder, such as bipolar disorder or depression.” The symptoms of the schizophrenia component include thought disorder , perceptual
disturbances such as hallucinations or delusions, and paranoia. “These symptoms alter one’s ability to differentiate be tween reality and fantasy and maintain orientation in reality thus impairing decision

- making, judgment, planning, and cognition function.” The symptoms of the mood disorder component include abruptly changing moods and emotional reactivity, which can also impair decision

- making, planning, and judgment. Dr. Weinstein found that S.H. had “a lack of insight and understanding into the nature of his psychiatric needs.” Although he stated he had a mental disorder, he was only able to understand it in “a non
- concrete and abstract way.” As Dr. Weinstein explained it, “[W]hen I asked about his reasons for detainment or reasons for referred to . . . the current facility, he j ust stated what happened; . . . I asked many different ways, and he was not able to5

explain why, what it was that occurred that caused him to require that treatment. He just stated that he was picked up and put in . . . .” Dr. Weinstein also provided opinions concerning S.H.’s recent physical
altercations. Based on her review of S.H.’s records , she found the incidents
indicated S.H.’s lack of control over aggressive or angry impulses. Dr.
Weinstein described that the altercations stemmed from S.H.’s paranoia or fear that someone was harming him or his belongings and a response that

was an impulsive and physically aggressive. She also observed that S.H.’s

statements to staff after the altercations showed he did not understand the gravity of the problem or his contribution to the interaction. S.H. was on two antipsychotic medications, which Dr. Weinstein explained are designed to help reduc e paranoid thinking and agitation and improv e impulse control. S. H. acknowledged that he took his medication with staff assistance , that the medication “ ‘keeps [him] from getting violent’ ” and “ ‘helps [him] a lot , ’ ” and that he “ ‘take [ s ] [his] pills ’ ” when he gets anxiety. However, when Dr. Weinstein asked S.H. a bout his knowledge of
the medications, he refused to continue talking to her. Dr. Weinstein testified that were S.H. to stop taking his medications, he may experience an increase in his symptoms of paranoia, emotional reactivity, and aggression, which i n turn would require a higher level of care. An increase in such symptoms, she explained, could also result in a psychiatric hold or even arrest or jail time. Like Dr. Smith, Dr. Weinstein concluded that S.H. was gravely disabled. She stated that his lack of insight into his mental disorder prevented him from understanding the nature of his psychiatric needs

. As examples, she pointed to S.H.’s 10

- year history of homelessness, trouble with emotional reactivity particularly in interactions with other people , his6

desired plan to exit the current facility without any psychiatric care or support, and his low engagement in his current rehabilitation program. Dr. Weinstein explained that S.H.’s “psychotic symptoms cause him to ha ve trouble thinking and following through with a rational plan to maintain stability in the community.” As such, she did not believe he could rationally
advocate for himself in order to obtain his basic needs. Dr. Weinstein testified that in addition t o medication management, meaningful treatment for S.H. include d participating in other sections of the rehabilitation program in which he was enrolled, such as group therapy and
recreational activities. Another “very important piece of his treatment,” she added, was for him to meet one on one with a mental health professional and talk through specific issues , as it would enable him to “reflect or process

. . . what happened . . . and plan for a different approach next time . . . .” S.H. struggled in this area, however. Dr. Weinstein pointed out that when she asked S.H. about prior incidents involving aggression, he responded by
call ing her “a whack job” and walking away fr om the meeting. This behavior demonstrated not only reactivity and anger, but also a n inability to “talk through incidents of aggression ” and “to understand fu rther how to better regulate his emotions in the future.” Dr. Weinstein added that he was “not quite able to do that yet.” Following that testimony and closing arguments, the trial court announced its decision. It found (1) beyond a reasonable doubt that S.H. remained gravely disabled ; (2) by clear and convincing evidence that several disabilities should be imposed, including the right to refuse or consent to medical treatment; and (3) S.H.’s current placement was the least restrictive and most appropriate level of care. On June 30, S.H. fi led a notice of appeal. On July 21, the court issued a written order reappointing the Public7

Guardian as conservator for the one

- year period commencing on April 28, 2021, as well as a letter of conservatorship. The order reiterated the findings
made at trial . It also set forth the Public Guardian’s duties as conservator. And regarding the medical treatment disability, the court found: “There is clear and convincing evidence that [S.H.] lacks the capacity to refuse or consent to treatment related specif ically to [his] being gravely disabled, including psychotropic medications, because [he] is incapable of making rational decisions and lacks the mental capacity to rationally understand the nature of his . . . psychiatric / medical condition, the proposed treatment, and the attendant risks.” 2 DISCUSSION
Mootness As a threshold matter, we must determine whether S.H.’s appeal is

moot. The conservatorship that is the subject of this appeal expired on April

2 An order granting a letter of conservatorship is an appealable order. (Prob. Code, § 1301, subd. (a); Conservatorship of D.C . (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 487, 493.) Here, it is unclear which order constitutes the final order for purposes of appeal. Although the court at the June 15 trial made its oral pronouncement and stated, “That will be the order,” it issued a minute order that same day, which noted, “Order to follow.” Then , on July 21, the court issued a letter of conservatorship and written order, which contained several provisions not included in its June 15 oral pronouncement, such as reappointment of the conservator, the scope of the conservator’s duties, and additional findings on the medical treatment disability. To the extent the July 21 order is the final order for purposes of appeal, it appears S.H.’s notice of appeal filed on June 30 was premature. However, we have authority to treat it as filed after entry of th e court’s July 21 order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) [“The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment”] ; see also id. , rule 8.104(e) [ the word “judgment ” under these rules “includes an appealable order if the appeal is from an appealable order”]. )8

28, 2022, technically mooting this appeal. Howeve r, “[b]ecause a conservatorship is relatively brief (one year) in comparison with the appellate process,” we will hear this appeal as one raising an issue that “is one capable of recurring, yet of evading review because of mootness.” ( C onservatorship of Susan T . (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1011, fn. 5.) We therefore conclude , as have other courts, that it is appropriate to consider the issue in this case

. ( See,

e.g., Conservatorship of K.P . (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695 , 705, fn. 3 ; Conservatorship of G.H. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1439

– 1440; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 960; Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2.) The Merits Turning to the substance of the appeal , S.H.’s sole contention is that insufficient evidence supports the order limiting his right to refuse or consent to treatment related to his grave disability. We disagree. A court may establish or renew a conservatorship under the LPS Act if a person is “gravely dis abled” (§ 5350 ), meaning the person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for her or his basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1) ( A) .) However, a finding of grave disability, by itself, does not justify imposing an order allowing involuntary medical treatment . (See Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 55 ( S.A. ) ; Riese v. St. Mary ’ s Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1312

– 1313 ( Riese ); § 5005.) “

A competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment, including the right to refuse psychotropic drugs

. ” ( S.A. , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 55 , citing In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14 .) Section 5357 sets forth various legal “disabilities” a conservator may seek to impose, including a limitation on “[ t ] he right to refuse or consent to treatment related specifically to the conservat ee ’s being9

gravely disabled

. ” (§ 5357, subd. (d) ; S.A.
, at p. 55. ) A court may order involuntary medical treatment if clear and convincing evidence shows the conservatee is incompetent to give or withhold informed consent. ( See S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 55, citing Riese , supra , 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1322

– 1323.) In In re Qawi , supra , 32 Cal.4th at

pages 17

– 19 , our Supreme Court approved this court’s decision in Riese , which listed factors a court must consider to determine whether a conservatee is incompetent. Those factors include “(a) whether the p atient is aware of his or her situation (e.g., if the court is satisfied of the existence of psychosis, does the individual acknowledge that condition); (b) whether the patient is able to understand the benefits and the risks of, as well as the
alternative s to, the proposed intervention . . . ; and (c) whether the patient is able to understand and to knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information required to be given patients whose informed consent is sought (§ 5326.2) and otherwise participate in the treatment decision by means of rational thought processes.” ( Riese , at pp. 1322

– 1323.) On review of an order imposing a disability on the right to refuse or

consent to treatment , “[w]e must determine whether the record contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this clear and convincing standard of proof. ( Conservatorship of O.B . (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005, 1009.) We do not reweigh evidence. ( Id. at p. 10 08.) We presume in favor of the judgment the findings of fact necessary to support it. ( Conservatorship of George H. [, supra , ] 169 Cal.App.4th [ at p. ] 165 ].)” ( S.A. , supra , 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 56.) Using the factors set forth in Riese , we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that S.H. was not competent to give10

informed consent to medical treatment

. While S.H. acknowledged that he had a mental disorder, Dr. Weinstein
and Dr. Smith concluded , and S.H. does not dispute, t hat he lacked insight into the nature of his disorder. For example, when asked about the reasons for being placed in his current facility, S.H. “just stated that he was picked up and put in” and could not explain why. In addition, S.H. ’s unreas onable explanations for getting into physical altercations with others at the facility
indicated a lack of insight into his triggers and emotions related to aggression

. Thus, there was ample evidence that S.H. lacked insight into his
mental condition. Because of this lack of insight , S.H. was distrustful and sometimes hostil e to his evaluators, preventing him from confront ing his symptoms and participat ing in a discussion about his psychiatric needs, much less the benefits and risks of specific componen ts of his treatment. During his interviews , S.H. was paranoid , which was symptomatic of his di agnosis

. He respond ed defensively to questions about his impulsive and aggressive behavior, his placement at the facility, and medications. For instance, S.H. refused to respond to what “seemed fairly like a rather simpl e question”
about his insight into the need for medicatio ns. Similarly, when asked about his prior acts of aggression, he became tense and refused to continue the discussion . In his meeting with Dr. Weinstein, in particular, S.H. got angry at her , called her “a whack job,” and walked away from the meeting. On the topic of his placement at the facility, he p ushed for his release and stated he did not want oversight or much in the way of treatment, without providing any explanation on how he would obtain psychiatric support for such a plan. And, as with other t opics, he became tense and declined to talk further

. Dr. Smith added that S.H.’s paranoid responses reflected his inability11

to perceive that Dr. Smith was his conservator, and therefore a person “trying to take care of him and make sure his needs are met . . . .” In a similar vein, Dr. Weinstein added that S.H.’s behavior indicated he was unable to talk with a mental health professional, which is itself a “very important piece of his treatment.”
T he record therefore demonstrates that due to his lack of insight into his disorder, S.H. could not be expected to be able to understand the benefits and risks of treatment, intelligently evaluate information about treatment , and rationally participate in the treatment decision

. S.H. nonet heless contends the evidence does not support the order imposing the medical treatment disability because there is “ no evidence that [he] was at risk of becoming non

- compliant with medication or refusing treatment.” S.H. also points to evidence that he wa s able to recognize some of the benefits of his medication. We are not persuaded. Regarding the first point, S.H. makes much of the fact that he complied with his medications, but he overlooks that medication management, while significant, was but one component of his treatment. And the record discloses he was resistant to other aspects of treatment. Specifically, i n addition to medication management , Dr. Weinstein explained, one
- on
- one talk therapy
with a mental health professional was “a very important piece of his treatment.” Dr. Weinstein found that S.H. struggled with this, as illustrated by him directing his anger and name calling at her . Other aspects of his

treatment included participating in prog rams provided at the facility , such as

group therapy and recreational activities. However, S.H.’s participation in these activities was low. Thus, the evidence indicates that S.H ., though compliant with medications, was not receptive to other aspects of his

treatment. Indeed, as noted, S.H. expressed to Dr. Smith that he wanted to12

leave the facility and did not want much in the way of treatment. As for S.H.’s second point, i t is true that he gave coherent responses to certain questions in his evalua tions , such as acknowledgment of the benefits of medications and care at the facility , which were indicative of some level of insight into his situation

. At the same time, however, Dr. Smith observed
that while S.H.’s responses “ superficially look [ed] good on the surface,” he exhibited paranoia , blunted emotional affect, and a thought process that “was perhaps not as good as

. . . expected

. ” Dr. Weinstein also found that although S.H. was able to identify events that occurred prior to being placed in the facility, he was unable to understand the reasons for his placement and referral to treatment. Dr. Weinstein therefore found that S.H.’s insight into his disorder and psychiatric needs was “minimal.” And “if his insight into his needs . . . is minimal, ” she explained , “ then his ability to independently meet his own treatment needs is minimal as well.” The record thus permits a finding th at although S.H. at times showed a linear thought process, h e did
not have sufficient mental capacity to make informed decisions about

treatment. In sum and in short, w e conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that S.H. was not competent to refuse or consent to treatment related to his grave disability. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.13 _________________________ Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________ Miller, J.

_________________________ Van Aken , J. *

Conservatorship of S.H. ( A163073 )
*Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, Judge Christine Van Aken , sitting as assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.