Be cause the FO I A applies only to fede ral g overnme nt ag encie s, see5 U.S.C. § 1 552(f) (1), the United States Depa rtment of Just ice is the prope r par ty defe ndant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09-0304 ( ESH)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiff bring s this action under the F ree dom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , see5 U .S. C. § 552, ag ainst the United States Depa rtment of Just ice ( “DOJ”). This matter is befor e the Court 1 on the DOJ’s moti on for summary judgme nt and plaintiff’s motion to dismi ss. For the rea sons d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n , th e C o urtw i l l g r an ts u m m ar y j u d g m e n tf

o r th e D O J. I. BACKG ROUND On or a bo ut Augus t 25 , 2 00 5, pla int if f s ub mitte d a

Pr iva c y Ac t I de nti fi c atio n a

nd Re qu e st For m to the DOJ ’s FO I A/PA Unit, Crimi nal Division, in W ashing ton, D.C. Compl aint (“Compl.”) at 3; Defe ndants’ Memora ndum in Support of its Motion for Summary J udg ment (“D ef.’ s Mem.”), D ecla

ration of Pamela

A. Roberts (“ Roberts Dec l.”), Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1 (Priva cy Ac t I de nti fi c atio n a

nd Re qu e st F or

m) . H e re qu e ste d th at th e a g e nc y se arc h th e fo llo wi ngsy ste ms of re cords f

or information about himself: J USTI CE/CR M-001 Central Criminal Division I ndex File and

Associated Re cords AL L EN WOL FSON, Plaintiff, v . UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, e t al

. ,

De fe nd ants .2 JUSTI CE/ CRM- 00 3 F ile of Na me s Ch e c ke d to De te rm ine if Those Individuals have be en the Subject of an Elec tronic Surveillance J USTI CE/CR M-004 Gene ral L itigation and L eg al Advice

Section, Criminal Divisi on, Central Index File a nd Associated Re cords J USTI CE/CR M-008 Name Ca rd F ile on Depa

rtment of Just ice Pe rs onne l Auth or ize d to have Ac c e ss t o Classified Files of the Depa rtment of Just ice J USTI CE/CR M-012 Org anized Crime and Rac ketee ringSection,

Gene ral Index File and Associated Recor ds J USTI CE/CR M-017 Reg istration and Propag anda F iles Under the

For eig n Ag ents Reg istration Act of 1938, a s amende d J USTI CE/CR M-019 Requests to the Attorney Gene ral for Approva l of Applications to Fe dera l J udg es for Ele ctronic I

nterc eptions J USTI CE/CR M-021 The Stocks and B onds Intellige nce Control

Card F ile Sy stem J USTI CE/CR M-022 Wit ness Immunity Records J USTI CE/CR M-024 Fr eedom of Information/Privacy

Act Records J USTI CE/CR M-025 Tax Disclosure Index File and Associated

Records See id. , Ex . 1. Throug h this FOIA re quest, plaintiff soug ht “ all of the w ire taps that we re done illega lly ag ainst him,” operating unde r the a ssumption t hat an Assistant United States Attorne y illega lly obtained wire taps “solely to keep tabbs [sic] of plaintiff[.] ” Compl. at 3. Throug h such surveillance , plaintiff fe lt “that the g overnme nt invaded his privac y and should be for ced to turn
over what eve r they

have a cquire d.” Id. Criminal Divisi on staff loc ated 16 doc uments responsive to plaintiff’ s reque st and pr oc e sse d th e m un de r t

he F OIA. Rob e rt s D e c l., Ex. 3 (Jun e 16 , 2 00 8 le tte r f ro m R. Y. Ki m, Chief, Fr eedom of

Information/Privacy

Act Unit, Criminal Division, reg ardingRequest No. CRM-200500908P). Of these 16 doc uments, the DOJ withheld two documents in full (I tems 15-One doc ument orig inated with the F eder al B urea u of Investig ation (“F BI ”), a nd 2 Criminal Divisi on staff r efe rre d it to the FB Ifor pr ocessingand dire ct re sponse to plaintiff. Roberts Dec l. ¶ 6. 3 16), re lease d eig ht documents in full (I tems 1-5, 12-14), a nd rele ased six documents in part (Items 6-11), a fter r edac ting infor mation under Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(D) of the FO I A. 2 Roberts Dec l. ¶ 13. This determination wa s upheld on administrative appe al. Id. , Ex . 5 (September

23, 2008 letter fr om J .G. McL eod, Associate Dire ctor, Of fice of Information and Privacy , DOJ). In this action, plaintiff demands the disc losure in full of all the infor mation he has
re qu e ste d in

or de r t o “ pr ov e that he did no t c omm it a

ny c ri me s f ro m [1]9 90 un til 20 02 ” and to “prove that the g overnme nt has bee n illega lly spying on [him] .” Compl. at 3. In addition, he

“ wa nts to b e fi na

nc ia lly c omp e ns ate d f

or the ill e g a l a c tiv ity

of the g ov e rnme nt i n li ste nin gto pla int if f’ s te le ph on e c onve rs atio n[s]” in t he amou nt o f “ 10 00 do lla

rs a da y fo r e ve ry da y his phones we re ta

pped.” Id. at 4. II. DI SCU SSIO N

A. Su mm ar

yJ ud gm e nt S tan da rd The Court may

g rant a motion for summary

judgme nt “if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any
mate ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56(c) . The movingparty

bear s the burden of

demonstratingan abse nce of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t in disput e. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). F actua l assertions in t he mov ingpa

rt y ’s a ff ida vit s ma y be a c c e pte d a s tr

ue un le ss t

he op po sin gpa

rt y su bmi ts h is own af fidavits or dec larations or documentar y evidenc e to the contr ary . Ne al v . Ke lly , 963 F.2d4

453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “F OIA ca ses ty

pically and appr opriately

are decide d on motions for summary judgme nt.” Defende rs of W

ildlif e v. U nited States Border Patrol , 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D .C. 2009) (citations omitted). In a F OIA ca se, the Court may g rant summary

judgme nt based on the information provided in a n ag ency ’s supportingaff idavits or decla

rations when the y

descr ibe

“ the do c ume nts and

the jus tif ic atio ns fo r n on dis c los ur e wi th r e a so na bly sp e c if ic de ta il, demonstrate that the information withheld log ically falls within the claimed e x emption, and ar e not controver

ted by either c ontrary

evidenc e in the re cord [or] by evidenc e of a g ency

bad fa ith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 6 56 F .2 d 7 24 , 7 38 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 1) ; see also He rtzberg v. Vene man , 273 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D .C. 2003). Such aff idavits or decla

rations ar e ac corde d “a presumption of g ood faith, which c annot be r ebutted by ‘pure ly speculative claims about the exis tence and discove rability of other doc uments.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc . v. Sec . &Exc h. Comm’n , 9 2 6 F. 2 d

1 1 9 7 , 1 2 0 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Ground Sauce r W atch, Inc . v. Central IntelligenceAgenc

y , 692 F.2d 770, 771 ( D.C. Cir. 1981)). B. The DOJ ’s Searc h for Responsive Re cords An ag ency ’s sea

rch is ade quate if its methods are rea sonably calc ulated to locate rec ords responsive to a

FOIA re quest, see Oglesby v . United States Dep’ t of the Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 0) , a

nd an a g e nc y

is n ot o bli g ate d to e xpand the sc op e of

its se arc h o r t o s e arc h a ll of its sy ste ms o f r e c or ds wh e n it ha s se arc he d th e sy ste ms o f r e c or ds mos t li ke ly to c on ta in responsive r ecor ds. See Campbell v. United States De p’t of Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 28 ( D.C. Cir. 19 98 ) ( statin gthat an a g e nc y g e ne ra lly ne e d n ot s e arc h e ve ry

re c or ds sy ste m a s lo nga s it
co n d u ct s “are as o n ab l e s ea rc ht ai l o re d t o th e n ature o f ap art i cu l ar re qu es t ”) (c i t i n g Oglesby , 9205

F .2 d at 68 ). “ [T]he iss ue to b e re so lve d is no t whe the r t he re might e xist a

ny oth e r d oc ume nts possibly responsive to the r equest, but rather whe ther the se arc h for those doc uments was adequate.” W

eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 7 0 5 F. 2 d 1 3 4 4 , 1 3 5 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 8 3 ) ( ci t i n g Perry v

. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 ( D.C. Cir. 1982)). A sea rch f or re cords r esponsive to a pe rson’s re quest for infor mation about himself to the Criminal Divisi on beg ins “by sear chingits centralized re cords index, J USTI CE/CR M-001 (C e ntr a l Cr imi na l D ivi sio n Ind e x Fi le and As so c iate d Re c or ds ). ” Rob e rt s D e c l. ¶ 9. I f t his
sear ch yields responsive or potentially

responsive r ecor ds, staff se nds “a se arc h reque st . . . to the section identified a s havingcustody of the re cords f

or such r ecor ds.” Id. A re quester a lso may desig nate spe cific Privac y Act sy stems of rec ords to be sea rche d, as plaintiff ha s done. Id. ¶ 10; see id. , Ex . 1. “Pursuant to long -standingFOIA/PA Unit searc h proce dures, a sear ch shee t with a copy of the re quest is transmitted to all sections that may have r esponsive re cords.” Id. ¶ 11. Desig nated pe rsonnel in ea ch sec tion “undertake a se arc h for r esponsive mater ials and re port the results by means of individual, sig ned for ms to the Crimi nal Division FOIA/PA Unit.” Id. Inth is c a s e , a

s e ar c ho f th e Cr im in a l D iv is io n ’ s c e n tr a li ze d r e c o r d s in d e x, J USTI CE/CR M-001, using plaintiff’s name as a se arc h term, “r evea led six separ ate indexes located in the F eder al Recor ds Center.” Notice of FilingSupplemental Dec laration, Sup ple me nta l D e c laratio n o f R e na Y. Ki m ( “ Ki m D e c l.” ) ¶

6. Sta ff de te rm ine d th at “ po te nti a lly responsive r ecor ds may

exis t [ in] the followingCriminal Divisi on Sections: the Appellate, the Fr aud and Public Integ rity Sections, as well as the FOIA/PA Unit.” Id. Also using plaintiff’ s name (or varia nts of his name) a s a sea

rch te rm, manual a

nd elec tronic sea

rche s of re cords maintaine d by the Appellate and Public Integ rity Sections yielded6

no responsive r ecor ds. Kim Decl. ¶¶ 7-8. L ikewise, sea

rche s of J USTI CE/CR M-003, J USTI CE/CR M-004, J USTI CE/CR M-012, J USTI CE/CR M-017, J USTI CE/CR M-021, and J USTI CE/CR M-025, yielded no re sponsive rec ords. See id. ¶¶ 11- 12, 14-16. DOJ staff did not
sear ch JUS TI CE/CR M-008. Id. ¶ 17. This sy stem of re cords “ contains only rec ords about prese nt and forme r [DOJ ] personnel[,] ” and pla intiff “g ave no indication that he has eve r bee n an employ ee of

the [DOJ ].” Id. Cr imi na l D ivi sio n s ta ff a lso re qu e ste d th at th e Com pute r C ri me
an d In t el l ec tu al P ro p erty

S ec t i o ns ea rc hi t s s y s t em s o f r ec o rd s . Ki mDe cl
. ¶ 1 8
. Us i n g “A l l en Z. Wolfson” as a sea

rch te rm, no responsive r ecor ds were located. Id. Re sp on siv e re c or ds a c tua lly
wer e located in four sy stems of rec ords: J USTI CE/CR M-001, J USTI CE/CR M-019, J USTI CE/CR M-022, and JUSTI CE/CR M-024, af ter having c onducted e lectronic and manua l
se arc he s o f e a c h s y ste m us ingpla int if f’ s n ame a s a

se arc h te rm . Ro be rt s D e c l. ¶ 12 ; K im D e c l. ¶¶ 6, 11 -1 3. Th e de c lara

nt “ pe rs on a lly

re vie we d a ll o f t

he or ig ina l, s ig ne d s e arc h r e sp on se s in this case, a

nd . . . verifie d that all of the Criminal Division’s Privacy Act sy stems of rec ords desig nated by

the Plaintiff wer e sea

rche d.” Roberts De cl. ¶ 12. Wit hout support, plaintiff asser ts that the DOJ “did not fulfill its obli [ga]tion under the FOIA . . . to demonstrate that its search w as re asonably calc ulated to uncove r all re levant do c ume nts .” Ob

je c tio n to Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt ( “ Pl. ’s Op p’ n” ) at 3. B e c a us e “plaintiff use [d] the telephone extensively ,” he opine s that there must be thousands of pag es missing” f

rom the DOJ’s relea se. Id. Havingrevie wed de fenda nt’s decla rations, the Court conc ludes that the DOJ’s searc hes
wer e “r easona

bly calc ulated to uncove r all re levant docume nts.” Valencia-Luce na , 180 F.3d at 325. The de clar ations “ar e ac corde d a pre sumption of good f aith, which ca

nnot be re butted by7

purely speculative claims about the e x istence a nd discovera

bility of other doc uments.” Sa

fe Car d Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200 (internal quotation mar ks and citation omitted). The f act that the D OJ did not locate all of the rec ords soug ht by plaintiff is not disposi tive. An ag ency ’s sea rch is not presumed unr easona

ble bec ause it fa ils to find all the requested inf ormation. See Steinberg v. United States Dep’ t of Justice , 23 F.3d 548, 551 ( D.C. Cir. 1994) (the que stion is not “whe ther there might exist any

other doc uments possibly responsive to the r equest, but rather whe ther the
se arc h f or tho se do c ume nts wa s a de qu ate ” ); se e als o M e e ro po l v . M e ese , 790 F.2d 942, 952- 53 (D.C. Cir. 1986). F urthermor e, a r equeste r’s c halleng e re quires that he pr esent e vidence rebuttingthe ag ency ’s initial showing of a g ood faith sea

rch. See M

aynard v. Central IntelligenceAgenc

y , 9 86 F .2 d 5 47 , 5 60 (1 st C ir . 1 99 3) ; W e isb e rg , 705 F.2d at 1351-52. Plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden. C. Exemptions At iss ue in t his c a se are e ig ht d oc ume nts , tw o o f whic h th e DO J withhe ld i n f ull (Ite ms 15-16), a nd six of which it re lease d in part (Items 6-11). Rober ts Decl. ¶ 13. 1. Ex emption 3 Ex emption 3 protects re cords that a re “ specific ally

exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute either . . . [require s withholding] in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or . . . establishes par

ticular c riteria f

or withholding or

ref ers to par ticular ty pes of matter s to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)( 3). Unde r Exemption 3, t he DOJ withholds fr om t hr e e do c ume nts (Ite ms 6 -8 ) p art ic ula r “ pa ra g ra ph s o f i nf or matio n c on c e rn ingthe c on te nts of int e rc e pte d c omm

un ic atio ns , in c lud ingdir e c t qu ote s f ro m th e se int e rc e pti on s. ” Rob e rt s D e c l. ¶ 1 6. I ts d e c lara

nt e xpla ins the a g e nc y ’s ra tio na le a s f

oll ow s:8 Title I I Iof th e Om n ibus Crime Control and Safe Stree t[ s] Act of 19 68 , 1 8 U .S. C. §§ 25 10 -2 52 1 ( “ Ti tle I I I ” ), pr ov ide s a c omp re he ns ive statut ory sc he me re g ulatin gbo th e le c tr on ic survei l l an ce as an investig ative tool as we ll as the disclosure of information obtained through such surve illance. Title I I I imposes clea r re straints on the use and dis cl o s u re of interce pted c omm un ic atio ns [an d] ex pre ssl y a uth or ize s th e re c ov e ry

of c ivi l damag es by

individuals whose communications have be en disclosed in violation of this s tatute. Since Title I I I cl ea rly identifies interce pted communications as the subje ct of its disclosure limit ations[,] it falls squarely within t h e scope of subsec tion (B) ’s second prong , as a statute r efe rringto particular ty pes of matter s to be wi thh e ld [, ] an d th

u s c o n s ti tute s a v a li d s tatuto r y b a s is f o rnond is c lo s ur e un d e r

E xe mp ti o n[3 ]. Id . ¶ 15 (inter

nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Althoug h plaintiff does not re fer expressly to Ex emption 3, he objects g ener ally to the DOJ’s decision to withhold any information perta ining to the wir etaps. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 3. The District of Columbia Circuit holds that “Title I I Ifalls square ly within the scope of [t he sec ond prongof 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (B )], as a statute re fer ringto ‘ particular types of
ma tte rs to b e with he ld .’” Lam Le k Cho ng v . U nite d S tate s D ru g E nfo rc e me nt A dm in ., 929 F.2d 72 9, 73 3 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 1) (q uo tin g5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) (3 )( B )) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; see Smith v. Dep’ t of Justice , 2 5 1 F. 3 d 1 0 4 7 , 1 0 4 9 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 1 ). Ac co rd i n gl y , wi re t ap p edre co rd i n gs obtained pursua

nt to Titl e I I Iordinarily

are exempt from disclosure under Ex emption 3. See Cottone v. Reno , 1 9 3 F. 3 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 4 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( fi n d i n g th atwi re t ap p edre co rd i n gs obtained pursua

nt to Titl e I I Iare exempt from disclosure under Ex emption 3 if they

have not
e nte re d th e pu

bli c do ma in) ; Davis v. U

nited States Dep’t of Justice , 9 68 F .2 d 1 27 6, 12 81 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 2) (c on c lud ingthat, a bs e nt p la int if

f’ s o bje c tio n o r a

sh ow ingof

pu bli c ava ila

bil ity , T itl e I I Iint e rc e pts pr op e rl y

we re wi thh e ld u

nd e r E xemp tio n 3 ); Ra ule rso n v . A sh c ro ft , 271 F. Supp. 2d9

17 , 2 5 ( D. D. C. 2 00 2) (c on c lud ingthat “ the F B Iva lid ly a pp lie d E xemp tio n 3 wi th r e g ard to T itl e I I I ' s g ener al prohibition on the relea se of inter cepte d information”)
. The Court conc ludes that the information described in the D OJ ’s supportingdecla ration as the c ontents of communications interc epted by means of a

Title I I Iwireta

p has prope rly

been is withheld under Exemption 3. See, e .g., W illis v. Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation , No. 98-5071, 1999 U.S. App. L EXI S 7354, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 19, 1999) ( aff irming grant of summar

y judgme nt as to the FB I ’s dec ision to wit hhold tapes obtained pur suant to Title I I Iwher e appe llant alleg ed, without supporting e vidence or off eringa re ason to doubt the vera city of the F BI ’s aff idavits, that the tapes we re not obtaine d pursuant to Title I I I ). 2. Ex emption 5 Ex emption 5 protects fr om disclosure “inter -ag ency or intra- ag ency

memorand[a] or letters which w ould not be available by law to a pa

rty other than a

n ag ency in liti g ation with the ag ency .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) . “[T] he par ameter s of Exempti on 5 are deter mined by ref ere nce t o th e p r o t e c t i o n s av a i l a

b l e t o l i t i g an t s i nc i v i l d i s c o v e r y; i f m at e r i a l i s n o tav a i l a

b l e i nd i s c o v e r

y, it may be withheld fr om FOIA re questers.” Burka v. U nited States Dep’t of He alth & Human Servs ., 87 F .3 d 5 08 , 5 16 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) ; Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roe buck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975). De l i b er at i v e P ro ce s s P ri v i l ege Th e de lib e rativ e pr oc e ss p ri vil e g e “ sh ie lds on ly g ov e rnme nt ‘ mate ri a ls whic h a re bo th prede cisional and de liberative.’ ” Tax An aly sts v . I nte rn al R e v e nu e Se rv ., 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( qu o t i n g W olfe v. De p’t of Health &Human Serv s ., 83 9 F .2 d 7 68 , 7 74 (D .C. C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) ( e nb an c ) )
. T o s h o wth ata d o c u m e n ti s p r e d e c i s i o n a l , th e a g e n c y n e e d n o ti d e n t i f

y a10

specific final ag ency

decision; it is sufficient to establish “what deliberative proce ss is invol ved, and the r ole play ed by

the documents at issue in the course of that proce ss.” Hegge

stad v. United States Dep’t of Justice , 1 8 2 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 , 7 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Coastal St ates Gas Corp. v. Dep’ t of Energy , 6 17 F .2 d 8 54 , 8 68 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 0) ); se e als o I n r e Se ale d Ca se , 121 F.3d 729, 73 7 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 7) (“ Th e de lib e rativ e pr oc e ss p ri vil e g e do e s n ot s hie ld d oc ume nts that si mpl y state or e x plain a dec ision the gove rnment has a lrea dy made[.]”). A document is “de liberative” if it “makes r ecommendations or expresses opinions on leg al or policy

matters.” Vaughn v. Rose n , 523 F.2d 1136, 1143- 44 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The deliberative proce ss privileg e is thoug ht to “preve nt injury to the quality

of ag ency

decisions.” Sears, Roebuc k &Co. , 421 U.S. at 151. Such protec tion encoura g es fr ank discussion of policy matters, pre vents premature disclosure of propose d policies, and avoids public confusion that may result from disclosure of rationales that wer e not ultimately g rounds for a g ency

action. See, e.g., Russell v. D ep’t of the Air Force , 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). Mate ri a ls m ay

be wi thh e ld u

nd e r E xemp tio n 5 un de r b oth the de lib e ra

tiv e pr oc e ss privileg e and the attorney work produc t privileg e. See, e .g., Miller v. United States De p’t of Justice , 5 62 F . Su

pp . 2 d 8 2, 11 4- 15 (D .D .C. 20 08 ) ( c on c lud ingthat dr a ft g ra nd jur y ind ic tme nt, trial attorney

cer tification and dra ft aff

idavit supporting a

reque st for plaintiff’s e x tradition were protec ted under

Ex emption 5 insofar a s they ref lected “ prede cisional communications among g overnme nt personnel suc h as discussions of var ious lit iga tion issues, alternatives, a nd strateg ies,” a

nd “such matters as trial pr epar ation, trial strategy , interpre tation, personal
e va luatio ns and

op ini on s p e rt ine nt t o [pl a int if f’ s] c ri min a l c a se ” ); Hegge stad , 182 F. Supp. 2d at 8- 12 (c on c lud ingthat pr os e c uti on me mor and a

pr e pa re d b y atto rn e y s to a ssi st t

he ir su pe ri or s in11

de te rm ini ngwh e the r t o a

uth or ize pr os e c uti on

of the targ e ts o f a

c ri min a l inve sti g atio n p ri or to the final de cision to prosecute proper ly wer e withheld under

Ex emption 5). At t o rn ey W o rkP ro d

u ctP ri v i l ege Attorney work produc t is among the ty pes of mate rial that is not available in discove ry . See , e.g. , Fede ral Trade Comm’n v. Grolier, Inc

. , 462 U.S. 19, 27 (1983). The attorney work pr od uc t pr ivi le g e pr ote c ts m ate ri a l g athe re d a nd me mor and a

pr e pa re d b y an atto rn e y

in anticipation of litigation, see H ickman v . Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and r ecor ds may be withheld as attorne y

work produc t if they

contain the “ mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
or le g a l th e or ie s o f a

n atto rn e y ” and

we re “ pr e pa

re d in anti c ipatio n o f l iti g atio n. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 26 (b )( 3) ; see M

iller v. United States Dep’ t of Justice , 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 115 (D.D .C. 2008) (docume nts which “re flec t such matters a s trial prepa ration, trial strate g y , interpre tation, personal evaluations and opinions pertinent to [ plaintiff’s]” qualify as attorne y

work produc t under Exe mpt ion

5) ; Hegge

stad , 182 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (the attorney work produc t privileg e “c overs fa c tua l mate ri a ls p re pa

re d in anti c ipatio n o f l iti g atio n, a s w e ll a s me nta l im pr e ssi on s, conclusions, opinions, and leg al theorie s”). The DO J asser

ts that information contained in Items 6-8 and 15- 16 is ex empt from disclosure unde r both the deliber ative proc ess privileg e and the attorney work produc t privileg e. Roberts Dec l. ¶ 21. I tems 6-8 I tems 6-8 ar e memora

nda “pr epar ed by

[C riminal] Divi sion attorney s [] rec ommending that authorization be g rante d to apply for a n order for c ontinued interce ption of oral communications” a

nd additional information “e stablishing proba ble ca use for theI tem 14 was re lease d in full. Roberts Decl. ¶ 13. 3 12 interce ptions[ .]” Roberts Decl. ¶ 19. The de clar ant states that these memoranda “[were ] prepa red . . . pr ior to making a re commendation to the Assistant Attorney Gene ral of the Criminal Divisi on (the De partment off icial with deleg ated a

uthority to authorize applications for wireta ps)” a nd thus “prec eded the final dec ision of whether to authorize the application for continued wire taps[.] ” Id. ¶ 2 8. F ur the r, the de c lara

nt s tate s th at th e me mor and a “ e xpre ss opinions and provide re commendations re levant to the fina l decision,” id. , insofar a s “dec isions and ana ly sis reg ardingreque sts for the author ization t o apply for inter ception orde rs under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 constitut e sensitive deliber ations undertake n by Criminal Divisi on attorney s and their super iors[.] ” Roberts De cl. ¶ 23. The de clar ant furthe r asse rts that the withheld information is protec ted by the attorne y
wo rk pr od uc t pr ivi le g e be c a

us e the se do c ume nts or

po rt ion s th e re of

“ se t f or th t he atto rn e y s’ thoughts, impressions, evide nce de velopment, leg al theory of the c ase, a

nd fac ts and issues upon which the attorney [s] could eva luate the c ase.” Roberts Dec l. ¶ 23. Wit h respe ct to I tem 8, the decla rant re prese nts that “attorney s’ thoug hts, opinions, candid discussions, and
rec ommendations conce rningthe nee d for c ontinued interce ption of oral communications” are set forth ther ein. Id. ¶ 29. I tems 15-16 I tems 15 is described a s “a one -pag e cove r memo date d August 11, 1982, that is attached to I tem 14[,] a prose cution memo also dated Aug ust 11, 1982.” Roberts Dec l. ¶ 19. The c over 3 memo “provide s a fe w statements of a naly sis reg ardingthe prosec ution memo.” Id . Ite m 16 is descr ibed as “ a 12-pa g e prose cution memorandum pre pare d on August 11, 1982[ , which]B e c a us e the Court

c on c lud e s th at a ll the inf or matio n w ithhe ld u

nd e r E xemp tio n 6 is 4 proper ly withheld under Exemption 7(C), there is no ne ed to consider the applica

bility of Ex emption 6. See Simon v . Dep’ t of Justice , 980 F.2d 782, 785 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). 13 ide nti fi e s th e de fe nd ants , d isc us se s th e pr op os e d c ha rg e s, summa

ri zes the c a se , a

nd pr ov ide s a statement of the la

w and a statement of the f

acts includingproposed testimony and the anticipated de fense s.” Id . These two doc uments, acc ordingto the decla rant, “ contain cr

ucial elements of the deliberations in m akingkey decisions in prosec uting the c ase [ag ainst plaintiff].” Id . ¶ 31. The de clar ant states that both documents “ wer e pre pare d in advanc e of tria l and re veal the attorne y ’s thoug ht proce sses and litigation strateg y .” Id. ¶ 31. Ba sed on the de clar ant’s re prese ntations, which plaintiff has not cha lleng ed, the Court
concur s that I tems 6-8 and 15- 16 “constitute ‘inter -ag ency or intra- ag ency ’ memora nda” a nd thus “mee t Ex emption 5’s threshold re quirement.” Roberts Dec l. ¶ 20. All were prepa red in a dvance of trial and in a

nticipation of litigation, and the ir rele ase w ould reve al the attorne y s’ thoug ht proce sses and litigation strateg y and would re veal the a g ency ’s deliber ations prior to the dec ision to seek a uthorization for continued monitoring of oral c ommunications. I n addition, the DOJ establishes that this information was pre pare d by attorney s in anticipation of a c riminal pr os e c uti on . T he Court

c on c lud e s th at th e re da c te d p or tio ns of I te ms 6 -8 and

I te ms 1 5- 16 in their entire ty

have pr operly

been w ithheld under Exemption 5.

3. Ex emption 7 4 a. L aw Enf

orce ment Records Ex emption 7 protects fr om disclosure “r ecor ds or information compiled f or law enfor ceme nt purposes,” but only to the extent that dis closure of such re cords would c ause a n
e nume rate d h arm . 5 U. S.C. § 5 52 (b )( 7) ; see Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation v. Abramson , 4 56 U. S.14

61 5, 62 2 ( 19 82 ). In o rd e r t o w ithho ld m ate ri a ls p ro pe rl y un de r E xemp tio n 7 , a

n a g e nc y mus t establish that the re cords at issue were compiled for la w enf orce ment purposes a

nd that the materia l satisfies the re quirements of one of the subpar ts of Ex emption 7. See Pratt v. W ebster , 673 F.2d 408, 413 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). In assessingwhether rec ords ar e compiled f

or law enfor ceme nt purposes, the “ focus is on how a nd under what circ umstances the r equeste d files
wer e compiled, a

nd whether

the files soug ht relate to any thing that c an fa irly

be cha rac terized as an enf orce ment proce eding .” Jefferson v . Dep't of Justice , 284 F.3d 172, 176- 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (c itations and internal quotations omitted). Pla int if f’ s c ri min a l hi sto ry

ha s b e e n d e sc ri be d a s f

oll ow s: Mr. Wolfson, work i ngwith cer tain other de fenda

nts named in the SEC’s complaint, play ed a ke y role in a fraudule nt scheme de signe d to artificially

inflate the stock pr ice of a cor poration known a s Fr eedom Surf, I

nc. Ove r the course of seve ral months, Mr. Wolfson attempted to cr eate the fa lse appe ara nce of marke t demand for

the sto c k b y us ingno min e e s und e r his c on tr ol to c a ll in e ve r- highe r b id and ask pr ices for

the stock. In fa ct , t h e dema nd for the stoc k was g ener ated by trading from accounts controlled by Mr. Wolfson. After the p r ic e h a d b e e n arti f

ic ia ll y in f late d b y th e s e s p ur io u s tr a des, Mr. Wolfson d eli vere d 25,000 share s to defenda nt Salomon Grey F ina nc ia l Co rp orat ion , at a

dis c ount o f 5 0% fr om t he c ur re nt b id pr ic e . Sa lom on

Gr e y the n ma rk e d up the pr ic e of the sh are s and so ld them to investors befor e the sha re pr ice c rashe d. In a cr iminal action in the Southern District of N ew York, Mr. Wolf so n p le a de d guil ty

to c rimi na l c ha

rg e s ari sin gfr om t

his fra udulent scheme
. He admitted under oath in his c ri m inal proce edings that he agree d to take steps to inflate the price of Fr eedom Surf stoc k. Acc ording to his sworn statement in allocution, he agree d to raise the pr ice of the stock in or der to defra ud investors and in o rd e r t o e nr ic h h ims e lf a s w e ll a s o the rs .Although the trial court f ound that plaintiff “wa s competent at the time of his trial and 5 g uil ty ple a ,” it c on c lud e d a ft e r a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngthat he sin c e ha d b e c ome “ inc omp e te nt t o be sente nced a

nd there fore [was] committed to the custody of the Attorne y

Gene ral for

car e and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 unti l such time as he ha s rec overe d so that he ca n be sentenc ed.” United States v. W olfson , 616 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) . Review of the c ri min a l do c ke t r e ve a ls that pl a int if f h a s b e e n d e e me d c omp e te nt t o b e se nte nc e d, and that he is to be transf

err ed to New

York for sentenc ing in the ne ar f

uture. SeeOrde r, United States v. W olfson , No. 02cr 1588 (S.D.N.Y. filed O ct. 14, 2009).
15 Sec. & Exc h. Comm’n v. W

olfson , 249 Fe d. App. 701, 702-03 (10th Cir. 2007). 5 The DO J repr esents that the r esponsive re cords “ wer e compiled in conne ction with a criminal investig ation into violations of fe dera l law involving r acke teer ing a ctivity , wire f raud, money launder ing, loa

n sharking , extorti on, obstruction of justice, . . . aidingand abe tting[,]
. . . secur ities fraud, . . . a

nd embezzli ngfunds from a labor org anization[ .]” Roberts Decl. ¶ 36. Plaintiff does not dispute that the rele vant re cords we re c ompiled in the course of a cr iminal investigation. The Court conc ludes that the re cords at issue in this case are law enf orce ment rec ords for purposes of E x emption 7. b. Exe mpt ion 7( C) Ex emption 7(C) protec ts from disclosure infor mation in law enfor ceme nt rec ords that “could r easona

bly be expected to c onstitut e an unw arr anted invasion of pe rsonal priva cy .” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)( C). “To de termine whe ther Exemption 7(C) applies, [courts] ‘bala nce the pr iva c y int e re sts that w ou ld b e c omp ro mis e d b y dis c los ur e a g a ins t th e pu bli c int e re st i n r e le a se of the re quested infor

mation.’” Sussman v. United States Marshals Serv

. , 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Da v is , 9 68 F .2 d at 12 82 ); see Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1993).16

Gene rally , the privac y

interests of third pa

rties mentioned in law e nforc ement files a re

“ su bs tanti a l,” wh ile “ [t]he pu bli c int e re st i n d isc los ur e [of thi rd -p art

y ide nti tie s] is no t ju st l e ss substantial, it is insubstantial.” Sa fe Car d S e rv s. , 926 F. 2d at 1205. “[U] nless acc ess to the
name s and

a dd re sse s o f p ri vate ind ivi du a ls a pp e ari ngin f

ile s w ith in t

he ambi t of

Exe mpt ion

7( C) is n e c e ssa ry in o rd e r t o c on fi rm

or re fute c omp e lli nge vid e nc e that th e a g e nc y is e ng a g e d in illega l activity , such information is ex empt from disclosure .” Id . at 12 06 ; see Nation Magazine v. United States Customs Serv. , 71 F.3d 885, 896 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). “[T] he only

public interest re levant for purposes of E x emption 7(C) is one that foc uses on ‘the c itiz ens’ r ight to be inf ormed a bout what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Da v is , 968 F.2d at 1 2 8 2 (qu o t i n g Un ite d S

tates D e p’ t of J us tic e v . R e

po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). I f the a sserted public inter est is gove rnment wrong doing, the n the reque ster must “produc e evide nce that would warr ant a be lief by a re asonable person that the alleg ed Gove rnment impropriety might have occur

red.” Boyd v . Criminal Div. of the United States Dep’t of Justice , 4 7 5 F. 3 d 3 8 1 , 3 8 7 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Nat’l Archives &Rec ords Ad mi n. v . F av ish , 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004)). Under Ex emption 7(C), the DOJ withholds from Items 6-11 the name s and addr esses of individuals who “either w ere the subjects of the criminal investig ation, the targ ets of the applications for

interce ption of communications, or other individuals re fer ence d in conjunction wi th t he inv e sti g atio n a

nd int e rc e pte d c omm

un ic atio ns .” Rob e rt s D e c l. ¶ 37 ; see id. ¶ 35. “The individuals whose identifies wer e withheld . . . we re not the [plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 35. The de clar ant
asser ts that these individuals “all maintain a substantial privac y interest in not beingidentified with a cr iminal law enfor ceme nt investigation.” Id. ¶ 38. To re lease these individuals’ identities17

“as e ither the subjec ts of criminal investig ations or beingassociate d with such investiga tions can subject them to innuendo, emba rra ssment, and stigmatiz ation or eve n hara ssment, retaliation and repr isals.” Id. Moreove r, “r evea ling suc h information is unlikely to add to the public’s understandingof how a

n ag ency works or howwell it perfor ms its s tatutory

duties.” Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff “is quite sure that the ta pping of his phones [was] an invasion of his privac y and illega l surveillance by

the g overnme nt.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4. H e is under the mistaken impression that th e pr iva c y

int e re st at is su e in t

he Exe mpt ion

7( C) ana ly sis is h is o wn . In h is v ie w, the re is no need to pr otect plaintiff’ s privacy interest bec ause he is the reque ster of “ all information reg ardingthe tappingof his conver sations.” Id. at 3. Exempti on 7(C), howe ver, f ocuses on the privac y interests of third pa

rties, who, in this case, w ere subjects of the c riminal investigation, targ ets of the wir etap a

pplications, or otherw ise wer e mentioned in conne ction with the wireta ps. Plaintiff fails to articulate a public intere st of such sig nificanc e that it outweig hs the privac y interests of these third parties. The Court concludes that the DOJ properly has re dacte d the
names a nd addre sses of the third pa rties desc ribed in the supportingdecla ration. c. Exemption 7(D) Ex emption 7(D) pr otects fr om disclosure re cords or information compiled for law
e nf or c e me nt p ur

po se s th at: could re asonably

be expected to disclose the identity of a c onfidential source . . . [who] furnished infor mation on a confide ntial ba sis, and, in the case of a r ecor d or informa t i o n compiled by a cr iminal law enfor ceme nt authority

in the course of a c riminal i n v es t i gation. . ., information furnishe d by

a conf idential source
. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( D). A c onfidential sourc e may be an individual, such a s a private citizen or paid informant, or

it may be a state, local or

fore ign la

w enf orce ment ag ency . Lesar v. Dep’ t of18

Justice , 636 F.2d 472, 491 ( D.C. Cir. 1980). There is no assumption t hat a sourc e is confide ntial for pur poses of Exemption 7(D) solely beca use the sourc e provide s information to a law enfor ceme nt ag ency

in the course of a c riminal investigation. See U nited States Dep’t of Justice v. Landano , 508 U.S. 165, 181 (1993). Rather , a sourc e’s c onfidentiality is determined on a
case -by -ca se basis. Id . at 179-80. “ A source is confidential within the meaningof 7(D) if the
source provided infor

mation under a

n express assuranc e of c onfidentiality or in circ umstances from which suc h an assur ance could re asonably be infe rre d.” W

illiams v. Fed. Bureau of Inve stigati on , 69 F.3d 1155, 1159 ( D.C. Cir. 1995) (citingLandano , 508 U.S. at 170-74). Un de r E xemp tio n 7 (D ), the DO J withho lds fr om Ite ms 6 -8 “ inf or matio n whic h w ou ld identify confide ntial sources a s well as the spe cific infor mation or assistance which this source provided to fe dera l investigators.” Roberts De cl. ¶ 44. It appea rs that there was only

one confide ntial source a

nd that he or she was ne ither a g overnme nt ag ency nor a c ooperating witness. See id. ¶ 46. The de clar ant asser ts that “the informa

nt’s cooper ation was provide d under c ircumstance s where an assur ance of conf identiality

could re asonably

be infe rre d[,] ” base d on “the se riousness of the of fense s and the sourc e’s infor mation.” Id. “[T] he natur e of the crimes be ing inve stigated included r acke teer ing a ctivity , wire f raud, mone y

launder ing, loa

n sharking , extorti on, obstruction of justice, aidingand abe tting, sec urities fra ud, and embe zz ling funds from a

labor org anization.” Id
. The nature of the crime inve stigated and infor mant’s re lation to it are the most important fac tors in determiningwhether implied confidentiality

exis ts. Landano , 508 U.S. at 179-80; Quiñon v. Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation , 8 6 F .3 d 1 22 2, 12 31 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) ; Coleman v. Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation , 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D .C. 1998) (plaintiff’s c onviction “of19

numerous violent cr imes” includingmurder, r ape a nd kidnaping , as we ll as “the re lation of the wi tne sse s th e re to i s p re c ise ly the ty pe that th e imp lie d c on fi de nti a lity e xemp tio n e xpre sse d in Landano is designe d to encompass” ). In deter mining whe ther the sour ce pr ovided information
un de r a n im pli e d a ssu ra nc e of c on fi de nti a lity , th e Court c on sid e rs “ wh e the r t

he vio le nc e and

ri sk of re taliation that attend this ty pe of c rime wa

rra nt an implied gr ant of c onfidentiality for suc h a
source .” Mays v . Drug Enforcem ent Admin. , 234 F.3d 1324, 1329 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). The question has bee n answe red in the a ffirmative with respec t to “the violence and dang er that
acc ompany

the coc aine tra de,” id. , g ang -re lated murde r, Landano , 508 U.S. at 179, and other violent acts committed in retaliation for witnesses’ c ooperation with law enforc ement. See Shores v. Fe d. Bureau of Inv estigation , No. 98-2728, 2002 WL230756, at *4 (D.D .C. Feb. 2, 20 02 ) ( wi thh old ingide nti tie s and ide nti fy inginf or matio n o f t

hr e e c oo pe ratin gwi tne sse s w ith kn ow le dg e of

the mur de r o f whic h p la int if f w a s c onvic te d, wh e re pla int if f “ su bs e qu e ntl y attempted to proc ure the murder of a fa mily member of

one of the witnesses”)
. Plaintiff counters that the g overnme nt alrea dy has disclosed the ide ntity of the pe rson

“ wh o o ri g ina lly

re c ie ve d [si c ] the pe rm iss ion [to] ta p p la int if f’ s te le ph on e ,” and

be c a us e thi s permission alleg edly

“wa s g rante d on false inf ormation,” he argues that the DO J cannot now establish that any

information prope rly

is withheld under either

an express or implied assura nce of conf identiality . Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff presume s that the reque ster of the wireta ps is the
source whose identity

the DOJ is protecting. See id. F ur the r, he a pp e ars to a

rgue that he is innocent of the crimes of

which he ha s been c onvicted, id. , such that the nature of the crimes should not be a fa ctor in dete rmining whether confide ntiality

can be rea sonably

implied. He offe rs nothing, how ever , to undermine the pr esumption of vera city aff orded to a n ag ency ’s20

supporting de clar ation. Albeit on fac ts more compellingthan those pre sented he re, c ourts have c oncluded that the investigation of crimes such a s rac ketee ring , loan sharkingand extortion are c ircumstance s under which sourc es have provided infor mation under a

n implied assuranc e of c onfidentiality
. See, e.g., Amuso v . United States Dep’ t of Justice , 600 F. Supp. 2d 78, 99-100 (D .D.C. 2009) (interview ees who provided infor mation to the FB Idid so under an implied assur ance of confide ntiality

based on the violent nature of plaintiff’s cr imes, which included murde r, extortion and labor rac ketee ring , and the f

act that the inter

viewee s repor

ted on the ac tiviti es of or g anized
c ri me fa mil ie s) ; McQ ueen v . United States , 264 F. Supp. 2d 502, 522-24 (S.D. Te x . 2003) (docume nts identifying a

confide ntial informant who provide d information per taining to the
c ri me s o f w ill fu lly

atte mpt ingto e va de fe de ra l di e se l f ue l e xcis e taxes a

nd c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it such an of

fense are entitled to a “c ateg orica l presumption of implied confidentiality ,” or, alternatively , holding that the r equeste r’s prior threats and ability

to harm witnesses justified a fi nd ingof imp lie d a ssu

ra nc e s o f c on fi de nti a lity

); Delvisc ovo v. F

ed. Bureau of I

nvestigation , 903 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D .C. 1995) (“[a] major rac ketee ringinvestigation focusingon g roups and ind ivi du a ls i nv olv e d in

e xtor tio n, g ambl ing , lo an s ha

rk ing , n arc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin gand

int e rs tate transportation of stolen property g ives rise to . . . an infe renc e [of confide ntiality ] wit hout the need f or ela boration”) . The Court conc ludes that the DOJ properly has re dacte d from Items 6-8 information which would identify a conf idential source
. D. Se gr e ga bil ity I f a re c or d c on ta ins inf

or matio n th at is e xemp t f

ro m di sc los ur e , a

ny re a so na bly se g re g a ble information must be rele ased a fter de leting the exempt portions, unl ess the non-e x empt portions21

are ine xtri c a

bly int e rt wi ne d w ithe xemp t po rt ion s. 5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) ; see Trans-Pac ific Policing Agreem ent v. United States Customs Serv

. , 1 77 F .3 d 1 02 2 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 9) . T he Court e rr s if it “simply approve [s] the withholding of an entire document without enter ing a finding on seg reg ability , or the lac k there of.” Powell v. United States Bureau of Prisons , 927 F.2d 1239, 1 2 4 2 n . 4 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep’ t of the Army , 611 F.2d 738, 744 ( 9th Cir. 1979)). Plaintiff asserts that it is imposs ible for the D OJ to have r elea sed all segreg able mate rial to h im, a pp are ntl y on the be lie f t

hat he is e nti tle d to dis c los ur e in f ull of a ll i nf or matio n r e late d to his criminal trial. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-5. The Court has revie wed the D OJ ’s dec larations and finds that these submissions adequate ly specify “which por

tions of the document[s] are disclosable and which ar e alleg edly

exempt.” Vaughn v. Rose n , 484 F.2d at 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de nied , 415 U.S. 977 (1974). III . C ON CL USI ON T h e D O J h a s c o n d

u c t e d ana d e qu at e s e ar c hf

o r m at e r i a l s r e s p o n s i v e t o p l a i n t i f f ’ s F O IA reque st and proper ly

has withheld information under Exemptions 3, 5, 7(C), and 7( D). The ag ency has established that there is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to its compliance with the FOIA and its entitlement to judgme nt as a matter of law. A ccor dingly , the Court will gr ant the DOJ’s mot ion for summary judgme nt and will deny

plaintiff’s motion to dism iss as moot. An Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion. / s /

E LLEN S E G A L H U V E LLE Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Nove mber 30, 2009