[Cite as State v. Thompson , 2021-Ohio-642.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-20-19 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v. DARIUS REGINALD THOMPSON, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2011 CR 490 Judgment Reversed, Cause Remanded Date of Decision: March 8, 2021

APPEARANCES: Dustin J. Redmond, Jr. for Appellant

Nathan R. Heiser for AppelleeCase No. 9-20-19

-2- WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant Darius R. Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, alleging t hat the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence him over six years afte r he had completed his term of community control. For the reasons set forth below, th e judgment of the

trial court is reversed. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} This case is about whether the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Thompson after his term of community control had been completed and terminated. On September 1, 2011, the State issued a four count indictment filed in Trial Case #11-CR-490, alleging that Thompson had committed violations of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), R.C. 2907.322(A)(1), R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), R.C. 2 907.323(A)(1), and R.C. 2907.323(A)(3). Doc. 1. On December 20, 2011, Thomps on pled guilty to violations of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), R.C. 2907.322(A)(5), and R .C. 2907.323(A)(3). Doc. 21. {¶3} On February 16, 2012, the trial court ordered Thompson to serve a two year sentence on community control in Trial Case #11-CR-490. D oc. 21. He began serving his community control sentence on March 5, 2012. Doc. 24. Two years later, after Thompson had completed his sentence, the trial cou rt issued a judgment entry on March 13, 2014 that released Thompson from community c ontrol. Doc. 24. This judgment entry declared that Thompson was “released f rom CommunityCase No. 9-20-19

-3- Control in the above entitled case wholly, fully, and completel y forthwith.” Doc. 24. The trial court further ordered that Thompson “be restored to all rights of citizenship * * *.” Doc. 24. {¶4} Subsequently, Thompson was imprisoned for a different offense i n another case. Doc. 27. Tr. 9. After his release in 2019, the trial court discovered that it had failed to notify Thompson that he was required to r egister pursuant to R.C. 2950.01, et seq ., for the charges associated with Trial Case #11-CR-490. Doc. 27. The trial court failed to order Thompson to comply with th is requirement during the course of Trial Case #11-CR-490. Doc. 21, 24. In fact, th e trial court made no mention of this requirement in its February 16, 2012 sentencing entry or in its March 13, 2014 judgment entry that terminated Thompson’s term of comm unity control. Doc. 21, 24. See Doc. 27. {¶5} On February 6, 2020, the trial court sua sponte ordered Thompso n to appear for a hearing in Trial Case #11-CR-490 on March 12, 2020 . Doc. 25. At this hearing, the trial court requested that the parties submit briefs on the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to resentence Thompson in Trial Cas e #11-CR-490 and impose the requirements of R.C. 2950.01, et seq . Doc. 27. The State then filed a brief that argued the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence Thompson.

Doc. 27. The State noted that [t]here is no indication that the Defendant was notified of his registration requirement and it is not included on the Judgment Entry of Sentencing. On March 13, 2014 the Defendant wasCase No. 9-20-19

-4- released from Community Control Sanctions and this matter was closed. Doc. 27. The State, agreeing with the arguments of the Defense , concluded that Thompson’s sentence could not be changed to impose the requirem ents of R.C. 2950.01, et seq . Doc. 27. {¶6} Nonetheless, on May 4, 2020, the trial court held a resentencin g hearing for Thompson. Doc. 30. The following exchange occurred at thi s resentencing hearing: [Trial court]: That’s my understanding of how this matter came to the attention of the Marion authorities is upon his release he was advised [of the requirements of R.C. 2950.01, et seq .] and I think that was news to Mr. Thompson. [Thompson]: Yeah, I didn’t—I had never heard that before, ever

. [Trial court]: Right. And I tend to believe that, sir. That there’s nothing in the file to show that you were advised of this oblig ation and so I imagine years later when you were released from prison on some totally separate matter, when they advised you that you needed to do this, it was shocking to you. Tr. 9. The trial court stated its intention to order Thompson to follow the applicable requirements and then notified him of the relevant conditions. Tr. 9-11, 18-21. {¶7} After this limited resentencing hearing, the trial court issued a judgment entry on May 15, 2020 that included the following statement: Based upon the record, the original sentencing judge did not inform [Thompson] of his registration obligations. [Another] Former Judge * * * also addressed this case and also failed to address this issue.Case No. 9-20-19

-5- Doc. 30. The trial court concluded this judgment entry by orde ring Thompson to register in compliance with R.C. 2950.01, et seq . Doc. 30. Assignment of Error {¶8} The appellant filed his notice of appeal on June 11, 2020. Doc . 31. On appeal, Thompson raises the following assignment of error: The trial court erred when it ordered the defendant to register as a Tier II Sex Offender six years after his sentence terminated. Thompson argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the requirements of R.C. 2950.01, et seq ., after his sentence had been completely served

and terminated. See Doc. 30. Legal Standard {¶9} “Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a valid judgment.” State ex rel. Post v. Speck , 185 Ohio App.3d 828, 2010-Ohio-105, 925 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.). Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when determ ining whether a trial court had jurisdiction to render a decision. State v. Stuber , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-38, 2018-Ohio-2809, ¶ 13. “De novo review is independent, without deference

to the lower court’s decision.” State v. Hudson , 2013-Ohio-647, 986 N.E.2d 1128, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). Legal Analysis {¶10} In State v. Holdcroft , the Ohio Supreme Court “consider[ed] when a trial court has the authority to correct a sentence.” State v. Holdcroft , 137 OhioCase No. 9-20-19

-6- St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 1, reversed in part by State v. Harper , 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 43. See State v. Hudson , 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849, 161 N.E.2d 608, ¶ 12 (ackno wledging the

reversal of Holdcroft ). The trial court had “fail[ed] to properly impose statutoril y mandated postrelease control as part of [the] defendant’s sente nce * * *.” Holdcroft at ¶ 7. After the defendant had completed the prison term for the offense that carried this postrelease control sanction, the trial court held a resen tencing hearing “to correct its errors related to postrelease control.” Id . at ¶ 3. {¶11} In Holdcroft , the Ohio Supreme Court announced three guiding principles for its determination: First, when a sentence is subject to direct review, it may be modified; second, when the prison-sanction portion of a sentenc e that also includes a void sanction has not been completely serv ed, the void sanction may be modified; and third, when the entirety of a prison sanction has been served, the defendant’s expectati on in finality in his sentence becomes paramount, and his sentence for that crime may no longer be modified. Holdcroft at ¶ 18. In other words, after sentencing, “either the defend ant or the state may challenge any aspect of a sentence so long as a timely appe al is filed.” Id

. After “the time for filing an appeal has run, Ohio courts are l imited to correcting a void sanction,” even though other challenges to the sentence ma y be barred by res judicata. Id . But after “the prison-sanction portion of a sentence for a c rime has been fully served,” a trial court has no authority to “further modify[] the sentence for that crime in any way.” Id

.Case No. 9-20-19

-7- {¶12} Importantly, the Ohio Supreme Court based its second and third principles on different foundations. The sanction-correction rule is based on principles of res judicata

— while a void sanction may be modified, a valid sanction general ly cannot. [ State v .] Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 17 [( reversed by Harper, supra )]. But once a valid prison sanction has been served, it is no longer res judicata t hat acts as a bar to modification; rather, the court has lost jurisdiction to modify the sentence. (Emphasis sic.) Holdcroft at ¶ 14. The Ohio Supreme Court then concluded that[n]either this court’s jurisprudence nor Ohio’s criminalsentencing statutes allow a trial court to resentence a defenda nt for an offense when the defendant has already completed the prison sanction for that offense. It is irrelevant whether the defendant is still in prison for other offenses.

Id . at ¶ 19. Since the trial court had resentenced the defendant after he had completed the relevant prison sentence, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the trial court “to vacate the imposition of postrelease control * * *.” Id

. {¶13} In State v. Harper , the Ohio Supreme Court “realigned [its] jurisprudence with the traditional understanding of void and vo idable sentences.” Harper , supra , at ¶ 43. Previously, [i]n cases in which the trial court inadvertently failed to pro perly impose postrelease control in the sentence, [the Supreme Court] provided a remedy by holding that the failure rendered the sentence—or part of the sentence—void and subject to correction at any time before the expiration of the original sentence.

Id . at ¶ 2. The Supreme Court then returned to the traditional r ule governing void

and voidable sentences:Case No. 9-20-19

-8-[A] void judgment is one entered by a court lacking subjectmatter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the parties. See Harper , 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 4; State v. Perry , 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967); Ex parte Shaw , 7 Ohio St. 81, 82 (1857); Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton , 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854). When a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the pa rties are properly before the court, any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void. Harper at ¶ 26; Pratts v. Hurley , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12. In general, a voidable judgment ma y be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal. Harper at ¶ 26.

Hudson , supra , ¶ 11. Thus, in Harper , the Ohio Supreme Court overturned the foundations of the second principle announced in Holdcroft : “when the prisonsanction portion of a sentence that also includes a void sancti on has not been completely served, the void sanction may be modified * * *.” Holdcroft, supra , at ¶ 18. This second principle did not survive the Ohio Supreme C ourt’s decision in Harper

. Harper, supra , at ¶ 4. See Hudson, supra , at ¶ 12. {¶14} However, after reviewing Harper and its progeny, we conclude that

this line of cases has not altered the foundations of the third principle announced in Holdcroft : once a defendant has completed his or her sentence, a trial c ourt does not have jurisdiction to resentence that defendant. Holdcroft, supra , at ¶ 14, 18. Harper affected the ability of trial courts to resentence a defendant before his or her sentence has been completed. Harper, supra , at ¶ 42-43. But Harper does not appear to affect the jurisdictional limitations on a trial court’s abilit y to resentence a defendantCase No. 9-20-19

-9- after his or her sentence has been completed. See State v. Ingels , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180469, C-180470, C-180471, 2020-Ohio-4367, ¶ 10. {¶15} Further, we also note that the third principle in Holdcroft is consistent with the reasons that the Ohio Supreme Court gave for overturni ng the second principle in Holdcroft . In State v. Henderson , the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the reason for the jurisprudential realignment in Harper was to “restore predictability and finality to trial-court judgments and crimin al sentences.” State v.

Henderson , 2020-Ohio-4784, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 33. The third principle re cognizes a jurisdictional limitation on the ability of a trial court to re sentence a defendant after a sentence has been completed. This limitation protects the “p redictability and finality” of “trial-court judgments and criminal sentences.” Id . For these reasons, we will follow the third principle from Holdcroft

. {¶16} Turning to the facts of the case before this Court, the trial c ourt held a sua sponte resentencing hearing over six years after the trial court had released Thompson “wholly, fully, and completely” from his community con trol sanction. Doc. 24, 27. While Holdcroft and Harper address the issue of postrelease control, the third principle of Holdcroft has been applied in the context of the registration requirements of R.C. 2950.01, et seq

. State v. Rucker , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C180606, 2019-Ohio-4490, ¶ 18; State v. Spicer , 5th Dist. Perry No. 2021-Ohio-386, ¶ 9, 18; State v. Metcalf , 2016-Ohio-4923, 68 N.E.3d 371, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.); State v. Halsey , 2016-Ohio-7990, 74 N.E.3d 915, ¶ 31-33 (12th Dist.). Since T hompsonCase No. 9-20-19

-10- had completed his sentence in full, the trial court lacked juri sdiction to resentence

him. Holdcroft , supra , at ¶ 14, 18-19. See State v. Hilliard , 5th Richland No. 15CA16, 2015-Ohio-5324, ¶ 42. As such, his sole assignment of error is sustained.

Conclusion {¶17} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particul ars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. Further, the judgment entry resentencing Thompson must be vacated.

This cause of action is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

with this decision. Judgment Reversed, And Cause Remanded ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.

/hls