13-184-cv 

John Delaney v. Bank of America Corp., et al. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

_____________________ 

August Term, 2013 

(Argued: January 14, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014) 

Docket No. 13-184-cv 

_____________________ 

JOHN DELANEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v.- 

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.,



 Defendants-Appellees. 

_______________________ 

Before: WINTER, WESLEY and HALL, Circuit Judges. 

_______________________ 

 On appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Paul A. Engelmayer, J.), entered on December 11, 2012, granting 

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff’s former employer on plaintiff’s claims of age 

discrimination, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 

seq., and breach of contract. 

 AFFIRMED. 

_______________________ 

JONATHAN HONIG, Feder Kaszovitz LLP, New York, NY, for PlaintiffAppellant.

 



 Defendants-Appellees have indicated in their brief on appeal that Defendant-Appellee 

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. was improperly pled as Bank of America Merrill 

Lynch f/k/a Banc of America Securities, LLC. The Clerk of the Court is therefore 

requested to amend the caption as above. 
2 

PATRICK J. LAMPARELLO, III (STEVEN D. HURD, on the brief), Proskauer Rose 

LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees. 

_______________________ 

PER CURIAM: 

 Plaintiff-Appellant John Delaney (“Plaintiff-Appellant” or “Delaney”) appeals from 

the December 11, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (Paul A. Engelmayer, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of 

Appellant’s former employers, Defendants-Appellees Bank of America Corporation, and 

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.1 (collectively “Defendants-Appellees” or 

“BoA”), on his claims of age discrimination, under the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and breach of contract. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

BACKGROUND

 Delaney began working for BoA’s predecessors in 1988 and continued to be 

employed by them through multiple mergers and acquisitions until his termination in 

September 2010. At all relevant times, Delaney remained an at-will employee. From 1996 to 

2006, Delaney worked in the High Yield Sales Group in which he predominantly sold “high 

yield products.” His compensation included a base salary and, where applicable, an annual 

award of discretionary incentive compensation. 

In 2005, Delaney was transferred to the Fixed Income Middle Markets Sales Group 

(“Middle Markets”). Although employees of this group “were expected to sell a wider array 

 

1 See supra n.*. 
3 

of products and cover smaller accounts,” Delaney continued to sell the same high yield 

products. He also remained in the same physical location with other members of the High 

Yield group. Delaney, however, was assigned to a different reporting line and became 

eligible for compensation under the Middle Markets Sales Compensation Plan whereby he 

received an annual salary and quarterly commission on the basis of his production credits. 

While working for Middle Markets, his commissions exceeded $1.6 million in 2009. That 

same year, Delaney also received a rating of “exceeds/meets” expectations on his annual 

performance review. 

In March 2010, Delaney was transferred back to the High Yield group. According to 

Delaney, this transfer “was a reward for [his] outstanding work developing middle markets 

accounts into higher revenue, institutional accounts.” Appellant Br. 6. Delaney also claims 

that BoA “agreed that his compensation would not suffer from the transfer because he 

would be awarded sufficient accounts to generate production credits so that his 

compensation would remain at least level and, hopefully, increase.” Id. at 7. For BoA, 

however, this transfer was the result of an institutional re-organization aimed at removing all 

High Yield sales personnel from Middle Markets, which closed in 2012. As a result of this 

transfer, although Delaney remained in the same physical location and continued to manage 

the same accounts, his compensation reverted to the one associated with High Yield 

employees, i.e., a base salary and, if eligible, a discretionary incentive compensation award. 

Delaney also received two additional accounts upon his transfer. 

In July 2010, Delaney received a negative mid-year performance review. According 

to the review, his production had decreased by seven percent, while the High Yield group’s 
4 

production as a whole had increased by twenty percent. The weaknesses cited included that 

he was a “momentum sales man, [who] could improve [his] credit skills,” had “difficulty 

multi-tasking,” “should cover less accounts,” and “need[ed] to focus”. The review also 

noted a concern as to whether Delaney was able to handle the accounts assigned to him. 

The following month, as part of a company-wide reduction-in-force (“RIF”), High 

Yield managers were instructed to select underperforming employees whose dismissal would 

have the least impact on the business going forward. Delaney’s performance continued to 

suffer. He was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year in September 2010, 

and his performance in the High Yield group was the worst of all employees at his level. 

Delaney, along with 418 other BoA employees, was selected for inclusion in the September 

2010 RIF process. BoA terminated Delaney’s employment that same month. At the time, 

Delaney was fifty-six (56) years old, the oldest member of the High Yield group and the only 

member of that group to be terminated. 

 Following his termination, Delaney brought this employment discrimination action 

against BoA, alleging claims of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and breach of 

contract. With respect to the breach of contract claim, Delaney alleges that BoA breached 

an oral promise made to him “that his compensation would not suffer from [his] transfer [to 

the High Yield group] because he would be awarded sufficient accounts to generate 

production credits so that his compensation would remain at least level and, hopefully, 

increase.” Appellant Br. 7. BoA moved for summary judgment, which the district court 

granted after determining that Delaney failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination case. 

Then assuming arguendo that Delaney had established a prima facie case, the district court 
5 

further ruled that Delaney’s evidence was insufficient “to permit a reasonable fact-finder to 

conclude that he would not have been terminated but for his age,” and thus that he failed to 

establish that BoA’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason—that Delaney was terminated as 

part of a RIF and selected based on his poor performance—was a pretext for age 

discrimination. Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 2d 498, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 

Having dismissed Delaney’s federal claim, the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 

exercised supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim and determined that none of the 

conversations and statements identified on the record constituted an enforceable contract. 

Id. at 517-18. Judgment was entered in favor of BoA. Delaney timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

 On appeal, Delaney argues that in granting summary judgment in favor of BoA, the 

district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him as the nonmoving party. Specifically, Delaney contends that if the district court had properly applied 

this Court’s decision in Weiss v. JP Moran Chase & Co., 332 F. App’x 659, 661 (2d Cir. 2009) 

(summary order), to the proffered evidence, it would have concluded that BoA’s legitimate 

nondiscriminatory reason lacked credence and was instead a pretext for age discrimination. 

Delaney also challenges the district court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over his contract law claim and further contends that if the district court had properly 

considered the submitted evidence, it would have concluded that he had established a breach 

of contract claim against BoA. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Allianz Ins. Co. v. 

Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). In so doing, we “construe the facts in the light 
6 

most favorable to the non-moving party and . . . resolve all ambiguities and draw all 

reasonable inferences against the movant.” Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 

F.3d 73, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A dispute about a 

‘genuine issue’ exists . . . where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the 

non-movant’s favor.” Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). We uphold a 

grant of summary judgment “if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

against whom it was entered, demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

and that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law.” Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City 

of New York, 562 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2009). 

I.

 We consider first Delaney’s age discrimination claim. It is well established that the 

burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973) applies to claims bought under the ADEA. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways 

Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). “Under McDonell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial 

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. Once this burden is met, 

the defendant must then “articulate ‘some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its 

action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The defendant need not persuade the 

court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason[ ]. It is sufficient if the 

defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the 

plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (citation omitted). 

When the employer meets its burden, “the plaintiff can no longer rely on the prima facie 

case,” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106, but “must prove that the employer’s proffered reason was 
7 

a pretext for discrimination,” McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 

2006). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 

167, 173 (2009), eliminating the mixed-motive analysis as to ADEA claims, “a plaintiff 

bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA” satisfies this burden by 

presenting facts, which “taken in [his] favor, suffice to . . . [show that] a triable issue [exists] 

as to whether [his] age was a ‘but for’ cause of [his] termination.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106 

(quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 180) (internal quotations omitted). 

 The district court determined that Delaney failed to establish a prima facie case of age 

discrimination, but because this burden is “not onerous,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, we will 

assume arguendo that Delaney has met this burden. We agree with the district court that BoA 

has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Delaney’s 

termination. We have previously held that a RIF constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for termination of employment. See, e.g., Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168-

69 (2d Cir. 2001); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, BoA 

has explained that Delaney’s employment was terminated as part of a company-wide RIF to 

eliminate positions that generated insufficient value and that could be eliminated with little 

impact to the company’s functioning and further that Delaney was selected for termination 

based on his poor performance. Specifically, the record evidence shows that two months 

prior to his termination Delaney received a negative mid-year performance review that raised 

concerns about his productivity level. Moreover, the evidence indicates that in September 

2010, Delaney was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his 

performance in the High Yield group was the worst of all employees at his level. 
8 

We must now decide whether “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, would permit a jury to find . . . . ‘that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged 

adverse employment action.’”2 Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106 (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 180). 

“The condition that a plaintiff’s age must be the ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment 

action is not equivalent to a requirement that age was the employers only consideration, but 

rather that the adverse employment action[ ] would not have occurred without it.” Fagan v. U.S. 

Carpet Installation, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 490, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 

175-77) (emphasis added). As the district court correctly determined, the evidence on the 

record establishes that BoA engaged in a RIF in September 2010 and that 418 other 

 

2 In his Reply Brief, Delaney contends that the “but-for” causation standard is a “trial proof 

burden [having] . . . no bearing on the burden at issue on summary judgment.” Reply Br. 23. 

Specifically, Delaney relies relentlessly on a summary order of this Court, Weiss v. JP Morgan 

Chase & Co., which states that “[a]n employee may satisfy the ultimate burden of proving 

pretext ‘either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 

unworthy of credence,’” to argue that the evidence taken in a light most favorable to him 

supports his claim that the RIF was a “subterfuge” designed to disguise BoA’s 

discriminatory animus. 332 F. App’x 659, 661 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); Reply Br. 21. 

In the first instance, pursuant to Local Rule 32.1.1., “a summary order is not citable as 

precedent.” U.S. v. Branch, 538 F.2d 314, 314 n.* (2d Cir. 1976). Second, this particular 

summary order was issued thirteen (13) days prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross

establishing that a “but-for” causation standard applies to ADEA claims, Gross, 557 U.S. at 

180. Since Gross has come down, this Court has, as it must, continuously applied a 

requirement of “but-for” causation in the pretext analysis of the McDonnell Douglas

framework in the ADEA context, including at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Taddeo 

v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 F. App’x 121, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order); Timbie v. Eli 

Lilly & Co., 429 F. App’x 20, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order); Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 

101, 106; Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010). Additionally, we note that the 

cases cited in Weiss and relied upon by Delaney do not involve age discrimination under the 

ADEA, but instead involve an alleged Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

violation and a Title VII gender-based discrimination claim. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 250-51; 

see also Dister v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1109 (2d Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we 

disregard Delaney’s arguments as to Weiss’s purported application to the pretext analysis in 

this case particularly in light of the fact that it does not state the law of this Circuit. 
9 

employees were included on that month’s RIF list. Although Delaney was the only member 

of the High Yield group to be terminated and also the oldest, the evidence supports BoA’s 

assertion that Delaney was terminated because of his poor performance. In fact, as noted 

above, in September 2010, Delaney was ranked 136th among all other BoA sales personnel 

and had the worst performance of employees in his group at his level. Although Delaney 

makes much of his 2009 annual performance review in which he received a rating of 

“exceeds/meets” expectations, the evidence demonstrates that his performance suffered in 

2010 after his return to the High Yield group. 

While we must ensure that employers do not act in a discriminatory fashion, we do 

“not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” 

Scaria v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The only age-related 

evidence that Delaney seeks to introduce is the draft Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) discrimination charge filed by C.G.,3 the second-oldest member of 

the High Yield group, who was terminated six months after Delaney in March 2011. In the 

draft EEOC charge, C.G. alleges that he was terminated on the basis of his age and that 

colleagues and managers made repeated comments concerning his age. As the district court 

correctly held, however, this evidence is inadmissible on hearsay grounds. See Fed. R. Evid. 

801(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). As the district court correctly held, the draft EEOC charge is 

inadmissible hearsay—an out-of-court statement that Delaney would rely on to show the 

truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Materials submitted in support of or 

in opposition to a motion for summary judgment “must be admissible themselves or must 

 

3 We, like the district court, use C.G.’s initials so as to respect his privacy. See Delaney, 908 F. 

Supp. 2d at 505 n.5. 
10 

contain evidence that will be presented in admissible form at trial.” Santos v. Murdock, 243 

F.3d 681, 683 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Even assuming, 

however, that Delaney could present the evidence from the EEOC charge in admissible 

form at trial by calling C.G. as a witness, the evidence would not call into doubt the 

nondiscriminatory reason BoA has proffered for Delaney’s termination. Comments about 

another employee’s age, removed from any context suggesting that they influenced decisions 

regarding Delaney’s own employment, do not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether age was the but-for cause of Delaney’s termination. 

Delaney’s remaining arguments center on his claims that BoA engaged in a 

“campaign against the oldest High Yield Sales group members” and a “simultaneous action 

against the two oldest members of the High Yield” group. Appellant Br. 16, 28 n.10; Reply 

Br. 1. Delaney, however, does not point to any admissible evidence in support of these 

claims. “Even in the discrimination context . . . a plaintiff must provide more than 

conclusory allegations to resist a motion for summary judgment.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 

101. Delaney’s allegations do not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether his 

age was the but-for cause of his termination, id. at 106; his ADEA claim therefore fails. 

II. 

We turn next to Delaney’s breach of contract claim. First, we review the district 

court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. 

HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). “[I]n any civil action of which the district courts 

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 

other claims that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same 
11 

case or controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367, i.e., “derive from a common nucleus of operative 

fact,” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “In general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims 

should be dismissed as well.” Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). That 

said, a district court does not abuse its discretion where the “values of judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity” support the exercise. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 350 (1988). In this case, Delaney’s federal and state claims are based on his 

employment and termination by BoA, and they clearly derive from a common nucleus of 

operative facts. Moreover, discovery is complete, and Delaney’s breach of contract claim 

does not turn “on novel or unresolved questions of state law.” Cf. Valencia ex rel. Franco v. 

Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We hold therefore 

that the district court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over Delaney’s non-federal claim. 

Second, we review Delaney’s allegation in support of his breach of contract claim. 

The district court correctly noted that Delaney’s various statements created an ambiguity as 

to the actual nature of the oral promise he asserted was made to him by BoA. Delaney, 908 

F. Supp. at 515. On appeal, Delaney contends that the oral promise concerned an 

agreement “that his compensation would not suffer from [his] transfer [to the High Yield 

group] because he would be awarded sufficient accounts to generate production credits so 

that his compensation would remain at least level and, hopefully, increase.” Appellant Br. 7. 

Under New York law, a binding contract can be formed without the execution of a 

written agreement. See Mun. Consultants & Publishers, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 47 N.Y.2d 144, 
12 

148-49 (1979). Nonetheless, and as the district court recognized, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the terms of any agreement are definite. See Charles Hyman, Inc. v. Olsen 

Indus., Inc., 227 A.D.2d 270, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“[T]he burden of establishing the 

terms of the verbal contract—which falls to the proponent—presents a formidable obstacle 

to its enforcement. Before a court will impose [a] contractual obligation, it must ascertain 

that a contract was made and that its terms are definite.” (citing, in relevant part, Cobble Hill 

Nursing Home v. Henry & Warren Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 475, 482 (1989) (other citations omitted)). 

In this case, Delaney’s allegation that BoA promised that his compensation would not suffer 

lacks the definiteness required by New York law. Maffea v. Ippolito, 247 A.D.2d 366, 367 

(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that the terms of an oral agreement to split the proceeds of a 

lottery win were “not sufficiently definite to be enforced”); see also Hecht v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 

65 A.D.3d 951, 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“The oral assurances lacking any actual terms as 

to the amount, form, and timing of payment of any compensation, and including no 

methodology or custom providing for the determination of the same, failed to manifest a 

clear intention on the part of the parties to form a binding, definite severance agreement.”). 

Our review of the record yields no evidence of the definite nature and terms of the oral 

promise Delaney asserts was given. Moreover, Delaney’s deposition testimony undermines 

any allegation that the contract terms were definite: 

Q. Was there any discussion about your compensation if you 

were to transfer into high yield sales, institutional accounts 

desk? 

A. Not specifically. 
13 

Q. That answer makes me ask, was there a discussion generally? 

A. Well, simply that I would move from the commission basis 

of being paid to the salary/bonus structure. 

Q. As far as the salary/bonus structure, were you told a specific 

salary that you would be earning? 

A. No. But there was no change. 

Q. There was no change from where you were in middle 

markets? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What about the bonus, was there any discussion about what 

bonus you would be paid? 

A. Not specifically. 

Q. There was no guarantee of a bonus, correct? 

A. Right. 

J.A. at 129. Additionally, the record contains no evidence of a conversation concerning the 

transfer of specific accounts to Delaney as part of his move from Middle Markets to High 

Yield. Finally, with respect to his bonus compensation, the district court correctly 

determined that Delaney was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were 

discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that Delaney was 

promised a mid-year bonus. We thus affirm the dismissal of Delaney’s breach of contract 

claim for substantially the same reasons as did the district court. 

 
14 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.