Circuit Court for Baltimore County

Case No. 03- C-12-002231

Argued: January 8, 2013

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 81

September Term, 2011

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v.

JEFFREY DAVID KAHL

Barbera, C.J.

Harrell

Battaglia

Greene

Adkins

 McDonald

 *Bell,

JJ.

Opinion by Bell, C.J. (Retired)

Filed: January 29, 2014

*Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the hearing

and conference of this case while an active

member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant

to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also

participated in the decision and adoption of this

opinion.
The petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the petitioner),

acting through Bar Counsel and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751 (a), filed, pursuant to 1

Maryland Rule 16-751, a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Jeffrey David

Kahl, the respondent. In that petition, it alleged that the respondent violated Rules 1.15,

Safekeeping Property, 8.1,Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters, and 8.4, Misconduct, 2 3 4

 Maryland Rule 16-751 (a) provides: 1

“(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action.

“(1) Upon approval of Commission. Upon approval or direction of the

Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial

Action in the Court of Appeals.

“2) Conviction of Crime; Reciprocal Action. If authorized by Rule 16-771

(b) or 16-773 (b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or

Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals without prior approval of the

Commission. Bar Counsel promptly shall notify the Commission of the

filing. The Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition

that was filed pursuant to this subsection.”

Rule 1.15 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 2

“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's

possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own

property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title

16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and

maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property shall be

identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its

receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the

account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be

preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created.

“(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account only as

permitted by Rule 16-607 b.

“(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different

arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in

advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer's

own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

“(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has

an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as

stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a

lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other

property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by

the client or third person, shall render promptly a full accounting regarding such
of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), as adopted by

Maryland Rule 16-812; Maryland Rules 16-606.1, Attorney trust account record-keeping; 5

property.

“(e) When a lawyer in the course of representing a client is in possession of

property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim

interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is

resolved. The lawyer shall distribute promptly all portions of the property as to

which the interests are not in dispute.”

MRPC 8.1 provides: 3

“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection

with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall

not:

“(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known

by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a

lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary

authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information

otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”

MRPC 8.4 provides: 4

“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do

so through the acts of another

“(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

“(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

“(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice

....“

Maryland Rule 16-606.1 provides: 5

“(a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and maintained

for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third persons:

“(1) Attorney Trust Account Identification. An identification of all

attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the

financial institution, account number, account name, date the

account was opened, date the account was closed, and an

agreement with the financial institution establishing each account

and its interest-bearing nature.

“(2) Deposits and Disbursements. A record for each account that

2
and 16-609, Prohibited transactions, and Maryland Code (1989, 2010 Repl, Vol.) § 10-306 6

of the Business Occupations and Professions Article (“BP”). We ordered, pursuant to 7

Maryland Rule 16-752 (a), that the matter be transmitted “to the Circuit Court for Baltimore

chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows:

“(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the

time of the deposit that shows (i) the date of the

deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the

client or third person for whom the funds were

deposited, and (iv) the purpose of the deposit;

“(B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement

made by electronic transfer, a record made at or near

the time of disbursement that shows (i) the date of

the disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv)

the identity of the client or third person for whom the

disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v)

the purpose of the disbursement;

(“C) for each disbursement made by electronic

transfer, a written memorandum authorizing the

transaction and identifying the attorney responsible

for the transaction.”

Maryland Rule 16-609 provides: 6

“a. Generally. An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds

required by the Rules in this Chapter to be deposited in an attorney trust account,

obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in

the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose.

“b. No Cash Disbursements. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account

may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash withdrawal may be

made from an automated teller machine or by any other method. All

disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by check or electronic

transfer.

“c. Negative Balance Prohibited. No funds from an attorney trust account shall be

disbursed if the disbursement would create a negative balance with regard to an

individual client matter or all client matters in the aggregate.”

Md. Code (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol.) § 10-306 of the Bus. Occ. & Prof. Article provides: 7

“A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for

which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”

3
County, to be heard and determined by Judge Mickey J. Norman, of the Third Judicial

Circuit, in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-757.”

Although personally served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action,

Interrogatories and Request for Admissions of fact and Genuineness of Documents, the

respondent made no timely response, neither filing an answer to the petition nor otherwise

responding to any of the petitioner’s pleadings. Nevertheless, when the matter came on for

a hearing on the merits, he was permitted to participate: the respondent was allowed to, and

did, cross-examine witnesses and he was offered the opportunity to submit proposed findings

of fact and conclusions of law. He chose not to testify in his defense and he failed to propose

findings of fact and conclusions of law for the court’s consideration, however. Following

the hearing, the hearing judge made findings of fact, as follows.

The respondent, who was admitted to the Maryland Bar on January 3, 2002 and, at all

times relevant to this case, maintained an office for the practice of law in Baltimore County,

in February 2004, joined with Richard K. Scott, who described the respondent as his best

friend, to establish a law partnership, Scott & Kahl, L.L.C. Under their agreement, they were

the only attorneys in the firm, “100% of the legal fees generated by them would be shared

50/50 ...everything was 50/50, bills and profits.” The parties received “draws” or salary twice

a month, on the 15 and the 30 , to be taken from the firm’s operating account, one of its two th th

bank accounts, the other being an IOLTA, or trust, account. As explained, without

contradiction, by Scott, who was familiar with the procedure for depositing and withdrawing

4
funds from these accounts and whom the hearing judge determined “diligently maintained

both bank accounts,” 

“... fees owed to the Firm for professional services were not paid directly from

the trust account. Rather, monies in the trust account that the parties earned

were then transferred into the operating account. Any fee disbursements owed

to the partners were distributed from the operating account. ... [A] Firm’s

computer kept the account records on spreadsheets, accessible by either

partner. ... In addition to the bi-weekly salary of $ 1,500, if either partner

needed additional funds, ‘the other would take the exact same amount.”’

In December, 2009, Scott discovered several wire transactions, made in November

and December, transferring funds from the firm’s trust account to the respondent’s personal

account. Not having been advised of those transactions and being unable to find evidence

that the respondent was owed fees other than his draw, Scott confronted the respondent, who

“‘told Scott that he had purchased stock options and needed the money right away to pay

margin calls.”’ Accepting the respondent’s expression of remorse, Scott did not further

pursue the matter, giving the respondent a second chance. He did institute additional

safeguards against misappropriation: he placed the firm’s checkbook in the office safe, took

the respondent’s key to the safe, and reviewed the bank accounts more frequently.

Nevertheless, on May 19 and 28, 2010, the respondent transferred $1300 and $2000,

respectively, from the firm’s trust account to his personal checking account. As before, Scott

was not informed of either transfer, before, or after, it was made. A deposit was also made,

by the respondent, ‘[u]sing a handwritten checking/saving deposit slip,” into the firm’s trust

account. The source of that $1300 deposit is not known and the respondent did not advise

5
Scott of the deposit, either before or after it was made. After confronting the respondent, 

who neither denied taking the monies nor offered any explanation, Scott terminated the

partnership and, thereafter, filed a complaint with the petitioner.

During the investigation of the Scott complaint, the respondent admitted making both

withdrawals from the firm’s trust account. With respect to the $1300 withdrawal, he claimed

it was a mistake, that he intended to withdraw it from the operating account, and that when

he realized the mistake, he redeposited the funds into the trust account. The $2000, he

explained, were donations to help defray the funeral expenses of his late brother in law,

which were deposited in the trust account on the advice of ‘“a husband and wife team

[attorneys],”’ that was handling his brother in law’s estate. According to the respondent, he

gave the $2000 to Scott, in a white envelope, for deposit in the trust account. Scott denied

ever receiving such an envelope from the respondent.

The petitioner requested the respondent’s financial records, that is, his personal

account at Bank of America. Although he was reminded to provide the requested records,

he never did so. The records were subpoenaed, prompting the respondent to advise the

petitioner, contrary to an earlier representation, that the records had already been sent, that

“he had just requested copies of the records from the bank.”

The respondent, on occasion, accepted representation and fees, but did not report

either in accordance with firm policy, thus mishandling funds entrusted to the firm or fees

owed to the firm. One such example was that involving Keith Hoyle, whom the respondent

6
agreed to represent in a speeding case. Although the respondent was paid $200 for the

representation, “there was no record of the Respondent receiving or recording the fee in the

Firm’s books.”

Another example involved fees owed the firm by the Public Defender for

representation in conflict cases:

“Scott discovered that, on October 20, 2009, a deposit of $ 1, 292.00 was made

to the Firm’s trust account. That same day, $ 1, 292.00 was transferred from

the trust account to the Respondent’s personal account at Bank of America. 

The Firm did not have a record of the receipt or disbursement of these funds. 

Scott researched the matter and determined that a check in the amount of $ 1,

292.00 was received from the State of Maryland, payable to the Firm. Scott’s

investigation of those funds revealed that the check was for services provided

to the Office of the Public Defender by the Firm. Based on his years of

practice with the Respondent, Scott is familiar with Respondent’s handwriting. 

He observed that the Respondent endorsed the deposited check, and the

Respondent wrote the deposit slip for the transaction. ... The check for $ 1,

292.00 was fee income, and should not have been deposited into the trust

account. Even if the Respondent had mistakenly deposited those funds into the

trust account, he failed to follow established Firm procedure and policy to

transfer those funds to the operating account before dispersing those funds as

fee income.”

Two other examples are the $1000 paid to the respondent by a Mr. German, for which

there was no “paper transaction,” indicating a deposit and the $600 Mr. Pedro Corona paid

to the respondent for representation. When the claims of the other people, who contacted

Scott, informing him that they paid the respondent for legal services, is taken into account,

Scott’s “uncontradicted testimony is that the Respondent may have misappropriated between

$40, 000 - $50, 000 in fees owed to the Firm.”

Finally, the respondent, without Scott’s knowledge or consent, intercepted a

7
credit/debit card issued on the firm’s operating account, and used it to withdraw $200 from

an ATM in Maryland, on July 19, 2009. Citing an unspecified emergency in New Jersey, the

respondent admitted to the withdrawal. His explanation for the withdrawal in Maryland - that

it was to repay a loan from his aunts and uncles - was determined by the court to lack

credibility.

From the foregoing, Judge Norman drew conclusions of law, as follows:

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that during the

period 2009 through 2010, the Respondent converted, for his personal use, fees

owed to the Firm. On occasion, during the period 2009 through May 2010, the

Respondent transferred funds from the Firm’s attorney trust account to his

personal bank account. During the period 2009 through June 2010, the

Respondent used trust funds maintained in the Firm’s attorney trust account for

unauthorized purposes. ... The Respondent did not inform Scott of the subjectmatter transfers.

“The Respondent failed to maintain and complete records of the

transfers he made from the Firm’s attorney trust account to his personal bank

account. ...

“During the period 2009 through June 3, 2010, Respondent engaged in

conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, and/or misrepresentation in his dealings

with Scott. ...

* * * *

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

knowingly made a false statement of material fact to Bar Counsel, when he

testified on December 6, 2010, that he gave $2, 000 in cash to Scott to be

deposited to the Firm’s trust account. The Respondent represented that he

discussed the funds, i.e. the purported donations to defray the cost of his

brother-in-law’s funeral, with two lawyers who advised him to put the funds in

the Firm’s trust account. ... Scott testified that the Firm’s records did not show

the transaction. This Court finds Scott’s testimony, that he neither had

knowledge of these funds, nor had he received $2, 000 in cash from the

8
Respondent, to be credible.

“The Respondent’s representation that two attorneys instructed him to

deposit the $2, 000 in the trust account was not corroborated. Both lawyers

denied speaking with the Respondent about such funds, and indicated that they

would not have advised hm to put the funds in the Firm’s operating account.

“The source of the $2, 000 was certainly material to Bar Counsel’s

investigation of the transfers of the trust funds to the Respondent’s personal

account. Clear and convincing evidence exists that the Respondent’s statement

concerning the $2, 000 was a material misrepresentation and that he thereby

violated MRPC 8.1 (a).

“The Respondent’s explanation for the $1,300 transfer on May 19, 2010,

was also shown to be a material misrepresentation. In his December 6, 2010

statement, the Respondent said that on May 19, 2010, he wanted to take a

$1,300 advance on his regular draw from the operating account, but mistakenly

wrote the trust account number on the withdrawal slip. According to the

Respondent, the funds were needed to pay taxes owed on his mother’s property,

and that he gave the funds to his brother to pay the taxes. The Respondent

testified that the mistake was discovered when Scott questioned him about the

transaction, and that he returned the funds to the trust account that same day,

May 25, 2010. ... However, the Respondent could not have learned from Scott

about, and corrected, the error on May 25 , because Scott did [not] know of the th

$1,300 transaction until after the May 28 transfer of the $2,000. After May th

28 , he confronted the Respondent about the $1,300 transfer. th

“The bank records for the Respondent’s personal account demonstrated

that the $1,300 transferred to the personal account on May 19, 2010, was

disbursed for what appears to be the Respondent’s living expenses, (i.e. car

payments and debit card purchases from grocery stores). None of the

disbursements between May 19 and May 25 were in the amount of $1,300, th th

and none were to the Respondent’s mother or brother. ... Additionally, Ramsey

[the petitioner’s investigator] interviewed the Respondent’s brother, who did

not corroborate the Respondent’s representations that the funds were used to

pay their mother’s property taxes. This Court find by clear and convincing

evidence that the Respondent made material misrepresentations to Bar Counsel

concerning the $1,300 transaction, in violation of MRPC 8.1 (a).

“This Court finds the Respondent also violated [MRPC] 8.1 (b) when he

9
knowingly failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s demands for bank records for his

personal account. It was not disputed that on or about December 6. 2010,

Assistant Bar Counsel requested the Respondent to provide financial records. 

On or about February 25, 2011, Ramsey reminded the Respondent that

Assistant Bar Counsel requested his financial records. On or about March 31,

2011, the Respondent was again reminded that Assistant Bar Counsel requested

that he provide financial records. The Respondent failed to provide the

financial records requested by Bar Counsel. The Respondent’s failure to

produce the requested records constituted a violation of MRPC 8.1 (b). This

Rule is interpreted to require an attorney to respond to letters or telephone calls

from a disciplinary authority without the use of a subpoena. Attorney

Grievance Commission v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 248-249, 760 A. 2d 1108,

1115-1116 (2000).

* * * *

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

violated BOP § 10-306 when he intentionally used trust funds for unauthorized

purposes. Scott testified that the Firm’s trust account was used to hold prepaid

fees, and when fees were earned they were deposited to the Firm’s operating

account. The Respondent and Scott then received draws from the operating

account on the 15 and 30 of the month. Scott testified that funds were not th th

disbursed from the trust account directly to either him and/or Respondent.

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that on two

occasions in November 2009, on one occasion in December 2009, and twice

in May 2010, the Respondent transferred funds from the trust account directly

to his personal account. ... Scott testified that the Respondent was not owed

funds from the trust account at the time of the transfers. The Respondent

admitted that the funds disbursed to his personal account in November and

December 2009 were not owed to the Firm. ... The fact that the Respondent

paid back the $1,300 disbursement made on May 19, 2010, and Scott replaced

the other funds in the trust account when he became aware of the transaction,

provides further evidence that neither Respondent, nor the Firm, were entitled

or authorized to [] take funds in the trust account at the time of the

disbursements.

“In addition, the Respondent offered no evidence that the disbursements

were authorized by the clients or earned by the Firm. ... The Respondent’s

explanation to Scott for the November and December transactions was that he

10
needed the funds to pay debts owed for the purchase of stock options. The

uncontroverted testimony is that the Respondent apologized to Scott for

transferring the money. The Respondent clearly understood his actions

constituted wrongful conduct. The Respondent offered Scott no explanation for

the May 2010 disbursements.

“This Court does not find the Respondent’s explanations to Bar Counsel

for the 2010 transfers credible. The Respondent represented that the $1,300

transfer was mistakenly disbursed from the trust account instead of the Firm’s

operating account. ... Scott’s testimony, the bank records, or the Respondent’s

brother’s interview does not support the Respondent’s explanation. The

Respondent’s explanation for the $2,000 transfer was that he believed those

funds represented $2,000 cash collected for his late brother-in-law’s funeral,

which he gave to Scott to deposit to the trust account. ... The Respondent’s

representation that he discussed the $2,000 with two other lawyers was not

confirmed. Scott denied any knowledge of the $2,000 in cash, and the

Respondent offered no evidence to the contrary. This Court finds as a fact that

Respondent lied when he told Ramsey that he gave $2,000 to Scott in a white

envelope.

* * * *

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness

and fitness as a lawyer in other respects. A violation of MRPC 8.4 (b) does not

require that the lawyer be prosecuted for, or convicted of, the criminal offense. 

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 810 A. 2d 996

(2002). As indicated above, the Respondent willfully misappropriated trust

funds for his own use, in violation of BOP § 10-306. The intentional

unauthorized use of trust funds is a criminal misdemeanor pursuant to BOP §

10-606 (b). ...

“In addition, the Respondent misappropriated the Firm’s funds. The

October 20, 2009 transaction involving the $1,292.50 check made payable to

‘Scott & Kahl, L.L.C.’, and the other incidents described by Scott, provide clear

and convincing evidence that the Respondent intentionally misappropriated fees

intended for the Firm. ... The Respondent also used the Firm’s credit/debit card

for an unauthorized purpose. ... These transactions provide further clear and

convincing evidence that the Respondent engaged in criminal conduct

involving theft; and that this conduct is adversely reflected on his honesty,

11
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. ...

“The Respondent’s use of trust funds for unauthorized purposes; his

theft of client and Firm funds; and his failure to disclose these transactions to

his partner are dishonest and deceitful. This Court finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the Respondent engaged in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by intentionally making

misrepresentations to Bar Counsel in order to hide his misappropriations of

funds in violation of MRPC 8.4 ( c).

“This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent

engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of

[MRPC] 8.4 (d). Conduct that reflects negatively on the legal profession and

sets a bad example for the public at large is prejudicial to the administration of

justice. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22, 922 A. 2d 554,

566 (2007). Criminal conduct involving misappropriation of trust funds, and

conduct involving dishonesty and deceit reflects negatively on the legal

profession. The Respondent has, therefore, violated MRPC 8.4 (d).

“The foregoing findings of violations of the MRPC provide clear and

convincing evidence that the Respondent violated MRPC 8.4 (a).

* * * *

“Subject to the informed consent of the client, prepaid fees must be

deposited to, and held in a trust account until earned. MRPC 1.15 ( c). This

Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent failed to hold

client-funds deposited in his Firm’s attorney trust account, separate from his

own property. When the Respondent made the transfers in November and

December 2009, and again in May 2010, he violated MRPC 1.15 (a).

“The Respondent also violated MRPC 1.15 (a) when he deposited the

check from the Office of the Public Defender to the Firm’s trust account,

thereby commingling the Firm’s earned fees with trust funds. ...

* * * *

“The Respondent’s admissions and Scott’s testimony that the Firm’s

records did not include the disbursements made by the Respondent from the

trust account on November 2, 20, 2009; December 7, 2009; and May 19, 25,

12
and 28, 2010, provide clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent did

not properly record the transaction or see that the transactions were recorded by

Scott. Therefore this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the

Respondent violated MRPC 16-606.1.

* * * *

“The same evidence, which supported the finding that Respondent

violated BOP § 10-306, provides clear and convincing evidence that the

Respondent used trust funds for unauthorized purpose in violation of Md. Rule

16-609.”

Neither the petitioner nor the respondent filed exceptions to Judge Norman’s Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Accordingly, we shall “treat the findings of fact as

established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.” Maryland Rule 16-

759 (b) (2) (A). On the other hand, as Rule 16-759 (b) (1) mandates that we do, we “shall 

review de novo the Circuit Court judge's conclusions of law.” That non-deferential review

convinces us that the conclusions of law drawn by Judge Norman are supported by the facts

found and, so, we shall accept, and adopt, them as established by clear and convincing

evidence.

This leaves for determination only the appropriate sanction. On January 18, 2013, the

date set for oral argument, we issued a Per Curiam Order immediately disbarring the

respondent “for reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed.” We now state those

reasons.

In its Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanctions, the petitioner offered the following

rationale for its recommendation that the respondent be disbarred:

13
“Respondent’s conduct constituted a betrayal of the trust placed in him by his

law partner and clients. Respondent engaged in further dishonest and deceitful

conduct in his representations to Bar Counsel in order to cover up his

misconduct. Judge Norman found no mitigating factors. Absent compelling

extenuating circumstances, intentional misappropriation of another’s funds is

deceitful and dishonest conduct which justifies disbarment. See e.g. Attorney

Grievance Commission v. Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 58-59, 25 A. 3d 181, 199

(2011), citing Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vlahos, 369 Md. 183, 186,

798 A. 2d 555, 556 (2002) (holding that disbarment was proper, where the

attorney misappropriated payments from clients of his firm for his own use and

took steps to conceal his conduct from his firm) and Attorney Grievance

Commission v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 572, 810 A. 2d 487, 494 (2002) (holding

that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated

funds from his real estate partners).”

Although not making a sanction recommendation, Judge Norman cited the holdings of

Carithers and Vlahos in support of his conclusion that the respondent’s conduct “adversely

reflected on [the respondent’s] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other

respects.” We agree with this rationale, and emphasize that it is one that is well settled in

attorney discipline cases. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 404, 593

A.2d 1087, 1092 (1991); Matter of Murray, 316 Md. 303, 308, 558 A.2d 710, 712 (1989);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sparrow, 314 Md. 421, 426-27, 550 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1988);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 687, 480 A.2d 807, 817 (1984);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Molovinsky, 300 Md. 291, 296, 477 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1984);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 609, 441 A.2d 328, 333 (1982);

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Burka, 292 Md. 221, 225, 438 A.2d 514, 517 (1981);Bar

Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 520, 307 A.2d 677, 682 (1973). Indeed, what we said in

14
Marshall has particular relevance to this case and all cases involving attorney

misappropriation:

“‘[I]t is essential that all members of the legal fraternity be strongly and

constantly impressed with the truism that in handling moneys and properties

belonging to their clients or others that they accept them in trust and are strictly

accountable for their conduct in administering that trust, so they dare not

appropriate those funds and properties for their personal use. The

misappropriation by an attorney of funds of others entrusted to his care, be the

amount small or large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of

professional misconduct[,]”’

 269 Md. 519, 307 A.2d at 682. Accordingly, we adopted the petitioner’s recommendation

and disbarred the respondent.

15