UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MARCOS SANCHEZ, De fendant - Appellant. No. 17-2064 (D.C. Nos. 1:15 -CV-01188-JB-SMV and 1:04-CR- 01685-JB-1) (D. N.M.)

__________________ ______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before MATHESON , BACHARACH , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ The defendant, Mr. Marcos Sanc hez, was convicted in 2006 of possessing a firearm after a prior fe lony conviction an d sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1 ). The sentence was enhanced under the Arme d Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which created a fifteen-year mandatory minimum. In district court, Mr.

* We have determined that oral argu ment would not ma terially aid our consideration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34( a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. This order and judgme nt does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But our order and judgment may be ci ted for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 1, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Sanchez unsuccessfully challenged the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm. * * * The Armed Career Criminal Act would have been triggered by three or more past convictions for violen t felonies or serious drug crimes. Applying the Armed Career Criminal Act, the dist rict court characterized the crimes underlying Mr. Sanchez’s past convictions as “violent felonies.” All of these convictions were for residential burglary under New Mexico law. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a felony conviction could be considered a “violent fel ony” in one of three ways. First, under the “elements clause ,” a conviction would constitute a “violent felony” if an element consisted of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ag ainst another person. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Second, under the “enu merated-offense clause,” a conviction would count as a “violent fel ony” if it was for burglary, arson, extortion, or another crime involvi ng the use of expl osives. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Third, under the “res idual clause,” a convic tion would constitute a “violent felony” if it otherwise involved conduct creating a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person. Id.3 Since the sentencing t ook place, the Supreme Co urt has held that the residual clause is unco nstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556-63 (2015) . Mr. Sanchez relies on the constitutional infirmity of the residual clause, ar guing that the se ntence enhancement would no longer be permissible. To decide this appeal, we mu st determine whether residential burglary under New Mexi co law would constitute a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. We can no longer rely on the residual clause because it is unconstitutionall y vague, and the government does not invoke the elements clause . As a result, the senten ce could be enhanced only if the New Mexico crime of residential burglary would satisfy the enumerated-offense clause. We recently addres sed this issue in United States v. Turrieta , holding that a conviction for resi dential burglary in Ne w Mexico satisfies the enumerated-offense clause . 875 F.3d 1340 (10th Ci r. 2017). Mr . Sanchez acknowledges that Turrieta forecloses relief but argues that Turrieta was wrongly decided. Appe llant’s Supp. Br., passim (Dec. 12, 2017). We recently denied a petition for rehearing in Turrieta and are obligated to follow that opinion. United States v. Tafoya , 557 F.3d 1121, 1129 (10th4 Cir. 2009). As a result, we affirm the denial of Mr. Sanchez’s § 2255 motion. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge