If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

December 22, 2022

v No. 359266

Bay Circuit Court

DAVID JAMES CRAMER, JR., LC No. 20-010385-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing 

a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and the trial court’s order finding him in contempt of court, 

MCL 600.1711. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 90 days in jail and one year of 

probation for the resisting or obstructing a police officer conviction and three days in jail for 

contempt of court. We affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant’s conviction of resisting or obstructing a police officer arose from an incident 

during the evening of July 4, 2020, at approximately 9:00 p.m. On that date, Bay City Department 

of Public Safety Officers Austin Bischer and Jonah O’Laughlin were working in full police 

uniform and traveling in a fully marked police vehicle. At the beginning and during his shift, 

Officer Bischer reviewed subjects with active felony warrants, and if he encountered those subjects 

during his shift, he would take the individuals into custody to protect the public. As a result of this 

review, Officer Bischer learned that defendant had a valid felony warrant for operating while 

intoxicated. He was familiar with defendant because of prior contacts and reviewed defendant’s 

recent driver’s license photograph as well as social media postings to confirm his identity and 

appearance.

When the officers drove up to an address on Fitzhugh, defendant was observed standing 

on the sidewalk near the front yard. When Officer Bischer got out of his patrol vehicle and asked 

defendant if he could talk to him, defendant began to turn away from Officer Bischer. After Officer 

Bischer instructed defendant not to go anywhere, defendant started running toward the house. As 
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defendant went up the steps to the house, Officer Bischer told defendant that he had a felony 

warrant for defendant’s arrest, but defendant continued up the steps and entered the house. 

Although Officer Bischer followed defendant to the steps with the intent to take defendant into 

custody, an unknown individual prevented the officer from going up the steps. Additionally, the

officers were concerned about their safety because there were 5 to 10 individuals present that were 

acting in an aggressive manner. After defendant entered the home, defendant’s father appeared on 

the front steps and stood above Officer Bischer. He also cursed, screamed, and threatened the 

officer.

After defendant entered the house, Officer O’Laughlin walked to the backyard and saw 

defendant leave through the back door. Officer O’Laughlin said, “stop, police,” and defendant 

began to run. Officer O’Laughlin chased defendant. Defendant ran around a shed that was at the 

end of the driveway and back to the front yard. Officer Bischer told defendant to “come over 

here,” but defendant reentered the house. Additional officers and a sergeant arrived at the scene. 

The sergeant and defendant’s father deescalated the situation. Defendant eventually exited the 

home and was taken into custody approximately 15 minutes after the incident began.

On September 24, 2021, the trial commenced, but defendant did not appear. At 8:55 a.m., 

the trial court went on the record to inquire about defendant’s location. Defense counsel 

represented that he was unable to reach defendant on his home telephone, his cellular telephone, 

or by text message. Defendant’s mother called defense counsel’s office, reporting that defendant 

was at work, and representing that she would call him and tell him to report to the courthouse. The 

trial court revoked defendant’s bond and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. The trial court 

noted that 40 prospective jurors were waiting.

At 9:22 a.m., defendant appeared for the trial. At a separate contempt proceeding, 

defendant represented that he was at work and misunderstood the date of trial. Defendant believed 

that the trial was scheduled for two days later. While at work, defendant saw that he missed three 

calls from his mother. Upon learning that the trial was scheduled, defendant left work and came 

to the courthouse. Defense counsel stated that he advised defendant of the trial date and sent 

notices to defendant’s home. Defense counsel did not dispute that defendant was in contempt of 

court. He noted that defendant arrived for the trial, and the court was only “a little bit behind.” 

Accordingly, defense counsel requested that no or “light” sanctions be imposed. The trial court 

held defendant in contempt and initially imposed a sentence of 30 days in jail, but reduced the 

sentence to three days.

At the trial, Officers Bischer and O’Laughlin testified regarding defendant’s felony 

warrant, their arrival on the scene, defendant’s failure to adhere to their commands, the aggressive 

nature of the bystanders at the scene, and the need to call additional officers. After approximately 

15 minutes, defendant was taken into custody. Additionally, both officers wore body cameras, 

and the footage was admitted and played for the jury. At the conclusion of the testimony, the jury 

found defendant guilty of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE–—RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING

Defendant alleges that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support the 

conviction of resisting or obstructing a police officer. We disagree.
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This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v 

Savage, 327 Mich App 604, 613; 935 NW2d 69 (2019). When reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, this Court must examine the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could determine whether 

the crime’s essential elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Reese, 491 Mich 

127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012); People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394, 402-403; 956 NW2d 562 

(2020). Due process compels the prosecution to prove every element of a crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. People v Smith, 336 Mich App 297, 308; 970 NW2d 450 (2021). “A jury, and 

not an appellate court, observes the witnesses and listens to their testimony; therefore, an appellate 

court must not interfere with the jury’s role in assessing the weight of the evidence and the 

credibility of the witnesses.” Kenny, 332 Mich App at 403.

The element of intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v Johnson-El, 

299 Mich App 648, 653; 831 NW2d 478 (2013). Because of the difficulty in proving an actor’s 

state of mind, only minimal circumstantial evidence is required to establish a defendant’s intent. 

Smith, 336 Mich App at 308. Id. A defendant’s intent can be gleaned or inferred from his actions.

See People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 615; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).

To convict a defendant of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer under 

MCL 750.81d(1), the prosecution must prove: “(1) the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, 

resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a police officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had 

reason to know that the person that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, 

obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer performing his or her duties.” People v 

Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 68; 859 NW2d 229 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Third, because citizens have a common-law right to resist illegal police conduct, the prosecution 

must also prove that the officers’ actions were lawful. See People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 48, 51-

52; 814 NW2d 624 (2012) (holding that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate the common-law right to 

resist illegal police conduct, including unlawful arrests). The lawfulness of the arrest presents an 

element of the offense, and an issue for resolution by the jury. Vandenberg, 307 Mich App at 68-

69. Prearrest flight is sufficient to establish the offense of resisting and obstructing a police officer. 

People v Pohl, 207 Mich App 332, 333; 523 NW2d 634 (1994). Physical obstruction need not 

occur,1rather, a defendant’s conduct in hindering a police officer’s investigation is sufficient. Id.

For a jury to convict a defendant of resisting or obstructing a police officer, all that is 

necessary is for the jury to find that defendant took the “requisite physical action to prevent a 

police officer from performing his lawful duties.” People v Morris, 314 Mich App 399, 414; 886 

NW2d 910 (2016). It was unnecessary to prove that the defendant ran away from the officers. Id. 

“[O]bstructing an officer through a ‘knowing failure to comply with a lawful command’ requires 

some physical refusal to comply with a command, as opposed to a mere verbal statement of 

disagreement.” Id. at 409 n 6. In this case, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that 

defendant took the requisite physical action to prevent the officers from performing their lawful 

duty of arresting him when he ran away after being ordered to stop. Pohl, 207 Mich app at 333. 

 

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“ ‘Obstruct’ includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing 

failure to comply with a lawful command.” MCL 750.81d(7)(a).
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Defendant’s acts of running away prevented the officers from performing their lawful duty of 

arresting him in light of a pending lawful felony warrant.

Nonetheless, defendant submits that there was insufficient evidence that defendant knew 

that the officers arrived to arrest him or that he intended to resist them in the performance of their 

duties. Specifically, on appeal, defendant contends that the officers did not advise him of the 

outstanding felony warrant until he was in the home, and once he was apprised about the warrant, 

he voluntarily surrendered. But defendant did not testify at trial, and there is no record evidence 

to support defendant’s contention. Rather, Officer Bischer testified that he advised defendant of 

the warrant before defendant entered the home. To convict defendant of resisting or obstructing a 

police officer, the jury apparently found this testimony credible. Morris, 314 Mich App at 415.

Furthermore, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 

Reese, 491 Mich at 139. Thus, after being apprised of the felony arrest warrant, defendant ran into 

the home. He also exited the back of the home and disregarded Officer O’Laughlin’s instructions 

to stop, avoided the officer by running around a shed, and ran to the front yard and reentered the 

home. Officer Bischer testified that a sergeant and other officers arrived at the scene and 

negotiated a peaceful resolution with defendant’s father. There was no testimony that defendant 

learned of a lawful warrant and then decided to surrender.

Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no requirement that the prosecutor 

establish that defendant knew that the police officer’s actions were lawful. The prosecution was 

required to prove that the officers’ actions were lawful, Moreno, 491 Mich at 51-52, not 

defendant’s knowledge of lawfulness. Whether an officer’s actions were lawful is a “question of 

fact for the jury,” People v Quinn, 305 Mich App 484, 494; 853 NW2d 383 (2014), and the jury 

resolved this issue in favor of the prosecution. Accordingly, the prosecution presented sufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew or had reason to know that the 

individuals he resisted were police officers performing their duties because the officers were in a 

fully marked police vehicle and dressed in their police uniforms when they encountered defendant. 

The prosecution also presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

officers’ actions were lawful, because the purpose of Officer Bischer’s and O’Laughlin’s 

encounter with defendant was to arrest him pursuant to a felony warrant. Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable juror could find, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that defendant knew or had reason to know that he was resisting or obstructing police 

officers who were performing their duties and that the officers’ actions were lawful.

III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendant contends that the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction deprived him of a 

viable defense—that is, that he fled because he was panicked and in fear and did not know that 

there was a warrant for his arrest—and, therefore, violated his constitutional right to present a 

defense. We disagree.

“We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de novo, but we 

review the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of the case for an 

abuse of discretion.” People v Everett, 318 Mich App 511, 528; 899 NW2d 94 (2017) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is not within the 
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range of reasonable and principled outcomes, when it makes an error of law, or when it operates 

within an incorrect legal framework. Id. at 516. Furthermore, “[e]ven when instructional error 

occurs, [r]eversal is warranted only if after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively 

appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” Id. at 528 

(quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original). Finally, the burden is on the 

defendant to show “that the error undermined the reliability of the verdict.” Id. at 528-529 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of resisting or obstructing in 

accordance with M Crim JI 13.1. During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the 

prosecution had to prove that defendant knew or had reason to know that the officers’ actions were 

lawful at the time of the incident. The prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s 

mischaracterization of the law and requested a curative instruction. As noted in section II, 

defendant’s statement of the law was incorrect, and the trial judge concluded the same. The trial 

court reinstructed the jury using the same instruction that it had previously given, but the court 

added the following sentence to the instructions provided in M Crim JI 13.1: “The prosecutor need 

not prove that at the time of the events the [d]efendant knew that the order, or command was 

lawful.”

“[J]ury instructions must include all the elements of the charged offenses and any material 

issues, defenses, and theories that are supported by the evidence.” People v McKinney, 258 Mich 

App 157, 162-163; 670 NW2d 254 (2003). MCR 2.512(B)(1) provides that “[a]t any time during 

the trial, the court may, with or without request, instruct the jury on a point of law if the instruction 

will materially aid the jury in understanding the proceedings and arriving at a just verdict.” When 

the applicable law or circumstance is not covered by the Model Criminal Jury Instructions, a trial 

court may give additional instructions as long as they are “patterned as nearly as practicable after 

the style of the model instructions” and are “concise, understandable, conversational, unslanted, 

and nonargumentative.” MCR 2.512(D)(4). This court rule gives the trial court broad authority

to fulfill its requirement to instruct the jury properly, and there is nothing in the rule to preclude

the trial court from supplementing its original instructions. People v Craft, 325 Mich App 598,

607; 927 NW2d 708 (2018). Rather, the court rule was designed to provide the trial court with the

appropriate tools to avoid error, and if necessary, to correct any errors. Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing a supplemental instruction upon 

request by the prosecution after defense counsel misstated the law. The supplemental instruction 

was concise and understandable, and resolved any confusion created by the inappropriate argument 

by the defense. Further, defendant’s argument that the supplemental instruction infringed upon 

his due process right to present a defense is without merit. Defendant operated on a mistaken 

belief that the prosecution had to prove that at the time of the events defendant knew that the order 

or command was lawful. Such knowledge is not an element of resisting or obstructing, see 

MCL 750.81d(1).

IV. CONTEMPT OF COURT

Defendant submits that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he exhibited disruptive 

behavior or that an order of contempt was necessary to restore order to the court. We disagree.
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This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Savage, 327 

Mich App at 613; see also In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 677; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). 

“The issuance of an order of contempt rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed 

only for an abuse of discretion.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App at 671. The trial court 

abuses its discretion when its decision is outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. 

Additionally, the findings made by a trial court “in a contempt proceeding are reviewed for clear 

error and must be affirmed on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them.” Id. at 668.

“Clear error exists when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 

made.” Id. at 669. Finally, “[t]he appellate court may not weigh the evidence or the credibility of 

the witnesses in determining whether there is competent evidence to support the findings.” Id. at 

668.

“Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public 

wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Porter v Porter, 285 Mich App 450, 

455; 776 NW2d 377 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Criminal contempt is 

intended to punish the contemnor for past conduct that affronts the dignity of the court.” Id. The 

court’s exercise of its criminal contempt power is not designed to force the contemnor to comply 

with an order, but simply punishes the contemnor for past misconduct that was an affront to the 

court’s dignity. Id. There are several circumstances that may cause a trial court to find a defendant 

in criminal contempt of court, including when a party disobeys a “lawful order . . . of the court.” 

MCL 600.1701(g).

Before the date of trial, the trial court entered several orders noticing the parties of the time 

and date of trial. Even so, when the trial court first went on the record at the commencement of 

defendant’s trial at 8:55 a.m. on September 14, 2021, defendant was not present in the courtroom. 

It was not until 9:22 a.m.—27 minutes later—when the court reconvened that defendant was 

present in the courtroom. Although defendant testified that he thought his trial was on Thursday 

instead of Tuesday, defendant’s counsel told the court that he had advised defendant of the trial 

date and had sent notices to defendant’s house. By failing to arrive at the start of trial despite 

adequate notice, defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err in finding defendant guilty of criminal contempt of court.

Affirmed.

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron 

/s/ Anica Letica