United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 7, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________ No. 06-30869 (Sum mary Calendar)

_________________ CHAMBERS MEDICAL FOUNDATION, Pl aint iff,
versus CAROL M. PETRIE, Defendant - Appellee,
versus RUSSELL C. CHAMBERS, Estate Movant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana No. 2:05-CV-786 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and GARZA, Circuit Judges.* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the cour t h as determ ined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set fo rth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. -2- PER CURIAM: * The Estate of Dr. Russell Chambers (“Estate”) appeals the district court’s denial of it s mo tion to int ervene in the underlying suit between the Chambers Medical Foundation (“Foundation”) and Carol Petrie Chambers (“Petrie”). The Estate filed a motion t o i nt ervene both as of right and permissively, asserting th at the Estate has an int erest in the lit igation because the Estate’s tax liabilit y may be affected by the outcom e and because the Estate has an interest in seeing th at Dr. Russell’s “estate plan”, as embo died by the agreement at issue in the suit (“the Agreement”), is protected. The district court denied int ervention on the grounds that the Estate did not have a sufficient interest in the lit igati on and that any int erest the Estate did possess was adequately represented by the Foundation. A district court’s denial of a mo tion fo r int ervention as of right is reviewed de novo . See Ross
v. Marshall , 426 F.3d 745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005). Intervention as of right is to be permit ted upon timely application “when the applicant claims an int erest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical mat ter impair or impede the applicant’s abilit y to protect th at int erest, unles s th e a pplicant’s int erest is adequately represented by existing parties.” FE D . R. C IV . P. 24(a)(2) . This Court requires th at the int erest asserted in int ervention be “direct, substantial and legally protectable.” Ross , 426 F.3d at 757. “Orders denying permissive int ervention are reviewed fo r ‘clear abuse of discretion’ and will be reversed only if ‘ext raordinary circumstances’ are shown.” T rans Chemical Ltd. v. China Nat.-3-

Machinery Import and Export Corp. , 332 F.3d 815, 821-22 (5th Cir. 2003). Under Rule 24(b), permissive int ervention is appropri ate where “an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” Id. at 824. The Estate fir st argues th at the district court erred in denying its motion to intervene as of right because the Estate’s int erest in the lit igation is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a). Th e Estate argues that if Petrie alleges and the trial court finds that the entire Agreement is unenforceable, the transaction embo died by the Agreement would have to be “unwound” and assets shift ed, which might have unspecified tax implicat io ns fo r the Estate and would undo Dr. Chambers’ “estate plan.” The Estate does not describe in detail how and to what degree the prospective results from the inst ant lit igation would actually affect the Estate’s tax liabilit y or i ts abilit y t o collect contri bution. Accordingly, the Estate’s fails to sufficiently specify its financial interest in the case and does not meet it s burden of showing a “direct, substantial and legally protectable” int erest. S ee Ross , 426 F.3d at 757. The Estate also cit es no legal authority suggesting that its abstract interest in ensuring th at Dr. Chambers’ estate plan is effectuated is sufficient to render the Estate an indispensable party and warrant intervention as of right. S ee id. Further, the Estate does not articulate why the Foundation cannot adequately represent it s int erest in defending the enforceability of the Agreement. Because the Estate has failed to demonstrate either the sufficiency of its interest
or the inadequacy of the existing party ’s representation if it , the district court did not err in denying the Estate’s motion to intervene as of right. Id. The Estate also ar g ues th at the district court clearly abused it s discretion in denying permissive int ervention. The Estate argues that permissive intervention was warranted because the Estate has an econom

ic int erest in the outcom

e of the suit. The Estate cites no authority suggesting-4-

th at refusal to allo w permissive int ervention by a party wit h an indirect and undefined econom ic int erest in the suit constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. The Estate also fails to otherwise establish th at “extraordinary circumstances” are sufficient ly present to warrant reversal of the district court’s decision. S ee Trans Chemical Ltd. , 332 F.3d at 821-22. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention. AFFIRMED.