In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1768

KENDALL REID and BRADLEY SEARS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSISTANCE

CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11-CV-8683 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2013 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2014 

Before BAUER, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Kendall Reid and Bradley

Sears allege that Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of

America discharged them in retaliation for making protected

complaints, in violation of Illinois law. It is undisputed that the

plaintiffsmade protected complaints and were discharged, but

the district court granted summary judgment to NACA,

concluding that plaintiffs had not offered sufficient evidence
2 No. 13-1768

of causation—that is, whether they were discharged in retaliation for their complaints. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the

district court failed to view the evidence (and draw all reasonable inferences) in the light most favorable to them. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

A. Plaintiffs’ Employment

Plaintiffs Kendall Reid and Bradley Sears were hired as atwill employees by Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of

America (“NACA”) in October 2007 and May 2010, respectively. They worked out of NACA’s Chicago office. NACA is

a nationwide not-for-profit corporation that helps potential

homeowners—especially those facing discriminatory or

predatory lending—obtainmortgages to purchase homes. Reid

and Sears worked as mortgage consultants and reported to an

office manager in the Chicago office, Norma Martinez. Martinez answered to a regional operationsdirector in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, Donald Meadows. As mortgage consultants,

plaintiffs were responsible for counseling potential homeowners, helping them assemble mortgage applications, and for

forwarding the applications initially to underwriting and,

eventually, to lenders. Mortgage consultants are required by

federal law to hold a license in order to prepare mortgage

applications. See 12 U.S.C. § 5103 (Supp. 2013). Reid and Don

Meadows (the regional manager) were the only people tied to

the Chicago office who held the appropriate licenses. Sears had

held a license, but it had not been properly registered by

NACA, so he was not appropriately licensed.

As part of preparing the mortgage applications, mortgage

consultants handle documents containing the private personal
No. 13-1768 3

information of NACA’s clients. Accordingly, NACA had a

Document Security Policy (the “paperless policy”) that

required employees to scan documents into a secure digital

system and shred the paper originals to protect the client’s

information—paper files for clients were not to be kept.

Evidence shows that the policy had been at least emailed to

managers, but it had not been enforced in the Chicago office

during the time plaintiffs worked there.

B. Plaintiffs’ Complaints

While working for NACA, plaintiffs made a number of

complaints about NACA’s business practices. First, they

complained about being paid less than Illinois’ minimum

wage. Effective July 1, 2010, Illinois raised its minimum wage

to $8.25 an hour ($1 above the federal minimum wage). 820

ILCS 105/4 (Supp. 2013). Before the effective date of the

increase, Reid asked whether NACA would pay the new

minimum wage and received mixed answers from different

managers. Soon thereafter, another (unspecified) employee

brought up the complaint at a company meeting and NACA’s

CEO, Bruce Marks, replied that NACA “will pay you what we

have to pay ... .” Reid Dep. at 73–74. Throughout that July,

Reid complained to the office manager and the regional

manager that he and other employees were not being paid the

new minimum wage, and on at least one occasion, that he was

not paid overtime when he should have been. 

Second, plaintiffs complained on several occasions that

NACA violated state and federal law in handling mortgage

applications. Specifically, they complained that mortgage

applications were being prepared by unlicensed mortgage
4 No. 13-1768

consultants and signed by licensedmortgage consultants. They

also complainedthat whenthishappened, NACA was splitting

the commissions between licensed and unlicensed mortgage

consultants and the company itself. During an audit of NACA

in February and March of 2010, Reid spoke with state and

federal regulators who told him that these practices were

illegal. After learning the practices were illegal, Reid complained to NACA management as early as April and May 2010.

He made several complaints to NACA management over the

next few months, including his last complaint in late September 2010. Sears also brought similar complaints to management

throughout that time, making his last complaint on October 11,

2010. Sears’s complaints were along different lines. This time

he complained that NACA had dropped the ball during his

licensing process, and as a result, he was not properly licensed

and was not receiving the full commission from NACA for

applications signed by other, licensed mortgage consultants.

Nonetheless, Sears’s complaints contained the same argument

that the practices were illegal.

In sum, plaintiffs’ complaints spanned a period of five to

six months. But they were not alone in their complaints. At

least four other individuals complained about not being paid

minimumwage, others complained about not receiving proper

overtime pay, and at least five others complained about

splitting commissions on mortgage applications prepared

between licensed and unlicensed mortgage consultants.

Further, at least three people complained about both minimum

wage and commission splitting. All of these other complaining

employees were also in the Chicago office and none of them

was fired.
No. 13-1768 5

C. Plaintiffs’ Termination

On Friday, October 8, 2010, Reid left the NACA office early

to attend a Chicago Bulls game. According to Reid, he received

permissionfromthe office manager, Martinez, on the condition

that he work the whole weekend. That weekend, NACA’s

Chicago office was operating as a back-up call center for

another NACA office that was hosting an event. However,

when Reid came in to work on Saturday morning, October 9,

Martinez told him that he was being suspended for leaving

early the night before. Martinez denies that she gave Reid

permission to leave, but at least one other witness corroborates

Reid’s story, so—because we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to Reid—we must assume that he had permission to leave, but was suspended regardless. 

On Monday, October 11, Rachelle Pride, NACA’s National

Real Estate Director, visited the Chicago office as part of a

nationwide effort to train NACA-affiliated real estate agents.

On that day, the office was closed for business and staffed only

by the skeleton crew of Sears, Martinez, and another mortgage

consultant, Mariola Jasinska. Martinez gave Pride a tour of the 1

office. During the tour, Pride noticed a number of violations of

NACA’s policies, including alcoholic beverages in Reid’s office

and volumes of paper copies of documents with confidential

information visible throughout the Chicago office, in violation

of the paperless policy. Pride called Marks to get instructions.

He told her to coordinate with Human Resources (“HR”) and

then ask that Sears and Jasinska turn in their office keys and

 That Monday was Columbus Day.

1
6 No. 13-1768

leave the office for the remainder of the day. After talking to

Christine Cannonier in HR, Pride met with Sears and Jasinska

individually to explain the violation of the paperless policy,

receive their keys, and ask them to leave, which they did. Pride

explained to Jasinska that she was not fired at that time, but

that she did need to leave for the day. Sears testified that Pride

told him he was fired as soon as she saw the violations of the

paperless policy, but Pride denies that. In any event, Sears

received formal notice of his termination on October 14.

Then, pursuant to Cannonier’s instructions, Pride photographically documented the violations of the paperless policy.

The photos revealed that every employee in the office but one

was in violation of the policy. Marks and Cannonier asked

Pride to stay in Chicago a while longerto interview the office’s

customers. During those interviews, Pride discovered that

applications assembled by Reidhadnotbeen timely forwarded

and, as a result, all of the customers’ information had expired

and would need to be redone. That delay was also a violation

of NACA policy. Pride passed all this information along to

Marks, who also spoke with Cannonier and Meadows.

Through some ofthe conversations andconference calls, Marks

was made aware that Sears’s client service was poor, though at

the time of his deposition he could not recall from whom he

had heard that.

Faced with an entire office in violation of its paperless

policy, NACA asserts that it decided to fire three people:

Jasinska and plaintiffs Reid and Sears. In an early response to

an interrogatory asking for the names of “all” people involved

in making the decision to fire the plaintiffs, NACA listed only

Cannonier, Meadows, and Pride. However, there is conflicting
No. 13-1768 7

evidence concerning how and by whom the firing decision was

made, with deposition testimony indicating that it was either

just Bruce Marks or a group of managers. NACA later updated

its interrogatory answer to include Marks among those

involved in making the decision (consistent with the prior

deposition testimony ofMeadows, andCannonier and the later

testimony of Marks and Pride). NACA insists (and Marks

testified) that, though Marks consulted with other managers,

he alone made the final decision to fire plaintiffs. It is undisputed that he was not aware of plaintiffs’ complaints. Nonetheless, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, in

addition to Marks, at least Meadows, Cannonier, and Pride had

a hand in making the decision and Cannonier and Meadows

had knowledge of plaintiffs’ complaints. Sears and Reid

received formal notice of their termination on October 14,

2010.2

NACA justifies its decision to fire Reid and Sears based on

their violations of the paperless policy and on its belief that

Reid had left work early for the Bulls game. Later in discovery,

NACA explained that the reason Reid and Sears were

fired—while other violators of the paperless policy were

not—was that Reidand Sears had problems in addition to their

violation of the paperless policy. These problems included the

Martinez was also later terminated, in part because of the violations of

2

the paperless policy that occurred under her management of the Chicago

office.
8 No. 13-1768

alcohol in Reid’s office, his expired client files, and Marks’s

perception that Sears’s customer service was poor.

3

After their termination, plaintiffs brought suit in Illinois

state court alleging state law retaliation claims. NACA removed to federal court and subsequently moved for summary

judgment. Thedistrict courtgranted NACA’s motion, concluding the plaintiffs had not offered sufficient evidence for a jury

to find in their favor regarding causation. Plaintiffs appeal,

arguing that the district court failed to construe the record in

the light most favorable to them and that both (1) the timing of

their firing in relation to their complaints, and (2) the evolution

of NACA’s interrogatory answers about the reasons for, and

the decision-makers involved in, their termination create an

inference that Reid and Sears were really fired for their

protected complaints.

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de

novo. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.

2005). Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

presents “no genuine issue as to any material fact” such that

“the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A “court may not assess the

credibility of witnesses, choose between competing inferences

or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence; it must

 Marks testified that Jasinska was also selected for firing based on 3

an attendance problem in addition to her violations of the paperless

policy.
No. 13-1768 9

view all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and resolve all factual disputes in

favor of the non-moving party.” Id. at 773.

To survive a motion for summary judgment on an Illinois

retaliatory discharge claim, a plaintiff must have offered

sufficient evidence for a jury to find that (1) the employer

discharged the employee (2) in retaliation for the employee’s

protected activities, and (3) that the discharge was in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. Palmateer v. Int’l

Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981). 

Plaintiffs were discharged after they complained that

NACA’s wage and hour practices and mortgage application

practices violated Illinois and federal law, which the parties

assume were protected complaints. Accordingly, the only 4

issue before us is whether plaintiffs proffered sufficient

evidence that their discharge was in retaliation for their

complaints. Simply put, the question is whether the plaintiffs

offered proof of causation. For the element of causation, “the

ultimate issue to be decided is the employer’s motive in

discharging the employee.” Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d

720, 730 (Ill. 1992).

Retaliation claims under Illinois law differ from federal

retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework,

where a plaintiff can present a prima facie case and shift the

Specifically, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/1, 4

et seq., the Illinois Residential Mortgage License Act (“IRMLA”), 205 ILCS

635/1-1, et seq., and the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage

Licensing Act (“SAFE” Act), 12 U.S.C. § 5101, et seq.
10 No. 13-1768

burden to the defendant to provide a legitimate reason for a

termination. Instead, Illinois law requires the plaintiff to offer

affirmative evidence of causation to survive summary judgment. Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F.3d 298, 300, 303 (7th Cir.

2010). Such evidence need not (and often will not) be direct

evidence of the employer’s motive, since an employer will

generally know betterthan to explicitly reveal that a discharge

is motivated by the employee’s protected complaints. Rather,

the evidence will typically be circumstantial. That includes

factual scenarios that give rise to a reasonable inference that

the employer’s motive was retaliatory. See Hugo v. Tomaszewski,

508 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“A plaintiff in a

[retaliatory discharge case] will often be required to rely

heavily upon circumstantial evidence of the employer’s intent

... .”). Ultimately, we look at the record as a whole to see

whether a jury could reasonably infer that NACA’s motive for

firing Reid and Sears was retaliation for their complaints. See,

e.g., Zuccolo v. Hannah Marine Corp., 900 N.E.2d 353, 360 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2008) (summarizing the pertinent circumstancesofthe

whole record and concluding that “a rational trier of fact could

find that [the employer] had a retaliatory motive”).5

Preliminarily, plaintiffs argue that the district court failed

to properly apply the summary judgment standard and draw

certain inferences favorable to the plaintiffs from the evidence.

This method of proof correlates with the “direct method” in a federal 5

retaliation claim, where the plaintiff has the burden to prove causation

either by direct evidence or, as is more common, by a “convincing mosaic”

of circumstantial evidence. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th

Cir. 2012) (explaining the use of circumstantial evidence in the direct

method).
No. 13-1768 11

Plaintiffs urge that, as we review de novo, we should draw two

inferences: first, that only Meadows, Cannonier, and Pride

(and not Marks) were involved in the decision to terminate the

plaintiffs; and second, that “NACA’s alleged reasons for

terminating” plaintiffs are “limited to” the reasons initially

“alleged” (that both Reid and Sears violated the paperless

policy and also that Reid left work early for the Bulls game).

Plaintiffs base their first proposed inference on NACA’s

omission of Marks’s name from its earliest interrogatory

answer about those individuals involved in plaintiffs’ termination. This initial omission is not a conclusive admission. The

interrogatory question was updated after Cannonier and

Meadows had consistently testified that Marks was involved

in the termination decision, which Marks’s and Pride’s later

testimony confirmed. Because every single witness with

personal knowledge consistently testified that Marks was

involved in the firing decision and the only contrary evidence

is an omission from a now-amended interrogatory answer, a

jury could not reasonably find that Marks was not involved.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence

on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”).

Plaintiffs’ second proposed inference is better viewed as an

argument that NACA’s later explanation of additional reasons

for plaintiffs’ termination should be viewed as evidence of

pretext (which could give rise to an inference of retaliatory

intent); as such, we turn to the record to discern whether an
12 No. 13-1768

inference of retaliatory intent is reasonable and address this

argument in due course.6

Plaintiffs make two main arguments in support of causation from the circumstances of their termination. First, that the

proximity in time of their termination to their complaints gives

rise to a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Second,

plaintiffs argue that NACA’s “‘moving target’ defense” of

shifting reasons for their termination and shifting positions on

who made the decision to fire them shows that the reasons are

pretextual and also gives rise to a reasonable inference of

retaliatory intent.

A. Timing

Plaintiffs argue that the fact that Sears had complained

three days, and Reidcomplained eleven days, before they were

fired gives rise to a reasonable inference of retaliatory animus.

In support, they rely on our decision in Loudermilk v. Best Pallet

Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). In Loudermilk, a

worker tasked with tearing down pallets complained about

racial discrimination when he (a black man) was tasked to do

a job that was normally done by two men, and when his

coworkers (Hispanic men) hurled racial epithets at him. Id. at

The parties also discuss a doctrine called “mend the hold,” whereby 6

insurance companies are required to stick to the first reasons they offer for

denying coverage. There is no reason to extend such a doctrine to retaliation

cases where the ultimate question is the employer’s intent and, as long as

the new reasons are offered during discovery, the plaintiff has ample time

to investigate and build an argument that they are pretextual. Besides,

because the plaintiffs raise this argument for the first time on appeal, it is

waived. Keene Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 736 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1984).
No. 13-1768 13

313–14. His complaints spanned about one month. Towards

the end of that month, he took pictures of the work that was

done (with the intent of later proving the work required two

men). Id. at 314. When management confronted him, he

reiterated his complaints and was told to “Put it in writing.”

He did so the next day and his manager “fired him on the

spot.” Id. In Loudermilk, we described the timing analysis this

way:

Suspicious timing may be just that—

suspicious—and a suspicion is not enough to get

past a motion for summary judgment. Occasionally,

however, an adverse action comes so close on the

heels of a protected act that an inference of causation

is sensible. Deciding when the inference is appropriate cannot be resolved by a legal rule; the answer

depends on context, just as an evaluation of context

is essential to determine whether an employer’s

explanation is fishy enough to support an inference

that the real reason must be discriminatory.

Id. at 315 (citations omitted). We applied that analysis to the

facts of Loudermilk and concluded that an inference of discriminatory intent was reasonable, so a jury should decide whether

it was appropriate. Id. We had reached a similar result before

in McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir.

1997), also cited by plaintiffs. There, amidst an escalating

conflict where the employee accused the employer of discrimination and the employer counter-accused the employee of

insubordination, the employee filed a lawsuit and was fired

three days later. Id. at 792–93. Under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, we concluded that the “sequence of events [was]
14 No. 13-1768

sufficient” to reasonably infer retaliatory intent. Id. at 796–97.

Nonetheless, we granted summary judgment because the

employee failed to raise any genuine issue about his employer’s reasons for firing him (insubordination). Id. at 799.

An inference of retaliatory intent from the timing of Reid’s

and Sears’s discharges is not reasonable because the evidence

as a whole does not permit such an inference. In context, the

“sequence of events” leading to plaintiffs’ termination was six

months of occasional complaints. There is no evidence that

plaintiffs’ complaints escalated; if anything their complaints

became less serious—Reid had spoken to state and federal

regulators months before he was fired, but leading up to his

termination, he had only sent emails and made comments in

person or over the phone. All of Sears’s complaints were just

the occasional email or remark. Finally, plaintiffs’ termination

was immediately preceded by an intervening event unrelated

to their complaints—Pride, an executive unfamiliar with

plaintiffs or their complaints, discovered pervasive violations

of NACA’s paperless policy. Cf. Loudermilk, 636 F.3d at 314

(decision to terminate made the moment plaintiff handed the

employer his written complaint). 

Turning to the record as a whole, an inference of retaliatory

intent becomes even more unreasonable. Almost everyone in

the office, not just the plaintiffs, complained about the same

issues—wages and commission-splitting—but the others were

not fired. However, someone was fired simultaneously with

Reid and Sears, Mariola Jasinska, but there is no specific

evidence that she had made similar complaints (only the vague

statements that “everyone complained”). Further, although

Illinois retaliatory discharge law does not require an employer
No. 13-1768 15

to proffer reasons for firing an employee, NACA has. NACA

states it fired Reid for violating the paperless policy, letting

client files expire, having alcohol in his office, and leaving

work early for a Chicago Bulls game. NACA states that it fired 7

Sears because of his violations of the paperless policy and

because of Marks’s perception that his customer service was

poor. The timing in this case does not give rise to a reasonable

inference of retaliatory intent.

B. “‘Moving Target’ Defense”

In turn, plaintiffs argue that NACA’s defense of this case

has involved shifting and inconsistent positions that, along

with other evidence, point to pretext and retaliatory intent.

First, plaintiffs argue that NACA’s reasons for firing them

were pretextual because a violation of the paperless policy did

not by itself merit termination. The other reasons—alcohol,

expired documents, and poor customer service—were additional excuses for the earlier decision to terminate. Every

manager who testified thought that a violation of the paperless

policy was sufficient grounds to fire an at-will employee. The

only evidence that the plaintiffs cite to dispute that proposition

is Marks’s testimony. Marks said that the plaintiffs were not

fired merely for the paperless violation (though they could

Reid offers testimony that Martinez gave him permission to go to the 7

game, and so we assume that is true. But he offers no evidence that the

decision-makers—Cannonier, Marks, Meadows, and Pride—knew about

that dispute, nor has Reid offered any other evidence that the group that

decided to fire him did not genuinely believed those reasons were valid.

Gacek, 614 F.3d at 303 (an Illinois retaliatory discharge plaintiff “could not

have prevailed merely by proving that the reasons given by the airline for

firing him were unworthy of belief”). 
16 No. 13-1768

have been) but for that violation and the plaintiffs’ additional

problems, because if everyone who had violated the policy had

been fired, the Chicago office would have had only one

employee left. Plaintiffs argue that this statement is evidence

that NACA management did not really believe that violating

the paperless policy alone merited termination. Plaintiffs

further argue that, because the other reasons for their termination were added later, that tends to indicate the reasons were

pretextual.

From day one, NACA has asserted that Reid and Sears

were fired based on their violations of the paperless policy and

Reid’s attendance issues, and all the managerial testimony

corroborates this. When Marks was deposed on August 16,

2012, he asserted that he was the final decision-maker, and

again corroborated these reasons. However, he also stated that

because so many people had violated the policy, he looked for

additional reasons to justify terminating any one particular

employee. Further, he testified that the alcohol that Pride had

found in Reid’s office, Reid’s incomplete and expired client

files, and Marks’s perception that Sears’s client service was

poor influenced his decision to select Reid and Sears for

termination. Pride’s testimony corroborated some of these 8

problems, and her photographs confirmed the presence of

alcohol in Reid’s office. Reid does not deny that he had bottles

of alcohol in his office, but states that they were unopened and

were just on display. But an employer’s reason need not be

good, just genuinely believed to be true. Everroad v. Scott Truck

Plaintiffs offer no evidence against their managers’ assessments of their

8

performance except their assertions that they performed satisfactorily. 
No. 13-1768 17

Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 478 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (“So long as they

genuinely believed in the truth of their stated reason for the

decision, that reason is not pretextual.”). Despite these additional reasons, NACA’s interrogatory responses have always

listed only the violation of the paperless policy and Reid’s

leaving work early as the reasons for plaintiffs’ termination.

Plaintiffs contend that this is enough for a jury to reasonably

conclude that NACA did not really believe the reasons it gave

for firing plaintiffs. In reliance, plaintiffs cite our decision in

Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2013).

In Hitchcock, we held that a jury could reasonably infer that

proffered reasons for a termination were pretext because they

were shifting and inconsistent. Id. at 738 (citing Rudin v. Lincoln

Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir. 2005)). A couple of

months after Hitchcock had discovered she was pregnant, she

visited a patient at her home. Id. at 734–35. Upon arriving, she

found she was unable to access the patient because of the

strange behavior of the patient’s son, and it was later determined that the patient had been dead for a couple days. Id. at

736. Nonetheless, her employer fired her and provided

multiple reasons including: that she had assessed a dead

patient; that she took actions that compromised that patient’s

health and safety; that she would have compromised the health

and safety of the patient (had she not been dead) by failing to

do something because of the son’s intimidating behavior; and,

finally, later in litigation, that she had performed a deficient

assessment of the dead patient (without any specifics about

how the assessment was deficient). Id. at 738. Unsurprisingly,

we held that a jury could reasonably find holding someone

accountable for compromising the health of an already-dead
18 No. 13-1768

patient was apretextual reason, and the laterinconsistent shifts

were also indicative of pretext.

But NACA’s reasons suffer from no such infirmities. From

the moment of plaintiffs’ termination to this very day, NACA

has consistently maintained that the main reason for plaintiffs’

termination was their violation of the paperless policy. Every

manager involved in the termination consistently gave the

violation of the paperless policy as the main reason. Marks’s

additional reasons are not inconsistent, and were not a shift

from the main reason. He explained why some employees who

violated the paperless policy were terminated and other were

not. See Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 579 (7th Cir.

2003) (holding that “an additional, not necessarily inconsistent

reason for the employment decision, rather than an abrupt

change in explanation” does not give rise to an inference that

the reasons are pretextual). A jury might reasonably be

suspicious if the people with additional problems who were

fired were complainers and those who were retained were

non-complainers, but that is not the case. Numerous other

employees who complained and violated the policy were not

fired while Jasinska was fired for violating the policy with no

evidence of her having complained save the assertion that

“everyone complained.” Plaintiffs’ manager, Norma Martinez,

was also terminated afterwards, in part because of the pervasive violations of the paperless policy.

Second, plaintiffs argue that NACA’s shift respecting who

the decision-makers were gives rise to an inference of mendacity, and therefore, retaliatory intent. We disagree. NACA’s inhouse counsel answered the interrogatories with the information he had at the time about who was involved in the decision
No. 13-1768 19

to fire plaintiffs. When every manager latertestified that Marks

was involved, NACA changed the interrogatory answer and

Marks was deposed. He testified that, as CEO, he was the final

authority on the firing decision. NACA changed its strategy to

assert the same, no doubtpleasedthat the undisputed evidence

showed that Marks had no knowledge of the plaintiffs’

complaints. To account for this shift, we have viewed the

evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and said

that a jury could believe that Marks was not the sole decisionmaker. But this shift in litigation strategy does not bear on the

decision-makers’ intent; if the decision really was made by

Pride, Cannonier, and Meadows, in addition to Marks, the fact

that Marks later claimed full responsibility does not mean that

it would be reasonable to infer that the decision-makers acted

with a retaliatory intent when making the decision. See

Schuster, 327 F.3d at 579 (“the changing story as to who

actually participated in the decision ... is also insufficient to

raise a question as to whether the ... reasons given are merely

pretextual”). 

In sum, though plaintiffs had made protected complaints

shortly before their termination, the same complaints had been

going on for some time and, if anything, had declined in

gravity. NACA asserts that it fired the plaintiffs for various

policy violations, which the undisputed evidence shows that

the decision-makers genuinely believed. The reasons NACA

offered, though they were later added to in order to explain

why others were not terminated, were not shifting orinconsistent, and there was no suspicious pattern in the employees it

chose to fire or retain. Viewing the evidence as a whole, we

agree with the district court that an inference of retaliatory
20 No. 13-1768

intent is not reasonable. Because there is also no direct evidence, plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue about the

material fact of causation. Therefore, summary judgment for

NACA was appropriate.

III. Conclusion

Plaintiffs alleging retaliatory discharge in Illinois are

required to produce evidence sufficient for a jury to reasonably

infer that they were terminated in retaliation for their protected

complaints. Because plaintiffs have not done so, summary

judgment in favor of NACA was appropriate. The judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.