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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

HALEY JONES, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 1:20-CV-329-RP

§

CSTORES VENTURES, INC., BOB KHAN, §

and SABA KHAN, §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER

Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and Dismiss with 

Prejudice. (Mot., Dkt. 18). The parties filed their joint motion to approve the settlement on August 

31, 2020, attaching the settlement agreement itself to the motion. (Mot., Dkt. 18; Settlement 

Agreement, Dkt. 18-1). In their motion, the parties state that the settlement agreement “represents a 

fair compromise of a bona fide dispute concerning the legality of compensation practices with 

respect to Plaintiff.” (Dkt. 18, at 2). After reviewing the parties’ settlement, arguments, and the 

relevant law, the Court will grant the motion.

Plaintiff Haley Jones (“Jones”) filed this action under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) to recover damages for violations of the FLSA’s overtime wage 

provision. (See Am. Compl., Dkt. 1). The Fifth Circuit has not strictly defined the ambit of FLSA 

vis-à-vis dismissals without judicial review of settlement agreements. See Martin v. Spring Break 

’83Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 255 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]his court has no binding precedent that 

resolves whether parties may privately settle a FLSA claim involving a bona fide dispute over 

whether the plaintiffs worked on days for which they seek unpaid wages.”). However, the Fifth 

Circuit has held a “private settlement of FLSA claims” to be binding when “the settlement gave 

employees ‘everything to which they [were] entitled under the FLSA at the time the agreement [was] 

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reached.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Louisiana, 524 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1976)). In Martin, the 

settlements were enforceable as “a way to resolve a bona fide dispute as to the number of hours 

worked—not the rate at which [the workers] would be paid for those hours.” Id. at 256.

Given the absence of explicit Fifth Circuit precedent to the contrary and the tendency of 

district courts within the Fifth Circuit to require review of FLSA settlement agreements, the Court 

finds that its review and approval of the settlement is appropriate, if not mandatory. See Trevino v. 

Colt Oilfield Servs., LLC, 2019 WL 3816302, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2019) “The primary focus of the 

Court’s inquiry in deciding whether to approve the settlement of a FLSA collective action is on 

ensuring that an employer does not take advantage of its employees in settling their claim for 

wages.” Sims v. Hous. Auth. City of El Paso, 2012 WL 10862119, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2012) 

(quoting Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd., P’ship, 2009 WL 2856246, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 

2009)). 

Here, there clearly “exists a bona fide dispute” under the FLSA regarding “the amount of 

hours worked or compensation due.” Jones v. JGC Dallas LLC, No. 3:11–CV–2743–O, 2014 WL 

7332551, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2014). Jones alleged that “Defendants repeatedly and willfully 

violated Sections 7 and 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate Plaintiff at a 

rate not less than one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 

40 in a workweek.” (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4). In their answer, Defendants denied Jones’s allegations 

and offered 47 affirmative defenses. (See Answer, Dkts. 10, at 3–5). The parties “vigorously disputed 

the claims and defenses,” and thus their settlement arises from a bona fide dispute. (Dkt. 18, at 3).

Having found a bona fide dispute, the Court reviews the settlement agreement to determine 

whether it is fair and reasonable. See Jones, 2014 WL 7332551, at *3 (citing Sims, 2012 WL 10862119, 

at *3). After engaging in “exhaustive and hard fought negotiations,” the parties agreed to a 

settlement of $3,650 as a “full settlement, compromise and release of all claims arising out of or in 

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connection with this lawsuit.” (Id. at 4; Settlement Agreement, Dkt, 18-1, at 4). The parties have 

agreed to each be “solely responsible for payment of their respective attorney’s fees” and “costs.” 

(Settlement Agreement, Dkt, 18-1, at 4). The settlement amount was determined through 

“thoroughgoing, comprehensive discussions” and Jones “stayed informed of its status almost 

monthly.” (Dkt. 18, at 4). Jones “took and active role in this litigation” and “deems this settlement 

fair and reasonable.” (Id.). As such, the settlement provides “‘everything to which [the FLSA 

Plaintiffs] are entitled under the FLSA at the time the agreement [was] reached.’” Martin, 688 F.3d at 

255. The Court finds that the settlement agreement comports with Martin and is a fair result of 

good-faith negotiations between the parties. It is therefore binding and enforceable.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the settlement agreement is consistent with the 

FLSA’s purposes of protecting workers “from substandard wages and excessive hours” and 

safeguarding their ability to obtain relief to which they may be entitled. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 

324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion to Approve Settlement and 

Dismiss with Prejudice, (Dkt. 18), is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jones’s claims against Defendants, (see Compl., Dkt. 

1), are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

The Court will render final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 in a separate 

order.

SIGNED on January 15, 2021.

_____________________________________

ROBERT PITMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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