71534 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 25, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Send information to ATTN: Wing Chan, 

Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Flight Test 

Branch, ANE–172, FAA, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1600 Stewart Avenue, 

Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; 

telephone (516) 228–7311; fax (516) 794– 

5531. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

has approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness 

Directive CF–2008–19, dated May 8, 2008; 

and Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin 

A670BA–56–002, Revision A, dated February 

26, 2008; for related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Bombardier Alert Service 

Bulletin A670BA–56–002, Revision A, dated 

February 26, 2008, to do the actions required 

by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., 400 CoˆteVertu Road West, Dorval, Que ́bec H4S 1Y9, 

Canada; telephone 514–855–5000; fax 514– 

855–7401; e-mail 

thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com; Internet http:// 

www.bombardier.com. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 6, 2008. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–27169 Filed 11–24–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–0289; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–208–AD; Amendment 

39–15740; AD 2008–23–19] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 757 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD 

requires sealing the fasteners on the 

front and rear spars inside the left and 

right main fuel tanks and on the rear 

spar and lower panel of the center fuel 

tank. This AD also requires inspections 

of the wire bundle support installations 

to verify if certain clamps are installed 

and if Teflon sleeving covers the wire 

bundles inside the left and right 

equipment cooling system bays, on the 

left and right rear spars, and on the left 

and right front spars; and corrective 

actions if necessary. This AD results 

from a fuel system review conducted by 

the manufacturer. We are issuing this 

AD to detect and correct improper wire 

bundle support installation and sleeving 

and to prevent improperly sealed 

fasteners in the main and center fuel 

tanks from becoming an ignition source, 

in the event of a fault current, which 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

30, 2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of December 30, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Judy 

Coyle, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion 

Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6497; 

fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Boeing Model 757 series 

airplanes. That NPRM was published in 

the Federal Register on December 6, 

2007 (72 FR 68764). That NPRM 

proposed to require sealing the fasteners 

on the front and rear spars inside the 

left and right main fuel tanks and on the 

lower panel of the center fuel tank. That 

NPRM also proposed to require 

inspections of the wire bundle support 

installations to verify if certain clamps 

are installed and if Teflon sleeving 

covers the wire bundles inside the left 

and right equipment cooling system 

bays, on the left and right rear spars, 

and on the left and right front spars; and 

corrective actions if necessary. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received from 

the four commenters. 

Request for Justification of the NPRM 

Northwest Airlines (NWA) has no 

objection to the intent of the NPRM, but 

it states it is not clear that we have 

shown that the probability of a fuel tank 

explosion due to unsealed fuel tank 

fasteners reaches the threshold for 

justifying the proposed modification. 

NWA requests that we provide more 

detail regarding the risk and benefit of 

the NPRM. 

We agree to provide clarification. The 

unsafe condition encompassed the 

scenario of single failures (for example, 

a wire bundle clamp failure that could 

result in wire bundle contact with the 

fuel tank causing an ignition source 

internal to the tank) that place an 

airplane at risk of a fuel tank explosion. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 25, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 71535 

The in-tank sealant is designed to 

provide a second level of protection 

against fuel tank ignition by 

encapsulating and containing the 

potential source of ignition. Further, the 

risk level associated with this single 

failure scenario was determined to 

warrant the actions required by this AD. 

No change to the AD is necessary in this 

regard. 

Request To Clarify the Unsafe 

Condition 

Boeing requests that we revise 

paragraph (d) of the NPRM to cover the 

requirement to do the general visual 

inspection for wire bundle support 

installation and sleeving. Boeing states 

that failures of the wire bundles and 

shorting to clamps are the prime 

candidates for the fault current source, 

and that they should be identified as the 

unsafe condition. 

We agree because accomplishing the 

general visual inspections for wire 

bundle supports and sleeving is one of 

the requirements of this AD. We have 

revised the Summary and paragraph (d) 

of this AD accordingly. 

Request To Clarify Requirements 

Boeing requests that we revise the 

Summary of the NPRM to include the 

requirement to seal the fasteners on the 

rear spar of the center fuel tank. Boeing 

states that this action is called out on 

page 149 in view B of Figure 7 of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0064, 

dated July 16, 2007. 

We agree and have revised the 

Summary of this AD accordingly. 

Although the specific location of the 

‘‘rear spar of the center tank’’ was 

inadvertently omitted from the 

Summary of the NPRM, it was covered 

by paragraph (f) of the NPRM, which 

specified accomplishing all of the 

applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0064, 

dated July 16, 2007. 

Request To Delay Issuance To Provide 

Instructions for Maintaining the Design 

Change 

Continental Airlines (CAL) is 

concerned that not enough attention has 

been given to ensure that the changes 

detailed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

757–57A0064, dated July 16, 2007, are 

preserved for the long-term operation of 

its Model 757 fleet. CAL states that, 

other than this service bulletin and 

some generic information found in the 

Boeing 757 Maintenance Planning Data 

(MPD) document, there are no other 

published ‘‘maintenance’’ documents 

currently available to show each 

specific requirement as detailed in the 

service bulletin. CAL further states that 

information detailed by the service 

bulletin must be available in manuals 

that are routinely used by maintenance 

personnel. CAL asserts that making this 

information available will prevent the 

inadvertent reversal of the implemented 

changes, which could lead to violation 

of the NPRM, in addition to 

compromising the higher level of safety 

intended for the Model 757 fleet. 

CAL believes the current program, as 

provided by the service bulletin and 

proposed by the NPRM, is not ready to 

be implemented. CAL states that, if the 

NPRM is mandated as proposed, CAL 

would not be able to incorporate the 

modification on its Model 757–200 

series airplanes, and a high risk of 

future de-modification would exist for 

those airplanes that could be modified. 

CAL recommends that we coordinate 

with Boeing regarding its requested 

changes. 

We infer that CAL requests that we 

delay issuance of the AD until Boeing 

has revised the applicable maintenance 

documents to provide detailed 

information for maintenance personnel 

to maintain the required design change. 

We agree with CAL’s concern about 

ensuring that the requirements of this 

AD are maintained throughout the life 

of the airplane. We are considering 

additional rulemaking in this regard. 

However, we disagree with delaying 

issuance of the final rule until Boeing 

has worked through its process to revise 

the applicable maintenance documents. 

To delay this action would be 

inappropriate, since we have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists and that the actions required by 

this AD must be mandated to ensure 

continued safety. However, as a result of 

this comment, we have initiated 

discussions with Boeing about 

including more detail in the Instructions 

for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to 

ensure that the integrity of this AD is 

maintained throughout the life of an 

airplane. Those discussions are ongoing 

at this time. We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Delay Issuance of the AD To 

Provide Instructions for Modified 

Airplanes 

CAL states that all of its 41 Model 

757–200 series airplanes were modified 

in the past with a Aviation Partners 

Boeing (APB) winglet design that 

incorporated significant changes to the 

forward and rear spars. CAL states that 

Boeing has acknowledged that Boeing 

Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0064, 

dated July 16, 2007, does not include 

instructions for the configuration of 

CAL’s modified airplanes. CAL also 

states that Boeing is currently assessing 

the configuration of CAL’s airplanes and 

that Boeing will respond with an action 

plan. 

We infer that CAL requests that we 

delay issuance of the AD until Boeing 

has revised the service bulletin to 

provide instructions for accomplishing 

the modification on airplanes equipped 

with APB winglets installed in 

accordance with Supplemental Type 

Certificate (STC) ST01518SE. We 

disagree with delaying issuance of the 

final rule because we have determined 

that an unsafe condition exists and that 

the actions required by this AD must be 

mandated to ensure continued safety. 

Further, we have discussed CAL’s 

concern about the service bulletin 

instructions with both the airplane and 

winglet manufacturers. They both 

indicated that the procedures in the 

service bulletin, as published, can be 

accomplished on airplanes equipped 

with APB winglets installed in 

accordance with STC ST01518SE. We 

have not changed the AD in this regard. 

Request To Extend Compliance Time 

European Air Transport, on behalf of 

DHL Air, and NWA request that we 

extend the compliance time from 60 

months to 72 months. European Air 

Transport states that, due to the high 

number of work hours needed to 

accomplish the proposed actions, it 

plans to do the work during a 4C-check 

(corresponding to 72 months, 24,000 

flight hours, or 12,000 flight cycles, 

whichever occurs first). European Air 

Transport also states that a 60-month 

compliance time would require it to do 

the proposed actions on some of its 

airplanes outside the 4C-check, but that 

a 72-month compliance time will allow 

it to do the proposed actions on the 

entire fleet during base maintenance. 

NWA states that, due to access 

requirements, it considers the proposed 

modification to be consistent with a Dcheck level of work. NWA also states 

that it does not understand the 

substantiation for the 60-month 

compliance time and believes that doing 

the work during scheduled fuel tank 

access will ensure more consistent 

quality of the modification, as well as 

reduced costs to industry. NWA also 

states that it is unaware of any accident 

or incident that has been attributed to 

unsealed fuel tank fasteners, or that the 

risk is such that compliance should be 

required within 60 months instead of 72 

months. NWA believes that a 1-year 

extension of the compliance time would 

not have an appreciable impact on 

safety. NWA further states its request is 

consistent with the FAA harmonization 

policy of the aging airplane programs in 


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71536 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 25, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

accordance with ‘‘Fuel Tank Safety 

Compliance Extension (Final Rule) and 

Aging Airplane Program Update 

(Request for Comments)’’ (69 FR 45936, 

July 30, 2004). 

We do not agree with the request to 

extend the compliance time. In 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for this action, we considered the 

urgency associated with the subject 

unsafe condition and the practical 

aspect of accomplishing the required 

modification within a period of time 

that corresponds to the normal 

scheduled maintenance for most 

affected operators. We recognize that 

operators have different maintenance 

schedules for accomplishing heavy 

maintenance on Model 757 airplanes, 

but at the same time we understand that 

a 60-month compliance time will 

accommodate most operators’ schedules 

for that type of work. However, 

according to the provisions of paragraph 

(g) of this AD, we may approve requests 

to adjust the compliance time if the 

request includes data that prove that the 

new compliance time would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have not 

changed the AD in this regard. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 1,049 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

This AD affects about 539 airplanes of 

U.S. registry. The required actions take 

up to 545 work hours per airplane 

depending on the airplane 

configuration, at an average labor rate of 

$80 per work hour. Required parts cost 

about $325 per airplane. Based on these 

figures, the estimated cost of the AD for 

U.S. operators is up to $23,675,575, or 

up to $43,925 per airplane. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2008–23–19 Boeing: Amendment 39–15740. 

Docket No. FAA–2007–0289; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–208–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective December 30, 2008. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 757– 

200, –200CB, –200PF, and –300 series 

airplanes, certificated in any category; as 

identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

757–57A0064, dated July 16, 2007. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from a fuel system 

review conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to detect and correct 

improper wire bundle support installation 

and sleeving and to prevent improperly 

sealed fasteners in the main and center fuel 

tanks from becoming an ignition source, in 

the event of a fault current, which could 

result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Fastener Sealing and Inspections 

(f) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD, seal the applicable fasteners 

and do the general visual inspections of the 

wire bundle support installations, and do all 

the applicable corrective actions before 

further flight, by accomplishing all of the 

applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 757–57A0064, dated July 16, 

2007. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, ATTN: Judy 

Coyle, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion 

Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6497; fax 

(425) 917–6590; has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested, using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(h) You must use Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 757–57A0064, dated July 16, 2007, 

to do the actions required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207; telephone 206– 

544–9990; fax 206–766–5682; e-mail 

DDCS@boeing.com; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information incorporated by reference at the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 25, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 71537 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

24, 2008. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–27168 Filed 11–24–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0889; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–092–AD; Amendment 

39–15738; AD 2008–23–17] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Empresa 

Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. 

(EMBRAER) Model ERJ 170 and ERJ 

190 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

[E]scape slide system installation [was 

found with] * * * tie-down straps which are 

used for escape slide packing [having not 

been removed]. The non-removal of the tiedown straps does not allow the aircraft door 

to reach the fully open position and the 

consequent deployment of the escape slide 

system in a * * * emergency evacuation, 

affecting the occupying safety. 

The unsafe condition is failure of an 

evacuation system, which could impede 

an emergency evacuation and increase 

the chance of injury to passengers and 

flightcrew during the evacuation. We 

are issuing this AD to require actions to 

correct the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

December 30, 2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of December 30, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Kenny Kaulia, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2848; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on August 21, 2008 (73 FR 

49362). That NPRM proposed to correct 

an unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

[E]scape slide system installation [was 

found with] * * * tie-down straps which are 

used for escape slide packing [having not 

been removed]. The non-removal of the tiedown straps does not allow the aircraft door 

to reach the fully open position and the 

consequent deployment of the escape slide 

system in a * * * emergency evacuation, 

affecting the occupying safety. 

The unsafe condition is failure of an 

evacuation system, which could impede 

an emergency evacuation and increase 

the chance of injury to passengers and 

flightcrew during the evacuation. The 

corrective action involves inspection of 

the forward and rearward doors’ 

emergency evacuation slide packs for 

the presence of tie-down straps, and, if 

applicable, removal of the tie-down 

straps. You may obtain further 

information by examining the MCAI in 

the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow our FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

highlighted in a NOTE within the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

about 144 products of U.S. registry. We 

also estimate that it will take about 2 

work-hours per product to comply with 

the basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. 

Based on these figures, we estimate the 

cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to 

be $23,040, or $160 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 


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