1

Filed 2/10/22 T

- N .H. v. Superior Court CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

T

- N.H., Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et a l., Real Parties in Interest. A163878
(Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. JD032537

- 01, JD032538

- 01)

T

- N. H . ( mother ) seeks extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order
terminat ing reunification services and set ting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing f or her two daughters , S

. H

. and J.G. ( collectively, children ). 1 Mothe r challenges the court’s finding
that she received r easonable reunification services

. We deny the petition on the merits

.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. We recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issue raised.2 BACKGROUND
In July 2020, t he Alameda County Social Services Agenc y ( Agency ) filed a petition alleging S.H., then seven years old, and J.G., then two years old, came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g)

. As amended, and as relevant here, the petition alleged mother ’s substance abuse and mental
health issues placed the children at risk of harm under section 300, subdivision (b)

. Mother disclosed suffering from mental health conditions

— including depression and anxiety

— and told the Agency she lacked a support system to assist her when she was “feeling overwhelmed or unable to find child care.” She was “ currently taking” marijuana and had previously us ed

“ other substances

. ” Mother expressed a willingness to “drug test” and an interest in finding new housing and “expanding her support network.”
T h e juvenile court detained the children and ordered reunification services for mother. These included substance use treatment, counseling and mental health services, vis itation, and parenting educatio n

. The Agency encouraged mother to “complete the substance use and mental health evaluations.” Mother completed a substance abuse evaluation but was denied entry into a treatment program in August 2020 after she mistreated staff. By October, mother had missed a scheduled visit with the children, had failed to communicate with the Agency, and had engaged in “threatening ”
behavior wit h the children’s caregivers. The Agency again encouraged mother to complete a mental health evaluation ; it subsequently provided
mother with a referral for a therapist and a medication evaluation. Mother “never attended the scheduled appointments.” I n late 2020 and early 2021,
mother tested positive for amphetamines , cocaine, and marijuana

.3

At the February 2021 jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court declared the children dependents

. It noted that mother had “ only recently
started

. . . engaging in service s” and d eemed her testimony that she did not receive referrals for services “unconvincing” in light of the “v ery clear
evidence ” that the Agency tried “ to engage her in services .” The court
scheduled a six

- month review hearing for July 2021

. Thereafter, mother began utilizing the mental health services offered by the Agency : she received a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and began taking medication and attending counseling sessions. But mother continued to struggle with attaining sobriety

— s he missed drug tests and tested positive for amphetamine s and cocaine

. At the six

- month review hearing in July 2021, the juvenile court found the Agency had provided reasonable reunification services and set a 12

- month review hearing

. The Agency filed its 12

- month review report in August 2021

. In it, the Agency recommended terminating reunification services and s cheduling

a permanency planning hearing

. The report summarized the services the Agency had provided ; it also noted that in June, mother had stopped attending counseling sessions , and in August, she had numerous positive drug tests

. At the 12

- month review hearing in October , mother described her
social workers as unhelpful and unresponsive ; she also complained t hat t he Agency had failed to recommend services to help her manage her mental
health issues. But mother a dmitted she stopped attending therapy (without telling the Agency) because she “wasn’t really feeling” the therapist

. Mother also acknowledged using heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine throughout the dependency proceedings

. One of m other’s social worker s testified that
she discussed mother’s case plan with her multiple times and opined the case plan was tailored to meet mother’s needs. The social worker further testified4

mother had “been in and out of” several substance abuse treatment programs
and had c ompleted none. Nor had mother consistently attended therapy, another component of her case plan. Counsel for mother asserted the Agency failed to provide reasonable reunification services . According to counsel, the services were not

“ specifically tailored ” to address mother’s “mental health issues ” and were provided too late in the reunification process. The Agency ’s attorney disagreed. Counsel for the Agency noted mother’s case plan had specific objectives

— including t hat mother participate in mental health treatment , individual counseling , and substance abuse treatment

— and that mother bore responsibility to “do something” to achieve th ose objective s and had not

. C ounsel argued mother would not be able to reunify with the children even if
the juvenile court extended the reunification period as there was no indication mother “ will do what she needs to do given her track record, given
her lack of honesty, and given her inability to prioritize her substance abuse history and her mental health needs .” Counsel for the children concurred.
The juvenile court terminated reuni fication services and set a permanency planning hearing. (§ 366.26.) In a thoughtful and comprehensive ruling, the court concluded retu r ning the children to mother would create a “ substantial risk of detriment ” to the ir safety in light of mother’s insufficient progress toward attaining sobriet y and her lack of

“ mental health stability.” T h e court opined mother w as “in the throes of drug addiction” and lamented her failure to acknowledge “ how destructive
addiction has been in her life ” and how that addiction had “ impacted her

c onduct, has impacted her children, is the reason for removal, and is the reason why return is out of the questio n in the eyes of the Court .”5

The juvenile court also found the Agency had provided reasonable
servic es. The court rejected the attempt of mother’s counsel to shift blame to the Agency ; it concluded mother’s case plan “ was designed adequately to address the concerns and she simply was not able to fulfill her end of the bargain

. . . . The Agency made numerous referrals and re

- referrals , ” and mother “ simply was unable to follow through or simply decided not to. [ ¶] In some instances, her testimony was not very compelling. For example, when
she decided not to continue on with therapy. She ’ s not really received therapeuti c support since. There was really no clear reason given fo r it. Certainly nothing compelling, nothing that would drive the Court to feel that the Agency did not somehow provid e reasonable services. ” DISCUSSION
M other challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s reasonable reunification services finding

. We reject the argument on the merits. 2
R eunification services are typically “ available to parents for a maximum of 18 months from the physical removal of the children from their home.” ( T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251 ( T.J .) .) “At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to the custody o f .

. . he r

2 We deny the Agency ’s request to dismiss the petition as untimely . We conclude mother has demonstrated exceptional good cause for failing to timely file the notice of intent to file writ petition. (See Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831; Cal. Rules of Court, r ul e 8.45 0 (d) [ r e viewing court may extend deadline based on a showing of exceptional good cause ].) We consider mother’s claims on the merit s , consistent with our obligation to “decide the petition on the merits by written opinion” absent “exceptional circumstances .” ( Cal . R ule s of Court, rule 8.452(h)(1).) Additionally, and in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the Agency , w e deem mother’s notice of intent to include both children. ( Id ., r ule 8.452 ( a)(1 ) [ reviewing court must liberally construe the petition ] .)6

parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether reasonable
services that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been offered or provided to the parent

. ” ( In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 121

. ) At the 12

- month review hearing, the juvenile court may not set

a permanency planning hearing unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, reasonable services were offered. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(4).) “T o support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, ‘ the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult

. . . . ’ [Citation.] Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family. ” ( In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001 .) But the “ ‘ standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstanc es. ’ [Citation.] The ‘ adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency ’ s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case. ’ ” ( Ibid. , brackets in original. )
We review the juvenile court’ s reasonable services finding for substantial evidence, bearing in mind the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. ( Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995

– 996; T.J. , supra , 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238.) “ Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credi ble and of solid value. ” ( T.J. , at p. 1238 .) In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, w e “ do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we7

draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court ’ s order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary
conclusion .” ( In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947 .) Our review is “limited to that period following the last reasonable services finding, which if unchallenged is final and binding.” ( Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 675.) Here, th e relevant peri od is
between the six

- month and 12

- mon th review hearings , from July to October
2021

. Mother has the burden to demonstrate the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court ’ s finding that the Agency provided reasonable
services

. ( I

n re L.Y.L

. , supra , 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947. )
Mother has not satisfied her burden. The record is replete with
evidence that mother received mental health services, including a psychiatric
evaluation , a medication evaluation, and individual therapy. The record also
contains evidence that the Agency encouraged mother to make her mental health a priority and worked to help mother attain sobriety and achieve the other objectives of her case plan

. Despite these efforts, m other used drugs throughout the dependenc y and st opped attending therapy because

— to paraphrase mother

— she did not like her therapist

. T ogether, this evidence amply supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency’s efforts were
reasonable under the circumstances . ( In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 54 5

– 547 .) As she did in the juvenile court, mother blames the Agency for “ignoring” her mental health issues and for fail ing to tailor the reunification
services to address her bipolar disorder

. The lower court was not persuaded by this argument, and neither are we. “In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services8

provided were imperfect.” ( In re Misako R. , supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) As stated above, the question is whether the services were reasonable under
the circumstances. The answer is yes. Nor are we persuaded by mother’s
assertion that the Agency’s purported delay in securing a mental health
evaluation for mother underm ine s the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding. The Agency made referrals for mental health services at the outset of the dependency , but mother failed to accept the referral s or to consistently attend therapy

. A social services agency cannot force a parent to participate in services. ( In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233; In re Ronell A

. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365 [“ ‘an unwilling or indifferent parent cannot be forced to comply’ ” with reunification services].)
Mother ’s reliance on T.J. , supra , 21 Cal.App.5th 1229 is unavailing

. There, the child welfare agency identified services for a developmentally disabled parent, but there were substantial delays in actually providing those
services

. ( Id. at p p . 12 40, 12 42.) For example, t he agency put the parent “ in a holding pattern that resulted in a wait of nearly 11 months after her children were removed from her physical custody before she was provided with an individual therapist; it failed completely to provide her wit h help for anger management;

. . . it failed to give her help with practical independent living skills; and it failed to provide her with housin g.” ( Id. at p. 12 48 .) Under those circumstances, the appellate court concluded the agency’s

“ limited steps ” we re in adequate and reversed the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding

. ( Id. at p. 1249.)
This case bears little resemblance to T.J. The challenges facing mother arise out of her mental health conditions and substance abuse issues, not

a documented intellectual disability. ( T.J. , supra , 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1250 .)
And mother was not in a “holding pattern” like the parent in T.J.

— t o the9

contrary , the Agency offered services, but she failed to engage with the provided resources . That does not make the services unreasonable. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414

– 415.) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findi ng , by clear and convincing evidence, that the Agency provided mother with
reasonable services. DISPOSITION
Mothe r’ s petition for e xtraordinary relief is denied on the merits. ( Cal. Rules of Court, r ule 8.452(h) .) The stay request is denied. This decision is final immediately. ( Id ., r ules 8.452 (i) , 8.490 (b) .)10 _________________________ Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Petrou, J.

A163878