J-S36002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF Z.N., A MINOR 

CHILD

APPEAL OF: P.N., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 825 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Orphans' Court at No: No. 15 OA 2021

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.R.N., A 

MINOR CHILD

APPEAL OF: P.N., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 826 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Orphans' Court at No: 14 O.A. 2021

IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.N., A MINOR 

CHILD

APPEAL OF: P.N., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 827 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County 

Orphans' Court at No: No. 13 OA 2021
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BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 30, 2022

Appellant, P.N. (“Father”), appeals from the orders entered on June 15, 

2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his three children, Z.N., born in December 

of 2017, L.N., born in July of 2019, and L.R.N., born in July of 2020

(collectively, “the Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm. 

We begin with an overview of the factual and procedural history. The 

family was first open for services with CYS in November 2019 due to the 

discovery of illicit substances in the home and the home’s deplorable 

condition. N.T., 3/8/22, at 12. The orphans’ court adjudicated Z.N. and L.N. 

dependent in 2019, and both children were taken into CYS custody. Id. at 

12-13. At that time, CYS recommended services to address issues concerning

drug and alcohol, housing, and parenting for the family. Id. at 13-14. 

In July of 2020, L.R.N. was born and remained with Mother on a safety 

plan. Id. at 12, 16. Father was not included in the safety plan because his 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Greene County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed petitions to confirm 

consent to adoption as to Children’s mother, S.H. (“Mother”). There is no 

indication on the certified docket that the court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children. In addition, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate any unknown father’s parental rights. There is no indication on the 

certified docket that the court terminated the parental rights of any unknown 

father.
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whereabouts were unknown at that time. Id. at 16. In September of 2020, 

Z.N. and L.N. were returned to Mother. Id. at 14.

On October 5, 2020, CYS obtained custody of all the Children after

receiving a report that Children and Mother were residing “with a sister who 

had no room and did not want them staying there.” Id. at 14-15. CYS was 

also notified that Mother was incarcerated and tested positive for illicit 

substances in jail. Id. at 15. Additionally, L.R.N. had a severe diaper rash 

and a fungal infection all over her body, and her two siblings appeared “dirty.” 

Id. CYS was informed that Father was “staying there a few days” but did not 

live at the residence. Id. 

The following day, on October 6, 2020, Father was arrested but was 

released soon after on an unspecified date that same month. Id. at 24. 

Before the month ended, on October 27, 2020, Father was again incarcerated,

and remained so until March 26, 2021. Id. at 18, 24. On March 29, 2021, 

Father presented to the CYS office and discussed the Children’s Permanency 

Plan (“CPP”) and services in which he was to participate. Id. at 18, 21, 24-

25, 52. CYS offered Father nine visits with the Children at the agency between 

March 26 and June 6, 2021, but Father attended only two, on April 12 and 

April 19, 2021. Id. at 18, 25, 32, 53. 

On June 6, 2021, Father was on pre-trial incarceration at Washington 

County Correctional Facility. Id. at 19, 28, 51, 54-55. According to Father, 

the Washington County trial court sentenced him to a “seven-year probation 
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program with a twenty-three-month restrictive treatment program.” Id. at 

49. Although it is unclear what Father’s specific offenses are, Father testified 

that this matter was related to “veteran’s court and drug court.” Id. As part 

of his sentence, on January 7, 2022, Father was transferred from Washington 

County prison to Gaudenzia Crossroads Treatment facility (“Gaudenzia”), a 

drug and alcohol treatment center where he remained at the time of the 

termination proceeding. Id. at 29, 48-49. While at Gaudenzia, Father was 

offered biweekly virtual visits with the Children. Id. at 40-42. Father 

attended one virtual visit that lasted twenty minutes in February of 2022. Id.

at 40-41.

On June 21, 2021, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Father’s 

parental rights to the Children. With respect to Z.N. and L.N., CYS alleged 

grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b). With respect to L.R.N., CYS alleged grounds under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).2

The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petitions on March 8, 2022.

3

 

CYS presented testimony from Jennifer Van Kirk, the CYS caseworker, and 

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2 On December 21, 2021, CYS filed an amended petition for involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights to L.R.N. to include the additional basis

of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

3 By this date, the Children, Z.N, L.N., and L.R.N., were four years old, two 

years old, and one year old, respectively. The Children’s best interests were 

represented during the hearing by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and each 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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M.P., the foster mother to Z.N. and L.N. Father testified on his own behalf via 

videoconference from Gaudenzia.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court directed counsel for 

CYS and counsel for Father to file Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 

within fifteen days of their receipt of the transcript. CYS and Father filed 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 25, 2022, and April 

14, 2022, respectively. By memoranda and orders dated and entered on June 

15, 2022, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights 

to the Children.4, 5 

On July 14, 2022, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise 

statements of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

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child’s legal interests were represented by separate counsel. Legal counsel 

for Z.N. participated via videoconference.

4

 The orphans’ court issued a separate memorandum and order for each child, 

Z.N., L.N., and L.R.N. The court’s reasoning and conclusions of law in each of 

the orders are substantially similar. In turn, we will refer only to the orphans’ 

court’s memorandum and order issued with respect to Z.N., and we cite it as 

“Orphans’ Court Opinion.”

5

In its opinion, the orphans’ court did not identify the particular subsection of 

Section 2511(a) under which it terminated Father’s parental rights. However, 

CYS filed petitions seeking involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights 

to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). The 

court acknowledged that CYS alleged grounds for termination of Father’s 

parental rights consistent with the provisions of 23 Pa.[C.S.A.] [§] 2511(a). 

Orphans’ Court Opinion at 1 (unpaginated). Because this Court need only 

agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a) in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights, we review the order under Section 2511(a)(2) 

only. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 
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1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The orphans’ 

court filed separate statements pursuant to Rule 1925(a), wherein it relied 

upon its reasoning set forth in the subject memoranda and orders. 

Father raises the following issues for review in his appeals relating to 

the Children. 

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding that [CYS] had 

proven by clear and convincing evidence that it had 

established the statutory grounds for termination under 23 

[Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)](1), (2), (5), and (8). 

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding that the 

[Father] failed to make sufficient progress toward successful 

parenting and complying with services due to obstacles that 

were mostly “self-inflicted[.]”

3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in not giving appropriate 

weight to the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 

[Father’s] ability to engage in the services necessary to 

reunify with his [C]hildren. 

Father’s Brief at 7.

In reviewing Father’s appeal from the orders terminating his parental 

rights, we bear in mind the following standard of review. “In cases concerning 

the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a 

determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by 

competent evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 

2021). When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial 

court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by 

the record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where 
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the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate 

court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error 

of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 

(Pa. 2021). 

“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing 

court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support 

an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012). 

Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to 

trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. 

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must 

balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the 

care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs 

for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358. 

Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences 

for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of 

this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory 

grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear 
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 

255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds 

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary 

termination.” Id.; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating 

whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a), the trial court 

must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best 

interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super. 

2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court 

then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the 

child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Here, we review the orphans’ court’s order pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . 
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(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we have indicated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met 

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting In re 

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citation 

omitted)). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of 

Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re 
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N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011)). As such, “[a] parent’s vow to 

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (quoting In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

Our Supreme Court in S.P. addressed the relevance of incarceration in 

termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2). The S.P. Court held that 

“incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s 

conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the 

repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that 

the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.” S.P., 47 A.3d at

828. Further, the Court explained,

[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be 

determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of 

providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the 

length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly 

relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2). 

Id. at 830. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court, in terminating Father’s parental rights 

under Section 2511(a), found that:

There were also many obstacles to [Father] parenting successfully 

and complying with services. Most, if not all, of these obstacles 

were self-inflicted. 
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Orphans’ Court Opinion at 8. The record reveals the “obstacles” to Father’s 

ability to successfully parent were primarily due to Father’s repeated 

incarceration throughout the Children’s dependency matters. See N.T., 

3/8/21, at 17-20, 24, 51. The court acknowledged that “incarceration alone 

cannot be used as a reason to terminate.” Orphans’ Court Opinion at 8. The 

court further found that:

While [Father] may have been incarcerated during certain periods 

of time, he really did very little to pursue the parent-child 

relationship[ ] or perform parental duties, whether incarcerated 

or not. 

Id.

In his brief, Father combines all three issues into a single argument.6 

See Father’s Brief at 12-23. Father argues the orphans' court erred in finding 

that CYS met its burden of establishing the grounds for termination of his

parental rights under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

at 16. Father contends that the court erred in characterizing the obstacles to 

his ability to parent as “self-inflicted.” Id. at 20, 22. He asserts that he was 

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6

In so doing, Father fails to comply with Rule 2119(a), which provides:

 

The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part

— in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed — the 

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and 

citation of the authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). As Father addresses all three issues in one argument, our 

analysis does the same. 
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unable to obtain the necessary services while he was incarcerated from June 

6, 2021 through January 7, 2022, due to factors “out of his control,” including 

the COVID-19 pandemic and CYS’s failure to arrange services for him. Id. at 

20-21. Father’s argument is unpersuasive. 

Father concedes that he has been incarcerated “throughout much of the 

life of this case.” Father’s Brief at 17. The record shows that Father was 

incarcerated on October 6, 2020, at which time he tested positive for 

amphetamines. N.T., 3/8/22, at 20. Though released later that same month, 

Father was incarcerated again on October 27, 2020, and remained in prison 

until March 26, 2021. Id. at 17-18. Subsequently, he was incarcerated a 

third time from June 6, 2021, until January 7, 2022. Id. at 19, 51. Father 

acknowledges that his incarceration on June 6, 2021, “may well have been 

‘self-inflicted.’” Father’s Brief at 19. On direct-examination, Father was asked 

about the reason for his June 2021 imprisonment, and he testified that he 

“caught a new case” and “got incarcerated.” N.T., 3/8/22, at 54. 

By the March 2022 hearing, the Children had been in CYS custody 

continuously for approximately seventeen months. See id. at 14. During that 

period, Father was incarcerated for nearly twelve months, and he was at 

Gaudenzia for two months. See id. at 17-19, 48, 51. In turn, Father’s 

repeated and continued incapacity due to his incarceration caused the Children 

to be without Father’s essential parental care, control, or subsistence 

necessary for their well-being. See generally In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 480-
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481 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding parent’s recurrent incarceration to be evidence 

of parental incapacity and that his pattern of behavior supported trial court’s 

conclusion that the parent refused to remedy the conditions that led to 

children’s placement); S.P., 47 A.3d at 831 (finding trial court did not err in

concluding that Section 2511(a)(2) was met where father was incarcerated 

before the child’s birth and never provided child with essential parental care).

Father claims “he was unable to access services from June 6, 2021, 

through January 7, 2022 through no fault of his own.” Father’s Brief at 21. 

He asserts that he “should not be penalized” due to CYS failing to arrange 

services for him and the COVID-19 pandemic limiting his access to services 

while in prison. Id. We reject Father’s claims. 

It is important to note that Father did not engage in the services offered 

to him even before his June 2021 incarceration. Father testified he was aware 

of CYS’s involvement with his family and the services requested of him since 

2019. N.T., 3/8/22, at 62-63. Father testified that in September 2020, he 

was “completely uncooperative,” “using drugs,” and did not have a phone at 

the time. Id. at 63. Moreover, immediately prior to his June 2021 

incarceration, Father had been out of prison for approximately ten weeks, but

he did not engage in services, aside from visitation, during that period. See 

id. at 17-19, 21, 53-54. Ms. Van Kirk, the CYS caseworker, testified that she 

spoke to Father about his objectives and referred Father for a drug and alcohol 

assessment, an anger management program at Catholic Charities, Greene 
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County Safe Parenting program, and visitation with the Children. Id. at 18, 

21, 31. Ms. Van Kirk, however, testified that she was not aware of Father 

making any progress in those services, aside from visiting the Children two 

times. Id. at 18, 21. Father also testified that visitation was the only service 

he complied with before returning to prison in June 2021. Id. at 54. Father 

did not offer any explanation for participating in only visitations and failing to 

engage in any of the other services while he was released. 

Although Father testified that he complied with visitation prior to his 

June 2021 incarceration, he attended only two of the nine visits offered by 

CYS between March 26 and June 6, 2021. Id. at 18, 25, 53-54. When asked 

why he did not attend the remaining seven visits, Father testified he lacked 

transportation and a working cell phone. Id. at 53. He also testified that he 

“moved to Washington [county]” and “it was just hard” to schedule the visits. 

Id. Father further explained:

So, I wasn’t able to (inaudible), and then I got incarcerated 

subsequently after. But just the pandemic (inaudible), just living 

-- living (inaudible) communication, (inaudible) homeless 

(inaudible) communication, (inaudible) communication.

Id. at 53. 

Notably, Ms. Van Kirk testified that Father was offered a total of thirtyseven visits in this case, and he never visited the Children before March 2021. 

Id. at 25-26. Ms. Van Kirk also testified that she requested Father to submit 

a drug screen before each of the two visits at the agency in April 2021. Id. 

at 18, 20, 32. Ms. Van Kirk testified that on April 12, 2021, Father declined 
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to provide a screen because “he said he knew he would test positive.” Id. at 

20. On April 19, 2021, Father tested positive for marijuana. Id. 

Father claims that he used the means available to him to maintain 

contact with the Children while incarcerated by writing letters and receiving 

pictures of the Children. Father’s Brief at 21. M.P., foster mother to Z.N. and 

L.N., testified that she received one letter from Father, and the CYS 

caseworker brought coloring pictures from Father on a separate occasion. 

N.T., 3/8/22, at 44. M.P. testified she sent Father correspondence with a 

picture of Z.N. and L.N. Id. M.P. testified that Father attended only one 

virtual visit with the Children in February of 2022, and Father ended the visit 

after twenty minutes. Id. at 40-42. M.P. also noted that the foster parents 

joined a subsequent virtual visit and waited approximately twenty minutes, 

but Father never joined that visit. Id. at 42. Father’s lack of consistent 

contact with the Children is further evidence of his neglect or refusal, causing 

the Children to be without the essential parental care, control, or subsistence 

necessary for their physical or mental well-being. 

At the time of the hearing, Father was at Gaudenzia, and he testified 

that he planned to leave Gaudenzia two weeks after the hearing, and enter a 

halfway house, called Another Way, for ninety days. N.T., 3/8/22, at 48-49, 

64. According to Father, he was sentenced to a “seven-year probation 

program with a twenty-three-month restrictive treatment program.” Id. at 

49, 51. On cross-examination, Father was asked if he had any place for the 
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Children to go right now if they were returned to him that day. Id. at 64. 

Father identified his sister and his mother as individuals who are willing to 

take the Children. Id. at 64-65. Father, notably, did not identify himself as 

being able, ready, or willing to care for the Children on the day of the hearing. 

Despite Father’s stated intention to complete his drug and alcohol treatment 

and enter a halfway home, Father’s assertion is speculative, and his future 

compliance is uncertain. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (“A parent’s vow 

to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, Father has not indicated how 

or whether he will address the remaining services of parenting and anger 

management. See generally In re S.P., 47 A.3d at 831 (upholding trial 

court’s termination of a father’s parental rights where record revealed father’s 

parole date was uncertain, and that, “even upon parole, father would reside 

in a half-way house and would need to obtain housing, employment, and 

transportation in addition to parenting skills”). 

Ultimately, the orphans’ court properly found that Father “has shown a 

repeated and continuing incapacity and neglect.” Orphans’ Court Opinion at 

8. The court correctly noted that Father “really did very little to pursue the 

parent-child relationship” or “perform parental duties, whether incarcerated 

or not.” Id. The court also noted that Father “did little to establish himself in 

a manner that he could have physical custody of the [Children] and perform 
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parental duties as would be expected.” Id. The record shows that Father’s 

repeated incapacity, neglect, and refusal, as evidenced by his recurrent 

incarceration due to his own conduct, minimal visitation with the Children, and 

failure to engage in the other services recommended by CYS, caused the 

Children to be without essential parental, care, control or subsistence 

necessary for their well-being. Further, the cause of Father’s incapacity, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2).

To the extent that Father argues there was a lack of reasonable efforts 

on the part of CYS to reunify him with the Children, Father’s argument is 

without merit because our Supreme Court has held that neither Section 

2511(a) nor (b) “requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided 

to a parent prior to termination of parental rights.” In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 

662, 672 (Pa. 2014). Although the Court recognized “the provision or absence 

of reasonable efforts may be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the 

grounds for termination and the best interests of the child[,]” it held that the 

provision of reasonable efforts to reunite parents and children is not a 

requirement for termination. Id.

Even if reasonable efforts were relevant, the record amply demonstrates 

that CYS did provide them. Ms. Van Kirk testified that, during Father’s 

imprisonment between October 27, 2020, and March 26, 2021, she “would 

take things to the jail to get signatures, so [Father] was aware of court dates 
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and CPPs.” N.T., 3/8/22, at 18. During his ten-week release from prison in 

2021, Ms. Van Kirk met with Father and discussed his CPP objectives and 

made the appropriate referrals for services. Id. at 18, 21, 30-31. When 

Father returned to prison in June 2021, Ms. Van Kirk testified that she initially 

was unaware that Father was incarcerated again and that she could not get in 

touch with him. Id. at 27, 30. When asked how CYS became aware of 

Father’s return to prison, Ms. Van Kirk testified, “I think it was -- for the next 

court date, we were trying to serve him.” Id. at 27. Ms. Van Kirk, however, 

could not recall the specific date. Id. When asked if she visited Father at 

Washington County prison, Ms. Van Kirk testified that she “would take forms 

up to sign, and they would take them from me and take them back to him.” 

Id. However, Ms. Van Kirk did not see Father on those occasions due to the

prison’s visitation rules. Id. at 27-28. Ms. Van Kirk testified her first contact 

with Father after his June 2021 incarceration was when Father called her from 

Gaudenzia on February 2, 2022. Id. at 19-20, 28. 

Thus, we conclude the record supports the orphans’ court’s 

determination to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to the 

Children under Section 2511(a)(2). We discern no abuse of discretion or error 

of law with the orphans’ court’s decision. 

We do not address Section 2511(b) because Father failed to include any 

such claim in his concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). In addition, Father failed to include any challenge 
J-S36002-22

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regarding Section 2511(b) in the statement of questions involved portion of

his brief. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[I]t 

is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant’s statement of questions 

involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal are 

waived.”). Thus, Father has waived any claim relating to Section 2511(b).

Accordingly, we affirm the orders terminating Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2022