IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 

TEXAS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 

GILBERTO HINOJOSA, Chair of the 

Texas Democratic Party, JOSEPH DANIEL 

CASCINO, SHANDA MARIE SANSING, 

and BRENDA LI GARCIA, 

Plaintiffs, 

and 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 

AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), and 

TEXAS LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 

AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

Plaintiff-Intervenors, 

V. 

RUTH HUGHS, Texas Secretary of State, 

Defendant. 

AUG 1 3 2021 

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT 1c. 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

BY DEJW 

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-20-CA-438-FB 

REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING 

Before the Court are defendant's motions to dismiss (docket nos. 150 & 151) filed on May 14, 

2021, plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenors' response (docket no. 155) filed on June 11, 2021, and 

defendant's reply (docket no. 157) filed on June 18, 2021. 

Since the filing of these pleadings, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (together with Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National 

Committee), 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), on July 1, 2021. 

The parties are hereby requested to submit additional briefing addressing how Brnovich and 

other recent intermediate appellate cases affect the issues in this case; and whether Brnovich has or has 

not implicitly overruled the A ndersonlBurdick framework for election litigation of applying: 

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1. A strict scrutiny review if an election law imposes a severe burden on voting rights; or 

2. An intermediate-level scrutiny if the law does not create a severe burden but still 

impacts the right to vote by: 

a. identifying "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 

burden imposed by its rule," and 

b. determining "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 

plaintiff's rights." 

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 

(1992). 

The parties should also address whether or not there is a newly-minted, morphed, mutated, 

variant standard of review which is essentially judicial deference to an independent state legislative 

doctrine in election law. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis) Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. 

L. REv. 553, 602 (2015) ("Recent Supreme Court election law jurisprudence reflects an unspoken, 

pernicious trend. Without identifying a specific new rule, the Court has been unjustifiably deferring to 

state laws regarding election administration, thereby giving states tremendous power to regulate 

elections. At the same time, the Court has diminished Congress's oversight role. That is a mistake. 

Placing too much power in states to administer elections is both constitutionally wrong and practically 

dangerous."); see also The Andrew Goodman Foundation, Age Discrimination in Voting at Home (June 

4, 2020), http://voteathorne26.us (last visited August 12, 2021) ("Some states forbid younger voters 

from voting at home while allowing older voters to do so. Courts will likely find these laws 

unconstitutional." Clearly, this prediction was erroneous.). 

Other cases the parties should address with reference to an explicit or implicit judicial deference 

doctrine are: 

1. Republican National Committee. v. Democratic National Committee, 140 S. Ct. 1205 

(2020); 

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2. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020); 

Democratic National Committee. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020); 

4. Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2020); 

5. Texas League of United Latin American Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 

2020); 

6. Richardson v. Hug/is, 978 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2020); 

7. Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Hug/is, 976 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2020); 

8. Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App'x 860 (5th Cir. 2020); 

9. A. Philip Randolph Institute of Ohio v. LaRose, 831 F. App'x 188 (6th Cir. 2020); 

10. Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett, 978 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2020) (Moore, J., dissenting) ("Make no mistake: today's majority opinion is yet another chapter in the 

concentrated effort to restrict the vote. To be sure, it does not cast itself as 

suchinvoking instead the disinterested language ofjusticiabilitybut this only makes 

today's majority opinion more troubling. As a result of today's decision, Tennessee is 

free toand willdisenfranchise hundreds, if not thousands of its citizens who cast 

their votes absentee by mail. Masking today's outcome in standing doctrine obscures that 

result, but that makes it all the more disquieting. I will not be a party to this passive sanctioning of disenfranchisement. I dissent.") (citations omitted)); 

11. Priorities USA v. Nessel, 978 F.3d 976 (6th Cir. 2020); and 

12. Other cases as the parties may choose if they are applicable to the judicial deference 

doctrine issue. 

Defendant shall file her additional briefing on or before November 16, 2021. Plaintiffs and 

plaintiff-intervenors shall file their response(s) on or before February 16, 2022. 

It is so ORDERED. 

SIGNED this 13th day of August, 2021. 

(' 

BIERY 

UNITED STATES FiISTRICT JUDGE 

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