PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ALPINE DIVISION

ERIC HEMPHILL, §

§

Plaintiff, § CIVIL ACTION NO.

§

v. § 4:20-cv-37

§

§ JURY TRIAL DEMAND

WESTSTAR AUTOPLEX, L.L.C., §

§

Defendant. §

§

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Plaintiff Eric Hemphill (“Hemphill”) and files this, his Original Complaint 

and Jury Demand against Defendant WestStar Autoplex, L.L.C. (“Weststar” or “Defendant”) 

concerning race/color discrimination arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 

and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001, et seq. In support of 

Hemphill’s claims, he respectfully states as follows:

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The Court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Texas Labor Code and Texas Law because those 

claims are so related to the claims in the action with the Court’s original jurisdiction that they 

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form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

III. PARTIES

3. Plaintiff is an African-American citizen of the United States and a lawful resident of Midland

County, Texas.

4. Defendant is an auto dealership located on 401 E. Interstate Hwy. 20, Monahans, Texas 79756, 

with a mailing address at PO Box 67 Monahans, TX 79756-0067, and a Registered Agent –

Larry L Bryant, maintaining a registered office at 2008 West Hwy. 80, Monahans, TX 79756.

IV. FACTS

5. Mr. Hemphill first began working for WestStar Autoplex in March, 2012.

6. For the duration of his employment, Mr. Hemphill gave his best efforts to WestStar, and had 

no disciplinary history prior to his termination.

7. Unfortunately, Charles Cassle, WestStar’s General Manager, harbors biases and prejudices 

against African-Americans. Racist terms and statements also permeate the WestStar Autoplex 

workplace. These included terms such as referring to Mr. Hemphill working the “cotton gin,” 

and being a “monkey.”

8. On or about September 21, 2016, WestStar and Mr. Cassle made the decision to terminate

Mr. Hemphill for the stated reason that he had made controversial statements on his Facebook 

page. Mr. Hemphill’s post was a parody of a commercial which directed criticism at the 

national situation where individuals, particularly African-Americans, are being killed at 

routine traffic stops.

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9. The real reason for Mr. Hemphill's termination was race and illegal pressure applied by local 

law enforcement to terminate Mr. Hemphill over his Facebook post.

10. Ironically, Mr. Cassle’s very own Facebook page reveals numerous posts that are both racist 

and sexist in nature. 

11. Mr. Cassle's public Facebook profile also reveals that he is the general manager of WestStar 

Autoplex. Comparatively, Mr. Hemphill’s Facebook post was made under the pseudonym Eric 

Sweetwater, in which he does not display a picture of himself, Eric Hemphill, or that he is an 

employee of WestStar.

12. Unfortunately, WestStar has allowed racial politics to permeate its workplace, allowing 

managers and others to make blatantly racist postings and statements on social media.

However, when an African-American such as Mr. Hemphill makes a post criticizing the killing 

of African-Americans at traffic stops, he is summarily terminated. Further, others have been 

given "second chances" or progressive discipline, whereas Mr. Hemphill was summarily 

terminated.

13. This sort of selective enforcement of rules is indicative of race discrimination. 

14. Notably, during Mr. Hemphill’s unemployment benefits hearing before the Texas Workforce 

Commission, Mr. Cassle testified that the termination decision was also made because of 

economic pressure, yet he was unaware of any economic damage done to the dealership from 

Mr. Hemphill’s statements.

15. Plaintiff timely filed an EEOC charge of discrimination on or about February 27, 2017, which 

was co-filed with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division. Plaintiff was 

mailed a notice of right to sue letter from the EEOC on February 7, 2020, and received it shortly 

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thereafter. This suit is being filed within 90 days of Plaintiff receiving the notice of right to 

sue letter from the EEOC.

VI. JURY DEMAND

16. Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all claims and defenses in this action.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION 

A. Color and Race Discrimination 

17. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in the above paragraphs as if fully 

stated herein.

18. As described above, Defendant’s actions constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of 

Plaintiff’s race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the 

Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001, et seq. The employment 

practices complained of above were intentional. 

19. Plaintiff has satisfied all jurisdictional prerequisites in connection with his claims under Title 

VII, section 1981, and the Texas Labor Code.

20. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful discrimination, Plaintiff has suffered and expects to suffer 

pecuniary losses, including but not limited to, lost wages and other benefits associated with his

employment. 

21. As a result of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff has suffered non-pecuniary losses 

including, but not limited to emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, personal humiliation, 

mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary damages. 

22. Defendant acted at all relevant times with malice and/or reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s

federal- and state-protected rights. Plaintiff therefore seeks punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1981 and the Texas Labor Code.

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23. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks any and all equitable relief necessary to return him to the position 

that he would have been in but for Defendant’s unlawful discrimination. 

24. Defendant’s actions referenced above have caused Plaintiff to retain the services of the 

undersigned counsel in order to pursue his state and federal rights in this action. Consequently, 

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees, expert costs, and other costs of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), and the Texas Labor Code.

VII. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests that the above-named Defendant be cited to 

appear in this matter and that, after jury trial by proof, Plaintiff be awarded:

a. Judgment against Defendant ordering Defendant to take such other reasonable 

actions as may be necessary to remedy the effects of Defendant’s violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), and the Texas Labor Code;

b. Judgment against Defendant for lost wages and benefits, both back pay and front 

pay;

c. In the alternative to front pay, judgment against Defendant reinstating Plaintiff to 

his position of employment, equivalent position of employment, or the position of employment he

would have enjoyed but for the discrimination, if reinstatement is deemed feasible;

d. Judgment against Defendant for compensatory damages including emotional pain, 

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life;

e. Judgment against Defendant for punitive damages to the extent allowed under the 

law;

f. Pre-judgment interest at the appropriate legal rate on all amounts awarded;

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g. Interest after judgment at the appropriate legal rate on all amounts awarded until 

paid in full;

h. Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees;

i. Costs of suit; and

j. Such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may justly be entitled

Respectfully submitted, Date: May 7, 2020

/s/ Adam S. Greenfield 

Adam S. Greenfield

Texas Bar No. 24075494

agreenfield@candglegal.com

Board Certified in Labor & Employment Law 

by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization

Edward Cloutman, III – Of Counsel

State Bar No. 04411000

crawfishll@prodigy.net

Cloutman & Greenfield, PLLC

3301 Elm Street

Dallas, Texas 75226

214.939.9224

214.939.9229 FAX

COUNSELS FOR PLAINTIFF

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