J-S19039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BONNIE JO PARTHEMORE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1690 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002093-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

Bonnie Jo Parthemore (“Parthemore”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following her convictions for driving under the influence 

(“DUI”) (controlled substance) and the summary offense of illegal parking.1 

Additionally, Parthemore’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel 

and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We 

grant counsel’s motion and affirm the judgment of sentence. 

In September 2021, Trooper Larry Reedy of the Pennsylvania State 

Police and his partner observed Parthemore’s vehicle disabled “in the right 

lane coming off the ramp . . . in the travel lanes” of southbound I-83 in 

Dauphin County. N.T., 11/14/22, at 5. The troopers conducted a traffic stop

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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2), 3353(a)(2)(ii).
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and approached the disabled vehicle. Id. at 5, 23. The trooper observed 

Parthemore lying down asleep in the backseat of the vehicle with two dogs. 

Id. at 6, 11. The trooper tapped on the back window of the vehicle to wake 

Parthemore and instruct her to open the door and exit the vehicle. Id. When 

Parthemore complied, the trooper immediately detected the odor of marijuana 

coming from the vehicle. Id. at 6, 13. Parthemore told the trooper that she 

had run out of gas. Id. at 6. The trooper observed that Parthemore appeared 

“very disheveled, very out of it, seemed confused . . . [and] slurred speech 

real bad.” Id. The trooper then transported Parthemore to the booking center 

where she refused a blood test. Id. at 9. He thereafter charged Parthemore 

with DUI and illegal parking. 

The matter proceeded to a bench trial on November 14, 2022, at which 

the trooper testified as to the above-referenced facts. The trooper then 

authenticated the video of the encounter with Parthemore, which had been

recorded by the dashboard camera of the patrol vehicle, and the video was 

then played for the trial court. Id. at 7-8. In the video, Parthemore admitted 

to having a glass of vodka and using marijuana. Id. at 7, 8. The video also 

showed that field sobriety tests were administered to Parthemore by the 

trooper, and she failed those tests. Id. at 8. Trooper Reedy explained that, 

based on the results of the field sobriety tests, he determined that Parthemore 

was under the influence and incapable of safely driving. Id. at 8-9. 
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At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Parthemore guilty 

of both offenses. The court immediately sentenced Parthemore to six months 

of restrictive punishment for DUI, with the first month on house arrest with 

electronic monitoring. The trial court then imposed fines and costs for illegal 

parking. Parthemore did not file a post-sentence motion. Parthemore filed a 

timely notice of appeal. The trial court then ordered her to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Parthemore’s 

counsel thereafter filed a concise statement indicating, inter alia, his intent to 

file a brief pursuant to Anders and Santiago. In light of counsel’s stated 

intention, the trial court determined that no further explanation of 

Parthemore’s conviction and sentence was necessary and did not prepare a 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. In this court, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw 

and an Anders brief. Parthemore has not filed a response to either of 

counsel’s filings.

When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 

2010). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and 

wishes to withdraw from representation, he must do the following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring 

to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which 

does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the 

brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new 
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counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems 

worthy of this Court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(internal citation omitted). In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the 

second requirement of Anders, i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and 

required that the brief:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders] 

requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial 

court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the 

appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228 (citation 

omitted).

Here, counsel avers in his motion to withdraw that he conducted a 

thorough and conscientious review of the record and applicable case law, and 

thereafter determined that there are no meritorious grounds to support 

Parthemore’s appeal. Counsel further avers that he mailed Parthemore copies 

of the motion and the Anders brief, as well as correspondence explaining 

Parthemore’s rights to retain private counsel or proceed pro se and raise any 

additional arguments she believes are meritorious. Counsel’s Anders brief 
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includes a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case, a list of 

issues that could arguably support Parthemore’s appeal, and counsel’s 

analysis of why the issues lack merit. We conclude counsel has complied with 

the technical requirements of the Anders procedure. Accordingly, we will 

conduct an independent review to determine whether Parthemore’s appeal is 

wholly frivolous.

In the Anders brief, counsel presents no issue for our review in his 

statement of questions presented, given his conclusion that “any appeal issue 

in the case is frivolous.” Anders Brief at 3. However, elsewhere in the brief 

counsel indicates that Parthemore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting her conviction for DUI under section 3802(d)(2). Id. at 8. 

Accordingly, we will address Parthemore’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence.

Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. 

Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013). When considering a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence:

[W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be 

deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each 

material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof 

by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical 

certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved 

by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 

that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from 
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the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the 

evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is 

circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence 

coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 

overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may 

not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so 

long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of 

a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Importantly, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. See

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 873 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).

To convict an individual of DUI under section 3802(d)(2), the 

Commonwealth must establish: “[t]he individual is under the influence of a 

drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability 

to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of 

the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).

In the Anders brief, counsel explains that “Parthemore admitted to 

smoking marijuana as well as drinking earlier in the day, was illegally parked, 

and failed sobriety tests.” Anders Brief at 8. Counsel further explains that 

Parthemore does not, and could not, contest the control element of the 

offense. Id. at 9. Counsel points out that Parthemore had slurred speech 

with a disheveled appearance and was found sleeping in her vehicle along the 
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interstate. Id. For these reasons, counsel concludes that any challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the DUI conviction would be 

frivolous. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

as the verdict winner in the court below, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient to support Parthemore’s conviction for DUI under section 

3802(d)(2). The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Reedy, 

who testified that Parthemore appeared “very disheveled, very out of it, 

seemed confused . . . [and] slurred speech real bad.” N.T., 11/14/22, at 6. 

The Commonwealth also presented the video of the encounter with 

Parthemore, wherein she admitted to having a glass of vodka and using 

marijuana, and which depicted her failing the field sobriety tests. Id. at 7, 8. 

Moreover, Parthemore also took the stand and admitted to consuming vodka 

and smoking marijuana that day, and to being asleep in her vehicle which 

was parked in the traffic lanes of the interstate. Id. at 16-17, 18, 19. Thus, 

we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Parthemore, 

while driving or operating a vehicle, was under the influence of a drug to a 

degree that impaired her ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle. See 

Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1236 (Pa. 2011); see also 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Thus, Parthemore’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting her conviction for DUI is, in fact, wholly frivolous. 
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Further, based on our independent review of the trial court proceedings, 

we discern no other non-frivolous issues that Parthemore could have raised.2 

See Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228 (citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that 

Parthemore’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Motion granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023

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2 Counsel additionally explained in the Anders brief that no discretionary 

sentencing claim could have been raised on Parthemore’s behalf because she

did not file a post-sentence motion or otherwise preserve any such claim at 

the time of sentencing. See Anders Brief at 11-12.