Filed 1/23/14 In re D.A. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re D.A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B247773

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
TYESHA A.,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK59639)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephen Marpet, Juvenile Co urt Referee. Affirmed. John M. Kennedy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ____________2 INTRODUCTION Tyesha A. (mother) appeals the jurisdic tional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court affecting her ch ildren Tyra J. and Dominique A. 1 The main issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the ju venile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) of the Welfare and Institutions
Code. 2 We conclude there was substantial evid ence to sustain the petition. Therefore,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND
1. Events Leading up to the Section 300 Petition On November 1, 2012, 12-year-old Tyra and her sister, 16-year-old Dominique, were reported missing by their maternal grandm other. The sisters were attempting to run away from home and were later found by a deputy sheriff at a local gas station. Dominique told the deputy sheriff they called he r father to pick them up. Tyra told the deputy sheriff that she did not want to go home because her mo ther hits her with a metal spoon on her hand and on the bottom of her fe et, and she was afraid she would be hit again. The deputy sheriff did not see any br uising on Tyra’s hand, but when he touched Tyra’s hand, she “shrieked in pain.” The deputy sheriff took the children into protective custody. Tyra told the social worker that she “ran away becau se her mother keeps hitting her on her hands and feet.” Tyra also told the social worker that she had marks on her
back. The social worker did not see any marks or bruises on Tyra’s back, but the social worker did observe that Ty ra’s hand was swollen. Dominique told the social wo rker that Tyra did not want to return home because Tyra gets in trouble and is punished for her poor grades. Dominique never saw her mother hit Tyra. Dominique to ld the social worker that two years ago her mother gave

1 The respective fathers are not part of this proceeding.

2 All further statutory references ar e to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 her a black eye. Later, Dominique stated th at she got the black ey e when she ran into something and that her mother never hit her. Mother admitted being strict and punishi ng the girls, but she denied hitting her
children. The children were released to mother. The following day, Tyra was medically evalua ted. Tyra’s right finger was swollen and it could not be ruled out that she was hit by a metal spoon. The Department filed a non- detained petition, alleging se rious physical harm and failure to protect. The petition alleges mother physically abused Tyra “by striking the
child’s feet and hands with a metal spoon,” and the child was afraid of mother and did not
want to return home because of the ongoing physical abuse. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b).) As to Dominique, the petition allege d that in 2010 mother physic ally abused her by striking her face, “resulting in the child sustaining bruises to the child ’s eye.” (§ 300, subds. (a), (b).) The petition also alleged under subdi vision (j) of section 300, there was a substantial risk of abuse of a sibling. The juvenile court continued the case for adjudication.
2. Jurisdictional/Dispositional Hearing The reports submitted and entered into evid ence at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing indicated mother had a prior child welfare history that included referrals in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Riverside counties with respect to her other children
and to a foster child in her car e. The family history of refe rrals included physical abuse, general neglect, abuse by the fathers, and do mestic violence. Reports of mother’s physical abuse of her children began in 2003 through 2010, ho wever most of the allegations were inconclusive or unfounded. Three referrals resulted in juvenile court proceedings. In 2009, mother’s oldest daughter was deta ined based upon allegations of mother’s physical abuse. The child ran away from home, and mother became upset and allegedly hit her in the eye. The reco rd contains conflicting reports of whether the physical abuse was substantiated. In May 20 09, the Riverside County Juven ile Court sustained a section 300 petition, alleging mother’s “l imited ability to parent the ch ild . . . due to the child’s4 behavior issues,” and mother’s inability to provide the child with care and support. Mother initially waived reunif ication services, but the juvenile court later granted mother’s request for services. In 2011, th e child was returned to mother’s custody and jurisdiction was terminated. In 2005, four of mother’s five childr en, including Tyra and Dominique, were
detained due to domestic violence and failure to protect. The children were declared dependents of the court. A year later, the c ourt ordered termination of jurisdiction in the
home of mother. In 2005, mother became angr y at a foster child in her care, and refused to permit her to return home. The allegations of “caret aker absence/incapacity ” with respect to the
foster child were substantiated.
In connection with the November 2012 incident involving Tyra and Dominique, Tyra’s medical report stated: “Child has tender ness to touch to right palm of the hand by 5” finger, no swelling or brui sing noted. Hematoma on the right thumb and on the right thumb nail. Per child, mother hit her with a metal servi ng spoon. Hypopigmented marks on the back, unknown origin.” The report conc luded the “[f]indings are consistent with history given by the child.” The summary st ated: “Evaluation suspicious of physical
abuse.”
Almost four weeks after the November 20 12 incident, a Department social worker separately interviewed Tyra, Dominique, and mother. Tyra said sh e had been punished because of her bad grades, and “ ‘threw a tant rum in the garage and [she] hit the table a couple of times with [her] ha nd.’ ” The right hand was starting to swell and bruise, and then the next day she “smashed ” her hand at school in the door. Tyra admitted that she told the deputy sheri ff that her mother hit her with a metal spoon, but “ ‘that was a lie, she didn’t.’ ” Tyra said she lied about being hit so she “ ‘would ge t out of trouble.’ ” Dominique denied her mother hit her or Tyra. Dominique said she heard “Tyra tell the police and the social wo rker that she was hit with a spoon but ‘that just isn’t true.’ ” Dominique also said that two year s ago, she lied to auth orities when she told5 them that her mother gave her a black eye. Dominique blamed her father’s youngest son,
and admitted that her fath er told her to lie. Mother said Tyra’s godmother told her that Tyra hit her hand on the table because
she was mad. Mother deni ed hitting Tyra on her back and referred to “ ‘some discoloration on her skin (on her back).’ ” Moth er also stated she di d not hit Dominique. Mother said Dominique’s father made up the allegation during their custody dispute, and Dominique actually suffered physical abuse while staying with her fa ther. Mother also recalled that Dominique’s medical evaluati on “ ‘concluded the mark was not caused by being hit with someone’s hand and that it c ould not have happened when they said it happened.’ ” Mother also re ported that Dominique recanted the story. Dominique’s father, however, told a Department social worker that Dominique told him mother hit her. The Department raised credibility issues with Tyra’s new explanation for her injury, and Dominique’s versions of the 2010 incident. Before the hearing, a Department social worker visited the family on two different
occasions. The social worke r’s opinion was “the children ha ve been instructed not to make any further disclosures and may have been threatened or intimidated in some manner by their mother.” During argument, the childrens’ counsel a nd mother’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the petition. The childrens’ counsel argued that both girls “recanted the stories that . . . brought this petition before the c ourt and they have been consistent on their recantation.” Additionally, th e children lived with mother and there were no further incidents. Mother’s counsel argued that he r client and the children had given the exact
same account of wh at happened.
3. The Juvenile Court’s Jurisdic tional and Dispositional Orders The juvenile court sustained the petition pu rsuant to section 30 0, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) as to physical abuse of Tyra, and th at such physical abuse endangers a sibling. The juvenile court, however, dismissed the petition as to Dominique, concluding there
was insufficient evidence.6 In its dispositional order, the juvenile cour t ordered mother to attend and complete a parenting class, and to ob tain individual counseling. The children were ordered to receive individual counseling and c onjoint therapy with mother. Mother appealed the orders.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Suppo rts the Juvenile Court’ s Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The Department has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the children are dependents of the court under section 300. ( In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) Based upon th e appropriate standard of review, the Department has met its burden.

a. Standard of Review We review the juvenile court’s juri sdictional findings under the substantial evidence test. ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “The term ‘substantial evidence’
means such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind would accept as ad equate to support a conclusion; it is eviden ce which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” ( In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) In determining whether there is substantial evidence, “we draw all reasonable inferences from the ev idence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determin ations; and we note that issu es of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” ( In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “When a dependency petition alleges multip le grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the . . . court’s finding of jurisdiction over th e minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not cons ider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction ar e supported by the evidence.” ( In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)7 b. Substantial Evidence Su pports the Juvenile Cour t’s Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivisions (a) and (j) Mother argues there was no substantial ev idence to support the jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300 , subdivisions (a) or (j) because Tyra did not suffer serious physical harm, Tyra recanted her st ory that mother inflicted physical harm by hitting her with a metal spoon, and there is no evidence that Domini que is at risk. Under section 300, subdivision (a), the c ourt can take jurisdiction over a child if she has suffered, or there is a substantial ri sk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm “inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent.” Section 300, subdivision (j) provides that th e court can take jurisdiction ov er a child if the “child’s sibling has been abused or negl ected, as defined in subdivisi on (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and
there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those
subdivisions.” Section 300 requires proof the child is subj ect to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. ( In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) A parent’s “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” ( In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.) “ ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” ( In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
The record contains substa ntial evidence to support th e juvenile court’s finding that it has jurisdiction pursuant to section 3 00, subdivisions (a) and (j). The evidence showed Tyra had a swollen ha nd, she had no visible bruisi ng but “shrieked” when the deputy sheriff touched her hand, and Tyra’s medical evaluation indicated the injury was consistent with her original version of events . Given Tyra’s initial reports to the deputy sheriff, social worker, and medi cal staff that she had been be aten by her mother with a metal spoon, and she feared further bea tings, there was sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious phys ical harm to Tyra and her si bling, given mother’s history of dealing with her older daugh ter’s behavioral issues.8 Mother cites In Re Roberto C. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4t h 1241, to support the argument that like the evidence in that case, the only evidence here of serious physical harm was a “slight swelling” of one of Tyra’s fingers. In Roberto C. , there was no evidence presented linking the pa rents to the injuries of their then nine-month-old son, and no credible evidence establishing that th e parents knew Roberto was being abused. ( Id. at pp. 1248, 1254.) Here, unlike in Roberto C. , there is a link to mother – Tyra reported that mother caused her injuries, an d Dominique also reported that she had been injured by mother. While the children later recanted, a re cantation in these circumstances is not the equivalent of the absence of any evidence. Contrary to mother’s next contention, the record contains substantial evidence that implicated her. Tyra to ld the authorities that mo ther hit her with a metal spoon. She later changed her story and stated she injured her hand by sla mming it on the table, and on the following day, further injured her hand at school. Mother corroborated only part of Tyra’s second version of her injury, but mother gave no explanation why she waited to disclose this information to the Department . While mother asks this court to credit Tyra’s second version of the ev ents, issues of fact and cred ibility are within the province of the juvenile court. ( In re Heather A.
, supra , 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) We do not disturb the jurisdictional finding because s ubstantial evidence su pports the juvenile court’s order, particularly when mother has a history of inability to parent because of the
child’s behavioral issues. Finally, mother contends that Dominique is not at risk as no evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictiona l finding under sec tion 300, subdivisi on (j). The record contains Department reports that mother resp onds to behavioral issues and conflict with her children by means of physical abuse. A reasonable inference from this pattern of conduct is that Dominique also is at risk . We reject the argument that Tyra and Dominique were no longer at risk based on mother’s representation that there was “no incident” of physical abuse from November 2012 until the February 2013 hearing. The family was under the supervis ion of the juvenile court a nd the Department during that9 period. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings with respect to section 3 00, subdivision (j). In light of our conclusion, we do not reach the merits of mother’s argument that
there was no substantial evid ence to support the jurisd ictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). ( In re Alexis E., supra , 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.)
2. Mother Did Not Meet her Burden of Sh owing the Juvenile Court’s Disposition
Constituted Reversible Error Mother’s only argument with respect to the juvenile court’s dispositional order is that “when jurisdictional findings must be re versed, the dispositional order must also be reversed.” Because we reject mother’s arguments regarding the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we also reject this argument.10 DISPOSITION The orders dated February 5, 2013 are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

CROSKEY, J.