IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30612

MARTIN ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C., 

Plaintiff - Cross-Claimant - Appellee

v.

BOURBON PETREL M/V, etc., et al, 

Defendant

CGG SERVICES US, INCORPORATED, 

Intervenor Defendant - Cross-Defendant - Appellant

SNC BOURBON CE PATEL; CGG SERVICES, S.A.; 

Movants - Appellants

--------------------------------------------------

MARTIN ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C., 

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MISS LILLY M/V, etc., 

Defendant

SEA SUPPORT VENTURES, L.L.C., IN PERSONAM, 

Defendant - Appellant

CGG SERVICES, S.A.; CGG SERVICES US, INCORPORATED, 

Appellants

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 17, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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----------------------------------------------------

MARTIN ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C., 

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

OMS RESOLUTION M/V, etc., 

Defendant

v.

REDERIJ GROEN BV, IN PERSONAM, 

Defendant - Appellant

CGG SERVICES, S.A.; CGG SERVICES US, INCORPORATED, 

Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before BARKSDALE, HIGGINSON, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (“CIMLA”), 

46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343, a person may obtain a maritime lien against a 

vessel by providing it with “necessaries.” Here, plaintiff Martin Energy 

Services (“Martin”) delivered fuel to three support vessels owned by C.G.G. 

Services, U.S., Inc. (“CGG”). The support vessels carried the fuel in their cargo 

tanks to refuel three other vessels performing seismic surveys off Louisiana’s 

coast. When CGG failed to pay for the fuel, Martin sued, and the district court 

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concluded Martin had a maritime lien on the support vessels. That result 

unduly expands our maritime lien precedents. Fuel may be “necessary” to a 

vessel if it fuels the vessel. But the fuel transported by the support vessels was 

for refueling other vessels. That fuel was not “necessary” to the support vessels. 

We therefore reverse and render judgment for CGG.

I.

In 2014, CGG was conducting seismic surveying operations off the coast 

of Louisiana with three vessels, the Geo Celtic, Oceanic Sirius, and Oceanic 

Vega (the “Seismic Vessels”). CGG was responsible for ensuring the Seismic 

Vessels were supplied with fuel, supplies, and equipment. To do so, CGG used

three other vessels, the Bourbon Petrel, OMS Resolution, and Miss Lilly (the 

“Support Vessels”), which made deliveries to the Seismic Vessels from Port 

Fourchon, Louisiana. At first, CGG purchased fuel directly from Martin, but 

credit problems eventually led it to buy through a trader, O.W. Bunker USA, 

Inc. (“O.W. Bunker”). For the purchases at issue in this case, O.W. Bunker 

arranged for fuel deliveries through Martin.

Those fuel deliveries occurred in October and November 2014. Pursuant 

to purchase orders from O.W. Bunker, Martin delivered fuel to each of the 

three Support Vessels. Each vessel had a cargo tank for carrying fuel to the 

Seismic Vessels, as distinct from a “day tank” holding fuel for the Support

Vessels themselves. On three separate occasions during this time, the Support

Vessels transported thousands of gallons of fuel in their cargo tanks to refuel

the Seismic Vessels.

Shortly after, O.W. Bunker filed for bankruptcy.1 CGG had not yet paid 

O.W. Bunker’s invoices for the Martin fuel. CGG eventually settled with O.W. 

1 This case is yet another “round in the maritime litigation spawned by the collapse of 

OW Bunker, formerly the world’s largest supplier of fuel for ships.” ING Bank N.V. v. Bomin 

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Bunker, but O.W. Bunker never forwarded payment to Martin. Martin then 

sued CGG in federal district court, asserting in rem claims against the Support

Vessels and in personam claims against the vessels’ owners. The in personam 

claims were disposed of on summary judgment, and the in rem claims were 

tried to the court.

The district court ruled for Martin. The court concluded that Martin’s 

delivery of fuel gave rise to a maritime lien against the Support Vessels. It

reasoned that the Martin fuel qualified as “necessaries” to those vessels under

CIMLA. See 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a). The court also concluded the fuel was 

provided “on the order” of CGG or its authorized agent, as CIMLA requires. 

See id. Finally, the court awarded Martin pre-judgment interest dating from 

each fuel purchase. CGG timely appealed.

II.

On appeal from a bench trial, we review fact findings for clear error and 

legal conclusions de novo. Maritrend, Inc. v. Serac & Co. (Shipping) Ltd., 348 

F.3d 469, 470 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Whether a maritime lien 

exists is a question of law, reviewed de novo.” Comar Marine, Corp. v. Raider 

Marine Logistics, LLC, 792 F.3d 564, 575 (5th Cir. 2015). 

III.

CIMLA2 governs entitlement to maritime liens. ING Bank N.V. v. Bomin 

Bunker Oil Corp., 953 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Valero Mktg. & 

Supply Co. v. M/V Almi Sun, IMO No. 9579535, 893 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 

2018)). It states, in relevant part, that “a person providing necessaries to a 

Bunker Oil Corp., 953 F.3d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting NuStar Energy Servs., Inc. v. 

M/V COSCO Auckland, 760 F. App’x 245, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ---,140 S. 

Ct. 339 (2019)). 

2 In 1988, CIMLA recodified the 1910 Federal Maritime Lien Act (“FMLA”), 46 U.S.C. 

§§ 971–975, without changing its substance. See Maritrend, 348 F.3d at 470–71. 

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vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner . . . has a 

maritime lien on the vessel [and] may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the 

lien.” 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). The lien “is a special 

property right in the vessel,” which “grants the creditor the right to appropriate 

the vessel, have it sold, and be repaid the debt from the proceeds.” Equilease 

Corp. v. M/V Sampson, 793 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (citation 

omitted).3 “We apply the provisions of CIMLA stricti juris to ensure that 

maritime liens are not ‘lightly extended by construction, analogy, or 

inference.’” Valero, 893 F.3d at 292 (quoting Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. M.V. 

Grand Loyalty, 608 F.2d 197, 200–01 (5th Cir. 1979)).

While not defining “necessaries,” CIMLA furnishes an illustrative list: 

“repairs, supplies, towage, and the use of a dry dock or marine railway.” 46 

U.S.C. § 31301(4). In that regard, “[n]ecessaries are the things that a prudent 

owner would provide to enable a ship to perform well the functions for which 

she has been engaged.” Equilease, 793 F.2d at 603 (citing 2 Benedict on 

Admiralty § 34 (7th ed. 1984)). The term, which has a “broad meaning,”4

includes “most goods or services that are useful to the vessel, keep her out of 

danger, and enable her to perform her particular function.” Id. These are items 

useful “to vessel operations”5 and “necessary to keep the ship going.”6

3 See also Racal Survey, U.S.A., Inc. v. M/V Count Fleet, 231 F.3d 183, 191 (5th Cir. 

2000) (necessaries are “designated for specific vessels”).

4 J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Off-Shore Menhaden Co., 262 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 

1959).

5 Gulf Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Golden Prince M/V, 230 F.3d 178, 180 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (discussing Equilease); see also Silver Star Enterprises, Inc. v. Saramacca M/V, 82 

F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1996) (maritime liens “developed as a necessary incident of the 

operation of vessels”) (quoting Piedmont & George’s Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 

245 U.S. 1, 9 (1920)).

6 Silver Star, 82 F.3d at 668 (quoting Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & 

Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268, 280 (1940)).

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A.

It is undisputed that the Martin fuel was put into the cargo tanks of the 

Support Vessels, each of which transported it to refuel the Seismic Vessels.

The issue is whether, as the district court concluded, that fuel constituted 

“necessaries” to the Support Vessels, giving rise to a maritime lien under 

CIMLA. The court reasoned that two of the Support Vessels, the Bourbon 

Petrel and the OMS Resolution, served as “floating gas stations” for the Seismic 

Vessels and that the fuel was “necessary” for the Support Vessels to perform 

this function. Similarly, the court reasoned the fuel was “necessary” for the 

third Support Vessel, the Miss Lilly, to function as an “offshore supply vessel,” 

transporting fuel, equipment, and personnel to the Seismic Vessels. On appeal, 

CGG argues this was error. It contends the Martin fuel supported operation of 

the Seismic Vessels, not the Support Vessels. The fuel was merely cargo carried 

by the Support Vessels, and no authority supports deeming cargo “necessaries” 

for purposes of a maritime lien. We agree.

Fuel may qualify as a “necessary” to a vessel under CIMLA when it is 

supplied to refuel that vessel. See, e.g., Valero, 893 F.3d at 291, 294 (there was 

“no dispute that [fuel] bunkers qualify as necessaries . . . to the Vessel” when

plaintiff supplied fuel to a vessel that “needed refueling”). In such a case, fuel 

could be akin to “repairs, supplies, [or] towage,” 46 U.S.C. § 31301(4): like those 

things, the fuel would be “necessary to keep the ship going.” Silver Star 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Saramacca M/V, 82 F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 310 U.S. 268, 280 

(1940)). Therefore, the Martin fuel may have qualified as a “necessary” vis-à-

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vis the Seismic Vessels.7 We need not decide that question, however, because 

the Seismic Vessels are not parties here.

The Support Vessels present a different scenario. As the district court 

found, CGG utilized the Support Vessels “for ensuring that the Seismic Vessels 

were supplied with fuel and water.” To that end, the fuel deliveries at issue 

“were put in the cargo tanks of the [Support Vessels],” and the entire amount 

was transported to the Seismic Vessels for their refueling. The district court 

did not find that any part of the Martin fuel was used to fuel the Support 

Vessels.8

Given those undisputed facts, there is no basis for concluding that the 

Martin fuel was a “necessary” as to the Support Vessels. To do so would, as 

CGG persuasively argues, “represent an unprecedented expansion of the 

CIMLA” by extending the concept of “necessaries” to cargo transported by a 

vessel. The parties cite no precedent—nor can we find any—supporting that 

expansion.9 Based on that absence alone, we would reject the proposition. “The 

7 See, e.g., Belcher Co. of Ala. v. M/V Maratha Mariner, 724 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 

1984) (stating in dicta that, “when Belcher supplied fuel to the M/V Marantha Mariner, a 

maritime lien [under the FMLA] may have arisen by operation of law”).

8 As to the Bourbon Petrel and OMS Resolution, the district court found the Martin 

fuel could not have been used to refuel those vessels because their cargo tanks were

“physically separated” from the “day tanks” used for their own fuel. The situation was more 

complex as to the Miss Lilly, because her cargo and day tanks were connected by piping and, 

during the period at issue, some fuel was transferred from her cargo to day tanks. The district 

court found this immaterial, however, because the amount of fuel transferred was less than 

the amount already aboard before the Martin deliveries. Consequently, the district court 

found the Miss Lilly “had sufficient fuel onboard to reach the Seismic Vessels prior to being 

loaded with the Martin Energy fuel.” Martin does not argue that this finding is clearly 

erroneous. In any event, the district court did not base its conclusion on the Miss Lilly’s 

putative consumption of any of the Martin fuel. 

9 As CGG points out, some precedent supports the idea that the physical “containers” 

that enable cargo ships to transport cargo may qualify as “necessaries” for the cargo ship. See

Foss Launch & Tug Co. v. Char Ching Shipping U.S.A., Ltd., 808 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 

1996). But, as CGG correctly argues, that precedent does not support the quite different idea 

that the cargo itself is a “necessary” as to the cargo ship. 

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absence of precedent signifies the weakness of [Martin’s] position, since 

admiralty enjoys an unusually rich legal tradition and, more than nearly any 

other contemporary area of federal law, relies on venerable precedents where 

they exist.” Gulf Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Golden Prince M/V, 230 

F.3d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 2000). 

B.

We are unpersuaded by the district court’s reasoning and by Martin’s 

arguments on appeal. The court reasoned the Martin fuel was necessary for 

the Support Vessels to perform their “particular function”—that is, as “floating 

gas stations” (the Bourbon Petrel and OMS Resolution), or an “offshore supply 

vessel” (the Miss Lilly). The court relied on decisions concluding maritime liens 

existed where goods and services (e.g., liquor, linens, cigarettes, or advertising) 

were provided to assist vessels in their “particular functions” (e.g., as a 

pleasure yacht, floating hotel, shrimper, or cruise ship).10 On appeal, Martin 

continues to rely on these decisions. They are off point. In each, the good or 

service was provided for use by the vessel itself, and the resulting lien ran 

against that vessel. Here, by contrast, the Martin fuel was provided for use by 

the Seismic Vessels, not the Support Vessels. Any lien based on the fuel as a 

“necessary” would presumably run against the Seismic Vessels (something, 

again, we do not decide). See Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Falcon Drilling 

Co., 116 F.3d 159, 161–62 (5th Cir. 1997) (supply boat services ferrying

provisions to drilling rig were “necessaries” as to rig). The cases cited by the 

10 See, e.g., Portland Pilots, Inc. v. Nova Star M/V, 875 F.3d 38, 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2017) 

(recognizing maritime lien for providing linens to a “floating hotel”); Stern, Hays, & Lang, 

Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1969) (recognizing maritime lien for providing 

advertising services to a cruise ship) (citing Colonial Press of Miami, Inc. v. The Allen’s Cay, 

277 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1960)); Allen v. The M/V Contessa, 196 F. Supp. 649, 651 (S.D. Tex. 

1961) (recognizing maritime lien for cigarettes provided as part of crew provisions on 

shrimper); Walker-Skageth Food Stores v. The Bavois, 43 F. Supp. 109, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 

(recognizing maritime lien for providing liquor to a pleasure yacht).

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district court (and Martin) fail to support the different proposition that the lien 

would run against the Support Vessels, which were merely carrying the fuel 

for other vessels’ consumption.

Finally, claiming we must view the situation “from the vendor’s 

perspective,” Martin argues it had no way of knowing the fuel it delivered was 

destined for refueling the Seismic Vessels, not the Support Vessels. The district 

court did not rely on this proposition. To support it, Martin cites only our 

statement in Equilease that a “necessary” turns on the “present, apparent want 

of the vessel, not the character of the thing supplied.” 793 F.2d at 603 (quoting 

2 Benedict on Admiralty § 34). Martin misreads the quote. It means only that 

a “necessary” is determined by the need of the vessel; it says nothing about the 

“perspective of the vendor.” Martin cites no other authority for introducing this 

element of subjectivity into the maritime lien analysis, because there is none.

In sum, we conclude that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the 

fuel supplied for refueling the Seismic Vessels did not qualify as a “necessary” 

with respect to the Support Vessels and so did not create a maritime lien under 

CIMLA as to the Support Vessels.11

CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is REVERSED and judgment is 

RENDERED in favor of CGG.

11 Given our resolution of the appeal, we do not reach CGG’s argument that the fuel 

was not provided “on its order,” nor its argument concerning pre-judgment interest.

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