If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

June 11, 2019

v No. 341463

Berrien Circuit Court

RYAN MATTHEW KRESTEL, LC No. 2017-015171-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Ryan Matthew Krestel, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of

manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) (amount of

marijuana less than 5 kilograms or fewer than 20 plants), and maintaining a drug house, in

violation of MCL 333.7405(1)(d). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 15

days in jail and 24 months of probation. We affirm.

In November of 2016, the Michigan State Police executed a search warrant at a home

located on Spring Creek Road in Galien Township. The home was leased in the name of R.J.

Serata, whom defendant states is his uncle. There was no one at the home when they executed

the warrant. Police seized 32 marijuana plants from the unlocked basement of the home, 55

ounces of marijuana from the kitchen freezer, 20 ounces of marijuana from a bedroom cabinet,

and 31 plants from a locked barn on the property. When one of the officers went back to the

home a week later to serve paperwork on the homeowner/renter, a truck with an Illinois license

plate was in the driveway and defendant was coming out of the front door of the house. 

Defendant advised the he was a medical marijuana patient and was also a caregiver to five other

patients. Although defendant provided valid medical marijuana registry cards to the officer, he

was charged with one count of manufacturing a controlled substance and maintaining a drug

house.
-2-

Defendant moved for dismissal or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing with respect to

whether he was immune from prosecution under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act

(MMMA),1 MCL 333.26421 et seq. He additionally brought a motion to dismiss the charges

against him, asserting he was entitled to assert a defense under the MMMA. At the conclusion

of an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant did not establish entitlement to

immunity under MCL 333.26424 (§ 4 of the MMMA) because he was a resident of Illinois,

rather than Michigan, and that defendant was further not entitled to an affirmative defense under

MCL 333.26428 (§ 8 of the MMMA). The trial court also ordered that defense counsel was to

pay $500 in sanctions for failing to make reasonable inquiry of defendant’s residency and then,

after the evidence established defendant’s Illinois residency, continuing to attempt to advance a

claim that he knew or should have known was false.

Defendant, thereafter, moved to disqualify the trial judge based on his assertion that the

court demonstrated a strong bias against marijuana, medical marijuana, individuals who move to

Michigan to participate in Michigan’s medical marijuana program, defendant, and defense

counsel. The motion was denied. This Court rejected defendant’s emergency application for

leave to appeal the order denying his motion. People v Krestel, unpublished order of the Court

of Appeals issued August 22, 2017 (Docket No. 339332). Defendant proceeded to a jury trial, at

the conclusion of which he was convicted, as stated above. 

On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred by rejecting defendant’s § 4

claim for immunity under the MMMA. We disagree.

There are “two sections of the MMMA that provide separate protections from

prosecution for offenses involving marijuana.” People v Kolanek, 491 Mich 382, 394; 817

NW2d 528 (2012). Our Supreme Court explained in Kolanek that § 4, codified at MCL

333.26424, grants individuals possessing registry identification cards “broad immunity from

criminal prosecution, civil penalties, and disciplinary actions . . . .” Id. at 394-395. 

Comparatively, § 8, codified at MCL 333.26428, “provides an affirmative defense to charges

involving marijuana for its medical use . . . .” Id. at 396.

Under the MMMA, it is a defendant’s burden to prove § 4 immunity by a preponderance

of the evidence. People v Hartwick, 498 Mich 192, 217; 870 NW2d 37 (2015). We review the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion and will not set aside the trial

court’s factual findings unless we find them clearly erroneous, i.e., we hold a definite and firm

conviction that the trial court made a mistake. See People v Bylsma, 493 Mich 17, 26; 825

NW2d 543 (2012). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.

People v Tackman, 319 Mich App 460, 469; 901 NW2d 638 (2017) (quotation marks and

citation omitted).

 1 “Although the statutory provisions at issue refer to ‘marihuana’ and ‘usable marihuana,’ by 

convention this Court uses the more common spelling ‘marijuana’ in its opinions.” People v 

Carruthers, 301 Mich App 590, 593 n 1; 837 NW2d 16 (2013) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).
-3-

Defendant argues that the trial court clearly erred when it held that defendant was not a

resident of Michigan and, therefore, could not validly assert immunity or a defense under the

MMMA. Citing People v Jones, 301 Mich App 566, 578-579; 837 NW2d 7 (2013), the trial

court reasoned that defendant could not validly assert either § 4 immunity or a § 8 defense

because he was not a resident of this state. Notably, Jones referred only to § 4 immunity when it

held that “Michigan residency is a prerequisite to the issuance and valid possession of a registry

identification card.” See Jones, 301 Mich App at 578-579. Because one needs to be a Michigan

resident in order to legally obtain a registry card, it necessarily follows, as this Court held in

Jones, that one must be a Michigan resident in order to assert § 4 immunity, which requires that

the individual validly possess a registry identification card. This finding is consistent with the

MMMA.

MCL 333.26426 provides:

(a) The department shall issue registry identification cards to qualifying patients

who submit the following, in accordance with the department’s rules:

(1) A written certification;

(2) Application or renewal fee;

(3) Name, address, and date of birth of the qualifying patient, except that if the

applicant is homeless, no address is required;

(4) Name, address, and telephone number of the qualifying patient’s physician;

(5) Name, address, and date of birth of the qualifying patient’s primary caregiver,

if any;

(6) Proof of Michigan residency. For the purposes of this subdivision, a person

shall be considered to have proved legal residency in this state if any of the

following apply:

(i) The person provides a copy of a valid, lawfully obtained Michigan driver

license issued under the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.1 to

257.923, or an official state personal identification card issued under 1972 PA

222, MCL 28.291 to 28.300.

(ii) The person provides a copy of a valid Michigan voter registration.

Thus, in order to obtain a patient registry identification card, an individual must provide proof of

Michigan residency in the form of a Michigan driver’s license, or an official state personal 

identification card, or a valid Michigan voter registration. While a person may be homeless and

still obtain a registry identification card under the language of the statute, that person must still

present one of the specified proofs of Michigan residency in order to obtain the card. Moreover,

if one presents a copy of a Michigan driver’s license, a Michigan identification card or a 

Michigan voter registration as proof of residency, the forms of identification must be valid and

lawfully obtained. MCL 333.26426(a)(6)(i) (emphasis added).
-4-

Here, based upon the evidence presented to the trial court and considering the forms of

proofs accepted to establish Michigan residency, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly

erred in finding that defendant was not a Michigan resident. Defendant testified that he moved

from Illinois to Michigan around March or April of 2014 and resided for the first year at a Creek

Drive residence in New Buffalo, Michigan. He testified that he applied for a Michigan medical

marijuana registry card “a couple of weeks” after he moved. 

While defendant applied for and obtained a Michigan driver’s license on March 14, 2014,

that Michigan driver’s license was cancelled the same day due to it being a nonresidential

address. Admittedly, the licensing issue is confusing due to defendant presenting to the trial

court a Michigan driver’s license in his name issued March 14, 2014, and containing a New

Buffalo address in Michigan, and bearing a sticker on the back of the license dated October 27,

2015, changing his address to 717 St. Joseph Drive, Suite 107 in St. Joseph, Michigan. That

address was in actuality not a suite, but a post office box located at a UPS store in St. Joseph,

some 25 or more miles from defendant’s claimed New Buffalo home. It would appear, then, that

defendant was permitted to change his address on his Michigan driver’s license after it had been

cancelled. However, a police officer testified at the evidentiary hearing that they must rely on

LIEN records for licensing information and that the Secretary of State documents show that

defendant’s Michigan license was cancelled on March 14, 2014, for a nonresidential address. 

Additionally, Illinois licensing records show that defendant was issued a renewed driver’s

license in the state of Illinois on July 6, 2015. 

Defendant testified that he resided at the New Buffalo address for a year, and then moved

to a house rented by his uncle on Spring Creek Road in Galien Township in 2015, where he still

resided.2 He testified that he had a verbal agreement with his uncle to pay rent, but produced no

records to show that he did pay rent or any other bills at the Spring Creek Road address. 

Defendant testified that he now had a Michigan driver’s license with the Spring Creek Road

address on it, but admitted that he did not obtain the license until after his November 2017 arrest

in this matter. 

Defendant confirmed that he drove a 2003 Ford pickup truck with an Illinois-issued

license plate. He renewed that Illinois plate on July 7, 2016, using his parents’ Illinois address. 

That vehicle, along with defendant, was at the Spring Creek Road residence when police

returned to it approximately one week after the search warrant had been executed. Defendant 

testified that he now had a Michigan license plate on that vehicle, but admitted that the license

plate had been obtained after his arrest. 

A police officer testified at the evidentiary hearing that when he made contact with

defendant at the Spring Creek Road address, he asked defendant where he lived or stayed. 

Defendant initially provided him the post office box address. The officer testified that he told

defendant that was a post office box and asked again where he actually lived. Defendant told the

 2 Interestingly, defendant listed the post office box as his address when he signed the February 

14, 2017 advice of rights form in this matter, but listed the Spring Creek Road address on his bail 

bond form.
-5-

officer that he “sometimes” lived at the Spring Creek Road address and seemed hesitant to

provide any information as to his actual residence. 

Further evidence produced at the evidentiary hearing indicating that defendant was a

resident of Illinois included a checkbook bearing defendant’s name and an Illinois address,

current bank and credit cards issued to defendant by an Illinois bank, and a voter registration

card from Illinois in defendant’s name. And, while defendant testified that everything he owned

was located at the Spring Creek home rented by his uncle and that his uncle resided at the home

as well, only one of the two bedrooms in the home apparently contained clothing and other items

that would indicate its regular use as a bedroom.

The trial court is charged with making the factual decision of whether a defendant

seeking immunity under § 4 or a defense under § 8 possessed a valid registry identification card

at the time of the charged offense. Our Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of a § 4

immunity hearing, the trial court acts “as both the finder of fact and arbiter of law.” See

Hartwick, 498 Mich at 214. “To determine whether a defendant is entitled to § 4 immunity, a

trial court must make factual determinations, including whether the defendant has a valid registry

identification card and whether he or she complied with the volume, storage, and medical use

limitations.” People v Manuel, 319 Mich App 291, 299; 901 NW2d 118 (2017) (quotation marks

and citation omitted). To determine whether defendant had a valid registry identification card,

the trial court must necessarily determine whether defendant had proven his Michigan residency. 

In this case, the trial court made a finding of fact based on credible evidence that defendant was

not a resident of the State of Michigan and had acted fraudulently. Defendant presented no

contrary evidence other than his own conclusory testimony, which the trial court found

incredible. In fact, the trial court stated at the evidentiary hearing that defendant “was perhaps

one of the least credible witnesses I’ve seen in 13 years on the bench.” We defer to the trial

court’s superior ability to view the evidence and gauge the credibility of witnesses. See People v

Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 638; 675 NW2d 883 (2003). 

A valid, legally obtained Michigan driver’s license, or a Michigan personal identification 

card, or a valid Michigan voter registration card are the methods through which to establish

patient residency under MCL 333.26426(a)(6)(i). It can be concluded from the evidence

presented that defendant did not have a valid and lawfully obtained Michigan driver’s license (or

a valid Michigan personal identification card, or a valid Michigan voter registration card) and

that he was not a Michigan resident under that section. He could thus not assert § 4 immunity as

a marijuana patient.

Notably, Michigan residency is not specified as a requirement for primary caregivers. 

MCL 333.26426(d) states:

The department shall issue a registry identification card to the primary caregiver,

if any, who is named in a qualifying patient’s approved application; provided that

each qualifying patient can have no more than 1 primary caregiver, and a primary

caregiver may assist no more than 5 qualifying patients with their medical use of

marihuana.
-6-

However, in Jones, the court made no distinction, for residency requirement purposes, between

patients and caregivers. The defendant in that case had a patient registry card as well as registry

cards indicating she was a primary caregiver for other patients, but the Court found that she was

not entitled to § 4 immunity at all. While at the time Jones was decided, there was no proof of 

Michigan residency requirement contained in MCL 333.26426, the Jones Court indicated that the

subsequent change to MCL 333.26426 requiring proof of Michigan residency to obtain a registry

identification card did not affect its analysis. Id. at 577 n 6. In its analysis, the Jones Court

looked to the language in the MMMA referring to Michigan citizens (MCL 333.264229(c)) and a

provision regarding medical use of marijuana by visitors to Michigan (MCL 333.26423(p)),

indicating that if the MMMA were read not to require Michigan residency, there would be no

need to make these references. Id. at 578-579. These cited references in the MMMA remain. 

We are therefore bound by the Jones Court analysis and its ultimate holding that it “affirm[s] the

trial court’s conclusion that Michigan residency is a prerequisite to valid possession of a registry

identification card.” Id. at 579.

Based upon the evidence and controlling case law, we are not convinced that the trial

court’s determination defendant was not a Michigan resident and thus not entitled to § 4

immunity as a patient or caregiver was in clear error. The fact that defendant possessed a patient

registry card and caregiver identification cards makes no difference.

In Tackman, 319 Mich App at 463, defendant Tackman was issued a registry

identification card in October of 2011 and became a caregiver sometime before September of 

2014. In May of 2014, Tackman was convicted of a felony but was permitted, under his

probationary terms, to continue to be a caregiver until August of 2014. Id. at 464. In September

of 2014, Tackman was found to have a marijuana “grow” operation in his garage, possessing 21

marijuana plants and 81.1 grams of marijuana. He was thus charged with delivery or

manufacture of marijuana and maintaining a drug house, among other things. Id. at 465-466. 

The trial court dismissed the charges against Tackman based upon § 4 of the MMMA, finding

that Tackman possessed a caregiver card under the MMMA and the amount of marijuana found

was within the statutory limits. Id. at 468. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s

decision. We stated:

It is undisputed that [] Tackman [] had been convicted of a felony before the

September 2014 search[] of [his] home[]. For that reason, [he was not] eligible

for § 4(b) caregiver immunity. That is necessarily so because MCL 333.26423(k)

of the MMMA in part defines a “primary caregiver” or “caregiver” as one who

“has not been convicted of any felony within the past 10 years and has never been

convicted of a felony involving illegal drugs . . . .” [] Tackman [did not] meet that

definition. Id. at 470.

This Court further found that Tackman was not eligible for patient immunity, because he

possessed an amount of marijuana in excess of what was statutorily allowed for a patient. Id. 

The Tackman Court held that because definition of “caregiver” specifically restricts that status to

persons who have not been convicted of any felony within the past 10 years, whether Tackman

possessed a valid, unrevoked caregiver card at the time of his actions and conviction was

irrelevant. “Accordingly, Tackman’s May 2014 conviction deprived him of caregiver status in

connection with the September 2014 search of his home and the criminal proceedings that
-7-

followed.” Id. at 471-472. Similarly, here, § 4 immunity is restricted to Michigan residents and

because defendant did not establish Michigan residency through a valid, lawfully obtained

means, he could not be a qualified patient or primary caregiver and was not entitled to assert

either such status. 

This does not end our inquiry, however, because defendant has additionally argued that

the trial court erred in rejecting his § 8 affirmative defense under the MMMA. “[T]he language

of § 8 permits those individuals who are not registered cardholding patients to assert the § 8

affirmative defense.” Kolanek, 491 Mich at 398. § 8 provides an affirmative defense to

“patients” or “a person” generally. Id. § 4 and § 8 are thus “separate and distinct protections and

require different showings . . . .” Id. at 401. Moreover, § 4 and § 8 are mutually exclusive, and a

defendant is not required to establish the elements of § 4 in order to avail himself of the § 8

affirmative defense. Id. at 403. 

§ 8 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in section 7(b),1 a patient and a patient’s primary

caregiver, if any, may assert the medical purpose for using marihuana as a defense

to any prosecution involving marihuana, and this defense shall be presumed valid

where the evidence shows that:

(1) A physician has stated that, in the physician’s professional opinion, after

having completed a full assessment of the patient’s medical history and current

medical condition made in the course of a bona fide physician-patient

relationship, the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from

the medical use of marihuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or

debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating

medical condition;

(2) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were collectively in

possession of a quantity of marihuana that was not more than was reasonably

necessary to ensure the uninterrupted availability of marihuana for the purpose of

treating or alleviating the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or

symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition; and

(3) The patient and the patient’s primary caregiver, if any, were engaged in the

acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, delivery, transfer, or

transportation of marihuana or paraphernalia relating to the use of marihuana to

treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or

symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition.

(b) A person may assert the medical purpose for using marihuana in a motion to

dismiss, and the charges shall be dismissed following an evidentiary hearing

where the person shows the elements listed in subsection (a). [MCL 333.26428]

“Alternatively, if a defendant establishes a prima facie case for this affirmative defense . . . but

material questions of fact exist, then dismissal of the charges is not appropriate and the defense

must be submitted to the jury.” Kolanek, 491 Mich at 412. The trial judge “must preclude from
-8-

the jury’s consideration evidence that is legally insufficient to support the § 8 defense” if no

reasonable juror could conclude that defendant satisfied the elements constituting the defense. 

Id.

We see nothing in the statutory text of § 8 necessarily purporting to limit the availability

of an affirmative defense solely to Michigan residents. However, we need not decide whether

any residency requirement is applicable to a § 8 affirmative defense in this case because, without

respect to residency, we are satisfied that defendant is unable to satisfy the requirements for

validly asserting the defense.

At the evidentiary hearing, defendant was unable to present prima facie evidence that the

quantity of marijuana he possessed “was not more than was reasonably necessary to ensure the

uninterrupted availability” of marijuana for himself and those for whom he assisted as primary

caretaker. MCL 333.26428(a)(2). In Hartwick, our Supreme Court rejected an argument that the

specific volume limitations applicable to § 4 apply to determining reasonableness under § 8. See

Hartwick, 498 Mich at 233-234. Our Supreme Court explained:

A patient seeking to assert a § 8 affirmative defense may have to testify

about whether a specific amount of marijuana alleviated the debilitating medical

condition and if not, what adjustments were made to the consumption rate and the

amount of marijuana consumed to determine an appropriate quantity. Once the

patient establishes the amount of usable marijuana needed to treat the patient’s

debilitating medical condition, determining whether the patient possessed “a

quantity of marihuana that was not more than was reasonably necessary to ensure

[its] uninterrupted availability” also depends on how the patient obtains marijuana

and the reliability of this source. This would necessitate some examination of the

patient/caregiver relationship.

The same analysis applies to primary caregivers seeking to present a

defense under § 8. Primary caregivers must establish the amount of usable

marijuana needed to treat their patients’ debilitating medical conditions and then

how many marijuana plants the primary caregiver needs to grow in order ensure

“uninterrupted availability” for the caregiver’s patients. This likely would include

testimony regarding how much usable marijuana each patient required and how

many marijuana plants and how much usable marijuana the primary caregiver

needed in order to ensure each patient the “uninterrupted availability” of

marijuana. [Id. at 234-235.]

Here, the trial court found, and the evidence supported, that defendant possessed

approximately 65 usable ounces of marijuana, as well as 63 marijuana plants. The trial court

accepted defendant’s testimony that he and his patients would need one to two ounces of

marijuana every two weeks (for a high-end total of six ounces per week) even though a law

enforcement officer testified that this amount, in his experience, was likely excessive. The trial

court determined that the 65 ounces of usable marijuana possessed by defendant was far in

excess of a reasonable quantity. We agree. 
-9-

Defendant’s testimony failed to undertake any searching review of the amount of

marijuana needed to individually treat his five patients’ debilitating medical conditions and to

determine how many marijuana plants were necessary to maintain “uninterrupted availability.” 

At most, defendant spoke in generalities and none of his patients appeared to testify. In his brief

on appeal, defendant makes no attempt to point to any testimony setting forth the reasonableness

of the quantity of marijuana possessed in relation to “how much usable marijuana the primary

caregiver needed in order to ensure each patient” an uninterrupted supply. See id. at 235

(emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly rejected defendant’s assertion

of a § 8 defense because no reasonable juror, on this evidence, could have concluded that the

amount of marijuana defendant possessed was reasonable in relation to the medical needs of

defendant and his patients.

Finally, defendant argues that he did not receive a fair trial. He asserts a variety of

grounds, none of which merit relief. 

First, defendant maintains that he was denied due process and a fair proceeding because

the chief circuit court judge, who reviewed the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s motion for

disqualification, did not allow an opportunity for briefing or oral argument and decided the

matter without the benefit of a transcript of the denial of defendant’s motion.

3

 Because the chief

judge’s review in this case was de novo, the resulting decision was the product of an independent

judicial view of defendant’s motion and no error is attributable to the chief judge’s asserted

inability to review the trial court judge’s initial impressions or decision-making process. 

Similarly, this Court has held that the inability to present oral argument is, at worst, harmless

error because courts “decide cases without oral argument on a routine basis” and, under the court

rules, briefs filed in the circuit court “should contain all of the arguments, issues, facts and law

necessary for a proper resolution of the case.” See Westland v Kodlowski, 298 Mich App 647,

662; 828 NW2d 67 (2012), reversed in part on other grounds 495 Mich 871 (2013).

Next, defendant argues the substantive merits of his disqualification motion, principally

arguing that the trial judge showed a bias toward marijuana or marijuana users. 

“Disqualification pursuant to the Due Process Clause is only required ‘in the most extreme

cases.’ ” In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 567; 781 NW2d 132 (2009), quoting Cain v Dep’t of

Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 498; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). 

Under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a), a judge must be disqualified from hearing a

case in which he or she cannot act impartially or is biased against a party.

“[J]udicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for

a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a ‘deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and

overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.’ ” Armstrong v Ypsilanti

Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597; 640 NW2d 321 (2001), quoting Cain, 451

 3 Where a judge denies a motion asserting the judge is disqualified from hearing a case, MCR 

2.003(D)(3)(a)(i) allows the defendant to request that the challenged judge “refer the motion to 

the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.” 
-10-

Mich at 496 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In fact, “a trial judge’s

remarks made during trial, which are critical of or hostile to counsel, the parties,

or their cases, ordinarily do not establish disqualifying bias.” In re MKK, 286

Mich App at 567. Under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b), the test for determining whether

there is an appearance of impropriety is “ ‘whether the conduct would create in

reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial

responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.’ ” People

v Aceval, 486 Mich 887, 889; 781 NW2d 779 (2010) (statement by HATHAWAY,

J., quoting Caperton [v Massey, 556 US 868, 888; 129 S Ct 2252; 173 L Ed 2d

1208 (2009)]. [Kern v Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212, 231-232; 905 NW2d

453 (2017).]

Although defendant is able to point to several statements disparaging marijuana evidently made

by the trial judge during sentencings of other defendants, he provides no foundation for the

contexts or circumstances of these cherry-picked statements. In any event, this Court has held

that “[a] generalized hostility toward a class of claimants does not present disqualifying bias.” 

MKK, 286 Mich App at 566. Similarly, defendant argues that the trial judge interrupted defense

counsel repeatedly. However, defense counsel fails to note that, at the very inception of the first

day of the motion hearing, the trial judge remarked, after defense counsel interrupted him, that in

the trial judge’s experience, defense counsel has “a terrible habit” of interrupting the court that

he should try to avoid. None of these alleged sources of bias overcome the presumption of

impartiality by rising to the level of undermining, or appearing to undermine, the trial judge’s

integrity, impartiality and competence. Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App at 231-232. 

Defendant also argues that the prosecution did not provide defense counsel with

documentation evidencing that defendant maintained his residence in Illinois, thereby violating

defendant’s constitutional rights. This argument also fails. Defendant had no general

constitutional right to discovery, and due process requires only that the prosecution “disclose

evidence in its possession that is exculpatory and material,” not evidence that is potentially

incriminating. See People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590-591; 808 NW2d 541 (2011),

citing Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). Again, the only

items defendant sought related to his alleged residency, evidence that was within defendant’s

own knowledge or ability to obtain and was not exculpatory in nature. 

Next, defendant claims error because the trial court did not agree to a continuance after

defense counsel informed it that defendant’s medical doctor recently underwent shoulder surgery

and was unable to appear at the scheduled motion hearing. Again, we find no merit in this

contention. We review a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s request for an adjournment or

continuance for an abuse of discretion. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 421; 608 NW2d

502 (2000).

“A motion for adjournment must be based on good cause.” People v Coy, 258 Mich App

1, 18; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). MCR 2.503(C), which governs the granting of adjournments on

the basis of the unavailability of a witness or evidence, provides:

(1) A motion to adjourn a proceeding because of the unavailability of a

witness or evidence must be made as soon as possible after ascertaining the facts.
-11-

(2) An adjournment may be granted on the ground of unavailability of a

witness or evidence only if the court finds that the evidence is material and that

diligent efforts have been made to produce the witness or evidence.

Accordingly, in light of MCR 2.503, this Court has opined that

to invoke the trial court’s discretion to grant a continuance or adjournment, a

defendant must show both good cause and diligence. People v Taylor, 159 Mich

App 468, 489; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). “Good cause” factors include “whether

defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for

asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous

adjournments.” People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348; 492 NW2d 810

(1992). Even with good cause and due diligence, the trial court’s denial of a

request for an adjournment or continuance is not grounds for reversal unless the

defendant demonstrates prejudice as a result of the abuse of discretion. Snider,

239 Mich App at 421-422. [Coy, 258 Mich App at 18-19.]

In this case, defendant did not take diligent steps to produce the medical doctor. Defense

counsel admitted that he learned of the doctor’s surgery “relatively recently,” without stating

exactly when. We also note that the trial court held a case conference just a few weeks prior to

the evidentiary hearing. Defendant did not promptly inform the prosecution or the trial court

about the potential absence of defendant’s witness, despite this period of time and the ample

opportunity to do so. Accordingly, defense counsel’s request for an adjournment was not “made

as soon as possible after ascertaining the facts,” as required by MCR 2.503(C)(1). We also note

that defense counsel did not attempt to subpoena the witness, although it was his right to do so. 

See MCR 2.506. Had defense counsel subpoenaed him, the doctor could have asserted the

impossibility of his attendance due to medical reasons, at which point the trial court would have

been in a position to conduct a special hearing on the issue of his attendance or simply adjourn

the hearing to another date. See MCR 2.506(C)(3). We also note that defense counsel could

provide no assurances to the trial court when, or if, the witness would appear. Given defendant’s

lack of diligence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

defendant’s request for an adjournment. 

We also uphold the trial court’s imposition of a $500 sanction against defense counsel for

failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry as to his client’s residency. We review defendant’s claim

on this issue for clear error. See In re Costs & Attorney Fees, 250 Mich App 89, 94; 645 NW2d

697 (2002). “MCR 2.114(D)[4] imposes various requirements of good faith and reasonable

inquiry upon the signatories of legal pleadings.” People v Herrera (On Remand), 204 Mich App

333, 337; 514 NW2d 543 (1994). The court rule expressly permits the imposition of sanctions

against attorneys who fail to comply with these requirements in criminal cases. Id. at 337-338.

More specifically,

 4 We note that MCR 2.114 was repealed effective September 1, 2018. The existing language 

transferred to MCR 1.109. MCR 2.114 remained in effect at the time the trial court imposed

sanctions. 
-12-

[t]he frivolous-claim-or-defense provisions of the Michigan Court Rules . . .

“impose an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into

the factual and legal viability of a pleading before it is signed.” Attorney General

v Harkins, 257 Mich App 564, 576; 669 NW2d 296 (2003). The reasonableness

of the attorney’s inquiry is determined by an objective standard, not the attorney’s

subjective good faith. Id. The purpose of imposing sanctions for asserting a

frivolous action or defense is to deter parties and their attorneys from filing

documents or asserting claims or defenses that have not been sufficiently

investigated and researched or that are intended to serve an improper purpose. 

BJ’s & Sons Constr Co, Inc v Van Sickle, 266 Mich App 400, 405; 700 NW2d

432 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A court must determine

whether a claim or defense is frivolous on the basis of the circumstances at the

time it was asserted. Robert A. Hansen Family Trust v. FGH Indus, LLC, 279

Mich App 468, 486; 760 NW2d 526 (2008). [Meisner Law Group PC v Weston

Downs Condo Ass’n, 321 Mich App 702, 731-732; 909 NW2d 890 (2017).] 

During the first day of the two-day evidentiary hearing, defense counsel repeatedly

complained that the prosecution had not provided him with notice that it possessed documentary

records reflecting that defendant lived in Illinois and not in Michigan. In response, the trial court

stated that, “[i]n doing [his] research and preparation for this motion, [defense counsel] could

have very easily requested, potentially, false and fraudulent documents filed by [his] client.” 

After hearing defendant’s testimony, the trial court remarked that defendant “was perhaps one of

the least credible witnesses” the trial court had seen over 13 years on the bench, and specifically

asked defense counsel whether he wished to proceed and whether defense counsel still

maintained that the motion was in good faith. The trial court warned that it intended to sanction

defense counsel if the “absurd” evidence continued. The trial court also noted that defense

counsel had “demonstrated a history in this court of filing baseless, groundless pleadings,” which

increased the cost of litigation and caused unnecessary delay. 

On these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that

defendant’s asserted defenses were frivolous. Defense counsel, before signing the motion, was

subject to an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal viability

of the purported defense. Despite this affirmative obligation, defense counsel essentially

admitted that he undertook no investigation and simply maintained that his client told him that he

lived in Michigan. Defense counsel did not state whether he undertook any investigation, let

alone a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances. Other than defendant’s own testimony,

which the court found completely lacking in credibility, the defense did not present any other

witness or documentary evidence supporting a claim of residency or, for that matter, the other

necessary elements supporting the asserted defenses.5

 5 There was no explanation for why defense counsel was so unprepared to refute the 

prosecution’s strategy of focusing on defendant’s residency, which was a key component of

questioning during defendant’s preliminary examination. The prosecutor even advanced this 

exact argument in support of binding over the charges. 
-13-

In his final argument, defendant contends that the prosecutor violated a promise not to

mention the MMMA during closing arguments at the jury trial when the prosecutor stated that

“[t]here’s been no testimony or evidence that this was somehow a legal grow operation.” We

disagree. First, defendant is unable to point to any such promise in the record. Moreover, as the

prosecution correctly points out, our Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor “may observe that

the evidence against the defendant is ‘uncontroverted’ or ‘undisputed.’ ” People v Fields, 450

Mich 94, 115; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). Assuming, as defense counsel asserted at trial, that the

prosecutor’s comment had the effect of suggesting that defendant carried any burden of proof,

the creation of such an inference would be error. However, we do not read the comment as

creating any such inference and, even if it did, the trial court specifically instructed the jury to

follow only the trial court’s instructions on the applicable law. This Court presumes that the jury

followed this instruction, further curing any possible error stemming from the prosecutor’s

statement. See People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).

Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens