NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ARIEL VALENZUELA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0429

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-001270-001

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joshua C. Smith

Counsel for Appellee

Barbara Hull, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Barbara L. Hull

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 9-5-2019
STATE v. VALENZUELA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Ariel Valenzuela appeals his convictions and sentences for 

first degree murder and promoting prison contraband. He challenges the 

superior court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he asserts were 

taken in violation of Miranda1 and made involuntarily. For reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 While Valenzuela was an inmate at the state prison in 

Buckeye, he and a group of inmates attacked and killed A.C., a fellow 

inmate. During the attack, Valenzuela inflicted a fatal stab wound to A.C.’s

chest with a “prison-made” weapon. Multiple inmates identified 

Valenzuela as A.C.’s killer, and Valenzuela eventually admitted his 

involvement in the attack, including that he stabbed A.C. three times. 

Nevertheless, Valenzuela claimed his weapon was defective, others had 

also stabbed A.C., and that he was not responsible for A.C.’s death. The 

State charged Valenzuela with first degree murder and promoting prison 

contraband.

¶3 Before trial, Valenzuela moved to suppress statements taken

in violation of Miranda and requested a voluntariness hearing. The superior 

court conducted an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from criminal 

investigations unit (“CIU”) investigators, who had spoken with Valenzuela 

three times during their investigation, and from special security unit 

(“SSU”) correctional officers, who had spoken with him twice during their 

administrative investigation.

¶4 CIU investigators first attempted to speak with Valenzuela 

the night of the murder. After being provided Miranda warnings, 

Valenzuela invoked his right to counsel and all questioning ceased. The 

next morning, an SSU officer transported Valenzuela from his housing unit 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
STATE v. VALENZUELA

Decision of the Court

3

to an SSU office, but Valenzuela refused to speak with the officer. Before 

being transported back to his housing unit, Valenzuela asked to speak with 

a specific SSU officer and claimed to have “game changing information.”

Valenzuela then admitted to his involvement in the attack but insisted he 

was not A.C.’s killer.

¶5 Fourteen days later, CIU investigators asked to speak with 

Valenzuela again, but he refused. In the final CIU interview more than a 

year later, after reaching out to investigators, Valenzuela waived his 

Miranda rights, and largely repeated the statements he made to the SSU

investigators. Valenzuela requested that CIU place him in protective 

custody in exchange for his statements. CIU investigators indicated that 

they could make a recommendation to prison officials, but that they had no 

control over his housing status and could make no promises.

¶6 The superior court heard argument and denied the motion to

suppress, finding that Valenzuela had reinitiated contact with law 

enforcement and that his statements were voluntary. At trial, the court 

allowed the State to present Valenzuela’s statements from the second SSU 

interview and the final CIU interview.

¶7 A jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts and found two 

aggravating factors as to the promoting prison contraband offense. The 

superior court found Valenzuela had multiple prior felony convictions and 

sentenced him to concurrent terms, the longest of which is life

imprisonment without the possibility of release. Valenzuela timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Alleged Miranda Violation.

¶8 Valenzuela argues the superior court abused its discretion by

refusing to suppress statements taken in violation of Miranda. Valenzuela

claims that SSU’s initial interview violated Miranda, and any subsequent 

statements should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). We review a ruling on a 

motion to suppress for abuse of discretion; we defer to the court’s factual 

findings but consider the court’s legal conclusions de novo. State v. 

Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 407–08, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). We consider only evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing, and we view the facts in the light 

most favorable to upholding the court’s ruling. State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 

233, 238, ¶ 4 (2014).
STATE v. VALENZUELA

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¶9 To safeguard the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, Miranda requires that law enforcement advise suspects of 

their rights before conducting a custodial interrogation. State v. Maciel, 240 

Ariz. 46, 49, ¶ 10 (2016). When a suspect invokes his right to counsel, law 

enforcement may not subject him to further questioning without counsel

present until after a 14-day break in custody. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 

98, 109–11 (2010); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482–85 (1981). There can 

be a break in custody for these purposes even if the suspect remains 

incarcerated for a prior conviction. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112–14. And a 

suspect may waive this requirement by reinitiating communication with 

law enforcement. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85; see also State v. Yonkman, 231 

Ariz. 496, 498, ¶ 8 (2013). To constitute a valid waiver, the suspect need 

only express “a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation”;

an explicit waiver statement is not required. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 

1039, 1045–46 (1983); see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375–76 

(1979).

¶10 Although Valenzuela invoked his right to counsel in the 

initial CIU interview, he reinitiated contact with SSU the next day and 

expressed a desire to give his version of events. Similarly, more than a year 

later, Valenzuela reinitiated contact with CIU, waived his Miranda rights, 

and, once again, gave his version of events. In both instances, Valenzuela 

maintained that he was not ultimately responsible for A.C.’s murder,

admitting only that he was involved in the attack and possessed a weapon.

The record does not show that these statements were the product of 

coercive conduct by either unit; Valenzuela appears to have understood his 

Miranda rights, and he personally initiated the discussions during which he

provided information regarding the attack on A.C..

¶11 Moreover, assuming SSU’s failure to wait 14 days before 

contacting Valenzuela was improper, the unit’s initial attempt to speak with 

Valenzuela did not yield a confession. The only statements admitted at trial 

were obtained after Valenzuela reinitiated contact and provided a valid 

waiver of his rights. There is no indication from the record that SSU’s

conduct so tainted all subsequent voluntary statements to warrant 

suppression. State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 246 (1988) (holding 

voluntary confession admissible if the taint of prior constitutional violation 

sufficiently attenuated).

¶12 Finally, even if Valenzuela’s statements to SSU had been

taken in violation of Miranda and admitted in error, the error was harmless. 

See State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 497 (1983) (applying harmless error 

analysis to the improper admission of statements at trial). “A constitutional 
STATE v. VALENZUELA

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error is harmless if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 

had no influence on the verdict of the jury.” Id. Valenzuela’s statements in 

the final CIU interview, made over one year later, were free of any coercive 

effects of SSU’s contact and were admissible at trial. See Fulminante, 161 

Ariz. at 246. Had the potentially tainted statements to SSU been 

suppressed, the jury would have nonetheless heard Valenzuela’s

inculpatory statements, along with substantial eye-witness testimony that 

he was A.C.’s killer.

¶13 Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion 

by rejecting Valenzuela’s Miranda argument.

II. Alleged Involuntariness.

¶14 Valenzuela argues his statements were involuntary because 

of the restrictions and dangers associated with being an inmate, coercive 

conduct by SSU and CIU, and alleged promises made by CIU. We review 

the superior court’s determination of voluntariness for abuse of discretion,

State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 8 (2002), and consider the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the challenged confession. State v. Stanley, 167 

Ariz. 519, 524 (1991). We start with the rebuttable presumption that a

confession made within the context of a custodial interrogation is 

inherently involuntary. State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 448–49 (1990).

¶15 A confession is involuntary if (1) prompted by impermissible 

police conduct, (2) attributable to coercive pressures that have not been 

dispelled, or (3) derived directly from a prior involuntary statement. State 

v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 164 (1990). Typically, a promise of leniency or 

another benefit, even by implication, is impermissibly coercive. State v. 

Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 138 (1992). The evidence, however, must show the

promise was in fact made and relied upon by the suspect. Id. It is not 

enough that a promise was made “couched in terms of a mere possibility.”

State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 18, 20 (1980).

¶16 Here, the evidence shows that Valenzuela understood his 

Miranda rights, expressed a desire to speak with SSU and CIU, and spoke 

with both units after making that request. Without more, the pressures

inherent in incarceration do not demonstrate an atmosphere of coercion.

See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112–14. Moreover, CIU officers explicitly refused to 

make any promises to Valenzuela regarding protective custody and noted

their lack of control over his housing status. The simple offer to provide a 

housing recommendation to prison officials was not impermissibly 

coercive. See State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 290–91 (1988).
STATE v. VALENZUELA

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¶17 We conclude, based on the totality of circumstances, that the

superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Valenzuela’s 

statements were voluntary.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Valenzuela’s convictions 

and sentences.