[Cite as State v. Cook, 2019-Ohio-3918.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

TIMOTHY COOK, JR. 

Defendant-Appellant 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-28 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-810 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 27th day of September, 2019. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

JOHN M. LINTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0097715, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark County 

Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JOHN S. PINARD, Atty. Reg. No. 0085567, 120 West Second Street, Suite 603, Dayton, 

Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

TUCKER, J. 
-2- 

{¶ 1} Timothy Cook, Jr. appeals from his conviction for improper handling of a 

firearm in a motor vehicle, which followed the trial court’s decision overruling his motion 

to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop and search of his vehicle. We 

conclude that the stop and search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the trial 

court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

Facts 

{¶ 2} On December 6, 2018, at approximately 3:40 p.m., following the end of his 

duty shift, Clark County Sheriff’s Sergeant Ralph Underwood was driving home in a 

marked cruiser. A male driver, who was accompanied by a “younger female,” pulled his 

vehicle alongside Underwood’s cruiser “in a panic” and motioned to Underwood to “roll 

down the [cruiser’s] window.” The individual then informed Underwood that “the guy 

behind [Underwood] in the white car [was] waving a gun.” Because Underwood’s 

immediate “focus was on the car behind [him] which supposedly had a gun,” Underwood 

did not obtain the informant’s identifying information. 

{¶ 3} Underwood radioed dispatch to request assistance. Clark County Sheriff 

Deborah Burchett arrived soon thereafter. Underwood then initiated a stop of Cook’s 

vehicle. Based upon the reported gun, Underwood approached Cook’s vehicle with his 

service weapon drawn. Cook and his passenger were ordered out of the vehicle and 

handcuffed. Underwood advised Cook and the passenger they were being handcuffed 

for everyone’s “protection,” and that “if it works out...I’ll let you go.” 

{¶ 4} At this point, Burchett advised Underwood there was a mask in plain view on 

the “passenger side” of Cook’s vehicle. The mask, referred to by the parties as an “opera 
-3- 

mask” and depicted in photographic exhibits 2 and 3, depicted a male face. At this 

juncture, Underwood looked under the vehicle’s passenger seat and observed a semiautomatic handgun. An unattached magazine was located beside the handgun. Cook was 

administered Miranda warnings, and, upon questioning, he admitted he owned the 

handgun. 

{¶ 5} Cook was indicted for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle in 

violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), a fourth degree felony. Cook filed a motion to suppress the 

handgun and his post-Miranda statements. After conducting a hearing, the trial court 

overruled the suppression motion. Cook thereafter entered a no contest plea and was 

found guilty. The trial court sentenced Cook to a six-month prison term. This appeal 

followed. 

Analysis 

{¶ 6} Cook raises two assignments of error as follows: 

 The officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to effectuate a 

traffic stop based solely on an anonymous tipster with no independent 

corroboration; 

 The officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle based 

solely on an uncorroborated anonymous tip and [the discovery of] a black 

opera mask. 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 7} An appellate court, when reviewing a motion to suppress decision, must 
-4- 

accept the trial court’s factual findings as long as the findings are supported by credible 

evidence. State v. Walker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24542, 2012-Ohio-847, ¶ 17. But an 

appellate court’s review of the legal conclusions drawn from those facts is de novo. Id. 

The Stop 

{¶ 8} Based upon the informant’s purported anonymous status and the absence of 

corroboration of the informant’s information, Cook asserts that Underwood did not 

possess a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and thus, the stop violated 

the Fourth Amendment. 

{¶ 9} Informants are classified into three basic, but on occasion “somewhat 

blurred,” groups: (1) the anonymous informant, (2) the known (often criminally connected) 

informant who has previously provided reliable information, and (3) the known citizen 

informant. State v. Gregory, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28240, 2019-Ohio-3000, ¶ 24 

quoting Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999). Irrespective 

of the informant’s status, when the police execute an investigative stop based exclusively 

on an informant’s tip, the stop’s legality is determined by an assessment of the informant’s 

reliability and, assuming the tip’s reliability, whether the tip established a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that the person to be stopped was, or was about to be, engaged in 

criminal activity. State v. Lester, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27762, 2018-Ohio-3601, ¶ 33, 

quoting State v. Hamilton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160247, 2017-Ohio-8140, ¶ 13, citing 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In this case, the 

tip, if reliable, established a reasonable suspicion that Cook was engaged in criminal 

activity. Thus, our determination turns on the informant’s reliability. The reliability 
-5- 

judgment is based upon the totality of circumstances including the informant’s status and 

basis of knowledge. Id. 

{¶ 10} An uncorroborated anonymous tip is “ ‘seldom [sufficient to] demonstrate[e] 

the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity’ ” but even so, “under appropriate 

circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to 

provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigative stop.’ ” Navarette v. California, 

572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014), quoting Alabama v. White, 

496 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 100 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). 

{¶ 11} In contrast, “an identified citizen informant is accorded a ‘greater degree of 

reliability’ [than an anonymous tipster] and ‘therefore, a strong showing as to the other 

indicia of reliability [i.e. indicia other than the classification of the informant] may be 

unnecessary.’ ” State v. Pickett, 2017-Ohio-5830, 94 N.E.3d 1046, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), quoting 

State v. Carrocce, 10 Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-101, 2006-Ohio-6376, ¶ 32, quoting City of 

Weisner at 300-301. Thus, when “a citizen-informant * * * is victimized or merely 

witnesses a crime and reports it out of a sense of civic duty, the police may be entitled to 

presume that the informant is reliable.” Pickett at ¶ 11, quoting Carrocci at ¶ 32. (Other 

citations omitted.) 

{¶ 12} Based upon Underwood’s failure to obtain the informant’s identifying 

information or to corroborate the tip, Cook argues that the informant was appropriately 

classified as an unreliable anonymous tipster. The circumstances surrounding the tip 

suggests otherwise. In contrast to a true anonymous tipster who acts to conceal his 

identity, the citizen in this case openly contacted Underwood on a public street. The 

informant, upon making contact, could not know that Underwood would not obtain his 
-6- 

identifying information, Underwood’s immediate, and understandable, focus upon the 

informant’s information did not make the informant a mere anonymous tipster. The 

informant’s open, public contact with Underwood was, instead, consistent with a citizen, 

albeit not identified, who, out of civic duty, reports criminal conduct he has witnessed. As 

noted, the categories, as here, are not always neat and tidy. But the categories are simply 

a tool used to assist in the ultimate determination of the informant’s reliability. 

{¶ 13} Based upon the informant’s face-to-face, contemporaneous, and panicked 

report of a startling event (the waving of a gun in the vehicle directly behind Underwood’s 

cruiser), we conclude that the informant’s tip was reliable. This reliability allowed 

Underwood “to credit the [informant’s] allegation” that the driver of the vehicle positioned 

directly behind his cruiser had been waving a gun. See Navarette at 399. Given this, the 

stop was a proper investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment and under Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 

The Search 

{¶ 14} Cook next argues that the search of his vehicle was not supported by 

probable cause. In response, the state asserts that the search was supported by probable 

cause that a handgun was present within the vehicle under the totality of circumstances, 

including the discovery of the mask. However, consistent with our investigative stop 

determination, we conclude that Underwood’s search of the vehicle’s passenger 

compartment was a protective weapons search sanctioned by Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 

1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In Long, the Supreme Court concluded 

that the protective pat down search for weapons authorized by Terry may extend to a 
-7- 

vehicle’s passenger compartment.1 Consistent with Terry, such a search is permissible 

when an officer, upon making an investigative stop involving a vehicle, has a reasonable 

belief, based upon specific, articulable facts, that the person stopped is dangerous, that 

a weapon may be within the vehicle’s passenger compartment, and that the suspect, 

upon his return to the vehicle, could gain immediate control of a hidden weapon. Long at 

1049. See also State v. Walker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24542, 2012-Ohio-847, ¶ 28; 

State v. Roye, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2001-CA-5, 2001 WL 703869, *3 (June 22, 2001). 

{¶ 15} We have already concluded that Underwood’s stop of Cook’s vehicle was 

authorized based upon the reasonable suspicion that, just before the stop, Cook had been 

waving a handgun inside the vehicle. This conclusion also supported the reasonable, 

prudent belief that Cook was dangerous and a handgun was within the vehicle. Finally, 

assuming the investigative stop did not otherwise reveal a handgun, Cook would have 

had immediate access to such a handgun upon the stop's completion and his return to 

the vehicle. Under these facts, we conclude that Underwood’s search of the vehicle’s 

passenger compartment was a protective weapons search that did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

{¶ 16} Cook’s assignments of error are overruled. 

Conclusion 

 

1 Terry, of course, allows an officer conducting an investigative stop to perform a weapons 

patdown search when the officer has a “reasonable individualized suspicion that the 

suspect is armed and dangerous * * *.” State v. Reece, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27058, 

2016-Ohio-7805, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Roberts, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23219, 2010-

Ohio-300, ¶ 18, citing Terry at 27. The constitutionality of a weapons patdown search 

turns on “whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 

the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. 
-8- 

{¶ 17} Having found that neither the stop nor the search violated the Fourth 

Amendment, the judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

John M. Lintz 

John S. Pinard 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter