NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL TARASKA, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARINA TARASKA, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0391

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-009146

The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Michael Taraska, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arina Taraska, Surprise

Defendant/Appellee

FILED 4-2-2019
TARASKA v. TARASKA

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Michael Taraska (“Michael”) appeals from the dismissal of his 

defamation complaint. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Michael sued his ex-wife Arina Taraska (“Arina”) for 

defamation. Michael alleged that Arina published a post on social media 

containing false information about his care of their minor child shortly after 

the parties’ divorce was finalized.

¶3 Arina moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that 

Michael’s complaint was precluded by the consent decree in their divorce

case (the “Consent Decree”). Specifically, in the Consent Decree, the parties 

stipulated that “[e]ach party hereby releases all past and future claims 

against each other. Neither party shall use information obtained during 

these proceedings to sue the other party” (the “Release”).

¶4 Additionally, Arina contended that Michael violated 

Arizona’s Anti-SLAPP law, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-

751, et seq., and requested her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 

§§ 12-752(D), -341, -341.04, -349, -3201 and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 41(d). Arina also requested that Michael be declared a vexatious 

litigant.

¶5 In response, Michael relied on the court’s ruling in a previous 

defamation complaint he filed against Arina (the “First Case”). In the First 

Case, Arina’s motion to dismiss was denied. Michael alleged that the 

superior court found that the allegations in that complaint were sufficient 

to survive a motion to dismiss, but it dismissed his complaint on procedural 

grounds. Michael also argued that the Release does not preclude him from 

filing the instant defamation lawsuit.
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¶6 In this case, the superior court granted Arina’s motion, 

finding that Michael’s defamation claim was precluded by the Release. The 

court noted that not all types of future claims may be reasonably 

contemplated by the Release, such as criminal activity. The court denied 

Arina’s request for fees and costs under § 12-752(D) because the AntiSLAPP law was inapplicable. The court also denied Arina’s request to have 

Michael deemed a vexatious litigant. The court entered a signed minute 

entry containing a certification of finality pursuant to Rule 54(c) (the “First 

Judgment”).

¶7 After the court dismissed Michael’s claim, Arina applied for 

attorneys’ fees and costs under §§ 12-341, -341.01 and -349, noting that the 

superior court only denied her fees and costs request under § 12-752(D). 

Michael moved to strike the fee request, arguing Arina failed to request an 

amended judgment under Rule 54(h)(2)(c) and failed to request her fees on 

a timely basis.

¶8 Michael filed a notice of appeal, and Arina filed a notice of 

cross-appeal.

¶9 The superior court treated Michael’s motion to strike as a 

response to Arina’s fee application. The court ultimately denied Arina’s fee 

request as untimely but noted that if timely, it would have treated the 

request as a motion to amend the judgment and granted fees under §§ 12-

341 and -341.01, but not -349.

¶10 We dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal because Arina’s 

request for attorneys’ fees was not fully resolved prior to entry of the First

Judgment. We held the First Judgment’s Rule 54(c) finality language was 

inappropriate, and, therefore, we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

¶11 Arina then moved to reconsider her fee request because the 

First Judgment was not final, and under Rule 54(g)(2), her fee request was 

timely. The superior court granted Arina’s motion to reconsider and 

ordered Arina to submit a fee application.

¶12 Michael also moved to reconsider, arguing he should have 

been afforded the opportunity to amend his complaint. In response, Arina 

argued that any amendment to the complaint would be futile because the 

Release precludes Michael’s defamation action. The court denied Michael’s 

motion, and also clarified that it did not consider any of the attachments to 

Arina’s motion to dismiss other than the Consent Decree.
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¶13 The superior court ultimately awarded Arina $10,000 in 

attorneys’ fees and $596.21 in costs pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01 

and entered final judgment in Arina’s favor. Michael timely appealed. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶14 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 

12(b)(6). Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012). We assume 

the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and resolve all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Yahweh v. City of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 

22, ¶2 (App. 2017). Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) only if, “as 

a matter of law . . . plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any 

interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, 

¶ 8 (citation omitted).

I. We Do Not Have Enough Information to Determine If the Release 

Precludes Michael’s Cause of Action.

¶15 We must take Michael’s allegation that Arina’s social media 

post “stated false information about Plaintiff with respect to his care of his 

minor child and served to solicit potential readers to harm and/or injure 

Plaintiff” as true when evaluating Arina’s motion to dismiss. Yahweh, 243 

Ariz. at 22, ¶2. Neither Michael nor Arina provided the superior court or 

this court with the actual language of the social media post.

¶16 The superior court dismissed Michael’s complaint because it 

determined that Michael’s defamation claim was precluded by the Release. 

In the Release, the parties stipulated that “[e]ach party hereby releases all 

past and future claims against each other. Neither party shall use 

information obtained during these proceedings to sue the other party.”

¶17 Considering the first sentence of the Release in the abstract, 

“[e]ach party hereby releases all past and future claims against each other,” 

we reach the same conclusion as the superior court. That is, Michael’s 

defamation claim was precluded by the Release. However, in interpreting 

a contract, we do not construe one term in a way that renders another 

meaningless. Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, 478, ¶ 56 (App. 

2010). As a corollary, each part of a contract must be read together, “to 

bring harmony, if possible, between all parts of the writing.” Gesina v. Gen. 

Elec. Co., 162 Ariz. 39, 45 (App. 1988). Therefore, we must read the two 

sentences of the Release together.
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¶18 The second sentence of the Release, “[n]either party shall use 

information obtained during these proceedings to sue the other party”

(emphasis added), clearly limits the Release to conduct that occurred 

during the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, read together, we read the

Release as limiting the parties’ future claims release to claims that relate to 

events which occurred during the divorce proceedings.

¶19 Without knowing the exact language of the social media post, 

we do not have enough information to determine whether the Release 

precludes Michael’s claim. For example, although we assume as true that 

Arina made the allegedly defamatory social media post after the Consent 

Decree was entered, we do not know when the alleged conduct related to 

Michael’s care of the parties’ child occurred. If the conduct announced in 

the social media post related to Michael’s care of his son occurred before

the Consent Decree was entered, the Release would preclude the 

defamation claim because it was based on “information obtained during” 

the divorce proceedings. If, however, the conduct Michael is said to have 

engaged in and Arina subsequently published occurred after the entry of 

the Consent Decree, Michael’s defamation claim could survive a motion to 

dismiss. Because we do not know when the conduct referenced in the social 

media post is said to have occurred, we cannot conclusively determine 

whether the Release precludes Michael’s claim. Therefore, we must reverse 

the superior court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

II. To the Extent the Consent Decree is Ambiguous, Extrinsic Evidence 

Must Be Reviewed to Determine the Parties’ Intent.

¶20 Alternatively, assuming the Consent Decree can be read in a 

manner different than we read it, we must also reverse the dismissal and 

remand to determine the intent of the parties.

¶21 Arina argued that the parties unambiguously agreed to 

release all future claims, including the instant defamation claim. Arina 

argued that the Release was added “to hopefully impede plaintiff from 

filing harassing claims such as the instant action[.]” Arina admitted that 

not all future claims would be covered by the Release, specifically naming 

personal injury claims or criminal activity.

¶22 On the other hand, Michael argued that the superior court’s 

interpretation was the opposite of his understanding of the Release. 

Michael alleged that he understood the Release to bar any claims that could 

have been brought whether known or unknown based upon the past 

divorce proceedings, “never contemplat[ing] a release of claims which 
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could accrue in the future[.]” Given the differing opinions, Michael argued

that the Consent Decree is “inherently and objectively ambiguous.”

¶23 Our role in interpreting a contract is to ascertain and enforce 

the parties’ intent. ELM Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 15 

(App. 2010). To determine the parties’ intent, we “look to the plain meaning 

of the words as viewed in the context of the contract as a whole.” United 

Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 238, 259 (App. 1983). When the 

terms of a contract are plain and unambiguous, its interpretation is a 

question of law for the court. Chandler Med. Bldg. Partners v. Chandler Dental 

Grp., 175 Ariz. 273, 277 (App. 1993). If the contract language is reasonably 

susceptible to more than one meaning, extrinsic evidence may be admitted 

to interpret the contract. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 

148, 158-59 (1993).

¶24 Both Arina’s attorney and Michael filed affidavits providing 

the superior court with their respective understanding of the divorce 

negotiations. The superior court specifically stated that it relied only on the 

Consent Decree in considering the motion, and we have no reason to doubt 

the court’s assertion. However, to determine the intent of the parties, the 

court must look to extrinsic evidence, which would require the court to treat 

Arina’s motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 

12(d) (stating if the court considers “matters outside the pleading” on a 

motion to dismiss, it must treat the motion as one for summary judgment).

¶25 Since the motion to dismiss was not converted into one for

summary judgment, we also reverse the court’s dismissal of Michael’s 

complaint on this basis and remand for further proceedings.

¶26 Because we are reversing the court’s dismissal order, we also 

reverse its fee award to Arina without prejudice to the court’s consideration 

of her fee request upon its resolution of Michael’s defamation claim.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying 

Michael’s Requests for Oral Argument.

¶27 Finally, Michael argues that the superior court violated 

Maricopa County Rule (“Local Rule”) 3.2(d) by failing to grant oral 

argument. Local Rule 3.2(d) provides, in relevant part, that if in a motion, 

response or reply a party requests oral argument, the court “may, in its 

discretion, order, allow, or deny oral argument . . . consistent with the 

Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.”
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¶28 Local Rule 3.2(d), however, does not require the superior

court to hold oral argument upon request. Courts may rule “without oral 

argument, even if oral argument is requested.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(d). See 

also Cristall v. Cristall, 225 Ariz. 591, 597, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). Thus, the court 

has discretion to, as it did here, grant or deny a request for oral argument.

CONCLUSION

¶29 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this matter 

to the superior court for proceedings consistent with this decision.