J-S41041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DEVON K. MOORE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 433 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0000058-2020

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

Appellant Devon K. Moore appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County following his 

conviction by a jury on the charges of third-degree murder, criminal attemptfirst-degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter.1

 After a careful review, 

we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: The 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with multiple crimes in connection with the 

shooting death of Solomon Moore (“Solomon”). On October 25, 2021, 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 901(a), and 2504(a), respectively.
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Appellant, who was represented by counsel, proceeded to a jury trial at which 

numerous witnesses testified.

Specifically, David Lambert (“David”) testified that, during the evening 

of October 25, 2019, he drove his daughter, Starasia David (“Starasia”), and 

her paramour, Marvin Butler (“Marvin”), to the Fine Wine and Liquor Store. 

N.T., 10/25-27, 2021, at 124-25. At approximately 10:50 p.m., he drove the 

pair back to Starasia’s house, and as they all began walking into the house, 

two men, later identified as Solomon and Appellant, crossed the street so that 

they were on the same side as Starasia’s house. Id. at 124. However, the 

men recrossed back to the opposite side of the street momentarily, “put their 

hoodies on,” and then again crossed back to the same side of the street as 

Starasia’s house. Id. at 125. David told Starasia and Marvin that “them guys 

[are] coming back across the street, and they don’t look good.” Id. at 132.

David indicated that, at this point, he was standing on the porch with 

Starasia while Marvin was standing on the sidewalk. Id. at 126. As the men 

walked closer, David noticed Appellant, who had dark skin and was wearing a 

dark-colored hoodie, was “adjusting the gun” in his left hoodie pocket area, 

and David could see “[a]lmost all [of the gun].” Id. at 125-26, 132. One of 

the men said “something” to Starasia as they walked by her; however, they

“never looked at her.” Id. at 126. Rather, the men approached Marvin and 

stood “face to face” with him. Id. at 126, 135.
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David testified that gunfire suddenly erupted from the group of men 

although he was unable to determine who fired the first shot.2 Id. at 127. He 

saw Appellant “get shot and fall to the ground[,]” and he saw Marvin shooting 

towards Solomon. Id. at 127, 134, 136. In response to the gunshots, David 

pulled Starasia into the building and, after the gunshots ceased, he went 

outside. Id. He saw Marvin running, Appellant lying on the sidewalk 

attempting to reload his gun, and Solomon lying dead behind a car. Id. 

David watched as Appellant spoke on a cell phone and crawled to the 

front of a car. Id. at 128. He observed an extra clip lying on the ground and, 

fearing that Appellant might begin shooting at him and Starasia, he pulled her 

towards the back of the building. Id. They then left the scene. Id. 

David testified that, after the shooting, Starasia fled, and he does not 

know where she is currently living. Id. at 131. He noted that, at some point 

after the shooting, people broke into Starasia’s house, and it appeared they 

had been waiting for her to return. Id. 

Horace Walton (“Horace”) testified he was sitting in a car near Starasia’s 

home during the evening of October 25, 2019. Id. at 138. He was playing 

“loud” music and did not hear any gunshots. Id. at 140. However, at 

approximately 10:50 p.m., a guy “bolted” in front of his car, opened the car 

____________________________________________

2 David testified that “30, 40 seconds, 50 at the most[,]” passed from when 

he declared the men were coming back across the street until the shooting 

occurred. Id. at 136. 
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door, entered the car, and asked Horace to drive him “somewhere.” Id. 

Horace drove the man to a nearby restaurant. Id.

Tanahsia (“Tanahsia”) Wright testified that Appellant is her boyfriend, 

and she knows Solomon, who was Appellant’s cousin. Id. at 153, 158. She 

and Appellant lived together near Starasia’s house, and during the evening of 

October 25, 2019, Appellant left their house. Id. at 160-61. Soon thereafter, 

at approximately 10:52 p.m., she heard sirens. Id. at 154. Prior to this, she 

did not hear any gunshots or “a commotion” in the street. Id. Upon hearing 

the sirens, Tanahsia left her home, and she discovered Appellant had been 

taken to the hospital while Solomon was dead. Id. at 155. 

Tanahsia confirmed she has made “approximately 900 plus phone calls” 

to Appellant in the time since the shooting, and she is still romantically 

involved with Appellant; however, she denied that they have ever talked about 

the shooting. Id. at 156. She confirmed Appellant never told her he was 

defending himself when he shot at Marvin. Id. at 157. She testified they do 

not talk about the subject because Appellant “gets depressed” when the 

shooting is mentioned. Id. She admitted Appellant did not want to talk to the 

police because the shooting was “traumatic” for him. Id. at 162. 

York City Police Detective Tiffany Pitts (“Detective Pitts”) confirmed she 

reviewed private security footage from a video recorded the night in question. 

The video reveals Appellant was wearing a dark sweatshirt while Solomon was 

wearing a white sweatshirt. Id. at 169. The video shows that David and 
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Starasia were standing on the porch while Marvin was standing on the 

sidewalk when Appellant and Solomon approached Marvin. Id. at 170. The 

video shows “a series of muzzle flashes[.]” Id. Specifically, the video shows 

“the first flash” appears to come from the left arm of Appellant, who is lefthanded. Id. at 177. 

The video then reveals that Solomon and Appellant “go down to the 

ground” while Marvin “kind of walk[s] out towards the street...between two 

vehicles[.]” Id. at 170. The video depicts Appellant crawling towards the back 

of a car, and a “reflection on one of the bumpers...indicates...there was a 

muzzle flash back there,” which suggested Appellant was continuing to fire his 

gun. Id. at 177. Soon thereafter, an unidentified person runs into the area, 

appears to pick up something, runs over to Appellant, and then runs away. 

Id. at 171. Detective Pitts additionally testified that video footage was 

retrieved from a nearby restaurant for the time in question. The video shows 

Horace driving up and dropping off Marvin. Id. at 179. 

Moreover, Detective Pitts testified she attempted to interview Appellant 

while he was in the hospital; however, Appellant indicated he could not talk 

because “he was mourning.” Id. at 351. Appellant never made any 

statements to the police about the events surrounding the shooting. Id. 

Detective Pitts noted Appellant had a valid license to carry a firearm on the 

date at issue. Id. at 354. She also testified that, as part of the investigation, 

she examined Appellant’s social media and discovered that, in the days prior 
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to the shooting, Appellant searched for “Flea,” which is Marvin’s nickname, on 

Facebook. Id. at 364-65. 

York City Police Officer Joseph Colahan (“Officer Colahan”) testified he 

was on duty during the evening of October 25, 2019, when he heard a call for 

shots fired outside of Starasia’s house. He and his partner traveled to the 

scene. While his partner checked on Appellant, who was wounded, and 

Solomon, who was deceased, Officer Colahan began taping off the scene. Id. 

at 195. Officer Colahan found a handgun, which was a Glock .40 caliber pistol 

containing a magazine, in the driver’s side rear wheel of a Volvo parked 

directly in the crime scene. Id. at 197, 234. Appellant was found shot and 

lying next to the Volvo by the police. Id. at 287. A cell phone was recovered 

from Appellant. Id. at 203. Additionally, money was discovered near

Solomon’s body. Id. Also, a vehicle leased to Appellant was found running 

and parked in a no parking zone in the middle of the street near the shooting. 

Id. at 198. 

Numerous additional York City police officers testified about the 

investigation. Their testimony revealed eighteen bullet casings, discharged 

from at least two separate firearms, were recovered from the scene. Id. at 

199-247, 258, 260. Also, Appellant’s clothing, including a black hoodie, which 

he was wearing at the time of the shooting, was recovered by police from the 

hospital, where Appellant was treated for two gunshot wounds. Id. at 208, 

221, 245, 289-90. Appellant’s hoodie had several bullet fragments lodged 
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into the cloth. Id. at 245. Allison Laneve, a forensic scientist, testified 

Appellant’s hoodie tested positive for gunshot residue. Id. 323-24, 327-41.

Dr. Samuel Land (“Dr. Land”), who is a forensic pathologist, testified he 

performed an autopsy on Solomon, who suffered gunshot wounds. Id. at 

308-09. Dr. Land testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that 

Solomon died from these gunshot wounds. Id. at 313. 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the offenses 

indicated supra, and on January 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate of seven years to fourteen years in prison. Appellant filed a 

timely counseled post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on 

January 18, 2022. Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal; however, 

on March 7, 2022, after Appellant filed a counseled petition, the trial court 

reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc in accordance with the 

PCRA.

3 On March 8, 2022, Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal nunc 

pro tunc. All Pa.R.A.P 1925 requirements have been met.

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of 

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

A. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

for third-degree murder under a theory that Defendant created 

a chain reaction that led to another person shooting and killing 

the victim?

B. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

for involuntary manslaughter?

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3 Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. 
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C. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

for criminal attempt-murder of the first degree?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

Initially, inasmuch as all of Appellant’s claims present challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we note this Court’s standard of review when 

considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to look 

at the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict 

winner, and determine whether the evidence presented, actual and/or 

circumstantial, was sufficient to enable a fact-finder to find every element of 

the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. 

O'Brien, 939 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super. 2007).

In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we 

note that the facts and the circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. 

Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the 

fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Id. at 913–914 (quotation omitted). The finder of fact is free to believe all, 

some, or none of the evidence presented and is free to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Dailey, 828 A.2d 356 

(Pa.Super. 2003).

Appellant first contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for third-degree murder on the following grounds: (1) the 

Commonwealth failed to prove malice and causation, and (2) the 
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Commonwealth failed to disprove that Appellant acted in self-defense. In 

essence, Appellant contends the evidence reveals he was lawfully walking 

down the street while carrying a licensed firearm when Marvin killed Solomon, 

who was Appellant’s cousin. According to Appellant, he shot at Marvin in selfdefense, and since his conduct was not the direct cause of Solomon’s death, 

he cannot be criminally culpable for third-degree murder. 

Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of murder, 

which is a killing conducted “with malice aforethought.” Section 

2502 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code categorizes murder into 

degrees. Third-degree murder is defined as “all other kinds of

murder,” i.e., those committed with malice that are not intentional 

(first-degree) or committed during the perpetration of a felony 

(second-degree).

Commonwealth v. Packer, 641 Pa. 391, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (2017) 

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 622 Pa. 366, 80 A.3d 

1186, 1195 (2013) (“[T]hird[-]degree murder is not by definition an 

unintentional killing; it is a malicious killing without proof that the specific 

result intended from the actions of the killer was the death of the victim.”) 

(citation omitted)).

Malice includes not only particular ill will toward the victim, but also 

wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wantonness, and cruelty, 

recklessness of consequences, and conscious disregard by the defendant of 

an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions may cause serious 

bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Young, 494 Pa. 224, 431 A.2d 230, 232 

(1981); Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2011).
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As it pertains to causation, the following legal framework governs our 

review:

(a) General rule.—Conduct is the cause of a result when:

(1) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would 

not have occurred; and

(2) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any 

additional causal requirements imposed by this title or by the law 

defining the offense.

***

(c) Divergence between probable and actual result.—When 

recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element 

of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is 

not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of 

negligence, of which he should be aware unless:

(1) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the 

respect that a different person or different property is injured or 

affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more 

serious or more extensive than that caused; or

(2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as 

the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its 

occurrence to have a bearing on the liability of the actor or on the 

gravity of his offense.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303 (bold in original).

The Commonwealth must “prove a direct causal relationship between 

the defendant’s acts and the victim’s death.” Commonwealth v. Rementer, 

598 A.2d 1300, 1304 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citations, quotation marks, and 

emphasis omitted). “Put another way, if the fatal result was an unnatural or 

obscure consequence of the defendant’s actions, our sense of justice would 

prevent us from allowing the result to impact on the defendant’s guilt.” Id.
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at 1306-07. “[I]t is well established that the tort theory of causation will not 

suffice to impose criminal responsibility.” Id. at 1304.

[C]ausation-in-fact, the “but for” element of assessing 

the causal connection, alone will not necessarily determine 

criminal culpability. If it did, little would distinguish tort liability 

from criminal liability. Our cases emphasize that a criminal 

conviction requires “a more direct causal connection” than tort 

concepts. Thus, not only do we demand that the defendant’s 

conduct actually cause the victim’s death in that “it is an 

antecedent but for which the result in question would not have 

occurred”, we also question, in cases such as the instant one, 

whether the fatal result was so extraordinary, remote or 

attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant criminally 

responsible for it.

Id. at 1306 (citations and footnotes omitted).

To establish criminal causation, “the Commonwealth must prove that 

the defendant’s conduct was so directly and substantially linked to the actual 

result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability.” Commonwealth

v. Long, 624 A.2d 200, 203-04 (Pa.Super. 1993) (citing Rementer, 598 A.2d 

at 1304).

In Rementer, we set forth a two-part test for determining 

criminal causation. First, the defendant’s conduct must be an 

antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have 

occurred. Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1304; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

303(a)(1). A victim’s death cannot be entirely attributable to 

other factors; rather, there must exist a “causal connection 

between the conduct and the result of conduct; and causal

connection requires something more than mere coincidence as to 

time and place.” Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305, n.3 (quotation 

omitted). Second, the results of the defendant’s actions cannot 

be so extraordinarily remote or attenuated that it would be unfair 

to hold the defendant criminally responsible. Id. at 1305.

As to the first part of the test, the defendant’s conduct need 

not be the only cause of the victim’s death in order to establish a

causal connection. Id. “Criminal responsibility may be properly 
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assessed against an individual whose conduct was a direct and 

substantial factor in producing the death even though other 

factors combined with that conduct to achieve the result.” Long, 

624 A.2d [at] 203[.] The second part of the test is satisfied when 

the victim’s death is the natural or foreseeable consequence of the 

defendant’s actions. 

Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations 

and quotations omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence provides ample support for 

Appellant’s conviction of third-degree murder for the shooting death of 

Solomon. Appellant, in concert with Solomon, put their hoodies on, crossed 

the street, and directly approached Marvin, who was walking behind David 

and Starasia after they disembarked from a vehicle. Appellant was visibly 

carrying a handgun and “adjusting” it as he approached Marvin. N.T., 10/25-

27, 2021, at 125-26, 132. David warned Marvin that the two men were 

approaching, and “they don’t look good.” Id. at 132. Surveillance video 

depicted gunfire between Appellant and Marvin with the first “flash of light” 

coming from Appellant’s left arm. Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/16/22, at 3 

(citation to transcript omitted). Marvin returned fire and, ultimately, Solomon 

was fatally shot. 

We conclude Appellant’s actions of engaging in the gunfight 

demonstrated a recklessness of consequences, and conscious disregard by 

him of an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions may cause 

serious bodily harm. Young, supra. Thus, the Commonwealth demonstrated 
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malice. Further, but for Appellant’s actions of approaching Marvin and 

shooting at him, Appellant’s cohort, Solomon, would not have been shot by 

Marvin’s return of gunfire. As noted supra, Appellant’s actions need not be 

the sole cause of death to establish a causal connection. Rather, Appellant’s 

conduct of crossing the street with his gun visible, approaching Marvin, and 

shooting at Marvin, thereby prompting the shoot-out, was “a direct and 

substantial factor in producing [Solomon’s] death even though other factors 

combined with that conduct to achieve the result.” Long, 624 A.2d at 203. 

The death of Appellant’s cohort, who was unarmed, was a natural and 

foreseeable consequence of the shoot-out; it does not matter for purposes of 

causation in a third-degree murder case that Appellant’s intended 

consequence was for Marvin to be shot, and not his cousin, Solomon. Thus, 

we conclude that both parts of the test for causation were satisfied, and the 

evidence supports a finding that Appellant caused the death of Solomon for 

purpose of third-degree murder. Rementer, supra.

Additionally, we reject Appellant’s claim the Commonwealth failed to 

disprove that Appellant acted in self-defense. 

Self-defense is a complete defense to a homicide charge if (1) the 

defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or 

serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent 

such harm; (2) the defendant did not provoke the threat that resulted in the 

slaying; and (3) the defendant did not violate a duty to retreat. 18 Pa.C.S.A.
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§ 505(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, 55 A.3d 1108, 

1124 (2012). Where the defendant has introduced evidence of self-defense, 

the burden is on the Commonwealth to disprove the self-defense claim beyond 

a reasonable doubt by proving that at least one of those three elements is 

absent. Sepulveda, supra, 55 A.3d at 1124.

The finder of fact is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony 

that he thought that he was in imminent danger and acted in self-defense. 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 610 Pa. 264, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (2011).

Disbelief of the defendant’s testimony, however, is not sufficient to satisfy the 

Commonwealth’s burden to disprove self-defense absent some evidence 

negating self-defense. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 766 A.2d 

342, 345 (2001).

Here, we conclude the Commonwealth sufficiently disproved Appellant’s 

claim of self-defense. Specifically, there is no dispute Appellant provoked the 

threat that resulted in Solomon’s slaying when he put on his hoodie, crossed 

the street with Solomon, approached Marvin while visibly adjusting his 

handgun, and fired the handgun at him. Further, there is no evidence 

Appellant attempted to retreat; but rather, he continued the shoot-out with 
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Marvin while on the street. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2); Sepulveda, supra.

Thus, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim.4

Appellant’s next claim is the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, he contends the 

Commonwealth failed to prove he did an unlawful or lawful act in a recklessly 

or grossly negligent manner, as well as failed to prove a causal connection 

between his conduct and the death of Solomon.

Section 2504 of the Crimes Code defines involuntary manslaughter as: 

“[a] person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of 

the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the 

doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the 

death of another person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). Stated differently, 

“involuntary manslaughter requires 1) a mental state of either recklessness 

or gross negligence[,] and 2) a causal nexus between the conduct of the 

accused and the death of the victim.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 

A.2d 801, 806 (Pa.Super .2003).

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4 To the extent Appellant raises the defense of imperfect self-defense, we note 

that, if the Commonwealth proves that the defendant’s belief that deadly force 

was necessary was unreasonable but does not disprove that the defendant 

genuinely believed that he was in imminent danger that required deadly force 

and does not disprove either of the other elements of self-defense, the 

defendant may be found guilty only of voluntary manslaughter under the 

defense of imperfect self-defense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b); Sepulveda, 

supra. As indicated supra, we conclude the Commonwealth proved Appellant 

provoked the attack, which led to Solomon’s slaying, and he violated a duty 

to retreat. Thus, we do not address this issue further. 
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A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element 

of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 

from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 

that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and 

the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 

would observe in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). The term “recklessly,” as set forth in Section 

302(b)(3), encompasses “gross negligence” for purposes of involuntary 

manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Huggins, 575 Pa. 395, 836 A.2d 862, 

868 (2003).

In the case sub judice, we conclude the Commonwealth sufficiently 

proved Appellant did an unlawful or law act in a reckless manner, i.e., 

consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a person’s 

death would result from his conduct, when he crossed the street with Solomon

(who was unarmed), visibly displayed his handgun, adjusted his handgun as 

he approached Marvin, and engaged in a shoot-out. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

302(b)(3). Further, for reasons already discussed supra, we reject Appellant’s 

claim that there was no casual nexus between his conduct and the death of 

Solomon.5 Accordingly, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to sustain his 

conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

____________________________________________

5 Moreover, to the extent Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to 

disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense as it relates to his conviction for

involuntary manslaughter, for the same reasons discussed supra, we find no 

merit to the claim. 
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In his final claim, Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction for criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder. 

To obtain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must 

demonstrate that a human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant 

perpetrated the killing, and the defendant acted with malice and a specific 

intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa.Super. 

2016). A person is guilty of attempted murder if he takes a substantial step 

towards an intentional killing. Commonwealth v. Wesley, 860 A.2d 585, 

593 (Pa.Super. 2004).

“A person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific 

crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the 

commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

“For a defendant to be found guilty of attempted murder, the 

Commonwealth must establish specific intent to kill.”

Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 

(Pa.Super.2004). Therefore, “[i]f a person takes a substantial step 

toward the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind 

to commit such an act, he may be convicted of attempted 

murder.” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 678 (Pa.Super. 2012). “The 

Commonwealth may establish the mens rea required for firstdegree murder, specific intent to kill, solely from circumstantial 

evidence.” Id. Further, our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

determined that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of 

the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill.”

Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1009 

(2007); see also Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928 

A.2d 1025, 1034 (2007) (“a specific intent to kill may be inferred 

from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's 

body.”).

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence was sufficient 

to sustain Appellant’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit firstdegree murder. Specifically, the circumstantial evidence reveals Appellant 

had the specific intent to kill Marvin, and he took a substantial step in this 

endeavor. Specifically, Appellant, who searched for Marvin on social media 

in the days before the shoot-out, crossed the street, visibly carried his 

handgun, adjusted his handgun, approached Marvin, fired a shot at him, 

and engaged in a shoot-out with him. Thus, we find no merit to Appellant’s 

claim. See Tucker, supra.

We note that, in developing his sufficiency of the evidence claims, 

Appellant invites us to reassess the credibility of the testimony offered by the 

witnesses. Also, in developing his sufficiency claims, he presents the evidence 

in the light most favorable to him and advances his version of the events.

However, under the standard governing our review of sufficiency challenges, 

an appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment 

for that of the jury, as fact-finder. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 

274, 282 (Pa.Super. 2009) (reiterating, “a review of the sufficiency of the

evidence does not include an assessment of the credibility of testimony”)

(citation omitted)). Also, we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner. O'Brien, supra.
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For all of the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s claims, 

and we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023