2022 UT 16

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN,

Appellant.

No. 20200651

Heard February 7, 2022

Filed March 31, 2022

On Direct Appeal

Third District Court, Salt Lake City

The Honorable Paul B. Parker

No. 911900907

Attorneys:

Daniel L. Day, Asst. Solic. Gen., Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Brett 

Keeler, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for appellant

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court in which

JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE PETERSEN, JUDGE BROWN,

and JUDGE HOWELL joined.

Having recused themselves, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE 

HIMONAS do not participate herein; DISTRICT JUDGE JENNIFER A. 

BROWN and DISTRICT JUDGE ANTHONY L. HOWELL sat.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 Following his divorce, Steven Thurman planted a pipe 

bomb in the car of his ex-wife‘s new boyfriend. The bomb exploded 

and killed the boyfriend‘s eleven-year-old son. Mr. Thurman was 

charged with aggravated murder, a capital offense, and other counts 

related to making and transporting a bomb. He negotiated a deal 

with prosecutors under which he pled guilty to depraved
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

2

indifference murder in exchange for the prosecution‘s agreement to 

drop all other counts against him and make several favorable 

recommendations to the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Board). 

Now, over twenty-three years later, he remains imprisoned and 

argues that the prosecution failed to fulfill its end of the plea 

agreement.

¶2 But before this court can consider the merits of Mr. 

Thurman‘s claim, we must address the manner in which it was 

brought. Mr. Thurman brought this claim as a motion under Utah 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), or alternatively, as a motion for a 

misplea, contending that he has no other avenue available for relief. 

The State argued below, and the district court agreed, that Utah 

Code section 77-13-6 (Plea Withdrawal Statute) mandates that Mr. 

Thurman‘s claim be brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies 

Act (PCRA), which provides Mr. Thurman with an avenue for relief.

¶3 Looking to the plain language of the Plea Withdrawal 

Statute and the PCRA, we agree with the State that Mr. Thurman‘s 

claim must be brought under the PCRA. Because his constitutional 

challenge to his guilty plea can properly be considered only under 

the PCRA, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Mr. Thurman‘s 

motion.

Background

¶4 In 1991, Mr. Thurman placed a pipe bomb under the seat of 

the car of his ex-wife‘s new boyfriend. The bomb detonated a few 

days later, killing the boyfriend‘s eleven-year-old son. After finding 

evidence tying Mr. Thurman to the bomb, the State arrested him and 

charged him with capital murder and other charges related to the 

construction and transportation of a bomb.

¶5 Mr. Thurman initially pled guilty to aggravated murder in 

exchange for the prosecution‘s agreement not to seek the death 

penalty and to dismiss the other counts. But after being sentenced to 

life in prison with the possibility of parole, he moved to withdraw 

his guilty plea. The trial court denied Mr. Thurman‘s motion, but we 

reversed the denial in State v. Thurman, holding that the facts to 

which Mr. Thurman had pled were insufficient to show the mental 

state necessary for an aggravated murder conviction.1

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1 911 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah 1996).
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶6 Following the withdrawal of his initial guilty plea, Mr. 

Thurman reached a new plea agreement with the prosecution, 

pleading guilty to depraved indifference murder on July 13, 1998.

The plea agreement included four guarantees from the State:

(1) State agrees to dismiss the remaining counts.

(2) State agrees to affirmatively recommend and 

stipulate that [the trial court] recommend to the Board 

of Pardons and Parole that defendant receive credit for 

time served from his arrest on May 17, 1991. (3) State 

agrees to affirmatively recommend to the Board of 

Pardons and Parole that defendant‘s case be reviewed 

and considered for a parole hearing as soon as possible,

given the fact that defendant has been incarcerated for 

more than seven (7) years. [A]nd (4) State agrees to 

recommend to the Board of Pardons and Parole that 

defendant‘s attorneys be allowed to represent him at 

all parole hearings, at the discretion of defendant‘s 

attorneys.

¶7 Mr. Thurman was sentenced to an indefinite term of five 

years to life in prison. His presentencing report included 

recommendations from the prosecution that he be sentenced to an 

indefinite term of five years to life and receive credit for time served, 

but it did not include a recommendation that his case be reviewed 

and considered for a parole hearing as soon as possible or a 

recommendation to allow his attorneys to represent him at any 

parole hearings.

¶8 Seven months after sentencing, Mr. Thurman had his first 

parole hearing. And while the Board acknowledged that his first 

parole hearing was taking place quicker than normal, they explained 

this was because of an ―administrative rule change‖ and did not 

mention a recommendation from the prosecutors. Additionally, one

of the Board members reported that the Board had received a fax 

from Mr. Thurman‘s defense attorneys stating they would have

attended the hearing but did not receive enough notice. The Board 

chose not to grant Mr. Thurman parole and scheduled his next 

parole hearing for 2011. At the 2011 hearing, the Board ―determined 

that [Mr.] Thurman would serve the remainder of his life in prison.‖

¶9 Following the 2011 hearing, Mr. Thurman ―moved to correct 

an illegal sentence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), 

alleging that the Board of Pardons and Parole  ̳illegally sentenced 

[Mr. Thurman] to life without possibility of parole‘ and that the 

pleaded facts in his guilty plea did not support a second-degree 
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

4

murder conviction.‖2 The district court denied Mr. Thurman‘s 

motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.

3

¶10 At this point, Mr. Thurman hired new counsel to work on 

his case. Working with new counsel, Mr. Thurman began to suspect 

that the prosecutors on his case had not made all of the

recommendations to the Board that were part of his plea agreement.

Following this discovery, Mr. Thurman filed a petition for postconviction relief under the PCRA, alleging prosecutorial breach 

following his plea agreement. A couple of months after filing the 

PCRA petition, Mr. Thurman also filed the motion we are 

considering today, seeking relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b), or alternatively, declaration of a misplea. The district court 

placed Mr. Thurman‘s PCRA petition on hold pending the outcome 

of this rule 60(b) and misplea motion.

¶11 The district court dismissed Mr. Thurman‘s rule 60(b) and 

misplea motion, holding that he was required to bring any challenge 

to his guilty plea under the PCRA. Specifically, the court held that 

Mr. Thurman‘s claim of prosecutorial breach of his plea agreement

fell within Utah Code subsection 77-13-6(2)(c)‘s requirement that

―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 

specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, 

Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules 

of Civil Procedure.‖ The court rejected Mr. Thurman‘s argument that 

the PCRA did not provide him with a remedy, stating that 

―[c]ertainly, the language of 78B-9-104 is broad enough to include 

defendant‘s claims.‖ The court also dismissed Mr. Thurman‘s rule 

60(b) and misplea motion on the alternative grounds that it was not 

―filed within a reasonable time‖ and that a ―balancing of interests 

weighs against a finding of legal necessity that is required for a 

misplea.‖

¶12 Mr. Thurman filed an appeal, arguing that the district court 

erred in dismissing his motion. We have appellate jurisdiction under 

Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(i).

Standard of Review

¶13 Mr. Thurman disputes the district court‘s interpretation of 

the Plea Withdrawal Statute and the PCRA. ―We review questions of 

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2 (Alteration in original.) (Citation omitted.)

3 See State v. Thurman, 2014 UT App 119, ¶ 1 , 327 P.3d 1240.
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Opinion of the Court

5

statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the 

district court's legal conclusions.‖4 Because we hold that Mr. 

Thurman‘s challenge to his guilty plea must be brought under the 

PCRA, we do not reach the district court‘s alternative grounds for 

dismissal.

Analysis

¶14 Mr. Thurman argues that a rule 60(b) motion or motion for a 

misplea is appropriate in this case because no other avenue for relief 

exists. To reach this conclusion, he contends that (1) the violation he 

is alleging falls outside the Plea Withdrawal Statute‘s requirement

that ―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea‖ not made prior to the 

announcement of sentencing be brought under the PCRA and (2) the 

PCRA does not allow for claims based on prosecutorial breaches of

plea agreements.

¶15 First, Mr. Thurman‘s interpretation of the Plea Withdrawal 

Statute conflicts with the broad language used in Utah Code 

subsection 77-13-6(2)(c). He relies on limitations from a separate part 

of the statute, subsection 77-13-6(2)(a), but we cannot import a 

limitation from one part of the statute to another when the 

Legislature chose not to do so. The plain language of the Plea 

Withdrawal Statute unambiguously requires Mr. Thurman‘s claim to 

be brought under the PCRA.

¶16 Second, Mr. Thurman reads the grounds for relief available 

under the PCRA more narrowly than they are written. He argues

that the PCRA does not provide him with an avenue for relief 

because his guilty plea was ―knowing and voluntary.‖ But the PCRA 

does not require that petitions be based on an unknowing or 

involuntary plea. Utah Code subsection 78B-9-104(1)(a) allows for 

petitions when ―the conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the 

United States Constitution or Utah Constitution.‖ And this is the 

foundation of Mr. Thurman‘s claim—that his conviction was 

obtained in violation of his constitutional right to due process.

I. The Plea Withdrawal Statute Requires that Mr. Thurman‘s 

Claim Be Brought Under the PCRA

¶17 The Plea Withdrawal Statute sets out how defendants can 

withdraw or challenge guilty pleas. It is a jurisdictional statute and 

_____________________________________________________________

4 Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 12, 267 

P.3d 863 (citation omitted).
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

6

limits the courts‘ abilities to hear both withdrawals of and challenges 

to guilty pleas.5 Mr. Thurman argues that his claim, alleging 

prosecutorial breach of his plea agreement, falls outside of the 

statute‘s reach. But looking to the plain language of Utah Code 

subsection 77-13-6(2)(c), we conclude that Mr. Thurman must bring

his claim under the PCRA.

¶18 ―It is well settled that when faced with a question of 

statutory interpretation,  ̳our primary goal is to evince the true intent 

and purpose of the Legislature.‘‖6 And ―[t]he best evidence of the 

legislature‘s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.‖7 So 

―[w]hen interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary 

indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly according to 

its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.‖8 And just as we

presume each term was used advisedly, we ―presum[e] all omissions 

to be purposeful.‖9

¶19 We start our analysis by looking to the text of the Plea 

Withdrawal Statute. It states in full:

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time 

prior to conviction.

(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn 

only upon leave of the court and a showing that it 

was not knowingly and voluntarily made.

(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, 

except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by 

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5 See State v. Rettig, 2017 UT 83, ¶ 27, 416 P.3d 520 (―The standard 

set forth in the Plea Withdrawal Statute is both a rule of preservation 

and a jurisdictional bar on appellate consideration of matters not 

properly preserved.‖).

6 Zilleruelo v. Commodity Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 18, _ P.3d 

_ (quoting Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 

267 P.3d 863).

7 Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

8 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

9 Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (citation 

omitted).
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Opinion of the Court

7

motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may 

not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a 

plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the 

plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading 

guilty or no contest.

(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the 

time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be 

pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction 

Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure.10

¶20 Relying on the statute as a whole, Mr. Thurman argues that 

subsection (c)‘s reference to ―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea not 

made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b)‖ actually 

only refers to attempts to challenge or withdraw a plea based on ―a 

showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.‖ But that 

language comes from subsection (2)(a), and the Legislature chose not 

to include any such limiting language in subsection (2)(c). Rather, 

the Legislature referred to ―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea.‖11

―Without a doubt, the Legislature could have written the [Plea 

Withdrawal] Statute‖ to apply only to pleas that were not knowing 

or voluntary in nature.

12 ―But also without a doubt, it did not. And it 

is not our job to second guess the Legislature and insert substantive 

terms into the statute‘s text.‖13

¶21 Mr. Thurman‘s proposed interpretation of the statute would 

also conflict with our previous decisions, where we have recognized 

that ―the term  ̳any‘ support[s] a broad reading of  ̳any challenge.‘‖14

For example, in State v. Badikyan, we declined to limit the meaning of 

―any challenge to a guilty plea‖ to untimely requests to withdraw 

guilty pleas because that ―would reduce the scope of the Plea 

Withdrawal Statute to less than  ̳any.‘‖15 And in State v. Flora, we 

concluded that ―by modifying  ̳challenge‘ with the adjective  ̳any,‘ 

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10 UTAH CODE § 77-13-6.

11 Id. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (emphasis added).

12 Zilleruelo, 2022 UT 1, ¶ 23.

13 Id.

14 State v. Badikyan, 2020 UT 3, ¶ 30, 459 P.3d 967.

15 Id. ¶¶ 24, 32.
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

8

the legislature necessarily recognized that a defendant might raise 

any number of specific plea challenges.‖16

¶22 The language of subsection (c) is unambiguous, so we need 

not look for other indicators of its meaning. The only question this 

leaves is whether or not Mr. Thurman‘s current motion is properly 

characterized as a challenge to his guilty plea. A challenge is ―a 

calling to account or into question‖17 or ―[a]n act or instance of 

formally questioning the legality or legal qualifications of a person, 

action, or thing.‖18 Mr. Thurman‘s motion fits within these 

definitions.

¶23 Mr. Thurman is calling his guilty plea into question by 

arguing that his constitutional right to due process was violated 

when the prosecution breached the plea agreement that induced his

plea. His motion is framed around the United States Supreme 

Court‘s holding in Santobello v. New York that ―when a plea rests in 

any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 

so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 

such promise must be fulfilled.‖19 According to Mr. Thurman, like in 

Santobello, the prosecution in his case failed to follow through with 

the promises that induced his guilty plea. And while the Santobello 

Court contemplated either specific performance by the prosecution 

of agreed upon terms in a plea agreement or withdrawal of a plea as 

possible remedies,20 due to the passage of time, Mr. Thurman seeks 

only ―to be released from his part of the agreement, his guilty plea.‖

¶24 By seeking his release from his guilty plea, or the 

declaration of a misplea, Mr. Thurman‘s motion constitutes a 

challenge to his guilty plea. Although his challenge is based on a 

different ground than the reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea 

contemplated in Utah Code subsection 77-13-6(2)(a), which requires 

a showing that a guilty plea ―was not knowingly and voluntarily 

_____________________________________________________________

16 2020 UT 2, ¶ 22, 459 P.3d 975 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

17 Challenge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/challenge (last 

visited Mar. 21, 2022).

18 Challenge, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

19 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

20 Id. at 263.
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Opinion of the Court

9

made,‖ it still falls within the broader scope of subsection (c), which 

refers to ―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea.‖21 Both parts of Mr. 

Thurman‘s motion, his arguments rooted in Utah Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b) and his motion for declaration of a misplea, are 

challenges to his guilty plea. So his claim must be brought under the 

PCRA.

¶25 Because the Plea Withdrawal Statute is jurisdictional, this 

could be the end of our analysis. Mr. Thurman‘s claim may only be 

brought through the PCRA, so the district court lacked jurisdiction 

over this motion and was correct to dismiss it.

22 But Mr. Thurman 

additionally argues that the jurisdictional limits of the Plea 

Withdrawal Statute cannot apply to Santobello claims because the 

PCRA provides no avenue for relief. We disagree.

II. The PCRA Provides an Avenue for Relief for Santobello Claims

¶26 In addition to disputing the meaning of the Plea Withdrawal 

Statute, Mr. Thurman argues that the PCRA provides no ground for 

relief for his Santobello claim. Mr. Thurman‘s argument centers on 

State v. Kay and Puckett v. United States, two cases holding that 

subsequent breaches by the prosecution of plea agreements do not 

render guilty pleas unknowing or involuntary.23 But Mr. Thurman‘s 

focus on the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea is 

misplaced, because the PCRA does not include any such limitation.

Mr. Thurman can file a petition under the PCRA based on a claim 

_____________________________________________________________

21 UTAH CODE § 77-13-6(2)(c) (emphasis added).

22 See State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 18, 247 P.3d 344 (―[F]ailure to 

withdraw a guilty plea within the time frame dictated by section 77–

13–6 deprives the trial court and appellate courts of jurisdiction to 

review the validity of the plea.‖); Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35, ¶ 20, 379 

P.3d 1278 (―[A] defendant may not file a motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea or directly appeal the plea, but must pursue postconviction 

relief through the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure.‖).

23 Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Utah 1986) (―The mere fact that Kay 

pleaded guilty to avoid a harsher penalty does not render an 

otherwise valid plea involuntary.‖); Puckett, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)

(―[T]here is nothing to support the proposition that the 

Government‘s breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the 

defendant‘s agreement to have been unknowing or involuntary.‖).
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

10

that his conviction was obtained in violation of his due process 

rights.

¶27 As discussed above, ―[w]hen interpreting statutes, we look 

first to the plain language of the statute, and give effect to that 

language unless it is ambiguous.‖24 ―In so doing, [w]e presume that 

the legislature used each word advisedly. We also presume[] that the 

expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of 

another[,] . . . [thereby] presuming all omissions to be purposeful.‖25

¶28 Under the PCRA, ―an individual who has been convicted 

and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 

court of original jurisdiction for postconviction relief to vacate or 

modify the conviction or sentence‖ on the ground that ―the 

conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States 

Constitution or Utah Constitution.‖26 We have previously 

interpreted this language as ―appl[ying] where the conviction or 

sentence was unconstitutional at the time it was handed down.‖27

¶29 Mr. Thurman argues that his claim does not fit within this 

category because the alleged constitutional violation did not take 

place until after his conviction was obtained. He contends that his 

due process rights were violated when the prosecution failed to 

follow through with promises that induced his guilty plea. 

Specifically, he claims that the prosecution breached the plea 

agreement by failing to recommend to the Board that he have a 

parole hearing as soon as possible and that his defense attorneys be 

allowed to attend that hearing. According to Mr. Thurman, the 

timing of the prosecution‘s acts, or failure to act, takes his claim out 

of the PCRA.

¶30 But even if the prosecution had not yet violated the plea 

agreement at the time Mr. Thurman entered his guilty plea, his 

guilty plea was still induced by promises that he alleges were empty. 

It was these promises that led to his guilty plea and conviction. So 

the alleged due process violation, the prosecution‘s breach of the 

_____________________________________________________________

24 Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, ¶ 27, 234 P.3d 

1105 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

25 Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (alterations in 

original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

26 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(1)(a).

27 Archuleta v. State, 2020 UT 62, ¶ 25, 472 P.3d 950.
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Opinion of the Court

11

plea agreement, is directly tied to the manner in which his conviction 

was obtained. Because his claim is based on the promises that 

induced his guilty plea and led to his conviction, it is properly 

considered a claim that his ―conviction was obtained . . . in violation 

of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution.‖28

¶31 Accordingly, Mr. Thurman‘s Santobello claim fits within the 

plain language of the PCRA.

29 He may file a petition under the 

PCRA based on his Santobello claim, as he already has, whether or 

not his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

Conclusion

¶32 The Plea Withdrawal Statute requires all challenges to 

guilty pleas made outside of the statute‘s framework be brought 

under the PCRA. The plain language of the statute incorporates 

―[a]ny challenge to a guilty plea,‖ and this jurisdictional limitation 

goes beyond pleas that were not entered knowingly or voluntarily. 

Mr. Thurman must bring his challenge to his guilty plea under the 

PCRA, which allows for claims that a conviction was obtained

unconstitutionally. Because Mr. Thurman‘s claim should have been 

_____________________________________________________________

28 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(1)(a).

29 Even were we to assume some ambiguity as to whether the 

language of subsection 78B-9-104(1)(a) allows for a PCRA petition 

based on a Santobello violation, our conclusion would be the same 

based on the application of the statutory canon of constitutional 

avoidance. ―Under the canon of constitutional avoidance, courts may 

reject[] one of two plausible constructions of a statute on the ground 

that it would raise grave doubts as to [the statute‘s] 

constitutionality.‖ Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, ¶ 54, 456 P.3d 750

(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We apply the canon based ―on the reasonable presumption 

that where there is more than one plausible interpretation of a 

statute, the legislature did not intend the [interpretation] which 

raises serious constitutional doubts.‖ State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 59, 

424 P.3d 171 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, applying the canon of constitutional 

avoidance to the relationship between the Plea Withdrawal Statute 

and the PCRA, we would presume that the Legislature did not 

intend to leave individuals with no remedy for a due process 

violation. Any other interpretation would raise grave doubts as to 

the Plea Withdrawal Statute‘s constitutionality.
STATE v. THURMAN

Opinion of the Court

12

brought under the PCRA, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of 

his rule 60(b) and misplea motion.