IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC D/B/A 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v. 

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION 6:20-cv-00454-ADA

CIVIL ACTION 6:20-cv-00461-ADA

CIVIL ACTION 6:20-cv-00465-ADA

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF 
i

Table of Contents

I. U.S. Patent No. 7,106,702 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00461-ADA)................................................. 1

A. Construction disputes.................................................................................................... 1

3. “active node(s)”.................................................................................................................1

4. “monitoring ...” terms.......................................................................................................3

5. “each of said nodes having a user database”.....................................................................4

B. Microsoft has not proven indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence ............. 5

6. “activating the AAA functions of the active nodes” .........................................................6

7. “geographic distance ... maximized” terms......................................................................6

8. “logging changes ...” terms..............................................................................................8

II. U.S. Patent No. 7,366,160 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00454-ADA)............................................... 10

A. Disputed terms of the ’160 patent which only Microsoft seeks to construe ........... 10

1. “selecting two or more parameters . . .” ..........................................................................10

2. “network parameter” .......................................................................................................11

3. “determining” limitations of claim 1...............................................................................12

4. “service indicator”...........................................................................................................13

5. “determining as a function of the trend of the indicator a time of the service 

indicator crossing a defined threshold”...........................................................................13

B. Microsoft’s attorney argument fails to prove indefiniteness of any term............... 14

6. “neural network determines rules of association . . .” ....................................................14

7. “calculating a mathematical expectation of financial loss . . .”......................................15

8. “determining a capacity to provide a network service at a given time” .........................16

III. U.S. Patent No. 8,274,902 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00465-ADA)............................................... 17

A. Disputed terms of the ’902 patent which only Microsoft seeks to construe ........... 17

1. “network that branches, downstream of the collection point” ........................................17
ii

2. “estimating a packet loss rate” and “an estimate of a packet loss rate” ..........................20

3. “packet loss rate”.............................................................................................................20

B. Sole phrase of the ’902 patent which Microsoft seeks to challenge as indefinite ... 21

4. “wherein the collected data relate to packet losses on the portion of a GPRS 

core network extending from the collection point to a plurality of [base / 

mobile] stations” .............................................................................................................21
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,

875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................... 9

Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc.,

780 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................. 19

Cisco Sys., Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLC,

928 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................... 2

Fisher-Rosemount Sys., Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc.,

No. A-13-CA-587-SS, 2015 WL 1275910 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2015) ..................................... 1

In re Corkill,

771 F.2d 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1985).............................................................................................. 7, 8

IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp.,

825 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................ 14

Lecat’s Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg.,

351 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (N.D. Ill. 2018) ............................................................................ 6, 14, 21

Media Rights Technologies, Inc. v. Capital One Financial Corp.,

800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................. 17

Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 2, 11

Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L.,

412 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 19

Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,

629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................... 5

SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp.,

336 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................... 4

Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc.,

279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................. 11

Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels,

812 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................. 13

Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.,

587 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................. 16
iv

Whirlpool Corp. v. Ozcan,

No. 2:15-CV-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) ....................... 6, 14, 21
1

I. U.S. Patent No. 7,106,702 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00461-ADA)

A. Construction disputes

Microsoft agrees that terms no. 1 (as numbered in opening brief) require no construction;

and it also does not dispute that term no. 2 (“the AAA functions”) makes reference to the 

antecedent recitation of “authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) functionality.” Dkt. 

47, 2−4. Microsoft’s only gripe is that those terms are not properly before the Court. Dkt. 50, 5. 

WSOU can hardly be faulted for misunderstanding which terms Microsoft seeks to construe, given 

Microsoft’s position was a shifting target even up until the week before the opening brief was due 

to be filed. As to the term “the AAA functions,” WSOU has consistently identified that term as 

one which requires construction, due in part to arguments Microsoft has made during the Markman

process. It is unclear why Microsoft believes it alone is allowed to identify terms for construction.

3. “active node(s)”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

node(s) in an active state of AAA functionality1 node(s) that carry out the AAA functions for 

the network by employing their respective 

user databases

Microsoft falsely asserts “[t]he patent drafter did not provide an express definition for 

‘active nodes’ here, so any appeals to lexicography are inapposite.” Dkt. 50, 6−7. It is telling that 

Microsoft failed to offer any explanation as to why the following statement in the specification is 

allegedly not lexicographic: “[h]erein, the terms ‘active’ and ‘non-active’ when used in the 

context of ‘active node’ and ‘non-active node’ refers to the state of the node’s AAA 

functionality.” ’702 patent, 3:22−27 (emphasis added). Here, the patentee clearly signaled 

lexicographic intent by (1) use of the word “herein,” (2) setting off both the “active” qualifier and

the “active node” term with quotation marks, and (3) use of the signal “refers to” followed by a 

definition. Fisher-Rosemount Sys., Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc., No. A-13-CA-587-SS, 2015 WL 

1275910, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2015) (instructing that “[c]lear definitions are usually set off 

1 The term “active node” is recited both in the plural and in the singular in the claims. Microsoft 

misstates WSOU’s proposed construction for this term. Compare Dkt. 50, 6 with Dkt. 47, 4. 
2

by quotation marks or are marked by the word ‘is.’”) (citation omitted). In arguing for a different 

construction, Microsoft simply ignores this explicit lexicography altogether.

Microsoft also fails to comprehend why its untethered construction would incorrectly 

encompass nodes that are not presently operating in an active state. To be clear, Microsoft does 

not propose construing this term as “nodes that are presently carrying out the AAA functions.” 

Rather, Microsoft’s construction expresses functional capability in general—i.e., “nodes that carry 

out the AAA functions . . . .” The ’702 patent makes clear that even though a set of nodes may all 

have the capability to carry out AAA functions when required, this does not necessarily mean all 

such nodes continuously operate in an active state. See Dkt. 49, 5 (discussing ’702 patent, 

3:29−31). The patentee avoided any needless ambiguity injected by Microsoft’s proposed 

construction by explicitly defining “active nodes” to refer to the state of the node’s AAA 

functionality. ’702 patent, 3:22−27. 

Microsoft boasts that its proposed construction “comes directly from the specification.” 

Dkt. 50, 6. But that also could be said of every other gross transgression of the “cardinal sin” of 

reading limitations from the specification into the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The exemplary disclosure Microsoft impermissibly seeks to add as a claim 

limitation concerns how an “active node” may carry out AAA functionality in certain 

embodiments—i.e., “. . . by employing their respective user databases.” Dkt. 50, 6 (quoting ‘702 

patent, 2:8−11). While Microsoft incorrectly characterizes this exemplary disclosure as a 

“requirement” (id., 7), Microsoft fails to explain why the Court should find any disclaimer here. 

Even if this were the only embodiment disclosed, and it is not, it still would be improper here to 

read in the cited disclosure as a claim limitation. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLC, 928 F.3d 1359, 

1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described 

in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication 

in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited”) (quoting LiebelFlarsheim Co v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
3

It is clear Microsoft has improperly viewed claim construction as an opportunity to advance 

a longshot non-infringement position. For virtually every one of its proposed constructions, 

Microsoft returns to its untethered theory that every claim allegedly requires “an exclusive, oneone-one relationship between node and user database.” Dkt. 50, 13 n.2. For the “active node(s)” 

term, Microsoft attempts to insert this additional, unrecited requirement as, “... by employing their 

respective user databases.” Even if one were to set aside the lexicography discussed above, claim 

differentiation also independently defeats Microsoft’s strained interpretation, as explained in the 

opening brief. Dkt. 47, 6−7. Microsoft’s only response is that claim differentiation does not apply 

here, ostensibly because “claim 8 specifically requires ‘provisioning each of the plurality of nodes 

with a duplicate copy of a user database,’ which is not the same as provisioning a node with a user 

database.” Dkt. 50, 8. Microsoft appears to have taken the undefended and untenable positions

that (1) claim 1 requires an unrecited user database per node and (2) claim 8 (depending therefrom) 

somehow requires an additional copy of that unrecited database (i.e., two databases per node). The 

word “duplicate” in the phrase “a duplicate copy of a user database” (claim 8, 5:30−33) simply 

refers to the fact that the same database is provided to each node, and thus each one is a “duplicate” 

of the others. This plain reading of claim 8 is supported by a disclosed example embodiment,

where the initial provision is referred to in terms of “duplicate copies of the user database 

employed to carry out AAA functions” (3:29−31). That claim 8 requires a database for each node 

(where each is a duplicate of the others), and claim 1 does not so require, only confirms that 

Microsoft’s construction would violate the doctrine of claim differentiation. Dkt. 47, 6−7. 

4. “monitoring ...” terms

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning two active nodes monitoring one another to detect 

if one becomes disconnected from the network

Microsoft misstates the law in suggesting Microsoft is justified in reading in limitations 

from exemplary disclosure in the specification because allegedly “only one monitoring protocol” 

is disclosed. Dkt. 50, 10 (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 
4

(Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Federal Circuit unequivocally explained that Wang Labs “does not stand 

for the proposition that if a patent specification describes only a particular embodiment, the claims 

must be limited to that subject matter. We have never read Wang Labs to stand for so broad a 

proposition.” Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d 898 at 907.

WSOU also explained in its opening brief why Microsoft’s proposed construction is 

presumptively incorrect due to the doctrine of claim differentiation. Dkt. 47, 7−8. The 

presumption arises here not only by comparing claims 1 and 3 but also by comparing claims 11 

and 16. Id. Microsoft responds that the presumption is rebuttable and that it is rebutted here 

simply because Microsoft says so. Dkt. 50, 11. However, the presumption here “is especially 

strong” because “the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an 

independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim 

should be read into the independent claim.” SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 

1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Claim 16 differs from claim 11, for example, only by adding the 

limitation that the claimed “active nodes monitoring one another” is “no more than two of the 

plurality of nodes.” This is precisely what Microsoft seeks to import into claim 11 through its 

erroneous claim construction—i.e., “two active nodes monitoring one another . . . .” It is telling 

that Microsoft ignores the differentiation of claims 11 and 16 altogether.

5. “each of said nodes having a user database”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning each of said nodes maintaining its own user 

database

Claim 18 is the only claim to recite “each of said nodes having a user database.” Microsoft 

overgeneralizes the dispute over this specific phrase as, instead, concerning “whether the claimed 

‘nodes’ of the ’702 patent [in general] each have their own user database.” Dkt. 50, 12. The 

dispute over this phrase pertains to claim 18 alone; and it does not somehow present a basis to 

apply a generalized limitation to all claims of the ’702 patent.
5

Microsoft has attempted to rewrite this term as “each of said nodes maintaining its own 

user database” (in the singular). Yet again, Microsoft seeks a narrowing interpretation (albeit 

applicable to this claim alone) that there must be “an exclusive, one-to-one relationship between 

node and user database such that each claimed node has its own database.” Id. As alleged support 

for its interpretation, Microsoft repeatedly cites to instances in the specification where example 

embodiments are described in terms of “nodes” (in the plural) employing “their respective user 

databases” (also in the plural). Id. However, nothing in the cited disclosures precludes nodes 

from sharing user databases, such as, for example, one pair of nodes sharing one user database and 

another pair of nodes sharing another user database. Such a scenario would still fit the description 

of multiple nodes employing their respective databases. Indeed, the ’702 does not explicitly state 

anywhere that there must always be a “one-to-one” relationship between node and user database. 

There appears to be little left to dispute now that Microsoft has acknowledged that the 

patentee’s word choice of “having” should control here. Id., 13 (“Microsoft agrees with WSOU 

that the patentee’s word choice here of ‘having’ should be given meaningful effect.”) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). Given that Microsoft’s construction initially sought to rewrite 

“having a” as “maintaining its own,” and further given Microsoft has now conceded that “having” 

should be given meaningful effect here (id., 13 n.2), the phrase “each of said nodes having a user 

database” (recited only in claim 18) should simply be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning.

B. Microsoft has not proven indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence

Microsoft has not met its burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence

merely by offering attorney argument, without the support of any expert testimony, that “a Skilled 

Artisan would not be able to reasonably understand what is meant by” the claim language it 

challenges as being indefinite. Dkt. 50, 14. Because Microsoft’s “garden-variety theory of 

indefiniteness ‘requires a determination whether those skilled in the art would understand what is 

claimed,’ Spansion, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation 

omitted), the Court [should] conclude[] that expert testimony is necessary” here to meet the 

exacting burden of proof. Lecat’s Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1114 
6

(N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Whirlpool Corp. v. Ozcan, No. 2:15-CV-2103-JRG, 2016 WL 7474517, 

at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) (rejecting indefiniteness contention and noting that the accused 

infringer only provided attorney arguments to support its position, and no expert testimony).

6. “activating the AAA functions of the active nodes”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft has not met its burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence

merely by offering attorney argument, without the support of any expert testimony, that “a Skilled 

Artisan would not be able to reasonably understand what is meant by ‘activating the AAA 

functions of active nodes.’” Dkt. 50, 14. This word choice makes clear that the nodes selected in 

step (a) are those that will become ‘active nodes’ by executing the ‘activating’ step (b).” Dkt. 47, 

9−10 (emphasis original). Microsoft responds (through attorney argument only) that the above 

straightforward interpretation cannot be correct ostensibly because step (a) recites “to be” and step 

(d) recites “to become.” According to Microsoft, in this context, “to be” and “to become” must be 

interpreted to mean different things. Dkt. 50, 15. But Microsoft’s counsel overlooks that the ’702 

patent uses “to be” and “to become” interchangeably in this very context. Compare ’702 patent, 

2:13−16 (“When one is determined to be disconnected from the network another of the plurality 

of nodes is selected to be an active node and the network informed thereof.”) with id., 5:1−3 (“(d) 

if one of the active nodes gets disconnected from the network[,] selecting another of the plurality 

of nodes to become an active node”) (emphasis added in both instances).

7. “geographic distance ... maximized” terms

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft’s sole reliance on attorney argument, without the support of any expert 

testimony, also fails to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence for the “geographic 
7

distance ... maximized” terms.2

 Microsoft’s first attorney argument is that “there are many 

methods to calculate ‘geographic distance’ between two points.” Dkt. 50, 16−17. Microsoft 

“misses the point.” Id. That various methods to calculate distance were allegedly known does not 

prove indefiniteness. A person of ordinary skill in the art could consistently apply any one of the 

alleged measurement techniques Microsoft’s counsel identifies(e.g., GPS or straight-line distance) 

to determine which pair of nodes has the “maximized” distance therebetween, as compared to other 

node pairs under consideration. In other words, one may simply select a given measurement 

technique and then make comparisons between node pairs consistently using that same technique. 

This would yield the pair having a “maximized” geographic distance therebetween, regardless of 

the specific measurement technique consistently used. 

Microsoft also has not proven indefiniteness by its attorney argument that “neither the 

specification nor any of the claims that include ‘geographic distance’ limitations specify how to 

determine when a geographic distance is ‘maximized.’” Id., 17. The disputed claim language 

does not recite any temporal “when” requirement. As discussed above, the surrounding context 

plainly recites “maximized” as a limiting qualifier pertaining to which node pair is selected in the 

referenced step of claim 1. The authority Microsoft cites does not support its indefiniteness theory. 

Id. (citing In re Corkill, 771 F.2d 1496, 1501 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). In re Corkill addressed claims 

rejected by the United States Patent and Trademark Office as having a scope which the applicant 

admitted read on an inoperative species. Here, Microsoft provides no evidentiary basis to conclude 

that any inoperative species fall within the scope of the dependent claims at issue, which all carry 

a presumption of validity (unlike the rejected claims in In re Corkill). Microsoft also leaves 

unaddressed the authority distinguishing the statutory definiteness requirement from that of 

inoperativeness and lack of enablement. Dkt. 47, 11 (collecting cases).

Microsoft’s third attorney argument that “the geographic distance between any two nodes 

is fixed, and therefore cannot be ‘maximized’” ignores the context in which the claim language in 

2 In addressing this term, Microsoft repeatedly asks the Court to take its counsel at their word as 

to the perspective of a “Skilled Artisan.” This fails to meet the exacting evidentiary burden.
8

question is recited. Dkt. 50, 18. The dependent claims in question add limitations to a respective 

selecting step of claim 1. Claim 2, for example, requires that “the two active nodes selected in 

step (a) [of claim 1] are chosen so that a geographic distance therebetween is maximized.” This 

claim language expresses choice. It is basic geometry that two given points will have a distance 

therebetween. A comparison of distances between pairs of points will yield a maximum as to a 

given collection of points. Claim 2 requires the chosen pair to be the one that yields the 

“maximized” distance therebetween, as compared to the other pairs for the “plurality of nodes.” 

8. “logging changes ...” terms

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft’s sole reliance on attorney argument, without the support of any expert 

testimony, also fails to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence for the “logging 

changes ...” terms. Microsoft first raises the conclusory attorney argument that “it is not possible 

for a Skilled Artisan to understand what ‘logging’ entails in combination with the other elements 

of this limitation.” Dkt. 50, 19. Microsoft unduly diminishes the significance of what is recited 

in the surrounding context—e.g., “logging changes to the user databases for the active nodes 

thereby updating the same to reflect changes in information contained therein” (claims 9 and 18).3 

The “logging” term is expressly directed to “users databases for the active nodes” (in the plural);

and “updating the same to reflect changes in information contained therein” is likewise directed to 

the “user database for the active nodes” (in the plural). Thus, in referring to “user databases for 

the active nodes” as a whole, “logging changes to the user databases for the active nodes” (e.g., to 

certain ones of those databases) enables performing synchronizing updates to reflect such changes 

(e.g., for the remainder of those databases).

3 Microsoft doubles-down on its misplaced reliance on In re Corkill as allegedly rebutting the point 

that Microsoft’s challenge goes to inoperativeness or lack of enablement, rather than 

indefiniteness. Dkt. 50, 19 n.3. Microsoft is again mistaken. See supra, § I.B.7.
9

This plain reading of the claim language is consistent with, and should be understood in 

light of, corresponding disclosure in the specification. For example, the specification teaches “[t]o 

maintain synchronization, any changes to the user database of one active node are logged, and the 

logged changes are communicated to the other active node so that its user database is similarly 

updated.” ’702 patent, 3:49−53; see also id., Id., 4:33−38. In the cited examples, logging involves 

keeping track of changes to user databases for active nodes, which at least enables synchronizing 

databases of all active nodes in general based on those logged changes. The claim language has 

not been shown to be indefinite in view of its surrounding context and the intrinsic evidence. 

Microsoft then raises the conclusory attorney argument that “one of ordinary skill would 

not be able to determine which ‘changes’ are to be logged.” That the claim language in question 

is not expressly limiting in terms of a particular species or quantity of “changes” does not render 

it indefinite. See BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017)

(“breadth is not indefiniteness.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Finally, Microsoft raises the conclusory attorney argument that “the phrase ‘updating the 

same’ introduces even more ambiguity into the claims because it lacks an antecedent basis.” Dkt. 

50, 19. For claims 9 and 18, WSOU explained why a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

readily recognize that “updating the same” refers back to “the user databases” term. Dkt. 47, 13. 

WSOU then explained that this interpretation is “further confirmed by comparing relevant claim 

language recited in dependents claim 13 and 14.” Id. (emphasis added). Microsoft offers no 

rebuttal to the discussion of claims 9 and 18 and, instead, misrepresents the opening brief as 

“improperly importing language that is explicitly recited in claim 14 . . . into every claim.” Dkt. 

50, 19. Microsoft merely offers a strawman attack; and it has failed to carry its burden.
10

II. U.S. Patent No. 7,366,160 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00454-ADA)

A. Disputed terms of the ’160 patent which only Microsoft seeks to construe

1. “selecting two or more parameters . . .”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning selecting two or more different types of 

parameters of a network / measuring and/or 

calculating at two or more times values of the two 

or more different types of network parameters

Microsoft’s response brief only underscores its error in seeking to unduly restrict the phrase 

“selecting two or more parameters” to require, instead, “selecting two or more different types of 

parameters.” It remains undisputed that the intrinsic evidence contains no unambiguous disclaimer 

compelling Microsoft’s narrowing construction. Quite the contrary, the specification contains a 

counter example to Microsoft’s construction by providing a non-exhaustive list of example 

“parameters” that may be used together, followed by the statement, “parameters of this kind enable the 

reliability of the network service to be determined, for example.” ’160 patent, 2:64−3:8 (emphasis 

added); see also Dkt. 47, 16 (discussing the same). Microsoft responds that those listed parameters 

should be considered as “different types,” notwithstanding the patentee characterization that they are 

all of the same “kind.” Dkt. 50, 22. Microsoft’s misinterpretation of the specification reveals that it 

offers a construction that would only inject ambiguity and impermissibly leave it to the jury to 

determine the meets and bounds of Microsoft’s extraneous “different type” limitation.

While Microsoft points to the statement in the specification that “[t]he parameters can be 

weighted as a function of their importance for a given level of service,” this statement does not 

unambiguously require the “different type” limitation Microsoft seeks to add. Dkt. 50, 21 (quoting 

’160 patent, 3:23−29) (emphasis added). On the contrary, use of the word “can” reveals that the 

statement is merely exemplary. That a particular example embodiment discusses the option of 

weighting parameters as a function of their importance does not foreclose the possibility the parameters 

so weighted are nevertheless of the same type (or “kind” as expressed in the ’160 patent). Moreover, 

parameter weighting is not expressed as a limitation in any of the claims. 
11

Finally, there is no merit to Microsoft’s attorney argument that its narrowing construction is 

necessary here to preserve novelty of the ’160 patent, ostensibly in view of statements made in the 

background section of the ’160 patent. Dkt. 50, 22−23. Such consideration of novelty is inapposite to 

properly interpretating the claims. While the authority Microsoft cites is irrelevant here because it 

addresses the doctrine of equivalents, which is not presently at issue, even that authority recognizes (in 

the immediately preceding sentence no less) that “this limit on the equitable extension of literal 

language provides no warrant for constricting literal language when it is clearly claimed.” Tate Access 

Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

2. “network parameter”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning measurable service level specifications from 

which service indicator values can be determined

In attempting to defend its rewrite of “network parameter” as “measurable service level 

specifications from which service indicator values can be determined,” Microsoft argues “[t]here 

can also be no dispute that ‘network parameters’ are [necessarily] measurable.” Dkt 50, 24. But 

there is a dispute. As WSOU observed, “[t]he phrase ‘measured and/or calculated parameter 

values’ (recited in claim 1) makes clear that the ‘values’ of a ‘network parameter’ are not 

necessarily measured values.” Dkt. 47, 17. In response, Microsoft states, “[t]hat parameter values 

can be calculated (as opposed to measured) does not negate the specification’s requirement that 

network parameters are measurable.” Dkt 50, 25. Here, Microsoft recognizes that the claim 

language itself expresses a distinction between “calculated” and “measured” values. Id. 

Notwithstanding this explicit distinction, which Microsoft acknowledges, Microsoft 

impermissibly attempts to commit the “cardinal sin” of importing a discussion of “measurable” 

from the specification as an affirmative claim limitation. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320.

Microsoft also offers no explanation as to why the following statement in the ’160 patent 

should be deemed lexicographic as to the “network parameters” term: “[i]n this way a number of 

network parameters, also known as service level specifications (SLSs), can be identified for 
12

preferential observation in order to determine the level of service.” ’160 patent, 2:54−67. That 

description of an example embodiment contains none of the typical lexicographic indicators. See

Dkt. 47, 17−18 (citing, inter alia, Fisher-Rosemount, 2015 WL 1275910, at *11). In addition, as 

explained further in the opening brief, the statement is expressly directed to a particular 

embodiment (e.g., “in this way”) and refers to “a number of network parameters,” as opposed to 

expressing lexicography universally applicable to all network parameters. Id. WSOU also 

explained that incorporation of “service level specifications” into a construction for “network 

parameter” is both improper and unhelpful here because it would simply swap one technical term 

for another. Id. (observing the above statement from the specification “is not offered . . . as a 

definition, but rather as an alternative description” offered in accordance with that embodiment).

Evidently recognizing the weakness of its position, Microsoft relegates to a footnote a 

willingness to agree “network parameter” should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, 

provided there is an understanding that whatever is identified as satisfying that term “cannot also 

satisfy the ‘service indicator’” element. Dkt. 50, 23 n.5. Microsoft’s new and unexplained fallback 

position, to the extent it is not waived given its untimeliness, would risk excluding preferred 

embodiments of the ’160 patent. In certain embodiments, for example, a service indicator may

simply be a collection of network parameters. Dkt. 49 at 20 (discussing’160 patent, 4:11−33); see 

also id., 2:57−58 (“A level of service indicator can be defined on the basis of measured and/or 

calculated data.”); 2:62−63 (“At a given time the indicator can also be defined by the values of 

different parameters at different times.”).

3. “determining” limitations of claim 1

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning computing [at two or more times the value of a service 

indicator / a trend of the indicator / a time of the 

service indicator crossing a defined threshold] using 

the [measured and/or calculated parameter values / 

determined indicator values / trend of the indicator]

Microsoft fails to justify its attempt to rewrite the “determining” term of claim 1 as 
13

“calculating” instead. Microsoft alleges that “determining” (as recited in claim 1) requires “more 

than mere ‘measurement” or “calculation’” (“measuring” and “calculating” are both also recited 

in claim 1). Dkt. 50, 25. It is unclear how Microsoft’s substitution of “computing” for 

“determining” reflects what appears to be a thinly veiled, non-infringement position advanced 

through claim construction. As explained in the opening brief, the patentee’s word choice of 

“determining” should control. Dkt. 47, 18−19. To the extent Microsoft injected a new dispute 

that requires a Court ruling, this term should be interpreted as at least encompassing both

measuring and calculating (i.e., it is broader in scope, not narrower as Microsoft newly argues). 

4. “service indicator”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning an indicator of the quality of a network service 

distinct from the network parameters

In purporting to defend its proposed construction for “service indicator,” Microsoft simply 

rehashes its position for the “network parameter” term. In both instances, WSOU impermissibly 

seeks to add virtually identical extraneous limitations. For the sake of brevity, WSOU defers to 

its briefing elsewhere on this same point. Dkt. 47, 16−18, 19−21; supra, § II.A.2. Given Microsoft 

also emphasizes its attempt to add a “quality” restriction to this term, however, it bears repeating 

that the ’160 patent discloses that a service indicator may simply be a collection of network 

parameters. Supra, § II.A.2. The ’160 patent never states its network parameters are restricted to 

quality only. On the contrary, “directionality of the communication” is listed among other example

network parameters, according to an example embodiment. ’160 patent, 2:67−3:3.

5. “determining as a function of the trend of the indicator a time of the 

service indicator crossing a defined threshold”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning determining as a function of the trend of the 

service indicator the time remaining for the 

indicator crossing a defined threshold

Microsoft’s resort to mere attorney argument fails to establish its burden of “proving the 
14

existence of a clear and unmistakable [prosecution history] disclaimer that would have been 

evident to one skilled in the art.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1063–64 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (citation and internal quotations omitted). WSOU also defers to counterpoints raised in its 

opening brief. Dkt. 47, 21−22. The remainder of Microsoft’s argument boils down to a violation 

of the proscription of reading in limitations from exemplary disclosure in the specification. 

B. Microsoft’s attorney argument fails to prove indefiniteness of any term

Microsoft fails to prove indefiniteness—by clear and convincing evidence—of any

challenged claim term of the ‘160 patent. For each term, Microsoft merely by offers attorney 

argument, without the support of any expert testimony as to the perspective of a person of ordinary 

skill in the art. The conclusory challenges are deficient on their face. See Lecat’s 351 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1114); Whirlpool, 2016 WL 7474517, at *3.

6. “neural network determines rules of association . . .” 

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft has not proven the above disputed term to be indefinite by clear and convincing 

evidence. Rather, it relies exclusively on conclusory attorney argument in raising its deficient 

indefiniteness objection to only the “rules of association” clause of the disputed phrase. Dkt. 50, 

32−33. This does not meet the exacting burden of clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft first 

complains that “[t]he phrase ‘rules of association’ appears only once in the specification, and is 

recited exactly as it is in claim 7.” Id. But “[t]he number of times [a claim term] is referenced in 

the specification is inapposite” to determining whether the term as used in the claim is definite. 

IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. App’x 900, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential). 

Microsoft then complains that the recitation of claim language in the summary of the 

invention allegedly provides “no description as to what such rules actually constitute.” Dkt. 50, 

32. But Microsoft provides no basis to dispute that at least the exemplary description of 

“weighting” in the ’160 patent is encompassed by the “rules of association” claim language. See
15

Dkt. 47, 23 (citing ’160 patent, 6:16–36); see also ’160 patent, 3:20–4:10 (discussing weighting). 

Its only retort is to urge the false dichotomy that either the disclosed “‘weighting’ is the only ‘rule 

of association’ contemplated by the patent” or “the scope of this limitation remains indeterminate 

and therefore indefinite.” Dkt. 50, 33. Microsoft cites no authority for false the proposition that 

claim language which encompasses and is reflected in at least one preferred embodiment must be 

deemed indefinite unless it is interpreted as being strictly limited to that embodiment.4 

Microsoft also myopically characterizes the specification as “not explain[ing] any 

association between elements.” Id., 32. Microsoft’s objection goes to enablement or written 

description, not indefiniteness. Nevertheless, Microsoft at least overlooks the explanation that 

“[w]eighting gives dominant importance to the most sensitive parameters in determining a given 

network service trend.” ’160 patent, 3:24−26; see generally also ’160 patent, 3:20–4:10, 6:16–36

(further discussing weighting). The ’160 patent thus describes an example of “weighting” in the 

context of associating “sensitive parameters” with “a given network service trend.” This 

disclosure closely tracks the claim language in question, which recites the “association” as being 

“between a service trend and service parameter values.” Id., 7:12−15 (claim 7); see also 1:64−67.

7. “calculating a mathematical expectation of financial loss . . .”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft has not proven the above disputed term (recited in claim 10 only) to be indefinite 

by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, it relies exclusively on conclusory attorney argument 

in raising its deficient indefiniteness objection that “[t]he phrases ‘mathematical expectation’ and 

‘financial loss’ represent vague concepts that are not given any meaning by the ’160 patent.” Dkt. 

50, 33. For “financial loss” in particular, Microsoft argues that the term “could conceivably refer 

to any number of different scenarios, and the method of calculating different types of financial loss 

could vary dramatically.” Id. Microsoft then cites to a non-patent case addressing financial loss 

4 Microsoft’s unexplained citations to “Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 901” and “IPXL, 430 F.3d at 

1383−84” do not support Microsoft’s false dichotomy. Dkt. 50, 33.
16

in a field other than telecommunications, evidently to emphasize that at issue there was “twentyfour different types of financial losses.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the Federal Circuit has 

instructed that “a claim to a formula containing over 5,000 possible combinations is not necessarily 

ambiguous if it sufficiently notifies the public of the scope of the claims.” Ultimax Cement Mfg. 

Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).

Microsoft’s attorney argument also fails to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

(1) the claim language is indefinite when viewed as a whole and (2) that “calculating” is somehow 

duplicative with “mathematical expectation.” The disputed phrase appears only in claim 10, which 

recites “[t]he method of claim 1, further comprising a step of calculating a mathematical 

expectation of financial loss as a function of the network service trend determined.” As explained 

in the opening brief, the “calculating” is plainly directed to a “mathematical expectation” (e.g., a 

calculatable formula). Dkt. 47, 26. The “mathematical expectation” is itself defined as being an 

expression of expected “financial loss as a function of the network service trend.” Id. While the 

claim language controls, in shorthand, the claim language may be symbolically summarized as 

calculating according to a formula expressing A as a function of B. That Microsoft’s counsel finds 

this confusing is not the proper perspective for the definiteness inquiry.

Finally, Microsoft’s conclusory attorney argument that the specification allegedly does not 

describe “examples of how ‘mathematical expectation of financial loss’ is to be calculated” goes 

to enablement or written description, not indefiniteness. Dkt. 50, 34.

8. “determining a capacity to provide a network service at a given time”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft has not proven the above disputed term (recited in claim 11 only) to be indefinite 

by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, Microsoft relies exclusively on conclusory attorney 

argument in raising its indefiniteness objection that “the ’160 patent offers competing meanings 

for the term ‘capacity’ with no guidance as to how to choose between them in the context of the 
17

claim.” Dkt. 50, 34. Microsoft’s attorney argument mischaracterizes the cited passage as 

presenting two contradictory definitions. But it does not even present one. For ease of reference, 

the entire cited paragraph is reproduced below. 

Trend determination can also be used to determine the service provision 

capacity at a given date. If the level of service is forecast at a given level at 

a given time, a service provision capacity at that time can be determined. A 

capacity to enter into service level agreements before reaching a saturation 

service level can therefore be defined.

’160 patent, 5:26−31. In the above example, “a service provision capacity” is determined on the 

basis of whether “the level of service is forecast at a given level at a given time.” This closely 

tracks the language of claim 11, which recites, “[t]he method of claim 1, further comprising a step 

of determining a capacity to provide a network service at a given time.” Id., 8:10−12. The final 

sentence of the paragraph does not provide divergent lexicography for the “capacity” term. Id., 

5:29−31. On the contrary, use of the word “therefore” makes explicit reference to the preceding 

sentences disclosing an example of how “capacity” may be determined. The “therefore” sentence 

simply expresses one purpose of employing a “capacity” as disclosed is to avoid reaching a 

saturation service level. Accordingly, the cited dicta from Media Rights5 is inapplicable here

because the cited paragraph of the ’160 patent, on its face, does not provide clear and convincing 

evidence that the claim language means “several different things and no informed and confident 

choice is available among the contending definitions.” 800 F.3d 1366, 1371 (quoting Nautilus, 

572 U.S. at 900 n. 8).

III. U.S. Patent No. 8,274,902 (Case No. 6:20-cv-00465-ADA)

A. Disputed terms of the ’902 patent which only Microsoft seeks to construe

1. “network that branches, downstream of the collection point”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning refers to a tree network

5 Media Rights Technologies, Inc. v. Capital One Financial Corp., 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016). 
18

Microsoft only confirms in its response that its proposed construction is deficient on its 

face and not supported by the record evidence. To be clear, Microsoft has not expressly proposed 

that the term be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning, where “network” should be deemed as 

having an unrecited “tree” qualifier.6

 Rather, Microsoft seeks to replace the entire phrase “network 

that branches, downstream of the collection point” with the untethered abstraction, “refers to a tree 

network.” Even if one were to set aside the error in newly adding a “tree” qualifier to the 

“network” term, notwithstanding the absence of any unambiguous requirement in the intrinsic 

evidence, it would not necessary follow that a tree network must “branch, downstream of the 

collection point.” Thus, it would be plainly erroneous to replace the disputed phrase with 

Microsoft’s untethered construction, “refers to a tree network.”

Microsoft failed to identify any statement in the ’902 patent unambiguously requiring that 

the claimed “network” must refer to a “tree” network only. On the contrary, Microsoft first 

emphasizes a statement that use the words “can” and “may” to indicate the disclosure is exemplary 

and hence not unambiguously required—i.e., “[o]ur method can be applied to any packetized 

communication network that may be represented by a tree graph.” Dkt. 50, 36 (citing ’902 patent, 

2:36–37) (emphasis altered). The ’902 patent also confirms here (and elsewhere) that when the 

patentee intended to identify a network as having a “tree” qualifier, it said so. It is significant, 

therefore, that the claim language in question recites no such qualifier.

Notwithstanding the explicitly non-limiting nature of the sentence quoted above, Microsoft 

offers the untenable argument that because a sentence a few lines down states “applications of our 

method are not limited to GPRS networks or to wireless networks” (2:40–41, emphasis added), it 

is appropriate to interpret the prior phrase “may be represented by a tree graph” as somehow 

unambiguously requiring a tree network as a claim limitation. Dkt. 50, 36. That a patentee uses 

6 Because Microsoft seeks to define the entire disputed phrase through use of a substituting 

construction, and because it has flatly refused to accept that the term should be afforded its plain 

and ordinary meaning (as WSOU proposes), the authority Microsoft cites as applying the plain 

and ordinary meaning with a “refer to” clarification is inapposite here. Dkt. 50, 37 (citations 

omitted).
19

“not limited to” in one instance to explicitly confirm a concept is not limiting does not preclude 

the patentee from expressing another concept is not limiting through use of the words “can” and 

“may.” See, e.g., Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2015) (“The statement in the specification that the concentration of the buffer ‘may be’ between 

0.1 and 10 mg/ml is not limiting, because even if ‘all of the embodiments discussed in the patent’ 

included a specific limitation, it would not be proper to import from the patent’s written description 

limitations that are not found in the claims themselves.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); 

Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 412 F.3d 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (refusing to import 

as a claim limitation a description of a preferred embodiment, which also happened to use the word 

“may”). The holding from Cadence—which is simply a restatement of well-established law—also 

defeats Microsoft’s argument that its importation from the specification is justified here ostensibly 

because “various embodiments of the claimed method . . . [are] all applied on a tree network.” 

Dkt. 50, 36; cf. Cadence Pharm., 780 F.3d at 1369.

Microsoft also errs in suggesting the extrinsic evidence identified—a technical dictionary 

published by Microsoft—supports its construction. The dictionary entry for “branch” included 

two distinct definitions, only one of which made specific mention of a “directory tree.” See Dkt. 

47, 28 (discussing Blanton, A., and Haynes, S., Microsoft Computer Dictionary Fifth Edition, 

Microsoft Press, 2002, p. 22, filed as Exhibit A to Dkt. 47). Microsoft’s own broader definition 

for “branch” was “[a]ny connection between two items such as . . . nodes in a network.” Id. In its 

response, Microsoft argues the secondary definition for “branch” is “inapposite” because does not 

describe “branching” of the network. Dkt. 50, 37. Setting aside that the claim language recites 

“branch,” not “branching,” it is nonsensical to argue that defining “branch” as a connection 

between nodes in a network somehow does not describe “branching” of the network. Id. It is also 

telling that Microsoft has no problem with the first dictionary definition, even though it defines 

“branch” as “[a] node . . .” in the singular. Dkt. 47, Ex. A at 22.
20

2. “estimating a packet loss rate” and “an estimate of a packet loss rate”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning calculating an approximate packet loss rate / 

a calculation of approximate packet loss rate

Regarding the “estimating . . .” and “estimate . . .” terms, Microsoft confirms in its response 

that it merely seeks to substitute its preferred language for what is recited. Microsoft flips the 

parties’ respective positions in suggesting WSOU has a narrower interpretation because it prefers 

the patentee’s word choice over the substitution proposed by Microsoft. By seeking to rewrite the 

recited “estimate” as “a calculation of approximate,” Microsoft introduces extraneous limitations 

that connote a relational proximity to an actual or theoretical value. To borrow from Microsoft’s 

own reasoning, “if the patent drafter wanted to claim [a relational proximity to an actual or 

theoretical value], the patent drafter could have recited, for example, [approximate], a term that is 

used elsewhere in the specification but not found in the claims.” Dkt. 50, 38. Microsoft falls on 

its own sword; and it has failed to persuasively defend its departure from the claim language.

3. “packet loss rate”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

the fraction of packets that are lost over a 

suitable time interval

the fraction of packets that are lost over a 

suitable time-averaging interval

Both parties recognize the specification contains lexicography for the “packet loss rate” 

term—i.e., “the fraction of packets that are lost over a suitable time-averaging interval[.]” ’902 

patent, 3:46–47. The sole dispute is whether (1) the Court should slavishly adopt the entirety of 

that lexicographic statement verbatim, while leaving it to the jury to decide the meaning and scope 

of “time-averaging” in this context (as Microsoft proposes); or, instead, (2) the Court should either 

drop or separately construe the unrecited “time-averaging” couplet of that statement (as WSOU 

proposes). Microsoft misrepresents to the Court (twice) that WSOU has conceded “timeaveraging” is “ambiguous” in this context. Dkt. 50, 39. Just because the written description

contains a word or phrase that is unnecessary, or that may benefit from Court interpretation if 
21

included in a construction, does not render it ambiguous. Moreover, in arguing the lexicography 

should be adopted verbatim, Microsoft has not raised, and does not even purport to have preserved 

the right to raise, an indefiniteness challenge as to “time-averaging” in this context.

If the Court is inclined to consider whether construction of “a suitable time-averaging

interval” is itself warranted here, an overview of certain relevant disclosure may prove useful. The 

same passage of the ’902 patent discusses the concept of “a time interval δ.” ’902 patent, 3:30−46. 

Use of the symbol “δ” is then repeated elsewhere in the written description in addressing the 

concept of a time interval. That passage further states that “[t]he value of δ may be specified by 

the operator, or it may be determined adaptively.” Id., 3:36–38. If construed at all, therefore, the 

statement “a suitable time-averaging interval” should be interpreted as encompassing both a fixed 

interval and one that is determined adaptively.

B. Sole phrase of the ’902 patent which Microsoft seeks to challenge as indefinite

4. “wherein the collected data relate to packet losses on the portion of a 

GPRS core network extending from the collection point to a plurality of 

[base / mobile] stations”

WSOU’s Proposed Construction Defendant’s Proposed Construction

Plain and ordinary meaning; not indefinite Indefinite

Microsoft’s one-paragraph argument fails to meet Microsoft’s burden to prove 

indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence of the two challenged “wherein . . .” clauses

(recited only in dependent claims 4 and 5 of the ’902 patent). Dkt. 50, 40. All Microsoft offers is 

mere conclusory attorney argument, without the support of any expert testimony as to the 

perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Microsoft’s conclusory attorney argument is 

deficient on its face. See Lecat’s 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1114); Whirlpool, 2016 WL 7474517, at *3.

Microsoft’s attorney argument is based on a flawed and unsupported premise—i.e., that 

“[c]laims 4 and 5 recite ‘base stations’ and ‘mobile stations,’ respectively, that are a ‘portion of a 

GPRS core network.’” Microsoft relies on a flawed interpretation that would turn the claim 

language on its head. As pointed out in the opening brief, the claim language at issue plainly 
22

recites “the portion of a GPRS core network” as a distinct claim element “extending from the 

collection point to a plurality of [base stations / mobile stations].” Dkt. 47, 31−32. This explicit 

differentiation, made plain with use of the words “the” and “to,” confirm neither the base station 

(claim 4) nor the mobile station (claim 5) is properly considered part of what is recited as “the 

portion of a GPRS core network.” This kills the entire premise of Microsoft’s invalidity theory.

Microsoft’s invalidity theory is also legally flawed in that it goes to inoperability, which is 

“irrelevant to definiteness under § 112, ¶ 2” and which says “nothing about a skilled artisan’s 

understanding to the bounds of the claimed invention.” Dkt. 47, 30 (quoting Miles Laboratories, 

Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875, (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Microsoft’s response brief ignores this 

independently-fatal deficiency altogether.
23

Dated: February 11, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Brett A. Mangrum

James L. Etheridge 

Texas Bar No. 24059147 

Ryan S. Loveless 

Texas Bar No. 24036997 

Brett A. Mangrum 

Texas Bar No. 24065671 

Travis L. Richins 

Texas Bar No. 24061296 

Jeffrey Huang

Brian M. Koide

Etheridge Law Group, PLLC 

2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324 

Southlake, TX 76092 

Tel.: (817) 470-7249 

Fax: (817) 887-5950 

Jim@EtheridgeLaw.com 

Ryan@EtheridgeLaw.com 

Brett@EtheridgeLaw.com 

Travis@EtheridgeLaw.com 

Jhuang@EtheridgeLaw.com 

Brian@EtheridgeLaw.com

Mark D. Siegmund

State Bar No. 24117055

mark@waltfairpllc.com

Law Firm of Walt, Fair PLLC.

1508 North Valley Mills Drive 

Waco, Texas 76710

Telephone: (254) 772-6400

Facsimile: (254) 772-6432

Counsel for Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC
24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was served or delivered electronically 

via U.S. District Court [LIVE]- Document Filing System, to all counsel of record, on February 11, 

2021.

/s/ James L. Etheridge

James L. Etheridge