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*********************************************** 
KENNETH BARNES v. CONNECTICUT PODIATRY

GROUP, P.C., ET AL.

(AC 39564)

Alvord, Moll and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff K sought to recover damages from the defendants for medical

malpractice in connection with the alleged failure of the defendant D,

a podiatrist, to rule out the possibility of impaired blood flow to K’s

feet and to refer K to a vascular specialist, resulting, inter alia, in the

partial amputations of K’s feet. K filed an expert witness disclosure

identifying G as an expert on the standard of care and causation, and

later filed an amended expert witness disclosure. The defendants filed

a motion to preclude the amended expert witness disclosure, which the

court denied without prejudice, but also ordered, on January 13, 2016,

that K was precluded from disclosing additional experts. After the court

denied K’s motion for reargument and reconsideration of that order, K

filed a motion to modify the court’s scheduling order dated January 19,

2016, and filed an expert witness disclosure identifying R as an additional

expert. The court sustained the defendants’ objections thereto and

granted their motion to preclude R’s testimony, stating that it was adhering to its January 13, 2016 order. The court subsequently precluded G

from offering expert testimony and rendered summary judgment in favor

of the defendants, from which K appealed to this court. Thereafter, S,

the administratrix of K’s estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. Held:

1. The trial court did not err in ordering that K could not disclose additional experts:

a. S could not prevail on her claim that the trial court’s January 13, 2016

order constituted a sanction of preclusion subject to the applicable rule

of practice (§ 13-4 [h]), which establishes procedures for the disclosures

and depositions of experts in civil matters: the order was a case management decision that the court had the inherent authority to enter, as the

court had expressed concern during argument on January 13, 2016,

concerning a representation made by K’s counsel that he might seek to

disclose additional experts, because at that time, the trial in this action,

which had been pending since 2012, was scheduled to begin on January

19, 2016, and nothing in the record indicated that the court entered the

order as a result of a violation by K of any of the provisions of § 13-4;

moreover, notwithstanding that the defendants did not request such an

order and that S claimed that good cause existed to allow K to disclose

additional experts, it was within the court’s broad discretion, exercised

pursuant to its authority to manage its docket, to preclude K from

disclosing additional experts, particularly where the parties were on the

eve of trial, which had been rescheduled, and where the date by which

K had to disclose his experts had passed.

b. The trial court did not err in adhering to the January 13, 2016 order;

that court determined that it would not hear reargument on the January

13, 2016 order because a different judge had entered the order and had

subsequently denied K’s motion for reargument and for reconsideration,

there was no basis for S’s contention that the court improperly relied on

the law of the case doctrine, and S did not present any other cognizable

argument challenging the court’s decision.

2. The trial court did not err in precluding G from offering expert opinions

as to the standard of care and causation: that court reasonably determined that there was an inadequate factual basis to conclude that G

knew the prevailing professional standard of care applicable to D in

Connecticut in 2011, when the defendants’ alleged professional negligence occurred, because G’s knowledge of that standard of care was

scant and there was no foundation for G to aver that the podiatric

standard of care in Connecticut was the same as the standard of care

in Pennsylvania, where G was licensed and had practiced exclusively;

moreover, G averred that he did not know whether the partial amputations of K’s feet could have been prevented and that a vascular surgeon

was needed to opine as to whether the amputations could have been
avoided but for the defendants’ alleged breach of the standard of care,

and S did not cite any part of the record that would have undermined

the court’s determination that G could not testify that the defendants’

breach of the standard of care led to K’s injuries.

3. S could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in rendering

summary judgment in favor of the defendants; that court properly precluded K from disclosing additional experts and G from offering standard

of care and causation opinions, and, as a result, K was unable to produce

expert testimony establishing the applicable standard of care, a breach

of that standard and causation, and he, therefore, could not establish

a prima facie case of medical malpractice.

Argued October 8, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020

Procedural History

Action seeking damages for the defendants’ medical

malpractice, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, A. Robinson, J., precluded certain expert testimony; thereafter, the court, Lager, J., granted the motion for

summary judgment filed by the defendants and rendered judgment thereon, from which the named plaintiff

appealed to this court; subsequently, this court granted

the motion to substitute Sherry West Barnes, the administratrix of the estate of the named plaintiff, as the

plaintiff. Affirmed.

Joseph R. Mirrione, for the appellant (substitute

plaintiff).

Ellen M. Costello, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this medical malpractice action, the substitute plaintiff, Sherry West Barnes, administratrix of

the estate of Kenneth Barnes (administratrix),1 appeals

from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the defendants, Connecticut Podiatry Group,

P.C., and Marc Daddio, a doctor of podiatric medicine.

On appeal, the administratrix claims that (1) the court,

A. Robinson, J., erred in precluding Barnes from disclosing additional experts, and (2) the court, Lager, J.,

erred in (a) adhering to Judge Robinson’s order precluding Barnes from disclosing additional experts, (b) precluding the expert opinions of Barnes’ disclosed expert,

and (c) rendering summary judgment in favor of the

defendants. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

summary judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On February 29,

2012, Barnes commenced this medical malpractice

action against the defendants. In a revised two count

complaint filed on April 17, 2012, Barnes alleged that,

while he was a patient of the defendants in 2011, the

defendants deviated from the applicable standard of

podiatric care by failing to suspect and rule out the

possibility of an impairment in the blood flow to Barnes’

feet and by failing to refer Barnes to a vascular specialist, resulting, inter alia, in the partial amputations of

Barnes’ feet. On April 26, 2012, the defendants answered

the revised complaint, denying the material allegations therein.

On May 3, 2012, Barnes filed an expert witness disclosure identifying Jack B. Gorman, a podiatrist practicing

in Pennsylvania, as his expert on the standard of care

and causation. The disclosure indicated that Dr. Gorman was expected to testify that the defendants deviated from the applicable standard of care by failing to

suspect and rule out the possibility of ‘‘vascular compromise’’ and make an appropriate and timely referral to

a vascular specialist. In addition, per the disclosure, Dr.

Gorman was expected to testify that the defendants’

deviation from the applicable standard of care resulted

in the partial amputations of Barnes’ feet.

On June 25, 2013, the trial court, A. Robinson, J.,

approved a scheduling order, inter alia, setting September 1, 2013, as the deadline by which Barnes had to

disclose all of his experts. The next day, a JDNO notice

was issued providing that a jury trial was scheduled to

begin on September 15, 2014. Barnes did not disclose

any additional experts on or before September 1, 2013.

On March 12, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to

preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Gorman on the

basis that, despite their multiple attempts to depose

him, Dr. Gorman refused to attend a deposition without

a prepayment of his fees. On April 7, 2014, Judge Rob-
inson issued an order declining to preclude Dr. Gorman’s expert testimony, but requiring the parties to

select a date, no later than May 14, 2014, on which to

conduct Dr. Gorman’s deposition, for which the defendants were not required to remit a prepayment. Notwithstanding the court’s order, Dr. Gorman was not

deposed on or before May 14, 2014.

On September 12, 2014, three days before the start

of trial, Terence S. Hawkins, Barnes’ prior counsel, filed

a motion for a continuance of the trial, representing

that Hawkins was scheduled to undergo an emergency

medical procedure on September 15, 2014. The same

day, Judge Robinson granted the motion and scheduled

a status conference for October 15, 2014. On October

14, 2014, Hawkins filed a motion for a continuance of

the status conference, representing that he was closing

his legal practice on October 31, 2014.2 The same day,

Judge Robinson granted the motion and ordered the

parties’ counsel to select a new date for the status

conference. Subsequently, Judge Robinson issued a separate order requiring an appearance to be filed on behalf

of Barnes no later than November 21, 2014, or else

the case would be dismissed. On November 17, 2014,

Attorney Joseph R. Mirrione appeared on behalf of

Barnes. On November 18, 2014, JDNO notices were

issued providing, respectively, that a trial management

conference was scheduled for December 22, 2015, and

that the trial was rescheduled to January 19, 2016.

On September 25, 2015, Barnes filed a motion for a

continuance of the trial on the ground that Attorney

Mirrione was ‘‘relatively new counsel’’ who had taken

over Barnes’ case from Hawkins. The same day, Judge

Robinson denied the motion for a continuance without

prejudice to the motion being renewed at the trial management conference. Notably, Judge Robinson also

stated that, if a continuance were granted at that time,

it would be marked final and no additional continuances

would be permitted.

On November 13, 2015, Barnes filed an amended

expert witness disclosure with respect to Dr. Gorman.

The amended expert witness disclosure indicated that

Dr. Gorman was expected to testify that (1) ‘‘the history

and physical were inadequate,’’ (2) upon noting ‘‘gangrenous changes,’’ the defendants failed to ‘‘take an adequate history and physical and did not order antibiotics

or other appropriate tests,’’ (3) the defendants failed

to refer Barnes to a vascular surgeon in a timely manner,

(4) the defendants failed to communicate with Barnes’

family doctor and vascular surgeon, (5) the defendants

allowed Barnes’ condition to deteriorate, and (6) Barnes

underwent multiple surgeries and amputations as a

result of the defendants’ conduct.

On November 24, 2015, the defendants filed a motion

to preclude the amendment to Dr. Gorman’s expert

witness disclosure, to which Barnes objected. On Janu-
ary 13, 2016, after hearing argument on January 11,

2016,3

Judge Robinson issued an order denying, without

prejudice, the motion to preclude. Judge Robinson

determined that Barnes should be allowed to supplement Dr. Gorman’s testimony, provided that Dr. Gorman be made available for a deposition within fourteen

days of the order. Additionally, Judge Robinson ordered

that Barnes was ‘‘precluded from disclosing any additional experts.’’ Judge Robinson then assigned the case

to Judge Lager for the management of any pending and

future pretrial motions, as well as for trial, and directed

the parties to report to Judge Lager to address the

scheduling of trial. On January 19, 2016, following a

status and scheduling conference, Judge Lager issued

a scheduling order, inter alia, rescheduling the trial date

to August 15, 2016. The January 19, 2016 scheduling

order did not provide for the additional disclosure of

experts by Barnes.

On January 19, 2016, Barnes filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration of the portions of Judge Robinson’s January 13, 2016 order precluding him from

disclosing any additional experts and requiring Dr. Gorman’s deposition to be conducted within fourteen days

of the order. The defendants filed an objection to that

motion later on the same day.

On January 29, 2016, Dr. Gorman was deposed. On

February 18, 2016, upon the filing of a request to amend

and without objection from the defendants, Barnes’

amended revised two count complaint was deemed

filed. Therein, Barnes alleged that the defendants deviated from the applicable standard of podiatric care,

causing, inter alia, the partial amputations of Barnes’

feet, on the grounds that (1) the defendants failed to

suspect and rule out the possibility of an impairment

in the blood flow to Barnes’ feet, (2) they failed to refer

Barnes to a vascular specialist, (3) ‘‘the history and

physical were inadequate,’’ (4) upon noting ‘‘gangrenous changes,’’ they failed to ‘‘take an adequate history

and physical and [to] order antibiotics or other appropriate tests,’’ (5) they failed to communicate with

Barnes’ treating kidney doctor and vascular surgeon,

and (6) they allowed Barnes’ condition to deteriorate.

The defendants subsequently answered the amended

revised complaint, denying the material allegations

therein.4

On February 29, 2016, Barnes filed a motion to modify

the January 19, 2016 scheduling order, wherein he, inter

alia, sought permission to disclose an additional expert,

to which the defendants objected. On March 4, 2016,

following argument, Judge Lager issued a modified

scheduling order, inter alia, amending the dates by

which certain witnesses had to be deposed. The modified scheduling order did not contain any provision for

the disclosure of additional experts by Barnes.

On March 9, 2016, notwithstanding the portion of
Judge Robinson’s January 13, 2016 order precluding

Barnes from disclosing additional experts (January 13,

2016 order), Barnes filed an expert witness disclosure

identifying Rakesh Shah, a cardiologist, as an additional

causation expert.5 On March 11, 2016, the defendants

filed a combined objection to the expert witness disclosure of Dr. Shah and a motion to preclude Dr. Shah’s

expert testimony, asserting that the disclosure violated

the January 13, 2016 order. Barnes subsequently filed

a combined reply to the defendants’ objection and an

opposition to the defendants’ motion to preclude.

On March 17, 2016, Barnes filed a request for argument regarding his motion for reargument and reconsideration of the January 13, 2016 order, and he reclaimed

the motion to the short calendar of March 21, 2016. On

March 24, 2016, Judge Robinson summarily denied both

the request for argument and the motion for reargument

and reconsideration. On May 12, 2016, following argument, Judge Lager sustained the defendants’ objection

to Barnes’ expert witness disclosure of Dr. Shah and

granted the defendants’ motion to preclude Dr. Shah’s

expert testimony, stating that she was adhering to the

January 13, 2016 order and noting that Judge Robinson

had declined to reconsider that order.

Following Dr. Gorman’s deposition on January 29,

2016, the defendants filed several motions in limine

seeking to preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Gorman

as to the standard of care and causation. Barnes

objected to these motions. On July 26, 2016, after hearing argument on July 15, 2016, Judge Lager issued a

memorandum of decision addressing the defendants’

claims regarding the preclusion of Dr. Gorman’s expert

opinions.6 With respect to Dr. Gorman’s standard of

care opinion, Judge Lager concluded that, although Dr.

Gorman satisfied the minimum qualification requirements of General Statutes § 52-184c, there was an insufficient factual basis to determine whether Dr. Gorman

knew the prevailing professional standard of care applicable to Dr. Daddio in Connecticut in 2011. Judge Lager

stated that the court would provide Barnes with ‘‘one

final opportunity’’ to establish the requisite foundation

on August 3, 2016, the date scheduled for a Porter hearing, at which Barnes had to produce Dr. Gorman to be

subject to examination. Turning then to the issue of

causation, Judge Lager concluded that Dr. Gorman was

precluded from offering expert testimony as to causation because he was not qualified and his causation

opinions exceeded the scope of his expertise and

were speculative.

On August 1, 2016, Barnes filed a request to disclose

Dr. Shah as a causation expert, to which the defendants

filed an objection. On August 2, 2016, Barnes filed a

letter with the court stating that he would not produce

Dr. Gorman at the scheduled August 3, 2016 hearing in

light of Judge Lager’s decision precluding Dr. Gorman
from testifying as to causation. On August 3, 2016, after

hearing argument, Judge Lager denied Barnes’ request

to disclose Dr. Shah as an expert and sustained the

defendants’ objection to the request.

Additionally, on August 1, 2016, the defendants filed

a motion for summary judgment, which they supplemented on August 8, 2016, on the ground that Barnes

was unable to produce expert testimony as to the standard of care or causation and, thus, could not demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice. Barnes

objected to the motion for summary judgment. On

August 10, 2016, following argument, Judge Lager

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on the record. The following day, Judge Lager issued

a memorandum of decision, determining that (1) there

was an inadequate factual basis upon which the court

could find Dr. Gorman qualified to testify as to the

standard of care, (2) as she had previously concluded,

Dr. Gorman was precluded from testifying as to causation, and (3) as a result of the court’s rulings, Barnes

lacked the expert opinions necessary to prove the elements of his medical malpractice claims and, therefore,

the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

At the outset, we set forth the legal principles governing medical malpractice actions. ‘‘[T]o prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the

requisite standard of care for treatment, (2) a deviation

from that standard of care, and (3) a causal connection

between the deviation and the claimed injury. . . .

Generally, expert testimony is required to establish both

the standard of care to which the defendant is held and

the breach of that standard. . . . Likewise, [e]xpert

medical opinion evidence is usually required to show

the cause of an injury or disease because the medical

effect on the human system of the infliction of injuries

is generally not within the sphere of the common knowledge of the lay person.’’7

(Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Procaccini v. Lawrence &

Memorial Hospital, Inc., 175 Conn. App. 692, 717–18,

168 A.3d 538, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 960, 172 A.3d

801 (2017).

I

The administratrix raises several claims on appeal

relating to the January 13, 2016 order. Specifically, the

administratrix asserts that (1) the January 13, 2016

order was improper because (a) it constituted a sanction of preclusion governed by Practice Book § 13-4

(h), the requirements of which were not satisfied, (b)

the defendants did not request that the court enter

an order precluding Barnes from disclosing additional

experts, and (c) good cause existed to allow Barnes to

disclose additional experts, and (2) Judge Lager erred

in adhering to the January 13, 2016 order. For the rea-
sons set forth subsequently in this opinion, we reject

these claims.

A

We first address the administratrix’ claims that the

January 13, 2016 order was improper because (1) it

constituted a sanction of preclusion subject to the

requirements Practice Book § 13-4 (h), which were not

met, (2) the defendants did not request that the court

preclude Barnes from disclosing additional experts, and

(3) good cause existed to permit Barnes to disclose

additional experts. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our disposition of these claims. On January 11, 2016, the parties appeared before Judge Robinson to present argument on the defendants’ motion

to preclude Barnes’ amendment to Dr. Gorman’s expert

witness disclosure. During argument, Barnes’ counsel

represented that he might seek to disclose other experts

in addition to Dr. Gorman. Judge Robinson indicated

that she was ‘‘concerned’’ by that representation.

Barnes’ counsel then reiterated that ‘‘there might be

another disclosure . . . .’’ In response, the defendants’

counsel stated that ‘‘if we’re going to start getting into—

into more experts, then, I really have a concern. I—I

mean, that is really concerning, because this case is

supposed to be going to trial next week.’’8 Additionally,

the defendants’ counsel stated that she ‘‘object[ed] . . .

to any further disclosures.’’

Thereafter, on January 13, 2016, Judge Robinson

denied the defendants’ motion to preclude without prejudice, stating in relevant part: ‘‘Though the defendant[s]

[make] many compelling and persuasive arguments, the

court ultimately holds that [Barnes] should be allowed

to supplement the opinions of his already disclosed

[expert, i.e., Dr. Gorman], provided the expert is made

available for [a] deposition within fourteen days of this

order. Further, [Barnes] is precluded from disclosing

any additional experts.’’ (Emphasis added.)

1

The administratrix contends that the January 13, 2016

order was improper because it constituted a sanction

of preclusion governed by Practice Book § 13-4 (h) and

it did not satisfy the requirements set forth therein. The

defendants argue that the January 13, 2016 order was

a case management decision that Judge Robinson had

the inherent authority to enter. We agree with the

defendants.

Resolving this claim requires us to interpret the

nature of the January 13, 2016 order. ‘‘The construction

of an order is a question of law for the court, and the

court’s review is plenary. . . . As a general rule,

[orders and] judgments are to be construed in the same

fashion as other written instruments. . . . The legal

effect of an order must be declared in light of the literal
meaning of the language used. The unambiguous terms

of [an order], like the terms in a written contract, are

to be given their usual and ordinary meaning. . . . [An

order] must be construed in light of the situation of

the court, what was before it, and the accompanying

circumstances.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Jacklyn H., 162 Conn. App. 811,

830, 131 A.3d 784 (2016).

The administratrix urges us to construe the January

13, 2016 order as a sanction of preclusion governed

by Practice Book § 13-4 (h). Section 13-4 establishes

procedures, inter alia, for the disclosures and depositions of experts in civil matters. Section 13-4 (h) provides: ‘‘A judicial authority may, after a hearing, impose

sanctions on a party for failure to comply with the

requirements of this section. An order precluding the

testimony of an expert witness may be entered only

upon a finding that: (1) the sanction of preclusion,

including any consequence thereof on the sanctioned

party’s ability to prosecute or to defend the case, is

proportional to the noncompliance at issue, and (2) the

noncompliance at issue cannot adequately be addressed

by a less severe sanction or combination of sanctions.’’

The administratrix contends that the January 13, 2016

order was entered without the hearing and findings

required by this rule of practice.

In response, the defendants argue that the January

13, 2016 order was a case management decision that

Judge Robinson had the inherent authority to enter.

‘‘[C]ase management authority is an inherent power

necessarily vested in trial courts to manage their own

affairs in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of

cases. . . . The ability of trial judges to manage cases

is essential to judicial economy and justice.’’ (Citation

omitted.) Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817

A.2d 628 (2003). As our Supreme Court has observed,

‘‘[i]t is well known that justice delayed is justice denied.

In order to fulfill our responsibility of dispensing justice

we in the judiciary must adopt an effective system of

caseflow management. Caseflow management is based

upon the premise that it is the responsibility of the

court to establish standards for the processing of cases

and also, when necessary, to enforce compliance with

such standards. Our judicial system cannot be controlled by the litigants and cases cannot be allowed to

drift aimlessly through the system. To reduce delay

while still maintaining high quality justice, it is essential

that we have judicial involvement in managing cases.’’

In re Mongillo, 190 Conn. 686, 690–91, 461 A.2d 1387

(1983), overruled in part on other grounds, State v.

Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 154–55, 735 A.2d 333 (1999).

As the defendants correctly posit, the January 13,

2016 order was a case management decision, rather

than a sanction of preclusion. During argument on the

defendants’ motion to preclude the amendment to Dr.
Gorman’s expert witness disclosure, Judge Robinson

expressed concern regarding the representation made

by Barnes’ counsel that he might seek to disclose additional experts. At the time of argument and when Judge

Robinson entered the January 13, 2016 order, the trial

in this action, which had been pending since February,

2012, was scheduled to begin on January 19, 2016. The

trial had been rescheduled once before in November,

2014, following Attorney Mirrione’s appearance on

behalf of Barnes. In addition, pursuant to the scheduling

order in effect at the time of argument and when the

January 13, 2016 order was entered, the deadline by

which Barnes had to disclose his experts—September

1, 2013—had long expired. By permitting Barnes to

amend the expert witness disclosure of Dr. Gorman

and continuing the trial date to accommodate that supplementation, Judge Robinson simultaneously ordered

that Barnes could not disclose any additional experts,

with the ostensible purpose of preventing any legerdemain. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that

Judge Robinson entered the January 13, 2016 order as

a result of a violation by Barnes of any of the provisions

of Practice Book § 13-4, which, by its plain terms, is

necessary in order to invoke § 13-4 (h).9 For these reasons, we conclude that the January 13, 2016 order was

a case management decision, as opposed to a sanction

of preclusion, that Judge Robinson had the inherent

authority to enter. Therefore, the administratrix’ reliance on § 13-4 (h) is misplaced.10

2

The administratrix also claims that the January 13,

2016 order was improper because, in seeking to preclude Barnes from amending the expert witness disclosure of Dr. Gorman, the defendants did not request,

as relief, that Judge Robinson preclude Barnes from

disclosing additional experts. In light of our conclusion

in part I A 1 of this opinion that the January 13, 2016

order was a case management decision, we reject this

claim. ‘‘[T]rial courts have wide latitude to manage

cases consistent with judicial economy and justice

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griswold v.

Camputaro, 331 Conn. 701, 709, 207 A.3d 512 (2019),

quoting Krevis v. Bridgeport, supra, 262 Conn. 818–19.

Thus, notwithstanding that the defendants did not

request such an action, it was within Judge Robinson’s

broad discretion, exercised pursuant to her inherent

authority to manage her docket, to preclude Barnes

from disclosing additional experts.11

3

The administratrix next claims that Judge Robinson

abused her discretion in entering the January 13, 2016

order because good cause existed to permit Barnes to

disclose additional experts. Specifically, the administratrix asserts that, as a result ‘‘of the manner in which

[Hawkins] conducted this case’’ before Attorney Mirri-
one appeared on behalf of Barnes in November, 2014,

Attorney Mirrione was initially unaware that he might

need to retain other experts and Attorney Mirrione

worked diligently to prosecute the case. This claim is

unavailing.

As we concluded in part I A 1 of this opinion, the

January 13, 2016 order constituted a case management

decision. ‘‘We review case management decisions for

abuse of discretion, giving [trial] courts wide latitude.

. . . A party adversely affected by a [trial] court’s case

management decision thus bears a formidable burden

in seeking reversal. . . . A trial court has the authority

to manage cases before it as is necessary. . . . Deference is afforded to the trial court in making case management decisions because it is in a much better position to determine the effect that a particular procedure

will have on both parties. . . . The case management

authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in

trial courts to manage their own affairs in order to

achieve the expeditious disposition of cases. . . . The

ability of trial judges to manage cases is essential to

judicial economy and justice.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Levine v. Hite, 189 Conn. App. 281,

296, 207 A.3d 100 (2019).

In the present case, it was well within Judge Robinson’s wide discretion to preclude Barnes from disclosing additional experts where the parties were on the

eve of trial, which had been rescheduled previously, in

a case pending since February, 2012, and where the

date by which Barnes had to disclose his experts had

passed.12 Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Robinson did not abuse her discretion in entering the January 13, 2016 order.13

B

We next turn to the administratrix’ claim that Judge

Lager erred in adhering to the January 13, 2016 order.

We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On January

19, 2016, after Judge Robinson had entered the January

13, 2016 order, Judge Lager issued a scheduling order

that did not contain any provision permitting Barnes

to disclose additional experts. On that same day, Barnes

filed the motion for reargument and reconsideration of

the January 13, 2016 order; however, he did not file a

caseflow request for immediate consideration of the

motion and he did not mark it ‘‘ready’’ or ‘‘take papers’’

when it printed on the February 1, 2016 short calendar.

On March 4, 2016, Judge Lager heard argument on

Barnes’ motion to modify the January 19, 2016 scheduling order, wherein Barnes, inter alia, requested permission to disclose an additional expert, and the defendants’ objection thereto. On the record, Judge Lager

stated that she was adhering to the January 13, 2016
order, which she described as ‘‘a very clear and direct

order’’ precluding Barnes from disclosing additional

experts. Judge Lager determined that she would not

hear reargument on the January 13, 2016 order because

Judge Robinson was the proper judicial authority from

whom Barnes had to seek reargument and reconsideration of the order.14 Judge Lager also stated that she

‘‘believe[d] at the moment [that the January 13, 2016

order was] the law of the case.’’ Thereafter, Judge Lager

issued a modified scheduling order, which did not contain any provision for the disclosure of additional

experts by Barnes.

On May 12, 2016, following Judge Robinson’s March

24, 2016 denial of Barnes’ motion for reargument and

reconsideration of the January 13, 2016 order, the parties presented argument to Judge Lager on the defendants’ combined objection to Barnes’ expert witness

disclosure of Dr. Shah and motion to preclude Dr.

Shah’s expert opinion. During argument, Barnes’ counsel argued that, notwithstanding Judge Robinson’s

denial of the motion for reargument and reconsideration, Judge Lager was not bound by the January 13,

2016 order and could examine its propriety. In response,

Judge Lager stated that she incorrectly referred to the

January 13, 2016 order as the law of the case during

the March 4, 2016 proceeding and that she could not

revisit the January 13, 2016 order on the basis that it

was a ‘‘discovery sanction’’ over which Judge Robinson

‘‘had full and complete authority . . . .’’15 In the May

12, 2016 order sustaining the defendants’ objection to

Dr. Shah’s expert witness disclosure and granting the

defendants’ motion to preclude Dr. Shah’s expert opinion, Judge Lager reasoned that she was adhering to the

January 13, 2016 order, noting that Judge Robinson had

declined to reconsider it.

The administratrix asserts that Judge Lager erred in

adhering to the January 13, 2016 order because she

improperly construed the January 13, 2016 order as the

law of the case. The record reveals, however, that Judge

Lager did not rely on the law of the case doctrine16 in

adhering to the January 13, 2016 order. Although Judge

Lager made a passing reference during the March 4,

2016 proceeding to the January 13, 2016 order as the

law of the case, the crux of Judge Lager’s decision

declining to hear reargument on the January 13, 2016

order was that Judge Robinson was the proper judicial

authority from whom Barnes had to seek adjudication

of his pending motion for reargument and reconsideration of that order. See Practice Book § 11-12 (c) (‘‘The

motion to reargue shall be considered by the judge who

rendered the decision or order. Such judge shall decide,

without a hearing, whether the motion to reargue

should be granted. If the judge grants the motion, the

judge shall schedule the matter for hearing on the relief

requested.’’ [Emphasis added.]) During the subsequent

May 12, 2016 proceeding, Judge Lager explicitly stated
that the January 13, 2016 order was not the law of the

case, but rather a discovery sanction imposed by Judge

Robinson that she could not revisit. There is no basis

for the administratrix’ contention that Judge Lager

improperly relied on the law of the case doctrine, and

she does not present any other cognizable argument

challenging the basis of Judge Lager’s decisions adhering to the January 13, 2016 order. Thus, this claim fails.

II

We next address the administratrix’ claim that Judge

Lager erred in precluding Dr. Gorman from offering

expert opinions as to the standard of care and causation. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

We first set forth the standard of review and legal

principles governing our resolution of the administratrix’ claim. ‘‘The decision to preclude a party from introducing expert testimony is within the discretion of the

trial court. . . . On appeal, that decision is subject only

to the test of abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Ruff v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.,

172 Conn. App. 699, 709, 161 A.3d 552 (2017).

‘‘Our standard regarding the admissibility of expert

testimony is well settled. Expert testimony should be

admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or

knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2)

that skill or knowledge is not common to the average

person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the

court or jury in considering the issues. . . . In other

words, [i]n order to render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must be a

factual basis for the opinion.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rockhill v. Danbury Hospital, 176 Conn. App.

39, 61, 168 A.3d 630 (2017); see also Conn. Code Evid.

§ 7-2.17

A

We first turn to the administratrix’ claim that Judge

Lager improperly precluded Dr. Gorman’s standard of

care opinion. This claim is unavailing.

We begin by setting forth the following legal principles applicable to the disposition of this claim. General

Statutes § 52-184c (a) provides: ‘‘In any civil action to

recover damages resulting from personal injury or

wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987,

in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted

from the negligence of a health care provider, as defined

in section 52-184b,18 the claimant shall have the burden

of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that

the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard

of care for that health care provider. The prevailing

professional standard of care for a given health care

provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment

which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate
by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.’’

(Footnote added.) General Statutes § 52-184c (c) provides: ‘‘If the defendant health care provider is certified

by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is

trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds

himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who: (1) Is trained and experienced in the

same specialty; and (2) is certified by the appropriate

American board in the same specialty; provided if the

defendant health care provider is providing treatment

or diagnosis for a condition which is not within his

specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a ‘similar

health care provider.’ ’’ General Statutes § 52-184c (d)

provides: ‘‘Any health care provider may testify as an

expert in any action if he: (1) Is a ‘similar health care

provider’ pursuant to subsection (b) or (c)19 of this

section; or (2) is not a similar health care provider

pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section but,

to the satisfaction of the court, possesses sufficient

training, experience and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in a related field of medicine, so as to

be able to provide such expert testimony as to the

prevailing professional standard of care in a given field

of medicine. Such training, experience or knowledge

shall be as a result of the active involvement in the

practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year

period before the incident giving rise to the claim.’’

(Footnote added.)

Our Supreme Court has explained that the provisions

of § 52-184c ‘‘have done nothing to abrogate the fundamental requirement . . . that an expert testifying

about the standard of care must know what that standard is in a particular situation. . . . [T]he requirements under § 52-184c (d) do not affect the trial court’s

discretion to determine whether a proffered expert is

qualified to testify as an expert. See Conn. Code Evid.

§§ 1-320 and 7-2 . . . . Indeed, § 52-184c merely sets out

minimum qualification standards for experts in medical

malpractice cases. Thus, a trial court that permits a

physician to testify as an expert without first determining whether he or she has a sufficient basis for knowing

the ‘prevailing’ standard of care is abdicating its evidentiary gatekeeping responsibilities.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnotes altered.) Grondin v. Curi, 262 Conn. 637,

656–57, 817 A.2d 61 (2003).

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our disposition of the administratrix’

claim. After Dr. Gorman had been deposed on January

29, 2016, the defendants filed several motions in limine

requesting, inter alia, that the trial court preclude Dr.

Gorman’s standard of care opinion on the basis that

Dr. Gorman was not qualified to testify. On July 15,

2016, Judge Lager heard argument on, inter alia, the

issue of whether preclusion of Dr. Gorman’s standard

of care opinion was warranted. Following argument,
with Judge Lager’s permission, Barnes filed an affidavit

of Dr. Gorman dated July 18, 2016 (July 18, 2016 affidavit), and the defendants filed an affidavit of their expert,

Joseph Treadwell.

On July 26, 2016, in addressing whether preclusion of

Dr. Gorman’s standard of care opinion was warranted,

Judge Lager concluded that Dr. Gorman satisfied the

‘‘minimum qualification standards for experts in medical malpractice cases’’ because Dr. Gorman ‘‘was

actively engaged in the practice of podiatric medicine’’

at the time of the defendants’ alleged professional negligence in 2011 and, therefore, Dr. Gorman met the

requirements of subdivision (d) (2) of § 52-184c. Citing

Grondin, Judge Lager then observed that the next step

was to determine whether Dr. Gorman had a sufficient

basis for knowing the prevailing professional standard

of care applicable to Dr. Daddio in Connecticut in 2011.

Following a review of Dr. Gorman’s deposition and

the affidavits of Dr. Gorman and Dr. Treadwell, Judge

Lager determined that ‘‘[Dr.] Gorman’s knowledge of

the standard of care applicable to [Dr.] Daddio in Connecticut is scant.’’ Judge Lager noted that Dr. Gorman

averred in the July 18, 2016 affidavit that, in comparing

his board certification to that of [Dr.] Daddio’s, the

‘‘standard of care for treating patients is the same’’;

(internal quotation marks omitted); however, on the

basis of the record before her, Judge Lager determined

that ‘‘[t]here is no foundation for [Dr.] Gorman’s statement that the podiatric standard of care in Connecticut

is the same as the podiatric standard of care in Pennsylvania where [Dr. Gorman] is licensed and has practiced

exclusively.’’ Judge Lager proceeded to conclude that

‘‘[o]n the present record, there is an inadequate factual

basis to conclude either that [Dr.] Gorman knows the

prevailing professional standard of care applicable to

[Dr.] Daddio in Connecticut in 2011 or that his Pennsylvania podiatric practice was governed by the same standard of care. The court is willing to give [Barnes] one

final opportunity to establish the requisite foundation

by holding a hearing on August 3, 2016 . . . at which

Dr. Gorman must appear and be subject to examination

and cross-examination on this issue . . . .’’ As discussed more comprehensively in part II B of this opinion, Judge Lager proceeded to rule that Dr. Gorman

was precluded from offering expert testimony as to causation.

On August 2, 2016, Barnes filed a letter addressed to

Judge Lager and the defendants’ counsel indicating that,

in light of Judge Lager’s preclusion of Dr. Gorman’s

causation opinion, Barnes would not produce Dr. Gorman at the scheduled hearing on August 3, 2016. On

August 3, 2016, the parties appeared before Judge Lager

to, inter alia, present argument on Barnes’ August 1,

2016 request to disclose Dr. Shah as a causation expert

and the defendants’ objection thereto. After Judge Lager
had denied the request to disclose and sustained the

defendants’ objection, there was a discussion on the

record about the defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment. During that discussion, Judge Lager

stated the following: ‘‘I think the ruling [on July 26,

2016] is clear that the [c]ourt felt there was an inadequate factual basis for the [c]ourt to make that determination [regarding Dr. Gorman’s knowledge of the applicable standard of care] and was going to provide today,

not any other day, but today, [Barnes] that opportunity

to establish that basis. That has not been done. So as

of today, the [c]ourt can only conclude that there is no

factual basis, based on the record before it.’’

On August 10, 2016, Judge Lager heard argument on

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, to which

Barnes had filed an objection accompanied by an affidavit of Dr. Gorman dated August 8, 2016 (August 8, 2016

affidavit). On August 11, 2016, in her memorandum of

decision granting the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Judge Lager stated in relevant part: ‘‘In the

ruling dated July 26, 2016 . . . this court focused on

the lack of foundational evidence upon which the court

could make a finding that ‘[Dr.] Gorman knows the

prevailing professional standard of care applicable to

[Dr.] Daddio in Connecticut in 2011 or that his Pennsylvania podiatric practice was governed by the same standard of care.’ . . . Although the court was aware that

[Dr.] Gorman averred in [the July 18, 2016 affidavit]

that the ‘standard of care for treating patients is the

same,’ this conclusory statement lacked foundation. In

[the August 8, 2016 affidavit], [Dr.] Gorman aver[red]

that: ‘The standard of care is the same for all podiatrists.

The national standard of care as to what is expected

of a reasonable, prudent podiatrist [with respect to] the

diagnosis and treatment of a patient under the same

circumstance is the same in Connecticut as it is in all

other states.’ The foundation for this averral is that

podiatry students ‘in the United States are trained in

the same manner; [t]he same textbooks and reference

materials are used.’ ’’ Judge Lager then concluded that,

in light of Dr. Gorman’s testimony during his deposition

that he did not know the standard of care in Connecticut, the ‘‘conclusory statements in [the August 8, 2016

affidavit]’’ failed to provide the ‘‘requisite foundation for

establishing [Dr.] Gorman’s knowledge of the prevailing

professional standard of care in this case’’ and ‘‘[t]here

is an inadequate factual basis before the court to find

[Dr.] Gorman qualified to testify as to the standard of

care.’’ For these reasons, Judge Lager, in effect, precluded Dr. Gorman’s standard of care opinion.

The administratrix asserts that Judge Lager erred in

precluding Dr. Gorman’s standard of care opinion

because physicians, including podiatrists such as Dr.

Gorman, are governed by a national standard of care

in medical malpractice cases. The administratrix also

contends that Dr. Gorman was qualified to offer a stan-
dard of care opinion on the ground that evidence was

produced illustrating, inter alia, that Dr. Gorman had

treated thousands of podiatric patients since 1967 and

trained residents in the field of podiatry.21 These contentions are unavailing.

The relevant inquiry here is whether Dr. Gorman

knew what the prevailing professional standard of care

applicable to Dr. Daddio was in Connecticut in 2011.

Dr. Gorman’s January 29, 2016 deposition testimony

strongly suggested that he was not familiar with the

standard of care.22 Judge Lager found that the July 18,

2016 affidavit in which Dr. Gorman asserted knowledge

of a national standard of care was conclusory and

lacked foundation. Judge Lager then considered the

August 8, 2016 affidavit, in which Dr. Gorman averred

that, because (1) all students enrolled in podiatry

schools in the United States are trained in the same

manner, (2) all podiatrists attend the same seminars

and conferences to earn continuing education credits,

and (3) there are many organizations in the United

States offering continuing education courses relating

to podiatric medicine, ‘‘[t]he standard of care is the

same for all podiatrists’’ and ‘‘[t]he national standard

of care as to what is expected of a reasonable, prudent

podiatrist [with respect to] the diagnosis and treatment

of a patient under the same circumstance is the same

in Connecticut as it is in all other states.’’ Judge Lager

found that such affidavit did nothing to cure the conclusory nature of, and lack of foundation for, Dr. Gorman’s

opinions as to standard of care. As Judge Lager reasonably determined, Dr. Gorman’s averments failed to

establish that Dr. Gorman had the requisite knowledge

of the applicable standard of care in order to testify

thereto. Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Lager did

not abuse her discretion in precluding Dr. Gorman’s

standard of care opinion.

B

We next consider the administratrix’ claim that Judge

Lager erred in precluding Dr. Gorman’s causation opinion. We are not persuaded.

‘‘All medical malpractice claims, whether involving

acts or inactions of a defendant physician, require that

a defendant physician’s conduct proximately cause the

plaintiff’s injuries. The question is whether the conduct

of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing the

plaintiff’s injury. . . . This causal connection must rest

upon more than surmise or conjecture. . . . A trier is

not concerned with possibilities but with reasonable

probabilities. . . . The causal relation between an

injury and its later physical effects may be established

by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction

by the process of eliminating causes other than the

traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical question. . . .
‘‘To be reasonably probable, a conclusion must be

more likely than not. . . . Whether an expert’s testimony is expressed in terms of a reasonable probability

that an event has occurred does not depend upon the

semantics of the expert or his use of any particular

term or phrase, but rather, is determined by looking at

the entire substance of the expert’s testimony. . . . An

expert . . . need not use talismanic words to show

reasonable probability. . . . There are no precise facts

that must be proved before an expert’s opinion may be

received in evidence. . . .

‘‘To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendant’s conduct legally caused

the injuries. . . . As [our Supreme Court] observed

. . . [l]egal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of

balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral

approaches to causation. The first component of legal

cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest

legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause

in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were

it not for the actor’s conduct. . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause, which [our

Supreme Court has] defined as [a]n actual cause that

is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . . The

proximate cause requirement tempers the expansive

view of causation [in fact] . . . by the pragmatic . . .

shaping [of] rules which are feasible to administer, and

yield a workable degree of certainty. . . . [T]he test of

proximate cause is whether the defendant’s conduct

is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s

injuries. . . . The existence of the proximate cause of

an injury is determined by looking from the injury to

the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal

connection. . . .

‘‘In other words, [p]roximate cause [is] defined as an

actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting

harm . . . . [T]he inquiry fundamental to all proximate

cause questions . . . [is] whether the harm which

occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward

v. Ramsey, 146 Conn. App. 485, 490–92, 77 A.3d 935,

cert. denied, 310 Conn. 965, 83 A.3d 345 (2013).

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of the administratrix’

claim. Following Dr. Gorman’s deposition on January

29, 2016, the defendants filed motions in limine seeking,

inter alia, to preclude Dr. Gorman’s expert testimony

as to causation on the grounds that Dr. Gorman’s causation opinions (1) had no factual basis underlying them,

(2) exceeded the scope of his expertise, and (3) were

speculative. On July 15, 2016, the parties presented

argument, inter alia, as to whether Dr. Gorman’s causation opinion should be precluded. Thereafter, Barnes

filed the July 18, 2016 affidavit, and the defendants filed
the affidavit of Dr. Treadwell.

On July 26, 2016, Judge Lager ordered that Dr. Gorman was precluded from testifying as to causation.

Judge Lager summarized Dr. Gorman’s causation opinion to be that the cause of the partial amputations of

Barnes’ feet was Dr. Daddio’s failures to suspect that

Barnes had ‘‘vascular insufficiency’’ and to refer Barnes

to a vascular surgeon. Judge Lager then observed:

‘‘While [Dr.] Gorman has treated patients with vascular

problems and knows something about vascular insufficiency in diabetic podiatric patients [such as Barnes],

he is not a vascular physician or vascular surgeon and

does not perform the types of amputations that [Barnes’

vascular surgeon] performed on Barnes. [The] mere

fact that he is not a vascular physician or surgeon is

not disqualifying. . . . However, in his deposition testimony, [Dr.] Gorman repeatedly deferred to the expertise of a vascular surgeon on the issue of causation.

Both his deposition testimony and the [July 18, 2016

affidavit] support the conclusion that, while it is his

practice to refer patients such as Barnes to a vascular

surgeon in an effort to avoid outcomes such as the one

which occurred in this case, [Dr.] Gorman does not have

any basis other than speculation to render a causation

opinion here. [Dr.] Gorman is unable to pinpoint

whether an alleged breach of the standard of care . . .

or some other underlying condition or behavior led to

the amputations. Finally . . . [Dr.] Gorman could not

identify the specific evidence that he relied upon in the

underlying medical records which eliminate all other

probable causes of the amputations other than [Dr.]

Daddio’s alleged negligence.’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted.) Concluding that ‘‘[Dr.] Gorman is insufficiently qualified to offer an opinion as to the actual

and proximate cause of Barnes’ amputations, that his

opinions admittedly exceed the scope of his expertise

and that his opinions are speculative,’’ Judge Lager precluded Dr. Gorman’s causation opinion.

The administratrix contends that the record demonstrates that Dr. Gorman is a board certified podiatrist

with over fifty years of experience in, inter alia, treating

podiatric patients, teaching students, and attending lectures, and that Dr. Gorman was able to testify with

reasonable medical probability that Barnes’ injuries

were caused by an untreated infection that led to additional complications and, ultimately, the partial amputations of Barnes’ feet. As reflected in his deposition and/

or in the July 18, 2016 affidavit, however, Dr. Gorman

averred that he did not know whether the partial amputations of Barnes’ feet could have been prevented and

that a vascular surgeon was needed to opine as to

whether the amputations could have been avoided but

for the defendants’ alleged breach of the standard of

care. The administratrix fails to cite to any portion of

the record undermining Judge Lager’s determination

that Dr. Gorman could not testify that the defendants’
alleged breach of the standard of care led to the partial

amputations of Barnes’ feet. Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that Judge Lager abused her discretion in

precluding Dr. Gorman’s causation opinion.

III

Finally, relying on the presumption that the trial court

erred in precluding Barnes from disclosing additional

experts and Dr. Gorman’s expert opinions as to the

standard of care and causation, the administratrix

claims that there exist genuine issues of material fact

and, thus, Judge Lager improperly rendered summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. This claim merits

little discussion. As set forth in parts I and II of this

opinion, the court acted properly in precluding Barnes

from disclosing additional experts and Dr. Gorman from

offering standard of care and causation opinions. As a

result, Barnes was unable to produce expert testimony

establishing the applicable standard of care, a breach

of the standard of care, and causation, and, therefore,

he could not establish a prima facie case of medical

malpractice. See Procaccini v. Lawrence & Memorial

Hospital, Inc., supra, 175 Conn. App. 717–18; see also

Dorreman v. Johnson, 141 Conn. App. 91, 98–99, 60

A.3d 993 (2013) (affirming summary judgment in favor

of defendant in medical malpractice case where plaintiffs failed to provide expert opinions with regard to

requisite standard of care, deviation from standard of

care, and causation). Accordingly, we conclude that

Judge Lager properly rendered summary judgment in

favor of the defendants.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On December 9, 2016, during the pendency of this appeal, counsel for

the named plaintiff, Kenneth Barnes, filed a suggestion of death indicating

that Kenneth Barnes had died. On September 26, 2017, Kenneth Barnes’

counsel filed a motion to substitute Sherry West Barnes, administratrix of

the estate of Kenneth Barnes, as the plaintiff, which this court granted on

October 27, 2017. For purposes of clarity, we will refer in this opinion to

Kenneth Barnes by his last name and to Sherry West Barnes as the administratrix.

2 On June 29, 2015, in relation to disciplinary proceedings commenced in

2014; see Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Hawkins, Superior Court, judicial

district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-14-6048369-S; Hawkins permanently

resigned from the Connecticut bar and waived his privilege of applying

for readmission.

3 A recitation of what transpired at the January 11, 2016 hearing is provided

in part I A of this opinion.

4 The defendants also asserted a statute of limitations defense as to both

counts of the amended revised complaint. Barnes subsequently filed a reply

denying the allegations underlying that defense.

5 The expert witness disclosure indicated that Dr. Shah was expected to

testify as to the standard of care as well. At a subsequent hearing before

Judge Lager, Barnes’ counsel clarified that he was seeking to disclose Dr.

Shah as a causation expert only.

6

In a motion in limine filed on April 18, 2016, and supplemented on June

23, 2016, the defendants asserted that Dr. Gorman’s expert opinions failed

to satisfy the requirements of State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739

(1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998),

and requested that the court hold a hearing pursuant to Porter. Those claims

were not argued on July 15, 2016, or addressed on the merits in the July
26, 2016 memorandum of decision; instead, Judge Lager scheduled argument

on the Porter issues for August 3, 2016.

7

In rare cases, expert testimony is unnecessary to satisfy the elements

of a medical malpractice claim. See Rosa v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital,

145 Conn. App. 275, 303–304, 74 A.3d 534 (2013) (‘‘An exception to the

general rule with regard to expert medical opinion evidence is when the

medical condition is obvious or common in everyday life. . . . Similarly,

expert opinion may not be necessary as to causation of an injury or illness

if the plaintiff’s evidence creates a probability so strong that a lay jury can

form a reasonable belief. . . . Expert opinion may also be excused in those

cases where the professional negligence is so gross as to be clear even to

a lay person.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Harlan v. Norwalk

Anesthesiology, P.C., 75 Conn. App. 600, 613–14, 816 A.2d 719 (‘‘[e]xcept in

the unusual case where the want of care or skill is so gross that it presents

an almost conclusive inference of want of care . . . the testimony of an

expert witness is necessary to establish both the standard of proper professional skill or care on the part of a physician . . . and that the defendant

failed to conform to that standard of care’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 911, 826 A.2d 1155 (2003). The administratrix

does not claim that any exceptions apply to negate the necessity of expert

testimony in this case.

8 At the time of argument on the motion to preclude, the trial was scheduled

to begin on January 19, 2016, eight days later.

9

In conjunction with her claim that the January 13, 2016 order was a

sanction of preclusion, the administratrix asserts that the January 13, 2016

order fails to satisfy the test set forth in Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v.

Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 17–18, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001). In Millbrook,

our Supreme Court established that ‘‘[i]n order for a trial court’s order of

sanctions for violation of a discovery order to withstand scrutiny, three

requirements must be met. First, the order to be complied with must be

reasonably clear. . . . Second, the record must establish that the order was

in fact violated. . . . Third, the sanction imposed must be proportional to

the violation.’’ Id. As we have explained in this opinion, the January 13,

2016 order was a case management decision, rather than a sanction entered

as a result of Barnes violating an order. Accordingly, Millbrook is inapposite.

10 The administratrix notes that Judge Lager, during the May 12, 2016

hearing on the defendants’ combined objection to Barnes’ expert witness

disclosure of Dr. Shah and motion to preclude Dr. Shah’s expert testimony,

characterized the January 13, 2016 order as a ‘‘sanction [that Judge Robinson]

could appropriately impose under Practice Book [§] 13-4 (h)’’ and as a

‘‘discovery sanction . . . .’’ Because the construction of the January 13,

2016 order is a question of law subject to our plenary review; In re Jacklyn

H., supra, 162 Conn. App. 830; we do not defer to Judge Lager’s interpretation

of the January 13, 2016 order.

11 We also observe that the issue of precluding Barnes from disclosing

additional experts was raised during argument on the defendants’ motion

to preclude the amendment to Dr. Gorman’s expert witness disclosure. After

Barnes’ counsel had represented that he was considering the possibility of

disclosing additional experts and Judge Robinson had expressed concern

with respect to that representation, the defendants’ counsel stated that she

was also concerned by Barnes potentially seeking to disclose additional

experts and that she objected to any further disclosures.

12 The administratrix also claims that Barnes was harmed as a result of

the January 13, 2016 order. Because we conclude that Judge Robinson did

not abuse her discretion in entering the January 13, 2016 order, we need

not address this claim.

13 In her principal appellate brief, the administratrix also claimed that

Judge Robinson’s March 24, 2016 denial of Barnes’ motion for reargument

and reconsideration of the January 13, 2016 order was erroneous. During

oral argument before this court, however, the administratrix’ counsel stated:

‘‘Now, you know, what we appealed on is Judge Robinson’s decision not

to allow any additional experts. A lot has been made . . . about the fortysix days between [counsel] making this motion to reargue and it ultimately

being decided by Judge Robinson not to allow reargument. That somehow

or another we did something wrong and that had that been argued or decided

or something had happened earlier there would be a different outcome. You

know, [the administratrix is] not challenging that [Judge Robinson] decided

not to let [counsel] reargue. What [the administratrix is] challenging is that

the initial decision was wrong.’’ We interpret counsel’s statements to be an

abandonment of the administratrix’ claim challenging the denial of the
motion for reargument and reconsideration and, thus, we do not address

that claim.

In addition, without citation to the record, the administratrix claims that

Judge Robinson erred when she purportedly failed to give Barnes a continuance to disclose an additional expert. There is nothing in the record to

indicate that Barnes requested that Judge Robinson grant him a continuance

to disclose an additional expert and, therefore, this claim lacks merit.

14 At the time of argument on March 4, 2016, Barnes had not reclaimed

the motion for reargument and reconsideration of the January 13, 2016 order.

15 As we concluded in part I A 1 of this opinion, the January 13, 2016

order was a case management decision.

16 ‘‘The law of the case doctrine provides that when a matter has previously

been ruled upon interlocutorily, the court in a subsequent proceeding in

the case may treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the

opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the absence of some new

or overriding circumstance. . . . The law of the case is not written in stone

but is a flexible principle of many facets adaptable to the exigencies of the

different situations in which it may be invoked. . . . A judge is not bound

to follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier stage of the

proceedings, and if the same point is again raised he has the same right to

reconsider the question as if he had himself made the original decision.

. . . [O]ne judge may, in a proper case, vacate, modify, or depart from an

interlocutory order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon a

question of law.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Levine v. Hite, supra, 189 Conn. App. 297.

17 Section 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘A witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, education

or otherwise may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning

scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will

assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a

fact in issue.’’

18 General Statutes § 52-184b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) For the purposes of this section, ‘health care provider’ means any person, corporation,

facility or institution licensed by this state to provide health care or professional services, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course

and scope of his employment. . . .’’

19 Dr. Daddio is a board certified podiatrist and, therefore, the definition

of a ‘‘similar health care provider’’ set forth in subsection (c) of General

Statutes § 52-184c is applicable in the present case. Subsection (b) of § 52-

184c applies only to a ‘‘defendant health care provider [who] is not certified

by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained

and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a

specialist’’; (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) Grondin

v. Curi, 262 Conn. 637, 650 n.15, 817 A.2d 61 (2003); and, accordingly, that

subsection is not germane here.

20 Section 1-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘(a) Questions

of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification

and competence of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege

or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.

‘‘(b) Admissibility conditioned on fact. When the admissibility of evidence

depends upon connecting facts, the court may admit the evidence upon proof

of the connecting facts or subject to later proof of the connecting facts.’’

21 The administratrix also claims that Judge Lager erroneously concluded

that Dr. Gorman failed to meet the requirements of § 52-184c. The administratrix apparently overlooks that, as set forth previously in this opinion, Judge

Lager concluded that Dr. Gorman satisfied the requirements of subdivision

(2) of § 52-184c (d).

22 Dr. Gorman testified during his deposition that ‘‘it was [Dr. Daddio’s]

responsibility as the—as we say, captain of the ship, in Pennsylvania, I don’t

know what you have [in Connecticut]’’ and that he had ‘‘no idea’’ whether

Connecticut abided by the same standard.