United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 1, 2006

Decided April 17, 2006

Before

 Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1872

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEYAWN D. DAVIS-COBBINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Western

District of Wisconsin

No. 04 CR 147

John C. Shabaz, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Keyawn Davis-Cobbins pleaded guilty to distributing “cocaine base” in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court indicated at sentencing that

cocaine base and crack were interchangeable terms and thus calculated the

guideline imprisonment range using the stiffer penalties applicable to crack. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5). Davis-Cobbins was sentenced after the Supreme Court

decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to 90 months’ imprisonment to

be followed by 5 years’ supervised release. Davis-Cobbins argues on appeal that the

district court abused its discretion in sentencing him according to the crack cocaine

guidelines absent any evidence or testimony that the substance was the crack

cocaine form of cocaine base. The government concedes that the district court erred

when it stated that there was no distinction between cocaine base and crack, but

argues that the court did not clearly err in sentencing Davis-Cobbins pursuant to

the higher guideline range. Because the district court did not make the required

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1872 Page 2

finding that the substance was crack, we vacate Davis-Cobbins’s sentence and

remand for resentencing. 

On June 30, 2004, Davis-Cobbins sold 43.2 grams of cocaine base to a

confidential source working with DEA agents. The probation officer described the

drug in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) as cocaine base, and calculated

Davis-Cobbins’ sentence according to the higher guidelines range for the crack

cocaine form of cocaine base. Davis-Cobbins did not object to the PSR, but at his

sentencing hearing he requested that the government retest the drugs to determine

whether they were cocaine base or crack in light of United States v. Edwards,

397 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005). 

The district court denied the request and said, “Whether this is cocaine base

or crack cocaine, I’ll give him any politically correct nomenclature that you wish,

but that’s what’s presently before the Court and the Court is now at sentencing and

it believes that we should proceed with that sentencing.” When questioned by the

court, counsel for the government said, “Your Honor, we believe that it’s -- crack

cocaine I believe is cocaine base as well so --.” The court then said, 

Well, I’m going to use the terms until I get reversed or there’s something

to the contrary, it’s cocaine base slash crack, and the Court does believe

that that’s the appropriate definition. This, however, is going to be shown

as 43.2 grams of cocaine base . . . . We will call it cocaine base because

that’s what the Indictment calls it, that’s what he --that’s what he pled

guilty to and that’s what the testing occurred [sic]. 

The court then sentenced Davis-Cobbins near the bottom of the proposed guidelines

range to a term of 90 months’ imprisonment. 

Davis-Cobbins argues that he should have been sentenced consistent with the

cocaine powder guidelines rather than those for crack cocaine because the

government failed to prove that he distributed crack. In 1993 Congress added a

definition of cocaine base to the sentencing guidelines: “ ‘Cocaine base,’ for the

purposes of this guideline, means ‘crack.’ ‘Crack’ is the street name for a form of

cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium

bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c),

Note (D). We interpreted the definition to mean that only the form of “cocaine base”

which is “crack” is eligible for the enhanced sentence under § 2D1.1. United States

v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1997). We recently reaffirmed this holding in

Edwards, 397 F.3d at 577.

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) requires the district court to

make a factual finding on “any disputed portion of the presentence report or other
No. 05-1872 Page 3

controverted matter” that will affect sentencing. See United States v. Buchanan,

362 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Chatmon, 324 F.3d 889, 893 (7th

Cir. 2003). This rule serves two purposes—it protects the defendant’s due process

right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information and provides a clear

record of the resolution of disputed facts for reviewing courts or agencies. See

United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.

Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1986).

In the present case, Davis-Cobbins argued at sentencing that there was not

sufficient evidence to show that he sold the crack form of cocaine base. Because he

contested an issue related to sentencing, the district court was required to make a

factual finding as to the kind of controlled substance he sold. See Edwards v.

United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998) (Sentencing Guidelines instruct judge “to

determine both the amount and the kind of ‘controlled substances’ for which a

defendant should be held accountable—and then to impose a sentence that varies

depending upon amount and kind.”); United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 829 (7th

Cir. 1999) (“The sentencing court is required to determine whether the controlled

substance at issue consisted of cocaine, crack, or both.”). The district court did not

do so, instead stating simply that cocaine base and crack were interchangeable

terms. As a result, we are unable to evaluate whether Davis-Cobbins was properly

sentenced pursuant to the higher guidelines range for crack cocaine.

Because the district court failed to make the required factual finding that

Davis-Cobbins distributed the crack form of cocaine base, we VACATE

Davis-Cobbins’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.