IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 

ANITA YOUNG, § 

§ 

§ 

§ 

Plaintiff 

vs. § No. ______ _ 

§' 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § 

§ 

Defendant § 

COMPLAINT 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT: 

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Anita Young, and files her Complaint: 

I. PARTIES 

1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salisbury, Rowan County, North Carolina but at the time 

of this action Plaintiff and Katie McSheffrey Gunther were residents of San Antonio, Bexar 

County, Texas. 

2. Defendant is the employer of Katie McSheffrey Gunther and is the real party in 

interest. 

3. Venue is proper in federal court because at all times material herein, the Plaintiff 

1 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 1 of 17
is aU. S. Air Force commissioned officer and the Defendant United States of America is the 

employer of Katie McSheffrey Gunther. See Exhibit A. Diversity pursuant to federal law exists 

because the parties live in different states and this cause of action occurred in this District. 

4. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2671-2680, the Federal Torts 

Claim Act. See Exhibit A. 

II. BASIS OF SUIT 

5. That in August and September 2017 Katie McSheffrey Gunther did disclose 

Plaintiffs medical health diagnosis, personal health information and in-patient treatment location 

to Dr. Elizabeth A. Heron without Plaintiffs consent in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Exhibit 

A. That all acts of Katie McSheffrey Gunther are imputed to Defendant United States of 

America under 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680. 

6. See Exhibit B which shows Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies 

pursuant to the Court's order. See Exhibits C and D. 

III. CAUSES OF ACTION 

Invasion of Privacy - Public Disclosure of Private Facts and Intrusion of Seclusion. 

7. Libel as Slander. Defendant's actions were meant to libel and slander Plaintiff by 

disclosing her medical records sometime between August 14 - September 20, 2017. 

8. Defendant's actions constitute abuse of process, deceit, and interference with 

Plaintiffs contract with the United States military. Defendant did her best to have Plaintiff 

discharged from the military. Defendant abused the civil process and the responsibility she had 

with the United States military. Defendant also interfered with Plaintiffs contract and right to 

work with the United States military. Finally, Defendant's actions constitute deceit because 

2 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 2 of 17
Defendant was attempting to deceive the military. 

9. Defendant's actions violate 5 U.S.C. § 552, Defendant failed to exercise due care 

in disclosing Plaintiffs medical records, Defendant was negligent, reckless, outrageous, and 

Defendant failed to use discretion. 

10. Defendant's actions constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

11. Defendant's actions were within the scope per Exhibit A. 

12. Defendant disclosed and publicized information about Plaintiffs private life that 

is her personal health information and in-patient treatment location to Dr. Elizabeth A. Heron 

without Plaintiffs consent in violation of5 U.S.C. § 552. 

13. Defendant intentionally intruded on Plaintiffs solitude, seclusion, and/or private 

affairs by disclosing her medical records and treatment plans to a third-party. The intrusion 

would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and as a result of the intrusion, Plaintiff has 

suffered damages. Plaintiffs medical treatment nor the location of her in-patient hospitalization 

facility is not a legitimate public concern. Plaintiff has suffered extreme and debilitating injury 

as a result of Defendant's disclosures. 

Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress 

14. Defendant acted intentionally and recklessly in her disclosure of medical mental 

health treatment and the location of where the plaintiff was receiving healthcare. Defendant's 

conduct proximately caused Plaintiff extreme emotional, prolonged distress, and to the extent 

other causes of action may be deemed, no other causes of action exist which provide a remedy 

for the severe emotional distress caused by the Defendant's conduct. 

.3 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 3 of 17
IV. DAMAGES 

15. Plaintiff sues Defendant for all actual damages, loss of income, reliance damages, 

back pay, unpaid vacation pay, past and future mental anguish, loss of earning capacity, and 

exemplary damages in an amount in excess of$100,000.00. 

16. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages to punish and deter Defendant for her intentional 

conduct toward Plaintiff in excess of$100,000.00. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Anita Young, prays Defendant United States of America, be 

cited to answer herein, for judgment as requested herein, for all pre-and post-judgment interest at 

the highest rate allowed by law, for all costs of court, for all reasonable and necessary attorney's 

. fees, and for all other relief, at law or equity, to which Plaintiff may show herself to be entitled. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Is/John Ogles 

John Ogles 

Arkansas Bar No. 89003 

Texas Bar No. 00797922 

· OGLES LAW FIRM, P.A. 

200 S. JeffDavis 

P;O.Box891 

Jacksonville, AR 72078 

(501) 982-8339 

jogles@aol.com 

4 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 4 of 17
Case 5:19-cv-00619-JKP Document 14 Filed 09/06/19 Page 1 of 5 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 

ANITA M. YOUNG, § NO. 5:19-CV-619-DAE 

§ 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

. vs. § 

§ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

--------------------~----§ 

ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES' MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA AS DEFENDANT AND AMEND CASE CAPTION; 

AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

LEA VETO AMEND 

The matters before the Court are the United States of America's 

("United States") Motion to Substitute the United States as Defendant and Amend 

the Case Caption (Dkt. # 5), and Plaintiff Anita M. Young's ("Plaintiff' or 

"Young") Motion to Amend Complaint1 (Dkt. # 8). Pursuant to Local Rule CV7(h), the Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a hearing. After 

careful consideration, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to substitute party 

and amend case caption, and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs 

motion to amend. 

1 Plaintiffs motion seeks·leave to amend her petition, which the Court construes in 

federal court to mean complaint. 

EXHIBIT f\ 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 5 of 17
Case 5:19-cv-00619-JKP Document 14 Filed 09/06/19 Page 2 of 5 

On June 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit against Katie McSheffrey 

Gunther, a United States Air Force employee, alleging that Ms. Gunther disclosed 

Plaintiffs medical health diagnosis, personal information, and an inpatienttreatment location to another individual. (Dkt. # 1.) Plaintiff alleges that this 

disclosure was (1) an invasion of privacy-public disclosure of private facts and 

intrusion on seclusion; and (2) an intentional infliction of emotional distress 

("liED"). (IQJ 

On July 26, 2019, the United States filed a motion to substitute the 

United States as the proper Defendant instead of Ms. Gunther who was acting 

within the course and scope of her federal employment with the United States Air 

Force. (Dkt. # 5.) On August 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition 

(Dkt. # 7); the United States filed a reply·on August 12, 2019 (Dkt. # 9). 

On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint. 

(Dkt. # 8.) On August 14, 2019, the United States filed a response in opposition 

(Dkt. # 10); Plaintiff filed a reply on August 19, 2019 (Dkt. # 11.) The pending 

matters are discussed below. 

2 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 6 of 17
Case 5:19-cv-00619-JKP Document 14 Filed 09/06/19 Page 3 of 5 

I. Motion to Substitute Party 

The United States moves to substitute itself as the proper Defendant 

in this case in place of Ms. Gunther in light of the fact that Plaintiff has alleged 

claims against Ms. Gunther while she was acting in the scope of her federal 

employment. (Dkt. # 5.) Despite Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the Court 

agrees with the United States. 

As a general rule, ''the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from 

suit unless it has specifically waived immunity." Jeanmarie v. United States, 

242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001); Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 

(5th Cir. 1994). However, because Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Gunther sound in 

tort, they are governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2671-2680. The FTCA provides a remedy for claimants "for injury or loss of 

property, or personal injury or death arising from the negligent act or omission of 

any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 

employment .... " Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d at 601; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, 

2679(b)(1).2 As such, the FTCA acts as a limited waiver ofthe United States' 

sovereign immunity. Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d at 601; Galvin v. Occupational Safety & 

Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988). 

2 The FTCA makes clear that a suit against the United States under the FTCA is the 

exclusive remedy for tort claims arising from the actions of government agencies 

or employees. See§ 2679(a). 

3 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 7 of 17
Case 5:19-cv-00619-JKP Document 14 Filed 09/06/19 Page 4 of 5 

Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil FTCA 

claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § l346(b)(1). However, the scope of a 

district court's jurisdiction over an FTCA claim is defined by the United States' 

consent to· be sued under the FTCA. Galvin, 860 F .2d at 183 n.2 (emphasis 

added); see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1990) ("[T]he terms 

of[the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's 

jurisdiction to entertain the suit."). Notably, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) only grants 

district courts jurisdiction for tort claims "against the United States," and courts 

have repeatedly held that the United States is the only proper defendant in an 

FTCA suit. See, e.g., Galvin, 860 F.2d at 183; Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 

1090, 1099 (lOth Cir. 2009); Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2008). 

As a result, "an FTCA claim against a federal agency or employee as opposed to 

the United States must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." Galvin, 860 F.2d at 

183; see also Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1981). 

Here, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's FTCA 

claim against Ms. Gunther, an employee of the United States Air Force, and she 

must be dismissed as a party from the action. Accordingly, the Court will 

GRANT the United States' motion to substitute itself as the proper party and the 

case caption should so be reflected. 

4 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 8 of 17
Case 5:19-cv-00619-JKP Document 14 Filed 09/06/19 Page 5 of 5 

II. Motion to Amend 

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to add additional 

allegations and causes of action. (Dkt. # 8.) Notably, however, Plaintiffs 

proposed amended complaint alleges only Ms. Gunther as a defendant. (See id. at 

3.) The Court, however, as already determined that Ms. Gunther is not a proper 

party to this FTCA action, only the United States. Accordingly, the Court will 

DENY WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs motion to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the United States' 

Motion to Substitute the United States as Defendant and Amend the Case Caption 

(Dkt. # 5), and the case caption should so be reflected. The Court DENIES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. # 8). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: San Antonio, Texas, September 6, 2019. 

··Ezra 

Senior United States Distict Judge 

5 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 9 of 17
. / 

HQ AFLOA/JACC 

·DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE· 

·Air Force Legal Operations Agency 

Joint Base Andrews, Maryland 

1500 West Perimeter Road, SUite 1700 .. .-. 

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762 

flAY 0 6 2028 . 

· John Ogles, Attorney at Law 

200 S Jeff Davis Ave 

Jacksonville, AR 72076 

Re: · Claim ' of Major Anita Yot.Wg, . . 

Air Force Claim . N9: . 20~11150 . 

Dear Mr. Ogles, · 

Under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Title 28, United States Code, 

Sections 1346(b) and 2671-2680, I have conside.red your client's claim for personal·injury 

· alleging the wrongful disclosure of personal information protected by the Privacy Act on or 

about 14 August2017. After a careful review of the facts and applicable law, I regret that I must 

deny her claim. · · 

Our investigation revealed that Maj9r Y OWlg was on active duty with the United States Air 

Forc.e at the time ofthe alleged incident. Under the holding ofFeres v. United States, 340 U.S. 

135 (1950), your client is barred from bringing claims for. negligence Wider the F'fCA. See also 

. Gaspard V; United States,.713.·F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983). There'is no legal recoUtse for her to 

o.6tain compensatio~ under the FTCA. · 

This is the final denial of your client's claim. If she is dissatisfied with this decision, she 

may now file suit in an appropriate United States District Court not later than six months after 

the date of mailing of this letter. 

·····Sincerely; 

'/~ ·aJL--··· ... ./·' (/ . /} .. · 1 . . . . . . 'J;/e.J (4' ,, . 

BRADFORD S; HUNT 

Chief, General Torts Branch 

. Claims and Tort Litigation Division · 

Air Force Legal Operations Agency 

EXHIBIT _!J"---

( .. 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 10 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 

ANITA YOUNG, 

Plaintiff, 

v. No. 5:19-CV-0619-JKP 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant. 

ORDER 

This matter came before the Court on April 8, 2020, for video conference hearing upon 

Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15), to which Plaintiff 

responded and Defendant replied (ECF Nos. 19, 20). In support of the motion, Defendant (the 

"Government") contends that Plaintiff ("Young") did not file an administrative claim with the 

United States Air Force prior to bringing this suit as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Defendant 

asks the Court to dismiss this suit without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to exhaust her 

administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Having carefully 

considered the pending motion, the responses and replies thereto, the applicable law, and the 

arguments of the parties, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

Young initiated this action on June 5, 2019, against an Air Force physician who disclosed 

Young's medical health diagnosis, personal health information, and in-patient treatment location 

without her consent in violation of5 U.S.C. § 552. ECF No. 1 at 2, 5. Because the FTCA is the 

exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States and precludes suit against individual 

government actors acting within the scope of their governmental employment, on September 6, 

2019, the Honorable David A. Ezra granted the Government's motion to substitute party, 

EXHIBIT C. 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 11 of 17
amending the complaint to name the United States as the proper defendant. See Order, ECF No. 

14 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(l) & 2671-2680). On September 13, 2019, the Government filed 

a motion to dismiss. ECF No 15. On September 16, 2019, this case was reassigned to the 

undersigned. ECF No. 16. Following an extension of time, Young filed her response on October 

10, 2019. ECF No. 19. The Government replied on October 17, 2019. ECF No. 20. The matter 

being ripe for ruling, this Court convened a hearing on April 8, 2020. In light of the COVID-19 

pandemic, the hearing was conducted on the record via video conference. Attorney John Ogles 

appeared on behalf of Young. Attorney Matthew Mueller appeared on behalf of the Government. 

In its briefing, the Government argues Young did not exhaust administrative remedies as 

required by the Act. ECF No. 15. Young responds she exhausted administrative remedies when 

the Air Force failed to make a final disposition on her claim. ECF No. 19. The Government 

replies that the documents Young points to as evidence of exhaustion are insufficient to comply 

with FTCA requirements, particularly because the documents do not specify damages in a sum 

certain. ECF No. 20 at 2. At the hearing, Young took the position that she has substantially 

complied with the requirements of the Act and urged the Court to apply Williams v. United 

States to the facts of this case. 693 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1982). The Government pointed the Court 

to the cases highlighted in its briefing, including Barber v. United States, 642 F. App'x 411, 415 

(5th Cir. 2016); Montoya v. United States, 841 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1988); and Martinez v. 

United States, 728 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1984), each of which reiterates that a "sum certain" 

must be included in any FTCA claim.1 

1 "To give notice under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), [a plaintiff] must submit 'a monetary claim in a sum-certain."' Barber, 

642 F. App'x at 415. "Section 14.2(a) lists the elements constituting notice-- a written notification of the injurycausing incident, a monetary claim in a sum-certain for property damage and personal injury, and authorization by 

the claimant." Montoya, 841 F.2d at 104. "[P]resentation of a claim including 'a sum certain' is a jurisdictional 

requirement." Martinez, 728 F.2d at 697. 

2 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 12 of 17
"The FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity from tort suits, .28 U.S.C. § 

2674, and is the exclusive remedy for compensation for a federal employee's tortious acts 

committed in the scope of employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679." McGuire v. Turnbo, 137 F.3d 321, 

324 (5th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must first exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an 

FTCA claim in federal court. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Price v. 

United States, 81 F.3d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1996). A tort claim filed pursuant to the FTCA cannot 

be entertained in federal court unless it is "first presented ... to the appropriate Federal agency" 

and the administrative claim has "been finally denied by the agency in writing," or unless six 

months have passed since the plaintiff made her administrative demand. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).An 

FTCA claim is "deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant 

... an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a 

claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or 

death alleged to have occurred by reason ofthe incident[.]" Flores v. United States, 719 F. App'x 

312, 319 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a)). "FTCAclaims failing to specify a sum 

certain are insufficient because they fail to comply with the.Act's statutory requirements~" !d. 

(citations omitted). Failure to follow the Act's procedure to exhaust administrative remedies 

deprives a district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Reynolds v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 

292-93 (5th Cir. 1984). 

In Williams, the plaintiff's car was struck by a vehicle driven by a U.S. Postal Service 

employee. Williams v. United States, 693 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1982). Williams first filed a 

state court action rather than an administrative claim with the Postal Service. !d. The state court 

complaint described the property damage to Williams's car, contained an itemized list of 

damages for the personal injuries Williams suffered due to the accident, and specified total 

3 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 13 of 17
damages in the amount of$218,000. !d. After being informed ofthe proper procedure to file an 

FTCA claim, Williams voluntarily dismissed his state court suit and filed a Form 95 with the 

Postal Service. !d. Williams's Form 95 claim specified only $7,000 for property damage and 

contained no amount for personal injuries and no total amount. !d. Williams's attorney then sent 

a letter to the Postal Service, which detailed Williams's personal and property damages and 

"offered to settle all claims for $83,413." !d. After the Postal Service denied his claim, Williams 

filed suit in federal district court alleging negligence and seeking $187,000 for personal injuries 

and $8,000 for property damage. !d. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the 

Form 95 was not proper because it did not include a sum certain, "the state suit could not be used 

to satisfy the sum certain requirement," and the letter from Williams's attorney "was filed more 

than two years after the alleged tort." !d. at 556-557. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that 

the combination of Williams's timely filed Form 95 and the information in the state court 

complaint satisfied the notice requirement in§ 2675 of the Tort Claims Act. !d. at 558. 

Young's complaint alleges an Air Force physician who disclosed Young's medical health 

diagnosis, personal health information, and in-patient treatment location without her consent in 

violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552. ECF No. 1 at 2. Young's complaint seeks actual damages in excess 

of $100,000 and punitive damages in excess of $100,000. !d. at 3-4. Young attaches to her 

complaint a letter from the Deputy Commander of Headquarters Air Education and Training 

Command. !d. at 5-6. Young contends this letter is sufficient to demonstrate the Air Force had 

notice of her complaint. Notably, the letter finds that Young's allegations against the physician 

named in her complaint were substantiated, that appropriate action was taken against the doctor, 

and the Deputy Commander considered the matter closed. !d. at 5. 

4 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 14 of 17
In absence of the claim Young contends she submitted to the Air Force; the Court looks 

to the Deputy Commander's letter to determine whether the Air Force received proper notice of 

an FTCA claim. The letter does not appear to be the denial of an FTCA claim for several 

reasons. First, the letter states that it serves as notification of the disposition of the "commander 

directed investigation (CDI)" into "allegations concerning leadership misconduct." Id. Second, 

the letter does not address any monetary demand made by Young. Third, the closing language 

states: 

If you are not satisfied with the final determination concerning your allegations, 

you may request further review by me, in writing, by no later than 18 August 

2019. Your request must provide new or additional information that was not 

otherwise available during the CDI; simply disagreeing with this determination 

will not be sufficient for further review. 

Id. at 6. The final denial of an FTCA claim "shall include a statement that, if the claimant is 

dissatisfied with the agency action, he may file suit in an appropriate U.S. District Court not later 

than six months after the date of mailing of the notification." Martinez, 728 F.2d at 698 (quoting 

28 C.P.R. § 14.9(a)). Consequently, the letter does not indicate the Air Force received proper 

notice of an FTCA claim by You:t;~g. Young's response includes two additional documents, a 

"Memo for Record" and a letter in response to an "IG complaint" "regarding headquarters policy 

on timely access to mental health services for patients requiring care following sexual assault." 

ECF No. 19 at 6-8. Neither of these documents indicate a response to an FTCA claim. Even 

applying the Fifth Circuit's "pragmatic view toward the form or manner of filing of 

administrative claims when deciding upon the fulfillment of§ 2675 of the Tort Claims Act," the 

documents Young presented to the court paired with her complaint do not demonstrate 

compliance with the Act's administrative requirements.2 Williams, 693 F.2d at 557. Accordingly, 

2 At least one Fifth Circuit case found "the presentation of an administrative claim 'in excess of $100,000' is a 

reasonable compliance with the 'sum certain' requirement," Martinez, 728 F.2d at 697 (stating that "in this circuit 

5 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 15 of 17
Young has failed to demonstrate the Court's jurisdiction because she has not shown that she 

complied with the FI'CA's administrative requirements. 

The Government assuaged any statute of limitations concerns when, at the hearing, 

Counsel pointed to§ 2679, which provides: 

(5) Whenever an action or proceeding in which the United States is substituted as 

the party defendant under this subsection is dismissed for failure first to present a 

claim pursuant to section 2675(a) of this title [28 uses § 2675(a)], such a claim 

shall be deemed to be timely presented under section 240 I (b) of this title [28 

uses§ 240l(b)] if-

(A) the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date the underlying 

civil action was commenced, and 

(B) the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after 

dismissal of the civil action. 

28 U.S.C. § 2679. As for Young's concern that dismissal of this case will likely necessitate a 

second filing fee, District Courts do not bar commencement of any suit on povetty alone. Any 

individual who believes she cannot afford to pay the filing fee, may apply to proceed without 

prepayment of fees by following the procedure set fotih in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendant United States of America's Motion 

to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

It is so ORDERED. 

SIGNED this 13th day of April 2020. 

substantial compliance with the requirement has been liberally construed" and citing as examples cases, "where the 

government had actually been apprised of the amount sought by a prior state court suit," Williams, 693 F.2d at 558, 

"where the attorney's letter included an invoice and inventory of items for which recovery was sought," Crow v. 

United States, 631 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir.1980), "or where the attorney's initial letter to the agency included medical 

bills and repair estimates (including some for expenses unrelated to and in excess of the claim)," Molinar v. United 

States, 515 F.2d 246, 247, 249 (5th Cir.l975)). 

6 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 16 of 17
AO 450 (Rev. 01/09) Judgment in a Civil Action 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

for the 

Western District of Texas 

ANITA YOUNG 

APR I 3 2020 

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

BY . 

Plaintiff 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. SA-1.9-CV-619-JKP 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Defendant 

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION 

The court has ordered that (check one): 

CJ . the plaintiff (name) recover from the 

defendant (name) ----------------------------------------------- -------------------~------------------------------

the amount of 

dollars ($ _______ ), which includes prejudgment 

interest at the rate of ____ %,plus postjudgment interest at the rate of %, along with costs. 

CJ the plaintiff recover nothing, the action be dismissed on the merits, and the defendant (name) · --------

----------~---------

recover costs from the plaintiff (name) 

fl other: The Court GRANTS the United States of America's Motion to Dismiss. This action is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. the Clerk shall enter this Judgment and CLOSE THIS CASE. 

This action was (checkone): 

· CJ tried by a jury with Judge -----------------------------------presiding, and the jury has . 

rendered a verdict. 

CJ tried by Judge 

was reached. 

----------------------------------- without a jury arid the above decision 

tf decided by Judge Jason Pulliam. 

Date: ____ 04_11_3_12_0_20 __ _ CLERK OF COURT 

EXHIBIT 1) 

Case 5:20-cv-00659 Document 1 Filed 06/02/20 Page 17 of 17