IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., 

DELL INC., EMC CORPORATION, 

AND VMWARE, INC., 

Defendants.

Case No.: 6:20-cv-00486-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) 

PUBLIC VERSION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 3

A. Brazos Is The Rightful Owner Of The ’144, ’435, ’800, ’133, ’360 And 

’489 Patents ............................................................................................................ 3

B.

 4

C.

 6

D.

 7

E. Dell Waited Two Years Before (1) Claiming Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Due To Brazos’s Purported Lack Of Right To Sue For Past 

Damages And (2) Moving To Dismiss The Patent Infringement Claims 

For Past Damages .................................................................................................. 8

III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 9

A. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Cases Against 

Dell Were Filed Under The Patent Act And Brazos’s Right To Sue For 

Past Damages Does Not Implicate Subject Matter Jurisdiction ............................ 9

B. Dell’s 12(b)(1) Motion Seeking To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Brazos’s Past Damages Claims Is Procedurally Defective .............. 11

C.

 11

D.

 16

E.

 18

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F.

 19

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 

8 N.Y.3d 318 (1st Dep’t 2007) ................................................................................................13 

Born v. Schrenkeisen, 

110 N.Y. 55 (N.Y. 1888) .........................................................................................................19 

BSC Assocs., LLC v. Leidos, Inc., 

91 F. Supp. 3d 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) .......................................................................................17 

C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Int’l Grp., LLC, 

2012 WL 1268623 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2012) .............................................................................14 

Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Res., Inc., 

724 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1983).....................................................................................................17 

DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 

517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................14 

Domain Protection, LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, 

23 F.4th 529 (5th Cir. 2022) ......................................................................................................9 

Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ams. Ins. Co., 

258 A.D.2d 39 (1st Dep’t 1999) ..............................................................................................15 

Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 

939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................14 

Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 

98 N.Y.2d 562 (N.Y. 2002) ...............................................................................................12, 13 

Harris v. Uhlendorf, 

24 N.Y.2d 463 (N.Y. 1969) .....................................................................................................19 

Kenyon & Kenyon LLP v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, 

No. 650795/2014, 2021 WL 1856980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 10, 2021) .............................15 

Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. of State of N.Y. v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 

727 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 2000) ....................................................................................................12 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

572 U.S. 118 (2014) .............................................................................................................9, 10 

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Lipper Holdings, LLC v. Trident Holdings, LLC, 

1 A.D.3d 170 (1st Dep’t 2003) ................................................................................................13 

Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019)............................................................................................1, 10 

Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 

1 N.Y.2d 42 (N.Y. 1956) .........................................................................................................13 

N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 

215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................11 

Nova Cas. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 

146 A.D.3d 428 (1st Dep’t 2017) ............................................................................................13 

Roc Nation LLC v. HCC Int’l Ins. Co., PLC, 

523 F. Supp. 3d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)......................................................................................19 

Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 

959 F.3d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................9, 10 

Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 

211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................14 

Univ. of S. Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys., 

19 F.4th 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................9 

W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 

77 N.Y.2d 157 (1990) ..............................................................................................................12 

Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Entech, Inc., 

100 N.Y.2d 352 (2003) ............................................................................................................13 

Wheelabrator Techs. of N. Am., Inc. v. Fin. Sec. Assurance of Okla., Inc., 

No. 88 Civ. 7623 (LMM), 1990 WL 180552 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1990) ................................17 

Statutes 

35 U.S.C. § 281 ..........................................................................................................................9, 10 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)................................................................................................................1, 8 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ......................................................................................................................11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ...........................................................................................................................11 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ..................................................................................................................... 11 

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Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and Development (“Plaintiff” 

or “Brazos”) files this opposition to Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., EMC 

Corporation, and VMWare, Inc.’s (together, “Dell”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) (“Motion” or “Mot.”).

I. INTRODUCTION 

Dell’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the 

argument that Brazos lacks standing for the ’360 Patent is both meritless and procedurally 

defective. 

First, there is no question that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

The Federal Circuit already rejected Dell’s argument that an assignee does not have Article III 

standing due to its purported lack of past damages rights, explicitly holding that whether the 

assignee “possesses all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235-36 

(Fed. Cir. 2019). As such, the Motion is meritless. 

Second, because Dell’s argument that Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages 

does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, Dell’s Motion is procedurally defective and should 

be denied on this basis alone. 

Third, even if the Court is inclined to treat this Motion as one under 12(b)(6), Dell still 

loses because the record is clear that Brazos was assigned the right to past damages for the asserted 

patent. 

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Accordingly, the Motion should be denied. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. Brazos Is The Rightful Owner Of The ’144, ’435, ’800, ’133, ’360 And ’489 

Patents 

Brazos is the owner of all rights, title and interest in the following U.S. patents asserted in 

six individual actions: U.S. Patent Nos. (i) 9,137,144 (“the ’144 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv00473-ADA; (ii) 7,565,435 (“the ’435 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00476-ADA; (iii) 9,164,800 

(“the ’800 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00481-ADA; (iv) 7,539,133 (“the ’133 Patent”) in Case 

No.: 6:20-cv-00480-ADA; (v) 7,092,360 (“the ’360 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00486-ADA; 

and (vi) 8,913,489 (“the ’489 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00477-ADA. 

On June 2, 2020, Brazos filed the aforementioned cases against Dell. For more than two 

years Dell actively litigated these cases and never challenged Brazos’s standing despite the fact 

that the USPTO assignment records (on which Dell now relies to claim purported defective 

assignments) have been publicly available long before the commencement of these cases. 

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B.

 

 

1

 

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C.

 

 

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D.

 

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E. Dell Waited Two Years Before (1) Claiming Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Due To Brazos’s Purported Lack Of Right To Sue For Past 

Damages And (2) Moving To Dismiss The Patent Infringement Claims For 

Past Damages 

On June 2, 2020, Brazos filed six separate actions against Dell for infringing the ’144, ’435, 

’800, ’133, ’360, and ’489 Patents, respectively. See, e.g., Dkt. 1. 

On October 5, 2020, Dell filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for induced 

and contributory infringement in the six actions but did not attack the Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction or argue that Brazos could not recover past damages. 

On June 8, 2022, Dell filed Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

(likely to avoid this Court’s dispositive motion page limitations) in the six actions, arguing for the 

first time since the case commencement two years ago that Brazos was not assigned the right to 

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past damages and moving to dismiss Brazos’s patent infringement claims to the extent they seek 

such damages. 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Cases Against Dell 

Were Filed Under The Patent Act And Brazos’s Right To Sue For Past 

Damages Does Not Implicate Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

There is no question that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this and the other 

five actions. Dell argues that Brazos lacks exclusionary rights and thus cannot have constitutional 

standing because no injury in fact can occur. Mot. at 8-9. Dell is wrong. Exclusionary rights are 

not a prerequisite for Article III standing. Indeed, the binding law2 is clear that a patent plaintiff 

has Article III standing as long as he alleges facts for case or controversy under the Patent Act, 

and the question of what rights were assigned to the patentee does not implicate Article III 

standing. Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 959 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 

2020) (exclusionary rights in a patent are not necessary for Article III standing); see also Domain 

Protection, LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, 23 F.4th 529, 535-36 (5th Cir. 2022) (whether the assignment 

of a right to domain names was valid did not implicate Article III standing). 

Dell itself emphasizes the fundamental difference between Article III constitutional 

standing and 35 U.S.C. § 281 statutory standing. Mot. at 9. Ironically, this very difference is the 

reason why Dell loses here. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court was the first one to conclude that 

“statutory standing” defects do not implicate Article III or subject-matter jurisdiction. See 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014) (citation 

2

 The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law when reviewing a dismissal of a complaint for 

lack of standing unless the issue is unique to patent law and therefore exclusively assigned to the 

Federal Circuit. See Univ. of S. Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys., 19 F.4th 1315, 

1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 

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omitted) (“the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate 

subject-matter jurisdiction”). 

The Federal Circuit followed Lexmark and held that whether the assignee “possesses all 

substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lone Star 

Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 

Specifically, in Lone Star, the assignee of the patents executed an agreement transferring “all right, 

title and interest” in the patents to the plaintiff but imposed certain assignment limits. See id. at 

1227-28. The defendant argued that plaintiff lacked Article III standing because it did not possess 

“all substantial rights” in the patents, and thus was not a “patentee” entitled to sue under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 281. Id. at 1234. The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the so-called “statutory standing” 

defects do not implicate a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1235-36. See also 

Schwendimann, 959 F.3d at 1071 (“[W]e made clear that whether one qualifies as a patentee under 

35 U.S.C. § 281 is a statutory prerequisite to the right to relief in a patent infringement action, but 

does not implicate the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. [] As long as a plaintiff alleges 

facts that support an arguable case or controversy under the Patent Act, the court has both the 

statutory and constitutional authority to adjudicate the matter.”). 

Here, just like in Schwendimann, there is no Article III standing issue because Brazos has 

alleged that: (i) Brazos is the owner of the asserted patent; (ii) Dell has infringed the asserted 

patent; (iii) Brazos suffered economic injury caused by Dell; and (iv) Brazos is entitled to recover 

damages. See Dkt. 1. As such, Dell’s argument that Brazos cannot sue for patent infringement 

under the Patent Act because Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages is meritless. 

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B. Dell’s 12(b)(1) Motion Seeking To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Brazos’s Past Damages Claims Is Procedurally Defective 

Because Dell’s argument that Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages does not 

implicate subject matter jurisdiction, Dell’s 12(b)(1) Motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is procedurally defective and must be denied on this basis alone. At best, Dell 

could have filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as Dell is asking to dismiss Brazos’s infringement 

claims for past damages. But there is no reason for the Court to treat sua sponte Dell’s Motion as 

a 12(b)(6) motion because even a 12(b)(6) motion would fail for the reasons in Section III.C, infra. 

Furthermore, the patent ownership issue Dell raises implicates the merits of the case, and 

not jurisdiction. As such, Dell’s motion is understood as one for summary judgment. But the 

summary judgment standard requires Dell to show no issue of material fact, which Dell has failed 

to do given Dell’s assertion of purported contract ambiguity. See N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung 

Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

Further, because Dell relies on external evidence and facts beyond which the Court may 

take judicial notice, the Motion cannot simply be converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Nor does Rule 12(d)3 provide means for converting Dell’s Motion into one for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, Dell’s Motion should be denied as procedurally defective. 

C.

3 FRCP 12(d) authorizes the Court to convert only a “motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c)” into a 

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. As such, a 12(b) motion is not the proper vehicle for the 

adjudication of this issue. But it is a way around the Court’s dispositive motion briefing limits. See 

OGP 4.1 at 9. 

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The binding New York law4 makes it clear that contracts and their schedules/exhibits 

 should be read together as one document for the purposes of 

contract interpretation. See Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 572 (N.Y. 2002) (A 

contract should be “read as a whole to determine its purpose and intent.”) (quoting W.W.W. Assoc. 

v Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990)); Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. of State of N.Y. v. 

4

 

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Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 727 N.E.2d 563, 566 (N.Y. 2000) (courts should interpret an 

agreement “as a whole” and read the document “in its entirety” instead of focusing exclusively on 

provisions); Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 318, 324-25 (1st Dep’t 2007) (A contract should 

be “read as a whole, and every part will be interpreted with reference to the whole [].”) (quoting 

Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358 (2003)). 

 

 See Lipper 

Holdings, LLC v. Trident Holdings, LLC, 1 A.D.3d 170, 171 (1st Dep’t 2003) (“A contract should 

not be interpreted to produce a result that is absurd, commercially unreasonable or contrary to the 

reasonable expectations of the parties.”) (internal citations omitted); Nova Cas. v. Harleysville 

Worchester Ins. Co., 146 A.D.3d 428, 428 (1st Dep’t 2017) (“We reject this interpretation, because 

it renders a portion of the contract meaningless and fails to read all contractual clauses together 

contextually.”). 

And Dell admits (Mot. at 20) that it is a seminal contract interpretation principle that a 

more specific provision controls over a more 

general one See Muzak Corp. 

v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 42, 46-47 (N.Y. 1956) (“Even if there was an inconsistency between 

a specific provision and a general provision of a contract [] the specific provision controls.”). 

5

 

 

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 First, the 

Federal Circuit already rejected this very argument, holding that an executed assignment pursuant 

to the express language of an agreement does not affect the conclusion that the agreement itself 

assigned the referenced rights. See DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 

1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument that an assignment was the operative 

document and reasoning that nothing in the assignment conflicted with the assignment provision 

in the agreement). See also C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Int’l Grp., LLC, 2012 WL 1268623, at 

*15 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2012) (DDB Technologies “ma[kes] clear that the fact of a later execution 

or recordation of ‘assignment’ does not govern whether, based on a prior document, there was an 

earlier transfer of legal title.”). 

 

 

 See DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB 

Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (contract that “agrees to and does 

hereby grant and assign” was an express assignment rather than a promise to assign in the future); 

Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (contract providing that 

“[employee] hereby conveys, transfers and assigns to [employer]” was an express assignment 

rather than a promise to assign in the future); Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 

1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (contract providing that the inventor “agrees to grant and does hereby grant” 

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all rights in future inventions was an express assignment rather than a promise to assign in the 

future). 

 See Kenyon & Kenyon LLP v. 

Sightsound Techs., LLC, No. 650795/2014, 2021 WL 1856980, at *10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 

10, 2021) (Where extrinsic evidence is introduced to aid in construction, “sworn affidavits by both 

original parties to a contract and those parties’ conduct after 

the contract was formed 

 are significant evidence of the parties’ intent.”) (quoting 

N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. – Civil 4:1, Contracts – Elements); see also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ams. Ins. Co., 

258 A.D.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Dep’t 1999) (“[T]here could be no more compelling evidence of intent 

than the sworn testimony and affidavits of both parties to the contract.”). 

Finally, Dell admits that Schedule B1 has been available on the USPTO’s public website 

since 2017 (more than two years before this action was filed on June 2, 2020). Mot. at 3-5. 

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Because Dell has no legitimate excuse for its blatant failure to file a timely 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss Brazos’s past damages claim and because a 12(b)(6) motion would only potentially 

exclude past damages (and not dispose of the case which is Dell’s goal here), Dell instead 

strategically filed this Motion under 12(b)(1) claiming that the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction. But as demonstrated above, Dell’s subject matter jurisdiction argument is unfounded 

and nonsensical. The Court should thus see through Dell’s gamesmanship and deny the Motion. 

D.

 

 

 

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 Under New York law, “[w]ith limited exception, contractual provisions 

prohibiting assignments are treated as personal covenants,” and “[a]n assignment that violates a 

personal covenant prohibiting assignments gives rise to an action for damages against the assignor, 

but is enforceable.” BSC Assocs., LLC v. Leidos, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 319, 323-24 (N.D.N.Y. 

2015) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Res., Inc., 724 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1983)) (emphasis 

added). For an anti-assignment clause to deprive an assignee of its rights, the clause “must 

specifically use language to the effect that the assignee receives no rights from an improper 

assignment or that such assignment is void.” Wheelabrator Techs. of N. Am., Inc. v. Fin. Sec. 

Case 6:20-cv-00486-ADA-DTG Document 206 Filed 07/13/22 Page 23 of 29
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Assurance of Okla., Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7623 (LMM), 1990 WL 180552, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 

1990). 

 

E.

 

 

Contract reformation is an equitable remedy that allows a court to restate the terms of a 

written agreement when the writing that memorializes the agreement does not properly reflect the 

parties’ mutual intent. Under New York law,6 a “party seeking reformation of a contract must 

show, by clear and convincing evidence, either a mutual mistake or a fraudulently induced 

6

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unilateral mistake.” Roc Nation LLC v. HCC Int’l Ins. Co., PLC, 523 F. Supp. 3d 539, 561 

(S.D.N.Y. 2021); see also Harris v. Uhlendorf, 24 N.Y.2d 463, 467 (N.Y. 1969) (“Where there is 

no mistake about the agreement and the only mistake alleged is in the reduction of that agreement 

to writing, such mistake of the scrivener, or of either party, no matter how it occurred, may be 

corrected.”) (quoting Born v. Schrenkeisen, 110 N.Y. 55, 59 (N.Y. 1888)). 

 

F.

 

 

7

 

 Because both Alcatel Lucent and Nokia Canada, 

Inc. are owned/controlled by Nokia Corp., Nokia Canada Inc. is an Affiliate of Alcatel Lucent. 

See Nokia Corp.’s annual report, Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, 

available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/924613/000155837022002758/nok20211231x20f.htm (listing Nokia Corp.’s significant subsidiaries at p. 167). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Dell’s meritless and procedurally 

defective Motion. 

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Dated: July 6, 2022 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 

By: /s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop 

Jonathan K. Waldrop (CA Bar No. 297903) 

(Admitted in this District) 

jwaldrop@kasowitz.com 

Darcy L. Jones (CA Bar No. 309474) 

(Admitted in this District) 

djones@kasowitz.com 

Marcus A. Barber (CA Bar No. 307361) 

(Admitted in this District) 

mbarber@kasowitz.com 

Heather S. Kim (CA Bar No. 277686) 

(Admitted in this District) 

hkim@kasowitz.com 

John W. Downing (CA Bar No. 252850) 

(Admitted in this District) 

jdowning@kasowitz.com 

ThucMinh Nguyen (CA Bar No. 304382) 

(Admitted in this District) 

tnguyen@kasowitz.com 

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP 

333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 200 

Redwood Shores, California 94065 

Telephone: (650) 453-5170 

Facsimile: (650) 453-5171 

Shelley Ivan (NY Bar No. 4338067) 

(Admitted in this District) 

sivan@kasowitz.com 

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP 

1633 Broadway 

New York, New York 10019 

Telephone: (212) 506-1700 

Facsimile: (212) 835-5235 

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Mark D. Siegmund (TX Bar No. 24117055) 

mark@swclaw.com 

STECKLER WAYNE COCHRAN CHERRY 

PLLC 

8416 Old McGregor Road 

Waco, Texas 76712 

Telephone: (254) 651-3690 

Facsimile: (254) 651-3689 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via the Court’s 

CM/ECF system on July 6, 2022. 

/s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop 

Jonathan K. Waldrop 

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