In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 17-855C

(Filed: December 7, 2017)

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HAHNENKAMM, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Statutory and contractual claims; 

jurisdiction; Santini-Burton Act; Southern 

Nevada Public Land Management Act; 

alleged breach of contractual terms sufficient 

to state a claim for relief under the Tucker 

Act

 Roger J. Marzulla, Marzulla Law, LLC, Washington, DC, for plaintiff. With him on the 

briefs and at the hearing was Nancie G. Marzulla, Marzulla Law, LLC, Washington, DC. 

 Geoffrey Martin Long, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the briefs 

were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Robert E. Kirschman, 

Jr., Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington DC. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

LETTOW, Judge. 

 Hahnenkamm, LLC seeks damages against the United States, alleging a breach of 

contract and contravention of two federal statutes, the Santini-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 96-586, 

94 Stat. 3381 (1980) (not codified in relevant part in the United States Code), and the Southern 

Nevada Public Land Management Act, Pub. L. No. 105-263, 112 Stat. 2343 (1998) (“Southern 

Nevada Land Act”) (not codified in relevant part in the United States Code). Hahnenkamm’s 

claims stem from a land transaction by which the United States Forest Service’s Lake Tahoe 

Basin Management Unit acquired “Cave Rock Summit,” a 39.25 acre tract of land overlooking 

Lake Tahoe in Douglas County, Nevada. The transaction occurred under an Option Agreement 

entered between Hahnenkamm and the Forest Service. Compl. at 1-2 & ¶ 6.

Hahnenkamm alleges that the statutes, which authorize the Forest Service to acquire 

“environmentally sensitive lands” in the Lake Tahoe region, require the Forest Service to pay 

fair market value for those acquisitions, and that the Option Agreement that governed the 

transaction likewise obligated the Forest Service to pay fair market value and obtain an appraisal 
2

that conformed to certain federal land appraisal standards—standards with which the Forest 

Service allegedly did not comply. Compl. at 1 & ¶ 34. Hahnenkamm asserts that the fair market 

value of Cave Rock Summit is approximately $20,000,000, and seeks damages in the amount of 

the difference between the purchase price provided in the Option Agreement and the fair market 

value as determined by an appraisal conducted in conformity with federal land appraisal 

standards. Compl. at 1 & ¶ 34. 

Pending before the court is the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) and for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 5. This motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is 

ready for disposition.

BACKGROUND1

Cave Rock Summit was acquired in 1909 and passed down to family members through 

several generations. Compl. ¶ 6. In 2004, the family formed Hahnenkamm, a Nevada limited 

liability company, to hold title to Cave Rock Summit, intending to develop it as a “luxury 

residential estate compound.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6. From 2004 to 2014, Hahnenkamm satisfied 

various prerequisites to developing Cave Rock Summit, including securing building permits 

from the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and rights-of-way for access from the Forest Service. 

Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Also during this time, Hahnenkamm was in talks to sell Cave Rock Summit to 

the government for conservation purposes. See Compl. ¶¶ 17-23. 

The Forest Service issued preliminary approval to purchase Cave Rock Summit in 2008, 

earmarking $11,686,950 for the acquisition. Compl. ¶ 17. In late 2013, the Service retained 

Daniel Leck, a local-appraiser to perform an appraisal of the property. Compl. ¶ 19. Cave Rock 

Summit was initially appraised at $4 million, which Hahnenkamm did not accept and instead 

requested a second opinion. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20. The Forest Service permitted a second appraisal 

to be done at Hahnenkamm’s expense, but subjected the second appraisal to a Valuation Services 

Protocol that restricted Hahnenkamm’s authority to participate in the appraiser’s work. Compl. 

¶¶ 20-21. The second appraisal, by the Doré Group, determined the value of Cave Rock Summit 

to be $5.03 million. Compl. ¶ 22 & Ex. 3. The government adopted the $5.03 million valuation 

as the appropriate price for Cave Rock Summit, and declined to negotiate further with 

Hahnenkamm as to price. Compl. ¶ 22. Hahnenkamm takes issue with several aspects of the 

Doré appraisal that served as the basis for the eventual purchase price of Cave Rock Summit. 

Among other things, Hahnenkamm alleges that “[t]he appraisal inaccurately described the 

subject property as having no legal or physical access and no entitlements,” even though it “had 

both TRPA approval for road construction and a commitment from the Forest Service to provide 

access,” ignored the “land coverage entitlement of 319,066 square feet, a transferable 

development right that c[ould] be sold to other landowners,” and “mistakenly identifie[d] the 

 

1The recitations that follow do not constitute findings of fact but rather are drawn from 

allegations in the complaint and documentary materials appended to the complaint. 
3

highest and best use . . . ‘AS VACANT: Rural residential or recreational land uses.’” Compl. at 

¶ 26; see also Compl. Ex. 3, at 6-10 (Doré Group Appraisal).2

On June 28, 2015, after unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a higher price for the sale 

of Cave Rock Summit to the Forest Service, Hahnenkamm granted the Forest Service a 24-

month option to purchase the property for the $5.03 million appraised value. See Compl. ¶ 23 & 

Ex. 1. The Option Agreement is set out on a form used by the Forest Service. See Compl. Ex. 1 

(Option Agreement), at 1 (showing USDA Forest Service form FS-5400-36 (09/2008)). The 

government exercised the option on July 7, 2015, and purchased Cave Rock Summit for $5.03 

million. See Compl. at 23; Def.’s Mot. at 4. Hahnenkamm filed the instant complaint on June 

23, 2017. 

STANDARDS FOR DECISION 

A. Rule 12(b)(1) 

The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over “any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an 

executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for 

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

Although the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity and allows a plaintiff to sue the United 

States for money damages, United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983), it does not 

provide a plaintiff with substantive rights, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To 

perfect jurisdiction in this court, “a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law 

that creates the right to money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part) (citing Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). 

That is, the plaintiff must identify a source of substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained”—commonly 

referred to as a money-mandating provision of law. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport 

S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Cl. Ct. 1967)) (additional citation omitted). 

Hahnenkamm, as plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 

1988)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

“accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” See id. (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 

(Fed. Cir. 1995)). Thus, a complaint will be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds only “if it 

appears beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle [it] to 

relief.” Frymire v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 450, 454 (2002) (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. 

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999)) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). 

 

2Hahnenkamm also contends that “the appraiser, who is based in California, was not 

licensed to appraise property in Nevada at the time he began work.” Compl. ¶ 26. 
4

“If a court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case, dismissal is required as a 

matter of law.” Gray v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 95, 98 (2005) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 

U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); 

see also Treviño v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 207 (2013) (“Where the court has not been 

granted jurisdiction to hear a claim, the case must be dismissed.”) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H 

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6) 

A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual matters alleged “must be enough 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in 

the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation 

omitted). In this context, “the court must accept as true the complaint’s undisputed factual 

allegations and should construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cambridge v. 

United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 

(1986) (additional citation omitted)).

ANALYSIS 

A. The Santini-Burton Act 

The government seeks dismissal of Hahnenkamm’s complaint in part because it contends 

that neither the Santini-Burton Act nor the Southern Nevada Land Act are money-mandating,

and thus that Hahnenkamm’s claim that the government contravened those statutes is outside this 

court’s jurisdiction. Def.’s Mot. at 11-12.

The Santini-Burton Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to acquire 

environmentally sensitive land located in the Lake Tahoe Basin for purposes of preserving the 

environmental quality of the region. See Pub. L. No. 96-586, § 1(b). The Act differentiates the 

Secretary’s powers and responsibilities in land acquisitions based on whether the land is 

“improved” or “unimproved” as defined by the Act, §§ 1-3. “Improved land” is defined as “any 

land on which there is located a single family dwelling or other residential or commercial 

building, the construction of which commenced before the date of enactment of this Act.” Id. §

3(c)(4)(A). In contrast, “unimproved land” is any land other than improved land. Id. at § 

3(c)(4)(B). The Santini-Burton Act provides that the Secretary may acquire improved land (1) 

only in California, (2) only with the consent of the owner (with limited exceptions), subject to a 

right by the owner to retain use and occupancy of the land for a period ranging from 25 years to 

the life of the owner, and, (3) most importantly, unless the land be acquired by donation, the 

Secretary “shall pay to the owner the fair market value of the improved land on the date of its 

acquisition.” Id. § 3(c). 

The provisions of the Santini-Burton Act addressing the Secretary’s authority to acquire 

unimproved land are less restrictive. To acquire unimproved land without the consent of the 

owner, the Secretary must determine that negotiation has failed. See id. § 3(d). Likewise, the 
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Act makes no provision for a landowner to retain an interest in the use and occupancy of the land 

after the sale. See id. § 3. Finally, for unimproved land, the Act requires that “[t]he fair market 

value of any land or interest in land to be acquired by the Secretary of Agriculture under this 

section shall be determined by an independent appraisal made, where practicable, on the basis of 

comparable sales at the time of such acquisition.” Id. § 3(e). 

A court ascertaining the meaning of a statute must begin with the statute’s plain meaning. 

See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s 

language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”) (citing 

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 

says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank 

v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Courts “do not . . . construe statutory phrases in 

isolation[ but instead] read statutes as a whole,” United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, and 

thus the Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]here Congress uses certain language in one part 

of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 

intentionally,” National Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (citing 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 

A plain reading of the Santini-Burton Act as a whole leads to the conclusion that it 

intended to provide greater protection to owners of improved land—and for single-family 

dwellings on improved land in particular—than to owners of unimproved land. Compare 

Santini-Burton Act § 3(c)(2) (“[n]o single family dwelling which is improved land . . . may be 

acquired . . . without the consent of the owner [unless . . .]”); and id. § 3(c)(5) (“Unless the 

improved land is wholly or partially donated, the Secretary of Agriculture shall pay to the owner 

the fair market value of the improved land.”), with id. § 3(e) (“The fair market value of any land 

or interest in land[, improved or unimproved,] . . . shall be determined by an independent 

appraisal.”). Nonetheless, despite their differences, the basis for the Forest Service purchase of 

either category of land must reflect fair market value based upon an independent appraisal. Id. § 

3(e). The government rests its jurisdictional motion to dismiss Hahnenkamm’s claim under the 

Santini-Burton Act on the distinction between “shall pay” regarding improved lands and “shall 

be determined” respecting unimproved lands, arguing that the Act is not money-mandating 

insofar as the latter category is concerned. Def.’s Mot. at 12 (“[The] statutory language requiring 

an [independent] appraisal does not require the Forest Service to pay the seller fair market 

value.”); Def.’s Reply at 6 (“[T]he requirement to determine fair market value is not sufficient to 

demonstrate that Hahnenkamm (or any other plaintiff) is entitled to receive fair market value . . . 

.”) (emphasis in original).

The government’s argument goes too far. In essence, Hahnenkamm contends that the 

Forest Service acquired Cave Rock Summit as a result of an ultra vires action, i.e., that the 

government caused the Doré Group to perform an appraisal which did not reflect pertinent facts 

respecting the property, using the Valuation Service Protocol it imposed on the Doré Group’s

work.3 The government principally responds to these allegations in addressing Hahnenkamm’s 

contractual claim, stating: 

 

3The Valuation Service Protocol specified that the appraiser’s “sole client will be the US 

Forest Service,” “the appraisal instructions and specific statement of work will be issued directly 
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Hahnenkamm is correct that “contractual provisions made in contravention of a 

statute are void and unenforceable, and an agent acting ultra vires cannot bind the 

federal government.” California v. United States, 271 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). And “where a contract is fairly open to two constructions, by one of which 

it would be lawful and the other unlawful, the former must be adopted.” Hobbs v. 

McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 576 (1886). But as we have shown, neither the SantiniBurton Act nor the S[outhern Nevada Land Act] require payment of fair market 

value. So the contract agreement to pay $5.03 million—as opposed to “fair 

market value”—does not violate either statute, and our offered construction of the 

contract therefore is not unlawful. 

Def.’s Reply at 9. In this regard, the government does not contend that the purchase price 

reflected fair market value. See id. Neither does it argue that the Doré Group’s appraisal was 

“an independent appraisal” that “determined” fair market value “on the basis of comparable sales 

at the time of such requisition” as specified in the Santini-Burton Act, § 3. See Def.’s Mot. at 21 

(assuming the contrary for purposes of argument); Def.’s Reply at 7-8 (arguing that the Option 

Agreement “does not create any obligation for the Forest Service to evaluate the fair market 

value on Hahnenkamm’s behalf”). Hahnenkamm consequently argues that the difference 

between “shall pay” and “shall determine,” insofar as improved and unimproved lands under the 

Santini-Burton Act are concerned, is insignificant in the circumstances for jurisdictional 

purposes. 

 The court concurs that the Santini-Burton Act sets out limits on the Forest Service’s 

authority to acquire lands, unimproved as well as improved, and that an alleged failure or 

omission, whether intentional or not, on the part of the Forest Service to adhere to those 

limitations can give rise to a cause of action on the part of a landowner adversely affected by 

such failure or omission. In context, the Act is susceptible to a fair inference that the remedy due 

is the payment of just compensation. Hahnenkamm has alleged facts sufficient to state a moneymandating claim under the Santini-Burton Act. 

B. The Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act 

The government also argues that the Southern Nevada Land Act is likewise not moneymandating. See Def.’s Mot. at 13. The Southern Nevada Land Act authorizes the Secretaries of 

the Interior and Agriculture to acquire “environmentally sensitive land and interests in 

environmentally sensitive land,” but further provides that “[l]ands may not be acquired under this 

section without the consent of the owner thereof.” Pub. L. No. 105-263, § 5(a)(3). As to the 

price at which the Secretary may acquire those lands, the Act provides that “[t]he fair market 

value of land or an interest in land to be acquired by the Secretary or the Secretary of Agriculture 

under this section shall be determined pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Land Policy and 

Management Act of 1976 and shall be consistent with other applicable requirements and 

 

from the Forest Service,” the appraiser’s “sole point of contact will be the Forest Service Review 

Appraisers assigned to the project,” and that any requests for information “regarding the 

appraisal (the process, timing, results, etc.) should be directed not to the contracted appraiser, but 

to the Forest Service Reviewer.” Compl. Ex. 4 (Valuation Service Protocol), at 1. 
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standards.” Id. at § 5(c). The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 

§ 206, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (“Federal Land Policy Act”) (codified as amended, in relevant part, 

at 43 U.S.C. § 1716), sets out requirements for appraising land to be acquired by exchange,

which requirements, as the parties acknowledge, are expressly incorporated into the Southern 

Nevada Land Act, Pub. L. No. 105-263, § 5(c). See Def.’s Mot. at 14; Pl.’s Opp’n to the Gov’t’s 

Mot. to Dismiss at 17. These requirements include the requirements that, if the parties cannot 

agree to accept the result of an appraisal of the land, the matter should generally be submitted to 

arbitration and that rules and regulations be promulgated concerning the standards governing 

appraisals conducted under the Federal Land Policy Act. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1716(d), (f). The 

Federal Land Policy Act expressly contemplates regulations “reflect[ing] nationally recognized 

appraisal standards, including, to the extent appropriate, the Uniform Appraisal Standards for 

Federal Land Acquisitions.” 43 U.S.C. § 1716(f)(2). 

Based on these provisions of the Federal Land Policy Act, incorporated by reference into 

the relevant section of the Southern Nevada Land Act, Hahnenkamm alleges that the Southern 

Nevada Land Act requires the payment of fair market value for land acquisitions, and that the 

Forest Service failed to obtain an appraisal that complied with the requirements of the Acts and

failed to arbitrate the disagreement between the parties over the valuations of Cave Rock 

Summit. See Compl. at ¶¶ 14-16, 22, 30-31. The Forest Service counters that neither the 

Southern Nevada Land Act nor the Federal Land Policy Act require the Forest Service to pay fair 

market value, but rather, fair market value must only be determined by an appraisal that follows 

certain procedures. See Def.’s Mot. at 13-15; Def.’s Reply at 4-5. 

In pertinent part, Hahnenkamm alleges that the Forest Service failed to comply with the 

appraisal provisions of the Southern Nevada Land Act as they incorporate the Federal Land 

Policy Act. See Compl. at ¶¶ 14-16, 22, 30-31. The question, then, is whether the appraisal 

provisions of the Southern Nevada Land Act can “fairly be interpreted” as mandating the 

payment of compensation if, as Hahnenkamm alleges, the Forest Service failed to comply with 

them. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400. Under the Tucker Act, “[i]n determining whether a law is 

money-mandating, the court ‘must train on specific . . . duty-imposing statutory or regulatory 

prescriptions.’” Johnson v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2012) (quoting United States v. 

Navajo Nation, 573 U.S. 488, 506 (2003)). 

The appraisal requirements of the Southern Nevada Land Act mandate a compliant 

appraisal as the basis for purchase of land by the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture. 

Hahnenkamm has factually alleged that Cave Rock Summit was acquired by the Forest Service 

in contravention of the appraisal provisions of the Southern Nevada Land Act. Congress, in the 

Southern Nevada Land Act, required that the Forest Service in every case determine the fair 

market value for the land it acquires through prescribed appraisal processes, a requirement that 

serves to protect both the government and the landowners with whom the government deals. As 

with the Santini-Burton Act, a failure or omission by the government to adhere to the 

requirements to determine fair market value as a basis for purchase of land can constitute a 

contravention of the Southern Nevada Land Act that is money-mandating in this context and thus 

that suffices for jurisdictional purposes under the Tucker Act. 
8

C. Alleged Breach of Contract 

In ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss Hahnenkamm’s claim of alleged breach 

of contract for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must determine 

whether Hahnenkamm has sufficiently alleged the elements of a breach of contract claim, 

namely: “(1) a valid contract between the parties, (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the 

contract, (3) a breach of that duty, and (4) damages caused by the breach.” San Carlos Irrigation 

& Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The validity of the 

contract is not in dispute. See Compl. at ¶ 23; Def.’s Mot. at 3. The issue at this stage, rather, is 

whether Hahnenkamm has sufficiently alleged an obligation incumbent upon the government, a 

breach of that obligation, and that Hahnenkamm consequently was damaged. As to whether a 

duty existed, the relevant inquiry is whether the Option Agreement incorporated a duty on the 

part of the Forest Service to pay fair market value for Cave Rock Summit and obtain an appraisal 

of that fair market value that complied with certain federal appraisal standards. If 

Hahnenkamm’s pleadings sufficiently allege facts that raise a sufficiently plausible claim to 

relief, then the Forest Service’s motion under RCFC 12(b)(6) must be denied. 

The Forest Service argues the Option Agreement’s price term supersedes any 

requirement to pay fair market value. Def.’s Reply at 7 (“[T]he option contract did not require 

the Forest Service to pay ‘fair market value’ for Cave Rock Summit. To the contrary, the parties 

agreed that the ‘purchase price is $5,030,000.00’”). The Forest Service further submits that the 

Option Agreement’s language pertaining to the appraisal of Cave Rock Summit does not 

incorporate any appraisal provisions of the Santini-Burton Act, the Southern Nevada Land Act, 

or the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisition, and that the Option 

Agreement “does not create any obligation for the Forest Service to evaluate the fair market 

value on Hahnenkamm’s behalf.” Id. at 7-8. 

The Forest Service’s arguments ignore the factual disputes that bear on Hahnenkamm’s

contractual claims. The court is bound to accept as true the allegations Hahnenkamm has alleged 

in its complaint, and the Forest Service’s arguments isolate some portions of the Option 

Agreement to the exclusion of others. Among other things, the contract specifies that “[t]he 

purchase price shall be supported by an appraisal prepared in conformity with the Uniform 

Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions.” Option Agreement ¶ II.D. And, while the 

contract contains an integration clause, id. ¶ XVI.C,4

it also specifies that “[a]ll representatives [ 

sic], warranties, obligations, and rights set forth herein shall survive the closing and not merge 

with the deed, id. ¶ XVI.B. 

 

4The integration clause provides: 

All terms and conditions with respect to this offer are expressly contained herein 

and the Vendor agrees that no representative or agent of the United States has 

made any representations or promise with respect to his offer not expressly 

contained therein. 

Option Agreement ¶ XVI.C. 
9

Hahnenkamm has alleged that the Option Agreement obligates the Forest Service to 

obtain an appraisal created in compliance with federal land appraisal standards and to pay fair 

market value as so determined, Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, that the Forest Service failed to satisfy this 

contractual duty by failing to pay fair market value, Compl. ¶ 35 and that the Service instead 

paid an amount that was reached in reliance on a flawed appraisal. Compl. ¶ 37. Finally, 

Hahnenkamm has alleged that it was damaged by the Forest Service’s alleged breach of the 

Option Agreement because it received less than fair market value for the sale of Cave Rock 

Summit as a result of the Forest Service’s alleged breach. Compl. ¶ 35. 

In short, Hahnenkamm has alleged all of the necessary elements of a breach of contract 

claim, and, accepting those allegations as true, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Cambridge, 558 

F.3d at 1335, has stated a claim to relief sufficient to survive dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6). 

Thus the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted must be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the government’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint 

pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and (6) is DENIED. 

The government shall file an answer to Hahnenkamm’s complaint within the time 

specified by RCFC 12(a)(4)(A)(i). 

No costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

s/ Charles F. Lettow 

Charles F. Lettow

Judge