COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

VERNON GREGORY PIGGOTT, S/K/A 

 VERNON PIGGOT 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2250-99-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 DECEMBER 5, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Anthony N. Sylvester (Anthony N. Sylvester, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Vernon Gregory Piggott (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights. We reverse Piggott's conviction and remand 

the case to the trial court for further proceedings, if the 

Commonwealth be so advised. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On appeal from a trial court's ruling on a suppression 

motion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

party prevailing below, in this case the Commonwealth. See

Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 
47, 48 (1991). However, "'[u]ltimate questions of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause . . . are reviewed de novo on 

appeal.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 

S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996)). Similarly, we review de novo

whether a seizure occurred. See id. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 261. 

On November 19, 1998, Piggott was a passenger in a car 

driven by Roy Dean Wright. Detective Michael S. Langford 

stopped the car because it was proceeding the wrong way on a 

one-way street. Detective Langford requested Wright's driver's 

license, ran it through his computer, and released Wright with a 

verbal warning. 

 Detective Langford obtained from Wright permission to 

search his car and person. Detective Langford found no weapon 

or contraband on Wright's person. He then identified himself to 

Piggott and asked Piggott to exit the car. Detective Langford's 

search of the car produced no weapon or contraband. Upon 

completion of the search of the car, Detective Langford asked 

Piggott for identification, which Piggott produced.1

 Detective Langford ran a warrant check on Piggott, which he 

testified took a "few" minutes. After discovering that Piggott 

 1

 The record does not disclose the precise nature of 

Piggott's identification. However, in a question, counsel 

referred to it as "his license." Detective Langford used the 

identification to access a central records bank. From this, we 

conclude that the identification was in some official form. 

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had two outstanding warrants, Detective Langford arrested him. 

On the way to jail, Piggott admitted he had cocaine concealed in 

his shoe. At the jail, Detective Langford searched Piggott and 

found three chunks of cocaine in a plastic bag inside his shoe. 

He charged Piggott with possession of cocaine. 

 Prior to trial, Piggott moved to suppress the cocaine found 

on his person. He argued that discovery of the cocaine derived 

from an unlawful seizure of his person. The trial court denied 

the motion, ruling that the encounter between Piggott and 

Detective Langford was consensual. In a bench trial, the trial 

court convicted Piggott of possessing cocaine. 

II. THE SEIZURE

"Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories 

of police-citizen confrontations: (1) consensual encounters, 

(2) brief, minimally intrusive investigatory detentions, based 

upon specific, articulable facts, commonly referred to as Terry

stops, and (3) highly intrusive arrests and searches founded on 

probable cause." Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 

169, 455 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1995) (citation omitted). 

"A consensual encounter occurs when police officers 

approach persons in public places 'to ask them questions,' 

provided 'a reasonable person would understand that he or she 

could refuse to cooperate.'" Payne v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 

86, 88, 414 S.E.2d 869, 870 (1992) (citations omitted). "As 

long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to 

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disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no 

intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under 

the Constitution require some particularized and objective 

justification." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 

(1979). 

An encounter is not consensual "if, in view of all of the 

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 

would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. The 

"principle embodied by the phrase 'free to leave' means the 

ability to ignore the police and to walk away from them," to 

"'feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise 

terminate the encounter.'" United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 

116, 122 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 

429, 436 (1991)). "Fourth Amendment scrutiny is triggered, 

however, the moment an encounter 'loses its consensual nature.'" 

Id. (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434). 

Detective Langford's request for Piggott's identification 

initiated a consensual encounter and implicated no Fourth 

Amendment interest. However, the consensual aspect of the 

encounter ceased when Detective Langford retained Piggott's 

identification while he ran a warrant check. A reasonable 

person in Piggott's circumstances would not have believed that 

he could terminate the encounter and walk away. By retaining 

Piggott's identification, Detective Langford implicitly 

commanded Piggott to stay. See Hodnett v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. 

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App. 684, 691-92, 530 S.E.2d 433, 436 (2000). Thus, for Fourth 

Amendment purposes, Piggott was then "seized" by Detective 

Langford. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). "In order 

to justify such a seizure, an officer must have a 'reasonable 

and articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of 

the defendant.'" Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 490, 

419 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. Holloway, 9 

Va. App. 11, 15, 384 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1989)). 

The circumstances in this case gave Detective Langford no 

objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that Piggott was 

engaged in criminal activity. Detective Langford had no 

information to such effect, nor had he observed any criminal 

behavior. Piggott cooperated and willingly gave his correct 

identification. 

Because Detective Langford's encounter with Piggott ceased 

to be consensual, and because the circumstances provided no 

lawful basis for further detention, Piggott was seized in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The cocaine was found 

on his person due to that unlawful seizure and should have been 

suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial 

court, reverse Piggott's conviction, and remand the case to the 

trial court for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so 

advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.

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