United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-7108 

MARGARITA DELAROSA, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

 Louis J. George, National Veterans Legal Services Program, of Washington, DC, 

argued for claimant-appellant. With him on the brief were Barton F. Stichman and 

Christine M. Cote. 

 Martin F. Hockey,Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for 

respondent-appellee. On the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, 

Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Mark A. Melnick, Assistant Director, and Marla T 

Conneely, Attorney. Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans, Assistant General 

Counsel and Y. Ken Lee, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of 

Washington, DC. 

 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Robert N. Davis 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-7108 

MARGARITA DELAROSA, 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 04-1225, Judge 

Robert N. Davis. 

___________________________ 

 DECIDED: January 31, 2008 

 ___________________________ 

Before RADER, PROST, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Margarita DeLaRosa (Mrs. DeLaRosa), the widow of veteran Albert DeLaRosa 

(Mr. DeLaRosa), appeals a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (Veterans Court), which affirmed an April 14, 2004, Board of Veterans’ Appeals 

(Board) decision denying her claim for dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC), 

i.e., service-connected death benefits. DeLaRosa v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 418 

(2006). We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. DeLaRosa served on active duty from May 1967 to March 1970, including 

combat service in Vietnam. He married Mrs. DeLaRosa in 1980. The couple separated 

in early 1994. Mr. DeLaRosa died from a gunshot wound to the head as the result of 

suicide after killing his daughter in July 1994. 

Six years after Mr. DeLaRosa’s death, in April 2000, Mrs. DeLaRosa filed a DIC 

claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA has defined DIC as a 

monthly payment made by the VA to a surviving spouse, child, or parent “[b]ecause of a 

service-connected death occurring after December 31, 1956.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)(1). 

Mrs. DeLaRosa contended that Mr. DeLaRosa had post-traumatic stress disorder 

(PTSD) due to his combat service and that the PTSD led to the suicide. Mrs. 

DeLaRosa submitted lay testimony from another daughter and from a co-worker of Mr. 

DeLaRosa, both of whom discussed Mr. DeLaRosa’s combat and post-service 

experiences. Mrs. DeLaRosa also submitted a medical opinion from Dr. John H. 

Fullerton, an internist and geriatrician, stating that he believed that Mr. DeLaRosa may 

have suffered from undiagnosed and untreated PTSD, which may have originated from 

his combat service and led to his violent behavior. This medical opinion was issued six 

years after Mr. DeLaRosa’s death, and was based upon prolonged discussions with 

Mrs. DeLaRosa. 

In December 2000, a VA regional office (RO) denied Mrs. DeLaRosa’s DIC claim 

because there was no confirmed diagnosis of PTSD. Mrs. DeLaRosa appealed the RO 

decision to the Board and the Board denied her claim. The Board found that Mr. 

DeLaRosa was never diagnosed with a psychiatric condition during his lifetime and that 

2007-7108 2
“[t]here [was] no medical evidence from the veteran’s lifetime that he had PTSD.” In re 

DeLaRosa, No. 03-14 001, slip op. at 7 (Bd. Vet. App., Apr. 14, 2004). The Board 

affirmed the RO’s findings and concluded that “the available evidence shows that the 

most obvious reasons for the veteran’s suicide [were] the bitter dispute with his wife and 

his killing of his own daughter.” Id. at 8. The Board also determined that Dr. Fullerton’s 

medical opinion was entirely speculative and without probative value, and that the 

various lay statements submitted by Mrs. DeLaRosa, suggesting that Mr. DeLaRosa’s 

suicide was caused by PTSD, did not constitute competent medical evidence. The 

Board concluded that Mr. DeLaRosa did not have a service-connected psychiatric 

disorder that caused or contributed to his suicide. Mrs. DeLaRosa appealed the Board 

decision to the Veterans Court. 

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, determining that the Board’s 

conclusion that there was no basis for service connection for the cause of Mr. 

DeLaRosa’s death was not clearly erroneous. The Veterans Court also determined that 

the VA was not required to obtain a medical opinion as part of its duty to assist under 38 

U.S.C. § 5103A because there was no valid diagnosis of PTSD and because the record 

contained no evidence of a causal connection between Mr. DeLaRosa’s military service 

and the cause of his death. The Veterans Court entered judgment, and this appeal 

followed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

The scope of our review of a Veterans Court decision is limited by statute. See

38 U.S.C. § 7292. Under § 7292(a), we may review a decision by the Veterans Court 

with respect to the validity of “any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof 

2007-7108 3
(other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the [Veterans] 

Court in making the decision.” We must affirm a Veterans Court decision unless it is 

“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of 

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) 

without observance of procedure required by law.” Id. § 7292(d)(1). Further, absent a 

constitutional issue, we may not review challenges to factual determinations or 

challenges to the application of a law or regulation to facts. Id. § 7292(d)(2). We review 

interpretation of statutes and regulations by the Veterans Court de novo. Smith v. 

Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Both parties agree that the Veterans Court committed an error of law by 

analyzing Mrs. DeLaRosa’s DIC claim under subsection (d) of 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, 

rather than under subsection (a). However, the parties disagree as to the effect of this 

error. The relevant subsections of 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, which outlines the Secretary’s 

duty to assist a claimant, provide: 

(a) Duty to assist. 

 (1)The Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant 

in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant’s 

claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary. 

(2) The Secretary is not required to provide assistance to a 

claimant under this section if no reasonable possibility exists 

that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim . . . . 

 (d) Medical examinations for compensation claims. 

(1) In the case of a claim for disability compensation, the assistance 

provided by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall include 

providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion 

when such an examination or opinion is necessary to make a 

decision on the claim. . . . 

 

2007-7108 4
 Mrs. DeLaRosa contends that the VA’s duty to obtain a medical opinion under 38 

U.S.C. § 5103A(d) does not apply to a DIC claim, but that the VA had a duty under 38 

U.S.C. § 5103A(a) to obtain a medical opinion to help substantiate her DIC claim. The 

Government agrees that the VA’s duty to obtain a medical opinion under § 5103A(d) 

does not apply to a DIC claim. However, the Government contends that § 5103A(a) 

cannot be read to require the Secretary to provide a medical examination or opinion, 

because that reading would obviate the need for § 5103A(d). We agree with the 

Government. 

38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) provides a general requirement in all cases for the VA to 

“make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to 

substantiate the claimant’s claim for a [VA] benefit.” In contrast, 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5103A(d)(1) requires that “[i]n the case of a claim for disability compensation, the 

assistance provided by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall include providing a 

medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such an examination or 

opinion is necessary to make a decision on the claim . . . .” Section 5103A(d)(1) 

explicitly limits its applicability to claims for disability compensation.1 If § 5103A(a)(1) 

always required the Secretary to assist a claimant with providing a medical examination 

or opinion, then § 5103A(d)(1) would be rendered meaningless. “It is a long-held tenet 

of statutory interpretation that one section of a law should not be interpreted so as to 

render another section meaningless.” Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.3d 

1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Therefore, we hold that 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) does not 

 1

 The VA has defined the term “disability compensation” as a monthly 

payment made by the VA to a veteran “if the veteran is disabled as a result of a 

2007-7108 5
always require the Secretary to assist the claimant in obtaining a medical opinion or 

examination. Under § 5103(A)(a), the Secretary only needs to make reasonable efforts 

to assist a claimant in obtaining a medical opinion when such opinion is “necessary to 

substantiate the claimant’s claim for a benefit.” 

The Board made a factual finding that a medical opinion was not necessary to 

decide the claim under § 5103A(d). In re DeLaRosa, No. 03-14 001, slip op. at 6 (Bd. 

Vet. App., Apr. 14, 2004). Here, the Board determined that there was no medical 

evidence of PTSD during the veteran’s lifetime and that his suicide was the result of 

willful misconduct, not unsound mind. Our jurisdiction precludes us from reviewing 

factual findings or even the application of law to facts. In light of the Board’s finding that 

the even more restrictive § 5103A(d) did not require the Secretary to provide a medical 

opinion and our holding that § 5103A(a) does not always require the Secretary to obtain 

a medical opinion, we conclude that the Veterans Court’s application of § 5103A(d) was 

harmless error. 

Additionally, Mrs. DeLaRosa argues that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 

C.F.R. § 3.302, which explains circumstances under which suicide will be considered to 

have resulted from mental unsoundness rather than from “willful misconduct.” A finding 

of the latter would bar entitlement to benefits based upon the veteran’s death. See 38 

C.F.R. § 3.303(a). The relevant subsection of § 3.302 provides: 

(b) Evidence of mental condition. (1) Whether a person, at the time of 

suicide, was so unsound mentally that he or she did not realize the 

consequence of such an act, or was unable to resist such impulse is a 

question to be determined in each individual case, based on all available 

 

personal injury or disease . . . while in active service if the injury or the disease was 

incurred or aggravated in line of duty.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.4(a), (b)(1). 

2007-7108 6
2007-7108 7

lay and medical evidence pertaining to his or her mental condition at the 

time of suicide. 

Mrs. DeLaRosa contends that the Veterans Court misinterpreted § 3.302 by requiring “a 

prior finding of service connection” during the veteran’s lifetime for the regulation to 

apply. The Government counters that Mrs. DeLaRosa misinterprets the Veterans Court 

decision. Specifically, the Government contends that the Veterans Court did not 

expressly require an actual determination of service connection for a psychiatric 

condition prior to Mr. DeLaRosa’s death, but required a determination of service 

connection for a psychiatric condition before service connection for mental 

unsoundness, if presumed from the suicide, could be established. The Veterans Court 

stated that “[s]ervice connection for mental unsoundness presumed as a result of 

suicide or a bona fide attempt, as addressed in § 3.302, may be granted only where a 

service-connected disability and the requirements for service connection are already 

established” and that “without a prior finding of service connection the provisions of § 

3.302 are not applicable.” DeLaRosa v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 418 (2006). 

We agree with the Government. Section 3.302 does not require that a 

determination of service connection for a mental disorder be made prior to the veteran’s 

death to establish service connection for mental unsoundness, and the Veterans Court 

did not impose such a requirement. Rather, the Veterans Court required a 

determination of service connection for PTSD prior to the application of § 3.302. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Veterans Court is 

AFFIRMED.