This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-36257 4 5 ELAINE ORTEGA, 6 Defendant-Appellant. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF VALENCIA COUNTY 8 James L. Sanchez, District Judge 9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General 12 Albuquerque, NM 13 for Appellee 14 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 Josephine H. Ford, Assist ant Appellate Defender 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellant 19 MEMORANDUM OPINION 20 GARCIA, Judge. 212 {1} Defendant appeals from the districtcourt’s judgment, sentence, and 1 commitment, convicting her following a jurytrial for one count each of unlawful 2 taking of a motor vehicle, conspiracy to commit unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, 3 nonresidential burglary, conspiracy to co mmit nonresidential burglary, larceny, and 4 contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In our first calendar notice, we proposed 5 to summarily affirm. [1 CN 1-7] Defendant then filed a memorandum in opposition 6 to that notice of proposed disposition, as well as a motion to amend her docketing 7 statement to add a double jeopardy claim. [1 MIO 1-5] 8
{2} In our second calendar notice, we noted that Defendant had abandoned her first 9 appellate issue—that the district court erred in admitting certain statements where the 10 police officers allegedly did not comply with NMSA 1978, Section 29-1-16 (2005) 11 [2 CN 2-3], and we continued to suggest that the evidence was sufficient to support 12 Defendant’s convictions. [2 CN 3-5] A dditionally, agreeing with Defendant’s double 13 jeopardy claim, we granted Defendant’s mo tion to amend and proposed to remand the 14 case to the district court to vacate one of Defendant’s conspir acy convictions and to 15 resentence accordingly. [2 CN 5-8] De fendant’s second memorandum in opposition 16 expresses agreement with our proposed disposition on the double jeopardy issue. [2 17 MIO 1] The State also filed a response i ndicating that it does not oppose this proposed 18 disposition on the double jeopardy issue. [Res p. 1] Consequently , one of Defendant’s 193 conspiracy convictions is reversed on double jeopardy grounds. 1
{3} Also in our second calendar notice, addressing Defendant’s sufficiency claim, 2 we suggested—as we did in our first cale ndar notice—that the jury could reasonably 3 infer from the evidence presented at trial that Defendant and her minor daughter 4 conspired to take items, including the Cr own Victoria, from 193 El Cerro Loop. [ See 5 2 CN 3-5; see also 1 CN 3-7] See State v. Gallegos , 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 45, 149 N.M. 6 704, 254 P.3d 655 (recognizing that conspiracy is a clandestine crime, and a jury may 7 infer the existence of an agreement based on conduct and the surrounding 8 circumstances). This evidence included: Defendant’s statement to police placing 9 herself and her daughter in the vicinity of 193 El Cerro Loop; her daughter’s actions 10 in taking the Crown Victoria from 193 El Cerro Loop and then hiding in the bathroom 11 cabinet when the police arrived; Defendant ’s presence in a vehicle containing stolen 12 items from 193 El Cerro Loop; and Defendant’s inconsistent statements to police. [2 13 CN 3] 14
{4} In her second memorandum in opposition, Defendant continues to argue that 15 the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, either as an accessory or as 16 a conspirator. [2 MIO 1-4] Notably, De fendant does not challenge the summary of 17 evidence contained in our first and sec ond calendar notices. Instead, she argues that 18 the jury could only have found through sp eculation that she intended to commit the 194 crimes or that she conspired to commit the crimes. [2 MIO 2-4] We disagree. A 1 reasonable jury could infer fro m the evidence presented at trial, without resorting to 2 speculation, that Defendant intended to co mmit the crimes of residential burglary, 3 larceny, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, especially where Defendant was 4 located sitting in a vehicle containing stolen items from 193 El Cerro Loop, parked 5 outside the same trailer as the stolen Cr own Victoria, which she apparently followed 6 from 193 El Cerro Loop after her daughter stole it. [1 CN 6-7; 2 MIO 2-3] See State 7 v. Montoya , 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 53, 345 P.3d 1056 (stating that circumstantial 8 evidence is substantial evidence); see also State v. Sosa , 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 129 9 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (“Intent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other 10 facts in the case, as it is rarely estab lished by direct eviden ce.” (internal quotation 11 marks and citation omitted)); State v. Carrasco , 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 7, 124 N.M. 64, 12 946 P.2d 1075 (stating that an accessory must share the criminal intent of the principal 13 and that “[t]his intent can be inferred from behavior which en courages the act or 14 which informs the confederates that the person approves of the crime after the crime 15 has been committed”); Gallegos , 2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 45. 16
{5} Accordingly, for the reasons stated here in, as well as those provided in our two 17 notices of proposed disposition, we reverse one of Defendant’s conspiracy convictions 18 and remand to the district court to vacate and resentence, and weotherwise affirm. 195 {6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

__________________________________ 2 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

_________________________________ 5 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 6

_________________________________ 7 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 8