J-S09036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JERRY L. RITCHEY JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1036 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000747-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: October 24, 2023

Jerry L. Ritchey, Jr. (“Ritchey”) appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for burglary, criminal 

trespass, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and criminal mischief.

1

 We 

affirm. 

The trial evidence showed that Pennsylvania State Police (the “PSP”) 

became aware of information that implicated Ritchey in the commission of a 

series of commercial burglaries in multiple counties. See N.T., 6/26/12, at 

83-85, 167-69. In July 2011, after obtaining a court order, the PSP installed

a mobile global positioning satellite (“GPS”) tracking device on a Mazda (“the 

car”) Ritchey operated. See id. at 132-40, 169.

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502, 3503, 3921, 3304.
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Between 4:00 p.m. on July 20, 2011, and 6:30 a.m. on July 21, 2011, 

unauthorized entry was made in three separately secured commercial 

businesses and one separately secured government office on or near Route 

322, and the police found distinctive four-arrow-tread shoeprints found at 

each location. Each office had been ransacked and damaged and money was 

taken from two of the locations. See N.T., 6/25/12, at 35-41, 49-58, 63, 70-

80, 87-94, 98-99, 110-13, 122-26.

GPS data showed Ritchey’s car had stopped for two and one-half hours 

in the immediate area of two of the burglarized commercial properties at 

approximately 11:30 p.m. on July 20, 2011, for nearly an hour in the vicinity 

of the third burglarized commercial property at 2:45 a.m. on July 21, 2011, 

and for forty minutes at 4:07 a.m. that morning in the vicinity of the 

burglarized government business. See N.T., 6/25/12, at 171, 174-76, 185-

90, 194. A trooper saw Ritchey driving his car in the area of the burglaries. 

See N.T., 6/26/12, at 33-44, 60, 80, 82. Another trooper followed Ritchey

returning to his home in the early hours of July 21, 2011, and saw him get 

out of the car on the block where he lived and take something out of his back 

seat. See id. at 65-66, 72-73; N.T. 6/25/12, at 196-98, 206.
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Video evidence showed Ritchey in multiple convenience stores near the 

burglary scenes hours before the crimes;

2 additional video evidence showed 

Ritchey buying water shoes with a four-arrow tread pattern two months before 

the crimes, a pattern troopers found at all four burglarized buildings. See 

N.T., 6/26/12, at 97-98, 104-05, 148-56. After being arraigned, Ritchey 

approached a trooper and asked, “[I]f a person was to commit these 80 to 

100 crimes . . . would it be better for that person to get that out in the open 

all at once?” See id. at 108. When told it would, Ritchey responded, “Sorry 

guys, I can’t.” See id. at 109, 127-30.3

At trial, the jury convicted Ritchey of all charges, and the court imposed 

an aggregate sentence of four to sixteen years of imprisonment. 

Following a direct appeal and lengthy post-conviction proceedings, this 

Court reinstated Ritchey’s appellate rights. See Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 

No. 1318 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super., July 1, 2019). On remand, the trial court 

permitted Ritchey to file counseled post-sentence motions, which the trial 

court then denied. Ritchey filed a notice of appeal, and he and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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2 When interviewed on July 27, 2011, Ritchey denied that he had been in the 

Route 322 area on the night of the burglaries. See N.T, 6/26/12, at 107-08.

3 Ritchey was later convicted of a series of late-night commercial burglaries in 

Venango County, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Ritchey, No. 96 WDA 2014 (Pa. Super., June 17, 2015) 

(unpublished memorandum).
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On appeal, Ritchey raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Ritchey’s] Omnibus 

Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress GPS Tracking Information where:

a.) the issuing county (Allegheny County) lacked jurisdiction 

pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5761?

b.) the warrant authorizing use of the GPS tracking device 

was based on a reasonable suspicion standard or otherwise 

lacked probable cause to establish [Ritchey] was engaged in 

criminal activity at the time the warrant was issued?

2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 

of [Ritchey] of burglary and criminal trespass when there was 

insufficient evidence to establish [Ritchey] entered the 

buildings/property of each victim?

3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict [Ritchey] of 

theft where [Ritchey] was never found to be in control/possession

of any property taken from the victims?

See Ritchey’s Brief at 3-4.

Ritchey first raises related issues concerning the denial of his motion to 

suppress the GPS tracking information. 

Our standard of review of a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a 

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the court’s findings of 

fact are supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1195 

(Pa. Super. 2022). This Court may only consider the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the defense evidence as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record. See id. It is the suppression court’s 

sole province as fact-finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the 
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weight to give their testimony. See id. When the record supports the 

suppression court’s factual findings, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions from those 

facts. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(en banc).

Our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record at the hearing 

on the pre-trial suppression motion. See Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 

A.3d 1217, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021). Where an appellant asserts legal error 

in a suppression court’s ruling, it is this Court’s duty to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. See id. at 7.

Ritchey asserts that the statute authorizing mobile tracking devices, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5761, was amended after the court authorized the placement of 

the GPS device, and, under the amended version of the statute (“the amended 

statute”), the Allegheny County court lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant

for the GPS device. Ritchey also asserts the Commonwealth was required to 

establish probable cause, as the amended statute requires, not reasonable 

suspicion as the statute previously required, and failed to do so.

4

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4 The amended statute provides: “Orders permitted by this section may 

authorize the use of mobile tracking devices if the device is installed and 

monitored within this Commonwealth. The court issuing the order must have 

jurisdiction over the offense under investigation.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5761(b) 

(effective December 24, 2012). The prior version of the statute provided:

“Orders permitted by this section may authorize the use of mobile tracking 

devices within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, and outside that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Regarding Ritchey’s jurisdictional claim, the trial court rejected his 

assertion that the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction 

to issue the warrant in question, which it analyzed under the amended statute. 

The trial court cited this Court’s previous decision in Ritchey’s appeal from a 

series of Venango County sentences. This Court held that that Allegheny 

County did have jurisdiction to obtain the warrant under the amended statute. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 6, citing Ritchey, No. 96 WDA 2014. 

We agree with this Court’s previous finding that Ritchey’s jurisdictional

claim under the amended statute lacks merit. In relevant part, this Court 

found that Allegheny County retained jurisdiction to issue the warrant 

notwithstanding the statute’s amendment:

Under the amendment, the “court issuing the order must have 

jurisdiction over the offense under investigation.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5761(b).

Controversies arising out of violations of the Crimes 

Code are entrusted to the original jurisdiction of the 

courts of common pleas for resolution. See 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 102. Every jurist within that tier of the 

unified judicial system is competent to hear and 

decide a matter arising out of the Crimes Code. Pa. 

Const. Art. 5, § 5 (establishing the jurisdiction of the

courts of common pleas within the unified judicial 

system). 

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jurisdiction, if the device is installed within the jurisdiction of the court of 

common pleas.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5761 (b) (effective December 8, 2008). 

To the extent Ritchey challenges the constitutionality of the former version of 

the statute, while simultaneously asserting the application of the amended 

statute, we decline to address the constitutionality of a statute not before us.
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See Ritchey, No. 96 WDA 2014 at 2 n.1. Thus, there is no merit to Ritchey’s 

jurisdictional claim under the amended statute.

Ritchey’s next assertion that the warrant failed to provide probable 

cause as the amended statute requires is similarly meritless.5 Probable cause 

requires the trial court to make a practical, commonsense decision whether 

all the facts and circumstances provide a “fair probability” that evidence of a 

crime will be found in a particular place, considering the veracity and basis of 

knowledge of the affiant. See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 64 A.3d 641, 655 

(Pa. Super. 2013). See also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 

61 (2018) (probable cause does not require ruling out an innocent explanation 

for suspicious facts).

The trial court stated the Venango County Court of Common Pleas 

properly found that the affidavit, the same one at issue in this case, rose not 

only to the level of reasonable suspicion but also to “the necessary level of 

probable cause.” See Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 6.

Here, a Pennsylvania State Police corporal with over twenty years of 

experience investigating hundreds of violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes 

Code resulting in arrests, convictions, and seizures of evidence, prepared the 

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5 Although a defendant is not generally entitled to the retroactive application 

of a statute, see 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1926, this Court held in Commonwealth v. 

Burgos, 64 A.3d 641 (Pa. Super. 2013), that under the version of the GPS 

statute that existed when the Allegheny County court approved the GPS 

tracking device, the police were required to have probable cause to do so. 

See id. at 651. 
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affidavit. He specified several articulable facts supporting probable cause to 

install the GPS tracker. He recited that between December 23, 2010 and July 

10, 2011, twenty-nine night-time commercial burglaries had been committed 

in Venango County by forced entry. The trooper averred Ritchey had a history 

of theft convictions. Ritchey was also a suspect in a Clarion County burglary

of a commercial property in January 2011 where police found tire tracks 

matching the tires on his car. On July 1, 2011, a burglary was committed at 

84 Lumber in Clarion Borough between 2:23 a.m. and 2:53 a.m., and the 

burglar stole money. An employee of 84 Lumber told police Ritchey had 

visited the business for half an hour the day before. The police found shoe 

prints similar to those found at other commercial burglary sites. Electronic 

surveillance revealed that Ritchey’s car drove from the location of the 84 

Lumber burglary toward his home at 3:10 a.m., seventeen minutes after the 

burglary. See Affidavit of Specific Articulable Facts, 7/08/21. 

 We conclude that the affidavit established the requisite probable cause 

for the attachment of the GPS device. It established a fair probability that a 

GPS device placed on Ritchey’s car would establish evidence of a crime. Thus, 

Ritchey’s suppression claim is without merit. See Burgos, 64 A.3d at 655.6

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6 Ritchey does not offer relevant case law to support his claim that probable 

cause was lacking, instead he offers only argument that others might have 

had criminal histories, his tires were not scientifically proven to match those 

at the crime scene, and others may have been driving near the burglarized 

locations. See Ritchey’s Brief at 10-11. Under the “fair probability” standard, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Ritchey’s second and third issues implicate the sufficiency of the 

evidence. He asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to prove he committed burglary and criminal trespass because the

evidence failed to prove that he entered each victim’s buildings or occupied 

structures, and insufficient evidence of theft because no evidence showed his 

possession of any of the victims’ property.7 

A jury convicted Ritchey of all the burglary, trespass, and other charges 

against him. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate 

court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and with all reasonable inferences 

therefrom, is sufficient to establish every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Haney, 131 A.3d 24, 33 (Pa. 

2015). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by means of 

wholly circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 

565, 578 (Pa. Super. 2021). 

A person commits burglary when, inter alia, he enters a building or 

occupied structure in which no person is present with the intent to commit a 

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such detailed investigative tools are not required to establish probable cause.

See Commonwealth v. Manuel, 194 A.3d 1076, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(stating that an affidavit of probable cause to support a search warrant does 

not require a prima facie showing of criminal activity). 

7 Ritchey does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

criminal mischief convictions.
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crime therein. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. A person commits criminal trespass 

when knowing he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he breaks into any 

building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion 

thereof. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii). A person commits theft by 

unlawful taking if he takes, or exercises control over, movable property of 

another with intent to deprive him thereof. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

Sufficient evidence to sustain Ritchey’s burglary, theft, and criminal 

trespass convictions was demonstrated by the presence of shoe prints at all 

four burglarized locations consistent with the prints on the water shoes Ritchey 

bought, the presence of Ritchey’s vehicle for prolonged periods of time in the 

immediate location of all four burglarized businesses, a trooper’s observation 

of Ritchey driving in the area of the burglaries and Ritchey’s evasive actions 

to avoid being followed, and Ritchey’s observation arriving home in the early 

morning hours after the burglaries and taking something from the back of his 

car. The court rejected Ritchey’s sufficiency claim noting that the 

circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that he was the only person 

who could have taken the money. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/22, at 7-10.

Under the applicable standard of review, we find no error in the trial 

court’s conclusion that Ritchey entered the burglarized properties and 

committed the charged burglaries, thefts, and criminal trespasses, including 

taking money from two of them. See Williams, 255 A.3d 578. Additionally, 

Ritchey’s lie to police that he was not in the Route 322 area at the time of the 
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burglaries, and his volunteered hypothetical question to police after his 

arraignment about whether it would be better for a person to admit to multiple 

crimes all at once provided strong evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See 

Commonwealth v. Ward, 188 A.3d 1301, 1305 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating 

that lies are evidence of consciousness of guilt). Thus, Ritchey’s sufficiency 

arguments merit no relief. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ritchey’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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