UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

CAMERON INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NITRO FLUIDS L.L.C., 

Defendant. 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-00125 

JURY TRIAL REQUESTED 

 

PLAINTIFF CAMERON INTERNATIONAL CORP.’S 

REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF 
 i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1

II. Nitro Misunderstands Its Burden ........................................................................................ 1

III. Disputed Terms ................................................................................................................... 2

A. “fluid conduit” ........................................................................................................ 2

B. “rigid fluid pathway” .............................................................................................. 5

C. “a first connection block positioned at the well fracturing tree” ............................ 6

D. “connection block” .................................................................................................. 7

E. “fracturing operation” ............................................................................................. 7

F. “fracturing tree” / “fracturing trees” ....................................................................... 8

G. “fracturing manifold” / “fracturing fluid distribution manifold” ............................ 9

IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 10
 ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Alloc, Inc. v. ITC, 

342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..............................................................................................3, 4 

Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 

637 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................3 

Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 

815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................8 

Falana v. Kent State Univ., 

669 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................4 

Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 

626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................8 

Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Intel Corp., 

No. 2:17-CV-00676-RWS-RSP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155822 (E.D. Tex. 

Sep. 12, 2018) ............................................................................................................................4 

Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 

582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................3, 4, 5

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 

572 U.S. 898 (2014) ...................................................................................................................7 

Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., 

Case No. 6:11-cv-492-RWS-KNM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148100 (E.D. Tex. 

Sep. 13, 2017) ............................................................................................................................7 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 

415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................1, 2, 3, 4 

Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 

543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................3, 4 

Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 

669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................2 

True Chem. Sols., LLC v. Performance Chem. Co., 

No. MO-18-CV-00078-ADA (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2019) ........................................................2 
 1 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Nitro admits that its central thesis is based on the (mistaken) belief that “the disclosures of 

both Patents-in-Suit demonstrate that the inventions require adjustability” through specific 

adjustment joints. ECF No. 45-1 at 1. To reach this conclusion, Nitro misapplies fundamental 

claim construction canons—ignoring the claims’ plain language and importing limitations from 

the specification into the claims—while disregarding claim differentiation principles. See id. 

Nitro is also wrong that “[n]either patent discloses an embodiment that is without 

adjustability” provided by adjustment joints, pivot joints, or swivels. Id. The ’645 Patent provides 

adjustability by, for instance, positioning pipe joints and connection blocks as desired before 

securing them together. See ECF No. 1-2 at 8:40–43. And the ’132 Patent introduces the adjustable 

elements Nitro seeks to read into all claims as present in only “one embodiment,” and clarifies that 

it discloses that embodiment “without limitation to the claimed subject matter.” ECF No. 1-1 at 

2:2–18. Nitro also ignores the fact that the patentee knew how to claim adjustable components 

when desired (see, e.g., ECF No. 1-1 at claim 1; ECF No. 1-2 at claims 6, 9), but chose not to do 

so in the asserted claims. 

In sum, the claims and specifications compel one conclusion: they do not require, as Nitro 

argues, “at least one adjustable joint (adjustment, pivot, or swivel) somewhere in the claimed 

system.” ECF No. 40-1 at 2. This is why Nitro could not identify any definition or disavowal of 

claim scope in the intrinsic record to support its conclusion. The Court should give the claims the 

full scope afforded by their plain and ordinary meanings. 

II. NITRO MISUNDERSTANDS ITS BURDEN 

Claim construction begins with the words in the claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). As this Court has explained, “[t]he ‘only two 

exceptions to [the] general rule’ that claims are construed according to their plain and ordinary 
 2 

meaning are when the patentee (1) acts as his/her own lexicographer or (2) disavows the full scope 

of the claim term in either the specification or during prosecution.” True Chem. Sols., LLC v. 

Performance Chem. Co., No. MO-18-CV-00078-ADA, at 3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2019) (quoting 

Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

Nitro insists this Court’s claim construction standard as explained in True Chemical is 

wrong and “is simply not the law.” See ECF No. 45 at 2. Nitro instead suggests courts may import 

limitations into the claims from the specification even “absent express definitions or disavowals 

in the specification” because Phillips requires reading the claims in view of the specification. But 

the Federal Circuit has rejected Nitro’s understanding of Phillips. 

For instance, since Phillips the Federal Circuit has reaffirmed that “words of a claim are 

generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” and that (as above) there “are only two 

exceptions to this general rule.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (applying Phillips). This does not mean, 

as Nitro says, that this Court and the Federal Circuit have improperly made the specification 

“subservient to the dictionary.” See ECF No. 45 at 6. It simply means the inquiry begins with the 

claims’ words and must “avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims.” 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 

III. DISPUTED TERMS 

A. “fluid conduit” 

A “channel for conveying fluid” is consistent” with the term “fluid conduit,” but Nitro also 

contends the Court should read “adjustment joint or pivot joint” into this otherwise simple term. 

See ECF No. 45 at 5–6. The claims do not support this. Independent claim 9, for instance, describes 

the fluid conduit as comprising pipes and connection blocks. ECF No. 1-1. It does not recite 

adjustment joints or pivot joints. But its dependent claim 11 adds such elements, requiring that 

“the single fluid conduit [of claim 9] includes at least one adjustment joint.” Id. This creates a 
 3 

strong presumption that these elements are not required in the independent claim. See Am. 

Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

Nitro, however, contends that the claim differentiation presumption does not apply because 

its proposal for “fluid conduit” disjunctively requires an adjustment joint or a pivot joint, and thus 

(in Nitro’s view) a dependent claim requiring only an “adjustment joint” is not superfluous. ECF 

No. 45 at 8. Under Nitro’s theory, every dependent claim limitation could be read into an 

independent claim disjunctively without raising claim differentiation concerns. Nitro cites no 

authority that would support that conclusion. This is so because it contradicts claim differentiation 

principles, which recognize that if an element appears in a dependent claim, this suggests that 

“when the inventor wanted to restrict the claims to require [the limitation], [the inventor] did so 

explicitly.” See Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Rather than rebutting the claim differentiation presumption (as Nitro argues), the 

specification confirms it. The specification underscores that the connection blocks and pipes in 

claim 9 differ from pivot joints and the adjustment joints of claim 11. ECF No. 1-1 at 4:66–5:3. 

When present, the specification identifies the pivot joints and adjustment joints explicitly. See id.

But they are not, as Nitro insists, in every embodiment. See id. at 2:2–6 (explaining that such joints 

are in “one embodiment” described “without limitation to the claimed subject matter”). 

Lacking support in the specification, Nitro misinterprets Phillips to permit reading 

limitations like “adjustment joint” or “pivot joint” into otherwise simple claim terms like “fluid 

conduit,” with no supporting definition in the specification, and with no clear disavowal of claim 

scope, if doing so does not read in an embodiment’s “exact configuration.” See ECF No. 45 at 7 

(citing Alloc, Inc. v. ITC, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 

F.3d 1306, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). None of these cases support Nitro’s proposition. 
 4 

First, the Federal Circuit has already distinguished Alloc under similar circumstances, 

explaining that it does not hold that courts may read elements from preferred embodiments into 

the claims, even when those elements appear in every disclosed embodiment. See Falana v. Kent 

State Univ., 669 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The decision in Alloc rather turned on the fact 

that “the specification defined the invention” as including the disputed limitation, and “the 

applicant emphasized the criticality of [the disputed limitation] during prosecution and 

distinguished the prior art on that basis.” See id. (emphasis added). Nitro has identified no such 

definitions or disavowals of scope. 

Second, unlike “fluid conduit,” which has an ordinary and customary meaning, the 

disputed term in Praxair (“flow restrictor”) was a nonce term with no ordinary and customary 

meaning. See Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Intel Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00676-RWS-RSP, 2018 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 155822, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2018) (distinguishing Praxair). The Federal Circuit 

explicitly rejected defining that term based on “specific embodiments” in the specification. 

Praxair, 543 F.3d at 1323, 1325. To the contrary, the Praxair Court determined it should construe 

the term more broadly than the exemplary embodiments suggested. See id. 

Third, Phillips does not limit its warnings to importing the “exact configurations” of 

preferred embodiments into claims, as Nitro contends. See ECF No. 45 at 7. Rather, it holds that 

“[t]he patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and [the Federal Circuit] will not limit 

him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into the claims.” 

Kara, 582 F.3d at 1348 (applying Phillips) (emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of the 

claim term “fluid conduit” requires adding “comprising an adjustment joint or pivot joint,” nor 

does anything in the specification’s description of embodiments. 

Kara shows how Phillips applies in the circumstances that Nitro argues (incorrectly) are 
 5 

present here. It similarly begins with a claim differentiation presumption. See id. And in Kara, 

“the specification repeatedly discusses [the disputed limitation],” and it consistently appears “[i]n 

the only detailed embodiments in the patent.” See id. But Kara held this did not overcome the 

claim differentiation presumption because “the patentee did not act as his own lexicographer or 

disavow claim scope.” See id. This Court should similarly reject Nitro’s proposal. 

B. “rigid fluid pathway” 

Nitro’s arguments on this term fail for substantially the same reasons as its arguments on 

“fluid conduit.” Here again, “fluid pathway” and “route for fluid flow” are not substantially 

different, but there is no patent-law or English-language basis to read the words “comprising an 

adjustment joint or pivot joint” into that simple phrase. The claims differentiate between 

embodiments with adjustment joints or swivels (e.g., dependent claims 6 and 9) and those without 

(e.g., independent claim 1). ECF No. 1-2. The claim differentiation presumption thus applies 

because the patentee knew how to claim adjustment joints and swivels, and deliberately chose to 

do so in some claims but not others. See Kara, 582 F.3d at 1348. 

According to Nitro, its construction does not implicate claim differentiation because it 

reads the elements of two dependent claims (6 and 9) disjunctively into independent claim 1. ECF 

No. 45 at 12. But just as with “fluid conduit” (see Section III.B, supra), Nitro cites no support for 

its theory that an independent claim includes the elements of all directly dependent claims in the 

disjunctive, or how that theory squares with claim differentiation principles. Instead, it argues that 

the claim differentiation presumption does not apply because (in Nitro’s mistaken view) every 

embodiment in the specification includes an adjustment joint or swivel. See ECF No. 45 at 6–7. 

Nitro is wrong on the law. Even if every embodiment included adjustment joints or swivel 

joints (they do not), this cannot rebut the claim differentiation presumption. See Kara, 582 F.3d at 

1347. Nitro is also wrong on the facts. The ’645 Patent discloses embodiments lacking adjustment 
 6 

joints and swivel joints, including by describing embodiments where pipe joints and connection 

blocks “could be rotated to desired positions before assembling these components together” to 

provide for any adjustments. ECF No. 1-2 at 8:40–43. Nitro tries to avoid this embodiment by 

contorting the specification’s wording and context. See ECF No. 45 at 9–12. 

But the plain text is clear. The specification describes this embodiment without adjustment 

joints or swivel joints in the context of distinguishing it from the embodiment in Figure 10, which 

shows such elements. See id. at 9. Describing Figure 10, the specification notes that “[a]s presently 

illustrated the fluid conduit 26 with rotatable components has three rotational degrees of freedom.” 

See ECF No. 1-2 at 8:39–40 (emphasis added). It then explains that “other embodiments could 

have fewer.” See id. (emphasis added). Reaching the next logical conclusion, it describes “some 

instances” where “adjacent [not rotatable] pipes 170 and connection blocks 172 could be rotated 

to desired positions before assembling these components together.” Id. at 8:40–43 (emphasis 

added). The passage concludes by again distinguishing that embodiment from “some 

embodiments” that use swivels to facilitate rotating portions of the fluid pathway “while those 

portions are connected to one another.” See id. at 8:43–48 (emphasis added). 

For these reasons, as well as the reasons discussed above with respect to “fluid conduit,” 

the Court should reject Nitro’s proposal and apply plain and ordinary meaning. 

C. “a first connection block positioned at the well fracturing tree” 

Nitro essentially contends this term is indefinite because it believes (incorrectly) that 

definiteness demands the precise “outer limits” at which a connection block stops being 

“positioned at” a fracturing tree. ECF No. 45 at 15. Its briefs, however, highlight that a POSITA 

would understand this term with reasonable certainty. Nitro concedes that a POSITA would 

understand this term to “[o]bviously” include “a connection block on top of or directly touching 
 7 

the tree.” ECF No. 40 at 15.1 It also concedes that a POSITA would understand that wellheads 

distanced as shown in Figure 3 are not “positioned at” each other. ECF No. 45 at 13. 

Nitro feigns confusion based on vague and incomplete hypotheticals about connection 

blocks positioned varying numbers of feet from a fracturing tree (id. at 15), implying the Court 

should resolve all potential (and hypothetical) factual disputes about the application of this 

otherwise simple term at the claim construction stage. But definiteness does not require absolute 

precision. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909–10 (2014). And even if this 

term might lead to good-faith factual disputes about its application in specific systems, it is not 

claim construction’s role to resolve all potential factual disputes for the jury. See Network-1 Techs., 

Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., Case No. 6:11-cv-492-RWS-KNM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

148100, at *19 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 13, 2017). The Court should thus find this term not indefinite. 

D. “connection block” 

Nitro now proposes that “‘connection block’ is ‘a component that connects pipes or other 

elements together.’” See ECF No. 45 at 16. This is less problematic than Nitro’s original proposal 

because it does not read in an unsupportable limitation about changing the direction of flow. But 

it still unnecessarily complicates a simple two-word term by making it a nine-word term and by 

vaguely introducing “pipes or other elements,” which is unnecessary when later limitations state 

that “one or more pipe sections” are coupled to the connection blocks. ECF No. 1-1 at claim 9. 

The Court should apply plain and ordinary meaning. 

E. “fracturing operation” 

Nitro incorrectly suggests the Court cannot apply plain and ordinary meaning simply 

 

1

 Nitro first admitted “positioned at” would “[o]bviously” include “a connection block on top of 

or directly touching the tree.” ECF No. 40 at 15. Nitro now contends a connection block absolutely 

cannot be on the tree. See ECF No. 45 at 13-14. Nitro was right the first time. 
 8 

because Nitro has proposed a different construction. See ECF No. 16 (citing Eon Corp. IP 

Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But the Federal Circuit 

affirmed in Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp. that courts may apply the plain and ordinary 

meaning rather than choose a specific definition when doing so resolves the dispute. See 626 F.3d 

1197, 1206–07 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Eon, by contrast, dealt with a distinct situation when applying 

plain and ordinary meaning did not resolve whether the term was limited in the manner a party 

proposed. See 815 F.3d at 1319. 

There is no dispute between the parties here about whether the ordinary meaning of 

“fracturing operation” is broader than “an act of injecting fluid into a well to create man-made 

fractures in a hydrocarbon bearing formation.” See ECF No. 45 at 17 (Nitro listing other parts of 

a fracturing operation). Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of “fracturing operation” thus 

settles the dispute: it is not artificially limited to “an act of injecting fluid into a well to create manmade fractures in a hydrocarbon bearing formation,” as Nitro proposes. 

Nitro is wrong that its construction would “clarify” the claim for the jury. It would instead 

complicate the claim by replacing two simple words with seventeen, including complex phrases 

like “man-made fractures” and “hydrocarbon bearing formation” that would require even more 

explanation while having no substantive relationship to the claim. POSITAs, as well as jurors in 

this district, understand the meaning of a fracturing operation. The Court should reject Nitro’s 

attempt to complicate and improperly limit the term. 

F. “fracturing tree” / “fracturing trees” 

Nitro says it is agreeable to Cameron’s proposed compromise of “a tree having at least one 

valve that can control the flow of fracturing fluid during a fracturing operation.” ECF No. 45 at 

18 (emphasis added). Yet Nitro incorrectly concludes that this “clearly encompasses ordinary 

production trees.” See id. As Cameron has explained, an ordinary production tree does not have a 
 9 

valve that can control the flow of fracturing fluid during a fracturing operation. See ECF No. 41 at 

11–14. This alternative construction properly gives meaning to the inventor’s use of the specific 

term “fracturing tree” instead of other terms like “Christmas tree” or “production tree.” The Court 

should thus reject Nitro’s attempt to accept an alternative construction limited to fracturing, and 

then say, “except it is not limited to fracturing.” The term “fracturing tree” was included in the 

claims, and not “tree,” “a production tree,” or “Christmas tree,” because those more general terms 

are not the components of the invention and do not meet the inventor’s intent. 

G. “fracturing manifold” / “fracturing fluid distribution manifold” 

Nitro argues incorrectly that the Court should apply an atypical definition of “fracturing 

manifold” that does not require valves. Nitro concedes that there is no special definition of 

“fracturing manifold” in the specification or the claims. See ECF No. 45 at 19–20 (describing 

disclosures about these elements as limited to “preferred embodiments”). The only industry 

definition in the record for “fracturing manifold” defines it as “[a] system of frac valves that directs 

treatment fluid from the missile to multiple frac trees.” ECF No. 41-3 (emphasis added). And none 

of Nitro’s definitions—all of which are for the general term “manifold” (see ECF No. 40-9 at 

NITRO001046-051)—support its self-serving conclusion that “there is no ordinary, fixed 

meaning” of the more specific term “fracturing manifold.” ECF No. 45 at 18. 

Nitro is also wrong that Cameron has taken different positions in other proceedings. 

Dr. Wooley has consistently said that fracturing manifolds have valves, including during the 

deposition Nitro cites, when he answered “I don’t see how” to Nitro’s question about whether a 

“fracturing manifold” could be just pipes. See ECF No. 40-9 at 115:17–23. Likewise, the 

annotation of Nitro’s accused system related to different claims in another patent is not inconsistent 

with a fracturing manifold having a valve. Nitro tried the same misdirection before the PTAB, 

which recognized that this annotation addressed a different term (“goat head”) and could not have 
 10 

addressed whether there was a valve in the accused fracturing manifold because the fracturing 

manifold in the annotation extends beyond the edges of the photograph. See ECF No. 40-8 at 12–

13, 16. And after considering essentially the same evidence and arguments that Nitro advances 

here, the PTAB concluded that Nitro was wrong and decided a “fracturing manifold” requires “at 

least one valve.” See id. at 17. This Court should similarly reject Nitro’s proposal. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court therefore should find “a first connection block positioned at the well fracturing 

tree” not indefinite, should reject Nitro’s improper limiting constructions, and should apply the 

plain and ordinary meaning to the terms in accord with Cameron’s proposals.
 11 

DATED: October 9, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ John R. Keville

John R. Keville 

Texas Bar No. 00794085 

jkeville@winston.com 

Merritt D. Westcott (Pro Hac Vice) 

Texas Bar No. 24027091 

mwestcott@winston.com 

William M. Logan 

Texas Bar No. 24106214 

wlogan@winston.com 

Evan D. Lewis (Pro Hac Vice) 

Texas Bar No. 24116670 

edlewis@winston.com 

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 

800 Capitol Street, Suite 2400 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Telephone: (713) 651-2600 

Facsimile: (713) 651-2700 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF, 

CAMERON INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION 

 
 12 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on the 9th day of October, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing 

to the following: 

 J. David Cabello 

 david@chzfirm.com 

 James H. Hall 

 james@chzfirm.com 

 Stephen D. Zinda 

 stephen@chzfirm.com 

 CABELLO HALL ZINDA, PLLC 

 801 Travis Street, Suite 1610 

 Houston, TX 77002 

 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, 

 NITRO FLUIDS L.L.C. 

 /s/ John R. Keville 

 John R. Keville