J-S58032-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

_____________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

IN RE: M.R.B. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER : No. 180 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 18, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at No(s): 2015-0125

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2016

Appellant, J.B. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the York 

County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of the York 

County Offices of Children, Youth & Families (“CYF”) for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor child (born January 

2009), M.R.B. (“Child”).1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On August 11, 2015, CYF filed an application for emergency protective 

custody of Child, based on allegations of abandonment. Specifically, CYF 

learned that sometime in early July 2014, Mother decided she could no 

longer perform parental duties for Child and left Child in the care of Mother’s 

father (“Maternal Grandfather”). Maternal Grandfather was unable to care 

for Child, so he contacted Wesley Pritt, Child’s second cousin, to see if Mr. 

 

1 The court also granted CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights. Father has not challenged that decision. 
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Pritt and his wife were willing to parent Child. After several requests, Mr. 

and Mrs. Pritt agreed; and Child began living with the Pritts and their three 

children on July 14, 2014. The Pritts tried to enroll Child in school but were 

unable to do so because they did not have legal custody of Child. When 

Child came to live with the Pritts, she was one year behind in school. Child 

also needed medical attention regarding a dental issue. The court granted 

CYF’s application and awarded CYF temporary legal and physical custody of 

Child; and CYF continued Child’s placement with the Pritts. The court held a 

shelter care hearing on August 13, 2015, after which the court awarded legal 

and physical custody of Child to CYF; and CYF continued Child’s placement 

with the Pritts. CYF filed a petition for adjudication of dependency on August 

14, 2015. Following a dependency hearing, the court adjudicated Child 

dependent on October 13, 2015, with a goal of adoption.2 

Since July 2014, Child has been living in the care of others. On 

October 27, 2015, CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. The court held a termination hearing on December 18, 

2015. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties incorporated into the 

record the proceedings and filings docketed in the related dependency 

action. Marilyn Monkowski testified that she is an intake caseworker for CYF. 

Ms. Monkowski said Mother currently resides in Delaware, and there is no 

 

2 The Family Court in Sussex County, Delaware, previously adjudicated Child 

dependent on July 11, 2011, based on Mother’s abandonment of Child. The 

Delaware Family Court returned Child to Mother’s custody on January 8, 

2013. 
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evidence that Mother is able to maintain and obtain safe, stable, and 

appropriate housing for herself and Child. Mother did not provide CYF with 

any documentation of a lawful source of income. Mother made no requests 

to CYF since Child’s adjudication of dependency to visit with Child or for 

services. Ms. Monkowski said CYF offered Mother family group decisionmaking services as well as one-way transportation for Mother to visit Child. 

Mother declined CYF’s offer of transportation to visit Child. Mother 

participated in the family group decision-making by speakerphone, at which 

time CYF arranged for appropriate times for Mother to call Mr. Pritt to speak 

with Child. Mother called Mr. Pritt for the first time on the morning of the 

termination hearing. Ms. Monkowski confirmed that Child is doing well in the 

Pritts’ care, attending school, and participating in play therapy. Ms. 

Monkowski said Child refers to the Pritts as mom and dad. Ms. Monkowski 

stated Child has no bond with Mother. Ms. Monkowski opined termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would give Child the permanency she needs so the 

Pritts can adopt Child. 

Mr. Pritt testified Child moved in with his family in July 2014. After 

Child moved in with the Pritts in July 2014, Mother did not attempt to 

contact Child or send Child any cards or presents. Mother also provided no 

financial support for Child. Mr. Pritt said he called Mother a few times and 

told Mother she could call him anytime to speak with Child or learn about 

Child’s wellbeing; Mother told Mr. Pritt she was too scared to call. While 
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living with the Pritts, Child admitted looking at pornography on an IPad. Mr. 

Pritt learned Child had been exposed to sexual behavior while previously 

living with Mother. Child also told Mr. Pritt she had seen Mother use drugs in 

the past. Mr. Pritt said Child is doing great in his care and excelling in 

school. Mr. Pritt stated Child rarely asks about Mother but does ask about 

Child’s brother, who resides with Mother. Mr. Pritt confirmed his willingness 

to let Child visit her brother and Mother, even if the court terminates 

Mother’s parental rights. 

Mother testified by speakerphone. Mother stated she currently resides 

in Delaware and has been attending a methadone clinic since February 2015. 

Mother admitted she is unemployed and seeking employment. Mother lives 

with her boyfriend, who is also unemployed. Mother claimed she was 

unaware Child was living with the Pritts until six or seven months after Child 

began living with them. Mother thought Child was still living with Maternal 

Grandfather during that time. Mother admitted she did not contact the 

police or report Child as missing when she was uncertain of Child’s 

whereabouts. Mother said she was afraid to contact the Pritts after she 

learned Child was living with them because Maternal Grandfather told her 

the Pritts did not want Mother to call them. Mother conceded she last saw 

Child in July 2014, and has performed no parental duties since then. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted CYF’s petition for 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child. On January 15, 
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2016, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal incorrectly under the Juvenile 

Court’s dependency docket number. Mother filed a second notice of appeal 

on January 27, 2016, along with a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), under the correct Orphans’ 

Court docket number. 

Mother raises two issues for our review:

DID MOTHER PRESERVE HER APPELLATE RIGHTS BY 

TIMELY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL EVEN THOUGH IT 

WAS FILED IN THE CLERK OF COURT’S OFFICE RATHER 

THAN THE ORPHANS’ COURT?

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND 

ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TERMINATING MOTHER’S 

PARENTAL RIGHTS WHEN [CYF] FAILED TO MEET ITS 

BURDEN THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS 

WARRANTED UNDER 23 PA.C.S. SECTION 2511(A)(1) AND 

(A)(2) IN THAT OBSTACLES WERE PUT IN MOTHER’S WAY 

WHICH PREVENTED HER FROM LOCATING HER CHILD AND 

PERFORMING PARENTAL DUTIES?

(Mother’s Brief at 3). 

In her first issue, Mother argues she timely filed her notice of appeal 

on January 15, 2016 from the court’s December 18, 2015 termination order 

but inadvertently filed the notice of appeal under the docket number for the 

dependency action. Mother admits she should have filed her notice of 

appeal in the Orphans’ Court. Mother asserts she filed a second notice of 

appeal from the termination order on January 27, 2016, in the Orphans’ 

Court under the correct docket number. Mother maintains she filed her Rule 

1925(a)(2)(i) statement along with the January 27, 2016 notice of appeal. 
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Mother insists this Court should consider the current appeal timely where 

she filed the initial notice of appeal within the requisite thirty-day timeframe 

but filed it in the wrong office. Mother acknowledges her concise statement 

was not filed contemporaneously with her initial notice of appeal. Mother 

emphasizes, however, that the belated filing of her concise statement did 

not prejudice CYF. Mother concludes this Court should consider her appeal 

timely and excuse the late filing of her concise statement. We agree.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 905 provides, in relevant 

part:

Rule 905. Filing of Notice of Appeal

(a) Filing with clerk.

(1) Two copies of the notice of appeal, the order for 

transcript, if any, and the proof of service required by Rule 

906 (service of notice of appeal), shall be filed with the 

clerk of the trial court. ...

(2) If the appeal is a children’s fast track appeal, the 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal as 

described in Rule 1925(a)(2) shall be filed with the notice 

of appeal and served in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(1).

(3) Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the clerk shall 

immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that 

date shall constitute the date when the appeal was taken, 

which date shall be shown on the docket.

(4) If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in an 

appellate court, or is otherwise filed in an incorrect office 

within the unified judicial system, the clerk shall 

immediately stamp it with the date of receipt and transmit 

it to the clerk of the court which entered the order 

appealed from, and upon payment of an additional filing 

fee the notice of appeal shall be deemed filed in the 
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trial court on the date originally filed. 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(1-4) (emphasis added). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) 

(stating in children’s fast track appeal, concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal shall be filed and served with notice of appeal as 

required by Rule 905). Rule 905(a)(2) is procedural, not jurisdictional. In 

re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009). Thus, non-compliance 

with Rule 905(a)(2) results in a defective notice of appeal, subject to a caseby-case waiver analysis and disposition. Id. (declining to quash or dismiss 

appeal or to waive issues, in light of purpose to expedite disposition of 

children’s fast track appeals, where mother filed her concise statement three 

days after notice of appeal and late filing did not prejudice other parties in 

case). 

Instantly, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the court’s 

December 18, 2015 termination order on January 15, 2016, but she 

inadvertently filed it under the Juvenile Court’s dependency docket instead 

of the correct Orphans’ Court docket. Mother’s initial appeal was docketed in 

this Court at 132 MDA 2016. On January 27, 2016, Mother filed an 

amended notice of appeal from the court’s termination order under the 

correct Orphans’ Court docket number, along with a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) 

statement, which was docketed in this Court at 180 MDA 2016. The notice 

of appeal in the certified record for the present appeal at 180 MDA 2016 

contains multiple timestamps indicating the notice of appeal was received by 
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the York County Judicial Center on January 15, 2016, and received in the 

Orphans’ Court division on January 27, 2016. Mother’s initial filing on 

January 15, 2016, preserved that filing date for purposes of the timeliness of 

this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(4). Thus, we consider Mother’s appeal, 

docketed in this Court at 180 MDA 2016, as timely filed.3 Additionally, 

Mother’s delayed Rule 1925 statement did not prejudice any other party in 

this case. Under these circumstances, and in light of the purpose to 

expedite disposition of children’s fast track appeals, we decline to dismiss 

the appeal or to waive Mother’s claims. See In re K.T.E.L., supra. 

In her second issue, Mother argues she did not know where Child was 

living for a significant period. Specifically, Mother asserts that, when she 

learned Maternal Grandfather had placed Child in the Pritts’ care, Mother did 

not know how to contact the Pritts; so she could not fulfill her responsibilities 

to parent Child. Mother contends that she left Child in Maternal 

Grandfather’s care and expected to regain custody of Child in the future. 

When Mother learned Child was living with the Pritts, Mother still believed 

she would regain custody of Child, once CYF became involved in this case; 

but CYF denied her that chance. Mother emphasizes that CYF set the goal in 

this case as adoption upon Child’s adjudication of dependency and did not 

attempt to reunify Mother and Child. Mother avers CYF gave up on her 

before allowing her an opportunity to show she was capable of caring for 

 

3

In a separate judgment order, we dismiss the companion appeal at 132 

MDA 2016 as duplicative.
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Child. Mother concludes CYF failed to show Mother evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child required under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), and this Court must reverse the order granting 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights.4 We disagree.

The standard and scope of review applicable in termination of parental 

rights cases are as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of 

fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses 

and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by [the] 

finder of fact. The burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

the existence of grounds for doing so. 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

 

4 Mother also alleges CYF failed to meet its burden for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother 

failed to raise this claim in her concise statement, so it is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (holding 

generally that any issues not raised in Rule 1925 concise statement will be 

deemed waived on appeal); In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007) 

(explaining waiver rules under Rule 1925 apply in context of family law 

cases). Mother does not contest the court’s termination decision under 

Section 2511(b). 
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as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. If the trial court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even though the record could support an 

opposite result. 

In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 

The court granted CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights on the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for [her] physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied 

by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 
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and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1-2), (b). “Satisfaction of any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), along with consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient 

for involuntary termination of parental rights.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 

758 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where 

the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa.Super. 

2000) (en banc). “Although it is the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the trial court must 

consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the 

six-month statutory provision.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 

(Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005). The 

court must examine the individual circumstances of each case to determine 

if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, warrants 

termination. Id. 

“Under [S]ection 2511, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated 

process.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

The initial focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 
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seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies at least one of 

the nine statutory grounds delineated in section 2511(a). 

If the trial court determines that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination under section 2511(a), then it must 

engage in an analysis of the best interests of the 

child...under section 2511(b), taking into primary 

consideration the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs of the child. 

* * *

[A] best interest of the child analysis under [section] 

2511(b) requires consideration of intangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability. To this end, this Court has 

indicated that the trial court must also discern the nature 

and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

bond. Moreover, in performing a “best interests” 

analysis[, t]he court should also consider the importance 

of continuity of relationships to the child, because severing 

close parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court 

must consider whether a natural parental bond exists 

between child and parent, and whether termination would 

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship. 

Most importantly, adequate consideration must be given to 

the needs and welfare of the child. 

Id. at 10-12 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Section 2511 outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of 

care that parents must provide for their children and a parent who cannot or 

will not meet the requirements may properly be considered unfit and have 

her parental rights terminated. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa.Super. 

2001). 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 
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physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert [herself] 

to take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of ...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the child’s right 

to have proper parenting and fulfillment of...her potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

“When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond 
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between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., supra at 762-63. 

“Above all else[,] adequate consideration must be given to the needs and 

welfare of the child. A parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.” In re Z.P., supra at 

1121. 

Additionally, neither Section 2511(a) nor Section 2511(b) requires a 

court to consider at the termination stage, whether an agency provided a 

parent with reasonable efforts aimed at reunifying the parent with her child 

prior to the agency petitioning for termination of parental rights. In re 

D.C.D., 629 Pa. 325, 342, 105 A.3d 662, 672 (2014). Although the 

agency’s reasonable efforts should be considered, and even ordered in the 

appropriate case, nothing in the statute prohibits the court from granting a 

petition to terminate parental rights under Section 2511 simply because the 

agency failed to provide reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and child. Id.

at 346, 105 A.3d at 675. 

Instantly, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, the court made 

the following remarks on the record:

This is the time set for the matter of the hearing on the 

petition for involuntary termination of parental rights as it 

relates to [Child]. We note that [Child] was placed in the 

care of [CYF] in October of 2015. Prior to that, however, 

she was placed in the care of the current foster care 

providers Mr. and Mrs. Pritt.
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[C]hild is 6 years old having been born January...2009. We 

note that she is almost 7 years of age and has had no 

contact with either parent since at least July of 2014. ...

A petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights was 

filed by [CYF] requesting the court to consider that the 

parents, by conduct continuing for at least six months 

preceding the filing of the petition, either evidenced a 

settled purpose to relinquish their parental claims or failure 

[or] refus[al] to perform parental duties.

We note that although [CYF] is not required to prove both 

allegations[,] that they are in the alternative, we do find 

that [CYF] has provided clear and convincing evidence 

sufficient to prove that both Mother and Father evidenced 

a settled purpose to relinquish their parental claim.

Neither one, for a period of more [than] one year prior to 

the petition, made any efforts to have any contact with 

their child, to locate their child, or use reasonable efforts 

to overcome any barriers that were placed in their path. 

Mother claims that she did not know for at least seven 

months after placing [C]hild in the care of [Maternal 

Grandfather] that [C]hild was not in his care. Clearly, she 

made no effort to see her child during that period of time 

nor at any time after that point.

Since [CYF] has become involved, Mother has been offered 

visitation. She has not taken advantage of that. She has 

not made any effort until this morning to have any contact 

with her child, despite having access to resources in which 

to secure that contact and also access to the information in 

order to contact her daughter directly.

In addition, [CYF] alleges that the parents’ repeated and

continuing incapacity or refusal to parent, the parent has 

caused [Child] to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for her wellbeing. We 

note that the requirement is also that the parent cannot or 

will not remedy the refusal.

* * *
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As it relates to Mother, again, it is clear that she has 

lacked any willingness to overcome any barriers. She 

either will not or cannot remedy the conditions which led 

to removal. She also cannot or will not remedy her refusal 

to parent.

One phone call on the morning of the hearing on the 

petition to terminate her parental rights is not sufficient to 

overcome her incapacity or unwillingness to parent as 

evidenced prior to the petition being filed. She has made 

no indication that she has any willingness to remedy her 

lack of parenting of [Child]; and, therefore, [Child] has 

been without proper care and subsistence as required. 

We note, particularly in light of the fact [that] [C]hild was 

without proper medical care and was unable to be enrolled 

in school due to the parents’ unwillingness to cooperate, 

not once did Mother contact the police or make any effort 

to locate her daughter other than contacting [Maternal 

Grandfather]. She seemed satisfied with his response in 

about February of 2015 that [C]hild was in the care of 

relatives. She appeared satisfied that [C]hild was well 

cared for and had no intention of making any effort to 

parent [C]hild.

The evidence is clear and convincing that both parents 

have failed or refused to perform parental duties, have 

evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish their claim, and 

continue to have incapacity or refusal to parent, which 

would support a termination of their parental rights on 

either of those grounds.

Therefore, after having a hearing on the petition, this 

[c]ourt is satisfied to the truth of the facts set forth in the 

petition, and finds that [Mother] and [Father] have 

forfeited their parental rights with respect to [Child].

The [c]ourt further finds that it is in the best interest of 

[Child] that the petition be granted. We note particularly 

that she has developed a bond with the foster family. 

They are relatives, and they have provided for all of her 

care. We do find that it is in her best interest, as we are 

required to find, that she remain in the care of the foster 

family. There would be no adverse effect to terminating 
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parental rights as neither parent has had any interaction 

with [C]hild for more than a year. 

(N.T. Termination Hearing, 12/18/15, at 63-67). In its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, the trial court elaborated on its findings as follows:

After a review of the record, it is clear that there was 

evidence substantially beyond that which would constitute 

clear and convincing evidence to support the termination 

of [Mother’s] parental rights.

[CYF] first filed for Emergency Protective Custody on 

August 11, 2015. At that time, [C]hild had been in the 

care of a kinship family since approximately July, 2014. 

[Mother] agreed that at the time the petition was filed, 

[CYF] had sufficient evidence to prove that the return of 

[C]hild to [Mother] was not in [C]hild’s best interest. 

[Mother] also stipulated that sufficient evidence was 

presented at a Shelter Care hearing, also held in August, 

to show that return of [C]hild to [Mother] still was not in 

[C]hild’s best interest. [C]hild was adjudicated dependent 

in October with a goal of adoption, and [CYF] then filed a 

Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights on 

October 27, 2015. At no time did [Mother] file an appeal 

of the adjudication of dependency or the goal of adoption, 

nor did she seek to change the goal. ... 

After a full hearing on the Petition, this [c]ourt found that 

clear and convincing evidence existed to show that 

[Mother’s] rights should be terminated under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1) and (2)[ and (b)]. The [c]ourt determined 

that for nearly eighteen months prior to the filing of the 

petition, [Mother] had failed or refused to perform parental 

duties and that she has evidenced a settled purpose to 

relinquish her claim to [C]hild. The [c]ourt further found 

that [Mother] continues to have an inability to parent 

[C]hild and that it cannot and will not be remedied by 

[Mother]. This [c]ourt determined that termination of 

[Mother’s] parental rights was in the best interest of 

[C]hild, as she appears far more bonded with her foster 

family than with [Mother].

In support of the [c]ourt’s findings, we note that [Mother] 
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currently resides in Delaware and claims to have 

transportation issues. She was permitted to appear for the 

hearing by speakerphone. However, [CYF] offered to 

assist with transportation, and that offer was declined. 

[Mother] states that she has had drug dependency issues, 

and that she has been attending a methadone clinic since 

February, 2015, with no established time frame for when 

she will no longer attend the clinic. She testified that one 

of the reasons she has been unable to have contact with 

[C]hild is due to the substantial amount of time she spends 

at the methadone clinic. She additionally testified that she 

has mental health issues including depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. Mother further stated that she 

is unemployed and that she has not held a job since 

approximately June or July of 2014.

At the hearing, credible evidence was presented that since 

[C]hild was adjudicated dependent, [Mother] has not 

contacted [CYF] or visited [C]hild. Evidence was presented 

that since [Mother] left [C]hild with Maternal Grandfather 

in July, 2014, she has not seen [C]hild. Further, [Mother] 

has not provided...cards to [C]hild, or attempted to have 

any involvement with [C]hild’s education or medical care. 

The caseworker further testified that there has been no 

indication that [Mother] has been able to maintain safe 

housing for [C]hild, nor has she verified any lawful source 

of any income.

Evidence was presented even that prior to July, 2014, 

[Mother] has a history of failing to provide parental care to 

[C]hild. When [C]hild resided in Delaware with [Mother], 

the Delaware Division of Family Services was involved due 

to abandonment of [C]]hild by [Mother], and [C]hild was 

removed from the home for approximately a year and a 

half. [C]hild returned to [Mother] in January, 2013. 

[Mother] then left [C]hild with Maternal Grandfather 

approximately 18 months later. Further, there are criminal 

charges pending in Delaware against [Mother] due to 

allegations of drug use in front of [C]hild and sexual abuse 

of [C]hild. [C]hild is now seven years old, and she has 

spent only approximately 18 months out of the last nearly 

five years in [Mother’s] care. Further, she now has a much 

stronger bond with her foster parents than her mother, as 

evidenced by the fact that she refers to them as mom and 
J-S58032-16

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dad, and does not ask about the whereabouts of [Mother].

Perhaps most [convincing] to this [c]ourt’s determination 

was [Mother’s] entirely incredible testimony that she had 

no idea where [C]hild was, [or] the name of the kinship 

care family. [Mother] stated that every time she called 

Maternal Grandfather to inquire as to the whereabouts of 

[C]hild, he would not answer or say that [C]hild could not 

talk to her because she was not home. [Mother], despite 

alleging that she did not know where her child was for 

approximately six months, never called the police or [CYF]. 

[Mother] never reported [C]hild as missing. Despite 

[Mother’s] statements, [Mother] herself testified that she 

learned the whereabouts of [Child] in December, 2014, 

and yet she still failed to attempt any contact with [C]hild.

Even since the adjudication of dependency in [October] of 

2015, [Mother] has failed to contact [CYF] at any time 

despite [CYF]’s offer to assist with transportation. 

[Mother] was informed at a hearing that [CYF] wanted to 

facilitate contact, and Mr. Pritt, [C]hild’s foster father[,] 

made several attempts to contact [Mother] to arrange that 

contact. Mr. Pritt testified that he told [Mother] she could 

call him anytime to speak to [C]hild, and that he would be 

willing to arrange visits, yet [Mother] still failed to contact 

him.

[Mother] had an affirmative duty to parent her child and 

chose not to do so. She was content with others...caring 

for her daughter and made no effort to locate or contact 

[C]hild. [Mother’s] indication that others failed to act is 

misguided. It was [Mother’s] obligation to be the parent of 

[C]hild, and she consistently failed to act as such. 

This [c]ourt found that clear and convincing evidence on 

the record supported the determination that [Mother] has 

consistently failed to parent [C]hild and that [Mother] 

refuses to remedy the situation. Therefore, this [c]ourt 

requests that the Order entered on December 18, 2015 be 

affirmed. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 9, 2016, at 3-9). The record supports 

the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child. See In 
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re Adoption of K.J., supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2016