Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 1 of 105

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION

ANGELA JANELL BURROWS, 

individually and as independent 

administrator of, and on behalf of, the 

ESTATE OF STEPHANIE GONZALES

and STEPHANIE GONZALES’ heirs-atlaw,

 

Plaintiff,

v.

MIDLAND COUNTY, TEXAS; GEORGE 

DARRELL RHEA; MATTHEW FRANCIS 

GROESSEL; MONICA MARIE ALLEN; 

CITY OF MIDLAND, TEXAS; and 

BLAKE ALLEN BLANSCETT,

Defendants.

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 CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:20-CV-62

 JURY DEMANDED

 

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

This is a case of a tragic pre-trial prisoner suicide resulting from violation of 

constitutional rights. Defendants failed to comply with known jail standards and/or 

State law, failed to conduct a proper jail intake, and/or ignored Stephanie in her cell 

while she killed herself. Defendants’ deliberate indifference and objective 

unreasonableness caused Stephanie’s unnecessary suffering and death. 

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Table of Contents

I. Introductory Allegations..............................................................................................4

A. Parties ..............................................................................................................4

B. Jurisdiction and Venue.....................................................................................7

II. Factual Allegations ......................................................................................................8

A. Introduction......................................................................................................8

B. Stefani Gonzales ..............................................................................................9

C. Stefani’s Arrest, Incarceration, and Suicide in the Midland County Jail.........9

1. Stefani’s June 17, 2018 Arrest and Transport to Jail...........................9

2. Summary of Stefani’s Incarceration and Suicide.................................16

3. Witness Statements..............................................................................18

a Allen, Monica – Corporal ........................................................18

b. Anderson – Corporal................................................................25

c. Esquivel, A. – Deputy..............................................................25

d. Groessel, Matthew – Jailer.......................................................25

e. Hunnicutt, K. – Jailer...............................................................32

f. Rhea, George Darrell – Jailer...................................................33

g. Santoyo, A. – Clerk..................................................................40

h. Stotts, J. – SRU Officer............................................................40

i. White, N. – Officer ..................................................................40

4. Video Evidence....................................................................................41

5. Medical Treatment and Death Reports................................................43

a. Medical Records ......................................................................43

b. Autopsy – Tarrant County Medical Examiner.........................44

c. Custodial Death – Midland County Sheriff’s Office (Filed 

with Attorney General) ............................................................44

d. Inquest Report – Judge Cobos.................................................46

E. Investigations...................................................................................................47

1. Midland County ...................................................................................47

2. Texas Rangers......................................................................................54

3. Texas Commission on Jail Standards ..................................................54

F. Midland County Sheriff’s Office Written Policies..........................................59

1. Intake Policies and Procedures ............................................................59

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2. Medical and Mental Health Policies and Procedures ..........................62

G. Defendants’ Knowledge and Education...........................................................66

1. Jail Suicides Are a Known Widespread Problem. ...............................66

2. Fifth Circuit’s Long-Held Constitutional Standard: Continuous 

Observation and Monitoring................................................................67

3. Individual Defendants’ Knowledge, Education, and Background.......72

a. Employment Records...............................................................72

(1) Officer Blake Blanscett................................................72

(2) Corporal Monica Allen ................................................74

(3) Jailer Matthew Groessel...............................................74

(4) Jailer George Rhea.......................................................75

b. TCOLE Records.......................................................................81

H. Monell Liability of Midland County and City of Midland ..............................85

1. Introduction..........................................................................................85

2. Midland County Sheriff’s Office Culture ............................................86

3. Midland County Liability ....................................................................87

4. City of Midland Liability.....................................................................89

III. Causes of Action..........................................................................................................90

A. 14th Amendment Due Process Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Objective 

Reasonableness Pursuant to Kingsley v. Hendrickson.....................................90

B. Remedies for Violation of Constitutional Rights and Other Federal Claims ..93

C. Cause of Action Against Individual Defendants Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

Violation of 14th Amendment Due Process and/or 4th Amendment Rights to 

Reasonable Mental Health Care, to be Protected, and not to be Punished ......94

D. Cause of Action Against Midland County and City of Midland Under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for Violation of 14th Amendment Due Process and/or 4th

Amendment Rights to Reasonable Mental Health Care, to be Protected, and 

not to be Punished............................................................................................98

E. Causes of Action Against Williamson County and/or City of Midland for 

Violation of Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act ............100

IV. Concluding Allegations and Prayer .............................................................................102

A. Conditions Precedent .......................................................................................102

B. Use of Documents at Trial or Pretrial Proceedings .........................................102

C. Jury Demand ....................................................................................................103

D. Prayer ..............................................................................................................103

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TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Plaintiff files this complaint and for cause of action will show the following. 

I. Introductory Allegations

A. Parties

1. Plaintiff Angela Burrows (“Angela Burrows” or “Ms. Burrows”) is a natural person 

who resided in, was domiciled in, and was a citizen of Texas at all relevant times. 

Angela Burrows was Stephanie Gonzales’ biological and legal mother. Stephanie Gonzales is 

referred to herein at times as “Ms. Gonzales” or “Stefani.” Angela Burrows sues in her individual 

capacity and as the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Stephanie Gonzales, Deceased. 

Angela Burrows, when asserting claims in this lawsuit as the Independent Administrator, does so 

in that capacity and on behalf of the estate and all of Stefani’s heirs (including Stefani’s heirs-atlaw, including: Richard Gonzales (husband), Hayden Palacios (son), Mackenzie Clarty (daughter), 

Madison Flemons (daughter), K. G. (minor son), and K. G. (minor daughter)). All of the people 

in the immediately preceding sentence, other than Angela Burrows, are collectively referred to 

herein as the “Claimant Heirs.” Angela Burrows asserts claims on behalf of, and seeks all survival 

damages and wrongful death damages available to, Claimant Heirs. Letters of independent 

administration were issued to Angela Burrows on or about June 17, 2019, in Cause Number 2018-

781,953, in the County Court of Lubbock County, Texas, in a case styled Estate of Stephanie 

Gonzales, Deceased. 

2. Defendant Midland County, Texas (“Midland County”) is a Texas county. Midland 

County may be served with process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) by serving 

its chief executive officer, Honorable County Judge Terry Johnson, at 500 N. Loraine Street, Suite 

1100, Midland, Texas 79701, or wherever Honorable Judge Johnson may be found. Service on 

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such person is also consistent with the manner prescribed by Texas law for serving a summons or 

like process on a county as a Defendant, as set forth in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 

Section 17.024(a). Midland County acted or failed to act at all relevant times through its 

employees, agents, representatives, jailers, and/or chief policymakers, all of whom acted under 

color of State law at all relevant times, and is liable for such actions and/or failure to act to the 

extent allowed by law (including but not necessarily limited to law applicable to claims pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act). Midland

County’s policies, practices, and/or customs were moving forces behind constitutional violations, 

and resulting damages and death, referenced and asserted in this pleading. 

3. Defendant George Darrell Rhea (sometimes referred to herein as “Mr. Rhea,” 

“Jailer Rhea,” or “Receiving Officer Rhea”) is a natural person who resides, is domiciled, and may 

be served with process at 2907 Douglas Drive, Midland, Texas 79701. Mr. Rhea may also be 

served with process wherever he may be found or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(e), by leaving a copy of this complaint and a summons directed to Mr. Rhea at Mr. Rhea’s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there. 

Mr. Rhea is being sued in his individual capacity, and he acted at all relevant times under color of 

State law. Mr. Rhea was employed by Midland County at all such times and acted or failed to act 

in the course and scope of his duties for Midland County.

4. Defendant Matthew Francis Groessel (sometimes referred to herein as “Mr. 

Groessel,” “Jailer Groessel,” or “Officer Groessel”) is a natural person who resides, is domiciled, 

and may be served with process at 4001 Pleasant Drive, Midland, Texas 79703. Mr. Groessel may 

also be served with process wherever he may be found or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(e), by leaving a copy of this complaint and a summons directed to Mr. Groessel at 

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Mr. Groessel’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who 

resides there. Mr. Grossel is being sued in his individual capacity, and he acted at all relevant 

times under color of State law. Mr. Groessel was employed by Midland County at all such times 

and acted or failed to act in the course and scope of his duties for Midland County. 

5. Defendant Monica Marie Allen (sometimes referred to herein as “Ms. Allen,” 

“Jailer Allen,” “Officer Allen,” or “Corporal Allen”) is a natural person who resides, is domiciled, 

and may be served with process at 1208 Pueblo, Midland, Texas 79705. Ms. Allen may also be 

served with process wherever she may be found or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(e), by leaving a copy of this complaint and a summons directed to Ms. Allen at Ms. Allen’s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there. 

Ms. Allen is being sued in her individual capacity, and she acted at all relevant times under color 

of State law. Ms. Allen was employed by Midland County at all such times and acted or failed to 

act in the course and scope of her duties for Midland County.

6. Defendant Blake Allen Blanscett (sometimes referred to herein as “Mr. Blanscett” 

or “Officer Blanscett”) is a natural person who resides, is domiciled, and may be served with 

process at 1608 Shell Avenue, Midland, Texas 79705. Officer Blanscett may also be served with 

process wherever he may be found or, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), by leaving 

a copy of this complaint and a summons directed to Officer Blanscett at Officer Blanscett’s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there. 

Officer Blanscett is being sued in his individual capacity, and he acted at all relevant times under 

color of State law. Officer Blanscett was employed by City of Midland at all such times and acted 

or failed to act in the course and scope of his duties for City of Midland. All natural person 

Defendants (George Darrell Rhea, Matthew Francis Groessel, Monica Marie Allen, and Blake 

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Allen Blanscett) in this case are collectively referred to in this complaint as the “Individual 

Defendants.” 

7. Defendant City of Midland, Texas (“City of Midland”) is a Texas incorporated 

municipality/city. City of Midland may be served with process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(j)(2) by serving its chief executive officer. The identify of City of Midland’s chief 

executive officer is determined by City of Midland’s decision to use the council-manager form of 

government. As a result, City of Midland’s chief executive officer is City Manager Courtney 

Sharp. City Manager Courtney Sharp may be served with process at City Hall, 300 N. Loraine, 

Midland, Texas 79701, or wherever City Manager Sharp may be found. City of Midland may also 

be served with process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) by serving it in the 

manner prescribed by Texas State law for serving a summons or like process (a citation in Texas 

State courts) on such a Defendant. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 17.024(b) reads, “In 

a suit against an incorporated city, town, or village, citation may be served on the mayor, clerk, 

secretary, or treasurer.” Therefore, City of Midland may be served with process by serving its 

mayor, clerk, secretary, or treasurer wherever any such person may be found. City of Midland 

acted or failed to act at all relevant times, in accordance with its customs, practices, and/or policies, 

through its policymakers, chief policymakers, employees, agents, representatives, and/or police 

officers, all of whom acted under color of State law at all relevant times, and is liable for such 

actions and/or failure to act to the extent allowed by law (including but not necessarily limited to 

law applicable to claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 

the Rehabilitation Act).

B. Jurisdiction and Venue

8. The court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit according to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(4), because this suit presents a federal question and seeks relief pursuant 

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to federal statutes providing for the protection of civil rights. This suit arises under the United 

States Constitution and the following federal statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. 

9. The court has personal jurisdiction over Midland County because it is a Texas 

county. The court has personal jurisdiction over City of Midland because it is a Texas 

municipality. The court has personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants because they 

reside and are domiciled in, and are citizens of, Texas. 

10. Venue is proper in the Midland-Odessa Division of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). A substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to claims in this lawsuit occurred in Midland County, which is in 

the Midland-Odessa division of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 

II. Factual Allegations 

 

A. Introduction

11. Plaintiff provides in the factual allegations sections below the general substance of 

certain factual allegations. Plaintiff does not intend that those sections provide in detail, or 

necessarily in chronological order, any or all allegations. Rather, Plaintiff intends that those 

sections provide Defendants sufficient fair notice of the general nature and substance of Plaintiff’s 

allegations, and further demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claim(s) have facial plausibility. Whenever 

Plaintiff pleads factual allegations “upon information and belief,” Plaintiff is pleading that the 

specified factual contentions have evidentiary support or will likely have evidentiary support after 

a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Moreover, where Plaintiff quotes 

a document, conversation, or recording verbatim, Plaintiff has done Plaintiff’s best to do so 

accurately and without any typographical errors. 

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B. Stefani Gonzales

12. Stefani was born in 1981 in Childress, Texas. Stefani was only 36 years old at the 

time of her tragic and unnecessary death, and she was survived by a number of family members. 

C. Stefani’s Arrest, Incarceration, and Suicide in the Midland County Jail 

13. Stefani suffered a tragic, completely unnecessary death in the Midland County jail. 

Individual Defendants’ deliberate indifference, and objective unreasonableness in their actions and 

inaction, caused, was a proximate cause, and was a producing cause of Stefani’s suffering and 

death.

1. Stefani’s June 17, 2018 Arrest and Transport to Jail

14. Midland Police Department Officer Blake Blanscett arrested Stefani on June 17, 

2018. Plaintiff’s counsel obtained certain documents related to that arrest through one or more 

Public Information Act requests before filing suit. A document received by Plaintiff’s counsel, 

providing a narrative description of the arrest, was significantly redacted. 

15. The report indicates that, on Sunday, June 17, 2018, at approximately 6:40 p.m., 

Officer Blanscett was dispatched to a “check person call” at the Resthaven cemetery on North Big 

Spring Street in Midland. Dispatch advised Officer Blanscett that a white female with red hair 

(Stefani) was walking in the middle of the roadway. It was apparent to any observer that Stefani 

was a danger to herself and others at the time. When Officer Blanscett arrived in the area, he 

noticed Stefani in front of the Stripes convenience store located at 4508 North Big Spring Street. 

He then parked his patrol unit and made contact with Stefani. 

16. The report is redacted at this point in time, but the next unredacted sentence reads, 

“Stephanie’s speech was very slurred and seemed very lost.” Officer Blanscett directed Stefani to 

move to the side of the store, so that they could converse more easily away from the noisy traffic. 

This supported that Stefani was close to or intended to walk into busy traffic. 

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17. Officer Blanscett wrote, “While walking to my unit Stefanie was stumbling all over 

the place.” It was thus apparent to Officer Blanscett that Stefani could not be left alone, to her

own devices. Also, upon information and belief, allegations of Individual Defendants and others 

in this complaint about Stefani’s ability to easily communicate in a straightforward manner after 

arriving at the Midland County jail are untrue. 

18. The narrative section was substantially redacted. Officer Blanscett wrote that 

Stefani told him that she had taken Xanax pills – approximately 10 that day. Upon information 

and belief, this indicated to Officer Blanscett that Stefani was taking more medication than any 

reasonable person would take to treat issues treated by Xanax – anxiety disorders, panic disorders, 

and anxiety caused by depression. Instead, it was apparent to Officer Blanscett that Stefani was 

making an outcry as to her intent to attempt to commit suicide. 

19. Officer Blanscett placed Stefani under arrest for public intoxication, noting that 

Stefani was a danger to herself. This is one of the elements required for a public intoxication

offense – that a person may be a danger to herself or others. Officer Blanscett ended the narrative 

section by writing, “Later in the night around 2200 hours I was made aware that Stephanie had 

committed suicide in her cell after I had booked her in. No further.” This would have been no 

surprise to Officer Blanscett, as Stefani’s demeanor, her walking in the middle of the busy 

roadway, her psychological history communicated to Officer Blanscett, by Stefani, and her 

indication that she had taken 10 Xanax pills that day clearly showed Officer Blanscett that Stefani 

intended to kill herself.

20. The redactions appear to have been made by City of Midland not for any privacy 

or other legally-required reasons, but instead to try to avoid liability for Stefani’s death. City of 

Midland also violated or facilitated violation of the Texas Public Information Act in response to a 

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request by Plaintiff’s counsel, evidenced by Officer Blanscett calling Plaintiff’s counsel’s office 

and asking why Plaintiff’s counsel was seeking records about him. Regardless, the following 

quotation is portions that were redacted from Officer Blanscett’s report mentioned elsewhere in 

this pleading. 

I advised Stephanie the reason for the contact and asked if everything was ok. 

Stephanie advised she was feeling depressed but did not specify a reason why upon 

me asking. I asked Stephanie if she was suicidal, which she advised she was not. I 

asked Stephanie why she was walking in the middle of the roadway, which she 

could not specify a reason why. . . . I asked Stephanie if she had taken any type of 

narcotics or any type of alcoholic beverage that would justify her reason for walking 

in the middle of the roadway, along with her slurred speech and unbalanced 

walking. . . . I asked her how many pills she had taken today, which . . . I asked 

Stephanie if she lived in Midland. She advised she lives in Hollis, Oklahoma and 

nowhere near Midland. . . . I then placed Stephanie into handcuffs which were 

double locked and placed her in the back of my patrol unit. . . . While driving to 

CDC I asked Stephanie if she was diagnosed anything for the screening sheet at the 

jail. Stephanie advised that she has PTSD, Bipolar, and depression. I then asked if 

she was suicidal in the past 90 days, which she advised she was not. Upon arrival 

at CDC Stephanie was booked in. Body cam as well as in-car video and audio was 

uploaded and is available.

21. When Officer Blanscett arrived at the Midland County Detention Center to transfer 

custody of Stefani, upon information and belief, he completed the Midland County Central 

Detention Center Screening Form for Suicide and Mental Impairments. While the form is typed, 

it indicates that the completing officer was “B. Blanscett,” and the agency was “Midland Police 

Dept.” 

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22. Further, upon information and belief, that form required Officer Blanscett to answer 

the following question: “Does the arresting officer or any other person have reasonable cause to 

believe that the defendant committed to the sheriff’s custody has a MEDICAL CONDITION, 

MENTAL ILLNESS, MENTAL RETARDATION, OR SUICIDE CONCERN?” Officer 

Blanscett checked “No.” He knew that such response was false based upon his interaction with 

Stefani and information he learned and which is referenced in this complaint. The fact that his 

response was false is further supported by what he, upon information and belief, typed into the 

comments section and/or affirmed when he allowed his name to be placed at the bottom of the 

form: “SUBJECT ADVISED IS DIAGNOSED WITH PTSD, BIPOLAR DISORDER AND 

DEPRESSION AND WOULD LIKE AN ISOLATED CELL.” It was clear that, when Stefani 

requested an isolated cell, in conjunction with taking an overdose of Xanax, being diagnosed with 

PTSD, being diagnosed as being bipolar, being diagnosed as being depressed, and walking in the 

street, Stefani was looking for an isolated cell so she could finish what she attempted to do during 

the day – commit suicide. 

23. Officer Blanscett also falsely checked the “No” box next to medications or, in the 

alternative, by allowing his name to be placed on the form, affirmed that the response was true. 

He clearly knew that Stefani indicated that she had overdosed on Xanax by taking ten pills during 

the day. Every law enforcement officer and jailer would know that taking ten Xanax pills would 

be well above any prescribed dosage. 

24. Officer Blanscett also falsely checked the “NO” box in response to the question, 

“Are there any current medical problems, recent hospitalizations or serious injuries or concerns 

about withdrawal?” As described by Corporal Allen in her statement, referenced elsewhere in this 

complaint, both Corporal Allen and Officer Blanscett saw a hospital bracelet on Stefani from her 

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hospitalization the day before. This is yet another reason why Officer Blanscett should have taken 

Stefani immediately to an appropriate mental health facility. Warning bells had to be going off in 

Officer Blanscett’s head as to Stefani committing suicide.

25. Texas law was clear in requiring Officer Blanscett to take Stefani to an appropriate 

mental health facility, rather than transporting her to the Midland County jail. The Texas Health 

and Safety Code, specifically Chapter 573, entitled “Emergency Detention,” is unambiguous 

regarding duties of a peace officer who comes in contact with a person with mental illness and 

who, as a result, is at a substantial risk of harm unless the person is immediately restrained. Section 

573.001 reads that a peace officer may take a person into custody, without a warrant, if the peace 

officer has reason to believe and does believe that (1) the person is a person with mental illness; 

and (2) because of the mental illness there is substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to 

others unless the person is immediately restrained, and there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant 

before taking the person into custody. The section indicates that a substantial risk of serious harm 

to such a person may be demonstrated either by the person’s behavior, or by evidence of severe 

emotional distress and deterioration in the person’s mental condition to the extent that the person 

cannot remain at liberty. The section also indicates that a peace officer may form the belief that 

the person meets the criteria for apprehension on the basis of the apprehended person’s conduct, 

or the circumstances under which the apprehended person is found.

26. Chapter 573 also reads, explicitly, that a peace office who takes such a person into 

custody “shall immediately:” 

Transport the apprehended person to:

• The nearest appropriate inpatient mental health facility; or 

• A mental health facility deemed suitable by the local mental health authority, if 

an appropriate inpatient mental health facility is not available. 

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Further: “A jail or similar detention facility may not be deemed suitable except in an extreme 

emergency.” (Emphasis added).

27. There is no doubt that Officer Blanscett was faced with the situation described by 

Chapter 573. He heard about Stefani walking in the middle of a roadway. Stefani told Officer 

Blanscett that she had taken 10 Xanax pills that day, had PTSD, was bi-polar, and was depressed. 

Those comments, taken together with her walking in the roadway, the medical bracelet on her arm, 

and other information referenced in this pleading, clearly evidenced to any person, including all 

reasonable police officers, that Stefani had a mental illness resulting in not only a substantial risk 

of serious harm to her, but her apparent intent to commit suicide.

28. Upon information and belief, Officer Blanscett was fully aware of Chapter 573 and 

his obligation to transport Stefani to an appropriate mental health facility. Moreover, information 

and belief, Officer Blanscett was clearly aware that the statement about Stefani indicating that she 

had taken 10 Xanax that day was a statement indicating she had intended to overdose on the drug 

and further harm herself. Considering other facts in this pleading, Officer Blanscett was

deliberately indifferent to, and acted in an objectively unreasonable manner regarding, Stefani’s 

serious mental health needs. Instead of complying with the law, and providing constitutional 

protection to Stefani, Officer Blanscett took Stefani to the one location to which he should not 

have taken her – the Midland County jail. 

29. Chapter 573 clearly and unambiguously requires peace officers not to take a person 

in Stefani’s situation to a local jail “except in an extreme emergency.” There was no “extreme 

emergency” requiring Officer Blanscett to take Stefani to the jail, at which she ultimately 

committed suicide within a very short period of time. 

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30. In the alternative, to the extent evidence indicates other than what Plaintiff expects 

the evidence will indicate after further discovery, if Officer Blanscett was unaware of Chapter 573 

or had not been trained about Chapter 573 nor how to handle mentally ill people such as Stefani, 

this would be an independent basis for a Monell claim against City of Midland. In such a case, 

City of Midland would not have appropriately supervised Officer Blanscett, allowing him to act 

on his own regard in Stefani and people in her situation, and likewise would not have trained him 

for one of the most basic scenarios which he would face in the field. Nevertheless, even if Officer 

Blanscett had not been trained about Chapter 573 or sufficiently supervised, based upon his 

interaction with Stefani, it was clear that she did not need to be taken to a jail, but instead to an 

appropriate mental health facility. Officer Blanscett’s failure to do so was objectively 

unreasonable and deliberately indifferent to Stefani’s constitutional rights.

2. Summary of Stefani’s Incarceration and Suicide

31. General details regarding Stefani’s incarceration and suicide are set forth below, in 

the form of summaries of statements of persons involved, and referenced documents. Thus, this 

portion of the pleading provides just a general summary of some events. 

32. As shown elsewhere in this pleading, when Stefani arrived at the Midland County 

jail, Corporal Allen would not initially accept her as a prisoner. Corporal Allen was concerned 

that Stefani had ingested ten Xanax and was thus suicidal. Therefore, Corporal Allen caused a 

registered nurse to consult with Stefani. 

33. Registered nurse Amanda Marshall, at the Midland County jail, wrote a summary 

of her interaction with Stefani. Nurse Marshall wrote, regarding her initial interaction with Stefani:

Called to booking around 1900, advised PT had taken some Xanax. When 

questioned, she stated “Yes, I take Xanax.” When asked how many, she stated “10, 

not at once, it was throughout the day. I take it every day.” Asked again if she took 

a handful of pills . . . she stated “no, it wasn’t at once” PT was alert & answered 

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questions directly. Asked if I could take her handcuffs off, motioned to officer & 

stated he was the one that did that. Notified CPL what she stated. 

34. Upon information and belief, Nurse Marshall knew that a typical prescription for 

Xanax would not allow a person to take ten pills throughout the day. It would make little sense, 

assuming a 10-hour period of time, for a person to take a Xanax once an hour. Thus, upon 

information and belief, it was unreasonable and deliberately indifferent for Nurse Marshall to 

allow Stefani to remain at the facility without immediate mental health treatment. Likewise, since, 

upon information and belief, Corporal Allen knew of the cursory interaction between Nurse 

Marshall and Stefani, Corporal Allen could not rely on Nurse Marshall’s determination as being 

in fact a medical opinion. All laypersons such as Corporal Allen, as such laity relates to medical 

and/or mental health knowledge, would know that Nurse Marshall did not in fact conduct an 

appropriate evaluation of Stefani. 

35. Jail staff also performed a CCQ query regarding Stefani. A CCQ query informs a 

jail as to whether an arrestee has likely received mental health care. The Midland County jail 

received a match, indicating that Stefani had received care from West Texas Centers. This would 

indicate to Individual Defendants and anyone else working at the jail that Stefani had received 

mental health treatment at West Texas Centers for MHMR. This was yet another red flag 

indicating that Stefani needed immediate inpatient mental health treatment and not to be 

incarcerated in the Midland County jail. Upon information and belief, Corporal Allen was the 

Midland County employee who obtained the CCQ information.

36. As shown elsewhere in this pleading, Corporal Allen ultimately changed out 

Stefani’s clothing and allowed her to be placed into a cell – alone – with jail-issued clothing which 

was not designed for a suicidal person. After Corporal Allen put Stefani into such a cell, other 

Midland County Individual Defendants did virtually nothing for a lengthy period of time. They 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 18 of 105

neither complied with 30-minute face-to-face observation standards and/or policies, or a similar 

15-minute face-to-face observation policy. Instead, all Midland County Individual Defendants 

chose to allow Stefani to remain in a cell – alone – for over an hour while Stefani committed 

suicide using her jail-issued pants. 

37. Thus, which was a surprise to no one, only approximately two-and-a-half hours

(according to Nurse Marshall) after Nurse Marshall initially spoke with Stefani, Nurse Marshall 

was called to a medical emergency in booking. Nurse Marshall wrote: 

Around 2130, I Amanda Marshall, RN was called to a medical emergency in 

booking while in G block passing meds. Notified that the PT had strangled herself 

with her pants. CPR was in progress upon arrival & was continued by this nurse 

with the officers assistence. Requested officers to bring AED & Ambu bag . . . 

oxygen tank. AED initiated & rescue breaths given via Ambu bag give via Ambu 

bag . . . continuous 2 person CPR. CPR was continued until EMS arrived. EMS 

took over situation upon arrival, PT was loaded onto stretcher and transferred 

offsite via EMS. 

Stefani had committed suicide. Individual Defendants had acted objectively unreasonably and 

been deliberately indifferent to Stefani’s known serious mental health and self-harm tendencies. 

Thus, Individual Defendants’ actions and inaction caused, were proximate causes of, and were 

producing causes of all damages asserted in this pleading, including Stefani’s death. 

3. Witness Statements

a Allen, Monica – Corporal

38. Corporal Monica Allen gave a statement to Investigator Chavez and Texas Ranger 

Sanchez. Her statement began at approximately 12:53 a.m. on June 18, 2018. Corporal Allen said 

that she was Corporal of the B shift booking. She indicated that her duties were to supervise her 

officers and to make sure that everything was running smoothly and correctly. She said that 

supervisors were supposed to be in the back watching everyone but, due to being short-handed, 

she was at Booking One. She said that she was at Booking One at the time Officer Groessel called 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 19 of 105

for a medical emergency after Stefani had committed suicide. She offered no real defense or 

excuse, other than what is stated above, as to why she was not involved at all with Stefani after 

putting her into the cell in which she committed suicide. She described attempts to revive Stefani, 

and what was found in the cell, after jailer Groessel found Stefani. She confirmed that Stefani had 

used jail-issued pants to form a ligature and commit suicide. 

39. Corporal Allen admitted that she was the person who assisted Stefani in changing 

into her jail clothing. She said that she had “medical” check Stefani out before being received, 

Officer Blanscett told Corporal Allen that Stefani had taken “like five or ten Xanax.” Corporal 

Allen then said, “Whoa. Okay. Well, hold on. I’m not taking her.” She said that she then said, “let 

me go get a nurse to evaluate her first cause. . . . I mean, did you take her to the hospital?” Corporal 

Allen then said that Officer Blanscett then said, “No.” Corporal Allen said that she then looked at 

Stefani and noticed the hospital bracelet. She said that she then asked Officer Blanscett, “You 

didn’t take her?” Corporal said that he then responded, “No. That . . .” She said that Officer 

Blanscett told Corporal Allen that the bracelet was from three days ago. Corporal Allen then said 

that she told Officer Blanscett, “Okay. Well, let me get the nurse first. I can’t accept her.” 

40. It was clear from interaction between Corporal Allen and Officer Blanscett that 

both realized that Stefani needed immediate health care. Corporal Allen, when hearing that Stefani 

had taken “like 5 or 10 Xanax” responded with shock: “Whoa. Okay. Well, hold on. I’m not 

taking her.” This was yet another clear indicator to Officer Blanscett that he needed not to leave 

Stefani in a jail, where she would not be receiving immediate mental health inpatient treatment, 

but to take her to the nearest inpatient mental health facility in accordance with Texas law. There 

was no “extreme emergency,” as referenced in the applicable Texas statute, requiring Officer 

Blanscett to leave Stefani at the jail. 

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41. Further, Corporal Allen cannot rely on the discussion between a jail nurse and 

Stefani to avoid liability for Stefani’s suicide. A nurse, and more specifically the nurse in this 

case, who questions a person about taking Xanax only, and who does not discuss any other factors 

regarding self-harm tendencies referenced in this pleading, has not even conducted a medical, 

psychological, or mental health examination. Thus, when Corporal Allen learned of and/or 

observed the cursory discussion, upon information and belief, she realized that she could not rely 

on it when admitting Stefani to the jail and moreover personally putting her into a cell with pants 

with which she could hang herself. 

42. Corporal Allen said that the nurse came and spoke to Stefani. Allegedly, Stefani 

told the nurse that she had taken ten Xanax throughout the day. Corporal Allen said that Stefani

was “feeling sleepy, but for the most part, she was coherent. She was able to stand up, go, follow 

commands.” She also said that Stefani was able to take her own clothes off by herself and change 

into the jail clothing without assistance. Corporal Allen also said that she did not have any 

difficulties with Stefani. She did say that Stefani “kinda stumbled a little” when she took off her 

clothes. Corporal Allen also said that Stefani told Corporal Allen that Stefani’s boyfriend had been 

yelling at her all day. Corporal Allen’s description of Stefani seems to indicate that Stefani could 

answer questions at intake. This is in stark contrast to other descriptions of Stefani referenced in 

this pleading, provided by one or more other Individual Defendants. 

43. Corporal Allen’s description of Stefani has nothing to do with whether Stefani 

intended to commit suicide, other than the description of Stefani’s physical reactions to one or 

more substances which she had apparently taken. Corporal Allen had information that one such 

substance would have been Xanax, and that the number of Xanax pills taken that day exceeded 

that which Corporal Allen was comfortable accepting when deciding whether to admit Stefani to 

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the jail. Moreover, it is common knowledge that someone admitted to a jail setting after a 

significant domestic dispute is at a higher likelihood of self-harm. Thus, when Corporal Allen 

learned about Stefani alleging that her boyfriend had been “yelling at her all day,” she added this 

to all of the other information she had received about Stefani. Corporal Allen knew that Stefani 

was at a serious risk of committing suicide. However, Corporal Allen did nothing. She certainly 

could not rely on the cursory questions made by a nurse, which could have been asked by Corporal 

Allen herself as a layperson. The nurse provided no specialized questions or care and thus did not 

conduct a medical and/or mental health evaluation.

44. Upon information and belief, Corporal Allen completed the Receiving Property 

Inventory form after searching Stefani and requiring her to change into jail-issued clothing. 

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45. The property list does not include a pill bottle, pills, physician’s prescription, or 

any other item indicating that Stefani had been prescribed Xanax. It would have made little sense 

to Corporal Allen, or any reasonable jailer, that a person who alleged to have taken ten Xanax 

throughout a day would have no physical evidence on her person of such a prescription and/or of 

such medication. This was yet another “red flag” to Corporal Allen indicating that Stefani needed 

to be taken to the nearest inpatient mental health facility. 

46. Corporal Allen also typed a statement into a Midland County Sheriff’s Office 

report. In that statement, Corporal Allen admitted that she was “stationed at Booking One when 

[she] saw Office Groessel conducting his jail security check when he had stopped at the detox C 

cell to check on inmate Gonzales, Stefani . . . .” Therefore, Corporal Allen was close enough to 

Stefani’s cell to have intervened, and to have conducted her own cell checks, during the time 

Stefani was incarcerated. Corporal Allen also indicated in her statement that she observed Jailer 

Groessel going into Stefani’s cell, and then running back to the cell door asking for medical 

assistance as soon as possible. It was then, according to Corporal Allen’s statement, that Corporal 

Allen called a medical emergency. 

47. Corporal Allen was admittedly in charge. It was her responsibility to assure that 

Stefani, if she was to be incarcerated in a jail cell alone, was continuously monitored and moreover 

was not provided with clothing or other items with which she could harm herself. It only takes a 

few minutes, significantly less than ten minutes, for a person to asphyxiate himself or herself in a 

jail cell. Unfortunately, it happens all the time. Corporal Allen knew this, and she took no 

precautions for Stefani. Not only did she not assure continuous monitoring. She did not assure 

any monitoring at all. She allowed Stefani to be put into a cell and ignored, for well over an hour, 

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so that Stefani could commit suicide. This was a violation of every known jail standard, including 

minimum standards imposed by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. 

48. Corporal Allen also typed into her statement that, upon entering Stefani’s cell, she 

witnessed Jailer Groessel holding up Stefani while Stefani had her orange booking pants wrapped 

around her neck and tied to what Corporal Allen at the time observed to be an unknown location 

on the cell sink. Thus, undisputedly, Stefani was provided with clothing with which she was able 

to asphyxiate herself. Suicide clothing, sometimes referred to as a suicide smock, was readily 

available and should have been used with Stefani if Individual Defendants chose to incarcerate her 

in a jail cell. Providing to Stefani clothing with which she could hang or asphyxiate herself was 

deliberate indifference to her known serious mental health issues. 

49. Corporal Allen also typed into her statement that she had been handed the booking 

security keys by Jailer Groessel. Thus, Jailer Groessel literally had the ability to unlock Stefani’s 

cell and save her life had he chosen to do so and not instead been deliberately indifferent. 

50. Corporal Allen also typed into her statement that she instructed Jailer Groessel to 

do a jail security check after Stefani had been discovered, as well as a head count of inmates in 

booking. This made it clear that Corporal Allen was in charge of the booking area and other 

Individual Defendants working at the Midland County jail at the time of the incident. 

51. Finally, Corporal Allen indicated that paramedics asked for Stefani’s name and 

birthdate. Corporal Allen was able to provide Stefani’s name, but she indicated that she had to go 

back to the desk to retrieve Stefani’s date of birth. Therefore, upon information and belief, all 

Individual Defendants who worked for Midland County had access to intake records for Stefani. 

Thus, upon information and belief, all such persons knew that the Screening Form for Suicide and 

Medical/Mental/Development Impairments had not been completed. 

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b. Anderson – Corporal 

52. Corporal Anderson typed a supplemental narrative regarding Stefani’s death. 

Corporal Anderson wrote that he/she was on duty in uniform stationed in the Midland County 

Detention Center. Corporal Anderson wrote that, at approximately 21:28, Corporal Allen, 

stationed as Booking Supervisor, called via radio “medical emergency in booking.” Corporal 

Anderson indicated that he/she had been relieving Officer White in Master Control and 

immediately began opening doors to respond. Upon information and belief, the person working 

in Master Control had the ability to see on a computer screen Stefani in her cell, and moreover to 

see that she was committing suicide. However, upon information and belief, Midland County 

custom, practice, and/or policy did not require such viewing. 

c. Esquivel, A. – Deputy

53. Deputy Esquivel indicated in a supplemental narrative that the deputy was on duty 

assigned to B-shift, A and B block, on June 17, 2018. Deputy Esquivel wrote that, at 21:28 hours, 

a medical emergency in booking was transmitted through the deputy’s block-issued radio. At 

some point, after arriving in booking, Deputy Esquivel radioed for Master Control which was, 

according to Deputy Esquivel, manned by Officer White, N. Upon information and belief, the 

person working in Master Control had the ability to see on a computer screen Stefani in her cell, 

and moreover to see that she was committing suicide. However, upon information and belief, 

Midland County custom, practice, and/or policy did not require such viewing. 

d. Groessel, Matthew – Jailer

54. Investigator Chavez and Ranger Sanchez interviewed Jailer Groessel. That 

interview began at approximately 12:37 a.m. on June 18, 2018. Jailer Groessel said that he was 

assigned to “What’s called booking security” that night. He said that is the officer that maintains 

the booking area and custody of the inmates that are already located n the booking area. He said 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 26 of 105

that the shift was “going on like normal.” He knew that Stefani had been received, through the 

Midland Police Department, and that she had been arrested for public intoxication. He said that 

she was taken to the detox cell. He also said that she was eating in the cell a sack lunch that she 

was given. He also said that he was doing cell checks and “she seemed fine until” about 9:27 p.m. 

55. Jailer Groessel’s allegation that he was doing cell checks in the booking area, which 

would include the cell in which Stefani was incarcerated, was false to the extent it implied that he 

actually made face-to-face observations of inmates as required by Texas Commission on Jail 

Standards’ minimum standards and/or accepted jail practices across the United States. Instead, he 

would simply walk by doors, sometimes looking into viewing windows, to do what he referenced 

as “cell checks.” Upon information and belief, Corporal Allen not only observed Jailer Groessel 

performing purported checks in such a manner, she approved of it. Further, upon information and 

belief, she approved of it because it was an accepted custom in the Midland County jail to conduct 

checks in such a manner. Thus, based upon Corporal Allen’s knowledge as referenced elsewhere 

in this pleading, she has independent liability as a supervisor failing to supervise Jailer Groessel 

and other Individual Defendants working at the Midland County jail. That failure, as she knew 

based upon other knowledge that she possessed, resulted in Stefani’s death. 

56. Jailer Groessel said that he got up to do a cell check around the jail and went up to 

the cell and did not see her. He said that was the point at which he entered into the cell and looked 

around the partition adjacent to the toilet area. This was far too late for Stefani, who had committed 

suicide sometime earlier. She had been left alone in the cell for over an hour, unobserved, but 

apparently consistent with Midland County customs and practices. As Jailer Groessel looked 

behind the wall, he saw Stefani on her knees, in a slouched position, on the ground right next to 

the toilet, with one end of the pants wrapped around her neck and the other end wrapped around a 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 27 of 105

hand rail next to the toilet. He acknowledged that when he saw her, he knew that she had passed 

away. If Individual Defendants working at the jail had actually conducted face-to-face checks of 

Stefani, and done so in a continuous and consistent manner, Stefani would not have died. 

Moreover, Stefani would not have died if Officer Blanscett had taken her to the nearest inpatient 

mental health facility as required by Texas law and constitutional standards.

57. Jailer Groessel said that Stefani had been put into the cell, based upon his 

recollection, somewhere around 8:20 p.m. or 8:30 p.m. He also indicated that Corporal Allen was 

the person who put Stefani into that cell. He said that Stefani seemed tired when she was being 

put into the cell by Corporal Allen, and “did seem pretty intoxicated.” 

58. Jailer Groessel said that, when a person does cell checks in the booking area, the 

person walks the whole booking area. He said that the person checks each cell. He said that when 

he went up to Stefani’s cell and noticed that she wasn’t visible, he thought that she was using the 

toilet. However, he said he got a “feeling” and wanted to see her. A jailer using his or her 

“feelings” when deciding whether to enter a cell is acting objectively unreasonably and in a 

deliberately indifferent manner toward the needs of inmates, and in particular with regard to this 

case, Stefani’s known mental health needs. 

59. Jailer Groessel also disclosed that there is a computer at the booking desk that has 

video surveillance of the cell in which Stefani committed suicide. He said that he did not use that 

computer to assist in conducting cell checks, because he acknowledged that he was required to 

physically get up and walk around and check the cells. He also noted that the computer on the 

booking desk, which would allow video surveillance of the cell, was “down and . . . . not working.” 

Upon information and belief, the computer on the booking desk which would have allowed 

continuous monitoring of Stefani had not been working for some time.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 28 of 105

60. Jailer Groessel also said that the master control room for the whole jail usually 

“kinda keeps an eye on booking.” He also said that “master control” is able to see into the detox 

C cell in which Stefani was incarcerated through the video surveillance system. However, upon 

information and belief, it was Midland County practice and/or custom that the person working in 

Master Control need not continuously watch someone such as Stefani, and/or any other inmate sin 

booking cells. If a person in Master Control had continuously monitored cells in booking, Stefani 

would have lived. 

61. Upon information and belief, Jailer Groessel completed a cell check form for the 

time period including that when Stefani was incarcerated in, and died at, the jail.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 29 of 105

Observation records produced by Midland County also indicate the following, what are referred 

to as “jail security checks:”

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Log Ev . . . Event Type Description Responsible Officer Start Date

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK RHEA D 06/17/2018

19:04:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018 

19:20:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

19:41:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

19:51:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

20:05:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

20:25:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

20:40:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

20:52:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

21:12:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

21:27:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

21:45:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

21:52:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

22:03:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

22:13:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

22:29:00

101726 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

22:16:00

101727 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK GROSSEL M 06/17/2018

22:43:00

101727 JSC JAIL SECURITY CHECK WHITE H 06/17/2018

22:47:08

A handwritten jail log was also produced by Midland County:

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62. Despite these written and typed records, neither Jailer Groessel, nor Jailer Rhea, 

nor Corporal Allen conducted appropriate observations of Stefani until she was deceased. They 

all failed to assure that continuous monitoring was done, which would be required for a suicidal 

person. It takes just a very few minutes – three minutes to seven minutes – for a person to commit 

suicide. Stefani as allowed to remain in her cell for a lengthy period of time, well more than even 

a 15-minute and/or a 30-minute interval cell check, without any face-to-face observation of her. 

Further, despite these records, the most that ever happened during any alleged “check” of Stefani 

while she was in her cell was a cursory look through the cell door windows. This was completely 

ineffective, and against clear jail standards. Stefani was behind the partition, and looking into a 

cell door window did nothing to comply with constitutional standards and/or to protect Stefani 

from herself. Thus, Individual Defendants’ objective unreasonableness and deliberate indifference 

regarding such alleged cell checks caused, were proximate causes of, and were producing causes 

of all damages in this pleading, including Stefani’s death. 

63. Jailer Groessel also typed a narrative regarding what occurred. He wrote in that 

narrative that, on June 17, 2018, at approximately 21:27 hours, he stood up from his assigned desk 

and began a standard jail security check of the jail’s booking area. He wrote that, as he made his 

way to Detox Cell C, located in the Southwestern corner of the booking area, he noticed that he 

did not have a visual on Stefani. This was not a surprise to Jailer Groessel, because he had not 

been able to obtain a “visual on Stefani” for quite some time. This was because she had been 

behind the partition for a lengthy period of time and had committed suicide. He indicated that 

Stefani was the only inmate secured in the cell. 

e. Hunnicutt, K. – Jailer

64. Officer Hunnicutt typed a statement about what occurred during the night of 

Stefani’s death. He wrote that, at approximately 21:30, a medical emergency was called in the 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 33 of 105

booking area via radio. Officer Hunnicutt wrote that he immediately responded to the area with 

Officer Mathis, SRU Officer Stotts, and Deputy Esquivel. Officer Hunnicutt described the 

situation, including medical treatment provided to Stefani. He also wrote that he entered Detox 

Cell C and requested booking keys from Officer Groessel. He was informed that Deputy Esquivel 

had the booking keys, and he entered the cell and retrieved them from Deputy Esquivel. After 

securing another female inmate into a different cell, he returned the keys to Corporal Allen. He 

then exited the booking area to retrieve his firearm, because he would be the officer escorting 

Stefani to the hospital with EMS. 

65. Officer Hunnicutt wrote that, at 21:36, Stefani was placed into the ambulance. He 

wrote that he exited the sally port at 21:40. He also wrote that he and Stefani arrived at Midland 

Memorial Hospital at 21:46. He described in his statement medical treatment received by Stefani. 

He also referenced 22:00 as the time Stefani was pronounced deceased by Doctor Kaufman. 

Sheriff Painter arrived at the hospital at 22:15, and Officer Hunnicutt informed him of what he 

knew about the situation. Officer Hunnicutt was then escorted back to the jail by Corporal 

Anderson. 

f. Rhea, George Darrell – Jailer

66. Midland County Investigator Chavez and Texas Ranger Gustavo took a statement 

of George Daryl Rhea at approximately 12:07 a.m. on June 18, 2018. Jailer Rhea said that he was 

the receiving Officer when Stefani arrived at the jail. He further noted that the jail was supposed 

to have two officers on duty, but there was only one officer on duty that night. 

67. Receiving Officer Rhea said that, when he went to receive Stefani into the jail after 

he had taken paperwork from apparently Officer Blanscett, Stefani was “sitting there rather 

droopy, rather, a, slow, whatever.” Receiving Officer Rhea said that he then remembered going 

into and talking to his supervisor, Corporal Allen, about it. Therefore, upon information and belief, 

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Officer Rhea possessed information in the form completed by Officer Blanscett as well as other 

information gained during a conversation between Officer Blanscett and Corporal Allen. 

68. Receiving Officer Rhea continued his statement. He said that Corporal Allen came 

out to Stefani and, after a few minutes, informed Receiving Officer Rhea that Corporal Allen was 

going to get a nurse down to the area to talk to Stefani. Jailer Rhea waited inside and, according 

to him, after a few minutes passed, he saw the nurse and Corporal Allen talking. He then said that 

he asked, “Is it alright to go ahead and receive her?” He said that both of them told him, “Yes.” 

Therefore, he said that he went out to get Stefani and brought her into the jail. Jailer Rhea said 

that Corporal Allen, being the only female officer, took Stefani in and had her strip searched and 

changed into jail clothing. Stefani was then brought out into the receiving area. 

69. Receiving Officer Rhea noted that Stefani was intoxicated. He further said that, 

based on his “belief in dealing with intoxicated inmates,” he thought she should “sleep it off.” 

Therefore, Jailer Rhea chose not to ask questions on the TCJS – promulgated Screening Form for 

Suicide and Medical/Mental/Developmental Impairments. He said, “Well, I’ll just ask her these 

questions when she has sobered up.” He said that Corporal Allen then put Stefani into the detox 

cell. Jailer Rhea then apparently did nothing else with regard to Stefani and “went on with further 

duties.”

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70. Therefore, Jailer Rhea failed to ask numerous critical questions which he was 

required to ask by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards including: 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 36 of 105

• Serious injury/hospitalization in last 90 days?

• Currently taking any prescription medications?

• Any disability/chronic illness (diabetes, hypertension, etc.)?

• Does inmate appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs?

• Do you have a history of drug/alcohol abuse? If yes, note substance and when last 

used.

• Do you think you will have withdrawal symptoms from stopping use of medications or 

other substances (including alcohol or drugs) while you are in jail? If yes, describe.

• Does the arresting/transporting officer believe or has the officer received information 

that inmate may be at risk of suicide?

• Are you thinking of killing or injuring yourself today? If so, how?

• Have you ever attempted suicide? If so, when and how?

• Are you feeling hopeless or have nothing to look forward to?

• Prior to arrest, did you feel down, depressed, or have little interest or pleasure in doing 

things?

• Do you have nightmares, flashbacks, or repeated thoughts or feelings related to PTSD 

or something terrible from your past?

• Are you extremely worried you will lose your job, position, spouse, significant other, 

custody of your children due to arrest?

• Have you ever received services for emotional or mental health problems?

• Have you been in a hospital for emotional/mental health in the last year?

• If you answered yes to the immediately two preceding questions, do you know your 

diagnosis?

Certain Individual Defendants attempt to paint a picture indicating that Stefani could communicate 

without any issue whatsoever, and further follow commands. If true, she could have answered 

questions. Moreover, answers to certain questions above, when answered in the affirmative, would 

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require notification to a magistrate and mental health professionals when warranted. There were 

other observation questions on the form, which Jailer Rhea chose not to ask: 

• Does inmate show signs of depression (sadness, irritability, emotional flatness)?

• Does inmate display any unusual behavior, or act or talk strange (cannot focus 

attention, hearing or seeing things which are not there)?

• Is inmate incoherent, disoriented or showing signs of mental illness?

If answers to any such questions were “Yes,” then Jailer Rhea was required to notify his supervisor, 

a magistrate, and mental health professionals immediately. Jailer Rhea just simply ignored his 

duties to do so and thus acted objectively unreasonably and in a deliberately indifferent manner 

regarding Stefani’s known mental health and self-harm issues. 

71. Upon information and belief, Officer Rhea was in fact doing in practice what was 

the custom and/or practice of the Midland County jail. Jailer Rhea had been an employee of the 

Midland County Sheriff’s office for nearly thirty years. He therefore had sufficient knowledge 

about the manner in which the jail was operated. If custom and/or practice was different from 

what Officer Rhea was doing at the time, he of all people would have known as much. 

72. Much later, Jailer Rhea heard Officer Groessel shouting and running toward cell C. 

Jailer Rhea observed Officer Groessel yelling about getting a pair of scissors. It was shortly 

thereafter that Jailer Rhea learned that Stefani had committed suicide. Based on Jailer Rhea’s 

experience, this should have been no surprise to him. 

73. Jailer Rhea said that Lieutenant Hillyard appeared at some point and asked Jailer 

Rhea why he did not do the medical intake for Stefani. Jailer Rhea said that he thought “that she 

was just too sleepy, intoxicated.” He further said that he printed an intake form and there were no 

questions answered for Stefani. He said, however, that he indicated that the bottom of the form 

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that he did not ask the questions because he thought that she was too intoxicated and that he would 

ask questions when she “sobered up.”

74. Investigator Chavez confirmed with Jailer Rhea that he knew that Stefani was 

brought in for public intoxication. Jailer Rhea further described what he observed in Stefani that 

caused him to believe that she was in fact intoxicated. Jailer Rhea stated, upon information and 

belief, a custom of the jail which was contrary to written policy, based upon his “nearly twenty 

eight years of working” there. He said that he had worked with “so many intoxicated people.” 

Upon information and belief, Jailer Rhea was expressing the custom and practice of Midland 

County in not completing intake forms, as required by written policies and State regulations for 

people who were intoxicated. 

75. Jailer Rhea said that he learned “an extremely hard lesson.” He also said, “[N]ext 

time, I don’t care if their drunk or not, I’m going to attempt to ask.” Jailer Rhea did not need to 

learn the “lesson,” because written policies had been in place for quite some time, and State 

regulations clearly required that he ask the questions and take certain actions if the questions were 

not answered at all. He further said that he had “no excuse” for what happened. 

76. Jailer Rhea also, upon information and belief, typed a statement into the Midland 

County Sheriff’s Office system. He wrote that, at approximately 21:20 or so, he was finishing up 

paperwork when he heard Jailer Groessel hollering and running in the direction of Detox Cell C. 

When Jailer Rhea arrived, Jailer Groessel was already inside the cell and had yelled for medical 

attention. 

77. Moreover, Jailer Rhea typed a booking information report into the Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office system. Jailer Rhea wrote that, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Jailer Rhea received 

Stefani from the Midland Police Department on a charge of public intoxication. Jailer Rhea wrote 

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that he noticed Stefani’s slow reaction, and thus informed Corporal Allen. Corporal Allen 

instructed Jailer Rhea to leave Stefani in the bench area until a nurse had an opportunity to speak 

with her. After several minutes, Jailer Rhea asked Corporal Allen and the nurse if Stefani was 

“good to accept.” “Both replied in the affirmative.” 

78. This decision was objectively unreasonable and deliberately indifferent to Stefani’s 

known mental health issues. As shown above, Corporal Allen could not rely on the cursory alleged 

“examination” of the nurse when agreeing to accept Stefani into the jail. Moreover, upon 

information and belief, if the nurse did not possess all other information about Stefani mentioned 

in this pleading that Individual Defendants possessed, then this custom and/or practice of Midland 

County also resulted in and caused, and was a moving force behind, Stefani’s damages and death. 

In the alternative, if the nurse possessed all other information about Stefani possessed by Individual 

Defendants, then the nurse acted objectively unreasonably and in a deliberately indifferent manner. 

79. Jailer Rhea wrote that Corporal Allen then strip-searched and changed out Stefani. 

Jailer Rhea completed a property reception form. However, before Jailer Rhea started what he 

referred to as “CCQ questioning” and medical intake, Stefani stated that she was tired and sleepy. 

Corporal Allen asked if Jailer Rhea was finished with Stefani, and Jailer Rhea wrote that he had 

the belief that Stefani was too intoxicated to answer questions. Therefore, Jailer Rhea wrote that 

he informed Corporal Allen that he was finished with Stefani. Jailer Rhea wrote that he “did a 

medical intake without answers, but did write that the intention was to ask her CCQ once when 

she had sobered up.” “CCQ” refers to a Continuity of Care Query and is simply a query into a 

database as to whether an arrestee has received mental healthcare. CCQ is not, as Jailer Rhea 

asserted, a list of mental health questions. Nevertheless, unfortunately, the last thing he wrote, 

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was “Incidents and events proved Rhea did not get the chance to do so.” This was no surprise to 

anyone, as it was apparent to Individual Defendants that Stefani would commit suicide. 

g. Santoyo, A. – Clerk

80. Clerk Santoyo also wrote a statement regarding the incident. Clerk Santoyo 

indicated that he/she was working on wrap sheets for the day while Jailer Groessel was doing 

rounds and checking on inmates. Clerk Santoyo said that he/she heard Jailer Groessel knock on a 

door. When Clerk Santoyo looked up, he/she saw Jailer Groessel entering Detox Cell C to check 

on Stefani. Clerk Santoyo wrote that Corporal Allen thereafter called via radio for medical 

assistance. Therefore, Corporal Allen was in close proximity to the cell in which Stefani had 

committed suicide. 

h. Stotts, J. – SRU Officer

81. Officer Stotts wrote that he/she was stationed as E/F block of the Midland County 

Central Detention Center. Officer Stotts wrote that, at around 21:28 hours, Corporal Allen in 

booking transmitted via radio a medical emergency in booking, and that personnel were needed as 

soon as possible. After Officer Stotts made his/her way to booking, and observed what was 

occurring, Officer Groessel told Officer Stotts that Stefani had tried to commit suicide by hanging. 

i. White, N. – Officer 

82. Office White wrote a brief statement about what occurred. Officer White wrote 

that, while he/she returned from a break, and went into Master Control, Corporal Anderson advised 

that there was an emergency in booking. Corporal Anderson was on the phone with dispatch 

advising the dispatcher of the incident. Officer White then took over Master Control and resumed 

his/her duties. Upon information and belief, Officer White, as well as other Midland County 

employees who worked in Master Control, did not observe inmates such as Stefani in booking 

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cells through the computer system. Upon information and belief, such failure to make such 

observations was consistent with Midland County custom and/or practice. 

4. Video Evidence

83. A Midland County Sheriff’s Office video, with file name “Detox C 1.mp4,” 

contains a video recording of Stefani’s cell. It begins at a point in time after which Stefani was 

placed into the cell and concludes after Stefani’s suicide. As pointed out elsewhere in this 

pleading, Midland County Sheriff’s Office failed to assure that its various recording devices were 

synced with the same time. Therefore, actual times of relevant events in this pleading are 

somewhat uncertain. Regardless, the gap in time between relevant events is what is material to 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

84. The video begins with a time shown, for Sunday, June 17, 2018, of 20:21:43. 

Stefani can be seen on the cell door-facing side of a partition wall which separates a toilet area 

from the main portion of the cell. She is initially eating what appears to be a sandwich. She then

stands and moves to the toilet area fairly quickly, after pushing a bag against a slot in the partition 

wall appearing to attempt to hide what she intends to do.

85. Stefani can be seen removing her jail-issued pants behind the partition at 

approximately 20:22:45. Moreover, Stefani appears to be unstable on her feet. When she 

stumbles, it is clearly evident from the perspective of the camera that Stefani has removed her 

pants. This can clearly be seen on the video recording. 

86. Stefani can be seen tying off the pants behind the partition at approximately 

20:23:22. There is no doubt, viewing the video, as to what she is doing. She glances toward the 

front of the cell a few times, obviously trying to see if anyone is watching her. No one is. Stefani 

immediately goes down behind the partition wall so that she is generally not seen. All reasonable 

jailers, and all Midland County Individual Defendants, would know exactly what Stefani is doing 

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at that time. Unfortunately, on that Sunday, Individual Defendants at the Midland County jail did 

nothing while Stefani committed suicide. 

87. At approximately 20:24:58, the top of Stefani’s head can be seen over the partition 

wall. It is generally clear from the movement of her head, and her right arm which becomes visible, 

that she is working to do something behind the partition. All reasonable jailers would have entered 

the cell as soon as Stefani began tying off her pants. Unfortunately, neither Individual Defendants, 

nor anyone in Master Control, did anything. 

88. At approximately 20:26:12, Stefani’s head can once again be seen over the partition 

wall. It is clear that Stefani is not using the toilet at any time when she is seen in this recording. 

At approximately 20:33:03, some movement can be seen over the partition wall. Individual 

Defendants continued doing nothing related to Stefani. At approximately 20:37:33, Stefani’s head 

and some movement can be seen over the partition wall. It appears that Stefani is continuing to 

work to form the noose with which she will commit suicide. Individual Defendants at the Midland 

County jail do nothing. 

89. It is apparent from the video that Stefani is putting the noose over her head. 

Movement of Stefani’s head can be seen over the partition, for the last time, at approximately 

20:40:35. This is approximately 19 minutes after the video begins and an uncertain amount of 

time after Stefani was initially put into the cell. Upon information and belief, she dies within three 

to give minutes thereafter. Still, no one enters Stefani’s cell. It is clear and apparent that no one 

is making any face-to-face observations of Stefani. Even if a person chose to attempt to see Stefani 

on the video, she was completely hidden behind the partition wall. Individual Defendants working 

at the Midland County jail shirked their responsibility, acted objectively unreasonably, and were 

deliberately indifferent to Stefani’s mental health needs and ultimately her suicide. 

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90. The video recording concludes at approximately 21:07:56, with Stefani deceased 

in her cell, and with no one having entered her cell or made any face-to-face observations of her. 

The entire video was approximately 46 minutes long. 

91. A Midland County Sheriff’s Office video, with file name “Detox C 2.mp4,” 

contains a video recording of Stefani’s cell. The video begins with a time shown, for Sunday, June 

17, 2018, of 21:07:57. This video recording is approximately 24 minutes long. It thus picks up 

where the above-referenced video ends. 

92. Individual Defendants at the Midland County jail continuing doing duties other 

than those which they owed to Stefani. Stefani’s lifeless body lies in her cell, while Individual 

Defendants do nothing to observe her and/or check on her. Finally, but unfortunately far too late 

for Stefani, the door to Stefani’s cell opens at approximately 21:19:42. This was approximately 

11 minutes, 44 seconds after the beginning of this second video recording, and nearly an hour after 

the beginning of the above-referenced first video recording. Jailer Groessel shortly thereafter 

walks slowly into the cell and toward the back. At approximately 21:19:51, based on Jailer 

Groessel’s body language, he realizes what has occurred. No medical assistance will revive Stefani 

at this point, because she has been deceased for quite some time. 

5. Medical Treatment and Death Reports

a. Medical Records

93. Information in this portion of the complaint was obtained from medical records. 

Midland Fire Department EMS records indicate that EMS personnel were dispatched to Stefani’s 

suicide attempt. The narrative reads that, upon arrival, EMS personnel found a 36-year-old female 

“laying on the bathroom floor unresponsive.” The narrative also reads that the facility nurse stated 

that jail staff had performed 10 rounds of CPR before EMS’s arrival. EMS personnel immediately 

checked for a radial and carotid pulse, and both were absent. CPR was continued. Stefani was 

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then transported to the hospital. Medication was administered, and CPR was continued with no 

change in Stefani’s condition. Stefani was taken to an assigned emergency department room in the 

hospital and transferred to a hospital bed. Despite efforts by EMS personnel, there was nothing 

that could be done to revive Stefani.

94. Hospital records indicate that Stefani presented to the emergency department with 

CPR in progress via EMS from the jail. The hospital – Midland Memorial Hospital Main – was 

the same hospital to which Stefani was transported the day before (June 16, 2018) with chest pain. 

When Stefani arrived on June 17, 2018 from the jail, hospital records indicate that she was 

unresponsive. As is unfortunately true with many medical records, hospital medical records 

incorrectly read that Stefani “was found in cell hanging from ceiling.” EMS personnel were unable 

to report to healthcare providers at the hospital the time of Stefani’s suicide attempt. Stefani was 

pronounced as being deceased. 

b. Autopsy – Tarrant County Medical Examiner 

95. An autopsy was conducted by Susan Roe, M.D., Deputy Medical Examiner with 

the Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s District. A comment 

in the report read: “This case was presented in Morning Conference on 7/13/2018. There is 

consensus with cause and manner of death.” The report provides as cause of death, I – Hanging; 

and II – Bipolar Disorder. Thus, it was clearly Stefani’s mental health issues, of which Individual 

Defendants were aware, that led to her suicide. 

c. Custodial Death – Midland County Sheriff’s Office (Filed with 

Attorney General)

96. The Midland County Sheriff’s Department filed a custodial death report with Ken 

Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. The report was completed by Captain Rebecca Graham on 

July 3, 2018. The report indicates that the time of custody or incident was 7:40 p.m. on June 17, 

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2018, and that Stefani died at 10:00 p.m. on June 17, 2018. The report reads that Stefani passed 

away as a result of suicide by hanging/strangulation in a detox cell. The report also indicates that 

the only reason that Stefani was arrested was due to public intoxication. The report reads that 

Stefani was received into the jail at 8:13 p.m. The report alleges that the booking officer 

determined that Stefani was too intoxicated to answer suicide screening questions. This allegation 

is in stark contrast to Corporal Allen’s allegation referenced elsewhere in this pleading. The 

booking officer did not complete the state-required form. The report included a “Summary of 

Incident” section: 

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97. Plaintiff does not concede that listed times are correct, whether in the abovereferenced report or in any other document cited or reproduced herein. Plaintiff reproduced some 

such documents to provide context for Plaintiff’s claims and to more clearly illustrate what 

occurred. Moreover, as demonstrated elsewhere herein, the Midland County jail did not even sync 

times on its various cameras. Thus, exact times cited by Midland County and/or in documents 

produced by it to Plaintiff before suit was filed are suspect at best. Nevertheless, it is not the exact 

times of certain occurrences which are important, as they relate to claims in this case, but rather 

the passage of time between material events. 

98. The Midland County Sheriff’s Department captain flatly wrote, “Officer did not 

place on suicide watch, did not notify supervisor, and did not notify medical.” This was a tacit 

admission that the referenced officer was deliberately indifferent to Stefani’s known mental health 

needs, and that Stefani should have been put on constant suicide watch. It is curious at best that 

the captain alleged that “medical” had not been notified, when other documents indicate a cursory 

conversation with a nurse (described elsewhere in this pleading). 

99. The form also indicates that Stefani was placed into the detox cell at 8:23 p.m. The

autopsy report was consistent in listing that Stefani died as a result of suicide by hanging, but also 

listed bipolar disorder. It is common knowledge among those working in Texas jails, through their 

training and/or education, that a person diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and who is intoxicated 

and has other mental health issues, is at a high risk of suicide when placed into a jail setting, 

especially in the first few hours or days. Upon information and belief, Individual Defendants 

possessed this knowledge when dealing with Stefani. 

d. Inquest Report – Judge Cobos

100. An inquest was performed by Judge D. Cobos, and Judge Cobos drafted a report as 

a result. The report lists Texas Ranger Gustavo Sanchez as the investigating officer. The report 

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reads that jail personnel indicated that Stefani was “high/intoxicated,” claiming that she had taken 

approximately 10 Xanax. The report also reads that jail personnel indicated that Stefani was 

uncooperative and refused to answer any questions at booking. This “uncooperative” allegation is 

in stark contrast with statements given by one or more Midland County Individual Defendants.

101. The report also reads that, the evening before Stefani’s suicide, on June 16, 2018, 

Stefani was brought to a hospital ER acting irrationally and screaming at medical staff. This was 

only partially true, in that Stefani initially received medical treatment without issue but later acted 

out and left the hospital due to her serious mental health issues. The report also says that she 

abruptly left the ER wearing a blood pressure cuff with an IV in her arm. The report indicates that 

police were called at the time but were ultimately unable to locate Stefani. Public Information Act 

requests to both the Midland Police Department and Midland County Sheriff’s Office resulted in 

substantively “no records” responses for records regarding any such June 16, 2018 phone call. The 

hospital tox screen indicated that Stefani was positive for amphetamines. Therefore, Stefani had 

clearly received treatment at a local hospital, contrary to Officer Blanscett’s representation on the 

jail intake form, and which would have been explicitly disclosed had the jailer done a proper intake 

and completed the Texas Commission on Jail Standards form. The fact that no one apparently 

contacted the hospital listed on the hospital bracelet being worn by Stefani at the time of her arrest, 

and/or further inquired as to the medical treatment she had received, was further evidence of 

Individual Defendants’ objective unreasonableness and deliberate indifference when dealing with 

Stefani. 

E. Investigations

1. Midland County

102. Midland County Sheriff’s Office conducted an investigation regarding Stefani’s 

death, and it generated a report as a result. The report indicates that Investigator M. Chavez was 

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contacted by Sergeant O’Donnell, at approximately 9:36 p.m. on June 17, 2018, regarding a female 

who had attempted suicide at the Midland County Detention Center. Sergeant O’Donnell advised 

Investigator Chavez that Sergeant O’Donnell was in route and would advise as to the outcome. 

Approximately six minutes later, Investigator Chavez heard from Lieutenant Weatherby and was 

told that there was a completed suicide at the detention center, and that Investigator Chavez needed 

to respond. Investigator Chavez learned through another phone call that Sheriff Painter and a 

Midland County jailer were currently at Midland Memorial Hospital with the deceased female 

(Stefani). Investigator Chavez then proceeded to Midland Memorial Hospital. 

103. When Investigator Chavez arrived at the hospital, she learned some information 

from Jailer Hunnicutt. Jailer Hunnicutt indicated that she (Jailer Hunnicutt) was not in booking at 

the time of the incident but was nonetheless told to go the hospital with Stefani. Investigator 

Chavez left the hospital at approximately 11:06 p.m. and proceeded to the jail. She and Sergeant 

Allee arrived at the jail at approximately 11:15 p.m. 

104. Investigator Chavez and Ranger Gustavo Sanchez examined the cell where Stefani 

committed suicide. Photographs of the cell were taken. Investigator Chavez noted that Stefani’s 

orange jail pants were hanging from a rail connected to the toilet. Investigator Chavez reviewed 

video from the camera in Stefani’s cell, clearly showing Stefani removing her pants and starting 

the process of committing suicide. She also noted that no one entered the cell from 8:30 p.m. 

through 9:27 p.m. Stefani was in the cell alone, and no face-to-face visual checks were conducted. 

This is in clear violation of even the minimum standards promulgated by the Texas Commission 

on Jail Standards, and it is more than sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference and objective 

unreasonableness of the Midland County Individual Defendants. 

105. Investigator Chavez’s report listed the following people as witnesses:

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• Jailer George Darrell Rhea;

• Jailer Matthew Groessel;

• Corporal Monica Allen;

• ***blank space here in report***

• Corporal Anderson;

• Deputy Esquivel;

• Jailer Hunnicutt; 

• Jailer McLaughlin;

• Jailer Mathis; and 

• Jailer Stotts. 

Upon information and belief, the blank space in Investigator Chavez’s report between the listed 

Individual Defendants and the other six listed people was to signal that the listed Individual 

Defendants were those with direct contact with, and the ability to save, Stefani. 

106. Investigator Chavez reviewed jail camera video. She was able to see where Stefani 

removed her pants and began the process of attempting suicide. Investigator Chavez wrote, “At 

no point did anyone enter detox C from the time frame of 2030 hours to 2137 hours.” She also 

noted that Stefani was alone in detox C. This is inexcusable. The Texas Commission on Jail 

Standards’ minimum requirements require county jailers to make face-to-face observations of all 

inmates no less than once every 60 minutes. This requirement is for normal inmates. However, 

for inmates who are known to be assaultive, potentially suicidal, mentally ill, or who have 

demonstrated bizarre behavior, such observations, at a bare minimum, must be performed at least 

every 30 minutes. Despite such minimum standards, even the 30-minute observation makes little 

sense when considering a potentially suicidal person. Such a person can easily commit suicide in 

much less than 10 minutes. Thus, from a sensible and practical perspective, such persons must be 

continuously observed. Regardless, Individual Defendants working at the Midland County jail did 

not even fulfill anything close to the 30-minute checks. As a result, Individual Defendants who 

worked at the Midland County jail acted objectively unreasonably, and in a deliberately indifferent 

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manner, and thereby caused and proximately caused all damages referenced in this pleading, 

including Stefani’s death. 

107. Investigator Chavez also noted, when she began to review video surveillance 

recordings provided to her by Lieutenant Hilliard, that it was clear that there was would be an 

approximate 18-minute time discrepancy between the actual camera within detox C, the camera 

labeled “checks leaving,” and the camera labeled “Sally Port.” It is beyond belief that a jail serving 

a large county in Texas would not synchronize the time on cameras which are used to assure that 

inmates are being appropriately monitored and served and employees are appropriately doing their 

jobs. Unfortunately, considering the continued problems with the Midland County Sheriff’s 

Office, some of which are referenced in this pleading, and all occurrences leading to and which 

were a moving cause behind Stefani’s damages and death, it might have been par for the course. 

Investigator Chavez also wrote, based upon her review of the video recordings:

From video surveillance labeled “5 c28 dvr2 book east” it is observed Gonzales 

being placed into Detox C by Allen at approximately 2029 hours. From the same 

camera it is observed Groessel walking by Detox C periodically. From the same 

camera Gonzales is observed walking around at from the time frame of 2039 to 

2041 hours. From the said camera Gonzales was no longer visible from that point. 

At approximately 2137 hours it was observed on the said camera Groessel walking 

inside Detox C and discovering Gonzales. 

From video surveillance labeled “Detox C1” and “Detox C2” Gonzales is observed 

standing up near the privacy wall, taking her last bite of food, and then removing 

her pants at approximately 2022 hours. Gonzales is observed looking out as she 

began the process of attempting suicide standing up. Gonzales then knelt down and 

from the time from of 2023 hours to the time she was discovered from the Detox C 

camera at approximately 2119 hours by Groessel (96 minutes). However, Gonzales 

was vaguely seen from the Detox C camera periodically. The last visible sign of 

Gonzales from the said camera was going to be from 2040 hours up until she was 

discovered by Groessel at approximately 2119 hours (79 minutes).

108. This description alone presents a damning indictment of Individual Defendants who 

worked at the Midland County jail. It also, when looking at the two separate paragraphs, 

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demonstrates the problem when the Midland County Sheriff’s Office chose not to sync the times 

on its various cameras within its jail.

109. When reading the second paragraph above, regarding the surveillance video labeled 

“Detox C1” and “Detox C2,” the reader wants to reach out and help Stefani when no one else 

chose to do so. It is worthy of note that this incident occurred on a Sunday. It appears that staff 

treated their duties as if they were off for the weekend. While this seems to be a harsh statement, 

the evidence supports it. 

110. Investigator Chavez notes that Stefani began to attempt suicide and knelt down at 

approximately 8:23 p.m. (according to the time stamp on that camera). She was not discovered by 

Jailer Groessel until approximately 96 minutes later – which is over three times the thirty-minute 

observation minimum requirement by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards and well beyond 

any reasonable jailer’s, or any reasonable juror’s, imagination as to how long a person with 

Stefani’s known serious mental health issues should be left without observation. This is clear 

evidence of deliberate indifference and objective unreasonableness not only by Jailer Groessel, but 

also the other Individual Defendants working at the jail. Sadly, the referenced paragraph above 

indicates that the last visible sign of Stefani from the camera was allegedly at approximately 8:40 

p.m. – long before Jailer Groessel finally chose to do what he should have done all along – had a 

face-to-face observation of Stefani. Unfortunately, it was far too late. Stefani had been deceased 

for quite some time, and the best medical professionals in or near Midland County could do nothing 

to bring her back. 

111. Captain Rebecca Graham, with the Midland County Sheriff’s Office, completed 

and filed or caused to be filed with the TCJS a Standard Inmate Death Reporting form. 

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112. As indicated elsewhere in this complaint, Plaintiff does not concede that listed times 

in the above-referenced report are correct, or times listed in any other referenced report in this 

pleading. The time between important events is more important that the specific time at which 

each event occurred, as it relates to Plaintiff’s claims. 

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2. Texas Rangers

113. The Texas Rangers investigated Stefani’s death. The lead investigator was Gustavo 

Sanchez. The typical purpose of a Texas Rangers investigation regarding a custodial death, such 

as Stefani’s, is to determine whether there was any criminal responsibility for what occurred. 

Texas Rangers do not determine whether there is civil liability, such as that alleged in this case. 

Therefore, the Texas Rangers’ determination as to whether to turn the case over to a grand jury for 

prosecution does not determine whether Defendants are liable for Stefani’s death and other 

damages referenced in this pleading. 

3. Texas Commission on Jail Standards

114. The Texas Commission on Jail Standards (“TCJS”) conducted an investigation of 

Stefani’s death. The TCJS regularly conducts investigations of custodial deaths in Texas county 

jails, and it is the State agency charged with enforcing bare minimum jail standards. The TCJS 

determined that the Midland County jail failed to meet minimum jail standards, and it issued a 

notice of non-compliance to Midland County. The TCJS did not make a rash decision. TCJS 

Inspector Wendy Wisneski determined that a notice of non-compliance should be issued. Assistant 

Director Shannon Herklotz then reviewed the determination and approved it. TCJS Executive 

Director Brandon Wood then concurred and also approved issuance of a notice of non-compliance. 

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115. Relevant portions of a summary TCJS investigation report, read:

Investigation reveals I/M Gonzales, Stephanie was processed into the Midland 

County Jail on June 17, 2018 at approximately 2013 hours for Public Intoxication. 

The arresting officer documented that I/M Gonzales indicated she suffered from 

PTSD, Bipolar Disorder and Depression and wanted an “isolated cell”. The facility 

nurse spoke with I/M Gonzales who indicated that she had taken ten (10) Xanax; 

the nurse received clarification I/M Gonzales did not take them all at once but rather 

over the course of the day and the nurse further documented I/M Gonzales was alert 

and answered questions directly. The screening form was not completed but the 

CCQ came back as a possible match. I/M Gonzales was not placed on suicide 

watch and neither the mental health staff nor the supervisory staff were notified. 

According to paperwork received, I/M Gonzales was placed in Detox at 2023 hours. 

At approximately 2127 hours, an officer was conducting rounds and was unable to 

observe I/M Gonzales in the cell. She had been behind the partition screening the 

toilet from outside view for the previous checks, so the officer entered the cell. I/M 

Gonzales was observed to be sitting on the floor of the cell next to the toilet with 

one leg of her jail issued uniform pants tied around her neck and the other leg tied 

around the handicap rail next to the toilet. The uniform was knotted in several 

places and the officer was unable to untie them. The officer called for assistance 

and scissors. Responding officers arrived and were to remove the uniform pants 

from the neck of I/M Gonzales. CPR was initiated and medical arrived. EMS was 

contacted and arrived to transport I/M Gonzales to Midland Memorial Hospital 

where she was pronounced deceased. Final autopsy and investigative reports are 

pending. 

Video reviewed indicates the time was off by approximately 10 minutes: I/M 

Gonzales was placed in the cell at approximately 2030 hours; a check is conducted 

at approximately 2034 hours. At approximately 2039 hours, I/M Gonzales can be 

seen in the window of the cell. At approximately 2048 hours, a check is conducted; 

the officer can be seen looking in the window several times and the officer is seen 

going back to look again at 2101 hours. At approximately 2104 hours, the officer 

is seen looking in the window again. At approximately 2137 hours, the officer is 

seen back at the cell and looking into the window at different angles before opening 

the door and entering the cell and the officer can be seen walking through the cell. 

The video shows the officer at the door to the cell, and other officers responding to 

something. A second officer enters the cell and immediately returns to the door 

and several other officers respond quickly. At approximately 2138, medical is in 

the cell and EMS is on the scene at 2144 hours. At 2147, EMS is off scene with 

I/M Gonzales and out of camera view. 

Inspector Wendy Wisneski reviewed all submitted paperwork and video to ensure 

compliance with minimum jail standards. After careful review, it was determined 

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that two (2) violations of minimum jail standards occurred and a notice of noncompliance was issued on July 10, 2018.

TCJS Assistant Director Shannon Herklotz signed the summary portion of the report and dated it 

July 10, 2019. TCJS issued a Special Inspection Report: 

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The second page of the Special Inspection Report cited portions of minimum jail standards which 

the Midland County jail had violated. 

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F. Midland County Sheriff’s Office Written Policies

116. The Midland County Sheriff’s Office had in place certain policies related to what 

occurred to Stefani. Any violation of such policies by Individual Defendants working for Midland 

County is evidence of a constitutional violation causing, proximately causing, and/or acting as a 

producing cause of damages referenced in this pleading, including Stefani’s death. Thus, 

undisputedly, the booking supervisor on duty at the time of Stefani’s incarceration had access to 

and, upon information and belief, knowledge of all documents in Stefani’s file. 

1. Intake Policies and Procedures

117. The Midland County jail, in addition to other policies referenced in this pleading, 

had in place certain written policies and procedures relating to intake and treatment of inmates at 

the time of Stefani’s death. Post orders for the Booking Supervisor indicate that the primary 

functions of the Booking Supervisor is to maintain security within the booking area, manage 

inmates within the booking area, and update files of unhoused inmates.

118. Jail security checks of holding cells and seating areas must be maintained and 

logged. Further:

• All inmates in holding must be checked every thirty minutes, which includes a face-toface observation of each inmate. 

• Inmates in a Violent Cell, in restraints, or on a medical watch, must be checked at least 

every fifteen minutes.

• Any inmate on a special watch, other than the regular thirty-minute must have a medical 

housing sheet.

Undoubtedly, as referenced elsewhere in this pleading, Individual Defendants working for 

Midland County violated these written policies. Stefani was not checked every 30 minutes by use 

of face-to-face observation. All Individual Defendants working for Midland County were able to 

do so, and they knew that they should have done so based upon their knowledge of Stefani and her 

history. Further, while the second and third listed policies should apply to Stefani, based upon 

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knowledge of her and her history, Individual Defendants failed to apply them. Individual 

Defendants completely ignored both the 30-minute observation policy and 15-minute observation 

policy. This was objectively unreasonable and constituted deliberate indifference. 

119. Further, it is the Booking Supervisor’s responsibility to assure that inmates are 

medically assessed in a timely manner. The supervisor must also document all communications 

with medical regarding medical assessments.

120. Post orders for the Booking Rover indicate that the primary function of the Booking 

Rover is management of inmate movement within the booking area. If there is no inmate 

movement or services within the booking area, the Booking Rover shall assist with inmate 

receiving. If there are no inmates to receive, the Booking Rover must assist the Booking 

Supervisor. These Booking Rover policies show that Individual Defendants should have worked 

together to protect Stefani, and not allowed her to commit suicide. Individual Defendants working 

at the Midland County jail could not strictly segregate their duties and be deliberately indifferent 

to Stefani’s known mental health issues and needs.

121. Post orders for the Receiving Officer indicate that the primary function for a 

Receiving Officer is to take custody of new inmates, properly search them, and process them for 

booking. The Receiving Officer takes custody of inmates as they are brought into the jail by an 

arresting officer. The Receiving Officer is not to take custody of inmates who have not completed 

interviews with arresting officers, and the arresting officers’ processing sheet and arrest 

information must be complete. The Receiving Officer must complete a medical intake screening 

form, through the electronic version. The officer must assure that every field is complete. The 

Receiving Officer is to escort the inmate to the proper holding area or cell, noting housing on the 

top of the property sheet. 

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122. The Midland County Detention Center has a written procedure regarding the Texas 

Commission on Jail Standards-issued intake medical and suicide screening form. The procedure 

indicates that the Receiving Officer shall complete the Screening Form for Suicide and Medical 

and Mental Impairments. The policy requires the officer to ask the inmate all questions listed on 

the form, and to complete all questions “in full immediately upon admission.” If an inmate is 

unable to answer a question, or a question does not apply to a particular inmate, the Receiving 

Officer must still make a notation in the blank for the question. If an inmate refuses to answer a 

question regarding mental health, depression, or suicidal attempts or thoughts, the inmate is to be 

treated as if the inmate answered “Yes.” Further, if an inmate cannot answer a question on a 

screening form for any reason, the inmate shall be placed on a suicide watch until she is able or 

willing to answer the question. Pursuant to Texas law, a magistrate must be notified in certain 

situations. Such a situation occurs, in one instance, when an inmate is unwilling to answer or 

cannot answer questions on the form for any reason. It also occurs if an inmate is intoxicated. 

Further, if an inmate is brought to booking to be placed on a suicide watch, an e-mail notification 

must be immediately sent.

123. These policies were blatantly violated, as indicated by factual assertions detailed 

elsewhere in this pleading. The Texas Commission on Jail Standards-issued medical and suicide 

screening form was not completed by the Receiving Officer. The Receiving Officer did not make 

notations in blanks for questions which Stefani purportedly could not answer. Further, the 

Receiving Officer did not treat Stefani, based upon “no” answers, as if she had answered “yes” by 

placing her on a suicide watch. Regardless, Individual Defendants are inconsistent in their 

descriptions of Stefani, as to whether she could answer questions or not. This is further evidence 

of objective unreasonableness and deliberate indifference of Individual Defendants. 

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2. Medical and Mental Health Policies and Procedures 

124. The Midland County Detention Center had in place, at the time of Stefani’s death, 

a Health Services Policy and Procedure Manual. The manual indicates that one of the policies 

behind its creation was to provide inmates access to care to meet serious medical needs. One of 

the procedures listed in the manual, to implement this and other policies, was that inmates were to 

be educated at intake on the process of how to access medical care and the medical care request 

system. 

125. The manual also includes a section entitled, “Basic Mental Health Services.” One 

of the policies in that section provides that basic mental health services, defined as including crisis 

intervention on-site or off-site. One policy reads, “Inmates in need of mental health services that 

are beyond the services provided at the facility [jail] are referred to alternative facilities for care.” 

Further, if an inmate’s condition requires mental health services beyond the scope provided at the 

site, i.e. in-patient psychiatric care, healthcare staff will follow established procedures to ensure 

each that transfer occurs in a timely manner. Moreover, importantly, the inmate must be safely 

housed under appropriate observation pending transfer. Clearly, this did not occur with regard to 

Stefani. 

126. Procedures in place to implement these basic mental health services policies are 

also identified in this section. The first listed procedure reads: 

Inmates receiving mental health screening at the time of booking. Inmates identified 

with mental health issues are referred to mental health for further evaluation. Inmates 

may also access mental health by the inmate request system. If an emergency 

(suicidal) they may go directly to the deputy in their housing area to have medical 

called by phone. 

In a crisis situation that correctional staff may identify at the time of booking, or the 

deputy assigned to the inmate’s housing area may identify, they may contact medical 

and report to medical staff. Monday through Friday business hours mental health is 

responsible for following up. All other times Midland MHMR crisis team will follow 

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up. Contact the on-call psychiatrist 24-hours a day 7 days a week. Verbal orders can 

be obtained at this time. 

127. The manual also includes a section entitled “Communication on Patients Health 

Needs.” The objective, which implicates both constitutional rights and rights under the ADA/RA, 

reads, “To preserve the health and safety of inmates with special medical, mental health, or 

developmental needs/disabilities in regard to housing, program assignments, disciplinary 

measures, and admissions to and transfers from the correctional institution.” The objective section 

also contains the following definition: 

Special Needs Patients: Inmates/patients who are mentally ill or suicidal, 

chronically ill, physically disabled, frail or elderly, terminally ill, pregnant, on 

dialysis, adolescent in an adult facility, infected with a communicable disease, 

or developmentally disabled.

(emphasis in original). 

128. There are several policies in this section of the manual, apparently intended to 

implement the stated objective. Policies relevant to claims in this case include: 

• An assessment is done on every inmate/patient transferred into the correctional facility. 

The medical and mental health information is reviewed for any special needs in the areas 

of housing, work assignments, or program assignments. 

• The special needs recommendations identified at intake are communicated to the 

correctional staff/classification department in writing via a Special Consideration form. 

• Medical staff notifies the correctional staff of any medical or mental health issues that 

could be affected by restrictive housing related to disciplinary actions and/or 

segregation/isolation. 

129. The Emergency Services section of the manual provides that 24-hour mental health 

care is available to inmates. Further, the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of psychiatrists 

and mental health clinicians are supposedly posted in the Health Services Unit. The manual also 

provides that mental health emergencies must be housed in a safe environment and monitored to 

prevent harm to self or others. Mental health emergencies beyond the scope of the facility are to 

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be transferred to the designated mental health treatment center and/or emergency room as 

determined per agreement with outside facility.” The procedures section includes the name and 

phone number of an on-call psychiatrist, and it also indicates that mental health transfers are to be 

sent to a hospital E.R. unless directed elsewhere. 

130. The manual also includes an Intoxication and Withdrawal section. This section 

contains policies and procedure for “Treatment and observation of inmates manifesting mild or 

moderate systems of withdrawal and/or acute intoxication.” The objective section defines 

detoxification as being the “process by which a patient is gradually withdrawn using medical 

intervention.” The intoxication withdrawal section contains procedures to be used on inmates such 

as Stefani. 

131. The manual also includes a Mental Health Screening and Evaluation section. The 

stated objective is that inmates identified with positive findings from a mental health screening 

and who are referred by security or healthcare staff must receive further evaluation by a qualified 

mental health professional for determination of treatment need. The policy requires: 

Qualified mental health professionals complete a comprehensive mental health 

evaluation on all inmates with positive findings for mental health issues, 

developmental disabilities, cognitive impairment, and/or substance abuse identified 

during the mental health screening and/or upon referral by security and/or 

healthcare staff. . . . Timeframe for completion of the mental health evaluation will 

be determined by the clinical need, but will not exceed 14 days from the date of the 

initial referral.

132. The policy manual includes a Receiving Screening section, and several policies are 

listed. One policy indicates that Receiving Screening will be completed by a qualified healthcare 

professional. The Receiving Screening must take place as soon as possible after a detainee arrives 

at the facility. Detainees are to be screened for suicide risk, mental illness, and other medical 

problems. Also, such a screening will be used to determine medical clearance to incarcerate an 

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arrestee. Importantly, findings of the screening are to be recorded. Mental health screening must 

be completed at the time of intake. The listed procedures are: 

• Upon arrival, an officer intake is completed by correctional staff. This includes medical 

and mental health screening.

• CCQ form is completed and brought to medical at the end of each shift.

• A medical chart is created if the inmate does not have a previous one.

• All inmates receive a medical and mental health screening within 24-48 hours into the 

jail (or as soon as possible for uncooperative inmates) by a medical staff member.

• Mental Health referrals are generated as indicated.

• All medical intake screenings are reviewed with HSA or designee.

• Any inmate refused for medical or mental health issues at intake will be taken to the 

emergency room by the arresting agency. MDC staff will complete a refusal form. A 

copy goes to the HSA and the original is given to the arresting officer.

133. As shown elsewhere in this pleading, a number of these policies seemed to be 

memorialized in writing but not actually reflect the customs and practices of Midland County. 

Regardless, Individual Defendants failed to comply with virtually any of the policies listed in this 

section of the pleading above. No Individual Defendant referred Stefani to an alternative facility 

for care – one required by Chapter 573. No Individual Defendant performed a mental health 

screening of Stefani. No Individual Defendant informed other personnel in the jail of Stefani’s 

serious mental health issues and/or her hospital care the day before her arrest. No Individual 

Defendant, upon information and belief, called any alleged on-call psychiatrist or other mental 

health professional. There can be little doubt that Individual Defendants working at the County 

jail acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, and were deliberately indifferent, when failing 

to comply with written policies. 

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G. Defendants’ Knowledge and Education

1. Jail Suicides Are a Known Widespread Problem.

134. Jail suicides, as Individual Defendants knew before incarcerating Stefani, are a 

huge problem in the United States. One-thousand fifty-three (1,053) people died in local jails in 

2014, three-hundred seventy-two (372) of which died as a result of suicide. Individual Defendants 

also knew when incarcerating Stefani that most jail suicides occur by hanging/strangulation, with 

prisoners using objects available to them as ligatures. Prisoners commonly use bed linens, clothing 

(including drawstrings), telephone cords, and trash bags. 

135. The Texas Commission on Jail Standards (“TCJS”) specifies use of a screening 

form for suicide and medical/mental/developmental impairments. The screening form was revised 

before Stefani was incarcerated to achieve, as one of three goals, the creation of an objective 

suicide risk assessment with clear guidance for front-line jail personnel as to when to notify their 

supervisors and/or mental health providers and magistrates. The TCJS indicates that intake 

screening “is the first step and is crucial to determine which inmates require more specialized 

mental health assessment.” Moreover, “Unless inmates are identified as potentially needing 

mental health treatment, they will not receive it.” 

136. The TCJS also notes that purposes of intake screening are to enable correctional 

staff to triage those who may be at significant risk for suicide; identify prisoners who may be in 

distress for a mental health disorder/psychosis or complications from recent substance abuse; and 

assist with the continuity of care of special-needs alleged offenders. The TCJS requires that an 

intake screening form be completed for all prisoners immediately upon admission into a jail 

facility. Further, staff should perform additional screenings when they have information that a 

prisoner has developed mental illness, or the inmate becomes suicidal, at any point during the 

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inmate’s incarceration. A jail must maintain any such additional screening forms in a prisoner’s 

file. 

137. Suicides were not a novel occurrence and/or unknown issue to Individual 

Defendants. They were well-aware of the risk – and Stefani’s case the certainty – of suicide. They 

were deliberately indifferent to this certainty, and Stefani died as a result. Individual Defendants

acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, and Midland County’s and City of Midland’s

policies, practices, and/or customs were moving forces behind Stefani’s death. 

2. Fifth Circuit’s Long-Held Constitutional Standard: Continuous 

Observation and Monitoring

138. Nearly 30 years ago, in November 1991, the Texas Commission on Jail Standards 

published the Guide for Development of Suicide Prevention Plans. Even that long ago, when 

society and medical professionals as a whole knew much less than they have learned over the last 

few years, the Commission recommended continuous observation for high risk, acutely suicidal 

inmates who had attempted suicide. Circuit Judge Goldberg, writing a concurring opinion on 

behalf of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nearly 30 years ago – in 1992 –

unambiguously wrote that the right to continual monitoring of prisoners with suicidal tendencies 

was clearly established. In Rhyne vs. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992), the mother 

of a pre-trial detainee brought suit for the death of her child. Judge Goldberg warned and put on 

notice all policymakers within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi), regarding pre-trial detainees in need of mental health 

care (and specifically those with suicidal tendencies):

Fortunately, the policymakers in charge can learn from their mistakes and take the 

necessary additional steps to insure the safety of pretrial detainees in need of mental 

health care. Other municipalities should also take heed of the tragic 

consequences which are likely to ensue in the absence of adequate safety 

measures to deal with detainees displaying suicidal tendencies.

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What we learn from the experiences of Henderson County [Texas] is that when 

jailers know a detainee is prone to committing suicide, a policy of observing 

such a detainee on a periodic, rather than on a continuous, basis, will not 

suffice; that vesting discretion in untrained jail personnel to assess the need for, and 

administer, mental health care, will not be responsive to the medical needs of 

mentally ill detainees; and that delegating the task of providing mental health care 

to an agency that is incapable of dispensing it on the weekends will endanger the 

well-being of its emotionally disturbed detainees. We need not remind jailers and 

municipalities that the Constitution works day and night, weekends and 

holidays—it takes no coffee breaks, no winter recess, and no summer vacation.

So the plaintiff in this case did not prove that Henderson County adopted its policy 

of handling suicidal detainees with deliberate indifference to their medical 

needs. But that does not insulate Henderson County, or any other municipality, 

from liability in future cases. Jailers and municipalities beware! Suicide is a real 

threat in the custodial environment. Showing some concern for those in 

custody, by taking limited steps to protect them, will not pass muster unless 

the strides taken to deal with the risk are calculated to work: Employing only 

“meager measures that [jailers and municipalities] know or should know to be 

ineffectual” amounts to deliberate indifference. To sit idly by now and await 

another, or even the first, fatality, in the face of the Henderson County tragedy, 

would surely amount to deliberate indifference.

Id. at 395-96 (emphasis added).

Defendants were put on notice long ago that anything short of continuous monitoring of suicidal 

inmates was insufficient and violated the United States Constitution. The law was clearly 

established with exacting specificity, and Defendants were charged with knowledge of it.

139. Midland County was also put on notice years before Stefani’s death, in a 

demonstrative and visible way, of the serious risk of a person who is intoxicated committing 

suicide in the Midland County jail shortly after arrest. A custodial death investigation was opened 

by the Texas Rangers on December 21, 2005 regarding the death of Wesley Thomas. Midland 

County Sheriff’s Department Sheriff Gary Painter, who was still the Sheriff at the time of Stefani’s 

death, requested assistance from the Texas Rangers to investigate Mr. Thomas’s death. While the 

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Fifth Circuit does not require Plaintiff to plead the chief policymaker, upon information and belief, 

Sheriff Painter was the chief policymaker for the Midland County jail both at the time of the death 

of Mr. Thomas and at the time of Stefani’s death. Upon information and belief, Sheriff Painter 

failed to take any significant action to assure that such suicides would not continue. Upon 

information and belief, Sheriff Painter was deliberately indifferent to the known consequences of 

his implementation of policy and/or failure to implement policy. As shown elsewhere in this 

pleading, Sheriff Painter chose to employ at least one incompetent employee. Unfortunately for 

Stefani, that incompetent employee was employed by Midland County at the time of Stefani’s 

death, is an Individual Defendant, and engaged in conduct causing and proximately causing 

Stefani’s death. 

140. Mr. Thomas had been booked into the Midland County jail for felony driving while 

intoxicated. He was placed into a cell, like Stefani, with something that allowed him to commit 

suicide by hanging. Mr. Thomas used his t-shirt to hang himself in his jail cell. While neither 

Midland County nor, upon information and belief, its chief policymaker regarding the jail needed 

a direct object lesson – such as the death of Mr. Thomas – to change its policies, practices, and/or 

customs of placing an arrestee into a jail cell with the ability to kill himself, Mr. Thomas’s death 

displayed explicitly why Stefani should have never been placed into a cell, in her intoxicated, 

mentally ill state, with the means with which to kill herself.

141. In addition to Mr. Thomas’s suicide in 2005, Midland County was put on notice 

again in 2007 with significant risk of leaving certain inmates in cells with items with which they 

could commit suicide. On September 7, 2007, Texas Ranger Lieutenant Bob Bullock received a 

request from Midland County Sheriff Gary Painter for assistance with a death in custody at the 

Midland County Detention Center. Inmate Jose Luis Lopez had hung himself while in an isolation 

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cell. Mr. Lopez had been arrested the previous day by the Midland Police Department on a 

outstanding sexual assault warrant from Lubbock County. Mr. Lopez was placed into an isolation 

cell, as a result of the charges against him, but items in the cell enabled him to form a ligature. Mr. 

Lopez formed a ligature with a strip of material torn from a blanket that had been provided to him 

by the Midland County jail. Part of the ligature was hanging from a water control knob in the 

shower at the time investigators appeared at the scene after Mr. Lopez’s death. This was yet another 

stark reminder that inmates at risk of suicide and/or other self-harm cannot be placed into a cell 

with items enabling such a person to commit suicide. Once again, Sheriff Painter was personally 

notified about the event.

142. Moreover, it appears that the manner in which Stefani was ignored was consistent 

with policy, practice, and/or custom of Midland County. This was further evidenced, aside from 

other allegations in this complaint, by yet another suicide occurring after Stefani committed suicide 

in the Midland County jail. A custodial death report filed by Midland County with Ken Paxton, 

Attorney General of Texas, on June 4, 2019, reported the death of Christopher Beau Duboise. The 

report indicates that Mr. Duboise appeared intoxicated by alcohol and/or drugs. The summary 

portion of the report reads that, on May 23, 2019, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Mr. Duboise was 

brought into custody by the Midland County Sheriff’s Office. He was arrested, as was Stefani, on 

a public intoxication charge. 

143. Mr. Duboise was placed on a stool in booking awaiting to be received. He then 

attacked another inmate who was being received. He further refused to answer suicide screening 

questions. He was thus placed on a “mental health check.” Presumably, the check was for 15-

minute observations. As pointed out elsewhere in this pleading, even 15-minute observations are 

insufficient to stop suicide. Suicidal persons must be placed on constant observation. 

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144. Ultimately, a jailer was able to have Mr. Duboise answer the suicide screening 

questions. It appears that based simply on those answers, Mr. Duboise was moved to another cell 

and allowed to have clothing with which he could hang himself. The summary indicates that, at 

approximately 9:55 p.m., a jailer had a face-to-face check on Mr. Duboise. The jailer did not 

conduct her next check for 17 minutes. It was then that she noticed that Mr. Duboise was in the 

back of the cell with a shirt tied around his neck on one end, and tied to a handicap bar on the other 

end. Mr. Duboise was eventually transported by EMS to Midland Memorial Hospital. 

Unfortunately, Jailer Hunnicutt was forced to – once again – ride with a person to the hospital who 

had committed suicide. Moreover, once again, Judge Cobos was required to pronounce yet another 

inmate who committed suicide in the Midland County jail as being deceased. 

145. Thus, Midland County clearly did not have a policy, practice, and/or custom of 

continuously monitoring inmates and thus assuring that inmates’ lives could be saved. It is 

important to note the passage of less than 72 minutes time from the time that Mr. Duboise was 

brought into the jail until the time he was seen after he had committed suicide. It is unreasonable 

at best to assume that a person who refuses to answer the suicide screening questions, and instead 

assaults a fellow inmate, could somehow then quickly answer those questions and prove that he 

was not suicidal – all within the space of less than an hour. 

146. The Texas Commission on Jail Standards, pursuant to Texas law, recently began 

requiring counties to report, monthly, certain categories of serious incidents occurring in county 

jails. One category of incidents is attempted suicides. The Midland County jail reported, for March 

2018 alone, four attempted suicides. Upon information and belief, there were a number of 

attempted suicides in that jail over a lengthy period of time – years – before Stefani’s completed 

suicide. Thus, upon information and belief, those prior attempted suicides were further notice to 

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Midland County that it needed policies and procedures, and more importantly customs and 

practices which are actually occurring, which would prevent suicides such as Stefani’s. Midland 

County could not employ incompetent employees and expect to save lives. 

3. Individual Defendants’ Knowledge, Education, and Background

a. Employment Records

(1) Officer Blake Blanscett

147. Officer Blanscett was hired as a police officer for the City of Midland on or about 

August 28, 2017. Therefore, he had been a police officer with the City for less than 10 months 

when he chose not to take Stefani to the nearest appropriate inpatient mental health facility or 

another mental health facility deemed suitable by the local mental health authority (if such an 

appropriate inpatient mental health facility was not available). 

148. Moreover, as of even August 2018, after Stefani committed suicide, Officer 

Blanscett’s Midland Police Department performance appraisal indicated that he was “still a young 

[o]fficer who [was] settling his feet into the sand.” Regardless, upon information and belief, 

Officer Blanscett was aware at the time he dealt with Stefani of procedures that he could use with 

intoxicated individuals and, upon information and belief, individuals with mental health issues 

(including the procedure mandated by Chapter 573 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, entitled 

“Emergency Detention”). In the alternative, City of Midland had not trained Officer Blanscett at 

all as to that statute and how he should transport a person to such a facility. 

149. Regardless, upon information and belief, before Officer Blanscett’s interaction with 

Stefani, Midland was aware that Officer Blanscett had issues with appropriate decisionmaking 

when interacting with the public. His performance review also indicated the reviewer’s belief that 

Officer Blanscett “can and will make improvements on his decisionmaking and judg[]ment as 

Officer Blanscett’s career moves forward.” One listed example of a judgment issue, was a 

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situation in which Officer Blanscett, after attempting to calm a female subject, decided to go 

“hands on.” Officer Blanscett did so, even though the female subject was still hand-in-hand with 

a child. The reviewer noted that Officer Blanscett could have injured the child when doing so. 

150. The reviewer also wrote that things that Officer Blanscett could work on was 

communication by word of mouth and/or problem-solving scenarios. In the job knowledge section 

of the 2018 performance review, the reviewer believed that it was good practice for Officer 

Blanscett to ride two-man with a senior officer. 

151. Officer Blanscett should have never been allowed by City of Midland to interact 

with and handle Stefani on his own, and City of Midland knew it at the time it allowed him to 

patrol – solo – on the day he interacted with Stefani. City of Midland actually put into writing that 

it would be a good idea for Officer Blanscett to ride with a senior officer. It made such a 

recommendation, because it had concerns about Officer Blanscett’s decisionmaking abilities. 

Ultimately, it was this concern, and City of Midland’s failure to train and/or supervise Officer 

Blanscett, that was a moving force behind and proximately caused Stefani’s death. 

152. Officer Blanscett has also been the subject of internal investigations. One incident, 

occurring on March 14, 2018, involved Officer Blanscett telling an arrestee, “I’m not gonna 

fu**ing play with you.” The senior officer indicated that Officer Blanscett’s statement was 

unprofessional and would be addressed with his chain of command. 

153. When Officer Blanscett applied to work the Midland Police Department, a 

background investigation was conducted in conjunction with the application process. Texas law 

requires such an investigation, and Officer Blanscett had to answer a series of questions. As to 

weaknesses, Officer Blanscett listed “nervousness” and “tunnel vision.” Officer Blanscett was 

asked, “How well do you work under pressure? High stress situations?” Officer Blanscett 

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responded in part, “I get some tunnel vision if I don’t calm down and think about the situation I’m 

dealing with.” The City of Midland was put on notice that it would need to supervise and train 

Officer Blanscett on life-and-death situations involving mentally ill people (such as Stefani). Upon 

information and belief, the City did not do so. 

(2) Corporal Monica Allen

154. Monica Allen, on or about June 5, 2018, gave her two-weeks’ notice to resign from 

the Midland County Sheriff’s Office. She indicated that she was resigning to take care her new 

baby through the rest of the year. Upon information and belief, that may not have been the reason 

for her resignation. This view is bolstered by the fact that, just a few months before Stefani’s 

death, on February 22, 2018, Corporal Allen requested in writing to be considered for the Jail 

Services Corporal position. She stated that she had been with the Midland County Sheriff’s Office 

four-and-a-half (41⁄2) years at that time, and had “no plans on leaving my ever-growing career with 

the County.” A form filed with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement indicates that 

Corporal Allen’s separation with Midland County was actually the day after Stefani died – June 

18, 2018. Thus, Corporal Allen was spending her last Sunday at the jail on the day that Stefani 

died. 

(3) Jailer Matthew Groessel

155. Interestingly, Jailer Groessel also left his employment with the Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office in June 2018. Jailer Groessel’s resignation letter was dated June 25, 2018 – only 

one week after Stefani’s – with a final date of employment of July 7, 2018. Jailer Groessel 

indicated that he had “decided to explore other avenues of employment.” The likely logical 

explanation for Jailer Groessel leaving the Midland County Sheriff’s Office was his actions related 

to Stefani’s death. 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 75 of 105

156. Three days before Stefani’s suicide – on June 14, 2018 – Jailer Groessel wrote to 

Sheriff Painter what he termed a “formal letter of interest” in attending a law enforcement academy 

session. The lengthy letter cited Jailer Groessel’s alleged accomplishments with the Midland 

County Sheriff’s Office. There is no indication in the letter whatsoever that Jailer Groessel 

intended to resign his employment position. In fact, it indicates quite the opposite. 

157. According to an application completed by Jailer Groessel seeking reemployment 

with the Midland County Sheriff’s Office in November 2018, Jailer Groessel left his employment 

in June 2018 for “personal” reasons. Upon information and belief, he likely resigned the Sheriff’s 

Office position as a result of his failure to act appropriately with regard to Stefani. Jailer Groessel 

also indicated in response to questions in or about December 2018 that he had a disciplinary writeup at the Midland County Sheriff’s Office, which was removed from his file. He also wrote that 

he had been the subject of a written complaint at work. 

158. Jailer Groessel had significant problems with his Midland County employment. 

Jailer Groessel was suspended without pay March 9 and 11, 2016. He was suspended without pay 

for a disciplinary action on July 29, 2015. He was also suspended on June 14, 2015. 

(4) Jailer George Rhea

159. Jailer Rhea received was a long-time employee of the Midland County Sheriff’s 

Office, originally applying in January 1988. Jailer Rhea left his employment not long after 

Stefani’s death, retiring on or about October 31, 2018. Javier Rhea had significant issues with his 

employment with the Midland County Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Painter’s and/or others’ decision 

to retain Jailer Rhea as an employee, and not appropriate supervise and/or train him, was a moving 

force behind and caused Stefani’s death. 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 76 of 105

160. Jailer Rhea received five days suspension without pay as a result of a disciplinary 

action taken just the month before Stefani’s death – on May 29, 2018. Jailer Rhea was to be 

suspended through May 9, 2018. Jailer Rhea had been an employee of Midland County for, 

according to him, almost 28 years. Jailer Rhea gave a reason for his inappropriate conduct that he 

had failed to take his medications. Jailer Rhea allegedly took medication to help with his serious 

depression. Jailer Rhea had used excessive force with an inmate, up to and including putting his 

hands around the inmate’s throat, not long before Stefani’s death. 

161. Jailer Rhea was promoted to jailer on Sunday, September 17, 2017. Upon 

information and belief, this was his third promotion to jailer. Upon information and belief, he had 

been promoted to jailer two times before, and then demoted each time. 

162. Jailer Rhea was assigned “B” Shift – to Booking. This is the shift during which 

Stefani was brought to the Midland County jail. After that promotion, Jailer Rhea wrote a letter 

to Sheriff Painter. He wrote in his letter that it had been brought to his attention that he could be 

a liability to the Sheriff and the office. He had been diagnosed with a mental condition known as 

“spiraling depressing.” This resulted in him engaging in arguments, to the point of outright 

insubordination – with supervisors and leadership appointed over him. He said that there was 

documentation and accounts of such actions – resulting in disciplinary actions in his personnel file 

in the Midland County administration office. “I had been advised – upon my promotion – to 

submit a letter of request to purge those particular records and documents from my personal [sic] 

file that would deem me as a possible threat.” Therefore, even though Midland County knew that 

it should not have entrusted Jailer Rhea with Stefani’s life, it chose to do so. Jailer Rhea should

not have been allowed to conduct Stefani’s intake, holding her life in his hands. The decision to 

Case 7:20-cv-00062 Document 1 Filed 03/11/20 Page 76 of 105
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 77 of 105

retain Jailer Rhea through significant problems and promotions – and then demotions – was made 

by, upon information and belief, the jail’s chief policymaker – Chief Painter. 

163. There were other significant issues with Jailer Rhea’s employment, which were 

apparently known to everyone. In one letter that he wrote, he admitted that he had been demoted 

twice before:

I realize that over a quarter of a century has passed with my employment here for 

you, and during that time I have spent all of it as a Jail Clerk. I also realize that 

twice before I had been promoted to the position of jailer, and have been relieved 

of the position and kept at the position of Jail Clerk. Thus, after nearly 30 years at 

the Midland County Sheriff’s Office, I had been promoted from a clerk only twice 

and demoted both such times. 

The apparent decision to promote Jailer Rhea a third time to jailer resulted in, caused, was a 

proximately cause of, was a producing cause of, and was a moving force behind Stefani’s death. 

164. Jailer Rhea’s attitude toward pre-trial detainees was not consistent with societal or 

jail norms and standards, but more importantly the United States Constitution. Pre-trial detainees 

have not been convicted of anything and must be treated as such. The Constitution prohibits 

punishment of such people in any way, since they have not been convicted. They enjoy a 

presumption of innocence. They must receive reasonable medical care and mental health care, 

and they must be protected from themselves and others. However, Officer Rhea had an attitude 

toward such pre-trial detainees inconsistent with the Constitution and inconsistent with views and 

norms of all competent jailers. He demonstrated such attitudes when he completed a form to be

used to demonstrate use of the form to other Midland County jail employees.

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165. One need say little after reading Jailer Rhea’s written comments on the form. 

Sufficient it to say that Jailer Rhea assumed that pre-trail detainees were convicted criminals, and 

that their younger children would follow in their footsteps. Upon information and belief, this view 

colored Jailer Rhea’s treatment of Midland County jail inmates. More importantly, it informed 

and supported his unconstitutional treatment of Stefani. 

166. Jailer Rhea had also been suspended without pay for a disciplinary action taken on 

May 1, 2008. In 2009, Captain Terrisa Candelaria received a termination request for then-Clerk 

Rhea from Lieutenant Soledad Gonzalez. Officer Candelaria acknowledged that “Clerk Rhea has 

exhibited unprofessional conduct in the workplace to Sheriff Painter. 

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167. Jailer Rhea’s personnel file is replete with significant material problems which 

should have resulted in termination long before his interaction with Stefani in June 2018. He did 

not possess reasonable decision-making abilities. He could not get along with co-workers. He 

had been promoted, and then demoted twice. He had an attitude toward pre-trial detainees which 

is not consistent with their rights under the United States Constitution. Sheriff Painter then 

apparently decided to promote him a third time, which unfortunately caused and was a moving 

force behind Stefani’s death. 

b. TCOLE Records

168. The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (“TCOLE”) keeps records of service 

histories and training and education of the natural person Defendants and which relates to law 

enforcement and/or jailer activities. TCOLE records indicate that each of the natural person 

Defendants had sufficient experience and/or education to be fully aware that a failure to act 

reasonably and/or being deliberately indifferent, would violate Stefani’s rights under the United 

States Constitution. 

169. TCOLE records indicate the following service history for Jailer Rhea:

Appointed 

As

Department Award Service 

Start Date

Service 

End Date

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 82 of 105

Jailer 

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Jailer License 04/26/18 10/31/18

Jailer 

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Temporary Jailer 

License

09/17/17 04/26/18

170. TCOLE records indicate the following award history for Jailer Rhea:

Award Type Action Action Date

Temporary Jailer License License Granted 09/17/17

Jailer License License Granted 04/26/18

171. TCOLE records indicate that Jailer Rhea received the following training and/or 

education which was, upon information and belief, relevant to claims against him in this case:

Course 

No.

Course Title Course 

Date

Course 

Hours

Institution

4900 Mental Health 

Training for Jailers

04/25/18 8 Permian Basin LEA

1007 Basic County Jail 

Course

04/25/18 96 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/05/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/04/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/03/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/02/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

3500 Jail 07/28/97 4 Permian Basin LEA

172. TCOLE records indicate the following service history for Jailer Groessel:

Appointed 

As

Department Award Service 

Start Date

Service 

End Date

Jailer 

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Jailer License 12/22/18

Jailer

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Jailer License 08/26/15 06/25/18

Jailer 

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Temporary Jailer 

License

09/11/14 08/26/15

173. TCOLE records indicate the following award history for Jailer Groessel:

Award Type Action Action Date

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 83 of 105

Temporary Jailer License License Granted 09/11/14

Jailer License License Granted 08/26/15

Basic Jailer Certificate Issued 08/27/15

174. TCOLE records indicate that Jailer Groessel received the following training and/or 

education which was, upon information and belief, relevant to claims against him in this case:

Course 

No.

Course Title Course 

Date

Course 

Hours

Institution

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/04/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/03/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/02/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

09/30/16 40 Permian Basin LEA

4040 Mental Impairment 

(General)

03/03/16 4 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

12/18/15 40 Permian Basin LEA

1007 Basic County Jail 

Course

08/25/15 96 Permian Basin LEA

3721 County Correction 

Officer Filed 

Training

10/08/14 160 Midland Co. Sheriff’s Office 

(Training Rosters)

175. TCOLE records indicate the following service history for Jailer Allen:

Appointed 

As

Department Award Service 

Start Date

Service 

End Date

Jailer Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Jailer License 09/04/14 06/18/18

Jailer 

(Full Time)

Midland County 

Sheriff’s Office

Temporary Jailer 

License

12/18/13 09/04/14

176. TCOLE records indicate the following award history for Jailer Allen:

Award Type Action Action Date

Temporary Jailer License License Granted 12/18/13

Jailer License License Granted 09/04/14

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 84 of 105

177. TCOLE records indicate that Jailer Allen received the following training and/or 

education which was, upon information and belief, relevant to claims against him in this case:

Course 

No.

Course Title Course 

Date

Course 

Hours

Institution

3737 New Supervisor’s 

Course

02/23/18 20 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/05/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/04/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/03/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

2084 Jail/Correction 

Inservice

01/02/18 1 Permian Basin LEA

4040 Mental Impairment 

(General)

03/01/16 4 Permian Basin LEA

1007 Basic County Jail 

Course

09/03/14 96 Permian Basin LEA

1071 Basic County 

Corrections 

Classroom 

Component

08/08/14 24 Permian Basin LEA

178. TCOLE records indicate the following service history for Officer Blanscett:

Appointed 

As

Department Award Service 

Start Date

Service 

End Date

Peace 

Officer

(Full Time)

Midland Police 

Department

Peace Officer 

License

09/07/17

179. TCOLE records indicate the following award history for Officer Blanscett:

Award Type Action Action Date

Peace Officer License License Granted 09/07/17

Basic Peace Officer Certificate Certification 08/23/18

180. TCOLE records indicate that Officer Blanscett received the following training 

and/or education which was, upon information and belief, relevant to claims against him in this 

case:

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 85 of 105

Course 

No.

Course Title Course 

Date

Course 

Hours

Institution

3270 Human Trafficking 05/07/18 4 Permian Basin LEA

Ethics for Law Enforcement 3925

Distance

05/04/18 4 TCOLE Online

3722 Peace Officer Field 

Training

12/21/17 160 Midland Police Department

(Training Rosters)

1000643 Basic Peace 

Officer Course 

(643)

08/09/17 643 South Plains College 

Academy

H. Monell Liability of Midland County and City of Midland

1. Introduction

181. Plaintiff sets forth in this section of the pleading additional facts and allegations 

supporting liability claims against Midland County and City of Midland pursuant to Monell v. 

Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It is Plaintiff’s intent that all facts asserted in this 

pleading relating to policies, practices, and/or customs of Midland County and City of Midland

support such Monell liability claims, and not just facts and allegations set forth in this section. 

Such policies, practices, and/or customs alleged in this pleading were moving forces behind and 

caused the constitutional violations and damages and death referenced herein.

182. Midland County knew, when it incarcerated Stefani, that its personnel, policies, 

practices, and/or customs were such that it could not meet its constitutional obligations to provide 

appropriate mental health treatment to Stefani. Midland County made decisions about policy and 

practice which it implemented through its commissioner’s court, its sheriff, its jail administrator, 

and/or through such widespread practice and/or custom that such practice and/or custom became 

the policy of Midland County as it related to its jail. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has made 

it clear that Plaintiff need not allege at the pleading stage the specific identity of Midland County’s 

chief policymaker. 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 86 of 105

183. City of Midland knew, when it allowed Officer Blanscett, without supervision, to 

arrest Stefani, that its personnel, policies, practices, and/or customs were such that it could not 

meet its constitutional obligations to provide appropriate mental health treatment to Stefani. Upon 

information and belief, City of Midland made decisions about policy and practice which it 

implemented through its city council, its chief of police, and/or through such widespread practice 

and/or custom that such practice and/or custom became the policy of City of Midland as it related 

to arrest and/or transport of people who presented as intoxicated and/or had significant mental 

health issues. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that Plaintiff need not allege at 

the pleading stage the specific identity of City of Midland’s chief policymaker. 

184. There were several policies, practices, and/or customs of Midland County and/or 

City of Midland which were moving forces behind, caused, were producing causes of, and/or

proximately caused Stefani’s suffering and death, and other damages referenced in this pleading. 

The County and City made deliberate decisions, acting in a deliberately indifferent and/or 

objectively unreasonable manner, when implementing and/or allowing such policies, practices, 

and/or customs to exist. Further, when the County and City implemented and/or consciously 

allowed such policies, practices, and/or customs to exist, they knew with certainty that the result 

would be serious injury, suffering, physical illness, and/or death. 

2. Midland County Sheriff’s Office Culture

185. David Criner, as of approximately March 2020, became Midland County’s first 

newly-elected Sheriff in over thirty years. Newly-elected Sheriff Criner indicated that the first 

action he will take as Sheriff is to resolve ongoing Texas Rangers investigations into the Midland 

County Sheriff’s Office. He said that he wanted the Office to start “with a new sheet of paper and 

go forward from there.” Sheriff Criner said, “It’s important for Midland County itself, the citizens 

of Midland County, and also the employees of the Midland County Sheriff’s Office, because right 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 87 of 105

now, there’s a dark cloud over the sheriff’s office.” Newly-elected Sheriff Criner also admitted 

that the jail’s mental health unit has only been operating eight hours per day – on weekdays. Thus, 

it was not operating on the Sunday when Stefani committed suicide. Moreover, upon information 

and belief, before Sheriff’ Criner’s election, the Midland County Sheriff’s Office was being 

investigated for alleged unlawful interception of oral or electronic communications, abuse of 

official capacity, and/or tampering with a governmental record and theft. 

186. It appears that the Midland County jail has had problems for quite some time. Even 

after the suicides and suicide attempts refereed in this complaint, the Midland County jail failed a 

Texas Commission on Jail Standards inspection in early year 2020. 

3. Midland County Liability

187. Plaintiff lists beneath this heading policies, practices, and/or customs which 

Plaintiff alleges, at times upon information and belief, caused, proximately caused, were producing 

causes of, and/or were moving forces behind all damages referenced in this pleading, including 

Stefani’s death. Thus, Midland County is liable for all such damages. 

188. Upon information and belief, the Midland County jail was understaffed at critical 

times, such as the time when Stefani committed suicide. Corporal Allen indicated that the jail was 

shorthanded on the Sunday on which Stefani committed suicide. 

189. Upon information and belief, there was a custom and/or practice of not completing 

the TCJS-required mental health screening form for inmates who were intoxicated. Evidence 

supporting such an allegation includes that of Jailer Rhea – a long time employee of the Midland 

County Sheriff’s Office – asserting that he would allow Stefani just to “sleep it off.” Upon 

information and belief, this was a consistent practice and/or custom. Upon information and belief, 

the Midland County Sheriff’s Office also had a practice and/or custom of intake officers not 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 88 of 105

communicating to other people in the intake area and/or jail when the TCJS-required intake 

screening form was not completed. 

190. Upon information and belief, Midland County also had a policy, practice, and/or 

custom of not providing suicide smocks to inmates who were suicidal and/or exhibited self-harm 

tendencies. There was no evidence in documents received related to Stefani’s death indicating 

that such a suicide smock was ever considered. Suicide smocks are designed to not be able to be 

used by inmates to asphyxiate and/or otherwise harm themselves. 

191. Upon information and belief, Midland County had a policy, practice, and/or custom 

which did not require jailers working in Master Control to continuously watch inmates. Upon 

information and belief, such persons were easily able to view on a monitor what was occurring in 

cells in the intake area, including Stefani’s cell. 

192. Upon information and belief, Midland County Sheriff’s Office did not have – for

quite some time – a computer in the booking area which would allow the viewing of inmates in 

cells in that area. As shown above, there was a computer in that area which would allow such 

viewing, but it was not working at the time of Stefani’s death. Upon information and belief, 

possibly had not been working for quite some time. 

193. Upon information and belief, the Midland County Sheriff’s Office had a policy, 

practice, and/or custom of allowing observations and/or checks of inmates in the booking area 

without actual face-to-face observation. This is evidenced by the fact that a jailer responsible for 

observing Stefani was able to clearly shirk responsibilities without anyone else in the area saying 

anything to him about the manner in which he was purportedly conducting cell checks walking by 

a cell door and/or making a cursory viewing through a cell window is not a “check” consistent 

with jail standards and/or TCJS minimum standards. 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 89 of 105

194. Upon information and belief, the Midland County Sheriff’s Office had a practice, 

policy, and/or custom of allowing a nurse, potentially not trained in mental health issues, to simply 

ask cursory questions about a person who had taken a number of pills and not requiring after such 

cursory questioning questioning by mental health professionals and/or others. This resulted in 

Stefani being placed into a cell so that she could commit suicide. The conversation between the 

nurse and Stefani, if true as represented in documents produced by Midland County, is not a 

medical and/or mental health evaluation at all. 

195. Midland County Sheriff’s Office only provided on-site mental health care Monday 

through Friday. This policy, practice, and/or custom did not allow Constitutional duties to be met 

by Midland County on weekends – specifically on the Sunday when Stefani died. 

196. Midland County, upon information and belief through its chief policymaker sheriff, 

chose over an extended period of time to retain Jailer Rhea as an employee. As shown in this 

complaint, Jailer Rhea was unfortunately not competent to perform his duties, having been 

demoted twice, and demonstrating in his own letter to the Sheriff that he was a “liability” to the 

jail. 

4. City of Midland Liability

197. Plaintiff lists beneath this heading policies, practices, and/or customs which 

Plaintiff alleges, at times upon information and belief, caused, proximately caused, were producing 

causes of, and/or were moving forces behind all damages referenced in this pleading, including 

Stefani’s death. Thus, City of Midland is liable for all such damages. 

198. Upon information and belief, the City of Midland had a policy, practice, and/or 

custom of not requiring that arrestees be taken to a local inpatient facility for mental health 

treatment in accordance with Chapter 573. There appears to be no discussion regarding Stefani 

being taken to a local inpatient facility at the time Stefani was delivered to the Midland County 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 90 of 105

jail and/or is evidenced by records produced by City of Midland. Moreover, upon information and 

belief, City of Midland policies in place at the time of Stefani’s arrest, for conducting arrests and 

seizures, made no provision for – and did not even mention – transport of a mentally ill person to 

an inpatient mental health facility. Thus, upon information and belief, Midland written policies 

made no provision for Chapter 573. 

199. Upon information and belief, City of Midland had not, in the alternative to other 

allegations made in this pleading, trained Officer Blanscett about Chapter 573, and its application. 

This is an alternative allegation, to the extent Officer Blanscett indicates that he did not receive 

such training. In the alternative, if he did receive such training, this is further evidence of his 

deliberate indifference and objective unreasonableness toward Stefani’s significant mental health 

issues. 

200. City of Midland failed to appropriately supervise and/or, upon information and 

belief, train Officer Blanscett. City of Midland knew about Officer Blanscett’s inexperience, and 

even noted that it would be good for a senior officer to ride with him in the field. Even so, City of 

Midland did not require that such a senior officer ride with Officer Blanscett. 

III. Causes of Action

A. 14th Amendment Due Process Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Objective 

Reasonableness Pursuant to Kingsley v. Hendrickson

201. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), a pretrial detainee sued several 

jail officers alleging that they violated the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause by using 

excessive force against him. Id. at 2470. The Court determined the following issue: “whether, to 

prove an excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the officers were subjectively

aware that their use of force was unreasonable, or only that the officer’s use of that force was 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 91 of 105

objectively unreasonable.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that the objectively 

unreasonable standard was that to be used in excessive force cases, and that an officer’s subjective 

awareness was irrelevant. Id. The Court did so, acknowledging and resolving disagreement 

among the Circuits. Id. at 2471-72. 

202. The Court flatly wrote “the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a plaintiff 

is required to prove.” Id. at 2472. Instead, “courts must use an objective standard.” Id at 2472-73. 

“[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposefully or knowingly used against him 

was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2473. Thus, the Court required no mens rea, no conscious

constitutional violation, and no subjective belief or understanding of offending police officers, or 

jailers, for an episodic claim but instead instructed all federal courts to analyze officers’, or jailers’,

conduct on an objective reasonability standard. Since pretrial detainees’ rights to receive 

reasonable medical and mental health care, to be protected from harm, and not to be punished at 

all, also arise under the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, there is no reason to apply a 

different standard when analyzing those rights.

203. It appears that this objective reasonableness standard is now the law of the land. In 

Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2017), the Fifth Circuit Court 

of Appeals considered appeal of a pretrial detainee case in which the pretrial detainee alleged 

failure-to-protect and failure to provide reasonable medical care claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Id. at 418. The court wrote, “Pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 419 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit determined, even 

though Kingsley had been decided by the United States Supreme Court, that a plaintiff in such a 

case still must show subjective deliberate indifference by a defendant in an episodic act or omission 

case. Id. at 419-20. A plaintiff must still show that actions of such an individual person acting 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 92 of 105

under color of state law were “reckless.” Id. at 420 (citation omitted). However, concurring Circuit 

Judge Graves dissented to a footnote in which the majority refused to reconsider the deliberate 

indifference, subjective standard, in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 420 and 424-25.1 

1 Circuit Judge Graves wrote: “I write separately because the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley 

v. Hendrickson, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015), appears to call into 

question this court’s holding in Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996). In Kingsley, 

which was an excessive force case, the Supreme Court indeed said: “Whether that standard might 

suffice for liability in the case of an alleged mistreatment of a pretrial detainee need not be decided 

here; for the officers do not dispute that they acted purposefully or knowingly with respect to the 

force they used against Kingsley.” Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2472. However, that appears to be an 

acknowledgment that, even in such a case, there is no established subjective standard as the 

majority determined in Hare. Also, the analysis in Kingsley appears to support the conclusion that 

an objective standard would apply in a failure-to-protect case. See id. at 2472–2476.

Additionally, the Supreme Court said:

We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard is appropriate in the 

context of excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the 

Fourteenth Amendment may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard 

in the context of excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners. We are 

not confronted with such a claim, however, so we need not address that issue today.

Id. at 2476. This indicates that there are still different standards for pretrial detainees and DOC 

inmates, contrary to at least some of the language in Hare, 74 F.3d at 650, and that, if the standards 

were to be commingled, it would be toward an objective standard as to both on at least some 

claims.

Further, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 

1060 (9th Cir. 2016), after a partially dissenting panel judge wrote separately to point out that 

Kingsley “calls into question our precedent on the appropriate state-of-mind inquiry in failure-toprotect claims brought by pretrial detainees.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 677 

(9th Cir. 2015). The en banc court concluded that Kingsley applies to failure-to-protect claims and 

that an objective standard is appropriate. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068–1073.

In Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2014), decided just one month after 

Kingsley, this court did not address any application of Kingsley. Likewise, the two subsequent 

cases also cited by the majority did not address or distinguish Kingsley. Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 

172 (5th Cir. 2016), and Zimmerman v. Cutler, 657 Fed.Appx. 340 (5th Cir. 2016). Because I read 

Kingsley as the Ninth Circuit did and would revisit the deliberate indifference standard, I write 

separately.”

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 93 of 105

204. The majority opinion gave only three reasons for the court’s determination that the 

law should not change in light of Kingsley. First, the panel was bound by the Fifth Circuit’s “rule 

of orderliness.” Id. at 420 n.4. Second, the Ninth Circuit was at that time the only circuit to have 

extended Kingsley’s objective standard to failure-to-protect claims. Id. Third, the Fifth Circuit 

refused to reconsider the law of the Circuit in light of United State Supreme Court precedent, 

because it would not have changed the results in Alderson. Id. Even so, the Fifth Circuit noted, 

nearly twenty-five years ago, that the analysis in pretrial detainee provision of medical care cases 

is the same as that for pretrial detainee failure-to-protect cases. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 

633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996). 

205. Thus, the trail leads to only one place – an objective unreasonableness standard, 

with no regard for officers’ or jailers’ subjective belief or understanding, should apply in this case 

and all pretrial detainee cases arising under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The 

Fifth Circuit, and the district court in this case, should reassess Fifth Circuit law in light of Kingsley

and apply an objective unreasonableness standard to constitutional claims in this case. The court 

should not apply a subjective state of mind and/or deliberate indifference standard. The Supreme 

Court discarded the idea that a non-convicted plaintiff should have such a burden.

B. Remedies for Violation of Constitutional Rights and Other Federal Claims

206. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that using a State’s 

wrongful death and survival statutes creates an effective remedy for civil rights claims pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff individually, and for and on behalf of Claimant Heirs, seeks, 

for causes of action asserted in this complaint, all remedies and damages available pursuant to

Texas and federal law, including but not necessarily limited to the Texas wrongful death statute 

(Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.002 et seq.), the Texas survival statute (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code § 71.021), the Texas Constitution, common law, and all related and/or supporting case law. 

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If Stefani had lived, she would have been entitled to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for violation 

of the United States Constitution, and actions for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

and Rehabilitation Act, and obtain remedies and damages provided by Texas and federal law. 

Plaintiff incorporates this remedies section into all sections in this complaint asserting cause(s) of 

action. 

C. Cause of Action Against Individual Defendants Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

Violation of 14th Amendment Due Process and/or 4

th Amendment Rights to 

Reasonable Mental Health Care, to be Protected, and not to be Punished 

207. In the alternative, without waiving any of the other causes of action pled herein, 

without waiving any procedural, contractual, statutory, or common-law right, and incorporating 

all other allegations herein (including all allegations in the “Factual Allegations” section above) to 

the extent they are not inconsistent with the cause of action pled here, Individual Defendants are 

liable to Plaintiff individually and to Claimant Heirs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating

Stefani's rights to reasonable mental health care, to be protected, and not to be punished as a pretrial 

detainee. These rights are guaranteed by the 4

th and/or 14th Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Pre-trial detainees are entitled to a greater degree of medical and mental health care 

than convicted inmates, according to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Pre-trial detainees are 

also entitled to protection, and also not to be punished at all since they have not been convicted of 

any alleged crime resulting in their incarceration. 

208. Individual Defendants acted and failed to act under color of state law at all times 

referenced in this pleading. They wholly or substantially ignored Stefani's obvious serious mental 

health issues and/or self-harm tendencies, and they were deliberately indifferent to and acted in an 

objectively unreasonable manner those needs. They failed to protect Stefani, in their arrest and/or 

incarceration of her, and placement of her into a cell to die alone after knowing about her serious 

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mental health and self-harm issues, as well as other actions and/or inaction referenced in this 

pleading, resulted in unconstitutional punishment of Stefani. Individual Defendants were aware 

of the excessive risk to Stefani’s health and safety and were aware of facts from which an inference 

could be drawn of serious harm, suffering, and death. Moreover, they in fact drew that inference. 

Individual Defendants violated clearly established constitutional rights, and their conduct was 

objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the relevant incidents. 

209. Individual Defendants are also liable pursuant to the theory of bystander liability. 

Bystander liability applies when the bystander jailer/officer (1) knows that a fellow jailer/officer 

is violating a person’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; 

and (3) chooses not to act. As demonstrated through facts asserted in this pleading, Individual 

Defendants’ actions and inaction meet all three elements. All Individual Defendants, regardless 

of their rank or employer, had a duty and an obligation to assure that Stefani was transported to an 

appropriate inpatient mental health facility and/or to call serious attention to her issues, to such 

Individual Defendants’ employer, regarding Stefani’s issues. They chose not to do so. Therefore, 

Individual Defendants are also liable to Plaintiff individually and Claimant Heirs pursuant to this 

theory.

210. In the alternative, Individual Defendants’ deliberate indifference, conscious 

disregard, state of mind, subjective belief, subjective awareness, and/or mental culpability are 

irrelevant to determination of constitutional violations set forth in this section of this pleading. 

The United States Supreme Court, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), determined 

the state of mind necessary, if any, for officers/jailers sued in a case alleging excessive force 

against a pretrial detainee in violation of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id at 2470-

71. Constitutional rights set forth in this section of the pleading, and constitutional rights affording

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pretrial detainees protection against excessive force, all flow from the 14th Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause. Id. Since such constitutional protections flow from the same clause, the analysis 

of what is necessary to prove such constitutional violations is identical.

211. Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.2 Their denial of 

reasonable mental health care, and other actions and/or inaction set forth in this pleading, caused,

2 The defense of qualified immunity is, and should be held to be, a legally impermissible defense. 

In the alternative, it should be held to be a legally impermissible defense except as applied to state 

actors protected by immunity in 1871 when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted. Congress makes laws. 

Courts do not. However, the qualified immunity defense was invented by judges. When judges 

make law, they violate the separation of powers doctrine, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause 

of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff respectfully makes a good faith argument for the 

modification of existing law, such that the court–created doctrine of qualified immunity be 

abrogated or limited. 

The natural person Defendants cannot show that they would fall within the category of persons 

referenced in the second sentence of this footnote. This would be Defendants’ burden, if they

choose to assert the alleged defense. Qualified immunity, as applied to persons not immunized 

under common or statutory law in 1871, is untethered to any cognizable legal mandate and is flatly 

in derogation of the plain meaning and language of Section 1983. See Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 

1843, 1870-72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). Qualified immunity should have never been 

instituted as a defense, without any statutory, constitutional, or long-held common law foundation, 

and it is unworkable, unreasonable, and places too high a burden on Plaintiffs who suffer violation 

of their constitutional rights. Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 Notre 

Dame L. Rev. 1797 (2018) (observing that qualified immunity has no basis in the common law, 

does not achieve intended policy goals, can render the Constitution “hollow,” and cannot be 

justified as protection for governmental budgets); and William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity 

Unlawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 45, 82 (2018) (noting that, as of the time of the article, the United 

States Supreme Court decided 30 qualified immunity cases since 1982 and found that defendants 

violated clearly established law in only 2 such cases). Justices including Justice Thomas, Justice 

Breyer, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Sotomayor have criticized qualified immunity. Schwartz, 

supra at 1798–99. See also Cole v. Carson, _ F.3d _, 2019 WL 3928715, at * 19-21, & nn. 1, 10 

(5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2019) (en banc) (Willett, J., Dissenting). Additionally, qualified immunity 

violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution. See generally Katherine Mims 

Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1405 (2019) 

(available at https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol117/iss7/3). Plaintiff includes allegations in 

this footnote to assure that, if legally necessary, the qualified immunity abrogation or limitation 

issue has been preserved.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 97 of 105

proximately caused, and/or were producing causes of Stefani’s suffering and death and other 

damages mentioned and/or referenced in this pleading, including but not limited to those suffered 

by Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs. 

212. Therefore, Stefani’s estate and/or her heirs at law (Claimant Heirs) suffered the

following damages, for which they seek recovery from Individual Defendants:

• Stefani’s conscious physical pain, suffering, and mental anguish;

• Stefani’s medical expenses;

• Stefani’s funeral expenses; and

• exemplary/punitive damages.

213. Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs also individually seek and are entitled to all remedies 

and damages available to each such person individually for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Plaintiff 

seeks such damages as a result of the wrongful death of her son; Richard Gonzales seeks such 

damages for the wrongful death of his wife; and Hayden Palacios, Mackenzie Clarty, Madison 

Flemons, K. G. (son), and K. G. (daughter) seek such damages due to the wrongful death of their 

mother. Those damages were caused and/or proximately caused by Individual Defendants. 

Therefore, their actions caused, were a proximate cause of, and/or were a producing cause of the 

following damages suffered by these people, for which they individually seek compensation: 

• loss of services that Plaintiff would have received from Stefani;

• expenses for Stefani’s funeral;

• past mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs

resulting from and caused by Stefani’s death;

• future mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs

resulting from and caused by Stefani’s death;

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 98 of 105

• loss of companionship and society that Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs would have 

received from Stefani; and 

• exemplary/punitive damages.

Exemplary/punitive damages are appropriate in this case to deter and punish clear and unabashed 

violation of Stefani’s constitutional rights. Individual Defendants’ actions and inaction showed a 

reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, Stefani’s rights and safety. Moreover, Plaintiff

individually, and also on behalf of Claimant Heirs, seeks reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees 

available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 

D. Cause of Action Against Midland County and City of Midland Under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 for Violation of 14th Amendment Due Process and/or 4

th Amendment Rights 

to Reasonable Mental Health Care, to be Protected, and not to be Punished

214. In the alternative, without waiving any of the other causes of action pled herein, 

without waiving any procedural, contractual, statutory, or common-law right, and incorporating 

all other allegations herein (including all allegations in the “Factual Allegations” section above) to 

the extent they are not inconsistent with the cause of action pled here, Defendants Midland County

and City of Midland are liable to Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for 

violating Stefani's rights to reasonable mental health care, to be protected, and not to be punished 

as a pre-trial detainee. These rights are guaranteed by the 4

th and/or 14th Amendmentsto the United 

States Constitution. Pretrial detainees are entitled to a greater degree of medical and mental health

care than convicted inmates, according to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. They are also entitled 

to be protected and not to be punished at all, since they have not been convicted of any alleged

crime resulting in their incarceration. 

215. Midland County and City of Midland acted or failed to act, through natural persons 

including Individual Defendants, under color of State law at all relevant times. Midland County’s

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 99 of 105

and/or City of Midland’s policies, practices, and/or customs were moving forces behind and 

caused, were producing causes of, and/or were proximate causes of Stefani’s suffering, damages,

and death, and the damages suffered by Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs. 

216. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that Plaintiff need not allege 

the appropriate chief policymaker at the pleadings stage. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of 

caution, the sheriff of Midland County was the relevant chief policymaker over matters at issue in 

this case. Moreover, in addition, and in the alternative, the Midland County jail administrator was 

the relevant chief policymaker over matters at issue in this case. Finally, in addition, and in the 

alternative, Midland County’s commissioners’ court was the relevant chief policymaker. 

Moreover, as to City of Midland, the city council was the relevant chief policymaker over matters 

at issue in this case. Moreover, in addition, and in the alternative, the chief of police for City of 

Midland was the relevant chief policymaker over matters at issue in this case. 

217. Midland County and City of Midland were deliberately indifferent regarding 

policies, practices, and/or customs developed and/or used with regard to issues addressed by 

allegations set forth above. They also acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. Policies, 

practices, and/or customs referenced above, as well as the failure to adopt appropriate policies, 

were moving forces behind and caused violation of Stefani’s rights and showed deliberate 

indifference to the known or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would occur. 

Midland County’s and/or City of Midland’s relevant policies, practices, and/or customs, whether 

written or not, were also objectively unreasonable as applied to Stefani. 

218. Therefore, Stefani’s estate and/or her heirs at law (Claimant Heirs) suffered the 

following damages, for which they seek recovery from Midland County and/or City of Midland:

• Stefani’s conscious physical pain, suffering, and mental anguish;

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 100 of 105

• Stefani’s medical expenses; and

• Stefani’s funeral expenses.

219. Plaintiff and Clamant Heirs also individually seek and are entitled to all remedies 

and damages available to each such person individually for the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations. 

Plaintiff seeks such damages as a result of the wrongful death of her son; Richard Gonzales seeks 

such damages for the wrongful death of his wife; and Hayden Palacios, Mackenzie Clarty, 

Madison Flemons, K. G. (minor son), and K. G. (minor daughter) seek such damages due to the 

wrongful death of their mother. Midland County’s and/or City of Midland’s policies, practices, 

and/or customs caused, were proximate and/or producing causes of, and/or were moving forces 

behind and caused the following damages suffered by these people, for which they individually 

seek compensation: 

• loss of services that Plaintiff would have received from Stefani;

• expenses for Stefani’s funeral;

• past mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs

resulting from and caused by Stefani’s death;

• future mental anguish and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff and Claimant 

Heirs resulting from and caused by Stefani’s death; and

• loss of companionship and society that Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs would have 

received from Stefani.

Moreover, Plaintiff individually, and on behalf of Claimant Heirs, seeks reasonable and necessary 

attorneys’ fees available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 

E. Causes of Action Against Williamson County and/or City of Midland for Violation 

of Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act

220. In the alternative, without waiving any of the other causes of action pled herein, 

without waiving any procedural, contractual, statutory, or common-law right, and incorporating 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 101 of 105

all other allegations herein (including all allegations in the “Factual Allegations” section above) to 

the extent they are not inconsistent with the cause of action pled here, Midland County and/or City 

of Midland are liable to Plaintiff and/or Claimant Heirs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“ADA”) and federal Rehabilitation Act. Upon information and belief, Midland County and/or 

City of Midland have been and are recipients of federal funds. Therefore, they are covered by the 

mandate of the federal Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act requires recipients of federal 

monies to reasonably accommodate persons with mental and physical disabilities in their facilities, 

program activities, and services, and also reasonably modify such facilities, services, and programs 

to accomplish this purpose. Further, Title II of the ADA applies to Midland County and/or City 

of Midland and has the same mandate as the Rehabilitation Act. Claims under both the 

Rehabilitation Act and ADA are analyzed similarly.

221. The Midland County jail is a “facility” for purposes of both the rehabilitation and 

ADA, and the jail’s operation comprises a program and services for Rehabilitation Act and ADA 

purposes. Stefani was a qualified individual for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, 

regarded as having a mental impairment and/or medical condition that substantially limited one or 

more of her major life activities. Stefani was therefore disabled. Upon information and belief, 

Stefani was also discriminated against by reason of her disability. 

222. A majority of circuits have held, for purposes of Rehabilitation Act and ADA 

claims, that one may prove intentional discrimination by showing that a defendant acted with 

deliberate indifference. The Fifth Circuit has, as yet, declined to follow the majority view. 

Nevertheless, intent can never be shown with certainty. Direct and circumstantial evidence can be 

used to support an “intent” jury finding, and allegations in this pleading show that there is more 

than enough of both.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 102 of 105

223. Midland County’s and/or City of Midland’s failure and refusal to accommodate 

Stefani’s mental and/or medical disabilities while in custody violated the Rehabilitation Act and 

the ADA. Such failure and refusal caused, proximately caused, and was a producing cause of 

Stefani’s suffering and death and Plaintiff s and Claimant Heirs’ damages. 

224. Midland County’s and City of Midland’s violations of the Rehabilitation Act and 

the ADA included the failure to reasonably modify facilities, services, accommodations, and 

programs to reasonably accommodate Stefani’s disabilities. These failures and refusals, which 

were intentional, proximately caused Stefani’s damages and death, and Plaintiff’s and Claimant 

Heirs’ damages. Because Stefani’s death resulted from Midland County’s and/or City of 

Midland’s intentional discrimination against her, Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs are entitled to the 

maximum amount of compensatory damages allowed by law. Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs seek 

all such damages itemized in the prayer and or body in this pleading (including sections above 

giving appropriate and fair notice of Plaintiff’s and Claimant Heirs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and 

resulting damages) to the extent allowed by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and Plaintiff and 

Claimant Heirs also seek reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and other remedies afforded by 

those laws. 

IV. Concluding Allegations and Prayer

A. Conditions Precedent

225. All conditions precedent to assertion of all claims herein have occurred.

B. Use of Documents at Trial or Pretrial Proceedings

226. Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs intend to use at one or more pretrial proceedings and/or 

at trial all documents produced by Defendants in this case in response to written discovery requests, 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 103 of 105

with initial disclosures (and any supplements or amendments to same), and in response to Public 

Information Act request(s). 

C. Jury Demand

227. Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs demand a jury trial on all issues which may be tried to 

a jury.

D. Prayer

228. For these reasons, Plaintiff asks that Defendants be cited to appear and answer, and 

that Plaintiff (Angela Janell Burrows) and Claimant Heirs (Richard Gonzales, Hayden Palacios, 

Mackenzie Clarty, Madison Flemons, K. G. (minor son), and K. G. (minor daughter) have 

judgment for damages within the jurisdictional limits of the court and against all Defendants, 

jointly and severally, as legally available and applicable, for all damages referenced above and 

below in this pleading:

a) actual damages of and for Angela Janell Burrows, individually and as administrator 

of the referenced estate; and Richard Gonzales, Hayden Palacios, Mackenzie 

Clarty, Madison Flemons, K. G. (minor son), and K. G. (minor daughter), including 

but not necessarily limited to:

• loss of services that Plaintiff would have received from Stefani;

• medical expenses for Stefani;

• expenses for Stefani’s funeral;

• past mental anguish and emotional distress resulting from and caused by 

Stefani’s death;

• future mental anguish and emotional distress resulting from and caused by

Stefani’s death;

• Stefani’s conscious physical pain, suffering, and mental health anguish; and 

• loss of companionship and society that they would have received from 

Stefani;

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 104 of 105

b) exemplary/punitive damages for Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs, from 

Individual Defendants (George Darrell Rhea, Matthew Francis Groessel, 

Monica Marie Allen, and Blake Allen Blanscett);

c) reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff and Claimant Heirs, 

through trial and any appeals and other appellate proceedings, pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act;

d) court costs and all other recoverable costs;

e) prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the highest allowable rates; and

f) all other relief, legal and equitable, general and special, to which Plaintiff

and Claimant Heirs are entitled.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint – Page 105 of 105

Respectfully submitted:

Law Offices of Dean Malone, P.C.

 /s/ T. Dean Malone

 T. Dean Malone

T. Dean Malone

Attorney-in-charge

dean@deanmalone.com

Texas State Bar No. 24003265

Law Offices of Dean Malone, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 730

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: (214) 670-9989

Telefax: (214) 670-9904

Of Counsel:

Michael T. O'Connor

Texas State Bar No. 24032922

michael.oconnor@deanmalone.com

Kristen Leigh Homyk

Texas State Bar No. 24032433

kristen.homyk@deanmalone.com

Law Offices of Dean Malone, P.C. 

900 Jackson Street, Suite 730

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: (214) 670-9989

Telefax: (214) 670-9904

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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