4 Hyatt v. United States No. 98-4229

States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997)(citing Forest v. United States Postal Serv., 97 F.3d 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, “a statute does not operate‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arisingfrom conduct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsetsexpectations based on prior law.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269(citations omitted). Rather, we must determine whether theAct “attaches new legal consequences to events completedbefore its enactment.” Id. at 269-70. Although the eventsunderlying Hyatt’s conviction antedate the Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act, the application of the Act’slimitation period does not attach “new legal consequences toevents completed before its enactment.” Id. The limitation

period applies to Hyatt’s filing of a motion under Section2255, which occurred after the enactment of the statute; as aresult, the application of the limitation period is prospectiveand not retroactive. See id.

We recognize that even though the limitation period is

prospective in application, it cannot be applied so as to bar amotion before the movant has had a reasonable opportunity tobring it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21

(1982) (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63(1902)). For this reason, applying the literal language ofSection 2255 would be an unfair and severe instance ofretroactivity. See id. However, the one-year grace periodensures that any prisoner whose conviction became final priorto April 24, 1996 would have had an adequate opportunity tofile a motion under Section 2255. Therefore, we join themajority of other circuits and hold that prisoners whoseconvictions became final on or before April 24, 1996 haduntil April 24, 1997 to file their Section 2255 motions. 

Consequently, because Hyatt filed his Section 2255 motion

after April 24, 1997, we hold that the motion was time-barredand AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

1

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-

Pursuant to Sixth Circ

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 F

File Name: 00a0

UNITED STATES COU

FOR THE SIXTH 

____________

DAVID L. HYATT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United St

for the Northern District o

No. 98-01042—David D. Dow

Submitted: Octobe

Decided and Filed: M

Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge

SILER, Circuit 

____________

COUNSE

ON BRIEF: Samuel A. YannuccSTATES ATTORNEY, Akron, OhHyatt, Coleman, Florida, pro se.
2 Hyatt v. United States No. 98-4229

1Section 2255 now reads in pertinent part:

A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this

section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. David L. Hyatt

appeals the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his conviction and vacate hissentence. The district court held that his motion was untimelyunder the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996, Pub. L. No. 104-143, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996),which allows prisoners one year after their convictionsbecome final to file motions under Section 2255. 

On November 19, 1993, David L. Hyatt was convicted of

possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violationof 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He was sentenced to life inprison on January 26, 1994. We affirmed the judgment andsentence on September 9, 1995. On May 4, 1998, Hyatt fileda motion to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentenceunder 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On September 25, the district courtgranted the United States’ motion to dismiss and issued acertificate of appealability on the sole issue of whetherHyatt’s Section 2255 motion was timely. In reviewing adistrict court’s denial of a motion under Section 2255, weapply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings andreview its conclusions of law de novo. See Nagi v. United

States, 90 F.3d 130, 134 (6th Cir. 1996).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by adding a time-limit provisionfor Section 2255 motions. As amended, Section 2255precludes a prisoner from filing Section 2255 motions morethan one year after the conviction becomes final.1 The

No. 98-4229 H

(2) the date on which the im

created by governmental action in violatiothe United States is removed, if the movaa motion by such governmental action; 

(3) the date on which the right a

by the Supreme Court, if that right has Supreme Court and made retroactively areview; or 

(4) the date on which the facts 

presented could have been discovered diligence.

Antiterrorism and Effective Deeffective on April 24, 1996. A interpreted the Act to provide a prisoners whose convictions beeffective date of the Act. See Pa

F.3d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1999); GooF.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998)F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1998); MicF. 3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); Un

F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998); B109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998); United Sta737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997); Lindh v. (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grouUnder this interpretation, such pri1997 to file motions under Section became final prior to the effective his Section 2255 motion on Maexpiration of the one-year grace district court rightly concluded tbarred. 

Hyatt argues that the retroactive 

limitations violates his due proSuspension Clause rights under arguments are without merit. Whil“long been disfavored,” Landgraf U.S. 244, 268 (1994), retroactivity bar the application of a changed limis filed after the amendment’s ef