J-A01015-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

R.E.P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

 v.

J.H.

No. 1318 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order August 11, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Family Court at No(s): FD16-007048-008

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2017

R.E.P. (“Father”) appeals the August 11, 2016 order wherein the trial 

court determined that it lacked jurisdiction of the child custody dispute with 

J.H. (“Mother”) pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), 23 Pa.C.S. § 5401, et seq. The court 

dismissed Father’s custody action and directed the parties to proceed with 

the simultaneous custody action Mother initiated in North Carolina. We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history 

as follows:

The Parties were never married. They have one child, 

[D.H.-P.,] born December . . . 2013 in North Carolina. [Mother 

and Father] met in Pittsburgh where Father was an associate 

professor at Carnegie Mellon University and Mother a graduate 

student at the University of Pittsburgh. Mother had been 

accepted into a six to eight year Ph.D. program at The University 
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of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC). When [Mother and 

Father] learned Mother was pregnant, they made a joint decision 

to move to North Carolina so Mother could enroll at UNC and the 

two could co-parent their child when he was born. 

[Mother and Father] lived as an intact family in North 

Carolina from [D.H.-P.’s] birth through June of 2015. [D.H.-P.] 

had a pediatrician whom he regularly saw there and took part in 

"play dates" with other young children and their [m]others, and 

attended a day care.

To preserve his tenure track position at Carnegie Mellon 

University, Father was required to return to Pittsburgh in 2015. 

Mother took a year-long leave of absence from UNC and 

accompanied Father to Pittsburgh on July 1, 2015, with [D.H.-

P.], who was now [one] and [one-]half years old. Mother 

sought, only a one semester leave from UNC but was told by her 

faculty advisor, Dr. Jennifer Ho, that it would be better to ask for 

a longer leave initially and return early rather than attempt to 

extend a shorter leave. Mother testified it was always her intent 

to return to UNC to finish her program. This testimony was 

supported by her advisor's testimony. 

[Mother and Father] rented a home in Pittsburgh and 

signed a one year lease. Mother did not have a job nor was she 

enrolled in any educational program in Pittsburgh.

While in Pittsburgh, [Mother and Father] began to 

experience difficulties in their relationship. . . . In August of 

2015, Mother traveled with [D.H.-P.] to Nevada to visit her 

parents and informed Father by email that she would not return 

to Pittsburgh but would, instead, return to North Carolina in 

September. At Father's urging, [Mother] instead returned to 

Pittsburgh but their relationship continued to deteriorate.

On December 4, 2015, Mother again left Pittsburgh with 

[D.H.-P.] to visit her parents. She again informed Father via 

email that she would not return. In late December 2015, Father 

requested that Mother return to Pittsburgh with [D.H.-P.]. She 

did not. From Nevada, she returned to North Carolina on 

January 6, 2016 with [D.H.-P.], and re-enrolled in her original 

Ph.D. program. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/16, at 2-3 (footnotes and citations to record 

omitted).

After Mother returned with D.H.-P. to North Carolina, Father filed a 

custody complaint in Pennsylvania. Mother countered two weeks later by 

initiating a custody action in North Carolina. On May 20, 2016, the trial 

court entered a consent order that granted it temporary emergency 

jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5424(b) pending its 

decision whether to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction.1 That order also 

outlined an interim physical custody arrangement, which granted Mother and 

Father alternating two-week periods of physical custody. 

Following two days of hearings to determine whether it had jurisdiction 

over the custody action pursuant to the UCCJEA, on August 10, 2016, the 

trial court entered the above-referenced order and dismissed Father’s 

custody action. Essentially, the trial court determined that under the facts of 

this case, D.H.-P. had no “home state” as the term is defined in the UCCJEA 

and that an evaluation of maximum significant contacts weighed in favor of 

____________________________________________

1 Since Father’s custody action preceded the complaint that Mother filed in 

North Carolina, the trial court had priority under the statutory framework to 

determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction. See M.E.V. v. R.D.V., 57 

A.3d 126, 130 (Pa.Super. 2012) (“a trial court MUST not exercise jurisdiction 

when another state has jurisdiction priority”); 23 Pa.C.S. § 5426(a) 

(regarding simultaneous proceedings).
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relinquishing initial jurisdiction to North Carolina.2 Father filed a timely 

appeal and a concomitant statement of errors complained of on appeal, and 

the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Father presents the following questions for our review. 

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 

concluding that Pennsylvania was not the home state of the 

minor child under the UCCJEA thus resulting in a determination 

by the court that Pennsylvania did not have jurisdiction over the 

matter of custody of the minor child?

II. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ceding 

jurisdiction to North Carolina even if the child had no home state 

under the UCCJEA.

Father’s brief at 4.

At the outset, we clarify our standard of review. The crux of Father’s 

first issue relates to the trial court’s determination that it did not have 

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 5421(a) to enter an initial child 

custody determination, i.e., that Pennsylvania was not D.H.-P.’s home state. 

Typically, the determination of whether a trial court possess subject matter 

jurisdiction involves de novo review because it raises a pure question of law. 

____________________________________________

2 Section 5402 defines “home state” as 

The state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting 

as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately 

before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. . . . A 

period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is 

part of the period.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5402. 
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S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 94 A.3d 402, 408 (Pa.Super. 2014) (differentiating 

between an appeal from an order to exercise or decline jurisdiction, which 

would be subject to an abuse of discretion standard, “[A] trial court's 

decision that it possesses subject matter jurisdiction under section 5422(1) 

is purely a question of law”); B.J.D. v. D.L.C., 19 A.3d 1081 (Pa.Super. 

2011) (de novo review of appeal from order to transfer custody jurisdiction 

under § 5427). However, the issue in the case at bar involves neither 

statutory construction nor rote application of an established legal principle. 

Instead, as we explain infra, it requires a nuanced factual determination 

regarding the date that Mother decided that she was not returning to 

Pittsburgh and if that date was prior to the six-month jurisdictional trigger 

under the statute, i.e., whether her trip to Nevada was temporary. Thus 

unlike the posture of S.K.C. and B.J.D., this case involves a mixed question 

of law and fact that rests squarely upon the trial court’s determination of 

fact regarding Mother’s subjective intention, a finding that we are unwilling 

to make in the first instance in light of our deference to the trial court’s role 

as the ultimate arbiter of fact.3 See R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 507 

____________________________________________

3 We observe that the S.K.C. Court made the required factual 

determinations in the first instance with the caveat, “We only make this 

determination for the first time on appeal because of the extensive factual 

record developed in the trial court.” S.K.C. supra, at 410 n.11. The Court 

also noted “the lack of a trial court determination on the legal question of 

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” Id. Likewise, the B.J.D. Court gleaned 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Pa.Super. 2011) (“[W]here there is a question of whether a parent's 

relocation to another jurisdiction is temporary and the pleadings are 

insufficient to make such a determination, an evidentiary hearing on the 

issue must be held”); T.A.M. v. S.L.M., 104 A.3d 30, 32 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(utilizing abuse-of-discretion standard to review trial court’s determination 

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify a custody determination 

pursuant UCCJEA Section 5423).

In T.A.M., we explained the applicable standard as follows, 

Under Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the 

court has overridden or misapplied the law, when its judgment is 

manifestly unreasonable, or when there is insufficient evidence 

of record to support the court's findings. An abuse of discretion 

requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court 

misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures.

Id. at 32 (citation omitted). Our review is deferential to the trial court’s role 

as the ultimate arbiter of fact. J.M.R. v. J.M., 1 A.3d 902, 911 (Pa.Super. 

2010). Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings or 

credibility determinations that the certified record supports. Id. (“We must 

accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the necessary findings of fact “[b]ased on . . . undisputed facts” in the 

record regarding the year that both parents departed Pennsylvania 

permanently. In contrast to those cases, the instant case not only involves 

disputed facts, but it also has the benefit of the trial court’s express 

credibility determinations and the court’s explanation for the manner it 

resolved the factual dispute regarding Mother’s subjective intention to leave 

Pittsburgh permanently. 
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of record, as our role does not include making independent factual 

determinations.”)

The initial step in determining whether to assume jurisdiction under 

the UCCJEA is to determine which jurisdiction, if any, was the child’s home 

state. Stated simply, if Pennsylvania was the child’s home state when 

Father filed his custody complaint, then the trial court had jurisdiction to 

make the initial custody determination. See 23 Pa.C.S § 5421(a)(1). 

However, where “there is no home state . . . there must be a determination 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421(a)(2) as to which state is the more appropriate 

forum based on where there are the most significant connections.” BouzosReilly v. Reilly, 980 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa.Super. 2009) (footnote omitted). 

The relevant section of UCCJEA provides as follows: 

§ 5421. Initial child custody jurisdiction

(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in 

section 5424 (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a 

court of this Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an initial 

child custody determination only if:

(1) this Commonwealth is the home state of the child on 

the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the 

home state of the child within six months before the 

commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from 

this Commonwealth but a parent or person acting as a parent 

continues to live in this Commonwealth;

(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction 

under paragraph (1) or a court of the home state of the child has 

declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 

Commonwealth is the more appropriate forum under section 
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5427 (relating to inconvenient forum) or 5428 (relating to 

jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct) and:

(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at 

least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a 

significant connection with this Commonwealth other than 

mere physical presence; and

(ii) substantial evidence is available in this Commonwealth 

concerning the child’s care, protection, training and 

personal relationships[.]

23 Pa.C.S. § 5421(a). As we indicated supra, the statute defines the home 

state as “[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting 

as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the 

commencement of a child custody proceeding [including any period of 

temporary absence[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5402.

Presently, the trial court found that Mother and D.H.-P. left 

Pennsylvania permanently during December 2015, which was slightly less 

than one month before the six-month jurisdictional threshold outlined in § 

5421(a)(1) was triggered. Therefore, the court concluded that Pennsylvania 

was not the child’s home state under the statute. Moreover, the court 

reasoned that, since the family had relocated from North Carolina over six 

months earlier, that state did not satisfy the statutory definition either. 

Thus, the court found that D.H.-P. did not have a home state under the 

statute and that, pursuant to the § 5421(a)(2) analysis, between 

Pennsylvania and North Carolina, the child had more significant contacts 

with North Carolina. 
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The first component of Father’s argument assails the trial court’s 

finding that Pennsylvania was not the home state. Father asserts that 

Mother’s travel to Nevada during December 2015 was temporary, and but 

for the trial court’s failure to include Mother’s month-long trip in its 

calculation of the six-month jurisdictional determination under § 5421(a)(1), 

Pennsylvania would have initial jurisdiction over this matter. Thus, Father 

argues that the trial court erred in failing to include the entirety of Mother’s 

December 2015 trip to Nevada in its calculation of the six-month milestone 

to trigger home-state jurisdiction. We disagree. 

The certified record is replete with evidence of Mother’s intention to 

leave Pennsylvania permanently in December 2015. During the evidentiary 

hearing, Mother testified that, from the outset, she was hesitant about 

leaving North Carolina and returning to Pittsburgh with Father. N.T., 

7/13/16, at 55. Eventually, she decided to take the one-year leave of 

absence from her Ph.D. program at UNC in order to appease Father, who 

desired that she abandon the program entirely. Id. at 57. Notwithstanding 

Father’s position, Mother intended to remain in Pittsburgh only for two 

academic semesters and return to North Carolina during the summer of 

2016. Id. at 54. 

The family arrived in Pittsburgh on July 1, 2015; however, as early as 

September 2015, Mother confirmed with Father that she intended to return 

to North Carolina to pursue her Ph.D. Id. at 63. Mother and Father’s 
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romantic relationship steadily deteriorated since their return to Pittsburgh, 

and it endured a brief estrangement brought about by Father during late 

August 2015 before he terminated it permanently during early November of 

that year. Id. at 58, 63, 65. Following the split, Mother repeated her desire 

to return to North Carolina and complete her Ph.D. Id. at 65. She booked 

one-way passage for her and D.H.-P. to travel to Nevada to visit her 

parents, “so that [they] could figure out how to end [the] relationship in a 

way that made sense and was calm and respectful.” Id. at 64. The flight 

was scheduled for December 4, 2015.

The relationship remained amicable over the following ten days while 

Mother awaited the scheduled departure date. Mother and Father discussed 

several short-term options, including Mother and D.H.-P. remaining in 

Nevada. Id. at 65. Again, Mother reiterated her long-range plan of 

returning to North Carolina permanently with their son, which she stated 

Father supported at that time. Id. However, before Mother and D.H.-P. 

were scheduled to leave for Nevada, Mother discovered emails wherein 

Father invited another woman to spend the evening at the family residence 

on the night that Mother and D.H.-P. were scheduled to depart. Id. at 66-

67. That incident placed the prior tentative discussions in disarray. 

Mother flew to Nevada as scheduled, and during the course of the next 

three weeks, Mother and Father communicated via text and email while she 

remained in Nevada and visited family in nearby states. Id. 67, 69-70; 
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Mother’s Exhibit F. On December 14, 2015, Mother sent Father an email 

outlining short-term and long-term options. Neither the body of her email 

nor the options that she proposed in the attachment established conclusively 

Mother’s intent to leave Pennsylvania permanently nor her acquiescence to 

anything other than a temporary return to Pittsburgh. The email informed 

Father, “until we come up with a decision together about the short and longterm future, I don't feel secure. It is much healthier for [D.H.-P.] and I 

emotionally and financially to be around my support system [in Nevada] 

until we can come up with a preliminary agreement about such things as 

housing, finances, custody, child support. etc.” Mother’s Exhibit F. 

Thereafter, she reiterated, “Again, nothing is set in stone, but I do want to 

come to a fairly concrete agreement by the end of the month.” Id. She 

added, “our return to Pittsburgh depends on us having concrete plans for 

housing, financing and other short and long-term plans.” N.T., 7/13/16, at 

78. Thus, while not definitive of her ultimate intent to leave Pennsylvania 

permanently, Mother’s email communications demonstrated her uncertainty 

whether she would ever reside in the Commonwealth again. 

Likewise, the options that Mother outlined in the email attachment 

proposed both 1) retuning to Pennsylvania for approximately four months 

before moving to North Carolina; and 2) remaining in Nevada “for several 

months” before moving to North Carolina directly from that state. Id. 

Significantly, however, all of Mother’s options involved her ultimate return to 
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North Carolina to complete her Ph.D. program. Id.; N.T., 7/13/16, at 76-

77. She explained, “Returning to North Carolina is the obvious answer for 

[me and D.H.-P]. I've thought a lot about it and [I] am going to finish my 

degree . . . to have the best chances for finding sustainable work when I 

finish.” Mother’s Exhibit F. 

On December 20, 2015, Mother contacted Dr. Jenifer Ho, her faculty 

advisor, and inquired about returning to the program before the conclusion 

of her year-long leave of absence. N.T., 7/13/16, at 75. The next day 

Mother submitted a request with the United States Postal Service to change 

her address from 1718 Duffield Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to 5005 

Heatherbrook Circle, Raleigh North Carolina, effective immediately. Id. at 

92-93, 157; Mother‘s Exhibit J. Dr. Ho’s testimony confirmed that, following 

further discussions regarding a teaching fellowship, Mother was permitted to 

return from her leave of absence early and re-enroll for the 2016 spring 

semester. Id. at 15-16, 20. 

Thereafter, on December 29, 2015, Mother informed Father that she 

was moving to North Carolina in order to terminate her leave of absence 

early and return to her Ph.D. program. N.T. 7/13/16, at 87; Mother’s 

Exhibit F. One week later, she and D.H.-P. flew to Chapel Hill North 

Carolina, arriving on January 6, 2016. 

The forgoing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Mother’s 

trip to Nevada was not a temporary retreat but rather an attempt to regroup 
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and decide her future. The record will not sustain the court’s finding that 

Mother intended to leave Pennsylvania permanently when she boarded the 

plan on December 4, 2015. Mother endured the first two weeks of 

December in limbo at her parent’s Nevada home while she decided what 

actions would be best for her and D.H.-P. 

However, Mother’s intent to leave Pennsylvania permanently was 

clearly manifest on December 21, 2015, when she submitted a request to 

officially change her mailing address to North Carolina in anticipation of 

securing a teaching fellowship and continuing her Ph.D. program. She told 

Father of her specific plans approximately one week later. Accordingly, the 

certified record sustains the trial court’s factual determination that Mother 

formed her intention to leave Pennsylvania and informed Father of that 

decision prior to the six-month jurisdictional trigger under § 5421(1). 

Mother removed D.H.-P. from Pennsylvania during December 2015, and 

after a month-long layover in Nevada, she moved permanently to North 

Carolina. While Mother may not have intended to leave Pittsburgh 

permanently on the date that she departed, her intentions became obvious 

as early as the December 21, 2016 and she never returned to the 

Commonwealth prior moving to North Carolina. Hence, Mother formed the 

intent to relocate from Pennsylvania permanently prior to the date homestate jurisdiction vested. Thus, no relief is due.
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We also reject Father’s alternative argument that Mother left 

Pittsburgh under the false pretense that her trip was temporary. Father 

invokes Mother’s failure to comply with the relocation provisions outlined in 

Pennsylvania’s Child Custody Law as proof of her misconduct. He contends 

that, under these circumstances, where Mother allegedly left Pittsburgh 

ostensibly for a short-term family visit, the trial court erred in failing to 

characterize the child’s absence as temporary for the purpose of determining 

whether Pennsylvania was the home state. 

Father’s assertion fails for at least two reasons. First, Father cannot 

demonstrate scienter, i.e., that Mother knowingly fled Pittsburgh with no 

intention of returning. Contrary to Father’s supposition, the certified record 

is replete with evidence that Mother traveled to Nevada to stay with her 

parents following the couple’s break up and to figure out her future plans. 

As we discussed thoroughly surpa, Mother was engrossed with achieving a 

solution that made sense to all three family members, and she did not 

foreclose a return to Pittsburgh until mid-December when it became clear 

that she could return to her Ph.D. program in time for the 2016 spring 

semester. Father failed to present a scintilla of evidence to corroborate his 

allegation of Mother’s devious scheme to circumvent the jurisdictional 

trigger, much less counter the competent evidence of record that she 

adduced regarding her good-faith intentions throughout this ordeal. This 

claim fails.
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Moreover, to the extent that Pennsylvania lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the child custody case, Mother was not required to comply 

with the notice requirements outlined in Pennsylvania’s Child Custody Law. 

Stated plainly, since the trial court lacked the authority to rule on the issue 

of relocation, Mother’s noncompliance with the inapplicable relocation 

proviso is neither evidence of a false pretense nor a substantive basis to 

disturb the trial court’s determination that home state jurisdiction did not 

vest in Pennsylvania. Thus, we also reject this position. 

Having found that the certified record supports the trial court’s finding 

that Pennsylvania was not the home state for purposes of making an initial 

custody determination under § 5421(a), we next address Father’s second 

issue relating to the trial court’s “maximum contacts” analysis under § 

5421(a)(2)(i) and (ii). This argument implicates the court’s decision to 

exercise or relinquish jurisdiction over the custody case in the absence of 

home-state jurisdiction. Accordingly, we review that aspect of the court’s 

decision for an abuse of discretion. Wagner v. Wagner, 887 A.2d 282, 285 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (“A court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction [per 

the UCCJEA] is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review[.]”).

Preliminarily, we observe that neither party currently challenges the 

trial court’s determination that North Carolina lacked home state jurisdiction, 

although Mother did proffer that argument below. Additionally, we note that 

the trial court’s maximum-significant-contacts analysis was the correct 
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procedure to determine in which state jurisdiction properly lay in the 

absence of home state jurisdiction. See R.M., supra, at 506 (citing Dincer 

v. Dincer, 701 A.2d 210, 215 (Pa. 1997)).

Father complains that the trial court erred in discounting the 

significance of the five months that D.H.-P. resided in Pittsburgh and 

ignoring evidence regarding the child’s contacts in Pennsylvania. 

Specifically, Father invokes evidence that D.H.-P. had a physician in 

Pennsylvania, with whom he was treated at least once, and that the parties 

had an active social life in the area. Father’s argument is unpersuasive. 

Pursuant to § 5421(a)(2), the test for maximum contacts includes 

whether the child and at least one parent has significant connections to the 

Commonwealth or North Carolina beyond mere physical presence in the 

state and if there is substantial available evidence in the Commonwealth or 

North Carolina concerning D.H.-P.’s care, protection, training and personal 

relationships. 

Instantly, the trial court explained its rationale as follows:

In this case, there are more significant connections to, and 

substantial evidence in, North Carolina concerning [D.H.-P.’s] 

care, protection, training, and personal relationships than in 

Pennsylvania. 

[D.H.-P.] spent his first two and a half years in North 

Carolina where he and Mother, as well as Father, were known, 

and had a support system. He had a regular pediatrician in North 

Carolina where he received routine care and where his records 

would be kept. He attended a day care and had regular play 

group interactions. While a pediatrician was engaged for [the 
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child] in Pennsylvania, a relationship with a pediatrician was not 

established.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/20/16, at 6/ (citations to record omitted). 

Notwithstanding the trial court’s miscalculation of the period that D.H.-

P. resided in North Carolina as thirty months rather than eighteen months, 

the record supports the trial court’s finding of maximum significant contacts 

with North Carolina. D.H.-P. was born in North Carolina and lived in the 

state for the first one and one-half years of his life before moving to 

Pennsylvania for approximately five months. During the evidentiary hearing, 

Mother presented competent evidence to establish that her and D.H.-P.’s 

friends, playgroups, support system, and mother’s club were all located in 

North Carolina. N.T., 7/13/16, at 92. Moreover, that state was the site of 

Mothers’ employment, and education, her and her son’s health insurance, 

and D.H.-P.’s childcare. Id. at 92-93. Furthermore, Mother had friends in 

the area to provide alternative childcare if needed. Id. Her automobile 

remained registered in North Carolina, and she considered herself a resident 

of that state. Id. at 132. 

As it related to her son’s contacts, Mother testified that D.H.-P. had 

several pediatric appointments in North Carolina, he attended daycare in 

North Carolina and participated in two to three playdates per week. Id. at 

94-95. In contrast, she and D.H.-P. had minimal social contacts in 

Pittsburgh. Id. at 96. Mother explained that two of her acquaintances in 
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Pennsylvania had children, but the family was not in Pittsburgh long enough 

to establish friendships beyond an isolated playdate. Id. at 97. Neither 

parent has family in the area. Id. at 97; 175. 

In contrast with the significant contacts with North Carolina, Mother 

and D.H.-P. shared few connections with Pennsylvania. Mother did not have 

any current ties to Pennsylvania. She never had employment or health care 

in Pennsylvania and neither parent owned property in the Commonwealth. 

Id. at 174. While Mother had been issued a Pennsylvania driver’s license 

during 2012, while she was a student at the University of Pittsburgh, that 

identification expired during January 2016, and she obtained a North 

Carolina driver license when she returned to that state. Id. at 175. 

Likewise, D.H.-P.’s contacts with Pennsylvania were sparse. Other 

than father, the child does not have family or friends in the Commonwealth. 

While he was here for the most recent five months prior to the initiation of 

litigation, he did not establish any meaningful relationships in that time. 

Father presented no evidence that D.H.-P. belonged to any clubs, classes, or 

organized activities in Pennsylvania. He had never been enrolled in daycare 

in Pennsylvania and was not part of a playgroup. At most Father presented 

evidence that he maintained his son’s state-sponsored health insurance and 

the child had one visit with the pediatrician. For all of the forgoing reasons, 

we find that the record supports the trial court’s finding that D.H.-P.’s 

maximum significant contacts rest with North Carolina and therefore, that 
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state was the appropriate jurisdiction to make the initial custody 

determination pursuant to § 5421(a). 

Finally, Father asserts that, to the extent that the evidence supported 

a finding of significant contacts in both states, the trial court was constrained 

to assume jurisdiction over the custody matter under the first-to-file rule. 

This aspect of Father’s argument is waived because he failed to raise it in his 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 

1925(b). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the 

Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph (b)(4) are waived”).

Order affirmed. 

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2017