IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION

MOTION OFFENSE, LLC, 

Plaintiff

v. 

DROPBOX, INC, 

Defendant

Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-00251-ADA

MOTION OFFENSE, LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DROPBOX, INC., 

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 6:21-cv-758-ADA

DROPBOX, INC.’S RENEWED PRE-VERDICT MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

REDACTED REDACTED

PUBLIC VERSION

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 1 of 26
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1

II. Dropbox Is Entitled To Judgment Of No Infringement.......................................................... 2

A. No Reasonable Jury Could Find Direct Infringement By Dropbox................................. 2

B. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That Motion Offense Met Its Burden To Prove Direct 

Infringement Of The Folder Share Patents. ................................................................................ 5

C. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That Motion Offense Met Its Burden To Prove Direct 

Infringement Of The File Request Patents.................................................................................. 7

III. Dropbox Is Entitled To Judgment Of No Damages On Motion Offense’s Infringement 

Claims. ............................................................................................................................................ 8

IV. Dropbox Is Entitled To Judgment That The Asserted Claims Are entitled To A Priority Date 

No Earlier Than October 3, 2017.................................................................................................. 12

V. Dropbox Is Entitled To Judgment Of Invalidity. .................................................................. 15

A. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Folder Share Patents Are Not Invalid Over 

Dropbox 2011. .......................................................................................................................... 15

B. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The File Request Patents Are Not Invalid Over 

Dropbox 2011-AirDropper. ...................................................................................................... 18

C. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Asserted Patents Are Not Invalid Over 

Dropbox 2017. .......................................................................................................................... 19

VI. Conclusion. ........................................................................................................................... 20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 

573 U.S. 208 (2014)...........................................................................................................15

Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 

601 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................14

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v, International Game Technology, 

709 F.3d at 1362 ..............................................................................................................4, 5

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 

576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................12

Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 

424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................2, 4

Elbit Systems Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Systems, LLC, 

927 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................10

Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 

626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................6

Garretson v. Clark, 

111 U.S. 120 (1884)...........................................................................................................10

IBM Corp. v. Booking Holdings Inc., 

775 F. App’x 674 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ......................................................................................4

Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 

107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..........................................................................................14

Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 

566 U.S. 66 (2012).............................................................................................................15

Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 

692 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................6

PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 

522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .........................................................................................13

Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., 

987 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2021)............................................................................................4

TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 

978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..........................................................................................11

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 3 of 26
iii

VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 

767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................9

Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

No. 2:19-CV-00123-JRG, 2020 WL 5815950 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2020) .......................11

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 4 of 26
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I. INTRODUCTION 

Dropbox respectfully moves for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 50(a), because no reasonable jury could find for Motion Offense on any issue. 

First, no reasonable jury could find that Dropbox infringed any asserted claim of the 

asserted patents. Each of the asserted claims require hardware and software that is not provided 

by Dropbox or steps that are not performed by Dropbox. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could 

find that Dropbox infringes any asserted claim. Moreover, each of the asserted claims require 

display of certain interfaces using “hypertext markup language-equipped code,” yet it is 

undisputed that none of the accused interfaces in Dropbox’s products are displayed using such 

code, and no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. 

Second, no reasonable jury could find that Motion Offense has proven entitlement to any 

damages in this case. Motion Offense’s damages claim rests on inherently flawed and unreliable 

inputs and testimony that are insufficient to sustain a damages verdict. Not only did Motion 

Offense fail to present any evidence of actual licenses or other transactions involving the four 

asserted patents, but it presented only speculative evidence that is not tied to the alleged value of 

the claimed invention. 

Third, no reasonable jury could conclude that Motion Offense is entitled to a priority date 

earlier than October 3, 2017, as there is no written description support for any of the asserted 

claims in earlier-filed applications. Specifically, the earlier applications to which the asserted 

patents claim priority do not disclose cloud-based computing where an apparatus that is separate 

from the user generates and sends emails based on information it receives from the user nodes. 

Fourth, no reasonable jury could conclude that the asserted claims are not invalid over the 

prior art. Dropbox established through extensive testimonial and documentary evidence that the 

Dropbox 2011, Dropbox 2011-AirDropper, and Dropbox 2017 systems were in public use, on sale, 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 5 of 26
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or otherwise available to the public as of the date of the alleged invention. Dropbox further 

conclusively proved that (1) Dropbox 2011 invalidates the asserted claims of the Folder Share 

patents, (2) Dropbox 2011-AirDropper invalidates the asserted claims of the File Request patents, 

and (3) Dropbox 2017 invalidates all asserted claims. Motion Offense provided only conclusory 

testimony on two claim elements related to two of the four asserted patents that no reasonable jury 

could credit.

For all these reasons, Dropbox should be granted judgment as a matter of law on all issues.

II. DROPBOX IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NO INFRINGEMENT. 

Motion Offense asserts infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,013,158 (the “’158 patent”) 

(claims 3, 6, and 14) and 11,044,215 (the “’215 patent”) (claim 18) (together, the “Folder Share 

Patents”) and U.S. Patent Nos. 10,021,052 (the “’052 patent”) (claims 12, 20, 27) and 10,587,548 

(the “’548 patent”) (claim 46) (together, the “File Request Patents”). Motion Offense failed to 

provide sufficient evidence that the asserted claims are infringed and no reasonable jury could 

conclude that Dropbox has directly infringed any asserted claim for the reasons set forth below.

A. No Reasonable Jury Could Find Direct Infringement By Dropbox. 

Apparatus Claims.1 No reasonable jury could conclude that Dropbox directly infringes

the asserted apparatus and computer readable medium claims. To prove infringement of those 

claims, Motion Offense was required to produce evidence that Dropbox makes, uses, offers to sell, 

or sells an apparatus that “meet[s] all of the structural limitations” of the claims. Cross Med. 

Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis 

added). 

 

1 Claims 3, 6, and 14 of the ’158 patent, claims 12, 20, and 27 of the ’052 patent, and claim 46 of 

the ’548 patent.

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However, each of the asserted apparatus claims require hardware (memory and processors) 

and software (operating systems and/or browsers) that Dropbox does not make, sell, or offer for 

sale. See PTX-1 (’158 patent) (claims 3, 6, and 14 requiring “at least one non-transitory memory 

storing instructions” and “one or more processors in communication with the at least one nontransitory memory, wherein the one or more processors execute the instructions”); PTX-2 (’052 

patent) (claims 12, 20, and 27 requiring “at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions” 

and “one or more processors in communication with the at least one non-transitory memory, 

wherein the one or more processors execute the instructions”); PTX-4 (’548 patent) (claim 46 

reciting a “non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the 

one or more programs comprising instructions which, when executed by an apparatus”). Each of 

the asserted claims further require that the claimed hardware and software “execute” instructions

that perform various functions, including causing display of a “representation” of or “reference” 

to a folder or file. PTX-1 (’158 patent) (claims 3, 6, and 14 requiring the “one or more processors” 

to “execute the instructions to” “cause, at the second node, display of the representation”); PTX-2 

(’052 patent) (claims 12, 20 requiring the “one or more processors” to “execute the instructions 

to” “cause, at the first node, display of at least one fourth interface with a reference to the at least 

one file,” claim 27 requiring “creation of a representation of the at least one file”); PTX-4 (’548 

patent) (claim 46 requiring “the one or more programs comprising instructions which, when 

executed by an apparatus, cause the apparatus to” cause “creation of a representation of the at least 

one file”). 

Motion Offense’s expert, Dr. Akl, testified that the “instructions” that cause “display of a 

representation” of or “reference” to a file or folder are satisfied by the Smart Sync feature contained 

on the user’s desktop. See 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 349:7-18 (testifying Smart Sync displays a 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 7 of 26
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“representation”); 5/15/23 Tr. (Akl) 291:16-20; PTX-274 (“Dropbox Smart Sync lets you see and 

access every file in your account and every folder that’s ever been shared with you, right from 

your desktop[.]”) (emphasis added); PTX-298; see also 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 342-69, 370-77. As Dr. 

Akl conceded, “the Smart Sync code is loaded to the user’s computer, ... [a]nd Smart Sync is 

executed using the code on the user’s computer[.]” 5/16/2023 Tr. (Akl) 493:19-24. Thus, it is the 

memory and processors at the user’s computer that execute the code that performs those claim 

limitations—not the Dropbox servers. See 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 766-767 (testifying that “[n]one 

of [the code that executes Smart Sync] is executed on Dropbox’s servers”); 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 

831-833; see also, e.g., 5/16/2023 Tr. (Akl) 418-491, 422-23 (testifying that “second node” is 

satisfied by a “second user”). “Because Dropbox does not provide its customers with any hardware 

in conjunction with its accused software, Dropbox does not make, sell or offer for sale the complete 

invention.” Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., 987 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see 

also Cross Med., 424 F.3d at 1311-12 (medical device manufacturer not liable for direct 

infringement of apparatus claim when doctors assembled the infringing apparatus while 

performing surgery). As in Synchronoss, Dropbox does not directly infringe because there is no 

dispute that “Dropbox provides its customers with software for download but no corresponding 

hardware.” Synchronoss Techs., 987 F.3d at 1368. 

Method Claim. No reasonable jury could conclude that Dropbox directly infringes asserted 

method claim 18 of the ’215 patent. To prove infringement of claim 18, Motion Offense was 

required to produce evidence to show that Dropbox “performs all of the steps of the claimed 

methods.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v, Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 

2013); see also IBM Corp. v. Booking Holdings Inc., 775 F. App’x 674, 677-78 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 8 of 26
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(holding that direct infringement requires that all steps of a claimed method be performed by or 

attributable to one entity). 

Asserted method claim 18 of the ’215 patent recites steps performed by third-party users, 

such as “causing ... display of” various user interfaces, “causing ... receipt of” an email, and 

“causing ... receipt of” a web page—all steps that are performed by the third-party end-user. PTX6 (’215 patent) (claim 18); 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 520:16-23 (testifying Smart Sync “is running on the 

desktop app on the client’s device”); 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 519:22-520:6; see also, 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 

346-365; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 766-767 (testifying that “[n]one of [the code that executes Smart 

Sync] is executed on Dropbox’s servers”); 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 831-833. For example, claim 18 

requires that “based on a detection of an indication that the HTTP link of the at least one email has 

been selected, causing, at the second node, sending, to at least one server, of a signal for causing 

creation of a first representation.” PTX-6 (’215 patent) (claim 18). As Dr. Akl conceded, the 

representation is created by the user at the user’s computer, as is the step of detecting that the link 

has been selected. See 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 349:7-18; see also 5/16/23 Tr. (Akl) 520:16-23 (testifying 

SmartSync “is running on the desktop app on the client’s device”); PTX-274. Because Dropbox 

does not “perform[] all the steps of the claimed method,” Dropbox does not directly infringe claim 

18 of the ’215 patent. Aristocrat, 709 F.3d at 1362.

B. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That Motion Offense Met Its Burden To 

Prove Direct Infringement Of The Folder Share Patents. 

At trial, Motion Offense asserted that certain folder sharing and Smart Sync features of 

Dropbox infringe claims 3, 6, and 14 of the ’158 patent and claim 18 of the ’215 patent. Claims 

3, 6, 14 of the ’158 patent each require instructions that cause “display of at least one first interface 

with a first user interface element, utilizing first hypertext markup language-equipped code” and 

“display of at least one second interface with a second user interface element, utilizing second 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 9 of 26
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hypertext markup language-equipped code.” PTX-1 (’158 patent) (claims 3, 6, and 14) 

(emphases added). Similarly, claim 18 of the ’215 patent requires “causing, at a first node, display 

of: a first user interface element, utilizing first hypertext markup language-equipped data,” “a 

second user interface element, utilizing second hypertext markup language-equipped data,” and 

“a third user interface element, utilizing the second hypertext markup language-equipped data.” 

PTX-6 (’215 patent) (claim 18) (emphases added). 

Motion Offense failed to meet its burden to prove that these requirements are met by the 

accused folder sharing and Smart Sync feature. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that the 

accused features do not use HTML-equipped code to display the accused “first interface,” “first 

user interface element,” “second interface,” or “second user interface element,” as required by 

the asserted claims of the ’158 patent. 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 769:15-20 (“And in Dropbox, what 

makes this dialogue box appear? A. Dropbox uses JavaScript to make this dialogue box 

appear.”); see also id. at 770-775, 776-781, 833-834; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Gibbons) 900:7-14; 904:5-

10; PTX-774.001-004. Similarly, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the accused 

features do not use HTML-equipped data to display the accused “first user interface element,” 

“second user interface element,” or “third user interface element,” as required by asserted claim

18 of the ’215 patent. 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 769-15-20; see also id. at 770-775, 776-781, 833-

834; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Gibbons) 900:7-14; 904:5-10; PTX-774.001-004; DTX-1056, DTX-1057, 

DTX-1058, DTX-1062, PTX-0088, PTX-774.28, PTX-774.29, PTX-774.30. 

Moreover, claim 18 of the ’215 patent is a method claim, yet Motion Offense offered no 

evidence that Dropbox actually practiced the claimed method in the United States. Therefore, 

judgment of no infringement for claim 18 of the ’215 patent is required for this reason as well. See 

Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing denial 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 10 of 26
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of JMOL of noninfringement of method claim where patentee failed to demonstrate all claimed

steps were performed in the United States); see also Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 692 F.3d 

1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming no infringement due to “no trial testimony of customers 

actually using each step of the method claims”).

C. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That Motion Offense Met Its Burden To 

Prove Direct Infringement Of The File Request Patents. 

At trial, Motion Offense asserted that the Dropbox file request and Smart Sync features

infringe claims 12, 20, 27 of the ’052 patent and claim 46 of the ’548 patent. Claims 12, 20, and 

27 of the ’052 patent each require instructions to “cause, at a first node, display of at least one first 

interface with a first user interface element and a second user interface element, utilizing first 

hypertext markup language equipped code,” “cause, at the first node, display of at least one 

second interface with a third user interface element and a fourth user interface element, utilizing 

second hypertext markup language-equipped code,” and “cause, at the second node, display of at 

least one third interface with a sixth user interface element and a seventh user interface element, 

utilizing third hypertext markup language-equipped code.” PTX-2 (’052 patent) (claims 12, 20, 

and 27). Similarly, claim 46 of the ’548 patent requires that “the first communication, the second 

communication, and the third communication each include hypertext markup language-equipped 

code for being displayed via at least one web page.” PTX-4 (’548 patent) (claim 46) (emphasis 

added). 

Motion Offense failed to meet its burden to prove that these requirements are met by the 

file request feature. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that the accused features do not use

HTML equipped code to display the accused “first interface,” “second interface,” or “third 

interface,” as required by the asserted claims of the ’052 patent. 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 773:15-16; 

see also id. at 773-775, 776-781, 833-834; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Gibbons) 900:7-14, 904:5-10; PTXCase 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 11 of 26
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774.001-004. Similarly, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the accused features do not 

use HTML-equipped code to display the accused “first communication,” “second 

communication,” or “third communication,” as required by asserted claim 46 of the ’548 patent. 

5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 773:15-16 (“Is this dialogue box shown by using HTML? A. No. It is not.”); 

see also id. at 773-775, 776-781, 833-834; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Gibbons) 900:7-14, 904:5-10; PTX774.001-004.

III. DROPBOX IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF NO DAMAGES ON MOTION 

OFFENSE’S INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS. 

Dropbox is entitled to judgment as a matter of law of no damages because no reasonable 

jury could find damages of any amount in light of the evidence presented at trial. 

First, Motion Offense failed to present any market evidence to support its damages claim. 

In particular, Motion Offense did not present any evidence of actual licenses or other transactions 

involving the four asserted patents. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 600:9-17. Moreover, Mr. Dell’s 

conclusion that the parties to the hypothetical negotiation would have agreed to a royalty rate of 

$0.10/subscriber-month is wholly inconsistent with the evidence. As an initial matter, none of the 

licenses and financial transactions in the record support a running royalty damages calculation, let 

alone a running royalty amounting to $0.10/subscriber-month. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 655:8-18, 

657:5-22, 658:1-14, 658:21-24, 659:8-14; 694:8-20; 5/15/2023 Tr. 240:5-9; PTX-7C; PTX-7D; 

PTX-7F; PTX-7G; PTX-138; DTX-320; DTX-324. Indeed, Mr. Dell conceded that there have 

been no licenses executed covering the asserted patents and all the transactions involving those 

patents (or related applications) are a miniscule fraction of the amount Mr. Dell offers as a 

reasonable royalty in this case. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 662:12-16; 5/15/2023 Tr. (Gordon) 240:5-9. 

Second, Mr. Dell’s damages opinion is speculative and insufficient to support a damages 

award. Mr. Dell’s opinion rests on the unsupported assumption that the parties to the hypothetical 

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negotiation would have agreed to a royalty rate of $0.10/subscriber-month. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 

553:23-554:3, 554:18-22. Mr. Dell arrives at this conclusion using quantitative inputs he selected 

from Dropbox consumer surveys that contain no information relating specifically to accused 

subscription plans or the accused features. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 607:20-609:6, 611:9-615:6,

617:17-618:18, 618:23-619:24, 620:2-622:11, 623:7-20, 626:20-627:22, 638:9-640:1; 668:2-

678:14; 688:22-691:20, 693:11-13; PTX-112; PTX-115; PTX-739; PTX-1100; , see also

5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 590:14-593:22 (generically pointing to Dropbox 10Ks and plan to convert 

Dropbox customers to paid plans without any reference to the accused functionality); PTX-103; 

PTX-810; PTX-0850; PTX-1228. Indeed, it is undisputed that the surveys underlying Mr. Dell’s 

damages opinions include unaccused features (including prior art features), unaccused plans, and 

responses from non-Dropbox users. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 666:18-667:24; 688:22-691:20, PTX220. Despite that the surveys provide no way to distinguish between unaccused features and plans 

and the specific accused features at issue here, Mr. Dell relies on data from the surveys at almost 

every step of his calculations. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 607:20-609:6, 611:9-615:6, 688:22-691:20. 

As just one example, the foundation for Mr. Dell’s damages opinion is a 2014 survey that was 

conducted years before the accused Smart Sync feature was ever released to the market. PTX112; 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 607:20-609:6, 611:9-615:6. Moreover, the monetary values derived 

from that survey generically value “folder sharing” even though both Mr. Dell and Dr. Akl 

conceded that those features are not accused of infringement. See 5/16/2023 Tr. (Akl) 492:18-20 

(testifying “folder share alone . . . would not infringe” the asserted patents); 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 

607:20-609:6, 611:9-615:6. As a result, Mr. Dell’s damages calculations include value attributable 

to unaccused features, and therefore fail to comply with the apportionment requirement. See 

VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (patentee seeking a royalty 

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for only some features of a multi-feature product “must take care to seek only those damages 

attributable to the infringing features.” (emphasis added)).

Third, Mr. Dell’s damages opinion is insufficient to support a damages award because he

fail to account for the distinctions between the asserted patents and accused features. Mr. Dell 

opines that the appropriate royalty rate for all four asserted patents is the same as the appropriate 

royalty rate for any one or more of the four asserted patents. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 573:1-19 

(opining that only the royalty base would be impacted if the earliest asserted patent was found to 

not be infringed); 580:5-581:6 (opining that the hypothetical negotiation would cover the patent 

family); see also Dkt. 359 (Dropbox’s offer of proof regarding cross-examination of Mr. Dell). 

Mr. Dell offers that opinion despite that the different features are alleged to infringe the Folder 

Share Patents and the File Request Patents. 5/15/2023 Tr. (Akl) 280:18-281:3 (testifying there is 

no plan that includes “just the accused features and nothing else . . . the plans include multiple 

features, including what’s accused”); 5/16/2023 Tr. (Akl) 493:25-494:6, 494:25-495:6; see also

Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (patentee “must in every case ... apportion ... the 

patentee’s damages between the patented feature[s] and the unpatented features” (emphases 

added)); Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. V. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, 927 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 

2019) (“The ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value 

attributable to the infringing features of the product, and no more.” (emphasis added)).

Fourth, Mr. Dell’s conclusion that Dropbox would agree to pay a portion of its gross 

profits is speculative and not tied to the facts of this case. Mr. Dell’s reliance on gross profits 

omitted key costs that would have factored into the hypothetical negotiation and Mr. Dell offered 

no explanation for why Dropbox would have agreed to a royalty tied to its gross profits. 5/16/2023 

Tr. (Dell) 622:17-623:2, 678:15-25, 681:12-682:3, 682:11-15, 684:6-19. Similarly, Mr. Dell’s 

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starting point relies on a survey that computes values that are more than three times the amount 

that Dropbox actually charges its customers for plans allegedly including the accused features. 

PTX-112; 5/16/2023 Tr. (Dell) 607:20-609:6, 611:9-615:6 . 

Fifth, Mr. Dell failed to tie his damages calculations to the allegedly infringing activity. 

Mr. Dell calculated damages based on Dropbox customers’ allegedly infringing use of Dropbox 

products, and Dropbox’s alleged indirect infringement, when Motion Offense asserts only direct 

infringement by Dropbox. 5/16/2023 Tr. (Akl) 502:23-503:3, 503:13-17, 526:20-24; 5/16/2023 

Tr. (Dell) 558:16-25, 561:13-21, 564:10-15 (“[T]he way in which Dropbox provides – or makes 

use of the invention is that by selling subscription to its services for which customers are able to 

access that system that Dropbox manages.”), 565:16-21 (“My understanding is that they sell the 

subscriptions, and then those users are able to access the system that’s managed by Dropbox.”),

587:25-588:11 (discussing technical benefits enjoyed by Dropbox’s customers); see supra 8-9

(relying on Dropbox consumer survey data), 688:17-20 (“Q. Now, you claim that you analyzed 

Dropbox subscribers’ extent of use of the accused features and functionality to apportion the 

royalty rate? A. Yes. One of the things I looked at. Yes.”). Damages should therefore be tied to 

any purported direct infringement by Dropbox (although as discussed above, there is none), not 

use of the allegedly infringing features by Dropbox’s customers. See TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 

978 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Sales of Acrobat . . . cannot be a measure of damages for 

direct infringement by Adobe—sales could serve here as a measure of damages only for TecSec’s

indirect infringement theory, which relies on infringement by Adobe customers.”); Vocalife LLC 

v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-00123-JRG, 2020 WL 5815950, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 

2020) (“Given that the Court has granted partial summary judgment of no pre-suit induced 

infringement, any surviving damages from the period prior to the filing of the complaint must have 

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resulted from direct infringement. Without being able to delineate which of Mr. Ratliff’s pre-suit 

damages opinions apply to direct infringement as opposed to indirect infringement . . . the Court 

must exclude Mr. Ratliff’s pre-suit damages opinions.”). Similarly, Motion Offense offered no 

evidence that any customer ever even used the allegedly infringing feature (let alone in any given 

month), such that Mr. Dell’s damages calculation of $0.10 per subscribe month rate is wholly 

divorced from any alleged infringement. See, e.g., PTX-1 (’158 patent) (claims 3, 6, and 14 

requiring the “one or more processors” to “execute the instructions”); PTX-2 (’052 patent) (same 

with respect to claims 12, 20, 27); PTX-4 (’548 patent) (claim 46 requiring “one or more programs 

comprising instructions which, when executed by an apparatus, cause the apparatus to” perform 

certain functions). Moreover, claim 18 of the ’215 patent is a method claim. But Motion Offense 

failed to offer evidence of actual infringing use with respect to that claim, and thus there is 

insufficient evidence to support damages for infringement of that claim. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 

Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding damages directed to a 

method claim are limited “to devices that actually practice the method”).

Finally, Motion Offense’s damages claim is legally deficient because, as set forth in 

Dropbox’s motions to exclude Mr. Dell’s opinions (Dkt. 195, Dkt. 271; Dkt. 342; Dkt. 343), Mr. 

Dell should not have been permitted to testify. Dropbox hereby incorporates the arguments and 

evidence presented in support of those motions.

IV. DROPBOX IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT THAT THE ASSERTED CLAIMS 

ARE ENTITLED TO A PRIORITY DATE NO EARLIER THAN OCTOBER 3, 

2017.

Motion Offense failed to provide sufficient evidence—or indeed any evidence—that the 

asserted claims are entitled to a priority date earlier than October 3, 2017. Motion Offense 

asserted at trial that the asserted patents were entitled to claim priority to two applications: No. 

13/624,906 (the “’906 application”), filed on September 22, 2012, and No. 13/626,635 (the “’635 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 16 of 26
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application”), filed on September 25, 2012 (the ’906 and ’635 applications together, the “2012 

Applications”). PTX-1332; PTX-1333; 5/15/2023 Tr. (Morris) 193:21-194:5; id at 106:1-7; id. 

at 119:18-120:8. However, the asserted patents are continuations-in-part of the 2012 

Applications, and there is no dispute that they contain additional subject matter not contained in 

the 2012 Applications. 5/15/2023 Tr. (Morris) 172:10-13, 173:13-23 (Morris admitting that the 

application he filed in 2017 “was not identical to the applications filed in 2012”); 5/18/2023 Tr.

(Shamos) 1092:13-17; id. at 1078-1106; 11:12-22; 1084:18-22. See also PowerOasis, Inc. v. TMobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Generally, a CIP adds new matter 

on which at least one claim relies for support.”); MPEP § 201.08 (“A continuation-in-part is an 

application filed during the lifetime of an earlier nonprovisional application, repeating some 

substantial portion or all of the earlier nonprovisional application and adding matter not 

disclosed in the earlier nonprovisional application.” (emphasis added)); 5/17/2023 Tr. (Zilka). 

Specifically, while the 2012 Applications were directed to requesting and/or sharing 

content between two user computers across a network via email such that the content is shared 

without being attached to the email (see, e.g., PTX-1333 ¶¶ 0005, 0029, 0065, 0074, 0086, 0122, 

0142; PTX-1332 ¶¶ 0003, 0087, 0103, 0115), the asserted patents claim and describe an apparatus 

that is separate from either user node that generates and sends emails based on information it 

receives from the user nodes (see, e.g., PTX-1 (’158 patent) (claims 3, 6, and 14); PTX-2 (’052 

patent) (claims 12, 20, and 27); PTX-4 (’548 patent) (claim 46); PTX-6 (’215 patent) (claim 18)). 

See 5/18/2023 (Shamos) 1102:5-9 (“So just in a nutshell, what is it that’s not disclosed in the 2012 

Morris applications that will be focused on here? A. Right. Well, one thing is there’s no third node 

that generates an e-mail.”); 1089:22-25 (similar); PTX-1332, PTX-1333.

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“To obtain the benefit of the filing date of a parent application, the claims of the laterfiled application must be supported by the written description in the parent ‘in sufficient detail 

that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as 

of the filing date sought.’” Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 

Motion Offense failed to meet its burden to prove that the asserted claims are entitled to a 

priority date earlier than October 3, 2017. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that the 

asserted claims are not supported by the written description of the 2012 Applications. 

5/18/2023 (Shamos) 1081:23-25; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1106:10-12. The 2012 Applications 

did not disclose cloud-based computing wherein an apparatus that is separate from either user 

node generates and sends emails based on information it receives from the user nodes. See, e.g., 

PTX-1333 ¶¶ 0005, 0029, 0065, 0074, 0086, 0122, 0142; PTX-1332 ¶¶ 0003, 0087, 0103, 0115. 

Instead, the 2012 Applications disclose only user-to-user computing, wherein one user or the 

first node generates an email, and it goes through a mail relay node, or path node, rather than 

through an apparatus, to get to the second node. See, e.g., PTX-1333 ¶¶ 0005, 0029, 0065, 0074, 

0086, 0122, 0142; PTX-1332 ¶¶ 0003, 0087, 0103, 0115. Indeed, Motion Offense’s technical 

expert, Dr. Akl, made no effort to establish that the asserted claims are supported by the 2012 

Applications during Motion Offense’s case-in-chief, and even in rebuttal, only pointed to a 

single paragraph without any explanation for how that paragraph purportedly supports the full 

scope of the asserted claims. 5/18/2023 Tr. (Akl) 1186:16-1192:11; PTX-1333 ¶ 0048. 

Because Motion Offense failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could conclude that the asserted claims are supported by the written description of the 2012 

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Applications, the asserted claims are entitled to a priority date of no earlier than October 3, 2017. 

See 5/18/2023 (Shamos) 1106:10-12.

V. DROPBOX IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY. 

As the Federal Circuit has explained, where a system was “‘known or used by others’ in 

this country before the date of invention or if it was ‘in public use’ in this country more than one 

year before the date of application, it qualifies as prior art.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 

F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), 102(b)); see also New 

Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The statutory 

phrase ‘public use’ does not necessarily mean open and visible in the ordinary sense; it includes 

any use of the claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, 

restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”). The evidence presented at trial 

conclusively established that that invalidating prior art systems render each of the asserted claims 

invalid. See, e.g., 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 981:22-982:14, 988:16-989:14 (establishing that 

Dropbox 2011 was a single system because it included each of the claimed features, as 

confirmed by source code for Dropbox 2011 from September 14, 2011 and September 21, 2011).

A. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Folder Share Patents Are Not 

Invalid Over Dropbox 2011. 

Dropbox conclusively established that Dropbox 2011 was available to the public as of 

September 25, 2012—the alleged priority date of the asserted patents—and at least one year prior 

and is thus prior art to the Folder Share Patents. Motion Offense’s own witnesses conceded that 

Dropbox was available to the public at least as early as 2012. See, e.g., 5/15/2023 Tr. (Morris) 

168:16-19 (“So Dropbox was a cloud-based storage system for sharing files and folder that already 

existed when you filed this application in 2012? A. That was my understanding. Correct.”),

118:17-119:5, 191:3-9; 5/15/2023 Tr. (Gordon) 220:11-18 (“Q. So you, like Mr. Morris, have been 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 19 of 26
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a Dropbox user since 2012 time frame. Is that about right? A. That sounds about right.”); 5/17/2023 

Tr. (Zilka) 968:19-969:1, 970:2-3; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Caldwell) 971:14-18. 

Multiple Dropbox and third party fact witnesses also testified to Dropbox’s public 

availability, and use, and sale prior to 2012, including before those witnesses had any affiliation 

with Dropbox. See, e.g., 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 755:2-5; 749:20-21; 760:4-6; 5/17/2023 Tr. 

(Belanger) 841:17-21; 846:14-847:18; 848:15-16; 857:6-858:1; 861:18-862:4; 5/15/2023 Tr. 

(Shu) 255:20-256:16; 5/15/2023 Tr. (Holstein) 265:9-19; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Pandurangan) 964:25-

965:11; 967:10-24. The public use, sale, and availability of Dropbox was also corroborated by 

contemporaneous evidence. See, e.g., DTX-0036, DTX-0042, DTX-0043, DTX-0086, DTX0113, DTX-0115, DTX-0116, DTX-0733, DTX-1088, DTX-0348, DTX-0349, DTX-0851. 

Dropbox’s expert, Professor Shamos similarly testified to the public availability of Dropbox 2011. 

See, e.g., 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 993:3-10, 993:14-994:2; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1135:25-

1136:10, 1138:10-21, 1139:12-24.

Professor Shamos also explained that Dropbox 2011 taught each and every limitation of 

the asserted claims of the Folder Share Patents and that those features were publicly available 

before 2012. See generally 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 989:15-996:3 (giving an overview of the 

invalidity case including a discussion of how Dropbox’s patents describe Dropbox 2011); id. at 

988-1022; 1025-1036; 1015:10-15; 1021:15-17; 1026:23-25; 1036:7-8; 994:6-16 (“Q. Did the 

Dropbox patent applications you reviewed show a user requesting files? A. Yes. So this is from 

the '929 application, which was filed in August 2012....”); 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1134:24-

1135:24; see also 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 766:2-10 (“A. Well, our mobile applications have always 

had to operate on devices with less space than our users had available on their computers. And so 

they always had the ability to show you files and folders inside of your Dropbox account but 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 20 of 26
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delay downloading the contents of those files until absolutely necessary. Q. And when was that 

technology first used by Dropbox customers? A. 2010, I believe.”); 5/17/2023 Tr. (Belanger) 

859:1-8; DTX-0036, DTX-0042, DTX-0043, DTX-0086, DTX-0113, DTX-0115, DTX-0116,

DTX-0733, DTX-1088, DTX-0348, DTX-0349, DTX-0851.

Motion Offense’s expert Dr. Akl offered no opinion that any element of any asserted 

claim of the ’158 patent was not disclosed by Dropbox 2011. The only limitation of the Folder 

Share patents that Dr. Akl disputed was disclosed in Dropbox 2011 was the step of causing 

“creation of a second representation of the at least one folder ... that is displayable via the file 

explorer interface of the client-based file explorer application,” as required by asserted claim 

18 of the ’215 patent. PTX-6 (’215 patent) (claim 1); 5/18/2023 Tr. (Akl) 1238:14-1239:4. But

Dr. Shamos explained that “a file explorer interface” is “an interface that allows you to explore 

files,” and he identified it in the Dropbox 2011 mobile application in DTX-0116. 5/17/23 Tr. 

(Shamos) 1010:18-22. Moreover, Professor Shamos explained that while a computer’s “native 

operating system” provides a file explorer interface, “[t]here are many application programs that 

have their own file explorer interface as Dropbox did,” as confirmed by corroborating evidence 

such as DTX-0116. 5/17/23 Tr. (Shamos) 1017:12-1018:1; see also 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 

1025:21-1026:9; 1032:5-14; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1164:15-1167:6 (stating that 2011 Dropbox 

mobile app meets both the “file explorer interface” and the “client-based file explorer 

application” elements of the ’215 patent claim 1); 5/18/2013 Tr. (Akl) 1251:3-1253:24

(conceding that mobile phones are among the exemplary devices disclosed in the 2012 

applications). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the asserted Folder Share patent 

claims were patentable over Dropbox 2011. 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 21 of 26
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B. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The File Request Patents Are Not 

Invalid Over Dropbox 2011-AirDropper. 

Dropbox conclusively established that the Dropbox 2011-AirDropper system was

available to the public as of September 25, 2012—the alleged priority date of the asserted 

patents—and at least one year prior and is thus prior art to the File Request Patents. See 

5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 764:4-16 (“Q. What do we see on this slide? A. These are four examples of 

the sorts of tools we were just talking about. Q. And these were available in 2010? A. Yes. . . . Q. 

And if we look at the first one here, AirDropper, what was that? A. AirDropper was a tool to 

request files from other people and have the files that they sent to you stored in your Dropbox 

account.”); see also 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 764:17-765:2; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Belanger) 875:2-14; 

5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1135:25-1136:10, 1046:25-1079:19; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1036-

1068; supra § V.A (describing public availability of Dropbox 2011). The public availability of 

Dropbox 2011-AirDropper was further confirmed through contemporaneous evidence. See, e.g.,

DTX-742, DTX-797, DTX-799, DTX-800; DTX-0105. 

Professor Shamos explained that Dropbox 2011-Airdropper taught and/or rendered 

obvious by each and every limitation of the asserted claims of the File Request Patents and that 

those features were publicly available before 2012. Supra § V.A (describing Dropbox 2011);

5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1066:14-22; 1068:4-1069:4; 1069-1072; 1071:25-1072:5; 1072:6-

1078:10; 1078:4-7; see also id. 1046:25-1079:19; 5/17/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1037:18-1040:8. His 

testimony was corroborated by contemporaneous evidence. See, e.g., DTX-0742, DTX-0797, 

DTX-0799, DTX-0800. 

Dr. Akl offered no opinion that any element of any asserted claim of the ’548 patent was 

not disclosed by Dropbox 2011-AirDropper. The only limitation of the File Request patents that 

Dr. Akl disputed was the “date or the time” element, which appears only in the ’052 patent. 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 22 of 26
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Asserted claims 12, 20, and 27 of the ’052 patent each require “an indication of at least one of a 

date or a time.” PTX-2 (’052 patent) (claims 12, 20, 27). Motion Offense attempted to establish 

that the AirDropper source code did not show a “deadline,” but instead showed “an expiration of 

the files that had been made available.” 5/18/23 Tr. (Shamos) 1174:16-25. However, Professor 

Shamos testified that 

 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1052:15-19. See also 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 

1066:12-1067:24; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1049:24-1053:23; 5/18/23 Tr. 1057:13-15; 1068:22-

1069:4. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the asserted File Request patent were 

patentable over Dropbox 2011-Airdropper.

C. No Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Asserted Patents Are Not Invalid 

Over Dropbox 2017. 

There is no dispute that Dropbox as it existed prior to October 3, 2017 anticipates the 

asserted claims. Dropbox conclusively established that Dropbox 2017 was in public use, on sale, 

or otherwise publicly available as of October 3, 2017 and is thus prior art to all asserted claims to 

the extent Motion Offense is not entitled to a priority date earlier than October 3, 2017. See supra

§ V.A. 5/17/2023 Tr. (Terk) 765:17-19; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1108:4-6 (“And was Dropbox 

2017 in public use before October of 2017? A. Yes. Dropbox has hundreds of millions of users. 

I'm sure most of them are members of the public”); 5/17/2023 Tr. (Belanger) 860:3-9, 861:18-

862:4; 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1108:4-8, 1135:25-1136:10; 5/15/2023 Tr. (Akl) 299:20-23, 

305:11-20. The public availability of Dropbox 2017 was corroborated by contemporaneous 

evidence, and was unchallenged by Motion Offense. See, e.g., PTX-0171.

REDACTED

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Dr. Shamos, further provided unrebutted opinions, supported by contemporaneous

documentation demonstrating that there is no material difference between the accused versions of 

Dropbox and Dropbox 2017. See generally 5/18/2023 Tr. (Shamos) 1108-117; 1116:22-1117:2; 

1117:4-1121:15; 1195:10-1916:6; 1106:10-12; 1106-1108; 1121:17-1127; 1128-1130; 1129:24-

1130:1; 1130-1133; 1133-1135; 1136-1137. His testimony was corroborated by contemporaneous 

evidence. See DTX-0877, DTX-0878, DTX-0879, DTX-0880, DTX-0881, DTX-0882, DTX0883, DTX-0884, DTX-0885, DTX-0886, DTX-0888, DTX-0889, DTX-0890, DTX-0891, DTX0893, DTX-0894, DTX-0907, DTX-0909, DTX-0911, DTX-0912, DTX-0913, DTX-0914, DTX0915, DTX-0916, DTX-0917, DTX-0918, PTX-0222, PTX-0243, PTX-0248, PTX-0257, PTX0260, PTX-0261, PTX-0262, PTX-0267, PTX-0274, PTX-0283, PTX-0284, PTX-0285, PTX0286, PTX-0291, PTX-0295, PTX-0298, PTX-0299, PTX-0316A, PTX-0316AA, PTX-0316B, 

PTX-0316BB, PTX-0316C, PTX-0316D, PTX-0316E, PTX-0316F, PTX-0316G, PTX-0316H, 

PTX-0316I, PTX-0316J, PTX-0316K, PTX-0316L, PTX-0316M, PTX-0316N, PTX-0316O, 

PTX-0316P, PTX-0316Q, PTX-0316R, PTX-0316S, PTX-0316T, PTX-0316U, PTX-0316V, 

PTX-0316W, PTX-0316X, PTX-0316Y, PTX-0316Z. Motion Offense’s expert, Dr. Akl, offered 

no contrary opinions. See 5/18/2023 Tr. (Akl) 1237-1255. Because no reasonable jury could 

conclude that the asserted patents are entitled to a priority date earlier than October 3, 2017 (see 

supra), Dropbox is entitled to judgment that Dropbox 2017 invalidates the asserted claims. 

VI. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, Dropbox respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment as 

a matter of law on all disputed issues in favor of Dropbox under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

50(a).

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 24 of 26
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May 19, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregory H. Lantier

Kelly Ransom

Texas State Bar No. 24109427

KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP

303 Colorado, Suite 2000

Austin, Texas 78701

Tel: (512) 495-6464

Kelly.ransom@kellyhart.com

Gregory H. Lantier

Amanda L. Major (pro hac vice)

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington DC 20037

Tel: (202) 663-6327

Tel: (202) 663-6304

gregory.lantier@wilmerhale.com

amanda.major@wilmerhale.com

Liv Herriot

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

2600 El Camino Real, Suite 400

Palo Alto, California 94306

Tel: (650) 858-6138

liv.herriot@wilmerhale.com

Makenzi G. Herbst (pro hac vice)

Rauvin A. Johl (pro hac vice)

Jeannette Leopold (pro hac vice)

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109 

Tel: (617) 526-6171

Tel: (617) 526-6104

Tel: (617) 526-6109

makenzi.herbst@wilmerhale.com

rauvin.johl@wilmerhale.com

jeannette.leopold@wilmerhale.com 

Attorneys for Dropbox, Inc.

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 25 of 26
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that all counsel of record are being served with a copy of the foregoing 

document via electronic mail on May 19, 2023.

/s/ Kelly Ransom

Kelly Ransom

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 393 Filed 05/30/23 Page 26 of 26