The Honor able Richa rd Mills, United St ates District Judge f or the Centra l District of * I llinois , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0828n.06 F iled: Novem ber 14,2006 No. 05-5258 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
VI CKY S. CR AWFORD, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. METROPOL I TAN GO VERNMENT OF NASHVI L L E AND D AVI DSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Def endant- Appellee , GENE HU GH ES, DR .; P ED RO GA RCIA, DR
. De fe nd ants
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appea l from the United States Di str ic t Co ur

t f or the Mid dle District of Tenne ssee

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge; DAUG HTREY, Circuit Judge; MILLS, District Judge. * P ER CURIAM . Vicky S. Crawford, a

for m er employ ee of

the Metropolitan Gover nment of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee ( “Metro” ), appe als the di strict court’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt ag ainst her c laims for re taliation under Title VI I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VI I ”). B eca use we find that there is no ge nuine issue of materia l fac t and that Metro is ent i t l ed to judgment a s a matter of law, we aff

irm the g rant ofNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 2 - summa ry jud g me nt.

I As thi s c a se is b e fo re us on an a pp e a l of a g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt, we state the fa c ts i n the light most favor able to the plaintiff. See H opson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 306 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2002). Vicky Crawf ord had w orked f

or Metro f

or thirty y ear s befor e beingfired in Nove mber of 2002. Crawf

ord alleg es t hat t he si tuation that led t o her firing arose in the fa ll of 2001, when Metr o hired Dr . Gene Hug hes as the e mploy ee r elations direc tor for t h e M et ro School District. As employ ee r elations direc tor, Hug hes wa s responsible for , inte r a lia , investigating c omplaints of discrimination. I n May

2002, an att o rn ey fo r the Metro L eg al Depa rtment contac ted the Human Resource s Depa

rtment afte r J ennife r Bozeman, a n attorney with Metro L eg al, lear

ned fr om another Metro empl oy ee that there w ere sever al employ ees w ithin the administ rative of fice s that had expressed conc ern a

bout specific inc idents of inappropr iate behavior by Hug hes. B eca use Hug hes
wo uld no rm a lly have be e n r e sp on sib le fo r i nv e sti g atin gc omplai nts of se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt, thi s complaint was instead broug ht to the a ttention of Dr. Pedro G arc ia, the dire ctor of sc hools. Metro then assig ned Ver onica F razier, the a ssistant director of huma n resour ces, to investig ate the complaint. I n car

rying out the inve stigation, Fra zier contac ted employ ees who worke d with Hug hes in the Metro administrative of fice s and aske d them to come to her office so that she could intervie w them. One of

the employ ees so a

pproac hed wa s Crawfor d. I n J uly 2002, Crawf

ord went to the l eg al department as re quested a nd Fr azier questioned he rNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

Specifica lly , Crawf

ord stated that Hughes “ha d asked to see her titties on numerous 1 occa sions,” that she would say “He y Dr. Hughes, What’s up? ” and he would “g rab his cr otch and state ‘you know what’ s up,’” that he would “appr oach he r window a nd put his crotch up to the window and a sk to see her titti es all at the same time,” and that one time, “Hug hes ca me into her of fi c e and sh e a sk e d h im w hat sh e c ou ld d o f or him and he g ra bb e d h e r h e a d a

nd pu lle d it to h is crotc h.” Br. of Appellant at 7. Se e als o J A 44-45.

- 3 - about Hug hes. Craw ford told the i n v es t i gat ors that Hug hes had se x ually hara ssed her

and other employ ees. Acc ording to Crawf ord, she be lieved that she w as exercisingher r ights unde r fe dera l 1 law whe n she informe d Fr azier of Hughes’s a ctions. Fra zier’s investigation c oncluded that Hughes had enga g ed in inappropriate and unprofe ssional behavior , though not to the ex tent of Craw ford’ s
a lle g a tio ns . I t app e ars that no disc ipl ina ry a c tio ns wa s tak e n ag a ins t Hug he s; the inv e sti g a tor s d id
rec ommend training and educ ation for the sta ff. Acc ording to Crawfor d, duringthe investig ation, three employ ees ma de st atements that Hug hes had e ng ag ed in sexually inappropriate conduc t, an dafte r the sexual hara ssment inv e sti g a tio n, the se thr e e e mpl oy e e s w e re imm e diate ly inv e stigated on

oth e r gro un ds and

a ll promptly discharg ed. Craw ford he rself w as terminate d in J anuar y 2003 afte r havingbeen a ccuse d of embezzlement a

nd drug use, char g es which she states wer e “ultimately found to be unfounde d.” I n J une 2003, Craw ford f

iled a cha rg e of discr imination with t he EEOC alleg ing r etaliation, and a fter
re c e ivi nghe r n oti c e of

ri g ht t o s ue , s he br ou g ht t his su it. II We r e vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo , using the same Rul e 56(c ) standard as the district court. Ha ns ar d v . B arre tt , 980 F.2d 1059, 1061 ( 6th Cir. 1992). Summ ary judgme nt “shall be render ed forthwith if the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a ndNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 4 - admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 5 6( c ); Mey ers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. , 3 4 1 F
. 3 d 4 6 1 , 4 6 6 ( 6 thC i r . 2 0 0 3 )
. In de c idi nga

mot ion f

or summa ry jud g me nt, we mus t vi e w t he fa c tua l e vid e nc e and dr aw a ll
r e a sonable infe renc es in favor of the nonmovingparty
. Ibid. ; Hopson v. Daimle rChrysler Corp. , 306 F.3d 427, 432 ( 6th Cir. 2002). III Ti tle VI Ipr ov ide s th a t “ [i]t sh a ll b e an unla wf ul e mpl oy

me nt p ra c tic e fo r a

n employ e r t o discriminate ag ainst any

of [ i t s ] employ ees . . . be cause [t he employ ee] has opposed a ny prac tice made an u n l aw fu l em p l o y m en tp ra ct i ce b y

th i s s u b ch ap t er [ (“ th e o p p o s i t i o ncl au s e” ] , o r b ec ause [ the employ ee] has made a char g e, testified, assisted, or pa rticipated in a

ny manner in an investig ation, proce eding , or hear ing under this subcha pter [(“the participation c lause” )].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a ). To establish a pr im a fa c ie c a se of un lawf ul r e ta liatio n und e r T itl e VI I , Cr awf or d mu st d e mon str a te by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that: “(1) [she] eng ag ed in ac tivity that Title VI Iprotec ts; (2) defe ndant knew that [ she] eng ag ed in this protected a ctivity ; (3) the de fenda nt subsequently

took an
e mpl oy me nt a c tio n a dv e rs e to t

he pla int if

f; (4 ) a c a us a l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity and the a dverse employ

ment action exists.” Abbot t v. Crown Motor Co., Inc. , 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). Up o n ap peal, Cra wford c laims that her ac tions during the inter nal investig ation constitute both opposition to a pra ctice ma de unlawf ul b y T i t l e VIIand participation in an investigation under Title VI I , and that she there fore eng ag ed in activity that Title VI Iprotec ts. As did the district court, we hold that prec edent c ompels a contra ry conclusion.No. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 5 - First, Craw ford’ s actions do not constitute opposition under the meaning of the opposition
c l a u s e . W e h av e e nu m e r a t e d t h e t y p e s o f a c t i v i t i e s th a tc o n s t i tu t e o p p o s i t i o nun d e r T i t l e V II:

“ c omp la ining to anyon e (m ana g e me nt, un ion s, oth e r e mpl oy e e s, or ne ws pa pe rs ) a bo ut a lle g e dly
un lawf ul p ra c tic e s; r e fu sin g to o be y an o rd e r b e c a

us e the wo rk e r t

hinks it i s unla

wf ul und e r T itl e VI I ; and oppos ing unlawful acts by persons other than t he employ er – e .g ., former employ ers, union, and co- worke rs.” J

oh ns on v . Uni v . o

f Cin c inn ati , 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000). The g ener al idea is that Title VI I“dema nds active, c onsist en t ‘o p p o s i ng ’ ac tiviti es to war rant . . . prote ction
a g a in s t r e ta li a ti o n.” Bel l v. Safe ty Gr oo v ing

an d G rin ding, LP , 107 F. App’ x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004). Crawf

ord’s a cti ons consisted of coope ratingwith Metro’s investig ation into Hughe s by appea ring for questioning at the reque st of Fr azier and, in re sponse to Fr azier’s que stions, relating unfavor able infor

mation about Hug hes. Craw ford doe s not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior to her

participation in the investigation, nor did she take a ny further action following the inv e sti g a tio n a

nd pr ior to h e r fi ri ng . Th is is no t the kin d of ov e rt op po sit ion that we have he ld i s r e qu i r e d

f o r p r o t e c t i o nu n d e r

T i t l e V II. Second, Craw ford’ s participation in an i n t er n al i nvestig ation initiated by Metro in the
a b s e n c e o f an y p e n d in g E E O C c h ar g e is n o t a p r o te c te d a c ti v it

y un d e r th e p arti c ip a ti o n c la u s e . We have held that “Title VI I protec ts a n employ ee’ s participation in an e mploy er’ s internal investig ation into alleg ations of unlawf ul discrimination where that inves t i g ation occur s pursuant to a pe nding EEOC cha

rg e.” Ab bo tt , 348 F.3d at 543. In Crawf ord’s case, howe ver, no EE OC char g e had be en filed at the time of the investigation or prior to her f iring ; the investigation was inte rn al and wa sNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 6 - pr omp te d b y

an in fo rm a l in te rn a l st a te me nt. Court s have g e ne ra lly he ld t hat th e pa rt ic ipatio n c la

us e does not protec t “an e mp l o y ee’s participation ‘in an employ er’ s internal, in-house inve stigation, conducte d apar

t from a formal charg e with t he EEOC’; at a minimum, an employ ee must have filed
a char g e with the EEOC or otherwise instigate d proce eding s under Title VI I .” Ibid. (q u o t i n g EEOC v. Total Sys. Serv., I

nc. , 2 21 F .3 d 1 17 1, 11 74 n. 2 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 0) ); B r o we r v . Runyon , 1 7 8 F.3d 10 02 , 1 00 6 ( 8th

Cir . 1 99 9) ; Va sc on c e los v . M e ese , 907 F .2 d 111 , 1 13 (9 th C ir . 1 99 0) ; Goldberg v. Media Ge neral, Inc. , 2003 WL 21920923 at *3 (E.D. T enn. June 18, 2003). Crawf ord ar g ues that we should break f rom the gene ral tre nd requiringa for mal EEOC char g e to have been f

iled or the mac hinery

of Tit le VI I otherwise invoked befor e the pa rticipation clause takes e ffe ct. Crawf ord points to the Supreme Court’s dec ision in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998), which cre ated an aff irmative defense ag ainst an employ er’ s vicarious liability for sex ual harassment by its employ ees when: (1) the employ er e x erc ised rea sonable c are to preve nt an d

c o r r e c t p r o mp tl y

an y s e xu a ll y h ar a s s in g b e h av io r , an d

( 2 ) th e p la inti f

f e mp lo y ee
unrea sonably

failed to take advanta g e of any preve ntive or corr ective oppor tunities provided by

the employ er or to avoid harm other wise.” Id. at 805-07. Cra wford hy pothesizes that after Faragher , an e mpl oy er cou ld i mpl e me nt f or ma l se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt p oli c ie s a

nd re po rt ingre qu ir e me nts , investigate complaints made to mana g ement, and the n such investig ati o n s would serve as an aff irmative def

ense to vicar ious liability arising out of claims of sexual hara ssment. She then argues that if the par

ticipation clause doe s not protect par ticipation i n internal investig ations made in the absenc e of a

n EEOC cha

rg e, employ ees c alled in such investig ations will know that they may be fired if they testify neg atively , and will stay silen t
. S h e concludes that employ ers, lac kingNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 7 - cor r o b o r a ti n g w it

n e s s e s , w il l n o t t ak e a c ti o nto r e me dy s e xu a l h ar a s s me n t, w h il e b eing simult aneously

shielded fr om vicarious liability by the Faragher

aff irmative def

ense. As an initial matter, this for eboding scena rio is pr edicated upon a lax readingof Faragher
. I n order to be entitled to a

n aff irmative defe nse, an employer must exercise “ rea sonable c are .” Ibid. Ce rt a inl y , a

po lic y or pr a c tic e of

fi ri nga pe rs on wh o te sti fi e d n e g a tiv e ly duri nga n inve sti g a tio n into
c omp la int s o f s e xua l h aras sme nt w ou ld n ot b e “ re a so na ble .” Cou

rt s h ave he ld t

hat an a nti

ha ra ssm e nt p oli c y de sig ne d to de te r se xua l ha ra ssm e nt c an he lp an e mpl oy e r me e t its burd e n a s to the first element of

the Faragher te st on ly if the po lic y is “ bo th re a so na bly de sig ne d a

nd re a so na bly eff ectua l” and not administered “ in bad fa ith.” See, e .g. , Br own v . P e rry , 184 F.3d 388, 396 ( 4th Cir. 19 99 ). A p oli c y

of fi ri ngany

wi tne ss t hat te sti fi e d n e g a tiv e ly

duri ngan inte rn a l inve sti g a tio n w ou ld
cer tainly const i t u t e b ad fa ith; even an instanc e of a n alleg edly

unjustified firing would put the Faragher defe nse at risk. Th is c ourt

ha s st a te d th a t th e purp os e of Ti tle VI I ’s pa rt ic ipatio n c la

us e “ is t o p ro te c t a c c e ss to the machiner

y available to seek re dress for civil rig hts violations and to protect the ope ration of that machiner

y once it has be en eng ag ed. Ac co rding ly , any activity by the employ ee pr ior to the instigation of statutory

proce eding s is to be considere d pursuant to the opposition clause.” Booke r v. Brown and W

illiamson T

obacco Co., Inc

. , 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989). The impac t of Title VI Ion an em p l o y er c an be one rous. B y protec ting only

participation in investi g ations that
occur relative to EEOC proce eding s, the participation clause pre vents the burde n of Title VI Ifrom falling on an employ er who proac tively chooses to launc h an interna l investigation. Ex pandingthe p u rv i ew o f t h e p a r t i c i p at i o ncl au s e t o co v er s u ch i n v es t i gat i o n s wo u l d s i mu l t an eo u s l y

d i s co u ra geNo. 05-5258

Crawf ord v. Metro. G ov’t of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee

- 8 - the m. We wi ll n ot a lte r t his lim it d e lin e a te d b y

the lang ua g e of T itl e VI I

and re c og nize d b y

thi s court a nd others. IV Acc ording ly , for the r easons se t out above, we AFF I RM the district court’s g rant of summar y jud g me nt.