10-2916-ag

Rexhepi v. Holder

BIA

Morace, IJ

A096 257 699

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 29th day of September, two thousand eleven.

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

PETER W. HALL,

DENNY CHIN,

 Circuit Judges. 

_______________________________________

RIZA REXHEPI,

Petitioner, 

 v. 10-2916-ag

NAC 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

______________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Susan E. Zak, Medford,

Massachusetts.

FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney

General; Christopher C. Fuller,

Senior Litigation Counsel; Paul F.
2

Stone, Trial Attorney, Office of

Immigration Litigation, United

States Department of Justice,

Washington D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Riza Rexhepi, a native and citizen of

Albania, seeks review of the June 22, 2010, decision of the

BIA affirming the July 21, 2003, decision of Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) Philip L. Morace denying his application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Riza Rexhepi, No.

A096 257 699 (B.I.A. June 22, 2010), aff’g No. A096 257 699

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 21, 2003). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the

IJ’s decision. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 523 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards

of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377,

379 (2d Cir. 2007); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99,

110 (2d Cir. 2008). 

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination. In finding Rexhepi not credible,

the IJ reasonably relied in part on Rexhepi’s inconsistent

testimony regarding the location of his 1997 arrest and the

procurement of his Democracy Party membership card. See Zhou

Yun Zhang v. U.S. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004)

(noting that the Court generally will not disturb adverse

credibility determinations that are based on “specific

examples in the record of inconsistent statements . . .

about matters material to [an applicant’s] claim of

persecution”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled

in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Moreover, a

reasonable fact finder would not be compelled to credit

Rexhepi’s explanations for these inconsistencies. See

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005). 

Furthermore, contrary to Rexhepi’s contention, the IJ

did not err in recognizing that Rexhepi’s testimony was of a

“generalized nature” and lacked “details and specifics.” We

have recognized that “[w]here an applicant gives very spare

testimony, . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the

testimony is fabricated,” Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d

140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled in part on other grounds
3

by Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 305, but have held that “a

finding of testimonial vagueness cannot, without more,

support an adverse credibility determination unless

government counsel or the IJ first attempts to solicit more

detail from the alien,” Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141,

147 (2d Cir. 2008). In this case, the IJ did not err by

noting the generalized nature of Rexhepi’s testimony,

particularly when both the IJ and the government attorney

probed Rexhepi for additional details regarding his claims

and when the IJ also relied on material inconsistencies in

the record to find him not credible. See id. 

Accordingly, because the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination was supported by substantial evidence, the IJ

did not err in denying Rexhepi’s application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT relief as those claims were

based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of

removal that the Court previously granted in this petition

is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in

this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for

oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second

Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk