1 Filed 11/27/13 Beckley v. Bd. Of Admin CalPERS CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

PERRY C. BECKLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Appellant. A135418 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG11593721)

Plaintiff Perry Beckley was a California Highway Patrol (C HP) officer until the CHP determined he was not able to perform th e tasks required of an officer. He applied for disability retirement, and the Board of Administration of California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) denied his appli cation, ruling that Beckley was not disabled from carrying out the duties of the position he had most recently held as a public affairs officer (PAO). Beckley br ought a petition for writ of mandate, which the trial court granted. CalPERS has appealed. 1 We shall affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1 Although CalPERS filed an election to proceed with an appendix in lieu of a clerk’s transcript (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124), CalPERS failed to file an appendix. The only record of the trial c ourt proceedings any party filed was a reporter’s transcript. CalPERS also failed to ensure the administrati ve record was transmitte d to this court in a timely manner. Because the factual backgr ound of this case is contained in the administrative record, which we arranged to have transmitted to us, we will decide this matter on the merits rather th an dismissing it for appellants’ failure to provide an adequate record. We remind CalPERS, ho wever, of its obligation to do so. (See In re2 I. BACKGROUND Beckley worked as a CHP o fficer for approximately 23 year s. In 2003, he sought treatment for wrist and arm pain, which he believed were the result of processing an unusually large number of reports at work. Later in 2003, Beckley reported that he had hurt his back getting out of his state vehicle. While he was assigned to patrol duty later that year, he had “ ‘flare-ups’ ” of his back condition, was diagnose d with lumbar disc degeneration and sciatica, and was taken off work temporarily on several occasions in

2003 and 2004. In 2004, Beckley applied for a positi on as a PAO. The duties of the position included meeting with local le gislators, city managers, a nd community leaders; speaking to community groups; community outreach progr ams such as child ca r seat inspections; and attending community fairs. Beckley woul d typically drive a patrol car and wear a uniform when attending outreach events. He was not assigned a beat to patrol, but when driving in a patrol car in uniform, he was expected to undertake ordinary enforcement actions, and did so on a number of occasions . The PAO is not a limited duty position, and a PAO could be assigned to perform ro ad duty. Beckley performed well in his position as a PAO. In 2006, Beckley was evaluated by a ch iropractor, Dr. Erich Parks, in connection with a workers’ compensation cl aim. Dr. Parks concluded that , as a result of his injuries to his upper extremities and lower back, Beck ley could not “continue in his occupation since he has preclusions which cause him to be unable to fulfill the 14 critical activities,

Marriage of Wilcox (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 492, 498–499; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(a).) On our own motion, we take j udicial notice of the records of the superior court in this matter. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d) & 459.)3 required by CHP.” 2 Of those tasks, Dr. Parks concluded Beckley was unable safely to extract a 200-pound victim from a vehicle an d lift, carry, and drag the victim 50 feet; physically subdue and handcuff a combative s ubject; change a flat tire; drive for extended periods of time; and run up and down stairs. Either the State Compensa tion Insurance Fund or CHP’ s disability and retirement section reviewed the chiropractor’s report, informed Beckley’s co mmanding officer that Beckley “ ‘could not perform the 14 critical tasks,’ ” and instructed the commanding officer to “ ‘send [Beckley] home.’ ” The commanding officer did so . Beckley asked if he could continue to work as a PAO, and was told he could not do so because CHP officers had to be able to perform the 14 cr itical tasks at any time. Beckley was sent home on leave, and later took service retirement. It is undisputed that in his job as PAO, Beckley was not required to perform any of the 14 critical tasks regularly, although he perfo rmed a few of the tasks on rare occasions during his time as PAO. Beckley applied for industrial disability retirement. At a hearing on his application, Beckley presented evidence from th ree chiropractors that he was unable to carry out all of the 14 critical tasks. This ev idence included the repo rt of Dr. Parks, who had evaluated Beckley in connection with hi s workers’ compensatio n claim. According to Dr. Parks, Beckley had suffered two distin ct industrial injuries. The first involved

2 The administrative record includes a document entitled “California Highway Patrol Officer Task Statemen ts,” which lists 14 attributes (such as lower and upper extremity muscle strength, balance, flexib ility, agility, and aerobic and anaerobic power and capacity), and samples of tasks that us e those attributes, including running up and down stairs; ascending and descending an embankment; crawling/crouching/walking 50 feet; extracting a 200-pound victim from a vehi cle and lifting, carryi ng, and/or dragging the victim 50 feet; exiting a vehi cle, sprinting 50 yards, vau lting a three-foot barrier, and running 20 yards up a 40 pe rcent grade; physically s ubduing and handcuffing a combative subject after a 100-yard chase; cha nging a flat tire; and driving, standing, or directing traffic for extended periods of time while dressed in full uniform. These tasks are referred to as the “14 critical tasks.”4 “cumulative trauma to his upper extremities, ” including carpal tunnel syndrome. The second was the injury to Beckley’s lowe r back, in which a “chronic degenerative condition . . . was aggravated by a sudden twist wh en exiting a patrol car.” Dr. Parks concluded Beckley had lost appr oximately half of his pre-inju ry capacity for fine motor control of his hands and for lifting, and th at he “should be precluded from doing heavy lifting, repeat bending or stooping.” Dr. Parks believed Beckley’s carpal tunnel syndrome was “permanent and stationary,” and his low back condition was “most likely permanent and stationary.” Another chiropractor, Dr. Joseph Ambros e, opined in 2005 that Beckley had strained his lower back and his upper extrem ities in his employment with CHP, and that, “[g]iven [Beckley’s] subjective factors of di sability and objective findings . . . it is my opinion that this patient should be perman ently precluded from heavy lifting, repeated bending, prolonged ru nning, jogging or jarring activities. ” Later, after reviewing MRI results, he opined that Beckley “cannot perform all of the essential f unctions of his usual and customary occupation.” The third chiropractor, Dr. Moses Jacob, evaluated Beckley in 2008 and reviewed his medical records. He diagnosed Beck ley as suffering from, among other things, chronic back strain, “superimp osed over lumbar disc hern iation” and “bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome,” and concluded that these in juries were caused by his employment as a CHP officer. Objective factor s for the spine diagnoses incl uded “[l]imited mobility on extension,” “[p]ain on palpatio n,” “MRI findings,” and “[p] ositive orthopedic tests.” Objective findings to support the upper extr emity injury included limited mobility in the right wrist and positive orthoped ic and radiographic tests. Dr. Jacob concluded Beckley5 had a “preclusion from heavy lifting, repeated bending and stooping,” and that as a result of his injuries, Beckley “can NOT perform the duties required of a CHP officer.” 3 Dr. Joseph Serra, an orthop edic surgeon, examined Beckley at the request of

CalPERS and reviewed his medical records. He concluded Beckley had “[c]hronic musculoligamentous strain lumb ar spine,” “[m]ild degenerativ e disc disease L3-4 lumbar spine,” and “carpal tunnel syndrome , mild, resolved at present. ” He opined that Beckley was not precluded from performing any of th e job duties of a CHP officer, including the 14 tasks, although he could suffer pain or discomfort from performing them. 4

CalPERS concl uded Beckley’s application for disability retirement “must be measured against his usual duties as a PAO, not against the 14 critical tasks” and that there was no medical evidence Beckley was un able to perform his usual duties as PAO either when he applied for disa bility in 2006 or when he retired in 2008. On that basis, CalPERS denied his application. Beckley brought a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court. The trial court granted the petition. The court prepared a statement of decision concluding CalPERS erred in measuring Beckley’s disability agains t his assigned usual dutie s as a PAO, rather than against the usual duties of a CHP office r, including the 14 critical tasks, and that the

3 In his report, Dr. Jacob stated that based on his musculoskeletal disorders, Beckley “would have difficulties with: [¶] Item 1: Lowe r extremity dynamic muscle strength anaerobic power. [¶] Item 2: Lowe r and upper extremity static and dynamic muscle strength aerobic power; ability to extract 200 pound victim from a vehicle. [¶] Item 3: Upper and lo wer extremity static and dynamic strength aerobic power. [¶] Item 5: Lower and upper extremity dynamic muscle strength aerobic power after 100 yard chase physically subdue and handcuff combative subjec t. Remove spilled loads or traffic hazards such as lumber, large rocks or sacks of heavy material from roadway. [¶] Item 11: Manual and finger dexterity. Lo ad and fire, reload shotgun shells from a shotgun. Operate a mobile digital compute r.” These item numbers correspond to the 14 critical tasks. At the hearing, Dr. Jacob te stified that Beckley could not perform those tasks.

4 Beckley also claimed ps ychological disabilit y and disability for tinnitus and hearing loss.6 weight of the evidence showed Beckley was incapacitated for his performance of his duties. The court entered judgment direc ting CalPERS (1) to set aside its decision denying Beckley’s application for disab ility for retirement and (2) to grant the application. Three weeks later, the cour t issued a perempto ry writ of mandamus commanding CalPERS “to reconsider [its] acti on in light of this Court’s Statement of Decision, and take further action especially enjoined on you by law.” This appeal

ensued. 5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A public employee has a fundamental vested right to a disability pension if he or she is in fact disabled. ( Quintana v. Board of Administration (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1023 ( Quintana ).) Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to apply its independent judgment as to the wei ght of the evidence. ( Id . at p. 1021.) On appeal, we “need only

review the record to determine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.” ( Id . at p. 1024, italics added; see also Singh v. Board of Retirement (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 11 80, 1185, fn. omitted ( Singh ).) As to questions of law, we review those determinations de novo, alth ough we give great weight to CalPERS’s

construction of the Californi a Public Employees’ Retiremen t Law (PERL) (Gov. Code, 6

5 The appeal purports to be from the writ of administrative mandamus. “No appeal lies from a peremptory writ of mandate issued pursuant to a judgment.” ( C.R.W. v. Orr (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 70, 72, fn. 2; see also Department of Transportation v. State Personnel Bd. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 568, 575, fn. 3 .) The appeal rather lies from the judgment itself. (See Kindig v. Palos Ve rdes Homes Assn. (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 349, 355; Demartini v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 787, 794, disapproved on other grounds in Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 589, 596; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) We sha ll exercise our discretion to deem the appeal to be from the judgment. (See Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 21 [appeal from nonappealable order denying a ne w trial may be construed as an appeal from an existing final judgment].)

6 All undesignated statutory referenc es are to the Government Code.7 § 20000 et seq.). ( Molina v. Board of Administration, Etc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 53, 61; O’Connor v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.Ap p.4th 1610, 1620– 1621.) If, however, there is “any ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of [the Public Employees’ Retirement System] legi slation [it] is to be libera lly construed in favor of the public employee, as long as such constructio n is consistent with the clear language and purpose of the statute.” ( City of Martinez v. Wo rkers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 601, 617.)

III. DISCUSSION Section 21151, subdivision (a ) provides: “Any patrol, stat e safety, state industrial, state peace officer/firefighter, or local safe ty member incapacitated for the performance of duty as the result of an industrial disab ility shall be retired fo r disability, pursuant to this chapter, regardless of age or amount of service.” The PERL defines “ ‘[d]isability’ ” and “ ‘incapacity for performance of duty’ ” to mean “disability of permanent or extended and uncertain duration, as determin ed by the board, . . . on the basis of competent medical opinion.” (§ 20026.)

CalPERS contends these st atutes mean that Beckley was eligible for disability retirement only if he was substantially unable to perform his “ ‘usual duties,’ ” and that

those duties should be measured based on the re quirements of his job as a PAO. For this,

CalPERS relies on Mansperger v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 873 ( Mansperger ) and Hosford v. Board of Administration (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 854 ( Hosford ). We examine each, in turn. The applicant in Mansperger was a fish and game ward en who had suffered workrelated injuries to his right arm that preven ted him from lifting and ca rrying heavy loads. ( Mansperger , supra , 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 875.) He rema ined able to perform most of his usual duties, including apprehending a prisone r, but could not lift heavy weights or carry the prisoner away. ( Ibid .) CalPERS concluded he was not physically incapacitated from performing his duties as a fish and game ward en. The trial court denied his petition for8 writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. ( Id . at pp. 874, 877.) The court held that “to be ‘incapacitated for performance of duty’ within [former] section 20122 means

the substantial inability of the applicant to perform his usual duties.” 7 Although the applicant was not able to lift or carry heav y objects, the evidence showed he “could substantially carry out the normal duties of a fi sh and game warden. The necessity that a fish and game warden carry off a heavy ob ject alone is a remote occurrence.” ( Id . at pp. 876–877.) Because the app licant could carry out most of his duties, CalPERS and the trial court properly found he was not “ ‘i ncapacitated for the performance of duty’ ” within the meaning of the statute, and he was therefore not entitled to disability retirement. ( Id . at p. 877.)

The court in Hosford reached a similar result. The applicant there was a CHP sergeant who had sustained injuries, including ba ck injuries, in three separate incidents. ( Hosford , supra , 77 Cal.App.3d at pp. 856–857.) As a result, he experienced continuing pain, and believed he was in danger of furt her injury when he had to overpower people who resisted arrest. ( Id . at p. 857.) CalPERS determined he was not incapacitated for his duties as a traffic officer. The applicant petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court, exercising its independent judgment, fo und he was “ ‘substantially able to perform the normal duties of a sergeant in the Ca lifornia Highway Patrol,’ ” and denied the petition. ( Id . at p. 859.) The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination. ( Id . at pp. 859, 865.) In considering the nature of the applicant’s “ ‘ usual duties,’ ” the court rejected th e contentions that those duties

should be determined exclusiv ely by use of either a job desc ription prepared by the State Personnel Board or a document prepared by the CHP describing the typical physical

7 Former section 21022, a pr edecessor to section 21151, pr ovided “[a]ny patrol or local safety member incapacitated for the performance of duty as the result of an industrial disability shall be retired for disa bility, pursuant to this chapter, regardless of age or amount of service.” ( Mansperger , supra , 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 876.)9 demands on traffic officers and sergeants. Th e court noted that a sergeant’s supervisory role meant both that he might need to make arrests and subdue prisoners and that he would be subjected to such phy sical demands less frequently than would traffic officers. ( Id . at pp. 860–861.) In concludi ng the evidence su pported the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeal noted that sitting for long periods of time woul d probably bother the applicant’s back, but that did not mean he was unable to do so, particularly since he could stop and exercise as needed. ( Id . at p. 862.) As to more strenuous activities, such as running and apprehending a fleeing suspect, the court relied on “[t]he rarity of the necessity for such stre nuous activity, coupled w ith the fact that Hosford could actually perform the function.” ( Ibid .) CalPERS argues that under Mansperger and Hosford , Beckley is entitled to disability retirement only if he is substantially unable to perform th e usual duties of the position he most recently held as a PAO, wh ether or not he could perform the general duties of a CHP officer. We disagree. Thes e cases do not hold that the usual duties of a job should be measured only by the applicant’s last job assignment. Instead, both cases measured those duties in terms of the job cla ssification the applicant held (fish and game

warden in Mansperger and CHP traffic sergeant in Hosford ). This approach makes

sense: As the trial court in the case befo re us pointed out, “[t]ying an applicant’s entitlement to disability retirement to his last specific assignment woul d tend to lead to highly inconsistent results for persons in identical job categories who suffer from

identical disabilities.” Moreover, this approach is undercut by Vehicle Code section 2268, which was enacted in 1983, after Mansperger and Hosford were decided. (Stats. 1983, c. 1004, § 1, p. 3552.) As pertinent here, that statute prov ides: “(a) Any member of the Department of the California Highwa y Patrol . . . shall be capable of fulfilling the complete range of

official duties administered by the commissioner pursuant to Section 2400 and other critical duties that may be necessary for the preservation of life and property. Members10 of the California Highway Patrol shall not be assigned to permanent limited duty positions which do not require the ability to perform those du ties. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Nothing in subdivisi on (a) entitles a member of the Ca lifornia Highway Patrol to, or precludes a member from receiving, an indust rial disability retirement.” Thus, under Vehicle Code section 2268, a CHP officer must be able to perform all of the job duties of an officer—and there appears to be no dis pute between the parties that the “14 critical

tasks” reflect those duties. This case is similar in many ways to Thelander v. City of El Monte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 736 ( Thelander ). The employee there, a prob ationary police officer for a city’s police department, was injured while attending police training academy. Her employment was terminated be cause of her inability to co mplete the police academy and perform the required duties of a police officer. ( Id . at pp. 739–740.) She later sought industrial disability retirement, and the city concluded she was not incapacitated for the performance of her duties as a police officer within the meaning of the PERL law. ( Id . at p. 741.) The trial court granted the em ployee’s petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. ( Id . at pp. 741–742, 749.) The court noted that there was evidence that every city police officer was “requi red to operate at the same level as a field officer regardless of her a ssigned position. This admission negates El

Monte’s contention that a distinction exists be tween the daily requirem ents of the job and

the rare strenuous activities that may occasionally be involved. If every officer must be capable of and prepared for th e worst everyday, then that is a ‘usual’ duty of the job .” ( Id . at p. 742, italics added.) Moreover, completing police academy was a requirement of the job of a police officer. The court reasoned: “The training requirement is analogous to the periodic health and performance tests a police department might require permanent officers to pass in order to reta in their positions on the force. Would a police department be allowed to terminate an industrially in jured officer on grounds she failed a required annual physical examinat ion or performance test yet deny her a disability pension11 because she was ‘capable’ of performing the ‘usual’ duties of the job? Pretty clearly

not. ” ( Id . at p. 745, italics added.) The court al so noted that no light duty assignment, or assignment that did not require the completi on of police academy training, was available to the officer on a permanent basis. ( Id . at p. 746.) Similarly, under Vehicle Code section 2 268, a CHP officer must be capable of carrying out “the complete range of offi cial duties,” and may not be assigned to permanent light duty assignmen ts that do not require those capabilities. (Veh. Code, § 2268, subd. (a).) As part of the job descri ption of an officer, th e CHP has enumerated

the “14 critical tasks” an offi cer must be able to carry ou t in order to perform those duties. Beckley’s position as PAO was not co nsidered a light duty assignment, and he was discharged because he was not able to perform all of the 14 tasks. This evidence amply supports the conclusion that—as was the case in Thelander —the ability to perform all tasks required of a CHP officer is part of the “usual” duties of his job. CalPERS argues that Vehicle Code secti on 2268 does not affect the rule of Mansperger and Hosford , and that it is still entitled to consider only the duties an individual CHP officer actually was performing when deciding a disability claim. But as mentioned above, these cases did not establish a rule that employees’ usual duties were to be established by their last assignment instea d of their job classification. And section 2268, which was enacted after Mansperger and Hosford were decided, makes clear that all CHP members, regardless of job classifi cation, must be capable of performing the12 complete range of duties ad ministered by the Commissioner, which—the parties do not dispute—include the 14 tasks. 8 CalPERS contends, nevertheless, that its position is supported by subdivision (c) of Vehicle Code section 2268, which provides: “Nothing in subdivision (a) entitles a member of the California Highway Patrol to , or precludes a memb er from receiving, an industrial disability retirement.” Accord ing to CalPERS, this provision means that, regardless of the clear language of subdivision (a), it has sole and complete authority to make a disability determination based on a CHP officer’s individual job duties. We disagree with the notion that subdivision (c) requires CalPERS to measure a CHP officer’s usual duties by looking to his or her la st assignment. When read as a whole, it is

clear that the statute establishes that the “u sual duties” of every CHP officer include, by legislative mandate, the ability to carry out all tasks necessary for the preservation of life and property, but that an officer’s inability to accomplish those tasks does not require a finding that the officer sustained an industrial disability (compare §§ 21150 & 21151), or that his incapacity is “of perm anent or extended and uncertai n duration” (see § 20026), or that the officer meets any othe r proper requirements for entitleme nt to industrial disability

retirement. These matters are for CalPERS to decide. In its reply brief, CalPERS acknowledges that Beckley “admittedly was left in a difficult position by [CHP’s] actions,” but argu es that it has exclusiv e authority to make

8 Indeed, in a precedential decision in 2 000, which it cites in its reply brief on appeal, CalPERS stated that it “has interpreted Vehicle Code section 2268(a) as defining the ‘usual job duties’ of respondent CHP me mbers as being the complete range of duties set forth in Vehicle Code section 2400 and ‘ other critical duties that may be necessary for the preservation of life and property .’ [¶] . . . [¶] The test for determining whether a [State Traffic Sergeant] is entitled to a CalP ERS disability is whether the official is substantially unable to perform his/her full range of ‘usual duties’ as defined by Vehicle Code section 2268 .” ( In the Matter of the Application fo r Reinstatement from Industrial Disability Retirement, Willie Starnes , Case No. 2530, OAH No . L-1999060537, Jan. 22, 2000, italics added.) We take judicial notice of this precedential decision.13 determinations of eligibility for disability retirement and that it is not bound by CHP’s determinations about whether Beckley could perform his job. (See §§ 20026, 20125, 21153, 21154, 21156.) Th e question here, however, is not who makes the eligibility determination, but whether CalP ERS applied the correct legal standards in doing so. We

have concluded that it did not because it measured Beckley’s usual job duties by considering only the duties he engaged in when he was assigned to be a PAO. CalPERS also argues that, rather than relieving Beckley of his duties as a PAO because of his disability, CHP s hould have applied for disability retirement on his behalf. (§ 21153.) But regardless of whether CHP fo llowed the correct procedure, CalPERS was required to apply the correct legal standards.

CalPERS also contends that as a resu lt of its determination that Beckley was substantially able to perform his duties as a PAO, he is entitled to reinstatement with the CHP. This argument simply reinforces th e problem with defining Beckley’s “usual duties” based on his role as a PAO, when th e law requires any CHP officer to be able to perform all of the duties necessary to protect life or property and does not permit limited duty assignments. CalPERS makes no effort to explain how CHP could reinstate an officer unable to perform all necessary duties in a manner consistent with section 2268. According to statute, Beckley’s usual duties were not limited to those normally performed by a PAO. Finally, CalPERS points out that Dr. Se rra, the orthopedic surgeon appointed by CalPERS, examined Beckley and concluded he was not precluded from performing any of the job duties of a CHP officer, including the 14 tasks. CalPERS’s decision, however,

was not based on the factual conclusion that Beckley could perform a ll of a CHP officer’s job duties, but on the legal c onclusion that his usual duties should be measured against those of a PAO. In any case, the trial c ourt made the factual finding that Beckley was incapacitated from performing all of the dutie s of a CHP officer, and we review the trial

court’s determination for substantial evidence. (See Singh , supra , 41 Cal.App.4th at14 p. 1185; Quintana , supra , 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1023–1024 .) As we have explained, in addition to Dr. Serra’s report and testimony, the record contains evidence from three chiropractors, all of whom ex amined Beckley and his medical records, and all of whom opined that Beckley was not able to carry ou t the full range of duties of a CHP officer. Although the trial court did not recite this medical evidence in its statement of decision, there is no indication that CalPERS objected to the statement of decision on this basis, and we will therefore imply findi ngs in Beckley’s favor that ar e supported by the record. (See Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.A pp.4th 515, 528–529; In re Marriage of

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133–1134; Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) Moreover, the record is undisputed that CHP directed B eckley to leave the workplace because of his inability to perform the 14 tasks. The evidence is suffi cient to support the trial court’s factual finding that Beckley was unable to ca rry out the usual duties of a CHP officer.15 IV. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 9

_ ____________ ____________ Rivera, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Reardon, Acting P.J.

_____________ ____________ Humes, J.

9 As we have noted, the trial court’s judgm ent directed CalPERS (1) to set aside its decision denying Beck ley’s application for disability fo r retirement and (2) to grant the application. Thereafter, the writ of manda mus commanded CalPERS “to reconsider [its] action in light of this Court’s Statement of Decision, and take further action especially enjoined on you by law.” CalPERS has not po inted out, or raised any argument about, the effect of the differing wording of the judgment and the writ of mandamus, and we express no opinion on the matter.