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22-3153

United States v. Narzikulov

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE 

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the

16th day of May, two thousand twenty-four. 

Present: 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

Chief Judge, 

GUIDO CALABRESI, 

MYRNA PÉREZ,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

v. 22-3153 

 

SUKHROB KHAMROKULOV, SHERZOD MUKUMOV,

JASUR KAMOLOV, FIRUZ JURAEV, MURODJON SULTANOV, 

 Defendants, 

AKMAL NARZIKULOV, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_____________________________________ 

For Appellee: Anthony Bagnuola and Frank Turner Buford, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States 
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Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant: Peter J. Guadagnino, Jr., Law Offices of Peter 

Guadagnino, New York, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United State District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Cogan, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Akmal Narzikulov appeals from a judgment entered on December 

13, 2022 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Cogan, J.) convicting him, following a jury trial, of eight counts: (1) conspiracy to unlawfully produce identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028; (2) conspiracy to commit kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c); (3) kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1); (4) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (5) Hobbs Act extortion, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (6) threatening physical violence in furtherance of an extortionate plan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (7) brandishing a firearm during and in relation 

to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (8) conspiracy to commit witness 

tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).1

 Narzikulov filed a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29(c) and 33, 

respectively.

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 ECF No. 268. In a memorandum decision and order entered on August 24, 2021, 

1 On November 18, 2022, after trial but prior to Narzikulov’s sentencing, the government moved to dismiss 

Count Seven of the Indictment, which charged Narzikulov with brandishing a firearm during and in relation 

to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). ECF No. 389. The district court granted the 

motion and sentenced Narzikulov on the remaining seven counts of conviction on December 12, 2022. 

See ECF Nos. 391, 409. 

2 Rule 29 provides that “[i]f the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and 

enter an acquittal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). Rule 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant's motion, the 
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the district court denied Narzikulov’s post-trial motion. ECF No. 279. The district court sentenced Narzikulov principally to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Narzikulov principally contends that two government witnesses gave perjured testimony and that the government’s proof was 

generally insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, warranting either acquittal or a new trial. We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and 

the issues on appeal, which we discuss here only as necessary to explain our decision to AFFIRM. 

* * * 

This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States 

v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2021). “[D]efendants face a heavy burden[] because our 

framework for evaluating such challenges is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Ho, 984 

F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “This deferential standard ‘is especially important when reviewing a conviction of conspiracy . . . . because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive 

operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the 

precision of a surgeon’s scalpel.’” United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(quoting United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1992)). We must uphold a jury 

verdict if, “credit[ing] every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor” and 

“viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Capers, 20 F.4th at 

113 (quoting Ho, 984 F.3d at 199) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We ‘may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent 

court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 33(a). 
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or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States 

v. Raniere, 55 F.4th 354, 364 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Capers, 20 F.4th at 113). 

We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). “Because the courts generally must defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence 

and assessment of witness credibility,” id, “[i]t is accordingly only in exceptional circumstances, where there is ‘a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted,’ that a 

court ‘may intrude upon the jury function of credibility assessment’ and grant a Rule 33 motion,” 

United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 330 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting McCourty, 562 F.3d at

475–76). For the Court to grant a new trial based on trial perjury, the appellant must demonstrate 

that the witness committed perjury by “giv[ing] false testimony concerning a material matter with 

the willful intent to provide false testimony, as distinguished from incorrect testimony resulting 

from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 219 (2d 

Cir. 2001). “Simple inaccuracies or inconsistencies in testimony do not rise to the level of perjury.” Id. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414–15 (2d Cir. 1992)). Even 

when perjured testimony is clearly identified, we are “reluctan[t] to . . . grant[] . . . a new trial 

unless we can say that the jury probably would have acquitted in the absence of the false testimony.” Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1413–14. 

Here, Narzikulov principally argues that one or more witnesses perjured themselves at his 

trial, and that the district court abused its discretion in failing to afford him Rule 33 relief. We 

disagree. Narzikulov’s argument centers on the allegedly inconsistent accounts of two cooperating witnesses, Firuz Juraev and Jasur Kamolov, regarding the events that led to Narzikulov’s indictment on Count Six, for threatening physical violence in furtherance of an extortionate plan. 
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Juraev and Kamolov were in accord, however, on the essentials of this incident, which occurred 

in Narzikulov’s white Toyota Camry in a Walgreens parking lot: namely, that Narzikulov angrily 

confronted Kamolov regarding his text to Firdavs Giyasov warning about the co-conspirators’ plan 

to kidnap him; that Kamolov replied that he sent the text for Narzikulov’s own good; that Narzikulov thereafter brandished a black pistol and threatened Kamolov; that Kamolov agreed with Narzikulov to pay money Narzikulov believed Giyasov to owe; and that Narzikulov and Kamolov

thereafter calmed down, at which point Kamolov briefly held the gun to inspect it. Contrary to 

Narzikulov’s claim, moreover, the inconsistent recollections of the two witnesses as to Juraev’s 

presence in the front passenger seat provide no basis for Rule 33 relief. Indeed, Narzikulov failed 

to establish before the district court that this and other alleged inconsistencies reflected perjury, 

rather than “confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Monteleone, 257 F.3d at 219. Nor did he 

establish that any such discrepancies seriously undercut the witnesses’ account as to the key factual 

question whether Narzikulov threatened Kamolov with a gun in the Walgreens parking lot. 

In such circumstances, resolving the discrepancies on which Narzikulov relied at trial 

turned on an assessment of witness credibility that was squarely within the province of the jury. 

Narzikulov repeatedly argued to the jury that the inconsistent testimony of the cooperators formed 

a basis for discrediting them as unreliable. During deliberations, the jurors requested to have Juraev’s and Kamolov’s testimony regarding “the Walgreens incident” read back to them, suggesting 

that they examined this specific topic. App’x 1720–22. This is not an “exceptional circumstance[]” that would warrant this Court’s intrusion on the jury’s assessment of witness credibility. 

Landesman, 17 F.4th at 330. Narzikulov has not shown that perjury occurred, and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion. 
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To the extent Narzikulov argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of 

law, we again disagree. As to Count Six, in addition to the testimony of Kamolov and Juraev, the 

government admitted into evidence paperwork associated with Narzikulov’s procurement of the 

gun that the government asserted had been used to threaten Kamolov. It presented evidence that 

authorities located the gun—which matched descriptions provided by the witnesses—along with 

bags of ammunition, in Narzikulov’s apartment. Id. An expert witness testified that DNA on the 

gun matched that of Narzikulov. “[C]redit[ing] every inference that could have been drawn in the 

government’s favor” and “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” 

Capers, 20 F.4th at 113 (quoting Ho, 984 F.3d at 199), a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Finally, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Narzikulov’s convictions on the remaining 

counts. Narzikulov’s arguments again largely hinge on supposedly inconsistent testimony and 

the credibility of witnesses. As with regard to Count Six, defense counsel raised these arguments 

for the jury’s consideration. We lack a valid basis on which to intrude on the jury’s judgment 

where, as here, the evidence was neither “nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could 

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

* * * 

We have considered Narzikulov’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT:

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court