(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 18–328. Argued October 16, 2019—Decided December 10, 2019 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizes private civil 

actions against debt collectors who engage in certain prohibited practices. An FDCPA action must be brought “within one year from the

date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U. S. C. §1692k(d). Respondent 

Klemm & Associates (Klemm) sued petitioner Rotkiske to collect an 

unpaid debt and attempted service at an address where Rotkiske no 

longer lived. An individual other than Rotkiske accepted service. Rotkiske failed to respond to the summons, and Klemm obtained a default

judgment in 2009. Rotkiske claims that he first learned of this judgment in 2014 when his mortgage application was denied. He then filed 

suit against Klemm, alleging that Klemm violated the FDCPA by contacting him without lawful ability to collect. Klemm moved to dismiss 

the action as barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

As relevant here, Rotkiske argued for the application of a “discovery 

rule” to delay the beginning of the limitations period until the date that

he knew or should have known of the alleged FDCPA violation. Relying on the statute’s plain language, the District Court rejected Rotkiske’s approach and dismissed the action. The Third Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Absent the application of an equitable doctrine, §1692k(d)’s statute 

of limitations begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, 

not when the violation is discovered. Pp. 4–7.

(a) The plain text of §1692k(d) unambiguously sets the date of the 

violation as the event that starts the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period. Rotkiske argues for the application of a general discovery rule as 

a principle of statutory interpretation that, in effect, would read a discovery provision into §1692k(d). But adopting this approach would require improper atextual supplementation of the statute. Such supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has 
 

 

 

 

 

2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Syllabus 

shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision. 

See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §3416. Pp. 4–6.

(b) Rotkiske cannot rely on the application of an equitable, fraudspecific discovery rule to excuse his otherwise untimely filing. This 

Court has noted the existence of decisions applying a discovery rule in 

fraud cases, see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 644, and 

has characterized these decisions as applying an equity-based doctrine, see, e.g., California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ 

Securities, Inc., 582 U. S. ___, ___. Rotkiske, however, neither preserved this issue before the Third Circuit nor raised it in his petition 

for certiorari. Pp. 6–7. 

890 F. 3d 422, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., 

joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed an 

opinion dissenting in part and dissenting from the judgment. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–328 

KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v. 

PAUL KLEMM, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[December 10, 2019]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizes private civil actions against debt collectors who engage

in certain prohibited practices. 91 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. 

§1692k(a). An action under the FDCPA may be brought 

“within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” §1692k(d). This case requires us to determine when 

the FDCPA’s limitations period begins to run. We hold 

that, absent the application of an equitable doctrine, the 

statute of limitations in §1692k(d) begins to run on the date

on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date

on which the violation is discovered. 

I 

A 

In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure

that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive 

debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” §1692(e). The 
 

 

2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of the Court 

FDCPA pursues these stated purposes by imposing affirmative requirements on debt collectors and prohibiting a 

range of debt-collection practices. §§1692b–1692j. 

The FDCPA authorizes the Federal Trade Commission, 

the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and other 

federal agencies to enforce its provisions. §1692l. The 

FDCPA also authorizes private civil actions against debt 

collectors. §1692k(a). These private civil actions “may be

brought in any appropriate United States district court 

without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any

other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from

the date on which the violation occurs.” §1692k(d). 

B 

Petitioner Kevin Rotkiske failed to pay approximately 

$1,200 in credit card debt.1 His credit card company referred the debt to respondent Klemm & Associates (Klemm) 

for collection.2 In March 2008, Klemm sued Rotkiske, seeking to collect the unpaid debt. Klemm attempted service at

an address where Rotkiske no longer lived, and a person

whose description did not match Rotkiske’s accepted service 

of the complaint. Klemm later withdrew the suit. 

Klemm refiled suit in January 2009, and a process server 

attempted service at the same address. Once again, someone other than Rotkiske accepted service. Rotkiske failed 

to respond to the summons, and Klemm obtained a default 

—————— 1Because this case comes to us from a decision granting a motion to

dismiss, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in Rotkiske’s operative

complaint. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 508, 

n. 1 (2002). 2Paul Klemm, the managing partner of Klemm & Associates, moved 

to a new firm named Nudelman, Nudelman & Ziering, which was later

renamed Nudelman, Klemm & Golub. Rotkiske has sued Paul Klemm, 

Klemm & Associates, Nudelman, Klemm & Golub, and Nudelman, 

Nudelman & Ziering. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the respondents as Klemm. 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

judgment. Rotkiske claims that he was not aware of 

Klemm’s 2009 debt-collection lawsuit until September 

2014, when he was denied a mortgage because of the default 

judgment against him. 

On June 29, 2015, more than six years after the default

judgment, Rotkiske brought suit against Klemm under the 

FDCPA. Rotkiske’s amended complaint alleged that equitable tolling excused his otherwise untimely filing because

Klemm purposely served process in a manner that ensured

he would not receive service. The sole FDCPA claim in the 

complaint asserted that Klemm commenced the 2009 debtcollection lawsuit after the state-law limitations period expired and therefore “violated the FDCPA by contacting

[Rotkiske] without lawful ability to collect.” First Amended 

Complaint in No. 2:15–cv–03638 (ED Pa.), Doc. 15, p. 4. 

Klemm moved to dismiss the action as barred by the 

FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations, 15 U. S. C. 

§1692k(d). Rotkiske argued that the court should apply a

“discovery rule” to delay the beginning of the limitations period until the date he knew or should have known of the 

alleged FDCPA violation. To support this contention, Rotkiske relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mangum v. 

Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F. 3d 935 (2009). That 

case held that, under the “discovery rule,” limitations periods in federal litigation generally begin to run when plaintiffs know or have reason to know of their injury. Id., at 

940–941. 

The District Court dismissed the action. It held that the 

Ninth Circuit’s general rule does not apply to §1692k(d), relying on the statute’s plain language. The court also concluded that Rotkiske was not entitled to equitable tolling

because, even accepting the truth of the allegations in the

complaint, he was not misled by Klemm’s conduct.

On appeal, the Third Circuit sua sponte reviewed the case 

en banc and unanimously affirmed. 890 F. 3d 422 (2018). 

The court held that, under the text of §1692k(d), the 
 

4 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of the Court 

FDCPA’s one-year limitations period runs from the “date on 

which the violation occurs,” not the date a potential plaintiff 

discovers or should have discovered the violation. Id., at 

425–426. The court expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s

approach, stating that there is no default presumption that 

all federal limitations periods run from the date of discovery. Id., at 427. Rotkiske failed to raise the application of 

equitable doctrines on appeal, so the court did not address

that issue. Id., at 428–429. 

Given the conflict between the Courts of Appeals, see id., 

at 427, we granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ___ (2019). 

II 

The question before us is whether the “discovery rule” applies to the FDCPA’s limitations period. The phrase “discovery rule,” however, has no generally accepted meaning. 

Rotkiske’s arguments invoking the discovery rule implicate 

two distinct concepts—the application of a general discovery rule as a principle of statutory interpretation and the 

application of a fraud-specific discovery rule as an equitable 

doctrine. We address each in turn. 

A 

When interpreting limitations provisions, as always, “we

begin by analyzing the statutory language.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). If 

the words of a statute are unambiguous, this first step of

the interpretive inquiry is our last. Connecticut Nat. Bank 

v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254 (1992). If “there are two 

plausible constructions of a statute of limitations,” we generally “adopt the construction that starts the time limit running when the cause of action . . . accrues” because “Congress legislates against the ‘standard rule that the 

limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’” Graham County Soil & 

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. 409, 418–419 (2005) (quoting Bay Area Laundry and 

Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 

522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997)).

Here, the text of §1692k(d) clearly states that an FDCPA 

action “may be brought . . . within one year from the date

on which the violation occurs.” That language unambiguously sets the date of the violation as the event that starts 

the one-year limitations period. At the time of the FDCPA’s 

enactment, the term “violation” referred to the “[a]ct or instance of violating, or state of being violated.” Webster’s 

New International Dictionary 2846 (2d ed. 1949) (Webster’s 

Second). The term “occur” meant “to happen,” and, as Webster’s Second explains, “occur” described “that which is 

thought of as definitely taking place as an event.” Id., at 

1684. Read together, these dictionary definitions confirm 

what is clear from the face of §1692k(d)’s text: The FDCPA 

limitations period begins to run on the date the alleged

FDCPA violation actually happened. We must presume

that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means

in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank, 503 

U. S., at 254. 

Rotkiske does not contest the plain meaning of 

§1692k(d)’s text or claim that he brought suit within one 

year of the alleged FDCPA violation. Instead, he suggests

that we should interpret §1692k(d) to include a general 

“discovery rule” that applies to all FDCPA actions. In effect, Rotkiske asks the Court to read in a provision stating

that §1692k(d)’s limitations period begins to run on the date

an alleged FDCPA violation is discovered. 

This expansive approach to the discovery rule is a “bad

wine of recent vintage.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 

37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that “absent 

provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.” A. Scalia & 

B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 

94 (2012). To do so “‘is not a construction of a statute, but, 
 

 

 

6 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of the Court 

in effect, an enlargement of it by the court.’” Nichols v. 

United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926)). 

Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows 

how to adopt the omitted language or provision. Congress

has enacted statutes that expressly include the language 

Rotkiske asks us to read in, setting limitations periods to

run from the date on which the violation occurs or the date 

of discovery of such violation. See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §3416; 

15 U. S. C. §1679i. In fact, at the time Congress enacted 

the FDCPA, many statutes included provisions that, in certain circumstances, would begin the running of a limitations period upon the discovery of a violation, injury, or

some other event. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §77m (1976 ed.); 19 

U. S. C. §1621 (1976 ed.); 26 U. S. C. §7217(c) (1976 ed.); 29 

U. S. C. §1113 (1976 ed.).

It is not our role to second-guess Congress’ decision to include a “violation occurs” provision, rather than a discovery 

provision, in §1692k(d). The length of a limitations period 

“reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which

the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of

stale ones.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 

U. S. 454, 463–464 (1975). It is Congress, not this Court,

that balances those interests. We simply enforce the value 

judgments made by Congress. 

B 

Narrowing his initial assertion and moving away from 

the question on which we granted certiorari, Rotkiske also 

contends that his filing should be treated as timely under 

an equitable, fraud-specific discovery rule, relying on a line 

of decisions beginning with Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 

(1875). Rotkiske claims that Bailey and its progeny apply

an equitable doctrine that delays the commencement of the 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

statute of limitations in fraud actions, and that he has 

pleaded (or could plead) a claim within the scope of this doctrine. This Court has noted the existence of decisions applying a discovery rule in “fraud cases” that is distinct from

the traditional equitable tolling doctrine. Merck & Co. v. 

Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 644 (2010); Gabelli v. SEC, 568 

U. S. 442, 450 (2013) (referring to the “fraud discovery 

rule”). And it has repeatedly characterized these decisions

as applying an equity-based doctrine. California Public 

Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 582 

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 10–11); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10–11 (2014); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U. S. 221, 226–227 

(2012); Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49–50 (2002). 

Rotkiske failed to preserve this issue before the Third Circuit, 890 F. 3d, at 428, and failed to raise this issue in his 

petition for certiorari. Accordingly, Rotkiske cannot rely on 

this doctrine to excuse his otherwise untimely filing.3 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 3We do not decide whether the text of 15 U. S. C. §1692k(d) permits 

the application of equitable doctrines or whether the claim raised in this

case falls within the scope of the doctrine applied in Bailey and its progeny. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–328 

KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v. 

PAUL KLEMM, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[December 10, 2019]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 

Like my colleagues in both the majority and the partial

dissent, I agree that 15 U. S. C. §1692k(d) is a one-year

statute of limitations that typically begins to run when the 

alleged violation “occurs,” not when the plaintiff discovers

it. Compare ante, at 1, with post, at 1 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting in part and from judgment). The only daylight between the majority and dissenting opinions is whether 

petitioner Rotkiske forfeited reliance on an “equitable, fraudspecific discovery rule” that forgives otherwise untimely filings. Ante, at 6–7; cf. post, at 4–5. Because I believe the 

Court of Appeals fairly found that Rotkiske failed to preserve an equitable argument of this sort, see 890 F. 3d 422, 

429, and n. 5 (CA3 2018), and because the Court did not 

grant certiorari on that doctrine, I join the majority opinion.

I write separately to emphasize that this fraud-specific

equitable principle is not the “‘bad wine of recent vintage’” 

of which my colleagues speak. Ante, at 5 (quoting TRW Inc. 

v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring 

in judgment)). Rather, the Court has long “recogni[zed]”

and applied this “historical exception for suits based on 

fraud.” Id., at 37; see also id., at 27 (majority opinion) (noting equitable discovery rule “in cases of fraud or concealment”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946); Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435 (1918); Bailey 
 

2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 (1875); Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. 

Cas. 1303 (No. 12,782) (CC NH 1828) (Story, J.). Nothing 

in today’s decision prevents parties from invoking that wellsettled doctrine. 
 Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 18–328 

_________________ 

KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v.

PAUL KLEMM, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2019] 

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting from the opinion in part 

and from the judgment. 

 Generally, I agree with the Court, the “discovery rule” 

does not apply to the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 

15 U. S. C. §1692k(d). That limitations period ordinarily 

commences to run on the date “the violation occurs,” ibid. 

See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28–33 (2001). But 

the ordinarily applicable time trigger does not apply when 

fraud on the creditor’s part accounts for the debtor’s failure 

to sue within one year of the creditor’s violation. Id., at 37 

(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). See also id., at 27 (majority opinion). 

 True, in the case at hand, debtor Rotkiske’s FDCPA claim 

does not rest on any fraud inhering in the claim creditor 

Klemm stated in his debt-collection suit. Rather, debtor 

Rotkiske alleges that creditor Klemm commenced the debtcollection suit too late. But Rotkiske was disarmed from 

asserting that defense in Klemm’s suit, for he never received notice of the suit and therefore had no opportunity 

to defend against it. For the same reason, he was stopped 

 
 

2 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

from raising an FDCPA claim challenging Klemm’s suit

within the one-year limitations period. By knowingly arranging for service of the complaint against Rotkiske at an

address where Rotkiske no longer lived, and filing a false

affidavit of service, Rotkiske alleges, Klemm engaged in

fraud. Such fraud, I would hold, warrants application of the 

discovery rule to time Rotkiske’s FDCPA suit from the date

he learned of the default judgment against him. 

As today’s decision recognizes, see ante, at 6–7, this Court 

long ago “adopted as its own the old chancery rule that

where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in

ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care 

on his part, the bar of the statute [of limitations] does not 

begin to run until the fraud is discovered.” Holmberg v. 

Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). See also Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 347 

(1875) (“[W]hen the object of the suit is to obtain relief 

against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence

to run until the fraud is discovered or becomes known to the 

party injured by it.”). Like the general discovery rule that

lower courts have “appl[ied] . . . when a statute is silent on 

the issue” of a claim’s accrual, TRW Inc., 534 U. S., at 27 

(quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000)), the

fraud-based discovery rule operates as a statutory presumption “read into every federal statute of limitation,” 

Holmberg, 327 U. S., at 397. This circumscribed rule is distinct from the general discovery rule in that it governs only

“case[s] of fraud.” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 

644 (2010). Unlike the general discovery rule, there is no 

reason to believe the FDCPA displaced the fraud-based discovery rule. The Court does not hold otherwise. 

The fraud-based discovery rule has a thrust different 

from equitable tolling.* “Equitable tolling” describes a doctrine that pauses, or “tolls,” a statutory limitations period 

—————— 

*The two doctrines are often blended or confused. See Klehr v. A. O. 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

after it has commenced. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 

U. S. 1, 10 (2014). A litigant qualifies for equitable tolling

only if he establishes “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U. S. __, __ 

(2016) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For example, in Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 

U. S. 424 (1965), a plaintiff filed an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) in Ohio state court, 

alleging that he sustained a workplace injury just under 

three years earlier. Ibid. Several months later, the state 

court dismissed the suit for improper venue under state 

law. Id., at 425. The plaintiff promptly brought an identical action in federal district court. That court dismissed the 

action on the ground that the FELA’s three-year statute of 

limitations began to run when the plaintiff was injured and 

had expired while his state-court action was pending. Ibid. 

This Court reversed. Id., at 436. Yes, the limitations period 

began to run on the date of the plaintiff’s injury. But, the 

Court held, the clock tolled during the pendency of the 

plaintiff’s state-court suit. Ibid. Subtracting the time consumed by the state-court suit, the plaintiff’s federal action 

was timely. Id., at 426, 434–436. 

By contrast, the fraud-based discovery rule sets the time 

—————— 

Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 192 (1997). The Court has sometimes referred to Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 (1875), and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946), as equitable tolling decisions. See Lampf, 

Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 363 

(1991); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10–11 (2014). And it has 

described Holmberg as “stand[ing] for the proposition that equity tolls

the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment.” TRW Inc. v. 

Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 27 (2001). But as this Court recently clarified, 

each doctrine has an independent office. See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 

442, 447, n. 2, 449 (2013) (addressing whether application of the fraudbased discovery rule was appropriate after acknowledging that the plaintiff had expressly waived equitable tolling). 
 

 

4 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

at which a claim accrues, i.e., the time when the statute of 

limitations commences to run. See Merck & Co., 559 U. S., 

at 644–645. It is “an exception to the standard rule” that “a

claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present

cause of action.” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 448–449 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

when a plaintiff is “injured by fraud . . . ‘the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’ ” 

Holmberg, 327 U. S., at 397 (quoting Bailey, 21 Wall., at 

348). For example, in Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 

U. S. 435 (1918), a company had unlawfully procured land 

from the United States through a series of fraudulent transactions in 1902. Id., at 437, 438. The parties involved in

the transactions successfully concealed the scheme until

1909. Ibid. When the Government brought suit to void the

transactions, the company raised the six-year statute of

limitations as a defense. Id., at 445. Applying the fraudbased discovery rule, the Court held that the limitations period began to run only upon the Government’s discovery of 

the fraud. Id., at 449. The suit was filed within six years

of that date and was therefore timely. Ibid. 

I do not agree that Rotkiske failed to preserve a fraudbased discovery rule argument in the Court of Appeals. See 

ante, at 7. Rotkiske did raise the issue; he argued that “[a]t 

the very least, . . . the discovery rule applies to [FDCPA]

claims based on false or misleading misrepresentations or 

other self-concealing conduct.” Supp. Brief for Appellant in

No. 16–1668 (CA3), p.13 (citing Bailey, 21 Wall., at 350).

The Court of Appeals apparently declined to address that 

argument because Rotkiske had failed to raise “equitable

tolling” in his appellate briefs. 890 F. 3d 422, 428–429, and 

n. 5 (CA3 2018). But failure to raise “equitable tolling” 

should pose no obstacle to determining whether the discrete

fraud-based discovery rule applies to Rotkiske’s claim. 

Nor do I agree that Rotkiske forfeited the issue by not 
 

 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

raising it in his petition for certiorari. See ante, at 7. Generously read, Rotkiske asked whether a discovery rule of 

any kind applies to the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. While hardly a model of the deft pleader’s art, the

petition for certiorari stated that Rotkiske did not learn of

Klemm’s debt-collection suit and default judgment until

long after their occurrence because of the “intended reservice [of Klemm’s complaint] at a known incorrect address.”

Pet. for Cert. 8. His brief on the merits in this Court noted: 

“Petitioner is not advocating that the Court adopt a generally applicable discovery rule.” Brief for Petitioner 16, n.16. 

His reply brief was more precise: “The default judgment obtained by [Klemm] at issue in [Rotkiske’s FDCPA complaint] was made possible by the filing of a fraudulent Affidavit of Service.” Reply Brief 15. Indeed, the Court 

recognizes that Rotkiske’s arguments included “a fraudspecific discovery rule as an equitable doctrine.” Ante, at 4.

 Rotkiske’s FDCPA complaint, in my view, falls comfortably within the fraud-based discovery rule’s scope. See Brief 

for Samuel L. Bray et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14. Rotkiske 

alleged that Klemm engaged in “sewer service”—intentionally serving process in a manner designed to prevent Rotkiske from learning of the collection suit. Klemm did so, 

according to Rotkiske, in order to ensure that Klemm’s untimely suit would result in a default judgment that would

remain undiscovered until time to oppose that judgment,

and to commence an FDCPA suit, ran out. Though Rotkiske did not allege that “sewer service” is itself a practice

independently proscribed by the FDCPA, such service is 

nonetheless a fraudulent abuse that should trigger the 

fraud-based discovery rule. See Reply Brief 15–17.

The Government urges that the fraud-based discovery 

rule applies only when the fraudulent conduct is itself the 

basis for the plaintiff’s claim for relief. Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 31–32. That is not so of Rotkiske’s 
 

 

6 ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

complaint, the Government observes, for his claim is premised on the assertion that Klemm’s debt-collection suit was 

time barred. 

I do not view the fraud-based discovery rule as so confined and would hold that the rule governs if either the conduct giving rise to the claim is fraudulent, or if fraud infects

the manner in which the claim is presented. That understanding of the rule is consistent with its equitable roots

and historic rationale. Nearly two centuries ago, Justice 

Story explained the rule this way: “[E]very statute is to be

expounded reasonably, so as to suppress, and not to extend, 

the mischief[s] which it was designed to cure.” Sherwood 

v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1307 (No. 12,782) (CC NH 1828). 

Because statutes of limitations “preven[t] fraudulent and

unjust claims from starting up at great distances of time,” 

a limitations provision “ought not . . . be so construed, as to 

become an instrument to encourage fraud, if it admits of 

any other reasonable interpretation.” Ibid. “[C]ases of

fraud, therefore, form an implied exception [to a limitations

prescription],” so as not to “permi[t] the defendant to avail 

himself of his own fraud.” Ibid. This Court expressed the 

same understanding of the fraud-based discovery rule in 

Bailey. There, the Court stated: “To hold that by concealing 

a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the 

fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is 

to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the

means by which it is made successful and secure.” 21 Wall., 

at 349. 

Klemm allegedly employed fraudulent service to obtain 

and conceal the default judgment that precipitated Rotkiske’s FDCPA claim. That allegation, if proved, should 

suffice, under the fraud-based discovery rule, to permit adjudication of Rotkiske’s claim on its merits. 

* * * 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

For the reasons stated, I would vacate the judgment of

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the 

case for further proceedings.