[Cite as State v. Drane , 2021-Ohio-730.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. JAMARIYO DRANE Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 28757

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-4239/2 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 12th day of March, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by LISA M. LIGHT, Atty. Reg. No. 0097348, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Ap pellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayto n, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee BRADLEY S. BALDWIN, Atty. Reg. No. 0070186, 854 East Franklin S treet, Centerville, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jamariyo Drane, appeals from his convictio n in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he was found guil ty of grand theft of a motor vehicle, felonious assault, burglary, having weapons unde r disability, and multiple firearm specifications. In support of his appeal, Drane conten ds that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manif est weight of the evidence. For the reasons outlined below, we find that the evi dence was sufficient to support Drane’s convictions and that his convictions were not a gainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court wi ll be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} On November 20, 2018, a Montgomery County grand jury returned a fivecount indictment charging Drane with robbery in violation of R. C. 2911.02(A)(3), felonious assault (serious physical harm) in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A) (1), felonious assault (deadly weapon) in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), and having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The two counts of felonious assault and the single count of hav ing weapons under disability each included a three-year firearm specification und er R.C. 2941.145(A) and a 54-month firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(D). {¶ 3} Drane pled not guilty to the indicted charges and the matter pr oceeded to trial. Drane elected to waive his right to a jury trial on the charge for having weapons under disability and on its attenda nt three-year and 54-month f irearm specifications. Drane also waived his right to a jury trial on the 54-month fir earm specifications attached to the two counts of felonious assault. Therefore, the aforeme ntioned specifications and-3- the count for having weapons under disability were tried to the bench, while the remaining counts and specifications were tried to a jury. {¶ 4} At trial, the State presented witness testimony and exhibits th at pertained to a string of events that occurred during the early morning hours of November 26, 2017, in Harrison Township and in Dayton, Montgomery County, Ohio. In d oing so, the following

information was elicited at trial.

Theft of Vehicle at Club Plush {¶ 5} Around midnight on November 26, 2017, Drane went to Club Plush in Harrison Township with Marquisa Goode, Jermichael Taylor, and D avon Williams. Goode drove the group to the club in her two-door, silver Chevy Monte Carlo. After a fight broke out at the club, Drane, Taylor, and Williams left t he club in Goode’s vehicle

without Goode. {¶ 6} At approximately 2:00 a.m., Goode called 9-1-1 to report that h er vehicle had been stolen. The responding officer, Montgomery County Sheriff ’s Deputy Joseph Schwieterman, testified that Goode flagged him down at Club Plu sh and told him that she saw three males getting into her vehicle after a fight broke ou t at the club. Goode also told Dep. Schwieterman that she knew one of the males, who she identified as “Davon,” and that the male who was in the driver’s seat pushed her to th e ground when she attempted to get him out of her vehicle. {¶ 7} Detective Bryan Statzer of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Depa rtment met with Goode the following day. Det. Statzer testified that Good e was able to locate a photograph on social media that depicted the driver who took he r vehicle. Det. Statzer-4- testified that after passing the photograph on to other detecti ves, he learned that the driver’s name was Jamariyo Drane. {¶ 8} One of the passengers, Williams, testified at trial and confirm ed that Drane was the driver of Goode’s vehicle when he, Drane, and Taylor le ft Club Plush. Williams also testified that he rode in the back seat and Taylor rode in the front-passenger seat. Williams further testified that he was intoxicated and passed o ut as Drane was driving. Williams did not recall how Drane obtained Goode’s car keys and did not recall seeing Drane push Goode.

Shooting at Siebenthaler and Salem Avenues {¶ 9} Around 2:00 a.m. on November 26, 2017, Shavorea Williams, who i s not related to Davon Williams, was driving a friend home from the E lks Lodge in Dayton, Ohio. Shavorea’s friend lived in Dayton just off of Siebenthaler Aven ue. After dropping off her friend, Shavorea saw a vehicle driving behind her while she was near the intersection of Siebenthaler and Salem Avenues. Shavorea thought that the vehi cle was going to pass her because she was driving too slow; however, when the vehicle pulled around her on the driver’s side, she saw flashes and realized that someone in the vehicle was shooting

a firearm at her. Shavorea testified that the vehicle was a bl ack Monte Carlo and that she saw the shooter’s hand sticking out the passenger-side wind ow. Shavorea also

testified that she saw two black individuals inside the vehicle

. {¶ 10} After the shots were fired, Shavorea sped away from the vehicle

. However, when she looked in her rearview mirror, Shavorea saw t hat the vehicle was still behind her. In an attempt to lose the vehicle, Shavorea decide d to make a quick left--5- hand turn off of Siebenthaler Avenue. The vehicle, however, co ntinued to follow Shavorea and once again pulled up to Shavorea’s driver’s side a nd resumed shooting at her. In response, Shavorea stopped abruptly so that the vehicl e would speed by her. After it passed by, the vehicle made a U-turn and continued in Shavorea’s direction. Shavorea then drove to a location at Ardery Drive and Baywood S treet, parked her vehicle, and began to walk home. {¶ 11} While walking, Shavorea called 9-1-1 to report the incident. A s Shavorea was speaking to the 9-1-1 operator, she noticed that she was wa lking funny and that her leg was wet. At this point, Shavorea realized that she had bee n shot in the left leg and needed medical assistance. When Shavorea was found by respondi ng officers, she was taken to Miami Valley Hospital, where she received treatment fo r a bullet wound in her leg. The bullet remains lodged in Shavorea’s leg, as physician s could not remove the bullet without causing greater damage to the leg. {¶ 12} When law enforcement located Shavorea’s vehicle at Ardery Drive and Baywood Street, officers observed four bullet holes on the driv er’s side of the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, an evidence technician discover ed one fired .380 caliber bullet lying on the driver’s seat. Evidence crews additionally discovered two .380 caliber shell casings in the area of the shooting near Siebenthaler and Salem Avenues.

Crash at Arlene Avenue {¶ 13} During the early morning hours of November 26, 2017, Darryl Dan iel was sleeping in his residence at 2451 Arlene Avenue in Dayton, Ohio , when he woke up to a loud noise. When Daniel looked around his house, he observed t hat a two-door, silver-6- Chevy Monte Carlo had run into his home, completely destroying his garage. Daniel also observed two men crawling out of the vehicle. One man was craw ling out of the driverside window and the other man was crawling out of the passenger -side window. Daniel tackled the man crawling out of the driver-side window and pinn ed him down until the police arrived. The other man exited the vehicle and mingled i nto a crowd of people that had gathered outside. {¶ 14} The man that Daniel had pinned down was identified by police as Davon Williams. Williams was not injured in the accident, but was ob served to be intoxicated. At the scene of the crash, officers observed a handgun on the f ront-passenger floorboard of the Monte Carlo. The handgun was determined to be a .380 ca liber Ruger with an empty magazine attached. {¶ 15} The Monte Carlo was severely damaged in the accident. Because both of the vehicle’s doors were pinned shut, “Jaws of Life” equipment and other means had to be used to open the doors to conduct a search of the vehicle. When the vehicle was searched, officers discovered a second empty .380 caliber magaz ine wedged between the front-passenger seat and the front-passenger door. Two .38 0 caliber shell casings were also discovered in the rear passenger compartment of the v ehicle.

Break-In at Owens Drive {¶ 16} Around 4:30 a.m. on November 26, 2017, Leslie Cox was sleeping in her residence at 4671 Owens Drive in Dayton, Ohio, when she woke up to the sound of glass breaking. When Cox went to her kitchen, she observed that her back kitchen window had been broken and that a black male, who Cox later identified as Drane, had crawled-7- through the window and into her home. {¶ 17} Drane told Cox that he was not going to hurt her and that he wa s running from the police. Drane instructed Cox not to go to her window or door. Drane also told Cox that someone else would be coming into her home. Shortly t hereafter, a second black male crawled through Cox’s kitchen window. Drane indicat ed that a third person might be coming too, but a third person never arrived. {¶ 18} Cox observed that both men were injured and bleeding. Cox spec ifically recalled that the second man had severe injuries to his face. Drane asked Cox for a nurse, but Cox advised that no nurse was present. Drane then a sked for some towels, which Cox provided. Thereafter, Drane had Cox call his mother and the second man’s girlfriend in an effort to get them picked up. Cox was eventua lly able to call her granddaughter, who came over and told the two men to leave. Af ter the men left, Cox and her granddaughter called 9-1-1 to report the incident. Res ponding officers were dispatched to Cox’s residence and Cox told the officers what ha d happened. Later on,

Cox realized that the second man had left his Timberland boot i n her bedroom. The boot was then retrieved by a police officer later in the day. {¶ 19} At approximately 5:00 a.m. that same morning, officers were als o dispatched to 623 Shoop Avenue on the report of a male who had been shot in the face. When officers arrived at the scene, a male with severe facial i njuries was found sitting in the backseat of a nearby vehicle. The officers observed that t he man’s facial injuries were consistent with blunt force trauma, not a gunshot wound. The officers also observed that the man was missing a Timberland boot. The man w as identified by police as Jermichael Taylor. Detectives later discovered that 623 Sho op Avenue was the-8- residence of Taylor’s mother. An officer took digital photogra phs of Taylor at the scene and then showed the photographs to Cox, who subsequently identi fied Taylor as the

second man who had entered her residence.

Forensic Evidence {¶ 20} A firearms and ballistics expert from the Miami Valley Regional Crime Lab (“MVRCL”) analyzed the Ruger and the two shell casings that wer e found in the silver Monte Carlo driven by Drane. The expert also analyzed the fire d bullet that was found in Shavorea’s vehicle and the two shell casings that were found at the scene of the shooting. The expert testified that the bullet found in Shavor ea’s vehicle and the two shell casings found in the Monte Carlo were all fired from the Ruger. The expert also testified that only one of the two shell casings found at the s cene of the shooting was fired from the Ruger. {¶ 21} A MVRCL DNA expert performed DNA testing on the Ruger by compar ing touch DNA found on the Ruger to DNA standards taken from Drane and Taylor. The expert testified that a partial mixed DNA profile was found on the Ruger and that Taylor was excluded as a possible DNA contributor. As to Drane, the e xpert testified that the

test results were inclusive and that Drane could not be include d or excluded as a DNA contributor. The expert explained that this meant Drane’s DNA may or may not be on the Ruger. {¶ 22} The same expert also performed DNA testing on blood swabs that were taken from the steering wheel, driver-side airbag, passenger-si de airbag, and passengerside fender of the Monte Carlo. The expert testified that a si ngle source DNA profile was-9- found on all four samples and that Drane was the DNA contributo r. {¶ 23} DNA testing was also performed on blood swabs taken from a drye r and a bedroom wall in Cox’s residence on Owens Drive, and from the Ti mberland boot found at Cox’s residence. The expert testified that a single source DNA profile was found on the sample taken from the dryer, and that Drane was the DNA contrib utor. The expert also testified that a partial mixed DNA profile was found on the sam ple taken from the bedroom wall, and that Taylor was the major DNA contributor. Drane, ho wever, was excluded as a contributor from the bedroom wall sample. The expert further testified that multiple

blood stains on the Timberland boot were tested and that both D rane and Taylor’s DNA

were on the boot.

Map Evidence {¶ 24} The State presented Google satellite map images showing the clo se proximity between the locations of each incident that occurred on the night in question. For example, the image on State’s Exhibit 104 showed that Cox’s residence on Owens Drive was approximately two blo cks from the Arlene Avenue resid ence where Drane crashed the Monte Carlo. The image on State’s Exhibit 97 showe d that the area of the shooting incident was a short driving distance away from the Ar lene Avenue and Owens

Drive residences. Exhibit 97 also showed the location of Club Plush, which Detective Statzer testified was just four to five miles from all the othe r incidents.

Verdicts and Sentencing {¶ 25} After the State rested its case, Drane moved for a Crim.R. 29 a cquittal,-10- which the trial court denied. The defense then rested its case without calling any witnesses. Following deliberations, the jury found Drane not g uilty of robbery, but guilty of the lesser included offense of grand theft of a motor vehicl e in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). The jury also found Drane guilty of burglary, b oth counts of felonious assault, and both of the three-year firearm specifications atta ched to the felonious assault

counts. {¶ 26} With regard to the count of having weapons under disability, th e parties stipulated that Drane had previously been convicted of a felony offense of violence and a three-year firearm specification in Montgomery C.P. No. 2009-CR -3145. Based on the stipulation and the evidence presented a trial, the trial court found Drane guilty of having weapons under disability and of the three-year and 54-month fir earm specifications attached to that offense. The trial court also found Drane gui lty of the 54-month firearm specifications that were attached to the two counts of feloniou s assault. {¶ 27} At sentencing, the trial court merged the two counts of felonio us assault. The State then elected to proceed to sentencing on the count in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) (serious physical harm). The trial court also me rged the three-year and 54-month firearm specifications that were attached to the felon ious assault and having weapons under disability offenses. The State thereafter electe d to proceed to sentencing on the 54-month firearm specification for both count s. {¶ 28} After merging the foregoing offenses and specifications, the tr ial court sentenced Drane to prison for 18 months for grand theft of a mo tor vehicle, 8 years for felonious assault, 8 years for burglary, 36 months for having w eapons under disability, and 54 months for each of the two firearm specifications. The trial court ordered all the-11- prison terms to be served consecutively, with the 54-month fire arm specifications to be served prior to the prison terms for the underlying offenses. Therefore, the trial court sentenced Drane to an aggregate term of 29.5 years in prison. {¶ 29} Drane now appeals, raising a single assignment of error for rev iew.

Assignment of Error {¶ 30} Under his assignment of error, Drane contends that his convicti ons for grand theft of a motor vehicle, felonious assault, burglary, ha ving weapons under disability, and the attendant firearm specifications were not s upported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. {¶ 31} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the St ate has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to a llow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “When reviewing a claim as to sufficiency o f evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis , 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997). “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” (Citations omitted.) Id

. {¶ 32} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges th e believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences sugg ested by the evidence-12- is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12. When evaluating whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evid ence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reaso nable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determi ne whether, in resolving confli cts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest misca rriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State

v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). “Th e fact that the evidence is subject to different interpretations does not rende r the conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams , 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2013-CA-61, 2013-CA-62, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24, citing Wilson at ¶ 14. {¶ 33} Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial , we must defer to the factfinder's decisions whether, and to what extent, to c redit the testimony of particular witnesses. State v. Lawson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997). Ther efore, “[t]he credibility of t he witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are matters for the trier of fac [t] to resolve.” State v.

Hammad , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26057, 2014-Ohio-3638, ¶ 13, citing State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). “This court wil l not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fac[t] on the issue of witnes s credibility unless it is patently apparent that the factfinder lost its way.” (Citation omitted. ) State v. Bradley , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 97-CA-03, 1997 WL 691510, *4 (Oct. 24, 1997). {¶ 34} As previously noted, Drane was convicted of one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A), two counts of fe lonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), one count of burg lary in violation of-13- 2911.12(A)(2), and having weapons under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Drane was also convicted of two 54-month firearm specifications . Each of the charges and specifications are addressed separately below.

Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle {¶ 35} Pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or exerts control over property without the c onsent of the owner with the purpose to deprive the owner of the property. “If the prop erty stolen is a motor vehicle, a violation of this section is grand theft of a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree.” R.C. 2913.02(B)(5). {¶ 36} In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for grand theft of a motor vehicle, Drane contends that the State did not provide sufficie nt evidence that he purposely deprived Marquisa Goode of her vehicle without her co nsent. Although Goode did not testify at trial, the testimony of Dep. Schwieterman es tablished that around 2:00 a.m. on the night in question, Goode called 9-1-1 and reported that her vehi cle had been stolen. Dep. Schwieterman testified that Goode made contact wi th him at Club Plush and told him that three men took her vehicle, one of whom Goode identified as “Davon.” Goode also told Dep. Schwieterman that she tried to get the man in the driver’s seat out of her vehicle, but that he pushed her to the ground. {¶ 37} In addition, Davon Williams testified that he, Drane, and Taylo r left Club

Plush in Goode’s vehicle without Goode. Williams also confirme d that Drane was the

driver of the vehicle. Drane was further identified as the dri ver though a photo that Goode provided to Det. Statzer the day after the incident.-14- {¶ 38} When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the foregoi ng testimony sufficiently established that Drane purposely deprived Goode of her vehicle without her consent. Drane’s claim to the contrary lacks merit and, based on all the evidence presented at trial, a rational factfinder could have reasonably determined that all essential elements of grand theft of a motor vehicle had been satisfied b eyond a reasonable doubt. {¶ 39} Drane also contends that his conviction for grand theft of a mo tor vehicle was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Drane argues that Goode’s comments to Dep. Schwieterman lacked credibility becaus e there was evidence indicating that Goode was intoxicated. Dep. Schwieterman, howe ver, testified that he

could not tell if Goode was intoxicated and noted that he did n ot recall Goode ever mumbling or wobbling when he spoke to her. Regardless, the cre dibility of the testimony was for the jury to decide and such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal. That said, after weighing all the evidence and reasonable inferences , we do not find that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found Drane guilty of grand theft of a motor vehicle. {¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, Drane’s conviction for grand theft o f a motor vehicle was supported by sufficient evidence and was not agains t the manifest weight of

the evidence.

Felonious Assault {¶ 41} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a person commits felonious assa ult when he or she knowingly causes serious physical harm to another. R .C. 2903.11(A)(1). Pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a person commits felonious assa ult when he or she-15- knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance. {¶ 42} Drane does not dispute that the shooting victim, Shavorea Willi ams, was the victim of a felonious assault under the foregoing statutes. Drane instead claims that the State did not provide sufficient evidence that he was invol ved in the shooting incident on which the felonious assault charges were based. In support of this claim, Drane first contends that he was driving a silver Monte Carlo on the night in question, and that Shavorea testified that the person who shot at her was riding i n a black Monte Carlo.

Drane also takes issue with the fact that Shavorea testified to seeing only two men in the vehicle when there were actually three men in the vehicle he wa s driving. {¶ 43} Despite these discrepancies, the State presented multiple piece s of evidence that linked the silver Monte Carlo, and thus Drane, to the shooting. First, the fired bullet found in Shavorea’s vehicle was tested by an exper t and it was found to have been fired from the Ruger that the police discovered in the sil ver Monte Carlo driven by Drane. One of the two shell casings found at the scene of the shooting was also tested and found to have been fired from the same Ruger. This evidenc e was sufficient to place the silver Monte Carlo at the scene of the shooting on the nigh t in question. {¶ 44} Moreover, although Shavorea testified that the area of the shoo ting was “a pretty well-lit area,” it would be reasonable to assume that Sh avorea got the color of the Monte Carlo wrong due to the stress of the incident and due to her focusing on being shot at. It would also be reasonable to assume that Shavorea only s aw two individuals in the vehicle because Williams was passed out in the backseat. {¶ 45} Drane next contends that he could not have been the shooter bec ause-16- Shavorea testified to seeing the shooter’s hand firing shots ou t the passenger-side

window of the Monte Carlo. Drane claims that since he was the one driving, it could not have been him firing at Shavorea’s vehicle. Although the touch DNA testing on the Ruger was inconclusive as to Drane, i.e., Drane’s DNA may or ma y not have been present on the Ruger, the fact remains that Taylor, who was riding in t he front-passenger seat, was excluded as a source of DNA on the Ruger. This evidence su ggests that it was either Drane or Williams who fired the Ruger. Since Williams t estified that he was intoxicated and passed out in the back seat, there was be suffi cient evidence for a jury to conclude that Drane was the one who fired the Ruger at Shavorea ’s vehicle. {¶ 46} Concerning the hand that Shavorea saw firing shots out the pass enger-side window, the State presented circumstantial evidence indicating that there was a second firearm used in the shooting. Specifically, a second empty mag azine that did not fit the Ruger was discovered wedged between the front-passenger seat an d passenger-side door of the Monte Carlo. Testing also revealed that the second shell casing found at the scene of the shooting was not fired from the Ruger. From this evidence, it would have

been reasonable to conclude that a second firearm was used in t he shooting. Given the location of the second magazine, it would also have been reason able to conclude that the second firearm was fired by the front-seat passenger, which wou ld explain the hand that Shavorea saw out the passenger-side window. {¶ 47} Regardless, even if Drane did not fire any weapon, the State’s evidence was sufficient to find him guilty of felonious assault under th e theory of complicity. The complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, provides that: “No person, ac ting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet another in-17- committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). “ ‘To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evid ence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, adv ised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendan t shared the criminal intent of the principal.’ ” State v. Hancher , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23515, 2010-Ohio-2507, ¶ 50, quoting State v. Johnson , 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 245, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001). “The requisite criminal intent may be inferred from the circumstance s of the crime * * * including from ‘ “presence, companionship and conduct before and after th e offense [was]

committed.” ’ ” State v. Koch , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28041, 2019-Ohio-4182, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Grissom , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25750, 2014-Ohio-857, ¶ 21, quoting

Johnson at 245. “An aider and abettor is ‘punished as if he were a pr incipal offender.’ ”

Grissom at ¶ 21, quoting R.C. 2923.03(F). {¶ 48} In this case, Shavorea’s testimony as to how the Monte Carlo sp ed up beside her when the shots were fired, chased her, and made a U- turn to continue in her

direction indicated that Drane aided and abetted the felonious assault by driving in a manner that assisted the shooting. Therefore, when considering all the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable f actfinder could have

concluded that Drane committed felonious assault in violation o f R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2) as either a principle offender or as an aider and abetto r. Also, after weighing all the evidence and reasonable inferences, we do not find that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Drane guilty of felonious assault. {¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons Drane’s conviction for felonious assa ult was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manife st weight of the evidence.-18-

Burglary {¶ 50} Pursuant to R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a person commits burglary when he or she uses “force, stealth or deception” to “trespass in an occupied structure * * * that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any criminal offense.” {¶ 51} In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for burglary, Dr ane does not dispute that he used force to trespass into Leslie Cox’s reside nce on Owens Drive. Rather, Drane contends that the State did not provide sufficien t evidence that he trespassed in the residence with the purpose to commit a crimin al offense. We disagree. {¶ 52} At trial, the State proceeded on a theory that Drane trespassed in the Owens Drive residence with the purpose to obstruct official bus iness in violation of R.C. 2921.31. A person obstructs official business when, “without p rivilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a pub lic official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity,” the person does “any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.” R.C. 2921.31(A). “[T]his Court has recognized that “ ‘ “[f]leeing from a police officer who is lawfully attempting to detain the suspect * * * is an affirmative act that hinders or impedes the officer in performance of the officer’s duties as a public official and is a violation of R.C. 2921.31[.]” ’ ” State v. Benton , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27592, 2018-Ohio-2042, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Branham , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22480, 2008- Ohio-5158, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Kates , 169 Ohio App.3d 766, 2006-Ohio-6779, 865-19- N.E.2d 66, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.). {¶ 53} Drane first contends that the State’s evidence failed to establ ish that he hampered or impeded a public official because he did not have a ny contact with the police after he crashed Goode’s vehicle and because he was not being c hased by the police. We know, however, from Darryl Daniel’s testimony that after the crash, Drane and the other occupants fled or, in Williams’s case, attempted to flee the scene after crawling through the driver and passenger windows of the vehicle, as bot h doors were pinned shut. The manner in which Drane escaped the vehicle and fled the scen e as opposed to waiting for help supported a finding that he was fleeing from law enfor cement. We also note that Dayton Police Officers Terrell Moore and Steven Hargraves testi fied that, on the night in question, they searched the area for the suspects involved in t he accident. Therefore, Drane’s claim that he was not being pursued by the police was c ontrary to the evidence. {¶ 54} Drane also argues that the only reason he trespassed in the Owe ns Drive residence was to seek medical aid for his injuries, not to hide from the police. However, Cox specifically testified that after Drane broke into her resi dence, he told her that he was running from the police. Cox further testified that, although Drane and Taylor were injured and wanted medical attention, they never had her call f or a medic, but instead asked her to call Drane’s mother and Taylor’s girlfriend. Agai n, had Drane really been seeking medical aid, he could have just waited at the scene of the accident for help. {¶ 55} Drane alternatively argues that even if his conduct did amount to obstructing official business, he completed that offense after he left the scene of the accident and before trespassing in Cox’s residence. However, it is well est ablished that “ ‘a defendant may form the purpose to commit a criminal offense at any point during the course of the-20- trespass.’ ” State v. Chafin , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-69, 2020-Ohio-3983, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Fontes , 87 Ohio St.3d 527, 721 N.E.2d 1037 (2000). See also State v.

Cook , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26809, 2016-Ohio-4574, ¶ 7. Therefor e, Drane could have formed the intent to obstruct official business before, du ring, or after breaking into

Cox’s residence. {¶ 56} When the aforementio ned evidence is viewed in a light most favo rable to the State, a reasonable factfinder could have concluded that Dr ane trespassed by force into Cox’s residence with the purpose to obstruct official busi ness in violation of R.C. 2921.31. Therefore, we find that the State established all ess ential elements of burglary at trial. Furthermore, after weighing all the evidence and rea sonable inferences, we do not find that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manif est miscarriage of justice when it found Drane guilty of burglary. {¶ 57} For the foregoing reasons, Drane’s conviction for burglary was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Having Weapons Under Disability {¶ 58} Pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2): “[N]o person shall knowingly ac quire, have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if * * * [t]he person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any felony offense of violence or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if comm itted by an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.” {¶ 59} Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Drane had a prior c onviction for a felony offense of violence and was therefore under a weapons di sability at the time of the-21- charged offenses. Drane, however, contends that that the State did not provide sufficient evidence that he knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a fi rearm on the night in question. We disagree. {¶ 60} In discussing Drane’s conviction for felonious assault, we have already

determined that there was sufficient evidence to find that Dran e had fired the Ruger found

in the Monte Carlo. We have also determined that even if Drane had not fired the Ruger, or any firearm for that matter, there was also sufficient evide nce to find that Drane aided and abetted the principle offender of the felonious assault by driving the Monte Carlo in a manner that facilitated the shooting of Shavorea Williams . See State v. Adams , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93513, 2010-Ohio-4478, ¶ 17-21 (an accomplice can be convicted of having weapons under disability wi thout holding the firearm if that accomplice aided and abetted the person who actually processed and brandished the fi rearm); Dalmida v.

Turner , 6th Cir. No. 19-3627, 2020 WL 7873080, *5 (July 22, 2020) (“O hio law allows an accomplice to be convicted of having weapons under disability i f he aids and abets the person who actually used the firearm.”). Furthermore, based on the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the trial court lost its way and c reated a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found Drane guilty of having weapons under d isability. {¶ 61} For the foregoing reasons Drane’s conviction for having weapons under disability was supported by suf ficient evidence and was not aga inst the manifest weight

of the evidence.

Firearm Specifications {¶ 62} Drane was convicted of two 54-month firearm specifications unde r R.C.-22- 2941.145(D). Pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(D), a mandatory 54-mont h prison term for a firearm specification is permitted where “the offender had a fi rearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committ ing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that t he offender possessed a firearm, or used the firearm to facilitate the offense and that the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a firearm specification of the type described in section 2941.141, 2941.144, 2941.145, 2941.146, or 2941.1412 of the Revised Code.” {¶ 63} Here the parties stipulated that Drane had been previously conv icted of a three-year firearm specification. And again, we have already d etermined that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Drane fired the Ruger fou nd in the Monte Carlo while committing the offenses in question or, at the very least, that he aided and abetted the shooting. “ ‘It is well settled that an unarmed accomplice can be convicted of an underlying felony, together with a firearm specification, based on an aider and abettor

status.’ ” State v. Dixon , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28797, 2021-Ohio-225, ¶ 10, quoting

State v. Porch , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 65348, 1994 WL 173509, *4 (May 5, 1994 ), citing State v. Chapman , 21 Ohio St.3d 41, 487 N.E.2d 566 (1986). Therefore, Drane’s conviction for the two 54-month firearm specifications was supp orted by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidenc e. {¶ 64} Because Drane’s convicted offenses and specifications were all supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, his sole assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion-23- {¶ 65} Having overruled Drane’s assignment of error, the judgment of t he trial court

is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DONOVAN, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

Copies sent to: Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Lisa M. Light Bradley S. Baldwin Hon. Steven K. Dankof