COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Powe ll and Senior Judge Annunziata Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

IN RE: C.J.F. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY Record No. 0056-10-4 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER AUGUST 24, 2010
IN RE: W.R.F. Record No. 0057-10-4

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY John G. Berry, Judge Gilbert Harrison Berger (Berger Law Office, P.C., on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor children. J. Michael Sharman (Commonwealth Law Offices, P.C., on brief), for Keith Robert Coughlin and Tami Renee Coughlin.
Gilbert Harrison Berger (guardian) appeals th e trial court’s final adoption orders allowing Keith Robert Coughlin (stepfather) to adopt th e biological children of Tami Renee Coughlin (mother, or collectively, the Coughl ins), stepfather’s wife. The guar dian argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) is suing the final adoption orders wi thout conducting an evidentiary hearing to respond to the guardian’s concerns regard ing the adoption; (2) ruli ng that it was in the best interests of the children to be adopted by stepfather in view of the totality of the circumstances;

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 This appeal was originally styled Berger v. Coughlin . Upon the guardian’s motion, we have changed the style of the case to reflect th e names of the proceedings as they appeared before the trial court.- 2 - and (3) refusing to apply the doct rine of equitable estoppel to precl ude stepfather fr om obtaining the final adoption orders. Finding no abuse of di scretion, we affirm the final adoption orders.
I. BACKGROUND On appeal, “[w]e view the evidence in the ‘ light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasona ble inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). Mother has twelve-year-old tw in sons, W.R.F. and C.J.F., 2 the subject of the present adoption proceeding. Mother had previously been married to Garett Robert Farwell, and W.R.F. and C.J.F. were born during that marriage. Ho wever, Farwell is not the children’s biological father, even though he was named as the fath er on the children’s birth certificates. 3 Mother and Farwell divorced on December 19, 2005, and they agreed to share join t legal custody of the children. On November 21, 2007, stepfather and mother filed petitions to a dopt the children. On January 21, 2008, Farwell filed objections to the adoption petitions and a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. Th e trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the children. In his answer to th e adoption petitions, the guardian raised multiple reservations regarding th e adoption and requested that the tr ial court “conduct an investigation

2 In the interest of maintaining the anonymity of the minor children, we refer to C.J.F. and W.R.F. by their initials.

3 The children’s biological father is William Werbowetzki. He has had no contact with the children and has consented to the adoption.- 3 - and . . . hearing . . . so that all facts and rele vant information regardi ng [C.J.F. and W.R.F.] be made known to the [trial c]ourt prior to a ruling on the merits of the Petition for Adoption.” On April 8, 2009, the trial court entered an Om nibus Agreed Order for C.J.F.’s adoption; it entered an identical order on September 9, 2009, for W.R.F.’s adoption. Both orders concluded “that this matter has been resolved by agreement of all the parties and the guardian” and, thus, that there was no “need for an investigati on and report prior to entr y of a final decree.” Farwell withdrew his obj ection to stepfather’s adoption of C.J.F. and W.R.F., and he obtained visitation rights with the children. All parties, including the guardian, signed the Omnibus orders as “WE ASK FOR THIS” without ob jection. The adoption proceedings were continued in order for the children to receive counseling and to pr oceed toward a final order consistent with the

statutes. On August 3, 2009, the guardian issued an inte rim report after meeting with the children and speaking with their counselor. Mother took exception to the guardian’s visiting with the children without her prior consent. The guardia n requested instruction and guidance from the trial court regarding his duties and access to th e children. The guardian also recommended that the trial court not approve th e adoptions due to “strong rese rvations about the motive and intentions behind these proceedings as well as whet her the [children] ‘need’ to be adopted.” On August 25, 2009, the trial court conducted a heari ng and instructed the guardian to follow up with the counselor and report back to the trial court. On September 4, 2009, the guardian filed anot her interim report de tailing his meeting with the children’s counselor. The guardian maintained that the trial court should not approve the adoptions. On September 8, 2009, the guardian reported back to the tr ial court his findings with respect to the counselor.- 4 - On September 30, 2009, the trial court held that the adoptions were in the best interests of the children and entered the final adoption orde rs. The guardian noted his objections and timely appealed the orders.
II. ANALYSIS
A. HEARING The guardian argues the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that it was in the best interests of the children to be adopted by stepfather because no direct evidence rebutted the guardian’s answers and affirmative defenses to the petitions for adoption. The guardian further contends the trial court should ha ve conducted a hearing to addre ss his concerns listed in his interim report regarding the couns elor’s analysis of the children and the Coughlins’ motives behind limiting the guardian’s access to the children. As the guardian concedes, no specific mandate within Code § 63.2-1242 requires a formal hearing. Instead, “an investigation and re port shall be undertaken onl y if the circuit court in its discretion determines that there should be an investigation before a final adoption order is entered.” Id. While “a trial court must afford a l itigant an opportunity to cross-examine a witness, it is not required to exercise that opport unity for the litigant.” Venable v. Venable , 2 Va. App. 178, 182, 342 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1986) (emphasi s added). The validity of the trial court’s ruling is not lessened by its decision to forgo a formal hearing. Cf. Williams v. Williams , 14 Va. App. 217, 219, 415 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1992) (“Wh ile ‘a divorce decree based solely on depositions is not as conclusive on appella te review as one based upon evidence heard ore

tenus ,’ it is nonetheless ‘presumed correct and will no t be overturned if supported by substantial,- 5 - competent and credible evidence.’” (quoting Collier v. Collier , 2 Va. App. 125, 127, 341 S.E.2d 827, 828 (1986))). Here, all parties, including the guardian, signed the Omnibus orders in which the parties agreed that there was no need for an investigation or report prior to the en try of a final order. The parties further agreed that the “stepparent adoption cases may proceed toward entry of a Final Order of Adoption consistent with the provisions of Code § 63.2-1241.” By signing the Omnibus orders without objection, the guardian wa ived the “affirmative defenses” enunciated in his answer to the adoption petitions. The trial court gave the guardian two addi tional opportunities to pr esent evidence at the August 25, 2009 and September 8, 2009 hearings. The guardian chose not to present evidence or call witnesses to testify on those dates, and he did not renew any of the concerns he had registered prior to entry of the Omnibus orders. See Venable , 2 Va. App. at 182, 342 S.E.2d at 648-49 (noting that the litigant “d id not avail himself of the opportunity to cross-examine” the witness or take her deposition when he knew she was available). The guardian questions whether it would have been appropriate for him to request a hearing on th e merits, since “it was not the [guardian’s] case to [either] present []or bear the burden of proof .” However, if the guardian believed that a hearing on the merits was necessary, he could have requested one. See Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 596, 603-04, 395 S.E.2d 199, 202-03 (1990) (discussing the authority of a guardian ad litem , including the ability to file petitions and appeals). In summary, by signing the Omnibus orders without objection, the guardian indicated to the trial court that a hearing to address the concerns raised in his answer to the adoption petitions was unnecessary. Further, the trial court affo rded the guardian ample opportunity to present evidence that would have addressed his concer ns regarding his access to the children and the- 6 - counselor’s role in the adoption proceedings. The guardian did not avail himself of these opportunities. Accordingl y, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the adoption petitions absent a formal evidentiary hearing.
B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN The guardian argues the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that it was in the best interests of the children to be a dopted by stepfather in view of th e totality of the circumstances. The guardian appears to contend that while Farwell withdrew his objection to the adoptions, the best interests standard neverthe less requires us to consider his initial objection and the basis therefor. The guardian further sugge sts it is not in the children’s best interests for stepfather to adopt them because no evidence shows such a cour se of action is necessary. The guardian also emphasizes mother’s conduct throughout proceedi ngs as evidence of some malignant intent. “When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. “In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “Where a trial court makes a dete rmination [that] is adequately supported by the record, the determination must be affirmed.” Id. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 796. “[T]he recommendation of the guardian ad litem . . . while not binding or controlling, should not be disregarded.” Bottoms v. Bottoms , 249 Va. 410, 420, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (1995). The factors the trial court must consider when determining what is in the child’s best interest include: the birth parent(s)’ efforts to obtai n or maintain legal and physical custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s)’ efforts to assert parental rights we re thwarted by- 7 - other people; the birth parent(s)’ ab ility to care for the child; the age of the child; the quality of any previous relationship between the birth parent(s) and the child and between the birth parent(s) and any other minor children; the duration and suitability of the child’s present custodial environment; a nd the effect of a change of physical custody on the child. Code § 63.2-1205. Here, the record contains sufficient eviden ce to support the trial co urt’s ruling that the adoption by stepfather was in the children’s best in terests. The trial cour t found that stepfather and mother were “financially, physically, and me ntally able to maintain adequately and are morally suitable and proper persons to care for an d train” C.J.F. and W.R. F. such “that the best interests of the infant[s] will be promoted” by the adoption. In addition to the August 25 and September 8 hearings, the trial court had before it the guardian’s reports and the recommendations of the counselor who met with the children to discuss the impending adoption. Specifically, the counselor noted that “[b]oth children have expre ssed acceptance of the adoption, offered no concerns about the adoption a nd are looking forward to it.” The counselor did not think it was relevant that C.J.F. did not wa nt to change his last name because it was “his way of appeasing [Farwell]” and showing that Farwe ll “will continue to be his father and in his life.” The counselor concluded that “there appears to be no clinical reason to delay the adoption.” The guardian’s characterizati on of mother’s conduct as secr etive and underhanded comes only from speculation and surmise, not from tangib le evidence in the record. The record is devoid of any evidence that mother’s conduct has ne gatively affected C.J.F. and W.R.F. As the counselor noted, the children “exhi bit no signs of psychosocial crises and they have mastered all developmental tasks at age appropriate times.” Further, the guardian ha s cited to no authority, and we have found none, that require s proof of necessity in order to secure a final adoption order under Code § 63.2-1241. And, we reject the guard ian’s argument that we should consider- 8 - Farwell’s visitation rights under in loco parentis theory. The guardian was appointed to represent the interests of C.J.F. and W.R.F. pursuant to Code § 16.1-266 and not to advocate for any residual parental rights Farwell might have possessed. See Verrocchio v. Verrocchio , 16 Va. App. 314, 322, 429 S.E.2d 482, 487 (1993) (upholding the appointment of a guardian “where such appointment was found necessary to protect th e interests of the minor child”). If Farwell wished to revoke his consent or appeal the award of visitation granted in the Omnibus orders, he could have done so on his own behalf. It is not the guardian’s responsibility to advocate for him. Because the evidence supports a finding that the a doptions were in the children’s best interests, the trial court did not err in so ruling c ontrary to the guardian’s recommendations.
C. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL The guardian argues we should apply the doc trine of equitable estoppel to preclude stepfather from obtaining the final adoption orde rs because the trial court’s ruling was plainly wrong and without evidence to supp ort it. Recognizing that a tim ely objection was not made to the trial court, the guardian asks that we invoke the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18. We shall do neither. Rule 5A:18 provided “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” We “will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial
court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). “The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to allow the trial court to correct in the trial court any error that is called to its attention.” Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) ( en banc ). “In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a- 9 - miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Redman v. Commonwealth , 25 Va. App. 215, 220-21, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). Here, the guardian failed to show that a miscarriage of justice occurred because the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply. “The ‘[e]lements n ecessary to establish equitable estoppel, absent a showing of fraud and decepti on, are a representation, reliance, a change of position, and detriment.’” NPA v. WBA , 8 Va. App. 246, 253, 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1989) (quoting Dominick v. Vassar , 235 Va. 295, 298, 367 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1988)). As stated above, the guardian was appointed to repr esent the interests of C.J.F. a nd W.R.F. In that capacity, he has pointed to no misrepresentation made by stepfa ther or mother to the children that induced them to act in a manner that resulted in their injury. See Moorman v. Blackstock, Inc. , 276 Va. 64, 78, 661 S.E.2d 404, 411 (2008). Quite the opposite, the parties have been quite forthright with the children and have taken steps to en sure they will live in a supportive and loving household. Further, the Omnibus orders ensure that Farwell and the children will have frequent contact in accordance with their wishes. Thus , no evidence in the reco rd suggests a fraud was perpetrated upon the guardian’s c lients to their detriment. The guardian had an opportunity to make hi s objection and argue hi s position before the trial court, but failed to do so. Further, the guardian has failed to show that a miscarriage of justice occurred. Accordingly, we will not invoke the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18 to apply the doctrine of equitabl e estoppel to the present case.
D. ATTORNEYS’ FEES The Coughlins request that this Court award them attorney’s fees and costs associated with this appeal. When determin ing the “propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts expended on appeal,” we “view th e record in its entirety and de termine whether the appeal is- 10 - frivolous or whether other reasons exis t for requiring additional payment.” O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). Here, the guardian’s appeal was ultimate ly meritless. Ordinarily, under these circumstances we would consider awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Here, the prevailing parties are the parents. Because the guardian represents the children, the parents would likely pay any fee awarded. See Verrocchio , 16 Va. App. at 322, 429 S.E.2d at 487 (“Indivisible from the power of appointm ent is the associated power equitably to apportion the fees and expenses of the guardian ad litem as costs to the parties .” (second emphasis added)). Accordingly, we decline to award the Cough lins attorney’s fees.
III. CONCLUSION We hold that (1) the guardian did not avail hims elf of the opportunity to present evidence or request a formal evidentiary hearin g; (2) the circumstances support a finding that the adoptions were in the best interests of the children; and (3) the gu ardian did not timely rais e his equitable estoppel objection in accordance with Rule 5A:18. We further decline to award the Coughlins attorney’s fees for efforts expended on this appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the final adoption orders. Affirmed.