IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Taking in Eminent Domain :

of Certain Parcel of Real Estate :

located at 401-403 East Fourth :

Street and 405 East Fourth Street, :

in the City of Bethlehem, :

Northampton County, Pennsylvania :

by the Redevelopment Authority of :

the City of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania :

: No. 1313 C.D. 2021

Appeal of: Kalavathi Shunmugam : Submitted: July 22, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 20, 2022

Kalavathi Shunmugam (Appellant) appeals from the Northampton 

County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) October 27, 2021 orders denying 

Appellant’s Motion to Strike (Motion to Strike) the Redevelopment Authority of the 

City of Bethlehem’s (Appellee) Petition to Pay Estimated Compensation (Petition)

and Writ of Possession (Writ), and granting Appellee’s Petition and Writ. Appellant 

presents one issue for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred by denying 

Appellant’s Motion to Strike. After review, this Court affirms.

Background

Appellant is the record owner of property located at 401-403 East 

Fourth Street and 405 East Fourth Street in Bethlehem, Northampton County, 

Pennsylvania (Property). On June 16, 2021, pursuant to Section 302 of the Eminent 
2

Domain Code,1 Appellee filed a Declaration of Taking concerning the blighted 

Property.

2 Also on June 16, 2021, Appellee filed the memorandum of the book and 

page number in which the notice is recorded, as required by Section 304(b)(4) of the 

Eminent Domain Code.3 On September 13, 2021, Appellee filed an Affidavit of 

Service on Appellant, pursuant to Section 305 of the Eminent Domain Code.

4

On August 5, 2021, Appellant’s counsel5sent Appellee’s counsel a 

letter, apparently memorializing a preliminary settlement agreement between the 

parties, wherein he stated that Appellant would not file preliminary objections to the 

Declaration of Taking if a settlement could be reached (Letter Agreement). See 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 9b-10b.

6 On August 7, 2021, Appellee’s counsel 

responded to the Letter Agreement with a revision stating that the required 

documents package was due within 45 days.7 See R.R. at 14b. On September 22, 

2021, Appellee’s counsel notified Appellant’s counsel that the documents package 

failed to meet the Letter Agreement’s requirements. See R.R. at 16b.

On September 28, 2021, Appellee filed the Petition and Writ, and 

requested the matter be placed on the trial court’s miscellaneous hearing list for 

1

26 Pa.C.S. § 302.

2 Appellee proceeded under Section 205 of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa.C.S. § 205 

(relating to blighted properties). 

3

26 Pa.C.S. § 304(b)(4).

4

26 Pa.C.S. § 305.

5 Appellant has new counsel and is no longer represented by the attorney who drafted the 

August 5, 2021 letter.

6 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2173 requires a reproduced record to “be

numbered . . . in Arabic figures . . . followed in the reproduced record by a small a . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 

2173. Appellant included the small a in numbering the first 3 pages of her Reproduced Record, 

but included a small b in numbering the next 17 pages, a small c in numbering the next 16 pages, 

and a small d in numbering the last 3 pages. Thus, for consistency, references to specific

Reproduced Record pages herein shall be as labeled by Appellant.

7

In the response cover letter, Appellee’s counsel stated that he “assume[d] the omission 

was an oversight.” R.R. at 12b. Thus, Appellee’s counsel indicated that the parties previously 

agreed upon the revision.
3

October 27, 2021. On October 27, 2021, Appellant filed the Motion to Strike. The 

trial court held the hearing on October 27, 2021, after which it denied the Motion to 

Strike and granted the Petition and Writ. On November 24, 2021, Appellant 

appealed to this Court.

8

 On that same date, Appellant filed a Statement of Errors 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

(Rule) 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b) Statement).

9

 On December 3, 2021, the trial court 

filed its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion).

Before setting forth its reasoning in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial 

court raised two waiver issues: (1) the Rule 1925(b) Statement asserted that the trial 

court erred in denying the Motion to Strike and granting the Petition and Writ, but 

did not specify the error; and (2) Appellant did not file preliminary objections to the 

Declaration of Taking. Notwithstanding its determination that Appellant waived her 

only issue on appeal, the trial court addressed the merits of Appellant’s claim of 

error. 

Discussion

Waiver

Preliminarily, concerning the vagueness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently explained:

[I]t bears noting that the purpose of Rule 1925 is to 

facilitate appellate review and to provide the parties and 

the public with the legal basis for a judicial decision. See

8

In an appeal from an eminent domain proceeding, this Court reviews the trial court’s 

record to “determine whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed an error of law or 

whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.” Szabo v. Dep’t of Transp., 

202 A.3d 52, 58 (Pa. 2019).

9 Appellant specified only one issue in her Rule 1925(b) Statement: “The trial court erred 

in denying Appellant’s Motion to Strike . . . made by Appellant in response to the Petition[ and 

Writ] filed by [] Appellee and therefore also erred in considering and granting [] Appellee’s 

Petition [and Writ].” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement.
4

Commonwealth v. Parrish, . . . 224 A.3d 682, 692 ([Pa.] 

2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, . . . 868 A.2d 

379, 382 ([Pa.] 2005)). If that basis is evident from the 

record, the trial court need not issue an opinion explaining 

it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (requiring an opinion only 

where “the reasons for the order [appealed from] do not 

already appear of record”). The function of the concise

statement is to clarify for the judge who issued the order

the grounds on which the aggrieved party seeks appellate 

review - so as to facilitate the writing of the opinion. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (“If the judge entering the order

giving rise to the notice of appeal . . . desires 

clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the 

judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file

of record . . . a concise statement of the errors 

complained of on appeal[.]”).

In Commonwealth v. Laboy, . . . 936 A.2d 1058 ([Pa.] 

2007) (per curiam), this Court faced a situation 

comparable to the present controversy. The defendant’s 

Rule 1925(b) [S]tatement was exceedingly brief in setting 

forth an evidentiary-sufficiency claim. Nevertheless, the 

common pleas court issued a Rule 1925(a) [O]pinion 

resolving the claim on its merits. The Superior Court 

found the claim waived due to its brevity and did not 

address its merits. [Our Supreme] Court held that the 

Superior Court should have afforded the requested 

sufficiency review, as the trial transcript was short, it was 

fairly evident from context that the sole legal issue was 

whether the defendant was vicariously liable for his codefendant’s actions, and “the common pleas court readily 

apprehended [the a]ppellant’s claim and addressed it in 

substantial detail.” Id. at . . . 1060.

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1224 (Pa. 2021) (emphasis added). The 

Rogers Court concluded: “[T]he brevity of [the a]ppellant’s . . . claim as set forth in 

his concise statement represent[ed] a good-faith attempt to comply with Rule 

1925[(b)]’s concision requirement, and that it did not prevent meaningful appellate 

review.” Id. at 1225.

Here, the trial court did not order Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) 

Statement. Rather, Appellant filed it contemporaneously with her Notice of Appeal. 
5

Further, the trial court transcript was short and it was fairly evident from its context 

that the sole legal issue was whether the trial court should have denied the Motion 

to Strike in light of the Letter Agreement. Moreover, the trial court was able to, and 

did address, Appellant’s claim. Accordingly, Appellant did not waive her appellate 

issue by failing to specify the trial court’s error in her Rule 1925(b) Statement. 

Relative to Appellant’s failure to file preliminary objections, Section 

306 of the Eminent Domain Code provides, in relevant part:

(a) Filing and exclusive method of challenging certain 

matters.--

(1) Within 30 days after being served with notice 

of condemnation, the condemnee may file 

preliminary objections to the declaration of taking.

(2) The court upon cause shown may extend the 

time for filing preliminary objections.

(3) Preliminary objections shall be limited to and 

shall be the exclusive method of challenging:

(i) The power or right of the condemnor to 

appropriate the condemned property unless it 

has been previously adjudicated.

(ii) The sufficiency of the security.

(iii) The declaration of taking.

(iv) Any other procedure followed by the 

condemnor.

(b) Waiver.--Failure to raise by preliminary objections the 

issues listed in subsection (a) shall constitute a waiver. 

Issues of compensation may not be raised by preliminary 

objections.

26 Pa.C.S. § 306. Here, Appellant is not challenging any of the matters listed in 

Section 306(a) of the Eminent Domain Code. Rather, Appellant argues that the 

Motion to Strike should have been granted in light of the Letter Agreement. 
6

Accordingly, Appellant did not waive her appellate issue by failing to file 

preliminary objections.

Merits

Appellant argues on appeal to this Court that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law by denying Appellant’s Motion to Strike where Appellee agreed to

enter into negotiations with Appellant toward a final and binding settlement 

agreement, and Appellee filed its Petition and Writ rather than enter into the agreedupon negotiations. Appellee rejoins that although Appellee’s counsel, at the request 

of Appellant’s first attorney, agreed to give Appellant one last chance to provide a

detailed proposal to eliminate the Property’s blight, Appellant’s forthcoming 

proposal did not meet the Letter Agreement’s requirements. Appellee maintains that 

the Letter Agreement was not an agreement to negotiate anything but, rather, was 

dictated solely by Appellee, as the sole judge of the content, quality, sincerity, and 

acceptability of Appellant’s proposal. 

Initially, in the Motion to Strike, Appellant averred, in relevant part:

8. Based on the understanding that the parties would 

negotiate a final settlement agreement within 

approximately 45 days, [Appellant] began assembling 

the estimates and documents she believed necessary to 

enter into a final settlement agreement.

9. As a show of good faith, prior to completing a final 

settlement agreement, [Appellant] provided the 

documents to [Appellee] to show that [Appellant] was 

making progress on the steps that [she] was anticipated 

would be required in any final settlement agreement.

10. The documents provided by [Appellant] include[d] an 

engineering report, estimate to make the repairs, and proof 

that the needed funds had been set aside is [sic] a separate 

account by [Appellant].
7

11. The letters between the parties clearly indicate that 

these documents were anticipated to be required by the 

final agreement not part of the preliminary settlement 

agreement.

12. Upon receipt of the documents, even though they

were not yet required because no final settlement 

agreement had been reached, [Appellee] declared the 

documents insufficient, filed the [Petition and Writ], 

refused to continue to negotiate with [Appellant], and 

ordered its agents and employees not to talk to

[Appellant]. . . .

R.R. at 1b-2b (emphasis added). However, a review of the relevant documents belies 

Appellant’s claims in her Motion to Strike.

The Letter Agreement provided:

PRELIMINARY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

1) [Appellant] will waive all preliminary objections that 

she has against the Declaration of Taking docketed at C48-CV-2021-04285 in [the trial court].

2) [Appellant] agrees to waive any increase in value in the 

[P]roperty if she defaults on the Final and Binding 

Settlement Agreement, and hereby agrees that the 

valuation of the Property will not include any increase in 

value due to the efforts of [Appellant] from the time of 

Condemnation to the perfection of the [Appellee’s] title in 

the Property. Valuation of the Property shall be as of 

[June ] 16[,] 2021.

3) The parties anticipate entering into a Final and Binding 

Settlement Agreement within approximately 45 days.

4) [Appellee] and [Appellant] agree to enter into a 

[F]inal and [B]inding [S]ettlement Agreement upon the 

following material terms:

a. [Appellant] provides proof of funds for the 

completion of the Project (as later defined)[.]

b. [Appellant] deposits said funds into an 

escrow account for the completion of the Project, 

before any work proceeds.
8

c. [Appellant] and/or her general contractor 

obtain a Bond for the Project.

d. The Project will be completed in a proposed 

reasonable time period approved by the

[Appellee].

e. The Project will be defined as all items of repair 

necessary to bring the Property into a codecompliant status with the City of Bethlehem 

regardless of [sic] said code items are for the 

purposes of blight or the purposes of a Certificate 

of Occupancy.

f. [Appellee] will not relinquish the Taking or the 

Blight Certification until a Certificate of 

Occupancy is granted by the City of Bethlehem, in 

[its] sole and absolute discretion, in accordance 

with applicable municipal laws.

g. [Appellant] will have one or more reputable 

appraisers of her choice view, evaluate and take 

pictures of the [P]roperty on or before one month 

from the date of this letter so that they can issue an 

appraisal of fair market value as of the date of [the 

T]aking in the event the valuation of the [P]roperty 

becomes relevant.

h. Such other terms and conditions as

[Appellee] shall deem appropriate to ensure 

[Appellant] will complete the required 

rehabilitation in order to obtain a [C]ertificate 

of [O]ccupancy.

5) This Agreement is being entered into between and is the 

recommendation of counsel, subject to the approval of 

[Appellee’s] Board at a public meeting.

R.R. at 9b-10b (emphasis added).

On August 7, 2021, Appellee included the following additional 

provision to paragraph 3 of the Letter Agreement:

3) The parties anticipate entering into a Final and 

Binding Settlement Agreement within approximately 

45 days . . . of [Appellant] submitting to [Appellee] 
9

their [sic] Proposed Document Package to include but 

not limited to the Construction Contract (to include 

timelines), performance bond, escrow account details,

structural engineer reports and other reports requested in 

the [C]ity of Bethlehem inspection notes of August 4, 

2021, financial disclosures and such other reasonable 

information that maybe requested. Said package to be 

submitted within 45 days of the date of this letter. 

R.R. at 13b-14b (emphasis added). According to Appellee’s September 22, 2021

correspondence to Appellant’s counsel, the documents package failed to satisfy the 

Letter Agreement’s requirements by not including, but not limited to, Appellant’s 

personal financial information and the Property’s mortgage balance. See R.R. at 

16b. Further, although Appellee’s counsel requested that Appellant’s counsel call 

him, there is nothing in the record indicating that Appellant’s counsel did so. See 

id. Because the Letter Agreement expressly required that certain documents be 

submitted within 45 days, it was up to Appellee to determine what it deemed

appropriate to ensure Appellant would complete the required rehabilitation in order 

to obtain a certificate of occupancy, and because Appellant failed to submit the 

required documents, the Letter Agreement was no longer binding.

The law is well settled:

Section 307(a)(1)(i) of the Eminent Domain Code provides:

The condemnor, after the expiration of the time for 

filing preliminary objections by the condemnee to 

the declaration of taking, shall be entitled to

possession or right of entry upon payment of or 

a written offer to pay to the condemnee [of] the 

amount of just compensation as estimated by 

the condemnor.

26 Pa.C.S. § 307(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Concerning 

the authority of a trial court to set aside a condemnor’s 

declaration of estimated just compensation, this Court has 

explained:
10

Only fraud or palpable bad faith in making the 

declaration, described by clear averments of facts 

in the condemnee’s pleading and thereafter proved 

by clear, precise[,] and indubitable evidence will 

justify the employment by the trial court of the 

powers we now hold they possess to set aside the 

condemnor’s declaration, to appoint an impartial 

appraiser[,] and to enter judgment in favor of the 

condemnee.

In re Condemnation by City of Phila. of Leasehold of 

Airportels, Inc., . . . 398 A.2d 224, 229 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 

1979).

Trinidad v. Dep’t of Transp., 273 A.3d 85, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022); see also In re 

Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1659 C.D. 2014, filed May 28, 

2015),

10 slip op. at 8 (“[A] trial court can only refuse to issue a writ of possession if 

the condemnee proves by clear and convincing evidence that the condemnor acted 

with fraud or palpable bad faith in making payment of or offering estimated just 

compensation.”).

Here, the trial court opined:

[Appellant’s] Motion to Strike does not allege fraud and/or 

palpable bad faith on the part of [Appellee,] and the record 

contains no “clear, precise[,] and indubitable” evidence 

that [Appellee] acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In fact,

[Appellant] specifically declined to introduce evidence at 

the October 27, 2021 hearing. At that hearing, despite 

repeated inquiries by the [trial c]ourt, counsel for both

parties stated there was no need for an evidentiary hearing. 

See [R.R. at 6c-7c, 11c-12c]. Thus, no evidence was 

introduced at the October 27, 2021 hearing[,] and no other 

“clear, precise[,] and indubitable evidence” of record 

establishes fraud or palpable bad faith by [Appellee].

10 Unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited as 

persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures. 210 

Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
11

Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Op. at 5-6. This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s 

reasoning. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the Motion to Strike, and 

granted the Petition and Writ. 

Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s orders are affirmed. 

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Taking in Eminent Domain :

of Certain Parcel of Real Estate :

located at 401-403 East Fourth :

Street and 405 East Fourth Street, :

in the City of Bethlehem, :

Northampton County, Pennsylvania :

by the Redevelopment Authority of :

the City of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania :

: No. 1313 C.D. 2021

Appeal of: Kalavathi Shunmugam :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of October, 2022, the Northampton County 

Common Pleas Court’s October 27, 2021 orders are affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge