The Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr., District Judge for the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2427

XING ZHENG,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

A070 583 126

ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2013—DECIDED MARCH 27, 2013

Before POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

NORGLE, District Judge.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Xing Zheng argues

that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in
2 No. 12-2427

denying his motion to reopen his immigration case

because it found that Zheng failed to show that China’s

conditions had materially changed for Christians without any reasoned explanation. We agree that the BIA’s

conclusory rejection of Zheng’s argument was error, but

we find that the error was harmless. Given the highly

generalized nature of Zheng’s evidence, which failed

to show with any meaningful level of specificity that

the persecution against Zheng’s practice of Christianity

had materially worsened since 1999, the BIA could

have reasonably concluded that such evidence was insufficient. We therefore deny Zheng’s petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Xing Zheng, a native of Fuzhou City in the Fujian

Province of China, arrived in the United States in 1991

and filed an application for asylum the following year,

which was denied. The INS charged him with removability in 1998, but Zheng renewed his request for

asylum, asserting that his wife (who arrived from China

in 1994 and whom he married in 1995) would be

forcibly sterilized under China’s one-child policy

because they already had two children (born in 1996 and

1998, respectively). The immigration judge denied his

application in 1999, relying in part on Zheng’s lack of

credibility, and the BIA affirmed in 2002. Over the

next several years, Zheng managed to remain in the

United States and filed three motions to reopen his immigration case. The BIA denied the motions because

they were untimely (and successive with respect to the
No. 12-2427 3

second and third motions) and because Zheng failed to

demonstrate changed country conditions as to forced

sterilization that would justify an exception to the

statutory bar against untimely and successive motions

to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.

In September 2011, Zheng filed a fourth motion to

reopen, the one at issue in this appeal, except this time

he argued that he would be persecuted in China

because he is a Christian. He did not argue this before

because he said he converted to Christianity in 2010

while in immigration detention, which was supported

by evidence including the fact that he and his family

were baptized at the First Chinese Free Methodist

Church. He asserted that he and his family wish to

“continue spreading the message of Christianity to

others, and to teach them how to accept the redemption

he ha[s].” He also submitted evidence which he

claimed showed that China’s treatment of Christians

had materially worsened since 1999.

Without questioning the sincerity of his alleged conversion, the BIA denied Zheng’s motion to reopen. After

setting forth the proper legal standards and summarizing Zheng’s evidence and arguments, the BIA’s

rejection of Zheng’s argument amounted to the following statements:

The respondent has shown changed personal

circumstances, but the evidence and assertions

presented in support of this motion do not demonstrate materially changed conditions in China

pertinent to this claim since the 1999 hearing,
4 No. 12-2427

especially in view of evidence before the Immigration Judge. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State,

China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions (April 14, 1998) (describing the suppression

of unregistered religious groups, including underground churches and “house church” Protestants,

arrests and beatings of religiosu leaders, demolition of property, etc.). Therefore, the Board

finds that the exception for untimely and numberbarred motions to reopen is inapplicable to the

respondent’s case.

Zheng petitioned for review. Along with his petition,

Zheng submits updated evidence of purported changed

country conditions, including the State Department’s

2011 International Religious Freedom Report, which

stated that China’s “respect for and protection of the

right to religious freedom deteriorated,” that unregistered religious organizations were not allowed to

hold worship services, and that “[p]roselytizing in public” was forbidden. The evidence also includes the

State Department’s 2011 Human Rights Report on

China, which stated that “[d]eterioration in key aspects

of the country’s human rights situation continued,”

noting that “politically sensitive” individuals faced restrictions on their freedom to “practice religion.” 

II. ANALYSIS

Section 1229a(c)(7) of Title 8 of the United States Code

and its implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c),
No. 12-2427 5

Part of Zheng’s brief appears to suggest that changed 1

personal circumstances, such as Zheng’s alleged conversion,

might justify granting a motion to reopen. We rejected such

an argument in Cheng Chen v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 758, 760

(7th Cir. 2007).

provide that as a general matter, only one motion to

reopen may be filed and it must be filed within 90 days

of the date of entry of a final administrative order of

removal. However, these time and number limits do not

apply to motions to reopen for the purpose of applying

for asylum if the movant shows “changed country conditions in the country of nationality or the country to

which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is

material and was not available and would not

have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see Gebreeyesus v.

Gonzales, 482 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). The parties

do not dispute that under these standards, Zheng was

required to show that China’s conditions materially

worsened for Christians since 1999 when his first immigration hearing was held, even though Zheng was not

a Christian in 1999.1

If the BIA denies a motion to reopen, we will not find

error “ ‘unless [the BIA decision] was made without a

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis

such as invidious discrimination against a particular race

or group.’ ” Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted). The BIA is required “to issue

opinions with rational explanations and adequate
6 No. 12-2427

Zheng asserts, and the government does not dispute, that 2

in assessing harmless error we may consider evidence of

(continued...)

analysis of the record, and to announce its decision in

terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive

that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Gebreeyesus, 482 F.3d at 954 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the BIA’s decision rejected Zheng’s argument

without an adequate analysis of the record. The BIA

simply stated that “the evidence and assertions presented in support of this motion do not demonstrate

materially changed conditions in China since the 1999

hearing,” but gave no explanation as to why. It summarily listed the evidence presented by Zheng and then

emphasized and cited one piece of evidence of religious

persecution that was available in 1999, but made no

comparison between the 1999 evidence and Zheng’s

more recent evidence to explain why no changed

country circumstances were shown. The government

argues that the record was sufficient to support the

BIA’s decision, but “the government may not defend

the BIA’s decision on grounds that are not stated—or

at least discernible—in the decision itself.” Gebreeyesus,

482 F.3d at 956. And it points to nothing in the BIA

order from which we may discern why it believed that

Zheng’s more recent evidence did not pass muster.

Nonetheless, we must deny Zheng’s petition because

any error was harmless. See Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650,

657 (7th Cir. 2007). Though Zheng submits a fair 2
No. 12-2427 7

(...continued)

country conditions as they exist currently, which means we

may consider Zheng’s updated evidence which did not exist

at the time of the BIA decision. See Giday v. Gonzales, 434

F.3d 543, 556 n.6 (7th Cir. 2006).

amount of evidence demonstrating poor conditions for

certain types of Christians today, such as evidence

that proselytizing (which Zheng wishes to do) is

forbidden, the only evidence that conditions materially

worsened since 1999 amounts exclusively to the statements that protections for religious freedoms “deteriorated.” Such highly generalized statements simply do

not satisfy Zheng’s burden. Cf., e.g., Moosa, 644 F.3d at

387 (“[G]eneral conditions of hardship that affect entire

populations . . . are not persecution.” (quotation marks

and citation omitted)); Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528,

532 (7th Cir. 2008) (single general statement about the

“happily married couple” was insufficient to demonstrate bona fide marriage). Zheng points to nothing

in the reports, for example, that shows in what time

frame conditions deteriorated, how conditions specifically deteriorated for those who practice Christianity

in the manner that Zheng wishes to practice, or whether

such persecution intensified in or around the region

where Zheng expects to live. Cf. Moosa, 644 F.3d at

387 (evidence of “broad social strife” occurring nearly

900 miles away from petitioner’s hometown was insufficient). Zheng points to evidence showing that conditions have worsened for attorneys who defend persecuted Christians, but he does not assert that he is an
8 No. 12-2427

attorney. He points to evidence that China persecutes

unregistered churches, but the evidence does not show

how that persecution specifically worsened since 1999

or before, and more importantly, he does not allege that

he belongs to, or would join, an unregistered church.

In sum, none of the evidence illustrates with any meaningful level of specificity how China’s treatment of

those who practice Christianity as Zheng wishes to do

actually worsened from 1999 or before until today.

“[B]ecause the BIA could have reasonably concluded”

that Zheng failed to demonstrate materially changed

circumstances, “we need not remand because the alleged

legal error was harmless.” Iglesias, 540 F.3d at 532-33.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, we DENY Zheng’s petition

for review.

3-27-13