Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 29, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00432-CR

JONATHAN ANTHONY EDWARDS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1656534

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault, and the trial court 

assessed an agreed punishment of thirty-five years’ confinement. In a single issue, 

appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress 

under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), because of material omissions 

from a search warrant affidavit. We affirm.
2

I. Legal Principles

The issuance of a search warrant depends on the existence of probable cause. 

Diaz v. State, 632 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Probable cause exists 

if there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at a specified 

location. Id. A “fair probability” is less than a preponderance of the evidence; it 

need not persuade a reasonable person “more likely than not.” See Rodriguez v. 

State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 & n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The test is whether a 

reasonable reading of an affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant

provides a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause 

exists. See Diaz, 632 S.W.3d at 892. This is a flexible and nondemanding 

standard. Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 60.

A defendant may challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in a 

search warrant affidavit. Diaz, 632 S.W.3d at 892 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–

72). The defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a material 

misstatement was made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the 

truth. Id. This court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have applied these 

principles to omissions from search warrant affidavits. See Islas v. State, 562 

S.W.3d 191, 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d); see also 

Diaz, 632 S.W.3d at 892 (“We have assumed that Franks applies to material 

omissions, but we have not decided the issue.”).

If the defendant carries their burden to show material omissions made at 

least with reckless disregard for the truth, then the true statement is added to the 

affidavit, and a reviewing court must determine whether probable cause for the 

warrant still exists. See Islas, 562 S.W.3d at 197. In making this determination, 

we review whether probable cause exists as the magistrate would, looking at the 

totality of the circumstances. See id. at 198; see also Diaz, 632 S.W.3d at 892. We 
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interpret the affidavit in a “commonsensical and realistic manner, drawing 

reasonable inferences from the information.” Diaz, 632 S.W.3d at 892 (quoting 

State v. Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). The focus is on the 

combined logical force of the facts in the affidavit. Id.

II. Background

The State applied for and was granted a warrant to search and seize 

appellant’s saliva via a buccal swab. Appellant filed a written motion to suppress

evidence obtained from this search and seizure, and the court held an evidentiary 

hearing. Four paragraphs of the search warrant affidavit are reproduced with 

minor redactions in Appendix A to this memorandum opinion. The first two 

paragraphs are based on information that the affiant, a Houston Police Department 

detective, learned from other officers’ reports. The third paragraph describes a 

follow-up investigation in which the detective met with the complainant. The 

fourth paragraph is based on information from a sexual assault nurse examiner’s

(SANE) report.

To summarize the affidavit, the detective testified that the complainant and 

appellant were in a non-sexual dating relationship when appellant became angry 

with the complainant on the evening of November 27, 2019. Appellant struck the 

complainant in the head with a pistol and slept with her that night. On the 

following morning, appellant again became angry, slapped her, forced her legs 

apart, and put his penis into her vagina while the pistol was nearby. He did this 

without her consent while she was in fear of injury or death. When appellant left 

the apartment, the complainant called police. Officers arrived and found appellant 

driving his car towards the exit of the apartment complex. They found a loaded 

pistol under his leg. The complainant went to a hospital for a sexual assault 
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examination. A sexual assault kit was submitted to the Houston Forensic Science 

Center for DNA analysis.

According to the affidavit, the complainant told the responding officers at 

the scene that appellant struck her in the head with the pistol so hard that her ears 

began to ring. She told the detective during the follow-up interview that appellant 

struck her with the pistol so hard that she blacked out.

At the hearing, the trial court also admitted as exhibits several of the 

detective’s police reports. The reports contain more detailed reproductions of the 

complainant’s statements to the SANE and to the detective during the follow-up 

interview. A report indicates that the complainant told the SANE that when 

appellant hit her with the gun, she fell to the ground in pain.

The court admitted as an exhibit a report from the Department of Public 

Safety, which the detective had searched before submitting his search warrant 

affidavit. The report provides that the complainant had a record of nine arrests 

with three “convictions/adjudications” for “driving w/lic inv w/prev conv/susp/w/o 

fin res,” “interfere w/public duties,” and “theft prop>=$50 < $500.”

The detective testified at the hearing that he was not aware that one of the 

officers who responded to the crime scene said, according to body-worn camera 

footage, that the complainant’s “story doesn’t add up.” The detective testified that 

he did not see any indication from the other officers’ reports that the complainant 

reported to them that she had passed out or blacked out.

The trial court overruled the motion to suppress, and the DNA evidence was 

admitted before the jury.
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III. Arguments and Preservation of Error

On appeal, appellant generally complains about the detective omitting from 

the search warrant affidavit alleged “inconsistencies” from the complainant’s 

statements, and appellant contends that the detective “embellished” information 

provided to him from the complainant. Appellant appears to complain about 

several omissions from the affidavit that he never complained about to the trial 

court, either in his written motion or at the hearing.0F

1

 It is difficult to determine 

from his brief which particular omissions he contends should have been included 

in the affidavit. Nor does appellant explain in his brief how probable cause is 

lacking with any missing information added to the affidavit.1F

2

As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record 

must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, 

objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling sought from the trial 

court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. A Franks complaint must be preserved at trial, and the 

defendant must identify the false portions of the affidavit. See Harris v. State, 227 

S.W.3d 83, 85–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A complaint on appeal must comport 

with the specific complaint that the defendant timely lodged in the trial court. 

Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, 

no pet.); see Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

1 For example, in his brief, appellant refers to the responding officers testifying that they 

did not observe visible injury to the complainant. Appellant refers to the complainant’s 

statement to the detective that the complainant did not see the gun until appellant hit her with it. 

Appellant refers to the complainant’s statement that she was dizzy and threw up in a toilet.

2 The State contends that appellant waived any error due to inadequate briefing. See 

Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (overruling inadequately briefed 

issues). Assuming without deciding that appellant has not waived error due to inadequate 

briefing, we will construe his brief liberally and address this issue to the extent possible. See

Tex. R. App. 38.9 (briefing rules to be construed liberally).
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From reviewing the arguments presented in appellant’s motion, at the 

hearing, and in his brief on appeal, appellant has preserved error regarding the 

following alleged material omissions from the detective’s search warrant affidavit:

(1) the complainant did not tell the responding officers or the SANE on November 

28 that she had passed out; (2) the complainant did not tell the SANE that appellant 

had the gun near him during the sexual assault; (3) one of the responding officers 

opined that the complainant’s story didn’t “add up”; and (4) the complainant’s 

criminal history.

IV. Analysis

Assuming without deciding that these alleged omissions were material and 

that the detective omitted them from the search warrant affidavit at least with 

reckless disregard, we conclude that probable cause for the search and seizure of

appellant’s saliva would still exist even if the omissions were added to the 

affidavit. 

The search warrant affidavit recited the complainant’s detailed statements in 

support of each element of aggravated sexual assault. See Tex. Penal Code 

§ 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i). In particular, the complainant repeatedly stated to different 

officers and the SANE that appellant threatened her with a pistol and forced his 

penis inside her vagina. None of the omissions would have made any difference to 

the probable cause determination. See Gonzales v. State, 481 S.W.3d 300, 312 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (reasoning that adding omitted 

information to affidavit—that witness’s statement was hearsay from another 

officer—“would make no difference to the probable cause determination”); see 

also Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 703–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding 

that the magistrate would have had probable cause to issue a warrant even with the 

inclusion of omitted information, e.g., that officer had already searched the vehicle
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that was the subject of the warrant and found no evidence linking the vehicle with 

the crime).

Even if the complainant failed to tell the responding officers or the SANE

every factual detail of the assault that she recited for the detective several days 

later—that is, whether she passed out and whether the gun was nearby—such 

alleged “inconsistencies” would not undermine the probative value of the 

information provided in the affidavit for the magistrate’s determination on the 

existence of probable cause. Cf. Jarnagin v. State, 392 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (affidavit was sufficient to support finding of 

probable cause despite a discrepancy between the deputy’s affidavit and the 

complainant’s statements about date of a sexual assault). The complainant’s 

statements were not, in fact, “inconsistent” as appellant characterizes them. For 

example, appellant directs this court to no evidence that the complainant told the 

responding officers or SANE that she did not pass out, only that the officers and 

SANE failed to include in their reports a statement by the complainant that she did

pass out. 

Adding the complainant’s criminal record to the affidavit—in particular, for 

no offenses tending to show bias against appellant or undermining her credibility 

regarding reports to police—would not prevent the magistrate from finding her 

statements reliable and that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime 

would be found from collecting appellant’s saliva. See Heitman v. State, 789 

S.W.2d 607, 611–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. denied) (reasoning that even if

information omitted from search warrant about an informant’s “extensive criminal 

record” and his “deal . . . to supply information about appellant in exchange for 

dismissal of four pending charges” were added to the search warrant, the affidavit 

would still be facially sufficient to give the magistrate probable cause to issue the 
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warrant); see also Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 

(false statement that unnamed informant had no criminal history—despite 

conviction for driving while intoxicated and participation in the crime that was the 

subject of the search warrant—was not material under Franks).

Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

V. Conclusion

The trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress. The 

trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

/s/ Ken Wise

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan. 

(Hassan, J., concurring without opinion).

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
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Appendix A: Partial Search Warrant Affidavit