IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN DIVISION C1ER, us DS7R"T COURT WESTE D CT OF TEXAS 

e v 

* LYNDON MIJOSEPH PIERRE, 

PLAINTIFF, 

I!i 

FILED 

lU AUG -9 AM 10: t+8 

SHEILA VASQUEZ, [N HER 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MANAGER 

OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF 

PUBLIC SAFETY-SEX OFFENDER 

REGISTRATION BUREAU AND 

STEVEN MCCRAW, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR 

OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF 

PUBLIC SAFETY, 

DEFENDANTS. 

CAUSE NO. 1:20-CV-224-LY 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFTER REMAND 

Before the court in the above-referenced cause are Plaintiff Lyndon Mijoseph Pierre's 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc #62); Defendants Sheila Vasquez and Steven McCraw's 

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc #67); Pierre's Motion to Strike 

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc #68); and all other responses and replies.' Having considered 

the briefing, summary-judgment evidence, applicable law, and entire case file, the court will grant 

in part and deny in part Pierre's motion for summary judgment, grant in part and deny in part 

Defendants' motion to dismiss, and deny Pierre's motion to strike. 

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND 

The court derives the following summary from the summary-judgment evidence and 

pleadings in this case. The Texas Sex Offender Registration Bureau (the "Registration Bureau") 

1 Also before the court are Pierre's Advisory to the Court (Doc #63) filed April 18, 2022; 

Defendants' Advisory to the Court (Doc #6 1); and those associated responses and replies. 

Case 1:20-cv-00224-LY Document 75 Filed 08/09/22 Page 1 of 15
is a division of the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS"). Defendant Vasquez, a DPS 

employee, is the Manager of the Registration Bureau. Vasquez is personally responsible for 

classifying, and supervising the classification of, persons as "extrajurisdictional sex offenders." 

She is further responsible for placing names and identifying information of individuals determined 

by DPS to have reportable sex offenses on an electronic "sex offense database." Defendant 

McCraw is the Director of DPS. McCraw is responsible for supervising, training, and disciplining 

employees of the Registration Bureau such as Vasquez. 

Pierre was convicted of one count of Attempted Interstate Transportation of Individual for 

Prostitution in Arizona. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421 ("Section 2421"). DPS determines whether an 

offense under the laws of another state, federal law, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of a Texas offense that requires 

sex-offender registration. If the offense is substantially similar, it is a "reportable conviction or 

adjudication." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.00 1 § (5)(H). If the offense was not 

substantially similar to a Texas offense requiring sex-offender registration, DPS reviews the 

federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requirements to determine if there is an 

extrajurisdictional registration requirement for the offense. See 34 U.S.C. § 20901-20991. DPS 

also reviews whether the offense falls into the (5)(C) exception to the extrajurisdictionalregistration requirement. See 34 U.S.C. § 2091 1(5)(C) (providing that offense is not "sex offense" 

if it involved consensual sexual conduct and "the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under 

the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 

years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim") 

In 2020, the Registration Bureau notified Pierre via an email composed by "TxSor_Legal," 

the address associated with the Registration Bureau, that Pierre must register as a sex offender in 

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Texas as a condition of his supervised release and as a result of his Arizona conviction. The email 

stated Pierre's conviction under Section 2421 did not contain elements "substantially similar to" 

elements of a "reportable" sex offense that would require Pierre to register under Texas law but 

that his Section 2421 conviction nonetheless rendered him an "extrajurisdictional registrant," 

requiring him to register under federal law. Defendants forwarded the information to Pierre's 

federal supervision officer. 

Pierre alleges that Defendants violated federal and state law when they notified Pierre and 

his supervision officer that he was an extrajurisdictional registrant without providing notice or an 

opportunity to dispute the sex-offender determination. Pierre sues Defendants in their official 

capacities as agents of the State of Texas. 

This court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Pierre v. Vasquez, No. 20-5 1032, 2022 WL 68970 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2022). On appeal, the Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit reversed this court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to 

consider the merits of Pierre's procedural-due-process claim, including whether Pierre's 

conviction under Section 2421 constitutes a sex offense under federal or state law such that Texas 

may treat him as an "extrajurisdictional registrant." Id. 

Post-appeal Change in Policy 

Following remand, Defendants submitted an affidavit of Jeanine C. Hudson, the Managing 

Attorney of DPS's Office of Crime Records Counsel. According to Hudson's affidavit, after the 

Fifth Circuit's January 2022 remand order, DPS changed its policy on sex-offender registrations 

for individuals convicted of offenses like that of Pierre. Under the previous policy, if a person had 

a listed federal or Uniform Code of Military Justice sex-offense conviction, DPS reviewed the 

findings of the convicting court for information affirmatively indicating the person met the 

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requirements of the (5)(C) exception. If the court paperwork did not show that the person met the 

exception, DPS considered the individual an extrajurisdictional registrant and required the 

individual to register, as was the case with Pierre. Following the change in policy, if the convicting 

court does not indicate that registration is required, like the Arizona court in Pierre's case, DPS 

will not consider the person to be an extrajurisdictional registrant. 

Defendants' briefing also includes a separate letter from Hudson stating that Pierre has 

never been on the Texas sex-offender registry. Hudson states that DPS will no longer require 

Pierre to register for his offense because DPS has since determined Pierre meets the (5)(C) 

exception. 

Defendants argue that the policy change for extrajurisdictional registrantsalong with 

the letter confirming that DPS will not require Pierre to register as a sex offenderextinguishes 

any case or controversy and renders Pierre's claim moot. Pierre maintains his claim for violation 

of rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nonetheless remains valid. 

See Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Pierre argues the "gravamen" of his complaint does 

not challenge the extrajurisdictional registrant policy, but instead challenges Defendants' general 

policy of declaring a person to be a sex offender, when the person has never been convicted or 

placed on community supervision for a "reportable" sex offense, and when Defendants have done 

so without any form of procedural due process. Alternatively, Pierre requests that the court strike 

Defendants' motion to dismiss because Defendants failed to file a motion for leave to file the 

motion and have not shown the "good cause" necessary for the court to modifi the scheduling 

order rendered in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. Due to the numerous filings from both parties 

in this case, Defendants' change in policy mid-litigation, and the court's inherent power to control 

its docket, the court excuses Defendants' failure to file a motion for leave and finds the Defendants' 

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motion complies with the requirements of Rule 16(b)(4). See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 

(2016). The court further notes that a litigant may raise a subject-matter-jurisdiction issue at any 

time throughout the action. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 444 (2004). 

The court will first assess whether the Registration Bureau's policy changes after remand 

moot Pierre's claims. After determining that Pierre's claim is not entirely moot, the court will 

address the merits of Pierre's procedural-due-process claim. 

II. MOOTNESS 

Defendants argue that DPS's voluntary cessation of the previous extrajurisdictionalregistration policy, along with Defendants' determination that Pierre has never been on the sexoffender registry, nor will ever be required to register, extinguishes any case or controversy and 

renders Pierre's claim moot, therefore depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Pierre 

claims the issue remains as to whether Defendants' practices violate the constitutional right to 

procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierre argues DPS's policy 

change is constitutionally inadequate as it relates to the complained-of conduct, instead 

constituting mere "litigation posturing," and DPS ' s voluntary cessation does not render the case 

moot. 

Analysis 

"The doctrine of mootness arises from Article III of the Constitution, which provides 

federal courts with jurisdiction over a matter only if there is a live 'case' or 'controversy." Dierlam v. Trump, 977 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Dierlam v. Biden, 141 S. Ct. 

1392 (2021). A case becomes moot "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties 

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 569 U.S. 85, 91 

(2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)). This court has held that "[t]he 

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requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation must continue 

throughout the existence of the litigation." Durst v. Collier, No. A-06-CA-139-LY, 2007 WL 

9701142 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007). If an intervening event renders the court unable to grant the 

litigant "any effectual relief whatever," the case is moot. Dierlam, 977 F.3d at 476. Alternatively, 

"as long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the 

case is not moot." Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984). Further, "[w]here one of 

the several issues presented becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply the constitutional 

requirement of a case or controversy." Powell v. Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969). 

The test for mootness in the case of voluntary cessation "is a stringent one" and the party 

asserting mootness bears a "heavy burden" in proving "subsequent events made it absolutely clear 

that the alleged wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis added). "The voluntary 

cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for 

mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed." 

Knox v. Service Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012). If the court lacks 

assurance that the wrong will not be repeated, the fact that "the defendant is free to return to his 

old ways" combined with "a public interest in having the legality of practices settled" may prevent 

mootness. United States v. W. T Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). 

Where due-process rights have been violated, "even if [plaintiffs] did not suffer any other 

actual injury, the fact remains that they were deprived of their right to procedural due process." 

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). Courts have maintained jurisdiction over proceduraldue-process claims where the government changed the complained-of sex-offender registration 

policy mid-litigation. See, e.g., Williams v. Ballard, 466 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2006). The 

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Williams court awarded declaratory relief for the plaintiff's procedural-due-process claim but 

denied plaintiff's requested injunctive relief as moot. Id. 

Despite DPS's voluntary cessation of the previous extrajurisdictional-registrant policy, 

Pierre's interest in vindicating his procedural-due-process right has remained and will remain 

throughout this litigation. DPS's policy change relieves Pierre of his registration requirement, but 

it does not address Pierre's claim that Defendants' failure to provide him notice or an opportunity 

to be heard violated his constitutional rights. Pierre's procedural-due-process claim remains a 

legally cognizable injury and, like in Williams, Pierre may be entitled to declaratory relief if his 

claim is meritorious. Additionally, this type of alleged procedural-due-process violation has 

recurred in multiple cases and the court does not find it "absolutely clear" that Defendants will 

provide adequate due process to those similarly situated to Pierre with DPS ' s changes to its 

extrajurisdictional-registrant policy.2 Defendants do not point to any policy change that would 

ensure procedural due process and demonstrate adherence to previous Fifth Circuit decisions, such 

as requiring a pre-determination hearing, in their multitude of motions, replies, and responses.3 

Instead, Defendants discuss only the change in the registration policy. The court concludes that 

Pierre's claim is not moot because Pierre maintains a redres sable injury and there remains a public 

interest in determining the legality of Defendants' practices in a manner consistent with previous 

decisions by this circuit. However, Pierre's specific requests for injunctive and declaratory relief 

2 Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 412 (5th Cir. 2010); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 

225 (5th Cir. 2004) (Coleman 1); Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (Coleman 

II); and Williams, 466 F.3d at 332 are all cases involving procedural-due-process violations 

through the application of Texas's sex-offender-determination policies and practices. 

In Meza, Coleman I, and Coleman lithe Fifth Circuit held an individual not convicted of 

a sex crime was entitled to due process prior to being required to register as a sex offender. 

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for the original extrajurisdictional-registrant determination are denied as moot because the change 

in policy has provided such requested relief. 

Remaining Issues in Dispute 

The court retains jurisdiction to render judgment on Pierre's procedural-due-process 

violation claim because declaratory relief may be granted for the violation of his due process rights 

under the precedent set by Williams. 466 F.3d at 330-35. The court will deny Defendants' motion 

to dismiss and proceed to the merits of Pierre's procedural-due-process claim. 

' w I Pierre argues in his summary-judgment motion that there is no genuine dispute of fact over 

whether Defendants violated his procedural-due-process rights through the official determination 

requiring Pierre to register as a sex offender under federal law without notice or an official hearing 

to contest the determination. Defendants respond that Pierre's claim is moot and the court no 

longer has jurisdiction. 

Standard Of Review 

Courts render summary judgment when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 

2007). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.s. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to 

view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Washburn, 504 F.3d 

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at 508. Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling 

on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 

150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55. 

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent 

summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 

Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are 

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 

476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and 

unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing 

summary judgment must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner 

in which that evidence supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 

164 (5th Cir. 2006). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in 

search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

Id. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the 

nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must 

be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

Procedural Due Process 

"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. When protected 

interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount." Board of Regents 

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of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). The Fifth Circuit has determined there is 

a liberty interest in being free from sex-offender classifications absent a conviction of a sex 

offense. See Meza, 607 F.3d at 412; Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 225; Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 670. 

While Texas law authorizes a defendant's parole panel is authorized by Texas law to impose 

reasonable conditions on parole or mandatory supervision, Coleman I holds, "[w]hen those 

conditions impact a liberty interest of the parolee, they may be imposed only with justification." 

395 F.3d at 225; See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.221. Absent a sex-offense conviction, the state 

must afford the individual "an appropriate hearing and find that he possess this offensive 

characteristic before imposing such conditions" in order to demonstrate said 'justification." Id. 

Williams agrees, stating that "some process was required before requiring registration of parolees 

not convicted of a sex offense."4 466 F.3d at 332. Meza goes further, maintaining that adequate 

due process for a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex offense to register as a sex offender 

or participate in sex-offender therapy requires: 

(1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his 

mandatory supervision; (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against [the 

parolee] to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a 

defense; (3) a hearing at which [the parolee] is permitted to be heard in person, 

present documentary evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and 

cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause is shown why this right should not be 

granted; (5) an impartial decision maker (which we assume the Board will be); and 

(6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons 

it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision. 

607 F.3d at 412. Alternatively, "[w]hen an individual is convicted of a sex offense, no further 

process is due before imposing sex-offender conditions." Id. at 401 (emphasis added). 

The Williams defendant, like Pierre, was placed on "mandatory supervision" rather than 

"paroled," but the court held the difference was immaterial "since the plaintiff in Coleman I was 

on mandatory supervision, and the court in Coleman Ilexplicitly discussed the nature of mandatory 

supervision as implicating the due process interest at issue." 466 F.3d at 333 n.6. The court, for 

convenience, said Williams was "paroled." Id. Similarly, the court here will discuss Plaintiff as 

a "parolee." 

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Here, Defendants conceded at oral argument that forcing an individual to register for a nonregisterable offense violates due process. Additionally, Hudson stated Pierre qualifies for the 

(5)(C) exception, meaning that his Arizona conviction should never have been classified as a sex 

offense nor should he have ever been required to register as a sex offender. Even though 

Defendants no longer classify Pierre as an "extrajurisdictional registrant," Defendants provided no 

hearing for Pierre to present evidence to demonstrate he fell into the exception. Nor did 

Defendants provide Pierre with written notice that he may have registration conditions imposed as 

a condition of mandatory supervision. Instead, Defendants notified Pierre that those conditions 

were being imposed with their email determination. Defendants therefore failed to give Pierre the 

process required under Meza and provided no "justification" for requiring his registration. 

As Defendants have given no evidence disputing the violation of Pierre's due process, 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in Pierre's claim. By failing to give Pierre a 

formal hearing or opportunity to rebut Defendants' determination that Pierre was an 

extrajurisdictional registrant, Defendants violated Pierre's procedural-due-process righta right 

that exists to protect Pierre's liberty interest in being free from sex-offender classification absent 

a sex offense conviction. The final issue to resolve lies in what relief Pierre has shown himself 

entitled. 

Relieffor Pierre's Procedural-Due-Process Claim 

Pierre's requested relief has been somewhat inconsistent throughout his filings. In Pierre's 

amended complaint, he requests (1) a declaratory judgment that Pierre was not an 

"extrajurisdictional registrant" and was not required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants 

from identifying Pierre as a sex offender or prosecuting him for failing to register. Pierre also 

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requests that the court deem him a "prevailing party," award reasonable attorney's fees, and award 

"any other relief to which he may show himself entitled." In later briefing and in Pierre's Proposed 

Order, Pierre requests (1) a declaration that Defendants' failure to afford Pierre notice and an 

opportunity to be heard prior to labelling Pierre an extrajurisdictional registrant was a violation of 

Pierre's constitutional right to procedural due process; (2) a permanent injunction that prohibits 

Defendants from applying their unconstitutional policy in the future; and (3) nominal damages to 

vindicate Pierre's "absolute" constitutional right to procedural due process. 

"Rule 5 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been construed liberally and under 

it the demand for relief in the pleadings does not limit, except in cases of default, the relief a court 

may grant when entering judgment." Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 176 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975). 

Additionally, "[t]here is no reason for denying his right to relief, if the plaintiff is otherwise entitled 

to it, simply because it is asked under the prayer for general relief, and upon a somewhat different 

theory from that which is advanced under one of the special prayers." Lockhart v. Leeds, 195 U.s. 

427, 437 (1904). 

Defendants argue Pierre cannot request a new type of relief in later briefing without seeking 

leave to amend his complaint. However, even if Pierre strayed from his original request, he 

included a prayer for general relief Under Renfroe and Lockhart, Pierre is not limited to his 

specific relief requests and the court will therefore consider all requested relief The court has 

already discussed that Pierre's request for injunctive relief in both iterations is moot due to DPS' s 

change in evaluating extrajurisdictional registrants. For the reasons below, the court will grant 

Pierre declaratory relief and deny his nominal-damages request. 

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Declaratory Relief 

"[A] district court should normally entertain a declaratory judgment action within its 

jurisdiction when it finds that the relief sought: (1) will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and 

settling the legal relations in issue; and (2) will terminate and afford relief from uncertainty, 

insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Continental Cas. Co. v. Fuscardo, 35 

F.3d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 

375 (4th Cir. 1994)). 

Pierre has shown himself entitled to declaratory relief for the violation of his proceduraldue-process rights. Accordingly, Pierre is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Defendants' sexoffender determination practices, which fail to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard prior 

to Defendants making their sex-offender determination, are unconstitutional as applied to Pierre 

and other persons similarly situated who have no reportable conviction or adjudication of an 

enumerated sex-related offense and have not been given notice or an opportunity to challenge the 

determination.5 

Nominal Damages 

"[T]he denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without 

proof of actual injury." Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266. However, a suit against a state official in his or 

her official capacity, as is the case here, is not a suit against an official, but is instead a suit against 

The magistrate's report and recommendation in Williams, adopted by the district court 

and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit stated, "[a]lthough defendants have represented that plaintiff and 

other persons who do not have qualifying convictions under [the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act] will no longer be required to register as sex-offenders as a condition of their 

parole or mandatory supervision, a judicial declaration to that effect will help enforce that policy 

and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to this proceeding." 

No. 3-02-CV-0270-M, 2004 WL 1499457 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2004), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0270-M, 2004 WL 2203250 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2004), affd, 466 

F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2006). 

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the official office and is no different from a suit against State itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71(1989). As this court has previously held, "state sovereign immunity 

bars suits against states for money damages, including nominal damages, which are paid from state 

funds." Luke v. Texas, No. 1:20-CV-388-LY, 2021 WL 2949479 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2021). 

Pierre requests nominal damages in the sum of one dollar against Defendants in their 

official capacities, for the purpose of vindicating his constitutional right to procedural due process. 

However, as Pierre is suing Defendants in their official capacities, Pierre's request for nominal 

damages is essentially a suit against the State of Texas. Therefore, the court cannot award the 

damages without violating the Eleventh Amendment and will deny his request. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Sheila Vasquez and Steven McCraw's 

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. #67) is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART as follows: the court DISMISSES AS MOOT Pierre's request for 

injunctive relief Defendants' motion in all other respects is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pierre Lyndon Mijoseph Pierre's Motion to Strike 

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc #68) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Pierre Lyndon Mijoseph Pierre's Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc #62) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: the court 

GRANTS summary judgment in Pierre's favor on his procedural-due-process claim against 

Defendants and will render declaratory relief by separate order. Pierre's motion in all other 

respects, including his requests for nominal damages and his registration-related declaratory and 

injunctive relief requests, is DENIED. cL 

SIGNED this I day of August, 2022. 

J - ) 1' I 

/ -J L 

LEE YEAL / 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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