UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RYAN CHRISTOPHER EADDY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District 

Judge. (4:10-cr-00604-TLW-1)

Submitted: September 10, 2013 Decided: October 21, 2013

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ryan Eaddy appeals his conviction and 200-month prison 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Eaddy’s counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning whether the district court substantially complied 

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Eaddy’s guilty plea and 

whether Eaddy’s sentence is reasonable. Eaddy, though given the 

opportunity to do so, has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

We affirm.

We first address Eaddy’s guilty plea. Prior to 

accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with 

the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that 

the defendant understands, the nature of the charges to which 

the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum 

possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is 

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). 

The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea 

was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and 

did not result from force, threats, or promises not contained in 

the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “In 
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reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this Court 

should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how 

best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.” 

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).

Because Eaddy did not move to withdraw his guilty plea 

in the district court or raise any objections during the Rule 11 

colloquy, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002). To 

demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there 

was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error 

affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). A defendant’s substantial rights are 

affected if the court determines that the error “influenced the 

defendant’s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to 

evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting 

criminal responsibility.” United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 

402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir. 

2002) (holding that defendant must demonstrate that he would not 

have pled guilty but for the error).

Our review of the record reveals that the district 

court substantially complied with Rule 11. The district court 

properly ensured that Johnson’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and 

supported by a sufficient factual basis. The district court 
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properly informed Eaddy of the maximum possible penalties he 

faced and of the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Though the district court did not inform Eaddy of his right to 

be protected from compelled self-incrimination, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1)(E), we conclude that this error did not affect Eaddy’s 

substantial rights because there is no indication that, but for 

the error, Eaddy would not have pled guilty.

Next, we address the reasonableness of Eaddy’s 

sentence. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th 

Cir. 2009). In so doing, we first examine the sentence for 

significant procedural error, including failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the advisory Sentencing Guidelines 

range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain 

adequately the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When 

considering the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we 

take into account the totality of the circumstances. United 

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 

If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume on 

appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go, 

517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States, 
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551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (permitting appellate presumption of 

reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). Upon review of 

the record, we conclude that the district court did not commit 

procedural error and gave sufficient reasons for Eaddy’s 

within-Guidelines sentence. Moreover, Eaddy has not rebutted 

the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and deny

Eaddy’s motion to remand. This Court requires that counsel 

inform Eaddy, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Eaddy

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in 

this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Eaddy.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED