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309 Nebraska Reports

RYAN v. STRECK, INC.

Cite as 309 Neb. 98

Stacy Ryan, appellant, v. Streck, Inc., 

a Nebraska corporation, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 29, 2021. No. S-20-457.

1. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s 

grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo, 

accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question 

of law, for which an appellate court is obligated to reach an independent 

conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.

3. Courts: Jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018), federal courts 

may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims not otherwise within 

their adjudicatory authority.

4. Actions: Words and Phrases. A cause of action consists of the fact or 

facts which give one a right to judicial relief against another.

5. Breach of Contract. A breach of contract action consists of a promise, 

its breach, damages, and compliance with any conditions precedent.

6. Statutes. A court determines a statute’s meaning based on its text, context, and structure.

7. ____. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if 

it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.

8. Statutes: Words and Phrases. The word “may” generally carries a 

permissive and discretionary meaning; and, when used in a statute, it 

usually implies some degree of discretion.

9. Courts: Jurisdiction: Claims. A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over specified state law claims, which it may (or may not) 

choose to exercise.

10. Courts: Appeal and Error. In deciding whether to remand a matter 

back to the state court, federal courts consider factors such as judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

07/09/2021 08:10 AM CDT
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Cite as 309 Neb. 98

11. Limitations of Actions: Words and Phrases. Tolling under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(d) (2018) means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock.

12. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Nathan 

B. Cox, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Bonnie M. Boryca and Cory R. Wilson, of Erickson & 

Sederstrom, P.C., for appellant.

Victoria H. Buter and Thomas H. Dahlk, of Kutak Rock, 

L.L.P., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ.

Funke, J.

This appeal involves a breach of contract claim filed against 

Streck, Inc., by one of its former shareholders, Stacy Ryan. 

Ryan alleged that Streck breached its contractual obligation 

to redeem her shares at fair market value. Litigation commenced in state court, then proceeded to federal court. The 

case returned to state court, where the court dismissed the case 

on statute of limitations grounds. Ryan appeals and argues the 

statute of limitations on her breach of contract claim was tolled 

either by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2018) or by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-201.01 (Reissue 2016). We agree that § 1367(d) tolled the 

statute of limitations on Ryan’s breach of contract claim and 

that as a result, the claim was timely filed. We reverse, and 

remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1985, Ryan was gifted shares of Streck. In 2012, pursuant to a revised redemption agreement, Streck repurchased 

Ryan’s shares for over $9 million. The revised redemption 

agreement set forth that the value of Ryan’s shares would 

be based upon the most recent valuation completed by Juris 
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Cite as 309 Neb. 98

Valuation Advisors, LLC (JVA). In June 2015, Ryan filed suit 

for breach of contract in the district court for Sarpy County, 

alleging that Streck violated the revised redemption agreement 

by undervaluing the stock. Ryan voluntarily dismissed the 

action without prejudice.

1. Federal District Court

In August 2015, Ryan filed suit in federal district court, 

alleging a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 

Ryan’s complaint also included several state law claims, 

including the breach of contract claim for Streck’s alleged violation of the revised redemption agreement. Streck moved to 

dismiss the complaint, alleging a failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted. On February 18, 2016, the federal district court granted the motion and dismissed the entire 

complaint. In particular, as to the breach of contract claim, 

the federal district court noted that the “[r]evised [p]urchase 

[a]greement stated that the fair market value of the stock would 

be the one ‘set forth in the most recent valuation prepared by 

[JVA] immediately preceding the date of the written notification of the option [to redeem] exercised by [Streck] . . . .’” 

The court noted that Ryan’s complaint did not dispute that the 

price she received for her shares was the amount set forth in 

the most recent valuation immediately preceding her redemption. As a result, the court found that Ryan had not alleged that 

Streck breached any term in the agreement, and it dismissed 

her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.

On March 17, 2016, Ryan filed a motion to alter or amend 

the judgment or to file an amended complaint based on newly 

discovered evidence. The motion alleged that a professional 

appraisal completed in 2014 showed that on March 28, 2012, 

Streck falsely represented that its voting and nonvoting shares 

were worth $3.49 and $3.32 per share, respectively, when 

the fair market value of the shares were in fact worth $8.33 

and $8.09 per share, respectively. The motion alleged that 
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Cite as 309 Neb. 98

on April 12, Streck falsely represented that Ryan’s stock was 

valued at approximately $9.5 million, when the 2014 appraisal 

revealed the stock was worth a total of $23 million as of 

March 7, 2013. The motion further alleged the discovery of 

new evidence which showed that JVA’s 2011 appraisal was 

not the most recent JVA appraisal for purposes of the revised 

redemption agreement. Ryan alleged that the most recent JVA 

appraisal was completed on July 27, 2012, and showed that 

the voting shares were worth $4.42 per share and that the nonvoting shares were worth $4.21 per share. Streck opposed the 

motion to alter and amend.

On June 14, 2016, the federal district court denied Ryan’s 

motion to alter and amend, and denied her request to file an 

amended complaint. In particular, the court stated:

In its Order and Judgment, the Court dismissed all of 

Stacy Ryan’s claims, finding that her allegation that she 

was not paid the fair market value of her stock failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This was 

because the Court determined that Stacy Ryan alleged that 

she was paid an amount calculated in accordance with the 

[r]edemption [a]greement. In other words, although Stacy 

Ryan alleged that the price she received for the stock did 

not reflect the actual fair market value at that time of 

redemption, she did not dispute that the price reflected 

the fair market value as calculated by the 2011 [JVA] 

valuation, which she admitted was the most recent [JVA] 

valuation at the time. Because this was all the [r]edemption [a]greement required Streck to pay to redeem the 

stock, Stacy Ryan could not establish that any wrongful 

conduct by Defendants caused her to incur a loss, nor that 

Defendants breached the [r]edemption [a]greement. This 

finding proved fatal to all of her claims, and the Court 

granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 1

1 Ryan v. Ryan, No.8:15CV312, 2016 WL 3264236 *2 (D. Neb. May 7, 

2018), reversed in part 889 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 2018).
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2. Eighth Circuit Court

On July 12, 2016, Ryan filed a second motion to alter or 

amend the judgment, arguing that she had become aware of 

previously sealed deposition testimony from another litigation 

matter involving Streck, which, she alleged, supported her 

contention that inaccurate information was provided to JVA 

by Streck. The next day, Ryan appealed the denial of the first 

motion to alter or amend to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Eighth Circuit. Subsequently, the federal district court denied 

Ryan’s second motion to alter or amend on the basis that the 

filing of the notice of appeal conferred jurisdiction on the 

appellate court and divested the district court of its control of 

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. 2

In May 2018, the Eighth Circuit entered an order affirming the dismissal of Ryan’s federal and state securities law 

claims, as well as her state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, and shareholder oppression. The Eighth Circuit further concluded that on 

appeal, Ryan had not “meaningfully argued that the remaining 

claims—conversion, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, 

and breach of contract—were improperly dismissed” and as 

such, challenges to the dismissal of those claims were waived. 3

Although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order 

dismissing the complaint, it remanded the matter “for further 

consideration of whether [Ryan’s] post-dismissal motion to 

alter or amend presented newly discovered evidence warranting alteration of the order dismissing her breach of contract 

claim.” 4 In particular, the Eighth Circuit noted:

Here, the record reflects that a document in Defendants’ 

custody and control that contradicts the factual basis for 

their motions to dismiss the breach of contract claim 

was first discovered after briefing and submission of 

2 See id.

3 Ryan, supra note 1, 889 F.3d at 507.

4 Id. at 502.
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Cite as 309 Neb. 98

those motions. Given “the Rule 15(a)(2) considerations 

that favor affording parties an opportunity to test their 

claims on the merits,” . . . we are not prepared to rule 

categorically that this evidence may not qualify as newly 

discovered for purposes of reconsidering Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal of the breach of contract claim. Further inquiry 

is required. 5

3. Federal District Court on Remand

On remand, in a September 24, 2018, order, the federal district court noted that the decision before it was “whether it will 

continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the only 

claim remaining in this case.” The court noted that at the outset 

of the case, the court had supplemental jurisdiction over Ryan’s 

breach of contract claim under § 1367 and that “‘[a] district 

court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction 

after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.’”

The federal district court indicated:

In considering the factor of fairness, the Court recognizes that it must be cognizant of the applicable statute 

of limitations. To the extent that the limitations period 

is a concern, . . . § 25-201.01 affords [Ryan] additional 

time [6 months] to file her breach-of-contract claim in 

Nebraska state court following this Court’s decision to 

decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Ultimately, the federal district court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim, 

concluding that after the affirmance of the dismissal, no claims 

remained giving jurisdiction to the federal courts. However, 

the court clarified, in a footnote, that it was not dismissing the breach of contract claim for any reason provided in 

§ 25-201.01(2), but that it was exercising its discretion to 

decline supplemental jurisdiction over the claim.

5 Id. at 509.
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RYAN v. STRECK, INC.

Cite as 309 Neb. 98

4. Sarpy County District Court

On March 22, 2019, Ryan filed a new complaint for breach 

of contract in the district court for Sarpy County, followed by 

an amended complaint on August 27. Streck moved to strike 

various allegations in the amended complaint, arguing that it 

went beyond the limited remand allowed by the Eighth Circuit. 

Streck also moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

On November 4, 2019, the court heard Streck’s motions. 

Streck argued that the amended complaint contained allegations beyond the breach of contract claim and sought an 

amended pleading. In response, Ryan detailed the history of 

the case and noted that on remand to the federal district court, 

the federal district court dismissed the complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction and opted to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it was merely a breach of contract claim under 

state law. Ryan also argued to the court that she was allowed 

to refile her claim in state court under the savings provision for 

the statute of limitations.

The district court for Sarpy County entered an order on 

May 22, 2020, which granted Streck’s motion to dismiss. 

According to the order, after the November 4, 2019, hearing, the court had instructed the parties to brief the issue 

of whether the statute of limitations had run on the breach 

of contract claim. In dismissing the case, the district court 

first rejected Ryan’s argument that the court could not consider the issue regarding the statute of limitations sua sponte 

when Streck had not raised such an affirmative defense in its 

motion to dismiss. The court cited Welsch v. Graves,

 6 where 

this court stated that “[w]hen it is apparent from the face of 

the petition that the action is barred by a statute of limitations, the petition fails to state a cause of action and is subject 

to a demurrer.”

6 Welsch v. Graves, 255 Neb. 62, 65, 582 N.W.2d 312, 325 (1998).
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The court then noted that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-205 

(Reissue 2016), the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim is 5 years. The court also noted that the breach 

of contract claim accrued in August 2012 and that the first 

action was filed and voluntarily dismissed in August 2015. 

Because there is no tolling under § 25-201.01 for a voluntary dismissal, the court determined the voluntary dismissal 

did not affect the statute of limitations that would expire in 

August 2017.

The court then went on to explain that it agreed with Streck 

that the federal district court did not exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim upon remand 

from the Eighth Circuit. The court reasoned that “[b]ecause 

the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claim 

that provided the [federal district court] with subject matter 

jurisdiction, there could not have been an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the precise breach of contract claim 

remanded on the basis of alleged newly discovered evidence.” 

The court found the breach of contract claim was not tolled 

under § 1367(d) and dismissed the action as untimely.

Ryan appeals. We moved the case to our docket on our 

own motion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the 

pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in 

the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party. 7

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for 

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the 

court below. 8

7 Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 302 Neb. 442, 923 N.W.2d 717 

(2019).

8 Id.
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III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Ryan assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) 

finding that the federal district court did not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her breach of contract claim, (2) finding that § 1367(d) did not toll the statute of limitations on her 

2012 breach of contract action while it was pending in federal 

court, (3) finding that § 25-201.01 did not toll the statute of 

limitations on her 2012 breach of contract action while it was 

pending in federal court, and (4) raising the affirmative defense 

of statute of limitations sua sponte and dismissing her amended 

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction

[3] Ryan contends that the district court erred in determining that the federal district court did not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law breach of contract claim. 

Ryan argues that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 

§ 1367, enables federal district courts to entertain claims not 

otherwise within their adjudicatory authority.

Streck argues that the state district court correctly found 

that, because the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 

Ryan’s federal claims, the federal district court could not 

have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over “the precise 

breach of contract claim remanded on the basis of alleged 

newly discovered evidence.” However, Streck sets forth no 

case law or statutory authority, nor do we find any, to support 

this contention.

Section 1367 provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or 

as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in 

any civil action of which the district courts have original 

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to 
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claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 

they form part of the same case or controversy under 

Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the 

joinder or intervention of additional parties.

. . . .

(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of 

State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the 

claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

Neither party disputes that under § 1367, the federal district 

court initially had supplemental jurisdiction over Ryan’s state 

law breach of contract claim because that claim formed part of 

the same case or controversy as her claims under the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934. Although the federal district court dismissed both the federal and state claims, Ryan timely filed her 

motion to amend in which she raised the issue of newly discovered evidence to support her breach of contract claim. When 

the federal district court overruled the motion to amend, Ryan 

then timely appealed.

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that one piece of 

the allegedly newly discovered evidence may tend to show 

one or more material issues of disputed fact as to Ryan’s 

breach of contract claim, which merited a limited remand. 9

The Eighth Circuit also determined that there was no need 

to amend Ryan’s complaint, because the federal district 

9 Ryan, supra note 1.
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court, with comparable foundation, could take judicial notice 

of the 2012 per share values, just as it did with the 2011 per 

share values. 10

It is clear that upon remand, the federal district court continued to have supplemental jurisdiction over the case and 

maintained the authority to consider the merits of the breach 

of contract claim. The federal district court intimated as much 

when it framed the issue before it as to “whether [the court 

would] continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

only claim remaining in this case.”

[4,5] Additionally, the record supports Ryan’s contention 

that the federal district court had supplemental jurisdiction 

over the state breach of contract claim from the beginning and 

that it continued to have jurisdiction over the state breach of 

contract claim until it chose to dismiss it on remand. A cause 

of action consists of the fact or facts which give one a right 

to judicial relief against another. 11 A breach of contract action 

consists of a promise, its breach, damages, and compliance 

with any conditions precedent. 12 Here, Ryan’s breach of contract claim arose out of the set of facts alleging that Streck 

failed to pay Ryan the fair value of her stocks as required 

under the revised redemption agreement. The newly discovered evidence did not create a new cause of action, but merely 

provided Ryan additional evidence to support her breach of 

contract claim.

The federal district court’s determination to dismiss the case 

after remand does not diminish its exercise of supplemental 

jurisdiction to that point. Under § 1367(c)(3), the federal district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over a claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction.

10 Id.

11 Saunders Cty. v. City of Lincoln, 263 Neb. 170, 638 N.W.2d 824 (2002).

12 See Kotrous v. Zerbe, 287 Neb. 1033, 846 N.W.2d 122 (2014).
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[6-8] A court determines a statute’s meaning based on its 

text, context, and structure. 13 A court must attempt to give 

effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, 

clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless. 14 Federal courts have recognized that the word “may” 

generally carries a permissive and discretionary meaning. 15 In 

fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that the word 

“may,” when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of 

discretion. 16 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that the 

decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining 

state law claims, after dismissing every claim over which it 

had original jurisdiction, is purely discretionary. 17 The Eighth 

Circuit has also stated that “‘[i]t is within the district court’s 

discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal 

of the federal claim.’” 18

[9,10] In Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe,

 19 plaintiffs filed a 

complaint against several defendants in federal district court, 

alleging violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act, in addition to state law claims for 

breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and civil conspiracy. 

Subsequently, the court granted the defendants’ motion to 

13 See In re Application Obtain Discovery in Foreign Pro., 939 F.3d 710 (6th 

Cir. 2019). See, also, Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 

306 Neb. 947, 947 N.W.2d 731 (2020).

14 Ash Grove Cement Co., supra note 13. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 

124 S. Ct. 2276, 159 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2004).

15 See Haroun v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 929 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 

2019) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 112-15 (2012)).

16 See United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 103 S. Ct. 2132, 76 L. Ed. 2d 

236 (1983).

17 See Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2011).

18 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 581 F.3d 737, 749 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Quinn v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 470 F.3d 1240 (8th Cir. 

2006)).

19 Crest Const. II, Inc., supra note 17.
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dismiss the federal claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 20 On 

appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over specified state law claims, which 

it may (or may not) choose to exercise. 21 The Eighth Circuit 

ultimately found that the federal district court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 

noting that a federal district court is afforded broad discretion in determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 22 Exercising this discretionary authority, federal courts, in 

deciding whether to remand a matter back to the state court, 

consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 23

In the present case, on remand, the federal district court’s 

decision whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Ryan’s state law breach of contract claim was a 

purely discretionary one. The federal district court’s September 

24, 2018, order acknowledged its broad discretionary authority 

and, in determining whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim, considered 

the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity. Although the federal district court ultimately dismissed 

the breach of contract claim, it made it clear that it was not dismissing the claim for any reason under § 25-201.01(2), but that 

it was merely exercising its discretion to decline supplemental 

jurisdiction over the claim.

At the time Ryan refiled her breach of contract claim in 

state district court, the issue of supplemental jurisdiction had 

already been resolved in the affirmative and was no longer an 

issue. The only issue before the state district court was whether 

Ryan’s claim was tolled by either federal or state statute. 

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id. (citing Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002)).

23 See, Glorvigen, supra note 18; Quinn, supra note 18.
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Therefore, the state district court erred in finding that the federal district court did not continue to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Ryan’s breach of contract claim.

2. Tolling Statutes

(a) Federal Law

Ryan next argues that the state district court erred in determining that § 1367(d) did not toll the statute of limitations 

on her breach of contract action while it was pending in federal court.

The state district court found that the breach of contract 

claim was “never tolled” under § 1367(d) based on the reasoning that the federal district court could not have exercised 

supplemental jurisdiction over Ryan’s breach of contract claim. 

Since we have concluded that the federal district court did 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ryan’s breach of contract claim upon remand, we must consider the effect of § 1367 

on Ryan’s second action in the state district court.

Section 1367(d) states:

The period of limitations for any claim asserted under 

subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action 

that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after 

the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be 

tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 

days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a 

longer tolling period.

In Artis v. District of Columbia,

 24 the U.S. Supreme Court 

discussed whether the word “tolled,” as used in § 1367, meant 

that the state limitations period is suspended during the pendency of the federal suit or whether the word “tolled” meant 

that, although the state limitations period continues to run, 

a plaintiff is accorded a grace period of 30 days to refile in 

state court after dismissal of the federal case. In December 

24 Artis v. District of Columbia, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 594, 199 L. Ed. 2d 

473 (2018).
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2011, Stephanie Artis sued her employer in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that she had suffered employment discrimination in violation of title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. She also asserted three allied claims 

under District of Columbia law. 25

In June 2014, the federal district court dismissed Artis’ title 

VII claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Artis’ state law claims. 26 The district court noted that Artis 

would not be prejudiced because § 1367(d) provided for “‘a 

tolling of the statute of limitations during the period the case 

was here and for at least 30 days thereafter.’” 27 Artis then filed 

her state law claims in the District of Columbia Superior Court 

59 days after the dismissal of her federal suit. 28

[11] The superior court dismissed Artis’ claims on the basis 

that they were filed 29 days too late, because when Artis first 

filed her claims in the federal district court, nearly 2 years 

remained on the applicable 3-year statute of limitations. 29

However, 21⁄2 years had passed before the federal district court 

relinquished jurisdiction. 30 The superior court rejected Artis’ 

argument that § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations on 

her claims, and it reasoned that Artis could have protected her 

state law claims by “‘pursuing [them] in a state court while 

the federal court proceeding [was] pending.’” 31 On appeal, 

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior Court and agreed that § 1367(d) did not 

stop the clock, but merely provided a 30-day grace period 

for Artis to refile her state law claims in state court. 32 On 

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id., 138 S. Ct. at 599-600.

28 Artis, supra note 24.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id., 138 S. Ct. at 600.

32 Artis, supra note 24.
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subsequent appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme 

Court disagreed and held that § 1367(d)’s instruction to toll 

a state limitations period meant to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to 

stop the clock. 33 As a result, the Court found that Artis’ claim 

was not barred by the statute of limitations. 34

Here, Ryan’s breach of contract claim accrued in August 

2012. She then filed her action in federal district court in 

August 2015. After Ryan spent nearly 3 years actively litigating in the federal court system, the federal district court ultimately declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her 

breach of contract claim and dismissed the same in September 

2018. Then, in March 2019, Ryan refiled her action in state 

district court.

Although § 25-205 provides a 5-year statute of limitations 

on breach of contract claims, following the U.S. Supreme 

Court’s holding in Artis, § 1367(d) tolled the state statute of 

limitations on Ryan’s breach of contract claim during the time 

the claim was being litigated in federal court. In other words, 

because the federal district court was exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over Ryan’s breach of contract claim, the clock 

stopped on the state limitations period in August 2015 when 

she first filed her cause of action in federal court. When the 

federal district court dismissed Ryan’s breach of contract claim 

in September 2018, Ryan still had over 2 years to refile her 

breach of contract claim in state district court. Thus, when 

Ryan refiled her claim in state district court in March 2019, 

such claim was timely.

(b) State Law

[12] Ryan also argues that the state district court erred in 

determining that her breach of contract claim was not tolled 

by § 25-201.01. Streck, in turn, argues that Ryan could have 

filed her claim in state district court within the statute of 

33 Id.

34 See id. See, also, Puetz v. Spectrum Health Hospitals, 324 Mich. App. 51, 

919 N.W.2d 439 (2018).
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limitations, citing our decision in Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue 

Shield.

 35 However, because we conclude that the limitations 

period for Ryan’s breach of contract claim was tolled under 

§ 1367(d), we need not consider other reasons why the limitations period may have been tolled. An appellate court is not 

obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it. 36

3. Remaining Issues

Ryan also argues the state district court erred in raising 

the affirmative defense of statute of limitations sua sponte. 

Similarly, because we have concluded that Ryan’s state law 

breach of contract claim was effectively tolled by § 1367(d), 

we decline to consider this assignment of error.

V. CONCLUSION

The state district court erred in dismissing Ryan’s breach 

of contract claim. The federal district court employed its 

discretionary authority in declining to continue to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. 

It was erroneous for the state district court to determine that 

the federal district court could not have continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. Additionally, 

because the federal district court was exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over the claim, under federal law, the statute of 

limitations on Ryan’s breach of contract claim was tolled during the pendency of the federal case. Ryan’s claim was timely 

filed within the 5-year limitations period. The judgment of 

dismissal is reversed and the matter is remanded for further 

proceedings.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.

Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.

35 Brodine v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 272 Neb. 713, 724 N.W.2d 321 (2006).

36 City of Sidney v. Municipal Energy Agency of Neb., 301 Neb. 147, 917 

N.W.2d 826 (2018).