UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and COMMONWEALTH OF 

MASSACHUSETTS ex rel. 

JAIDEEP S. CHAWLA, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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6:20-CV-00362-ADA-JCM 

United States’ Response in 

Opposition to [12] Motion for 

Appointment and [13] Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction 

UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RELATOR’S MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROCESS SERVER AND RELATOR’S MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AS TO DEFENDANTS INTERNAL 

REVENUE SERVICE AND MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE 

The United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Relator Jaideep S. Chawla’s 

motion for appointment of a special process server (ECF No. 12) and motion for a preliminary 

injunction (ECF No. 13). 

On July 30, 2020, Judge Manske recommended that the Court grant the United States’ 

motion to dismiss this frivolous qui tam action. (ECF No. 10.) Relator did not file an opposition 

to the United States’ motion to dismiss, nor did he object to the magistrate judge’s recommended 

disposition of that motion. Accordingly, the United States asks this Court to adopt the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation, dismiss this action, and deny Relator’s pending motions as moot. See 

Local Rule CV-7(e)(2) (“If there is no response filed within the time period prescribed by this rule, 

the court may grant the motion as unopposed.”); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th 

Cir. 1989) (holding that district court may apply the “clearly erroneous” standard of review where 

party fails to objection to magistrate judge’s recommendation).

Should the Court decide to address Relator’s motions notwithstanding the United States’ 

meritorious motion to dismiss, it should deny them for the reasons set forth below. 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO [12] MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 

AND [13] MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 2 

1. Motion for Appointment of Special Process Server. Relator asks this Court to appoint 

a special process server to serve the defendants. (ECF No. 12 at 1.) In the alternative, he asks the 

Court to extend and/or clarify the deadline for service. (Id.) Relator’s request is premature, as the 

summons and complaint in a qui tam action “shall not be served on the defendant until the court 

so orders.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). It is only after the court orders service that Rule 4(m)’s 90-day 

deadline to serve the complaint commences. See U.S. ex rel. Gudar v. Texas Dep’t of Health, No. 

H-00-CV-1169, 2002 WL 511483, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2002). Because the Court has not 

yet ordered Relator to serve the defendants, it would be inappropriate to appoint a special process 

server at this time.1

 Nor should the Court extend or clarify a deadline that does not yet exist. 

Instead, the United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Relator’s motion. 

2. Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Relator also seeks an injunction “halting any state 

and federal tax proceedings” against him, including “the Internal Revenue Service’s ongoing audit 

and collection process and the associated, automatic tax assessment(s) from the Massachusetts 

Department of Revenue.” (ECF No. 13 at 1.) This request runs afoul of the Tax Anti-Injunction 

Act, which provides—with limited exceptions—that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the 

assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7421(a); see also Keese v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 85, 89 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (explaining that 

the Act applies to requests to enjoin audits or other efforts by the IRS to “collect[] information that 

is intended to or may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes”). A related statute provides 

that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any 

tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such 

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341; see Fontaine v. U.S. Gov’t, No. 04-CV-30080, 2004 WL 2284499, at *2 

 

1

 Even were that not the case, a court should appoint a special process server only where “a 

particular person is needed or that person needs to be given an authority that is not available to the 

ordinary private process server.” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1091 (4th ed. 2020). 

Here, no special authority is needed to send a summons and copy of the complaint to each of the 

federal and state defendants by certified mail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2) (service of United States 

agencies and officers); Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) (service of Massachusetts agencies and officers). 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO [12] MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 

AND [13] MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 3 

(D. Mass. July 22, 2004) (“There is no question that Massachusetts provides taxpayers with ‘plain, 

speedy and efficient’ remedies.”). 

 Even assuming Relator’s motion for a preliminary injunction were not barred by 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7421 and 28 U.S.C. § 1341, Relator provides no basis for this Court to award injunctive relief in 

this case: 

A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that should be granted only 

if the movant establishes (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a 

substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the 

threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if 

the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the 

public interest. 

Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Here, Relator has little likelihood of success on the merits, for the reasons already set 

forth in Judge Manske’s recommendation on the motion to dismiss. Nor does Relator face 

irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, as any allegedly improper tax assessment may 

be challenged at a later date by seeking a refund.2

 Finally, the public interest would be disserved 

by an injunction, particularly in light of the fact that Relator improperly seeks to enjoin the Internal 

Revenue Service (an agency of the United States) and the Massachusetts Department of Revenue 

(an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts) in a case purportedly brought on behalf of 

the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In effect, he seeks an order forcing 

the government to enjoin itself. (See ECF No. 8 at 3.) 

 WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this action 

and deny as moot Relator’s motion for appointment of a special process server and motion for a 

preliminary injunction. 

 

2

 Indeed, Congress enacted § 7421 to “protect the government’s need to assess and collect taxes 

as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement interference, and to require that 

the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.” Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 

1278, 1282 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO [12] MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 

AND [13] MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 4 

Dated: October 16, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

GREGG N. SOFER 

United States Attorney 

/s/ Thomas A. Parnham, Jr. 

THOMAS A. PARNHAM, JR. 

Assistant United States Attorney 

New York Bar No. 4775706 

903 San Jacinto Blvd, Suite 334 

Austin, Texas 78701 

(512) 916-5858 (tel) 

(512) 916-5854 (fax) 

thomas.parnham@usdoj.gov 

Attorneys for the United States 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on October 16, 2020, I caused the foregoing to be served on Relator at the 

below listed address via first class U.S. mail: 

Jaideep S. Chawla 

379 Amherst Street #214 

Nashua, NH 03063 

 /s/ Thomas A. Parnham, Jr. 

THOMAS A. PARNHAM, JR. 

Assistant United States Attorney