# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2020

Decided May 12, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

J OSEPH HAZLEY, Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-CR-00430(1)

Sharon Johnson Coleman, J udge

.

O R D E R
Joseph Hazley was convicted by a jury of six sex-trafficking counts related to his recruitment of two women and a minor girl into prostitution in 2016. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)–(c), 1594(c), 2421(a). The district cour t sentenced him to a within-guidelines term of 384 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 7 years’ supervised release. Hazley appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Hazley has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the issues that he raises. See United States v. Bey
, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 19-2160 Page 2

Counsel first considers whether the distri ct court may have violated Hazley’s Fourth Amendment rights by allowing th e government to introduce evidence of location data gleaned from cell-tower record s to show that he drove from Illinois to Ohio to recruit a woman forcibly into prostitution. See Carpenter v. United States
, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). But even if we assume that Hazley’s failure to challenge the admission of this data amounted to a forfeiture (rather than a waiver), see United States v. Dridi , 952 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2020), we agr ee with counsel that an appellate challenge would be frivolous. The jury acqu itted Hazley of the charge related to the Ohio trip, so any error in admitting the ev idence would not have affected the verdict and would therefore be harmless. See United States v. Chaparro , 956 F.3d 462, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel next considers whether Hazley could challenge the district court’s denial of his post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, and correctly concludes that he could not. On appeal, we would view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and reverse only if the record was “devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cooper , 767 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Johnson , 729 F.3d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2013)). And here, ample evidence supported each of the six counts of conviction.
To start, a rational jury could conclude from the evidence that Hazley trafficked a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). To prove this charg e, the government needed to show that Hazley enticed a minor to engage in a commercial sex act either after learning of her age, recklessly disregarding it, or having the “reasonable opportunity to observe” her. Id . § 1591(c); C OMM

. ON F ED

. C RIM

. J URY I NSTRUCTIONS OF THE S EVENTH C IR ., P ATTERN C RIM

. J URY I NSTRUCTIONS OF THE S EVENTH C IR ., at 512 (2012), www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ pattern-jury-instructions/Pattern_Crimi nal_Jury_Instructions_2012ed_includes_2015- 2019_changes.pdf; see United States v. Wearing , 865 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the jury could rely on witness testimony to support each of these elements. Witnesses stated that for about a month in 2016, Hazl ey lived with a 16-year-old girl whom he daily escorted to 5 to 6 “dates” (appointm ents for commercial sex). One witness added that she and the minor went on dates toge ther a few times at Hazley’s behest. Corroborating the witness account were advert isements for commercial sex posted on Backpage.com (an online classified-adver tising forum)—generated from Hazley’s computer and featuring photos of both th e witness and the minor. As for Hazley’s awareness of the girl’s status as a minor, mu ltiple witnesses testified that she appeared or acted younger than eighteen, and one stated that she asked for the girl’sNo. 19-2160 Page 3

identification in Hazley’s presence, but he es corted her out before the girl could answer. From these facts, a jury could conclude th at Hazley had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor, as well as the sufficient mens rea for this offense. See United States v. Whyte , 928 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 875 (2020) (defendant had “reasonable opportunity to observe” vict im when they lived together for about two months).
Next, a reasonable jury could conclude th at Hazley was part of a conspiracy to traffic the girl. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). To prove this charge, the government had to show that a plan to traffic a minor existed and that Hazley joined it with an intent to help carry it out. P ATTERN C RIM

. J URY I NSTRUCTIONS at 70. Here, the jury could rely on a co-defendant’s testimony that he introduced the minor to Hazley based on Hazley’s offer to give him a “finder’s fee” for bringing him women who wanted to “make money.” See United States v. Faulkner , 885 F.3d 488, 492–93 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding RICO conspiracy charge based on cooperat ing witness testimony that he acted at defendant’s direction).
Sufficient evidence also could support th e four remaining counts—each of which alleged that Hazley “transported” an adul t woman through interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging her in commercial sex acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). For each count, the government needed to show that Hazley took the woman across state lines, and that he intended for her to engage in prostitution at the time of the trip. P ATTERN C RIM

. J URY I NSTRUCTIONS at 690. Here, the victim herself te stified that in late October and November 2016, Hazley drove her from Illinois to Indiana three times to set up dates for her in Indianapolis. Her testimony wa s corroborated by posts on Backpage.com featuring her photo and advertising her avai lability for dates in Indianapolis—posts that, she attested, were made by Hazley. Then, upon bringing her back to Illinois after these trips, Hazley set up more dates for her using Backpage.com. Because each leg of each trip could count as a separate violatio n of § 2421, a jury reasonably could conclude from this evidence that Hazley violat ed the statute at least four times. See United States v. Haslage , 853 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2017) (crime be gins when “defendant set[s] out with the intent to cross a state line and commit the crime”); see also United States v. McGuire , 627 F.3d 622, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2010) (§ 2421 transportation need not be for sole purpose of prostitution).
Finally, counsel considers whether Hazley could make any nonfrivolous challenge to his sentence and correctly conc ludes that he could not. First, Hazley’s 384-month prison term did not exceed th e statutory-maximum sentence of lifeNo. 19-2160 Page 4

imprisonment, so he could not argue that it violated the law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(b), 1594(c). Second, the court properly calculated a guidelines range of 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment based on an offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. This calculation approp riately included (over Hazley’s objection) an enhancement for the use of a computer be cause he created online advertisements for commercial sex with a minor. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B); United States v. McMillian
, 777 F.3d 444, 449–50 (7th Cir. 2015). Third, counse l rightly concludes that Hazley could not challenge the substantive reasonable ness of his sentence because the court considered thoroughly the factors set fort h in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): In justifying the sentence, the court highlighted the seriousn ess of the offense (Hazley exploited his victims’ immaturity and put them in harm’s way); Hazley’s personal characteristics (that he grew up without a father and that his incarceration would leave two of his own children behind); and the probability that Hazl ey would be less likely to reoffend upon release because he then would be of advanced age.

We therefore GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.