If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

OWEN R. SCHROEDER and ANGELA RAE 

JONES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

March 23, 2023

v No. 360472

Muskegon Circuit Court

COUNTY OF MUSKEGON DHS, also known as 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, TIA RYMAL, LINDSEY 

LASSANSKE, KATHY SHOLTE, also known as 

KATHY SHOLTY, AND BRIAN CHARRON,

LC No. 2021-004341-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Owen R. Schroeder and Angela Rae Jones, appeal as of right the trial court’s 

order granting defendants, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Tia Rymal, 

Lindsey Lassanske, Kathy Sholte, and Brian Charron summary disposition of plaintiff’s libel 

action under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8) because defendants were immune from liability, the claim 

was time-barred, and plaintiffs failed to state a claim. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Schroeder is Jones’s father. Jones had her parental rights to five children terminated. 

Plaintiffs’ libel claim arose from events that occurred at the end of Jones’s termination of parentalrights proceedings. During one of Jones’s parenting-time visits in October 2019, Rymal, a DHHS 

caseworker on Jones’s case, observed Schroeder exhibit what she considered inappropriate 

behavior and Jones failed to intervene. Following the visit, Rymal changed the location of 

remaining visits to the DHHS office. At the end of October 2019, on the last day of Jones’s 

parental-rights termination trial, Rymal explained to the trial court that she moved the remaining 

visits, in part, because of Schroeder’s behavior during the visit which to the court she characterized 
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as threatening. Rymal included information about Schroeder’s behavior in Jones’s case service 

plan which was published on November 26, 2019.

After the termination of her parental rights, Jones made multiple requests for documents 

associated with her case for over 16 months, including the case service plan, but received only one 

unrequested report. In March 2021, Lassanske, one of Rymal’s supervisors, provided Jones with 

the requested documents including the case service plan. In July 2021, Schroeder e-mailed 

defendants about statements contained in the case service plan that he believed were false. In a 

reply, defendants explained that they could not retract the specified statements from the case 

service plan.

In October 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendants libeled Schroeder in 

the case service plan. In November 2021, defendants moved for summary disposition under

MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered an order granting 

summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary dispositions de novo. Barnard 

Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 

(2009). Review of a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) requires us 

to consider “all documentary evidence and accept[s] the complaint as factually accurate unless 

affidavits or other documents presented specifically contradict it.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 

656; 790 NW2d 629 (2010). “The applicability of governmental immunity is a question of law 

that is reviewed de novo on appeal.” Herman v Detroit, 261 Mich App 141, 143; 680 NW2d 71 

(2004). We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation and application of a statute. McLean v 

McElhaney, 289 Mich App 592, 596; 798 NW2d 29 (2010). When a claim is barred because of 

immunity granted by law, summary disposition is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7). 

Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 58; 860 NW2d 67 (2014). We also review de novo 

whether a claim is barred by a statute of limitations and a trial court’s interpretation and application 

of the limitations period. Stephens v Worden Ins Agency, LLC, 307 Mich App 220, 227-228; 859 

NW2d 723 (2014). A motion for summary disposition based on a statute of limitations is properly 

brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Nucolovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 61; 783 NW2d 124 (2010).

III. ANALYSIS

A. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(7) on government immunity grounds because the DHHS engaged in an ultra vires act by

not making the case service plan available upon request. We disagree.

Aside from certain exceptions, none of which plaintiffs argue apply, “a governmental 

agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or 

discharge of a governmental function.” MCL 691.1407(1). A “governmental function” is “an 

activity that is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter 

or ordinance, or other law.” MCL 691.1401(b). The determination whether an activity qualifies 
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as a governmental function must focus on the “general activity involved rather than the specific 

conduct engaged in when the alleged injury occurred.” Ward v Mich State Univ (On Remand), 

287 Mich App 76, 84; 782 NW2d 514 (2010).

Under MCL 712A.18f(2) and (3), in the course of a termination-of-parental-rights case, the

DHHS must prepare a case service plan that provides the trial court with information “for placing 

the child in the most family-like setting available and in as close proximity to the child’s parents’

home as is consistent with the child’s best interests and special needs.” In this case, the creation 

and revision of the case service plan for the investigation and provision of information concerning 

the children and the family for Jones’s termination-of-parental-rights case constituted general 

activity in which the DHHS is engaged. See MCL 712A.18f(4) and (5). Construing the term 

“governmental function” broadly, as this Court must do, Maskery v Bd of Regents of Univ of Mich, 

468 Mich 609, 614; 664 NW2d 165 (2003), we conclude that the Probate Code expressly mandated 

and authorized this activity. See MCL 712.18f. The DHHS engaged in a governmental function 

by creating and revising the case service plan. Accordingly, the DHHS was entitled to 

governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(1).

Plaintiffs argue that Rymal, Lassanske, Sholte, and Charron were not entitled to summary 

disposition of their claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because they engaged in ultra vires acts. We 

disagree.

A caseworker or supervisor with the DHHS is immune from tort liability if engaged in the 

initiation and monitoring of court-supervised child placement proceedings. Martin v Children’s 

Aid Society, 215 Mich App 88, 93, 97; 544 NW2d 651 (1996). This Court first recognized absolute 

immunity from tort liability for social workers who initiated and monitored court-supervised child 

placement proceedings in Martin. More recently, this Court explained that “[s]ocial workers are 

granted absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of their work as ‘advisors and agents’

of the” family division of the circuit court because “without the threat of civil litigation, social 

workers have more freedom to honestly assess a particular situation” in court-supervised child 

placement proceedings. Beauford v Lewis, 269 Mich App 295, 300; 711 NW2d 783 (2005). 

Indeed, such workers are entitled to absolute immunity for “initiating and monitoring child 

placement proceedings” to ensure that the caseworkers can make the discretionary decisions that 

they believe are in the children’s best interests without fear of litigation. Spikes v Banks, 231 Mich 

App 341, 346-347; 586 NW2d 106 (1998); Martin, 215 Mich App at 95-98.

In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs’ libel claim originated from a child protection 

proceeding involving the termination of Jones’s parental rights during which the trial court 

oversaw Jones’s case and reviewed the case service plan for Rymal’s findings and 

recommendations. Rymal, a caseworker, Lassanske and Sholte, Rymal’s supervisors, and 

Charron, their manager, were assigned by the DHHS to investigate Jones’s conduct with her 

children that resulted in the initiation of a termination proceeding against Jones, which involved 

monitoring of the children’s well-being and Jones’s progress, and the determination whether 

termination of Jones’s parental rights served the children’s best interests. These defendants 

engaged in governmental functions and were entitled to immunity granted by law.
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B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by ruling their claim time-barred under the 

applicable statute of limitations. We disagree.

Under MCL 600.5805(1), “[A] person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover 

damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or 

to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within” the applicable 

period of limitations. “The period of limitations is 1 year for an action charging libel or slander.”

MCL 600.5805(11). A claim accrues “at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was 

done regardless of the time when damage results.” MCL 600.5827. An action for libel accrues 

from the date of publication of the libelous statement. Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415, 433; 

957 NW2d 357 (2020). The record reflects that plaintiffs based their libel claim on statements 

published on or about November 26, 2019. Plaintiffs, however, did not file their complaint until

October 11, 2021. Their libel claim, therefore, was time-barred by MCL 600.5805(11).

Plaintiffs contend that the one-year limitations period for their libel claims was tolled 

because of fraudulent concealment. Fraudulent concealment may toll the running of a statute of 

limitations. Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop, 264 Mich App 632, 642; 692 NW2d 398 (2004). 

MCL 600.5855, the fraudulent concealment statute, provides:

If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the 

existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim from 

the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the action may be 

commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is entitled to bring the 

action discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim or the 

identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would 

otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.

To establish fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must show an affirmative act or misrepresentation 

on the defendant’s part designed to conceal the existence of the claim or the identity of a potential 

defendant. Doe, 264 Mich App at 642-643. A plaintiff must “plead in the complaint the acts or 

misrepresentations that comprised the fraudulent concealment.” Id. at 643 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Mere silence is insufficient.” Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp, 220 Mich App 303, 

310; 559 NW2d 348 (1996). “If there is a known cause of action there can be no fraudulent 

concealment which will interfere with the operation of the statute, and in this behalf a party will 

be held to know what he ought to know . . . .” Weast v Duffie, 272 Mich 534, 539; 262 NW 401 

(1935) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[i]f liability were discoverable 

from the outset, then MCL 600.5855 will not toll the applicable period of limitations.” Prentis 

Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 48; 698 

NW2d 900 (2005).

Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ failure to comply with multiple requests for production 

of documents to which they were entitled precluded defendants from asserting the period of 

limitations as a legitimate defense. The record indicates that, as of October 2019, plaintiffs 

suspected that a libel claim existed because they believed Rymal provided false testimony to the 

trial court and that the information would be reported in the case service plan. Plaintiffs argue, 
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however, that they only discovered the claim after obtaining the case service plan in March 2021. 

Plaintiffs contend that defendants intentionally withheld the case service plan which permitted

them to invoke the statutory remedy available for fraudulent concealment under MCL 600.5855. 

We disagree.

MCL 600.5855 requires focusing on whether defendants “fraudulently conceal[ed] the 

existence of [a] claim . . . from the knowledge of” plaintiffs. For plaintiffs’ theory to be viable, 

there must be evidence that defendants did not provide the case service plan to plaintiffs to conceal 

the existence of the libel claim from them. This proposition necessarily fails because plaintiffs 

admitted that they suspected a libel claim as early as October 2019. Plaintiffs have failed to prove 

that defendants concealed plaintiffs’ cause of action or withheld information to induce plaintiffs 

to refrain from filing a complaint or caused plaintiffs to be unaware that a cause of action might 

exist. Even if they were not completely confident about the suspected libel claim, plaintiffs could 

have filed a complaint against defendants within the one-year limitations period. Plaintiffs’ claim, 

therefore, was time-barred because they presented no evidence that defendants acted to 

affirmatively conceal or misrepresent the nature or existence of plaintiffs’ cause of action.

C. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by finding that, consistent with MCR 2.116(C)(8), 

they failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We disagree.

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint on the 

pleadings alone and summary disposition is appropriate when a party has failed to state a claim on 

which relief can be granted. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). 

“All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable 

to the nonmovant.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A court 

should grant a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) only when the claims alleged are “so clearly 

unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

The elements of libel are:

1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, 2) an unprivileged 

communication to a third party, 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part 

of the publisher, and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special 

harm or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Collins v Detroit 

Free Press, Inc, 245 Mich App 27, 32; 627 NW2d 5 (2001) (citation omitted).]

A claim of libel must be pleaded with specificity. Royal Palace Homes, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, 

Inc, 197 Mich App 48, 52; 495 NW2d 392 (1992). A complaint in a libel action must specifically 

identify the statements that the plaintiff considers to be materially false and defamatory. Id. at 52-

53.

Although plaintiffs admit that they failed to specifically identify the statements they 

considered to be defamatory in their complaint, plaintiffs argue that they did not fail to properly 

plead their claim because they sent an e-mail which listed the allegedly defamatory statement to 
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defendants approximately three months before they filed their complaint. We disagree because 

this Court has held that the complaint must specifically plead the allegedly false and defamatory 

words or statements. Id. Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to do so. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err by dismissing it.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court properly granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) 

because the DHHS was entitled to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(1), and Rymal, 

Lassanske, Sholte, and Charron were entitled to absolute immunity pursuant to Martin. The trial 

court also did not err by granting summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7) 

because tolling under the fraudulent concealment exception under MCL 600.5855 did not apply 

and plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred by their failure to file their complaint within the applicable 

one-year statute of limitations under MCL 600.5805(11). Further, the trial court did not err by 

granting summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because plaintiffs’ complaint 

failed to properly plead a claim on which relief can be granted.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ James Robert Redford