UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

DAVID ROY HUTCHINGS,

Plaintiff

v.

COUNTY OF LLANO, TEXAS, LLANO 

CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, 

LLANO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, LLANO COUNTY TAX

ASSESSOR/COLLECTOR, LLANO

COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES, 

424TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, LLANO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, JUDGE 

EVAN STUBBS, RONALD 

CUNNINGHAM, BILL BLACKBURN, 

SCOTT DUDLEY, KRIS 

FOGELBERGE, MAC EDWARDS, 

GILBERT BENNETT,

AND JOYCE GILLOW,

Defendants

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Case No. 1:20-CV-308-LY-SH

O R D E R

Before this Court is Judicial Defendants’ Opposed Motion to Stay Discovery, filed April 20, 

2020 (Dkt. No. 17). On April 28, 2020, the District Court referred to the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge all pending and future discovery motions and other nondispositive motions for resolution, 

and all pending and future dispositive motions for Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local 

Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

I. Background

Plaintiff David Roy Hutchings’s Complaint alleges that the above-named Defendants illegally 

assessed and collected property taxes on his property in Llano County, Texas, and that his property 

was illegally sold through a state court judicial proceeding. Plaintiff alleges a plethora of claims,

including claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 

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§§ 1961 and 1962 (“RICO”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; the Eighth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution; the Texas Theft Liability Act; and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices 

Act; as well as fraud, conversion, and a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On April 20, 2020, Defendants Judge Evan Stubbs and the 424th Judicial District Court 

(collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss based on judicial immunity, 

qualified immunity, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim on which relief 

can be granted, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively (Dkt. No. 12). The 

Judicial Defendants now ask the Court to stay discovery pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) until 

threshold issues raised in the motion to dismiss are decided. Although Plaintiff failed to file a 

response to the motion to dismiss, the Judicial Defendants indicate in their Motion to Stay that 

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

II. Legal Standards and Analysis

“A trial court has broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary 

questions that may dispose of the case are determined.” Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 

(5th Cir. 1987). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to issue a 

protective order on a showing of good cause “to protect a party or person from annoyance, 

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Under Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” 

requirement, the party seeking a protective order has the burden “to show the necessity of its 

issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from 

stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). To determine whether 

a stay is appropriate, a court must balance the harm produced by the delay in discovery against the 

possibility that the motion will be granted and eliminate the need for such discovery entirely.

Bickford v. Boerne Indep. Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 1430063, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016).

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The Judicial Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 

claims and that they are barred by judicial and qualified immunity, and that discovery should be 

stayed until these threshold issues are decided. The Supreme Court “has described immunity as a 

threshold question, to be resolved as early in the proceedings as possible.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 

279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991)). The 

Fifth Circuit has stated that, “until resolution of the threshold question of the application of an 

immunity defense, discovery should not be allowed.” Nieto v. San Perlita Indep. Sch. Dist., 894

F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted); see also Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 815 

F.2d 368, 383 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that district court acted properly in staying discovery 

pending resolution of issues of absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity); Carlisle v. Normand, 

2018 WL 3474715, at *4 (E.D. La. July 19, 2018) (granting motion to stay discovery pending 

resolution of motions to dismiss concerning defendant’s sovereign, absolute, or qualified 

immunity); LeClerc v. Webb, 2003 WL 21026709, at *7 (E.D. La. May 2, 2003) (granting motion 

to stay discovery based on judicial immunity).

The undersigned finds that Judicial Defendants have established good cause for a stay of 

discovery of limited duration by demonstrating the existence of the threshold question whether 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by immunity. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Judicial Defendants’ 

Opposed Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt. No. 17) until the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

has been ruled on by this Court.

SIGNED on April 30, 2020.

SUSAN HIGHTOWER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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