Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 1 of 6

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Michelle Walker,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

July 19, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

24A-CR-443

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court

The Honorable Jill R. Marcrum, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

82D07-2306-CM-3905

Opinion by Judge Mathias

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 2 of 6

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Michelle Walker appeals her conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal 

trespass following a bench trial. She presents a single issue for our review, 

namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her 

conviction.

[2] We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts are undisputed. On June 27, 2023, Walker was employed by 

Grandy’s, a restaurant in Evansville. That evening, she was working at the front 

counter when two managers, Destiny Neighbors and Lauren Evans (“Evans”),

asked Walker to leave the restaurant. Walker initially refused but eventually 

left, and Jason Evans (“Jason”), another employee, locked the door. Jason had 

observed that, just prior to being asked to leave, Walker “was acting normal 

with the exception of a raised voice.” Tr. p. 14.

[4] For some period of time, Walker tried to regain entry to the restaurant. And at 

some point, Neighbors let Walker back inside the restaurant. But Neighbors 

and Evans again asked Walker to leave, and she refused. Someone called the 

police, and when officers arrived, one asked Jason whether Walker had been 

“barred” from the restaurant. Tr. p. 17. Jason responded, “We couldn’t make 

that decision to bar her. We just wanted her to leave the property.” Id. at 18.

When Walker again refused to leave, she was arrested. Walker was not fired.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 3 of 6

[5] The State charged Walker with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. During 

a bench trial, Jason was the sole witness for the State; neither manager testified. 

The trial court found Walker guilty as charged. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Walker contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her 

conviction. Our standard of review is well settled. 

When an appeal raises “a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we 

do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the 

witnesses . . . .” We consider only the probative evidence and the 

reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. “We will 

affirm ‘if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 

from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942 

N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)).

[7] Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2022) provides that a person who, “not 

having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to 

leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the 

other person or that person’s agent” commits Class A misdemeanor criminal 

trespass. (Emphasis added.) Walker argues that the State did not prove either 

that (1) the property owner or the owner’s agent had asked her to leave or (2) 

that she did not have a contractual interest in the property. Because the second 

issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address Walker’s first argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 4 of 6

[8] The parties agree that, at the time of the alleged trespass, Walker had a 

contractual interest in the property because she was an employee. The State 

alleges, however, that her contractual interest was “limited” and that she 

committed criminal trespass when she violated the terms of that limited 

contractual interest. Appellee’s Br. at 12. Specifically, the State argues that 

Walker’s contractual interest in the restaurant was “limited to the purpose of 

providing customer service at the front counter and [she] could be terminated if 

she was disruptive.” Id.

[9] The State does not cite any evidence in support of that contention. Instead, the 

State cites Taylor v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In 

Taylor, we held that, because a student’s contractual interest in school premises 

is inherently limited temporally and spatially, and because the defendant was 

still on the premises more than two hours after his class had ended despite an 

IPS police officer’s demand that he leave, the State had presented sufficient 

evidence to prove criminal trespass. Id. at 1028 (citing A.E.B. v. State, 756 

N.E.2d 536, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

[10] We decline the State’s invitation to extend our holding in Taylor to the facts 

here. In Taylor, the State presented evidence that the student “was scheduled to 

attend class only from 8:15 to 10:15 a.m., and he was still at school around 

noon.” Id. at 1026. The State also presented evidence that an IPS Police Officer 

was charged with “mak[ing] sure that people aren’t hanging around the school 

that aren’t supposed to be there[.]” Id. We held that, “[e]ven assuming that a 

student has a contractual interest in school property, . . . we conclude that such 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 5 of 6

an interest is limited temporally to when taking classes or engaged in other 

school activities and limited spatially to areas necessary to the attendance 

function.” Id. at 1028.

[11] In contrast, here, the State did not argue and presented no evidence at trial to 

show that Walker’s contractual interest in the premises was limited during her 

shift. Even assuming for purposes of this appeal that there is an inherent limit 

on an employee’s contractual interest in her employer’s premises to not disrupt 

business operations, there is simply no evidence that Walker exceeded any such 

limit. Jason testified only that Walker “was acting normal with the exception of 

a raised voice.” Tr. p. 14. The State did not present evidence, for example, that 

Walker had upset any customers or other employees. Significantly, Jason did 

not know why Walker was asked to leave the premises.

[12] We agree with Walker that our holding in Pogue v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, is applicable here. In Pogue, the State presented 

evidence that a student’s contractual interest in his school’s premises was 

limited in that it could be terminated if he became disruptive or was suspended 

from his program. Id. at 1257-58. But the State in Pogue did not present 

evidence either that the student had been disruptive or that he had been 

suspended. Thus, we held that his conviction for criminal trespass was not 

supported by the evidence and reversed. Id. at 1258. We acknowledged that

schools, as well as businesses . . . have a legitimate interest in 

maintaining a safe environment and preserving order on their 

premises. However, once a school or business has entered into an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-443 | July 19, 2024 Page 6 of 6

agreement with an individual which grants the individual a 

contractual interest in its property, the individual may not be 

found to have committed criminal trespass so long as the 

individual’s contractual interest remains.

Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).

[13] Likewise, here, without any evidence that Walker had exceeded any limits on 

her contractual interest in the restaurant, the State could not prove that she 

committed criminal trespass.

[14] For all these reasons, we reverse Walker’s conviction for criminal trespass.

[15] Reversed.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana