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[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 249 (Wednesday, December 29, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 81849-81853]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32719]

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 72

[Docket No. OAG 117; AG Order No. 3239-2010]
RIN 1105-AB22

Office of the Attorney General; Applicability of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

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[[Page 81850]]

SUMMARY: By this rule, the Department of Justice is finalizing an 
interim rule specifying that the requirements of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, title I of Public Law 109-248, apply 
to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense 
for which registration is required before the enactment of that Act.

DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective January 28, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul R. Almanza, Deputy Chief, Child 
Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Criminal Division, United States 
Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 202-514-5780.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department of Justice by this 
publication is finalizing an interim rule regarding the scope of 
application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA), title I of Public Law 109-248 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 16901 et 
seq.). The interim rule, Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act, was published on February 28, 2007, at 72 FR 
8894. The interim rule solicited public comments and the comment period 
ended on April 30, 2007.
    The preamble to the interim rule explained that SORNA establishes 
national standards for sex offender registration and notification. The 
preamble further explained that SORNA's requirements are of two sorts. 
First, SORNA directly imposes registration obligations on sex offenders 
as a matter of federal law and provides for federal enforcement of 
these obligations under circumstances supporting federal jurisdiction. 
These federal registration obligations on sex offenders have been in 
force since the enactment of SORNA. Second, SORNA establishes minimum 
national standards for non-federal jurisdictions to incorporate in 
their sex offender registration and notification programs. The relevant 
``jurisdictions'' as defined by SORNA are the 50 States, the District 
of Columbia, the principal territories, and Indian tribes to the extent 
provided in 42 U.S.C. 16927. See 42 U.S.C. 16911(10). Jurisdictions 
that do not substantially implement SORNA's requirements in their 
programs within the time specified by SORNA are subject to a 10% 
reduction of certain justice assistance funding. SORNA affords 
jurisdictions a three-year period for substantial implementation of the 
SORNA standards, subject to extension for up to an additional two years 
in the Attorney General's discretion. See 42 U.S.C. 16924-25.
    The preamble to the interim rule took the position that SORNA 
applies of its own force to all sex offenders regardless of when they 
were convicted of their sex offenses. It also stated that rulemaking 
was immediately necessary to ``foreclos[e] any dispute as to whether 
SORNA is applicable where the conviction for the predicate sex offense 
occurred prior to the enactment of SORNA.'' 72 FR at 8896. The rule 
noted that this issue was ``of fundamental importance to the initial 
operation of SORNA, and to its practical scope for many years, since it 
determines the applicability of SORNA's requirements to virtually the 
entire existing sex offender population.'' Id. In light of these 
considerations, the Attorney General exercised his rulemaking authority 
under SORNA, see 42 U.S.C. 16912(b), 16913(d); 28 CFR 72.1, to specify 
that ``[t]he requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders 
convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to 
the enactment of that Act.'' 28 CFR 72.3; see 72 FR at 8896.
    In issuing the interim rule, the Attorney General determined that 
there was good cause for receiving public comment after, rather than 
before, the rule's initial publication and for dispensing with the 
normal 30-day delay in effectiveness because of the urgency of 
eliminating any possible uncertainty regarding SORNA's applicability to 
sex offenders whose convictions predate SORNA's enactment. See 72 FR at 
8896-97. Accordingly, the Attorney General issued the rule as an 
interim rule with immediate effectiveness. See id.
    Following the publication of the interim rule, the Attorney General 
published proposed guidelines to provide guidance and assistance to the 
states and other jurisdictions in incorporating the SORNA requirements 
into their sex offender registration and notification programs. See 72 
FR 30209 (May 30, 2007). The proposed guidelines solicited public 
comment and the comment period ended on August 1, 2007. Following 
consideration of the comments received, the Attorney General issued the 
final National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification (hereafter, the ``SORNA Guidelines'' or ``Guidelines'') on 
July 2, 2008, appearing at 73 FR 38030. The Guidelines, like the 
interim rule, state that SORNA applies to all sex offenders regardless 
of when they were convicted, and they provide guidance to jurisdictions 
regarding the registration of sex offenders whose convictions predate 
the enactment of SORNA. See 73 FR at 38031, 38035-36, 38046-47, 38063-
64.
    In United States v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2010), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
SORNA Guidelines are, independently of the interim rule, a valid final 
rule providing that SORNA applies to all sex offenders, including those 
whose convictions predate SORNA. This rulemaking reflects no 
disagreement with that conclusion but rather aims to eliminate any 
possible uncertainty or dispute concerning the scope of SORNA's 
application by finalizing the interim rule. This publication does not 
reflect agreement with the conclusions of an earlier decision of the 
Sixth Circuit holding that the interim rule was invalid at the time of 
its publication and that SORNA does not apply retroactively of its own 
force. See United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 413-24 (6th Cir. 2009).

Summary of Comments

    The public comments on the interim rule were similar to comments 
received on the portions of the proposed SORNA Guidelines addressing 
SORNA's application to sex offenders with convictions predating SORNA's 
enactment. Accordingly, as discussed below, the preamble to the final 
SORNA Guidelines, see 73 FR at 38031, 38035-36, 38043, and various 
features of the Guidelines themselves, address the concerns raised by 
the comments on the interim rule.
    Many of the commenters on the interim rule assumed that the 
Attorney General made a discretionary decision to apply SORNA to sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions and argued in effect that the 
Attorney General should reverse the decision based on their policy 
objections. The Department of Justice does not agree that the 
criticisms raised in these comments are well-founded. By authorizing 
the Attorney General ``to specify the applicability of the requirements 
of [SORNA] to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of 
[SORNA],'' 42 U.S.C. 16913(d), Congress at the very least placed it 
within the Attorney General's discretion to apply SORNA's requirements 
to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions if he determines (as he 
has) that the public benefits of doing so outweigh any adverse effects. 
The preamble to the interim rule, 72 FR at 8895-97, and the remainder 
of this summary, explain the considerations justifying the Attorney 
General's conclusion on this point. Accordingly, the Attorney General's 
issuance and finalization of the interim rule have a

[[Page 81851]]

sound legal basis, regardless of whether (i) SORNA's requirements apply 
of their own force to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions, and the 
interim rule merely confirmed that fact, or (ii) the applicability of 
SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions 
depends on rulemaking by the Attorney General.

Misunderstandings of SORNA

    Some of the comments on the interim rule reflected 
misunderstandings of SORNA's requirements. Many of these comments 
included assertions or assumptions that SORNA adopts a one-size-fits-
all approach that treats all persons convicted of sexual offenses in 
the same way. However, SORNA's registration and notification 
requirements apply only to persons convicted of ``sex offense[s]''--a 
defined term that does not include all crimes of a sexual nature. See 
42 U.S.C. 16911(5)-(8); 73 FR at 38037, 38051-52. Within the class of 
``sex offender[s]'' required to register under SORNA because of their 
conviction for ``sex offense[s],'' SORNA distinguishes three tiers of 
offenders based on the nature and seriousness of the predicate sex 
offense and the offender's history of recidivism. Offenders in 
different tiers are treated differently under SORNA's standards in 
relation to length of registration, frequency of required in-person 
appearances to verify registration information, and public 
notification. See 42 U.S.C. 16911(1)-(4), 16915-16, 16918(c)(1). 
Another common misconception in the comments was that SORNA restricts 
where sex offenders may live. However, SORNA is concerned with 
obtaining and disseminating information about sex offenders and does 
not prescribe limitations on sex offenders' places of residence, 
locations, or activities. See 42 U.S.C. 16913-21; 73 FR at 38032.
    Some of the public comments reflected misconceptions about SORNA's 
provisions relating to juvenile sex offenders, stating or assuming that 
there is little or no difference between SORNA's treatment of adult and 
juvenile offenders. However, SORNA requires registration much more 
narrowly on the basis of juvenile delinquency adjudications than on the 
basis of adult convictions. Juvenile delinquency adjudications count as 
``convictions'' that trigger SORNA's requirements only if the juvenile 
is at least 14 years old at the time of the offense and the offense is 
comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse as described 
in 18 U.S.C. 2241 (or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an 
offense). See 42 U.S.C. 16911(8); 73 FR at 38030, 38032, 38040-41, 
38050.
    Hence, SORNA's registration requirements based on juvenile 
delinquency adjudications are limited to cases involving the commission 
of particularly serious sex offenses by juveniles who were at least 14 
years old at the time of the offense. In addition, even for juveniles 
in this category, SORNA permits the reduction of their registration 
periods from life to 25 years if certain conditions are satisfied, a 
reduction that is not available to sex offenders with adult convictions 
for such crimes. See 42 U.S.C. 16915(b)(2)(B), (3)(B).

SORNA's Effect on Sex Offenders

    Some of the comments received criticized SORNA as lacking valid 
policy support or as being counterproductive. Some commenters raised 
such criticisms in relation to SORNA's effects on covered sex offenders 
generally, while other commenters focused their criticisms on SORNA's 
application to juvenile sex offenders. The commenters often expressed 
particular concerns about the adverse effects of registration and 
notification on sex offenders and their families in such areas as 
housing, employment, personal security, education, and social 
relations.
    In raising these concerns, some commenters may have been under an 
exaggerated impression of what SORNA's application to sex offenders 
with pre-SORNA convictions entails. The consequences are not boundless 
or indiscriminate. SORNA reserves its requirement of lifetime 
registration for the most serious category of sex offenders (``tier 
III''), and even in this category the registration period may be 
reduced to 25 years in certain circumstances if the registration 
requirement is based on a juvenile delinquency adjudication. The 
registration period for tier II offenders is 25 years, and the 
registration period for tier I offenders is 15 years, which may be 
reduced to 10 years in certain circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. 16915. The 
registration period begins to run when a sex offender is released from 
imprisonment for the predicate sex offense, or at the time of 
sentencing in connection with a nonincarcerative sentence. See 73 FR at 
38068. Hence, for example, if a person was released from imprisonment 
in 1980 for a sex offense that places him in tier II, his SORNA 
registration period based on that offense ended in 2005--whether or not 
he was ever actually registered for the offense--and he is subject to 
no present registration requirement based on SORNA, absent conviction 
for other sex offenses. This limits the potential impact of SORNA's 
applicability to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions. See 73 FR at 
38036, 38046-47, 38068-69 (discussing limits on duration of 
registration and other practical limitations on SORNA's effect on sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions).
    Turning to the underlying substantive issues, Congress's enactment 
of SORNA reflects a general legislative judgment that the public safety 
benefits of SORNA's requirements outweigh any adverse effects. The 
effects of SORNA's requirements on sex offenders, and the public safety 
concerns sex offenders present, are similar, whether a sex offender's 
conviction occurred before or after SORNA's enactment. Accordingly, the 
interests opposing and supporting registration--any adverse effect or 
burden of SORNA's requirements on sex offenders weighed against the 
public safety interests furthered by those requirements--are much the 
same whether the class of sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions or 
the class of sex offenders with post-SORNA convictions is considered. 
See 72 FR at 8896-97 (noting frustration of SORNA's public safety 
objectives if sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions were exempt from 
SORNA's requirements); 73 FR at 38035-36 (noting similarity of effects 
on sex offenders and public safety interests regardless of when the 
predicate sex offense convictions occurred). Hence, the Attorney 
General was and is justified in concluding that the balance comes out 
the same for the two classes and, accordingly, in exercising his 
authority to ``specify the applicability of the requirements of [SORNA] 
to sex offenders convicted before the enactment'' of SORNA, 42 U.S.C. 
16913(d), to provide that SORNA applies to sex offenders with pre-SORNA 
convictions. 28 CFR 72.3.
    Some commenters argued that the application of SORNA to sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions would violate the Constitution's 
prohibition of ex post facto laws or other provisions of the 
Constitution. However, the SORNA requirements are non-punitive 
regulatory measures adopted for public safety purposes, and accordingly 
do not implicate the Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws. 
See 42 U.S.C. 16901; 72 FR at 8896; 73 FR at 38036, 38044-46. The 
comments received identified no persuasive distinction for ex post 
facto purposes between the SORNA requirements and the sex offender 
registration and notification measures upheld by the Supreme Court 
against ex post facto challenge in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), 
and also did

[[Page 81852]]

not identify any persuasive reason to believe that either SORNA's 
requirements or their application to sex offenders with pre-SORNA 
convictions violates any other provision of the Constitution. This was 
so regardless of whether the general class of sex offenders or the 
limited class of juvenile delinquents qualifying as covered sex 
offenders under SORNA is considered.
    Some commenters argued that applying SORNA's requirements to sex 
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions (or with pre-SORNA juvenile 
adjudications counting as ``convictions'' for SORNA purposes) would be 
unfair because the applicability of those requirements could not have 
been anticipated at the time of the offender's conviction for the 
predicate sex offense. However, fairness does not require that, when an 
offender's case is adjudicated, it must be possible to anticipate 
future regulatory measures that may be adopted in relation to persons 
like him to protect public safety. See 73 FR at 38036. The government 
may not yet have developed effective regulatory measures to address the 
public safety concerns presented by certain types of offenders at the 
time of their offenses or convictions. That does not constitute a 
commitment to those offenders by the government that it will not 
develop such measures and apply them to the offenders at a later time, 
cf., e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 89-91 (registration requirements 
applied to sex offenders with convictions predating enactment of the 
registration law), and does not constitute a commitment to those 
offenders by the government that it will refrain from later 
strengthening or improving existing regulatory measures in light of 
lessons learned from experience. Moreover, on the other side of the 
balance, fairness is also due to persons who may be victimized by sex 
offenses that could be prevented by applying SORNA's requirements to 
sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions. See 73 FR at 38044-45 
(discussing role of registration and notification measures in solving 
and preventing sex offenses). If such crimes occur, the harm to the 
victims is no less because the offender's previous sex offense 
conviction or convictions occurred before SORNA's enactment rather than 
after.
    The conclusion does not differ when the treatment of juvenile 
delinquent sex offenders under SORNA is considered specifically. Both 
for sex offenders with adult convictions and for those adjudicated 
delinquent, the effects of registration requirements on the offenders 
and the public safety concerns the offenders present are similar 
regardless of whether their case dispositions occurred before or after 
the enactment of SORNA. Hence, as with adult sex offenders, the 
Attorney General was and is justified in concluding that the balance of 
interests does not differ materially depending on the timing of the 
adjudication in relation to SORNA's enactment and that SORNA's 
requirements should apply to juvenile delinquent sex offenders with 
pre-SORNA adjudications as well as to those with post-SORNA 
adjudications.
    In relation to juvenile delinquent sex offenders, the operation of 
registration systems may entail a relaxation of confidentiality 
requirements that might otherwise apply in juvenile proceedings, but 
that is the case whether the delinquency adjudications occur before or 
after SORNA's enactment. The confidentiality of juvenile proceedings is 
generally a matter of legislative discretion. With respect to juveniles 
at least 14 years old adjudicated delinquent for particularly serious 
sex offenses, Congress has made a policy judgment that the public 
safety interests warrant a departure from strict juvenile 
confidentiality policies. See 42 U.S.C. 16911(8); H.R. Rep. No. 218, 
109th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 25 (2005) (``While the Committee 
recognizes that States typically protect the identity of a juvenile who 
commits criminal acts, in the case of sexual offenses, the balance 
needs to change; no longer should the rights of the juvenile offender 
outweigh the rights of the community and victims to be free from 
additional sexual crimes.'').
    Thus, as reflected in the interim rule and this finalizing 
rulemaking, it is the Attorney General's view that applying SORNA's 
requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions, including sex 
offenders required to register on the basis of juvenile delinquency 
adjudications, appropriately effectuates Congress's purposes in 
enacting SORNA. See 72 FR at 8895-97; 73 FR at 38031-32, 38035-36, 
38038, 38040.

SORNA's Effects on Jurisdictions

    The scope of SORNA's application to sex offenders has implications 
for jurisdictions because the states and other covered jurisdictions 
are generally expected to incorporate offenders to whom SORNA applies 
into their sex offender registration programs. See 42 U.S.C. 16911(9), 
16912(a), 16924-25; 72 FR at 8895; 73 FR at 38048. In light of this 
consequence, some of the public comments on the interim rule objected 
that jurisdictions would have difficulty in identifying, locating, 
notifying, and registering sex offenders required to register under 
SORNA who were convicted many years ago and who have since merged into 
the general population. These concerns about potential burdens on 
jurisdictions, however, were considered in the development of the SORNA 
Guidelines and are addressed through various features of the 
Guidelines.
    The Guidelines recognize that it may not be feasible for a 
jurisdiction to identify and register all sex offenders with pre-SORNA 
convictions who are required to register under the SORNA standards. The 
Guidelines accordingly provide that jurisdictions will be considered to 
have substantially implemented the SORNA requirements if they register 
such offenders who remain in the justice system as prisoners, 
supervisees, or registrants, and such offenders who have passed out of 
the system but later re-enter it because of a subsequent criminal 
conviction. See 73 FR at 38046, 38063-64.
    As the Guidelines note, sex offenders in these classes are within 
the cognizance of the jurisdiction in any event and the jurisdiction 
will often have independent reasons to review their criminal histories 
for penal, correctional, or registration/notification purposes. See 73 
FR at 38046. In addition, the Guidelines provide that, in attempting to 
identify individuals who may be required to register under SORNA, 
jurisdictions may rely on their normal methods and standards in 
searching criminal histories, and need not undertake extraordinary 
efforts to identify individuals with old sex offense convictions that 
may be difficult to find. The Guidelines also provide guidance to 
jurisdictions about notifying such sex offenders concerning their 
registration obligations under SORNA and incorporating such offenders 
into their registration systems. See 73 FR at 38043, 38063-64.
    In sum, the comments received provide no persuasive reason to 
change the rule.
    However, this final rule makes one clarifying change in the interim 
rule in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Carr v. United States, 
560 U.S. ------, 2010 WL 2160783 (2010). Carr held that sex offenders 
cannot be criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for failing to 
register as required by SORNA where federal jurisdiction is premised on 
interstate travel by the offender occurring before the enactment of 
SORNA. Example 2 in 28 CFR 72.3, which is part of the regulations added 
by the interim rule, describes a situation involving potential 
liability under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for a sex offender with a pre-SORNA sex 
offense conviction based on interstate travel. While the

[[Page 81853]]

example is not specific about the timing of the interstate travel in 
relation to the enactment of SORNA, it could be understood as referring 
to a situation in which the travel occurred before the enactment of 
SORNA. Accordingly, this final rule makes minor changes in the language 
of Example 2 so as to avoid any arguable inconsistency with the Supreme 
Court's holding in Carr regarding the scope of criminal liability under 
18 U.S.C. 2250.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Attorney General, in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this regulation and by approving it 
certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities for the purposes of 
that Act because the regulation concerns the application of the 
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to 
certain offenders.

Executive Order 12866

    This regulation has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with 
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' section 
1(b), Principles of Regulation. The Department of Justice has 
determined that this rule is a ``significant regulatory action'' under 
Executive Order 12866, section 3(f), and accordingly this rule has been 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

Executive Order 13132

    This regulation will not have substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national Government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. There has been substantial consultation 
with State officials regarding the interpretation and implementation of 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Therefore, in 
accordance with Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule 
does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
preparation of a federalism assessment.

Executive Order 12988--Civil Justice Reform

    This regulation meets the applicable standards set forth in 
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, and it will not significantly or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed 
necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995. By way of explanation, this rule finalizes an interim rule 
concerning the applicability of SORNA's registration requirements to 
sex offenders, including those whose sex offense convictions occurred 
before SORNA's enactment. The rule facilitates federal prosecution of 
sex offenders in the affected classes who fail to register as required, 
see 18 U.S.C. 2250, but it does not directly require expenditures by 
state, local, or tribal governments. The interim rule was issued prior 
to the publication by the Attorney General of the SORNA Guidelines, 
appearing at 73 FR 38029 et seq., which determine what state, local, 
and tribal jurisdictions must do to achieve substantial implementation 
of the SORNA standards in their registration programs. The SORNA 
Guidelines include instructions to jurisdictions concerning the classes 
of sex offenders with pre-existing convictions whom the jurisdictions 
must register, and the costs of doing so will not be affected or 
increased by the finalization of the interim rule. Based on the known 
costs in jurisdictions that have implemented SORNA to date, it is not 
anticipated that the cost of implementing this aspect of the SORNA 
standards will exceed $100 million annually.

Executive Order 13175--Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal 
Governments

    This rule comports with Executive Order 13175. The Department of 
Justice has carried out previous tribal consultations regarding actions 
under SORNA affecting Indian tribes. The Department engaged in a 
voluntary consultation on this rule with tribal officials in Spokane, 
Washington, on October 4, 2010.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

    This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 251 of the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. 5 U.S.C. 
804. This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, 
productivity, or innovation, or on the ability of United States-based 
companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and 
export markets.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 72

    Crime, Information, Law enforcement, Prisons, Prisoners, Records, 
Probation and Parole.

0
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the interim rule adding 28 CFR 
part 72, which was published at 72 FR 8894 on February 28, 2007, and 
for the reasons stated in the supplementary information to this rule, 
the interim rule is adopted as a final rule with one change as follows:

PART 72--SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION

0
1. The authority citation continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587.

0
2. In Sec.  72.3, Example 2 is revised to read as follows:

Sec.  72.3  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act.

* * * * *
    Example 2. A sex offender is convicted by a state jurisdiction in 
1997 for molesting a child and is released following imprisonment in 
2000. The sex offender initially registers as required but relocates to 
another state in 2009 and fails to register in the new state of 
residence. The sex offender has violated the requirement under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act to register in any 
jurisdiction in which he resides, and could be held criminally liable 
under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for the violation because he traveled in 
interstate commerce.

    Dated: December 21, 2010.
Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2010-32719 Filed 12-28-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-18-P
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