Honora ble Gordon J. Quist, Unit ed S tates S enior District J udg e for the Western District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0017n.06 No. 09-3033 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

ZVON KO S ARL OG, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COUR T F O R THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O O P I N I O N

BEFORE: BOGG S and McK EAGU E, Circuit Ju dges; and QUIS T, Seni or Distr ict Judge. * P er C uriam . Pe tit ion e r, Z vo nk o Sa rl og , a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his Mo tio n to Vac ate, Ame nd, or Corre ct Sentence , pursuant t o 2 8 U. S .C. § 2255, which alleg ed that counse l pr ov ide d c on st it ut io nal ly ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e in f a ili ngto f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l a ft e r S arl ogso ins tr uc te d a nd in f a ili ngto p ro pe rl y

argue a g a ins t th e a

pp lic a tio n o f e nh anc e me nts ba se d u po n h is role in the off

ense a nd abuse of

a position of trust. For the rea sons set forth below, w e vac ate the district court orde r and r emand f or an e videntiary

hear ing. I. BACKG ROUND Sarlog pleade d g uilty

to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to dist ribute coc aine, in v iol a tio n o f 2 1 U .S. C. § § 8 41 and 84 6, and c on sp ir ingto l a

un de r m on e y , in

vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C.No. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-2- § 1956(h). Dur ing the ch ange of plea he aring , the district court e x plained that, base d upon the amount o f d ru gs i nvolved, Sarlog fac ed a ma ndatory minimum sentenc e of te n y ear s unless he qualified for

an exception such a s “sa fe t y v alve” treatment under § 5C1.2 of the Sente ncing Gu ide lin e s. Th e c ourt e sta bli sh e d tha t Sar logwo uld se e k, and the g ov e rnme nt w ou ld o pp os e , s a fe ty valve tre atment, and that the g overnme nt would seek, an d S ar l o g woul d oppose, a thre e-le vel incre ase f or his manag eria l role in the offe nse under § 3B1.1 and a two-leve l increa se for abuse of a p o s i t i o no f t ru s tu n d er

§ 3 B 1

. 3

. I mp o rt an t l y , an d as t h e go v ern m en tp o i n t edo u tat t h e h ea ri n g, Sarlog would be inelig ible for sa fety valve tre atment i f t h e court we re to find that he had a manag eria l role under

§ 3B1.1. The court then addressed P ara g raph 13 of t he written plea agree ment, which ac knowledg ed that Sarlog had bee n advised by counsel of his rig hts to appea l, and stated that he “expressly waives those rig hts ex cept a s rese rved.” The a g ree ment rese rved only the rig ht to appeal “ any

punishment in excess of the statutory maxi mum,” “any

sentenc e to the extent it e x ce ed s the maxi mum of the sentenc ing r ang e” de termined unde r the Guide lines, and “any leg al re medies he ma

y otherwise ha

ve on appea l or c o ll a

tera l attack pe rtaining to claims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel or prose cutorial mis c on du c t.” I n e xpla ini ng the wa ive r pr ov isi on , how e ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt be g an: “No w, wh a t th is para g raph 13 doe s is ask y ou to give up most, but not all, of those rig hts of direc t appea l and collater al attack.” (Plea Hr’gTr. at 33.) Wit h reg ard to the se cond re servation, the court explained: Now, it’s my

understandinghere ’s what it means. L et’s assume that at the time of sentenc ing, w e have a dispute as to whe ther y ou should ge t three levels for role in the offe nse. I say y es. You’ve rese rved the rig ht to challeng e that on appe al, or let’s sa y Ifind that if we add two levels for abuse of position of trust, y ou rese rve your rig htNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-3- to challeng e that on appe al, or let’s say Ifind that y ou’re not involved—y ou are not entitled to the safe ty

valve, you are enti t l ed to challeng e that on appe al. So y ou’ve re se rv e d a

numbe r o f c hal len ges her e ba se d o n h owthe g uid e lin e c a lc ulatio n is eventua lly

deter mined by me. Do y ou understand? (I d. a t 34 .) Sarl oga ns we re d in the a ff ir ma tiv e . F ina lly , the c ourt e xpla ine d th a t no thi ngin Para g ra ph13 inh ibi te d Sa

rl og fr om ra isi ng c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Ne ith e r p a rt y objected to the c ourt’s explanation of Sarlog ’s appe llate rig hts. After this discussion, the court a sked Sarlog whether

he wished to plea d g uilty under the ag ree ment, and ac cepte d his plea. At se nte nc ing , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a pp lie d b oth the thr e e -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt fo r Sarl og ’s ro le in the offe nse and the two-leve l enhanc ement for abuse of a position of trust. The cour t found that beca use Sarlogmanag ed or supe rvised at lea st one person in the c onsp i ra cy , he wa s ineligible f or safe ty valve treatment unde r U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Having been de nied safe ty valve tre atment, Sarlog

wa s subject to a ten-y ear mandatory minimum sentenc e. The district c ourt g rante d Sarlo g a down w ar d

v ar ia n c e f r o m t h e a d v is o r

y g u id e li n e s r an g e o f

1 5 1

- 1 8 1 mo n th s , u lt im a te ly s e n te n c ing him to 121 mont hs of imprisonment on e ach of the two counts to r un concur rently with eac h other. No direc t appea l was filed. Acting pro se, Sar log timely filed a moti o n t o v ac at e, set a side, or cor rec t his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requesting an evidentiary hear ing and raising three i ssues: (1) that the district court improper ly

enhanc ed Sarlog ’s offe nse leve l based upon his rol e i n t h e offe nse and abuse of a position of trust and that counse l provided constitutionally ineffe ctive assist ance in failing to properly argue aga inst both enhanc ements; (2) that Sarlog was denied a prope r evide ntiary hear ing in that counsel failed to c all his co-conspirators as witnesses be cause they could have ref

uted theNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-4- argument that he had a

manag eria l role; and (3) that counsel r ender ed inef fec tive assistance in failing to pursue a dir ect a

ppeal c ontrary

to Sarlog ’s express instruction that he do so. I n support, S ar l o g s u bmitted an aff idavit swear ing that he told his attorney that the

ma n a g e r ia l r o le e n h an c e me n t w a s “ ju s t no t r ig h t” an d th a t h e “ w an te d to a p p e a l t h e s e n te n c e . ” ( E x. A to Pet’r’s Mot. at 3.) Acc ording to the affidavit, counsel re sponded by saying that Sarlog had ten day s to file an appe al and that they “would discus s t h e matter tomorrow or the next day ,” but he

never contac ted Sarlog there afte r. ( Id. a t 3-4 .) Sarl og tr ie d ca lli ng c ou ns e l se ve ra l ti me s f

ro m ja il, but his office w ould not take ca lls from prisoners. ( Id. at 4.) Finally , the aff

idavit alleg es, Sarlog also asked f

amily members to conta ct counse l about fi l i n g an appea l and they did so, but the messag es they

left we re ne ver r eturne d. ( Id. ) Wit hout holding an e videntiary hear ing, the district court denie d th e motion. The cour t found that Sarl ogwa ive d h is r ig ht t o co llate ra lly a tta c k his co nv ic tio n a nd se nte nc e in t

he ple a a g re e me nt. I n addition, the court c oncluded that e ven without the waive r, Sarlog ’s claims that he should not have be en asse ssed the mana g eria l role a nd abuse of

a position of trust enhanc ements ar e not cog nizable on collater al attack. Grant v. United States , 72 F .3 d 50 3, 50 6 (6 th Cir . 1 99 6) ; Jones v

. United States , 178 F.3d 790, 796 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 9 ). As to Sarlog ’s claims of inef fec tive assistance , the cour t ac kn o w le d g e d th a t Sa r lo g h a d r e s e r

v e d th e r ig h t to s e e k s u c h r e li e f o n d ir e c t a p p e al or collater al attac k, but concluded that counsel did not rende r ineff ective a ssistance be cause Sarlog was sentenc ed pursua

nt to a mandatory

minimum and had not e stablished elig ibili t y fo r s af ety valve treatment. Specifica lly , the cour t stated:No. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

The district cour

t’s asser tion that Sarlog does not argue that he should have bee n g rante d the 1 safe ty valve is incorr ect. Sarlog ’s entire argument is that, ha d the manag eria l role enha nceme nt not b ee n ap p l i ed, he would have be en entitled to safe ty valve tre atment. See, e .g., Pet.’s Mot. at 10 (“The result of the failure t o eff ectively argue the misapplication of §3B1.1 ( manag eria l/supervisory role) de nied the De fenda

nt the ‘saf

ety valve’ which would re duce his sente nce.” ). -5- The pet i t i oner did re serve in his guilty plea a g ree ment the rig ht to seek re lief on direc t appea l or in a collate ral pro ce ed ing ba sed on the inef fec tive assistance of counsel. The petitioner wa stes his e ffor t in this c ontext in a

rg uing that he should not have b ee n assessed a dd-ons in calc ulating the offe nse leve l. I n so arguing, the petitioner continues to ig nore the obvious. He wa s subject to a mandatory minimum sentenc e of 120 months, unless he wa s succe ssfu l i n ea rn i n g the safe ty valve. He fa ile d. Th e pe tit ion e r d oe s n ot c on te nd tha t he sho uld have be e n g ra nte d th e sa fe ty va lve wh ic h th e n r e su lte d in the ne c e ssi ty fo r t he Cou rt to s e nte nc e the pe tit ion e r t o a se nte nc e of

12 0 mo nth s. 1 (District Ct. Op. at 19.) The court ne ither made finding s of fa ct nor he ld an evidentiar y hear ing a s to whether

Sarlog actua lly

reque sted that counsel f

ile a notice of

appea l. There afte r, this court g rante d Sarlog ’s re quest for a cer tificate of appea lability

and the r ight to pr ocee d in f

orma pauper is. On appea l, Sarlog argues that (1) counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l w he n Sa

rl oge xpre ssl y

ins tr uc te d th a t he do so; (2) eve n if he did no t so instruct, counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to “c onsult” Sarlog reg arding the m erits of an appe al; and (3) c ounsel was inef

fec tive in failing to call Sarlog ’s co- conspirator s as witnesses as they would have t e s t i f i e d t h a tS ar l o g d i d

n o th a v e a

m an a g e r i a l r o l e i nt h e c o n s p i r a c y. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Stand ard of Review Claims of ineffe ctive assistanc e pre sent mix ed questions of lawand fact, which this cour t

re vie ws de novo

. Mallett v. United States , 334 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2003). We revie w the districtNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-6- cour t ’s d ec i s i o n not to hold an evidentiary hear ing f or abuse of discre tion. Arredondo v. U nited States , 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6 t h C i r. 1999). A § 2255 pe titioner is ge nera lly entitled to “a pr ompt hear ing” at which the district c ourt is to “deter mine the i ssues and make finding s of fa ct and

c on c lus ion s o f l aw w ithre sp e c t th e re to. ” 28 U. S.C. § 22 55 (b ). Th e he ari ngis m and a tor y “ un le ss the re cord c onclusively

shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ,” such a s where “the petitioner’s a lleg ations cannot be acc epted a s tr u e because they are contra dicted by

the re cord, inhere ntly incre dible, or conc l u sions rather tha n statements of fa ct.” Arredondo , 178 F.3d at 782 (interna l citations and quotations omitt ed). I f a f actua l dispute ex i s t s , t h e co urt “must hold an evidentiar y hear ing to de termine the truth of the petitioner’s c laims.” Turner v. United States , 183 F.3d 474, 477 ( 6th Cir. 1999). The § 2255 petitioner’s burden “for establishi ng an entitlement to an evidentiar y hear ing is re latively

light.” Id. B. Ana lys is To est ab lish constitut ionally ineffe ctive assistanc e, a pe titioner must demonstrate that

c o u n s e l’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e w a s “ d e f

ic ie n t” an d th a t “ p r e

ju d ic e ” r e s u lt e d th e r e from. S t r ickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In Roe v . Flores-Ortega , 5 28 U. S. 470, 120 S. Ct . 1029 (2000), the Supre me C ourt aff irmed that this two-prong ed inquiry also applies to c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l ba se d o n f

a ilure to f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l. Id. at 476-77, 12 0 S. Ct. a t 10 34 . T he Court e xpla ine d th a t w he re an atto rney disr e g ard s h is c lie nt’ s e xpre ss ins tr uc tio n to pe rf

e c t an a pp e a l, h e ha s p e rf

or me d d e fi c ie ntl y

and pr e jud ic e is p re su me d r e g a rd le ss of the a ppeal’ s potential merit. Id. at 477, 483, 120 S. Ct. at 1035, 1038; accord Ludwig v. United States , 162 F.3d 456, 459 ( 6th Cir. 1998).No. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-7- Even whe re a

client has not spec ifically re quested that c ounsel perf ect a n appea l, Fl or esOrtega holds that counsel may have a constitutional duty

to “consult” with the c lient reg ardingthe advanta g es and disadva

ntag es of a

ppealingand make rea sonabl e ef forts t o deter

mine whether

the

c lie nt w ish e s to do so . 5 28 U. S. a t 47 8, 12 0 S. Ct. a t 10 35 . T he c on sti tut ion a ll y imp os e d d uty to consult exis ts wher e counsel has reason t o believe e ither “( 1) that a r ational def endant would wa

nt to appea l (for example, beca use there are nonfrivolous g rounds for a ppeal) , or (2) that this particular defe ndant re asonably

demonstrated to c ounsel that he wa s interested in a ppealing .” Id. at 480, 120 S. Ct

. at 1036. Fa ilure to consult in those circumstanc es constitutes defic ient perf ormanc e and, althoug h prejudice is not presumed, it can be est ab l i s h ed by prese nting e vidence that had counse l

c on su lte d, de fe nd ant w ou ld h a ve a pp e a le d, or

that th e re e xist no nf

ri vo lou s g ro un ds fo r a

pp e a l. Id. at 484, 486, 120 S. Ct. at 1038, 1039. Sarlog takes the a

rg ument one step fur

ther: he arg ues t hat an attorney ’s fa ilure to perf ect a n

a pp e a l w he n in str

uc te d to do so , or fa ilure to c on su lt w iththe c lie nt w he n g ro un ds or int e re st e xist,

c on sti tut e s in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l e v e n wh e re , as her e, t h e d ef endant ha s entere d into a plea a g ree ment waiving some or all of his rights t o a direct appea l. I n fac t, this argument raises a nNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

Severa l circuits have conclude d that counsel mu s t f ile an appe al when r equeste d, even w here 2 the def endant ha s entere d into a plea a g ree ment waiving some or all of his appe al rig hts. See U nited States v. Poindex ter , 49 2 F .3 d 2 63 , 2 73 (4 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; United St ates v. Tapp , 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; W

atson v. United States , 49 3 F .3 d 96 0, 96 4 ( 8th Cir . 2 00 7) ; Campusano v. United States , 442 F .3 d 770 , 777 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ); United States v. Sandov al-Lopez , 4 09 F .3 d 1 19 3, 11 97 (9 th Cir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d Stat es v. G arre tt , 4 02 F .3 d 1 26 2, 12 66 -6 7 ( 10 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Gomez- Diaz v. United States , 433 F.3d 788, 790 ( 11th Cir. 2005). Others have come to the opposite conclusion. Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008); United Sta te s v . M ab ry , 536 F.3d 231, 241- 42 (3rd Cir. 2008). -8- iss ue on wh ic h t he c ir c uit

c ourt s are c ur

re ntl y sp lit

. Th is c ourt

ha s n ot w e ig he d in

on thi s c ir c uit 2 split, addressing the applica bility of Flores-Ortega when a n appea l waiver

has bee n executed. We need not dec ide th at i s s u e in this case, howe ver, be cause we f ind that Sarlog did not knowing ly

and voluntarily

waive his rig ht to appeal. Her e, the plea ag ree ment, by its terms, failed to reser ve (a nd thus waived) Sar l o g’s ri g hts to appeal the sa fety valve, position of trust, and manag eria l role dete rminations. I t is true that co u rt s may not modify

plea a g ree ments, and that state me nts ma de b y th e c ourt do no t su

pe rc e de the te rm s o f a

n a g re e me nt w he n th e wa ive r i s knowing ly

and voluntarily

made. S e e U n it e d S ta te s v . Fleming , 2 3 9 F.3d 761 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Ho we ve r, wh e re , a s h e re , th e c ourt ’s mi ss tat eme nt c ome s before the ple a is a c c e pte d a

nd in circ umstances that c ause the defe ndant to misunderstand t he terms based on the cour t’s explanation, the def endant c annot be sa id to have knowing ly and voluntarily

waived the rig hts that the court purported to tell him he re tained. See United States v. Padilla-Colon , 578 F.3d 23, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that wher e cour t told the defenda

nt he could appe al an i s s u e b ef o re acc epting the plea, the w aiver

was not knowing and voluntary and ther efor e could n o t be enf orce d). He re, the court spec ifically

told Sarlog that the terms of the a g ree ment meant he retaine d the ability to appea lNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-9- the “ mana g e ri a l r ole ,” “ po sit ion of tr us t,” and “ sa fe ty va lve ” de te rm inatio ns ; th e re fo re , a s to tho se specific issues, Sarlog did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive his a

ppellate r ights. B e c a us e Sarl ogre ta ine d h is r ig ht t o ap peal on tho se iss ue s, he ha d a ri g ht t o in str

uc t hi s attorney to appea l. Flores-Ortega , 52 8 U. S. a t 47 7, 48 3. Withhis § 2 25 5 p e tit ion , Sa rl oga sse rt s that he e xpre ssl y

inst ruc te d h is atto rn e y

to f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l, p re se nts a

sw or n a ff ida vit in support, and re quests an evidentiar y hear ing. The g overnme nt pr esents no evidenc e to the contr ary and, in fa ct, conc edes that Sarlog is entitled to the evidentiary hear ing he seeks on the issue of whether he instructed his attorney to perfe ct an a

ppeal. Unde r these c ircums t ances, Sarlog has

s at i s fi edt h e “ re l at i v el y

l i gh t ” b u rd en h e b ea rs i nes t ab l i s h i n g en t i t l em en tt o an ev i d en t i ary h ea ri n g, Turner , 183 F.3d at 477, and the district cour t abus ed i t s d iscretion in fa iling to hold one . See Valentine v. U

nited States , 488 F.3d 325, 333- 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (findingthat the district court

err ed in dec lining to hold a hea ring wher e def

endant ha d prese nted an a ff i d av i t , the g overnme nt offe red nothing to contradic t it, and the claim wa s not “inhere ntly incre dible” nor c ontradicte d by the re c or d) . I f, in f

a c t, S arl ogins tr

uc te d h is a tto rn e y

to f ile a no tic e of a pp e a l, c ouns e l w a s p e r s e ineffe ctive in fa iling to do so and Sarlogis entitled to a delay ed appe al. Lud wig , 162 F.3d at 459. III . C ON CL USI ON Acc ording ly , we VA CA TE the district court orde r deny ing Sar log’ s § 2 2 5 5 petition and REMAND for a

n evidentiar

y hear ing to deter

mine whether

Sarlog actua lly

instructed his attorney to file a notice of appe al. Should the court determine that such re quest was made , Sarlog is entitled to a de lay e d a

pp e a l. A s p art

of the e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , th e dis trict cou rt may a lso inq uir e int o whether counsel provide d const i t

u t i o n al l y i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce i nfa i l i n g t o co n s u l tS ar log r eg ardingNo. 09-3033

Sarlog v. United States

-10- the me ri ts o f a

n a pp e a l and /or in f a ili ngto c a ll Sarl og ’s c o- c on sp ir a tor s a s w itn e sse s o r o the rw ise arguing a g ainst the sentenc ing e nhance ments.