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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

DIANN H. ANGUS,

Plaintiff

v.

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, 

DIRECTOR OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY,

Defendant

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 Case No. 1:20-CV-00242-LY-SH

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude All Witness[es] and Documents 

as Undisclosed Documents, filed August 13, 2021 (Dkt. 42); Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and 

Request for Sanctions, filed September 13, 2021 (Dkt. 49); and the associated response and reply 

briefs. The District Court referred all motions in this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for 

disposition and Report and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Texas (“Local Rules”). Dkt. 15.

I. Background

Plaintiff Diann Angus, proceeding pro se, is a federal employee who applied unsuccessfully 

for three job openings posted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency in the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). In 2012, Plaintiff applied for the positions of 

Intelligence Research Specialist and Intelligence Assistant. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 17, 23. To fill vacant 

positions, ICE prepares a “certificate” for each category of eligible candidate. Dkt. 37 at 2. Plaintiff

asked to be placed on the “Schedule A” certificate for each position. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 17, 23. Applicants 

for federal positions may be eligible for listing on a Schedule A certificate if they have a certified 

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mental or physical disability or satisfy other criteria. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 213.3101, 213.3102(u).

Instead, Plaintiff was placed on the competitive service “merit” selection certificate for each 

position. Dkt. 12-1 ¶ 6. Her applications were forwarded to the selecting official, Special Agent in 

Charge for San Antonio Homeland Security Investigations Jerry Robinette. Dkt. 12-1 ¶ 6. Plaintiff

was not selected for either position. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 21, 27. 

In 2013, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the ICE Equal Employment Opportunity Office

(“ICE EEO”), alleging that her non-selection was the result of discrimination based on her sex, 

age, and physical or mental disability, and in retaliation for prior EEO activity. Id. at 1 & ¶ 27; 

Dkt. 12-2; Dkt. 12-3 at 2. ICE EEO investigated Plaintiff’s allegations. Dkt. 1 ¶ 32; Dkt. 12-3.

Although Plaintiff initially requested a hearing before the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”), she withdrew the request and asked that her case be remanded to DHS for

a Final Agency Decision. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 35, 39. In January 2019, DHS issued a Final Agency Decision 

concluding that ICE did not discriminate against Plaintiff and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint as 

untimely. Id. ¶ 44; Dkt. 12-4. Plaintiff appealed to the EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations, which 

affirmed the ruling. Dkt. 1 ¶ 45; Dkt. 12-5 at 4. 

In 2016, Plaintiff applied to ICE for a third time, this time for the position of an Investigative 

Research Specialist. Dkt. 1 ¶ 46. Again, Plaintiff was not selected. Id. ¶ 47. In 2017, Plaintiff filed 

a second formal complaint with ICE EEO, alleging age and sex discrimination and retaliation. Id.

¶ 48; Dkt. 12-6 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that the EEO investigator engaged in improper tactics during 

the investigation, did not allow her to respond to witness statements, and failed to timely provide 

the investigation report. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 50-54. Plaintiff requested a hearing before the EEOC, but

subsequently withdrew the request to file an action in federal district court. Id. ¶ 55; Dkt. 12-6 at 

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2. On February 19, 2020, DHS issued a Final Agency Decision affirming the dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s case based on her intent to file a federal action. Dkt. 1 ¶ 56; Dkt. 12-6 at 2-3.

On March 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that her non-selection for the three positions 

was the result of multiple forms of illegal discrimination in ICE’s hiring process and retaliation 

for her participation in protected activities. Dkt. 1. In her 49-page original complaint, Plaintiff 

asserted fifteen overlapping “counts” against Defendant. Her allegations can be condensed into the 

following claims: (1) disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act; (2) failure to properly process and investigate her previous equal employment opportunity 

complaints; (3) sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”);

(4) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; and 

(5) retaliation under Title VII. The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss 

all Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) except her Title VII retaliation 

claim (Count 12). Dkt. 21. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 27.

Plaintiff now moves to exclude all witnesses and proposed exhibits in Defendant’s Rule 26(a) 

disclosures as a sanction for untimely service. Dkt. 42. Plaintiff also asks the Court to compel 

Defendant to produce certain documents and impose sanctions for alleged discovery violations. 

Dkt. 49.

II. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

The Court’s Scheduling Order set an August 6, 2021 deadline for Defendant to file his

designation of witnesses, experts, and exhibits. Dkt. 34 ¶ 2. Defendant did not timely file his 

designations due to an erroneous calendar entry. Dkt. 43 at 1. On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff 

contacted Defendant regarding the omission. Id. Defendant filed and served his designation within 

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an hour of learning of the oversight. Id.; Dkt. 41. Plaintiff filed her motion in limine after receiving 

the designations. Dkt. 42-1 at 1.

A court may impose sanctions for discovery violations pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 37. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) provides for sanctions if a party or its agent “fails to obey an order 

to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a).” Rule 37(c)(1) 

states:

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as 

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that 

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, 

or at a trial, unless that failure was substantially justified or is 

harmless.

Courts consider the following factors in determining whether a failure to disclose is harmless: 

(1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the potential prejudice to the opposing party from including 

the evidence; (3) the availability of a continuance; and (4) the explanation for the party’s failure 

to disclose. Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2004).

Defendant has disclosed the information required by Paragraph 2 of the Court’s Scheduling 

Order. Defendant gave a reasonable explanation for his delay and immediately remedied his

oversight when Plaintiff inquired. Defendant’s seven-day delay in service did not prejudice 

Plaintiff because discovery remained open for another four months and trial is not set until June 

2022. Dkt. 34 ¶¶ 6, 8. Defendant’s delay in serving his designations was harmless and does not 

support the exclusion of evidence. See Guerra v. United States, EP-18-CV-00270-FM, 2019 WL 

7761441, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2019) (finding that failure to disclose evidence in initial 

disclosures did not require Rule 37 exclusion where plaintiff received the evidence two months 

before close of discovery and four months before trial). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine 

to Exclude All Witness[es] and Documents as Undisclosed Documents (Dkt. 42) is DENIED.

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III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions

In her Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against 

Defendant because he allegedly “attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the Court and purposely malign 

the Plaintiff” by objecting to her discovery requests to the extent “they seek information subject to 

the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, such as date of birth, home address, telephone number, or social 

security number of any person identified.” Dkt. 49 at 2; Dkt. 57-1 at 2. Plaintiff asserts that she 

never specifically sought information covered by the Privacy Act. Dkt. 49 at 2. Plaintiff also moves 

for the production of eight categories of documents related to (1) Plaintiff’s previously dismissed 

Schedule A claims; (2) past discrimination charges against Robinette and Human Resources 

Specialist Peggy Brake; and (3) any previous litigation in which Robinette testified. Id. at 16-17.

A. Request for Sanctions

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) and Local Rule CV-26(c) allow a party to seek entry 

of a protective order. On August 26, 2021, anticipating the production of documents subject to 

federal privacy laws, Defendant moved for entry of the Court’s form protective order (Appendix 

H-1 to the Local Rules). Dkt. 48 at 1. Plaintiff opposed the motion. Id. at 2. On August 31, 2021, 

Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s First Requests for Production and objected to producing 

information subject to the Privacy Act. Dkt. 57-1 at 2. The Court entered a Confidentiality and 

Protective Order on September 17, 2021. Dkt. 52. Defendant subsequently produced documents 

to Plaintiff, marking as “Confidential” those containing information subject to the Privacy Act.

Dkt. 57 at 2. Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions relating to Defendant’s Privacy Act objection is 

frivolous and therefore is DENIED.

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B. Motion to Compel

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that: “Parties may obtain discovery 

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional 

to the needs of the case.” The scope of discovery is broad. Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. 

Co., 647 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011). “A discovery request is relevant when the request seeks 

admissible evidence or ‘is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” 

Id. (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 2004)).

After a party has attempted in good faith to obtain discovery without court action, that party 

may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). The party 

resisting discovery must show how each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise 

objectionable. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 

1990). A trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery. 

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. DataTreasury Corp., 936 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2019).

1. Schedule A Claims (Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8)

Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 seek documents regarding Defendant’s use of 

Schedule A certificates in its hiring process, as follows: 

Request for Production No. 1: Peggy Brake stated that the Agency 

(DHS and ICE) had a policy that if a Schedule A applicant makes 

and are reachable on the competitive list, they are not placed on the 

Affirmative Action Schedule A certificate. Produce all documents 

in the Agency’s possession, custody or control that related to and 

includes a copy of the signed and dated policy to which Peggy Brake 

swore the Agency was using and provide any publications and dates 

of publications where the policy was published. 

(a) Provide name and title of the individual signing the policy at 

the time of signature. 

(b) Please stipulate whether this policy applies to only Schedule 

A applicants or does this policy equally apply to veterans and 

which other hiring authorities this policy has been used on.

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Request for Production No. 2: Please provide copies of the 

Schedule A certificates that were referred to the Selecting Official 

for each of the following job announcements:

a. DAL-INT 700288-MP-JJT

b. DAL-INV-1771497-MP-JCD

c. DAL-INT-710627-MP-FG

d. DAL-INV-1109219-DEU-PM

e. DAL-INV-527533-DEU-RDD

f. DAL-INV-1876981-MP-DLD

g. DAL-INV-10513579-MP-RMD

h. DAL-OPR-10547852-DH-JCD

i. DAL-INV-527533-DEU-RDD

Request for Production No. 5: Please provide[ ] all document[s]

related to the procedures of how the Agency handles Schedule A 

applications through any means that those applications are received.

Request for Production No. 7: Please provide all training 

certificates of training or training attended for both Jerry Robinette 

a[nd] Peggy Brake for any training received on Schedule A, 

Diversity, Individuals with Targeted Disabilities and Affirmative 

Action.

Request for Production No. 8: Please provide all broadcast 

messages, memorandums emails and PowerPoint presentations that 

the Agency has sent out or used which a component of those emails, 

broadcast messages or PowerPoint presentations that in part are [sic] 

in whole concerned Schedule A, Diversity, Individuals with 

Targeted Disabilities, Affirmative Action Model Employer status 

for the years of 2011-2017.

Dkt. 49 at 16-17. Defendant objects to these five requests as not reasonably calculated to lead to 

the discovery of admissible evidence, not relevant to any claim or defense, and not proportional to 

the needs of the case. Dkt. 57-1 at 3-5. Defendant argues that his use of the Schedule A hiring 

authority has no bearing on any element or defense to Plaintiff’s remaining claim for retaliation. 

Dkt. 57 at 4. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s failure to use a Schedule A certificate is relevant to 

her Title VII retaliation claim, but she does not explain how. Dkt. 49 at 2-5, 7, 9-11.

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The District Court has dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims relating to Defendant’s use 

of Schedule A certificates in its hiring process. Dkt. 27 at 2-3. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

documents Plaintiff seeks in these requests are neither relevant to any claim or defense nor 

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery the admissible evidence. See Davis v. U.S. Marshals 

Serv., 849 F. App’x 80, 87 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming denial of motion to compel where documents 

were not relevant to plaintiff’s remaining claim); Curry v. Strain, 262 F. App’x 650, 652 (5th Cir. 

2008) (finding no abuse of discretion where district court denied motion to compel because 

discovery related to dismissed claims). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Compel production of documents responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8.

2. Other Discrimination Charges (Requests for Production Nos. 3 and 4)

Requests for Production Nos. 3 and 4 seek information related to other charges of 

discrimination against Robinette and Brake. The requests state: 

Request for Production No. 3: Please provide all other charges of 

discrimination against Jerry Robinette, or where Jerry Robinette was 

a named Responsible Management Official in the case from 2011 

until 45 days after his retirement. 

(a) Provide the charges for each case. 

(b) Provide the outcomes of each case.

Request for Production No. 4: Please provide all other charges of 

discrimination against Peggy Brake, or where Peggy Brake was a 

named Responsible Management Official in the case from 2011 

until 45 days after her retirement.

(a) Provide the charges for each case. 

(b) Provide the outcomes of each case.

Dkt. 49 at 17. Defendant objects to the requests as not reasonably calculated to lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence, not relevant to any claim or defense, not proportional to the 

needs of the case, and irrelevant. Dkt. 57-1 at 4. Subject to its asserted objections, Defendant timely 

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responded that “there were no findings of discrimination against [Robinette or Brake]” during the 

specified period. Dkt. 57-1 at 4. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is distinct from her discrimination claims, 

which have been dismissed. Dkt. 57 at 5. Plaintiff argues that other cases involving Robinette and 

Brake could “show evidence of a pattern” of discrimination, and therefore are subject to discovery. 

Dkt. 49 at 5-6. Plaintiff cites Hale v. Napolitano, No. SA-08-CA-106-XR, 2009 WL 1507144 

(W.D. Tex. May 28, 2009), a Title VII case in which she alleges Robinette was involved. Robinette 

is not mentioned in the opinion. Id.

“Discrimination and retaliation claims are distinct.” Frazier v. Sabine River Auth., 509 

F. App’x 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013). To prove discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show 

that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought; 

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but outside the 

protected class were treated more favorably. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 

2007). To prove retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in an activity 

protected by Title VII; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 

492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007). “[C]ourts typically allow limited discovery of other 

complaints or incidents of alleged discrimination or retaliation to show motive, intent, or purpose, 

but only where the incidents relate to other similarly situated employees.” Crain v. Judson Indep. 

Sch. Dist., No. SA-16-CV-00832-XR, 2017 WL 10581119, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2017).

Plaintiff seeks information relating to previous discrimination claims against Robinette and Brake, 

which is not relevant to her retaliation claim. For these reasons, The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Compel as to Requests Nos. 3 and 4.

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3. Previous Robinette Cases (Request for Production No. 6)

Request for Production No. 6 states:

Request for Production No. 6: Please provide any State or Federal 

cases in which the decisions were overturned in which Jerry 

Robinette testified.

(a) Case number

(b) Jurisdiction and Court

Dkt. 49 at 17. Defendant objects to the request as vague, contending that it is unclear what Plaintiff 

seeks by “cases in which the decisions were overturned.” Dkt. 57-1 at 5. Defendant further objects 

that the request is not relevant, not limited to cases in which Robinette testified in his capacity as 

a federal employee, and seeks information and documents outside the possession, custody, or

control of DHS. Id. Defendant points out that “Robinette retired from DHS in 2012, nearly a 

decade ago . . . . And DHS does not maintain a database of its former employees’ testimony.” 

Dkt. 57 at 6.

In her Motion, Plaintiff clarifies that she is referring to Robinette’s testimony discussed in the 

District Court’s amended order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Guerra v. Collins, 

916 F. Supp. 620, 636 (S.D. Tex. 1995), and to “another case which we believe would be a Civil 

Rights violation.” Dkt. 49 at 8. Guerra v. Collins concerns a 1982 capital murder conviction. It

appears that Robinette testified at Guerra’s trial in state court as an officer of the Houston Police 

Department. Id., 916 F. Supp. at 636. Plaintiff argues that the District Court’s characterization on 

habeas review of Robinette’s trial testimony as “inconsistent” with another witness’s testimony 

and with police reports is relevant to his credibility. See id.; Dkt. 49 at 8. 

Plaintiff appears to request identification – by case number, jurisdiction, and court – of any 

other state or federal cases that have been reversed in which Robinette testified. To the extent that 

Defendant may possess such information, it may bear on Robinette’s credibility and therefore is 

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discoverable. See 8 RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (WRIGHT &

MILLER) § 2015 (3d ed. Apr. 2021 Update) (stating that discovery “is commonly allowed in which 

the discovering party seeks information with which to impeach witnesses for the opposition,” 

including “matters that go to his credibility”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Compel as to Request No. 6 to the extent that Defendant must produce any documents in its

possession, custody, or control which identify any state or federal cases that have been reversed in 

which Robinette testified.

4. Conclusion as to Motion to Compel

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Dkt. 49) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

The Court GRANTS the Motion to Compel as to Request for Production 6, subject to the limitation 

stated herein, and DENIES the Motion to Compel regarding all other Requests for Production. 

The Court further DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions.

SIGNED on November 16, 2021.

SUSAN HIGHTOWER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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