Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Stanford v. City of Flora, 2018 IL App (5th) 160115

Appellate Court 

Caption

ROGER DALE STANFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF 

FLORA and FLORA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Defendants

(Flora Chamber of Commerce, Defendant-Appellee).

District & No. Fifth District

Docket No. 5-16-0115

Filed April 18, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County, No. 11-L-6; the Hon. 

Wm. Robin Todd, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Linda J. Cantrell, of Winters, Brewster, Crosby & Schafer, LLC, of 

Marion, for appellant.

Douglas A. Enloe and Eric A. St. Ledger, of Gosnell, Borden, Enloe, 

Sloss & McCullough, Ltd., of Lawrenceville, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justice Cates concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Overstreet concurred in part and dissented in part, with 

opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Roger Dale Stanford, appeals from the Clay County circuit court’s order granting 

a motion for setoff in favor of defendant, the Flora Chamber of Commerce (Chamber). 

Pursuant to the collateral source rule recognized by Illinois courts, we find the trial court erred 

in granting the motion for setoff. We further find that the jury verdict concerning plaintiff’s 

medical expenses, disability, and lost earnings was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Plaintiff, Roger Stanford, was injured on October 30, 2010, after a vehicle operated by Curt 

Jordan collided with the rear of plaintiff’s antique tractor, which plaintiff was standing beside. 

At the time, plaintiff was a participant in the annual Halloween parade organized in Flora, 

Illinois, and plaintiff’s tractor was the last vehicle in the parade. On November 10, 2010, 

Jordan’s insurance company, Geico Indemnity Company (Geico), tendered $20,000 to 

plaintiff pursuant to a release and settlement agreement signed by plaintiff. On July 18, 2011, 

plaintiff’s insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State 

Farm), tendered $280,000 to plaintiff pursuant to plaintiff’s underinsured motorist policy. 

¶ 4 Plaintiff and his wife, Joan Stanford, subsequently filed an amended complaint against 

defendants, the City of Flora (City) and the Chamber, on January 5, 2012, alleging negligence, 

willful and wanton conduct, and loss of consortium. Regarding the alleged negligence, 

plaintiff asserted that as a direct and proximate result, in whole or in part, of one or more of 

defendants’ careless and negligent acts or omissions to act:

“Plaintiff was greatly injured in and about his body and extremities, both internally and 

externally, and has and will in the future endure great pain and suffering, has and will in 

the future expend large sums of money in endeavoring to become cured of said injuries, 

has been temporarily and permanently injured as a result of said injuries and has lost 

wages.” 

¶ 5 Regarding the alleged willful and wanton conduct, plaintiff asserted defendants’ failures to 

act and/or omissions to act were an utter indifference and/or conscious disregard for the safety 

of others, which caused plaintiff to sustain severe personal injuries and damages. Joan Stanford 

alleged loss of consortium against defendants. 

¶ 6 The City and the Chamber subsequently denied the allegations and filed affirmative 

defenses. Relevant to this appeal, the Chamber’s third and fourth affirmative defenses asserted 

that in the event plaintiff recovers a judgment against the Chamber, the Chamber is entitled to 

a setoff in the amount of $311,000 against any such judgment since plaintiff had already 

received $20,000 from Geico, $280,000 from State Farm under plaintiff’s underinsured 

motorist policy, $10,000 from State Farm for medical payments, and upon information and 

belief that plaintiff had received $1000 from a victim’s advocacy fund. Specifically, the 

Chamber asserted the sum of $311,000 that plaintiff received “is in full satisfaction of any and 

all claim that [plaintiff has] against [the Chamber], and would act as a setoff and bar of any 

judgment claimed that plaintiff has against this defendant.” 
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¶ 7 On August 31, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the Chamber’s affirmative defenses. 

Regarding the Chamber’s third and fourth affirmative defenses, plaintiff argued the Chamber’s 

allegation of a setoff entitlement is an inaccurate statement of the law. Citing our supreme 

court’s decision in Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72 (2005), plaintiff noted that, pursuant to the 

collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent 

of and collateral to the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the 

tortfeasor. Plaintiff also filed a motion in limine on August 31, 2015, requesting that the court 

prohibit defendants and their attorneys or witnesses from testifying or making any statements 

regarding any payments received by plaintiff from State Farm. 

¶ 8 Oral arguments on plaintiff’s motions were held on September 2, 2015. On October 20, 

2015, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike the Chamber’s third and fourth 

affirmative defenses regarding a setoff entitlement but granted plaintiff’s motion in limine

prohibiting defendants from testifying or making statements regarding any payments received 

by plaintiff from State Farm. On October 23, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration 

that asserted that “[t]o allow a setoff for underinsured or uninsured motorist insurance would 

directly circumvent the collateral source rule.”

¶ 9 A jury trial commenced on November 2, 2015. On November 5, 2015, the trial court 

granted the City’s motion for a directed verdict and dismissed it from this case. After the jury 

trial concluded on November 6, 2015, the jury tendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff and 

against the Chamber, finding plaintiff suffered $50,000 in damages ($25,000 for pain and 

suffering and $25,000 for earnings lost). The jury further found plaintiff was 10% 

contributorily negligent, thereby reducing the verdict to a total of $45,000. The jury awarded 

zero damages for medical expenses, disability, and remodeling expenses. 

¶ 10 After the jury verdict, the Chamber made an oral motion based on its previously filed 

affirmative defense regarding a setoff entitlement. On November 16, 2015, the Chamber filed 

a motion for setoff to be applied to the jury verdict, requesting that the court allow a setoff in its 

favor for the sum of $20,000 paid by Jordan’s insurer, Geico, to plaintiff and also the sum of 

$280,000 paid by State Farm to plaintiff under plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage. The 

Chamber’s motion for setoff asserted “plaintiff has previously received satisfaction in full for 

his claimed damages in bar of action.” 

¶ 11 The court granted the Chamber’s motion for setoff to be applied to the jury verdict on 

December 7, 2015, for both the sum of $20,000 paid by Geico and the sum of $280,000 paid by 

State Farm. Specifically, the court stated: 

“[T]he Judgment entered on the verdict of the jury is satisfied in full and [the Chamber] 

shall not be required to pay any sum of money to Plaintiff as a result of the November 

6, 2015 jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff due to the fact that the jury verdict was less 

than the amount of setoff to which [the Chamber] is entitled.” 

¶ 12 On January 8, 2016, plaintiff filed a posttrial motion requesting that the verdict concerning 

damages be vacated and a new trial be granted. Plaintiff further requested that the order 

allowing a setoff against the jury verdict for underinsured benefits received by plaintiff be 

reversed because it directly circumvented the collateral source rule. The Chamber filed a 

response to plaintiff’s posttrial motion requesting that it be denied. The Chamber argued the 

collateral source rule was not applicable to the facts of this case and that refusing to allow the 

Chamber a setoff against the jury verdict would guarantee a double recovery for plaintiff. After 

hearing oral arguments on the aforementioned motions, the trial court denied plaintiff’s 
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posttrial motion. This appeal followed. 

¶ 13 ANALYSIS 

¶ 14 Plaintiff first alleges the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for setoff 

against the jury verdict, thereby allowing a setoff for underinsured motorist insurance proceeds 

tendered pursuant to plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy. Specifically, plaintiff contends 

the court’s decision to allow a setoff directly circumvents the collateral source rule. Since we 

are asked to determine the correctness of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed 

facts, our standard of review is de novo. Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 399 (2008). 

¶ 15 Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the injured party from a source 

completely independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages 

otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 78. The rule provides that 

“ ‘[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not 

credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which 

the tortfeasor is liable.’ ” Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 399 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 920A(2), at 513 (1979)). 

¶ 16 The collateral source rule has been characterized as an “ ‘established exception to the 

general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory.’ ” Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 

399 (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages § 172 (2002)). The rule protects collateral payments made to 

or benefits conferred on the plaintiff by denying the defendant any corresponding credit or 

offset. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 78. Although collateral benefits reduce the plaintiff’s loss, they do 

not reduce the defendant’s tort liability. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 78. 

¶ 17 Illinois courts have held that the collateral source rule encompasses both evidentiary and 

substantive components. Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 400. As a rule of evidence, the rule prevents the 

jury from learning anything concerning collateral income. Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 400. As a 

substantive rule of damages, the rule prohibits a defendant from reducing the plaintiff’s 

compensatory award by the amount the plaintiff received from the collateral source. Wills, 229 

Ill. 2d at 400. 

¶ 18 A situation in which the collateral source rule is frequently applied is where the injured 

plaintiff has been partly or wholly indemnified for the loss by proceeds from his or her accident 

insurance. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 320 (1989). In such a case, the 

damages recovered by the plaintiff from the tortfeasor are not decreased by the amounts 

received from insurance proceeds. Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320. It is well settled that damages 

recovered by the plaintiff from the defendant are not decreased by the amount the plaintiff 

received from insurance proceeds where the defendant did not contribute to the payment of the 

insurance premiums. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 79. “The justification for this rule is that the 

wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take 

advantage of contracts or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third 

persons.” Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320. Our supreme court has observed the collateral source rule 

is premised upon the public policy that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should not 

be shifted so as to become a windfall to the tortfeasor. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 90. 

¶ 19 In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff received the benefit of his underinsured motorist 

policy with State Farm when State Farm tendered $280,000 to plaintiff as a result of the 

October 2010 accident. This was a benefit bargained for and provided by plaintiff for 

plaintiff’s benefit. This payment was not made on behalf of a tortfeasor. Further, State Farm is 
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not a party to plaintiff’s action against the Chamber. Rather, State Farm is a third party and a 

source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor. Therefore, the collateral source 

rule applies to the benefits State Farm tendered to plaintiff. Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 399. As we 

discuss above, the rule protects these collateral payments tendered to plaintiff by State Farm by 

denying the Chamber any corresponding setoff or credit. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 78; Wills, 229 

Ill. 2d at 402. Such collateral benefits do not reduce the Chamber’s tort liability even though 

they reduced plaintiff’s loss. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 90; Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 419. 

¶ 20 In consideration of the foregoing principles, plaintiff’s insurance proceeds, being proceeds 

from a collateral source, should not have been set off against the jury’s verdict of $45,000 in 

favor of plaintiff and against the Chamber. We note that the parties do not dispute the setoff 

granted for the $20,000 paid by Jordan’s insurer, Geico, to plaintiff under Jordan’s separate 

policy. This is not at issue in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment 

granting the Chamber’s motion for setoff of plaintiff’s insurance proceeds ($280,000 from 

State Farm) against the jury verdict and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

¶ 21 The Chamber raises several arguments on appeal. Most of the Chamber’s arguments 

attempt to distinguish the facts of the instant case from the facts of the cases cited by plaintiff in 

his brief, which include the following: Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d 72; Wills, 229 Ill. 2d 393; Halverson 

v. Stamm, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1206 (2002); and Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d 308. After careful 

consideration, we find the Chamber’s arguments are misplaced. 

¶ 22 Although the cases referenced above do not specifically address the collateral source rule 

as it pertains to underinsured motorist proceeds, Arthur, Wills, and Wilson all discuss the 

justification for the collateral source rule: “the wrongdoer should not benefit from the 

expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other relations that 

may exist between the injured party and third persons.” Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320. Further, 

Halverson indicates double recovery is appropriate in situations where the plaintiff bargained 

for such a double recovery. In this case, the $280,000 plaintiff received from State Farm was a 

benefit bargained for and provided by plaintiff for plaintiff’s benefit. The source of this 

payment was not made by a tortfeasor. Thus, the collateral source rule protects this payment, 

and it is inappropriate for the Chamber, the wrongdoer in this case, to benefit from the 

relationship plaintiff bargained for with State Farm. For these reasons, we reject the Chamber’s 

argument. 

¶ 23 The Chamber next indicates that the legislature’s intent in enacting a provision for 

underinsured motorist coverage was to place the insured in the same position he or she would 

have occupied if injured by a motorist who carried liability insurance in the same amount as the 

policyholder. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 558 (1992). Since it is 

undisputed plaintiff has already received the sum of $300,000 ($20,000 from Geico and 

$280,000 from State Farm), the Chamber argues it would violate public policy to allow 

plaintiff to accept the underinsured motorist coverage and receive double recovery from the 

Chamber for the same injuries and damages. The Chamber further asserts that, because State 

Farm has not claimed any subrogation lien against plaintiff, plaintiff will not have to “pay 

back” any of the $280,000 paid by State Farm to plaintiff regardless of the jury verdict. The 

Chamber asserts that this fact by itself guarantees plaintiff will receive a double recovery if the 

Chamber is denied the right to setoff against the jury verdict. We disagree. 
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¶ 24 The Chamber’s argument ignores the well-established principle that the collateral source 

rule is an exception to the policy against double recovery. Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 

308 Ill. App. 3d 213, 220 (1999). As we discuss more extensively above, in a case where an 

injured plaintiff has been compensated for the loss by his or her accident insurance, the 

damages recovered by the plaintiff from the tortfeasor are not decreased by the amounts 

received from insurance proceeds. Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 320. Further, although Illinois courts 

generally disfavor a double recovery, this is a situation where a double recovery is appropriate 

because plaintiff bargained for such a double recovery when he purchased his underinsured 

motorist policy. The fact that State Farm has claimed no subrogation lien against plaintiff is 

irrelevant. Accordingly, we reject the Chamber’s argument. 

¶ 25 Plaintiff’s next argument contends the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motion for a 

new trial. Specifically, plaintiff asserts a new trial on damages should be ordered because the 

damages awarded by the jury were irreconcilably inconsistent with the objective evidence 

presented at trial. 

¶ 26 Generally, the decision of whether to grant a new trial is a matter reserved to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and the court’s determination will not be overturned on review 

absent an abuse of discretion. Wade v. Rich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587 (1993). However, a 

jury’s verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered where the amount of damages awarded 

is against the manifest weight of the evidence or where the jury has clearly disregarded a 

proven element of damages. Wade, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 587. A verdict is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings 

of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence. Maple v. 

Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992). 

¶ 27 The amount of money a jury awards is an issue of fact for the jury to determine and is 

entitled to substantial deference. Anderson v. Zamir, 402 Ill. App. 3d 362, 364 (2010). If the 

jury received proper instruction and otherwise had a reasonable basis for its award, a reviewing 

court will not disturb the verdict. Anderson, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 364. Although we recognize 

there is no precise formula for determining whether a monetary award is fair and reasonable, 

the following factors should be considered: (1) the extent of the injuries suffered and the 

degree of the permanency of the injuries, (2) the plaintiff’s age, (3) the possibility of 

difficulties in the future, (4) the amount of medical expenses incurred, and (5) the restrictions 

upon the plaintiff’s life as a result of the injuries suffered. Anderson, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65. 

Generally, a reviewing court will not order a new trial on damages unless (1) the damages 

awarded are manifestly inadequate, (2) it is clear that proven elements of damages were not 

awarded, or (3) the amount bears no relationship to the loss suffered by plaintiff. Walters v. 

Yellow Cab Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 729, 740-41 (1995). When reviewing a question regarding the 

adequacy of damages, the court must consider the record in its entirety. Hastings v. Gulledge, 

272 Ill. App. 3d 861, 864 (1995). 

¶ 28 Here, the jury awarded plaintiff $25,000 for pain and suffering and $25,000 for lost 

earnings after determining the Chamber was at fault. The jury further found that plaintiff was 

10% contributorily negligent, thereby reducing the verdict to $45,000. As previously stated, 

the jury awarded zero damages for the following: the reasonable expense of necessary medical 

care, treatment, and services received; the disability experienced; and the reasonable expense 

of necessary handicap remodeling expenses. Since the jury awarded zero damages for medical 

expenses, disability, and remodeling expenses, plaintiff contends the jury’s award is arbitrary 
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and bears no relationship to the losses he sustained. Plaintiff further contends that the jury 

award for lost earnings is grounds for a new trial because it is inconsistent with the evidence 

presented at trial. We address these contentions in turn. 

¶ 29 Based upon our review of the record in its entirety, we conclude the jury’s verdict 

regarding medical expenses was against the manifest weight of the evidence. To recover for 

medical expenses, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she has paid or become liable to pay a 

medical bill, (2) he or she has necessarily incurred the medical expenses because of injuries 

resulting from the defendant’s negligence, and (3) the charges were reasonable for the services 

of that nature. Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 81-82. “When evidence is admitted, through testimony or 

otherwise, that a medical bill was for treatment rendered and that the bill has been paid, the bill 

is prima facie reasonable.” Arthur, 216 Ill. 2d at 82. 

¶ 30 The defendant may rebut the prima facie reasonableness of a medical expense by 

presenting proper evidence casting doubt on the transaction. Baker v. Hutson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 

486, 494 (2002). The proponent’s offering of a paid bill or the testimony of a witness that a bill 

is fair and reasonable simply satisfies the requirement to prove reasonableness. Baker, 333 Ill. 

App. 3d at 494. The proponent must also present evidence that the costs were incurred as a 

result of the defendant’s negligence. Baker, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 494. Furthermore, satisfying the 

minimum requirements for the admission of a bill into evidence does not conclusively 

establish that the entire amount of the bill must be awarded to the plaintiff. Baker, 333 Ill. App. 

3d at 494. The admission of a bill into evidence merely allows the jury to consider whether to 

award none, part, or all of the bill as damages. Baker, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 494. 

¶ 31 Here, it is indisputable that plaintiff sustained serious and significant injuries in the 

accident, from which he incurred medical expenses. At trial, plaintiff introduced 

uncontroverted evidence of medical bills totaling $116,195.94. Plaintiff testified all of these 

bills were incurred from treatment he received as a result of the injuries he sustained in the 

accident. Said treatment included hospitalization, surgery, and home health care. When asked 

whether these bills had been paid, plaintiff testified: “As far as I know.” The Chamber 

presented no evidence that these medical bills were unreasonable or unnecessary. Nonetheless, 

the jury awarded zero damages for plaintiff’s medical bills despite finding the Chamber was 

90% at fault for plaintiff’s injuries. 

¶ 32 When a reviewing court is faced with a zero-dollar award where damages are clearly 

evident, this court has held there is no choice but to declare that the verdict is inconsistent. 

Kumorek v. Moyers, 203 Ill. App. 3d 908, 913 (1990). In light of the foregoing, we conclude 

the jury’s verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as it bears no reasonable 

relationship to the medical bills established by plaintiff at trial. Accordingly, we vacate the jury 

verdict concerning medical expenses. 

¶ 33 Similarly, we find the jury’s award of zero damages for disability was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Initially, we note that disability is a separate element of damages, and 

the jury’s decision regarding whether to make any award for disability and, if so, how much is 

not dependent upon whether or what amount of other damages are awarded. Hastings, 272 Ill. 

App. 3d at 865. 

¶ 34 Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows plaintiff was disabled for a period of time 

following the accident. Plaintiff was not released from medical care until October 2012, 

approximately two years after the accident, at which time he was unable to return to his 

previous employment due to permanent physical restrictions. Specifically, plaintiff testified he 
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is unable to climb, load, and secure his trailer. Plaintiff further testified his physical disabilities 

affect his ability to perform daily activities, and he cannot perform many activities that he 

could prior to the accident. Plaintiff testified the longest time he can stand before feeling pain 

in his leg is 10 to 15 minutes. Plaintiff testified that in April or May of 2013 he experienced 

severe pain in his knee, for which he ultimately underwent surgery in November 2013. 

¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we find the jury award of zero damages for disability was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. The record shows plaintiff sustained serious injuries in the 

accident that, as a result, caused plaintiff to miss substantial time from work and prevented him 

from returning to his previous employment. The jury’s zero award bears no reasonable 

relationship to the disability established by plaintiff at trial. Therefore, the jury verdict 

awarding nothing for disability must be vacated. 

¶ 36 As to the jury’s award of zero damages for remodeling expenses, we cannot say this 

determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record shows the jury 

heard conflicting testimony regarding plaintiff’s claim for remodeling expenses. The record 

further indicates plaintiff presented brief testimony concerning home remodeling expenses 

incurred to fit his physical capabilities, and defense counsel competently cross-examined 

plaintiff on these claims. 

¶ 37 We find nothing in the record that suggests the jury ignored any proven element of 

damages in its award of zero damages for plaintiff’s claim for remodeling expenses. Moreover, 

we cannot say this verdict resulted from passion or prejudice or that this award bears no 

reasonable relationship to the alleged loss suffered. In sum, we find no adequate grounds to 

disturb the award of damages concerning remodeling expenses. 

¶ 38 Finally, we find the jury’s award of $25,000 to plaintiff for lost earnings was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. It is well settled that lost income is a proper element of 

damages to be considered by the trier of fact. Turner v. Chicago Transit Authority, 122 Ill. 

App. 3d 419, 428 (1984). However, recovery must be limited to such loss as will be reasonably 

certain to occur and cannot be based on testimony that is merely speculative, remote, or 

uncertain. Turner, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 428-29. Generally, the measure of damages for 

impairment of earning capacity is the difference between the amount that the plaintiff was 

capable of earning before his or her injury and what he or she is capable of earning after the 

injury. Smith v. Marvin, 377 Ill. App. 3d 562, 571 (2007). Again, a jury’s award can be 

overturned only if the jury ignored an element of damages, acted out of passion or prejudice, or 

made an award not reasonably related to the loss. Dixon v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 

App. 3d 453, 470 (2008). 

¶ 39 Here, plaintiff testified he was employed by Balyes Farm Trucking (Balyes) as a truck 

driver at the time of the accident. Plaintiff’s duties included hauling grain bins, grain dryers, 

steel pipe, and fans. Plaintiff testified he had been a truck driver for 351⁄2 years and that he 

started working for Balyes in September 2009. Plaintiff was 62 years old at the time of the 

accident. On cross-examination, plaintiff testified he planned on driving a truck until he was 67 

years old. On redirect, when questioned about what age he intended to retire, plaintiff testified 

as follows: 

“A. Before the—when they initially had, was going to make, pass a law to require 

all drivers to retire at 65, I was going to retire at 65. But when they repealed that, I was 

going to go to 67, because of the social security. 
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 Q. Okay. And 65 was an age that you threw out because the law was going to 

change? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. And it was going to bar truck drivers from driving over-the-road past age 65? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. Do you know if that law was passed? 

A. No, it was not.”

We note that when asked at a deposition prior to trial how long he planned to drive a truck, 

plaintiff testified until he was 66 or 67 years old. Plaintiff testified he took an unpaid leave of 

absence from Balyes after the accident and has not been able to return to work since the 

accident. Plaintiff testified his injuries restricted him from climbing, which prevented him 

from returning to his previous employment. Plaintiff’s limitations regarding climbing 

prevented him from loading, unloading, and securing his trailer. 

¶ 40 Plaintiff further testified that from January 1, 2010, through the date of the accident on 

October 30, 2010, his tax return indicated he earned $29,906, which is $2990.60 per month. At 

closing argument, plaintiff’s counsel recommended an award of lost earnings for the time 

period following the accident through August 2015, which is when plaintiff turned 67 years 

old. As previously noted, plaintiff testified at trial that he intended to work until he was 67 

years old. The recommended lost earnings totaled $170,464.20, which represented 57 months 

at $2990.60 per month. As we indicate above, plaintiff earned $2990.60 per month from 

January 1, 2010, through the date of the accident in October 2010. 

¶ 41 After careful consideration, we find the jury award of $25,000 to plaintiff for lost earnings 

bears no reasonable relationship to plaintiff’s loss. The record indicates plaintiff was not 

released from medical care for the injuries he sustained in the accident until October 2012, 

approximately two years after the accident took place. The record further shows that plaintiff 

has been unable to return to his employment with Balyes due to physical limitations resulting 

from the accident. The jury’s award of $25,000, which represents less than plaintiff’s earnings 

in the 10-month period of 2010 prior to the accident, cannot be viewed as a reasonable 

relationship to plaintiff’s lost earning capacity. For these reasons, we vacate the jury’s award 

of $25,000 for lost earnings. 

¶ 42 The Chamber argues plaintiff expressly waived his arguments concerning dollar amounts 

awarded by the jury. Specifically, since the parties agreed during the jury’s deliberations that 

the jury could award zero damages on some categories and change the amount of damages on 

other categories, the Chamber contends plaintiff waived any future argument that the jury 

should not have awarded zero damages in some categories. 

¶ 43 After careful review, we find the Chamber’s argument is without merit. In this case,

plaintiff timely filed a posttrial motion requesting that the verdict concerning damages be 

vacated and a new trial be granted. The trial court denied this motion, and plaintiff 

subsequently filed a timely appeal. Nothing in the record suggests plaintiff explicitly waived 

his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his posttrial motion requesting that the verdict 

concerning damages be vacated and a new trial be granted. Accordingly, we reject the 

Chamber’s argument. 

¶ 44 The Chamber further asserts the jury award of zero damages for medical expenses and 

disability and the jury award of $25,000 for lost earnings was not against the manifest weight 
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of the evidence because it is the function of the jury to evaluate the evidence and weigh the 

testimony presented at trial in determining whether to award none, part, or all of the claimed 

damages. The Chamber contends the jury could have reasonably concluded plaintiff failed to 

meet his burden. We disagree. 

¶ 45 Although we recognize it is generally for the trier of fact, in this case the jury, to resolve 

conflicting testimony and give weight to the credibility of said testimony, a zero-dollar award 

is inconsistent where damages are clearly evident. Martin v. Cain, 219 Ill. App. 3d 110, 115 

(1991). Accordingly, we reject the Chamber’s argument concerning medical expenses and 

disability. We further find the jury award of $25,000 for lost earnings is unreasonable 

considering plaintiff’s limitations as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident, the fact 

that plaintiff has not been able to return to his previous employment, and the fact that the award 

represents less than plaintiff’s total earnings in the 10-month period of 2010 prior to the 

accident. For these reasons, we reject the Chamber’s argument.

¶ 46 CONCLUSION 

¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting the Chamber’s 

motion for setoff against the jury verdict. Under the collateral source rule, the proceeds 

plaintiff received under his underinsured motorist policy should not be offset against the jury 

verdict. Further, we vacate the jury’s verdict regarding medical expenses, disability, and lost 

earnings because it bears no reasonable relationship to the injuries established by plaintiff at 

trial. As to the remodeling expenses, we find no adequate grounds to disturb the award of zero 

damages. This cause is hereby remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages only. We note 

our supreme court has concluded a new trial on the question of damages only is appropriately 

granted where (1) the jury’s verdict on the question of liability is sufficiently supported by the 

evidence, (2) the questions of damages and liability are so separate and distinct that a trial 

limited to the question of damages is not unfair to the defendant, and (3) the record suggests 

neither that the jury reached a compromise verdict nor that the error which resulted in the 

jury’s awarding inadequate damages also affected its verdict on the question of liability. 

Robbins v. Professional Construction Co., 72 Ill. 2d 215, 224 (1978); Balestri v. Terminal 

Freight Cooperative Ass’n, 76 Ill. 2d 451, 456 (1979). Here, these elements have been 

satisfied. 

¶ 48 Reversed and remanded. 

¶ 49 JUSTICE OVERSTREET, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

¶ 50 I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the circuit court’s judgment granting the 

Chamber’s motion for setoff against the jury verdict. I agree that the proceeds the plaintiff 

received under his underinsured motorist policy should not have been offset against the jury’s 

verdict. I also concur with the majority’s decision to vacate the jury’s verdict regarding 

medical expenses and lost earnings. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the jury’s 

award of zero-dollar damages for the plaintiff’s medical expenses, despite awarding him 

$25,000 for pain and suffering, was inconsistent and contrary to the manifest weight of the 

evidence. I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that the jury’s award of $25,000 to 

plaintiff for lost earnings bears no reasonable relationship to the plaintiff’s loss. I also concur 
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with the majority’s conclusion that the jury’s award of zero damages for remodeling expenses 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should not be disturbed. 

¶ 51 However, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that vacates the jury’s 

verdict regarding disability. Nothing in the record suggests that the jury ignored any proven 

element of damages, that the verdict resulted from passion or prejudice, or that the award bore 

no reasonable relationship to the alleged loss suffered. Snover v. McGraw, 172 Ill. 2d 438, 447 

(1996). 

¶ 52 “Disability is clearly a separate element of damages.” Hastings v. Gulledge, 272 Ill. App. 

3d 861, 865 (1995). “The jury’s decision as to whether to make any award for disability and, if 

so, how much, is not dependent upon whether or what amount of damages are awarded for pain 

and suffering.” Id. Here, the plaintiff presented no medical testimony regarding his disability 

claim, and the jury heard conflicting testimony on this issue. For example, Donald Delaney, 

the plaintiff’s fellow member of the local antique tractor clubs, testified that he continued to 

see the plaintiff from time to time after the plaintiff recovered from his broken leg. Delaney 

testified that since the plaintiff’s medical release about 18 months after the accident, Delaney 

“can’t tell any difference” in the plaintiff since before the accident and that the plaintiff “does 

what he wants.” Delaney testified that the plaintiff continued to show three or four tractors at 

the tractor shows and that he climbed, drove, loaded, and unloaded the tractors. Accordingly, 

the evidence in the record permitted the jury to conclude that the plaintiff was not disabled and 

would not be in the future. See Poliszczuk v. Winkler, 387 Ill. App. 3d 474, 491 (2008) (“fact 

that the jury chose to award no money for disability and for loss of normal life, while awarding 

money for medical expenses and pain and suffering, is not proof, by itself, that the jury 

‘ignored’ that element”); see also Rodriguez v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. 

Corp., 2012 IL App (1st) 102953, ¶ 52 (“there is a reasonable hypothesis to support the jury’s 

verdict awarding *** damages for pain and suffering and lost wages, but nothing for disability: 

namely, that compensating her for both lost wages and disability would be a double 

recovery”). “Where evidence is contradicted, or where it is merely based on the subjective 

testimony of the plaintiff, a jury is free to disbelieve it.” Stift v. Lizzadro, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 

1029 (2005). 

¶ 53 In sum, I see no adequate grounds to disturb or revisit the jury’s determination of damages 

concerning the plaintiff’s claim of disability. For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully 

concur in part and dissent in part.