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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

EL CAMPO VENTURES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

STRATTON SECURITIES INC., 

STRATTON OILFIELD SYSTEMS 

TEXAS LLC, DANIEL STRATTON, 

SHANNON STRATTON,

Defendants.

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No. 1:20-CV-00560-RP

AMENDED1 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Prejudgment Interest, PostJudgment Interest and Costs (“the Motion”) (Dkt. #113), Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Prejudgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest and Costs (Dkt. #116) 

and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Prejudgment Interest, PostJudgment Interest and Costs (Dkt. #117).2 A hearing was held on December 3, 2021 and a followup hearing was held on January 4, 2022. In the wake of the January hearing, Plaintiff was ordered 

to submit additional information in support of their attorneys’ fee claim. The Court is now in 

receipt of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Attorney Fees, 

Prejudgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest and Costs (Dkt. #128) and Defendant’s Response to 

Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Prejudgment 

1 The undersigned issues this Amended Report and Recommendation to correct a typo in the post-judgment 

interest rate in its previous report and recommendation (Dkt. #130). 2 On October 14, 2021, the Motion was referred by United States District Judge Robert Pitman, via text order, to 

the undersigned for resolution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

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Interest, Post-Judgment Interest and Costs (Dkt. #129). After reviewing the pleadings, the 

arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, as well as the entire case file, the undersigned 

recommends the District Court GRANT, in part, and DENY, in part the Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

On September 9, 2021, a jury returned a verdict in favor of El Campo Ventures, LLC (“El 

Campo”). The jury found that Defendant Stratton Securities, Inc. failed to comply with the 

agreement in dispute and awarded damages in the amount of $4,095,300.00. Dkt. #109. To be 

clear, the jury’s verdict implicated only Defendant Stratton Securities, Inc. Defendants Stratton 

Oilfield Systems Texas LLC, Daniel Stratton and Shannon Stratton were not implicated by the 

jury’s verdict in favor of El Campo.

Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees, prejudgment and post-judgment interest and 

costs. Dkt. #113. The parties agree that Texas law applies to this case. In addition, it appears that 

the parties are in agreement on the post-judgment interest rate and costs. A sharp dispute remains 

concerning the amount of recoverable attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fee request is premised on section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil 

Practices and Remedies Code, which provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, if the 

claim is for an “oral or written contract.” Plaintiff contends that to recover attorneys’ fees under 

this chapter it only need prove that Plaintiff: (1) was represented by an attorney, (2) presented its

claim to the opposing party or agent, and (3) payment for the just amount owed was not tendered 

before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim was presented. §38.002(2). Under this provision

and consistent with the jury’s verdict in its favor, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and 

costs.

Plaintiff engaged attorneys, Alfonso C. Nevarez (“Nevarez”) and Benjamin P. Gates 

(“Gates”), to represent Plaintiff in this matter. Nevarez and Gates were retained on the basis of an 

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agreement by which they “agreed to be compensated solely in the form of a contingent fee. The 

contingent fee percentage was 25% on amounts recovered prior to the commencement of a trial, 

and 30% after the commencement of a trial.” See Dkt. #113-1 and 113-2. Consequently, Plaintiff 

initially seeks to recover 30% of the awarded damages for an attorneys’ fee recovery of 

$1,228,590. Plaintiff maintains that a 30% contingency fee arrangement is a usual and customary 

fee agreement in this type of case. Recognizing the potential for segregation of fees because 

Plaintiff did not prevail on all claims against all parties, Plaintiff offers a 5% reduction of the 

requested attorneys’ fees reducing the percentage of recovery to 27%. This concession reduces 

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fee request to $1,105,731.

Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff’s contention that all Plaintiff must show is that a 30% 

contingency fee agreement was reached between Plaintiff and its counsel. Defendant contends that 

the Texas Supreme Court held that the lodestar analysis applies to any situation in which an 

objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be employed. Dkt. 

#116 at 2 (citing, Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 497-498 

(Tex. 2019) (“Rohrmoos Venture”)). Defendant contends the “Texas Supreme Court expressly 

held in Rohrmoos that a contingency fee agreement may not be used to shift attorney’s fees to the 

defendant. ‘Only fees reasonable and necessary for the legal representation will be shifted to the 

non-prevailing party, and not necessarily the amount contracted for between the prevailing party 

and its attorney, as a client's agreement to a certain fee arrangement or obligation to pay a particular 

amount does not necessarily establish that fee as reasonable and necessary.’” Id. at 3, (citing

Rohrmoos Venture, at 488). Defendant notes that all but one distinguishable case cited by Plaintiff, 

pre-date Rohrmoos Venture. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s failure to provide any evidence of an 

objective figure that “approximates the fee Plaintiff’s attorneys would have received had they 

properly billed a paying client by the hour in a similar case.” Id. at 5.

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Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to properly segregate, or reduce, the 

requested attorneys’ fee amount. Specifically, Defendant notes that the final jury verdict 

implicated only one defendant, Stratton Securities, Inc. Six of the seven original defendants were 

absolved of any responsibility. After contested litigation, three defendants were dismissed prior 

to trial. At trial, three additional defendants (Daniel Stratton, Shannon Stratton and Stratton 

Oilfield Systems Texas, LLC) were essentially dismissed as well. At trial, the jury was only asked 

to determine the liability of one defendant, Stratton Securities, Inc. The jury found for Plaintiff on 

the question of whether the defendant failed to comply with the Proceeds Sharing Agreement. Dkt. 

#109. Plaintiff’s conversion and fraud claims, and request for exemplary damages, against Stratton 

Securities, Inc. (“the Defendant”) were rejected by the jury. Id.

In its reply brief, Plaintiff maintains that Rohrmoos Venture specifically authorized the 

recovery of attorneys’ fees pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. Dkt. #117 at 1-2. Plaintiff 

also suggest that Rohrmoos Venture provides that a prevailing Plaintiff may elect whether to 

recover under either the loadstar method or contingent fee arrangement. Id. at 2. 

At the January 4, 2020, hearing, this Court shared with Plaintiff its belief that Plaintiff 

misread Rohrmoos Venture. While Plaintiff is correct in asserting that Rohrmoos Venture did not 

prevent the recovery of attorneys’ fees generated pursuant to a contingency fee agreement, the 

Texas Supreme Court clearly requires the prevailing party to establish that the attorneys’ fees

requested are reasonable and necessary. In other words, Plaintiff was required to do more than 

simply reference a contingency fee agreement. Instead, Plaintiff must attempt to approximate the 

lodestar method and submit evidence to support its belief that the attorneys’ fees sought were 

reasonable and necessary in this case. Plaintiff was authorized to supplement its original fee 

request.

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Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum stubbornly clings to the belief that all Plaintiff must 

show is the existence of a 30% contingency fee agreement between a plaintiff and retained counsel 

to support an award of attorneys’ fees. Dkt. #128. Plaintiff apparently believes that because 30% 

contingency fee agreements are common, such compensation agreements always reflect a 

reasonable and necessary rate. Plaintiff appears to suggest that a court should then enter an order 

that rubber stamps contingency fee agreements as the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees for the 

prevailing party after trial. That simply is not the law. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to cite a 

single persuasive post-Rohrmoos Venture case for this proposition.3

Defendant points out numerous deficiencies in its response to Plaintiff’s supplement. Dkt. 

#129. Defendant’s criticism starts with Plaintiff’s continued insistence that the lodestar method 

does not apply in contingency fee agreement cases. Id. at 1-3. Defendant also objects to Plaintiff’s 

$750 hourly rate as excessive. Id. at 3-6. Similarly, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s billable 

hours are not reasonable, and Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that it segregated nonrecoverable attorneys’ fees from its request. Id. at 6-13.

II. ANALYSIS

A. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

To secure an award of attorneys’ fees from an opponent, the prevailing party must prove 

that: (1) recovery of attorneys’ fees is legally authorized, and (2) the requested attorneys’ fees are 

reasonable and necessary for the legal representation, so that such an award will compensate the 

prevailing party generally for its losses resulting from the litigation process. Rohrmoos Venture, 

supra at 487. Given the jury’s verdict, the recovery of attorneys’ fees is not contested by Defendant

and is legally authorized. What remains to be decided is whether Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ 

3 The only case cited by Plaintiff was CAN Capital Asset Servicing, Inc. v. Walker, 1:17-CV-1147-RP (W.D. Tex. 

May 30, 2019). This case was decided 39 days after the Rohrmoos Venture decision, makes no reference to that 

decision and is otherwise distinguishable.

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fees are reasonable and necessary, so that the requested amount generally compensates Plaintiff

for its losses resulting from the litigation process.

A determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees is premised on the application 

of the lodestar method. Id. at 489. Courts in the Fifth Circuit also apply the lodestar method to 

calculate attorneys’ fees. Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Heidtman v. Cty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999)). The lodestar amount is 

calculated by multiplying the number of hours an attorney reasonably spent on the case by an 

appropriate hourly rate. Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (citing Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & 

Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012)). The appropriate hourly rate is defined by the 

market rate in the community in which the district court sits and should reflect the prevailing 

market rates, not the rates that “lions at the bar may command.” Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (citing 

Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 490); Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002); 

Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). Litigants seeking attorneys’ fees have the 

burden to show the reasonableness of the hours billed and that the attorneys exercised reasonable 

billing judgment. Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (citing Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 

795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006)); Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996). The lodestar 

amount is entitled to a strong presumption of reasonableness. Black, 732 F.3d at 502 (citing 

Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)).

After calculating the lodestar amount, the district court may adjust the amount of attorneys’ 

fees based on the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 

714 (5th Cir. 1974). Id. 4 Many of these factors are subsumed within the initial calculation of 

4 These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of issues in the case; (3) the skill 

required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to accepting 

the case; (5) the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or 

contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and results 

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature 

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hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate and should not be double-counted. See id.; 

Jason D.W. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal citations 

omitted). In Rohrmoos Venture, the Texas Supreme Court established eight factors to determine 

whether a requested fee award is reasonable and necessary. The relevant factors are similar to those 

articulated in Johnson.

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With this said, the Court proceeds to calculate an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.

1. HOURLY RATE

Nevarez has been a licensed attorney for 22 years and states “[a] large portion of my 

practice has been devoted to litigation of complex business matters and catastrophic injury cases 

in state and federal court. I practice law in numerous counties and metropolitan areas in Texas, 

including in Travis County, Texas, and within the Western District of Texas, Austin Division ...

where this action is pending.” Dkt. #128-3 at 2-3. Nevarez bills at an hourly rate of $500.

However, Nevarez contends that this rate is not reasonable because it fails to account for the risk 

of loss, the delay in receiving payment for services or the recovery of advanced litigation costs. Id.

at 3. Consequently, Nevarez believes the lodestar should be calculated at the higher hourly rate of 

$750 instead.

and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Black, 732 F.3d at 502 

n.7 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19). 5 (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, involved, and the skill required to 

perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood ... that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the 

lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services 

have been rendered. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019) (citing Arthur 

Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W. 2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)).

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Gates has been a licensed attorney for 14 years and his practice is devoted to litigation of 

complex business matters in state and federal court. Dkt. #128-4 at 1. Gates also bills at a standard 

hourly billing rate of $500. Gates also contends the $500 hourly rate is unreasonable in this case 

for the same reasons articulated by Nevarez. In fact, the affidavits submitted by Nevarez and Gates 

are essentially identical with the exception of the number of hours worked by each attorney.

Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit from Dan Gattis (“Gattis’), the Manager of El Campo 

Ventures, LLC. Dkt. #128-2. Gattis has also been a licensed attorney for 27 years. His affidavit 

describes the contingency fee arrangement between Plaintiff and attorneys Nevarez and Gates. 

Gattis also states that he is familiar with the average, customary and reasonable hourly rates 

charged by attorneys in complex commercial litigation in Austin and based on his knowledge and 

experience, ”$750-$790 seems to be the range of hourly rates charged by partners at reputable 

Austin law firms for this type of representation.” Id. at 3.

Nevarez and Gates (“counsel”) have essentially submitted identical affidavits. Despite 

differences in experience and background both Nevarez and Gates state that they normally employ 

a $500 hourly rate. Both seek a significant 33% increase in their professed traditional hourly rate 

to $750 an hour. Counsel justifies this increase because the higher rate is appropriate given the 

contingent nature of their fee agreement with Plaintiff. See Dkt. 128-3 and Dkt. 128-4. As 

Defendant notes, counsel have presented little evidence as to their respective backgrounds, 

education, skill, experience or reputation. Counsel attempt to buttress their hourly rate request 

with the Gattis affidavit. As the manager of El Campo, Gattis can only speculate that an hourly 

rate between $750-$790 “seems” to be appropriate. Gattis does not state what El Campo 

traditionally pays for legal services. Simply stated, the Gattis affidavit is unpersuasive. 

Plaintiff’s collective briefing and affidavit submissions are a clear effort to reverseengineer a justification for an attorneys’ fee award that mimics the amount they would have 

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recovered under the contingency fee agreement. Between continued unpersuasive and erroneous 

legal arguments and obviously manipulative affidavits and attached billing records, it is difficult 

to put much stock in Plaintiff’s analysis of this issue or evidence submitted. As a consequence, the 

Court finds Defendant’s legal arguments more persuasive.

Defendant’s evidence on hourly rates is centered on the affidavits of attorneys, William S. 

Rhea (“Rhea”) and Michael Jones (“Jones”). The Court finds the Rhea and Jones affidavits to be 

significantly more persuasive than those of Nevarez and Gates. Based on his 34 years of legal 

experience, Rhea contends that a reasonable hourly rate for Nevarez is between $350-$475 and for 

Gates between $300-$375. Dkt. #129-1 at 3-4. Based on his 36 years of legal experience, his 

familiarity with this case as Defendant’s counsel and based on references to State Bar of Texas 

hourly rate information, Jones contends an hourly rate of $400 for Nevarez and $300 for Gates is 

appropriate. Dkt. #129-2 at 3-4.

Based on all of the information before it, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly rate for 

Nevarez is $400.00. While the reasonably hourly rate for Gates is $350.00.

2. TIME EXPENDED

Next, the Court must determine whether the hours worked by Nevarez and Gates in this 

case were reasonable. Both attorneys submitted billing records as attachments to their affidavits. 

See Dkt. #128-3 at 7-23; Dkt. #128-4 at 7-20. Nevarez and Gates seek reimbursement for a total 

of 379.3 and 747.9 hours respectively for a total of 1,127.2 hours of legal work. Defendant 

contends the submitted billing records evidence billing inflation, charges for duplicative and 

unnecessary work, unnecessary and inflated travel expenses and work related to briefing on 

matters that were resolved unfavorably to the Plaintiff in the run up to trial.

The issues presented at trial were not difficult. The trial itself represented a contract dispute 

and was not a difficult case to try. Between voir dire and verdict, the entire trial took only three 

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days. Moreover, counsel spent a number of hours unsuccessfully attempting to pursue meritless 

claims against the original seven named defendants. As Defendant notes, Plaintiff’s supplemental 

memorandum makes no concession or proposed reduction to the lodestar to reflect the hours spent 

on meritless claims.

Plaintiff’s advocacy is so obviously compromised on this issue that it is barely worthy of 

consideration. As a consequence, the Court is again forced to rely on Defendant’s analysis of 

counsels’ billing records. Defendant suspects Plaintiff’s counsels’ billing records were prepared 

in connection with the submission of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum rather than kept 

contemporaneously with the work performed. While the Defendant’s suspicion may in fact be true, 

for the purpose of further analysis the Court will take Plaintiff’s counsel at their word. After having 

carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties and all evidentiary submissions, the Court finds 

that Nevarez’s original 379.30 hours should be reduced to 308.80 hours. Similarly, Gates original 

747.90 hours should be reduced to 501.80 hours. The reductions to Nevarez and Gates hours are

made for the reasons cited in Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum and 

the summary exhibit to that response. See Dkt. #129 at 6-14, and Dkt. #129-2 at 76.6

Having made these reductions, the Court declines Defendant’s invitation to further reduce 

the hours worked by an additional 15% to reflect “duplicative work, conferences and trial prep

etc.” See Dkt. #129-2 at 76. Similarly, the Court declines Defendant’s request for a further 20% 

reduction in fees based on a failure to properly segregate for unsuccessful claims. The Court finds 

this has been adequately addressed by way of the reduction in attorney hours. See Dkt. 129-2 at 

76.

6 In summary, the reductions are justified based on inflated and unnecessary travel and legal work, as well as, 

time attributable to the pursuit of meritless claims against all seven originally named defendants.

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3. JOHNSON FACTORS

Counsel contend that application of the Johnson factors necessitates an enhancement to 

their fee request. Specifically, Plaintiff argues an enhancement is appropriate because Plaintiff 

could not have secured legal representation absent a contingency fee. Defendant argues that 

counsels’ contention that Plaintiffs would not have been able to afford representation without a 

contingency fee is “not one of the Johnson factors which might support enhancement.” Dkt. #129 

at 13. Defendant is wrong. Whether a fee is fixed or contingent is a Johnson factor. This factor 

when combined with a second Johnson factor pertaining to the amount involved and results 

obtained warrant an enhancement in this case. Based on all of the information before it, the Court 

finds that a 25% enhancement is appropriate in this case.

Other than the contingency argument above, neither side has argued persuasively for any 

further increase or decrease to the lodestar based upon an application of the Johnson factors. 

4. ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARD

The Court initially determined that Plaintiff is entitled to an attorneys’ fee award of 

$299,150.00. This figure is a function of Nevarez’ 308.8 hours worked times an hourly rate of 

$400.00 for a total of $123,520.00; and Gates’ 501.8 hours worked times an hourly rate of $350.00 

for a total of $175,630.00. However, the total attorneys’ fee award of $299,150.00 should be 

increased by 25% ($74,787) for a total of 373,937.00.

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7 The $373,937.00 reward is significantly less than what is called for in contingency fee agreement between 

Plaintiff and counsel, but as the Texas Supreme noted in Rohrmoos Venture, “[w]e emphasize that, pursuant to an 

attorney–client fee agreement, a client could ultimately owe its attorney more fees than the amount of the award 

shifting fees to the non-prevailing party. However, fact finders should be concerned with awarding reasonable and 

necessary fees, not with any contractual obligations that may remain between the attorney and client.” Rohrmoos 

Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 502, fn. 13.

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B. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

Pursuant to Chapter 304, Subchapter A, Plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of prejudgment 

interest. The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest for 659 days 

at an interest rate of 5%. Plaintiff contends that this calculation should be applied to the total jury 

award of $4,095,300, for a total of $369,699.00.

Defendant contends this calculation should not be applied to the total jury award. Instead, 

Defendant argues the jury award “could only have been arrived as follows.” Dkt. #116 at 8. 

Defendant goes on to calculate that the jury award must have included contract year 4 and contract 

year 5 recovery, years that would have taken place after the date judgment was entered. 

Unfortunately, the jury was not asked to discern between past and future damages. Instead, the 

question posed was: “What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably 

compensate Plaintiff El Campo Ventures, LLC for its damages that resulted from Defendant 

Stratton Securities, Inc.'s failure to comply with the Proceeds Sharing Agreement dated May 2, 

2019?” Dkt. #109 at 1 (emphasis added).

Defendant may be right, but who knows? The jury was in the best position to distinguish 

between past and future damages. Unfortunately, the jury was not asked to do so. The Defendant 

did not object to the form of the question posed to the jury. It is impossible to establish with 

certainty how the jury arrived at the final damages figure of $4,095,300. As a consequence, the 

Court recommends that Defendant be ordered to pay prejudgment interest totaling $369,699.00 

which is calculated by applying an interest rate of 5% for 659 days to the total jury award.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees, Prejudgment Interest, Post-Judgment Interest and Costs (Dkt. #113) be 

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GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Specifically, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that the Court enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, El Campo Ventures, LLC, as follows:

A. Attorneys’ Fees in the in the amount of $358,980.00.

B. Prejudgment Interest in the amount of $369,699.00.

C. Post-Judgment Interest at the rate of 0.08%.

D. Costs in the amount of $14,472.49.

IV. OBJECTIONS

The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing 

objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are 

being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See 

Battles v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations 

contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the 

Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and 

recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from 

appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); 

Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

SIGNED February 1, 2022.

_______________________________

MARK LANE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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