Exhibit 2b

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 Page 1 of 99
Infringement Contentions – PayPal’s iOS M

U.S. Patent No. 5,991,399 

Claim Analysis 1. A method of securely distributing data comprising: 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of 

“mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, so

downloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. To the extent any steps identified herein are performed by Apple, such acts are a joint enterprise in the building and distribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) beca

direction and control of PayPal, or acts as agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the b

Alternatively, any steps or acts performed by PayPal, are attributable to Apple, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps through its app store, upon compliancin the building and upload of PayPal’s mobile apps, and PayPal induces infringemobile apps.To the extent the preamble is limiting, PayPal distributes data according to the In order to build and send the mobile app securely to the Apple servers, Defensecurely distribute its mobile app to Defendant’s customers through the Apple 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Store Connect portal (https://appstoreconnect.apple.com, Last accessed on M

App Store, as evidenced by the “https” in its URL. Source: https://developer.apple.com/support/app-store-connect/, Last access

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/devcd5016d31, Last acce

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
generating an asymmetric key pair 

having a public key and a private key; 

The Court previously construed1 “an asymmetric key pair having a public key a

pairs, one of the asymmetric key pairs having the claimed public key and claimcomplementary by performing complementary functions, such as encrypting aAlso relevant to this claim element is the Court’s previous construction of “execode module” / “tamper resistant key module” to mean “software that is desigmodification, and that includes a key for secure communication.” Also relevant to this claim element is the Court’s rejection of limiting “includingUpon information and belief, the method step of “generating an asymmetric ke

and/or its agents – whose acts are attributable to PayPal (i) because PayPal wodistribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) because Apple distributes and markets Pa

agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the building, marketing and distribution of PayPayPal uploads their mobile apps to Apple using a TLS connection – which begithat allows PayPal and Apple to exchange cryptographic parameters, including 

communication including upload of PayPal’s mobile apps to Apple servers. A TLS handshake begins with PayPal sending a list of cipher suites supported by the following key exchange algorithms: 

1 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Document 104 signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 7/21/2016 in re Plano Encryption Techno

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Each of these algorithms necessitates generating one or more asymmetric key For RSA and RSA _PSK, an Apple server generates an RSA public-private key pa

performing complementary function encrypting and decrypting data. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, Apple server generates an 

private key pair2. PayPal also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private 

complementary by performing complementary functions, such as creating and Hellman private key are also complementary by performing complementary fuDiffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman pubcompute a premaster secret and thereon a master secret3 for encrypting data. Apple’s own Diffie-Hellman private key to compute the same premaster secret 

Conversely, Apple uses PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple

thereon, a master secret4 for encrypting data. PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellm

to compute a premaster secret and thereon a master secret for decrypting encFor DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, Apple server generates a DSA public-private key pagenerates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. The DSA public key acomplementary functions, such as creating and verifying signatures. The Diffie-complementary by performing complementary functions, such as encrypting aexchange algorithm, PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined wsecret and thereon a master secret5 for encrypting data. Apple in turn uses PayHellman private key to compute the same premaster secret and the master secPayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple’s own Diffie-Hellman p

2 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellmhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. (Last ac3 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 4 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 5 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
secret6 for encrypting data. PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key comb

premaster secret and thereon a master secret for decrypting encrypted data frFor ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, an Apple server generates an ECDSA pub

PayPal also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. The ECD

performing complementary functions, such as creating and verifying signatures

also complementary by performing complementary functions, such as encrypti

exchange algorithm, PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined w

secret and thereon a master secret7 for encrypting data. Apple in turn uses PayHellman private key to compute the same premaster secret and the master secPayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple’s own Diffie-Hellman p

secret8 for encrypting data. PayPal uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key comb

premaster secret and thereon a master secret for decrypting encrypted data fr

6 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 7 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 8 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher s

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 50-51, Last accessed on Mar 19, 20

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Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

In addition, PayPal and/or Apple also generate additional asymmetric key pairs communications during the operation of the mobile app. Thus, at least one asymmetric key pair is generated having the claimed public k

the mobile app code and metadata can be sent securely to the Apple servers b

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
used to digitally sign the app) is complementary as described below by perform

and/or creating and verifying signatures. As described in greater detail below, upload the mobile app onto the Apple servers by SSL/TLS when building the apasymmetric key pair and the encrypted predetermined data that has been encr

encrypting predetermined data with the generated public key; 

In order to send the mobile app code securely to the Apple servers, data that is secret, is encrypted with the generated public key of the claimed asymmetric kthe public key of the generated asymmetric key pair to encrypt data including bsymmetric key for secure communications. Upon information and belief, the method step of “encrypting predetermined dagents. To the extent any portion of the method step is performed by Apple and/or its 

together with Apple in a joint enterprise in the building and distribution of its m

mobile apps under the direction and control of PayPal, or acts as agent, or on bmobile apps. When PayPal uploads its mobile apps to Apple, it connects to Apple App Store handshake procedure which uses asymmetric key encryption and necessitates 

negotiates with Apple a cipher suite and the key exchange algorithm that will b

The cryptographic parameters of the session state are produced by the 

 TLS Handshake Protocol, which operates on top of the TLS record  layer. When a TLS client and server first start communicating, they  agree on a protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms,  optionally authenticate each other, and use public-key encryption  techniques to generate shared secrets.  The TLS Handshake Protocol involves the following steps:  - Exchange hello messages to agree on algorithms, exchange random  values, and check for session resumption. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
 - Exchange the necessary cryptographic parameters to allow the 

 client and server to agree on a premaster secret.  - Exchange certificates and cryptographic information to allow the  client and server to authenticate themselves. - Generate a master secret from the premaster secret and exchanged  random values.  - Provide security parameters to the record layer.  - Allow the client and server to verify that their peer has  calculated the same security parameters and that the handshake  occurred without tampering by an attacker. 

Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The actual key exchange uses up to four messages: the server 

 Certificate, the ServerKeyExchange, the client Certificate, and the  ClientKeyExchange. New key exchange methods can be created by 

 specifying a format for these messages and by defining the use of the  messages to allow the client and server to agree upon a shared  secret. This secret MUST be quite long; currently defined key  exchange methods exchange secrets that range from 46 bytes upwards.  Following the hello messages, the server will send its certificate in  a Certificate message if it is to be authenticated. Additionally, a  ServerKeyExchange message may be sent, if it is required (e.g., if  the server has no certificate, or if its certificate is for signing  only). If the server is authenticated, it may request a certificate  from the client, if that is appropriate to the cipher suite selected.  Next, the server will send the ServerHelloDone message, indicating  that the hello-message phase of the handshake is complete. The 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
 server will then wait for a client response. If the server has sent 

 a CertificateRequest message, the client MUST send the Certificate  message. The ClientKeyExchange message is now sent, and the content  of that message will depend on the public key algorithm selected  between the ClientHello and the ServerHello. If the client has sent  a certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed  CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify possession of  the private key in the certificate. 

Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The TLS Handshaking Protocols 

 TLS has three subprotocols that are used to allow peers to agree upon 

 security parameters for the record layer, to authenticate themselves,  to instantiate negotiated security parameters, and to report error  conditions to each other.  The Handshake Protocol is responsible for negotiating a session,  which consists of the following items:  session identifier  An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an  active or resumable session state.  peer certificate  X509v3 [PKIX] certificate of the peer. This element of the state 

 may be null.  compression method  The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption.  cipher spec  Specifies the pseudorandom function (PRF) used to generate keying 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
 material, the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, AES, 

 etc.) and the MAC algorithm (such as HMAC-SHA1). It also defines  cryptographic attributes such as the mac_length. (See Appendix

A.6 for formal definition.) 

 master secret  48-byte secret shared between the client and server.  is resumable  A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new  connections.  These items are then used to create security parameters for use by  the record layer when protecting application data. Many connections  can be instantiated using the same session through the resumption  feature of the TLS Handshake Protocol. 

Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

As explained above, PayPal and Apple negotiate a key exchange algorithm from 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

For each of the above key exchange algorithms, Apple and/or PayPal encrypts For RSA and RSA _PSK, PayPal encrypts a random premaster secret with Apple

Apple decrypts the premaster secret with its matched RSA private key. PayPal awhich is then used by both PayPal and Apple to encrypt all subsequent commu

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
RSA _PSK algorithms are chosen during a TLS handshake, PayPal encrypts pred

key (i.e. Apple’s RSA public key). For the other key exchange algorithms, namely Diffie-Hellman based algorithmECDH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal sends its Diffie-Hellman pPayPal. PayPal then uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with PayPApple in turn uses PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple’s owPayPal and Apple both use the premaster secret to compute a master secret10 communications between PayPal and Apple. Therefore, when any of the Diffie-Hellman based key exchange algorithms are i.e. all communication with Apple subsequent to the TLS handshake, including information such as name, category, screenshots and description related to PaHellman public key, since the master secret used to encrypt the predetermined PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key11. Similarly, when any of the Diffie-Hellman based key exchange algorithms are ch

all communication with Apple subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at le

Connect website and forms that PayPal uses for uploading its mobile app to ApHellman public key, since the master secret used to encrypt the predetermined Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key12. 

and building an executable tamper resistant key module identified for a selected program, the executable 

Relevant to this claim element is the Court’s previous construction13 of “execut

code module” / “tamper resistant key module” to mean “software that is desig

9 For Diffie-Hellman (DH) based algorithms such as DH_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DHE_DSS, ECDH_ECDSA and Hellman public key and encrypts the hash with their RSA/DSA/ECDSA private key (i.e. signing the message). Apple then sends that RSAauthenticate the Apple server by decrypting the hash using Apple’s public key and matching the decryption result to a hash of the recknows that the message originated from Apple and not from a malicious third party. 10 The master secret obtained from the premaster secret may be hashed according to a hashing algorithm also specified in the cipher https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246, Sections 6.3, 7.4.9 and 8.1. 11 See, for example, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631, Page 2. , Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 12 Id. 13 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Document 104 signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 7/21/2016 in re Plano Encryption Techno

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
tamper resistant key module including 

the generated private key and the encrypted predetermined data. 

modification, and that includes a key for secure communication.” Also relevant 

“including” to compiling14. 

The method step of “building an executable tamper resistant key module ident

module including the generated private key and the encrypted predetermined 

To the extent any portion of the method step is performed by Apple and/or its 

together with Apple in a joint enterprise in the building and distribution of its m

mobile apps under the direction and control of PayPal, or acts as agent, or on bmobile apps. Building of an “executable tamper resistant code module” (that is, the mobile aasymmetric key pairs: (1) An asymmetric key pair must be included in order to send the mobile a

(2) An asymmetric key pair must be included by PayPal in order to digitally 

mobile app has not been changed with the public key for iOS compatible mobiThe asymmetric key pair that is included to digitally sign the mobile app is diffesecurely upload the mobile app to the Apple servers for distribution on the AppThus, at least one asymmetric key pair is included having the claimed public ke

the mobile app code can be sent uploaded to the Apple servers using SSL/TLS pused to digitally sign the app) is complementary as described below by perform

and/or creating and verifying signatures. As described in greater detail below, upload the mobile app onto the Apple servers by SSL/TLS when building the apasymmetric key pair(s) and the encrypted predetermined data. 

PayPal uploads their mobile apps to Apple using a TLS connection – which begithat allows PayPal and Apple to exchange cryptographic parameters, including 

communication including upload of PayPal’s mobile apps to Apple servers. 

14 Also relevant is the Court’s construction of “an asymmetric key pair having a public key and a private key” in claims 1, 9 and 10 to mhaving the claimed public key and claimed private key, the asymmetric keys of an asymmetric key pair being complementary by perfocreating and verifying signatures.” 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
A TLS handshake begins with PayPal sending a list of cipher suites supported by 

the following key exchange algorithms: 

Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

For each of the key exchange algorithms, PayPal and/or Apple build an executa

key and the encrypted predetermined data. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the executable tamper resistant key module includes e

it would be impossible for PayPal to send its mobile app to Apple using SSL/TLS executable tamper resistant key module also includes: 

1. Apple’s RSA private key corresponding to Apple’s RSA public key used b2. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, the executable tamper recommunication with Apple subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at leas

information such as name, category, screenshots and description related to Pa

includes: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste

3. Apple’s RSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D

4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, the executable tamper resistant key module includ

subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at least the executable compiled ccategory, screenshots and description related to PayPal’s mobile apps). The ex

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s DSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, the executable tamper resistant key mod

with Apple subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at least the executable name, category, screenshots and description related to PayPal’s mobile apps). 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s ECDSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s 4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
PayPal builds an executable tamper resistant key module identified for a select

mobile app, which is an executable tamper resistant key module, as explained program resident on a remote system, namely the iOS operating system on a rThe mobile app comprises an executable tamper resistant key module that is idkey described above and the encrypted predetermined data encrypted with thso that it can be made available for download from Apple servers onto devices key pair is used not only to upload the binary code files for the mobile app, but app, such as title, screenshots, and other resources or information such as appprocess so that the mobile app can be identified by potential users for downloaPayPal’s mobile app is each an executable tamper resistant key module becaussystem as well as other applications or programs installed on a user’s mobile d

modification, as explained below; and because in building PayPal mobile apps ogenerated private key and the encrypted predetermined data including by way generated public key when the mobile app is securely uploaded onto the Apple The tamper resistant key module includes several keys “used for secure commfollowing: For RSA and RSA _PSK: 

1. Apple’s RSA private key corresponding to Apple’s RSA public key used b

2. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 3. Symmetric key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple subsequent 4. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell

2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste

3. Apple’s RSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D

4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s

15 See, e.g., https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/IDEs/Conceptual/AppDistributionGuide/SubmittingYourApp/Subaccessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s DSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s

6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s ECDSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s 4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

PayPal’s mobile apps are tamper resistant, resistant to observation and modific

1. Resistant to Observation Because App Source Code Is Compiled Befor

PayPal mobile apps are resistant to observation, at least in part, since PayPal co– and uploads the binary output of the compilation process rather than the sou

See, e.g., App Store Connect Help, “Submit your app for review” stating “You syour app available on the App Store. However, before you can submit an app tthe build for the version.Before you submit an app to App Review, you choose which build (from all the 

16 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e. , Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
associate only one build with an App Store version. However, you can change t

Review.”Source: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last acce

2. Resistant to Observation Because Upload To Apple Is Over SSL/TLS 

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in part

of the building process. App Store Connect portal (https://appstoreconnect.ap

communications when uploading PayPal’s apps, as evidenced by the “https” in the code from being observed in transit from the code developer to Apple. The secure upload process starts with a TLS handshake procedure which uses a

asymmetric key pair. Specifically, PayPal negotiates with Apple the cipher suite 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

For each of the above key exchange algorithms, Apple and/or PayPal encrypts secret, rendering the communication resistant to observation during transit fro

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, PayPal encrypts a random premaster secret with Apple

Apple decrypts the premaster secret with its matched RSA private key. PayPal awhich is then used by both PayPal and Apple to encrypt all subsequent commu

For the other key exchange algorithms, namely Diffie-Hellman based algorithmECDH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal sends its Diffie-Hellman p

PayPal. PayPal then uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with PayPApple in turn uses PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple’s owPayPal and Apple both use the premaster secret to compute a master secret wcommunications between PayPal and Apple. 

3. Resistant to Modification Because App Binary Is Code Signed 

The mobile app code is made resistant to modification, at least in part, because must sign the mobile app submission with his/her asymmetric developer key th

impersonator18. 

Xcode code signs your app during the build and archive process. If neede

certificate with its public-private key pair, to your keychain. The certificaSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, L

A signing signing certificate includes the certificate with its public-privatprivate key is stored locally, protect it as you would an account passwor

ensure that your certificate is issued by a certificate authority such as ApYour signing certificate is added to your keychain and the corresponding Source: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev1c7c2c67d, L

17 For Diffie-Hellman (DH) based algorithms such as DH_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DHE_DSS, ECDH_ECDSA and Hellman public key and encrypts the hash with their RSA/DSA/ECDSA private key (i.e. signing the message). Apple then sends that RSAauthenticate the Apple server by decrypting the hash using Apple’s public key and matching the decryption result to a hash of the recknows that the message originated from Apple and not from a malicious third party. 18 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8. , Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
About Signing Identities and Certificates 

Code signing (or signing) an app allows the system to identify who signesigned. Signing is a requirement for uploading your app to App Store Connect ansystem verifies the signature of apps downloaded from the App Store to executable code is protected by its signature because the signature becovalid signature lets users trust that the app was signed by an Apple sour

Xcode uses your signing certificate to sign your app during the build pro

certificate. The private key is used by cryptographic functions to generatkey and identifies you as the owner of the key pair. In order to sign appscertificate authority in your keychain. 

An app’s signature can be removed, and the app can be re-signed using 

the App Store. Also, a fully-tested development build of your app can be understood not as proof of the app’s origin but as a verifiable mark placSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devfbe995ebf, La

PayPal complies with Apple’s instructions on code signing as shown by PayPal’s file _CodeSignature/CodeResources in PayPal’s iOS apps which are generated d

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: Contents of Venmo, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3517274

Asymmetrical key cryptography and hashing algorithms are used to create the used to sign the resources in an application package, including the compiled cothe digital code signing is used to code sign the app. This private key is included key of the claimed generated asymmetric key pair because it does not match ththe court’s construction. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Hashes are created for every resource in the application package with the help 

prevent unauthorized changes. The hashes are encrypted with a private key. Acreated. By signing the app binary with a digital signature, PayPal’s mobile apps are tamthe application is being distributed by trusted source (i.e. PayPal) and that the 

verified by the corresponding public key generated as part of the pair. Thus the Accordingly PayPal’s iOS mobile apps establish SSL/TLS communications with Pinvolving asymmetric key encryption. SSL/TLS ensures secure communication a

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the program is on a remote system and further comprising sending the executable tamper resistant key module to the remote system. 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of 

“mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, so

downloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. Upon information and belief, the method step of sending the executable tampand/or its agents – whose acts are attributable to PayPal (i) because PayPal wo

distribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) because Apple distributes and markets Pa

agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the building, marketing and distribution of PayAlternatively, to the extent any portion of this method step is performed by Pain and the receipt of a benefit, namely, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps procedures and guidelines dictated by Apple in the building and upload of PayPbuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
PayPal’s mobile apps are sent or downloaded from Apple servers and are execu

a user accesses Apple App Store – and requests to download PayPal app, Apple device(s). Further, the step of “sending” PayPal mobile apps to the remote system occurs to the extent required by the claims, also includes a private key and predetermIn particular, PayPal mobile apps sent to users’ remote devices are tamper resi

1. Resistant to Observation Because App is Downloaded in Compiled Fo

PayPal mobile apps are resistant to observation, at least in part, since PayPal co

– and uploads the binary output of the compilation process rather than the sou

source code from Apple rather than the source code itself19.

See, e.g., App Store Connect Help, “Submit your app for review” stating “You syour app available on the App Store. However, before you can submit an app tthe build for the version.Before you submit an app to App Review, you choose which build (from all the associate only one build with an App Store version. However, you can change tReview.”Source: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last acce

2. Resistant to Observation Because Download from Apple Is Over SSL/T

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in partfrom Apple servers. PayPal app users establish SSL/TLS communications with Phttps://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id351727428 for Venmo, Last accessed 

19 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
by the “https” in the URL. Sending the mobile app code by SSL/TLS is necessary 

user’s remote system. The secure download process starts with a TLS handshake procedure which use

one asymmetric key pair. Specifically, user’s remote device negotiates with Ap

for the handshake. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Each of these algorithms necessitates generating one or more asymmetric key 

encrypting the mobile app download. For RSA and RSA _PSK, Apple server generates an RSA public-private key pair. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, Apple server generates an 

key pair20. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman puFor DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, Apple server generates a DSA public-private key pa

device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, Apple server generates an ECDSA public-user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key 

20 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. , Last ac

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 50-51, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The generated asymmetric key pairs are then used to compute a shared maste

that it is resistant to observation during transit.

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the RSA public-private key pair is used to encrypt a rand

user’s remote device to compute a master secret. Apple uses the master secre

decrypt the downloaded mobile app according to the TLS protocol. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, Apple server generates an key pair21. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman pu

and the user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and suthe user’s Diffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to csecret that Apple uses to encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device protocol. For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, Apple server generates a DSA public-private key padevice also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. Apple sepublic key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently compute a masteprivate key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the same premas

encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device uses to decrypt the downFor ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, Apple server generates an ECDSA public-

user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently coHellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the samuses to encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device uses to decrypt th

21 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair , Last ac

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
3. Resistant to Modification Because Mobile App is Code Signed 

The downloaded mobile app code is resistant to modification, at least in part, ballows users’ remote systems to verify that the downloaded app binary is authedictates that each developer must sign the mobile app submission with his/her modified by a third party impersonator22. 

Xcode code signs your app during the build and archive process. If neede

certificate with its public-private key pair, to your keychain. The certificaSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, L

A signing signing certificate includes the certificate with its public-privatprivate key is stored locally, protect it as you would an account passwor

ensure that your certificate is issued by a certificate authority such as ApYour signing certificate is added to your keychain and the corresponding Source: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev1c7c2c67d, L

About Signing Identities and Certificates 

Code signing (or signing) an app allows the system to identify who signesigned. Signing is a requirement for uploading your app to App Store Connect ansystem verifies the signature of apps downloaded from the App Store to executable code is protected by its signature because the signature becovalid signature lets users trust that the app was signed by an Apple sour

Xcode uses your signing certificate to sign your app during the build pro

certificate. The private key is used by cryptographic functions to generat

22 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
key and identifies you as the owner of the key pair. In order to sign apps

certificate authority in your keychain. 

An app’s signature can be removed, and the app can be re-signed using 

the App Store. Also, a fully-tested development build of your app can be understood not as proof of the app’s origin but as a verifiable mark placSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devfbe995ebf, La

PayPal complies with Apple’s instructions on code signing as shown by PayPal’s file _CodeSignature/CodeResources in PayPal’s iOS apps which are generated d

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: Contents of PayPal, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3517274

By signing the app binary with a digital signature, PayPal’s mobile apps are tamthe application is being distributed by trusted source (i.e. PayPal) and that the verified by the corresponding public key generated as part of the pair. Thus the Accordingly PayPal’s iOS mobile apps establish SSL/TLS communications with Pinvolving asymmetric key encryption. SSL/TLS ensures secure communication a

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
4. Resistant to Observation Because Mobile App is Stored on Remote Sy

The mobile app is made further resistant to observation because when downloencrypted form. iOS implements disk encryption for encrypting the operating sfurther renders PayPal app resistant to observation23. 

5. Resistant to Observation Because Mobile App Securely Communicate

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in partduring operation. PayPal app users establish SSL/TLS communications with Paynecessary to keep source code as well as user identity and activity from being oversa. The secure communications process starts with a TLS handshake procedure whleast one asymmetric key pair. Specifically, user’s remote device negotiates witwill be used for the handshake. 

23 See, e.g., https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Pages 10-18, Last accessed on May 22, 2019 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Each of these algorithms necessitates generating one or more asymmetric key 

encrypting communication between PayPal and user’s remote device. For RSA and RSA _PSK, PayPal server generates an RSA public-private key pair. 

For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, PayPal server generates a

key pair24. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman pu

24 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/la

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, PayPal server generates a DSA public-private key pa

remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal server generates an ECDSA public

The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last acc

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 50-51, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The generated asymmetric key pairs are then used to compute a shared maste

between PayPal and the user’s remote device so that they are resistant to obse

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the RSA public-private key pair is used to encrypt a rand

user’s remote device to compute a master secret. PayPal and the user’s remotcommunication messages. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, PayPal server generates akey pair25. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman puand the user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and suthe user’s Diffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to csecret for encrypting and decrypting communication messages. For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, PayPal server generates a DSA public-private key pa

remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. PHellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently compute 

Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the sam

and decrypting communication messages. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal server generates an ECDSA publicThe user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequenDiffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute thencrypting and decrypting communication messages. 

9. The method of claim 1, wherein building the executable tamper resistant code module comprises generating an integrity verification kernel. 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of 

“mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, so

downloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

25 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last acc

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. Upon information and belief, the method step of generating an integrity verificattributable to PayPal (i) because PayPal works together with Apple in a joint e

because Apple distributes and markets PayPal’s mobile apps under the directiobuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. Alternatively, to the extent any portion of this method step is performed by Pain and the receipt of a benefit, namely, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps procedures and guidelines dictated by Apple in the building and upload of PayPbuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. Alternatively, any steps or acts performed by PayPal, are attributable to Apple, 

the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps through its app store, upon compliancin the building and upload of PayPal’s mobile apps, and PayPal induces infringemobile apps.The Court construed “integrity verification kernel” to mean “software that veri

and that is resistant to observation and modification.” When a mobile app is deployed on device, a hash algorithm is used to compute in the hash manifest. Then, the hashes from the hash manifest are compared w

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
digital signature is invalid and the application does not launch. Thus, the privat

the app, and this digital signature is supplied so that the mobile app can be ver

The code for iOS used to validate the digitally signed mobile app code is itself r

Further, iOS implements disk encryption for encrypting the operating system so

renders the code for validating the digitally signed mobile app binary further reFurther iOS implements a secure boot functionality that verifies the operating 

when the mobile device is powered on. If this verification fails, i.e. if the operat

not launch28. Thus, the software that verifies that a program image correspond

modification. 

26 See, e.g., https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/AboutCS/AboutCS.27 See, e.g., https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Pages 10-18, Last accessed on May 22, 2019 28 See, e.g., https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Pages 5-6, Last accessed on May 22, 2019 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: iOS Security Guide, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Securi

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: iOS Security Guide, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Securi

Further iOS implements a secure boot functionality that verifies the operating 

when the mobile device is powered on. If this verification fails, i.e. if the operatnot launch. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Last a

10. The method of claim 9, wherein generating an integrity verification kernel comprises accessing an asymmetric public key of a predetermined asymmetric key pair associated with a manifest of the program signed by an asymmetric private key of the predetermined asymmetric key pair, producing integrity verification kernel code with the asymmetric public key for verifying the signed manifest of the program and combining manifest parser generator code and the integrity verification kernel code to 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of “mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, sodownloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
produce the integrity verification 

kernel. 

Upon information and belief, the method step of accessing an asymmetric pub

manifest of the program signed by an asymmetric private key of the predeterm

with the asymmetric public key for verifying the signed manifest of the program verification kernel code to produce the integrity verification kernel is performe

because PayPal works together with Apple in a joint enterprise in the building amarkets PayPal’s mobile apps under the direction and control of PayPal, or acts distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. Alternatively, to the extent any portion of this method step is performed by Pa

in and the receipt of a benefit, namely, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps procedures and guidelines dictated by Apple in the building and upload of PayPbuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. The Court previously construed29 “integrity verification kernel” to mean “softw

digital signature and that is resistant to observation and modification” and “maverification kernel’s entry code, generator code, accumulator code, and other c

iOS implements a secure boot functionality that verifies the operating system, mobile device is powered on. If this verification fails, i.e. if the operating system 

mobile apps installed on the device, does not launch. Thus every time the devian asymmetric public key of a predetermined asymmetric key pair associated w

asymmetric private key by Apple. This integrity verification kernel is implement

manifest associated with the operating system and code that verifies that the obeen maliciously modified. Further, the software that performs the above verification is stored in a compi

Additionally, the software is digitally signed by Apple with their asymmetric pri

29 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Document 104 signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 7/21/2016 in re Plano Encryption Techno

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Last a

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: iOS Security Guide, Page 10, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iO

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: iOS Security Guide, Page 11, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iO

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
11. The method of claim 10, wherein 

the program comprises a trusted player and the method further comprises building a manifest for the trusted player, signing the manifest with the asymmetric private key of the predetermined asymmetric key pair, and storing the asymmetric public key of the predetermined asymmetric key pair. 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of 

“mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, so

downloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. Upon information and belief, the method step of building a manifest for the truthe predetermined asymmetric key pair, and storing the asymmetric public key 

and/or its agents – whose acts are attributable to PayPal (i) because PayPal wodistribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) because Apple distributes and markets Pa

agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the building, marketing and distribution of PayAlternatively, to the extent any portion of this method step is performed by Pain and the receipt of a benefit, namely, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps procedures and guidelines dictated by Apple in the building and upload of PayPbuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. As explained in claim 10, iOS implements a secure boot functionality that verifimobile apps, when the mobile device is powered on. If this verification fails, i.esystem, along with the mobile apps installed on the device, does not launch. W

device before the device is sold to a user, Apple builds a manifest for the opera

with their asymmetric private key and storing the corresponding asymmetric psystem can be verified during device restart. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Last a

34. A method of securely distributing data encrypted by a public key of an asymmetric key pair comprising: 

PayPal’s mobile software application products and services including by way of “mobile apps” or “Accused Products”) that are specifically developed, used, sodownloaded onto Apple iOS mobile or tablet devices.

 Venmo (Owned by PayPal) (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3

 PayPal: Mobile Cash (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-mobile-ca PayPal Here - Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her PayPal Business: Invoice Maker (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypa

2020 

 PayPal Here : Point of Sale (https://apps.apple.com/us/app/paypal-her

PayPal directly infringes and/or continues to knowingly induce Apple to infringadvertising, providing, sending, distributing and licensing its mobile applicationabetting, encouraging, promoting or inviting use thereof. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
To the extent any steps identified herein are performed by Apple, such acts are 

a joint enterprise in the building and distribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) beca

direction and control of PayPal, or acts as agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the b

Alternatively, any steps or acts performed by PayPal, are attributable to Apple, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps through its app store, upon compliancin the building and upload of PayPal’s mobile apps, and PayPal induces infringemobile apps.To the extent the preamble is limiting, PayPal distributes data encrypted by a pcode securely to the Apple servers, data is encrypted with the public key of an portal (https://appstoreconnect.apple.com, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020) estevidenced by the “https” in the URL. That process necessarily uses the public k

create a symmetric key for secure communications. 

building an executable tamper resistant key module identified for a selected program resident on a remote system, the executable tamper resistant key module including a private key of the asymmetric key pair and the encrypted data; and 

Relevant to this claim element is the Court’s previous construction30 of “execut

code module” / “tamper resistant key module” to mean “software that is desigmodification, and that includes a key for secure communication.” Also relevant “including” to compiling31. The method step of “building an executable tamper resistant key module identexecutable tamper resistant key module including a private key of the asymmeagents. To the extent any portion of the method step is performed by Apple and/or its together with Apple in a joint enterprise in the building and distribution of its m

30 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Document 104 signed by Judge Rodney Gilstrap on 7/21/2016 in re Plano Encryption Techno

31 Although the exact language construed from the previous claims is not at issue in claim 34, also relevant is the Court’s construction and 10 to mean “one or more asymmetric key pairs, one of the asymmetric key pairs having the claimed public key and claimed privaperforming complementary functions, such as encrypting and decrypting data or creating and verifying signatures.” While not necesskey and private key in claim 34 must perform complementary functions. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
mobile apps under the direction and control of PayPal, or acts as agent, or on b

mobile apps. Building of an “executable tamper resistant code module” (that is, the mobile aasymmetric key pairs: (1) An asymmetric key pair must be included in order to send the mobile a(2) An asymmetric key pair must be included by PayPal in order to digitally mobile app has not been changed with the public key for iOS compatible mobiThe asymmetric key pair that is included to digitally sign the mobile app is diffesecurely upload the mobile app to the Apple servers for distribution on the AppThus, at least one asymmetric key pair is included having the claimed public kethe mobile app code can be sent uploaded to the Apple servers using SSL/TLS p

used to digitally sign the app) is complementary as described below by perform

and/or creating and verifying signatures. As described in greater detail below, upload the mobile app onto the Apple servers by SSL/TLS when building the ap

asymmetric key pair(s) and the encrypted data. PayPal uploads their mobile apps to Apple using a TLS connection – which begithat allows PayPal and Apple to exchange cryptographic parameters, including 

communication including upload of PayPal’s mobile apps to Apple servers. A TLS handshake begins with PayPal sending a list of cipher suites supported by the following key exchange algorithms: 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

For each of the key exchange algorithms, PayPal and/or Apple build an executa

key and the encrypted data. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the executable tamper resistant key module includes e

impossible for PayPal to send its mobile app to Apple using SSL/TLS without entamper resistant key module also includes: 

1. Apple’s RSA private key corresponding to Apple’s RSA public key used b2. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, the executable tamper rewith Apple subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at least the executable name, category, screenshots and description related to PayPal’s mobile apps). 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s RSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D

4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, the executable tamper resistant key module includthe TLS handshake, including at least the executable compiled code related to and description related to PayPal’s mobile apps). The executable tamper resist

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste

3. Apple’s DSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, the executable tamper resistant key mod

subsequent to the TLS handshake, including at least the executable compiled ccategory, screenshots and description related to PayPal’s mobile apps). The ex

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s ECDSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s 4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 

PayPal builds an executable tamper resistant key module identified for a selectmobile app, which is an executable tamper resistant key module, as explained program resident on a remote system, namely the iOS operating system on a r

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
The mobile app comprises an executable tamper resistant key module that is id

key described above and the encrypted data encrypted with the claimed public made available for download from Apple servers onto devices compatible with not only to upload the binary code files for the mobile app, but an entire applicscreenshots, and other resources or information such as application type, cate

the mobile app can be identified by potential users for download32. PayPal’s mobile app is each an executable tamper resistant key module becaussystem as well as other applications or programs installed on a user’s mobile d

modification, as explained below; and because in building PayPal mobile apps ogenerated private key and the encrypted data including by way of example, the 

when the mobile app is securely uploaded onto the Apple servers as described The tamper resistant key module includes several keys “used for secure comm

following: For RSA and RSA _PSK: 

1. Apple’s RSA private key corresponding to Apple’s RSA public key used b

2. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 3. Symmetric key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple subsequent 4. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell

2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste

3. Apple’s RSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D

4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s

6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste

32 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev067853c94, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
3. Apple’s DSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s D

4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s

6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA: 

1. Apple’s Diffie-Hellman private key corresponding to Apple’s Diffie-Hell2. PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman private key used to compute the shared maste3. Apple’s ECDSA private key used to sign the message containing Apple’s 4. PayPal’s private key used to code-sign the mobile app. 5. Shared master secret key used for uploading the mobile app to Apple s6. Asymmetric keys and symmetric keys used for TLS communications du

PayPal’s mobile apps are tamper resistant, resistant to observation and modific

1. Resistant to Observation Because App Source Code Is Compiled Befor

PayPal mobile apps are resistant to observation, at least in part, since PayPal co– and uploads the binary output of the compilation process rather than the sou

See, e.g., App Store Connect Help, “Submit your app for review” stating “You syour app available on the App Store. However, before you can submit an app tthe build for the version.Before you submit an app to App Review, you choose which build (from all the associate only one build with an App Store version. However, you can change tReview.”Source: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last acce

33 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
2. Resistant to Observation Because Upload To Apple Is Over SSL/TLS 

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in partof the building process. App Store Connect portal (https://appstoreconnect.ap

communications when uploading PayPal’s apps, as evidenced by the “https” in the code from being observed in transit from the code developer to Apple. The secure upload process starts with a TLS handshake procedure which uses a

asymmetric key pair. Specifically, PayPal negotiates with Apple the cipher suite 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

For each of the above key exchange algorithms, Apple and/or PayPal encrypts secret, rendering the communication resistant to observation during transit fro

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, PayPal encrypts a random premaster secret with Apple

Apple decrypts the premaster secret with its matched RSA private key. PayPal awhich is then used by both PayPal and Apple to encrypt all subsequent commu

For the other key exchange algorithms, namely Diffie-Hellman based algorithmECDH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal sends its Diffie-Hellman p

PayPal. PayPal then uses Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with PayPApple in turn uses PayPal’s Diffie-Hellman public key combined with Apple’s owPayPal and Apple both use the premaster secret to compute a master secret wcommunications between PayPal and Apple. 

3. Resistant to Modification Because App Binary Is Code Signed 

The mobile app code is made resistant to modification, at least in part, because must sign the mobile app submission with his/her asymmetric developer key th

impersonator35. 

Xcode code signs your app during the build and archive process. If neede

certificate with its public-private key pair, to your keychain. The certificaSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, L

A signing signing certificate includes the certificate with its public-privatprivate key is stored locally, protect it as you would an account passwor

ensure that your certificate is issued by a certificate authority such as ApYour signing certificate is added to your keychain and the corresponding Source: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev1c7c2c67d, L

34 For Diffie-Hellman (DH) based algorithms such as DH_RSA, DHE_RSA, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_DSS, DHE_DSS, ECDH_ECDSA and Hellman public key and encrypts the hash with their RSA/DSA/ECDSA private key (i.e. signing the message). Apple then sends that RSAauthenticate the Apple server by decrypting the hash using Apple’s public key and matching the decryption result to a hash of the recknows that the message originated from Apple and not from a malicious third party. 35 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
About Signing Identities and Certificates 

Code signing (or signing) an app allows the system to identify who signesigned. Signing is a requirement for uploading your app to App Store Connect ansystem verifies the signature of apps downloaded from the App Store to executable code is protected by its signature because the signature becovalid signature lets users trust that the app was signed by an Apple sour

Xcode uses your signing certificate to sign your app during the build pro

certificate. The private key is used by cryptographic functions to generatkey and identifies you as the owner of the key pair. In order to sign appscertificate authority in your keychain. 

An app’s signature can be removed, and the app can be re-signed using 

the App Store. Also, a fully-tested development build of your app can be understood not as proof of the app’s origin but as a verifiable mark placSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devfbe995ebf, La

PayPal complies with Apple’s instructions on code signing as shown by PayPal’s file _CodeSignature/CodeResources in PayPal’s iOS apps which are generated d

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: Contents of PayPal, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3517274

Asymmetrical key cryptography and hashing algorithms are used to create the used to sign the resources in an application package, including the compiled cothe digital code signing is used to code sign the app. This private key is included key of the claimed generated asymmetric key pair because it does not match thconstruction. 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Hashes are created for every resource in the application package with the help 

prevent unauthorized changes. The hashes are encrypted with a private key. Acreated. By signing the app binary with a digital signature, PayPal’s mobile apps are tamthe application is being distributed by trusted source (i.e. PayPal) and that the 

verified by the corresponding public key generated as part of the pair. Thus the Accordingly PayPal’s iOS mobile apps establish SSL/TLS communications with Pinvolving asymmetric key encryption. SSL/TLS ensures secure communication a

sending the executable tamper resistant key module to the remote system. 

Upon information and belief, the method step of sending the executable tamp

and/or its agents – whose acts are attributable to PayPal (i) because PayPal wo

distribution of its mobile apps, or (ii) because Apple distributes and markets Pa

agent, or on behalf of PayPal, in the building, marketing and distribution of Pay

Alternatively, to the extent any portion of this method step is performed by Pain and the receipt of a benefit, namely, the distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps procedures and guidelines dictated by Apple in the building and upload of PayPbuilding, marketing and distribution of PayPal’s mobile apps. PayPal’s mobile apps are sent or downloaded from Apple servers and are execu

a user accesses Apple App Store – and requests to download PayPal app, Apple device(s). Further, the step of “sending” PayPal mobile apps to the remote system occurs 

In particular, PayPal mobile apps sent to users’ remote devices are tamper resi

1. Resistant to Observation Because App is Downloaded in Compiled Fo

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
PayPal mobile apps are resistant to observation, at least in part, since PayPal co

– and uploads the binary output of the compilation process rather than the sou

source code from Apple rather than the source code itself36.

See, e.g., App Store Connect Help, “Submit your app for review” stating “You syour app available on the App Store. However, before you can submit an app tthe build for the version.Before you submit an app to App Review, you choose which build (from all the associate only one build with an App Store version. However, you can change tReview.”Source: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last acce

2. Resistant to Observation Because Download from Apple Is Over SSL/T

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in partfrom Apple servers. PayPal app users establish SSL/TLS communications with Ahttps://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id351727428 for Venmo, Last accessed by the “https” in the URL. Sending the mobile app code by SSL/TLS is necessary user’s remote system. The secure download process starts with a TLS handshake procedure which useone asymmetric key pair. Specifically, user’s remote device negotiates with Apfor the handshake. 

36 See, e.g., https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev301cb2b3e, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2020 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Each of these algorithms necessitates generating one or more asymmetric key 

encrypting the mobile app download. For RSA and RSA _PSK, Apple server generates an RSA public-private key pair. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, Apple server generates an 

key pair37. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman puFor DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, Apple server generates a DSA public-private key pa

device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, Apple server generates an ECDSA public-user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key 

37 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last acc

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 50-51, Last accessed on Mar 19, 20

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The generated asymmetric key pairs are then used to compute a shared maste

that it is resistant to observation during transit.

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the RSA public-private key pair is used to encrypt a rand

user’s remote device to compute a master secret. Apple uses the master secre

decrypt the downloaded mobile app according to the TLS protocol. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, Apple server generates an key pair38. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman pu

and the user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and suthe user’s Diffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to csecret that Apple uses to encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device protocol. For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, Apple server generates a DSA public-private key padevice also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. Apple sepublic key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently compute a masteprivate key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the same premas

encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device uses to decrypt the downFor ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, Apple server generates an ECDSA public-

user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently coHellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the samuses to encrypt the mobile app and the user’s remote device uses to decrypt th

3. Resistant to Modification Because Mobile App is Code Signed 

The downloaded mobile app code is resistant to modification, at least in part, ballows users’ remote systems to verify that the downloaded app binary is authe

38 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last ac

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
dictates that each developer must sign the mobile app submission with his/her 

modified by a third party impersonator39. 

Xcode code signs your app during the build and archive process. If neede

certificate with its public-private key pair, to your keychain. The certificaSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev3a05256b8, L

A signing signing certificate includes the certificate with its public-privatprivate key is stored locally, protect it as you would an account passwor

ensure that your certificate is issued by a certificate authority such as ApYour signing certificate is added to your keychain and the corresponding Source: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/dev1c7c2c67d, La

About Signing Identities and Certificates 

Code signing (or signing) an app allows the system to identify who signesigned. Signing is a requirement for uploading your app to App Store Connect ansystem verifies the signature of apps downloaded from the App Store to executable code is protected by its signature because the signature becovalid signature lets users trust that the app was signed by an Apple sour

Xcode uses your signing certificate to sign your app during the build pro

certificate. The private key is used by cryptographic functions to generatkey and identifies you as the owner of the key pair. In order to sign appscertificate authority in your keychain. 

39 See, e.g., https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/IDEs/Conceptual/AppDistributionGuide/MaintainingCertificates/

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
An app’s signature can be removed, and the app can be re-signed using 

the App Store. Also, a fully-tested development build of your app can be understood not as proof of the app’s origin but as a verifiable mark placSource: https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devfbe995ebf, La

PayPal complies with Apple’s instructions on code signing as shown by PayPal’s file _CodeSignature/CodeResources in PayPal’s iOS apps which are generated dSource: Contents of PayPal, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/venmo/id3517274

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
By signing the app binary with a digital signature, PayPal’s mobile apps are tam

the application is being distributed by trusted source (i.e. PayPal) and that the verified by the corresponding public key generated as part of the pair. Thus the Accordingly PayPal’s iOS mobile apps establish SSL/TLS communications with Pinvolving asymmetric key encryption. SSL/TLS ensures secure communication a

4. Resistant to Observation Because Mobile App is Stored on Remote Sy

The mobile app is made further resistant to observation because when downloencrypted form. iOS implements disk encryption for encrypting the operating sfurther renders PayPal app resistant to observation40. 

5. Resistant to Observation Because Mobile App Securely Communicate

PayPal’s mobile apps are made further resistant to observation, at least in partduring operation. PayPal app users establish SSL/TLS communications with Pay

necessary to keep source code as well as user identity and activity from being oversa. The secure communications process starts with a TLS handshake procedure wh

least one asymmetric key pair. Specifically, user’s remote device negotiates witwill be used for the handshake. 

40 See, e.g., https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf, Pages 10-18, Last accessed on May 22, 2019 

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Each of these algorithms necessitates generating one or more asymmetric key 

encrypting communication between PayPal and user’s remote device. For RSA and RSA _PSK, PayPal server generates an RSA public-private key pair. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, PayPal server generates akey pair41. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman puFor DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, PayPal server generates a DSA public-private key pa

remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal server generates an ECDSA publicThe user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private 

41 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last acc

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 48-49, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 at 50-51, Last accessed on Mar 19, 2

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
Source: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, IETF RFC 5246, 

The generated asymmetric key pairs are then used to compute a shared maste

between PayPal and the user’s remote device so that they are resistant to obse

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20 
For RSA and RSA _PSK, the RSA public-private key pair is used to encrypt a rand

user’s remote device to compute a master secret. PayPal and the user’s remotcommunication messages. For DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DH_RSA and ECDH_RSA, PayPal server generates akey pair42. The user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman puand the user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and suthe user’s Diffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to csecret for encrypting and decrypting communication messages. For DHE_DSS and DH_DSS, PayPal server generates a DSA public-private key pa

remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair. PHellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequently compute 

Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute the sam

and decrypting communication messages. For ECDH_ECDSA and ECDHE_ECDSA, PayPal server generates an ECDSA publicThe user’s remote device also generates a second Diffie-Hellman public-private user’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute a premaster secret, and subsequenDiffie-Hellman private key and Apple’s Diffie-Hellman public key to compute thencrypting and decrypting communication messages. 

42 ECDH and ECDHE algorithms require generating at the server and the client, elliptical curve parameters that constitute a Diffie-Hellhttps://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 page 49-52, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525 page 12, http://www.cse.hut.fi/fi/opinnot/T-110.5http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2897.pdf, http://www.networkworld.com/article/2268575/lahttp://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~fvercaut/papers/ACM2012.pdf, Implementing SSL / TLS Using Cryptography and PKI by Joshua DavieNetworks and Cybersecurity By Chwan-Hwa (John) Wu, J. David Irwin, ISBN 1466572140, 9781466572140, Page 1021, which state that ECDH requires generating a Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair, Last acc

Case 1:20-cv-00404-RP Document 1-3 Filed 04/16/20