1 ... Al t h ou g h t h e pl ea di n g s we r e ame n ded t o pr oper l y n ame t h e pl ai n t i f f / appe l l an t as Lu i s D av i s , T r u s t ee of the D a v is F a m ily B la n c o R o a d P ro p e rty T ru st, t h e tru st w a s n a m e d a s the p la intiff in the style o f t h e fi n a l ju d g m e n t.
2 ... T h e H o n o ra b le K a re n P o z z a p re sid e d o v e r th e he a rin g o n the m o tio n to a llo w se rv ic e b y e le c tro n ic m a il an d si gn ed t he o rd er g ran t i ng t he m o t i o n. T he H o no rab l e P eter Sa ka i p resid ed o ve r t he he aring o n t he m o t i o n to d i sm i ss and s i gn ed t he order gra nt i ng t he mo t i on t o di s mi s s wi t h prej udi ce. T he H onorabl e G l ori a Sal daña s i gn ed t he agr eed o rd e r o n the p a rtia l sum m a ry j u d g m e n t. T h e H o n o ra b le D a v id A . B e rc h e lm a n n , Jr ., sign e d the fi n a l ju d g m e n t. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 00 7- CV DA VI S F AM ILYBLA NC O R OA D P RO P ER TY TR UST , 1 Appellant
v . CA NY ON CREEK

ESTA TES HO M EOW NE RS A SSOC IA TIO N , et al.,

Appellee s Fr om the 224th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CI -12456 Honora ble David A. B erc helmann, Jr., J udg e Presiding 2 Opinion by : Marialy

n Ba rnar d, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: October 21, 2009 AFF I RMED; REMANDED Th e un de rl y inglaws uit wa s ini tia lly fi le d by the Da vis F a mil y B lanc o Roa d Pr op e rt y Tr us t (“Tr ust”) ag ainst Cany on Creek E states Homeowne rs Association (the “Association”) and e ach of04

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- 2- the individual lot owners of the Canyon Creek E states Subdivisi on (re fer red to he rein a s the “L ot Ow ne rs ” ). On a

pp e a l, the Tr

us t c on te nd s the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by : (1 ) dis mis sin g the Tr us t’ s c la ims ; (2) signing an ag ree d order g ranting a par

tial summary

judgme nt; and (3) g ranting the Association’s mot ion to a llo w s e rv ic e by

e le c tr on ic ma il.

B ACKG ROUND Since 1963, restric tive covena nts have limited the use of most of the lots in the Cany on Creek E s tate s Su

b d iv is io n ( “ Su

b d iv is io n ” ) f

o r r e s id e n ti a l p u r

p o s e s o n ly
. O n o r a

b o u t M ay 2 3 , 1997, Ed wa rd and Ros a ur a Da vis , L uis Da vis ’s pa re nts , a c qu ir e d L ot 8 , B loc k 2 of the Sub div isi on . T his lot fronted B lanco R o ad
. On o r about March 1, 2000, Elar e Partne rs, L td., a Texas limit ed partne rship, purcha sed lots 6 and 7 of B lock 2 of the Subdivision. These lots also fronted B lanco Road. Luis Davis i s the m anag ing member of Navitas Origo, L L C, which is the g ener al par tner of El are Part ne rs . L uis and Pa tr ic ia Da vis indiv idu a lly

purc ha se d a

lot in t he Sub div isi on

wh ic h d id not front B lanco Road a

round 2005. On Aug ust 14, 2006, the Trust sued the Assoc iation and the L ot Owner s se eking a dec laratory judgme nt that the Subdivis ion should no longer be burde ned by

restric tive covena

nts lim iting the
commerc ial and business use of the prope rty . The pe tition asserted that the Tr ust owned lots 6, 7, and 8 of B lock 2 of the Subdivision. The p et i t i on alleg ed the r estrictive c ovenants we re null and void or that circ umstances a nd conditions had cha

ng ed such that the lots located on B lanco Road should no longe r be r estricted. On De c e mbe r 1 2, 20 07 , th e As so c ia tio n fil e d a motio n to a llo w s e rv ic e by e le c tr on ic ma il. Th e m o t i o nn o t e d

t h a tt h e l aw s u i ti n v o l v e d t w e n ty - e i g h td e f

e n d an t s , i n c l u d i n g a

p p r o xima te ly twenty -three L ot Owner s w h o wer e proc eedingin the litigation pr o s e . Seventee n of the pr o s e04

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- 3- de fe nd ant L ot O wn e rs sig ne d e le c tr on ic se rv ic e e le c tio ns re qu e sti ng to r e c e ive se rv ic e by e le c tr on ic mail. After a

hear ing, the trial court sig ned an order allowing documents and pleading s to be serve d by elec tronic mail but requiringnotice of he aring s and trial setting s t o al s o be fax ed or se nt by
certi f ie d le tt e r . T h e o r d e r c o n ta in e d c e rta in o th e r p r o te c ti o n s in c lu d in g a p r o v is io n a llowing any party to notify the ot her parties of any loss of e-mail service and to re quest servic e by other mea

ns until e-mail service was re stored. On J anuar

y 3, 2008, the Association filed a plea in abate ment and a plea to the jurisdiction. The Assoc iation a sserted that the Trust lacke d the leg al capa city to be a party to the lawsuit, noting that the pr op e r pa

rt y wo uld be the tr

us te e of the Tr

us t. Th e As so c ia tio n a lso a sse rt e d th a t th e Tr us t did not own proper

ty in the Subdivis ion and, there fore , lacke d standing to reque st declar atory relief
. Th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d th e ple a to t

he jur isd ic tio n a

nd g a ve the Tr

us t un til Janu ary

24 , 2 00 8, to “ fi le
an am en d ed p et i t i o n ad d i n g t h e co rr ec t p ro p er t y o wn er s as p l ai n t i ff s . ” T h e t ri al co u rt d i d

n o ts i gn the written orde r until Febr uary 19, 2008. On J anuar

y 24, 2008, an ame nded petition was filed na ming L uis Davis, as trustee of the Trust (re fer

red to herein as “ Trustee ”), a s the plaintiff. The sa me day , Luis and Patricia Da vis, as individual L ot Owner s, filed an amende d answe r and cross-c laim seeking decla ratory relief that the lots in t he Subdivision l ocate d on Bla nco Road we re not subjec t to the restrictions or that the restric tions were null and void. On Ap ri l 24 , 2 00 8, the As so c ia tio n f iled a mot ion to d ism iss a sse rt ingthe Tr us t w a s n ot a proper ty owner in the Subdivis ion; ther efor e, the Trustee lacke d standing to c halleng e the r estrictive
covena nts. The Association also filed a motion for partial summary judgme nt, a sserting the Trustee04

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- 4- was estopped from invoki ng the “c hang ed conditions” doc trine bec ause the purcha sers of L ots 6, 7,
and 8 h a d k no wl e dg e of

the c ha ng e s w he n th e y

a c qu ir e d th e lot s. On May 27, 2008, th e t ri al court held a hea ring on the motion to dis miss and motion for partial summary

judgme nt. The trial cour

t gr anted the Trust a c ontinuance on the motion for partial summary judgme nt based on the Trust’s asser tions that proper notice of the hear ing on that motion
wa s no t g ive n and

a dd iti on a l ti me wa s n e e de d to re sp on d. At the he ari ng , th e Tr

us te e int ro du c e d in to evidenc e an unr ecor ded dee d that convey ed L ot 8 from Edwa rd and Rosaur a Davis to the Trust and
an unre corde d deed that convey ed L ots 6 and 7 from Elare P artne rs t o the Trust. At the e nd of the hear ing, the trial court g rante d the motion to dis m i s s an d dismiss ed all cla ims by the Trustee as plaintiff. The order noted that it did not aff ect the attorney s’ fees claims of some def endants whic h
w e r e s t i l l p e n d i n g ; t h e r e f

o r e , t h e o r d e r

d i s m i s s i n g t h e T r

u s t e e ’ s c l a i m s a s p l a i n t i f

f w a s i n t e r l o c u t o r

y. Despite dismissing the Tr ustee’s c laims, the trial court insisted that a he aringbe set on the As so c ia tio n’ s mo tio n f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt: THE CO U RT : . . . . Ci r c u late an o r d e r . I f th e r e is an y is s u e , I w il l c o me back out and cla rify that order

for y ’all, sig n it. I still w ant a[n] order of [sic] the sum m ary judgme nt, Mr. C aldw ell [counsel for the Association]. Imean, I rea liz e – M R . CAL DW E L L : Yo uwa n tm e t o go fo rw ar d wi t h t h e s u m m ary

j u d gm en th ea ri n g? TH E CO UR T: Yo u k

no w, I , th a t’ s – MR. CAL DWEL L : Oh, g et an or der e ntere d, Isee. TH E CO UR T: I w ant that sett ing. Y ’ a l l d e c i d e w h a ty’ a l l h a v e a f t e r t o d ay. M R
. C A L D W E L L : O k ay. O k ay. THE COU R T : Al l rig ht. Ihave g iven y ou leg al ruling s. I w ant that sum m ary judgme nt set. On J une 3, 2008, the tria l co u rt considere d the Association’s motion for pa rtial summary judgme nt and noted the pa rt i es an n o unced a

n ag ree ment betwee n the Association, the Tr ustee a s plainti ff, and Luis and Patricia Da vis as cross-pla intiffs. Ba sed on the a g ree ment, the trial cour t04

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- 5- signe d an ag ree d order g ranting the motion for par tial summary

judgme nt. I n the ag ree d order , the tr ia l c ourt awa rd e d a take no thi ngjud g me nt “ on a ll c la ims fo r d e c larator

y jud g me nt r e g ard ingc la ims that chang es in c onditions or circ umstances as of the date Plaintiff or Cross-Plaintiffs ac quired the pr op e rt y jus tif y the c anc e lin g or

inv a lid a tio n o f a

ny re str ic tiv e c ovenan ts o n Pl a int if f’ s o r C ro ssPlaintiffs’ proper

ties as to use for

residential pur

poses.” The order

further descr ibed the “Plaintiff’ s and Cross-Plaintiffs’” proper ties as L ots 6, 7, and 8. On De c e mbe r 8 , 200 8, the tr ia l court he ld a he ari ng on the de fe nd ants ’ r e qu e st f or sanc tio ns . On De c e mbe r 1 8, 20 08 , th e tr ia l c ourt sig ne d a fi na l ju dg me nt d e nyingthe re qu e st f or sa nc tio ns . E-M A I L S E RVI CE I n it s th ir d is su e , th e Tr

us t c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngse rv ic e by e -m a il. Rul e 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e, howe ver, permits service “by such other ma nner a s the court in its discre tion may direc t.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 2 1a . I n a dd iti on , Ru le 5. 1( b) of

the B e xar County L oc a l Ru le s o f D istri c t Co ur ts c ov e ri ngthe El e c tr on ic F ili ngof Court Doc ume nts state s, “Doc uments may

be ele ctronica lly

serve d upon a party
. . . wher e the c ourt has orde red the parties to electr onically

serve documents.” B exar County (Tex.) Dist. Ct. L oc. R. Elec. Filing 5.1(b). The
c on ve nie nc e to t

he nume ro us pro se defe ndants who expressly consente d to e-mail ser

vice pr ovided
a sound basis for the trial court’s order permitting e-ma il se rvice
. There fore , the trial court did not
err in orderingservice by

e-ma il. I n a dd iti on , th e Tr

us t f a ils to s ho w h owit w a s h arm e d b y the tr ia l c ourt

pe rm itt inge -m a il service
. The trial court g rante d the only continuance the Trust re quested ba sed on insufficie nt notice. “[S] ervic e and notice in a technic al s en s e i s i n ci dental whe re the main purpose of obtaining the appea ranc e of a ll parties and their participation is a ccomplished.” Hill v. W . E. Brittain, Inc. , 40504

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- 6- S.W .2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.—For t Worth 1966, no writ). “I t is in instances where parties or the a tt o r n e y s f a il to ma k e an a p p e ar an c e an d p arti c ip a te in a h e ar in g a f f e c ti n g th e ir r ig h ts th a t an
e xami na t i o n o f t h e t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e r u l e s o f s e r

v i c e an d n o t i c e ar e an d s h o u l d b e c los e ly
ex am ined and a dhere d to.” Id
. I n this c ase, the Trust appea red and participated at ever y h ea ri n g. There fore , even a ssuming the tria l c ourt err ed in allowing se rvice by e-ma il, the Trust has not shown that the er ror “ probably cause d the rendition of an improper judg ment” or “ probably preve nted the appellant from proper ly prese nting the c ase to the c ourt of appe als.” T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.1(a)
. The Trust’s third issue is overr uled. D I S M I S S AL I n its first point of error, the Trust contends the tr ial court e rre d in dismi ssing its claims at the conc lusion of the May 27, 2008 hear ing. T he Trust a sserts that the unrec orded de eds transf err ed title to L ots 6, 7, and 8 to the Trust; there fore , the Tru s t o wn ed p ro p er ty in the Subdivis ion. The As so c ia tio n a sse rt s th a t pr oo f o f d e liv e ry of the de e ds wi th a

n in te nt to c on ve y

wa s r e qu ir e d to
e s t a b l i s h t h a tt h e T r

u s to w n e d

t h e p r o p e rt y. I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s order on a motion to dismiss for lack of sta nding, w e conside r the issue as we would in a plea to the jur isdiction. See Brown v. Todd , 5 3 S. W. 3 d 2 9 7 , 3 0 5 n . 3 ( T e x. 2001). I f a ple a to the jurisdiction challeng es jurisdictional fac ts, we consider rele vant evidenc e submitt ed by

the par ties when ne cessa

ry to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised, as the trial court is require d to do. Tex. Dept. of Parks &W ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d

2 1 7 , 2 2 7 ( T e x . 2 0 0 4 )
. If the evidenc e cr eate s a fa ct question reg arding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court c annot g rant the plea to the jur i sdiction, and the fa ct issue will be re solved by the fa ct finder
. Id . at 227-28. Howeve r, if the rel evant e vidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fac t issue on the jurisdictional04

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- 7- issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law which w e re view de novo
. Id . at 228. The Tr ust does not contest the proposition that in order to have standing to see k decla ratory
re lie f r e g ard ingthe e nf

or c e a bil ity of the re str ic tiv e c ov e na

nts , th e Tr us t w a s r e qu ir e d t o o wn

p ro pe rt y in the Subdivis ion. See Ski Masters of Texas, LLC v. Heineme yer , 2 6 9 S. W. 3 d

6 6 2 , 6 6 7
- 6 9 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 08 , n o p e t.) ; Nelson v. Flache , 487 S.W .2d 843, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amar illo 1972, writ ref’d n.r .e.). The Trust asser ts, however , that the unre corde d deeds w ere
e vid e nc e tha

t L ots 6, 7, and

8 w e re c on ve y e d f

ro m th e ir fo rm e r o wn e rs to t

he Tr us t. Sin c e the Tr

us t
ow ne d p ro pe rt

y in t he Sub div isi on , th e Tr

us t argue s th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in dis mis sin g its c la ims
. An unrec orded deed is binding on the parties to the convey ance , and rec ording a deed is not
nece ssary to pass title. Hi da lgo Cou nty Ap prais al Dis t. v. HI

C Te x as I, L.L. C. , No. 13-07-083- CV, 20 09 WL 62 04 68 , at *2 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i Mar . 1 2, 20 09 , n o p e t.) (m e m. o p. ); W atson v. Tipton , 274 S.W .3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2008, pet. denied). Althoug h the Association raised que stions re gar ding the timing of the unr ecor ded dee ds, the unrec orded de eds, at the ve ry least, ra ised a fa ct issue re g ardingthe Trust’s prope rty owner ship that prevente d the trial cour t from g ranting the motion to dis miss. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28. Acc ording ly , the t rial cour t
e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe mot ion

to d ism iss
. S UM M ARY J UDGMENT I n its second issue, the Trust contends the trial court e rre d in gr anting the par tial summary judgme nt r eg arding its c laims be cause the trial court had alr eady dismiss ed those c laims based on lack of standing . The Association responds that the Tr ust waived its complaint by ag ree ing to the
o rd er , an d

t h e t ri al co u rt s t i l l h adj u ri s d i ct i o no v er t h e c as e b ec au s e c l ai m s re m ai n edp en d i n g.04

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- 8- A par ty ’s conse nt to the trial court’s e ntry of judg ment waives a

ny err or, except jurisdictional
err or, conta ined in the j u d gm en t. In re A.M .S. , 277 S.W .3d 92, 99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009,
no pe t.) ; Boufaissal v. Boufaissal , 2 51 S.W. 3d 16 0, 16 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 200 8, no pe t.) . In th is
case , the trial cour

t continued to have ple nary jurisdiction ove r the c ase de spite the dismissal of the Trust’s cla im s b eca

use numerous othe r cla ims remained pe nding, inc luding the c ross-cla im for decla ratory relief asser

ted by Luis a

nd Patricia Davis which also was disposed of by the ag ree d order
. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 329b(d). Moreove r, the following exchang e occur red at the conc lusion of the hear ing on the motion to di smiss i n which the tria l court expressly rec og nized its plenar

y power : THE COURT: I am not – Mr. Crist [ counsel for the Trust], I ’m not questioning the fac t that your firm has g otten these signatures [on the unrec orded deeds] and t hey have be en notar ized. I t – Iam g oing all the way back to the sta rt of this lawsuit and then trying to de termine, a lso, what – g ive leg al ef fect t o J u d g e Pozz a’s or der [of] F e br ua ry 19 th, 20 08 . I t ju st do e sn ’t a pp e ar t o me that th is i s –

ha s b e e n a

pr op e rl y plead law suit, is what it boi ls down to. And I ’m strug g ling a s to – y ou know, if I – if Iam to g rant this dismiss al, then Iwant to make sur e I ’m not cre ating reve rsible er ror, so – MR. CR I ST: I understand, Y our Honor. THE COURT: Iknow y ou’re arguin g t h at, J udg e, we – we f ix ed Judge Pozz a’s c on c e rn s. MR. CR I ST: Yes, Your Honor
. THE COURT: But these conveyance – MR. CR I ST: Yes, Your Honor
. THE COURT: But these conveyance s – this is what I ’m g oing to do f or today
. The Court is going to grant the m otion, bu t, of course, as y’all kn ow, th e Courthas 30 days p lenary pow er. Y’ a ll f ig ur e ou t w hat y ’a ll g ot. (empha sis added). A s previously noted, the trial c ourt also insisted that the attorney set a he aring
on the mot ion

fo r p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt.

“ A t r i a l c o u rth a s p l e n ar y p o w e r o v e r an d t h e r e f o r e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o nan d

a u t h o r i t y to
rec onsider, not only

its judgment but also its interlocutory order s u n t i l t h i rt y

day s after

the date a final j udg ment is signe d” unless extended by the fil ing of a mot ion for new trial. Or ion En te rp ris es,04

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- 9- Inc. v . Pope , 927 S.W .2d 654, 658 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1996, orig
. proce eding [l eave denied]). “‘Plena ry power ’ is ‘that which is ‘[f]ull, entire, complete, a bsolute, perf

ect, unqua lified.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g Mesa Agro v . R. C. Dove & Sons , 584 S.W .2d 506, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.—El P aso 1979, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). The a g ree d order in this case expressly rec og nized that the P laintiff or Cross-Plaintiffs had acquir ed prope rty

and expressly

descri b ed t h at proper

ty as L ots 6, 7, and 8 of B lock 2 of the Subdivis ion. I n requiringthe m otion for partial summary judgme nt to be set withi n the trial cour t’s plenar y power and in sig ning a

n order rec og nizi ng the Trust’s owne rship of t h e p roperty , the trial court impliedly

overr uled its earlier

order dismiss ing the Trust’s cla ims for lack of standing based
on non-owne rsh i p . See Chilke witz v. Hyson , 22 S.W .3d 825, 828 (Tex. 1999) (noting trial court impliedly overr uled par ty ’s m otion for judg ment notwithstanding the ve rdict by rende ring judgme nt fo r o the r p art

y ); Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins , 246 S.W .3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2 0 0 7 , p e t. dism’d w.o.j.) (noting trial cour t impliedly denied motion to vacate application for protec tive order by iss uin g pr ote c tiv e or de r) ; se e als o E x pr ess- Ne ws Co rp . v . S

pe ar s , 7 6 6 S.W .2d

8 8 5 , 8 8 8 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 89 , ori g . pro c e e din g [le a ve de nie d]) (n oti ngtr ia l c ourt may c ho os e to v a c a te prior orde r duringits plenary power ). B eca

use the trial c ou rt had both plenar y power over a nd jurisdiction to reconsider the dismissal order, see O rion Enterprises, Inc. , 927 S.W .2d at 6 5 8 , the ag ree d order

contains no jurisdictional err or, and the Trust’s consent to the agr eed or der w aived a ny
err or with reg ard to the g ranting of the pa rtial summary

judgme nt. See I

n re A.M.S. , 277 S.W .3d at 99 ; Boufaissal , 251 S.W .3d at 162. The Tr ust’s second issue is over ruled.04

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- 10- C ONCL US I ON Al tho ug h the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g the Tr us t’ s c la ims , the tr ia l c ou rt im pl iedl y
overr uled its dismi ssal order

when it g rante d the par

tial summary judgme nt. Although w e af firm the order g ranting the partial summary judgme nt, that order only g rants sum mary judgme nt with reg ard to the Trust’s cla ims “for de clar atory judgme nt reg ardin g claims that cha ng es in conditions or circ umstances a s of the date Plaintiff or Cross-Plaintiffs acquire d the prope rty justify the ca nceling or invalidation of any

restric tive covena

nts on Plaintiff’s or Cross-Plaintiffs’ prope rties as to use f or residential pur

poses.” The ref

ore, the cause is r emande d to the trial court f or fur ther proc eeding s on the Tr us t’ s c la ims that w e re no t di sp os e d o f b y the pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt. Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice