### FILED July 14, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF T ENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE APRIL SESSION, 1999 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9807- CR-00245 ) Appellee, ) ) ) KNOX COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. MARY BETH LEIBOWITZ ANTHONY T. JONES, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Dire ct Ap pea l - Agg ravat ed R obb ery)

FOR THE APPELLANT : FOR THE APPELLEE : THOMAS SLAUGHTER PAUL G. SUM MERS 501 Clinch Avenue, 3rd Floor Attorney General& Reporter Knoxvill e, TN 37902 ERIK W. DAAB Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashvill e, TN 337243 RANDALL E. NICHOLS Distri ct Attorney General ROBERT JOLLEY Assistant Distri ct Attorney City-County

Building Knoxvill e, TN 37902
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED JERRY L . SMI TH, J UDGE-2- 

## OPINION
On October 1, 1997, the Kno x County Grand Jury i ndicted Appel lant AnthonyT. Jones for one count of aggrav ated robbery . After

a jury t rial on May 11, 199 8, A ppellant was convicte d of aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing on Ju ne 5, 1998, the t rial cour t sentenced Appel lant as a Range I st andard offender to a term of twelve years in the T ennesse e Depart ment o f Co rrecti on. Appellant c hallenges bot h his convi ction and hi s sentence, r ai sin g the following i ssues: 1) whether t he evidence was suf ficien t to support

Appellant’ s convict ion; 2) whetherthe trial court erre d when it refused to conso lidate this ca se with another case in which Appel lant wascharged with first degree murder; and 3) whether t he trialcourt err oneously imposed an excessive sentence. After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.

I. FA CTS

On August 23, 1997, at approxi mately 11:00 p. m., Matthew Mil ler walked to his car af

terhe com pleted a s hift at his pl ace of employment. After Mil ler got in his car and r

olled down t he window, James Mell on app roach ed Miller and asked whether he had a ci gar ette lighte r. W hen M iller beg an se archin g for his ci garette lighter, M ellon p ulled o ut a ch rome hand gun a nd de man ded M iller’s wallet and car keys. Mill er gave Mellon his car keys a nd his wallet which contained $40.00. Mell on then got i nto a vehicle a nd drove away. Miller co uld see tha t the vehicle was oc cupied by addition al individua ls.-3- On Augus t 26, 19 97, Ap pellan t waived his righ t to rem ain silen t and h is right to counsel and gave a statement to the poli ce. In his s tatemen t to the police, Appellant stated that he was drivi ng around in acar with Mel lon and some otherindivi duals when Mell on said that theyneeded to get some money so that theycould buy some marij uana. At some poi nt, t here was a discussi on about “rippi ng off a drug dea ler, or a drug hou se or som ething.” When Appellant was asked whether he knew wha t “everybody w as talk ing abo ut going a nd doin g,” Appellant

responded, “ev

erybody knew

what w as go ing on . Ther e can ’t nobody sit there and lie and s ay they didn’t, becau se, you know what I’m saying .”
Appellant

stated th at the group t hen did some more driv ing around and Mellon eventu ally got out of the car and robbed Mil ler wit h the gun that Appellant had broug ht with h im tha t nig ht. A ppellant stated tha t he watched the robbery from appro ximate ly one parking space away and believed at

first that Mell on was bluffing.
Appellant

stated tha t when M ellon return ed to the car, Mel lon gave M iller’s wallet to “E.” “E” then to ok the money out of the wallet, and the g roup spent $20.00 to purch ase marijuana and $20. 00 to purchase somethi ng else.
Appellant

subsequently

told the police t hat the gun used i n t he robbery could be loc ated a t his girlf riend’ s house, and the pol ice later retri eved the gun from tha t location.-4- II.SUFFICI ENCY OF THE EVI DENCE
Appellant

contends that

the evidence was insuff icient to supp ort his conviction for aggra vated robbe ry.

When an appellant

challenges t he sufficie ncy of th e evide nce, th is Court is obliged to review that chal lenge according to certai n well-settl ed principles. A verdictof guil ty by th e jury, approved by t he trialjudge, accr edits th e testimony of the State’s w itnesses and res olves all co nflicts in the testimony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994). Although an accused is originally cloaked with a p resump tion of innocenc e, a jury verdictremo ves this presumption and replaces i t with oneof guilt. State v. Tug gle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, t he burden of proof re sts with Ap pellant to demo nstrate the insufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e. Id
. On app eal, “t he [S]tate is entitled to th e strong est legiti mate v iew of th e evide nce a s well a s all
reaso nable and legitimate inferences that m ay be drawn therefrom.” Id. Wh ere the suffic iency of t he evidence i s contested on appeal, t he relevant question for the reviewi ng court is whethe r any ra tio nal tri er of fact could have found the accused guilty

of every e lemen t o f the offens e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S . 307, 319 , 99 S. C t. 2781, 2 789 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 56 0 (1979). In conducting o ur evaluation of the c onvicting evi den ce, this Cour t is precluded from reweighi ng orreconsideri ng the evide nce. State v. Morgan , 929 S.W.2d 380, 38 3 (Ten n. Crim. A pp. 1 996). More over, t his Court may not sub stitute its own infe rences “for those d rawn by the trier of fa ct fro m circumstant ial evidence.” State v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1990). Finally, Rule 13(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Pro cedure-5-

provides, “findi ngs of guil t in cri minal ac tions whe ther by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insuf ficien t to support

the findi ngs by the trier of fact beyo nd a rea sonab le doub t.”

Under Tenn essee law, “[r]obbe ry is the inte ntiona l or knowing thef t of property from th e pers on of a nothe r by viole nce or putting th e perso n in fear.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-4 01(a) (1997). Further, aggravated robbery is a robbery which i s “[a]cc omplished wit h a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashi oned to lead t he victi m to reasonably be lieve i t to be adead ly weapo n.” Tenn . Code Ann. § 3 9-13-40 2(a)(1) (19 97). In add ition, “[a] p erson is crimin ally respo nsible for an offense committed by the co nduct o f anothe r if . . . [a]cti ng with intent to p romote or assist the comm ission of the offense, o r to bene fit in the proceeds or results of t he offense, the person soli cits, dir ects, aids,
or attempts to aid a nother perso n to comm it the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-402(2) (19 97).

In this c a se, there i s no dispute t hat Mellon commit ted the off

ense of aggravated robbery by us ing a deadly weapo n to take proper ty from Mil ler by putting him in fear

forhis safety. Essential ly, t he only dis pute is whet her the evidence was suffi cient to establi sh beyond a reasonabl e dou bt that A ppellant
was guilty of aggravated robbery because he was criminal ly responsi ble for t he conduct of Mell on.
Initially, Appellant contends tha t the evidence w as insufficient to supp ort his convicti on because there was no pr oof that he ever put Mi ller i n fear, t hat he t ook anythin g directly from Mill er, or t hat he exerci sed direct control ov

er the-6-

property that was taken from Miller. Howe ver, this arg umen t i s com pletely irrel evant in the sit uation presen ted sub judice
. In orde r to esta blish A ppella nt’s guilt, the State had t o prove that

Appellant “solici t[ed], direct[ed], ai d[ed] , or attempt[ed]to aid” Mellon in the co mmissio n of the aggra vated ro bbery “w ith intent to promote or as sist t he c omm issio n of the off ense, or to b enefit i n the proceeds or results of the offense .” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997). Contrary to Appellant’s assert ion, nothi ng i n the crim inal respo nsibility statute required the State to prove that Appellan t had committed t he offense of agg ravate d robbery hi mself by thr eatening Mil ler and tak ing propert y direct ly fr

om Miller.
Appellant

also contends that

the evidence was insufficient becaus e there
wa s no pr oof about how Mell on obtained possess ion of Appell ant’s gun. Howeve r, Appellant’ s own statementshowed thatwhen A ppellant in itially got into the car with Mellon and theother individuals, Mellon did n ot know that Appellant had a gun. Then, someti me after thediscussion about the need to obtain money formarijuana and t he proposal to rob a drug dealer, Mellon used Appellant’ s gun to rob Mill er. The poli ce subsequently located t he gun at App ellant’s girlfriend ’s house. A rationaljury coul d infer f rom this evi dence that Appel lant gave hi s gun to Mellon befor

e the robbery

an d too k po sse ssi on of thegun agai n so meti me after the robbery.
Appe lla nt further contends that the evid ence was insufficient becaus e there
was no proofthat he knew that Mellon was going to com mit a robbery. H owever, when Appellant was asked whether ever yone knew what was goi ng t o happen after the discussion about obtain ing money for marijuana and t he proposal to rob-7-

a drug dealer, Appel lantexpressly stated “ev

erybody knew what

was going on. There can’t n obod y sit there and lie and s ay they didn’t.” T his evid ence is clear ly suffic ientfor a rat ional j ury to concl ude that Appell ant knew that Mellon was goi ng to comm it a robbery.
Finally, Ap pellant

contends that the evidence was insuf ficient because there was no proof tha t he directe d or instruc ted Mello n to commit the aggravated robbery. Howe ver, the crim inal respo nsibility statute express ly states tha t a person is cri minally r

esponsible for the conduct of another if that person “aids, or attempts to aid” the ot her in the commission ofan offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 9 -11-402(2) (1997). Thus, the State was not required to prove that Appellant directed or

instruct ed Mellon to commit the offense.

We conc lude th at whe n the e videnc e in this case is vi ewed in the light most favora ble to the State, as it must be, the evidence was suffi cientfor a rational jury to conclude beyond a reas onab le dou bt that A ppella nt was crimin ally resp onsib le forthe aggravated robbery of Miller. The eviden ce sh ows th at App ellant to ok his handgun with him and got into thecar with M ellon and the other individuals. Mellon subsequently

stated that the gr

oup needed to obtai n some money in order to purchase m arijuana. T he group the n discussed robbing a dru g dealer or a drug house and by Appell ant’s own admissi on, “everybody knew what was goi ng on.” Mellon su bsequ ently got ou t of the car and used Appellant ’s gun to r ob Miller. Appellant a nd the rest of the group th en use d $20.0 0 of the m oney to purchase marijuana and t hey then spent t he remaining $20. 00 on something else. The police l ater ret rieved t he gun from Appella nt’s gi rlfr iend’s house. This evidence was clearly sufficie nt for a ration al jury to conclude tha t Appellant gave-8-

Mellon his gun so that

Mellon coul d commit the aggravated robbery an d A ppellant and the rest of the group could t hen use the proceeds to buy marijuana. Thus,
a rational jury could clearly find that A ppellant was c ri minally re sponsible for Mellon ’s conduct because Appel lant aid ed the commission of the aggravated robbery with the i ntent of sharing i n the proceeds.

In this cas e, App ellant e ssen tially asks us to recon sider the evidence and substitute a verdict of not guilty i n place of the verdict found by thejury. Th at is not our functi on. Inste ad, we concl ude that a rat ional j ury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appell ant was gu ilty of the off ense of aggravated robbery because he was criminal ly responsi ble for t he conduct of Mel lon. This issue ha s no m erit.

III . FAI LURE TO CONSOLIDATE
Appellant conte nds th at the tria l court e rred w hen it re fused to gran t his motion to conso lidate this cas e with a nothe r case in which he was ch arged w ith first degree m urder beca use it pre ven ted him from b eing a ble to s how th at his statement that “everybody knew what was going on” only appli ed to the murder charge.
Rule 13(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provi des:
The court may order consolidat ion of two o r more indictments, present ments, or informations for trialif the offenses and al l defendants could have b een jo ined in a single ind ictmen t, presentment, or informati on pursuant to Rul e 8.-9-

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 13( a). In addition, Rul e 8(a) of t he Tennessee R ules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Two or more offenses shall bejoi ned i n th e sa me indictme nt, prese ntmen t, or informati on, with eac h offense stated in ase parate count, or consolidated pursuan t t o Rul e 13 if theoffense s are bas ed up on t he s ame conduct or arise from the s ame crim inal episode an d if such offenses are known to the app ropriate prosecuti ng offic ial at the time of

the return of the indict ment(s), pr

esentment(s), or information(s) and if they are with in the jurisdi ction of a single court. A defen dant sh all not be s ubject to s eparate trials for mul tipl e offenses falling within this s ubsection un less they are severed pursuant

to Rule 14. Tenn. R. Cr im. P. 8(a). Essential ly, Appel lant contends that t he trialcourt was required to consoli date the two t rials und er 13(a) because j oinder of t he tw o charged o ffenses in the sam e indictment w as man datory unde r Rule 8(a).
Appellant

contends that

cons ol idation was mandatory under Rul e 8(a) because the alleged of fenses were committed within one hour ofeach other and occurred at locations that were only a few miles a part. Howeve r, Appellant has failedto support t his conclusor y allegat ion with a ny furt her information. In deed, Appellant

has fail ed to specif

y what ti me the events i n the murder case took place and has failed to spe cify where they occur red. In addition, Appel lant has failed to provide any

informati on about the vi ctim of t he murder, ha s faile d to spec ify how the murde r occurred, and has fail ed to specif y the all eged motive for the murder. In additio n, the ind ictment for the murder case is not i n the record, and there is nothi ng else in t he record that contains any

specifi c informati on about the murder case. In fa ct, the record indicates that Appell ant fail ed to intr oduce any proof at t he hearing on hi s motion to consol idate.1 The record indi cates that the State was o pposed to permissive consoli dation of this case with the murder case under Rule 8(b)because it i ntended to use a convicti on in thi s case as a basis for seeking the death penalty i n the murder case. Regardless of the propriety of the prosecut

or’s motivation for opposing permissive consoli dation, that motiv ation i s simply not

relevant

to determini ng whether the aggravated rob bery and t he murder offenses were “based upon the same conduct or ar[o]se fro m the same crim inal episode” as is required for mandatory conso lidation under Rule 8(a). -10- In short, Ap pellant ha s failed to provide u s with any information about t he murder case up on whic h we ca n dete rmine whether the tw o offenses w ere “based upon the sa me con duct or a r[o]se fro m the s ame c riminal ep isode.” There fo re, we have no basis for determini ng whether Rule 8( a) mandated consolidat ion of this case wi th the murder case. The mere fact

that two of

fenses
were commi tt ed by

thesameperson within a re latively short time a t two rela tively close locati ons, without more, is i ns uff icient to establish that Rule 8(a) applies. Be cause Appellant has provided us with no info rmation upon whi ch we coul d reach a contrary

conclusion , w e must presume that the trial cour t was correct when it determined that t he mandatory joi nde r provisi ons of Rule 8(a)did not require the consolidat ion of Appellant’ s two cases. 1 This issu e has n o merit.

IV. LENGTH OF SENTEN CE
Appellant

c ont ends that t he trialcourt err oneously sentenced him to a longer term than he deserves.

“When reviewing senten cing issu es . . . incl uding the grant ing or deni al of probation and the lengt h of sentence, the appellate cou rt shall conduct a d e novo review on the record of such issues. Such review shal l be conducted wi th a presumption that the determinati ons made by the co urt from which the ap peal is taken are correct .” Ten n. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d) (1997). “However, t he presumption of correct ness which acco mpa nies th e trial co urt’s ac tion is-11-

conditi oned upon the affir mativ e showing in th e record that the trial cou rt considered the sentencing principl es and all rele vant facts a nd circum stance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 199 1). In conduc ting ou r revi ew, we must cons ider all th e evide nce, th e pres enten ce rep ort, the s enten cing p rin ciple s, the enha ncing and m itigating factors , argum ents o f coun sel, the defen dant’s statem ents , the nature and character of the offens e, and the defendant’s potent ia l forrehabilitation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(5), -210( b) (1997 & Supp. 1998); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169 . “The de fe ndant has the burden of demonstratingthat the sentenc e is imprope r.” Id. Because the record in this
case indicates that the trial court failed to p roperly conside r t he sent encing principl es and all rel evant facts and circumstance s, our rev iew is de novo wi thout
a presum ption of co rrectnes s. State v. Poo le , 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (T enn. 1997 ).

In this case, Appellant was convict ed of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 (1997). The sentence for a Range I offender convicted of a Class B felony is b etween eight and twelve yea rs. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(2) (1997). The presumptive sentence for a Class B felony is the mini mum sentence in the range if ther e are no enhancement or mitig ating fa ctors. Tenn. C ode Ann . § 40-35-210 (c) (1997). W hen there are enhancement but no miti gating fac tors that apply to a s entence, the court may set the sentence above the minimum in that range but sti ll wit hin the range. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d) (1997). When both enhancement and mi tigati ng factors are applicable to a senten ce, the court is directed t o begin wit h the minimum sentence, enhance t he sentence wit hin the rangeas appropriate for the enhancement factors, and then reduce t he sentence wit hin the range as appropriate for the mit igating factors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210 (e) (1997).-12- In determini ng that Appell ant should be sentenced to a twel ve year term, the trialcourt found that the f ollowing enhancement factors ap plied: (1) Appell ant had a previous hi story of criminal convicti ons or crimi nal behavior in addit ion to those necessary to establish the app ropriate sentencing r ange, (2) Appel lant was
a leader in the commission of an offen se involv ing two or more criminal actors, (7) the offens e involved a victim an d was c omm itted to gratify Appellant’s des ire forpleasure or excitement, (8) Appell ant had a history o f unwillin gnes s to co mply with the condit ions of a sentence involving releas e into the c ommunity, (10) Appellant

had no hesitat ion in committ ing an offense where the risk to human life
was high, and (20) App ellant had been a djudicate d to have committed del inquent
a ct s as a juven ile that wou ld be felon ies if com mitted by an adu lt. See Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-114( 1), (2), (7), ( 8), (10), (20) (1997) . The trial cour t appare ntly found that no m itigating facto rs applied
.
Appellant

does not challenge the applicat ion of enhancement fact or (1) , how ever, we conclude that it was i ncorrectly applied. In 1995, t he T ennesse e Legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated secti on 40-35-114 by addi ng enhancement factor (20) , w hich all ow s for enhancement of a sentence if

“[t] he defendantwas adjudica ted to h ave committed a delinquent act or acts as a juvenile that wo uld co nstitute a felon y if com mit t ed by an adult. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(20) (1997). Thi s Court has prev iously stated that for offenses
comm itte d after t he effective date of t he amendment (July 1, 1995), only thos e d elinquent

acts by a j uvenile t hat would const itute a f elony if committed by a n a dult can be conside red to en hance a senten ce. State v. Ronald Shipley , No. 02C01-9601-CR-00031, 1997 WL 21190, at *7 n.1 ( Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Jan. 22, 199 7); State v . Ti moth y Ad ams , No. 02C01-9512-CC-00376, 1997 WL2 W e not e tha t App ellant ’s rec ord c onta ins no prev ious conv iction s for offe nse s co mm itted w hile Appellan t was an adult. -13- 1821, at *4 n.4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Jan. 3, 1997). Because the offense in this case was committed after July 1, 1995, t he trialcourt err ed when it appl ied enhance ment factor (1 ) base d on A ppella nt’s pre vious re cord o f juvenil e adjudications. 2
Appellant

contends that the trial cou rt erred when it applied enhancement factor (2) because t here was no evidence thathe ha d any le aders hip role in the commission of the aggrava ted robbery. We a gree that t he record si mply does not contain a ny eviden ce th at Appe llant was a leader i n the commission of the offense. Wh ile the evide nce indic ates th at Ap pellant was present duri ng c onversat ions about obtai ning money for mari juana and about committ ing a
r obb ery, there is no evidence th at Appellant initi ated those conversations or otherwise directed o r planned the robbery. While the evidence s how s that Appellant

knew that Mell on intended to commit a robbery when he gave Mellon his gun, there is no evidence t hat Appellant inst ructed M ellon to commit the
r obbery
. We cannot agree with th e State that the mere fact

that Appell ant provided Mellon with a gun, without more, establi shes thatAppellant was a leader in the commissi on of the of fense.
Appellant

does not chall en ge the application of enh ancem ent factor (7), however, we con clude tha t it was incorr ectly applie d. The S tate has the burden of demonstratingthat the c rime was comm itted to gratify a defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitem ent. State v . Ad ams , 864 S.W .2d 31 , 35 (T enn. 1 993). In this case, while there was evidence that Appellant and the others committed the-14-

aggravated robbery i n order to use t he proceeds to obtain plea sure by purchasing and then consuming marijuana, there was absolutely no evi dence thatAppellant par

ticipated in the agg ravated ro bbery in o rder to obtain pleasu re or excitem ent from the robb ery itself. Thus, the tri al court erred when it appl ied enhance ment factor (7).
Appe llant

does not ch allenge the ap plication of enhan cemen t factor ( 8) , and we co nclud e that it w as co rrectly applied. Indeed , the record indicates that Appellant has

been placed on probat ion numerous times and has t hen violated the terms of hi s probation by committing new offenses and failingto com ply with court ord ered reg ulations.
Appellant

contends that

the tri al court err

ed when it appl ied enhancement factor (10). W e agree that this facto r was inco rrectly app lied. This Court has previo usly stated th at absentany proof establishi ng a risk to a life other than t he victim’s, enhancement factor (10) is i napplicabl e to sentences f or ag grava ted robbery because a high ri sk to human lif e is an element of

the offens e. State v. Hicks , 868 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1993). There i s no proof i n the record that the l ife of any one othe r than the vict im was endangered duri ng the aggravated robbery of Miller . Thus, thetrial co urt erre d whe n it app lied this factor.
Appellant

does not ch allenge the ap plication of enhan cemen t factor (20), and we conclude that

it was cor rectly

applied because Appel lant was adj udicated
as having com mitted offens es as a juven ile that w ould have been felonie s if-15-

commi tted by an adult. Indeed, th e record indi cates that Appellant has adjudica tions for ag gravated robbery a nd agg ravated a ssault.
Appellant

contends tha t the trial court should have appl ied mitigati ng factor (6) beca use Appellant was only ei ghteen years ol d when he committed t h e offense. See Tenn . Code Ann. § 40-35-1 13(6) (19 97). The Te nnes see Supr eme Court has stated t hat when determining th e applicability of this mitigating facto r, the sentencing cour

t should consi der “the defenda nt’s age, educ ation, maturity, experience, mental capacit y or devel opment, and any other pertinent circumst an ce tending to demo nstrate the defend ant’s ability or in ability to appreciat e t he nature of h is conduct.” State v . Ad ams , 864 S.W.2d at 33. Besides referri ng to his age at the time of

the o ffense, Appe llant has fa iled to indicate any reason for why this fac tor applied . Appellan t has failed to indicate how his age or anyt hing else affected his j udgment when he parti cipated i n the aggravated robbery. In deed, th e record indicates th at Ap pellan t is wellacquainted with t he cr iminal j ustice system and with t he consequences of violat ing the law. In fact, the record indicates that besi des the two adj udicati ons forfelonies, A ppellant h as had adjudica ti o ns for approx imately t hirty-four delinquent

acts th at occ urred over a s ix year perio d. Thus, mitigat ing factor (6) was not appli cable.

Even though we hold t hat the trial cou rt erred in applyi ng s ome enhancement factors, a fi nd ing tha t enha ncem ent fac tors we re erro neou sly applied does not equate to a r e duction in the sente nce. State v. Keel , 882 S.W.2d 410, 423 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1994). Given the numberand severit y of the felony offenses i n Appellant’ s juveni le record, and the failure of lesser forms of3 The reco rd ref lects that A ppe llant h as ju venile adju dica tions of de linque ncy fo r app roxim ately eight felonies. These i nclude aggravat ed robbery andaggravated assaul t. Appel lant at

the ti me of the sentencing hearing was nineteen (19 ) years old and had been a perenn ial defendant in juvenile court since the age of

thirt een (13). I t is appar

ent that none of the measures taken by juvenil e court have been effective in rehabi litating t his young man. -16- punishment to curb Appellant’s criminal behavior, we co ncl ude that the two enhancement factors applicab le in this cas e warran t a sentence of twelve years. 3

According ly, the j udgment of t he trial cour

t is AFFIRMED
.

____________________________________ JERRY L . SMI TH, J UDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOE G. RILE Y, J UDGE

___________________________________ NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE