Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1409-CR-409 | March 19, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael R. Fisher 

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Jodi Kathryn Stein 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Arturo Estrada-Medina, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

March 19, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A04-1409-CR-409 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court Criminal Division 4 

Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge 

Cause No. 49G04-1305-FB-028012 

Friedlander, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1408-CR-409 | March 19, 2015 Page 2 of 9

[1] Arturo Estrada-Medina appeals following his convictions of class B felony 

Rape1

 and class D felony Criminal Confinement.2 He raises two issues on 

appeal, one of which we find dispositive: Do his convictions for rape and 

criminal confinement violate Indiana’s constitutional double jeopardy 

protections? 

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions. 

[3] In the early evening hours of September 24, 2006, then-seventeen-year-old 

D.W. went to the Berkley Commons apartments in Indianapolis to visit her 

boyfriend, Derek Reynolds. When she arrived, Reynolds was with his friend 

“Red” and a Hispanic man D.W. did not know. The group hung out in a park 

by the apartment complex while Reynolds, Red, and the Hispanic man drank 

beer. At some point, Derek suggested that they all go to the apartments’ 

laundry facility, where D.W. had previously hung out with Reynolds on several 

occasions. D.W. led the way to the basement of the building where the laundry 

room was located. When she got into the room and turned around, she 

discovered that she was alone with the Hispanic man. D.W. tried to leave, but 

 

1

 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-1 (West, Westlaw 2013). Effective July 1, 2014, this offense has been reclassified 

as a Level 3 felony. See I.C. § 35-42-4-1 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2015 First Regular 

Session of the 119th General Assembly effective through February 23, 2015). Because the offense in this case 

was committed prior to that date, it retains its former classification as a class B felony. 

2

 I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (West, Westlaw 2013). Effective July 1, 2014, the criminal confinement statute has been 

revised and the offense has been reclassified as a Level 6 felony, which may be elevated to a Level 5, 3, or 2 

felony under certain circumstances. See I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (West, current with all legislation of the 2015 First 

Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly effective through February 23, 2015). Because the offense in 

this case was committed prior to that date, it retains its former classification as a class D felony. 
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the man blocked her way and grabbed her by the throat and squeezed. D.W. 

was scared and could not breathe. D.W. then ended up on the floor with the 

man on his knees between her legs. D.W. was crying and begging for him to let 

her go, and the man was telling her in Spanish to shut up. D.W. removed her 

pants and underwear because she “knew [she] wasn’t leaving the laundry room 

unless [she] did something.” Transcript at 130. The man then undressed and 

penetrated D.W.’s vagina with his penis while she continued to cry. After he 

ejaculated inside D.W.’s vagina, D.W. then grabbed her clothes and left the 

laundry room. 

[4] D.W. put her clothes back on outside, and almost immediately thereafter ran 

into Reynolds and Red. D.W. told Reynolds that she had been raped, and he 

told her not to call the police because there was an active warrant for his arrest. 

Shortly thereafter, a friend of D.W.’s contacted Deborah Schonfeld, who ran a 

program for at-risk youth in which D.W. participated. Schonfeld sent her 

husband to pick up D.W. and bring her back to their house. Schonfeld spent 

time talking to D.W., who was shaking, extremely distressed, and having 

difficulty communicating. Eventually, D.W. agreed to report the incident. She 

was then interviewed by police and taken to the hospital, where a rape kit was 

completed. In February 2007, a DNA profile was developed from sperm 

fractions found during the rape kit exam and the profile was uploaded into 

Indiana’s DNA database. No match was found at that time, and no arrests 

were made. 
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[5] Six years later, in April 2013, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective David 

Miller was notified that there was a DNA match in the database with EstradaMedina’s profile, which had been recently uploaded due to a criminal trespass 

conviction. Detective Miller contacted D.W., who stated emphatically that she 

wished to pursue charges. Subsequently conducted DNA testing confirmed 

that Estrada-Medina was the source of the DNA found during D.W.’s rape kit. 

[6] The State charged Estrada-Medina with class B felony rape, two counts of class 

D felony criminal confinement, and class D felony strangulation. A two-day 

jury trial commenced on July 14, 2014, at the conclusion of which EstradaMedina was found guilty of rape and one count of criminal confinement and 

acquitted of the remaining charges. Estrada-Medina now appeals. 

[7] Estrada-Medina argues that his convictions for rape and criminal confinement 

violate Indiana’s constitutional double jeopardy protections. The double 

jeopardy clause found in article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution “was 

intended to prevent the state from being able to proceed against a person twice 

for the same criminal transgression.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 

(Ind. 1999). Two or more offenses are the “same criminal transgression” for 

the purposes of the Indiana double jeopardy clause if, “with respect to either the 

statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to 

convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the 

essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id. 
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[8] In this case, Estrada-Medina challenges his convictions under the actualevidence test, which “prohibits multiple convictions if there is ‘a reasonable 

possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the 

essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the 

essential elements of a second challenged offense.’” Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 

319, 323 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d at 53). 

Establishing a “‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same facts to reach 

two convictions requires substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. 

State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). Instead, the existence of a reasonable 

possibility “turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may have 

latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” Id. In applying this 

test, we seek “to identify the essential elements of each of the challenged crimes 

and to evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective, considering where 

relevant the jury instructions, argument of counsel, and other factors that may 

have guided the jury’s determination.” Wright v. State, 950 N.E.2d 365, 369 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

[9] On appeal, Estrada-Medina argues that his convictions violate double jeopardy 

principles because there is a reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the 

same conduct to support the criminal confinement conviction and to establish 

the force element of the rape conviction. “In addition to the instances covered 

by Richardson, ‘we have long adhered to a series of rules of statutory 

construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but 

are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson.’” Guyton v. 
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State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 

826, 830 (Ind. 2002)). One of these rules prohibits “[c]onviction and 

punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as an element of 

another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished.” Id.

(quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring)). Thus, 

if we determine that Estrada-Medina’s criminal confinement conviction is based 

on the same act that establishes the force element of his rape conviction, a 

double jeopardy violation has occurred. 

[10] “[A] person who ‘commits rape or criminal deviate conduct necessarily 

confines the victim at least long enough to complete such a forcible crime.’” 

Jacobs v. State, 2 N.E.3d 116, 122-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Gates v. State, 

759 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ind. 2001)), summarily aff’d in relevant part, 22 N.E.3d 

1286 (Ind. 2015). For criminal confinement to constitute a separate crime, 

there must be proof of force to effectuate the confinement that goes beyond that 

necessary to effectuate the rape. See Ryle v. State, 549 N.E.2d 81, 85 n.7 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. For example, in Sallee v. State, rape and criminal 

confinement convictions did not violate double jeopardy protections when, as 

the victim gave the defendant and his co-defendant a ride, the defendant pulled 

her into the backseat and would not let her out of the car despite her pleas, and 

the two defendants then took her to their house, where they repeatedly raped 

her. 777 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 

[11] On appeal, the State argues that the rape and criminal confinement convictions 

are supported by separate acts of force. Specifically, the State argues that the 
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criminal confinement was accomplished when Estrada-Medina made D.W. get 

on the ground, and “[t]he confinement necessary to effectuate the rape . . . was 

[Estrada-Medina’s] act of physically touching D.W.’s body—by lying on her or 

next to her—in order to penetrate his penis into her vagina.” Appellee’s Brief at 

10. 

[12] Assuming arguendo that a factual distinction this fine could support separate 

convictions for rape and criminal confinement, we note that such distinction 

was not argued to the jury. The charging information presented to the jury 

alleged that Estrada-Medina committed rape by knowingly or intentionally 

having sexual intercourse with D.W., a member of the opposite sex, when 

D.W. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force. See I.C. § 35-42-4-1. 

The charging information for the relevant criminal confinement charge 

provided that Estrada-Medina committed the offense by “knowingly confin[ing] 

[D.W.] without the consent of [D.W.], by making [D.W.] get on the ground.” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 24; see also I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (West, Westlaw 2013) 

(providing that a person who “confines another person without the other 

person’s consent” commits class D felony criminal confinement).3

 Thus, 

 

3

 The criminal confinement statute applicable at the time of these offenses provided that a defendant may 

commit class D felony criminal confinement in two distinct ways: either by “confin[ing] another person 

without the other person’s consent” or by “remov[ing] another person, by fraud, enticement, force, or threat 

of force, from one (1) place to another”. I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (West, Westlaw 2013); see also State v. Greene, 16 

N.E.3d 416, 419-20 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that under the previously applicable statute, “[t]wo distinct types 

of criminal confinement are encompassed: confinement by non-consensual restraint and confinement by 

forcible removal”). In this case, Estrada-Medina was charged with two counts of criminal confinement. In 

Count II, he was charged with criminal confinement by forcible removal for dragging D.W. into the laundry 

room. In closing arguments, the State conceded that no evidence had been presented to support Count II and 

that the jury should acquit Estrada-Medina on that count, which it did. In Count III, Estrada-Medina was 
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although the charging information for criminal confinement specified the 

precise act supporting the charge, the charging information for rape contained 

no similar specificity. Instead, it was in substance merely a recitation of the 

relevant language of the rape statute. The jury instructions contained no 

specific assertions as to which acts were alleged to support the force element of 

the rape and which acts were alleged to support the criminal confinement 

charge. In closing arguments, the State argued that Estrada-Medina committed 

criminal confinement by forcing D.W. to get on the ground, but it made no 

attempt to differentiate the force supporting the criminal confinement 

conviction from the force used to accomplish the rape. Indeed, the State argued 

to the jury that “[h]e puts her on the ground and then he forces her to have sex. 

That’s rape.” Transcript at 325. This may well have been construed by the jury 

as an invitation to rely on precisely the same act establishing the criminal 

confinement conviction to establish the force element of rape. Although we 

note that D.W. testified to other acts that could, at least theoretically, have been 

relied upon to establish the force element of rape—e.g., that Estrada-Medina 

blocked her exit from the laundry room and grabbed her by the throat and 

 

charged with criminal confinement by non-consensual restraint for making D.W. get on the ground, and he 

was convicted on this charge. We note, however, that with respect to Count III, the jury was instructed on 

the elements of criminal confinement by forcible removal, not non-consensual restraint. See Appellant’s 

Appendix at 154 (instructing the jury that to support a conviction for criminal confinement as charged in 

Count III, the State must prove that Estrada-Medina “removed [D.W.] by force or threat of force from one 

place to another”). Because we reverse with instructions to vacate Estrada-Medina’s criminal confinement 

conviction, we need not address any potential problems arising from this inconsistency. Regardless of 

whether Estrada-Medina was convicted of criminal confinement based on non-consensual restraint or 

forcible removal, the evidence relied upon to support the offense was the same—that is, that Estrada-Medina 

made D.W. get on the ground. 
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squeezed—the State did not present the evidence in a manner that eliminated 

the possibility that the jury would rely on the same evidence to establish both 

the criminal confinement and the force element of the rape. In other words, 

there is a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Estrada-Medina of 

criminal confinement based on the very same act it relied upon to establish the 

force element of rape. Accordingly, the convictions violate double jeopardy 

protections, and we therefore remand with instructions to vacate the criminal 

confinement conviction. Because Estrada-Medina’s convictions were ordered 

to be served concurrently, his aggregate sentence will not change. 

[13] Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions. 

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.