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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 24, 2017 

v No. 329124 

Clare Circuit Court 

LAWRENCE EDWARD REED, LC No. 11-004237-FC; 

 11-004238-FC; 

 11-004239-FC; 

 11-004240-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Lawrence Edward Reed, was convicted of several crimes that arose out of a 

series of break-ins and attempted break-ins in 2010. He appealed as of right those convictions, 

and this Court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing. People v Reed, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 21, 2014 (Docket Nos. 

308647, 308648, 308649, 308650), p 1. Specifically, this Court remanded the matter for 

resentencing because it agreed with defendant’s argument that offense variable (OV) 9 was 

incorrectly scored at ten points, an issue that the prosecution conceded on appeal. Id. at 8. On 

remand, the trial court correctly scored OV 9 at zero points and resentenced defendant 

accordingly. Defendant now appeals as of right again, raising a variety of arguments with 

respect to his convictions and sentences. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but 

remand this matter for the ministerial task of correcting the presentence investigation reports 

(PSIRs) in each lower court file. 

 On appeal, defendant’s appellate counsel argues that a remand is necessary to correct the 

PSIRs to reflect the changes made to the scoring of OV 9. We agree, and the prosecution 

concedes the same. We therefore remand this matter for the ministerial task of correcting the 

PSIRs in that regard. People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 534; 640 NW2d 314 (2001) 

(“Affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting the presentence investigation 

report.”). Defendant’s appellate counsel also argues that resentencing is again required pursuant 

to our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). 

We disagree. The only OVs that were scored on remand were OVs 13 and 16. With respect to 

OV 13, which was scored at ten points based on defendant’s pattern of felonious activity, this 

Court has previously held that a defendant’s admission or a jury’s finding of a prior conviction 
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satisfies Sixth Amendment concerns with respect to sentencing enhancements. People v Jackson 

(On Reconsideration), 313 Mich App 409, 435-436; 884 NW2d 297 (2015). Consequently, even 

if we assume that OV 16 was impermissibly scored at five points based on judicially found facts, 

defendant’s minimum guideline range would remain the same, MCL 777.65; thus, a remand is 

not required by Lockridge. Jackson, 313 Mich App at 436 (providing that a “remand is not 

required under Lockridge” when a scoring change “would not alter defendant’s guidelines

minimum sentence range.”). Relatedly, we also reject the argument that a remand is necessary to 

determine the reasonableness of defendant’s sentences. Defendant’s sentences were within the 

applicable guidelines range; consequently, his sentences are presumptively proportionate and 

reasonable under Lockridge. See People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 47-48; 880 NW2d 297 

(2015). 

 Defendant also raises several additional arguments in a pro se brief filed pursuant to 

Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4. First, he claims that he was deprived of his 

constitutional right to due process because the prosecution failed to turn over potentially 

exculpatory evidence; that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing various prosecution 

witnesses to comment on suppressed evidence; that he was deprived of his constitutional right to 

the effective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to obtain potentially 

exculpatory evidence from the prosecution, his trial counsel’s failure to secure expert testimony 

regarding false identifications, his trial counsel’s failure to call various witnesses, and his trial 

counsel’s failure to object to various instances of prosecutorial misconduct; that resentencing is 

again required pursuant to Lockridge; and that his appellate counsel’s performance constituted 

ineffective assistance because these arguments were not raised on appeal. 

 We need not address the majority of these arguments, however, because they are beyond 

the scope of defendant’s appeal after remand. People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 

477, 481; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“[W]here an appellate court remands for some limited purpose 

following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the 

scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand.”); see also People v Jones, 394 Mich 

434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (“[T]he scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope 

of the remand.”). Similarly, we also reject defendant’s argument that appellate counsel was 

ineffective in failing to raise these arguments for the same reason. People v Ericksen, 288 Mich 

App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile 

objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). While defendant’s argument 

with respect to Lockridge is within the scope, it is meritless for the reasons set forth above. We 

therefore affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

 Affirmed but remand for the ministerial task of correcting the PSIRs as indicated above. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien