Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy P. Broden

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stevonta D. Hill,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 11, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A02-1709-CR-2196

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79C01-1609-F3-35

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary

[1] Stevonta Hill (“Hill”) appeals his convictions for Count I, Conspiracy to 

Commit Robbery as a Level 3 felony;1 Count XVIII, Use of a Firearm in 

Commission of an Offense;2 and his sentence enhancement. 

[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Issues

[3] Hill raises the following two issues on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

refused to give Hill’s proffered jury instruction on 

conspiracy.

II. Whether the trial court erred when it enhanced Hill’s 

sentence pursuant to the firearms enhancement statute.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In 2014, Charles Hunter III (“Hunter”) conceived of a plan to rob the Industrial 

Federal Credit Union (“the bank”) located on Meijer Drive in Lafayette, and 

Hill, Michael Mitchell (“Mitchell”), and Ronnie Creed (“Creed”) subsequently 

agreed to rob the bank with Hunter. On August 4, 2014, Hunter borrowed a 

 

1

 Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2(a) (2014) and 35-42-5-1 (2014).

2

 I.C. § 35-50-2-11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 3 of 17

Hyundai automobile from Hill’s sister, Tahtyana Bagsby (“Bagsby”). At 

approximately 9:20 a.m. that same day, Hill, Hunter, Mitchell, and Creed 

entered the bank wearing dark clothing, masks, and gloves, and they demanded 

money from the bank employees. One of the men hit teller Maria Olivio 

(“Olivio”) on the back of her head with a handgun, causing her to “black out a 

little bit” and suffer a concussion. Tr. Vol. II at 85. Both Hill and Creed 

possessed firearms during the robbery. The bank employees gave the four men 

approximately $35,350 in cash and a dye pack with tear gas and red dye that 

looked like $1,000 in $20 bills.

[5] As the four men drove away from the bank, the dye pack exploded in the car 

and someone threw one of the bags of stolen money out of the vehicle. Hunter 

attempted to clean the red dye off the inside of the Hyundai but was not 

completely successful. He then returned the vehicle to Bagsby.

[6] The Lafayette Police Department (“LPD”) obtained still photographs from a 

surveillance video of the robbery and distributed them to LPD personnel. One 

of the LPD officers recognized Hunter in one of the still photos, and he was 

aware of Hunter’s associates, including Hill. On August 14, 2014, patrol officer 

Alvin Cudworth (“Officer Cudworth”) of the LPD was on duty and received a 

request to conduct a traffic stop of a vehicle suspected of having false plates and 

of being involved in the bank robbery. Officer Cudworth stopped the vehicle, 

which was Bagsby’s Hyundai. Hill was the driver. After discovering that the 

plates on the Hyundai were for a different vehicle, the LPD impounded the 

vehicle and obtained a search warrant. During the search of the vehicle, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 4 of 17

LPD took samples of pink-stained carpet from the vehicle and sent the samples 

to the Indiana State Police laboratory. Testing of the carpet samples revealed 

that the chemical on the stained carpet matched the chemical in the dye pack 

from the August 4 bank robbery.

[7] On August 9, 2016, Hill testified before a grand jury under a grant of use 

immunity. Hill denied involvement in the bank robbery and testified that he 

had not seen either Mitchell or Hunter on the morning of August 4, 2014. Hill 

further testified that he did not recognize any of the individuals depicted in the 

bank security video and denied knowledge of how the dye stains got into his

sister’s Hyundai. On September 17, 2016, the grand jury returned an 

indictment charging Hill with nineteen counts: conspiracy to commit robbery, 

as a Level 3 felony; robbery, as a Level 3 felony;3criminal confinement, as a 

Level 3 felony;4criminal confinement, as a Level 5 felony;5robbery, as a Level 

5 felony;6theft, as a Level 6 felony;7criminal confinement, as a Level 6 felony;8

two counts of intimidation, as Level 6 felonies;9carrying a handgun without a 

 

3

 I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a).

4

 I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a) and (b)(2).

5

 I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a) and (b)(1).

6

 I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a)(1).

7

 I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).

8

 I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a).

9

 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a) and (b)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 5 of 17

license, as a Class A misdemeanor;10 obstruction of justice, as a Level 6 felony;11

battery by means of a deadly weapon, as a Level 5 felony;12 battery resulting in 

moderate bodily injury, as a Level 6 felony;13 criminal recklessness while armed 

with a deadly weapon, as a Level 6 felony;14 pointing a firearm, as a Level 6 

felony;15 perjury, a Level 6 felony;16 pointing a firearm, as a Class A 

misdemeanor;17 intimidation, as a Class A misdemeanor;18 and use of a firearm 

during the commission of an offense. Prior to trial, the court dismissed the 

misdemeanor intimidation charge. 

[8] Hill’s trial proceeded in two phases. The first phase was tried to a jury from 

July 31, 2017 to August 2, 2017 and consisted of all charges except the firearm 

sentencing enhancement and the perjury charge. In the second phase, the latter 

charges were tried to the bench following Hill’s jury waiver as to those two 

charges. At the close of evidence, the court dismissed Count XIV, pointing a 

firearm as a Level 6 felony, per the State’s request.

 

10

 I.C. § 35-47-2-1(a)(e).

11

 I.C. § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(3).

12

 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b) and (f)(2).

13

 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b) and (d)(1).

14

 I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a) and (b)(1)(A).

15

 I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b).

16

 I.C. § 35-44.1-2-1(a)(1).

17

 I.C. § 35-47-4-3(b).

18

 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 6 of 17

[9] At trial, Hill requested that the court include one of the following two 

instructions on conspiracy:

(1) Conspiracies cannot be established by a mere suspicion. 

Evidence of mere relationship or association between the 

parties do not show a conspiracy. Johnson v. State, 1933, 208 

Ind. 89, 95, 194 N.E. 619; Kelley v. State, 1936, 210 Ind. 380, 

385, 3 N.E.2d 65; Weer v. State, 1941, 219 Ind. 217, 232, 36 

N.E.2d 787, 37 N.E.2d 537; Shonfeld v. State, 1942, 219 Ind. 

654, 666, 667, 40 N.E.2d 700; Eacock v. State, 1907, 169 Ind. 

488, 502, 82 N.E. 1039; § 10-1101, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, 

supra.

Coughlin v. State, 228 Ind. 393, 395, 92 N.E.2d 718, 719 (1950)

(2) Conspiracies cannot be established by mere suspicion, nor 

does evidence of mere relationship between parties or 

association show “conspiracy,” but there must be evidence to 

prove agreement directly or such state of facts that agreement 

may be legally inferred, though agreement need not be proved 

by direct evidence.

Johnson v. State, 208 Ind. 89, 194 N.E. 619 (1935)

Appellant’s App. at 58-59. The trial court denied Hill’s two proposed 

instructions on conspiracy because the content of those instructions was already 

contained in other jury instructions. 

[10] The jury found Hill guilty on all charges, and the trial court found Hill guilty of 

perjury and unlawful use of a firearm as an enhancement. On August 28, 2017, 

the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 7 of 17

trial court entered a judgment of conviction only on Count I, Conspiracy to 

Commit Robbery as a Level 3 felony; Count II, Robbery as a Level 3 felony; 

Count XVI, Carrying a Handgun without a License as a Class A misdemeanor; 

Count XVII, Obstruction of Justice as a Level 6 felony; Count XVIII, Use of 

Firearm in Commission of an Offense; and Count XIX, Perjury, a Level 6 

felony. The court merged the remaining charges into Count II, the robbery 

conviction. 

[11] The court sentenced Hill to twelve years imprisonment on Count I; twelve years 

on Count II; one year on Count XVI; two and a half years on Count XVII; and 

one and a half years on Count XIX. The court ordered the sentences on Counts 

I, II, and XVI to be served concurrent with one another. It ordered the 

sentences on Counts XVII and XIX to be served concurrent to one another but 

consecutive to the sentences on Counts I, II and XVI. The trial court enhanced 

the sentence on Count II by an additional term of five years based on the 

sentencing enhancement in Count XVIII. Hill’s total sentence is nineteen and a 

half years to be executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. This appeal 

ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Jury Instructions on Conspiracy Charge

[12] Hill appeals the trial court’s denial of his proposed jury instructions on the 

conspiracy to commit robbery charge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 8 of 17

Upon review of a trial court’s decision to give or refuse a jury 

instruction, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Treadway 

v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 636 (Ind. 2010) (internal citation 

omitted). “[T]his Court considers: (1) whether the instruction 

correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the 

record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether 

the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other 

instructions which are given.” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 

1144 (Ind. 2002) (internal citation omitted). Reversal arises 

“only if the appellant demonstrates that the instruction error 

prejudices his substantial rights.” Treadway, 924 N.E.2d at 636 

(internal citation omitted).

Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). Moreover, “[w]e consider 

jury instructions as a whole and in reference to each other and do not reverse 

the trial court ... unless the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as to the law 

in the case.” Albores v. State, 987 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation 

and citation omitted), trans. denied.

[13] The substance of Hill’s proposed jury instructions was contained in other final 

jury instructions the trial court gave—specifically, Court’s Instruction No. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 9 of 17

3.5700;

19 Court’s Instruction No. 2.1600;20 Court’s Instruction No. 9.0120;21 and 

Court’s Instruction No. 12.0100.

22

 So it is not surprising that Hill has failed to 

demonstrate how he was in any way prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to 

 

19

 This instruction stated, in relevant part:

A person conspires to commit a felony when, with intent to commit the felony, he agrees with 

another person to commit the felony. A conspiracy to commit a felony is a felony of the same class 

as the underlying felony. The State must allege and prove that either the person or the person with 

whom he agreed performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.

***

Count I

Before you may convict the Defendant of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery [as] a Level 5 felony, as 

charged in Count I, the State must have proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt:

1. The Defendant

2. agreed with other persons, Charles D. Hunter III, Michael A. Mitchell, and/ or unknown others, 

to commit the crime of Robbery

3. with the intent to commit the crime, and

4. Defendant and the other persons, Charles D. Hunter III, Michael A. Mitchell, and/or unknown 

others performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement ...

***

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 

Defendant not guilty of the crime of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, a Level 5 felony, charged in 

Count I.

If the State proved elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 beyond a reasonable doubt and the State further proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt that

a. a deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun, was used in the robbery or

b. the robbery resulted in bodily injury to any person other than a conspirator,

you may find the Defendant guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, a Level 3 felony, charged in 

Count I.

Appellant’s App. at 36.

20

 This instruction stated, in relevant part: “A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or 

causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.” Id. at 48.

21

 This instruction explained the meaning of the terms “intentionally” and “knowingly.” Id.

22

 This instruction explained the meaning of the terms “direct evidence” and “circumstantial evidence” and 

gave examples of each term. Id. at 52. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 10 of 17

give his proposed jury instructions. That refusal was not an abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion. Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 376.

Firearm Sentence Enhancement

[14] Hill challenges the five-year sentence enhancement the trial court entered 

pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 

(2014), the firearm enhancement statute, provides:

(a) As used in this section, “firearm” has the meaning set forth in 

IC 35-47-1-5.

(b) As used in this section, “offense” means:

(1) a felony under IC 35-42 that resulted in death or 

serious bodily injury;

(2) kidnapping; or

(3) criminal confinement as a Level 2 or Level 3 felony.

(c) The state may seek, on a page separate from the rest of a 

charging instrument, to have a person who allegedly committed 

an offense sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment 

if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person 

knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of 

the offense.

(d) If the person was convicted of the offense in a jury trial, the 

jury shall reconvene to hear evidence in the enhancement 

hearing. If the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 11 of 17

on a guilty plea, the court alone shall hear evidence in the 

enhancement hearing.

(e) If the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing 

is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used 

a firearm in the commission of the offense, the court may 

sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment 

of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.

[15] Hill was indicted with criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony, Appellant’s 

App. at 106, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that count, i.e., Count 

IV. Hill was also indicted with the use of a firearm “in the commission of 

criminal confinement as a Level 2 or Level 3 felony,” Id. at 121, and the trial 

court found him guilty on that count, i.e., Count XVIII. However, due to 

double jeopardy concerns, the trial court only entered a judgment of conviction 

on Count I (conspiracy to commit robbery), Count II (robbery), Count XVI 

(carrying a handgun without a license), Count XVII (obstruction of justice), 

Count XVIII (use of firearm in commission of an offense for purposes of 

sentence enhancement), and Count XIX (perjury). For all remaining counts, 

including Count IV (criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony), the trial court 

did not enter judgments of conviction but rather merged them with Count II 

(robbery).

[16] Hill correctly points out that Count II, robbery as a Level 3 felony, cannot 

support a firearm sentence enhancement. Count II involves robbery while 

armed with a deadly weapon or that results in bodily injury, I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a), 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 12 of 17

but the firearm enhancement statute only applies to felonies under IC 35-42 that 

result in serious bodily injury, I.C. § 35-50-2-11(b). Compare I.C. § 35-31.5-2-29 

(defining “bodily injury” as “any impairment of physical condition, including 

physical pain”), with I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292 (defining “serious bodily injury” as 

“bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious 

permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent 

or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ; 

or (5) loss of a fetus.”). The evidence shows that Hill was armed with a gun 

during the robbery and that bank teller Olivio “blacked out a little bit” and 

suffered a concussion as a result of the blow to her head with a firearm. Tr. 

Vol. II at 85. Thus, the State only charged Hill with robbery while armed with 

a deadly weapon or involving “bodily injury”—a Level 3 felony—and the 

evidence supports the finding Hill committed that offense, rather than one 

involving “serious” bodily injury. I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a). 

[17] However, the State contends that Count IV—criminal confinement as a Level 3 

felony—supported the five-year sentence enhancement pursuant to Indiana 

Code Section 35-50-2-11(b)(3), even though Count IV was merged and the trial 

court did not enter a judgment of conviction on it. The State avers that the 

language in section (e) of the firearm enhancement statute—which states that

the court may enhance a sentence if “the state has proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the 

commission of the offense”—does not require a judgment of conviction of the 

enumerated offense, only that the State prove such offense beyond a reasonable 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 13 of 17

doubt. And the State notes that it did prove Count IV beyond a reasonable 

doubt, as shown by the jury’s guilty verdict on that count.

[18] Resolution of this issue requires that we construe the meaning of Indiana Code 

Section 35-50-2-11, the firearm enhancement statute. Statutory construction 

and interpretation are matters of law and we review them de novo. E.g., Suggs 

v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). 

When construing a statute our primary goal is to ascertain the 

legislature’s intent. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.

2012). To discern that intent, we look first to the statutory 

language itself and give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning 

of statutory terms. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind.

2015). “If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible to but 

one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain 

meaning.” State v. Evans, 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004) 

(quotation omitted). However, if a statute admits of more than 

one interpretation, then it is ambiguous; and we thus resort to 

rules of statutory interpretation so as to give effect to the 

legislature’s intent. Adams, 960 N.E.2d at 798. “For example, 

we read the statute as whole, avoiding excessive reliance on a 

strict, literal meaning or the selective reading of individual 

words.” Id. And we seek to give a practical application of the 

statute by construing it in a way that favors public convenience 

and avoids an absurdity, hardship, or injustice. Merritt v. State, 

829 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. 2005). Further, criminal statutes must 

be strictly construed against the State, and “may not be enlarged 

beyond the fair meaning of the language used....” Yao v. State, 

975 N.E.2d 1273, 1279 (Ind. 2012) (internal citation omitted).

Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 14 of 17

[19] The State cites no authority—other than the language of the statute itself—for 

its contention that a sentence enhancement can be applied to a crime for which 

a defendant was not convicted. Yet it is well-settled that a sentence cannot be 

based on a jury verdict of guilty unless a judgment of conviction is entered on 

that verdict. See, e.g., Jerden v. State, 37 N.E.3d 494, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) 

(quoting Haddix v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. 

denied) (“‘A verdict is the jury’s finding of guilt, but such finding carries no legal 

consequences unless the trial court enters a judgment of conviction on the 

verdict.’”)

A verdict of guilty can certainly be a significant legal event, but 

only if a court later enters judgment on it. ... [A] verdict of guilt 

on which no judgment or sentence has been entered would not 

constitute legal grounds for incarceration. We treat the 

judgments and sentences entered by courts in a different way 

[than we treat jury verdicts alone]. 

Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind. 2001) (explaining why it was not 

necessary for double jeopardy purposes to vacate the jury’s guilty verdict on a 

lesser included offense).

[20] Moreover, the State emphasizes the “proved beyond a reasonable doubt” 

language of section (e) of the statute while ignoring section (d), which clearly 

requires a hearing on an enhancement after “the person was convicted of the 

offense.” I.C. § 35-50-2-11(d) (emphasis added). But when we interpret a 

statute, we examine the statute as a whole and “avoid interpretations that 

depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 15 of 17

disharmonizing results.” ESPN, Inc. v. University of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 

N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted). The only 

harmonious interpretation of both sections (d) and (e) of the firearm 

enhancement statute is that section (d) requires a hearing on enhancement if the 

defendant is convicted of an enumerated offense and, if the trier of fact at the 

hearing finds that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant used a firearm while engaging in the offense of which he was convicted, 

the court may enhance the sentence for the underlying offense. 

[21] Given well-settled case law, the language of the statute as a whole, and our rule 

of lenity requiring that penal statutes be construed strictly against the State, we 

reach the logical conclusion that a sentence cannot be enhanced pursuant to the 

firearm enhancement statute unless a judgment of conviction is entered against 

the defendant for one of the enumerated offenses. Therefore, Hill’s firearm 

enhancement cannot be supported by the jury verdict finding him guilty of 

criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony because the trial court did not enter a 

judgment of conviction on that verdict.

[22] The trial court improperly enhanced Hill’s robbery sentence by five years; the 

crime of robbery as a Level 3 felony cannot support a firearm sentence 

enhancement under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11, nor was there any other 

conviction that would support such an enhancement. Therefore, we must reverse 

the judgment of conviction for Count XVIII, Use of Firearm in Commission of 

an Offense, and vacate the five-year sentence enhancement entered pursuant to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 16 of 17

Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11.

23

 See e.g., Hull v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“A sentence in contravention of statutory authority 

constitutes “fundamental error” and cannot be ignored by a court of review.”). 

Conclusion

[23] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Hill’s 

proffered jury instruction on conspiracy, since the substance of that instruction 

was addressed by the other instructions the court gave the jury. Therefore, we 

affirm Hill’s conspiracy conviction under Count I. However, the trial court 

erred in enhancing Hill’s sentence by five years under the firearm enhancement 

statute because Hill was not convicted of any offense that would support such 

an enhancement. Thus, we reverse the judgment of conviction for Count XVIII 

and vacate the five-year sentence enhancement entered pursuant to Indiana 

Code Section 35-50-2-11. 

 

23

 The State has provided us with no authority for its request that we vacate the robbery conviction—a 

perfectly legal judgment—for the sole purpose of ordering the trial court to enter judgment of conviction on a 

jury verdict on a different charge—i.e., criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony—that would support a 

firearm enhancement. Unlike in Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1225 (Ind. 2015), cited by the State, we have 

no double jeopardy violation to remedy here as there are not two convictions involving the same evidence, 

but only one conviction (robbery) and one jury verdict (criminal confinement). And, as we have already 

noted, a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a 

sentence, is “unproblematic” as far as double jeopardy is concerned. Carter, 750 N.E.2d at 781. 

In short, if the State wanted Hill’s sentence enhanced for use of a firearm, it should have requested that the 

trial court enter judgment on a charge that would support such an enhancement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1709-CR-2196 | April 11, 2018 Page 17 of 17

[24] Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.