1

Filed 4/28/15 In re S.M. CA4/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re S.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

S.M., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 E061464 

 (Super.Ct.No. J253927) 

 OPINION 

 APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin, 

Judge. Affirmed. 

 Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, and Christopher P. 

Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

 The trial court sustained a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) 

after finding true the allegation that defendant and appellant S.M. (minor) possessed 

marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The court deemed the offense a felony 

and ordered minor to be placed in the custody of her grandmother, subject to certain 

probation terms.1

 On appeal, minor argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress 

evidence. While she makes no challenge to the finding that she possessed marijuana, 

minor also contends insufficient evidence supports the allegation that she possessed it for 

sale. We discern no error and affirm the adjudication order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 19, 2014, David Wibert, an officer with the Fontana school police 

department was on duty in a marked patrol car. While near a high school at 

approximately 1:15 p.m., he saw a pickup truck with an object hanging from the rearview 

mirror. Through the truck’s tinted rear window, Officer Wibert could see the object 

hanging about 13 inches below the mirror near the center of the windshield. It “was 

swaying back and forth, black in color.” Officer Wibert “could tell that it was a string,” 

but he could not recall “what the details entailed.” 

 When he saw the truck, Officer Wibert was 15 to 20 feet behind it. He was 

concerned that the object could distract the driver or obstruct the driver’s view of 

 1 Minor does not challenge the trial court’s dispositional orders on appeal. 
3

pedestrians. His concern was heightened because school was letting out, the nearby 

crosswalk had no signals, and “kids do cross back and forth.” Officer Wibert testified 

that he had personally seen that “even . . . the smallest object” can obstruct a driver’s 

view. The fact that this particular object was swinging caused him additional concern 

regarding visibility. He could not estimate what percentage of the windshield might be 

impeded by the object. Instead, he explained that, “swaying back and forth it could 

obstruct any amount of length back and forth.” 

 Because he concluded the object hanging from the mirror might cause a violation 

of Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(2)2 (Vehicle Code section 26708(a)(2)), 

Officer Wibert activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop. As he approached the 

vehicle, he saw a male driver3 and a female passenger. At the jurisdictional hearing, 

Officer Wibert identified the passenger as minor. After the driver indicated he did not 

have a driver’s license, Officer Wibert asked him to step outside the truck. As the driver 

exited the vehicle, he handed Officer Wibert a “small Ziploc baggie” of marijuana. The 

baggie had been on the driver’s lap when Officer Wibert approached the truck.

 Officer Wibert called for assistance. Other police officers, including Amanda 

 2 This provision reads: “A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any 

object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle 

that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows.” 

3 The driver was declared a ward of the court on April 8, 2014. He is not a party 

to this appeal. 
4

Liabeuf and Andres Garcia, arrived at the scene within five minutes. Officer Wibert 

asked minor to remain in the vehicle while he interacted with the driver. 

 The driver was exiting the truck when Officer Liabeuf arrived. Officer Wibert 

told Officer Liabeuf the driver had handed him a bag of marijuana. Officer Liabeuf 

performed a patdown search of minor “[f]or safety reasons.”4 During this interaction, 

Officer Liabeuf asked minor “if she had anything on her,” and she answered in the 

negative. However, as the patdown search continued minor said “she was going for some 

marijuana or some drugs” and pulled something out of her waistband. The item minor 

retrieved was “[o]ne big baggie” with a pipe and four smaller bags inside. Officer 

Liabeuf concluded that each of the small bags contained “a useable quantity” of 

marijuana. Minor told Officer Liabeuf that she hid the marijuana in her waistband 

because she “got scared” when Officer Wibert initiated the traffic stop. 

 To obtain help with searching the vehicle for marijuana or other drugs, Officer 

Liabeuf requested assistance from a canine officer. The dog provided a positive alert 

near the front of the vehicle. Officer Liabeuf conducted a search and found another 

baggie of marijuana in the center console of the truck. She was advised that another 

 4 It appears minor had not been Mirandized (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 

436) before the patdown search. After a voir dire examination of Officer Liabeuf, the 

trial court concluded that minor had not yet been taken into custody, such that no 

Miranda warnings were required. 
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officer found yet another bag of marijuana above the visor.5 Someone sitting in the front 

passenger seat would have had access to both of these bags of marijuana. 

 Another investigating officer, Andres Garcia, helped search the vehicle. He 

located another bag of marijuana “up top” in the sunglasses compartment in the center of 

the vehicle. Officer Garcia did not find any drugs or money on the passenger side of the 

truck. However, he found five $1 bills in the visor on the driver’s side. He also found 

$254 in the driver’s wallet. 

 Officers took minor and the driver into custody and had the vehicle towed. Minor 

and the driver indicated they had recently smoked marijuana, so Officer Liabeuf 

transported them to the hospital for medical clearance. 

 On May 7, 2014, the trial court conducted a jurisdictional hearing and also heard a 

motion to suppress evidence by minor. Officers Wibert, Liabeuf, and Garcia testified to 

the facts recited ante. 

 In addition, Officer Liabeuf opined that minor possessed marijuana with an intent 

to sell it. She acknowledged that minor had no money, empty baggies or sheets showing 

balances owed. Minor also had no phone, purse or backpack with her. Unlike the driver, 

 5 Officer Liabeuf emphasized that she did not find this bag of marijuana. She 

“was told” the bag was found “above the visor,” but it appears this is the bag of 

marijuana that Officer Garcia found in the sunglasses compartment, which he described 

as being in the center of the vehicle. An item in the middle of the vehicle would be closer 

to the passenger seat than one on the driver’s side. Therefore, Officer Liabeuf’s slight 

error in describing where Officer Garcia located another bag of marijuana does not 

weaken her conclusion that the bag of marijuana that Officer Garcia found was within 

minor’s reach. 
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minor said nothing about intending to sell marijuana. However, the following factors 

nevertheless indicated to Officer Liabeuf that minor had the intent to sell marijuana: 

first, the driver told investigating officers that he planned to sell each baggie of marijuana 

for $5. Also, the driver and minor were dating each other. According to the training 

Officer Liabeuf had received, the marijuana minor gave her was in “the type of 

packaging . . . commonly used for the sales of controlled substances.” Officer Liabeuf 

also emphasized that each of the bags held the same amount of marijuana. She also noted 

that money was found in the vehicle, although she could not recall specifics about how 

much or in what denominations. 

 For his part, Officer Garcia concluded that a sale had occurred shortly before the 

traffic stop. This was in part because the driver had a bag of marijuana on his lap when 

Officer Wibert stopped the truck. Also, it appeared the driver had not moved the money 

from the visor to his wallet yet. Like Officer Liabeuf, Officer Garcia noted that there 

were multiple packages of marijuana in the vehicle. Finally, Officer Garcia testified that 

sellers of marijuana often use marijuana, and that they often resort to selling drugs to be 

able to afford the drugs they personally use. 

 A criminalist, Darci Fullner, gave additional testifimony at the jurisdictional 

hearing. In connection with the investigation in this case, she received two envelopes, 

one of which held four baggies containing “dried green plant material” and the other of 

which held three baggies of a similar material. Fullner tested the material and concluded 

that it was marijuana. 
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 After the presentation of testimony summarized ante, the trial court took up 

minor’s motion to suppress evidence. It found the traffic stop and patdown search were 

constitutional. Consequently, the court denied the motion to suppress. 

 Minor was the final witness at the jurisdictional hearing. She testified to the 

following facts: 

 Minor and the driver were dating at the time of the incident. The driver picked 

minor up from school on that day at approximately 1:00 p.m. After he retrieved minor, 

the driver sat in the vehicle with her “[r]ight in front of the school.” They smoked two to 

four bowls of marijuana there. Minor did not have a pipe or any marijuana on her when 

she was at school that day. Rather, the driver had provided both to her after school. 

Even after school, minor did not buy any marijuana from the driver; instead, he shared 

some with her because they were dating. 

 The driver did not have a bag of marijuana on his lap when the officer first 

approached the vehicle. Instead, he had a knife in his lap, which he handed to Officer 

Wibert. The driver had already removed “the whole baggie that had the little ones inside 

of it” from his pocket and handed it to minor. Minor also had the “piece” (i.e. the pipe). 

She became scared so she put the marijuana and the pipe in her pants. 

 At the time, minor thought the driver had given her “all of the marijuana.” There 

were four little bags inside one bigger bag, but this was how the driver always acquired 

marijuana when he bought it. Minor had never seen the driver get money for marijuana 

or accompanied him when he bought marijuana. As far as she knew, “he just had it and 
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he was sharing it.” Minor did not think the baggies the driver gave her were for sale. 

Once the driver handed over the marijuana, minor thought it belonged to her. She 

intended to smoke it, but not to sell it. 

 On the day of the incident, minor did not know that the driver was selling 

marijuana. In fact, she continued to think he was not selling marijuana at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing. The reason the driver had money was because he did construction 

work for his father. Also, the driver told minor he had no marijuana on him other than 

what they were smoking. 

 At the close of evidence, the trial court found minor’s explanation regarding what 

happened was not credible. The court noted minor claimed to have been smoking 

marijuana in the truck immediately before the traffic stop, but no officer mentioned 

seeing or smelling smoke. In addition, no officer mentioned a knife, and the number of 

bags of marijuana submitted to the criminalist for testing only matched the facts 

presented if the driver had a bag of marijuana rather than a knife on his lap. The trial 

court found minor had possessed marijuana for sale and sustained the wardship petition. 

ANALYSIS 

 On appeal, minor argues first that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 

suppress evidence because there was no evidence showing that Officer Wibert had a 

reasonable suspicion that the item hanging from the rearview mirror amounted to a 

Vehicle Code violation. We disagree and find Officer Wibert’s testimony contained 

specific, articulable facts establishing that the driver was engaging in criminal activity. 
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Minor also attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that she 

intended to sell marijuana. We again disagree, this time because substantial, if 

circumstantial, evidence supports the jurisdictional finding. 

1. The trial court properly denied minor’s suppression motion 

 Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A), allows a defendant to move for 

suppression of evidence on grounds including that a warrantless search or seizure was 

unreasonable. “If the initial stop of [an] automobile was unlawful, then all subsequent 

observations of the officers and contraband secured in a search following an arrest which 

flows from those observations must be suppressed as more pieces of forbidden fruit from 

that familiar grove of poisonous trees. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 

471.)” (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 598, fn. 4 (Leyba).) In the first portion of 

this opinion, we therefore consider the constitutionality of Officer Wibert’s stopping the 

truck on the suspicion that the item hanging from the rearview mirror violated the 

Vehicle Code. 

 “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining 

officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be 

involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; see In re 

Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303, 307.) A traffic violation need not have actually 

occurred before a traffic stop can be lawful; rather, the test is whether the detaining 

officer had “a reasonable suspicion that any traffic violation has occurred, even if it is 
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ultimately determined that no violation did occur.” (Brierton v. Department of Motor 

Vehicles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 510, italics in original.) In fact, the purpose of a 

warrantless traffic stop when the detaining officer suspects a driver or passenger is 

engaged in criminal activity is to investigate and determine whether a violation of the law 

has in fact occurred. (Leyba, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 599.) 

 “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view 

the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express 

or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We 

independently review the trial court's application of the law to the facts. [Citation.]” 

(People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969.) 

 In this case, Officer Wibert decided to stop the truck in which minor was a 

passenger because he saw an object hanging from the rearview mirror and thought it 

might disrupt the driver’s view enough to cause a violation of Vehicle Code section 

26708(a)(2). The object was long enough to extend more than a foot below the rearview 

mirror, and it was substantial enough that Officer Wibert could see it through a tinted rear 

window from 15 to 20 feet away. In addition, the object was in motion, which means it 

could have obstructed a large portion of the windshield as it moved from side to side. 

Officer Wibert testified that he had personally experienced how even very small items 

may obstruct a driver’s view. Given this experience, he was especially concerned about 

the ability of the truck’s driver to see clearly because school had just let out. Officer 

Wibert, who was employed by a school district, knew that students tended to “walk out in 
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the roadway.” Even when they used the crosswalk, there was a risk that a driver would 

not see them because the crosswalk was not controlled by any traffic signals. Because 

the object was moving, Officer Wibert feared it might “obstruct the view of a kid maybe 

riding a bicycle, not paying attention to what they are doing.” 

 Officer Wibert’s testimony to the facts described above constitutes substantial 

evidence supporting the finding that he reasonably thought the object might “obstruct[] or 

reduce[] the driver’s clear view through the windshield.” (Veh. Code, § 26708(a)(2).) At 

the very least, his suspicion was reasonable enough that he was justified in stopping the 

truck to investigate. 

 Minor argues this case is on point with People v. White (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 

636 (White). That opinion reversed a trial court order denying suppression motions by 

defendants charged with marijuana-related offenses. (Id. at p. 639.) The defendants were 

arrested after an officer with the California Highway Patrol noticed a tree-shaped air 

freshener hanging from the rearview mirror of the car one of the defendants was driving. 

(Id. at pp. 640-641.) “The air freshener remained in a stationary position while the 

officer followed the . . . vehicle.” (Id. at p. 641.) The officer never testified that he 

thought the air freshener actually obstructed the driver’s view. (Id. at p. 642.) He also 

“never testified to other specific and articulable facts, like hesitant or erratic driving, that 

might suggest the driver’s clear view was impeded.” (Ibid.) In contrast, the defense 

presented expert testimony that the air freshener covered less than .05 percent of the 

windshield, and that it would not obstruct the view of a six-foot-tall driver. (Ibid.) 
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Furthermore, the vehicle’s driver testified that the air freshener did not in fact obstruct his 

view. (Ibid.) 

White is distinguishable on multiple grounds. First, the object hanging from the 

rearview mirror in this case swayed back and forth, while the air freshener in White was 

stationary. Minor makes no attempt to explain why an object that moved would not 

increase the extent to which the driver’s visual field was obstructed. Second, Officer 

Wibert explicitly testified that he thought the object could impair the driver’s view, while 

the officer in White made no such statement. Officer Wibert even gave several reasons, 

including his personal experiences with the visual disruption caused by even small item, 

why he thought the object hanging from the rearview mirror violated Vehicle Code 

section 26708(a)(2). Finally, minor in this case, unlike the defendants in White, 

presented no evidence that the object did not actually impede the driver’s view. 

 Minor complains Officer Wibert, like the officer in White, never testified to facts 

showing that the driver’s view was actually affected by the hanging object, such as 

hesitant or erratic driving. While the White court indicated testimony to this effect would 

have been helpful, nothing in the opinion suggests that such a showing is necessary 

before a traffic stop can be found lawful when the stop was made on the ground that the 

driver’s view through the windshield is impaired. Also, in White the other evidence the 

People presented failed to show that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the air 

freshener obstructed the driver’s view. Here, for the reasons set forth ante the evidence 

does support such a finding. 
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 Minor makes much of Officer Wibert’s testimony that the object he saw was “a 

string.” Because strings are likely to be extremely thin, minor reasons the evidence 

cannot support a reasonable suspicion that the string sufficiently obstructed the driver’s 

view. As a threshold matter, we question whether Officer Wibert really meant that he 

saw a string and only a string. After indicating he “could tell that it was a string,” Officer 

Wibert continued by saying, “I can’t remember exactly what . . . the details entailed.” 

We have some difficulty imaging what other “details” might be inherent in a string, and 

we wonder how a string with nothing suspended from it would have sufficient mass to 

sway back and forth as the car moved. However, even if Officer Wibert meant that all he 

saw was a string, this would not foreclose a finding that the object could have obstructed 

the driver’s vision. After all, the “string” was thick enough that it was visible at a 

distance and through a tinted rear window. 

 More significant is that even something as thin as a crack in a windshield may 

provide reasonable cause to stop a vehicle on the ground that a Vehicle Code violation 

was occurring. (See Veh. Code, § 26710 [“It is unlawful to operate any motor vehicle 

upon a highway when the windshield or rear window is in such a defective condition as 

to impair the driver’s vision either to the front or rear.”]; see also People v. Vibanco

(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [cracked windshield justified investigatory traffic stop]; 

People v. Miller (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 221, 224 [traffic stop was reasonable because 

cracked windshield was “unlawful”]; and People v. Superior Court (1968) 266 

Cal.App.2d 685, 689-690 [cracked windshield may impair visibility].) 
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 For each of these reasons, substantial evidence supports the finding that Officer 

Wibert had specific, articulable reasons for suspecting that the driver of the truck was 

violating Vehicle Code section 26708(a)(2). The trial court therefore properly denied 

minor’s motion to suppress evidence. 

2. Substantial evidence supports the judgment 

In reviewing minor’s claim that proof of an essential element was lacking, “we 

must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.) 

In the course of this inquiry, we “ ‘ “presume in support of the judgment the existence of 

every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

We remain mindful that, “A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a 

witness’s credibility.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) 

Even when the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, the standard of 

review is the same. (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) “ ‘ “If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing 

court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding 

does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 

Cal.3d 919, 933.) 

 To prove that minor possessed marijuana for sale, the People must show that “the 

defendant possessed the contraband with the intent of selling it and with knowledge of 
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both its presence and illegal character.” (People v. Meza (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 

1745-1746.) Intent to sell marijuana may be established by circumstantial evidence. 

(People v. Harris (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 371, 374.) “ ‘In cases involving possession of 

marijuana and heroin, it is settled that an officer with experience in the narcotics field 

may give his opinion that the narcotics are held for purposes of sale based upon matters 

such as quantity, packaging, and the normal use of an individual.’ ” (People v. Dowl

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 1079, 1084 (Dowl).) 

Minor in this case handed Officer Liabeuf a bag containing four smaller bags of 

marijuana. Each of the four bags held approximately the same quantity, and the 

packaging of each quantity was similar. In fact, Officer Liabeuf testified that the 

marijuana that had been in minor’s pants was in “the type of packaging . . . commonly 

used for the sales of controlled substances.” In addition, Officer Liabeuf located another 

bag of marijuana in the center console, which was in minor’s reach when she was in the 

passenger seat. From this location, minor could have reached even the bag of marijuana 

that was in the sunglasses compartment in the center of the truck. Also, although minor 

did not admit intending to sell the bags of marijuana, the driver did. Because the driver 

was minor’s boyfriend, they were in the same vehicle, and they both possessed 

marijuana, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that the driver and minor 

intended to sell marijuana together. In short, substantial evidence supports the finding 

that minor intended to sell at least some of the marijuana she possessed. 
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 Minor insists this conclusion cannot follow, in part because she had no money or 

balance sheets in her possession. However, her boyfriend had $254 in his wallet, and an 

additional $5 in singles was found in the driver’s-side visor. If minor and her boyfriend 

were jointly selling marijuana, we see no reason why they would not have decided that 

only one of them would hold the proceeds of their sales. Since minor indicated the driver 

was the only member of the couple who bought marijuana, he would be the logical one to 

choose to hold their funds. As for pay-owe sheets, these are unnecessary if the driver and 

minor only accepted cash as payment for marijuana. (See Dowl, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 

p. 1261 [expert testimony that balance sheets are unnecessary if all marijuana sales are in 

cash].) The presence of cash in the visor and the driver’s wallet indicates that at least 

some of the customers did, in fact, pay in cash. 

 Minor also makes much of her own testimony that she did not intend to sell 

marijuana, did not think the driver was selling marijuana, and did not know the truck 

contained any marijuana other than what she and the driver had been smoking. 

Moreover, minor’s emphasis on her testimony that she and the driver had been smoking 

marijuana implies that the marijuana the police seized was for personal use rather than for 

sale. We note, however, that the trial court explicitly found minor’s story to be not 

credible. We will not undermine this determination on appeal. In particular, we, like the 

trial court, wonder why none of the three officers who testified mentioned the smell of 

marijuana smoke emanating from the truck. If minor had been smoking marijuana in the 
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15 minutes in between getting picked up from school and the traffic stop, it is difficult to 

see how no odor would have been present. 

 “To be sure, [minor] offered explanations for some of the[] circumstances 

[surrounding the offense], but the [court] did not have to believe them.” (Dowl, supra, 57 

Cal.4th at p. 1092.) It did not and instead made an explicit finding that minor was not 

credible. We affirm the jurisdictional order because substantial evidence from witnesses 

other than minor supports the judgment. 

DISPOSITION 

 The trial court’s jurisdictional order is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

RAMIREZ 

 P. J. 

We concur: 

McKINSTER 

 J. 

KING 

 J.