1The Honorable Mary Ann L. Medler, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-1239EM

_____________

Raymond Russell, *

*

Appellant, * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court

v. * for the Eastern District

* of Missouri.

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of *

Social Security Administration, * [Not to be Published]

*

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: September 7, 1999

 Filed: September 16, 1999

___________

Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Raymond Russell sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income, alleging disability from arthritis in his neck, shoulders, and hands. Russell now

appeals the District Court’s1 grant of summary judgment affirming the Commissioner’s

decision to deny him benefits.
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Having carefully reviewed the record, taking into consideration evidence in the

record that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s final decision, we

conclude the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the

Commissioner. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1999). We believe

the ALJ’s findings were in conformity with Polaksi v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322

(8th Cir. 1984). As required, the ALJ expressly discredited Russell’s subjective

complaints of pain, noting, inter alia, Russell’s normal appearance and demeanor at the

hearing and interview, his failure consistently to seek medical attention, and his work

and earnings record. See Long v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989) (ALJ

must expressly discredit claimant, giving legally sufficient reasons; observations that

claimant demonstrated no evidence of impairment during hearing included as one of

legally sufficient reasons); see also Johnston v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir.

1994) (failure to seek medical attention is inconsistent with subjective complaints of

pain); McClees v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 301, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (Polaksi supports, indeed

compels, consideration of such factors as claimant’s prior, spotty work record).

Although the ability to do light household tasks does not necessarily preclude a

finding of disability, see Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1996),

Russell’s reliance on his daily activities to support his subjective complaints of pain is

misplaced. Painting the garage, adjusting the carburetor, and watering outside plants,

particularly in light of Russell’s claims of carpal tunnel and upper extremity arthritis,

are inconsistent with his complaints of disabling upper extremity pain. Cf. Johnston,

42 F.3d at 451 (daily activities of reading, watching TV, driving, gardening, grocery

shopping, cooking, washing dishes, and visiting with children are inconsistent with

complaints of disabling pain).

We believe that the record supports the ALJ’s assessment of Russell’s alleged

mental impairment, as the ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form

(PRTF) and specifically addressed Russell’s depression, finding it not to be a severe

impairment. Russell did not claim depression before the hearing; he saw a psychiatrist
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twice within six weeks prior to the hearing, canceling his last appointment; and there

was no evidence of further treatment. See Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821

(8th Cir. 1992) (ALJ properly followed procedure; and despite consulting physician’s

diagnosis of depression from anxiety, there was substantial evidence to support ALJ’s

finding that claimant’s affective disorder was not severe); see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520a(d)(1)(i), (iii) (1998) (“[ALJ] may complete [PRTF] without the assistance

of a medical advisor”; “where the issue of a mental impairment arises for the first time

at the [ALJ] hearing level, the [ALJ] may decide to remand the case to the State agency

for completion of the [PRTF] and a new determination” (emphasis added)).

We do not believe that the consulting physician’s opinion was given undue

weight. The record shows the ALJ based his findings on all the medical evidence, and

the consulting physician’s opinion did not conflict with other medical evidence, except

that he questioned the previous diagnosis of upper-extremity radiculopathy. Also, later

radiology reports were not accompanied by clinical notations evidencing any symptoms

or treatment related to these supposedly significant findings. Cf.Thompson v. Sullivan,

957 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1992) (ALJ erred in relying on consulting physician’s

opinion to the exclusion of other evidence; opinion of consulting physician who

examined claimant once generally does not constitute substantial evidence, particularly

when contradicted by other evidence).

Finally, we reject Russell’s argument that denying him benefits violates the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys.

Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1999) (Social Security Act provides monetary benefits

to disabled individuals who are insured; ADA prohibits covered employers from

discriminating against individuals with disabilities). 

Accordingly, we affirm.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.