United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 11, 2020 

Decided May 12, 2020 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2160 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 

v. 

JOSEPH HAZLEY, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-CR-00430(1) 

Sharon Johnson Coleman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Joseph Hazley was convicted by a jury of six sex-trafficking counts related to his 

recruitment of two women and a minor girl into prostitution in 2016. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1591(a)–(c), 1594(c), 2421(a). The district court sentenced him to a within-guidelines 

term of 384 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 7 years’ supervised release. 

Hazley appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and 

moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Hazley has not 

responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears 

thorough, we limit our review to the issues that he raises. See United States v. Bey, 

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-2160 Page 2 

Counsel first considers whether the district court may have violated Hazley’s 

Fourth Amendment rights by allowing the government to introduce evidence of 

location data gleaned from cell-tower records to show that he drove from Illinois to 

Ohio to recruit a woman forcibly into prostitution. See Carpenter v. United States, 

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). But even if we assume that Hazley’s failure to challenge the 

admission of this data amounted to a forfeiture (rather than a waiver), see United States 

v. Dridi, 952 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2020), we agree with counsel that an appellate 

challenge would be frivolous. The jury acquitted Hazley of the charge related to the 

Ohio trip, so any error in admitting the evidence would not have affected the verdict 

and would therefore be harmless. See United States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 481–82 

(7th Cir. 2020). 

 Counsel next considers whether Hazley could challenge the district court’s 

denial of his post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial based on insufficiency of the 

evidence, and correctly concludes that he could not. On appeal, we would view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and reverse only if the record 

was “devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cooper, 767 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

United States v. Johnson, 729 F.3d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2013)). And here, ample evidence 

supported each of the six counts of conviction. 

To start, a rational jury could conclude from the evidence that Hazley trafficked a 

minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). To prove this charge, the government needed to show 

that Hazley enticed a minor to engage in a commercial sex act either after learning of 

her age, recklessly disregarding it, or having the “reasonable opportunity to observe” 

her. Id. § 1591(c); COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., PATTERN 

CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., at 512 (2012), www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ 

pattern-jury-instructions/Pattern_Criminal_Jury_Instructions_2012ed_includes_2015-

2019_changes.pdf; see United States v. Wearing, 865 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, 

the jury could rely on witness testimony to support each of these elements. Witnesses 

stated that for about a month in 2016, Hazley lived with a 16-year-old girl whom he 

daily escorted to 5 to 6 “dates” (appointments for commercial sex). One witness added 

that she and the minor went on dates together a few times at Hazley’s behest. 

Corroborating the witness account were advertisements for commercial sex posted on 

Backpage.com (an online classified-advertising forum)—generated from Hazley’s 

computer and featuring photos of both the witness and the minor. As for Hazley’s 

awareness of the girl’s status as a minor, multiple witnesses testified that she appeared 

or acted younger than eighteen, and one stated that she asked for the girl’s 
No. 19-2160 Page 3 

identification in Hazley’s presence, but he escorted her out before the girl could answer. 

From these facts, a jury could conclude that Hazley had a reasonable opportunity to 

observe the minor, as well as the sufficient mens rea for this offense. See United States 

v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) cert. denied 140 S. Ct. 875 (2020) (defendant 

had “reasonable opportunity to observe” victim when they lived together for about two 

months). 

Next, a reasonable jury could conclude that Hazley was part of a conspiracy to 

traffic the girl. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). To prove this charge, the government had to show 

that a plan to traffic a minor existed and that Hazley joined it with an intent to help 

carry it out. PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS at 70. Here, the jury could rely on a 

co-defendant’s testimony that he introduced the minor to Hazley based on Hazley’s 

offer to give him a “finder’s fee” for bringing him women who wanted to “make 

money.” See United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 492–93 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding 

RICO conspiracy charge based on cooperating witness testimony that he acted at 

defendant’s direction). 

Sufficient evidence also could support the four remaining counts—each of which 

alleged that Hazley “transported” an adult woman through interstate commerce for the 

purpose of engaging her in commercial sex acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). For each count, 

the government needed to show that Hazley took the woman across state lines, and that 

he intended for her to engage in prostitution at the time of the trip. PATTERN CRIM. JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS at 690. Here, the victim herself testified that in late October and 

November 2016, Hazley drove her from Illinois to Indiana three times to set up dates 

for her in Indianapolis. Her testimony was corroborated by posts on Backpage.com 

featuring her photo and advertising her availability for dates in Indianapolis—posts 

that, she attested, were made by Hazley. Then, upon bringing her back to Illinois after 

these trips, Hazley set up more dates for her using Backpage.com. Because each leg of 

each trip could count as a separate violation of § 2421, a jury reasonably could conclude 

from this evidence that Hazley violated the statute at least four times. See United States 

v. Haslage, 853 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2017) (crime begins when “defendant set[s] out 

with the intent to cross a state line and commit the crime”); see also United States 

v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2010) (§ 2421 transportation need not be for 

sole purpose of prostitution). 

Finally, counsel considers whether Hazley could make any nonfrivolous 

challenge to his sentence and correctly concludes that he could not. First, Hazley’s 

384-month prison term did not exceed the statutory-maximum sentence of life 
No. 19-2160 Page 4 

imprisonment, so he could not argue that it violated the law. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(b), 

1594(c). Second, the court properly calculated a guidelines range of 324 to 405 months’ 

imprisonment based on an offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I. 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. This calculation appropriately included (over Hazley’s objection) 

an enhancement for the use of a computer because he created online advertisements for 

commercial sex with a minor. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B); United States v. McMillian, 

777 F.3d 444, 449–50 (7th Cir. 2015). Third, counsel rightly concludes that Hazley could 

not challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence because the court 

considered thoroughly the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): In justifying the 

sentence, the court highlighted the seriousness of the offense (Hazley exploited his 

victims’ immaturity and put them in harm’s way); Hazley’s personal characteristics 

(that he grew up without a father and that his incarceration would leave two of his own 

children behind); and the probability that Hazley would be less likely to reoffend upon 

release because he then would be of advanced age. 

We therefore GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.