1 

16-2425-cv 

Arroyo v. City of New York, et al. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 21st day of March, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

Circuit Judges,

WILLIAM K. SESSIONS III, 

 District Judge.*

 

SANTIA ARROYO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 16-2425-cv 

v. 

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL 

A. VEGA (official and individual capacity), POLICE 

OFFICER WANDA PEREZ (individual capacity), 

Defendants-Appellees.

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Garry Pogil, New York, NY. 

 

*

 Judge William K. Sessions III, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, 

sitting by designation. 
2 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Deborah A. Brenner and Daniel MatzaBrown, of Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, 

Corporation Counsel for the City of New 

York, New York, NY. 

Appeal from a July 11, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-appellant Santia Arroyo sued defendants-appellees the City of New York (the 

“City”) and New York Police Department Officers Michael A. Vega and Wanda Perez (the 

“Officers”) for various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law. Arroyo’s claims arise from 

her interactions with the Officers on December 20, 2011, her subsequent detention for mental 

health treatment, and her arrest for possession of a firearm. On July 8, 2016, the District Court 

granted the defendants’ motion of summary judgment on all claims and denied Arroyo’s motion for 

partial summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history of this case, and the issues on appeal. 

 “[W]e review de novo a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure], construing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Willey 

v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015). “Summary judgment is required where ‘the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.’” Rodriguez v. Vill. Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 39 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Applying this standard, we affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by the 

District Court in its thorough decision. 

A. False Arrest 

Arroyo first argues that the District Court erred by granting the Officers summary judgment 

on her false arrest claim. The District Court granted summary judgment on the ground that the 

Officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Among other things, Arroyo argues that the Officers 

were not entitled to qualified immunity, that they lacked probable cause to remove her from her 

home to Metropolitan Hospital pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) § 9.41, and 

that the Officers lacked probable cause to then arrest her at the hospital for criminal possession of a 

firearm. We disagree. 

“Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably 

trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a 
3 

crime.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if 

an officer makes an arrest without probable cause, “[t]he defense of qualified immunity shields law 

enforcement officers from § 1983 claims for money damages provided that their conduct does not 

violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been 

aware.” Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 

context of § 1983 actions for false arrest, “an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity so 

long as arguable probable cause was present when the arrest was made.” Id. at 100 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A police officer has arguable probable cause “if either (a) it was 

objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of 

reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Zalaski v. City of 

Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “an 

arresting officer will find protection under the defense of qualified immunity unless no reasonably 

competent officer could have concluded, based on the facts known at the time of arrest, that 

probable cause existed.” Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We agree with the District Court that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on 

Arroyo’s false arrest claim because they had arguable probable cause. First, the Officers had arguable 

probable cause to remove Arroyo from her home pursuant to MHL § 9.41. Under MHL § 9.41, a 

police officer “may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting 

. . . herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” As the 

District Court noted, the Officers (1) received a 911 call from an identified caller reporting possible 

elder abuse and stating that Arroyo was bipolar; (2) spoke with an identified source (the supervisor 

of Arroyo’s mother’s home attendant) with knowledge of Arroyo’s conduct who indicated that 

Arroyo was threatening to her mother and kept a gun at home;1

 (3) observed Arroyo acting in an 

erratic and unresponsive manner; and (4) spoke to Arroyo’s mother, who expressed that she was not 

permitted to leave her bedroom. With these facts taken together, a reasonable officer could have 

found that probable cause existed to remove Arroyo to a hospital under MHL § 9.41. 

Second, the Officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Arroyo at the hospital for gun 

possession. At the time she was arrested, the Officers had heard from the supervisor of Arroyo’s 

mother’s home attendant that Arroyo kept a gun at home, and Officer Vega had discovered a gun in 

Arroyo’s purse.2

 The fact that the gun was later suppressed does not preclude a determination that 

 

1

 Arroyo contends that the police should not have relied on the information provided by the 

attendant’s supervisor to make an arrest because she lacked personal knowledge of Arroyo’s mental 

state. A finding of probable cause, however, “may be based on hearsay.” United States v. Walsh, 712 

F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

2

 Arroyo argues that there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether Officer Vega found a gun in 

Arroyo’s purse. For the reasons stated by the District Court, we find that there is no genuine dispute 
4 

there was arguable probable cause for the arrest. See Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d 

Cir. 1999) (“Victims of unreasonable searches or seizures . . . cannot be compensated [under § 1983] 

for injuries that result from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal 

prosecution.”). 

B. Malicious Prosecution 

Arroyo next contends that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment to the 

Officers on her § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. As with § 1983 false arrest claims, qualified 

immunity precludes § 1983 malicious prosecution claims where there was arguable probable cause. 

See Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed 

above, the District Court properly held that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on 

Arroyo’s malicious prosecution claim. 

C. Excessive Force 

Arroyo next seeks to reinstate her § 1983 excessive force claim based on her arrest and 

handcuffing at Metropolitan Hospital. To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendants’ use of force was objectively unreasonable “in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We agree with the District Court that, even assuming one of the 

Officers handcuffed Arroyo, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her 

handcuffing involved excessive force. Arroyo alleged no physical injury and never asked for the 

handcuffs to be removed. Accordingly, the District Court did not err by granting summary judgment 

to the defendants on Arroyo’s excessive force claim. 

D. Municipal Liability 

Arroyo also argues that the District Court erred by granting the City summary judgment on 

her municipal liability claims arising under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978). To state a Monell claim for official or municipal violation of constitutional 

rights, a plaintiff must adequately plead an official policy or custom that resulted in the violation 

alleged. See id. at 694; accord Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 314–15 (2d Cir. 2015). Here, 

the District Court properly held that Arroyo offered no evidence of a citywide policy or custom, nor 

has she linked such a policy to her treatment by the Officers. Arroyo has thus failed to raise a triable 

issue of fact regarding her Monell claims. 

 

as to whether Officer Vega found the gun. Officer Vega’s testimony on the subject was consistent, 

and Arroyo has presented no evidence, either below or on appeal, to contest this finding. 
5 

E. State-Law Claims 

Arroyo’s remaining arguments address her claims arising under New York law. Because the 

District Court correctly dismissed all of Arroyo’s federal claims, it was entitled to decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Arroyo on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the July 11, 2016 judgment of the District 

Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk