13-4346 Shi v. Lynch BIA Hom, IJ A200 751 372 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 25 th** **day of June, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DENNIS JACOBS,** 7 **PETER W. HALL,** 8 **DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,** 9 Circuit Judges**.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **HUIXIN SHI,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 13-4346** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent**.** ***** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 23 24 **FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.** 25

***Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically**  **substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.**1 **FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney** 2 **General; Douglas E. Ginsburg,** 3 **Assistant Director; John M. McAdams,** 4 **Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of** 5 **Immigration Litigation, United** 6 **States Department of Justice,** 7 **Washington, D.C.** 8 9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 11 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 12 is DENIED. 13 Petitioner Huixin Shi, a native and citizen of China, 14 seeks review of an October 31, 2013, order of the BIA, 15 affirming the July 9, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge 16 (“IJ”), denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 17 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Huixin 18 Shi , No. A200 751 372 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2013), aff’gNo. A200 19 751 372 (Immig. Ct. New York City July 9, 2012). We assume 20 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 21 procedural history in this case. 22 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the 23 decisions of both the IJ and the BIA “for the sake of 24 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 25 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 26

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2review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 1 Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 2 I. Past Persecution 3 The BIA has defined persecution as “a threat to the 4 life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm 5 upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.” In 6

re Acosta , 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), 7 overruled, in part, on other grounds, by INS v. 8 Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. 9 U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006). A 10 past persecution finding may be based on harm other than 11 threats to life or freedom, including “non-life-threatening 12 violence and physical abuse,” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 13 223, 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), but the harm must be 14 sufficiently severe to rise above “mere harassment,” 15 Ivanishvili , 433 F.3d at 341. “[T]he difference between 16 harassment and persecution is necessarily one of degree that 17 must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id

. 18 The agency reasonably determined that Shi’s past harm 19 did not rise to the level of persecution. Shi was not 20 physically mistreated during her detention, and was 21 permitted to continue studies at her government sponsored 22

3college. The agency also reasonably concluded that Shi did 1 not suffer economic persecution because she did not provide 2 evidence of her financial situation at the time she was 3 fined, or allege that she suffered any economic disadvantage 4 as a result of the fine, as required. See Guan Shan Liao v. 5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 293 F.3d 61, 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2002); 6 accord In re T-Z- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170-75 (B.I.A. 7 2007). 8 II. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution 9 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish 10 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear 11 of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). “An 12 asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future 13 persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she 14 ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if 15 returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or 16 practice in [the] . . . country of nationality . . . of 17 persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the 18 applicant[.]’” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 19 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)). 20 The agency did not err in finding that Shi failed to 21 show she would be singled out individually for persecution. 22

4See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) 1 (observing that, absent “solid support in the record,” a 2 fear of persecution is “speculative at best”). The agency 3 reasonably found that the country conditions, which 4 reflected problems for religious leaders and large 5 underground church congregations, did not support a 6 well-founded fear of persecution for Shi because she was not 7 a religious leader and attended a small underground church. 8 The agency also reasonably observed that the 2011 ChinaAid 9 Report documented only one instance of a raid on a house 10 church in Shi’s home Province. See Jian Hui Shao v. 11 Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149-50, 159-60, 163-65 (2d Cir. 12 2008). Though Shi contends that the agency selectively 13 cherry picked evidence to support its burden finding, the 14 task of resolving conflicts in the record evidence lies 15 “largely within the discretion of the agency,” id. at 171, 16 and the record does not compellingly suggest that any 17 material evidence was ignored, see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 18 Dep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). 19 The agency also did not err in finding that Shi failed 20 to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of 21 underground church members in China. To establish a pattern 22 or practice of persecution against a particular group, a 23 5petitioner must demonstrate that the harm to that group is 1 “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 2 741 (B.I.A. 2005); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d 3 Cir. 2007). Here, the country conditions evidence reflected 4 variation in the treatment of house church members in China. 5 Moreover, the agency reasonably determined that Shi had 6 failed to establish a substantial risk of persecution in her 7 locality. The agency therefore did not err in finding that 8 Shi failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution 9 of underground church members in China. 10 Because the agency did not err in finding that Shi 11 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, it 12 also did not err in finding that she failed to meet the 13 higher burden required for withholding of removal or CAT 14 relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-57 (2d Cir. 15 2006); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). 16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 17 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 18 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 19 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 20 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 21 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 22

23 6Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 1 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 2
FOR THE COURT: 3 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4 5 6

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