No. 01-15-00512-CR 

In the 

Court of Appeals 

For the 

First District of Texas 

At Houston 



No. 1980492

In the County Criminal Court at Law #3 

Of Harris County, Texas 



TAYLOR MARTIN KORB 

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Appellee



STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF



DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

ALAN CURRY 

State Bar No: 05263700

Assistant District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

JESSICA JUNEK

Appellate Intern 

1201 Franklin, Suite 600 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Tel.: 713/755-5826

FAX No.: 713/755-5809

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 

ACCEPTED

01-15-00512-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

10/30/2015 3:46:09 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 10/30/2015 3:46:09 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
ii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(g) and Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 39.1, the State requests oral argument only if appellant requests 

oral argument. 

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list of 

the names of all interested parties is provided below. 

Counsel for the State: 

Devon Anderson – District Attorney of Harris County 

Alan Curry – Assistant District Attorney on appeal

Napoleon Stewart – Assistant District Attorney at trial 

Molly Wurzer – Assistant District Attorney at trial

Appellant or Criminal Defendant: 

Taylor Martin Korb

Counsel for Appellant: 

Dan Krieger – Counsel on appeal and at trial 

Christopher Morton – Counsel at trial

Trial Judge: 

Honorable Natalie Fleming – Presiding judge of the CCCL#3
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT.................................................... ii

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES......................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. v

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:......................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT................................................................................. 3

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR............................................. 3

I. The trial court was within her discretion to deny the appellant’s motion 

to suppress the traffic stop. ...............................................................................3

a. Standard of Review ...................................................................................3

b. There was reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the 

appellant’s vehicle. ............................................................................................4

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... 12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLAINCE .............................................................................. 13
iv

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................................... 14
v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES 

Crain v. State, 

315 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).............................................9, 10

Derichsweiler v. State, 

348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)...........................................3-6

Hime v. State, 

998 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d.)..........5, 9

Johnson v. State, 

444 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], pet. ref’d). ................3-7

Pipkin v. State, 

114 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)......................3, 4, 8

State v. Ballard, 

987 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).............................................4

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P 9.4(i)..........................................................................13

CONSTITUIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. amend I.V.
1

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated on 

August 28, 2014. (1 CR at 6). The appellant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop 

on March 13, 2015. (1 CR at 23-24). A hearing on the motion to suppress took place 

on April 28, 2015. (3 RR at 42). The trial judge denied the appellant’s motion to 

suppress the traffic stop. (3 RR at 42). A jury trial followed, and the appellant was 

found guilty of driving while intoxicated. (1 CR at 41-42). The appellant was 

sentenced to 180 days in the county jail, probated for twelve months, and a $500 fine. 

(1 CR at 41-42). 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 28, 2014, at 12:04 AM, Officer Alberto Galvin received a 

dispatched call from a resident located in the residential area between Orchard 

Mountain Drive and Roaring Rapids. (3 RR at 7, 4 RR at 13). The resident reported 

he witnessed a suspicious light-colored small truck circling the area. (3 RR at 6). 

Specifically, the resident said the truck had circled three times in the last ten minutes.

(3 RR at 6). The caller gave his contact information, name, and location to Officer 

Galvin. (3 RR at 12-13). 
2

Officer Galvin, a nineteen-year veteran with the Pasadena Police Department, 

had been stationed on patrol in that exact area since January 2014. (3 RR at 5, 4 RR at 

12). This area was known to have a significant level of criminal activity, including 

instances of burglaries, trespassing, criminal mischief, and accidents. (3 RR at 9, 4 RR 

at 12, 42). Officer Galvin testified there had been reports of similar incidents 

occurring in the area in August of 2014. (4 RR at 42-3). 

At approximately 12:05 AM, within a minute of the call, Officer Galvin 

reported to the residential area. (3 RR at 8, 13). When he arrived at the intersection of 

Orchard Mountain Drive and Roaring Rapids, he observed a tan-colored Chevrolet 

pick-up proceeding to make a turn. (3 RR at 14). It was the only vehicle on the street 

at the time, and it was within 100 yards from the location of the caller. (3 RR at 15, 4 

RR at 14, 42). Therefore, Officer Galvin initiated an investigative stop to affirm or 

dispel the report because this was suspicious activity and raised indications that the 

driver could be “casing homes” and “possibly looking to burglarize”. (3 RR at 28, 4 

RR at 43). 

Officer Galvin identified the appellant as the driver of the vehicle. (3 RR at 6, 

44 RR at 14). During the stop, Officer Gavin observed the appellant with red-watery 

eyes, and he reeked of alcohol. (4 RR at 15). The appellant was later charged with 

driving while intoxicated. (1 CR at 6). 
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court was within her discretion to deny the appellant’s motion to 

suppress because there were specific and articulate facts that gave rise to support 

reasonable suspicion. As a result, the traffic stop performed by Officer Galvin did not 

violate the Fourth Amendment. And, therefore, this Court should affirm the trial 

court’s ruling that there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop of the 

appellant’s vehicle. 

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR

In his sole point of error, the appellant argues the trial court abused their 

discretion in denying his motion to suppress because there were insufficient facts to 

establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. 

I. The trial court was within their discretion to deny the appellant’s 

motion to suppress the traffic stop. 

a. Standard of Review

The Court should review the trial court’s ruling on an abuse of discretion. 

Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). When 

reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, this Court should apply a 

bifurcated standard of review, giving total deference to the trial court’s findings of 

facts and review the court’s application of the law de novo. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 

S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The trial court is the sole trier of the 
4

credibility of the witness and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ballard, 

987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In reviewing the trial court’s decision an 

appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

ruling. Id. The reviewing court shall not disturb supported findings of fact absent an 

abuse of discretion. Id. Therefore, the court should address the question of whether 

the trial court properly applied the law to the facts. Id.

b. There was reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of 

the appellant’s vehicle. 

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend I.V. Under the Fourth 

Amendment, a temporary detention of a person may be justified by mere reasonable 

suspicion because there is a significantly lesser intrusion upon the privacy and integrity 

of the person than a custodial arrest. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916. Reasonable 

suspicion is met when there are “specific, articulable facts that, combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, would lead [the officer] reasonably to conclude 

that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Id. 

at 914. This is an objective standard that looks to the totality of the circumstances. 

Johnson v. State, 444 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], pet. ref’d). 

Therefore, reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of the 

information possessed by the officer and its degree of reliability. Pipkin, 114 S.W.3d 

at 654 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).
5

In the situation where a citizen-informant provides information regarding 

suspicious conduct to officers, the information is presumed reliable when the citizeninformant identifies himself to the officers and may be held accountable for the 

accuracy and veracity of the report. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914-15. The only 

question then is “whether the information that the known citizen-informant provides,

viewed through the prism of the detaining officer’s particular level of knowledge and 

experience, objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity 

is afoot.” Id. at 915. Here, the reliability of the caller is not at issue. See Id.; See also 

Hime v. State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 895-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. 

ref’d.) (holding the reliability of the citizen’s report is inherent when the private citizen 

identifies himself by name). 

The facts known to the investigating officer need not point to a particular and 

identifiable criminal offense. Id. In other words, the requirement that there is some 

indication that the unusual activity is related to a crime does not mean that a particular 

criminal offense must be imminent. Johnson, 444 S.W.3d at 214. It is only necessary for 

the information to be sufficiently detailed and reliable to suggest something of an 

apparently criminal nature is brewing. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917. An officer may 

have a “close call”, but as long as the information amounts to more than a mere 

hunch, then there will be enough to satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion. 

Johnson, 444 S.W.3d at 214. Therefore, the facts must only show that “an unusual 
6

activity occurred, suggest a connection between the detainee and the unusual activity, 

and provide some indication the unusual activity is related to a crime.” Id. 

The appellant contends that, when a citizen calls and reports innocuous 

activity, that does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. However, precedent suggests 

an investigative detention can be justified, even when the conduct of the detainee 

appeared innocent in nature. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917 (holding there was 

reasonable suspicion when a citizen-informant reported a man driving around a 

parking lot and staring into vehicles). Therefore, the question is not whether the 

conduct is innocent or criminal; it is whether there is any suspicion that attaches to 

the conduct. Id. In the present case, the suspicious activity was when the appellant was 

noticed circling the neighborhood and, specifically, was observed circling at least three 

times in ten minutes. While this seems innocent in nature, the fact that it was done 

after midnight and in an area of high criminal activity, attaches the suspicion that the 

appellant was “casing” houses in the neighborhood. 

The following case presents an instructive example of when a stop is justified 

by reasonable suspicion. In Johnson, a resident of an apartment complex called 911 to 

report suspicious activity of an individual watching people and cars in the parking lot. 

Johnson, 444 S.W.3d at 211. The caller provided a physical description of the individual 

and the person’s location near the leasing office of the complex. Id. Within thirty 

minutes, an officer arrived at the complex where he had previously responded to 
7

robberies. Id. He noticed a running car with its lights turned on that was backed into a 

parking spot in front of the leasing office. Id. He also was able to identify the man in 

the front seat as matching the description provided by the caller. Id. Further, he 

recognized from his experience that the man was parked in the same manner in which 

a getaway car would be parked. Id. Therefore, he initiated a search and found 

marijuana. Id. 

The court in Johnson ruled this search was justified by reasonable suspicion for 

three reasons. Id. at 215. First, the evidence raised suspicions of unusual activity 

because there was a reliable 911 call about the suspicious person watching people and 

cars near the leasing office. Id. Second, there was a proven connection between the 

reported unusual activity and the detainee because the man matched the description 

and was in the same location provided by the informant. Id. And, finally, the unusual 

activity was somehow related to a crime because the officer had knowledge and 

experience of the past robberies and articulated the detainee’s vehicle was parked like 

a typical getaway car. Id. The court held it did not matter that the reported conduct 

appeared innocent in nature because when viewed objectively and in the aggregate 

there was a realistic possibility of criminal motive. Id. at 214. Therefore, given the 

totality of the circumstances, the officer was justified to conduct an investigative 

detention. Id. at 215. 
8

The present case is significantly analogous to the Johnson case and, therefore, 

this Court should find there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the 

appellant’s vehicle. First, like the report by the caller in Johnson, this report was by a 

reliable and identifiable citizen-informant. The citizen-informant gave a description of 

the vehicle as a light-colored truck circling the residential area. This call was evidence 

that established unusual activity taking place in the residential area, like the call in 

Johnson. Further, our informant articulated a specific fact that the truck had circled the 

neighborhood three times in the last ten minutes. The informant also provided a

location of where he saw the vehicle last circle the residential area. Therefore, the call 

established that unusual and suspicious activity was taking place in the neighborhood.

Second, there was a connection found between the appellant and the unusual 

activity. When there is a reliable and identifiable citizen-informant, less corroboration 

is needed by the officer. Pipkin, 114 S.W.3d at 651. In this case, Officer Galvin was 

able to match the appellant’s vehicle to the description provided by the citizeninformant. Further, this was corroborated because there were no other cars on the 

street. Also, like the officer in Johnson, Officer Galvin first saw the vehicle at the 

intersection near the location provided by the citizen-informant and noticed the 

vehicle turning from Orchard Mountain Drive onto Roaring Rapids, possibly to make 

another circle or having just finished completing a circle of the area for a fourth time. 

Therefore, Officer Galvin was able to make an objective and rational conclusion that 
9

the appellant’s vehicle was the one associated with the unusual conduct relayed by the 

citizen-informant.

1

Finally, the unusual activity reported by the citizen-informant was related to the 

crime of burglary because there was the suspicion that the appellant could have been 

canvassing houses. The informant reported that the appellant’s vehicle had circled the 

residential area at least three times in the last ten minutes. This activity occurred

around midnight in a residential area. Further, like the officer in Johnson, Officer 

Galvin testified that he was stationed on patrol in that exact area for a year, and the 

area was known for burglaries. Therefore, the officer’s stop of the appellant’s vehicle 

was based off a reasonable suspicion that the appellant soon would be engaged in 

criminal activity. 

Further, the appellant’s reliance on Crain v. State is misplaced. In Crain, the 

defendant was merely walking down a street at midnight in a residential area in which 

burglaries occurred. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When 

the officer passed the defendant in his squad car the defendant “grabb[ed] at his 

waist”. Id. At that point, the officer initiated a stop on the defendant. Id. The officer 

testified that he became suspicious merely because the appellant was walking in the 

residential area late at night. Id. at 53. The court ruled time of day and level of criminal 

 

1

See Hime v. State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 895-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d.) 

(holding the officer was justified in making the stop when he matched the description of the 

appellant’s vehicle and location to that of the witness’s report). 
10

activity in an area are just factors to be considered when determining whether there 

was reasonable suspicion. Id. The court held “in order for these facts to affect the 

assessment of the suspect’s actions, the surroundings must raise a suspicion that the 

particular person is engaged in illegal behavior.” Id. 

In the present case, the officer did not rely solely on the time of day and level 

of criminal activity in the residential area. In fact, unlike the officer in Crain, Officer 

Galvin received a report from the reliable citizen-informant, which articulated a 

specific fact about the appellant and used this report as the main piece of information 

to establish reasonable suspicion. The report was corroborated by Officer Galvin 

when he saw the appellant’s vehicle – matching the description provided by the 

citizen-informant – in the location of the call. The time of day and the criminal 

activity just raised his suspicions, unlike the officer in Crain who solely relied on those 

two factors to initiate the stop. Therefore, the officer followed the standard set out 

under the Fourth Amendment and established reasonable suspicion prior to initiating 

the stop of the appellant’s vehicle. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, including Officer Galvin’s nineteen 

years of experience, there was reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop of 

the appellant. First, Officer Galvin received a reliable call from an identifiable citizeninformant. Second, the citizen-informant relayed that a light-colored pick-up truck 

had circled the residential area three times in the last ten minutes. This was the 
11

specific and articulable fact that established unusual and possibly criminal activity 

would soon occur because it was conduct that suggested the person was “casing”

houses to possibly burglarize. Third, Officer Galvin corroborated the report when he 

saw the appellant’s vehicle – matching the description provided by the citizeninformant – approximately 100 yards from the caller’s residence. And Officer Galvin 

noticed the car turning back onto Roaring Rapids Drive, which further suggested the 

appellant’s vehicle was connected to the caller’s report. And, finally, this all occurred 

after midnight in a residential area that was known to Officer Gavin to have incidents 

of burglaries. Therefore, this Court should find the traffic stop did not violate the 

Fourth Amendment because reasonable suspicion was established. 
12

PRAYER

The State of Texas respectfully urges the Court to overrule appellant’s sole 

point of error and affirm his conviction. 

DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

/s/ Alan Curry

ALAN CURRY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 755-5826

TBC No. 05263700

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net
13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLAINCE

The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer-generated document has 

a word count of 2,945, based upon the representation provided by the word 

processing program that was used to create the document. TEX. R. APP. P 9.4(i).

/s/ Alan Curry

ALAN CURRY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 755-5826

TBC No. 05263700

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net
14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The State will mail a copy of the foregoing instrument to appellant’s attorney at 

the following address: 

Dan Krieger

215 East Galveston Street 

League City, TX 77573

/s/ Alan Curry

ALAN CURRY

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 755-5826

TBC No. 05263700

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net