2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-13-2005

In Re:Congoleum Corp

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-3609

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-3609

 

IN RE: CONGOLEUM CORP., ET AL.

CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO

CCI INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICAN; 

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY f/k/a 

CIGNA INSURANCE COMPANY; ACE PROPERTY

 & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY f/k/a CIGNA

PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Appellants

vs.

CONGOLEUM CORPORATION; CONGOLEUM SALES,

INC.; CONGOLEUM FISCAL, INC.

____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01709) 

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

____________

Argued July 15, 2005

Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

Filed October 13, 2005

____________
Tancred V. Schiavoni, Esquire (ARGUED)

Jonathan J. Kim, Esquire

O’Melveny & Myers LLP

7 Times Square

Times Square Tower

New York, New York 10036

Marty F. Siegal, Esquire

Siegal & Napierkowski

220 Lake Drive East

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002

Leonard P. Goldberger, Esquire

White & Williams LLP

1800 One Liberty Place

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellants Century Indemnity Company; Ace

American Insurance Company; Ace Property & Casualty

Insurance Company

Richard W. Hill, Esquire (ARGUED)

Rachel L. Diehl, Esquire

Kevin J. Licciardi, Esquire

McCarter & English, LLP

Four Gateway Center

100 Mulberry Street

Newark, New Jersey 07102

Kerry A. Brennan, Esquire (ARGUED)

Richard L. Epling, Esquire

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP

1540 Broadway

New York, New York 10036

Paul S. Hollander, Esq.

Okin, Hollander & DeLuca

One Parker Plaza

12 Floor th

Fort Lee, NJ 07024
 Congoleum Corporation v. Ace American Ins. Co.,

1

et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex

County, Docket No. MID-L 8908-01.

We take judicial notice of the state court 2

proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. See Furnari v.

Warden, Allenwood Federal Correctional Inst., 218 F.3d 250, 255

(3d Cir. 2000); In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205

(3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of

certain facts such as that a document was filed, a position taken, an

3

Attorneys for Appellees Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum

Sales, Inc., Congoleum Fiscal, Inc. and Gilbert Heintz &

Randolph, LLP

____________

OPINION

____________

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

In this pre-packaged Chapter 11 reorganization, we

hold that evidence of pre-petition conduct in this case by a law firm

is relevant to a review of a debtor’s application to retain the firm as

special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge

should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted

as counsel for the debtor pre-petition in negotiating settlement

arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by

attorneys who were co-counsel with the firm in insurance matters

for those same claimants. We conclude that conflicts existed which

precluded the firm’s retention under the Rules of Professional

Conduct and the Bankruptcy Code. 

Facing nearly 100,000 claims for injury caused by

asbestos in its products and the exhaustion of its primary liability

insurance coverage, Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the

Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess

carriers. The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi, Hewit 1

& Pallatucci, which had represented Congoleum in insurance

matters for more than ten years.

2
admission or allegation made “as long as it is not unfair to a party

to do so and does not undermine the trial court’s factfinding

authority.”). 

Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum Sales, Inc. 3

and Congoleum Fiscal, Inc. filed for bankruptcy. We will refer to

those entities as “Congoleum.” 

Pre-packaged bankruptcies employing a channeling 4

injunction are not eligible for the “cram down” provision contained

in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) which allows the bankruptcy court to

confirm a plan of reorganization over creditors’ objections in

certain circumstances. 

4

While that litigation continued, Congoleum sought 3

relief in the Bankruptcy Court in a Chapter 11 pre-packaged plan

of reorganization designed to channel existing and future asbestos

claims to a trust as authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). Approval of

the plan would enable Congoleum to preserve its assets and

continue in business because the trust would assume its asbestos

liability. Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that 75%

of current asbestos claimants approve a plan of reorganization

before a channeling order may be issued. As a result, garnering

support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success

of a plan. 

A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation

is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of

thousands of plaintiffs. Another notable aspect is that, because

over time they may have been exposed to asbestos in various

environments, some of the injured persons may have claims against

a number of defendants. 

The realities of securing favorable votes from

thousands of claimants to meet the 75% approval requirement

forces debtors to work closely with the few attorneys who represent

large numbers of injured claimants. A prepackaged plan of

reorganization acceptable to the debtor must be satisfactory for the

claimants as well and, consequently, extensive negotiations are 4

necessary.
11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g) provides for the bankruptcy 5

channeling injunction and subsection (2)(B) contains the

requirements for the injunction; it requires that – 

(i) the injunction is to be implemented in connection

with a trust that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization – 

(I) is to assume the liabilities of a debtor ...;

(II) is to be funded in whole or in part by the

securities of 1 or more debtors involved in such plan

and by the obligation of such debtor or debtors to

make future payments, including dividends;

(III) is to own, or by the exercise of rights granted

under such plan would be entitled to own if specified

contingencies occur, a majority of the voting shares

of – 

(aa) each such debtor;

(bb) the parent corporation of each

such debtor; or

(cc) a subsidiary of each such debtor

that is also a debtor; and

(IV) is to use its assets or income to pay claims and

demands; ...

11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g)(emphasis added). 

5

I. 

In this case, negotiations between the debtor and

counsel for plaintiffs produced a proposal that involved the

creation of a trust funded primarily by proceeds from Congoleum’s

insurance carriers to pay for settlements of existing, as well as

future asbestos personal injury claims. Congoleum was to

contribute to the trust a $2.7 million promissary note payable ten

years after confirmation and ABI, Congoleum’s parent corporation,

was to contribute $250,000 cash and the pledge of its shares in

Congoleum to secure Congoleum’s promissory note. Notably,

neither Congoleum nor related entities were required to contribute

equity to the trust. 

5

The pre-petition activity that occurred in this case is
Perry Weitz is a partner in the law firm of Weitz & 6

Luxenberg, P.C. Joseph Rice is a partner in the law firm of Motley

Rice, LLC. Those two firms represent hundreds of thousands of

asbestos claimants. Weitz and Rice executed the Claimant

Agreement as representatives of participating asbestos claimants.

 The settlement amounts were assigned as follows: 7

(1) mesothelioma – $100,000; 

(2) lung cancer – $30,000; 

(3) other cancers – $10,000; 

(4) Level II non-malignant disease – $3,000; and 

(5) Level I – nonmalignant disease – $1,000. 

6

fairly typical of that in a number of asbestos pre-packaged plans.

Joseph F. Rice and Perry Weitz, two plaintiffs’ lawyers, negotiated 6

a settlement of numerous asbestos claims with Congoleum’s

counsel, Gilbert, Heintz & Randolph, LLP (“Gilbert”). The

agreement employed a matrix to “resolve and settle” the amounts

the various classes of claimants would receive as damages. For

example, mesothelioma victims were each allocated $100,000. In

contrast, those with non-malignant injuries would receive $1,000.7

 

To qualify for compensation, a participating claimant

was required to provide evidence of injury and exposure to

Congoleum products. Claims of the qualified participating

claimants would be secured to 75% of the matrix values and the

remainder would be treated as unsecured claims. In contrast to the

claims of participating claimants addressed in the settlement

agreement, claims settled with a separate group of claimants prepetition would be secured in full. 

II.

The role Gilbert played in preparing the plan is

challenged in this proceeding. In October 2002, Perry Weitz

recommended that Congoleum retain Gilbert to assist in solving

insurance coverage for Congoleum’s mounting asbestos liability.

Gilbert specializes in insurance coverage disputes and product
Perry Weitz’s suggestion that Congoleum contact 8

Gilbert occurred in the midst of negotiations of claims against

Congoleum by two individuals suffering from mesothelioma,

Messrs. Cook and Arseneault. 

7

liability matters. It serves in a variety of capacities related to

various asbestos mass tort cases and represents defendants as well

as claimant and creditor committees in various asbestos

bankruptcies. 

At the time he recommended the firm to Congoleum,

Weitz had existing co-counsel relationships with Gilbert in other

asbestos related proceedings. The arrangements were that Gilbert 8

would represent the claimants in seeking recovery from the insurers

of asbestos defendants. 

Gilbert described its work as co-counsel with Weitz

as providing:

 “insurance-related advice to certain

claimants in asbestos and other

contexts. [Gilbert] represents certain

asbestos-related bodily injury

claimants in proceedings against a

primary insurer with respect to that

insurer’s coverage obligations . . . in

pursuing coverage claims against

insurers . . . and in pursuing coverage

from insurers of similar defendants.”

Gilbert explained that it did not represent the individual claimants

with respect to the establishment of their tort claims, “but only with

respect to the collection of insurance monies to pay claims that may

be established.” 

On February 6, 2003, Gilbert entered into a formal

retention agreement to advise and represent Congoleum in efforts

to negotiate with claimants’ counsel to settle “pending asbestosrelated bodily injury” claims, and arrange for the “terms of a ‘prepackaged’ plan of reorganization.” For these services, Gilbert was

to receive a fixed fee of $2 million from Congoleum. Congoleum
 No party has raised objections to the fees of $2 9

million payable to Gilbert and the $1 million each payable to Weitz

and Rice. That matter is not before us and we do not rule on it at

this point. 

In In re: Combustion Engineering, 295 B.R. 459

(Bankr. D. N.J. 2003) (vacated on other grounds, 391 F.3d 190

(2004)), a pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcy case, Joseph Rice

sought a $20 million fee for his pre-petition work. That fee was to

be paid by a corporation affiliated with the debtor, but was

disallowed by the bankruptcy judge because Rice had a conflict of

interest.

In In re Pittsburgh Corning, 308 B.R. 716 (Bankr.

W.D. Pa. 2004), the bankruptcy court refused to allow a fee of $30

million to be received by Gilbert in representing the asbestos

claimants’ committee. The judge found Gilbert had a conflict of

interest in that pre-package asbestos proceeding.

8

also paid Perry Weitz and Joseph Rice $1 million each for fees and 9

expenses they “incurred or may incur in connection with”

negotiating the pre-packaged plan. 

In its letter of retention, Gilbert disclosed to

Congoleum its many representations in the asbestos field, including

that it had been retained to represent individual tort claimants “to

provide legal advice with respect to insurance matters.” Gilbert

explained that its “co-counsel with respect to many of these matters

is [Weitz].” Gilbert also stated that it

“represents other clients, not listed

here, that are or may be adverse to the

[sic] Congoleum with respect to

asbestos related claims. GHR will

continue to represent these and other

similarly situated clients in these

capacities in the future. ... In light of

the Firm’s representation of entities

that are potentially adverse to

Congoleum in other matters, GHR
9

cannot provide any legal services to

Congoleum that could impair its

ability to represent fully its corporate

and other clients. Congoleum agrees

that GHR may continue to represent or

to undertake to represent existing or

new clients as described above or in

other matters, even though the

positions taken by other clients in

those matters may be adverse to the

positions taken by Congoleum in those

or other matters. Congoleum will not,

in [sic] the basis of GHR’s

representation of them, object to

GHR’s continuing or undertaking the

representation of other clients in

matters where the positions taken by

such clients are adverse to those taken

by Congoleum in those or other

matters.” 

In addition to negotiating on Congoleum’s behalf

with claimants’ counsel to structure the contemplated bankruptcy

reorganization, Gilbert participated in the declaratory judgment

action in New Jersey state court, although the Dughi firm is the

lead trial counsel in that proceeding. 

Congoleum filed its reorganization petition on

December 31, 2003 and on January 23, 2004 applied for

bankruptcy court approval to retain Gilbert as “special insurance

counsel.” The application stated that Gilbert “would be primarily

responsible for strategic advice on insurance issues, including but

not limited to insurance-related settlement negotiations, and the

representation of the Debtors with respect to insurance issues

arising in the context of the Chapter 11 Cases.” 

The application continued, “GHR was the primary

counsel that negotiated with representatives of asbestos plaintiffs

to create the structure of the Debtors’ Plan. GHR also represented

Congoleum in negotiating and drafting asbestos settlement
10

agreements that liquidated numerous claims asserted against

Congoleum in the tort system. The settlement of numerous

asbestos claims allowed the Debtors to negotiate the Plan, which

contemplates that the primary assets dedicated to pay asbestos

claims will be Congoleum’s right to receive insurance proceeds.”

The following services “among other things” were

to be provided by Gilbert: 

“(a) advising and representing the

D ebto rs in in su r a nc e -re la te d

settlement negotiations and mediations

with insurers and other parties; 

(b) pursuant to request of the Debtors,

advising and assisting the Debtors in

consultations with parties-in-interest

regarding unresolved, potentially

available insurance coverage; 

(c) advising the Debtors as to the

appropriate steps necessary to assert

claims against and obtain proceeds

from insurers; 

(d) reviewing and analyzing

insurance-related documents, data,

applications, orders, operating reports,

schedules and other materials; 

(e) representing the Debtors at

hearings concerning insurance-related

issues in the bankruptcy case; 

(f) advising and assisting the Debtors

in preparing appropriate insurancerelated legal pleadings and proposed

insurance-related orders in the

bankruptcy case; 

(g) pursuant to requests of the

Debtors, advising and assisting the

Debtors with respect to insurance-
11

related issues in connection with the

formulation n e g o t i atio n and

confirma tion of a p l a n of

reorganization; 

(h) pursuant to requests of the

Debtors, assisting and advising the

Debtors generally with respect to

insurance-related issues during the

Chapter 11 Cases, and such other

services as may be in the best interest

of the Debtors; and 

(i) preparing appropriate pleadings

and orders, conducting discovery, and

representing Congoleum in the

Coverage Litigation (if the automatic

stay is not maintained) or in any

adversarial proceeding relating to the

determination of insurance rights or

collection of insurance claims;

provided, however, that the Debtors

anticipate that [Dughi] will continue

to act as primary litigation counsel in

the Coverage Litigation and GHR’s

role in this regard will consist of

coordinating the Coverage Litigation

with insurance settlement efforts and

assisting [Dughi] as required.” 

Certain of Congoleum’s liability insurers who had

not participated in the formulation of the plan objected to the

application to retain Gilbert. They alleged that Gilbert was in

conflict because of the duties it owed the individual claimants it

represented as co-counsel with Weitz. The insurers also pointed

out that the Kenesis Group, LLC (“Kenesis”), a third party owned

70% by Gilbert and hired pre-petition by Congoleum to screen

claimants, had already been disqualified from being retained to

review claims in In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395 (Bankr. D. Del.

2003), a proceeding in which Gilbert had been involved. They

argued that Gilbert’s extensive relationship to Perry Weitz and
In re: Marvel Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d 463 10

(3d Cir. 1998).

12

Joseph Rice in other asbestos matters violated both the

disinterestedness requirement of section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy

Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, the details

of the fee arrangement between Gilbert and Weitz had not been

disclosed. The insurers also asked for discovery to further explore

Gilbert’s relationship with other parties involved in the bankruptcy.

On March 1, 2004, the bankruptcy judge heard

argument on Congoleum’s application to retain Gilbert. The

United States Trustee appeared and stated that he did “not object

to Gilbert Heintz’ retention.” The Trustee conceded, however, that

“[t]here are certainly potential conflicts. And when it’s potential

under Marvel, there’s a weighing of whether it’s going to become 10

actual or not ... [a]nd we need to see what happens here.” 

Gilbert contended that its conduct pre-petition was

not relevant to its employment as special counsel. It argued that,

as to the matters listed in the application, the interests of the

individuals it represented as co-counsel with Weitz were aligned

with Congoleum’s interests to obtain recovery from the insurers. 

The bankruptcy judge granted the application to

employ Gilbert, holding that the standards set in section 327(e) of

the Bankruptcy Code, rather than those in section 327(a), applied

and, hence, the requirement of disinterestedness of section 327(a)

was not pertinent. The judge noted the difference between pre- and

post- petition representation and said, 

“[w]hatever else may have gone on in

the pre-petition negotiations, even if

GHR was bad, bad, bad, now today,

both the Debtor and GHR want to

preserve and maximize the Debtor’s

insurance assets. I’m not making a

finding about whether GHR acted

improperly pre-petition. 

I’m just saying that its pre-petition
Kenesis subcontracted its work to The 11

Clearinghouse LLC, an organization owned by an individual who

was on leave of absence from a position as a paralegal at Joseph

Rice’s law firm. Kenesis purchased The Clearing House before

beginning claims review work for Congoleum. 

13

behavior cannot carry the day on a

post-petition retention application for

different services.” 

In addition to the challenge to Gilbert’s retention, the

insurers also contested Congoleum’s employment of Kenesis

Group, LLP as consultants and claim processors. Gilbert owned a

70% interest in Kenesis. Congoleum had paid $1,678,000 for

Kenesis’ work screening asbestos claimants. Congoleum’s 11

application described Kenesis’ work pre-petition, indicating that it

would continue to review claims it had previously processed and

determined to be deficient to determine whether the defects had

been cured. In addition, the application indicated that Kenesis

would perform consulting services for Congoleum’s law firms,

including Gilbert and Dughi. 

On April 5, 2004, about one month after granting

Gilbert’s application, the Bankruptcy Court heard argument on the

Kenesis application. In response to the objections from

Congoleum’s insurers and the United States Trustee, the Court

denied the application. The bankruptcy judge based her denial on

the “concern that Kenesis [was] not disinterested due to its

relationship with [Gilbert].” The judge noted that Kenesis had

been involved in “negotiating the Claimant Agreement [prepetition] and that forms the backbone of the reorganization plan. 

So the Court finds that they were and continue to be involved in

negotiating the plan.” 

The bankruptcy judge further expressed concern that

Kenesis might have a conflict of interest with the debtor because

the payment it received for pre-petition services might be a

preference. Moreover, the court shared “the U.S. Trustee’s

concern that Kenesis is not disinterested due to its relationship with

GHR. The prospect that GHR would be reviewing the work

product of an entity with such a strong overlap of identity is still
14

more reason that Kenesis does not meet the standards of 327.” 

The insurers appealed the ruling on Gilbert’s

retention. The District Court concluded that the bankruptcy judge

was correct in her rulings on the alignment of interests and the

application of section 327(e). The district judge commented that

because the insurance companies were the primary source of funds

to pay claimants, the carriers “have every interest in making it, to

put it bluntly, difficult to confirm this bankruptcy, and that

motivation is not lost on the Court.” 

In their appeal to this Court, the insurers raise several

issues including: (1) whether the District Court erred in affirming

the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that retaining Gilbert

violated neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Rules of Professional

Conduct; (2) whether the District Court erred by affirming that

section 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code applied rather than section

327(a); (3) whether the District Court erred in not reversing the

Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law where

the Bankruptcy Court neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor

allowed discovery; (4) whether the District Court erred by failing

to consider Gilbert’s economic and other ties to lawyers

representing asbestos claimants who are adverse to Congoleum;

and (5) whether the District Court erred by affirming the

Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the insurers’ Motion for Judicial

Notice. 

Congoleum questions whether the insurers have

standing to challenge the retention of special insurance counsel.

III.

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

157(b)(2). The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. We have before us a final order which we

review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In re United Artists Theatre Co.

V. Walton, 315 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2003); In re: Pillowtex, 304 F.3d

246 (3d Cir. 2002).

Because we are a court of appeals, “twice removed

from the primary tribunal, we review both the factual and the legal

determinations of the district court for error.” In re BH & P, Inc.,

949 F.2d 1300, 1305 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Universal Minerals,
15

Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981)). 

In order to determine whether the District Court erred, we review

the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards the District Court

should have employed. Id. at 1306. 

IV.

At the outset we must consider Congoleum’s

contention that the insurers lack standing to bring this appeal.

Congoleum argues that the insurers are not creditors of the debtor,

are not persons aggrieved by the retention order, and under the

more restricted bankruptcy standards, lack appellate standing. In

support of its position, Congoleum cites Travelers Insurance

Company v. H.K. Porter Company, Inc., 45 F.3d 737 (3d Cir.

1995) and In re: Dykes, 10 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Article III standing need not be financial and only

need be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action. See Miller v.

Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 362 F.3d 209, 221 (3d Cir. 2004)

(listing the elements of Article III standing). In the bankruptcy

field, however, we have adopted a jurisprudential rule that limits

appellate standing to persons or entities that are aggrieved by an

order which diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or

detrimentally affects their rights. Travelers, 45 F.3d at 742. 

We cited the standing distinction in In re:

Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2005). We

recognized the acute need to limit appeals in bankruptcy cases

which often involve a myriad of parties indirectly affected by every

bankruptcy court order. Combustion Engineering involved a prepackaged Chapter 11 plan similar to the one before us. We

concluded that some of the insurers had appellate standing but only

with respect to the limited group of issues that affected them. Id.

at 217-18. 

Here, the insurers are entitled to standing even under

the more restrictive standard applied to bankruptcy proceedings.

The retention of special insurance counsel is an important

preliminary matter that will profoundly affect the determination of

the validity of a proposed plan ab initio. It is an issue based on

procedural due process concerns that implicate the integrity of the

bankruptcy court proceeding as a whole. The retention of Gilbert

as special insurance counsel will affect the resolution of issues that
16

may directly affect the rights of insurers and fairness to the

asbestos claimants.

Combustion Engineering and Dykes, on the other

hand, were appeals from final orders confirming plans of

reorganization. In Travelers, the objections were directed at an

order reinstating certain claims. In the present case, the appeal is

from an order which will affect the fairness of the entire

bankruptcy proceeding, including the determination of issues such

as those for which we granted insurer standing to challenge a final

order in Combustion Engineering. 

Further, it is extremely important to resolve this

preliminary matter now; otherwise, it may never be addressed. 

In re: Marvel Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d 463 (3d

Cir. 1998), presented a challenge to our jurisdiction in an appeal

from an order refusing the trustee’s request to retain a certain law

firm. We treated the bankruptcy judge’s order as final, pointing out

that if we did not take jurisdiction at that point, no “meaningful

review” of the denial of the appointment could ever take place. Id.

at 470. 

We observed that once a plan has proceeded to

confirmation, orders involving retention of professionals are

unlikely to get the attention they deserve. Once a bankruptcy

reorganization has been completed, it would be unlikely that the

proceedings would commence again from the beginning to correct

preliminary issues. Id.; see also In re: Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d

1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that “waiting until a final plan

is approved may well cause several years of hearings and

negotiations to be wasted”); In re: GI Holdings, 385 F.3d 313 (3d

Cir. 2004) (reviewing an order appointing a trustee prior to plan

confirmation). Addressing the challenges to Gilbert’s retention at

this stage comports with our discussion of the unlikelihood of

review late in a bankruptcy in Marvel as well as the concern for

fairness and due process throughout complex bankruptcy

proceedings such as this one. 

In addition, counsel for the insurers has a

responsibility, if not a duty, to alert the Court to ethical conflicts.

Rules governing professional conduct are often viewed as even
17

more necessary and applicable in bankruptcy cases than in other

contexts. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 ed.) ¶ 8.01[1] (“Thus th

the importance of adherence to the ethical rules, as well as

disclosure, initial and continuing, cannot be overemphasized.”). 

There are, of course, concerns about the tactical use

of disqualification motions to harass opposing counsel. See

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985)

(disqualification of counsel in a civil, not a bankruptcy

appointment). Similarly, courts must be cautious about infringing

on the right of the debtor to retain counsel of its choice.

Nevertheless, the obligation to ensure that professional ethics are

followed has led courts to rule that counsel has standing to raise

and challenge unethical procedures on the part of opposing

lawyers. See Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 848 (1 Cir. 1984) st

(citing cases from the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth

Circuits authorizing attorneys to report ethical concerns to the

court). 

We raised, but did not decide, whether a “motion to

disqualify must be brought by a former client” in In re: Corn

Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1984).

However, we noted, “one of the inherent powers of any federal

court is the admission and discipline of attorneys practicing before

it.” Id. at 160.

The District Court in Schiffli Embroidery Workers’

Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., 1994 WL 62124 (D.N.J. 1994),

cited then Rule 8.1 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional

Conduct, which required lawyers to report violations of the Rules

of Professional Conduct. Based on that duty, the court found that

a lawyer had standing to present a motion to disqualify its opposing

counsel. 

Rule 8.3 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional

Conduct is the current version of the rule addressed in Schiffli; it

provides that a lawyer who knows that another lawyer has

committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that

raises a “substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,

trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform

the appropriate professional authority.” See also O’Connor v.

Jones, 946 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8 Cir. 1991) (“In cases where th
18

counsel is in violation of professional ethics, the court may act on

motion of an aggrieved party or may act sua sponte to disqualify.”);

International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d

Cir. 1975) (considering the issue of attorney conflict despite failure

of parties to raise the point). 

We need not decide whether the insurers’ counsel

had a duty to disclose Gilbert’s conduct in this case. It is enough

that the insurers’ counsel had the right to raise the issue under the

Rules of Professional Conduct and require adjudication by the

court. Concluding otherwise would suggest that we do not support

the long-standing role of lawyers practicing before federal courts

in monitoring and reporting ethical violations. 

We note also, as a practical matter, that in

circumstances such as those present here, it is highly unlikely that

any of the parties other than the insurers or their attorneys would

challenge the application for retention of Gilbert. Congoleum,

Gilbert, Perry Weitz and Joseph Rice worked together to negotiate

the terms of the pre-packaged plan and all were deeply committed

in having it approved. Moreover, we are aware that the standard

set out in Travelers is a jurisprudential and not a strict statutory

requirement for standing. We are persuaded that, in the

circumstances here, the insurers and their attorneys have standing

to present this appeal. 

V.

Having concluded that standing has been established,

we turn to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the standards set

by the Bankruptcy Code. 

A.

The District Court’s local rules provide that the rules

of American Bar Association, as revised by the New Jersey

Supreme Court, apply to attorneys practicing before the court

“subject to such modifications as may be required or permitted by

federal statute, regulation, court rule or decision of law.” Local

Rule 103.1 (D.N.J.). In the absence of a “definitive state court

decision interpreting the rules as promulgated by the [New Jersey]

Supreme Court, the federal court will proceed to reach its own

conclusions as to the appropriate application of the rules of
Rule 1.7 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional 12

Conduct was revised in November 2003 and the new rule became

19

professional conduct. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 435 (3d

Cir. 1996) (quoting New Jersey District Court Local Rules). 

In International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin,

579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978), we noted that the “conduct

of practitioners before the federal courts must be governed by the

rules of those courts rather than those of the state courts.”

However, in United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980),

we approved the district court’s reliance on an opinion of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey in applying the local rules on

professional conduct. We observed that incorporation of state law

in this field serves to avoid “detriment to the public’s confidence

in the integrity of the bar that might result from courts in the same

state enforcing different ethical norms.” Id. at 1200. 

State precedents as to professional responsibility

should be consulted when they are compatible with federal law and

policy and do not “balkanize federal law.” Grievance Comm. for

Southern District of New York v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir.

1995); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 341

(5 Cir. 1993). Bankruptcy professionals are required to examine th

their relationship not only based on the two-party litigation model,

but also one guided by “a stricter, fiduciary standard.” 1 Collier on

Bankruptcy (15 ed.) ¶ 8.01[1]. th

Rule 1.7 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional

Conduct, like Rule 1.7 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional

Conduct, provides that, a lawyer shall not represent a client if there

is a “concurrent conflict of interest,” a situation where either: 

(1) the representation of one client will be directly

adverse to another client; or 

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation

of one or more clients will be materially limited by

the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a

former client, or a third person or by a personal

interest of the lawyer.

NJ RPC 1.7(a). Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 12
effective on January 1, 2004. The previous version of Rule 1.7 did

not address situations where a lawyer’s responsibilities to former

clients impaired the current representation and it did not use the

“significant risk language”; instead it mentioned situations where

the representation of a client “may be materially limited” by a

lawyer’s other responsibilities. These changes do not affect our

disposition of the case because Gilbert would have been acting

under a concurrent conflict under either version of the rule. 

20

conflict of interest, a lawyer may undertake the representation if:

(1) each affected client gives informed consent,

confirmed in writing, after full disclosure and

consultation ... [w]hen the lawyer represents multiple

clients in a single matter, the consultation shall

include an explanation of the common representation

and the advantages and risks involved;

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer

will be able to provide competent and diligent

representation to each affected client;

(3) the representation is not prohibited by law; and

(4) the representation does not involve the assertion

of a claim by one client against another client

represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or

other proceeding before a tribunal.

NJ RPC 1.7(b). 

Comments to the ABA version of this rule explain

the policies underlying a rule against concurrent conflicts of

interest. Absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in

one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other

matter, because a conflict that materially limits a lawyer’s

representation of her client, even absent direct adversity may hinder

a lawyer’s ability to “recommend or advocate all possible

positions” for her clients. Annotated Model Rules of Professional

Conduct 109 (5 ed.). th

As the New Jersey rule specifies, the lawyer’s own

interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on, or

otherwise materially limit, the representation of a client. A lawyer
Section 327(a) states: 13

“ Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the

court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,

appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not

hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are

disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying

out the trustee's duties under this title.”

11 U.S.C.A. § 327(a). Section 327(e) addresses professionals

employed for a “specified special purpose” and provides that 

“The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ,

for a specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee

in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor,

if in the best interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not

represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate

with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be

employed.”

11 U.S.C.A. § 327(e). 

Section 327 applies to a debtor in possession as well

as a trustee. United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d

138 (3d Cir. 1994). 

21

cannot allow a related business interest to affect his representation,

for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the

lawyer has an identified financial interest. See id. 

In addition to the standards established by

professional ethics, attorneys retained in bankruptcy proceedings

are also required to meet the restrictions imposed by section 327 of

the Bankruptcy Code. Subsection (a) restricts retention of 13

lawyers and other professionals to those who do not hold or

represent an interest adverse to the estate and are disinterested.

Subsection (e) permits employment of an attorney “for a specified

special purpose,” so long as the attorney does not hold or represent

“any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to

the matter” on which he is to be employed. The “special purpose”
It appears that Gilbert acted as co-counsel with 14

Weitz for these two individuals in their claims against another

bankrupt asbestos company. 

We note a striking disparity between the combined 15

settlement of $16 million, which included fully secured

assignments of insurance proceeds Messrs. Cook and Arseneault

received, and the partially unsecured $100,000 settlement that

others with mesothelioma claims would receive under the

settlement agreement’s disease matrix.

22

must be unrelated to the reorganization and must be explicitly

described in the application. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 ed.) ¶ th

327.04[9][d]. 

To put the matter in focus we will review Gilbert’s

activities in chronological order. In September 2002, when it had

existing co-counsel agreements with Weitz in several asbestos

matters, Gilbert represented Congoleum in settlement negotiations

with Weitz to resolve the claims of two of its own clients, Cook 14

and Arsenault, whose mesothelioma claims were then in trial.

Congoleum settled the cases for cash, plus a secured claim against

funds that Congoleum hoped to recover from its excess insurers.15

In November 2002, Gilbert became co-counsel with Weitz in two

other asbestos bankruptcy cases. 

In February 2003, Congoleum retained Gilbert for the

purpose of negotiating the pre-packaged chapter 11 reorganization.

The retainer called for negotiations with “key asbestos bodily

injury claimants’ counsel” as well as arriving at the “terms of a

‘pre-packaged’ plan of reorganization . . . reviewing and

commenting on the plan of reorganization . . . [and] assisting or

consulting with Congoleum and its bankruptcy counsel on a

strategy for confirmation of the pre-packaged plan.” 

For most of 2003, Gilbert, Weitz and Rice worked

on the terms of an agreement to settle Congoleum’s current

asbestos related injury claims. The settlement agreement they

ultimately drafted provided for screening of each participating

claimant by Kenesis, a process that was in effect during the prepetition period. At the same time, Gilbert was assisting the Dughi

firm in the coverage litigation in the New Jersey state court. 
In a deposition in the New Jersey coverage action, 16

Scott Gilbert, a partner in Gilbert, was asked if any of the claimants

he represented as co-counsel with Weitz in the Robert A. Keasbey

case were also suing Congoleum. Scott Gilbert replied that he was

unsure how many claimants overlapped and had never attempted

to determine if there was an overlap. In subsequent deposition

testimony he would only “assume” that Gilbert represented clients

in other bankruptcies that had claims against Congoleum, including

Messrs. Cooke and Arsenault. 

23

Weitz represented many individuals who presented

claims against Congoleum and who were screened by Kenesis and

who were also clients of Gilbert as co-counsel. Before the

insurers’ appeal reached the District Court, Gilbert produced in the

New Jersey coverage action a list of claimants that it represented

as co-counsel with Weitz. This list contains the names of

approximately 15,000 individuals; the insurers estimated 10,000 of

those individuals have claims against Congoleum. Neither Gilbert

nor Congoleum have denied that there is an overlap of claimants.

16

In at least three other asbestos claimant cases, Gilbert

and Weitz had agreed to charge the individuals they jointly

represented a 10% contingency fee “on any and all insurance

proceeds recovered . . . [by the claimant] in connection with their

claims against [the asbestos defendant] and its insurers.” The

insurers here assert that that same fee arrangement is present in

cases against Congoleum. Gilbert has not denied that assertion

despite demands that it disclose the details of its fee sharing

arrangements with Weitz. Thus Gilbert represented Congoleum

and actively participated in the claimants’ settlement negotiations

while simultaneously representing some of those claimants, albeit

assertedly only in insurance matters. 

In negotiating the settlement agreement and plan

terms with Weitz and Rice pre-petition, Gilbert, as counsel for

Congoleum, had a duty to limit the company’s responsibility on

such key features as the disease matrix, exposure to asbestos from

Congoleum products, if any, and the extent of actual injury.

Although the settlement agreement required the claimants to

release Congoleum, Gilbert admitted in the coverage action in state
24

court that the release was a limited one and applied only if

proceeds were recovered from the insurance companies. If that

attempt failed, then Congoleum would be liable to the individual

claimants for the amount of the settlements, thus pitting

Congoleum against the individual claimants Gilbert represents as

co-counsel with Weitz.

Congoleum’s interests called for a reduction in the

number of claims approved that would likely be included in a

settlement package presented to the insurers. The insurers cited

major deficiencies in the validity of some claims approved by

Kenesis. To the extent that the claims were not valid, it was

Gilbert’s responsibility in representing Congoleum to see that they

were rejected, even though it would be adverse to Gilbert’s

interests if those claims were pursued individually or were

excluded from a “package” offered to the insurers in settlement.

This was not a potential, but an actual conflict. 

To legitimize the alleged conflicts, Gilbert relies on

waivers both from Congoleum and clients the firm represented as

co-counsel with Weitz. However, Gilbert did not contact the

claimants; instead it relied upon Weitz to secure those waivers. 

As discussed above, in several earlier asbestos

bankruptcy proceedings, Weitz executed engagement letters for

Gilbert’s work as co-counsel. In those agreements, Weitz waived

“all present and future conflicts of interest on behalf of” the

individual clients the firms jointly represented and agreed to advise

the clients of the information contained in the engagement letters

including Gilbert’s disclosure of its representation of tort

defendants. Gilbert has not disclosed an engagement letter with

Weitz for claimants in the Congoleum case, although it has not

denied that one exists. 

The record does not establish that Weitz had the

authority to issue waivers on behalf of the thousands of individual

claimants it represented. In addition, the record does not include

the information, if any, that Weitz furnished to the individuals nor

does it indicate whether they were given the opportunity to object
 In a subsequent proceeding, the insurers 17

challenged Rice & Weitz’s failure to disclose any type of cocounsel, consultant or fee sharing relationships as required by

Bankruptcy Rule 20019. The bankruptcy judge directed Weitz,

Rice and others to comply and commented that many of the

creditors “have never seen a copy of the disclosure statement and,

for all the court knows, have absolutely no idea how their claim

will be treated under the plan.” Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured

Asbestos Claimant’s Committee [Congoleum], 321 B.R. 147, 2005

WL 435207 (D. N.J. 2005). 

25

to Gilbert’s representation. 

17

Although concurrent conflicts may be waived by

clients under the New Jersey and ABA Rules of Professional

Conduct, the effect of a waiver, particularly a prospective waiver,

depends upon whether the clients have given truly informed

consent. Given the complexities of the bankruptcy proceeding and

the “many hats” worn by Gilbert throughout the pre- and postpetition process, we cannot conclude that the purported waivers

Gilbert received from Weitz “on behalf of” the individual clients

constituted informed, prospective consent. See Baldasarre v.

Butler, 625 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1993) (concluding that informed

consent was not sufficient in a complex commercial real estate

transaction); In re Matter of Edward J. Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076, 1082

(N.J. 1978) (“[T]his Court will not tolerate consents which are less

than knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”); In re Lanza, 322 A.2d

445 (N.J. 1974) (concluding that attorney should have first

explained . . . all the facts and indicated in specific detail all of the

areas of potential conflict that foreseeably might arise.”). 

We conclude that Gilbert did not receive effective

waivers from the claimants it represented and, therefore, acted in

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

B.

In addition to failing to review the waiver problem,

the bankruptcy judge relied on an unrealistic view that the

insurance interests of the claimants and Congoleum were so closely

aligned and so narrowly defined that there was no actual conflict

of interest. This error was the result, to a great extent, of the
On May 13, 2005, the state judge in the New 18

Jersey coverage action heard oral argument on a motion to

disqualify Gilbert as counsel for Congoleum in that action. The

court concluded it would “reluctantly deny the insurance

companies’ motion to disqualify GHR as Congoleum’s attorney.”

The judge stated that he might have reached a different result if he

had received the motion to disqualify earlier in the proceedings.

The court also noted, in support of its decision not to grant the

motion to disqualify, that the Bankruptcy and District Courts in this

proceeding had previously denied similar motions as to Gilbert’s

alleged conflicts of interest.

26

court’s refusal to consider evidence about Gilbert’s activities in

negotiating and preparing the plan before its filing. Those prepetition activities were clearly separate from seeking a recovery

from insurance companies after the claims were liquidated or from

attempting to negotiate settlements with the insurers.18

The application presented to the bankruptcy court

recited that Gilbert would be “primarily responsible for strategic

advice on insurance issues, including but not limited to insurancerelated settlement negotiations and the representation of the

Debtors with respect to insurance issues arising in the context of

the chapter 11 cases.” However, the application also stated that

Gilbert’s representation had encompassed the negotiations of the

plan and pre-petition settlement of asbestos claims. The

application indicated that services to be provided post-petition

included “advising and assisting the debtors with respect to

insurance-related issues in connection with the formulation,

negotiation, and confirmation of a plan of reorganization.” 

Although the bankruptcy court relied on the narrow

role Gilbert was to have in the reorganization process, the judge did

not inquire about the broad scope of Gilbert’s activities in

negotiating the plan and the settlement agreement. Nor did the

court question Gilbert’s role post-petition, as described in

Congoleum’s application, in “advising and assisting [Congoleum]

with respect to insurance-related issues in connection with the

formulation, negotiation and confirmation of a plan of

reorganization.” 
27

Gilbert, in fact, continues to participate actively in

formulating and revising the plan. There have been changes and

amendments, at least four of them, to the text of the original plan

thus far and Gilbert has been involved in that process. A fifth

version of the plan is set for consideration some months hence.

In the usual situation, when counsel is retained to

recover insurance proceeds, the underlying claim has been reduced

to a judgment or settled for a specific amount. The retention of

special counsel to act solely as appellate lawyer in such

circumstances is an example of the intent of section 327(e). But

here the claims have not been liquidated – the plan has not yet been

approved and only that ruling will confirm the specific allocation

of damages. Until that occurs, action against the insurers is

premature. Gilbert has attempted to draw a sharp demarcation

between its insurance advice and other tasks it undertook. Its

efforts, however, might be likened to attempts at using a scalpel to

carve a bowl of soup. 

Gilbert’s retention is far too expansive an assignment

to be appropriate for an appointment under § 327(e). The

application more properly falls under the ambit of § 327(a) which

allows employment of professionals to assist generally in the

administration of the estate. That subsection, however, prohibits

appointments of individuals or entities who hold or represent an

interest adverse to the estate and are not “disinterested.”

In Marvel Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d 463 (3d

Cir. 1998), we held that disqualification could be imposed where

an actual conflict of interest was present or, within the discretion

of the court, where a potential conflict of interest existed. The

presence of the appearance of impropriety standing alone is not a

sufficient ground for disqualification, id. at 477, but there is more

than that here. See also In re: BHNP, 949 F.2d 1300, 1313 (3d Cir.

1991) (“[I]n some circumstances, the potential for conflict and the

appearance of conflict may, without more, justify remov[al] . . .[of

a trustee].”); In re: Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180-81 (1 Cir. 1987) st

(concluding that section 327 addresses the appearance of

impropriety, “irrespective of the integrity of person or firm under

consideration.”); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 ed.) § 327.04[5][a] th

(noting that the appearance of impropriety may, when combined

with a potential conflict, be sufficient for disqualification). 
 In Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos 19

Claimant’s Committee [Congoleum], 321 B.R. 147 n.17, 2005 WL

435207 (D. N.J. 2005), a proceeding in the Congoleum case

subsequent to this one, both courts agreed that pre-petition

relationships were relevant. “The totality of the facts before the

bankruptcy court suggest the opportunity for abuse of fee sharing

relationships, involving attorneys in connection with the prepetition process, to the end of conferring preferential security

interests on appellant’s clients.” 

See also S. Elizabeth Gibson, Fed. Judicial Ctr.,

Judicial Management of Mass Tort Bankruptcy Cases 122 (2005).

(“A judge presented with a prepackaged mass tort plan needs to be

fully informed about the circumstances surrounding the prepetition

negotiations in order to determine whether the process has been

tainted by conflicts of interest or self-interested actions by the

participants.”).

28

Our discussion of the Rules of Professional Conduct

demonstrates that Gilbert also cannot meet the Bankruptcy Code’s

requirement of disinterestness contained in section 327(a). Its

status as co-counsel with Weitz and its ownership interest in

Kenesis represent factors which prevent Gilbert from being

completely loyal to Congoleum’s interests. We note also in this

respect that waivers under § 327(a) are ordinarily not effective.

See In re: Granite Partners LP, 219 B.R. 22, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1998); Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 328.05[3] (15 ed.). th

We conclude that Gilbert’s employment in this case

was contrary to section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

We do not approve of a bankruptcy court applying

less than careful scrutiny to pre-petition procedures in prepackaged plans. The parties here seek the court’s imprimatur of a

reorganization that will free the debtor of all current and future

asbestos liability. The legitimacy of such a transaction is

dependent on the stature of the court.19

In a pre-packaged setting, most of the work on a plan

of reorganization that would occur in a “traditional bankruptcy”

happens before the debtor files its petition. For a court to approve
29

a pre-packaged plan whose preparation was tainted with

overreaching, for example, would be a perversion of the

bankruptcy process.

Pre-packaged plans offer a means of expediting the

bankruptcy process by doing most of the work in advance of filing.

That efficiency, however, must not be obtained at the price of

diminishing the integrity of the process. In this case, it was not a

proper exercise of the bankruptcy court’s discretion to fail to

consider and appraise the conduct of the parties and counsel prepetition. 

We observe also that the bankruptcy court has an

obligation to prevent unnecessary expenditures in the

administration of an estate. See In re: Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs.,

Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the bankruptcy court

has authority to examine counsel fees sua sponte). Even if it be

assumed that Gilbert’s representation of Congoleum post-petition

was exclusively related to its forthcoming disputes with the

insurers, it is not clear on this record why it was necessary to

appoint an additional firm to handle insurance issues. The Dughi

firm had represented Congoleum for more than ten years in

insurance matters and had been actively engaged in the state court

coverage action since 2001. The record fails to reveal what special

competence in the insurance field Gilbert would provide in

addition to that of the Dughi firm. 

The flood of asbestos litigation has been a serious

problem for the courts of this country because the large number of

claims are not easily adaptable to traditional common law

procedures. See Achem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997);

Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 200. Congress has provided

for the use of a trust and channeling injunction as a possible

solution, but it appears that the proposals for implementation of an

administrative system somewhat similar to that used in black lung

claims are more promising. 

As this case demonstrates, leaving the procedures for

allocation of resources predominantly in the hands of private,

conflicting interests has led to problems of fair and equal

resolution. The need for counsel with undivided loyalties is more

pressing in cases of this nature than in more familiar conventional

litigation. Correspondingly, the level of court supervision must be
30

of a high order. 

Many of the issues are similar to those that arise in

class actions for personal injuries. In re: Community Bank of

Northern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005), we commented

that “in class actions, particularly settlement-only suits, the district

court has a duty ‘to protect the members of the class . . . from

lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional

and fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead

of that of the class.’” Id. at 318 (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial

Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7 Cir. 2002)). We need make no th

finding that this has occurred in the case before us, but we caution

that here, as in situations of settlement-only class litigation,

“careful and comprehensive scrutiny is required.” 

We recognize that ordinarily a remand to the District

and Bankruptcy courts would be in order for further findings and

appropriate action. However, here the record contains sufficient

evidence that we may expedite the procedures. Therefore, we will

reverse the order approving the retention of the Gilbert firm and

remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with

this Opinion.