IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION

MOTION OFFENSE, LLC, 

Plaintiff

v. 

DROPBOX, INC, 

Defendant

Civil Action No.: 6:20-cv-00251-ADA

MOTION OFFENSE, LLC, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DROPBOX, INC., 

Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 6:21-cv-758-ADA

DROPBOX, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 

OPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 1 of 11
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. MOTION OFFENSE WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE JURY’S VERDICT ON 

INVALIDITY AND PRIORITY FOR THE ’548 AND ’215 PATENTS........................... 1

II. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT ON INVALIDITY AND PRIORITY FOR 

THE ’548 AND ’215 PATENTS......................................................................................... 3

III. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PRIORITY........................................................ 5

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 2 of 11
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Bankers Trust Co. v. Mullins, 

435 U.S. 381 (1978).............................................................................................................5

Carr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

312 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2002) ...............................................................................................4

Flexuspine, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., 

879 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018)............................................................................................4

Floyd v. Laws, 

929 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991) .............................................................................................4

Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 

708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)....................................................................................2, 3, 5

In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 

454 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Aug. 30, 2006).................................................5

Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 

688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................2

Luken v. Lynaugh, 

98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 1996) ...........................................................................................4, 5

Mercer I v. Long Mfg. N. C., Inc, 

665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................3

Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 

671 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1982) ...............................................................................................1

Minshall v. Hartman Equine Reprod. Ctr., P.A., 

No. 4:15-CV-764, 2017 WL 1495077 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2017).......................................4

Nat’l Hispanic Circus, Inc. v. Rex Trucking, Inc., 

414 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2005) ...............................................................................................4

Oyefodun v. City of New Orleans, 

No. CIV.A. 98-3283, 2001 WL 775574 (E.D. La. July 9, 2001) ........................................4

Robroy Indus. Inc. v. Schwalbach, 

481 F. App’x 133 (5th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................4

Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 

497 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1974) ...............................................................................................1

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 3 of 11
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Team Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint Nola, L.L.C., 

976 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2020) ...........................................................................................3, 4

White v. Grinfas, 

809 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1987) .............................................................................................4

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 4 of 11
On May 19, 2023, the jury returned its verdict, finding (1) no asserted claim infringed; (2) 

all asserted claims—including the ’548 and ’215 patent claims—invalid; (2) that no asserted claim 

is entitled to a September 2012 priority date. Dkt. 382. After this Court read the verdict and 

confirmed it was the verdict of each juror, Motion Offense lodged no objection; it instead sat mute. 

Dkt. 410 at 1399:1-1401:18. 117 days passed, yet Motion Offense took no action. Only after 

Dropbox filed its August 28, 2023 motion seeking entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict did 

Motion Offense—for the first time—raise any issue with the verdict. Under Fifth Circuit and 

Federal Circuit precedent, Motion Offense waived its belated objections to the jury’s verdict. Even 

absent waiver, Motion Offense provides no basis on which this Court should disregard any aspect 

of the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, Dropbox’s proposed judgment should enter.

I. MOTION OFFENSE WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE JURY’S VERDICT

ON INVALIDITY AND PRIORITY FOR THE ’548 AND ’215 PATENTS.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 contemplates two categories of verdict forms: special 

and general. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro 49(a)-(b). As Motion Offense concedes, in the Fifth Circuit, a 

party waives its objection to alleged inconsistencies in a general verdict if the party fails to lodge 

those objections before the jury is dismissed. See Dkt. 411 at 6; see also Mercer v. Long Mfg. 

N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 948 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (waiver applies to general verdicts under Rule 

49(b)); Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529, 533-35 (5th Cir. 1974) (“By failing 

to object to the form of the verdict and answers at the time they were announced . . . both parties 

waived any objection . . . under Rule 49(b)”). Because Motion Offense failed to object to the jury’s 

verdict at the time it was read, it waived its objections. See Stancill, 497 F.2d at 533-35.

Attempting to avoid waiver, Motion Offense first claims the verdict is special under Rule

49(a). Dkt. 411 at 5-6. That is incorrect. The Federal Circuit addressed this precise issue in 

Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., where it determined, applying Fifth Circuit law, that a 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 5 of 11
2

verdict with yes/no questions on invalidity “is a general verdict [covered by Rule 49(b)] because 

...questions on anticipation and validity require legal instruction, the application of legal 

principles, and are more than ‘simply’ ‘written finding[s] upon each issue of fact.’” Function 

Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted); 

see also id. at 1328-29 (“[G]eneral verdicts require the jury to apply the law to facts, and therefore 

require legal instruction, whereas special verdicts compel the jury to focus exclusively on its fact 

finding role.”). Under Function Media, the jury’s verdict here is general, not special. Indeed, the 

invalidity verdict form questions closely parallel those found to be general in Function Media. 

Compare Dkt. 382 at 4 (“For each asserted patent claim, has Dropbox proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that the claim is invalid as anticipated or obvious in light of the prior art?”),

with Ex. 1, Function Media L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., No. 07-CV-0279, Dkt. 413 at 5 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 

26, 2010) (“Do you find that Google has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the 

following claims of the ’025 patent are invalid for [obviousness or anticipation]?”). Similarly, as 

with the invalidity verdict, the jury’s priority date verdict “require[d] the jury to apply the law to 

facts” and “require[d] legal instruction,” rendering it general under Function Media. Function 

Media, 708 F.3d at 1328; see also Dkt. 382 at 3 (“For each asserted patent claim, has Motion 

Offense proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is entitled to a priority date of 

September 25, 2012?”); Dkt. 374 § 11.2.1 (final jury instructions on prior art and priority date). 

Motion Offense thus waived its objection to the jury’s invalidity and priority date verdicts for the 

’548 and ’215 patents.

1

 

 1 Contrary to Motion Offense’s suggestion (Dkt. 411 at 5-6), Kinetic Concepts did not decide what 

constitutes a special versus general verdict. Rather, the Federal Circuit merely considered whether

a plaintiff waived implied fact issues not submitted to the jury. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & 

Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Kinetic Concepts is also consistent with 

Function Media, as the court noted “there is strength to the argument that . . . the [district] court 

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 6 of 11
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Motion Offense next appears to claim—without support—that the presence of multiple 

general verdict questions somehow transforms a general verdict into a special one. But Function 

Media bars that argument. Dkt. 411 at 6. As here, the Function Media verdict included multiple 

questions and yet was a general verdict. See 708 F.3d at 1329; Ex. 1 at 2, 5; see also Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 49(b) (“General Verdict with Answers to Written Questions”)2. Moreover, Motion Offense’s 

claim that the jury “never decided the classic general verdict question of who won and who lost” 

(Dkt. 411 at 6) is incorrect and irrelevant. The verdict form clearly indicated whether each answer 

(yes or no) was “for Motion Offense” or “for Dropbox.” See Dkt. 382 at 2-4. And even if the jury 

did not decide the “classic general verdict question,” (Dkt. 411 at 6) where “the form satisfies Rule 

49(b) except for not stating that the jury finds for one party, it can still be a general verdict.” Team 

Contractors, L.L.C. v. Waypoint Nola, L.L.C., 976 F.3d 509, 515-17 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[s]uch a 

verdict form...would be an even worse fit for Rule 49(a)”). In fact, though Motion Offense relies 

on Team Contractors, there a multi-question breach of contract verdict was held to be general. Id.

at 519-20. And in Mercer I v. Long Mfg. N. C., Inc, “[n]o general verdict was rendered by the jury, 

and the [court] entered judgment only after applying the treble damage provisions of the [Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act].” Mercer I v. Long Mfg. N. C., Inc, 665 F.2d 

61, 65 (5th Cir. 1982)). In contrast, here, judgment may enter on the jury’s verdict, which “fully 

resolve[s] the case.” Team Contractors, 976 F.3d at 517. Because the verdict is general under Rule

49(b) and Motion Offense failed to object before the jury was dismissed, its objections are waived. 

II. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT ON INVALIDITY AND PRIORITY 

FOR THE ’548 AND ’215 PATENTS.

Contrary to Motion Offense’s assertion (Dkt. 411 at 2), the Court cannot simply disregard 

 

chose to employ a general verdict.” Id. at 1359. 2 All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 7 of 11
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the jury’s invalidity and priority verdicts for ’548 and ’215 patents. “Under the Seventh 

Amendment and Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(2), a district court is bound to enter judgment on the jury’s 

answers if they are clear and consistent.” Luken v. Lynaugh, 98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 1996); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2) (“[T]he court must promptly approve the form of the judgment, [when] 

the jury returns a special verdict or a general verdict with answers to written questions[.]”).3 “[A] 

judgment not in accord with [the jury’s] answers must be reversed.” Luken, 98 F.3d 1339. 

Flexuspine, on which Motion Offense relies (Dkt. 411 at 3-4), is not to the contrary. 

Critically, there, the court was able to send the verdict back to jury before its release to revisit the 

verdict form. Flexuspine, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., 879 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The 

district court instructed the jury to retire again with a blank verdict form, review the verdict form, 

and return a verdict consistent with both questions asked and the district court’s written 

instructions on the verdict form.”). In contrast here, Motion Offense failed to object before the 

jury’s dismissal, thus depriving this Court of the ability to send the verdict back to the jury. 

Motion Offense’s reliance on caselaw involving special verdicts is also misplaced.

4 Unlike 

special verdicts, general verdicts—like that at issue here—require the jury to “appl[y] the 

explanations given to them on the law to their fact findings and thereby indicate a final result” to

“resolv[e] the case.” Team Contractors, 976 F.3d at 517-20. For that reason, the court may not 

abrogate the jury’s role by refusing to enter judgment on its verdict. That is particularly true here, 

 3 Motion Offense takes inconsistent positions on whether the jury’s verdict is irreconcilably 

inconsistent. See Dkt. 411 at 2-3. However, to the extent Motion Offense contends that the jury’s 

verdict is inconsistent, as discussed above, that objection was waived. 

4 See Robroy Indus. Inc. v. Schwalbach, 481 F. App’x 133, 137 (5th Cir. 2012); White v. Grinfas, 

809 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1987); Nat’l Hispanic Circus, Inc. v. Rex Trucking, Inc., 414 F.3d 546 

(5th Cir. 2005); Carr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 312 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2002); Minshall v. 

Hartman Equine Reprod. Ctr., P.A., 2017 WL 1495077, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2017); Oyefodun 

v. City of New Orleans, 2001 WL 775574, at *3 (E.D. La. July 9, 2001); Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 

1390, 1397 (9th Cir. 1991).

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 8 of 11
5

where the jury was provided no opportunity to cure any alleged inconsistency, as doing so “would 

undermine the incentives for efficient trial procedure and would allow the possible misuse of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . to implant a ground for appeal should the jury’s opinion prove 

distasteful.” Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1330. Thus, the Court should enter judgment on the 

jury’s validity and priority verdicts for the ’548 and ’215 patents.

III. THE JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PRIORITY.

Judgment should enter on the jury’s verdict on the priority date for all asserted patents. The 

Court already considered and overruled Motion Offense’s objections to the priority date 

questions—and for good reason. See Dkt. 368, 382. As the jury was properly instructed, Motion 

Offense had the burden to prove that there was written description support for a priority date earlier 

than the asserted patents’ filing date. See Dkt. 374 § 11.2.1. Entry of judgment is not the proper 

place for Motion Offense to relitigate its verdict form objections. Rather, “[t]he sole purpose of 

the [Rule 58] separate-document requirement,...[i]s to clarify when the time for appeal...begins 

to run.” Bankers Trust Co. v. Mullins, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978). As discussed above, this Court is 

“bound to enter judgment on the jury’s answers.” Luken, 98 F.3d 1339. 

Nor was the priority date issue an “ancillary factual question.” Dkt. 411 at 7. The issue was 

hotly contested; indeed, both parties included it in their statement of contentions. See Dkts. 321-3, 

321-4. The mere fact that the jury could have found invalidity on an alternative basis does not 

mean judgment should not enter on the questions the jury actually decided. Moreover, unlike in 

Cendant, Dropbox has not proposed including “an extended presentation of facts and procedural 

history” in the final judgment. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 

2006), as amended (Aug. 30, 2006). Dropbox merely requests that the Court honor the jury’s 

verdict by entering a consistent judgment.

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 9 of 11
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September 26, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregory H. Lantier

Kelly Ransom

Texas State Bar No. 24109427

KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP

303 Colorado, Suite 2000

Austin, Texas 78701

Tel: (512) 495-6400

kelly.ransom@kellyhart.com

Gregory H. Lantier

Amanda L. Major (pro hac vice)

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington DC 20037

Tel: (202) 663-6327

Tel: (202) 663-6304

gregory.lantier@wilmerhale.com

amanda.major@wilmerhale.com

Liv Herriot (pro hac vice)

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

2600 El Camino Real, Suite 400

Palo Alto, California 94306

Tel: (650) 858-6138

liv.herriot@wilmerhale.com

Makenzi G. Herbst (pro hac vice)

Rauvin A. Johl (pro hac vice)

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & 

DORR LLP

60 State Street

Boston, MA 02109 

Tel: (617) 526-6171

Tel: (617) 526-6104

Tel: (617) 526-6109

makenzi.herbst@wilmerhale.com

rauvin.johl@wilmerhale.com

Harry L. Gillam, Jr.

Texas State Bar No. 07921800

GILLAM & SMITH, L.L.P.

303 South Washington Avenue

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 10 of 11
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Marshall, Texas 75670

Tel: (903) 934-8450

Fax: (903) 934-9257

gil@gillamsmithlaw.com 

Attorneys for Dropbox, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record are being served with a copy of 

this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system on September 26, 2023. 

/s/ Kelly Ransom

Case 6:20-cv-00251-ADA Document 413 Filed 09/26/23 Page 11 of 11