Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices 63139 

collection of information associated 

with the DHS complaint form. DHS is 

proposing to make one change to the 

DHS compliant form. This change is the 

addition of a new checkbox that says 

‘‘gender identity’’ as a sub-category 

under the existing checkbox that says 

‘‘sex’’ on the form. Gender identity 

discrimination is a form of sex 

discrimination, which is covered under 

Title VII. So this information is already 

included in data gathered in EEO 

complaints; adding the separate check 

box just more clearly identifies a subcategory. This form modification is in 

accordance with new instructions from 

EEOC—requiring all government 

agencies to specifically identify this 

type of information on our complaint 

forms. 

The Office of Management and Budget 

is particularly interested in comments 

which: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

Analysis 

Agency: Office for Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties, DHS. 

Title: DHS Individual Complaint of 

Employment Discrimination. 

OMB Number: 1610–0001. 

Frequency: Annually. 

Affected Public: Federal Government. 

Number of Respondents: 1200. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 30 

minutes. 

Total Burden Hours: 600 hours. 

Dated: October 9, 2014. 

Margaret H. Graves, 

Deputy Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25055 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9B–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Regional Equipment and 

Capabilities Exchange, DHS Form 

10090 and DHS Form 10089 

AGENCY: Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, DHS. 

ACTION: 30-Day Notice and request for 

comments; New Collection, 1601–NEW. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security, Domestic Nuclear Dectection 

Office, DHS will submit the following 

information collection request (ICR) to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review and clearance in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 

44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). DHS previously 

published this information collection 

request (ICR) in the Federal Register on 

July 1, 2014 at 79 FR 37337 for a 60-day 

public comment period. No comments 

were received by DHS. The purpose of 

this notice is to allow additional 30- 

days for public comments. 

DATES: Comments are encouraged and 

will be accepted until November 21, 

2014. This process is conducted in 

accordance with 5 CFR 1320.10. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit written comments on 

the proposed information collection to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget. Comments should be addressed 

to OMB Desk Officer, Department of 

Homeland Security and sent via 

electronic mail to oira_submission@

omb.eop.gov or faxed to (202) 395–5806. 

The Office of Management and Budget 

is particularly interested in comments 

which: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Joint 

Analysis Center (JAC), of the Operation 

Support Division, is responsible for 

providing awareness of the Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), 

and functions as a central point of the 

GNDA providing awareness of nuclear 

threats to the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO). The JAC plans 

to implement a Regional Equipment and 

Capabilities Exchange (RECE) to identify 

and compare existing information 

referencing the domestic nuclear 

radiological detection capabilities of all 

participating stakeholders. 

The circumstances that make the 

RECE necessary is the need for a 

database that accurately reflects the 

current R/N detection capabilities 

federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local 

(FSTTL) stakeholders. 

The RECE will recognize a standard 

process and procedure that the JAC 

facilitates to ensure a collaborative and 

coordinated data collection 

methodology is followed for fidelity of 

information. The successful 

implementation of the RECE will aid 

DNDO in achieving specific objectives 

mandated in National Security 

Presidential Directive (NSPD)–43/

Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive (HSPD)–14, and codified in 

Title 6, United States Code (U.S.C.) 592. 

Attached is the HSPD14/NSPD43, 

please reference the following sections 

within NSPD–43/HSPD–14: 

Subject: Domestic Nuclear Detection 

(1)(b) Continue to enhance the 

effective integration of nuclear and 

radiological detection capabilities across 

Federal, State, local, and tribal 

governments and the private sector for 

a managed, coordinated response; 

(2)(b) Enhance and coordinate the 

nuclear detection efforts of Federal, 

State, local, and tribal governments and 

the private sector to ensure a managed, 

coordinated response; 

(2)(f) Support and enhance the 

effective sharing and use of appropriate 

information generated by the 

intelligence community, law 

enforcement agencies, counterterrorism 

community, other government agencies, 

and foreign governments, as well as 

provide appropriate information to 

these entities; and 

DNDO needs the information to be 

collected by the RECE to enhance and 

coordinate the rad/nuc detection efforts 

of Federal, State, local and tribal 

governments, and to effectively share 

the resources information with all 

interested entities. 

Although not legal justification to 

collect information, the 2010 GNDA 

Strategic Plan goals are provided as 

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63140 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices 

additional information that serves as 

examples for how this collection effort 

supports internal DNDO initiatives. 

The RECE directly relates to the 

following specific goals within the 2010 

GNDA Strategic Plan: 

• Goal 3: Communicate—Exchange 

relevant data, by receiving information 

from and disseminating information to 

relevant authorities and the general 

public, as appropriate. 

• Goal 4: Coordinate—Ensure that 

stakeholders with GNDA functions 

minimize gaps and unintended overlaps 

in roles and responsibilities, including 

through collaboration and cooperation. 

Additionally, the RECE helps DNDO 

meet DHS’ lead and supporting roles in 

the following 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan 

Objectives: 

• Objective 4: Assist state, local, and 

tribal governments in detecting and 

reporting on any unauthorized nuclear 

and radiological materials within their 

jurisdictions. 

• Objective 5: Develop or enhance the 

federal interior detection architectures 

and strategies. 

• Objective 7: Receive information 

from, and disseminate information to 

relevant authorities and the general 

public. 

• Objective 8: Ensure that 

Stakeholders with GNDA functions 

minimize gaps and unnecessary 

overlaps in roles, responsibilities, and 

activities. 

• Objective 9: Ensure that the GNDA 

can adapt and react in response to 

changes in technology, protocols, and 

adversary capabilities. 

Information collected is the type used 

in the ordinary course of business 

(official business Points of Contact; 

names, addresses, emails, office phone 

number to call.) The purpose of the 

RECE form (DHS Form 10089) is to 

collect and warehouse relevant data for 

federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local 

(FSTTL) authorities to minimize gaps 

and unintended overlaps in roles and 

responsibilities for radiological or 

nuclear (R/N) detection capabilities. The 

primary purpose of the RECE 

Questionnaire form is to collect data on 

current stakeholder (primarily directed 

at state and local) radiological or 

nuclear (R/N) detection equipment 

inventories and resources to streamline 

access to a real-time depiction of R/N 

detection capabilities and serve as a 

warehouse for the data. Data collected 

will be available via the Joint Analysis 

Center Collaborative Information 

System (JACCIS). The Adobe Active 

‘‘fillable’’ form focuses on the specific 

information regarding the respective R/ 

N detection program plans, assets, and 

status of equipment. As part of the 

overall mission of the JAC, the RECE 

presents an opportunity to extend 

access to stakeholders with a RND 

mission, program, or equipment but not 

reflected in an accessible database. 

The JAC aims to provide assistance to 

State or Local entities with limited 

access to resources as part of the RECE, 

and establish a standing collection 

strategy. Information can be submitted 

through use of a questionnaire (hard/

soft copy transmittal), or scripted phone 

interviews. The questionnaire will be 

distributed in compatible file format 

Adobe PDF Fill-able Form. All emails 

and phone interviews will not deviate 

from the scope or content of the DHS 

Form 10089. Phone interviews will be 

conducted on an as needed basis for the 

purposes of non-submittals or to address 

questions related to answers of 

information provided within the form. 

All data submitted will be processed 

and stored in a Microsoft Excel 

spreadsheet for review prior to Joint 

Analysis Center Collaborative 

Information System (JACCIS) 

integration. The RECE will help to 

accurately reflect the current domestic 

radiological and detection capabilities 

within JACCIS. The JACCIS Dashboard 

provides a secure web interface to 

collaborate with mission partners and 

includes a GIS that allows users to view 

detection information, detectors, 

situational awareness reports, and other 

overlays (critical infrastructure, etc.) in 

a geospatial viewer. Web Service 

interfaces to other mission partner’s 

systems and content routers provide 

linkages to detection assets around the 

country in real-time. 

The information collected will be 

used to provide a more accurate or realtime depiction of the GNDA. 

Information can be submitted through 

use of a questionnaire (hard/soft copy 

transmittal), email DNDO.JAC2@

HQ.DHS.GOV or phone interviews 1– 

877–363–6522. Use of these three 

methods of information submittals 

provides flexibility to the targeted 

collection audience which may have 

limited access to technological 

collection. All data submitted will be 

processed and stored in an excel 

spreadsheet, saved in a designated 

folder within a non-public DHS network 

share drive folder. Following review of 

spreadsheet information, data will be 

integrated into JACCIS in accordance 

with agreed distribution or sharing 

regulations; each questionnaire 

participant will be encouraged to 

acquire a JACCIS account, and point of 

contact information for JACCIS account 

acquisition are included within DHS 

Form 10089 RECE Questionnaire 

Directives. Information already available 

cannot be used or modified for use 

because it extremely dated, and lacks 

the specificity required for accurate 

accountability. To provide real-time 

depiction of the GNDA, there needs to 

be accountability of current resources 

available at all levels. RND equipment 

varies greatly between States, Territories 

and Local jurisdictions, and it is often 

not controlled or regulated by a single 

entity. 

Efforts to identify duplication have 

included coordination with Federal 

stakeholders such as FEMA, CBP, and 

the FBI; each engagement revealed none 

of these agencies were in possession of 

a comprehensive complete data source 

which included specific domestic 

(United States) R/N detection 

capabilities for all States, Territories or 

Local jurisdictions. 

In 2007 and 2009 COL Brent 

Bredehoft Deputy Assistant Director (in 

2007/2009) of the Joint Analysis Center 

(JAC) directed his staff to conduct an 

informal information data call to federal 

entities only. In 2007 State and Local 

data was collected by the FBI (2006/

2007) and provided to the JAC. Neither 

data collection was for JACCIS, but a 

plan was developed to put data 

collected in JACCIS after receiving. This 

information was neither consistent nor 

comprehensive and largely inaccurate 

since much of the information was 

haphazardly compiled with limited 

distribution. Additionally the FBI has 

not updated or made available a revised 

version of the 2006/2007 data call. 

Additionally the RECE is organizing 

and analyzing relevant data from 

domestic Preventative Radiological 

Nuclear Detection (PRND) reports, 

specifically the National Capabilities 

Effort (NCE), but many of these NCE 

reports are extremely dated (greater than 

5 years old), do not provide definitive 

identification details regarding 

equipment, therefore there is no way to 

de-conflict with existing equipment 

data. The NCE reports were a contracted 

effort through Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA), and due to proprietary 

limitations when distributed to DNDO 

were not accompanied by the related 

raw data collection. Additionally, the 

NCE reports were created through 

informal collection techniques, and are 

largely inconsistent. 

Lastly, in the years since the NCE 

reports and JACCIS informal data calls 

many States, Territories and Local 

jurisdictions have made significant 

advancements and or efforts towards 

acquiring R/N detection capability. With 

that said, State, Territories and Local 

jurisdictions are not subjected to any 

standing reporting requirement 

regarding R/N detection equipment or 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices 63141 

capabilities, which precludes DNDO or 

any other Federal Agency from 

providing a real-time and accurate 

accountability to decision-makers 

regarding available domestic R/N 

detection assets. 

There is no assurance of 

confidentiality provided to respondents. 

There will be no collection of trade 

secret or business proprietary 

information. Furnishing this 

information is voluntary; however, 

failure to furnish the requested 

information may prevent a user from 

contributing radiological or nuclear 

detection information to RECE. This 

could cause a hindrance when 

attempting to allocate resources during 

a global nuclear detection architecture 

related threat incident. 

The Office of Management and Budget 

is particularly interested in comments 

which: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

Analysis 

Agency: Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, DHS. 

Title: Regional Equipment and 

Capabilities Exchange. 

OMB Number: 1601–NEW. 

Frequency: Annually. 

Affected Public: State, Local, Tribal 

Governments. 

Number of Respondents: 102. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 1 

hour. 

Total Burden Hours: 102. 

Dated: October 9, 2014. 

Margaret H. Graves, 

Deputy Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25050 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9D–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

United States Secret Service Protective 

Mission Panel 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, 

Department of Homeland Security. 

ACTION: Committee management: notice 

of committee establishment. 

SUMMARY: In order to facilitate an 

effective review of the security provided 

by the U.S. Secret Service to the White 

House compound, the Department of 

Homeland Security (Department or 

DHS) is creating the U.S. Secret Service 

Protective Mission Panel (USSSPMP or 

Panel). Pursuant to the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, the Department is 

taking immediate measures to establish 

this independent panel of experts to 

inquire into recent incidents at the 

White House compound and to provide 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security 

recommendations for potential new 

directors of the U.S. Secret Service and 

whether there should be a broader 

review of the U.S. Secret Service. 

Name of Committee: U.S. Secret 

Service Protective Mission Panel. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Peter Boogaard, Office of Public Affairs, 

(202) 282–8010, MediaInquiry@

HQ.DHS.GOV. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

DHS is establishing an independent 

panel to review the recent fence 

jumping incident at the White House on 

September 19, 2014 and related issues 

concerning security at the White House 

compound; to provide 

recommendations for potential new 

directors of the Secret Service; and to 

recommend whether there should be a 

broader review of the Secret Service. 

This time-sensitive and important 

review will entail discussion of 

classified information. 

This Department has recognized in 

the past that some highly critical issues 

cannot be discussed in public without 

jeopardizing the security and 

confidentiality of sensitive homeland 

security information. For example, in 

2006, the Department established the 

Critical Infrastructure Partnership 

Advisory Council (CIPAC) to aid in the 

communication and coordination 

between critical private sector entities 

and the Federal agencies charged with 

regulating them. See 71 FR 14930 (Mar. 

24, 2006). Discussions between the 

members of that Council involve 

intelligence and law enforcement 

information and remain non-public to 

avoid giving our nation’s enemies 

information they could use to effectively 

attack a particular infrastructure. 

Many of the issues to be reviewed by 

the Panel will require access to, and 

discussion of, non-public classified 

information and other non-public law 

enforcement sensitive information. 

These matters include protective 

measures at the White House, sensitive 

law enforcement techniques and 

methods, and the management of these 

protective and law enforcement 

missions of the Secret Service. 

II. Identifying Solutions 

The Department recognizes the 

importance of the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (FACA). The FACA, 

when it applies, generally requires 

advisory committees to meet in open 

session and make publicly available 

associated written materials. It also 

requires a 15-day notice before any 

meeting may be closed to public 

attendance. These requirements, 

however, would prevent the Department 

from convening on short notice a panel 

to discuss the sensitive and classified 

information surrounding the review of 

protective measures at the White House 

compound and other U.S. Secret Service 

law enforcement missions in an 

appropriate setting. The FACA contains 

a number of exceptions to its general 

disclosure rules, but the applicability of 

those exceptions are not sufficient to 

address the proper handling of 

classified material and the protection of 

law enforcement sensitive information 

in this unique context. The information 

that will be discussed and reviewed by 

this panel will be deliberative in nature 

and will involve classified information 

that, if discussed in public, would result 

in the unauthorized disclosure of 

information that could reasonably be 

expected to result in threats or damage 

to national security. Furthermore, the 

information discussed will involve 

techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations. The release 

of this information would enable 

criminals and enemies to use that 

information to circumvent the law and 

could reasonably be expected to 

endanger the life or physical safety of 

individuals. 

Section 871 of the Homeland Security 

Act provides the Secretary of Homeland 

Security with the authority to establish 

advisory committees and exempt them 

from the FACA. 6 U.S.C. 451(a). This 

authority allows the Department to 

freely and completely review the 

security procedures, to discuss potential 

vulnerabilities, and to provide the 

Department with information and 

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