IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

Ann Marie Attridge § 

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Plaintiff Civil Action No.:

5:20-cv-00205-OLG

versus

Colonial Savings F.A., & 

TransUnion, LLC

Defendants

Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

Repeated dissemination of incorrect information by Colonial Savings F.A. (“Colonial”)

unquestionably confers Article III standing for Plaintiff to pursue her claims in this 

matter. Plaintiff has pleaded and provided sufficient evidence to proceed to trial and show 

that she has suffered concrete, particularized, and actual harm as defined by the United 

States Supreme Court. 

Defamation per se is not a requirement to establish Article III standing under the 

FCRA. 

1. In the eleventh hour of this matter, Defendant contests the adequacy of Plaintiff’s 

pleadings relating to the concrete harms alleged. 

2. Defendant’s Reply relies on the distinction between defamation per se and 

defamation per quod. However, Defendant acknowledges that the Supreme Court 

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in Ramirez does not require this standard be met in the pursuit of a claim for 

damages caused by a defendant’s violation of the FCRA. Docket No. 93, n. 1.

3. Defendant acknowledges that “[t]he elements for a claim of defamation are the 

publication of a false statement to a third party and that this publication 

proximately caused damages to the plaintiff.” Docket No. 93, ¶ 3. It cites Texas 

law in saying that a good dentist can be a bad businessperson and not suffer 

reputational harm for being falsely called bankrupt. Shipp v. Malouf, 439 S.W.3d 

432, 441 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2014, pet. denied). As well as a 7th Circuit case 

explaining that calling former NBA player Scottie Pippen bankrupt did not 

constitute defamation. Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 613 (7th 

Cir. 2013).

4. Additionally, Defendant’s original Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing stated, 

“for an injury to be concrete, the Supreme Court has ‘emphasized repeatedly’ that 

it ‘must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense. The complainant 

must allege an injury to [herself] that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely 

abstract.” Docket No. 89, p. 6 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 

(1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 

5. Malouf explains when false information is defamation:

“These cases illustrate the principle stated in Hancock— to be defamatory 

per se, the words must adversely affect the plaintiff's fitness for the proper 

conduct of his business, trade, or profession. The words must touch the 

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plaintiff in a way harmful to one engaged in his particular business or 

profession. A merchant or building contractor will be touched in their 

profession by a false statement of bankruptcy, but not necessarily others. 

Thus we reject Malouf's argument that a false charge of bankruptcy is 

always defamation per se.

Shipp v. Malouf, 439 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) 

[internal citations omitted]

6. Here, Ann Attridge made a declaration wherein she explains that she spent her 

career as a mortgage loan officer. See Docket No. 40-1. More than a merchant, she 

is a banking professional. She has had substantial training in compliance. She holds 

an NMLS license. For someone to say that her mortgage was included in 

bankruptcy goes to the heart of who she is and what she does. It touches on her in a 

way easily considered harmful to her profession. 

Hypersensitive or not, Colonial takes Attridge as Found

7. Defendant does not contest that it repeatedly provided TransUnion with 

inaccurate information relating to Plaintiff. Defendant admits that its 

organizational and procedural lapses caused TransUnion to disseminate and 

publish these inaccuracies to third-party businesses. 

8. Defendant’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s damages concludes that Plaintiff has is 

hypersensitive. It claims “a hypersensitive allegation of mental anguish” (Docket 

No. 93, ¶ 9) or “hypersensitivity to feeling embarrassed that others might think 

she filed bankruptcy” (Docket No. 93, ¶ 11).

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9. Defendant, therefore, implies that even though it repeatedly violated the FCRA, 

Plaintiff has not suffered concrete harms—harms that may be “difficult to prove 

or measure” (Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341)—and that Defendant does not believe 

Plaintiff has suffered an “actual injury” (Docket No. 93, ¶ 11). Fortunately, as this 

Court has previously held, this determination remains in the hands of a jury, not 

Defendant. (See Docket No. 51, § III(A-B)). If Defendant is correct and Plaintiff is 

unusually sensitive even to the point of being hypersensitive to being called 

bankrupt, in 5th Circuit a Defendant takes a Plaintiff as found—with no limitation. 

Koch v. United States, 857 F.3d 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2017). 

10. Attridge has suffered multiple violations of her legally protected interests. These 

repeated violations have caused her concrete, particularized, and actual harm that 

is neither conjectural nor hypothetical. Thus, the Court must deny Colonial 

Savings F.A.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 

Dated: January 27, 2023 Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/William M. Clanton

William M. Clanton

Texas Bar No. 24049436

Law Office of Bill Clanton, P.C.

926 Chulie Drive

San Antonio, Texas 78216

Phone: (210) 226-0800

Fax: (210) 338-8660

Email: bill@clantonlawoffice.com

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