UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4427

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLES DENARD WASHINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00294-NCT-1)

Submitted: November 10, 2011 Decided: December 15, 2011

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, 

Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Robert A. J. Lang, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Charles Denard Washington appeals his conviction for

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, Washington contends that 

the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 

evidence produced during what he claims was an illegal seizure 

of his person by police officers. He argues that his detention 

violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by a 

reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. 

We affirm. 

This court reviews for clear error the factual 

findings underlying a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United 

States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When 

evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, the Court 

construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, the prevailing party below. Id.

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer 

may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer 

has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that 

criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 273 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Whether 

there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the 

totality of the circumstances, including the information known 
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to the officer and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the 

time of the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 

(1989); Foster, 634 F.3d at 246. The reasonable suspicion 

determination is a “commonsensical proposition,” and deference 

should be accorded to police officers’ determinations based on 

their practical experience and training. United States v. 

Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court correctly determined that Washington’s seizure 

was supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. When 

officers encountered Washington, he was in a known high-crime 

area and appeared to be attempting to conceal himself behind a 

dumpster. When an officer tried to confront him, he fled and 

failed to heed commands to stop. As we have previously stated, 

such circumstances, considered in their totality, are sufficient 

to support a reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in 

criminal activity. See United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 

345 (4th Cir. 2010). We find no merit in Washington’s reliance 

on the fact that, when taken alone, unprovoked flight or 

presence in a high-crime area will not support a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity. Foreman, 369 F.3d at 782. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED