IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION

PARKERVISION, INC., 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

INTEL CORPORATION,

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 6:20-cv-00108-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

 

 

PLAINTIFF PARKERVISION, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT INTEL CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

OF NONINFRINGMENT REGARDING U.S. PATENT NO. 7,539,474 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

APPLICABLE LAW ...................................................................................................................... 2

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3

I. Intel’s Evidence Contradicts its New Interpretation of the Word “Conductor.” ..................... 3

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...................................................................................................................2

Impossible Elecs. Techniques v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 

669 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................2

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 

37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................4

Mobility Electronics Inc v. Formosa Electronic Industries Inc et al, 

Case No.: 5-04-cv-00103, D.I. 204 (EDTX; Decided Feb 24, 2006) ........................................4

Texas Instruments, et al v. Linear Technology, 

Case No.: 2-01-cv-00003, D.I. No.: 133 (EDTX; Decided Apr. 3, 2002) .................................4

Tolan v. Cotton, 

134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) ...............................................................................................................2

Travanti Pharma Inc., v. Iomed, Inc., 

Case No.: 0-04-cv-02667, D.I. No. 56 (DMN; Decided Jan 11, 2006) .....................................4

Other Authorities

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ........................................................................................................................2

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INTRODUCTION

Claim 1 of the ’474 patent requires that a switch is coupled to a reference potential. The

Court construed the term “coupled” to mean “directly connected or connected through a 

conductor (or a closed switch).” D.I. 75 at 4 (emphasis added). Through summary judgment, 

Intel effectively seeks for the Court to decide whether a circuit component – a resistor – 

is a conductor. ParkerVision’s expert opines that within the context 

of the claims as the Court construed them, a resistor is a conductor. Thus, there is a genuine 

dispute of material fact and Intel’s motion should be denied. 

Recognizing that it is untenable to argue that a resistor does not conduct, Intel does not 

dispute this issue. Instead, Intel pivots and attempts to narrow the Court’s construction by 

reading-in new limitations -- which Intel never advocated for during claim construction. Intel 

now argues that when the Court used the word “conductor” in its construction it really meant “a 

circuit component that is designed to enable the unimpeded flow of electric current.” See, Intel’s 

Opening Brief for Non-Infringement at 5. (Emphasis in the original)(Hereinafter “D.I. 173”.) 

Intel is essentially asking the Court to re-interpret its prior claim construction ruling in a way that 

would render the indirect connection portion of that construction – “connected through a 

conductor (or a closed switch)” – meaningless. 

Nevertheless, the Court need not engage in Intel’s belated word games at summary 

judgment. They have no merit. Notably, the dictionary Intel relies on to support its position 

defines a “conductor” as simply something that conducts current – “a medium suitable for the 

conduction of electrical ... energy” See D.I. 173 at 5.n6 (citing Wiley Electrical Electronics 

Engineering Dictionary at definition no. 1.) As such, Intel’s own dictionary citation contradicts 

its position and creates a genuine dispute over a material fact requiring the denial of their 

summary judgment motion. 

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APPLICABLE LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). The burden of demonstrating that 

no genuine dispute of material fact exists lies with the party moving for summary judgment. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A court must view the movant’s presented 

evidence and all factual inferences from such evidence in a light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment. Impossible Elecs. Techniques v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 

669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982). 

BACKGROUND

Intel’s non-infringement argument is directed to the bolded language from claim 1 of the 

U.S. Patent No. 7,539,474, (the “’474 patent”) (below): 

wherein the first frequency down-conversion module comprises a first switch and a first 

storage element, wherein the first switch is coupled to the first storage element at a first 

node and coupled to a first reference potential; and

wherein the second frequency down-conversion module comprises a second switch and a 

second storage element, wherein the second switch is coupled to the second storage 

element at a second node and coupled to a second reference potential. 

D.I. 173 citing to D.I. 1-4. 

During claim construction, Intel attempted to improperly limit the term “coupled” to a 

direct connection. See D.I. 53 at 24-29 (Arguing that the claim term “the [] switch is coupled to 

the [] storage element at a [] node and coupled to a [] reference potential” should be construed as 

“the switch receives current from a storage element via a node, and shunts (i.e., diverts) current 

to a point held at a constant reference voltage”). In its claim construction ruling, the Court 

rejected Intel’s construction and construed “coupled” as having a plain and ordinary meaning of 

“directly connected or connected through a conductor (or a closed switch).” D.I. 75 at 4. 

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ARGUMENT

I. Intel’s Evidence Contradicts its New Interpretation of the Word “Conductor.” 

Intel argues that 

. D.I. 173 at 1. In particular, Intel asserts that because 

ParkerVision’s expert, Dr. Steer, disagrees. Indeed, Intel’s argument is facially incongruent with 

the Court’s construction, which provides that plain and ordinary term “coupled” includes both 

direct connections and indirect connections (through a conductor). D.I. 75 at 4. 

Intel cites to Dr. Steer’s deposition testimony as purportedly foreclosing any possible 

overlap between the words “resistor” and “conductor”. D.I. 173 at p. 5.n6. But the very 

testimony that Intel cites from Dr. Steer states that a conductor is simply “something that 

conducts current.” See D.I. 173 at p. 5 (citing Dr. Steer’s October 17, 2022, deposition at 167:19-

168:1). Notably, even Intel does not have the temerity to advance the fallacious position that a 

resistor does not conduct current. 

Though the Court does not have to go any further in its analysis, the record here is replete 

with additional evidence that shows that Intel has not, and cannot, establish the absence of a 

genuine dispute. For example, In Dr. Steer’s opening report he explains that “[w]hen a constant 

voltage V is placed across the resistor, the potential on one side of the resistor is higher than the 

potential on the other side and there will be a constant current I through the resistor.” Exhibit A, 

Steer Opening Report at ¶104. (emphasis added.). Therefore, there is record evidence

establishing that a resistor is “something that conducts a current” and, therefore, is a “conductor” 

Case 6:20-cv-00108-ADA Document 227 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 9
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as Dr. Steer discusses. See Id.; D.I. 173 at p. 5 (citing Dr. Steer’s October 17, 2022, deposition at 

167:19-168:1).1

Intel halfheartedly implies that because a resistors “introduce[] resistance into a circuit,” 

resistors somehow stop being conductors. This is also contradicted by the same testimony from 

Dr. Steer that Intel cites. Id. Specifically, Dr. Steer testified that a conductor “is a resistance” that 

is “generally” but “not necessarily a low resistance.” See Id. (emphasis added.) 

Intel’s argument that a resistor is incompatible with the claimed conductor is also 

contradicted by the very dictionary Intel cites in support of its motion. While Intel cites one of 

the definitions of “conductor” in Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary for the 

proposition that a conductor is “[a] medium which allows electric current to flow easily,” Intel 

ignores a second definition from the same dictionary that a “conductor” is simply “[a] medium 

suitable for the conduction of electrical ... energy.” See D.I. 173 at 5.n6. It is respectfully 

submitted that where, as here, a summary judgment movant’s own citations establish a genuine 

dispute of material fact, the motion should be denied for failure to meet its prima facie burden to 

show the absence of a dispute of material facts. See e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (Where the party moving for summary judgment fails its initial burden to 

1

 In the context of a summary judgment motion, Dr. Steer’s using the plain and uncontroversial 

definition of a “conductor” as “something that conducts a current” is independently sufficient to 

establish that a genuine dispute of material facts exists. Indeed, other District Courts have 

construed “conductor” consistently with Dr. Steer’s testimony in this case. See e.g., Texas 

Instruments, et al v. Linear Technology, Case No.: 2-01-cv-00003, D.I. No.: 133 at p. 17 (EDTX; 

Decided Apr. 3, 2002)(construing “conductor” as “a wire or other material available for carrying 

a current or transmitting voltage”); Travanti Pharma Inc., v. Iomed, Inc., Case No.: 0-04-cv02667, D.I. No. 56 at pp. 9-10 (DMN; Decided Jan 11, 2006)(construing “conductor” as “one or 

more conducting media”); Mobility Electronics Inc v. Formosa Electronic Industries Inc et al, 

Case No.: 5-04-cv-00103, D.I. 204 at 24 (EDTX; Decided Feb 24, 2006) (construing 

“conductor” as “a wire, cable or other body or medium that is suitable for carrying electric 

current”). 

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact “the motion must be denied, 

regardless of the nonmovant’s response.”). 

Since they were unable to establish the absence of a genuine dispute through Dr. Steer’s 

testimony, or even their own hand-picked dictionary entries, Intel resorts to a fallback argument 

based on their own expert’s erroneous opinion. But this is irrelevant because where experts 

disagree, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact. Intel inaccurately argues that “because it 

is [allegedly] undisputed that virtually all circuit components allow some current to 

flow...ParkerVision’s argument would mean that virtually all circuit components would 

constitute conductors and that all of the components of a circuit would be connected through 

conductors thus rendering the ‘connected through a conductor’ claim requirement completely 

meaningless.” D.I. 174 at p. 6. As an initial matter even if it were true, which it isn’t, that 

“virtually all” circuit components allowed some current to flow through them, that would not 

render the court’s construction “completely meaningless.” But, putting Intel’s hyperbole aside, 

there are circuit components that do not allow current flow, e.g., insulators and open switches. 

If Intel wants to present its litigation theory that even though its resistors conduct an 

electrical current, they somehow aren’t “conductors,” they are free to do so to the jury. But, in 

view of the foregoing, summary judgment of non-infringement should be denied. 

Case 6:20-cv-00108-ADA Document 227 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 9
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Dated: November 15, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

OF COUNSEL:

THE MORT LAW FIRM, PLLC

/s/Raymond W. Mort, III

Ronald M. Daignault (pro hac vice)*

Chandran B. Iyer (pro hac vice) 

Jason S. Charkow (pro hac vice)* 

Stephanie R. Mandir (pro hac vice) 

Zachary H. Ellis (Texas Bar No.

24122606)* 

Shailendra Maheshwari (pro hac vice)* 

Christian E. Samay (pro hac vice)* 

Scott R. Samay (pro hac vice)* 

Oded Burger (pro hac vice forthcoming)* 

 

DAIGNAULT IYER LLP

rdaignault@daignaultiyer.com 

cbiyer@daignaultiyer.com 

jcharkow@daignaultiyer.com 

smandir@daignaultiyer.com

zellis@daignaultiyer.com

smaheshwari@daignaultiyer.com

csamay@daignaultiyer.com

ssamay@daignaultiyer.com

oburger@daignaultiyer.com 

8618 Westwood Center Drive, Suite 150 

Vienna, Virginia 22182 

*Not Admitted in Virginia 

Raymond W. Mort, III

Texas State Bar No. 00791308 

raymort@austinlaw.com

501 Congress Avenue, Suite 150 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Tel/Fax: 512-865-7950 

Attorneys for Plaintiff ParkerVision, Inc.

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