Plaintiffs’ Original Collective Action Complaint Page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

PECOS DIVISION

JOHN COMEAUX AND DARRALL 

HENRY, ON BEHALF OF 

THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

PLAINTIFF

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-cv-15

LOTRAK ENVIRONMENTAL 

SERVICES, LLC AND BETH 

LAMBERT, INDIVIDUALLY,

DEFENDANTS

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PLAINTIFFS’ ORIGINAL COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT

 

Plaintiffs John Comeaux and Darrall Henry (“Named Plaintiffs”) on behalf of themselves 

and all others similarly situated (“Class Members”) (Named Plaintiffs and Class Members are 

collectively referred as “Plaintiffs”) bring this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) suit against the 

above-named Defendants (the “Defendants”) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, 

et seq., as amended. 

I. NATURE OF SUIT

1. The FLSA requires employers pay employees a minimum wage of at least $7.25 per hour. 29 

U.S.C. § 206(a). The FLSA “limits to 40 a week the number of hours that an employer may employ 

any of his employees subject to the Act, unless the employee receives compensation for his 

employment in excess of 40 hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at 

which he is employed.” Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944) (discussing the 

requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)).

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2. Defendants operate an oil services company performing work in and around Monahans, Texas. 

Defendants employed employees, including Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members, as 

roustabouts. Defendants paid Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members by the hour, and did not 

pay overtime premiums for any hours worked over forty. 

3. Because there are other putative Plaintiffs who are similarly situated to the Named Plaintiffs with 

regard to the work performed and the Defendants’ compensation policies, Named Plaintiffs bring 

this action as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

II. PARTIES

4. Named Plaintiff John Comeaux is an individual residing in Louisiana. His notice of consent is 

attached to Plaintiffs’Original Collective Action Complaint as Exhibit A. Named Plaintiff Darrall 

Henry is an individual residing in Louisiana. His notice of consent is attached to Plaintiffs’Original 

Collective Action Complaint as Exhibit B. At all relevant times, Comeaux and Henry were both

“employees” of Defendants as defined by the FLSA. At all relevant times, Defendants were the

“employer” of Comeaux and Henry as defined by the FLSA. 

5. Plaintiffs are Defendants’ current and former employees working as roustabouts who were paid 

hourly and who were not paid overtime wages. 

6. Defendant Lotrak Environmental Services, LLC is a foreign corporation doing business in Texas 

that was formed and existing under the laws of the State of Arkansas. Beth Lambert is the agent 

for service of process, and she can be served at 1840 Sugar Loaf Road, Amity, AR 71921.

7. Defendant Beth Lambert is an individual residing in Arkansas, and can be served at 1840 Sugar 

Loaf Road, Amity, AR 71921. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Beth Lambert has exercised 

managerial responsibilities and substantial control over Defendants’ employees, including Named 

Plaintiffs, and the terms and conditions of their employment. Lambert has the authority to: hire, 

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fire and direct Defendants’ employees, including Named Plaintiffs; supervise and control the 

employment relationships and work schedules of Defendants’ employees, including Named 

Plaintiffs; set and determine the rate and method of pay of Defendants’ employees, including 

Named Plaintiffs; and decide whether Named Plaintiffs and others received overtime 

compensation.

8. Defendants were the employers of Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated as defined by 29 

U.S.C. §203(d). 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this matter because Named Plaintiffs assert claims 

arising under federal law. Specifically, Named Plaintiffs assert claims arising under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Therefore, this Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over 

all parties to this action.

10. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants conduct business in Texas 

and have entered into relationships with Plaintiffs in Texas and have committed actions in Texas 

that give rise to this cause of action. 

11. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas, Alpine Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), 

because Defendants do business in this Division, and Plaintiffs were employed in this Division. 

Inasmuch as Defendants are subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction for purposes of this civil 

action, Defendants reside in this district and division. Venue in this Court is therefore proper 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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IV. COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA

12. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer 

with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members.

13. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an “employer” within the meaning of 

Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

14. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been engaged in an “enterprise” within the 

meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).

15. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an enterprise engaged in commerce or 

in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA, 29 

U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that Defendants are an enterprise and have had employees engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or 

otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by 

any person and in that said enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or 

business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are 

separately stated).

16. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Named Plaintiffs and Class Members were individual 

“employees” (as defined in Section 3(e)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)) who were engaged 

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. §207 and whom 

Defendants at all relevant times “employ[ed],” within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the FLSA, 

29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 

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V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

17. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated handled and otherwise worked on and/or with

vehicles as well as oilfield services tools and equipment, including hoses and pressure washers, 

that have been moved in or produced for commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(b). 

18. Defendants employed Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated during the three-year period 

preceding the filing of this Original Complaint. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were 

roustabouts working in and around Monahans, Texas. 

19. Defendants paid Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated hourly for all work performed each 

day. Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and those similarly overtime premiums for any 

hours worked over forty per week. 

20. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were non-exempt employees. 

21. Defendants maintained control, oversight, and direction over their operations, including 

employment practices. Defendants maintained and exercised the power to hire, fire, and discipline 

Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated during their employment with Defendants. 

22. Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were required to comply with Defendants’ policies 

and procedures in performing their work during their employment with Defendants. 

23. At all times relevant hereto, all Defendants knew of, approved of, and benefited from the regular 

and overtime work of Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 

24. Defendants did not make a good faith effort to comply with the overtime provisions contained 

within the FLSA. 

25. Defendants’ actions were willful and in blatant disregard for the federally protected rights of 

Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.

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VI. COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

26. Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members have performed—and are performing—the same or 

similar job duties as one another in that they perform roustabout work, such as hooking up and 

disconnecting hoses, washing rigs, and vacuuming oil spills on behalf of Defendant. Further, 

Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they 

were not paid overtime premiums for all hours worked over forty in a workweek. Thus, the Class 

Members are owed one and one-half their regular hourly rate for all hours worked over forty in a 

week without regard to their individualized circumstances.

27. Defendants have a policy or practice of not paying their roustabouts overtime wages. This policy 

or practice is and has been, at all relevant times, applicable to the Named Plaintiffs and all Class 

Members. Application of this policy or practice does not depend on the personal circumstances of 

the Named Plaintiffs or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice that resulted 

in the non-payment of overtime compensation to Named Plaintiffs also applied to all Class 

Members. Accordingly, the “Class Members” are properly defined as:

All current and former employees of Defendants working as roustabouts 

or performing similar duties who were paid on an hourly basis and who 

were not paid overtime wages.

VII. CAUSE OF ACTION

FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

28. During the relevant period, Defendants have violated and are violating Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 

U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or 

in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as stated herein above, 

for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such employees for all of their work in 

excess of forty hours per week at rates no less than one-and-one-half times their regular rates for 

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which they were employed. Defendants have acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiffs in 

accordance with applicable law.

29. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime 

at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which their employees are paid are 

applicable to the Named Plaintiffs or Class Members.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, cause having been shown, Plaintiffs pray for an expedited order certifying 

a class and directing notice to putative class members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and, 

individually, and on behalf of any and all such class members, on trial of this cause, judgment 

against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

a. For an Order pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), finding 

Defendants liable for unpaid back wages due to Named Plaintiffs (and those who may join in the 

suit) and for liquidated damages equal in amount to the unpaid compensation found due to Named 

Plaintiffs (and those who may join the suit);

c. For an Order awarding Named Plaintiffs (and those who may join in the suit) the

taxable costs and allowable expenses of this action;

d. For an Order awarding Named Plaintiffs (and those who may join in the suit) 

attorneys’ fees; and

e. For an Order awarding Named Plaintiffs (and those who may join in the suit) prejudgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rates allowed by law;

f. For an Order awarding Named Plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief as 

necessary to prevent the Defendants’ further violations, and to effectuate the purposes, of the Fair 

Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; and

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g. For an Order granting such other and further relief, at law or in equity, as may be 

necessary and/or appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.

/s/ Douglas B. Welmaker

Douglas B. Welmaker

Attorney-in-Charge

State Bar No. 00788641

Moreland Verrett, PC

2901 Bee Cave Rd, Box L 

Austin, Texas 78746

Phone: (512) 782-0567

Fax: (512) 782-0605

Email: doug@morelandlaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS

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