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Jeffry P. Macy II, appellant and 

cross-appellee, v. Megan A. Macy, 

appellee and cross-appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 26, 2023. No. A-22-528.

1. Divorce: Child Custody: Child Support: Property Division: 

Alimony: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution 

action, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the record to 

determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial 

judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court’s determinations 

regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony, and 

attorney fees.

2. Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a review de novo on the record, an 

appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations 

based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the matters at issue.

3. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the 

reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters 

submitted for disposition.

4. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When evidence is in conflict, an appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial judge 

heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts 

rather than another.

5. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 

2016) authorizes a trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate 

according to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

6. Divorce: Property Division. In a marital dissolution action, the purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably 

between the parties.

7. ____: ____. In a marital dissolution action, there is no mathematical 

formula by which property awards can be precisely determined, but 

as a general rule, a spouse should be awarded one-third to one-half of 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

10/02/2023 01:06 AM CDT
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the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as 

determined by the facts of each case.

8. ____: ____. In a dissolution action, the equitable division of property 

is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property 

as either marital or nonmarital, setting aside the nonmarital property to 

the party who brought the property to the marriage. The second step 

is to value the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. And 

the third step is to calculate and divide the net marital estate equitably 

between the parties.

9. ____: ____. As a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by 

either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate, unless it 

falls within an exception to the general rule.

10. Divorce: Property Division: Proof. In a marital dissolution proceeding, the burden of proof rests with the party claiming that property 

is nonmarital.

11. Property Division. The date upon which the marital estate is valued 

should be rationally related to the property composing the marital estate.

12. Divorce: Property Division: Pensions. In dissolution actions, district 

courts have broad discretion in valuing pension rights and dividing such 

rights between the parties.

13. Property Division: Appeal and Error. The date of valuation of a marital estate is reviewed for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

14. Property Division. A trial court is not required to use only one valuation date for marital assets and marital debts in equitably dividing a 

marital estate.

15. ____. The purpose of assigning a date of valuation of a marital estate in 

a decree is to ensure that the marital estate is equitably divided.

16. ____. The choice of a date as of which marital assets are available for 

equitable distribution should be identified and valued must be dictated 

largely by pragmatic considerations.

17. ____. The division of property is not subject to a precise mathematical formula.

18. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When evidence is in conflict, an appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial judge 

heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts 

rather than another.

19. Judgments: Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A “judgment” is a 

court’s final consideration and determination of the respective rights and 

obligations of the parties to an action as those rights and obligations 

presently exist.

20. Judgments: Equity. The void conditional judgment rule does not 

extend to actions in equity or to equitable relief granted within an 
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action at law. Rather, where it is necessary and equitable to do so, a 

court of equitable jurisdiction may enter a conditional judgment and 

such judgment will not be deemed void simply by virtue of its conditional nature.

21. Judgments: Equity: Collateral Attack. Simply because a conditional 

judgment in an action at equity is not automatically void, it does not 

follow that all conditional judgments are acceptable on direct review 

or that judgments in equity cannot, for different reasons, be void and 

therefore subject to collateral attack.

22. Judgments: Equity. Conditional judgments in equity are required 

to determine the rights and obligations of the parties with reasonable certainty.

23. Divorce: Property Division: Pensions. Marital assets are subject to 

equitable division in a dissolution proceeding, and retirement benefits, 

whether vested or not vested, are eligible for inclusion in the marital estate.

24. Divorce: Property Division: Armed Forces: Pensions. Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 42-366(8) (Reissue 2016) requires that a nonvested military pension 

be treated as marital property in a dissolution proceeding.

25. Divorce: Child Custody. When custody of minor children is an issue in 

a proceeding to dissolve the marriage of the children’s parents, custody 

is determined by parental fitness and the children’s best interests.

26. Child Custody. When both parents are found to be fit, the inquiry for 

the court on the issue of custody is the best interests of the children.

27. ____. When determining the best interests of the child in deciding custody, a court must consider, at a minimum, (1) the relationship of the 

minor child to each parent prior to the commencement of the action; 

(2) the desires and wishes of a sufficiently mature child, if based on 

sound reasoning; (3) the general health, welfare, and social behavior 

of the child; (4) credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or 

household member; and (5) credible evidence of child abuse or neglect 

or domestic intimate partner abuse.

28. Visitation. The Parenting Act provides that the best interests of a 

child require a parenting plan that provides for a child’s safety, emotional growth, health, stability, physical care, and regular school attendance, and which promotes a child’s continued contact with his or her 

families and parents who have shown the ability to act in the child’s 

best interests.

29. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In dividing property and considering alimony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider 

four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the 
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marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage, and (4) the 

ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without 

interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody of 

each party. In addition, a court should consider the income and earning 

capacity of each party and the general equities of the situation.

30. Alimony. The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or support of one party by the other when the relative economic 

circumstances make it appropriate.

31. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court does not determine whether it would have awarded the same 

amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether the trial court’s 

award is untenable such as to deprive a party of a substantial right or 

just result. The ultimate criterion is one of reasonableness.

32. ____: ____. An appellate court is not inclined to disturb the trial court’s 

award of alimony unless it is patently unfair on the record.

33. Property Division. Marital debt includes only those obligations incurred 

during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties.

Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo 

P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Affirmed in part, affirmed in part as 

modified, vacated in part, and in part reversed and remanded 

with directions.

Adam R. Little, of Nebraska Legal Group, for appellant.

Rhonda R. Flower, of the Law Office of Rhonda R. Flower, 

for appellee.

Riedmann, Bishop, and Welch, Judges.

Welch, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Jeffry P. Macy II appeals and Megan A. Macy cross-appeals 

from the Scotts Bluff County District Court’s order dissolving their marriage and adjudicating issues of custody, property 

classification and division, and alimony. For the reasons stated 

herein, we affirm in part, affirm in part as modified, vacate in 

part, and in part reverse and remand with directions.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties were married in August 2008 and had two children during the course of their marriage: twins who were born 

in 2009. During the parties’ marriage, Jeffry was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, which job required the family 

to reside in at least four different locations in California and 

Maryland. During the marriage, Megan primarily took care of 

the home and the children, while also earning an undergraduate 

degree and a master’s degree, which involved incurring student 

loan debt. After the children entered kindergarten, Megan was 

employed teaching at different schools at the various duty 

stations. In October 2018, based upon the parties’ agreement, 

Megan began homeschooling the children.

In March 2019, Megan and the children relocated to 

Nebraska to care for Megan’s father, who had suffered a heart 

attack. Because Jeffry was still actively serving in the Navy, 

he was unable to relocate to Nebraska with the family. Megan 

testified that the parties separated in May 2019, shortly after 

her move to Nebraska. Despite their separation, the parties purchased a house in Nebraska in July 2019, and Jeffry provided 

Megan with $3,000 to $3,500 in monthly support. Jeffry rented 

a room and a storage locker in California. Megan testified 

that after moving to Nebraska, she obtained employment as 

a teacher, earning approximately $63,000 per year in addition 

to receiving Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability 

benefits that she testified would decrease after the divorce to 

$758.28 monthly.

In May 2020, Jeffry filed for dissolution of marriage, 

requesting, inter alia, joint legal and physical custody of the 

parties’ minor children. In her answer and counterclaim, Megan 

requested, inter alia, legal and physical custody of the parties’ 

minor children. The dissolution proceeding was held over 2 

days in February and March 2022. During the trial, witnesses 

included Jeffry; Megan; the parties’ children; and Adam Astley, 

an attorney specializing in dissolutions and military benefits. 
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Additionally, the parties offered into evidence a joint property 

statement, among other exhibits.

Jeffry testified that after Megan and the children relocated 

to Nebraska, he had difficulty visiting the children due to his 

deployment schedule and his visits were generally limited to 

holidays. Due, in part, to his desire to be closer to his children, 

Jeffry decided to separate from the Navy and was honorably 

discharged on September 30, 2021, after 13 years of service. Jeffry subsequently moved to Nebraska and purchased a 

separate home. At the time of the trial, Jeffry was employed 

full time as “a director of IT in cyber operations,” earning 

$150,000 a year. He was also employed part time, earning 

$33,000 as a remote teacher at a university, but he indicated 

that this position was temporary. After moving to Nebraska, 

Jeffry exercised parenting time on Monday and Wednesday 

evenings after the children were done with school and one 

weekend per month.

Jeffry testified that he requested joint physical and legal 

custody of the children because the children informed him that 

they wanted equal time with both parents. Megan, on the other 

hand, testified that, in her opinion, joint custody was not in the 

children’s best interests because Jeffry needed additional time 

to acclimate to spending more time with the children, needed 

to make sure his environment was proper for the children, and 

needed to get used to having only one job, and also because 

there was an incident during Jeffry’s parenting time when one 

of the children located a loaded gun. The parties’ children 

testified that they had good relationships with both of their 

parents and wanted equal time with them.

As it related to the division of the marital property, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement where they 

generally agreed on the valuation of most of the parties’ debts 

and assets and how to divide the marital property. During the 

trial, the parties disputed the value and classification of certain debts and assets. Specifically, they disputed the classification of Megan’s student loans and a credit card, the value of 
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a motorcycle, the valuation of debt related to a fence installed 

at the home where Megan and the children resided, the date of 

valuation of Jeffry’s Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), and the division of his military benefits.

Megan adduced testimony from Astley, an attorney specializing in difficult dissolution cases. Astley testified regarding 

the military benefits and credits at issue in this case. Astley 

testified that because Jeffry did not complete 20 years of 

service in the Navy, his military pension benefit remained 

unvested unless he either reentered the military or began working in the federal sector, which would provide Jeffry with 

the opportunity to buy back his 13 years of service and, if in 

total, he accumulated 20 years, he would be eligible to receive 

his pension. As a result, Astley testified that the court should 

include those potential benefits in the division of the marital 

estate when entering the final decree, and he provided the proposed language that is required in the decree to properly divide 

those benefits.

In June 2022, the district court entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage, awarding the parties joint physical 

and legal custody of the parties’ minor children, and dividing 

the marital estate. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, the 

district court awarded Megan alimony of $250 per month for 

60 months; awarded Jeffry the motorcycle, which the court 

valued at $2,000; classified $27,453 of Megan’s student loans 

and $2,893 in Megan’s credit card debt incurred during the 

parties’ marriage as marital debt; and determined that Megan’s 

payment of $8,000 for the installation of a fence at the marital 

property should be credited to her.

Further, regarding Jeffry’s military “credits,” the court found 

that Jeffry

served as an active[-]duty member of the U.S. Navy 

for more than ten (10) years overlapping ten (10) years 

of marriage. The credits that [Jeffry] earned during his 

service are a marital asset, subject to division by this 

Court. [Jeffry] separated from active[-]duty service on 
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September 30, 2021, having served less than twenty 

(20) years.

Should [Jeffry] re-enter active[-]duty military service 

at any time during his lifetime, he shall promptly notify 

[Megan] of his re-entry. Should [Jeffry] complete a total 

of twenty (20) or more years of military service, [Megan] 

will be awarded a portion of [Jeffry’s] military retired 

pay, as described in this section, and with the following 

factual findings, legal conclusions, and information necessary for [Defense Finance and Accounting Service] to 

effectuate this award.

(Emphasis omitted.) The court awarded Megan 50 percent of 

the disposable military retired pay that Jeffry “would have 

received had he retired with a retired base (High-3) of $7,630 

per month, and with 12.75 years of credi[ta]ble service on July 

31, 2021. This award shall include [50 percent] of all future 

cost-of-living adjustments (‘COLA’s’).” (Emphasis omitted.)

In addition to the award of the disposable military retired 

pay, the court’s award went further and stated:

[Jeffry] shall also promptly notify [Megan] if he obtains 

employment with any government branch or agency 

which will permit him to obtain any credit towards any 

other government retirement system in consideration for 

the credits he earned while in the military. His notification must include the name of the branch or agency, and 

the retirement system in which he will participate. If 

[Jeffry] obtains such employment having not completed 

twenty (20) years of military service, he shall be entitled 

to sell, merge, trade, or waive his military retirement 

credits for credits with such agency’s retirement system 

(this shall include the right to make a “Military Service 

Credit Deposit” with the government).

If [Jeffry] makes such a deposit or sells, merges, 

trades, or waives his military retired pay in return for 

credits under the agency’s retirement system, [Megan] 

will be awarded a portion of [Jeffry’s] retirement under 
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that system which is equal to one-half of a fraction, the 

numerator of which is 153 months (12 years, 9 months), 

and the denominator of which is the total number of 

months of equivalent service recognized by the agency to 

include service after the marriage and any service credits 

obtained by selling merging, trading, or waiving military retired pay or by making a Military Service Credit 

Deposit. In such case, [Megan] shall also be awarded 

a survivor annuity in a sufficient amount to continue 

her benefits at the same level in the event [Jeffry] predeceases [sic] her. [Megan’s] portion of this benefit will 

be perfected by entry of an appropriate order or instrument which complies with the requirements of the system 

in which [Jeffry] participates.

If [Jeffry] is able to sell or waive his military retired 

pay credits outright in return for a fixed sum of money 

or property (such as, for example, funds deposited in 

a TSP or similar Plan), [Jeffry] shall promptly notify 

[Megan] of the sale or waiver, including a description of 

the money or property he received and the Plan to which 

it is attached, and [Megan] shall be awarded 1⁄2 of the 

proceeds of such sale or waiver.

(Emphasis omitted.) Jeffry appeals, and Megan cross-appeals, 

from the court’s order.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Jeffry’s assignments of error, consolidated and restated, are 

that the district court abused its discretion by (a) improperly 

classifying as marital debt $27,453 in Megan’s student loans, 

$8,000 for a replacement fence, and $2,893 in Megan’s credit 

card debt; (b)improperly valuing Jeffry’s TSP and the motorcycle; (c) improperly calculating the equalization payment; 

and (d) entering a conditional judgment of unvested military 

“credits” that did not determine the rights or obligations of the 

parties with reasonable certainty.
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Megan cross-appeals, arguing that the district court abused 

its discretion in awarding the parties joint legal and physical 

custody, awarding alimony of $250 per month for 60 months, 

and including $3,000 in Jeffry’s attorney fees in its division of 

the parties’ marital estate.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-3] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court 

reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether 

there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Eis v. 

Eis, 310 Neb. 243, 965 N.W.2d 19 (2021). This standard of 

review applies to the trial court’s determinations regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony, and attorney 

fees. Id. In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court 

is required to make independent factual determinations based 

upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent 

conclusions with respect to the matters at issue. Id. A judicial 

abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial 

judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a 

substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted 

for disposition. Id.

[4] When evidence is in conflict, an appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial judge heard 

and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the 

facts rather than another. Wright v. Wright, 29 Neb. App. 787, 

961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).

V. ANALYSIS

1. Jeffry’s Appeal

(a) Classification and Valuation 

of Marital Debt

Jeffry first assigns as error that the district court abused 

its discretion in classifying the following as marital debt: (i) 

$27,453 of Megan’s student loans incurred during the parties’ 

marriage, (ii) Megan’s payment of $8,000 for the installation of 

a fence, and (iii) $2,893 of Megan’s credit card debt.
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[5-7] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016) authorizes a 

trial court to equitably distribute the marital estate according to 

what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Parde v. 

Parde, 313 Neb. 779, 986 N.W.2d 504 (2023). In a marital dissolution action, the purpose of a property division is to distribute the marital assets equitably between the parties. Id. There 

is no mathematical formula by which property awards can be 

precisely determined, but as a general rule, a spouse should be 

awarded one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar 

being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of 

each case. Id.

[8] In Kauk v. Kauk, 310 Neb. 329, 336, 966 N.W.2d 45, 52 

(2021), the Nebraska Supreme Court discussed the three-step 

process under § 42-365 for the division of property, stating:

In a dissolution action, the equitable division of property is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the 

parties’ property as either marital or nonmarital, setting 

aside the nonmarital property to the party who brought 

the property to the marriage. The second step is to value 

the marital assets and marital liabilities of the parties. And 

the third step is to calculate and divide the net marital 

estate equitably between the parties.

(i) Classification of Student Loans

Jeffry argues that the district court erred in classifying 

$27,453 of Megan’s student loans incurred during the parties’ 

marriage as marital debt because Megan failed to provide any 

documentation showing that the loans were used for marital expenses.

[9-10] As a general rule, all property accumulated and 

acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the 

marital estate, unless it falls within an exception to the general rule. Sitz v. Sitz, 275 Neb. 832, 749 N.W.2d 470 (2008). 

In a marital dissolution proceeding, the burden of proof rests 

with the party claiming that property is nonmarital. Wright v. 

Wright, 29 Neb. App. 787, 961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).
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Here, the parties do not dispute that, during the course of the 

parties’ marriage and prior to their separation, Megan incurred 

student loans to further her education. During the dissolution 

hearing, both Jeffry and Megan acknowledged that some of the 

funds were used for marital expenses, including to pay off debt 

associated with Megan’s wedding ring. Jeffry specifically testified that “I know that they were used for living expenses. They 

were, also, used to buy her diamond ring that she wanted at the 

time, which we didn’t include, because that’s — I forgot what 

you told me, but it’s like a $5,000 diamond ring . . . .”

In Wright v. Wright, supra, in classifying school debt 

incurred during the marriage as marital or nonmarital, this 

court reemphasized the importance of presenting a sufficient 

record that establishes the distribution and utilization of student loans incurred during the marriage as it relates to their 

proper classification. There, as here, the evidence inadequately 

indicated where the loan proceeds were actually spent, save 

only the limited evidence presented above that suggested the 

loans were utilized for marital purposes. Similar to Wright, in 

the absence of further evidence and context governing the balance on the student loans, and in recognition of the fact that 

the burden belonged to Jeffry to show this debt incurred during 

the marriage was nonmarital, we cannot say the district court 

abused its discretion in attributing the debt as marital on the 

limited evidence presented on this topic. This assignment of 

error fails.

(ii) Classification of Fence

Jeffry next argues that the district court abused its discretion 

in determining that $8,000 paid for the installation of a fence 

on the marital property was a marital debt. Specifically, Jeffry 

contends that because Megan paid $7,000 up front for the 

fence, only the $1,141.09 that remained to be paid on the fence 

should have been included in the marital estate.

During the proceedings, the district court received two 

invoices sent to Megan for the cost of the fence. The evidence 
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showed that after the complaint for dissolution had been filed, 

Megan had a fence installed to replace a fence that was rotting 

and was not secured. However, after the work began, Megan 

noticed that a portion of the fence was not being taken down 

and she was informed that the portion of the fence needing 

repair was not included in the initial estimate. Megan paid 

the June 2020 invoice of $7,000. Thereafter, in August 2020, 

Megan received, and paid, a second invoice in the amount 

of $1,141.09. The parties did not dispute that the debt was 

paid after the parties’ separation but prior to trial; however, 

Megan argued that because the value of the home increased by 

$33,000 due in part to the fence replacement, and the district 

court utilized the appreciated value of the property in the division of assets, she should be entitled to a credit of $8,000 paid 

for the fence.

The district court agreed and credited Megan for the amount 

of the fence. Based on the fact that the parties both received 

a benefit as a result of the increase in value of the home and 

that Jeffry also received a credit for mortgage payments made 

following the parties’ separation, we cannot say it was unreasonable or unfair for the court to credit Megan for the $8,000 

payment for the fence that at least partially contributed to the 

increase in the value of the marital home, which increase was 

ultimately shared by the parties. This assignment fails.

(iii) Classification of Credit Card Debt

Jeffry also asserts that the district court erred in including $2,893 of Megan’s credit card debt as marital debt. Jeffry 

contends that because Megan did not have any documentation 

supporting the balance on the credit card, inclusion of the debt 

was not supported on the record.

In a marital dissolution proceeding, the burden of proof rests 

with the party claiming that property is nonmarital. Wright v. 

Wright, 29 Neb. App. 787, 961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).

During the trial, Megan testified that the $2,893 credit card 

was mislabeled as a USAA credit card balance on the parties’ 
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joint property statement when the card was actually a different credit card. She indicated that the balance on the card 

was from “May of 2019 or the other date that was provided.” 

Jeffry did not dispute Megan’s testimony, nor argue during the 

proceedings that the credit card debt was not a marital debt. 

Because the undisputed evidence establishes that the $2,893 

credit card balance was a debt accrued during the parties’ marriage, prior to their separation, we find that the district court 

did not err in classifying the debt as marital. Accordingly, this 

claim fails.

(b) Valuation of Assets

The second step in the three-part equitable division of property requires the valuation of the parties’ marital assets and 

liabilities. In connection with this step, Jeffry takes issue with 

the court’s valuation of his TSP account and his motorcycle. 

We will discuss those assignments separately.

(i) TSP

Jeffry argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

valuing his TSP as of June 30, 2020, which resulted in a valuation of $69,784. He contends that the court should have valued 

the TSP account on the same date as the rest of the marital 

estate and that, had his TSP been valued as of March 31, 2020, 

it would have resulted in a value of $52,529.31.

[11-13] The date upon which the marital estate is valued 

should be rationally related to the property composing the 

marital estate. Tyma v. Tyma, 263 Neb. 873, 644 N.W.2d 139 

(2002). In dissolution actions, district courts have broad discretion in valuing pension rights and dividing such rights between 

the parties. Id. The date of valuation of a marital estate is 

reviewed for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Rohde 

v. Rohde, 303 Neb. 85, 927 N.W.2d 37 (2019).

[14-16] In Rohde v. Rohde, 303 Neb. at 94-95, 927 N.W.2d 

at 45, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue of multiple valuation dates, stating:
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We decline to mandate that a trial court must use only 

one valuation date in equitably dividing a marital estate. 

The date for valuation must be rationally related to the 

property being divided. Frequently, a single valuation 

date will be appropriate; but sometimes, it will not. The 

purpose of assigning a date of valuation in a decree is to 

ensure that the marital estate is equitably divided. This 

harkens back to the polestar of equitable division, which 

is fairness and reasonableness under the facts of the case. 

What may be a fair and reasonable valuation on one date 

for an asset may be unfair and unreasonable for another 

asset on the same date. “The choice of a date as of which 

assets available for equitable distribution should be identified and valued must be dictated largely by pragmatic 

considerations.” It can become arduous for the district 

court to determine one date that fairly and reasonably 

values the entire marital estate. We choose not to tie the 

hands of the district court; thus, the court need not find 

“‘[o]ne [date] to rule them all.’”

Here, Megan testified at trial that she believed that the TSP 

account should be valued as of June 30, 2020, because Jeffry 

stopped contributing to the plan after the parties decided to 

separate, despite the fact they had contributed about $1,000 

per month to the TSP prior to that time. Thereafter, the account 

initially lost money through market fluctuations but eventually recovered. According to Megan, utilization of Jeffry’s 

valuation date would result in a valuation during the period of 

time that the account’s value slightly decreased.

The district court valued Jeffry’s TSP based on Megan’s 

proposed valuation date of June 30, 2020, which resulted in 

the TSP being valued at $69,784. The district court has discretion to utilize multiple dates to fairly and reasonably divide 

the marital estate so long as the valuation date is rationally 

related to the property being divided, and the district court did 

so in this case. Here, we find it both fair and reasonable that 

the court chose a valuation date that coincided with a date that 
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the TSP recovered its value through normal market fluctuations, rather than the date used for other valuations that were 

not susceptible to market fluctuations. Stated differently, had 

the court valued the account on the date proposed by Jeffry, 

he would have incurred a benefit from the downward market 

fluctuation that recovered shortly thereafter. Under these circumstances, we find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in using multiple valuation dates in order to achieve 

an equitable division of the marital estate. This assignment of 

error fails.

(ii) Motorcycle

Jeffry contends that the district court erred in valuing a 

motorcycle at $2,000 without evidence to support such a value. 

He asserts that the district court should have accepted his value 

of $1,500 for the motorcycle.

[17,18] The division of property is not subject to a precise 

mathematical formula. Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 20 Neb. App. 

290, 824 N.W.2d 63 (2012). When evidence is in conflict, an 

appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that 

the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted 

one version of the facts rather than another. Wright v. Wright, 

29 Neb. App. 787, 961 N.W.2d 834 (2021).

During the trial, the parties offered differing opinions regarding the motorcycle’s value. Megan valued the motorcycle at 

$4,000 based on its Kelley Blue Book value but admitted that 

she was unsure of the motorcycle’s mileage, which would have 

an impact on its total value. Jeffry, on the other hand, testified 

that he had purchased the motorcycle in 2014 for $6,000; that 

the motorcycle had 80,000 miles; that he accidentally knocked 

it over in the driveway, damaging the “right hand brake” and 

electronic components; and that the manufacturer would only 

give $500 credit for a trade-in value. He valued the damaged 

motorcycle at $1,500.

Here, the district court did not accept the specific values 

provided by either party, but instead valued the motorcycle at 
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$2,000, which was half of the Kelley Blue Book value proffered by Megan and more than Jeffry’s proposed valuation of 

$1,500. We further note that the district court’s valuation of 

the motorcycle is consistent with Jeffry’s answers to interrogatories, which were received into evidence, wherein he valued 

the motorcycle at $2,000. We find that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in choosing a value between the values 

proposed by the parties and that the valuation determined by 

the court was supported by the evidence. This assignment of 

error fails.

(c) Calculation of Equalization Payment

Jeffry’s next assignment of error is that the district court 

erred in calculating the equalization payment, because there 

was a $10,000 typographical error in the court’s calculation. 

He further argues that, in combination with the cumulative 

errors as argued above, the equalization payment should have 

been $31,637.03.

After dividing up the marital estate, the district court summarized as follows:

Property and Debt Summary

Jeffry Megan

Section A: $2,270.00 $5,645.00

Section B: $18,781.85 $3,976.00

Section C: $9,000.00 [$2,267.00]

Section E: $57,957.00 $46,786.66

Section F: $75,148.35 $14,565.65

Section J: [$23,190.58] [$38,436.00]

Totals: $149,966.62 $30,269.66

Payment from Jeffry to Megan to equalize the property 

division is $59,848.48.

We agree with Jeffry that the court’s table contains a typographical error. In section J, Jeffry was assigned debt of 
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$13,190.58 for his USAA credit card, but the court’s table 

incorrectly lists that debt as $23,190.58. However, the court’s 

calculation of marital assets awarded to Jeffry utilized the correct $13,190.58 figure to reach the correct total of $149,966.62 

of assets awarded to Jeffry. Since the court’s determination of 

the total award to Jeffry utilized the correct amount awarded to 

Jeffry under section J and the court’s totals listed in the table 

reflect the proper amount awarded under the decree, we find 

no error in the court’s final calculation. Additionally, because 

we previously rejected Jeffry’s claims regarding error by the 

district court in its classification and/or valuation of marital 

assets and debts, we find no error in the court’s calculation of 

the equalization payment. This claim fails.

(d) Conditional Judgment

Jeffry’s final assignment of error is that the portion of the 

court’s order contained in “Exhibit E,” dividing his unvested 

military credits on a conditional basis, was a conditional judgment where the rights of the parties could not be determined 

with reasonable certainty.

[19] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 (Cum. Supp. 2022) defines a 

judgment as “the final determination of the rights of the parties 

in an action.” The Nebraska Supreme Court stated in Strunk 

v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 929-30, 708 N.W.2d 821, 

834 (2006):

We have elaborated that a “judgment” is a court’s 

final consideration and determination of the respective 

rights and obligations of the parties to an action as 

those rights and obligations presently exist. Village of 

Orleans v. Dietz, 248 Neb. 806, 539 N.W.2d 440 (1995). 

Thus, we have held that orders purporting to be final 

judgments, but that are dependent upon the occurrence 

of uncertain future events, do not operate as “judgments” 

and are wholly ineffective and void as such. See Kroll 

v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 256 Neb. 548, 590 

N.W.2d 861 (1999). These “conditional judgments” are 

not final determinations of the rights and obligations of 
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the parties as they presently exist, but, rather, look to 

the future in an attempt to judge the unknown. Village of 

Orleans v. Dietz, supra. We have held that a conditional 

judgment is wholly void because it does not “perform in 

praesenti” and leaves to speculation and conjecture what 

its final effect may be. Id.

[20-22] However, as it related to actions in equity, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court further elaborated in Strunk:

We now expressly hold that the void conditional judgment rule does not extend to actions in equity or to equitable relief granted within an action at law. Rather, where 

it is necessary and equitable to do so, a court of equitable 

jurisdiction may enter a conditional judgment and such 

judgment will not be deemed void simply by virtue of 

its conditional nature. Conditional judgments are a fundamental tool with which courts sitting in equity have 

traditionally been privileged in order to properly devise 

a remedy to meet the situation. We will not take away 

that tool by extending our void conditional judgment rule 

into the realm of equity. Rather, we follow the numerous 

decisions from other jurisdictions, set forth above, and 

precedent by this court that recognizes that a strict prohibition against conditional judgments is inappropriate to 

equitable relief.

. . . We note, however, that simply because a conditional judgment in an action at equity is not automatically 

void, it does not follow that all conditional judgments are 

acceptable on direct review or that judgments in equity 

cannot, for different reasons, be void and therefore subject to collateral attack. Certain conditional judgments 

may still be considered erroneous or an abuse of discretion, be set aside where procured by fraud, or be considered void as contrary to statute or public policy.

Perhaps most relevant, conditional judgments in equity 

are required to determine the rights and obligations of the 

parties with reasonable certainty.

270 Neb. at 934-35, 708 N.W.2d at 837.
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Here, after hearing evidence related to the division of military benefits, the district court found Jeffry had served in the 

U.S. Navy for more than 10 years, overlapping 10 years of 

marriage, and that the credits that Jeffry earned during his 

service were marital assets that were subject to division by the 

court. Further, having noted that Jeffry separated from activeduty service on September 30, 2021, prior to serving 20 years 

in the Navy, the Court stated:

Should [Jeffry] re-enter active duty military service 

at any time during his lifetime, he shall promptly notify 

[Megan] of his re-entry. Should [Jeffry] complete a total 

of twenty (20) or more years of military service, [Megan] 

will be awarded a portion of [Jeffry’s] military retired 

pay, as described in this section, and with the following 

factual findings, legal conclusions, and information necessary for [Defense Finance and Accounting Service] to 

effectuate this award.

(Emphasis omitted.)

Jeffry argues that the portion of the district court’s order 

related to his military credits is a void conditional judgment, because it does not determine his rights and obligations 

with reasonable certainty. More specifically, he argues that 

because his military retirement benefits were unvested, any 

order would not be recognized by the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service because there were no benefits to divide. 

Additionally, he argues that the order contains a hypothetical 

division of an unvested asset that may never vest, and it fails 

to address how Megan should buy in if the credits are converted. Jeffry argues that because the district court is unable 

to predict the legal landscape at the time of any hypothetical 

future employment, and there are no actual benefits to divide, 

the court had no ability to ascertain his rights and obligations 

under the decree.

[23] Insofar as his argument relates to the fact that his 

benefits are unvested, that argument fails. In Nebraska, marital assets are subject to equitable division in a dissolution 
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proceeding and retirement benefits, “whether vested or not 

vested,” are eligible for inclusion in the marital estate under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-366(8) (Reissue 2016). Weiland v. Weiland, 

307 Neb. 882, 951 N.W.2d 519 (2020).

As it relates to the certainty of the rights and obligations, the 

court’s order requires that should Jeffry reenter the military or 

become employed in the federal sector, convert his credits, and 

complete 20 years of service, he is required to notify Megan 

and she will be awarded a portion of the retirement benefit. 

More specifically, the district court order awarded Megan 50 

percent of the disposable military retired pay Jeffry “would 

have received had he retired with a retired base (High-3) of 

$7,630 per month, and with 12.75 years of credi[ta]ble service 

on July 31, 2021. This award shall include [50 percent] of 

all future cost-of-living adjustments (‘COLA’s’).” (Emphasis 

omitted.) Neither party disputes that the district court’s order 

is conditioned on whether or not Jeffry either reenters the military or obtains employment in the federal sector and converts 

his time-served credits to the federal retirement plan. Because 

the void conditional judgment rule does not apply in cases of 

equity, we cannot find that the conditional nature of the order 

alone renders the judgment void.

However, since certain conditional judgments may still be 

considered erroneous or an abuse of discretion, be set aside 

where procured by fraud, or be considered void as contrary to 

statute or public policy, we consider whether the judgment is 

void due to the order not determining the rights and obligations 

of the parties with reasonable certainty as alleged by Jeffry. 

See Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 270 Neb. 917, 708 N.W.2d 821 

(2006). We find that it is not.

[24] In Longo v. Longo, 266 Neb. 171, 663 N.W.2d 604 

(2003), the Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed Nebraska law 

in relation to a conditional award of future military pension benefits that had not vested. In connection therewith, 

the appellant argued that, because there was no guarantee of receiving a future pension benefit, the appellant had 
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no ownership interest under § 42-366(8). In finding that 

the argument ran contrary to its prior decisions involving 

the treatment of military benefits in dissolution proceedings, 

the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conditional award, 

citing Ray v. Ray, 222 Neb. 324, 383 N.W.2d 752 (1986), and 

ultimately held:

We agree with Justice Brodkey’s observation that 

§ 42-366(8) logically requires that a nonvested military 

pension be treated as marital property in a dissolution 

proceeding. While military personnel do not make monetary investments in a pension plan, they invest time 

and personal sacrifice in order to qualify for a nondisability military pension. Spouses of such personnel share 

in this investment to the extent that the duration of the 

marriage coincides with the period of military service. 

As one court has noted, the future retirement pay of a 

career military service member who is not yet eligible 

to retire “is a contractual right, subject to a contingency, 

and is a form of property.” Jackson v. Jackson, 656 So. 

2d 875, 877 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). Because § 42-366(8) 

specifically requires the inclusion of retirement benefits 

“whether vested or not vested” in the marital estate, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in awarding 

[appellee] a share of [appellant’s] future nondisability 

military pension entitlement, payable only if and when 

such benefits become payable to [appellant].

Longo v. Longo, 266 Neb. at 179, 663 N.W.2d at 610.

But Jeffry also assigns and argues that the conditional 

aspect of the order here should be set aside on a separate 

basis. That is, he argues that the part of the court’s order 

awarding a portion of the pension benefit to Megan does not 

determine the rights and obligations of the parties with reasonable certainty.

In relation to the conditional aspect of the order governing Jeffry’s pension, the court fashioned language that dealt 

with both disposable military retired pay should Jeffry reenter 
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(which we will refer to as his “Military Retirement Pension”) 

and potential retirement pay in any other government system 

that would give Jeffry credit for the time he served while 

in the military (which we will refer to as his “Civil Service 

Retirement Benefit”).

As to the former, the language of the order awarding 

Megan 50 percent of the disposable military retired pay that 

Jeffry “would have received had he retired with a retired 

base (High-3) of $7,630 per month, and with 12.75 years of 

credi[ta]ble service on July 31, 2021,” (emphasis omitted), 

complies with the Nebraska Supreme Court’s directives in 

Weiland v. Weiland, 307 Neb. 882, 951 N.W.2d 519 (2020). 

In Weiland, after reviewing applicable Department of Defense 

regulations that provide guidance for district courts to create a hypothetical retired pay amount, in relation to a district court’s order awarding pension benefits, the Nebraska 

Supreme Court held:

We reverse and vacate the district court’s order and 

remand the matter with directions to value [the husband’s] hypothetical retired base pay, to be determined 

based on the average basic pay for the most recent 36 

months (known as high-3) prior to the hypothetical retirement date of September 30, 1996. Applicable Department 

of Defense regulations provide guidance for the district 

court to create a hypothetical retired pay formula based 

on the relevant facts. To enable the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service to calculate the hypothetical retired 

pay amount, the clarifying court order must provide the 

following: (1) the percentage the former spouse was 

awarded; (2) the hypothetical years of creditable service, 

or, in the case of a reservist, the Reserve retirement 

points on which the hypothetical retired pay is to be 

based; (3) the hypothetical retired pay base; and (4) the 

hypothetical retirement date. See DoD FMR 7000.14-R, 

vol. 7B, ch. 29, ¶ 290608(F). The decree should be clarified to reflect that [the wife] is awarded 50 percent of 
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the disposable military retired pay [the husband] would 

have received had he become eligible to receive military retired pay with a “retired pay base (high-3) of [$]” 

and with 3,334 Reserve retirement points on September 

30, 1996. See DoD FMR 7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 29, 

figure 29-1.

307 Neb. at 891-92, 951 N.W.2d at 526.

In summary, as for the Military Retirement Pension, which 

is addressed in the dissolution decree’s attached “Exhibit E” 

through paragraph xvi, we find no abuse of discretion and 

affirm that portion of “Exhibit E.”

That said, in his brief, Jeffry appears to take greater exception to the language of the order governing the hypothetical 

Civil Service Retirement Benefit. In doing so, he argues:

Astley also specifically testified about how his proposed 

language in subparagraph xvii . . . is based on hypothetical scenarios that the Court must address in its order. . . . 

He testified that the Court needed to determine the fair 

and equitable manner to account for a future buy-in to the 

Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) program in 

the event[Jeffry] became employed by the government as 

a civil service employee. . . . Specifically, should [Jeffry] 

become a federal employee, he may be entitled to “buyout” any past military credits and apply [them] towards 

FERS retirement. This is based on a percentage of total 

earnings. This would be an additional up[-]front cost just 

to [Jeffry] if this extended series of variables were to 

come to fruition.

. . . .

The problem with these hypotheticals is that the benefits and their calculation are impossible to determine 

based on the record. . . . Astley admitted that [Jeffry’s] 

possible benefits could vest on entirely different schedules depending on whether he was active[-]duty military 

or whether he converted his military credits to a FERS 

benefit. . . . Astley acknowledged that the intent of the 
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proposed language (which was adopted [by the district 

court]) was to divide “credits,” that’s what he defined 

as the asset. . . . Yet . . . Astley specifically testified that 

he had no way to quantify or value those credits because 

“I don’t know under what conditions they would vest if 

at all.”

Brief for appellant at 21-22.

We agree with Jeffry’s argument related to his potential Civil 

Service Retirement Benefit. Because this record is devoid of 

the future eventualities associated with civil service employment that could shape a future benefit award, we agree that 

the language related to the Civil Service Retirement Benefit 

found in paragraph xvii of the district court’s order does not 

comply with the requirement that the provision must articulate the rights and obligations of the parties with reasonable 

certainty and is therefore vacated. As Astley acknowledged 

during his testimony, there are simply too many variables 

associated with Jeffry’s possible civil service employment to 

capture in the form of an award, and those differing options 

are certainly not contained within this record. Instead, it was 

clear that the court wanted to make sure the order captured 

that Megan would be entitled to an award relating to any 

future FERS program where Jeffry obtained benefits from his 

prior military service that occurred while Jeffry was married 

to Megan. In that regard, the court should simply have ordered 

the following:

The husband shall promptly notify the wife if he obtains 

employment with any governmental branch or agency 

that will permit him to obtain any credit toward any 

other government retirement system in combination with 

the time or credits he earned while in the military. In 

that event, the wife shall be entitled to 50 percent of the 

value for the 12 years and 9 months of creditable service that the husband earned during the parties’ marriage 

and the court retains jurisdiction to amend the decree to 
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issue such supplemental orders as may be required to 

effectuate this award.

In summary, we vacate paragraph xvii contained within 

“Exhibit E” attached to the dissolution decree and remand the 

matter with directions to replace paragraph xvii as set forth 

above.

2. Megan’s Cross-Appeal

In her cross-appeal, Megan contends that the district court 

abused its discretion in awarding the parties joint legal and 

physical custody, awarding alimony of $250 per month for 60 

months, and including $3,000 in Jeffry’s attorney fees in its 

division of the parties’ marital estate.

(a) Custody

Megan contends that the district court erred in awarding the 

parties joint legal and physical custody. She points to Jeffry’s 

behavior toward her and one of the children who found an 

unattended loaded gun while in Jeffry’s care as factors weighing against joint legal and physical custody and in favor of 

awarding her sole legal and physical custody.

[25,26] When custody of minor children is an issue in a proceeding to dissolve the marriage of the children’s parents, custody is determined by parental fitness and the children’s best 

interests. Burcham v. Burcham, 24 Neb. App. 323, 886 N.W.2d 

536 (2016). When both parents are found to be fit, the inquiry 

for the court is the best interests of the children. Id.

[27,28] When determining the best interests of the child in 

deciding custody, a court must consider, at a minimum, (1) 

the relationship of the minor child to each parent prior to the 

commencement of the action; (2) the desires and wishes of 

a sufficiently mature child, if based on sound reasoning; (3) 

the general health, welfare, and social behavior of the child; 

(4) credible evidence of abuse inflicted on any family or 

household member; and (5) credible evidence of child abuse 

or neglect or domestic intimate partner abuse. State on behalf 

of Kaaden S. v. Jeffery T., 303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 692 
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(2019); Bryant v. Bryant, 28 Neb. App. 362, 943 N.W.2d 742 

(2020). The Parenting Act also provides that the best interests 

of a child require a parenting plan that provides for a child’s 

safety, emotional growth, health, stability, physical care, and 

regular school attendance, and which promotes a child’s continued contact with his or her families and parents who have 

shown the ability to act in the child’s best interests. Bryant v. 

Bryant, supra.

Here, the district court found that both parties were fit and 

proper persons to have custody of their minor children and 

awarded them joint legal and physical custody. During the dissolution hearing, both children testified that they had the same 

general routine at both parents’ homes, that they had good 

relationships with both parents, and that they wanted to spend 

equal amounts of time with them. The evidence supported that 

both Jeffry and Megan provide for their children’s safety, emotional well-being, physical and emotional care, and educational 

needs. Although one of the children located a loaded firearm 

at Jeffry’s residence, neither party disputed that the child did 

not touch the firearm and that Jeffry immediately placed the 

firearm away from the children. Neither child reported seeing a 

firearm after this one occasion. Based on our de novo review, 

we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody of their 

minor children. This assignment fails.

(b) Alimony

Megan next asserts that the district court erred in awarding 

her insufficient alimony of $250 per month for 60 months. 

She argues that an award of $600 per month for a total of 60 

months is more appropriate, considering the parties’ significant 

income disparity, the disruptions to her career, and her contributions to the marriage.

[29-32] In Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13, 20-21, 911 N.W.2d 

582, 588-89 (2018), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
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In dividing property and considering alimony upon a 

dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration 

of the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the 

marriage, and (4) the ability of the supported party to 

engage in gainful employment without interfering with 

the interests of any minor children in the custody of each 

party. In addition, a court should consider the income and 

earning capacity of each party and the general equities of 

the situation.

The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued 

maintenance or support of one party by the other when 

the relative economic circumstances make it appropriate.

In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court does 

not determine whether it would have awarded the same 

amount of alimony as did the trial court, but whether 

the trial court’s award is untenable such as to deprive 

a party of a substantial right or just result. The ultimate 

criterion is one of reasonableness. An appellate court is 

not inclined to disturb the trial court’s award of alimony 

unless it is patently unfair on the record.

Here, the district court awarded Megan alimony in the 

amount of $250 per month for 60 months, finding that

Jeffry has significantly higher earnings, and he has sufficient uncommitted funds available to pay child support 

and alimony. Jeffry has historically through the thirteen 

years of their marriage supplied the majority of the financial needs of the family. There is a demonstrated need of 

Megan for support, and ability of Jeffry to meet that need. 

Megan has what appears to be a stable job in the teaching profession which affords health insurance benefits. 

She also has disability income through the VA which 

she expects will be in the amount of $758.28 following 

the decree. Unless Megan acquires further education, her 

future earning capacity will be limited.
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Based on our de novo review, we cannot find that the district 

court abused its discretion in the amount of the alimony award. 

At the time of the dissolution proceedings, the parties had been 

married for 13 years. Shortly after the parties married, Jeffry 

entered the Navy and the parties frequently moved to accommodate Jeffry’s military career. Jeffry was the primary financial support for the family. Jeffry separated from the Navy in 

September 2021, and since then, he obtained two jobs earning 

a total amount of $183,000 per year. Evidence at trial established that after the parties agreed that Megan and the children 

would relocate to Nebraska, Jeffry sent $3,500 in monthly support to Megan to cover living expenses.

During the parties’ marriage, from 2009 to 2014, Megan was 

a stay-at-home mother while simultaneously attending school 

to obtain a teaching degree. After 2014, Megan began to teach 

at various schools at the locations where Jeffry was stationed. 

Then, after Megan and the children moved to Nebraska to help 

care for Megan’s father, she began teaching, earning $63,000 

per year. Additionally, she was receiving her VA disability at 

40 percent, which she testified would decrease after the divorce 

to $758.28.

The district court found that an award of alimony was 

proper, and the court’s order makes clear that it considered 

the parties’ income disparity, the contributions of each party 

to the marriage, and the primary financial support provided by 

Jeffry for the family during the marriage, as well as Megan’s 

demonstrated need for support. Although Megan argues that 

she should be awarded more because of the disruptions in 

her career due to the frequent moves to accommodate Jeffry’s 

career, an appellate court does not determine whether it would 

have awarded the same amount of alimony as did the trial 

court, but whether the trial court’s award is untenable such 

as to deprive a party of a substantial right or just result. 

See Wiedel v. Wiedel, 300 Neb. 13, 911 N.W.2d 582 (2018). 

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the amount 
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awarded was unreasonable or patently unfair. This assignment fails.

(c) Classifying Attorney 

Fees as Marital Debt

Megan’s final assignment of error is that the district court 

erred in including the full amount of Jeffry’s USAA credit 

card of $13,190.58 as marital debt because the evidence at trial 

established that Jeffry had paid $3,000 of his attorney fees with 

the card.

Here, although both parties requested attorney fees in their 

pleadings, the district court did not award attorney fees and 

stated that “[a]ll other relief prayed for by either party, not 

otherwise specifically addressed in this decree, is denied.” 

Accordingly, each party was to pay his or her own attorney 

fees, and the issue is whether the entire amount of Jeffry’s 

credit card should be considered marital debt, despite Jeffry’s 

testimony that he paid $3,000 of his attorney fees on that 

credit card.

[33] “‘[M]arital debt includes only those obligations incurred 

during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties.’” 

Vanderveer v. Vanderveer, 310 Neb. 196, 210, 964 N.W.2d 694, 

706 (2021).

It is undisputed that $3,000 of Jeffry’s attorney fees were 

paid by Jeffry on the credit card on February 25, 2020, and the 

court included the entirety of the credit card balance as marital debt. Because the court explicitly determined it would not 

require either party to pay the other party’s attorney fees, we 

find that the district court erred in including the entire balance 

of the credit card as marital debt in its calculation, because 

this expense was not incurred for the joint benefit of the parties. Accordingly, we reduce the total amount of Jeffry’s credit 

card debt as listed in Section J from $13,190.58 to $10,190.58 

and modify the district court’s award as follows (see bold 

text below):
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Jeffry Megan

Section A: $2,270.00 $5,645.00

Section B: $18,781.85 $3,976.00

Section C: $9,000.00 [$2,267.00]

Section E: $57,957.00 $46,786.66

Section F: $75,148.35 $14,565.65

Section J: [$10,190.58] [$38,436.00]

Totals $152,966.62 $30,269.66

With this modification, Jeffry’s total portion of the marital 

estate is $152,966.62 and Megan’s total portion of the marital 

estate is $30,269.66. Accordingly, we increase the amount of 

the equalization payment that Jeffry is to make to Megan to 

$61,348.48.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part and affirm 

in part as modified the district court’s order, but reverse and 

vacate paragraph xvii of “Exhibit E” and remand the matter 

with directions to replace paragraph xvii with the following 

language:

The husband shall promptly notify the wife if he obtains 

employment with any governmental branch or agency 

that will permit him to obtain any credit toward any other 

government retirement system in combination with the 

time or credits he earned while in the military. In that 

event, the wife shall be entitled to 50 percent of the value 

for the 12 years and 9 months of creditable service that 

the husband earned during the parties’ marriage, and the 

court retains jurisdiction to amend the decree to issue 

such supplemental orders as may be required to effectuate 

this award.

Affirmed in part, affirmed in part as modified,

vacated in part, and in part reversed

and remanded with directions.