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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1768

K E ND AL L R E I D and B R AD L E Y S E ARS

, Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

N E I G HB ORH OOD A S S I S TAN C E C OR P OR AT I O N OF A M E R

I C A , Defen dant-Appellee.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n. No. 11 -CV- 86 83 — Amy J. St. Eve , Judg e.

A RG UE D N OV E MB E R 7, 2013

— D E C I D E D A P RI L 1, 2014

Before B AU E R

, M AN I O N

, and S YKE S

, Circ uit Judges.
M AN I O N , Cir cui t Judge

. Plainti ffs Kendall Reid and Bradley Sear s allege that Nei ghborho od Assis tance Cor porat i on of Americ a di sch arg ed them i n r eta l iation for maki ng prot ected complaints, i n violati on of Illi noi s law

. It i s undi sputed that the plainti ffs made prot ected complain ts and were di sch arg ed, but the di stric t court gr anted sum mary judgment to NACA, conclu di ng th a t plainti ffs had not offered suffi ci ent evidenc e2 No. 13-1768

of caus ation—that i s, whether they w ere di sch arg ed in retaliation for their complaints. Plainti ffs appeal, arg uing tha t t he di stric t court fai led to view the evidenc e (and draw all reasonable inferences) i n the li ght most fav or able to them. W e affi rm. I. Factual B ackground A. Plaintiffs’ Empl oyment Plainti ffs Kendall Reid and Bradley Sear s w ere hi red as atwi ll employ ees by Nei ghborho od Assi stance Cor porat i on of Americ a (“NACA”) i n October 2007 and May 2010, respectiv ely

. They w or ke d o ut of NACA’s Chi cago offi ce. NACA i s
a na t i onwi de not-for -profi t corpor ation that helps potent i al homeowners—especi ally those facing di scri minator y or pre d a to ry l e n d in g— ob ta in m or tg a ges to purchas e homes. Reid and Sear s w or ked as mort gage consu ltants and repo rt ed to an offi ce manager in the Chi cago offi ce, Norma Martinez. Mar tinez answered to a reg i onal oper ations di recto r i n Baton Rouge, L o uisi ana, Donald Meadows

. As mort gage consu ltants , plainti ffs w ere responsible for couns eli ng potent i al homeowners, helping them assemble mort gage appli cati ons, and for forw ardin g t he appli cati ons i ni tiall y to underwri tin g and,

ev entually

, to lenders

. M or tgag e consu ltants are required by federal law to hold a li cens e i n or der to prepar e mort gage appli cati ons. Se e 1 2 U.S.C. § 5103 (Supp. 2013). Reid and Don Meadows (the reg i onal manager) w ere the only people tied to the Chi cago offi ce who held the appropr i ate li cens es. Sear s had held a l icens e, but i t had not been proper ly reg i stered by NACA, so he w as not appro priately li cens ed.
As part of prepar i ng the mort gage appli cati ons, mort gage
consu ltants handle documents contai ning the priv ate personalNo. 13-1768 3

i nfor ma t io n of NACA’s cli ents. Accordi ngly , NACA had a Docum ent Security P olicy (the “ p a p erless poli cy”) that required employ ees t o scan documents i nto a secu re di gital system and shred the paper or i gin als to prot ect the cl ie nt ’ s i nformation—paper fi les for cli ents w ere not to be k ept. Eviden ce shows th a t t he poli cy had been at least emai led to managers, but i t had not been enfor ce d i n the Chi cago offi ce duri ng the t i me plainti ffs w or ked ther e. B. Plaintiffs’ C omplaints
Whi le w or kin g for NACA, plaint i ffs made a numb er of complaints about NACA’s bus i ness practic es. First, they complained about being pai d less than Illi nois’ mini mum

w age. Effec tiv e July 1, 2010, Illi noi s r ai sed its mi ni mum w age to $8.25 an hour ($1 abov e the federal mini mum w age). 820 ILCS 105/4 (Supp. 2013). Before the effecti v e date of the i ncrease, Reid ask e d wh ether NACA w ould pay the new mini mum w age and receiv ed mi xed answ e r s from di fferent managers. So o n there after , another (uns peci fi ed) employ ee brought up the complaint at a company meetin g and NACA’s CEO, Bruce Mar ks, replied that NACA “wi ll pay y ou what w e hav e to pay

... .” Reid Dep. at 73–74. Throughout that July , Reid co mplained to the offi ce manager and the reg i onal manager that he and other employ ees w ere not being pai d the

new mini mum w age, and on at least one occasi on, that he w as not paid ov ert i me whenhe should h av e been. Second, plainti ffs complained o n several occasi ons that NACA violated state and federal law i n handling mort gage appli cati ons. Speci fi cally , they co mplained that mort gage appli cat io ns w ere being prepar ed by unli cens ed mort gage4 No. 13-1768

consu ltants and si gned by li c e n s e d m or tg a ge c on sultants. They also complain e d th a t wh e n thi s happened, NACA w as spli tting the comm iss i ons betw een li cens ed and unli cens ed mort gage
consu ltants and the company i tself. During an audi t of NACA in Februar y and Mar ch of 2010, Reid spoke wi th stat e a nd federal reg ulat o r s who told hi m that these practic es w ere i llegal. After learnin g the practic es w ere i llegal, Reid complained to NACA management as early as April and May 2010. He made sev eral complaints t o NACA management ov er t he next few months, inclu ding hi s last complaint in late Sept ember 2010. Sear s also brought s i m i l a r c omplaints to management thro ughout that tim e, maki ng hi s last complaint on October 11, 2010. Sear s’s complaints w ere along di ffere nt l ines. Thi s tim e he complained that NACA had dropped the ball dur ing hi s li cens i ng process, and as a result, he w as not proper ly li cens ed and w as not receiving the full commi ssi on from NACA for appli cati ons si gned by other , li cens ed mort gage consu lt a nt s. Nonetheless, Sear s’s complaints contai ned the same arg ument that t he practic es w ere illegal.
In su m, plainti ffs ’ complaints spann ed a period of fi v e to si x months. But they w ere not alone in their complaints. At least four other i ndi vidu als complai ned abo ut not being pai d mini mum w age, other s co m p l a ine d about not receiving proper
ov ert i me pay

, and at least fi v e other s complained about spli tting commi ssi ons on mort gage appli cati ons prepar ed betw een l i cens ed and unli cens ed mort gage consu ltants. Furt h er , at least three people complained about both mini mum

w age and commi ssi on spli tting. All of these other complaining employ ees were a l so i n the Chi cago offi ce and none of them

w as fi red.No. 13-1768 5 C. Plaintiff

s’ T ermin atio n On Fr i day

, October 8, 2010, Reid left the NACA offi ce early to atte nd a Chi cago Bulls game. Accordi ng to Reid , he receiv ed perm i s s i on fro m the offi ce manager , Mar tin ez, on the condi tion that he w or k the whole w eekend. That w eekend, NACA’s Chi cago o ff ice w as oper atin g as a back-u p call center for another NACA offi ce that w as hosti ng an e ven t. How ev er , when Reid came in t o w or k on Sat urday mornin g, October 9, Mar tin ez told hi m that he w as being sus pended for leaving early the ni ght befor e. Mar tin ez deni es that she gav e Reid permi ssi on to leav e, but at least one other wi tness corr obor ates R e id’s stor y

, so—becau se w e view the evidenc e i n the li gh t most fav or able to Reid —w e mus t assu me that he had permi ssi on to leav e, but w as su spended regardless.
On Monday

, October 11, Rachelle Pri de, NACA’s National Rea l Estate Di recto r

, vis i ted the Chi cago offi ce as part of a nati onwi de effort to tr ai n NACA-affi li ated real estate agen ts. On that day

, the offi ce w as closed for bus i ness and staffed only by the skeleto n crew of Sear s, Mar tin ez, and another mort gage
consu ltant, Mar i ola Jasinska. Mar tin ez gav e Pri de a tour of the 1 offi ce. During the tour

, Pri de notic ed a numb er of violati ons of NACA’s poli ci es, i ncluding alcoholi c bev erag es i n Reid ’s offi ce and v olumes of p a per copi es of documents wi th confi denti al i nformation vis ible thro ughout the Chi cago offi ce, i n violati on of the pap erless poli cy

. Pri de called Mar ks to get instructi ons. He told her to coordinate wi th H uman Resources (“HR”) and then ask that Sear s and Jasinska tu r n in their offi ce key s and

T hat Mo nday wa s Co l umb us Day

. 16 No. 13-1768

leav e t he offi ce for the remain der of the day

. After talking to Chris tin e Cannoni er i n HR, Pri de met wi th Sear s and Jasinska i ndi v idu a l ly to explain the violati on of the paperless poli cy , receiv e their key s, and ask them to leav e, whi ch they di d. Pri de explain ed to Jasinska tha t she w as not fi red at that tim e, but that she di d need to leav e for the day

. Sear s testifi ed that Pri de told hi m he w as fired as soon as she saw the v io lations of the paperless poli cy

, but Pri de deni es that. In any e v ent, Sear s receiv ed formal notice of hi s termin ation on October 14. Then, pursuant to Cannonie r ’ s i nstructi ons, Pri de photo

gr aphi cally documented the violati ons of the paperless poli cy

. The photo s rev ealed that ev ery employ ee i n the offi ce but one

w as i n violati on of the poli cy

. Ma rk s and Cannoni er asked Pri de to stay i n Chi cago a whi le longer to i nterv i ew the offi ce’s

cus tomer s. During t hose i nterv i ews, Pri de di scov ered that appli cati ons assembled by Reid h a d n ot b e e n tim ely forw arded and, as a result, al l of the customers’ information had expired and w ould need to be r edone. That d elay w as also a violati on of NACA p o l i cy

. Pri de pass ed all thi s i nformation along to Mar k s, who also spoke wi th Cannoni er and Meadows. Through some of the c onv e rs a ti on s a n d c onference calls, Mar ks

w as made aw are that Sear s’s cli ent service w as poor , though at the tim e of hi s deposi tion he could not reca l l from whom he had heard that.
Faced wi th an entire offi ce i n violati on of i ts paperless poli cy , NACA asserts that i t deci ded to fi re three people: Jasinska and plainti ffs Reid and Sear s. In an early response to
an interr ogat or y aski ng for the names of “all” people i nv olv ed i n maki ng the deci si on to fi re the plainti ffs, NACA li sted only Cannoni er

, Meadows, and Pri de. How ev er , there i s confli ctingNo. 13-1768 7

evidenc e concerning how and by whom the fi ring deci si on w as made, with depositi on testim ony i ndi cating that i t w as either just Bruce Mar ks or a gr oup of managers. NACA later updated i ts i nterr ogat or y answer to i nclu d e Mar ks among those inv olv ed i n maki ng the deci si on (cons i stent wi th the pr io r deposi tion testim ony of Me a d ow s, an d C a n n oni er and the later t e st i mony of Mar ks and Pri de). NACA insi sts (and Mar k s testifi ed) t hat, though Mar ks consu lted wi th othe r ma nag ers, he alone made the final deci si on to fi re plainti ffs

. It i s undi sputed that he was not aw are of plainti ffs ’ complaints. Nonetheless, viewed i n the li g ht mo st fav or able to the plainti ffs, i n addi tion to Mar ks, at least Meadows, C a nn oni e r , a nd Pri de had

a hand i n maki ng the decis io n a nd Cannoni er and Meadows had knowledge of plainti ffs ’ complaints. Sear s a nd Reid

rec ei v ed formal notic e of their ter minati on on October 14, 2010. 2
NACA justifi es i ts deci si on to fi re Reid and Sear s based on their violati ons of the paperless poli cy and on i ts beli ef that Reid had left w or k early for the Bulls game. Later i n di scov ery , N A C A explain ed that the reason Reid and Sear s w e r e fi red —whi le other violator s of the paperless poli cy w ere not—w as that Reid and Sear s had problems i n addi tion to their violati on of the paperless poli cy

. These problems i nclu ded the

Marti nez was also l ater termi nat ed, i n part be c ause of the v i ol atio ns o f 2 the paperl ess pol i cy tha t occ ur r e d u nder her man agement o f the Chic ago of fi ce.8 No. 13-1768

alcoho l in Reid ’s offi ce, hi s expired cli ent fi les, and Mar ks’s perception that Sear s’s customer serv i ce w as poor

. 3
A ft e r their ter minati on, plainti ffs brought sui t i n Illi nois state court allegin g state law ret a l ia t io n clai ms. NACA remov ed to federal court and sub sequently mov ed for sum mary judgment. The d i s tr i c t c ou rt gr anted NACA’s motion, conclu di ng the plainti ffs had not offered suffi ci ent evidenc e for a jury to find i n their fav or reg ardin g caus ation. Pl ai nti ffs appeal,

a r g uing that the di stric t court fai led to construe the recor d in the li ght most fav or able to them and that both (1) the tim i ng of their fi ring i n relat i on to their complaints, and (2) the ev olution

o f NACA’s i nterr ogat or y answers about the reasons for , and the deci si on-makers i nv olv ed i n, their ter minati o n cr eate an inf erence that Reid and Sear s w ere really fi red for th e ir prot ected complaints. II. Disc uss ion
W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s sum mary judgment ruli ng de
novo

. Abdullahi v

. City of Madiso n , 423 F

. 3d 763, 769 (7th Ci r

. 2005). Summary judgment i s w arr anted i f the evidenc e, when viewed i n the li ght most fav or able to the non-movin g party , presents “no genui ne i ssu e as to any material fact” su ch that “the moving party i s entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Id. (ci tin g Fed. R

. C iv

. P

. 56(c) ). A “court may not asses s the credibi li ty of wi tnesses, choose betw een competi ng i nferences

or balanc e the relat i v e w ei ght of co nf l icting evidenc e; i t mus t

Marks testifi ed that Jasin ska was also selected for fi rin g based on 3

an attenda nc e probl em in addition to her vi olation s of the paperless poli cy.No. 13-1768 9

view all the evi dence i n the recor d in the li ght most fav or able to the non-mo ving party and resolv e all factual di sputes i n fav or of the non-moving party .” Id. at 773.
T o survive a motion for sum mary judgment on an I llinoi s ret ali ator y di sch arg e clai m, a plainti ff mus t have offered suffi ci ent e v idence for a jury to find that (1) the employ er di sch arg ed the employ ee (2) in r e taliati on for the employ ee’s prot ected acti viti es, and (3) that the di sch arg e w a s i n contrav ention of a clearly mandated publi c poli cy

. Palmateer v

. In t’ l Harvester Co. , 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (Ill. 1981).
Pl a i nti ffs w ere di sch arg ed after they complained that NACA’s w age and hour practic es and mort gage a ppli cati on practic es violated Illi noi s and federal law , whi ch the parties

assu me were p ro tected complaints. Accordi ngly , the only 4 i ssu e before us i s whether plainti ffs proffer ed suffi ci ent eviden ce t hat their di sch arg e w as i n ret ali ation for their complaints. S i mply put, the questi on i s wh ether the plainti ffs offered p r o o f of caus ation. F or the element of caus ation, “t he ulti mate i ss ue t o be deci ded i s the employ er’s motiv e i n di sch arg i ng the employ ee.” Hartlein v

. Ill. Power Co. , 601 N.E.2d 720, 730 (Ill. 1992).
Retaliat io n clai ms under Illi noi s law di ffer from federal ret ali ation clai ms under the McDonnell Douglas fr a mew or k, where a plainti ff can present a prima facie case and shi ft the

Spec i fi call y, the Il l i noi s Mi nimum Wage Law (“ IMWL” ), 82 0 ILCS 10 5/ 1, 4 et s eq. , th e Ill i noi s Reside ntial Mo rtgage Li cense Act (“ IRMLA” ), 20 5 ILCS 63 5/ 1- 1, et seq

. , and the Secure and Fair Enforc ement for Mo r tgage Lic ensing Ac t (“SAFE” Act), 12 U.S.C. § 510 1, et se q

.10 No. 13-1768

burden to t he defendant to prov i de a legiti mate reason for a ter minati on. Instead, Illi noi s law requires the pl ainti ff to offer affi rmativ e evidenc e of caus ation to surviv e sum mary judgment. Gacek v

. Am. Airlin es, Inc. , 614 F .3d 298, 300, 303 (7th Ci r

. 2010). Such evidenc e need not (and often wi ll not) be di rect evidenc e of the employ er’s motiv e, since an employ er wi ll gener ally know better than to explic i tly rev eal that a di sch arg e i s mot i v ated by t he employ ee’s prot ected complaints. R ather , the evidenc e wi ll typical ly be ci rcums tantial. That inclu des factual scen ar io s that giv e ris e to a reasonable i nference that the employ er’s motiv e w as ret ali ator y

. See Hugo v

. T

omasz ewski, 508 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 9 8 7 ) (“A plainti ff i n a [retaliator y d i sch arg e case] wi ll often be required to rely heavily upon ci rcums tantial evidenc e of the employ er’s i ntent

... . ” ). Ultim ately

, w e look at the recor d as a whole to see whether a jury could reasonably i nfer that NACA’s motiv e for fi ring Reid and Sears w as retaliati on for thei r c omplaints. See, e.g., Zuc colo v

. Han n ah Marine Corp. , 900 N.E.2d 353, 360 (Ill. Ap p. Ct. 2008) (su mmari zi ng the pert i nent c i rcu m s tan c e s of the whole recor d and conclu ding that “a rat i onal tr i er of fact could find that [the employ er] had a ret ali ator y mot i v e”). 5
Preli minaril y

, plainti ffs arg ue that the di stric t court fai led to proper ly apply the sum mary judgment standard and draw certain i nferences fav or able to the plainti ffs from the evidenc e.

This method of pro of cor rel ates wi t h t he “di rect method” i n a fed eral 5 retali atio n cl ai m, where the pl aintif f has the b urden to pro v e causa tio n ei ther b y di rect evidence or , as i s more commo n, b y a “co nv i ncing mosaic” of ci rcumstan tial evidence. See Coleman v. Donah oe, 66 7 F.3d 83 5, 86 0 (7 th Ci r. 20 12 ) (explai ning the use of ci rcumstan tial evidence i n the di rect method)

.No. 13-1768 11

Plainti ffs urge that, as w e rev i ew de novo , w e should draw tw o inf e r ences: fi rst, that only Meadows, Cannoni er, and Pri de (and not Mar ks) w ere i nv olv ed i n the deci si on to ter minate the plainti ffs ; and second, that “ N A C A ’s alleged reasons for ter minati ng” plainti ffs a r e “li mi ted to” the reasons i ni tiall y “alleged” (that both Reid and Sear s violated the paperless poli cy and also that Reid left w or k ear ly for the Bulls game).
Plainti ffs base their fi rst propo sed i nference on NACA’s omi ssi on of Mar ks’s na me from i ts earlies t i nterr ogat or y
answer about those i ndi vidu als i nv olv ed i n plainti ffs ’ ter mination. Thi s ini tial omi ssi on i s not a conclu si v e admi ssi on. The i nterr ogat or y ques tion w as updated after Cannoni er and Meadows had consist ently testifi ed that Mar ks w as i nv olv ed i n t he ter minati on deci si on, whi ch Mar ks’s and Pri de’s later testim ony confi rmed. Becaus e ev ery single wit ness wi th persona l knowledge consi stently testifi ed that Mar ks w as i nv olv ed i n the fi ring deci si on and the only contrar y evidenc e i s an omi ssi on from a now-amen ded i nterr ogat or y answer , a jury could not reasonably find that Mar k s w as not i nv olv ed. Anderson v

. Liberty Lobby , Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The

mere exis ten ce of a scinti lla of evidenc e i n supp or t of the plainti ff’s posi tion wi ll be i nsu ffi ci ent; there mus t be evidenc e
on whi ch the jury could reasonably find for the plainti ff.”)

. Plainti ffs ’ second prop o se d i nference i s better viewed as an arg ument that NACA’s later explanation of addi tional reasons for plainti ffs ’ ter minati on should be viewed as evidenc e of pret ext (wh i ch could giv e r i se to an i nference of ret ali ator y i ntent); as such, w e turn to the rec o rd to di scern whether an12 No. 13-1768

i nference of ret ali ator y i ntent i s reasonable a nd address thi s arg ument in due c ourse. 6
Plainti ffs make tw o main arg uments i n su p port of caus ation from the ci rcums tances of their ter minati on. First, that the prox i mi ty i n tim e of their ter minati on to their complaints giv es ris e to a reason a ble i nference of ret ali ator y intent. Second, plainti ffs arg ue that NACA’s “ ‘ mo ving tar get ’ defense” of shi fti ng reasons for their ter minati on and shi fti ng posi tions on who made the deci si on to fi re them shows that the reasons are pret ext ual and a lso giv es ris e to a reasonable i nference of ret ali ator y in tent. A. T imin g Plainti ffs arg ue that t he fact that Sear s had complained three days, and Reid complain ed elev en days, before they w ere fi red giv es ris e to a reasonable i nference of ret ali ator y ani mus

. In supp or t, they rely on our deci si on i n Loudermi lk v

. Best Pallet Co., L L C, 636 F .3d 312, 315 (7th Ci r

. 2011). In Loudermi lk , a

w or ker tasked wi th tear i ng down pallets complained about raci al di scri minati on when he (a black man) w as tasked to do

a jo b that w as normally done by tw o men, and whe n his

cow or ker s (H i spani c men) hurled raci al epi thets at him

. Id. at

The partie s also di scuss a do ctri ne call ed “mend the hol d,” whereby 6 i nsuran ce companie s are requir ed to stick to the fi rst reasons they of fer fo r denyi ng coverage. There i s no reason to extend such a do ctri ne to retali atio n cases where the ul timate questio n i s the empl oyer ’s i ntent and, as l ong as the new reasons are of fere d duri ng di scovery, the pl aintif f has ample time to i nv esti gate and b uil d an argumen t that they are pretextual. Besi des, b ecause the pl aintif fs raise this argument fo r the fi rst time on app e al, i t i s waived. Kee ne Corp. v. Int’l Fid. I ns. Co. , 7 36 F.2 d 3 88 , 3 93 (7 th Ci r. 1 98 4)

.No. 13-1768 13

313–14. Hi s complaints spann ed about one month. T ow ards the end of that month, he too k pi ctures of the w or k that w as done (wi th the i ntent of later prov i ng t he w or k required tw o men). Id. at 314. When management conf r onted hi m, he reiterat ed hi s complaints a nd w a s told to “Put i t i n wri tin g.” He di d so the nex t d a y a nd hi s manager “fi red hi m on the spot.” Id. In Loudermi lk , w e descri

bed the tim i ng anal y si s thi s
w ay: S u s p i c i o u s t i m i n g m a y b e j u s t t h a t

— sus pi ci ous—and a sus pi ci on i s not enough to g e t past a motion for sum mary judgment. Occasi onally , how ev er , an adv erse acti on comes so close on the heels of a prot ected act that an inference of caus ation i s sens i ble. Deci ding when the i nference i s appropr i

at e cannot be resolv ed by a legal rule; the answer depends on context, just as an ev aluati on of context i s essenti al to deter mine whether an employ er’s explanation i s fi shy enough to supp or t an i nference that t he real r eason mus t be di scri minator y

. Id. a t 3 1 5 (citati ons omi tte d). W e appli ed that analysi s to the facts of Loudermi lk and conclu ded that an i nference of di scri mi

nator y i ntent w as reasonable, so a jury should deci de whether i t w as appr opriate. Id. W e had r eached a si mi lar result be fo r e i n Mc C l e n d on v

. Ind. Sugars, Inc. , 108 F .3d 789, 792 (7th Ci r

. 1997), also ci ted by plaint iffs

. There, ami dst an escalating confli ct where the employ ee accu sed the employ er of di scri mi

nati on and the emplo yer counter -accused the employ ee of i nsubordinati on, the employ ee fi led a laws ui t and w as fi red three days later

. Id. a t 7 9 2–93. Under the McDonnell Douglas framew or k, w e conclu ded t hat the “sequenc e of ev ents [w as]14 No. 13-1768

suffi ci ent” to reasonably i nfer ret ali ator y i ntent. Id. at 796–97. Nonetheless, w e gr anted sum mary judgment becau se the employ e e fai led to rais e any genui ne i ssu e about hi s employ er’s r easons for fi ring hi m (insubordinati on). Id. at 799. An inference of ret ali ator y i ntent from the tim i ng of Reid ’s and Sear s’s di sch arg es i s not reasonable becau se the evi dence

as a whole does not permi t su ch a n i nference. In context, the “sequenc e of ev ents” leading to plainti ffs ’ ter minati on w as si x
mon t hs of occasi onal complaints. There i s no evidenc e that p l a int i ffs ’ complaints escalated; i f anythin g their complaints becam e le ss se r i ous—Rei d had spoken to state and federal reg ulator s months before he w as fi r e d , bu t leading up to hi s ter minati on, he had only sent emails a nd made comments i n person or ov er the phone. All of Sear s’s complaints w ere just the occasi onal emai l or remark

. Fin ally , plainti ffs ’ ter minati on

w as i mmedi ately preceded by an i ntervening ev ent unrelated to their complaints—Pri de, an executiv e unfam i li ar wi th plainti ffs or their complaints, di scov ered per v asi v e violati ons of NACA’s paperless poli cy

. Cf. Louderm ilk

, 636 F .3d at 314 (deci si on to ter minate made t he moment plainti ff handed the employ er his wri tte n complaint).
T urni ng to the recor d as a whole, an i nference of ret ali ator y int e nt becomes ev en more unreasonable. Almost ev ery one in the o ff i ce, not just the plainti ffs, complained about the same i ssu es—w ages and commi ssi on-spli tting—but the other s w ere
no t fi red. How ev er

, someone w as fi red si multaneously wi th Reid and Sear s, Mar i ola Jasins k a, but there i s no speci fi c evidenc e that she had made si mi lar complaints (only the v ague state ments that “ev ery one complained”). Furt her , although Illi noi s ret ali ator y di sch arg e law does not require an employ erNo. 13-1768 15

to proffer reasons for fi ring a n employ ee, NACA has. NACA states i t fi red Reid for violati ng the paperless poli cy , letting cli en t fil e s expire, havin g alcohol i n hi s offi ce, and leaving

w or k early for a Chi cago Bulls game. NACA states that i t fi red 7 S e a r s becau se of hi s violati ons of the paperless poli cy and becau se of Mar ks’ s p e r cept i on that hi s cus tomer service w as poor

. The tim ing i n thi s case does not giv e ris e to a reasonable i nference of retaliator y in tent. B. “‘Moving T

ar get’ Defen se” In turn, plainti ffs arg ue that NACA’s defense o f t his case has inv olv e d shi fti ng and inconsi stent posi tions that, along wi th other evidence, poin t to pret ext and ret ali ator y i ntent. First, plainti ffs arg ue that NACA’s reasons for fi rin g t hem

w ere pret ext ual becau se a violati on of the paperless poli cy di d not by i tself merit ter mination. The other reasons—alcohol, expired documents, and poor cust o me r service—were addi

t io nal excuses for the earlier deci si on to ter minate. Ev e r y manager who testifi ed thought that a violati on of the paperless poli cy w as su ffi ci ent gr ounds to fi re an at-wi ll employ ee. The only evidenc e that the plainti ffs ci te to di spute that propo si tion i s Mar ks’s testim ony

. Mar ks sai d that the plainti ffs w ere not fi red merely for th e paperless violati on (though they could

Reid of fers testimo ny tha t Marti nez gave him permi ssio n to go to the 7 gam e, and so we ass ume t hat i s true. But he of fers no evidence tha t the deci sio n-mak ers—Cannonier , Marks, Meado ws, and Pr i d e —knew ab out tha t di spute, nor has Reid of fere d any other evidence tha t the group tha t deci ded to fi re him di d not genuinel y b el i eved those re as ons were v ali d. Gacek , 614 F .3d a t 303 (an Il l i noi s retali atory di scha rge pl aintif f “co uld n ot hav e preva i l ed merel y b y pro v i ng tha t the rea sons g i v en b y the airl i ne fo r fi ri ng him were unworthy ofbeli ef” ).16 No. 13-1768

hav e been) bu t for that vi olation and the pl ai nti ffs ’ addi tional problems, becau se i f ev ery one who had violated the poli cy had bee n fi red, the Chi cago offi ce w ould hav e had only one employ ee left. Plainti ffs arg ue that thi s statement i s evidenc e t hat NACA management di d not really beli ev e that violat ing the paperless p o l icy alone merited ter minati on. Plainti ffs further arg ue that, becau se the other reasons for their ter mination w ere added lat er

, that tends t o i ndi cate the reaso ns w ere pret ext ual.
Fr om day one, NACA has assert e d that Reid and Sear s
w ere fi red based on their violati ons of the paperless poli cy and Reid ’s atte ndanc e i ssu es, and all the managerial testim on y
corr obor ates thi s. When Mar ks w as deposed on August 16, 2012, he asserted t ha t he w as the final deci si on-maker , and again corr obor ated these reasons. How ev er , he also stated that becau se so many people had violated the poli cy , he look ed for addi tional reasons to justif y ter minati ng any o ne particu lar employ ee. Further

, he testifi ed that the alcohol that Pri de had found i n Reid ’s offi ce, Reid ’s incomplete and expired cli ent fil e s, and Mar ks’s perception that Sear s’s cli ent service w as poor i nflu enced hi s decis io n to select Reid and Sear s for ter minati on. Pri de’s testim ony corr obor ated some of these

8 problems, and her photo gr aphs confi rmed t he presence of alcohol i n Reid ’s offi ce. Reid does not deny that he had bott les of alcohol in hi s offi ce, but states that they w ere unopened and

w ere just on di splay

. But an employ er’s reason need not be goo d, just genuinely beli ev ed to be tr ue. Everroad v

. Scott T ruck

Plai ntif fs offe r n o evidence aga i nst their m ana gers’ a ssessmen ts ofth ei r 8 perf or man ce e xcept their ass erti ons that they perfo rmed satisf actori l y.No. 13-1768 17 Sys., Inc. , 604 F .3d 471, 478 n.2 (7th Ci r

. 2010) (“So long as they g enuinely beli ev ed i n the tr uth of their stated reason fo r t he deci si on, that reason is not pret ext ual.”). Despi te these addi

tional reasons, NACA’s i nterr ogat or y responses hav e alw ays li sted o nl y t he violati on of the paperless poli cy and Reid ’s leaving w or k early as the reasons fo r plainti ffs ’ ter minati on. Plainti ffs contend that thi s i s enough for a jury to reasonably conclu de that NACA di d not really beli ev e the reasons i t gav e for fi ring plainti ffs

. In relianc e, pla int iff s ci te our deci si on i n Hitchcock v . Angel Corps, Inc

. , 718 F .3d 733 (7th Ci r . 2013).
In Hitchcock

, w e held that a jury could reasonably i nfer that proffere d reasons for a ter minati on w ere pret ext becau se they

w ere shi fti ng and i nconsi stent. Id. at 738 (ci tin g Rudi n v

. Lin coln Land Cmty

. Coll. , 420 F .3d 712, 726 (7th Ci r

. 2005)). A c ouple of months after Hi tchcock had di scov ered she w as preg nant, she vis i ted a patien t at her home. Id. at 734–35. Upon arr i ving, she fo und she w as unabl e to acces s the patien t becau se of the strange behavi or of the patient’s son, and i t w as later deter

mined that the patien t had been dead for a couple days. Id. at 7 3 6

. Nonetheless, her employ er fi red her and prov i ded multipl e r e asons i nclu ding: that she had asses sed a dead patien t; thatshe too k ac tions that compro mi sed that patient’s health and safety; that she would have compromi sed the health and safety of the pati ent ( had sh e not been dead) by fai ling to do somethi ng becau se of the son’s i nti mi datin g behavi or ; and, finally , later i n li tigati on, that she had perfor med a defi ci ent
asses sment of the dead patien t (wi thout any speci fi cs about how t he asses sment w as defic i ent). Id. at 738. Unsurpri singly , w e held that a j ury could reasonably find holdi ng someone
accoun table for compromi sing the he alth of an already-dead18 No. 13-1768 patien t w as a p re te xtual reason, and the later i nconsi stent shi fts

w ere also indi cati v e of pret ext

. But NACA’s reasons suffer from no such i nfi rmi ties

. Fr om the moment of plain tiffs’ termi nati on to thi s v ery day , NACA has consi stently maintai ned that the main reason for plainti ffs ’ ter minati on w as their v i olation of the paperless poli cy

. Ev ery manager i nv olv ed i n the ter mination consi stently gav e the violati on of the paperless poli cy as the main reason. Mar ks’s addi tional reasons are not i nconsi stent, and w ere no t a shi ft from the main reason. He explain ed why some employ ees who violated the paperless poli cy w ere ter minated and other w ere not. See Schu ster v

. Luc ent T echs., Inc. , 327 F .3d 569, 579 (7th Ci r

. 2003) (holding that “an addi tional, not necess arily i nconsi stent
reason for the employment deci si on, rat her than an abr upt change in ex planati on” does not g i v e ris e to an inference that the reasons are pret ext ual). A jury mig ht reasonably be

sus pi ci ous i f the people wi th a d d it ional problems who w ere fi red w ere complainers and th o se who w ere ret ai ned w ere non-complainers, but that i s not the case

. N umerous other employ ees who complained and violated the policy w ere not fi red whi le Jasinska w as fired for violating the policy wi th no evidenc e of her havin g complained sav e the a ss e r tion that “ev ery one complained.” Plainti ffs ’ manager , N or ma Mar tin ez,

w as also ter minated afterw ards, in par t becau se o f t he perv asi v e violati ons of the paperless poli cy

. Second, plainti ffs arg ue that NACA’s shi ft respecti ng who the deci si on-makers w ere giv es ris e to an i nference of mendac

i ty , and there fore, ret ali ator y intent. W e di sagree. NACA’s i nhouse couns el answered the i nterr ogat or i es wi th the i nformation he had at the tim e about who w as i nv olv ed i n the deci si onNo. 13-1768 19

to fi re plainti ffs

. When ev ery manager later testif i e d that Mar ks

w as inv olv ed, NACA changed the i nterr ogat or y answer and Mar ks w as deposed. He testifi ed that, as CEO, he w as the final authority on the fi ring deci si on. NACA changed i ts strat egy to assert the same, no doubt p l e a s e d th a t the undi sputed evidenc e show ed that Mar ks had no knowledge of the plainti ffs ’ complaints. T

o account for thi s shift, w e hav e viewed the

e v idence i n the li ght most fav or able to the plainti ffs and said that a jury could beli ev e that Mar ks w as not the sole deci si onmaker

. But thi s shi ft i n li tigati on strat egy does not bear on the deci si on-makers’ i ntent; i f the deci sio n really w as made by Pri de, Cannoni er

, and Meadows, i n addi tion to Mar ks, the fact that Mar ks later clai med full responsibi li ty does not mean that i t w ould be reasonable to i nfer that the deci si on-makers ac ted wi th a ret ali ator y i ntent when maki ng the deci si on. See Schu ster, 327 F .3d at 579 (“the changing stor y as to who actually partici pated i n the deci si on

... i s also i nsu ffi ci ent to rais e a questi on as to whether the

... reasons giv en are merely pret ext ual”).
In sum, though plainti ffs had made prot ected complaints shortly before their ter minati on, the same complaints had been going on for some tim e and, if a ny thi ng, had declined i n gr avity

. NACA asserts that i t fi red the plainti ffs for v arious p o l icy violati ons, whi ch the undi sputed evidenc e shows that the deci si on-makers genui nely beli ev e d

. The reasons NACA offered, though they w ere later added to i n or der t o explain why other s w ere not ter minated, w ere not shi fti ng or i nconsi stent, and there w as no sus pi ci ous pa tte rn i n the employ ees i t chose to fi re or ret ai n. Vi ewing t he evidenc e as a whole, w e agr ee wi th the d ist r i ct court that an i nference of ret ali ator y20 No. 13-1768

i ntent i s not reasonable. Becaus e there i s also no d irect evidence, plainti ffs hav e fai led to create a genui ne i ssu e about the material fact of caus ation. Ther efore, sum mary judgment for NACA w as appropriate. III. Conclusi on Plainti ffs allegin g ret ali ator y di sch a r ge i n Illi noi s are required to produce evidenc e suffi ci ent for a jury to reasonably in fe r that they w ere ter minated i n ret ali ation for their prote c te d complaints. Because plainti ffs hav e not done so, sum mary judgment i n fav or of NACA w as appropr i ate. The judgment of the di stric t courti s AFFI RMED.