IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-414

No. COA18-1118-3

Filed 21 June 2022

Rowan County, Nos. 17CRS51470, 17CRS51353, 17CRS51350, 17CRS51412, 

17CRS974

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

KENNETH RUSSELL ANTHONY, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from order entered on or about 26 April 2018 by Judge 

Lori I. Hamilton in Superior Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 

May 2019, and opinion filed 20 August 2019. Remanded to this Court by order of the 

North Carolina Supreme Court for further consideration in light of State v. Grady, 

372 N.C. 509, 831 S.E.2d 542 (2019). Opinion filed 17 November 2020. Remanded to 

this Court by order of the North Carolina Supreme Court for further consideration in 

light of State v. Hilton, 378 N.C. 692, 2021-NCSC-115, State v. Strudwick, 379 N.C. 

94, 2021-NCSC-127, and the General Assembly’s recent amendments to the satellitebased monitoring program in 2021 North Carolina Laws S.L. 2021-138 (Sept. 2, 2021, 

eff. 1 December 2021).

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sonya 

M. Calloway-Durham, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. 

Andrews, for defendant.
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Opinion of the Court

STROUD, Chief Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Kenneth Russell Anthony appeals a trial court order directing him 

to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) for life following his plea to an 

aggravated sex offense. We are reviewing Defendant’s case for a third time; the North 

Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to us to reconsider our holding in light 

of State v. Hilton, 378 N.C. 692, 2021-NCSC-115, State v. Strudwick, 379 N.C. 94, 

2021-NCSC-127, and the General Assembly’s recent amendments to the SBM 

program from Session Law 2021-138, § 18. 2021 North Carolina Laws S.L. 2021-138

(Sept. 2, 2021, eff. 1 December 2021). Based upon these recent Supreme Court rulings 

and the newly revised statutes applicable to this SBM order, we find the trial court 

conducted an adequate hearing as to the reasonableness of SBM in Defendant’s case

and thus we reject his argument the State failed to prove lifetime SBM was 

reasonable as applied to him. Because we further conclude SBM is reasonable as 

applied to Defendant after our own de novo review, we affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 As this is the third time this case is before us, we draw on our previous opinions 

to give the factual background of the case, adding details only as necessary for this 

current opinion. Our first opinion summarized the underlying facts of the case:

Defendant entered an Alford plea to attempted first-degree 
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sex offense, habitual felon, assault on a female, 

communicating threats, interfering with emergency 

communication, first-degree kidnapping, incest, and 

second-degree forcible rape. Defendant’s charges were 

consolidated into a single judgment and the trial court 

imposed a sentence of 216 to 320 months. On the same day 

judgment was entered, Defendant submitted a motion to 

dismiss the State’s petition for SBM. The trial court held a 

hearing regarding SBM. The trial court denied Defendant’s 

motion and entered an order directing Defendant to submit 

to lifetime SBM upon his release from prison. Defendant 

timely appealed the order requiring him to submit to 

lifetime SBM.

State v. Anthony, 267 N.C. App. 45, 46, 831 S.E.2d 905, 906–07 (2019) (“Anthony I”).

¶ 3 To expand upon that summary with the facts relevant to this appeal, the plea 

hearing included a summary of the evidence, to which Defendant had consented. 

Specifically, the trial court heard summarized evidence on a previous felony sex 

offense Defendant had committed, a previous sex offender registry violation, and the 

factual basis for the two charges to which Defendant pled in this case. The trial court 

later used the factual basis for these charges to conclude Defendant had committed 

an aggravated offense that made him eligible for SBM.

¶ 4 As Anthony I indicated, the trial court also held a hearing regarding SBM, and 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s petition for it, immediately after the plea 

hearing. 267 N.C. App. at 46, 831 S.E.2d at 906. Defendant argued in his motion to 

dismiss SBM was unconstitutional facially and as applied to him under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the North 
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Carolina Constitution. In the current appeal, Defendant only argues SBM violates 

the Fourth Amendment as applied to him.

¶ 5 As part of that argument, Defendant highlighted the Fourth Amendment 

requires searches to be reasonable and the United States Supreme Court in Grady v. 

North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (“Grady I”) (per curiam), held 

SBM is a search. Thus, the trial court conducted an analysis of reasonableness of

SBM as to Defendant and found as follows:

In this matter, the defendant is already, as a 

convicted sex offender, required to register as a sex 

offender. Those registration requirements already impose 

a burden upon the defendant and the -- the additional 

burden of satellite-based monitoring would be a slight 

additional burden or infringement on the defendant’s life 

and liberty. That, in fact, the satellite-based monitoring 

does not actually curtail the defendant’s liberty. It does not 

require that he be locked up or placed in any sort of 

detention facility, but rather makes his whereabouts 

known for the purposes of serving greater governmental 

interests and legitimate State interests such as protecting 

society from, in this particular case, a twice convicted sex 

offender and deterring the conduct of what is, in this case, 

a twice convicted sex offender. 

I will note also that studies show that sex offenders 

generally have a higher recidivism rate than does the 

general population of convicted felons, and for that reason 

-- for that reason and others, the State does have a 

legitimate State interest and a legitimate concern for the 

protection of society and the deterrence of future conduct. 

And for those reasons, I will -- that and the fact that I have 

now made findings of fact sufficient to justify the 

imposition of satellite-based monitoring will require that 

the defendant enroll in the satellite-based monitoring 
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program for a period of his natural life, unless monitoring 

is earlier terminated pursuant to G.S. §14-208.43.

The trial court then denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s SBM petition 

and imposed SBM. As Anthony I noted, Defendant then “timely appealed the order 

requiring him to submit to lifetime SBM.” 267 N.C. App. at 46, 831 S.E.2d at 907.

¶ 6 While we explain the nature of our prior rulings in our analysis below, we 

briefly review the procedural history of Defendant’s appeal. Following our opinion 

reversing the SBM order in Anthony I, 267 N.C. App. at 52, 831 S.E.2d at 910, the 

North Carolina Supreme Court remanded “for reconsideration in light of” State v. 

Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 831 S.E.2d 542 (2019) (“Grady III”). State v. Anthony, No. 

COA18-1118-2, slip op. at 2, 274 N.C. App. 356 (2020) (“Anthony II”) (unpublished), 

remanded for reconsideration in 379 N.C. 668, 865 S.E.2d 851 (2021). In Anthony II, 

we again reversed the trial court’s order imposing lifetime SBM. Id., slip op. at 6–7. 

Our Supreme Court remanded again for reconsideration in light of Hilton, Strudwick, 

and the legislative changes to the SBM program. 379 N.C. 668, 865 S.E.2d 851. 

Following the latest remand, we ordered supplemental briefing from each party. We 

now address Defendant’s arguments from that briefing, which again challenges the 

trial court’s order imposing lifetime SBM.

II. Analysis

¶ 7 Defendant argues the trial court erred by imposing SBM because “[t]he State 
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failed to prove that SBM would be a reasonable search as applied to” him. 

Specifically, Defendant asserts that, just as our first opinion in this case determined, 

“the State ‘presented no evidence as to the reasonableness of SBM,’” so “the order 

imposing SBM should be reversed.” (Quoting Anthony I, 267 N.C. App. at 47, 831 

S.E.2d at 907.) Defendant also contends the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in 

Hilton and Strudwick do not impact his argument because they were facial challenges 

in contrast to his as-applied challenge.

¶ 8 We first address the standard of review. Then, to aid in the understanding of 

Defendant’s arguments, we provide a brief overview of the recent history of SBM 

litigation and legislation as well as its impact on this case. Finally, we address his 

argument directly.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 9 We review a trial court order to determine “whether the trial judge’s 

underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, . . . and whether 

those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State 

v. Carter, 2022-NCCOA-262, ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 

S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)) (alteration in original). “We review a trial court’s 

determination that SBM is reasonable de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Gambrell, 265 

N.C. App. 641, 642, 828 S.E.2d 749, 750 (2019)).
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B. Brief History of Recent SBM Litigation and Legislation

¶ 10 With that standard of review in mind, we now provide a brief history of recent 

SBM litigation and how this case fits within that history. This Court’s recent opinion 

in Carter provides a helpful overview of the history:

The Supreme Court of the United States held in Grady v. 

North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 191 L. Ed. 

2d 459 (2015) (“Grady I”), that the imposition of SBM 

constitutes a warrantless search under the Fourth 

Amendment and necessitates an inquiry into

reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. 575 

U.S. at 310, 135 S. Ct. at 1371, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 462.

Carter, ¶ 15. Grady I served as the basis for Defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s 

SBM petition. And the trial court issued its SBM ruling with Grady I as the leading 

case on the matter.

¶ 11 We also issued our first opinion in this case, Anthony I, before the Grady case 

had reached the North Carolina Supreme Court again in Grady III. See Anthony II, 

slip op. at 2 (noting the Supreme Court remanded the case “for reconsideration in 

light of” Grady III). As Defendant highlights, we reversed the trial court order in 

Anthony I because “the State presented no evidence supporting the reasonableness of 

SBM as applied to Defendant.” 267 N.C. App. at 46, 831 S.E.2d at 906. In Anthony 

I, we evaluated reasonableness by analyzing: “the defendant’s risk of recidivism and 

the efficacy of SBM to accomplish a reduction of recidivism.” Id., 267 N.C. App. at 

47, 831 S.E.2d at 907. Our lack-of-evidence holding focused on the second part of that 
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analysis, the State’s failure to present any evidence on whether SBM effectively 

prevents recidivism. Id., 267 N.C. App. at 52, 831 S.E.2d at 910. Notably, our ruling 

was based on State v. Grady, 259 N.C. App. 664, 817 S.E.2d 18 (2018) (“Grady II”). 

See Anthony I, 267 N.C. App. at 52, 831 S.E.2d at 910 (including language about being 

bound by Grady II).

¶ 12 Grady III, however, changed the way courts analyze reasonableness within the 

SBM context. Specifically, it replaced the two-pronged analysis used in Anthony I

with a new set of three factors “to be considered in determining whether SBM is 

reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” See Carter, ¶ 17 (noting this 

Court used Grady III “for guidance as to the scope of the reasonableness analysis” 

required by Grady I). Under Grady III, courts had to weigh an offender’s privacy 

interests, SBM’s “‘intrusion’” into those interests, and the State’s “‘without question 

legitimate’ interest in monitoring sex offenders.” Id. (quoting Grady III, 372 N.C. at 

527, 534, 538, 543–44, 831 S.E.2d at 557, 561, 564, 568).

¶ 13 Thus, Defendant’s emphasis on our previous determination in Anthony I that

the State failed to present evidence supporting the reasonableness of SBM overlooks

the difference in what reasonableness meant then versus now and thus what type of 

evidence the State needed to present. In Anthony I, we held that the State failed to 

provide evidence of SBM’s efficacy. 267 N.C. App. at 52, 831 S.E.2d at 910. Grady 

III instead explained the State had to show SBM was reasonable under the totality 
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of the circumstances as measured by its three factors. Carter, ¶ 17 (citing Grady III, 

372 N.C. at 527, 534, 538, 543–44, 831 S.E.2d at 557, 561, 564, 568). As explained 

more below, our Supreme Court’s recent cases have made clear the State need not 

prove SBM’s efficacy, only the three factors from Grady III. See Hilton, ¶ 28 (“Since 

we have recognized the efficacy of SBM in assisting with the apprehension of 

offenders and in deterring recidivism, there is no need for the State to prove SBM’s 

efficacy on an individualized basis.”); Hilton, ¶¶ 19, 29, 32 (laying out three factors 

for SBM reasonableness analysis that mirror those from Grady III). Thus, we reject 

Defendant’s argument our holding on lack of evidence from Anthony I has any bearing

on our analysis of his argument in this appeal.

¶ 14 Following Grady III, the Supreme Court remanded this case to us “for 

reconsideration in light of” Grady III, which led to our opinion in Anthony II. Anthony 

II, slip op. at 2. In Anthony II, we again determined the State could not establish 

SBM was reasonable; the State did not prove SBM would be a reasonable search in 

the distant future when Defendant was released from prison—18 years at the time of 

the opinion—which was the time when SBM would begin. Anthony II, slip op. at 6–

7.

¶ 15 Since our decision in Anthony II, our Supreme Court has issued two further 

relevant decisions on SBM, Hilton and Strudwick. In Hilton, the Supreme Court 

“narrowly construed Grady III’s holding” noting Grady III “‘left unanswered the 
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question of whether the SBM program is constitutional as applied to sex offenders 

who are in categories other than that of recidivists who are no longer under State 

supervision.’” Carter, ¶ 18 (quoting Hilton, ¶ 2). That includes people such as 

Defendant who falls under SBM’s purview because he committed an aggravated 

offense. See Hilton, ¶ 21 (differentiating between the recidivist and aggravated 

offense categories in the SBM context). Hilton answered the question of the 

constitutionality of SBM for at least the aggravated offense category by laying out a 

three-step reasonableness inquiry under the totality of the circumstances, which 

resembles the inquiry from Grady III. See Hilton, ¶ 19 (“The first step of our 

reasonableness inquiry under the totality of the circumstances requires . . . .”). 

Specifically, courts must analyze: (1) “the legitimacy of the State’s interest,” (2) “the 

scope of the privacy interests involved,” and (3) “the level of intrusion effected by the 

imposition of” SBM. Hilton, ¶¶ 19, 29, 32. Hilton concluded the SBM statute is not 

unconstitutional for the aggravated offender category because the SBM search is 

reasonable in that context. Hilton, ¶ 36.

¶ 16 Strudwick confirmed the three-step reasonableness inquiry. See Strudwick, ¶ 

20 (“[W]e are bound to apply the instructions which we enunciated in Grady III—and 

further developed in Hilton—in order to determine the reasonableness of the trial 

court’s imposition of lifetime SBM in defendant’s case.” (citing Hilton, ¶ 18)). In 

Strudwick, the Supreme Court again concluded lifetime SBM for the defendant was 
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reasonable because the “legitimate and compelling government interest” outweighed 

“its [SBM’s] narrow, tailored intrusion into defendant’s expectation of privacy in his 

person, home, vehicle, and location.” Id., ¶ 28.

¶ 17 Strudwick included two additional relevant discussions. First, the Supreme 

Court clarified the reasonableness determination takes place in the present, not the 

future:

[T]he State is not tasked with the responsibility to 

demonstrate the reasonableness of a search at its 

effectuation in the future for which the State is bound to 

apply in the present; rather, the State is tasked under a 

legislative enactment presumed to be constitutional with 

the responsibility to demonstrate the reasonableness of a 

search at its evaluation in the present for which the State 

is bound to apply for the future effectuation of a search.

Id., ¶ 13 (emphasis in original). Strudwick thus makes clear our decision in Anthony 

II cannot stand because it relied on the State’s failure to prove reasonableness at the 

time Defendant will be released from prison. Anthony II, slip op. at 6–7.

¶ 18 The second relevant additional aspect of Strudwick is its discussion on how to 

reevaluate SBM orders as time moves forward and circumstances change. Strudwick, 

¶¶ 15–17. Strudwick indicates a defendant could file a petition under Rule 60 of the 

North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds “it is no longer equitable that 

the judgment should have prospective application” or “[a]ny other reason justifying 

relief from the operation of the judgment.” Id., ¶ 16 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-1A, 
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Rule 60(b)(5)–(6) (2019)); see also id., ¶ 17 (further explaining how sub-sections (5) 

and (6) could provide paths to relief). The Supreme Court also noted a defendant 

could file a petition under North Carolina General Statute § 14-208.43 (2019). 

Strudwick, ¶ 15.

¶ 19 Strudwick’s second option of statutory relief still exists, but subsequent 

statutory changes—the ones we are to consider on remand—have slightly altered the 

statute and process for defendants already ordered to enroll in SBM at the time of 

the changes.1 The General Assembly rewrote § 14-208.43 to focus only on “offender[s] 

who [are] ordered on or after December 1, 2021, to enroll in satellite-based 

monitoring” and the means by which they can file a petition to terminate or modify 

SBM after five years of enrollment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.43(a) (eff. 1 Dec. 2021); 

see also S.L. 2021-138 § 18(h) (showing changes made to § 14-208.43). For offenders 

ordered to enroll in SBM before that date, such as Defendant, the new § 14-208.46 

allows them to file a petition to terminate or modify the monitoring. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 14-208.46(a) (2021); see also S.L. 2021-138 § 18(i) (showing creation of § 14-208.46). 

 

1 It is unclear why the Supreme Court mentioned only the old statute and not the statutory 

changes since the updated statute had already been signed into law by the time Strudwick

was filed. Compare Strudwick, 2021-NCSC-127 (filed 29 October 2021) with 2021 North 

Carolina Laws S.L. 2021-138 (approval date of 2 September 2021). The old law also would 

not have applied to the defendant in Strudwick because it required at least a year of postrelease SBM, Strudwick, ¶ 15, and the defendant would not be released within a year. See

id. ¶¶ 3, 7 (explaining the defendant was sentenced to 30 to 43 years in prison in 2017).
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If the offender files the petition before he has been enrolled for 10 years, then “the

court shall order the petitioner to remain enrolled in the satellite-based monitoring 

program for a total of 10 years”; if the offender has been enrolled for at least 10 years 

already, “the court shall order the petitioner’s requirement to enroll in the satellitebased monitoring program be terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.46(d)–(e).2 

Combined with a change setting a ten-year maximum on new SBM enrollments, N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(c1), see also S.L. 2021-138 § 18(d) (showing changes made to 

 

2 The full language of (d) and (e) categorizes petitioners not enrolled “for at least 10 years” 

versus enrolled “for more than 10 years”:

“(d) If the petitioner has not been enrolled in the satellite-based monitoring program for at 

least 10 years, the court shall order the petitioner to remain enrolled in the satellite-based 

monitoring program for a total of 10 years.

(e) If the petitioner has been enrolled in the satellite-based monitoring program for more than 

10 years, the court shall order the petitioner’s requirement to enroll in the satellite-based 

monitoring program be terminated.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.46(d)–(e).

Given (d) indicates courts should only order petitioners to remain enrolled in SBM for 10 

years, not more, it appears the General Assembly intended to define two categories of 

offenders: those not enrolled for at least 10 years and those enrolled for at least 10 years. See 

State v. Alexander, 2022-NCSC-26, ¶ 34 (“The primary rule of construction of a statute is to 

ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.”

(quotations and citation omitted)); North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 

Inc. v. Dana, 379 N.C. 502, 2021-NCSC-161, ¶ 16 (“Legislative intent controls the meaning 

of a statute.” (quotations and citation omitted)).

This Court’s recent opinion in Carter also recognizes our view without further explanation of 

the wording in sub-section (e). See Carter, ¶ 22 (quoting sub-section (e) as part of a citation 

supporting the following sentence, “However, during the pendency of this appeal, our 

legislature amended the SBM statutes, in part, to create an avenue by which [d]efendant 

may petition a superior court to terminate his monitoring after ten years of enrollment.”).
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§ 14-208.40A), the statutory system now limits SBM to ten years for all offenders.3

¶ 20 As a final piece of our review of the recent history of SBM, we address 

Defendant’s argument that Hilton and Strudwick do not constrain his overall 

argument because they both “primarily involved facial challenges” and he has an asapplied challenge. In Grady III, our Supreme Court explained the distinction 

between facial and as-applied challenges does not neatly apply to our SBM 

jurisprudence. See 372 N.C. at 546–47, 831 S.E.2d at 569–70 (“[T]he remedy we 

employ here is neither squarely facial nor as-applied.” (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 

558 U.S. 310, 331, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010))). Specifically, in Grady III, the Supreme 

Court noted its ruling was as-applied in the sense that it did not apply to “all of the 

program’s applications” given its limits to a specific category, but the ruling was facial 

“in that it is not limited to defendant’s particular case.” Id.

¶ 21 Hilton and Strudwick reflect the difficulty in separating facial from as-applied 

challenges in the SBM context. The Hilton court said it was addressing the 

constitutionality of the SBM program “as applied to defendants who fall outside” of 

Grady III, which both uses the as-applied language but was not limited to the 

 

3 See Jamie Markham, Revisions to North Carolina’s Satellite-Based Monitoring Law, UNC 

School of Government Blog (Oct. 11, 2021), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/revisions-tonorth-carolinas-satellite-based-monitoring-law/ (“Former lifetime categories are changed to 

10 years, and the abuse-of-a-minor category (‘conditional’ offenders) is capped at 10 years.”); 

see also id. (explaining legislative changes in more detail).
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particular defendant before the court. Hilton, ¶¶ 18, 36. Similarly, Strudwick

involves language related to facial challenges when discussing the timing of the 

reasonableness determination, Strudwick, ¶ 14, and language about applying Grady 

III and Hilton’s reasonableness test “in order to determine the reasonableness of the 

trial court’s imposition of lifetime SBM in defendant’s case.” Id., ¶ 20 (emphasis 

added).

¶ 22 Thus, rather than trying to distinguish between facial and as-applied 

challenges, our courts’ “practice is to examine searches effected by the SBM statute 

categorically.” Hilton, ¶ 37 (citing Grady III, 372 N.C. at 522, 831 S.E.2d at 553). As 

this Court has recently clarified, trial courts must still conduct a Fourth Amendment 

reasonableness analysis, and we review that analysis de novo. Carter, ¶¶ 20–21. As 

part of the analysis, reviewing courts are bound by categorical determinations made 

by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. ¶ 27 (explaining because the defendant fit within 

a certain category, this Court “must follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Hilton

that he requires continuous lifetime SBM to protect public safety”). But if the 

defendant does not fit within one of the categorical determinations already made, a 

reviewing court’s analysis is not constrained in the same way. See id., ¶¶ 24–25 

(determining the defendant did not fit into the categories in Grady III or Hilton so 

conducting its own analysis based upon the reasoning of those cases). Given this 

background, we need not determine precisely whether Hilton and Strudwick made 
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facial or as-applied rulings; we will follow the review framework set out in Carter.

C. Reasonableness in this Case

¶ 23 Having reviewed the recent legal changes and determined the impact on our 

prior opinions in this case, we now conduct the required review as laid out above. 

First, we evaluate whether the trial court properly considered if monitoring was 

constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Carter, ¶¶ 20–21. Then we conduct 

our own de novo review of the trial court’s determination. Id.

1. Trial Court’s Reasonableness Inquiry

¶ 24 While Hilton proclaims “‘the SBM statute as applied to aggravated offenders 

is not unconstitutional’ because the ‘search effected by the imposition of lifetime SBM 

on the category of aggravated offenders is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,’” 

Carter, ¶ 18 (quoting Hilton, ¶ 36), “trial courts must continue to conduct 

reasonableness hearings before ordering SBM unless a defendant waives his or her 

right to a hearing or fails to object to SBM on this basis.” Id., ¶ 19 (citing State v. 

Ricks, 378 N.C. 737, 2021-NCSC-116, ¶ 10). Defendant preserved his objection on 

Fourth Amendment grounds via his motion to dismiss, which he also incorporated 

into his argument to the trial court at the SBM hearing.

¶ 25 Turning to Carter as an example of how to review a trial court’s reasonableness 

hearing, this Court found the trial court “conducted a hearing regarding the facts and 

applicable law, and weighed the State’s interests against [d]efendant’s expectation of 
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privacy.” Id., ¶ 20. Specifically, the trial court heard testimony concerning: the 

statutory category authorizing SBM; the defendant’s risk assessment; the failure of 

the defendant’s previous sex offender registration to “deter his conduct or protect 

public safety”; and the defendant’s prior sex offender registry violations. Id. Because 

the trial court weighed that against “the State’s interest in protecting the public from 

a recidivist sex offender” and determined SBM was reasonable as applied to the 

defendant, this Court concluded the trial court’s inquiry was appropriate. Id. While 

Carter involved a defendant required to enroll in SBM “solely because of his status 

as a recidivist” and thus focused on recidivism when evaluating the State’s interest 

in public safety, id., ¶¶ 20, 24, its explanation of the type of evidence a trial court 

should examine still aids our review here.

¶ 26 Here, the SBM hearing immediately followed Defendant entering his Alford

plea and being sentenced. As part of the Alford plea, Defendant consented “to the 

Court hearing a summary of the evidence.” The summary of the evidence included a 

previous felony sex offense, a sex offender registry violation, and the factual bases for 

the two charges to which Defendant pled. The summary of the evidence thus provided 

support for the trial court’s Finding Defendant committed an aggravated offense 

under North Carolina General Statute § 14-208.6(1a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2017) because the

second-degree forcible rape and incest conviction included a sexual act using “force or 

the threat of serious violence.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(1a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2017) 
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(defining “aggravated offense” as a criminal offense that includes, inter alia, 

“engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of 

any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence”). The trial court 

could also use the summary of the evidence to conduct its reasonableness assessment.

¶ 27 Turning to the reasonableness assessment, the trial court heard no additional 

evidence during the SBM hearing, only argument from counsel. Although the trial 

court did not have the benefit of any rulings past Grady I, it is still held to the latest 

standard announced in Hilton and Strudwick. See State v. Yancey, 221 N.C. App. 

397, 400 & n.1, 727 S.E.2d 382, 385–86 & n.1 (2012) (applying latest standard in 

Miranda jurisprudence from a case coming after an order on appeal because “new 

rules of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively ‘to all cases, state or federal, 

pending on direct review or not yet final’” (quoting State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 511, 

444 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1994) (in turn quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 

107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987)))). Thus, the trial court had to balance: the State’s interest; 

Defendant’s privacy interest; and the “level of intrusion effected by the imposition of” 

SBM. Hilton, ¶¶ 19, 29, 32.

¶ 28 The trial court’s entire reasonableness analysis was:

In this matter, the defendant is already, as a 

convicted sex offender, required to register as a sex 

offender. Those registration requirements already impose 

a burden upon the defendant and the -- the additional 

burden of satellite-based monitoring would be a slight 
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additional burden or infringement on the defendant’s life 

and liberty. That, in fact, the satellite-based monitoring 

does not actually curtail the defendant’s liberty. It does not 

require that he be locked up or placed in any sort of 

detention facility, but rather makes his whereabouts 

known for the purposes of serving greater governmental 

interests and legitimate State interests such as protecting 

society from, in this particular case, a twice convicted sex 

offender and deterring the conduct of what is, in this case, 

a twice convicted sex offender. 

I will note also that studies show that sex offenders 

generally have a higher recidivism rate than does the 

general population of convicted felons, and for that reason 

-- for that reason and others, the State does have a 

legitimate State interest and a legitimate concern for the 

protection of society and the deterrence of future conduct. 

And for those reasons, I will -- that and the fact that I have 

now made findings of fact sufficient to justify the 

imposition of satellite-based monitoring will require that 

the defendant enroll in the satellite-based monitoring 

program for a period of his natural life, unless monitoring 

is earlier terminated pursuant to G.S. §14-208.43.

¶ 29 The trial court conducted the required reasonableness analysis. At the start, 

the trial court noted Defendant’s status as a registered sex offender imposes burdens, 

and that discussion addresses his privacy interest. The trial court then discussed 

“the additional burden of satellite-based monitoring,” which addresses the level of 

intrusion from imposing SBM. Finally, the trial court recounted the State’s interest 

in imposing SBM. Thus, the trial court addressed the three factors it had to balance 

as part of its reasonableness assessment. See Hilton, ¶¶ 19, 29, 32 (recounting the 

factors).
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¶ 30 A comparison to our review in Carter also reveals the adequacy of the trial 

court’s reasonableness analysis. As in Carter, ¶ 20, the trial court here heard 

evidence about the statutory category authorizing SBM, namely that Defendant had 

committed an aggravated offense. The trial court also heard evidence, as in Carter, 

id., about Defendant’s previous sex offender registration, which apparently failed to 

deter his conduct in the instant offenses, as well as evidence he had previously 

committed sex offender registry violations.

¶ 31 The only difference between the evidence before the trial court in Carter and 

in this case is the lack of information in the record about a risk assessment of 

Defendant. See id. (listing risk assessment as part of evidence before trial court). But 

that difference does not change our determination the trial court conducted an 

adequate reasonableness hearing. The statute concerning court-imposed SBM in 

effect at the time of Defendant’s hearing did not require the trial court to order a risk 

assessment if an offender had committed an aggravated offense, as Defendant did. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 2017) (requiring court to order 

offender who has committed an aggravated offense to enroll in lifetime SBM with no 

mention of a risk assessment).4 Further, the risk assessment at most could have 

 

4 Under the version of § 14-208.40A in effect at the time of Defendant’s trial, if the offender 

did not commit an aggravated offense or fit into one of the other categories in (c), sub-section 

(d) required the trial court to order a risk assessment if the offender committed an offense 
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Opinion of the Court

further justified the State’s interest in SBM. But the State already had significant 

other evidence supporting its interest such as the previous sex offender registration 

failing to deter the instant offense and the previous sex offender registry violations. 

As a result, the lack of evidence of a risk assessment of Defendant does not persuade 

us the outcome here should differ from Carter.

5

¶ 32 We therefore conclude the trial court held an adequate reasonableness hearing 

as required. See Carter, ¶ 19 (explaining trial courts must continue to conduct 

hearings on the reasonableness of SBM). Further the trial court made adequate 

findings to support its conclusion SBM was reasonable as applied to Defendant.

2. De Novo Review of Reasonableness Determination

¶ 33 Since we have determined the trial court conducted an adequate 

reasonableness analysis, we now review de novo its determination SBM is reasonable 

as applied to Defendant. Carter, ¶ 21. As part of our de novo review, we must 

 

involving a minor. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(d) (eff. Dec. 1, 2017). Further, the current 

version of § 14-208.40A(c) requires the trial court to order a risk assessment of offenders who 

have committed an aggravated offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.40A(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 2021).

5 Defendant also later brings up the lack of risk assessment when arguing we should remand 

for the trial court to conduct a risk assessment because the current version of §14-208.40A(c)

requires such assessment for all people subject to SBM. However, when making that change, 

the General Assembly made clear it would only apply to SBM determinations “on or after” 1 

December 2021. See S.L. 2021-138 § 18(d) (adding risk assessment provisions to § 14-

208.40A(c) as laid out above and in Footnote 4); id. § 18(p) (explaining all subsections of § 18 

in the session law “appl[y] to [SBM] determinations on or after” 1 December 2021 with the 

exception of (b), (i), and (o)). Defendant’s SBM determination took place on or about 26 April 

2018, so the General Assembly clearly did not intend for him to benefit from the changes in 

the statute. Therefore, we reject Defendant’s argument.
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Opinion of the Court

evaluate the reasonableness of SBM under the totality of the circumstances 

considering: (1) the legitimacy of the State’s interest; (2) the scope of Defendant’s 

privacy interests; and (3) the intrusion imposed by SBM. Hilton, ¶¶ 19, 29, 32.

a. Legitimacy of the State’s Interest

¶ 34 We start by considering the State’s interest in monitoring Defendant. Hilton

and Strudwick both recognized the dual interests served by SBM imposed on

aggravated offenders in “preventing and prosecuting future crimes committed by sex 

offenders.” Strudwick, ¶ 26; see also Hilton, ¶ 25 (“assisting law enforcement agencies 

in solving crimes”) and ¶ 27 (“protecting the public from aggravated offenders by 

deterring recidivism”). Our courts have long recognized these dual interests are “both 

legitimate and compelling,” Strudwick, ¶ 26, particularly for aggravated offenses. See 

Hilton, ¶ 21 (“[T]he State’s interest in protecting the public from aggravated offenders 

is paramount.”). As the Supreme Court made clear in Hilton, “after our decision in 

Grady III, the three categories of offenders who require continuous lifetime SBM to 

protect public safety are (1) sexually violent predators, (2) aggravated offenders, and 

(3) adults convicted of statutory rape or a sex offense with a victim under the age of 

thirteen (adult-child offenders).” Id., ¶ 23 (footnote omitted).

¶ 35 Here, Defendant committed an aggravated offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

208.6(1a) (eff. Dec. 1, 2017) because the second-degree forcible rape and incest 

conviction included a sexual act using “force or the threat of serious violence.” So 
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Opinion of the Court

under Hilton, Defendant requires continuous lifetime SBM to protect public safety. 

Hilton, ¶¶ 21, 23.

¶ 36 Defendant argues his case is distinguishable from Strudwick because his 

offenses “were committed against two known victims in his home” who “identified 

him to investigators” rather than against a stranger in a public space. He asserts 

that, as a result, the State’s interests in using SBM to solve crimes and for deterrence 

“are lessened” in his case because SBM would not solve or prevent his crimes.

¶ 37 We reject Defendant’s attempt to distinguish from our binding precedent. 

First, this argument ignores Hilton, on which Strudwick relied when articulating the 

State’s interest. Strudwick, ¶ 26. In Hilton, SBM was imposed in a case where the 

victim in the case was also a victim in a case in which that defendant was previously 

convicted. Hilton, ¶ 6. That situation resembles the situation in Defendant’s 

argument here, as Defendant contends a victim who knows a perpetrator could 

identify him to investigators, as opposed to a victim who is a “stranger . . . in a public 

space.”

¶ 38 Further, on a broader level, Defendant misconstrues the nature of the State’s 

interest. Defendant assumes the State’s interest is in preventing or prosecuting the 

crime which triggered SBM (or a repeat of the same scenario), but the State’s interest 

is broader. It encompasses all potential future sex crimes. See, e.g., Hilton, ¶ 21 

(defining interest as “protecting children and others from sexual attacks” without 
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Opinion of the Court

limitation) (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted). Thus, as long as SBM 

could prevent or solve a future sex crime, regardless of the exact facts of that scenario, 

the State’s interest is served. Since our Supreme Court has concluded that is true for 

aggravated offenders like Defendant, we conclude the State has a legitimate interest 

here.

b. Scope of Defendant’s Privacy Interest and Intrusion Imposed by SBM

¶ 39 Next we consider the scope of Defendant’s privacy interest and the intrusion 

upon that interest caused by SBM. Hilton concluded an aggravated offender, such as 

Defendant, “has a diminished expectation of privacy both during and after any period 

of post-release supervision” because of the “numerous lifetime restrictions that 

society imposes upon him,” especially via the sex offender registration requirements. 

Hilton, ¶¶ 36, 31.

¶ 40 Hilton and Strudwick also explain the intrusion imposed by SBM. Hilton

determined “the imposition of lifetime SBM causes only a limited intrusion into that 

diminished privacy expectation.” Hilton, ¶ 36. Specifically, Hilton noted SBM is less 

invasive than criminal sanctions or civil commitment. Id., ¶¶ 33, 35. The Hilton

court also highlighted the similarities of SBM to sex offender registration and the 

ability of a defendant to petition to be removed from SBM via the mechanism we 

discussed above. Id., ¶ 34. Relying on these portions of Hilton, Strudwick likewise 

concluded “the imposition of lifetime SBM . . . constitutes a pervasive but tempered 
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Opinion of the Court

intrusion upon . . . Fourth Amendment interests.” Strudwick, ¶ 25 (citing Hilton, ¶ 

35).

¶ 41 Defendant argues we should not reach the same conclusion as Hilton and 

Strudwick on the intrusion into his privacy interests caused by SBM because they 

failed to consider “two significant privacy interests that are not diminished following 

post-release supervision.” Specifically, he argues our Supreme Court’s previous 

decisions failed to consider SBM “will involve a search of [his] house” and “of the 

whole of [his] movements for the rest of his life.”

¶ 42 We reject Defendant’s arguments because Hilton and Strudwick considered 

those privacy interests and the intrusions thereupon caused by SBM. As a general 

note, Hilton specifically concluded aggravated offenders have a diminished 

expectation of privacy “after any period of post-release supervision.” Hilton, ¶ 36 

(emphasis added). 

¶ 43 As to the search into Defendant’s home, Strudwick incudes an explanation of 

how Grady III determined State v. Bowditch, 364 N.C. 335, 700 S.E.2d 1 (2010), 

“sufficiently incorporate[d] . . . the invasion of a defendant’s home” into an evaluation 

of offenders’ expectations of privacy and the impact of SBM thereupon. Strudwick, ¶ 

22 (citing Grady III, 372 N.C. at 532, 831 S.E.2d 542). While the Strudwick court 

noted Grady III’s discussions of Bowditch’s limitations, it ultimately still relied on 

Bowditch for the idea “that it is constitutionally permissible for the State to treat a 
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Opinion of the Court

sex offender differently than a member of the general population” because of their sex 

offense conviction. Strudwick, ¶ 22 (citing Hilton, ¶ 30). Given Strudwick’s reliance 

on Bowditch and its emphasis on how Bowditch covered a search of offenders’ homes, 

our Supreme Court has considered SBM effecting a search of the home and found 

those concerns did not justify finding SBM searches unreasonable for aggravated 

offenders. If that was not clear enough, Strudwick also explicitly said SBM was 

reasonable given the government interest outweighed SBM’s intrusion “into 

defendant’s expectation of privacy in his person, home, vehicle, and location. 

Strudwick, ¶ 28 (emphasis added). As a result, we reject Defendant’s argument on 

the search of his house.

¶ 44 Hilton and Strudwick also considered the search of Defendant’s movements for 

the rest of his life; they scarcely could have avoided it considering such monitoring is 

inherent in SBM. See Hilton, ¶ 35 (minimizing intrusion of “SBM’s collection of 

information regarding physical location and movements”). Strudwick also 

specifically found SBM reasonable even when considering its intrusion into a 

defendant’s “expectation of privacy in his . . . location.” Strudwick, ¶ 28. Hilton

emphasized once an offender is unsupervised, “no one regularly monitors the 

defendant’s location, significantly lessening the degree of intrusion.” Hilton, ¶ 35. 

Building on that, Strudwick recognized using the data tracking offenders’ movements 

for anything other than the State’s permissible purpose of preventing and solving 
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Opinion of the Court

crimes “would present an impermissible extension of the scope of the authorized 

search” that could change the calculus. See Strudwick, ¶ 23 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 19–20, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) (explaining the State has an “ongoing” burden 

to establish the reasonableness of the search as a result of the possibility of an 

impermissible extension of the scope of the search). As a result, our Supreme Court 

has already weighed the search of all an offender’s movements for the rest of his life 

and determined that adequate protections are in place. We therefore reject 

Defendant’s argument Hilton and Strudwick failed to address the matter.

c. Reasonableness under the Totality of the Circumstances

¶ 45 Examining the reasonableness of SBM under the totality of the circumstances, 

we weigh the State’s legitimate interest in “preventing and prosecuting future crimes 

committed by sex offenders,” Strudwick, ¶ 26, against Defendant’s “diminished 

expectation of privacy both during and after any period of post-release supervision,”

Hilton, ¶ 36, and the “limited intrusion” caused by lifetime SBM for aggravated 

offenders. Id. Given Hilton and Strudwick balanced these factors for aggravated 

offenders like Defendant, Hilton, ¶¶ 36–37, Strudwick, ¶ 28, and we have rejected 

Defendant’s arguments trying to differentiate his case from those cases, we conclude 

after de novo review that SBM is reasonable in Defendant’s case.

III. Conclusion

¶ 46 We reject Defendant’s argument the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
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to the trial court for it to make a determination of the reasonableness of SBM. 

Following our de novo review, we also conclude SBM is reasonable in Defendant’s 

case. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order imposing lifetime SBM on 

Defendant. Defendant can, however, petition to terminate or modify the SBM with 

the superior court in Rowan County, which would be required to terminate the 

monitoring after 10 years enrolled, under the terms of § 14-208.46.

AFFIRMED.

Judge CARPENTER concurs.

Judge HAMPSON concurs in result only.