COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner 

DWAYNE A. MILLER, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 2331-08-3 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 24, 2009 

HARRISONBURG-ROCKINGHAM 

 SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

James V. Lane, Judge 

 (Tracy J. Evans, II; Eldridge, Elledge & Harding, PLC, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (Rachel Errett Figura, Assistant County Attorney; Warren A. 

Picciolo, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for 

appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief. 

 On August 22, 2008, the trial court terminated the residual parental rights of Dwayne 

Miller, Jr., to his daughter, S.D.1

 The trial court found clear and convincing evidence proved the 

circumstances required for termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). On appeal, 

Miller contends the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s decision. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), a trial court may terminate the rights of a parent to a 

child upon clear and convincing evidence that the parent, 

without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact with and 

to provide or substantially plan for the future of the child for a 

period of six months after the child’s placement in foster care 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 The trial court also terminated the residual parental rights of S.D.’s mother. We 

affirmed that decision in Doyle v. Harrisonburg-Rockingham Soc. Servs. Dist., Record No. 

2109-08-3 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2009). 
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notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, 

medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to 

communicate with the parent . . . and to strengthen the parent-child 

relationship. Proof that the parent . . . ha[s] failed without good 

cause to communicate on a continuing and planned basis with the 

child for a period of six months shall constitute prima facie 

evidence of this condition[.] 

Termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof that the parent, “without good 

cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve 

months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions 

which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” notwithstanding 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of service agencies. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in 

the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 

(2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 

S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the 

circuit court “‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and 

made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Id. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 769 

(quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 

(2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 

S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its 

capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad discretion in making the 

decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley, 

9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). 
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 S.D., the biological child of Miller and Audra Doyle, was born on November 9, 2006. 

Doyle had been diagnosed with mental conditions requiring medication and treatment, and she had 

no permanent home. After S.D.’s birth, the child lived with Doyle at a Salvation Army shelter. 

Social workers for Harrisonburg-Rockingham Social Services District (HRSSD) intervened with 

Doyle following reports of her engaging in behavior that put S.D.’s welfare at risk. 

 On February 16, 2007, HRSSD advised Doyle she needed to find a relative to care for S.D. 

or the child would be placed in foster care. Doyle took the child to Miller, who was then living with 

his girlfriend’s parents. S.D. remained in Miller’s care for less than a week. During that time the 

child lost weight. Miller later indicated he had not known how to feed or care for the child properly. 

 On February 21, 2007, Miller and Doyle met with HRSSD social workers and discussed 

placing S.D. with relatives. None of the relatives identified by Miller or Doyle was capable or 

willing to take S.D. Therefore, S.D. was placed in foster care. 

 Cheryl Dickensheets was the foster care social worker assigned to S.D. The foster care 

service plan required Miller to receive individual counseling, complete a psychological evaluation, 

maintain employment, and consistently participate in visitation with S.D. The service plan also 

required Miller, who had not maintained independent housing as an adult, to obtain a suitable 

residence for himself and S.D. 

 Miller left Dickensheets telephone messages on March 12 and 14, 2007. When Miller 

called Dickensheets on March 21, 2007, they discussed the requirements of the service plan, 

including that Miller obtain consistent employment and remain in contact with HRSSD. During a 

telephone conversation on April 16, 2007, Dickensheets gave Miller an update regarding S.D.’s 
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welfare. Miller said he was looking for work and was moving in with his grandparents.2 Miller 

stated that he agreed with the requirements of the foster care service plan. 

 In May 2007, Dr. Joanne Grayson, a clinical psychologist, completed an evaluation of 

Miller with regard to his general functioning and parenting. Dr. Grayson concluded Miller lacked 

the knowledge and insight required for appropriate parenting. Dr. Grayson recommended Miller 

obtain individual instruction in parenting and take a parenting class. 

 In the course of Dr. Grayson’s evaluation, Miller had one visit with S.D. on May 8, 2007. 

Dickensheets advised Miller to contact her to schedule visitation with S.D. after he completed the 

evaluation with Dr. Grayson, but he did not do so. Miller initiated no further contact with 

Dickensheets other than leaving telephone messages for her on May 22, 2007 and July 13, 2007.3

 

Although he subsequently attended court hearings regarding S.D., he did not approach Dickensheets 

to discuss S.D. or the plans for her future. Miller completed none of the programs and services 

required by the foster care service plan or recommended by Dr. Grayson. 

 Beginning in February 2008, Miller was incarcerated upon charges of carnal knowledge of a 

minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was convicted of the offenses on June 11, 

2008. Miller was sentenced to seven years with five years and ten months suspended for the carnal 

knowledge offense, and received a twelve-month suspended sentence for contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor. 

 At the time of the termination hearing on August 22, 2008, S.D. was living with the same 

foster family with whom she was placed in February 2007. S.D. was thriving in her foster home. 

2

 Miller’s grandfather had been convicted of a “barrier” crime that prevented the 

placement of a child in his household. 

3

 Miller claimed to have called Dickensheets a number of times when either he did not 

leave a message or her voicemail did not respond. 
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Miller remained incarcerated but expected to be released in February 2009. Miller claimed he 

would be able to provide a home for S.D. within a few months of his release. 

 Miller contends the evidence did not support a termination of his parental rights pursuant to 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). However, the evidence proved Miller knew S.D. was placed in foster care 

in February 2007. Miller had initial telephone contacts with Dickensheets and was aware of the 

requirement that he participate in the service plan. During the course of his psychological 

evaluation, Miller visited with S.D. in May 2007. Yet, he did not contact Dickensheets to arrange 

visitation thereafter. At the time of the termination hearing, Miller had had no contact with S.D. for 

fifteen months. Miller’s claim that he became frustrated in attempting to reach Dickensheets by 

telephone did not constitute good cause for his lack of contact with S.D. or failure to plan for her 

future. 

 In determining what is in the best interests of a child, this Court has stated: 

a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age 

and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age 

and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship 

existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child 

or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in 

the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and 

such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests 

of the child or children. 

Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). 

 S.D. is thriving in the foster home where she has lived since she was three months old. 

Although Miller claims he will be capable of providing a suitable home for S.D. within a few 

months of his release from incarceration, he has demonstrated no ability to live independently. 

In this regard, Miller’s “‘past actions . . . over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of 

what the future may be expected to hold.’” Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 696-97, 492 

S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997) (quoting Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 46, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 

(1990)). 
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 We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and 

irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 

407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Richmond, 231 Va. 

277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child 

to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of 

resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 

535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The record supports the trial court’s finding that the best 

interests of S.D. would be served by terminating Miller’s parental rights pursuant to Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(1). 

 Miller also contends the trial court erred in terminating his residual parental rights 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Because we conclude the trial court’s decision terminating 

Miller’s parental rights was warranted under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), we need not reach this 

issue. When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider 

whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and, if 

we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Fields, 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at 659 

(termination of parental rights upheld under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 forecloses need 

to consider termination under alternative subsections). 

 Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.