[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-13878

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-03327-ODE

HASKELL COLCLOUGH, JR., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GWINNETT PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

 Defendant,

GWINNETT COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(May 11, 2018)

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Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Haskell Colclough, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals following the District 

Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Gwinnett County School District 

(“School District”) in his employment-discrimination action under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

1

 Colclough contends that the Court erred 

in: (1) refusing to enter a default judgment against the School District, (2) ruling on 

a summary judgment motion that was untimely filed, and (3) granting summary 

judgment to the School District on his disability claim after finding that he did not 

make out a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrate pretext, or prove 

discrimination based on a failure to accommodate. We address each argument in 

turn and ultimately affirm the District Court. 

I.

We review the denial of a motion for a default judgment under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 

1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). An entry of default is appropriate under Federal Rule 

 

1 In his initial complaint, Colclough also alleged race discrimination in violation of Title 

VII. Although he cited to Title VII in his amended complaint, the District Court found that 

Colclough’s amended complaint did not reassert his race-discrimination claim and did not allege 

discrimination based on any other characteristic protected by Title VII. Because Colclough does 

not challenge this ruling on appeal, any Title VII issue is abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate 

Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that a failure to challenge on 

appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment results in abandonment 

of that argument).

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of Civil Procedure 55 “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment . . . is sought has 

failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or 

otherwise.” Rule 12(a) provides that a defendant must generally serve a responsive 

pleading within twenty-one days of being served with a summons and complaint. 

Colclough served his initial complaint upon the School District on January 

9, 2015, and the School District failed to serve a responsive pleading within 

twenty-one days. He then moved for an entry of default under Rule 55. In a 

Report and Recommendation, later adopted by the District Court, the Magistrate 

Judge recommended denial of Colclough’s motion because Colclough’s service of 

process was insufficient—he served the School District by certified mail, which is

not a proper method under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Georgia law.

2

 

We agree. Given the improper service, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the 

matter and could not render a default judgment or enter default. In re Worldwide 

 

2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j), service on a state or local government entity 

may be completed by: “(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief 

executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for 

serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Such service is properly executed 

under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(5), when copies of the summons and complaint are 

delivered “to the chairman of the board of commissioners, president of the council of trustees, 

mayor or city manager of the city or to an agent authorized by appointment to receive service of 

process.” Neither rule allows for service by mail. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of 

Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 1983); Winters v. City of Valdosta, No. 7:11-CV-22 

(HL), 2012 WL 523693, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2012).

Colclough was given an extension to properly serve the School District. He filed an 

amended complaint on July 9, 2015, and properly served the School District four days later. 

This initiated the School District’s legal duty to respond, which it did by timely filing a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion.

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Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Bank of Am., 

N.A., 557 F. App’x 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2014). 

II.

A party may file a motion for summary judgment until thirty days after the 

close of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b); N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 56.1(D). Here, 

discovery closed on August 25, 2016, pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s order 

granting a motion to extend discovery until then. Colclough, appearing to not have 

accounted for this extension, argues that the School District’s summary judgment 

motion, filed September 23, was due August 24. The School District’s motion was 

timely filed. 

III.

We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary 

judgment de novo, viewing the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 

F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court “shall grant summary judgment 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The 

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will 

be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 

the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 

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2512 (1986). To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on 

multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated 

ground for the judgment against him is incorrect. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian 

Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). 

The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating based upon the 

known physical or mental impairments of a qualified individual with a disability. 

42 U.S.C. § 12112. To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination 

under the ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he was subjected to 

unlawful discrimination because of his disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 

492 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2007). Demonstrating an employer’s 

knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition is an essential element of establishing a 

prima facie case. Morisky v. Broward Cty., 80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not 

sufficient to put an employer on notice of an employee’s disability. Id. at 448. If 

the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, and the defendant then presents 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s termination, the plaintiff 

must show that the employer’s reasons were pretexts for intentional discrimination. 

Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Here, Colclough claims that the School District discriminated against him on 

the basis of his disability, cancer, when it terminated him from his job as a crossing 

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guard. After careful review, we agree with the District Court that Colclough failed 

to present any evidence indicating that his supervisor, or any other decisionmaker, 

knew of his cancer. Indeed, Colclough admits that, during his time employed, he 

did not advise anyone employed by the School District of his cancer diagnosis. 

Colclough also did not present evidence reasonably suggesting that the School 

District’s decisionmakers had—or even should have had—notice of his cancer.3

 

Finally, Colclough argues that the District Court erred by rejecting his claim 

that the School District failed to reasonably accommodate his cancer. Colclough 

does not contend that he requested an accommodation that went unmet. Nor does 

he specify what accommodation he desired. Rather, Colclough claims that the 

School District should have noticed that he requested numerous days off, derived 

from this that he needed an accommodation, and approached him to ask how it 

could help. 

The ADA imposes upon employers the duty to provide reasonable 

accommodations for known disabilities unless doing so would result in an undue 

hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). It is generally the 

responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an 

 

3 Further, even if he had, the School District cited as the reason for Colclough’s 

termination excessive absences and a failure to wear his required uniform. Colclough failed to 

present evidence reasonably demonstrating that this was a pretext for discrimination. 

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accommodation is needed. Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999). 

As discussed, neither Colclough’s direct supervisor nor anyone above his 

supervisor was aware—or reasonably on notice—of Colclough’s cancer. The

School District therefore had no legal duty to approach Colclough on its own 

accord and ask whether he needed an accommodation. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision granting 

the School District’s summary judgment motion. 

AFFIRMED. 

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