UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARVIN HASKINS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 10-0706 (RMU) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18 : U.S. ONE TRANSPORTATION, LLC : et al. , : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION G RANTING THE D EFENDANTS ’ M OTION TO V ACATE THE C LERK ’ S E NTRY OF D EFAULT ;

D ENYING THE P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR D EFAULT J UDGMENT ; D ENYING W ITHOUT P REJUDICE THE D EFENDANTS ’ M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT ; G RANTING AS C ONCEDED THE P LAINTIFF ’ S F IRST AND S ECOND M OTIONS FOR L EAVE TO A MEND THE C OMPLAINT ; D ENYING W ITHOUT P REJUDICE THE P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO F ACILITATE THE I DENTIFICATION OF S IMILARLY S ITUATED I NDIVIDUALS I. INTRODUCTION The plaintiff, Marvin Haskins, has filed a complaint alleging that the defendants, his employers, have deprived him of wa ges to which he is lawfully entit led, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), and the D.C. Wage Payment and Wage Collection Act, D.C. C ODE §§ 32-1301 et seq. (“DCWPA”). Because the defendants did not file a timely response to the complaint, the Clerk of the Court entered default against them. The matter is now before the court on the plaintiff’ s motion for default judgment and the defendants’ motion to vacate the entry of default. For th e reason discussed below, the court grants the defendants’ motion to vacate the entry of default and denies th e plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. The parties have also filed a number of additional motions that are now ripe for adjudication, including the plaintiff’s motions for leave to amend the complaint and the2 defendants’ motion for summary j udgment. For the reasons discu ssed below, the court denies without prejudice the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, grants the plaintiff’s first and second motions for leave to amend the complaint and denies without prej udice the plaintiff’s motion to facilitate the identification of similarly situated employees.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND As stated in the complaint, defendants U. S. One Transportation, LLC and U.S. One, LLC (collectively, “the LLCs”) are businesses that pr ovide transportation services to adults with disabilities and to school children in Maryland an d the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4. Defendant Modupe Ayodeji Atanda-Owo is allege d to be the owner an d president of both entities. Id. ¶ 5. Since June 2008, the plaintiff has worked as a full-time driver for the defendants, picking up and dropping off the defendants’ clie nts using the defendants’ vehicles. Id. ¶ 7. The plaintiff contends that the defendants have violatedthe FLSA and DCWPA by failing to pay him overtime wages to which he is entitled and by wrongfully deducting amounts from his wages. Id. ¶¶ 8-12. The plaintiff commenced this action on May 3, 2010 on behalf of himself and all individuals similarly situated. See generally id. The defendants were served with the complaint on May 10, 2010, Aff. of Service (June 14, 2010), but did not respond. As a result, on June 16, 2010, the Clerk of the Court entere d default against the LLCs. En try of Default (June 16, 2010). The Clerk of the Court subsequently entered default against Atanda-Owo on June 22, 2010, after the plaintiff filed the requisite Soldiers and Sailor s affidavit. Aff. in Compliance with Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 (June 18, 2010); Entry of Default (June 22, 2010).3 On July 12, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion fo r default judgment against the defendants. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. The defendants then filed a motion to vacate the entry of default against them and an opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default & O pp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Default J. (“Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default”). At the sa me time, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. See generally Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. The plaintiff has filed oppositions to both motions. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Vaca te Entry of Default; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. On August 24, 2010, the plaintiff filed a moti on for leave to amend the complaint. See generally Pl.’s 1st Mot. to Amend Compl. Three w eeks later, the plaintiff filed a motion to facilitate the identification and notificati on of other similarly situated employees. See generally Pl.’s Mot. to Facilitate Identification & Notific ation of Other Similarly Situated Employees. Finally, on September 27, 2010, the plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to amend the complaint. See generally Pl.’s 2d Mot. to Amend Compl. The defendants have not filed oppositions to any of these motions. The motions described above are ripe for ad judication. The court th erefore turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties’ arguments.

III. ANALYSIS A. The Court Grants the Defendants’ Mo tion to Vacate the Entry of Default 1. Legal Standard for Setting Aside Entry of Default “Once a defendant fails to f ile a responsive answer, he is in default, and an entry of default may be made by either the clerk or the judge.” Jackson v. Beech , 636 F.2d 831, 8354 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Under Federal Rule of Civ il Procedure 55(c), however, a court has the discretion to set aside entry of default for “good cause shown.” F ED
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. P. 55(c). To demonstrate good cause, “the moving party [must] provide an explanation for the default or [] give reasons why vacation of th e default entry would serve the interests of justice.” 10A F ED
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. 3d § 2696. In exercising its discretion to set aside entr y of default, the cour t must consider three factors: “[1] whether the defau lt is willful, [2] whether the defe ndant has presented a meritorious defense, and [3] whether the plai ntiff would suffer substantial prej udice by a decision to set aside the default.” Whelan v. Abell , 48 F.3d 1247, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co. , 627 F.2d 372, 373, 374 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the court must exercise its discretion in light of the thr ee factors). The court must resolve all doubts in favor of the party seeking relief. Jackson , 636 F.2d at 836. Finally, the court should keep in mind that in this Circuit, “strong policies fa vor[] the resolution of ge nuine disputes on their merits.” Id. at 835. 2. The Relevant Factors Warrant Se tting Aside the Entry of Default The defendants contend that good cause exists for vacating the Clerk of the Court’s entry of default against them. See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default. First, the defendants argue that the court should vacate the entry of default against the LLCs because they were “dissolved or forfeited” atthe time the summon was issued. Id. at 1-2. Next, the defendants assert that the court should vacate the entry of default against Atanda-Owo because her failure to file a re sponse was excusable. Id. at 3-4. More specifically, the defendants contend that Atanda-Owo’s involvement with the matter in dispute is lim ited to serving as the registered agent for the LLCs and that she is not the plaintiff’s empl oyer for purposes of the5 FLSA or DCWPA. Id. at 3. Accordingly, the defendants as sert, Atanda-Owo did not understand that she was being sued in her personal capacity. Id. In addition, the defendants contend that Atanda-Owo lacked the resources until now to pay for an attorney. Id. at 4. In his opposition to the defendants’ motion, th e plaintiff “concedes that Defendants set forth a valid legal defense to justify that the Court [v]acate the Entry of Default against U.S. One, LLC and U.S. One Transportation, LLC.” Pl.’s Opp’ n to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default at 1 n.1. The plaintiff maintain s, however, that defendant At anda-Owo has not demonstrated good cause for setting aside the entry of default ag ainst her and that her failure to respond has caused him prejudice. Id. at 3-5. Because the plaintiff concedes that the court s hould vacate the entry of default against the LLCs, see id. at 1 n.1., the court grants the defendants’ motion and vacates the entry of default as to those defendants. As a resu lt, the court denies the plainti ff’s motion for default judgment against the LLCs. Turning to Atanda-Owo, the court first cons iders whether that defendant’s failure to respond was willful. “The boundary of willfulne ss lies somewhere between a negligent filing error, which is normally considered an excusabl e failure to respond, and a deliberate decision to default, which is generally not excusable.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Union & Industry Pension Fund v. H.W. Ellis Painting Co. , 288 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D .D.C. 2003) (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry , 158 F.3d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1998)). The court is persuaded that defendant Atanda-Owo falls somewh at closer to the latter pole than the former. Although the plaintiff contends that she did not realize she was being sued in her personal capacity, the complaint clearly lists Atanda-Owo as a defendant, see Compl. at 1, and expressly alleges that she was “the owner and president” of the LLCs, functioned “as the plaintiff’s supervisor” and6 “determined [the] [p ]laintiff’s rate and method of pay,” id. ¶ 4. Nor is there any dispute that Atanda-Owo was properly serv ed with the complaint. See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default. Indeed, the defendants indicate that Atanda-Owo did not respond because she determined that she had no involvement in the su it, suggesting that her failure to respond was deliberate. See Gilmore v. Palestinian In terim Self-Government Auth. , 675 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that the defendants’ de fault was willful as the defendants expressly acknowledged that they “had chosen not to f ile and answer”). Alt hough Atanda-Owo was not represented by counsel at the time she was se rved with the compla int and may not have understood fully the consequences of failing to re spond to the complaint, the evidence suggests that the Atanda-Owo’s failure to respond wa s, at least to some degree, willful. On the other hand, the second factor that the c ourt must consider in this analysis – the existence of a meritorious defense – weighs in At anda-Owo’s favor. This Circuit has stated that when moving to vacate an entry of de fault, “the movant is not required to prove a defense, but only to assert a defense that it may prove at trial.” Whelan, 48 F.3d at 1259 (emphasis added). Indeed, a defense is meritorious if it “contain[s] ‘even a hint of a sugge stion’ which, proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.” Keegel , 627 F.2d at 374; see also Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth. , 233 F. Supp. 2d 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2002) (observing that “[l]ikelihood of success is not the measure fo r determining whether a defense is meritorious” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, the defendants maintain that At anda-Owo bears no personal liability in this action because she was not the plaintiff’s employer. See Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default, Aff. of Modupe Ayodeji Atanda-Owo ¶¶ 3-4. More specifically, Atanda- Owo maintains that she “was never, at any time whatsoever, the owner or president or manager or officer of either U.S.7 One Transportation, LLC or U.S. One, LLC,” id. ¶ 3, and that she “ha[s] never managed the affairs or business of the two entities” and has “n o knowledge of the facts that have been alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint,” id. ¶ 13. Although the plaintiff may ultimately prove that Atanda-Owo was the plaintiff’s “employer” for purposes of the FLSA and the DCWPA, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Defau lt at 4-5 & Exs. 1-5, Atanda-Owo has asserted a defense which, if proven, would free her from liab ility, which is all that this Circuit requires, see Keegel , 672 F.2d at 374. Accordingly, th e presence of a meritorious de fense weighs in favor of vacating the entry of default against Atanda-Owo. The third factor that the court must c onsider – whether the plaintiff would be substantially prejudiced by vacating the entry of default against Atanda-Owo – also favors Atanda-Owo. Although vacating the entry of defa ult will delay the resolution of the claims against Atanda-Owo, “delay in and of its elf does not constitu te prejudice[.]” KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2003)

. “The issue is not mere delay, but rather its accompanying dangers: loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or an enhanced opportunity for fraud or collusion.” Id. ; see also Keegel , 627 F.2d at 374 (stating that the fact that “setting aside the default would delay satisfa ction of plaintiffs’ claim, should plaintiffs succeed at trial, is insufficient to re quire affirmance” of the entry of default). In this case, the plaintiff has identified no prej udice, other than delay, that he will suffer if the court sets aside the entry of default against Atanda-Owo. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Vacate Entry of Default at 4. Th is litigation is still in a prel iminary stage and the motion to vacate the entry of default comes well before the pl aintiff has litigated any of his claims against the remaining defendants. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq , 658 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by vacating the entry of default8 because the action was “still in a preliminary stage”); cf. Whelan , 48 F.3d at 1259 (holding that the plaintiff would be prejudi ced by vacating the default agai nst one defendant following the completion of trial against two co-defendants, as th e plaintiff would then be forced to try the case again). Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiff will suffer no substantial prejudice through the setting aside of the entry of defau lt against Atanda-Owo. In sum, although there is some evidence to s uggest that Atanda-Owo’s failure to respond to the complaint was willful, this fact is c ounterbalanced by the fact that Atanda-Owo has asserted a meritorious defense and that the plai ntiff will not be prejudiced by vacating the entry of default against her. In light of the Circui t’s strong policy favoring the resolution of disputes on their merits, Jackson , 636 F.2d at 835, as well as the Circui t’s admonition that the district court must resolve all doubts in favor of the party seeking relief under Rule 55(c), id. at 836, the court concludes that there is good cause for setting aside the entry of default against AtandaOwo. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion to vacat e the entry of default against the defendants and concomitantly denies the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

B. The Court Denies Without Prejudice the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment At the same time the defendants filed their motion to vacate the entry of default, they also filed a motion for summary judgment. See generally Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. This motion, however, does not comply with various provision s of Local Civil Rule 7, including Rule 7(h), which provides that “[e]ach motion for summar y judgment shall be accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genu ine issue, which shall include references to the parts of the record reli ed on to support the statem ent.” LCvR 7(h)(1). The court therefore denies the defendants’ mo tion for summary judgment without prejudice. See9 10A F ED
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. 3d § 2718 (observing that “it is with in the trial court’s discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment without prej udice to its being renewe d at a later date”). C. The Court Grants the Plainti ff’s First and Second Motions for Leave to Amend the Complaint As previously noted, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint on August 24, 2010 and a second motion for leave to amend the complaint on September 27, 2010. See generally Pl.’s 1st Mot. to Amend Compl.; Pl.’s 2d Mot. to Amend Compl. In his first motion, the plaintiff seeks leave to amend the comp laint so as to include the following entities and individuals as defendants in this action: U.S. One Trans portation, Olatunde Atanda-Owo and Ganiyu Atanda-Owo. See generally Pl.’s 1st Mot. to Amend Compl. In his second motion, the plaintiff seeks leave to add MV Contract Transp ortation, Inc. as a defendant and to assert a number of additional claims against the defenda nts, including one for unlawful retaliation under the FLSA. See generally Pl.’s 2d Mot. to Amend Compl. The defendants have not filed oppositions to e ither of these motions. Accordingly, the court grants both motions as conceded. See LCvR 7(b) (providing that if the opposing party does not file a timely opposition to a motion, the co urt may treat the motion as conceded). D. The Court Denies Without Prejudice th e Plaintiff’s Motion to Facilitate the Identification and Notification of Other Similarly Situated Employees The FLSA allows for actions to challenge the denial of overtime payments to be “maintained against any employer (including a pub lic agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U. S.C. § 216(b). Although neither the FLSA nor its implementing regulations defines “similarly situate d,” courts have relied on a two-tier approach to certify a collective challenge under the FLSA. At the first stage, also termed the “notice10 stage,” the court makes a preliminary determin ation whether to author ize notifications to potential class members so that th ey may opt in to the litigation. Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co. , 54 F.3d 1207, 1214 (5th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff, who has asserted claims under th e FLSA, has filed a motio n to facilitate the identification and notification of other similarly situated employees of the defendants. See generally Pl.’s Mot. to Facilitate Identification & Notification of Other Similarly Situated Employees. As noted in the foregoing section, ho wever, the plaintiff has now been granted leave to supplement the allegations in the original co mplaint with numerous additional defendants and claims. See supra Part III.C. Because these modifications may impact who is “similarly situated” to the plaintiff, the c ourt denies without prej udice the plaintiff’s motion to facilitate the identification and notification of othe r similarly situated employees.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court grants th e defendants’ motion to vacate the entry of default, denies the plaintiff’s motion for de fault judgment, denies without prej udice the defendants’ motion for summary j udgment, grants the plaintiff’ s first and second motions for leave to amend the complaint and denies without prejudi ce the plaintiff’s motion to facilitate the identification and notification of similarly situat ed employees. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contempor aneously issued this 15th day of December, 2010.

RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge