Filed 3/23/23 (unmodified opinion attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ANA WOOD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079528

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00005146-

 CU-OE-CTL)

 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

 NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed February 24, 2023 be modified on 

footnote 16 (page 25), deleting the word “not” from the sentence, so it reads as 

follows:

Because of this disposition, it is unnecessary to consider 

Wood’s alternative arguments that PAGA penalties are 

“equitable” remedies within the meaning of section 245.8, 

subdivision (e).

There is no change in the judgment.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties
Filed 2/24/23 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ANA WOOD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079528

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-00005146-

 CU-OE-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Reversed. Wood’s requests for judicial notice 

denied; Kaiser’s request for judicial notice granted.

Mashiri Law Firm, Alex Asil Mashiri; The Jami Law Firm and Tamim 

Jami for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Seyfarth Shaw, Christian J. Rowley, Kerry Friedrichs and Kiran Aftab 

Seldon for Defendant and Respondent.
2

The judiciary’s responsibility to interpret statutes often places courts in 

the position of trying to decide how the Legislature would have resolved an 

issue we strongly suspect it never actually considered. We endeavor, as best 

we can, to be prognosticators. Sometimes, however, our role in statutory 

interpretation is more that of a detective. The Legislature included a 

provision or used a particular term in a statute, and it is our job to uncover

what it had in mind when it employed those words. In this case we function 

largely as detectives, hopefully more like Sherlock Holmes than Inspector 

Clouseau. 

California’s Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (the 

Act) (Labor Code,1 § 245 et seq.) generally requires employers to provide 

eligible employees with at least three paid sick days per year. The Labor 

Commissioner and the Attorney General are charged with enforcing this law. 

Violators may be assessed compensatory as well as liquidated damages, plus 

civil penalties. (§ 248.5.) 

The last clause of section 248.5, subdivision (e) is the focus of this 

appeal. It provides that “any person or entity enforcing this article on behalf 

of the public as provided for under applicable state law shall, upon 

prevailing, be entitled only to equitable, injunctive, or restitutionary 

relief . . . .” (Ibid.) It would seem fairly obvious that the Legislature had 

something specific in mind when it used the phrase, “enforcing this article on 

behalf of the public as provided for under applicable state law.” It was 

envisioning some kind of enforcement action. But what was it? In particular, 

did the Legislature mean to include—and thus restrict—actions by aggrieved 

employees to recover civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorney 

General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (§ 2698 et seq.) as defendant Kaiser Foundation 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
3

Hospitals (Kaiser) contends? Or instead, as plaintiff Ana Wood argues, did 

the Legislature have in mind an entirely different statutory scheme, the 

Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.)?

The procedural setting of this case perfectly frames the issue as one of 

statutory interpretation. Wood filed a PAGA action against her former 

employer Kaiser seeking penalties for alleged violations of the Act. The trial 

court sustained Kaiser’s demurrer without leave to amend, determining that 

a PAGA action is one brought “on behalf of the public” and since it seeks only 

civil penalties, is prohibited by section 248.5, subdivision (e). 

Following our independent review, we reach a different conclusion. 

As we explain, the statute’s text and history provide compelling evidence that 

the phrase “on behalf of the public as provided under applicable state law” in 

section 248.5, subdivision (e) was intended to refer to actions prosecuted 

under the UCL—not PAGA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 

dismissal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Kaiser owns and operates hospitals and medical facilities throughout 

California. Wood, a nonexempt employee, was paid hourly wages by Kaiser. 

In February 2021, she filed a PAGA action against Kaiser alleging that as an 

“ ‘aggrieved employee’ ” she was “properly suited to act on behalf [of] the 

state, and collect civil penalties for all violations committed against” other 

aggrieved Kaiser employees in California. Her first cause of action claimed 

that Kaiser violated the Act by not paying sick leave at “the correct rate.” 

2 Because this case arises after the trial court sustained a demurrer 

without leave to amend, we assume as true all properly pleaded material 

facts, but not conclusions of fact or law asserted in the complaint. (See Sheen 

v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 916.)
4

The second cause of action alleges that Kaiser wrongfully denied employees 

the right to use sick leave. In the third, Wood maintained that Kaiser 

violated Labor Code provisions regarding vacation pay. 

Kaiser demurred to the first cause of action on the grounds that the Act 

“does not authorize PAGA actions for civil penalties.” After an unreported 

hearing, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.3 

Following voluntary dismissals (without prejudice) of the remaining causes of 

action, the court entered a judgment of dismissal in Kaiser’s favor. 

DISCUSSION

“ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the 

Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] 

We look first to the words of the statute, which are the most reliable 

indications of the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a 

statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by 

considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework 

as a whole.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its 

plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one 

reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the 

ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ” (Kim v. Reins 

International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).)

3 The court’s minute order initially states that the demurrer is sustained 

“without leave to amend.” But the last paragraph of the order purportedly 

grants leave to amend and states, “Nothing in this ruling prevents plaintiff 

from pursuing a PAGA claim; instead, only penalties are prohibited.” 

However, because PAGA “only creates a cause of action for civil penalties” 

(ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 188), no amendment 

consistent with the trial court’s ruling was possible. We therefore construe 

the facially ambiguous order as having sustained the demurrer without leave 

to amend. 
5

The phrase “enforcing this article on behalf of the public” in section 

248.5, subdivision (e) is ambiguous. It is susceptible of at least two possible

meanings. It could refer to a PAGA action, because relief under PAGA has 

been characterized as being “designed primarily to benefit the general public, 

not the party bringing the action.” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81.) But how 

PAGA relief has been characterized by the courts and who it “primarily” 

benefits does not necessarily indicate that the Legislature had PAGA in mind 

when it referred to “enforcing this article on behalf of the public.” (§ 248.5, 

subd. (e), italics added.) It might have instead been describing an action 

alleging a claim under the UCL, which can be brought on behalf of the public 

by various government officials, and in which even private individuals can 

seek public injunctive and restitutionary relief. (See, e.g., McGill v. Citibank, 

N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 959; Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes (2008) 

160 Cal.App.4th 136, 147 [noting that under the UCL, the Attorney General 

and certain other public officials can sue on behalf of the public at large].) 

Even Kaiser concedes that the UCL “may serve as a vehicle to enforce 

provisions of the [Act].” As in every question of statutory interpretation, the 

crucial issue is what did the Legislature mean?

PAGA became effective in 2004, a decade before the Act was adopted. 

(Stats. 2003, ch. 906 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 796); Stats. 2014, 

ch. 317, § 3 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill No. 1522).)4 The Legislature 

is presumed to have been aware of PAGA when it adopted the Act

(Hirschfield v. Cohen (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 648, 661), and because the 

4 Kaiser’s request for judicial notice of all versions of Assembly Bill 

No. 1522 and of the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of that bill as 

amended June 15, 2014 is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)
6

premise for Kaiser’s argument is that the Legislature intended to restrict the 

use of PAGA to enforce of the Act, we start our analysis with PAGA. 

Prior to 2004, California’s Labor Code was enforced by the Labor and 

Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), which could assess and collect civil 

penalties for violations. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis on Sen. Bill 

No. 796 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 22, 2003, p. 1 (Bill 

Analysis).)5 In 2003, a federal study indicated that garment industry 

employers in Los Angeles alone, collectively employing more than 100,000 

workers, had over 33,000 serious and ongoing wage violations; during the 

same period, the LWDA had issued fewer than 100 wage citations per year 

for all industries throughout the state. (Bill Analysis, supra, Sen. Bill No. 

796, p. 2.) Two core problems were hampering the prosecution of Labor Code 

violations. First, district attorneys were reluctant to prosecute them because 

labor matters were considered low priorities. Second, allocated government 

resources simply could not keep pace with the sprawling, and often 

“underground” economy.

The Legislature’s solution was to “ ‘deputize and incentivize employees 

uniquely positioned to detect and prosecute . . . violations.’ ” (Medina v. 

Vander Poel (E.D.Cal. 2015) 523 B.R. 820, 824–825.) Effective January 2004, 

PAGA declared it was “in the public interest to allow aggrieved employees, 

acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code 

violations, with the understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were 

to retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.” (Arias v. Superior Court

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).)

5 This bill analysis is cited and discussed in both parties’ briefs, but 

neither side specifically requested that we take judicial notice of it. We do so 

on our own motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
7

PAGA does not create any new substantive rights or legal obligations. 

It “ ‘ “is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to 

recover civil penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would be 

sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.” ’ ” (Bautista v. Fantasy 

Activewear, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 650, 657.) Although an aggrieved 

employee is the named plaintiff in a PAGA action, the dispute is actually 

between the state and the employer. (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

Under PAGA, 75 percent of the penalties recovered go to the LWDA; the 

remaining 25 percent are disbursed to employees aggrieved by the particular 

violation. (§ 2699, subd. (i).) 

The UCL in its current form was enacted in 1977 (Stats. 1977, ch. 299,

§ 1, p. 1202; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), although it incorporated 

existing elements from a predecessor statute that had been in place for many 

years. (See generally Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 116, 129–131.) When considering the enactment of PAGA more than 

20 years later, the Legislature realized that the UCL already authorized a 

private action alleging unfair business practices. But for two reasons, it was 

considered an “inadequate tool” for enforcing the Labor Code. First, the UCL

“only permits private litigants to obtain injunctive relief and restitution,” and 

that was considered an insufficient deterrent. (Bill Analysis, supra, Sen. Bill 

No. 796, as amended Apr. 22, 2003, p. 5.) Second, it did not provide for an 

attorney’s fee award to a prevailing plaintiff, and the sponsors of the 

proposed PAGA legislation believed that “few aggrieved employees can afford 

to bring an action to enjoin the violations.” (Bill Analysis, supra, Sen. Bill 

No. 796, p. 6.) 

The Legislature was also “mindful” of “well-publicized” pre-Proposition 

64 allegations of abuse of the UCL by private plaintiffs who had not suffered 
8

actual harm. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 

1317.)6 Determined to avoid a similar issue in PAGA, the bill granted 

standing only to “aggrieved” employees. As explained in the Bill Analysis:

“First, unlike the UCL, this bill would not open private 

actions up to persons who suffered no harm from the 

alleged wrongful act. Instead, private suits for Labor Code 

violations could be brought only by an ‘aggrieved 

employee’—an employee of the alleged violator against 

whom the alleged violation was committed. . . .

“Second, a private action under this bill would be brought 

by the employee ‘on behalf of himself or herself or others—

that is, fellow employees also harmed by the alleged 

violation—instead of ‘on behalf of the general public’ 

as private suits are brought under the UCL.” (Bill 

Analysis, supra, Sen. Bill No. 796, as amended Apr. 22, 

2003, p. 7, italics and boldface added.)7 

6 In November 2004 the UCL was amended by Proposition 64 to provide 

that only private persons “ ‘who [have] suffered injury in fact and [have] lost 

money or property’ ” may sue to enforce it. (See generally, Branick v. Downey 

Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 240–241.)

7 Kaiser asserts that the Senate Committee analysis “does not help” 

because when the Act became law in 2014, the UCL no longer authorized 

actions by any person acting on behalf of the general public. (See fn. 6, ante.) 

Thus, it maintains that section 248.5, subdivision (e)’s use of the term “on 

behalf of the public” cannot refer to UCL claims because by 2014, those 

claims had standing requirements much like PAGA’s. But while that might 

be true as to individual plaintiffs, a civil action under the UCL may be 

brought on behalf of the public by the Attorney General, any district 

attorney, or any city attorney in a city having a population in excess of 

750,000. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) Proposition 64 did not change that. 

(Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 658.) Thus, even 

after Proposition 64, local prosecuting authorities not otherwise given 

standing under the Act may bring a civil action on behalf of the public under 

the UCL. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) Such an action would fall within the 

last clause of section 248.5, subdivision (e) limiting remedies.
9

This legislative understanding—that PAGA actions were brought by an 

aggrieved employee “on behalf of himself or herself” and “fellow employees 

also harmed” (as distinguished from UCL actions, which were brought “on 

behalf of the general public”)—was given the force of law. Section 2699, 

subdivision (a) provides in part:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision 

of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed 

and collected by the [LWDA] . . . for a violation of this code, 

may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action 

brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or 

herself and other current or former employees . . . .” (Ibid., 

italics added.) 

So is a PAGA action one that is brought “on behalf of the public”? The 

answer is one that perhaps only a law professor could love: yes and no. 

In a PAGA action, courts recognize that the aggrieved 

employee/plaintiff acts as an agent of the state. Like any other agency 

relationship, the agent in a PAGA action (the aggrieved employee/plaintiff) 

acts for the benefit of the principal.8 In this sense, a PAGA action is brought

on behalf of the state or public. (See ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 

Cal.4th 175, 185 [“All PAGA claims are ‘representative’ actions in the sense 

that they are brought on the state’s behalf. The employee acts as ‘ “the proxy 

or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies” and “represents the 

same legal right and interest as” ’ those agencies — ‘ “namely, recovery of 

8 There are, however, also some unique aspects to the PAGA agency 

relationship. Unlike the typical agent, the PAGA plaintiff must have been 

personally affected by the same wrong that it complains about on behalf of its 

principal. (§ 2699, subd. (c).) And unlike an ordinary principal, in a PAGA 

action the state delegates enforcement to the employee entirely and 

irrevocably. (See Lewis v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2022) 85 

Cal.App.5th 983, 998–999.)
10

civil penalties that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the 

[LWDA]” ’ ”]; see also Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986; Kim, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 87 [“every” PAGA action is one “on behalf of the state” with the 

plaintiff acting “as the state’s designated proxy”].)

But from the Legislature’s perspective and particularly as compared to 

a UCL claim, a PAGA action is not brought “on behalf of the public,” but 

instead on behalf of other aggrieved employees. The text of section 2699, 

subdivision (a) plainly says so. (See Santos v. El Guapos Tacos, LLC (2021) 

72 Cal.App.5th 363, 372, [stating that “as a matter of law” a PAGA claim is 

“ ‘brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other 

current or former employees’ ”].) In light of the express language in PAGA’s 

section 2699, subdivision (a), it would be surprising for the Legislature to 

refer to an enforcement action “on behalf of the public” if it meant a PAGA 

claim.

Seeking further clarification, we turn to the Act’s legislative history. 

Although ultimately enacted in 2014, proposed legislation involving 

mandatory sick pay—and particularly section 248.5, subdivision (e)—actually 

traces its roots to 2008.9 That part of the initial Assembly Bill No. 2716

(2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) is a single long paragraph, but it can conveniently be 

broken down into three parts: (1) Standing, (2) Remedies, and (3) Exceptions

to remedies. The first part on standing stated:

9 As a general rule, unpassed legislation provides only limited guidance 

when interpreting legislation enacted into law. But an exception to that rule 

exists where, as here, reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evolution 

of statutory text. (See, e.g., Athletics Investment Group LLC v. Dept. of Toxic 

Substances Control (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 953, 974 [“The fact that the 

Legislature made this change to the language of the bill during the political 

process has implications for a proper construction of the statute.”].)
11

“The department [of Industrial Relations], the Attorney 

General, a person aggrieved by a violation of this article, an 

entity a member of which is aggrieved by a violation of this 

article, or another person or entity acting on behalf of the 

public as provided for under applicable state law, may 

bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction 

against the employer or other person violating this 

article . . . .” (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 

2716 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 22, 2008, 

§ 6 [proposed § 248.5, subd. (e)].)

The second part on remedies stated:

“and, upon prevailing, shall be entitled to such legal or 

equitable relief as may be appropriate to remedy the 

violation, including reinstatement, back pay, the payment 

of any sick leave unlawfully withheld, the payment of an 

additional sum as liquidated damages in the amount of fifty 

dollars ($50) to each employee or person whose rights 

under this article were violated for each day or portion 

thereof that the violation occurred or continued, plus, if the 

employer has unlawfully withheld paid sick leave to an 

employee, the dollar amount of paid sick leave withheld 

from the employee multiplied by three; or two hundred fifty 

dollars ($250), which amount is greater; and reinstatement 

in employment or injunctive relief; and further shall be 

awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs . . . .” (See 

Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2716 (2007–2008 

Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 22, 2008, § 6 [proposed 

§ 248.5, subd. (e)].)

The third part on exception to remedies stated:

“provided, however, that any person or entity enforcing this 

article on behalf of the public as provided under applicable 

state law shall, upon prevailing, be entitled only to 

equitable, injunctive, or restitutionary relief, and 

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” (See Legis. Counsel’s 

Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2716 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as 

introduced Feb. 22, 2008, § 6 [proposed § 248.5, subd. 

(e)].)as introduced Feb. 22, 2008, § 6 [proposed § 248.5, 

subd. (e)].)
12

Thus, as originally drafted as part of 2008 Assembly Bill No. 2716, 

section 248.5, subdivision (e)’s standing provision distinguished between an 

action by (1) state officials, (2) a person aggrieved, (3) a labor organization for 

an aggrieved member, and (4) “another person or entity acting on behalf of 

the public as provided for under some other state law.” (See Legis. Counsel’s 

Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2716 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) § 6 [proposed § 248.5, subd. 

(e)].) The “some other state law” in category (4) must be a reference to the 

UCL rather than PAGA. Only aggrieved employees can bring PAGA claims, 

so the fourth category would be unnecessary and duplicative of category (2) if 

it was intended to mean a PAGA action. In contrast, local prosecutors (not 

otherwise identified in section 248.5) can file UCL actions, so interpreting the 

fourth category to mean a UCL action adds something substantive to the 

standing provisions. 

After the discussion of standing, the next part of the paragraph 

provided a smorgasbord of remedies, including compensatory damages, 

liquidated damages, and civil penalties. This structure (standing first, then 

remedies) was logical, but it presents an obvious drafting problem. Some of 

the remedies contained in the second part (such as liquidated damages and 

penalties) were not recoverable as a matter of law by certain types of 

plaintiffs given standing in the first part. For example, as a matter of law in 

a UCL action brought by a private person, only injunctive relief and 

restitution would be available remedies. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17203; 

17535.) Thus, if the action brought “on behalf of the public” was a reference 

to a UCL action, then somewhere else the statute had to make clear that 

liquidated damages and penalties were not recoverable.

The final clause in section 248.5, subdivision (e) must have been 

drafted for this purpose, and thus it is no coincidence that the restriction to 
13

“equitable, injunctive, or restitutionary relief” matches the limited remedies 

available under the UCL. (See Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical 

Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 155 (Hambrick).) Any person or 

entity enforcing the statute “on behalf of the public as provided under 

applicable state law”—i.e., a UCL plaintiff—would be limited to UCL 

remedies. This was meant to clarify that to the extent the preceding clauses 

in section 248.5 provided for relief beyond that available under the UCL,

those additional remedies were not available in a UCL action based on a 

violation of the mandatory sick pay law.10 

Although the 2008 legislation was not passed, it was resurrected the 

following year as Assembly Bill No. 1000. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. 

Bill No. 1000 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.).) Deletions from the 2008 version are 

indicated in strikeout, and additions in double underlining below. The first 

part on standing stated:

“(e) The department [of Industrial Relations], The Labor 

Commissioner, the Attorney General, a person aggrieved by 

a violation of this article, or an entity a member of which is 

aggrieved by a violation of this article, or another person or 

entity acting on behalf of the public as provided for under 

applicable state law, may bring a civil action in a court of 

competent jurisdiction against the employer or other person 

violating this article . . . .”11 (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., 

Assem. Bill No. 1000 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 

Feb. 27, 2009 [proposed § 248.5, subd. (e)].) 

10 Thus, contrary to Kaiser’s assertion, the limitation of remedies for UCL 

actions is not “redundant.” Without that clarification in the last clause of 

section 248.5, subdivision (e), the statute might be read to expand UCL 

remedies for sick pay violations.

11 The second part on remedies and the third part on limitations for UCL 

remedies was unchanged from the 2008 version. (Assem. Bill No. 1000

(2009–2010 Reg. Sess.).)
14

Thus, the bill’s author deleted language appearing in the earlier 2008 

version that provided an enforcement action could be brought by “another 

person or entity acting on behalf of the public as provided for under 

applicable state law.” But interestingly, the last clause in section 248.5, 

subdivision (e), restricting remedies in such an action, remained unchanged 

in the 2009 version. 

Why would this new version of the bill delete the action “on behalf of 

the public” in the standing provision but retain the “on behalf of the public” 

limitation of remedies? Because the UCL itself already conferred standing, 

the drafters of the legislation likely concluded that an express reference to 

standing for a UCL claim was unnecessary. In enacting the statute on 

mandatory sick pay, it simply went without saying that a person or entity 

could bring the action on behalf of the public as provided under some other 

state law. If some other law provided a right to enforce sick leave rules, then 

there was no need to repeat that again in section 248.5, subdivision (e). At 

the same time, the limitation on UCL remedies in the last clause did no harm 

in that it accurately conveyed the Legislature’s intent and forestalled any 

argument that the Act should be construed to expand UCL remedies when a 

sick pay violation was involved. And because attorney fees are not 

recoverable under the UCL (see Hambrick, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 157),

it also assured UCL plaintiffs successfully enforcing the Act the right to seek 

attorney’s fees.

In any event, the 2009 bill also died, and similar legislation was not 

proposed again until Assembly Bill No. 400 in 2011. (See Legis. Counsel’s 

Dig., Assem. Bill No. 400 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 14, 2011

[proposed § 248.5, subd. (e)].) The 2011 version of section 248.5, subdivision 
15

(e) was identical to that in the 2009 bill. The 2011 bill suffered the same fate, 

and similar legislation would not be reintroduced until 2014.

In 2014, the Legislature finally enacted mandatory sick pay in 

Assembly Bill No. 1522. (Stats. 2014, ch. 317, § 3 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.)

effect. Jan. 1, 2015.) Pertinent here, there were two changes from the prior 

(unpassed) versions. 

Like its predecessor bills, as introduced Assembly Bill No. 1522

authorized the Labor Commissioner, the Attorney General, an aggrieved 

person, or an entity a member of which is aggrieved to bring a civil 

enforcement action. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1522 (2013–

2014 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 16, 2014, § 4 [proposed § 248.5, subd. (e)].) But 

opponents had raised “particular concern about some of the enforcement 

mechanisms contained in this bill, including the private right of action.” 

(Assem. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1522 (2013–

2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 2014, p. 4.) Addressing that concern, 

on May 28, 2014, the bill was amended to delete the authorization for both 

the private right of action (aggrieved persons) and the action brought by a 

labor organization (i.e., an entity of which such a person was a member). 

The changes in this amended version of the bill are indicated below:

“The Labor Commissioner, or the Attorney General, a 

person aggrieved by a violation of this article, or an entity a 

member of which is aggrieved by a violation of this article,

or another person or entity acting on behalf of the public as 

provided for under applicable state law, General may bring 

a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against 

the employer or other person violating this article . . . .” 

(Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill 

No. 1522 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 2014,

p. 13 [proposed § 248.5, subd. (e)].)
16

Did these changes manifest an intent to preclude an aggrieved 

employee from bringing a PAGA action? Every indication is that it did not. 

PAGA itself creates standing for aggrieved employees to collect civil penalties 

otherwise recoverable by the LWDA. (§ 2699, subd. (a).) Thus, eliminating a 

private right of action for damages is an entirely different issue. Moreover, 

despite deleting the private right of action, the May 28, 2014 bill analysis 

assured its readers that although “recent amendments” deleted standing for 

aggrieved persons, “it should be noted that the provisions of this bill are in 

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

available under any other law and do not diminish, alter or negate any other 

legal rights, remedies, or procedures available to an aggrieved person.” 

(Assem. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1522 (2013–

2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 28, 2014, p. 4.) Those “other . . .

procedures” included PAGA.

About two weeks later, the bill was amended to give this assurance the 

force of law. On June 15, 2014, section 245, subdivision (b) was added to the 

bill, providing:

“The provisions of this article are in addition to and 

independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures 

available under any other law and do not diminish, alter, or 

negate any other legal rights, remedies, or procedures 

available to an aggrieved person.” (See Legis. Counsel’s 

Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1522 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended June 15, 2014, p. 8 [proposed § 245, subd. (b), 

italics omitted].) 

These two changes: (1) deleting the private right of action, but 

(2) making clear that it was not intended to “diminish, alter, or negate” 

any existing rights or procedures available to an “aggrieved person,” 
17

remained part of the bill and were enacted into law. (§ 245, subd. (b); Stats.

2014, ch. 317, § 3 (Assem. Bill No. 1522).)

The reasonable inferences from this history all point in the same 

direction. PAGA was created because of the stark reality that the Labor 

Commissioner and Attorney General lacked adequate resources to enforce 

labor laws. The Legislature believed that unless aggrieved employees acting 

as private attorneys general were authorized to enforce those laws, employers 

would continue to violate them on a massive scale. Studies showed these 

violations were costing the state enormous amounts of cash—between $3 to 

$6 billion annually—as a result of employers operating outside the state’s 

labor laws. (Bill Analysis, supra, Sen. Bill No. 796, as amended Apr. 22, 

2003, p. 2.) 

This recognized need for private enforcement of labor laws was 

compounded by the many robust policy reasons for mandating paid sick 

leave. As of 2014 when the Act became law, roughly 39 percent of the state 

workforce received no sick leave benefits, leaving “seven million Californians 

with few options when personal or family needs arise.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. 

of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1522 (2013–

2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 18, 2014, p. 9.) Workers without paid sick 

leave were either expected to work while sick, risking the health and safety of 

coworkers and customers, or stay home and forego wages, jeopardizing the 

worker’s own financial ability to survive. (Ibid.) 

Given the perceived necessity for mandating minimum paid sick leave,

coupled with its documented understanding that traditional government

institutions would be unable to adequately assure compliance, it seems

inconceivable that the Legislature intended to prohibit PAGA actions to 

enforce the Act. Doing so would essentially leave only the Labor 
18

Commissioner and the Attorney General to litigate violations—and the 

Legislature had already determined a decade earlier that these agencies were 

flatly incapable of adequately enforcing labor laws. To accept Kaiser’s 

argument is to believe the Legislature intended the Act to be nothing more 

than statutory cotton candy—something that looks nice but has no substance. 

We are confident that was not its intent.

Moreover, when amending Assembly Bill No. 1522 in May and June 

2014, the Legislature could have easily and expressly abolished a PAGA 

remedy when, in the face of staunch opposition to the bill, it deleted the 

private right of action. But instead, it did the opposite. In section 245, 

subdivision (b), it codified that the Act does not “diminish, alter, or negate” 

any other procedures “available to an aggrieved” person. (Ibid.) It is no 

small coincidence that PAGA is a procedural device that uses the same 

terminology, conferring standing to an “aggrieved employee.” (§ 2699, 

subd. (a).)12

12 Disagreeing with this analysis, Kaiser contends that section 245, 

subdivision (b) is best understood as protecting a private plaintiff’s ability to 

pursue a UCL action. But if that were the intent, one would expect the 

Legislature to have used then-existing UCL terminology—preserving an 

action by “a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or 

property” as a result of the violation. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) 

Instead, however, the Legislature used PAGA terminology—“aggrieved”

employee. Kaiser also maintains that section 245, subdivision (b) was 

intended to carve out “the Kin Care statute[s],” sections 233 to 234, which 

permit employees to use half of their provided sick leave to care for certain 

family members. But there is not so much as a whisper of that intent in the 

legislative history. And given the timing of the amendment adding section 

245, subdivision (b), the more reasonable interpretation is the Legislature 

wanted to make clear that despite eliminating the private right of action, a 

PAGA action was still authorized.
19

It is of course true, as Kaiser points out, that section 248.5, subdivision 

(e) only authorizes the Labor Commissioner or the Attorney General to collect 

penalties. But that should not be interpreted to prohibit an aggrieved 

employee from bringing a PAGA action. Section 248.5, subdivision (e) does 

not need to authorize a PAGA action because such actions are already 

authorized by the PAGA statute itself. It begins by stating, 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that 

provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the [LWDA] . . . 

may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an 

aggrieved employee . . . .” (§ 2699, subd. (a), italics added.) The statutory 

phrase “ ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law’ ” is a term of art that 

“ ‘declares the legislative intent to override all contrary law.’ ” (Arias, supra, 

46 Cal.4th at p. 983.) It means that an aggrieved employee’s rights under 

PAGA control, despite the existence of other laws that might otherwise 

govern or restrict. (See California Taxpayers Action Network v. Taber 

Construction, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 115, 130.) Illustrating this point, 

there are many other statutes that on their face would only permit the Labor 

Commissioner to recover penalties, yet have instead been enforced by an 

aggrieved employee under PAGA. (See, e.g., § 226.3 [providing that “the 

Labor Commissioner shall” enforce this section], Raines v. Coastal Pacific 

Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667, 675 [PAGA action to 

enforce § 226.3]; § 256 [providing that “[t]he Labor Commissioner shall 

impose a civil penalty”], and Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 

Cal.App.4th 562, 579 [PAGA action to recover a civil penalty for violation of 

section 256].)

Similarly, that an employee cannot file an individual action for 

violations of the Act does not mean the Legislature also intended to preclude 
20

a PAGA action based on the same alleged violation. PAGA is not a private 

right of action, but rather a procedural device under which an agent or proxy 

of the state enforces the government’s ability to collect penalties. It applies 

even where there is no private right of action. (See, e.g., Noe v. Superior 

Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 339 [where a Labor Code provision 

provides for a civil penalty and contains no language suggesting it is 

recoverable directly by employees, a PAGA action is available, although no 

private right of action].)

In response to a question during oral argument, Kaiser’s attorney 

asserted that the last clause in section 248.5, subdivision (e)—“any person or 

entity enforcing this article on behalf of the public”—could only refer to a 

private person bringing a UCL action (and not a “public actor” such as a local 

prosecutor) because (1) Labor Code section 18 defines “person” in a way that 

excludes public entities, and (2) in Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164 (Wells), the Supreme Court held “that same language, 

that definition of person” does not include “public actors.”

For several reasons, we understand the statute differently. Section 18 

defines “person” to mean “any person, association, organization, partnership, 

business trust, limited liability company, or corporation.” The literal textual 

meaning of this definition might seem to exclude government agencies. 

Obviously, a government entity is not a natural person or any of the types of 

business organizations listed in section 18. 

But as in so many other areas of law, what may seem simple on its face 

is not. To begin with, Kaiser’s argument conveniently overlooks the word 

“entity” in this part of the statute. Moreover, nothing in section 18 expressly 

excludes government entities either. As Wells recognized, “[G]overnment 

agencies are excluded from the operation of general statutory provisions ‘only 
21

if their inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign 

governmental powers . . . . Pursuant to this principle, governmental agencies 

have been held subject to legislation which, by its terms, applies simply to any 

‘person.’ ” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1192, italics added.)

For example, in State v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 

699, the Streets and Highways Code provided that any “person” maintaining 

a pipeline could be required to move it upon written demand when necessary 

for safety or public improvement purposes. The issue was whether it 

encompassed municipal water districts. Much like Labor Code section 18 

here, another provision of the Streets and Highways Code defined “person” 

as “ ‘any person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, or 

business trust.’ ” (Marin Municipal Water Dist., at p. 704.) Applying this law 

to municipal water districts would not limit their otherwise valid power but 

would only operate to prevent them from exercising their franchises in a 

manner contrary to law. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the 

Legislature intended to embrace municipal water districts within the 

statute’s application. In short, the statutory definition of a “person” 

encompassed a government entity.

As explained in Los Angeles v. San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199 (Los 

Angeles), the rule Kaiser invokes here—excluding governmental agencies 

from the operation of general statutory provisions—applies “only if their 

inclusion would result in an infringement upon sovereign governmental 

powers. ‘Where . . . no impairment of sovereign powers would result, the 

reason underlying this rule of construction ceases to exist and the Legislature 

may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to 

governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.’ ” 

(Id. at pp. 276–277.) Thus, in Los Angeles, the court interpreted the language 
22

“person, firm or corporation” in Civil Code section 1007 (pertaining to title by 

prescription) to include governmental agencies. (See also Regents of 

University of Cal. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 533, 

536 [concluding that “ ‘person, association, copartnership or corporation’ ” in 

usury laws included public entity); Flournoy v. State (1962) 57 Cal.2d 497, 

498–499 [applying to a state government a wrongful death statute attaching 

liability to any “person” responsible for another’s death].)

Wells is a good illustration of the principle. That case involved a 

lawsuit against a school district that allegedly defrauded the State. The 

Supreme Court considered whether public school districts were “persons” 

subject to suit under the California False Claims Act. (Wells, supra, 39 

Cal.4th at p. 1179; Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.) It concluded that the statutory 

definition—“any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization, 

partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust” excluded public 

schools for purposes of imposing liability. (Wells, at p. 1166.) The Wells court 

explained the need to protect public school districts from “draconian 

liabilities” of the California False Claims Act, which include double and 

treble damages. (Id. at p. 1193.) The court reasoned that the Legislature 

could not have intended to subject financially strapped school districts to 

such liabilities, given their responsibility to provide free public 

education. (Id. at pp. 1193–1197.)

But in sharp contrast here, we are not dealing with a statute that 

imposes liability or some other negative consequence on a government entity. 

To the contrary, to the extent it is capable of enforcing the Labor Code, the 

government’s role is to do just that—enforce it against private employers. 

The rationale for the Wells holding simply does not apply here. 
23

In short, whether the Legislature intends a governmental entity to be a 

“person” is not a simple question, and the answer is almost always 

contextual. Here, the phrase “person or entity” in the last clause of section 

248.5, subdivision (e) is broad enough to include public agencies seeking to 

enforce the UCL, and we think the Legislature likely acted with that 

understanding when it passed the Act.

Perhaps Kaiser’s best argument is that “[e]very federal district court to 

have considered the issue” has reached the opposite conclusion—that the Act 

“ ‘expressly prohibits a private plaintiff from recovering PAGA penalties.’ ” 

The leading case is Stearne v. Heartland Payment Sys. LLC (E.D.Cal., Feb. 6, 

2018, No. 2:17-cv-01181-MCE-CKD) 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20679 (Stearne). 

But without analyzing the PAGA statute itself or any legislative history 

whatsoever, the district court in Stearne thought section 248.5, subdivision 

(e) “makes clear that persons or entities seeking to recover on behalf of the 

public may not recover penalties” and, therefore, a PAGA action, which is 

brought on “behalf of the public” is barred because it seeks only penalties. 

(Stearne, at p. *6.) 

Although we are not bound by federal district court decisions (Sanchez 

v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 769), we look to “analytically sound”

reasoning in federal opinions as persuasive. (Futrell v. Payday California, 

Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1432, fn. 6.)13 For reasons already 

discussed, we are not persuaded by the reasoning in Stearne. The other 

federal trial court decisions that Kaiser relies on—Segal v. Aquent LLC 

13 Conversely, California state trial court decisions in other cases have no 

precedential value and cannot be cited. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.) Accordingly, 

Wood’s requests for judicial notice of minute orders in four other superior 

court cases is denied. 
24

(S.D.Cal., Sept. 24, 2018, No. 18cv346-LAB (JLB)) 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 

164610, page *19, footnote 5 and Rudolph v. Herc Rentals (C.D.Cal., Aug. 27, 

2021, No. 2:20-cv-05412-ODW (Ex)) 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 244970, page *14

also contain no serious statutory analysis, do not discuss any legislative 

history materials, and merely cite Stearne and other district court decisions 

that have followed it. We decline to follow these federal district court 

decisions for the same reasons.14

Kaiser also maintains that if interpreted to preserve PAGA claims, 

section 245, subdivision (b) (providing that the Act is “in addition to” any 

other “rights, remedies, or procedures” under “any other law”) is

“irreconcilable with” section 246, subdivision (i). That statute requires 

employers to provide employees with written notice of the amount of paid 

sick leave available. Section 246 gives the employer the option of including

that notice in a wage statement already required by section 226, which shows

certain information including gross wages earned, deductions, and net wages 

earned.15 Or it can provide the employee with a separate sick leave 

document. Either way, the penalties for noncompliance specified in section 

246 shall be “in lieu of the penalties provided for a violation of [s]ection 226.” 

In other words, the fact that section 246 notice can be satisfied in a section 

14 Kaiser also relies on Titus v. McLane Foodservice, Inc. (E.D.Cal., Sept. 

14, 2016, No. 2:16-cv-00635-KJM-EFB) 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 125116. 

However, that court expressly declined to address the argument that section 

248.5, subdivision (e) bars a PAGA action. (Titus, at p. *15.)

15 Section 226, subdivision (a) generally requires an employer to provide 

employees with an itemized written statement showing total hours worked, 

the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the 

employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, all deductions, gross/net wages earned, 

the dates for which the employee is being paid, and other identifying 

information.
25

226 wage statement does not permit the employee to recover section 226 

penalties for what is, fundamentally, a section 246 violation. 

Kaiser appears to argue that if section 245, subdivision (b) is read to 

authorize all remedies (including a PAGA action), then any remedy excluded 

under section 246, subdivision (i) would nevertheless be available under 

section 245, subdivision (b)—an internal inconsistency creating an absurd 

result. We find this argument difficult to follow, and more difficult to accept. 

Section 245, subdivision (b) simply provides that to the extent an aggrieved 

person has greater rights, remedies, or procedures available under some 

other law, nothing in the Act diminishes, alters, or negates such rights. 

Section 226 does not provide a right to written notice of available paid sick 

leave. So the fact that sick leave notice can be included in a section 226 wage 

statement, avoiding the need for a separate sick leave document, does not 

create an otherwise “available” remedy, a point that section 246 merely 

clarifies. There is no conflict between section 245, subdivision (b) and section 

246, subdivision (i).

In sum, we hold that section 248.5, subdivision (e) does not preclude an 

aggrieved employee from bringing a PAGA action for violations of the Act. 

Reasonably construed according to its text, history, and context, the phrase, 

“on behalf of the public as provided for under applicable state law” refers to a

UCL claim and not a PAGA action. (§ 248.5.) Because the superior court’s 

ruling was based on the opposite conclusion, the judgment of dismissal must

be reversed.16

16 Because of this disposition, it is unnecessary to consider Wood’s 

alternative arguments that PAGA penalties are not “equitable” remedies 

within the meaning of section 245.8, subdivision (e).
26

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. Wood is entitled to costs on 

appeal.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DO, J.