In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-19-00297-CV 

APPROXIMATELY $23,606.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 100th District Court 

Carson County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 11734, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding 

 

March 27, 2020 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Guinapauline Santos, Real Party in Interest, appeals the trial court’s summary 

judgment granting the State’s forfeiture petition and awarding it the seized $23,606. By 

her appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss for 

want of prosecution. Santos also contends the statutory forfeiture scheme violates 

constitutional protections. We affirm.
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Background

Santos moved the trial court to dismiss the State’s action for want of prosecution 

on the failure of the State to prosecute the forfeiture action to final disposition within one 

year. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a trial court may dismiss for want 

of prosecution when a case is “not disposed of within time standards promulgated by the 

Supreme Court under its Administrative Rules.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(2). The relevant 

time standard in this non-family-law, nonjury trial is one year. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN.

6.1(a)(2), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app. (West Supp. 2019). The 

particular rule states:

District and statutory county court judges of the county in which cases are 

filed should, so far as reasonably possible, ensure that all cases are brought 

to trial or final disposition in conformity with the following time standards:

* * * * * 

(2) Civil Nonjury Cases. –Within 12 months from appearance date.

Id. The application of Rule 6 is discretionary and nonbinding. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 74.024(c)(1) (West 2013) (authorizing the Texas Supreme Court to promulgate 

“nonbinding time standards for pleading, discovery, motions, and dispositions”); see also 

Jones v. Morales, 318 S.W.3d 419, 427 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. denied); In re 

Fifty-One Gambling Devices, 298 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. 

denied). In other words, Rule 6 does not fix a bright line demarking the outward limit of a 

trial court’s discretion to control its docket. See Jones, 318 S.W.3d at 427. By its own

terms, Rule 6 recognizes that, “in especially complex cases or special circumstances it 

may not be possible to adhere to these standards.” TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.1(d).
3

The relevant time frame is as follows. On June 6, 2016, the State filed its notice 

of seizure and intended forfeiture. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.04 (West 

2018). Santos filed her general denial on July 5, 2016. The State sent its Request for 

Admissions on December 15, 2016. Santos’s response to the Request for Admissions

was due January 14, 2017, but was never filed.1 The State filed its motion for summary 

judgment on November 29, 2017. Santos filed her response along with a motion to 

dismiss for want of prosecution on December 13, 2017. A hearing on the motion for 

summary judgment was set for February 6, 2018, but was not held. The parties entered 

into a tacit agreement to informally abate the instant case pending disposition of a 

factually similar case by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Callano, No. 18-0200. The 

beginning date of that informal abatement is not entirely clear from the record; nor is the 

date on which the parties considered the case informally reinstated. Nonetheless, the 

Texas Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus in In re Callano on April 13,

2018, without written opinion.

It appears that the parties did not immediately undertake further action in the 

matter following issuance of the In re Callano decision. Yet, on May 9, 2019, the State 

sought a hearing on its previously filed motion for summary judgment. After the trial court 

reset the matter for hearing on June 3, 2019, Santos filed a motion asking, in the 

alternative, that the trial court vacate the June 2019 setting and grant Santos a 

1 We note that trial counsel in this cause participated in In re Callano in this Court and the Texas 

Supreme Court. Callano also involved a forfeiture, and counsel presented a similar argument there to that 

postulated here. We noted in Callano that counsel acknowledged he deliberately failed to respond to 

discovery there. In re Callano, No. 07-17-00435-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11753, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Dec. 18, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). We note here a similar concession by counsel 

regarding the failure to answer the State’s request for admissions, though the concession is less clear as 

to whether the omission was deliberate. 
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continuance in order to complete discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g). Further delay 

followed, and the trial court again reset the hearing for August 12, 2019. After that, Santos 

filed her notice of challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory forfeiture scheme. 

Ultimately, the trial court held a hearing on both the motions for summary judgment and 

dismissal on August 12. It denied the latter and granted the former. 

As the parties have presented, we examine the duration of the proceeding in two 

distinct phases. We do so because, by agreement, the parties agreed to an informal 

abatement of the cause while this Court and the Texas Supreme Court addressed similar 

issues in an unrelated case. See In re Callano, No. 07-17-00435-CV, 2017 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 11753 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 18, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Santos maintains that the first time period in excess of one year that preceded that 

the State’s motion for summary judgment should have prompted the trial court to dismiss 

the State’s action for want of prosecution. That period is measured from the date Santos 

made her appearance to the date that the State filed its motion for summary judgment. 

She also contends that the nearly thirteen-month period following that abatement period

required dismissal of the State’s case. She measures this second period from April 13,

2018, when the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision in In re Callano to May 9, 2019,

when the State again requested a hearing on its motion for summary judgment. 

Analysis

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution by 

the abuse of discretion standard. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (per 

curiam); Jones, 318 S.W.3d at 427. Here, because Santos sought dismissal based on 

the State’s failure to adhere to the disposition standard in Rule 6.1, we rely on that rule’s 
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own provisions, calling for the disposition of the case within one year “as far as reasonably 

possible” but also allowing for “special circumstances” that may excuse the delay in 

excess of one year. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.1(a), (d).

We first examine the initial delay, that from the time of appellant’s appearance to 

the time the State filed its motion for summary judgment. This span was approximately 

seventeen months. In the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, it cited Santos’s 

failure to participate in discovery. Indeed, as we have noted before in response to such 

conduct, the failure to participate in discovery serves as an impediment to the efficient 

disposition of the case. See In re Callano, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11753, at *3. It is 

“rather problematic to dismiss the State’s suit because of a delay in its timely disposition 

when the delay was caused, in part, by [a litigant]’s deliberate disregard of her obligation 

to cooperate in discovery.” Id. at *4. Given this, Santos’s refusal to cooperate in discovery 

as evinced by her failure to respond to the requests for admissions provided the trial court 

with basis to deny her motion to dismiss.

We also note that, sometime after she filed her motion to dismiss, Santos agreed 

to further delay the disposition of the case pending disposition of In re Callano. That too 

is a consideration available to the trial court in assessing whether to grant the motion to 

dismiss. See Bishop v. Wollyung, 705 S.W.2d 312, 314–15 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (despite ten-year delay in prosecution of suit, concluding that trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of 

prosecution when defendant acquiesced in the delay).

Santos next points to the delay following the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in 

In re Callano on April 13, 2018. About a year passed before the State requested a hearing 
6

on its motion for summary judgment. During that interim, Santos still had yet to supply 

her discovery responses to the State’s outstanding discovery requests. She also moved 

for a continuance to conduct additional discovery per her Rule 166a(g) motion filed May 

23, 2019. In it, she maintained that she had sought but been unable to obtain recently 

requested depositions and sought, among other remedies, further delay of the proceeding 

so that she could conduct further discovery. It should be noted that the State had 

responded to Santos’s initial discovery requests and, since then, had not been asked to 

supply anything further until May 2019.

It was also months after the State filed its request to reset the summary judgment 

hearing that Santos filed her notice of intent to challenge the constitutionality of the 

forfeiture statutes. This also invited further delay given the procedural hurdles created by 

statute when one challenges the constitutionality of a statute.2 

The foregoing circumstances lay before the trial court. They were indicia it 

reasonably could have considered in deciding to deny dismissal. Thus, its decision to 

deny that motion was not an instance of abused discretion. See Enexco, Inc. v. Staley,

No. 05-15-01047-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 109, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 9, 2017,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (observing that special circumstances, such as a venue challenge 

and a plea in abatement, “made it unlikely, if not impossible, for the case to be disposed 

2 Texas law calls on a party who files a petition, motion, or other pleading challenging the 

constitutionality of a statue to also file a specific form, which the court must serve on the Attorney General 

of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.010(a) (West Supp. 2019). The trial court may not enter a final 

judgment holding a statute of the state unconstitutional before the 45th day after the date such notice was 

served on the attorney general. See id. § 402.010(b). “The purpose of this statute is to provide the attorney 

general with the opportunity to be heard on issues important to the laws of the state—the laws the attorney 

general’s office is charged with defending and enforcing.” In re State, 489 S.W.3d 454, 454–55 (Tex. 2016)

(orig. proceeding) (quoting In re State, No. 04-14-00282-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5653, at *2 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio, May 28, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)). 
7

of within the twelve-month time frame in the administrative rules”). We overrule Santos’s 

first issue.

Constitutionality of Forfeiture Statute

Santos next contends that statutory framework of the civil forfeiture procedure 

deprives citizens of “due process in determining their right to retain possession and 

ownership of the property.” We overrule the issue.

An appellant’s failure to cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis in 

support of her issues constitutes inadequate briefing and waives the complaint. Dimock 

Operating Co. v. Sutherland Energy Co., LLC, No. 07-16-00230-CV, 2018 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 2865, at *31 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 24, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.);

Sunnyside Feedyard, L.C. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 106 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2003, no pet.). Here, Santos deems the civil forfeiture system unconstitutional 

and a denial of due process because those who prosecute and adjudicate the suits 

allegedly encounter financial benefit. For instance, “[t]he current system . . . ha[s] criminal 

prosecutor[s] in charge of arranging deals with law enforcement agencies to split the 

profits from law enforcement[‘]s seizing property” and “[t]he prosecutor’s office profits to

the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars over the years, [and] millions of dollars in

profits that go right back into . . . making the prosecutor’s office have things to make the 

prosecutor[‘]s occupation better.” Yet, not only prosecutors fall within the sights of her

attack. Allegedly, “[p]rofits from forfeiture cases go into the county general revenue fund,

and the county general revenue fund is where the Judge’s office also obtains budget 

consideration for things such as additional staff, additional equipment and resources,

travel reimbursement, etc.” Even “[t]he Appellate Courts . . . profit from increased 
8

revenue,” in her estimation. And, because of this, the forfeiture statute, Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure art. 59.01 et seq., purportedly transgresses the limits of due process. 

Missing from her diatribe, however, is citation to factual support underlying her

contentions. The same is true concerning citation to legal authority, controlling or merely 

analogous.3 Appellant says little about the legal parameters of due process. Nor does 

she attempt to explain why those parameters encompass the Texas forfeiture statute. 

Instead, her writing appears to suggest little more than a personal viewpoint on the 

supposed inequities of historic and current forfeitures. 

That legal authority exists touching upon aspects of her complaint cannot be 

denied. See, e.g., Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267 

(1972) (acknowledging precedent holding that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment and 

deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process to subject her liberty or property 

to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary 

interest in reaching a conclusion adverse to the defendant).4 But, this Court, as opposed 

to appellant, recalled it. From appellant, we encounter silence when it comes to whether 

or how such existing authority applies to the situation at bar. And, most importantly, our 

3 Allusion is made to various United States Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana,

___ U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 682, 203 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2019) (involving whether the “Excessive Fines Clause”

found in the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to the States via the 14th

Amendment); Honeycutt v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 198 L. Ed. 2d 73 (2017) 

(describing the issue as “whether, under [21 U.S.C.] § 853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally 

liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not 

acquire”); Leonard v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 847, 197 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2017) (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (discussing one justice’s views on whether the Due Process Clause requires a State to carry 

its burden under a civil forfeiture statute by clear and convincing evidence). No effort is made by appellant,

though, to explain how they pertain to or control the dispute at bar. 

4 At first blush, one could question whether appellant’s attenuated trickle-down theory would fall 

within the test mentioned in Ward. In view of appellant’s lack of attention to that, though, we do not address 

that now.
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obligation to adjudicate appellate disputes does not encompass an obligation to contrive 

appellant’s argument for her. 

Simply put, an appellant’s contention that the forfeiture statute is unconstitutional 

is a serious matter. Our rules of appellate procedure obligate her to present more than a 

skeleton bereft of flesh, bereft of analysis and citation to the evidentiary record and 

controlling legal authority on such an important topic. That was not done here. 

Consequently, appellant waived her constitutional attack upon article 59 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure.

Having overruled both issues presented on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

summary judgment.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice