PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 02-4935

RONALD LEE BROOKINS,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CR-02-153-2)

Argued: June 3, 2003

Decided: September 25, 2003

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and

GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in

which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judge Williams joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Brian Lee Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney,

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Larry Mark Dash, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul

J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Sherrie S. Capotosto, Assistant

United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Frances H.

Pratt, Research and Writing Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge: 

Ronald Lee Brookins ("Brookins") was indicted by a federal grand

jury on a charge of distribution of cocaine base. Brookins moved

before trial to suppress certain evidence that was seized from his automobile shortly after the time of his arrest. The district court granted

his motion and later denied the government’s motion for reconsideration. Resolution of this appeal turns upon our construction of the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Because we find that the police had probable cause to search

Brookins’ vehicle and that the exception applies, we conclude that a

warrant was not required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s

suppression of the contraband discovered in Brookins’ automobile. 

I.

On February 20, 2001, at approximately 3:00 p.m., five officers of

the Suffolk, Virginia Police Department’s Special Investigation Unit

were patrolling, in an unmarked car, open-air drug markets in downtown Suffolk, Virginia.1

 As they approached an intersection, the officers observed a gold Ford Expedition, backed into a driveway, which

they recognized as belonging to Brookins, who had been convicted of

prior drug offenses and was the subject of an ongoing narcotics investigation. One of the officers had recently received reliable confidential

information that Brookins frequently made trips to this intersection to

distribute narcotics. As the officers passed Brookins’ vehicle, they

observed Brookins and one other individual, who was later identified

as Benny Harvey ("Harvey"), standing in the open doorway of the

Ford Expedition. Brookins’ wife, Crystal, was seated in the backseat

of the vehicle. The patrolling officers continued down the street and

pulled into a driveway. At this time, at least two officers observed

Brookins reach into the vehicle and hand Harvey a clear plastic sand1We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Accordingly, our recital of the facts will reflect the district court’s findings supplemented by inferences reasonably drawn therefrom upon the basis of

the record. 

2 UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS
wich bag. The officers next observed Brookins and Harvey walk

away from the vehicle "at a fast pace." Two of the officers pursued

Harvey, whom they observed discard the plastic bag, which was later

found to contain 26 small, packaged rocks of suspected crack cocaine.

Harvey was apprehended and searched. Upon his person, the officers

discovered a two-way Radio Shack radio. Officer Coleman then

received verification regarding the suspected contraband and commenced pursuit of Brookins. Soon thereafter, Officer Coleman found

Brookins inside a nearby market and arrested him. During the officers’ pursuit of the two suspects, Crystal Brookins fled the scene in

the Ford Expedition at a high rate of speed. The officers next radio

broadcasted an all points bulletin to locate the vehicle. 

Approximately fifteen minutes later, a patrolman observed the gold

Ford Expedition parked in the driveway of a residence belonging to

Brookins’ mother-in-law. As Officers Coleman and Buie approached

the home, a man exited the residence and opened the door of the Ford

Expedition, "like he was going to get into the vehicle." Officer Coleman prevented this individual from entering the truck. The officers

found Crystal Brookins in her mother’s house, and she agreed to

accompany them to the police station. After obtaining the keys to the

Ford Expedition, the officers conducted a cursory search of the vehicle in the driveway. 

Later, while Crystal Brookins underwent questioning at the police

station, officers performed a more thorough search of Brookins’ vehicle. As a result of the search, the officers recovered electronic scales,

a Radio Shack two-way radio, aluminum foil, and a box of razor

blades. Brookins’ driver’s license, social security card, and vehicle

registration were also recovered. 

Brookins was indicted for unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally

distributing in excess of five grams of a mixture of substances containing crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(B)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Before trial, Brookins filed a motion

to suppress the contraband discovered in his car, which the district

court granted. The government then filed a motion for reconsideration, offering forfeiture as an additional basis to justify the warrantless search of the Ford Expedition. This motion was denied by the

district court’s superceding Memorandum and Order, which affirmed

UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS 3
its earlier suppression order.2

 The Government’s timely appeal followed. 

II.

We review de novo the legal determinations, including the existence of probable cause, underlying the district court’s suppression

order. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Park v.

Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 849-50 (4th Cir. 2001) (probable cause

review); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992)

(general suppression review standard). However, we "take care both

to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give

due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges."

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 

Before the district court, the government maintained that the warrantless search and seizure of Brookins’ automobile was valid on several alternative grounds.3

 On appeal, the government raises three

principal arguments in support of its warrantless search and seizure.4

First, the government argues that the search was justified under the

"automobile exception." Second, the government maintains that the

warrantless seizure of Brookins’ automobile from his mother-in-law’s

driveway was appropriate under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42

(1975). Finally, the government invokes state and federal forfeiture

statutes authorizing the warrantless seizure of vehicles used to commit a crime. 

2The district court made findings from the bench, but filed its Order

in response to the motion for reconsideration. The district court designated the Order as superseding the bench ruling. 

3For example, the government also argued that the search was valid

because it was incident to a lawful arrest. The district court rejected this

justification. Because the government has not challenged the district

court’s conclusion on this ground, we shall not review the applicability

of that exception to the present case. 

4The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures." "This fundamental right is preserved by the

requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by

an independent judicial officer." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390

(1985). 

4 UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS
Under the "automobile exception," "[i]f a car is readily mobile and

probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth

Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more."

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam) (quoting

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)).

Under the rule set forth in Chambers, officers with probable cause to

search an automobile at the scene of an arrest or stop may constitutionally seize the automobile and subsequently search it at the station

house without obtaining a warrant. See 399 U.S. at 52. Finally, under

the relevant forfeiture statutes, the police may seize an automobile

without first obtaining a warrant when they have probable cause to

believe that it is forfeitable contraband. See Florida v. White, 526

U.S. 559, 565 (1999). 

At issue in this appeal is the availability of these exceptions to the

warrant requirement under the circumstances surrounding the search

and seizure of Brookins’ vehicle. Prior to addressing the applicability

of these exceptions, however, we must first determine whether the

district court erred in concluding that the officers lacked probable

cause to support the search and seizure of Brookins’ automobile.

Without probable cause, neither the "automobile exception" nor a forfeiture provision is available to support a warrantless search or seizure.5

A.

In Ornelas, the Supreme Court, after noting that probable cause is

not susceptible to precise definition, nonetheless described it as "existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found." 517 U.S. at 696; see also Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("[W]hether . . . given all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place." (emphasis added)).

Supplementing this definition, the Court noted: 

5Similarly, the availability of Chambers to justify the warrantless seizure on these facts turns upon whether the search would be permissible

in the first instance under either the "automobile exception" or a forfeiture statute. 

UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS 5
The principal components of a determination of . . . probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to

the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively

reasonable police officer, amount to . . . probable cause. 

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. 

Accordingly, the district court noted the following with respect to

the facts surrounding Brookins’ arrest and concluded that the officers

possessed probable cause to search for contraband in his vehicle at the

time of arrest: 

Defendant has previously been convicted of drug offences,

and a reliable confidential informant told officers that the

Defendant made narcotics deliveries in the vicinity of E.

Washington Street . . . . [O]fficers stated that they saw

Defendant retrieve a package from the front seat of the car

and pass it to Harvey, who later discarded it. When the

package was recovered by officers, it was determined it contained crack cocaine. These facts are sufficient to support a

reasonable belief by the officers that contraband may have

been present in the vehicle. 

However, the district court concluded that probable cause became

stale during the fifteen-minute interval between the officers’ arrest of

Brookins and the subsequent seizure of his Ford Expedition from his

mother-in-law’s driveway. 

The lower court offered two justifications for this conclusion: first,

the district court was not "firmly convinced" that the officers had

actually witnessed a passing of drugs; and second, in its view, the

officers had "allowed" the vehicle to depart the scene, which might

have permitted Crystal Brookins to dispose of contraband while fleeing from the scene of her husband’s arrest. Citing these observations,

the district court concluded that it was not clear that a reasonable officer would determine that probable cause existed at the time of the seizure of the Ford Expedition. Critical of the officers’ approach to the

search, the district court maintained that the vehicle should have been

6 UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS
searched at the time of arrest or seized and searched later upon the

issuance of a warrant. 

Although Brookins’ wife may have had an opportunity to dispose

of the incriminating evidence which was ultimately discovered in the

car, we do not find that this mere possibility should have led a reasonable officer to conclude that probable cause no longer existed when

the automobile was located fifteen minutes later. Brookins’ wife

might simply have imagined that she had successfully evaded the

police and that she would have time to dispose of the contraband once

in a safe place — such as her mother’s home. Alternatively, not

knowing whether the police were in pursuit, or when they might

catch-up with her, Crystal Brookins might have feared that she would

be observed or stopped in the process of jettisoning contraband.

Given the plausibility of any of several such hypothetical alternatives,

we cannot conclude that probable cause no longer existed when the

vehicle was seized. Of course, if the officers had undertaken this

search two weeks after the arrest, we would have little trouble concluding, ceteris paribus, that probable cause had become stale during

the intervening period. However, in this instance, only fifteen minutes

had transpired between Crystal Brookins’ dash from the scene of

arrest and the discovery of the vehicle. Reviewing the relevant "historical facts," none of which is in dispute, we conclude that the district court erred when it found that probable cause no longer obtained

at the time of seizure. 

B.

The district court next proceeded to analyze whether, assuming that

probable cause had existed, a warrantless search would have been

constitutionally permissible pursuant to the "automobile exception,"

which was established under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132

(1925), and its progeny. The district court interpreted the Carroll line

of cases to require a showing of exigency, notwithstanding recent

Supreme Court precedent specifically disavowing the existence of any

such separate requirement.6 The district court found in Carroll a

6The district court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s statement in

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999), that "the ‘automobile

UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS 7
requirement that the subject automobile be, in a somewhat phenomenological sense,7

 "readily mobile" to justify a warrantless search.

Applying this formulation of the rule, the district court concluded that

on the facts presented — viz. the ease with which the officers could

have blocked Brookins’ automobile and the fact that the Ford Expedition was unoccupied when discovered by the officers — a warrant

was required to search and seize the automobile because it was not

"readily mobile." 

On appeal, Brookins proposes an interpretation of the "automobile

exception," which he grounds largely in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Supreme Court, by the opinion

of a four-justice plurality, declined to apply Carroll under circumstances evincing no exigency whatsoever. Specifically, the defendant’s automobile was parked in his own driveway and contained no

contraband. Additionally, the police had developed probable cause

well in advance of the warrantless search. Brookins maintains that

Coolidge represents the sole Supreme Court decision to address

"head-on" the warrantless search of an automobile at a private residence. Based upon the facts of Coolidge, Brookins would posit a

bright-line rule, whereby the automobile exception may never apply

when a vehicle is stationed on private, residential property.8

exception’ has no separate exigency requirement." See also Labron, 518

U.S. at 940 (summarily reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania requiring separate showing of "unforseen circumstances"

or exigency). It is worthwhile to note that the standard for obtaining a

summary reversal of a lower court’s judgment is strenuous. As the Dyson

court noted, "summary reversal does not decide any new or unanswered

question of law, but simply corrects a lower court’s demonstrably erroneous application of federal law." 527 U.S. at 466 n.1 (emphasis added).

7The district court required evidence that the vehicle was mobile under

the totality of circumstances surrounding its seizure. For the reasons discussed below, we decline to adopt this rule as a general requirement.

Although this consideration may be relevant in a private, residential setting, we view ready mobility as defining the nature of the use of the vehicle, rather than its ability to be moved by a defendant upon stop or

seizure. 

8We decline to adopt this construction of Coolidge. Nor do we find it

necessary to determine the contours of the expectation of privacy in and

8 UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS
Brookins seeks additional support for this theory in California v.

Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985), where the Supreme Court held that

a mobile home, on the facts presented, was more characteristic of an

automobile than a fixed residence. The Court did look to the nature

of the location where the vehicle was discovered, but only to ascertain

whether the vehicle itself was, in an ontological sense, in use as a

"movable vessel" or as a fixed residence. Hence, the Court’s reference

to a "place not regularly used for residential purposes," Carney, 471

U.S. at 392 — from which the police would be less likely to infer that

the object was residential in nature — served as a guidepost to determine, ab initio, whether the object encountered was a vehicle or a residence. After considering these circumstances, the Court concluded

that the warrantless search of the mobile home was covered by the

"automobile exception." Id. at 394. Brookins’ invocation of Carney

to buttress his reading of Coolidge as generating a bright-line

approach to the application of the "automobile exception" is therefore

flawed. The Supreme Court has expressly held that the "automobile

exception" is applicable "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable

cause exists to believe it contains contraband." Dyson, 527 U.S. at

466 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Dyson, we find the "automobile exception" applicable to the case before us. First, the motor

vehicle at issue was clearly operational and therefore "readily movable." Second, as discussed in greater detail above, the police officers

had probable cause to conclude that there was contraband in the vehicle, as the party responsible for the vehicle’s flight, Brookins’ wife,

was present on the scene at her mother’s home. Given these facts, the

warrantless search of Brookins’ vehicle by law enforcement officers

did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 

C.

Under the rule of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1975), and

Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), "[o]fficers with

around one’s private property. Although heightened privacy interests

may be triggered when a vehicle is encountered on private property, the

Coolidge plurality opinion cannot be fairly read to create a bright-line

rule precluding warrantless searches on private property under all circumstances. 

UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS 9
probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was

stopped . . . [may] constitutionally do so later at the station house

without first obtaining a warrant." The district court acknowledged

the government’s argument based upon Chambers and White in a

footnote, but interpreted these cases to require that the vehicle be

seized immediately incident to arrest. Because the officers "allowed"

the vehicle to leave the arrest scene, the district court found that there

was no lawful warrantless seizure, and that the subsequent search was

therefore impermissible. 

We decline to adopt this interpretation of the controlling precedent.

Although both cases happened to involve situations in which the car

was seized immediately after an arrest, the reasoning supporting the

subsequent search was that probable cause still obtained. "[P]olice

officers with probable cause . . . [who may] search an automobile at

the scene where it was stopped could do so later at the station house

without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, ‘[t]he probable-cause

factor’ developed at the scene ‘still obtained at the station house.’"

White, 423 U.S. at 68 (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52). Hence, the

ongoing existence of probable cause is what animated these decisions,

not the factual happenstance of search incident to arrest. Because we

conclude that the officers were entitled to search Brookins’ automobile without obtaining a warrant at the time that it was discovered, the

seizure and subsequent searches were lawful.9

III.

Because we find that the district court erred in concluding that the

officers did not have probable cause to search Brookins’ vehicle at the

time it was seized, and because we find that the search would have

been constitutional under Carroll at the time the automobile was

seized, we uphold both the seizure and subsequent searches as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court’s

order granting suppression is

REVERSED.

9Having concluded that the seizure was justified under Texas v. White

and Chambers v. Maroney, we need not address the applicability of the

relevant forfeiture statutes. 

10 UNITED STATES v. BROOKINS