NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL
- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 18a0429n.06
Case No. 17

- 4306
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WELLS FARGO BANK , N.A. , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
McK EAGUE , Circuit Judge. Wells Fargo Bank owned an insurance policy on an
abandoned hom e that an arsonist set ablaze. Allstate Insurance Company refused to inde mnify Wells Fargo , relying on a policy exclusion for damage caused by “vandalism or malicious mischief” after the property has been vacant for 30 or more days. Wells Fargo sued, arguing that other policy provisions confirm that fire damage is considered distinct from vandalism or
malicious mischief. The district court agreed with Wells Fargo and entered summary judgment in
its favor

. Allstate appealed

— but prematurely, it turns out.
While the district court’s summary judgm ent order determined that Allstate was on the hook for the arson damage under the terms of the policy, the district court failed to address other issues that remained in the case, most prominently Wells Fargo’s demand for breach

- of

- contractCase No. 17

- 4306 , Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company

- 2

- damages. That means the district court’s decision did not constitute a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and so we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A brief review of how we got here is in order

. The district court styled its judgment a final

o ne under § 1291. And n either party to the case initially questioned the fi nality of the decision below. Section 1291’s finality requirement, however, goes to this court’s jurisdiction, meaning

we must decide for ourselves whether the district court fully and finally resolved the dispute in its summary judgment order. Daleure v. Commonwealth of Kentucky , 269 F.3d 540, 543 (6th Cir. 2001)

. D oubtful that the order did so

— since it resolved only the liability, and not the damages, question

— w e asked the parties to provide their take on the matter through supplemental briefs. Both parties in their briefing conceded that the district court’s decision was not final. And though they offer some arguments and authority suggesting we can overlook this technical defect, we think doing so would risk piecemeal appeal s in this case and would promote a similar practice
in future cases. 1 We may answer the liability question today , only to review the damages issue

tomorrow. That runs counter to both the letter and sp irit of § 1291. See Bd. of Trustees of Plumber , Pipe Fitters & Mech. Equip. Serv., Local Union No. 392 v. Humbert , 884 F.3d 624, 626 (6th Cir.
2018 ) (stating that “a stipulated order that leaves open the possibility of piecemeal appeals is not final” (cit ation and quotation marks omitted)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Baker , 137 S. Ct. 1702,
1712 (2017) (stating that § 1291 “ preserves the proper balance between trial and appellate courts, minimizes the harassment and delay that would result from repeated i nterlocutory appeals, and promotes the efficient administration of justice .” ).

1 Both Wells Fargo and Alls tate rely primarily on Pittman ex rel. Sykes v. Franklin , 282 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that this court can review a district court decision that is not final and was not certified as an interlocutory appeal. But Pittman (beyond being unpublished) involved dramatically different facts and serves as a poor guide in this case. Perhaps most importantly, the district court decision appealed from in Pittman fully resolved the claim against one of the defendants in a multi

- def endant suit. Id. at 431. Not so here.Case No. 17

- 4306 , Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company

- 3

- The parties admit the possibility of a successive appeal , yet assure us that we can keep the
case since any remaining appeal would concern only the extent of damages. But there is no special exception to an appellate court’s aversion to multiple appeals where the second app eal will be limited to damages. Indeed, we recently held just the opposite. Humbert , 884 F.3d at 626 (“ The point of the fi nality requirement . . . is to make the parties bring all of their issues

— liability, damages, and whatever else they choose to litigate

— in a single appeal .”). True, this rule is
sometimes relaxed when the dam ages determination is all but foreordained and the district court need only do a bit of arithmetic. S ee , e.g. , Griffin v. Michigan Dep’ t of Corr. , 5 F.3d 186, 190 (6th Cir. 1993). T his , however, is not such a case

— not if we take each party at their word

. S ee Wells Fargo’s Supp. Br. at 3 (discussing need for evidentiary hearing on the amount of damages) ; Allstate’s Supp. Br. at 4 (acknowledging that decision in Wells Fargo’s favor “will require the district court to conduct a damages proceeding”)

. Wells Fargo has demanded an indeterminate amount of damages from Allstate, and the district court has to settle on an amount before we will hear an appeal

. See Humbert , 884 F.3d at 626.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.