UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

PECOS DIVISION

TROY HINKLE, Individually and for Others 

Similarly Situated,

v.

PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY.

Case No. 4:20-cv-00022

Jury Trial Demanded

FLSA Collective Action 

Pursuant to § 216(b)

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

SUMMARY

1. Troy Hinkle (Hinkle) brings this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) lawsuit to recover

the unpaid overtime wages and other damages owed to him by Phillips 66 Company (Phillips 66).

2. Phillips 66 is one of the largest energy providers in the United States. 

3. Hinkle and the other Phillips 66 employees regularly work more than 40 hours in a 

week. 

4. But Phillips 66 does not pay them overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours 

in a single workweek. 

5. Instead of paying overtime, Hinkle received a daily rate with no overtime 

compensation. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

because this action involves a federal question under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

7. Venue is proper in this Court because Phillips 66 conducts substantial business in this 

District and Division.

8. Hinkle performed work for Phillips 66 in Winkler County, Texas, which is in this 

District and Division. 

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9. While working for Phillips 66, Hinkle lived in Ward County, Texas, which is located 

in this District and Division. 

THE PARTIES

10. Hinkle worked for Phillips 66 from April 2019 until October 2019. 

11. Hinkle was a utility inspector for Phillips 66. 

12. Hinkle worked for Phillips 66 in and around Wink, Texas and Sonora, Texas. 

13. Throughout his employment with Phillips 66, Hinkle was paid a day-rate with no 

overtime compensation. 

14. Hinkle’s consent to be a party plaintiff is attached as Exhibit A.

15. Hinkle brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated workers 

who were paid by Phillips 66’s day-rate scheme.

16. Each of these workers were paid a flat amount for each day worked and Phillips 66 

failed to pay them overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in accordance with 

the FLSA. 

17. The class of similarly situated employees or putative class members sought to be 

certified is defined as follows:

All inspectors of Phillips 66 who were paid a day-rate with no 

overtime in the past 3 years (Putative Class Members).

18. The Putative Class Members are easily ascertainable from Phillips 66’s business 

records.

19. Phillips 66 may be served by serving their registered agent for service of process,

Corporate Service Company d/b/a CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, 211 7th Street, Suite 

620, Austin, Texas 78701. 

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COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA

20. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Phillips 66 has been an employer within the 

meaning of the Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

21. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Phillips 66 has been part of an enterprise within 

the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 

22. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Phillips 66 has been part of an enterprise engaged 

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of 

the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that said enterprise has and has had employees engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise 

working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce - such as oilfield

equipment, hand tools, computers, automobiles, and cell phones - by any person and in that said 

enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than 

$10,000,000.

23. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Hinkle and the Putative Class Members were 

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.

24. As will be shown through this litigation, Phillips 66 treated Hinkle the Putative Class 

Members as employees and uniformly dictated the pay practices Hinkle and its other employees were 

subjected to.

FACTS

25. Phillips 66 is a global energy company. 

26. To provide its services, Phillips 66 hires inspectors (like Hinkle) to perform work.

27. Many of these inspectors worked for Phillips 66 on a day-rate basis and make up the 

proposed Putative Class. 

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28. These inspectors perform similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar 

illegal pay practices for similar work. 

29. Because of Phillips 66’s day-rate pay practice, Hinkle and the Putative Class Members

are paid a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day 

(or in that workweek).

30. Because of Phillips 66’s day-rate pay practice Hinkle and the Putative Class Members

failed to receive overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

31. For example, throughout Hinkle’s employment with Phillips 66, he was paid on a dayrate basis. 

32. Hinkle and the Putative Class Members normally worked 12 or more hours a day.

33. Hinkle and the Putative Class Members would regularly work 7 days a week. 

34. Phillips 66 never guaranteed Hinkle and the Putative Class Members a salary.

35. Phillips 66 never paid Hinkle or the Putative Class Members on a salary basis.

36. Hinkle was required to report the days worked to Phillips 66.

37. The work Hinkle performed was an essential and integral part of Phillips 66’s core 

business. 

38. Phillips 66 directly determined Hinkle and the Putative Class Members’ rates of pay 

and his work schedule.

39. The Putative Class Members worked hours similar to Hinkle’s. 

40. During Hinkle’s employment with Phillips 66, it and/or the company Phillips 66

contracted with exercised control over all aspects of his job. 

41. Phillips 66 and/or the company it contracted with, controlled all the significant or 

meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Hinkle and the Putative Class Members.

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42. Phillips 66 controlled all aspects of Hinkle’s job duties by enforcing mandatory 

compliance with Phillips 66’s policies and procedures.

43. Phillips 66 directly determined Hinkle’s rates of pay and his work schedule while he 

was working for Phillips 66.

44. The Putative Class Members were denied overtime by the same illegal pay practice

(Phillips 66’s day-rate pay scheme) that resulted in Hinkle being denied overtime wages. 

45. Phillips 66’s policy of failing to pay its employees, including Hinkle, overtime violates 

the FLSA because these workers are non-exempt.

46. Phillips 66’s day-rate scheme violates the FLSA because Hinkle and the Putative Class 

Members did not receive any overtime pay for hours worked over 40 hours each week.

FLSA VIOLATIONS

47. As set forth herein, Phillips 66 has violated, and is violating, Section 7 of the FLSA, 

29 U.S.C. § 207, by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production 

of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for workweeks longer than 40 hours without 

compensating such employees for their employment in excess 40 hours per week at rates no less than 

1 and 1⁄2 times the regular rates for which they were employed. 

48. Phillips 66 knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard carried out this illegal pattern 

or practice of failing to pay the Putative Class Members overtime compensation. 

49. Phillips 66’s failure to pay overtime compensation to these employees was neither 

reasonable, nor was the decision not to pay overtime made in good faith. 

50. Accordingly, Hinkle and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime wages 

under the FLSA in an amount equal to 1 and 1⁄2 times their rate of pay, plus liquidated damages, 

attorney’s fees and costs.

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COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

51. Hinkle incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices 

Phillips 66 imposed on Hinkle were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members.

52. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in

willful violation of the FLSA. 

53. Numerous other individuals who worked with Hinkle indicated they were paid in the 

same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as 

required by the FLSA.

54. Based on his experiences and tenure with Phillips 66, Hinkle is aware that Phillips 66’s 

illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members.

55. The Putative Class Members were all not afforded the overtime compensation when 

they worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

56. Phillips 66’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by 

law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the 

personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members.

57. Hinkle’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class 

Members.

58. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not 

prevent collective treatment. 

59. Hinkle has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. 

60. Like each Putative Class Member, Hinkle has an interest in obtaining the unpaid 

overtime wages owed to him under the FLSA.

61. A collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair 

and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 

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62. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their 

injuries and Phillips 66 will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA.

63. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual 

litigation against Phillips 66, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 

64. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity 

among the claims of individual members of the class and provide for judicial consistency.

65. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate 

over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and 

fact are:

a. Whether Phillips 66 employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning 

of the FLSA;

b. Whether Phillips 66’s day rate pay scheme meets the salary-basis test; 

c. Whether Phillips 66’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the 

Putative Class Members was made in good faith; 

d. Whether Phillips 66’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and 

e. Whether Phillips 66’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly to all Putative 

Class Members.

66. Hinkle’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Hinkle and 

the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Phillips 66’s illegal and uniform 

employment policy. 

67. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no 

detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 

68. Therefore, this issue does not preclude class or collective action treatment.

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JURY DEMAND

69. Hinkle demands a trial by jury.

RELIEF SOUGHT

70. WHEREFORE, Hinkle prays for judgment against Phillips 66 as follows:

a. An Order designating this lawsuit as a collective action and permitting the 

issuance of a notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to the Putative Class 

Members with instructions to permit them to assert timely FLSA claims in this 

action by filing individual Consents to Sue pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

b. For an Order pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA finding Phillips 66 liable 

for unpaid back wages due to Hinkle and the Putative Class Members for 

liquidated damages equal in amount to their unpaid compensation;

c. For an Order awarding attorneys’ fees, costs and pre- and post-judgment 

interest; and

d. For an Order granting such other and further relief as may be necessary and 

appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Michael A. Josephson

Michael A. Josephson 

Fed. Id. 27157

State Bar No. 24014780

Richard M. Schreiber

Fed Id. 705430

State Bar No. 24056278

Josephson Dunlap, LLP

11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050

Houston, Texas 77046

713-352-1100 – Telephone

713-352-3300 – Facsimile

mjosephson@mybackwages.com 

rschreiber@mybackwages.com

AND

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Richard J. (Rex) Burch

Fed. Id. 21615

Texas Bar No. 24001807

BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.

8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 

Houston, Texas 77046

713-877-8788 – Telephone

713-877-8065 – Facsimile

rburch@brucknerburch.com 

ATTORNEYS IN CHARGE FOR PLAINTIFF

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