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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-13-1148-KuPaTa

)

ROBERT W. HUNT M.D., ) Bk. No. 11-58228

a Medical Corporation, )

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

PELI POPOVICH HUNT, Agent for )

Robert W. Hunt M.D., a Medical)

Corporation & Trustee of 2007 )

Restated Robert & Peli Hunt )

Living Trust, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

DAVID M. GOODRICH, Chapter 7 )

Trustee, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on February 20, 2014

at Pasadena, California

Filed – March 26, 2014

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Franklin Pegues Jeffries argued for appellant Peli

Popovich Hunt, as agent for Robert W. Hunt M.D., a

Medical Corporation, and as trustee of the 2007

Restated Robert & Peli Hunt Living Trust; Jill R.

Schecter argued for appellee David M. Goodrich,

Chapter 7 Trustee.

FILED

 MAR 26 2014

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

*This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.
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Before: KURTZ, PAPPAS and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Peli Popovich Hunt,1 as agent for Robert W. Hunt, MD, a

Medical Corporation (“MD”), and as trustee of the 2007 Restated

Robert & Peli Hunt Living Trust (“Hunt Trust”), appeals from the

order disallowing MD’s exemption claims and from the order

denying MD’s motion to modify the disallowance order.

The bankruptcy court correctly held that MD, as a

corporation, is not entitled to claim any exemptions under

11 U.S.C. § 522(b).2 The bankruptcy court also correctly held

that Cal. Probate Code §§ 16335 and 19324, on which MD relied as

the statutory grounds for its exemption claims, do not actually

confer any exemptions. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

FACTS

MD commenced its voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy case in

November 2011.3 Peli signed all of MD’s initial schedules and

its initial statement of financial affairs as an officer of the

corporation. Also, she identified herself therein as MD’s

1We refer to Peli Popovich Hunt herein by her first name,

Peli, for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended.

2Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

3To facilitate our analysis and disposition of this appeal,

we have drawn some of our facts from items referenced in the

bankruptcy court’s case docket. We take judicial notice of the

record in the underlying bankruptcy case. See O'Rourke v.

Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957–58

(9th Cir. 1989).

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president, treasurer, secretary, director and 100% owner.4 The

bankruptcy court subsequently appointed a chapter 11 trustee and,

on the chapter 11 trustee’s motion, thereafter converted the case

to chapter 7. David Goodrich was appointed to serve as chapter 7

trustee.

MD did not initially file any Schedule C listing exemptions

claimed. This was an intentional omission. As stated in MD’s

chapter 11 disclosure statement: “Debtor is a corporation and

has not filed Schedule C, and thus does not claim any exemptions

by way of Schedule C.” Disclosure Statement (April 15, 2012) at

17:10-11. Nonetheless, on October 15, 2012, MD filed papers

indicating that it was claiming as exempt a host of assets,

including: the medical office building from which it conducted

its business (“Offices”); its accounts receivables; rental

derived from leasing some of the Offices; ten acres of vacant

land in Cotulla, Texas; several parcels of real property located

in Glendale, California; its goodwill; its medical records; and

so on. The statutory bases stated for each of the exemption

claims were § 522(b) and Cal. Probate Code §§ 16335 and 19324.

On November 28, 2012, within thirty days of the conclusion

of the § 341(a) meeting in the chapter 7 case, Goodrich filed an

objection to all of MD’s exemption claims. As pointed out by

Goodrich, only individual debtors can claim exemptions under

§ 522(b), and MD by its own admission was a corporation. 

4In a later version of MD’s schedules and statement of

financial affairs, filed after the case was converted to

chapter 7, Peli identified herself merely as MD’s “agent” and

specified that MD was 100% owned by the Hunt Trust.

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Furthermore, Goodrich noted, the provisions of the California

Probate Code relied upon by MD did not actually provide for any

exemptions.

MD filed a response, in which it contended that certain

procedural defects existed which invalidated Goodrich’s exemption

claim objection. According to MD, Goodrich did not timely or

properly accept his appointment as chapter 7 trustee, and he had

not posted the requisite bond. MD further asserted that the

exemption objection was untimely and that the objection should

have been signed by Goodrich’s counsel of record rather than

Goodrich himself.

On January 9, 2013, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on

the exemption claim objection and, for the reasons stated in the

objection, sustained the objection in its entirety. On

January 14, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order

sustaining Goodrich’s objection and disallowing MD’s exemption

claims. 

On January 28, 2013, MD filed a motion to modify the court’s

order disallowing its exemption claims. The motion to modify

reiterated MD’s concerns regarding the timeliness of the

exemption claim objection and regarding Goodrich’s allegedly

improper and untimely notice of his appointment as chapter 7

trustee. The modification motion also complained about how the

hearing on the exemption claim objection was conducted and the

amount of time the court waited before entering the order

sustaining the objection. In essence, MD asserted, it was not

given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the exemption

claim objection. Goodrich opposed the motion to modify, and MD

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filed a reply. 

On March 13, 2103, the bankruptcy court entered a memorandum

decision and a separate order denying the modification motion. 

According to the bankruptcy court, MD had not offered any grounds

that would justify reconsideration of the order sustaining

Goodrich’s exemption claim objection.

On March 25, 2013, MD timely filed a notice of appeal from

the order denying its modification motion and from the order

disallowing its exemption claims. 

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A) and (B). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Did the bankruptcy court err when it disallowed MD’s

exemption claims?

2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion when it denied

MD’s modification motion?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the bankruptcy court's interpretation of 

state exemption laws, as well as its interpretation of the

Bankruptcy Code. See Hopkins v. Cerchione (In re Cerchione),

414 B.R. 540, 545 (9th Cir. BAP 2009). Under the de novo

standard of review, "we consider a matter anew, as if no decision

had been rendered previously." Mele v. Mele (In re Mele),

501 B.R. 357, 362 (9th Cir. BAP 2013).

In substance, MD’s modification motion was a motion under

Rule 9023 seeking to alter or amend the court’s exemption claim

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disallowance order. We review the denial of that motion for an

abuse of discretion. In re Cerchione, 414 B.R. at 545. A

bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it identifies the

incorrect legal standard to apply, or if its factual findings are

illogical, implausible or without support in the record. See

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.2009)

(en banc).

DISCUSSION

The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates a bankruptcy

estate consisting of all of the debtor's property. See § 541;

Wolfe v. Jacobson (In re Jacobson), 676 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir.

2012); Gaughan v. Smith (In re Smith), 342 B.R. 801, 805 (9th

Cir. BAP 2006). The debtor may exempt property from the estate 

to the extent permitted by applicable law. See § 522(b);

In re Jacobson, 676 F.3d at 1198. Typically, the debtor's

entitlement to an exemption is determined based on the facts and

law as they existed at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy

filing. See In re Jacobson, 676 F.3d at 1199; Ford v. Konnoff

(In re Konnoff), 356 B.R. 201, 204-05 (9th Cir. BAP 2006). And

the trustee bears the burden of proof to establish that the

debtor is not entitled to the claimed exemption. See

In re Cerchione, 414 B.R. at 548-49.

The right to claim property as exempt from property of the

estate under § 522(b) is afforded only to “individual” debtors. 

See § 522(b)(1); Andrada Financing, LLC v. Humara Group, Inc.

(In re Andrada Financing, LLC), 2011 WL 3300983, at *1 n.3 (9th

Cir. BAP 2011). As one leading treatise states, “[s]ection

522(b)(1) allows individual debtors to claim property as exempt

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from the bankruptcy estate. Since individuals are distinct from

partnerships and corporations, those forms of enterprises are not

eligible to claim exemptions.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy

¶ 522.04[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.

2013) (footnotes omitted). Because MD, as a corporation, was not

entitled to claim exemptions under § 522(b), the bankruptcy court

correctly disallowed MD’s exemption claims.

Even if MD were entitled to claim exemptions under § 522(b),

the California statutes on which it relied in support of its

exemption claims did not grant MD any exemption rights. 

California has elected not to make available to its residents the 

federal bankruptcy exemptions set forth in § 522(d). 

In re Jacobson, 676 F.3d at 1198. Consequently, California

residents are limited to those exemptions permitted by California

law. See id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.130. 

The exemptions that California has granted to its residents

generally are found at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 703.140(b) and

704.010, et seq. See Garcia v. Orange Cnty's Credit Union

(In re Garcia), 451 B.R. 909, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d,

709 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2013); Sticka v. Applebaum

(In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 686 n.2 (9th Cir. BAP 2009);

see also Kono v. Meeker, 196 Cal.App.4th 81, 86 (2011) (“The

kinds and degrees of property exempt from levy are described in

sections 704.010 through 704.210.”). Here, MD did not attempt to

claim any exemptions under either Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§§ 703.140(b) or 704.010, et seq. Instead, it relied upon two

statutes from California’s Probate Code to support all of its

exemption claims.

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The first statute MD relied upon, Cal. Probate Code

§ 16335,5 generally concerns what the fiduciary of a trust or a

decedent’s estate is permitted to do and is required to do in

terms of allocating receipts and disbursements between principal

and income.

The second statute MD relied upon, Cal. Probate Code

§ 19324,6 deals with the allocation of debt between a trust and a

5Cal. Probate Code § 16335 provides in part as follows:

(a) In allocating receipts and disbursements to or

between principal and income, and with respect to any

other matter within the scope of this chapter, a

fiduciary:

(1) Shall administer a trust or decedent's estate in

accordance with the trust or the will, even if there is

a different provision in this chapter.

(2) May administer a trust or decedent's estate by the

exercise of a discretionary power of administration

given to the fiduciary by the trust or the will, even

if the exercise of the power produces a result

different from a result required or permitted by this

chapter, and no inference that the fiduciary has

improperly exercised the discretion arises from the

fact that the fiduciary has made an allocation contrary

to a provision of this chapter.

(3) Shall administer a trust or decedent's estate in

accordance with this chapter if the trust or the will

does not contain a different provision or does not give

the fiduciary a discretionary power of administration.

(4) Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to

principal to the extent that the trust or the will and

this chapter do not provide a rule for allocating the

receipt or disbursement to or between principal and

income.

6Cal. Probate Code § 19324 provides in part as follows:

(continued...)

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surviving spouse of the settlor. On their face, neither of these

statutes entitled MD to claim an exemption. California

6(...continued)

(a) The trustee, the personal representative, if any,

of a deceased settlor's probate estate, and the

surviving spouse may provide for allocation of debts by

agreement so long as the agreement substantially

protects the rights of other interested persons. The

trustee, the personal representative, or the spouse may

request and obtain court approval of the allocation

provided in the agreement.

(b) In the absence of an agreement, each debt subject

to allocation shall first be characterized by the court

as separate or community, in accordance with the laws

of the state applicable to marital dissolution

proceedings. Following that characterization, the debt

or debts shall be allocated as follows:

(1) Separate debts of either spouse shall be allocated

to that spouse's separate property assets, and

community debts shall be allocated to the spouses'

community property assets.

(2) If a separate property asset of either spouse is

subject to a secured debt that is characterized as that

spouse's separate debt, and the net equity in that

asset available to satisfy that secured debt is less

than that secured debt, the unsatisfied portion of that

secured debt shall be treated as an unsecured separate

debt of that spouse and allocated to the net value of

that spouse's other separate property assets.

(3) If the net value of either spouse's separate

property assets is less than that spouse's unsecured

separate debt or debts, the unsatisfied portion of the

debt or debts shall be allocated to the net value of

that spouse's one-half share of the community property

assets. If the net value of that spouse's one-half

share of the community property assets is less than

that spouse's unsatisfied unsecured separate debt or

debts, the remaining unsatisfied portion of the debt or

debts shall be allocated to the net value of the other

spouse's one-half share of the community property

assets.

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exemptions are exclusively the product of legislative enactment,

in the form of statutory exemption provisions, and courts

interpreting those provisions may not confer exemptions not

specifically provided for by statute. See Collect Access LLC v.

Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 483 B.R. 713, 724 (9th Cir. BAP

2012) (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 166 Cal.App.4th

Supp. 1, 8 (2008)); Kono, 196 Cal.App.4th at 86.

In order to claim an exemption, the debtor must state the

statutory basis for the exemption claim. See Schwab v. Reilly,

130 S.Ct. 2652, 2663 (2010) (indicating that the trustee and the

bankruptcy court are entitled to evaluate exemption claims based

on the statutory grounds stated in the debtor’s Schedule C);

9 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at ¶ 4003.02[1]. Because neither

Cal. Probate Code § 16335 nor Cal. Probate Code § 19324 confer

any exemption rights, neither statute provides any legal basis

for MD's exemption claims. This is another reason that we

conclude that the bankruptcy court correctly disallowed them. 

On appeal, MD reiterates the same procedural concerns it

raised in the bankruptcy court. First and foremost, MD contends

that Goodrich’s exemption claim objection was untimely filed,

citing § 521(a)(2)(A) and (B) and Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,

503 U.S. 638 (1992). But nothing in either § 521 or in Taylor

required the bankruptcy court to conclude that Goodrich’s

objection was untimely. Rule 4003(b) set the deadline for

objecting to MD’s exemption claims, and that deadline was 30 days

after the conclusion of the § 341(a) meeting of creditors or

30 days after the filing of any amendment to the debtor’s

schedules, whichever was later. See Rule 4003(b); Schwab,

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130 S.Ct. at 2658 (“Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require interested parties

to object to a debtor's claimed exemptions within 30 days after

the conclusion of the creditors' meeting held pursuant to

Rule 2003(a).”).

Here, MD filed its Schedule C on October 5, 2012, for the

first time attempting to claim its assets as exempt. And

Goodrich concluded the § 341(a) meeting of creditors on

November 6, 2012. Under these facts, the deadline for Goodrich

to file his exemption claim objection was December 6, 2012

(30 days after conclusion of the § 341(a) meeting of creditors). 

Consequently, Goodrich’s exemption claim objection, filed on

November 28, 2012, was timely. Thus, MD’s contention regarding

the timeliness of the objection is meritless.7

MD also claims that Goodrich did not properly and timely

accept and qualify for his appointment as chapter 7 trustee, so

his exemption claim objection was invalid. According to MD,

Goodrich was required under § 322, within seven days of his

appointment, to do each of the following: (1) to file with the

court an individual bond covering his conduct in the case, and

(2) to file and serve notice of his acceptance of the

appointment. We disagree. Based on the Bankruptcy Rules

governing the acceptance and qualification of trustees, there was

7The fact that MD’s case had been converted from chapter 11

to chapter 7 does not change our analysis. Subject to a handful

of exceptions not applicable here, the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure explicitly provide for the commencement of a

new limitations period under Rule 4003(b) after a case has been

converted to chapter 7. See Rule 1019(2)(B).

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nothing improper or untimely about Goodrich’s acceptance and

qualification. More specifically, Rule 2010 permitted Goodrich

to post a blanket bond covering his trustee services in multiple

cases, and Rule 2008 did not require Goodrich to file or serve

anything before his appointment as trustee became effective. In

relevant part, Rule 2008 provides:

A trustee that has filed a blanket bond pursuant to

Rule 2010 and has been selected as trustee in a

chapter 7, chapter 12, or chapter 13 case that does not

notify the court and the United States trustee in

writing of rejection of the office within seven days

after receipt of notice of selection shall be deemed to

have accepted the office.

(Emphasis added.)

 Here, on July 30, 2012, the United States Trustee filed a

notice stating that Goodrich had been appointed to serve as

chapter 7 trustee and that the case was covered by a blanket bond

on file with the court. When Goodrich did not reject this

appointment in writing within seven days, his appointment as MD’s

chapter 7 trustee automatically became effective, per Rules 2008

and 2010.

Moreover, a notice of commencement of the chapter 7 case was

served on MD’s counsel on August 1, 2012. That notice identified

Goodrich as the case trustee. If MD had any genuine concern

regarding Goodrich’s selection, acceptance or qualification as

trustee, MD should have acted upon receipt of that notice. 

Instead, MD waited until Goodrich took actions in the case that

MD opposed and then attempted to invalidate those actions by

raising unfounded concerns regarding Goodrich’s qualification and

acceptance of his appointment as trustee.

Even if there had been some technical defect associated with

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Goodrich’s qualification and acceptance (there was not), it is

unlikely that such a defect would have justified the invalidation

of Goodrich’s filings and other official actions months after the

fact. See generally Granderson v. Carpenter (In re Granderson),

252 B.R. 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. BAP 2000) (holding that § 322 is not

jurisdictional and that untimely filing of trustee’s bond did not

invalidate trustee’s actions in chapter 7 case). To hold

otherwise would encourage debtors who disagree with legitimate

trustee activities to belatedly raise technical procedural

arguments regarding trustee appointment, qualification and

acceptance, at the expense of the proper, expeditious and

economical functioning of chapter 7 cases.

MD next argues that Goodrich’s counsel of record in this

case, rather than Goodrich himself, should have signed and filed

the exemption claim objection. According to MD, because 

Goodrich rather than his counsel signed and filed the objection,

the bankruptcy court should have struck the objection. We

disagree.

The chapter 7 trustee represents the interests of the

bankruptcy estate and has the authority to sue and be sued on

behalf of the estate. See § 323. Furthermore, the trustee is

obligated to conserve the estate’s assets and maximize the

distribution to the estate’s creditors. United States ex rel.

Block v. Aldrich (In re Rigden), 795 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir.

1986). In order to conserve estate assets and maximize creditor

recoveries, the trustee may appear in the bankruptcy court

without the assistance of counsel to represent the estate’s

interests. See generally In re Virissimo, 354 B.R. 284, 296-97

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(Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (discussing when trustee should be expected

to pursue routine bankruptcy court matters without the assistance

of counsel); In re Perkins, 244 B.R. 835, 844 (Bankr. D. Mont.

2000) (same). In fact, the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the

Central District of California state that “Routine objections to

exemption” are deemed by the court to be “‘trustee services’

subject to the limitation on compensation contained in 11 U.S.C.

§ 326(a).” C.D. Cal. Local Bankr. R. 2016-2(e)(2)(L). Thus, the

local rules indicate that the bankruptcy court typically

considers it unnecessary and inappropriate for the trustee to

utilize the assistance of counsel to make routine objections to

exemption claims. 

According to MD, once Goodrich retained counsel to represent

him in the bankruptcy case, only that counsel could properly file

the exemption claim objection on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. 

MD cited Rule 9011 to support this argument.8 We decline to

construe Rule 9011 as prohibiting bankruptcy trustees from

representing themselves in exemption claim objection proceedings

once they have retained general bankruptcy counsel. To do so

might unnecessarily increase estate costs at the expense of the

estate’s creditors. The principal purpose of Rule 9011 is to

discourage counsel and unrepresented litigants from filing

frivolous papers in the bankruptcy court or from filing papers

for improper purposes. See Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch),

8At times, MD actually referred to Rule 8011, but Rule 8011

has nothing to do with who must sign and file papers with the

bankruptcy court. Rule 8011 deals with motions filed in

bankruptcy appeals.

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36 F.3d 825, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1994). That purpose is not impeded

by permitting bankruptcy trustees to represent themselves in

appropriate bankruptcy matters, even when the trustees have

retained general bankruptcy counsel. Provided that the

bankruptcy trustee has signed the papers to be filed, as Goodrich

did here, the trustee has sufficiently complied with the

requirements of Rule 9011(a). By signing and filing such papers,

the trustee thereby certifies the propriety of the papers filed,

in accordance with Rule 9011(b), to the same extent as the

trustee’s counsel would have if counsel had signed the papers on

the trustee’s behalf.

At bottom, this argument is nothing more than another

attempt by MD to turn a spurious procedural defect into grounds

for invalidating the trustee’s meritorious exemption claim

objection. We are not persuaded that either Rule 9011 or any

other Rule or provision of the Bankruptcy Code required the

bankruptcy court to strike the objection.

The only other challenge to the exemption claim disallowance

order we can discern from MD’s opening appeal brief appears

substantive in nature. But that argument is difficult to follow

at best and incomprehensible at worst. As best we can make out,

MD’s representative, Peli, is arguing that either she or the

Trust is the true owner of most or all of MD’s assets. But this

argument does not support MD’s position in this appeal. Even if

we were to assume the truth and validity of Peli’s ownership

allegations, that would only serve to establish yet another

reason why the court properly disallowed MD’s exemption claims. 

On its face, § 522(b)(1) only permits an individual debtor to

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exempt property from his or her own bankruptcy estate. Thus, if

MD really has no ownership interest in the assets claimed as

exempt, then MD could not properly claim an exemption in them

under § 522(b)(1).

MD also challenges on appeal the bankruptcy court’s denial

of its modification motion. To establish grounds for amendment

or alteration of the exemption claim disallowance order, MD

needed to demonstrate one or more of the following: (1) that it

could present “newly discovered evidence that was not available

at the time of the original hearing,” (2) that the bankruptcy

court “committed clear error or made an initial decision that was

manifestly unjust,” or (3) that “there is an intervening change

in controlling law.” Fadel v. DCB United LLC (In re Fadel),

492 B.R. 1, 18 (9th Cir. BAP 2013).

Once again, MD’s arguments are difficult to follow. 

However, for the most part, MD attempted in its modification

motion to reargue the same points it argued in support of its

exemption claims. Rehashing arguments previously made and

rejected is neither appropriate nor sufficient to support a

motion to alter or amend a bankruptcy court’s judgment or order. 

See id.

For the first time in its modification motion, MD appears to

complain that Goodrich did not file a reply in support of his

exemption claim objection and chose to rest on the bankruptcy

court’s tentative ruling rather than orally argue in support of

his objection. MD also complains that the bankruptcy court

signed and entered Goodrich’s proposed form of order disallowing

MD’s exemption claims without waiting for the time period to

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expire under Local Bankruptcy Rule 9021-1(b)(3)(B), which permits

the adverse party an opportunity to object to the form of the

proposed order. 

But none of MD’s complaints about the procedures the

bankruptcy court utilized justified modification of the court’s

exemption claim disallowance order. The record establishes that

MD had a full and fair opportunity to present all of its

arguments in support of its exemption claims and that none of

these arguments had any merit. The record further establishes

that MD’s so-called objections to the form of Goodrich’s proposed

order were nothing more than an attempt to reargue the merits of

its exemption claims. Because no amount of additional response

time and no amount of additional briefing would have rendered

MD’s merits arguments any more valid or effective, any error of

the bankruptcy court concerning its hearing practices or

concerning its consideration of Goodrich’s proposed form of order

necessarily was harmless. And we must ignore harmless error. 

See Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 484 B.R. 344, 355 (9th

Cir. BAP 2012).

In sum, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the modification motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

court’s order sustaining Goodrich’s exemption claim objection,

and we also AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order denying MD’s

modification motion.

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