1

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Estrada CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARK ANTHONY ESTRADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165383

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. 464391)

Defendant Mark Estrada killed a Hayward police officer during a 2015

traffic stop. Several years later, Estrada pleaded no contest to one count of 

first degree murder and an accompanying firearm enhancement. Before 

judgment was entered, he unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea, and 

the trial court sentenced him to the stipulated term of 50 years to life in 

prison. 

On appeal, Estrada claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by not supporting or arguing his motion to withdraw the 

plea, thereby “abandon[ing] his defense at a critical portion of the case.” He 

also claims that the trial court erred by not fulfilling its promise to appoint 

another attorney to assist him with that motion or, alternatively, by failing to 

hold a Marsden hearing.

1 Finally, he claims that he made a prima facie 

1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
2

showing that the plea was coercive, based on his declaration that defense 

counsel pressured him to take the plea deal. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

The underlying facts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. Briefly, 

early on the morning of July 22, 2015, Hayward Police Sergeant Scott Lunger 

stopped a truck, later identified as Estrada’s father’s, that had been

“swerving all over the road.”2 A second police officer arrived in time to see 

Sergeant Lunger approach the truck. After Sergeant Lunger said, “[W]hoa, 

whoa, whoa,” the second officer heard a gunshot and saw the sergeant fall to 

the ground. Meanwhile, the truck drove away as the second officer chased 

after it on foot, shooting at it. 

Sergeant Lunger died from a gunshot wound to the face. Estrada, who 

was 21 years old and had also been shot, was soon apprehended. The gun 

used to kill Sergeant Lunger was recovered near the scene, and five cartridge 

casings fired from it were found in Estrada’s home. 

Two years later, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an 

information charging Estrada with one count of murder, with an

accompanying allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm causing death.3 Several special circumstances rendering Estrada

eligible for the death penalty and/or a sentence of life without the possibility 

2 The underlying facts are drawn from the preliminary hearing 

transcript, to which Estrada stipulated as the factual basis for the plea. 

3 The murder count was brought under Penal Code section 187, 

subdivision (a), and the firearm enhancement was alleged under Penal Code 

section 12022.53, subdivision (d). All further statutory references are to the 

Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
3

of parole (LWOP) based on the murder were also alleged.4 Finally, Estrada 

was charged with two felony counts related to his possession of the firearm.5 

After significant delays, including a mistrial declared in March 2020 

due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury selection began in December 2021.

6 On 

February 1, 2022, the parties notified the trial court that they had reached a 

plea agreement. Under the agreement, Estrada then pleaded no contest to 

one count of first degree murder and admitted the accompanying firearm 

allegation in exchange for a sentence of 50 years to life in prison, and the 

special circumstances and remaining charges were dismissed. 

On March 2, 2022, a few weeks before sentencing was to occur, the trial

court placed the matter on calendar at the request of Estrada’s trial counsel

(March 2 hearing). At the hearing, the court stated that it understood 

Estrada wanted to speak to it, and his counsel added, “And I think that he 

was also going to request through me that if the Court would possibly appoint 

a person—I don’t see grounds to withdraw the plea, but I would maybe

4 The special circumstances rendering Estrada death-eligible were 

alleged under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7) (murder of on-duty peace 

officer), (15) (murder by lying in wait), and (21) (drive-by murder). He was 

also alleged to be eligible for an LWOP sentence under section 190, 

subdivision (c), which applies to a defendant who commits second degree 

murder of a peace officer under specified circumstances.

5 The first charge was carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle under 

section 25400, subdivision (a)(1), with an allegation under subdivision (c)(6) 

of the statute that the firearm was unregistered and loaded. The second 

charge was carrying a loaded firearm in public under section 25850, 

subdivision (a), with an allegation under subdivision (c)(6) of the statute that 

the firearm was unregistered. 

6 The People initially sought the death penalty, and in 2020, Estrada 

filed two unsuccessful petitions for a writ of mandate in this court based on 

selection of a death-eligible jury for the trial that ended in a mistrial. 

(Estrada v. Superior Court of Alameda (Jun. 18, 2020, A160148); Estrada v. 

Superior Court of Alameda (Jan. 30, 2020, A159445).)
4

request that somebody be appointed in an abundance of caution to see if 

there’s grounds to withdraw the plea.” After Estrada confirmed that he 

“want[ed] the Court to appoint [him] a lawyer to look at the plea transcript to 

determine whether or not there’s sufficient grounds to set aside this plea,” 

the court agreed to “make an appointment. We’ll find out how we go about 

[it] to get someone from the bar to take a look at the plea transcript as well as 

talk to Mr. Estrada.” 

The record does not indicate that another attorney was appointed or 

otherwise became involved in helping Estrada move to withdraw the plea. 

Instead, about two weeks after the possibility of appointing another attorney 

was raised, Estrada’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea. The 

motion’s argument section stated only that a guilty plea could be set aside 

upon a showing of good cause, which exists “when the defendant 

demonstrates that he was operating under duress, to the extent that it 

overcame the exercise of his free judgment,” and asked the trial court to 

consider Estrada’s accompanying declaration giving “his reasons for entering 

the plea and allowing him to withdraw his plea.” 

In his declaration, Estrada stated that he always intended “to take the 

case to trial,” but he “felt pressured to take the deal” and “rushed” because 

his trial counsel gave him only a day to make the decision. He claimed that 

while he was deciding whether to take the deal, counsel “tried to get [him] to 

feel guilty about taking the case to trial, by talking about putting the victim’s 

family through a trial and having them look at pictures of the victim shot.” 

Estrada also averred that counsel “had an angry outburst” and threatened to 

“call [his] family and tell them that they were committing a criminal action 

by telling [him] not to take the plea.” After this, Estrada and his family were 

“afraid” of counsel, and he “felt pressured to take the plea.” Finally, he 
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“feared that [counsel] was not giving [him] the best defense” and “was not 

really going to do her best to defend [him],” based on certain evidentiary 

issues she identified and her statement “that she would [not] get paid more if

[they] took the case to [trial] than if [they] entered the no contest plea.” 

On March 28, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Estrada’s motion 

to withdraw the plea (March 28 hearing). The hearing primarily consisted of 

the court’s “voir diring [Estrada]” about the plea and his declaration. The 

court began by giving Estrada a copy of his plea form and confirming that he

had reviewed it with trial counsel, initialed it, and signed it. Estrada 

answered affirmatively when asked whether he “understood that form at the 

time [he] signed it.” The court also asked whether there was “anything 

[Estrada] want[ed] to add to [his] declaration,” and he responded, “No. 

Basically everything I wanted . . . to put is in [it].” 

Next, the trial court discussed at length the plea hearing and the 

history of the case, including the progress on jury selection made before the 

parties reached the plea agreement. In particular, Estrada agreed that he 

knew that because of his trial counsel’s advocacy, the punishment he faced 

had gone from the death penalty to LWOP to an indeterminate sentence with 

the possibility of being granted parole after 25 years. (See § 3051, subd. (b)

[parole for youthful offenders].) Estrada also confirmed that at the plea 

hearing he “accepted [his] responsibility and said what [he] did, and [he] said 

that [he] wanted to enter this plea under these circumstances and [he] was 

doing it without threats and without fear and free[ly] and voluntarily.” 

The trial court then addressed Estrada as follows: 

“I understand and I accept what you say in . . . your 

declaration. . . . I appreciate what you said, but I don’t think—

when I look at the paragraph about the issue of whether or not 

[defense counsel] was going to do the best job possible, she did the 

best job possible. There is no question in my mind. Under all the 
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factual circumstances of this case and all the cases I’ve done as a 

judge and as a lawyer, there’s no question that she worked hard 

for you and did everything she could to get you to this point and 

it was because of her work we got here.

“And so . . . the allegations . . . if she went to trial, she 

wouldn’t make any more money. That’s not ever a consideration, 

I think, with her. That’s not what she did. She’s here to do the 

best job possible, and she knows the consequences and the facts.

“So I say to you in terms of payments and the lack of 

commitment, she has always been committed to you, and I think 

by her good work—and I think you have to admit and 

acknowledge that the quality of her work and what she’s done in 

this case is tremendous. [¶] Would you not say that?”

Estrada agreed, stating that he “appreciate[d] . . . everything [his trial 

counsel had] done” on his behalf. Reiterating parts of his declaration, he 

stated that he wanted to go to trial “from the very beginning,” had “less than 

24 hours” to think about the plea deal after counsel informed him of it, and 

felt that counsel “pour[ed] guilt into [him]” by referring to the victim’s family 

in encouraging him to avoid trial. 

The trial court responded that it would not have accepted Estrada’s 

plea if it “had felt any reluctance on [his] behalf.” Though there were 

numerous jurors “very eager to serve,” the court “did what was required” and 

took his plea “based upon what was represented to [it], that this was a fair 

and negotiated disposition and that . . . it was done freely and voluntarily.” 

Addressing Estrada, the court concluded, “[L]ooking at you, your 

mannerism[s] . . . during the process, . . . there was nothing in this remotely 

that I felt under the circumstances [showed] that you were operating under 

any type of threat or fear or any factors that would . . . make me find that 

there was good cause with clear and convincing force that, in fact, your 

judgment was not free and voluntar[y] and that you’d done this by mistake or 
7

fear.” Thus, the court denied the motion to withdraw the plea for lack of good 

cause. 

In mid-April 2022, the trial court sentenced Estrada to 50 years to life 

in prison, composed of a term of 25 years to life for the murder and a 

consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. This appeal 

followed.7

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Estrada Was Not Completely Denied the Assistance of Counsel for 

Purposes of His Motion to Withdraw the Plea.

Estrada claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

stating at the March 2 hearing that she did not see grounds for a motion to 

withdraw the plea and “fail[ing] to argue the motion” at the March 28 

hearing. (Boldface omitted.) He contends that this amounted to “a complete 

denial of the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding and is 

reversible per se.” We are not persuaded.

A criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel 

under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 

section 15 of the California Constitution. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773.) 

Normally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” such that 

“counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ [constitutionally] guaranteed,” 

7 The trial court originally denied Estrada’s request for a certificate of 

probable cause to challenge the plea’s legality. Estrada responded by filing a 

petition for a writ of mandate in this court, which we dismissed as moot after 

the trial court reversed course and granted the certificate request. 

(Estrada v. Superior Court of Alameda (Sept. 7, 2022, A165625).)
8

and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland, at 

p. 687; People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674.) 

In People v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 (Cronic), the United States 

Supreme Court “ ‘recognized a narrow exception to’ the rule that a defendant 

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show prejudice.” (People v. 

Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 91.) Under Cronic, prejudice is presumed if the 

defendant was completely denied counsel “ ‘at a critical stage of the 

proceedings’ ” or if “ ‘counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case 

to meaningful adversarial testing. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Otherwise, 

‘specific errors and omissions’ by trial counsel must generally be litigated as 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland.” (People v. Banks

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1169–1170.)

Estrada attempts to analogize this case to United States v. Swanson

(9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070, in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

held that “defense counsel’s concession, during closing argument, that no 

reasonable doubt exist[ed] regarding the only factual issues in dispute” was 

reversible per se under Cronic. (Swanson, at pp. 1071, 1074.) Although 

recognizing that his trial counsel “didn’t abandon [his] entire defense,” 

Estrada claims she “abandoned his defense at a critical portion of the case.” 

We disagree that defense counsel’s conduct amounted to a complete 

denial of counsel for purposes of the motion to withdraw the plea. Defense 

counsel not only requested a hearing once Estrada expressed his desire to 

withdraw the plea, she also filed a formal motion to withdraw the plea that 

contained his position. And contrary to Estrada’s claim otherwise, she did 

not “decline[] to argue [the] motion” at the March 28 hearing. In fact, the

trial court did not ask either her or the prosecutor to argue, instead focusing 

the hearing on its own questioning of Estrada. Thus, counsel aided Estrada 
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in presenting his position to the court, and her performance hardly amounted 

to a complete denial of counsel. 

Having failed to show that prejudice should be presumed under Cronic, 

Estrada does not argue that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or

prejudicial under Strickland. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel fails. (See People v. Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) 

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Appointing Substitute 

Counsel for a Limited Purpose, and Any Error in the Failure to 

Hold a Marsden Hearing Was Harmless.

Estrada also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by 

failing to appoint another attorney to assist him with his motion to withdraw 

the plea. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to a remand for a 

Marsden hearing. Neither contention is persuasive.

In Marsden, our state Supreme Court held that the constitutional right 

to effective assistance of counsel “encompasses the right to have . . . courtappointed counsel discharged and replaced by another one when the 

‘ “ ‘failure to do so would substantially impair or deny the right’ ” ’ to 

assistance of counsel.” (People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1178.) 

A defendant who wants new counsel is not required to make a formal motion, 

but “need only clearly indicate to the trial court ‘in some manner’ ” that “the 

discharge and replacement of the appointed counsel” is desired. (Ibid.) If a 

defendant seeks new counsel under Marsden, “ ‘the trial court must permit 

the defendant to explain the basis of [the] contention and to relate specific 

instances of inadequate performance. A defendant is entitled to relief if the 

record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate 

representation or that [the] defendant and counsel have become embroiled in 

such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to 

result.’ ” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.)
10

Particularly relevant here is People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80

(Sanchez), which addressed when “a trial court is obligated to conduct a 

hearing on whether to discharge counsel and appoint new counsel when a 

criminal defendant indicates a desire to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea 

on the ground that current counsel has provided ineffective assistance.” (Id.

at pp. 83–84.) In Sanchez, after the defendant pleaded guilty, his public 

defender “told the trial court that [the] defendant ‘wishe[d] to have the Public 

Defender explore having his plea withdrawn.’ ” (Id. at pp. 84–85.) The court 

asked whether the public defender could do that or whether the court needed 

to appoint conflict counsel, and the public defender asked for more time “ ‘to 

check out any issues for possible withdrawal.’ ” (Id. at p. 85.) At the next 

hearing, another public defender told the court “that conflict counsel needed 

to be appointed,” and the court responded by “ ‘appoint[ing] conflict counsel 

for the sole purpose of looking into the motion to withdraw [the defendant’s] 

plea.’ ” (Ibid.) Conflict counsel concluded there was no basis for withdrawing 

the plea, and sentencing proceeded with the defendant’s original counsel 

representing him. (Id. at pp. 85–86.) 

Sanchez held that a trial court must hold a Marsden hearing in 

response to a defendant’s desire to withdraw a plea based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel “only when there is at least some clear indication by the 

defendant, either personally or through counsel, that the defendant wants a 

substitute attorney.” (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 84.) The Supreme 

Court determined that the defendant before it satisfied this standard because 

“through counsel, [he] requested that a ‘conflict’ or substitute attorney be 

appointed immediately, and the obvious implicit ground for that request was 

the incompetency of [his] currently appointed counsel.” (Id. at p. 91.) In 

turn, the trial court erred by “appoint[ing] substitute counsel to represent 
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[the] defendant on a motion to withdraw his plea in lieu of conducting a 

Marsden hearing—in effect, granting [his] Marsden motion without 

conducting the required hearing.” (Id. at p. 92.) The Supreme Court 

“specifically disapprove[d] of the procedure of appointing substitute or 

‘conflict’ counsel solely to evaluate a defendant’s complaint that [the 

defendant’s] attorney acted incompetently with respect to advice regarding 

the entry of a . . . plea,” emphasizing that “substitute counsel must be 

appointed as attorney of record for all purposes.” (Id. at p. 84.) The Court 

concluded that the failure to hold a Marsden hearing was prejudicial and a

remand for such a hearing was required. (Sanchez, at pp. 92–93.)

In his opening brief, Estrada argued that the trial court erred by failing 

to appoint a new attorney to represent him for purposes of filing and arguing 

a motion to withdraw the plea. He did not cite Sanchez, which the Attorney 

General raised for the first time in the respondent’s brief. As that decision

makes clear, courts should not appoint substitute counsel solely “ ‘to 

investigate or evaluate [a] defendant’s proposed . . . plea withdrawal 

motion.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 89.) Thus, although the trial

court indicated it would appoint new counsel to assist Estrada with a motion 

to withdraw the plea, it did not err by failing to do so.

In his reply brief, Estrada argues that it is “irrelevant” whether the 

trial court had “authority [under Sanchez] to make a limited appointment” 

because the court did not intend to appoint substitute counsel “for the limited 

purpose[] of determining whether there were grounds to withdraw the plea.” 

Estrada appears to claim that the proposed appointment was not for a 

limited purpose because the court indicated that substitute counsel would not

only evaluate potential grounds for a motion to withdraw the plea but also 

argue the motion on his behalf. But under Sanchez, “substitute counsel must 
12

be appointed as attorney of record for all purposes.” (Sanchez, supra, 

53 Cal.4th at p. 84, italics added.) The record contains no evidence that the 

court contemplated that Estrada’s trial counsel would be discharged and new 

counsel would represent him for all purposes going forward. Indeed, as 

Estrada recognizes elsewhere in his brief, the court specifically stated at the 

March 2 hearing that it was “not going to appoint a [substitute] lawyer for 

the sentencing in this matter.” 

The question then becomes whether the trial court erred by failing to 

hold a Marsden hearing in response to a “clear indication” by Estrada that he 

wanted a substitute attorney. (Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 84.) Sanchez

concluded that the defendant clearly indicated his desire for a substitute 

attorney because his public defender asked that conflict counsel be appointed 

to evaluate a motion to withdraw the plea. (Id. at pp. 84–85, 91.) Likewise,

at the March 2 hearing, Estrada’s trial counsel requested the appointment of 

conflict counsel to evaluate a motion to withdraw the plea. Under Sanchez, 

this was sufficient to trigger a Marsden hearing.

Nonetheless, we disagree with Estrada that a remand for a Marsden

hearing is required. Unlike in Sanchez, here the trial court did not follow 

through on its promise to appoint substitute counsel for a limited purpose, 

and Estrada’s trial counsel ultimately filed the motion to withdraw the plea 

on his behalf. But Estrada never objected to the court’s failure to appoint a 

substitute attorney or suggested he was dissatisfied with counsel’s assistance 

in filing the motion. Indeed, at the March 28 hearing he agreed that her

work had been “tremendous,” and he said he “appreciate[d] . . . everything 

she ha[d] done for [him].” Thus, even if he wanted substitute counsel on 

March 2, by March 28 he had abandoned that position. As a result, his 

current request for a Marsden hearing is forfeited. 
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In any case, we agree with the Attorney General that any error in the 

failure to hold a Marsden hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 

because the trial court would have denied Estrada’s motion to withdraw the 

plea even if substitute counsel was appointed. (See Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126; People v. Winn

(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 871.) Through his declaration, which contained 

“everything” he wanted to say, Estrada had a full opportunity to present his 

reasons for wanting to withdraw the plea. The court did not find the

declaration credible, however, and it denied the motion based on its 

observations of Estrada at the plea hearing and knowledge of his trial

counsel’s performance. There is no indication that the outcome would have 

changed had Estrada been represented by a different attorney, and he does

not argue otherwise. In short, he is not entitled to relief based on the fact 

that substitute counsel was never appointed.

C. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Credit Estrada’s

Declaration.

Finally, Estrada contends that his declaration “state[d] a prima facie 

case” that he was coerced into entering the plea, based on his claim that his 

trial counsel threatened to accuse his family members of a crime if he did not 

take the plea deal. He argues that because counsel did not deny making this 

threat, his statement was “uncontradicted and the trial court had to accept it 

as true.” This claim is meritless.

Although Estrada does not frame it as such, his claim is effectively that 

the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw the plea. Under 

section 1018, a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea before 

judgment “for a good cause shown.” For good cause to exist, there must be

“clear and convincing evidence that [the defendant] was operating under 

mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of . . . free 
14

judgment, including inadvertence, fraud, or duress.” (People v. Breslin (2012) 

205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.) We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a 

plea for an abuse of discretion, and we “must adopt the trial court’s factual 

findings if substantial evidence supports them.” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 

16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)

Even if the alleged threats to Estrada’s family otherwise established

good cause to withdraw the plea, the trial court was not required to credit 

Estrada’s declaration. “It is up to the trial court to determine whether [a]

defendant’s assertion is credible, and the court may reject an assertion that is 

not supported by an explanation or other corroborating circumstances.” 

(People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 565.) In other words,

uncontradicted evidence is not necessarily credible evidence.8 

In any case, Estrada’s declaration was contradicted—by his own 

statements before entering the plea. As the Attorney General points out, 

“[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,” 

meaning that Estrada’s representations at the plea hearing are “a formidable 

barrier” to obtaining relief. (Blackledge v. Allison (1977) 431 U.S. 63, 74.) At 

that hearing, Estrada agreed that he was “entering this plea free[ly] and 

voluntarily,” and he denied that “anybody threatened [him] to get [him] to 

enter this plea today.” Moreover, in denying Estrada’s motion to withdraw 

the plea, the trial court relied on its own observations of Estrada, noting that 

8 In his reply brief, Estrada claims that his declaration was 

corroborated because by filing it, his trial counsel implicitly certified that it 

had “evidentiary support” under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, 

subdivision (b)(3). He also claims that counsel’s certification under that 

statute triggered an “affirmative duty” on the Attorney General’s part to 

disclose evidence supporting his declaration. Since Estrada did not raise 

these arguments in his opening brief, we decline to consider them. (See 

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 872, fn. 11.)
15

his demeanor did not “remotely” suggest that he was “operating under any 

type of threat or fear.” Combined with Estrada’s statements at the plea 

hearing, these observations constituted substantial evidence that the plea 

was not entered under duress. The court did not err by denying the motion to 

withdraw the plea.

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, J.

_________________________

Bowen, J.*

*Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.

People v. Estrada A165383