PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 000130 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 November 3, 2000 

HOMER D. MONTAGUE 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the felony-murder 

statute applies to the facts of this case. 

I 

 Tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of 

Richmond, Homer D. Montague was convicted of felony murder in 

violation of Code § 18.2-33.∗ The trial court sentenced Montague 

to imprisonment for 15 years, with seven years suspended. 

Montague appealed his felony-murder conviction to the Court of 

Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded 

the case. Montague v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 187, 522 S.E.2d 

379 (1999). We awarded the Commonwealth this appeal. 

II 

 The facts are undisputed. On August 23, 1997, between 

11:00 a.m. and noon, Leslie Louick parked her red 1991 Dodge 

Shadow automobile in the City of Richmond, on Grayland Avenue, 

 ∗

 Montague also was convicted of grand larceny and of 

eluding the police for which he received sentences of three 

years' imprisonment, with two years suspended, and 12 months in 

jail, with six months suspended, respectively. 
near Boulevard. The following day, around noon, Louick 

discovered that her car had been stolen. During the daytime on 

August 24, a witness saw Montague driving Louick's car in the 

Jackson Ward area of the City. 

 On the evening of August 24, Richmond City police officers 

set up a routine traffic checkpoint on the Fourth Street Bridge. 

Officer Chester Roberts, Jr., was authorized to operate the 

southbound chase car and to pursue any vehicles that attempted 

to evade the checkpoint. 

 Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Officer Roberts saw two 

automobiles approach the bridge from the south. One car was a 

large sedan. The other car was Louick's, driven by Montague. 

The two cars had traveled approximately 100 feet onto the bridge 

when each made an illegal U-turn across double yellow lines and 

headed south. 

 Officer Roberts immediately activated his vehicle's 

emergency lights and siren and pursued the fleeing cars. At an 

intersection, the sedan turned left, and the car driven by 

Montague continued forward. The officer pursued Montague into 

the Gilpin Court neighborhood. 

 After Montague entered Gilpin Court, Roberts saw the car's 

illuminated brake lights. Roberts also could see and hear that 

the car was skidding as Montague was attempting to negotiate a 

left turn onto St. Paul Street. Montague failed to make the 

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turn, and the car traveled over the curb and struck ten-year-old 

Antoine Lamont Lewis, who was riding his bicycle on the 

sidewalk. 

 Montague exited the car and ran, and another police officer 

apprehended him less than a block away. Montague later gave a 

statement to Officer Roberts in which he admitted that he was 

the driver of Louick's car and that he had stolen it. 

 Antoine Lewis died at the Medical College of Virginia 

Hospitals. His death was the result of trauma to his brain 

caused by the collision. 

III 

 Code § 18.2-33 provides that "[t]he killing of one 

accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, while in 

the prosecution of some felonious act other than those specified 

in §§ 18.2-31 and 18.2-32, is murder of the second degree." The 

felony-murder doctrine originated at common law and, when 

supported by the evidence, operates to elevate to second-degree 

murder a homicide committed during the commission of a felony by 

imputing malice to the killing. F.P. Heacock v. Commonwealth, 

228 Va. 397, 403, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1984); Wooden v. 

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981). 

 Although the homicide in the present case did not occur 

until at least eleven hours after the grand larceny was 

completed, the Commonwealth contends that the felony-murder 

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statute applies. The Commonwealth asserts that Montague's 

flight from police in an effort to avoid detection of his crime 

established a causal connection between the larceny and the 

homicide. 

 Montague contends, on the other hand, that the felonymurder statute does not apply because the homicide and the 

underlying felony "were widely and distinctly separated in time, 

distance and continuity of action, and were not parts of the 

same criminal enterprise." Montague relies mainly on our 

decisions in Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500, 237 S.E.2d 797 

(1977), and Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 

477 (1978). 

 In Doane, the defendant, who was charged with felony 

murder, had stolen an automobile in the City of Richmond around 

noon on July 7, 1976. The following day, around 6:15 p.m., the 

defendant, while operating the stolen car, ran a stop sign and 

killed a passenger in another vehicle. The accident occurred in 

Smyth County, approximately 280 miles from the City of Richmond. 

218 Va. at 501, 237 S.E.2d at 798. The Commonwealth contended 

that larceny is a continuing offense, and, therefore, the 

homicide occurred during the commission of a felony. The trial 

court agreed and convicted the defendant of second-degree 

murder. Id. at 501-02, 237 S.E.2d at 798. We, however, 

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reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 503, 237 

S.E.2d at 799. 

 We noted, in Doane, that "[t]he concept of larceny as a 

continuing offense is a fiction of the common law, . . . which 

allows a thief who steals within a jurisdiction to be tried for 

the offense in any venue of that jurisdiction to which he 

transports, or wherein he possesses, the fruits of the larceny." 

Id. at 502, 237 S.E.2d at 798. Although we recognize this legal 

fiction in support of venue considerations, we declined, in 

Doane, to extend the fiction to satisfy the requirements of the 

felony-murder statute. Id. 

 We also said, in Doane, that, without the benefit of the 

fiction, there was "neither a showing of causal relationship nor 

a showing of nexus between the larceny . . . and the accidental 

killing." Id. We further stated, however, that we would defer 

to another day the issue "[w]hether that showing must be one of 

causal relationship, or whether a showing of mere nexus will 

suffice." Id. at 502-03, 237 S.E.2d at 798-99. 

 Approximately six months after the Doane decision, we 

decided Haskell, another felony-murder case. In Haskell, the 

three defendants and their companion attacked, beat, and 

searched an intoxicated sailor in an attempt to rob him. When 

the defendants and their companion discovered that the sailor 

had no money, they tried to leave in their automobile. The 

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beaten sailor, however, sought to prevent his assailants' 

escape, and, during a scuffle, the defendants' companion shot 

and killed the sailor. 218 Va. at 1036-37, 243 S.E.2d at 478-

79. The defendants contended that, as a matter of law, the 

homicide did not occur during the commission of a felony because 

the attempt to rob had been abandoned by them before the 

altercation between their companion and the sailor ended in the 

fatal shooting. Id. at 1039, 243 S.E.2d at 480. 

 In Haskell, we affirmed the three defendants' convictions 

for felony murder. In doing so, we adopted the so-called res

gestae rule, which represents the prevailing view among other 

jurisdictions. The rule provides that "the felony-murder 

statute applies where the killing is so closely related to the 

felony in time, place, and causal connection as to make it a 

part of the same criminal enterprise." Id. at 1043-44, 243 

S.E.2d at 483. We found, in Haskell, that the killing of the 

sailor was closely related in time, place, and causal connection 

to the attempted robbery of him, and, therefore, the underlying 

felony and the homicide were parts of the same criminal 

enterprise. Id. at 1043, 243 S.E.2d at 483. 

 It is important to note that the required elements of the 

rule, i.e., time, place, and causal connection, are stated in 

the conjunctive. Therefore, all three elements must be 

established for the felony-murder statute to apply. 

6
 In the present case, the grand larceny occurred at least 

eleven hours before the homicide. Thus, we agree with the Court 

of Appeals' conclusion that "the accidental killing of the 

victim was not related in time to the larceny." 31 Va. App. at 

192, 522 S.E.2d at 381-82. We also conclude that the place 

element has not been established as the larceny and the homicide 

transpired in different parts of the City, and Montague had been 

seen driving Louick's car in still another part of the City in 

the interim. We hold, therefore, that the grand larceny and the 

homicide were not parts of the same criminal enterprise as 

required by the res gestae rule and that the felony-murder 

statute does not apply to the facts of this case. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Affirmed. 

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