SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3995-22 

PETER and NITA ROSE, 

on behalf of themselves and 

all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

SHORE CUSTOM HOMES 

CORP., 

Defendant, 

and 

VINCENT SIMONELLI, 

and DREAM HOMES & 

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

Submitted August 27, 2024 – Decided September 3, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-1428-22.

_______________________________

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3995-22

Lueddeke Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Ronald 

L. Lueddeke, on the brief). 

Vito C. DeMaio, attorney for respondents. 

PER CURIAM 

 Plaintiffs Peter and Nita Rose appeal from the Law Division's June 19, 

2023 order compelling arbitration of their individual contractual and statutory 

claims against defendants Vincent Simonelli and Dream Homes and 

Development Corporation (Dream Homes), as well as the July 21, 2023, and 

August 25, 2023 orders denying plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration.1 We 

affirm. 

 Plaintiffs entered into an "Addition/Renovation C[ontract]" (Contract) 

with Shore Custom Homes Corp. (Shore Custom) to raise, renovate, and build 

an addition on their property located in Bayville for a total cost of $314,800.2 

1

 Plaintiffs also asserted putative class action claims against defendants that 

were bifurcated by the trial court and excluded from the June 19, 2023 order 

compelling arbitration. The parties did not appeal from that aspect of the June 

19 order. Accordingly, the arbitrability of plaintiffs' class action claims is not 

before us. 

2

 Shore Custom is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dream Homes. Shore 

Custom was dismissed from the case after it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 

protection. 
3 A-3995-22

The Contract contains a provision entitled "Contact and Warranty Disputes" 

that provides: 

In the event any dispute arises between the parties and 

the dispute is not resolved within thirty (30) business 

days, [plaintiffs] agree[] to submit resolution of the 

dispute(s) to [b]inding [a]rbitration as administered by 

the American Arbitration [Association], and to be 

bound by the Rules and Regulations as promulgated 

by the American Arbitration [Association]. 

[Plaintiffs] specifically agree[] that any disputes shall 

be determined by arbitration and shall not be 

otherwise litigated in a court of law. [Plaintiffs] 

agree[] to submit all unresolved disputes covered 

under the Homeowner's Warranty to the Homeowner's 

Warranty agency and agree[] to permit all necessary 

work if warranted, to be performed by the 

Homeowner[']s Warranty agency before initiating any

further action against [Shore Homes]. Cost of 

arbitration will be paid for by the party who institutes 

arbitration. [Plaintiffs] specifically agree[] that no 

claims will be made under the Consumer Fraud Act 

unless there is a specific material breach by [Shore 

Homes] involving a default under this contract or 

failure to complete the scope of work. 

The Contract contains a provision entitled "Legal Representation" that 

provides, in relevant part: "[Plaintiffs] acknowledge[] that [plaintiffs have] the 

right at [plaintiffs'] cost and expense, to hire any lawyer to represent 

[plaintiffs'] interest[s] in this transaction." The Contract also contains a 

provision entitled "Attorney Review" that provides, in relevant part: "From 

the date of signing of this Agreement, the [plaintiffs] may cancel this contract 
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by midnight of the third day after receiving a copy of this contract, by 

registered or certified mail." 

 After disputes arose regarding Shore Custom's work under the Contract, 

plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division against Shore Custom and 

Simonelli alleging causes of action based on: (1) the New Jersey Consumer 

Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -227 (CFA); (2) fraud; (3) breach of contract; (4) 

breach of warranty; (5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; (6) breach of the implied covenant that work will be performed in a 

workmanlike manner; (7) negligence; and (8) unjust enrichment. 

 Shore Custom and Simonelli moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs 

opposed that motion and cross-moved to file a first amended complaint to add 

Dream Homes as a defendant and assert putative class action claims alleging 

violations of the CFA and the New Jersey Truth in Consumer Contract, 

Warranty and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -14-18 (TCCWNA). 

 On May 26, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the trial court granted

both motions in an oral opinion. The court determined, "there is an arbitration 

clause that binds the parties to arbitration. The [c]ourt does[ not] find that 

there[ is] anything unusual or unclear, anything that would be unconscionable 

about that clause." The court also found "these disputes were between two 
5 A-3995-22

competent knowing parties. That there was the opportunity . . . to have the 

[C]ontract reviewed by an attorney" and "[a]ttorney review says you have 

three days to cancel the contract if you do[ not] want to proceed." 

Based on defendants' representation that they would initiate the 

arbitration proceeding, the court "recognize[d] the obligation to pay for the 

arbitration, which will be paid for and file[d] by the defendant[s] . . . within 

[thirty] days . . . ." Finally, with the consent of defendants, the court 

bifurcated plaintiffs' class action claims from the claims the court determined 

were subject to the arbitration provision. On June 19, 2023, the court entered 

an order consistent with its May 26 opinion. 

 Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration arguing their CFA claims are not 

subject to arbitration because the Contract does not expressly provide for 

arbitration of statutory claims. On July 21, 2023, the court heard oral 

argument and denied plaintiffs' motion in an oral opinion. 

 Plaintiffs subsequently moved to extend discovery, vacate the court's 

June 19 order compelling arbitration, or, alternatively, for a stay pending 

appeal. Plaintiffs did not request oral argument. On August 25, 2023, the 

court entered an order extending discovery, denying plaintiffs' motion to 

vacate the June 19 order, and staying the arbitration for thirty days. 
6 A-3995-22

 As permitted by Rule 2:2-3(b)(8), plaintiffs appeal from the June 19, 

July 21, and August 25, 2023 orders to the extent they compelled arbitration of 

plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, plaintiffs contend: (1) the arbitration provision 

is defective because it does not clearly and unambiguously convey the rights 

being waived; (2) the arbitration provision is defective because it is 

unconscionable, goes against public policy, and contains multiple violations of 

the TCCWNA; and (3) there is no delegation clause that would arguably give 

the arbitrator authority to resolve issues of arbitrability. 

 We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's May 

26, 2023 oral opinion. We add the following comments. 

 The enforceability of an arbitration agreement is a question of law, 

which we review de novo. Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). 

"Similarly, the issue of whether parties have agreed to arbitrate is a question of 

law that is reviewed de novo." Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP, 441 N.J. 

Super. 464, 472 (App. Div. 2015). Thus, we exercise de novo review of a trial 

court's order compelling arbitration. Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 

191, 207 (2019). "[I]n reviewing such orders, we are mindful of the strong 

preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal 

level." Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013). That 
7 A-3995-22

preference, "however, is not without limits." Garfinkel v. Morristown 

Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001). 

Arbitration agreements are subject to customary contract law principles. 

Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014). A valid and 

enforceable agreement requires: (1) consideration; (2) a meeting of the minds 

based on a common understanding of the contract terms; and (3) unambiguous 

assent. Id. at 442-45. Consequently, to be enforceable, the terms of an 

arbitration agreement must be clear, and any legal rights being waived must be 

identified. Id. at 442-43; see also Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., 

Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 319-20 (2019). "[C]ontract terms should be given their 

plain and ordinary meaning." Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 321. 

Plaintiffs' contention that the arbitration provision is defective because it 

fails to convey a waiver of the right to bring suit in court is not persuasive. 

"No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and 

unambiguous waiver of rights." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444. If, "at least in some 

general and sufficiently broad way," the language of the clause conveys that 

arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum, the clause 

will be enforced. Id. at 447; see also Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 
8 A-3995-22

289, 309 (2016) ("No magical language is required to accomplish a waiver of 

rights in an arbitration agreement."). 

Here, the Contract provides, "[i]n the event any dispute arises between 

the parties . . . [plaintiffs] agree[] to submit resolution of the dispute(s) to 

[b]inding [a]rbitration as administered by the American Arbitration 

[Association]" and "be bound by the Rules and Regulations as promulgated by 

the American Arbitration [Association]." The Contract further provides, 

"[plaintiffs] specifically agree[] that any disputes shall be determined by 

arbitration and shall not be otherwise litigated in a court of law." 

We agree with the trial court that this arbitration provision meets the 

standards of Atalese and its progeny. The provision clearly and 

unambiguously evidences a waiver of plaintiffs' right to pursue any claims 

against defendants in a judicial forum and obligates plaintiffs to resolve their 

claims through arbitration. 

Plaintiffs' contention that the arbitration provision does not encompass 

their CFA claims is likewise unconvincing. "[I]t is well-established that CFA 

claims may be the subject of arbitration and need not be exclusively presented 

in a judicial forum." Curtis v. Cellco P'ship, 413 N.J. Super. 26, 37 (App. Div. 

2010). "Arbitration of statutory claims is enforceable when the contract 
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provisions . . . contain language reflecting a general understanding of the type 

of claims included in the waiver[.]" Id. at 35-36. An arbitration clause need 

not "identify the specific constitutional or statutory right . . . that is waived by 

agreeing to arbitration." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447.

The arbitration provision in Curtis provided that the parties agreed to 

submit "any controversy or claim arising out of or related to [the parties] 

agreement," and defined the subject claims to include any "statutory right for 

reimbursement of attorney's fees." Curtis, 413 N.J. Super. at 37. We 

concluded that contractual language was sufficient to encompass CFA claims 

because it "reflect[ed] a willingness to arbitrate all claims, contractual, as well 

as statutory . . . ." Id. at 39. 

 Here, the arbitration provision extends to "any disputes" between the 

parties. Moreover, the provision specifically references the CFA, providing, 

"no claims will be made under the [CFA] unless there is a specific material 

breach . . . involving a default under this contract or failure to complete the 

scope of work." Given the broad language of the arbitration agreement and the 

specific reference to claims asserted under the CFA, we are satisfied the court 

correctly determined the arbitration agreement reflects a willingness to 

arbitrate all claims, including CFA claims. 
10 A-3995-22

 Plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration provision is unconscionable lacks 

merit. Plaintiffs' contention that the provision violates the CFA and the 

TCCWNA because it improperly shifts the "[c]ost of arbitration" to "the party 

who institutes arbitration" is moot. Defendants agreed they will institute 

arbitration and, based on that representation, the court ordered defendants to 

do so and pay the costs as required by the Contract. 

 Plaintiffs' claim that they are precluded from pursuing CFA claims based 

on the Home Improvement Practices regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2 (HIP 

regulations) or the Contractor's Registration Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-136 to -152 

(CRA) is unavailing. Nothing in the Contract prohibits such claims. The 

Contract provides "no claims will be made under the [CFA] unless there is a 

specific material breach . . . involving a default under this contract or failure to 

complete the scope of work." Plaintiffs satisfied that condition because they 

allege material breaches involving a default under the Contract and failure to 

complete the scope of work. Therefore, based on the plain terms of the 

Contract, plaintiffs are free to assert all manner of CFA claims, including 

claims based on the HIP regulations or the CRA.3

3

 Defendants concede plaintiffs satisfied the condition set forth in the Contract 

and may assert CFA claims without limitation. 
11 A-3995-22

 Plaintiffs' reliance on our recent decision in Achey v. Cellco Partnership, 

475 N.J. Super. 446 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 255 N.J. 286 (2023), is 

misplaced. Achey involved a customer agreement that was a "contract of 

adhesion . . . 'presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis . . . without opportunity 

for the "adhering" party to negotiate.'" Id. at 455 (second omission in 

original). Under those circumstances, we concluded the "'cumulative effect' 

of . . . various unconscionable terms render[ed] the arbitration agreement 

'unenforceable for lack of mutual assent.'" Id. at 459. 

 The Contract in this case is not a contract of adhesion. Plaintiffs entered 

into an agreement with Shore Custom for substantial renovations to their 

property. The Contract was not presented to them on a "take-it-or-leave-it 

basis." Plaintiffs selected Shore Custom to do the work, had the express right 

under the Contract to retain counsel to review and negotiate the terms of the 

Contract, and had the right to cancel the Contract within three days. Even if 

plaintiffs could demonstrate that their statutory rights were impaired, which 

they cannot, there would be no basis to find the arbitration agreement 

unenforceable under the circumstances of this case.

 Finally, plaintiffs' claim that the arbitration agreement is not enforceable 

because it does not contain a "delegation" clause is incorrect. "Parties to an 
12 A-3995-22

arbitration agreement can agree to delegate to an arbitrator the issue of 

whether they agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute." Morgan, 225 N.J. at 

303. Absent a delegation clause, "the decision whether the parties agreed to 

arbitration . . . is for a court to resolve." Id. at 295-96. Here, the Contract 

does not contain a delegation clause and, as a result, the court decided whether 

the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration. 

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiffs' remaining 

arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.