NO. 18-50646

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________________________________________________

CITY OF AUSTIN,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS;

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION,

Defendants – Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________

Appeal from Cause No. 1:17-CV-00843-SS

In the United States District Court, Western District of Texas

Honorable Sam Sparks, Presiding

__________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLEE CITY OF AUSTIN

__________________________________________________________________

ANNE L. MORGAN, City Attorney

MEGHAN L. RILEY, Chief, Litigation 

PATRICIA L. LINK, Assistant City Attorney

State Bar No. 24041343

HANNAH M. VAHL

State Bar No. 24082377

City of Austin Law Department

P. O. Box 1546

Austin, Texas 78767-1546

Telephone: (512) 974-2173

Facsimile: (512) 974-1311

patricia.link@austintexas.gov

ATTORNEYS FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons 

and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the 

outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this 

Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

Plaintiff-Appellee:

City of Austin

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee:

Anne L. Morgan

Meghan L. Riley

Patricia L. Link (lead counsel)

Hannah M. Vahl

City of Austin Law Department

Defendants-Appellants:

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the 

State of Texas

Texas Workforce Commission

Counsel for Defendants-Appellants:

Ken Paxton

Jeffrey C. Mateer

Kyle D. Hawkins

Lisa A. Bennett (lead counsel)

Adam N. Bitter

Office of the Attorney General

s/ Patricia L. Link

PATRICIA L. LINK

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RECORD CITATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

This brief uses the following abbreviations and record citations:

ROA ___ Record on appeal.

APX ___ Appendix.

AT Br ___ Brief of Appellant 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The City agrees that oral argument is appropriate in this case. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS.................................................. ii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT......................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................. vi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES .....................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...............................................................................1

I. Background......................................................................................................1

A. City of Austin Fair Housing Law.....................................................................1

B. Legislative Response........................................................................................3

C. Attorney General’s Litigation History Against the City..................................4

II. Procedural History...........................................................................................5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...............................................................................6

STANDARD OF REVIEW.....................................................................................6

ARGUMENT............................................................................................................6

A. The Attorney General has “some connection” to the enforcement of Section 

250.007. ...........................................................................................................7

1. The Attorney General demonstrates “some connection” through his conduct. .............. 8

2. Texas law establishes “some connection” between the Attorney General and Section 

250.007......................................................................................................................... 11

B. The City established the Attorney General’s demonstrated willingness to 

enforce. ..........................................................................................................12

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF..................................................14

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................16

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 

 851 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2017) .............................................................................6,7

Ex Parte Young, 

 209 U.S. 123 (1908).................................................................................... passim

Hamilton v. Foti, 

 372 F. App’x 480 (5th Cir. 2010)...................................................................9, 10

K.P. v. LeBlanc, 

 627 F.3d 115 (5th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................7

Morris v. Livingston, 

 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................9

Okpalobi v. Foster, 

 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................... 9, 10, 11

Paxton v. City of Austin, et al., 

 Travis County District Court, Case No. D-1-GN-16-003340 ...............................5

Pulliam, et al., v. City of Austin, et al., 

 Travis County District Court, Case No. D-1-GN-16-004307 ...............................5

Steffel v. Thompson, 

 415 U.S. 452 (1974)............................................................................................13

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

 573 U.S. 149 (2014).............................................................................................13

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Tex. Assoc. of Bus. et al., v. City of Austin, et al., 

 2018 WL 6005551 (Tex.App.—Austin, 2018)......................................... 8, 11, 14

Texas v. Travis County, Texas, 

 2017 WL 6550737 (C.A.5)....................................................................................8

Texas v. Travis County, Texas, 

 910 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2018) ..............................................................................5,8

Yu v. Perry, 

 82 F.App’x. 993 (5th Cir. 2003)...........................................................................9

Zaatari, et al., v. City of Austin, et al., 

 Travis County District Court, Case No. D-1-GN-16-002620 ............... 5, 8, 11,14

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1291........................................................................................................1

42 U.S.C. § 1437f (a).................................................................................................3

42 U.S.C. § 3615........................................................................................................1

Civil Practice and Remedies Code §37.006.............................................................14

Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 501.063 ...............................................................................9

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006(b)...............................................................11

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 250.007 ..................................................................... passim

Tex. Prop. Code §301.090 .......................................................................................12

Other

Texas S.B. 267, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).................................................................3, 4

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, pursuant to the 

collateral order doctrine. 

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Section 250.007 of the Texas Local Government Code prohibits a 

municipality, such as the City of Austin, from adopting or enforcing ordinances that 

outlaw housing discrimination based on the fact that the household receives federal 

housing assistance. Because Section 250.007 authorizes a discriminatory practice, it 

is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 3615. The issue presented by this appeal: the district 

court correctly ruled that Ex parte Young waives the Texas Attorney General’s 

immunity.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Background 

A. City of Austin Fair Housing Law

The City of Austin has a long-standing set of City Code provisions that 

prohibit housing discrimination. Austin City Code Chapter 5-1 (Housing 

Discrimination) prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s race, national 

origin, religion, color, sex, familial status, disability, student status, marital status, 

sexual orientation, gender identity, age, or creed. ROA 97. The Austin Fair Housing 

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Office (FHO) administers Chapter 5-1, which is substantially equivalent to the 

federal Fair Housing Act with regard to substantive rights, procedures, remedies, 

and the availability of judicial review. ROA 97. The City’s FHO received its initial 

certification from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

in 1996 and has retained its certification since that time. ROA 97.

During April of 2014, the Austin City Council passed Resolution No. 

20140417-048 (“Resolution”) directing the City Manager to prepare an ordinance to 

amend the City Code to prohibit discrimination against an individual based on their 

source of income. ROA 98. The Resolution was approved in response to several 

factors, including recommendations from the City’s Community Development 

Commission; an Austin Tenants’ Council report concerning the acceptance of 

vouchers by landlord; and a report from HUD concerning the impact of prohibiting 

source of income discrimination. ROA 98. The Resolution also supported the City’s 

federally mandated effort to affirmatively further fair housing. ROA 98. 

Later that same year [2014], the Austin City Council passed Ordinance No. 

20141211-050 (“Ordinance”), which prohibits landlords from discriminating against 

a person in the provision of housing based on their source of income. ROA 98. The 

Ordinance defines “source of income” as “lawful, regular, and verifiable income 

including, but not limited to, housing vouchers and other subsidies provided by 

government and non-governmental entities, child support, or spousal maintenance, 

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but does not include future gifts.” ROA 98. The Ordinance does not require landlords 

to favor a person with a Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) over any other applicant; 

rather, the Ordinance simply prohibits a landlord from denying an otherwise 

qualified applicant because of their source of income. ROA 98. After the Austin City 

Council passed the Ordinance, the City notified HUD of the Ordinance. To date, 

HUD has not withdrawn the City’s substantial equivalency certification. ROA 98. 

B. Legislative Response

One week following the passage of the Ordinance, Texas Senator Charles 

Perry filed Texas S.B. 267, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015). Senate Bill 267 (“SB 267”), 

which sought to prohibit Texas cities from adopting or enforcing ordinances that 

prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s income that comes from a 

federal housing assistance program1

. ROA 99-100. On June 19, 2015, Governor 

Abbott signed into law SB 267. ROA 100. At the time SB 267 was signed into law, 

no other Texas city or county had enacted local protections for HCV holders. ROA 

100. 

1 Federal housing assistance program is commonly understood to mean the federal Housing Choice 

Voucher (HCV) Program (formerly known as “Section 8 Vouchers”), which was created for the 

purposes of “aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live” and “promoting 

economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (a). In 2014, the Housing Authority of the City 

of Austin (HACA) administered at least 5,000 vouchers, which in turn served over 14,000 

individuals. Of those individuals, approximately 58 percent were African-Americans and 41 

percent were white. Of those white individuals, 75 percent identified as Hispanic or Latino. ROA 

95.

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SB 267 was codified as Texas Local Government Code Section 250.007 

(“Regulation of Rental or Leasing of Housing Accommodations”), effective 

September 1, 2015. Section 250.007 provides:

(a) Except as provided by this section, a municipality or county may not 

adopt or enforce an ordinance or regulation that prohibits an owner, lessee, 

sublessee, assignee, managing agent, or other person having the right to 

lease, sublease, or rent a housing accommodation from refusing to lease or 

rent the housing accommodation to a person because the person's lawful 

source of income to pay rent includes funding from a federal housing 

assistance program.

(b) This section does not affect an ordinance or regulation that prohibits 

the refusal to lease or rent a housing accommodation to a military veteran 

because of the veteran's lawful source of income to pay rent.

(c) This section does not affect any authority of a municipality or county 

or decree to create or implement an incentive, contract commitment, 

density bonus, or other voluntary program designed to encourage the 

acceptance of a housing voucher directly or indirectly funded by the 

federal government, including a federal housing choice voucher.

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 250.007.

Section 250.007 limits the City’s ability to prohibit housing discrimination based on 

use of a HCV.

C. Attorney General’s Litigation History Against the City 

In 2017, the Texas Attorney General (Attorney General) sued the City of 

Austin and various other parties in an attempt to secure a pre-enforcement 

declaration that the law known as Senate Bill 4 (“SB 4”) is lawful. See Texas, et al., 

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v. Travis County, et al., 910 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2018). ROA 144. The Attorney 

General filed the suit before SB 4 went into effect. Texas, 910 F.3d at 811.

In 2016, the Attorney General filed pleas in intervention in two lawsuits filed 

by private parties. The first was Zaatari, et al., v. City of Austin, et al., Travis County 

District Court, Case No. D-1-GN-16-002620 (currently on appeal at the Third Court 

of Appeals, Case No. 03-17-00812-cv). Zaatari is a suit filed by individuals who are 

challenging the City’s short-term rental regulations. ROA 144; ROA 226, ll 12-19. 

The second was Pulliam, et al., v. City of Austin, et al., Travis County District Court, 

Case No. D-1-GN-16-004307, which relates to the City’s collective bargaining 

agreement with the Austin Firefighter’s Association. ROA 144. Also in 2016, the 

Attorney General filed suit against the City in relation to its weapon’s policy at City 

Hall. See Paxton v. City of Austin, et al., Travis County District Court, Case No. D1-GN-16-003340. ROA 144.

II. Procedural History

The City agrees that this interlocutory appeal is limited to the district court’s 

ruling on the Attorney General’s and the Texas Workforce Commission’s immunity. 

As it relates to the Attorney General, the district court’s analysis and ruling on this 

issue was correct and should be upheld. 

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Attorney General has some connection to enforcement because he acts to 

enforce the supremacy of state law, he intervenes in litigation against the City that 

involves the constitutionality and validity of state law and municipal ordinances, and 

lastly, he is able to prevent housing discrimination investigations that concern a 

landlord’s refusal to accept HCV. The Attorney General’s conduct demonstrates his 

willingness to enforce the supremacy of state law and waives his immunity. The 

district court’s decision is consistent with Ex parte Young and its progeny.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The City agrees that the standard of review in this appeal is de novo. 

ARGUMENT

A “straightforward inquiry” is used to determine whether Ex parte Young

waives a state official’s immunity. The “straightforward inquiry” does not “go 

beyond a threshold analysis.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of 

Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 517 (5th Cir. 2017). In this case, the district court 

made a straightforward inquiry and found that the Attorney General’s immunity is 

waived. 

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A. The Attorney General has “some connection” to the enforcement of Section 

250.007.

Ex parte Young waives the immunity for a state official who, because of his 

office, has some connection to the enforcement of the challenged act. Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). This Court has interpreted “some connection” to 

include “a specific means through which to apply” the law. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 851 

F.3d at 518. Whether Ex parte Young applies must be decided within the context of 

the complaint “including the challenged law and defendants.” Id., 851 F.3d at 519. 

Where the enforcement authority derives from is not relevant “so long as it exists.” 

K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 

at 157.). Moreover, enforcement encompasses direct enforcement and acts of 

“compulsion or constraint.” K.P., 627 F.3d at 122. The Attorney General easily 

possesses the requisite connection to the challenged law to make him a proper party 

defendant under Ex parte Young.

Looking at the context of this complaint and making a straightforward inquiry, 

the Attorney General is a state official with the ability to apply Section 250.007 to 

the City. In other words, if the City attempts to enforce its Ordinance, the Attorney 

General is authorized to enforce (or apply) Section 250.007 by filing its own lawsuit 

or intervening in a lawsuit filed against the City by private parties. Moreover, the 

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Texas Fair Housing Act (TFHA) grants the Attorney General authority interfere with 

housing discrimination investigations. The requisite connection exists. 

1. The Attorney General demonstrates “some connection” through his conduct. 

In recent years, the Attorney General has demonstrated his connection to the 

enforcement of state law against municipal ordinances and policies. See generally

Texas v. Travis County, Texas, 910 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2018); Zaatari, et al., v. City 

of Austin, et al., Case No. D-1-GN-16-002620, Travis County District Court, Aug. 

24, 2017, Second Amended Plea in Intervention of Texas. APX 1.); and Tex. Assoc. 

of Bus. et al., v. City of Austin, et al., 2018 WL 6005551 (Tex.App.—Austin, 2018).

2

APX 2. In these cases, he claimed that his general enforcement authority extends to 

enforcing the supremacy of state law over municipal ordinances.3 If the City 

attempts to enforce its Ordinance, the Attorney General will rely on his general 

enforcement authority to prevent the City from enforcing its Ordinance. ROA 241, 

ll 15-20; ROA 242, ll 10-12. For this reason, City is not similarly situated to an 

2 The ordinance that is subject of the Texas Association of Business lawsuit was adopted in 

February of 2018. Private parties filed a lawsuit against the City in April of 2018 and the 

Attorney General intervened in April of 2018. 

3 Additionally, in 2017, the Attorney General argued in its briefing that “Texas has an interest in 

its laws being enforced and being properly recognized by other governmental entities, including 

its political subdivisions.” Appellants’ Brief in Texas v. Travis County, Texas, 2017 WL 

6550737 (C.A.5), 36. APX 3.

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individual who sues an attorney general or governor4 because of their general 

responsibilities. As a result, the Attorney General’s reliance on Morris v. Livingston, 

739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014); Hamilton v. Foti, 372 F. App’x 480 (5th Cir. 2010); 

and Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) is misplaced.5

In Morris v. Livingston, the plaintiff, a state inmate, filed suit under §1983 

challenging the collection of a health care services fee from inmates under Section 

501.063 of the Texas Government Code. 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). This 

particular provision made “clear that the [Texas Department of Corrections and 

Justice] TDCJ is the agency responsible” for administering and enforcing the fee. 

Morris, 739 F.3d at 746. However, in Morris’ initial complaint, he named Governor 

Perry as a defendant and alleged that the Governor has a “guardian-ward 

relationship” with him. The district court, recognizing that a proper party existed per 

the statute, substituted in the executive director of the TDCJ, which this court upheld.

Morris, 739 F.3d at 745-746. Section 250.007 is not structured like Section 501.063 

of the Texas Government Code nor does identify a particular individual or agency 

charged with its enforcement, and as such, Morris is not determinative of whether 

the Attorney General is the proper defendant in this case. 

4 The Attorney General appears to equate the City’s complaint to the complaint filed by Inclusive 

Communities Project, Inc. (ICP) that challenged Section 250.007 and was filed against Governor 

Abbot. However, when considered in context, the City is not similarly situated to ICP nor is 

Governor Abbot similarly situated to the Attorney General. 

5 The Attorney General also relies on Yu v. Perry, 82 F. App’x. 993 (5th Cir. 2003); however, the 

lack of factual information in the opinion limits its utility in this case.

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In Hamilton v. Foti, the plaintiff, also an inmate, filed a §1983 action against 

the Louisiana Attorney General (Foti). 372 F. App’x 480 (5th Cir. 2010). The basis 

of his claim was the automatic stay provision of the Louisiana’s Prisoner Litigation 

Reform Act (PLRA). The automatic stay was applied by a state court clerk after 

Hamilton failed to pay court costs in a separate state breach of contract case. 

Hamilton, 372 F. App’x at 482-483. Hamilton claimed that the automatic stay 

provision violated the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Hamilton, 372 

F.App’x at 483. He filed suit against Foti and alleged that Foti is the guardian of the 

PLRA and that it is Foti’s duty (as attorney general) to enforce the laws of the state.

Hamilton, 372 F. App’x at 485. This Court held that Foti’s duty to enforce state law 

was insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, especially because the 

complaint and record lacked any indication that Foti would enforce the automatic 

stay against Hamilton. Hamilton, 372 F. App’x at 485-486. The statute Hamilton 

challenged, which only restricted access to the court without payment of the fees, is 

not similar to Section 250.007, which prohibits adoption or enforcement of a certain 

municipal ordinance and, as a result, is not instructive in this case. 

In Okpalobi v. Foster, individuals and entities who provide abortion services 

sued Louisiana’s governor and attorney general (collectively referred to as “Foster”). 

244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs alleged a tort statute that made abortion 

providers liable to patients for damages resulting from the abortion was 

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unconstitutional. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 409. This Court dismissed the case based on 

a lack of standing; however, the lead opinion in the case expressed concern with 

relying on general duties of Foster to waive immunity under Ex parte Young. 

Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 419. Because Section 250.007 is not a private cause of action 

statute like the statute in Okpalobi, it is not instructive. 

2. Texas law establishes “some connection” between the Attorney General and

Section 250.007. 

Even if the City is similarly situated, there are additional bases that 

demonstrate “some connection.” In a lawsuit that involves the validity or 

constitutionality of a municipal ordinance or state law, the Attorney General must 

receive notice of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code § 37.006(b).

6 The Third Court of Appeals recently held that this provision 

gives the Attorney General the right to intervene in litigation as a party plaintiff 

where state law preemption of a municipal ordinance is at issue. Tex. Assoc. of Bus., 

et al. v. City of Austin, et al., 2018 WL 6005551, *4 (Tex.App.—Austin, 2018)

(upholding the Attorney General’s standing to intervene in litigation brought by 

private parties who challenged the City’s earned sick leave ordinance on preemption 

and other grounds).

6 The Attorney General relied on this statutory provision to intervene in the Zaatari and Texas 

Association of Business cases.

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The Attorney General also has at least some connection to Section 250.007—

if not direct enforcement authority over it—by virtue of his authority under the 

TFHA. If a potential discriminatory housing practice involves the legality of a land 

use law or ordinance, the Texas Workforce Commission (Commission) is deprived 

of jurisdiction and must “immediately refer the matter to the attorney general for 

appropriate action.” Tex. Prop. Code §301.090. If the Commission receives a 

complaint that alleges a landlord refuses to accept HCV and that the refusal has 

discriminatory impact based on race or other state-recognized protected class, 

Section 250.007 would be implicated. Because it is likely the Commission and the 

Attorney General will consider Section 250.007 a law covered by § 301.090, the 

Commission will be required to refer the matter to the Attorney General. This 

statutory authority allows the Attorney General to prevent the investigation of 

certain housing discrimination complaints. Additionally, if the individual who filed 

the complaint refiles with the FHO, the Attorney General will likely attempt to use 

his general enforcement authority or Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 

37.006 to prevent the City from investigating. 

B. The City established the Attorney General’s demonstrated willingness to 

enforce. 

The Attorney General’s habit of suing or intervening in litigation against the 

City chills its lawful enforcement of the Ordinance and impairs the City’s ability to

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fulfill the command that it affirmatively further fair housing. As recognized by the 

Attorney General, a “demonstrated willingness to exercise” the official’s duty is 

sufficient to establish an exception to immunity under Ex parte Young. AT Br 22.7

Yet, contrary to that recognition, the Attorney General asserts that the recent lawsuits 

and interventions are insufficient to demonstrate a willingness to enforce. Id., at 22. 

This assertion is without merit.

In order for the City to establish an Ex parte Young waiver of immunity, the 

Attorney General asks this Court to require the City to show that the Attorney 

General took an affirmative step to threaten the City as it relates to this particular 

state law. AT Br 22. However, such a requirement would require the City wait to 

seek a declaration (or injunction) regarding the constitutional validity of Section 

250.007 until it is sued again or until the Attorney General issues a press release or 

sends a letter, which is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Steffel v. 

Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). The Attorney General’s proposed requirement 

is untenable because there is no statutory requirement that the Attorney General give 

the City notice before filing suit (under his general enforcement authority) or 

7 In the event the Court requires the City to establish a “threat of enforcement”, the Attorney 

General’s conduct is sufficient to reach that threshold because past enforcement against the same 

conduct is evidence that the threat of enforcement is not illusory. See Susan B. Anthony List v. 

Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014).

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intervening in litigation as a party-plaintiff (under Civil Practice and Remedies Code 

§37.006). 

The Attorney General, by his own admission, has a particular duty to enforce 

the supremacy of state law over municipal ordinances. Filing suit against the City or 

intervening in litigation because the City enforces the Ordinance is the same conduct 

the Attorney General challenges in the Zaatari and Texas Association of Businesses

lawsuits.

8 For this reason, it was reasonable for the City (and the district court) to 

rely on the Attorney General’s past litigation-related behavior to establish a 

demonstrated willingness to enforce. As a result, the City established his 

demonstrated willingness to enforce the supremacy of state law over municipal 

ordinances. 

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Court should affirm the district court’s order denying the Attorney 

General’s motion to dismiss as to sovereign immunity, and remand for further 

proceedings. 

8 The pre-enforcement suit against the City in Texas v. Travis County, Texas aimed to curb City 

policy preempted by state law, which would also be the same conduct as a suit against the City 

as it relates to the Ordinance. 

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ANNE L. MORGAN, City Attorney

MEGHAN L. RILEY, Chief, Litigation

s/ Patricia L. Link 

PATRICIA L. LINK

Assistant City Attorney

State Bar No. 24041343

patricia.link@austintexas.gov

HANNAH M. VAHL

State Bar No. 24082377

hannah.vahl@austintexas.gov

City of Austin-Law Department

P.O. Box 1546

Austin, Texas 78767-1546

Telephone: (512) 974-2173

Facsimile: (512) 974-1311 

ATTORNEYS FOR 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On February 15, 2019, this brief was served via CM/ECF on all registered 

counsel and transmitted to the Clerk of the Court. Counsel further certifies that: 

(1) any required privacy redactions have been made in compliance with Fifth Circuit 

Rule 25.2.13; and (2) the electronic submission is an exact copy of the paper 

document in compliance with Firth Circuit Rule 25.2.1.

s/ Patricia L. Link

PATRICIA L. LINK

15 

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Case 1:20-cv-00275-RP Document 15-1 Filed 07/13/20 Page 22 of 23
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. of App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 3,173 words, excluding the parts of the brief 

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) 

and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has 

been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14 point 

Times New Roman.

3. The undersigned understands that a material misrepresentation in completing 

this certificate, or circumvention of the type-volume limits in 5th Cir. R. 32.3, may 

result in the Court’s striking of the brief and imposing sanctions against the person 

signing the brief.

s/ Patricia L. Link

PATRICIA L. LINK

16

 Case: 18-50646 Document: 00514838174 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/15/2019

Case 1:20-cv-00275-RP Document 15-1 Filed 07/13/20 Page 23 of 23