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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2882
J O S E M. Z AMB R

ANO-R E Y E S

, also known as J O S E M ANUE L Z AMB R ANO

R E Y E S , Petitioner,

v.

E RI C H. H OL D E R

, J R ., Att or ney General of the United Stat es, Responden t.

Peti tio n fo r Review o f an Order ofthe Bo ard o f Immi gratio n Appe als.

No. A0 90 -9 33 -0 06

A RGUE D F E B R

UAR Y 15, 2013

— D E C I D E D A UGUST 2, 2013

Before F L AUM

, W OOD, and H AMI L TON , Circ uit Judges.
H AMI L TON , Cir cui t Judge. Th is p etiti on for judi ci al rev i ew presents questi ons affec tin g al i e n s wh o we re l a w f ul permanent resi dents and were removed becau se of cri minal conduc t, and especi ally those who then reenter ed the Uni ted States unlawfully

. Petiti oner Jose Zambrano-Rey es was a lawfu l permanent2 No. 12-2822
resi dent of t he Uni ted St ates, but he w as o rder ed removed in 2000 on accoun t of tw o felony convic tions

. Shor tly after hi s
remov al, he reent ered the Uni ted St ates unlaw fully

. In 2011, he

w as arr ested by i mmi gr ation offi cers and his r e mov al or der from 2000 was reins tate d. He then asked the Board of Immi gr ation Appeals to r e o p e n hi s or i gin al remov al proceedings. He arg ued that hi s ini tial remov al w a s in e r ro r becau se he was prev ented from seeking di screti onary relief from r e mo v al in 2000, whi le intervening Supreme Court deci si ons show that di screti onary relief s hould hav e been av ai lable to hi m back in 2000. The Board deni ed hi s motion to reo pen, finding that i t was unti mely and that the 90-day statuto ry deadline should not be equi tably tolled to permi t Zambrano-Rey es t o reo pen hi s
remov al elev en y e a rs later

. The Board also found that the di screti onary relief he sought w as not av ai lable to hi m, despi te the changes in the law

, becau se he had reent e red the country unlaw fully

. Zambrano-Rey es seeks rev i ew of the deni al of hi s motion to reo pen. W

e hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew his petiti on
un d e r 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(D ), but we agr ee wi th the B o a r d that Zambrano-Rey es’s unlaw ful reen t r y means he i s not eli gib le for the relief he seeks. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)( 5) (barrin g
reo pening of remov al proceedings) ; 8 C.F .R. § 1003.44(k)(2) (barrin g dis cretionary r eli ef from remov al).
I. Factual, Legal, and Procedural Background Zambrano-Rey es i s a ci tizen of Mex i co who enter ed the Uni ted St ates in 1979 a nd w as gr anted lawfu l permanent resi dent status in 1989. In 1993, he pled gui lty to tw o felony

co un t s of aggr av ated sexual abus e of a minor
. He w as sen-No. 12-2822 3

t e nced to six months in pris on and four y ears of probat io n. These convict ions set the stage for the legal tr oubles that follow ed.
A. Relevant Legal Backgr ound
T o understand the legal i ssu e s Z ambrano-Rey es presents,
we mus t begin wit h a bri ef hi stor y of the di screti onary relief from remov al that he seeks. Under sect io n 212(c) of the Immi gr ation and Nationali ty Act of 19 5 2 (INA), i f a lawfu l permanent resi dent left the Uni ted St ates and w ould hav e been excluded from r e e nt ering the country on one of the gr ounds l ist e d in the statute, he or she could seek di screti onary rel ie f from that exclusi on from the Att or ney General. Pub

. L. No. 82- 414, § 212(c ), 6 6 St at. 163, 187. The Board of Immi gr ation Appeals made that di screti ona r y relief av ai lable to lawfu l permanent resi dents who were subject to being deport ed, in addi tion to those subject to ex clus i on. See Mat ter of S— , 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 396 (BIA 1954); Mat ter of S ilva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 27 (BIA 1976). 1
In 1996 Congr ess twi ce amended the r e l e v ant port i ons of the INA. The fi rst am e n d m e nt b a rr e d d i s c re ti on ary relief under

se cti on 212(c) for those who had commi tte d certain cri minal offenses

. See Antiterro ris m and Effec tive Death Penalty Act of

Under i mmigratio n l aw, an ali en i s “excl udab l e” or “i nadmissible” i f the 1 government may prevent him or her fro m enteri ng or reenteri ng the Uni ted States. Bo th terms are also used to descri b e an ali en who i s r e mo vab l e b ecause he or she i s present i n the Uni ted States wi t ho ut havi ng b een l aw fu l l y admitted. See 8 U.S .C. § 11 82 (a) (setti ng fo rth the grounds o f i nadmissibil i ty). “Dep o r t atio n” or “re mova l ” refe rs to the remo v al of an ali en who fall s i nto any of the cl ass es of “de por tab l e ali ens” under 8 U.S .C. § 1 22 7( a).4 No. 12-2822
1996 (AEDP

A ), Pub

. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 St at. 1214, 1277. Congr ess then eli minated secti on 212(c) relief altog ether , r e p l a c i n g i t w i t h a n o t h e r f o r m o f d i s c r e t i o n a r y relief—“c ancellati on of remov al”—whi ch i s not av ai lable to permanent resi dents who hav e been convic ted of an “a g gr av ated felony

.” Illega l Immi gr ation Refor m and Immi gr ant Responsi bi li ty Act of 1996 (IIRIR A), Pub

. L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 St at. 3009-546, -594; canc ellation o f r emov al codi fi ed at 8 U.S .C. § 1229b(a).
AEDP A and IIRI RA di d not specify whether or how their

new bars to di screti onary rel ief under secti on 212(c) w ould apply to someone in Zambrano-Rey es’s posi tion—permanent resi dents who were convi cted of di squali fying feloni es before the new laws too k e ff ect. The Att or ney General i ssu ed an opini on in 1997 statin g that di screti onary relief un der former secti on 212(c) w as not av ai lable in any remov al pr o ceedings occurrin g after AEDP

A becam e effec t ive. Mat ter of Soriano, 21 Op. OLC 1 (Op. Att ’y Gen. 1997)

. Under the Att or ney General’s view in Soriano , ev en i f a permanen t r e sident had pled gui lty to a di squalifying cri me before AEDP A w as pass ed,

as Zambrano-Rey es had done, he w as ineli gib le for secti on 212(c) di screti onary relief. Id . at 6.
In 2000, though, fi v e weeks before the Boar d affi rmed the

or der to remove Zambrano-Re yes , we i ssu ed an opini on that departe d from the Att or ney General’s view

. W e he l d t hat a permanent re si dent who had pled gui lty t o crim es in relian ce upon the old secti on 2 12(c) di screti onary relief could not be barred from that relief. Jideonwo v
. I.N.S. , 224 F .3d 692, 700 (7th Ci r
. 2000). The next y ear , after Zambrano-Rey es had been

remove d and then ret urned i llegally , the Supreme CourtNo. 12-2822 5
si mi larly held that secti on 212(c) relief w a s av ai lable to permanent resi dents who pled gui lty to cri mes before AEDP A and IIRI RA that w ould hav e di squali fi ed them from such relief under those new laws

. I.N.S. v
. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). Thus, St. Cy r meant that permanent resi dents who were
remov able on account of certain cri mes could sti ll seek di scretion ary relief i f they pled gui lty to the relev ant cri mes before AEDP A and IIRI RA became effecti v e. In ev aluating such appli cati ons for reli ef in the wake of St. Cyr, the Board faced a further questi on. Though the tex t of the

or i gin al secti on 212(c) appli ed only as relief from exclusi on but not from deport ation, i t had been a p p l ie d to both. Y et exclusi on and depo rt ation hav e separate statuto ry lists of gr ounds for those respecti v e consequen ces. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) wi th § 1227(a). The Board needed a w ay to deter mine i f a permanent resi dent subject to deport ation on gr ounds li sted in that statute secti on could be eli gib le for relief under the exclusi on statute. As we explain ed in the compani on cri minal case, United States v
. Zambrano-Reyes , No. 12-1524, — F .3d

— , 2 0 13 WL 3871002 (7th Ci r
. July 29, 2013), in 2005 the Board deci ded that secti on 212(c) di screti onary re l ief w ould be av ai lable to a permanent resi dent subject to remov al only i f t he st atuto ry gr ound of removal with whi ch the permanent resi dent was charged compri sed a range of offenses that w as “sub stanti ally equi v alent” to the range of offenses co vered by a statuto ry gr ound of exclusi on. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. De c. 7 22, 728 (BIA 2005); In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 76 6 , 7 72-73 (BIA 2005). W e affi rmed thi s appr oach, k nown as the “comparable6 No. 12-2822

gr ounds” rule. See, e.g ., Fre d e rick v
. Holder , 644 F .3d 357, 363 (7th Ci r
. 2011); Zamora-

Mallari v
. Mukasey, 514 F .3d 679, 692-93 (7th Ci r
. 2008). But in 2011, after the Boa r d had reins tate d Zambrano-Rey es’s remov al or der and after he had pled gui lty to a new 2011 indi ctment for unlawfu l reentr y under 8 U.S .C. § 1326(a), the Supreme Court rej ected t he “ comparable gr ounds” rule as arbi tr ary and capri ci o us and effectiv ely

ov err uled those deci si ons. Judulang v
. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 (2011).
In sum, only after St. Cyr w as i t settled tha t d isc ret i onary relief from remov al w as av ai lable to a permanent resi dent li ke Zambrano-Rey es who had ple d gui lty to certain cri minal offenses that made hi m remov able p r ior to AEDP A and I I RIRA , and only after Judulang w as the path to seekin g di screti onary relief clear fo r a permanent resi dent whose cri minal offenses render ed hi m remov able based on a catego ry that di d not hav e a “comparable gr ound” in the li st of gr ounds for ex clus i on. B. Zambrano-Reyes’s Case
In Nov ember 1997, i mmi gr ation authorit ies i ssu ed Zambrano-Rey es a Notice to Appear for remov al proceedings and charged hi m as remov able for havin g been convic ted of an aggr av ated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)( i i i ). He hi red an at tor ney to r epresent hi m. A t hi s r emov al hearin g on June 23, 1998, the i mmi gr ation judge deter mined t ha t ZambranoRey es w as remov able becau se of hi s convic tions for sexual

abuse of a minor
. The judge also ruled that, in li ght of t he Att or ney General’s Soriano opini on, Zambrano-Rey es w as not eli gib le for the di screti onary relief fr o m r e mo v al that w ouldNo. 12-2822 7
hav e been av ai lable to hi m under secti on 212(c) prior to enactment of AEDP

A and IIRI RA. Zambrano-Rey es appealed and t he Board affi rmed wi thout opini on on Sept ember 29, 2000. Zambrano-Rey es di d not seek judi ci al rev i ew , and he was removed to Mex i co on Nov ember 13, 2000. He ret urned to the Uni ted St ates unlaw fully someti me in January 2001. And as we
e xp l a in below

, that unlaw ful reent ry has deci s ive c on s e qu e n c e s here. Zambrano-Rey es apparently av oided d e t ecti on for y ears, but he w as arrested by imm i gr ation offi cers in Jun e 2011. The Department of Homeland Security reins tate d hi s or i gin al

remov al or der that w as affi rmed by the Board in 2000. AR 1922. He di d not contest hi s remov abi li ty. On July 19, 2011, he

w as also indi cted for i lleg a l r e e nt ry in violati on of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Zambrano-Rey es pled gui lty to the i llegal reent ry charge. After Judulang w as deci ded, and before he w as sentenced in hi s cri minal case, Zambrano-Rey es fi led a motion to wi thdraw hi s gui lty plea and challen ged the legality of the 2000 remov al

or der

. He arg ued that he w as wrongly deprived of the oppor tuni ty t o seek di screti onary relief under secti on 212(c) in hi s
remov al proceedings in 1998 becau se St. Cyr later ov err uled the Board and held that such di screti onary relief was av ai lable to someone in hi s p osi tion. He also arg ued that, since hi s gr ound for remov abi li ty d id not have a counterpar t in the statuto ry gr ounds for exclusi on, he w as sti ll barred from seeking such relie f un til Judulang rej ected the comparable gr o un ds rule in 2011. He arg ued that only after Judulang was the path clear for himto seekdi screti onary relief. The dis tr i ct court deni ed the mo tion. Zambrano-Rey es appealed, and we8 No. 12-2822
affi rmed. See United States v
. Zambrano-Reyes , No. 12-1524 , — F .3d —, 2013 WL 3871002 (7th Ci r . July 29, 2013). On May 14, 2012, Zambrano-Rey es fi led a motion wi th the Board to reo pen his remov al proceedings. H e arg ued that hi s prior i mmi gr ati on a tt orne y had prov i ded ineffec tive assi stance by fai ling to request explic i tly a secti on 212(c) w ai v er during hi s remov al proceedings and by fai ling to advis e hi m that such relief mi ght be av ai lable to hi m. Alter nat ively , he urged the Board to reo pen hi s remov al proceedings sua sponte in li ght of St. Cyr and Judulang

. He also fi led an emerge ncy motion to stay hi s remov al. The Bo a rd deni ed the motion, though, and Zambrano-Rey es w as remov ed to M exic o on M ay 22, 2012. On Jul y 16, 2012 the Board deni ed the motion to reo pen. The Board found that Zambrano-Reye s ’s m otion to reo pen was unti mely

. It w as fi led more than elev en y ears after hi s or i gin al

remov al or der was enter ed, long past t he st atuto ry 90-day deadline for moving to reo pen remov al pro ceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7 )( C)(i ). The Board declined to apply equi table t o l l ing to that deadline, whi ch i t may do when the petiti oner has exer ci sed due di li gence, meaning that a reasonable person in that posi tion w ould not have been aw are of the possi bi li ty that he or she had suffered an injury and could not reasonably hav e been expected to fil e earlier

. App. 4, ci tin g Patel v
. Gonza les , 442 F .3d 1011, 1016 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (equi table tol l ing “ requires a showing of due di li gence”); Pervaiz v
. Gonza les , 405 F .3d 488, 490 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (the test for equi table tolling “i s whether the clai mant could reasonably have bee n expected t o ha v e fi led earlier”). The Board found that Zambrano-Rey es di d not ex e r cis e due di li gence and couldNo. 12-2822 9 reasonably have been expected to fi le sooner becau se he indi cated that he thought at the tim e of hi s repr esentation that hi s atto rney w as no t sa t isfactor y , and thus he should hav e kno wn t o mov e to reo pen at that tim e. In the alter nati v e, the Board found that Zambrano-Rey es’s atto rney was not ineffec

tive, statin g that i t could not “conclu de tha t the respondent’s former atto rney acted ineffec tively by not advis ing the respondent to pursue thi s form of relief.” Id

. The Board also declined to reo pen hi s remov al or der sua sponte, finding that ev en wi th the changes from St. Cyr and Jud ul a ng , Zambrano-Rey es w ould not be eli gib le for reo pening or di screti onary relief becau se of his un l a wfu l reent ry into the Uni ted St ates. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)( 5); 8 C.F .R. § 1003.44(k)(2). Zambrano-Rey es now petiti ons for rev i ew of the Board ’ s deni al of hi s motion to
reo pen hi s remov al proceedin gs. II. Analysis
A. Jurisdic tion W e hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the Boar d ’ s deni al of Zambrano-Rey es’s motion to reo pen, t hough that conclu si on take s a bi t of an explanation. T o sum mari ze, we have jurisdi ction to rev i ew a deni al of a motion to reo pen so long as we
w ould hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the underlyin g or der

. W e
w ould hav e jurisdi cti on ov er Zambrano-Rey es’s or i gin al

remov al or der becau se he clai ms that i t inv olv ed consti tutional and legal err or
. Our jurisdi cti on does not mean, how ev er , that relief on the meri ts could be av ai lable. Appellate courts or dinarily hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the Board’ s deni al of a motion to reo pen. See Kuc ana v
. Holder, 558 U

. S. 233, 248-54 (2010) (courts hav e jurisdi cti on ov er10 No. 12-2822
motion to reo pen where Board’ s deci si on on the motion i s commi tte d to a g e ncy di screti on by reg ulati on rather than by statute); see also T

apia- Lemos v
. Holder, 6 9 6 F .3d 687, 689 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (“Deni al of a bonafide motion to reo pen i s rev i ew able under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).”)

. But Kuc ana left open the questi on “whether review of a reo pening d eni al w ould be precluded i f the court w ould lack jurisdi cti on ov er the al i en’s underlyin g clai m for relief.” Kuc ana, 558 U.S. at 250 n.17. In thi s ci rcui t, the default answ e r i s that “we do not hav e jurisdi cti on ov er the motions to reo pen or reconsi der i f we lack jurisdi cti on ov er the underlyin g or der .” See Cruz-Maya ho v
. Holder, 698 F .3d 574, 577 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Thus, we hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the Board’ s deni al of Zambrano-Rey es’s motion t o r e open hi s remov al

or der only i f we w ould hav e jurisdi cti on to rev i ew the Board’ s 2000 remov al order i tself. 2
Our jurisdi cti on ext ends to Zambrano-Rey es’s or igin al

remov al or der to the ext ent that he a r g ue s on judi ci al rev i ew that i t inv olv ed consti tutional or legal err or
. Section 1252(a)( 2)(D ) of Ti tle 8 of the U.S. Code prov i des that “Nothing in sub parag r a p h (B) or (C), or in any other prov i si on of thi s chapter (other than thi s secti on) whi ch li mi ts or e l iminates

There i s an exceptio n to o u r d e fault rul e. Judi ci al review of pro cedur al 2 moti ons “i s fo recl osed onl y i f the age nc y ’ s ratio nale fo r denyi ng the pro cedur al request also estab l i shes the peti tio ner's i nab i l i ty to prevail on the meri ts o f hi s underl ying cl aim.” See Cruz-Mayaho , 69 8 F.3d at 57 6– 77 (i nternal q

uotati ons omitted ), ci ting Calma v. Hold er , 66 3 F.3d 86 8, 87 6 (7th Ci r. 20 11 ). But we held i n Moral-Salazar v. Hold er , 70 8 F.3d 95 7, 96 1– 62 (7 th Ci r. 20 13 ), tha t the Calma exceptio n di d not apply where the underl ying
or der was a remo v al or der tha t woul d b e b arred fro m review b ecause i t was entered on account of an aggra v ated fel ony. Za mb rano-Reyes’s was such a
remo v al o rder, so the Calma excepti on d oe s not gi v e us j uri sdi cti on here

.No. 12-2822 11 judi ci al rev i ew

, shall be construed as precluding rev i ew of consti tutional clai ms or questi ons of law rais ed upon a petiti on for rev i ew
... .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)( 2)(D ). Thi s exception appli es to nearly all l imit s on jurisdi cti on in the INA, inclu ding tw o t hat w ould other wi se apply to Zambrano-Rey es. First, it expr essly appli es to se ct i on 1252(a)( 2)(C), whi ch w ould other wi se bar our rev i ew of Zambrano-Rey es’s remov al or der becau se i t w as on accoun t o f an aggr av ated felony

. See Alvar ado- Fonsec a v
. Holder, 631 F .3d 385, 389 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (sec tion 1252(a)( 2)(D ) allow ed jurisdi cti on to rev i ew or der

remov ing ali en convic ted of commi tting an aggr av ated felony despi te secti on 1252(a)(2) (C)). Se c on d, s e c ti on 1 2 52(a)( 2)(D ) also appli es to our jurisdi cti on despi te 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)( 5), whi ch prov i d e s t ha t i f an ali en who w as removed reent ers the Uni ted St ates i llegally , as Zambrano-Rey es di d, the or der of remov al “i s not subj e ct to being reo p e ne d or rev i ewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)( 5). Section 1252(a)( 2)(D ) applies to all “o ther prov i si on[s] of t his ch apter (other than thi s secti on),” which includes secti on 1231(a)( 5). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D ). 3

Other ci rcui ts hav e fo und tha t secti on 12 52 (a)(2 )(D) can overri de secti on 3 12 31 (a)(5 ) to the extent the l atter might otherwi se b ar appell ate juri sdi cti on. See , e.g. , Villegas de la Paz v. Hold er , 64 0 F.3d 65 0, 65 6 (6 th Ci r
. 2 0 1 0) (co l l ecti ng cases and stating on di rect review of rei nsta tement pro ceed i ngs tha t “the ci rcui t cour ts tha t hav e consi dere d the i nt e rpl ay b etween § 12 52 (a)(2 )(D) and § 12 31 (a)(5 ) ha ve held tha t § 12 52 (a)(2 )(D) re-vests the ci rcui t cour ts with juri sdi cti on over consti tutio nal cl aims or questio ns of l aw raised i n the context of rei nsta teme nt pro ceed i ngs;”) (quotatio ns omi tted). Al though these case s ad d ressed juri sdi cti on to review an underl ying remo v al or der as a chall enge to the or der’s r e i ns t atement, (co ntinued. ..)12 No. 12-2822 Zambrano-Rey es has rais ed consti tutional and legal clai ms in hi s petiti on for rev i ew of the deni al of hi s motion to reo pen. He arg ue s tha t he w as deni ed due process in hi s or i gin al

remov al proceeding becau se he received ineffec tive assi stance
o f co unsel and that the Board err ed in deter mining that hi s
couns el was not ineffec tive. Although ali ens in i mmi gr ation p r o ce edings do not hav e a Sixth Amendment right to th e effectiv e assi stance of couns el, see Pervaiz v
. Gonza les , 405 F .3d 488, 4 8 9

– 90 (7th Ci r
. 2005), they do “have a due-process right to a fai r hearing.” Solis-Chavez v. Holder , 662 F .3d 462, 466 (7th Ci r
. 2011), ci tin g Kay v
. As h c rof t, 387 F .3d 664, 676 (7th Ci r
. 2004) (in remov al proceedings, “couns el’s ineffec tiveness may ris e to the lev el of a due process violati on i f the all eged erro rs li kely affec ted the outcome of the pro ceeding”). In holding as
much, we hav e relied on the Board’ s “body of caselaw holding that an ali en’s due-process rights can be violated by hi s
a tt orne y’ s ine ffec tive assi stance in remov al proceedings.” So lis

C h avez, 662 F .3d at 466, ci tin g Mat ter of L oza da, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 1988) (“Ineffec tive a ss ist ance of couns el in a deport ation proceeding i s a deni al of due process only i f the proceeding w as so fund amentally unfai r t hat the ali en was

( ...c onti nued) 3 secti on 12 52 ( a) (2 )(D) ’s b ro ad l anguage shoul d also apply to a moti on to
reo pen a rei nsta ted or der. So me of the ci rcui t cases ci ted b y Villegas de la Paz endo rsed (but di d not actua l l y apply ) a “ g r o ss miscarri age of justi ce” exceptio n to secti on 12 31 (a)(5 ). See , e.g. , Garci a d e Ri ncon v. Dep' t of Hom eland Se c. , 539 F .3d 1133 , 113 8 (9 th Ci r. 20 08 ). We need not and do n ot endo rse tha t stan dard fo r the purpo ses o f t his opi nio n. As we explain b el ow, the pote ntial av ail ab i l i ty of appell ate juri sdi cti on do es not mean tha t the Bo ard or other i mmigratio n au t ho r i tie s coul d actua l l y grant the rel i ef tha t secti on 1 23 1( a)(5) ba rs o n the meri ts.No. 12-2822 13

prev ented fr o m reasonably presentin g hi s case.”) , ov err uling
v acated by Mat ter of Compean , 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 2009). Thi s i s tr ue ev en though an ali en may not hav e a prot ected liberty intere st in di screti onary relief. “An ali en res isting
remov al, whi ch w ould deprive hi m of hi s li berty to remain in the Uni ted St a t e s, i s entitled to due process, whi ch comprehends the right to present a defense.” Jezierski v
. Mukasey, 543 F .3d 886, 889–90 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (internal ci tations omi tte d) (also acknowledging that there i s no “entitlement to reo pen on the basi s of ineffec tive assi stance of couns el,” but finding that the complexi ty of an i mmi gr ation case “in a particu lar remov al proceeding mi ght be so gr eat that forcing the ali en to proceed wi thout the assi stance of a competent lawyer w ould deny hi m due process of law”). But we have declined to find jurisdi cti on under secti on 1252(a)( 2)(D ) ov er petiti ons rais ing ineff e ct i v e assi stance o f counsel claim s where we found that the Board’ s deni al of reo pening rested on a finding that any ineffec tiveness in couns el di d not actually prej udi ce the p e t it ioner

. W e hav e tr eated the questi on of prej udi ce as factual rather than legal or consti tutional. Jezierski, 543 F .3d at 891 (finding no jurisdi cti on becau se Board’ s prej udi ce deter m in a ti on was factual, not legal,

a nd petiti oner di d not allege infringement of consti tutional right).
In thi s cas e, the Board deter mined that Zambrano-Rey es’s

couns el w as not ineffec tive, whi ch is a legal deter min a t io n. I t required analyzing the relev ant contro lling law on the ret ro activi ty of AEDP

A an d IIRI RA at the time of Zambrano-Rey es’s14 No. 12-2822

remov al proceedings, a task r e qui ring legal analysi s. And to 4 the ext ent thatthe Board also det ermin ed that any ineffecti v e assi stance d id not prej udi ce Zambrano-Rey es, that finding
w ould need to be reconsi dered i f the Board’ s ini tial legal deter minati on w as err oneous and thus does not defeat our jurisdi cti on. See Sanchez v
. Keisl er, 505 F .3d 641, 647-50 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (wh ere di screti onary deter mina tions rested on Board’ s
err oneous ini tial deter minati on that couns el was not ineffec

tive, no jurisdi cti onal bar despi te Board’ s alter nate di screti onary holdings). W e conclu de that our jurisdi cti on e x tends to ZambranoRey es’s remov al or der becau se he rais es a consti tutional clai m
o r l e gal questi on wi th reg ard to hi s underlyin g or der o f

In denyi ng Za mb rano-Reyes’s moti on to reo pen, the Bo ard overl oo ked a 4 signi fi cant l egal develo pment i n our ci rcui t sh o r t l y b efo re i ts or i ginal affi rman ce o f hi s remo v al o rder i n 20 00 . The Bo ard w ro te in 2012 : “ At the time of the respo ndent’s hearings b efo re the Immigratio n Judge and duri ng the pendency of his appeal to this Bo ard, the contro l l i ng l aw i ndic ated tha t he was not el i gible fo r a secti on 21 2( c) waiver.” App. 4, ci ting Ma t t er of Soriano , 21 Op. OLC 1 (Op. Att’y Gen. 19 97 ); Turkham v. Perryman , 18 8 F.3d 81 4 (7 th Ci r. 19 99 ). As noted ab ove, over a month b efo re the Bo ard’s or der affi rming Za mb rano-Reyes’s or der of remo v al on Se ptemb er 29 , 20 00 , we held i n Jideonwo tha t “where speci fi c facts demo nstra te tha t an al i e n p l ed guil ty to an aggra v ated fel ony b efo re the enactment of AEDPA and rel i ed, at l east i n part, on the av ail ab i l i ty of§ 21 2( c) rel i ef i n maki ng hi s deci sio n to so pl ead, AEDPA’s § 44 0( d) cann o t be ap p l i ed retro actively to b ar tha t ali en fro m rece i v i ng a di screti onary w aiver under INA § 21 2( c).” 22 4 F. 3d at 70 0. As we noted i n the companio n case, United States v. Zambrano-Reyes , — F.3 d —, No. 12 -1 52 4, 20 13 WL 3 87 10 02 , sl i p o p. at 8– 9 ( 7th Ci r. J uly 29 , 20 13 ), this woul d hav e b een a strong argument fo r a moti on to reo pen at the time. But Za mb rano-Reyes’s deci sio n to reenter the United States i l l egall y had the eff ect of b l ocki ng any rel i ef he mig ht ha ve so ught on this b asis.No. 12-2822 15

remov al. Under Kuc ana a nd our default rule, we thus hav e jur isd i cti on to rev i ew the Board’ s deni al of hi s motion to
reo pen that or der of remov al. Becaus e he rais es consti tutional 5 and legal clai ms, o ur jurisdi cti on also ext ends to the Board’ s refusal to reo pen Zambrano-Rey es’ remov al proceedings su a sponte

. See Anaya-Aguilar v
. Holder, 697 F .3d 1189 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (bar on rev i ew of motions to reo pen sua sponte does not apply where petiti oner rais es consti tutional or legal clai ms) , denying reh’g of 683 F .3d 369 (7th Ci r
. 2012). The potent i al obstacles to
our jurisdi cti on here d o n ot ove rc ome the “stro ng presumpti on in fav or of judi ci al rev i ew of admini strat i v e acti on.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at298 & n.9 (collecting cases ).
B. Merits of the Denial of the Mo tion to Reopen Although we have jurisdi cti on, we mus t deny Z a mbr anoRey es’s petiti on on t he merits. The Board gav e three reasons for denying Zambrano-Rey es’s motion to reo pen: fi rst, that he

w as not entitled to equi table tolling of the de a d l ine of hi s motion to reo pen; second, that he di d not show that hi s former atto rney w as so ineffec tive as t o i mpinge on the fund amental fair ness of hi s proceedings; and thi rd, that hi s case di d not inv olv e “excep ti on a l c i rcu m s tan c e s ” s u ch th a t the Board w ould

In Moral-Salazar v. Hold er , 70 8 F.3d 95 7, 96 1- 62 (7 th Ci r. 20 13 ), we decl i ned 5 to extend “ Kucana to remova l order s where an ali en h as b een conv i cted of

a cri me covered b y the juri sd i c t i onal b ar i n sub secti on (C) ,” and we i nt e rprete d the phrase “f i nal or der of remo v al” i n sub secti on (C) to “enco mpas s not onl y the actua l remo v al or der, b ut all deci sio ns c l osel y rel ated to the pro ceed i ng”). But Moral-Salazar di d not rej ect the appli catio n of s ection 12 52 (a )( 2) (D )’s exceptio n to sub secti on (C) ’s juri sdi cti onal b ar. W e noted tha t “[ n]otwi thstanding sub secti on (C) ’s juri sdi cti onal b ar, we woul d hav e juri sdi cti on to review any l egal and consti tutio nal i ssues tha t Mo ral raises,” but found that he had raised none. Id . at 96 2.16 No. 12-2822

r e o p en hi s proceedings sua sponte

. The Board’ s reasonin g o n the thi rd point i s suffi ci ent to deny Zambrano-Rey es’s petiti on
on all gr ounds. B e cause of hi s unlaw ful reent ry after hi s
remov al, Zambrano-Rey es i s si mply barred as a matter of law from the di screti onary relief and the reo pening of hi s remov al proceedings that he seeks. The Board found that, ev en though St. Cyr a nd Judulang cleared tw o o bstacles to Zambrano-Rey es seeking secti on 212(c) d i s c re ti on a ry re l i e f , one obstacle remain ed that could not be ov ercome: hi s i llegal r e entry

. A reg ulati on establi shes procedures for former permanent re s i d e nts s uch as ZambranoRey es, who were subject to remov al on accoun t of gui lty pleas to cri mes prior to the enactment of AEDP A and IIRI RA, to seek secti on 212(c) di screti onary r e l ie f in li ght of St. Cyr

. 8 C.F .R. § 1003.44. Under thi s reg ulati on, ali ens who hav e been “i ssu ed

a final or der of de p o r t a tion or remov al who then i llegally ret urned to the Uni ted St ates” are not eli gib le to apply for such relief. 8 C.F .R. § 1003.44(k)(2). In denying Zambrano-Rey es’s motion to reo pe n, the Board ci ted thi s reg ulati on and conclud e d t hat ev en when the law changed under St. Cyr, Zambrano-Rey es “w as not entitled to reo pening of hi s proceed ing s becau se he had ret urned to thi s country i llegally .” That prov i si on of the reg ulati on i mplement s 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)( 5), whi ch prov i des that a prior or der of remov al “i s not subject t o be ing reo pened or rev i ewed” i f the ali en has reenter ed the Uni ted St a t e s i llegally

. See 69 Fed. Reg. 57826-01, 57827 (Sept. 28, 2004) (final rule); 67 Fed. Reg. 52627, 52629 (Aug. 13, 2002) (proposed rule). W e agr ee wi th the Board that 8 C.F .R. § 1003.44(k )( 2) bars Zambrano-Rey es from seeking secti on 2 1 2(c) di screti onaryNo. 12-2822 17
relief becau se of hi s i llegal reent ry , despi te the l a t e r dev elopment s in St. Cyr and Judulang

. In publi shing the rule, the Depart me nt of Jus tic e commented that “the deci si on to preclude ali ens under a deport ation or remov al or der from obtaining secti on 212(c) relief i s gr ounded in Congr ess’s intent to li mi t i ts av ai labi li ty to those not under deport ation or ders.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 57828. The Sixth Ci rcui t has held that 8 C

. F .R. § 1003.44(k)(2) barred a permanent resi dent from seeking sectio n 212(c) relief where he w as subject to a final or der of

remov al and hi s reent ry into the Uni ted St ates w as only for the purpose of standing tr i al. See Manso u r v
. Gonza les , 470 F .3d 1 1 9 4 , 1200 (6th Ci r
. 2006). Here, there i s no questi on tha t Zambrano-Rey es enter ed the country unlaw fully after havin g been removed pursuant to a final or der of removal

. Under 8 C .F .R. § 1003.44(k)(2), ev en i f the Board were to r e o p e n Zambrano-Rey es’s remov al proceedings, the di screti onary relief h e seeks w ould sti ll not be av ai lable to hi m. The B o a r d corr ectly stated that Zambrano-Rey es i s “not

en t it l ed to reo pening of hi s proceedings becau se he had ret urned to thi s country i llega l l y
. ” The Board ci ted secti on 1003.44(k)(2) for thi s propo si tion. T o be preci se, the reg ulati on i tself does not expr essly state that i llegal reent ry bars reopening, but i t clear l y has that consequen ce. The statute that the reg ulat i on i mplements speci fi cally bars rev i ew or reo pening after i llegal reent ry : i f an “ali en has reent ered the Uni ted St ates i llegally a ft er havin g been removed

... the prior or der of

remov al i s reins tate d from i ts or i gin al date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed .” 8 U

. S.C. § 1231(a)( 5) (emphas i s added).18 No. 12-2822
Thus, although s ecti on 1231( a)(5) does not bar jurisdi cti on
ov er Zambrano- Reye s ’s p e ti tion for judi ci al rev i ew , i t shows on the merits that hi s remov al proceeding cannot be reo pened. Any r emand w ould be futile. Th e Boar d could not reo pen hi s proceeding, and he i s ineli gib le for the relief he seeks. “W e need not remand an imm i gr ation case where doin g so w ould prove futi le.” Marin-Ga rcia v
. Holder , 647 F .3d 666, 672 (7th Ci r
. 2011).
III

. Conclu sion Regar dless of St. Cyr and Judula n g, Zambrano-Rey es i s barred from secti on 212(c) di screti onary relief and hi s remov al proceedings may not be reo pened becau se of hi s i llegal reent ry
. W e nee d no t reach hi s other arg uments again st the Board’ s deci si on. The peti tion i s deni ed.