Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Derick W. Steele

Deputy Public Defender

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Paula J. Beller

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James R. Lunsford,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 9, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A02-1511-CR-2056

Appeal from the 

Howard Superior Court

The Honorable

William C. Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-1203-FB-206

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] James R. Lunsford (“Lunsford”) appeals the trial court’s order revoking his 

previously-suspended sentence for violation of the conditions of his re-entry 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 2 of 6

program. He raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the 

trial court abused its discretion when it did not award him credit time for time 

spent incarcerated for violating the re-entry program when the trial court 

revoked his suspended sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 23, 2012, Lunsford pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and in exchange, the State 

dismissed three additional counts. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Lunsford 

was sentenced to 4,380 days with 2,555 days executed in the Department of 

Correction and 1,825 days suspended to supervised probation. On June 29, 

2015, as a part of his probation, Lunsford appeared in court and signed a ReEntry Program Participation Agreement, in which he agreed to participate in 

the Howard County Re-Entry Program for a maximum of three years, which 

included substance abuse treatment and counseling. 

[4] On July 1, 2015, Lunsford was taken into custody for being in indirect 

contempt of court as a result of violating the terms and conditions of the ReEntry Program based on allegations that he violated a no-contact order with his 

wife. On August 26, 2015, an arrest warrant was issued for Lunsford for 

violations of the terms of the Re-Entry Program, and he was arrested on the 

same date. Lunsford failed to appear for a Re-Entry Program hearing and was 

arrested, pursuant to a bench warrant, on September 15, 2015. On September 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 3 of 6

16, a case manager for the Re-Entry Program filed a notice of termination with 

the trial court stating that the Re-Entry Program intended “to terminate . . . 

Lunsford’s participation in the program due to absconding from the Howard 

County Re-Entry Court Program.” Appellant’s App. at 79. On the same date, 

the trial court issued an order terminating Lunsford’s participation in the ReEntry Program, and the probation department filed a petition to revoke 

Lunsford’s previously-suspended sentence. At the fact-finding hearing on the 

petition, Lunsford admitted that he violated his probation. The trial court then 

found that the State had proven the violation by a preponderance of the

evidence and ordered Lunsford to serve the balance of his suspended sentence, 

which was determined to be 1,825 days. Lunsford was given credit for fortyfour actual days, or eighty-eight days as a result of day-for-day credit, that were 

served while awaiting disposition of the petition to revoke his suspended 

sentence. Lunsford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 

2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). It is within the 

discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke 

probation if the conditions are violated. Id. In appeals from trial court 

probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of 

discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 4 of 6

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial 

court misinterprets the law. Id.

[6] Lunsford argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his 

previously-suspended sentence as a result of his violation of the terms of his 

probation. Lunsford specifically asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for 

the trial court to not grant him credit for the time he spent incarcerated for 

sanctions resulting from his violations of the Re-Entry Program. He contends 

that he was entitled to this credit for time served because the Re-Entry Program 

was post-sentencing, and participants should receive credit for any time spent 

incarcerated during the program.

[7] At the time Lunsford entered into the Re-Entry Program on June 29, 2015, he 

was on probation, and when he signed the participation agreement, he agreed 

to abide by all rules and conditions of the Re-Entry Program, which included, 

among other things, complying with the case plan, submitting to drug testing, 

and obeying all laws. Appellant’s App. at 74-75. The participation agreement 

stated that sanctions shall be given for violations of the Re-Entry Program, and 

such sanctions were set forth in a sanction schedule and could include 

termination from the program. Id. Lunsford initially violated his terms of the 

Re-Entry Program on July 1, 2015 and was taken into custody for that 

violation; he was subsequently found to have violated the terms of the Re-Entry 

Program two more times, and after the third violation, a notice of termination 

from the Re-Entry Program was filed with the trial court. After admitting the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 5 of 6

violations, the trial court ordered that Lunsford’s participation in the Re-Entry 

Program be terminated. Id. at 78. 

[8] Although Lunsford contends he was entitled to credit for the time he was 

incarcerated due to sanctions while participating in the Re-Entry Program, he 

fails to acknowledge the provision of the participation agreement in which he 

voluntarily and intentionally waived his right to earn credit time for any 

sanction under the Re-Entry Program. Paragraph nine of the participation 

agreement for the Re-Entry Program specifically stated, “Participant agrees to 

waive his right to earn credit time for any time spent in jail or otherwise 

confined to which he would otherwise be entitle[d] pursuant to Indiana law 

during participation in the Re[-]Entry Program.” Id. at 75. Lunsford was not 

eligible to earn credit for time served for any sanctions that occurred while he 

was participating in the Re-Entry Program; he was only eligible to begin 

earning credit for time served once his participation in the program was 

terminated on September 16, 2015. He was, therefore, only entitled to credit 

time from September 16, 2015, the date he was no longer participating in the 

Re-Entry Program until October 28, 2015, the date his probation was revoked. 

When the trial court revoked his suspended sentence, it did give him credit for 

forty-four actual days served while awaiting the disposition of the case. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding credit time to Lunsford.1 

 

1

In his brief, Lunsford discusses several cases to bolster his position that he was entitled to credit time for the 

time he spent incarcerated for sanctions under the Re-Entry Program. However, because we conclude that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1511-CR-2056 | September 9, 2016 Page 6 of 6

[9] Affirmed.

[10] Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

he agreed, pursuant to the participation agreement, to waive any claim to credit time for sanctions while 

participating in the Re-Entry Program, we do not address these cases.