2018 WI 104

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2016AP2148-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Jason C. Gonzalez, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Jason C. Gonzalez,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GONZALEZ

OPINION FILED: November 8, 2018

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: August 7, 2018

ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT:

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED:

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 

Peyton B. Engel, Elizabeth L. Spencer, and Hurley, Burish & 

Stanton, S.C., Madison.

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

Jonathan E. Hendrix and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Madison.
2018 WI 104

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2016AP2148-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Jason C. Gonzalez, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Jason C. Gonzalez,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

NOV 8, 2018

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly 

reprimanded. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Jason C. Gonzalez has appealed 

a report filed by Referee James C. Boll, Jr., concluding that 

Attorney Gonzalez committed five counts of professional 

misconduct and recommending that he be publicly reprimanded. In 

his appeal, Attorney Gonzalez challenges three of the counts of 

misconduct found by the referee. Specifically, he challenges 

the referee's findings of fact with respect to counts five, 

seven, and nine of the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

2

Regulation (OLR). He also challenges the referee's conclusion 

of law with respect to count five. Attorney Gonzalez argues 

that a private, rather than a public, reprimand is an 

appropriate sanction. He also asks that the costs of the 

proceeding be reduced.

¶2 Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold all of 

the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

conclude that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction for 

Attorney Gonzalez's misconduct. In addition, we find it 

appropriate to follow our usual custom of imposing the full 

costs of this proceeding, which are $9,733.36 as of April 2, 

2018, on Attorney Gonzalez. The OLR does not seek restitution 

and we do not impose a restitution order.

¶3 Attorney Gonzalez was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 2011 and practices in Madison. He has no prior 

disciplinary history. 

¶4 On November 3, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint 

alleging nine counts of misconduct with respect to two client 

proceedings. Attorney Gonzalez filed an answer on December 6, 

2016. The referee was appointed that same day.

¶5 Counts one through five of the OLR's complaint arose 

out of Attorney Gonzalez's representation of J.C. In March of 

2013, J.C. was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), 

third offense. J.C. hired Attorney Gonzalez to represent him in 

April of 2013. J.C. signed a fee agreement, which required him 

to pay Attorney Gonzalez $2,500 in advanced fees. J.C. informed 

Attorney Gonzalez that he wanted any sentencing to occur after 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

3

September 2013. In May of 2013, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez 

and said he wanted to push any conviction past late November 

2013.

¶6 In July of 2013, the circuit court set J.C.'s trial 

for September 19, 2013. Later that month, J.C. emailed Attorney 

Gonzalez several times asking for a status update and 

questioning why the court had set a trial date for September. 

Attorney Gonzalez did not respond. In late August of 2013, the 

circuit court removed the September trial date.

¶7 On September 5, 2013, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez 

with a new mailing address. In October of 2013, J.C. emailed 

Attorney Gonzalez again to remind him to inform the circuit 

court of the address change. Attorney Gonzalez did not inform 

the circuit court of the change.

¶8 In late October and early November 2013, J.C. again 

asked for status updates from Attorney Gonzalez. Attorney 

Gonzalez promised J.C. he would contact him with information, 

but he never did.

¶9 On November 12, 2013, J.C. requested Attorney Gonzalez 

provide him with documents and information and with answers to 

specific questions about the case. Attorney Gonzalez responded 

within a few hours, but he did not give J.C. the requested 

information. From January through May of 2014, J.C. 

occasionally sought updates about the case, but received no 

substantive responses.

¶10 On May 15, 2014, J.C. emailed Attorney Gonzalez saying 

he did not see any reason to delay the proceeding any longer. 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

4

On June 3, 2014, J.C. signed an affidavit which Attorney 

Gonzalez had prepared to collaterally attack one of the prior 

OWI convictions. Attorney Gonzalez filed a motion to 

collaterally attack one of the prior convictions on October 13, 

2014. 

¶11 On October 20, 2014, the circuit court allowed 

Attorney Gonzalez to withdraw from representation, upon J.C.'s 

request. The circuit court later appointed counsel for J.C. 

¶12 On October 22, 2014, J.C. requested a partial refund 

from Attorney Gonzalez. Attorney Gonzalez responded that he 

would prepare and send J.C. an itemized bill.

¶13 In December of 2014, J.C. pled no contest to and was 

convicted of fourth offense OWI after the State discovered an 

additional prior offense.

¶14 On July 5, 2015, Attorney Gonzalez provided the OLR 

with a closing letter he purportedly sent to J.C. on October 30, 

2014. The letter used a pre-September 2013 address for J.C. 

Attorney Gonzalez never sent J.C. an itemized bill, accounting 

of fees, or information on how to dispute the fee after the 

representation ended.

¶15 In July 2015, Attorney Gonzalez told the OLR that J.C. 

had not requested a refund or contacted him to indicate that he 

believed Attorney Gonzalez had not earned the entire advanced 

fee paid.

¶16 In addition to the OWI matter, the OLR's complaint 

detailed an additional matter involving J.C. While the OWI 

charge was pending, in November 2013, the City of Horicon issued 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

5

two municipal citations to J.C. regarding his car. The 

appearance date to contest the citations was December 18, 2013. 

¶17 J.C. notified Attorney Gonzalez about the citations, 

but no representation agreement was ever signed concerning the 

citations.

¶18 On December 1, 2013, Attorney Gonzalez emailed J.C. 

that he had entered not guilty pleas on the City of Horicon 

citations. In fact, Attorney Gonzalez had not done so, nor had 

he entered an appearance in the City of Horicon cases. On 

December 10, 2013, Attorney Gonzalez told J.C. he did not have 

to appear at the December 18, 2013, hearing because of the entry 

of the not guilty pleas.

¶19 On December 18, 2013, the Horicon Joint Municipal 

Court found that J.C. had defaulted on the citations and 

assessed fines against him. In late January 2014, Attorney 

Gonzalez and J.C. discussed reopening the City of Horicon 

citations. Attorney Gonzalez told J.C. he would not pay the $50 

fee to reopen the citations, and J.C. subsequently paid the fee 

to reopen the matters.

¶20 On February 18, 2014, Attorney Gonzalez wrote to the 

municipal court saying he represented J.C. in the reopened 

matters and at that time he also entered not guilty pleas on 

J.C.'s behalf. In May 2014, the Horicon municipal court found 

J.C. guilty on both violations. In July 2015, Attorney Gonzalez 

wrote to the OLR saying he did not represent J.C. in connection 

with the City of Horicon citations, but had done him a favor by 

"assisting" him.
No. 2016AP2148-D 

6

¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of 

J.C.:

Count One: By failing to diligently pursue resolution 

of the operating while intoxicated charge against 

J.C., Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.3.1

Count Two: By failing to promptly respond to J.C.'s 

requests for information throughout the 

representation, Attorney Gonzalez violated 

SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).2

Count Three: By failing to provide J.C. a written 

final accounting and the notices regarding how to 

dispute the fee, Attorney Gonzalez violated former 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.3

 

1 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing a client."

2 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides: "A lawyer shall promptly 

comply with reasonable requests by the client for information."

3 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 

Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct. 

Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). Because 

the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016, 

unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court 

rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.

Former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. provided: 

Upon termination of the representation, the 

lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 

the following:

1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 

date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 

of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 

fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 

fees;

2. notice that, if the client disputes the 

amount of the fee and wants that dispute to be 

(continued)
No. 2016AP2148-D 

7

Count Four: By failing to enter not guilty pleas to 

J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated 

SCR 20:1.3.

Count Five: By misrepresenting to the OLR that he had 

sent J.C. a letter dated October 30, 2014, accounting 

for his fee and providing the notices required under 

former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), and that he did not 

represent J.C. on J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney 

Gonzalez in each instance violated SCR 22.03(6),4

enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).5

¶22 The remaining four counts of misconduct alleged in the 

OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Gonzalez's representation 

of D.J. In January 2013, D.J. was charged with three counts of 

sexual assault of a child. D.J. hired Attorney Gonzalez to 

represent him in February 2013. In March 2013, D.J. was charged 

with four felonies, including three for child enticement. At 

 

submitted to binding arbitration, the client must 

provide written notice of the dispute to the lawyer 

within 30 days of the mailing of the accounting; and

3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 

resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 

within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 

from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 

to binding arbitration.

4 SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

5 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 

grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 

by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 

or SCR 22.04(1)."
No. 2016AP2148-D 

8

least one of the child enticement counts was for an attempt. 

Attorney Gonzalez agreed to represent D.J. in the child 

enticement case. 

¶23 The OLR's complaint alleged that with respect to the 

child enticement case, Attorney Gonzalez did not perform legal 

research on whether D.J.'s actions constituted an "attempt." 

¶24 On May 9, 2014, D.J. pled no contest to one count of 

attempted child enticement and one count of exposing a child to 

harmful materials in the child enticement case. The State 

dismissed the charges in the sexual assault case. In July of 

2014, D.J. was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by six 

years of extended supervision. 

¶25 In August 2014, Attorney Gonzalez filed a Notice of 

Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief on behalf of D.J. In 

November 2014, the state public defender appointed Attorney Cole 

Ruby to represent D.J. in the postconviction matter. In October 

2015, Attorney Ruby moved the court to vacate D.J.'s conviction 

and withdraw his guilty plea. One of Attorney Ruby's arguments 

was that Attorney Gonzalez had been ineffective because the 

attempted child enticement charges lacked a factual basis and 

could have been dismissed.

¶26 On January 12, 2016, Attorney Gonzalez testified at a 

hearing on the postconviction motion that he had not done any 

case law research on the meaning of "attempt." In April of 

2016, the circuit court granted D.J.'s motion to withdraw his 

plea, citing as the basis Attorney Gonzalez's failure to 

understand and explain "attempt" to D.J. In May 2016, the 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

9

circuit court vacated D.J.'s conviction and reopened both the 

sexual assault case and the child enticement case.

¶27 In 2013, Attorney Gonzalez also agreed to represent 

D.J. in an ongoing paternity and child support matter. Attorney 

Alicia Nall represented the petitioner.

¶28 In January 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on 

placement and granted D.J. telephone contact with his daughter. 

Attorney Gonzalez was ordered to prepare a written order but 

failed to do so.

¶29 On January 22, 2015, Attorney Gonzalez and D.J. 

discussed D.J.'s ability to telephone his daughter. Attorney 

Gonzalez told D.J. he would contact Attorney Nall. 

¶30 In February 2015, D.J. made numerous attempts to 

contact Attorney Gonzalez about having telephone contact with 

his daughter, without success. In March 2015, D.J. wrote to the 

circuit court requesting a hearing about telephone contact with 

his daughter.

¶31 In March 2015, the circuit court contacted Attorney 

Nall about the order which Attorney Gonzalez was supposed to 

have prepared. Attorney Nall drafted an order and submitted it 

to the court. In May 2015, Attorney Nall moved the circuit 

court for attorney's fees and sanctions against Attorney 

Gonzalez for his failure to draft the order.

¶32 On May 11, 2015, D.J. wrote to Attorney Gonzalez about 

his lack of communication and inquired about setting up the 

telephone calls with his daughter.
No. 2016AP2148-D 

10

¶33 D.J. filed a grievance against Attorney Gonzalez in 

March 2015. By letter dated May 19, 2015, the OLR notified 

Attorney Gonzalez that his written response to the grievance was 

required. Attorney Gonzalez provided his written response to 

the OLR on July 5, 2015. Attorney Gonzalez said D.J. had not 

attempted to contact him since he was incarcerated in 2014 and 

that it was up to D.J., not Attorney Gonzalez, to arrange 

telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter.

¶34 Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose to the OLR his 

failure to prepare and submit the written order effectuating the 

ruling made in January 2015 that D.J. be allowed telephone 

contact with his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose 

to the OLR Attorney Nall's motion for sanctions based upon 

Attorney Gonzalez's failure to prepare the order as directed. 

¶35 On July 13, 2015, the circuit court ordered Attorney 

Gonzalez to pay $100 to Attorney Nall. The circuit court also 

granted Attorney Gonzalez's motion to withdraw as D.J.'s 

counsel. Attorney Gonzalez subsequently paid the $100 sanction 

to Attorney Nall.

¶36 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of 

D.J.:

Count Six: By failing to research case law on the 

issue of whether D.J.'s actions constituted an 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

11

"attempt" at child enticement, Attorney Gonzalez 

violated SCR 20:1.1.6

Count Seven: By failing to prepare the court order to 

permit D.J. to have telephone contact with his 

daughter, Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.3.

Count Eight: By failing to respond to D.J.'s 

inquiries regarding establishing telephone contact, 

Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4).

Count Nine: By misrepresenting to the OLR that D.J. 

had not contacted him about the paternity matter and 

by failing to disclose to the OLR that he was 

responsible for preparing the court order to 

facilitate D.J.'s phone visits with D.J.'s daughter, 

Attorney Gonzalez in each instance violated 

SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶37 The parties filed a stipulation of facts on August 29, 

2017. A hearing was held before the referee on August 31, 2017. 

The referee issued his report and recommendation on November 6, 

2017. The referee found that the OLR had met its burden of 

proof on counts two, four, five, seven, and nine of the 

complaint, but had not met its burden of proof on counts one, 

three, six, and eight.

¶38 With respect to count two, the referee said based on 

the long spans of Attorney Gonzalez having no communication with 

J.C. and his failure to respond to J.C.'s requests in a 

substantive way, the OLR demonstrated by clear and convincing 

evidence that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). With 

respect to count four, the referee said that Attorney Gonzalez 

 

6 SCR 20:1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent 

representation to a client. Competent representation requires 

the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 

reasonably necessary for the representation."
No. 2016AP2148-D 

12

admitted that he lied to J.C. when he said he had filed the 

pleas to the City of Horicon citations and when he told J.C. he 

did not have to appear on the hearing date because not guilty 

pleas had been entered. 

¶39 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez did nothing to 

defend the citations after the matter was reopened, and J.C. was 

found guilty of the two citations. The referee also said 

Attorney Gonzalez's testimony at the disciplinary hearing that 

he would not apologize to J.C. for lying to him was a troubling 

indication of a lack of remorse. The referee found by clear and 

convincing evidence that by failing to enter not guilty pleas to 

J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated 

SCR 20:1.3.

¶40 With respect to count five, the referee noted that 

J.C. was sometimes without a phone and at times was not 

accessible during regular hours. In addition, J.C. changed his 

address several times during Attorney Gonzalez's representation. 

The referee found that Attorney Gonzalez did not misrepresent to 

the OLR that he sent an October 30, 2014 closing letter, and the 

referee termed this an administrative error that occurs in all 

businesses. 

¶41 The referee said there was nothing in the record to 

indicate that when Attorney Gonzalez represented to the OLR that 

he had sent the letter he was not being truthful. The referee 

found, however, that Attorney Gonzalez did misrepresent to the 

OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to representing J.C. 

regarding the City of Horicon citations, and the referee said 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

13

the facts of record demonstrated that Attorney Gonzalez was 

serving the function of representing J.C., not merely 

"assisting" him. Thus, the referee found by clear and 

convincing evidence that, when Attorney Gonzalez represented to 

the OLR that he "assisted" J.C. and did not represent him 

regarding the citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated 

SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶42 With respect to count seven, the referee found that 

Attorney Gonzalez was working to obtain a facilitator for D.J. 

to arrange telephone contact with his daughter. The referee 

found that Attorney Gonzalez's explanation that he could not 

draft the order pursuant to the circuit court's direction 

because he could not find a facilitator was not credible. The 

referee noted that Attorney Nall was able to draft the order 

without obtaining a facilitator. The referee found that by 

failing to prepare the court order to permit D.J. to have 

telephone contact with his daughter, Attorney Gonzalez failed to 

act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of 

SCR 20:1.3.

¶43 Finally, with respect to count nine, the referee said 

Attorney Gonzalez admitted that his statement to the OLR that 

D.J. had not contacted him since he was incarcerated was untrue. 

While Attorney Gonzalez argued this was a misstatement and that 

he provided a letter contradicting the statement to the OLR, the 

referee said this was not the only misrepresentation contained 

in Attorney Gonzalez's response to the OLR regarding his 

representation of D.J. in the paternity matter. 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

14

¶44 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez stated it was up to 

D.J. to arrange telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter 

when this was not true. The referee also said that Attorney 

Gonzalez neglected to notify the OLR of his failure to prepare 

and submit the written order effectuating the circuit court's 

January 13, 2015 order. Finally, the referee said that Attorney 

Gonzalez failed to notify the OLR that Attorney Nall had filed a 

motion for sanctions against him for his failure to file the 

order and that the motion had been granted. The referee found, 

based on these misstatements and omissions, that Attorney 

Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶45 The referee concluded that a public reprimanded was an 

appropriate sanction for Attorney Gonzalez's misconduct. The 

referee also recommended that the full costs of the proceeding 

should be assessed against Attorney Gonzalez.

¶46 In his appeal, Attorney Gonzalez says he concedes 

count 2, i.e. that he failed to promptly respond to J.C.'s 

request for information. He also concedes the substance of 

count 4 and admits that he failed to enter not guilty pleas for 

J.C.'s municipal citations and that he told J.C. he had done so. 

However, Attorney Gonzalez takes issue with the referee's 

conclusion that Attorney Gonzalez's invocation of the phrase 

"excusable neglect" in his motion to reopen the municipal 

citations was an untruthful statement to the municipal court. 

He also challenges the referee's statement that Attorney 

Gonzalez's unwillingness to apologize to J.C. represents a 

troubling lack of remorse. He asks the court to take notice of 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

15

these points insofar as they bear on the referee's findings that 

Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via 

SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶47 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's 

conclusion of law with respect to count five is without support 

in the record. Attorney Gonzalez does not dispute the referee's 

conclusion related to his sending a closing letter to J.C. dated 

October 30, 2014. He does dispute the referee's finding that he 

misrepresented to the OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to 

"representing" J.C. with respect to the City of Horicon 

citations. Attorney Gonzalez continues to argue that his 

involvement with the citations was a favor to J.C., and he says 

neither party viewed the relationship as an attorney/client 

relationship. Attorney Gonzalez asks this court to overturn the 

referee's conclusion that Attorney Gonzalez violated 

SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h) when he stated he did 

not represent J.C. regarding the City of Horicon citations.

¶48 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's 

findings of fact with respect to count seven are clearly 

erroneous because they relied on evidence not in the record. He 

says that SCR 20:1.3 requires that an attorney "shall act with 

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 

He says the record reflects that D.J. did not want Attorney 

Gonzalez's representation. He says pursuant to a request by 

D.J., Attorney Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw as D.J.'s 

counsel. The motion was granted but the circuit court 

subsequently reappointed Attorney Gonzalez as counsel to avoid a 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

16

delay. Once D.J. entered a guilty plea and was sentenced, 

Attorney Gonzalez was replaced by Attorney Cole Ruby. Attorney 

Gonzalez argues that once his involvement with D.J.'s criminal 

matters ended, so did the need for his involvement in the 

paternity action. 

¶49 Attorney Gonzalez says he has always acknowledged that 

he failed to prepare a court order regarding D.J.'s telephone 

contact with his daughter. He argues that under the 

circumstances he believed it was impossible to complete the task 

as assigned since he was unable to find a person acceptable to 

the child's mother who was willing to serve as a chaperone for 

calls between D.J. and his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez says he 

has conceded he could have taken some action, but he argues 

anything he could have done would not have fulfilled the court's 

order. 

¶50 Attorney Gonzalez notes the referee found the 

explanation that he could not find a facilitator to be "not 

credible" since Attorney Nall was able to draft the order 

without obtaining a facilitator. Attorney Gonzalez argues the 

referee's finding in this regard is partially made on facts not 

in the record since neither party offered either the order 

drafted by Attorney Nall or any testimony about its contents 

into evidence. Attorney Gonzalez argues that because the 

referee's conclusion regarding count seven assumes facts not in 

evidence, this court should overturn the referee's conclusion of 

law with respect to count seven.
No. 2016AP2148-D 

17

¶51 Finally, Attorney Gonzalez argues that the referee's 

findings of fact with respect to count nine are clearly 

erroneous. He concedes he made misstatements, but he argues 

they were never intended to mislead the OLR and that he 

corrected them and complied with any follow up investigation. 

He argues his mistakes in disclosing information, while 

unfortunate, were not an attempt to hinder or deceive the OLR. 

¶52 Attorney Gonzalez acknowledges that aspects of the 

record reflect poorly on him, but he says that to the extent he 

is to be disciplined, the discipline should be on the basis of 

legally and factually correct determinations and should be 

proportional to the degree of misconduct actually proved. He 

says given his "otherwise untroubled history" the sanction 

"should be relaxed." In his reply brief, Attorney Gonzalez 

suggests that a private reprimand would be an appropriate 

sanction.

¶53 The OLR argues that the record supports the referee's 

findings of fact with respect to all of the counts on which the 

referee found the OLR met its burden of proof. With respect to 

count four, the OLR says the record supports the referee's 

factual finding that Attorney Gonzalez indicated to the Horicon 

municipal court that the reason for the default on the citations 

was excusable neglect when that was not true. The OLR says the 

referee's finding of fact in this regard is not clearly 

erroneous, and it is reasonable for the referee to infer that 

Attorney Gonzalez was being evasive during his testimony at the 

disciplinary hearing when he said, "I don't reference whose 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

18

neglect it was or whether it was excusable." The OLR also says 

the referee's finding that Attorney Gonzalez is not remorseful 

with respect to his handling of J.C.'s cases is clearly 

supported by the record.

¶54 The OLR goes on to argue that the referee's findings 

of fact and conclusions of law with respect to counts five, 

seven, and nine are all supported by the record. The OLR says a 

public reprimand is an appropriate sanction. It also asserts 

that the full costs of the proceeding should be assessed against 

Attorney Gonzalez. The OLR says although the referee found that 

the OLR did not meet its burden of proof on four of the nine 

counts alleged in the complaint, the referee did not find that 

any of the counts were improperly brought, and the referee was 

troubled by Attorney Gonzalez's conduct in regard to some of the 

unproven counts. The OLR's position is that all of the 

litigation costs of the proceeding are reasonable and were 

necessarily incurred.

¶55 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless 

clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 

See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 

14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose 

whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's 

recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶56 After careful review of the matter, we conclude there 

has been no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact 

are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We further 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

19

agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney 

Gonzalez violated the supreme court rules set forth above. 

¶57 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 

we also agree with the referee that a public reprimand is an 

appropriate sanction. Although Attorney Gonzalez has no 

disciplinary history, and even though the referee found that the 

OLR did not meet its burden of proof on all counts alleged in 

the complaint, the counts that were proven are serious enough to 

warrant public discipline. We find the misconduct at issue here 

somewhat analogous to the Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, 

No. 2011-6 (electronic copy available at https://

compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002365.html), in which an 

attorney was publicly reprimanded for giving a client an 

incorrect date for a removal hearing, making a misrepresentation 

in a motion to reopen an order denying an asylum petition and 

ordering the client's deportation, failing to follow statutory 

requirements in pursuing an appeal, and lying to the client.

¶58 Finally, we find it appropriate to follow our usual 

practice of imposing the full costs of the disciplinary 

proceeding on Attorney Gonzalez. The OLR does not seek 

restitution, and we do not impose any.

¶59 IT IS ORDERED that Jason C. Gonzalez is publicly 

reprimanded.

¶60 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Jason C. Gonzalez pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $9,733.36. 
No. 2016AP2148-D 

1