SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2803-15T1

JENNINE DATTOLI, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCOTT A. DATTOLI,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted May 4, 2017 - Decided 

Before Judges Whipple and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic 

County, Docket No. FM-16-1428-15.

Scott A. Dattoli, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from a default judgment of divorce filed 

on January 21, 2016. He urges reversal, arguing the trial judge 

utilized the wrong income for him and awarded alimony greater than 

warranted based on his actual earnings. He asserts plaintiff 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 9, 2017
2 A-2803-15T1

committed perjury during the default hearing when she testified 

defendant did not pay the family's expenses, portrayed the lack 

of a relationship between the parties' children and defendant, and 

misrepresented the number of parenting time overnights he enjoyed. 

Additionally, defendant argues the trial judge should be 

disqualified because he discussed his impending retirement with 

plaintiff's counsel at the conclusion of the default hearing. 

Following our review of the record, we reverse and remand the 

judgment because the trial judge did not make adequate findings 

of fact and conclusions of law on the relief sought. 

We derive the following facts from the record. The parties 

were married July 9, 2000. Three children were born of the 

marriage who were minors. Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce 

on April 30, 2015. The parties had few assets, save for the 

marital residence, which was in foreclosure, two automobiles and 

modest retirement accounts in each party's name. 

Plaintiff and her counsel appeared for a default hearing on 

January 21, 2016. Defendant did not appear. The issues at the 

default hearing were outlined in plaintiff's notice of proposed 

final judgment of divorce filed pursuant to Rule 5:5-10. 

Specifically, plaintiff sought sole legal and residential custody 

of the children and half of any marital assets. Further, she 

requested defendant pay: open durational alimony, the cost of the 
3 A-2803-15T1

children's medical insurance, his share of unreimbursed medical, 

extracurricular activity and college costs, all joint credit card 

debt, her counsel fees, and premiums on life insurance.

Only three documents were admitted into evidence, namely, 

foreclosure correspondence associated with the marital residence, 

one paystub belonging to plaintiff, and documents plaintiff 

subpoenaed from defendant's employer regarding his earnings. 

Plaintiff's case information statement (CIS) was not formally 

marked and moved into evidence, but was referenced by the judge 

because it had been previously filed with the court. 

Plaintiff's testimony was limited. After addressing the 

cause of action for divorce, her testimony supporting her custody 

request was scant. Plaintiff answered leading questions from her 

attorney regarding whether she desired sole legal and physical 

custody of the parties' children with a simple "yes." Plaintiff's 

counsel then asked plaintiff whether she believed she should be 

the sole decision maker for the children's health and education 

and again plaintiff's answer was "yes." No other testimony 

regarding custody or parenting time was provided and no other 

evidence to support the reasons for seeking sole legal and physical 

custody of the children was in evidence for the judge to consider. 

Plaintiff's testimony regarding alimony was equally minimal. 

She requested alimony of an "indeterminate term," which the trial 
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judge interpreted as a request for open durational alimony. She 

explained the marriage lasted fifteen and one-half years. And 

testified the documents subpoenaed from defendant's employer 

revealed his income was $175,000 per year. Plaintiff described 

her level of education, income, and stated she received no benefits 

from her employment. When asked whether the marital lifestyle was 

comfortable, plaintiff's answer was simply "yes." She testified 

the parties had been separated for five years and defendant had 

not supported her, causing her to rely upon her family and incur 

debt. Plaintiff explained her credit had been adversely affected 

by the foreclosure and she intended to rent a three-bedroom 

residence for herself and the children. 

Plaintiff's CIS reported $6,065 per month in expenses for 

herself and the children; however, based on her limited net monthly 

earned income, she suffered a monthly shortfall of $4,412. 

Plaintiff testified this budget did not meet the marital standard 

of living enjoyed during the marriage. Also, she anticipated

incurring counseling expenses for one child, to address issues 

surrounding the divorce.

Next, by answering little more than "yes" to leading questions 

by her counsel, plaintiff asked the trial judge to compel defendant 

to provide health insurance for the children, pay child support, 

pay one-half of the extracurricular expenses for the children, 
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provide life insurance for alimony and child support, contribute 

to college for the children, and pay all of the joint debt. 

Plaintiff testified that she incurred $15,000 in counsel fees, 

which she requested defendant pay. Lastly, regarding equitable 

distribution, plaintiff's testimony was simply there were no 

assets. 

From this record, the trial judge referenced the notice of 

proposed judgment, which mirrored plaintiff's limited testimony. 

Regarding custody the trial judge said:

I've heard the testimony of the plaintiff 

about the notice of final judgment, I've had 

the opportunity to review the notice while she 

was testifying and I have received some 

exhibits. Based on all of that, I'm going to 

order that the sole physical and legal custody 

of the children be granted to the plaintiff.

Regarding alimony, the trial judge found: 

I'm going to order that, as to support issues, 

first alimony, this is a 15 and a half year 

marriage. And there are particular problems. 

[Defendant] has not paid an awful lot of 

things. There are problems . . . all of which 

are going to require a significant amount of 

funds. And probably funds for quite some 

time. I, therefore, will order, as requested, 

that the alimony be what we call open 

durational alimony. And it be in the sum of 

$4,400 per month, payable each and every 

month, and that will be through the Passaic 

County Probation Department, and it will be 

by wage garnishment.
6 A-2803-15T1

In a summary fashion, the trial judge adopted the child 

support guidelines proffered by plaintiff, ordered defendant to 

maintain health insurance for the children and contribute to their 

unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurricular activities, and 

required defendant to obtain $250,000 in life insurance to secure 

his child support and alimony obligations. The judge declined to 

address college contribution because of the children's young ages, 

but then stated "the law is clear that the parties will contribute 

to the college costs in proportion to their income and assets at 

that time," adjudicating the issue.

Regarding equitable distribution, the judge only said:

Equitable distribution, the house is in 

foreclosure, so there's not going to be 

anything there to distribute. But, there are 

some debts to distribute. Credit card debts. 

And I will order that the defendant pay . . . 

any credit card debt that's in the joint 

names, or incurred by the plaintiff in her 

sole name, or his debts that were incurred 

[in] his name during the time of this 

marriage.

On appeal, defendant seeks to vacate the judgment of divorce, 

which he asserts is not supported. Generally, under our standard 

of review:

findings by the trial court are binding on 

appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. . . . [A]n appellate 

court should not disturb the factual findings 

and legal conclusions of the trial judge 

unless [it is] convinced that they are so 
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manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with 

the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice. 

[Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998) at 411-

412 (citations omitted).] 

"On the other hand, where our review addresses questions of 

law, a trial judge's findings are not entitled to that same degree 

of deference if they are based upon a misunderstanding of the 

applicable legal principles." N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super.

205, 215 (App. Div. 2015). The appropriate standard of review for 

conclusions of law is de novo. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super.

417, 430 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. 

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

Rule 1:7-4(a) states:

The court shall, by an opinion or memorandum 

decision, either written or oral, find the 

facts and state its conclusions of law thereon 

in all actions tried without a jury, on every 

motion decided by a written order that is 

appealable as of right, and also as required 

by R. 3:29. The court shall thereupon enter 

or direct the entry of the appropriate 

judgment.

Specific to the issues raised in this matrimonial matter, our 

Supreme Court has stated "[w]hen analyzing whether [open 

durational] alimony is appropriate, the trial court is required 

to make findings of fact and to state specific reasons in support 

of its conclusion." See Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015).
8 A-2803-15T1

Failure to make explicit findings and clear statements of reasoning 

"'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, and 

the appellate court.'" Ibid. The court is required to "state 

clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant 

legal conclusions." Ibid. "An alimony award that lacks 

consideration of the factors set forth in [the statute] is 

inadequate." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 26 (2000). N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(b) requires the trial court to consider fourteen factors 

in making an award of alimony, specifically stating "[i]n each 

case where the court is asked to make an award of alimony, the 

court shall consider and assess evidence with respect to all 

relevant statutory factors." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) enumerates thirteen factors for consideration of the best interests of the children in awarding custody 

and parenting time. A custody determination, even in the context 

of a default proceeding, requires special care to assure the best 

interests of the children. This is because "[a] judgment, whether 

reached by consent or adjudication, embodies a best interests 

determination." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. 

Div. 1993). 

This is especially so when a court awards a parent sole legal 

and physical custody. Similarly, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 states: "[t]he 

Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public policy of 
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this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing 

contact with both parents after the parents have separated." See

also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 494 (1981) and Terry v. Terry, 270 

N.J. Super. 105, 119 (App. Div. 1994). See also Pascale v. 

Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 597 (1995). Therefore, an award of sole 

legal and residential custody, while permissible, is a departure 

from the legislative intent that must be explained in a trial 

court's findings. 

Similarly, an award of equitable distribution pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 requires consideration of sixteen factors 

under the statute and an award of counsel fees requires 

consideration of the nine factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c). 

We reverse the January 21, 2016 judgment because the trial 

judge made virtually no findings and did not apply the law as a 

part of his decision making process. Additionally, where the 

trial judge did make findings, they were either inconsistent with 

judgment or in error. 

For instance, the judgment signed by the judge requires 

defendant to procure $250,000 of life insurance coverage to insure 

his child support obligation and $250,000 of coverage for his 

alimony obligation. Yet, the judge's findings were: "I will order 

that the defendant secure and maintain $250,000 of life insurance. 

That's not a lot of insurance when it [has] to insure four people, 
10 A-2803-15T1

being the plaintiff and the three children." Similarly, the 

judgment awards counsel fees of $15,000 to the plaintiff pursuant 

to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4), which is a mechanism for the award of 

counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in a domestic violence 

action, not this divorce matter. 

We recognize the judgment was borne of a default hearing in 

which defendant did not appear or participate and where plaintiff 

did not provide copious amounts of information. But even in a 

default proceeding, plaintiff must provide the court with 

sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance 

of the evidence and the court's obligation is to make adequate 

findings. Rule 1:7-4(a) does not exempt a trial court from making 

findings where a party is in default. 

Although the record is unclear how defendant defaulted, his 

failure to participate in the proceedings, whether deliberate or 

not, may have contributed to the paucity of information provided 

to the trial court in the hearing. However, plaintiff bears the 

burden to adduce the necessary proofs for the hearing. Regardless, 

this record is insufficient to determine how the trial court 

arrived at its decision on the issues before it, save for its 

findings regarding the cause of action and defendant's income. 

For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the matter 

remanded for a new hearing. We do not reach the balance of 
11 A-2803-15T1

defendant's claims as they are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. Rule 2:11-3(e)(i)(E). 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.