06
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S ing h v . C ity o f N e w Y o rk U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS FOR THE SECOND C IR C U IT August Term, 2007 (Argued: Octobe r 1, 2007 De cided: Apr il 29, 2008) Docke t No. 06-2969-c v

_____________________________________________ RA J K U M A R S IN G H , T H O M A S S
. M A T T H E W S , V IV E K N
. P A T IL, TRUSHANT SHAH, F ARAMARZ ROBEN Y AND F REDO J OSEPH, Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , – v. – THE CI TY OF NEW YORK, Defendant- Appellee
.

____________________________________________ Be fore NEWMAN, SOTOMAYOR and WESL EY, Circuit Judges
.

____________________________________________ Plaintiffs-appellants Rajkumar Singh, Thomas S. Matthews, Vive k N. Patil, Trushant Shah, Fa rama rz Robeny

and F redo Joseph (collec tively the “plaintiffs” ) appe al from a J une 2, 20 06 jud g me nt o f t

he Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( Ca ste l, J .), g rantingsummary

judgme nt to defenda

nt-appe llee City

of Ne w York ( the “City ”) a nd denying the plaintiffs’ cr oss-motion for summary judgme nt. The plaintiffs ar e fire alar m inspectors e mploy ed by

the City who asser

t that they must be compensate d under the Fa ir L abor Standards Ac t (“F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , f or the ir c omm uti ngtim e be c a

us e the City require s them to carr

y inspection documents duringtheir commutes. We hold that car rying ins pe c tio n d oc ume nts wh ile c omm uti ngis n ot w or

k und e r t he F L SA e xce pt t o th e e xtent th a t it inc re a se s th e duratio n o f a c omm ute . B e c a us e the re c or d s ho ws that su c h a n in c re a se in c omm uti ngtim e is demi nim is as a matter of law , we AF FI RM the district court’s judg ment that none of the plaintiffs’ commuting time is compensable unde r the F L SA. MI CHAEL

J . ANDREWS, New York, N ew Yor k, for pla int iff s- ap pe lla nts .2 RONAL D E. STERNBERG ( Michae l A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of Ne w York, L eonar d Koer

ner, on the brief

) Ne w York City

L aw Depa rtment, NewYork, Ne w York, for de fe nd an tappellee
. SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge : This case require s us to decide whe ther the City of Ne w York ( “City ”) f

ire a larm inspectors must be compe nsated unde r the F air L abor Standa rds Act ( “F L SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , for a ll or part of the ir commuting time fr om home to work and ba ck bec ause the y are
re qu ir e d b y

the ir e mpl oye r t o c arr

y and ke e p s a fe ne c e ssa

ry ins pe c tio n d oc ume nts duri ngthe ir commutes. Plaintiffs-appe llants Rajkumar Singh, Thomas S. Matthews, V ivek N. Patil, Trushant Shah, Fa rama rz Robeny

and F redo Joseph (collec tively the “plaintiffs” ) appe al from a J une 2, 20 06 jud g me nt o f t

he Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Co ur t f or the Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k ( Ca ste l, J .), g rantingsummary

judgme nt in favor of

the def endant- appellee City

and deny ing the plaintiffs’ cr oss-motion for summary judgme nt. We hold that, in t he par ticular c ircumstance s of thi s c a se , th e me re c arr

yingof ins pe c tio n d oc ume nts wi tho ut a ny oth e r a c tiv e e mpl oy

me ntre late d r e sp on sib ili tie s w hil e c omm uti ngis n ot w or

k u nd e r t he F L SA, e xce pt t o th e e xtent th a t it inc re a se s th e duratio n o f t he c omm ute . T he re c or d s ho ws that any inc re a se in c omm

uti ngtim e in thi s c a se is demi nim is as a matter of law and thus not compensable under the FL SA. There fore , we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt, c on c lud ingthat no ne of the pla int if

fs ’
c omm uti ngtim e is c omp e ns a

ble un de r t

he F L SA. In a dd iti on , w e c on c lud e tha t Sin g h’ s F ir st Am e ndme nt r e ta liatio n c la im i s w ith out me ri t be c a us e his sp e e c h w a s n ot a

matte r o f p ub lic
conce rn and w as made only in his capac ity

as an e mploy ee a

nd not as a c itiz en.The City char g es the owne rs or ope rators of inspected pr emises $210 per hour for eac h 1 ins pe c tio n p e rf

or me d d ur ingre g ula

r b us ine ss h ours . T he City do e s n ot c ha

rg e , h ow e ve r, fo r t ime spent by inspectors traveling to inspection sites. 3 BACK GR OUND F or purp os e s o f t

his a pp e a l, w e a c c e pt a s tr

ue the pla int if

fs ’ v e rs ion

of the fa c ts a

nd a ll oth e r u nd isp ute d f

a c ts. The plaintiffs a

re e mploy ed by

the City as inspector s within the Fire Alarm Inspection Unit (“F AIU”) in the New Y ork F ire De partment. As f ield inspectors, the plaintiffs perf

orm fire alar

m inspections throug hout the five boroughs of New York City . Ba sed on a collec tive barg aining ag ree ment, they are paid to complete a

thirty -five hour

work we ek, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Monday throug h Fr iday , including a half-hour brea k for lunch. Field inspec tions ge nera lly take plac e Monday

throug h Thursday , with eac h inspector completing approximately five “ schedule d” and sixteen “unsche duled” inspec tions each w eek. On Fr iday

morning s, inspectors norma lly repor t to FAIU hea dquarte rs to return c ompleted ins pe c tio n f

ile s f or the pa st w e e k a

nd pic k u p n e w i ns pe c tio n f

ile s f or the c omi ngwe e k. Th e se files g ener ally

include docume nts describingthe floor plans a nd fire a larm history

of the buildings to be inspec ted; various inspec tion checklists, forms, and r eports; and a ny
corr espondenc e betwe en building owners a nd City ag encie s. Inspectors a

re r esponsible for ke e pin g the se do c ume nts sa fe fr om t he tim e the y

pic k th e m up on

F ri da y mor nin g un til the tim e they return the m on the following Fr iday
. The plaintiffs e stimate that the collec tive weig ht of the se we e kly

a ssi g ne d mate ri a ls i s b e tw e e n f if te e n a nd tw e nty po un ds
. Th e pr e se nt d isp ute ari se s f ro m th e City ’s re qu ir e me nt t hat in sp e c tor s c arr

y the se ins pe c tio n f

ile s w ith out pa

y in a n F AI U- pr ov ide d b ri e fc a se duri ngthe ir c omm ute s f ro m ho me to
wo rk and ba c k. In o rd e r t o im

pr ov e e ff ic ie nc y and ma ximize re ve nu e -g e ne ra tin g ho ur s, the City

14

does not permit inspectors to store their docume nts overnig ht at FAI U hea dquarte rs or to start or
e nd the ir wo rk da y at he a dq ua rt e rs . Ins te a d, the City

re qu ir e s in sp e c tor s to re po rt dir e c tly to t he ir first inspection site at 9:00 a.m. with all nec essar y inspection materia ls and to sign out at the e nd of the da y at the close st firehouse. I nspectors who repor

t to inspection sites without the prope r ins pe c tio n f

ile s o r who fa il t o k e e p th e ins pe c tio n f ile s sa fe duri ngthe we e k a re su bje c t to discipline by

the FA IU. The plaintiffs a ssert that ca rry ing a nd keepingsafe inspection files af fec ts their commutes in various way s and that they should theref

ore be compensated for the ir time and ef fort. F or
e xamp le , M atth e ws and

Sha h te sti fi e d th a t c arr

yingdo c ume nts c a

us e d th e m oc c a sio na lly

to m iss
a bu s o r t ra in. Patil and

Rob e ny sim ila rl y te sti fi e d th a t c arr

yingthe br ie fc a se slo we d d ow n th e ir walk to the subwa

y station. J oseph testified that the br iefc ase slowe d his commute by “g ive or t ak e” t en m i nu t es , al th o u ghh e a dm i t t edi twa s d i ff i cu l tt o s p ec i fy

an ex ac tnu mb er . S i n gh te sti fi e d th at c arr

yingthe do c ume nts c a

us e d h im o c c a sio na lly

to m iss the su

bw ay and that, a s a
re s u l t , h e h adt o p l an fo r t we n ty o r t h i rt y m i nu t es ex trat i m e f

o r h i s co m mu t e e ac hwa y . S i n gh further testified that he would sometimes take the subway in the opposite direction of where he
w a s h e a d i n gi no r d e r

t o b o ar d a tr a i nw i thf

e w e r p e o p l e an d

m o r e s p a c e f

o r h i s b r i e f c a s e . In addition, severa l inspectors complaine d that keepingthe documents saf e af ter wor k hours was inc onve nie nt, pr e ve nti ngthe m f ro m atte nd ingso c ia l e ve nts be c a us e the y ha d to g o d ir e c tly

ho me in order to e nsure the sa fety of the doc uments. The plaintiffs do not asse rt that they wer e assig ned any

other e mploy

ment-re lated tasks duringtheir commutes. Se pa rate ly , Si ng h c on te nd s th at th e City vio late d h is F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts wh e n it suspended him without pay for thirty day s in alleg ed re taliation for voicingconce rns re g arding5

the City ’s a

bo ve -d e sc ri be d p oli c y

a s w e ll a s it s p oli c y

of re ta ini ngins pe c tor s in

“ pr ov isi on a l” status fo r l on g e r t

ha n n ine months
. Singh complaine d to various supervisors a nd fire de partment officia ls on severa l occa sions in 2000 and 2001 about the re quirement that inspec tors transport and saf eguard inspec tion documents, stating his belief that the pra ctice violate d the FL SA. Followingthose complaints, on April 2, 2001, Singh re ported to his first inspection site without inspection documents. He nry Gittlit z, then-FAI

U manag er, infor

med Singh that his ac tions were a “de reliction of duty” and c autioned that any repe at behavior would result in administrative char g es. In J une 2001, Singh wrote on his time sheets that his workda y beg an and e nded at home. Deputy

Chief Fir e Inspector B arr ington B rown dire cted Sing h to discontinue this practice and informe d him that his behavior could lea d to administrative and cr iminal charg es. Singh w as l at er s u s p en d edfo r t h i rt y

d ay s wi th o u tp ay

o nJ u l y 1 3 , 2 0 0 1
. T h e f

i re d ep art m en tp ro v i d edS i n gh with a memora

ndum detailing the five c harg es ag ainst him on August 6, 2001. This litigation beg an shortly

there afte r. The district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt in favor of

the City on both the FL SA and the Fir st Amendment reta liation claims. See Singh v . Ci ty of N e w York, 418 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S .D .N .Y . 2 00 5) . O n th e F L SA c la im, the dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th a t or din ary

c omm uti ngtim e is not compensable under the FL SA beca use the Portal-to-Porta l Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. , specific ally

excludes “trave ling to and f rom the ac tual place of per formanc e of the principal activity [of employ

ment],” Singh , 4 1 8 F. S u

p p . 2 d at3 9 6 , b u tan y

wo rkco mp l et edd

uri n g a commute that is “integ ral a nd indispensable” to a

principal a ctivity

of employ

ment falls outside that exclusion, id. at 397. The c ourt then found that e ven if c arr ying a nd possessing inspe ction files was ne cessa

ry for the inspe ctors to per form their jobs, “that fac t without more does notThe district cour t also analy

zed claims for c ompensation under the FL SA for 2 administrative duties perf ormed outside of nor

mal workinghours and f

or state- law re taliation and fr e e do m of

sp e e c h v iol atio ns . T ho se c la ims are no t on a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t. 6 make this ac tivity

‘integ ral a

nd indispensable’ to the pr incipal ac tivity of the inspec tions.” Id. at 399. The district cour

t further conclude d that any

additional commuting time as a result of
c arr yingthe br ie fc a se s w a s demi nim is as a matter of law
. Id. at 400. Fina lly , the district court reje cted Sing h’s Fir st Amendment reta liation claim, expl aining that his speech w as not constitutionally

protec ted bec ause Sing h voiced c oncer ns only as an e mploy ee upon matters of persona l interest and not as a citizen upon matters of public conc ern. Id. at 404-05. 2 DI SCU SSIO N On a pp e a l, t he pla int if

fs argue that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in c on c lud ing : ( 1) tha

t th e ir
c omm uti ngtim e wa s n ot c omp e ns a ble un de r t

he F L SA; and

(2 ) t hat Sin g h’ s r e ta liatio n c la im fails bec ause he did not eng ag e in protec ted spee ch on a matter of public c oncer n. This Court
re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt d e no vo , v ie wi ngthe fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t favor able to the non- moving pa rty and re solving a ll factua l ambiguities in its favor. See Bu ffa lo Teachers Fe d’n v. Tobe , 4 64 F .3 d 3 62 , 3 67 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Sum mary jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr iate only if we c onclude that the c ase pr esents “no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). I. F LSACl aim We a na ly ze t he pla int if

fs ’ F L SA c la im i n tw o p art s: whe the r t he pla int if

fs are e nti tle d to compensation for their entire commute bec ause the City require s them to carr

y inspection documents duringtheir commute; and if not, whe ther the pla intiffs are entitled to compensation f o r an y ad dit ion al commuting time re sulting fr om the City ’s policy
.7

A. All Commuting T

ime The F L SA “guara

ntee[s] compensation for all work or employ ment eng ag ed in by employ ees c overe d by

the Act.” Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Musc oda Local No. 123 , 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944). Thoug h Congr ess has ne ver e x plicitly define d what constitutes work under the FL SA, the Supreme Court has g ener ally descr ibed work a s “phy sical or menta l exertion (whe ther burde nsome or not) c ontrolled or re quired by the employ er a

nd pursued ne cessa

rily and primarily for the be nefit of the e mploy er a nd his business.” Id. a t 59 8; se e als o Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc

. , 514 F.3d 280, 285 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Howe ver, e x ertion is not nece ssarily require d for a n activity to be compensa

ble bec ause “ an employ er, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or

to do nothing but wait for something to ha

ppen.” Armour &Co. v. W antock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). The issue is whether the “time is spent predominantly for the e mploy er’ s benef it or for the e mploy ee’ s [which] is a question depende nt upon all the circ umstances of the
case .” Id. ; see also Re ich v. S. New England Telec omms. Corp. , 121 F.3d 58, 64- 65 (2d Cir. 1997). Be cause the ac tivity at issue her e occ urs outside the sche duled workda y , the Portal-toPortal Act, which a

mended the F L SA, adds a fur ther obstac le to the plaintiffs’ potential r ecove ry . The Portal-to-Porta l Act exempts employ ers f rom compensating e mploy ees unde r the F L SA “for
or on ac count of” time spent “trave ling to and f rom the ac tual place of per formanc e of the principal a ctivity

or ac tiviti es” of

employ ment and any

activities which a

re “ preliminary

to or postlim inary

to said principal ac tivity

or ac tiviti es.” 29 U .S.C. § 254(a). The Supre me Court has interpre ted this provision to m ean that “any activity that is ‘integ ral a

nd indispensable’ to a ‘principa l activity ’ is itself a ‘pr incipal ac tivity .’” IBP, Inc . v. Alvare z , 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005).Our holdingdoes not aff ect the status of inspectors’ tr avel be tween inspe ction sites 4 duringnormal workinghours, which r emains fully compensa

ble under the FL SA. See 29 C.F .R. § 785.38 (“Time spe nt by an employ ee in tra

vel as pa rt of his principal a ctivity , such as tra vel from job site to job site during the workda y , must be counted a s hours worke d.”). 8 Ac c or din g ly , w hil e e mpl oye e s n e e d n ot b e c omp e ns a te d “ fo r o r o n a c c ount o f” c omm uti ngto
and fr om w or k, the y mus t be c omp e ns a te d f

or any wo rk pe rf or me d d ur inga c omm ute that is “integ ral a

nd indispensable” to a

principal a ctivity

of their e mploy

ment. Se e Re ic h v . N. Y

. Ci ty Transit Auth. , 45 F.3d 646, 651 ( 2d Cir. 1995); Smith v. Aztec W ell Servic ing Co. , 462 F.3d 1274, 12 87 (1 0th

Cir . 2 00 6) ; Ai k

e n v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 1 90 F .3 d 7 53 , 7 58 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.41 (“Any

work whic h an employ ee is re quired to per form while tra veling must, of
course , be counte d as hours wor ked.”)
. In s ho rt , in

or de r f or the pla int if

fs to p re va il und e r t

he F L SA, a s ame nd e d b y the Por ta lto-Portal Act, they

must demonstrate that ca rry ing inspe ction documents duringa commute: (1) constitutes work under

the FL SA and (2) is a

n integ ral a

nd indispensable par

t of their inspec ting dutie s. F or

the re a so ns e xpla ine d b e low , w e c on c lud e tha t th e me re c arr

yingof a br ie fc a se wi tho ut a ny oth e r a c tiv e e mpl oy

me nt- re late d r e sp on sib ili tie s d oe s n ot t ra ns fo rm the pla int if

fs ’ entire c ommute into work. 4 As noted ea

rlier, whe ther a

n employ ee’ s expenditure of time is considere d work unde r the FL SA turns in part on whethe r that time is spent predominantly for the be nefit of the e mploy er or the e mpl oy e e . A lth ou g h w e have no t pr e vio us ly a pp lie d th e pr e do min ant b e ne fi t st and ard to commuting time, we find useful guidance from F L SA case s applying this test in other c ontext s. For example, courts fre quently apply the pre dominant benef

it standard in the conte x t of employ ee br eak time, whe re e mploy ees ha ve soug ht compensation for their bre aks bec ause,Simi larly , the pre dominant benef it test is often applied in the context of on-ca ll tim e, 5 wher e employ ees ha

ve soug ht compensation for time spent “on ca ll” beca use their e mploy er restric ted their a

bility to use time fre ely

for their own bene fit. See, e .g. , Rutlin v. Prime Succe ssion, Inc. , 220 F.3d 737 ( 6th Cir. 2000). 9 though r elieved f

rom normal duties, they

rema in responsible for

cer tain employ

ment-re lated functions. In these c ases, c ourts have distinguished betwe en employ er r equire ments that

5 substantially

hinder a n employ ee’ s ability

to use the time fre ely

and those re quirements that plac e only a minimal burden on the e mploy ee’ s use of time. Thus, in Reich v . Southern New England Telecomm unications Corp. , 1 21 F .3 d at 64 -6 6, we he ld t hat e mpl oy e e s w ho we re re qu ir e d to
rema in at their outdoor wor k site duringtheir lunch bre aks to maintain public safe ty and provide
secur ity must be compensate d for that time bec ause it wa s spent predominantly for the be nefit of the employ er. In that situation, we noted that althoug h the employ ees w ere otherwise f ree to eat their lunch, they

lacke d flexibi lity

with reg ard to the lunc h brea k and their pr esenc e at the w ork site was indispensable. Id. at 65. I mportantly , we disting uished those circ umstances f rom sever al ca ses dec ided by other
c ir c uit s w he re e mpl oye e s, tho ug h r e ta ini ngso me e mpl oy me nt d uti e s, we re signif

ic antl y le ss burdene d such that the bre ak time re mained pre dominantly for the e mploy ees’ benef it. Id. at 66. For example, in Hill v. United States , 751 F.2d 810 ( 6th Cir. 1984), the Six th Circuit held that the Postal S ervic e did not need to c ompensate a letter c arr ier for

his lunch break duringwhich he
rema ined ac countable f

or the saf ety of undeliver ed mail and ha d to car ry with him various postal items and rec eipts. Id. at 81 4- 15 . T he c ourt re a so ne d th a t th e se burd e ns did “ no t r e qu ir e him

to eng ag e in any

substantial activities or interfe re w ith his l unch per iod to such an extent that the FL SA would require compensation.” Id. L ikewise, seve ral other circ uits have held that police10

of fi c e rs ne e d n ot b e c omp e ns ate d f or me a l ti me duri ngwh ic h th e y we re re qu ir e d to re ma in i n
un if or m and to r e sp on d to c a lls fo r a ssi sta nc e and inq uir ie s f ro m th e pu

bli c , b e c a us e tho se minimal restrictions, though be nefitting the employ er, still permitted the off icer s flexibi lity

and independe nce suc h that they predominantly

benef itted from the time. See, e .g. , Ave ry v. City of Talladega , 2 4 F .3 d 1 33 7, 13 47 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 4) ; Ar

mi tage v . Ci ty

of E mp or ia , 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992). This case is significa

ntly more similar to these latter case s than to Southern New England Telecomm unications
. Carry ing a briefc ase dur ing a

commute pre sents only

a minimal burden on the inspectors, pe rmitting them fr eely to use their commuting time as they otherwise w ould have without the briefc ase. Whether it be rea ding, listeningto music, eating , runningerr ands, or whateve r else the plaintiffs choose to do, their use of the c ommuting time is materially unaltere d. Whil e the City

c e rt a inl y be ne fi ts f ro m th e pla int if

fs ’ c arr yingthe se mate ri a ls, it c ann ot b e sa id that the City

is the predominant bene ficiar y of this time. We a c kn ow le dg e that th e c on str a int s o f c omm uti ngmay lim it a n e mpl oy e e ’s a

bil ity to
us e c omm

uti ngtim e a s f

re e ly a s in oth e r c on te xts, s uc h a s d ur inga br e ak. B ut t

ho se c on str a int s, which ar e norma l incidents of employ ment, see 29 C.F.R. § 785.35, should not factor into the predominant be nefit test, just as the constra ints of a re mote work site should not fac tor into the test for a worke r who c annot use his bre ak time as fr eely as he c ould with a more c onvenient work site. In the commuting c ontext , we be lieve that the a ppropriate application of the pr e do min ant b e ne fi t te st i s w he the r a n e mpl oy e r’ s r e str ic tio ns hin de r t he e mpl oy e e s’ a

bil ity to use their c ommuting time as they otherwise w ould have ha d there been no w ork-r elated restric tions. Base d on this test, we conclude that the mere car rying of inspection documents doesThe leg islative history of the Employ ee Commuting F lexi bility Act of 1996 ( “ECFA ”), 6 wh ic h ame nd e d th e Por

ta l- to- Por ta l A c t w ithre g ard

to t he us e of e mpl oy e r- pr ov ide d v e hic le s, provides fur

ther support for

our conc lusion. The ECFA e x empts employ ers f rom compensating employ ees f

or the use of

an employ er’ s vehicle f

or trave l (and for

activities incidental to that use) so lon g a s th e tr ave l is wi thi n th e no rm a l c omm uti ngare a fo r t he e mpl oy e r’ s b us ine ss a

nd the us e of the ve hicle is subject to an a g ree ment betwee n the employ er a nd the employ ee ( or repr esentative). See 29 U. S.C. § 2 54 (a ). Al tho ug h th e ECF A c on te xt dif fe rs fr om o ur

c a se beca use of the voluntar

y ag ree ment require ment, the House Repor t for the ECF A makes c lear Congr ess’s view that “[m] ere ly transportingtools or supplies should notchang e the noncompensa

ble nature of the tra

vel.” H.R. Rep. No. 104- 585, at 5 (1996).

11 not transform plaintiffs’ otherwise non- compensa ble commute into compensa ble time. 6 Al tho ug h w e re a c h o ur

ho ldi ngba se d o n th e pr e do min ant b e ne fi t te st, our a na ly sis in many way s rese mbles a demi nim is test. I n an ana logous c ase, the Six th Circuit held that police office rs nee d not be compensated for the ir entire c ommuting time, duringwhich they wer e require d to monitor poli ce r adios in order to respond to emer g encie s, beca use “the amount of work involved in monitoring a police ra dio during a commute is simply de minimis.” Aiken , 190 F.3d at 759. As the court e x plained, the c ompensability of the c ommute is determined by “whe ther the e mploy er r equire s the employ ee to pe rfor m a sig nificant amount of work duringthe commute.” Id. at 759 n.4. Our a naly sis mirrors that of the Six th Circuit; we simply rea ch our holding through a slig htly differ ent path. The point is t hat, under either a pproac h, when a

n employ ee is minimally

restric ted by

an employ er dur ing a

commute, such that his or he r use of
c omm uti ngtim e is m ate ri a lly

un a lte re d, the c omm

uti ngtim e wi ll g e ne ra lly

no t be c omp e ns a

ble under the FL SA. In decidingthis case, we note the pra ctical c onsequenc es of the pla intiffs’ cha lleng e. Ruling in their fa

vor could have a w ide-ra

ng ing impac t, suddenly

imposing upon businesses
a c ro ss t he c ountr y a lia bil ity to c omp e ns a te e mpl oy e e s a ny tim e tho se e mpl oy e e s mu st c omm uteT h e p l ai n t i ff s h er e d o n o ts ee k

co mp en s at i o nfo r t h e p h y s i ca l ex ert i o no f c arry i n g a 7 briefc ase. Rathe r, they

believe that the FL SA require s that they be compe nsated for

the entire c omm ute sim ply fo r t he pr e se nc e of

the do c ume nts , in c lud ing , f or e xamp le , w he n th e do c ume nts are in the trunks of their c ars or under the ir leg s on a train. As the plaintiffs contende d at ora l argume nt, if

ins te a d o f b e ingre qu ir e d to c arr y a br ie fc a se of

do c ume nts , th e y

we re re qu ir e d to c arr y a sma ll m ob ile de vic e c on ta ini nge le c tr on ic c op ie s o f t ho se same do c ume nts , th e City would still have to c ompensate the m for their c ommuting time. Such an ar g ument loses sight of the def inition of work, which must involve some level of e x ertion or lost time. 12 to work with important documents, tools, or communications device s. In the six ty y ear s 7 fo llo wi ngthe Por

ta l- to- Por ta l A c t, w e are un awa

re of any c ourt tha t ha s r e qu ir e d e mpl oy e rs to pa y e mpl oy e e s f

or oth e rw ise no n- c omp e ns a ble c omm uti ngtim e sim

ply be c a us e e mpl oy e e s mu st trave l with a briefc ase or

a small toolbox or a ha

ndheld device in order to be prepa red f or the workda y . We are not convinced that the fac ts in thi s case war rant such groundbre akinglaw. In s um, a lth ou g h th e City is p us hin g the lim its on

the burd e ns it m ay

imp os e on

its
e mpl oy e e s d

ur inga c omm ute be fo re it mus t pa

y the m f or su c h ti me , w e c on c lud e ne ve rt he le ss that un de r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nte d in thi s c a se , th e c arr

yingof a br ie fc a se duri nga

c omm ute without any

other e mploy

ment-re lated ac tivity

does not transfor

m the entire c ommute into work for pur poses of the F L SA. B. Additional Commuting Time Our a naly sis differs with re g ard to a dditional commuting time resulting from the City ’s po lic y . U nli ke or din ary

c omm uti ngtim e , th e re is n o q

ue sti on that any a dd e d c omm

uti ngtim e is both require d by

the City and is time spent nece ssarily and primar ily

for the be nefit of the City
. See Tenn. Coal , 321 U.S. at 598. Indeed, the inspectors re ceive no benef it or convenie nce f

rom the los t pe rs on a l ti me re su lti ngfr om a le ng the ne d c omm

ute , th us le avin g no dis pute that th is incre mental time is spent predominantly for the be nefit of the City
.The “ integ ral a nd indispensable” sta

ndard r equire s that an ac tivity be both integ ral (i.e ., 8 “nec essar y ”) a nd indispensable (i.e ., “esse ntial to completeness” or “org anica lly

joined or linked”) to a

principal a ctivity

of employ

ment. Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp. , 488 F.3d 586, 59 2 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 7) ; see also IBP , 54 6 U .S. at 40 (“ [T] he fa ct that ce rtain pre shift activities are nece ssary for e mploy ees to e ng ag e in their princ ipal activities does not mean that those preshift activities are ‘integ ral a

nd indispensable’ to a

‘principa l activity ’ . . . .”) . Her e, ca rry ing inspection materia ls is arguably integ ral a nd indispensable bec ause the paper work is essential f

or inspectors prope rly

to complete a f

ield inspection. See Kosakow v . New Rochelle Radiology As so cs. , P .C. , 274 F.3d 706, 718 ( 2d Cir. 2001) (holding that power ing up a nd testing a

n x -ra y ma c hin e is i nte g ra l and

ind isp e ns a

ble to a n x-r ay la b te c hn ic ian’ s d

uti e s) ; see also Mitche ll v. King Packing Co. , 350 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1956) ( holding that sha rpeningknives is an integ ral and indispensable pa

rt of a butc her’ s duties). In Ne w York City Tra ns it A uth or ity , 45 F.3d 646, we co n cl u d edth atp o l i ce d o g h an d l er s ’ c o mp l et i o no f d o g-c ar e a ct i v i t i es (e
. g. , fe ed i n g, wa l k i n g, or tr a ini ng ) d

ur inga c omm ute wa s c omp e ns a

ble a s a n inte g ra l and

ind isp e ns a

ble pa rt of the ir employ ment activities. Id. at 650-51. How ever , we lef t open the question of whe ther the handler s’ transpor

tation of the dog s to work was itself integral a nd indispensable – a que stion that is in many

way s analog ous to the transportation of inspec tion materials for pur poses of the Portal-to-Portal Act – holdinginstead that the time wa s non-compensa ble bec ause it involved no work. Id. at 652. 13 As noted ea

rlier, be cause such time occ urs outside the normal wor king hour s, it is noncompensa ble under the Portal-to-Portal Ac t unless car rying inspe ction materia ls is an integr al and indispensable par

t of the plaintiffs’ inspec ting duties. B eca use we conclude below that the
a dd iti on a l c omm

uti ngtim e in t

his c a se is demi nim is a s a matte r o f l aw, we do no t r e so lve thi s issue and instead a ssume without deciding that car rying inspe ction documents is an integ ral a nd ind isp e ns a

ble pa rt of the pla int if

fs ’ i ns pe c tin g dutie s. 8 The demi nim is doctrine pe rmits employ ers to disreg ard, f or purpose s of the F L SA, otherwise c ompensable w ork “[w]hen the matter in issue conc erns only a fe w sec onds or minutes of work be y ond the sche duled workinghours.” Anderson v. M t. Clemens Pottery Co. , 3 28 U. S. 68 0, 69 2 ( 19 46 ). “ I t is on ly wh e n a n e mpl oy e e is r e qu ir e d to g ive up a su bs tanti a l me a sure of

his time and ef

fort that compe nsable wor king time is involved.” Id. This Court considers three fac tors in determiningwhether otherwise c ompensable time should be c onsidered demi nim is : (1)In Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc

. , 546 U.S. 21 (2005), the c ompanion case to IBP , a jury 9 conclude d that time spent donning a nd doffingprotec tive g ear – which the district cour

t pr e vio us ly

he ld w a s an inte g ra l and

ind isp e ns a

ble pa rt of the wo rk e rs ’ e mpl oy

me nt – wa s de mi nim is and ther efor e not compensa ble. The Supre me Court vacated this judgment be cause the district court er

roneously excluded from the jury ’s consider ation walkingtime betwee n the production line and the place of donningand doff ing, imply

ing that this post -donning /pre-dof fing wa lki ngtim e sh ou ld h ave be e n p art of the jur y ’s demi nim is analy sis. We n ote d in re sp on se to IBP that it was unclea

r “whether

the demi nim is test measure s only the first integ ral a

nd in d is p e n s a

b le a c ti v it y o f th e d ay , o r

in c lu d e s a s w e ll a ll inte r

v e n in g s te p s th a t p r e c e d e th e n e xt principal a ctivity

of the c ontinuous workday .” Gorman , 488 F.3d at 594 n.7. Although we do not fully resolve this question her e, we believe that the demi nim is test nece ssarily only measure s time that involves work. See A nderson , 328 U.S. at 692 (“When the matter in issue conc erns only a fe w sec onds or minutes of wor k beyond the sche duled workinghours, such trifle s may be disreg arde d.” (e mphasis added) ). As we have a lrea dy deter mined that the re mainder of the commuting time does not c onstitut e wor k for pur poses of the F L SA, that time is not included here as par

t of our demi nim is ana ly sis
. Additionally , the plaintiffs conte nd that the demi nim is test is irreleva nt here beca

use of the De pa rtme nt o f L a

bo r’ s “ c on tin

uo us wo rk da

y ru le ,” wh ic h p ro vid e s th a t “ [p]e ri od s o f t ime be tw e e n th e c omm e nc e me nt o f t he e mpl oy e e ’s fi rs t pr inc ipa l a c tiv ity and the c omp le tio n o f h is la st p ri nc ipa l a c tiv ity

on any wo rk da y mus t be inc lud e d in

the c omp utatio n o f h ours wo rk e d to the same e xtent a s w ou ld b e re qu ir e d if the Por ta l A c t ha d n ot b e e n e na c te d. ” 29 C.F .R. § 7 90 .6 (a ); see also IBP , 546 U.S. at 37. The plaintiffs a ssert that their “ compensa ble statutory ‘w or kd ay ’ s tart s w he n [th e y ] be g in t ra ns po rt ingthe de fe nd ant’ s in sp e c tio n r e c or ds to t he ir fi rs t a ssi g ne d in sp e c tio n s ite (i .e ., the ir fi rs t pr inc ipa l a c tiv ity

), ” and thu s th e y are e nti tle d to compensation for their e ntire commute unde r the “ continuous workday rule.” In Ne w York

City Tra ns it A uth or ity , we co n cl u d edth atan y t i m e t h atth e c an i n e o ff

i ce rs s p en ten gage d

i ntru e d o gc are a c tiv ity

duri ngthe ir

c omm ute s w a s demi nim is , and ther efor e the of fice rs wer e not entitled to compensation for

that time. 45 F.3d at 652. Notwithstanding , the plaintiffs’ c ontention to the contra ry , then, the law of

this circuit – at least since New Y ork City Transit

Authority – is that a demi nim is principal a ctivity does not trig g er the continuous workday rule. We do not rea d IBP as ca s t i n g d o u

b to nth i s h o l d i n g. 14 the pra ctical a dminist rative diff iculty of re cordingadditional time; (2) the size of the cla im in the ag g reg ate; and ( 3) whe ther the c laimants perf ormed the w ork on a r egular ba sis. See N.Y. Cit y Transit Auth. , 45 F.3d at 652. B a se d o n th e se fa c tor s, we c on c lud e tha t any a dd iti on a l c omm

uti ngtim e in t

his c a se is de mi nim is as a matter of law
. First, as a prac tical administrative matter , it would be difficult for 9F or e xamp le , M atth e ws , Patil , Ro be ny and Sha h te sti fi e d th a t c arr

yingthe do c ume nts 10 slowed down their w alk to the bus or subwa y station, causingthem occa sionally to miss a bus or train. Jos eph testified that his commute wa s slowed by “g ive or take ” ten minutes, althoug h he admitted it was difficult to specif y an exact number
. On ly

Sin g h ma de a

larg e a g g re g a te c la im, asser ting that he had to plan for twenty or thirty minutes ex tra time for

his commute. Howeve r, the substantial differ ence betwee n Singh and the other plaintiffs is the re sult of Singh’s idiosy ncratic behavior

– including oc casiona lly

boardingtrains g oing in the wrongdirec tion – and thu s is no t ti me sp e nt n e c e ssa ri ly and pr ima ri ly fo r h is e mpl oy e r’ s b e ne fi t. We n ote that th e F L SA p ro vid e s o nly a fl oo r a s to wh e n a

n e mpl oy e r m

us t c omp e ns a te 11 employ ees f

or their time. The inspectors re main fre e to contra ct with the City throug h the c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini ngpr oc e ss f

or a dd iti on a l c omp e ns a tio n f or the ir e ff or ts c omp le te d w hil e commuting. Give n the plaintiffs’ ong oing e mploy ment with the City , a contr actua l ag ree ment may yield the most equitable re solution t o this disput e. 15 the City to rec ord and monitor the a dditional commuting time for e ach inspe ctor. The task of
cre ating a re liable sy stem to disti ng uish betwee n ordinary and additional commuting time for
eac h individual inspector on a da ily basis would be cha lleng ing, if not impossi ble. Second, the pla int if fs ’ d e po sit ion s sh owthat th e a g g re g a te c la ims are qu ite sma ll, g e ne ra lly amou nti ngto
on ly a fe w m inute s o n o c c a sio na l da y s. F ina lly , w hil e the pla int if fs c arr y ins pe c tio n d oc ume nts 10 to and from wor

k ever y day , sever al conc eded that their commutes ar e ac tually only leng thened on those occ asional day s when they miss a train or bus. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s judg ment that none of the plaintiffs’ commuting time is compensable unde r the F L SA. 11 II. F ir stAm e ndm e ntRe ta lia ti on C lai m Sin g h s e pa

rate ly a sse rt s th at hi s F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts we re vio late d w he n th e City suspended him without pay for thirty day s in alleg ed re taliation for voicingconce rns re g arding the City ’s po lic y

of re qu ir ingins pe c tor s to c arr y ins pe c tio n d oc ume nts to a nd fr om w or k a nd its po lic y of re ta ini ngins pe c tor s in

“ pr ov isi on a l” status fo r l on g e r t ha n n ine months , a lle g e dly

in violation of New Y ork Civil S ervic e L aw § 65. To establish a F irst Amendment re taliationSingh’s attempt to turn his personal g rieva nce into a matter of public c oncer n throug h a 12 Marc h 2001 conver sation with the Fire Commi ssioner whe re he alleg edly raised the issue of
“ pr ov isi on a l” e mpl oye e s – an is su e tha

t he a sse rt s d id n ot c on c e rn him a s a “ pe rm ane nt” e mpl oy e e – is un ava ili ng . Si ng h s tate d in his a ff ida vit that he wa s r e qu e ste d to g ive up his
“ pe rm ane nt” status in 1 99 8 a nd to a c c e pt a

“ pr ov isi on a l” tit le and

wa s late r a dv ise d th a t un le ss h e a g r e e d to a r e d u c e d ti tl e , h e w o u ld

n o t b e c o n s id e r e d

f o r an y p r o mo ti o n s . I t i s in

th is c o n te xt th a tS i n g hr a i s e d

h i s c o n c e r

n s r e g ar d i n g th e C i v i l S e r v i c e Laww i thth e C o m m i s s i o n e r . In a d d i t i o n , S i n g hw a s a

p p ar e n t l y i n v o l v e d i nane ar l i e r

d i s c r i m i n a t i o nl aw s u i ta g a i n s tth e F A IU re late d to the “ pr ov isi on a l” ve rs us “ pe rm ane nt” e mpl oy e e status iss ue , a nd he c la ime d in

his d ep o s i t i o nth ath e w as co n t i nu o u s l y b ei n g re t al i at edaga i n s tb ec au s e o f t h ats u i t
. As S i n gh summa ri zed : “ Th e se c ha

rg e s are be ingbr ou g ht u

po n a s a n in str ume nt t o h ara ss m e and

fr ame wr on g ly a s r e ta liatio n to my

va ri ou s atte mpt s to se e k ju sti c e pe r my c on tr a c t, my rig hts as [a] c ivi l se rv ant a

nd a bo ve a ll my civil rig hts which are beingviolated by manag ement.” 16 claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) his spee ch addr essed a matter of public c oncer

n; (2) he suf

fer ed
an a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n; a

nd (3 ) a c a us a l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e sp e e c h a nd the a dv e rs e employ ment action. Cioff

i v. Ave rill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 444 F.3d 158, 162 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 6) . We a g re e wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt

that Sin g h’ s sp e e c h w a s n ot a matte r o f p ub lic
conce rn and, a ccor dingly , that summary judgme nt was prope rly

awa rded in fa vor of the City
. Em plo y e e e xpre ssi on

is n ot a matte r o f p ub lic c on c e rn wh e n it “ c ann ot b e fa ir ly considere d as re lating to a ny matter of political, soc ial, or other c oncer n to the community .” Con nic k v . M y e rs , 4 61 U. S. 1 38 , 1 46 (1 98 3) . T hu s, “ wh e n a pu bli c e mpl oy e e sp e aks no t a s a citizen upon matters of public conc ern, but instead a s an employ ee upon matters only of per sonal int e re st, a bs e nt t he mos t un

us ua l c ir c ums tanc e s, a

fe de ra l c ourt

is n ot t he a pp ro pr iate fo rum in which to re view the wisdom of a personne l decision.” Id. at 147. Whether spee ch is a matter of public conce rn is question of law that is dete rmined by the “c ontent, form and c ontext of a g iven statement, as r evea led by

the whole r ecor d.” Id. a t 14 7- 48 & n. 7. He re , Si ng h’ s sp e e c h w a s n ot a
matte r o f p ub lic c on c e rn , r e latin g on ly to i nte rn a l e mpl oy

me nt p oli c ie s o f t

he City and ma de on ly in h is c a pa c ity a s an e mpl oye e and

no t a s a c iti zen . As a

re su lt, Sin g h c ann ot e sta bli shthe fi rs t 1217

e le me nt o f h is F ir st A me ndme nt r e ta liatio n c la im. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.