### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 14, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Ho no ra ble Ric ha rd Mil ls, Un ite d St ate s D istri c t Judg e fo r t he Ce ntr a l D ist

ri c t of I lli no is, * sitti ngby desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1426 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00126 -CV -O RL -31-KR S MOYE, O’ BRIEN, O’ROURKE, HOGAN, & PICKERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP ORATION, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ (J ul y 14 , 200 4) Before TJO FL AT and HI LL , C ircuit Judg es, and MILL S , D istrict Judg e. * RICH ARD MIL LS , D istrict Judg e:2

W e de al he re w iththe sc ope of the F re ed om

of I nf orm at ionA ct ’ s E xc ep tio n 5, co m m on ly kno wn as th e “ de li be rat iv e p ro ces s p riv il eg e.” Sp ec if ic al ly , w e m

ust de te rm ine w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in concludin g that the Freedom of Inform ation Act re quests m ade to the National Railroad Pa ssenger Corporation bythe lawfirm of Moy e, O’ Brien, O’ Rourke, H ogan, & Pi ck er

t w er e not

pr ote ct ed

f ro m dis cl osur e pur suant t o th e “ de lib er at ive pr oc es s p riv il eg e.” A ft er ar ev ie wof

the r ec or d, w e co nc lud e that the m at er ia l so ught is pr ote ct ed f ro m dis cl osur e by

the “ de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge ” an d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in re qui ri ng the N at ion al Ra ilr oa d P as se nge r Co rp or at ionto dis cl ose thi s m at er ia l. A cc or din gly , w e m

ust r ev er se and r em an d. I. BACK GROUND InD ec em be r 1995 , the N at ion al Ra ilr oa d P as se nge r Co rp or at ion (“ A m tr ak ”) e nte re d in to a

$32 1, 000, 000. 00 c ontra ct w ithBa lf

our Be atty Construction , I nc., and Massachusetts Electric Construction Com pany (“ BBCMEC ”) to design and bu ild a high -speed rail e lectrification sy stem betwee n New Haven, Connecticut, and Bosto n, Massac husetts . This proj ect w as ref erre d to as the “N orthe as t C or

ri dor E le ctri fi catio n P ro

j ec t, ” w as f

inanc ed w ithf ed er al f unds ,3

an d w as int en de d to c onstru ct ar ai l sy ste m

w hic h w oul d e nable A m tr ak to ope rate high speed train service betw een W ashingt on, D .C. , and Bosto n. T he contract set fo rth c er ta in w ork st an dard s and a se ri es of paym en t t er

m s. In 1988, Congress establis hed an Of fice of Inspector Ge neral (“ OI G” ) w ith in A m

tr ak . C ongr es s e sta

bli she d th e O IGw ith in A m tr ak und er the I nspe ct or G en er al A ct

of 197 8, 5 U . S. C. App. 3 §§ 1- 12, w hic h c re at ed ins pe ct or ge ne ra ls thr ough out

the f ed er al gov er

nm en t i n or de r to c om

ba t f ra ud, w as te , abuse , and m is m an ag em en t i n fe de ral pro gr am s an d o pe rat io ns . Purs uant t o th e te rm s of

it s st at uto ry m an da te , A m

tr ak ’ s O IGc ondu ct ed

a se ri es of f inanc ia l and p er fo rm an ce audi ts o f BB C- ME C’ s a ct ivi tie s si nc e the inc ep tio n of

the N orthe as t C or

ri dor E le ctri fi catio n P ro

j ec t. S om e of

the se audi ts pr om pte d f urthe r inv es tig at ionof

w he the r BB C- ME C c om m itt ed c ivi l and/ or cr im ina l f ra ud i n se ek ing c ontra ct

paym en ts. A m

tr ak ’ s O IGa lso c ondu ct ed a se ri es of m or e ro uti ne f

inanc ia l audi ts e va luatin g w he the r BB C- ME C’ s vari ous claim s for additional paym ents wer e proper. O n M ay 1, 200 1, the lawf

irm of Mo y e, O ’ Br ie n, O ’ Ro urke , H ogan & Pickert ( “ the firm ”) sent A m trak a F reedom

of Inform ation Act (“ FO IA ”), 5 U. S. C. § 552 , r equest which contained 21 s eparate ly num bered para graphs and which asked Am

trak to produce docum ents associated with twelve r outin e financialMore spe cifica lly , para g raphs 1- 13 soug ht various “a udits” of the Nor

theast Corridor 1 El e c tr if ic atio n Pr oje c t; p ara g ra

ph14 so ught “ any

a nd a ll d ra ft a ud it r e po rt s” duri ngthe tim e BB C-MEC had bee n involved in the projec t; paragraph 15 sought “any and all notes” reg arding tho se a ud its ; pa ra g ra ph16 so ught “ any

and a ll i nte rn a l me mos ” re g ard ingtho se a ud its ; para g raphs 17- 20 soug ht audit documents relating to a pr ior contra ctor on the pr oject; and pa ra g ra ph21 so ught d oc ume nts re latin gto t he iss ue s o f a

nc ho r b olt s o n th e pr oje c t. 4 au d i t s wh i ch Amt ra k ’s OI G h adp er fo rmedwi t h re g ar dt o th e B BC -M EC ’s N orthe as t C or

ri dor E le ctri fi catio n P ro

j ec t c ontra ct . T he f

irm ’ s F O IAr eque st soug ht a broad array

of docum ents, including final audit reports and associated dr af ts, not es , int er

na l m em or an da , and o the r w ork pa pe rs . 1 On July 20, 2001, Am

trak issued a blanket denial of the firm ’ s FOI A re que st, a sse rt ing that a ll of the r eque ste d do cum en ts w er e ex em pte d f ro m disclos ure pursuant to all three com ponent s of FO IA ’ s Exem ption 5 (i.e ., attorney work p ro du ct , att orne y -cl ie nt pri vi le ge , andde li be rat iv e p ro ces s p riv il eg e). 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(5). O n August 20 , 2001, the fir m filed an adm inistrative appeal of Am tra k’s d eci si on . H ow ev er , A m

tr ak did not r ule upo n th e m er its of

the f irm ’ s a ppe al . I nst ea d, Am trak, through a letter

from its general counsel, inform ed the firm that Am trak w oul d be una

ble to ad dr es s th e m er its of the a dm ini str at ive appe al be ca use the do cu m en ts in qu es ti on were i n t he po ss es si on of Amtra k’s OIG. On Fe brua ry

2, 2 00 2, t he firm

fil edsu itin fed eral di st ric t co ur t. Sp eci fic al ly, th e fi rm

su edAm tra k, p ur su an t t o 5 U.S.C. § 5 52 (a)( 4) (B)( i.e.,T h e d i s tr i c tc o urth a s h e l d th r e e b e n c htr i a l s o nth e f i r m ’ s F O IAr e qu e s t s : o n e f o r F O IA 2 reque sts 1-16 which has r esulted in the instant appea l number 03-14264; F OIA re quest 21 which has re sulted in appea l number 03-15535; and F OIA re quests 17-20 which ha s resulted in appe al number 03-14823. 5 FO IA ), to co m

pe l pr oduc tio n of

the r eque ste d do cum en ts. A m tr ak answ er ed

the firm ’ s Com

plaint byrea sserting, inter alia, that the docum ents requested wer e exem pted from disclosu re by

the deliberative process privilege codified in FOI A at 5 U . S. C. § 55 2( b) (5 ). O n June 7, 200 2, the part ie s c onse nte d to havin g th e ca se he ardby Uni te d S ta te s M ag is tra te Ju dg e Karl a R. Sp au ld in g (“ th e d is tri ctco ur t” ). The district court then held a serie s of schedulin g conference s, order ed that re spon se s to the f

irm ’ s F O IAr eque sts be sta ge d, and r equir ed A m tr ak to re spon d to the f irm ’ s r eque sts in gr oups : i . e. , r eque sts 1- 16, r eque st 2 1, and r eque sts 17- 20, in t ur n. 2 O n N ove m

be r 8, 200 2, the f

irm m ove d f or part ia l sum

m ar y j udgm en t on re que sts 1- 16 and o n r eque st 21. O n January 15, 200 3, A m

tr ak f ile d ac ro ssm otion for sum

m ary j udgm ent as to these requests. O n May 13, 2003, the district co urt l ar ge ly

de nie d bo th p ar

tie s’ m oti ons, e sse nti al ly

c onc lud ing that the ev ide nti ar

y r ec or d ha d no t be ensuf

fi ci en tly de ve lop ed

in or de r to d et er

m ine w he the r A m

tr ak ha d ava lid

ba sis f or a sse rt ing the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le geThe district cour t did allow the firm’s motion with respec t to two categ ories of 3 information which ha d been r edac ted from pr eviously disclosed documents: the identity of cer tain individuals named in cer tain financ ial audit statements and third pa rty business and financ ial information containe d in two final audit repor ts. Amtrak has re prese nted in its brief that it has now disclosed this material, a nd there fore , these doc uments are no longe r at issue. 6 as to the r eque ste d do cum en ts. 3 On J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt co n du ct eda b en ch tri al o n th e f i rm’s FO IA re qu es t s 1 -1 6 . On Au g u s t1 8 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt re je ct edAmt ra k ’s as se rt ionof

the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge , a llo w ed the f irm ’ s F O IAr eque sts 1- 16, and e nte re d an or de r/ inj unc tio n di re ct ing A m tr ak to dis cl ose m ost

of the re que ste d do cum en ts t o th e fi rm w ith in tw en ty

day s. O n S ep te m

be r 5, 200 3, the district court stay ed its order/injunction requiring Am trak to disclose the FOIA m at er ia l r eque ste d by

the f irm in para gr ap hs 1 -1 6 pe ndi ng a r es olu tio n of A m tr ak ’ s a ppe al to thi s C ourt. II . ISS UE Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fi ndi ng tha t the f

irm ’ s F O IAr eque sts 1- 16 t o A m tr ak w er e not pr ote ct ed

by the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge and, thu s, we re not exem

pt from disclosu re pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 522 (b)(5)? III. STA ND AR

D O F REVIE W T his Co urt r ev ie w s adis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ion s of lawr eg ar din g th e deliberative process privilege de novo and its findin gs of fact f or clear err or.7

Of fice of the Capital Collateral C ouns el, N. Region of Florida exre l. Mo rd en ti v. De partm ent of Justice, 331 F.3d 799, 802 (11th Cir. 2003); MiTek H oldin gs, Inc. v. A rce Eng’ g Co., Inc. , 89 F. 3d 15 48, 1554 (11t h Cir. 1996 ). IV . A N A LY SI S A. ARGUMENTS 1. Am trak Am trak argues that the district court err ed in finding that the firm ’ s FOI A re que sts 1- 16 w er e not

pr ote ct ed

f ro m dis cl osur e pur suant t o F O IA ’ s E xe m pti on 5 (i.e ., th e d el ib erat iv e p ro ces s p riv il eg e), 5 U.S.C. § 5 52 (b )(5 ), fo r fo urreas on s. Fi rs t, A m tr ak a sse rt s th at , c ontrary

to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ion s, the pr ote ct ion s a ff

or de d by the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge are not c onf ine d on ly to the docum ents reviewe d by the final decision-m aker. O n the contrary , A m trak co nte nds that the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge e xte nds, not onl y to the dr af

t audi t reports subm itted for the final decision-m aker’ s consid eration, but to the internal m em or an da , not es , and o the r w ork pa pe rs pr ep ar ed

by low er le ve l audi tor s and the ir sta ff be ca use the se sta ff

le ve l w ork pa

pe rs play asig nif ic an t r ole in the deliberative process and are a vital part of the consultative process. A m trak as se rt s th at

the se doc um en ts e sse nti al ly r ec or d th e de lib er at ive pr oc es s and, therefore , are protecte d by the privilege.8

Se co nd, A m

tr ak c la im s th at

the pub lic pol ic y

c onsi de ratio ns unde rl y ing the privilege m andate that these docum ents be consid ered privileged. Am trak argues that decision-m aking in large, hierarc hical organizations frequently requires co nsul ta tio n and d el ibe ratio n am ong sta ff and l ow er

le ve l of fi ci al s inor de r to ga the r an d ana ly ze da ta , narr owthe r an ge of pos sib le pol ic y

c hoi ce s, c om

pil e an d verify a fa ctual rec ord, and shape rec omm endations for a final decision. A m trak as se rt s th at

sub or din at es ’ part ic ipatio n inthi s pr oc es s r equir es the sam e pr ote ct ion of f ull and f rank c om m uni catio ns whic h is a ff

or de d to hig he r le ve l of

fi ci al s; oth er w ise , A m tr ak c la im s, the pot en tia l f

or dis cl osur e w oul d c hil l su bor din at es ’ co m m uni catio ns and i nte rn al dis cu ssi ons. Third, Am

trak argues that the district court im properly placed the burden uponit to es ta bli sh tha t di sc los ur e of

the doc um en ts w oul d c hil l c om m uni catio ns fr om apart ic ular subo rd inate audi tor to se nio r au dit or s and, ult im at el y , to the decision-m aker. A m

trak asserts that Congress has alrea dy determ ined that dis cl osur e of

de lib er at ive m at er ia ls c ar ri es ar isk of c hil lin g in te rn al dis cu ssi ons, and thus , the district court er red in requiring it to m ake a f urther showing of a ch ill ing e ff

ec t. Fo urth, A m

tr ak arg ue s th at

it s de ta ile d e vid en tiary

sub m iss ion s to the district court at the bench trial clear ly established th at the audit work papers9

soug ht b y the f irm e m bodi ed pr ec ise ly the ty pe of a dvi ce , r ec om

m en da tio ns, and discretionary

policy choices protected by

the deliberative process privilege. I n part ic ular, A m

tr ak c ont en ds tha t the audi t w ork pa pe rs r ec or d th e au dit or s’ decisions as to the m ethodo logyand scope of the planned audi t, the m ental im pr es sio ns o f int er

vie w s, doc um en ts, and o the r da ta , pr el im inary ana ly se s and co nc lus ion s, sup er

vis or y r ev ie w , and o n- goi ng e va luatio n of the audi t w ork in pr ogr es s. A s su ch , A m

tr ak c la im s th at

the audi t w ork pa

pe rs doc um en t a collaborative, consultative process leading to a final audit decision and, therefore , fall squarely

within the protection of the deliberative process privilege. Insho rt , A m

tr ak arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s narr ow , r es tr ic tiv e int er pr et at ionof

the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge is at odd s w ithboth pr ec ed en t an d so und publ ic pol ic y

c onsi de ratio ns. A m

tr ak c ont en ds tha t, c ontrary

to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing , it c ar ri ed it s burd en

of e sta bli shi ng tha t the doc um en ts soug ht by the firm we re both predecisional and delib erative. A s such, A m trak as ks the Co urt t o r ev er se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r/ inj unc tio n r equir ing the m to dis cl ose the doc um en ts s ough t by the f irm in its F O IAr eque sts 1- 16. 2. The F irm T he f irm a sks the Co urt t o a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ho ldi ng b ec au se the district court correctly

found that Am

trak had failed to car

ry its evidentiary

burdenThe fir m also argues that Amtrak ha s waived its ar gument that the district court a pplied 4 the wr on gle g a l st and ard

by fa ili ngto r a ise the iss ue to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

duri ngthe be nc h tr ia l. 10 of proof at trial and because the district court didnot comm it any err ors as a m atter of law . Specifica lly , the f irm asserts that the district court correc tly found that Am trak had failed to car

ry its evidentiary

burden of provin g that the audit work pa pe rs w er e pr ed ec isi ona l and d el ibe rativ e. T he f irm c ont en ds tha t the onl y de lib er at ive pr oc es s a sse rt ed by A m tr ak w as G ar y G low ac ki’ s ( i. e. , the de ci sio nm aker) decision regarding whether or not to issu e a f inal audit report. H owever , the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that A m tr ak f ai le d to of

fe r any e vid en ce r eg ar din g th e de lib er at ive pr oc es s e m

plo y ed by G low ac ki i n de te rm ini ng whe the r or not to iss ue a fi na l audi t r ep ort onthe BB C- ME C c ontra ct , and the f irm a sse rt s th at

thi s fi ndi ng i s no t c le ar ly

e rr one ous. Furtherm ore, the firm

claim s that the dist rict court applied the proper legal standards in evaluatin g Am trak’ s claim

of the deliberative process privilege. In fa ct , the f irm not es that the dis tr ic t c ourt qu ote d ve rb at im the standard

se t f orth b y thi s C ourt i n pr ior

pub lis he d op ini ons fo r de te rm ini ng whe the r the pr ivi le ge ap pli es . 4 Moreover, the firm

contends th at A m

trak has m ischaracter ized the district co urt’ s ho ldi ng i n th at , c ontrary to A m tr ak ’ s a sse rt ion , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t11

lim it the appl ic ab ili ty

of the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge to the de lib er at ion s of the decision-m aker. O n the contrary , the f irm argues that the district court ex p re s s l y re co g n i ze dth at th e p ri v i l eg e c o u l dal s o re ac h a d ec i s i o n -mak er ’s co m m uni catio ns w ithsub or din at es , but the dis tr ic t c ourt w en t onto hol d th at the pr ivi le ge did

not e xte nd t o th es e doc um en ts unde r the c ir cum stanc es . Ina ddi tio n, the f

irm arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n is c onsi ste nt with public po licy

considerations relating to FOI A. Specif ically , the f

irm co nte nds that C ongr es s e na ct ed F O IAin or de r to p er

m it ac ce ss t o in fo rm at ionand th atFOIA m an da te s d is cl os ur e o f do cu m en ts un le ss a sp eci fie d e xe m pt io n app li es . T he f irm a sse rt s th at

A m tr ak ’ s in te rp re ta tio n of

E xe m pti on 5 w oul d sw al lowthe ru le and w oul d sh ie ld a lm ost e ve ry doc um en t w ith in the G ove rn m en t’ s c ontro l f r o m p ub l i c s c r

u t i n y. Fi na lly , the f

irm arg ue s th at

G low ac ki’ s de ci sio n r eg ar din g w he the r or not to issu e a f

inal audit report is no t a “ decision” to which Exem ption 5 applies. In short, the firm

contends th at the decision to is sue or not to is sue a final audit report doe s no t qu al if

y a s ade lib er at ive pr oc es s a ff ec tin g any

a ge nc y lawor pol ic y , and t h u s , Amt r a kc a n n o ta v a i l i t s e l f o f th e d e l i b e r a t i v e p r o c e s s p r i v i l e g e . Ac c o r d i n g l y, the f irm a sks the Co urt t o a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r/ inj unc tio n r equir ing A m tr ak to dis cl ose the m at er ia l whic h it sou ght pur suant t o it s F O IAr eque sts 1-Although Amtrak is not a fe dera l ag ency , it mustcomply with FOIA’s re quirements. 49 5 U.S.C. § 24301(e). 12 16. B. DISCUSS ION FO IArequires governm ent agencies to disclos e to the publi c any requested docum ents. United State s v. W eber A ircra ft Corp. , 465 U. S. 792, 793-94 (19 84);

5 5 U . S. C. § 55 2( a) , ( b) . A n a ge nc y m ay a voi d di sc los ur e onl y

if it pr ove s th at

the docum ents fall w ithin one of nine statuto ry exem ption s. N LRB v. S ears, Roebuck & C o. , 421 U . S. 132 , 136 ( 1975 ); O ff ic e of the Ca pit al Co llate ra l C ouns el , 331 F. 3d at 80 2. B ec au se F O IA ’ s purp ose is to e nc our ag e dis cl osur e, it s e xe m pti ons ar e to b e narr ow ly

c onstru ed . Co ch ran v. U nit ed S ta te s, 770 F . 2d 9 49, 954 ( 11th Ci r. 19 85 )(ci ti ng Depa rtment o f Air F or ce v . Ros e, 42 5 U.S. 3 52 , 36 6 (1 97 6) ). T he gov er

nm en t be ar s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng tha t a

r eque ste d do cum en t i s ex em pte d. E PAv. Mi nk, 410 U . S. 73, 80 ( 1973 ); Ch ili vis v. S E C, 673 F . 2d 1 205, 1210 -11 (11th Cir. 1982); 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)( 4)(B) .

“ Exem ption 5 protects from

disclosu re ‘ inter-agency

or intra-a gency m em orandum s or letters which would no t be available by lawto a party

other than an agency

in litigatio n with the agency .’ ” D epartm ent of Interior v. Klam ath W ater U se rs P ro te ct ive A ss’ n, 532 U . S. 1, 8 ( 2001 )( quot ing 5 U . S. C. § 55 2( b) (5 )) . T his13

provisi on shi elds thos e docum ents, and only those docu m ents, norm ally privileged in the civil di scovery

context. Se ars, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S . at 149. “ Stated sim ply , ‘ [a ] ge nc y

doc um en ts whic h w oul d no t be obt ai nable by apr ivate li tig an t in an a ct iona ga ins t the a ge nc y und er nor m al dis co ve ry

r ule s ( e. g. , a tto rn ey -c lie nt, work- pr oduct, executive privilege) are protected fr om disclosu re under Exem ption 5.’ ” G rand Cent. P’ ship, Inc. v. Cuom o, 166 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 1999 )( quot ing P ro vid en ce Journ al Co . v. U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

the A rm y , 981 F. 2d 5 52, 557 ( 1st

Ci r. 1992 )) ; E nvi ro T ec h I nt’ l, I nc . v. U SE PA , 371 F . 3d 3 70, 2004 W L 127 4331 , * ( 7thCi r. Jun e 10, 200 4) (“ Co nve rs el y , if apr ivate li tig an t co uld not obt ai n c er

ta in r ec or ds f

ro m the a ge nc y

in dis co ve ry , E xe m

pti on 5 re lie ve s th e ag en cy

of the obl igatio n to pr oduc e that do cum en t t o am em be r of the publ ic.” ). E xe m pti on 5 a lso inc lud es a“ de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge . ” N ad le r v. United States D ep’ t. of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479 , 1490 (11th Cir. 1992), a brogated on o the r gr ound s by

U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

Jus tic e v. L an dano, 508 U . S. 165 (1993). T he purpose of this privilege is to allow agencies to free ly explore poss ibi lit ie s, e nga ge in int er na l de ba te s, or

play de vil ’ s a dvoc at e w ith out f ear of pu bl ic scrut in y . Klam at h WaterUser s, 5 32 U.S. at 8 -9 . Ina ddi tio n, the pr ivi le ge “pr ote ct [s ] a ga ins t pr em at ur e dis cl osur e of14

pr opos ed pol ic ie s be fo re the y

have be enf

ina lly f orm ulate d or a dopt ed and pr ote ct [s ] a ga ins t c onf

usi ng the iss ue s and m isl ea din g th e publ ic by dis se m inatio n of docum ents sug gesting rea sons and rationales for a course of action which w ere not in fa ct the ult im at e re as ons fo r the a ge nc y ’ s a ct ion . ” Id . T hus, E xe m pti on 5 co ve rs doc um en ts r ef

le ct ing a dvi sor

y opi nio ns, r ec om

m en da tio ns, and de lib er at ion s c om

pr isi ng p ar

t of apr oc es s by

w hic h go ve rn m en ta l de ci sio ns and pol ic ie s are f

orm ulate d. S ears , Ro eb uc k & Co . , 421 U . S. a t 15 0. T o f al l w ith in the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge , adoc um en t m ust be both

“pr ed eci si on al ” an d “ de li be rat iv e.” Kla m at h WaterUser s, 5 32 U.S. at 8 . A

“pr ed ec isi ona l” doc um en t i s on e pr ep ar ed in or de r to a ssi st an a ge nc y de ci sio nm aker in ar

riving at his decision and m ay include recom

m endations , dra ft docum ents, proposals, suggesti ons, and other subjective docum ents which ref lect the pe rs ona l op ini ons of

the w ri te r rathe r than th e pol ic y of the a ge nc y . F lor ida H ouse of Re pr es en ta tiv es v. U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

Co m m er ce , 961 F . 2d 9 41, 945 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) ; S ta te of Mi sso ur i ex rel . S hor

r v. U nit ed

S ta te s A rm

y Co rp s of E ng’ rs , 147 F . 3d 7 08, 710 ( 8thCi r. 199 8) . H ow ev er , “ the pr ivi le ge doe s no t pr ote ct adoc um en t whic h is m er el y pe ri phe ra l t o a ct

ua l po lic y f orm at ion ; the reco rdm us t b ear o n t he for m

ul at io n o r ex erci se of p ol ic y -o rie nt edjud gm en t. Material which predates a decision chronolo gically , but did notcontribute to th at15

de ci sio n, is not

pr ed ec isi ona l i n any

m eanin gf

ul s en se . ” G rand C en tr al P ’ shi p, 166 F. 3d at 48 2 ( quot ing E thy l C or p. v. U SE PA , 25 F . 3d 1 241, 124 8 ( 4thCi r. 199 4) (internal quotation m arks om itted)). Adoc um en t i s “ de lib er at ive ” if the dis cl osur e of

the m at er ia ls w oul d e xpos e ana ge nc y ’ s de ci sio n- m ak ing pr oc es s insuc h aw ay a s to dis co ur ag e candi d dis cu ssi on w ith in the a ge nc y and, the re by , und er

m ine the a ge nc y ’ s a

bil ity to pe rf orm it s f unc tio ns. S hor

r, 147 F . 3d at 71 0 ( ci tin g A sse m bly of S ta te of Ca lif or nia v. U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

Co m m er ce , 968 F . 2d 9 16, 920 ( 9thCi r. 199 2) ; D udm anCo m

m uni catio ns C or

p. v. D ep ar

tm en t of A ir F or ce , 815 F . 2d 1 565, 156 8 (D . C. Ci r. 198 7) (“ [T ] he ke y que sti on i n E xe m

pti on 5 c as es [ is] w he the r the disclos ure of m aterials w ouldexpose an agency ’ s decisionm aking process in such a w ay a s to dis co ur ag e ca

ndi d di sc uss ionw ith in the a ge nc y and the re by

und er m ine the a ge nc y ’ s a

bil ity to pe rf orm it s f unc tio ns. ”) . T he und er ly ing pur pose of the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge is to e nsur e that a ge nc ie s are not f or ce d to ope rate in a fi sh b ow l. D owJon es & Co . , I nc . v. D ep ar tm en t of Jus tic e, 917 F . 2d 5 71, 573 (D . C. Ci r. 199 0) (quot at ionom itt ed ). T he re fo re , c ourts m ust f oc us o n th e ef

fe ct of th e m at eri al ’s rel eas e, Sch el l v . Uni te d S ta te s Dep ’t of Hea lt h & Hum an Serv s., 843 F.2d 933 , 940 (6th Cir. 1988 ), and conclude that “ [p] redecisional m aterials ar e pr ivi le ge d ‘ to the e xte nt tha t the y r ev ea l the m en ta l pr oc es se s of de ci sio n-16

m akers. ’ ” A ssem

bly of State of California, 968 F.2d at 921 (quot ing National W ildlife Fed’ n v. U nited States Forest Se rv., 861 F.2d 1114 , 1119 (9th Cir. 1988). Fu rth erm or e, th e Supr em e Co ur t h as ad op te d, fo r Exe m pt io n 5 pu rp os es , a distin ction between “ factual” and “ opin ion” data. “ Exem ption 5 . . . requires differe nt treatm ent for m aterial r eflec ting d eliberative or policy -m aking processes on the one hand, and p ur el y f ac tua l, inv es tig at ive m atte rs on the oth er . ” Mi nk, 410 U . S. a t 89 . T he S upr em e Co urt i ssu ed thi s m an da te de spi te it s a cknow le dgm en t that the task of drawing a line betw een w hat is fact and w hat is opin ion can at tim es be fr

ustrating andperplexing. Florida H ouse of Representatives, 961 F. 2d at 947. Whil e it w as de lin eatin g th e co nto ur s of the pr ivi le ge in Se ar s, Ro eb uc k & Co . , the S upr em e Co urt i m pli ci tly r ea ff ir m ed thi s f ac t/o pin iondis tin ct ionby not ing that the f

oc us o f the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge w as “ on d oc um en ts refl ect in g a dv is ory

op in io ns , reco m

m en da ti on s an d d el ib erat io ns . . . . ” Id . at 1 50 . L at er , in Fe de ra l O pe n M kt. Co m m . of F ed . Re se rv e Sy s. v. Me rr ill , 443 U . S. 340 ( 1979 ), the S upr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d th at the pur pose of the pr ivi le ge f

or pr ed ec isi ona l de lib er at ion s is to en sur e that a de ci sio n- m ak er

w ill r ec ei ve the u n i mp e d e da d v i c e o f

h i s a s s o c i a t e s . I d . a t3 5 9 - 6 0 . A c c o r d i n g l y, th e S up r e me Co urt ha s he ld tha t f

ac tua l i nf orm at ionge ne ra lly

m ust be dis cl ose d and m at er ia ls em body ing of

fi ci al s’ opi nio ns are or din ar ily e xe m pt f ro m dis cl osur e. P etro le umOur holdingapplies equa lly to the documents identified by the district court a s 6 “miscellane ous work pape rs.” Although it is t rue that these docume nts were issued afte r a f inal a ud it r e po rt , th e do c ume nts a ll p e rt a in t o d e c isi on s a s to wh e the r t o c on du c t f ur the r a ud it w or k in light o f t he c omp le te d a

ud it f ind ing s and , th e re fo re , a

re pr ote c te d b y

the de lib e ra

tiv e pr oc e ss privileg e for

the re asons discussed infr a. 17 Info. Corp. v. United State s Dep’ t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429 , 1434 (D. C. Cir. 1992 )(citing Mink, 410 U. S. at 87-91)). Inthe ins tant c as e, w e fi nd tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in co nc lud ing that the doc um en ts s ough t by

the f irm w er e not pr ote ct ed

f ro m dis cl osur e pur suant t o th e de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge . 5 U . S. C. § 55 2( b) (5 ). I n r ea ch ing thi s c onc lus ion , w e ag re e w ithA m

tr ak ’ s a sse ssm en t tha t the re is no r ea l f ac tua l di sput e inv olv ed

in thi s a ppe al ; r athe r, the ke y

iss ue is a le ga l on e: w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly concluded th at the audit work papers and internal m em oranda sough t by the firm ar e not pr ote ct ed

by the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge be ca use the y w er e not considered by

the final decision-m aker. Bec ause we believe that the district court too k to o narr owavie wof E xe m pti on 5 , w e m

ust r ev er se and r em an d. 6 Based upon th e fa ctual findings m ade by the district court, w e believe that the audit work papers and the internal m em oranda at issue are both predecisional an d de lib er at ive be ca

use A m tr ak ’ s e vid en tiary

sub m iss ion s e sta

bli sh tha t the en tir e body

of c oll ab or at ive w ork pe rf

orm ed by A m tr ak ’ s O IGaudi tor s do cum en t an d c ont ai n th e co m

m en ts and n ote s auth or ed by a ll le ve ls o f au dit or s w orkin g on18

the BBC- MEC assignm ent. C ongress establis hed Am trak’ s OI G to ensure, inter alia, that federa l funds are used for its intended pu rpose and to deter fra ud, w aste, and abuse. Inspector G en. of US DAv. G lenn, 122 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997 ). A cc or din gly , A m tr ak ’ s O IGis ch ar ge d w iththe r es pons ibi lity to “pr ovi de pol ic y dir ec tio n f

or , and t o c ondu ct , sup er

vis e, and c oor din at e au dit s and inv es tig at ion s, ” to r ec om m en d po lic ie s f

or pr om oti ng e ff

ic ie nc y and e co nom

y , and to p re ve nt and d et ec t f

ra ud and w as te . 5 U . S. C. App. 3 §§ 3, 4. Furtherm ore, althoug h the district court acknowledged that Am trak’ s OI G iss uanc e of

af ina l audi t r ep orte d in vol ve d c er ta in p re de ci sio na l j udgm en ts and internal consult ations which are protecte d by the deliberative process privilege, the dis tr ic t c ourt t oo n ar

ro w ly c onstru ed

the sc ope of

the pr ivi le ge . T he li nc hpi n of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ea soni ng ( an d our ba sis f or r ev er sa l) is fo und in p ar ag ra ph fifteen of the district court’ s conclusio ns of law. T herein, the district court re j ec te d A m

tr ak ’ s a sse rt ionof

pr ivi le ge a s to the audi t w ork pa pe rs be ca use

“ [t ] he re is no e vid en ce that G low ac ki r ev ie w ed any of the audi tor s’ w orkin g pa pe rs a ft er r ec ei vin g th e dr af

t audi t r ep ort f

ro m the S en ior

D ir ec tor r es pons ibl e for the audit. T herefor e, I f ind th at the inform ation in th e audit working papers w as not dir ec tly inv olv ed in G low ac ki’ s de ci sio n- m ak ing pr oc es s. ” R/ E 177 . H ow ev er , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng f ai ls t o a cc ount

f or the sig nif

ic an t r ole19

du ri n g th e a u d i t i n g p ro ce s s wh i ch th e l o we r l ev el s t af f p l ay i n Amt ra k ’s OI G’s deliberative process. Again, as A m trak’ s evidence revea led and as the district court’ s own fac tual finding s establish, the audit work papers docum ent the entire bodyof collaborative work per form ed by the auditors and cont ain: (1) the initial w ork pl anf

or the audi t de sc ri bin g it s purp ose and o bj ec tiv es a s w el l a s th e m ethodo logies and s am

pling techniques which will be used to gather and analy ze the audi t data ; ( 2) the sta ff audi tor s’ not es and/ or

m em or an dasum

m ar iz ing sit e vis its , int er

vie w s, m ee tin gs, and/ or

te le phon e co nve rs at ion s w hic h r ec or d th e au dit or s’ im

pr es sio ns o f the inf

orm at ionobt ai ne d and h is v ie wof the r el ia bil ity of the inf orm at ion ; ( 3) the audi tor s’ pr el im inary c al cu la tio ns, f

ind ing s, and co nc lus ion s a s w el l a s ade sc ri pti on o f any a ddi tio na l w ork th e au dit or be lie ve s is necessary in order to com

plete an evaluation; and (4) sugg estions and critiques from the auditors’ peers and superiors, including recom m endations for f

urther ac tio n. Contrary , to the district court’ s finding and the firm ’ s assertion, A m trak need not cite to a specific policy decision in con nection with which the audit work pa pe rs and i nte rn al m em or an daw er e pr ep ar ed in or de r fo r the se doc um en ts t o be p r o t e c t e df

r o m d i s c l o s u r e b y t h e d e l i b e r a t i v e p r o c e s s p r i v i l e g e . A s th e S up r e me Co urt ha s e xpl ai ne d:20

Our e m phasis o n the need to protect pre-decisional docum ents does not m ean that the existence of the privilege turns on th e ability of an ag en cy to ide nti fy

aspe ci fi c de ci sio n inc onne ct ionw ithw hic h a m em orandum

is prepared. A gencies are, and properly shoul d be, en ga ge d inac ont inu ing pr oc es s of e xam ini ng the ir

pol ic ie s; this process will generate m em oranda containing rec omm endations which do n ot r ipe n in to a ge nc y

de ci sio ns; and the low er c ourts s houl d be w ar y of int er fe ri ng w iththi s pr oc es s. Se ar s, Ro eb uc k & Co . , 421 U . S. a t 15 1- 52 n . 18; V au ghn v. Ro se n, 523 F . 2d 1136 , 1146 (D. C. Cir. 1975 )(“ W e ar e not say ing th at a ‘ final decision’ is necessary for there to be a ‘ deliberative process’ which is protected by Exem ption 5. R ather, w e ci te the abse nc e of

any a ssure d f ina l de ci sio n a s in dic at ive of the a m or phou s nature of the m ass of inform ation the Governm ent seeks to protect, i. e. , the f ailure of the a ff idavit s r el ie d onto co m e to g ri ps w ithand d ef ine w ha t i t i s ou t of

thi s m as s of doc um en ts tha t the G ove rn m en t c onsi de rs the ‘ de lib er at ive pr oc es s’ and thu s e nti tle d to pr ote ct ion . ”) . T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fo cu sin g e xc lus ive ly upon whether

the final decision-m aker view ed the requested m aterial r ather than vie w ing the e nti re audi tin g pr oc es s a s aw hol e. I d. a t 15 0 ( hol din g th at the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge pr ote ct s “ doc um en ts r ef le ct ing a dvi sor

y opi nio ns, re co m m en da tio ns, and d el ibe ratio ns c om pri sin g pa rt o

f a proc es s by

which governm ental policies are for m ulated.”) (em

phasis add ed). H ad the district court done so, it would have determ ined that the audit work paper s and internal21

m em or an daw er e pr ote ct ed by the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge . S ee H am ilt on Se c. G ro up I nc . v. D ep ar

tm en t of H ousi ng and Urb anD ev . , 106 F . S upp. 2d 2 3, 29-32 (D. D. C. 2000 )(holding that the Inspector Ge neral’ s draft audit m aterials ar e deliberative m aterials protected f rom disclosu re by

Exem ption 5 of FO IA ); see al so M ea d D at a Ce nt. , I nc . v. U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

A ir F or ce , 575 F . 2d 9 32, 934 - 35 ( D . C. Ci r. 197 8) (c onc lud ing that “ co st c om pari sons , f

ea sib ili ty opi nio ns, and the da tar el ev an t t o ho wthe pe rs onne l i nvol ve d arr ive d a t those c om pari sons and opin ions are policy

deliberative.” ). Likew ise, the district court’ s finding that Am trak failed to carry

its burden of proof with re gard to establish ing th e applicability of the privilege is incorrect because the district court focused solely upon the audit work papers and internal m em oranda as it relate d directly to the decision-m aker, Glow acki, rather than viewing these docum ents as they relate d to the entire auditin g process. When vie w ed a cc or din gly , it

is cl ear that A m

tr ak e sta bli she d th at

the m at er ia l w as both pr ed eci si on al an d d el ib erat iv e in ch arac te r. For exam ple, A m trak subm itted a detailed declaration from a senior A m

trak O IGaudi tor , Ro y

W ie gand, w ho d et ai le d th e na tur e of the audi t pr oc es s and the ro le w hic h th e au dit

w ork pa pe rs play in doc um en tin g th e m en ta l i m pr es sio ns, advice, opinions , and recom m endations of the auditors and sup ervisors at lowerContrary to the firm’s asse rtion otherwise, the district court did not find Wiega nd’s 7 te sti mony inc re dib le . In f

a c t, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

c ite d Wie g and ’s un c ontr a dic te d d e c lara tio n a s a ba sis fo r i ts f

ind ing s o n th e c onte nt a

nd purp os e of

the a ud it w or k p a pe rs . 22 le ve ls o f the de ci sio na l pr oc es s. W ie gand’ s te sti m ony w as und isp ute d a t the be nc h tr ia l. T hus, it

is cl ear that this m at er ia l w as c onsu ltativ e an d de lib er at ive in 7 na tur e. Ci ty

of V ir gin iaBe ac h, V ir gin iav. U nit ed S ta te s D ep ’ t of

Co m m er ce , 995 F. 2d 1 247, 125 3 ( 4thCi r. 199 3) ( de lib er at ive doc um en ts b ro ad ly inc lud e

“ re co m m en da tio ns, dr af

t do cum en ts, pr opos al s, sug ge sti ons, and o the r subj ec tiv e docum ents which ref

lect the personal opinio ns of the writer rather than the pol icy of the agency .” )(internal quotation o m itted). Ina ddi tio n, w hil e it is c er ta inl y tr ue that F O IA ’ s purp ose is to e nc our ag e dis cl osur e, it

is equa lly

tr ue that A m

tr ak ’ s O IGse rv es ava lid pub lic pur

pose and that this pur

pose w oul d be ham

pe re d if low er le ve l audi tor s de cl ine d to e nga ge in open and frank discus sions with supervisors and decisio n-m akers for fear that the ir c om m en ts w oul d be sub

j ec te d to pub lic sc ru tiny . F lor ida H ouse of Representatives, 961 F.2d at 949 (“ It defies r eason as we ll as Suprem e Court pr ec ed en t, to the n go ba ck and w ei gh the pol ic ie s un de rl y ing the dis tin ct ionto d e c i d e w h e t h e r

d i s c l o s u r e w o u l di n f

a c td i s c o u r a g e f

r a n kd i s c u s s i o n i n s o me spe ci fi c ca se . ”) . C ongr es s e sta bli she d A m

tr ak ’ s O IGto en sur e that f ed er al f unds we re being appropriately spent, and the enabling statu te charged A m trak’ s OI GWe a re no t pe rs ua de d b y

the fi rm ’s oth e r a

rgume nts (1 ) t

hat A mtr ak h a s w a ive d it s 8 argument that the district court a pplied the wrongstandard, ( 2) that Glowa cki’s dec ision reg ardingwhether

or not to issue a final a

udit is nota dec ision to which Ex emption 5 even applies, and ( 3) that the a udit work pape rs contain c erta in fac tual information which is not protec ted by

the deliber ative proc ess privileg e. Our revie w of the r ecor d persua des us that Amtrak ha s not waived a

ny arguments for purpose s of this appea l. In addition, as discussed supra, Exemption 5 is applicable to the documents sought by the firm. F inally , contra

ry to the district court’s c onclusion, the selec tion and sifting of fac tual materia ls (as is the ca se her e) ma y itself be the pr oduct of a

g overnme nt ag ency ’s deliber ative proc ess and, ther efor e, entitled to the pr ivi le g e . L e a d Ind

us . A ss’ n, Inc . v . O SHA , 6 10 F .2 d 7 0, 85 (2 d Ci r. 19 79 ); Mo ntr os e Che m. Corp. of California v. T rain, 491 F .2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 23 w iththe r es pons ibi lity

of e sta bli shi ng a ppr opr ia te audi t po lic ie s, r ec om m en din g pol ic ie s f or pr om oti ng e ff

ic ie nc y and d et er ri ng a buse , and r ef

er ri ng s uspe ct ed

c ivi l an d c riminal vi ol at io ns to th e Att orne y Gene ral . 5 U.S.C. Ap p. 3 §§ 3, 4 . Am trak’ s OI G c annot fulfil these du ties and further these policies if the lower level staff a

udito rs’ com

m unication s with supervisors and d ecision-m akers ar e chilled by the fear of having their com m ents m ade public. N or are w e ove rl y

c onc er ne d th at our r uli ng w ill ne ce ssari ly

r es ult in E xe m pti on 5 sw al low ing F O IA ’ s di sc los ur e re qui re m en ts. O n th e co ntr ar y , in or de r fo r the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge to ap ply , the de ci sio n- m ak ing pr oc es s m ust be ar ar ea sona

ble ne xus to the doc um en ts s ough t. H er e, w e fi nd tha t su cha reasonable nexus exists , and therefore, the audit work papers and internal m em or an dasou ght

by the f irm are pr ote ct ed

f ro m dis cl osur e by

E xe m pti on 5 . 8 V. CO NC LUS ION24

Insum , w e fi nd tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt t ook too narr owavie wof the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge w he n it r es tr ic te d E xe m

pti on 5 ' s sc ope to ex te nd onlyto thos e docum ents which we re a ctually review ed by

the decision-m aker G low ac ki. I n de te rm ini ng whe the r the de lib er at ive pr oc es s pr ivi le ge appl ie d, the district court sho uld have cons idered w hether the docum ents reflec ted advisory opi nio ns, r ec om

m en da tio ns, and d el ibe ratio ns c om pr isi ng p ar

t of apr oc es s by w hic h A m

tr ak ’ s O IGaudi tin g po lic ie s w er e fo rm ulate d. W e hol d th at , appl y ing this stan dard, A m

trak has satisfied its burden of establis hing that the m aterial soug ht b y the f irm is both pr ed ec isi ona l and d el ibe rativ e an d, thu s, pr ote ct ed f ro m di sc lo su re b y

FOIA’s Exem

pt io n 5 . A cc or din gly , w e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ho ldi ng tha t A m tr ak ’ s audi t w ork pa pe rs and i nte rn al m em or an daare not pr ote ct ed

f ro m dis cl osur e pur suant t o FO IA ’ s Exem

ption 5 and rem and this case to the dis trict court for f urther pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. REVERSED AND REMANDED.