SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5183-15T2

S.H.,

1

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

Submitted January 28, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

S.H., appellant, pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Kevin J. Dronson, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

 

1 We use initials to protect the privacy of S.H.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 11, 2019
2

A-5183-15T2

PER CURIAM

S.H. appeals from the final decision of the Department of Corrections 

(DOC), denying his request to eliminate or modify contraband seizure forms 

utilized by the Special Treatment Unit (STU) at Avenel. We affirm.

We glean the procedural history and pertinent facts, which essentially are 

undisputed, from the record before the DOC. S.H. was involuntarily committed 

under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38, 

and resides in the STU. In June 2016, S.H. submitted a grievance claiming "the 

DOC is utilizing an improper form at the STU when [it] seize[s] a resident's 

personal property."2In particular, S.H. contended the STU's "Resident Receipt, 

Contraband Seizure Form 171-IIA" incorrectly references N.J.A.C. 10A:3-6, 

which generally applies to correctional facilities and, as such, does not pertain 

to civil commitment institutions, such as the STU. In a terse written statement, 

the DOC acknowledged receipt of S.H.'s inquiry, indicating the issue would be 

considered. Following S.H.'s administrative appeal, the DOC upheld its 

decision, but failed to explain its reasoning. 

 

2

In April 2016, we granted the DOC's motion to dismiss S.H.'s prior appeal of 

the STU's seizure of his personal electronic property because the property was 

returned to him prior to disposition of that appeal. S.H. v. Special Treatment 

Unit, No. A-5489-14 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2016). 
3

A-5183-15T2

Thereafter, S.H. appealed the DOC's decision to our court, and we granted 

the DOC's motion for a remand to explain the basis of its decision. On June 6, 

2018, the DOC issued the following final written decision:

The [DOC] utilizes Form[s] "171-IA Seizure of 

Contraband [Report]," and "171-IIA Resident Receipt, 

Contraband Seizure" for the purpose of documenting 

items that are seized from you if they are not permitted 

inside the facility. Th[ese are] . . . departmental form[s] 

and the use of the term "correctional facility" [on the 

forms] does not in any way indicate that you are an 

"inmate" nor does it deny you any of your rights set 

forth in the [SVPA]. Per [N.J.S.A.] 30:4-27.34[(a)], the 

[]DOC is "responsible for the operation of any facility 

designated for the custody, care, and treatment of 

sexually violent predators."

Regarding the [N.J.A.C.] . . . "10A:3-6"

[reference] appearing in the upper right hand corner of 

. . . [F]orm [171-IIA] and regarding paragraphs that 

read: "If no disciplinary charges [have been] issued[, 

you have three business days from the date of this 

receipt to send a written appeal to the Administrator 

containing information as to why this item should not 

be considered contraband] . . ." and "If disciplinary 

charges have been issued[, your appeal is through the 

disciplinary process] . . ." These [paragraphs] do not 

pertain to you as a [r]esident [of the STU]. In review 

of your time at the STU[,] you were never subject to 

discipline [pursuant to N.J.A.C.] 10A:3-6[,] nor were 

you issued any disciplinary charges. 

This appeal followed.
4

A-5183-15T2

On appeal, S.H. asserts a single argument for our consideration in his 

merits brief:

THE [DOC] ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [S.H.]'S 

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY REQUEST TO 

PURGE AND REVISE THE [STU]'S RESIDENT 

RECEIPT CONTR[A]BAND SEIZURE FORM (171-

IIA . . . ). (Emphasis added).

In his supplemental brief, S.H. further argues:

THE DECISION OF THE [DOC] IS BOTH 

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE ITS 

FORM 171-IA, SEIZURE OF CONTRABAND, MAY 

ONLY BE UTILIZED AT A CORRECTIONAL 

INSTITUTION AND PROVIDES MISLEADING 

INFORMATION IF USED AT A CIVIL 

COMMITMENT FACILITY. (Emphasis added).

Finally, in his reply brief,3 S.H. claims:

THE [DOC]'S FINAL AGENCY DECISION SHOULD 

BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE [DOC]'S ACTIONS 

ARE UNREASONABLE.

Our limited review of an administrative agency's action is well settled. 

See, e.g., Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 

(2011). Reviewing courts presume the validity of the "administrative agency's 

exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 

 

3

In his reply brief, S.H. contends he only "is challenging the validity of Form 

171-IIA and not 'Form 171-IA[,]'" but the arguments set forth in his 

supplemental brief pertain to both forms.
5

A-5183-15T2

163, 171 (2014). For those reasons, "an appellate court ordinarily should not 

disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a 

clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was 

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate 

of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). "The burden of demonstrating that the 

agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] 

challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-

44 (App. Div. 2006). 

Further, "[A]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and 

regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily 

entitled to our deference." Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. 

Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted). The DOC is given broad 

discretion in matters affecting the STU. We are not, however, bound by an 

agency's statutory interpretation or other legal determinations. Russo, 206 N.J. 

at 27. 

Both the DOC and the Department of Human Services (DHS) are 

statutorily obligated to participate in the management of the STU and the 

treatment of its residents. Specifically, the DOC is charged with the operation 
6

A-5183-15T2

of the facilities, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(a), and the DHS is required to "provide or 

arrange for treatment" of the STU's residents, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(b). The 

Legislature also directed that representatives of both agencies "participate in an 

interagency oversight board to facilitate the coordination of the policies and 

procedures of the facility." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(c). In fulfilling that mission, 

the two agencies adopted identical regulations for the governance of the STU. 

See N.J.A.C. 10:36A-1 to -10; N.J.A.C. 10A:35-1 to -10. 

Here, S.H. contends the STU's use of Forms 171-IA and 171-IIA is 

"confusing and misleading" because STU residents need not submit "a written 

appeal to the [A]dministrator [when their contraband items are seized]." S.H.'s 

argument, though well-intentioned, is misplaced. While the STU is designated 

as a treatment facility, and not a correctional facility, the DOC is duly authorized 

to operate the STU and uses the forms at issue to document impermissible items 

seized from its residents. 

Moreover, the procedures for appeal following confiscation of property 

are virtually identical for a STU resident and a prison inmate. Compare N.J.A.C. 

10:36A-3.2(b) (providing "three business days" for a STU resident to appeal "by 

submitting a grievance to the individual designated to process grievances, with 

the DOC Administrator or [Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services]
7

A-5183-15T2

Clinical Director . . . . "), with N.J.A.C. 10A:3-6.1(a)(5) ("The inmate shall have 

three business days to appeal the seizure to the Administrator or designee."). 

Importantly, N.J.A.C. 10:36A-3.2(b) further mandates the staff member who 

confiscates a STU resident's property to notify the resident of the appeal 

procedure. Accordingly, even if Form 171-IIA could be construed as confusing, 

STU residents are apprised of the appeal process. Nor has S.H. demonstrated 

that the STU's residents will be time-barred by the continued use of Form 171-

IIA.4

We therefore discern nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in the 

DOC's use of the forms at issue here. Such decisions are committed to the 

discretion of the DOC, as the operator of the STU. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.34(a). 

Consequently, we decline to disturb the DOC's decision, which is supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record. To the extent not addressed, S.H.'s 

remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

 

4

In his reply brief, S.H. included the certification of another STU resident, S.G., 

claiming "sometime in or about the year 2013 or 2014[,]" S.G.'s property was 

confiscated, and because S.G. had forwarded Form 171-IIA to the DOC, and not 

to the DHS, his time to file an administrative appeal had expired. Because the 

record does not indicate that S.H. submitted S.G.'s certification to the DOC, it 

is inappropriate for our consideration on appeal. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 

199, 226-27 (2014). 
8

A-5183-15T2

Affirmed.