alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON DC 

) 

PRO-FLIGHT AVIATION, INC., ) 

Complainant ) 

) 

~ ) 

) 

CITY OF RENTON, ) 

Respondent ) 

ORDER 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-03 

On April 23, 2015, Complainant, Pro-Flight Aviation, filed a Motion under 14 CFR 

§ 16.19(e), requesting a 30-day extension of time to file its answer to the Respondent's 

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

The Complainant advised that additional time is needed to appropriately respond to a 

number of issues in the Respondent's 46-page Motion for Summary Judgment, which was 

filed on April 17, 2015. The Complainant also stated that the Respondent does not oppose 

an extension. 

Part 16 is intended to expedite substantially the handling and disposition of airport-related 

complaints. See Rules of Practice for Federally-Assisted Airports (Retrospective 

Regulatory Review) Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 56135 (Sept. 12, 2013); Rules of Practice for 

Federally-Assisted Airport Enforcement Proceedings Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 53998 

(Oct. 16, 1996). Parties may file a written motion for an extension of time. 14 CFR 

§ 6.19( e). The Director may issue an order extending any time period prescribed where 

necessary or appropriate for a fair and complete consideration of matters before the agency. 

14 CFR § 16.11(a). 

An extension of time is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the Complainant 

is hereby granted an extension of time to submit an answer to the Respondent's Motion for 

Summary Judgment. The Complainant's answer is now due on June 4, 2015. 

Director, Office of Airport 

Compliance and Management Analysis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 1 20 15, I caused to be emailed and placed in 

the United States mail (first class, post ge paid) or personally delivered a true copy of the 

foregoing ORDER addressed to: 

Complainant 

Bernard A. Paholke 

Vice President 

PRO-FLIGHT AVIATION, INC. 

750 W. Perimeter Rd. Unit 1 

Renton, WA 98057 

proflightaviationinc@yahoo.com 

Counsel for Respondent 

Zan etta L. Fontes 

Senior Assistant City Attorney 

CITY OF RENTON 

1055 South Grady Way 

Renton, W A 98057 

zfontes@rentonwa. gov 

Hand-Delivered to: 

FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket (AGC-600) 

FAA Office of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis (AC0-100) 

~tv~ Claudia Roberts 

Office of Airport Compliance
#### Dan N. BAKER et al., Appellants, v. Harry J. MEYERS et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 19, 1954.

Motion for Extension of Opinion Denied April 16, 1954.

Napier & Napier, C. W. Napier, C. W. Napier, Jr., Hazard, for appellant.

No brief for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment denies a new trial sought under the terms of Sec, 518, Civil Code of Practice, and the setting aside of a judgment for $337.88 for the value of truck tires alleged to have been purchased by the defendants from a person who stole them from the plaintiffs. The petition does not state a cause of action.

The motion for an appeal is overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
#### East Harlem Development Partnership et al., Appellants, v East Harlem Council for Human Services, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Order of Supreme Court, New York County (Davis, J.), entered March 20, 1990, granting plaintiff Fletcher’s motion to open a default judgment entered against him upon his failure to appear in opposition to defendants’ motion to cancel a lis pendens, and which thereafter granted defendants’ motion, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff Lancelot E. Fletcher is not a proper party to any action for specific performance to enforce the terms of a development contract which purportedly requires defendant *254East Harlem Council for Human Services, Inc. to convey a one-half interest in certain real property to plaintiff East Harlem Development Partnership. While the complaint, which seeks specific performance, may set forth a cause of action on behalf of plaintiff East Harlem Development Partnership, the lis pendens was filed solely in the name of plaintiff Fletcher, and not on behalf of the partnership. As plaintiff Fletcher has no cause of action in his own right, the notice of pendency was properly canceled. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Milonas, Rosenberger and Ellerin, JJ.
#### TAYLOR et al. v. STATE.

No. 24154.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 17, 1948.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1949.

See also 149 Tex.Cr.R. 552, 196 S.W.2d 925.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

This is an appeal from final judgment of a forfeiture of an appeal bond.

There are no briefs filed in this court by appellants, and it does not appear from the record that any were filed in the court below. Under the record as it appears in this case, this court is required to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. It is the uniform holding of this court that in cases of this nature, briefs must be filed in the trial court and in this court, as in civil cases. See Art. 866, C.C.P; Rules 414, 415, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Hooper v. State, 127. Tex.Cr.R. 117, 75 S.W.2d 274; Orr v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 526, 158 S.W.2d 533; and Franklin v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 179, 109 S.W.2d 482.

From what we have said here it follows that the appeal in this case should be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
#### John Kohilakis et al., Respondents, v Town of Smithtown et al., Defendants, and County of Suffolk, et al., Appellants.

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants County of Suffolk and Douglas Mercer appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cannavo, J.), entered May 9, 1989, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for discovery and inspection of certain documents and photographs.

*514Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The appellants contend that the Supreme Court erred by ordering them to produce for the plaintiffs’ discovery and inspection certain specified documents concerning the automobile accident involving the plaintiff and a Suffolk County Police car. The appellants assert that these documents constitute police department personnel records shielded from disclosure by Civil Rights Law § 50-a. However, the applicability of Civil Rights Law § 50-a was never raised before the Supreme Court. The appellants instead relied upon the invocation of only an alleged work product privilege and later upon an undefined privilege allegedly applicable to internal police department correspondence. Having failed to raise the applicability of Civil Rights Law § 50-a before the Supreme Court, the appellants may not now raise their present argument for the first time on appeal *(see, Gunzburg v Gunzburg,*152 AD2d 537; *Empire Indus. Sys. Corp. v Northeastern Bank,*144 AD2d 429; *Rohdie v Michael Guidice, Inc.,*132 AD2d 541; *Schoonmaker v State of New York,*94 AD2d 741).

Furthermore, as to all but the alleged Police Internal Affairs documents, the appellants are judicially estopped from opposing disclosure *(see, Kimco of N. Y. v Devon,*163 AD2d 573; *Neumann v Metropolitan Med. Group.,*153 AD2d 888; *Karasik v Bird,*104 AD2d 758). Indeed, upon their prior motion to enlarge their time to perfect their appeal, the appellants asserted to this court that they did "not object to the discovery of most of the documents * * * [except] the Police Internal Affairs documents”. Having made the foregoing concession, the appellants may not now argue that all of the documents requested by the plaintiffs are privileged and confidential and thus immune from discovery (see, *Environmental Concern v Larchwood Constr. Corp.,*101 AD2d 591, 594; *Scarano v Central R. R. Co.,*203 F2d 510, 513). Suffice it to say, even with respect to the alleged Police Internal Affairs documents, the defendants’ failure to raise the bar of Civil Rights Law § 50-a is fatal to their request to keep those documents confidential.

We have reviewed the appellants’ remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Harwood, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
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|Texas - RRC District 10 Nonassociated Natural Gas, Wet After Lease Separation, Reserves Extensions and Discoveries (Billion Cubic Feet)
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|Texas - RRC District 10 Nonassociated Natural Gas, Wet After Lease Separation, Reserves Extensions and Discoveries (Billion Cubic Feet)
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|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2010's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        | 26     | 498    | 1,067  | 416   
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 52     | 244    |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
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|Release Date: 12/30/2022                                                                                                         
|Next Release Date: 12/29/2023
<Page>

EXHIBIT (4)(e)

                       ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT


         This Assignment and Assumption Agreement (the "Agreement") is made
as of the 17th day of August, 2001, between Martin Currie Global Investors
Limited, a Scottish corporation ("Martin Currie Global") and Martin Currie,
Inc., a New York corporation ("Martin Currie, Inc.").

         WHEREAS, Martin Currie Global has entered into an Investment
Advisory Agreement (the "Advisory Contract") with the Martin Currie Business
Trust, an unincorporated business trust organized under the laws of The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the "Trust"), on behalf of its MCBT Pan
European Mid Cap Fund series (the "Fund");

         WHEREAS, Martin Currie Global and Martin Currie, Inc. are
wholly-owned subsidiaries of Martin Currie Limited, a Scottish corporation,
and share the same directors, officers and other personnel; and

         WHEREAS, Martin Currie Global wishes to assign, and Martin Currie,
Inc. wishes to assume, all of Martin Currie Global's rights, duties and
obligations under the Advisory Contract;

         NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the parties hereby agree as
follows:

         1.  ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION.  Martin Currie Global hereby assigns
to Martin Currie, Inc. and Martin Currie, Inc., intending to be legally
bound, hereby agrees to assume and perform, all rights, duties and
obligations of Martin Currie Global under the Advisory Contract.

         2.   UNDERSTANDING OF PARTIES.  It is the intention and
understanding of the parties to this Agreement that the transactions
contemplated hereby shall not constitute an "assignment" of the Advisory
Contract within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

<Page>



         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to
be duly executed as of the date first written above.

                                         MARTIN CURRIE GLOBAL INVESTORS LIMITED


                                                      By: /s/ J. K. R. Falconer
                                                      -------------------------
                                                        Name: J. K. R. Falconer
                                                        Title:   Director


                                                      MARTIN CURRIE, INC.


                                                     By:  /s/ Allan D. Macleod
                                                          ---------------------
                                                        Name: Allan D. MacLeod
                                                        Title:   Vice President
UNITEDSTATESENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCYREGIONIII1650ArchStreetPhiladelphia,Pennsylvania19103-2029Mr.GeorgeS.Aburn,DirectorAirandRadiationManagementAdministrationMarylandDepartmentoftheEnvironment1800WashingtonBoulevardBaltimore,MD21230-1720DearMr.Aburn:FE2ThisisinresponsetoyourFebruary3,2012lettertotheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)docketonareadesignationsforthe20088-hourozoneNationalAmbientAirQualityStandards(NAAQS),docketnumberEPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0476.Inyourletter,yourequestawrittenresponsebyFebruary10,2012.However,asyouknow,EPAhasbeenengagingtheMarylandDepartmentoftheEnvironment(MDE)inaseriesoftelephonecallsonthesubject,includingaconferencecallwithSecretaryRobertM.SummersonFebruary10,2012.EPAbelievesthat,inlightoftheongoingdialoguebetweenMDEandEPA,adetailedwrittenresponseisprematureuntilweconcludeourdiscussions.Ilookforwardtoacontinueddialoguewithyouandyourstaff.Ifyouhaveanyquestions,pleasedonothesitatetocontactme,at215-814-2706.YoucanhaveyourstaffcontactMs.MariaA.Pino,at215-814-2181.0K’Printedon100%recycled/recyclablepaperwith100%post-consumerfiberandprocesschlorinefree.CustomerServiceHotline:1-800-438-2474Sincerely,Diana,DirectorAirProtectionDivision
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|Florida Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Reserves Revision Increases (Million Barrels)
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|Florida Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Reserves Revision Increases (Million Barrels)
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|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2000's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | 8     
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 10     | 9      | 6      | 13     | 1      | 0      | 2      | W      | W      | W     
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 12/30/2022                                                                                                         
|Next Release Date: 12/29/2023
#### Annice BELAND, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27052.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 6, 1954.

Truman Power, Jack Love, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Howard M. Fender, Crim. Dist. Atty., Randell C. Riley, Conrad Florence, Asst. Crim. Dist. Attys., Fort Worth, Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

*431BELCHER, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted for the offense of felony theft, and her punishment was assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

Reginald C. Phillips, an employee of the Wood Photo Company, testified that he saw appellant pick up a camera, place it under her skirt and leave the building occupied by said Photo Company. He identified appellant at the trial as being the person who took the camera.

Will S. Wood, Jr., testified that after Phillips notified him of the loss of the camera and pointed out appellant as she left the building as the person who took it, he pursued appellant until she boarded a bus. He identified appellant at the trial as the person he saw leaving his place of business after the loss of the camera.

Appellant did not testify and offered no evidence in her behalf.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Appellant contends that the indictment charging her with taking “one camera” does not describe with sufficient certainty the type or kind of property alleged to have been taken, therefore it does not apprise her of the nature of the accusation against her.

We are of the opinion that the allegation as to the description of the property designated an object which is commonly known by that name and was sufficiently definite to apprise appellant of the nature of the charge against her. Art. 403, C.C.P.; Smith v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 322, 98 S.W.2d *806;*Young v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 509, 141 S.W.2d 315.

By Informal Bill of Exception No. 1, appellant complains of the state asking its witness Montgomery “Are you acquainted with the general reputation of this defendant in the community in which she resides for being a law abiding, peaceable person,” which question was not answered. The court sustained appellant’s objection thereto and instructed the jury not to consider it for any purpose. Upon objection to the asking of the question, the court sustained same and again instructed the jury not to consider any reference to the question for any purpose.

Appellant did not testify and offered no evidence in her behalf. No issue being made in the testimony, the complained-of question not being answered and the court promptly instructing the jury not to consider same and the lowest penalty being assessed, we feel that under the record in this case an order of reversal is not authorized. Long v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 270, 43 S.W.2d 932.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the court.
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37736

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN JEFFERY HUNT,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 376

Filed: March 2, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and concurrent unified sentences of seven years, with 

minimum periods of confinement of two years, for two counts of forgery, 

affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge, LANSING, Judge

and GUTIERREZ, Judge

PER CURIAM

Sean Jeffery Hunt was convicted of two counts of forgery, Idaho Code § 18-3601. The 

district court imposed unified sentences of seven years, with minimum periods of confinement of 

two years on each count, and ordered that the sentences would run concurrently with each other 

and with a separate case in Bonneville County. Hunt appeals, contending that the sentences are 

excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Hunt’s judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed.