IN THE



## S UPREME 

## C OURT OF THE 

## S TATE OF 

## A RIZONA

R OBERT B URNS , P laintiff/Appellant

,

v.

A RIZONA P UBLIC S ERVICE C OMPANY , ET AL

. , De fendants/Appellees

.

No. C V

- 2 1

- 0 0 80

- PR
Filed September 27, 2022

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley , Judge

No

. CV201 7

- 0 01831
REVERSED AND REMANDED

O pinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 250 Ariz. 607 (App. 2021)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

William A. Richards (argued), Richards & Moskowitz PLC , Phoenix, Attorneys for Robert Burns

Mary R. O’Grady

, Joseph N. Roth, Matthew J. Stanford, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix ; Matthew E. Price (argued), Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, Attorneys for Arizona Public Service Compan y , et al.

Edward F. Novak, Jonathan G . Brinson (argued), Polsinelli PC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Corporation Commission

, et al.

Sarah L. Barnes, Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, P.C., Phoenix, Attorney s for ( Former ) Commissioner Boyd Du nnBURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

2 __ _____________

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the O pinion of the Court, in which JUSTICES

BEENE

, MONTGOMERY

, and KING joined. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
TIMMER dissented. *

_______________

JUSTICE BOLICK, O pinion of the Court:

¶1 In this case we hold that the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”) acting by a majority of its commissioners may not prevent a n individual commissioner from exercising investigatory powers pursuant to a rticle 15, section 4 of the Arizona Constitution ; and
that a commissioner a ggrieved by such action may seek judicial recourse by way of declaratory judgment pursuant to A.R.S. § § 12

- 1831 to

- 1846

.

BACKGROUND

¶2 During the 2014 primary and general elections for the

Commission

, allegations were made that two elected commissioners
received anonymous campaign contributions from Pinnacle West, using
funds derived from Arizona Public Service Co. (“APS”) . Pinnacle West is
the holding company of APS, a public service corporation (“PSC”)

. In November 2015, Robert Burns, then a member of the Commission, requested spending reports from APS regarding the 2014 election cycle. APS did not comply

. Subsequently, Burns requested and received an opinion from the Attorney General

, who concluded that A.R.S. § 40

- 241 confers power on individual c ommissioners to “gather information regarding a PSC’s political and charitable contributions, and lobbying expenditures , by inspecting the books and records of a PSC, and examining under oath PSC personnel .” Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. I16

- 005 at 9 (2016)

.

¶3 In August 2016, the four other commissioners voted to refuse

to fund Burn s’ investigatio n into APS’s records for its pending rate

- making

case before the Commission (the “Rate Case”)

. In turn

, later that month

* Chief Justice Robert Brutinel and Justice John R. Lopez IV ha ve recused
themselves from this case.BURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

3 Burns issued two subpoenas to AP S in his capacity as a single

commissioner . Both subpoenas sought information regarding donations
made to independent expenditure groups to support Commission
candidates in the 2014 election

. In February 2017, Burns again issued two similar subpoenas to APS during a new Commission proceeding (the

“ Rule

- Making Case”). A PS did not fully comply with either the 2016 or

2017 subpoenas

.

¶4 Shortly after, in March 2017

, Burns sued APS for declaratory
relief , arguing that individual commissioners have authority to demand compliance with subpoenas without the approval from other

commissioners. APS moved to dismiss, arguing that Burns failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as to both sets of subpoenas

. Ruling in favor of APS, t he superior court stayed both proceedings so that Burns
could first exhaust his administrative remedies.

¶5 During the Rate Case, Burns attempted to call six witnesses

, including APS and Pinnacle West ’s president and board chairman. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) declined to call the witnesses without approval from the other Commission members. In response, Burns sought emergency relief from the ALJ

. He also moved to disqualify two

commissioners

, alleging they had received “dark money” from APS and Pinnacle West during the 2014 election. The ALJ did not rule on either

motion

.

¶6 Burns next sought compliance with his issued sub poenas. On June 2 0 , 20 17, the Commission held a public meeting to consider his

motions. An interlocutory order was issued on June 27, 2017 on behalf of
the Commission and approved by the four other commissioners . The order
den ied Burns’ motions

. In the interlocutory order, the other commissioners
found that Burns ’ motions sought information that was irrelevant to the
Rate Case ; the subpoenas were overly broad, burdensome

, and would not produce admissible evidence ; and Burn s’ requests for witnesses were irrelevant and would not lead to admissible evidence.

¶7 In response, Burns sought leave to amend his s uperior c ourt complain t to challenge the interlocutory order and add the Commission
and the four other individual commissioner s as defendants

. The s uperior

c ourt granted Burns’ motion to amend , and on August 4, 2017, he timelyBURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

4 filed his First Amended Complaint

. Burns also fi led a special action with this Court on August 20, 2017 . The special action challenged the denial of
Burns’ motion to suspend the Rate Case to investigate g rounds for disqualifying the o ther commissioners . This Court declined jurisdiction.

¶8 Shortly after, the other commissioners reached a settlement agreement that the ALJ approved over Burns’ opposition

. Following the settlement, both APS and the Commission moved to dismiss Burns’ First Amended Complaint

. T he s uperior c ourt held that ( i ) th e case was not

moot ; ( ii ) the request for declaratory relief was appropriate to determine the commission’s investigatory powers ; ( iii ) the subpoenas did not improperly
interfere with the legislature ’s or Commission ’s powers ; and ( iv ) Burns had
the authority to issue the subpoenas as an individual commissioner

. However, the court also ruled that although individual commissioners may issue subpoenas, t he power to enforce subpoenas rests with the Commission as a body

. For th at reason, the c ourt dismissed Burns’ F irst Amended Complaint.

¶9 Following th at decision, Burns sought leave to amend his complaint a second time to request specific declaratory relief on the

s uperior c ourt’s rulings in his favor

, and to argue his due process right to investigate and present f acts about APS’s financial support to the

commissioner s ’ campaigns

. The s uperior c ourt granted leave to amend in part, denying Burns’ request for declaratory relief as to its prior rulings

.

¶10 After Burns’ Second Amended Complaint was filed, APS and
the Commission moved to dismiss it. On January 17, 2019, the s uperior

c ourt dismissed the case and entered judgment against Burns. The court held that Burns lacked standing to assert his due process argument

. Additionally, the court held that Burns was not legally entitled to initiate and maintain an investigation to disqualify other commissioners.

¶11 Burns timely appealed to the court of appeals challenging the dismissal of his two amended complaints. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court ’s ruling , holding that individual commissioners lack authority to enforce investigatory subpoenas in rate

- making cases because that authority rests solely with the Commission and a majority of itsBURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

5 commissioners

. Burns v. Ariz

. Pub

. Serv

. Co

. , 250 Ariz. 607, 614

– 15 ¶ 3 4 (App. 2021).

¶12 We granted review on two issues . First, whether the Arizona Constitution allows a majority of commissioners to prevent any single commissioner from exercising the investigatory powers expressly granted

to each in article 15, section 4 . Second, whether the Arizona Uniform Declaratory J udgment Act (“UDJA”) grants a commissioner standing to
seek a declaration of his and his colleagues’ rights

. These are significant

issues of statewide concern. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant

to article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution

.

DISCUSSION

¶13 We note at the outset that the questions on which we granted

review are narrow

. Moreover, we focus only on the subpoenas issued by
Burns in the Rate Case that the other commissioners e ffective ly quashed.
Therefo re , we will n either resolve all the issues addressed in the courts below nor the appropriate scope of Commission rules and proceedings going forward. But we agree with the court of appeals that the questions

as presented are important and that we should resolve them even though

Burns and his colleagues are no longer commissioner s

. Burns , 250 Ariz.

at 611 ¶ 14. Because they present purely issues of law, we review them de

novo

. Johnson Utils. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n , 249 Ariz. 215, 219 ¶ 11 (2020).

¶14 The Commission is established by a rticle 15 of the Arizona

Constitution . Its creation arose from the framers’ determination “to protect the public from corporate abuses and overreaching.” Johnson Utils.

, 249
Ariz. at 219 ¶ 13. The Commission has plenary authority to set rates for
PSCs and permissive authority to regulate PSCs for the health, safety, comfort, and convenience of their customers, employees, and the public. Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 3; see also Johnson Utils.

, 249 Ariz. at 220

– 21 ¶¶ 19, 21. As relevant here, the Commission also has authority to investigate records
and affairs of publicly traded corporations and PSCs. Ariz. Const. art. 15

, § 4. This Court has held that the Commission has “broad powers to conduct public or private investigations to determine whether any person or corporation has violated or is about to violate” Arizona laws and may “investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.” Polaris Int ’ l Metals Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n

, 133 Ariz. 500, 506 (1982) ( quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt Co.

, 338BURNS V

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. Opinion of the Court

6 U.S. 632, 642

– 43 (1950)). Moreover, the legislature may add to the Commission’s powers and responsibilities. See Ariz. Const. a rt. 15, § 6 (“The law

- making power may enlarge the powers and extend the duties of the corporation commission, and may prescribe rules and regulations to govern proceedings instituted by and before it; but, until such rules and regulations are provided by law, the co mmission may make rules and regulations to govern such proceedings.”)

.

¶15 Even within its plenary ratemaking authority ; however, the Commission remains “subject to constitutional constraints and requirements , both general (such as due process) and those spec ific to the entity.” Sun City Home Owners Ass’n v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n , 252 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 16 (2021)

. Those boundaries are subject to judicial review

. See Johnson
Utils.

, 249 Ariz. at 227 ¶ 52 (“A l though we certainly recognize the constitutional authority of the Commission, it is our duty to interpret the limit and extent of that authority.”).

A. An Individual Commissioner’s Investigatory Authority

¶16 Burns argues that his authority as an individual
commissioner emanates from article 15, section 4 , which states as follows:

The corporation commission, and the several members thereof, shall have power to inspect and investigate the property, books, papers, business, methods, and affairs of any

corpora tion whose stock shall be offered for sale to the public and of any public service corporation doing business within the state, and for the purpose of the commission, and of the several members thereof, shall have the power of a court of general jurisdicti on to enforce the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence by subpoena, attachment, and punishment, which said power shall extend throughout the state. Said commission shall have power to take testimony
under commission o r deposition either within or without the

state.

Burns asserts that this constitutional text specifically authorizes not only the Commission as a whole, but each of its “several commissioners,” to inspectBURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

7 and investigate PSC records and affairs and to comp el the testimony of witnesses and production of evidence by subpoena and otherwise.

¶17 Burns further identifies as a source of authority A.R.S. § 40

- 241(A), which provides as follows:

The commission , each commissioner and person employed by the commission m ay, at any time, inspect the accounts, books, papers and documents of any public service corporation, and any of such persons who are authorized to administer oaths may examine under oath any officer, agent or employee of such corporation in relation to th e business and affairs of the corporation.

Burns also notes that A rizona Administrative Code R14

- 3

- 109(P) provides that “[t]he Commission, a Commissioner, or any party to any proceeding before it may cause the depositions of witnesses to be taken in the manner prescribed by law and of the civil procedure for the Superior Court of the
state of Ari zona.”

¶18 APS and the Commission counter with several arguments. First, they note that under article 15, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution

, the Commission’s power over ratemaking is plenary, see Johnson Utils.

, 249
Ariz. at 221 ¶ 21, and thus, they contend the Commission controls the proceedings that lead to ratemaking. They argue that section 4, which Burns cites as the constitutional source of his authority to act unilaterally, only provides “that the commissioners, when acting on behalf of the commission and not independently of the commission, have authority.”

T hey also assert that under section 6, the Commission has the power to establish rules and procedures unless and until the legislature does so. And

section 19 invests the Commission with the authority to enforce its rules, regulations, and orders, subject to the limitations prescribed in section 16.

¶19 Beyond these constitutio nal provisions, the Commission and

A PS cite A.R.S. § 40

- 243 (A) , which provides that “[a]ll hearings and investigations before the commission or a commissioner shall be governed by this article, and by rules of practice and procedure adopted by the

commissi on.” The Commission argues that when it quashed Burns’BURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

8 subpoena, it was acting pursuant to R14

- 3

- 109(O), which empowers it to “[q]uash the subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive.”

¶20 Although not addressing the specific subpoenas at issue here,

t he Attorney General, in his opinion responding to Burns’ inquiry,
concluded that an individual commissioner is authorized to unilaterally issue subpoenas to PSCs, pursuant to both article 15, section 4 of the

Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 40

- 241(A). Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. I16

- 005

at 5 . In particular, the Attorney General observed that “ [ t ] he plain language
of Section 40

- 241(A) specifically refers to not just ‘[t]he c ommission’ but also
‘each commissioner.’” Id. at 8 (second alteration in original).

¶21 The court of appeal s , by contrast, agreed with APS and the

Commission. It note d that under article 15, section 6 of the Arizona
Constitution , the Commission is authorize d to make rules and regulations to govern proceedings before it. Burns

, 250 Ariz. at 612 ¶ 20. The Commission quashed Burns’ subpoena under one such rule, R14

- 3

- 109(O),
and the court held that its “review of a Commission determination not to enforce a subpoena is deferential.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶22 With respect to the narrow issue presented here of a single commissioner’s authority to inspect the books of a PSC and depose its officials, we agree with the Attorney General and Burns : t he principal source of that authority is article 1 5 , section 4 of the Arizona Constitution

. The court of appeals quoted its language, Id. ¶ 19, but then failed to apply it, instead subordinating th e authority provided there to the Commission’s general rulemaking authority. That was in error.

¶23 Our role in constitutional interpretation is to construe the text, when possible, in accord with its plain meaning. Morrissey v. Garner

, 248 Ariz. 408, 410 ¶ 8 (2020). We seek to give effect to every word, so as to render superfluous none of the text. Id. We also read the provision at issue
in its broader context. Id.

¶24 Article 15, section 4 confers the power to inspect and investigate upon “[t]he corp oration commission, and the several members
thereof.” Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4. It further provides that “for the purpose of the commission, and of the several members thereof, [ they ] shall haveBURNS V

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. Opinion of the Court

9 the power of a court of general jurisdiction to enforce th e attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence by subpoena” or otherwise. Id.

¶25 “Several” in this context means separate, respective, or
individual. Several

, Merriam

- Webster, https://www. merriam

webster.com/dictionary/several (last visited Sep t. 21 , 2022) 1 ; cf. U.S. Const

. art. 1, § 2 , cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen

. . . by the People of the several States.”)

. Were it to mean the collective body, no reason would exist to conjoin the Commission “and
the several members thereof.” Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4. Moreover, the
drafters’ use of a comma following “[t]he corporation commission”
indicates that what follow s is a separate category. See, e.g.

, U.S. v. Ron Pair

Enter s. , 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ( stating that where two nouns are separated by a comma as well as “and,” each “stands independent” of the other ); State
v. Feldstein

, 134 Ariz. 129, 130 (App. 1982).

¶26 The Commission argues that the introduction to the second part of the provision

— “for the purpose of the commission”

— restricts the investigatory powers to the purpose established by the commission. Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4. But again, this prefac e is conjoined with “and of the several members thereof.” Reading section 4 in its totality, giving effect to every word, the conclusion is inescapable: it provides to the Commission,
and to its individual members, the authority to investigate and inspect, and the power of a court of general jurisdiction to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents through specified means such as a subpoena.

¶27 This interpretation is consistent with the Commission’s

structu re. Our c onstitution’s framers could have provided for a single

commissioner . Instead, it comprised the Commission of three members, later enlarged to five, three of wh om are elected at one general election and

1 A 1912 dictionary likewise defines “several” to include distinct, separate, different, and various; but also “consisting of a number more than two, but

n ot many.” Several

, New Websterian Dictionary Illustrated 745 ( 1912 ). Given that the Commission initially was comprised of only three members, “a number more than two” would comprise the entire Commission, rendering meaningless “the several members thereof.” Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4

. We therefore conclude that the meaning of “several” in this context
means the individual commissioners.BURNS V

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. Opinion of the Court

10 two the next. Ariz. Const. art. 15 , § 1 (B). That structure facilitates a Commission that acts as a collective body in most instances, but with individual members authorized to act unilaterally in specified

circumstances.

¶28 Moreover, other provisions of a rticle 15 (§§ 3, 5, 6, 14, 19)
confer aut hority exclusively upon the “commission

, ” whereas “and the
several members thereof ” is confined to section 4. Where the drafters used different language in different provisions, we imply that a different meaning is intended. Rochlin v. State , 112 Ariz. 1 71, 176 (1975) (“If the
authors of the constitution had intended the sections to mean the same thing they could have used the same or similar language. The fact that they did not, requires the conclusion that the sections were meant to be different.”). T he framers plainly meant to authorize not only the
Commission but also individual commissioners, for their purposes, to issue investigatory subpoenas.

¶29 Reading a rticle 15 in its entirety dictates that any other interpretation would render section 4 superfluous. It would expressly vest

powers in individual commissioners but then subordinat e that right to the
unreviewable determinations of other commissioners . Burns’ allega tions demonstrate how untenable such a construction is, whereby a commissioner’s investigation into possible improprieties concerning his colleagues can be squelched by the very subjects of the investigation.

¶30 The court of appeals emphasizes the regulatory authority conferred upon the Commission by article 15, section 6 of the Arizona
Constitution to “make rules and regulations” to govern proceedings

. Burns

, 250 Ariz. a t 612 ¶ 20. We do not read separate constitutional provisions to
determine which prevails over the other; rather, we read them to harmonize
the provisions and give effect to each. State v. Osborne

, 14 Ariz. 185, 204 (1912) (observing that “each and every clause in a written [c] onstitution has
been inserted for some useful purpose ” and “whenever it is possible to do so, each provision must be construed so that it shall harmonize with all others without distorting the meaning of any of such provisions”)

. Giving all provisions due meaning , the Commission posses s es authority t o theBURNS V

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. Opinion of the Court

11 extent provided to create rules and procedures but not to cancel the individual commissioners’ express rights.

¶31 Nor does the fact that the subpoenas were issued in the context of a ratemaking proceeding under article 15, section 3 alter the analysis. Although that section invests the Commission with plenary authority to regulate rates, it neither furnishes additional authority to the Commission to establish procedural rules (which is conferred by section 6)
nor cancel s an individual commissioner’s in vestigatory powers under section 4. Indeed, as the circumstances here illustrate, it may be especially pertinent for a commissioner to deploy such investigatory powers to determine possible conflicts of interest in a rate case. And as we emphasized in Jo hnson Utilities , even the Commission’s plenary ratemaking authority is constrained by the c onstitution. Johnson Utilities

, 249 Ariz.

at 221 ¶ 2 3

. Again, we seek to harmonize the powers and constraints set
forth in a rticle 15.

¶32 Moreover, the court of appeals omits a crucial part of the
constitutional passage conferring regulatory authority. It cites the language
from section 6 that “the commission may make rules and regulations to govern [proceedings instituted by and before it],” Burns

, 250 Ariz. at 612 ¶ 20 (alteration in original)

, but fails to acknowledge the temporal limitation immediately preceding it: “until such rules and regulations are provided by law.” Ariz. Const. a rt. 15, § 6. The l egislature definitively resolved this very question in A.R.S. § 40

- 241(A), which authorizes the Commission and “each commissioner” to inspect a PSC’s books and papers
and to examine PS C officials under oath.

¶33 Th ough Burns argued he had authority under § 40

- 241(A), the court of appeals nowhere addressed that statute

, instead proceed ing directly to the agency’s rules, specifically R14

- 3

- 109(O). Burns

, 250 Ariz.

at 612 ¶ 21. It is unclear whether R14

- 3

- 109 as a whole, or subsection (O) in particular, applies in this context

. See, e.g.

, R14

- 3

- 101(A) (providing that the rules shall not “apply to any investigation by the Commission, any of its divisions or its staff”). Regard less, the Commission cannot by
administrative fiat erase an individual commissioner’s constitutional authority. See, e.g.

, Polaris , 133 Ariz. at 506 ; Saguaro Healing LLC v. Stat e , 249 Ariz. 362, 365 ¶ 19 (2020) ( noting “[t]he scope of an agency’s power is measured by statute and may not be expanded by agency fiat .” (alterationBURNS V

. ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO MPANY, ET AL

. Opinion of the Court

12 in original) (quoting Cochise Cnty

. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.

, 170 Ariz. 443, 445 (App. 1991)) ).

¶34 That does not mean that the individual commissioner’s subpoena powers are without constraint. To the contrary, they are bound by the Commission’s own limited constitutional authority, as well as the overarching requirements of due process. Polaris

, 133 Ariz. at 507. The target of a subpoena may seek judicial recourse through a declaratory judgment action and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 45 , or other legally
authorized recourse

. W e also do not imply that the fruits of an individual commissioner’s investigation are necessarily admissible in a particular Commission procee ding.

¶35 Likewise, the Commission may adopt and enforce subpoena procedures

. S ee A.R.S. § 40- 243(A) (“All

. . . investigations before the commission or a commissioner shall be governed by this article, and by rules of practice and procedure adopted by the commission.”)

. Such authority clearly encompasses rate cases, which are quasi

- judicial proceeding s where more formal procedures may be ap propriate. But the Commission has not adopted procedures governing subpoenas issued by individual commissioners. It may adopt such procedures so long as they do not abrogate an individual commissioner’s constitutional and statutory authority. As the fol lowing section suggests, an aggrieved commissioner should seek recourse through a declaratory action in superior court.

B. Availability of Relief Under the Uniform Declaratory

Judgment Act

¶36 Section12- 1832 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny

person

. . . whose rights

. . . are affected by a statute

. . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the

. . . statute

. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” The legislature further provided that “[t]his article is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legalBURNS V

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. Opinion of the Court

13 relations; an d is to be liberally construed and administered.” A.R.S. § 12-
1842.

¶37 As we held above, Burns has a statutory right to investigate PSCs. Moreover, we have applied the UDJA to administrative orders.
Polaris , 133 Ariz. at 504 ; s ee also City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n

, 246 Ariz. 206, 210 ¶ 9 (2019) (holding that indirect assertion of regulatory authority provides “sufficient injury to provide standing ”).

¶38 No party seriously disputes Burns’ standing to pursue relief under the UDJA. Rather, the Commission and APS argue that the courts below were correct in denying declaratory relief. On the narrow substantive issue on which we granted review, we disagree an d remand to the trial court to determine if any further proceedings are warranted given that Burns no longer serves on the Commission.

C. Attorney Fees

¶39 Per Burns’ motion, w e award his attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S § 12-348.01, and costs under A.R.S. § 12-1840.

CONCLUSION

¶40 We vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, reverse the superior court’s denial of summary judgment on the issues before us, and remand the case to that court for any further proceedings consistent with this ruling.BURNS V . ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL

. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

14 TIMMER, VCJ., Dissenting

¶41 I agree with my colleagues that Burns has standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S. §§ 12

- 1831 to

- 1846, to file this lawsuit. I also agree that the Arizona Corporation Commission, by majority vote, cannot prevent an individual commissioner from exercising his authority under article 15, section 4 of the Arizona Constitution, to inspect
and investi gate the affairs of a publicly held corporation or a public service corporation (“PSC”). But I disagree with my colleagues that the Commission prevented Burns from exercising his right to inspect and investigate here by denying several motions Burns filed in APS’s rate case.

¶42 As a commissioner, Burns had constitutional authority to inspect and investigate “the property, books, papers, business, methods, and affairs” of APS and its holding company, Pinnacle West Capital Corporation. See Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4; see also A.R.S. § 40

- 241(A) (authorizing individual commissioners “at any time [to] inspect the accounts, books, papers and documents of any [PSC]”). He exercised this authority outside the rate case. For example, in 2015 Burns created a “generic docket” to explore PSC’s campaign contribution practices. In that docket, Burns demanded that APS produce a “full report[] of any campaign
contributions and indirect contributions to third

- party organizations” made during the 2014 elec tion cycle, and later broadened that request to include “funds expended on all political contributions, lobbying, and charitable contributions, i.e. , all donations made

— either directly or indirectly

— by APS or under APS’s brand name for any purpose.” APS

r efused to comply with Burns’ demands, but Burns did not enforce the request by issuing a subpoena and apparently dropped the matter in that
docket. See Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 4 (empowering an individual
commissioner to “enforce the attendance of witnesse s and the production of evidence by subpoena, attachment, and punishment”).

¶43 APS’s rate case began in 2016 when it filed an application to set new utility rates. The Commission then issued orders setting a procedural schedule, granting several interventions, and consolidating the rate case with two APS audits. Most of the approxi mately forty parties in the case reached a settlement agreement that increased APS’s base rate, and after reviewing documentation and conducting a seven

- day evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) recommended that theBURNS V . ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL

. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

15 Commission approve th e new rate as just and reasonable. In 2017, the full Commission, with Burns dissenting, adopted the ALJ’s recommendation.

¶44 During the rate case proceedings, Burns renewed his quest to obtain information about APS and Pinnacle West’s spending. He issued

t wo subpoenas duces tecum compelling the companies to produce documents and information identifying political and charitable contributions and lobbying and marketing/advertising expenditures from 2011 through 2016. APS and Pinnacle West moved to quash the subpoenas,
but the Commission never ruled on the motion. See Ariz. Admin. Code

R14

- 3

- 109(O)(1) (empowering the Commission to quash unreasonable or oppressive subpoenas). Then Burns filed this lawsuit asking the superior
court to declare he was entitled t o demand compliance with the subpoenas, but the court stayed the suit to give Burns an opportunity to exhaust his administrative remedies by asking the Commission to compel compliance.

¶45 Thereafter, and as pertinent here, Burns filed motions to (1) compel A PS and Pinnacle West’s compliance with the subpoenas; (2) require the ALJ to call several previously unscheduled witnesses during the evidentiary hearing and permit Burns’ private attorney to question those witnesses; and (3) stay the entire rate case unti l Burns completes his investigation. The Commission, with Burns dissenting, denied the motions, ruling the information sought was irrelevant to the rate case, and the subpoenas were overbroad, unduly burdensome, and sought information
outside the 2015 “te st year,” which was the only year relevant in applying
the rate

- setting formula. See Residential Util. Consumer Off. v. Ariz. Corp.
Comm’n , 240 Ariz. 108, 110 ¶ 6 (2016) (describing the formula);

R14

- 2

- 103(A)(3)(p) (defining “test year”).

¶46 The issue here is whether the Commission’s ruling in matters properly brought before it in the rate case violated Burns’ constitutional authority under article 15, section 4 of the Arizona Constitution, to inspect and investigate. Unlike the majority, I conclude it did not.

¶47 First, even assuming Burns’ subpoenas and requests constituted an “investigation” under section 4, nothing in that provision authorized him to compel the other commissioners or the Commission as a
whole to enforce his efforts. See City of Surprise v . Ariz. Corp. Comm’n

, 246 Ariz. 206, 212 ¶ 20 (2019) (noting that the Commission, and necessarilyBURNS V . ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL

. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

16 each commissioner by extension, “has no implied powers and its powers”
are “derived from a strict construction of the [c] onstitution and implementing statutes ” (quoting Com. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright , 64 Ariz. 129, 139 (1946))). Thus, although Burns was empowered by section 4 to enforce his investigative efforts, he could not force the Commission to assist him by granting his motions. 2 And no matter how tightl y the majority squints, the other commissioners’ refusal to compel APS and Pinnacle West’s compliance with Burns’ subpoenas did not “effectively quash[]” those subpoenas. See supra ¶ 13.

¶48 Second, Burns’ subpoenas and requests were not, in fact, an inspect ion or investigation authorized by section 4, but instead they formed part of a contested rate case subject to Commission authority. The Arizona Constitution grants the Commission, not individual commissioners, “full power” to prescribe just and reasonabl e utility rates (except as to towns and cities). See Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 3; see also Johnson Utils., L.L.C. v. Ariz. Corp.
Comm’n , 249 Ariz. 215, 221 ¶ 21 (2020) (describing the Commission’s ratemaking authority as plenary and exclusive). This “full power” includes directing “the timing, procedure, or methods the Commission uses in calculating rates.” See id. at 222 ¶ 25. Also, subject to statutory or constitutional restraints, the Commission, not individual commissioners, has full authority to esta blish procedures for prescribing rates and to preside over proceedings initiated thereunder. See Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 6

2 What can an individual commissioner do when a publicly owned corporation or a PSC refuses to comply with inspection and investigation requests? Because section 4 does not direct how an individual commissioner can compel enforcement with a subpoena or other inspection request, and no statutes or Commission rules otherwise apply, an individual commissioner’s only remedy is to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the superior court. See §§ 12

- 1831 to

- 1846 . The court
can then resolv e any disputes between the commissioner and the targeted

company and enter appropriate orders. See Polaris Int ’l Metals Corp. v. Ariz

. Corp. Com m ’n , 133 Ariz. 500, 506 (1982) (“Courts must have the power to curb administrative investigations in appropriat e instances.”). The
Commission as a whole is left out of the matter. Burns filed such a lawsuit
with the superior court, which nevertheless required him to first ask for relief from the Commission. As explained hereafter, this was not error
because Burn s’ requests were not part of a solitary investigation but instead formed part of a rate case.BURNS V . ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL

. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

17 (empowering the Commission, absent statutory directives, to promulgate rules and regulations to govern proceedings pending before it ); see also Johnson Utils. , 249 Ariz. at 227 ¶ 52 (recognizing that Commission authority is subject to judicial review). The Commission has exercised this authority by promulgating rules of practice and procedure for rate cases. See
R14

- 2

- 103,

- 105; R14

- 3

- 101 to

- 113. As the majority suggests, see supra ¶ 33, these rules govern contested cases before the Commission but do not apply to investigations by the Commission or individual commissioners.

¶49 By filing his motions, Burns did not “inspect and investigate” as authorized by section 4. Instead, he participated in the rate case by issuing discovery requests through subpoenas and seeking rulings from the ALJ and the Commission to enforce his individ ual determination of what was relevant and admissible in the rate case. Had he issued his subpoenas in his 2015 docket or opened another docket for investigatory purposes while the rate case was pending, I would agree that the other
commissioners had no a uthority to interfere with his efforts to investigate APS and Pinnacle West’s spending. But section 4 did not authorize him under the guise of an “investigation” to hijack a contested rate case involving numerous parties that properly followed procedures laid out by the Commission under its constitutional authority. See Ariz. Const. art. 15, § 6. In short, the Commission did not interfere with Burns’ investigation; it properly invoked its quasi

- judicial powers in the rate case to rule on Burns’

motions. See Sun City Home Owners Ass’n. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n , 252 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 17 (2021).

¶50 The majority’s opinion has lasting consequences that both violate the constitution and leave confusion, and potentially chaos, in its
wake. Now i ndividual commissioners c an compel the Commission to enable and enforce their inspection and investigation efforts, despite the plain language of section 4, which does not direct that result. Also, an individual commissioner, under the pretext of inspecting and investigating,

now can determine what discovery is permissible in rate cases, despite

section 3, which explicitly gives the Commission as a whole full power to
make those decisions. It remains uncertain whether an individual commissioner may be permitted to insist that cer tain witnesses be called and questioned at a rate case hearing, as Burns argues is within his constitutionally bestowed investigatory right. Regardless, i t is not difficult to imagine that the flow in rate cases could quickly enter choppy waters,BURNS V . ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, ET AL

. VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting

18 particul arly if individual commissioners exercise their investigatory powers in conflicting ways.

¶51 For all these reasons, although I agree with much of the majority’s analysis, I respectfully disagree that the Commission here prevented Burns from exercising his in vestigatory powers under section 4. I would therefore affirm the superior court’s judgment.