1 The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-3523

___________ Ora J. Berkley, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern District * of Missouri. Dillard's Inc. and Kim Georgie, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 21, 2006 Filed: June 14, 2006

___________ Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ BENTON, Circuit Judge. Ora J. Berkley sued her fo rmer employer and a supervisor for racial harassment, intentional infliction of emoti onal distress, negligent infliction of mental distress, and retaliation. The district court 1 compelled arbitration. After the arbitration, it dismissed Berkley's case with prejudice. Berkley appeals. This court affirms.
Berkley, an African American, began working in August 2000 for Dillard's, Inc. According to her, in 2001 some coworkers—including supervisor Kim-2- Georgie—began to hara ss her. On May 23, 2001, Berkley filed complaints against Dillard's with the EEOC and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR"), alleging racial harassment.
On June 16, 2001, Dillard's implemented an arbitration program. The same day, Dillard's distributed two documents describing the program to Berkley and other employees. The "Rules of Arbitration" document says: "Arbitra tion applies to any claim that could be made in a court of law," including "harassment on the basis of race" and "[r]etaliation for . . . exercisi ng your protected rights under any statute." The second document, "The Dillard's Fair ness in Action Program," summarizes the policy, specifying how an employee can accept it. That document says that by "accepting or continuing employment with Dillard's, you have agreed to accept the Program known as the Agreement to Arbitr ate Certain Claims." The document also reiterates that the arbitrati on program covers racial hara ssment and retaliation claims.
A few days later, Dillard's asked its employees to sign an "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Rules for Arbitration." That document states: "Employees are deemed to have agreed to the provisions of the Rule s by virtue of accepting employment with the Company and/or continuing employment th erewith." The document has a signature line where the employee can acknowledge receiptof the rules of arbitration and the agreement to arbitrate certain claims. Berkley refused to sign. Dillard's advised her that refusing to sign had no effect on the applicability of the arbitration agreement, because it applied automatically to all employees who conti nued their employment.
After receiving notice of right to su e from the EEOC and the MCHR, Berkley sued in the district court on February 19, 2002. On March 8, Dillard's fired her. Berkley then amended the complain t to add a claim of retaliation.
Dillard's moved to compel arbitration and stay the district court proceedings. The court granted the motion, finding thatBerkley's claims were covered by the-3- arbitration program. Following arbitrati on, the court dismissed with prejudice each of Berkley's claims.

I.

This court reviews de novo a district c ourt's order compelling arbitration, when the decision is based on contract interpretation. See Lyster v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. , 239 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C. , 225 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2000)). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id
. "A dispute must be submitted to arbitration if there is a valid agreement to arbitrate a nd the dispute falls within the scope of that agreement." Id
. (citations omitted).
Berkley argues that the district court erred in enforcing the arbitration agreement. In particular, Berkley asserts that the district court "had no basis for the conclusion that the Dillard's arbitration pr ogram was part of a larger offer of a unilateral contract of at -will employment that could be accepted by Ms. Berkley's continuing her preexisting employment w ith Dillard's." Berkley relies on Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. banc 1988), where the Missouri Supreme Court found that an employer's distribution of an employee handbook describing company policies was not a c ontractual offer to the employees.
Berkley's reliance on Johnson is misplaced. There, the court emphasized that the handbook was "merely an informationa l statement" providing "the rules were subject to change at any time." Id
. at 662. In contrast, "The Dillard's Fairness in Action Program" document is contractual, not me rely informational. It states that, by "accepting or continuing employment with Dillard's, you have agreed to accept the Program known as the Agreement to Arbitr ate Certain Claims." Unlike the handbook in Johnson , the Dillard's document is a valid offer. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc. , 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997) (employee–employer arbitration-4- agreement is valid where it "u ses contractual terms such as 'I understand,' 'I agree,' I 'agree to abide by and accept,' 'condition of employment,' 'fin al decision,' and 'ultimate resolution.'")
Berkley next contends that, even if th ere was a valid offer to arbitrate, she rejected it by refusing to sign the acknowledgment form. However, the acknowledgment form—much like "The D illard's Fairness in Action Program" document—states that employees "are deemed to have agr eed to the provisions of the Rules by virtue of accepting employment with the Company and/or continuing employment therewith." Further, after Berkley refused to sign, Dillard's informed her that her refusal did not affect the arbitr ation agreement, which applied automatically to all employees who continued their employment. By continuing her employment, Berkley accepted the terms of the arbitration program. See Cook v. Coldwell Banker , 967 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Mo. App. 1998); Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz , 964 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Mo. App. 1998).
Berkley further argues that her claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, becausemost of them arose before Dillard's implemented the Program. However, "any doubts concerning th e scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Lyster , 293 F.3d at 945. The plain language of the arbitration agreement includes "any claim that could be madein a court of law." The arbitration agreement does not excludepending administrative complaints. See Winfrey v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. , No. 99-1405, 1999 WL 1295310, at *2 (8th Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) (unpublished) (plain la nguage of arbitration agreement covered plaintiff's claims against his employer, although they arose before the agreement). Berkley's claims are within the sc ope of the arbitration agreement.
Finally, Berkley asserts that the arbitr ation agreement is unconscionable, that she had "a reasonable expectation that her cas e would be tried in a court of law," and that the arbitration agreement is one-sided , without mutual obligations. This court declines to consider those arguments because Berkley failed to raise them before the-5- district court and to deve lop the relevant facts. See Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Ordinarily, we do not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. We consider a newl y raised argument only if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual development, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.") (internal citations omitted).

II.
The district court's judgment is affirmed.

______________________________