IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Lewis, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Lehigh Asphalt Paving & Construction :

Co. (Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board), : No. 1445 C.D. 2021

Respondent : Submitted: September 11, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: October 19, 2023

Robert Lewis (Claimant) petitions for review of the December 3, 2021

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the April 14, 

2021 decision and order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) that denied and 

dismissed Claimant’s Claim Petition for Compensation Benefits (Claim Petition) 

and Penalty Petition filed against Lehigh Asphalt Paving & Construction Co.

(Employer) pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).

1

 Upon review, we 

affirm.

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4 & 2501-2710.
2

I. Facts and Procedural Posture

The facts underlying this matter are straightforward and not in dispute. 

On November 12, 2018, Claimant worked in the equipment yard of Employer’s 

facility moving equipment in preparation for winter. See Board Opinion dated 

December 2, 2021 (Second Board Opinion) at 4, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 427a. 

Throughout the course of the day, Claimant began to feel pain and weakness in his 

left calf and ankle, like it was slowly giving out. See id. At the end of his 6:30 a.m. 

to 4:30 p.m. shift, Claimant locked up the shop area, proceeded to the time clock, 

and punched out. See id. After punching out, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Claimant 

returned to the work truck he was driving and hurriedly attempted to get into the cab 

of the vehicle. See id. As he pushed off with his left foot to step up into the cab of 

the truck, Claimant felt a popping sensation in his lower leg, which was a tear of his 

Achilles tendon. See id. Claimant was able to get into the cab of the vehicle and 

drive home. See id. However, after driving home, the pain in Claimant’s leg 

increased and his wife transported him to the emergency room for treatment. See id. 

As he returned home from the hospital, Claimant placed a call to his foreman to 

explain his injury. See id.

Claimant testified before the WCJ that his injury did not result from 

tripping over anything in Employer’s parking lot and that he did not hit his leg 

against the vehicle in any way to cause the injury. See Second Board Opinion at 4,

R.R. at 427a. He further testified that he neither performed, nor was asked to 

perform, work duties between the time when he punched out for the day and when 

he returned home. See id. Claimant also testified that he began experiencing pain 

in his mid-calf toward the center of his ankle. See id. at 4-5, R.R. at 427a-28a. 
3

Claimant explained that the pain increased throughout the day, but that he did not 

tell anyone about it. See id. at 5, R.R. at 428a.

On November 28, 2018, Employer issued a Notice of Workers’ 

Compensation Denial (Notice of Denial) for Claimant’s November 12, 2018 injury, 

indicating that the injury did not occur within the scope of Claimant’s employment. 

See Second Board Opinion at 1; see also Notice of Denial at 2, R.R. at 5a. Claimant 

filed the Claim Petition on December 21, 2018, which alleged that Claimant “was 

working when the condition began and he suffered a tear in the parking lot entering 

his work truck during an employer[-]required duty[,]” and sought total disability 

benefits and medical bill payment. Claim Petition at 1, R.R. at 6a. Claimant also 

filed a Penalty Petition on December 21, 2018, based on allegations that Employer 

failed to promptly investigate Claimant’s injury, failed to provide proper notices, 

and knowingly denied workers’ compensation benefits despite medical evidence of 

Claimant’s injury. See Penalty Petition filed December 21, 2018, R.R. at 16a-17a.

After a hearing,2the WCJ issued a Decision and Order on October 11, 

2019, that granted the Claim Petition. See WCJ Decision dated October 11, 2019 

(First WCJ Decision) at 10-11, R.R. at 391a-92a. The WCJ denied the Penalty 

Petition, however, determining that Employer had a reasonable basis to contest the 

Claim Petition. See First WCJ Decision at 12, R.R. at 393a. Claimant and Employer 

both appealed to the Board. See Second Board Opinion at 1, R.R. at 424a. 

On October 8, 2020, the Board determined that the WCJ had failed to 

make a finding regarding whether Claimant met his burden of establishing that he 

sustained his injury in the course and scope of his employment and remanded the 

2 The WCJ conducted the hearing over three dates: January 17, 2019, March 28, 2019, and

June 27, 2019.
4

matter to allow the WCJ to make a finding on the issue. See Board Opinion dated 

October 8, 2020 (First Board Opinion) at 8-9, R.R. at 397a-407a; see also Second 

Board Opinion at 2, R.R. at 425a. The Board observed that, while Claimant appeared 

to have been on Employer’s premises at a reasonable time after the end of his work 

shift, a finding of fact was required regarding whether the evidence established that 

Claimant’s injury had been caused by a condition of Employer’s premises or by the 

operation of the business or affairs thereon. See First Board Opinion at 8, R.R. at 

406a; see also Second Board Opinion at 2, R.R. at 425a. 

On remand, the WCJ determined that Claimant’s injury had not been 

caused by a condition of Employer’s premises and that Claimant had not been 

engaged in the business of Employer when injured. See WCJ Decision dated April 

14, 2021 (Second WCJ Decision) at 10-12, R.R. at 418a-20a; see also Second Board 

Opinion at 2, R.R. at 425a. The WCJ thereafter determined that Claimant had not 

met his burden of proving that he sustained his injury in the course of his 

employment or as a result of a condition of Employer’s premises and, consequently,

denied and dismissed the Claim Petition. See Second WCJ Decision at 12-13, R.R. 

at 420a-21a; see also Second Board Opinion at 2, R.R. at 425a. Claimant appealed 

this determination to the Board. 

On December 3, 2021, the Board issued its opinion affirming the 

Second WCJ Decision. See generally Second Board Opinion. Claimant timely 

petitioned this Court for review.3

3

In workers’ compensation appeals, this Court’s “scope of review is limited to determining 

whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law was committed and 

whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Morocho v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Home Equity Renovations, Inc.), 167 A.3d 855, 858 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) 

(citing Johnson v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dubois Courier Express), 631 A.2d 693 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1993)).
5

II. Issues

Claimant now forwards three claims of error. First, Claimant alleges 

that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s determination that Claimant’s injury did 

not occur in the course and scope of his employment where Claimant was injured as 

he stepped from a work area into a work vehicle. See Claimant’s Br. at 2, 20-34. 

Next, Claimant alleges that the Board erred by not addressing whether Claimant was 

a traveling employee. See Claimant’s Br. at 2, 35-38. Finally, Claimant alleges that 

the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s denial of the Penalty Petition based on a 

finding of a reasonable contest by Employer. See Claimant’s Br. at 2, 38.

III. Discussion

A. Course and Scope of Employment

Initially, as this Court has previously noted, in workers’ compensation 

cases,

[t]he WCJ is the fact finder, and it is solely for the WCJ 

. . . to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. Neither the Board nor this Court may reweigh 

the evidence or the WCJ’s credibility determinations. In 

addition, it is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, to 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence a reasonable person might 

find sufficient to support the WCJ’s findings. In determining whether a finding of 

fact is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must consider the evidence as 

a whole, view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed 

before the WCJ, and draw all reasonable inferences which are deducible from the 

evidence in favor of the prevailing party.

Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Johnson), 106 A.3d 202, 206 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
6

determine what weight to give to any evidence. . . . As 

such, the WCJ may reject the testimony of any witness in 

whole or in part, even if that testimony is uncontradicted.

Hawbaker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kriner’s Quality Roofing Servs. & 

Uninsured Emp. Guar. Fund), 159 A.3d 61, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (internal 

citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

“With respect to a claim petition, the claimant bears the initial burden 

of proving that [an] injury arose in the course of employment and was related 

thereto.” Frankiewicz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kinder Morgan, Inc.), 177 

A.3d 991, 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). “Whether an employee is injured in the course 

of employment is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the WCJ’s 

findings of fact.” Stewart v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bravo Grp. Servs., Inc.), 

258 A.3d 584, 589 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). Pertinently, Section 301(c)(1) of the Act 

states:

The terms “injury” and “personal injury,” as used in this 

act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, 

regardless of his previous physical condition, [] arising in 

the course of his employment and related thereto . . . . The 

term “injury arising in the course of his employment,” as 

used in this article . . . shall include all [ ] injuries sustained 

while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance 

of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon 

the employer’s premises or elsewhere, and shall include 

all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by 

the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, 

sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is 

injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control 

of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business

or affairs are being carried on, the employe’s presence 

thereon being required by the nature of his employment.
7

77 P.S. § 411(1). Thus, Section 301(c) of the Act contemplates compensable injuries 

that occur in the course and scope of employment in two situations. The first and 

more straightforward situation is where the employee is injured, on or off the 

employer’s premises, while “actually engaged in the furtherance of the [employer’s] 

business or affairs . . . .” 77 P.S. § 411(1). In the second situation, an employee who

is not engaged in his work at the time of injury can nonetheless be entitled to 

compensation where he: (1) is on a premises under the control of the employer; (2) 

is required by the nature of his employment to be on such premises; and (3) sustains 

an injury or injuries due to a condition of the premises or operation of the business. 

See Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Slaugenhaupt) v. United States Steel Corp., 376 

A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977); see also Stewart, 258 A.3d at 589. To satisfy 

the Slaugenhaupt test, the employee must prove all three of these requirements. See 

Inglis House v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993)

(“[I]n a claim proceeding, the employee bears the burden of establishing a right to 

compensation and of proving all necessary elements to support an award.”).

Here, Claimant was not actually engaged in furtherance of Employer’s 

business or affairs; he had punched out and was entering a vehicle following his shift 

to go home. Therefore, to be entitled to compensation, Claimant must prove that he 

was entitled to compensation under the Slaugenhaupt test. The first two prongs of 

the Slaugenhaupt test are satisfied here; there is no dispute that Claimant was on 

Employer’s premises, where he was required to be during his scheduled shift that 

had concluded a mere 15 minutes before the occurrence of Claimant’s injury. See

Newhouse v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Harris Cleaning Serv., Inc.), 530 A.2d 

545, 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (concluding that 15 minutes after punching out 

constituted a reasonable time after the work period for purposes of Slaugenhaupt
8

analysis). Thus, the only question in the instant matter is the satisfaction of the third

prong of the Slaugenhaupt test – whether Claimant sustained his injury due to a 

condition of the premises or operation of the business.

As this Court has explained:

The third prong of the Slaugenhaupt test requires us to 

examine whether the injury was caused by the condition 

of the premises. We have long ago rejected the assertion 

that an employee must show some faulty condition or 

negligent operation in order to receive compensation for 

injuries sustained while on the employer’s premises. 

Indeed, the employer’s lack of fault or negligence relative 

to the injury is of no consequence when considering the

condition of the employer’s premises. Further, the 

condition of the premises or operation of employer’s 

affairs need not be the immediate or direct cause of 

claimant’s injury; it must simply play some role in the 

causative chain.

Stewart, 258 A.3d at 590 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)

(emphasis added).

In Slaugenhaupt, a claimant suffered an epileptic seizure, causing him 

to lose control of his vehicle and strike a concrete abutment, killing the claimant. 

See Slaugenhaupt, 376 A.2d at 272-73. The parties agreed that, while the seizure 

had caused the accident, the claimant’s death was “not immediately occasioned by 

the epilepsy itself, but by the traumatic injuries resulting from the force of the car 

striking the abutment.” Id. at 273. This Court held that the concrete abutment was 

a condition of the employer’s premises that contributed to the claimant’s death. See 

id. at 274-75. 
9

Likewise, in Newhouse, this Court found the third prong of the 

Slaugenhaupt test satisfied where a claimant was injured when he fell off the hood 

of a car on which he was traveling from a work site to a public road. See Newhouse, 

530 A.2d at 546. The claimant was thrown from the hood and injured as he struck 

the ground when the car turned to follow a bend in the road because the exit gate 

was closed. See id. The Court determined that the closed gate and bend in the road 

constituted a condition of the premises that caused a claimant’s injuries, despite the 

claimant’s poor decision to sit on the hood of a moving vehicle. See id. at 547. 

Additionally, in Stewart, a claimant was injured when he “slipped and 

fell forward to the ground while stepping down off [a] shuttle van[.]” Stewart, 258 

A.3d at 593. The Court determined that “the ground where [the c]laimant landed 

constituted a condition of the premises that contributed to [the c]laimant’s 

injuries[,]” noting that, although “[the c]laimant may have tripped over his own feet 

while exiting the shuttle van, [] the concepts of fault and negligence have no bearing 

on the application of the Act.” Id. at 594.

However, this Court has determined that the third prong of the 

Slaugenhaupt test is not satisfied in cases where the employer’s premises plays no 

role in the causative chain of the claimant’s injury. This Court has determined, for 

instance, that a lightning strike is “in no way related to the condition of the premises 

or the operation of the employer’s business.” Anzese v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal 

Bd., 385 A.2d 625, 626 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (en banc). Similarly, where a claimant 

stopped to help a coworker with a disabled vehicle, the movement of the coworker’s 

vehicle itself did not constitute a condition of the premises. See Dana Corporation 

v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Gearhart), 548 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). 
10

Additionally, in a case where a claimant was injured climbing over the 

center console of her car, which she had entered from the passenger’s side door 

because poor snow plowing had allegedly forced vehicles to park so close together 

that she was unable to enter her car via the driver’s side door, this Court found that 

“it was not the accumulated snow in the parking lot or the parked truck that caused 

[the c]laimant’s injury; rather, it was her own act of climbing over her car’s console 

that injured her.” See Markle v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bucknell Univ.), 785 

A.2d 151, 156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In affirming the Board’s denial of benefits, the 

Court held “that [the c]laimant’s injury did not arise as a result of a condition of [the 

employer’s] premises, but as a result of a condition in the [c]laimant’s car.” Id.

Likewise, in Quality Bicycle Products, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Shaw), 139 A.3d 266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), this Court found the 

claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that his injury was caused by a 

condition of the premises or the employer’s business thereon where the claimant left 

work after he received a telephone call about a family emergency and suffered a 

fractured kneecap while running to his car in the employer’s parking lot. See id. 139 

at 270. As he ran toward his vehicle, the claimant heard a popping sound, felt 

excruciating pain, and collapsed to the ground unable to put weight on his leg. See 

id. The claimant did not allege that the parking lot caused his injury. See id. In fact, 

the claimant admitted that there was no physical condition of the parking lot that 

caused the injury. See id. As such, the Court determined the claimant failed to prove 

any connection between the condition of the employer’s premises and his injuries 

and reversed the WCJ’s award of benefits. See id.

The facts of the instant matter closely track those presented in Shaw. 

Here, Claimant testified that, after punching out for the day, he felt a popping 
11

sensation as he pushed off the ground with his leg in a hurried attempt to get into the 

cab of his vehicle. It was not the ground, but rather this step up into the vehicle that 

caused Claimant’s leg injury. Claimant himself testified that his injury did not result 

from tripping over anything in Employer’s parking lot and that he did not hit his leg 

against the vehicle in any way. Based on this testimony, the WCJ concluded that 

Claimant did not meet his burden to prove that the injury he sustained was caused 

by a condition of the premises or the Employer’s business or affairs thereon. See

Second WCJ Decision at 11-12, R.R. at 419a-20a. In affirming the WCJ, the Board 

likewise found that “Claimant here injured his ankle while jumping into his truck. 

Neither party attributed his injury to any condition of [E]mployer’s premises.” 

Second Board Opinion at 6, R.R. at 429a. 

We find no error in the Board’s determination. The record reveals 

substantial evidence – specifically Claimant’s own testimony – that Claimant’s 

injury resulted from his own act of stepping up into the vehicle independent of 

contact with the ground or the vehicle. Simply stated, as in Shaw, Claimant’s act of 

stepping up into the vehicle was not a condition of Employer’s premises and, as 

such, the parking lot did not cause or contribute to the causative chain of Claimant’s 

injury. The matter is also distinguishable from Slaugenhaupt, Newhouse, and 

Stewart, which involved injuries attributable not to a claimant’s volitional act, but 

instead to a concrete abutment, a closed gate and unexpected turn in a road, and the 

ground itself. Not unlike being struck by lightning, the location of the occurrence 

of Claimant’s injury on Employer’s premises was coincidental, not related to the 

condition of the premises. 

For these reasons, we find no error in the Board’s conclusion that 

Claimant failed to establish the third prong of the Slaugenhaupt test that required 
12

Claimant to prove that he sustained his injury due to a condition of the premises or 

operation of Employer’s business. See Shaw. As a result, we find no error in the 

Board’s affirmance of the Second WCJ Decision that denied and dismissed the 

Claim Petition.

B. Traveling Employee

To the extent Claimant argues that the fact that Employer provided him 

with a company telephone and a company vehicle, for which Employer also 

provided gasoline, made him a “traveling employee”4exempt from the “coming and 

going” rule,5 he is not entitled to relief. See Claimant’s Br. at 35-38. 

First, Claimant did not raise this matter initially before the WCJ, but 

instead attempted to argue it on remand. Generally, “[w]here a case is remanded for 

a specific and limited purpose, issues not encompassed within the remand order may 

not be decided on remand.” Levy v. Senate of Pa., 94 A.3d 436, 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014) (quoting In re Indep. Sch. Dist. Consisting of the Borough of Wheatland, 912 

A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is so 

4 We acknowledge that “[w]hat constitutes ‘scope and course of employment’ is broader 

for traveling employees than for stationary employees, and it includes driving to any appointment 

for the employer.” Jamison v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Gallagher Home Health Servs.), 955 

A.2d 494, 498 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Whether an individual is a traveling employee is determined 

on a case-by-case basis in consideration of factors including “whether the claimant’s job duties 

include travel, whether the claimant works on the employer’s premises, or whether the claimant 

has no fixed place of work.” Id. at 498-99 (quoting The Baby’s Room v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Stairs), 860 A.2d 200, 203 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)).

5 Under what is known as the “coming and going” rule, injuries sustained during the time 

an employee is traveling to and from his place of work are generally not compensable because the 

employee is neither on the employer’s premises nor actively engaged in the furtherance of the 

employer’s business. See Best v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 238 A.3d 539 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Peer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (B&W Constr.), 503 A.2d 1096, 1098 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)).
13

to prevent litigants from receiving a “proverbial second bite at the apple.” Id. In 

this matter, the Board remanded the matter for the WCJ to make a finding of whether 

Claimant’s injury arose in the course and scope of his employment in terms of 

satisfaction of the Slaugenhaupt test for injuries sustained by employees on an 

employer’s premises while the employee was not engaged in furthering the business 

of the employer. See First Board Opinion at 7-8, R.R. at 405a-06a. Claimant’s 

distinct argument regarding his alleged status as a traveling employee was neither 

raised below nor contemplated by either the WCJ in the First WCJ Decision or the 

Board in its remand opinion. See First WCJ Decision; First Board Opinion; Second 

WCJ Decision. Therefore, the issue was waived and could not be reviewed on 

remand or now before this Court. See Levy.

Further, we note that the “coming and going” rule applies in situations 

where an employee is traveling to or from work but is not on an employer’s property. 

See Peer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (B & W Constr.), 503 A.2d 1096, 1098 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (“[The coming and going] rule is grounded on the recognition 

that in the usual case an employee traveling to or from work is neither on the 

premises of his employer, nor engaged in the furtherance of his employer’s affairs, 

as is required by Section 301(c) of the Act.” (emphasis added)). By contrast, when 

an employee is on his employer’s property and is injured after having ended his shift, 

compensation for the injury must satisfy the requirements of the Slaugenhaupt test, 

as discussed supra. Thus, Claimant’s status as a traveling or stationary employee is 

immaterial to his entitlement to compensation for an injury sustained while leaving 

Employer’s premises following his completed shift. See Quality Bicycle; Markle; 

Newhouse.
14

C. The Penalty Petition

To the extent Claimant challenges the denial of the Penalty Petition,6

however, he is not entitled to relief. In his first decision, the WCJ denied the Penalty 

Petition because Employer had complied with its investigatory and documentary 

obligations and had a reasonable basis to contest the Claim Petition.

7

 See First WCJ 

6 We note that Claimant’s entire argument on this issue consists of the statement: “These 

issues were previously briefed and are preserved for appeal. The arguments in the January 3, 2020 

[Board] briefing are incorporated by reference.” Claimant’s Br. at 38.

7

In his first decision, the WCJ concluded that “Claimant has not met his burden on the 

Petition for Penalties of proving Employer violated the Act” and further that “Employer had a 

reasonable basis to contest the Claim Petition” (see First WCJ Decision at 13, Conclusions of Law 

8-9, R.R. at 394a) based on the following two findings of fact:

56. This [WCJ] finds that Claimant has not met his burden on the 

Petition for Penalties of proving Employer violated the Act in three 

different ways based on the following:

a. It is evident from the Notice of Denial filed on 

November 28, 2018[,] that Employer investigated this 

injury as required by Section 406. 

b. There is no requirement in the Act that [] Employer 

provide an employee with a list of providers and there is no 

evidence of such a list in the record. Claimant’s purported 

lack of proper notice did not keep him from timely 

reporting his injury or seeking and receiving medical 

treatment. 

c. This is essentially an allegation that Employer had no 

reasonable basis to contest the Claim Petition which is not 

properly addressed in the Petition for Penalties.

. . . .

58. This [WCJ] finds that Employer had a reasonable basis to 

contest the Claim Petition based on the fact the injury occurred after 
15

Decision at 12, Findings of Fact 56 & 58, R.R. at 393a. After reviewing the record, 

the Board likewise determined that Employer had a reasonable basis to contest the 

Claim Petition and so affirmed the denial of the Penalty Petition.8 See Second WCJ 

Decision at 12, R.R. at 420a. We find no error in the WCJ’s denial of the Penalty 

Petition or the Board’s affirmance of that denial, based on Employer having 

reasonably (and ultimately successfully) contested the Claim Petition on the basis of 

the third prong of the Slaugenhaupt test, as discussed above.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Board’s order.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

everyone but Claimant had left work for the day and he didn’t report 

the injury before he went to the hospital.

First WCJ Decision at 12, Findings of Fact 56 & 58, R.R. at 393a.

8 Following the remand, the WCJ’s discussion of the Penalty Petition consisted simply of 

the finding “that Employer’s contest of the Claim Petition was reasonable.” Second WCJ Decision 

at 12, R.R. at 420a.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Lewis, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Lehigh Asphalt Paving & Construction :

Co. (Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board), : No. 1445 C.D. 2021

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2023, the December 3, 2021 

order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge