[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 188 (Wednesday, September 27, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57980-57992]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-24839]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-98-4515; Notice 2]
RIN 2127-AF43


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This document establishes a new Federal motor vehicle safety

[[Page 57981]]

standard (FMVSS) FMVSS No. 305, ``Electric-powered vehicles: 
electrolyte spillage and electrical shock protection'' addressing 
safety issues exclusive to electric vehicles (EVs). The standard is 
based upon a notice of proposed rulemaking published on October 13, 
1998. It applies to all EVs (except EVs to which FMVSS No. 500 ``Low-
Speed Vehicles'' applies) that have a propulsion power source greater 
than 48 volts and a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs) or less.

DATES: The final rule is effective October 1, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, contact Charles 
Hott, Office of Safety Performance Standards, NHTSA (202-366-0427). For 
legal issues, contact Taylor Vinson, Office of Chief Counsel, NHTSA 
(202-366-5263).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

1. Background of this Rulemaking Action.
2. SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle Battery System Crash Integrity Testing.''
3. Proposed FMVSS No. 305.
4. Specific Issues for Which We Sought Comment.
5. Modifications to the Final Rule Based Upon Comments:
    A. Vehicles to Which FMVSS No. 305 Applies.
    i. The standard will apply to vehicles that use more than 48 
volts as propulsion power.
    ii. The standard will not apply to Low-Speed Vehicles (LSVs).
    iii. The standard will not apply to large electric-powered 
schoolbuses.
    B. S5.1 Electrolyte Spillage From Propulsion Batteries.
    C. S5.2 Battery Retention.
    D. S5.3 Electrical Isolation.
    E. S6.1 Pre-Impact Test Static Rollover.
    F. S6.3 Side Moving Deformable Barrier Impact.
    G. S7.1 Battery State of Charge.
    H. S7.7 Electrical Isolation Test Procedure.
    I. Editorial Comments.
6. Effective Date.
7. Regulatory Impacts and Analyses.

1. Background of This Rulemaking Action

    The 1990s may be remembered as the beginning of a new generation of 
electric vehicles (EVs). In mid-decade, General Motors Corporation (GM) 
introduced the EV1, an electric-powered passenger car, offered for 
lease in selected western markets in the United States. Other 
manufacturers, such as Honda and Nissan, have also introduced new EVs. 
The primary impetus for the introduction of EVs into the marketplace 
appears to be the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 which included 
provisions for zero emission vehicles (ZEVs). EVs are the only known 
vehicles that will meet the emission requirements for ZEVs. In 
California, these provisions were to become effective beginning in 
model year 1998, and would have required automobile manufacturers to 
sell, collectively, 40,000 EVs in the model year. However, those 
provisions were delayed by the California Air Resources Board until 
model year 2003. At that time, car companies will be required to meet 
10 percent of their sales with ZEVs. In addition, the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 requires Federal and State fleets to acquire increasing 
percentages of alternative fueled vehicles.
    On December 27, 1991, we published an advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM) on EV safety (56 FR 67038). The purpose of that 
notice was to help us to determine which existing Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards (FMVSS) may need modification to better accommodate 
the unique technology of EVs and what new FMVSS may need to be 
developed and issued to assure their safe introduction. We requested 
comments on a broad range of potential EV safety issues including 
battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazard. The ANPRM 
elicited widespread public interest and 46 comments were received.
    After reviewing the comments and information received in response 
to the ANPRM, we concluded in a November 18, 1992 notice (57 FR 54354) 
that it was premature to initiate rulemaking for FMVSSs specifically 
addressing EVs. In that notice, we stated that further research was 
needed in the areas of battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock 
hazard.
    Shortly thereafter, in 1993, we conducted research and testing on 
two converted EVs. We tested these vehicles as specified in FMVSS No. 
208, ``Occupant Crash Protection.'' Both vehicles were equipped with 
flooded (i.e., filled with liquid electrolyte) lead-acid batteries 
located in the engine and luggage compartments in the front and rear of 
the vehicle. One vehicle was equipped with twelve 12-volt batteries 
(five in the front and seven in the rear). The other vehicle was 
equipped with ten 12-volt batteries (four in the front and six in the 
rear). Both vehicles were subjected to 48 km/h frontal crashes into a 
fixed barrier. In both cases, the front batteries sustained significant 
damage, spilling large quantities of electrolyte. On one vehicle, 17.7 
liters of electrolyte spilled from the front batteries as a result of 
the crash and in the other vehicle, 10.4 liters. In addition, 
electrical arcs were observed under the hood of one vehicle during the 
crash.
    In the following year, we published a notice of request for 
comments (59 FR 49901, September 30, 1994 ) to help us to assess the 
need to regulate battery electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazard 
of EVs during a crash or rollover. We received 32 comments from 
automobile manufacturers, EV converters, and industry associations. The 
majority of the commenters supported some type of Federal regulation 
for electrolyte spillage and electric shock prevention, provided that 
the requirements of the regulation were performance-based and not 
design restrictive to the extent that they might inhibit technology 
development. Two manufacturers, Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Nissan, 
and two industry associations (Electric Vehicle Industry Association 
and Electric Vehicles of America) did not believe that Federal 
regulation was necessary because electric vehicle design was constantly 
changing due to technological breakthroughs. However, Ford did state 
that it would follow the recommendation of industry associations such 
as the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) which, at the time, was 
developing SAE J1766 ``Recommended Practice For Electric and Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing.''
    In 1995, we again conducted research and testing, this time on four 
EVs. Three vehicles were converted to run on electricity and one was 
built as an EV. The three converted vehicles were equipped with starved 
(i.e., electrolyte that is absorbed in an inert material to prevent 
leakage in case of rupture) lead-acid batteries and the vehicle built 
as an EV was equipped with flooded lead-acid batteries. We subjected 
three vehicles to 48 km/h frontal crashes similar to the test described 
in FMVSS No. 208, ``Occupant Crash Protection'' and a fourth to a 54 
km/h side crash similar to the test specified in FMVSS No. 214,'' Side 
Impact Protection.'' Each vehicle was also subjected to pre and post-
crash rollover tests to measure electrolyte spillage. The crash and 
rollover tests revealed that the vehicles with the starved lead-acid 
batteries had very little leakage (as expected because of their 
design), while the vehicle with the flooded lead-acid batteries leaked 
approximately 50 liters of electrolyte. We also performed electrical 
isolation tests on these vehicles before and after each of the crash 
tests. Two of the converted EVs maintained their electrical isolation 
after the crash tests. The other converted EV was the vehicle subjected 
to a side impact test. That EV

[[Page 57982]]

chafed a wire which came in contact with the vehicle structure during 
the crash and did not maintain electrical isolation. The vehicle built 
as an EV was subjected to a frontal crash test. That vehicle lost 
electrical isolation when two of the battery connectors came in contact 
with the battery tunnel during the crash.

2. SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing''

    During our earlier rulemaking activities, there was not yet an 
industry standard in place that addressed potential safety problems in 
EVs. However, in February 1996, SAE published its Recommended Practice 
SAE J1766 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing.'' The purpose of SAE 
J1766 is to define minimum performance standards and establish test 
methods which evaluate battery system spillage, retention, electrical 
system isolation, and liquid interaction in electric and hybrid 
electric vehicles during crash scenarios. The Recommended Practice 
covers all electric and hybrid EVs with a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs) 
or less.
    As the document notes, electric and hybrid EVs contain many types 
of battery systems. J1766 promotes the use of barriers between 
occupants and battery systems which are necessary to provide protection 
from potentially harmful factors and materials within the battery 
system, which can cause injury to vehicle occupants during different 
crash scenarios.
    The potentially harmful factors and materials include:

electrical isolation integrity, electrolyte spillage and liquid 
interactions, and retention of the battery system. Maintaining 
electrical isolation of the system is important to prevent hazardous 
shock of vehicle occupants. Electrolyte spillage and battery fluid 
interactions should be minimized to prevent chemical reactions and 
electrical conductance. The latter could lead to an electrical shock 
hazard.

    SAE J1766 establishes certain performance criteria to be met when 
an EV is subjected to the frontal impact procedures of FMVSS No. 208 
(including the 30-degree oblique), the side impact procedures of FMVSS 
214, and the rear impact procedure of FMVSS No. 301. No spillage of 
electrolyte into the occupant compartment is permitted. Electrolyte 
spillage outside the passenger compartment is limited to 5 liters for a 
30-minute period after vehicle motion ceases and throughout the post 
crash rollover test. Battery modules must stay restrained in the 
vehicle, without any component intruding into the occupant compartment. 
Electrical isolation between the chassis and high voltage system is at 
least 500 ohms per nominal volt.

3. Proposed FMVSS No. 305

    On October 13, 1998, we proposed that provisions similar to those 
of SAE J1766 be adopted in a new FMVSS No. 305 to afford the public 
protection from electrolyte spillage and electric shock hazards in 
crashes (63 FR 54652). These provisions should help secure the safe 
introduction of new EVs into the marketplace.
    As proposed, FMVSS No. 305 would apply to all passenger cars, and 
to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 
4536 kg (10,000 lbs) or less, and to school buses with a GVWR over 4536 
kg (10,000 lbs), that use more than 72 volts of electricity as 
propulsion power. Seventy-two volts is the equivalent of six 12-volt 
batteries. Under proposed FMVSS No. 305, EVs covered by the standard, 
other than heavy school buses, would be required to meet leakage and 
battery retention requirements that are essentially those of SAE J1766 
after front (FMVSS No. 208), side (FMVSS No. 214), and rear impact 
barrier crash tests (FMVSS No. 301). A static rollover test (FMVSS No. 
301) would also be conducted both before and after each of these crash 
tests. Heavy school buses (those with a GVWR greater than 4536 kg) 
would be required to meet the same performance requirements after a 
moving contour barrier crash test, without the pre- and post-test 
rollovers. The performance requirements proposed were that there shall 
be no electrolyte spillage in the passenger compartment, with spillage 
outside the compartment limited to 5 liters total in a 30-minute period 
following the cessation of motion after a crash test. Intrusion of the 
battery system components into the occupant compartment would also be 
prohibited. Batteries must be restrained in the vehicle in their 
original installations. The electric isolation value must be at least 
500 ohms per nominal volt, as determined by the SAE procedure for the 
measurement of the insulation resistance of the propulsion battery of 
an EV. The standard known resistance Ro (in ohms) should be 
approximately 500 times the nominal operating voltage of the vehicle 
(in volts). The Ro is not required to be precisely this value since the 
equations are valid for any Ro. However, a Ro value in this range 
should provide good resolution for the voltage measurements.
    However, FMVSS No. 305 would not apply to passenger-carrying EVs 
with a maximum speed of 40 km/h (25 mph) or less. We noted that we had 
recently issued a standard expressly for low-speed vehicles (LSVs), 
FMVSS No. 500 (63 FR 33194; June 17, 1998). LSVs are any 4-wheeled 
vehicles, other than trucks, with a maximum speed of not less than 32 
km/hr nor more than 40 km/h. EVs subject to FMVSS No. 500 could include 
Neighborhood Electric Vehicles (NEVs) and those battery-powered golf 
cars within the speed range. FMVSS No. 500 does not require LSVs to 
meet FMVSS Nos. 208, 214, and 301, which contain some 48 and 54 km/h 
impact barrier tests like those proposed for FMVSS No. 305.

4. Specific Issues for Which We Sought Comment

    We received comments from the following 14 companies/organizations: 
Bombardier Motor Corporation of America, Navistar International 
Transportation Corp., Blue Bird Body Company, Infrastructure Working 
Council, Toyota Technical Center, USA, Inc., Ford Motor Company, Nissan 
North America, Inc., DaimlerChrysler Corporation, General Motors/North 
American Operations, Applied Safety Technologies Corporation, Mike 
Beebe, Honda/American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Mitsubishi Motors R & D of 
America Inc., and Volvo Cars of North America, Inc.
    We asked for comments on six specific issues.
    The first issue was the extent to which the proposed rule would 
necessitate expenditures by manufacturers of EVs to meet electrolyte 
spillage, battery retention, and electrical isolation test 
requirements.
    Ford and DaimlerChrysler commented specifically on the cost to 
conform vehicles with a GVWR of 4536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less. 
Neither believed that there would be any additional cost since the 
tests for these requirements will be conducted in the course of 
conventional testing for existing FMVSS. Blue Bird, a manufacturer of 
large school buses, on the other hand, stated that the cost to conform 
in terms of dollars, weight, compliance tests, etc. would drastically 
impair, if not destroy, current research and development activities 
regarding electric and hybrid electric large school buses. This 
commenter also stated that it is not aware of any electric or hybrid 
electric powered school buses currently being offered on a regular 
production basis. It therefore appears that the cost

[[Page 57983]]

to conform to FMVSS No. 305 will be negligible for vehicles with a GVWR 
of 4536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less.
    The second issue was the adequacy of the proposed spillage 
specification. We present and address these comments below in our 
discussion pertaining to the adoption of S5.1, a requirement on 
electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries.
    The third issue was the adequacy of the proposed specification for 
electrical isolation. We address these comments below on our discussion 
of S5.3, the specification for electrical isolation that we are 
adopting.
    The fourth and fifth issues concerned the coverage of the proposed 
standard, and whether the proposed standard should apply to electric 
Low-Speed Vehicles. We address these issues below in our discussion on 
the applicability of the final rule.
    Sixth, we asked about the appropriateness of a rollover test. The 
SAE currently recommends that the vehicle undergo a rollover test 
before the barrier impact test. We are concerned that damage may occur 
to the test vehicle during rollover that could affect the results of 
the barrier impact test. Accordingly, we asked for comments as to 
whether there should be a rollover test before the barrier impact test 
and as to the importance of conducting a rollover test before the 
barrier impact test.
    None of the commenters believe that the pre-test rollover procedure 
is necessary. The SAE Electric Vehicle Safety Committee has revised the 
February 1996 standard. This revised standard was reissued in June 
1998. In the revised standard, the SAE determined that it was not 
necessary to perform the pre-crash static rollover test. It found that 
no failures occurred to any of the vehicles tested using this 
procedure. The most significant information regarding safety was only 
found during a post-crash condition. We believe that the likelihood of 
electrolyte spillage or shock hazard without a related crash event is 
extremely remote. Further, we do not see any additional safety benefit 
in conducting the static rollover test prior to the crash tests. 
Therefore, this test is not included in the final rule.

5. Modifications to the Final Rule Based Upon the Comments

A. Vehicles to Which FMVSS No. 305 Applies

i. The Standard Will Apply to Vehicles That Use More Than 48 Volts as 
Propulsion Power
    We proposed that the new standard apply to vehicles that use 72 
volts or more as propulsion power. However, we were unsure whether 
there might be vehicles or vehicle designs which are powered, in whole 
or in part (perhaps a hybrid electric configuration), by less than 72 
volts of electricity. We asked whether there were any such and whether 
it would be appropriate to apply FMVSS No. 305 to them.
    Navistar commented that the industry seems to have developed closer 
to a 50-volt segregation between high and low voltage. SAE J1673 ``High 
Voltage Automotive Wiring Assembly Design'' covers systems over 50-
volts nominal. SAE J1797 ``Packaging of Electric Vehicle Battery 
Modules'' recommends against exceeding 60-volts DC in a single module 
during any state. This value equates to a 48-50 volt nominal battery. 
SAE Information Report 52232 ``Vehicle System Voltage--Initial 
Recommendations'' suggests not to exceed 65-volts during periodic 
ripple and 50-volts AC RMS. Again, these values equate to 48-50 volts 
nominal voltage.
    ASTC commented that the final rule should not totally exclude 
vehicles which are propelled by 72 volts or less. Currently, SAE 
Standard J52344 JUN98 ``Guidelines for Electric Vehicle Safety,'' 
defines ``potentially hazardous voltage'' as 60 VDC and above. This is 
based on the UL standards UL 223 1 and UL 2202. Above this level, it is 
recommended to design with the intent to protect as one would for any 
high voltage system.
    Mitsubishi argued that the application threshold should be set at 
or below 60 volts. This is the level specified by the National Electric 
Code (NEC, article 725) and UL as the limit above which a risk is posed 
to the human body by high voltage.
    On the basis of these comments, we have concluded that that FMVSS 
No. 305 should not apply only to vehicles that use more than 72 volts 
as propulsion power as we proposed. It is clear from the commenters and 
industry standards that 60 volts DC can cause bodily injury. Further, 
we are not aware of any EV manufacturer which is presently producing 
motor vehicles propelled by 48 volts DC or less; it seems that these 
lower voltages are not detrimental to the safety of humans in the same 
manner that 60 volts DC may be. Accordingly, FMVSS No. 305 will apply 
to EVs that are propelled by 48 volts or more of electricity.
ii. The Standard Will Not Apply to Low-Speed Vehicles (LSVs)
    Although we were aware that two Low-Speed Vehicles ( LSVs) will be 
produced with six 12-volt batteries totaling 72 volts, the Bombardier 
NV and the GEM vehicle (the Trans2 NEV design upgraded from 48 volts), 
the proposed rule nevertheless excluded LSVs. However, we asked whether 
the standard ought not to apply to LSVs after all, and, if so, whether 
the proposed requirements would be reasonable, practicable, and 
appropriate for them.
    Two commenters recommended against including LSVs in FMVSS No. 305. 
Bombardier commented that we had extensively discussed the safety 
features incorporated into FMVSS No. 500 based upon LSVs' design and 
performance characteristics and concluded in the final rule that this 
``rule requires safety equipment on low-speed vehicles consistent with 
their characteristics and operating environment.'' Bombardier further 
commented that, in issuing FMVSS No. 500, we had concluded that LSVs, 
given their limited-speed capability and relatively controlled 
operating environments, need not be designed to meet the full range of 
FMVSSs, especially those incorporating dynamic crash requirements. 
Moreover, complying with the proposed dynamic crash test standards 
would require LSVs to undergo impact barrier tests at speeds of 48.3 
km/h (30 mph). This speed is above the maximum speed of 40 km/h (25 
mph) set forth in FMVSS No. 500 of which an LSV is capable.
    Ford also argued that FMVSS No. 305 should not apply to electric-
powered LSV's. Ford believes that compliance with FMVSS No. 305 would 
not provide appreciable additional safety benefit for LSV's beyond that 
provided by compliance to FMVSS No. 500 which is now required. Ford 
stated that the primary patterns of use for LSVs are anticipated to be 
Closed Community environments where it is highly unlikely they will be 
involved in a crash at 30 mph. Ford argued that if LSVs would have to 
meet the crash requirements of FMVSS No. 305, the manufacturers may be 
more likely to develop gasoline LSVs than develop zero emission 
electric-powered LSVs.
    Contrary to these comments, Mitsubishi argued that it is possible 
that flooded lead-acid batteries may be used

[[Page 57984]]

in LSVs and that the electrolyte leakage from LSVs's so equipped could 
be far greater than the proposed 5.0 liter limit, and thus pose a risk 
to humans and the environment. Therefore, Mitsubishi recommended that 
LSVs be covered by FMVSS No. 305. It is true that LSVs are not required 
to meet any of the crash test standards and their structures are not 
the equivalent in strength of conventional passenger cars, presenting 
the possibility of electrolyte spillage and failure of battery 
retention in crashes. NHTSA is developing a proposal to add performance 
requirements for the equipment required by FMVSS No. 500 for LSVs. We 
will carefully consider Mitsubishi's points about electrolyte leakage 
in developing that proposal. We prefer to take a comprehensive look at 
appropriate requirements for LSVs, instead of a piecemeal, standard-by-
standard approach.
    We noted that FMVSS No. 500's definition of LSV does not include 
trucks and asked whether trucks that are powered by less than 72 volts 
of electricity should be covered if their maximum speed is not more 
than 40 km/h (25 mph). Ford commented, in essence, that trucks should 
be included in the standard unless they cannot achieve a maximum speed 
of 25 mph regardless of their voltage. Inasmuch as load-carrying 
vehicles with a maximum speed that exceeds 20 mph are classified as 
``trucks'' and therefore must meet requirements in 30 mph barrier crash 
tests of other FMVSS, we see no logical basis on which low-speed trucks 
should be excused from the barrier crash specifications of FMVSS No. 
305, and therefore they are not excluded from the standard. However, we 
shall revisit this issue if FMVSS No. 500 is ever amended to include 
low-speed trucks.
iii. The Standard Will Not Apply to Large Electric-Powered Schoolbuses
    We proposed that FMVSS No. 305 also apply to electric school buses 
with a GVWR of greater than 4356 kg (10,000 lbs). Blue Bird, Navistar 
and IWC commented that FMVSS No. 305 should not be applicable to large 
school buses. Navistar argued that it may seem logical to apply the 
same requirements to electric-powered school buses with a GVWR of 
greater than 4536 kg, but that, in reality, these vehicles can be quite 
different from electric-powered passenger vehicles. The electric 
propulsion system and components have to be much larger for school 
buses with a GVWR greater than 4536 kg and this creates packaging, 
shock hazard protection, and costs that are different from electric-
powered passenger vehicles.
    Blue Bird argued that the standard should not apply to large school 
buses until appropriate testing and research are conducted to determine 
if the requirements are justified, reasonable, appropriate and 
practicable. The school bus manufacturer commented that there currently 
are limited applications in which electric vehicle technology may be 
practical and that school bus service is one of these. It also said 
that the research that is currently in progress may be vitally 
important to the successful development of large electric-powered 
vehicles. Blue Bird stated that it is not aware of any electric or 
hybrid electric powered school buses currently being offered on a 
regular production basis. The few electric school buses that it 
currently produces contain 3636 kg (8,000 pounds) of batteries and 
support structure. The weight of the additional structure required to 
protect the battery modules could be substantial and this can only be 
accomplished by a reduction in capacity or an addition of a tandem 
axle. Blue Bird further argued that the extension of the proposed 
requirements to large school buses would constitute regulation of 
research and development activities rather than the regulation of 
production vehicles for consumer use.
    IWC argued that it would be premature at this time to require bus 
manufacturers to comply with a standard which was developed without 
consideration for their application.
    We agree that, in terms of cost and weight, FMVSS No. 305 could 
have a substantial effect on large school buses. Further, it is 
plausible that the additional weight and cost associated with applying 
FMVSS No. 305 to large school buses could restrict the development of 
electric-powered school buses. We do not believe that at this time 
large school buses should be covered by FMVSS No. 305 because the 
testing we proposed would require a massive safety cage to prevent the 
batteries from becoming damaged and leaking the electrolyte. Current 
school bus construction appears sufficient to prevent the electrolyte 
from entering the passenger compartment. There are many issues that 
must be resolved before issuing an FMVSS applicable to the 
crashworthiness of large electric-powered school buses, such as 
appropriate test procedures and the added weight of more battery 
containment. Accordingly, this aspect of the proposed rule has not been 
adopted.
    We note that we do not regard electric school buses as ``research 
and development vehicles.'' They are production vehicles and certified 
as conforming to all applicable FMVSS. We anticipate that Blue Bird and 
other manufacturers developing electric school buses will take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the safety of school children from 
electrolyte spillage and electrical shock hazards even though these 
buses are not required to comply with FMVSS No. 305.

B. S5.1 Electrolyte Spillage From Propulsion Batteries.

    We proposed that:

    S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. There shall 
be no spillage of electrolyte from propulsion batteries into the 
passenger compartment. Not more than 5.0 liters of electrolyte from 
propulsion batteries shall leak outside the passenger compartment. 
Spillage and leakage are measured from the time the vehicle ceases 
motion after a crash until 30 minutes thereafter, and throughout any 
static rollover before or after a crash test.

    DaimlerChrysler believes that a requirement of ``no spillage'' may 
be appropriate for a voluntary standard, but not for a regulation. In 
this commenter's view, during the post-test static rollover, a 
measurable quantity of spillage should be specified in S5.1, for 
example, 100 ml maximum of spillage into the passenger compartment in 
the first 30 minutes after the crash test.
    GM agrees with the intent of this requirement, and participated in 
writing the provision into SAE J1766. GM also argued that this 
provision is appropriate in the context of an SAE Recommended Practice. 
The literal inability to measure zero--i.e., ``no spillage''--creates a 
practicability problem in the context of an FMVSS. GM noted that the 
agency's other fuel integrity standards do allow a small non-zero 
amount of fuel spillage. GM recommended that proposed S5.1 be revised 
to allow a small non-zero amount (perhaps one deciliter) of electrolyte 
spillage into the passenger compartment.
    Our desired goal is zero spillage, and we believe that it can be 
achieved with current battery technology. Although a requirement of 
``no spillage'' would differ from the performance required of fuel 
systems in other FMVSS, there is a distinction: batteries are not 
subject to the same operating conditions as fuel tanks. Fuel tanks are 
filled frequently, which requires that the be opened and closed. 
Batteries recharge through applying electricity to the terminals and do 
not require opening on a regular basis. However, given the concern 
about the phrase ``no spillage,'' we are adopting the phrase ``no 
visible trace'' as a substitute which we believe is a more practicable 
specification.
    The value of 5.0 liters derives from SAE J1766 and is based upon 
the

[[Page 57985]]

amount of electrolyte that is contained in present large automotive 
batteries. Commenters were asked for their views on whether a different 
amount may be more appropriate to protect the public in EV crashes.
    Ford and DaimlerChrysler commented specifically on the proposed 
limit. Ford argued that the 5.0 liters of electrolyte spillage should 
be the maximum that is allowed. DaimlerChrysler believes the 5.0 liter 
limit to be satisfactory and stated that, in all probability, spillage 
will be a blend of electrolyte and battery coolant, rather than 
electrolyte alone.
    Navistar and Blue Bird both argued that the proposed limit of 5.0 
liters is too restrictive for large school buses. Given the fact that 
we have decided to exclude large school buses from FMVSS No. 305, we 
simply note, without discussion, that these comments were submitted.
    Upon review, we have replaced the words ``crash'' and ``crash 
test'' in S5.1 with the more accurate ``barrier impact test.'' For the 
same reason, we have also substituted ``impact'' for ``crash'' in other 
paragraphs of the standard.
    Accordingly, S5.1 as adopted reads:

    S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. Not more 
than 5.0 liters of electrolyte from propulsion batteries shall spill 
outside the passenger compartment, and no visible trace of 
electrolyte shall spill into the passenger compartment. Spillage is 
measured from the time the vehicle ceases motion after any barrier 
impact test until 30 minutes thereafter, and throughout any static 
rollover after any barrier impact test.

    Note that we have eliminated the word ``leakage'' from the final 
rule. We used it as a synonym for ``spillage'' in the proposed rule. 
Both words indicate the escape of electrolyte from the battery. 
Elimination of ``leakage'' will avoid questions of whether we intended 
different meanings for these words. You will note also that rollover 
before a crash test has also been deleted. The reason for this is 
discussed in the paragraph below relating to S6.1.

C. S5.2 Battery Retention

    We proposed that:

    Battery modules shall remain restrained in the location in which 
they are installed in the vehicle. No part of any battery system 
component shall enter the passenger compartment, as determined by a 
visual inspection.

    Navistar argued that this is too restrictive and that the wording 
can have a variety of meanings. It suggested adopting the wording of 
J1766 in which the battery modules must stay restrained to the vehicle. 
Blue Bird commented that the batteries or any part thereof pose no more 
danger or safety threat than any other part of a school bus that may 
become detached during a barrier crash test. Echoing Navistar, it said 
that the requirement that battery modules shall remain restrained in 
the location in which they are installed in the vehicle may not be 
necessary from a safety viewpoint. Mitsubishi argued that slight 
movement of the batteries does not necessarily pose a safety risk, and 
suggested modifying that the ``Battery module must not separate from 
the battery system.'' In Toyota's view, the definition of battery 
module includes the venting system and it is unlikely the venting 
system entering the passenger compartment could cause harm. Volvo 
argued that the proposed requirement is unnecessarily design 
restrictive and may prevent innovative and better (safer) solutions 
that would have the potential of improving occupant protection as 
compared to a design solution that would comply with the proposed 
requirement.
    GM focused on the proposal that ``no part of any battery system 
component shall enter the passenger compartment, as determined by a 
visual inspection.'' Proposed S4 defines a battery system component as: 
``* * * any part of a battery module, interconnect, venting system, 
battery restraint device, and battery box or container which holds the 
individual battery modules.'' GM noted that the proposed battery 
retention requirement should recognize the possibility that battery 
system components may be located inside the passenger compartment by 
design. GM further argued that the prohibition against the presence of 
the battery container inside the passenger compartment per se serves no 
safety purpose and that the proposed language could be interpreted as 
an unnecessary design restriction. GM recommended the following 
alternative wording for S5.2:

    S5.2 Battery retention. Battery modules shall remain restrained 
in the location in which they are installed in the vehicle. No part 
of any battery system component that is positioned outside the 
passenger compartment shall enter the passenger compartment during 
the test procedures described in S7 of this standard, as determined 
by visual inspection.

    We note that the intent of the proposed requirements in S5.2 was to 
ensure that the battery modules would not become unattached and become 
flying projectiles in a crash or subsequent rollover. We agree with 
Navistar that the wording can have a variety of meanings, as is clearly 
shown based on the comments received. We have also concluded that the 
proposed language is unnecessarily design restrictive and should be 
modified to avoid unnecessary confusion. Further, the test procedures 
are located in S6 (S7 specifies the test conditions). We therefore are 
adopting the following wording for S5.2:

    S5.2 Battery Retention. Battery modules located inside the 
passenger compartment shall remain restrained in the location in 
which they are installed. No part of any battery system component 
that is located outside the passenger compartment shall enter the 
passenger compartment during the test procedures of S6 of this 
standard, as determined by visual inspection.

D. S5.3 Electrical Isolation

    We proposed that:

    Electrical isolation between the battery system and the vehicle 
electricity-conducting structure shall be maintained at a minimum of 
500 ohm/volt.

    Navistar and GM argued that momentary loss of isolation should not 
be regarded as a noncompliance. If electrical isolation measurements 
were made real-time during the crash test, a detected momentary loss of 
isolation could be interpreted as violating this requirement. In GM's 
opinion, paragraph 4.4.3 of SAE J1766 recognizes that, during a crash, 
electrical isolation may be lost momentarily and should be immediately 
restored.
    We concur that S5.3 as proposed could be interpreted to mean that 
any loss of isolation is prohibited. In our view, momentary loss is not 
an undue safety risk provided that the system subsequently restores 
itself. We are revising S5.3 to indicate that the measurement is to be 
taken after each crash test. S5.3 as adopted reads:

    S5.3 Electrical isolation. Electrical isolation between the 
battery system and the vehicle electricity-conducting structure 
after each test shall be not less than 500 ohms/volt.

E. S6.1 Pre-Impact Test Static Rollover

    We proposed that a vehicle must meet the requirements of S5.1, 
S5.2, S5.3 after being rotated on its longitudinal axis to successive 
increments of 90 degrees, before each crash test. Upon review, however, 
we are concerned that damage may occur to the test vehicle during 
rollover that could affect the results of the barrier impact test. 
Further, none of the commenters argued that the pre-impact test static 
rollover procedure was necessary. We also believe that the likelihood 
of electrolyte spillage or shock hazard without a related impact event 
is extremely remote. Accordingly, we have eliminated the proposed 
pre'impact static rollover from the final rule.

[[Page 57986]]

F. S6.3 Side Moving Deformable Barrier Impact

    We proposed that:

    S6.3 Side impact moving deformable barrier crash. After a static 
rollover, when the vehicle is impacted from the side by a deformable 
barrier moving at 54 km/h, the vehicle shall meet the requirements 
of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3.

    Honda stated that the side impact test specified in S6.3 of 
proposed FMVSS 305 does not mention the installation of the test dummy 
in the test vehicle. Honda argued that, in order to prevent any 
possible misunderstanding, we should prescribe a dummy installation in 
the final rule that is identical to that in FMVSS No. 214.
    We agree, and are so specifying. The test dummy that should be used 
in this and other tests is a 50th percentile male dummy as specified in 
subpart F of 49 CFR Part 572. To simplify the regulatory text, we are 
adopting that definition of ``dummy'' in S3. The final rule, then, 
revises S6.3 to read as follows:

    S6.3 Side moving deformable barrier impact. The vehicle must 
meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 when it is impacted 
from the side by a barrier conforming to part 587 of this chapter 
that is moving at any speed up to and including 54 km/h, with 
dummies positioned in accordance with S7 of Sec. 571.214 of this 
chapter.

G. S7.1 Battery State of Charge

    We proposed that:

    S7.1 Battery state of charge. The battery system is charged 
using the vehicle manufacturer's recommended charging system. All 
tests are performed with the propulsion batteries charged to not 
less than 95 percent capacity.

    Navistar commented that it may be unrealistic to obtain 95 percent 
state of charge on some hybrid electric vehicles. Typically hybrid 
electric vehicles do not operate with batteries fully charged like 
fully electric vehicles. It may be more representative to test at 
nominal working voltage or state of charge for the system. Similarly, 
Toyota commented that the 95 percent requirement seems unreasonable for 
hybrid electric vehicles. It suggested that the test be performed with 
the batteries charged to the level recommended by the manufacturer. 
DaimlerChrysler argued that the batteries will not maintain 95 percent 
capacity because they are under a load at the point of impact, and will 
have been discharged somewhat. Honda stated that, for hybrid vehicles, 
the vehicle controls the batteries' state of charge with its vehicle's 
Electrical Control Unit. Finally, Honda reminded us that, in the final 
rule of FMVSS 105, we agreed to revise the proposed rule from ``95 
percent battery state of charge'' to ``manufacturer's recommended state 
of charge or 95 percent battery state of charge.''
    We agree with the above comments and note that the June 1998 
revised version of SAE J1766 changed 4.1.2 to read ``The Battery system 
shall be fully charged prior to the crash test using the vehicle 
manufacturers recommended charging procedure.'' We therefore are 
adopting the following wording:

    S7.1 Battery state of charge: The battery system shall be at the 
maximum state of charge recommended by the manufacturer, as stated 
in the vehicle operator's manual or on a label that is permanently 
attached to the vehicle, or, if the manufacturer has made no 
recommendation, at a state of not less than 95 percent of the 
maximum capacity of the battery system.

H. S7.7 Electrical Isolation Test Procedure

    We proposed that S7.7.1 read as follows:

    S7.7.1 The propulsion battery system is connected to the 
vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle ignition is in the 
``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized) position.

    GM asked that this sentence be clarified in the final rule, to 
avoid confusion and inconsistent interpretations of the test procedure, 
and state that the isolation measurement is from the battery side of 
the contactors or automatic disconnect system and the vehicle chassis, 
consistent with SAE J1766. Navistar argued that the specification that 
the propulsion battery be connected to the vehicle propulsion system 
during the electrical isolation test indicates that any safety devices 
such as fuses or contractors that were opened during or as a result of 
the crash would have to be re-closed for this test. Navistar stated 
that since such devices would be included in the design to provide a 
high degree of safety in a crash, it does not seem appropriate to 
require these safety features be defeated to determine if the test has 
met the requirements. Navistar is incorrect. The propulsion battery is 
connected to the vehicle propulsion system before a dynamic test. 
During the electrical isolation test, any safety devices such as fuses 
or contactors are not closed.
    We agree with GM that we intended to have the voltage measurement 
taken from the battery side of the contactors if they are used. We do 
not agree with Navistar that the contactors would need to be reclosed 
for this test. During the SAE discussions in which the revisions to SAE 
J1766 were being developed, there was considerable attention focused on 
whether the electrical isolation measurement to chassis should be taken 
from the battery side or the traction side of the contactors. All 
agreed that the measurement is taken from the battery side of the 
contactors to the vehicle chassis because the procedure is meaningless 
if the voltage measurement is made between the output side of opened 
contactors and vehicle chassis, since there would likely be no voltage 
between those points.
    GM recommended that S7.7.1 be revised to read as follows, and we 
have accepted that recommendation (note that the deletion of proposed 
S7.6 pertaining to the testing of large school buses has resulted in a 
renumbering of S7.7 to S7.6):

    S7.6.1 Prior to the barrier crash, the propulsion battery system 
is connected to the vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle 
ignition is in the ``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized) 
position. If the vehicle utilizes an automatic disconnect between 
the propulsion battery system and the traction system, the 
electrical isolation measurement after the crash is made from the 
battery side of the automatic disconnect to the vehicle chassis.

    Proposed paragraph S7.7.3 (now S7.6.3) set forth a procedure for 
measuring voltage in Figure 1. Upon review, we have decided that only 
the first two sentences related to the procedure itself. We are 
adopting these sentences as proposed. The remaining material we set 
forth here, as it relates to propulsion battery voltage (Vb). We 
anticipate that Vb after the crash test will be approximately the same 
as Vb before the crash test. After the crash test, a Vb greater than 
zero is required in order to conduct the remainder of the procedure of 
S7.6.3. If Vb after the crash test is zero, this indicates that a short 
across the propulsion battery has occurred, which precludes the 
remainder of this test procedure. A short across the propulsion battery 
may be conspicuous by virtue of arcing, fire, and/or component 
meltdown.
    Navistar stated S7.7.6 and S7.7.7 in the proposal specify a 
standard known resistance without reference to any approximate size. 
Navistar agrees that the magnitude of this resistor is not critical to 
the measurement. Navistar recommended that the word ``standard'' be 
deleted. We agree, and have eliminated it from S7.6.6 and S7.6.7. With 
respect to S7.6.7, we did not provide in the NPRM the background for 
the equation used to calculate electrical isolation for SAE J1766. We 
have placed a copy of the derivation in Docket No. NHTSA-98-4515.

[[Page 57987]]

I. Editorial Comments

    GM called our attention to typographical or technical corrections 
that should be corrected in the final rule. We have done so. In Figure 
1, the description is revised to ``Measurement Location for Vb 
Voltage.'' In Figure 3, the symbol within the circle is ``V2'' rather 
than ``Vb.'' In Figure 4, the equation for Ri is revised to:

Ri = Ro[1 +(V2/V1)][(V1-V1')/V1']

    In Figure 5, the equation for Ri is revised:

Ri = Ro[1 +(V1 /V2)][(V2-V2')V2']

6. Effective Date

    We have concluded that an effective date of approximately one year 
after the issuance of the final rule is sufficient for manufacturers 
covered by FMVSS No. 305 to comply with the proposed new safety 
standard. The major EV manufacturers all are using, or plan to use, 
battery types that are not susceptible to leaking large amounts of 
electrolytes. To our knowledge, all incorporate a device that would 
shut-off the propulsion battery current or prevent loss of electrical 
isolation in the event of a crash or short circuit.

7. Rulemaking Analyses

    Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures. 
This document was not reviewed under Executive Order 12866. It has been 
determined that the rulemaking action is not significant under 
Department of Transportation regulatory policies and procedures.
    Informal discussions with some EV manufacturers indicate that the 
industry is aware of SAE J1766 and that manufacturers are planning or 
producing EVs with batteries designed for minimal leakage, and to shut 
off the current or prevent loss of electrical isolation in the event of 
a crash. We believe that a substantial portion of the nascent EV 
industry is already designing its production to comport with SAE J1766. 
The added costs of our tests are minimal, as reflected in the comments 
on this issue in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking. The 
frontal barrier impact test of S6.1 of FMVSS No. 305 is the same test 
specified in FMVSS Nos. 208 and 301. The rear moving barrier impact 
test is the same test specified in FMVSS No. 301. The lateral moving 
barrier impact test is the same test specified in FMVSS No. 214. This 
means that there will be no additional costs imposed for testing an EV 
to which FMVSS Nos. 208, 214, and 301 already apply. To the extent that 
one or more of these standards do not apply to a specific EV type, the 
additional testing costs are not considered significant. The cost of a 
frontal impact test is $18,600 and the rollover test following, $1,500. 
The cost of a rear moving barrier impact test is $5,200, and the 
rollover test following, $1,500. The cost of a lateral moving barrier 
impact test is $18,000, and the rollover test following, $1,500. To 
this must be added the cost of the test vehicle for each test, to which 
we have assigned an approximate figure of $30,000. Accordingly, the 
impacts of the rule are so minimal as not to warrant preparation of a 
full regulatory evaluation.
    Regulatory Flexibility Act. We have also considered the impacts of 
this rulemaking action in relation to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 
U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq. I certify that this rulemaking action does not 
have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small 
entities.
    The following is our statement providing the factual basis for the 
certification (5 U.S.C. Sec. 605(b)). The technology to prevent leakage 
of electrolytes, battery retention, and electrical isolation in the 
event of the crash of a battery-powered motor vehicle is simple and has 
been well known for years. The specifications of the industry standard, 
J1766, have been settled since February 1996. As noted above, we 
believe that a substantial portion of the nascent EV industry is 
already designing its production to comport with SAE J1766. 
Verification of compliance with FMVSS No. 305 can be determined by 
rollover tests conducted after an EV is tested for compliance with the 
barrier impact specifications of FMVSS No. 301 and the cost of testing 
to this standard is not impacted, as we have discussed above. However, 
as noted above, if an EV is not required to comply with FMVSS No. 301, 
there will be the added cost of three rollover tests and a rear moving 
barrier impact test, plus the cost of a test vehicle, if the EV 
manufacturer chooses to certify its vehicle on the basis of an actual 
test rather than on engineering studies, computer simulations, 
mathematical calculations, or other means. We estimate the total costs 
for these tests as $38,200 for this segment of the EV industry. Since 
the overall economic impact is not considered to be significant, the 
agency has not determined formally whether the entities affected by the 
rules are ``small businesses'' within the meaning of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. In NHTSA's experience, manufacturers of motor vehicles 
are generally not ``small businesses.'' Accordingly, no regulatory 
flexibility analysis has been prepared.
    Executive Order 13132 (Federalism). Executive Order 13132 on 
``Federalism'' requires us to develop an accountable process to ensure 
``meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the 
development of ``regulatory policies that have federalism 
implications.'' The E.O. defines this phrase to include regulations 
``that have substantial direct effects on the States, on the 
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government.'' This final rule, which regulates the manufacture of 
certain motor vehicles, will not have substantial direct effect on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government, as specified in E.O. 13132.
    National Environmental Policy Act. We have analyzed this rulemaking 
action for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act. The 
rulemaking action will not have a significant effect upon the 
environment as it does not affect the present method of manufacturing 
motor vehicle lighting equipment.
    Civil Justice Reform. This rule will not have any retroactive 
effect. Under 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1), whenever a Federal motor vehicle 
safety standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a 
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is 
not identical to the Federal standard. Section 30161 sets forth a 
procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing, amending, or 
revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That section does not 
require submission of a petition for reconsideration or other 
administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in court.
    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. The Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written 
assessment of the cost, benefits and other effects of proposed or final 
rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the 
expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, 
or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually. Because 
this rule will not have a $100 million effect, we have not prepared an 
Unfunded Mandates assessment.
    National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act. Section 12(d) of 
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (the Act) requires 
agencies to evaluate and use existing

[[Page 57988]]

voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing 
so would be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory 
provisions regarding our vehicle safety authority) or otherwise 
impractical. In meeting that requirement, we are required to consult 
with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies. Examples of 
organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus standards 
bodies include the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI). If we do not use available and potentially 
applicable voluntary consensus standards, we are required by the Act to 
provide Congress, through OMB, an explanation for not using such 
standards.
    As we have explained in the preamble, this final rule is based upon 
SAE J1766 FEB96 ``Recommended Practice for Electric and Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity Testing,'' and is substantially 
similar to it in its specifications for prohibition of electrolyte 
spillage in front, side, and rear impacts, and batter retention during 
such impacts, and electrical isolation. No other voluntary consensus 
standards are addressed by this rulemaking.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 571 is amended as 
follows:
    1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30166; delegation of 
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. A new Sec. 571.305 is added to subpart B to read as set forth 
below:


Sec. 571.305  Standard No. 305; Electric-powered vehicles: electrolyte 
spillage and electrical shock protection.

    S1. Scope. This standard specifies requirements for limitation of 
electrolyte spillage, retention of propulsion batteries during a crash, 
and electrical isolation of the chassis from the high-voltage system, 
to be met by vehicles that use electricity as propulsion power .
    S2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce deaths and 
injuries during a crash which occur because of electrolyte spillage 
from propulsion batteries, intrusion of propulsion battery system 
components into the occupant compartment, and electrical shock.
    S3. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4536 
kg or less, that use more than 48 volts of electricity as propulsion 
power and whose speed attainable in 1.6 km on a paved level surface is 
more than 40 km/h.
    S4. Definition.
    Battery system component means any part of a battery module, 
interconnect, venting system, battery restraint device, and battery box 
or container which holds the individual battery modules.
    Dummy means a 50th percentile male test dummy as specified in 
subpart F of part 572 of this chapter.
    S5. General requirements. Each vehicle to which this standard 
applies, when tested according to S6 under the conditions of S7, must 
meet the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3.
    S5.1 Electrolyte spillage from propulsion batteries. Not more than 
5.0 liters of electrolyte from propulsion batteries shall spill outside 
the passenger compartment, and no visible trace of electrolyte shall 
spill into the passenger compartment. Spillage is measured from the 
time the vehicle ceases motion after a barrier impact test until 30 
minutes thereafter, and throughout any static rollover after a barrier 
impact test.
    S5.2 Battery Retention. Battery modules located inside the 
passenger compartment must remain in the location in which they are 
installed. No part of any battery system component that is located 
outside the passenger compartment shall enter the passenger compartment 
during the test procedures of S6 of this standard, as determined by 
visual inspection.
    S5.3 Electrical isolation. Electrical isolation between the battery 
system and the vehicle electricity-conducting structure after each test 
must be not less than 500 ohms/volt.
    S6. Test requirements. Each vehicle to which this standard applies, 
under the conditions of S7, must be capable of meeting the requirements 
of any applicable single barrier crash/static rollover test sequence, 
without alteration of the vehicle during the test sequence. A 
particular vehicle need not meet further test requirements after having 
been subjected to a single barrier crash/static rollover test sequence.
    S6.1 Frontal barrier crash. The vehicle must meet the requirements 
of S5.1, S5.2 and S5.3 when it is traveling longitudinally forward at 
any speed, up to and including 48 km/h, and impacts a fixed collision 
barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, or 
at any angle up to 30 degrees in either direction from the 
perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle.
    S6.2 Rear moving barrier impact. The vehicle must meet the 
requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3, when it is impacted from the rear 
by a barrier moving at any speed up to and including 48 km/h, with a 
dummy at each front outboard designated seating position.
    S6.3 Side moving deformable barrier impact. The vehicle must meet 
the requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3 when it is impacted from the 
side by a barrier that conforms to part 587 of this chapter that is 
moving at any speed up to and including 54 km/h, with dummies 
positioned in accordance with S7 of Sec. 571.214 of this chapter.
    S6.4 Post-impact test static rollover. The vehicle must meet the 
requirements of S5.1, S5.2, and S5.3, after being rotated on its 
longitudinal axis to each successive increment of 90 degrees after each 
impact test specified in S6.1, S6.2, and S6.3.
    S7. Test conditions. When the vehicle is tested according to S6, 
the requirements of S5 must be met under the conditions in S7.1 through 
S7.6.7. Where a range is specified, the vehicle must be capable of 
meeting the requirements at all points within the range.
    S7.1 Battery state of charge. The battery system is at the maximum 
state of charge recommended by the manufacturer, as stated in the 
vehicle operator's manual or on a label that is permanently affixed to 
the vehicle, or, if the manufacturer has made no recommendation, at a 
state of not less than 95 percent of the maximum capacity of the 
battery system.
    S7.2 Vehicle conditions. The switch or device that provides power 
from the propulsion batteries to the propulsion motor(s) is in the 
activated position or the ready-to-drive position.
    S7.2.1 The parking brake is disengaged and the transmission, if 
any, is in the neutral position. In a test conducted under S6.3, the 
parking brake is set.
    S7.2.2 Tires are inflated to the manufacturer's specifications.
    S7.2.3 The vehicle, including test devices and instrumentation, is 
loaded as follows:
    (a) A passenger car is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus 
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, secured in the luggage 
area, plus the necessary test dummies as specified in S6, restrained 
only by means that are installed in the vehicle for protection at its 
seating position.

[[Page 57989]]

    (b) A multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, or bus with a GVWR of 
4536 kg or less is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus the 
necessary dummies, as specified in S6, plus 136 kg or its rated cargo 
and luggage capacity weight, whichever is less. Each dummy is 
restrained only by means that are installed in the vehicle for 
protection at its seating position.
    S7.3 Static rollover test conditions. In addition to the conditions 
of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S7.4 of Sec. 571.301 of this 
chapter apply to the conduct of static rollover tests specified in 
S6.4.
    S7.4 Rear moving barrier impact test conditions. In addition to the 
conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S7.3 of Sec. 571.301 of 
this chapter apply to the conduct of the rear moving barrier impact 
test specified in S6.2. The rear moving barrier is described in S8.2 of 
Sec. 571.208 of this chapter and diagramed in Figure 1 of Sec. 571.301 
of this chapter.
    S7.5 Side moving deformable barrier impact test conditions. In 
addition to the conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions of S6.10, 
S6.11, and S6.12 of Sec. 571.214 of this chapter apply to the conduct 
of the side moving deformable barrier impact test specified in S6.3.
    S7.6 Electrical isolation test procedure. In addition to the 
conditions of S7.1 and S7.2, the conditions in S7.6.1 through S7.6.7 
apply to the measurement of electrical isolation specified in S5.3.
    S7.6.1 Prior to any barrier impact test, the propulsion battery 
system is connected to the vehicle's propulsion system, and the vehicle 
ignition is in the ``on'' (traction (propulsion) system energized) 
position. If the vehicle utilizes an automatic disconnect between the 
propulsion battery system and the traction system, the electrical 
isolation measurement after the impact is made from the battery side of 
the automatic disconnect to the vehicle chassis.
    S7.6.2 The voltmeter used in this test measures direct current 
values and has an internal resistance of at least 10 M<greek-OH>
    S7.6.3 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 1 and the 
propulsion battery voltage (Vb) is recorded. Before any vehicle impact 
test, Vb is equal to or greater than the nominal operating voltage as 
specified by the vehicle manufacturer.
    S7.6.4 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 2, and the 
voltage (V1) between the negative side of the propulsion battery and 
the vehicle chassis is recorded.
    S7.6.5 The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 3, and the 
voltage (V2) between the positive side of the propulsion battery and 
the vehicle chassis is recorded.
    S7.6.6 If V1 is greater than or equal to V2, insert a known 
resistance (Ro) between the negative side of the propulsion battery and 
the vehicle chassis. With the Ro installed, measure the voltage (V1') 
as shown in Figure 4 between the negative side of the propulsion 
battery and the vehicle chassis. Calculate the electrical isolation 
(Ri) according to the formula shown. This electrical isolation value 
(in ohms) divided by the nominal operating voltage of the propulsion 
battery (in volts) must be equal to or greater than 500.
    S7.6.7 If V2 is greater than V1, insert a known resistance (Ro) 
between the positive side of the propulsion battery and the vehicle 
chassis. With the Ro installed, measure the voltage and record the 
voltage (V2') between the positive side of the propulsion battery and 
the vehicle chassis as shown in Figure 5. Calculate the electrical 
isolation (Ri) according to the formula shown. This electrical 
isolation value (in ohms) divided by the nominal operating voltage of 
the propulsion battery (in volts) must be equal to or greater than 500.

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    Issued on: September 21, 2000.
Sue Bailey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 00-24839 Filed 9-26-00; 8:45 am]
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