NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

LONDON STEVERSON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

2009-3287 

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in CB-7521-08-0017-T-1. 

___________________________ 

Decided: June 17, 2010 

___________________________ 

RONALD P. ACKERMAN, Law Office of Ronald P. Ackerman, of Culver City, California, argued for petitioner. 

TARA K. HOGAN, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With 

him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney 

General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and TODD M.

HUGHES, Deputy Director. 

__________________________ 
STEVERSON v. SSA 2

Before RADER,* Chief Judge, PLAGER, and LOURIE, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

I. 

London Steverson petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) 

terminating his position as an Administrative Law Judge 

with the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”). 

Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to uphold Mr. Steverson’s termination, this court 

affirms. 

II. 

Mr. Steverson was an Administrative Law Judge for 

the SSA’s Downey, CA branch office. On April 18, 2008, 

the SSA filed a complaint with the Board seeking to 

remove Judge Steverson from his position based on four 

charges: (1) conduct unbecoming of an administrative law 

judge, (2) misuse of government property, (3) lack of 

candor, and (4) failure to follow agency policy. 

The first charge related to Judge Steverson’s use of 

agency letterhead for personal correspondence in violation 

of agency policy. The agency based the charge on four 

separate specifications. In the first three specifications, 

the agency alleged that Judge Steverson used official 

agency letterhead to send three letters to mortgage or 

loan companies relating to a personal home loan. The 

letters had an official SSA seal as well as the name and 

address of Judge Steverson’s SSA office. Judge Steverson 

had signed the letter with the title “Administrative Law 

Judge.” The fourth specification alleged that Judge 

 * Randall R. Rader assumed the position of Chief 

Judge on June 1, 2010. 
3 STEVERSON v. SSA

Steverson had used official agency letterhead to lodge a 

complaint against a California state court commissioner 

he had appeared before in a custody dispute. In response, 

the Superior Court of California’s counsel wrote to the 

SSA’s regional counsel identifying the letter and explaining that the use of an official title and stationery might be 

a violation of California’s judicial ethics codes. In addition, the state court commissioner identified in the letter 

by Judge Steverson filed a judicial ethics complaint with 

the SSA against Judge Steverson. 

The second charge contained two specifications. The 

first specification alleged that Judge Steverson had used 

his work computer between 2001 and 2007 to view and 

store sexually oriented material. A routine resource 

management initiative by the SSA’s information technology division revealed that Judge Steverson had stored 

over 1000 sexually graphic files on the individual personal 

drive of his government computer. The second specification alleged that Judge Steverson had misused his government computer in 2004 and 2005 by using it for 

several personal business ventures. Judge Steverson has 

since admitted that the use of his work computer relating 

to his personal business ventures was in violation of 

agency policy. 

The third charge asserted that Judge Steverson had 

displayed a lack of candor during his investigatory interview with Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge 

Cynthia Minter. Judge Minter was assigned to question 

Judge Steverson after the allegations specified in charges 

one and two arose. Judge Steverson received advance 

notice of the interview and waived his right to have a 

union representative present. At the interview, Judge 

Steverson maintained that he had no idea how the sexually graphic material got on his computer and that he 
STEVERSON v. SSA 4

thought his use of official stationery was acceptable under 

the circumstances. 

The fourth charge related to Judge Steverson’s use of 

his business address to send and receive personal correspondence. In June 2004, the office director for Judge 

Steverson’s branch office informed all employees that the 

office mailing address was not to be used for personal 

correspondences. 

The administrative law judge assigned to the complaint held a two-day hearing and heard testimony from 

six witnesses, including Judge Steverson. The administrative law judge later issued an initial decision upholding all but the lack-of-candor charge and finding that a 

35-day suspension was the appropriate penalty. The SSA 

then petitioned the full Board contesting the administrative law judge’s finding that the lack-of-candor charge had 

not been proven and the penalty determination of a 35-

day suspension rather than the proposed removal. The 

Board agreed in whole with the SSA and found good cause 

to remove Judge Steverson. This appeal followed. 

III. 

This court must affirm the Board’s decision unless it 

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without 

procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 

been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c); Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of Justice, 198 F.3d 

843, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

Administrative law judges may be removed for “good 

cause established and determined by the [Board].” 5 

U.S.C. § 7521(a). “Deference is given to the agency's 

judgment unless the penalty exceeds the range of permissible punishment specified by statute or regulation, or 
5 STEVERSON v. SSA

unless the penalty is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of 

discretion.” Parker v. United States Postal Serv., 819 F.2d 

1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

On appeal, Judge Steverson raises two arguments. 

First, Judge Steverson argues that the Board’s decision to 

sustain the charge of lack of candor is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Second, Judge Steverson argues 

that the Board’s decision to remove him was an abuse of 

disrection. 

As to the first, substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s finding that Judge Steverson displayed a lack of 

candor during his interview with Judge Minter. “Lack of 

candor . . . is [a broad] and more flexible concept whose 

contours and elements depend upon the particular context 

and conduct involved. It may involve a failure to disclose 

something that, in the circumstances, should have been 

disclosed in order to make the given statement accurate 

and complete.” Ludlum v. Dept. of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 

1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, in response to Judge 

Minter’s questioning relating to the use of SSA official 

stationery, Judge Steverson stated that he thought it was 

fine because he was using an out-of-date SSA stationery 

that had since been replaced by the agency. In addition, 

in regards to the sexually oriented material on his computer, Judge Steverson claimed that he was either not 

responsible for the content or had no idea how it got on 

his computer. The Board found both these excuses unbelievable—rightly so. What difference would it make to the 

recipient of an SSA correspondence whether the stationery used was out-of-date? How would the recipient even 

know that it was out-of-date? Even more, Judge Steverson’s claim of ignorance as to the 1000 sexually graphic 

files on his computer strains credulity. Significantly, 
STEVERSON v. SSA 6

agency information technology staff testified that the type 

of files found on Judge Steverson’s personal work computer were files created by the user, which required 

several separate and volitional acts by him. Substantial 

evidence therefore supports the Board’s findings. 

Judge Steverson’s second argument on appeal—that 

removal was an unreasonable penalty given the charges—

also fails. The charges at issue here are sufficient such 

that the Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding to 

terminate Judge Steverson. Again, all charges alleged 

were sustained. Judge Steverson engaged in conduct 

unbecoming of an Administrative Law Judge, misused 

government property, displayed a lack of candor with an 

investigatory official, and failed to follow agency policy. 

Together, these charges amount to good cause for removal. The agency therefore did not abuse its discretion 

in removing Judge Steverson from employment. 

The judgment of the Board is affirmed. 

COSTS

No costs.