1 Filed 6/3/15 In re L.F. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re L.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. L.F., Defendant and Appellant. A142296
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J42519)

Minor L.F. appeals after the juvenile c ourt sustained a wardship petition alleging she committed a criminal threat. (Pen. Code, 1 § 422; Welf. & Inst . Code, § 602.) On appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court: (1 ) erred in finding she violated section 422, (2) erred in overruling her de murrer, (3) abused its discretion by not reducing the violation to a misdemeanor, (4) improperly faile d to include a scienter requirement in a probation condition, and (5) improperly faile d to inform her of the duration of her probation. We shall modify the challenge d probation condition to include an express knowledge requirement, and otherwise affirm the order.
I. BACKGROUND Thomas F.’s two daughters attended Fai rfield High School (FHS). One evening in May 2014, one of his daughters told him she did not want to go to school after reading on

1 All undesignated statutory refe rences are to the Penal Code.2 Twitter that “somebody was going to shoot up the school the follo wing morning.” The person “tweeting” was Minor, another FHS student . Thomas F. looked at the “tweets” on his daughter’s phone and then found the Twitte r account on his own p hone. Although he was not one of Minor’s “followers,” Thom as F. was able to view the account by searching for her username. The tweets in question were made over the course of approximately three hours. Among Minor’s tweets were the following: “If I get a gun it’s fact I’m spraying [five laughing emojis] everybody better duck or get wet”; 2 “I’m dead ass [three laughing emojis] not scared to go to jail for shooting up FHS warni ng everybody duck”; “Nigga we ain’t fighting I’m bringing a gun [six laughing emojis]”; “Mfs don’t really kno me [two laughing emojis] I have touched a gun po inted one don’t [. . .] Bitch I kno how to aim”; 3 “Mfs tripping boii [three laughing emoj is] I’m frfr black mask yellow tape homicide niggas better he cool”; 4 “Ain’t nobody safe [‘100’ em oji]”; “I’m finnah come to FHS like black opps stabbing niggas! Who really with it?”; “I feel sorry for whoever got c wing 1st period [four laughing emojis]”; “@ [username] idk when shit go down prolly the next day”; “I hope ms Sh eila run c wing that day”; 5 “Oh yeah all my friends have c wing so d wing”; “And wtf lo l tf you getting popped first fr try me [laughing emoji]”; “It’s funny cause nobody fightin g no more sooooo!! I’m just shootin niggas for fun”; “Mfs wanna test me now [three clapping hands emojis] you crazy I’m crazy too let’s die shooting”; “I’m leaving school early and goi ng to get my cousin gun now [three laughing emojis and two clapping hands emojis]”; “Y’a ll gonna make me go to jail before I step

2 An emoji is “[a] sm all digital image or icon used to express an idea, emotion, etc., in electronic communi cations.” (OED Online, Emoji, n. (March 2015) Oxford University Press <http://w ww.oed.com/view/En try/389343> [as of May 6, 2015].) Example of emojis include a ha ppy face and a laughing face.

3 “Mfs” is an abbreviati on for “Mother fuckers.”

4 “FrFr” means “for real [for] real.”

5 Sheila Bell was a campus monitor at FH S whose primary role was to maintain order and safety. She patrolled both C-wing and D-wing.3 foot on campus [laughing emoji]”; “I really wanna a challenge shooting at running kids not fun [laughing emoji]”; “Ok I’m done and if I get called in by the FBI or something bout shooting up a school you Mfs really gonna get shot”; and “Kill or be killed!!” Thomas F. also testified that he saw a response on Minor’s account in which someone offered to sell her a gun. Some of Minor’s tweets include laughi ng emojis and statements like “just kidding.” For example, Minor tweeted: “Lma o I’m really jk tho [three laughing emojis] don’t jump him and it’s g frfr [‘100’ emo ji] or ima really come spraying” 6 ; “Do y’all really think I’m that crazy it’s a compliment” ; “I love my life [laughing emoji].” Minor’s Twitter account showed that some Twitte r users who responded to her tweets did so in a joking manner. For example, one us er, “@[username]” tweeted to Minor “o you crazy [laughing emoji, devil emoji].” Thomas F. grew concerned about the num ber and nature of the tweets and called the police. He was concerned for his daugh ters’ safety, and neither of them attended school the next day. A police officer arrived at Thomas F.’s house, and he showed the officer the tweets. The officer reviewed an d took pictures of the tweets, spoke to Thomas F. and his daughter, and determined Minor’s name and addr ess. Thomas F. told the officer he was concerned about his children’s safety and feared sending them to school the next day. The officer went to Minor’s home, pla ced her in handcuffs, and read her her constitutional rights. Minor said that she di d not mean the statements she had made on Twitter and that they were a joke. She was unable to explain why she made the statements. She told the officer she was not angry. Minor and her mother told the officer there were no weapons in the house. The same evening, Dr. Willia m Cushman, a vice principal of FHS, received a text message from a former student informing him of tweets indicating that someone was

6 “Lmao” is an abbreviation for “laughing my ass off” and “jk” is an abbreviation for “just kidding.”4 going to shoot up the school. Dr. Cushman asked for screen shots of the tweets. Dr. Cushman saw tweets that made specific refe rences to parts of the school, C-wing and D-wing, and specific people. Dr. Cushman fe lt “[s]cared and nervous” because as the person in charge of the lockdown protocol in an emergency, he wo uld have to “go out and clear the hallways and make sure people leave the rooms,” and he would be in “as much danger as anybody else.” Dr. Cushman contacted the school resource officer and the principal, and sent out a mass text to sc hool faculty and staff about the issue. The following morning, Dr. Cushman decided to c oncentrate resources on C-wing. He sent a campus-wide email to the school’s staff saying there had been a specific threat to C-wing and directed Bell, who had been specifically mentioned in th e tweets, to remain in the office. An intern at the district attorney’s office testified that although she was not one of Minor’s Twitter followers, she was able to lo ok up Minor’s Twitter ac count by searching for her username. Minor had about 500 followe rs. It was possible to create a private Twitter account that could be vi ewed only with permission, but Minor’s account was not private. Minor’s best friend testified that she ha d read the tweets a nd did not take them seriously, and that the use of laughing emo jis in the tweets indicated that Minor was joking. Minor’s sister also testified that wh en she saw the tweets, she thought they were a joke due to the use of laughing and smiling emojis and the terms fo r “just kidding” and “laugh out loud.” She had never known Minor to be violent or threaten others. No one in the family owned a gun, and Minor did not have access to a gun. The district attorney file d a juvenile wardship petiti on alleging Minor had made felony criminal threat s against “FAIRFIELD HI GH SCHOOL ST UDENTS AND STAFF.” (§ 422.) Minor demurred on the ground the petition failed to state a public offense, and the court overruled the demurrer. The juvenile court sustained the petition af ter a contested hearing. The juvenile court found that the tweets were clearly a threat. The juven ile court also found specific intent that the tweets be taken as a threat because “[s]he had appr oximately 500 people on5 her account . . . and the fact that some of thos e wouldn’t take that as a serious threat is inconceivable.” The juvenile court stated, “Two to three hours of tweets that—I just don’t see how you can get around it. It was intended to be taken as a threat. There’s anger in those. There’s statements in there ab out the teacher going to be the first to get it, and other racial comments about they’re going to be the first to get popped and all.” The juvenile court was satisfied “beyond a reason able doubt that the offense has occurred.” Minor moved to have the offense reduced to a misdemeanor, and the trial court denied the motion. Minor was released to her mother and granted probation. Among Minor’s terms of probation, she was prohibited from possessing any weapons or ammunition.
II. DISCUSSION A. Section 422 Violation Minor contends there was in sufficient evidence to suppor t a finding that she made a criminal threat under secti on 422. “To determine the suffi ciency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court re views the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whet her it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a ra tional trier of fact c ould find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.) However, where the appellant rais es a “plausible First Amendm ent defense” to a criminal threat conviction, we make an independent examination of the record in order to ensure that the speaker’s free speech righ ts have not been infringed. ( In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 632 ( George T .).) Credibility determinations a nd findings of fact that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue are not subject to independent review. ( Id . at p. 634.) Thus, we defer to the lower cour t’s credibility determinations but make an independent examination of th e whole record to determine whether the facts establish a criminal threat. ( Ibid .) As noted in George T. , supra , 33 Cal.4th at page 630, not all threats are criminal. In order to prove a violation of section 422 , the People must esta blish the following: (1) that Minor “ ‘willfully th reaten[ed] to commit a crime which [would] result in death6 or great bodily injury to anot her person,’ ” (2) that Minor made the threat “ ‘with the specific intent that the statement . . . be take n as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,’ ” (3) that the th reat was, “ ‘on its face and under the circumstances’ ” in which it was made, “ ‘s o unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,’ ” (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened “ ‘to be in sustaine d fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.” ( People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228 ( Toledo ).) Minor does not dispute that the evidence supports the first element of the offense but argues that there is in sufficient evidence to estab lish the remaining elements. 1. Specific Intent To determine whether Minor had the specif ic intent that her tweets be taken as a threat, section 422 “does not require that a threat be personally communicated to the victim by the person who makes the threat”; however, “it must be shown that [she] specifically intended that the threat be conveyed to the victim.” ( In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861 ( Ryan D. ).) “[I]f one broa dcasts a threat intending to induce sustained fear, section 422 is violated if th e threat is received and induces sustained fear—whether or not the threatener know s [her] threat has hit its mark.” ( People v. Teal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281.) Minor contends there is no evidence sh e intended to convey her threats to FHS students and staff through her Twitter account. We disagree . Minor had approximately 500 Twitter followers, and her a ccount was publicly accessibl e. The posts themselves indicate that some of those who replied to , or “retweeted,” Minor’s posts were FHS students. The evidence is su fficient to support the juvenile court’s factual finding that Minor intended to convey a threat. We are not persuaded othe rwise by Minor’s reliance on Ryan D . There, a month after being cited for possession of marijuana, a minor submitted a painting in his art class depicting him shooting the officer who had c ited him. The art instructor found the7 painting to be “ ‘disturbing’ ” and “ ‘scary’ ” and showed it to an administrator. ( Ryan D. , supra , 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 858.) A day later, an assistant principal confronted the minor, who admitted he was angry with the officer and that it was reasonable that she would even tually see the picture. ( Ibid. ) Later that day, the officer was shown the painting and “ ‘was pretty shocked’ and ‘upset’ because it depicted somebody ‘blowing [her] head off.’ ” ( Id. at p. 859.) The juvenile court found the minor had made a criminal threat, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order on this point, holding that the paintin g did not constitute a criminal threat in violation of section 422. ( Id. at pp. 857, 865.) In doing so, the court noted that the minor had turned the painting into his class for cr edit, rather than displaying it to the officer or putting it in a location where he knew she would see it, and concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he in tended the officer to see it. ( Id . at p. 863.) Here, on the other hand, the evidence supports an inference that, in posting the threatening statements on her Twitter account, Minor intended to convey them to members of the victim group. Relying on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 ( Ricky T. ), Minor also argues the evidence does not show she intended her st atements to be taken as a threat. The minor in Ricky T . was charged with violating se ction 422 after threatening his teacher. The minor stepped out of class to use the restroom. ( Id . at p. 1135

. ) When he returned and found the door locked, he pounded on it; when the teacher opened the door, the door hit the minor. He became angry, cu rsed at his teacher, a nd said, “I’m going to get you.” ( Ibid. ) The teacher felt phys ically threatened. ( Ibid. ) The police were called the following day. ( Id. at p. 1138.) Division Four of the First Appellate District reversed the juvenile court’s finding and held that there was no violation of section 422. ( Id. at p. 1141.) The court concluded the remark wa s “ambiguous on its face and no more than a vague threat of retaliation wit hout prospect of execution.” ( Id . at p. 1138.) Moreover, the court noted, the surrounding circumstances did not indicate gravity of purpose: There was no prior history of disagr eements, the police were not ca lled until the next day, and they did not interview the minor agai n until a week after the incident. ( Id . at pp. 1137– 1138.)8 Minor contends her statements were si milarly ambiguous because many of them were accented by symbols of laughing faces and some were accompanied by the terms such as “jk” or “Lmao,” which, Minor argues, show her statements were meant as a joke. In the circumstances of this case, we cannot fault the juvenile court’s findings. Minor’s threatening statements were made over a peri od of hours, they includ ed threats to shoot people in C-wing or D-wing, including on e named staff member, and Minor stated she was going to get a gun. Moreover, Minor pr ovided specific details about the impending shooting, going so far as clarifying that she would target D-wing instead of C-wing; she also stated she did not care about going to jail and threaten ed to shoot those who called the FBI. On these facts, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude Minor intended her statements to be taken as a threat. 2. Nature of the Threat Minor contends the tweets were too vagu e and general in natu re to satisfy the requirement that a threat be “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threat ened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) To determine if a purported threat meets this standard, it must be examined “on its face and under the circumstances in which it was made.” ( Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) “The surround ing circumstances must be examined to determine if the threat is real and genuine, a true threat.” ( Id . at p. 1137) Examples of circumstances that may be considered includ e “the prior relationship of the parties and the manner in which the communication was made.” ( Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) “ ‘ “[U]nequivocality, uncond itionality, immediacy and specificity are not absolutely mandated, but must be sufficien tly present in the threat and surrounding circumstances.” ’ ” ( George T. , supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635.) The four elements are “ ‘ “simply the factors to be considered in determining whether a threat, considered together with its surrounding circumstances, co nveys those impressions to the victim.” ’ ” ( People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 7 89, 807.) “ ‘A threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not insufficient simply because9 it does “not communicate a time or precise manner of execution[;] section 422 does not require those details to be expressed.” ’ ” ( Id. at p. 806.) The evidence here supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Minor’s statements were sufficiently “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific” to constitute a criminal threat under section 422. Minor men tioned her intention to direct violence at specific parts of the school, she said she wa s “sorry for whoever got c wing 1st period,” she said she was “leaving school early and going to get [her] cousin[’s] gun now,” and her Twitter page included the statement, “idk when shit go do wn prolly the next day.” Indeed, Dr. Cushman notified the school’s st aff the next morning, “We have a very specific threat. It’s lim ited to C-wing.” Given the specific references to parts of FHS and an individual staff member and the indication the threats would be carried out in first period, “prolly the next day,” the juvenile court properly found the thre ats were “ ‘so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific,’ ” that they constituted a criminal threat. ( Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 227.) 3. Sustained and Reasonable Fear Minor contends the People failed to prove the threats actually caused students and staff reasonably to suffer sustained fear. Se ction 422 applies where “the threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety.’ ” ( Toledo , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 228.) “The phrase to ‘cause[] that person reasonably to be in sust ained fear for his or her own safety’ has a subjective and an objective component. A victim must actually be in sustained fear, and the sustained fear must also be r easonable under the circumstances.” ( Ricky T. , supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) “Sustained fear” means “a period of time ‘that extends beyond what is momentary, fl eeting, or transitory.’ ” ( Ibid .) What constitutes “sustained fear” may depend on the circumstances: “Fif teen minutes of fear of a defendant who is armed, mobile, and at large, and who has thre atened to kill the vic tim and her daughter, is more than sufficient to cons titute ‘sustained’ fear for pur poses of this element of section 422.” ( People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App. 4th 1149, 1156.)10 Minor contends this element is not sati sfied because (1) rather than immediately calling law enforcement to arrest her, Dr. Cush man called the school resource officer and principal; (2) Thomas F.’s testimony about his daughter’s statements to him were admitted not for their truth but to explai n his actions; and (3) although Thomas F. testified to his own fear, he was not amon g the students and staff at the school, the alleged victims of the offense. Whether or not the fear of Thomas F. or his daughter may properly be considered, we conclude the evidence of Dr. Cushman’s fear is sufficient to support a finding that this element has been met. Dr. Cu shman testified that he was “[ s]cared and nervous” because as the person in charge of the lockdown prot ocol, he would be in danger. His actions show he took the threat seriously; he called th e principal and the school resource officer and he sent a mass text to staff members that evening. The next mo rning he told Bell to remain in the office and sent an email to th e entire school staff telling them there had been a specific threat to C-wi ng. This evidence is suffici ent to support a finding that Minor’s victims were in sustained, re asonable fear due to Minor’s tweets. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to th e judgment, the trial court reasonably concluded that all the elements of a criminal threat were met. Further, because the juvenile court properly found Minor’s statements were criminal threats within the meaning of section 422, the st atements were not protected by the First Amendment. ( George T. , supra , 33 Cal.4th at pp. 633–634.)
B. Demurrer Minor argues that the juvenile court erred in overruling her demurrer because the petition failed to state a public offense or to give her adequate notice of the charges against her. 7 Specifically, she contends the petiti on was impermissibly vague because it

7 A defendant may demur to an accusatory pleading when it appears on the face of the pleading “[t]hat the facts stated do no t constitute a public offense.” (§ 1004, subd. (4).) While there is no statutory author ization for a demurrer in juvenile cases, there is case law supporting the use of a demurrer in juvenile cases. ( In re Jamil H. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 556, 560 –561 [juvenile court should have sustained minor’s demurrer to § 602 petition on grou nd it failed to advise him ade quately of charge against11 failed to specify a person who received the th reat, but instead named as the victim the students and staff of the high school. The petition alleged Minor vi olated section 422 by “t hreaten[ing] to commit a crime which would result in death and gr eat bodily injury to FAIRFIELD HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENTS AND STAFF, with the specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat,” that the threat was “so unequivo cal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey to FAIRFIELD HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND ST AFF a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution,” and that “FAIRFIELD HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENTS AND STAFF was reasonably in sustained fear of his/her safety and the safety of his/her immediately family.” Minor demurred to this allegation on the ground it failed to state a public offense beca use it did not identify a specific person who had received the threat. The juvenile court overruled the demurrer, concluding that if a threat was made to a group of people, the in dividuals did not have to be named in the petition. However, the court stated that Minor should receive discovery about the identity of the individual student who was in fear—apparently Thomas F.’s daughter— and the district attorney indicated her name was in the police report and Minor’s counsel had that information. “Due process of law requires that an ac cused be advised of the charges against [her] so that [she] has a reasonable opportuni ty to prepare and present [her] defense and not be taken by surprise by evid ence offered at [her] trial.” ( People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 31 7; see § 952. 8 ) “A defendant’s right to be informed of the charges ‘is

him]; In re Rudolfo A. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 845, 853–857 [juvenile court should have sustained minor’s demurrer on ground pleading was insufficient to advise him adequately of charge against him]; see also In re Rottanak K. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 268–269 [People may appeal orders sustaining demurre rs without leave to amend in juvenile matters].)

8 Section 952 provides: “In charging an offense, each count shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains in substa nce, a statement that the accused has committed some public offense therein specified. . . . It may be in the words of the enactment describing the offense or decl aring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused. . . .”12 satisfied when the accused is advised of th e charges against [her] so that [she] has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and presen t a defense and is not taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial.’ ” ( People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 ( Stone ).) “[W]e may not conclude that a complaint is insufficient, or set aside a guilty plea or sentence unless we first determine that a ‘def ect or imperfection in matter of form’ has ‘prejudice[d] a substantial right of the de fendant upon the merits .’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Ramirez (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 992, 999.) A pplying this rule, our high court in Stone concluded that where a defendant was accuse d of attempted murder by firing a single shot at a group of 10 people, “it would be sufficient to allege enough facts to give notice of the incident referred to and that the defe ndant is charged with attempted murder. For example, . . . it would have been sufficient to allege that defend ant committed attempted murder, in that on or about [the date in question], he attempted to murder a member of a group of persons gathered together in a pa rking lot in [the city in question].” ( Stone , supra , 46 Cal.4th at pp. 136, 141–142.) On this record, we cannot conclude Mi nor’s substantial rights were prejudiced. The evidence showed that she published her threats to anyo ne who saw her public Twitter account, which had hundreds of followers, and that she threat ened anyone in C-wing or D-wing at the high school. She cannot now co mplain that the recipients of her threats were not all known by name. Moreover, the juvenile court en sured that Minor had been informed of the name of the st udent mentioned in the police re port. In the circumstances, Minor’s right to notice of the allegations ag ainst her was not violated, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in overruling her demurrer. C. Request to Treat Offense as Misdemeanor Minor argues that the juvenile court abus ed its discretion when it refused to reduce the criminal threat violation from a felony to a misdemeanor. Minor claims the juvenile court improperly based its decision on unre lated school shootings and other irrelevant factors.13 A criminal threat in violation of section 422 is a wobbler offense, 9 or an offense that may be sentenced as a felony or a misdemeanor. ( People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 88.) When a mi nor is found to have committed a wobbler, the juvenile court, exercising its discretion, must declare th e offense to be a misdemeanor or a felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1201, 1207; In re Jacob M. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1178 , 1181–1182.) “[T]he court must consider which description applies and expressly declar e on the record that it has made such consideration, and must state its determ ination as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.” (Cal. Rules of C ourt, 5.780(e)(5).) Tria l courts have broad discretion to reduce a wobbler offense ch arged as a felony to a misdemeanor. ( People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974, 977–978 ( Alvarez ); In re Curt W. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 169, 184.) Factors the court may consider include “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defend ant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or [her] traits of ch aracter as evidenced by [her] behavior and demeanor at the trial.” ( Alvarez , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.) Where, as here, the challenge is to the lower court’s exercise of its discretion, the bur den is on Minor to “ ‘clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” ( Id. at p. 977.) The petition alleged Minor committed a felony violation of section 422. After the juvenile court sustained the petition, Minor moved to have her offense reduced to a misdemeanor. She contended she had stro ng family support and that a felony adjudication would impair her ab ility to join the Navy or the Job Co rps. Noting that Minor had made the threats over the course of two or three hours and that the tweets showed “some real hostility and anger,” the court deferred its final decision until it reviewed the probation report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.780(e)(5).) The probation

9 A criminal threat in violation of sec tion 422 is punishable “by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) If an adult is foun d guilty of viol ating section 422 and is punished in county jail, the offense is deemed a misdemeanor. If that adult is punished in state prison, the offense constitutes a felony . (§ 17, subds. (a), (b).)14 officer’s report indicated that Minor had repo rted that she was receiving A’s and C’s in school; in fact, however, her current progress report showed two F’s, three D’s, and one C. Her records showed she had a pattern of defiant behavior at school and that she had been suspended several times for such behavi or. Minor described her relationship with her mother as “great,” but her mother reporte d that she and Minor had a tense relationship and that Minor was defiant and disrespect ful at home. Minor had been attending counseling for depression, and shortly before her offense had been hospitalized after attempting to commit suicide by ta king pills that had been pres cribed for her depression. She described her offense as a joke and a “stupid” mistake, but she did not express remorse for her actions. The juvenile court denied Minor’s request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. In doing so, the court stated, “Had she not attempted suicide, had she had good grades, had she not had any history at a ll, this was just some, as she put it, ‘stupid joke,’ I think I could see it. But given the state of our so ciety right now and the things that have happened, Columbine and Connecticut and Santa Barbara, I think I even mentioned at the jurisdiction hearing, it’s kind of like saying so mething on an airplane to a TSA agent. You may be joking, but people don’t take it as a joke anymore. [¶] And given what probation described as a hostility towards aut horities or defiant and oppositional attitude at times, the fact that she tried to commit suicide, was just released from the hospital some two days, or two weeks, or very shortly before she did this, and the fact that she said she was getting As and Cs, and then they would go down to Fs and Ds. [¶] Even if she intended this as a joke at the time, I don’ t think the Court can treat it as a joke. And the Court cannot, in good [conscience], treat it as a misdemeanor.” The court acknowledged that its decision might have harmful consequenc es for Minor’s future, but in light of the “gravity of her language,” concluded it could not grant Minor’s request. Based on this record, the juvenile cour t could reasonably conclude that Minor’s credibility was diminished by the inaccurate statements sh e had made to the probation officer, that her recent suicid e attempt raised a concern th at her threats were meant seriously, and that she did not appreciate th e wrongfulness of her offense. Nor does the15 juvenile court’s mention of other school shootings lead us to conclude it relied on improper factors in making its decision; rath er, the court could properly note that as a result of those widely publiciz ed events, the recipients of Minor’s threats were more likely to take them seriously and experience fear. Considering the “extremely deferential and restrained standard by which appella te courts are bound in these matters” ( Alvarez , supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 981), we fi nd no abuse of discretion in th e juvenile court’s ruling.
D. Vague Probation Term Among Minor’s terms of probation was an order that she not possess any weapons or ammunition. Minor contends this cond ition is constitutionally vague because it lacks an express knowledge requirement. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4t h 875, 889–892 ( Sheena K. ).) Minor asks us to modify the probati on condition to state: “The minor shall not knowingly possess any ammun ition, or deadly or dangerous weapons.” The Attorney General does not object to the proposed modification. A probation condition that forbids certai n conduct is impermissibly vague and overbroad unless it is suffici ently precise for a probationer to know in advance what behavior is forbidden. (See Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891–892 [in absence of express requirement of know ledge, probation cond ition limiting association with anyone disapproved of by probati on was unconstitutionally va gue].) Where a probation condition suffers from this defect, the appe llate court may modify the condition to include the missing knowledge requirement. (See id . at pp. 889, 892; see also In re
Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912–9 13, 931 [modifying probation condition prohibiting presence where danger ous or deadly weapons, fi rearms, or ammunition exist to include express kn owledge requirement]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752–753 [modifying probation cond ition to specify that defendant not knowingly possess guns and ammunition].) We shall therefore modify the probati on condition to add an express knowledge requirement.16 E. Duration of Probation After adjudging Minor a ward of the co urt, the juvenile court granted probation, placed her in her mother’s custody under the s upervision of the prob ation officer, and set the matter for an annual review in June 2015. Without citation to authority, Minor argues the matter should be remanded so the juvenile court may specify the duration of her probation. We first note that Minor failed to raise her objection in the juvenile court, and has therefore arguably forfeited it. (See In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App. 4th 168, 172–173; In re Khonsavahn S. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4t h 532, 537; but see Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885–889 [facial challenge that probation condition unconstitutionally vague or overbroad not forfeited by failure to raise it below] .) In any case, her contention is meritless. Welfare and Institutions Code section 727 , subdivision (a)(1), provides that after declaring a minor a ward of the court, “the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenanc e, and support of the minor . . . subject to further order of the court.” Except in cases not relevant here, “the court shall order the care, custody, and control of the minor or non minor to be under the supervision of the probation officer,” who may place the minor in the approved home of a relative. (§ 727, subd. (a)(3).) Likewise, California Rules of Court, rule 5.790 provides that at a disposition hearing, the court ma y either dismiss the petition, place the child on probation for no more than six months without declarin g the child a ward of the court, or declare the child a ward of the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(a)(2).) When placing a child on probation, the court must set reasona ble terms and conditions of probation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(b).) We are awar e of nothing in the st atutory or regulatory schemes that requires a juvenile court to speci fy the length of probation; rather, it is implicit in Welfare and Institutional Code se ction 727, subdivision (a)(1), that probation will continue until “further order of the cour t.” Here, the court will review the matter, and presumably make any ne cessary further orders, at the scheduled annual review hearing.17 III. DISPOSITION The weapon probation condition is modified to read: “Minor shall not knowingly possess any ammunition, or deadly or dangerous weapons.” As so modified, the order is affirmed.18 _ ____________ ____________ Rivera, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Reardon, Acting P.J.

_____________ ____________ Streeter, J.