In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-1219

Kenneth Oliver,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Richard B. Gramley, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 4962--George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Submitted September 3, 1999--Decided December 29, 1999

 Before Posner, Chief Judge, Bauer and Cudahy,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Chief Judge. The district judge

dismissed Oliver’s petition for habeas corpus (28

U.S.C. sec. 2254) with prejudice (compare

Demarest v. Price, 130 F.3d 922, 939 (10th Cir.

1997)), on the ground that he had committed a

fraud on the court, and denied Oliver’s request

for a certificate of appealability, and he renews

the request with us.

 When the state sought to dismiss Oliver’s

petition for habeas corpus on the ground that he

had failed to petition the Supreme Court of

Illinois for leave to appeal, he came back with

an affidavit swearing that he had given prison

officials the petition to file, and he also

submitted what appeared to be a certificate of

service. The district judge thought the

certificate a forgery and the affidavit

perjurious, and Oliver, while denying that he

intended to commit perjury or deceive the court,

does not deny that the certificate was forged (by

Oliver’s father) and the affidavit false.

 Although dismissal with prejudice is a

permissible judicial sanction for fraud on the

court, Kovilic Construction Co. v. Missbrenner,

106 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 1997); Peerless

Industrial Paint Coatings Co. v. Canam Steel

Corp., 979 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam);
Nichols v. Klein Tools, Inc., 949 F.2d 1047 (8th

Cir. 1991); Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d

1115, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989); Wyle v. R.J. Renolds

Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.

1983), the general rule is that before dismissing

a suit with prejudice as a sanction for

misconduct a court should consider the adequacy

of a less severe sanction, Ball v. City of

Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 1993); English

v. Cowell, 969 F.2d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 1992);

Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, 892 F.2d at

1118; see also Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & O

Enterprises, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1496 (7th Cir.

1989), and there is no indication that the

district court did that here. But we do not think

that such consideration is necessary in a case in

which the plaintiff’s fraud is criminal in

character and would if undetected destroy a

legitimate and dispositive defense. Cf. Wyle v.

R.J. Renolds Industries, Inc., supra, 709 F.2d at

591. Such behavior is so egregious, inexcusable,

and destructive that no lesser sanction than

dismissal with prejudice could be adequate. See

Nichols v. Klein Tools, Inc., supra, 949 F.2d at

1049; Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d

388, 396 (1st Cir. 1990); Aoude v. Mobil Oil

Corp., supra, 892 F.2d at 1122; Brockton Savings

Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d

5, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985); cf. C.K.S. Engineers,

Inc. v. White Mountain Gypsum Co., 726 F.2d 1202,

1209 (7th Cir. 1984).

 The request for a certificate for appealability

is therefore

Denied.