NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM KEVIN CAWTHON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0460 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2018-148733-001

The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Doran Justice PLLC, Phoenix

By Tyler Howell Schwenke

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-18-2022
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 William Kevin Cawthon appeals his conviction and sentence 

for misconduct involving weapons. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. See State v. Gunches, 225 Ariz. 22, 23 n.1 (2010). In October 2018, 

Phoenix Police Detective Warner joined a criminal task force to execute a 

search warrant at a home. Cawthon lived at but did not own the home and

was the “primary target” of the search. Warner along with Department of 

Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Special Agent 

Livingston arrived at the home 30 minutes before SWAT breached it. 

¶3 Warner and Livingston saw Cawthon leave the garage with 

another man, and Warner warned the SWAT team that two men were in 

the home’s driveway near a blue-tarped car. The SWAT team approached

the men and ordered them to get on the ground. While the other man 

immediately complied, Cawthon “ducked” and threw an object toward the 

blue-tarped car before complying. The SWAT team found a gun under the 

blue-tarped car; the gun was in good condition and did not look like it had 

been outside long. During an interview that night, Cawthon initially denied 

seeing a gun but eventually admitted that he had found the gun in the 

garage, possessed it while in the driveway, and that it had just been “bad 

timing” that the SWAT team arrived. Neither Warner nor Livingston tested 

the gun for DNA or fingerprint evidence. 

¶4 The State indicted Cawthon for, among other things, 

misconduct involving weapons, a class 4 felony, and alleged that he had 

historical prior felony convictions. Two weeks after the indictment, the 

State disclosed its intent to use his prison records to prove the prior felony 

convictions. Before the final management conference, the State disclosed

that it would have an Arizona Department of Public Safety fingerprint 

technician testify about Cawthon’s prior felony convictions, an essential 

element to the misconduct involving weapons claim under A.R.S. 
STATE v. CAWTHON

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3

§ 13–3102(A)(4). Cawthon moved to preclude the untimely disclosure, 

which the court granted. The court stated, however, that preclusion was not 

fatal to the State’s case because it had timely disclosed Cawthon’s “pen 

pack”—which is the collective Arizona Department of Correction’s 

(“ADOC”) record on an inmate and includes fingerprints, photographs, 

physical descriptions, criminal history, judgments, sentencing dates, other 

crimes committed, and where the inmate had been housed—and that the 

State could use it to establish Cawthon’s prior felony convictions.

¶5 At trial, Warner identified Cawthon as the man he saw throw 

something under the blue-tarped car where the gun was found. The State 

then submitted the video of Cawthon admitting that he possessed the gun 

and stating that the SWAT team’s arrival was just bad timing. Because 

Cawthon also admitted to possessing the gun, Warner did not get DNA or 

fingerprint evidence from the gun. He also examined a pen pack for

Cawthon’s criminal history information. The pen pack’s fourth page was a 

notarized letter signed by the correctional records’ clerk but had “Page 2” 

on its corner without a “Page 1” in the packet. The pen pack also contained 

a notarized “In-State Exemplification” sheet signed by the Offender 

Services Bureau (“OSB”) administrator, attesting that the records were true 

and correct copies. When the State offered the pen pack into evidence, 

Cawthon objected, claiming that it contained inadmissible hearsay and that 

because the pen pack was not properly self-authenticated and no one from 

ADOC was going to testify to the records’ authenticity, the public records 

exception to hearsay did not apply to it. The court overruled the objection

but precluded the state disclosing to the jury the nature of Cawthon’s prior 

felony convictions and required the State provide a redacted version.

¶6 In cross-examining Warner, Cawthon used a Google Earth 

image from three years after the raid. When Cawthon asked Warner to 

show where he was on the image and if his vision was obstructed, the State 

objected to the question and to publishing the image to the jury, arguing 

that Cawthon used the image as a late-disclosed exhibit and not as a 

demonstrative exhibit as he claimed. The State also argued that the image 

was irrelevant because it was taken in daylight three years later after the 

raid and the front yard had since been redone. The court sustained the 

objection, finding that because Cawthon used the exhibit to ask questions 

like “can you see through this, can you see through that,” it was not being 

used as a demonstrative exhibit and did not allow him to publish it.

Cawthon then questioned Warner using an admitted exhibit.

¶7 On redirect examination, Warner testified without objection 

that he had information that Cawthon was one of two living at the home.
STATE v. CAWTHON

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4

Next, a criminal division operations manager at the Maricopa County Clerk 

of Court testified that the person in a photograph from Cawthon’s pen pack 

looked like Cawthon and that he had a prior felony conviction in Maricopa 

County. The State admitted an affidavit from the Maricopa County 

Superior Court Clerk’s Office that the court had not restored Cawthon’s 

rights from the felony conviction. A detective who executed the search 

warrant testified that he had photographed the gun in the driveway and 

that it was in working condition. Livingston then testified that when the 

SWAT team arrived, Cawthon ducked, reached his right hand towards his 

waist, then moved his right arm forward in a tossing motion. Although he 

could not see Cawthon’s right hand, he could see his arm making a distinct

tossing motion. Livingston stated that although Cawthon at first denied 

ownership of the gun, he admitted to picking up the gun in the garage and 

possessing it on the driveway until the SWAT team arrived.

¶8 The State rested and Cawthon moved for a judgment of 

acquittal. He argued that the inconsistencies in Warner’s and Livingston’s 

testimonies—including where he stood when the SWAT team approached 

and whether he was holding something in his hand when he exited the 

garage—constituted reasonable doubt. He also argued that because the 

State lacked DNA or fingerprint evidence tying him to the gun, the State 

could not prove that he knowingly possessed the gun. Last, he argued that 

inconsistencies in the pen pack made it inadmissible and the jury therefore 

could not find that he had a prior felony conviction. The court denied the

motion.

¶9 Cawthon then testified in his defense and admitted that he 

had a prior felony conviction and was a prohibited possessor. While he 

admitted to staying at the home a couple times and that his dog and her 

seven puppies lived there full-time, he mostly stayed at a motel. He said 

that on the night of the raid, he had just stopped by the home to check on 

his stuff and saw that someone had gone through his things in the garage.

He stepped onto the driveway with the other man to inquire if that man 

knew who had rifled through his things. Five minutes later, the SWAT team 

appeared. He denied having known about or seen the gun.

¶10 On cross-examination, the State responded to Cawthon’s 

inconsistent testimony by replaying his confession. Even after replaying the 

video, Cawthon testified inconsistently with his previous statements. Each 

time he did so, the State replayed a portion of his confession. After the 

fourth time, Cawthon objected, arguing that playing the video was 

needlessly cumulative and prejudicial; the trial court overruled the 

objection. The State then called Warner as a rebuttal witness. Warner 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

5

reiterated his testimony from re-direct that he had information that 

Cawthon lived at the home. Cawthon objected on the grounds of hearsay, 

which the court overruled.

¶11 The jury convicted Cawthon on one count of misconduct 

involving weapons. In his sentencing memorandum, Cawthon requested a 

mitigated six-year term of imprisonment because, among other things, he 

had a dysfunctional and troubled family history, including sexual abuse,

and a recent family tragedy. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued

that Cawthon’s pen pack showed he had a prior felony conviction. After 

examining the unredacted pen pack and considering the evidence

presented at the hearing, the trial court found that Cawthon indeed had a 

prior felony conviction but had proven a dysfunctional family background 

and a family tragedy as mitigating circumstances. The court therefore 

sentenced Cawthon as a repetitive offender to a mitigated term of 8 years’ 

imprisonment under A.R.S. § 13–703(C) and credited him 70 days of 

presentence incarceration. Cawthon timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Cawthon argues that the court erred in (1) making its

evidentiary rulings; (2) denying his Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

(“Criminal Rule”) 20 motion; and (3) sentencing him as a category three 

repetitive offender under A.R.S. § 13–703(C). 

I. The court’s evidentiary rulings did not amount to reversible error.

¶13 Cawthon argues that the court erred in (1) admitting the pen 

pack at trial; (2) precluding him from using the Google Earth image as a 

demonstrative exhibit; (3) overruling his cumulative objection to the State’s

playing his police interview video; and (4) overruling his hearsay objection 

to Warner’s rebuttal testimony that he had information that he lived at the 

home. We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including hearsay 

and related exceptions, for an abuse of discretion, State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 

104, 114 ¶ 21 (App. 2022), but review de novo the court’s interpretation of 

the Arizona Rules of Evidence (“Rule”), State v. Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 199–

200 ¶ 127 (2019).

A. The court did not err in admitting the pen pack.

¶14 Cawthon claims that the court erred in admitting the pen pack 

because it was not properly self-authenticated and therefore inadmissible 

hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement being used for the truth of the 

matter asserted, Rule 801, and is inadmissible unless an exclusion or 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

6

exception applies, Rule 802. The records and reports of public offices and 

agencies are one such exception. Rule 803(8). Because ADOC is statutorily 

required to maintain a master record file of each person committed to 

prison under A.R.S. § 13–221, the pen pack is admissible under the public 

records request if properly authenticated. Id.; see also State v. King, 213 Ariz. 

632, 636 ¶ 11 (App. 2006).

¶15 “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying 

an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to 

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Rule

901(a). This requirement is satisfied under Rule 901(b)(7)(B) for public 

records when evidence is submitted that “a purported public record or 

statement is from the office where items of this kind are kept.” Certified 

copies of public records are self-authenticating under Rule 902(4), provided 

the record has the proper certification. State v. Bennett, 216 Ariz. 15, 16 ¶ 3 

n.4 (App. 2007). The sufficiency of the foundation for the authentication of 

a document is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Thompson, 166 Ariz. 

526, 527 (App. 1990). 

¶16 The pen pack that the State offered into evidence had two 

pages bearing notarized signatures. On the first page, the records clerk 

attested to the validity of the automated summary records for Cawthon, 

including the sentences imposed for his prior convictions. Second, the OSB 

administrator attested to the photograph, fingerprints, and other 

information were the Department’s copies. The contents of the full pen pack 

were therefore self-authenticating as certified copies under Rule 902(4). 

Bennett, 216 Ariz. at 16, 18 ¶¶ 1, 8; see also State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 242, 246 ¶ 

11 (App. 2014) (in-state exemplification incorporates attached documents 

as being true and correct copies). 

¶17 Cawthon argues, however, that even assuming the pen pack 

was a self-authenticated document, it did not fall under the public records 

exception because the “source of the information or other circumstances 

indicate a lack of trustworthiness,” citing Rule 803(8)(b). But Cawthon’s 

name, inmate number, physical characteristics, and personally identifying 

information, including birthdate and social security number, were on the 

separate items of the packet. Based on the uniformity of information 

identifying Cawthon, the trial court did not err in finding the selfauthenticated document trustworthy and admitting them as an exception 

to the rule against hearsay under Rule 803(8). 

B. The court did not err in precluding Cawthon’s use of a Google 

Earth image as a demonstrative exhibit. 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

7

¶18 Cawthon argues that the court erred in precluding him from 

publishing the Google Earth image to the jury as a demonstrative exhibit. 

He argues that the Google Earth Street View function would have allowed 

the jury to see what Warner and Livingston would have seen on the night 

of the raid. The admission of maps, diagrams, as well as demonstrative 

exhibits to help the jury understand testimony, falls within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. See State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 66 ¶ 47 (1998). 

“Demonstrative evidence is relevant if it illustrates or explains testimony 

presented at trial,” see State v. King, 226 Ariz. 253, 256 ¶ 7 (App. 2011), and 

must be sufficiently similar to the conditions that existed at the time of the 

offense, see State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 408 (1981); see also State v. 

Burkheart, 106 Ariz. 490, 491 (1970). The court found that Cawthon did not 

merely want to use the exhibit to illustrate or explain testimony, but to 

establish testimony. The court did not err. 

¶19 Cawthon could show the jury the Google Earth image as a 

demonstrative exhibit to show the home’s location in the neighborhood. He 

could not ask Warner specific questions about whether anything in the 

photo hindered his view, however. In doing so, Cawthon tried to elicit

evidence through the photo rather than merely demonstrate what the 

evidence had already established. Even on appeal Cawthon claims that the 

court prejudiced him in cutting off the “line of questioning” about what 

Warner and Livingston did or did not see. Such questions made the image 

no longer demonstrative. Furthermore, the map and street view were not 

sufficiently similar to the conditions on the night of the raid. First, the image 

was taken about three years after the incident. Second, the image was taken 

in daylight. Last, the front yard and setting looked different from the night 

of the raid. Thus, the exhibit would not have aided the witness’s testimony 

or the jury’s understanding of the crime scene from the established 

evidence. Mincey, 130 Ariz. at 408. As a result, the trial court correctly 

determined that Cawthon’s use was not demonstrative and therefore did 

not abuse its discretion in refusing its publication. See King, 226 Ariz. at 256 

¶ 7 (App. 2011).

C. The court did not err in overruling Cawthon’s objection to the 

State’s playing his interview during his cross-examination. 

¶20 Cawthon argues that the trial court erred by overruling his 

cumulative objection to the State’s replaying his police interview. This court 

reviews the trial court’s ruling on cumulative objections for an abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 513 ¶ 118 (2013). A trial court 

“may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger” of “needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

8

Rule 403. Cumulative evidence establishes a “point already proved by other 

evidence.” State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz. 22, 26 (App. 1979). 

¶21 The State replayed the video to impeach Cawthon’s testimony

and was therefore not cumulative. Cawthon repeatedly testified 

inconsistently with his statement to the police. The State had a right to 

impeach Cawthon, Rule 607, and could do so with the video of his prior 

inconsistent statements, Rule 801(d)(2) (opposing party’s statements not 

hearsay); see also Rule 613 (witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements). Such 

use was not cumulative. Moreover, even if replaying the video was

cumulative, Cawthon has failed to show that he was prejudiced because its 

inclusion was harmless error. State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 226 (1982)

(erroneous admission of evidence which is entirely cumulative constitutes 

harmless error); cf. State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 145 ¶ 100 (2019) (“And 

even if the court abused its discretion in admitting the recording, it was not 

unduly prejudicial because . . . it was admitted by stipulation and thus 

could be considered by the jury regardless of whether it was played in open 

court.”).

D. The court properly overruled Cawthon’s hearsay objection to 

Warner’s testimony that Cawthon lived at the home. 

¶22 Cawthon argues that the trial court erred when it overruled 

his hearsay objection to Warner’s rebuttal testimony that Cawthon lived at 

the home. “[I]f hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it becomes 

competent evidence admissible for all purposes.” State v. Butler, 230 Ariz. 

465, 472 ¶ 25 (App. 2012). In re-direct examination, Warner said that he had 

information that Cawthon lived at the home. Indeed, Warner said that 

Cawthon was one of two people that lived there. Cawthon did not object 

and the evidence became admissible for all purposes. Id. at 472 ¶ 25. 

Because Cawthon did not object and the evidence was properly admitted, 

he waived his right to object during Warner’s rebuttal testimony. See State 

v. Lalonde, 156 Ariz. 318, 319–20 (App. 1987) (holding hearsay objection 

meritless when witness’s statement was introduced without objection and 

could not prevent the trier of fact from hearing subsequent evidence 

relevant to statement). Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling 

Cawthon’s objection during Warner’s rebuttal testimony. Because Cawthon 

has failed to show the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings and has 

failed to prove he was prejudiced, we find no reversible error. 

II. The court properly denied Cawthon’s Criminal Rule 20 motion.

¶23 Cawthon next argues that after the close of the State’s case, no 

reasonable juror could have found that Cawthon was guilty beyond a 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

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reasonable doubt. We review de novo the trial court’s Criminal Rule 20

ruling. State v. Montes Flores, 245 Ariz. 303, 308 ¶ 23 (App. 2018). 

¶24 A trial court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if no 

substantial evidence warrants conviction. Criminal Rule 20; State v. West, 

226 Ariz. 559, 561 ¶ 6 (2011). Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable 

person could find the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.

at 563 ¶ 16; State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212 ¶ 87 (2004). If reasonable 

persons may fairly differ on whether certain evidence, including differing 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence, establishes a fact in issue, then 

such evidence must be considered as substantial. Id.; see also West, 226 Ariz. 

at 563 ¶ 18. A defendant who goes forward and presents a case waives any 

error if his case supplies evidence missing in the State’s case. State v. Nunez, 

167 Ariz. 272, 279 (1991). 

¶25 Sufficient evidence shows that Cawthon committed 

misconduct involving weapons. Under A.R.S. § 13–3102(A)(4), a person 

commits misconduct involving weapons if the person (1) knowingly 

possessed a deadly weapon, and (2) was a prohibited possessor. A deadly 

weapon is “anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm.” A.R.S. 

§ 13–105(15). “Possession may be actual or constructive.” State v. Gonsalves, 

231 Ariz. 521, 523 ¶ 9 (App. 2013). “Actual possession means a defendant 

knowingly exercised direct physical control over an object.” Id. “One who 

exercises dominion or control over property has constructive possession of 

it even if it is not in his physical possession.” State v. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 

Ariz. 360, 363 ¶ 13 (App. 1998). A “prohibited possessor” means a person 

“[w]ho has been convicted within or without this state of a felony or who 

has been adjudicated delinquent for a felony and whose civil right to 

possess or carry firearm has not been restored.” A.R.S § 13–3101(A)(7)(b). 

¶26 The State presented ample evidence on both elements. First, 

the State provided video of Cawthon’s acknowledgment that he had the 

gun on the driveway and that it was just “bad timing” when the SWAT 

team approached him. Warner and Livingston testified that when the

SWAT team approached, Cawthon ducked and threw something towards 

where the gun was found. Warner and Livingston’s testimony along with 

Cawthon’s incriminating statement provided sufficient evidence that 

Cawthon actually possessed the gun. See Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. at 523 ¶ 9 

(actual possession is direct, physical control of an object). Also, Warner 

testified that Cawthon said that he kept his property in the garage and that 

he lived at the home. This evidence, along with Cawthon’s testimony that 

the gun came from the garage, was sufficient to show that Cawthon 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

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constructively possessed the gun. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. at 363 ¶ 13 (a 

person who exercises dominion or control over property has constructive 

possession of it). Second, not only did Cawthon testify that he was a 

prohibited possessor, his pen pack showed that he was a convicted felon 

and did not have his rights restored. This was sufficient evidence that he 

was a prohibited possessor. 

¶27 Cawthon nevertheless argues that the only evidence tying 

him to the gun was his incriminating statements, since no forensic 

evidence—i.e., DNA or fingerprint—was taken from the gun. As a result, 

he argues that the doctrine of corpus delicti required the court grant his 

Criminal Rule 20 motion. That doctrine precludes the admission of a 

defendant’s confession unless the State admits evidence from which the 

jurors could infer that the confessed crime actually occurred. State v. 

Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 387 ¶ 8 (2015). The evidence need only show a 

“reasonable inference” that the crime occurred. Id. Circumstantial evidence 

can support such an inference. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 333 ¶ 34 (2007).

Appellate courts review sufficiency of the evidence for corpus delicti 

purposes for an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at ¶ 34.

¶28 The State presented sufficient evidence for the jurors to 

reasonably infer that the crime of misconduct involving weapons had

occurred. Warner and Livingston testified that they saw Cawthon leave the 

garage with another individual and stand near the tarp-covered car. When 

the SWAT team approached, both saw Cawthon duck and toss an object 

towards where the SWAT team found a gun. Although Cawthon points to

discrepancies in Warner’s and Livingston’s testimonies, their material 

commonalities provided a reasonable inference that Cawthon had 

possessed the gun. See Morris, 215 Ariz. at 333 ¶ 34. 

III. The trial court properly sentenced Cawthon as a category three 

repetitive offender.

¶29 Cawthon argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him 

as a category three repetitive offender after it allowed the State to untimely 

provide the pen pack at sentencing. We review the trial court’s admission 

of evidence of prior convictions and resulting sentencing order for an abuse 

of discretion, see State v. Newnom, 208 Ariz. 507, 507 ¶ 3 (App. 2004) (prior 

convictions); State v. Vermuele, 226 Ariz. 399, 403 ¶ 15 (App. 2011) 

(sentencing), as we do its sanction ruling for untimely disclosures, State v. 

Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 454 ¶ 114 (2004). The trial court abuses its discretion 

when “no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the 
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

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circumstances.” State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, 242 ¶ 29 (2014) (internal 

quotations omitted).

¶30 Under Criminal Rule 15.1(b)(6) and (c), the State must provide 

a list of all prior felony convictions it intends to use at trial within 30 days 

after arraignment. The State alleged historical prior felony convictions for 

enhancement purposes less than two weeks after the indictment. The day 

after that, it disclosed that it might use the pen pack to prove those priors. 

Cawthon already had the unredacted pen pack. Although the court had 

thought that the pen pack was admitted for the limited purpose of 

establishing an element in the guilt phase, the entire pen pack had been 

disclosed long before the hearing and the State said that it would use such 

evidence in the aggravation phase. Thus, the pen pack was not untimely 

disclosed. 

¶31 Even if the pen pack had been untimely disclosed, the court 

did not err in admitting it. The trial court has “great discretion” in 

sanctioning a party for untimely disclosure. State v. Mesa, 203 Ariz. 50, 55

¶ 19 (App. 2002). In determining sanctions, “a court must determine the 

significance of the information not timely disclosed, the violation’s impact 

on the overall administration of the case, the sanction’s impact on the party 

and the victim, and the stage of the proceedings when the party ultimately 

made the disclosure.” Criminal Rule 15.7(c). The sanction “should be 

proportionate to the harm caused” and “cure that harm to the maximum 

practicable extent.” State v. Krone, 182 Ariz. 319, 322 (1995). 

¶32 This court in State v. Ramos presented two components that 

render preclusion for untimely disclosure proper: willfulness and 

prejudice. 239 Ariz. 501, 504 ¶ 9 (App. 2016). Neither are present here. 

Cawthon’s own sentencing memorandum belies any claimed prejudice as 

it conceded that he faced the 10-year presumptive term and had prepared 

extensive mitigation material. And the State had disclosed the unredacted 

pen pack, along with other disclosures, long before trial and sentencing. 

The court and parties’ confusion over whether the pen pack had been 

disclosed for sentencing purposes is not willful nondisclosure: Cawthon 

always had the evidence. As a result, the court did not abuse its “great 

discretion” in admitting the pen pack. Mesa, 203 Ariz. at 55 ¶ 19.
STATE v. CAWTHON

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶33 For the reasons stated, we affirm Cawthon’s conviction and 

sentence.