# Diario Oficial C 204/2012

| | ISSN 1977-0928
  doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2012.204.spa |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 204 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 55o año12 de julio de 2012 |

ISSN 1977-0928

doi:10.3000/19770928.C_2012.204.spa

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 204

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

55o año12 de julio de 2012

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| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicaciones |
| | COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2012/C 204/01 | Retirada de la notificación de una concentración (Asunto COMP/M.6564 — ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

II   Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2012/C 204/01

Retirada de la notificación de una concentración (Asunto COMP/M.6564 — ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Información |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2012/C 204/02 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 2 |
| 2012/C 204/03 | Decisión de Ejecución de la Comisión, de 11 de julio de 2012, relativa a la financiación del programa de trabajo para 2012 sobre herramientas informáticas en el ámbito de la seguridad alimentaria, la salud animal, el bienestar de los animales y la fitosanidad | 3 |
| | INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO |
| | Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| 2012/C 204/04 | Invitación a presentar observaciones de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia respecto a la posible ayuda estatal de Noruega a AS Oslo Sporveier y AS Sporveisbussene | 15 |

IV   Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2012/C 204/02

Tipo de cambio del euro

2

2012/C 204/03

Decisión de Ejecución de la Comisión, de 11 de julio de 2012, relativa a la financiación del programa de trabajo para 2012 sobre herramientas informáticas en el ámbito de la seguridad alimentaria, la salud animal, el bienestar de los animales y la fitosanidad

3

INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

2012/C 204/04

Invitación a presentar observaciones de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia respecto a la posible ayuda estatal de Noruega a AS Oslo Sporveier y AS Sporveisbussene

15

| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 204/05 | Convocatoria de oposiciones generales | 41 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2012/C 204/06 | Notificación previa de una operación de concentración [Asunto COMP/M.6647 — Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)] — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 42 |
| 2012/C 204/07 | Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto COMP/M.6651 — Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 43 |
| 2012/C 204/08 | Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en el asunto COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) [notificada con el número C(2012) 4873]
   (
  1
  ) | 44 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

2012/C 204/05

Convocatoria de oposiciones generales

41

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

2012/C 204/06

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración [Asunto COMP/M.6647 — Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)] — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

42

2012/C 204/07

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto COMP/M.6651 — Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

43

2012/C 204/08

Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en el asunto COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) [notificada con el número C(2012) 4873]
   (
  1
  )

o

[notificada con el número C(2012) 4873]

1

44

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE |

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(1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE

1

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

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II Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/1

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Retirada de la notificación de una concentración

(Asunto COMP/M.6564 — ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2012/C 204/01

[Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo]

El 15 de junio de 2012, la Comisión Europea recibió una notificación de un proyecto de concentración entre ARM, Giesecke & Devrient, Gemalto y JV. El 3 de julio de 2012, la(s) parte(s) notificante(s) comunicó (comunicaron) a la Comisión que retiraba(n) su notificación.

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IV Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/2

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Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

11 de julio de 2012

2012/C 204/02

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,2260 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 97,14 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4363 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,78815 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 8,5384 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,2010 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 7,4745 |
| BGN | lev búlgaro | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 25,395 |
| HUF | forint húngaro | 288,75 |
| LTL | litas lituana | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letón | 0,6962 |
| PLN | zloty polaco | 4,1697 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,5255 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,2191 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,1953 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,2493 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 9,5070 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 1,5369 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 1,5499 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 398,56 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 10,0655 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 7,7828 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,4858 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 11 558,92 |
| MYR | ringgit malayo | 3,8944 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 51,288 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 40,2341 |
| THB | baht tailandés | 38,864 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 2,4899 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 16,3330 |
| INR | rupia india | 68,2000 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,2260

JPY

yen japonés

97,14

DKK

corona danesa

7,4363

GBP

libra esterlina

0,78815

SEK

corona sueca

8,5384

CHF

franco suizo

1,2010

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

7,4745

BGN

lev búlgaro

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

25,395

HUF

forint húngaro

288,75

LTL

litas lituana

3,4528

LVL

lats letón

0,6962

PLN

zloty polaco

4,1697

RON

leu rumano

4,5255

TRY

lira turca

2,2191

AUD

dólar australiano

1,1953

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,2493

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

9,5070

NZD

dólar neozelandés

1,5369

SGD

dólar de Singapur

1,5499

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 398,56

ZAR

rand sudafricano

10,0655

CNY

yuan renminbi

7,7828

HRK

kuna croata

7,4858

IDR

rupia indonesia

11 558,92

MYR

ringgit malayo

3,8944

PHP

peso filipino

51,288

RUB

rublo ruso

40,2341

THB

baht tailandés

38,864

BRL

real brasileño

2,4899

MXN

peso mexicano

16,3330

INR

rupia india

68,2000

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

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| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/3

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DECISIÓN DE EJECUCIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN

de 11 de julio de 2012

relativa a la financiación del programa de trabajo para 2012 sobre herramientas informáticas en el ámbito de la seguridad alimentaria, la salud animal, el bienestar de los animales y la fitosanidad

2012/C 204/03

LA COMISIÓN EUROPEA,

Visto el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea,

Visto el Reglamento (CE, Euratom) no 1605/2002 del Consejo, de 25 de junio de 2002, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento financiero aplicable al presupuesto general de las Comunidades Europeas (1) (en lo sucesivo, «el Reglamento financiero»), y, en particular, su artículo 75,

Visto el Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 29 de abril de 2004, sobre los controles oficiales efectuados para garantizar la verificación del cumplimiento de la legislación en materia de piensos y alimentos y la normativa sobre salud animal y bienestar de los animales (2), y, en particular, su artículo 66, apartado 1, letra c), y apartado 2,

Vista la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo, de 25 de mayo de 2009, relativa a determinados gastos en el sector veterinario (3), y, en particular, su artículo 35, apartado 2, y su artículo 36, apartado 2,

Considerando lo siguiente:

| (1) | De conformidad con el artículo 75 del Reglamento financiero y el artículo 90, apartado 1, de las normas de desarrollo, los compromisos de gasto del presupuesto de la Unión deben ir precedidos de una decisión de financiación en la que se establezcan los elementos esenciales de una acción que implique un gasto y que sea adoptada por la institución o las autoridades en las que la institución haya delegado competencias. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

De conformidad con el artículo 75 del Reglamento financiero y el artículo 90, apartado 1, de las normas de desarrollo, los compromisos de gasto del presupuesto de la Unión deben ir precedidos de una decisión de financiación en la que se establezcan los elementos esenciales de una acción que implique un gasto y que sea adoptada por la institución o las autoridades en las que la institución haya delegado competencias.

| (2) | El Reglamento (CE, Euratom) no 2342/2002 de la Comisión, de 23 de diciembre de 2002, por el que se establecen las normas de aplicación del Reglamento del Consejo (CE, Euratom) no 1605/2002, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento financiero aplicable al presupuesto general de las Comunidades Europeas (4) (en lo sucesivo denominado «las normas de desarrollo»), determina el grado de detalle que se considera suficiente para describir el marco de una decisión de financiación. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

El Reglamento (CE, Euratom) no 2342/2002 de la Comisión, de 23 de diciembre de 2002, por el que se establecen las normas de aplicación del Reglamento del Consejo (CE, Euratom) no 1605/2002, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento financiero aplicable al presupuesto general de las Comunidades Europeas (4) (en lo sucesivo denominado «las normas de desarrollo»), determina el grado de detalle que se considera suficiente para describir el marco de una decisión de financiación.

| (3) | De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 53 quinquies del Reglamento financiero, se han obtenido pruebas de que las organizaciones internacionales a las que la Comisión confiará la ejecución de fondos de la Unión en gestión conjunta, aplican normas que ofrecen una garantía equivalente a las normas internacionalmente aceptadas en materia de contabilidad, auditoría, control interno y procedimientos de contratación. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 53 quinquies del Reglamento financiero, se han obtenido pruebas de que las organizaciones internacionales a las que la Comisión confiará la ejecución de fondos de la Unión en gestión conjunta, aplican normas que ofrecen una garantía equivalente a las normas internacionalmente aceptadas en materia de contabilidad, auditoría, control interno y procedimientos de contratación.

| (4) | El artículo 50, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 178/2002 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 28 de enero de 2002, por el que se establecen los principios y los requisitos generales de la legislación alimentaria, se crea la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria y se fijan procedimientos relativos a la seguridad alimentaria (5), establece un sistema de alerta rápida, en forma de red, destinado a notificar los riesgos directos o indirectos para la salud humana derivados de alimentos o piensos, y determina que la Comisión será responsable de la gestión de la red. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

El artículo 50, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 178/2002 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 28 de enero de 2002, por el que se establecen los principios y los requisitos generales de la legislación alimentaria, se crea la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria y se fijan procedimientos relativos a la seguridad alimentaria (5), establece un sistema de alerta rápida, en forma de red, destinado a notificar los riesgos directos o indirectos para la salud humana derivados de alimentos o piensos, y determina que la Comisión será responsable de la gestión de la red.

| (5) | El artículo 20 del Reglamento (CE) no 1924/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 20 de diciembre de 2006, relativo a las declaraciones nutricionales y de propiedades saludables en los alimentos (6), obliga a la Comisión a establecer y mantener un registro de las declaraciones nutricionales y de propiedades saludables en los alimentos. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

El artículo 20 del Reglamento (CE) no 1924/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 20 de diciembre de 2006, relativo a las declaraciones nutricionales y de propiedades saludables en los alimentos (6), obliga a la Comisión a establecer y mantener un registro de las declaraciones nutricionales y de propiedades saludables en los alimentos.

| (6) | El artículo 28 del Reglamento (CE) no 1829/2003 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 22 de septiembre de 2003, sobre alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente (7), obliga a la Comisión a establecer y mantener un registro de acceso público de alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

El artículo 28 del Reglamento (CE) no 1829/2003 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 22 de septiembre de 2003, sobre alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente (7), obliga a la Comisión a establecer y mantener un registro de acceso público de alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente.

| (7) | El artículo 25 del Reglamento (CE) no 1334/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2008, sobre los aromas y determinados ingredientes alimentarios con propiedades aromatizantes utilizados en los alimentos y por el que se modifican el Reglamento (CEE) no 1601/91 del Consejo, los Reglamentos (CE) no 2232/96 y (CE) no 110/2008 y la Directiva 2000/13/CE (8), indica que la Unión establecerá una lista de sustancias aromatizantes. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

El artículo 25 del Reglamento (CE) no 1334/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2008, sobre los aromas y determinados ingredientes alimentarios con propiedades aromatizantes utilizados en los alimentos y por el que se modifican el Reglamento (CEE) no 1601/91 del Consejo, los Reglamentos (CE) no 2232/96 y (CE) no 110/2008 y la Directiva 2000/13/CE (8), indica que la Unión establecerá una lista de sustancias aromatizantes.

| (8) | El artículo 31, apartado 2, de la Directiva 2001/18/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 12 de marzo de 2001, sobre la liberación intencional en el medio ambiente de organismos modificados genéticamente y por la que se deroga la Directiva 90/220/CEE del Consejo (9), obliga a la Comisión a establecer uno o varios registros con el fin de recoger la información sobre las modificaciones genéticas en los OMG que pueden emplearse para detectar e identificar productos con OMG concretos a fin de facilitar el control y la inspección post-comercialización. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

El artículo 31, apartado 2, de la Directiva 2001/18/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 12 de marzo de 2001, sobre la liberación intencional en el medio ambiente de organismos modificados genéticamente y por la que se deroga la Directiva 90/220/CEE del Consejo (9), obliga a la Comisión a establecer uno o varios registros con el fin de recoger la información sobre las modificaciones genéticas en los OMG que pueden emplearse para detectar e identificar productos con OMG concretos a fin de facilitar el control y la inspección post-comercialización.

| (9) | Los artículos 4 a 8 del Reglamento (CE) no 258/97 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de enero de 1997, sobre nuevos alimentos y nuevos ingredientes alimentarios (10), exigen la creación y el mantenimiento de una red entre los Estados miembros de la UE y la Comisión Europea con vistas a un rápido intercambio de datos que permita la tramitación segura de información confidencial. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Los artículos 4 a 8 del Reglamento (CE) no 258/97 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de enero de 1997, sobre nuevos alimentos y nuevos ingredientes alimentarios (10), exigen la creación y el mantenimiento de una red entre los Estados miembros de la UE y la Comisión Europea con vistas a un rápido intercambio de datos que permita la tramitación segura de información confidencial.

| (10) | El artículo 2, apartado 1, letra i), y el artículo 21, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2000/29/CE del Consejo, de 8 de mayo de 2000, relativa a las medidas de protección contra la introducción en la Comunidad de organismos nocivos para los vegetales o productos vegetales y contra su propagación en el interior de la Comunidad (11), prevén que se establezca una red para la notificación de nuevas manifestaciones de organismos nocivos, se emitan recomendaciones que sirvan de guía para los inspectores nacionales en la realización de los controles fitosanitarios de importación y se elaboren programas con objeto de elevar los conocimientos de los inspectores nacionales. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

El artículo 2, apartado 1, letra i), y el artículo 21, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2000/29/CE del Consejo, de 8 de mayo de 2000, relativa a las medidas de protección contra la introducción en la Comunidad de organismos nocivos para los vegetales o productos vegetales y contra su propagación en el interior de la Comunidad (11), prevén que se establezca una red para la notificación de nuevas manifestaciones de organismos nocivos, se emitan recomendaciones que sirvan de guía para los inspectores nacionales en la realización de los controles fitosanitarios de importación y se elaboren programas con objeto de elevar los conocimientos de los inspectores nacionales.

| (11) | El artículo 10 de la Directiva 69/464/CEE del Consejo, de 8 de diciembre de 1969, relativa a la lucha contra la sarna verrugosa (12); el artículo 1, letra a), y el artículo 2 de la Directiva 93/85/CEE del Consejo, de 4 de octubre de 1993, relativa a la lucha contra la necrosis bacteriana de la patata (13); el artículo 1, letra a), y el artículo 2 de la Directiva 98/57/CE del Consejo, de 20 de julio de 1998, sobre el control de Ralstonia solanacearum (Smith) Yabuuchi et al.
   (14); y los artículos 1, 4 y 8 de la Directiva 2007/33/CE del Consejo, de 11 de junio de 2007, sobre el control de los nematodos del quiste de la patata y por la que se deroga la Directiva 69/465/CEE (15), establecen, respectivamente, los requisitos para el control de la sarna verrugosa, de la necrosis bacteriana de la patata, de la podredumbre parda de la patata y de los nematodos del quiste de la patata, que son todas enfermedades muy importantes de los cultivos de patata. En particular, establecen estrictos requisitos para la realización de exámenes sistemáticos con el fin de detectar la presencia de los organismos nocivos antes mencionados, así como la obligación de notificar sus resultados a la Comisión. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

El artículo 10 de la Directiva 69/464/CEE del Consejo, de 8 de diciembre de 1969, relativa a la lucha contra la sarna verrugosa (12); el artículo 1, letra a), y el artículo 2 de la Directiva 93/85/CEE del Consejo, de 4 de octubre de 1993, relativa a la lucha contra la necrosis bacteriana de la patata (13); el artículo 1, letra a), y el artículo 2 de la Directiva 98/57/CE del Consejo, de 20 de julio de 1998, sobre el control de Ralstonia solanacearum (Smith) Yabuuchi et al.
   (14); y los artículos 1, 4 y 8 de la Directiva 2007/33/CE del Consejo, de 11 de junio de 2007, sobre el control de los nematodos del quiste de la patata y por la que se deroga la Directiva 69/465/CEE (15), establecen, respectivamente, los requisitos para el control de la sarna verrugosa, de la necrosis bacteriana de la patata, de la podredumbre parda de la patata y de los nematodos del quiste de la patata, que son todas enfermedades muy importantes de los cultivos de patata. En particular, establecen estrictos requisitos para la realización de exámenes sistemáticos con el fin de detectar la presencia de los organismos nocivos antes mencionados, así como la obligación de notificar sus resultados a la Comisión.

| (12) | El artículo 76, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 1107/2009 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, relativo a la comercialización de productos fitosanitarios y por el que se derogan las Directivas 79/117/CEE y 91/414/CEE del Consejo (16), establece la financiación de la creación de una base de datos para la recopilación y el almacenamiento de toda la información relativa a los productos fitosanitarios. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

El artículo 76, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 1107/2009 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, relativo a la comercialización de productos fitosanitarios y por el que se derogan las Directivas 79/117/CEE y 91/414/CEE del Consejo (16), establece la financiación de la creación de una base de datos para la recopilación y el almacenamiento de toda la información relativa a los productos fitosanitarios.

| (13) | El artículo 5 sexto de la Directiva 68/193/CEE del Consejo, de 9 de abril de 1968, referente a la comercialización de los materiales de multiplicación vegetativa de la vid (17), establece que la Comisión publique un catálogo común de variedades que entran en el ámbito de aplicación de dicha Directiva. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

El artículo 5 sexto de la Directiva 68/193/CEE del Consejo, de 9 de abril de 1968, referente a la comercialización de los materiales de multiplicación vegetativa de la vid (17), establece que la Comisión publique un catálogo común de variedades que entran en el ámbito de aplicación de dicha Directiva.

| (14) | El artículo 7, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2008/90/CE del Consejo, de 29 de septiembre de 2008, relativa a la comercialización de materiales de multiplicación de frutales y de plantones de frutal destinados a la producción frutícola (18), dispone que se podrá decidir que se establezca y publique una lista común de variedades. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

El artículo 7, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2008/90/CE del Consejo, de 29 de septiembre de 2008, relativa a la comercialización de materiales de multiplicación de frutales y de plantones de frutal destinados a la producción frutícola (18), dispone que se podrá decidir que se establezca y publique una lista común de variedades.

| (15) | El artículo 11, apartado 1, de la Directiva 1999/105/CE del Consejo, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, sobre la comercialización de materiales forestales de reproducción, dispone que la Comisión puede publicar una «Lista de materiales de base admitidos en la Comunidad para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción». |
| --- | --- |

(15)

El artículo 11, apartado 1, de la Directiva 1999/105/CE del Consejo, de 22 de diciembre de 1999, sobre la comercialización de materiales forestales de reproducción, dispone que la Comisión puede publicar una «Lista de materiales de base admitidos en la Comunidad para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción».

| (16) | El artículo 17, párrafo primero, de la Directiva 2002/53/CE del Consejo, de 13 de junio de 2002, referente al catálogo común de las variedades de las especies de plantas agrícolas (19), y el artículo 17, párrafo primero, de la Directiva 2002/55/CE del Consejo, sobre la comercialización de semillas de plantas hortícolas (20), prevén que la Comisión publique un catálogo común de las variedades de las especies de plantas agrícolas y de las especies de plantas hortícolas, respectivamente. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

El artículo 17, párrafo primero, de la Directiva 2002/53/CE del Consejo, de 13 de junio de 2002, referente al catálogo común de las variedades de las especies de plantas agrícolas (19), y el artículo 17, párrafo primero, de la Directiva 2002/55/CE del Consejo, sobre la comercialización de semillas de plantas hortícolas (20), prevén que la Comisión publique un catálogo común de las variedades de las especies de plantas agrícolas y de las especies de plantas hortícolas, respectivamente.

| (17) | El artículo 36, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de febrero de 2005, relativo a los límites máximos de residuos de plaguicidas en alimentos y piensos de origen vegetal y animal y que modifica la Directiva 91/414/CEE (21), prevé la elaboración de una base de datos consolidada de la legislación de la Unión sobre los límites máximos de residuos de plaguicidas, destinada asimismo a hacer pública dicha información. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

El artículo 36, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de febrero de 2005, relativo a los límites máximos de residuos de plaguicidas en alimentos y piensos de origen vegetal y animal y que modifica la Directiva 91/414/CEE (21), prevé la elaboración de una base de datos consolidada de la legislación de la Unión sobre los límites máximos de residuos de plaguicidas, destinada asimismo a hacer pública dicha información.

| (18) | El artículo 8 de la Directiva 96/23/CE del Consejo, de 29 de abril de 1996, relativa a las medidas de control aplicables respecto de determinadas sustancias y sus residuos en los animales vivos y sus productos y por la que se derogan las Directivas 85/358/CEE y 86/469/CEE y las Decisiones 89/187/CEE y 91/664/CEE (22), prevé una base de datos relativa a los planes de vigilancia. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

El artículo 8 de la Directiva 96/23/CE del Consejo, de 29 de abril de 1996, relativa a las medidas de control aplicables respecto de determinadas sustancias y sus residuos en los animales vivos y sus productos y por la que se derogan las Directivas 85/358/CEE y 86/469/CEE y las Decisiones 89/187/CEE y 91/664/CEE (22), prevé una base de datos relativa a los planes de vigilancia.

| (19) | El artículo 6, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 22 de mayo de 2001, por el que se establecen disposiciones para la prevención, el control y la erradicación de determinadas encefalopatías espongiformes transmisibles (23), prevé una base de datos en relación con la vigilancia epidemiológica de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

El artículo 6, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 22 de mayo de 2001, por el que se establecen disposiciones para la prevención, el control y la erradicación de determinadas encefalopatías espongiformes transmisibles (23), prevé una base de datos en relación con la vigilancia epidemiológica de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina.

| (20) | El artículo 10 del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2008, sobre aditivos alimentarios (24), requiere el funcionamiento y el mantenimiento de bases de datos en relación con el procedimiento de autorización común relativo a los aditivos alimentarios. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

El artículo 10 del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2008, sobre aditivos alimentarios (24), requiere el funcionamiento y el mantenimiento de bases de datos en relación con el procedimiento de autorización común relativo a los aditivos alimentarios.

| (21) | El artículo 35, apartado 1, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE permite acogerse a una ayuda financiera de la Unión para el establecimiento de sistemas de identificación de los animales y de notificación de las enfermedades. Procede conceder una participación financiera de la Unión para gestionar y mejorar el Sistema de Notificación de las Enfermedades de los Animales (ADNS), establecido mediante la Decisión 2005/176/CE de la Comisión, de 1 de marzo de 2005, por la que se establecen la forma codificada y los códigos para la notificación de las enfermedades de los animales, de conformidad con la Directiva 82/894/CEE (25). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

El artículo 35, apartado 1, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE permite acogerse a una ayuda financiera de la Unión para el establecimiento de sistemas de identificación de los animales y de notificación de las enfermedades. Procede conceder una participación financiera de la Unión para gestionar y mejorar el Sistema de Notificación de las Enfermedades de los Animales (ADNS), establecido mediante la Decisión 2005/176/CE de la Comisión, de 1 de marzo de 2005, por la que se establecen la forma codificada y los códigos para la notificación de las enfermedades de los animales, de conformidad con la Directiva 82/894/CEE (25).

| (22) | El artículo 36 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE contempla una participación financiera de la Unión en determinados sistemas informáticos utilizados en el comercio en el interior de la Unión y en las importaciones. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

El artículo 36 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE contempla una participación financiera de la Unión en determinados sistemas informáticos utilizados en el comercio en el interior de la Unión y en las importaciones.

| (23) | Es necesario seguir aportando participación financiera para alojar, gestionar y mantener el sistema informático veterinario integrado TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System) introducido mediante la Decisión 2003/24/CE de la Comisión, de 30 de diciembre de 2002, sobre la creación de un sistema informático veterinario integrado (26). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Es necesario seguir aportando participación financiera para alojar, gestionar y mantener el sistema informático veterinario integrado TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System) introducido mediante la Decisión 2003/24/CE de la Comisión, de 30 de diciembre de 2002, sobre la creación de un sistema informático veterinario integrado (26).

| (24) | De conformidad con el artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE, los Estados miembros han de presentar solicitudes relativas a los programas de erradicación/vigilancia, informes y solicitudes de pagos en relación con los programas aprobados; la creación de un sistema en línea para la presentación de las solicitudes, los informes y las solicitudes de pagos facilitaría el tratamiento de la información. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

De conformidad con el artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE, los Estados miembros han de presentar solicitudes relativas a los programas de erradicación/vigilancia, informes y solicitudes de pagos en relación con los programas aprobados; la creación de un sistema en línea para la presentación de las solicitudes, los informes y las solicitudes de pagos facilitaría el tratamiento de la información.

| (25) | A fin de garantizar su coordinación y una aplicación eficiente del plan informático de la Dirección General de Salud y Consumidores debe aprobarse mediante esta única Decisión el programa de trabajo de 2012 relativo a dichas acciones, junto con su financiación necesaria. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

A fin de garantizar su coordinación y una aplicación eficiente del plan informático de la Dirección General de Salud y Consumidores debe aprobarse mediante esta única Decisión el programa de trabajo de 2012 relativo a dichas acciones, junto con su financiación necesaria.

| (26) | La presente Decisión constituye también una decisión de financiación del gasto en el contexto de la gestión centralizada indirecta o la gestión conjunta con cargo al presupuesto de la Unión. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

La presente Decisión constituye también una decisión de financiación del gasto en el contexto de la gestión centralizada indirecta o la gestión conjunta con cargo al presupuesto de la Unión.

| (27) | La presente Decisión de financiación también puede cubrir el pago de los intereses de demora adeudados con arreglo al artículo 83 del Reglamento financiero y al artículo 106, apartado 5, de las normas de desarrollo. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

La presente Decisión de financiación también puede cubrir el pago de los intereses de demora adeudados con arreglo al artículo 83 del Reglamento financiero y al artículo 106, apartado 5, de las normas de desarrollo.

| (28) | Las medidas establecidas en la presente Decisión se ajustan al dictamen del Comité Permanente de la Cadena Alimentaria y de Sanidad Animal. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Las medidas establecidas en la presente Decisión se ajustan al dictamen del Comité Permanente de la Cadena Alimentaria y de Sanidad Animal.

DECIDE:

Artículo 1

Queda adoptado el programa de trabajo para 2012 sobre acciones relativas a la creación y al mantenimiento de herramientas informáticas en el ámbito de la seguridad alimentaria, la salud animal, el bienestar de los animales y la fitosanidad («el programa de trabajo»), tal como figura en el anexo. Su adopción constituye una decisión de financiación en el sentido del artículo 75 del Reglamento financiero.

Artículo 2

La contribución máxima autorizada mediante la presente Decisión para la ejecución del Programa queda establecida en 6 856 000 EUR, que se financiará a partir de las siguientes líneas del Presupuesto General de la Unión Europea para el ejercicio 2012:

| a) | línea presupuestaria no 17 04 02 01: 4 989 000 EUR; |
| --- | --- |

a)

línea presupuestaria no 17 04 02 01: 4 989 000 EUR;

| b) | línea presupuestaria no 17 04 04 01: 1 180 000 EUR; |
| --- | --- |

b)

línea presupuestaria no 17 04 04 01: 1 180 000 EUR;

| c) | línea presupuestaria no 17 04 07 01: 687 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

c)

línea presupuestaria no 17 04 07 01: 687 000 EUR.

Estos créditos también podrán incluir los intereses de demora adeudados.

Artículo 3

La ejecución presupuestaria de las tareas relacionadas con la acción que figura en el anexo, punto 2, puede confiarse a la OIE, que aplica normas que ofrecen una garantía equivalente a las normas internacionalmente aceptadas en su contabilidad, auditoría, control interno y procedimientos de contratación.

Artículo 4

Las modificaciones acumuladas de los recursos asignados a las acciones específicas cubiertas por el programa de trabajo que no superen el 10 % de la contribución máxima autorizada por el artículo 2 de la presente Decisión no se considerarán sustanciales en el sentido del artículo 90, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE, Euratom) no 2342/2002 de la Comisión, a condición de que no afecten significativamente a la naturaleza o al objetivo del programa de trabajo.

El ordenador podrá aprobar tales modificaciones de conformidad con los principios de buena gestión financiera y de proporcionalidad.

Hecho en Bruselas, el 11 de julio de 2012.

Por la Comisión

John DALLI

Miembro de la Comisión

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22

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26

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ANEXO

Programa de trabajo para 2012 sobre herramientas informáticas en el ámbito de la seguridad alimentaria, la salud animal, el bienestar de los animales y la fitosanidad

1.   INTRODUCCIÓN

El presente programa de trabajo recoge las medidas de ejecución correspondientes al año 2012. Teniendo en cuenta los objetivos asignados, la distribución del presupuesto y las principales acciones son las siguientes:

| — | por una subvención (455 000 EUR) y adjudicación de contratos (ejecutados mediante gestión centralizada directa) 6 401 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

por una subvención (455 000 EUR) y adjudicación de contratos (ejecutados mediante gestión centralizada directa) 6 401 000 EUR.

2.   ACCIÓN EJECUTADA EN GESTIÓN CONJUNTA MEDIANTE UN ACUERDO CON LA OIE

CONTRIBUCIÓN AL DESARROLLO Y A LA APLICACIÓN DE UN SISTEMA DE INFORMACIÓN ZOOSANITARIA (ADIS)

Base jurídica

Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01

Importe estimado

Entre 380 000 y 455 000 EUR

La contribución será cubierta mediante un acuerdo de contribución por escrito celebrado con la OIE.

Entidad encargada de la ejecución

La Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE) es el organismo intergubernamental responsable de la mejora de la salud animal en todo el mundo. Con objeto de mejorar la situación zoosanitaria en todo el mundo y, en consecuencia, de reducir el riesgo de enfermedades animales en la UE, es importante que la concepción que tiene la UE sobre la salud y el bienestar de los animales sea compartida con todos los países miembros de la OIE, y que la UE apoye activamente las conferencias y seminarios de formación organizados por la OIE para promover la política de la Unión relativa a la salud y al bienestar de los animales en ese contexto.

La Comisión y la OIE firmaron el 7 de junio de 2010 un acuerdo marco a largo plazo en el que se establecen las disposiciones administrativas y financieras aplicables a esta cooperación (véase el documento adjunto), mediante el cual el «Acuerdo de Contribución de la Unión Europea con una organización internacional» (el «Modelo de acuerdo de contribución») se aplica a los programas y acciones de alcance mundial, regional o nacional administrados por la OIE y financiados o cofinanciados por la Unión Europea.

Previamente se procedió a una evaluación a fondo y completa de la OIE, mediante una evaluación de «cuatro pilares» que determinó que la OIE aplicaba, en su contabilidad, auditoría, control interno y procedimientos de contratación, normas que ofrecen garantías equivalentes a las internacionalmente aceptadas.

Objetivo general y objetivo de la acción

Una vez que la actual fase piloto de ADIS haya concluido y se haya validado en 2012, se desarrollará una primera versión de ADIS para su uso en condiciones reales.

3.   CONTRATACIÓN PÚBLICA

3.1.   Proyectos informáticos de apoyo al funcionamiento del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales (RASFF), registro de aditivos alimentarios, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, OMG, nuevos alimentos, aromas y declaraciones de propiedades nutricionales y saludables

La acción cuya financiación está prevista con esta partida está destinada a la fase final de puesta en marcha y al mantenimiento de la aplicación informática del Sistema Genérico de Alerta Rápida (GRAS), que se empezó a utilizar en 2011 por la última versión del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales, que también se implantó en 2011. El uso de la misma plataforma informática por los distintos sistemas de alerta gestionados por la Comisión facilita el intercambio de información entre dichos sistemas y mejora la capacidad de gestión desde el punto de vista informático.

Con el fin de disponer de una opinión fundamentada sobre las sustancias no autorizadas y de apoyar el RASFF, es preciso mantener los registros de las sustancias autorizadas (aditivos, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, nuevos alimentos, alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente, OMG, aromas, etc.).

Acciones previstas:

| — | contribución al mantenimiento y el desarrollo del RASFF: 200 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución al mantenimiento y el desarrollo del RASFF: 200 000 EUR,

| — | desarrollo complementario para mejorar el rendimiento de la aplicación sectorial del RASFF, incluidas las especificaciones relativas a los enlaces del sistema externo: 308 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

desarrollo complementario para mejorar el rendimiento de la aplicación sectorial del RASFF, incluidas las especificaciones relativas a los enlaces del sistema externo: 308 000 EUR,

| — | registro de materiales en contacto con alimentos (sustancias para su utilización en materiales y artículos activos e inteligentes; procedimientos de reciclaje), nuevos alimentos, alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente, OMG, aditivos alimentarios y aromas autorizados: 200 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

registro de materiales en contacto con alimentos (sustancias para su utilización en materiales y artículos activos e inteligentes; procedimientos de reciclaje), nuevos alimentos, alimentos y piensos modificados genéticamente, OMG, aditivos alimentarios y aromas autorizados: 200 000 EUR,

| — | desarrollo de una nueva versión del registro de nuevos alimentos (basada en un programa informático existente): 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

desarrollo de una nueva versión del registro de nuevos alimentos (basada en un programa informático existente): 100 000 EUR,

| — | establecimiento de un registro de declaraciones nutricionales y saludables de la Unión Europea: 82 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

establecimiento de un registro de declaraciones nutricionales y saludables de la Unión Europea: 82 000 EUR,

| — | contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, del equipo de apoyo central, del alojamiento central y de los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 390 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, del equipo de apoyo central, del alojamiento central y de los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 390 000 EUR.

Base jurídica

Artículo 50, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 178/2002,

Artículo 19, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1829/2003,

Artículo 28 del Reglamento (CE) no 1924/2006,

Artículo 25 del Reglamento (CE) no 1334/2008,

Artículo 31 de la Directiva 2001/18/CE,

Artículos 4 a 8 del Reglamento (CE) no 258/97

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01 — Importe: 1 280 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es trece.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Gestión directa

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.2.   Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la realización de medidas fitosanitarias, EUROPHYT

EUROPHYT es una aplicación basada en la web y concebida para que los Estados miembros notifiquen las interceptaciones de envíos que no cumplan los requisitos fitosanitarios. En una reunión con todos los representantes de los Estados miembros de EUROPHYT, se adoptó un plan para la renovación de la interfaz. El sistema EUROPHYT utiliza recursos centrales y recursos de la aplicación GRAS, que deben proveerse y ser objeto de mantenimiento. La base de datos de requisitos fitosanitarios para la importación se encuentra en construcción y estará lista antes de finales de año.

Las acciones que se financiarán con arreglo a este presupuesto son:

| — | elaboración de una lista comunitaria de materiales forestales de reproducción: 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

elaboración de una lista comunitaria de materiales forestales de reproducción: 100 000 EUR,

| — | desarrollo y alojamiento de una base de datos de requisitos fitosanitarios para la importación: 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

desarrollo y alojamiento de una base de datos de requisitos fitosanitarios para la importación: 100 000 EUR,

| — | registro de las aplicaciones de productos fitosanitarios: 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

registro de las aplicaciones de productos fitosanitarios: 100 000 EUR,

| — | establecimiento del registro de todos los envíos de vegetales: 200 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

establecimiento del registro de todos los envíos de vegetales: 200 000 EUR,

| — | recogida de datos para el seguimiento de la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos: 25 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

recogida de datos para el seguimiento de la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos: 25 000 EUR,

| — | mantenimiento evolutivo de la actual aplicación EUROPHYT: 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

mantenimiento evolutivo de la actual aplicación EUROPHYT: 100 000 EUR,

| — | labores de desarrollo para mejorar la interfaz del usuario de la aplicación EUROPHYT: 150 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

labores de desarrollo para mejorar la interfaz del usuario de la aplicación EUROPHYT: 150 000 EUR,

| — | alojamiento de la aplicación EUROPHYT: 50 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

alojamiento de la aplicación EUROPHYT: 50 000 EUR,

| — | recogida de datos en relación con la vigilancia y la notificación de la aparición de organismos nocivos, con arreglo a la Directiva del Consejo 2000/29/CE y las Directivas 93/85/CEE, 98/57/CE y 2007/33/CE: 60 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

recogida de datos en relación con la vigilancia y la notificación de la aparición de organismos nocivos, con arreglo a la Directiva del Consejo 2000/29/CE y las Directivas 93/85/CEE, 98/57/CE y 2007/33/CE: 60 000 EUR,

| — | contribución destinada al equipo informático central de apoyo, al punto de alojamiento central y al equipo informático central: 60 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución destinada al equipo informático central de apoyo, al punto de alojamiento central y al equipo informático central: 60 000 EUR,

| — | contribución destinada al equipo web central y a la seguridad: 65 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución destinada al equipo web central y a la seguridad: 65 000 EUR.

Base jurídica

Artículo 2, apartado 1, letra i), y artículo 21, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2000/29/CE,

Artículo 10 de la Directiva 69/464/CEE,

Artículo 1, letra a), y artículo 2 de la Directiva 93/85/CEE del Consejo,

Artículo 1, letra a), y artículo 2 de la Directiva 98/57/CE del Consejo,

Artículos 1, 4 y 8 de la Directiva 2007/33/CE,

Artículo 66, apartado 1, letra c), y apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004 y

Artículo 76, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 1107/2009.

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 04 01 — Importe: 1 010 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es diez.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.3.   Proyecto informático de apoyo al funcionamiento de los Catálogos Comunes de variedades de plantas agrícolas, hortícolas, vid y plantones de frutal y de la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción

La aplicación Catálogo Común gestiona los catálogos de las variedades de plantas agrícolas (Directiva 2002/53/CE) y hortícolas (Directiva 2002/55/CE), cuyas semillas no están sujetas a ninguna restricción con respecto a su comercialización, tanto dentro de la Unión Europea como en Noruega y en Islandia.

Dicha aplicación también está prevista para el catálogo de las variedades de vid (Directiva 68/193/CEE), la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción (Directiva 1999/105/CE) y una lista común de las variedades de plantones de frutal (Directiva 2008/90/CE).

Una base de datos permite la gestión de dichos catálogos por parte de la Comisión, el acceso de los Estados miembros y el intercambio electrónico de datos entre los Estados miembros, la Comisión y la Oficina de Publicaciones.

En 2012, quedará garantizado el mantenimiento del sistema, y se actualizarán las funcionalidades tecnológicas con el fin de adaptarlo a los avances más modernos en el ámbito de la publicación electrónica.

Base jurídica

Artículo 5 sexto de la Directiva 68/193/CEE,

Artículo 7, apartado 6, de la Directiva 2008/90/CE,

Artículo 11, apartado 1, de la Directiva 1999/105/CE,

Artículo 17, apartado 1, de la Directiva 2002/53/CE, y

Artículo 17, apartado 1, de la Directiva 2002/55/CE.

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 04 01 — Importe: 50 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es uno.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

El contrato ha de estar firmado antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II.

3.4.   Base de datos sobre residuos de plaguicidas

El Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005 establece las condiciones para la creación y el mantenimiento de una base de datos consolidada de la legislación comunitaria sobre los límites máximos de residuos (LMR) de plaguicidas. Dicha acción tiene por objeto la aplicación de las disposiciones anteriormente mencionadas, mediante el mantenimiento y la mejora de una base de datos que permita la introducción de los datos de los Estados miembros y su publicación electrónica automática gracias a la instauración de un formato de exportación para la Oficina de Publicaciones.

Base jurídica

Artículo 36, apartado 1, letra a), del Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005.

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 04 01 — Importe: 120 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es uno.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

El contrato ha de estar firmado antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.5.   Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la ejecución del Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, de la Directiva 96/23/CE del Consejo, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001, y del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008

Entre las acciones que han de financiarse con cargo a esta línea presupuestaria figuran la creación y el mantenimiento de herramientas e instrumentos informáticos destinados a aplicar correctamente los nuevos requisitos en materia de controles oficiales en el ámbito de la legislación sobre piensos y alimentos por parte de los Estados miembros y de la Comisión, y/o al cumplimiento de obligaciones o de necesidades específicas en el ámbito de los controles de piensos y alimentos en virtud de la base jurídica.

Dichas acciones se refieren a la mejora y el aumento de la capacidad de las bases de datos para la recogida de datos relativos a los planes nacionales de control y a los resultados de los controles oficiales, a fin de que la Comisión pueda verificar su cumplimiento y efectuar su seguimiento a lo largo del tiempo, así como al desarrollo de sistemas en línea para la incorporación de datos en relación con los planes nacionales de control y los resultados de los controles oficiales, facilitados por los Estados miembros y/o la Comisión.

Acciones previstas:

| — | la aplicación, funcionamiento y mantenimiento de bases de datos en relación con la vigilancia epidemiológica de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina [artículo 6, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001], el procedimiento de autorización común de los aditivos alimentarios [Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008], los planes de vigilancia de residuos (artículo 8 de la Directiva 96/23/CE), y sus resultados cuantitativos, es decir, la información acerca del seguimiento: 150 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

la aplicación, funcionamiento y mantenimiento de bases de datos en relación con la vigilancia epidemiológica de la encefalopatía espongiforme bovina [artículo 6, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001], el procedimiento de autorización común de los aditivos alimentarios [Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008], los planes de vigilancia de residuos (artículo 8 de la Directiva 96/23/CE), y sus resultados cuantitativos, es decir, la información acerca del seguimiento: 150 000 EUR,

| — | el desarrollo continuado de un sistema informático y el mantenimiento y la evolución de una infraestructura específica que permita compartir, validar y supervisar los datos recopilados por la Comisión en relación con la aplicación de la legislación sobre piensos y alimentos en los Estados miembros y en terceros países, incluida la información recogida por la Oficina Alimentaria y Veterinaria; la herramienta informática debe permitir la constitución de «perfiles por país» que puedan facilitar la evaluación de los planes de control presentados por las autoridades competentes: 122 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

el desarrollo continuado de un sistema informático y el mantenimiento y la evolución de una infraestructura específica que permita compartir, validar y supervisar los datos recopilados por la Comisión en relación con la aplicación de la legislación sobre piensos y alimentos en los Estados miembros y en terceros países, incluida la información recogida por la Oficina Alimentaria y Veterinaria; la herramienta informática debe permitir la constitución de «perfiles por país» que puedan facilitar la evaluación de los planes de control presentados por las autoridades competentes: 122 000 EUR,

| — | la aplicación y el mantenimiento de un sistema completo y seguro para la gestión y la planificación de las inspecciones de la Unión de acuerdo con el Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, para la gestión y el almacenamiento de los informes de auditoría y los documentos conexos, así como para el seguimiento de las recomendaciones resultantes de las auditorías de inspección: 220 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

la aplicación y el mantenimiento de un sistema completo y seguro para la gestión y la planificación de las inspecciones de la Unión de acuerdo con el Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, para la gestión y el almacenamiento de los informes de auditoría y los documentos conexos, así como para el seguimiento de las recomendaciones resultantes de las auditorías de inspección: 220 000 EUR,

| — | la contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, equipo de apoyo central y material informático central necesario para la ejecución de todos los sistemas relacionados con las mencionadas acciones: 195 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

la contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, equipo de apoyo central y material informático central necesario para la ejecución de todos los sistemas relacionados con las mencionadas acciones: 195 000 EUR.

Base jurídica

Artículo 8 de la Directiva 96/23/CE

Artículo 6, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001

Artículo 10 del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008

Artículo 66, apartado 1, letra c), y apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 04 01 — Importe: 687 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II, ITSS II y el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es siete.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II, ITSS II y SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.6.   Sistema de Notificación de las Enfermedades de los Animales (ADNS)

La acción que debe financiarse con este presupuesto se destina a finalizar la aplicación y mantener el Sistema de Notificación de las Enfermedades de los Animales.

Acciones previstas:

| — | contribución al mantenimiento y el desarrollo del ADNS: 150 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución al mantenimiento y el desarrollo del ADNS: 150 000 EUR,

| — | desarrollo complementario para mejorar el rendimiento y la calidad de los datos de los mapas de focos de las enfermedades y de los mapas explorables o manipulables mediante un navegador de internet: 100 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

desarrollo complementario para mejorar el rendimiento y la calidad de los datos de los mapas de focos de las enfermedades y de los mapas explorables o manipulables mediante un navegador de internet: 100 000 EUR,

| — | servicios de alojamiento para asegurar la disponibilidad de la aplicación: 78 000 EUR, |
| --- | --- |

—

servicios de alojamiento para asegurar la disponibilidad de la aplicación: 78 000 EUR,

| — | contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, del equipo de apoyo central, del alojamiento central y de los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 255 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución a la mejora de la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, del equipo de apoyo central, del alojamiento central y de los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 255 000 EUR.

Base jurídica

Artículos 35 y 36 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01 — Importe: 583 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es cuatro.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.7.   Sistema de Información Zoosanitaria (ADIS)

La acción que debe financiarse con este presupuesto se destina al desarrollo de la interfaz y al mantenimiento del Sistema de Información Zoosanitaria.

Acción prevista:

| — | contribución para apoyar la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, el equipo de apoyo central, el alojamiento central y los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 75 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

—

contribución para apoyar la seguridad de los sistemas informáticos, el equipo de apoyo central, el alojamiento central y los equipos informáticos centrales necesarios para el funcionamiento y la gestión de las aplicaciones de acceso público: 75 000 EUR.

Base jurídica

Artículos 35 y 36 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01 — Importe: 75 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es uno.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contrato específico sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.8.   Sistema informático veterinario integrado (TRACES)

La acción que se financiará con este presupuesto está destinada a mejorar, mantener, apoyar y poner a disposición el sistema TRACES.

Acciones previstas:

| — | 2 380 000 EUR para albergar, gestionar y mantener el sistema informático veterinario integrado TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System), apoyo logístico para ayudar a los usuarios de TRACES, contribución a los servicios centrales, comunicación, sitio web, seguridad y adquisición (mantenimiento y asistencia técnica) de licencias de programas informáticos, firma electrónica y alojamiento de la aplicación, |
| --- | --- |

—

2 380 000 EUR para albergar, gestionar y mantener el sistema informático veterinario integrado TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System), apoyo logístico para ayudar a los usuarios de TRACES, contribución a los servicios centrales, comunicación, sitio web, seguridad y adquisición (mantenimiento y asistencia técnica) de licencias de programas informáticos, firma electrónica y alojamiento de la aplicación,

| — | 80 000 EUR para el apoyo al sistema de intercambio de datos de identificación bovina. |
| --- | --- |

—

80 000 EUR para el apoyo al sistema de intercambio de datos de identificación bovina.

Base jurídica

Artículo 36, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo.

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01 — Importe: 2 460 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es quince.

Un memorando de entendimiento con la DG DIGIT para el alojamiento.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

Los contratos han de estar firmados antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

3.9.   Recogida de datos para los programas de erradicación y control

Acciones previstas:

| — | 136 000 EUR para la recogida y el tratamiento de los datos relativos a las aplicaciones para la erradicación/programas de vigilancia y los informes y las declaraciones de gastos relacionados con los programas aprobados de conformidad con el artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE. |
| --- | --- |

—

136 000 EUR para la recogida y el tratamiento de los datos relativos a las aplicaciones para la erradicación/programas de vigilancia y los informes y las declaraciones de gastos relacionados con los programas aprobados de conformidad con el artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE.

Base jurídica

Artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo.

Línea presupuestaria

17 04 02 01 — Importe: 136 000 EUR.

Número indicativo y tipo de contratos previstos

Contratos específicos intramuros según el volumen de tiempo y de recursos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o el contrato marco SANCO/2010/A4/001.

El número indicativo de contratos específicos es dos.

Objeto de los contratos previstos (si es posible)

Desarrollo y mantenimiento de sistemas informáticos, incluyendo la gestión de proyectos, el control de la calidad, el análisis del funcionamiento, la programación y la documentación.

Calendario indicativo para el lanzamiento del procedimiento de contratación

El contrato ha de estar firmado antes de que concluya el primer semestre de 2012

Ejecución

Directamente por la DG

Contrato específico

Contratos específicos sobre la base de los contratos marco existentes facilitados por la DG DIGIT con arreglo a la convocatoria de ofertas ESP-DESIS II y/o SANCO/2010/A4/001.

4.   RESUMEN

| No | Denominación | Línea presupuestaria | Número estimado de contratos | Base jurídica | Importe en EUR |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | Contribución al desarrollo y a la aplicación de un sistema de información zoosanitaria (ADIS) | 17 04 02 01 | 1 | Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE | 455 000 |
| 2. | Proyecto informático de apoyo al funcionamiento del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales (RASFF), registro de aditivos alimentarios, aromas, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, OMG y nuevos alimentos | 17 04 02 01 | 13 | Reglamentos (CE) no 178/2002, (CE) no 1924/2006, (CE) no 1829/2003 y (CE) no 1334/2008; Directiva 2001/18/CE; y Reglamento (CE) no 258/97 | 1 280 000 |
| 3. | Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la realización de medidas fitosanitarias, EUROPHYT | 17 04 04 01 | 10 | Directivas 2000/29/CE, 69/464/CEE, 93/85/CEE, 98/57/CE y 2007/33/CE; Reglamentos (CE) no 882/2004 y (CE) no 1107/2009 | 1 010 000 |
| 4. | Proyecto informático de apoyo al funcionamiento de los Catálogos Comunes de variedades de plantas agrícolas, hortícolas, vid y plantones de frutal y de la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción | 17 04 04 01 | 1 | Directivas 68/193/CEE, 2008/90/CE, 1999/105/CE, 2002/53/CE y 2002/55/CE | 50 000 |
| 5. | Base de datos sobre residuos de plaguicidas | 17 04 04 01 | 1 | Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005 | 120 000 |
| 6. | Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la ejecución del Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, de la Directiva 96/23/CE del Consejo, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001, y del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008 | 17 04 07 01 | 7 | Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, Directiva 96/23/CE, Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001, Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008 | 687 000 |
| 7. | Sistema de notificación de las enfermedades de los animales (ADNS) | 17 04 02 01 | 4 | Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo | 583 000 |
| 8. | ADIS | 17 04 02 01 | 1 | Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo | 75 000 |
| 9. | Sistema informático veterinario integrado (TRACES) | 17 04 02 01 | 15 | Artículo 36, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo | 2 460 000 |
| 10. | Estudios de sanidad animal | 17 04 02 01 | 2 | Artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo. | 136 000 |
| TOTAL | | 55 | | 6 856 000 |

No

Denominación

Línea presupuestaria

Número estimado de contratos

Base jurídica

Importe en EUR

1.

Contribución al desarrollo y a la aplicación de un sistema de información zoosanitaria (ADIS)

17 04 02 01

1

Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE

455 000

2.

Proyecto informático de apoyo al funcionamiento del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales (RASFF), registro de aditivos alimentarios, aromas, materiales en contacto con los alimentos, OMG y nuevos alimentos

17 04 02 01

13

Reglamentos (CE) no 178/2002, (CE) no 1924/2006, (CE) no 1829/2003 y (CE) no 1334/2008; Directiva 2001/18/CE; y Reglamento (CE) no 258/97

1 280 000

3.

Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la realización de medidas fitosanitarias, EUROPHYT

17 04 04 01

10

Directivas 2000/29/CE, 69/464/CEE, 93/85/CEE, 98/57/CE y 2007/33/CE; Reglamentos (CE) no 882/2004 y (CE) no 1107/2009

1 010 000

4.

Proyecto informático de apoyo al funcionamiento de los Catálogos Comunes de variedades de plantas agrícolas, hortícolas, vid y plantones de frutal y de la lista comunitaria de materiales de base admitidos para la producción de materiales forestales de reproducción

17 04 04 01

1

Directivas 68/193/CEE, 2008/90/CE, 1999/105/CE, 2002/53/CE y 2002/55/CE

50 000

5.

Base de datos sobre residuos de plaguicidas

17 04 04 01

1

Reglamento (CE) no 396/2005

120 000

6.

Proyectos informáticos de apoyo a la ejecución del Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, de la Directiva 96/23/CE del Consejo, del Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001, y del Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008

17 04 07 01

7

Reglamento (CE) no 882/2004, Directiva 96/23/CE, Reglamento (CE) no 999/2001, Reglamento (CE) no 1333/2008

687 000

7.

Sistema de notificación de las enfermedades de los animales (ADNS)

17 04 02 01

4

Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

583 000

8.

ADIS

17 04 02 01

1

Artículo 35, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

75 000

9.

Sistema informático veterinario integrado (TRACES)

17 04 02 01

15

Artículo 36, apartado 2, de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo

2 460 000

10.

Estudios de sanidad animal

17 04 02 01

2

Artículo 27 de la Decisión 2009/470/CE del Consejo.

136 000

TOTAL

55

6 856 000

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INFORMACIONES RELATIVAS AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/15

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Invitación a presentar observaciones de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia respecto a la posible ayuda estatal de Noruega a AS Oslo Sporveier y AS Sporveisbussene

2012/C 204/04

Mediante la Decisión no 123/12/COL, de 28 de marzo de 2012, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas que siguen al presente resumen, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC incoó el procedimiento con arreglo al apartado 2 del artículo 1 de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. Se ha informado a las autoridades noruegas mediante una copia de la Decisión.

Mediante la presente Comunicación, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC invita a los Estados de la AELC, a los Estados miembros de la UE y a los terceros interesados a que presenten sus observaciones sobre la medida en cuestión en el plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de publicación a:

| Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Las observaciones se comunicarán a las autoridades noruegas. La identidad de las partes interesadas que presente observaciones podrá preservarse, previa solicitud por escrito, exponiendo los motivos de su solicitud.

RESUMEN

Contexto

En Noruega, el sector del transporte local en autobús está regulado por la Ley del Transporte Comercial de 2002 (la «LTC») y por el Reglamento del Transporte Comercial de 2003 («el RTC»). Tanto la LTC como el RTC derogaban leyes anteriores que eran básicamente similares. Este marco legislativo establece, entre otras cosas, un sistema de concesiones necesarias para las empresas que desean que se les encomienden servicios de transporte público en autobús, y atribuye a los condados, como el municipio de Oslo, la responsabilidad de compensar a las empresas que cubren rutas no rentables. Dicha compensación puede concederse a fin de cubrir la diferencia entre los ingresos generados por la venta de billetes y el coste de explotación del servicio.

Desde antes de la entrada en vigor del Acuerdo EEE, Oslo concedía una compensación anual a los concesionarios de rutas no rentables de acuerdo con el procedimiento presupuestario de la ciudad. La compensación abonada era un importe a tanto alzado, basada en los gastos realizados en años anteriores, teniendo en cuenta una serie de factores de corrección. Desde 2008, todos los contratos para servicios de autobuses de línea se han adjudicado a las empresas previa licitación pública. Desde entonces, no se ha concedido ninguna compensación como las anteriormente descritas a AS Oslo Sporveier por servicios de autobuses de línea.

A AS Oslo Sporveier y, posteriormente, a su filial AS Sporveisbussene se les encomendó la prestación de los servicios de autobuses de línea de Oslo, de conformidad con las anteriores disposiciones brevemente descritas, desde mucho antes de la entrada en vigor del Acuerdo EEE hasta 2008.

AS Oslo Sporveier ha sufrido numerosas reorganizaciones desde 1994. Por ejemplo, la explotación de todos los servicios de autobuses, incluidos los autobuses turísticos además de los autobuses de línea de Oslo, se subcontrató en 1997 a su filial AS Sporveisbussene. Como consecuencia de ello, AS Oslo Sporveier y AS Sporveisbussene firmaron un denominado Acuerdo de Transporte, a fin de que AS Sporveisbussene pudiera ser el beneficiario efectivo del importe de la compensación anual. En virtud del Acuerdo de Transporte, la compensación para los autobuses de línea se abonó en conformidad con las disposiciones anteriormente descritas. Las autoridades noruegas sostienen que durante todo el período objeto de la investigación — de 1994 a 2008 — se llevaron cuentas separadas para las actividades de carácter comercial y las de servicio público en el Oslo Sporveier Group y que a las actividades comerciales se les aplicaron siempre los precios de mercado por los servicios prestados en el marco de las actividades de servicio público.

En 2004, el municipio de Oslo, propietario entonces del 98,8 % de las acciones de AS Oslo Sporveier, inyectó 111 760 000 NOK para cubrir el déficit del fondo de pensiones de AS Sporveisbussene. Dicho déficit se había acumulado en el período anterior a 1997, afectando a los fondos de pensiones de los trabajadores tanto del servicio público como de la división de autobuses turísticos de AS Oslo Sporveier. AS Oslo Sporveier se vio obligada a cubrir el déficit. En su condición de propietario, el municipio de Oslo eligió para ello la inyección de capital, por ser la medida menos costosa.

Evaluación de la medida

Existencia de ayuda estatal

El Órgano de Vigilancia considera que tanto la inyección de capital como los pagos de la compensación anual constituyen ayudas estatales.

Por lo que se refiere a la inyección de capital destinada a cubrir el déficit del fondo de pensiones de la actividad comercial, el Órgano de Vigilancia no puede actualmente excluir que otorgue una ventaja económica a AS Oslo Sporveier, dado que no ha recibido información alguna que demuestre que se concedió de acuerdo con el principio del inversor en una economía de mercado.

Además, el Órgano de Vigilancia es de la opinión preliminar que tanto la compensación anual como la inyección de capital destinada a cubrir el déficit del fondo de pensiones del servicio público (relacionado con el coste que podría también servir de base para la compensación anual) no se han determinado mediante un procedimiento de contratación pública y no son similares a los costes que hubiera tenido que soportar una empresa, bien gestionada y adecuadamente equipada. Así pues, no se cumple el cuarto criterio de la sentencia Altmark y, por lo tanto, ambas medidas constituyen ayudas estatales a tenor del artículo 61, apartado 1, del Acuerdo EEE.

Naturaleza de la ayuda

En la fase actual, el Órgano de Vigilancia no puede concluir si la ayuda se ha concedido en virtud de un régimen de ayudas existente, que se basaría en la LTC y en el RTC, aplicado en Oslo desde antes de la entrada en vigor del Acuerdo EEE. Cabe señalar que, desde 2008, no se ha concedido ninguna otra ayuda de conformidad con las disposiciones anteriormente citadas. Suponiendo que esté en vigor un régimen de ayudas existente desde 1994, el Órgano de Vigilancia no puede actualmente determinar la delimitación exacta del régimen, y si todas las ayudas concedidas se basaban en dicho régimen. Además, no puede excluir que las medidas constituyan, al menos en una pequeña medida, en particular en lo que se refiere a la cobertura de los compromisos por las pensiones relativas a las actividades comerciales, ayuda estatal ilegal e incompatible.

Compatibilidad de la ayuda

En la fase actual, parece que los pagos efectuados hasta la concesión adjudicada directamente terminaron en 2008 y que la inyección de capital de 2004 destinada a compensar el déficit del fondo de pensiones podría, al menos en gran parte, ser compatible con las compensaciones de servicio público contempladas en el artículo 49 del Acuerdo EEE. Por lo tanto, la evaluación de la compatibilidad en la decisión final se centrará, en particular, en si se ha producido una compensación excesiva. Además, la ayuda podría, al menos en parte, ser compatible de conformidad con el artículo 61, apartado 3, letra c).

Conclusión

A la luz de las consideraciones anteriores, el Órgano ha decidido incoar el procedimiento de investigación formal de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 2, del Acuerdo EEE. Se invita a las partes interesadas a presentar sus observaciones en el plazo de un mes a partir de la publicación del presente anuncio en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 123/12/COL

of 28 March 2012

opening the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 49 and 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Article 4(2) and (4) and Articles 6 and 13 of Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Provisions Decision’) (1),

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

1.1.   
  Administrative procedure leading to the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL

| (1) | By letter dated 11 August 2006, the Authority received a complaint from Konkurrenten.no AS (‘the complainant’) alleging that the Norwegian authorities had granted State aid to AS Oslo Sporveisbussene (‘the complaint’). The letter was registered by the Authority on 16 August 2006 (Event No 384017). By letter dated 17 August 2006 to the complainant, the Authority acknowledged the receipt of the complaint (Event No 384134). |
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(1)

By letter dated 11 August 2006, the Authority received a complaint from Konkurrenten.no AS (‘the complainant’) alleging that the Norwegian authorities had granted State aid to AS Oslo Sporveisbussene (‘the complaint’). The letter was registered by the Authority on 16 August 2006 (Event No 384017). By letter dated 17 August 2006 to the complainant, the Authority acknowledged the receipt of the complaint (Event No 384134).

| (2) | By letter dated 7 September 2006, the Authority forwarded the complaint to the Norwegian authorities and invited them to comment (Event No 387163). By letter dated 11 October 2006, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. The letter was registered by the Authority on 19 October 2006 (Event No 392725). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 7 September 2006, the Authority forwarded the complaint to the Norwegian authorities and invited them to comment (Event No 387163). By letter dated 11 October 2006, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. The letter was registered by the Authority on 19 October 2006 (Event No 392725).

| (3) | By letter dated 20 October 2006, the complainant submitted further comments. The letter was registered by the Authority on 23 October 2006 (Event No 394520). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 20 October 2006, the complainant submitted further comments. The letter was registered by the Authority on 23 October 2006 (Event No 394520).

| (4) | By letter dated 29 November 2006, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 394397). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 January 2007. The letter was registered by the Authority on 12 January 2007 (Event No 406541). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By letter dated 29 November 2006, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 394397). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 January 2007. The letter was registered by the Authority on 12 January 2007 (Event No 406541).

| (5) | By letter dated 19 June 2007, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 425271). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 16 August 2007 (Event No 434326).
  By e-mail dated 20 February 2008, the complainant submitted further information (Event No 466226). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

By letter dated 19 June 2007, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 425271). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 16 August 2007 (Event No 434326).

By e-mail dated 20 February 2008, the complainant submitted further information (Event No 466226).

| (6) | By letter submitted electronically on 2 April 2008, the Authority requested yet further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 471926). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 29 April 2008 (Event No 475480). |
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(6)

By letter submitted electronically on 2 April 2008, the Authority requested yet further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 471926). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 29 April 2008 (Event No 475480).

| (7) | The complainant submitted further information by e-mails dated 25 May 2008 (Event No 478132), 2 June 2008 (Event No 479743), 9 July 2008 (Events No 489623 and 489626), 14 August 2008 (Event No 489591), 15 August 2008 (Event No 488527), 1 September 2008 (Event No 489591), 20 January 2009 (Event No 505210) and 22 January 2009 (Event No 505503). |
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(7)

The complainant submitted further information by e-mails dated 25 May 2008 (Event No 478132), 2 June 2008 (Event No 479743), 9 July 2008 (Events No 489623 and 489626), 14 August 2008 (Event No 489591), 15 August 2008 (Event No 488527), 1 September 2008 (Event No 489591), 20 January 2009 (Event No 505210) and 22 January 2009 (Event No 505503).

| (8) | During the beginning of 2010, the Authority and the Norwegian authorities had informal contact both via telephone and e-mail regarding the case. Information received by the Authority in this context was consolidated in a letter submitted to the Authority electronically on 21 April 2010 by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 554417). |
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(8)

During the beginning of 2010, the Authority and the Norwegian authorities had informal contact both via telephone and e-mail regarding the case. Information received by the Authority in this context was consolidated in a letter submitted to the Authority electronically on 21 April 2010 by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 554417).

| (9) | On 21 June 2010, the Authority adopted Decision No 254/10/COL closing the case on the grounds that the aid involved existing aid that was incompatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. However, as the existing aid measures had been terminated on 30 March 2008, the Authority concluded that no further measures were required. By letters dated 21 June 2010, the Authority forwarded copies of Decision No 254/10/COL to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 558824) and the complainant (Event No 561949). |
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(9)

On 21 June 2010, the Authority adopted Decision No 254/10/COL closing the case on the grounds that the aid involved existing aid that was incompatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. However, as the existing aid measures had been terminated on 30 March 2008, the Authority concluded that no further measures were required. By letters dated 21 June 2010, the Authority forwarded copies of Decision No 254/10/COL to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 558824) and the complainant (Event No 561949).

1.2.   
  Judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

| (10) | By application lodged at the Registry of the EFTA Court on 2 September 2010, the complainant brought an action for annulment of the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL. |
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(10)

By application lodged at the Registry of the EFTA Court on 2 September 2010, the complainant brought an action for annulment of the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL.

| (11) | On 22 August 2011, the EFTA Court rendered its judgment in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, annulling Decision No 254/10/COL in its entirety, for the following reasons. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

On 22 August 2011, the EFTA Court rendered its judgment in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, annulling Decision No 254/10/COL in its entirety, for the following reasons.

| (12) | Firstly, the Court found that the Decision was inadequately reasoned, in that the Authority had failed to explain how the renewal of the concession, as of 1 January 2000, could be classified as part of an existing aid scheme, or why it could not be considered to be a relevant alteration of that aid scheme (2). |
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(12)

Firstly, the Court found that the Decision was inadequately reasoned, in that the Authority had failed to explain how the renewal of the concession, as of 1 January 2000, could be classified as part of an existing aid scheme, or why it could not be considered to be a relevant alteration of that aid scheme (2).

| (13) | Secondly, the Court held that the Authority had infringed its obligation to open the formal investigation procedure in respect of aid granted during the period 1997-2000. It found that the Authority could not exclude the possibility that AS Oslo Sporveier had received aid over and above the losses associated with discharging the public service obligation, and that the Authority indeed considered that such overcompensation was likely. Given that the Authority was unable, after almost four years of investigation, to establish which parts of the aid were existing aid and which parts were unlawful aid, the Authority should have opened the formal investigation procedure in order to become, as far as possible, fully informed of the facts. The applicant’s plea addressing the same issues with regard to the period 2000-2008 was also declared well founded (3). |
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(13)

Secondly, the Court held that the Authority had infringed its obligation to open the formal investigation procedure in respect of aid granted during the period 1997-2000. It found that the Authority could not exclude the possibility that AS Oslo Sporveier had received aid over and above the losses associated with discharging the public service obligation, and that the Authority indeed considered that such overcompensation was likely. Given that the Authority was unable, after almost four years of investigation, to establish which parts of the aid were existing aid and which parts were unlawful aid, the Authority should have opened the formal investigation procedure in order to become, as far as possible, fully informed of the facts. The applicant’s plea addressing the same issues with regard to the period 2000-2008 was also declared well founded (3).

| (14) | Thirdly, the Court held that the Authority had failed to identify whether the capital injection only concerned unfunded pension liabilities that arose in connection with the discharge of public service obligations, or if it also covered other activities. As the Court could not review the Decision in relation to the applicant’s claim that the capital injection did not correspond to a payment for transport services provided, this amounted to a lack of reasoning (4). |
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(14)

Thirdly, the Court held that the Authority had failed to identify whether the capital injection only concerned unfunded pension liabilities that arose in connection with the discharge of public service obligations, or if it also covered other activities. As the Court could not review the Decision in relation to the applicant’s claim that the capital injection did not correspond to a payment for transport services provided, this amounted to a lack of reasoning (4).

1.3.   
  Re-assessment of the complaint

| (15) | The Authority commenced a reassessment of the complaint, and by e-mail dated 25 October 2011 to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 613053) requested additional information. The Norwegian authorities responded in a telephone conference on 28 October 2011. Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012. By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information. |
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(15)

The Authority commenced a reassessment of the complaint, and by e-mail dated 25 October 2011 to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 613053) requested additional information. The Norwegian authorities responded in a telephone conference on 28 October 2011. Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012. By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information.

| (16) | By letter dated 27 January 2012 (Event No 622888), the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities responded by letter dated 22 February 2012 (Events No 625908, 625916, 625949, 626065 and 626066) and e-mails of 5 March 2012 (Events No 627096 and 627097). |
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(16)

By letter dated 27 January 2012 (Event No 622888), the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities responded by letter dated 22 February 2012 (Events No 625908, 625916, 625949, 626065 and 626066) and e-mails of 5 March 2012 (Events No 627096 and 627097).

2.   The content of the complaint

| (17) | The complaint alleged that the following measures may involve unlawful State aid:






  1. | cross-subsidies between the four companies: AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS (5); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(17)

The complaint alleged that the following measures may involve unlawful State aid:

1.

cross-subsidies between the four companies: AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS (5);

| 2. | a capital injection of NOK 41 499 000 made in 2004 by AS Oslo Sporveier into AS Sporveisbussene; |
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2.

a capital injection of NOK 41 499 000 made in 2004 by AS Oslo Sporveier into AS Sporveisbussene;

| 3. | a favourable tax position acquired in a non-competitive market, allowing AS Sporveisbussene to avoid paying tax on profits; and |
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3.

a favourable tax position acquired in a non-competitive market, allowing AS Sporveisbussene to avoid paying tax on profits; and

| 4. | guarantees granted by AS Sporveisbussene to the benefit of its subsidiaries Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS. |
| --- | --- |

4.

guarantees granted by AS Sporveisbussene to the benefit of its subsidiaries Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS.

3.   Background: Norwegian legislative framework on local scheduled bus transport

3.1.   
  Commercial Transport Act 2002 and Commercial Transport Regulation 2003

| (18) | At present, the local bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (the ‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (the ‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9). |
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(18)

At present, the local bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (the ‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (the ‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9).

| (19) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the relevant provisions regulating local bus transport, presented in the following, appear not to have been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. |
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(19)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the relevant provisions regulating local bus transport, presented in the following, appear not to have been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994.

3.2.   
  Administrative responsibility of the counties

| (20) | In Norway, the responsibility of providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services. |
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(20)

In Norway, the responsibility of providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services.

| (21) | The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation, or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation, or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves.

3.3.   
  Co-financing of local transport services by the State and counties

| (22) | The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants are determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants are determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13).

3.4.   
  Concessions

| (23) | Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out remunerated bus transport services (14).
  Both a general and a special concession are needed for operators of scheduled passenger transport services. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out remunerated bus transport services (14).

Both a general and a special concession are needed for operators of scheduled passenger transport services.

3.4.1.   General concession for remunerated passenger transport

| (24) | Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time-limited (17). |
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(24)

Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time-limited (17).

3.4.2.   Special concessions for scheduled passenger transport

| (25) | In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions; and (ii) route-specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered in so far as other route-specific concessions have not been granted for routes in the area. The holder of a route-specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions; and (ii) route-specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered in so far as other route-specific concessions have not been granted for routes in the area. The holder of a route-specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route.

| (26) | The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties. The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (21). |
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(26)

The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties. The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (21).

| (27) | The special concessions can either be awarded (i) through tender procedures (granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (22), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (23)), or (ii) directly, without the use of a tender (granted for a 10-year period) (24). |
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(27)

The special concessions can either be awarded (i) through tender procedures (granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (22), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (23)), or (ii) directly, without the use of a tender (granted for a 10-year period) (24).

3.5.   
  Contracts

| (28) | To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of the public service. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (25). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of the public service. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (25).

3.6.   
  Remuneration to the concessionaires

| (29) | The counties are responsible for remunerating the concessionaires (26). Compensation is granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). |
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(29)

The counties are responsible for remunerating the concessionaires (26). Compensation is granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service).

| (30) | According to the Norwegian authorities, under Article 22 of the CTA the county is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes. The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be remunerated; the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the compensation is to be provided. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

According to the Norwegian authorities, under Article 22 of the CTA the county is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes. The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be remunerated; the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the compensation is to be provided.

| (31) | The Authority understands that Article 22 of the CTA is read as allowing for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenue, and that compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Authority understands that Article 22 of the CTA is read as allowing for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenue, and that compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA.

4.   Organisation of the local scheduled bus transport in Oslo

| (32) | As noted above, the responsibility of providing local scheduled public transport services is conferred on the counties. Oslo Municipality is a county as well as a municipality. In the following, it is referred to as Oslo Municipality.
  From before 1994, all public transport administration in Oslo was carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier (27), as Oslo Municipality has delegated to the company the task of planning and administering public transport in Oslo (28). At the same time, AS Oslo Sporveier operated an in-house department (29) carrying out most (30) of the scheduled bus transport in Oslo. This activity was carried out on the basis of an area concession awarded on 16 November 1992, permitting AS Oslo Sporveier to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire Oslo grid in so far as other route-specific concessions had not been granted. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

As noted above, the responsibility of providing local scheduled public transport services is conferred on the counties. Oslo Municipality is a county as well as a municipality. In the following, it is referred to as Oslo Municipality.

From before 1994, all public transport administration in Oslo was carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier (27), as Oslo Municipality has delegated to the company the task of planning and administering public transport in Oslo (28). At the same time, AS Oslo Sporveier operated an in-house department (29) carrying out most (30) of the scheduled bus transport in Oslo. This activity was carried out on the basis of an area concession awarded on 16 November 1992, permitting AS Oslo Sporveier to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire Oslo grid in so far as other route-specific concessions had not been granted.

| (33) | The concession had been granted for a 10-year period, with retroactive effect from 1 January 1990. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The concession had been granted for a 10-year period, with retroactive effect from 1 January 1990.

| (34) | Additionally, from 1994, AS Oslo Sporveier operated small-scale tour bus services outside its public service remit. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Additionally, from 1994, AS Oslo Sporveier operated small-scale tour bus services outside its public service remit.

| (35) | On 23 April 1997, the bus department, including the small tour bus division, was separated from AS Oslo Sporveier and transferred to a newly established company, AS Sporveisbussene. From then on AS Sporveisbussene carried out the scheduled local bus transport in accordance with the concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

On 23 April 1997, the bus department, including the small tour bus division, was separated from AS Oslo Sporveier and transferred to a newly established company, AS Sporveisbussene. From then on AS Sporveisbussene carried out the scheduled local bus transport in accordance with the concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (36) | The companies entered into a Transport Agreement, signed on 23 April 1997, and with retroactive force with effect from 1 January 1997 (‘the Transport Agreement’). The Transport Agreement was due to expire at the date of expiry of the existing concession (i.e. 31 December 1999), but it would be prolonged automatically for one year at a time as long as AS Oslo Sporveier’s area concession would be renewed. Under this Transport Agreement, AS Sporveierbussene assumed the public service activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and received remuneration directly from AS Oslo Sporveier for these services. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The companies entered into a Transport Agreement, signed on 23 April 1997, and with retroactive force with effect from 1 January 1997 (‘the Transport Agreement’). The Transport Agreement was due to expire at the date of expiry of the existing concession (i.e. 31 December 1999), but it would be prolonged automatically for one year at a time as long as AS Oslo Sporveier’s area concession would be renewed. Under this Transport Agreement, AS Sporveierbussene assumed the public service activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and received remuneration directly from AS Oslo Sporveier for these services.

| (37) | The area concession was renewed for another 10 years on 20 September 2001, with retroactive effect from 1 January 2000. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The area concession was renewed for another 10 years on 20 September 2001, with retroactive effect from 1 January 2000.

| (38) | In 2001, Oslo Municipality decided that all scheduled bus transport in Oslo should be tendered out. On this basis, scheduled bus transport was gradually put up for public tender in five lots during the period 2003-2008. The respective contracts entered into force the year following that in which they had been tendered out. The last lot was tendered in 2007, and the last contract entered into force on 30 March 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

In 2001, Oslo Municipality decided that all scheduled bus transport in Oslo should be tendered out. On this basis, scheduled bus transport was gradually put up for public tender in five lots during the period 2003-2008. The respective contracts entered into force the year following that in which they had been tendered out. The last lot was tendered in 2007, and the last contract entered into force on 30 March 2008.

| (39) | Due to its residual nature, the scope of the area concession would be reduced in accordance with the gradual tendering of the routes that once had been covered by the area concession. Thus, the area concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier expired on 30 March 2008 (when all scheduled bus transport in Oslo had been tendered out). As the concession lapsed, so did the Transport Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Due to its residual nature, the scope of the area concession would be reduced in accordance with the gradual tendering of the routes that once had been covered by the area concession. Thus, the area concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier expired on 30 March 2008 (when all scheduled bus transport in Oslo had been tendered out). As the concession lapsed, so did the Transport Agreement.

| (40) | As set out above, in 1997 AS Sporveisbussene took over the small tour bus division from AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As set out above, in 1997 AS Sporveisbussene took over the small tour bus division from AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (41) | In 2003, AS Sporveisbussene established a subsidiary, Nexus Trafikk AS, in order to participate in tenders for operating scheduled bus transport routes in Oslo. In 2005, AS Sporveisbussene acquired the company Arctic Express AS and its subsidiary Lavprisexpressen.no, engaged in airport express services and regional bus transport. In 2006, the tour bus division was separated from AS Sporveisbussene into a newly established company, Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, owned 100 % by AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In 2003, AS Sporveisbussene established a subsidiary, Nexus Trafikk AS, in order to participate in tenders for operating scheduled bus transport routes in Oslo. In 2005, AS Sporveisbussene acquired the company Arctic Express AS and its subsidiary Lavprisexpressen.no, engaged in airport express services and regional bus transport. In 2006, the tour bus division was separated from AS Sporveisbussene into a newly established company, Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, owned 100 % by AS Sporveisbussene.

| (42) | From 1 July 2006 to 1 January 2007, the administration of the public transport in Oslo was reorganised. A new company was established under the name AS Oslo Sporveier (the ‘new AS Oslo Sporveier’). The former AS Oslo Sporveier changed its name to Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS (‘KTP’). The administrative functions of the former AS Oslo Sporveier were transferred to the new AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

From 1 July 2006 to 1 January 2007, the administration of the public transport in Oslo was reorganised. A new company was established under the name AS Oslo Sporveier (the ‘new AS Oslo Sporveier’). The former AS Oslo Sporveier changed its name to Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS (‘KTP’). The administrative functions of the former AS Oslo Sporveier were transferred to the new AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (43) | KTP retained the operative part of AS Oslo Sporveier and the ownership of AS Sporveisbussene. The latter turned into a parent company with three subsidiaries. The subsidiaries were renamed (from Nexus Trafikk to Unibuss AS; Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS to Unibuss Tur AS; and Arctic Express AS to Unibuss Ekspress AS). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

KTP retained the operative part of AS Oslo Sporveier and the ownership of AS Sporveisbussene. The latter turned into a parent company with three subsidiaries. The subsidiaries were renamed (from Nexus Trafikk to Unibuss AS; Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS to Unibuss Tur AS; and Arctic Express AS to Unibuss Ekspress AS).

5.   Compensation for the public service obligation in Oslo

5.1.   
  Administrative practice

| (44) | As noted above, Oslo Municipality is responsible for compensating operators of public services it wishes to establish or maintain within its region (31). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

As noted above, Oslo Municipality is responsible for compensating operators of public services it wishes to establish or maintain within its region (31).

| (45) | In Oslo, there is a common ticketing system that applies to all operators for bus, tram, underground and ferry. The public service operators are not responsible for the ticketing system. The ticketing system is the responsibility of KTP (formerly AS Oslo Sporveier), and the ticket prices are subject to the control of Oslo Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In Oslo, there is a common ticketing system that applies to all operators for bus, tram, underground and ferry. The public service operators are not responsible for the ticketing system. The ticketing system is the responsibility of KTP (formerly AS Oslo Sporveier), and the ticket prices are subject to the control of Oslo Municipality.

| (46) | The concessionaire is allowed to keep the ticket income generated by the operation of the scheduled bus transport (32). When the ticket income is not sufficient to cover the cost of the operations, the concessionaire is eligible for public service compensation from Oslo Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The concessionaire is allowed to keep the ticket income generated by the operation of the scheduled bus transport (32). When the ticket income is not sufficient to cover the cost of the operations, the concessionaire is eligible for public service compensation from Oslo Municipality.

| (47) | In the late 1980s, a system of compensation in the form of annual grants of lump sums was introduced. In essence, a lump sum that covered the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service in question and the income from sale of tickets was determined by Oslo Municipality and the concessionaire. This was done as part of the general budget process in Oslo Municipality. According to the Norwegian authorities, the budget process can be outlined as follows:






  January/February | The City Government (Byrådet) decides the budget limits for the next year. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| March | The municipal departments and undertakings are informed of the budget limits and the time limit for submission of budget proposals. |
| March/April | The municipal undertakings deal with the budget of the following year. |
| May | The municipal departments and undertakings submit their budget proposals based on previous years income and costs, activity level, budget limits and assumptions on future cost developments and efficiency gains. |
| June-August | Discussions between the departments/undertakings and the responsible governmental unit are carried out in order to clarify the budget and the activities covered by it. |
| September | The budget proposal is announced by the City Government. |
| October | The different committees of the City Council (Bystyret) deal with the different parts of the budget. |
| October/November | The City Government proposes a revised budget. |
| December | The budget is approved by the City Council. |

(47)

In the late 1980s, a system of compensation in the form of annual grants of lump sums was introduced. In essence, a lump sum that covered the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service in question and the income from sale of tickets was determined by Oslo Municipality and the concessionaire. This was done as part of the general budget process in Oslo Municipality. According to the Norwegian authorities, the budget process can be outlined as follows:

January/February

The City Government (Byrådet) decides the budget limits for the next year.

March

The municipal departments and undertakings are informed of the budget limits and the time limit for submission of budget proposals.

March/April

The municipal undertakings deal with the budget of the following year.

May

The municipal departments and undertakings submit their budget proposals based on previous years income and costs, activity level, budget limits and assumptions on future cost developments and efficiency gains.

June-August

Discussions between the departments/undertakings and the responsible governmental unit are carried out in order to clarify the budget and the activities covered by it.

September

The budget proposal is announced by the City Government.

October

The different committees of the City Council (Bystyret) deal with the different parts of the budget.

October/November

The City Government proposes a revised budget.

December

The budget is approved by the City Council.

| (48) | According to the Norwegian authorities, this has been the administrative practice in Oslo Municipality at least since 1994. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

According to the Norwegian authorities, this has been the administrative practice in Oslo Municipality at least since 1994.

| (49) | With regard to the compensation for the scheduled bus transport, the aim of the process was to determine the amount of compensation necessary to cover the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service and the income from the sale of tickets. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

With regard to the compensation for the scheduled bus transport, the aim of the process was to determine the amount of compensation necessary to cover the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service and the income from the sale of tickets.

| (50) | Based on the budget proposals (and possible amendments during the budget discussions in the City Council), the compensation was granted by budget decisions within certain presumptions that were specified in each decision, i.e. to achieve certain efficiency gains and maintain the preceding year’s transport services to the public. The decisions also contained certain goals with respect to, inter alia, the volume of produced transportation services and costs per travel. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Based on the budget proposals (and possible amendments during the budget discussions in the City Council), the compensation was granted by budget decisions within certain presumptions that were specified in each decision, i.e. to achieve certain efficiency gains and maintain the preceding year’s transport services to the public. The decisions also contained certain goals with respect to, inter alia, the volume of produced transportation services and costs per travel.

| (51) | The assessment of the amount of compensation was based on the costs incurred in the preceding years, corrected for efficiency gains, the development of the Norwegian consumer price index, salaries, taxes, and laws and regulations that would affect the costs. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The assessment of the amount of compensation was based on the costs incurred in the preceding years, corrected for efficiency gains, the development of the Norwegian consumer price index, salaries, taxes, and laws and regulations that would affect the costs.

| (52) | According to the Norwegian authorities, separate accounts were kept for the public service and commercial activities (i.e. the tour bus service) carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier. According to the Norwegian authorities, the cost of the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier was not taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation for public services. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

According to the Norwegian authorities, separate accounts were kept for the public service and commercial activities (i.e. the tour bus service) carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier. According to the Norwegian authorities, the cost of the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier was not taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation for public services.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, also under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997, which lapsed on 30 March 2008 when all public service contracts had been tendered and the area concession itself lapsed, the calculation of the compensation was carried out on an annual basis in accordance with the principles described above. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, also under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997, which lapsed on 30 March 2008 when all public service contracts had been tendered and the area concession itself lapsed, the calculation of the compensation was carried out on an annual basis in accordance with the principles described above.

| (54) | Thus, the public service compensation was determined in accordance with the same procedure. The amount of public service compensation was determined on the basis of the difference between cost and revenue on the public service and adjusted in accordance with the same correction factors throughout the entire period under assessment, and separate accounts were kept for the public service activities and the non-public service activities. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Thus, the public service compensation was determined in accordance with the same procedure. The amount of public service compensation was determined on the basis of the difference between cost and revenue on the public service and adjusted in accordance with the same correction factors throughout the entire period under assessment, and separate accounts were kept for the public service activities and the non-public service activities.

5.2.   
  Introduction of a quality bonus/malus system

| (55) | According to the Norwegian authorities, a quality bonus/malus system was agreed on by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and introduced before 2004. According to that system, the performance of AS Sporveisbussene was assessed in accordance with the following criteria: (i) total customer satisfaction; (ii) punctuality; (iii) level of safety and comfort; and (iv) the driver being forthcoming. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

According to the Norwegian authorities, a quality bonus/malus system was agreed on by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and introduced before 2004. According to that system, the performance of AS Sporveisbussene was assessed in accordance with the following criteria: (i) total customer satisfaction; (ii) punctuality; (iii) level of safety and comfort; and (iv) the driver being forthcoming.

| (56) | AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004. The Authority is not aware of any other quality bonuses being granted. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004. The Authority is not aware of any other quality bonuses being granted.

5.3.   
  Common cost and intra-group transactions

| (57) | According to the Norwegian authorities, AS Sporveisbussene paid market prices for all services that were provided by AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

According to the Norwegian authorities, AS Sporveisbussene paid market prices for all services that were provided by AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (58) | Likewise, the Norwegian authorities maintain that the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries were always charged market prices for all services provided by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (for example, the tour bus division paid market prices for their use of office space, garage facilities and administration provided by the Oslo Sporveier Group). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Likewise, the Norwegian authorities maintain that the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries were always charged market prices for all services provided by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (for example, the tour bus division paid market prices for their use of office space, garage facilities and administration provided by the Oslo Sporveier Group).

| (59) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that from 2004 onwards, [...] (33) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that from 2004 onwards, [...] (33) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads.

| (60) | However, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted further information on the allocation of the common costs, or whether such a particular allocation key was used for this purpose, or whether the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

However, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted further information on the allocation of the common costs, or whether such a particular allocation key was used for this purpose, or whether the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms.

| (61) | Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a ‘general overhead fee’ in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that date. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a ‘general overhead fee’ in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that date.

5.4.   
  Profitability of the public service

| (62) | According to an overview of the annual results of the bus activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the average annual profit of the companies was 0,49 % in the period from 1994 to 2008. This figure, however, includes commercial activities from 2005 onwards. The average annual return for the period between 1994 and 2005, for which the data submitted by the Norwegian authorities relates exclusively to the public service, was 1,98 % (34). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

According to an overview of the annual results of the bus activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the average annual profit of the companies was 0,49 % in the period from 1994 to 2008. This figure, however, includes commercial activities from 2005 onwards. The average annual return for the period between 1994 and 2005, for which the data submitted by the Norwegian authorities relates exclusively to the public service, was 1,98 % (34).

6.   Capital injection of 2 April 2004

6.1.   
  The complaint

| (63) | The complainant states that AS Oslo Sporveier transferred NOK 41 499 000 in new equity to AS Sporveisbussene in 2004, and alleges that this transaction may have involved State aid as no private market investor would inject capital in a loss-making company. The complainant furthermore questions whether capital has been injected in order to fund new activities taking place in a market exposed to competition. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The complainant states that AS Oslo Sporveier transferred NOK 41 499 000 in new equity to AS Sporveisbussene in 2004, and alleges that this transaction may have involved State aid as no private market investor would inject capital in a loss-making company. The complainant furthermore questions whether capital has been injected in order to fund new activities taking place in a market exposed to competition.

| (64) | The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Oslo Municipality injected new capital into Oslo Sporveier Group on 2 April 2004, and that this measure related to a one-time contribution to the pension fund of the Group (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse) (35) to cover an accumulated shortage of funds in the existing pension fund accounts. The amount of this capital injection allocated to AS Sporveisbussene was NOK 111 760 000. The Norwegian authorities have furthermore explained that at the same time as the capital injection took place, AS Sporveisbussene changed accounting principles for estimating future pension obligations with the result that from 2004 onwards such obligations were recognised in their accounts (36). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Oslo Municipality injected new capital into Oslo Sporveier Group on 2 April 2004, and that this measure related to a one-time contribution to the pension fund of the Group (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse) (35) to cover an accumulated shortage of funds in the existing pension fund accounts. The amount of this capital injection allocated to AS Sporveisbussene was NOK 111 760 000. The Norwegian authorities have furthermore explained that at the same time as the capital injection took place, AS Sporveisbussene changed accounting principles for estimating future pension obligations with the result that from 2004 onwards such obligations were recognised in their accounts (36).

| (65) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority assumes that the complainant, when referring to the transfer of NOK 41 499 000 in his correspondence with the Authority, has compared the 2003 and 2004 accounts of AS Sporveisbussene, and deducted NOK 39 501 000 (total equity in 2003) from NOK 81 000 000 (total equity in 2004) (37). In this Decision, the Authority will assess the actual capital injection of NOK 111 760 000, which is the amount allocated to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene (as opposed to NOK 41 499 000 referred to by the complainant). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority assumes that the complainant, when referring to the transfer of NOK 41 499 000 in his correspondence with the Authority, has compared the 2003 and 2004 accounts of AS Sporveisbussene, and deducted NOK 39 501 000 (total equity in 2003) from NOK 81 000 000 (total equity in 2004) (37). In this Decision, the Authority will assess the actual capital injection of NOK 111 760 000, which is the amount allocated to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene (as opposed to NOK 41 499 000 referred to by the complainant).

| (66) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted explanations regarding the rationale for this capital injection, which relates to the pension liabilities of AS Sporveisbussene. These are summarised in the following. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted explanations regarding the rationale for this capital injection, which relates to the pension liabilities of AS Sporveisbussene. These are summarised in the following.

6.2.   
  Mid-1990s shortfall in AS Oslo Sporveier Group’s pension fund and increased annual compensation

| (67) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Norwegian local authorities — and companies owned or controlled by them — were obliged to provide their employees with an indexed pension equal to 70 % or 66 % of their final salary upon retirement at the age of 67 (38). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Norwegian local authorities — and companies owned or controlled by them — were obliged to provide their employees with an indexed pension equal to 70 % or 66 % of their final salary upon retirement at the age of 67 (38).

| (68) | By the mid-1990s, it had become clear that the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group was underfunded. The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had a coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995. Municipal pension funds with a coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year (39). Oslo Municipality, as its owner, was therefore legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group (40). Thus, as resolved by Decision of 23 December 1996, AS Oslo Sporveier had to submit a plan on how to make up for the shortfall. Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down. This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

By the mid-1990s, it had become clear that the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group was underfunded. The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had a coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995. Municipal pension funds with a coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year (39). Oslo Municipality, as its owner, was therefore legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group (40). Thus, as resolved by Decision of 23 December 1996, AS Oslo Sporveier had to submit a plan on how to make up for the shortfall. Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down. This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997.

| (69) | In accordance with the payment plan, Oslo Municipality adjusted upwards the annual public service compensation so as to cover the increased pension premiums. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In accordance with the payment plan, Oslo Municipality adjusted upwards the annual public service compensation so as to cover the increased pension premiums.

6.3.   
  Capital injection into Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse

| (70) | According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality decided in 2003 to cover the pension fund shortfall at Oslo Sporveier Group with a one-time payment. As a result, on 2 April 2004, AS Oslo Sporveier injected NOK 802,5 million (41) in Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to cover the current total shortfall (42). The capital injection covered the underfunding of the pension liabilities relating to the employees of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality decided in 2003 to cover the pension fund shortfall at Oslo Sporveier Group with a one-time payment. As a result, on 2 April 2004, AS Oslo Sporveier injected NOK 802,5 million (41) in Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to cover the current total shortfall (42). The capital injection covered the underfunding of the pension liabilities relating to the employees of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

| (71) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that although Oslo Municipality was legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group, it was not required to do so by a one-time payment: it chose to do so as this solution would be more cost-efficient than adhering to the existing amortisation plan. The annual amortised amount to service the underfunding was higher than the finance costs needed to service a bank loan of the same size. Moreover, a one-time payment was estimated to provide savings in the operating budget of approximately NOK 160 million, and reduce the Group’s annual pension costs by NOK 60 million. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that although Oslo Municipality was legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group, it was not required to do so by a one-time payment: it chose to do so as this solution would be more cost-efficient than adhering to the existing amortisation plan. The annual amortised amount to service the underfunding was higher than the finance costs needed to service a bank loan of the same size. Moreover, a one-time payment was estimated to provide savings in the operating budget of approximately NOK 160 million, and reduce the Group’s annual pension costs by NOK 60 million.

| (72) | Of the NOK 802,5 million, NOK 111 760 000 went to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene. According to the Norwegian authorities, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. In the annual accounts of AS Sporveisbussene for 2004, the pension contribution of NOK 111 760 000 was recorded as an injection of new share capital. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Of the NOK 802,5 million, NOK 111 760 000 went to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene. According to the Norwegian authorities, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. In the annual accounts of AS Sporveisbussene for 2004, the pension contribution of NOK 111 760 000 was recorded as an injection of new share capital.

6.4.   
  Underfunding of the pension liabilities for the tour bus employees

| (73) | According to the Norwegian authorities, a part of the capital injection transferred to AS Sporveisbussene covered pension liabilities for employees in the tour bus operation for the period 1994 (when the tour bus operations commenced) until 1 January 1997. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

According to the Norwegian authorities, a part of the capital injection transferred to AS Sporveisbussene covered pension liabilities for employees in the tour bus operation for the period 1994 (when the tour bus operations commenced) until 1 January 1997.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted calculations according to which approximately NOK 430 300 of the total capital injection was related to pension liability underfunding in the tour bus division. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted calculations according to which approximately NOK 430 300 of the total capital injection was related to pension liability underfunding in the tour bus division.

6.5.   
  Change of pension funds to Vital Forsikring ASA

| (75) | The payment of NOK 111 760 000 also enabled AS Sporveisbussene to transfer its pension fund from Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to Vital Forsikring ASA, a life insurance company. The change took effect on 1 June 2004. Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another (43). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The payment of NOK 111 760 000 also enabled AS Sporveisbussene to transfer its pension fund from Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to Vital Forsikring ASA, a life insurance company. The change took effect on 1 June 2004. Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another (43).

7.   Taxation of the Oslo Sporveier Group

7.1.   
  Allegations of the complainant

| (76) | The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. According to the complainant, favourable tax conditions in the Oslo Sporveier Group could possibly have been used to avoid payment of tax on profits made in a market wholly or partially exposed to competition. The basis for this complaint seems to be that AS Sporveisbussene in the period 2000-2004, while having a profit before tax of approximately NOK 54 796 000, only had a taxable income of NOK 2 027 000. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. According to the complainant, favourable tax conditions in the Oslo Sporveier Group could possibly have been used to avoid payment of tax on profits made in a market wholly or partially exposed to competition. The basis for this complaint seems to be that AS Sporveisbussene in the period 2000-2004, while having a profit before tax of approximately NOK 54 796 000, only had a taxable income of NOK 2 027 000.

| (77) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it seems that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same group (group contributions). AS Sporveisbussene has apparently transferred parts of its profits thus avoiding the payment of income tax on the amount transferred. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it seems that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same group (group contributions). AS Sporveisbussene has apparently transferred parts of its profits thus avoiding the payment of income tax on the amount transferred.

7.2.   
  The relevant provision of the Norwegian Tax Act

| (78) | According to the Norwegian Tax Act (44), every undertaking within a group shall be taxed as a single taxable entity; there is no consolidation of groups of companies for tax purposes. However, under certain conditions, the taxation rules permit income earned by the companies in the group to be distributed within the group by way of so-called ‘group contributions’. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

According to the Norwegian Tax Act (44), every undertaking within a group shall be taxed as a single taxable entity; there is no consolidation of groups of companies for tax purposes. However, under certain conditions, the taxation rules permit income earned by the companies in the group to be distributed within the group by way of so-called ‘group contributions’.

| (79) | Group contributions are allowed (45) when the contributing company and the receiving company are limited liability companies (46) and belong to the same group (47). In addition, the parent company has to own more than 90 % of the subsidiary, and hold an equivalent share of the votes (48). A group contribution may consist of money, working capital or other financial contributions (49). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Group contributions are allowed (45) when the contributing company and the receiving company are limited liability companies (46) and belong to the same group (47). In addition, the parent company has to own more than 90 % of the subsidiary, and hold an equivalent share of the votes (48). A group contribution may consist of money, working capital or other financial contributions (49).

| (80) | The group contributions are deductible for the granting company to the extent that the contribution is covered by the taxable income of the contributor (50). The receiving company, on the other hand, is liable for paying taxes on the group contribution (51). The contribution is considered as an income for the receiving company in the same year as the granting company deducts the contribution in its tax assessment. Provided that the recipient suffers a deficit, the contribution may be set off against any losses, also those incurred in previous years. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The group contributions are deductible for the granting company to the extent that the contribution is covered by the taxable income of the contributor (50). The receiving company, on the other hand, is liable for paying taxes on the group contribution (51). The contribution is considered as an income for the receiving company in the same year as the granting company deducts the contribution in its tax assessment. Provided that the recipient suffers a deficit, the contribution may be set off against any losses, also those incurred in previous years.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (81) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (82) | The Authority will in the following assess whether the four alleged measures referred to in the complaint constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess (i) whether there are State resources involved, (ii) whether the alleged measures confer an economic advantage on the relevant entities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, and (iii) whether the alleged measures distort competition and have an effect on trade between the contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Authority will in the following assess whether the four alleged measures referred to in the complaint constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess (i) whether there are State resources involved, (ii) whether the alleged measures confer an economic advantage on the relevant entities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, and (iii) whether the alleged measures distort competition and have an effect on trade between the contracting parties.

2.   Alleged cross-subsidies — compensation for the public service and the 2004 capital injection

2.1.   
  Introduction

| (83) | A preliminary assessment of the complaint concerning the alleged cross-subsidisation and the 2004 capital injection is set out below.
  Concerning the complaint that cross-subsidisation has occurred between the public service activities and the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, the Authority understands the allegation to be that compensation for the provision of the local scheduled transport service has subsidised the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

A preliminary assessment of the complaint concerning the alleged cross-subsidisation and the 2004 capital injection is set out below.

Concerning the complaint that cross-subsidisation has occurred between the public service activities and the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, the Authority understands the allegation to be that compensation for the provision of the local scheduled transport service has subsidised the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group.

| (84) | It is evident that cross-subsidisation (in the sense of entailing incompatible State aid) can only occur if the cross-subsidising undertaking receives State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Thus, in respect of this part of the complaint, the Authority must first assess if the financing measures, i.e. (i) the annual payments from Oslo Municipality granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) as compensation for the provision of scheduled bus services, and (ii) the 2004 capital injection, entail State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

It is evident that cross-subsidisation (in the sense of entailing incompatible State aid) can only occur if the cross-subsidising undertaking receives State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Thus, in respect of this part of the complaint, the Authority must first assess if the financing measures, i.e. (i) the annual payments from Oslo Municipality granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) as compensation for the provision of scheduled bus services, and (ii) the 2004 capital injection, entail State aid.

2.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (85) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid must be granted by the State or through State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid must be granted by the State or through State resources.

| (86) | As a preliminary point, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (52). Hence, Oslo Municipality is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

As a preliminary point, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (52). Hence, Oslo Municipality is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules.

| (87) | In the present case it is clear that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, provided funding to AS Oslo Sporveier for carrying out scheduled bus transport until 1997. For the period 1997-2008 it is undisputed that AS Oslo Sporveier passed on the annual compensation to AS Sporveisbussene, according to the terms of the Transport Agreement, which appears in essence to have formalised the previous unwritten administrative practice of calculating the annual compensation (53). |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the present case it is clear that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, provided funding to AS Oslo Sporveier for carrying out scheduled bus transport until 1997. For the period 1997-2008 it is undisputed that AS Oslo Sporveier passed on the annual compensation to AS Sporveisbussene, according to the terms of the Transport Agreement, which appears in essence to have formalised the previous unwritten administrative practice of calculating the annual compensation (53).

| (88) | As regards the 2004 capital injection into AS Sporveisbussene to cover the underfunding of the pension fund it is undisputed that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, contributed NOK 111 760 000 as capital for AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As regards the 2004 capital injection into AS Sporveisbussene to cover the underfunding of the pension fund it is undisputed that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, contributed NOK 111 760 000 as capital for AS Sporveisbussene.

| (89) | The Authority therefore comes to the preliminary conclusion that the 2004 capital injection and the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier, and then to AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo were granted by the State and financed by State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority therefore comes to the preliminary conclusion that the 2004 capital injection and the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier, and then to AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo were granted by the State and financed by State resources.

2.3.   
  Economic advantage

2.3.1.   Introduction

| (90) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on an undertaking, for example by relieving it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on an undertaking, for example by relieving it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (91) | The beneficiaries of any potential aid will be AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene. That an undertaking, or undertakings, will benefit from any economic advantage does not therefore raise any doubts. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The beneficiaries of any potential aid will be AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene. That an undertaking, or undertakings, will benefit from any economic advantage does not therefore raise any doubts.

2.3.2.   Compensation for scheduled bus transport in Oslo

| (92) | As mentioned above, the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo constitutes — at least in part — compensation for costs incurred by providing a public service. Such compensation does not entail an economic advantage if the criteria established in the Altmark case-law of the European Court of Justice are met (54). |
| --- | --- |

(92)

As mentioned above, the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo constitutes — at least in part — compensation for costs incurred by providing a public service. Such compensation does not entail an economic advantage if the criteria established in the Altmark case-law of the European Court of Justice are met (54).

| (93) | Furthermore, as regards the 2004 capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997, and is at this stage of the view that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose. It is also worth noting that whilst certain changes to the capital position of AS Sporveisbussene were recorded in the accounts, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the pension fund and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

Furthermore, as regards the 2004 capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997, and is at this stage of the view that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose. It is also worth noting that whilst certain changes to the capital position of AS Sporveisbussene were recorded in the accounts, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the pension fund and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene.

| (94) | However, in order to determine whether the capital injection described above entailed an economic advantage for AS Sporveisbussene, a distinction needs to be drawn between the capital that was injected to remedy the underfunding of the pension accounts of the public service employees (‘public service capital injection’), and the capital that covered the underfunding of the pension accounts of the employees in the commercial arm of AS Sporveisbussene (‘commercial activities capital injection’). As set out above, according to the Norwegian authorities, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the commercial tour bus division. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

However, in order to determine whether the capital injection described above entailed an economic advantage for AS Sporveisbussene, a distinction needs to be drawn between the capital that was injected to remedy the underfunding of the pension accounts of the public service employees (‘public service capital injection’), and the capital that covered the underfunding of the pension accounts of the employees in the commercial arm of AS Sporveisbussene (‘commercial activities capital injection’). As set out above, according to the Norwegian authorities, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the commercial tour bus division.

| (95) | As for the public service capital injection, it does not relate to new costs but to costs accrued in the past which had technically not been reflected in the general accounts of the company. However, these liabilities were already present at the time of the capital injection, which seems to have been necessary to make up for the shortfall in the pensions funds. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

As for the public service capital injection, it does not relate to new costs but to costs accrued in the past which had technically not been reflected in the general accounts of the company. However, these liabilities were already present at the time of the capital injection, which seems to have been necessary to make up for the shortfall in the pensions funds.

| (96) | Therefore, the public service capital injection can be considered to form part of the cost that Oslo Municipality had to bear in exchange for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) providing the public service. Instead of injecting this capital, Oslo Municipality could have paid out a higher annual public service compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Therefore, the public service capital injection can be considered to form part of the cost that Oslo Municipality had to bear in exchange for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) providing the public service. Instead of injecting this capital, Oslo Municipality could have paid out a higher annual public service compensation.

| (97) | Thus public service capital injection constituted an integral part of the public service compensation granted to AS Sporveisbussene, as it had been from the mid-1990s until the capital injection was made (and as it would have been if carried out in accordance with the amortisation plan until 2020). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Thus public service capital injection constituted an integral part of the public service compensation granted to AS Sporveisbussene, as it had been from the mid-1990s until the capital injection was made (and as it would have been if carried out in accordance with the amortisation plan until 2020).

| (98) | In the Altmark judgment the European Court of Justice (the ‘Court of Justice’) held that compensation for a public service does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met.






  — | First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(98)

In the Altmark judgment the European Court of Justice (the ‘Court of Justice’) held that compensation for a public service does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met.

—

First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined.

| — | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. |
| --- | --- |

—

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner.

| — | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

—

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| — | Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (55). |
| --- | --- |

—

Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (55).

| (99) | The Authority will firstly examine the fourth criterion, namely whether the compensation was based on a tender or on the basis of the costs of an efficient and well-run company. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Authority will firstly examine the fourth criterion, namely whether the compensation was based on a tender or on the basis of the costs of an efficient and well-run company.

| (100) | Oslo Municipality paid an annual compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier for scheduled bus transport services, which from 1997 was passed on to AS Sporveisbussene. However, with regards to the routes operated under the area concession, neither AS Oslo Sporveier nor AS Sporveisbussene were selected in a public procurement procedure. Hence, neither the compensation from Oslo Municipality to AS Oslo Sporveier nor the compensation subsequently passed on from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene were based on prices resulting from public tenders. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Oslo Municipality paid an annual compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier for scheduled bus transport services, which from 1997 was passed on to AS Sporveisbussene. However, with regards to the routes operated under the area concession, neither AS Oslo Sporveier nor AS Sporveisbussene were selected in a public procurement procedure. Hence, neither the compensation from Oslo Municipality to AS Oslo Sporveier nor the compensation subsequently passed on from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene were based on prices resulting from public tenders.

| (101) | Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have neither argued that (nor provided the Authority with information enabling a verification of whether) the costs incurred by AS Oslo Sporveier or AS Sporveisbussene correspond to the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. Therefore, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the fourth Altmark criterion is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have neither argued that (nor provided the Authority with information enabling a verification of whether) the costs incurred by AS Oslo Sporveier or AS Sporveisbussene correspond to the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. Therefore, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the fourth Altmark criterion is not met.

| (102) | On the basis of the above, the Authority considers at this stage that the scheduled bus transport services carried out under the area concession in Oslo have, both in the case of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, therefore not been discharged in accordance with the fourth criterion of the Altmark judgment. Consequently, as the Altmark criteria must be satisfied cumulatively for public service compensation not to constitute State aid (56), the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that the annual compensation, including the public service capital injection, confers an economic advantage to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

On the basis of the above, the Authority considers at this stage that the scheduled bus transport services carried out under the area concession in Oslo have, both in the case of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, therefore not been discharged in accordance with the fourth criterion of the Altmark judgment. Consequently, as the Altmark criteria must be satisfied cumulatively for public service compensation not to constitute State aid (56), the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that the annual compensation, including the public service capital injection, confers an economic advantage to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

2.3.3.   The commercial activities capital injection

| (103) | As set out above, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the tour bus division. As this part of the injected capital does not relate to public service cost, it cannot be assessed on the basis of Altmark. Thus, according to settled case-law, it is necessary for the Authority to establish whether the recipient undertaking, AS Sporveisbussene, received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal conditions (57). In doing so, the Authority has to apply the market economy investor test (58) which in essence provides that State aid is granted whenever a State makes funds available to an undertaking which in the normal course of events would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (59). |
| --- | --- |

(103)

As set out above, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the tour bus division. As this part of the injected capital does not relate to public service cost, it cannot be assessed on the basis of Altmark. Thus, according to settled case-law, it is necessary for the Authority to establish whether the recipient undertaking, AS Sporveisbussene, received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal conditions (57). In doing so, the Authority has to apply the market economy investor test (58) which in essence provides that State aid is granted whenever a State makes funds available to an undertaking which in the normal course of events would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (59).

| (104) | It should be recalled that the initial amortisation plan was triggered by a decision of Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority requesting AS Oslo Sporveier to make up for the shortfall in its pension fund. This meant that the owners of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene needed to either remedy the underfunding in their business, or run the risk of their company becoming insolvent. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

It should be recalled that the initial amortisation plan was triggered by a decision of Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority requesting AS Oslo Sporveier to make up for the shortfall in its pension fund. This meant that the owners of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene needed to either remedy the underfunding in their business, or run the risk of their company becoming insolvent.

| (105) | In assessing whether the capital injection was done on conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor, the Authority points out that a private owner/investor in a similar situation — i.e. with the options to either (a) inject fresh capital into the company, or (b) liquidate the company and invest the same amount elsewhere, would choose strategy (a) only if it was globally more profitable than strategy (b). The fact that the owner had made a previous investment is otherwise irrelevant in this context (60). This means that it is not sufficient to choose the ‘cheapest’ solution, which the Norwegian authorities have submitted the capital injection was, in order to meet the market economy investor benchmark, but that it is necessary to demonstrate an acceptable rate of future return for the ‘price of this cheapest solution’. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

In assessing whether the capital injection was done on conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor, the Authority points out that a private owner/investor in a similar situation — i.e. with the options to either (a) inject fresh capital into the company, or (b) liquidate the company and invest the same amount elsewhere, would choose strategy (a) only if it was globally more profitable than strategy (b). The fact that the owner had made a previous investment is otherwise irrelevant in this context (60). This means that it is not sufficient to choose the ‘cheapest’ solution, which the Norwegian authorities have submitted the capital injection was, in order to meet the market economy investor benchmark, but that it is necessary to demonstrate an acceptable rate of future return for the ‘price of this cheapest solution’.

| (106) | The Norwegian authorities have not, however, further substantiated their argument in this respect, and have in particular not submitted any profitability forecasts that a market economy investor would presumably have made. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Norwegian authorities have not, however, further substantiated their argument in this respect, and have in particular not submitted any profitability forecasts that a market economy investor would presumably have made.

| (107) | Furthermore, none of the information submitted indicates that the Municipality of Oslo injected further capital in this part of the business based on expectations of acceptable long-term profit. Moreover, the Authority is not aware of then minority shareholder(s) of AS Oslo Sporveier having contributed to remedy the underfunding — and a private shareholder surely would have requested the other shareholders to either do so pro rata, or would have increased its stake. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Furthermore, none of the information submitted indicates that the Municipality of Oslo injected further capital in this part of the business based on expectations of acceptable long-term profit. Moreover, the Authority is not aware of then minority shareholder(s) of AS Oslo Sporveier having contributed to remedy the underfunding — and a private shareholder surely would have requested the other shareholders to either do so pro rata, or would have increased its stake.

| (108) | For the above reasons, the Authority is at this stage uncertain whether the market economy investor test is met with regard to the commercial activities capital injection. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

For the above reasons, the Authority is at this stage uncertain whether the market economy investor test is met with regard to the commercial activities capital injection.

3.   Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (109) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.

| (110) | The Court of Justice has held that in order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in the light of the objective pursued by the measure (61). |
| --- | --- |

(110)

The Court of Justice has held that in order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in the light of the objective pursued by the measure (61).

| (111) | In the present case, the annual compensation and the capital injection favoured AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene to the exclusion of other bus transport operators. Such other bus operators operate scheduled bus transport services in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA and were therefore in a similar legal and factual situation compared to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. For these reasons, the Authority is of the preliminary view that these two measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the present case, the annual compensation and the capital injection favoured AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene to the exclusion of other bus transport operators. Such other bus operators operate scheduled bus transport services in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA and were therefore in a similar legal and factual situation compared to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. For these reasons, the Authority is of the preliminary view that these two measures are selective.

4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (112) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between contracting parties. According to the EFTA Court case law, this requires the Authority to examine whether such aid is liable to affect trade and to distort competition (62). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between contracting parties. According to the EFTA Court case law, this requires the Authority to examine whether such aid is liable to affect trade and to distort competition (62).

| (113) | Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway several undertakings have provided scheduled bus services in Oslo, the Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to distort competition since then (63). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway several undertakings have provided scheduled bus services in Oslo, the Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to distort competition since then (63).

| (114) | With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Oslo, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that
  ‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned (64).’. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Oslo, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that

‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned (64).’.

| (115) | This means that even if — as in the present case — only the local bus transport market (Oslo) is concerned, public funding made available to one operator in such a local market is liable to affect trade between contracting parties (65). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to affect trade between contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

This means that even if — as in the present case — only the local bus transport market (Oslo) is concerned, public funding made available to one operator in such a local market is liable to affect trade between contracting parties (65). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to affect trade between contracting parties.

5.   Taxation of the Oslo Sporveier Group

| (116) | The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene.

| (117) | Based on the submissions of the Norwegian authorities, it appears to the Authority that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same corporate group (‘group contributions’). |
| --- | --- |

(117)

Based on the submissions of the Norwegian authorities, it appears to the Authority that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same corporate group (‘group contributions’).

| (118) | The Authority observes that these rules are applicable to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former. Thus, AS Oslo Sporveier or any of its subsidiaries could in principle offset taxable profits by distributing contributions within the group. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

The Authority observes that these rules are applicable to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former. Thus, AS Oslo Sporveier or any of its subsidiaries could in principle offset taxable profits by distributing contributions within the group.

| (119) | The Authority points out that the complainant seems to have taken issue with what appears to be an application of the general Norwegian rules on corporate taxation. The Authority notes that the complainant has neither alleged, nor submitted any information sustaining that the relevant tax rules are drafted in a manner which could lead to State aid being granted to specific companies. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Authority points out that the complainant seems to have taken issue with what appears to be an application of the general Norwegian rules on corporate taxation. The Authority notes that the complainant has neither alleged, nor submitted any information sustaining that the relevant tax rules are drafted in a manner which could lead to State aid being granted to specific companies.

| (120) | Moreover, and with more particular regard to the case at hand, it appears to the Authority that the offsetting of taxable income by making a group contribution would not confer an economic advantage on AS Sporveisbussene when it, as a condition of benefitting from the tax deductions, was obliged to make a contribution to the group of the same amount as the tax base reduction obtained in this manner. By transferring income, AS Sporveisbussene may avoid paying taxes on the transferred amount, but the amount will not be at its disposal. Arguably, the benefit of not paying taxes on an income which is no longer disposable does not produce any obvious effects resulting in an economic advantage for that entity (although the situation may be different for the corporate group as a whole). |
| --- | --- |

(120)

Moreover, and with more particular regard to the case at hand, it appears to the Authority that the offsetting of taxable income by making a group contribution would not confer an economic advantage on AS Sporveisbussene when it, as a condition of benefitting from the tax deductions, was obliged to make a contribution to the group of the same amount as the tax base reduction obtained in this manner. By transferring income, AS Sporveisbussene may avoid paying taxes on the transferred amount, but the amount will not be at its disposal. Arguably, the benefit of not paying taxes on an income which is no longer disposable does not produce any obvious effects resulting in an economic advantage for that entity (although the situation may be different for the corporate group as a whole).

| (121) | However, the Authority considers that it is in possession of insufficient facts and information allowing it to assess the application of the Norwegian Tax Act to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group, and to exclude without any doubt that in this case a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with the State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

However, the Authority considers that it is in possession of insufficient facts and information allowing it to assess the application of the Norwegian Tax Act to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group, and to exclude without any doubt that in this case a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with the State aid rules.

6.   Alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries

| (122) | The Authority has asked the Norwegian authorities to clarify whether the subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene have benefitted from any guarantees granted by their owner, as alleged by the complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority has asked the Norwegian authorities to clarify whether the subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene have benefitted from any guarantees granted by their owner, as alleged by the complainant.

| (123) | The Norwegian authorities have stated that no guarantees have been granted by AS Sporveisbussene, and that its subsidiaries consequently have not benefitted from any guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene. The Authority is in possession of no information suggesting that this is incorrect. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

The Norwegian authorities have stated that no guarantees have been granted by AS Sporveisbussene, and that its subsidiaries consequently have not benefitted from any guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene. The Authority is in possession of no information suggesting that this is incorrect.

| (124) | In light of this, the Authority sees no reason to investigate further this part of the complaint. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

In light of this, the Authority sees no reason to investigate further this part of the complaint.

7.   Conclusion

| (125) | The Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation disbursed until 2008 and the 2004 capital injection of NOK 111 760 000 in Oslo constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

The Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation disbursed until 2008 and the 2004 capital injection of NOK 111 760 000 in Oslo constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (126) | As regards the allegations concerning the taxation of AS Sporveisbussene, the Authority is, as indicated above, unable to exclude without any doubt that a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with Article 61(1).
  The Authority sees no reason to investigate further the alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

As regards the allegations concerning the taxation of AS Sporveisbussene, the Authority is, as indicated above, unable to exclude without any doubt that a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with Article 61(1).

The Authority sees no reason to investigate further the alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries.

8.   Classification of the aid as existing or new

| (127) | Regarding the allegation of potential cross-subsidisation, it is necessary in this context to firstly determine if the aid in question is to be qualified as existing or new aid. Were the public service compensation existing aid (i.e. granted under an existing aid scheme), the Authority could at most request the Norwegian State to bring it in line with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement (if the aid was deemed incompatible and the existing aid scheme in question still applicable). If, on the other hand, the aid was considered as new aid, the consequence of its incompatibility would normally be the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Regarding the allegation of potential cross-subsidisation, it is necessary in this context to firstly determine if the aid in question is to be qualified as existing or new aid. Were the public service compensation existing aid (i.e. granted under an existing aid scheme), the Authority could at most request the Norwegian State to bring it in line with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement (if the aid was deemed incompatible and the existing aid scheme in question still applicable). If, on the other hand, the aid was considered as new aid, the consequence of its incompatibility would normally be the recovery of the aid.

8.1.   
  Introduction — the Court’s judgment

| (128) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:
  ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.’. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:

‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.’.

| (129) | The Authority notes that AS Oslo Sporveier, at the time of the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway (1 January 1994), was compensated for carrying out scheduled bus transport in Oslo in accordance with the provisions of the transport legislation and established administrative practice (pre-dating the EEA Agreement), as described in detail above. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

The Authority notes that AS Oslo Sporveier, at the time of the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway (1 January 1994), was compensated for carrying out scheduled bus transport in Oslo in accordance with the provisions of the transport legislation and established administrative practice (pre-dating the EEA Agreement), as described in detail above.

| (130) | In the judgment in Case E-14/10 annulling the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:
  ‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes “existing aid” [...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]
  [...] to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (66).’. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

In the judgment in Case E-14/10 annulling the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:

‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes “existing aid” [...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]

[...] to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (66).’.

8.2.   
  Aid scheme

| (131) | Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an aid scheme:
  ‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an aid scheme:

‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’.

| (132) | Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that individual aid:
  ‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that individual aid:

‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’.

| (133) | This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 only provides the Authority with a competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 only applies to existing aid schemes (the terms ‘aid schemes’ and ‘systems of aid’ are to be treated as synonyms in the Authority’s view (67)).
  The Authority recalls that the Norwegian transport legislation in essence sets out the following key parameters that are relevant for the aid measures at hand: (i) a system of co-financing of scheduled bus transport services (from State and county); (ii) that the counties are responsible for administering the scheduled bus transport services, control concessions, routes, schedules and ticket prices; and (iii) a detailed concession system. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 only provides the Authority with a competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 only applies to existing aid schemes (the terms ‘aid schemes’ and ‘systems of aid’ are to be treated as synonyms in the Authority’s view (67)).

The Authority recalls that the Norwegian transport legislation in essence sets out the following key parameters that are relevant for the aid measures at hand: (i) a system of co-financing of scheduled bus transport services (from State and county); (ii) that the counties are responsible for administering the scheduled bus transport services, control concessions, routes, schedules and ticket prices; and (iii) a detailed concession system.

| (134) | Moreover, according to the Norwegian authorities, Article 22 of the CTA entails that Oslo Municipality is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes (where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). The Authority understands that the compensation aims to cover the gap between the costs and the revenues (in the form of ticket sales). |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Moreover, according to the Norwegian authorities, Article 22 of the CTA entails that Oslo Municipality is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes (where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). The Authority understands that the compensation aims to cover the gap between the costs and the revenues (in the form of ticket sales).

| (135) | Before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, Oslo Municipality had chosen to provide scheduled bus transport services under the relevant provisions of the CTA and CTR, compensating unprofitable routes in accordance with the administrative practice described above. This continued without interruption until the last directly awarded concession had run its course (on 30 March 2008). |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, Oslo Municipality had chosen to provide scheduled bus transport services under the relevant provisions of the CTA and CTR, compensating unprofitable routes in accordance with the administrative practice described above. This continued without interruption until the last directly awarded concession had run its course (on 30 March 2008).

| (136) | Whether the system in Oslo as outlined above constitutes an aid scheme in accordance with the definition of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 depends on whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled bus transport in Oslo can be considered to be ‘an act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Whether the system in Oslo as outlined above constitutes an aid scheme in accordance with the definition of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 depends on whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled bus transport in Oslo can be considered to be ‘an act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’.

| (137) | The Authority notes that this definition was incorporated into the EEA Agreement in 2001 with the insertion of Part II of Protocol 3. Prior to 2001, when Protocol 3 was brought in line with the Procedural Regulation, there was no similarly precise definition in EEA law determining what an aid scheme was. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid — in principle that of providing EEA States and beneficiaries of State with some legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems whilst providing the Authority with the possibility of bringing such systems in line with EEA law — must in the Authority’s view be borne in mind. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

The Authority notes that this definition was incorporated into the EEA Agreement in 2001 with the insertion of Part II of Protocol 3. Prior to 2001, when Protocol 3 was brought in line with the Procedural Regulation, there was no similarly precise definition in EEA law determining what an aid scheme was. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid — in principle that of providing EEA States and beneficiaries of State with some legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems whilst providing the Authority with the possibility of bringing such systems in line with EEA law — must in the Authority’s view be borne in mind.

| (138) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. The Authority has thus reviewed its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ were held to encompass non-statutory customary law (68) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (69) and non-statutory law (70). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (71). |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. The Authority has thus reviewed its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ were held to encompass non-statutory customary law (68) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (69) and non-statutory law (70). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (71).

| (139) | Nevertheless, the Authority is at this stage in doubt as to whether the three criteria defining an ‘aid scheme’ as provided for in Protocol 3 — (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded; (ii) requiring no further implementing measures; and (iii) defining the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner — are met.
  As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA and the CTR are acts on the basis of which Oslo Municipality could award aid. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

Nevertheless, the Authority is at this stage in doubt as to whether the three criteria defining an ‘aid scheme’ as provided for in Protocol 3 — (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded; (ii) requiring no further implementing measures; and (iii) defining the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner — are met.

As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA and the CTR are acts on the basis of which Oslo Municipality could award aid.

| (140) | As for the second criterion, the Authority notes that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process which can (but does not have to) lead to individual awards of aid being made. However, an arrangement that would for example require, for individual aid to be awarded, the adoption of further legislative measures, cannot be considered as an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

As for the second criterion, the Authority notes that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process which can (but does not have to) lead to individual awards of aid being made. However, an arrangement that would for example require, for individual aid to be awarded, the adoption of further legislative measures, cannot be considered as an aid scheme.

| (141) | A mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (72). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

A mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (72). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures.

| (142) | In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment such as the award of a concession, for which the CTA foresees a duration of 10 years, in the case at hand as an implementing measure would make it ex ante impossible to set up an aid scheme for public service compensation under which aid to several undertakings could be awarded, as any entrustment would then entail individual aid. A concession — as any other act of entrustment — specifies one particular undertaking, and could thus not relate to a group of undertakings, ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment such as the award of a concession, for which the CTA foresees a duration of 10 years, in the case at hand as an implementing measure would make it ex ante impossible to set up an aid scheme for public service compensation under which aid to several undertakings could be awarded, as any entrustment would then entail individual aid. A concession — as any other act of entrustment — specifies one particular undertaking, and could thus not relate to a group of undertakings, ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’.

| (143) | On the other hand, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood as entailing a certain degree of discretion, that could influence the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted to a significant degree. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines for which clearly defined purpose aid can be awarded. Thus, where a public body for example has general powers allowing it to use different instruments to promote the local economy, and grants several capital injections based on those general powers, this granting of capital injections implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (73). |
| --- | --- |

(143)

On the other hand, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood as entailing a certain degree of discretion, that could influence the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted to a significant degree. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines for which clearly defined purpose aid can be awarded. Thus, where a public body for example has general powers allowing it to use different instruments to promote the local economy, and grants several capital injections based on those general powers, this granting of capital injections implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (73).

| (144) | In the case at hand, it is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for compensation payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene to be made. The preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the CTA and CTR arguably ringfenced the discretion of Oslo Municipality, to the extent that they appear to have been applied by the Municipality, in line with its administrative practice, in a way that did not allow for compensation in excess of cost for the public service minus revenue. Moreover, the compensation was not based on discretionary budget allocations. Oslo Municipality, after choosing to maintain the public service, was not free to decide whether to cover the loss of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene or not. Oslo Municipality was obliged to do so, and did so, every year until 2008, in line with a routine procedure. It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo. The municipality could not have awarded aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

In the case at hand, it is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for compensation payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene to be made. The preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the CTA and CTR arguably ringfenced the discretion of Oslo Municipality, to the extent that they appear to have been applied by the Municipality, in line with its administrative practice, in a way that did not allow for compensation in excess of cost for the public service minus revenue. Moreover, the compensation was not based on discretionary budget allocations. Oslo Municipality, after choosing to maintain the public service, was not free to decide whether to cover the loss of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene or not. Oslo Municipality was obliged to do so, and did so, every year until 2008, in line with a routine procedure. It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo. The municipality could not have awarded aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above.

| (145) | However, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that the provisions and practice that set out how providers of scheduled bus services were to be remunerated in Oslo is sufficiently precise and detailed. The Authority has doubts as to the exact extent of the discretion enjoyed by Oslo Municipality, taking into account the administrative practice, in determining the amount of compensation for scheduled bus services. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

However, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that the provisions and practice that set out how providers of scheduled bus services were to be remunerated in Oslo is sufficiently precise and detailed. The Authority has doubts as to the exact extent of the discretion enjoyed by Oslo Municipality, taking into account the administrative practice, in determining the amount of compensation for scheduled bus services.

| (146) | As for the last criterion, the compensation system in Oslo applies to all concessionaires that have been entrusted with providing bus services on unprofitable routes. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

As for the last criterion, the compensation system in Oslo applies to all concessionaires that have been entrusted with providing bus services on unprofitable routes.

| (147) | Consequently, in particular given the Authority’s doubts as regards the second criterion mentioned above, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the financing of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as described above, constitutes an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Consequently, in particular given the Authority’s doubts as regards the second criterion mentioned above, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the financing of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as described above, constitutes an aid scheme.

| (148) | However, so as to address issues of law relevant for the final assessment of this case, the Authority sets out its preliminary views below based on the assumption that public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene has been awarded on the basis of an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

However, so as to address issues of law relevant for the final assessment of this case, the Authority sets out its preliminary views below based on the assumption that public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene has been awarded on the basis of an aid scheme.

8.3.   
  Existing aid due to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement

| (149) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.

| (150) | As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the preliminary view that the scheme became an existing aid scheme on 1 January 1994. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the preliminary view that the scheme became an existing aid scheme on 1 January 1994.

8.4.   
  Aid not granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme

8.4.1.   Judgment in Case E-14/10

| (151) | In the judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:
  ‘(...) what is relevant is whether the aid was granted in accordance with the provisions providing for it.
  (...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant (the Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.
  However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (74). |
| --- | --- |

(151)

In the judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:

‘(...) what is relevant is whether the aid was granted in accordance with the provisions providing for it.

(...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant (the Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.

However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (74).

| (152) | The Authority understands the judgment of the EFTA Court to mean that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (75).
  Therefore, to determine whether the aid granted is existing or new, the Authority must assess whether it was granted in accordance with the scheme providing for it. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

The Authority understands the judgment of the EFTA Court to mean that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (75).

Therefore, to determine whether the aid granted is existing or new, the Authority must assess whether it was granted in accordance with the scheme providing for it.

| (153) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the scheme was based on the CTA, the CTR as applied in Oslo in accordance with the established administrative practice. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the scheme was based on the CTA, the CTR as applied in Oslo in accordance with the established administrative practice.

| (154) | The scheme only provided for cost coverage (the difference between cost and revenue) of the unprofitable scheduled bus services that the concessionaires provided. This therefore is the benchmark against which the Authority must assess the extent to which the measures covered by the complaint have been made on the basis of the aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The scheme only provided for cost coverage (the difference between cost and revenue) of the unprofitable scheduled bus services that the concessionaires provided. This therefore is the benchmark against which the Authority must assess the extent to which the measures covered by the complaint have been made on the basis of the aid scheme.

| (155) | In the following, the Authority assesses whether (i) the annual compensation and (ii) the 2004 capital injection were granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the system of compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

In the following, the Authority assesses whether (i) the annual compensation and (ii) the 2004 capital injection were granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the system of compensation.

8.4.2.   Annual compensation

| (156) | As set out above, the Authority is at this stage of the view that at least a large part of the compensation that AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene have received has been awarded in line with the existing aid scheme, which provides in essence for loss coverage for the public service. Such a scheme would appear to presuppose the separation of accounts, an appropriate allocation of common costs and arms-length intra-group transactions for undertakings that in addition to providing public services also engage in commercial activities. Complying with these principles seems necessary to avoid that aid is granted outside the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

As set out above, the Authority is at this stage of the view that at least a large part of the compensation that AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene have received has been awarded in line with the existing aid scheme, which provides in essence for loss coverage for the public service. Such a scheme would appear to presuppose the separation of accounts, an appropriate allocation of common costs and arms-length intra-group transactions for undertakings that in addition to providing public services also engage in commercial activities. Complying with these principles seems necessary to avoid that aid is granted outside the scheme.

| (157) | According to the Norwegian authorities, market prices were paid for services that were provided between the companies in the Oslo Sporveier Group. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

According to the Norwegian authorities, market prices were paid for services that were provided between the companies in the Oslo Sporveier Group.

| (158) | However, aside from indicating that from 2004 onwards, [...] (76) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted information that would allow the Authority to conclude that the allocation of the common costs was done in accordance with a particular allocation key, or that the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a general overhead fee in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

However, aside from indicating that from 2004 onwards, [...] (76) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted information that would allow the Authority to conclude that the allocation of the common costs was done in accordance with a particular allocation key, or that the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a general overhead fee in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that.

| (159) | Thus, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that all payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene were made on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid.
  In particular, the Authority has doubts as to whether the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group (the tour bus activities in particular), were financed by the annual public service compensation in contravention of the provisions providing for the aid. The information provided has not enabled the Authority to conclude that the annual payments were restricted to cover only costs that could be covered in accordance with the legal framework of the scheme — in other words, whether the annual compensation exceeded the difference between the costs and the revenues of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Thus, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that all payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene were made on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid.

In particular, the Authority has doubts as to whether the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group (the tour bus activities in particular), were financed by the annual public service compensation in contravention of the provisions providing for the aid. The information provided has not enabled the Authority to conclude that the annual payments were restricted to cover only costs that could be covered in accordance with the legal framework of the scheme — in other words, whether the annual compensation exceeded the difference between the costs and the revenues of the public service.

8.4.3.   2004 capital injection

| (160) | Turning to the 2004 capital injection, already since the mid-1990s, it was clear that the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier was underfunded. Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented. In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier in order for the compensation to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

Turning to the 2004 capital injection, already since the mid-1990s, it was clear that the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier was underfunded. Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented. In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier in order for the compensation to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service.

| (161) | In 2004, the remaining shortfall was covered by a capital injection of NOK 111 760 000. Although it was not granted as part of the annual lump sum to AS Sporveisbussene, the payment appears to mainly (77) have been made on the basis of the existing aid scheme, in that it went to cover a cost incurred whilst providing the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

In 2004, the remaining shortfall was covered by a capital injection of NOK 111 760 000. Although it was not granted as part of the annual lump sum to AS Sporveisbussene, the payment appears to mainly (77) have been made on the basis of the existing aid scheme, in that it went to cover a cost incurred whilst providing the public service.

| (162) | As noted above, the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the concessionaire is to be compensated for the public service, in practice, the compensation has simply been awarded annually in the form of lump sums in accordance with the established administrative practice. The EFTA Court has held (78) that when an existing aid scheme does not have any particular provisions on how the aid is to be provided, a divergence from the usual procedure cannot in and of itself, lead to the finding that the aid was not granted on the basis of that scheme. The fact that the 2004 capital injection was not made in accordance with the normal annual block grant procedure cannot in and of itself entail that it was not made on the basis of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

As noted above, the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the concessionaire is to be compensated for the public service, in practice, the compensation has simply been awarded annually in the form of lump sums in accordance with the established administrative practice. The EFTA Court has held (78) that when an existing aid scheme does not have any particular provisions on how the aid is to be provided, a divergence from the usual procedure cannot in and of itself, lead to the finding that the aid was not granted on the basis of that scheme. The fact that the 2004 capital injection was not made in accordance with the normal annual block grant procedure cannot in and of itself entail that it was not made on the basis of the scheme.

| (163) | As described above, Oslo Muncipality had since the mid-1990s increased the annual public service compensation payments to cover a historic shortfall in the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group by 2020. These pension costs were predominantly (79) linked to the public service which Oslo Municipality was obliged to cover in accordance with their obligation to cover the cost of the public service. Instead of continuing with the annual payments until 2020, it was decided that the 2004 capital injection should cover the remaining share of the underfunding, thus eliminating the need for further annual payments to cover the historic underfunding. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

As described above, Oslo Muncipality had since the mid-1990s increased the annual public service compensation payments to cover a historic shortfall in the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group by 2020. These pension costs were predominantly (79) linked to the public service which Oslo Municipality was obliged to cover in accordance with their obligation to cover the cost of the public service. Instead of continuing with the annual payments until 2020, it was decided that the 2004 capital injection should cover the remaining share of the underfunding, thus eliminating the need for further annual payments to cover the historic underfunding.

| (164) | On this basis, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that the 2004 capital injection was largely carried out in accordance with the provisions providing for the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

On this basis, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that the 2004 capital injection was largely carried out in accordance with the provisions providing for the aid.

| (165) | However, the Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority that the capital injection was not restricted to cover the cost of the pensions related to the public service. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the capital injection also covered pension obligations related to employees engaged in commercial tour bus services and have calculated the amount of this compensation to be approximately NOK 430 300. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

However, the Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority that the capital injection was not restricted to cover the cost of the pensions related to the public service. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the capital injection also covered pension obligations related to employees engaged in commercial tour bus services and have calculated the amount of this compensation to be approximately NOK 430 300.

| (166) | As this portion of the compensation does not appear to have been disbursed on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid, it appears that it cannot be held to be covered by the existing aid scheme. Thus, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that it represents new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

As this portion of the compensation does not appear to have been disbursed on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid, it appears that it cannot be held to be covered by the existing aid scheme. Thus, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that it represents new aid.

8.5.   
  Alterations to existing aid

| (167) | According to Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3, a measure that existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and was still in force afterwards is existing aid. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

According to Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3, a measure that existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and was still in force afterwards is existing aid.

| (168) | Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:
  ‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:

‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’.

| (169) | In Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:
  ‘[...] the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it (80).’ |
| --- | --- |

(169)

In Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:

‘[...] the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it (80).’

| (170) | As set out in the factual description of the case above, there are a number of events that could potentially be considered as altering the scheme and turning it into new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

As set out in the factual description of the case above, there are a number of events that could potentially be considered as altering the scheme and turning it into new aid.

8.5.1.   1997 internal reorganisation

| (171) | In 1997, an internal reorganisation led the newly established entity AS Sporveisbussene to take over the responsibility of carrying out the scheduled bus transport services previously provided by AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

In 1997, an internal reorganisation led the newly established entity AS Sporveisbussene to take over the responsibility of carrying out the scheduled bus transport services previously provided by AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (172) | Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (81). The question is whether this reorganisation brought with it a change to the existing aid scheme involving new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (81). The question is whether this reorganisation brought with it a change to the existing aid scheme involving new aid.

| (173) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that, in essence, the change from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene as the provider of the service was a change of a formal nature. By establishing AS Sporveisbussene, AS Oslo Sporveier created a subsidiary for operating public bus services that it formerly ran itself. AS Oslo Sporveier — in its position as the mother company — remained, however, the primary recipient of the compensation and holder of the concession, and simply underwent an internal reorganisation that led to AS Sporveisbussene being in charge of providing the services in accordance with the concession. For this it received compensation from its mother company. The reorganisation did necessitate the conclusion of the Transport Agreement, which however, as the Norwegian authorities have explained, did not substantially change the established administrative practice relating to the financing of the public service. Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that, in essence, the change from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene as the provider of the service was a change of a formal nature. By establishing AS Sporveisbussene, AS Oslo Sporveier created a subsidiary for operating public bus services that it formerly ran itself. AS Oslo Sporveier — in its position as the mother company — remained, however, the primary recipient of the compensation and holder of the concession, and simply underwent an internal reorganisation that led to AS Sporveisbussene being in charge of providing the services in accordance with the concession. For this it received compensation from its mother company. The reorganisation did necessitate the conclusion of the Transport Agreement, which however, as the Norwegian authorities have explained, did not substantially change the established administrative practice relating to the financing of the public service. Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR.

| (174) | On this basis, the reorganisation of 1997 cannot be held to have involved a substantive change to the aid scheme (82). Consequently, the scheme remained in the Authority’s preliminary view an existing aid scheme after the reorganisation. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

On this basis, the reorganisation of 1997 cannot be held to have involved a substantive change to the aid scheme (82). Consequently, the scheme remained in the Authority’s preliminary view an existing aid scheme after the reorganisation.

8.5.2.   Renewal of concession

| (175) | With reference to the description of the scheme above, the Authority notes that it does not consider the concession to form part of the provisions providing for the existing aid scheme. The concession, granted for a duration of 10 years pursuant to the CTA, appears to be an act of entrustment. The entrustment in essence determines the route(s) for which the concessionaire has a right and obligation to provide a scheduled service. The Authority considers that an existing aid scheme will not be altered by the grant or renewal of an act of entrustment under that scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

With reference to the description of the scheme above, the Authority notes that it does not consider the concession to form part of the provisions providing for the existing aid scheme. The concession, granted for a duration of 10 years pursuant to the CTA, appears to be an act of entrustment. The entrustment in essence determines the route(s) for which the concessionaire has a right and obligation to provide a scheduled service. The Authority considers that an existing aid scheme will not be altered by the grant or renewal of an act of entrustment under that scheme.

| (176) | In any event, other than the temporal prolongation, no changes were made to the renewed concession. AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

In any event, other than the temporal prolongation, no changes were made to the renewed concession. AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession.

| (177) | Therefore, the Authority does not consider the renewal of the concession as an alteration to the existing aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

Therefore, the Authority does not consider the renewal of the concession as an alteration to the existing aid scheme.

8.5.3.   Introduction of a quality bonus/malus system

| (178) | AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system some time before 2004. The Authority has not received exact information on when this system was introduced. Nor has the Authority received information on how the system was implemented in the contractual relationship between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. Thus, further information is necessary for the Authority to fully assess the nature of the quality bonus and its relationship to the existing aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system some time before 2004. The Authority has not received exact information on when this system was introduced. Nor has the Authority received information on how the system was implemented in the contractual relationship between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. Thus, further information is necessary for the Authority to fully assess the nature of the quality bonus and its relationship to the existing aid scheme.

| (179) | The Authority is at this stage of the opinion that the quality bonus that AS Sporveisbussene received in 2004 pursuant to the bonus/malus system could either form part of the compensation for the public service, possibly constituting part of the reasonable profit that the company appears to have been entitled to, or a change to the existing aid scheme. If so, this measure could constitute new aid (83). |
| --- | --- |

(179)

The Authority is at this stage of the opinion that the quality bonus that AS Sporveisbussene received in 2004 pursuant to the bonus/malus system could either form part of the compensation for the public service, possibly constituting part of the reasonable profit that the company appears to have been entitled to, or a change to the existing aid scheme. If so, this measure could constitute new aid (83).

8.6.   
  Period subsequent to 30 March 2008

| (180) | In the early 2000s, Oslo Municipality decided to tender all public service contracts for scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region. By 30 March 2008, this process was brought to an end, thus AS Oslo Sporveier’s concession was without object, and all services were provided on the basis of tendered contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

In the early 2000s, Oslo Municipality decided to tender all public service contracts for scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region. By 30 March 2008, this process was brought to an end, thus AS Oslo Sporveier’s concession was without object, and all services were provided on the basis of tendered contracts.

| (181) | Therefore, from 30 March 2008 onwards, the new concessionaires have been remunerated on the basis of the tendered contracts, and not in accordance with the system described above under which aid had been granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene before. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

Therefore, from 30 March 2008 onwards, the new concessionaires have been remunerated on the basis of the tendered contracts, and not in accordance with the system described above under which aid had been granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene before.

9.   Compatibility of the aid

| (182) | As set out above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that a substantial part of the aid to AS Oslo Sporveier (in the form of annual compensation and the 2004 capital injection) was granted under an existing aid scheme. The Authority has furthermore come to the preliminary conclusion that the bonus/malus system introduced some time before 2004 may represent new aid. Moreover, the Authority has preliminarily concluded that some of the aid was potentially granted outside the aforementioned scheme and thus constitutes new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

As set out above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that a substantial part of the aid to AS Oslo Sporveier (in the form of annual compensation and the 2004 capital injection) was granted under an existing aid scheme. The Authority has furthermore come to the preliminary conclusion that the bonus/malus system introduced some time before 2004 may represent new aid. Moreover, the Authority has preliminarily concluded that some of the aid was potentially granted outside the aforementioned scheme and thus constitutes new aid.

| (183) | The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not submitted any arguments relating to the compatibility of either the new or existing aid described above. In the absence of such information and, in particular, without a detailed account of which costs formed the basis for the annual payment negotiations and the methodology and justification for the allocation of common cost, the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not submitted any arguments relating to the compatibility of either the new or existing aid described above. In the absence of such information and, in particular, without a detailed account of which costs formed the basis for the annual payment negotiations and the methodology and justification for the allocation of common cost, the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter.

| (184) | However, it would appear to the Authority that the compensation payments for the public service, or at least parts thereof, and the capital injection to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, or at least parts thereof, could be compatible public service compensation under Article of the 49 EEA. This provision cannot be applied directly (84) but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (85) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (86). An essential element in the assessment under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

However, it would appear to the Authority that the compensation payments for the public service, or at least parts thereof, and the capital injection to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, or at least parts thereof, could be compatible public service compensation under Article of the 49 EEA. This provision cannot be applied directly (84) but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (85) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (86). An essential element in the assessment under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation.

| (185) | Moreover, it also cannot be excluded at this stage that the aid measures under assessment, in particular the capital injection to remedy the underfunded pension fund, could be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

Moreover, it also cannot be excluded at this stage that the aid measures under assessment, in particular the capital injection to remedy the underfunded pension fund, could be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (186) | Should any new aid have been granted that benefitted the commercial activities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, the Authority does not at this stage envisage any provision in EEA State aid law that could form the basis for deeming such aid compatible. As the Authority expresses solely a preliminary view however, the Norwegian authorities are invited to submit arguments and information regarding the compatibility of all State aid that was granted to the Oslo Sporveier Group, including (potential) aid to the commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

Should any new aid have been granted that benefitted the commercial activities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, the Authority does not at this stage envisage any provision in EEA State aid law that could form the basis for deeming such aid compatible. As the Authority expresses solely a preliminary view however, the Norwegian authorities are invited to submit arguments and information regarding the compatibility of all State aid that was granted to the Oslo Sporveier Group, including (potential) aid to the commercial activities.

10.   Conclusion

| (187) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has come to the conclusion that the complainant’s allegations that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene may involve unlawful State aid are unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has come to the conclusion that the complainant’s allegations that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene may involve unlawful State aid are unfounded.

| (188) | However, the Authority preliminarily considers that the three additional measures referred to by the complainant — namely: (i) the annual compensation payments for scheduled bus services; (ii) the 2004 capital injection; and (iii) an alleged favourable tax position benefiting AS Sporveisbussene — may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. As regards the second measure, the Authority has doubts whether (parts of) it might indeed have been granted in line with the market economy investor principle. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

However, the Authority preliminarily considers that the three additional measures referred to by the complainant — namely: (i) the annual compensation payments for scheduled bus services; (ii) the 2004 capital injection; and (iii) an alleged favourable tax position benefiting AS Sporveisbussene — may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. As regards the second measure, the Authority has doubts whether (parts of) it might indeed have been granted in line with the market economy investor principle.

| (189) | As established above, the Authority moreover is at this stage of the view that most of the State aid appears to have been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Oslo to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service. However, the Authority has doubts as to the precise delineation of that scheme, i.e. how exactly the costs, that formed the basis for the annual negotiations on the compensation payment, were calculated, and which costs were exactly taken into account. Given that the beneficiary is also engaged in commercial activities, the Authority doubts at this stage if indeed costs that should have been borne by those commercial activities were taken into account in the process of calculating the annual compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

As established above, the Authority moreover is at this stage of the view that most of the State aid appears to have been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Oslo to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service. However, the Authority has doubts as to the precise delineation of that scheme, i.e. how exactly the costs, that formed the basis for the annual negotiations on the compensation payment, were calculated, and which costs were exactly taken into account. Given that the beneficiary is also engaged in commercial activities, the Authority doubts at this stage if indeed costs that should have been borne by those commercial activities were taken into account in the process of calculating the annual compensation.

| (190) | Furthermore, and in line with the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted in line with the scheme would have to be qualified as new aid. It preliminarily considers that the 2004 capital injection also covered underfunded pension funds of employees of the commercial activities of the beneficiary. Moreover, it doubts whether the quality bonus described above has been granted on the basis of the scheme, or whether it is a severable amendment to the scheme involving new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

Furthermore, and in line with the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted in line with the scheme would have to be qualified as new aid. It preliminarily considers that the 2004 capital injection also covered underfunded pension funds of employees of the commercial activities of the beneficiary. Moreover, it doubts whether the quality bonus described above has been granted on the basis of the scheme, or whether it is a severable amendment to the scheme involving new aid.

| (191) | Finally, if any new aid not in line with the scheme has been granted, the Authority has doubts as to whether such aid would be compatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular Articles 49 and 61(3)(c) thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

Finally, if any new aid not in line with the scheme has been granted, the Authority has doubts as to whether such aid would be compatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular Articles 49 and 61(3)(c) thereof.

| (192) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute aid, are existing aid or new aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute aid, are existing aid or new aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (193) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this Decision. In particular, it invites the Norwegian authorities to comment, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, on:






  (a) | the compliance of the commercial activities capital injection with the market economy investor principle; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(193)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this Decision. In particular, it invites the Norwegian authorities to comment, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, on:

(a)

the compliance of the commercial activities capital injection with the market economy investor principle;

| (b) | the description of the potential existing aid scheme in this Decision; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the description of the potential existing aid scheme in this Decision;

| (c) | the costs that were taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation, and whether it can be excluded that costs of the commercial activities were taken into account for this purpose; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the costs that were taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation, and whether it can be excluded that costs of the commercial activities were taken into account for this purpose;

| (d) | the distribution of common costs between the various activities and subsidiaries, and the methodology for the pricing of services provided by the public service activities to the commercial activities; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the distribution of common costs between the various activities and subsidiaries, and the methodology for the pricing of services provided by the public service activities to the commercial activities;

| (e) | a detailed description of the rules on group taxation, and their application to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

a detailed description of the rules on group taxation, and their application to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group;

| (f) | the nature and potential compatibility of the amounts paid under the bonus/malus system; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the nature and potential compatibility of the amounts paid under the bonus/malus system;

| (g) | how, should any of the above measures entail new aid, they could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(g)

how, should any of the above measures entail new aid, they could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (194) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to immediately forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to immediately forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid.

| (195) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless, exceptionally, such recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(195)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless, exceptionally, such recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers the allegation that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries may involve unlawful State aid are without object.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the compensation for scheduled bus services in Oslo paid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene during the period 1 January 1994-30 March 2008, the capital injection paid by Oslo Municipality on 1 June 2004, and the application of the group taxation rules to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the nature and compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Decision made at Brussels, 28 March 2012.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/195-04-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Judgment, paras. 55-63.

2

(3)  Ibid., paragraphs 76-80.

3

(4)  Ibid., paragraphs 84-91.

4

(5)  References to the ‘Oslo Sporveier Group’ in this Decision will be used to refer to AS Oslo Sporveier and its subsidiaries.

5

(6)  Act of 21.6.2002 No 45 (e.i.f. 1.1.2003).

6

(7)  Regulation of 26.3.2003 No 401 (e.i.f. 1.4.2003).

7

(8)  Act of 4.6.1976 No 63 (e.i.f. 1.7.1977). Repealed and replaced by the CTA on 1.1.2003.

8

(9)  Regulation of 12.8.1986 No 2170 (e.i.f. 1.1.1987) and Regulation of 4.12.1992 No 1013 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994). Both repealed and replaced by the CTR on 1.4.2003.

9

(10)  In Norwegian: Administrasjonsselskap.

10

Administrasjonsselskap

(11)  Article 23 CTA.

11

(12)  Article 22(3) CTA.

12

(13)  Article 22(4) CTA.

13

(14)  Articles 4 and 6 CTA.

14

(15)  Article 4(1) CTA.

15

(16)  Article 4(2) CTA and Chapter I of the CTR.

16

(17)  Article 27(1) CTA.

17

(18)  Article 6(1) CTA.

18

(19)  Article 25 CTR.

19

(20)  Articles 28 and 29 CTR. These are the requirements the Authority considers to be the most relevant for the purposes of describing the national scheme, however, a number of other detailed requirements for a special concession are set out in the CTR.

20

(21)  Articles 28(2) and 29(2) CTR.

21

(22)  Article 27(2) CTR.

22

(23)  As stated in the preparatory works, Chapter 10.1 of Prop. 113 L (2009-2010).

23

(24)  Article 8 CTA. The possibility to tender the concessions was introduced by an amendment of the Transport Act of 1976 by Act of 11.6.1993 No 85 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994).

24

(25)  Article 22(5) CTA. The 1997 Transport Agreement between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, discussed in Section I.4 below, is an example of such a contract.

25

(26)  Article 22(1) CTA.

26

(27)  Since 1934, Oslo Municipality has practically been the sole owner of AS Oslo Sporveier (with 98,8 % ownership) until a reorganisation in July 2006. Following this reorganisation, a new company, Kollektivtransportproduksjon, which is wholly owned by Oslo Municipality, became the 100 % owner of AS Oslo Sporveier.

27

(28)  According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality was involved in all issues of commercial importance relating to the carrying out of collective bus transport by AS Oslo Sporveier, including financial aspects of agreements/contracts with subsidiaries (such as AS Sporveisbussene) or other third parties. Oslo Municipality was involved via the management board of AS Oslo Sporveier.

28

(29)  Additionally, AS Oslo Sporveier had other departments operating i.a. underground, tram and ferry services.

29

(30)  Three other operators, ING. M.O. Schøyens Bilcentraler A/S, Norgesbuss AS/Oslo and Follo Busstrafikk A/S also held concessions for carrying scheduled bus transport on a few specified routes in Oslo. Norgesbuss AS/Oslo acquired Follo Busstrafikk A/S in 1996 and with that took over its concessions.

30

(31)  Article 22 CTA.

31

(32)  All ticket revenue generated by direct sale on their own buses, plus a share of the ticket revenue stemming from AS Oslo Sporveier, Stor-Oslo Lokaltrafikk and Norges Statsbaner.

32

(33)  The exact figure is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. It is in the range of 2 %-7 %.

33

(34)  Own calculation by the Authority.

34

(35)  Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse was the pension fund for the employees of the Oslo Sporveier Group. The 2004 capital injection covered the underfunding related to the pension obligations of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

35

(36)  The Norwegian authorities have explained that prior to the 2004 capital injection, AS Sporveisbussene recorded its pension obligations using the so-called ‘corridor solution’. Using this accounting method, the company amortised adjustments in calculated pension obligations over a period of 10 years. The ‘corridor solution’ was based on the assumption that there will be deviations every year between the long-term assumptions and realities and that, over time, such differences will even out. In 2004, the Norwegian authorities decided to change the accounting method used for recording pension obligations. Annual adjustments that included, in the accounts, all costs over the period of assumed average employment were made. As a consequence, AS Sporveisbussene recorded in 2004 a reduction in equity of NOK 80 934 000 (under the item ‘estimatavvik’), which reflects this change in accounting methods. These changes resulted in an increase in the obligations recognised in the balance sheet and a corresponding reduction of the equity capital of the company. This change in accounting principles did not have an impact on the amount of capital needed to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, but rather explains some of the changes in the accounts of AS Sporveisbussene from 2003 to 2004 to which the complaint referred.

36

(37)  Alternatively, the complainant might have deducted the share capital reduction of NOK 70 261 000 (as reported in the accounts of 2004) from the actual capital injection, which amounted to NOK 111 760 000.

37

(38)  Given that Norwegian national insurance would provide a basic pension between 40 % and 50 %, the employer provided the remaining part through either pension funds or life insurance companies. Oslo Sporveier Group organised their pension fund as a municipal pension fund (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse), in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Insurance Act of 10.6.2005 No 44.

38

(39)  Regulation of 19.2.1993 No 117, Section 28 A.

39

(40)  Not complying with this obligation could have had several legal consequences for Oslo Sporveier Group, for instance it may have been declared bankrupt.

40

(41)  Of which NOK 800 million was transferred from Oslo Municipality.

41

(42)  The amount paid to Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse was NOK 711 980 000 (NOK 90 519 282 (14,1 % of the total amount NOK 802,5 million) was employment tax).

42

(43)  Act of 10.6.1988 No 39 (repealed), Article 8c-11 in conjunction with Article 8c-10 at paragraphs 1 and 3.

43

(44)  The Tax Act of 26.3.1999 No 14, Article 2-2.

44

(45)  Articles 10-2 to 10-4 of the Tax Act.

45

(46)  According to Article 10-1 of the Tax Act, the rules governing group contributions are applicable for ‘aksjeselskap, allmennaksjeselskap samt likestilt selskap og sammenslutning’.

46

(47)  As provided by Act of 13.6.1997 No 44, Articles 1-3 and 1-4.

47

(48)  Article 10-4(1) of the Tax Act.

48

(49)  The actual payment does not necessarily need to take place in the same year as the income is made, provided that it will be effected by a real transfer of wealth at a later date. Accordingly, it is sufficient that the granting company undertakes an unconditional obligation to make the contribution.

49

(50)  Article 10-2(1) of the Tax Act.

50

(51)  Article 10-3(1) of the Tax Act.

51

(52)  Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings, OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17, incorporated by means of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

52

(53)  As regards, in particular, the quality bonus from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million, the Authority has not received information allowing it to exclude that the funds stem from State resources, or that the payment is not imputable to the State. As Oslo Municipality is involved in all issues of commercial importance relating to the provision of scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region, and AS Oslo Sporveier is a publicly-owned company, it is likely that the transaction could be held to be imputable to the State and thus represent State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

53

(54)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747. See also Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.

54

Altmark

BUPA

(55)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 89-93.

55

Altmark

(56)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 94-95.

56

Altmark

(57)  Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [2006] ECR I-3547, at paragraph 60.

57

SFEI

La Poste

(58)  This principle is explained in the Authority’s guidelines Part IV Rules on public service compensation, State ownership of enterprises and aid to public enterprises, Application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector.

58

(59)  Cf. for example Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Kingdom of Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, at paragraph 28. See also Case 40/857 Belgium v Commission (Boch) [1986] ECR-2321, at paragraph 13; Case C-301/87 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraphs 39-40; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission (Lanerossi) [1991] ECR I-1433, at paragraph 24.

59

Kingdom of Spain

Commission

Belgium

Commission (Boch)

France

Commission (Boussac)

Italy

Commission (Lanerossi)

(60)  Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission [2003] ECR II-435, at paragraph 222.

60

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen

Commission

(61)  Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke ECR [2001] I-8365, paragraph 41.

61

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

(62)  Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04, Fesil and Finnfjord and Others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court Report, 117 at paragraph 93.

62

Fesil and Finnfjord and Others

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(63)  Moreover, the Court of Justice observed in the Altmark judgment that since 1995 several EU Member States had voluntarily opened-up certain urban, suburban or regional transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other EU Member States, the risk to inter-Member State trade was not hypothetical, but real as the market was open to competition (paragraphs 69 and 79).

63

Altmark

(64)  Paragraphs 77 and 82 of the Altmark judgment.

64

Altmark

(65)  See also Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26.

65

France

Commission

Italy

Commission

(66)  Paragraphs 50-53.

66

(67)  Cf. Sinnaeve/Slot, The new Regulation on State aid Procedures, Common Market Law Review 36/1999, p. 1153, footnote 28.

67

(68)  See the Authority’s Decision No 405/08/COL HFF (OJ L 79, 25.3.2010, p. 40 and the EEA Supplement No 14, 25.3.2010, p. 20), Chapter II.2.3.1, p. 23: ‘The State guarantee on all State institutions for all their obligations follows from general unwritten rules of Icelandic public law predating the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. The guarantee is applicable to all State institutions, regardless of when they are established, or of their activities, or changes in those activities. This possible aid measure must be regarded as a scheme falling within the definition in Article 1(d) in part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.’

68

(69)  See Commission Decision in Case E-45/2000 (Netherlands) Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group (OJ C 37, 11.2.2004, p. 13).

69

Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group

(70)  From the Authority’s Decision No 491/09/COL Norsk Film group (OJ C 174, 1.7.2010, p. 3 and the EEA Supplement No 34, 1.7.2010, p. 1), Chapter II.2 p. 8: ‘the yearly payments made by the Norwegian State since the 1970s to Norsk FilmStudio AS/Filmparken AS for the production of feature films and to maintain an infrastructure necessary for the production of films were based on an existing system of aid. The Authority considers that in this case, where regular payments were consistently made over a very long period of time, the practice shows that State support was an essential element in the financing of the company. The Authority considers on that basis that the annual grants were made under an existing system of state aid within the meaning of Article 62 EEA.’ In that case, the Authority opened the formal investigation into a payment of NOK 36 million that had been made in addition to the regular payments and an alleged preferential tax measure. With Decision No 204/11/COL (not yet published in the OJ, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/) the Authority closed the procedure on the basis that the NOK 36 million payment was made on the basis of the existing aid scheme and that the tax measure did not constitute State aid.

70

(71)  See Commission Decision in Case E-10/2000 (Germany) State guarantees for public banks in Germany (OJ C 150, 22.6.2002, p. 6).

71

State guarantees for public banks in Germany

(72)  See Commission Decision in Case E-4/07 (France) Charges aéroportuaires, paragraph 56 (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 16).

72

Charges aéroportuaires

(73)  Cf. Commission Decision in Case C-6/08 (Finland) Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus, (not yet published), paragraphs 107-109 in particular.

73

Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus

(74)  Paragraphs 73-76.

74

(75)  The same logic applies for schemes that have been approved by the Authority or the European Commission. See for example Case C-47/91, Italy v Commission [1994] ECR-4635, paragraphs 25-26.

75

Italy

Commission

(76)  The exact figure is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. It is in the range of 2 %-7 %.

76

(77)  See below on the approximate amount of NOK 430 300 that went to cover non-PSO pension costs.

77

(78)  Paragraph 87 of the judgment of the EFTA Court.

78

(79)  See below on the approximate amount of NOK 430 300 that went to cover non-PSO pension costs.

79

(80)  Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 28.

80

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit

(81)  See Article 4(1) of the Implementing Provisions Decision. See also the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Namur (cited above).

81

Namur

(82)  This is supported by the conclusions drawn by the European Commission in similar cases, see the Commission Decisions in Case NN 73/08 (Hungary) Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt. (OJ C 109, 13.5.2009, p. 5), at paragraphs 59-60 and Case E-14/05 (Portugal) Compensation payments to public service broadcaster RTP (not published in the OJ) at paragraphs 78-80.

82

Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt.

Compensation payments to public service broadcaster RTP

(83)  Only changes affecting the substance of an existing scheme can transform that existing aid to new aid. Changes severable from the existing aid will not affect the substance of that existing aid (Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraph 111).

83

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(84)  See Altmark (cited above), at paragraph 107.

84

Altmark

(85)  Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 on public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ L 156, 8.6.1969, p. 8), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement.

85

(86)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement. Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 entered into force in Norway on 1 January 2011, see Regulation of 17.12.2010 No 1673.

86

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V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/41

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CONVOCATORIA DE OPOSICIONES GENERALES

2012/C 204/05

La Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) organiza las siguientes oposiciones generales:

| | EPSO/AD/240/12 — Traductores de lengua estonia (ET) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/240/12 — Traductores de lengua estonia (ET)

| | EPSO/AD/241/12 — Traductores de lengua irlandesa (GA) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/241/12 — Traductores de lengua irlandesa (GA)

| | EPSO/AD/242/12 — Traductores de lengua letona (LV) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/242/12 — Traductores de lengua letona (LV)

| | EPSO/AD/243/12 — Traductores de lengua portuguesa (PT) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/243/12 — Traductores de lengua portuguesa (PT)

Los anuncios de oposición se publicarán exclusivamente en estonio, irlandés, letón y portugués en el Diario Oficial C 204 A de 12 de julio de 2012.

Para más información, consúltese el sitio Web de EPSO en la dirección: http://www.eu-careers.info

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PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/42

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Notificación previa de una operación de concentración

[Asunto COMP/M.6647 — Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)]

Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2012/C 204/06

| 1. | El 5 de julio de 2012, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual las empresas Mitsubishi Corporation («MC», Japón) y Mitsubishi Electric Corporation («MELCO», Japón) adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones, de la totalidad de Mitsubishi Elevator Singapore Co. Ltd («MESP», Singapur) mediante adquisición de acciones. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El 5 de julio de 2012, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual las empresas Mitsubishi Corporation («MC», Japón) y Mitsubishi Electric Corporation («MELCO», Japón) adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones, de la totalidad de Mitsubishi Elevator Singapore Co. Ltd («MESP», Singapur) mediante adquisición de acciones.

| 2. | Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:






  — | MC es una empresa comercial general con actividad en diversos sectores, entre los que se incluyen los de energía, metales, maquinaria, productos químicos, alimentos y mercancía general, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:

—

MC es una empresa comercial general con actividad en diversos sectores, entre los que se incluyen los de energía, metales, maquinaria, productos químicos, alimentos y mercancía general,

| — | MELCO desarrolla su actividad en la fabricación y venta de equipos eléctricos y electrónicos utilizados en sistemas energéticos y eléctricos, automatización industrial, sistemas de información y comunicación, dispositivos electrónicos y aparatos domésticos, |
| --- | --- |

—

MELCO desarrolla su actividad en la fabricación y venta de equipos eléctricos y electrónicos utilizados en sistemas energéticos y eléctricos, automatización industrial, sistemas de información y comunicación, dispositivos electrónicos y aparatos domésticos,

| — | MESP es una sociedad registrada de Singapur activa en el suministro, distribución, instalación y mantenimiento de ascensores y escaleras mecánicas de MELCO en Singapur. Sus actividades se limitan a Singapur. |
| --- | --- |

—

MESP es una sociedad registrada de Singapur activa en el suministro, distribución, instalación y mantenimiento de ascensores y escaleras mecánicas de MELCO en Singapur. Sus actividades se limitan a Singapur.

| 3. | Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación.

| 4. | La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.
  Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia COMP/M.6647 — Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore), a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Registro de Concentraciones |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.

Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia COMP/M.6647 — Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore), a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Registro de Concentraciones

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones»).

(2)  DO C 56 de 5.3.2005, p. 32 («Comunicación sobre el procedimiento simplificado»).

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| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/43

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Notificación previa de una operación de concentración

(Asunto COMP/M.6651 — Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings)

Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2012/C 204/07

| 1. | El 5 de julio de 2012, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual fondos asesorados y gestionados por The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. («Goldman Sachs», EE.UU.) y Mr William C. Young adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones, de la empresa Plastipak Holdings, Inc. («Plastipak», EE.UU.) mediante adquisición de acciones. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El 5 de julio de 2012, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual fondos asesorados y gestionados por The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. («Goldman Sachs», EE.UU.) y Mr William C. Young adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones, de la empresa Plastipak Holdings, Inc. («Plastipak», EE.UU.) mediante adquisición de acciones.

| 2. | Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:






  — | Goldman Sachs: banco de inversiones mundial, empresa de gestión de valores e inversiones, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:

—

Goldman Sachs: banco de inversiones mundial, empresa de gestión de valores e inversiones,

| — | Mr William C. Young: persona física que controla varias empresas, |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr William C. Young: persona física que controla varias empresas,

| — | Plastipak: fabricante de resinas plásticas, recipientes y preformas de plástico para envasado, que lleva a cabo también operaciones de reciclado para la producción de materias primas plásticas recicladas post-consumo. |
| --- | --- |

—

Plastipak: fabricante de resinas plásticas, recipientes y preformas de plástico para envasado, que lleva a cabo también operaciones de reciclado para la producción de materias primas plásticas recicladas post-consumo.

| 3. | Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación.

| 4. | La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.
  Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia COMP/M.6651 — Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings, a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Registro de Concentraciones |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.

Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia COMP/M.6651 — Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings, a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Registro de Concentraciones

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Reglamento comunitario de concentraciones»).

(2)  DO C 56 de 5.3.2005, p. 32 («Comunicación sobre el procedimiento simplificado»).

---

| 12.7.2012 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 204/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 204/44

---

Comunicación de la Comisión publicada de conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo en el asunto COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs)

[notificada con el número C(2012) 4873]

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2012/C 204/08

1.   INTRODUCCIÓN

| 1. | Con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002 (1), cuando la Comisión se disponga a adoptar una decisión que ordene la cesación de una infracción y las empresas interesadas propongan compromisos que respondan a las inquietudes que les haya manifestado la Comisión en su análisis preliminar, ésta podrá, mediante decisión, convertir dichos compromisos en obligatorios para las empresas. La decisión podrá ser adoptada por un período de tiempo determinado y en ella constará que ya no hay motivos para la intervención de la Comisión. Con arreglo al artículo 27, apartado 4, del mismo Reglamento, la Comisión publicará un breve resumen del asunto y el contenido fundamental de los compromisos o de la línea de acción propuesta. Los terceros interesados podrán presentar sus observaciones en un plazo que fijará la Comisión. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002 (1), cuando la Comisión se disponga a adoptar una decisión que ordene la cesación de una infracción y las empresas interesadas propongan compromisos que respondan a las inquietudes que les haya manifestado la Comisión en su análisis preliminar, ésta podrá, mediante decisión, convertir dichos compromisos en obligatorios para las empresas. La decisión podrá ser adoptada por un período de tiempo determinado y en ella constará que ya no hay motivos para la intervención de la Comisión. Con arreglo al artículo 27, apartado 4, del mismo Reglamento, la Comisión publicará un breve resumen del asunto y el contenido fundamental de los compromisos o de la línea de acción propuesta. Los terceros interesados podrán presentar sus observaciones en un plazo que fijará la Comisión.

2.   RESUMEN DEL ASUNTO

| 2. | El 19 de septiembre de 2011, la Comisión aprobó un análisis preliminar a efectos del artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo. El análisis se refería al sector de los servicios de información financiera, más concretamente al mercado de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real (2). El destinatario era Thomson Reuters Corporation y las empresas bajo su control directo o indirecto, incluida Reuters Limited (Thomson Reuters). A la Comisión le preocupa que algunas de las prácticas restrictivas en materia de licencias de Thomson Reuters respecto a los Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) puedan constituir una infracción del artículo 102 del TFUE (3). El procedimiento contra Thomson Reuters se incoó el 30 de octubre de 2009. |
| --- | --- |

2.

El 19 de septiembre de 2011, la Comisión aprobó un análisis preliminar a efectos del artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo. El análisis se refería al sector de los servicios de información financiera, más concretamente al mercado de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real (2). El destinatario era Thomson Reuters Corporation y las empresas bajo su control directo o indirecto, incluida Reuters Limited (Thomson Reuters). A la Comisión le preocupa que algunas de las prácticas restrictivas en materia de licencias de Thomson Reuters respecto a los Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) puedan constituir una infracción del artículo 102 del TFUE (3). El procedimiento contra Thomson Reuters se incoó el 30 de octubre de 2009.

| 3. | Según el análisis preliminar:






  a) | Thomson Reuters domina el mercado mundial de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real (4). |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Según el análisis preliminar:

a)

Thomson Reuters domina el mercado mundial de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real (4).

| b) | Thomson Reuters puede haber abusado de su posición dominante imponiendo a sus clientes restricciones sobre el uso de los RICs. Thomson Reuters a) prohíbe a sus clientes usar los RICs para recuperar datos de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de otros proveedores y b) impide a terceros crear y mantener memorias de correspondencias que incorporen los RICs que permitirían a los sistemas de los clientes de Thomson Reuters interoperar con los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de otros proveedores (5). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Thomson Reuters puede haber abusado de su posición dominante imponiendo a sus clientes restricciones sobre el uso de los RICs. Thomson Reuters a) prohíbe a sus clientes usar los RICs para recuperar datos de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de otros proveedores y b) impide a terceros crear y mantener memorias de correspondencias que incorporen los RICs que permitirían a los sistemas de los clientes de Thomson Reuters interoperar con los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de otros proveedores (5).

| c) | Al parecer estas restricciones crean importantes obstáculos para cambiar de proveedor. Los clientes de Thomson Reuters utilizan ampliamente los RICs en sus aplicaciones y el personal que trabaja con dichas aplicaciones está familiarizado con la simbología de los RICs. Debido a las restricciones implantadas por Thomson Reuters, en los casos en los que los RICs se han integrado en las aplicaciones, cambiar de proveedor supone suprimir los RICs y recodificar dichas aplicaciones con el fin de sustituir los RICs por una simbología alternativa, lo que constituye una tarea ardua y con frecuencia excesivamente costosa. La opinión preliminar de la Comisión es que, en efecto, Thomson Reuters tiene cautivos a sus actuales clientes de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real que han integrado los RICs en sus aplicaciones. En consecuencia, otros proveedores de este tipo de datos no pueden competir efectivamente con Thomson Reuters en el mercado de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Al parecer estas restricciones crean importantes obstáculos para cambiar de proveedor. Los clientes de Thomson Reuters utilizan ampliamente los RICs en sus aplicaciones y el personal que trabaja con dichas aplicaciones está familiarizado con la simbología de los RICs. Debido a las restricciones implantadas por Thomson Reuters, en los casos en los que los RICs se han integrado en las aplicaciones, cambiar de proveedor supone suprimir los RICs y recodificar dichas aplicaciones con el fin de sustituir los RICs por una simbología alternativa, lo que constituye una tarea ardua y con frecuencia excesivamente costosa. La opinión preliminar de la Comisión es que, en efecto, Thomson Reuters tiene cautivos a sus actuales clientes de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real que han integrado los RICs en sus aplicaciones. En consecuencia, otros proveedores de este tipo de datos no pueden competir efectivamente con Thomson Reuters en el mercado de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real.

| 4. | El 14 de diciembre de 2011 (6) se inició una primera prueba de mercado en relación con la propuesta inicial de compromiso ofrecido por Thomson Reuters. Se invitó a los participantes en el mercado a presentar observaciones hasta el 25 de enero de 2012. A raíz de las observaciones recibidas en la primera prueba de mercado, Thomson Reuters ha revisado sustancialmente su propuesta de compromiso para resolver los fallos apuntados por dichos participantes en relación con las objeciones de la Comisión. |
| --- | --- |

4.

El 14 de diciembre de 2011 (6) se inició una primera prueba de mercado en relación con la propuesta inicial de compromiso ofrecido por Thomson Reuters. Se invitó a los participantes en el mercado a presentar observaciones hasta el 25 de enero de 2012. A raíz de las observaciones recibidas en la primera prueba de mercado, Thomson Reuters ha revisado sustancialmente su propuesta de compromiso para resolver los fallos apuntados por dichos participantes en relación con las objeciones de la Comisión.

| 5. | Los compromisos revisados difieren de los compromisos anteriores en varios aspectos. Los principales cambios son los siguientes:






  a) | se reduce el nivel del canon aplicable a la licencia RIC ampliada (Extended RIC Licence o «ERL»); |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Los compromisos revisados difieren de los compromisos anteriores en varios aspectos. Los principales cambios son los siguientes:

a)

se reduce el nivel del canon aplicable a la licencia RIC ampliada (Extended RIC Licence o «ERL»);

| b) | la estructura del canon de la ERL ya no está vinculada a cualesquiera descuentos existentes aplicables a los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters y es menos compleja y más transparente; |
| --- | --- |

b)

la estructura del canon de la ERL ya no está vinculada a cualesquiera descuentos existentes aplicables a los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters y es menos compleja y más transparente;

| c) | la ERL puede ser utilizada en todo el mundo por los clientes que realicen verdaderamente operaciones comerciales en el EEE (7); |
| --- | --- |

c)

la ERL puede ser utilizada en todo el mundo por los clientes que realicen verdaderamente operaciones comerciales en el EEE (7);

| d) | la ERL incluye RICs de fuente única sobre instrumentos OTC siempre que el contribuyente pertinente dé su consentimiento (salvo que Thomson Reuters sea el único proveedor de datos sobre instrumentos OTC en el momento del cambio); |
| --- | --- |

d)

la ERL incluye RICs de fuente única sobre instrumentos OTC siempre que el contribuyente pertinente dé su consentimiento (salvo que Thomson Reuters sea el único proveedor de datos sobre instrumentos OTC en el momento del cambio);

| e) | la ERL abarca las interfaces humanas para aplicaciones en servidor (sin coste adicional); |
| --- | --- |

e)

la ERL abarca las interfaces humanas para aplicaciones en servidor (sin coste adicional);

| f) | además del periodo inicial de cinco años durante el cual está disponible la suscripción a la ERL, el cliente tiene la opción de ampliar el plazo de suscripción otros dos año a cambio de un canon nominal; y |
| --- | --- |

f)

además del periodo inicial de cinco años durante el cual está disponible la suscripción a la ERL, el cliente tiene la opción de ampliar el plazo de suscripción otros dos año a cambio de un canon nominal; y

| g) | se pondrá a disposición de los desarrolladores terceros una licencia separada para que puedan desarrollar y mantener herramientas que faciliten el cambio para venderlas a los clientes con objeto de facilitar que estos cambien de proveedor. |
| --- | --- |

g)

se pondrá a disposición de los desarrolladores terceros una licencia separada para que puedan desarrollar y mantener herramientas que faciliten el cambio para venderlas a los clientes con objeto de facilitar que estos cambien de proveedor.

3.   CONTENIDO FUNDAMENTAL DE LOS COMPROMISOS REVISADOS

| 6. | Thomson Reuters no está de acuerdo con el análisis preliminar de la Comisión. No obstante, ha ofrecido una serie de compromisos con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 con objeto de despejar las objeciones de la Comisión desde la óptica de la competencia. Los compromisos ofrecidos por Thomson Reuters (los «compromisos») se resumen brevemente a continuación. Una versión no confidencial de los compromisos está publicada íntegramente en lengua inglesa en el sitio Internet de la Dirección General de Competencia de la Comisión:
  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

6.

Thomson Reuters no está de acuerdo con el análisis preliminar de la Comisión. No obstante, ha ofrecido una serie de compromisos con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 con objeto de despejar las objeciones de la Comisión desde la óptica de la competencia. Los compromisos ofrecidos por Thomson Reuters (los «compromisos») se resumen brevemente a continuación. Una versión no confidencial de los compromisos está publicada íntegramente en lengua inglesa en el sitio Internet de la Dirección General de Competencia de la Comisión:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

| 7. | Los compromisos consisten en ofrecer una licencia a los actuales y futuros clientes de RT Service de Thomson Reuters (8) (una ERL) que les da la opción de conceder una licencia sobre derechos adicionales de uso de la simbología RIC a efectos de cambiar de proveedor de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real. Esta licencia les permite, a cambio de abonar un canon de licencia mensual, utilizar los RICs para recuperar datos financieros en tiempo real de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real procedentes de los competidores de Thomson Reuters con el fin de cambiar algunas o todas las aplicaciones en servidor por las de otros proveedores de este tipo de datos. Además, Thomson Reuters entregaría a los titulares de las licencias ERL actualizaciones sistemáticas y en el momento adecuado de los correspondientes RICs incluida, si procede, la información necesaria ligada al RIC (a saber, centro de negociación, fuente, código oficial, moneda y/o descripción). La ERL no afecta a ningún derecho de uso en relación con los RICs de los que ya disfrutan los clientes en virtud de su actual relación contractual con Thomson Reuters. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Los compromisos consisten en ofrecer una licencia a los actuales y futuros clientes de RT Service de Thomson Reuters (8) (una ERL) que les da la opción de conceder una licencia sobre derechos adicionales de uso de la simbología RIC a efectos de cambiar de proveedor de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real. Esta licencia les permite, a cambio de abonar un canon de licencia mensual, utilizar los RICs para recuperar datos financieros en tiempo real de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real procedentes de los competidores de Thomson Reuters con el fin de cambiar algunas o todas las aplicaciones en servidor por las de otros proveedores de este tipo de datos. Además, Thomson Reuters entregaría a los titulares de las licencias ERL actualizaciones sistemáticas y en el momento adecuado de los correspondientes RICs incluida, si procede, la información necesaria ligada al RIC (a saber, centro de negociación, fuente, código oficial, moneda y/o descripción). La ERL no afecta a ningún derecho de uso en relación con los RICs de los que ya disfrutan los clientes en virtud de su actual relación contractual con Thomson Reuters.

| 8. | Los compromisos abarcan i) los clientes que cambien parcial y/o totalmente de los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters a otros flujos de datos en tiempo real alternativos; y ii) los clientes que se suscriban a flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de terceros además de al servicio de Thomson Reuters RT sin prescindir de este (por ejemplo como solución de recambio en caso de emergencias por interrupciones o para permitir verificar la funcionalidad y la fiabilidad de nuevos flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Los compromisos abarcan i) los clientes que cambien parcial y/o totalmente de los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters a otros flujos de datos en tiempo real alternativos; y ii) los clientes que se suscriban a flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de terceros además de al servicio de Thomson Reuters RT sin prescindir de este (por ejemplo como solución de recambio en caso de emergencias por interrupciones o para permitir verificar la funcionalidad y la fiabilidad de nuevos flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real).

| 9. | En caso de un cambio parcial, Thomson Reuters se compromete a no discriminar a sus clientes que se pasen a otro u otros proveedores de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real en lo que se refiere a las condiciones en que se suministra el servicio RT de Thomson Reuters. Los clientes que utilicen la ERL para prescindir totalmente de Thomson Reuters no están obligados a suscribir ninguna otra licencia o servicio ofrecidos por Thomson Reuters |
| --- | --- |

9.

En caso de un cambio parcial, Thomson Reuters se compromete a no discriminar a sus clientes que se pasen a otro u otros proveedores de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real en lo que se refiere a las condiciones en que se suministra el servicio RT de Thomson Reuters. Los clientes que utilicen la ERL para prescindir totalmente de Thomson Reuters no están obligados a suscribir ninguna otra licencia o servicio ofrecidos por Thomson Reuters

| 10. | Los clientes podrán suscribirse a la ERL por un periodo de cinco años. Además, los clientes que no se hayan suscrito a la ERL dentro de ese periodo de cinco años pueden adquirir una opción de suscribirse a ella a cambio de un canon administrativo de 150 USD al mes. Esta opción se debe ejercer en los dos años siguientes al periodo inicial de suscripción de cinco años (lo que ofrece a los clientes la posibilidad de suscribirse a la ERL en un plazo de siete años). Una vez suscrita, la licencia ampliada se concede a los clientes a perpetuidad, siempre que se abone el canon correspondiente. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Los clientes podrán suscribirse a la ERL por un periodo de cinco años. Además, los clientes que no se hayan suscrito a la ERL dentro de ese periodo de cinco años pueden adquirir una opción de suscribirse a ella a cambio de un canon administrativo de 150 USD al mes. Esta opción se debe ejercer en los dos años siguientes al periodo inicial de suscripción de cinco años (lo que ofrece a los clientes la posibilidad de suscribirse a la ERL en un plazo de siete años). Una vez suscrita, la licencia ampliada se concede a los clientes a perpetuidad, siempre que se abone el canon correspondiente.

| 11. | La medida correctora se aplicará a todos los símbolos RIC directamente asociados al precio de un instrumento financiero individual o a un valor de índice relativo al servicio Thomson Reuters, por lo tanto, entre otras cosas, i) datos de las bolsas y los sistemas multilaterales de negociación (MTF); y ii) títulos negociados al margen de las bolsas (OTC) y que por tanto no cotizan en ellas o en los MTF. Los RICs relativos a instrumentos negociados OTC para los que Thomson Reuters obtiene los datos de un contribuyente único identificable por el RIC («RICs de fuente única») se incluyen a petición de los clientes, previo consentimiento del contribuyente de datos pertinente. Los RICs de cuyo contenido solamente disponga Thomson Reuters están excluidos, siempre que el contribuyente de datos no ofrezca el contenido al competidor proveedor de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real al que se cambia el cliente. |
| --- | --- |

11.

La medida correctora se aplicará a todos los símbolos RIC directamente asociados al precio de un instrumento financiero individual o a un valor de índice relativo al servicio Thomson Reuters, por lo tanto, entre otras cosas, i) datos de las bolsas y los sistemas multilaterales de negociación (MTF); y ii) títulos negociados al margen de las bolsas (OTC) y que por tanto no cotizan en ellas o en los MTF. Los RICs relativos a instrumentos negociados OTC para los que Thomson Reuters obtiene los datos de un contribuyente único identificable por el RIC («RICs de fuente única») se incluyen a petición de los clientes, previo consentimiento del contribuyente de datos pertinente. Los RICs de cuyo contenido solamente disponga Thomson Reuters están excluidos, siempre que el contribuyente de datos no ofrezca el contenido al competidor proveedor de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real al que se cambia el cliente.

| 12. | Thomson Reuters suministrará, además, la información necesaria para que los clientes puedan cruzar los RICs con la simbología de otros proveedores en el momento oportuno. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Thomson Reuters suministrará, además, la información necesaria para que los clientes puedan cruzar los RICs con la simbología de otros proveedores en el momento oportuno.

| 13. | La licencia propuesta puede utilizarse en todo el mundo para aplicaciones en servidor a condición de que el cliente realice verdaderamente operaciones comerciales en el EEE. |
| --- | --- |

13.

La licencia propuesta puede utilizarse en todo el mundo para aplicaciones en servidor a condición de que el cliente realice verdaderamente operaciones comerciales en el EEE.

| 14. | Los cánones mensuales de la licencia ERL que Thomson Reuters tiene previsto cobrar son incrementales y dependen el número de símbolos RIC que el cliente desee utilizar bajo licencia para retirar datos de un competidor. Para los 50 000 primeros RICs, un cliente tendrá que pagar 0,01 USD al mes por cada RIC. Por encima de esa cifra, el canon pagadero por cada RIC disminuye cuantos más RICs desee utilizar bajo licencia el cliente (9). El régimen de pagos incluye también un canon mensual mínimo de 750 USD. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Los cánones mensuales de la licencia ERL que Thomson Reuters tiene previsto cobrar son incrementales y dependen el número de símbolos RIC que el cliente desee utilizar bajo licencia para retirar datos de un competidor. Para los 50 000 primeros RICs, un cliente tendrá que pagar 0,01 USD al mes por cada RIC. Por encima de esa cifra, el canon pagadero por cada RIC disminuye cuantos más RICs desee utilizar bajo licencia el cliente (9). El régimen de pagos incluye también un canon mensual mínimo de 750 USD.

| 15. | Los cánones cubren los derechos de uso adicionales en la simbología RIC y los costes del servicio que prestará Thomson Reuters a sus clientes con arreglo a los compromisos. Según Thomson Reuters, el nivel del canon representa una proporción muy pequeña del precio de los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters para el mismo ámbito de los RIC y su uso con licencia. Para más detalles sobre el régimen de pagos de la ERL consúltese la versión no confidencial de los compromisos publicada en el sitio web de la Dirección General de Competencia (anexo III). |
| --- | --- |

15.

Los cánones cubren los derechos de uso adicionales en la simbología RIC y los costes del servicio que prestará Thomson Reuters a sus clientes con arreglo a los compromisos. Según Thomson Reuters, el nivel del canon representa una proporción muy pequeña del precio de los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de Thomson Reuters para el mismo ámbito de los RIC y su uso con licencia. Para más detalles sobre el régimen de pagos de la ERL consúltese la versión no confidencial de los compromisos publicada en el sitio web de la Dirección General de Competencia (anexo III).

| 16. | Los compromisos también permiten a los desarrolladores terceros desarrollar y mantener una herramienta que facilite el cambio (es decir, memorias de correspondencias) en nombre de los clientes. Los desarrolladores terceros que puedan optar a esta posibilidad (con exclusión de cualquier vendedor de datos de mercado) podrán utilizar y mantener RICs en las herramientas de cambio que desarrollen para una gama de clientes a cambio del pago de un canon mensual. |
| --- | --- |

16.

Los compromisos también permiten a los desarrolladores terceros desarrollar y mantener una herramienta que facilite el cambio (es decir, memorias de correspondencias) en nombre de los clientes. Los desarrolladores terceros que puedan optar a esta posibilidad (con exclusión de cualquier vendedor de datos de mercado) podrán utilizar y mantener RICs en las herramientas de cambio que desarrollen para una gama de clientes a cambio del pago de un canon mensual.

| 17. | Los derechos de los terceros desarrolladores antes descritos se incluyen en una licencia separada para los diseñadores terceros que se adjunta a la propuesta de compromisos como anexo II. Dichos desarrolladores deben pagar los mismos cánones que los clientes, pero sus cánones mensuales tienen un límite máximo de 3 750 USD y la licencia está sujeta a un canon mensual mínimo de solo 250 USD. Los terceros desarrolladores pueden obtener asistencia de vendedores alternativos de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real en las correspondencias con la simbología de ese vendedor y pueden realizar publicidad conjunta dirigida a los clientes potenciales. |
| --- | --- |

17.

Los derechos de los terceros desarrolladores antes descritos se incluyen en una licencia separada para los diseñadores terceros que se adjunta a la propuesta de compromisos como anexo II. Dichos desarrolladores deben pagar los mismos cánones que los clientes, pero sus cánones mensuales tienen un límite máximo de 3 750 USD y la licencia está sujeta a un canon mensual mínimo de solo 250 USD. Los terceros desarrolladores pueden obtener asistencia de vendedores alternativos de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real en las correspondencias con la simbología de ese vendedor y pueden realizar publicidad conjunta dirigida a los clientes potenciales.

4.   INVITACIÓN A PRESENTAR OBSERVACIONES

| 18. | La Comisión se propone, en función de la prueba de mercado, adoptar una Decisión con arreglo al artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 en virtud de la cual se declaren obligatorios los compromisos revisados anteriormente resumidos y publicados en la página web de la Dirección General de Competencia. Si se produjeran cambios sustanciales en los compromisos se realizaría una nueva prueba de mercado. |
| --- | --- |

18.

La Comisión se propone, en función de la prueba de mercado, adoptar una Decisión con arreglo al artículo 9, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 en virtud de la cual se declaren obligatorios los compromisos revisados anteriormente resumidos y publicados en la página web de la Dirección General de Competencia. Si se produjeran cambios sustanciales en los compromisos se realizaría una nueva prueba de mercado.

| 19. | De conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, la Comisión invita a los terceros interesados a presentar sus observaciones sobre los compromisos. |
| --- | --- |

19.

De conformidad con el artículo 27, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003, la Comisión invita a los terceros interesados a presentar sus observaciones sobre los compromisos.

| 20. | Se aconseja razonar las observaciones, que deberán exponer los hechos relevantes. Si descubren algún problema en cualquier parte de los compromisos propuestos, sugiera posibles soluciones. |
| --- | --- |

20.

Se aconseja razonar las observaciones, que deberán exponer los hechos relevantes. Si descubren algún problema en cualquier parte de los compromisos propuestos, sugiera posibles soluciones.

| 21. | El plazo para presentar observaciones expirará a las cuatro semanas de la fecha de publicación de la presente Comunicación. Se ruega a las partes interesadas que faciliten una versión no confidencial de sus observaciones en la cual los secretos de negocios y otros pasajes de contenido confidencial hayan sido suprimidos y sustituidos, en su caso, por un resumen no confidencial o por la indicación «secretos de negocios» o «confidencial». |
| --- | --- |

21.

El plazo para presentar observaciones expirará a las cuatro semanas de la fecha de publicación de la presente Comunicación. Se ruega a las partes interesadas que faciliten una versión no confidencial de sus observaciones en la cual los secretos de negocios y otros pasajes de contenido confidencial hayan sido suprimidos y sustituidos, en su caso, por un resumen no confidencial o por la indicación «secretos de negocios» o «confidencial».

| 22. | Pueden enviarse las observaciones a la Comisión con el número de referencia «Asunto COMP/39.654 — RICs», bien por correo electrónico (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), bien por fax (+32 22950128) o por correo, a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Registro de Acuerdos y Prácticas Restrictivas |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

22.

Pueden enviarse las observaciones a la Comisión con el número de referencia «Asunto COMP/39.654 — RICs», bien por correo electrónico (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), bien por fax (+32 22950128) o por correo, a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Registro de Acuerdos y Prácticas Restrictivas

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  DO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1. Con efecto a partir del 1 de diciembre de 2009, los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE han pasado a ser los artículos 101 y 102, respectivamente, del TFUE. Los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE y los artículos 101 y 102 del TFUE son en esencia idénticos. A efectos de la presente Comunicación, las referencias a los artículos 101 y 102 del TFUE se entenderán hechas, cuando sean de aplicación, a los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE.

(2)  El asunto se refiere específicamente a los flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real y no afecta a los datos en tiempo real transmitidos a través de terminales o mediante flujos directos. Además, las preocupaciones desde el punto de vista de la competencia se limitan a los datos de mercado en tiempo real sin incluir los servicios de datos de referencia y de datos recopilados al término de la jornada.

(3)  Según Thomson Reuters, los RICs son códigos alfanuméricos que constituyen el mecanismo de recuperación creado por Thomson Reuters y suministrado a sus clientes como parte integrante de sus servicios de información financiera Thomson Reuters para identificar, navegar por ellos y recuperar un conjunto estructurado de datos de las recopilaciones de datos en tiempo real y de la red de distribución (IDN Integrated Data Network) de Thomson Reuters.

(4)  La investigación de mercado puso de manifiesto que los flujos directos suministrados a los clientes directamente mediante intercambios o MTF forman parte de un mercado de producto distinto.

(5)  Thomson Reuters afirma que no impide a sus clientes de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real cruzar las referencias RICs con la simbología de otros proveedores, siempre que las bases de datos o mapas de correspondencias resultantes no se utilicen para recuperar datos de otro proveedor. En otros términos, Thomson Reuters no prohíbe la creación de mapas de correspondencias como tales, pero se opone al uso directo e indirecto de RICs para recuperar datos en tiempo real de otros proveedores.

(6)  DO C 364 de 14.12.2011, p. 21.

(7)  A los efectos de los compromisos, el EEE también incluye Suiza.

(8)  Thomson Reuters comercializa su oferta de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real para uso general de las empresas bajo el nombre de Thomson Reuters Real-time Service («RT Service» — conocido anteriormente como Reuters Datascope Real-Time Service, es decir RDRT) para su utilización en aplicaciones en servidor. A efectos del alcance de los compromisos, la definición de servicio RT se ha ampliado para incluir todas las demás licencias de Thomson Reuters de datos en tiempo real que incluyen datos para el uso general en empresas en aplicaciones en servidor. Los operadores humanos podrán seguir utilizando los RICs en interfaces de usuario de programas informáticos asociados con aplicaciones en servidor, para acceder, ver y validar datos de flujos de datos consolidados en tiempo real de otros vendedores con objeto de facilitar el cambio sin costes adicionales. Las aplicaciones que se suministran actualmente en virtud de la licencia de terminal para la utilización individual (y no para uso general de las empresas) concedida por Thomson Reuters están fuera del ámbito de los compromisos propuestos.

(9)  Entre 50 001 y 500 000 RICs, el canon por RIC será de 0,005 USD; entre 500 001 y 3 000 000 RICs será de 0,002 USD, y por encima de 3 000 001 será de 0,001 USD. Los cánones se ajustan en consonancia con la inflación general.

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