Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MARK LEEMAN TRICIA L. THOMPSON

Cass County Conflict Public Defender Indiana Dep’t of Child Services

Leeman Law Offices Logansport, Indiana

Logansport, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

DCS Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child )

Relationship of J.R. and L.R., minor children, )

and Je.R., their father, )

)

Je.R., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 09A05-1203-JT-152

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE CASS CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Leo T. Burns, Judge 

Cause No. 09C01-1107-JT-10

November 20, 2012

 

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge 
2

Je.R. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his

children, J.R. and L.R. Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

trial court’s judgment.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Father is the biological father of J.R., born in August 2004, and L.R., born in May 

2007.

1 The facts most favorable to the trial court’s judgment reveal that in July 2010 the 

local Cass County office of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received 

and substantiated a referral alleging that the parents were “involved in a violent domestic 

situation, the family home [had been] recently destroyed by fire, and the family ha[d] no 

stable or suitable home in which to reside with the child[ren].” Appellant’s App. at 15. 

DCS initiated an investigation of the matter and discovered that Father was living in a tent 

on the property where the family trailer had burned down. Father informed the DCS 

assessment caseworker that he and the children were temporarily sleeping at the paternal 

grandfather’s home at night. The children were either with the grandfather or with Mother 

at her camper during the weekdays. On the weekends, the children stayed with an aunt.

DCS also learned that Father had been arrested several days earlier in Jasper County 

on multiple drug-related charges including Class D felony possession of chemical reagents 

or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, Class D felony possession 

of methamphetamine, and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. There were 

 

1 The parental rights of both children’s biological mother, A.R. (“Mother”), were terminated by the 

trial court in its February 2012 judgment after Mother signed consents to voluntarily relinquish her parental 

rights. Mother does not participate in this appeal. Consequently, we limit our recitation of the facts to 

those pertinent solely to Father’s appeal.
3

also allegations of an earlier shooting involving Father and Mother and a drug-related

arrest of two individuals living in a motor home on the parents’ property approximately 

two weeks after the fire. Based on all the information gathered during its assessment, 

DCS asked Father to submit to a drug screen. Father complied.

Upon learning that Father’s drug screen result was positive for methamphetamine 

and marijuana, DCS took both children into emergency protective custody and filed 

petitions, under separate cause numbers, alleging J.R. and L.R. were children in need of 

services (“CHINS”). Shortly thereafter, the children were relocated to another relative 

placement. Following a hearing in August 2010, J.R. and L.R. were adjudicated CHINS, 

and a dispositional order was entered in October 2010.

As part of its dispositional decree, the trial court ordered that both children be 

formally removed from Father’s custody and deemed wards of DCS. The dispositional 

order also directed Father to successfully complete a variety of tasks and services designed 

to address his parenting deficiencies and to facilitate reunification with the children. 

Among other things, Father was ordered to: (1) refrain from the use, manufacture, sale or 

distribution of any illegal or controlled substances; (2) successfully complete a substance 

abuse intensive out-patient program (“IOP”) and follow all resulting recommendations; (3) 

obtain and maintain a legal source of income, as well as safe and stable housing; (4) 

successfully complete parenting classes and home-based counseling services; (5) 

participate in regular supervised visits with the children; and (6) maintain regular contact 

with DCS and notify caseworkers of any change in address, household composition, 

telephone number, or employment.
4

Father’s participation in court-ordered services during the ensuing months was 

sporadic and ultimately unsuccessful. Father tested positive for amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and marijuana in September 2010 and was positive for marijuana in 

December 2010. Although Father submitted to a substance abuse assessment in December 

2010 and eventually successfully completed an IOP in March 2011, he failed to participate 

in the recommended follow-up treatment programs, including Narcotics Anonymous 

(“NA”) and Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”), after completing the IOP. Father also failed 

to maintain his sobriety following his participation in the IOP, testing positive for 

methamphetamine once in April 2011 and twice in June 2011. Positive test results for 

marijuana were likewise reported in June and July 2011, and Father tested positive for 

amphetamine in June 2011. Father could not be located for any additional drug screens 

after July 2011.

Father also continued to engage in criminal activities throughout the underlying 

CHINS cases. In January 2011, Father was arrested in Cass County on multiple drugrelated charges including Class D felony possession of methamphetamine; Class A 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, driving while suspended, and reckless 

possession of paraphernalia. Father later missed a court date and was “on the run” for 

approximately three months beginning in July 2011. Tr. at 17. While attempting to evade 

arrest, Father discontinued his participation in all reunification services. He also failed to 

visit with the children and cut-off all communication with DCS.

Based on Father’s non-compliance and lack of progress in services, DCS filed 

petitions seeking the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to J.R. and L.R. in 
5

July 2011. A consolidated evidentiary hearing on the termination petitions was held in 

December 2011. During the termination hearing, DCS presented substantial evidence 

concerning Father’s failure to successfully complete and/or benefit from a majority of

court-ordered reunification services available throughout the underlying CHINS and 

termination cases. In addition, DCS established that Father had recently been arrested and 

incarcerated on outstanding warrants pertaining to his pending criminal charges, never 

successfully resolved his addiction issues, and remained incapable of providing the 

children with a safe and stable home environment. DCS also presented evidence showing 

the children were living together and thriving in pre-adoptive relative foster care.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement. On February 27, 2012, the trial court entered judgments terminating Father’s

parental rights to J.R. and L.R. Father now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly 

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re 

K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing a termination of parental 

rights case, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In 

re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider 

only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will 

set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly 

erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 
6

Here, in terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific findings 

and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment contains specific findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office 

of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the 

judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 

1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. 

The “traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 

666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. These parental interests, however, 

are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the 

proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. In addition, although the 

right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better 

home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or 

unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 836. 

Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is required 

to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
7

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated 

a child in need of services; [and]

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these allegations 

in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 

1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (2008)). Moreover, if the 

court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, 

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). Father

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings only as to 

subsections (b)(2)(B) and (C) of the termination statute cited above.

I. Conditions Remedied/Threat to Well-Being

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires the trial court to find that only one 

of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and 

convincing evidence before terminating parental rights. Here, the trial court determined 

that DCS established by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable 

probability the conditions resulting in J.R.’s and L.R.’s removal or continued placement 

outside of Father’s care will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i). 

When making such a determination, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to 

care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 
8

trans. denied. The court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to 

determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this 

rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug 

and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate 

housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 

1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider any 

services offered to the parent by the county department of child services and the parent’s 

response to those services, as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id. 

Moreover, DCS was not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; 

rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent’s

behavior will not change. In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

On appeal, Father asserts that he “made a good decision regarding finding a home 

for the children after his house burn[ed] down and he started getting into trouble with the 

law” by finding a “safe, secure, and clean place for his children to live during this turbulent 

period.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. Father further claims that he has “responded well to drug 

treatment” in the past and “could find success in the future if he reenrolled in treatment.” 

Id. at 17. Father also states that his “desire to reunite with his children encouraged him to 

remain off drugs” and that he “did not hide from his drug issues” but instead “admitted” he 

had a problem. Id. at 18. Father therefore contends that DCS failed to establish that the 

conditions resulting in the children’s removal and continued placement outside his care 

would likely not be remedied. 
9

In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court made multiple findings 

regarding his unresolved substance abuse issues, parenting deficiencies, and lack of 

stability. Specifically, the court found that although Father initially “participated in and 

cooperated with the services provided to him,” he nevertheless was unable to “obtain 

steady employment, or a stable, self-sufficient residence” during this “positive period.” 

Appellant’s App. at 87.2 The trial court went on to find that after his relapse in July 2011, 

Father’s “contact and cooperation with DCS ceased[,] and because of criminal charges 

filed in Jasper County and Cass County, [Father] was on the run and failed to participate in 

services.” Id. The court also noted that Father “had no meaningful contact” with the 

children, failed to obtain employment and housing, and continued to have trouble with 

criminal cases in several counties during the summer and fall of 2011. Based on these and 

other findings, the trial court determined that there is a reasonable probability the 

conditions resulting in removal and continued placement of the children outside of Father’s 

care would likely not be remedied. Our review of the record leaves us confident that clear 

and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings cited above.

Although the evidence makes clear that Father initially participated in several of the 

recommended services, including a substance abuse evaluation, IOP, and supervised 

visitation with the children, he refused to follow through with the IOP post-treatment

recommendations. Father then relapsed and began using illegal substances again

 

2

For clarification purposes, we note that because DCS filed separate involuntary termination 

petitions for each child under separate cause numbers, the trial court issued separate termination orders for 

each child. The language contained in the termination orders and cited herein, however, is substantially the 

same, aside from the headings and other specific information pertaining to each child such as names, birth 

dates, etc. We therefore cite to only one of the termination orders.
10

approximately one month after completing the IOP. The evidence further establishes that 

Father failed to achieve any significant, long-term improvement in his ability to parent J.R. 

and L.R. despite a wealth of services available to him throughout the underlying 

proceedings.

During the termination hearing, DCS case manager Stephanie Neher (“Neher”) 

informed the trial court that Father had failed to remedy “the reasons for removal with the 

drugs and the instability.” Tr. at 110. Neher also explained that she had experienced 

significant difficulty in contacting Father throughout the duration of the underlying 

proceedings, that Father repeatedly refused to participate in child and family team meetings 

despite having knowledge of said meetings, and that although there was a “short period of 

time from January to March [2011] that he was doing rather well, and [Neher] had hopes 

that [Father] would make it[,]... [Father] relapsed and went downhill from there.” Id. at 

121.

Drug and Alcohol Counselor Deborah Carithers (“Carithers”) likewise testified that 

although Father had been an “active participant” and had done “quite well” during the IOP 

classes, he later refused her offer to “come back as an alumni [sic]” and seek help 

following his relapse. Id. at 64, 66. Carithers also testified that without a support system, 

Father’s prognosis for successfully kicking his addiction to methamphetamine was 

“Guarded,” explaining that although it is possible, she had “never known anybody 

personally that did it without some kind of support.” Id. at 68. As for visitation, homebased services counselor Jan Shaver (“Shaver”) informed the trial court that Father never 

progressed from fully-supervised visits with the children. Shaver also confirmed that 
11

Father’s participation in home-based services became irregular after Father moved out of 

the paternal grandfather’s home, and that Father’s housing situation never improved.

Father’s own testimony lends further support to the trial court’s judgment. During 

the termination hearing, Father confirmed that he was currently incarcerated, had drugrelated criminal charges pending in two separate counties, and was unavailable to care for 

the children at that time. Father further admitted that he had failed to obtain employment 

or stable housing since the time the children were removed from his care, was on the run 

from police for several months leading up to the termination hearing, had failed to visit 

with the children since July 2011, never participated in any after-care substance abuse 

treatment program, such as AA or NA, and never asked service providers for help 

following his relapse in April 2011.

As noted above, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child 

at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent’s habitual 

patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the 

child. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. Where a parent’s “pattern of conduct shows no overall 

progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic 

situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Here,

the record makes clear that throughout the underlying proceedings Father demonstrated a 

persistent unwillingness and/or inability to take the actions necessary to show that he is

capable of (1) overcoming his addiction to methamphetamine and other substances and (2) 

providing J.R. and L.R. with the safe, stable, and drug-free home environment which the 

children need to thrive. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s 
12

determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the 

children’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father’s arguments to the contrary, 

emphasizing his self-serving testimony rather than the evidence cited by the trial court in 

its termination order, amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we may not 

do. See D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.

II. Best Interests

We next consider Father’s assertion that DCS failed to prove termination of his

parental rights is in J.R.’s and L.R.’s respective best interests. In determining what is in 

the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified 

by the Indiana Department of Child Services and look to the totality of the evidence. 

McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the 

child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating 

the parent-child relationship. Id. Moreover, we have previously held that the 

recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, 

in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is 

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. In re M.M., 733 N.E.2d 6, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

In addition to the findings previously cited, the trial court made several other

pertinent findings relating to J.R.’s and L.R.’s best interests. Specifically, the trial court 

noted that during the summer and fall of 2011 Father had “no meaningful contact” with the 
13

children, and the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) was unable to talk with, “let 

alone work with” Father during that time. Appellant’s App. at 87-88. The court also found 

that J.R. and L.R. were thriving in relative foster care placement, that the Guardian ad 

Litem had recommended termination of Father’s parental rights, and that the children had 

“settled into a pattern of school attendance and sports involvement which would be 

disrupted” if they were reunified with Father. Id. at 88. Finally, the trial court specifically 

found that Father continued to struggle with “substance abuse and the subsequent 

entanglements resulting from criminal charges related to possession of controlled 

substances,” did not have a “steady job or a suitable residence” for the children, and 

currently had “no way to provide care” for the children. Id. Based on these and other 

findings, the trial court concluded that termination of Father’s parental rights is in both 

children’s best interests. These findings, too, are supported by the evidence.

During the termination hearing, CASA Tony Magna (“Magna”) informed the trial 

court that in March 2011 he “really had high hopes” that Father would be successful in 

services and that reunification would be possible, but “all of a sudden everything went 

downhill” for Father. Tr. at 98. In recommending termination of Father’s parental rights, 

Magna testified that he was “very comfortable” with the children’s current pre-adoptive 

relative placement with their aunt and uncle and believed that the children had the chance 

for a “really good future” with the relative placement. Id. at 98, 100. Magna further 

indicated that although J.R. loves Father, the child also “loves” and feels “safe and secure” 

with his aunt and uncle. Id. at 99. Case manager Neher likewise confirmed that both 

children were “doing wonderful[ly]” in their current relative care placement, that J.R. was 
14

an “honor roll” student, and that both children needed a “stable and safe home with 

permanency.” Id. at 109, 124.

Based on the totality of the evidence, including Father’s current incarceration, 

unresolved struggle with substance abuse, and failure to successfully complete and/or 

benefit from a wealth of reunification services available to him during the underlying 

proceedings, coupled with the testimony from the DCS case manager Neher and CASA

Magna recommending termination of the parent-child relationships, we conclude that there 

is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s 

parental rights is in J.R.’s and L.R.’s respective best interests. See, e.g., In re A.I., 825 

N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that testimony of court-appointed 

advocate and family case manager, coupled with evidence that conditions resulting in 

continued placement outside home will not be remedied, is sufficient to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence termination is in child’s best interests), trans. denied. 

This court will reverse a termination of parental rights ‘“only upon a showing of 

“clear error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.’” Matter of A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Egly v. 

Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We find no 

such error here.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and MAY, J., concur.