Filed 11/8/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff/Respondent,

 v.

RIGOBERTO IGNACIO VERA,

Defendant/Appellant.

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Sup. Ct. Appeal No. 0003066 

Sup. Ct. Case No. M21910977

OPINION

APPEAL from a pretrial order of the Superior Court of Fresno 

County, Hon. Elizabeth Egan, J., denying a motion to suppress 

evidence obtained during a warrantless search and seizure. 

Affirmed.1

Attorneys and Law Firms

Robert L.S. Angres, attorney for defendant/appellant 

Rigoberto Ignacio Vera.

1 This opinion was originally issued by the court on November 8, 2023. It was 

certified for publication on November 14, 2023, which is within the time that 

the appellate division retained jurisdiction. This opinion has been certified 

for publication in the Official Reports. It is being sent to the Fifth District 

Court of Appeal to assist the Court of Appeal in deciding whether to order the 

case transferred to the court on the court’s own motion under Rules 8-1000 –

8.1018.
-2-

Neda Shahrestani, attorney for plaintiff/respondent Fresno 

County District Attorney’s Office.

Opinion

Hon. F. Brian Alvarez, Presiding Judge of the Appellate 

Division of the Fresno Superior Court.

I.

INTRODUCTION

By way of pretrial appeal, defendant Rigoberto Vera (Vera) 

challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in his 

ongoing criminal prosecution. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd.(j).)2 

Citing to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and 

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appointed appellate

counsel asked us to independently review the record for any arguable 

issue that could be raised. Vera, represented by the Fresno County 

Public Defender in the trial court, has yet to be arraigned on the 

criminal complaint.

We requested supplemental briefing as to: (1) whether this 

pretrial appeal was timely sought under section 1510; and (2)

whether the procedures under Anders and Wende apply on pretrial

appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor 

case. We conclude that this appeal was not timely sought and the 

procedures under Anders and Wende are not required. Because 

respondent urges us to review the matter, we elect to do so. However, 

we employ the procedure set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 

Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo).

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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II.

BACKGROUND

The circumstances surrounding Vera’s arrest for driving under 

the influence (DUI) are not detailed here because they are not 

salient to the issues raised on appeal. Suffice to say that Vera 

was arrested for DUI on June 6, 2021, after colliding into a city

streetlamp, injuring himself. A warrantless blood draw confirmed 

he drove a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 

On August 12, 2021, respondent filed a misdemeanor complaint 

charging Vera with DUI (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (b) & (b)), and 

driving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)).

On September 26, 2022, Vera initially appeared for his

arraignment hearing. With counsel, Vera waived statutory time for 

arraignment and moved to continue his arraignment hearing to a later 

date. The trial court granted his motion and scheduled the hearing 

for October 17, 2022.

On October 17, 2022, Vera appeared for the scheduled hearing. 

With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for arraignment and 

moved for another continuance. The trial court granted his motion 

and set the case for a hearing on December 12, 2022. 

On December 12, 2022, Vera appeared for his scheduled 

arraignment. With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for 

arraignment and moved for another continuance. The trial court

granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on January 19, 

2023. 

On January 19, 2023, Vera appeared again for his scheduled 

arraignment. With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for 

arraignment and sought a further continuance. The trial court
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granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on February 2, 

2023. 

On February 1, 2023, Vera filed a motion to suppress evidence 

under section 1538.5. He argued that his blood draw violated his 

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

On February 2, 2023, Vera again appeared at his scheduled 

arraignment, and again waived statutory time for his arraignment. 

The trial court set the matter for a suppression hearing to be heard

on March 16, 2023. 

On March 9, 2023, respondent filed an opposition to Vera’s

motion to suppress. 

On March 16, 2023, the trial court heard and denied Vera’s

motion to suppress. At the same hearing, Vera again waived 

statutory time for arraignment and sought another continuance of 

his arraignment hearing. The trial court granted his request. 

On March 23, 2023, the Fresno County Public Defender filed 

Vera’s pretrial notice of appeal challenging the denial of his

motion to suppress, and requesting we appoint appellate counsel. 

(§ 1538.5, subd. (j).) Thereafter, we appointed appellate counsel. 

On July 25, 2023, appellate counsel filed an opening brief 

pursuant to Anders and Wende, noting three potential issues that 

counsel did not believe had a reasonable chance of success.

On September 6, 2023, we asked the parties to provide 

supplemental briefing addressing: (1) whether Vera timely filed this 

pretrial appeal from the denial of his suppression motion where it 

appeared that he had not yet been formally arraigned on the criminal 

complaint, and (2) whether the procedures of Anders and Wende apply 
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to pretrial appeals from the denial of motions to suppress evidence 

in misdemeanor cases. (See Gov. Code, § 68081.)

Both parties have now filed supplemental briefs addressing 

these issues.

 III.

DISCUSSION

A. This Pretrial Appeal is Untimely Under Section 1510

Vera has never been arraigned on the criminal complaint. We 

have repeatedly seen this procedural anomaly in pretrial appeals in 

other cases, where the Fresno County Public Defender is the attorney 

of record in the trial court. Initially, we questioned whether 

pretrial appellate review was timely sought in light of section 

1510. We now conclude that this appeal is untimely under that 

statute.

Vera argues that the plain language of section 1510 provides

that the time requirements of the statute are not triggered until 

a defendant has actually been arraigned. Because he has not been 

arraigned, Vera maintains pretrial review is timely. Respondent 

argues that Vera should have been arraigned before the hearing on 

the motion to suppress. Respondent adds that section 1510 renders 

this appeal untimely because pretrial review had not been sought 

within 45 days following Vera’s arraignment. Nevertheless, 

respondent urges us to independently review the record. 

Section 1510 provides, in salient part, that “[t]he denial of 

a motion made pursuant to ... section 1538.5 may be reviewed prior 

to trial only if the motion was made by the defendant in the trial 

court not later than 45 days following defendant’s arraignment on 

the complaint if a misdemeanor...unless within these time limits 
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the defendant was unaware of the issue or had no opportunity to 

raise the issue.” Our inquiry requires us to interpret statutory 

language, which we do de novo. (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. 

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.)

In this endeavor, “[o]ur task is to discern the Legislature’s 

intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable 

indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them 

their usual meanings, and construing them in context. If the words 

themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what 

it said, and the statute’s plain language governs.” (Wells v. 

One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.) “If the 

language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning 

unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences 

the Legislature did not intend.” (People v. Sanchez (2021)66 

Cal.App.5th 14, 18 (Sanchez.)

Section 988 requires that “[t]he arraignment must be made by 

the court, or by the clerk or prosecuting attorney under its 

direction, and consists in reading the accusatory pleading to the 

defendant and delivering to the defendant a true copy thereof, and 

of the endorsements thereon, if any, including the list of 

witnesses, and asking the defendant whether the defendant pleads 

guilty or not guilty to the accusatory pleading; provided, that 

where the accusatory pleading is a complaint charging a misdemeanor, 

a copy of the same need not be delivered to any defendant unless 

requested by the defendant.”3 (§ 988.) At the arraignment hearing, 

3 We note there is a long-standing split of authority about whether a completed 

arraignment includes entering a defendant’s plea. (Compare Simpson v. Municipal 

Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 112, 114 [includes entering a plea]; People v. Terry

(1970) 14 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [same]; with Chartruck v. Municipal Court (1975) 

50 Cal.App.3d 931, 936-937 [entry of plea not required] People v. Cruz (1980) 
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a defendant must be allowed a “reasonable time to answer,” which is 

“not more than seven days in a misdemeanor or infraction case.” (§ 

990.) “If the defendant refuses to answer the accusatory pleading 

by demurrer or plea, a plea of not guilty must be entered.” (§ 

1024.) 

Section 1510 allows pretrial review “only if the motion was 

made by the defendant in the trial court not later than 45 days 

following defendant’s arraignment on the complaint if a misdemeanor 

. . ..” (Italics added.) By its plain language, we believe the 

statute requires there be an arraignment, then a motion to suppress 

made not later than 45 days following that arraignment. The 

Legislature’s choice of words is clear on this point – any 

suppression motion must follow an arraignment and must do so within 

45 days. Without a misdemeanor arraignment, there can be no timely 

pretrial appeal under the statute. Thus, giving the statutory 

language a “plain” and “commonsense” meaning (Sanchez, supra, 66 

Cal.App.5th at p. 18), we conclude that pretrial appellate review 

here is untimely under section 1510. If pretrial review could be 

timely sought under section 1510 by repeatedly waiving the statutory 

time for arraignment (without actually waiving formal arraignment), 

the statutory deadline would effectively be evaded by a simple 

strategy of indefinitely postponing the formal arraignment hearing 

without actually waiving the right to a formal arraignment, as 

occurred here. 

“The spirit and purpose” of section 1510 “is to require a 

defendant to raise the issue of suppression and have it determined 

109 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 21 [same].) We need not weigh into this split because 

Vera has never been arraigned under either definition.
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prior to trial, without any needless postponement of the trial 

date.” (People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 484.) As such, 

the limitation of pretrial appellate review to those defendants who 

have brought their motions to suppress within 45 days following the 

arraignment tracks the outer limit with which misdemeanor defendants 

must be brought to trial. (See § 1382, subd. (a)(3).) Interpreting 

section 1510 to allow pretrial appellate review indefinitely when 

a defendant continually waives the statutory time for arraignment 

throughout the criminal proceeding would circumvent the purpose of 

the statute. Because Vera has neither been formally arraigned nor 

waived formal arraignment, and there is no applicable exception, 

pretrial appellate review of the denial of his motion is untimely 

under the plain language of section 1510. 

Appellate counsel nevertheless contends that pretrial review 

is timely in the absence of Vera’s arraignment because the motion 

to suppress was filed “not later than 45 days following defendant’s 

arraignment.” (§ 1510.) In other words, since Vera has never been 

arraigned, appellate counsel maintains that the motion was brought 

not later than 45 days following the defendant’s arraignment. 

However, this interpretation renders the word “following” 

surplusage in the statute. We must interpret statutes giving effect 

to all words used and avoid an interpretation that renders words 

nugatory. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67.) Again, we 

believe the Legislature’s use of the word “following” requires an

arraignment to precede any motion to suppress.

Notwithstanding the applicability of section 1510, respondent

urges us to independently review the record. Appellate courts do

generally retain the authority to exercise discretion to address 
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issues that are properly barred from appellate review under 

traditional rules of procedure. (Cf. People v. Williams (1998) 17 

Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6; People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 

794.) “Appellate courts have fundamental inherent equity, 

supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power 

to control litigation before them.” (People v. Flores (2020) 54 

Cal.App.5th 266, 273 (Flores).) 

As respondent notes in supplemental briefing, it is only when 

the prosecution raises noncompliance with section 1510 that a 

defendant bears the burden of showing an applicable exception to 

the statute’s requirements. (See Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1988) 

199 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1460.) Because respondent did not raise noncompliance with section 1510 prior to our request for supplemental 

briefing, and because both parties ask us to independently review 

the record, we exercise our discretion to excuse Vera’s noncompliance with section 1510.

B. Anders/Wende Review Is Not Required On Pretrial Appeal

We must next address whether Anders and Wende review is 

mandated, discretionary, or unavailable on pretrial appeal from the 

denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor proceeding. 

Appellate counsel contends that the Anders/Wende procedures should 

apply to a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress 

in a misdemeanor case because it is a “first appeal as a matter of 

right” and that, even if Anders/Wende review is not mandated, we

should exercise our discretion to independently review the record. 

We take a different approach. 

As a general matter, where appointed appellate counsel is 

unable to find viable issues to raise on appeal, Fourteenth 
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Amendment principles of due process and equal protection require 

reviewing courts to independently examine the record for any 

arguable issue on appeal from a defendant’s “first appeal as a 

matter of right.” (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 743-745; Wende, 

supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.) Reviewing courts must include “a 

brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, 

the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment 

imposed.” (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.) “[A]ny 

other information from the record that they anticipate will be 

relevant in further challenges to the judgment” should also be 

included in opinions resolving appeals filed in such cases. (Ibid.) 

Anders and Wende review applies to misdemeanor appeals from a final 

judgment. (In re Olsen (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 386, 389–392.) 

But this “prophylactic” procedure is required only when there 

is a previously established right to counsel. (Delgadillo, supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 224.) Wende review is thus limited to a criminal 

defendant’s “first appeal as a matter of right,” meaning, an appeal 

from a final judgment in a criminal case. (People v. Griffin (2022) 

85 Cal.App.5th 329, 333.) Wende procedures do not extend to all

appeals in criminal matters. (See e.g., People v. Serrano (2012) 

211 Cal.App.4th 496, 501 (Serrano).) Consistent with these 

principles, the California Supreme Court recently explained in 

Delgadillo that a state-created statutory right to the appointment 

of counsel in postconviction proceedings does not invoke 

Anders/Wende procedures because there is “no constitutional right 

to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction 

proceedings.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 224.) 
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Anders/Wende review has been found inapplicable in contexts 

including conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris 

Short Act (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 537); 

civil commitment proceedings under the Mentally Disordered Offender 

Act (People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.4th 304, 309); proceedings for 

restoration of sanity under section 1026.2 (People v. Dobson (2008) 

161 Cal.4th 1422, 1425), and to indigent parent's appeals from 

rulings adversely affecting child custody status (In re Sade C.

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). Because Anders/Wende review serves to 

protect an indigent appellant’s rights, it is also unavailable to 

those represented by privately retained counsel. (People v. 

Placencia (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 422, 424.)

Review under Anders/Wende does not generally extend to pending 

trial court proceedings. In People v. Thurman (2007) 157 

Cal.App.4th 36 (Thurman), the defendant argued that his attorney 

provided constitutionally deficient representation by failing to 

file a brief under Anders and Wende after finding no valid grounds 

to bring a motion for a new trial in an ongoing criminal proceeding. 

(Id. at pp. 44-45.) Rejecting that argument, Thurman explained 

that “[t]he purpose of the Anders/Wende procedure is to ensure that 

attorneys who are appointed to represent indigent defendants...

conscientiously scrutinize the record and actively assert those 

issues which may, in the attorney’s professional judgment, result 

in a reversal of the judgment or in a reduction of the defendant’s 

sentence.” (Ibid.) 

Thurman explained that “[n]o court, as far as we are aware, 

has extended these procedures to trial court proceedings, and we 

see no reason to do so.” (Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 
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45.) This is because “[d]ue process does not require extending 

those procedures beyond the first appeal of right in a criminal 

prosecution unless, among other considerations, their absence would 

significantly increase the risk of erroneous appellate resolution. 

(Ibid.) “Procedures that are practically ‘unproductive’ ... need 

not be put into place, no matter how many and how weighty the 

interests that theoretically support their use.” (Id. at p. 46.) 

“Any of the grounds for a new trial, whether or not they were 

presented in a new trial motion, can also be raised on appeal, if 

they appear on the face of the record and are sufficiently developed 

to permit appellate review.” (Ibid.) 

 Recently, the California Supreme Court stressed in Delgadillo, 

supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, that the procedures in Anders and Wende are 

“relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously 

established constitutional right to counsel.” (Id. at p. 224.) Our 

Supreme Court addressed a defendant’s constitutional right to 

counsel when the prosecution appeals from the grant of a motion to 

suppress evidence in a misdemeanor case in Gardner v. Appellate 

Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998. Gardner found 

that a criminal defendant facing misdemeanor charges has the right 

to appointed counsel to defend against the prosecution’s appeal 

from the grant of a motion to suppress. (Id. at p. 1001.) While 

finding it unnecessary to address whether the Sixth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution afforded that right, Gardner found 

that article I, section 15 of the California Constitution did 

require a court-appointed attorney. (Ibid.) Gardner thus 

establishes that there exists a state constitutional right to 
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counsel in appellate proceedings following the grant of a motion to 

suppress in a misdemeanor case. 

But Gardner expressly declined to address whether a criminal 

defendant like Vera has a corresponding state constitutional right 

to counsel following the denial of a motion to suppress. (Gardner, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1008–1009, fn. 8 [“[t]his case, of course, 

concerns the right to appointed counsel for purposes of responding 

to a pretrial prosecution appeal of a favorable suppression 

ruling... [w]e express no opinion about a defendant’s right to 

appointed counsel for purposes of bringing a pretrial appeal of an 

adverse suppression ruling.”].) It is likewise unsettled whether 

the Anders/Wende procedures are required in such cases. While 

Gardner leaves open the possibility of a state constitutional right 

to appellate counsel on appeal from the denial of a motion to 

suppress, review under Anders/Wende is required only if there is 

both a constitutionally mandated right to counsel on appeal and

principles of equal protection and/or due process require such 

review. (See e.g., Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at 

p. 541 [finding Anders/Wende procedures do not apply to 

conservatorship proceedings even though a proposed conservatee is 

entitled to counsel in conservatorship proceedings and on appeal 

from conservatorship proceedings].) 

To assess whether these concerns support Anders/Wende review, 

courts examine: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s 

interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the 

procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of the 

appeal. (See In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, 987; 

Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.) In the 
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context of pretrial appeals from the denial of suppression motions, 

the private interests at stake are the defendant’s liberty interest 

which must be considered alongside state interests that include 

ensuring there was a correct ruling, judicial economy, and 

administrative costs. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229; 

Flores, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 274.) As explained in Flores, 

“[t]he risk of an erroneous ruling is present if appointed counsel 

failed to identify a meritorious (reversible) issue on appeal, and 

the appellate court also failed to identify that issue by failing 

to conduct an independent review.” (Id. at p. 274.) Delgadillo

instructs that “[u]ltimately, the salient question... is whether 

the absence of the Anders/Wende procedures significantly increases 

the risk of erroneous resolutions.” (Delgadillo, supra, 19 Cal.5th 

at p. 229.)

Because a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the 

denial of a motion to suppress following judgment in all misdemeanor 

cases, pretrial review under Anders/Wende does not significantly 

reduce the risk of erroneous appellate rulings. In misdemeanor 

cases, appellate review of suppression motions is available both 

pretrial and postconviction. Under section 1538.5, both the People 

and the defendant, in a misdemeanor case, are entitled to appeal 

any decision on a motion to suppress to the appellate division. (§ 

1538.5, subd. (j).) But, as discussed, pretrial appellate review 

is limited to those defendants who bring a motion to suppress within 

45 days following the arraignment. (§ 1510.) If the defendant is 

ultimately convicted, appellate review is available to challenge 

the suppression ruling whether the defendant was convicted by a 

jury trial or plea. (§§ 1538.5, subd. (m); 1466, subd. (b)(1).) 
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Under this framework, a misdemeanor defendant who brings a 

suppression motion within 45 days following the arraignment has the 

opportunity for appellate review of the denial of a suppress motion 

twice if they are ultimately convicted: once pretrial and once 

postjudgment. (§ 1538.5, subds. (j), (m).) If appellate counsel 

is unable to find an arguable issue, review under Anders/Wende could 

potentially be required both times. 

If Anders/Wende review is required pretrial, any appellate 

ruling on the merits of the pretrial denial would likely be binding 

in subsequent appellate proceedings. If the suppression ruling is 

challenged twice, the law of the case doctrine would likely prevent 

any reconsideration after judgment of a decision already made on 

pretrial review. “The law of the case doctrine holds that when an 

appellate opinion states a principle or rule of law necessary to 

the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case 

and must be adhered to through its subsequent progress in the lower 

court and upon subsequent appeal.” (People v. Superior Court

(Plascencia) (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 409, 432.) Because Anders/Wende

review will always be available postjudgment, and there can only be 

a single appellate ruling on the same suppression issue, pretrial 

review appears to offer only the minimal theoretical benefit of the 

possibility of an erroneous ruling being discovered on independent 

review earlier rather than later.

An additional layer of Anders/Wende review will provide a very 

minimal and theoretical extra protection to a misdemeanor 

defendant’s liberty interest in the sense that an erroneous ruling 

may be discovered earlier. But “[p]rocedures that are practically 

‘unproductive’ ... need not be put into place, no matter how many 
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and how weighty the interests that theoretically support their use.” 

(Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.) Due process does not 

mandate Anders/Wende review beyond the first appeal of right in a 

criminal prosecution unless, among other considerations, its 

“absence would significantly increase the risk of erroneous 

appellate resolution.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no net reduction in 

the risk of erroneous rulings because Anders/Wende review will be 

available postjudgment on the same suppression issue. 

In supplemental briefing, appellate counsel contends that the 

Anders/Wende procedures do apply because a pretrial appeal from the 

denial of a suppression motion is a “first appeal as a matter of 

right” in a criminal prosecution. Contrary to appellate counsel’s 

contention, a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to 

suppress is not a “first appeal as a matter of right” because it is 

not an appeal from a judgment imposed after a criminal conviction. 

(Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356 [“[w]e are dealing 

only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich 

and poor alike ... from a criminal conviction”]; Anders, supra, 386 

U.S. at p. 739 [“[w]e are here concerned with the extent of the 

duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first 

appeal from a criminal conviction”]; Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 501 [“[t]he appeal before us, although originating in a 

criminal context, is not a first appeal of right from a criminal 

prosecution, because it is not an appeal from the judgment of 

conviction.”].) And although a criminal defendant has a statutory 

right to file a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to 

suppress in an ongoing misdemeanor case, the “matter of right” that 

requires review under Anders/Wende is a matter of constitutional 
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right under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a statutory right 

imposed by state law. (See Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 741.) As 

discussed above, the Anders/Wende procedures that are required by 

the due process and equal protection principles embodied in the 

Fourteenth Amendment do not generally extend to ongoing trial court 

proceedings. (Thurman, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.)

On balance, we conclude that review under Anders and Wende is 

not constitutionally required on pretrial appeal from the denial of 

a suppression motion in a misdemeanor case. “Independent review in 

Wende appeals consumes substantial judicial resources.” 

(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 229.) Our appellate division, 

like most others, is comprised of busy trial court judges tasked 

with the additional duty of reviewing certain appellate and writ 

matters. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 77.) The expedited nature of 

pretrial review stretches thin judicial resources thinner yet. 

Given this reality, we believe the proper “framework” is the 

procedure set forth in Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216: “When 

appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be presented on 

appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing 

on the denial of the [motion]; and (2) the court should send, with 

a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the 

defendant of the right file a supplemental letter brief or brief 

and that if no letter brief or brief is filed within 30 days, the 

court may dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.)
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IV.

DISPOSITION

 The court clerk is directed to send Vera and trial counsel a 

copy of appellant’s brief along with notice informing them of the 

right to file a supplemental letter brief or brief within 30 days, 

otherwise the court may dismiss this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this ___ day of November, 2023

 

_____________________________________

Hon. F. Brian Alvarez

Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division 

of the Fresno County Superior Court 

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________________

Hon. D. Tyler Tharpe

Assistant Presiding Judge of the

Appellate Division of the Fresno County 

Superior Court

________________________________________

Hon. Robert G. Mangano

Judge of the Appellate Division of the 

Fresno County Superior Court