IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MIDLAND DIVISION

YADIRA URANGA, §

§

Plaintiff, § CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:20-CV-21

v. §

§

MIDLAND ODESSA URBAN TRANSIT §

DISTRICT, §

§

CITY OF ODESSA, TEXAS, §

§

CITY OF MIDLAND, TEXAS, §

§

RATP DEV USA, INC., and §

§

MIDLAND-ODESSA TRANSIT §

MANAGEMENT, INC., §

§

Defendants. §

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff Yadira Uranga (“Ms. Uranga” or “Plaintiff”) is a resident of Odessa, 

Texas, and is a person with long-term visual impairments, who uses a service animal as a guide.

Ms. Uranga brings this action against (1) the Midland Odessa Urban Transit District (“MOUTD”), 

a public entity that operates a transportation system in the cities of Odessa and Midland, Texas,

(2) the Cities of Midland, Texas, and Odessa, Texas, public entities that created and retained 

control over the MOUTD, (3) and RATP Dev USA (“RATP”) and Midland-Odessa Transit 

Management, Inc. (“MOTM”) as subcontractors retained by, Midland, Odessa, and MOUTD to 

oversee day-to-day operations of MOUTD. Ms. Uranga brings this action against the above 

entities under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by the Americans 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 2

with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, and its implementing 

regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101, et seq., 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1, et seq., and Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and its 

implementing regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.1, et seq.

2. The cities of Midland and Odessa created and retained control over the MOUTD to 

provide public transportation.

3. MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus system in and between the cities of Odessa and 

Midland, Texas, which consists of several bus line routes. Pursuant to the ADA, the MOUTD

must provide complementary paratransit service to persons with disabilities who cannot access the 

fixed-route due to their disabilities because it operates a fixed route bus system. Ms. Uranga is 

one such individual and was already deemed paratransit eligible by MOUTD before the filing of 

this lawsuit.

4. Complimentary paratransit service means transit providers, such as MOUTD, must 

provide direct pick up and drop off transportation (like a taxi-service) to paratransit riders. The 

transit authority is only obligated to provide this direct transportation service to locations that are 

within three-fourths of a mile of fixed-route bus lines (on each side of the bus line). That is, both 

the pick-up and the drop-off locations must be within three-quarters of the nearest fixed-route bus 

line operated by the transit authority.

5. MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus lines in the cities of Midland and Odessa. 

MOUTD provides complimentary paratransit services to these bus lines.

6. Two of MOUTD’s fixed-route bus lines start respectively in the cities of Midland 

and Odessa and then run between the two cities, connecting them. MOUTD, however, does not 

provide complimentary paratransit services along these fixed-route bus lines. That is, there is no 

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 3

way for a MOUTD paratransit rider to receive direct paratransit service between the cities of

Odessa to Midland.

7. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit eligible rider with MOUTD. Ms. Uranga lives 

in Odessa. MOUTD will not provide direct paratransit transportation for Ms. Uranga between the 

cities of Midland and Odessa in one continuous trip.

8. MOUTD states it does not need to provide paratransit between Midland and Odessa 

because the fixed-route bus lines that run between Midland and Odessa are what MOUTD

considers a “commuter bus service.” Transit authorities do not need to provide paratransit services

adjacent to bus systems that are used solely as a “commuter bus service.” MOUTD bus system, 

however, is not used solely as a commuter bus service. Therefore, MOUTD must provide 

paratransit service for Ms. Uranga between the cities of Midland and Odessa.

9. In sum, Defendant MOUTD violated and continues to violate Ms. Uranga’s rights 

under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to provide her paratransit service between 

Midland and Odessa (and vice-versa) in one continuous, non-stop trip. Ms. Uranga therefore seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief requiring MOUTD to provide her paratransit service between 

Odessa and Midland, Texas.

10. The cities Midland and Odessa created and retain control over MOUTD and are 

therefore responsible for MOUTD’s actions and/or inactions under the ADA and Rehabilitation 

Act.

11. RATP and MOTM are subcontractors retained by the cities Odessa and Midland 

and MOUTD to oversee day-to-day operations of MOUTD. RATP and MOTM are responsible 

for MOUTD’s actions and/or inactions under the Rehabilitation Act.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 4

JURISDICTION

12. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 because Ms. 

Uranga’s claims involve federal questions arising under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation 

Act.

13. This Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Uranga’s request for declaratory relief 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure. 

Injunctive relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2202, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Rule 65 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

VENUE

14. Venue of this action is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because all of the 

events and omissions complained of arise within this district and division, specifically, Midland 

and Odessa, Texas.

PARTIES

15. Plaintiff Yadira Uranga resides in Odessa, Texas.

16. Defendant MOUTD is the entity that provides, operates, and administers public bus 

transportation in Odessa and Midland, Texas. Based on a request for public information to the 

City of Midland, Texas, the chief executive officer for the MOUTD is Transit Board Chairperson 

Sharla Hotchkiss. MOUTD, a public entity, may be served through its Transit Board Chairperson 

Sharla Hotchkiss, Midland Odessa Urban Transit District, 10300 Younger Road, Midland, Texas 

79711 or at her personal residence available via public record.

17. Defendant City of Odessa, Texas, is the public entity and political subdivision of 

Texas that created and retains control over MOUTD. Process may be served on Odessa through 

its City Secretary, Norma Aguilar-Grimaldo, at 411 W. 8th Street, Odessa, Texas 79761.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 5

18. Defendant City of Midland, Texas, is the public entity and political subdivision of 

Texas that created and retains control over MOUTD. Process may be served on Midland through 

its City Secretary, Amy Turner, at 300 N. Loraine, 3rd floor, Midland, Texas 79702.

19. Defendant RATP is a domestic for-profit corporation that may be serviced through 

its registered agent, Corporation Service Company d/b/a CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service 

Company, at 322 E. 7th Street, Suite 620, Austin, Texas 78701.

20. Defendant MOTM is a domestic for-profit corporation that may be served through 

its registered agent Corporation Service Company d/b/a CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service 

Company, at 322 E. 7th Street, Suite 620, Austin, Texas 78701.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Transportation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

21. On July 12, 1990, Congress enacted the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA), 

establishing the most important civil rights laws for persons with disabilities in our nation’s 

history.1 In passing the ADA, Congress found that persons with disabilities are a discrete and 

insular minority who had been systemically discriminated against. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 

509 (2004).

22. Finding the then-existing laws to be “inadequate” to combat the “pervasive 

problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing,” S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 

1st Sess. 18 (1989), H.R. Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1990), Congress recognized 

a need for “omnibus civil rights legislation” that would “finally set in place the necessary civil 

 

1

In 2008, Congress amended the ADA. The Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 

2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., where the definition of disability was expanded. For the 

purposes of this complaint, ADA 2008 amendments did not change any of the core transportation 

requirements discussed later in this complaint.

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rights protections for people with disabilities.” S. Rep. No. 116, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1989); 

H.R. Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1989). In reaching that determination, Congress 

concluded:

[T]here is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national 

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities 

and for the integration of persons with disabilities into the economic and social 

mainstream of American life. Further, there is a need to provide clear, strong, 

consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals 

with disabilities.

S. Rep. No. 116, 20; H.R. Rep. No. 485(II).

23. Therefore, a major purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive 

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to 

provide clear, strong, consistent and enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 

individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)&(2).

24. Congress’s finding and intention in enacting the ADA extended to many aspects of 

American life, transportation among them. The ADA sets forth Congress’s finding that 

discrimination against individuals with disabilities persisted in a number of “critical areas,” 

including transportation. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). In fact, one of the areas of critical concern to 

Congress was the availability of public transportation to persons with disabilities because, without 

mobility, the carry-on of one’s life is seriously disrupted. H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 2, at 58 (1990).

25. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that transportation was an area of 

particular concern to Congress in passing the major piece of disability rights legislation. The 

House Committee on Education and Labor, for example, described transportation as “the linchpin 

which enables people with disabilities to be integrated and mainstreamed into society.” H.R. Rep. 

No. 485(II) at 37 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 319.

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26. Similarly, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce stated that 

transportation “is a veritable lifeline to the economic and social benefits that our Nation offers its 

citizens [....] For this reason, the National Council on Disability has declared that ‘accessible 

transportation is a critical component of a national policy that promotes self-reliance and selfsufficiency of people with disabilities.’” H.R. Rep. No. 485(IV) at 25, (1990), reprinted in 1990 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 514.

27. Title II of the ADA covers governmental entities. Title II of the ADA provides that 

“[n]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

28. Title II of the ADA and implementing regulations establishes a robust framework 

of transportation requirements for persons with disabilities. Title II of the ADA prohibits state and 

local governments that operate public transit agencies (hereinafter “transit agencies”) from 

discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in transportation services offered to 

the public. Title II, Subtitle B of the ADA applies to state and local governments’ transit agencies. 

42 U.S.C §§ 12141, et. seq.

29. Transit agencies traditionally operate a fixed-route bus system. A transit agency’s 

fixed-route system is defined as “a system of providing designated public transportation on which 

a vehicle is operated along a prescribed route according to a fixed schedule” and does not require 

individuals to request service in advance. 42 U.S.C. § 12141(3).

30. Transit agencies operating fixed-route transportation systems are required to 

provide paratransit service for individuals with disabilities as a complement to the fixed-route

system. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a). Paratransit provides transportation to individuals unable to use 

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public transportation routes that are available to the public. Further, complimentary paratransit is 

not same-day service as is the case with the fixed-route system. Qualified paratransit riders must 

schedule their trips 24-hours in advance.

31. Individuals must qualify for paratransit services. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(1)(A).

32. Congress instructed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations providing 

minimum service criteria for paratransit service. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(b) & (c).

33. A public entity that operates a fixed route must “provide complementary paratransit

service to origins and destinations within corridors with a width of three-fourths of a mile on each 

side of each fixed route.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1)(i).

34. The basic bus system service area is a corridor with a width of three-quarters (3⁄4)

of a mile on each side of each fixed route. At the end of a route, there is a semicircular “cap” on 

the corridor, consisting of a three-quarter mile radius from the end point of the route to the parallel 

sides of the corridor. The fixed-route bus system service area is a corridor that is three-quarters of 

a mile on each side of the fixed-route bus line. Complementary paratransit must provide service 

to any origin or destination point within a corridor fitting this description around any route in the 

bus system. 49 C.F.R. Pt. 37, App. D, Construction and Interpretation of Provisions of 28 CFR 

Part 37, Effective April 16, 2014.

35. Public entity transit providers do not need to provide complimentary paratransit 

services to a fixed-route system if the system is a “commuter bus service.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.121(c). 

This exception only applies if the system provides “solely commuter bus service.” 42 U.S.C.A. 

§ 12143 (emphasis added to original).

36. In implementing the ADA transit regulations, the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA) defined a commuter bus service as a “fixed route bus service, characterized by service 

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predominantly in one direction during peak periods, limited stops, use of multi-ride tickets, and 

routes of extended length, usually between the central business district and outlying suburbs. 

Commuter bus service may also include other service, characterized by a limited route structure, 

limited stops, and a coordinated relationship to another mode of transportation.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 

(definitions).

37. The definition of “commuter bus service” is important because the ADA does not 

require complementary paratransit be provided with respect to commuter bus service operated by 

public entities. The rationale that may be inferred for the statutory exemption for this kind of 

service concerns its typical characteristics (e.g., no attempt to comprehensively cover a service 

area, limited route structure, limited origins and destinations, interface with another mode of 

transportation, limited purposes of travel). These characteristics can be found in some 

transportation systems other than bus systems oriented toward work trips. For example, bus 

service that is used as a dedicated connecter to commuter or intercity rail service, certain airport 

shuttles, and university bus systems share many or all of these characteristics. 49 C.F.R. Pt. 37, 

App. D, Construction and Interpretation of Provisions of 28 CFR Part 37, Effective April 16, 2014.

II. Creation of MOUTD and Hiring of Its Private Subcontractors 

38. In 2001, the Cities of Midland and Odessa entered into an Interlocal Agreement to 

create an urban transit district under Chapter 458 of the Texas Transportation Code.

39. The urban transit district Midland and Odessa created was the Midland Odessa 

Urban Transit District, or the “MOUTD.”

40. The agreement specified that MOUTD “shall be exclusively governed by the City 

Councils of Midland and Odessa” unless the city councils of Midland and Odessa delegate the 

authority to a Board.

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41. A Transit Board governs the MOUTD. However, the cities of Odessa and Midland

retain control over MOUTD. Examples of this control include, the cities of Midland and Odessa 

select the members of the MOUTD Transit Board. Additionally, the cities, through their respective 

city councils, approve budgets and route changes for MOUTD.

42. RATP and MOTM serve as private subcontractors and local managers of the dayto-day operations of the MOUTD transportation services. RATP specifically manages and 

operates MOUTD and maintains MOTM to employ transit employees.

43. MOUTD, the cities of Midland and Odessa, RATP and MOTM, are recipients of 

federal financial assistance, in particular, via the U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and 

the Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”). Defendants use these federal funds and grants to 

operate and maintain the public transportation system Ms. Uranga uses and intends to use as the 

basis of this complaint.

III. MOUTD’s Public Transportation Bus System

A. Fixed-Route Bus Lines

44. MOUTD has the legal authority to operate in the jurisdictions of the cities of

Midland and Odessa, to travel back and forth between the two cities, and to operate in areas 

between the cities.

45. MOUTD administers an interconnected bus system with buses running along routes

lines with pre-designated bus stops that serve the cities of Midland and Odessa, as well as areas

between the two cities.

46. MOUTD operates six fixed-route bus lines inside Midland. MOUTD labels these 

fixed-route bus lines “M1,” “M2,” “M3,” “M4,” “M5,” and “M6.” MOUTD operates an additional 

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fixed route bus line that takes passengers to locations in Midland as well as locations in and near 

the Airport. MOUTD calls this fixed-route line the Midland Connect.

47. MOUTD operates six fixed-route bus lines inside Odessa. MOUTD names these 

fixed-route bus lines individually, “O1,” “O2,” “O3,” “O4,” “O5,” and “O6.” MOUTD operates 

an additional fixed route bus line that takes passengers to locations in Odessa as well as locations 

in and near the Airport. MOUTD calls this fixed-route line the Odessa Connect.

48. When viewed in its entirety, MOUTD operates all its fixed route bus lines, M1-M6, 

O1-06, the Midland Connect, and the Odessa Connect, as one interconnected, comprehensive bus 

system service. A rider can enter the MOUTD bus system at any bus stops along the M1-M6, O1-

O6, the Midland Connect, or the Odessa Connect, and travel and transfer onto other lines 

throughout the entire system without ever leaving the bus system.

49. MOUTD charges $1.25 for its fixed-route bus rides on the M1-M6, O1-O6, the 

Midland Connect, and Odessa Connect.

50. MOUTD offers all-day passes for its fixed-route bus rides on the M1-M6, O1-O6,

the Midland Connect, and Odessa Connect.

51. Defendant’s fixed-route buses described above operate from 6:15 a.m. until 6:15

p.m. Monday through Friday (with some Saturday service), whether during peak or non-peak 

ridership times.

B. The “Odessa Connect” and the “Midland Connect” Bus Lines

52. The “Midland Connect” and “Odessa Connect” are fixed route bus lines that are 

part of MOUTD’s overall comprehensive bus system, not separate or apart from the M1-M6 and 

O1-O6 bus lines.

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53. The “Midland Connect” and “Odessa Connect” serve several important destination 

points along their fixed-routes, such as the University of Texas Permian Basin Building, Texas 

Department of Public Safety, various major shopping centers, and a Veteran’s medical clinic, and 

do not predominantly run in one direction.

54. The “Midland Connect” serves the following pre-determined buses stop in the 

following order: 

(1) Greyhound station (where MOUTD’s main office is located), 2624 E. 8th Street, 

Odessa Texas 79761;

(2) University of Texas Permian Basin Building – north, 1310 FM 1788, Midland, Texas 

79707;

(3) Oxy Building, 5716 Deauville Blvd., Midland, Texas 79706;

(4) Sam’s Club, 1500 Tradewinds Blvd., Midland, Texas 79706;

(5) Midland Park Mall, 4511 N. Midkiff Road, Midland, Texas 79705;

(6) Walmart Supercenter, 4517 Midland Dr., Midland, Texas 79707;

(7) H-E-B- Supermarket, 5407 Andrews Hwy., Midland, Texas 79706;

(8) Texas Department of Safety Mega Center, 2800 Wright Dr., Midland, Texas 79706;

(9) Midland International Airport, 9506 La Force Blvd., Midland, Texas 79706; and then 

returning to

(10) Greyhound station at 2624 E. 8th St. Odessa, Texas 79761.

55. The “Midland Connect” operates during peak and non-peak ridership hours, 

beginning its fixed-route tours at 6:45 a.m. MOUTD used to operate the “Midland Connect” 

during only peak transit hours in the morning (6:45 a.m. to 9:40 a.m.) and peak transit hours in the 

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afternoon-evening (2:40 p.m. to 6:40 a.m.), but changed the “Midland Connect” to a full service 

fixed-route schedule.

56. The “Odessa Connect” fixed-route buses stop at the following pre-determined 

locations in the following order:

(1) Greyhound station (where MOUTD’s headquarters is located), 2624 E. 8th Street, 

Odessa Texas 79761;

(2) Sunset Lodge, 7701 E, TX-191, Odessa, TX 79762;

(3) Chimney Rock Shopping Center, 6201 TX-191 Frontage, Odessa, TX 79762;

(4) Music City Mall, 4101 E. 42nd St. Odessa, Texas 79762;

(5) Conn’s Home Plus, 6976 E. TX-191, Odessa, Texas 79765;

(6) ProCare VA Internal Medicine Clinic, 8050 TX-191 Frontage, Odessa, Texas 79765;

(7) Midland International Airport, 9506 La Force Blvd., Midland, Texas 79706;

(8) Texas Department of Safety Mega Center, 2800 Wright Dr., Midland, Texas 79706; 

and then returning to 

(9) Greyhound station at 2624 E. 8th St. Odessa, Texas 79761.

57. The “Odessa Connect” operates during peak and non-peak ridership hours, 

beginning its fixed-route tours at 6:45 a.m. and ending at 6:40 p.m. MOUTD used to operate the 

“Odessa Connect” during peak transit hours in the morning (6:45 a.m. to 9:40 a.m.) and peak 

transit hours in the afternoon-evening (2:40 p.m. to 6:40 a.m.), but changed the “Odessa Connect” 

to a full service fixed-route schedule.

58. The “Midland Connect” and the “Odessa Connect” overlap and intersect at the 

following bus stops: (1) Texas Department of Safety Mega Center, 2800 Wright Dr., Midland, 

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Texas 79706; (2) the Midland International Airport; and (3) the Greyhound station. Riders can 

transfer between the two bus lines at these three bus stops.

59. “Midland Connect” and “Odessa Connect,” riders can transfer to the M1-M6 and 

O1-O6 fixed route bus lines. For example, at the Midland Park Mall, 4511 N. Midkiff Road, 

Midland, Texas, riders can disembark from the “Midland Connect” and then transfer to the M2, 

M3, or M4 bus lines.

60. The “Midland Connect” and the “Odessa Connect” do not provide service to any 

suburban outlining areas of Midland or Odessa; only transportation between the two cities.

61. Neither the “Midland Connect” nor the “Odessa Connect” are dedicated and 

coordinated connecters to other commuter or intercity rail services, certain airport shuttles, or a 

university bus system.

62. Riders can purchase all-day tickets for the two Connects; however, this is no 

different for any of the other fixed-route bus lines operated by MOUTD. Further, the price for the 

all-day ticket passes is the same for all fixed-routes; there is no reduced price for the all-day passes 

for the two Connects. 

63. MOUTD does not operate the “Midland Connect” or the “Odessa Connect” in a

formal coordinated relationship to another mode of transportation. MOUTD does not have a 

formal agreement with the Midland International Airport to provide coordinated travel between 

MOUTD and the airport. For example, when the buses for the “Midland Connect” and “Odessa 

Connect” make their trips to the Midland International Airport, riders can ask the MOUTD bus to 

stop at the rider’s desired location. These unscheduled stops are not coordinated with the Midland 

International Airport. Nor is there any coordinated relationship or memorandum of understanding

between MOUTD and the Midland International Airport to provide transportation at drop-off or 

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pick-up points where airport shuttle buses provide further transportation inside the airport 

complex.

64. MOUTD stops at a Greyhound terminal, but does not provide coordinated travel 

with Greyhound. There is no formal referral agreement or memorandum of understanding to 

transfer passengers between MOUTD and Greyhound. There is also no known MOUTD schedule 

keyed and dedicated to Greyhound’s schedule to help facilitate a transfer interface. Rather,

MOUTD and Greyhound only have an agreement to share a common workspace. Further, a

“Midland Connect” or “Odessa Connect” ride ticket does not transfer to Greyhound services.

65. MOUTD also comprehensively and broadly covers the areas its serves with the 

“Midland Connect” and “Odessa Connect.” The “Midland Connect” and “Odessa Connect” 

service its areas with strategic and selective population centered fixed-stops that helps 

comprehensively cover its designated area. Where both Connects do not stop, there is substantially 

undeveloped vacant land or industrial locations. There are few commercial non-industrial uses, 

and where there are such uses, they range from cemeteries to a few churches. There is also a very 

low population density in the areas the Connects do not stop relative to the areas by the Connects. 

The Connects bypass a relatively new shopping outlet that includes restaurants, six (6) hotels, and 

a car dealership. An event and performing arts centers are also bypassed, but the vast majority of 

events held at these locations are held after bus services end.

C. MOUTD’s EZ Express

66. MOUTD operates an express service that runs only once a day from 6:15 a.m. to 

6:40 a.m. This express operates back and forth between only the Midland Park Mall in Midland, 

Texas, and the Music City Mall in Odessa, Texas.

67. After 6:40 a.m., MOUTD’s EZ Express stops operating.

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68. MOUTD’s EZ Express does not coordinate with any other mode of transportation. 

Its fair price is the same as all other bus lines operated by MOUTD, which is $1.25.

D. MOUTD’s Complimentary Paratransit Services

69. MOUTD provides complimentary paratransit service to its M1-M6 and O1-O6 bus 

lines. A one-way paratransit trip costs $2.50.

70. MOUTD does not provide complimentary paratransit along the Midland Connect 

and Odessa Connect fixed-route bus lines because it considers these bus lines to be commuter bus 

services.

71. Per MOUTD’s paratransit plan policy, only locations that are three-quarters of a 

mile within a fixed route bus line are eligible for paratransit trip pick-ups and drop-offs.

72. MOUTD provides demand response non-paratransit trips between the cities 

Midland and Odessa for a one-way fee of $5.00.

IV. Plaintiff Ms. Uranga Wants to Use Paratransit Service to Travel Back and Forth 

Between Midland and Odessa

73. Ms. Uranga is a person with a visual impairment. Her physical impairment

substantially impacts the major life activity of sight. This is a long-term impairment. Ms. Uranga 

also uses a service animal to assist her with her visual impairment. The service animal is trained 

to perform specific tasks related to Ms. Uranga’s visual impairment and to help her navigate.

74. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit rider with MOUTD and receives 

complimentary paratransit rides from MOUTD.

75. Ms. Uranga lives in Odessa, Texas. Her home is within three-quarters of a mile of 

a fixed-route bus line operated by MOUTD.

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76. Ms. Uranga attempted and continues to want to travel via paratransit services from 

paratransit eligible locations (i.e., within three-quarters of a mile of the nearest fixed-route bus 

line) in Odessa to paratransit eligible locations (i.e., within three-quarters of a mile of the nearest 

fixed-route bus line) in Midland, Texas.

77. MOUTD refuses Ms. Uranga one continuous paratransit trip from her home in 

Odessa, Texas to locations in Midland, Texas that are within three-quarters of a mile of the M1, 

M2, M3, M4, M5, or M6 lines and stops.

78. MOUTD does not provide paratransit services to Ms. Uranga in the same way 

someone using the fixed-route would receive. 

79. Paratransit services between Odessa and Midland takes longer than riding the fixedroute bus system between the two cities.

80. MOUTD refuses to provide one continuous trip from Odessa to Midland because it 

believes the Midland Connect and Odessa Connect are a commuter bus service. The Midland 

Connect and Odessa Connect are not a commuter bus service; nor are they used solely as a 

commuter bus service.

CAUSES OF ACTION

I. Claims Against MOUTD

A. Violations of Title II of the ADA

81. The allegations listed in the preceding paragraphs above are incorporated by 

reference.

82. Ms. Uranga is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of the 

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), as she is an individual with a visual impairment that impacts the 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 17 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 18

following major life activities: sight and independent mobility. Her physical impairment is 

substantial and long-term.

83. Defendant MOUTD is a governmental entity, making it a public entity pursuant to 

Title II of the ADA. MOUTD also qualifies as a transit agency under Title II of the ADA.

84. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

85. Title II of the ADA and implementing regulations establishes a robust framework 

of transportation requirements for persons with disabilities. Title II of the ADA prohibits state and 

local governments that operate public transit agencies (hereinafter “transit agencies”) from 

discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in transportation services offered to 

the public. Title II, Subtitle B of the ADA applies to state and local governments’ transit agencies. 

42 U.S.C §§ 12141, et. seq.

86. MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus system. 42 U.S.C. § 12141(3).

87. Because MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus system, it is required to provide 

paratransit service for individuals with disabilities as a complement to the fixed-route system. 42 

U.S.C. § 12143(a).

88. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit rider with MOUTD. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12143(c)(1)(A).

89. Congress instructed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations providing 

minimum service criteria for paratransit service. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(b) & (c).

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 18 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 19

90. A public entity that operates a fixed route bus system, such as MOUTD, must 

“provide complementary paratransit service to origins and destinations within corridors with a 

width of three-fourths of a mile on each side of each fixed route.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1)(i).

91. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit eligible rider with MOUTD. Ms. Uranga lives 

in Odessa, Texas, and her home is within three-quarters of a mile from a fixed-route bus line

operated by MOUTD. Ms. Uranga attempted to and continues to want to travel via paratransit

from her home in Odessa to locations in Midland, Texas that are within three-quarters of a mile of 

the M1-M6 fixed-route bus lines and stops.

92. MOUTD, however, refuses to provide Ms. Uranga one continuous paratransit ride 

even though its fixed-route bus lines in Midland and Odessa are interconnected via the Midland

Connect and Odessa Connect as one interconnected bus route system and thus seamlessly connect 

the two cities.

93. Neither MOUTD’s “Midland Connect” nor “Odessa Connect” are a commuter bus 

service. MOUTD is therefore obligated to provide complimentary paratransit service along the 

Midland Connect and Odessa Connect. To date, however, MOUTD refuses to provide paratransit

trips based on an erroneous interpretation and application that its Midland Connect and Odessa 

Connect are commuter bus services.

94. In sum, Defendant MOUTD violated and continues to violate Ms. Uranga’s rights 

under the ADA to receive complimentary paratransit service between Midland and Odessa, Texas.

95. Defendant MOUTD’s actions and/or inactions described above therefore:

a. constitute discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 35;

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 19 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 20

b. fail to provide complimentary paratransit in violation of Title II of the ADA, 

42 U.S.C. § 12143, and its implementing regulation, 49 C.F.R Part 37;

c. exclude individuals with disabilities from participation in and deny them 

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity on the basis of 

disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing 

regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a);

d. afford qualified individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in 

or benefit from the services of a public entity that are not equal to those afforded others, in 

violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii);

e. limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, 

privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service, 

in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 

C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(vii);

f. fail to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures 

necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title II of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7);

g. utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting qualified 

individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title 

II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.130(b)(3);

h. exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an 

individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the 

individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association, in violation of Title II 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 20 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 21

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g); 

and

i. interfere with an individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account 

of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or 

encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 

protected by the ADA, in violation of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).

96. MOUTD’s violations of Title II of the ADA harmed and will continue to harm Ms. 

Uranga in the future.

B. Violations of the Rehabilitation Act

97. The allegations listed above above are incorporated by reference.

98. Ms. Uranga is qualified individual with disabilities under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

99. MOUTD receives federal financial assistance to operate transportation programs 

and services designed to provide transportation to Plaintiff.

100. The regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act provide that: “[r]ecipients 

shall administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 

qualified [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).

101. These regulations further prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from 

“utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . (i) [t]hat have the effect of subjecting 

[disabled] persons to discrimination on the basis of [disability]; [or] (ii) that have the purpose or 

effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with 

respect to [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b).

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 21 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 22

102. MOUTD’s criteria and methods of administering their transportation services for 

persons with disabilities subjects plaintiffs to illegal discrimination and unnecessary segregation 

in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations.

103. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act

prohibits any program or activity receiving federal funding from denying to persons with 

disabilities, on the basis of disability, the benefits of the program or activity, or from subjecting 

persons with disabilities to discrimination.

104. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) a “program or activity” receiving federal funds is defined 

to include all the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or local government.”

105. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 27.3, “each recipient of Federal financial assistance from 

the Department of Transportation and . . . each program or activity that receives such assistance” 

is subject to 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., prohibition of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities regulations.

106. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., it is considered discrimination 

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act “for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public 

transportation program or activity conducted in [existing] facilities so that, when viewed in the 

entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

107. In engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant MOUTD denied Plaintiff

the benefits of its services, programs, and activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. 

§ 27.1, et seq., on the basis of her disability. The benefit denied was paratransit services between 

Odessa and Midland in one continuous trip.

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 22 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 23

108. MOUTD’s violations of the Rehabilitation Act harmed and will continue to harm 

Ms. Uranga in the future.

II. Claims Against City of Odessa 

A. Violations of Title II of the ADA

109. The allegations listed in paragraphs 1–111 above are incorporated by reference.

110. Ms. Uranga is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of the 

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), as she is an individual with a visual impairment that impacts the 

following major life activities: sight and independent mobility. Her physical impairment is longterm and substantial.

111. Odessa is a governmental entity, making it a public entity pursuant to Title II of the 

ADA.

112. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

113. Title II of the ADA and implementing regulations establishes a robust framework 

of transportation requirements for persons with disabilities. Title II of the ADA prohibits state and 

local governments that operate public transit agencies (hereinafter “transit agencies”) from 

discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in transportation services offered to 

the public. Title II, Subtitle B of the ADA applies to state and local governments’ transit agencies. 

42 U.S.C §§ 12141, et. seq.

114. Defendant Odessa provides transportation services by overseeing and controlling 

MOUTD. MOUTD operates fixed-route bus systems. 42 U.S.C. § 12141(3).

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 23 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 24

115. Because MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus system, it is required to provide 

paratransit service for individuals with disabilities as a complement to the fixed-route system. 42 

U.S.C. § 12143(a).

116. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit rider with MOUTD. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12143(c)(1)(A).

117. Congress instructed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations providing 

minimum service criteria for paratransit service. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(b) & (c).

118. A public entity that operates a fixed route, such as MOUTD, must “provide 

complementary paratransit service to origins and destinations within corridors with a width of 

three-fourths of a mile on each side of each fixed route.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1)(i).

119. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit eligible rider with MOUTD. Ms. Uranga lives 

in Odessa, Texas, and her home is within three-quarters of a mile from a fixed-route operated by 

MOUTD. Ms. Uranga attempted to and continues to want to travel from her home in Odessa, 

which is within three-quarters of a mile of the nearest fixed-route line, to locations in Midland, 

Texas that are within three-quarters of a mile of the M1-M6 fixed-route bus lines and stops.

120. MOUTD, however, refuses to provide Ms. Uranga one continuous paratransit ride 

even though its fixed-routes in Midland and Odessa are interconnected via the Midland Connect 

and Odessa Connect as one interconnected bus route system.

121. Neither MOUTD’s “Midland Connect” nor “Odessa Connect” are a commuter bus 

service. MOUTD is therefore obligated to provide complimentary paratransit service along the 

Midland Connect and Odessa Connect, therefore permitting paratransit riders to travel between 

Midland and Odessa in one continuous paratransit trip. To date, however, MOUTD refuses to 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 24 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 25

provide these paratransit trips based on an erroneous interpretation and application that its Midland 

Connect and Odessa Connect are commuter bus service lines.

122. In sum, Defendant MOUTD violated and continues to violate Ms. Uranga’s rights 

under the ADA to receive complimentary paratransit service between Midland and Odessa, Texas.

123. In turn, Defendant City Odessa is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and/or 

inactions as it retains control over MOUTD after creating it.

124. Defendant Odessa’s actions and/or inactions described above therefore:

a. constitute discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 35;

b. fail to provide complimentary paratransit in violation of Title II of the ADA, 

42 U.S.C. § 12143, and its implementing regulation, 49 C.F.R Part 37

c. exclude individuals with disabilities from participation in and deny them 

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity on the basis of 

disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing 

regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a);

d. afford qualified individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in 

or benefit from the services of a public entity that are not equal to those afforded others, in 

violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii);

e. limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, 

privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service,

in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 

C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(vii);

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 25 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 26

f. fail to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures 

necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title II of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7);

g. utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting qualified 

individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title 

II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.130(b)(3);

h. exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an 

individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the 

individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association, in violation of Title II 

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g); 

and

i. interfere with an individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account 

of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or 

encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 

protected by the ADA, in violation of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).

125. Defendant Odessa’s violations of Title II of the ADA harmed and will continue to 

harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

B. Violations of the Rehabilitation Act

126. The allegations listed in the above paragraphs above are incorporated by reference.

127. Ms. Uranga is qualified individual with disabilities under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 26 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 27

128. Defendant Odessa receives federal financial assistance to operate transportation 

programs and services designed to provide transportation services and supports to the plaintiff.

129. The regulations accompanying Rehabilitation Act provide that: “[r]ecipients shall 

administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 

qualified [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).

130. These regulations further prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from 

“utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . (i) [t]hat have the effect of subjecting 

[disabled] persons to discrimination on the basis of [disability]; [or] (ii) that have the purpose or 

effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with 

respect to [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b).

131. Odessa created and retains control over MOUTD. MOUTD’s criteria and methods 

of administering their transportation services for persons with disabilities subjects plaintiffs to 

illegal discrimination and unnecessary segregation in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

and its implementing regulations.

132. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act

prohibits any program or activity receiving federal funding from denying to persons with 

disabilities, on the basis of disability, the benefits of the program or activity, or from subjecting 

persons with disabilities to discrimination.

133. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) a “program or activity” receiving federal funds is defined 

to include all the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or local government.”

134. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 27.3, “each recipient of Federal financial assistance from 

the Department of Transportation and . . . each program or activity that receives such assistance” 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 27 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 28

is subject to 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., prohibition of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities regulations.

135. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq. it is considered discrimination 

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act “for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public 

transportation program or activity conducted in [existing] facilities so that, when viewed in the 

entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

136. In engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant MOUTD denied Plaintiff 

the benefits of its services, programs, and activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and49 C.F.R. 

§ 27.1, et seq., on the basis of her disability. The benefit denied was paratransit services between 

Odessa and Midland in one continuous trip.

137. Defendant Odessa is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and inactions.

138. Defendant Odessa’s violations of the Rehabilitation Act harmed and will continue 

to harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

III. Claims Against the City of Midland

A. Violations of Title II of the ADA

139. The allegations listed in the above are incorporated by reference.

140. Ms. Uranga is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of the 

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), as she is an individual with a visual impairment that impacts the 

following major life activities: sight and independent mobility. The physical impairment is longterm and substantial.

141. Midland is a governmental entity, making it a public entity pursuant to Title II of 

the ADA.

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 28 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 29

142. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

143. Title II of the ADA and implementing regulations establishes a robust framework 

of transportation requirements for persons with disabilities. Title II of the ADA prohibits state and 

local governments that operate public transit agencies (hereinafter “transit agencies”) from 

discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in transportation services offered to 

the public. Title II, Subtitle B of the ADA applies to state and local governments’ transit agencies. 

42 U.S.C §§ 12141, et. seq.

144. Defendant Midland provides transportation services by overseeing and controlling 

MOUTD. MOUTD operates fixed-route bus systems. 42 U.S.C. § 12141(3).

145. Because MOUTD operates a fixed-route bus system, it is required to provide 

paratransit service for individuals with disabilities as a complement to the fixed-route system. 42 

U.S.C. § 12143(a).

146. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit rider with MOUTD. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12143(c)(1)(A).

147. Congress instructed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations providing 

minimum service criteria for paratransit service. 42 U.S.C. § 12143(b) & (c).

148. A public entity that operates a fixed route, such as MOUTD, must “provide 

complementary paratransit service to origins and destinations within corridors with a width of 

three-fourths of a mile on each side of each fixed route.” 49 C.F.R. § 37.131(a)(1)(i).

149. Ms. Uranga is a qualified paratransit eligible rider with MOUTD. Ms. Uranga lives 

in Odessa, Texas, and her home is within three-quarters of a mile from a fixed-route operated by 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 29 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 30

MOUTD. Ms. Uranga attempted to and continues to want to travel from her home in Odessa, 

which is within three-quarters of a mile of the nearest fixed-route line, to locations in Midland, 

Texas that are within three-quarters of a mile of the M1-M6 fixed-route bus lines and stops.

150. MOUTD, however, refuses to provide Ms. Uranga one continuous paratransit ride 

even though its fixed-routes in Midland and Odessa are interconnected via the “Midland Connect”

and “Odessa Connect” as one interconnected bus route system.

151. Neither MOUTD’s “Midland Connect” nor “Odessa Connect” are a commuter bus 

service, and therefore, MOUTD is obligated to provide complimentary paratransit service along 

the Midland Connect and Odessa Connect, therefore permitting paratransit riders to travel between 

Midland and Odessa in one continuous paratransit trip. To date, however, MOUTD refuses to 

provide these paratransit trips based on an erroneous interpretation and application that its Midland 

Connect and Odessa Connect are commuter bus service lines.

152. In sum, Defendant MOUTD violated and continues to violate Ms. Uranga’s rights 

under the ADA to receive complimentary paratransit service between Midland and Odessa, Texas.

153. In turn, Defendant Midland is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and/or inactions. 

Midland created and retains control over MOUTD.

154. Defendant Midland’s actions and/or inactions described above therefore:

a. constitute discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. Part 35;

b. fail to provide complimentary paratransit in violation of Title II of the ADA, 

42 U.S.C. § 12143, and its implementing regulation, 49 C.F.R Part 37

c. exclude individuals with disabilities from participation in and deny them 

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity on the basis of 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 30 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 31

disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing 

regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a);

d. afford qualified individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in 

or benefit from the services of a public entity that are not equal to those afforded others, in 

violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii);

e. limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, 

privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service, 

in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 

C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(vii);

f. fail to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures 

necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title II of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7);

g. utilize methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting qualified 

individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of Title 

II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.130(b)(3);

h. exclude or otherwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an 

individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the 

individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association, in violation of Title II 

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g); 

and

i. interfere with an individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account 

of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or 

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 31 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 32

encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or 

protected by the ADA, in violation of Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).

155. Defendant Odessa’s violations of Title II of the ADA harmed and will continue to 

harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

B. Violations of the Rehabilitation Act

156. The allegations listed in the above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

157. Ms. Uranga is qualified individual with disabilities under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

158. Defendant Midland receives federal financial assistance to operate transportation 

programs and services designed to provide transportation services and supports to the plaintiff.

159. The regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act provide that: “[r]ecipients 

shall administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 

qualified [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).

160. These regulations further prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from 

“utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . (i) [t]hat have the effect of subjecting 

[disabled] persons to discrimination on the basis of [disability]; [or] (ii) that have the purpose or 

effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with 

respect to [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b).

161. Midland created and retains control over MOUTD. MOUTD’s criteria and 

methods of administering their transportation services for persons with disabilities subjects 

plaintiffs to illegal discrimination and unnecessary segregation in violation of the Rehabilitation 

Act and its implementing regulations.

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 32 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 33

162. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act 

prohibits any program or activity receiving federal funding from denying to persons with 

disabilities, on the basis of disability, the benefits of the program or activity, or from subjecting 

persons with disabilities to discrimination.

163. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) a “program or activity” receiving federal funds is defined 

to include all the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or local government.”

164. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 27.3, “each recipient of Federal financial assistance from 

the Department of Transportation and . . . each program or activity that receives such assistance” 

is subject to 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., prohibition of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities regulations.

165. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq. it is considered discrimination 

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act “for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public 

transportation program or activity conducted in [existing] facilities so that, when viewed in the 

entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

166. In engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant MOUTD denied Plaintiff 

the benefits of its services, programs, and activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. 

§ 27.1, et seq., on the basis of her disability. The benefit denied was paratransit services between 

Odessa and Midland in one continuous trip.

167. Defendant Midland is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and inactions.

168. Defendant Midland’s violations of the Rehabilitation harmed and will continue to 

harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 33 of 39
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 34

IV. Claims Against RATP

169. The allegations listed in the above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

170. Ms. Uranga is qualified individual with disabilities under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

171. Defendant RATP receives federal financial assistance as a subcontractor to manage 

and operate the day-to-day services of MOUTD’s transportation programs designed to provide 

transportation services and supports to the plaintiff.

172. The regulations accompanying Rehabilitation Act provide that: “[r]ecipients shall 

administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 

qualified [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).

173. These regulations further prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from 

“utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . (i) [t]hat have the effect of subjecting 

[disabled] persons to discrimination on the basis of [disability]; [or] (ii) that have the purpose or 

effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with 

respect to [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b).

174. Midland created and retains control over MOUTD. MOUTD’s criteria and 

methods of administering their transportation services for persons with disabilities subjects 

plaintiffs to illegal discrimination and unnecessary segregation in violation of the Rehabilitation 

Act and its implementing regulations.

175. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., Rehabilitation Act prohibits 

any program or activity receiving federal funding from denying to persons with disabilities, on the 

basis of disability, the benefits of the program or activity, or from subjecting persons with 

disabilities to discrimination.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 35

176. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) a “program or activity” receiving federal funds is defined 

to include all the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or local government.”

177. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 27.3, “each recipient of Federal financial assistance from 

the Department of Transportation and . . . each program or activity that receives such assistance” 

is subject to 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., prohibition of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities regulations.

178. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., it is considered discrimination 

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act “for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public 

transportation program or activity conducted in [existing] facilities so that, when viewed in the 

entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

179. In engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant MOUTD denied Plaintiff 

the benefits of its services, programs, and activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and49 C.F.R. 

§ 27.1, et seq., on the basis of her disability. The benefit denied was paratransit services between 

Odessa and Midland in one continuous trip.

180. Defendant RATP is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and inactions as a 

subcontractor implementing and following MOUTD’s discriminatory paratransit policies.

181. Defendant RATP’s violations of the Rehabilitation Act harmed and will continue 

to harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

V. Claims Against MOTM

182. The allegations listed in the above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

183. Ms. Uranga is qualified individual with disabilities under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 36

184. Defendant RATP receives federal financial assistance as a subcontractor to manage 

and operate the day-to-day services of MOUTD’s transportation programs designed to provide 

transportation services and supports to the plaintiff.

185. The regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act provide that: “[r]ecipients 

shall administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of

qualified [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).

186. These regulations further prohibit recipients of federal financial assistance from 

“utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . (i) [t]hat have the effect of subjecting 

[disabled] persons to discrimination on the basis of [disability]; [or] (ii) that have the purpose or 

effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient’s program with

respect to [disabled] persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b).

187. Midland created and retains control over MOUTD. MOUTD’s criteria and 

methods of administering their transportation services for persons with disabilities subjects 

plaintiffs to illegal discrimination and unnecessary segregation in violation of the Rehabilitation 

Act and its implementing regulations.

188. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act 

prohibits any program or activity receiving federal funding from denying to persons with 

disabilities, on the basis of disability, the benefits of the program or activity, or from subjecting 

persons with disabilities to discrimination.

189. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) a “program or activity” receiving federal funds is defined 

to include all the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or local government.”

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 37

190. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 27.3, “each recipient of Federal financial assistance from 

the Department of Transportation and . . . each program or activity that receives such assistance” 

is subject to 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., prohibition of discrimination against individuals with 

disabilities regulations.

191. Under 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. § 27.1, et seq., it is considered discrimination 

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act “for a public entity to fail to operate a designated public 

transportation program or activity conducted in [existing] facilities so that, when viewed in the 

entirety, the program or activity is readily accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

192. In engaging in the conduct described above, Defendant MOUTD denied Plaintiff 

the benefits of its services, programs, and activities in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 49 C.F.R. 

§ 27.1, et seq., on the basis of her disability. The benefit denied was paratransit services between 

Odessa and Midland in one continuous trip.

193. Defendant RATP is responsible for MOUTD’s actions and inactions as a 

subcontractor implementing and following MOUTD’s discriminatory paratransit policies.

194. Defendant RATP’s violations of Rehabilitation Act harmed and will continue to 

harm Ms. Uranga in the future.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant the following relief:

A. That this Court issue a permanent injunction ordering Defendants MOUTD,

Midland, Odessa, MOTM, and RATP, including their agents, servants, and employees, to develop 

and implement changes to its complimentary paratransit plan and provide Ms. Uranga paratransit 

service between Midland and Odessa, Texas.

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 38

B. That this Court order a declaratory judgment, specifying Defendants’ violations of 

her transportation rights under the ADA, including that the “Midland Connect” and “Odessa 

Connect” bus lines are not commuter bus services and therefore must have complimentary 

paratransit service associated with these lines; 

C. Defendant MOUTD adopt and implement an ADA/Rehabilitation Act coordinator 

position;

D. Defendants undergo training regarding disability rights under Title II of the ADA 

and Rehabilitation Act and those statutes’ implementing regulations;

E. That this Court order Defendants to pay Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees, 

costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205; and

F. That this Court grant such other relief as may be just, equitable, and proper.

DATED: January 27 , 2020

Respectfully submitted,

DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS

s/Christopher McGreal

CHRISTOPHER P. MCGREAL

TX State Bar No. 24051774

1420 Mockingbird Lane, Suite 450 

Dallas, Texas 75247

(214) 845-4056 (Phone)

(214) 630-3472 (Fax)

cmcgreal@drtx.org

RACHEL B. COHEN-MILLER

TX State Bar No. 24064301

1420 Mockingbird Lane, Suite 450 

Dallas, Texas 75247

(214) 845-4069 (Phone)

(214) 630-3472 (Fax)

rmiller@drtx.org

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Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 39

LEGAL AID OF NORTHWEST TEXAS

MARK OUALLINE*

TX State Bar No. 24088166

1001 Main St., Ste. 502

Lubbock, Texas 79401

(806) 763-4557 ext. 6050 (Phone)

(806) 765-7201 (Fax)

ouallinem@lanwt.org

MARVILYN E. B. BOHANNAN*

NC Bar No.: 54338

Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas

620 N. Grant Ave., Suite 410

Odessa, Texas 79761

(432) 332-1207, ext. 4504 (Phone)

(432) 334- 6848 (Fax)

bohannanm@lanwt.org

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Yadira Uranga

*Pro Hac Vice Application to be filed

Case 7:20-cv-00021 Document 1 Filed 01/27/20 Page 39 of 39