FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

WILLIAM S. FRANKEL, IV GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Wilkinson, Goeller, Modesitt, Attorney General of Indiana

 Wilkinson & Drummy, LLP

Terre Haute, Indiana MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CURTIS L. BASS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 84A01-1110-CR-473

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable John T. Roach, Judge

Cause Nos. 84D01-1001-FB-291

 84D01-0912-FB-3885

July 18, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
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Case Summary

Curtis L. Bass (“Bass”) challenges the ten-year sentence imposed upon his plea of 

guilty to two counts of Burglary, as Class B felonies, and also appeals a subsequent order 

revoking his community corrections placement and committing him to the Indiana 

Department of Correction (“the DOC”) for six years. We affirm.

Issues

Bass presents three issues for review:

I. Whether his advisory sentence is inappropriate;

II. Whether the trial court admitted urinalysis reports in violation of Bass’s 

due process rights as a probationer; and

III. Whether the revocation is supported by sufficient evidence.

Facts and Procedural History

On August 3, 2011, Bass pled guilty to two counts of Burglary. On August 19, 2011, 

he was given concurrent sentences of ten years, with four years suspended to formal 

probation and six years to be served in direct placement to community corrections or in-home 

detention. Subsequently, Bass was appointed a public defender to perfect an appeal of his 

sentence. 

On September 22, 2011, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Direct Placement, 

alleging that Bass had, on September 8, 2011, tested positive for methamphetamine. On 

October 12, 2011, Bass was granted permission to file a belated notice of appeal addressing 

the propriety of his sentence. On October 18, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on the 

placement revocation petition. Following the hearing, Bass’s probation and placement were 

revoked and he was ordered to serve six years of his sentence in the DOC. On October 31, 
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2011, Bass filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include a challenge to the revocation. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Sentence

A person who commits a Class B felony has a sentencing range of between six and 

twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Bass 

received two advisory sentences, to be served concurrently. Four years were suspended to 

probation.

Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this “Court may revise a sentence authorized by 

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” In performing our review, we assess “the culpability of the defendant, the severity 

of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). A defendant ‘“must 

persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard 

of review.”’ Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)).

The nature of Bass’s offenses is that he burglarized two homes. From one home, that 

of a deployed soldier, Bass stole at least forty guns and ammunition. The stolen guns had an 

estimated value of over $10,000. Some of the guns were then traded for drugs, thereby 

placing weapons in the hands of drug dealers. The second burglary involved the violation of 

the home of a family friend.
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 As for the character of the offender, Bass pled guilty, which reflects favorably on his 

character. See Scheckel v. State, 655 N.E.2d 506, 511 (Ind. 1995) (“[T]he fact that [the 

defendant] pled guilty demonstrates his acceptance of responsibility for the crime and at least 

partially confirms the mitigating evidence regarding his character”). However, he also 

received a benefit, in that two other charges were dismissed with prejudice. Prior to 

sentencing, Bass had sought substance abuse treatment and had cooperated with the 

Department of Child Services to regain custody of his children. He testified that he had, at 

the time of sentencing, been clean of drugs for eighteen months.

Bass has a criminal history, commencing in 1991, which includes two prior felony 

convictions and three misdemeanor convictions. He was on probation for a domestic battery 

conviction when he committed the present offenses. He has a long history of substance 

abuse and committed the instant crimes to fund his illegal drug use.

In light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender, we do not find 

Bass’s advisory sentences, with four years suspended, to be inappropriate.

II. Admission of Evidence-Probation Revocation

Bass contends that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence in determining 

whether he had violated a term of his probation and placement. Over Bass’s objection, a 

community corrections case manager was permitted to testify that Bass had “tested positive” 

for methamphetamine. (Tr. 5.) Contemporaneously, the trial court admitted as exhibits two 

toxicology reports from Redwood Toxicology Laboratory indicating that Bass’s screens of 

September 8 and 20, 2011 had each shown “positive” results for amphetamines, specifically 
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methamphetamines. (St. Ex. 2-3.) Bass asserts that the documentary evidence was not 

substantially trustworthy so as to satisfy his due process rights as a probationer.1

A probation revocation hearing is not equivalent to an adversarial criminal 

proceeding. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind. 1999). However, the Due Process 

Clause applies to probation revocation proceedings, and the due process rights of a 

probationer include: “written notice of the claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence 

against him, an opportunity to be heard and present evidence, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and a neutral and detached hearing body[.]” Id. at 549.

Because probation revocation procedures “are to be flexible, strict rules of evidence 

do not apply.” Id. The scope of the right to confrontation as defined in Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), does not apply in such proceedings. Reyes v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 438, 440 n.1 (Ind. 2007). In Cox, the Court held that judges could consider hearsay 

“bearing some substantial indicia of reliability,” but declined to adopt a particular approach 

to determining that reliability. 706 N.E.2d at 551. Subsequently, in Reyes, the Indiana 

Supreme Court adopted a “substantial trustworthiness” test. 868 N.E.2d at 440. 

In Reyes, the State had filed a notice of probation violation alleging that Reyes had 

violated his probation by testing positive for cocaine. Id. at 439. At a hearing, the State 

submitted the affidavit of the scientific director of the laboratory that conducted the urinalysis 

of Reyes’s sample, together with related documents. Id. The director did not testify at the 

hearing, and Reyes objected to the affidavits as hearsay and claimed that the admission of the 

 

1 Bass had not, as a condition of his in-home placement, agreed that toxicology results obtained by a probation 

officer would be admissible in revocation proceedings. 
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affidavit without live testimony would violate his right of confrontation. Id. The trial court 

admitted the affidavits and revoked Reyes’s probation. Id. The probation revocation was 

affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at 443. 

In reaching its decision, the Court observed that hearsay evidence may not be admitted 

“willy-nilly.” Id. at 440. However, although there may sometimes be no adequate alternative 

to live testimony, due process does not prohibit substitutes where appropriate, including 

affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 

778, 782-83 n.5 (1973)). Where the State has shown that the hearsay “bears substantial 

guarantees of trustworthiness,” the State need not additionally show good cause for not 

producing live testimony. Id. at 441. The trial court must evaluate the reliability of the 

hearsay evidence and, ideally, the trial court should explain on the record why the hearsay is 

reliable and why that reliability is substantial enough to supply good cause for not producing 

live witnesses. Id. at 442.

Here, community corrections case manager Cierra Fox (“Fox”) testified that drug 

screens were administered to Bass pursuant to the rules of the in-home detention program. 

Fox explained the procedure implemented: Bass had urinated in a container in the presence 

of a correctional officer, the cup was security sealed and labeled, and it was then placed in a 

bag to be sent to Redwood Toxicology for testing.

According to Fox, similar tests were administered by her department and sent to 

Redwood Toxicology between twenty and sixty times per week. Reports were generated by 

Redwood Toxicology at the request of Vigo County Community Corrections; the reports 
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were then maintained as community corrections records. Fox stated that, to the best of her 

knowledge, Redwood Toxicology was a certified lab; however, she lacked personal 

knowledge of its certification.

The trial court concluded that a “regular urinalysis report prepared by a company 

whose professional business it is to conduct such tests” was sufficiently trustworthy. (App. 

105.) Bass argues that the trial court’s conclusion is erroneous, because the hearsay evidence 

in his case falls short of the level of trustworthiness of that submitted in Reyes. Bass 

observes that the affidavit at issue in Reyes included the opinion of the director that “Reyes 

would have had to use cocaine some time in the 72 hours prior to collection.” Id. at 439. 

According to Bass, his case is distinguishable from that of Reyes in that (1) “no 

affidavits from anyone at the laboratory were offered” and (2) “the test results do not state 

that Bass used methamphetamine and the only sworn testimony came from someone who 

knows nothing about the laboratory’s procedures and reliability.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. 

Thus, Bass implicitly argues that the “substantial trustworthiness” test of Reyes requires an 

affidavit and a scientific opinion validating drug screen results. We discern no such 

requirement in Reyes. 

Moreover, a panel of this Court has recently concluded that the record of probation 

revocation proceedings supported a determination of substantial trustworthiness of “a routine 

report demonstrating that [appellant] had tested positive for marijuana.” Williams v. State, 

937 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The urinalysis had been performed by the 

president of the company handling Williams’s home detention, the report contained a signed 
8

chain of custody signed by Williams and the president, and an employee of the home 

detention company had testified and explained the report and the date and time of sample 

collection. Id.; see also Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 

(substantial trustworthiness existed for urinalysis report where the toxicologist affirmed 

under penalty of perjury that the sample was received under controlled conditions and 

processed in accordance with laboratory standard operating procedures and the scientist 

affirmed that the sample was handled in accordance with applicable requirements).

The absence of an affidavit from a toxicologist or laboratory employee does not render 

drug test results inadmissible in probation revocation proceedings where there is otherwise a 

substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Here, the substantial guarantee of trustworthiness 

was provided by a case manager’s testimony. She was familiar with and described the 

urinalysis collection and chain of custody procedures; she testified that the laboratory which 

had generated Bass’s urinalysis report was the laboratory used to generate twenty to sixty 

reports per week for Vigo County Community Corrections. The reports identify the 

collecting and processing individuals, and contain detailed information about the testing time.

Each report is accompanied by a document signed by Bass and by the collecting officer, 

acknowledging that the sample was sealed and secured in Bass’s presence. We conclude that 

the trial court did not contravene Bass’s due process rights when it admitted the State’s 

exhibits. 

II.Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Revocation

A reviewing court treats a petition to revoke a placement in a community corrections 
9

program the same as a petition to revoke probation. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d at 549. 

Community corrections is “a program consisting of residential and work release, electronic 

monitoring, day treatment, or day reporting[.]” Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-2. A defendant is not 

entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections program. Monroe 

v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, such placement is a “matter of 

grace” and a “conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 

998, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Probation may be revoked for violation of a probation condition. Runyon v. State, 

939 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 2010). The State must prove the violation by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Id. If a defendant violates the terms of his placement in community 

corrections, the court may, after a hearing:

(1) Change the terms of the placement.

(2) Continue the placement.

(3) Revoke the placement and commit the person to the department of 

correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5.

The State presented evidence that Bass twice tested positive for methamphetamines. 

The State established that Bass violated a term of his probation and placement – he did not 

remain law-abiding and drug-free. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5(3), the trial 

court had the option of revoking Bass’s placement and committing him to the DOC to serve a 

portion of his sentence. The probation revocation decision is supported by sufficient 

evidence.

Conclusion
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Bass has not persuaded us that his ten-year aggregate sentence, with four years 

suspended to probation, is inappropriate. Bass was not denied due process by the admission 

of hearsay evidence at the placement revocation hearing, and the decision to revoke Bass’s 

probation and order a portion of his sentence executed is supported by sufficient evidence. 

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.