J-S66028-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RANEESHA NICOLE EVANS

Appellant No. 676 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered April 16, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No: CP-25-CR-0001505-2009

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2016

Appellant, Raneesha Nicole Evans, appeals pro se from the April 16, 

2015 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, denying as 

untimely her second petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Following 

review, we affirm.

In its notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court 

provided the following summary of the facts and procedural history of the 

case:

After a jury trial, [Appellant] was found guilty in absentia of six 

counts of possession with intent to deliver, criminal conspiracy, 

six counts of possession, and one count of possession of 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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paraphernalia. On April 29, 2010, [Appellant] was sentenced in 

absentia to an aggregate term of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. 

On June 1, 2010, after the [c]ourt granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion to reconsider, the [c]ourt amended [Appellant’s] 

sentence to impose an aggregate term of 8 to 16 years’ 

imprisonment. [Appellant] filed a direct appeal and on 

November 29, 2011, the Superior Court affirmed her judgment 

of sentence. Commonwealth v. Evans, 718 WDA 2011 (Pa. 

Super., filed Nov. 29, 2011) (unpublished memorandum). 

On February 9, 2012, [Appellant] filed her first PCRA petition 

alleging, inter alia, that she was improperly denied the benefit of 

RRRI1sentences. On July 5, 2012, the [c]ourt dismissed 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition. [Appellant] filed an appeal, and on 

April 3, 2013, the Superior Court dismissed her appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 143 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super., filed 

April 5, 2013) (unpublished memorandum).

On February 18, 2015, [Appellant] filed a “Petition for 

Resentencing [u]nder Act 81 RRRI”, which [the court] treated as 

a second PCRA petition.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 3/25/15, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

Appellant filed a timely response to the notice, arguing her petition 

raised a non-waivable legality of sentence claim. On April 16, 2015, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely filed an appeal 

and complied with the PCRA court’s directive to file a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On May 19, 2015, 

the PCRA court issued its 1925(a) opinion, incorporating by reference the 

March 25 notice of intent to dismiss. In that notice, the PCRA court

concluded that Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely filed more than a year 

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1

“Recidivism risk reduction incentive.” See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4501 et seq.
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after her judgment was final and that Appellant failed to allege any facts to 

satisfy an exception to the PCRA’s time bar.2 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 

3/25/15, at 2-3 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)).

In her brief filed with this Court, Appellant restates the same two 

issues raised in her 1925(b) statement.

I. Did the [l]ower [c]ourt err when it failed to apply the RRRI 

to [A]ppellant’s sentence on April 29, 2010, when the 

Supreme Court ruled that the sentencing court must apply 

RRRI when a defendant is eligible?

II. Did the [l]ower [c]ourt err by denying [A]ppellant[’

]

s 

challenges to the legality of her sentence, when RRRI is 

one of the CLEAR issues under challenges to the legality of 

sentence and can never be waived?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (emphasis in original).

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2 To qualify for an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements, a PCRA 

petition must allege, and the petitioner must prove, that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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As reflected above, the PCRA court treated Appellant’s petition as a 

second PCRA petition and denied the petition as untimely. In 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court 

reiterated:

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the 

PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, [86 A.3d 795, 803 

(Pa. 2014)] (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, [84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014)] (citation omitted). “It is 

well-settled that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are 

binding upon an appellate court so long as they are supported by 

the record.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, [82 A.3d 998, 1013 

(Pa. 2013)] (citation omitted). However, this Court reviews the 

PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. 

Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Id. at 992. 

Before we can consider the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must 

determine if her petition was timely filed. 

Pennsylvania law makes clear that when “a PCRA petition is 

untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction 

over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 

241 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). The “period for filing a 

PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; 

instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only 

if the PCRA permits it to be extended[.]” Commonwealth v. 

Ali, [86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014)] (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). This is to “accord finality to the collateral 

review process.” Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80, 23 

A.3d 980, 983 (2011) (citation omitted).

Id. at 992-93.
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In this case, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was final on December 

29, 2011. Therefore, in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), absent 

a recognized exception, Appellant had until December 31, 20123to file a 

petition, including a second or subsequent petition. Appellant’s petition, filed 

in February 2015, more than two years beyond the deadline, is untimely on 

its face. Because the petition was untimely filed and because Appellant did 

not plead or prove any exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, the 

PCRA court was without jurisdiction to consider the petition. Id. at 992; 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 654-55 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Appellant does not acknowledge the time limitations of the PCRA or 

the PCRA court’s lack of jurisdiction over untimely petitions. Instead, she 

contends that her claim is an illegality of sentence claim that cannot be 

waived. It is true that a challenge to the legality of a sentence cannot be 

waived on appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 

(Pa. Super. 2014). In Miller, this Court recognized: 

It is generally true that “this Court is endowed with the ability to 

consider an issue of illegality of sentence sua sponte.” 

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 883 n. 7 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). However, in order for this Court 

to review a legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for 

our jurisdiction to engage in such review. See Commonwealth 

v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating, 

“[a] challenge to the legality of a sentence . . . may be 

entertained as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction[ ]”) 

(citation omitted). As this Court recently noted, “[t]hough not 

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3 December 29, 2012 was a Saturday.
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technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may 

nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PCRA 

petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving 

the court of jurisdiction over the claim.” [Commonwealth v. 

Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 242 (Pa. Super. 2014)]. As a result, the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of 

Appellant’s second PCRA petition, as it was untimely filed and no 

exception was proven. 

Miller, 102 A.3d at 995-96 (citations omitted).

The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition as untimely and determined 

it lacked jurisdiction to consider it. We find the PCRA court’s determinations 

are supported by the record and free of legal error. Further, even though a 

legality of sentence claim can be considered sua sponte by this Court under 

some circumstances, it cannot be considered if this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over the claim. See Newman, supra; Miller, supra. Because Appellant’s 

petition was untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction over it and cannot 

consider the merits, if any, of Appellant’s claims. Therefore, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2016