COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Humphreys, O’Brien and Chaney

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

SHAHEIM DAMONTE MOON, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS

 SHAHEIM DAMONT’E MOON

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0667-22-3 JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY

JULY 11, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG

J. Frederick Watson, Judge

Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for 

appellant.

Matthew J. Beyrau, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Shaheim Damont’e Moon of possession 

with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance, third or subsequent offense,

possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, and possession of a firearm while in possession 

of a Schedule I or II controlled substance.1 On appeal, Moon challenges the trial court’s judgment 

denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by police during a warrantless vehicle search. 

Op. Br. 3-8. Moon contends that without the firearm evidence that should have been suppressed, 

the evidence was insufficient to support both firearm convictions. Moon also argues that the 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

1 The trial court granted Moon’s motion to strike the evidence on related charges of 

possession of ammunition by a convicted felon and eluding a police officer.

UNPUBLISHED
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evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled 

substance. Op. Br. 3-4, 11. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party” in the trial court. McGowan v. 

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 

(2018)).

On January 19, 2021, when Officer Page of the Lynchburg Police Department made a traffic 

stop, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle—Moon—parked in a convenience store parking lot 

and “rapidly exited the vehicle and began to walk away.” Although Officer Page repeatedly 

instructed Moon to go back in the vehicle, Moon “took off running.” Officer Page chased Moon on 

foot for about a block. After catching Moon, the officer handcuffed and searched him and found his 

driver’s license. The vehicle was registered to an unidentified female, not to Moon. 

When checking Moon’s driver’s license, Officer Page was advised that Moon had waived 

his Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless searches (Fourth Amendment waiver) and the 

waiver remained in effect. In 2015, Moon was convicted of two charges of possession with intent 

to distribute cocaine in addition to other felony drug and firearm convictions. Moon’s 2015 

conviction and sentencing order provided:

The defendant specifically agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment 

right against a warrantless search for a period of 10 years from this 

day. The defendant agrees to consent and voluntarily submit to a 

warrantless search of his person, place of residence or any vehicle he 

is occupying, at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement 

officer during this period. The defendant further agrees that any 

evidence seized from such search shall be admissible in any hearing 

or trial resulting therefrom.
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Given Moon’s Fourth Amendment waiver, the police moved the vehicle to a nearby park and 

searched the vehicle and its contents. The police did not get the vehicle owner’s consent to move 

and search the vehicle. 

In searching a backpack found in the vehicle, the police found a loaded Glock .45 caliber 

handgun with one cartridge of ammunition in the chamber and 13 cartridges in the magazine. The 

police also found a credit card purchase receipt for the ammunition, which identified Moon as the 

purchaser. However, upon viewing the surveillance video from the store where the ammunition 

was purchased, Officer Page observed that a female—not Moon—purchased the ammunition. 

Inside the backpack, the police also discovered a knotted plastic bag containing 21 round 

blue pills that appeared from the pills’ markings to be oxycodone hydrochloride. The Virginia 

Department of Forensic Science (DFS) analyzed the pills and found that they contained fentanyl, a 

Schedule II controlled substance. DFS also determined that “[v]isual examination of the [pills’] 

physical characteristics, including shape, color and manufacturer’s markings, was consistent with a 

Schedule II pharmaceutical preparation containing Oxycodone.” The backpack search also revealed 

four glass jars containing marijuana, among other items. The police found no drug prescriptions in 

the backpack or the vehicle. 

Moon moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search on the 

grounds that his Fourth Amendment waiver did not authorize the police to move and search the 

vehicle without the third-party owner’s consent. Moon did not contest the authority of police to 

search the vehicle at the location of the traffic stop. But Moon contended that the officers’ “right to 

search was limited to searching the vehicle when the vehicle was stopped” and ended “[a]s soon as 

the vehicle [was] moved.” In response, the Commonwealth argued that Moon lacked standing to 

assert a third party’s Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, the Commonwealth contended that 

pursuant to Moon’s Fourth Amendment waiver, the police were authorized to search the vehicle 
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after they moved it to another location. The trial court found “that Mr. Moon was the exclusive 

occupant and had exclusive control over this vehicle at the time of the stop.” The trial court also 

found that Moon “had waived his Fourth Amendment rights pertinent to this time period and that he 

had no right to assert Fourth Amendment right to any third party.” Pursuant to these findings, the 

trial court denied Moon’s motion to suppress. 

At trial, Detective Hendricks of the Lynchburg Police Department’s Vice/Narcotics Unit 

was recognized as an expert in the sale and distribution of narcotics, with specific expertise in the 

sale and distribution of opioids. Detective Hendricks testified that the quantity and packaging of the 

fentanyl pills found in the backpack were inconsistent with personal use.2 The detective explained 

that a fentanyl user would have at most one or two pills and the 21 pills from the backpack had a 

“street value” of $630. The detective also testified that the presence of both the firearm and the 

drugs in the backpack was significant because a firearm is commonly used “as a tool in the drug 

distribution trade to protect from the violence associated with the trade.” Detective Hendricks 

opined that the totality of the circumstances related to the fentanyl pills was inconsistent with 

personal use. 

Officer Page testified at trial that he Mirandized and questioned Moon after he was arrested. 

Moon told Officer Page that the backpack found in the vehicle belonged to him. Moon also 

admitted that “his friend gives his marijuana to sell and he sells it from the back pack and then when 

it’s all gone, he goes back and gets more marijuana to sell.” Moon said that the pills and gun found 

in the backpack belonged to his friend and that Moon discovered these items in the backpack two 

days before he was arrested. 

2 The parties agreed to adopt the evidence presented during the suppression hearing as 

evidence for purposes of the trial. 
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With the trial court’s permission, Moon presented a combined motion to strike and closing 

argument. Moon argued that the trial court should give little weight to the expert testimony that the 

circumstances related to the fentanyl pills were inconsistent with personal use. Moon contended 

that the purported expert’s opinion was insufficiently “based upon interviews with five or six people 

who may or may not have been telling the truth,” and on the officer’s recollection of a single 

criminal case. Moon also argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove that (i) he possessed or 

intended to distribute the fentanyl pills, which Moon said belonged to his friend; (ii) he possessed 

the firearm, which Moon also said belonged to his friend; and (iii) he possessed the ammunition, 

which was purchased by an unidentified woman, albeit with Moon’s credit card. 

Following closing arguments, the trial court denied Moon’s motion to strike in relevant part 

and found him guilty of three charged felonies: possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II 

controlled substance, third or subsequent offense, possession of a firearm by a convicted violent 

felon, and possession of a firearm while in possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance. 

The trial court sentenced Moon to incarceration for 30 years, with 13 years suspended. This appeal 

followed.

ANALYSIS

I. The trial court did not err in denying Moon’s suppression motion.

Moon contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained when the police searched the vehicle he was driving pursuant to Moon’s waiver of his 

Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless searches. Although Moon acknowledges that a 

2015 sentencing order showed that his valid waiver of Fourth Amendment rights was in effect at 

the time of the warrantless vehicle search, Moon contends that the trial court’s interpretation of 

his Fourth Amendment waiver was overbroad and police exceeded the waiver’s scope. 

Specifically, Moon argues that his waiver applied only to searches of his own person or property, 
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not to the vehicle owned by a third party. In addition, Moon asserts that his waiver did not 

authorize the search of the vehicle after it was moved from the place where Moon had occupied 

it. We disagree.

Moon contends that “[n]othing in the record indicates that the Appellant knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to a search of anything other than his person and property.” 

Op. Br. 4. However, by the explicit terms of his Fourth Amendment waiver, Moon “agree[d] to 

consent and voluntarily submit to a warrantless search of . . . any vehicle he is occupying, at any 

time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer during this period.” (Emphasis added). 

Thus, although Moon did not own the vehicle stopped by police, his Fourth Amendment waiver 

authorized police to search the vehicle after stopping Moon.3 Pursuant to his Fourth Amendment 

waiver, Moon also “agree[d] that any evidence seized from such search shall be admissible in any 

hearing or trial resulting therefrom.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Moon’s motion 

to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle search.

This Court also rejects Moon’s contention that the police unlawfully searched the vehicle 

after it was moved and allegedly “no longer had a temporal or physical connection to the 

Appellant at the time of the search.” Op. Br. 6. Moon contends that his Fourth Amendment 

waiver did not authorize the warrantless vehicle search because the vehicle “was not searched at 

the scene of an arrest nor was the Appellant in the vehicle at the time of the search.” Op. Br. 5. 

On Moon’s interpretation of his Fourth Amendment waiver, his consent to a warrantless search 

of “any vehicle he is occupying” applies only when he is inside or in physical proximity to the 

3 This opinion does not decide whether, in a hypothetical case, Moon’s Fourth 

Amendment waiver would authorize police to search a vehicle owned by a third party and 

occupied by both the vehicle’s owner and Moon. The Court’s resolution of this appeal does not 

require the Court to resolve that hypothetical issue. See Alexandria Redevelopment & Hous. 

Auth. v. Walker, 290 Va. 150, 156 (2015) (Virginia appellate Courts “strive to decide cases on 

the ‘best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 

626 n.4 (2010))).
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vehicle. In rejecting this interpretation, the trial court interpreted Moon’s Fourth Amendment 

waiver as recorded in the trial court’s own sentencing order. On appeal, this Court accords 

deference to the trial court’s interpretation of its own orders so long as that interpretation is 

reasonable. Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 458 (2006). The trial court reasonably construed 

Moon’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and his consent to a 

warrantless search of “any vehicle he is occupying” to include the warrantless search of the vehicle 

he was driving after it was moved to a nearby park. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in interpreting Moon’s Fourth Amendment waiver and did not err in denying Moon’s 

suppression motion.4

II. The evidence was sufficient to prove Moon’s intent to distribute the fentanyl pills.

A. Standard of Review

Moon contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to distribute the 

21 fentanyl pills found in a knotted plastic bag in his backpack. “When reviewing the sufficiency 

of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed 

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521

(alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such 

cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 

296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. 

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 

4 Moon’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support both firearm convictions is 

predicated on his claim that the evidence obtained from the vehicle search should have been 

suppressed. Having determined that the trial court did not err in denying Moon’s suppression 

motion, this Court concludes that the lawfully admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain the firearm 

convictions.
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(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted 

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by 

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. 

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

This Court’s deference to the trial court’s factual findings stems, in part, from the trial 

court’s “opportunity to observe the witnesses’ testimony and demeanor.” Lopez v. 

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 70, 82 (2021). Accordingly, settled principles dictate that 

“[d]etermining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [fact 

finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they 

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact 

finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed on appeal only when we find that the 

witness’ testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it 

unworthy of belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby 

v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so 

manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or 

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald, 295 

Va. at 487 (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)).

B. Sufficient Evidence of Moon’s Intent to Distribute the Fentanyl Pills

Although not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he possessed the 

fentanyl pills in his backpack, Moon argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he 

intended to distribute the drugs. “Intent is the purpose formed in a person’s mind and may, like 

any other fact, be shown by circumstances.” Secret, 296 Va. at 228 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Herring, 288 Va. 59, 75 (2014)). “Absent a direct admission by the defendant, intent to 
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distribute must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 

57 Va. App. 658, 666 (2011) (en banc). “When the proof of intent to distribute narcotics rests 

upon circumstantial evidence, . . . quantity, alone, may be sufficient to establish such intent if it 

is greater than the supply ordinarily possessed for one’s personal use.” Dukes v. Commonwealth, 

227 Va. 119, 122 (1984). “Expert testimony, usually that of a police officer familiar with 

narcotics,” may be used “to prove the significance of the weight and packaging of drugs 

regarding whether it is for personal use.” Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 307, 327 

(2000). In addition, “[w]e have recognized that the unique, simultaneous possession of a 

combination of disparate drugs can be indicative of the possessor’s intent to distribute.” Scott v. 

Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 166, 174 (2009). Finally, “firearms” are “recognized as tools of 

the drug trade, the possession of which [is] probative of intent to distribute.” Askew v. 

Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 104, 108 (2003).

The record supports the trial court’s finding that Moon intended to distribute the fentanyl 

pills found in his backpack. The backpack, which Moon acknowledged was his, contained 21 

fentanyl pills with a street value of $630. Moon also admitted that he used the same backpack to 

distribute marijuana and he knew the pills were in the backpack. At trial, Detective Hendricks 

opined as an expert in the sale and distribution of narcotics that the quantity, value, and packaging 

of the fentanyl pills were “inconsistent with personal use.” Moon’s intent to distribute the 

fentanyl pills was further established by the evidence of other drugs and a firearm in his 

backpack. That evidence combined with Detective Hendricks’s expert testimony provided 

compelling proof of Moon’s intent. Cf. Askew, 40 Va. App. at 111 (holding evidence proved 

defendant’s intent to distribute where he possessed a “tool of the drug trade” and more than 

seven grams of individually-packaged crack cocaine with a $700 street value, where a drug 

expert opined that those circumstances were inconsistent with personal use). Therefore, the trial 
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court did not err in convicting Moon of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II 

controlled substance.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in denying Moon’s motion to suppress and the evidence was 

sufficient to support the trial court’s findings of guilt for all of Moon’s convictions. 

Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.