### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30110

ANN DESHOT E LS; KIMBERLY ANN DESHOTELS; JAMIE JOURDAN DESHOTELS PUCHEU; MATTHEW RISHER DESHOTELS, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v. M IKE MARSHALL; TRAVIS MILLER; ANTHONY MANCUSO; JE F F P ITTMAN; JEFF MORGAN; CITY OF LAKE CHARLES; ST. PAUL F I R E & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Seldon D eshotels died shortly after an altercation with law enforcement officers from the Lake Charles Police Department and the C al c a sieu Parish Sheriff’s Office. His surviving wife and children, Plaintiffs-Appellants, filed suit against the officers and their employers, among others, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court granted summary judgment U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 10, 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat thisop inion s houldnot * be publish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-30110 Document: 00511662381 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/10/2011No. 11-30110

dismissing various claims against appellees Mike Marshall, Travis Miller, Jeff Pittman, Jeff Morgan, and Anthony Mancuso. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM. BACKGROUND The incident giving rise to this case occurred on November 1, 2007, in Lake Charles, Louisiana. At approximately 9:20 p.m., Cherie Norsworthy looked out her back door and saw Seldon Deshotels in her garage. Deshotels, a clinical and anatomical pathologist, had recently moved to Lake C h arles for employment
purposes and was living in the nearby Nelson Pointe apartment complex. Ms. Norsworthy did not recognize Deshotels, but assumed he was there to see her husba n d

. When she opened the door and asked if he was “looking for Greg,”

1 Deshotels “kind of panic k e d” and quickly exited the garage. Alarmed by Deshotels’s reaction, Ms. Norsworthy went back into the house and yelled for her husband. When M s. Norsworthy told her husband what happened, he instructed her to call the police and then immediately left the house to look for Deshotels. Ms. Norsworthy contacted the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s O f f i c e (CPSO). Mr. N orsworthy searched the neighborhood on his four-wheeler and eventually located Deshotels running toward the Nelson Point e apartment complex. Norsworthy, a trained martial artist, caught up with Deshotels near the gate to the apartment complex, jumped on his back, and applied a choke hold that rendered Deshotels temporarily unconscious. Both men fell to the gr o u n d and Norsworthy released the choke hold. Deshotels regained consciousness shortly thereafter. At about the same ti m e, Jessica Cobb and two friends were driving into the apartment c o mplex parking lot. Cobb testified that when they approached

TheN ors wo rthys didno t kn ow , and had never me t, D es hote ls. 1 2 Case: 11-30110 Document: 00511662381 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/10/2011No. 11-30110

the gate, she saw Deshotels laying on his stomach and Norsworthy sitting on his back. Norsworthy yelled to Cobb that Deshotels had broken into his house and asked her to call the police. Cobb called 911 and was connected t o th e L ake Charles Police Department (LCPD). She told the 911 operator that a homeowner

was restraining a man who br o k e i nto his house and that they were near the gate to the Nelson Pointe apartment complex. Both CPSO and LCPD dispatched officers to res p o n d t o the incident. LCPD officer Jeff Pittman was the first law enforcement office r at the scene. When he arrived, Deshotels was sitti ng on the ground and Norsworthy was standing nearby. Norsworthy ide ntified himself as the complainant and Deshotels as the b u rglary suspect. As Pittman approached the two men, Deshotels got up and began running toward Nelson Road. Pittman chased and quickly caught Deshotels, bringing him to the ground face down. Pittman straddled Deshotels’s lower back and pull e d o n his left arm in an attempt to apply handcuffs. Deshotels resisted, pulling his arms down and underneath his chest. As Pittman struggled with Deshotels, CPSO deputies Mike Marshall and Travis Miller and LCPD officers Jeff Morgan and Kevin O’Rourke arrived and began assisting. Marshall attempted to gain control of Deshotels’s right arm and Miller placed his knee on Deshotels’s right shoulder. Deshotels was kicking his legs, so officer Morgan crossed one leg over the oth e r a n d pushed them down towards Deshotels’s back. Officer O’Rourke warned Deshotels to stop resisting or he would be tased. When Deshotels failed to surrender his hands, O’Rourke conducted a five second “drive-stun” tase to Deshotels’s right shoulder. Despite 2 b e i n g t a sed, Deshotels continued to pull his arms under his chest. O’Rourke moved t o D e shotels’s left side and conducted another drive-stun tase to

With a drive- st un t ase , an o ff icers hock s a sus pec t by applyin g the Ta se r dir ect ly t o 2 the sus pec t’s bo dy. 3 Case: 11-30110 Document: 00511662381 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/10/2011No. 11-30110

Deshotels’s lower back. After the second tasing, the officers secured Deshotels’s arms and applied handcuffs. 3 O n c e the handcuffs were on, Pittman and Marshall attempted to lif t Deshotels off the ground. They noticed that Deshotels’s body was limp and that he was unable to support his own weight. At about the same time, LCPD officers John Thacker, Robert McCauley, and Larry Moss arrived at the s c e n e . They observed Deshotels being dragged as “dead weight” in the direction of a police

car. They noticed that Deshotels’s face looked blue and that he did not appear to be breathing. Thacker instructed Pittman to remove Deshotels’s handcuffs and lay him on the ground. The officers removed Deshotels’s handcuffs, laid him on his back, and at some point, called an ambulance. The parties dispute what, if anything, the officers did to assist Deshotels before the ambulance arrived. McCauley testified th at Deshotels’s tongue appeared to be blocking his airway. He stated that Moss held Deshotels’s head while he used a pen t o m ove Deshotels’s tongue in an attempt to clear the blockage. Moss testified that he assisted McCaul e y until a paramedic arrived and was standing next to Deshotels. Appellants point to the deposition testimony of Walter Sief f o rd, an EMT/paramedic who responded to the incident. Siefford testified that when he arrived at the scene, Deshotels was lying on his bac k and a single officer, presumably McCau l e y , w as attempting to pry his mouth open with a pen. 4 Siefford stated that the officer repeatedly asked him to help Deshotels. Siefford further testified that Deshotels’s mouth was full of vomit and that there was

It is not clear wh en De sho tel s’ s lef t hand wa s cuf

fed and unde r c o n t rol. Mar shall 3 tes tif ied that De sho tel s’ s left hand was cuf fed and in Pitt man ’scontr ol bef ore De sho tel s was tas ed. O’ Rourk e tes tif ied that Pitt man c u f

f e d De sho tel s’ s lef

t hand betw een the fir st and se condt asi ng. Pitt mant es tif iedthat neither hand wa s cuf fedunt il aft er the se condt asi ng. Acco rding to Sief

for d, seven to eight off icer s we re c o n gr e g a t ed near the parki ng lot 4 gate. 4 Case: 11-30110 Document: 00511662381 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/10/2011No. 11-30110

vomit on his face and in the area around his head. McCauley, Moss, and Thacker all testified that they did not see Deshotels vomit and did not see vomit on or around Deshotels. D e shotels was eventually transported to Women’s and Children’ s H o s p it al where he was later pronounced dead. He was fifty-six years old. According to an autopsy conducted by th e P arish Coroner, Dr. Terry Welke, Deshotels was asthmatic and had a blood alcohol level of .12. The reported cause of death was excited delirium. Appellants commissioned a second autopsy , whi ch was performed by Dr. Collie Trant, a board certified forensic pathologist. Dr. Trant concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia caused by a misappli e d choke h o l d , compression of the chest and abdomen during the struggle with th e officers, and airway obstruction by gastric contents. Appellants filed suit on September 18, 2008, namin g a s def e n dant s , a mong others, Marshall, Miller, Pittman, Morgan , and O’Rourke, in their individual capacities, and Calcasieu Parish Sheriff Anthony Mancuso in his individual and official capacities. Appellants brought claims under § 1983 and state l aw for excessive force and for failing to render a p propriate medical assistance. Appellants also brought § 1983 bystander liability claims, asserting that Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan are liable for failing to prevent O’Rourke from tasing Deshotels. In opinions filed October 27, 2010, and January 4, 2011, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Appellants’ excessive force and bystander liability claims against Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan. The district court al s o gr ante d s u m m ary j u dgm e nt di s mi s sin g Ap p ellants’ official and individual capacity excessive force claims ag ai n s t Calcasieu Parish Sheriff Anthony Mancu s o . Th e court de nie d s u m m ary j u dgm e nt o n Ap p ell ant s’ excessive force claims against O ’ R o u rk e. The court also denied summary judgment on Appellants’ claims against Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan for failing to

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render appro p ri ate medical assistance. Those claims are currently pending before th e district court. The judgments accompanying the October 27 and January 4 opinions were certified as final and appealable under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DISCUSSION This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Hill v. Carroll Cnty., Miss. , 587 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate wh e n “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex. , 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc. , 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 200 0)). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting H a m i l t o n , 232 F.3d at 477). In determining whether a fact issue exists, the court views “the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co. , 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). Section 1983 Claims Against Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan 1. Excessive Force The distri c t court concluded that Marshall’s, Miller’s, Pittman’s, and Morgan’s actions to subdue and handcuff Deshotels were objectively reasonable and that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ § 1983 excessive force claims. Appellants argue that they have raised a fact issue as to whether the officers’ actions were reasonable and that the district court therefore erred.

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Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person wou l d have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the court conducts the two-part analysis set forth in Saucier

v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 2 2 3 (2009). The court decides “(1) whether facts alleged or shown by plai ntif f make out the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right

was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pasco

v . K n o b la uch , 566 F.3d 572, 579 (5th Cir. 2009). “The relevant, dispositiv e inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex. , 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Saucier , 53 3 U

. S. at 202). If the answer to either of the two above questions is

“no,” qualified immunity applies and the government official is immune f r o m suit. Th e p l aintiff bears the burden of overcoming the qualified immunity defense. Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex. , 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1989). After the Supreme Co u rt ’ s decision in Pearson , 555 U.S. 223, courts have discretion as to which of the two qualified immunity prongs to address first. Turning to the first prong of the qualified immunity a n alysis, this court must determine whether the fa c t s , taken in the light most favorable to Appellants, show that the officers violated a constitutional right. “[ A] ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the

course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ s tandard.” Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty. , 246 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (alteration in original). To prevail in an excessive force claim, “a plaintiff must show that he was seized and that

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he ‘suffered (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that ( 3 ) the force used was objectively unreasonable.’” Balla rd v. Burton , 444 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Flores v. City of Palacios , 381 F. 3 d 3 9 1 , 3 96 (5th Cir. 2004)). Determining

whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable “requires care f u l attenti o n to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham , 490 U.S. at 396. Courts must be mindful that police officers ar e often required to make split-second judgments “in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” and must evaluate an officer’s use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396–97. To support a fact i s s u e , Appellants point to Marshall’s deposition testimony stating that he was not concerned for his or the other officers’ safety during the struggle with Deshotels and that h e believed they could have handcuffed Deshotels without the use of a Taser. Ap p e llants also point to Miller’s testimony that he agreed with O’Rourke’s use of a Ta s er and that he would have used his Taser h a d O ’ R o urke not done so first. Appellants further note that Deshotels did not att e m p t t o s trike or kick the officers and that the LCPD use of force repo rt c h ar acterized Deshotels’s behavior as “empty hand defensive resistance.” Appellants’ evidence tends to focus on whether O’Rourke’s use of a Taser constituted excessive force, an issue not before the court. The relevant inquiry is whether Marshall’s, Miller’s, Pittman’s, and Morgan’s individual actions to subdue and handcuff Deshotel s were reasonable under the circumstances. See Meadours v. Ermel , 483 F.3d 417, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that each officer ’ s individual actions should be considered in determining whether

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qualified immunity applies). The facts show that the officers were responding to

a burglary in progress, “a crime normally and reasonably expected to involve a weapon.” United States v. Barnett , 505 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2 0 0 7). When

5 Pittman approached the scene, Deshotels immediately fled, a n d when caught,

a c tively resisted Pittman’s attempts to apply handcuffs. Marshall, Miller , a n d Morgan arrived to see Pittman struggling with a large, unruly suspect. (At the time of the autopsy, Deshotels was 5'10" tall and 240 lbs.) The officers repeatedly instructed Deshotels to show them his hands and to stop resisting. Despite the commands, Deshotels continued to resist the officers by pulling his arms under his chest. Though the officers had not seen a weapon on Deshotels, they had also not confirmed that he was unarmed. To secure Deshotels, Pittman straddled his b ack and pulled on his left arm. Miller kneeled on Deshotels’s right s h o u l d e r while Marshall seized Deshotels’s right forearm. Morgan folde d o n e of Deshotels’s legs over the other to stop him from kicking. In light of the above described circumstances, the officers’ actions were objectiv e ly reasonable and they are entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ § 1983 excessive force claims. 2. Bystander Liability Appellants argue that Marshall, Miller, Pittman, a n d M o r gan are liable for failing to prevent O’Rourke’s alleged use of excessive force when he tased Deshotels. In support of these claims, Appellants rely on this court’s holding in

6 Hale v. Townley , 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995), that “an officer who is present

CPSO dep utie s Mar shall and Mil ler we re initially dis pat ched to res pond to a tre sp ass 5 at the Nor sw orthy’s hous e. As they we re driving to the Nor sw orthy’s , Pitt man pas se d them in his pat rol car wi th his lights and sir en on. The dis pat ch info rm ed the dep utie s that Pitt man w a s res ponding to a burglary in pr ogres s at the Nel so n Point e com ple x. They ass ume d th at their callandPit tm an’sw erer elat ed and dec ide d to fol lowhi m to the apartm ent com ple x. A s me ntio ned above, App ellant s’ § 1983 exces sive for ce clai m agains t O’ Rourk e i s 6
current ly pending at the dis tri ct court. There has been no det erm inati on wh ethe r O’ Rourk e’s useof a Tase r cons tit utedexc es sivef orc e a nd weof

fernoop inion on thatque stion. 9 Case: 11-30110 Document: 00511662381 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/10/2011No. 11-30110

at the scene and does not take rea s onable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s u s e o f excessive force may be liable under section 1983.” The court deter m i n e d that liability under § 1983 can attach when the bystander officer “had a reasonable opportunity to realize the excessive nature of the force and to intervene to stop it.” Id. Appellants maintain that Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan had an opportunity to realize that O’Rourke was going to tase Deshotels and to intervene and stop him. 7 As discussed above, to overcome the office r s’ defense of qualified immunity, Appellants must show that the officers “violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights o f which a reasonable person would have known.” Manis v. Lawson , 585 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009). Exercising the discreti o n p rovided in Pearson , 555 U.S. 223, we first consider whether the officers’ conduct violated clearly established law. If the answe r is “no,” the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and the court need not decide whether Appellants’ facts make out the violation of a constitutional right. F o r a right to be clearly established, the “contours of the right must b e sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would unders t a nd that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 202. “As we h ave held, preexisting law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise

a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law i n t h e circumstances .” Pasco , 566 F.3d at 5 79–80 (internal quotations omitted); see also Saucier , 533

In sup port, App ellant s po i n t t o tes tim ony that De sho tel s wa s verbal ly wa rned that 7 he wo uld be ta s e d u n les s he st opp ed res ist ing. O’ Rourk e tes tif ied that bef

ore he tas ed De sho tel s he tol d him “s top res ist ing or I’m going to dep loy the Tase r on you.” Mar shall tes tif ied that O’ Rourk e sai d “Tas er, Tase r, Tase r, ” bef ore he tas ed De sho tel s. Brady He ndrix, an eyew itne ss , tes tif

ied that he hear d an o ff icert ell De sho tel s “if you ke ep mo ving, you will ge t t a s e d .” App ellant s argue that if thes e wa rnings we re suf fic ient for De sho tel s to ceas e st ruggling and avoid being tas ed, they we re als o suf fic ient to alert the off

icer s that O’ Rourk e plan ned to usehi s Tase r and to do so me thing to st op him

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U

. S

. at 202 (“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). “[Q]ualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subj ected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (int e rnal quotations omitted). Thus, the inquiry is whether, under the l aw i n effect at the time of the arrest, the officers could have reasonably believed that they were not required to intervene and prevent O’Rourke’s alleged use of excessive force. The answer to that question is clearly “yes.” The facts in Hale are significantly different from the facts in this case. In Hale , the plaintiff produced evidence that he was beaten by a police officer while the bystander officer stood by and laughed, making no effort to intervene. Hale , 45 F.3d at 919. Nothing in Hale provided police officers “fair n o ti c e” that officers actively engaged in restraining a large, potentially dangerous suspect are required to intervene and prevent another officer’s use of excessive force. See Manis , 585 F.3d at 845–46 (“If the l aw at the time of a constitutional violation does not give the officer ‘fair notice’ that his conduct is unlawful, the officer is immune from suit.”). Nor do Appellants provide any other authority, and we could not find any, supporting that proposition. Accordingly, th e officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly establishe d l aw and they are entitled to qualified immunity. State Law Claims Against Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their state law excessive force claims ag ai n s t M arshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan. In Louisiana, excessive force claims are analyzed under a reasonableness standard similar to that used to evaluate § 1983 excessive force claims. Kyle v. City of New O r le a n s , 353 So. 2d 969, 972–73 (La. 1977). “Whether the force used i s reasonable depends upon the totality o f th e f acts and circumstances in each

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case.” Id. at 973. Factors to be considered include “the known c h aracter of the

arr e s t e e, the risks and dangers faced by the officers, the nature of the offense involved, the chance o f th e arrestee’s escape if the particular means are not employed , the existence of alternative methods of arrest, the physical size, strength, and weaponry of the officers as compared to the arrestee, and the exigencies of the moment.” Id. Given the similarity between the se factors and those used to evaluate § 1983 excessive force cl aims, we conclude that the officers’ use of force was reasonable under Louisiana law for the same reasons the use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 1 5 6 , 1 7 3 (5th Cir. 2009) (“These considerations are sufficiently similar to the Graham factors that our decision on this claim mirrors

our decision of plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force claim

. . . .”); see also Winston v. City of Shreveport , 390 F. App’x 379, 385–86 (5th Cir. 201 0)

. W e affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ state law excessive force claims. Appellants al s o argue that the district court erred in dismissing claims that the officers were negligent under Louisiana law because they “had notice of O’Rourke’s intentions with regard to the use of his Taser and

. . . failed to take any action whatsoever to prohibit O’Rourke’s excessive use of force.” Appellants’ brief, however, provides no authority di s cu s sin g b ystander liability claims under Louisiana law or whether Louisiana law enforcement offi c e r s h ave a duty to prevent another officer’s use of excessive force. Accordingly, that argu ment is

w aived. See Kohler v. Englade , 470 F.3d 1104, 1114 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding appellant’s claim waived for inadequate briefing because it was not supported with any legal authority); Salazar-Regino v. Trominski , 415 F.3d 436, 452 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a claim supported by only one c it ati o n w as waived for inadequate briefing), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Salazar-Regino v. Moore , 549 U.S. 1093 (2006); L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs. Inc. , 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Southern c it e s n o a uthority in its one-page
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argument on the attorney fee question, however, and we consider the challenge abandoned for being inadequately briefed.”). Vicarious Liability Excessive Force Claim Against Sheriff Man cuso In Louisiana, sheriffs are vicariously liable in their official capacity for the torts of their deputie s committed in the course and scope of employment. Jenkins

v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Offic e , 402 So. 2d 669, 669 (La. 1981); Riley v. Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Office , 94-C-0202, p. 1 (La. 4/4/94); 637 So. 2d 395, 395. Appellants argue that the state law excessive force claims against deputies M arshall and Miller were erroneously dismissed and therefore it follows that the vicarious liability excessive force clai m a gain s t C alc a sieu P ari sh Sh erif f Anthony Mancuso was also erroneously dismissed. As discussed ab ov e , the state law excessive force claims against deputies Marshall and Mill e r were correctly dismissed by the district court. Th e r e fore, there is no basis for a vicarious li ability excessive force claim against Sheriff Mancuso. The district court’ s rulin g on this issue is affirmed. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judge dismissing Appellants’ § 1983 and state law excessive force and bystander liability claims against officers Marshall, Miller, Pittman, and Morgan. We also affirm the dismissal of the state law excessive force clai m s a g ainst Sheriff Mancuso.

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