* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate recor d, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered sub mitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAY 21 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

LESLIE A. STRACHAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA; SHARON WARDEHOFF, Municipal Court Judge; DOUG MORRIS, Probation Officer for City of Huntsville, Alabama, Defendants - Appellees. No. 97-3263 (D.C. No. 96-CV-3488) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges. **
Mr. Strachan, an inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint. The district court determined that it was without jurisdiction over the Defendants, an d that the matter should not be- 2 -

transferred because Mr. Strachan’s complaint failedto state a claim. See R. doc. 9; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The district cou rt did not abuse its discretion in declining to transfer this action “in the interest of justice” under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Mr. Strachan’s complaint is that he was sentenced t o ninety days imprisonment after his probation was revoked. He c ontends that he was entitled to counsel, that the municipal court failed to holda meaningful hearing, and that he was improperly placed in high risk status while imprisoned based upon erroneous information supplied by a probation offic er. He also argues that he should have been granted leave to amend his complai nt. The municipal court judge is protected by immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978). Mr. Strachan has not s tated a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest based upon his co nfinement, see Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995), nor for deprivation of counsel based upon a probation revocation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). Concerning his contention that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to allege a municipal custom or policy of disregarding the rights of indigents, Mr. Strachan filed his motion to amend w ell after the judgment, beyond the ten-day period permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59( e), and after he filed his notice of appeal. In such circumstances, the district cou rt did not err in not acting on the- 3 -

pleading. See Glenn v. First Nat’l Bank , 868 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1989). AFFIRMED. Mr. Strachan’s motion for leave to proce ed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is moot as the districtcourt granted him such leave, with payments to the court of appeals to begin afte r the district court filing fee was satisfied. Mr. Strachan is reminded of this ob ligation.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge