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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-4085

C E D RI C J. S MI T H

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Defen dant-Appellee.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 4: 14 -cv-40 09 — Harold A . Ba ker, Judg e.

A RGU E D A P RI L 18, 2017

— D E C I D E D J UN E 23, 2017

Before E AS T E R

B R O O K , K AN N E, and R OVN E R

, Circ uit Judges

. R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judg e
. Cedric Smi th brought sui t again st the federal government under the Feder al T or t Clai ms Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq. , for injuries he sus tain ed when he fell off

a stool at the federal courthouse in Rock Island, Illi noi s. Smi th relies on the doctrine of res i psa loqui tur to i mpute negli gence to the government. The di stric t court conclu ded that Smi th had not made a showing suffi ci ent to tr i gge r the res i psa loqui tur2 No. 16-4085
inf e r ence of negli gence. R. 12. W e find to the contrar y a nd

rev erse and remand for furt her pro ceedings. I.
As the case w as deci ded on su mm a r y judgment, we take the facts in the li ght most fav or able to Smi th. E.g. , V ega v. New Forest Home Cemetery

, LLC, 856 F .3d 1130, 1131 (7th Ci r . 2017). On the mornin g of January 18, 2013, Smi th w as tr ansported from the Rock Island Cou nty Jai l to the U.S. Di stric t Court

ho us e in Rock Island to be arr ai gned on a federal w eapons charge. Follo wing t he arr ai gnment before Judge Darro w, deputy U.S. marshals too k Smi th to an interv i ew ro om so that he could meet wi th hi s appointed counsel to di scu ss the case. The U.S. Mar shals Ser vic e maintai ns tw o secu re at t or ney interv i ew ro oms in the courthouse where lawy ers may confer wi th cli ents who are in the governm e nt’s cus tody

. The Mar

shals Ser vic e inspec t s the furni ture and equi pment in the

ro oms on a w eekly basi s. The ro om to whi ch Smi th w as take n i s di vided in half by a w all wi th a large screened openi ng that enables the lawy er si t t ing on one si de of the screen to speak wi th hi s (detai ned) cli ent si tting on the other

. On the detain ee’s si de of the ro om there i s a metal stool attached to the w a l l by

means of a swing-arm that perm it s the stool to be posi tioned in front o f the wi re screen or mov ed out o f the w ay to accommodate a detain ee in a wheelchai r
. The Mar shals Ser vice contro ls acces s to the ro om, escorting a detain ee li ke Smi th into hi s si de of the ro om and separat ely buzzing the atto rney into the other half of the ro om by means of an electro ni c lock. T ypic ally , a detain ee’s handcuff s a r e r emov ed when he i s broughtinto t he roo m, bu t hi s leg i ro ns are left i n place.No. 16-4085 3
Accordi ng to Smi th, when he enter ed the interv i ew ro om
a nd sa t d own on the stool (wh i ch w as already posi tioned in front of the screen), the stool “brok e” and tilted ba ck w a r d s, wi th the front of the stool ris ing and the ba ck descen ding,
ca us ing hi m to fall to the floor and strike hi s head. As he look ed up from the floor at the undersi de of the stool, he could

see that there w ere bolts mi ssing

. When he tr i ed to balanc e hi mself on the stool as he li fted hi mself from th e fl o o r , i t

w obbled agai n. Smi th’s atto rney sum moned a court secu rity offi cer to help Smi th, and he w as sent back to the Rock Island County Jai l wi th instructi ons that he be seen i mmedi ately by the jail nurse. When the nurse exami ned Smi th and noted that hi s speech w as slurred, she arr anged for hi m to be t aken to the emerge ncy
ro om at a local hospi tal. There he w as treat ed for a str oke . By hi s own accoun t, Smi th conti nues to suffer a v ariety of adv erse effects from the inci dent, inclu ding w eakness on the left si de of hi s body , di ffi culty speaking, headaches, and memory i mpai r ment. Smi th av ers that when he ret urned to th e Rock Island courthouse at a later date and used the sam e i nterv i ew roo m, he exami ned the stool and found that i t had been w elded into place. Th e stoo l no longer w obbled. Smi th fi led an admini strat i v e tor t clai m again st t he Mar

shals Ser vic e allegin g that the stool w as brok en on January 18, 2013, and that he had fallen and struck hi s head as a r e sult. That clai m w as deni ed.4 No. 16-4085
Smi th then brought sui t again st the government under the FTCA. The di stric t court r e cr ui ted couns el to repr esent hi m

1 pro bono. Smi th asserted multi ple clai ms below , but the sole clai m that he pursues on appeal i s one of or dinary negli gence. That clai m i s premi sed on the theor y that the gover nment breached the duty o f care that i t ow ed to Smi th to maintai n reasonably safe premi ses at the courthouse and in particu lar to keep the stool in the interv i ew ro om in a condi tion safe for use. Smi th r e li ed on the doctrine of res i psa loqui tur to i mpute negli gence to the government. Smi th reaso ne d t hat the government (through the M arshals Serv i ce) c ontr olled acces s to the ro om; that i t inspec ted the equi pment in t he ro om and

w as responsible for maintenance of that equi pment, inclu ding the stool; and that the stool di d not func tion as intended when i t caus ed hi m to fall to the floor

. These ci rcums tances, Smi th asserted, supp or ted an inference that negli gence on the part of the go v ernment w as the caus e of the mi shap. Ju d ge Baker

, how ev er

, w as not convin ced that the facts

w arr anted resor t to the res i psa loqui tur inference o f negli

g e nce. He noted that the i ll-fated conference betw een S mit h and hi s couns e l t ook place at approx i mately 11 a.m.; consequently , “[i ]t i s possi

ble t ha t other s could hav e damaged the seat earlier that day or in the days prior

. It i s also possi ble that [Smi t h] could hav e, thro ugh inadv ert ence or other wi se, d a ma ged the seat hi mself .” R. 12 at 8–9. For that matter , the jud ge noted, Smi th mi ght hav e si mply tilted backw ard and

Smi th i niti all y nam ed the U.S

. Atto rney General and the Marshals Ser v i ce 1

as def endants, b ut the di stric t cour t or dere d the Uni te d S t ates to b e sub stituted as the appropr i ate defe ndant . R. 9 at 2 ¶ 2

.No. 16-4085 5
fallen off the stool wi thout the stool havin g ma l functi oned in any w ay
. Id. at 9. In sum, the facts di d not supp or t an inference that negli gence on th e part of the government w as the only explanation for the fall. Id.
II.
W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s sum mary judgment deci si on de nov o. E.g. , V

ega , s u p r a , 8 5 6 F .3d at 1132. As we explain below , becau se the evidenc e that Smi th presented to the court

w as suffi ci ent to meet the cri ter i a for appli cati on of the res i psa loqui tur doctrine, a factfinder could infer that the government

w as negli gent. The deci si on to enter sum mary judgment in the government’s fav or w as thus in err or

. The FTCA incorpor ates the sub st a nt iv e law of the state where the alleged tor t occurred. E.g. , Buscaglia v
. United States , 25 F .3d 530, 534 (7th Ci r
. 1994). Thus, Smi th’s negli gence clai m i s subject to Illi no i s law , whi ch requires hi m to establi sh that the government ow ed hi m a duty of care, that i t breached that duty , and that the breach prox i mately c aused hi s injuries. See, e.g. , Calles v . Scri pto- T

oka i Corp. , 864 N.E.2d 249, 270 (Ill. 2007). There i s no di spute t hat the go v ernment ow ed Smi th, as a detain ee in i ts cus tody , a duty of care. The g o ver nment concedes that “i t ow es a duty to prov i de pret rial detain ees, li ke Smi th, wi th a reasonably safe environment and to maintai n the premi ses in a reasonably safe condi tion.” Gov ernment Brief 13. The focus of the parties’ di spute i s on whether Smi th has presente d e no ugh evidenc e to permi t the inference that the government breached its duty to Smi th wi th respect to the stool.6 No. 16-4085
Lacking di rect evidenc e of negli gence on the government’s p a rt, Smi th resor ts to the doctrine of res i psa loqui tur (“ t he thi ng speaks for i tself”). See Blasius v
. Angel Auto., Inc. , 839 F .3d 639, 649 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 6 ). In ci rcums tances where such proo f i s prim arily wi thi n the knowledge and contro l of the defendant, thi s doctrine permi ts the plainti ff to resor t to a particu lar type of ci rcums tantial evidenc e as supp or t for t he notion that the defendant w as negli gent. See Smith v
. Eli Lill y & Co. , 560 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Il l

. 1990); Metz v
. Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co. , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ill. 1 9 6 5 ); Aguirre v
. T urn er Constr

. Co. , 501 F .3d 825, 831 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (Illinoi s law). T o wi t, i f the plainti ff

can show that he w as injured (1) in ci rcums tances tha t o r di

naril y w ould not occu r abs ent n egligence, (2) by an agency or instrumenta l i ty w i thin the d e fe n d a nt’ s m a n a gemen t or contro l, t he n r e s i psa loqui tur permi ts the factfinder to infer that th e defendant w as negli gent. Metz, 2 0 7 N.E.2d at 307; see also Heastie v
. Roberts , 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (Ill. 2007); Gat lin v
. Ru d e r, 5 6 0 N.E.2d 586, 590–91 (Ill. 1990). Other evidenc e may poin t to a contrar y conclu si on, and p r o of suffi ci ent to tr i gge r the res i psa loqui tur doctrine permi ts but does not compel the inference that the defendant w as negli gent. Metz, 207 N.E.2d at 307. But i f Smi th’s proo f sati sfi es the cri ter i a for r es i psa l o q ui tur , then he has shown enough to preclude sum mar y judgment on the questi on of negli gence. See id. (adoptin g view that “the inference, or presum p t i on, [of negli gence] does not si mply v ani sh or di sappear when contr ary evidence appears, but remain s to be consi dered wi th all the other evidenc e in the

case and mus t be w ei ghed by the jury again st the di rectNo. 16-4085 7
evidence o ff ered by the party charged”); see also Imig v
. Beck , 503 N.E.2d 324, 329–30 (Ill. 1986). 2
The evidenc e sati sfi es the fi rst of the tw o cri ter i a. A properly func tioning stool of the type described should not w obble

so as to tip i ts occupan t onto the floo r
. B ut , on Smi th’s repr esentation of the facts, w obble i t di d. The scen ario Smi th has described bespeaks a malfunc t io ning stool, and the malfu nction—whi ch w ould pose a hazard to any one us ing the stool—po ints to negli gence. See Robinson v
. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. , 64 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946) (abs tr act of op.) (res ips a loqui tur appli ed where cus tomer in defendant’s sales

ro om invited to si t in folding cha ir a nd chai r collapsed when

cus tomer sat down; on sub sequent inspec tion, riv et on si de of chai r observ ed to hav e come o ut of slot); Hun ter v
. Alfina , 251 N.E.2d 303 , 3 05–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (su mmari zing facts of Robinson and collecting cases in whi ch re s ips a loqui tur has been appli ed to col l a p se of seati ng devic es in bus iness establi shm ents).

Al though the government has contend e d tha t Smi th must present 2 addi tio nal evidence tha t i t had no t i c e o f any pro b l em with the stoo l , see Schm id v. Fairmont Hot el Co.-Chicag o , 80 3 N.E.2 d 16 6, 17 4 (Il l

. App. Ct. 20 03 ) ( l i ab i l i ty under rul es of or di nary negli gence requir es some knowl e d g e , actua l or constructi v e, of danger compl ained of ) (quoti ng Prater v
. V ea ch , 18 1 N. E.2 d 7 39 , 7 41 (Il l . A pp. C t. 1 96 2) ), the i nference tri ggered b y the res ipsa l oqui tur do ctri ne woul d i nclud e the pro posi tio n tha t th e de fe n dant h a d noti ce of the def ecti v e nature of the i ns t r umenta l i ty tha t caused the pl aintif f’s injury. See Higg ins v. Wh ite Sox Baseball Clu b, Inc. , 787F .2d 1125 , 11 29 (7 th Ci r. 19 86 ) (Il l i noi s l aw); DeBello v. Checker Tax i Co. , 29 0 N.E.2 d 36 7, 37 0 ( Il l . A pp. C t. 1 97 2)

.8 No. 16-4085 Judge Ba k e r ci ted the possi bi li ty that Smi th mi ght si mply hav e fallen from the stool without i t having malf unc tioned in any w a y ; a nd the government pursues the same poin t on appeal. See Britton v
. Univ

. of C h icago Hosps. , 889 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“i f tw o reasonable inferences are deduci ble from th e same facts, one of whi ch comport s wi th defendant’s responsibi li ty and the ot he r is di rectly contra there to, nei ther should be indulged to permi t recov ery by use of the do ct r ine o f res ipsa loquitur

... ”); Nickel v
. Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc. , 7 3 0 N

. E .2d 1212, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (res i psa l o quit ur does not apply where injury “can be as readily attr ibuted to pure acci dent as to negli gence”). Smi th does not si mply repr esent that he fell from the stool, a mi shap that plaus ibly could be explain ed by hi m sli pping off the stool due to hi s own mi sadv enture as by the stool’ s malfu ncti on. Cf. id. at 1213, 1215–16 (cas ino patro n wi th di ffi culty w alkin g and standing alleged that metal stool sli d out from under her as she tr i ed to si t down, caus ing her to fall to floor ; she di d not know what caus ed stool to sli p aw ay from he r nor could she recall condi tion of stoo l ). Smi th av ers that the stool w obbled and tipp ed hi m backw ards. (Hi s av erment reg ardin g mi ssing bolts reinfor ces the notion t ha t the stool w as brok en.) Cert ainly he could be wrong, and perhaps a factfinder mi ght conclu de that the stool d id no t, in fact, w obble. But at thi s stage of the 3

There i s (di sputed) testim o ny i n t he reco rd tha t no one had f all en fro m 3 the stoo l previo usly; tha t no detainee had ever compl ained ab out the stoo l posi ng a danger; and tha t the stoo l had ne v er b een observ ed i n a state of di srepair

. We also note tha t Smi th’s f e d e r al def ender, when depo sed, testif i ed tha t sh o r t l y af ter Smi th too k a seat on the stoo l , he reared b ack (co ntinued. ..)No. 16-4085 9 proceedings, w e mus t credi t Smi th, who ave r s unequi v ocally that the stool in fact di d w obble and th a t he w as tipp ed onto the floor as a result. Contr a r y inferences w ould be for the factfinder to draw (or not ) after a tr i al. Mar oules v

. Jumbo, Inc. , 452 F .3d 639, 646 (7th Ci r . 2006). The evidenc e also sati sfi es the contro l el e me nt of res i psa loqui tur

. The stool w as wi thi n a r o om maintai ned and contr olled by the government. Acces s to the ro om i s reg ulated by t he Mar shals Ser vic e and for obvious reasons i s gr anted t o a li mi ted uni v erse of indi vidu als under i ts supervis i on. The government must be concerned not only that the ro om func tions for i ts in te n d e d p u rp os e ( a tt orney-cli ent conferences) but that the ro om i s secu red—in the se ns e that a detain ee
ca nno t escape from i t; that an unauthorized person cannot
acces s i t from the outsi de (to help a detain ee escape, to harm a detain ee, or to l e a ve a w eapon or other contraband for the de t a ine e ); and that a detain ee cannot in some w ay use the contents of the ro om to w or k m i sch i ef (to make a w eapon, for example). Gi v en such safety c oncerns, i t c omes as no surpris e that the government admi ts that the Mar sh a l s Se rv i c e re gu l a rly inspec ts the sto o l and the other equi pment in the ro om. Cf. Hun te r , 251 N.E.2d at 306 (di stingui shing respecti v e duti es o f

( ...c onti nued) 3 sli ghtly, his eyes wid ened, and he ma de a gurgl i ng noi se b efo re fall i ng to the fl oo r; c ounsel h ad the i mpressio n tha t Smith was a dj usting hi mselfo n the stoo l and l ost his b alance. The attorney’s reco l l ecti on i s not necessaril y i nconsi stent with Smi th’s account of wha t caused him to fall

. But Smi th had suffer ed a stroke pri or to this i ncid ent, and the government ci tes the attorney’s v ersi on as suppor t fo r the noti on tha t a stroke caused Smi th to fall rather than

the o ther way around.10 No. 16-4085

ca r e o w ed by owner of priv ate home and propr i eto r o f bus iness establi shm ent). The government nonetheless arg ues, and the di stric t court conclu ded, that the Mar shals Ser vice di d not hav e li ter ally exclu sive contro l ov er the stool giv en that Smi th and o t he r detain ees reg ularly u sed the room ( and li kely had done s o on the day Smi th w as injured) and may themselve s hav e been responsible for the alleg ed malfu ncti oni ng of the sto ol.
How ev er

, as the Illi noi s Supreme Court has recog ni zed, the contro l cri ter i on of the res i psa loqui tur doctrine i s a fle x ible rat her than a rigi d standard. Heastie, 877 N.E.2d at 1076. “[T] he key questi on i s whet her the probable caus e of the plainti ff’s injury w as on e wh ich the defendant w as under a duty to the plainti ff t o anti ci pate or guard again st.” Id. (collecting cases );

see also Nichols v
. City of Chicago Heights , 31 N.E.3d 824, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Aguirre, 501 F .3d at 831 (ci tin g L ynch v
. Pr

ecisi on Mach. Shop, Ltd. , 443 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ill. 1982))

. If indeed the stool malfu ncti oned, as w e hav e a ss um ed based on Smi th’s accoun t of ev ents, then hi s w as an injury that the government w as under a d ut y to anti ci pate and guard again st. The governmen t ma intai ns the ro om and the equi pment there in, and admi ts th a t it inspec ts the equi pment, inclu ding the stool, on a reg ular basi s. A brok en stool, reg ardless o f t he caus e, w ould be t he type of condi tion such i nspec
tions are ai med at di scov ering. Indeed, giv en the secu r ity

co nc e r ns that a loose bolt, for example, mi ght present in the wrong hands, the Mar shals Ser vic e w ould have a stro ng incenti v e to chec k the sto ol to make sure i t w as secure.No. 16-4085 11
The fact that a detain ee i s typical ly left alone to confe r in priv ate wi th his l a wy er does not defeat the notion that the

ro om—and the st o ol—re main wi thi n the contro l of the government ev en when a deputy marshal i s not present. The st o o l d o e s require a user to “oper ate” i t in the w ay that a
rev olving door d o e s, for example, such that a malfu ncti on mi ght just as li kely be the result of negli gence on the part of the

user as opposed to the premi ses owner

. Cf. Britton , 889 N.E.2d at 70 9 (pointi ng out that rev olving door cannot oper ate i tself and that injured user or prev i ous user may hav e appli ed excessi v e force to door , causing door glass to shatter). When Smi th w as escorted into t he interv i ew ro om, the stool had already been placed in front of the screen; he si mply had to si t down. The sort of malfu ncti on that Smi th has described i s the kin d of hazard that the government may be expected to guard again st. The evidenc e, in sum, meets the cri ter i a fo r appli cati on of the res i psa loqui tur doctrine. The recor d w ould th e refor e permi t the factf ind e r to infer negli gence on the part of the government. III.
A s t he r e i s a di spute of material fact as to whether the government w as negli gent, sum mary judgment w as i mproper

. The j ud g me nt i s REVERS ED, and the case is REMANDED t o the di stric t court for further proc e e d ings consi stent wi th thi s opin i on.