Filed 8/20/24 Royal Palm Crest v. Groft CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ROYAL PALM CREST, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SAMUEL GROFT,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 B331401

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. 

 No. 22STRO06123)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Timothy Martella, Judge. Affirmed.

Samuel Groft, in pro per., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

Samuel Groft appeals from a three-year workplace violence 

restraining order (WVRO) obtained by Royal Palm Crest, Inc., 

(Royal Palm) under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8,

1

1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
2

protecting three Royal Palm employees. Groft contends the trial 

court violated his due process rights by holding the WVRO

hearing in his absence, even though he told opposing counsel he 

was running late and the attorney agreed to wait for him to 

arrive. Because the record on appeal does not support Groft’s 

contentions, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 21, 2022 Royal Palm filed a petition for a 

WVRO against Groft protecting three Royal Palm employees: 

Promise Okechukwu, Collenthmary Chukwu, and Eke Ukpai. 

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) the 

following day. The TRO was reissued and the hearing on the 

WVRO was continued multiple times. On February 23, 2023

Groft filed a request to continue the hearing, which was granted. 

On May 25, 2023 Groft gave notice that the hearing had again 

been continued to July 5, 2023.

On July 5, 2023 the trial court held a hearing on Royal 

Palm’s request for a WVRO. According to the minute order, the 

court called the matter for hearing at 1:40 p.m. Royal Palm’s 

attorney, Ali Ziai, appeared for Royal Palm, and Okechukwu was 

present. Groft did not appear by 1:40 p.m., nor did he call the 

courtroom. Ziai confirmed that the facts in the petition for a 

WVRO were correct and Royal Palm was still seeking a WVRO. 

The trial court granted Royal Palm’s request and issued a 

three-year WVRO protecting Okechukwu, Chukwu, and Ukpai. 

According to the July 5 minute order, the court reviewed the case 
3

file, moving papers, and supporting declarations.2 The WVRO 

prohibited Groft from harassing, following, contacting, or taking 

any action to obtain the addresses of the three employees. The 

order also required Groft to stay 100 yards away from 

Okechukwu, Chukwu, and Ukpai, as well as their homes, schools, 

vehicles, and children’s schools and childcare. The order 

prohibited Groft from owning any firearms or ammunition. 

Groft timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

“Section 527.8 permits an employer to seek a restraining 

order on behalf of an employee who has ‘suffered unlawful 

violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that 

can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been 

carried out at the workplace.’ (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) A ‘credible 

threat of violence’ includes a ‘course of conduct that would place a 

reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his 

or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.’

(§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2).)”

3 (City of Los Angeles v. Herman (2020) 

2 Groft did not designate for inclusion in the appellate record

Royal Palm’s initial request for a WVRO or the supporting 

declarations. 

3 Section 527.8, subdivision (a), provides, “[A]ny employer, 

whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible 

threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be 

construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the 

workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order 

after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of 

the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, 
4

54 Cal.App.5th 97, 102; accord, Technology Credit Union v. Rafat 

(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 322.) Under section 527.8, 

subdivision (j), “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or 

made a credible threat of violence, an order shall issue 

prohibiting further unlawful violence or threats of violence.”

Groft’s sole contention on appeal is that his due process 

rights were violated because the trial court held the hearing on 

the WVRO without his presence even though he was only 

10 minutes late and had informed opposing counsel that he was 

running late.4 However, Groft has not supported his contention 

with any evidence in the record showing that he appeared in 

court 10 minutes late (or at all) or requested opposing counsel or 

the court to delay the hearing until he arrived. To the contrary, 

the minute order from the July 5 hearing states that Groft had 

not contacted the court. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of 

appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily 

presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to 

demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate 

court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies 

reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

594, 608-609; accord, L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 

619, 621 [affirming grant of WVRO where appellant failed to 

if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the 

employer.” 

4 Groft also argues he was prejudiced by the order because 

he has a pending criminal case. The appellate record does not 

contain any information regarding a pending criminal case, nor 

does Groft make any arguments as to how a pending criminal 

case is relevant to his appeal.
5

address evidence in record supporting order].) “‘“Failure to 

provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be 

resolved against appellant.”’” (Mack v. All Counties Trustee 

Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 940; accord, Hotels 

Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 

336, 348; see Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 

[“‘[b]ecause [the appellant] failed to furnish an adequate record of 

the attorney fee proceedings, [the appellant’s] claim must be 

resolved against [him]’”].)5

5 At oral argument Groft again stated that he called opposing 

counsel to say he would be running late and that opposing 

counsel responded that he would ask the superior court to delay 

the hearing. As discussed, however, the record does not show 

that this call was made or how late Groft appeared in court. If 

Groft believed the trial court should have set aside the WVRO as 

a result of his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect, he could have sought relief in the trial court and 

presented evidence that he spoke with opposing counsel or

showing the time he appeared in court. (See County of San 

Bernardino v. Mancini (2022), 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102 

[“Section 473(b) authorizes the trial court to vacate a dismissal, 

order, or judgment if it occurred because of the excusable 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of a party or its 

attorney.”].) 

We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding 

of the rules in the trial court or on appeal are, as a practical 

matter, more limited than an experienced attorney’s. Whenever 

possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a 

manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, we are 

required to apply the rules on appeal and substantive rules of law 

to a self-represented litigant’s claims on appeal, just as we would 

to those litigants who are represented by trained legal counsel. 

(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) 
6

Accordingly, on the record before us, there was no due 

process violation. Groft had notice of the hearing but failed to 

appear; the trial court reviewed Royal Palm’s moving papers and 

supporting declarations; and Groft does not contend substantial 

evidence does not support issuance of the WVRO. 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

FEUER, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.