Esquivel’s attorney , Br ian B erna rd, wa s also sanctioned, a nd he attempts to join Esquivel 1 in her briefing and request for relief
. The only notice of appea l filed i n this case, howe ver, state s that “ANAESQUI VEL desires to appea l from all portions of t he judgment . . . This notice is being filed by ANA ESQUIVEL .” Thus, B erna rd did not file a notice of appe al, and we cannot a war d him any relief
. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1. But even if Be rnar d had filed a notice of appea l, we would aw ard him no relief f

or the re asons explained below. Mart ine z an d E sq

uiv e l ha d o the r c hil dr e n w ho are no t in vo lve d in thi s a pp e a l. 2 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 792 -CV

Ana Esqui ve l , A ppe lla nt

v. Edw ard Mart inez , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 00- 0012 82 , HO NORAB LE DERWO OD JO HNS ON , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ana Esquivel a

ppeals fr om an orde r aw ardingsanctions to her e x -husb an d, E dw ar d M a rti n e z. Whe n E sq

uiv e l and Ma rt ine z div or c e d in

20 01 , M art ine z wa s nam ed so le 1 manag ing c onservator of the c ouple’s son, Da v id. Es qu ive l w a s n a me d p os se sso ry c on se rv a tor

wi th 2 limit ed super

vised visitation. I n 2 008, Esquivel took custody of David without the court’s or Martinez’s per

mission and filed a motion to become David’s sole manag ing conser vator. Martinez
mov e d f or sanc tio ns a g a ins t E sq

uiv e l, a lle g ingthat he r m oti on fo r a c us tod y c ha ng e wa s g ro un dle ss and broug ht in bad faith. He also moved for sanctions ag ainst Esquivel’s attorney , Br ian B erna rd,Ex cept whe re note d, the following fac ts are either ag ree d upon or unconte sted. See T e x. 3 R. A pp . P. 38 .1 (g ) ( “ I n a

c ivi l c a se , th e c ourt wi ll a c c e pt a s tr ue the fa c ts s ta te d unle ss a no the r p a rt

y contra dicts them.”). 2 on the g ro un d th a t B e rn ard

a ssi ste d E sq

uiv e l in fi lin g the g ro un dle ss m oti on . T he tr ia l c ourt he ld
a hear ing on Martinez’s motion without Esquivel or Be rnar d in a ttendance
. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the court awarde d Martinez $10,000 in sanctions ag ainst Esquivel and $5,000 in sanctions
a g a ins t B e rn ard . E sq

uiv e l a pp e a ls tho se awa

rd s. We w ill a ff

ir m.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND 3 Es qu ive l and

Mart ine z div or c e d in 2001 . The div or c e de c re e name d M art ine z sol e manag ing c onservator of the c ouple’s son, David, and named E squivel possessory conser vator. Equivel was g iven only

four hours of supervised visitation with David per month be cause the cour t had ser ious conce rns about her influence on David’s we lfare
. I n 2006 , E s q u i v el filed a Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship. She was repr esente d by

Br ian B erna

rd at t h e t i m e. The c ourt appointed a g uardia n ad litem, who wrote a repor t stating that Da

vid was best ser

ved by the exist ing c ustody

arr ang ement. The g uardia n ad litem
rea ched this re sult partly beca use Esquivel had not be en re ceivingpsy chological c ounseling as previously

rec ommended. F or re asons that ar e not c lear from the re cord, the court ne ver e ntere d an order g ranting or deny

ing E squivel’s Petition. On June 4, 20 08 , Da

vid e nd e d up in Es qu ive l’ s c us tod y . Th e pa rt ie s d isa g re e a s to how that came about. Esquivel cla ims that David called he r fr om a pay phone to say

that he had run
awa y from his fathe r’s home. She further claims that she contacted Ber nard for l eg al advice, and heMartinez believed that Esquivel was living in Ky le at the time. 4 3 advised her to pic k up David and call Martinez to inf orm him of the situation. Martinez, on the other ha nd , c la ims that Es qu ive l ini tiate d c on ta c t wi th Da vid and “ re mov e d him fr om sc ho ol. ” He c la ims that when Esquivel c alled him on J une 4 af ter picking up David, she ref used to sa y wher e she wa s
o r w h e ns h e w o u l d

r e tu r nD a v i d t o h i s c u s t o dy. The ne x t da

y , J une 5, 2008, Mar

tinez took a copy

of his and Esquivel’s divorc e dec ree to t he Ky le , T e xas p oli c e de pa

rtme nt. He repor

ted the situation to a serg eant a nd had the se rg eant 4 call Esquivel to inform her that she was violating the te rms of the de cre e by exercising custody

over David. Esquivel alleg edly ag ree d to meet Martinez and hand over David later that morning at the Travis Count y courthouse, but she never showe d up. Martinez waited a pproxi mately

an hour a nd
a half past the arr ang ed mee ting time and the n went to the Tra vis County

Domestic Relations Off

ice to inform an assistant mana g er, Rosyly n Pitre, about the situation. Wit h Martinez in her off ice, Pitre c alled Bernar d and informe d him that Esquivel sh ou ld n ot b e e xer c isi ngc us tod y ov e r D a vid . Be rn ard

a lle g e dly re sp on de d b y

say ingthat D a vid “had run away

fr om [h is] d a d” and

Es qu ive l “ wa s tr

y ingto j us t ke e p th e c hil d s a fe .” Pitr e tol d B e rn ard sh e wa s g oin g to i nf

or m Ch ild Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s a

bo ut t he sit uatio n, and

B e rn ard a lle g e dly responde d by

saying that “he understood [her] position, a nd [she] neede d to do what [she] thought [she] neede d to do.”

The same day , Esquivel took David to Be rnar d’s office, whe re D avid completed a n aff idavit stating that he had run a way from his fathe r’s home a nd wa n t ed t o live with his mot her. He also completed a document entitled “Choice of Manag ing Conser vator by Child Twelve Yea

rs4

of Ag e or O lder” (David was 13 at the time) that s t at ed he wa nted Esquivel to be his manag ing
conser vator. B erna

rd fa x ed these documents to Ter esa D uffin, who wa s Martinez’s attorney of
rec ord at the time, a

nd to Catherine Schmidt, who had been David’s guar dian ad litem in 2006; he did no t tr ans mit

the do c ume nts to M art inez. B e rn ard a lso a lle g e dly

c a lle d D uf

fi n a nd Sc hmi dt t o inf or m th e m th a t he int e nd e d to “ g o to the un c on te ste d do c ke t to ob ta in an or de r a llo wi ng[Esq uiv e l] to temporarily

keep D avid in her home .” F or re asons that ar e not clea r from the rec ord, Duff

in and Schmidt seem not to have ac ted on this information in any way . Th e ne xt day , J un e 6, 20 08 , Be rn ard did ind e e d g o to the un c on te ste d d oc ke t and fi le a “Motion for

Additional Temporar

y Orde rs.” The court hel d a h ea ri n g on the motion without Mart ine z or

any on e re pr e se nti nghim in atte nd anc e . T he he ari ngwa s n ot r e c or de d. At its conclusion, the c ourt issued an orde r sche duling a conser vatorship hear ing for June 25, 2008, and g iving Esquivel e x clusive custody of David until t hen. Some time between June 6 and June 12, 2008, Martinez learne d of t h i s o rd er a nd hired attorney Sarah Diafi. Diafi promptly moved for a writ of attac hment to have Da vid returne d t o M ar t i n ez ’s cu s t o dy . T h e c o u rt h el d a h ea ri n g o nt h e m o t i o no nJ u n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 8
. At t h e h ea r i n g, Mart i n ez and Diaf

i learne d for the f

irst time about Esquivel’s Motion for Additional Tempora ry Orde rs. At the conclusion of the he aring , the cour t vacated the ea

rlier c ourt’s June 6 order, r eturne d David to Martinez’s custody , and set a J une 25 hea

ring on E s q u i v el ’s Motion for Additional Te mpo ra ry Or de rs . On J u n e 25, 2008, the pa rties and their

attorney s appea

red in c ourt. Be rnar d
r e qu e s t e d a c o n t i n u an c e , an d

D i a f i a g r e e d t o r e s e tt h e h e ar i n g f

o r J u l y 1 6 , 2 0 0 8
. T h e s a m e d a y,The court also purported to a war d sanctions pursuant to Texas Ci vil Practice a nd Remedies 5 Code cha pter 9 (“ Chapter 9” ), but that cha pter wa s not applicable. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 9.012(h) ( West 2002). 5 Diafi filed the sanctions motion that is t he subjec t of thi s ap p ea l
. T h e cour t added the sa

nctions mot ion to i ts Jul y

16 do c ke t. On J uly 14, 2008, Be rnar d contac ted Diaf i to request another c ontinuance. She ref used, and B erna

rd filed a motion for continuance with the court the next day
. For rea sons that are not clear from the r ecor d, Be rnar d appear s n o t t o h ave obta ined a r uling on the motion or done any thing e lse to secur e a c ontinuance. T here is ev i d en ce t h at h e ins tructed Esquive l to attend the J uly 16 hear ing w ithout him , but she ultimately did not do so. O n J uly 16, 2008, a visiting judg e held the he aring . Neither Be rnar d nor Esquivel wa s pr e se nt. Di a fi c a lle d wi tne sse s wh o te sti fi e d to the a bo ve fa c ts, inc lud ingRos y ly n Pi tr e (t he Tr a vis County D o me s ti c Re lati o n s O f

f ic e e mp lo y e e ) an d

M arti n e z. D ia f

i a ls o to o k

th e s ta n d to te s tify
a bo ut h e r f e e s. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the court de nied Esquivel’s Motion for Additional T em p o ra ry

Orde rs, denied E squivel’s 2006 Petition t o Modify Parent-Child Relationship, and, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedie s Code chapte r 10 and Te x as Rule of Civil Procedure 13 , g ra nte d M art ine z’s mot ion

fo r s anc tio ns . T h e cour t awar ded Mar

tinez $10,000 in s anctions 5 ag ainst Esquivel and $5,000 in sanctions ag ain s t Be rnar d. The c ourt issued an orde r conta ining finding s of fa ct to support the sanctions awa rd. Esquivel subsequently filed a motion for ne w trial that w a s d e nie d a

nd the n f ile d th is a pp e a l.Es qu ive l’ s b ri e f d oe s not obe y the ru le s o f a

pp e llate pr oc e dure . In it s ta ble of c on te nts it 6 lis ts a sin g le iss ue . In it s “ I ssu e s Pr e se nte d” se c tio n, howe ve r, it l ist s tw o is su e s th a t are tot a lly distinct from the i ssue l isted in the t able of contents. This inconsistency should not exi st. Com pa re Te x. R. Ap p. P. 38. 1( b) (t a ble of c on te nts “ mus t indi c a te the su bje c t matt e r of

e a c h is su e or

po int , or g roup of issues or points”) with Te x. R. A pp . P. 38 .1 (f

) (“ iss ue s pr e se nte d” se c tio n “ mus t st a te c on c ise ly a ll i ssu e s o r p oin ts pr e se nte d fo r re vie w” ). Th e inc on sis te nc y make s it d if fi c ult fo r u s to deter mine what to re view.

Our t a sk is f ur the r c omp lic a te d by

thr e e a dd iti on a l a sp e c ts o f E sq uiv e l’ s b ri e f. F ir st, the “St at em en t of F acts” section does not “state conc isely . . . the fa cts pertinent to the issues . . . pr e se nte d, ” no r d oe s it

inc lud e s r e c or d r e fe re nc e s. Te x. R. A pp . P. 38 .1 (g ). Se c on d, the br ie f w ho lly omits a “Summary of the Argument” section. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 38 .1 (h ) ( a

pp e lla nt’ s b ri e f “ mus t contain a suc cinct, cle ar, a nd acc urate statement of the arguments made in the body of the brie f.”)
. Third, the “A rg ument” sec tion of the brief does not “c ontain a cle ar and concise ar g ument for the contentions made.” Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(h). That is to say , the Argument section (1) is not structure d in a way that ref lects the “I ssues Presente d”; (2) r aises issues that ar e neither enumer ated in n or su g g e ste d b y

the “ I ssu e s Pr e se nte d” se c tio n; a nd (3 ) f a ils to su pp ort many

of its argume nts “with appr opriate c itations to authorities.” Id
. 6 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa trial c ourt’s imposition of s an ct i ons for a n abuse of

discretion. Low

v . H e nr y , 221 S.W .3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). We may reve rse a sanctions award only if the trial cour t imposed it without ref

ere nce to a

ny g uiding rules and pr inciples, such that its ruling w as ar bitrary
or unre asonable
. Id . Asanc tio ns awa rd mu st “be no mor e se ve re tha n n e c e ssa ry to s a tis fy

its leg itimate purposes” a

nd must share a

“dire ct nexus” with bo t h t he “of fensive c onduct” a

nd “the offe nder.” Spohn Hosp. v. May er , 104 S.W .3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003).
DI SCU SSIO N Esquivel s eems to raise a host of issues in her brief, but she proper ly

enumer ates and supports only

three
. We examine those three issues a nd deem the othe rs waive d. See M cLane 6 v. Mc Lane , 263 S.W .3d 358, 360 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Di st.] 2008, pet. denied) (op. on7

re h’ g ) ( “ S h o u l d

[a p p e l l an t ] a s k

u s t o c o n s t r

u e h i s b r i e f

t o a s s e rta d d i t i o n a l i s s u e s [b e y o n d t h os e properly e n u me r a ted], we hold that the additional points were improperly briefe d and thus waive d.”); Ma rti ne z v . E l P as o Coun ty , 218 S.W .3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. struck) ( “The Ap pe lla nt b e ars the burd e n of dis c us sin g he r a sse rt ion s of e rr or . A n a

pp e llate c ourt

ha s n o d uty to p e r f o r m an in d e p e n d e n t r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d an d a p p li c a b le la w to d e te r

mi n e w h e th er the re w as
err or.” ( citation omitted)).
Fir st I ssu e E s qu i v el ’s fi rs ten u m er at edi s s u e i s t h e f o l l o wi n g:
Did the trial cour

t err in a war ding attorney ’s fe es of $10,000 a g ainst appellant Ana Esquivel and $5,000 ag ainst appellant’s attorney when the e vidence showed that appellee ’s attorne y

had only substitut ed on [the] case one month prior and ha d been no tif ie d tw o d ay s b e fo re c ourt date that a

ppell ant’s a tto rn e y

ne e de d to re sc he du le h e ar i n g d a t e s i n c e h e w o u l d b e i nj u r y t r i a l o nan o t h e r

m a t t e r i nan o th e r

c o u n t y? This issue seems to complain that M artinez’s attorney , Sarah Diafi, was not entitled to an awa rd of fe e s b e c a us e sh e (1 ) h a d o nly

be e n o n the c a se fo r a

mon th a nd (2 ) s ome ho w a c te d im

pr op e rl y in proce eding with a hea

ring on Martinez’s sanc tions mot ion knowing that Be rnar d could not attend. Es q u i v el cit es no authority in support of these pr opositions. They are there fore waived. Martinez , 218 S.W .3d at 844. B ut even if the y wer e not waived, Diafi testified a s to her attorney ’s fe es without contradic tion. See I n re A.B.P. , 291 S.W .3d 91, 98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,
no pe t.) (“ Te sti mony

fr om a pa rt y ’s a tto rn e y

a bout a part y ’s a tto rn e y s’ fe e s is take n a s tr ue a s a
ma tte r of law i f t

he te sti mony

is n ot c on tr a dic te d b y

any oth e r w itn e ss a

nd is c le ar, po sit ive , d ir e c t, and fr ee f rom contra diction.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Fur thermore , beca

use B erna rd8

and Es qu ive l w e re pr op e rl y

se rv e d w ithno tic e of

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt ha d the di scr etio n to deny Be rnar d’s motion for a co ntinuance a nd hold a hea

ring without him present. See V illegas v. Carter , 711 S.W .2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). We overr ule Esquivel’s first issue.
Se c ond Iss ue E s qu i v el ’s s ec o n d en u m er at edi s s u e i s t h e f o l l o wi n g:
Di d th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr in a wa rd inga pp e lle e ’s a tto rn e y , Sa

ra h Di a fi , $ 10 ,0 00 a g a ins t Ana Esquivel a

nd $5,000 ag ainst appellant’ s attorney on defa ult wher e the e vidence shows that appellee ’s attorne y made false allegations and used those fa lse alleg ations as the ba sis for that awa

rd?
I n the sec tion that discusses this point of err or, Esquivel includes only a single leg al citation (one that stands for the pr oposition t hat “a party must present evide nce in g ood faith”) . This is i nsufficie nt to support an ar g ument t h at , in the posture of this ca se, Diaf i’s alleg edly

false a lleg ations warr ant
a re versa l. Thus, the issue is waived. See Martinez , 218 S.W
. 3 d at 844. I n any event, a s an appellate court , we do not determine which f acts a re “ true” ; we dete rmine whe ther the
rec ord conta ins at least some evide nce to support the fac ts f ound by the trial cour

t. See B utnaru v. Ford Mo t o r Co. , 8 4 S. W.3 d 1 98 , 2 11 (T e x. 20 02 ). Th e re c or d d oe s so he re . We ov e rr ule Esquivel’s sec ond issue.
Thi rd Iss ue E s qu i v el ’s t h i rden u m er at edi s s u e i s t h e f o l l o wi n g:
Do e s a d i s t r i c t c o u rt m i s a p p l y t h e l aw an d t h u s c l e ar l y a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n w h e nit imposes a $10,000 puni t i v e fine ag ainst Ana Esquivel a nd a $5,000 punitive fine a g a ins t B ri an B e rn ard

a s a sanc tio n w ith ou t any

e vid e nc e that th e fi ne is re la te d to the opposing party ’s har

m or that lesser sa

nctions were considere d?9

This issue does not warr ant re versal b ec au s e t here was in fa ct evidenc e that (1) the sanc tions assessed w ere related to Martinez’s har m and (2) le sser sanc tions were c onsidered. Reg ardingthe forme r, it is true that sanctions awa rds should r efle ct the har

m cause d and should be no m o re s ev ere than nec essar y . See M

ayer , 1 04 S.W. 3d

a t 88 2; see also Low , 221 S.W .3d at 6 2 0 -2 1 n.5 (listing fa ctors that may help cour

t determine a

ppropriate sanctions). Es qu ive l argue s th a t th e sanc tio ns a wa rd e d h e re do no t r e fl e c t th e ha rm c a us e d b e c a us e Mart ine z did not substantiate his monetary losses. We d isa g re e . M art ine z te sti fi e d th a t he los t hi s jo b b e c a us e he mi ss ed wo rk

wh ile trying to g et David back, a nd Diafi testified that her attorney ’s fe es totaled $5,000. Esquivel a rg ues that this testim ony

does not support a sanc tions awa rd because Martinez could not have missed wor k “sea rching ” for

his son, as “he kne w all along wh ere his son was and who he was with.” O n the contra r y , M arti n e z te s ti f

ie d th a t h e d id n o t kn o w w h e r e E s qu iv e l li v e d an d th a t he did not spend hi s ti me me r e ly

“ s e a r c h in g ” f o r D a v id , b u t r a th e r

s p e n t h is ti me p u r s u in g v ar io u s le g al
avenue s (e.g ., contac ting the police, contac ting the Travis County Domestic Relations Off

ice) to try to ge t David bac k.

Reg ardingDiafi’s attorney ’s fe es, Esquivel cl ai m s that Diafi introduce d “no evidenc e” in support of her $5,000 f igur e. On the c ontrary , Diafi testified a s to her hourly rate and the num ber of hours she wor ked for Martinez. See I

n re A.B.P. , 291 S.W .3d at 98 (“Te stimony from a par ty ’s attorne y

about a pa

rty ’s attorne y s’ fe es is taken a s true a s a matter of law if the te stimony is not contradicted by any other witness a nd is clear , positive, direct, and f ree from contr adiction.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)).10 Reg ardingwhether

the trial cour

t considere d lesser sa

nctions, the court’ s sanctions order specific ally states that a “le sser sanc tion was not imposed beca use ANAESQUI VEL

and her attorney committed eg reg ious misconduct. The c ourt consider ed lesser sanctions but they

would not have be en ef

fec tive.” The court re cited seve ral ba ses for this fi n d i n g , none of w hich Esquivel direc tly challeng es. We overr

ule Esquivel’s third issue.

CO NC LU SION For the re asons stated a

bove, we hold that the trial court did not a buse its discretion in imposi ng sanctions on Esquivel and B erna rd. We aff

irm the sanctions orde r.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: September

16, 2010