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Filed 4/14/23 P. v. Perkins CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KOLIJAH DESHAUN PERKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095832

(Super. Ct. No. 21FE011911)

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 

§ 1538.5),

1 defendant Kolijah Deshaun Perkins pleaded no contest to carrying a 

concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)). Pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, 

the trial court placed defendant on probation for two years. He now appeals, contending 

the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. Finding no error, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Underlying Facts

On July 14, 2021, during the late afternoon, Sacramento Police Officer Mark 

Thrall and three other officers were patrolling a known high-crime area of Sacramento in 

an unmarked vehicle. Officer Thrall saw a dark green BMW without a front license plate 

driving on the road. Officer Thrall followed the BMW and conducted a “records check 

of the license plate”; defendant was the registered owner, but the car’s registration was 

expired.

Eventually, the BMW stopped in a store parking lot; defendant got out of the car 

and went inside the store. While defendant was inside the store, the officers conducted 

another “records check,” this time on defendant, and learned defendant recently drove a 

friend to the hospital after that friend was shot during a robbery.

Approximately 10 minutes after going into the store, defendant came out. He got 

into the BMW, pulled out of the parking stall, and backed into another parking stall. The 

officers approached defendant to discuss the missing license plate and expired 

registration. Defendant started to get out of the car; he was holding a black “satchel.” 

Officer Thrall stopped defendant and asked to search the satchel; defendant agreed and 

gave the satchel to Officer Thrall. The satchel “did not feel as if there was something as 

heavy as a firearm” in it, so Officer Thrall handed it to Officer Conner Mills. Officer 

Mills looked inside the satchel and did not find a firearm or anything illegal.

Officer Thrall asked defendant for his driver’s license, but defendant did not have 

it with him. Defendant was visibly shaking; he appeared nervous to Officer Thrall. 

Officer Thrall asked defendant why he was shaking, and defendant said the officers were 

making him nervous. While talking to defendant at the driver’s side door, Officer Thrall 

saw a beanie shoved into the small space between the driver’s seat and the center console. 

It appeared to Officer Thrall “that the beanie was placed there purposefully.” Officer 
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Thrall also smelled “a large quantity of unburnt marijuana” coming from inside the car 

and saw a small amount of “loose-leaf marijuana” on the floorboard.

Defendant remained seated in the driver’s seat, with his hands visible. Officer 

Thrall asked defendant to step out of the car because he was concerned for the officers’ 

safety and intended to issue a citation for the Vehicle Code violations. As defendant was 

getting out of the car, Officer Thrall patted him down to ensure defendant did not have 

any weapons on him. There were none. Officer Thrall asked defendant whether there 

was any marijuana in the car; defendant said there was a “doobie.”2 However, when 

Officer Mills asked defendant where the doobie was, defendant said there was no doobie 

in the car.

Officer Thrall saw a backpack in the car and asked defendant what was inside. 

Defendant said it might contain clothes that belonged to “his girl.” The officers asked 

defendant for permission to search the backpack and the car; defendant refused. 

Defendant did ask Officer Thrall to get his water but directed Officer Thrall to get it 

“only from the passenger side.” Officer Thrall suspected defendant did not want him to 

see what was under the beanie. Officer Thrall searched the car.

During the search of defendant’s car, Officer Thrall looked under the beanie and 

found a loaded firearm. The firearm did not have a serial number and was not registered. 

Officer Thrall also looked inside the backpack and found approximately 171 grams of 

“processed marijuana.” The officers arrested defendant. The entire encounter, from 

contact with defendant to his arrest, lasted 10 minutes.

Procedural Background

The People charged defendant with carrying a concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. 

(a)(1)); they alleged that firearm was loaded (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6)). The People also 

2 A doobie is a rolled-up cigarette paper filled with marijuana (i.e., a marijuana 

cigarette).
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charged defendant with carrying a loaded firearm in public. (§ 25850, subd. (a).) The 

People further alleged defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm (§ 11106, 

subd. (c)(1)) and he committed the offenses while he was released from custody on a 

primary offense prior to judgment on the primary offense becoming final (§ 12022.1). 

Defendant initially pleaded not guilty to the charges and denied the allegations.

On October 14, 2021, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 

as a result of the traffic stop. The People opposed the motion. In his motion, defendant 

argued the warrantless searches of his backpack and car were not supported by probable 

cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He also argued the traffic stop 

became a “prolonged unlawful detention after officers abandoned their interest in expired 

registration and it became a fishing expedition.” Finally, he argued the doctrine of 

inevitable discovery did not apply.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Thrall testified that based on his 

experience and training, he can detect the smell of marijuana and is able to recognize the 

distinct smells of burnt and unburnt marijuana. He also knows it is difficult to smell 

small amounts of marijuana, but easy to smell large amounts. Moreover, in his 

experience, people who are nervous interacting with him are usually hiding something.

Officer Thrall also testified that, based on his experience and training, people who 

have been shot or shot at, or are associated with others who have been shot or shot at, will 

arm themselves either for retaliation or protection. He also knows that people who carry 

guns often conceal them in satchels or in the space between the driver’s seat and the 

center console where the gun can be hidden but is easily accessible. Days before this 

traffic stop, Officer Thrall found a firearm in that space between the driver’s seat and the 

center console during the search of a different vehicle.

Following supplemental briefs on the recent changes in state law relative to 

regulating marijuana, the magistrate denied defendant’s motion. The magistrate found 

the detention was not unduly prolonged because only six minutes passed from the 
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moment the officers stopped defendant until they found the firearm. Moreover, the 

magistrate found, “the progression of inquiry and conduct was reasonable and lawful.” 

The officers’ “observations led to a progression of concerns, in addition to the reasons 

that underlie the initial traffic stop. Specifically, their observations gave rise to specific, 

articulable reasons to be concerned about both the possible presence of marijuana in the 

car, in an illegal amount, and the possible presence of a firearm in the car.”

The magistrate also found the officers had probable cause to search defendant’s 

car based on the combination of circumstances, as presented by the evidence, and the 

officers’ experience with marijuana and firearms.

Defendant later moved the trial court to dismiss the charges and renewed his 

motion to suppress the evidence. The court denied both motions, and shortly thereafter 

defendant pleaded no contest to possessing a concealed firearm. In exchange for his plea, 

the remaining charge and allegations were dismissed. Pursuant to the terms of his plea 

agreement, the trial court “ordered that imposition of judgment and sentence be 

suspended” and placed defendant on formal probation for two years with a 90-day 

sentence “out of custody.”

Defendant appeals without a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises three arguments on appeal: (1) his detention was unduly 

prolonged, (2) the officers had no legal authority to pat him down for weapons, and (3) 

the smell of unburnt marijuana did not provide probable cause for the warrantless search 

of his car.3 We affirm the judgment.

3 Defendant also argues the rule of inevitable discovery does not apply. Because we 

conclude there was probable cause to search the car, we do not address this alternative 

argument. 
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I

Standard of Review

“In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress evidence, we 

rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, provided they are supported 

by substantial evidence, to independently determine whether the search was 

constitutional. [Citation.] ‘Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment 

to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the 

context of historical facts determined by the trial court.’ [Citation.] It is the trial court’s 

role to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 

evidence, and draw factual inferences. [Citation.] We review those factual findings 

under the deferential substantial evidence standard, considering the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s order.” (People v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 

296-297 (Moore).)

II

Analysis

A. The Stop

Defendant does not contend the officers’ initial stop was unlawful. Rather, he 

contends the stop became unlawful when it was unduly prolonged after the officers 

“abandoned the traffic infractions to begin a fishing expedition.” We disagree.

“An investigatory stop exceeds constitutional bounds when extended beyond what 

is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible. 

[Citation.] Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable 

suspicion to prolong the detention. [Citation.] There is no set time limit for a permissible 

investigative stop; the question is whether the police diligently pursued a means of 

investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People 

v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101-102.)
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Here, the detention took approximately 10 minutes, an objectively short amount of 

time. More importantly, in that time, circumstances developed that gave the officers 

“reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell, supra,

81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) Based on his experience and what he knew about defendant, 

Officer Thrall knew when he approached defendant that it was reasonably likely 

defendant was armed. The officers thus searched the satchel defendant was carrying but

found no firearm. 

Officer Thrall then saw a beanie stuffed between the driver’s seat and the center 

console. He knew this was a common method for concealing a firearm within arm’s 

reach. He also smelled a potentially illegal amount of unburnt marijuana and saw looseleaf marijuana on the floorboards. Officer Thrall asked defendant if he had marijuana in 

the car. Defendant made inconsistent statements about whether he did or did not. 

Officer Thrall then asked defendant if he could search the car, and the backpack he 

saw inside the car; defendant refused. He asked defendant to step out of the car. As 

defendant was getting out of the car, Officer Thrall conducted a patdown search of 

defendant’s person and confirmed defendant was not concealing a weapon on his body. 

At that point, Officer Thrall searched the car; he found a firearm under the beanie and 

marijuana in the backpack. The officers arrested defendant.

In sum, as quickly as these circumstances presented themselves, the officers 

worked to confirm or dispel their suspicion of illegal activity. They searched the satchel,

they asked defendant to step out of the car, and they searched his person. Then, they 

searched the car. The entire encounter, including the arrest, lasted 10 minutes.

We thus conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s ruling the detention was 

not unduly prolonged.

B. The Patdown Search

Defendant also contends the officers had no legal authority to perform a “Terry

frisk because they had no reason to believe he was armed and dangerous.” Defendant did 
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not make this claim in the trial court. Even assuming he preserved this issue, however,

his contention fails because the patdown search did not lead to the discovery of any 

incriminating evidence. As a result, there is no remedy available to defendant. (See

People v. Downey (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657.) The contention would fail in any 

event.

“In Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27, the United States Supreme Court held 

that a police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest could undertake a patdown search 

only ‘. . . where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 

individual . . . .’ ‘The sole justification of the search . . . is the protection of the police 

officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion 

reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 

assault of the police officer.’ [Citation.] The officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts together with rational inferences therefrom which reasonably support a 

suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.” (People v. Dickey (1994) 

21 Cal.App.4th 952, 955-956.)

Officer Thrall conducted the patdown search of defendant as defendant was 

getting out of his car. At that point, Officer Thrall knew they were in a high-crime area. 

(See Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 301-302 [reputation of an area for criminal 

activity is an articulable fact upon which an officer can rely].) He also knew defendant 

might be armed for either protection or retaliation as a result of his friend recently being 

shot. Officer Thrall knew defendant was carrying a type of bag frequently used to 

conceal guns, but that bag was already found to be empty. Officer Thrall suspected the 

car contained an illegal amount of marijuana, and defendant was notably nervous. (Ibid. 

[nervous behavior may be considered in determining whether probable cause exists].) 

Based on these specific and articulable facts, it was rational for Officer Thrall to suspect 

defendant may have a firearm on his person and was therefore armed and dangerous.
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In short, were this claim preserved and viable, it would fail.

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C. Search of the Vehicle

Defendant contends “the odor of unburned marijuana did not provide probable 

cause to search the vehicle, nor did Thrall’s subjective belief a firearm might be present.” 

We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Warrantless searches are ‘per se

unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions.’ [Citations.] One such exception to the warrant requirement is the 

automobile exception, which allows for warrantless searches of automobiles where an 

officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a 

crime. [Citations.] Probable cause to search exists ‘where the known facts and 

circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’ [Citation.] An officer who has 

probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception may then conduct a 

probing search of all ‘compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are 

not in plain view.’ [Citation.]

“A warrantless automobile search ‘is not unreasonable if based on facts that would 

justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.’ 

[Citation.] Thus, ‘if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable 

cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing 

officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to 

seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.’ [Citation.]

4 To the extent defendant raises the patdown search as another basis for unduly 

prolonging the detention, that issue is resolved above.
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“As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ‘probable cause is a fluid 

concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not 

readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ [Citation.] Further, ‘[a]n 

officer is entitled to rely on his [or her] training and experience in drawing inferences 

from the facts he [or she] observes, but those inferences must also “be grounded in 

objective facts and be capable of rational explanation.” ’ [Citation.] When considering 

the validity of the evidence, it is to be analyzed ‘ “as understood by those versed in the 

field of law enforcement.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The principal components of a determination of

. . . probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and 

then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 

objectively reasonable police officer, amount . . . to probable cause.’ [Citation.] As such, 

we consider the totality of the circumstances, and analyze these facts as would a 

reasonable police officer, in assessing the officer’s probable cause, rather than looking to 

singular facts in a vacuum.” (Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 297-298.)

2. Analysis

First, defendant contends the smell of marijuana does not support a finding of 

probable cause. Defendant is correct in so far as the smell alone may not support a 

finding of probable cause. The smell of fresh marijuana, combined with other 

circumstances, however, is sufficient to find probable cause. (Moore, supra, 

64 Cal.App.5th at p. 300.) Like in Moore, a case decided by this court last year, it was 

not just the smell of marijuana that caused Officer Thrall to search defendant’s car. On 

the contrary, defendant was stopped in a known high-crime area. (Id. at p. 301.) 

Defendant was nervous. (Id. at p. 302.) And he changed his story about the presence of 

marijuana in his car while stopped, presumably to avoid a search.

In addition, while it is accurate to say that Officer Thrall only saw a small amount 

of loose-leaf marijuana on the car’s floorboards, he knew based on his experience that if 

he could smell the unburnt marijuana, it was likely to be a large, and therefore illegal,
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amount. He was entitled to rely on his experience to make that inference. (U.S. v. LopezSoto (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1101, 1105.)

Defendant also contends Officer Thrall could not establish probable cause to 

search the car based on Thrall’s “assumption” that defendant “was hiding a gun in his 

car.” Defendant’s contention overlooks Officer Thrall’s experience, which renders 

Officer Thrall’s inference that defendant was hiding a firearm in the car more than just a 

bare “assumption.” As noted above, police officers are allowed to rely on their “training 

and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he [or she] observes.” (U.S. v. 

Lopez-Soto, supra, 205 F.3d at p. 1105.)

Here, based on his training and experience, Officer Thrall knew defendant may be 

armed with a firearm, but he quickly learned that firearm was not concealed in 

defendant’s satchel. Officer Thrall then saw the beanie stuffed between the driver’s seat 

and center console, which based on his experience, was another likely place for defendant 

to conceal a firearm. Defendant’s efforts to keep Officer Thrall away from the beanie 

only served to reinforce the inference that he was hiding a firearm.

In short, based on the totality of circumstances, including the neighborhood, the 

smell of unburnt marijuana, the likelihood defendant was armed, and defendant’s own 

behavior, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order 

finding probable cause to search defendant’s car and denying defendant’s motion to 

suppress.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /s/

EARL, J.

We concur:

 /s/

RENNER, Acting P. J.

 /s/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.