# Eiropas Savienības C 204/2012

| | ISSN 1977-0952
  doi:10.3000/19770952.C_2012.204.lav |
| --- | --- |
| Eiropas Savienības
  Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204 |
| | |
| Izdevums latviešu valodā | Informācija un paziņojumi | 55. sējums2012. gada 12. jūlijs |

ISSN 1977-0952

doi:10.3000/19770952.C_2012.204.lav

Eiropas Savienības

Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204

Izdevums latviešu valodā

Informācija un paziņojumi

55. sējums2012. gada 12. jūlijs

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| Paziņojums Nr. | Saturs | Lappuse |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Informācija |
| | EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI |
| | Eiropas Komisija |
| 2012/C 204/01 | Koncentrācijas paziņojuma atsaukšana (Lieta COMP/M.6564 – ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Paziņojums Nr.

Saturs

Lappuse

II   Informācija

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Eiropas Komisija

2012/C 204/01

Koncentrācijas paziņojuma atsaukšana (Lieta COMP/M.6564 – ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV) (
  1
  )

ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV

1

1

| | IV   Paziņojumi |
| --- | --- |
| | EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI |
| | Eiropas Komisija |
| 2012/C 204/02 | Euro maiņas kurss | 2 |
| 2012/C 204/03 | Komisijas Īstenošanas lēmums (2012. gada 11. jūlijs) par finansējumu 2012. gada darba programmai par IT rīkiem pārtikas nekaitīguma, dzīvnieku veselības, dzīvnieku labturības un augu veselības jomā | 3 |
| | INFORMĀCIJA ATTIECĪBĀ UZ EIROPAS EKONOMIKAS ZONU |
| | EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde |
| 2012/C 204/04 | Uzaicinājums iesniegt piezīmes saskaņā ar Nolīguma starp EBTA valstīm par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu par valsts atbalstu saistībā ar iespējamo atbalstu uzņēmumiem AS Oslo Sporveier un AS Sporveisbussene Norvēģijā | 15 |

IV   Paziņojumi

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Eiropas Komisija

2012/C 204/02

Euro maiņas kurss

2

2012/C 204/03

Komisijas Īstenošanas lēmums (2012. gada 11. jūlijs) par finansējumu 2012. gada darba programmai par IT rīkiem pārtikas nekaitīguma, dzīvnieku veselības, dzīvnieku labturības un augu veselības jomā

3

INFORMĀCIJA ATTIECĪBĀ UZ EIROPAS EKONOMIKAS ZONU

EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde

2012/C 204/04

Uzaicinājums iesniegt piezīmes saskaņā ar Nolīguma starp EBTA valstīm par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu par valsts atbalstu saistībā ar iespējamo atbalstu uzņēmumiem AS Oslo Sporveier un AS Sporveisbussene Norvēģijā

AS Oslo Sporveier

AS Sporveisbussene

15

| | V   Atzinumi |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS |
| | Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 204/05 | Paziņojums par atklātiem konkursiem | 41 |
| | PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU |
| | Eiropas Komisija |
| 2012/C 204/06 | Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.6647 – Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)) – Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru (
  1
  ) | 42 |
| 2012/C 204/07 | Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.6651 – Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings) – Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru (
  1
  ) | 43 |
| 2012/C 204/08 | Komisijas paziņojums, kas publicēts saskaņā ar Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 27. panta 4. punktu lietā COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs)
  (izziņots ar dokumenta numuru C(2012) 4873)
   (
  1
  ) | 44 |

V   Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO)

2012/C 204/05

Paziņojums par atklātiem konkursiem

41

PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU

Eiropas Komisija

2012/C 204/06

Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.6647 – Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)) – Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru (
  1
  )

Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore)

1

42

2012/C 204/07

Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju (Lieta COMP/M.6651 – Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings) – Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru (
  1
  )

Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings

1

43

2012/C 204/08

Komisijas paziņojums, kas publicēts saskaņā ar Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 27. panta 4. punktu lietā COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs)
  (izziņots ar dokumenta numuru C(2012) 4873)
   (
  1
  )

Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs)

(izziņots ar dokumenta numuru C(2012) 4873)

1

44

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ |

---

(1)   Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ

1

| LV | |
| --- | --- |

LV

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II Informācija

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Eiropas Komisija

| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/1

---

Koncentrācijas paziņojuma atsaukšana

(Lieta COMP/M.6564 – ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto/JV)

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2012/C 204/01

(Padomes Regula (EK) Nr. 139/2004)

Eiropas Komisija 2012. gada 15. jūnijā saņēma paziņojumu par ierosinātu koncentrāciju starp ARM, Giesecke & Devrient, Gemalto un JV. Pieteikuma iesniedzējs(-i) 2012. gada 3. jūlijā informēja Komisiju par šā paziņojuma atsaukšanu.

---

IV Paziņojumi

EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS IESTĀŽU UN STRUKTŪRU SNIEGTI PAZIŅOJUMI

Eiropas Komisija

| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/2

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Euro maiņas kurss (1)

2012. gada 11. jūlijs

2012/C 204/02

1 euro =

| | Valūta | Maiņas kurss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ASV dolārs | 1,2260 |
| JPY | Japānas jena | 97,14 |
| DKK | Dānijas krona | 7,4363 |
| GBP | Lielbritānijas mārciņa | 0,78815 |
| SEK | Zviedrijas krona | 8,5384 |
| CHF | Šveices franks | 1,2010 |
| ISK | Islandes krona | |
| NOK | Norvēģijas krona | 7,4745 |
| BGN | Bulgārijas leva | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Čehijas krona | 25,395 |
| HUF | Ungārijas forints | 288,75 |
| LTL | Lietuvas lits | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvijas lats | 0,6962 |
| PLN | Polijas zlots | 4,1697 |
| RON | Rumānijas leja | 4,5255 |
| TRY | Turcijas lira | 2,2191 |
| AUD | Austrālijas dolārs | 1,1953 |
| CAD | Kanādas dolārs | 1,2493 |
| HKD | Hongkongas dolārs | 9,5070 |
| NZD | Jaunzēlandes dolārs | 1,5369 |
| SGD | Singapūras dolārs | 1,5499 |
| KRW | Dienvidkorejas vona | 1 398,56 |
| ZAR | Dienvidāfrikas rands | 10,0655 |
| CNY | Ķīnas juaņa renminbi | 7,7828 |
| HRK | Horvātijas kuna | 7,4858 |
| IDR | Indonēzijas rūpija | 11 558,92 |
| MYR | Malaizijas ringits | 3,8944 |
| PHP | Filipīnu peso | 51,288 |
| RUB | Krievijas rublis | 40,2341 |
| THB | Taizemes bāts | 38,864 |
| BRL | Brazīlijas reāls | 2,4899 |
| MXN | Meksikas peso | 16,3330 |
| INR | Indijas rūpija | 68,2000 |

Valūta

Maiņas kurss

USD

ASV dolārs

1,2260

JPY

Japānas jena

97,14

DKK

Dānijas krona

7,4363

GBP

Lielbritānijas mārciņa

0,78815

SEK

Zviedrijas krona

8,5384

CHF

Šveices franks

1,2010

ISK

Islandes krona

NOK

Norvēģijas krona

7,4745

BGN

Bulgārijas leva

1,9558

CZK

Čehijas krona

25,395

HUF

Ungārijas forints

288,75

LTL

Lietuvas lits

3,4528

LVL

Latvijas lats

0,6962

PLN

Polijas zlots

4,1697

RON

Rumānijas leja

4,5255

TRY

Turcijas lira

2,2191

AUD

Austrālijas dolārs

1,1953

CAD

Kanādas dolārs

1,2493

HKD

Hongkongas dolārs

9,5070

NZD

Jaunzēlandes dolārs

1,5369

SGD

Singapūras dolārs

1,5499

KRW

Dienvidkorejas vona

1 398,56

ZAR

Dienvidāfrikas rands

10,0655

CNY

Ķīnas juaņa renminbi

7,7828

HRK

Horvātijas kuna

7,4858

IDR

Indonēzijas rūpija

11 558,92

MYR

Malaizijas ringits

3,8944

PHP

Filipīnu peso

51,288

RUB

Krievijas rublis

40,2341

THB

Taizemes bāts

38,864

BRL

Brazīlijas reāls

2,4899

MXN

Meksikas peso

16,3330

INR

Indijas rūpija

68,2000

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(1)  Datu avots: atsauces maiņas kursu publicējusi ECB.

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| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/3

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KOMISIJAS ĪSTENOŠANAS LĒMUMS

(2012. gada 11. jūlijs)

par finansējumu 2012. gada darba programmai par IT rīkiem pārtikas nekaitīguma, dzīvnieku veselības, dzīvnieku labturības un augu veselības jomā

2012/C 204/03

EIROPAS KOMISIJA,

ņemot vērā Līgumu par Eiropas Savienības darbību,

ņemot vērā Padomes 2002. gada 25. jūnija Regulu (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 par Finanšu regulu, ko piemēro Eiropas Kopienu vispārējam budžetam (1) (turpmāk “Finanšu regula”), un jo īpaši tās 75. pantu,

ņemot vērā Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2004. gada 29. aprīļa Regulu (EK) Nr. 882/2004 par oficiālo kontroli, ko veic, lai nodrošinātu atbilstības pārbaudi saistībā ar dzīvnieku barības un pārtikas aprites tiesību aktiem un dzīvnieku veselības un dzīvnieku labturības noteikumiem (2), un jo īpaši tās 66. panta 1. punkta c) apakšpunktu un 66. panta 2. punktu,

ņemot vērā Padomes 2009. gada 25. maija Lēmumu 2009/470/EK par izdevumiem veterinārijas jomā (3) un jo īpaši tā 35. panta 2. punktu un 36. panta 2. punktu,

tā kā:

| (1) | Saskaņā ar Finanšu regulas 75. pantu un Īstenošanas kārtības 90. panta 1. punktu pirms izdevumu saistību uzņemšanās no Savienības budžeta jāpieņem finansēšanas lēmums, kurā izklāstītas ar izdevumiem saistītās darbības būtiskās sastāvdaļas un kuru pieņem iestāde vai institūcijas, kam iestāde ir deleģējusi šīs pilnvaras. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Saskaņā ar Finanšu regulas 75. pantu un Īstenošanas kārtības 90. panta 1. punktu pirms izdevumu saistību uzņemšanās no Savienības budžeta jāpieņem finansēšanas lēmums, kurā izklāstītas ar izdevumiem saistītās darbības būtiskās sastāvdaļas un kuru pieņem iestāde vai institūcijas, kam iestāde ir deleģējusi šīs pilnvaras.

| (2) | Komisijas 2002. gada 23. decembra Regulā (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002, ar ko paredz īstenošanas kārtību Padomes Regulai (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 par Finanšu regulu, ko piemēro Eiropas Kopienu vispārējam budžetam (4) (turpmāk “Īstenošanas noteikumi”), noteikts, cik sīki jāapraksta finansēšanas lēmuma kārtība. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Komisijas 2002. gada 23. decembra Regulā (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002, ar ko paredz īstenošanas kārtību Padomes Regulai (EK, Euratom) Nr. 1605/2002 par Finanšu regulu, ko piemēro Eiropas Kopienu vispārējam budžetam (4) (turpmāk “Īstenošanas noteikumi”), noteikts, cik sīki jāapraksta finansēšanas lēmuma kārtība.

| (3) | Saskaņā ar Finanšu regulas 53.d pantu ir iegūti pierādījumi tam, ka starptautiskās organizācijas, kam Komisija, īstenojot kopīgu pārvaldību, uztic Savienības līdzekļu izmantošanu, savās uzskaites, revīzijas, iekšējās kontroles un publiskā iepirkuma procedūrās piemēro standartus, kuri sniedz starptautiski atzītiem standartiem līdzvērtīgas garantijas. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Saskaņā ar Finanšu regulas 53.d pantu ir iegūti pierādījumi tam, ka starptautiskās organizācijas, kam Komisija, īstenojot kopīgu pārvaldību, uztic Savienības līdzekļu izmantošanu, savās uzskaites, revīzijas, iekšējās kontroles un publiskā iepirkuma procedūrās piemēro standartus, kuri sniedz starptautiski atzītiem standartiem līdzvērtīgas garantijas.

| (4) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2002. gada 28. janvāra Regulas (EK) Nr. 178/2002, ar ko paredz pārtikas aprites tiesību aktu vispārīgus principus un prasības, izveido Eiropas Pārtikas nekaitīguma iestādi un paredz procedūras saistībā ar pārtikas nekaitīgumu (5), 50. panta 1. punktā paredzēta ātrās reaģēšanas sistēmas izveide, lai paziņotu par tiešu vai netiešu risku cilvēku veselībai, kas rodas no pārtikas vai dzīvnieku barības, un Komisijas atbildība par tīkla pārvaldību. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2002. gada 28. janvāra Regulas (EK) Nr. 178/2002, ar ko paredz pārtikas aprites tiesību aktu vispārīgus principus un prasības, izveido Eiropas Pārtikas nekaitīguma iestādi un paredz procedūras saistībā ar pārtikas nekaitīgumu (5), 50. panta 1. punktā paredzēta ātrās reaģēšanas sistēmas izveide, lai paziņotu par tiešu vai netiešu risku cilvēku veselībai, kas rodas no pārtikas vai dzīvnieku barības, un Komisijas atbildība par tīkla pārvaldību.

| (5) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2006. gada 20. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1924/2006 par uzturvērtības un veselīguma norādēm uz pārtikas produktiem (6) 20. pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido un uztur produktu uzturvērtības un veselīguma norāžu reģistru. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2006. gada 20. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1924/2006 par uzturvērtības un veselīguma norādēm uz pārtikas produktiem (6) 20. pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido un uztur produktu uzturvērtības un veselīguma norāžu reģistru.

| (6) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2003. gada 22. septembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1829/2003 par ģenētiski modificētu pārtiku un barību (7) 28. pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido un uztur publiski pieejamu ģenētiski modificētās pārtikas un barības reģistru. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2003. gada 22. septembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1829/2003 par ģenētiski modificētu pārtiku un barību (7) 28. pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido un uztur publiski pieejamu ģenētiski modificētās pārtikas un barības reģistru.

| (7) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 16. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1334/2008 par aromatizētājiem un dažām pārtikas sastāvdaļām ar aromatizētāju īpašībām izmantošanai pārtikā un uz tās un par grozījumiem Padomes Regulā (EEK) Nr. 1601/91, Regulās (EK) Nr. 2232/96 un (EK) Nr. 110/2008 un Direktīvā 2000/13/EK (8) 25. pantā paredzēts, ka Savienība izveido aromatizējošu vielu sarakstu. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 16. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1334/2008 par aromatizētājiem un dažām pārtikas sastāvdaļām ar aromatizētāju īpašībām izmantošanai pārtikā un uz tās un par grozījumiem Padomes Regulā (EEK) Nr. 1601/91, Regulās (EK) Nr. 2232/96 un (EK) Nr. 110/2008 un Direktīvā 2000/13/EK (8) 25. pantā paredzēts, ka Savienība izveido aromatizējošu vielu sarakstu.

| (8) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2001. gada 12. marta Direktīvas 2001/18/EK par ģenētiski modificētu organismu apzinātu izplatīšanu vidē un Padomes Direktīvas 90/220/EEK atcelšanu (9) 31. panta 2. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido vienu vai vairākus reģistrus, lai reģistrētu informāciju par ģenētiskām modifikācijām ĢMO, ko var izmantot konkrētu ĢMO noteikšanai un identifikācijai, lai atvieglotu pārdoto ĢMO produktu kontroli un inspekciju. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2001. gada 12. marta Direktīvas 2001/18/EK par ģenētiski modificētu organismu apzinātu izplatīšanu vidē un Padomes Direktīvas 90/220/EEK atcelšanu (9) 31. panta 2. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija izveido vienu vai vairākus reģistrus, lai reģistrētu informāciju par ģenētiskām modifikācijām ĢMO, ko var izmantot konkrētu ĢMO noteikšanai un identifikācijai, lai atvieglotu pārdoto ĢMO produktu kontroli un inspekciju.

| (9) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 1997. gada 27. janvāra Regulas (EEK) Nr. 258/97, kas attiecas uz jauniem pārtikas produktiem un jaunām pārtikas produktu sastāvdaļām (10), 4. līdz 8. pantā paredzēts starp ES dalībvalstīm un Eiropas Komisiju izveidot tīklu, ar kura palīdzību varētu īstenot datu ātru apmaiņu, nodrošinot konfidenciālas informācijas drošu apstrādi, un arī veikt šāda tīkla uzturēšanu. |
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(9)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 1997. gada 27. janvāra Regulas (EEK) Nr. 258/97, kas attiecas uz jauniem pārtikas produktiem un jaunām pārtikas produktu sastāvdaļām (10), 4. līdz 8. pantā paredzēts starp ES dalībvalstīm un Eiropas Komisiju izveidot tīklu, ar kura palīdzību varētu īstenot datu ātru apmaiņu, nodrošinot konfidenciālas informācijas drošu apstrādi, un arī veikt šāda tīkla uzturēšanu.

| (10) | Padomes 2000. gada 8. maija Direktīvas 2000/29/EK par aizsardzības pasākumiem pret tādu organismu ievešanu, kas kaitīgi augiem vai augu produktiem, un pret to izplatību Kopienā (11) 2. panta 1. punkta i) apakšpunktā un 21. panta 6. punktā paredzēts izveidot tīklu, lai paziņotu par kaitīgu organismu parādīšanos un sniegtu ieteikumus par to, kā sastādīt vadlīnijas ekspertiem un valstu inspektoriem importa fitosanitāro inspekciju veikšanai, kā arī paredzētas programmas, kuru mērķis ir uzlabot valstu inspektoru zināšanas. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Padomes 2000. gada 8. maija Direktīvas 2000/29/EK par aizsardzības pasākumiem pret tādu organismu ievešanu, kas kaitīgi augiem vai augu produktiem, un pret to izplatību Kopienā (11) 2. panta 1. punkta i) apakšpunktā un 21. panta 6. punktā paredzēts izveidot tīklu, lai paziņotu par kaitīgu organismu parādīšanos un sniegtu ieteikumus par to, kā sastādīt vadlīnijas ekspertiem un valstu inspektoriem importa fitosanitāro inspekciju veikšanai, kā arī paredzētas programmas, kuru mērķis ir uzlabot valstu inspektoru zināšanas.

| (11) | Padomes 1969. gada 8. decembra Direktīvas 69/464/EEK par kartupeļu vēža kontroli (12) 10. pantā, Padomes 1993. gada 4. oktobra Direktīvas 93/85/EEK par kartupeļu gaišās gredzenpuves kontroli (13) 1. panta a) apakšpunktā un 2. pantā, Padomes 1998. gada 20. jūlija Direktīvas 98/57/EK par Ralstonia Solanacearum (Smith) Yabuuchi et al. apkarošanu (14) 1. panta a) apakšpunktā un 2. pantā un Padomes 2007. gada 11. jūnija Direktīvas 2007/33/EK par kartupeļu cistu nematožu kontroli un ar ko atceļ Direktīvu 69/465/EEK (15), 1., 4. un 8. pantā paredzētas prasības attiecīgi attiecībā uz kartupeļu vēža, kartupeļu gaišās gredzenpuves, kartupeļu tumšās gredzenpuves un kartupeļu cistu nematožu kontroli, kuras visas ir ļoti nopietnas kartupeļu kultūras slimības. Šajos tiesību aktos jo īpaši paredzētas stingras prasības par regulāru apsekojumu veikšanu, lai kontrolētu iepriekš minēto kaitīgo organismu klātbūtni, kā arī pienākums ziņot Komisijai par šādu apsekojumu rezultātiem. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Padomes 1969. gada 8. decembra Direktīvas 69/464/EEK par kartupeļu vēža kontroli (12) 10. pantā, Padomes 1993. gada 4. oktobra Direktīvas 93/85/EEK par kartupeļu gaišās gredzenpuves kontroli (13) 1. panta a) apakšpunktā un 2. pantā, Padomes 1998. gada 20. jūlija Direktīvas 98/57/EK par Ralstonia Solanacearum (Smith) Yabuuchi et al. apkarošanu (14) 1. panta a) apakšpunktā un 2. pantā un Padomes 2007. gada 11. jūnija Direktīvas 2007/33/EK par kartupeļu cistu nematožu kontroli un ar ko atceļ Direktīvu 69/465/EEK (15), 1., 4. un 8. pantā paredzētas prasības attiecīgi attiecībā uz kartupeļu vēža, kartupeļu gaišās gredzenpuves, kartupeļu tumšās gredzenpuves un kartupeļu cistu nematožu kontroli, kuras visas ir ļoti nopietnas kartupeļu kultūras slimības. Šajos tiesību aktos jo īpaši paredzētas stingras prasības par regulāru apsekojumu veikšanu, lai kontrolētu iepriekš minēto kaitīgo organismu klātbūtni, kā arī pienākums ziņot Komisijai par šādu apsekojumu rezultātiem.

| (12) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2009. gada 21. oktobra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1107/2009 par augu aizsardzības līdzekļu laišanu tirgū, ar ko atceļ Padomes Direktīvas 79/117/EEK un 91/414/EEK (16), 76. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunktā paredzēts finansēt tādas datu bāzes izstrādi, kurā vāc un glabā visu ar augu aizsardzības līdzekļiem saistīto informāciju. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2009. gada 21. oktobra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1107/2009 par augu aizsardzības līdzekļu laišanu tirgū, ar ko atceļ Padomes Direktīvas 79/117/EEK un 91/414/EEK (16), 76. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunktā paredzēts finansēt tādas datu bāzes izstrādi, kurā vāc un glabā visu ar augu aizsardzības līdzekļiem saistīto informāciju.

| (13) | Padomes 1968. gada 9. aprīļa Direktīvas 68/193/EEK par vīnogulāju veģetatīvās pavairošanas materiāla tirdzniecību (17) 5.e pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija publicē tādu šķirņu kopējo katalogu, uz kurām attiecas minētā direktīva. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Padomes 1968. gada 9. aprīļa Direktīvas 68/193/EEK par vīnogulāju veģetatīvās pavairošanas materiāla tirdzniecību (17) 5.e pantā paredzēts, ka Komisija publicē tādu šķirņu kopējo katalogu, uz kurām attiecas minētā direktīva.

| (14) | Padomes 2008. gada 29. septembra Direktīvas 2008/90/EK par tirdzniecību ar augļaugu pavairošanas materiālu un augļaugiem, kas paredzēti augļu ražošanai (18), 7. panta 6. punktā paredzēts, ka var pieņemt lēmumu veidot un publicēt kopējo šķirņu sarakstu. |
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(14)

Padomes 2008. gada 29. septembra Direktīvas 2008/90/EK par tirdzniecību ar augļaugu pavairošanas materiālu un augļaugiem, kas paredzēti augļu ražošanai (18), 7. panta 6. punktā paredzēts, ka var pieņemt lēmumu veidot un publicēt kopējo šķirņu sarakstu.

| (15) | Padomes 1999. gada 22. decembra Direktīvas 1999/105/EK par meža reproduktīvā materiāla tirdzniecību 11. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija var publicēt sarakstu ar nosaukumu “Kopienas Apstiprinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai”. |
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(15)

Padomes 1999. gada 22. decembra Direktīvas 1999/105/EK par meža reproduktīvā materiāla tirdzniecību 11. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija var publicēt sarakstu ar nosaukumu “Kopienas Apstiprinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai”.

| (16) | Padomes 2002. gada 13. jūnija Direktīvas 2002/53/EEK par lauksaimniecības augu sugu šķirņu kopējo katalogu (19) 17. panta 1. punktā un 2002. gada 13. jūnija Direktīvas 2002/55/EK par dārzeņu sēklu tirdzniecību (20) 17. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija publicē kopējo lauksaimniecības augu sugu un attiecīgi dārzeņu sugu šķirņu katalogu. |
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(16)

Padomes 2002. gada 13. jūnija Direktīvas 2002/53/EEK par lauksaimniecības augu sugu šķirņu kopējo katalogu (19) 17. panta 1. punktā un 2002. gada 13. jūnija Direktīvas 2002/55/EK par dārzeņu sēklu tirdzniecību (20) 17. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Komisija publicē kopējo lauksaimniecības augu sugu un attiecīgi dārzeņu sugu šķirņu katalogu.

| (17) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2005. gada 23. februāra Regulas (EK) Nr. 396/2005, ar ko paredz maksimāli pieļaujamos pesticīdu atlieku līmeņus augu un dzīvnieku izcelsmes pārtikā un barībā un ar ko groza Padomes Direktīvu 91/414/EEK (21), 36. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunktā paredzēts izveidot konsolidētu datubāzi Savienības tiesību aktiem par maksimāli pieļaujamajiem pesticīdu atlieku līmeņiem, darot šādu informāciju publiski pieejamu. |
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(17)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2005. gada 23. februāra Regulas (EK) Nr. 396/2005, ar ko paredz maksimāli pieļaujamos pesticīdu atlieku līmeņus augu un dzīvnieku izcelsmes pārtikā un barībā un ar ko groza Padomes Direktīvu 91/414/EEK (21), 36. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunktā paredzēts izveidot konsolidētu datubāzi Savienības tiesību aktiem par maksimāli pieļaujamajiem pesticīdu atlieku līmeņiem, darot šādu informāciju publiski pieejamu.

| (18) | Padomes 1996. gada 29. aprīļa Direktīvas 96/23/EK, ar ko paredz pasākumus, lai kontrolētu noteiktas vielas un to atliekas dzīvos dzīvniekos un dzīvnieku izcelsmes produktos, un ar ko atceļ Direktīvu 85/358/EEK un Direktīvu 86/469/EEK, kā arī Lēmumu 89/187/EEK un Lēmumu 91/664/EEK (22), 8. pantā paredzēta uzraudzības plānu datubāzes izveide. |
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(18)

Padomes 1996. gada 29. aprīļa Direktīvas 96/23/EK, ar ko paredz pasākumus, lai kontrolētu noteiktas vielas un to atliekas dzīvos dzīvniekos un dzīvnieku izcelsmes produktos, un ar ko atceļ Direktīvu 85/358/EEK un Direktīvu 86/469/EEK, kā arī Lēmumu 89/187/EEK un Lēmumu 91/664/EEK (22), 8. pantā paredzēta uzraudzības plānu datubāzes izveide.

| (19) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2001. gada 22. maija Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001, ar ko paredz noteikumus dažu transmisīvo sūkļveida encefalopātiju profilaksei, kontrolei un apkarošanai (23), 6. panta 4. punktā paredzēts izveidot datubāzi saistībā ar govju sūkļveida encefalopātiju epidemioloģisko uzraudzību. |
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(19)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2001. gada 22. maija Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001, ar ko paredz noteikumus dažu transmisīvo sūkļveida encefalopātiju profilaksei, kontrolei un apkarošanai (23), 6. panta 4. punktā paredzēts izveidot datubāzi saistībā ar govju sūkļveida encefalopātiju epidemioloģisko uzraudzību.

| (20) | Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 16. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1333/2008 par pārtikas piedevām (24) 10. pantā noteikts, ka jāizveido un jāuztur datubāzes saistībā ar vienotu atļauju piešķiršanas procedūru pārtikas piedevām. |
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(20)

Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes 2008. gada 16. decembra Regulas (EK) Nr. 1333/2008 par pārtikas piedevām (24) 10. pantā noteikts, ka jāizveido un jāuztur datubāzes saistībā ar vienotu atļauju piešķiršanas procedūru pārtikas piedevām.

| (21) | Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Savienības finansiālo atbalstu var piešķirt dzīvnieku identifikācijas un slimību reģistrācijas sistēmu ieviešanai. Savienības finansiālais ieguldījums būtu jāpiešķir, lai pārvaldītu un uzlabotu dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēmu (ADNS), kuras pamatā ir Komisijas 2005. gada 1. marta Lēmums 2005/176/EK par kodificētas veidlapas un kodu noteikšanu dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanai saskaņā ar Padomes Direktīvu 82/894/EEK (25). |
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(21)

Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 1. punktā paredzēts, ka Savienības finansiālo atbalstu var piešķirt dzīvnieku identifikācijas un slimību reģistrācijas sistēmu ieviešanai. Savienības finansiālais ieguldījums būtu jāpiešķir, lai pārvaldītu un uzlabotu dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēmu (ADNS), kuras pamatā ir Komisijas 2005. gada 1. marta Lēmums 2005/176/EK par kodificētas veidlapas un kodu noteikšanu dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanai saskaņā ar Padomes Direktīvu 82/894/EEK (25).

| (22) | Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 36. pantā paredzēts, ka Savienības finansiālo ieguldījumu var piešķirt atsevišķām datorizētām sistēmām, ko izmanto saistībā ar tirdzniecību un importu Savienības robežās. |
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(22)

Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 36. pantā paredzēts, ka Savienības finansiālo ieguldījumu var piešķirt atsevišķām datorizētām sistēmām, ko izmanto saistībā ar tirdzniecību un importu Savienības robežās.

| (23) | Ir jāturpina finansiālie ieguldījumi ar Komisijas 2002. gada 30. decembra Lēmumu 2003/24/EK par integrētas datorizētas veterinārās sistēmas izstrādi (26) ieviestās integrētās datorizētās veterinārās sistēmas TRACES (tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma) mitināšanā, pārvaldībā un apkopē. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Ir jāturpina finansiālie ieguldījumi ar Komisijas 2002. gada 30. decembra Lēmumu 2003/24/EK par integrētas datorizētas veterinārās sistēmas izstrādi (26) ieviestās integrētās datorizētās veterinārās sistēmas TRACES (tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma) mitināšanā, pārvaldībā un apkopē.

| (24) | Saskaņā ar Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pantu dalībvalstīm jāievieš pieteikšanās kārtība izskaušanas/kontroles programmām, ziņojumiem un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumiem saistībā ar apstiprinātajām programmām; tiešsaistes sistēmas izstrāde pieteikumu, ziņojumu un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumu iesniegšanai paātrinātu informācijas apstrādi. |
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(24)

Saskaņā ar Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pantu dalībvalstīm jāievieš pieteikšanās kārtība izskaušanas/kontroles programmām, ziņojumiem un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumiem saistībā ar apstiprinātajām programmām; tiešsaistes sistēmas izstrāde pieteikumu, ziņojumu un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumu iesniegšanai paātrinātu informācijas apstrādi.

| (25) | Lai nodrošinātu to koordināciju un efektīvu Veselības un patērētāju ģenerāldirektorāta IT plāna īstenošanu, ar šo lēmumu būtu jāapstiprina minēto darbību darba programma 2012. gadam kopā ar vajadzīgo finansējumu. |
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(25)

Lai nodrošinātu to koordināciju un efektīvu Veselības un patērētāju ģenerāldirektorāta IT plāna īstenošanu, ar šo lēmumu būtu jāapstiprina minēto darbību darba programma 2012. gadam kopā ar vajadzīgo finansējumu.

| (26) | Šis lēmums ir finansēšanas lēmums arī attiecībā uz netieši centralizētas vai kopējas pārvaldības izdevumiem, kas jāsedz no ES budžeta. |
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(26)

Šis lēmums ir finansēšanas lēmums arī attiecībā uz netieši centralizētas vai kopējas pārvaldības izdevumiem, kas jāsedz no ES budžeta.

| (27) | Pamatojoties uz Finanšu regulas 83. pantu un īstenošanas kārtības 106. panta 5. punktu, šajā finansēšanas lēmumā var ietvert arī procentu maksu par novēlotu maksājumu. |
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(27)

Pamatojoties uz Finanšu regulas 83. pantu un īstenošanas kārtības 106. panta 5. punktu, šajā finansēšanas lēmumā var ietvert arī procentu maksu par novēlotu maksājumu.

| (28) | Šajā lēmumā paredzētie pasākumi ir saskaņā ar Pārtikas aprites un dzīvnieku veselības pastāvīgās komitejas atzinumu, |
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(28)

Šajā lēmumā paredzētie pasākumi ir saskaņā ar Pārtikas aprites un dzīvnieku veselības pastāvīgās komitejas atzinumu,

IR NOLĒMUSI ŠĀDI.

1. pants

Ar šo pieņem darba programmu 2012. gadam attiecībā uz darbībām, kas saistītas ar IT rīku pārtikas nekaitīguma, dzīvnieku veselības, dzīvnieku labturības un augu veselības jomā izstrādi un uzturēšanu (turpmāk “darba programma”), kā izklāstīts pielikumā. Tās pieņemšana ir finansēšanas lēmums Finanšu regulas 75. panta nozīmē.

2. pants

Ar šo lēmumu atļautais maksimālais ieguldījums darba programmas īstenošanā ir EUR 6 856 000, un to finansēs no šādām 2012. gada Eiropas Savienības vispārējā budžeta pozīcijām:

| a) | budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 02 01 – EUR 4 989 000; |
| --- | --- |

a)

budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 02 01 – EUR 4 989 000;

| b) | budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 04 01 – EUR 1 180 000; |
| --- | --- |

b)

budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 04 01 – EUR 1 180 000;

| c) | budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 07 01 – EUR 687 000. |
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c)

budžeta pozīcija Nr. 17 04 07 01 – EUR 687 000.

Šīs apropriācijas var segt arī procentu maksu par novēlotu maksājumu.

3. pants

Budžeta īstenošanu saistībā ar uzdevumiem, kas minēti pielikuma 2. punktā, var uzticēt Pasaules Dzīvnieku veselības organizācijai (OIE), kura attiecībā uz uzskaites, revīzijas, iekšējās kontroles un publiskā iepirkuma procedūrām piemēro standartus, kas sniedz starptautiski atzītiem standartiem līdzvērtīgas garantijas.

4. pants

Tādas kopējās izmaiņas piešķīrumos konkrētam darba programmā paredzētām darbībām, kas nepārsniedz 10 % no šā lēmuma 2. pantā noteiktā maksimālā ieguldījuma, nav uzskatāmas par būtiskām Regulas (EK, Euratom) Nr. 2342/2002 90. panta 4. punkta nozīmē, ja tās ievērojami neietekmē darba programmas būtību un mērķi.

Kredītrīkotājs var pieņemt minētās izmaiņas saskaņā ar pareizas finanšu vadības un proporcionalitātes principu.

Briselē, 2012. gada 11. jūlijā

Komisijas vārdā –

Komisijas loceklis

John DALLI

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(1)  OV L 248, 16.9.2002., 1. lpp.

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16

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17

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18

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24

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25

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26

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PIELIKUMS

Darba programma 2012. gadam par informācijas tehnoloģijas rīkiem pārtikas nekaitīguma, dzīvnieku veselības, dzīvnieku labturības un augu veselības jomā

1.   IEVADS

Šajā darba programmā ir iekļauti īstenošanas pasākumi 2012. gadam. Pamatojoties uz mērķiem, budžeta sadale un galvenās darbības ir šādas:

| — | vienai dotācijai (EUR 455 000) un publiskajiem iepirkumiem (īsteno tiešas centralizētas vadības kārtībā) EUR 6 401 000. |
| --- | --- |

—

vienai dotācijai (EUR 455 000) un publiskajiem iepirkumiem (īsteno tiešas centralizētas vadības kārtībā) EUR 6 401 000.

2.   DARBĪBA, KO ĪSTENO KOPĒJAS PĀRVALDĪBAS KĀRTĪBĀ, PAMATOJOTIES UZ VIENOŠANOS AR OIE

IEGULDĪJUMS DZĪVNIEKU SLIMĪBU INFORMĀCIJAS SISTĒMAS IZSTRĀDĒ UN ĪSTENOŠANĀ (ADIS)

Juridiskais pamats

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01

Aprēķinātā summa

No EUR 380 000 līdz 455 000

Par ieguldījumu jānoslēdz rakstiska vienošanās ar OIE.

Īstenošanas struktūra

Pasaules Dzīvnieku veselības organizācija (OIE) ir starpvaldību organizācija, kas atbild par dzīvnieku veselības uzlabošanu visā pasaulē. Lai uzlabotu dzīvnieku veselības stāvokli visā pasaulē un tādējādi samazinātu dzīvnieku slimību risku Eiropas Savienībā, ir svarīgi, lai visas OIE dalībvalstis būtu informētas par ES pieeju dzīvnieku veselībai un labturībai un lai ES aktīvi atbalstītu OIE rīkotās konferences un mācību seminārus, tādējādi vienlaikus informējot par dzīvnieku veselības un labturības politiku Savienībā.

2010. gada 7. jūnijā Komisija un OIE parakstīja ilgtermiņa pamatlīgumu, ar ko noteica savstarpējās sadarbības administratīvo un finansiālo kārtību (līgums pievienots) un ar ko “Līgums par Eiropas Savienības ieguldījumu sadarbībai ar starptautisku organizāciju” (“standarta ieguldījumu līgums” jeb “SIL”) attiecas uz globālajām, reģionālajām vai valsts programmām un darbībām, kuru administrēšanu veic OIE un kuras finansē vai līdzfinansē Eiropas Savienība.

Agrāk jau ir veikts detalizēts un pilnīgs OIE novērtējums, izmantojot tā saucamo “četru pīlāru novērtējumu”, kurā konstatēja, ka OIE uzskaites, revīzijas, kontroles un publiskā iepirkuma procedūras atbilst standartiem, kas sniedz starptautiski atzītiem standartiem līdzvērtīgas garantijas.

Vispārējais mērķis un darbības mērķis

Pēc tam, kad 2012. gadā būs pabeigts un validēts šobrīd īstenotais ADIS izmēģinājuma posms, tiks izstrādāta pirmā ADIS versija lietošanai apstākļos, kas līdzinās reālajiem apstākļiem.

3.   IEPIRKUMI

3.1.   IT projekti, ar kuriem atbalsta ātrās brīdināšanas sistēmas pārtikas un barības jomā (RASFF) darbību, kā arī pārtikas piedevu, materiālu, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku, ĢMO, jaunu pārtikas produktu, aromatizētāju, uzturvērtības un veselīguma norāžu reģistra darbību

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības mērķis ir vispārējās ātrās reaģēšanas sistēmas (GRAS) IT lietojumprogrammas, kas izvietota 2011. gadā, īstenošanas pabeigšana un tās uzturēšana, lai to varētu lietot ātrās reaģēšanas sistēmas pārtikas un barības jomā, kura arī izvietota 2011. gadā, jaunākajai versijai. Izvietojot vairākas trauksmes sistēmas uz vienas IT platformas, kuru pārvalda Komisija, tiek atvieglota informācijas apmaiņa starp šīm sistēmām un uzlabota to vadāmība no IT viedokļa.

Lai gūtu pārskatu par neatļautām vielām un atbalstītu RASFF, ir jāuztur atļauto vielu (piedevas, materiāli, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku, jauni pārtikas produkti, ģenētiski modificēti pārtikas produkti un barība, aromatizētāji u. c.) reģistri.

Paredzētās darbības:

| — | ieguldījums RASFF apkopē un izstrādē – EUR 200 000, |
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ieguldījums RASFF apkopē un izstrādē – EUR 200 000,

| — | papildu izstrādes darbības, ar kurām uzlabo RASFF lietojumprogrammas sniegumu, ieskaitot specifikācijas attiecībā uz sasaisti ar ārējām sistēmām – EUR 308 000, |
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papildu izstrādes darbības, ar kurām uzlabo RASFF lietojumprogrammas sniegumu, ieskaitot specifikācijas attiecībā uz sasaisti ar ārējām sistēmām – EUR 308 000,

| — | atļauto materiālu, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku (vielas lietošanai aktīvos un viedos materiālos; pārstrādes procesi), jaunu pārtikas produktu, ģenētiski modificētu pārtikas produktu un barības, ĢMO, pārtikas piedevu, aromatizētāju reģistrs – EUR 200 000, |
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atļauto materiālu, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku (vielas lietošanai aktīvos un viedos materiālos; pārstrādes procesi), jaunu pārtikas produktu, ģenētiski modificētu pārtikas produktu un barības, ĢMO, pārtikas piedevu, aromatizētāju reģistrs – EUR 200 000,

| — | jauni pārtikas produkti: reģistra jaunas versijas izstrāde (izmantojot esošo programmatūru) – EUR 100 000, |
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jauni pārtikas produkti: reģistra jaunas versijas izstrāde (izmantojot esošo programmatūru) – EUR 100 000,

| — | Savienības uzturvērtību un veselīguma norāžu reģistra izveide – EUR 82 000, |
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Savienības uzturvērtību un veselīguma norāžu reģistra izveide – EUR 82 000,

| — | ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, uzlabošanai – EUR 390 000. |
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ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, uzlabošanai – EUR 390 000.

Juridiskais pamats

Regulas (EK) Nr. 178/2002 50. panta 1. punkts

Regulas (EK) Nr. 1829/2003 19. panta 1. punkts

Regulas (EK) Nr. 1924/2006 28. pants

Regulas (EK) Nr. 1334/2008 25. pants

Direktīvas 2001/18/EK 31. pants

Regulas (EK) Nr. 258/97 4. līdz 8. pants

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01, summa – EUR 1 280 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 13.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

Tieša pārvaldība

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.2.   IT projekti, ar ko atbalsta pasākumu īstenošanu augu veselības jomā – EUROPHYT

EUROPHYT ir tīmekļa lietojumprogramma, kurā dalībvalstis ziņo par aizturētiem sūtījumiem, kas neatbilst augu veselības prasībām. Europhyt veltītas sanāksmes laikā, kurā piedalījās visu dalībvalstu pārstāvji, tika pieņemts plāns par saskarnes atjaunošanu. EUROPHYT sistēma izmanto centrālos resursus un GRAS lietojumprogrammas resursus, kas ir jānodrošina un jāuztur. Datubāze par importa prasībām augu veselības jomā šobrīd vēl ir izstrādes stadijā, un tā tiks pabeigta līdz gada beigām.

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības ir šādas:

| — | Kopienas saraksta ar meža reproduktīvā materiālā ieguves avotiem izstrāde – EUR 100 000, |
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Kopienas saraksta ar meža reproduktīvā materiālā ieguves avotiem izstrāde – EUR 100 000,

| — | datubāzes par importa prasībām augu veselības jomā izstrāde un mitināšana – EUR 100 000, |
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datubāzes par importa prasībām augu veselības jomā izstrāde un mitināšana – EUR 100 000,

| — | pieteikumu par augu aizsardzības līdzekļu atļaušanu reģistrēšana – EUR 100 000, |
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pieteikumu par augu aizsardzības līdzekļu atļaušanu reģistrēšana – EUR 100 000,

| — | visu augu sūtījumu reģistrācijas izstrāde – EUR 200 000, |
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visu augu sūtījumu reģistrācijas izstrāde – EUR 200 000,

| — | datu vākšana, lai kontrolētu Kopienas sarakstā iekļautos apstiprinātos meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotus – EUR 25 000, |
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datu vākšana, lai kontrolētu Kopienas sarakstā iekļautos apstiprinātos meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotus – EUR 25 000,

| — | esošās EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas uzturēšana – EUR 100 000, |
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esošās EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas uzturēšana – EUR 100 000,

| — | izstrādes darbības, ar ko uzlabo EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas lietotāju saskarni – EUR 150 000, |
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izstrādes darbības, ar ko uzlabo EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas lietotāju saskarni – EUR 150 000,

| — | EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas mitināšana – EUR 50 000, |
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EUROPHYT lietojumprogrammas mitināšana – EUR 50 000,

| — | datu vākšana saistībā ar kaitīgu organismu klātbūtnes kontroli un ziņojumiem par šādu organismu klātbūtni, pamatojoties uz Padomes Direktīvu 2000/29/EK un Direktīvām 93/85/EEK, 98/57/EK, 2007/33/EK, – EUR 60 000, |
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datu vākšana saistībā ar kaitīgu organismu klātbūtnes kontroli un ziņojumiem par šādu organismu klātbūtni, pamatojoties uz Padomes Direktīvu 2000/29/EK un Direktīvām 93/85/EEK, 98/57/EK, 2007/33/EK, – EUR 60 000,

| — | ieguldījums IT centrālajā atbalsta komandā, centrālajā mitināšanā, centrālajā IT aprīkojumā – EUR 60 000, |
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ieguldījums IT centrālajā atbalsta komandā, centrālajā mitināšanā, centrālajā IT aprīkojumā – EUR 60 000,

| — | ieguldījums centrālajā vietnes veidotāju komandā un drošībā – EUR 65 000. |
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ieguldījums centrālajā vietnes veidotāju komandā un drošībā – EUR 65 000.

Juridiskais pamats

Direktīvas 2000/29/EK 2. panta 1. punkta i) apakšpunkts un 21. panta 6. punkts

Direktīvas 69/464/EEK 10. pants

Direktīvas 93/85/EEK 1. panta a) punkts un 2. pants

Direktīvas 98/57/EK 1. panta a) punkts un 2. pants

Direktīvas 2007/33/EK 1., 4. un 8. pants

Regulas (EK) Nr. 882/2004 66. panta 1. punkta c) apakšpunkts un 66. panta 2. punkts

Regulas (EK) Nr. 1107/2009 76. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 04 01, summa – EUR 1 010 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 10.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.3.   IT projekts, ar kuru atbalsta kopējos lauksaimniecības augu, dārzeņu, vīnogulāju un augļaugu katalogus un sarakstu “kopienas apstirpinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai”

Lietojumprogramma “Kopējais katalogs” aptver tādu lauksaimniecības augu sugu šķirņu (Direktīva 2002/53/EK) un dārzeņu sugu šķirņu (Direktīva 2002/55/EK) kopējos katalogus, uz kuru sēklu tirdzniecību Eiropas Savienībā, kā arī Norvēģijā un Islandē neattiecas nekādi ierobežojumi.

Tāpat lietojumprogramma ir paredzēta vīnogulāju šķirņu katalogam (Direktīva 68/193/EEK), sarakstam “Kopienas Apstiprinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai” (Direktīva 1999/105/EK) un augļaugu šķirņu kopējam sarakstam (Direktīva 2008/90/EK).

Datubāze Komisijai nodrošina iespēju pārvaldīt minētos katalogus, tāpat tā nodrošina dalībvalstu piekļuvi un elektronisku datu apmaiņu starp dalībvalstīm, Komisiju un Publikāciju biroju.

2012. gadā tiks nodrošināta sistēmas apkope un atjauninātas tehnoloģiskās funkcijas, lai pielāgotu sistēmu jaunākajām iespējām elektronisko publikāciju jomā.

Juridiskais pamats

Direktīvas 68/193/EEK 5. panta e) punkts

Direktīvas 2008/90/EK 7. panta 6. punkts

Direktīvas 1999/105/EK 11. panta 1. punkts

Direktīvas 2002/53/EK 17. panta 1. punkts

Direktīvas 2002/55/EK 17. panta 1. punkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 04 01, summa – EUR 50 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 1.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgums jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II ietvaros.

3.4.   Pesticīdu atlieku datubāze

Regulā (EK) Nr. 396/2005 paredzēts, ka tiek izveidota konsolidēta datu bāze Savienības tiesību aktiem par maksimāli pieļaujamajiem pesticīdu atlieku līmeņiem (MAL). Šīs darbības mērķis ir izpildīt iepriekš minēto noteikumu, uzturot un uzlabojot datubāzi, ar kuras palīdzību dalībvalstis varēs ievadīt datus un tos automātiski elektroniski publicēt, izveidojot eksportēšanas formātu Publikāciju birojam.

Juridiskais pamats

Regulas (EK) Nr. 396/2005 36. panta 1. punkta a) apakšpunkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 04 01, summa – EUR 120 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 1.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgums jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.5.   It projekti, ar kuriem atbalsta Regulas (EK) Nr. 882/2004, padomes Direktīvas 96/23/EK, Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001, Regulas (EK) Nr. 1333/2008 īstenošanu

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības ietver IT rīku un instrumentu izstrādi un apkopi ar mērķi nodrošināt tādu jaunu prasību veiksmīgu īstenošanu, ko dalībvalstis un Komisija piemēro oficiālām pārbaudēm barības un pārtikas aprites tiesību nozarē, un/vai izpildīt specifiskas tiesību aktos paredzētas vajadzības vai pienākumus attiecībā uz pārtikas produktu un barības pārbaudēm.

Minētās darbības attiecas uz tādu datubāžu turpmāku uzlabošanu un kapacitātes palielināšanu, kurās paredzēts apkopot datus par nacionālajiem kontroles plāniem un oficiālo pārbaužu rezultātiem, tā lai Komisija var pārbaudīt to atbilstību un uzraudzīt attīstību laikā, kā arī uz tādu tiešsaistes sistēmu izstrādi, kas paredzētas ar nacionālajiem kontroles plāniem un oficiālo pārbaužu rezultātiem saistītu datu vākšanai, kurus sniedz dalībvalstis un/vai Komisija.

Minētās darbības ietver:

| — | datubāžu īstenošanu, darbināšanu un uzturēšanu (datubāzes saistībā ar govju sūkļveida encefalopātiju epidemioloģisko kontroli (Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001 6. panta 4. punkts), vienotu atļauju piešķiršanas procedūru pārtikas piedevām (Regula (EK) Nr. 1333/2008), atlieku kontroles plāniem (Direktīvas 96/23/EK 8. pants) un kvantitatīvajiem rezultātiem, proti, ziņojumiem par šādu kontroli) – EUR 150 000, |
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datubāžu īstenošanu, darbināšanu un uzturēšanu (datubāzes saistībā ar govju sūkļveida encefalopātiju epidemioloģisko kontroli (Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001 6. panta 4. punkts), vienotu atļauju piešķiršanas procedūru pārtikas piedevām (Regula (EK) Nr. 1333/2008), atlieku kontroles plāniem (Direktīvas 96/23/EK 8. pants) un kvantitatīvajiem rezultātiem, proti, ziņojumiem par šādu kontroli) – EUR 150 000,

| — | IT sistēmas turpmāku izstrādi un apkopi, kā arī piemērotas infrastruktūras izveidi, kas nodrošinās iespēju validēt, kontrolēt un apmainīties ar datiem, ko savākusi Komisija un kas saistīti ar barības un pārtikas aprites tiesību aktu izpildi dalībvalstīs un trešās valstīs, ieskaitot Pārtikas un veterinārā biroja savākto informāciju. Minētajam IT rīkam būtu jānodrošina iespēja izveidot “valstu profilus”, kā rezultātā tiktu veicināta kompetento iestāžu iesniegto kontroles plānu novērtēšana – EUR 122 000, |
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IT sistēmas turpmāku izstrādi un apkopi, kā arī piemērotas infrastruktūras izveidi, kas nodrošinās iespēju validēt, kontrolēt un apmainīties ar datiem, ko savākusi Komisija un kas saistīti ar barības un pārtikas aprites tiesību aktu izpildi dalībvalstīs un trešās valstīs, ieskaitot Pārtikas un veterinārā biroja savākto informāciju. Minētajam IT rīkam būtu jānodrošina iespēja izveidot “valstu profilus”, kā rezultātā tiktu veicināta kompetento iestāžu iesniegto kontroles plānu novērtēšana – EUR 122 000,

| — | tādas pilnīgas un drošas sistēmas īstenošanu un apkopi, kas paredzēta Savienības inspekciju pārvaldībai un plānošanai saskaņā ar Regulu (EK) Nr. 882/2004, revīzijas ziņojumu un citu saistīto dokumentu, kā arī ieteikumu, kuri sniegti, pamatojoties uz revīzijas rezultātiem, pārvaldībai un uzglabāšanai – EUR 220 000, |
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tādas pilnīgas un drošas sistēmas īstenošanu un apkopi, kas paredzēta Savienības inspekciju pārvaldībai un plānošanai saskaņā ar Regulu (EK) Nr. 882/2004, revīzijas ziņojumu un citu saistīto dokumentu, kā arī ieteikumu, kuri sniegti, pamatojoties uz revīzijas rezultātiem, pārvaldībai un uzglabāšanai – EUR 220 000,

| — | ieguldījumu IT sistēmu drošības uzlabošanā, centrālās atbalsta komandas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai nodrošinātu visu ar iepriekš minētajām darbībām saistīto sistēmu īstenošanu, uzlabošanā – EUR 195 000. |
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ieguldījumu IT sistēmu drošības uzlabošanā, centrālās atbalsta komandas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai nodrošinātu visu ar iepriekš minētajām darbībām saistīto sistēmu īstenošanu, uzlabošanā – EUR 195 000.

Juridiskais pamats

Direktīvas 96/23 8. pants

Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001 6. panta 4. punkts

Regulas (EK) Nr. 1333/2008 10. pants

Regulas (EK) Nr. 882/2004 66. panta 1. punkta c) apakšpunkts un 66. panta 2. punkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 07 01, summa – EUR 687 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II, ITSS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 7.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājumu iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un ITSS II un SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.6.   Dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēma (ADNS)

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības mērķis ir dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēmas īstenošanas pabeigšana un tās apkope.

Paredzētās darbības:

| — | ieguldījums ADNS apkopē – EUR 150 000, |
| --- | --- |

—

ieguldījums ADNS apkopē – EUR 150 000,

| — | papildu izstrādes darbības, ar ko uzlabo tādu karšu sniegumu un datu kvalitāti, kurās norādītas slimību uzliesmojumu vietas, kuras ir pārlūkojamas un kuras ir zīmētas tiešsaistē, – EUR 100 000, |
| --- | --- |

—

papildu izstrādes darbības, ar ko uzlabo tādu karšu sniegumu un datu kvalitāti, kurās norādītas slimību uzliesmojumu vietas, kuras ir pārlūkojamas un kuras ir zīmētas tiešsaistē, – EUR 100 000,

| — | mitināšanas pakalpojumi lietojumprogrammas pieejamības nodrošināšanai – EUR 78 000, |
| --- | --- |

—

mitināšanas pakalpojumi lietojumprogrammas pieejamības nodrošināšanai – EUR 78 000,

| — | ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, uzlabošanā – EUR 255 000. |
| --- | --- |

—

ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, uzlabošanā – EUR 255 000.

Juridiskais pamats

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. un 36. pants

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01, summa – EUR 583 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 4.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.7.   Dzīvnieku slimību informācijas sistēma (ADIS)

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības mērķis ir izstrādāt saskarni un īstenot dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēmu.

Paredzētā darbība:

| — | ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, atbalstam – EUR 75 000. |
| --- | --- |

—

ieguldījums IT sistēmu drošības, centrālās atbalsta komandas, centrālās mitināšanas un centrālā IT aprīkojuma, kas vajadzīgs, lai darbinātu un pārvaldītu publiski pieejamas lietojumprogrammas, atbalstam – EUR 75 000.

Juridiskais pamats

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. un 36. pants

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01, summa – EUR 75 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 1.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķs līgums, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.8.   Tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma (TRACES)

No šā budžeta finansējamās darbības mērķis ir uzlabot, veikt apkopi un atbalstīt TRACES sistēmu un nodrošināt tās pieejamību.

Paredzētās darbības:

| — | EUR 2 380 000 integrētās datorizētās veterinārās sistēmas TRACES (tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma) mitināšanai, pārvaldībai un apkopei, loģistikas atbalstam TRACES lietotājiem, ieguldījumam centrālajos pakalpojumos, komunikācijā, vietnē, drošībā un programmatūru licenču iepirkšanai (uzturēšanai un atbalstam), elektroniskajam parakstam, lietojumprogrammas mitināšanai, |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 2 380 000 integrētās datorizētās veterinārās sistēmas TRACES (tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma) mitināšanai, pārvaldībai un apkopei, loģistikas atbalstam TRACES lietotājiem, ieguldījumam centrālajos pakalpojumos, komunikācijā, vietnē, drošībā un programmatūru licenču iepirkšanai (uzturēšanai un atbalstam), elektroniskajam parakstam, lietojumprogrammas mitināšanai,

| — | EUR 80 000 liellopu identifikācijas datu apmaiņas sistēmas atbalstam. |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 80 000 liellopu identifikācijas datu apmaiņas sistēmas atbalstam.

Juridiskais pamats

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 36. panta 2. punkts

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01, summa – EUR 2 460 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 15.

Viena vienošanās ar DIGIT ĢD par mitināšanu.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgumi jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

3.9.   Datu vākšana priekš izskaušanas un kontroles programmām

Paredzētās darbības:

| — | EUR 136 000 tādu datu vākšanai un apstrādei, kas saistīti ar izskaušanas/kontroles programmu pieteikumiem un ar ziņojumiem un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumiem attiecībā uz apstiprinātajām programmām saskaņā ar Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pantu. |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 136 000 tādu datu vākšanai un apstrādei, kas saistīti ar izskaušanas/kontroles programmu pieteikumiem un ar ziņojumiem un izdevumu atlīdzināšanas pieprasījumiem attiecībā uz apstiprinātajām programmām saskaņā ar Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pantu.

Juridiskais pamats

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pants

Budžeta pozīcija

17 04 02 01, summa – EUR 136 000

Paredzamais līgumu skaits un to veidi

Intra muros noteikta termiņa un līdzekļu līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai pamatlīguma SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

Paredzamais atsevišķu līgumu skaits – 2.

Paredzamo līgumu priekšmets (ja iespējams)

Informācijas tehnoloģijas sistēmu izstrāde un apkope, ieskaitot projekta vadību, kvalitātes kontroli, saimnieciskās darbības analīzi, programmēšanu un dokumentēšanu.

Paredzamais līgumu parakstīšanas periods

Līgums jāparaksta līdz 2012. gada pirmā semestra beigām.

Īstenošana

ĢD tieši

Atsevišķs līgums

Atsevišķi līgumi, pamatojoties uz DIGIT ĢD pamatlīgumiem uzaicinājuma iesniegt piedāvājumus ESP-DESIS II un/vai SANCO/2010/A4/001 ietvaros.

4.   KOPSAVILKUMS

| Nr. | Nosaukums | Budžeta pozīcija | Prognozētais līgumu skaits | Juridiskais pamats | Summa (EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | Ieguldījums dzīvnieku slimību informācijas sistēmas izstrādē un īstenošanā (ADIS) | 17 04 02 01 | 1 | Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts | 455 000 |
| 2. | IT projekts, ar ko atbalsta ātro reaģēšanas sistēmu pārtikas un barības jomā (RASFF), pārtikas piedevu, aromatizētāju, materiālu, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku, ĢMO un jaunu pārtikas produktu reģistru | 17 04 02 01 | 13 | Regula (EK) Nr. 178/2002, (EK) Nr. 1924/2006 un (EK) Nr. 1829/2003, (EK) Nr. 1334/2008, Direktīva 2001/18/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 258/97 | 1 280 000 |
| 3. | IT projekti, ar ko atbalsta pasākumu īstenošanu augu veselības jomā – EUROPHYT | 17 0404 01 | 10 | Direktīva 2000/29/EK, 69/464/EEK, 93/85/EEK, 98/57/EK un 2007/33/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 882/2004, (EK) Nr. 1107/2009 | 1 010 000 |
| 4. | IT projekts, ar kuru atbalsta kopējos lauksaimniecības augu, dārzeņu, vīnogulāju šķirņu katalogus, augļaugu kopējo sarakstu un sarakstu “kopienas apstiprinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai” | 17 04 04 01 | 1 | Direktīva 68/193/EEK, 2008/90/EK, 1999/105/EK, 2002/53/EK un 2002/55/EK | 50 000 |
| 5. | Pesticīdu atlieku datubāze | 17 04 04 01 | 1 | Regula (EK) Nr. 396/2005 | 120 000 |
| 6. | IT projekti, ar kuriem atbalsta Regulas (EK) Nr. 882/2004, Padomes Direktīvas 96/23/EK, Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001, Regulas 1333/2008/EK īstenošanu | 17 04 07 01 | 7 | Regula (EK) Nr. 882/2004, Padomes Direktīva 96/23/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 999/2001, Regula (EK) Nr. 1333/2008 | 687 000 |
| 7. | Dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēma (ADNS) | 17 04 02 01 | 4 | Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts | 583 000 |
| 8. | ADIS | 17 04 02 01 | 1 | Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts | 75 000 |
| 9. | Tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma (TRACES) | 17 04 02 01 | 15 | Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 36. panta 2. punkts | 2 460 000 |
| 10. | Pētījumi par dzīvnieku veselību | 17 04 02 01 | 2 | Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pants | 136 000 |
| KOPĀ | | 55 | | 6 856 000 |

Nr.

Nosaukums

Budžeta pozīcija

Prognozētais līgumu skaits

Juridiskais pamats

Summa (EUR)

1.

Ieguldījums dzīvnieku slimību informācijas sistēmas izstrādē un īstenošanā (ADIS)

17 04 02 01

1

Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts

455 000

2.

IT projekts, ar ko atbalsta ātro reaģēšanas sistēmu pārtikas un barības jomā (RASFF), pārtikas piedevu, aromatizētāju, materiālu, kas nonāk saskarē ar pārtiku, ĢMO un jaunu pārtikas produktu reģistru

17 04 02 01

13

Regula (EK) Nr. 178/2002, (EK) Nr. 1924/2006 un (EK) Nr. 1829/2003, (EK) Nr. 1334/2008, Direktīva 2001/18/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 258/97

1 280 000

3.

IT projekti, ar ko atbalsta pasākumu īstenošanu augu veselības jomā – EUROPHYT

17 0404 01

10

Direktīva 2000/29/EK, 69/464/EEK, 93/85/EEK, 98/57/EK un 2007/33/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 882/2004, (EK) Nr. 1107/2009

1 010 000

4.

IT projekts, ar kuru atbalsta kopējos lauksaimniecības augu, dārzeņu, vīnogulāju šķirņu katalogus, augļaugu kopējo sarakstu un sarakstu “kopienas apstiprinātā meža reproduktīvā materiāla ieguves avotu saraksts meža reproduktīvā materiāla ražošanai”

17 04 04 01

1

Direktīva 68/193/EEK, 2008/90/EK, 1999/105/EK, 2002/53/EK un 2002/55/EK

50 000

5.

Pesticīdu atlieku datubāze

17 04 04 01

1

Regula (EK) Nr. 396/2005

120 000

6.

IT projekti, ar kuriem atbalsta Regulas (EK) Nr. 882/2004, Padomes Direktīvas 96/23/EK, Regulas (EK) Nr. 999/2001, Regulas 1333/2008/EK īstenošanu

17 04 07 01

7

Regula (EK) Nr. 882/2004, Padomes Direktīva 96/23/EK, Regula (EK) Nr. 999/2001, Regula (EK) Nr. 1333/2008

687 000

7.

Dzīvnieku slimību izziņošanas sistēma (ADNS)

17 04 02 01

4

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts

583 000

8.

ADIS

17 04 02 01

1

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 35. panta 2. punkts

75 000

9.

Tirdzniecības kontroles un ekspertu sistēma (TRACES)

17 04 02 01

15

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 36. panta 2. punkts

2 460 000

10.

Pētījumi par dzīvnieku veselību

17 04 02 01

2

Padomes Lēmuma 2009/470/EK 27. pants

136 000

KOPĀ

55

6 856 000

---

INFORMĀCIJA ATTIECĪBĀ UZ EIROPAS EKONOMIKAS ZONU

EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde

| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/15

---

Uzaicinājums iesniegt piezīmes saskaņā ar Nolīguma starp EBTA valstīm par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu par valsts atbalstu saistībā ar iespējamo atbalstu uzņēmumiem AS Oslo Sporveier un AS Sporveisbussene Norvēģijā

2012/C 204/04

Ar 2012. gada 28. marta Lēmumu Nr. 123/12/COL, kas autentiskajā valodā pievienots šim kopsavilkumam, EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde uzsāka procedūru saskaņā ar Nolīguma starp EBTA valstīm par Uzraudzības iestādes un Tiesas izveidi 3. protokola I daļas 1. panta 2. punktu. Norvēģijas iestādes tika informētas, nosūtot tām lēmuma kopiju.

Ar šo EBTA Uzraudzības iestāde aicina EBTA valstis, ES dalībvalstis un ieinteresētās personas viena mēneša laikā no šā paziņojuma publicēšanas dienas iesniegt savas piezīmes par minēto pasākumu, nosūtot tās uz adresi:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIË/BELGIQUE |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIË/BELGIQUE

Piezīmes paziņos Norvēģijas iestādēm. Ieinteresētās personas, kura iesniedz piezīmes, identitāti var neizpaust, ja tiek iesniegts rakstisks lūgums, kurā izklāstīti šāda lūguma iemesli.

KOPSAVILKUMS

Vispārīga informācija

Norvēģijā vietējo autobusa sektoru regulē 2002. gada Komerciālā transporta likums (KTL) un 2003. gada Komerciālā transporta noteikumi (KTN). Gan KTL, gan KTN atcēla iepriekšējos tiesību aktus, kas satura ziņā bija līdzīgi. Šis tiesiskais regulējums cita starpā paredz koncesiju sistēmu, lai uzņēmumiem varētu uzticēt veikt sabiedrisko autobusu pakalpojumu sniegšanu, un uzliek par pienākumu apgabaliem, kā piemēram, Oslo pašvaldībai, piešķirt kompensācijas uzņēmumiem, kas darbojas nerentablos maršrutos. Šādu kompensāciju var piešķirt, lai segtu starpību starp ieņēmumiem no biļešu tirdzniecības un pakalpojuma sniegšanas izmaksām.

Jau pirms EEZ līguma stāšanās spēkā koncesionāriem Oslo tika piešķirta ikgadējā kompensācija par nerentabliem maršrutiem saskaņā ar pilsētas budžeta kārtību. Kompensācija tika izmaksāta ar ikgadēju vienreizējo maksājumu, balstoties uz izmaksām, kas radušās iepriekšējos gados, ņemot vērā dažādus korekcijas koeficientus. Kopš 2008. gada līgumi regulāro autobusu pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšanai tika piešķirti, izmantojot atklāta konkursa procedūru, un kopš tā laika AS Oslo Sporveier iepriekšminētā kompensācija par regulāro autobusu pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšanu vairs nav piešķirta.

AS Oslo Sporveier un vēlāk tā meitasuzņēmumam AS Sporveisbussene jau ilgi pirms EEZ līguma stāšanās spēkā un līdz 2008. gadam bija uzticēts Oslo nodrošināt regulāros pārvadājumus autobusos saskaņā ar iepriekš aprakstītajiem noteikumiem.

Kopš 1994. gada AS Oslo Sporveier ir notikušas vairākas reorganizācijas. Piemēram, 1997. gadā visu autobusu pakalpojumu sniegšana Oslo, tai skaitā komerciālo tūrisma autobusu pakalpojumu un regulāro autobusu pārvadājumu pakalpojumu sniegšana uz līguma pamata tika nodota meitasuzņēmumam AS Sporveisbussene. Tā rezultātā AS Oslo Sporveier un AS Sporveisbussene noslēdza tā saucamo Transporta nolīgumu, lai AS Sporveisbussene varētu kļūt par faktisko ikgadējās kompensācijas saņēmēju. Saskaņā ar Transporta nolīgumu kompensācija par regulārajiem autobusu pārvadājumiem tika samaksāta kā to paredz iepriekšminētie noteikumi. Norvēģijas iestādes apgalvo, ka visā izmeklēšanā apskatītajā laika posmā – no 1994. līdz 2008. gadam – Oslo Sporveier group pastāvēja nodalīta grāmatvedība attiecībā uz komerciālo un sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanu un ja komerciālo darbību veikšanai tika izmantoti pakalpojumi, kas sniegti sabiedrisko darbību ietvaros, par tiem vienmēr tika iekasēta tirgus cena.

2004.gadā Oslo pašvaldība - toreiz 98,8 % AS Oslo Sporveier akciju turētāja – iepludināja uzņēmumā kapitālu NOK 111 760 000 apmērā, lai segtu AS Sporveisbussenes darbinieku pensiju fondu nepietiekamo finansējumu. Nepietiekamais finansējums izveidojās laika posmā pirms 1997. gada sakarā ar AS Oslo Sporveier pensiju saistībām attiecībā uz darbiniekiem gan sabiedrisko pakalpojumu, gan tūrisma autobusu nodaļā. AS Oslo Sporveier bija pienākums novērst nepietiekamo finansējumu. Oslo pašvaldība, īpašnieka statusā, izvēlējās kapitāla iepludināšanu kā vislētāko risinājumu.

Pasākuma novērtējums

Valsts atbalsta esība

Uzraudzības iestāde uzskata, ka gan kapitāla iepludināšana, gan ikgadējās kompensācijas maksājumi uzskatāmi par valsts atbalstu.

Uzraudzības iestāde pašlaik nevar izslēgt, ka kapitāla iepludināšana, lai segtu komercdarbības nepietiekami finansētos pensijas kontus, piešķir AS Oslo Sporveier ekonomiskas priekšrocības, tā kā nav iesniegta informācija pierādot, ka tas būtu noticis saskaņā ar tirgus investora principu.

Turklāt, Uzraudzības iestādes provizoriskais viedoklis ir, ka gan ikgadējā kompensācija, gan kapitāla iepludināšana, lai segtu nepietiekami finansētos sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniedzēju pensiju kontus (kas ir saistīti ar izmaksām, kas arī varēja būt par pamatu ikgadējām kompensācijām) netika veikta, izmantojot publiskā iepirkuma procedūru, un nelīdzinās izmaksām, kas būtu radušās labi pārvaldītam un atbilstoši nodrošinātam uzņēmumam. Tādējādi 4. kritērijs Altmark lietā, nav izpildīts, un tāpēc abi pasākumi uzskatāmi par valsts atbalstu EEZ līguma 61. panta 1. punkta nozīmē.

Atbalsta raksturs

Uzraudzības iestāde šajā posmā nevarēja secināt, vai atbalsts ir piešķirts saskaņā ar pastāvošu atbalsta shēmu, kas pamatojas uz KTL un KTN, kā to piemēroja Oslo pirms EEZ līguma stāšanās spēkā. Jāatzīmē, ka kopš 2008. gada atbalsts vairs netika piešķirts saskaņā ar iepriekšminētajiem noteikumiem. Pieņemot, ka pastāvošā atbalsta shēma ir spēkā kopš 1994. gada, Uzraudzības iestāde pašlaik nespēj noteikt precīzas šīs shēmas aprises, un vai viss atbalsts tika piešķirts pamatojoties uz šo shēmu. Turklāt nav iespējams izslēgt, ka atbalsta pasākumi, vismaz zināmā mērā, uzskatāmi par nelikumīgu un nesaderīgu valsts atbalstu, jo īpaši attiecībā uz pensiju saistību segšanu komercdarbībā iesaistītajiem.

Atbalsta saderīgums

Šajā posmā Uzraudzības iestādei šķiet, ka maksājumi, kas veikti līdz brīdim, kad 2008. gadā izbeidzās tieši piešķirtās koncesijas, un 2004. gada kapitāla iepludināšana ar mērķi kompensēt finansējuma nepietiekamību pensiju fondā, varētu, vismaz zināmā mērā, būt saderīgi kā kompensācija par sabiedrisko pakalpojumu sniegšanu, kas paredzēta EEZ līguma 49. pantā. Saderīguma novērtējums galīgajā lēmumā tādējādi būs jo īpaši vērsts uz to, lai noskaidrotu, vai kompensācija ir bijusi pārmērīga. Turklāt, atbalsts, vismaz daļēji, varētu būt saderīgs 61. panta 1. punkta c) apakšpunkta nozīmē.

Secinājums

Ņemot vērā iepriekš minētos apsvērumus, Uzraudzības iestāde nolēma uzsākt formālu izmeklēšanas procedūru saskaņā ar EEZ līguma 1. panta 2. punktu. Ieinteresētās personas tiek aicinātas iesniegt piezīmes viena mēneša laikā no šā paziņojuma publicēšanas dienas Eiropas Savienības Oficiālajā Vēstnesī.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 123/12/COL

of 28 March 2012

opening the formal investigation into potential aid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 49 and 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Article 4(2) and (4) and Articles 6 and 13 of Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (‘the Implementing Provisions Decision’) (1),

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

1.1.   
  Administrative procedure leading to the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL

| (1) | By letter dated 11 August 2006, the Authority received a complaint from Konkurrenten.no AS (‘the complainant’) alleging that the Norwegian authorities had granted State aid to AS Oslo Sporveisbussene (‘the complaint’). The letter was registered by the Authority on 16 August 2006 (Event No 384017). By letter dated 17 August 2006 to the complainant, the Authority acknowledged the receipt of the complaint (Event No 384134). |
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(1)

By letter dated 11 August 2006, the Authority received a complaint from Konkurrenten.no AS (‘the complainant’) alleging that the Norwegian authorities had granted State aid to AS Oslo Sporveisbussene (‘the complaint’). The letter was registered by the Authority on 16 August 2006 (Event No 384017). By letter dated 17 August 2006 to the complainant, the Authority acknowledged the receipt of the complaint (Event No 384134).

| (2) | By letter dated 7 September 2006, the Authority forwarded the complaint to the Norwegian authorities and invited them to comment (Event No 387163). By letter dated 11 October 2006, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. The letter was registered by the Authority on 19 October 2006 (Event No 392725). |
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(2)

By letter dated 7 September 2006, the Authority forwarded the complaint to the Norwegian authorities and invited them to comment (Event No 387163). By letter dated 11 October 2006, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. The letter was registered by the Authority on 19 October 2006 (Event No 392725).

| (3) | By letter dated 20 October 2006, the complainant submitted further comments. The letter was registered by the Authority on 23 October 2006 (Event No 394520). |
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(3)

By letter dated 20 October 2006, the complainant submitted further comments. The letter was registered by the Authority on 23 October 2006 (Event No 394520).

| (4) | By letter dated 29 November 2006, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 394397). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 January 2007. The letter was registered by the Authority on 12 January 2007 (Event No 406541). |
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(4)

By letter dated 29 November 2006, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 394397). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 January 2007. The letter was registered by the Authority on 12 January 2007 (Event No 406541).

| (5) | By letter dated 19 June 2007, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 425271). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 16 August 2007 (Event No 434326).
  By e-mail dated 20 February 2008, the complainant submitted further information (Event No 466226). |
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(5)

By letter dated 19 June 2007, the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 425271). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 16 August 2007 (Event No 434326).

By e-mail dated 20 February 2008, the complainant submitted further information (Event No 466226).

| (6) | By letter submitted electronically on 2 April 2008, the Authority requested yet further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 471926). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 29 April 2008 (Event No 475480). |
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(6)

By letter submitted electronically on 2 April 2008, the Authority requested yet further information from the Norwegian authorities (Event No 471926). The Norwegian authorities replied by letter submitted electronically on 29 April 2008 (Event No 475480).

| (7) | The complainant submitted further information by e-mails dated 25 May 2008 (Event No 478132), 2 June 2008 (Event No 479743), 9 July 2008 (Events No 489623 and 489626), 14 August 2008 (Event No 489591), 15 August 2008 (Event No 488527), 1 September 2008 (Event No 489591), 20 January 2009 (Event No 505210) and 22 January 2009 (Event No 505503). |
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(7)

The complainant submitted further information by e-mails dated 25 May 2008 (Event No 478132), 2 June 2008 (Event No 479743), 9 July 2008 (Events No 489623 and 489626), 14 August 2008 (Event No 489591), 15 August 2008 (Event No 488527), 1 September 2008 (Event No 489591), 20 January 2009 (Event No 505210) and 22 January 2009 (Event No 505503).

| (8) | During the beginning of 2010, the Authority and the Norwegian authorities had informal contact both via telephone and e-mail regarding the case. Information received by the Authority in this context was consolidated in a letter submitted to the Authority electronically on 21 April 2010 by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 554417). |
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(8)

During the beginning of 2010, the Authority and the Norwegian authorities had informal contact both via telephone and e-mail regarding the case. Information received by the Authority in this context was consolidated in a letter submitted to the Authority electronically on 21 April 2010 by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 554417).

| (9) | On 21 June 2010, the Authority adopted Decision No 254/10/COL closing the case on the grounds that the aid involved existing aid that was incompatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. However, as the existing aid measures had been terminated on 30 March 2008, the Authority concluded that no further measures were required. By letters dated 21 June 2010, the Authority forwarded copies of Decision No 254/10/COL to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 558824) and the complainant (Event No 561949). |
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(9)

On 21 June 2010, the Authority adopted Decision No 254/10/COL closing the case on the grounds that the aid involved existing aid that was incompatible with Article 49 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. However, as the existing aid measures had been terminated on 30 March 2008, the Authority concluded that no further measures were required. By letters dated 21 June 2010, the Authority forwarded copies of Decision No 254/10/COL to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 558824) and the complainant (Event No 561949).

1.2.   
  Judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority

| (10) | By application lodged at the Registry of the EFTA Court on 2 September 2010, the complainant brought an action for annulment of the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL. |
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(10)

By application lodged at the Registry of the EFTA Court on 2 September 2010, the complainant brought an action for annulment of the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL.

| (11) | On 22 August 2011, the EFTA Court rendered its judgment in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, annulling Decision No 254/10/COL in its entirety, for the following reasons. |
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(11)

On 22 August 2011, the EFTA Court rendered its judgment in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.no v EFTA Surveillance Authority, annulling Decision No 254/10/COL in its entirety, for the following reasons.

| (12) | Firstly, the Court found that the Decision was inadequately reasoned, in that the Authority had failed to explain how the renewal of the concession, as of 1 January 2000, could be classified as part of an existing aid scheme, or why it could not be considered to be a relevant alteration of that aid scheme (2). |
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(12)

Firstly, the Court found that the Decision was inadequately reasoned, in that the Authority had failed to explain how the renewal of the concession, as of 1 January 2000, could be classified as part of an existing aid scheme, or why it could not be considered to be a relevant alteration of that aid scheme (2).

| (13) | Secondly, the Court held that the Authority had infringed its obligation to open the formal investigation procedure in respect of aid granted during the period 1997-2000. It found that the Authority could not exclude the possibility that AS Oslo Sporveier had received aid over and above the losses associated with discharging the public service obligation, and that the Authority indeed considered that such overcompensation was likely. Given that the Authority was unable, after almost four years of investigation, to establish which parts of the aid were existing aid and which parts were unlawful aid, the Authority should have opened the formal investigation procedure in order to become, as far as possible, fully informed of the facts. The applicant’s plea addressing the same issues with regard to the period 2000-2008 was also declared well founded (3). |
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(13)

Secondly, the Court held that the Authority had infringed its obligation to open the formal investigation procedure in respect of aid granted during the period 1997-2000. It found that the Authority could not exclude the possibility that AS Oslo Sporveier had received aid over and above the losses associated with discharging the public service obligation, and that the Authority indeed considered that such overcompensation was likely. Given that the Authority was unable, after almost four years of investigation, to establish which parts of the aid were existing aid and which parts were unlawful aid, the Authority should have opened the formal investigation procedure in order to become, as far as possible, fully informed of the facts. The applicant’s plea addressing the same issues with regard to the period 2000-2008 was also declared well founded (3).

| (14) | Thirdly, the Court held that the Authority had failed to identify whether the capital injection only concerned unfunded pension liabilities that arose in connection with the discharge of public service obligations, or if it also covered other activities. As the Court could not review the Decision in relation to the applicant’s claim that the capital injection did not correspond to a payment for transport services provided, this amounted to a lack of reasoning (4). |
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(14)

Thirdly, the Court held that the Authority had failed to identify whether the capital injection only concerned unfunded pension liabilities that arose in connection with the discharge of public service obligations, or if it also covered other activities. As the Court could not review the Decision in relation to the applicant’s claim that the capital injection did not correspond to a payment for transport services provided, this amounted to a lack of reasoning (4).

1.3.   
  Re-assessment of the complaint

| (15) | The Authority commenced a reassessment of the complaint, and by e-mail dated 25 October 2011 to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 613053) requested additional information. The Norwegian authorities responded in a telephone conference on 28 October 2011. Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012. By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information. |
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(15)

The Authority commenced a reassessment of the complaint, and by e-mail dated 25 October 2011 to the Norwegian authorities (Event No 613053) requested additional information. The Norwegian authorities responded in a telephone conference on 28 October 2011. Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012. By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information.

| (16) | By letter dated 27 January 2012 (Event No 622888), the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities responded by letter dated 22 February 2012 (Events No 625908, 625916, 625949, 626065 and 626066) and e-mails of 5 March 2012 (Events No 627096 and 627097). |
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(16)

By letter dated 27 January 2012 (Event No 622888), the Authority requested further information from the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities responded by letter dated 22 February 2012 (Events No 625908, 625916, 625949, 626065 and 626066) and e-mails of 5 March 2012 (Events No 627096 and 627097).

2.   The content of the complaint

| (17) | The complaint alleged that the following measures may involve unlawful State aid:






  1. | cross-subsidies between the four companies: AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS (5); |
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(17)

The complaint alleged that the following measures may involve unlawful State aid:

1.

cross-subsidies between the four companies: AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS (5);

| 2. | a capital injection of NOK 41 499 000 made in 2004 by AS Oslo Sporveier into AS Sporveisbussene; |
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2.

a capital injection of NOK 41 499 000 made in 2004 by AS Oslo Sporveier into AS Sporveisbussene;

| 3. | a favourable tax position acquired in a non-competitive market, allowing AS Sporveisbussene to avoid paying tax on profits; and |
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3.

a favourable tax position acquired in a non-competitive market, allowing AS Sporveisbussene to avoid paying tax on profits; and

| 4. | guarantees granted by AS Sporveisbussene to the benefit of its subsidiaries Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS. |
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4.

guarantees granted by AS Sporveisbussene to the benefit of its subsidiaries Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS.

3.   Background: Norwegian legislative framework on local scheduled bus transport

3.1.   
  Commercial Transport Act 2002 and Commercial Transport Regulation 2003

| (18) | At present, the local bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (the ‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (the ‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9). |
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(18)

At present, the local bus transport sector is regulated by the Commercial Transport Act of 2002 (the ‘CTA’) (6) and the Commercial Transport Regulation of 2003 (the ‘CTR’) (7). The CTA repealed and replaced the Transport Act of 1976 (8). The CTR repealed and replaced two regulations (9).

| (19) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the relevant provisions regulating local bus transport, presented in the following, appear not to have been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. |
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(19)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the relevant provisions regulating local bus transport, presented in the following, appear not to have been significantly altered since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994.

3.2.   
  Administrative responsibility of the counties

| (20) | In Norway, the responsibility of providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services. |
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(20)

In Norway, the responsibility of providing local public transport services is conferred on the counties. However, the counties are not under any obligation to offer such services.

| (21) | The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation, or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves. |
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(21)

The counties can either administer local bus transport services through their own organisation, or through an administrative company (10) set up by the county. The CTA provides that when the county sets up an administrative company, the funds intended for the financing of the local bus transport services will be allocated to that company (11). The administrative companies can obtain the bus transport services from a third party, or provide the services themselves.

3.3.   
  Co-financing of local transport services by the State and counties

| (22) | The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants are determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13). |
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(22)

The counties partly finance the local transport services with tax revenue. In addition, under the CTA the counties receive State funding by way of annual block grants (12). The amount of the grants are determined on the basis of the extent to which the counties need contributions from the State. Therefore, the counties have to provide the Ministry of Transport with budgets, accounts and other relevant information necessary to assess the need for contributions (13).

3.4.   
  Concessions

| (23) | Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out remunerated bus transport services (14).
  Both a general and a special concession are needed for operators of scheduled passenger transport services. |
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(23)

Under the CTA, concessions are required to carry out remunerated bus transport services (14).

Both a general and a special concession are needed for operators of scheduled passenger transport services.

3.4.1.   General concession for remunerated passenger transport

| (24) | Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time-limited (17). |
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(24)

Undertakings providing passenger transport services for remuneration must have a general concession (15). In order to obtain a general concession, the applicant must (i) provide a certificate of good conduct, (ii) have satisfactory financial means and abilities, and (iii) have satisfactory professional qualifications (16). General concessions are not time-limited (17).

3.4.2.   Special concessions for scheduled passenger transport

| (25) | In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions; and (ii) route-specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered in so far as other route-specific concessions have not been granted for routes in the area. The holder of a route-specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route. |
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(25)

In addition to the general concession, any undertaking wishing to carry out scheduled passenger transport for remuneration must have a special concession (18). There are two types of special concessions: (i) area concessions; and (ii) route-specific concessions. The area concession is of a residual nature, in that it permits its holder to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire area covered in so far as other route-specific concessions have not been granted for routes in the area. The holder of a route-specific concession is the sole entity entitled to operate scheduled bus transport on that route.

| (26) | The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties. The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (21). |
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(26)

The special concession confers upon the concessionaire both a right and a duty to carry out the transport service as set out in the concession (19). When applying for a special concession, a proposal for a transportation schedule and tariffs must be submitted (20). Schedules and tariffs are subject to the control of the counties. The counties can order changes in the schedules and tariffs (21).

| (27) | The special concessions can either be awarded (i) through tender procedures (granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (22), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (23)), or (ii) directly, without the use of a tender (granted for a 10-year period) (24). |
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(27)

The special concessions can either be awarded (i) through tender procedures (granted for the period determined in the tender procedure (22), which in any event will not be for a longer period than 10 years (23)), or (ii) directly, without the use of a tender (granted for a 10-year period) (24).

3.5.   
  Contracts

| (28) | To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of the public service. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (25). |
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(28)

To complement the concessions, the counties may enter into contracts with the concessionaires about the provision of the public service. The counties are free to determine the form of these contracts (25).

3.6.   
  Remuneration to the concessionaires

| (29) | The counties are responsible for remunerating the concessionaires (26). Compensation is granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). |
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(29)

The counties are responsible for remunerating the concessionaires (26). Compensation is granted to undertakings that operate unprofitable routes (i.e. where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service).

| (30) | According to the Norwegian authorities, under Article 22 of the CTA the county is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes. The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be remunerated; the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the compensation is to be provided. |
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(30)

According to the Norwegian authorities, under Article 22 of the CTA the county is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes. The counties are free to determine the manner in which the concessionaires are to be remunerated; the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the compensation is to be provided.

| (31) | The Authority understands that Article 22 of the CTA is read as allowing for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenue, and that compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA. |
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(31)

The Authority understands that Article 22 of the CTA is read as allowing for compensation to cover the cost of the public service minus the ticket revenue, and that compensation beyond that could not be based on the CTA.

4.   Organisation of the local scheduled bus transport in Oslo

| (32) | As noted above, the responsibility of providing local scheduled public transport services is conferred on the counties. Oslo Municipality is a county as well as a municipality. In the following, it is referred to as Oslo Municipality.
  From before 1994, all public transport administration in Oslo was carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier (27), as Oslo Municipality has delegated to the company the task of planning and administering public transport in Oslo (28). At the same time, AS Oslo Sporveier operated an in-house department (29) carrying out most (30) of the scheduled bus transport in Oslo. This activity was carried out on the basis of an area concession awarded on 16 November 1992, permitting AS Oslo Sporveier to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire Oslo grid in so far as other route-specific concessions had not been granted. |
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(32)

As noted above, the responsibility of providing local scheduled public transport services is conferred on the counties. Oslo Municipality is a county as well as a municipality. In the following, it is referred to as Oslo Municipality.

From before 1994, all public transport administration in Oslo was carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier (27), as Oslo Municipality has delegated to the company the task of planning and administering public transport in Oslo (28). At the same time, AS Oslo Sporveier operated an in-house department (29) carrying out most (30) of the scheduled bus transport in Oslo. This activity was carried out on the basis of an area concession awarded on 16 November 1992, permitting AS Oslo Sporveier to operate scheduled bus transport services in the entire Oslo grid in so far as other route-specific concessions had not been granted.

| (33) | The concession had been granted for a 10-year period, with retroactive effect from 1 January 1990. |
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(33)

The concession had been granted for a 10-year period, with retroactive effect from 1 January 1990.

| (34) | Additionally, from 1994, AS Oslo Sporveier operated small-scale tour bus services outside its public service remit. |
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(34)

Additionally, from 1994, AS Oslo Sporveier operated small-scale tour bus services outside its public service remit.

| (35) | On 23 April 1997, the bus department, including the small tour bus division, was separated from AS Oslo Sporveier and transferred to a newly established company, AS Sporveisbussene. From then on AS Sporveisbussene carried out the scheduled local bus transport in accordance with the concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier. |
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(35)

On 23 April 1997, the bus department, including the small tour bus division, was separated from AS Oslo Sporveier and transferred to a newly established company, AS Sporveisbussene. From then on AS Sporveisbussene carried out the scheduled local bus transport in accordance with the concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (36) | The companies entered into a Transport Agreement, signed on 23 April 1997, and with retroactive force with effect from 1 January 1997 (‘the Transport Agreement’). The Transport Agreement was due to expire at the date of expiry of the existing concession (i.e. 31 December 1999), but it would be prolonged automatically for one year at a time as long as AS Oslo Sporveier’s area concession would be renewed. Under this Transport Agreement, AS Sporveierbussene assumed the public service activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and received remuneration directly from AS Oslo Sporveier for these services. |
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(36)

The companies entered into a Transport Agreement, signed on 23 April 1997, and with retroactive force with effect from 1 January 1997 (‘the Transport Agreement’). The Transport Agreement was due to expire at the date of expiry of the existing concession (i.e. 31 December 1999), but it would be prolonged automatically for one year at a time as long as AS Oslo Sporveier’s area concession would be renewed. Under this Transport Agreement, AS Sporveierbussene assumed the public service activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and received remuneration directly from AS Oslo Sporveier for these services.

| (37) | The area concession was renewed for another 10 years on 20 September 2001, with retroactive effect from 1 January 2000. |
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(37)

The area concession was renewed for another 10 years on 20 September 2001, with retroactive effect from 1 January 2000.

| (38) | In 2001, Oslo Municipality decided that all scheduled bus transport in Oslo should be tendered out. On this basis, scheduled bus transport was gradually put up for public tender in five lots during the period 2003-2008. The respective contracts entered into force the year following that in which they had been tendered out. The last lot was tendered in 2007, and the last contract entered into force on 30 March 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

In 2001, Oslo Municipality decided that all scheduled bus transport in Oslo should be tendered out. On this basis, scheduled bus transport was gradually put up for public tender in five lots during the period 2003-2008. The respective contracts entered into force the year following that in which they had been tendered out. The last lot was tendered in 2007, and the last contract entered into force on 30 March 2008.

| (39) | Due to its residual nature, the scope of the area concession would be reduced in accordance with the gradual tendering of the routes that once had been covered by the area concession. Thus, the area concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier expired on 30 March 2008 (when all scheduled bus transport in Oslo had been tendered out). As the concession lapsed, so did the Transport Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Due to its residual nature, the scope of the area concession would be reduced in accordance with the gradual tendering of the routes that once had been covered by the area concession. Thus, the area concession awarded to AS Oslo Sporveier expired on 30 March 2008 (when all scheduled bus transport in Oslo had been tendered out). As the concession lapsed, so did the Transport Agreement.

| (40) | As set out above, in 1997 AS Sporveisbussene took over the small tour bus division from AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As set out above, in 1997 AS Sporveisbussene took over the small tour bus division from AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (41) | In 2003, AS Sporveisbussene established a subsidiary, Nexus Trafikk AS, in order to participate in tenders for operating scheduled bus transport routes in Oslo. In 2005, AS Sporveisbussene acquired the company Arctic Express AS and its subsidiary Lavprisexpressen.no, engaged in airport express services and regional bus transport. In 2006, the tour bus division was separated from AS Sporveisbussene into a newly established company, Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, owned 100 % by AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In 2003, AS Sporveisbussene established a subsidiary, Nexus Trafikk AS, in order to participate in tenders for operating scheduled bus transport routes in Oslo. In 2005, AS Sporveisbussene acquired the company Arctic Express AS and its subsidiary Lavprisexpressen.no, engaged in airport express services and regional bus transport. In 2006, the tour bus division was separated from AS Sporveisbussene into a newly established company, Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, owned 100 % by AS Sporveisbussene.

| (42) | From 1 July 2006 to 1 January 2007, the administration of the public transport in Oslo was reorganised. A new company was established under the name AS Oslo Sporveier (the ‘new AS Oslo Sporveier’). The former AS Oslo Sporveier changed its name to Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS (‘KTP’). The administrative functions of the former AS Oslo Sporveier were transferred to the new AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

From 1 July 2006 to 1 January 2007, the administration of the public transport in Oslo was reorganised. A new company was established under the name AS Oslo Sporveier (the ‘new AS Oslo Sporveier’). The former AS Oslo Sporveier changed its name to Kollektivtransportproduksjon AS (‘KTP’). The administrative functions of the former AS Oslo Sporveier were transferred to the new AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (43) | KTP retained the operative part of AS Oslo Sporveier and the ownership of AS Sporveisbussene. The latter turned into a parent company with three subsidiaries. The subsidiaries were renamed (from Nexus Trafikk to Unibuss AS; Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS to Unibuss Tur AS; and Arctic Express AS to Unibuss Ekspress AS). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

KTP retained the operative part of AS Oslo Sporveier and the ownership of AS Sporveisbussene. The latter turned into a parent company with three subsidiaries. The subsidiaries were renamed (from Nexus Trafikk to Unibuss AS; Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS to Unibuss Tur AS; and Arctic Express AS to Unibuss Ekspress AS).

5.   Compensation for the public service obligation in Oslo

5.1.   
  Administrative practice

| (44) | As noted above, Oslo Municipality is responsible for compensating operators of public services it wishes to establish or maintain within its region (31). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

As noted above, Oslo Municipality is responsible for compensating operators of public services it wishes to establish or maintain within its region (31).

| (45) | In Oslo, there is a common ticketing system that applies to all operators for bus, tram, underground and ferry. The public service operators are not responsible for the ticketing system. The ticketing system is the responsibility of KTP (formerly AS Oslo Sporveier), and the ticket prices are subject to the control of Oslo Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

In Oslo, there is a common ticketing system that applies to all operators for bus, tram, underground and ferry. The public service operators are not responsible for the ticketing system. The ticketing system is the responsibility of KTP (formerly AS Oslo Sporveier), and the ticket prices are subject to the control of Oslo Municipality.

| (46) | The concessionaire is allowed to keep the ticket income generated by the operation of the scheduled bus transport (32). When the ticket income is not sufficient to cover the cost of the operations, the concessionaire is eligible for public service compensation from Oslo Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The concessionaire is allowed to keep the ticket income generated by the operation of the scheduled bus transport (32). When the ticket income is not sufficient to cover the cost of the operations, the concessionaire is eligible for public service compensation from Oslo Municipality.

| (47) | In the late 1980s, a system of compensation in the form of annual grants of lump sums was introduced. In essence, a lump sum that covered the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service in question and the income from sale of tickets was determined by Oslo Municipality and the concessionaire. This was done as part of the general budget process in Oslo Municipality. According to the Norwegian authorities, the budget process can be outlined as follows:






  January/February | The City Government (Byrådet) decides the budget limits for the next year. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| March | The municipal departments and undertakings are informed of the budget limits and the time limit for submission of budget proposals. |
| March/April | The municipal undertakings deal with the budget of the following year. |
| May | The municipal departments and undertakings submit their budget proposals based on previous years income and costs, activity level, budget limits and assumptions on future cost developments and efficiency gains. |
| June-August | Discussions between the departments/undertakings and the responsible governmental unit are carried out in order to clarify the budget and the activities covered by it. |
| September | The budget proposal is announced by the City Government. |
| October | The different committees of the City Council (Bystyret) deal with the different parts of the budget. |
| October/November | The City Government proposes a revised budget. |
| December | The budget is approved by the City Council. |

(47)

In the late 1980s, a system of compensation in the form of annual grants of lump sums was introduced. In essence, a lump sum that covered the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service in question and the income from sale of tickets was determined by Oslo Municipality and the concessionaire. This was done as part of the general budget process in Oslo Municipality. According to the Norwegian authorities, the budget process can be outlined as follows:

January/February

The City Government (Byrådet) decides the budget limits for the next year.

March

The municipal departments and undertakings are informed of the budget limits and the time limit for submission of budget proposals.

March/April

The municipal undertakings deal with the budget of the following year.

May

The municipal departments and undertakings submit their budget proposals based on previous years income and costs, activity level, budget limits and assumptions on future cost developments and efficiency gains.

June-August

Discussions between the departments/undertakings and the responsible governmental unit are carried out in order to clarify the budget and the activities covered by it.

September

The budget proposal is announced by the City Government.

October

The different committees of the City Council (Bystyret) deal with the different parts of the budget.

October/November

The City Government proposes a revised budget.

December

The budget is approved by the City Council.

| (48) | According to the Norwegian authorities, this has been the administrative practice in Oslo Municipality at least since 1994. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

According to the Norwegian authorities, this has been the administrative practice in Oslo Municipality at least since 1994.

| (49) | With regard to the compensation for the scheduled bus transport, the aim of the process was to determine the amount of compensation necessary to cover the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service and the income from the sale of tickets. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

With regard to the compensation for the scheduled bus transport, the aim of the process was to determine the amount of compensation necessary to cover the difference between the estimated costs of operating the public service and the income from the sale of tickets.

| (50) | Based on the budget proposals (and possible amendments during the budget discussions in the City Council), the compensation was granted by budget decisions within certain presumptions that were specified in each decision, i.e. to achieve certain efficiency gains and maintain the preceding year’s transport services to the public. The decisions also contained certain goals with respect to, inter alia, the volume of produced transportation services and costs per travel. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Based on the budget proposals (and possible amendments during the budget discussions in the City Council), the compensation was granted by budget decisions within certain presumptions that were specified in each decision, i.e. to achieve certain efficiency gains and maintain the preceding year’s transport services to the public. The decisions also contained certain goals with respect to, inter alia, the volume of produced transportation services and costs per travel.

| (51) | The assessment of the amount of compensation was based on the costs incurred in the preceding years, corrected for efficiency gains, the development of the Norwegian consumer price index, salaries, taxes, and laws and regulations that would affect the costs. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The assessment of the amount of compensation was based on the costs incurred in the preceding years, corrected for efficiency gains, the development of the Norwegian consumer price index, salaries, taxes, and laws and regulations that would affect the costs.

| (52) | According to the Norwegian authorities, separate accounts were kept for the public service and commercial activities (i.e. the tour bus service) carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier. According to the Norwegian authorities, the cost of the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier was not taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation for public services. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

According to the Norwegian authorities, separate accounts were kept for the public service and commercial activities (i.e. the tour bus service) carried out by AS Oslo Sporveier. According to the Norwegian authorities, the cost of the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier was not taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation for public services.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, also under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997, which lapsed on 30 March 2008 when all public service contracts had been tendered and the area concession itself lapsed, the calculation of the compensation was carried out on an annual basis in accordance with the principles described above. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, also under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997, which lapsed on 30 March 2008 when all public service contracts had been tendered and the area concession itself lapsed, the calculation of the compensation was carried out on an annual basis in accordance with the principles described above.

| (54) | Thus, the public service compensation was determined in accordance with the same procedure. The amount of public service compensation was determined on the basis of the difference between cost and revenue on the public service and adjusted in accordance with the same correction factors throughout the entire period under assessment, and separate accounts were kept for the public service activities and the non-public service activities. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Thus, the public service compensation was determined in accordance with the same procedure. The amount of public service compensation was determined on the basis of the difference between cost and revenue on the public service and adjusted in accordance with the same correction factors throughout the entire period under assessment, and separate accounts were kept for the public service activities and the non-public service activities.

5.2.   
  Introduction of a quality bonus/malus system

| (55) | According to the Norwegian authorities, a quality bonus/malus system was agreed on by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and introduced before 2004. According to that system, the performance of AS Sporveisbussene was assessed in accordance with the following criteria: (i) total customer satisfaction; (ii) punctuality; (iii) level of safety and comfort; and (iv) the driver being forthcoming. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

According to the Norwegian authorities, a quality bonus/malus system was agreed on by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and introduced before 2004. According to that system, the performance of AS Sporveisbussene was assessed in accordance with the following criteria: (i) total customer satisfaction; (ii) punctuality; (iii) level of safety and comfort; and (iv) the driver being forthcoming.

| (56) | AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004. The Authority is not aware of any other quality bonuses being granted. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004. The Authority is not aware of any other quality bonuses being granted.

5.3.   
  Common cost and intra-group transactions

| (57) | According to the Norwegian authorities, AS Sporveisbussene paid market prices for all services that were provided by AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

According to the Norwegian authorities, AS Sporveisbussene paid market prices for all services that were provided by AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (58) | Likewise, the Norwegian authorities maintain that the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries were always charged market prices for all services provided by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (for example, the tour bus division paid market prices for their use of office space, garage facilities and administration provided by the Oslo Sporveier Group). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Likewise, the Norwegian authorities maintain that the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries were always charged market prices for all services provided by AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (for example, the tour bus division paid market prices for their use of office space, garage facilities and administration provided by the Oslo Sporveier Group).

| (59) | The Norwegian authorities have indicated that from 2004 onwards, [...] (33) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Norwegian authorities have indicated that from 2004 onwards, [...] (33) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads.

| (60) | However, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted further information on the allocation of the common costs, or whether such a particular allocation key was used for this purpose, or whether the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

However, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted further information on the allocation of the common costs, or whether such a particular allocation key was used for this purpose, or whether the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms.

| (61) | Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a ‘general overhead fee’ in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that date. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a ‘general overhead fee’ in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that date.

5.4.   
  Profitability of the public service

| (62) | According to an overview of the annual results of the bus activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the average annual profit of the companies was 0,49 % in the period from 1994 to 2008. This figure, however, includes commercial activities from 2005 onwards. The average annual return for the period between 1994 and 2005, for which the data submitted by the Norwegian authorities relates exclusively to the public service, was 1,98 % (34). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

According to an overview of the annual results of the bus activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the average annual profit of the companies was 0,49 % in the period from 1994 to 2008. This figure, however, includes commercial activities from 2005 onwards. The average annual return for the period between 1994 and 2005, for which the data submitted by the Norwegian authorities relates exclusively to the public service, was 1,98 % (34).

6.   Capital injection of 2 April 2004

6.1.   
  The complaint

| (63) | The complainant states that AS Oslo Sporveier transferred NOK 41 499 000 in new equity to AS Sporveisbussene in 2004, and alleges that this transaction may have involved State aid as no private market investor would inject capital in a loss-making company. The complainant furthermore questions whether capital has been injected in order to fund new activities taking place in a market exposed to competition. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The complainant states that AS Oslo Sporveier transferred NOK 41 499 000 in new equity to AS Sporveisbussene in 2004, and alleges that this transaction may have involved State aid as no private market investor would inject capital in a loss-making company. The complainant furthermore questions whether capital has been injected in order to fund new activities taking place in a market exposed to competition.

| (64) | The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Oslo Municipality injected new capital into Oslo Sporveier Group on 2 April 2004, and that this measure related to a one-time contribution to the pension fund of the Group (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse) (35) to cover an accumulated shortage of funds in the existing pension fund accounts. The amount of this capital injection allocated to AS Sporveisbussene was NOK 111 760 000. The Norwegian authorities have furthermore explained that at the same time as the capital injection took place, AS Sporveisbussene changed accounting principles for estimating future pension obligations with the result that from 2004 onwards such obligations were recognised in their accounts (36). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that Oslo Municipality injected new capital into Oslo Sporveier Group on 2 April 2004, and that this measure related to a one-time contribution to the pension fund of the Group (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse) (35) to cover an accumulated shortage of funds in the existing pension fund accounts. The amount of this capital injection allocated to AS Sporveisbussene was NOK 111 760 000. The Norwegian authorities have furthermore explained that at the same time as the capital injection took place, AS Sporveisbussene changed accounting principles for estimating future pension obligations with the result that from 2004 onwards such obligations were recognised in their accounts (36).

| (65) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority assumes that the complainant, when referring to the transfer of NOK 41 499 000 in his correspondence with the Authority, has compared the 2003 and 2004 accounts of AS Sporveisbussene, and deducted NOK 39 501 000 (total equity in 2003) from NOK 81 000 000 (total equity in 2004) (37). In this Decision, the Authority will assess the actual capital injection of NOK 111 760 000, which is the amount allocated to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene (as opposed to NOK 41 499 000 referred to by the complainant). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority assumes that the complainant, when referring to the transfer of NOK 41 499 000 in his correspondence with the Authority, has compared the 2003 and 2004 accounts of AS Sporveisbussene, and deducted NOK 39 501 000 (total equity in 2003) from NOK 81 000 000 (total equity in 2004) (37). In this Decision, the Authority will assess the actual capital injection of NOK 111 760 000, which is the amount allocated to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene (as opposed to NOK 41 499 000 referred to by the complainant).

| (66) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted explanations regarding the rationale for this capital injection, which relates to the pension liabilities of AS Sporveisbussene. These are summarised in the following. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted explanations regarding the rationale for this capital injection, which relates to the pension liabilities of AS Sporveisbussene. These are summarised in the following.

6.2.   
  Mid-1990s shortfall in AS Oslo Sporveier Group’s pension fund and increased annual compensation

| (67) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Norwegian local authorities — and companies owned or controlled by them — were obliged to provide their employees with an indexed pension equal to 70 % or 66 % of their final salary upon retirement at the age of 67 (38). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the Norwegian local authorities — and companies owned or controlled by them — were obliged to provide their employees with an indexed pension equal to 70 % or 66 % of their final salary upon retirement at the age of 67 (38).

| (68) | By the mid-1990s, it had become clear that the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group was underfunded. The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had a coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995. Municipal pension funds with a coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year (39). Oslo Municipality, as its owner, was therefore legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group (40). Thus, as resolved by Decision of 23 December 1996, AS Oslo Sporveier had to submit a plan on how to make up for the shortfall. Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down. This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

By the mid-1990s, it had become clear that the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group was underfunded. The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had a coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995. Municipal pension funds with a coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year (39). Oslo Municipality, as its owner, was therefore legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group (40). Thus, as resolved by Decision of 23 December 1996, AS Oslo Sporveier had to submit a plan on how to make up for the shortfall. Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down. This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997.

| (69) | In accordance with the payment plan, Oslo Municipality adjusted upwards the annual public service compensation so as to cover the increased pension premiums. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In accordance with the payment plan, Oslo Municipality adjusted upwards the annual public service compensation so as to cover the increased pension premiums.

6.3.   
  Capital injection into Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse

| (70) | According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality decided in 2003 to cover the pension fund shortfall at Oslo Sporveier Group with a one-time payment. As a result, on 2 April 2004, AS Oslo Sporveier injected NOK 802,5 million (41) in Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to cover the current total shortfall (42). The capital injection covered the underfunding of the pension liabilities relating to the employees of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality decided in 2003 to cover the pension fund shortfall at Oslo Sporveier Group with a one-time payment. As a result, on 2 April 2004, AS Oslo Sporveier injected NOK 802,5 million (41) in Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to cover the current total shortfall (42). The capital injection covered the underfunding of the pension liabilities relating to the employees of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

| (71) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that although Oslo Municipality was legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group, it was not required to do so by a one-time payment: it chose to do so as this solution would be more cost-efficient than adhering to the existing amortisation plan. The annual amortised amount to service the underfunding was higher than the finance costs needed to service a bank loan of the same size. Moreover, a one-time payment was estimated to provide savings in the operating budget of approximately NOK 160 million, and reduce the Group’s annual pension costs by NOK 60 million. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that although Oslo Municipality was legally obliged to cover the underfunding of Oslo Sporveier Group, it was not required to do so by a one-time payment: it chose to do so as this solution would be more cost-efficient than adhering to the existing amortisation plan. The annual amortised amount to service the underfunding was higher than the finance costs needed to service a bank loan of the same size. Moreover, a one-time payment was estimated to provide savings in the operating budget of approximately NOK 160 million, and reduce the Group’s annual pension costs by NOK 60 million.

| (72) | Of the NOK 802,5 million, NOK 111 760 000 went to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene. According to the Norwegian authorities, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. In the annual accounts of AS Sporveisbussene for 2004, the pension contribution of NOK 111 760 000 was recorded as an injection of new share capital. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Of the NOK 802,5 million, NOK 111 760 000 went to cover the pension obligations of AS Sporveisbussene. According to the Norwegian authorities, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. In the annual accounts of AS Sporveisbussene for 2004, the pension contribution of NOK 111 760 000 was recorded as an injection of new share capital.

6.4.   
  Underfunding of the pension liabilities for the tour bus employees

| (73) | According to the Norwegian authorities, a part of the capital injection transferred to AS Sporveisbussene covered pension liabilities for employees in the tour bus operation for the period 1994 (when the tour bus operations commenced) until 1 January 1997. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

According to the Norwegian authorities, a part of the capital injection transferred to AS Sporveisbussene covered pension liabilities for employees in the tour bus operation for the period 1994 (when the tour bus operations commenced) until 1 January 1997.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted calculations according to which approximately NOK 430 300 of the total capital injection was related to pension liability underfunding in the tour bus division. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted calculations according to which approximately NOK 430 300 of the total capital injection was related to pension liability underfunding in the tour bus division.

6.5.   
  Change of pension funds to Vital Forsikring ASA

| (75) | The payment of NOK 111 760 000 also enabled AS Sporveisbussene to transfer its pension fund from Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to Vital Forsikring ASA, a life insurance company. The change took effect on 1 June 2004. Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another (43). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The payment of NOK 111 760 000 also enabled AS Sporveisbussene to transfer its pension fund from Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse to Vital Forsikring ASA, a life insurance company. The change took effect on 1 June 2004. Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another (43).

7.   Taxation of the Oslo Sporveier Group

7.1.   
  Allegations of the complainant

| (76) | The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. According to the complainant, favourable tax conditions in the Oslo Sporveier Group could possibly have been used to avoid payment of tax on profits made in a market wholly or partially exposed to competition. The basis for this complaint seems to be that AS Sporveisbussene in the period 2000-2004, while having a profit before tax of approximately NOK 54 796 000, only had a taxable income of NOK 2 027 000. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. According to the complainant, favourable tax conditions in the Oslo Sporveier Group could possibly have been used to avoid payment of tax on profits made in a market wholly or partially exposed to competition. The basis for this complaint seems to be that AS Sporveisbussene in the period 2000-2004, while having a profit before tax of approximately NOK 54 796 000, only had a taxable income of NOK 2 027 000.

| (77) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it seems that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same group (group contributions). AS Sporveisbussene has apparently transferred parts of its profits thus avoiding the payment of income tax on the amount transferred. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it seems that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same group (group contributions). AS Sporveisbussene has apparently transferred parts of its profits thus avoiding the payment of income tax on the amount transferred.

7.2.   
  The relevant provision of the Norwegian Tax Act

| (78) | According to the Norwegian Tax Act (44), every undertaking within a group shall be taxed as a single taxable entity; there is no consolidation of groups of companies for tax purposes. However, under certain conditions, the taxation rules permit income earned by the companies in the group to be distributed within the group by way of so-called ‘group contributions’. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

According to the Norwegian Tax Act (44), every undertaking within a group shall be taxed as a single taxable entity; there is no consolidation of groups of companies for tax purposes. However, under certain conditions, the taxation rules permit income earned by the companies in the group to be distributed within the group by way of so-called ‘group contributions’.

| (79) | Group contributions are allowed (45) when the contributing company and the receiving company are limited liability companies (46) and belong to the same group (47). In addition, the parent company has to own more than 90 % of the subsidiary, and hold an equivalent share of the votes (48). A group contribution may consist of money, working capital or other financial contributions (49). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Group contributions are allowed (45) when the contributing company and the receiving company are limited liability companies (46) and belong to the same group (47). In addition, the parent company has to own more than 90 % of the subsidiary, and hold an equivalent share of the votes (48). A group contribution may consist of money, working capital or other financial contributions (49).

| (80) | The group contributions are deductible for the granting company to the extent that the contribution is covered by the taxable income of the contributor (50). The receiving company, on the other hand, is liable for paying taxes on the group contribution (51). The contribution is considered as an income for the receiving company in the same year as the granting company deducts the contribution in its tax assessment. Provided that the recipient suffers a deficit, the contribution may be set off against any losses, also those incurred in previous years. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

The group contributions are deductible for the granting company to the extent that the contribution is covered by the taxable income of the contributor (50). The receiving company, on the other hand, is liable for paying taxes on the group contribution (51). The contribution is considered as an income for the receiving company in the same year as the granting company deducts the contribution in its tax assessment. Provided that the recipient suffers a deficit, the contribution may be set off against any losses, also those incurred in previous years.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (81) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (82) | The Authority will in the following assess whether the four alleged measures referred to in the complaint constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess (i) whether there are State resources involved, (ii) whether the alleged measures confer an economic advantage on the relevant entities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, and (iii) whether the alleged measures distort competition and have an effect on trade between the contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Authority will in the following assess whether the four alleged measures referred to in the complaint constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. The Authority will assess (i) whether there are State resources involved, (ii) whether the alleged measures confer an economic advantage on the relevant entities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, and (iii) whether the alleged measures distort competition and have an effect on trade between the contracting parties.

2.   Alleged cross-subsidies — compensation for the public service and the 2004 capital injection

2.1.   
  Introduction

| (83) | A preliminary assessment of the complaint concerning the alleged cross-subsidisation and the 2004 capital injection is set out below.
  Concerning the complaint that cross-subsidisation has occurred between the public service activities and the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, the Authority understands the allegation to be that compensation for the provision of the local scheduled transport service has subsidised the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

A preliminary assessment of the complaint concerning the alleged cross-subsidisation and the 2004 capital injection is set out below.

Concerning the complaint that cross-subsidisation has occurred between the public service activities and the commercial activities of AS Oslo Sporveier, AS Sporveisbussene, Arctic Express AS and Sporveisbussenes Turbiler AS, the Authority understands the allegation to be that compensation for the provision of the local scheduled transport service has subsidised the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group.

| (84) | It is evident that cross-subsidisation (in the sense of entailing incompatible State aid) can only occur if the cross-subsidising undertaking receives State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Thus, in respect of this part of the complaint, the Authority must first assess if the financing measures, i.e. (i) the annual payments from Oslo Municipality granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) as compensation for the provision of scheduled bus services, and (ii) the 2004 capital injection, entail State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

It is evident that cross-subsidisation (in the sense of entailing incompatible State aid) can only occur if the cross-subsidising undertaking receives State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Thus, in respect of this part of the complaint, the Authority must first assess if the financing measures, i.e. (i) the annual payments from Oslo Municipality granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) as compensation for the provision of scheduled bus services, and (ii) the 2004 capital injection, entail State aid.

2.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (85) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid must be granted by the State or through State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid must be granted by the State or through State resources.

| (86) | As a preliminary point, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (52). Hence, Oslo Municipality is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

As a preliminary point, both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (52). Hence, Oslo Municipality is equivalent to the State for the purposes of the EEA State aid rules.

| (87) | In the present case it is clear that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, provided funding to AS Oslo Sporveier for carrying out scheduled bus transport until 1997. For the period 1997-2008 it is undisputed that AS Oslo Sporveier passed on the annual compensation to AS Sporveisbussene, according to the terms of the Transport Agreement, which appears in essence to have formalised the previous unwritten administrative practice of calculating the annual compensation (53). |
| --- | --- |

(87)

In the present case it is clear that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, provided funding to AS Oslo Sporveier for carrying out scheduled bus transport until 1997. For the period 1997-2008 it is undisputed that AS Oslo Sporveier passed on the annual compensation to AS Sporveisbussene, according to the terms of the Transport Agreement, which appears in essence to have formalised the previous unwritten administrative practice of calculating the annual compensation (53).

| (88) | As regards the 2004 capital injection into AS Sporveisbussene to cover the underfunding of the pension fund it is undisputed that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, contributed NOK 111 760 000 as capital for AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

As regards the 2004 capital injection into AS Sporveisbussene to cover the underfunding of the pension fund it is undisputed that the State, in the capacity of Oslo Municipality, contributed NOK 111 760 000 as capital for AS Sporveisbussene.

| (89) | The Authority therefore comes to the preliminary conclusion that the 2004 capital injection and the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier, and then to AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo were granted by the State and financed by State resources. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Authority therefore comes to the preliminary conclusion that the 2004 capital injection and the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier, and then to AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo were granted by the State and financed by State resources.

2.3.   
  Economic advantage

2.3.1.   Introduction

| (90) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on an undertaking, for example by relieving it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on an undertaking, for example by relieving it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (91) | The beneficiaries of any potential aid will be AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene. That an undertaking, or undertakings, will benefit from any economic advantage does not therefore raise any doubts. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The beneficiaries of any potential aid will be AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene. That an undertaking, or undertakings, will benefit from any economic advantage does not therefore raise any doubts.

2.3.2.   Compensation for scheduled bus transport in Oslo

| (92) | As mentioned above, the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo constitutes — at least in part — compensation for costs incurred by providing a public service. Such compensation does not entail an economic advantage if the criteria established in the Altmark case-law of the European Court of Justice are met (54). |
| --- | --- |

(92)

As mentioned above, the compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene for carrying out bus transport services in Oslo constitutes — at least in part — compensation for costs incurred by providing a public service. Such compensation does not entail an economic advantage if the criteria established in the Altmark case-law of the European Court of Justice are met (54).

| (93) | Furthermore, as regards the 2004 capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997, and is at this stage of the view that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose. It is also worth noting that whilst certain changes to the capital position of AS Sporveisbussene were recorded in the accounts, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the pension fund and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

Furthermore, as regards the 2004 capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997, and is at this stage of the view that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose. It is also worth noting that whilst certain changes to the capital position of AS Sporveisbussene were recorded in the accounts, the full amount was paid directly from AS Oslo Sporveier to the pension fund and was not transferred as cash to AS Sporveisbussene.

| (94) | However, in order to determine whether the capital injection described above entailed an economic advantage for AS Sporveisbussene, a distinction needs to be drawn between the capital that was injected to remedy the underfunding of the pension accounts of the public service employees (‘public service capital injection’), and the capital that covered the underfunding of the pension accounts of the employees in the commercial arm of AS Sporveisbussene (‘commercial activities capital injection’). As set out above, according to the Norwegian authorities, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the commercial tour bus division. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

However, in order to determine whether the capital injection described above entailed an economic advantage for AS Sporveisbussene, a distinction needs to be drawn between the capital that was injected to remedy the underfunding of the pension accounts of the public service employees (‘public service capital injection’), and the capital that covered the underfunding of the pension accounts of the employees in the commercial arm of AS Sporveisbussene (‘commercial activities capital injection’). As set out above, according to the Norwegian authorities, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the commercial tour bus division.

| (95) | As for the public service capital injection, it does not relate to new costs but to costs accrued in the past which had technically not been reflected in the general accounts of the company. However, these liabilities were already present at the time of the capital injection, which seems to have been necessary to make up for the shortfall in the pensions funds. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

As for the public service capital injection, it does not relate to new costs but to costs accrued in the past which had technically not been reflected in the general accounts of the company. However, these liabilities were already present at the time of the capital injection, which seems to have been necessary to make up for the shortfall in the pensions funds.

| (96) | Therefore, the public service capital injection can be considered to form part of the cost that Oslo Municipality had to bear in exchange for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) providing the public service. Instead of injecting this capital, Oslo Municipality could have paid out a higher annual public service compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Therefore, the public service capital injection can be considered to form part of the cost that Oslo Municipality had to bear in exchange for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene (via AS Oslo Sporveier) providing the public service. Instead of injecting this capital, Oslo Municipality could have paid out a higher annual public service compensation.

| (97) | Thus public service capital injection constituted an integral part of the public service compensation granted to AS Sporveisbussene, as it had been from the mid-1990s until the capital injection was made (and as it would have been if carried out in accordance with the amortisation plan until 2020). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Thus public service capital injection constituted an integral part of the public service compensation granted to AS Sporveisbussene, as it had been from the mid-1990s until the capital injection was made (and as it would have been if carried out in accordance with the amortisation plan until 2020).

| (98) | In the Altmark judgment the European Court of Justice (the ‘Court of Justice’) held that compensation for a public service does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met.






  — | First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(98)

In the Altmark judgment the European Court of Justice (the ‘Court of Justice’) held that compensation for a public service does not constitute State aid when four cumulative criteria are met.

—

First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined.

| — | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. |
| --- | --- |

—

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner.

| — | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

—

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| — | Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (55). |
| --- | --- |

—

Fourth, and finally, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped, would have incurred (55).

| (99) | The Authority will firstly examine the fourth criterion, namely whether the compensation was based on a tender or on the basis of the costs of an efficient and well-run company. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Authority will firstly examine the fourth criterion, namely whether the compensation was based on a tender or on the basis of the costs of an efficient and well-run company.

| (100) | Oslo Municipality paid an annual compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier for scheduled bus transport services, which from 1997 was passed on to AS Sporveisbussene. However, with regards to the routes operated under the area concession, neither AS Oslo Sporveier nor AS Sporveisbussene were selected in a public procurement procedure. Hence, neither the compensation from Oslo Municipality to AS Oslo Sporveier nor the compensation subsequently passed on from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene were based on prices resulting from public tenders. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Oslo Municipality paid an annual compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier for scheduled bus transport services, which from 1997 was passed on to AS Sporveisbussene. However, with regards to the routes operated under the area concession, neither AS Oslo Sporveier nor AS Sporveisbussene were selected in a public procurement procedure. Hence, neither the compensation from Oslo Municipality to AS Oslo Sporveier nor the compensation subsequently passed on from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene were based on prices resulting from public tenders.

| (101) | Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have neither argued that (nor provided the Authority with information enabling a verification of whether) the costs incurred by AS Oslo Sporveier or AS Sporveisbussene correspond to the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. Therefore, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the fourth Altmark criterion is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have neither argued that (nor provided the Authority with information enabling a verification of whether) the costs incurred by AS Oslo Sporveier or AS Sporveisbussene correspond to the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. Therefore, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the fourth Altmark criterion is not met.

| (102) | On the basis of the above, the Authority considers at this stage that the scheduled bus transport services carried out under the area concession in Oslo have, both in the case of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, therefore not been discharged in accordance with the fourth criterion of the Altmark judgment. Consequently, as the Altmark criteria must be satisfied cumulatively for public service compensation not to constitute State aid (56), the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that the annual compensation, including the public service capital injection, confers an economic advantage to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

On the basis of the above, the Authority considers at this stage that the scheduled bus transport services carried out under the area concession in Oslo have, both in the case of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, therefore not been discharged in accordance with the fourth criterion of the Altmark judgment. Consequently, as the Altmark criteria must be satisfied cumulatively for public service compensation not to constitute State aid (56), the Authority’s preliminary conclusion is that the annual compensation, including the public service capital injection, confers an economic advantage to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

2.3.3.   The commercial activities capital injection

| (103) | As set out above, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the tour bus division. As this part of the injected capital does not relate to public service cost, it cannot be assessed on the basis of Altmark. Thus, according to settled case-law, it is necessary for the Authority to establish whether the recipient undertaking, AS Sporveisbussene, received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal conditions (57). In doing so, the Authority has to apply the market economy investor test (58) which in essence provides that State aid is granted whenever a State makes funds available to an undertaking which in the normal course of events would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (59). |
| --- | --- |

(103)

As set out above, approximately NOK 430 300 of the 2004 capital injection appears to have been related to underfunding of pension accounts in the tour bus division. As this part of the injected capital does not relate to public service cost, it cannot be assessed on the basis of Altmark. Thus, according to settled case-law, it is necessary for the Authority to establish whether the recipient undertaking, AS Sporveisbussene, received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal conditions (57). In doing so, the Authority has to apply the market economy investor test (58) which in essence provides that State aid is granted whenever a State makes funds available to an undertaking which in the normal course of events would not be provided by a private investor applying ordinary commercial criteria and disregarding other considerations of a social, political or philanthropic nature (59).

| (104) | It should be recalled that the initial amortisation plan was triggered by a decision of Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority requesting AS Oslo Sporveier to make up for the shortfall in its pension fund. This meant that the owners of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene needed to either remedy the underfunding in their business, or run the risk of their company becoming insolvent. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

It should be recalled that the initial amortisation plan was triggered by a decision of Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority requesting AS Oslo Sporveier to make up for the shortfall in its pension fund. This meant that the owners of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene needed to either remedy the underfunding in their business, or run the risk of their company becoming insolvent.

| (105) | In assessing whether the capital injection was done on conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor, the Authority points out that a private owner/investor in a similar situation — i.e. with the options to either (a) inject fresh capital into the company, or (b) liquidate the company and invest the same amount elsewhere, would choose strategy (a) only if it was globally more profitable than strategy (b). The fact that the owner had made a previous investment is otherwise irrelevant in this context (60). This means that it is not sufficient to choose the ‘cheapest’ solution, which the Norwegian authorities have submitted the capital injection was, in order to meet the market economy investor benchmark, but that it is necessary to demonstrate an acceptable rate of future return for the ‘price of this cheapest solution’. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

In assessing whether the capital injection was done on conditions that would be acceptable to a private investor, the Authority points out that a private owner/investor in a similar situation — i.e. with the options to either (a) inject fresh capital into the company, or (b) liquidate the company and invest the same amount elsewhere, would choose strategy (a) only if it was globally more profitable than strategy (b). The fact that the owner had made a previous investment is otherwise irrelevant in this context (60). This means that it is not sufficient to choose the ‘cheapest’ solution, which the Norwegian authorities have submitted the capital injection was, in order to meet the market economy investor benchmark, but that it is necessary to demonstrate an acceptable rate of future return for the ‘price of this cheapest solution’.

| (106) | The Norwegian authorities have not, however, further substantiated their argument in this respect, and have in particular not submitted any profitability forecasts that a market economy investor would presumably have made. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Norwegian authorities have not, however, further substantiated their argument in this respect, and have in particular not submitted any profitability forecasts that a market economy investor would presumably have made.

| (107) | Furthermore, none of the information submitted indicates that the Municipality of Oslo injected further capital in this part of the business based on expectations of acceptable long-term profit. Moreover, the Authority is not aware of then minority shareholder(s) of AS Oslo Sporveier having contributed to remedy the underfunding — and a private shareholder surely would have requested the other shareholders to either do so pro rata, or would have increased its stake. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Furthermore, none of the information submitted indicates that the Municipality of Oslo injected further capital in this part of the business based on expectations of acceptable long-term profit. Moreover, the Authority is not aware of then minority shareholder(s) of AS Oslo Sporveier having contributed to remedy the underfunding — and a private shareholder surely would have requested the other shareholders to either do so pro rata, or would have increased its stake.

| (108) | For the above reasons, the Authority is at this stage uncertain whether the market economy investor test is met with regard to the commercial activities capital injection. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

For the above reasons, the Authority is at this stage uncertain whether the market economy investor test is met with regard to the commercial activities capital injection.

3.   Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (109) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.

| (110) | The Court of Justice has held that in order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in the light of the objective pursued by the measure (61). |
| --- | --- |

(110)

The Court of Justice has held that in order to determine whether a measure is selective, the question is whether the undertaking(s) in question are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable to other undertakings in the light of the objective pursued by the measure (61).

| (111) | In the present case, the annual compensation and the capital injection favoured AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene to the exclusion of other bus transport operators. Such other bus operators operate scheduled bus transport services in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA and were therefore in a similar legal and factual situation compared to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. For these reasons, the Authority is of the preliminary view that these two measures are selective. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

In the present case, the annual compensation and the capital injection favoured AS Oslo Sporveier and/or AS Sporveisbussene to the exclusion of other bus transport operators. Such other bus operators operate scheduled bus transport services in Norway or elsewhere in the EEA and were therefore in a similar legal and factual situation compared to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. For these reasons, the Authority is of the preliminary view that these two measures are selective.

4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (112) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between contracting parties. According to the EFTA Court case law, this requires the Authority to examine whether such aid is liable to affect trade and to distort competition (62). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the aid measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between contracting parties. According to the EFTA Court case law, this requires the Authority to examine whether such aid is liable to affect trade and to distort competition (62).

| (113) | Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway several undertakings have provided scheduled bus services in Oslo, the Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to distort competition since then (63). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

Since before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway several undertakings have provided scheduled bus services in Oslo, the Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to distort competition since then (63).

| (114) | With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Oslo, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that
  ‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned (64).’. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

With respect to the effect on trade and the fact that the present case concerns a local market for bus transport in Oslo, the Authority recalls that in the Altmark judgment, which also concerned regional bus transport services, the Court of Justice held that

‘a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may none the less have an effect on trade between Member States ... The second condition for the application of Article 92(1) of the Treaty, namely that the aid must be capable of affecting trade between Member States, does not therefore depend on the local or regional character of the transport services supplied or on the scale of the field of activity concerned (64).’.

| (115) | This means that even if — as in the present case — only the local bus transport market (Oslo) is concerned, public funding made available to one operator in such a local market is liable to affect trade between contracting parties (65). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to affect trade between contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

This means that even if — as in the present case — only the local bus transport market (Oslo) is concerned, public funding made available to one operator in such a local market is liable to affect trade between contracting parties (65). Consequently, the Authority considers that the annual compensation and the capital injection were liable to affect trade between contracting parties.

5.   Taxation of the Oslo Sporveier Group

| (116) | The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

The complainant has argued that AS Oslo Sporveier’s negative tax position has been used to reduce the tax burden on AS Sporveisbussene.

| (117) | Based on the submissions of the Norwegian authorities, it appears to the Authority that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same corporate group (‘group contributions’). |
| --- | --- |

(117)

Based on the submissions of the Norwegian authorities, it appears to the Authority that the complainant is referring to the taxation rules regarding contributions between companies belonging to the same corporate group (‘group contributions’).

| (118) | The Authority observes that these rules are applicable to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former. Thus, AS Oslo Sporveier or any of its subsidiaries could in principle offset taxable profits by distributing contributions within the group. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

The Authority observes that these rules are applicable to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as the latter is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former. Thus, AS Oslo Sporveier or any of its subsidiaries could in principle offset taxable profits by distributing contributions within the group.

| (119) | The Authority points out that the complainant seems to have taken issue with what appears to be an application of the general Norwegian rules on corporate taxation. The Authority notes that the complainant has neither alleged, nor submitted any information sustaining that the relevant tax rules are drafted in a manner which could lead to State aid being granted to specific companies. |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Authority points out that the complainant seems to have taken issue with what appears to be an application of the general Norwegian rules on corporate taxation. The Authority notes that the complainant has neither alleged, nor submitted any information sustaining that the relevant tax rules are drafted in a manner which could lead to State aid being granted to specific companies.

| (120) | Moreover, and with more particular regard to the case at hand, it appears to the Authority that the offsetting of taxable income by making a group contribution would not confer an economic advantage on AS Sporveisbussene when it, as a condition of benefitting from the tax deductions, was obliged to make a contribution to the group of the same amount as the tax base reduction obtained in this manner. By transferring income, AS Sporveisbussene may avoid paying taxes on the transferred amount, but the amount will not be at its disposal. Arguably, the benefit of not paying taxes on an income which is no longer disposable does not produce any obvious effects resulting in an economic advantage for that entity (although the situation may be different for the corporate group as a whole). |
| --- | --- |

(120)

Moreover, and with more particular regard to the case at hand, it appears to the Authority that the offsetting of taxable income by making a group contribution would not confer an economic advantage on AS Sporveisbussene when it, as a condition of benefitting from the tax deductions, was obliged to make a contribution to the group of the same amount as the tax base reduction obtained in this manner. By transferring income, AS Sporveisbussene may avoid paying taxes on the transferred amount, but the amount will not be at its disposal. Arguably, the benefit of not paying taxes on an income which is no longer disposable does not produce any obvious effects resulting in an economic advantage for that entity (although the situation may be different for the corporate group as a whole).

| (121) | However, the Authority considers that it is in possession of insufficient facts and information allowing it to assess the application of the Norwegian Tax Act to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group, and to exclude without any doubt that in this case a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with the State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

However, the Authority considers that it is in possession of insufficient facts and information allowing it to assess the application of the Norwegian Tax Act to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group, and to exclude without any doubt that in this case a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with the State aid rules.

6.   Alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries

| (122) | The Authority has asked the Norwegian authorities to clarify whether the subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene have benefitted from any guarantees granted by their owner, as alleged by the complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

The Authority has asked the Norwegian authorities to clarify whether the subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene have benefitted from any guarantees granted by their owner, as alleged by the complainant.

| (123) | The Norwegian authorities have stated that no guarantees have been granted by AS Sporveisbussene, and that its subsidiaries consequently have not benefitted from any guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene. The Authority is in possession of no information suggesting that this is incorrect. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

The Norwegian authorities have stated that no guarantees have been granted by AS Sporveisbussene, and that its subsidiaries consequently have not benefitted from any guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene. The Authority is in possession of no information suggesting that this is incorrect.

| (124) | In light of this, the Authority sees no reason to investigate further this part of the complaint. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

In light of this, the Authority sees no reason to investigate further this part of the complaint.

7.   Conclusion

| (125) | The Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation disbursed until 2008 and the 2004 capital injection of NOK 111 760 000 in Oslo constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

The Authority preliminarily concludes that the annual compensation disbursed until 2008 and the 2004 capital injection of NOK 111 760 000 in Oslo constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (126) | As regards the allegations concerning the taxation of AS Sporveisbussene, the Authority is, as indicated above, unable to exclude without any doubt that a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with Article 61(1).
  The Authority sees no reason to investigate further the alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

As regards the allegations concerning the taxation of AS Sporveisbussene, the Authority is, as indicated above, unable to exclude without any doubt that a potential economic advantage may have indirectly been derived by AS Sporveisbussene, or the Oslo Sporveier Group, in a manner incompatible with Article 61(1).

The Authority sees no reason to investigate further the alleged guarantees from AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries.

8.   Classification of the aid as existing or new

| (127) | Regarding the allegation of potential cross-subsidisation, it is necessary in this context to firstly determine if the aid in question is to be qualified as existing or new aid. Were the public service compensation existing aid (i.e. granted under an existing aid scheme), the Authority could at most request the Norwegian State to bring it in line with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement (if the aid was deemed incompatible and the existing aid scheme in question still applicable). If, on the other hand, the aid was considered as new aid, the consequence of its incompatibility would normally be the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Regarding the allegation of potential cross-subsidisation, it is necessary in this context to firstly determine if the aid in question is to be qualified as existing or new aid. Were the public service compensation existing aid (i.e. granted under an existing aid scheme), the Authority could at most request the Norwegian State to bring it in line with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement (if the aid was deemed incompatible and the existing aid scheme in question still applicable). If, on the other hand, the aid was considered as new aid, the consequence of its incompatibility would normally be the recovery of the aid.

8.1.   
  Introduction — the Court’s judgment

| (128) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:
  ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.’. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ shall mean:

‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.’.

| (129) | The Authority notes that AS Oslo Sporveier, at the time of the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway (1 January 1994), was compensated for carrying out scheduled bus transport in Oslo in accordance with the provisions of the transport legislation and established administrative practice (pre-dating the EEA Agreement), as described in detail above. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

The Authority notes that AS Oslo Sporveier, at the time of the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway (1 January 1994), was compensated for carrying out scheduled bus transport in Oslo in accordance with the provisions of the transport legislation and established administrative practice (pre-dating the EEA Agreement), as described in detail above.

| (130) | In the judgment in Case E-14/10 annulling the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:
  ‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes “existing aid” [...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]
  [...] to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (66).’. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

In the judgment in Case E-14/10 annulling the Authority’s Decision No 254/10/COL, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:

‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes “existing aid” [...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]

[...] to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement (66).’.

8.2.   
  Aid scheme

| (131) | Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an aid scheme:
  ‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that an aid scheme:

‘shall mean any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount;’.

| (132) | Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that individual aid:
  ‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

Article 1(e) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that individual aid:

‘shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme;’.

| (133) | This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 only provides the Authority with a competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 only applies to existing aid schemes (the terms ‘aid schemes’ and ‘systems of aid’ are to be treated as synonyms in the Authority’s view (67)).
  The Authority recalls that the Norwegian transport legislation in essence sets out the following key parameters that are relevant for the aid measures at hand: (i) a system of co-financing of scheduled bus transport services (from State and county); (ii) that the counties are responsible for administering the scheduled bus transport services, control concessions, routes, schedules and ticket prices; and (iii) a detailed concession system. |
| --- | --- |

(133)

This distinction is of particular importance in the context of existing aid, as Protocol 3 only provides the Authority with a competence to keep under constant review existing systems of aid (cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3). Likewise, Section V of Part II of Protocol 3 only applies to existing aid schemes (the terms ‘aid schemes’ and ‘systems of aid’ are to be treated as synonyms in the Authority’s view (67)).

The Authority recalls that the Norwegian transport legislation in essence sets out the following key parameters that are relevant for the aid measures at hand: (i) a system of co-financing of scheduled bus transport services (from State and county); (ii) that the counties are responsible for administering the scheduled bus transport services, control concessions, routes, schedules and ticket prices; and (iii) a detailed concession system.

| (134) | Moreover, according to the Norwegian authorities, Article 22 of the CTA entails that Oslo Municipality is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes (where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). The Authority understands that the compensation aims to cover the gap between the costs and the revenues (in the form of ticket sales). |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Moreover, according to the Norwegian authorities, Article 22 of the CTA entails that Oslo Municipality is under the obligation to compensate the operators for the provision of the transport service on unprofitable routes (where the revenue generated from the sale of tickets does not cover the cost of operating the service). The Authority understands that the compensation aims to cover the gap between the costs and the revenues (in the form of ticket sales).

| (135) | Before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, Oslo Municipality had chosen to provide scheduled bus transport services under the relevant provisions of the CTA and CTR, compensating unprofitable routes in accordance with the administrative practice described above. This continued without interruption until the last directly awarded concession had run its course (on 30 March 2008). |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, Oslo Municipality had chosen to provide scheduled bus transport services under the relevant provisions of the CTA and CTR, compensating unprofitable routes in accordance with the administrative practice described above. This continued without interruption until the last directly awarded concession had run its course (on 30 March 2008).

| (136) | Whether the system in Oslo as outlined above constitutes an aid scheme in accordance with the definition of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 depends on whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled bus transport in Oslo can be considered to be ‘an act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

Whether the system in Oslo as outlined above constitutes an aid scheme in accordance with the definition of Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3 depends on whether the legal framework for the financing of scheduled bus transport in Oslo can be considered to be ‘an act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner’.

| (137) | The Authority notes that this definition was incorporated into the EEA Agreement in 2001 with the insertion of Part II of Protocol 3. Prior to 2001, when Protocol 3 was brought in line with the Procedural Regulation, there was no similarly precise definition in EEA law determining what an aid scheme was. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid — in principle that of providing EEA States and beneficiaries of State with some legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems whilst providing the Authority with the possibility of bringing such systems in line with EEA law — must in the Authority’s view be borne in mind. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

The Authority notes that this definition was incorporated into the EEA Agreement in 2001 with the insertion of Part II of Protocol 3. Prior to 2001, when Protocol 3 was brought in line with the Procedural Regulation, there was no similarly precise definition in EEA law determining what an aid scheme was. Moreover, the rationale for the concept of existing aid — in principle that of providing EEA States and beneficiaries of State with some legal certainty regarding arrangements that predate the entry into force of State aid control in their legal systems whilst providing the Authority with the possibility of bringing such systems in line with EEA law — must in the Authority’s view be borne in mind.

| (138) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. The Authority has thus reviewed its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ were held to encompass non-statutory customary law (68) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (69) and non-statutory law (70). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (71). |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the case-law of the European Courts does not provide detailed guidance as regards the interpretation of this definition. The Authority has thus reviewed its own case practice and that of the European Commission and found that existing ‘aid schemes’ were held to encompass non-statutory customary law (68) and administrative practice related to the application of statutory (69) and non-statutory law (70). In one case, the European Commission found that an aid scheme relating to Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung was based on the combination of an unwritten old legal principle combined with widespread practice across Germany (71).

| (139) | Nevertheless, the Authority is at this stage in doubt as to whether the three criteria defining an ‘aid scheme’ as provided for in Protocol 3 — (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded; (ii) requiring no further implementing measures; and (iii) defining the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner — are met.
  As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA and the CTR are acts on the basis of which Oslo Municipality could award aid. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

Nevertheless, the Authority is at this stage in doubt as to whether the three criteria defining an ‘aid scheme’ as provided for in Protocol 3 — (i) an act on the basis of which aid can be awarded; (ii) requiring no further implementing measures; and (iii) defining the potential aid beneficiaries in a general and abstract manner — are met.

As for the first criterion, the Authority notes that the CTA and the CTR are acts on the basis of which Oslo Municipality could award aid.

| (140) | As for the second criterion, the Authority notes that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process which can (but does not have to) lead to individual awards of aid being made. However, an arrangement that would for example require, for individual aid to be awarded, the adoption of further legislative measures, cannot be considered as an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

As for the second criterion, the Authority notes that the administration of any aid scheme requires a certain decision-making process which can (but does not have to) lead to individual awards of aid being made. However, an arrangement that would for example require, for individual aid to be awarded, the adoption of further legislative measures, cannot be considered as an aid scheme.

| (141) | A mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (72). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

A mere ‘technical application’, as indicated above, of the provisions providing for the scheme would thus not be an implementing measure (72). Moreover, the mere fact that a decision awarding aid under an aid scheme has implications for the budget of the authority administering that scheme, cannot, in the Authority’s view, mean that such decisions are to be regarded as implementing measures.

| (142) | In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment such as the award of a concession, for which the CTA foresees a duration of 10 years, in the case at hand as an implementing measure would make it ex ante impossible to set up an aid scheme for public service compensation under which aid to several undertakings could be awarded, as any entrustment would then entail individual aid. A concession — as any other act of entrustment — specifies one particular undertaking, and could thus not relate to a group of undertakings, ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

In a similar vein, considering acts of entrustment such as the award of a concession, for which the CTA foresees a duration of 10 years, in the case at hand as an implementing measure would make it ex ante impossible to set up an aid scheme for public service compensation under which aid to several undertakings could be awarded, as any entrustment would then entail individual aid. A concession — as any other act of entrustment — specifies one particular undertaking, and could thus not relate to a group of undertakings, ‘defined in a general and abstract manner’.

| (143) | On the other hand, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood as entailing a certain degree of discretion, that could influence the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted to a significant degree. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines for which clearly defined purpose aid can be awarded. Thus, where a public body for example has general powers allowing it to use different instruments to promote the local economy, and grants several capital injections based on those general powers, this granting of capital injections implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (73). |
| --- | --- |

(143)

On the other hand, the Authority is of the view that ‘implementing measures’ should be understood as entailing a certain degree of discretion, that could influence the amount, characteristics or conditions under which the aid is granted to a significant degree. In particular, it would seem that every scheme determines for which clearly defined purpose aid can be awarded. Thus, where a public body for example has general powers allowing it to use different instruments to promote the local economy, and grants several capital injections based on those general powers, this granting of capital injections implies the use of considerable discretion as to the amount, characteristics or conditions and purpose for which the aid is granted, and is hence not to be regarded as an aid scheme (73).

| (144) | In the case at hand, it is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for compensation payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene to be made. The preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the CTA and CTR arguably ringfenced the discretion of Oslo Municipality, to the extent that they appear to have been applied by the Municipality, in line with its administrative practice, in a way that did not allow for compensation in excess of cost for the public service minus revenue. Moreover, the compensation was not based on discretionary budget allocations. Oslo Municipality, after choosing to maintain the public service, was not free to decide whether to cover the loss of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene or not. Oslo Municipality was obliged to do so, and did so, every year until 2008, in line with a routine procedure. It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo. The municipality could not have awarded aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

In the case at hand, it is clear that no further legislative measures needed to be adopted for compensation payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene to be made. The preliminary opinion of the Authority is that the CTA and CTR arguably ringfenced the discretion of Oslo Municipality, to the extent that they appear to have been applied by the Municipality, in line with its administrative practice, in a way that did not allow for compensation in excess of cost for the public service minus revenue. Moreover, the compensation was not based on discretionary budget allocations. Oslo Municipality, after choosing to maintain the public service, was not free to decide whether to cover the loss of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene or not. Oslo Municipality was obliged to do so, and did so, every year until 2008, in line with a routine procedure. It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo. The municipality could not have awarded aid for different purposes on the basis of the provisions described above.

| (145) | However, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that the provisions and practice that set out how providers of scheduled bus services were to be remunerated in Oslo is sufficiently precise and detailed. The Authority has doubts as to the exact extent of the discretion enjoyed by Oslo Municipality, taking into account the administrative practice, in determining the amount of compensation for scheduled bus services. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

However, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that the provisions and practice that set out how providers of scheduled bus services were to be remunerated in Oslo is sufficiently precise and detailed. The Authority has doubts as to the exact extent of the discretion enjoyed by Oslo Municipality, taking into account the administrative practice, in determining the amount of compensation for scheduled bus services.

| (146) | As for the last criterion, the compensation system in Oslo applies to all concessionaires that have been entrusted with providing bus services on unprofitable routes. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

As for the last criterion, the compensation system in Oslo applies to all concessionaires that have been entrusted with providing bus services on unprofitable routes.

| (147) | Consequently, in particular given the Authority’s doubts as regards the second criterion mentioned above, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the financing of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as described above, constitutes an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

Consequently, in particular given the Authority’s doubts as regards the second criterion mentioned above, the Authority cannot at this stage conclude that the financing of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, as described above, constitutes an aid scheme.

| (148) | However, so as to address issues of law relevant for the final assessment of this case, the Authority sets out its preliminary views below based on the assumption that public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene has been awarded on the basis of an aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

However, so as to address issues of law relevant for the final assessment of this case, the Authority sets out its preliminary views below based on the assumption that public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene has been awarded on the basis of an aid scheme.

8.3.   
  Existing aid due to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement

| (149) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that existing aid encompasses all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.

| (150) | As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the preliminary view that the scheme became an existing aid scheme on 1 January 1994. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994. As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the preliminary view that the scheme became an existing aid scheme on 1 January 1994.

8.4.   
  Aid not granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme

8.4.1.   Judgment in Case E-14/10

| (151) | In the judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:
  ‘(...) what is relevant is whether the aid was granted in accordance with the provisions providing for it.
  (...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant (the Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.
  However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (74). |
| --- | --- |

(151)

In the judgment in Case E-14/10, the EFTA Court stated the following on the question of the existing or new nature of the aid:

‘(...) what is relevant is whether the aid was granted in accordance with the provisions providing for it.

(...) in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant (the Authority) may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.

However, (...) any aid granted to Oslo Sporveier in excess of the losses actually incurred in connection with the services in question cannot be regarded to constitute, on the basis of that aid scheme, existing aid (...)’ (74).

| (152) | The Authority understands the judgment of the EFTA Court to mean that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (75).
  Therefore, to determine whether the aid granted is existing or new, the Authority must assess whether it was granted in accordance with the scheme providing for it. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

The Authority understands the judgment of the EFTA Court to mean that only payments made on the basis of the existing aid scheme can be considered as existing aid disbursed under that scheme. Payments not made on the basis of the provisions providing for the scheme cannot be protected by the existing aid nature of that scheme (75).

Therefore, to determine whether the aid granted is existing or new, the Authority must assess whether it was granted in accordance with the scheme providing for it.

| (153) | The Authority’s preliminary view is that the scheme was based on the CTA, the CTR as applied in Oslo in accordance with the established administrative practice. |
| --- | --- |

(153)

The Authority’s preliminary view is that the scheme was based on the CTA, the CTR as applied in Oslo in accordance with the established administrative practice.

| (154) | The scheme only provided for cost coverage (the difference between cost and revenue) of the unprofitable scheduled bus services that the concessionaires provided. This therefore is the benchmark against which the Authority must assess the extent to which the measures covered by the complaint have been made on the basis of the aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

The scheme only provided for cost coverage (the difference between cost and revenue) of the unprofitable scheduled bus services that the concessionaires provided. This therefore is the benchmark against which the Authority must assess the extent to which the measures covered by the complaint have been made on the basis of the aid scheme.

| (155) | In the following, the Authority assesses whether (i) the annual compensation and (ii) the 2004 capital injection were granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the system of compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

In the following, the Authority assesses whether (i) the annual compensation and (ii) the 2004 capital injection were granted on the basis of the provisions providing for the system of compensation.

8.4.2.   Annual compensation

| (156) | As set out above, the Authority is at this stage of the view that at least a large part of the compensation that AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene have received has been awarded in line with the existing aid scheme, which provides in essence for loss coverage for the public service. Such a scheme would appear to presuppose the separation of accounts, an appropriate allocation of common costs and arms-length intra-group transactions for undertakings that in addition to providing public services also engage in commercial activities. Complying with these principles seems necessary to avoid that aid is granted outside the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

As set out above, the Authority is at this stage of the view that at least a large part of the compensation that AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene have received has been awarded in line with the existing aid scheme, which provides in essence for loss coverage for the public service. Such a scheme would appear to presuppose the separation of accounts, an appropriate allocation of common costs and arms-length intra-group transactions for undertakings that in addition to providing public services also engage in commercial activities. Complying with these principles seems necessary to avoid that aid is granted outside the scheme.

| (157) | According to the Norwegian authorities, market prices were paid for services that were provided between the companies in the Oslo Sporveier Group. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

According to the Norwegian authorities, market prices were paid for services that were provided between the companies in the Oslo Sporveier Group.

| (158) | However, aside from indicating that from 2004 onwards, [...] (76) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted information that would allow the Authority to conclude that the allocation of the common costs was done in accordance with a particular allocation key, or that the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a general overhead fee in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

However, aside from indicating that from 2004 onwards, [...] (76) % of the overall costs were levied from all subsidiaries for general overheads, the Norwegian authorities have not submitted information that would allow the Authority to conclude that the allocation of the common costs was done in accordance with a particular allocation key, or that the payment for the services that the commercial subsidiaries of AS Sporveisbussene received was done on an arms-length basis and on market terms. Furthermore, no explanations have been provided as to the rationale of introducing a general overhead fee in 2004, and if overheads were exclusively born by the public service activities before that.

| (159) | Thus, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that all payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene were made on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid.
  In particular, the Authority has doubts as to whether the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group (the tour bus activities in particular), were financed by the annual public service compensation in contravention of the provisions providing for the aid. The information provided has not enabled the Authority to conclude that the annual payments were restricted to cover only costs that could be covered in accordance with the legal framework of the scheme — in other words, whether the annual compensation exceeded the difference between the costs and the revenues of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

Thus, the Authority cannot, on the basis of the information provided, conclude that all payments to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene were made on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid.

In particular, the Authority has doubts as to whether the commercial activities carried out by the Oslo Sporveier Group (the tour bus activities in particular), were financed by the annual public service compensation in contravention of the provisions providing for the aid. The information provided has not enabled the Authority to conclude that the annual payments were restricted to cover only costs that could be covered in accordance with the legal framework of the scheme — in other words, whether the annual compensation exceeded the difference between the costs and the revenues of the public service.

8.4.3.   2004 capital injection

| (160) | Turning to the 2004 capital injection, already since the mid-1990s, it was clear that the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier was underfunded. Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented. In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier in order for the compensation to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

Turning to the 2004 capital injection, already since the mid-1990s, it was clear that the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier was underfunded. Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented. In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation to AS Oslo Sporveier in order for the compensation to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service.

| (161) | In 2004, the remaining shortfall was covered by a capital injection of NOK 111 760 000. Although it was not granted as part of the annual lump sum to AS Sporveisbussene, the payment appears to mainly (77) have been made on the basis of the existing aid scheme, in that it went to cover a cost incurred whilst providing the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

In 2004, the remaining shortfall was covered by a capital injection of NOK 111 760 000. Although it was not granted as part of the annual lump sum to AS Sporveisbussene, the payment appears to mainly (77) have been made on the basis of the existing aid scheme, in that it went to cover a cost incurred whilst providing the public service.

| (162) | As noted above, the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the concessionaire is to be compensated for the public service, in practice, the compensation has simply been awarded annually in the form of lump sums in accordance with the established administrative practice. The EFTA Court has held (78) that when an existing aid scheme does not have any particular provisions on how the aid is to be provided, a divergence from the usual procedure cannot in and of itself, lead to the finding that the aid was not granted on the basis of that scheme. The fact that the 2004 capital injection was not made in accordance with the normal annual block grant procedure cannot in and of itself entail that it was not made on the basis of the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

As noted above, the CTA and the CTR do not have any particular provisions on how the concessionaire is to be compensated for the public service, in practice, the compensation has simply been awarded annually in the form of lump sums in accordance with the established administrative practice. The EFTA Court has held (78) that when an existing aid scheme does not have any particular provisions on how the aid is to be provided, a divergence from the usual procedure cannot in and of itself, lead to the finding that the aid was not granted on the basis of that scheme. The fact that the 2004 capital injection was not made in accordance with the normal annual block grant procedure cannot in and of itself entail that it was not made on the basis of the scheme.

| (163) | As described above, Oslo Muncipality had since the mid-1990s increased the annual public service compensation payments to cover a historic shortfall in the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group by 2020. These pension costs were predominantly (79) linked to the public service which Oslo Municipality was obliged to cover in accordance with their obligation to cover the cost of the public service. Instead of continuing with the annual payments until 2020, it was decided that the 2004 capital injection should cover the remaining share of the underfunding, thus eliminating the need for further annual payments to cover the historic underfunding. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

As described above, Oslo Muncipality had since the mid-1990s increased the annual public service compensation payments to cover a historic shortfall in the pension fund of the Oslo Sporveier Group by 2020. These pension costs were predominantly (79) linked to the public service which Oslo Municipality was obliged to cover in accordance with their obligation to cover the cost of the public service. Instead of continuing with the annual payments until 2020, it was decided that the 2004 capital injection should cover the remaining share of the underfunding, thus eliminating the need for further annual payments to cover the historic underfunding.

| (164) | On this basis, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that the 2004 capital injection was largely carried out in accordance with the provisions providing for the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

On this basis, the Authority is of the preliminary opinion that the 2004 capital injection was largely carried out in accordance with the provisions providing for the aid.

| (165) | However, the Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority that the capital injection was not restricted to cover the cost of the pensions related to the public service. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the capital injection also covered pension obligations related to employees engaged in commercial tour bus services and have calculated the amount of this compensation to be approximately NOK 430 300. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

However, the Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority that the capital injection was not restricted to cover the cost of the pensions related to the public service. The Norwegian authorities have explained that the capital injection also covered pension obligations related to employees engaged in commercial tour bus services and have calculated the amount of this compensation to be approximately NOK 430 300.

| (166) | As this portion of the compensation does not appear to have been disbursed on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid, it appears that it cannot be held to be covered by the existing aid scheme. Thus, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that it represents new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

As this portion of the compensation does not appear to have been disbursed on the basis of the provisions providing for the aid, it appears that it cannot be held to be covered by the existing aid scheme. Thus, the preliminary opinion of the Authority is that it represents new aid.

8.5.   
  Alterations to existing aid

| (167) | According to Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3, a measure that existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and was still in force afterwards is existing aid. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

According to Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3, a measure that existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and was still in force afterwards is existing aid.

| (168) | Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:
  ‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

Further, Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘new aid’ is:

‘all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including alterations to existing aid;’.

| (169) | In Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:
  ‘[...] the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it (80).’ |
| --- | --- |

(169)

In Namur, the Court of Justice stated the following:

‘[...] the emergence of new aid or the alteration of existing aid cannot be assessed according to the scale of the aid or, in particular, its amounts in financial terms at any moment in the life of the undertaking if the aid is provided under earlier statutory provisions which remain unaltered. Whether aid may be classified as new aid or as alteration of existing aid must be determined by reference to the provisions providing for it (80).’

| (170) | As set out in the factual description of the case above, there are a number of events that could potentially be considered as altering the scheme and turning it into new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

As set out in the factual description of the case above, there are a number of events that could potentially be considered as altering the scheme and turning it into new aid.

8.5.1.   1997 internal reorganisation

| (171) | In 1997, an internal reorganisation led the newly established entity AS Sporveisbussene to take over the responsibility of carrying out the scheduled bus transport services previously provided by AS Oslo Sporveier. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

In 1997, an internal reorganisation led the newly established entity AS Sporveisbussene to take over the responsibility of carrying out the scheduled bus transport services previously provided by AS Oslo Sporveier.

| (172) | Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (81). The question is whether this reorganisation brought with it a change to the existing aid scheme involving new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

Purely formal or administrative changes to an aid scheme do not lead to the reclassification of existing aid as new (81). The question is whether this reorganisation brought with it a change to the existing aid scheme involving new aid.

| (173) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that, in essence, the change from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene as the provider of the service was a change of a formal nature. By establishing AS Sporveisbussene, AS Oslo Sporveier created a subsidiary for operating public bus services that it formerly ran itself. AS Oslo Sporveier — in its position as the mother company — remained, however, the primary recipient of the compensation and holder of the concession, and simply underwent an internal reorganisation that led to AS Sporveisbussene being in charge of providing the services in accordance with the concession. For this it received compensation from its mother company. The reorganisation did necessitate the conclusion of the Transport Agreement, which however, as the Norwegian authorities have explained, did not substantially change the established administrative practice relating to the financing of the public service. Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that, in essence, the change from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene as the provider of the service was a change of a formal nature. By establishing AS Sporveisbussene, AS Oslo Sporveier created a subsidiary for operating public bus services that it formerly ran itself. AS Oslo Sporveier — in its position as the mother company — remained, however, the primary recipient of the compensation and holder of the concession, and simply underwent an internal reorganisation that led to AS Sporveisbussene being in charge of providing the services in accordance with the concession. For this it received compensation from its mother company. The reorganisation did necessitate the conclusion of the Transport Agreement, which however, as the Norwegian authorities have explained, did not substantially change the established administrative practice relating to the financing of the public service. Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR.

| (174) | On this basis, the reorganisation of 1997 cannot be held to have involved a substantive change to the aid scheme (82). Consequently, the scheme remained in the Authority’s preliminary view an existing aid scheme after the reorganisation. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

On this basis, the reorganisation of 1997 cannot be held to have involved a substantive change to the aid scheme (82). Consequently, the scheme remained in the Authority’s preliminary view an existing aid scheme after the reorganisation.

8.5.2.   Renewal of concession

| (175) | With reference to the description of the scheme above, the Authority notes that it does not consider the concession to form part of the provisions providing for the existing aid scheme. The concession, granted for a duration of 10 years pursuant to the CTA, appears to be an act of entrustment. The entrustment in essence determines the route(s) for which the concessionaire has a right and obligation to provide a scheduled service. The Authority considers that an existing aid scheme will not be altered by the grant or renewal of an act of entrustment under that scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

With reference to the description of the scheme above, the Authority notes that it does not consider the concession to form part of the provisions providing for the existing aid scheme. The concession, granted for a duration of 10 years pursuant to the CTA, appears to be an act of entrustment. The entrustment in essence determines the route(s) for which the concessionaire has a right and obligation to provide a scheduled service. The Authority considers that an existing aid scheme will not be altered by the grant or renewal of an act of entrustment under that scheme.

| (176) | In any event, other than the temporal prolongation, no changes were made to the renewed concession. AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

In any event, other than the temporal prolongation, no changes were made to the renewed concession. AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession.

| (177) | Therefore, the Authority does not consider the renewal of the concession as an alteration to the existing aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

Therefore, the Authority does not consider the renewal of the concession as an alteration to the existing aid scheme.

8.5.3.   Introduction of a quality bonus/malus system

| (178) | AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system some time before 2004. The Authority has not received exact information on when this system was introduced. Nor has the Authority received information on how the system was implemented in the contractual relationship between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. Thus, further information is necessary for the Authority to fully assess the nature of the quality bonus and its relationship to the existing aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system some time before 2004. The Authority has not received exact information on when this system was introduced. Nor has the Authority received information on how the system was implemented in the contractual relationship between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene. Thus, further information is necessary for the Authority to fully assess the nature of the quality bonus and its relationship to the existing aid scheme.

| (179) | The Authority is at this stage of the opinion that the quality bonus that AS Sporveisbussene received in 2004 pursuant to the bonus/malus system could either form part of the compensation for the public service, possibly constituting part of the reasonable profit that the company appears to have been entitled to, or a change to the existing aid scheme. If so, this measure could constitute new aid (83). |
| --- | --- |

(179)

The Authority is at this stage of the opinion that the quality bonus that AS Sporveisbussene received in 2004 pursuant to the bonus/malus system could either form part of the compensation for the public service, possibly constituting part of the reasonable profit that the company appears to have been entitled to, or a change to the existing aid scheme. If so, this measure could constitute new aid (83).

8.6.   
  Period subsequent to 30 March 2008

| (180) | In the early 2000s, Oslo Municipality decided to tender all public service contracts for scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region. By 30 March 2008, this process was brought to an end, thus AS Oslo Sporveier’s concession was without object, and all services were provided on the basis of tendered contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

In the early 2000s, Oslo Municipality decided to tender all public service contracts for scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region. By 30 March 2008, this process was brought to an end, thus AS Oslo Sporveier’s concession was without object, and all services were provided on the basis of tendered contracts.

| (181) | Therefore, from 30 March 2008 onwards, the new concessionaires have been remunerated on the basis of the tendered contracts, and not in accordance with the system described above under which aid had been granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene before. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

Therefore, from 30 March 2008 onwards, the new concessionaires have been remunerated on the basis of the tendered contracts, and not in accordance with the system described above under which aid had been granted to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene before.

9.   Compatibility of the aid

| (182) | As set out above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that a substantial part of the aid to AS Oslo Sporveier (in the form of annual compensation and the 2004 capital injection) was granted under an existing aid scheme. The Authority has furthermore come to the preliminary conclusion that the bonus/malus system introduced some time before 2004 may represent new aid. Moreover, the Authority has preliminarily concluded that some of the aid was potentially granted outside the aforementioned scheme and thus constitutes new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

As set out above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that a substantial part of the aid to AS Oslo Sporveier (in the form of annual compensation and the 2004 capital injection) was granted under an existing aid scheme. The Authority has furthermore come to the preliminary conclusion that the bonus/malus system introduced some time before 2004 may represent new aid. Moreover, the Authority has preliminarily concluded that some of the aid was potentially granted outside the aforementioned scheme and thus constitutes new aid.

| (183) | The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not submitted any arguments relating to the compatibility of either the new or existing aid described above. In the absence of such information and, in particular, without a detailed account of which costs formed the basis for the annual payment negotiations and the methodology and justification for the allocation of common cost, the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

The Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not submitted any arguments relating to the compatibility of either the new or existing aid described above. In the absence of such information and, in particular, without a detailed account of which costs formed the basis for the annual payment negotiations and the methodology and justification for the allocation of common cost, the Authority cannot take a final view on this matter.

| (184) | However, it would appear to the Authority that the compensation payments for the public service, or at least parts thereof, and the capital injection to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, or at least parts thereof, could be compatible public service compensation under Article of the 49 EEA. This provision cannot be applied directly (84) but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (85) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (86). An essential element in the assessment under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

However, it would appear to the Authority that the compensation payments for the public service, or at least parts thereof, and the capital injection to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, or at least parts thereof, could be compatible public service compensation under Article of the 49 EEA. This provision cannot be applied directly (84) but only by virtue of Council Regulations, i.e. Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 (85) or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (86). An essential element in the assessment under both regulations is to verify that aid in the form of public service compensation only covers the cost of the public service (including a reasonable profit) and does not lead to overcompensation.

| (185) | Moreover, it also cannot be excluded at this stage that the aid measures under assessment, in particular the capital injection to remedy the underfunded pension fund, could be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

Moreover, it also cannot be excluded at this stage that the aid measures under assessment, in particular the capital injection to remedy the underfunded pension fund, could be compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (186) | Should any new aid have been granted that benefitted the commercial activities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, the Authority does not at this stage envisage any provision in EEA State aid law that could form the basis for deeming such aid compatible. As the Authority expresses solely a preliminary view however, the Norwegian authorities are invited to submit arguments and information regarding the compatibility of all State aid that was granted to the Oslo Sporveier Group, including (potential) aid to the commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

Should any new aid have been granted that benefitted the commercial activities of the Oslo Sporveier Group, the Authority does not at this stage envisage any provision in EEA State aid law that could form the basis for deeming such aid compatible. As the Authority expresses solely a preliminary view however, the Norwegian authorities are invited to submit arguments and information regarding the compatibility of all State aid that was granted to the Oslo Sporveier Group, including (potential) aid to the commercial activities.

10.   Conclusion

| (187) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has come to the conclusion that the complainant’s allegations that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene may involve unlawful State aid are unfounded. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has come to the conclusion that the complainant’s allegations that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene may involve unlawful State aid are unfounded.

| (188) | However, the Authority preliminarily considers that the three additional measures referred to by the complainant — namely: (i) the annual compensation payments for scheduled bus services; (ii) the 2004 capital injection; and (iii) an alleged favourable tax position benefiting AS Sporveisbussene — may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. As regards the second measure, the Authority has doubts whether (parts of) it might indeed have been granted in line with the market economy investor principle. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

However, the Authority preliminarily considers that the three additional measures referred to by the complainant — namely: (i) the annual compensation payments for scheduled bus services; (ii) the 2004 capital injection; and (iii) an alleged favourable tax position benefiting AS Sporveisbussene — may entail State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. As regards the second measure, the Authority has doubts whether (parts of) it might indeed have been granted in line with the market economy investor principle.

| (189) | As established above, the Authority moreover is at this stage of the view that most of the State aid appears to have been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Oslo to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service. However, the Authority has doubts as to the precise delineation of that scheme, i.e. how exactly the costs, that formed the basis for the annual negotiations on the compensation payment, were calculated, and which costs were exactly taken into account. Given that the beneficiary is also engaged in commercial activities, the Authority doubts at this stage if indeed costs that should have been borne by those commercial activities were taken into account in the process of calculating the annual compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

As established above, the Authority moreover is at this stage of the view that most of the State aid appears to have been granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme which entitled concessionaires that provided public scheduled bus services in Oslo to a compensation which would cover the difference between ticket revenue and cost for discharging the public service. However, the Authority has doubts as to the precise delineation of that scheme, i.e. how exactly the costs, that formed the basis for the annual negotiations on the compensation payment, were calculated, and which costs were exactly taken into account. Given that the beneficiary is also engaged in commercial activities, the Authority doubts at this stage if indeed costs that should have been borne by those commercial activities were taken into account in the process of calculating the annual compensation.

| (190) | Furthermore, and in line with the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted in line with the scheme would have to be qualified as new aid. It preliminarily considers that the 2004 capital injection also covered underfunded pension funds of employees of the commercial activities of the beneficiary. Moreover, it doubts whether the quality bonus described above has been granted on the basis of the scheme, or whether it is a severable amendment to the scheme involving new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

Furthermore, and in line with the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority is of the view that any aid not granted in line with the scheme would have to be qualified as new aid. It preliminarily considers that the 2004 capital injection also covered underfunded pension funds of employees of the commercial activities of the beneficiary. Moreover, it doubts whether the quality bonus described above has been granted on the basis of the scheme, or whether it is a severable amendment to the scheme involving new aid.

| (191) | Finally, if any new aid not in line with the scheme has been granted, the Authority has doubts as to whether such aid would be compatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular Articles 49 and 61(3)(c) thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

Finally, if any new aid not in line with the scheme has been granted, the Authority has doubts as to whether such aid would be compatible with the EEA Agreement, in particular Articles 49 and 61(3)(c) thereof.

| (192) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute aid, are existing aid or new aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute aid, are existing aid or new aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (193) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this Decision. In particular, it invites the Norwegian authorities to comment, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, on:






  (a) | the compliance of the commercial activities capital injection with the market economy investor principle; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(193)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments, as well as all documents, information and data needed to address the doubts of the Authority outlined above, as well as all relevant information that will enable the Authority in consolidating its preliminary views expressed in this Decision. In particular, it invites the Norwegian authorities to comment, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, on:

(a)

the compliance of the commercial activities capital injection with the market economy investor principle;

| (b) | the description of the potential existing aid scheme in this Decision; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the description of the potential existing aid scheme in this Decision;

| (c) | the costs that were taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation, and whether it can be excluded that costs of the commercial activities were taken into account for this purpose; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the costs that were taken into account for the calculation of the annual compensation, and whether it can be excluded that costs of the commercial activities were taken into account for this purpose;

| (d) | the distribution of common costs between the various activities and subsidiaries, and the methodology for the pricing of services provided by the public service activities to the commercial activities; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the distribution of common costs between the various activities and subsidiaries, and the methodology for the pricing of services provided by the public service activities to the commercial activities;

| (e) | a detailed description of the rules on group taxation, and their application to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

a detailed description of the rules on group taxation, and their application to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group;

| (f) | the nature and potential compatibility of the amounts paid under the bonus/malus system; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the nature and potential compatibility of the amounts paid under the bonus/malus system;

| (g) | how, should any of the above measures entail new aid, they could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(g)

how, should any of the above measures entail new aid, they could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.

| (194) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to immediately forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to immediately forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid.

| (195) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless, exceptionally, such recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(195)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless, exceptionally, such recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers the allegation that guarantees provided by AS Sporveisbussene to its subsidiaries may involve unlawful State aid are without object.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the compensation for scheduled bus services in Oslo paid to AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene during the period 1 January 1994-30 March 2008, the capital injection paid by Oslo Municipality on 1 June 2004, and the application of the group taxation rules to and by the Oslo Sporveier Group.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the nature and compatibility of the aid measures.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Decision made at Brussels, 28 March 2012.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/195-04-COL.pdf

1

(2)  Judgment, paras. 55-63.

2

(3)  Ibid., paragraphs 76-80.

3

(4)  Ibid., paragraphs 84-91.

4

(5)  References to the ‘Oslo Sporveier Group’ in this Decision will be used to refer to AS Oslo Sporveier and its subsidiaries.

5

(6)  Act of 21.6.2002 No 45 (e.i.f. 1.1.2003).

6

(7)  Regulation of 26.3.2003 No 401 (e.i.f. 1.4.2003).

7

(8)  Act of 4.6.1976 No 63 (e.i.f. 1.7.1977). Repealed and replaced by the CTA on 1.1.2003.

8

(9)  Regulation of 12.8.1986 No 2170 (e.i.f. 1.1.1987) and Regulation of 4.12.1992 No 1013 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994). Both repealed and replaced by the CTR on 1.4.2003.

9

(10)  In Norwegian: Administrasjonsselskap.

10

Administrasjonsselskap

(11)  Article 23 CTA.

11

(12)  Article 22(3) CTA.

12

(13)  Article 22(4) CTA.

13

(14)  Articles 4 and 6 CTA.

14

(15)  Article 4(1) CTA.

15

(16)  Article 4(2) CTA and Chapter I of the CTR.

16

(17)  Article 27(1) CTA.

17

(18)  Article 6(1) CTA.

18

(19)  Article 25 CTR.

19

(20)  Articles 28 and 29 CTR. These are the requirements the Authority considers to be the most relevant for the purposes of describing the national scheme, however, a number of other detailed requirements for a special concession are set out in the CTR.

20

(21)  Articles 28(2) and 29(2) CTR.

21

(22)  Article 27(2) CTR.

22

(23)  As stated in the preparatory works, Chapter 10.1 of Prop. 113 L (2009-2010).

23

(24)  Article 8 CTA. The possibility to tender the concessions was introduced by an amendment of the Transport Act of 1976 by Act of 11.6.1993 No 85 (e.i.f. 1.1.1994).

24

(25)  Article 22(5) CTA. The 1997 Transport Agreement between AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene, discussed in Section I.4 below, is an example of such a contract.

25

(26)  Article 22(1) CTA.

26

(27)  Since 1934, Oslo Municipality has practically been the sole owner of AS Oslo Sporveier (with 98,8 % ownership) until a reorganisation in July 2006. Following this reorganisation, a new company, Kollektivtransportproduksjon, which is wholly owned by Oslo Municipality, became the 100 % owner of AS Oslo Sporveier.

27

(28)  According to the Norwegian authorities, Oslo Municipality was involved in all issues of commercial importance relating to the carrying out of collective bus transport by AS Oslo Sporveier, including financial aspects of agreements/contracts with subsidiaries (such as AS Sporveisbussene) or other third parties. Oslo Municipality was involved via the management board of AS Oslo Sporveier.

28

(29)  Additionally, AS Oslo Sporveier had other departments operating i.a. underground, tram and ferry services.

29

(30)  Three other operators, ING. M.O. Schøyens Bilcentraler A/S, Norgesbuss AS/Oslo and Follo Busstrafikk A/S also held concessions for carrying scheduled bus transport on a few specified routes in Oslo. Norgesbuss AS/Oslo acquired Follo Busstrafikk A/S in 1996 and with that took over its concessions.

30

(31)  Article 22 CTA.

31

(32)  All ticket revenue generated by direct sale on their own buses, plus a share of the ticket revenue stemming from AS Oslo Sporveier, Stor-Oslo Lokaltrafikk and Norges Statsbaner.

32

(33)  The exact figure is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. It is in the range of 2 %-7 %.

33

(34)  Own calculation by the Authority.

34

(35)  Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse was the pension fund for the employees of the Oslo Sporveier Group. The 2004 capital injection covered the underfunding related to the pension obligations of Oslo Sporvognsdrift AS, Oslo T-banedrift AS, AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene.

35

(36)  The Norwegian authorities have explained that prior to the 2004 capital injection, AS Sporveisbussene recorded its pension obligations using the so-called ‘corridor solution’. Using this accounting method, the company amortised adjustments in calculated pension obligations over a period of 10 years. The ‘corridor solution’ was based on the assumption that there will be deviations every year between the long-term assumptions and realities and that, over time, such differences will even out. In 2004, the Norwegian authorities decided to change the accounting method used for recording pension obligations. Annual adjustments that included, in the accounts, all costs over the period of assumed average employment were made. As a consequence, AS Sporveisbussene recorded in 2004 a reduction in equity of NOK 80 934 000 (under the item ‘estimatavvik’), which reflects this change in accounting methods. These changes resulted in an increase in the obligations recognised in the balance sheet and a corresponding reduction of the equity capital of the company. This change in accounting principles did not have an impact on the amount of capital needed to offset the underfunding of the pension fund, but rather explains some of the changes in the accounts of AS Sporveisbussene from 2003 to 2004 to which the complaint referred.

36

(37)  Alternatively, the complainant might have deducted the share capital reduction of NOK 70 261 000 (as reported in the accounts of 2004) from the actual capital injection, which amounted to NOK 111 760 000.

37

(38)  Given that Norwegian national insurance would provide a basic pension between 40 % and 50 %, the employer provided the remaining part through either pension funds or life insurance companies. Oslo Sporveier Group organised their pension fund as a municipal pension fund (Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse), in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Insurance Act of 10.6.2005 No 44.

38

(39)  Regulation of 19.2.1993 No 117, Section 28 A.

39

(40)  Not complying with this obligation could have had several legal consequences for Oslo Sporveier Group, for instance it may have been declared bankrupt.

40

(41)  Of which NOK 800 million was transferred from Oslo Municipality.

41

(42)  The amount paid to Oslo Sporveiers Pensjonskasse was NOK 711 980 000 (NOK 90 519 282 (14,1 % of the total amount NOK 802,5 million) was employment tax).

42

(43)  Act of 10.6.1988 No 39 (repealed), Article 8c-11 in conjunction with Article 8c-10 at paragraphs 1 and 3.

43

(44)  The Tax Act of 26.3.1999 No 14, Article 2-2.

44

(45)  Articles 10-2 to 10-4 of the Tax Act.

45

(46)  According to Article 10-1 of the Tax Act, the rules governing group contributions are applicable for ‘aksjeselskap, allmennaksjeselskap samt likestilt selskap og sammenslutning’.

46

(47)  As provided by Act of 13.6.1997 No 44, Articles 1-3 and 1-4.

47

(48)  Article 10-4(1) of the Tax Act.

48

(49)  The actual payment does not necessarily need to take place in the same year as the income is made, provided that it will be effected by a real transfer of wealth at a later date. Accordingly, it is sufficient that the granting company undertakes an unconditional obligation to make the contribution.

49

(50)  Article 10-2(1) of the Tax Act.

50

(51)  Article 10-3(1) of the Tax Act.

51

(52)  Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings, OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17, incorporated by means of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

52

(53)  As regards, in particular, the quality bonus from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million, the Authority has not received information allowing it to exclude that the funds stem from State resources, or that the payment is not imputable to the State. As Oslo Municipality is involved in all issues of commercial importance relating to the provision of scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region, and AS Oslo Sporveier is a publicly-owned company, it is likely that the transaction could be held to be imputable to the State and thus represent State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

53

(54)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747. See also Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.

54

Altmark

BUPA

(55)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 89-93.

55

Altmark

(56)  Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 94-95.

56

Altmark

(57)  Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [2006] ECR I-3547, at paragraph 60.

57

SFEI

La Poste

(58)  This principle is explained in the Authority’s guidelines Part IV Rules on public service compensation, State ownership of enterprises and aid to public enterprises, Application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector.

58

(59)  Cf. for example Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Kingdom of Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, at paragraph 28. See also Case 40/857 Belgium v Commission (Boch) [1986] ECR-2321, at paragraph 13; Case C-301/87 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraphs 39-40; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission (Lanerossi) [1991] ECR I-1433, at paragraph 24.

59

Kingdom of Spain

Commission

Belgium

Commission (Boch)

France

Commission (Boussac)

Italy

Commission (Lanerossi)

(60)  Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission [2003] ECR II-435, at paragraph 222.

60

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen

Commission

(61)  Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke ECR [2001] I-8365, paragraph 41.

61

Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke

(62)  Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04, Fesil and Finnfjord and Others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court Report, 117 at paragraph 93.

62

Fesil and Finnfjord and Others

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(63)  Moreover, the Court of Justice observed in the Altmark judgment that since 1995 several EU Member States had voluntarily opened-up certain urban, suburban or regional transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other EU Member States, the risk to inter-Member State trade was not hypothetical, but real as the market was open to competition (paragraphs 69 and 79).

63

Altmark

(64)  Paragraphs 77 and 82 of the Altmark judgment.

64

Altmark

(65)  See also Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26.

65

France

Commission

Italy

Commission

(66)  Paragraphs 50-53.

66

(67)  Cf. Sinnaeve/Slot, The new Regulation on State aid Procedures, Common Market Law Review 36/1999, p. 1153, footnote 28.

67

(68)  See the Authority’s Decision No 405/08/COL HFF (OJ L 79, 25.3.2010, p. 40 and the EEA Supplement No 14, 25.3.2010, p. 20), Chapter II.2.3.1, p. 23: ‘The State guarantee on all State institutions for all their obligations follows from general unwritten rules of Icelandic public law predating the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. The guarantee is applicable to all State institutions, regardless of when they are established, or of their activities, or changes in those activities. This possible aid measure must be regarded as a scheme falling within the definition in Article 1(d) in part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.’

68

(69)  See Commission Decision in Case E-45/2000 (Netherlands) Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group (OJ C 37, 11.2.2004, p. 13).

69

Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group

(70)  From the Authority’s Decision No 491/09/COL Norsk Film group (OJ C 174, 1.7.2010, p. 3 and the EEA Supplement No 34, 1.7.2010, p. 1), Chapter II.2 p. 8: ‘the yearly payments made by the Norwegian State since the 1970s to Norsk FilmStudio AS/Filmparken AS for the production of feature films and to maintain an infrastructure necessary for the production of films were based on an existing system of aid. The Authority considers that in this case, where regular payments were consistently made over a very long period of time, the practice shows that State support was an essential element in the financing of the company. The Authority considers on that basis that the annual grants were made under an existing system of state aid within the meaning of Article 62 EEA.’ In that case, the Authority opened the formal investigation into a payment of NOK 36 million that had been made in addition to the regular payments and an alleged preferential tax measure. With Decision No 204/11/COL (not yet published in the OJ, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/) the Authority closed the procedure on the basis that the NOK 36 million payment was made on the basis of the existing aid scheme and that the tax measure did not constitute State aid.

70

(71)  See Commission Decision in Case E-10/2000 (Germany) State guarantees for public banks in Germany (OJ C 150, 22.6.2002, p. 6).

71

State guarantees for public banks in Germany

(72)  See Commission Decision in Case E-4/07 (France) Charges aéroportuaires, paragraph 56 (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 16).

72

Charges aéroportuaires

(73)  Cf. Commission Decision in Case C-6/08 (Finland) Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus, (not yet published), paragraphs 107-109 in particular.

73

Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus

(74)  Paragraphs 73-76.

74

(75)  The same logic applies for schemes that have been approved by the Authority or the European Commission. See for example Case C-47/91, Italy v Commission [1994] ECR-4635, paragraphs 25-26.

75

Italy

Commission

(76)  The exact figure is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. It is in the range of 2 %-7 %.

76

(77)  See below on the approximate amount of NOK 430 300 that went to cover non-PSO pension costs.

77

(78)  Paragraph 87 of the judgment of the EFTA Court.

78

(79)  See below on the approximate amount of NOK 430 300 that went to cover non-PSO pension costs.

79

(80)  Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 28.

80

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit

(81)  See Article 4(1) of the Implementing Provisions Decision. See also the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Namur (cited above).

81

Namur

(82)  This is supported by the conclusions drawn by the European Commission in similar cases, see the Commission Decisions in Case NN 73/08 (Hungary) Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt. (OJ C 109, 13.5.2009, p. 5), at paragraphs 59-60 and Case E-14/05 (Portugal) Compensation payments to public service broadcaster RTP (not published in the OJ) at paragraphs 78-80.

82

Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt.

Compensation payments to public service broadcaster RTP

(83)  Only changes affecting the substance of an existing scheme can transform that existing aid to new aid. Changes severable from the existing aid will not affect the substance of that existing aid (Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Government of Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-2309, paragraph 111).

83

Government of Gibraltar

Commission

(84)  See Altmark (cited above), at paragraph 107.

84

Altmark

(85)  Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 on public service in transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ L 156, 8.6.1969, p. 8), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement.

85

(86)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1), incorporated in the EEA Agreement by means of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement. Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 entered into force in Norway on 1 January 2011, see Regulation of 17.12.2010 No 1673.

86

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V Atzinumi

ADMINISTRATĪVAS PROCEDŪRAS

Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO)

| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/41 |
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12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/41

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PAZIŅOJUMS PAR ATKLĀTIEM KONKURSIEM

2012/C 204/05

Eiropas Personāla atlases birojs (EPSO) rīko atklātus konkursus:

| | EPSO/AD/240/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir igauņu valoda (ET) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/240/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir igauņu valoda (ET)

| | EPSO/AD/241/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir īru valoda (GA) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/241/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir īru valoda (GA)

| | EPSO/AD/242/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir latviešu valoda (LV) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/242/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir latviešu valoda (LV)

| | EPSO/AD/243/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir portugāļu valoda (PT) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/243/12 – Tulkotāji, kuru galvenā valoda ir portugāļu valoda (PT)

Paziņojums par konkursiem ir publicēts
  Oficiālā Vēstneša C sērijā 204 A 2012. gada 12. jūlijā tikai igauņu, īru, latviešu un portugāļu valodā.

Papildu informācija atrodama EPSO tīmekļa vietnē: http://www.eu-careers.info

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PROCEDŪRAS, KAS SAISTĪTAS AR KONKURENCES POLITIKAS ĪSTENOŠANU

Eiropas Komisija

| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/42 |
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12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/42

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Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju

(Lieta COMP/M.6647 – Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore))

Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2012/C 204/06

| 1. | Komisija 2012. gada 5. jūlijā saņēma paziņojumu par ierosinātu koncentrāciju, ievērojot Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4. pantu, kuras rezultātā uzņēmumi Mitsubishi Corporation (“MC”, Japāna) un Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (“MELCO”, Japāna) iegūst Apvienošanās regulas 3. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkta izpratnē pilnīgu kontroli pār uzņēmumu Mitsubishi Elevator Singapore Co. Ltd (“MESP”, Singapūra), iegādājoties akcijas. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija 2012. gada 5. jūlijā saņēma paziņojumu par ierosinātu koncentrāciju, ievērojot Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4. pantu, kuras rezultātā uzņēmumi Mitsubishi Corporation (“MC”, Japāna) un Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (“MELCO”, Japāna) iegūst Apvienošanās regulas 3. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkta izpratnē pilnīgu kontroli pār uzņēmumu Mitsubishi Elevator Singapore Co. Ltd (“MESP”, Singapūra), iegādājoties akcijas.

| 2. | Attiecīgie uzņēmumi veic šādu uzņēmējdarbību:






  — | uzņēmums MC: vispārējas tirdzniecības uzņēmums, kas darbojas dažādās nozarēs, tostarp enerģētikas, metālu, iekārtu, ķīmisko vielu, pārtikas un vispārējās nozīmes preču nozarē, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Attiecīgie uzņēmumi veic šādu uzņēmējdarbību:

—

uzņēmums MC: vispārējas tirdzniecības uzņēmums, kas darbojas dažādās nozarēs, tostarp enerģētikas, metālu, iekārtu, ķīmisko vielu, pārtikas un vispārējās nozīmes preču nozarē,

| — | uzņēmums MELCO: ražo un pārdod elektriskās un elektroniskās iekārtas, ko izmanto energosistēmās un elektrosistēmās, rūpnieciskās automatizācijas procesos, informācijas un komunikācijas sistēmās, elektroniskajās ierīcēs un sadzīves ierīcēs, |
| --- | --- |

—

uzņēmums MELCO: ražo un pārdod elektriskās un elektroniskās iekārtas, ko izmanto energosistēmās un elektrosistēmās, rūpnieciskās automatizācijas procesos, informācijas un komunikācijas sistēmās, elektroniskajās ierīcēs un sadzīves ierīcēs,

| — | uzņēmums MESP: Singapūrā reģistrēts uzņēmums, kas nodarbojas ar MELCO liftu un eskalatoru piegādi, izplatīšanu, uzstādīšanu un apkopi. |
| --- | --- |

—

uzņēmums MESP: Singapūrā reģistrēts uzņēmums, kas nodarbojas ar MELCO liftu un eskalatoru piegādi, izplatīšanu, uzstādīšanu un apkopi.

| 3. | Iepriekšējā pārbaudē Komisija konstatē, ka uz paziņoto darījumu, iespējams, attiecas EK Apvienošanās regulas darbības joma. Tomēr galīgais lēmums šajā jautājumā netiek pieņemts. Ievērojot Komisijas paziņojumu par vienkāršotu procedūru noteiktu koncentrācijas procesu izskatīšanai saskaņā ar EK Apvienošanās regulu (2), jānorāda, ka šī lieta ir nododama izskatīšanai atbilstoši paziņojumā paredzētajai procedūrai. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Iepriekšējā pārbaudē Komisija konstatē, ka uz paziņoto darījumu, iespējams, attiecas EK Apvienošanās regulas darbības joma. Tomēr galīgais lēmums šajā jautājumā netiek pieņemts. Ievērojot Komisijas paziņojumu par vienkāršotu procedūru noteiktu koncentrācijas procesu izskatīšanai saskaņā ar EK Apvienošanās regulu (2), jānorāda, ka šī lieta ir nododama izskatīšanai atbilstoši paziņojumā paredzētajai procedūrai.

| 4. | Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus iespējamos novērojumus par ierosināto darbību.
  Novērojumiem jānonāk Komisijā ne vēlāk kā 10 dienas pēc šīs publikācijas datuma. Novērojumus Komisijai var nosūtīt pa faksu (+32 22964301), pa e-pastu uz adresi COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu vai pa pastu ar atsauces numuru COMP/M.6647 – Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore) uz šādu adresi:






  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus iespējamos novērojumus par ierosināto darbību.

Novērojumiem jānonāk Komisijā ne vēlāk kā 10 dienas pēc šīs publikācijas datuma. Novērojumus Komisijai var nosūtīt pa faksu (+32 22964301), pa e-pastu uz adresi COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu vai pa pastu ar atsauces numuru COMP/M.6647 – Mitsubishi Corporation/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation/Mitsubishi Elevator (Singapore) uz šādu adresi:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OV L 24, 29.1.2004., 1. lpp. (“EK Apvienošanās regula”).

(2)  OV C 56, 5.3.2005., 32. lpp. (“Paziņojums par vienkāršotu procedūru”).

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12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/43

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Iepriekšējs paziņojums par koncentrāciju

(Lieta COMP/M.6651 – Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings)

Lieta, kas pretendē uz vienkāršotu procedūru

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2012/C 204/07

| 1. | Komisija 2012. gada 5. jūlijā saņēma paziņojumu par ierosinātu koncentrāciju, ievērojot Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4. pantu, kuras rezultātā fondi, kurus konsultē un pārvalda uzņēmums The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”, ASV), un William C. Young kungs Apvienošanās regulas 3. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkta nozīmē iegūst kopīgu kontroli pār uzņēmumu Plastipak Holdings, Inc. (“Plastipak”, ASV), iegādājoties akcijas. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija 2012. gada 5. jūlijā saņēma paziņojumu par ierosinātu koncentrāciju, ievērojot Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4. pantu, kuras rezultātā fondi, kurus konsultē un pārvalda uzņēmums The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”, ASV), un William C. Young kungs Apvienošanās regulas 3. panta 1. punkta b) apakšpunkta nozīmē iegūst kopīgu kontroli pār uzņēmumu Plastipak Holdings, Inc. (“Plastipak”, ASV), iegādājoties akcijas.

| 2. | Attiecīgie uzņēmumi veic šādu uzņēmējdarbību:






  — | Goldman Sachs: globālas ieguldījumu banku darbības, vērtspapīru un ieguldījumu pārvaldības uzņēmums, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Attiecīgie uzņēmumi veic šādu uzņēmējdarbību:

—

Goldman Sachs: globālas ieguldījumu banku darbības, vērtspapīru un ieguldījumu pārvaldības uzņēmums,

| — | William C. Young: fiziska persona, kuras kontrolē ir vairāki uzņēmumi, |
| --- | --- |

—

William C. Young: fiziska persona, kuras kontrolē ir vairāki uzņēmumi,

| — | Plastipak: plastmasas sveķu, plastmasas iepakojuma konteineru un sagatavju ražotājs, iesaistīts arī pārstrādes darbībās patērētāju izlietotās pārstrādātās plastmasas izejvielu ražošanai. |
| --- | --- |

—

Plastipak: plastmasas sveķu, plastmasas iepakojuma konteineru un sagatavju ražotājs, iesaistīts arī pārstrādes darbībās patērētāju izlietotās pārstrādātās plastmasas izejvielu ražošanai.

| 3. | Iepriekšējā pārbaudē Komisija konstatē, ka uz paziņoto darījumu, iespējams, attiecas EK Apvienošanās regulas darbības joma. Tomēr galīgais lēmums šajā jautājumā netiek pieņemts. Ievērojot Komisijas paziņojumu par vienkāršotu procedūru noteiktu koncentrācijas procesu izskatīšanai saskaņā ar EK Apvienošanās regulu (2), jānorāda, ka šī lieta ir nododama izskatīšanai atbilstoši paziņojumā paredzētajai procedūrai. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Iepriekšējā pārbaudē Komisija konstatē, ka uz paziņoto darījumu, iespējams, attiecas EK Apvienošanās regulas darbības joma. Tomēr galīgais lēmums šajā jautājumā netiek pieņemts. Ievērojot Komisijas paziņojumu par vienkāršotu procedūru noteiktu koncentrācijas procesu izskatīšanai saskaņā ar EK Apvienošanās regulu (2), jānorāda, ka šī lieta ir nododama izskatīšanai atbilstoši paziņojumā paredzētajai procedūrai.

| 4. | Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus iespējamos novērojumus par ierosināto darbību.
  Novērojumiem jānonāk Komisijā ne vēlāk kā 10 dienas pēc šīs publikācijas datuma. Novērojumus Komisijai var nosūtīt pa faksu (+32 22964301), pa e-pastu uz adresi COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu vai pa pastu ar atsauces numuru COMP/M.6651 – Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings uz šādu adresi:






  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus iespējamos novērojumus par ierosināto darbību.

Novērojumiem jānonāk Komisijā ne vēlāk kā 10 dienas pēc šīs publikācijas datuma. Novērojumus Komisijai var nosūtīt pa faksu (+32 22964301), pa e-pastu uz adresi COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu vai pa pastu ar atsauces numuru COMP/M.6651 – Goldman Sachs/William C. Young/Plastipak Holdings uz šādu adresi:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OV L 24, 29.1.2004., 1. lpp. (“EK Apvienošanās regula”).

(2)  OV C 56, 5.3.2005., 32. lpp. (“Paziņojums par vienkāršotu procedūru”).

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| 12.7.2012 | LV | Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis | C 204/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.7.2012

LV

Eiropas Savienības Oficiālais Vēstnesis

C 204/44

---

Komisijas paziņojums, kas publicēts saskaņā ar Padomes Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 27. panta 4. punktu lietā COMP/39.654 — Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs)

(izziņots ar dokumenta numuru C(2012) 4873)

(Dokuments attiecas uz EEZ)

2012/C 204/08

1.   IEVADS

| 1. | Ja Komisija plāno pieņemt lēmumu, ar ko tā pieprasa izbeigt pārkāpumu, un iesaistītās puses piedāvā uzņemties saistības, lai panāktu atbilstību prasībām, kuras tām izteikusi Komisija savā sākotnējā vērtējumā, Komisija saskaņā ar 9. pantu Padomes 2002. gada 16. decembra Regulā (EK) Nr. 1/2003 (1) var nolemt padarīt šīs saistības uzņēmumiem saistošas. Šādu lēmumu var pieņemt uz noteiktu laika posmu, un tajā secina, ka Komisijas rīcībai vairs nav pamata. Atbilstīgi minētās regulas 27. panta 4. punktam Komisija publicē īsu lietas kopsavilkumu un saistību galveno saturu. Ieinteresētās personas var iesniegt savus apsvērumus termiņā, ko noteikusi Komisija. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ja Komisija plāno pieņemt lēmumu, ar ko tā pieprasa izbeigt pārkāpumu, un iesaistītās puses piedāvā uzņemties saistības, lai panāktu atbilstību prasībām, kuras tām izteikusi Komisija savā sākotnējā vērtējumā, Komisija saskaņā ar 9. pantu Padomes 2002. gada 16. decembra Regulā (EK) Nr. 1/2003 (1) var nolemt padarīt šīs saistības uzņēmumiem saistošas. Šādu lēmumu var pieņemt uz noteiktu laika posmu, un tajā secina, ka Komisijas rīcībai vairs nav pamata. Atbilstīgi minētās regulas 27. panta 4. punktam Komisija publicē īsu lietas kopsavilkumu un saistību galveno saturu. Ieinteresētās personas var iesniegt savus apsvērumus termiņā, ko noteikusi Komisija.

2.   LIETAS KOPSAVILKUMS

| 2. | Komisija 2011. gada 19. septembrī saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. panta 1. punktu pieņēma sākotnēju vērtējumu. Vērtējums attiecās uz finanšu informācijas pakalpojumiem, konkrētāk – konsolidētu datu saņemšanu reāllaikā (2). Tas ir adresēts Thomson Reuters Corporation un uzņēmumiem tā tiešā vai netiešā kontrolē, tostarp Reuters Limited (Thomson Reuters). Komisijai ir bažas, ka daži Thomson Reuters licencēšanas ierobežojošās prakses aspekti attiecībā uz Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC) varētu būt LESD 102. panta pārkāpums (3). Procedūra pret Thomson Reuters tika uzsākta 2009. gada 30. oktobrī. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Komisija 2011. gada 19. septembrī saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. panta 1. punktu pieņēma sākotnēju vērtējumu. Vērtējums attiecās uz finanšu informācijas pakalpojumiem, konkrētāk – konsolidētu datu saņemšanu reāllaikā (2). Tas ir adresēts Thomson Reuters Corporation un uzņēmumiem tā tiešā vai netiešā kontrolē, tostarp Reuters Limited (Thomson Reuters). Komisijai ir bažas, ka daži Thomson Reuters licencēšanas ierobežojošās prakses aspekti attiecībā uz Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC) varētu būt LESD 102. panta pārkāpums (3). Procedūra pret Thomson Reuters tika uzsākta 2009. gada 30. oktobrī.

| 3. | Saskaņā ar sākotnējo novērtējumu:






  a) | Thomson Reuters ir dominējošs stāvoklis pasaules tirgū attiecībā uz konsolidētu reāllaika datu avotiem (4); |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Saskaņā ar sākotnējo novērtējumu:

a)

Thomson Reuters ir dominējošs stāvoklis pasaules tirgū attiecībā uz konsolidētu reāllaika datu avotiem (4);

| b) | pastāv iespēja, ka Thomson Reuters ir ļaunprātīgi izmantojis savu dominējošo stāvokli, nosakot klientiem ierobežojumus RIC lietošanā. Thomson Reuters a) aizliedz klientiem izmantot RIC datu saņemšanai no konsolidētiem reāllaika datu avotiem, ko piedāvā citi pakalpojumu sniedzēji, un b) neļauj trešām personām veidot un uzturēt RIC saturošas atbilstības tabulas, kas nodrošinātu Thomson Reuters klientu sistēmu sadarbspēju ar citu pakalpojumu sniedzēju konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem (5); |
| --- | --- |

b)

pastāv iespēja, ka Thomson Reuters ir ļaunprātīgi izmantojis savu dominējošo stāvokli, nosakot klientiem ierobežojumus RIC lietošanā. Thomson Reuters a) aizliedz klientiem izmantot RIC datu saņemšanai no konsolidētiem reāllaika datu avotiem, ko piedāvā citi pakalpojumu sniedzēji, un b) neļauj trešām personām veidot un uzturēt RIC saturošas atbilstības tabulas, kas nodrošinātu Thomson Reuters klientu sistēmu sadarbspēju ar citu pakalpojumu sniedzēju konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem (5);

| c) | šie ierobežojumi, šķiet, var ievērojami traucēt pāreju uz citiem datu avotiem. Thomson Reuters klienti plaši izmanto RIC savās lietojumprogrammās, un darbinieki, kas apkalpo šīs lietojumprogrammas, ir labi iepazinuši RIC simbolus. Thomson Reuters noteikto ierobežojumu dēļ gadījumos, kad RIC ir iestrādāti lietojumprogrammās, pāreja pie cita pakalpojumu sniedzēja ir saistīta ar RIC izņemšanu un šo lietojumprogrammu pārkodēšanu, lai aizvietotu RIC ar alternatīviem simboliem. Tas ir darbietilpīgs un bieži vien arī pārāk dārgs pasākums. Saskaņā ar Komisijas provizorisko viedokli Thomson Reuters faktiski ir piesaistījis esošos klientus, kas izmanto konsolidētu reāllaika datu saņemšanu un kuru lietojumprogrammās ir iestrādāti RIC. Rezultātā citi pakalpojumu sniedzēji, kas piedāvā konsolidētu reāllaika datu saņemšanu, nevar efektīvi konkurēt ar Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotu tirgū. |
| --- | --- |

c)

šie ierobežojumi, šķiet, var ievērojami traucēt pāreju uz citiem datu avotiem. Thomson Reuters klienti plaši izmanto RIC savās lietojumprogrammās, un darbinieki, kas apkalpo šīs lietojumprogrammas, ir labi iepazinuši RIC simbolus. Thomson Reuters noteikto ierobežojumu dēļ gadījumos, kad RIC ir iestrādāti lietojumprogrammās, pāreja pie cita pakalpojumu sniedzēja ir saistīta ar RIC izņemšanu un šo lietojumprogrammu pārkodēšanu, lai aizvietotu RIC ar alternatīviem simboliem. Tas ir darbietilpīgs un bieži vien arī pārāk dārgs pasākums. Saskaņā ar Komisijas provizorisko viedokli Thomson Reuters faktiski ir piesaistījis esošos klientus, kas izmanto konsolidētu reāllaika datu saņemšanu un kuru lietojumprogrammās ir iestrādāti RIC. Rezultātā citi pakalpojumu sniedzēji, kas piedāvā konsolidētu reāllaika datu saņemšanu, nevar efektīvi konkurēt ar Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotu tirgū.

| 4. | Pirmā tirgus pārbaude saistībā ar sākotnējo priekšlikumu par saistībām, ko piedāvāja Thomson Reuters, tika uzsākta 2011. gada 14. decembrī (6). Tirgus dalībnieki tika aicināti iesniegt piezīmes līdz 2012. gada 25. janvārim. Ņemot vērā piezīmes, kas saņemtas šajā pirmajā tirgus pārbaudē, Thomson Reuters ievērojami pārskatīja saistību priekšlikumu, lai novērstu tirgus dalībnieku identificētos trūkumus attiecībā uz Komisijas izteiktajām bažām par konkurenci. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Pirmā tirgus pārbaude saistībā ar sākotnējo priekšlikumu par saistībām, ko piedāvāja Thomson Reuters, tika uzsākta 2011. gada 14. decembrī (6). Tirgus dalībnieki tika aicināti iesniegt piezīmes līdz 2012. gada 25. janvārim. Ņemot vērā piezīmes, kas saņemtas šajā pirmajā tirgus pārbaudē, Thomson Reuters ievērojami pārskatīja saistību priekšlikumu, lai novērstu tirgus dalībnieku identificētos trūkumus attiecībā uz Komisijas izteiktajām bažām par konkurenci.

| 5. | Pārskatītās saistības atšķiras no iepriekšējām vairākos aspektos. Galvenās izmaiņas ir šādas.






  a) | maksa par Extended RIC License (“ERL”) ir samazināta; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Pārskatītās saistības atšķiras no iepriekšējām vairākos aspektos. Galvenās izmaiņas ir šādas.

a)

maksa par Extended RIC License (“ERL”) ir samazināta;

| b) | ERL maksas struktūra vairs nav saistīta ar esošajām atlaidēm par Thomson Reuters konsolidētajiem reāllaika datu avotiem, tā nav tik sarežģīta un ir pārredzamāka; |
| --- | --- |

b)

ERL maksas struktūra vairs nav saistīta ar esošajām atlaidēm par Thomson Reuters konsolidētajiem reāllaika datu avotiem, tā nav tik sarežģīta un ir pārredzamāka;

| c) | klienti, kuru uzņēmējdarbība notiek EEZ (7), var izmantot ERL visā pasaulē; |
| --- | --- |

c)

klienti, kuru uzņēmējdarbība notiek EEZ (7), var izmantot ERL visā pasaulē;

| d) | ERL ietver RIC par viena avota OTC instrumentiem ar noteikumu, ka attiecīgais datu sniedzējs tam piekrīt (ja vien pārejas brīdī Thomson Reuters nav vienīgais OTC datu piedāvātājs); |
| --- | --- |

d)

ERL ietver RIC par viena avota OTC instrumentiem ar noteikumu, ka attiecīgais datu sniedzējs tam piekrīt (ja vien pārejas brīdī Thomson Reuters nav vienīgais OTC datu piedāvātājs);

| e) | ERL ietver saskarnes serveru lietojumprogrammām (bez papildu samaksas); |
| --- | --- |

e)

ERL ietver saskarnes serveru lietojumprogrammām (bez papildu samaksas);

| f) | papildus sākotnējam 5 gadu periodam, kura laikā ERL ir pieejama abonēšanai, klientiem par nominālu samaksu ir iespējams pagarināt abonēšanas periodu vēl par 2 gadiem; kā arī |
| --- | --- |

f)

papildus sākotnējam 5 gadu periodam, kura laikā ERL ir pieejama abonēšanai, klientiem par nominālu samaksu ir iespējams pagarināt abonēšanas periodu vēl par 2 gadiem; kā arī

| g) | neatkarīgiem izstrādātājiem būs pieejama atsevišķa licence, kas ļaus izstrādāt, uzturēt un pārdot klientiem pārejas rīkus, kas tiem atvieglotu pāreju pie cita piedāvātāja. |
| --- | --- |

g)

neatkarīgiem izstrādātājiem būs pieejama atsevišķa licence, kas ļaus izstrādāt, uzturēt un pārdot klientiem pārejas rīkus, kas tiem atvieglotu pāreju pie cita piedāvātāja.

3.   PĀRSKATĪTO SAISTĪBU GALVENAIS SATURS

| 6. | Thomson Reuters nepiekrīt Komisijas sākotnējam vērtējumam. Lai kliedētu Komisijas bažas par konkurenci, tas tomēr piekrita uzņemties saistības saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. pantu. Turpmāk sniegts Thomson Reuters piedāvāto saistību (“saistības”) īss apkopojums. Saistību nekonfidenciālā versija ir pilnībā publicēta angļu valodā Komisijas Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē šādā adresē:
  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html |
| --- | --- |

6.

Thomson Reuters nepiekrīt Komisijas sākotnējam vērtējumam. Lai kliedētu Komisijas bažas par konkurenci, tas tomēr piekrita uzņemties saistības saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. pantu. Turpmāk sniegts Thomson Reuters piedāvāto saistību (“saistības”) īss apkopojums. Saistību nekonfidenciālā versija ir pilnībā publicēta angļu valodā Komisijas Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē šādā adresē:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html

| 7. | Saistību saturs ir Thomson Reuters piedāvātā licence esošajiem un turpmākajiem RT Service
   (8) klientiem (ERL), ar kuru tiem piedāvā iespēju izmantot papildu lietošanas tiesības uz RIC simboliem nolūkā mainīt konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājus. Šāda licence ļauj klientiem par mēneša licences maksu izmantot RIC, lai iegūtu reāllaika finanšu datus no Thomson Reuters konkurentu piedāvātajiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem nolūkā pārslēgt dažas vai visas no to serveru lietojumprogrammām uz alternatīviem konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājiem. Turklāt Thomson Reuters piedāvātu ERL licences turētājiem regulārus un savlaicīgus attiecīgo RIC atjauninājumus, vajadzības gadījumā iekļaujot nepieciešamo ar RIC saistīto informāciju (t. i., ziņas par attiecīgo tirdzniecības vietu, avotu, oficiālo kodu, valūtu un/vai aprakstu). ERL neietekmē RIC lietošanas tiesības, kuras klientiem jau ir piešķirtas atbilstoši to pašreizējām līgumattiecībām ar Thomson Reuters. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Saistību saturs ir Thomson Reuters piedāvātā licence esošajiem un turpmākajiem RT Service
   (8) klientiem (ERL), ar kuru tiem piedāvā iespēju izmantot papildu lietošanas tiesības uz RIC simboliem nolūkā mainīt konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājus. Šāda licence ļauj klientiem par mēneša licences maksu izmantot RIC, lai iegūtu reāllaika finanšu datus no Thomson Reuters konkurentu piedāvātajiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem nolūkā pārslēgt dažas vai visas no to serveru lietojumprogrammām uz alternatīviem konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājiem. Turklāt Thomson Reuters piedāvātu ERL licences turētājiem regulārus un savlaicīgus attiecīgo RIC atjauninājumus, vajadzības gadījumā iekļaujot nepieciešamo ar RIC saistīto informāciju (t. i., ziņas par attiecīgo tirdzniecības vietu, avotu, oficiālo kodu, valūtu un/vai aprakstu). ERL neietekmē RIC lietošanas tiesības, kuras klientiem jau ir piešķirtas atbilstoši to pašreizējām līgumattiecībām ar Thomson Reuters.

| 8. | Saistības attiecas uz i) klientiem, kas vēlas daļēji un/vai pilnībā pāriet no Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem uz alternatīviem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem; un ii) klientiem, kas papildus Thomson Reuters RT service vēlas abonēt trešo personu piedāvātus konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotus, vienlaikus neatsakoties no Thomson Reuters pakalpojuma (piemēram, kā rezerves risinājumu ārkārtas pārtraukumu gadījumā vai nolūkā testēt funkcijas un uzticamību jauniem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Saistības attiecas uz i) klientiem, kas vēlas daļēji un/vai pilnībā pāriet no Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem uz alternatīviem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem; un ii) klientiem, kas papildus Thomson Reuters RT service vēlas abonēt trešo personu piedāvātus konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotus, vienlaikus neatsakoties no Thomson Reuters pakalpojuma (piemēram, kā rezerves risinājumu ārkārtas pārtraukumu gadījumā vai nolūkā testēt funkcijas un uzticamību jauniem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotiem).

| 9. | Ja notiek daļēja pāreja, Thomson Reuters apņemas klientiem, kas pāriet pie citiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājiem, nepiemērot diskriminējošus noteikumus attiecībā uz Thomson Reuters RT Service. Klientiem, kas izmanto ERL, lai pilnībā pārietu no Thomson Reuters pie citiem piedāvātājiem, netiek prasīts abonēt nekādu citu Thomson Reuters piedāvāto licenci vai pakalpojumu. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Ja notiek daļēja pāreja, Thomson Reuters apņemas klientiem, kas pāriet pie citiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājiem, nepiemērot diskriminējošus noteikumus attiecībā uz Thomson Reuters RT Service. Klientiem, kas izmanto ERL, lai pilnībā pārietu no Thomson Reuters pie citiem piedāvātājiem, netiek prasīts abonēt nekādu citu Thomson Reuters piedāvāto licenci vai pakalpojumu.

| 10. | Klientiem būs iespēja abonēt ERL 5 gadu laikā. Turklāt klienti, kas nebūs abonējuši ERL sākotnējā piecu gadu perioda laikā, varēs iegādāties opciju abonēt ERL par administrācijas maksu USD 150 mēnesī. Šī opcija ir jāizmanto 2 gadu laikā pēc sākotnējā 5 gadu abonēšanas termiņa (tādējādi piedāvājot klientiem iespēju abonēt ERL 7 gadu laikā). Pēc abonēšanas paplašināto licenci klienti, maksājot attiecīgo maksu, var izmantot bez laika ierobežojumiem. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Klientiem būs iespēja abonēt ERL 5 gadu laikā. Turklāt klienti, kas nebūs abonējuši ERL sākotnējā piecu gadu perioda laikā, varēs iegādāties opciju abonēt ERL par administrācijas maksu USD 150 mēnesī. Šī opcija ir jāizmanto 2 gadu laikā pēc sākotnējā 5 gadu abonēšanas termiņa (tādējādi piedāvājot klientiem iespēju abonēt ERL 7 gadu laikā). Pēc abonēšanas paplašināto licenci klienti, maksājot attiecīgo maksu, var izmantot bez laika ierobežojumiem.

| 11. | Šis koriģējošais pasākums tiktu piemērots visiem RIC simboliem, kas ir tieši saistīti ar atsevišķa finanšu instrumenta cenu vai indeksa vērtību, kas ietverti Thomson Reuters RT service, cita starpā i) biržas datiem un daudzpusējām tirdzniecības sistēmām (MTF); un ii) OTC instrumentiem, kas nav reģistrēti biržās vai MTF. Pēc klientu pieprasījuma (ja attiecīgais datu sniedzējs tam piekrīt) saistībās ietver ārpusbiržas instrumentus, par kuriem Thomson Reuters iegūst datus tikai no viena avota, kas ir identificējams ar konkrēto RIC (“viena avota RIC”). RIC, par kuriem saturs ir pieejams tikai no Thomson Reuters, nav ietverti saistībās, ja vien šo saturu datu sniedzējs nav darījis pieejamu konkurējošam konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājam, pie kura pāriet klients. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Šis koriģējošais pasākums tiktu piemērots visiem RIC simboliem, kas ir tieši saistīti ar atsevišķa finanšu instrumenta cenu vai indeksa vērtību, kas ietverti Thomson Reuters RT service, cita starpā i) biržas datiem un daudzpusējām tirdzniecības sistēmām (MTF); un ii) OTC instrumentiem, kas nav reģistrēti biržās vai MTF. Pēc klientu pieprasījuma (ja attiecīgais datu sniedzējs tam piekrīt) saistībās ietver ārpusbiržas instrumentus, par kuriem Thomson Reuters iegūst datus tikai no viena avota, kas ir identificējams ar konkrēto RIC (“viena avota RIC”). RIC, par kuriem saturs ir pieejams tikai no Thomson Reuters, nav ietverti saistībās, ja vien šo saturu datu sniedzējs nav darījis pieejamu konkurējošam konsolidēto reāllaika datu piedāvātājam, pie kura pāriet klients.

| 12. | Turklāt Thomson Reuters savlaicīgi piedāvās informāciju, kas ir vajadzīga, lai atvieglotu klientiem savstarpēju norāžu veidošanu starp RIC un citu piedāvātāju simboliem. |
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12.

Turklāt Thomson Reuters savlaicīgi piedāvās informāciju, kas ir vajadzīga, lai atvieglotu klientiem savstarpēju norāžu veidošanu starp RIC un citu piedāvātāju simboliem.

| 13. | Ierosināto licenci var izmantot serveru lietojumprogrammās visā pasaulē, ja klients veic uzņēmējdarbību EEZ. |
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13.

Ierosināto licenci var izmantot serveru lietojumprogrammās visā pasaulē, ja klients veic uzņēmējdarbību EEZ.

| 14. | Mēneša maksa par ERL licenci, ko Thomson Reuters paredz iekasēt, ir progresīva un atkarīga no RIC simbolu skaita, par kuriem klients vēlas saņemt licenci datu saņemšanai no konkurenta. Par pirmajiem 50 000RIC klients maksās USD 0,01 par RIC mēnesī. Maksa par vienu RIC samazināsies, pieaugot RIC skaitam, par kuriem klientiem vēlas saņemt licenci (9). Maksājumu grafiks ietver arī minimālo mēneša maksu USD 750 apmērā. |
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14.

Mēneša maksa par ERL licenci, ko Thomson Reuters paredz iekasēt, ir progresīva un atkarīga no RIC simbolu skaita, par kuriem klients vēlas saņemt licenci datu saņemšanai no konkurenta. Par pirmajiem 50 000RIC klients maksās USD 0,01 par RIC mēnesī. Maksa par vienu RIC samazināsies, pieaugot RIC skaitam, par kuriem klientiem vēlas saņemt licenci (9). Maksājumu grafiks ietver arī minimālo mēneša maksu USD 750 apmērā.

| 15. | Maksas sedz papildu lietošanas tiesības RIC simboliem un izmaksas par pakalpojumu, ko Thomson Reuters sniedz klientiem atbilstoši saistībām. Thomson Reuters apgalvo, ka maksas līmenis veido tikai ļoti nelielu daļu no Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu cenas tādam pašam licencēto RIC apjomam un lietojumam. Sīkāku informāciju par ERL maksājumu grafiku lūdzam skatīt saistību nekonfidenciālajā versijā, kas publicēta Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē (III pielikums). |
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15.

Maksas sedz papildu lietošanas tiesības RIC simboliem un izmaksas par pakalpojumu, ko Thomson Reuters sniedz klientiem atbilstoši saistībām. Thomson Reuters apgalvo, ka maksas līmenis veido tikai ļoti nelielu daļu no Thomson Reuters konsolidēto reāllaika datu cenas tādam pašam licencēto RIC apjomam un lietojumam. Sīkāku informāciju par ERL maksājumu grafiku lūdzam skatīt saistību nekonfidenciālajā versijā, kas publicēta Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē (III pielikums).

| 16. | Saistības arī dod iespēju neatkarīgiem izstrādātājiem izstrādāt un uzturēt pārejas rīkus (t. i., atbilstības tabulas) klientu uzdevumā. Atbilstošie trešo pušu izstrādātāji (izslēdzot tirgus datu pārdevējus) par mēneša licences maksu var izmantot un turēt RIC pārējas rīkos, ko tie izstrādā vairāku klientu vajadzībām. |
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16.

Saistības arī dod iespēju neatkarīgiem izstrādātājiem izstrādāt un uzturēt pārejas rīkus (t. i., atbilstības tabulas) klientu uzdevumā. Atbilstošie trešo pušu izstrādātāji (izslēdzot tirgus datu pārdevējus) par mēneša licences maksu var izmantot un turēt RIC pārējas rīkos, ko tie izstrādā vairāku klientu vajadzībām.

| 17. | Iepriekš aprakstītās neatkarīgo izstrādāju tiesības ir iekļautas atsevišķā neatkarīgā izstrādātāja licencē, kas ierosinātajām saistībām ir pievienota kā II pielikums. Neatkarīgajiem izstrādātājiem jāmaksā tāda pati maksa kā klientiem, taču to mēneša maksu maksimālā summa ir USD 3 750 un minimālā mēneša maksa ir tikai USD 250. Neatkarīgie izstrādātāji var saņemt atbalstu no citiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotu pārdevējiem, sagatavojot atbilstības tabulas šo pārdevēju simboliem, un viņi drīkstēs veikt kopīgus reklāmas pasākumus klientu piesaistīšanai. |
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17.

Iepriekš aprakstītās neatkarīgo izstrādāju tiesības ir iekļautas atsevišķā neatkarīgā izstrādātāja licencē, kas ierosinātajām saistībām ir pievienota kā II pielikums. Neatkarīgajiem izstrādātājiem jāmaksā tāda pati maksa kā klientiem, taču to mēneša maksu maksimālā summa ir USD 3 750 un minimālā mēneša maksa ir tikai USD 250. Neatkarīgie izstrādātāji var saņemt atbalstu no citiem konsolidēto reāllaika datu avotu pārdevējiem, sagatavojot atbilstības tabulas šo pārdevēju simboliem, un viņi drīkstēs veikt kopīgus reklāmas pasākumus klientu piesaistīšanai.

4.   AICINĀJUMS IESNIEGT PIEZĪMES

| 18. | Komisija atkarībā no tirgus pārbaudes rezultātiem plāno pieņemt lēmumu saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. panta 1. punktu, ar ko tā pasludinātu par saistošām iepriekš apkopotās un Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē publicētās pārskatītās saistības. Ja saistībās būs izdarītas būtiskas izmaiņas, tiks uzsākta jauna tirgus pārbaude. |
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18.

Komisija atkarībā no tirgus pārbaudes rezultātiem plāno pieņemt lēmumu saskaņā ar Regulas (EK) Nr. 1/2003 9. panta 1. punktu, ar ko tā pasludinātu par saistošām iepriekš apkopotās un Konkurences ģenerāldirektorāta tīmekļa vietnē publicētās pārskatītās saistības. Ja saistībās būs izdarītas būtiskas izmaiņas, tiks uzsākta jauna tirgus pārbaude.

| 19. | Saskaņā ar 27. panta 4. punktu Regulā (EK) Nr. 1/2003 Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus apsvērumus par saistībām. |
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19.

Saskaņā ar 27. panta 4. punktu Regulā (EK) Nr. 1/2003 Komisija aicina ieinteresētās trešās personas iesniegt tai savus apsvērumus par saistībām.

| 20. | Piezīmes vēlams pamatot un minēt tajās attiecīgos faktus. Ja jūs konstatējat problēmu saistībā ar kādu ierosināto saistību daļu, lūdzam ierosināt iespējamo risinājumu. |
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20.

Piezīmes vēlams pamatot un minēt tajās attiecīgos faktus. Ja jūs konstatējat problēmu saistībā ar kādu ierosināto saistību daļu, lūdzam ierosināt iespējamo risinājumu.

| 21. | Termiņš apsvērumu iesniegšanai ir četras nedēļas pēc šā paziņojuma publikācijas. Ieinteresētās personas tiek aicinātas iesniegt arī piezīmju nekonfidenciālu versiju, kuras tekstā komercnoslēpumi un citas konfidenciālas vietas tekstā ir svītrotas un pēc vajadzības aizstātas ar nekonfidenciālu kopsavilkumu vai ar vārdiem “komercnoslēpumi” vai “konfidenciāli”. |
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21.

Termiņš apsvērumu iesniegšanai ir četras nedēļas pēc šā paziņojuma publikācijas. Ieinteresētās personas tiek aicinātas iesniegt arī piezīmju nekonfidenciālu versiju, kuras tekstā komercnoslēpumi un citas konfidenciālas vietas tekstā ir svītrotas un pēc vajadzības aizstātas ar nekonfidenciālu kopsavilkumu vai ar vārdiem “komercnoslēpumi” vai “konfidenciāli”.

| 22. | Piezīmes Komisijai ar atsauces numuru COMP/39.654 – RIC var nosūtīt pa e-pastu (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), pa faksu (fakss +32 22950128) vai pa pastu uz šādu adresi:






  European Commission |
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| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Antitrust Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

22.

Piezīmes Komisijai ar atsauces numuru COMP/39.654 – RIC var nosūtīt pa e-pastu (COMP-GREFFE-ANTITRUST@ec.europa.eu), pa faksu (fakss +32 22950128) vai pa pastu uz šādu adresi:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Antitrust Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OV L 1, 4.1.2003., 1. lpp. No 2009. gada 1. decembra EK līguma 81. un 82. pants kļuva par Līguma par Eiropas Savienības darbību 101. un 102. pantu. Šie divi noteikumu kopumi pēc būtības ir identiski. Šajā paziņojumā atsauces uz LESD 101. un 102. pantu vajadzības gadījumā jāsaprot kā atsauces uz EK līguma 81. un 82. pantu.

(2)  Šī lieta attiecas tieši uz konsolidētu reāllaika datu saņemšanu un neattiecas uz reāllaika datiem, ko nodod ar galddatoru produktiem vai ar tiešām datu plūsmām. Turklāt konkurences bažas attiecas tikai uz reāllaika tirgus datiem un neattiecas uz atsauces datiem un dienas beigu datu pakalpojumiem.

(3)  Atbilstoši Thomson Reuters informācijai RIC ir burtciparu kodi, kas ir izguves mehānisms, ko Thomson Reuters ir izveidojis un nodrošina saviem klientiem kā daļu no Thomson Reuters finanšu informācijas pakalpojumiem, lai identificētu, pārlūkotu un izgūtu saistītu datu strukturētu kopumu no Thomson Reuters reāllaika datu bāzēm un izplatīšanas tīkla (IDN – integrēts datu tīkls).

(4)  Tirgus izpēte apliecināja, ka datu tiešās plūsmas, ko klientiem tieši piedāvā biržas vai MTF, ir atsevišķa produkta tirgus.

(5)  Thomson Reuters apgalvo, ka tas neaizliedz saviem klientiem, kas izmanto konsolidēto datu saņemšanu reāllaikā, veidot savstarpējas norādes starp RIC un citu pakalpojumu sniedzēju simboliem, ja vien iegūtā datubāze vai atbilstības tabula netiek izmantota, lai iegūtu datus no cita pakalpojumu sniedzēja. Citiem vārdiem, Thomson Reuters neaizliedz veidot atbilstības tabulas pašas par sevi, taču iebilst pret tiešu vai netiešu RIC izmantošanu reāllaika datu saņemšanai no citiem pakalpojumu sniedzējiem.

(6)  OV C 364, 14.12.2011., 21. lpp.

(7)  Šo saistību nolūkiem EEZ ietver arī Šveici.

(8)  Thomson Reuters pakalpojumu konsolidēto reāllaika datu saņemšanai un lietošanai uzņēmuma mērogā pārdod ar nosaukumu Thomson Reuters Real-time Service (“RT Service” – iepriekš pazīstams ar nosaukumu Reuters Datascope Real-Time Service jeb RDRT) lietošanai serveru lietojumprogrammās. Šo saistību nolūkā RT Service definīcija ir paplašināta, lai attiecinātu to uz visām pārējām Thomson Reuters reāllaika datu licencēm, ar kurām licencē datus lietošanai uzņēmuma līmenī serveru lietojumprogrammās. Personāls arī varēs turpināt lietot RIC lietojumprogrammu lietotāju saskarnēs, kas saistītas ar serveru lietojumprogrammām, nolūkā piekļūt, aplūkot un apstiprināt datus no cita pārdevēja konsolidētajiem reāllaika datu avotiem, lai sekmētu pāreju bez papildu maksas. Lietojumprogrammas, kas šobrīd saņem datus saskaņā ar Thomson Reuters galddatoru licencēm individuālai lietošanai (un nevis lietošanai uzņēmuma līmenī), ir ārpus ierosināto saistību jomas.

(9)  No 50 001 līdz 500 000RIC maksa par vienu RIC būs USD 0,005; no 500 001 līdz 3 000 000RIC tā būs USD 0,002 un virs 3 000 001 – USD 0,001. Maksas tiks palielinātas atbilstoši vispārējai inflācijai.

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