2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-15-2002

Rowe v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-1878

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Rowe v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 733.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/733
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ______________________ 

 

 No: 02-1878 

 _____________________ 

 

 ELLA HAIRSTON, o/b/o 

 RAYMONN L. ROWE 

 

 v. 

 JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

 Commissioner of Social Security 

 

 Raymonn L. Rowe, 

 Appellant 

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-1550) 

 District Judge: Honorable Alan Bloch 

 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 on October 15, 2002 

 

 Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH 

 and ROSENN Circuit Judges 

 

 (Opinion filed: November 15, 2002 ) 

 

 O P I N I O N 

 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 Ella Hairston o/b/o Raymonn Rowe, a minor, appeals the judgment of the District 

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, affirming the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s final decision denying plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income (SSI) 

benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1381. Raymonn 

Rowe is a minor child, who has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 

Disorder (ADHD). Ella Hairston, his mother, requested benefits under the Act and its 

applicable provisions. Hairston contends that the District Court erred in its determination 

that the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of SSI benefits was supported by 

substantial evidence. In addition, Hairston challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that her 

statements regarding Raymonn’s functional limitations were not entirely credible. 

 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 to review the district 
court’s final order. Review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to 

determining whether that decision is supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. 

405(g); Monsour Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986). "Overall, 

the substantial evidence standard is deferential and includes deference to inferences 

drawn from the facts if they, in turn, are supported by substantial evidence." Schaudeck 

v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(citing Monsour, 806 F.2d at 1190-91). For the following reasons, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

 The final rules for determining minor disability benefits define the statutory 

standard of "marked and severe limitations" in terms of an impairment that meets, 

medically equals, or functionally equals the severity of an impairment in the listing. 20 

C.F.R. 416.924(d). A child’s functional limitations will be evaluated in the following 

domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) 

interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) 

caring for herself or himself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. 

416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). A medically determinable impairment or combination of 

impairments functionally equals a listed impairment if it results in "marked" limitations in 

two domains of functioning or an "extreme" limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. 

416.926a(e)(2). A marked limitation exists when an impairment seriously interferes with 

the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. 

416.926a(e)(2). 

 Hairston claims that Raymonn’s limitations are functionally equivalent to a listing 

under the Act. Substantial evidence exists, however, to show that Raymonn did not have 

two marked limitations or one extreme limitation in any functional domain. When 

analyzing the first domain of acquiring and using information, the Commissioner 

considers how well a child acquires or learns information and how well the child uses that 

information. 20 C.F.R. 416.926a(g). The ALJ found that Raymonn had mild to 

moderate, but less than marked limitation of function. We find there is substantial 

evidence to affirm this. Raymonn achieved average grades with fifty percent special 

education placement. Also, his tests indicated he fell within the average to low-average 

range for his age group in reading, mathematics, language, and writing performance. Dr. 

Pacella had noted that Raymonn had adequate language development and good problem 

solving abilities, and his school work improved once he was medicated on Adderall. 

 Second, there is substantial evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that Raymonn had 

no more than a moderate limitation in his ability to attend and complete tasks. The 

Commissioner considers how well a child begins, carries through, and finishes his or her 

activities. 20 C.F.R. 416.926a(h). The record reveals that Raymonn did not have more 

than a moderate limitation in his ability to attend and complete tasks. Upon starting 

Ritalin, his activity level improved to a good level, Ms. Kline reported he worked hard 

and had the ability to pay attention, and Dr. Pacella found no signs of distractability or 

hyperactivity. 

 Third, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Raymonn 

did not have more than a moderate limitation in his ability to interact. Once starting 

Ritalin, his mother stated his aggressive behavior towards his brother decreased, Ms. 

Kline stated he related well to other children, Dr. Pacella found him to be quiet and 

cooperative, and during his visit to St. Vincent hospital, he was easily engaged in 

conversation with the doctor. Raymonn’s interactions also improved once he switched to 

the medication Aderrall. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. 

 Hairston failed to assert a marked limitation in the remaining three domains. We 

find substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Raymonn did not have a 

limitation in those domains. 

 Finally, Hairston argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that her statements did 

not credibly establish marked and severe limitation of function. There is, however, 

substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the ALJ. It is for the ALJ to make 

these findings and to resolve the conflicts in evidence. See Monsour Medical Center, 806 

F.2d. at 1190-91. Here, the ALJ did so in favor of the Commissioner. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 
TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing Opinion. 

 By the Court, 

 /s/ Jane R. Roth 

 Circuit Judge