In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16-4085

CEDRIC J. SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 4:14-cv-4009 — Harold A. Baker, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 18, 2017 — DECIDED JUNE 23, 2017

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Cedric Smith brought suit against

the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 2671, et seq., for injuries he sustained when he fell off

a stool at the federal courthouse in Rock Island, Illinois. Smith

relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to impute negligence

to the government. The district court concluded that Smith had

not made a showing sufficient to trigger the res ipsa loquitur
2 No. 16-4085

inference of negligence. R. 12. We find to the contrary and

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

As the case was decided on summary judgment, we take

the facts in the light most favorable to Smith. E.g., Vega v. New

Forest Home Cemetery, LLC, 856 F.3d 1130, 1131 (7th Cir. 2017). 

On the morning of January 18, 2013, Smith was transported

from the Rock Island County Jail to the U.S. District Courthouse in Rock Island to be arraigned on a federal weapons

charge. Following the arraignment before Judge Darrow,

deputy U.S. marshals took Smith to an interview room so that

he could meet with his appointed counsel to discuss the case. 

The U.S. Marshals Service maintains two secure attorney

interview rooms in the courthouse where lawyers may confer

with clients who are in the government’s custody. The Marshals Service inspects the furniture and equipment in the

rooms on a weekly basis. The room to which Smith was taken

is divided in half by a wall with a large screened opening that

enables the lawyer sitting on one side of the screen to speak

with his (detained) client sitting on the other. On the detainee’s

side of the room there is a metal stool attached to the wall by

means of a swing-arm that permits the stool to be positioned

in front of the wire screen or moved out of the way to accommodate a detainee in a wheelchair. The Marshals Service

controls access to the room, escorting a detainee like Smith into

his side of the room and separately buzzing the attorney into

the other half of the room by means of an electronic lock.

Typically, a detainee’s handcuffs are removed when he is

brought into the room, but his leg irons are left in place.
No. 16-4085 3

According to Smith, when he entered the interview room

and sat down on the stool (which was already positioned in

front of the screen), the stool “broke” and tilted backwards,

with the front of the stool rising and the back descending,

causing him to fall to the floor and strike his head. As he

looked up from the floor at the underside of the stool, he could

see that there were bolts missing. When he tried to balance

himself on the stool as he lifted himself from the floor, it

wobbled again. 

Smith’s attorney summoned a court security officer to help

Smith, and he was sent back to the Rock Island County Jail

with instructions that he be seen immediately by the jail nurse.

When the nurse examined Smith and noted that his speech was

slurred, she arranged for him to be taken to the emergency

room at a local hospital. There he was treated for a stroke. By

his own account, Smith continues to suffer a variety of adverse

effects from the incident, including weakness on the left side of

his body, difficulty speaking, headaches, and memory impairment. 

Smith avers that when he returned to the Rock Island

courthouse at a later date and used the same interview room,

he examined the stool and found that it had been welded into

place. The stool no longer wobbled.

Smith filed an administrative tort claim against the Marshals Service alleging that the stool was broken on January 18,

2013, and that he had fallen and struck his head as a result.

That claim was denied.
4 No. 16-4085

Smith then brought suit against the government under the

FTCA.1 The district court recruited counsel to represent him

pro bono. Smith asserted multiple claims below, but the sole

claim that he pursues on appeal is one of ordinary negligence.

That claim is premised on the theory that the government

breached the duty of care that it owed to Smith to maintain

reasonably safe premises at the courthouse and in particular to

keep the stool in the interview room in a condition safe for use.

Smith relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to impute

negligence to the government. Smith reasoned that the

government (through the Marshals Service) controlled access

to the room; that it inspected the equipment in the room and

was responsible for maintenance of that equipment, including

the stool; and that the stool did not function as intended when

it caused him to fall to the floor. These circumstances, Smith

asserted, supported an inference that negligence on the part of

the government was the cause of the mishap.

Judge Baker, however, was not convinced that the facts

warranted resort to the res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence. He noted that the ill-fated conference between Smith

and his counsel took place at approximately 11 a.m.; consequently, “[i]t is possible that others could have damaged the

seat earlier that day or in the days prior. It is also possible that

[Smith] could have, through inadvertence or otherwise,

damaged the seat himself.” R. 12 at 8–9. For that matter, the

judge noted, Smith might have simply tilted backward and

Smith initially named the U.S. Attorney General and the Marshals Service

1

as defendants, but the district court ordered the United States to be

substituted as the appropriate defendant. R. 9 at 2 ¶ 2.
No. 16-4085 5

fallen off the stool without the stool having malfunctioned in

any way. Id. at 9. In sum, the facts did not support an inference

that negligence on the part of the government was the only

explanation for the fall. Id.

II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision

de novo. E.g., Vega, supra, 856 F.3d at 1132. As we explain

below, because the evidence that Smith presented to the court

was sufficient to meet the criteria for application of the res ipsa

loquitur doctrine, a factfinder could infer that the government

was negligent. The decision to enter summary judgment in the

government’s favor was thus in error. 

The FTCA incorporates the substantive law of the state

where the alleged tort occurred. E.g., Buscaglia v. United States,

25 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, Smith’s negligence claim

is subject to Illinois law, which requires him to establish that

the government owed him a duty of care, that it breached that

duty, and that the breach proximately caused his injuries. See,

e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 270 (Ill. 2007). 

There is no dispute that the government owed Smith, as a

detainee in its custody, a duty of care. The government

concedes that “it owes a duty to provide pretrial detainees, like

Smith, with a reasonably safe environment and to maintain the

premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Government Brief 13.

The focus of the parties’ dispute is on whether Smith has

presented enough evidence to permit the inference that the

government breached its duty to Smith with respect to the

stool.
6 No. 16-4085

Lacking direct evidence of negligence on the government’s

part, Smith resorts to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (“the

thing speaks for itself”). See Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d

639, 649 (7th Cir. 2016). In circumstances where such proof is

primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant,

this doctrine permits the plaintiff to resort to a particular type

of circumstantial evidence as support for the notion that the

defendant was negligent. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d

324, 339 (Ill. 1990); Metz v. Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 207

N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ill. 1965); Aguirre v. Turner Constr. Co., 501

F.3d 825, 831 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois law). To wit, if the plaintiff

can show that he was injured (1) in circumstances that ordinarily would not occur absent negligence, (2) by an agency or

instrumentalitywithinthedefendant’smanagement or control,

then res ipsa loquitur permits the factfinder to infer that the

defendant was negligent. Metz, 207 N.E.2d at 307; see also

Heastie v. Roberts, 877 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (Ill. 2007); Gatlin v.

Ruder, 560 N.E.2d 586, 590–91 (Ill. 1990). Other evidence may

point to a contrary conclusion, and proof sufficient to trigger

the res ipsa loquitur doctrine permits but does not compel the

inference that the defendant was negligent. Metz, 207 N.E.2d at

307. But if Smith’s proof satisfies the criteria for res ipsa

loquitur, then he has shown enough to preclude summary

judgment on the question of negligence. See id. (adopting view

that “the inference, or presumption, [of negligence] does not

simply vanish or disappear when contrary evidence appears,

but remains to be considered with all the other evidence in the

case and must be weighed by the jury against the direct
No. 16-4085 7

evidence offered by the party charged”); see also Imig v. Beck,

503 N.E.2d 324, 329–30 (Ill. 1986).2

The evidence satisfies the first of the two criteria. A properly functioning stool of the type described should not wobble

so as to tip its occupant onto the floor. But, on Smith’s representation of the facts, wobble it did. The scenario Smith has

described bespeaks a malfunctioning stool, and the malfunction—which would pose a hazard to anyone using the

stool—points to negligence. See Robinson v. Peoples Gas Light &

Coke Co., 64 N.E.2d 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946) (abstract of op.) (res

ipsa loquitur applied where customer in defendant’s sales

room invited to sit in folding chair and chair collapsed when

customer sat down; on subsequent inspection, rivet on side of

chair observed to have come out of slot); Hunter v. Alfina, 251

N.E.2d 303, 305–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (summarizing facts of

Robinson and collecting cases in which res ipsa loquitur has

been applied to collapse of seating devices in business establishments). 

Although the government has contended that Smith must present 2

additional evidence that it had notice of any problem with the stool, see

Schmid v. Fairmont Hotel Co.-Chicago, 803 N.E.2d 166, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)

(liability under rules of ordinary negligence requires some knowledge,

actual or constructive, of danger complained of) (quoting Prater v. Veach,

181 N.E.2d 739, 741 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)), the inference triggered by the res

ipsa loquitur doctrine would include the proposition that the defendanthad

notice of the defective nature of the instrumentality that caused the

plaintiff’s injury. See Higgins v. White Sox Baseball Club, Inc., 787 F.2d 1125,

1129 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois law); DeBello v. Checker Taxi Co., 290 N.E.2d 367,

370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). 
8 No. 16-4085

Judge Baker cited the possibility that Smith might simply

have fallen from the stool without it having malfunctioned in

any way; and the government pursues the same point on

appeal. See Britton v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 889 N.E.2d 706,

709 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“if two reasonable inferences are

deducible from the same facts, one of which comports with

defendant’s responsibility and the other is directly contra

thereto, neither should be indulged to permit recovery by use

of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ... ”); Nickel v. Hollywood

Casino-Aurora, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)

(res ipsa loquitur does not apply where injury “can be as

readily attributed to pure accident as to negligence”). Smith

does not simply represent that he fell from the stool, a mishap

that plausibly could be explained by him slipping off the stool

due to his own misadventure as by the stool’s malfunction. Cf.

id. at 1213, 1215–16 (casino patron with difficulty walking and

standing alleged that metal stool slid out from under her as she

tried to sit down, causing her to fall to floor; she did not know

what caused stool to slip away from her nor could she recall

condition of stool). Smith avers that the stool wobbled and

tipped him backwards. (His averment regarding missing bolts

reinforces the notion that the stool was broken.) Certainly he

could be wrong, and perhaps a factfinder might conclude that

the stool did not, in fact, wobble. But at this stage of the 3

There is (disputed) testimony in the record that no one had fallen from

3

the stool previously; that no detainee had ever complained about the stool

posing a danger; and that the stool had never been observed in a state of

disrepair. We also note that Smith’s federal defender, when deposed,

testified that shortly after Smith took a seat on the stool, he reared back

(continued...)
No. 16-4085 9

proceedings, we must credit Smith, who avers unequivocally

that the stool in fact did wobble and that he was tipped onto

the floor as a result. Contrary inferences would be for the

factfinder to draw (or not) after a trial. Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc.,

452 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 2006).

The evidence also satisfies the control element of res ipsa

loquitur. The stool was within a room maintained and controlled by the government. Access to the room is regulated by

the Marshals Service and for obvious reasons is granted to a

limited universe of individuals under its supervision. The

government must be concerned not only that the room

functions for its intendedpurpose (attorney-client conferences)

but that the room is secured—in the sense that a detainee

cannot escape from it; that an unauthorized person cannot

access it from the outside (to help a detainee escape, to harm a

detainee, or to leave a weapon or other contraband for the

detainee); and that a detainee cannot in some way use the

contents of the room to work mischief (to make a weapon, for

example). Given such safety concerns, it comes as no surprise

that the government admits that the MarshalsService regularly

inspects the stool and the other equipment in the room. Cf.

Hunter, 251 N.E.2d at 306 (distinguishing respective duties of

 (...continued) 3

slightly, his eyes widened, and he made a gurgling noise before falling to

the floor; counsel had the impression that Smith was adjusting himself on

the stool and lost his balance. The attorney’s recollection is not necessarily

inconsistent with Smith’s account of what caused him to fall. But Smith had

suffered a stroke prior to this incident, and the government cites the

attorney’s version as support for the notion that a stroke caused Smith to

fall rather than the other way around. 
10 No. 16-4085

care owed by owner of private home and proprietor of

business establishment).

The government nonetheless argues, and the district court

concluded, that the Marshals Service did not have literally

exclusive control over the stool given that Smith and other

detainees regularly used the room (and likely had done so on

the day Smith was injured) and may themselves have been

responsible for the alleged malfunctioning of the stool.

However, as the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, the

control criterion of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a flexible

rather than a rigid standard. Heastie, 877 N.E.2d at 1076. “[T]he

key question is whether the probable cause of the plaintiff’s

injury was one which the defendant was under a duty to the

plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.” Id. (collecting cases);

see also Nichols v. City of Chicago Heights, 31 N.E.3d 824, 842 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2015); Aguirre, 501 F.3d at 831 (citing Lynch v. Precision

Mach. Shop, Ltd., 443 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ill. 1982)) . 

If indeed the stool malfunctioned, as we have assumed

based on Smith’s account of events, then his was an injury that

the government was under a duty to anticipate and guard

against. The government maintains the room and the equipment therein, and admits that it inspects the equipment,

including the stool, on a regular basis. A broken stool, regardless of the cause, would be the type of condition such inspections are aimed at discovering. Indeed, given the security

concerns that a loose bolt, for example, might present in the

wrong hands, the Marshals Service would have a strong

incentive to check the stool to make sure it was secure.
No. 16-4085 11

The fact that a detainee is typically left alone to confer in

private with his lawyer does not defeat the notion that the

room—and the stool—remain within the control of the

government even when a deputy marshal is not present. The

stool does require a user to “operate” it in the way that a

revolving door does, for example, such that a malfunction

might just as likely be the result of negligence on the part of the

user as opposed to the premises owner. Cf. Britton, 889 N.E.2d

at 709 (pointing out that revolving door cannot operate itself

and that injured user or previous user may have applied

excessive force to door, causing door glass to shatter). When

Smith was escorted into the interview room, the stool had

already been placed in front of the screen; he simply had to sit

down. The sort of malfunction that Smith has described is the

kind of hazard that the government may be expected to guard

against.

The evidence, in sum, meets the criteria for application of

the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The record would therefore

permit the factfinder to infer negligence on the part of the

government. 

III.

As there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the

government was negligent, summary judgment was improper.

The judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.