Filed 11/ 8 /23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO

THE PEOPLE ,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v. RIGOBERTO IGNACIO VERA ,

Defendant/Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Sup. Ct. Appeal No. 000 3066 Sup
. C t. Case No. M21910977
OPINION

APPEAL from a pretrial order of the Superior Court of Fresno County, Hon. Elizabeth Egan, J. , denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search and seizure. Affirmed. 1 Attorneys and Law Firms
Robert L.S. Angres, attorney for defendant/appellant Rigoberto Ignacio Vera.

1 This opinion was originally issued by the court on November 8 , 202 3 . It was certified for publication on November 14 , 202 3 , which is within the time that the appellate division retained jurisdiction. This opinion has been certified for publication in the Official Reports. It is being sent to the Fifth District Court of Appeal to assist the Court of Appeal in deciding whether to order the case transferred to the court o n the court’s own motion under Rules 8

- 1000

– 8.1018.- 2

- Neda Shahrestani, attorney for plaintiff/respondent Fresno County District Attorney’s Office. Opinion Hon. F. Brian Alvarez, Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division of the Fresno Superior Court.
I.
INTRODUCTION By way of pretrial appeal, d efendant Rigoberto Vera (Vera) challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in h is ongoing criminal prosecution . (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd.(j).) 2 Citing to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 ( Anders ) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 ( Wende ) , appointed appellate
counsel ask ed us to independently review the record for any arguable issu e that could be raised

. Vera , represented by the Fresno County Public Defender in the trial court, has yet to be arraigned on the criminal complaint. We requested supplemental briefing as to : (1) whether th is pretrial appeal was timely sought under section 1510 ; and (2) whether the procedures under Anders and Wende apply on pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor

case . W e conclude that this appeal was not timely sought and the procedures under Anders and Wende are not required

. Because respondent urges us to review the matter, we elect to do so. However, we employ the procedure set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 ( Delgadillo ).

2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code

.- 3

- II.
BACKGROUND The circumstances surrounding Vera’s arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) are not detailed here because they are not salient to the issues raised on appeal. Suffice to say that Vera
was arrested for DUI on June 6 , 2021, after colliding into a city streetlamp, injuring himself. A warrantless blood draw confirmed he drove a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. On August 12, 2021, respondent filed a misdemeanor complaint charging Vera with DUI (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd s . (b) & (b) ) , and
d riving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). On September 26, 202 2 , Vera initially appea red for his arraignment hearing. With counsel, Vera waived statutory time for arraignment and moved to continue his arraignment hearing to a l ater date. The trial court granted his motion and scheduled the hearing for October 17, 2022. On October 17, 2022, Vera appeared for the scheduled hearing. With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for arraignment and
moved for a nother continuance. The trial court granted his motion
and set the case for a hearing on December 12, 2022. On December 12, 2022, Vera appeared for his scheduled arraignment. With counsel, Vera again waived statutory time for arraignment and moved for anoth er continuance . The trial court granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on January 19, 2023. On January 19, 2023, Vera appeared again for his scheduled arraignment. With c ounsel, Vera again waived statutory time for arraignment and sought a further continuance

. The trial court- 4

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granted his motion and set the matter for a hearing on February 2, 2023. On February 1, 2023, Vera filed a motion to su ppress evidence
under section 1538.5. He argued that his blood draw violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On February 2, 2023, Vera again appeared at his scheduled arraignment, and again waived statutory time for his arraignment.
The trial court set the matter for a suppression hearing to be heard on March 16, 2023. On March 9, 2023, respondent filed an opposition to Vera’s motion to suppress. On March 16, 2023, the trial court heard and denied Vera’s motion to suppress. At the same hearing, Vera again waived statutory ti me for arraignment and sought another continuance of his arraignment hearing

. The trial court granted his request. On March 23, 2023, the Fresno County Public Defender filed Vera’s pretrial notice of appeal challenging the denial of his

m otion to suppress , and requesting we appoint appellate counsel

. ( § 1538.5, subd. (j).) Thereafter, we appointed appellate counsel. On July 25, 2023, appellate counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders and W ende , noting three potential issues that counsel did not believe had a reasonable chance of success

. On September 6, 2023, we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing addressing: (1 ) whether Vera timely filed this pretrial appeal from the denial of his sup pression motion where it appeared that he had not yet been formally arraigned on the criminal complaint , and ( 2 ) whether the procedures of Anders and Wende apply- 5

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to pretrial appeals from the denial of motions to suppress e vidence in misdemeanor cases

. (See Gov. Code, § 68081 .) Both parties have now filed supplemental briefs addressing these issues

. III.
DISCUSSION
A. This Pretrial Appeal is Untimely Under Section 1510
Ver a has never been arraigned on the criminal complaint. We have repeatedly seen this procedural anomaly i n pretrial appeal s in
other cases , where the Fresno County Public Defender is the attorney of record in the trial court

. Initially, we questioned whether pretrial appellate review was timely sought in light of section 1510 . We now conclude that this appeal is untimely under that
statute
. Vera argues that the plain language of section 1510 provides
that the time requirements of the statute are not triggered until a defendant has actually been arraigned

. Because he has not been arraigned, Vera maintains pretrial review is timely . Respondent
argues that Vera should have been arraigned before the hearing on
the motion to suppress

. Respondent add s that section 1510 renders this appeal untimely because pretrial review ha d not been sought within 45 days following Vera’s arraignment. Nevertheless, respondent urges us to independently review the record.
S ection 1510 provides , in salient part, that “[t]he denia l of a motion made pursuant to ... s ection 1538.5 may be reviewed prior to trial only if the motion was made by the defendant in the trial court not later than 45 days following defendant’s arraignmen t on the complai nt if a misdemeanor... unless within these time limits- 6

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the defendant was unaware of the issue or had no oppo rtunity to raise the issue.” Our inquiry requires us to interpret statutory language , which we do de novo . ( Bruns v. E

- Commerce Exchange, Inc
. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724 .) In this endeavor, “[o]ur task is to discern the Legislature’s intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them their usual mea nings, and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain language governs.” ( Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190 .) “If the langua ge is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” ( People v. Sanchez (2021)66 Cal.App.5th 14, 18 ( Sanchez .)
S ection 988 requires that “[t]he arraignment must be made by the court, or by the clerk or prosecuting attorney under its direction, and consists in reading the accusatory pleading to the defendant and delivering to the defendant a true copy thereof, and
of the endorsements thereo n, if any, including the list of witnesses, and asking the defendant whether the defendant pleads guilty or not guilty to the accusatory pleading; provided, that where the accusatory pleading is a complaint charging a misdemeanor, a copy of the same need n ot be delivered to any defendant unless requested by the defendant.” 3 ( § 988. ) At the arraignment hearing,

3 We note t here is a long

- standing split of authority about whether a completed arraignment includes entering a defendant’s plea. (Compare Si mpson v. Municipal Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 112, 114 [includes entering a plea]; People v. Terry ( 1970) 14 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4 [same]; with Chartruck v. Municipal Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 931, 936

- 937 [entry of plea not required] People v. Cruz (1980)- 7

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a defendant must be allowed a “reasonable time to answer,” which is “not more than seven days in a misdemeanor or infraction case.” (§ 990.) “If t he defendant refuses to answer the accusatory pleading by demurrer or plea, a plea of not guilty must be entered.” (§ 1024.) Section 1510 allows pretrial review “ only if the motion was made by the defendant in the trial court not later than 45 days
follo wing defendant’s arraignment on the complaint if a misdemeanor . . ..” (Italics added.) By its plain language, we believe the statute requires there be an arraignment, then a motion to suppress made not later than 45 days following th at arraignment. The Legislature’s choice of words is clear on this point

– any suppression motion must follow an arraignment and must do so within 45 days
. Without a misdemeanor arraignment, there can be no timely pretrial appeal under the statute. Thus, g iving the statutory language a “plain” and “commonsense” meaning ( Sanchez , supra , 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 18 ) , we conclude that pretrial appellate review
here is untimely under section 1510

. If pretrial review could be timely sought under section 1510 by repeatedly waiving the statutory time for arraignment (without actually waiving formal arraignment), the statutory deadline would effectively be evaded by a simple strategy of indefinitely pos tponing the formal arraignment hearing without actually waiving the right to a formal arraignment , as occurred here
. “The spirit and purpose” of section 1510 “is to require a defendant to raise the issue of suppression and have it determined

109 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 21 [same].) We need not weigh into this split because Vera has never been arraigned under either definition.- 8

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prior to tr ial, without any needless postponement of the trial date.” ( People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 484.) As such, the limitation of pretrial appellate review to those defendants who have brought thei r motions to suppress within 45 days following the arraignment tracks the outer limit with which misdemeanor defendants must be brought to trial. ( See § 1382, subd. (a)(3) .) Interpreting section 1510 to allow pretrial appellate review indefinitely when
a defendant continually waives the statutory time for arraignment throughout the criminal proceeding would circumvent the purpose of
the statute. Because Vera ha s neither been formally arraigned nor waived formal arraignment, and there is no applicable exception, pretrial appellate review of the denial of his motion is untimely under the plain language of section 1510

. Appellate counsel nevertheless contends that pretrial review is timely in the absence of Vera’s arraignment because the motion to suppress was filed “not later than 45 days following defendant’s arraignment.” (§ 1510.) In other words, since Vera has neve r been arraigned, appellate counsel maintains that the motion was brought not later than 45 days following the defendant’s arraignment. However, this interpretation renders the word “following” surplusage in the statute . We must interpret statutes giving effect
to all words used and avoid an interpretation that renders words nugatory . ( People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 67 .) Again, we believe the Legislature’s use of the word “following” requires an arraignment to precede any motion to suppress

. Notwithstanding the applicability of section 1510, respondent
urges us to in dependently review the record. Appellate courts do generally retain the authority to exercise discretion to address- 9

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issues that are properly barred from appellate review under traditional rules of procedure . (Cf. People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 ; People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 7 86, 794 .) “ Appellate courts have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them.” ( People v. Flores (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 266, 273 ( Flores )
. ) As respondent notes in supplemental briefing, it is only when the prosecution raises noncompliance with section 1510 that a
defendant bears th e burden of showing an applicable exception to the statute’s requirements. (See Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1988 ) 199 Cal.App.3d 1453, 1460.) Because respondent did not raise non

compliance with section 1510 prior to our request for supplemental briefing , and because both parties ask us to independently review the record, we exercise our discretion to excuse Vera’s non compliance with section 1510.
B. Anders / Wende Review Is Not Required On Pretrial Appeal
W e must next address whether Anders and Wende review is mandated, discretionary, or unavailable on pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor proceeding. Appellate counsel contends that the Anders / Wende procedures should apply to a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor case because it is a “first appeal as a matter of right” and that, even if Anders / Wende review is not mandated, we should exercise our discretion to independently review the record. We take a different approach. As a general matter , w here appointed appellate counsel is unable to find viable issues to raise on appeal, Fourteenth- 10

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Amendment principles of due process and equal protection require reviewing courts to independently examine the record for any arguable issue on appeal from a defendant’s “first appeal as a
matter of right.” ( Anders , supra , 386 U.S. at pp. 743

- 745 ; Wende , supr a, 25 Cal.3d at p p . 441

- 442.) Reviewing courts must include “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.” ( People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.) “[A]ny other information from the record that they anticipate will be relevant in further challenges to the judgment” should also be included in opinions resolving appeals filed in such cases. ( Ibid .)
Anders and Wende review applies to misdemeanor appeals from a final judgment. ( In re Olsen (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 386, 389

– 392.) But this “prophylactic ” procedure is required only when there is a previously established right to counsel. ( Delgadillo , supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 224.) Wende review is thus limited to a criminal defendant’s “first appeal as a matter of right,” meaning, an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case. ( People v. Griffin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 329, 333.) Wende procedures do not extend to all appeals in criminal matters. (See e.g., People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 501 ( Serrano ) .) Consistent with these principles, the California Supreme Court recently explained in Delgadillo that a state

- created statutory right to the appointment of counsel in post conviction proceedings does not invoke
Anders / Wende procedures because there is “no co nstitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in state post

- conviction proceedings.” ( Delgadillo , supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 224.)- 11

- Anders / Wende review has been found inapplicable in contexts including conservatorship proceedings under the La nterman

- Petris Short Act ( Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 C al .4th 529, 537 ); civil commitment proceedings under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act ( People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.4th 304, 309 ) ; proceedings for
restora tion of sanity under section 1026.2 ( People v. Dobson (2008) 161 Cal.4th 1422, 1425), and to indigent parent's appeals from rulings adversely affecting child custody status ( In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 ). Because Anders / Wende review serves to prote ct an indigent appellant’s rights, it is also unavailable to those represented by privately retained counsel. ( People v. Placencia (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 422, 424.) Review under Anders / Wende does not generally extend to pending trial court proceedings. In People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36 ( Thurman ) , the defendant argued that his attorney provided constitutionally deficient representation by failing to file a brief under Anders and Wende after finding no valid grounds to bring a motion for a new trial in an ongoing criminal proceeding. ( Id . at pp. 44

- 45.) Rejecting that argument, Thurman explained that “[t]he purpose of the Anders / Wende procedure is to ensure that attorneys who are appointed t o represent indigent defendants... conscientiously scrutinize the record and actively assert those issues which may, in the attorney’s professional judgment, result in a reversal of the judgment or in a reduction of the defendant’s sentence.” ( Ibid .)
Thurman explained that “[n]o court, as far as we are aware, has extended these procedures to trial court proceedings, and we see no reason to do so.” ( Thurman, supra , 157 Cal.App.4th at p.- 12

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45.) This is because “[d]ue process does not require extending those procedures beyond the first appeal of right in a criminal prosecution unless, among other considerations, their absence would significantly increase the risk of erroneous appellate resolution. ( I bid .) “Procedures that are practically ‘unproductive’ ... need not be put into place, no matter how many and how weighty the interests that theoreticall y support their use.” ( Id. at p. 46 .) “Any of the grounds for a new trial, whether or not they were
p resented in a new trial motion, can also be raised on appeal, if they appear on the face of the record and are sufficiently developed to permit appellate review.” ( Ibid .) Recently, the California Supreme Court stressed in Delgadillo,
supra , 14 Cal.5th 216 , th at the procedures in Anders and Wende are “relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel.” ( Id . at p. 224.) Our
S upreme C ourt addressed a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel when the prosecution appeals from the grant of a motion to suppress evidence in a misdemeanor case in Gardner v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998. Gardner found that a crimi nal defendant facing misdemeanor charges has the right to appointed counsel to defend aga inst the prosecution’s appeal
from the grant of a motion to suppress. ( Id . at p. 1001.) While finding it unnecessary to address whether the Sixth Amendment to
the Un ited States Constitution afforded that right, Gardner found that article I, section 15 of the California Constitution did require a court

- appointed attorney. ( Ibid .) Gardner thus establishes that there exists a state constitutional right to- 13

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counsel in ap pellate proceedings following the grant of a motion to suppress in a misdemeanor case.
But Gardner expressly declined to address whethe r a criminal defendant like Vera has a corresponding state constitutional right to counsel following the denial of a motion to suppress. ( Gardner,
supra , 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1008

– 1009, fn. 8 [“[t]his case, of course, concerns the right to appointed counsel for purposes of responding to a pretrial prosecution appeal of a favorable suppression ruling... [w]e express no opinion about a defendant’s right to appointed counsel for purposes of bringing a pretrial appeal of an adverse supp ression ruling.”].) I t is likewise unsettled whether
the Anders / Wende procedur es are required in such cases. While
Gardner leaves open the possibility of a state constitutional right to appellate counsel on appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, review under Anders / Wende is required only if there is both a constitutionally mandated right to counsel on appeal and prin ciples of equal p rotection and/or due process require such review. (See e. g., Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 541 [finding Anders / Wende procedures do not apply to conservatorship proceedings even though a proposed conservatee is entitled to counsel in c onservatorship proceedings and on appeal from conservatorship proceedings]

. )
To assess whether these concerns support Ander s/ Wende review, courts examine: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of the appeal. (See In re Sade C. , supra , 13 Cal.4th 952, 987; Conservatorship of Ben C. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.) In the- 14

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context of pretrial appeals from the denial of suppression motions, the private interests at stake are the defendant’s liberty interest which must be considered alongside state interests that include ensuring there was a co rrect ruling , judicial economy, and administrative costs. (See Delgadillo, supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 229 ; Flores, supra , 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 274 .) As explained in Flores , “[t]he risk of an erroneous ruling is present if appointed counsel failed to identify a meritorious (reversible) issue on appeal, and the appellate court also failed to identify that issue by failing to conduct an independent review.” ( I d
. at p. 274. ) Delgadillo instructs that “[u] ltimately, t he salient q uestion... is whether
the absence of the Anders / Wende procedures significantly increases the risk of erroneous resolutions.” ( Delgadillo, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 229 .) Because a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress following judgment in all misdemeanor cases, pretrial review under Anders / Wende does not significantly reduce the risk of erroneous appellate rulings. In misdemeano r cases, appellate review of suppression motions is a vailable both pretrial and post conviction. Under section 1538.5, both the People
and the defendant , in a misdemeanor case, are entitled to appeal any decision on a motion to suppress to the a ppellate di vision. ( § 1538.5, subd. (j).) But , as discussed, pretrial appellate review is limited to those defendants who bring a motion to suppress within
45 da ys following the arraignment. ( § 1510.) If the defendant is ultimately convicted, appellate review is available to challenge the suppression ruling whether the defendant was convicted by a jury trial or plea. ( §§ 1538.5, subd. (m); 1466, subd. (b)(1) .)- 15

- Under this framework, a misdem eanor defendant who brings a suppression motion within 45 days following the arraignment has the opportunity for appellate review of the denial of a suppress motion twice if they are ultimately convicte d: once pretrial and once post judgment. ( § 1538.5, su bds. (j), (m).) If appellate counsel is unable to find an arguable issue, review under Anders / Wende c ould potentially be required both times.
If Ande rs / Wende review is required pre trial, any appellate ruling on the merits of the pretrial denial would l ikely be binding in subsequent appellate proceedings. If the suppression ruling is challenged twice, the law of the case doctrine would likely prevent any reconsideration after judgment of a decision already made on pretrial review. “The law of the case doctrine holds that when an appellate opinion states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to through its subsequent progress in the lower court and upon subsequent appe al. ” ( People v. Superior Court ( Plascencia ) (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 409, 432.) Because Anders / Wende revie w will always be available post judgment, and there can only be a single appellate ruling on the same suppression issue, pretrial review appears to offer only the minimal theoretical benefit of the possibility of an erroneous ruling being discovered on independent review earlier rather t han later. An additional layer of Anders / Wende review will provide a very minimal and theoretical extra protection to a misdemeanor defendant’s liberty interest in the sense that an erroneous ruling may be discovered earlier. But “[p]rocedures that are pr actically ‘unproductive’ ... need not be put into place, no matter how many- 16

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and how weighty the interests that theoretically support their use.” ( Thurman, supra , 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.) Due process does not
mandate Anders / Wende review beyond the first appeal of right in a criminal prosecution unless, among other considerations, its “absence would significantly increase the risk of erroneous appellate resolution.” ( Ibid .) Here, there is no net reduction in the risk of erroneous rulings because Anders / Wende review will be available post judgment on the same suppression issue. In supplemental briefing, appellate counsel contends that the
Anders / Wende procedures do apply because a pretrial appeal from the denial of a suppression motion is a “first appeal as a matter of rig ht” in a criminal prosecution. Contrary to app ellate counsel’s contention, a pretrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress is not a “fi rst appeal as a matter of right ” because it is not an appeal from a judgment imposed after a criminal conviction. ( Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356 [“ [w] e are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike ... from a criminal conviction”]; Anders, supra , 386 U.S. at p. 739 [“[w]e are here concerned with the extent of the duty of a court

- appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction”] ; Serrano , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 501 [“ [t] he appeal before us, although originating in a criminal context, is not a first appeal of right from a criminal prosecution, because it is not an appeal from the judgment of conviction.”].) And a lthough a criminal defendant has a statutory right to file a pr etrial appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in an ongoing misdemeanor case, the “matter of right” that requires review under Anders / Wende is a matter of constitutional- 17

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right under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a statutory right imposed by state law
. (See Anders, supra , 386 U.S. at p. 741.) As discussed above, t he Anders / Wende procedures that are required by the due process and equal protection principles embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment do not generally extend to ongoing trial court proceedings. ( Thurman, supra , 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.) On balance, we conclude that revi ew under Anders and Wende is not constitutionally required on pretrial appeal from the denial of

a s uppression motion in a misdemeanor case

. “Independent review in
Wende appeals consumes substantial judicial resources.” ( Delgadillo, supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 229.) Our appellate division , like most others, is comprised of busy trial court judges tasked with the additional duty of reviewing certain appellate and writ
matters . (See Code Civ. Pro c . § 77.) The expedited nature of pretrial review stretches thin judicial resources thinner yet. Given this reality , we believe the proper “framework” is the procedure set forth in Delgadillo , supra, 14 Cal.5th 216: “When appointed co unsel finds no arguable issues to be presented on appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the [motion]; and (2) the court should send, with

a co py of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right file a supplemental letter brief or brief and that if no letter brief or brief is file d within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.” ( Id . at pp. 231

- 232.)- 18

- IV.
DISPOSITION
The court clerk is directed to send Vera and trial counsel a copy of appellant’s brief along with notice informing them of the right to file a supplemental letter brief or brief within 30 days, otherwise the court may dismiss this matter

. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this ___ day of November, 2023

__________________________ ___________ Hon. F. Brian Alvarez Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division of the Fresno County Superior Court
W E CONCUR :

_____________________________________ Hon. D. Tyler Tharpe Assistant Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division of the Fresno County Superior Court

_____________________________________ ___ Hon. Robert G. Mangano Judge of the Appellate Division of the Fresno County Superior Court