STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

Judith T., FILED Plaintiff Below, Petitioner January 20, 2017 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK vs) No. 16-0212 (Kanawha County 15-C-1658) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Andrea D., Steven T., and 

Defendant Doe, 

Defendants Below, Respondents 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Judith T.,1 pro se, appeals the December 17, 2015, order of the Circuit Court of 

Kanawha County that awarded summary judgment to Respondents Andrea D. and Steven T. 

(collectively “respondent”)2 on the ground that petitioner’s action was barred by the doctrine of 

res judicata. Respondent, by counsel Ariella G. Silberman, filed a response, and petitioner filed a 

reply. 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993); State v. 

Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2

Petitioner and Steven T. were once married and had two children together. Andrea D. is 

Steven T.’s long-term romantic partner. In 2008, Steven T. transferred a one-half interest in his 

residence, with the right of survivorship, to Andrea D. That transfer formed the basis of one of the 

claims in petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner alleged that Steven T. fraudulently transferred the 

one-half interest to Andrea D. in order to protect his assets from collection efforts undertaken by 

petitioner with regard to a child support arrearage. However, as discussed infra, the Family Court 

of Kanawha County subsequently found that petitioner’s collection efforts against Steven T. 

during the period that Steven T. was found in child support arrears under a defunct temporary order 

were null and void. Therefore, to the extent petitioner asserted a claim that Andrea D. aided Steven 

T. in hiding assets during those collection efforts, we find that Andrea D. was in privity with 

Steven T. for the purposes of the doctrine of res judicata. See Syl. Pt. 1, Antolini v. W.Va. Div. of 

Nat. Res., 220 W.Va. 255, 647 S.E.2d 535 (2007) (setting forth necessary elements for doctrine of 

res judicata to apply). 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The parties’ divorce case, which was initiated in 2002, was protracted. As a result of 

proceedings in 2008 and 2009, the Family Court of Kanawha County (1) calculated child support 

for the parties’ two children; (2) declared that petitioner’s collection efforts against respondent 

during the period respondent was found in child support arrears under the defunct temporary order 

were null and void; and (3) found that petitioner owed respondent $32,543.99, plus interest at the 

statutory rate, in unpaid child support. The family court subsequently reaffirmed its rulings from 

2008 and 2009 in an order entered April 3, 2013. The family court’s April 3, 2013, order was 

affirmed by this Court in Judith T. v. Steven T., No. 13-0633, 2014 WL 998424, at *4 (W.Va. 

March 14, 2014) (memorandum decision).3 On April 14, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for 

rehearing alleging that the child support calculation upheld by this Court in Judith T. was 

“fraudulent” because it was procured through a “deceptive scheme” engaged in by respondent. By 

order entered May 28, 2014, this Court refused the petition for rehearing. 

Petitioner also filed a motion pursuant to Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil 

Procedure in the family court on December 5, 2013, asking that respondent be sanctioned for 

“misrepresentations” and “wrongful representations” that caused the parties to engage in 

protracted litigation regarding child support. Respondent filed a response on December 9, 2013. 

By order entered January 29, 2014, the family court denied petitioner’s Rule11 motion. In denying 

the motion, the family court found that the affidavits submitted by respondent prior to the child 

support calculation that was affirmed in Judith T. “were accurate at the time of [their] filing.” 

Subsequently, on September 2, 2015, petitioner filed the instant action in the Circuit Court 

of Kanawha County pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3)4 alleging that the child support calculation by 

which she was found in arrears resulted from a fraud on the family court perpetuated by 

respondent.5 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s action on September 22, 2015, and 

requested that the circuit court take judicial notice of the record in Judith T. At an October 15, 

3

By order entered June 2, 2016, the Court took judicial notice of the appendices in Judith T. 

v. Steven T., No. 13-0633, 2014 WL 998424 (W.Va. March 14, 2014) (memorandum decision). 

The Court also takes judicial notice of the lower court record in Case No. 02-D-2143 pursuant to 

Rule 6(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

4

Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek relief 

from a prior judgment by filing either a motion or an independent action. 

5

Given petitioner’s allegation that respondent was aided by others in his fraud upon the 

family court, she named any unidentified individuals as “Defendant Doe.” 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2015, hearing, the circuit court converted respondent’s motion into a motion for summary 

judgment on the ground that it was necessary to consider materials outside the four corners of 

petitioner’s complaint. Accordingly, on October 19, 2015, petitioner filed a response to 

respondent’s motion and an affidavit, pursuant to Rule 56(f), certifying her belief that discovery 

was necessary before the circuit court could rule on respondent’s motion. At an October 29, 2015, 

hearing, petitioner introduced fifteen exhibits in opposition to respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment. At the conclusion of that hearing, the circuit court gave petitioner until November 30, 

2015, to file additional documents. 

By order entered December 17, 2015, the circuit court awarded summary judgment to 

respondent on the ground that petitioner’s action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The 

circuit court first found that further discovery was not required. The circuit court noted that its 

award of summary judgment was based on (1) the allegations in petitioner’s complaint; and (2) the 

parties’ pleadings and the various orders entered by the family court, the circuit court, and this 

Court in Judith T.6 Second, the circuit court found that the doctrine of res judicata barred 

petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(3) action given petitioner’s admission that there was “a final adjudication 

on the merits in the divorce proceeding [in Judith T.].” The circuit court found that the fraud claims 

contained in petitioner’s complaint were identical or substantially similar to her arguments, 

rejected in Judith T., that the child support calculation by which she was found in arrears was 

inaccurate or fraudulent. 

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s December 17, 2015, order awarding summary 

judgment to respondent.7 In syllabus point one of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 

755 (1994), we held that “[a] circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” 

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted 

6

At the October 29, 2015, hearing, petitioner objected to respondent’s suggestion that the 

circuit court take notice of the record in Judith T. on the ground that the court had to go 

document-by-document and determine whether each was susceptible to judicial notice pursuant to 

Rule 201 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, which regulates a court’s ability to take judicial 

notice of adjudicative facts. On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court improperly took 

judicial notice of the record in Judith T. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, 

where all the documents of which respondent wanted the circuit court to take judicial notice had 

been entered into the record of the parties’ previous case, we find that the circuit court properly 

took judicial notice of the entire record in Judith T. 

7

Petitioner also assigns error to an earlier order, entered on November 2, 2015, by which 

the circuit court sealed the instant case given the amount of sensitive personal information 

contained in the record because of the related divorce case. We find that, between petitioner’s 

opening brief and her reply brief, petitioner devotes only one sentence to arguing that the circuit 

court erred in sealing this case. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner has waived this issue and 

deem it abandoned. See State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (stating 

that “half-hearted assignments” that are not fully developed will be deemed “abandoned.”). 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

provided that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” “Summary judgment is appropriate where the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party [.]”Painter, 192 W.Va. 

at 190, 451 S.E.2d at 756, syl. pt. 4, in part. 

On appeal, petitioner contends that the circuit court did not allow adequate time for 

discovery prior to ruling on respondent’s motion for summary judgment. “Summary judgment is 

appropriate only after the non-moving party has enjoyed adequate time for discovery.” Payne’s 

Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., v. Apple Valley Trading Co., of W.Va., 200 W.Va. 685, 690, 490 

S.E.2d 772, 777 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Respondent notes his request 

for the circuit court to take judicial notice of the record in Judith T. We find that the circuit court 

had the option to take judicial notice of the record in Judith T. without converting respondent’s 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because, in deciding dismissal motions, a 

court is permitted to “consider matters that are susceptible to judicial notice.” Forshey v. Jackson, 

222 W.Va. 743, 747, 671 S.E.2d 748, 752 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Moreover, as explained infra, we find that the record in Judith T. was sufficient to allow the circuit 

court to award judgment to respondent in this case as a matter of law. Therefore, we reject 

petitioner’s argument that the circuit court erred in not allowing additional time for discovery. 

Petitioner readily admits that there was a previous and final adjudication on the merits in 

Judith T. because the lack of an “adequate legal remedy” is a required element for maintaining an 

independent action to seek relief from a judgment in a prior case pursuant to Rule 60(b). In 

syllabus point two of Downing v. Ashley, 193 W.Va. 77, 454 S.E.2d 371 (1994), we held, as 

follows: 

“In order to obtain relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding through 

an independent action, the independent action must contain the following elements: 

(1) the final judgment, order or proceeding from which relief is sought must be one 

that, in equity and good conscience, should not be enforced; (2) the party seeking 

relief should have a good defense to the cause of action upon which the final 

judgment, order or proceeding is based; (3) there must have been fraud, accident or 

mistake that prevented the party seeking relief from obtaining the benefit of his 

defense; (4) there must be absence of fault or negligence on the part of the party 

seeking relief; and (5) there must be no adequate legal remedy.” Syllabus Point 3, 

N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434, 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984). 

In syllabus point one of Downing, we further held that an independent action under Rule 60(b) was 

“limited to special circumstances” and, like a motion filed pursuant to that rule, was not to be used 

to “re[-]litigate the issues of the final judgment, order or proceeding from which relief is sought.” 

193 W.Va. at 78, 454 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting N.C., 173 W.Va. at 435, 317 S.E.2d at 794, syl. pt. 

2)). 

We agree with respondent that petitioner attempted to use the instant action to re-litigate 

the issues of Judith T. Even excluding petitioner’s petition for rehearing and her Rule 11 motion 

filed in the family court, we find that, based on our review of the record in Judith T., petitioner 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

consistently asserted that (1) respondent willfully failed to disclose certain tax returns despite a 

clear legal obligation to do so; (2) instead of submitting those tax returns, respondent submitted 

“unverified” financial information to the family court; and (3) the “unverified” financial 

information submitted by respondent “misrepresented” that his income was lower than what 

petitioner alleged the tax returns would have shown. We find that the same or substantially similar 

allegations comprise petitioner’s claims of fraud in the instant case.8 Therefore, we conclude that 

there is no reason, in equity and good conscience, not to enforce the various orders entered by the 

family court, the circuit court, and this Court in Judith T. merely because petitioner is dissatisfied 

with those orders. 

In Downing, we found that such a determination “not only invalidate[s] the claim as an 

independent action, but also bar[s] [the action] under the doctrine of res judicata.” 193 W.Va. at 

81, 454 S.E.2d at 375. Three elements must be satisfied before the prosecution of an action may be 

barred on the basis of res judicata: (1) there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the 

first proceeding; (2) the second proceeding must involve the same parties, or persons in privity 

with those same parties, as the first proceeding; and (3) the cause of action in the second 

proceeding must be identical to the cause of action determined in the first proceeding or must be 

such that it could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the first proceeding. See Syl. Pt. 1, 

Antolini v. W.Va. Div. of Nat. Res., 220 W.Va. 255, 647 S.E.2d 535 (2007) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, 

Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 498 S.E.2d 41 (1997)). First, 

petitioner does not dispute that there was a final adjudication on the merits in Judith T. Second, we 

find that there is also no dispute that Judith T. and the instant action involve the same parties or 

persons in privity with them. Finally, given our finding that petitioner attempted to use the instant 

action to re-litigate the issues of Judith T., we find that the third element necessary for the doctrine 

of res judicata to apply is also satisfied. 

While an exception to the doctrine of res judicata exists where one party’s fraud prevents 

the other party from litigating her claims in the previous case, see Blake, 201 W.Va. at 477, 498 

S.E.2d at 49, our finding that petitioner attempted to re-litigate the issues of Judith T. precludes the 

application of this exception. In Downing, we found that the doctrine of res judicata barred a 

party’s Rule 60(b) action against her former husband, despite her claim that he committed fraud by 

testifying falsely in the first case, because she did not file an appeal in the earlier case. 193 W.Va. 

at 80-81, 454 S.E.2d at 374-75. In Judith T., petitioner filed an appeal and argued that respondent 

willfully failed to disclose all the tax and financial information to which she was entitled. 

However, we found that the family court did not err in “[re]affirming its previous calculation of 

child support.” Id., 2014 WL 998424, at *3. Therefore, when we decided petitioner’s appeal in 

Judith T., we rejected the argument that forms the basis of petitioner’s fraud claims in the instant 

8

Petitioner characterizes one of her claims as a cause of action for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. However, in making this claim, petitioner alleges that respondent’s fraudulent 

scheme constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. Therefore, despite petitioner’s 

characterization of this claim, we find that it constitutes another claim alleging fraud. 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

action. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in awarding summary judgment 

to respondent on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata barred petitioner’s instant action. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s December 17, 2015, order 

awarding summary judgment to respondent. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: January 20, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

6