UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4594

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSEPH MICHAEL FORT, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (3:07-cr-00593-MJP-1) 

Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: February 27, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States 

Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Joseph Michael Fort appeals from his conviction and 

eight-month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of a 

Remington 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel length of less than 18 

inches, and a Colt, model AR-15, .223 caliber machine gun, 

neither of which were properly registered, in violation of 26 

U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871 (2006). Fort contends that 

police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by improperly 

seizing the firearms during a search of his vehicle, as there 

was no justification for carrying out an inventory search after 

police discovered him in medical distress behind the wheel of 

his parked car. Fort further asserts that the seizure of the 

weapons cannot be justified based on the fact that they were in 

plain view, as the incriminating nature of the firearms was not 

immediately apparent and could only be determined after the 

officers handled them. After thoroughly reviewing the record, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

Fort’s motion to suppress. 

 This court reviews the district court’s factual 

findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, and 

the district court’s legal determinations de novo. United 

States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). When a 

suppression motion has been denied, the evidence is reviewed in 

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the light most favorable to the government. United States v. 

Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 A warrantless search or seizure is prohibited by the 

Fourth Amendment unless it falls within an exception to the 

warrant requirement. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 

134 n.4 (1990). An inventory search qualifies as a well-defined 

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as 

the exception serves to “guard against claims of theft, 

vandalism, or negligence” by police, as well as to “avert any 

danger to police or others that may have been posed by the 

property.” See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987). 

The Fourth Amendment requirements are violated when, considering 

the totality of the circumstances, an inventory search is 

unreasonable. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 

373-75 (1976). If an inventory search is conducted according to 

standard departmental policies and not as a ruse for an 

impermissible search, the search does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment, and evidence seized during the search is admissible 

at trial. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1990); United 

States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986). 

“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory 

procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth 

Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be 

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able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different 

procedure.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369-70 & 374. 

 Fort contends there was no justification for 

performing an inventory search because there was no need to tow 

or impound the vehicle, as Fort’s wife was given custody of the 

vehicle and permitted to drive it home. However, the decision 

to have the vehicle towed, and therefore subject it to an 

inventory search, was made before Fort’s wife arrived and spoke 

to the officers. The lead officer testified that a tow truck 

was called and en route before Fort’s wife arrived at the scene 

“about halfway through the inventory.” The officer stated that 

he decided to have the vehicle towed and to take inventory of 

the items inside based on the fact that Fort was unable to give 

consent for someone to take custody of the vehicle, and the 

actual owner of the car was also unavailable. 

 Fort also asserts that the police policy manual did 

not permit his vehicle to be towed under these circumstances; 

however, the manual’s “Property Control Safeguards” state that 

“[w]hen an injured driver is removed from an accident scene 

and/or it is necessary to tow the vehicle,” a tow truck request 

should be put in to the dispatcher and “[t]he officer will 

conduct an inventory [] of the contents of the vehicle.” Based 

on the information available to him at the time, the lead 

officer acted well within his discretion in determining that it 

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was necessary to have the car towed. As the Supreme Court has 

noted, there is no prohibition on the discretion of a police 

officer to determine how to store and secure an unattended 

vehicle “so long as that discretion is exercised according to 

standard criteria and on the basis of something other than 

suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” Bertine, 479 U.S. 

at 375; see also United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 

780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991) (when the police have “solid, 

noninvestigatory reasons for impounding a car, there is no need 

for them to show that they followed explicit criteria in 

deciding to impound, as long as the decision was reasonable”). 

 Furthermore, the police inventory policy did not 

specifically address the procedures to be followed in the 

particular circumstances present in this case, especially 

considering the dangerous nature of the items that were visible 

inside of the vehicle. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 

733, 740 (4th Cir. 2007). In such a situation, the police are 

not required to comply with “all the written directives 

governing one particular application of the standardized 

procedures for inventory searches”; rather, the relevant 

question is whether the officers, in light of the unusual 

circumstances, “acted in accordance with standard procedures 

more generally.” Id. In this case, the police properly abided 

by the “Property Control Safeguards” that are generally employed 

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for traffic accidents in which a driver is removed from the 

scene. Accordingly, because the police did not violate any 

clear directives under their towing and inventory policy and 

there is no evidence that the search was initiated by an 

investigatory motive, we find that the officers did not abuse 

their discretion and that the decision to have Fort’s vehicle 

towed and inventoried was reasonable. 

 As for the manner in which the officers carried out 

the inventory search of the vehicle, Fort has failed to 

demonstrate that the seizure of the firearms was in any way 

unreasonable. Looking into the vehicle, officers could see, in 

plain view, that Ford was in possession of an assault rifle with 

a grenade launcher attachment, loaded magazines, multiple boxes 

of ammunition, and police tactical gear. In all, seven 

different firearms, many of which were loaded, were taken out of 

the vehicle and placed into police custody for safekeeping. One 

of the key purposes served by an inventory search is to provide 

officers with precise knowledge of the property in order to 

“avert any danger to police or others that may have been posed 

by the property.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373; see also United 

States v. Ford, 986 F.2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). In light of 

the inherently hazardous nature of the items found in Fort’s 

car, the officers were fully justified in carrying out a 

complete search of the vehicle to ensure that no dangerous or 

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illegal items remained inside. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. 

Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

find the inventory search was reasonable and not in violation of 

Fort’s Fourth Amendment rights.*

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

 *

 Because the officers’ actions were undertaken as part of a 

valid inventory search, it is unnecessary to determine whether 

the officers were alternatively justified in seizing the weapons 

because they were in plain view.