J-E01002-19

2019 PA Super 290

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ORONDA LIGON

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 215 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order December 6, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009244-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., 

OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and 

McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019

The Commonwealth appeals from the order dismissing its case against 

Oronda Ligon on the day of trial. The Commonwealth argues the trial court 

abused its discretion when it dismissed the case against Ligon because, 

although the complaining witnesses were not at the courthouse, the 

Commonwealth had informed the court that they were on their way and it was 

ready to proceed with trial. We reverse and remand.

Police arrested Ligon in March 2012 and charged him with a large 

number of crimes, including charges of robbery, burglary, and aggravated 

assault, as well as violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.

1 The charges 

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1

In all, he was charged with two counts each of robbery (threat of immediate 

serious injury), conspiracy, unlawful restraint (serious bodily injury), theft by 

unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, terroristic threats, simple assault, 

recklessly endangering another person, and false imprisonment. He was also 
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stemmed from the September 2011 robbery and assault of Carl Brady and his 

grandmother, Doris Martin. 

After five continuances of the preliminary hearing, Ligon was held for 

trial. The court then granted copious continuances of the trial; Ligon requested 

most of the continuances. He was subject to unrelated charges in federal court 

and told the Commonwealth that he wanted to resolve those charges before 

pleading guilty in this matter. Ligon ultimately elected to go to trial in this case 

and, after additional continuances, the case was reassigned to a new trial 

judge. The new judge granted two more continuances, one due to a court 

conflict and one because the prosecutor had another trial. 

The trial in this case finally began on Monday, December 5, 2016, and 

on that day, the parties picked a jury. The following morning, before the jury 

came into the courtroom, the assistant district attorney (“ADA”) told the trial 

court that the complaining witnesses had not arrived. N.T., 12/6/16, at 3. The 

ADA stated that, although she had arranged a ride for the complaining 

witnesses, when the ride arrived, they did not answer the door. Id. at 3, 12. 

The ADA said she had been in “constant contact” with them, having spoken

with both the day before trial and having met with one of them on the Friday

preceding trial. Id. 3-4. The ADA asked for “a little bit more time” for the 

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charged with one count each of aggravated assault, burglary, criminal 

trespass, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on 

public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(c), 2902(a)(1), 3921(a), 3925(a), 

2706(a)(1), 2701(a), 2705, 2903(a), 2702(a), 3502(a), 3503(a)(1)(i), 

6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
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witnesses to arrive. Id. at 3. The court said it could “probably give [the 

Commonwealth] till 11.” Id. at 4. 

When the court reconvened at 11:00 a.m., a second ADA explained that 

the probation officer of complaining witness Carl Brady was attempting to 

contact him, and the Commonwealth had arranged “for transportation to go 

to his house, since he is in a wheelchair to get him into that vehicle and come 

down to court.” Id. at 8. The ADA stated she “should have confirmation that 

all of that is happening in about 20 to 30 minutes.” Id. The court said it would 

recess the proceedings until 11:45 a.m. Id. at 16.

The Court reconvened at 12:00 p.m., and the first ADA said the 

witnesses were “on their way,” said she was ready to proceed with trial, and 

asked if she could begin with her opening statement. Id. at 17. The trial court 

replied that the witnesses were supposed to be there at 9:30 a.m. The ADA

again advised the court that the witnesses were on their way. She said she 

was ready to begin with her opening statement and could put on another 

witness, by the end of which she was “absolutely certain” the complaining 

witnesses would arrive. Id. at 17-18. The trial court declined to allow the 

prosecution to begin. It instead dismissed the charges, stating, “Okay. Well, 

the case is discharged.” Id. at 18. 
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The Commonwealth filed this appeal.2In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, 

the trial court stated that it dismissed the case because, in the absence of the 

complaining witnesses, the prosecution would be unable to make out a prima 

facie case. Trial Court Opinion, filed July 19, 2017, at 3. The court also opined

that the order from which the Commonwealth had appealed was not a final 

order, because the dismissal was without prejudice and the Commonwealth 

could refile the charges. Id. at 2. The court stated:

In this case, this court dismissed the criminal complaint 

against [Ligon] in light of the Commonwealth’s failure to 

make a prima facie case due to the absence of the 

complaining witnesses on the date set for trial, nearly five 

years after the complaint was filed. Finally on the date of 

trial, a jury was selected and waited patiently on the 

following day for hours before the case was dismissed. This 

court did not dismiss the complaint with prejudice. At the 

trial readiness conference on December 5, 2016, the 

Commonwealth asserted that it was ready to proceed to 

trial. On December 6th at trial, the Commonwealth failed to 

have the complaining witnesses appear in court for 

necessary testimony. Thereupon, this court dismissed the 

complaint against [Ligon]. As in [Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 676 A.2d 251 (Pa.Super. 1996)] and

[Commonwealth v. Waller, 682 A.2d 1292 (Pa.Super. 

1996) (en banc)], this court’s dismissal was based upon the 

Commonwealth’s failure to present necessary witnesses to 

make a prima facie case. In neither the docket nor the 

transcripts did this court ever represent the dismissal to be

with prejudice. This court also notes that the dismissal of 

the complaint occurred 1,782 days after the complaints had 

originally been filed. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s appeal 

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2 The Commonwealth also filed a motion to re-instate the bills of information, 

which the trial court denied. The Commonwealth appealed from that order, 

and we consolidated the two appeals. See Commonwealth v. Ligon, 375 

EDA 2017. Because the Commonwealth is no longer pursuing that appeal, we 

have remitted the record to the trial court. See Order, filed 8/30/18, at 2. 
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is precluded from appellate review and its sole recourse is 

the refiling of criminal charges.

1925(a) Op. at 3-4 (italics added, citations to record omitted).

The Commonwealth’s brief raises the following issue: 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing the case 

after the statute of limitations had expired because the 

victims – an elderly woman and a paraplegic man – were 

unexpectedly late for court where the Commonwealth 

affirmed that, despite the victim’s absence, it was ready for 

trial, and [Ligon] suffered no prejudice as a result of any 

brief delay?

Commonwealth’s Br. at 4. 

I. The Order Discharging Ligon Is a Final Order.

The trial court is of the opinion that we lack jurisdiction because the 

Commonwealth’s appeal is interlocutory. It reasons that the order dismissing 

the charges is not a final, appealable order because the Commonwealth can

refile charges in the trial court. The Commonwealth counters that it is unable 

to refile charges because the applicable statutes of limitations had expired by 

the time the trial court dismissed the case, rendering the order at issue final.

3

A party may appeal from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final order 

includes an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 

341(b)(1). Often, an order dismissing criminal charges is not a final order, as 

the Commonwealth may refile charges. Commonwealth v. Waller, 682 A.2d 

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3 Because the Commonwealth was unaware until the trial court filed its Rule 

1925(a) opinion that the trial court believed the Commonwealth could refile 

charges, the Commonwealth did not waive this argument. See 

Commonwealth v. Zheng, 908 A.2d 285, 286 (Pa.Super. 2006).
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1292, 1294 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc). If, however, “the defect which 

requires the dismissal of [the] charges is uncurable, then the order dismissing 

the charges is final, and appellate review is proper.” Id.

We faced a situation similar to the one at hand in Commonwealth v. 

Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Pa.Super. 1985). There, the Commonwealth 

appealed from an order discharging a defendant following a preliminary 

hearing. We explained that such orders are ordinarily not final orders, as the 

Commonwealth may re-arrest the defendant. Id. However, in Finn, the 

defendant was not subject to re-arrest because the statute of limitations had 

expired at the time of the discharge order. Id. We therefore concluded that 

the order “must be viewed . . . as a final order from which an appeal may 

properly be taken.” Id.

Here, two separate statutes of limitations applied to the crimes with 

which Ligon was charged. For some of the crimes, such as burglary and 

aggravated assault, the statute of limitations was five years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5552(b). For others, the statute of limitations was two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A 

§ 5552(a). Ligon was charged with committing the crimes on September 11, 

2011. Therefore, the statutes of limitations had expired at the latest on

September 11, 2016, months before the court dismissed all charges on 

December 6, 2016.

Consistent with Finn, we conclude that where, as here, the statute of 

limitations expired before the trial court dismissed the charge at issue, such 

that the Commonwealth cannot refile the charges, the order dismissing the 
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charges is final and appealable. See Waller, 682 A.2d at 1294; Finn, 496 

A.2d at 1255. Because the order was final and appealable, we have jurisdiction 

and will address the Commonwealth’s issue on appeal. 

II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Dismissing the Charges.

On the merits, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court should not 

have dismissed the charges because the Commonwealth’s actions were not 

egregious or in bad faith. It points out that at the start of the morning, it

alerted the court that the witnesses were not present, and the court allowed 

it time to contact them. The Commonwealth adds that by the time the court 

dismissed the case, it had informed the court that they were en route to court 

and the prosecution was ready to begin. 

We review an order dismissing charges against a defendant for an abuse 

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367, 372 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa.Super. 

2002)). A trial court has the “authority to regulate attendance upon its 

schedule and concomitant authority to sanction a breach[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Carson, 510 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. 1986). In a civil case, it is a private

party that seeks to use the court’s authority to its own ends that will bear the 

brunt of the sanction. Id.

Imposing such a sanction on the Commonwealth in a criminal case, 

however, is a different matter. In criminal cases, any sanction the trial court 

imposes “must be visited upon the offender and not upon the interests of 

public justice.” Id. In other words, courts must take into account the effect 
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the sanction will have on public interests. The court must calibrate the penalty

in a criminal case to the nature of the violation, while taking into account other 

relevant circumstances, such as the running of the statute of limitations. The 

court certainly has the power to vindicate its authority, but must do so without 

unfairly harming the public’s interest. Id.

We do not think the trial court struck an appropriate balance in this 

instance. At the time of dismissal, the Commonwealth was not in violation of 

any court order specifically regulating witnesses’ attendance. At most, it had 

failed to ensure that its complaining witnesses were in court at the proper time 

to comply with the court’s schedule. To that end, it had arranged for the 

witnesses’ attendance ahead of time, albeit ineffectually. When the witnesses 

failed to show up, it promptly informed the court and asked for an extension.

The court, in its discretion, gave the prosecution the leeway it requested and 

allowed a recess for the Commonwealth to procure the witnesses’ attendance. 

Yet when the Commonwealth later informed the court that it was ready 

to proceed, the court dismissed the charges. This was an abuse of discretion. 

The prosecution had assured the court that the witnesses were on their way, 

and proposed a solution that would allow the case to begin and give time for 

the witnesses to get to the courtroom. Despite having given the 

Commonwealth time to make such arrangements, the court refused to allow 

the Commonwealth to go forward with them. It instead dismissed the case on 

the stated belief that the Commonwealth could not make out a prima facie

case without the complaining witnesses. The court could not know that such 
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was the case, and it is not for the court, barring circumstances not present 

here, to regulate the order of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. 

Although a trial court may properly take steps to regulate the 

presentation of evidence, it “should bear in mind that [its] undue interference, 

impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe 

attitude on [its] part toward witnesses . . . may tend to prevent the proper 

presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect 

thereto.” Commonwealth v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1152 (Pa.Super. 

1985) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Myma, 123 A. 486, 508-09 

(Pa. 1924)). 

The court here failed to abide by McGuire’s admonition. It went too far, 

under these circumstances, in refusing to allow the Commonwealth to give its 

opening statement and put on another witness. Having allowed the 

Commonwealth time to bring the witnesses to the courtroom, the court could 

not dismiss the case immediately after the ADA stated she was ready. The 

court’s actions amounted to undue interference with the Commonwealth’s 

presentation of its case and prevented “the proper presentation of the cause, 

or the ascertainment of the truth[.]” Id. The court’s dismissal order was an 

abuse of discretion, and we reverse it and remand the case for further 

proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/24/19