COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00403-CR

NO. 02-13-00404-CR

NO. 02-13-00405-CR

JOSHUA CLAXTON APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Joshua Claxton appeals from his two convictions for aggravated 

sexual assault of a child and one conviction for indecency with a child by contact. 

We affirm.

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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with various sexual-assault, indecency, and 

delivery-of-a-controlled-substance offenses involving three children, A.D., K.D., 

and E.R. On May 25 and August 14, 2012, Appellant was declared incompetent 

to stand trial by agreement and was committed to a mental-health facility until he

could attain competency to stand trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 

46B.005(c), 46B.054 (West 2006), art. 46B.073 (West Supp. 2013).

In February 2013, a facility psychologist submitted a report to the trial court 

concluding that, although Appellant was bipolar and had borderline intellectual 

functioning, he was competent to stand trial because he had the capacity to 

(1) rationally understand the charges and potential consequences of the pending 

charges against him; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, pertinent events, and 

his state of mind; (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and 

options; (4) understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit 

appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) testify:

[Appellant’s] current mental status indicates that he has adequate 

memory, attention, and communication skills to assist his attorney in 

preparing his defense. He demonstrates the ability to disclose 

relevant details and discuss what preceded and followed his arrest, 

thus suggesting that he has the ability to do the same with his 

attorney in preparation for court. Although he is able to 

communicate effectively, it is recommended that court personnel 

accommodate any limitations . . . . Likewise, he appears to be 

capable of testifying relevantly, if he chooses to take the stand. He 

has an appreciation of his charge[s] and understands basic legal 

strategies and options, as well as an awareness of the 

consequences and penalties, if convicted. He demonstrates both 

factual and rational understanding of court proceedings, the 
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functions of court personnel, as well as clear appreciation of the 

adversarial nature of criminal proceedings. Furthermore, [Appellant] 

demonstrates the ability to conform his behavior to what is 

acceptable decorum in the court. In sum, he meets each of the 

criteria for competency to stand trial. 

 

See id. art. 46B.024(1) (West Supp. 2013). The trial court determined that 

Appellant was competent to stand trial on March 5, 2013. See id. art. 46B.0755

(West Supp. 2013).

On April 17, 2013, pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, Appellant waived 

his right to a jury, stipulated to the evidence against him, and pleaded guilty to 

one count of aggravated sexual assault of A.D., one count of aggravated sexual 

assault of K.D., and one count of indecency with a child as to E.R. See id. art. 

1.13 (West Supp. 2013), art. 1.15 (West 2005), art. 26.14 (West 2009). The 

State waived all other counts alleged in the indictments, but a sentence 

recommendation was not a part of the plea-bargain agreement. After a 

presentence-investigation report (the report) was prepared, the trial court held a 

punishment hearing on August 6, 2013. See id. arts. 37.07(d), 42.12, § 9 (West 

Supp. 2013).

The report revealed that Appellant previously had been hospitalized 

between November 2000 and January 2005 for juvenile sex offenses against two 

other children. The report also detailed Appellant’s mental-health status and 

behavioral issues occurring between July 2000 and November 2011. The report 

noted that after Appellant was examined in November 2011, the examining 

psychologist stated that Appellant “might be restored to competency at some 
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point . . . [but] his intellectual functioning will undoubtedly continue to be 

problematic toward participation in his defense.” Appellant was not interviewed 

for the report so no facts regarding Appellant’s mental state after the November 

2011 examination were included. Appellant’s stepfather testified at the 

punishment hearing that Appellant required medication and that allowing 

Appellant to have contact with children was “just like giving cocaine to a cocaine 

addict.” Appellant did not testify at the punishment hearing.

The trial court sentenced Appellant to forty years’ confinement for each 

aggravated-sexual-assault-of-a-child conviction and twenty years’ confinement 

for the indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction, all to be served 

concurrently. The trial court certified that Appellant had the right to appeal from 

his guilty pleas, and Appellant filed notices of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. LAW REGARDING INFORMAL COMPETENCY INQUIRY AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellant argues in one point that the trial court erred by failing to inquire 

into his competency sua sponte before or during the punishment hearing 

because the court “received indication of . . . Appellant’s incompetence to stand 

trial.” Indeed, a defendant must be mentally competent to be sentenced. Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.07(2) (West 2006); Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 

946, 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If a “suggestion” that a defendant is 

incompetent “comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion 

shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial” and “shall
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determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source 

that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand 

trial.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(b)–(c) (West Supp. 2013). Article 

46B.004(c–1) governs when an informal competency inquiry is required:

A suggestion of incompetency is the threshold requirement for an 

informal inquiry under Subsection (c) and may consist solely of a 

representation from any credible source that the defendant may be 

incompetent. A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate 

the inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt 

about the competency of the defendant. Evidence suggesting the 

need for an informal inquiry may be based on observations made in 

relation to one or more of the factors described by Article 46B.024 or 

on any other indication that the defendant is incompetent within the 

meaning of Article 46B.003.

Id. art. 46B.004(c–1); see also Turner v. State, No. AP-76580, 2013 WL 

5808250, at *11 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2013) (recognizing article 

46B.004(c–1), effective September 1, 2011, abrogated requirement that trial 

court needed bona-fide doubt as to defendant’s competency before conducting 

informal inquiry). Although a defendant is presumed competent to stand trial, he 

is incompetent if he does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his 

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as 

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. art. 46B.003 

(West 2006).

We review a trial court’s decision regarding an informal competency inquiry 

for an abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2009); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. 
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denied, 558 U.S. 833 (2009). Thus, our inquiry is whether the trial court abused 

its discretion by failing to conduct an informal competency inquiry in light of the 

evidence introduced at punishment. See Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 829 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d).

B. APPLICATION

Here, the evidence Appellant relies on to suggest Appellant was

incompetent—the report—merely recounted Appellant’s past behaviors and 

mental state occurring as much as fifteen months before the trial court declared 

Appellant competent. Further, Appellant’s stepfather testified at the punishment 

hearing that Appellant should be considered for a community-supervision 

sentence because Appellant does not believe that he needs to be hospitalized

and he “minds” his stepfather “as long as he’s on his medication.”

At the time of the punishment hearing, the February 2013 competency 

evaluation clearly indicated that Appellant had sufficient present ability to consult 

with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and had a 

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him; thus, he 

was presumed competent. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003. 

Appellant’s stepfather’s testimony that Appellant could serve a communitysupervision sentence and that he did not need to be hospitalized did not suggest 

that Appellant’s circumstances had materially changed since the February 2013 

competency evaluation. Nothing in the record before the trial court at the 

punishment hearing suggested that Appellant’s mental status had materially 
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changed in the five months after its prior competency determination such that a 

sua sponte, informal competency hearing was required. See Turner, 2013 WL 

5808250, at *11 (“Should the formal competency trial result in a finding of 

competency, the trial court is not obliged to revisit the issue later absent a 

material change of circumstances suggesting that the defendant’s mental status 

has deteriorated.”). We conclude that the facts before the trial court at the 

sentencing hearing did not suggest that Appellant’s competency had materially 

changed after the trial court’s prior order determining Appellant to be competent. 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an 

informal competency inquiry under article 46B.004(c). We overrule Appellant’s 

point.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Lee Gabriel

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 13, 2014