NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LAURA STELMASEK, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0393

 1 CA-CR 15-0860

 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201100653

The Honorable Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eliza C. Ybarra

Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Public Defender’s Office, Prescott

By Nicole S. Murray

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley1 delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Laura Stelmasek appeals her convictions and sentences for 

first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, tampering 

with physical evidence, and concealment of a dead body. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Stelmasek was married to the victim for about twenty years. 

During the year before the victim was killed, their relationship was 

turbulent, and Stelmasek confided to friends that she wanted to end the 

marriage.

¶3 Amidst the marital turmoil, Stelmasek rekindled a 

relationship with herformer boyfriend, Marzet Farris. Stelmasek and Farris 

exchanged hundreds of emails expressing their desire to be together. They

also plotted to kill the victim. As their plan solidified, Stelmasek told Farris 

where all weapons were located inside the Prescott home she shared with 

the victim and their daughter, then 16.

¶4 Stelmasek and her daughter drove from Arizona to California

in two cars in late May 2011 to visit friends. Stelmasek separately returned 

to Arizona on June 1, 2011, picked up Farris at Sky Harbor airport, and 

drove him to a motel in Prescott.

 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93, 314 P.3d 1239, 1264 (2013).
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Later that evening, Farris took a cab to the Stelmaseks’ 

neighborhood. Hours later, Farris checked out of the motel, leaving

numerous “bloody rags” behind.

¶6 Two days later, Farris flew from Albuquerque, New Mexico 

to North Carolina, his home state. The same day, Stelmasek’s daughter 

returned home, and Stelmasek told her that her father had left them and 

did not want either of them to contact him. The next morning, Stelmasek 

told her daughter that “she had to get away,” and then flew to North 

Carolina to join Farris.

¶7 The victim’s body was discovered bundled in blankets inside 

the Stelmaseks’ van on June 5, 2011, at the Albuquerque airport. By then, 

his body was significantly decomposed, and was not immediately 

identifiable. Investigators, however, discerned numerous stab wounds.

¶8 Unsure where the victim was murdered, Albuquerque 

authorities contacted the Prescott police, and local officers conducted a 

welfare check at the Stelmaseks’ home. They found the daughter home 

alone, and she did not know where her parents were. Officers showed her 

a picture of the blanket the victim had been wrapped in, and she recognized 

it as one that had been on her parents’ bed. Officers then obtained a search 

warrant for the residence and, using a chemical to detect the presence of 

blood, discovered substantial blood residue in the master bedroom and a 

trail of blood residue from the master bedroom to the garage.

¶9 On June 14, 2011, Stelmasek and Farris were arrested 

together, in North Carolina. Stelmasek was charged with first-degree 

murder (Count I), conspiracy to commit murder (Count II), tampering with 

physical evidence (Count III), concealing a dead body (Count IV), and child 

abuse (Count V).

3 The State also alleged three aggravating circumstances.

¶10 At trial, Stelmasek unsuccessfully argued that her 

communications to Farris discussing a possible murder of her husband 

were only “fantasy” and she did not actually believe that Farris would kill 

him. She was convicted by the jury on all counts. She was sentenced to 

natural life for murder, a consecutive prison term of twenty-five years to 

life for conspiracy to commit murder, a concurrent, presumptive term of 

one year imprisonment for tampering with evidence, and a concurrent, 

 

3 Before trial, the court granted Stelmasek’s uncontested motion to 

sever the child abuse charge. After the verdicts, the court granted the 

State’s motion to dismiss that charge without prejudice.
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

4

presumptive term of one and one-half years’ imprisonment for concealing 

a dead body. Stelmasek then timely appealed the convictions and 

sentences.

¶11 Subsequently, the trial court ordered Stelmasek to pay

restitution of $2,603.08 for funeral expenses and travel costs. She timely 

filed an appeal from that order. This court consolidated the appeals, and 

we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

4

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Stun Gun Evidence

¶12 Stelmasek contends the trial court improperly admitted 

evidence regarding the purchase of a stun gun. She argues the evidence 

was irrelevant because there was no proof that a stun gun was used to 

commit the murder. In addition, she asserts the stun gun evidence lacked 

sufficient foundation because the State failed to present any direct evidence 

that she purchased the weapon.

¶13 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 129, ¶ 42, 140 P.3d 899, 912 (2006). 

“Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess a trial court’s 

ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 186 

Ariz. 240, 250, 921 P.2d 643, 653 (1996).

¶14 Before trial, Stelmasek moved to preclude any reference to the 

purchase of a stun gun from a California military surplus store on June 1, 

2011, arguing the evidence was irrelevant, “unreliable and unsubstantiated 

innuendo.” After a hearing, the court denied the motion, concluding 

Stelmasek’s challenges to the evidence went to its weight, not its 

admissibility.

¶15 At trial, and consistent with its pretrial representations to the 

court, the State introduced evidence that Stelmasek called the military 

surplus store the evening of May 31, 2011, approximately forty minutes 

before the store closed. Before and after this call, Stelmasek and Farris 

exchanged calls and texts. The following morning, and before the store 

opened at 10:00 a.m., Stelmasek and Farris again exchanged numerous calls 

and texts. Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., service to Stelmasek’s cell 

 

4 We cite to the version of the statute in effect at the time of trial unless 

otherwise noted.
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

5

phone switched to the cell tower that serviced the military surplus store, 

though several other cell towers were in closer proximity to the residence 

she was visiting. During this thirty-minute period, Stelmasek called Farris 

four times.

¶16 No employee from the military surplus store could identify 

Stelmasek as a customer, and there was no available surveillance video 

from June 1, 2011. However, store personnel produced the first sales receipt 

of June 1, 2011, which reflected a cash purchase of a stun gun and pepper 

spray.

¶17 An Albuquerque medical investigator testified that she did 

not observe any burn marks consistent with a stun gun on the victim’s 

body. She explained, however, that the level of decomposition and loss of 

blood compromised her ability to evaluate the body, and specifically stated 

that burn marks may have been inflicted but rendered indiscernible by the 

decomposition. Likewise, a forensic pathologist testified that 

decomposition may have obscured any injury to the body caused by a stun 

gun.

¶18 Relevant evidence is admissible unless it is otherwise 

precluded by the federal or state constitution, an applicable statute, or rule. 

Ariz. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a 

fact of consequence in determining the action “more or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401.

¶19 In this case, the State charged Stelmasek with premeditated

murder, under a theory of accomplice liability, and conspiracy to commit 

murder. Given the charges and the State’s framing of the case, the issues 

before the jury included whether Stelmasek: (1) solicited, aided, or enabled 

Farris to kill her husband, and (2) entered an agreement with Farris that one 

of them would kill the victim. See A.R.S. §§ 13-301, -1003, and -1105. 

Because she contested the State’s theory and evidence, the evidence that 

Stelmasek purchased a device designed to immobilize a person the day of 

the murder tended to make a fact of consequence more probable. 

Specifically, the evidence that Stelmasek obtained a weapon that could 

subdue a person, and was in near constant communication with Farris 

during its acquisition, tended to show that she intended to kill her husband, 

acted with intent to aid in her husband’s murder, and had agreed with 

Farris that one of them would commit the offense.

¶20 Moreover, we disagree with Stelmasek’s argument that the 

stun gun evidence was irrelevant because she and Farris never mentioned 
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

6

the use of a stun gun in their emails and the State failed to prove the weapon 

was used on the victim. There was no trial evidence that ruled out the use 

of a stun gun during the murder, and the purchase of a stun gun tends to 

demonstrate that Stelmasek conspired and actively participated in the 

murder, regardless of the emailed plans or the manner in which Farris 

ultimately killed the victim. Or, stated differently, a murder is premediated 

when the perpetrator acts with intention or knowledge and such intention 

or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time sufficient to permit 

reflection, A.R.S. §§ 13-1101(1), -1105, and that evidence is not irrelevant 

even if the planned means of committing the murder remains fluid or 

subject to change.

¶21 Likewise, because the requisite elements of conspiracy to 

commit murder are established once a person agrees with another that at 

least one of them will commit a murder, the fact that the eventual method 

of killing deviates from the conspirators’ plans does not make the evidence 

irrelevant. See A.R.S. § 13-1003, -1105. Therefore, because the stun gun 

receipt had some tendency to make a fact of consequence more probable, it 

was relevant, but only if the State offered sufficient proof that Stelmasek 

was the purchaser. See Ariz. R. Evid. 104(b) (“When the relevance of 

evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced 

sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit 

the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced 

later.”).

¶22 “[A]s a condition precedent to admissibility,” a party seeking 

to introduce evidence must produce proof “sufficient to support a finding 

that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” State v. George, 

206 Ariz. 436, 446, ¶ 30, 79 P.3d 1050, 1060 (App. 2003) (citing Ariz. R. Evid. 

901(a)). “This standard is satisfied if the evidence can be identified by its 

distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with the circumstances of 

the case.” Id. (citing Ariz. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)).

¶23 The authentication requirement of Rule 901 may be satisfied

by circumstantial evidence. State v. Best, 146 Ariz. 1, 2, 703 P.2d 548, 549 

(App. 1985). Indeed, a party may rely upon circumstantial and 

corroborating evidence, as well as the evidence, to establish its authenticity. 

See State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 388, 814 P.2d 333, 345 (1991). In ruling on 

admissibility, “[t]he question for the trial judge is not whether the evidence 

is authentic, but only whether evidence exists from which the jury could 

reasonably conclude that it is authentic.” State v. Wooten, 193 Ariz. 357, 368, 

¶ 57, 972 P.2d 993, 1004 (App. 1998).
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

7

¶24 Applying the principles here, the State presented sufficient

foundation for the admission of the stun gun evidence. Stelmasek does not 

dispute that the store receipt is a valid document evidencing the purchase 

of a stun gun on the morning in question. Rather, she challenges the lack 

of direct evidence that she was the purchaser. Although there was no direct 

evidence that she purchased the stun gun, the State presented substantial 

circumstantial and corroborating evidence that Stelmasek purchased the 

stun gun. It is uncontroverted that she called the military surplus store 

shortly before closing time the evening before the murder. And she does 

not contest that the only time her phone was serviced by the cell tower 

located near the military surplus store during her visit to California was 

between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on June 1, 2011; a period corresponding 

to the time the stun gun was purchased. Given these facts, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by admitting the stun gun evidence.

II. Preclusion of Farris’s Police Interview Statements

¶25 Stelmasek contends the trial court improperly precluded

Farris’s interview statements to authorities following his arrest. 

Specifically, she argues the ruling prevented her from fully presenting her 

defense that Farris acted alone in killing the victim and did so without her

knowledge or agreement.

¶26 Before trial, the State moved in limine to preclude all evidence 

of Farris’s police interview statements that Stelmasek “didn’t do anything”

and was, herself, a “victim.” Citing Farris’s testimony from his own trial, 

in which he admitted that he had lied when he made those statements, the 

State argued the statements failed to comport with the Rule 804(b)(3)

hearsay exception for statements against interest.

¶27 After a hearing on the State’s motion, the court found Farris’s 

statements were circumstantially against his interest, though he never 

expressly identified himself as “the culprit” during the interview. The court 

further found, however, that Farris’s characterization of Stelmasek as a 

victim and claim that she took no part in the murder were “in complete 

contradiction” to his sworn trial testimony, and therefore “unreliable at 

best.” On that basis, the court precluded all evidence of Farris’s police 

interview statements.

¶28 We review the admissibility of third-party culpability 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157, 161, ¶ 21, 

52 P.3d 189, 193 (2002). The normal restrictions on hearsay apply to thirdparty culpability evidence. State v. Machado, 224 Ariz. 343, 358, ¶ 40, 230 
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

8

P.3d 1158, 1173 (App. 2010), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in State 

v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 26 n.4, ¶ 13, 289 P.3d 949, 954 n.4 (App. 2012)). 

Because Stelmasek offered Farris’s statements to prove she played no role 

in the victim’s murder, the statements were plainly hearsay. See Ariz. R. 

Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does 

not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party 

offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”).

¶29 Pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), a defendant may offer a hearsay 

statement as evidence tending to exonerate the defendant if: (1) the 

declarant is unavailable, (2) the statement tended to subject the declarant to 

criminal liability at the time the statement was made such that “a reasonable 

person in the declarant’s position” would have made the statement “only if 

the person believed it to be true,” and (3) “corroborating circumstances 

clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” Accordingly, a trial court determining 

the admissibility of a statement under this exception “must examine any 

evidence that corroborates or contradicts the statement to find whether a 

reasonable person could conclude that the statement is true.” Machado, 224 

Ariz. at 358, ¶ 40, 230 P.3d at 1173 (internal quotations omitted).

¶30 The State does not contest that Farris, charged as a 

codefendant, was unavailable to testify. Although Farris did not directly 

inculpate himself during the police interview, the State concedes, consistent 

with the trial court’s finding, that his “statements were circumstantially 

against [his] interest.” Therefore, the only question remaining is whether 

corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the statements’

trustworthiness.

¶31 On this record, there are no corroborating circumstances 

demonstrating the statements are true and reliable. Farris testified that he 

lied throughout his police interview. He also testified that Stelmasek 

stabbed the victim to death, and explained that he initially believed 

Stelmasek was a victim because he had been “duped” and “played.” More 

importantly, Farris’s claim that Stelmasek was innocent of any wrongdoing 

is undermined by the following: (1) her emails to Farris provide 

overwhelming evidence that she was not a passive, uninformed bystander,

but an active conspirator in the murder; (2) she rejected Farris’s suggestion 

that she pursue an alternative means of leaving her husband and originated 

the idea of murdering him; and (3) she disclosed the location of all the 

weapons in her home in response to Farris’s email containing a detailed 

murder plan. Moreover, Stelmasek’s post-murder conduct undermines 

Farris’s claim that she was innocent of any wrongdoing. Most notably, she

told her daughter that the victim had left them, then flew across the country 
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

9

to reunite with Farris, then failed to respond to her daughter’s calls and 

texts.

¶32 Likewise, any contention that the victim abused Stelmasek is 

contradicted by substantial evidence. Although Stelmasek, in her emails 

to Farris, described her husband as controlling and alluded to possible 

abuse, there was myriad testimony from neighbors and friends describing 

that she was quite assertive with the victim; those witnesses denied seeing 

any physical abuse. Therefore, because there is only minimal evidence 

corroborating Farris’s statements, and the overall record substantially

contradicts them, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Farris’s 

police interview statements.

III. Preclusion of Other Acts Evidence

¶33 Stelmasek contends the trial court improperly excluded 

evidence of Farris’s other acts. Specifically, she asserts the court infringed 

on her right to present a full defense by excluding evidence that Farris had 

previously assaulted another girlfriend, J.S., with a knife and attacked her 

boyfriend. Stelmasek claims the evidence would have demonstrated that 

Farris was both spontaneously violent and manipulative.

¶34 Before trial, the State moved to preclude all evidence of 

Farris’s other acts related to J.S. In response, Stelmasek argued the other 

acts were third-party culpability evidence that tended to prove Farris acted

alone in murdering the victim. At a hearing on the motion, the court stated 

that the evidence would be irrelevant if the parties simply stipulated that 

Farris had already been convicted of the murder, to which defense counsel 

replied, “I don’t disagree with you.” The State declined to stipulate to 

Farris’s conviction, but avowed that it would not put forward any evidence 

or argument that Stelmasek stabbed the victim, and would only pursue a 

theory of accomplice liability for the murder. Based on that avowal, the 

court questioned how the evidence of Farris’s prior acts remained relevant, 

and defense counsel acknowledged that “perhaps” the evidence lost “its 

relevancy.” The court then granted the State’s motion, concluding the 

prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed any remaining probative 

value.

¶35 The admission of third-party culpability evidence is governed 

by Rules 401 through 403, not Rule 404(b). State v. Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, 

284, ¶ 16, 246 P.3d 632, 635 (2011); Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161, ¶ 22, 52 P.3d at 

193. Accordingly, when evaluating the admissibility of third-party 

culpability evidence, the general rules of evidence apply and evidence 
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

10

“must simply be relevant and then subjected to the normal 403 weighing 

analysis between relevance, on the one hand, and prejudice or confusion on 

the other.” Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161, ¶ 22, 52 P.3d at 193. Third-party 

culpability evidence “is relevant only if it tends to create a reasonable doubt 

as to the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Alvarez, 228 Ariz. 579, 581, ¶ 4, 269 P.3d 

1203, 1205 (App. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).

¶36 Although evidence that Farris previously attacked another 

girlfriend and her boyfriend may have further inculpated him, that 

evidence would not have exculpated Stelmasek. Indeed, Farris’s capacity 

for violence and manipulation was not in dispute. The prosecutor, during 

opening statements, informed the jury that Farris “almost certainly” was 

the one who “plunged the knife” into the victim, and during closing 

argument, characterized Farris as “clearly [] dangerous, deadly, distorted, 

[and] demented.” Given the evidence and the State’s theory, Farris’s role 

as the primary actor in the murder did not lessen Stelmasek’s culpability or

controvert the overwhelming evidence that she acted as an accomplice and 

co-conspirator. See Alvarez, 228 Ariz. at 582, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d at 1206 

(concluding third-party culpability evidence was not relevant because, 

even if the third party was culpable, he could have acted as the defendant’s 

accomplice and the evidence did not suggest that someone other than the 

defendant committed the crime). Therefore, the court did not abuse its 

discretion by precluding the evidence as irrelevant.

¶37 Moreover, even if the evidence was minimally relevant, any 

error in its exclusion was harmless. First, it was cumulative to other 

evidence at trial. See State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 456-57, 930 P.2d 518, 533-

34 (App. 1996) (explaining an erroneous evidentiary ruling excluding 

cumulative evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Stelmasek

presented numerous emails Farris wrote vividly describing violent acts he 

threatened to commit on the victim and boasting about his ability to 

“abuse[],” “break,” and “control[]” people. Second, the record uniformly 

demonstrates that Stelmasek solicited her husband’s murder, and provides 

no factual basis to begin to conclude that Farris pressured or manipulated 

her into committing the crimes. Therefore, the exclusion of Farris’s prior 

acts did not affect the verdict and, if error, was harmless. See State v. 

Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 446, ¶ 39, 189 P.3d 366, 373 (2008).
STATE v. STELMASEK

Decision of the Court

11

CONCLUSION

¶38 We affirm Stelmasek’s convictions and sentences.