UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

K.J. BRUBAKER, M.C. HOLIFIELD, A.C. RUGH

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JEREMY A. MEADOWS

STAFF SERGEANT (E-6), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201400401

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 16 June 2014.

Military Judge: LtCol Leon J. Francis, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft 

Wing, MCAS Miramar, San Diego, CA.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: Col D.K. Margolin, 

USMC.

For Appellant: Maj Jason R. Wareham, USMC; LT Jacqueline 

Leonard, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: LCDR Keith B. Lofland, JAGC, USN.

31 August 2015

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

 

PER CURIAM: 

A general court-martial consisting of officer and enlisted 

members convicted the appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two 

specifications of violating a general order by engaging in 

unduly familiar relationships with subordinates, one 

specification of committing an indecent act, one specification 

of pandering by enticing an act of prostitution, and three 

specifications of adultery in violation of Articles 92, 120, and 
2

134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 920, 

and 934. The members sentenced the appellant to confinement for 

a period of 18 months, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a badconduct discharge. The convening authority (CA) approved the 

sentence as adjudged. 

The appellant raises three assignments of error (AOE): 

that his convictions for indecent conduct, pandering and 

adultery were legally and factually insufficient.1

After careful consideration of the record of trial, the 

parties’ pleadings, and the appellant’s AOEs, we conclude that 

the findings and the sentence are correct in law and fact and 

that no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights 

of the appellant was committed. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. 

Background

Beginning in March 2011, the appellant embarked on a series 

of adulterous relationships with three civilian women: MT, BC, 

and SP. 

 MT met the appellant through an online advertisement for 

“swingers parties,” a shared lifestyle interest that eventually 

morphed into a mutual enterprise in which the appellant and MT 

would rent hotel rooms, solicit male and female attendees, 

collect a “cover charge” and provide security. During these sex 

parties, the appellant and MT would engage in sexual activity in 

front of and with other attendees. Outside of these parties, 

the appellant and MT maintained an ongoing sexual relationship. 

Additionally, MT attended the November 2011 Marine Corps Ball 

with the appellant, meeting several members of appellant’s 

command and their respective dates. 

 BC also met the appellant online. Although initially 

warned away by the appellant’s wife, BC moved into the 

appellant’s on-base residence, serving as housecleaner, 

babysitter, and paramour until the arrival of SP and her 

children in May 2012. BC routinely socialized with junior 

members of the appellant’s unit and was referred to as his 

“girlfriend.” BC was aware of the appellant’s sex parties and 

of his sexual activity with other women, including an occasion 

when BC discovered the appellant and SP indiscreetly coupling in 

the on-base residence’s kitchen. 

 

1 AOEs I-III are raised summarily pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 

M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). 
3

 While the appellant was still living with BC, he rekindled 

a prior relationship with SP and invited her and her children to 

move in with him, replacing BC. Once together with the 

appellant, SP became active in the sex party lifestyle as well. 

SP routinely attended command functions and knew many of the 

Marines with whom appellant worked. Both in person and online, 

SP held herself out as the appellant’s girlfriend and soon-to-be 

wife, stymied only by the appellant’s existing marriage and 

child custody dispute. 

 The appellant remained married during these relationships, 

and MT, BC, and SP were all aware that the appellant was 

married. While geographically distant - his wife lived outside 

California - the appellant alternately attempted legal 

separation and reconciliation during the time of his extramarital relationships. 

 Then-Lance Corporal (LCpl) TK reported to Marine Heavy 

Helicopter Squadron 462 in July 2011. Not wholly satisfied with 

her immediate supervisor in the S-2 Division, LCpl TK sought out 

a mentor among the staff noncommissioned officers within the 

other divisions. She selected the appellant, and they struck up 

a close relationship. Over time the appellant invited LCpl TK 

to a private dinner at his house, enjoined her to engage in 

sexual activity with him while on duty, and introduced her to 

the idea of making extra money working at one of his sex 

parties. 

 On 4 November 2011 the appellant, MT, LCpl TK and two other 

male Marines, then-Private First Class (PFC) NT and then-LCpl 

DZ, attended the Marine Corps Ball at a hotel in downtown San 

Diego. At the end of an evening in which LCpl TK, LCpl DZ and 

PFC NT imbibed heavily, these five returned to the appellant’s 

hotel room. After temporarily excusing themselves from the 

living area, the appellant and MT returned to find the three 

junior Marines engaged in sexual activity together. 

Showing particular concern for LCpl TK’s intoxication 

level, the appellant asked “Hey, is everything OK in here?” 

LCpl TK responded, “[y]ea, we are just playing around.” LCpl DZ 

added, “[y]es, staff sergeant, everything is OK.”2 PFC NT said 

nothing but looked to appellant with some concern that the 

appellant would be upset at this affair. Contrarily, the 

appellant and MT said nothing, sat across from the bed, and 

watched. 

 

2 Prosecution Exhibit 1 at 1.
4

Several minutes later PFC NT stated, “I can’t do this,” 

dressed and left the room.3 Shortly thereafter, an impatient 

appellant asked LCpl DZ and LCpl TK to “hurry up” their 

activity.4 The tryst then ended, and LCpl TK and LCpl DZ left 

the room. 

In March 2013, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

recorded a “pretext” phone call between the appellant and LCpl 

TK during which the appellant elaborated on the pay scale for 

participation in the aforementioned sex parties. 

It depends on what you want to do. I mean, and then 

that determines how much you get paid. . . . [I]f you 

decide that you want to actually play around and do 

adult stuff and everything like that, then you can get 

up to 250, $300 in a night or more.5

When confronted on these admissions during his subsequent 

interrogation, the appellant asserted that his offer was solely 

a ruse to engage in sexual activity with LCpl TK.

Legal and Factual Sufficiency

We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. 

United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 459 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by 

determining “whether, considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable fact-finder could 

have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Day, 66 M.J. 172, 173-74 (C.A.A.F. 

2008) (citing United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 

1987)). The test for factual sufficiency is whether “after 

weighing all the evidence in the record of trial and recognizing 

that we did not see or hear the witnesses as did the trial 

court, this court is convinced of the appellant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 557 

(N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 2006) (citation omitted), aff’d, 64 M.J. 348 

(C.A.A.F. 2007). 

In the specification under Charge II, the appellant was 

charged using an “aider and abettor” theory of liability for 

 

3 Id.

4 Record at 385. 

5 PE 7 at 14. 
5

encouraging LCpl DZ and LCpl TK to engage in sexual conduct in 

front of PFC NT and MT.6

According to the explanation to Article 77, UCMJ, for a 

person to be guilty as a principal under an aiding and abetting 

theory, he must:

(i) Assist, encourage, advise, instigate, counsel, 

command, or procure another to commit, or assist, 

encourage, advise, counsel, or command another in the 

commission of the offense; and,

(ii) Share in the criminal purpose of design.

. . . In some circumstances, inaction may make one 

liable as a party, where there is a duty to act. If a 

person . . . has a duty to interfere in the commission 

of an offense, but does not interfere, that person is 

a party to the crime if such a noninterference is 

intended to and does operate as an aid or 

encouragement to the actual perpetrator.7

The crime of aiding and abetting through nonperformance of 

a duty has four components: “(1) duty (the accused has ‘a duty 

to act‘); (2) inaction (the accused ‘has a duty to interfere in

the commission of an offense, but does not interfere’); (3) 

intent (the “noninterference is intended to . . . operate as an 

aid or encouragement to the actual perpetrator” of the 

underlying crime); and, (4) effect on the perpetrator (the 

“noninterference . . . does operate as an aid or encouragement 

to the actual perpetrator’”). United States v. Simmons, 63 M.J. 

89, 94 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (Effron, J, concurring in the result). 

“Each of these components is essential. Regardless of 

whether the prosecution demonstrates duty, inaction, and intent, 

that is insufficient if the inaction does not actually aid or 

encourage the perpetrator.” Id.8

 

6 Specification: In that [appellant], on active duty, did, at or near San 

Diego, California, on or about 4 November 2011, wrongfully commit indecent 

conduct, to wit: penetrating with the penis of [LCpl DZ], the vagina of 

[LCpl TK], while in the presence of [PFC NT] and [MT]. 

7 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012 ed.), Part IV, ¶ 1(b). 

8 The members were instructed: 

The prosecution has alleged that the accused was a principal in 

the offense for failure to intervene in the sexual act between 
6

In this case, the appellant, a staff noncommissioned 

officer (NCO), had a duty to intervene in the indecent conduct 

between LCpl DZ, LCpl TK and PFC NT, and he failed to do so. 

See id at 93 (citing Navy and Marine Corps regulations and 230 

years of custom and tradition to create a duty for an NCO to 

intervene in the commission of a crime against a member of the 

same unit). It is clear that appellant’s intent in this regard 

was to enjoy “free porno,” which he did until he grew tired.9

His failure to intervene operated as an encouragement to the 

junior Marines as evidenced first by PFC NT’s expression of 

concern when appellant returned to the main room, then by LCpl 

DZ’s and LCpl TK’s responses to the appellant’s inquiry whether 

they were “OK,” and finally by the junior Marines’ prompt 

obedience once the appellant asked them to “hurry up.” Under 

such circumstances, we find ample evidence to conclude the

finding of guilt as an aider and abettor was both legally and

factually sufficient. 

Likewise, applying the tests for legal and factual 

sufficiency to the remaining charges, we are convinced that the 

evidence was both legally and factually sufficient. United 

States v. Clifton, 35 M.J. 79, 81 (C.M.A. 1992). 

Conclusion

The findings and the sentence as approved by the CA are 

affirmed. 

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court

 

then [LCpl DZ] and [LCpl TK] in the presence of [PFC NT] and 

[MT], after he allegedly confronted them. In order for an 

appellant to be liable as a principal for failure to intervene, 

you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that: One the 

appellant has a duty to act; Two the appellant had a duty to 

interfere in the commission of an offense, but did not interfere;

Three the noninterference was intended to operate as an aid or 

encouragement to the actual perpetrator of the underlying crime; 

and, Four the noninterference did operated as an aid or 

encouragement to the actual perpetrator. Each of these 

components is essential.

Record at 1036.

9 Id. at 382.