[Cite as WRRS, L.L.C. v. Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-2129.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 105661 

 

WRRS, L.L.C.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL. 

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED; REMANDED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-16-863546 

BEFORE: Kilbane, P.J., Stewart, J., and Jones, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 31, 2018 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark J. Vanrooy 

20525 Center Ridge Road, Suite 626 

Suite 626 

Rocky River, Ohio 44116 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Barbara Langhenry 

Director of Law 

City of Cleveland 

By: Patricia McGinty Aston 

Assistant Director of Law 

601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, WRRS, L.L.C. (“WRRS”), appeals from the trial court’s 

judgment affirming the decision of defendant-appellee, City of Cleveland (“City”), on behalf of 

the Board of Building Standards (“Board”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

{¶2} WRRS is the owner of property located at 16700 St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland, 

Ohio. WRRS uses the property as a recycling facility. In 2011, there was a fire that essentially 

destroyed most of the structures on the property. In July 2011, WRRS was issued four permits 

to demolish the affected structures. The City closed out the permits in March 2012. In May 

2012, the Board had a hearing to review violations on the property. The Board determined that 

the property was in full compliance. The City did not appeal from the Board’s determination. 
{¶3} As a result of this fire, WRRS’s insurance company deposited $175,000 with the 

City pursuant to Ohio’s fire loss statute. WRRS sought the return of these funds after the 

permits were closed out and the Board found WRRS in compliance. In October 2015, WRRS 

retained an attorney, who sent a letter to the City seeking the return of the $175,000. As of the 

date of this appeal, the City has not returned the funds to WRRS. 

{¶4} Then in January 2016, the City of Cleveland Building Department issued WRRS a 

violation notice for exterior maintenance code violations at the property. The notice cited 

WRRS for a public nuisance by having steel I-beams, trusses, and piles of rubble and concrete on 

the exterior of the property without having the proper building permits. 

{¶5} WRRS appealed the violation to the Board. The Board scheduled a public 

hearing on the appeal in April 2016. At the public hearing, the Board heard testimony from the 

owner and president of WRRS, Frank Lasky (“Lasky”), who believed the notice was improperly 

issued because the property conditions are the same as they were when WRRS was found to be in 

compliance at the 2012 hearing. The City of Cleveland’s Chief Building Official, a 

representative from the City’s Fire Department, and a City Councilman testified to the conditions 

on the property and their objections to those conditions. 

{¶6} The testimony presented at the hearing revealed that several of the structures on 

the property were damaged because of a fire in 2011. Lasky obtained four demolition permits 

for the affected structures. The permits ordered Lasky to raze the buildings and remove all 

debris from the premises. The City witnesses provided current photographs of the property’s 

condition to the Board. The photographs show piles of debris on the property. 

{¶7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board found that the notice was valid, 

“referring to the fact that with the demolition that the rubble is not acceptably left on the 
property[.]” The Board then remanded the matter to the City’s Division of Building and 

Housing. The Board adopted their decision in April 2016. 

{¶8} In May 2016, WRRS filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. Chapter 

2506, challenging the Board’s decision. 1 The common pleas court affirmed the Board’s 

decision, finding that it was supported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and 

probative evidence. The trial court stated that it “does not find that the order of the [Board] was 

unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the 

preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. See R.C. 2506.04. Therefore, 

the order is affirmed.” 

{¶9} It is from this order that WRRS appeals, raising the following three assignments 

of error for review. 

Assignment of Error One 

The court erred in affirming the [Board’s decision] because the [City] failed to 

appeal [Board] Docket A-361-11 and therefore waived any rights to issue 

violation citations to [WRRS] for conditions which existed on the subject 

property on or prior to May 9, 2012. 

Assignment of Error Two 

The court erred in affirming the [Board’s 2015 decision] under the doctrine of res 

judicata because conditions which the City deemed to be violations in 2015 had 

already been litigated and found to be compliant by the [Board] in 2012. 

Assignment of Error Three 

The court erred in affirming the [Board’s decision] — because the [City] failed to 

demonstrate that the conditions existing on [WRRS’s] property created a health, 

accident or fire hazard, or were a public nuisance. 

 

1

In June 2016, WRRS filed leave for an amended appeal, adding the City of Cleveland as a party. The trial court 

granted WRRS’s motion in August 2016. Attached and incorporated to WRRS’s motion to leave was its amended 

administrative appeal. 
Standard of Review 

{¶10} Under R.C. 2506.04, the common pleas courts and the courts of appeals apply 

different standards of review for administrative appeals. When a party appeals an administrative 

agency’s decision to the common pleas court, the court “considers the ‘whole record,’ including 

any new or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03, and determines whether the 

administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or 

unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.” Henley v. 

Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 2000-Ohio-493, 735 N.E.2d 433. 

{¶11} The standard of review to be applied by an appellate court reviewing a judgment of 

a common pleas court in an R.C. 2506.04 appeal is narrower, more limited in scope, and more 

deferential to the lower court’s decision. Id. at 147. A review by the court of appeals is limited 

to questions of law and does not include the same power to weigh the evidence. Id. “The 

standard of review for the court of appeals in an administrative appeal is designed to strongly 

favor affirmance. It permits reversal only when the common pleas court errs in its application or 

interpretation of the law or its decision is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence as a 

matter of law.” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 

2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 30. 

{¶12} Thus, this court will review the judgment of the trial court only to determine if the 

lower court abused its discretion in finding that the administrative order was supported by 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. See Wolstein v. Pepper Pike City Council, 156 

Ohio App.3d 20, 2004-Ohio-361, 804 N.E.2d 75, ¶ 21-22 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion 

“‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. 
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio 

St.2d 151, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

{¶13} In the first and second assignments of error, WRRS argues that the City has waived 

its right to cite WRRS for any maintenance violations currently existing at the property, and the 

City is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because these exterior conditions existed in 2012 

when the Board found the property in compliance.2

{¶14} Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is barred “from raising and litigating in 

any proceeding except an appeal from [a final] judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due 

process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial * * * or on an 

appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). 

{¶15} While the testimony at the Board hearing included the property’s history, the issue 

on appeal is specific as to what was cited in 2016 — the removal of the currently existing debris 

piles. The Board’s 2012 decision on a different violation (poor workmanship) did not waive the 

City’s right, nor was it precluded from finding WRRS in violation for conditions on the property 

in 2016. Furthermore, WRRS did not include the transcript or photographs from the 2012 

hearing to substantiate its claim that the 2016 conditions were the same as the 2012 conditions, 

which the Board found to be in compliance. 

{¶16} The Board’s 2012 decision, however, does preclude the City from continuing to 

withhold the $175,000 WRRS deposited with the City pursuant to Ohio’s fire loss statute. In 

2012, the Board found the WRRS property to be in compliance after the fire. The City could 

have appealed from the 2012 decision, but chose not to do so. Thus, the City is now precluded 

 

2

We will treat WRRS’s waiver argument to encompass its res judicata argument, even though it did not explicitly 

argue “res judicata” at the trial court. 
under res judicata from challenging the Board’s 2012 decision. As a result, the City is ordered 

to return the $175,000 to WRRS. 

{¶17} Accordingly, the first and second assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶18} In the third assignment of error, WRRS agues the City offered no credible evidence 

that the property presents a health, accident, or fire hazard. WRRS again argues that because the 

City failed to appeal a prior ruling by the Board, it had no authority to issue the notice for 

exterior maintenance violations. 

{¶19} The instant appeal involves only the violation notice issued in January 2016 by the 

City for the exterior maintenance violations existing at the property at that time. In reaching its 

decision to affirm the violations, the Board considered testimony from WRRS and City 

representatives, photographs of the property, the history of the property, including the fire and the 

demolition of prior buildings at the property, and the current conditions of the property. From 

this evidence, the Board concluded that there were exterior maintenance violations at the 

property and that the notice was issued correctly to WRRS for those violations. The trial court 

affirmed the Board’s decision upon concluding that WRRS had not demonstrated that the 

Board’s decision was unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported 

by a preponderance of the evidence. On review, we conclude that the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence supports the trial court’s decision. 

{¶20} Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶21} Judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remanded with instructions for the trial 

court to enter a judgment ordering the City to return to WRRS the $175,000 WRRS deposited 

with the City in 2012. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR