NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-2035

___________

ROBERT H. LEE, JR.,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, ET AL.; DEREK A. STEENSON, ESQ.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-06096)

District Judge Mark A. Kearney

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 1, 2015

Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: October 5, 2015)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Robert H. Lee, Jr. appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his 

complaint. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Lee filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of 

Philadelphia and his former attorney, Derek Steenson. The matter arose from the police 

response to a domestic dispute at Lee’s home. He alleged that the police did not properly 

handle the situation because they sided with his wife and filed a report falsely identifying 

him as the offender. Lee requested an internal investigation and hired an attorney to 

represent his interests, but his attorney was not permitted to question interviewees during 

the investigation. The result of the internal investigation was that Lee’s complaint 

against the police officers was deemed unfounded. He then filed suit in the District 

Court, alleging that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights. He also asserted 

claims of civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.1

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. The District Court granted the motions, concluding that Lee failed to allege 

facts sufficient to support his § 1983 claims. The court also declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims for conspiracy, breach of contract, and 

breach of fiduciary duty. This appeal followed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Fleisher v.

 

1 Lee, a former police officer, alleged that he had previously settled an employment 

discrimination lawsuit with the City and that the police actions complained of in this 

matter were in violation of, or retaliation for, that settlement.
3

Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, 

all well-pleaded allegations . . . must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan 

v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We construe Lee’s pro se pleadings 

liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and we may affirm on any basis 

supported by the record, Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam).

We agree with the District Court that Lee failed to plead sufficient facts to support 

his § 1983 claims. To succeed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that 

[he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. 

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Although Lee generally alleged violations of his 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, his specific allegations were that the police (1) 

forced him to show his driver’s license and leave his home during the domestic dispute, 

(2) incorrectly listed him as the offender in a report, and (3) did not allow his attorney to 

question a police officer during the internal investigation. As the District Court 

concluded, these facts do not expressly implicate the deprivation of a federal 
4

constitutional or statutory right by the City of Philadelphia,

2

rendering Lee’s allegations 

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Nor does it appear that these allegations could suffice to implicate a constitutional 

right. Lee has cited no authority for the notion that his constitutional rights were violated 

when the police required him to identify himself with his driver’s license and leave his 

home, and we are not aware of any that would apply to these allegations. As for the 

allegedly false police report, Lee did not claim that it was used against him in any 

proceedings, and the mere existence of such a report does not deprive a person of a 

constitutional right. See Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 

1980). Finally, there is no constitutional right to the investigation of another, Mitchell v. 

McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007), so we fail to see how the restriction placed on 

Lee’s attorney during the internal police investigation could implicate the deprivation of a 

federal constitutional or statutory right.

Lee also failed to allege sufficient facts to hold the city liable for the acts of its

police officers. A municipality cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action on a theory of 

respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 

Instead, liability may be imposed only where it can be shown that the municipality had a 

policy, regulation, custom, or practice that led to the constitutional violation. See

Mulholland v. County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). As noted by the 

 

2 Although Lee named individual police officers, it does not appear that they were 

served with the complaint, and they are not listed as parties on the District Court docket.
5

District Court, Lee’s complaint described only his personal experiences and contained no 

allegations whatsoever of a policy, custom, or practice of the City that resulted in the 

alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Lastly, to the extent the complaint may be 

read to allege a claim of conspiracy under §1983 between the City and Lee’s former 

attorney, we agree with the District Court that Lee’s vague allegations are insufficient to 

support an inference that the Defendants made an agreement to deprive Lee of his 

constitutional rights. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615

F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010).

Although Lee asserts on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his 

complaint, he presents nothing that addresses the deficiencies in his pleading or otherwise 

casts any doubt upon the court’s conclusions. Nor has he shown that he should have been 

permitted to amend his complaint – a course of action he does not appear to have sought 

in the District Court. It is apparent from the District Court’s memorandum order that the 

shortcomings in Lee’s claims were such that amendment would be futile. See Phillips v. 

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2008).

Finally, the District Court appropriately refused to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In general, a district court may decline 

to decide state law claims when the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction 

are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 

780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, Lee has failed to persuasively argue any considerations 
6

that would warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over his state law claims given that his 

federal claims are no longer viable.

Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court.