alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 12.1****CERTIFICATION**  I, David Colin Sinclair Veitch, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of NCL Corporation Ltd.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and15d-15(f)) for the company and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  b. Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused suchinternal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, toprovide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and thepreparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generallyaccepted accounting principles;  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and theaudit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the company’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date: March 12, 2008 /s/ David Colin Sinclair Veitch   Name:  David Colin Sinclair Veitch   Title:  President and Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 31.1
I, John R. Folkerth, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Shopsmith, Inc.(the “registrant”);
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand we have:
a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;
b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal controls over financial reporting.   Date: January 27, 2004   By: /s/ John R. Folkerth  John R. Folkerth  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Page 13
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

THOMAS HENRY MERDZINSKI, AKA

Tom Merdzinski,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 21

- 50287

D.C. No. 5:08

- cr

- 00139

- SGL

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 17, 2022 * *

Before: S.R. THOMAS, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Thomas Henry Merdzinski appeals pro se from the district court’s order

denying his second motion for early termination of supervised release under 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (1) . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Merd zinski first contends that the district court failed to explain adequately

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 26 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 50287

its decision to deny early termination

. We need not resolve the parties’ dispute

over the applicable standard of review because this claim fail s under any standard.

T he court stat ed that it had reviewed the oppositions filed by the government and

probation, which indicated that the reasons given by the court when it denied early

termination in a lengthy order less than t hree years earlier still applied . The

oppositions also explained that Merdzinski’s circumstances had not meaningfully

changed since that time and that early termination would pose a risk to the

community . Given these arguments, and the record as a whole, the district court’s

explanation, while brief

, is suffi cient to permit meaningful appellate review

. See

United States v. Carty

, 520 F.3d 984

, 992 (9th Cir. 2008 ) (en banc).

Merdzinski also argues that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his motion because his circumstances had changed sufficiently to warrant

early termination. A review of the record shows, however, that t he district court

did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that early termination of

supervised release was not in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) ;

United States v. Emmett , 749 F.3d 817, 8 19 (9th Cir. 2014)

.

Merdzinski’s remaining arguments lack merit or are beyond the scope of this

appeal.

AFFIRMED.
#### William Howard FITZGERALD, Appellant v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 26906.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 31, 1954.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for unlawfully operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The punishment assessed is a fine of $100.

Since perfecting his appeal, the appellant has filed a written motion, duly verified, requesting the dismissal thereof.

The motion is granted and the appeal ordered dismissed.
|                                                                           
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|                                                                           
|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                             
|View History: Annual                                                       
|View History: Annual                                                       
|View History:                                                              
|                                                                           
|Arkansas Natural Gas Total Liquids Extracted in Arkansas (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                           
|                                                                           
|Arkansas Natural Gas Total Liquids Extracted in Arkansas (Thousand Barrels)
|                                                                           

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2010's                                                                                                                            |        |        | 336    | 378    | 457    | 427    | 324    | 310    | 226    | 212   
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 174    | 166    | 152    |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-11184 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SHELBY LEE DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:99-CR-98-1-T

-------------------- April 10, 2001 Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Shelby Lee Daniels, federal prisoner #22481-077, appeals the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the indictment, which was filed after Daniels had noticed his appeal from his judgment of conviction. Daniels’ timely notice of appeal from his judgment of conviction divested the district court of jurisdiction to address the Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) motion. See United States v. Hitchmon , 602 F.2d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1979)(en banc). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictmentNo. 00-11184 -2- on the ground that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion. AFFIRMED.
#### MOTORS INS. CORP. v. CALDWELL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 26, 1954.

Armer H. Mahan, Louisville, Will Hoskins, Hyden, for appellant.

A. E. Cornett, Hyden, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on motion for an appeal under KRS 21.080 from a judgment for $780 and interest rendered by 1 the Leslie Circuit Court March 26, 1953, for the destruction of a 1950 Chevrolet by fire.

The appeal is based on the theory that there was not substantial evidence to support the appellee’s contention that the automobile was so badly damaged that it could not be repaired, and hence was a total loss, citing our. recent opinions in Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Huffman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 617, and Motors Insurance Corp. v. Hoskins, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 741.

In the case at bar, after conflicting evidence as to the reparability of the damage, it was admitted that the car ultimately was sold to a company which salvaged parts for use in repairing other damaged vehicles. This evidence alone distinguishes this case, from the cited cases. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment.

The motion for an appeal is dismissed and the judgment is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rodney Russ, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a *362judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kreindler, J.), rendered December 4, 1986, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant and his codefendant James Bumpus were tried together for the felony murder of Hector Rodriguez. We have already reviewed and affirmed Bumpus’s conviction *(People v Bumpus,*163 AD2d 484). In so doing, we rejected the arguments raised in this appeal concerning the alleged improper use of Grand Jury testimony of prosecution witnesses for impeachment purposes, the closure of the courtroom to spectators in order to conduct a brief hearing, as well as the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and we find that these contentions similarly lack merit within the context of the present appeal. As for the defendant’s contentions concerning the remarks of the prosecutor which were not raised in the previous appeal, we find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) or without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Kooper, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
----

|                              |
|------------------------------|
|                              |  |  |  |  |
|                         |   |   |   |   |
| Ohio                         |   | 000-5734 |   | 34-0907152 |
|                         |
| (State or other jurisdiction |   | (Commission File Number) |   | (IRS Employer Identification No.) |
| of incorporation)            |   |   |   |   |

|                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                                 |  |  |
|                                            |   |   |
| 425 Walnut Street, Suite 1800, Cincinnati, Ohio |   | 45202 |
|                                            |
| (Address of principal executive offices)        |   | (ZIP Code) |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |
|  ̈ |   | Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425) |
|   |   |   |
|  ̈ |   | Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12) |
|   |   |   |
|  ̈ |   | Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b)) |
|   |   |   |
|  ̈ |   | Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c)) |

----

----

|                |
|----------------|
|                |  |  |
| Item 2.02 |   | Results of Operations and Financial Condition; |
| Item 7.01 |   | Regulation FD Disclosure; and |
| Item 8.01 |   | Other Events. |

|                |
|----------------|
|                |  |  |
| Item 9.01 |   | Financial Statements and Exhibits |

|      |
|------|
|      |  |  |
| 99.1 |   | Agilysys, Inc. December 2013 investor presentation. |

----

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |  |
|   | AGILYSYS, INC.   |   |
|   | By: | /s/JANINE K. SEEBECK |   |
|   |   | Janine K. Seebeck |   |
|   |   | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, |   |
|   |   | and Treasurer |   |

----

|                |
|----------------|
|                |  |  |  |  |
| Exhibit Number |   | Description |
|           |   |   |   |   |
|           | 99.1 |   |   | Agilysys, Inc. December 2013 investor presentation. |
#### ADCOCK, Appellant, v. STATE *of*Texas, Appellee.

No. 24087.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 2, 1948.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1948.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Upon a plea of guilty to selling whisky in dry area appellant was fined $150.00.

The prosecution originated in the county court. No information was ever filed. Appellant has filed in this court a request to withdraw his appeal.

In all respects the record before us in this case reflects the same situation and *177procedure found in Cause No. 24086, 212 S.W.2d 175, against the same appellant, which cause was this day reversed and remanded. Reference is made to the opinion in No. 24,086 for the reasons for such action.

Appellant’s request to dismiss his appeal is refused and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

On Motion for Rehearing.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant filed a motion for a rehearing in this case based on the same claimed error asi in the case of Adcock v. State, No. 24086, 212 S.W.2d 175. What we have said in disposing of his motion in that case applies to the instant case.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### BURNS v. STATE.

No. 26632.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 25, 1953.

*407Allison & Allison, Levelland, by Tom Steele, Levelland, for appellant. •

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

This is a conviction for murder; the punishment, five years in the penitentiary.

A number of people, among whom were the deceased, known as “Black Red,” the witness Courtney, known as “Santa Claus,” the witness Williams, known as “Rabbit,” his wife, known as “Mama Rabbit,” and another woman known as “Doll” met at the home of appellant, where a card game soon started. Deceased and appellant got into an argument and began “fighting” in appellant’s bedroom. When deceased struck appellant with his fist, Courtney separated them, took deceased into another room, and endeavored, by force, to get him to leave the house. As they reached the front door, deceased resisted by propping his feet against it and causing both of them to fall to the floor. Deceased got up, removed his jacket, and started running back into the bedroom where appellant was. Appellant then shot him one time with a pistol. As he continued advancing toward her, she fired two more shots into his body, as a result of which he died shortly thereafter. According to the witness Courtney’s testimony, deceased had been drinking and had appeared to be “mad” when he started back into the bedroom.

These are the facts shown by the state’s witnesses. The appellant did not testify or call any witnesses.

It is insisted that the facts are insufficient to support the conviction, in two particulars : (a) There was an absence of malice aforethought,, and (b) the facts showed a killing in self-defense.

The intended shooting of one with a pistol is sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the shooting was activated by malice. Lovelady v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 50, 198 S.W.2d 570.

It must be remembered that under our present murder statute, the issue of malice arises only as to the question of punishment. One may be guilty of a killing with malice and receive the minimum punishment for murder. ■

The jury, here, was authorized to conclude that the shooting was upon malice aforethought. ■ :

Obviously, the facts present a strong case showing that deceased was advancing upon appellant at the time he was shot, and the issue of self-defense was properly in the case. The trial court fully instructed the jury thereon. But an attack, actual or apparent, does not as a matter of law authorize a killing. The attack must be one that gives rise to an apprehension of death or serious bodily injury, as viewed from the standpoint of the aocused, or where, the attack not being deadly, all other means are resorted to before the killing.

Such being true, self-defense arises only as a fact question. It was the -province of the jury to determine that issue, and, having done so, we would not be authorized to set aside its finding under the facts here presented.

Accordingly, the .judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.