Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC15-1823

____________

MATTHEW LEE CAYLOR,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

____________

No. SC16-399

____________

MATTHEW LEE CAYLOR,

Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE L. JONES, etc.,

Respondent.

[May 18, 2017]

PER CURIAM.

Matthew Lee Caylor appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 

to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
- 2 -

habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the 

reasons stated below, we grant Caylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, vacate 

Caylor’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase. We affirm, 

however, the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a jury trial, Matthew Caylor was convicted of first-degree murder, 

sexual battery involving great physical force, and aggravated child abuse for the 

2008 murder of Melinda Hinson. Caylor v. State, 78 So. 3d 482, 486 (Fla. 2011). 

The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, which the trial court 

followed in its sentencing order. Id. This Court set forth the following facts on 

direct appeal:

In July 2008, Melinda Hinson was living with her mother, her 

mother’s boyfriend, her fifteen-year-old brother, and Daryl Lawton, a 

family friend, in a single room at the Valu-Lodge Motel in Panama 

City. The family had moved to Florida from Kentucky in December 

2007 and Lawton came to live with the family soon after. Due to 

strained finances, all five moved to the motel in mid-June. The room 

was crowded and the children did not have school during the summer, 

so Melinda would spend most of her time by the motel’s pool. 

Melinda would also walk two dogs belonging to Scott Heinze and 

Tyler Nichols, who also lived at the motel, while Heinze and Nichols 

were at work.

According to the motel’s records, Matthew Caylor checked into 

the motel on June 25, 2008. At trial, Lawton testified that prior to the 

date of Melinda’s disappearance, he had only spoken with Caylor a 

few times and that he had never seen Melinda or her brother speak 

with Caylor. However, at around noon on July 8, Caylor came to 

Lawton and asked to borrow some duct tape, which Lawton took to 

Caylor’s room. Later in the day, Caylor called Lawton and asked if 
- 3 -

he could also borrow a steak knife. Again, Lawton went to Caylor’s 

room to take him the item. Lawton recalled that Melinda and her 

brother accompanied him on one of these occasions, but said that they 

did not speak to Caylor.

Melinda was last seen alive shortly after 5 p.m. on July 8, when 

she returned Heinze and Nichols’ dogs to their room after taking the 

dogs for a walk. When Melinda did not return to her family’s room, 

the family first asked Heinze and Nichols whether they had seen her.

Heinze told the family that he had last seen Melinda when she 

returned the dogs to their room. The family then searched the motel 

and the surrounding area. When they could not find Melinda, they 

called the police and reported that the girl was missing.

Melinda’s body was discovered on the morning of July 10, 

hidden under a bed in a room two doors down from Heinze and 

Nichols’ room. The body was found naked and lying face-down. The 

discovery was made by a housekeeper who was following the motel’s 

requirement of checking under the beds for trash. Although the room 

had been cleaned the previous day, the first housekeeper to clean the 

room testified that she did not look under the bed that day because her 

back was hurting. A review of the motel’s records revealed that 

Matthew Caylor had been renting the room on the day of Melinda’s 

disappearance. Officers of the Panama City Police Department 

subsequently learned that Caylor had been arrested in connection with 

a different criminal matter and that he was already in the custody of 

the Bay County Sheriff’s Department.

Detective Mark Smith of the Panama City Police Department 

testified at trial that he interviewed Caylor after the body was 

discovered. He was accompanied by Investigator Mike Wesley of the 

Bay County Sheriff’s Department, who had interrogated Caylor 

following the initial arrest. When Smith and Wesley went to see 

Caylor, Caylor said that he was glad to see the officers because he 

wanted to talk to them. The officers read Caylor his Miranda [v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] rights, which he waived. In the 

interrogation that followed, Caylor confessed to the murder of 

Melinda Hinson and described the circumstances leading up to the 

crime. Based on Caylor’s statements and evidence recovered from the 

crime scene, Caylor was charged with first-degree murder (based on 

both premeditation and felony murder theories of the offense), see

§ 782.04(1)(a) 1.-2., Fla. Stat. (2008), sexual battery involving great 
- 4 -

physical force, see § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2008), and aggravated 

child abuse, see § 827.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2008).

In statements made initially to the police officers and later to 

the trial court, Caylor gave the following account of the murder and 

the events leading up to it. In the summer of 2008, Caylor was on 

felony probation in the State of Georgia based on an incident that had 

occurred several years before in which he was accused of molesting 

the fourteen-year-old daughter of a neighbor. Caylor asserted that he 

was falsely accused, but said that on his attorney’s advice he pled 

guilty to avoid a possible prison sentence. He was later required to 

register as a sex offender after violating the terms of his probation by 

being convicted of possession of cocaine. Caylor stated that after 

several years he became frustrated with the restrictions placed on him 

as a sex offender, and said that he told his probation officer that he 

would rather serve time in jail and be done with the sentence. Caylor 

said that he then went to Panama City to relax because he thought he 

would have to spend approximately a year and a half in jail. Caylor 

admitted that he had not been given permission by his probation 

officer to leave Georgia, even though he knew he was required to 

receive such permission by Georgia law.

Caylor decided to rent a room at the Valu-Lodge Motel because 

it was close to the beach. While in Panama City, Caylor began selling 

cocaine and methamphetamine. He said that he also became friends 

with “two Russian girls,” and that he became romantically involved 

with one of the girls, Marina. He said that he discovered on July 8 

that the women had stolen some of his drugs. Caylor said that he 

borrowed a knife and duct tape with the intent of using it to threaten 

them to get his drugs back. He subsequently went to the women’s 

apartment, taking the knife and duct tape with him. Caylor said that 

he became violent during that encounter and decided to go back to his 

room at the motel. He was later arrested for the incident at the 

apartment.

During his interrogation, Caylor told Smith and Wesley that he 

returned to his motel room immediately after the incident at the 

women’s apartment. He said that he had been back in his room for 

only a few minutes when Melinda Hinson knocked on his door and 

asked him for a cigarette. He told the officers that at the time Melinda 

came to his room, he felt that he had “been through all of this because 

of something I didn’t do,” and told the officers that he decided he was 

“going to make it worth it.” When asked during the Spencer hearing 
- 5 -

what he meant by these statements, Caylor responded that he meant he 

was angry about his prior conviction for child molestation. He told 

the trial court he felt that “[i]f I’m going to be in trouble for having 

sex with this girl being in my room, I might as well have sex with this 

girl.”

After Melinda entered the room, Caylor said that she sat down 

on the bed and that they began smoking. He asked her what she had 

been doing. Melinda replied that she had just finished walking a dog 

that belonged to the men in the next room. Caylor asked how old she 

was and she told him that she was thirteen. He said that he asked her 

why she hung out with the guys next door. Melinda responded that 

“they think they’re hot stuff” but said that she “[did]n’t really like 

them.” According to Caylor, Melinda then told him that she thought 

he was “hot,” moved close to him on the bed and put her arm around 

him. Caylor said that they started kissing, that he took her clothes off, 

and that they started having sex.

Caylor said that at some point he “just started choking her.” He 

claimed that they had stopped having sex just before he began to 

strangle her. He said that he “wasn’t into it” and that the intercourse 

lasted for only thirty to forty-five seconds. However, he said that they 

were still naked when he began to strangle her and that he was still on 

top of her. Caylor said that when he began to choke Melinda, “she 

was flipping out and I just wanted her to go away.” He said that she 

began fighting him and saying, “[L]et me ask you a question, let me 

ask you a question,” and that during the struggle they fell from the bed 

to the floor. Caylor told the officers that he then unplugged the phone 

cord from the wall and wrapped it around her neck. The officers 

asked whether Melinda was moving when he began to strangle her 

with the cord, and Caylor responded: “Well, yeah, it was like no, no,” 

When he thought Melinda was dead, he released her and plugged the 

phone cord back into the wall. He then lifted up the mattress and 

placed Melinda and her clothes under the bed. He said that he 

gathered his things and left the room.

Detective Smith asked Caylor why he decided to kill Melinda:

[Detective Smith:] Well, is your thoughts that now I’ve had sex 

with her she’s going to tell? Is that what led to that she has to die?

[Caylor:] No, it wasn’t like that, no, it wasn’t like that, it was 

just like, it was like, more or less like you’re the fucking reason why 
- 6 -

I’m in this situation I’m in now because I did the right thing. I think it 

was more of a hate, like a hate, like I was really angry, I think is what 

it was.

[Detective Smith:] A hate for her or a hate the fact [sic] that 

she’s 13 years old.

[Caylor:] That she was 13 coming on to me.

Caylor said that when Melinda came into his room, he was “all 

pissed off about everything that has happened, not to mention the fact 

of what just happened at Marina’s house.” He said that Melinda “just 

kind of walked up at the wrong, with, you know, with that same bull 

shit, man, at the wrong time.”

At trial, the State called several witnesses to describe physical 

evidence recovered from the crime scene. Brenda Pelfrey, a crime 

scene investigator, identified photographs of the motel room where 

the body was discovered. She stated that the victim’s clothes, which 

were found underneath the body, were not ripped or torn and that 

there was no blood on the victim’s underwear. Pelfrey was also 

present during the autopsy, where she collected a sexual assault kit.

Trevor Seifert, a crime lab analyst, testified that he found Melinda’s 

DNA on portions of the phone cord removed from the motel room, 

and that Caylor was a possible contributor to scrapings taken from 

under Melinda’s fingernails. Seifert also stated that vaginal swabs 

from the victim tested positive for blood and semen, and that Caylor’s 

DNA profile matched these samples.

The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Michael Hunter, the 

medical examiner who conducted the autopsy. Dr. Hunter stated that 

during the examination he observed considerable injuries to the 

victim’s neck. He found that some of these injuries were consistent 

with strangulation by hand, while other straight-line markings showed 

strangulation by ligature. He agreed that the latter markings could 

have been inflicted through the use of a telephone cord. Dr. Hunter 

noted that there were multiple straight-line abrasions, which indicated 

application and reapplication of the ligature. He determined that these 

markings were most likely inflicted while the victim was still alive.

He also observed bleeding in the victim’s eyes, which provided 

further evidence of strangulation. Dr. Hunter ultimately concluded 

that the cause of death was strangulation. He said that the victim 
- 7 -

would have been in pain while she was conscious, and noted that there 

was no evidence of any head trauma that might have impaired her 

ability to feel pain or made her unaware of what was happening 

around her.

In addition to evidence of strangulation, Dr. Hunter observed 

other injuries on the body, including a bruise on the victim’s arm, a 

small abrasion on her left ankle, and another large bruise that 

extended over the length of the left side of her clavicle. He said that 

there was considerable bleeding underneath the clavicle bruise.

Additionally, Dr. Hunter observed discoloration in the victim’s pubic 

area, although he said that this injury could have occurred during 

consensual sex. He noted that the victim was menstruating at the time 

of death, but found no indication as to whether she was sexually 

active. He said that the victim’s blood tested positive for nicotine but 

negative for drugs or alcohol.

After the jury convicted Caylor of all three charged offenses, a 

penalty proceeding was held. The State’s only witness at this 

proceeding was Thomas Shakitra, who testified that he was employed 

as a probation officer with the State of Georgia. Shakitra stated that in 

2008, he was supervising Caylor, who was on felony probation.

Following this testimony, the defense stipulated that Caylor had a 

prior felony conviction in Georgia.

The defense called four witnesses during the penalty phase. 

The appellant’s parents, Kimberly and Kerry Caylor, testified that 

they were both addicted to amphetamines while the appellant was a 

child and that for a time the family had no money and lived in a trailer 

with no power. Both parents testified that the appellant had an 

abusive relationship with his father, began abusing drugs at a young 

age, and suffered from emotional problems. A third defense witness 

testified that he worked with the appellant as a mechanic in Jasper, 

Georgia, and described the appellant’s drug problems. The final 

defense witness was a veterinarian who testified that Matthew Caylor 

had worked in the kennel area of his office for several months. He 

stated that Caylor was a good employee and treated the animals well. 

At the end of the proceeding, the jury recommended the death penalty 

by a vote of eight to four.

The trial court held a Spencer hearing on November 18, 2009.

Caylor testified in his own defense and described the events preceding 

the murder. He said that contrary to his initial statement to the police, 

he had used a large amount of drugs on the day of the homicide. He 
- 8 -

stated that he decided to have sex with Melinda because he was angry 

about the fact that he had been on probation for eight years for an 

offense he did not commit, and that he was angry because he found

himself in a similar situation with a thirteen-year-old girl. He said 

that he did not rape Melinda and that he was remorseful for killing 

her.

In its written sentencing order, the trial court found and 

assigned weight to the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the 

capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a 

felony and under a sentence of imprisonment or placed on community 

control or on felony probation (great weight); (2) the capital felony 

was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of 

sexual battery and aggravated child abuse (great weight); and (3) the 

capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”) 

(great weight). The court found the following mitigating 

circumstances: (1) dysfunctional family (little weight); (2) under the 

influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (some 

weight); (3) compassionate to animals and good employee (little 

weight); (4) learning difficulties (very little weight); and (5) remorse 

(little weight).

The trial court concluded that the nature and quality of the 

mitigating factors “pale[d] in comparison” to the enormity of the 

aggravating circumstances. Furthermore, the court determined that 

the aggravating circumstances clearly and convincingly outweighed 

the mitigating factors. Based on these determinations, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of death.

Id. at 486-91 (footnotes omitted). On appeal, Caylor raised six claims1and this 

 

1. Caylor argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the offense of aggravated child abuse; (2) the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of sexual 

battery involving great force; (3) the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating 

circumstance that he committed the murder while on felony probation; (4) the trial 

court erred in assigning “little weight” to the “dysfunctional family” and “remorse” 

mitigating circumstances; (5) death is a disproportionate punishment; (6) Florida’s 

death penalty is unconstitutional under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 

584 (2002). Caylor, 78 So. 3d at 491.
- 9 -

Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Id. at 502. The United States 

Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 14, 2012. Caylor v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 

2405 (2012).

On May 2, 2013, Caylor filed his original postconviction motion. The 

motion raised six claims.2 On August 7, 2013 the court conducted a Huff3 hearing 

and summarily denied claim 1 (in part) and claim 3 (in part), with the court 

reserving ruling on whether claim 4 required further evidentiary consideration. 

The court granted an evidentiary hearing on claim 1 (in part), regarding Juror 

Marianne Moore, claim 2, regarding counsel’s failure to investigate and present 

mitigation evidence during the penalty phase and claim 3 (in part), regarding 

counsel’s failure to have a mental health professional testify with respect to 

Caylor’s mental state during the penalty phase. The remaining claims were to be 

 

2. Caylor argued: (1) trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire for 

failing to challenge jurors, properly inquire of them, and to move to strike the 

entire panel; (2) trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to 

investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) trial counsel was ineffective during 

the penalty phase for failing to use a mental health expert to present evidence of 

mental health mitigation; (4) denial of constitutional rights due to Rule of 

Professional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4) prevented trial counsel from interviewing jurors 

and is unconstitutionally vague; (5) execution by lethal injection violates the 

Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; and (6) 

cumulative error. 

3. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
- 10 -

resolved without an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing took place on 

June 1–2, 2015. Following the evidentiary hearing, the court filed a final order 

denying Caylor’s postconviction motion on September 9, 2015. This appeal 

followed. 

RULE 3.851 MOTION ON APPEAL

Caylor has raised the following five issues on this appeal: (1) trial counsel 

was ineffective for his investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence at the 

penalty phase; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring that Caylor receive 

a reasonably competent mental health evaluation for mitigation; (3) the trial court 

erred in summarily denying Caylor’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to challenge Juror Weaver; (4) the trial court erred in summarily denying the claim 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask any of the jurors about their

views on mental health, addiction, remorse, rehabilitation, mercy, experts, or any 

other potential mitigation; and (5) cumulative error. Because we find that Caylor 

is entitled to a new penalty phase, we only address issue three concerning Juror 

Weaver. As to this issue, we affirm the trial court’s ruling and its denial of 

Caylor’s postconviction motion.

Juror Weaver

Caylor argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge Juror Weaver. According to Caylor, Juror 
- 11 -

Weaver indicated that she was not sure if she could be impartial, knew one of the 

witnesses, and was once the victim of a crime. The postconviction court

summarily denied this claim, finding that Caylor failed to show that an actually 

biased juror sat on the jury panel.

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction motion 

unless: (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the 

movant is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or particular claim is legally 

insufficient. Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 54 (Fla. 2012). A postconviction 

court’s decision on whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is a pure question of 

law, reviewed de novo. Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 2013). For a 

defendant to show that his trial counsel was ineffective during the jury selection

process for failing to remove a juror from the panel, that defendant must show that 

an actually biased juror sat on his jury. Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324 

(Fla. 2007). 

In support of his claim, Caylor relies on the following colloquy with Juror 

Weaver:

THE COURT: No. Have you ever been a victim of crime or the party 

in a lawsuit?

JUROR WEAVER: I had a wallet stolen. 

THE COURT: Okay, would that affect your ability to sit on this case?

JUROR WEAVER: This one might.

THE COURT: Pardon?

JUROR WEAVER: This might.
- 12 -

THE COURT: Okay. Do you think because of that, you wouldn’t be 

able to sit on this case or other reasons?

JUROR WEAVER: I can sit.

THE COURT: Okay. Let’s see. Have you had any experiences with 

the State Attorney’s office or law enforcement that would influence 

your decision?

JUROR WEAVER: No, ma’am.

. . . .

THE COURT: And do you feel that you could be fair and impartial 

on this case?

JUROR WEAVER: I might.

THE COURT: Pardon?

JUROR WEAVER: I might.

THE COURT: You might. You’re not sure?

JUROR WEAVER: No ma’am.

Caylor also relies on questioning by the State during voir dire that revealed that 

one of the witnesses, Margaret Davis, was the aunt of Juror Weaver’s two 

daughters:

JUROR WEAVER: Margaret Davis.

MS. BASFORD: Margaret Davis, yes, ma’am. You know Ms. 

Davis?

JUROR WEAVER: Yes.

MR. BASFORD: How do you know Ms. Davis?

JUROR WEAVER: The lady who worked at the hotel?

MR. BASFORD: Yes, ma’am.

JUROR WEAVER: She’s my two daughters’ aunt.

MR. BASFORD: Excuse me?

JUROR WEAVER: She’s my two daughters’ aunt.

MR. BASFORD: She’s your two daughters’ aunt?

JUROR WEAVER: Uh huh.

MR. BASFORD: Oh, okay, okay. Well, she is going to be a witness 

in this case. Now, my question is, usually we don’t have people that 

are, you know, that closely related. Do you see her that often, 

ma’am?

JUROR WEAVER: No.
- 13 -

MR. BASFORD: Okay. If she testifies, and well, there’s no if, she is 

going to testify, Good Lord willing she’s going to testify, could you 

weigh and evaluate her testimony as you would that of the other 

witnesses in this case?

JUROR WEAVER: Yes.

MR. BASFORD: The Judge will give you some criteria to judge the 

witnesses’ testimony. But you could do that?

JUROR WEAVER: Yes, sir. 

We agree with the postconviction court’s determination and find that the 

record refutes any claim that an actually biased juror sat on the jury. In regards to 

Juror Weaver’s comment that she was not sure if she could be impartial, Mr. 

Basford later rehabilitated her through the following exchange:

MR. BASFORD: All right. I’ve got a question mark down here 

whether or not you could be impartial. How do you feel about it after 

sitting here this far in this case?

JUROR WEAVER: I’m in favor of the death penalty.

MR. BASFORD: Okay.

JUROR WEAVER: In some cases.

MR. BASFORD: In some cases you’re in favor of the death penalty. 

Do you think you can be fair and impartial in this case?

JUROR WEAVER: Yes, sir. 

Additionally, Juror Weaver stated that in regard to Margaret Davis, she would 

weigh and evaluate her testimony as she would the other witnesses. She also stated 

that she did not see Margaret Davis that often. As evidenced by the record, trial 

counsel was not ineffective because Juror Weaver clearly indicated that she could 

be fair and impartial, and there is no evidence that she was actually biased. 

Consequently, we deny relief as to this claim.
- 14 -

HABEAS PETITION

Caylor raises three claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with 

this Court. He contends that (1) section 775.082(2) requires that all deathsentenced capital felons receive life sentences without parole; (2) he is entitled to a 

new penalty phase under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), because the jury 

verdict at the sentencing phase was not unanimous; and (3) appellate counsel 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise an Ake v. Oklahoma, 

470 U.S. 68 (1985), claim on direct appeal. As mentioned previously, we find 

merit in Caylor’s second claim and grant him a new penalty phase. 

Application of Hurst v. Florida

Caylor argues that he is entitled to a new penalty phase under Hurst v. 

Florida, because the jury verdict at the sentencing phase was not unanimous. 

During the pendency of Caylor’s case, the United States Supreme Court found 

Florida’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. at 

619. We have interpreted Hurst v. Florida to require a jury to unanimously find 

each aggravating factor, that the aggravating factors are sufficient to warrant death, 

and that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation. See Hurst v. State, 202 

So. 3d 40, 57-58, 66-69 (Fla. 2016). We have also determined that most 

defendants sentenced to death after the Ring decision should receive the benefit of 
- 15 -

Hurst. See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016). Caylor, whose sentence 

was final in 2012, is one such defendant. 

Because Hurst applies to Caylor, we must consider whether it is clear 

beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have unanimously found all 

the facts necessary for the imposition of death and unanimously recommended 

death, such that any Hurst error is harmless. See Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1284. In 

this case, the jury’s recommendations of death were not unanimous and the jury 

made no findings concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 

jury recommended death for the murder of Melinda Hinson by a vote of eight to 

four. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the error in Caylor’s penalty phase was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Caylor is entitled to a new 

penalty phase.4

Section 775.082(2)

Caylor also argues that section 775.082(2), Florida Statutes (2016), requires 

that all death sentenced capital felons receive life sentences without parole. We 

previously rejected this claim in Hurst. Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 65 (“[W]e conclude 

that the statute does not mandate automatic commutation to life sentences after the 

 

4. Because we find that Caylor is entitled to a new penalty phase, we do not 

address Caylor’s argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

an Ake claim on direct appeal. 
- 16 -

decision in Hurst v. Florida.”). Therefore, we deny Caylor’s claim that he is 

entitled to a life sentence under section 775.082(2).

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

postconviction relief. However, we grant Caylor habeas relief, vacate his death 

sentence as unconstitutional under Hurst, and remand to the trial court for a new 

penalty phase. 

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.

POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 

CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 

sentence pursuant to Hurst.

CANADY and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County, 

James Ball Fensom, Judge - Case No. 032008CF002244XXAXMX

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 

Michael P. Reiter, Ocala, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner
- 17 -

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Marilyn Muir 

Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent