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*********************************************** 
VICTOR DIAZ v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL.

(AC 44104)

Prescott, Suarez and Vertefeuille, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant employer and its insurer appealed from the decision of the

Compensation Review Board affirming the Workers’ Compensation

Commissioner’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s request to commute into

a lump sum certain disability payments. The defendant had employed

the plaintiff as a member of its municipal police department. While

employed by the defendant, the plaintiff was diagnosed with hypertension. Subsequently, the commissioner found that the plaintiff’s hypertension was a significant, contributing factor in the development of his

coronary artery disease and, accordingly, that such disease was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The

plaintiff was later diagnosed with chronic kidney disease caused by his

hypertension and, in a supplemental finding and award, was awarded 245

weeks of permanent partial impairment disability benefits. The plaintiff

thereafter requested that the final 123 weeks of the award period be

commuted into a lump sum. After a hearing, the commissioner concluded

that the plaintiff had shown good cause for a commutation of his award

pursuant to statute (§ 31-302), and, accordingly, granted the plaintiff’s

request for a commutation of the benefits due to him for weeks 123

through 245 of his award. The defendant appealed to the board, claiming,

inter alia, that the commissioner improperly applied § 31-302 by ordering

a commutation of the back end of the award without also awarding the

defendant a moratorium of payment of benefits for the front end of the

award. The board affirmed the order of the commissioner, and this

appeal followed. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the board improperly

affirmed the commissioner’s order granting the plaintiff’s request for a

commutation of the partial disability payments due to him for weeks

123 through 245 of his award, without instituting a moratorium against

payment of the benefits due for the first 122 weeks of his award: although

the defendant argued that a lump-sum payment pursuant to a commutation order should be included in determining whether a payment exceeds

the maximum weekly compensation under the applicable statute (§ 31-

309) for workers’ compensation benefits, this interpretation was inconsistent with the purpose of the commutation statute and, without reference to the lump-sum payment pursuant to the commutation, the plaintiff’s award did not exceed the maximum weekly compensation under

§ 31-309.

2. The defendant’s claim that the board erred in not concluding that the

commissioner’s commutation order violated the cap on heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to statute (§ 7-433b) was unavailing: although

the statutory cap applied in the present case because the plaintiff was

receiving both a disability benefit pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c) and a

retirement pension, the plaintiff’s award complied with the statutory

cap imposed by § 7-433b because the plaintiff’s lump-sum payments

pursuant to the commutation award are excluded and the amount of

the plaintiff’s weekly disability benefit coupled with his pension payment

did not exceed the statutory guidelines.

3. The board correctly concluded that the commissioner’s commutation

order did not violate the principles of equity: contrary to the defendant’s

claim, there was no double recovery because, although one-half of the

award was paid in weekly installments and the other half was paid as

a onetime lump sum, the plaintiff did not receive anything in excess of

the original award to which he was entitled and, thus, the fact that the

plaintiff received the lump sum while simultaneously receiving weekly

payments of the award did not constitute a double recovery; moreover,

although the commutation order may have presented a budgetary challenge for the defendant, this court was not persuaded that the commissioner’s decision to commute the award in the fashion requested by the

plaintiff was improper.
Argued April 14—officially released November 9, 2021

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fourth District granting the

plaintiff’s request to commute certain disability benefit

payments due to him into a lump sum, brought to the

Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision, and the defendants appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Joseph J. Passaretti, Jr., with whom was Amanda

A. Hakala, for the appellants (defendants).

David J. Morrissey, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this workers’ compensation matter,

the defendant employer, the city of Bridgeport,1 appeals

from the decision of the Compensation Review Board

(board) affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Fourth District (commissioner) of the Workers’ Compensation Commission to

grant the request of the plaintiff, Victor Diaz, to commute into a lump sum the permanent partial disability

benefit payments due him for the final 123 weeks of

an overall period of 245 weeks. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the board improperly (1) affirmed the order

of the commissioner granting the plaintiff’s request

without instituting a moratorium against payment of the

plaintiff’s first 122 weeks of permanent partial disability

benefits, (2) concluded that the commissioner’s commutation order does not violate the cap on heart and

hypertension benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 7-

433b (b), and (3) concluded that the commissioner’s

commutation order does not violate the principles of

equity, including the prohibition against double recovery in the workers’ compensation system. We affirm

the decision of the board.

The following facts, as found by the commissioner

or as are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On and

for some time prior to January 31, 1989, the defendant

employed the plaintiff as a regular member of its municipal police department. Upon his entry into service, the

plaintiff submitted to a preemployment physical examination, which failed to reveal evidence of heart disease

or hypertension. On or about January 31, 1989, while

still employed by the defendant, the plaintiff was diagnosed with hypertension. Pursuant to an initial finding

and award dated October 20, 1993, the commissioner

awarded the plaintiff a specific award equal to a 10

percent permanent impairment of the heart.

On June 20, 2001, the plaintiff retired as a result

of unrelated orthopedic injuries. On May 17, 2007, the

plaintiff was diagnosed with coronary artery disease.

By a finding and award dated August 9, 2010, the commissioner found that the plaintiff’s hypertension was a

significant, contributing factor in the development of

his coronary artery disease and, accordingly, that such

disease also was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et. seq. Pursuant to this finding and award, the plaintiff had sustained

a 17 percent permanent impairment of the heart due

to hypertension and a 14 percent permanent impairment

of the heart as a result of coronary artery disease. By

March 16, 2018, according to a subsequent finding and

award, the plaintiff’s permanent impairment of the heart

had increased to 47 percent.

On January 19, 2017, Paul Nussbaum, a nephrologist,
evaluated the plaintiff and determined that he suffered

from chronic kidney disease. Nussbaum examined the

plaintiff again on February 5, 2018, and determined that

the plaintiff had a 70 percent permanent impairment of

the bilateral kidneys caused by his hypertension. On

the basis of this determination, on January 30, 2019, in

a supplemental finding and award, the plaintiff was

awarded 245 weeks of permanent partial impairment

disability benefits at the weekly compensation rate of

$551.13. The plaintiff’s maximum medical improvement

date was February 20, 2019. The plaintiff subsequently

requested that the partial disability benefit payments

due him for the final 123 weeks of the 245 week award

period be commuted into a lump sum.

On April 15, 2019, a formal hearing was held to determine whether a portion of the plaintiff’s permanent

partial disability award was eligible for commutation

pursuant to General Statutes § 31-302. The plaintiff indicated that he was seeking a lump-sum payment to pay

past due property taxes, to reduce his credit card debt,

and to pay a portion of his children’s student loans. At

the formal hearing, the plaintiff testified that he understood that any commutation of the award would be

subject to a 3 percent actuarial reduction and that, once

the lump sum was paid, he would be deemed to have

been paid his full weekly rate for the weeks covered

by the commutation period. The defendant objected to

the plaintiff’s request.

Following the hearing, the commissioner concluded

that the plaintiff had shown ‘‘good and sufficient cause’’

for a commutation of his permanent partial disability

award. Accordingly, the commissioner granted the commutation for benefits due the plaintiff for weeks 123

through 245 of his award. The commissioner also

ordered the defendant to continue paying the plaintiff’s

weekly permanent partial disability benefits until the

expiration of week 122, at which time the entire award

would be satisfied.2 The defendant could then terminate

its weekly payments without filing a notice to discontinue benefits. The commissioner instituted a moratorium against the payment of weekly benefits for the

time period covered by the commutation.

The defendant filed an appeal to the board. On appeal,

the defendant claimed that the commissioner improperly applied § 31-302 when she ordered a commutation

of the ‘‘back end’’ of the plaintiff’s award without also

awarding the defendant a moratorium of payment of

benefits for the ‘‘front end’’ of the award. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board affirmed the order of

the commissioner. In its decision, the board addressed

the specific claims that are before us on appeal. These

claims include that the plaintiff’s total payment exceeded

the maximum weekly payment under § 31-302, violated

the statutory cap imposed by § 7-433b (b), and breached

the principle against double recovery. This appeal from
the decision of the board followed.

‘‘As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of

review applicable to workers’ compensation appeals.

The principles that govern our standard of review in

workers’ compensation appeals are well established.

The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from

the facts found must stand unless they result from an

incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts

or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn

from them. . . . It is well established that [a]lthough

not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers’ compensation statutes by the

commissioner and [the] board. . . . A state agency is

not entitled, however, to special deference when its

determination of a question of law has not previously

been subject to judicial scrutiny.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Yelunin v. Royal Ride Transportation,

121 Conn. App. 144, 148, 994 A.2d 305 (2010).

To the extent that the claims raised in the present

appeal require us to interpret the Workers’ Compensation Act, ‘‘we are mindful of the proposition that all

workers’ compensation legislation, because of its remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor of

disabled employees. . . . This proposition applies as

well to the provisions of [General Statutes] § 7-433c

. . . because the measurement of the benefits to which

a § 7-433c claimant is entitled is identical to the benefits

that may be awarded to a [claimant] under . . . [the

Workers’ Compensation Act].’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265,

277–78, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010).

We must also set forth the legal principles common

to the defendant’s claims. ‘‘[Section] 7-433c entitles a

qualified, hypertensive or heart-disabled firefighter or

police officer to receive compensation and medical care

equivalent to that available under . . . the Workers’

Compensation Act.’’ Lambert v. Bridgeport, 204 Conn.

563, 566, 529 A.2d 184 (1987). Subsection (a) of § 7-

433c provides in relevant part that, ‘‘in the event . . .

a regular member of a paid municipal police department

who successfully passed a physical examination on

entry into such service, which examination failed to

reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease,

suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or

impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart

disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents,

as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal

employer compensation and medical care in the same

amount and the same manner as that provided under

[the Workers’ Compensation Act] if such death or disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out

of and in the course of his employment and was suffered

in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-433c (a).
‘‘The benefits provided under § 7-433c are . . . payable and administered under the Workers’ Compensation Act, contained in chapter 568 of the General Statutes, and the type and amount of benefits available

pursuant to § 7-433c are the same as those under the

Workers’ Compensation Act . . . . The monetary benefits received under § 7-433c are the same as those available to anyone with similar disabilities who receives

workers’ compensation benefits under chapter 568; that

is, one would not receive additional compensation simply by receiving benefits under § 7-433c rather than

under chapter 568.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v.

Waterbury, 286 Conn. 732, 752, 945 A.2d 936 (2008).

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the board

improperly affirmed the order of the commissioner

granting the plaintiff’s request for a commutation of

partial disability payments due the plaintiff for weeks

123 through 245 of his award, without instituting a moratorium against payment of the benefits due the plaintiff

for the first 122 weeks. The defendant argues that the

plaintiff’s receipt of the lump-sum payment while simultaneously collecting the weekly benefit results in an

award that exceeds the maximum weekly compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Because

the plaintiff’s weekly compensation rate does not, in

and of itself, exceed the maximum weekly compensation under General Statutes § 31-309 (a), inherent in the

defendant’s argument is the notion that a lump-sum

payment pursuant to a commutation order should be

included in determining whether a weekly payment

exceeds the maximum weekly compensation under the

Workers’ Compensation Act. We disagree.

To resolve the defendant’s claim, we must interpret

the language of § 31-309 (a). Our review, therefore, is

plenary, and we apply established principles of statutory construction. See Rutter v. Janis, 334 Conn. 722,

730, 224 A.3d 525 (2020). Under General Statutes § 1-

2z, ‘‘[t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance,

be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and

its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered.’’ ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,

we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts

of [the] case, including the question of whether the

language actually does apply. . . . Furthermore, [i]t is

well established that, in resolving issues of statutory

construction under the act, we are mindful that the
act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be

construed generously to accomplish its purpose. . . .

The humanitarian and remedial purpose of the act counsel against an overly narrow construction that unduly

limits eligibility for workers’ compensation. . . .

Accordingly, [i]n construing workers’ compensation

law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae

in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of

the act.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Balloli v. New Haven Police Dept., 324 Conn.

14, 18–19, 151 A.3d 367 (2016).

We interpret § 31-309 (a) to establish a maximum

weekly compensation for workers’ compensation benefits. That statute provides in relevant part that ‘‘the

weekly compensation received by an injured employee

under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case be

more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even

dollar, of the average weekly earnings of all workers

in the state . . . .’’3 General Statutes § 31-309 (a). Section 31-302, however, expressly authorizes an alternative to weekly compensation, permitting the commutation of weekly compensation into monthly or quarterly

payments or into a lump sum. Specifically, § 31-302

provides in relevant part: ‘‘Compensation payable under

this chapter shall be paid at the particular times in the

week and in the manner the commissioner may order

. . . except that when the commissioner finds it just

or necessary, the commissioner may approve or direct

the commutation, in whole or in part, of weekly compensation under the provisions of this chapter into

monthly or quarterly payments, or into a single lump

sum, which may be paid to the one then entitled to the

compensation, and the commutation shall be binding

upon all persons entitled to compensation for the injury

in question.’’

Section 31-309 (a) limits a claimant’s ‘‘weekly compensation . . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-309 (a).

Affording this language its plain and unambiguous

meaning, ‘‘weekly compensation’’ refers to compensation that a claimant is entitled to receive on a weekly

basis. A lump-sum payment made pursuant to a commutation award, however, is not a weekly payment but,

rather, a singular payment consisting of benefits that

otherwise would have been paid to a claimant over the

course of multiple weeks. Because of the nature of

these types of payments, they will almost always exceed

the established maximum weekly compensation that

may be paid to a claimant. The defendant’s interpretation of § 31-309 (a) is inconsistent with and undermines

the purpose of the commutation statute and is, therefore, not a reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, we

do not interpret § 31-309 (a) to encompass lump-sum

payments.

In addition to the text of the statute itself, we must

also consider the relationship of § 31-309 (a) to other
statutes. See General Statutes § 1-2z. As acknowledged

by our Supreme Court, ‘‘[an award pursuant to] . . .

§ 7-433c . . . is a work[ers’] compensation award in

the sense that its benefits are payable and procedurally

administered under the Work[ers’] Compensation Act

. . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Carriero v. Naugatuck, 243 Conn. 747, 759,

707 A.2d 706 (1998). Further, unless there is a rational

justification to do otherwise, courts should construe

statutes in such a manner as to ‘‘foster harmony’’ with

related statutes, thereby resulting in a consistent body

of law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Spears, 234 Conn. 78, 91, 662 A.2d 80, cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1009, 116 S. Ct. 565, 133 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995); see

also Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 759.

As we have explained, § 31-302, by its plain language,

specifically authorizes lump-sum payments made pursuant to commutation awards. Section 31-302 also provides that an award may be commuted ‘‘in whole or in

part . . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-302. The only reasonable way to interpret the statute’s authorization of a

commutation ‘‘in part’’ is to mean that a portion of an

award may be paid as a lump sum. After a partial lump

sum has been paid, the portion of the award that has

not been commuted remains payable to the claimant

in the form of weekly benefits. The fact that the legislature, in § 31-302, prescribed that such awards may represent the whole or part of weekly compensation benefits reflects that the legislature intended to permit an

award to be made while a claimant was also receiving

weekly benefits. Our interpretation of § 31-309 (a)

allows both §§ 31-309 (a) and 31-302 to have effect and

fosters harmony between these related statutes.

Our interpretation also aligns with the remedial purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The provisions

of § 31-302 afford a commissioner significant discretion

to decide whether to grant a commutation and to structure a commutation in accordance with the needs or

preferences of the party seeking the commutation. See

General Statutes § 31-302. Specifically, a commutation

may be granted whenever the commissioner ‘‘finds it

just or necessary . . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-302. The

commissioner also has the discretion to grant a commutation ‘‘in whole or in part,’’ which makes possible a

number of award structures. General Statutes § 31-302.

Interpreting § 31-309 (a) to include lump-sum payments

pursuant to a commutation award in the calculation of

the maximum weekly compensation would impede the

commissioner’s ability to grant a partial commutation

of an award when a claimant is still receiving weekly

payments to satisfy another portion of the same award.

This would, in turn, diminish the commissioner’s ability

to structure an award to meet the needs and preferences

of the claimant. As provided in § 31-302, a commissioner

has the flexibility to structure an award in different

ways, which reflects the remedial nature of the Work-
ers’ Compensation Act.

Without reference to the lump-sum payment pursuant

to the commutation, the plaintiff’s award does not

exceed the maximum weekly compensation under § 31-

309 (a). The plaintiff’s weekly compensation rate was

$551.13. The maximum weekly compensation rate for

the plaintiff’s date of injury is $671. Because we have

determined that the plaintiff’s award does not violate

§ 31-309 (a), we conclude that the board did not err in

affirming the order of the commissioner granting the

plaintiff’s request for a commutation.

II

We next address the defendant’s claim that the board

erred in not concluding that the commissioner’s commutation order violates the cap on heart and hypertension benefits pursuant to § 7-433b (b). The defendant

argues that the sum of the plaintiff’s commutation

award, weekly disability benefit, and weekly pension

benefit violates the statutory cap imposed by § 7-433b

(b). We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the additional legal principles pertinent to this claim. Section 7-433b (b) imposes

a cap on the benefits that employees may collect under

§ 7-433c, the Heart and Hypertension Act. See General

Statutes § 7-433b (b). Section 7-433b (b) provides in

relevant part: ‘‘[T]he cumulative payments, not including payments for medical care, for compensation and

retirement or survivors benefits under section 7-433c

shall be adjusted so that the total of such cumulative

payments received by such member or his dependents

or survivors shall not exceed one hundred per cent

of the weekly compensation being paid, during their

compensable period, to members of such department

in the same position which was held by such member

at the time of his death or retirement.’’

In Carriero v. Naugatuck, supra, 243 Conn. 753, our

Supreme Court held that this statutory cap on benefits

is applicable to cumulative payments of disability compensation and retirement pension benefits whenever

any portion of those payments is awarded under § 7-

433c. If a retired employee receives any benefit under

§ 7-433c, the calculation of the ceiling on heart and

hypertension benefits must take into account that

employee’s regular pension retirement benefits, not just

the employee’s disability pension benefits. See id., 750–

51.

The statutory cap is applicable in the present case

because the plaintiff was receiving both a disability

benefit under § 7-433c and a retirement pension based

on his years of service in the police department. Here,

the plaintiff was receiving a disability benefit under § 7-

433c to compensate him for a 70 percent permanent

impairment of the bilateral kidneys caused by his hypertension. The award consisted of 245 weeks at the
weekly compensation rate of $551.13. As a retired police

officer, the plaintiff was also receiving a weekly pension

benefit related to his years of service. Because the plaintiff was receiving disability benefits under § 7-433c as

well as unrelated retirement pension benefits, the plaintiff’s award must comply with the statutory cap imposed

by § 7-433b (b).

Although the statutory cap applies, we agree with

the board that the plaintiff’s award does not violate

§ 7-433b (b). The defendant argues that the onetime

payment to be made to the plaintiff by virtue of the

commutation order, together with the weekly disability

benefit and pension payment to the plaintiff, violates

the cap on heart and hypertension benefits imposed by

§ 7-433b (b). The defendant does not argue, and there

is no evidence before us, that the plaintiff’s cumulative

weekly payment, without considering the lump-sum

payment pursuant to the commutation order, exceeds

the statutorily prescribed limit. Accordingly, inherent

in the defendant’s argument is the idea that a calculation

of benefits for the purposes of the cap imposed by § 7-

433b (b) should take into account a lump-sum payment

made pursuant to a commutation order. We do not

agree.

To address the defendant’s claim, we must interpret

§ 7-433b (b) in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation set forth in part I of this opinion.

Section 7-433b (b) provides in relevant part that the

‘‘cumulative payments . . . for compensation and

retirement . . . benefits under section 7-433c shall be

adjusted so that the total of such cumulative payments

. . . shall not exceed one hundred per cent of the

weekly compensation being paid . . . to members of

such department in the same position which was held

by such member at the time of his death or retirement.’’

Examining the text’s plain meaning, the phrase ‘‘cumulative payments’’ reflects that the legislature intended

to put a cap on recurring weekly payments that are

comprised of both a disability benefit and a retirement

pension benefit. The statute refers to ‘‘payments’’ in the

plural, indicating that it applies to multiple payments.

When an award is commuted, however, a portion of

the award is paid as a onetime lump sum, which is a

singular payment. The use of the plural suggests that

the legislature did not intend to include a lump-sum

payment pursuant to a commutation award in the calculations related to the statutory cap. Additionally, the

statute refers to ‘‘cumulative payments’’ of disability

and retirement benefits as being measured against and

compared to the ‘‘weekly compensation’’ received by

working members of the police department. This indicates that the legislature intended to limit the amount

of weekly compensation benefits that a retired member

of the department may receive. Because it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute to treat a

lump-sum payment pursuant to a commutation award
to be a weekly payment, it should not be considered

in calculations concerning the weekly statutory cap.

We are persuaded that the statute’s plain objective is

to limit the cumulative effect of several weekly benefits,

not to prohibit a onetime commutation award.

Further, we must consider the relationship of § 7-

433b (b) to other statutes. See General Statutes § 1-2z.

As we noted in part I of this opinion, courts should

construe statutes in such a manner as to ‘‘foster harmony’’ with related statutes in order to create a consistent body of law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Spears, supra, 234 Conn. 91. Our interpretation

of § 7-433b (b) permits §§ 7-433b (b) and 31-302 to coexist. If this court were to adopt the defendant’s argument,

any significant lump-sum payment pursuant to a commutation award under § 31-302 would result in a onetime violation of the statutory ceiling imposed by § 7-

433b (b). To interpret the statute as the defendant suggests would thwart the legislature’s expressed intent

to permit commutation awards ‘‘in whole or in part

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-302. We agree with the

board that there is no ‘‘reasonable basis for concluding

that the legislature intended to impose a blanket prohibition against commutation orders for this reason.’’

Our interpretation of the statute is also consistent

with the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation

Act. As we noted previously in this opinion, the Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial in nature and ‘‘should

be broadly construed in favor of disabled employees.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciarlelli v. Hamden, supra, 299 Conn. 277. This principle also applies

to the provisions of § 7-433c. Id., 277–78. Interpreting

the statutory cap on benefits imposed by § 7-433b (b)

to exclude lump-sum payments pursuant to a commutation award is consistent with the remedial purpose of

the Workers’ Compensation Act. If we interpret the

statutory cap in § 7-433b (b) to include commutation

awards, these awards would almost always violate § 7-

433b (b). Such an interpretation would greatly limit the

commissioner’s ability to structure an award to meet

the needs and preferences of a workers’ compensation

claimant. For this reason, our interpretation of the statutory cap in § 7-433b (b), namely, that it does not apply

to lump-sum payments pursuant to a commutation

award, is consistent with the remedial purpose of the

Workers’ Compensation Act.

We agree with the board that, regardless of whether

the commissioner had granted the plaintiff’s request for

a commutation, § 7-433b (b) would be violated only if

the cumulative amount of the plaintiff’s weekly disability benefit coupled with his weekly pension payment

exceeded the statutory guidelines. They did not. Without reference to the onetime, lump-sum payment, the

plaintiff did not collect more than 100 percent of the

weekly compensation being paid to others in the same
position that the plaintiff held at his retirement. It is

true that, during the week that the commutation award

was granted, the plaintiff received the lump sum, the

weekly disability benefit, and the weekly pension benefit. Although the lump-sum payment resulted in a single

week in which the plaintiff received more than he would

have if he had been working, any commutation would

have caused the same result. If the commutation had

not been granted, however, and the award had been

spread out over the 245 week period, the plaintiff’s

weekly payments would not have exceeded 100 percent

of the weekly payment received by others employed in

the same position. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s award

did not violate the statutory cap.

III

Finally, we address the defendant’s claim that the

board improperly concluded that the commissioner’s

commutation order does not violate the principles of

equity, including the prohibition on double recovery

in the workers’ compensation system. The defendant

argues that the commissioner’s approval of the commutation of the ‘‘back end’’ of the plaintiff’s award while

the ‘‘front end’’ benefits were being paid concurrently

constitutes a double recovery. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) We disagree.

This court has long recognized that ‘‘[o]ur [Workers’

Compensation] Act does not permit double compensation. . . . When an injury entitles a worker to benefits

both under the compensation statute and under other

legislation, so that a double burden would be imposed

on the employer, our courts have held that compensation payments during the period of disability reduce

the employer’s obligation created by other legislation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McFarland v. Dept.

of Developmental Services, 115 Conn. App. 306, 313,

971 A.2d 853, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 919, 979 A.2d 490

(2009). This prohibition on double recovery stems from

the rationale that ‘‘[t]he law cannot permit [a] claimant

to enjoy a windfall, i.e., to be paid twice for his medical

expenses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Pokorny v. Getta’s Garage, 219 Conn. 439, 444 n.6, 594

A.2d 446 (1991).

Double recovery occurs ‘‘[w]hen an injury entitles a

worker to benefits both under the compensation statute

and under other legislation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) McFarland v. Dept. of Developmental

Services, supra, 115 Conn. App. 313. For example, this

court has held, and our Supreme Court has affirmed,

that an award received pursuant to the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act must be

‘‘wholly credited’’ against a subsequent award arising

out of the same injury under the state Workers’ Compensation Act in order to prevent a double recovery by the

plaintiff. McGowan v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric

Boat Division, 15 Conn. App. 615, 615–16, 546 A.2d 893
(1988), aff’d, 210 Conn. 580, 566 A.2d 587 (1989). Our

Supreme Court also has held that requiring an employer

to pay a claimant for medical expenses that already

have been paid by the claimant’s medical insurance

carrier constitutes an impermissible double recovery.

See Pokorny v. Getta’s Garage, supra, 219 Conn. 448.

In the present case, there is no double recovery. The

plaintiff received a single award of 245 weeks of compensation at a rate of $511.13 per week. Although onehalf of the award was paid in weekly installments and

the other half was paid as a onetime lump sum, the

plaintiff did not receive anything in excess of the total

original award to which he was entitled. Thus, the fact

that the plaintiff received the lump sum while he was

simultaneously receiving weekly payments of the same

award does not constitute a double recovery. As the

board acknowledged in its decision, the plaintiff’s ‘‘total

payout is still predicated on, and limited to, the same

number of weeks for which he would have received

weekly benefits had he not chosen to convert part of

his permanency award into a lump-sum payment.’’

Conceding that the plaintiff has received only the 245

weeks of compensation to which he is entitled, the

defendant argues that the manner in which the payment

was structured, rather than the amount, constitutes a

double recovery. This argument, however, also fails. As

illuminated by our case law, the principle against double

recovery seeks to prevent a claimant from receiving a

‘‘windfall’’ or being ‘‘paid twice for his medical

expenses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Pokorny v. Getta’s Garage, supra, 219 Conn. 444 n.6.

The facts in the present case simply do not demonstrate

that the commutation order resulted in a windfall or

double payment for the plaintiff. As our case law

reflects, the principle against double recovery is not

violated simply by virtue of when or how benefits are

paid but whether a claimant has been ‘‘paid twice

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The defendant further argues that the commutation

order ‘‘is not just to all parties interested in the award.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Specifically, the defendant argues

that, because the plaintiff received the lump-sum payment (due him for weeks 123 through 245) while he

was still receiving weekly payments (due him for weeks

1 through 122), the plaintiff is ‘‘placed in the best position possible . . . while the [defendant is] being

unduly burdened without any consideration.’’ We do

not agree.

Our Supreme Court has held that the commutation

statute ‘‘[confers] upon the commissioner authority to

commute a compensation award in those cases only

where it is reasonably necessary for the welfare of the

claimant and his dependents, and at the same time is

just to all parties interested in the award.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Reid v. Hartford Fuel Supply Co., 120 Conn.
541, 546, 182 A. 141 (1935). The defendant argues that

this particular commutation award is unjust to the

defendant because it ‘‘allows a lump-sum payment, but

also weekly benefits for that same time period . . . .’’

According to the defendant, the structure of the commutation award is ‘‘an unpredicted loss to the fiscal year

that could not have been budgeted for in advance.’’

Although the structure of the commutation in the present case may present an unanticipated budgetary challenge for the defendant, like the board, ‘‘we are not

persuaded that the financial difficulties attendant on

compliance with the commutation order are such that

the commissioner’s decision to commute the award in

the fashion requested by the claimant was improper.’’

In fact, the initial financial burden on the defendant

would have been more substantial had the plaintiff

requested a commutation of the entire award at once,

which he was entitled to do. It is unclear how the partial

commutation of the award, coupled with a concurrent

weekly benefit, constitutes an undue burden when the

defendant could have been required to pay out the entire

award up front had the plaintiff requested a full commutation. Further, the defendant is entitled to the usual

actuarial discount in payment for the weeks covered

by the commutation.4 See General Statutes § 31-302.

The actuarial discount contained in the commutation

statute ensures that a ‘‘true equivalence of value [is]

maintained’’ and that an employer is not made worse

off due to a commutation. General Statutes § 31-302.

We agree with the board’s assessment that the actuarial

reduction compensates the defendant for the prejudice

associated with the contraction of the period of time

over which the award must be paid. For these reasons,

the plaintiff’s award does not offend the principles of

equity in our workers’ compensation system.

The decision of the Compensation Review Board is

affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 PMA Companies, the workers’ compensation insurer for the city of

Bridgeport, was also a defendant in this case and is a party to this appeal.

For convenience, we refer in this opinion to the city of Bridgeport as the

defendant.

2 The plaintiff had been receiving weekly benefits since the commissioner

issued the January 30, 2019 finding and award. Several weeks later, on April

15, 2019, when the commissioner granted the plaintiff’s request to commute

the final 123 weeks of the award, the plaintiff was still entitled to the

remaining balance of the first 122 weeks of compensation, to be paid in

weekly installments.

3 The maximum weekly compensation rate for the plaintiff’s date of injury

is $671.

4 General Statutes § 31-302 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n any case

of commutation, a true equivalence of value shall be maintained, with due

discount of sums payable in the future . . . .’’