ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

People v. Villafuerte-Medrano, 2012 IL App (2d) 110773

Appellate Court

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

MANUEL VILLAFUERTE-MEDRANO, a/k/a Oscar Medrano,

Defendant-Appellant.

 District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-11-0773

Filed December 19, 2012

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The appellate court dismissed defendant’s appeal in which he contended

that the judgment entered on the forfeiture of his bond in his DUI cases

was equivalent to a conviction for aggravated DUI that rendered a

subsequent DUI conviction entered on his guilty plea based on the same

conduct a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy, since

defendant failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) by filing a

motion to reconsider his sentence or withdraw his guilty plea and vacate

the judgment.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, No. 06-CF-192; the

Hon. John H. Young, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appeal dismissed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Thomas A. Lilien and Sherry R. Silvern, both of State Appellate

Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. 

Michelle J. Courier, State’s Attorney, of Belvidere (Lawrence M. Bauer

and Jay Paul Hoffmann both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s

Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Zenoff and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Manuel Villafuerte-Medrano, appeals his conviction of aggravated driving

under the influence (aggravatedDUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(G)(West 2006)), which was

entered upon his plea of guilty. He argues that his conviction is void pursuant to double

jeopardy principles because judgment had already been entered upon a bond forfeiture, and

the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2006)) provides that a bond

forfeiture equates to a conviction of the underlying offense. However, defendant’s failure to

comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006) requires us to dismiss

this appeal without reaching the merits.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment on June 2, 2006, in case No. 06-CF-192 with two

counts of aggravated DUI(625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(G)(West 2006)), in that he drove while

under the influence of alcohol without possessing a valid license. The record is missing many

orders but contains a court case search that explains the procedural background through case

notes entered by court officials. According to the case notes, there were misdemeanor traffic

citations issued for the same conduct in case Nos. 06-DT-129 and 06-TR-4060 through 06-

TR-4062. The notes indicate that on September 13, 2006, defendant failed to appear in court;

his attorney, Dennis Steeves, withdrew; the court ordered defendant’s bond forfeited; an

arrest warrant was issued; and the court set the matter for hearing on October 25, 2006.

Defendant failed to appear on October 25, and the court finalized the bond forfeiture by

entering judgment in favor of the State, listing case Nos. 06-DT-129 and 06-TR-4060

through 06-TR-4062.

¶ 4 On January 22, 2007, defendant was arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant issued in

September 2006. Bail was set at $10,000. On January 23, defendant paid the bail bond

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amount. The bail bond lists case Nos. 06-CM-41, 06-CM-42, 06-DT-14, 06-CF-192, 06-DT129, and 06-TR-4060 through 06-TR-4064. Defendant was ordered to appear in court on

February 14, 2007. After defendant failed to appear, the court ordered that defendant’s bond

was forfeited and issued an arrest warrant. Judgment was entered on the bond forfeiture on

March 14 for the same case numbers.

¶ 5 Defendant was arrested again on May 27, 2008, on the warrant issued in February 2007.

On that date, defendant paid the bail amount and a court date was set for June 13. Defendant

appeared on June 13 without counsel. Defendant informed the court that he was hiring

counsel. Three new cases were listed as pending against defendant: 07-CM-41 and 07-CM42 (misdemeanor obstruction of justice and delivery of alcohol to a minor) and 07-DT-14

(misdemeanor DUI). On July 23, defendant failed to appear in court again. On July 25, the

court entered an order forfeiting defendant’s bond and issued an arrest warrant. On

September 3, the bond forfeiture was finalized.

¶ 6 Defendant was arrested on January 3, 2011, pursuant to the arrest warrant issued in

September 2008. On March 4, 2011, defendant, through Assistant Public Defender Carie 1

L. Poirier, moved to dismiss case Nos. 06-CF-192, 06-DT-129, and 06-TR-4060. According

to the motion, the trial court ordered bond forfeiture finalization on October 25, 2006, and

notified the Secretary of State of that judgment. Upon receipt of that judgment, defendant

argued, he was “convicted” in case Nos. 06-DT-129 and 06-TR-4060. On June 2, 2006, the

State filed a bill of indictment in case No. 06-CF-192, alleging the same conduct as in 06-

DT-129, enhanced to a Class 4 felony. Defendant argued that this prosecution was barred

pursuant to section 3-4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 2010)) and

double jeopardy provisions because judgment was entered on the bond forfeiture on October

25, 2006, for case Nos. 06-DT-129 and 06-TR-4060 through 06-TR-4062. The trial court

denied the motion. The trial court stated that it did not believe that a bond forfeiture barred

the continuation of the underlying case. Thus, it did not believe that the bond forfeiture was

a final conviction on the pending cause.

¶ 7 Defendant moved to reconsider this denial on April 26, 2011, stating that the court had

denied his motion on March 30 without hearing arguments. Defendant stated that the court

considered two cases (People v. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d 179 (2004), and People v. Glowacki,

404 Ill. App. 3d 169 (2010)) when it determined that a bond forfeiture judgment was an

“alternative” conviction that may be used to enhance a charge to a felony but was not a

“final” conviction for the purposes of defendant’s case. Defendant argued that the trial court

was incorrect and that, if the State may rely upon a bond forfeiture to a defendant’s

detriment, he should be allowed to claim its protections. Therefore, he argued, the court erred

in denying his motion to dismiss.

¶ 8 The trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration on May 18, 2011. On that

date, defendant pleaded guilty to count II of the indictment in case No. 06-CF-192. Count I

of that indictment was dismissed as well as the other charged offenses in case Nos. 06-DTAn additional felony DUI was mentioned in the reports of proceedings under case No. 08- 1

CF-300, but defendant had not yet been arraigned in that case.

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129 and 06-TR-4060 through 06-TR-4062. On July 11, 2011, defendant was sentenced on

count II in case No. 06-CF-192 (aggravated DUI), a Class 4 felony, to 18 months’

imprisonment. Defendant, without moving to withdraw his guilty plea or for reconsideration

of his sentence, appealed on the basis that the court’s entry of judgment on his plea was void.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that the judgment on the bond forfeiture entered on October

25, 2006, was the equivalent of a conviction of aggravated DUI under the Vehicle Code.

Therefore, defendant argues, the subsequent DUI conviction entered upon his guilty plea

violated double jeopardy protection and was thus a void judgment. Defendant argues that we

should address the merits of his appeal despite his failure to move to withdraw his guilty

plea, because his conviction is void for violating double jeopardy protection. Defendant

argues that a void judgment may be attacked at any time. People v. Woolsey, 278 Ill. App.

3d 708, 709 (1996). The State argues that no appeal may be taken from a judgment entered

on a guilty plea unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which the sentence is

imposed, files a motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the guilty plea pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006). The State, while agreeing that a void

judgment may be attacked at any time, argues that defendant’s double jeopardy claim does

not involve a void judgment, relying on People v. Dieterman, 243 Ill. App. 3d 838 (1993),

for this proposition. We agree with the State.

¶ 11 Void orders are orders entered by a court (1) without jurisdiction or (2) that exceeded its

jurisdiction by entering an order beyond its inherent power. People v. Johnson, 327 Ill. App.

3d 252, 256 (2002). In People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993), the defendant argued that

his double jeopardy claim based on convictions of both a greater and a lesser included

offense did not depend on the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West

1992)) for its viability, because a conviction that violated double jeopardy constituted a void

judgment. Our supreme court rejected this argument, stating that an order is void only when

jurisdiction is lacking and that, by contrast, a voidable judgment is one entered erroneously

bya court having jurisdiction. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155. The court explained that “jurisdiction

or power to render a particular judgment does not mean that the judgment rendered must be

the one that should have been rendered, for the power to decide carries with it the power to

decide wrong as well as to decide right.” Id. at 156. Once a court has acquired jurisdiction,

no subsequent error or irregularity will remove the jurisdiction; thus, a court cannot lose

jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining either the facts, the law, or both. Id.

A judgment is void only where a court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Id. Although the

defendant in Davis, like defendant here, claimed that, because the constitution prohibits

multiple convictions of the same offense, and the improper conviction thus exceeded

constitutional authority, our supreme court stated that such a violation does not remove the

court’s jurisdiction to render the improper judgment. Id. at 157. Thus, the court held that,

because the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter, the

court had the authority to enterthe conviction and the sentence, and even if judgment on both

was error, the order was merely voidable, not void. Id. In this case, the trial court had proper

personal and subject matter jurisdiction to enter the conviction, even if entry of such was

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error. Thus, it is not a void order.

¶ 12 Defendant in this case relies on Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam),

for the proposition that a guilty plea does not waive a claim that the charge is one on which

the State did not have the authority to hale him into court and therefore was void. Defendant

further relies upon language in Dieterman for his argument that the order was void.

Dieterman stated, “We cannot, therefore, review defendant’s double jeopardy claim unless

a double jeopardy violation would render void the judgment on defendant’s guilty plea to the

felony charge.” Dieterman, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 841. Defendant’s reliance on these cases is

misplaced.

¶ 13 In Menna, the defendant was convicted of refusing to testify before a grand jury and

served a 30-day sentence; later, he was indicted for refusing to answer questions in

connection with the same investigation. Menna, 423 U.S. at 61. The defendant moved to

dismiss the second indictment under the double jeopardy clause, but he was unsuccessful.

Id. at 62. The defendant pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and appealed, claiming that the

double jeopardy clause divested the state of the authority to hale him into court on a charge

to which he had already pleaded guilty. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s

ruling, which was based on a case that had previously held that a double jeopardy claim was

waived by virtue of entering a guilty plea. Id. The Supreme Court stated that, where the state

was “precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a

charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the

conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” Id. The Supreme Court

explained that it was holding not that a plea of guilty would never serve to waive a double

jeopardy claim, but simply “that a plea of guilty to a charge [did] not waive a claim

that–judged on its face–the charge is one which the State maynot constitutionallyprosecute.”

Id. at 62 n.2. Menna, therefore, stands for the proposition that a guilty plea does not in itself

waive a defendant’s claim that his double jeopardy rights were violated. It does not conclude

that an order that violates a defendant’s double jeopardy rights is necessarily void.

¶ 14 The Supreme Court later explained that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea made by

a defendant, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked

unless one of the exceptions set forth in Menna or in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21

(1974), exists. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989). The Blackledge exception

involves situations where prosecutorial vindictiveness affects the defendant’s right not to be

haled into court in violation of his due process rights. Id. at 574-75 (attack on guilty plea

allowed where the state filed charges on a greater offense after the defendant appealed

conviction on lesser offense, obtained a new trial, and then pleaded guilty to the state’s new,

greater charges). The Supreme Court explained that the defendant in Menna was allowed to

attack his guilty plea for the same reason as in Blackledge–that the state was precluded by

the constitution from haling the defendant into court on a charge. Id. at 575. The Supreme

Court explained that in “neither Blackledge nor Menna did the defendants seek further

proceedings at which to expand the record with new evidence.” Id. Rather, “the

determination that the second indictment could not go forward should have been made by

the presiding judge at the time the plea was entered on the basis of the existing record.” Id.

The Supreme Court explained:

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“Both Blackledge and Menna could be (and ultimately were) resolved without any need

to venture beyond that record. In Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant’s

guilty plea were simply irrelevant, because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings

lay in the State’s power to bring any indictment at all. In Menna, the indictment was

facially duplicative of the earlier offense of which the defendant had been convicted and

sentenced so that the admissions made by Menna’s guilty plea could not conceivably be

construed to extend beyond a redundant confession to the earlier offense.” Id. at 575-76.

¶ 15 Therefore, the Blackledge/Menna exception, as the federal courts refer to this, serves to

protect those defendants who have otherwise waived certain constitutional protections by

pleading guilty where the infirmity in the proceedings lay in the state’s power to bring any

indictment at all. The facts of Broce did not implicate the Blackledge/Menna exception,

because the indictments to which the defendant pleaded guilty described different

conspiracies on their faces. The defendant, therefore, could not, without looking beyond the

indictments, prove his claim that only one conspiracy existed and that the entry of judgment

on both violated his double jeopardy rights. Id. at 576.

¶ 16 Later, in United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit

summarized that the Blackledge/Menna exception exists if a defect is jurisdictional, such as

the unconstitutionality of a statute. The Seventh Circuit has further held that double jeopardy

rights can be forfeited by failing to preserve the issue for appeal. Gomez v. Berge, 434 F.3d

940, 943 (7th Cir. 2006). Importantly, Menna did not discuss any issue with the defendant’s

preservation of the issue for appeal; rather, the appellate court had declined to reach the

merits of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim, holding that it was waived by virtue of his

guilty plea. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62. What we glean from the federal case law is that a

defendant mayappeal his guilty plea on a double jeopardyviolation, a right otherwise waived

by entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, where the double jeopardy violation can be

established on the face of the indictment. Broce, 488 U.S. at 575-76. However, such claims

can be forfeited if the defendant fails to preserve the issue on appeal. Gomez, 434 F.3d at

943. In neither event, though, is the judgment void.

¶ 17 Dieterman is consistent with Menna and its progeny as well as Davis in that the

defendant’s double jeopardy claim was not waived by virtue of his guilty plea, but it was not

properly preserved for appeal. In Dieterman, the defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor

driving while his license was revoked (DWLR), with an assistant State’s Attorney (ASA)

who was unaware that another ASA had informed the defendant that he planned to change

the charge to a felony. Dieterman, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 839-40. The State moved to vacate the

guilty plea, which the court granted, and the defendant pleaded guilty to the felony DWLR

and was sentenced to probation. Id. at 840. Later, the State filed a petition to revoke the

defendant’s probation, charging that he had driven on two dates. Id. The court found that the

defendant violated his probation and sentenced him to 21⁄2 years’ imprisonment. Id. The

defendant then appealed the revocation of probation, arguing that the underlying felony

DWLR conviction was void because it resulted from a prosecution that violated the double

jeopardy clause. Id. We stated that, in an appeal from an order revoking a defendant’s

probation, the court cannot consider the correctness of the underlying conviction unless that

judgment is void. Id. at 841. We went on to conclude that the double jeopardy clause does

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not concern the authority of the trial court to enter a judgment; thus, it is not a void order and

the right to be free from double jeopardy is a personal right that can be forfeited. Id. at 843.

¶ 18 As Dieterman explained, the trial court in that case had jurisdiction to enter the

conviction that the defendant claimed was a violation of double jeopardy. We explicitly

stated that we could not review the defendant’s double jeopardy claim “unless [the] double

jeopardy violation would render void the judgment on defendant’s guilty plea to the felony

charge.” Id. at 841. We stated that, “[f]or example, where defendant is convicted of a crime

that has no statutory authority, the judgment is void, and defendant can challenge it at any

time.” Id. Since the order in Dieterman was merely voidable, we concluded that, because the

defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal bymoving to withdraw his guilty plea under

Rule 604(d), he could not invoke plain error and his only avenue for relief was the PostConviction Hearing Act. Id. at 843.

¶ 19 Here, while Menna allows a defendant to raise a double jeopardy claim after entering an

otherwise valid guilty plea, defendant’s double jeopardy claim was stillsubject to forfeiture.

As Dieterman and Davisinstruct, a double jeopardy violation does not render an order void.

The trial court in this case had jurisdiction to enter the order, even if the order implicated

double jeopardy protection. Like in Dieterman, where the orderis not void and the defendant

fails to comply with Rule 604(d), the court may not review the double jeopardy claim.

Accordingly, the order that defendant attacks in this case is merely voidable and may not be

attacked at any time. Defendant was therefore subject to the procedural rules applicable to

guilty pleas. While it might seem somewhat anomalous to require a defendant to face a

second trial in violation of his double jeopardy rights, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(f)

allows a defendant to appeal to this court the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal

proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(f) (eff. July 1, 2006); see also

People v. Gray, 214 Ill. 2d 1 (2005). This rule allows a defendant recourse to pursue his

double jeopardy claim before facing trial or plea negotiations. Defendant in this case filed

a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of former jeopardy but did not appeal the

denial of that motion to this court. Instead, defendant proceeded to plead guilty, implicating

Rule 604(d).

¶ 20 Rule 604(d) provides that no appeal shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days

of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a written motion to

reconsider the sentence or a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006). Defendant did not file a written postplea motion

within 30 days of the date of sentencing. Accordingly, we are required to dismissthis appeal

without reaching the merits of defendant’s argument. See People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291,

301 (2003).

¶ 21 For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss defendant’s appeal.

¶ 22 Appeal dismissed.

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