IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-30648

Summary Calendar

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JOSEPHINE S. LOVOI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TREASURE CHEST CASINO, LLC;

BOYD GAMING CORPORATION;

ROBERT GUIDRY,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 98-30770

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JOSEPHINE S. LOVOI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TREASURE CHEST CASINO, LLC;

BOYD GAMING CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(97-CV-446-S)

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January 13, 1999* Pu rsuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Josephi ne S. Lovoi, proceeding pro se, appeals the cases of

Lovoi v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, et al.

, No. 98-30648 ( Treasure

Chest I ) and L ovoi v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, et al.

, No.

98-30770 ( Treasure Chest II ). In T reasure Chest I

, the district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees on

Lovoi’s wrongful termination and failure to rehire claims under the

Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b) et seq. , as

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) et seq. (ADEA) and the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1 990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 e t seq. (ADA). In

doing so, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation. Next, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the

district court dismissed without prejudice Lovoi’s related

statutory state law claims. Lovoi filed a timely notice of appeal.

In Treasure Chest II

, the district court granted the

appellees’ motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the

grounds of res judicata. Finally, in this case, the district court

denied Lovoi’s motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

Judgment was issued accordingly and a notice of appeal filed.

As best as we can deduct from Lovoi’s pro se brief, Lovoi

appeals only the denial of her motion for recusal in Treasure Chest1 We further note that despite Lovoi’s argument that she

properly preserved for appellate review the dismissal of her

termination and failure to rehire claims under the ADEA and the

ADA, Lovoi has failed to brief the issues of whether the district

court erred in granting summary judgment against her in Treasure

Chest I a nd granting the motion to dismiss in T reasure Chest II

. Consequently, these issues are waived and will not be entertained

on appeal. H idden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin

, 138 F.3d 1036, 1046

n.7 (5th Cir. 1998); Price v. Digital Equipment Co

., 846 F.2d 1026,

1028 (5th Cir. 1988)(arguments of pro se appellants must be briefed

to be preserved). Lovoi’s blanket assertion in her rely brief that

the appellees purportedly owe her back pay is also insufficient to

preserve appellate review of her discrimination claims. S ee Price

, 846 F.2d at 1028.

3 II . Lovoi argues that in granting judgment for the appellees in

Treasure Chest I and Treasure Chest II

, the district court engaged

in crimes of corruption, treason, subordination of perjury, and the

falsification of information. Lovoi contends that the motivation

for the district court’s purported bias is its association with

former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards who is also associated with

Robert Guidry, one of the appellees. 1

A motion for recusal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex as , 143 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir.

1998).

Our study of the briefs and a review of the record plainly

demonstrate that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion for recusal. On appeal, Lovoi makes several

disparaging and inflammatory accusations impugning the integrity of

the district court. Each of Lovoi’s contentions, ranging from the

far-fetched to the absurd, have no arguable basis in law nor fact.

No reasonable person familiar with the record in this case would2 On September 8, 1998, Lovoi moved this court for a hearing to

“cease any deals made with the defendants, which [are] further

causing obstruction of jus tice.” The appellees objected to the

motion on the grounds that it was procedurally improper and

frivolous and therefore moved for sanctions, attorney’s fees, and

costs to be accessed against Lovoi. Next, Lovoi filed a motion in

objection and similarly moved for san ctions and attorney’s fees

against the appellees. Both motions are hereby DENIED. Lovoi is

warned, however, that unsubstantiated allegations, which neither

are supported by the record nor by specifically cited legal

authority, are indeed frivolous and subject to severe monetary

sanctions. Any further briefing and pleadings filed in this case,

which are of a similar character lacking in evidentiary and legal

support, will draw substantial sanctions under Fed.R.App.P. 38.

4 harbor doubts about the district court’s impartiality. S ee Garcia

,

143 F.3d at 229 (citing § 455(a)).

In the light of this record and considering Lovoi’s procedural

err or in not briefing her employment discrimination claims, we

conclude that the judgment of the district court, in all aspects,

is hereby

A F F I R M E D. 2