1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INDEPENDENT SETTLEMENT SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 16-1372 (JDB) JIMMY LEWIS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before the Court is [44] defendant Jimmy Lewis’s motion for rec onsideration. Although Lewis does not identify the specific order that he moves the Co urt to reconsider, the Court shall construe his motion as one to reconsider [38] the Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Independent Settlement Services, LLC (“Independent”) o n its breach of contract claim against Lewis. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Lewis’s mo tion.
I. BACKGROUND The full factual bac kground of this action was recounted in the Court’s February 16, 2018 memorandum opinion and will not be repeated here. See Mem. Op. [ECF No. 39]. In relevant part, in 2007 Lewis refinanced property he owned in the Distric t of Columbia and obtained a $262,500 loan. This loan was secure d by a promisso ry note (the “Note”), in which he committed to repay the principal loan amount and interest through monthly payments, and by a deed of trust, which established a lien against his property. See Note, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 25-3]; Deed of Trust, Ex. 3 to Pl. ’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 25-4]. The deed of trust was not recorded in the District of Columbia land records. See 1st Aff . of Jessica Thurbee, Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 25-5] ¶ 8.2 Subsequently, in 2013, Lewis sold the property and ceased makin g payments on the loan. Id. ¶ 10; 2nd Aff. of Jessica Thurbee, Ex. 1 t o Pl.’s Reply [EC F No. 28-1] ¶¶ 4, 7–8. At the time, the loan had an outstanding balance of $243,785.36. 2nd Aff. o f Jessica Thurbee ¶ 4. The thencurrent holder of the Note filed an action against Lewis, asser ted a claim for breach of contract based on his alleged failure to make required payments under th e terms of the Note, and moved for summary judgment. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 10] ¶¶ 46–51; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 25]. Thereafter, Independent acquired an interest in the breac h of contract claim and was substituted as plaintiff in the action. See Feb. 16, 2018 Orde r [ECF No. 37] at 2–3. Lewis opposed summary judgment and subsequen tly filed an amended opposition a fter this Court advised him of the consequences of failing to respond adequately to plaintiff’ s motion. See Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 29]; Fox/Neal Order [ECF No . 33]; Def.’s Am. Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 35]. On February 16, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment in fav or of Independent on its breach of contract claim, finding that Lewis had failed to present any evidence that would create a genuine dispute of material fact. Mem. Op. [ECF No. 39] at 5 –7. Accordingly, on February 26, 2018, the Court entered final judgment against Lewis in the amo unt of $322,432.06. Order and Final J. [ECF No. 42]. Lewis now moves for reconsideration, as serting that Answer Title, the entity that conducted th e closing process when he sold his prop erty, was at fault for failing to identify the unrecorded lien and prevent the sale of the proper ty. 1 See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. ¶¶
1–2.

1 After entry of final judgment, L ewis also belatedly filed a mo tion to dismiss that included the substance of the motion currently at issue. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [ECF No. 43]. The motion to dis miss was denied as moot. Apr. 20, 2018 Min. Order.3 II. LEGAL STANDARD Although Lewis does not state the Federal Civil Rule pursuant t o which he seeks reconsideration, there are two avenues by which a party may see k such relief: Rule 59(e), which permits a party to move to alter or amend a judgment, and Rule 60(b), which permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998). A motion to alter or amend a judg ment under Rule 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and it is not within the court’s power to extend this period, see Fed R. Civ. P. 6(b )(2) (“A court must not extend the time to act under Rule[] . . . 59 . . . (e).”). By contrast, a party may request relief from final judgment pur suant to Rule 60(b) “within a reasonable time,” which, when reconsideration is sought on ce rtain grounds, ma y not exceed “a year after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1 ). Rule 60(b) enumerates six grounds for relief, including mistake or excusable neglect, newly disco vered evidence, fraud, or “any other reason that justifies reli ef.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Before reaching the merits of a Rule 60(b) motion, however, the Court must consider a threshold issue: whether the movant has “at least establish[ed] that [he] possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense” t o the motion upon which judgment was issued. Murray v. District of Columbia, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitte d) (explaining that relief from a judgment should not be granted if it would “be an empty exercis e or a futile gesture”). The bar to satisfy this threshold requirement is not high; the movant must provide only a “‘hint of a suggestion’ which, proven at tria l, would constitute a complete defense.” Marino v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 685 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citat ion omitted). But when the new allegations fail to contradict or even undermine the material f acts in the record on which the Court4 relied, relief from summary judgment should not be granted. Se e Jeffries v. Sessions, 323 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.D.C. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION Lewis brought this motion for rec onsideration nearly two months after final judgment was entered in this case. As Indepe ndent correctly notes, the moti on is therefore untimely under Rule 59(e). 2 Nonetheless, because the motion was filed within a “reasonabl e” time following the entry of judgment, the Court will constr ue it as one seeking relief f rom judgment under Rule 60(b). See Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 309 F.R.D. 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir . 1996)). Lewis’s motion fails, however, because he has not provided even a “hint of a suggestion” that he has a valid defense to Independent’s breach of contract claim. Marino, 685 F.3d at 1080 (citation omitted). Nothing he alleges contradicts the central findings of this Court—that he entered into a valid contract under which he received a loan th at he promised he would repay in monthly installments, and that he breached that agreement by fa iling to repay the loan, resulting in damages to Independent. See Mem. Op. at 5–6. The fact that the loan was also secured by a lien on property and that this lien was unrecorded and undiscov ered prior to Lewis’s sale of that property does not excuse his failu re to repay the loan he recei ved.

2 Even if the motion had been timely, it would still fail to sat isfy the demands of Rule 59(e). A party may not use Rule 59(e) “to relitigate old matters, or to raise argu ments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). Motions to alter or amend a judgment under 59(e) may be granted “only: (1) if there is an ‘intervening change of controlling law’; (2) if new evidence becomes available; or (3) if the judg ment should be amended in order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Repub lic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (pe r curiam)). As discussed below, Lewis does not present any newly discovered evidence or explain why he did not raise h is argument prior to the entry of judgment. Nor does he cite a change in controlling law or suggest there has been a clear error or manifest inj ustice. Lewis offers nothing to challenge the undisputed mat erial facts underlying the breac h of contract claim against him, and the Court finds he has failed to demonstrate that the extraordinary measure of rec onsideration under Rule 59(e) is warranted.5 By signing the promissory note, Lewis became personally obligat ed to repay the full loan amount, plus interest. See Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 72 ( D.C. 1979) (noting a promissory note is “evidence of the mortga gor’s primary personal obligatio n”). “In return for a loan,” Lewis “promise[d] to pay U.S. $262,500.00 . . . plus interest, to the order of the Lender” in monthly installments. Note ¶¶ 1–3. A lien against the property was es tablished as an “addition[al]” protection for the note holder “from potential losses which mig ht result if [Lewis did] not keep the promises which [he made],” but it did not supplant Lewis’s prim ary obligation to repay his debt. See id. ¶ 10. When Lewis failed to make the required payments, he defaulted on the loan and breached the agreement. See 2nd Aff. of Jessica Thurbee ¶ 4; N ote ¶ 6(B) (“If I do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on the date it is due, I wi ll be in default.”). As a result, the note holder was en titled to demand “the f ull amount of Principa l which has not b een paid” and all interest owed. Note ¶ 6(C). Lewis has not provided any evidence demonstrating that he has r epaid his debt or made any effort to cure the default. Instead, he appears to suggest that he should be relieved from liability because the note holde r could have for eclosed on the property (rather th an bringing a suit against him personally) but for Answer Title’s failure to ident ify the unrecorded lien and prevent the sale of the property. See De f.’s Mot. for Recons. ¶¶ 1–2. 3 Even if the property had not been sold, however, the note holde r still could have chosen to sue Lewis directly instead of foreclosing on the property. “[A ] creditor ordinarily is not limited to foreclosure on the mortgaged property should the debtor default on his obligation; rather, the creditor may in addition sue to establish the debtor’s in perso nam liability for any deficiency on

3 Lewis more explicitly suggests that the note holder should hav e sought compensation from Answer Title rather than from Lewis. See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. ¶ 3. It i s not clear on what grounds Answer Title could be held liable for failing to discover an unrecorded lien prior to sale of the property. In any event, the potential liability of a third party does not negate Le wis’s own liability for failure t o repay the loan.6 the debt and may enforce any judgment against the debtor’s asse ts generally.” Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82 (1991); see also Yasuna, 399 A.2d a t 72 (“This case, for example, involves a suit on a promissory note rather than a mortgage for eclosure and deficiency judgment.” (footnote omitted)); Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages §1.1 cmt. (1997) (“[If] the mortgagor or some other person is personally liable for the per formance of the obligation in question . . . the mortgagee may proceed either by foreclosure of the mortgage or by means of a personal action against the party liable . . . .”). The questi on whether the lien should have been discovered prior to the sale is thus independent of and irrelev ant to Lewis’s obligation to repay the loan. The Court need not consider whe ther any grounds for relief unde r Rule 60(b) apply in this case because Lewis has not met his threshold burden. Even if h e had met that burden, however, he has presented no grounds that would justify relief from summ ary judgment. Evidence regarding the failure to identify the lien prior to sale of the property cannot be considered “newly discovered” under Rule 60(b)(2). Indeed, the fact that the lien had not be en recorded and therefore foreclosure against the property after its sale was not possible was the ca talyst for this lawsuit. See Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Moreover, the Court already considered and dismis sed Lewis’s general defense that he had purchased title insurance. See Mem. Op. at 7. And Lewi s has not suggested that his failure to present, in either of his oppos itions to summary judgment, h is more specific arguments concerning the sale was the result of “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1). The other potential grounds for relief under Rule 60( b) are similarly inapposite.7 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, Lewis’s motion for reconsidera tion does not satisfy the requirements of Rules 59(e) or 60 (b). Therefore, his motion wi ll be denied. A separate order has been issued on this date.
SO ORDERED

.

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judg e Dated: June 4, 2018