Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 8 , 2021.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00447

- CV

MARCUS A. TOWNLEY AND ERIN M. MCCAIN , Appellant s
V.
LINDA A. LANIER , Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 4

Harris Count y , T exas Tri al Court Cause No. 1077886

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N This appeal arises from a dispute between neighboring property owners over the cost to re construct a shared residential fence

. Appellee Linda A. Lanier paid to rebuild the f

ence and sought paymen t fr om h er neigh bors , appellants Marcus A. Townley and Erin M

. McCain , bel ie ving they agreed to bear some of the cost

. Appellants refused to contribute , Lanier sued, and the case proceeded to jury trial on breach of contract and quantum meruit claims. Th e ju ry found in Lanier ’ s2

favor , and the court signed a judgment awarding $780 in d amages , plus attorneys ’ fees

. Appellants raise seventee n n umbered issues on appeal

. After reviewing the briefs and the record, we conclude that appellants have no t demonst r ate d re versible
error, and we affirm the judgment

. Background In 2014, Lanier ’s property abut ted property owned by Town ley and McCain , and a fen ce divid ed the two lots. 1 C onstructed in 1993 or 19 94 , t he original wood fence deteriorated over time . Accord i ng to Lanier, she “ was having a great deal of trouble keeping the fence boards up. ” Additionall y, t he p arties ’ multiple dogs

“ w oul d bicker between the fen ces. ” One day in 2014, Lanier said, Town ley “ climbed up on the fence and he explained to [Lanier] t hat he and his wife wer e doing a lot of remodeli ng with the house and that they had recently re placed the fence that was common bet ween he and [another neigh bor] and would [Lanier] be interested in sharing the cost of the fence that was common between the i r t wo yards. ” Lanier u ltimately agreed and hire d a contr actor to do the work. She g ave Town le y a copy of the bid and told him tha t she would “ only charge him ha lf ” of the price per square foot that Townley had paid to replace his side fence , wh ich would hav e amount ed to $785.

T he contractor Lanier hired did not p erform adequately, which Townley brought to Lanier ’ s attentio n. I n the even ing s , Townley, who was at home during the day, shared his observations w ith Lanier : [A] t one point he told me the workm a nsh ip was not good, tha t t he fence wasn ’ t straight, that they weren ’ t building the corners correctly and at the far corn er where his fence would adjoin mine, or the

1 By the time of trial i n 2019, La nier h ad sold her property and moved

.3

common fence anyway, he wasn ’ t going to be able to adjoin it because they weren ’ t building it in the right place a nd at one other occasion they told me they found the contractors dri nking on the job when I wasn ’ t there.
As a result , Lan ier terminated that contractor. Based on Townley ’ s recommendation, Lanier hired the contra ctor Townley had us e d t o replace the fence on the other side of his property . The second contractor completed the fence, giving Townley and McCain the “ good ” side or the “ pret ty ” side

— i.e., the side with flush plan ks that did not show framing

. When Lanier asked for payment, Tow nley ref used. His last comments to Lanier were “ I ’ m not paying you anything. The fence looks great. ”

La nier sued, alleging that “ [i] t was fully understood between [ Lanier] a nd [Townley and McCain] that said fence was a mutual obligation with mutual b e nef its

. ” She assert ed c la ims for breach of contract , quantum meruit , fraud, and fraudulent m isrepresentation . The contract and qua ntum meruit claims were tried
to a jury, which found in Lanier ’s favor. Specifically, the jury found that:

• T ownley and McC a in agreed to ha ve Lanier a uthorize the building of a replacement fence between their two prop er ties.

• Townley and McCain faile d to comply with the agreement to pay for part of the fence.

• Townley and McCain failed to comply with the agreement first.

• Service s /ma terials wer e provided t o Townley and McCain

.

• Townley and McCain accepted the services or materials.

• Townley and McCain had reasonable notice that Lanier expected compensation for the paymen t of service s or materials.

• $78 0 would fairly and reasonably co m p en sate Lanier for her dam ages that resulted from or because of Townley ’ s and McCain ’ s fai lure to comply.4

In accordance with the jury ’s verdict, the trial court signed a judgment that Lanier recover fr o m Townley an d McCain $780 in da mages and $1,320 in
at t orn ey ’ s fe es , as well as c onditional ap pellate fees , costs , a nd pre
- and post

judgment interest

. Townley and McCain ap peal

. A nalysis Appellants present seventeen issues for our review . M ost of them, however, l ack citation to the recor d or to legal autho r i ty

. Under our rules of appellate
pr ocedure, briefs must contain “a clear and con cise argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R

. App. P. 38.1(i). Althou gh we must co nstrue briefs liberally to avoi d d isposing of issues without reaching the merits when possible, s ee Perry v. Cohen , 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) , the complete dearth of applicable argumen t , legal authority, or record support for several i ssues , discussed below , compels us to con c lude th at appell an ts have waived them due to inadequate briefing. See In re R.H.W. III , 542 S.W.3d 724, 742 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018 , no pet. ) ; San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford , 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [ 14th Dist.] 2005, no pe t .)

. As we are abl e , we will address th ose arguments we find sufficient ly briefed in support of appellants ’ stated issues , s ee @.C.T.S. @dvanced Computer Tech. Servs., LLC v. Lexington Auto Repair, Inc. , No. 14

- 16

- 0 0497

- CV, 2017 WL 366246 5, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Hou sto n [14th Dist. ] Aug. 24, 2017, n o pet.) (mem. op.) , while avoiding the role of advocate for any party. Joseph v. Woodgrove Condo. Ass ’ n , No. 14

- 10

- 00273

- CV, 2011 WL 2149409, a t *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Ma y 26, 2011 , no pet

. ) (mem. op.) ; Ev ans v. Duncan , No. 05

-5

04

- 00761

- CV, 2005 WL 1926324, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Aug. 12, 2005 , no pet. ) ; see also In re R. H.W. III , 542 S.W.3d at 7 42

. We first cons ider several procedural issues, follow ed by issues ch allenging the eviden tiary support for t he j ury ’ s v erd ict , b efore finally turning t o appellants ’ remaining complaints

. The bolded headings are ap pel lants ’ is sues, re
- pr inted verbatim.

A. Pro cedural Complaints
Issue 1: The trial court abused its discretion by holding an o ff

- record pre - trial hearing wi thou t a cou rt reporter p re sent, despi te A ppellants’ ob je ctions, on February 20, 2019

. A ppell ants conte nd that the tr ial court held a pre

- trial hearing , that they requested a court report er to transcribe the hearing, that no reporter was made availa ble, tha t ap pel lants objected to t he re porter ’ s absence, and t hat the trial court

con duc ted the unre corded hea ring over their objection . Appella nts ar gue that the lack of reporter ’ s record prevents them from complaining “ of certain error and other post

-

judgment a nd a ppe llate procedural remedies. ”

Not o nly do appellant s fail to support their argument w ith legal authority, but we see no indication on the docket sheet that the trial court conducted a hearing

a s claimed by appellants. Further, although appellants a sser t t hat they “ filled out a
court r eport er req

uest form, reques ted a transcrip t be taken of all pro c eedings that day for this case, and submitted the request form to the court clerks , ” they do not direct us to where we may find such a request in the reco rd.

In the absence of legal or record cit a tion, we overrule appel lants ’ first issue. See T ex. R. App. P. 38.1( i ) ; In re R. H.W. III , 542 S.W.3d at 742

. Issue 2: Th e trial court abused its discretion, and violated A ppellants’ due process rights, by denying the D e fendants’ third motion for6

con tinua nce, a nd by denying the D efendants’ amended motio n to compel disclosure and production of documents

. Appellants assert that, w hile preparin g for trial, they discovered that Lanier sold and vacated her residential p rope rty several months b efore trial began. A ppell ant s moved for a trial continuance, as well as to compel certain discovery

. Appe llant s contend that the trial court orally denied their motions at a hearing, but we have no record of the hearing. We al so s e e n o w ritten order ruli ng on the motions. Appell ant s ’ failure to obtain a ruling on either motion , or to object
to the court ’ s l ack of ruling, rend e rs their complaint unp reserved for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Jackson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.
, In c. , No. 0 2

- 07

- 00 246

- CV, 2008 WL 1867931, at *2 (T ex. App.

— For t Worth Apr. 24, 2008 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (motion for continuanc e) ; Copenhaver v. M e dina , No. 08

- 02

- 00136

- CV, 2003 WL 22215152, at *1 (Tex. App.

— El Paso Sept. 25, 2003 , no pet. ) (mem. op .) ( m oti on to compel)

. We o verrule appell ants ’ second is sue.
Issue 3: The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to submit jury instructions, definitio n s, and que stions as to the fact elements of the A ppellants’ defenses. Appellants argue tha t th e t rial court’s “ sweeping rejection ” of a pp ell ant s ’ proposed jury instructions, definitions, and questions was erro neous because non e of the factual questions on a ppellant s ’ pleaded defense s or affirmative defenses

was submitted to the jury for a findi ng

. A p pel lants contend that t hey introduced evide nce and testimony at trial supporting some of their affirmative defenses, including fa ilure of consideration, accor d and satisfaction , and waiv er ; although they cite no passage in the reporter ’s record supp ort i ng their assertion

. To preser ve error in the o mis sion of a party ’ s own question, the party must have objected to the omission, tendered the question in substantiall y correct form, and obtained a ruling f

rom the trial court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274, 276, 2 78; S ea rs,7

Roebuck & Co. v. Abell , 157 S.W.3d 886, 89 3 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2005, pet

. denied). We do not s ee in the record that the trial court ruled on appellants ’
pr o posed ques tions

. A ppellants ’ pr oposed jury charge is unmarked and does not bear any ind ica ti o n th at the court “ refused ” t o submit the qu est ion s , and , if the court orally ruled on the prop osal, we were not provided wit h the repo rter ’ s record docu menting the ruling

. In the absence of an y evidence in the record tha t the trial court considered and ref used appellants ’ questions on defe nses, we fin d that
appe llants did not preserve error based on these questions. Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P

. , 97 S.W .3d 179, 198 (Tex. App.

— Houst o n [14th Dist.] 2002 , no pet. )

. We overrule appell ants ’ thi r d i ssue.
Issue 4: The trial court err ed by re fus ing to admit evid ence at trial demonstrating that P laintiff alienated her ownership interest in her fence. During t rial, a

p pellants attem pted to introduc e a printo ut from a n i n tern et web site sho wing Lani er ’ s h o use for s ale and a lis t of upgrades to t he pro perty, including the new fenc e. The trial court excluded the evidence. Appellants argue that this ev idence would have shown t hat Lanier clearly claimed the fence as her

o wn property, i ntended to sell t he n ew fence together with her land and bu ildin gs,

an d then alienated her ownership interest in the fence when Lanier sold the property

. This evidence, they contend, would have supported their defenses of failure of consideration and waiver.
Given t hat the jur

y was not charged with any af firma tiv e defense issues , appellant s ’ argument is unpers uasi ve

. T hey a lso cite no legal authority t o s up port their argument . In the absence of any persuasive expla nation how the trial court ’ s ruling probably caused the ren di t ion of an improper judgment , 2 and in t he ab sence

2 Appellan ts ’ argument would fail for another reason. In their brief, appellants concede that Lanier testified tha t she s old the fence along with her house. Accord in gly, the excluded8

o f citation to re levant case law, we overr ule appellants ’ fourth is sue for inadequate brie fin g. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i) ; Duruji v. Duruji , No. 14

- 05

- 01185

- CV, 2007 WL 582282, at *8 n.16 (Tex. App

. — Housto n [ 14t h Di st.] Feb. 27, 2007 , no pet. )

. Issu e 12: The t rial court erred by submitting improper and/ or defective instructions, definitions, and questions to the j ury at trial, and/or by
e ntering judgment on a verdict, that completely omitted design ated
res pon sib le t hird parties.
Prior to trial , the trial cour t de sign ated certa in third par ties

— other neigh bors

w hose properties also abut ted the fence at issue

— as re sponsib le third parties. Howeve r, the trial court did not include the responsible third parties in the jur y charge. Appellants com plain tha t this omi s s ion prevented the jury from determining the liabil ity a nd proportiona te responsibility of the designated responsibl e third parties. Appellan ts do not cite any portion of the trial record regar ding con tri butory cond u ct o f the responsible third parties , an d thus we c an not conclude that the trial
court erred as allege d

. See Gardner Oil, Inc. v. Chavez , No. 12

- 10

- 00274

- CV, 2012 WL 1 623420 , at *6 ( Tex. App.

— Tyler May 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“ The trial c our

t should no t allow t he submission of a question to the ju ry regard in g conduct of a respon sible third party where ther e is not sufficient evidence to support the submission.”)

. We overrule a ppellant s ’ twe l f

th issue

. B. Merits Com plaints The part ies agree t hat Lanier sub mitted he r case to the jury on two issues: br each of c on tract and quantum mer uit. The jury found in Lanier ’ s favor on both

evidence would have bee n cumulati ve of a dmitted testimony, and thus the e xclusion would not be rev ersible error. Sta te v. Cent. Expre ssway Sign Assoc s

. , 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009) (exclus ion of cumulat ive evidence is harmless).9

claims, and the judgment granted Lanier recovery without specifying the theory on which liability is based

. In six iss ues, a ppell ants chal lenge the su bmission of, or the suffi ciency of
t he evidence sup porting , L anier ’s breach of contract claim

. Appellants also cha llenge the charge language accompanying Lanier ’ s quantum meruit claim , but with one exception, they do not ch allenge the suff i ciency of the evidence supporting the ju ry ’ s findings on th at clai m

. If we c onclude that the ju dgment may be upheld on either one of the independent theor ies of recovery , we nee d not address any alleged error p ertaining to t he other cl aim

. See , e.g

. , Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey , 609 S. W.2d 743 , 750 (Tex. 1980) (alleged er ror in the submission o f an issue is harmless when the findings of the jury in answer to other issues are sufficient to support the trial court ’ s ju dgment).

Is sue 9: The tr ial court er red by signing and entering a judg ment on M arch 6, 2019 agai nst A ppella nts beca use the jury’s verdict does not reflect all elements of P lain tiff’s quantum meruit claim. To recover under quantum meruit a claimant must pr ove that: ( 1) valuable

s ervices were ren dered or materials furnished; ( 2) for the pe rson sought to be charg ed; ( 3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged, used , and enjoyed by him; and ( 4) under such circumstances as reasonably no tified the person sough t to be char ged that the plaintiff in performing such servic es was expe cting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. Bashara v. Baptist Mem ’ l Hosp

. Sys

. , 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985).
The c ourt ’ s charge submi tted the qu ant um meruit t heory to the jury in a seri es of questions, as opposed to a single question. The relevant inquir ies are: Question No. 4

W ere the servi ces/materials provided to the Def endants?10 Question No. 5

D id the D efendants accept the services or mater ial s? Qu es tion No . 6
Di d Defendants have reasonable notice that Plaintiff expected c ompensation f or the payment of services or materials? Question No. 8

D id Plaintiff provide valuable services or materials? The jury answer ed all these questions aff irmatively. Ap p ellants adva nce two separate , but related, arguments under their ninth issue. First , they contend the judgment can not stand on a quantum meruit th eory because the charge omitted one required element necessary to support quantum

mer uit recov ery , and th us “ the jury’s v erdict lacks findings sufficient to establish all of the necessary elements of the Appellee’s quantum m eruit cause of action

. ” The missing element, appellants say, is whether they “ used and enjoyed ” the fen ce

. Although Question No. 5 aske d w hether appell ants accepted the servi ces or materials, a

ppellants are correct tha t the charge di d not ask whether appellants

“ used and enj oyed ” them. Appellant s, h owever, did not object to that omission. I n the absenc e of o bjection, and when as here th e t rial court do es not make written findings on omitted eleme nts , the y are deemed found in a manner supporting the judgment if the deemed findings are supported by evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 279; In re J.F.C

. , 96 S.W. 3d 256, 262

- 63 (T ex. 200 2) ; C louse v. Levin , 339 S. W.3d 766, 770 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

. Which brings us to appellant s ’ second argument under their ninth issue , namely that “ insuffic ient credible evidence ” exists to support a findi ng that they

u sed and en

joyed the f

enc e. There is some evidenc e from w hich a reasonable jury11

rationally could have infe r r ed that appell ants accepted , used , and enjoyed the services or materi als provided by Lanier. Lan ier testified : that it was To wnley ’ s idea to replace t he fen ce; that La nie r had con v ers ations with bot h Townley an d McCain abo ut the f

enc e ; that Townley and M cCain got the “ good ” or “ pretty ” side of the fen ce; that McCain never said she would not pay for the fence ; and that Townley was concerned about the fir st con tract or ’ s w ork because Town ley wanted to b e sure that the new fenc e would join with the s ide fence appellants had already replaced. Th e jury may have in ferred that the completed fence met with Townley ’ s approval in that regard. Appella nts disputed Lanier ’ s v ersion of events and de nied using, enj oying, or benefitting from the new fence in any way

. However, the jury is the sole arbiter of the credibilit y of witne s s es and t he w eight to give to their testimony

. See Golden Eagle Archery, I nc. v. Jackso n , 116 S.W.3d 757 , 761 ( Tex. 2003). L anier ’ s testimo ny , which the jury reasonably could have believe d , is legally and factually sufficient evidence that Townley and McCain used and e njoyed the materials or services pro vi ded. See , e.g. , RC Mgmt., Inc. v. Tex

. W aste Sys., Inc. , N o. 04

- 02

- 00488

- CV, 2003 WL 1712535, at *4 (Tex. App.

— San An tonio Apr. 2, 2 00 3 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (evidence tha t appellant did not refuse delivery of trash containers or contact tras h com pany to, at the very least , complain of the delive ry of the c ontaine rs was suffici ent to suppo rt jury ’ s determination that appellant accepted, used, and enjoyed the benefits of tra sh
company ’ s services )

. Because there is some evidence that appellants used and enjoy ed the f en ce, that om itted element is dee med found i n suppo rt of the judg ment. See In re J.F.C ., 96 S.W.3d at 262

- 63 ; C louse , 339 S.W.3d at 770

. Thus, the judgment is supported by all findings and eleme nts necessary to support recovery under a quantum me ruit theory.12

Appellants do not challenge the other f indings on qu antum me ruit, nor do they make any other argument against the claim. Acc ordingly, those uncha llenged findings are binding. Rayner v. Dillon , 501 S.W.3d 143, 158 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2016 , p et. dism ’ d ) ( when a party fails to “c hall enge in the court o f
app eals the factual or legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting” the jury ’ s answer, the answe r is established as to the theory alleged )

. We overrule appellant s ’ ninth issue. Furthermore, b e cause the jury ’ s quantum meruit findings are suffici ent to

s uppor t the tr ial court ’ s judgment, any alleged er ror s regarding Lanier ’ s breach of
contract claim a re harmless, and we need not address th e merits of those issue s. For this reason, we also overrule appellants ’ seventh, ei ghth, thirt eent h, fi fteenth, sixteenth, and sevente enth issues. 3 Boatland of Houston , 609 S.W.2d at 750

.

3 Appellants ’ issues relating to breach of contract are as f o llows: Issue 7: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on M arch 6, 2019 against A ppellant E rin M c C ain because there is insuffici ent ev i dence of the
e xistence of a contract between the P laintiff and D efendant M c C ain

. Issue 8: The t rial c ourt erred by signing and entering a judgm ent on March 6, 2019 against A p pella nts because the P laint iff fai led to meet her burden of proof that a v aluabl e consideration was exchanged. Issue 13: The trial court erred by submitting an improper instruct ion o n ratification to the jury. Issue 15: The trial court erred by submitting ques tion No. 2 to the jury , and/or erred by entering judgment on the verd ict, b e cause question No. 2 presumes existince [sic] of an essential but unestablished fact

- element [ex isten c e of a contract]

. Issue 16: The trial cou rt erred by submitting question No. 3 [who breached agreem ent first ] to the jury, and/or erred by enterin g judg m ent on the ver dict, because question No. 3 is irrelevant and c ould have conf used the jury. Issue 17: Th e trial court erred by submitting questio n No. 7 [damages] to the jury, and/or erre d by entering ju dgment on the verdict, because question No. 7 a sks fo r a conclusion founded on a false premise [existence of a contr act]

.13

Issu e 5: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgm e nt of joint a n d several liability, on M arch 6, 2019, b ecause there is insufficient evidence of join t liabi lity, an d/or because the judgment does no t conform to the A p pel lee’s pleadings in that res pect
. Issue 11 : The trial court erred by sub mittin g impro p er and /or d ef e ctive instructions, definitions, and que stions to the jury at trial, and/or by enteri ng judg ment on a verdict, that prevented the jur y from apportioning responsibility between the tw o D efenda nts. In two issues, appellants complain tha t the j u dgment errone ou sly imposes joint an d several liab il ity against T ownle y and McCain

. Joint and seve ra l lia

bility arises in contract and, by extensi on, in quantum meruit, based upon the relationshi p between the parties and the existence of what

amou nts to joint promises

. K

- Bar Servs ., Inc. v. English , No . 0 3

- 05

- 00076

- C V, 2006 WL 903735, at *5 (Tex. App.

— A ustin Apr. 7, 2006 , no pet. ) (mem. op.)

. T he quantum meruit question s did not a sk about Town l ey ’ s and McCain ’ s actions individually. However, we se e no indication in the r ecord that app ellants made the trial court a ware of their complaint. Se e Blues tar Ener gy, Inc. v

. M

urphy , 205 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Te x. App.

— Eastland 2006 , pet. denied ) (rejecting ap pellant ’ s argument that joint and several liability was ina ppro priate whe n jury was a sked to determine whether both appellants jointly breached the agr eement and comp laining
ap pell ant did not object to inclu sion in the ques tion); cf. W & F Transp., Inc. v. W ilhelm , 208 S.W.3d 32, 45 n.12 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th D ist.] 2 006 , n o pet. ) ( appel lants did not waive complaint that charge failed to ask about individual defe ndant ’ s liability , when the s pecific issue was dis cus sed at t he charge

c onference ). Appellants a ssert that they raised the issue in their proposed jury

c harge, but as we dete rmined above, there is no indication that the trial court consid ered or ruled on appel lants ’ proposal.14

Further , appellants ’ refere nce to “ proportionate responsibility ” is misp laced

. The proportionate

- responsibility statute does not ap ply to contr act or qu as i

- contract claims. See Tex. Civ. P rac. & Rem. Code § 33.0 02 ; In re Mob ile Mini , In c

. , 596 S.W.3d 781, 787 n.2 (Tex. 2020) (ori g. proceeding) ; GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union Ga s Oper at ing Co. , 527 S.W.3d 563, 576 (Tex. App.

— H o uston [ 14t h Dist. ] 2017 , pet. d en ied )

. We overrule appellant s ’ fifth and eleventh issues.

Issue 6: The t rial cou rt er red by signing and entering a judgment on M arch 6, 2019 that awards attorney’s fees to t he A pp el lee because P laintiff’s attorney’s fees were not pro perly p roven up at tr ia l. In their sixth issue, appellants argue that Lanier failed to prove th e

reason ablen ess of her attorney ’s fees.

T he fact finde r ’ s startin g point for calculating an attorne y ’ s f ee award is deter mining the reasonable hours worked mul tiplied by a reas onab le hourly rat e, and the fee claimant bear s the burden of providing suffici ent evid ence on both

co unts. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UT SW DVA Heal thcare, LLP , 578 S.W.3d 469, 498 ( Tex. 201 9 ); El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas , 370 S.W.3d 757 , 760 (Tex. 2 012)

. Suf fici en t evidence includes, at a minimum, evid ence of (1) p articular services
p erformed , (2) who perfo rmed those services, (3) approxim at ely when the services were performed, (4) t he re aso nable amount of time required to perform the service s, and (5) the re ason ab le hourly r ate for each person performi ng such servi ces. Rohrmoos Ventu re , 578 S.W.3 d at 498

. Here, Lanier ’s atto rne y, Richard Martini , briefl y testified at trial and also introduc e d several pages o f in voices , which included billing detail s

. After revi e wing this evidence , we conclude that Lanier ’s evidence sufficiently add ressed the Rohr moos V ent ure factors

. Martini test ified , “ I ’ ve been an attorney for 3315

years. The fees that I ’ ve charged are custom and regular in the industry fo r cases such as this. They were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of this claim. ” Martini c harge d Lanier $250 per hour but testified on cro ss
- examination that he had seen billing rates “ as low as 150 or 175

. . . [or] as high as 300 or 350. An d, agai n, that ’ s just for a standard contract case. No bells and whistles

. ”
Martini su

bstant i ated the hours worked with invoices that contained billin g details

. T he invoices were itemized b y t ask and by date and wer e calcula ted by
Mar tini ’ s bi lling rate multipl ied by t he amo u nt of time worked, which was timed in

s ix

- minute in crements

. Martini sought ove r $ 10 ,000 in attorney ’ s fees , and the jury award ed him $1,320 (and conditional appellate fees of $ 3,0 00)

. We hold that there is legally suffic ient evide nce to support the re a sonable attorn ey ’ s fees awarded by the trial

cou rt and overrule appella nt s ’ si xth issu e. Rohrmoos Venture , 5 78 S. W.3d at 4 98

. C. Re maining Complaints
Issue 10 : The trial court erred b y signing and entering a judgment on M a rch 6, 2019 a gainst A ppellants bec a use the P laintiff’s claims were compromised by the sale of h er property
. Appellan ts co ntend that Lanier should be estopped from r ecovering damages from appe llants because she “ sold t he fence to another buyer. ” Appellants ’ argument is as fol lows:
Effectiv e ly Appellee, according to her allegations, entered into a contract with Appellant s for the sale of the fence, but then sometime l ater sold the fence to anot her buyer. Appelle e is, o r ought to be, estopped, under an equit a ble theory, from re covery for bre a ch of a contract and quantum meruit claims while at the same time excha nging the same underlying consideration [the fence] in ano ther contract with another party.16

There is no evidenc e that Lanier entered into a contract w i t h Townley a nd McCa in to sell app e l lants the fen ce. Rather, Lanier ’ s theory was that the parties
agr eed that each prope rty owner would pay a share of the cost to buil d the new fenc e

. A gain, a ppellan ts c ite no por ti on of the record to support th eir ass ertion that
Lan ier con tracte d to sel l appellants the fence, nor do t hey cite legal authority to support thei r ar gument

. We overrule appellants ’ t enth issue.

Issue 14 : The trial court erred by submittin g question N o. 1 to the jury, and/or erred by entering judgment on t h e verd ict, b ecause q uestion N o. 1 is an irrelevant finding.
In the charge, the jury was aske d, “ Did De fenda nts agree to have Plaintiff authorize the b u ilding of a repla cement fence betwee n their two prop erties? ” Appellants argue tha t this question failed to pu t the f act elem ents of Lanier ’ s pleaded causes of action

— breach of contract or quantum meruit

— to the j ury

. We agree that this question does not p erta in to either of L anier ’ s tried claim s. However, appellants do not explain how the su bmission of the questio n prob ably led to the rendition of an improper judgment. Crowson v. Bowen , 320 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (“To ob tain a r eversal based on the trial court’s e rror, however , [appellant] must show that the err or probably caus ed the rendit ion of a n improper judgment or probably prevented him from properly presenting h is case to this court.”) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.1( a); Rome ro v. KPH Consoli dation, Inc. , 166 S .W.3d 212, 22 5 (Tex. 2005)).
In the absence of any argument or legal a uthori ty to sh ow why the trial court’s submission of the question amounts to reversibl e error, w e ove rrule appellants’ fourteenth issue

.17 C onclus ion

W e affirm the trial co urt ’ s judgment

.

/s/ K evin Jewell Justi ce

Panel con sists o f Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Hassan

.