If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re A. ESTEP, Minor. August 31, 2023

No. 362872

Bay Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 21-013223-NA

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and GADOLA and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), appeals as of right the 

trial court’s order finding that petitioner failed to establish grounds for jurisdiction of the fiveyear-old minor child, AE, under MCL 712A.2(b).

1

 We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 20, 2021, petitioner filed a petition seeking jurisdiction over AE and requesting 

that the trial court remove AE from respondent-father’s care. The petition alleged that respondentfather had inappropriately touched AE, that respondent-mother caught respondent-father 

masturbating in AE’s bedroom while AE was present, and that respondent-father masturbated in 

the presence of AE and other children on two other occasions. In addition, the petition alleged 

that respondent-father had a third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) conviction from 1996.

An adjudicatory trial was held, during which petitioner presented numerous witnesses. 

Respondent-mother and respondent-father were never married and had no court-ordered custody 

arrangement for AE. Respondent-father lived at respondent-mother’s house though they were no 

longer in a relationship at the time of DHHS’s investigation into this matter. Because he was a 

 

1 AE’s mother was a party to this appeal, but was dismissed by this Court after a stipulated order 

was filed by the parties. In re A Estep Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

January 12, 2023 (Docket No. 362872). Only jurisdiction with respect to respondent-father is at 

issue on appeal.
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long-haul truck driver, respondent-father was home only on weekends and would sometimes stay 

at his brother’s house instead of respondent-mother’s house. Respondent-mother’s nephew, KC 

Slates, and his wife and children also lived at respondent-mother’s house at this time. 

The remainder of the evidence petitioner presented conflicted with the evidence respondent 

presented. Slates testified that respondent-father would sleep in the same bed as AE. Slates further 

testified that respondent-mother told him that she caught respondent-father masturbating in AE’s 

room with AE present on a security camera she had installed.

2

 In addition, Slates testified that he 

saw respondent-father on the couch with a blanket on top of him, and presumed that respondentfather was masturbating while AE was present. Slates stated that he informed respondent-mother 

of the incident. Slates’ daughter, who was 10 years old, testified that respondent-father had untied 

his robe and exposed himself to her, but she could not remember whether he was wearing 

underwear under his robe. Slates’ wife also testified that respondent-mother told her she caught 

respondent-father masturbating in AE’s room on a security camera, and that AE was in the room 

at the time. Further, the mother of respondent-father’s two other children testified that she caught 

respondent-father masturbating on a couch while watching a pornographic video on his phone, and 

that AE and other children were in the room sleeping during this incident.

Respondent-mother testified that she caught respondent-father masturbating on camera in 

AE’s room, but that AE was not home at the time. Respondent-mother also testified that AE said 

once that her “butt hurt” from wiping after respondent-father wiped AE’s buttocks too hard, and 

that this was misconstrued as inappropriate touching. Respondent-mother denied that Slates 

informed her he had caught respondent-father masturbating under a blanket; she had learned of it 

while Slates was testifying. 

Respondent-father testified that he was convicted of CSC-III in 1996 for inappropriately 

touching an eight-year-old girl, and his judgment of sentence and a related police statement were

admitted into evidence without objection. Respondent-father clarified that he and AE slept in 

separate beds. Respondent-father denied the allegations that he masturbated in front of the children 

and denied that he exposed himself. But respondent-father testified that he did not know whether 

respondent-mother caught him masturbating on camera and admitted that he helped AE wipe her 

buttocks after she used the bathroom. Respondent-father and respondent-mother testified that 

Slates and respondent-mother often fought about household bills, and that Slates threatened to turn 

respondent-father in and make false allegations against him because respondent-mother raised the 

rent of Slates and his wife. 

After several witnesses were asked about respondent-father’s CSC-III conviction, the trial 

court interrupted petitioner’s questioning of the final witness and asked why respondent’s CSC-III 

conviction was relevant. The trial court stated on the record that respondent-father’s CSC-III 

conviction was “irrelevant in this case.” The trial court declined to take jurisdiction over both 

respondent-father and respondent-mother under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), because petitioner had not 

proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the trial court concluded that it 

did not find respondent-mother’s nephew, Slates, or his daughter’s testimony credible, and instead 

 

2 No footage from the camera in AE’s room was recorded. 
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found contrary testimony to be “much more convincing after viewing the demeanor of the 

witnesses in person and watching them testify.” This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

A trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction is reviewed for clear error in light of the 

trial court’s factual findings. In re Long, 326 Mich App 455, 460; 927 NW2d 724 (2018). “A 

finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” 

People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110; 832 NW2d 738 (2013). “A trial court abuses its discretion 

only when that decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Masi, ___ Mich 

App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 358922); slip op at 2 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

In a child protection proceeding, after a trial court authorizes the filing of a petition to 

exercise jurisdiction over a child, the adjudication phase follows. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15; 

934 NW2d 610 (2019). The adjudication phase determines whether a trial court can exercise 

jurisdiction over a child and the respondent parents under MCL 712A.2(b). Id. To exercise 

jurisdiction, the trial court must find that a statutory basis for jurisdiction exists. Long, 326 Mich 

App at 460. Jurisdiction is established if the trial court finds that petitioner established one of the 

statutory grounds for jurisdiction in MCL 712A.2 by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

“Preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, 

has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth.” People v Cross, 281 Mich App 

737, 740; 760 NW2d 314 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). MCL 712A.2(b) 

provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court has the following authority and jurisdiction”:

(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18 years of age 

found within the county:

(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and 

maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide 

proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary 

for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or 

her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other 

custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship.

* * *

(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, 

drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent 

adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.

Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by deeming evidence of 

respondent-father’s 1996 conviction “irrelevant.” We note that although the trial court did state

that this evidence was “irrelevant” with respect to whether statutory grounds for jurisdiction were 
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proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court admitted into evidence—without objection—

respondent-father’s 1996 judgment of sentence and considered this evidence in reaching its

jurisdiction decision. Accordingly, the court did not conclude that the evidence was irrelevant in 

the sense that it was inadmissible under MRE 402. To the contrary, the trial court appears to have

concluded that respondent-father’s 1996 conviction, together with the other credible testimony 

presented, was not sufficient to establish the statutory ground by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The trial court did not err by determining that the evidence of respondent-father’s 1996 

CSC-III conviction was not persuasive with respect to substantiation of the allegations in the 

petition. Considering that the finder of fact is in a better position to weigh evidence and evaluate 

a witness’s credibility, Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 28; 581 NW2d 11 (1998), we defer 

to the trial court’s determination regarding the weight of this evidence, Varran v Granneman (On 

Remand), 312 Mich App 591, 624; 880 NW2d 242 (2015) (“A trial court has superior fact-finding 

ability, and this Court must give deference to a trial court’s determination regarding the weight to 

assign evidence.”). 

Moreover, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the evidence was insufficient to 

demonstrate that the statutory grounds for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) were 

satisfied. No evidence was presented that respondent-father had improperly touched AE. With 

respect to the additional allegations in the petition, the only pertinent evidence that the trial court 

found credible was that respondent-father slept in the same room as AE on a futon couch; walked 

around in his boxers and robe in front of AE and the other children; masturbated in AE’s room 

while she was out of the house; and had a CSC-III conviction from 1996. The trial court’s decision 

that this evidence did not demonstrate that the home was unfit by reason of neglect, cruelty, 

drunkenness, criminality, or depravity, or that respondent-father failed to provide proper or

necessary support or provide proper care of AE, was not clearly erroneous. We are not left with a 

definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred by finding that the statutory grounds 

for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) were not met. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Christopher P. Yates