Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-3071 | May 30, 2019 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven Knecht

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent–Child Relationship 

of: J.R., J.B., & T.R. (Minor 

Children)

and

S.R. (Mother),

1

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner. 

May 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-3071

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Hon. Faith A. Graham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos. 

79D03-1803-JT-44

79D03-1803-JT-45

79D03-1803-JT-46

 

1

 The parental rights of T.B., the biological father of J.B. and T.R., and D.W., the alleged biological father of 

J.R., were also terminated in proceedings below. Neither participates in this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-3071 | May 30, 2019 Page 2 of 14

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] S.R. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of T.R., J.B., and J.R. (collectively, 

“the Children”). In December of 2015, the Indiana Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) removed the Children from Mother’s home after receiving a 

report that she had left them alone for several hours. After the juvenile court 

found the Children to be children in need of services (“CHINS”), it ordered 

Mother to participate in various services. Visitation could not occur 

immediately because Mother was incarcerated throughout much of 2016 and 

the early part of 2017. Mother’s compliance with the visitation order was 

initially good but eventually deteriorated. Moreover, visitation was often 

tumultuous, involving a lack of discipline and/or arguments with the Children

and/or the visitation supervisors. Mother was also largely noncompliant with 

the other ordered services, including orders to receive individual and family 

therapy. At the same time, the Children had developed varying degrees of 

behavioral issues, and J.R. and J.B. entered individual therapy. In March of 

2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights in the Children

(“the TPR Petitions”). At the termination hearing, the two DCS family case 

managers who had worked on the cases and the Children’s court-appointed 

special advocate (“CASA”) all opined that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights was in the Children’s best interests. Following the hearing, the juvenile 

court granted the TPR Petitions. Mother contends that DCS failed to establish 
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that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Because we disagree, we 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of T.R. (DOB June 4, 2011), J.B. (DOB March 

21, 2010), and J.R. (DOB January 30, 2009). On or around December 22, 

2015, DCS received reports that Mother had left the Children alone for 

approximately six and one-half hours in her Lafayette home. DCS removed the 

Children and petitioned to have them found to be CHINS on December 23, 

2015. On February 19, 2016, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing, 

after which it found the Children to be CHINS. On March 18, 2016, the 

juvenile court ordered Mother, inter alia, to maintain contact with DCS, 

participate in a mental-health evaluation and follow all recommendations, and 

participate in home-based case management. 

[3] There was initially no visitation referral because Mother was incarcerated off 

and on from March of 2016 until March of 2017. DCS Family Case Manager 

Ambyr Wade (“FCM Wade”) met with Mother on March 5, 2017, to arrange 

visitation with the Children in Indianapolis, where Mother was living with an 

aunt. Initially, Mother only had visitation with J.B., who was also living in 

Indianapolis. In July of 2017, Mother moved to Gary, where J.R. was residing 

at the time. By August, arrangements had been made for visitation with the 

Children to occur in Gary, with J.B. being transported from Indianapolis and 

T.R. being transported from White County, where he was residing. 
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[4] At first, Mother was complaint with visitation with J.B. in Indianapolis, not 

missing any scheduled visitations. The situation seemed to deteriorate after 

Mother’s move to Gary, however. Harold Daniels started supervising visits in 

September of 2017 and observed that the first visits he supervised were “rough.” 

Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Mother did “some name calling” and did not properly 

discipline Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 151. She “grabbed [J.R.] roughly on a couple 

of occasions. She called him like a cry baby.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 151–52. Mother

also fell asleep during visits in September and October. Mother was not 

receptive to Daniels’s feedback and she would yell and curse at him. 

[5] Stephanie Parr supervised visits beginning in November of 2017. Parr 

attempted to work with Mother on parenting education, but Mother resisted. 

Mother also declined Parr’s attempts to help her with home-based case work 

and housing. By November of 2017, Mother’s participation in visits declined to 

the point where she missed half of her visits, and this continued through 

February of 2018. Mother missed all of the visits in March and April of 2018. 

[6] When Mother did not attend scheduled visitation with the Children, they

reacted negatively. In May of 2018, a visitation supervisor ended a visit fifteen

minutes in because Mother and J.R. were yelling at each other. On June 2, 

2018, Parr ended a visit early because Mother and J.R. were arguing. Parr 

explained that Mother and J.R. got into an “angry argument” that escalated to 

the point where they were “toe-to-toe” with each other. Tr. Vol. II p. 78. Parr 

ended the visit because J.R. was “almost out of control” and Mother’s “very 
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stern” redirection of J.R. was not appropriate given that he was only nine years

old. Tr. Vol. II pp. 78–79. 

[7] As for other ordered services, Mother told DCS after she moved to Gary in July 

of 2017 that she did not want to continue with individual therapy. Mother had 

only participated in six sessions before she moved. DCS then referred Mother 

for family therapy, but she did not want to participate in that either. Still, a 

service provider tried to work with Mother on individual therapy, and the 

provider supervised therapeutic visits with Children from November of 2017 

until the service closed out in May of 2018. The goals were for Mother to work 

on communication and set appropriate boundaries with Children. Mother, 

however, only scheduled five sessions—four in November of 2017 and one in 

January of 2018. 

[8] Before Mother’s move to Gary, she had completed an initial intake for a 

mental-health evaluation in Indianapolis but had never gone back to complete 

it. Mother did not complete a second referral until February of 2018. Mother 

did not timely arrive for her evaluation, and when the examiner called her, 

Mother said that she had forgotten about the appointment. When Mother 

arrived, the examiner observed that she “appeared agitated and hostile with 

aggressive mood.” Ex. Vol. II p. 5. After approximately two hours, Mother 

agreed to undergo testing. Mother’s testing indicated (1) that she had a valid, 

elevated abuse score which often resulted in physical child abuse; (2) that she

had “inappropriate expectations for her children which exceeded their 

developmental capabilities[;]” (3) that she lacked “understanding of normal 
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child growth and development[;]” (4) “a consistent reversal of family roles, 

where children are used to meet adult needs[;]” (5) that “she has extremely 

variable and unpredictable moods, an embittered and resentful irritability” and 

lacked empathy; and (6) that she “lacks insight, good judgment, and exercises 

poor decision making[.]” Ex. Vol. II pp. 7, 8, 10. The evaluator’s clinical 

impressions were (1) bipolar I disorder, current/most recent episode depressed, 

with psychotic features; (2) generalized anxiety disorder; (3) paranoid 

personality disorder; (4) unspecified personality disorder, 

negativistic/antagonistic type; and (5) narcissistic personality traits. The 

evaluator recommended that Mother participate in therapy, receive “extensive 

parenting education[,]” and be evaluated for possible medication management. 

Ex. Vol. II p. 10. 

[9] Meanwhile, on March 23, 2018, DCS filed the TPR Petitions. On June 19, 

August 27, and September 11, 2018, the juvenile court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing on the TPR Petitions. A DCS report to the juvenile court 

showed that the Children had been acting out and getting in trouble at school 

and home. Inter alia, (1) J.B. and J.R. had become physical with their peers and 

teachers; (2) J.B. had become defiant with teachers, roamed the halls, had lain

down and refused to get up, had hit other students and staff, was stealing, and 

had recently been diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 

(“ADHD”); (3) J.R. continued to have outbursts, be defiant, and get upset 

when Mother did not visit; and (4) T.R. had also acted out at school and 
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urinated on himself on several occasions. J.B. and J.R. were both in individual 

therapy as of June 19, 2018. 

[10] The then nine-year-old J.R. had completed a psychological evaluation in March 

of 2018, and the report was released on April 5 and later admitted as DCS 

Exhibit 4. J.R. exhibited “[p]roblematic behaviors” including “insubordination, 

fire-setting, verbal/physical aggression, impulsivity, lying, and difficulties with 

peer relationships.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 4. In one instance, J.R. fought with a 

younger child at his school “and responded by stomping on the child’s face with 

his boot.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 5. J.R. had previously been diagnosed with 

oppositional defiant disorder and ADHD, and his psychiatrist had sent a letter 

to DCS in November of 2017 noting that that he had been suspended from 

school at least three times since August of 2017, including once for bringing a 

toy gun and threatening to “blow the brains out” of a peer. Ex. Vol. IV p. 14. 

J.R. “becomes more defiant [and] irritable” when Mother cancels visits. Ex. 

Vol. IV p. 5. The evaluator noted that J.R. “has seen a significant amount of

trauma throughout his life, including significant neglect in the home and 

repeated abandonment.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 10. The evaluator’s clinical 

impressions of J.R. included disruptive mood dysregulation disorder; ADHD, 

unspecified type; and major depressive disorder, recurrent and moderate. The 

evaluator recommended that J.R. receive the assurance of a nurturing, stable 

home environment; family therapy with his siblings; counseling; and 

medication management but did not recommend therapy with Mother. 
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[11] Therapist Traci Coney began providing J.R. with individual therapy in May of 

2017 and was still working with him as of June of 2018. J.R.’s therapeutic 

goals are to “decrease his behavior problems, discuss his traumatic past, 

emotional regulation and for him to learn skills to manage [...] symptoms from 

his diagnosis.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. Coney’s description of J.R.’s behavioral issues 

echoed what was in his psychological evaluation. According to Coney, J.R. 

needs to continue in therapy because of the inconsistency, abandonment, and 

neglect that he had experienced. 

[12] Coney started working with J.B. in May of 2018, but only had approximately

four sessions with her by June 19. J.B.’s therapeutic goals were to address her 

sadness and impulse control. J.B. had improved in therapy, and Coney 

recommended that she continue. Coney also recommended that J.B. be 

evaluated to see if medication would help with her ADHD. 

[13] Home-based therapist Bonnie Atkins worked with all three Children in August 

and September of 2016 and stopped working with T.R. in September of 2016,

J.B. in February of 2017, and J.R. in March of 2017. Atkins observed “a lot of 

fighting” between the Children in their foster home, with Atkins noting that 

they “had a hard time getting through a [board] game without one of them 

becoming very escalated[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 58. Atkins indicated that J.R. 

progressed when she worked with him, learning coping skills for anger, while 

J.B. progressed “quite a bit[,]” becoming able to use coping skills when 

frustrated or upset and identify “safe” persons. Tr. Vol. II p. 58–59. 
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[14] Hilary Laughner was appointed as Children’s CASA in February of 2018. 

CASA Laughner testified that she was concerned with Mother’s lack of 

consistency in participating in services, and the Children’s negative reactions 

when Mother missed visits. CASA Laughner noted Mother’s lack of 

documentation regarding Mother’s concerns, her dishonesty, her lack of 

responsibility, and that Mother became verbally aggressive when confronted 

with issues. CASA Laughner was also concerned with Mother’s failure to

properly supervise Children during visits and her lack of housing and 

employment stability. CASA Laughner noted that J.R. was more verbally and 

physically aggressive and that J.B. exhibited “an increase in behaviors” when 

Mother missed her visitation appointments. Tr. Vol. III p. 4. 

[15] FCM Christopher Lamar took over the case from FCM Wade in May of 2018. 

FCM Lamar and CASA Laughner testified that at a child and family team 

meeting in May of 2018, Mother seemed to blame everyone else for the case 

going on for so long, became verbally aggressive, and left the room. Mother 

was still not accepting responsibility and she “still blames DCS and everyone 

else for her current situation.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 242. 

[16] FCM Wade testified that termination was in Children’s best interests because 

they need to know what is going to happen to them after three years of not 

knowing. FCM Lamar also testified that termination was in Children’s best 

interest because Children need permanency “soon” and Mother had not made 

enough progress. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 236. CASA Laughner testified that termination 

was in the Children’s best interests because “they deserve permanency, they 
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need something that’s stab[le,] they deserve to know what the next step is[, a]nd 

so as individuals that they can grow and that they can be given a stable life.” 

Tr. Vol. III pp. 10–11. CASA Laughner opined that continuing the parentchild relationship between Mother and the Children would be harmful to them. 

DCS’s plan for the Children if the court granted termination was adoption. J.B. 

and T.R were in pre-adoptive placements, and J.R.’s placement was uncertain

and awaiting the outcome of the termination hearing. On November 21, 2018, 

the juvenile court entered its orders terminating Mother’s parental rights in the 

Children. 

Discussion and Decision

[17] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. 

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, 

we acknowledge that the parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued 

relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights 

when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. 

In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, 

parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s 

interest in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the 

parent–child relationship. Id. 

[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the 

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental 
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Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider 

the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, 

our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the 

legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to 

assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment 

terminating a parent–child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn 

therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal 

conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact

or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[19] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) governs what DCS must allege and establish 

to support a termination of parental rights, namely 

(A) that [...] the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

[....]

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.
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[...]

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 

[20] Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests. We are mindful 

that in determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the juvenile

court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the 

totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. 

Furthermore, this court has previously determined that the testimony of a GAL 

regarding a child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is 

in the child’s best interests. In the matter of Y.E.C., 534 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1992). FCMs Wade and Lamar and CASA Laughner all testified that 

termination was in the Children’s best interests, essentially all on the basis that 

they needed and deserved permanence. While this testimony is likely sufficient 

to support the juvenile court’s conclusion to that effect, it is not as though this 

testimony is unsupported by other evidence in the record. 

[21] The record contains ample evidence that Mother’s compliance with visitation 

and other services was sporadic at best, and her attitude toward service 

providers has consistently been antagonistic, noncooperative, and even abusive 

at times. Mother did not cooperate with attempts to provide her with 
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individual therapy, despite a mental-health evaluator’s conclusion that it was 

needed. Mother also refused to fully participate in family therapy and declined 

offers for home-based services and assistance in finding housing. Mother has 

repeatedly blamed the Children’s removal on others and has denied that she 

requires any services at all. 

[22] Moreover, the record indicates that this case has taken a heavy toll on the 

Children. The Children have all exhibited behavioral problems to varying 

degrees since their removal—up to and including violence against teachers and 

peers—with J.R.’s and J.B.’s issues being severe enough to warrant individual 

therapy. CASA Laughner noted that while the Children’s negative behaviors 

increased when Mother missed visitation, Mother failed to properly supervise 

them when she did attend. In summary, while the Children’s removal from 

Mother’s care introduced instability into their lives, Mother showed little 

inclination to take any of the steps necessary to secure their return to her. 

[23] Mother points to evidence that her compliance with services improved after 

DCS filed the TPR Petitions. While we are mindful that the juvenile court 

must assess the parent’s ability to care for the children as of the date of the 

termination proceeding and consider any evidence of changed conditions, it 

should also consider the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct as a means of 

determining the probability of future detrimental behavior. Rowlett v. 

Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006), trans. denied. The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate 

evidence of changed conditions, and, given the evidence of Mother’s 
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demonstrated history of temporary compliance followed by regression, we will 

not second-guess its conclusions. See S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. Mother has 

not established that the juvenile court’s determination that termination was in 

the Children’s best interests was clearly erroneous. 

[24] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. 

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.