J-A24037-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARIA L. CERCIELLO, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

THOMAS R. CERCIELLO,

Appellee No. 415 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree January 29, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County

Domestic Relations at No.: 1624-2007-Civil

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2014

Appellant, Maria L. Cerciello (Wife), appeals from the decree granting a 

divorce to her and Appellee, Thomas R. Cerciello (Husband), and equitably 

distributing the parties’ marital property. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Wife and Husband married on August 7, 1995, and they separated 

approximately eleven years later on April 1, 2006. When they separated, 

Wife moved out of the marital residence and took her personal possessions 

and other household items with her. Husband cashed in a MetLife Investors 

account valued at $6,433.15 to help Wife pay for moving expenses. On 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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September 27, 2007, Wife filed a divorce complaint seeking equitable 

distribution of the marital property. 

On April 11, 2011, five years after the parties separated, a fire 

destroyed the marital residence. The parties still jointly owned the home 

and Husband resided in it. Husband was the only named insured on the 

homeowners’ insurance policy and he paid all premiums for coverage after 

the parties’ separation. The insurance company made all payments directly 

to Husband, and the proceeds were allocated into three categories, to 

compensate for loss of the structure of the home, the contents of the home, 

and related living expenses. 

The trial court appointed a Divorce Master, attorney Steven R. Guccini 

(Master), who held hearings on the issue of equitable distribution on August 

17, 2012 and November 8, 2012. On October 8, 2013, the Master filed a 

report recommending an award of 60% of the marital property to Wife and 

40% to Husband, calculating $40,416.53 net payable to Wife. With respect 

to the insurance proceeds relating to the fire, the Master recommended that 

the court award Wife 60% of the funds for the structure of the marital 

residence (with no award of interest), but no share of the proceeds for the 

contents of the residence or living expenses. The Master also recommended 
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a credit of $2,573.26 to Husband for the money he gave Wife from the 

MetLife account to help with moving expenses.1

Both parties filed exceptions to the Master’s report. On January 14, 

2014, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the 

parties’ exceptions. On January 29, 2014, the court entered a divorce 

decree ordering Husband to pay Wife $40,416.53. This timely appeal 

followed.2

Wife raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in failing to award 

[Wife] a percentage share of the entirety of the insurance proceeds 

resulting from the loss of a marital home?

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in failing to award 

[Wife] interest on the insurance proceeds awarded to her when the 

reason for the delay in her receipt of the same was due to [Husband’s] 

misappropriation of funds to his benefit and interest is compensation 

for the deprivation of said funds?

3. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in failing to award 

[Wife] her percentage share of the MetLife account?

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1 The MetLife account was valued at $6,433.15 in March 2006. (See

Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 3 ¶ 12). Husband testified 

that he gave all of the funds to Wife to cover moving expenses. (See N.T. 

Hearing, 11/08/12, at 6). The $2,573.26 credit to Husband represents his 

40% share of the MetLife account. (See Trial Court Opinion, 3/11/14, at 

11). The Master deducted this credit to Husband in calculating the net 

payable to Wife. (See Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 10). 

2

Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Wife filed a timely concise statement of 

errors on February 20, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed a Rule 

1925(a) opinion on March 11, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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4. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion in adopting the 

report and recommendation of the Divorce Master who did not timely 

file his report and recommendation in accordance with the Rules of 

Civil Procedure? 

(Wife’s Brief, at 6). 

Our standard of review is as follows:

A trial court has broad discretion when 

fashioning an award of equitable distribution. Our 

standard of review when assessing the propriety of 

an order effectuating the equitable distribution of 

marital property is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to 

follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find 

an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of 

clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not 

find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised 

was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the 

evidence in the certified record. In determining the 

propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts 

must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. 

[W]e measure the circumstances of the case against 

the objective of effectuating economic justice 

between the parties and achieving a just 

determination of their property rights.

Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to 

weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not 

reverse those determinations so long as they are supported by 

the evidence. We are also aware that a master’s report and 

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the 

fullest consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of 

witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe 

and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455-56 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 
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In her first issue, Wife claims that the trial court abused its discretion 

in adopting the Master’s recommendation to award her 60% of the insurance 

proceeds for the structure of the marital home, but no share of the proceeds 

for the contents of the home or living expenses related to the fire. (See 

Wife’s Brief, at 14-23). She argues that “the entirety of the proceeds should 

be split 60/40 in favor of Wife.” (Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted); see also id.

at 23). Wife acknowledges the parties’ long separation before the fire, but 

asserts that she left several items of marital personal property at the home, 

such as tools, guns, and appliances, which she intended to claim. (See id.

at 20). This issue does not merit relief. 

In addressing Wife’s issue, we are mindful that “[t]he process of 

equitable distribution is an exercise in marshalling, valuing and dividing the 

marital pot in a fair manner.” Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “There is no simple formula by which to 

divide marital property; the method of distribution derives from the facts of 

the individual case.” Taper v. Taper, 939 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citation omitted). “The courts attempt to split property equitably, instead 

of equally, taking into consideration such factors as length of marriage, the 

contributions of both spouses, ages and health of each spouse.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

We also note that this Court has found that, under circumstances 

where an insurance policy on a marital residence is issued in only one 

spouse’s name, the unnamed spouse may recover an equitable share of the 
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proceeds paid on that policy for personal property destroyed by fire. See 

Beamer v. Beamer, 479 A.2d 485, 487, 489 (Pa. Super. 1984) (finding 

that, under particular circumstances of case, trial court should determine 

value of Wife’s personal property left in possession of Husband and 

destroyed by fire where obvious that parties agreed to distribution of 

property and Wife left several items behind at Husband’s request). 

In the instant case, the record reflects that, in making its equitable 

distribution recommendation, the Master considered the parties’ education 

levels and employment status, Husband’s ability to earn a higher salary than 

Wife, Wife’s lack of retirement benefits or health insurance, and each party’s 

health conditions. (See Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered pages 2-

3, 8); see also Taper, supra at 974. When considering the appropriate 

distribution of the insurance proceeds paid because of the fire at the marital 

residence, the Master recommended and the trial court agreed that Wife 

should receive a 60% share of the proceeds paid for the structure of the 

home, and Husband should receive only a 40% share. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 

4). However, the Master and the court concluded that Wife was not entitled 

to any of the funds paid for the contents of the home or for living expenses. 

(See id.). The court explained the basis for its decision regarding the 

contents of the home as follows:

The parties had been separated for five years at the time 

of the fire. [(See Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered 

page 2)]. Testimony revealed that Wife had moved her personal 

property from the home shortly after separation. [(See N.T. 

Hearing, 8/17/12, at 17, 38)] (Where Wife testified that she 
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removed pre-marital property she had brought to the house) 

[;(see id. at 59)] (Where Wife testified that she hired a mover 

and a moving truck). Wife also testified that the only items of 

significant value purchased during the marriage were a dining 

room table, which she took when she moved out of the 

residence, and a living room set [valued at $3,000.00, left in the 

home. (see id. at 40-43; see also Master’s Report, 10/08/13, 

at unnumbered pages 4, 9)]. Husband claimed that Wife took 

many items in addition to those she brought to the house 

including small appliances, dishes, furnishings, and an 

entertainment center. [(See N.T. Hearing, 8/17/12, at 63)]. 

The parties’ daughter, Andrea Cerciello, testified that Wife 

moved many items from the home, including a dining room 

hutch, desk, pictures, and the contents of her bedroom. . . . 

[(See N.T. Hearing, 11/08/12, at 17-19)]. 

. . . [T]he value of the $3,000 living room set [lost in the 

fire], which both parties acknowledged was marital property, 

was factored into the total amount of marital assets. [(See 

Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 9)]. Although 

Wife claimed, and her friend Alison O’Shea corroborated, that 

there were additional personal items she intended to remove 

from the home, the Master determined that this argument was 

[not] compelling. [(see id. at unnumbered page 8; N.T Hearing 

11/08/12, at 33-34)]. This determination was based on the 

[testimony at the hearings], the fact that five years had elapsed 

between the parties’ separation and the fire, and that Wife had 

not made any claims to items in the home in the interim. [(See

Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered pages 7-8).] 

(Id. at 5-6).3 

With respect to the living expense insurance proceeds, Husband 

testified that he used the funds to cover the cost of purchasing a mobile 

home to live in when the fire destroyed the marital home, while a new home 

was constructed. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/17/12, at 66-67; see also Master’s 

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3 Wife acknowledged that the parties never had an agreement with respect 

to the remaining contents of the home. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/17/12, at 31). 
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Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 11). Wife had not lived in the 

marital home for five years, and therefore did not incur similar living 

expenses. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/17/12, at 43-44). Husband was the only 

named insured on the policy and he paid all premiums for coverage after the 

parties separated. (See Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 2; 

Trial Ct. Op., at 6). 

Upon review, we conclude that the court’s determination that Wife is 

not entitled to insurance proceeds for the contents of the home or living 

expenses is supported by the record where: Wife removed her property at 

separation five years before the fire; the parties did not enter an agreement 

with respect to the remaining contents; Wife made no claims for items left 

behind before the fire; and Wife did not incur any additional living expenses 

as a result of the fire. Compare Beamer, supra at 487, 489. We discern 

no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. See Childress, supra at 455-

56. Wife’s first issue does not merit relief. 

In her second issue, Wife argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to award her interest on her portion of the insurance 

proceeds for the structure of the home from the date Husband received the 

funds. (See Wife’s Brief, at 23). Wife contends that she is entitled to 

interest because Husband received the proceeds in 2011 and spent the funds 

to his benefit, while he gave her none of the proceeds. (See id.). This issue 

does not merit relief.
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In her one-page argument on this issue, Wife cites one case, Bryant 

v. Girard Bank, 517 A.2d 968 (Pa. Super. 1986). (See Wife’s Brief at 23). 

The Bryant case involved interest purportedly accrued on settlement funds, 

and Wife cites it for the general proposition that “[i]nterest is the 

compensation allowed by law for the deprivation of money.” (Wife’s Brief at 

23 (quoting Bryant, supra at 979)). Wife cites no relevant legal authority 

to persuade us that she is entitled to interest on the insurance proceeds 

under the facts of this case. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b). 

In the instant case, the trial court agreed with the Master’s decision 

not to award interest based on its finding that the Master carefully 

considered the economic circumstances of Husband and Wife along with 

relevant statutory factors, and fairly and accurately interpreted the 

testimony and evidence presented at the hearings. (See Trial Ct. Op. at 5, 

11-12). The trial court concluded that it could “find no compelling reason to 

award [W]ife interest on the insurance money when she was awarded a 60% 

share of the marital assets.” (Id. at 12). We find no abuse of discretion in 

the court’s decision. See Childress, supra at 455-56. Moreover, Wife’s 

assertion that Husband should have paid her in 2011 immediately upon 

receipt of the funds is specious where the record shows that the parties 

wholly disagreed as to the appropriate allocation of funds and sought 

resolution through equitable distribution. Accordingly, Wife’s second issue 

does not merit relief.
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In her third issue, Wife claims that the trial court abused its discretion 

in failing to award her 60% of the MetLife account (valued at $6,433.15) 

that Husband cashed in to help her with moving expenses. (See Wife’s 

Brief, at 24). In support of this issue, Wife argues that Husband’s testimony 

was not credible, because he first testified that he gave her approximately 

$6,000.00 to help with moving expenses, and later “contradicted himself” by 

stating that he gave her $5,000.00 for these expenses. (Id. (citing N.T. 

Hearing, 11/08/12, at 6, 12)). Wife asserts that she testified that Husband 

gave her only $2,500.00 for expenses, not the entire amount from the 

MetLife account.4 (See id.). This issue does not merit relief. 

As stated above, a master’s report is to be given the fullest 

consideration, especially on questions of witness credibility, because the 

master had the opportunity to observe the parties’ demeanor and behavior. 

See Childress, supra at 455-56. It was for the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and resolve credibility issues, and this Court will not reverse its 

determinations if the evidence supports them. See id. 

Here, Husband testified that he gave all of the funds from the MetLife 

account to Wife to help with moving costs. (See N.T. Hearing, 11/08/12, at 

6). When asked on cross-examination by Wife’s attorney whether he gave 

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4 Wife provides this Court with no citation to the record for this purported 

testimony, (see Wife’s Brief, at 24), and after review of the hearing 

transcript, we did not locate her testimony to this effect. 
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Wife only $3,000.00 to help her move, Husband answered “No.” (Id. at 12). 

The Master found Husband’s testimony that he gave Wife all of the funds 

from the MetLife account credible despite his reference to a $5,000.00 

figure. (See Master’s Report, 10/08/13, at unnumbered page 10; see also

N.T. Hearing, 11/08/12, at 12). The trial court reviewed the record and 

found no evidence that Husband agreed to give Wife only $2,500.00 toward 

moving expenses. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 10). The court determined that 

Wife’s recollection of the record did not comport with the hearing testimony, 

and that the record instead supported the Master’s findings. (See id.). We 

agree, and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

award Wife 60% of the MetLife account where the record reflects that she 

used all of the proceeds for moving expenses. See Childress, supra at 

455-56. Wife’s third issue lacks merit.

In her fourth issue, Wife argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in adopting the Master’s report because the Master failed to file it 

within thirty days of the equitable distribution hearing in this matter, in 

violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55-2.

5

 (See Wife’s 

Brief, at 24; see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/20/14, at unnumbered 

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5

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55-2, provides in relevant part 

that, after the conclusion of a hearing, a Master “shall . . . file the record and 

the report within . . . thirty days after the receipt of the transcript by the 

master in contested actions[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(a)(1)(ii). 
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pages 1-2). Wife contends that the court should not have adopted the 

report because the Master filed it nearly one year after the final hearing. 

(See Wife’s Brief, at 24). This issue is waived.

It is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure that this Court receives a 

complete record, and when deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to 

conduct meaningful appellate review, we may find certain issues waived. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Cresci Const. Serv., Inc. v. Martin, 64 

A.3d 254, 266 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, in her appellate brief, Wife has not 

provided this Court with any legal argument to support her contention that 

the court abused its discretion in accepting the Master’s report. (See Wife’s 

Brief, at 24). Wife’s only presented argument on this issue consists of one 

and one-half sentences; her brief omits the subsequent page that 

presumably addressed this issue. (See id.). Accordingly, the issue is 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Cresci Const. Serv., Inc., supra at

266.6 

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6 Moreover, Wife’s fourth issue would not merit relief. First, we note that 

Rule 1920.55-2(a)(1)(ii) sets forth a thirty-day deadline for the Master to file 

a report after receipt of the transcript, not a thirty-day timeframe from the 

date of the hearing. Further, even assuming a violation of the rule, “the 

court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any 

error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of 

the parties.” Pa.R.C.P. 126. 

Here, the trial court acknowledged the lengthy delay between the 

equitable distribution hearings and filing of the Master’s report. (See Trial 

Ct. Op., at 7). It considered the proceedings and determined that the delay 

did not substantially affect the parties’ rights where the record reflects that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/2/2014

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the Master carefully considered the unique facts of this case and his report 

was in accord with the testimony and evidence presented at the hearings. 

(See id. at 5, 7); see also Pa.R.C.P. 126. We discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s disposition of this issue.