alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit






EXHIBIT 10.1
FIRST AMENDMENT TO
SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED
WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
2005 SUPPLEMENTAL INCOME PLAN


Effective April 1, 2019


This First Amendment (the “Amendment”) to the Second Amended and Restated World Acceptance Corporation 2005 Supplemental Income Plan (the “Plan”) is adopted as of April 15, 2019 and shall become effective April 1, 2019.


		
	1.
	Section 2.5 of the Plan is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:




2.5    “Early Retirement Benefit” means, with respect to each Executive, 45% of such Executive’s monthly base salary, at the time of Early Retirement, multiplied by such Executive’s Salary Adjustment Factor, multiplied by the Executive’s Days of Service Fraction.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Executive’s monthly base salary used in determining the Early Retirement Benefit shall be the actual monthly base salary paid to the Executive rather than the reduced amount used to calculate severance payments or other benefits.  


		
	2.
	Section 2.12 of the Plan is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:




2.12    “Normal Retirement Benefit” means, with respect to each Executive, 45% of such Executive’s monthly base salary at the time of Normal Retirement, multiplied by such Executive’s Salary Adjustment Factor.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Executive’s monthly base salary used in determining the Normal Retirement Benefit shall be the actual monthly base salary paid to the Executive rather than the reduced amount used to calculate severance payments or other benefits.  


		
	3.
	The following new Section 2.18 is added to the Plan:




2.18    “Salary Adjustment Factor” means, with respect to each Executive, the Salary Adjustment Factor determined and approved by the Board of Directors of the Company for such Executive and recorded on the Salary Adjustment Factor Schedule set forth as a schedule to this Plan. The Salary Adjustment Factor may be different for different Executives, and the Salary Adjustment Factor Schedule shall be updated by the Company if, when and as additional Executives become participants in the Plan.


		
	4.
	The following new Section 3.8 is added to the Plan:




3.8    The Plan was amended effective April 1, 2019 to add the Salary Adjustment Factor definition in Section 2.18 and to make related changes to the Plan. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Plan, any Executive who had accrued benefits under the Plan as of March 31, 2019 shall be entitled to receive benefits at least equal to the Executive’s accrued benefits as of March 31, 2019, as determined under, and subject to, the terms of the Plan as of March 31, 2019.


		
	5.
	The initial Salary Adjustment Factor Schedule shall be the schedule attached hereto.




		
	6.
	Except as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Plan shall remain unmodified and in full force and effect.











SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED
WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
2005 SUPPLEMENTAL INCOME PLAN


SALARY ADJUSTMENT FACTOR SCHEDULE
As of April 1, 2019




	
		
	Executive
	Salary Adjustment Factor

	R. Chad Prashad
	.50

	John L. Calmes, Jr.
	.56

	D. Clinton Dyer
	.56

	Jeff L. Tinney
	.75
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-15-00069-CV

WILLIAM WINDSOR,

Appellant

v.

KELLIE MCDOUGALD,

Appellee

From the 378th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 88611

ORDER

Because Appellant’s brief was stricken by Court order on July 16, 2015, 

appellant’s “Request for Leave to Supplement Record to Make Citation Corrections to 

Appellant’s Brief” filed on July 2, 2015 is dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Request dismissed as moot

Order issued and filed July 16, 2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL C. CHRISTEN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 

REVENUE, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-72868 

Tax Ct. No. 16147-14 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from a Decision of the

United States Tax Court

Submitted September 26, 2017**

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Michael C. Christen appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s decision, following 

a bench trial, upholding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s determination of 

deficiencies and penalties for the tax years 1999, 2000, and 2002. We have 

jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We review de novo conclusions of law and 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 3 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-72868 

for clear error questions of fact. Hardy v. Comm’r, 181 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

1999). We affirm.

The Tax Court properly upheld the deficiencies for tax years 1999, 2000, 

and 2002 because the Commissioner presented “some substantive evidence” that 

Christen failed to report income, and Christen failed to submit any relevant 

evidence, including establishing the existence of a settlement agreement, that the 

“deficiency was arbitrary or erroneous.” Id. at 1004-05 (Commissioner’s 

deficiency determination is presumptively correct, and it is incumbent on taxpayer 

to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence).

The Tax Court properly found that penalties under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651(a)(1) 

and 6662 were appropriate for Christen’s delinquent and understated taxes. See 26 

U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (addition appropriate when taxpayer fails to file taxes unless 

such failure was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect); id.

§ 6662(a), (d)(1) (authorizing penalty for substantial understatement of taxes when 

understatement exceeds the greater of ten percent of the tax required to be shown 

on the tax return or $5,000).

We reject as without merit Christen’s contentions that the Commissioner 

engaged in spoliation of evidence.

AFFIRMED.
#### LONG v. STATE.

No. 24059.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 26, 1948.

Rehearing Denied June 23, 1948.

No attorney for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for driving an automobile upon a public highway while intoxicated. Punishment assessed was a fine of $50.00 and 10 days in jail.

Three highway patrolmen observed an .automobile being operated on a street in San Angelo in an erratic manner. They stopped it and found appellant was the driver. They asked him to get out of the vehicle and walk a few steps. Their testimony was that he was “unsteady on his feet” and there was a “very distinct odor of intoxicants on his breath, his speech rather blurred and he had trouble in pronouncing his words.” Each of the patrolmen testified to substantially the same facts, and in their opinion appellant was intoxicated. Appellant, his wife and several members of his family testified that appellant had drunk only two bottles of beer and that he was sober. His peculiar speech was attributed to the fact that many of his teeth had been extracted, and his unsteady walk and erratic driving to illness.

The court gave a special charge telling the jury that if they found lack of control of the car which the officers had observed was due to the illness, lack of teeth, rheumatism, or any other physical defect of appellant, or had a reasonable doubt thereof, to acquit appellant.

A sharp issue on the facts was drawn, which the jury settled against appellant. This was the jury’s special province.

A number of objections to the court’s charge are found in the record, but none are thought to be meritorious, or to demand discussion.

Only one bill of exception is brought forward. It concerns the argument of the county attorney, who said to the jury, “Every man that was ever tried in this court charged with driving a car while drunk has said that he was sick.” Objection to said remark was promptly sustained and the jury was instructed not to consider the statement of the county attorney.

The argument should not have been made. We think the prompt action of the court in withdrawing it protected appellant from harmful effect therefrom.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing

KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing in which he contends that in the original disposition of this case we erred in two respects, first, in holding that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard certain argument of the county attorney *150cured the evil effect, if any, thereof, and second, that the trial court committed no reversible error in defining intoxication.

We have again reviewed the record in the light of his motion and are convinced that this case was properly disposed of on original submission.

Therefore, the motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JERRY LEE HUTTO, §

§

No. 08-15-00294-CR

Appellant,

§

Appeal from the

V.

§

97th District Court

of Montague County, Texas

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

§

(TC# 2014-0179M-CR)

Appellee.

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jerry Lee Hutto appeals his conviction of indecency with a child by sexual contact. 

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the lesserincluded offense of indecency with a child by sexual contact.

1

 The trial court followed the plea 

bargain and assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for a term of thirteen years. We 

affirm. 

FRIVOLOUS APPEAL

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief in which she has concluded that the 

appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), by presenting a professional 

 

1

 The indictment charged Appellant with continuous sexual abuse of a child. 
- 2 -

evaluation of the record demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be 

advanced. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)(“In Texas, an 

Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it 

must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal 

authorities.”); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has notified the 

Court in writing that she has delivered a copy of counsel’s brief and the motion to withdraw to 

Appellant, and she has advised Appellant of his right to review the record, file a pro se brief, and 

to seek discretionary review. Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318-20 (Tex.Crim.App.

2014)(setting forth duties of counsel). Counsel also provided Appellant with a copy of the 

clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Appellant has not filed a pro se brief.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and agree that the appeal is 

wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May 25, 2016

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
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|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                      
|View History: Annual                                                
|View History: Annual                                                
|View History:                                                       
|                                                                    
|Texas Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Proved Reserves (Million Barrels)
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|Texas Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Proved Reserves (Million Barrels)
|                                                                    

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2000's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | 5,496 
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 6,356  | 8,108  | 11,101 | 12,004 | 14,058 | 13,057 | 13,998 | 17,327 | 19,617 | 19,796
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 16,689 | 18,620 |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 12/30/2022                                                                                                         
|Next Release Date: 12/29/2023
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 52 (Wednesday, March 18, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 14130]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06215]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-9924-50-OCFO]

Meeting of the Environmental Financial Advisory Board--Public 
Notice

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice of open meeting of the Environmental Financial Advisory 
Board.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The United States Environmental Protection Agency's (USEPA) 
Environmental Financial Advisory Board (EFAB) will hold a public 
meeting on May 14-15, 2015. EFAB is an EPA advisory committee chartered 
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to provide advice and 
recommendations to EPA on creative approaches to funding environmental 
programs, projects, and activities.
    The purpose of this meeting is to hear from informed speakers on 
environmental finance issues, proposed legislation, and EPA priorities; 
to discuss activities, progress, and preliminary recommendations with 
regard to current EFAB work projects; and to consider requests for 
assistance from EPA offices.
    Environmental finance discussions and presentations are expected 
on, but not limited to, the following topics: Water infrastructure 
financing; financing operations and maintenance at green sites; and 
EPA's Water Infrastructure and Resiliency Financing Center.
    The meeting is open to the public; however, seating is limited. All 
members of the public who wish to attend the meeting must register, in 
advance, no later than Friday, May 1, 2015. Registration is required 
for all members of the public to assure an expeditious security 
process.

DATES: The full board meeting will be held on Thursday, May 14, 2015 
from 1:00 p.m. to 5 p.m., EDT and Friday, May 15, 2015 from 9:00 a.m. 
to 5 p.m., EDT.

ADDRESSES: District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, 5000 
Overlook Drive, Washington, DC 20005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on access or services 
for individuals with disabilities, or to request accommodations for a 
person with a disability, please contact Sandra Williams, U.S. EPA, at 
(202) 564-4999 or williams.sandra@epa.gov, at least 10 days prior to 
the meeting, to allow as much time as possible to process your request.

    Dated: March 6, 2015.
David Bloom,
Acting Chief Financial Officer.
[FR Doc. 2015-06215 Filed 3-17-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
September 20, 2016

Exemption No. 15380A

Regulatory Docket No. FAA–2015–5639

Mr. David Liddell

Owner/Operator

Chandelle

P.O. Box 50176

Phoenix, AZ 85076

Dear Mr. Liddell:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition for an amendment. It explains 

the basis for our decision, describes its effect, and lists any changes to the original conditions 

and limitations.

By letter posted to the public docket on July 22, 2016, you petitioned the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) on behalf of Chandelle (hereinafter petitioner or operator) for an 

amendment to your current exemption. That exemption from §§ 61.23(a) and (c), 

61.101(e)(4) and (5), 61.113(a), 61.315(a), 91.7(a), 91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(a)(1), 

91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1) and (2), and 91.417(a) and (b) of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) allows the petitioner to conduct UAS operations. You 

requested an amendment to change the company name from Chandelle Consulting to 

Chandelle.

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested amendment to the exemption would not set a 

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to the petitioner. 

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 15380

remains valid and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the authority contained 
2

in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, the operator is 

granted an amendment to change the operator name.

The operator shall add this amendment to its original exemption.

 

Conditions and Limitations

In this grant of amendment, Chandelle is hereafter referred to as the operator. All conditions 

and limitations within Grant of Exemption No. 15380 remain in effect.

Failure to comply with any of the conditions and limitations of this grant of exemption will be 

grounds for the immediate suspension or rescission of this exemption. 

This exemption terminates on March 31, 2018, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/

John S. Duncan

Director, Flight Standards Service
#### FLORES v. STATE.

No. 24076.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 9, 1948.

No attorney for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for assault with intent to murder, punishment assessed at three years in the penitentiary.

The record contains neither statement of facts nor bills of exception. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-8142

TROY EUGENE MOBLEY, JR., 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

LEROY CARTLEDGE, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (3:07-cv-01593-GRA) 

Submitted: January 13, 2009 Decided: January 20, 2009 

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KING, Circuit 

Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Troy Eugene Mobley, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Melody Jane Brown, 

Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Troy Eugene Mobley, Jr. seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) 

petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate 

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The 

magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised 

Mobley that failure to file timely objections to this 

recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court 

order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, 

Mobley failed to object to the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation. 

The timely filing of specific objections to a 

magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve 

appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when 

the parties have been warned of the consequences of 

noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th 

Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Mobley 

has waived appellate review by failing to timely file specific 

objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
3 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

) JERRY ELLIS -HEMBY, ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 12-0052 (ESH) ) BRANDON TOATLEY, et al. , ) ) Defendan ts. )

)
ORDER On Marc h 19, 2012, defe ndants filed a motion pursuant to F ederal Civil Rule of Procedur e 12(b) (1) a

nd (2) to dismiss the complaint for lac k of jurisdiction. On Marc h 20, 2012, the Court issued an orde r advisingthe pro se plaintiff to respond to the motion to dismi ss no later than April 20, 2012, and infor ming he r that if she did not timely respond, the motion could be deeme d conce ded and r esult in the dismis sal of the c omplaint. (Order , Mar. 20, 2012 [Dkt. No. 6].) Pl aintiff has ne ither re sponded nor sought an extension of time in which to respond. Acc ording ly , it is hereby ORDERED that defe ndants’ Motion to Dismis s [Dkt. No. 5] is GR ANTED as
conce ded; and it is further ORDERED that the above -ca ptioned matter is DISMISSE D.

/s/ EL L EN SEGAL

HUVELL E United States District J udg e DATE: April 24, 2012
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Siliconix incorporated (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 27, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
King Owyang, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

   A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                                   /s/ King Owyang
                                                   ---------------------
                                                   King Owyang
                                                   President and Chief
                                                   Executive Officer
                                                   November 11, 2003