IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-11333

DANNY EUGENE IVIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GREG ABBOTT, Attorney General for the State of Texas; RICK THALER, 

Corrections Director, Texas; STUART JENKINS, B.P.P. Director, Texas,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:13-CV-3157

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Danny Eugene Ivie, Texas prisoner # 1719844, seeks leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (IFP) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 complaint as time barred. In his complaint, he alleged that the 

defendants violated his rights to due process and against cruel and unusual 

punishment by treating him as a sex offender when he was never admonished 

prior to his guilty plea that he would be required to register as a sex offender. 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 15, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-11333

After the district court dismissed his complaint, it denied his motion for leave 

to proceed IFP on appeal, certifying that his appeal was not taken in good faith. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

By moving for leave to proceed IFP, Ivie is challenging the district court’s 

certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 

117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(5). In his brief 

supporting his IFP motion, Ivie argues that (1) the district court failed to 

address the underlying merits of all of his claims; and (2) the limitations period 

did not begin to run until December 2, 2011, when the State admitted during 

a state habeas corpus hearing that it had not admonished him prior to his 

guilty plea that he would be required to register as a sex offender.

Although the statute of limitations applicable in this case is the two-year 

limitations period used for Texas personal injury claims, see Stanley v. Foster, 

464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006), “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action 

is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law,” 

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a claim generally 

accrues “the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury 

or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured” and that there 

is a connection between his injury and the defendant’s actions. Piotrowski v. 

City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “[W]here it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in 

forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations, those claims are properly dismissed” under § 1915. Gartrell v. 

Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993).

As found by the district court, the limitations period began when Ivie 

was released in March 2004 and reportedly began experiencing the negative 

effects of the sex offender restrictions. Ivie’s § 1983 complaint was therefore 

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No. 13-11333

untimely and the district court did not err by dismissing it without considering 

the underlying merits of his claims. See Gartrell, 981 F.2d at 256. Because 

Ivie has not shown that his appeal involves a nonfrivolous issue, we deny his 

motion to proceed IFP on appeal and dismiss his appeal as frivolous. See 

Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

This court’s dismissal of his appeal as frivolous counts as a strike for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-

88 (5th Cir. 1996). We warn Ivie that if he accumulates at least three strikes 

under § 1915(g), he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed in a 

court of the United States while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility 

unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; § 1915(g) WARNING 

ISSUED.

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