IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-97

No. COA21-186

Filed 15 February 2022

Mecklenburg County, No. 17 CVD 6303

LISA WALKER-SNYDER, Plaintiff,

v.

GERARD REGIS SNYDER, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from order entered 20 May 2020 by Judge Tracy H. 

Hewett in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2

November 2021.

No brief filed for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Arnold & Smith, PLLC, by Matthew R. Arnold and Ashley A. Crowder, for 

Defendant-Appellant.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Gerard Regis Snyder appeals from a domestic violence protective 

order entered against him and in favor of his daughter, Kristen Alexis Snyder.

Kristen’s mother, Plaintiff Lisa Walker-Snyder, pursued the order on Kristen’s 

behalf. Defendant argues that the order should be vacated because (1) the trial court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order and (2) competent evidence did 

not support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant committed an act of domestic 
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Opinion of the Court

violence. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order but that 

the order was unsupported by competent evidence of domestic violence. We therefore

vacate the order entered against Defendant.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 Defendant and Plaintiff are former spouses. On 21 November 2019, Plaintiff 

filed a motion in Mecklenburg County District Court requesting that the court issue 

a protective order against Defendant “with respect to both [Plaintiff] and the parties’ 

minor child,” Kristen, who was 17 years old at the time. Plaintiff alleged in her 

motion that “Defendant[] has committed acts of domestic violence against both 

Plaintiff[] and the minor child[.]”

¶ 3 On 17 February 2020, a hearing was held on Plaintiff’s motion for a protective 

order. Plaintiff tendered exhibits showing text message exchanges between 

Defendant and Kristen which spanned from June to November of 2019. Kristen 

testified during the hearing and characterized Defendant’s text messages to her as 

follows:

A lot of them were just about my mom’s litigation and. . . 

the interaction between them in court. Some of them were 

about college, and how he was no longer going to be able to 

pay for me to go. Some of them were odd, and earlier in the 

morning, about just either not paying for college or no 

longer being [able] to pay for my car. So it was those, 

basically, what I would receive.
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When asked how the messages made her feel, Kristen testified, “I really thought that

. . . it was really hurtful, and I just didn’t know what . . . to do with all of this. . . . [I]t 

feels that I’m always anxious and upset to get these.”

¶ 4 On 20 May 2020, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order 

with respect to Kristen but denied Plaintiff’s request for a protective order for herself. 

The order stated that Defendant’s text messages to Kristen “placed [Kristen] in fear 

of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial emotional 

distress[.]” Defendant timely filed notice of appeal from the trial court’s order.

II. Analysis

¶ 5 Defendant argues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order 

because Kristen attained the age of majority before the order was entered and (2) 

competent evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant 

committed an act of domestic violence. Although the trial court had jurisdiction to 

enter the order, we vacate the order for lack of competent evidence of domestic 

violence.

A. Jurisdiction

¶ 6 Defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective 

order because Kristen “had reached the age of majority” before the order was entered. 

Defendant contends that “[o]nce [Kristen] reached the age of 18,” a protective order 

“could no longer be entered on her behalf[] as a minor child of Plaintiff[.]” We 
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disagree.

¶ 7 “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the 

kind of action in question” and “is conferred upon the courts by either the North 

Carolina Constitution or by statute.” Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 

S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (citation omitted). With respect to domestic violence protective 

orders, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute: 

Any person residing in this State may seek relief under this 

Chapter by filing a civil action or by filing a motion in any 

existing action filed under Chapter 50 of the General 

Statutes alleging acts of domestic violence against himself 

or herself or a minor child who resides with or is in the 

custody of such person. Any aggrieved party entitled to 

relief under this Chapter may file a civil action and proceed 

pro se, without the assistance of legal counsel. The district 

court division of the General Court of Justice shall have 

original jurisdiction over actions instituted under this 

Chapter.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(a) (2019). 

¶ 8 We conclude the above-referenced statute provided the trial court with 

jurisdiction to enter the protective order. Kristen was seventeen years old when 

Plaintiff filed the motion for a protective order on her behalf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B2(a) provides that district courts “shall have original jurisdiction over actions 

instituted under this Chapter.” Id. Because Plaintiff filed her motion while Kristen 

was still a minor, the trial court had jurisdiction to act on the motion and enter the 

protective order.
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¶ 9 Plaintiff also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because a summons 

was not issued to Defendant after Plaintiff filed her motion. See id. (“Any action for 

a domestic violence protective order requires that a summons be issued and served.”). 

“The purpose of the summons is to[,]” inter alia, “give jurisdiction of the subject 

matter of litigation and the parties in that connection[.]” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 

346, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009). However, “when the parties are voluntarily before 

the [c]ourt, and . . . a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another, 

such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of 

procedure.” Id. (citation omitted). Because Defendant appeared at and participated 

in the hearing voluntarily, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its order. 

B. Competent Evidence of Domestic Violence

¶ 10 Defendant argues that the trial court’s order was unsupported by competent 

evidence of domestic violence. Specifically, Defendant contends that there was no 

competent evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant “placed 

[Kristen] in fear of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict 

substantial emotional distress.” We agree.

¶ 11 We review a domestic violence protective order to determine “whether there 

was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its 

conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts. Where there is competent 

evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are binding on 
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appeal.” Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 59, 685 S.E.2d 541, 544 (2009). “The 

trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” Bunting v. Bunting, 

266 N.C. App. 243, 249, 832 S.E.2d 183, 188 (2019) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

¶ 12 “To support entry of a [protective order], the trial court must make a conclusion 

of law ‘that an act of domestic violence occurred.’” Kennedy v. Morgan, 221 N.C. App. 

219, 223, 726 S.E.2d 193, 196 (2012) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) (2011)). 

“Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) states that the trial court must ‘find’ that an act 

of domestic violence occurred, in fact this is a conclusion of law; the trial court must 

make findings of fact based upon the definition of domestic violence to support this 

conclusion[.]” Id. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at 196 n.2. “While the trial court need not set 

forth the evidence in detail[,] it does need to make findings of ultimate fact which are 

supported by the evidence; the findings must identify the basis for the ‘act of domestic 

violence.’” Id. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at 196.

¶ 13 Here, the trial court concluded that Defendant’s text messages to Kristen 

“placed [her] in fear of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict 

substantial emotional distress.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A defines “harassment” as 

“[k]nowing conduct . . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or 

terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

277.3A(b)(2) (2019). “The plain language of the statute requires the trial court to 
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apply only a subjective test to determine whether the aggrieved party was in actual 

fear; no inquiry is made as to whether such fear was objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances.” Bunting, 266 N.C. App. at 250, 832 S.E.2d at 188 (citation omitted).

“Substantial emotional distress” is defined as “[s]ignificant mental suffering or 

distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional 

treatment or counseling.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(4).

¶ 14 We conclude that competent evidence does not support the conclusion that 

Defendant’s texts to Kristen “torment[ed], terrorize[d], or terrifie[d]” her. N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2). When asked to describe Defendant’s texts to her, Kristen 

testified,

A lot of them were just about my mom’s litigation and . . . 

the interaction between them in court. Some of them were 

about college, and how he was no longer going to be able to 

pay for me to go. Some of them were odd, and earlier in the 

morning, about just either not paying for college or no 

longer being [able] to pay for my car. So it was those, 

basically, what I would receive.

When asked how the messages made her feel, Kristen testified, “I really thought that

. . . it was really hurtful, and I just didn’t know what . . . to do with all of this. . . . [I]t 

feels that I’m always anxious and upset to get these.”

¶ 15 At no point did Kristen’s testimony indicate that she was in any state of fear

because of Defendant’s text messages to her. If anything, her texts to Defendant 

indicate the opposite. For example, after receiving one message from Defendant
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about finances, Kristen replied, “Oh boy I’m really shook [laughing emoji.]” Her other 

responses to Defendant’s messages were similarly flippant and did not indicate any 

state of fear. At no point did Kristen attempt to block Defendant from texting her. 

Instead, she continuously replied to the messages she received.

¶ 16 Moreover, Kristen’s testimony did not assert substantial emotional distress 

stemming from Defendant’s messages to her. Being generally “anxious” or “upset” 

about Defendant’s conduct cannot constitute substantial emotional distress. If such 

feelings rose to the level of substantial emotional distress under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

277.3A(b)(4), then we would cease to have any real standard at all for “substantial” 

emotional distress.

¶ 17 We are mindful that “[w]here the trial judge sits as the finder of fact, and where 

different reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence, the determination of 

which reasonable inferences shall be drawn is for the trial judge.” Wornstaff v. 

Wornstaff, 179 N.C. App. 516, 519, 634 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2006) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he trial court was present to see and hear the 

inflections, tone, and temperament of the witnesses, and . . . we are forced to review 

a cold record.” Id. Here, however, the Record contains no evidence that Kristen was 

“torment[ed], terrorize[d], or terrifie[d]” by Defendant’s text messages to her. N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2). Her own testimony as well as her messages to 

Defendant indicate that she was not in any state of fear. There is also no evidence of 
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substantial emotional distress. We therefore vacate the protective order entered 

against Defendant for lack of competent evidence of domestic violence.

III. Conclusion

¶ 18 We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order against 

Defendant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(a). However, we vacate the order for 

lack of competent evidence of domestic violence.

VACATED.

Judges MURPHY and JACKSON concur.