SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2401-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LUIS F. LECAROS-DELGADO,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted June 7, 2021 – Decided August 9, 2021

Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal No. 22-

2019.

Eric B. Morrell, attorney for appellant. 

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (David M. Liston, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant appeals from a February 18, 2020 Law Division order denying 

his motion to withdraw two driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) guilty pleas that 

he entered in municipal court in 2007. Defendant did not seek to withdraw those 

guilty pleas until 2019. He now contends the municipal court judge who 

accepted the pleas and imposed the sentence was hostile and biased against him. 

After carefully reviewing the record in light of the applicable legal principles, 

we reject defendant's contentions and affirm.

We briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history. In the 

early morning hours of February 24, 2007, defendant drove from the bar he 

owned after consuming a substantial amount of alcohol. He was stopped by 

police and subsequent testing indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) well 

above the legal limit. Less than two weeks later, on March 9, 2007, defendant 

was again arrested and charged with DWI when he again consumed alcohol and 

proceeded to operate his vehicle.

On April 12, 2007, defendant pled guilty to both DWI offenses. On the 

conviction for the first incident, the municipal court judge imposed an eightmonth license suspension, twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource 

Center (IDRC), and monetary fines and penalties. On the conviction for the 

second DWI offense, the judge imposed a two-year license suspension, forty-
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eight hours in the IDRC, monetary fines and penalties, and participation in a 

twenty-eight-day rehabilitation program to be immediately followed by a thirtyday county jail term.

Defendant appealed to the Law Division seeking to modify the sentence. 

The Law Division conducted a de novo review and imposed the same sentence 

on December 17, 2007. Defendant did not file a direct appeal to the Appellate 

Division.

Ten years later, in 2017, defendant was charged with yet a third DWI 

offense. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the municipal 

court claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in the first two matters, which 

the court denied on June 8, 2017. Defendant appealed the denial of his PCR 

petition to the Law Division. On November 6, 2017, Judge Robert J. Jones 

denied defendant's PCR petition, stating his reasons in a six-page written 

decision. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of PCR. State v. LeCaros-Delgado, 

A-1829-17 (App. Div. Apr. 10, 2019) (slip op.).

Defendant then moved before the municipal court to withdraw his 2007 

guilty pleas. That motion was denied on July 31, 2019. Defendant appealed 

that decision to the Law Division. On February 18, 2020, Judge Jones affirmed 

the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in an oral opinion. 
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Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:

POINT I

THE COURT PRACTICED AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION IN ITS DECISION TO DENY THE 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE PLEA.

A. THE COURT CITED THE TIMING [OF THE 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW] AS A REASON FOR 

DENIAL IN OPPOSITION TO 7:6-2(b).

B. NEITHER THE COURT NOR THE STATE 

DEFINITIVELY PROVE OR STATE THAT 

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BIAS AT THE 

DEFENDANT'S ORIGINAL HEARING.

Because we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Jones's 

thorough and thoughtful oral opinion, we need not re-address defendant's 

arguments at length. We add the following comments.

Rule 7:6-2(b) provides "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be 

made before sentencing, but the court may permit it to be made thereafter to 

correct a manifest injustice." The scope of our review of the denial of a motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea is narrow. "Absent 'an abuse of discretion which 

renders the [Law Division's] decision clearly erroneous,' we must affirm a trial 

court's decision on a motion to vacate." State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91, 

99 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999)).
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In State v. Slater, our Supreme Court "distill[ed] . . . common principles 

to help trial courts assess plea withdrawal motions." 198 N.J. 145, 157 (2009). 

The Court set forth a four-factor test: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a 

colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons 

for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal 

would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 

Id. at 157–58. The Court emphasized, moreover, that "efforts to withdraw a 

guilty plea after sentencing must be substantiated by strong, compelling 

reasons." Id. at 160.

Judge Jones addressed and weighed all four Slater factors. We agree with 

Judge Jones that defendant has not presented a colorable claim of innocence. 

We also agree with Judge Jones that withdrawing DWI guilty pleas more than a 

decade after the pleas were entered would result in unfair prejudice to the State 

and an unfair advantage to defendant. See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575 

(acknowledging "[a]s time passes after conviction, the difficulties associated 

with a fair and accurate reassessment of the critical events multiply").

With respect to the reasons urged by defendant for withdrawal, the 

gravamen of defendant's argument is that the municipal court judge who took 

the guilty pleas and imposed sentence exhibited hostility and bias. We agree 
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with Judge Jones that the sentencing court was "stern" when he admonished 

defendant for committing two DWI offenses in the span of two weeks. We also 

agree with Judge Jones' conclusion the sentencing judge's comments did not 

exhibit bias against defendant. 

Specifically, the municipal court judge referred to defendant as a "deadly 

menace." The judge also remarked, "what troubles me is every time he gets 

drunk coming out of that bar, he aims himself like a missile straight at 

Dunellen," referring to the back-to-back DWI offenses committed in that town. 

As Judge Jones aptly observed, the sentencing judge's comments were offered 

"to impress [upon defendant] the seriousness of what happened" and to take 

"into account the fact that [defendant] had just pled guilty to . . . [t]wo drunk 

driving incidents two weeks apart." Consternation is not necessarily 

inappropriate at sentencing. A sentencing proceeding provides an opportunity—

if not obligation—for the court to make clear, using strong language, that a 

defendant's repetitive unlawful conduct must cease and that future offenses will 

not be treated lightly.

We add that the municipal court judge's characterization of defendant as 

a deadly menace is consistent with the rhetoric we have used to condemn drunk 

driving and to acknowledge the grave danger it poses to public safety. See State 
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v. Magner, 151 N.J. Super. 451, 454 (App. Div. 1977) (referring to "the 

dangerous menace posed by the intoxicated driver"); State v. Sisti, 62 N.J. 

Super. 84, 87 (App. Div. 1960) (remarking that the DWI statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50, "regards an intoxicated driver as a menace").

We reject defendant's argument the judge's inclusion of the adjective 

"deadly" somehow crossed the line of judicial propriety. The regrettable but 

undeniable truth is that drunk driving does indeed pose a deadly menace. We 

note that in enacting the requirement that repeat DWI offenders install an 

ignition interlock device, the Legislature found in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.16(a):

[t]his State's penalties for drunk driving, including the 

mandatory suspension of driver's licenses and 

counseling for offenders, are among the strongest in the 

nation. However, despite the severity of existing 

penalties, far too many persons who have been 

convicted under the drunk driving law continue to 

imperil the lives of their fellow citizens by driving 

while intoxicated.

[(emphasis added).]

Sadly, DWI offenses too often result in fatal crashes. Strict enforcement 

of our DWI laws is designed to deter and prevent such foreseeable tragedies. 

We see nothing inappropriate in a sentencing judge remonstrating defendant by 

referring to him as a "deadly menace" based on the back-to-back DWI offenses 

he committed. So too the sentencing judge's reference to defendant as a 
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"missile" expressed, if by means of hyperbole, the judge's legitimate concern for 

the safety of the residents of the town in which both DWI offenses were 

committed. The judge's use of that metaphor to describe defendant's repetitive 

offense conduct suggests frustration and concern, but does not demonstrate 

judicial bias warranting the withdrawal of defendant's knowing and voluntary 

guilty pleas. 

Nor does the fact that the municipal court judge imposed a county jail term 

as authorized by law indicate judicial bias. As our Supreme Court stressed in 

State v. Marshall, "bias is not established by the fact that a litigant is 

disappointed in a court's ruling on an issue." 148 N.J. 89, 186 (1997).

Finally, we reject defendant's contention that it was inappropriate for 

Judge Jones to consider that defendant's claim of judicial bias was made for the 

first time a decade after sentencing. The timeliness of defendant's efforts to 

withdraw his guilty plea is clearly relevant to whether vacating the pleas would 

prejudice the prosecution. Slater, 198 N.J. at 158. Nor was it inappropriate to 

consider that defendant could have raised the judicial bias contention in his PCR 

petition. Judge Jones did not suggest there is a time limit for filing a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 7:6-2(b) or that the judicial bias claim was 
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otherwise procedurally barred. On the contrary, the judge carefully considered 

and rejected defendant's bias argument on its merits. 

We add that meritless arguments do not ripen with age. Nor does a 

meritless argument become viable merely because a defendant, years later, now 

has incentive to raise it for the first time. As we have noted, defendant sought 

to withdraw his 2007 guilty pleas only after he was charged with a third DWI 

offense. We appreciate that defendant is strongly motivated to find some basis 

upon which to avoid enhanced punishment as a repeat DWI offender. 1 We 

conclude that defendant's judicial bias argument affords no such basis.

In sum, defendant has not established that Judge Jones abused his 

discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Mustaro, 411 N.J. 

at 99. Defendant has not suffered a manifest injustice within the meaning of 

1 N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 provides in relevant part:

For a third or subsequent [DWI] violation, a person 

shall be subject to a fine of $1,000, and shall be 

sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 

180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the 

court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 

90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol 

inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the 

Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter 

forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the 

highways of this State for eight years.
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Rule 7:6-2(b). To the extent we have not addressed them, any additional 

contentions raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.