No. 13-0037 - West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority v. A.B. 

FILED 

March 27, 2014 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Davis, C.J., dissenting: 

While confined at the Southern Regional Jail, the plaintiff alleged that she was 

raped on seventeen (17) different occasions by a correctional officer. The plaintiff sued the 

rapist and his employer, the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority 

(“the Regional Jail”). The Regional Jail moved for summary judgment on the grounds of 

qualified immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and the Regional Jail appealed. The 

majority opinion reversed after determining, in essence, that the Regional Jail does not have 

a duty to protect female prisoners from being raped by the correctional officers it employs. 

The majority opinion also tersely rejected the circuit court’s determination that the special 

relationship doctrine precluded summary judgment. For the reasons set out below, I dissent. 

A. Qualified Immunity 

In order to find that the Regional Jail is immune from liability when female 

inmates are raped with impunity by correctional officials, the majority opinion recast our law 

on qualified immunity in such a manner as to make it now virtually impossible for any state 

agency, not just the Regional Jail, to ever be held accountable for tortious conduct committed 

by employees within the scope of their employment. I do not make this accusation lightly. 

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The decision in Heckenlaible v. Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority, 491 F. Supp. 2d 

544 (E.D. Va. 2007), helps to illustrate the true impact of the majority opinion. 

Before examining Heckenlaible, it is appropriate to review the constitutionally 

recognized “liberty interest in the integrity of the human body.” Farrell, ex rel. Farrell v. 

Transylvania Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 682 S.E.2d 224, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). “The liberty 

interest protected by substantive due process encompasses the right to be free from state 

intrusion upon one’s bodily security and personal privacy. State action which ‘shocks the 

conscience’ or runs counter to ‘certain decencies of civilized conduct’ violates the due 

process clause.” Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cnty., 682 F. Supp. 451, 457 

(E.D. Mo. 1988). “[C]ourts uniformly hold that the right to be free from sexual abuse–the 

logical extension of the right to bodily security-is well established.” Arbaugh v. Board of 

Educ., County of Pendleton, 329 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (N.D. W. Va. 2004). Accord Doe ex 

rel. Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Gooden, 214 

F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th 

Cir.1994); Hinkley v. Baker, 122 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D. Me. 2000). Indeed, the United States 

Supreme Court has commented that "[a]mong the historic liberties so protected [by the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments] was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, 

unjustified intrusions on personal security.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 

S. Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977). In the context of corporal punishment of 

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children by school officials, the Fourth Circuit summarized the constitutional protection 

afforded the human body in Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980): 

[Citizens have] the right to be free of state intrusions into realms 

of personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, 

demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of 

a court. The existence of this right to ultimate bodily security 

the most fundamental aspect of personal privacyis unmistakably 

established in our constitutional decisions as an attribute of the 

ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process. 

Numerous cases in a variety of contexts recognize it as a last 

line of defense against those literally outrageous abuses of 

official power whose very variety makes formulation of a more 

precise standard impossible. Clearly recognized in persons 

charged with or suspected of crime and in the custody of police 

officers[.] 

Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. In the instant case, the plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free “from 

invasion of her personal security through sexual abuse, was well-established at the time the 

assaults upon her occurred.” Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3rd 

Cir. 1989). As a result of this well recognized constitutional protection, the majority opinion 

should have applied the analysis and reasoning in Heckenlaible in order to affirm the circuit 

court’s decision in the instant case. 

The plaintiff in Heckenlaible sued a correctional officer and his employer, 

Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority, for sexual assault while she was confined in jail. 

The defendant, Peninsula Regional Jail, moved for summary judgment on several grounds, 

including the contention that it could not be held liable under the theory of respondent 

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superior.1 The federal district court disagreed with the defendant as follows: 

[A] jury issue may exist as to whether an employee’s wrongful 

act occurred within the scope of employment notwithstanding 

the fact that the employee’s act violated an employer's rules or 

directives. Ultimately, the issue for the court to resolve is 

whether the service itself, in which the tortious act was done, 

was within the ordinary course of [the employer’s] business. 

. . . . 

[T]his was not a case where a wrongful act occurred in the 

workplace merely because an employee was in a particular 

location at a particular time as a result of his employment. 

Steele’s duties as a correctional officer required him to observe 

inmates in the shower, and the alleged sexual assault occurred 

after he observed Heckenlaible showering and during a “cell 

search” thereafter. Steele’s impulse to have sexual contact with 

Heckenlaible may well have arisen, at least in part, from the fact 

that he was required to view Heckenlaible while she was 

unclothed in the shower. In light of these circumstances, a 

reasonable juror could conclude that the alleged sexual assault 

arose out of Steele’s performance of his duties. 

Moreover, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 

to Heckenlaible, Steele was activelyengaged in the performance 

of his job duties, which included supervising Heckenlaible and 

the other inmates in the medical unit, when the wrongful act 

occurred. Steele was supervising Heckenlaible when he 

accompanied her to the shower, looked at her while she 

showered, and returned her to her cell afterwards. In addition, 

he ultimately entered her cell on the pretense of conducting a 

cell search, and cell searches are also among the duties of a 

correctional officer. It follows that a reasonable juror could 

conclude that when the wrongful act occurred, Steele was 

engaged in a service, namely, the supervision of Heckenlaible, 

that was within the ordinary course of the Jail Authority’s 

1

Other issues were raised that are not relevant. 

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business. A reasonable juror could reach this conclusion 

notwithstanding the fact that Steele violated the Jail Authority’s 

policies when he had a sexual encounter with Heckenlaible. 

Furthermore, the instant case reflects a situation where 

special circumstances related to employment facilitated the 

alleged intentional tort. Steele could not have reached 

Heckenlaible within the confines of her cell were it not for his 

employment with the Jail Authority. Also, in announcing that 

he was entering her cell to conduct a search, Steele arguably 

used the authority of his office to accomplish the wrongful act. 

Such facts weigh strongly against resolving the scope of 

employment issue, as a matter of law, in favor of the Jail 

Authority. In sum, having carefully reviewed the relevant case 

law and studied the arguments set forth by the parties, this court 

concludes, for the several reasons discussed above, that whether 

Steele was acting within the scope of his employment when he 

allegedly assaulted Heckenlaible is an issue for the jury to 

resolve. 

Heckenlaible, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 549-52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The majority opinion summarily rejected Heckenlaible on the grounds that 

Virginia did not extend qualified immunity to itself. The majority opinion’s rejection of 

Heckenlaible is misguided. The fact that Virginia did not extend qualified immunity under 

the facts of Heckenlaible was irrelevant. The most important issue addressed in Heckenlaible 

and completely omitted from the majority opinion was an understanding of how to analyze 

“scope of employment.” In other words, both Virginia and West Virginia require that a state 

employee’s conduct fall within the scope of employment in order to extend liability to the 

State. 

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Under Heckenlaible, the mere fact that an employee’s wrongful conduct 

violated an employer’s rules or directives does not automatically mean that the employee’s 

wrongful act occurred outside the scope of his/her employment. Instead, Heckenlaible 

requires the fact finder to determine “whether the service itself, in which the tortious act was 

done, was within the ordinary course of [the employer’s] business.” Heckenlaible, 491 

F. Supp. 2d at 549-52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Stated simplistically, the 

issue for a jury is whether “the employee’s wrongful conduct was related to the nature of the 

employment.” Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir. 2004). 

Although the majority opinion repeatedly mentions that proof is required to 

show that the wrongful conduct was committed during the scope of employment, the opinion 

totally failed to provide any analysis of how to apply the phrase “scope of employment.” It 

is the absence of such analysis that makes the majority opinion dangerous. The majority 

opinion stands for the proposition that any wrongful act not authorized by a State agency will 

immunize the State from liability. This new standard can never be overcome by a plaintiff, 

because no State agency ever authorizes wrongful conduct. 

To add insult to injury, the majorityopinion also has concluded specificallythat 

liability cannot be imposed on the Regional Jail merely because it did not have any 

regulations designed to protect female inmates from being raped. According to the majority 

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opinion, such regulations “easily fall within the category of ‘discretionary’ governmental 

functions.” The majority opinion requires a rape victim to specifically point to “a ‘clearly 

established’ right or law with respect to . . . supervision[.]” In the final analysis, under the 

majority opinion, the Regional Jail simply has to bury its head in the sand and never 

promulgate any regulation designed to protect the bodily integrity of female inmates to 

ensure its continued impunity from liability. 

“Although mere failure to supervise is not a basis for liability under [the law], 

liability will result if delinquent supervision is so severe as to amount to gross negligence or 

deliberate indifference to constitutional violations.” Holland v. Breen, 623 F. Supp. 284, 290 

(D. Mass. 1985) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The majority opinion promotes 

and rewards “gross negligence and deliberate indifference” to the constitutional right of 

female inmates to be free of sexual assaults. But, the State cannot be granted absolute 

immunity merely because no regulation was violated when its employee raped an inmate 

seventeen times. Just what will it take to protect women from such assaults? Simply put, 

the Regional Jail was grossly negligent in not having regulations in place that would have 

protected the plaintiff from being alone with any male correctional officer on seventeen 

separate occasions. 

Finally, I wish to point out that the decision in J.H. v. West Virginia Division 

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of Rehabilitation Services, 224 W. Va. 147, 680 S.E.2d 392 (2009), supports the trial court’s 

decision in the instant case. In J.H., the plaintiff was a resident in a rehabilitation center 

operated by a State agency. While at the facility, the plaintiff was raped by another resident 

living at the facility. The plaintiff sued the State agency on various grounds of negligence, 

including negligent supervision and failure to provide adequate protection. The State moved 

to dismiss the case on the grounds of qualified immunity.2 The circuit court granted the 

State’s motion. This Court, in summary fashion, found that qualified immunity did not exist: 

The Division argues that because qualified immunity 

protects governmental entities from tort liability for alleged 

negligence in the exercise of “discretionary” functions, the 

Appellant’s Amended Complaint alleging mere negligence 

rather than a violation of any clearly established law failed to 

state a claim against the Division for which relief could be 

granted. 

. . . . 

[T]he first issue that must be determined in analyzing the 

issue of qualified immunity and the applicability of this 

immunity to a State agency is whether the State’s insurance 

policyexpresslywaives common-law immunityfor tort liability. 

In the instant matter, no such waiver exists. Thus, the second 

inquiry is whether the State entity was exercising a legislative or 

judicial function or an administrative function involving the 

determination of a fundamental governmental policy. There are 

no allegations made by the Appellant of any type of legislative, 

judicial, or administrative functions involving the determination 

of a fundamental governmental policy, which are the types of 

functions susceptible to the application of qualified immunity. 

2

The State also sought dismissal under the public duty doctrine, which I will discuss 

in the next section of my dissent. 

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Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity does not preclude this 

claim. 

J.H., 224 W. Va. at 156-57, 680 S.E.2d at 401-02 (citation omitted). Even though J.H. 

summarily addressed the issue of qualified immunity, the opinion nonetheless should have 

been followed because it was factually similar to the instant case. In both cases, the victims 

were raped. At the time of the rapes, both victims were under the care and supervision of the 

State. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the State failed to properly supervise their 

assailants and failed to provide adequate protection to safeguard them from being raped. The 

decision in J.H. correctly found this set of facts was sufficient to defeat a claim of qualified 

immunity. In the instant case, the majority opinion has taken these same facts and concluded 

that the State did not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from being raped by its employee. 

B. Special Relationship Exception to the Public Duty Doctrine 

The final issue I wish to address involves the majorityopinion’s terse treatment 

of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine.3 We have held that, under 

the public duty doctrine, “a local governmental entity’s liability for nondiscretionary . . . 

functions may not be predicated upon the breach of a general duty owed to the public as a 

whole.” Walker v. Meadows, 206 W. Va. 78, 83, 521 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1999) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). The public duty doctrine is different from the principle of 

3

The special relationship exception is also called the special duty doctrine. 

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governmental immunity. That is, the public duty doctrine “does not rest squarely on the 

principle of governmental immunity, but rests on the principle that recovery may be had for 

negligence only if a duty has been breached which was owed to the particular person seeking 

recovery.” Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 199 W. Va. 161, 172, 483 S.E.2d 

507, 518 (1996). If the public duty doctrine applies, there is no duty owed by the government 

and therefore no need to inquire as to the existence of governmental immunity. However, 

the public dutydoctrine may be defeated under the special relationship exception. This Court 

set forth the following test for determining when the “special relationship” exception to the 

public duty doctrine gives rise to a cause of action: 

To establish that a special relationship exists between a 

local governmental entity and an individual, which is the basis 

for a special duty of care owed to such individual, the following 

elements must be shown: (1) an assumption by the local 

governmental entity, through promises or actions, of an 

affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; 

(2) knowledge on the part of the local governmental entity’s 

agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct 

contact between the local governmental entity’s agents and the 

injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the local 

governmental entity’s affirmative undertaking. 

Syl. pt. 2, Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W. Va. 253, 387 S.E.2d 307 (1989). 

Turning now to the instant case, the first matter I am compelled to address 

involves the majorityopinion’s assertion that the plaintiff injected the issue of the public duty 

doctrine and special relationship exception into this appeal. The record clearly shows that 

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the Regional Jail injected this issue as a specific assignment of error.4 Consequently, the 

plaintiff had a right to respond to the assignment of error. Moreover, the Regional Jail 

addressed the issue as an assignment of error because the trial court ruled that the special 

relationship exception applied in this case. 

The second issue I must address concerns the majority opinion’s unsupported 

assertion that the special relationship exception cannot be invoked until a government entity 

raises the public duty doctrine as a defense. Specifically, the majority opinion states that the 

record does not show that the Regional Jail “assert[ed] the public duty doctrine as a defense 

to liability, to which respondent could then properly invoke the special duty exception.” This 

erroneous limitation on the invocation of the special relationship exception was compounded 

by the majority opinion’s unsupported assertion that the special relationship exception is not 

“a stand-alone basis of liability.”5 

Our prior cases have clearly held that the special relationship “exception gives 

rise to a cause of action in certain situations when there is a special relationship between an 

individual and a governmental entity.” Holsten v. Massey, 200 W. Va. 775, 780-81, 490 

4

The Regional Jail entitled the assignment of error as follows: “The Trial Court Erred 

By Finding A Special Duty Existed Between Petitioner And Respondent.” 

5

I will note that “[i]f immunity exists . . . no inquiry into the public duty doctrine and 

its special relationship exception is necessary.” Moats v. Preston Cnty. Comm’n., 206 

W. Va. 8, 14, 521 S.E.2d 180, 186 (1999). 

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S.E.2d 864, 869-70 (1997) (emphasis added). This Court held in syllabus point 3 of Benson 

v. Kutsch, 181 W. Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36 (1989), that “[i]f a special relationship exists between 

a local governmental entity and an individual which gives rise to a duty to such individual, 

and the duty is breached causing injuries, then a suit may be maintained against such entity.” 

The decision in J.H., discussed supra, illustrates the application of the special relationship 

exception. 

As previously pointed out, the plaintiff in J.H. was a resident in a State 

rehabilitation center when he was raped by another resident living at the facility. After the 

plaintiff filed the action, the State moved to dismiss the action under several defenses that 

included the public duty doctrine. The circuit court found that the public duty doctrine 

prevented imposition of liability against the State. This Court reversed the circuit court’s 

ruling and reasoned as follows: 

[W]e direct our attention to the pivotal issue in this 

matter, which is the public duty doctrine and whether the special 

relationship exception applies in this case. Generally, the duty 

imposed upon a governmental entity is one owed to the general 

public, and unless the injured party can demonstrate that some 

special relationship existed between the injured person and the 

allegedly negligent entity, the claim is barred. As the Court has 

previously recognized the public duty doctrine is a principle 

independent of the doctrine of governmental immunity, although 

in practice it achieves much the same result. The Appellant 

maintains that as a resident of the attendant care unit at the 

Rehabilitation Center, he had a special relationship with the 

Division beyond the relationship with the general public. The 

Appellant maintains that the Division had full knowledge of the 

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Appellant’s compromised mobility and had knowledge of Jeff 

Bell’s prior sexual predator acts at the Rehabilitation Center. 

The Appellant also maintains that at the time of the alleged 

molestation, the Division allowed Mr. Bell private access to the 

Appellant’s bedroom. 

Contrariwise, the Division argues that the public duty 

doctrine only applies to an alleged breach of a nondiscretionary 

duty to provide fire or police or other public safety protection to 

an individual, and the Division maintains that it has no 

nondiscretionary statutory duty to provide police, fire, or other 

public safety protection to disabled individuals or the general 

public. The Division, therefore, asserts that the Appellant failed 

to allege operative facts that would support the application of 

the public duty doctrine or its special relationship exception to 

avoid dismissal of his negligence claims under the doctrine of 

qualified immunity. 

First, it is important to note that the public duty doctrine 

is not an immunity; but, rests on the principle that recovery may 

be had for negligence only if a duty has been breached which 

was owed to the particular person seeking recovery. 

. . . . 

Finally, this Court previously held that . . . the question 

of whether a special duty arises to protect an individual from a 

State governmental entity’s negligence is ordinarily a question 

of fact for the trier of facts. 

In the instant case, the Court concludes that the circuit 

court erred in granting the Division’s Motion to Dismiss. A de 

novo review of the allegations contained in the Appellant’s 

Amended Complaint reflects that sufficient allegations are 

present to allow the Appellant’s claims to go forward against the 

Division. It is for a jury to determine, under appropriate 

instruction of law, whether a special duty arises to protect the 

Appellant from the Division's alleged negligence. We, 

therefore, reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand 

this case for reinstatement of the Appellant’s claims based upon 

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the allegations of a special relationship and a special duty. 

J.H., 224 W. Va. at 158-59, 680 S.E.2d at 403-04 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Clearly the decision in J.H. recognizes a claim may be maintained against the 

State under the special relationship exception. Therefore it was legally wrong for the 

majority opinion to suggest otherwise. See McCormick v. West Virginia Dep’t. of Pub. 

Safety, 202 W. Va. 189, 503 S.E.2d 502 (1998) (holding that a jury could find that the 

Department of Corrections owed a duty to a social worker killed in her apartment by an 

inmate she once counseled in a prison). 

Based upon the foregoing, I dissent. 

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