1

Filed 6/3/15 In re L.F. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re L.F., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

L.F., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 

 A142296 

 (Solano County 

 Super. Ct. No. J42519) 

 

 Minor L.F. appeals after the juvenile court sustained a wardship petition alleging 

she committed a criminal threat. (Pen. Code,1

 § 422; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) On 

appeal, Minor contends the juvenile court: (1) erred in finding she violated section 422, 

(2) erred in overruling her demurrer, (3) abused its discretion by not reducing the 

violation to a misdemeanor, (4) improperly failed to include a scienter requirement in a 

probation condition, and (5) improperly failed to inform her of the duration of her 

probation. We shall modify the challenged probation condition to include an express 

knowledge requirement, and otherwise affirm the order. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Thomas F.’s two daughters attended Fairfield High School (FHS). One evening in 

May 2014, one of his daughters told him she did not want to go to school after reading on 

 1

 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

Twitter that “somebody was going to shoot up the school the following morning.” The 

person “tweeting” was Minor, another FHS student. Thomas F. looked at the “tweets” on 

his daughter’s phone and then found the Twitter account on his own phone. Although he 

was not one of Minor’s “followers,” Thomas F. was able to view the account by 

searching for her username. 

 The tweets in question were made over the course of approximately three hours. 

Among Minor’s tweets were the following: “If I get a gun it’s fact I’m spraying [five 

laughing emojis] everybody better duck or get wet”;2

 “I’m dead ass [three laughing 

emojis] not scared to go to jail for shooting up FHS warning everybody duck”; “Nigga 

we ain’t fighting I’m bringing a gun [six laughing emojis]”; “Mfs don’t really kno me 

[two laughing emojis] I have touched a gun pointed one don’t [. . .] Bitch I kno how to 

aim”;3

 “Mfs tripping boii [three laughing emojis] I’m frfr black mask yellow tape 

homicide niggas better he cool”;4

 “Ain’t nobody safe [‘100’ emoji]”; “I’m finnah come to 

FHS like black opps stabbing niggas! Who really with it?”; “I feel sorry for whoever got 

c wing 1st period [four laughing emojis]”; “@[username] idk when shit go down prolly 

the next day”; “I hope ms Sheila run c wing that day”;5

 “Oh yeah all my friends have c 

wing so d wing”; “And wtf lol tf you getting popped first fr try me [laughing emoji]”; 

“It’s funny cause nobody fighting no more sooooo!! I’m just shootin niggas for fun”; 

“Mfs wanna test me now [three clapping hands emojis] you crazy I’m crazy too let’s die 

shooting”; “I’m leaving school early and going to get my cousin gun now [three laughing 

emojis and two clapping hands emojis]”; “Y’all gonna make me go to jail before I step 

 2

 An emoji is “[a] small digital image or icon used to express an idea, emotion, 

etc., in electronic communications.” (OED Online, Emoji, n. (March 2015) Oxford 

University Press <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/389343> [as of May 6, 2015].) 

Example of emojis include a happy face and a laughing face. 

3

 “Mfs” is an abbreviation for “Mother fuckers.” 

4

 “FrFr” means “for real [for] real.” 

5

 Sheila Bell was a campus monitor at FHS whose primary role was to maintain 

order and safety. She patrolled both C-wing and D-wing. 
3

foot on campus [laughing emoji]”; “I really wanna a challenge shooting at running kids 

not fun [laughing emoji]”; “Ok I’m done and if I get called in by the FBI or something 

bout shooting up a school you Mfs really gonna get shot”; and “Kill or be killed!!” 

Thomas F. also testified that he saw a response on Minor’s account in which someone 

offered to sell her a gun. 

 Some of Minor’s tweets include laughing emojis and statements like “just 

kidding.” For example, Minor tweeted: “Lmao I’m really jk tho [three laughing emojis] 

don’t jump him and it’s g frfr [‘100’ emoji] or ima really come spraying” 6 ; “Do y’all 

really think I’m that crazy it’s a compliment” ; “I love my life [laughing emoji].” 

Minor’s Twitter account showed that some Twitter users who responded to her tweets did 

so in a joking manner. For example, one user, “@[username]” tweeted to Minor “o you 

crazy [laughing emoji, devil emoji].” 

 Thomas F. grew concerned about the number and nature of the tweets and called 

the police. He was concerned for his daughters’ safety, and neither of them attended 

school the next day. 

 A police officer arrived at Thomas F.’s house, and he showed the officer the 

tweets. The officer reviewed and took pictures of the tweets, spoke to Thomas F. and his 

daughter, and determined Minor’s name and address. Thomas F. told the officer he was 

concerned about his children’s safety and feared sending them to school the next day. 

 The officer went to Minor’s home, placed her in handcuffs, and read her her 

constitutional rights. Minor said that she did not mean the statements she had made on 

Twitter and that they were a joke. She was unable to explain why she made the 

statements. She told the officer she was not angry. Minor and her mother told the officer 

there were no weapons in the house. 

 The same evening, Dr. William Cushman, a vice principal of FHS, received a text 

message from a former student informing him of tweets indicating that someone was 

 6

 “Lmao” is an abbreviation for “laughing my ass off” and “jk” is an abbreviation 

for “just kidding.” 
4

going to shoot up the school. Dr. Cushman asked for screen shots of the tweets. 

Dr. Cushman saw tweets that made specific references to parts of the school, C-wing and 

D-wing, and specific people. Dr. Cushman felt “[s]cared and nervous” because as the 

person in charge of the lockdown protocol in an emergency, he would have to “go out 

and clear the hallways and make sure people leave the rooms,” and he would be in “as 

much danger as anybody else.” Dr. Cushman contacted the school resource officer and 

the principal, and sent out a mass text to school faculty and staff about the issue. The 

following morning, Dr. Cushman decided to concentrate resources on C-wing. He sent a 

campus-wide email to the school’s staff saying there had been a specific threat to C-wing 

and directed Bell, who had been specifically mentioned in the tweets, to remain in the 

office. 

 An intern at the district attorney’s office testified that although she was not one of 

Minor’s Twitter followers, she was able to look up Minor’s Twitter account by searching 

for her username. Minor had about 500 followers. It was possible to create a private 

Twitter account that could be viewed only with permission, but Minor’s account was not 

private. 

 Minor’s best friend testified that she had read the tweets and did not take them 

seriously, and that the use of laughing emojis in the tweets indicated that Minor was 

joking. Minor’s sister also testified that when she saw the tweets, she thought they were 

a joke due to the use of laughing and smiling emojis and the terms for “just kidding” and 

“laugh out loud.” She had never known Minor to be violent or threaten others. No one in 

the family owned a gun, and Minor did not have access to a gun. 

 The district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor had made 

felony criminal threats against “FAIRFIELD HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND 

STAFF.” (§ 422.) Minor demurred on the ground the petition failed to state a public 

offense, and the court overruled the demurrer. 

 The juvenile court sustained the petition after a contested hearing. The juvenile 

court found that the tweets were clearly a threat. The juvenile court also found specific 

intent that the tweets be taken as a threat because “[s]he had approximately 500 people on 
5

her account . . . and the fact that some of those wouldn’t take that as a serious threat is 

inconceivable.” The juvenile court stated, “Two to three hours of tweets that—I just 

don’t see how you can get around it. It was intended to be taken as a threat. There’s 

anger in those. There’s statements in there about the teacher going to be the first to get it, 

and other racial comments about they’re going to be the first to get popped and all.” The 

juvenile court was satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense has occurred.” 

 Minor moved to have the offense reduced to a misdemeanor, and the trial court 

denied the motion. 

 Minor was released to her mother and granted probation. Among Minor’s terms 

of probation, she was prohibited from possessing any weapons or ammunition. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Section 422 Violation 

 Minor contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she made 

a criminal threat under section 422. “To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128.) 

However, where the appellant raises a “plausible First Amendment defense” to a criminal 

threat conviction, we make an independent examination of the record in order to ensure 

that the speaker’s free speech rights have not been infringed. (In re George T. (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 620, 632 (George T.).) Credibility determinations and findings of fact that are 

not relevant to the First Amendment issue are not subject to independent review. (Id. at 

p. 634.) Thus, we defer to the lower court’s credibility determinations but make an 

independent examination of the whole record to determine whether the facts establish a 

criminal threat. (Ibid.) 

 As noted in George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 630, not all threats are criminal. 

In order to prove a violation of section 422, the People must establish the following: 

(1) that Minor “ ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which [would] result in death 
6

or great bodily injury to another person,’ ” (2) that Minor made the threat “ ‘with the 

specific intent that the statement . . . be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of 

actually carrying it out,’ ” (3) that the threat was, “ ‘on its face and under the 

circumstances’ ” in which it was made, “ ‘so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and 

specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate 

prospect of execution of the threat,’ ” (4) that the threat actually caused the person 

threatened “ ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate 

family’s safety,’ and (5) that the threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the 

circumstances.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228 (Toledo).) 

 Minor does not dispute that the evidence supports the first element of the offense 

but argues that there is insufficient evidence to establish the remaining elements. 

1. Specific Intent 

 To determine whether Minor had the specific intent that her tweets be taken as a 

threat, section 422 “does not require that a threat be personally communicated to the 

victim by the person who makes the threat”; however, “it must be shown that [she] 

specifically intended that the threat be conveyed to the victim.” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 

100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861 (Ryan D.).) “[I]f one broadcasts a threat intending to induce 

sustained fear, section 422 is violated if the threat is received and induces sustained 

fear—whether or not the threatener knows [her] threat has hit its mark.” (People v. Teal

(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 281.) 

 Minor contends there is no evidence she intended to convey her threats to FHS 

students and staff through her Twitter account. We disagree. Minor had approximately 

500 Twitter followers, and her account was publicly accessible. The posts themselves 

indicate that some of those who replied to, or “retweeted,” Minor’s posts were FHS 

students. The evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s factual finding that 

Minor intended to convey a threat. 

 We are not persuaded otherwise by Minor’s reliance on Ryan D. There, a month 

after being cited for possession of marijuana, a minor submitted a painting in his art class 

depicting him shooting the officer who had cited him. The art instructor found the 
7

painting to be “ ‘disturbing’ ” and “ ‘scary’ ” and showed it to an administrator. 

(Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 858.) A day later, an assistant principal 

confronted the minor, who admitted he was angry with the officer and that it was 

reasonable that she would eventually see the picture. (Ibid.) Later that day, the officer 

was shown the painting and “ ‘was pretty shocked’ and ‘upset’ because it depicted 

somebody ‘blowing [her] head off.’ ” (Id. at p. 859.) The juvenile court found the minor 

had made a criminal threat, and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order on this 

point, holding that the painting did not constitute a criminal threat in violation of 

section 422. (Id. at pp. 857, 865.) In doing so, the court noted that the minor had turned 

the painting into his class for credit, rather than displaying it to the officer or putting it in 

a location where he knew she would see it, and concluded the evidence was insufficient 

to support a finding that he intended the officer to see it. (Id. at p. 863.) Here, on the 

other hand, the evidence supports an inference that, in posting the threatening statements 

on her Twitter account, Minor intended to convey them to members of the victim group. 

 Relying on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 (Ricky T.), Minor also 

argues the evidence does not show she intended her statements to be taken as a threat. 

The minor in Ricky T. was charged with violating section 422 after threatening his 

teacher. The minor stepped out of class to use the restroom. (Id. at p. 1135.) When he 

returned and found the door locked, he pounded on it; when the teacher opened the door, 

the door hit the minor. He became angry, cursed at his teacher, and said, “I’m going to 

get you.” (Ibid.) The teacher felt physically threatened. (Ibid.) The police were called 

the following day. (Id. at p. 1138.) Division Four of the First Appellate District reversed 

the juvenile court’s finding and held that there was no violation of section 422. (Id. at 

p. 1141.) The court concluded the remark was “ambiguous on its face and no more than 

a vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution.” (Id. at p. 1138.) Moreover, 

the court noted, the surrounding circumstances did not indicate gravity of purpose: There 

was no prior history of disagreements, the police were not called until the next day, and 

they did not interview the minor again until a week after the incident. (Id. at pp. 1137–

1138.) 
8

 Minor contends her statements were similarly ambiguous because many of them 

were accented by symbols of laughing faces and some were accompanied by the terms 

such as “jk” or “Lmao,” which, Minor argues, show her statements were meant as a joke. 

In the circumstances of this case, we cannot fault the juvenile court’s findings. Minor’s 

threatening statements were made over a period of hours, they included threats to shoot 

people in C-wing or D-wing, including one named staff member, and Minor stated she 

was going to get a gun. Moreover, Minor provided specific details about the impending 

shooting, going so far as clarifying that she would target D-wing instead of C-wing; she 

also stated she did not care about going to jail and threatened to shoot those who called 

the FBI. On these facts, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude Minor 

intended her statements to be taken as a threat. 

2. Nature of the Threat 

 Minor contends the tweets were too vague and general in nature to satisfy the 

requirement that a threat be “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to 

convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of 

execution of the threat.” (§ 422, subd. (a).) 

 To determine if a purported threat meets this standard, it must be examined “on its 

face and under the circumstances in which it was made.” (Ricky T., supra,

87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) “The surrounding circumstances must be examined to 

determine if the threat is real and genuine, a true threat.” (Id. at p. 1137) Examples of 

circumstances that may be considered include “the prior relationship of the parties and 

the manner in which the communication was made.” (Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 860.) “ ‘ “[U]nequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy and specificity are not 

absolutely mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding 

circumstances.” ’ ” (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635.) The four elements are 

“ ‘ “simply the factors to be considered in determining whether a threat, considered 

together with its surrounding circumstances, conveys those impressions to the victim.” ’ ” 

(People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 807.) “ ‘A threat is sufficiently specific 

where it threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not insufficient simply because 
9

it does “not communicate a time or precise manner of execution[;] section 422 does not 

require those details to be expressed.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 806.) 

 The evidence here supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Minor’s statements 

were sufficiently “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific” to constitute a 

criminal threat under section 422. Minor mentioned her intention to direct violence at 

specific parts of the school, she said she was “sorry for whoever got c wing 1st period,” 

she said she was “leaving school early and going to get [her] cousin[’s] gun now,” and 

her Twitter page included the statement, “idk when shit go down prolly the next day.” 

Indeed, Dr. Cushman notified the school’s staff the next morning, “We have a very 

specific threat. It’s limited to C-wing.” 

 Given the specific references to parts of FHS and an individual staff member and 

the indication the threats would be carried out in first period, “prolly the next day,” the 

juvenile court properly found the threats were “ ‘so unequivocal, unconditional, 

immediate, and specific,’ ” that they constituted a criminal threat. (Toledo, supra,

26 Cal.4th at p. 227.) 

3. Sustained and Reasonable Fear 

 Minor contends the People failed to prove the threats actually caused students and 

staff reasonably to suffer sustained fear. Section 422 applies where “the threat actually 

caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or 

her immediate family’s safety.’ ” (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 228.) “The phrase to 

‘cause[] that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety’ has a 

subjective and an objective component. A victim must actually be in sustained fear, and 

the sustained fear must also be reasonable under the circumstances.” (Ricky T., supra, 

87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.) “Sustained fear” means “a period of time ‘that extends 

beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (Ibid.) What constitutes “sustained 

fear” may depend on the circumstances: “Fifteen minutes of fear of a defendant who is 

armed, mobile, and at large, and who has threatened to kill the victim and her daughter, is 

more than sufficient to constitute ‘sustained’ fear for purposes of this element of 

section 422.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.) 
10

 Minor contends this element is not satisfied because (1) rather than immediately 

calling law enforcement to arrest her, Dr. Cushman called the school resource officer and 

principal; (2) Thomas F.’s testimony about his daughter’s statements to him were 

admitted not for their truth but to explain his actions; and (3) although Thomas F. 

testified to his own fear, he was not among the students and staff at the school, the 

alleged victims of the offense. 

 Whether or not the fear of Thomas F. or his daughter may properly be considered, 

we conclude the evidence of Dr. Cushman’s fear is sufficient to support a finding that this 

element has been met. Dr. Cushman testified that he was “[s]cared and nervous” because 

as the person in charge of the lockdown protocol, he would be in danger. His actions 

show he took the threat seriously; he called the principal and the school resource officer 

and he sent a mass text to staff members that evening. The next morning he told Bell to 

remain in the office and sent an email to the entire school staff telling them there had 

been a specific threat to C-wing. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that 

Minor’s victims were in sustained, reasonable fear due to Minor’s tweets. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the trial court 

reasonably concluded that all the elements of a criminal threat were met. Further, 

because the juvenile court properly found Minor’s statements were criminal threats 

within the meaning of section 422, the statements were not protected by the First 

Amendment. (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 633–634.) 

B. Demurrer 

 Minor argues that the juvenile court erred in overruling her demurrer because the 

petition failed to state a public offense or to give her adequate notice of the charges 

against her.7

 Specifically, she contends the petition was impermissibly vague because it 

 7

 A defendant may demur to an accusatory pleading when it appears on the face of 

the pleading “[t]hat the facts stated do not constitute a public offense.” (§ 1004, 

subd. (4).) While there is no statutory authorization for a demurrer in juvenile cases, 

there is case law supporting the use of a demurrer in juvenile cases. (In re Jamil H.

(1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 556, 560–561 [juvenile court should have sustained minor’s 

demurrer to § 602 petition on ground it failed to advise him adequately of charge against 
11

failed to specify a person who received the threat, but instead named as the victim the 

students and staff of the high school. 

 The petition alleged Minor violated section 422 by “threaten[ing] to commit a 

crime which would result in death and great bodily injury to FAIRFIELD HIGH 

SCHOOL STUDENTS AND STAFF, with the specific intent that the statement be taken 

as a threat,” that the threat was “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as 

to convey to FAIRFIELD HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND STAFF a gravity of 

purpose and an immediate prospect of execution,” and that “FAIRFIELD HIGH 

SCHOOL STUDENTS AND STAFF was reasonably in sustained fear of his/her safety 

and the safety of his/her immediately family.” Minor demurred to this allegation on the 

ground it failed to state a public offense because it did not identify a specific person who 

had received the threat. The juvenile court overruled the demurrer, concluding that if a 

threat was made to a group of people, the individuals did not have to be named in the 

petition. However, the court stated that Minor should receive discovery about the 

identity of the individual student who was in fear—apparently Thomas F.’s daughter—

and the district attorney indicated her name was in the police report and Minor’s counsel 

had that information. 

 “Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against 

[her] so that [she] has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present [her] defense and 

not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at [her] trial.” (People v. Jones (1990) 

51 Cal.3d 294, 317; see § 952.8

) “A defendant’s right to be informed of the charges ‘is 

 

him]; In re Rudolfo A. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 845, 853–857 [juvenile court should have 

sustained minor’s demurrer on ground pleading was insufficient to advise him adequately 

of charge against him]; see also In re Rottanak K. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 268–269 

[People may appeal orders sustaining demurrers without leave to amend in juvenile 

matters].) 

8

 Section 952 provides: “In charging an offense, each count shall contain, and 

shall be sufficient if it contains in substance, a statement that the accused has committed 

some public offense therein specified. . . . It may be in the words of the enactment 

describing the offense or declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words 

sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused. . . .” 
12

satisfied when the accused is advised of the charges against [her] so that [she] has a 

reasonable opportunity to prepare and present a defense and is not taken by surprise by 

the evidence offered at trial.’ ” (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141 (Stone).) 

“[W]e may not conclude that a complaint is insufficient, or set aside a guilty plea or 

sentence unless we first determine that a ‘defect or imperfection in matter of form’ has 

‘prejudice[d] a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits.’ [Citation.]” (People 

v. Ramirez (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 992, 999.) Applying this rule, our high court in Stone

concluded that where a defendant was accused of attempted murder by firing a single 

shot at a group of 10 people, “it would be sufficient to allege enough facts to give notice 

of the incident referred to and that the defendant is charged with attempted murder. For 

example, . . . it would have been sufficient to allege that defendant committed attempted 

murder, in that on or about [the date in question], he attempted to murder a member of a 

group of persons gathered together in a parking lot in [the city in question].” (Stone, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 136, 141–142.) 

 On this record, we cannot conclude Minor’s substantial rights were prejudiced. 

The evidence showed that she published her threats to anyone who saw her public Twitter 

account, which had hundreds of followers, and that she threatened anyone in C-wing or 

D-wing at the high school. She cannot now complain that the recipients of her threats 

were not all known by name. Moreover, the juvenile court ensured that Minor had been 

informed of the name of the student mentioned in the police report. In the circumstances, 

Minor’s right to notice of the allegations against her was not violated, and the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in overruling her demurrer. 

C. Request to Treat Offense as Misdemeanor 

 Minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it refused to reduce 

the criminal threat violation from a felony to a misdemeanor. Minor claims the juvenile 

court improperly based its decision on unrelated school shootings and other irrelevant 

factors. 
13

 A criminal threat in violation of section 422 is a wobbler offense,9

 or an offense 

that may be sentenced as a felony or a misdemeanor. (People v. Douglas (1999) 

20 Cal.4th 85, 88.) When a minor is found to have committed a wobbler, the juvenile 

court, exercising its discretion, must declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or a felony. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1201, 1207; In re 

Jacob M. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1181–1182.) “[T]he court must consider which 

description applies and expressly declare on the record that it has made such 

consideration, and must state its determination as to whether the offense is a 

misdemeanor or a felony.” (Cal. Rules of Court, 5.780(e)(5).) Trial courts have broad 

discretion to reduce a wobbler offense charged as a felony to a misdemeanor. (People v. 

Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974, 977–978 (Alvarez); In re Curt W.

(1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 169, 184.) Factors the court may consider include “ ‘the nature 

and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the 

offense, or [her] traits of character as evidenced by [her] behavior and demeanor at the 

trial.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.) Where, as here, the challenge is to the 

lower court’s exercise of its discretion, the burden is on Minor to “ ‘clearly show that the 

sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.’ ” (Id. at p. 977.) 

 The petition alleged Minor committed a felony violation of section 422. After the 

juvenile court sustained the petition, Minor moved to have her offense reduced to a 

misdemeanor. She contended she had strong family support and that a felony 

adjudication would impair her ability to join the Navy or the Job Corps. Noting that 

Minor had made the threats over the course of two or three hours and that the tweets 

showed “some real hostility and anger,” the court deferred its final decision until it 

reviewed the probation report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.780(e)(5).) The probation 

 9

 A criminal threat in violation of section 422 is punishable “by imprisonment in 

the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” (§ 422, 

subd. (a).) If an adult is found guilty of violating section 422 and is punished in county 

jail, the offense is deemed a misdemeanor. If that adult is punished in state prison, the 

offense constitutes a felony. (§ 17, subds. (a), (b).) 
14

officer’s report indicated that Minor had reported that she was receiving A’s and C’s in 

school; in fact, however, her current progress report showed two F’s, three D’s, and one 

C. Her records showed she had a pattern of defiant behavior at school and that she had 

been suspended several times for such behavior. Minor described her relationship with 

her mother as “great,” but her mother reported that she and Minor had a tense relationship 

and that Minor was defiant and disrespectful at home. Minor had been attending 

counseling for depression, and shortly before her offense had been hospitalized after 

attempting to commit suicide by taking pills that had been prescribed for her depression. 

She described her offense as a joke and a “stupid” mistake, but she did not express 

remorse for her actions. 

 The juvenile court denied Minor’s request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. 

In doing so, the court stated, “Had she not attempted suicide, had she had good grades, 

had she not had any history at all, this was just some, as she put it, ‘stupid joke,’ I think I 

could see it. But given the state of our society right now and the things that have 

happened, Columbine and Connecticut and Santa Barbara, I think I even mentioned at the 

jurisdiction hearing, it’s kind of like saying something on an airplane to a TSA agent. 

You may be joking, but people don’t take it as a joke anymore. [¶] And given what 

probation described as a hostility towards authorities or defiant and oppositional attitude 

at times, the fact that she tried to commit suicide, was just released from the hospital 

some two days, or two weeks, or very shortly before she did this, and the fact that she 

said she was getting As and Cs, and then they would go down to Fs and Ds. [¶] Even if 

she intended this as a joke at the time, I don’t think the Court can treat it as a joke. And 

the Court cannot, in good [conscience], treat it as a misdemeanor.” The court 

acknowledged that its decision might have harmful consequences for Minor’s future, but 

in light of the “gravity of her language,” concluded it could not grant Minor’s request. 

 Based on this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Minor’s 

credibility was diminished by the inaccurate statements she had made to the probation 

officer, that her recent suicide attempt raised a concern that her threats were meant 

seriously, and that she did not appreciate the wrongfulness of her offense. Nor does the 
15

juvenile court’s mention of other school shootings lead us to conclude it relied on 

improper factors in making its decision; rather, the court could properly note that as a 

result of those widely publicized events, the recipients of Minor’s threats were more 

likely to take them seriously and experience fear. Considering the “extremely deferential 

and restrained standard by which appellate courts are bound in these matters” (Alvarez, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 981), we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s ruling. 

D. Vague Probation Term 

Among Minor’s terms of probation was an order that she not possess any weapons 

or ammunition. Minor contends this condition is constitutionally vague because it lacks 

an express knowledge requirement. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889–892 

(Sheena K.).) Minor asks us to modify the probation condition to state: “The minor shall 

not knowingly possess any ammunition, or deadly or dangerous weapons.” The Attorney 

General does not object to the proposed modification. 

 A probation condition that forbids certain conduct is impermissibly vague and 

overbroad unless it is sufficiently precise for a probationer to know in advance what 

behavior is forbidden. (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891–892 [in absence of 

express requirement of knowledge, probation condition limiting association with anyone 

disapproved of by probation was unconstitutionally vague].) Where a probation 

condition suffers from this defect, the appellate court may modify the condition to 

include the missing knowledge requirement. (See id. at pp. 889, 892; see also In re 

Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912–913, 931 [modifying probation condition 

prohibiting presence where dangerous or deadly weapons, firearms, or ammunition exist 

to include express knowledge requirement]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 

747, 752–753 [modifying probation condition to specify that defendant not knowingly

possess guns and ammunition].) 

 We shall therefore modify the probation condition to add an express knowledge 

requirement. 
16

E. Duration of Probation 

 After adjudging Minor a ward of the court, the juvenile court granted probation, 

placed her in her mother’s custody under the supervision of the probation officer, and set 

the matter for an annual review in June 2015. Without citation to authority, Minor argues 

the matter should be remanded so the juvenile court may specify the duration of her 

probation. 

 We first note that Minor failed to raise her objection in the juvenile court, and has 

therefore arguably forfeited it. (See In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 172–173; 

In re Khonsavahn S. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 532, 537; but see Sheena K., supra, 

40 Cal.4th at pp. 885–889 [facial challenge that probation condition unconstitutionally 

vague or overbroad not forfeited by failure to raise it below].) In any case, her contention 

is meritless. 

 Welfare and Institutions Code section 727, subdivision (a)(1), provides that after 

declaring a minor a ward of the court, “the court may make any reasonable orders for the 

care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor . . . subject to 

further order of the court.” Except in cases not relevant here, “the court shall order the 

care, custody, and control of the minor or nonminor to be under the supervision of the 

probation officer,” who may place the minor in the approved home of a relative. (§ 727, 

subd. (a)(3).) Likewise, California Rules of Court, rule 5.790 provides that at a 

disposition hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition, place the child on probation 

for no more than six months without declaring the child a ward of the court, or declare 

the child a ward of the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.790(a)(2).) When placing a 

child on probation, the court must set reasonable terms and conditions of probation. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.790(b).) We are aware of nothing in the statutory or regulatory 

schemes that requires a juvenile court to specify the length of probation; rather, it is 

implicit in Welfare and Institutional Code section 727, subdivision (a)(1), that probation 

will continue until “further order of the court.” Here, the court will review the matter, 

and presumably make any necessary further orders, at the scheduled annual review 

hearing. 
17

III. DISPOSITION 

 The weapon probation condition is modified to read: “Minor shall not knowingly 

possess any ammunition, or deadly or dangerous weapons.” As so modified, the order is 

affirmed. 
18

 _________________________ 

 Rivera, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Reardon, Acting P.J. 

_________________________ 

Streeter, J.