IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2016-WC-01264-COA CHARLES WRIGHT APPELLANT

v. TURAN-FOLEY MOTORS, INC., MISSISSIPPI AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION, AND DR. RAHUL VOHRA APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/2016 TRIBUNAL FROM W HICH APPEALED: MISSISSIPPI W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ROGEN K. CHHABRA DARRYL MOSES GIBBS CAROLINE JANE SCOTT AMANDA GRACE HILL RAYNETRA LASHELL GUSTAVIS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: KARL R. STEINBERGER STACIE ELIZABETH ZORN W A LTER T. JOHNSON W I LLIAM ABRAM ORLANSKY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ORKERS’ COMPENSATION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART - 01/23/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The M ississippi W orkers’ C om pensation Com m ission denied Charles W r ight’s claim
f or disability benef

its af ter f inding t h at he f

a iled to m eet his burden of proving a causal connection b etween his e m ploy m ent and a d isabl i n g c ondition. On appeal, W right argues that t he Com m ission’s d ecision should be reversed because it is not supported by s u bstantialevidence. W r i g h t also argues that the Com m ission erred by quashing a subpoena that he

served o n Dr. Rahul V ohra, w ho had perf orm ed a n em

ploy er’s m edical exam i nation (EME)
in this case. The subpoena sought docum ents and other inf orm a tion concerning D r. Vohra’s

com pensation in an ef

f ort to dem onstrate bias. W right f urther a rgues that the Com m ission erred by deny ing his m otion to exclude Dr. Vohra’s testim ony af te r D r . Vohra ref

used to

answer deposition q

uestions o n m atters covered by the subpoena. Finally , W right argues that

t h e Com m ission erred by ordering his attorney to p ay Dr. Vohra’s attorney ’s f ees and a $5,000 “civil penalty ” as s a n c t i ons f or the subpoena a nd deposition questioning o f Dr. Vohra. ¶2. W e hold that the Com m ission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the Com m ission did not com m it any r eversible error by quashing the subpoena or by deny ing
W r ight’s m otion to exclude Dr. V ohra’s testim ony . Theref ore, w e af f irm the C om m ission’s decision deny ing W right’s claim f or benef its. However, we hold t hat the Com m i ssion erred by sanc t i o n i n g W right’s attorney

. Theref ore, we r everse and render t he C om m ission’s
im p osition of

a civil penalty and award of attorney ’s f

e es. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. W r ight worked as an a uto m echanic at Turan Foley Motors in Gulf port. He had f

orty

two y ears of experience i n t he industry and s pecialized in f ront suspension. W right testif ied that on Friday , October 25, 2013, he was busier and his work was m ore strenuous than usual because General Motors was having “vibration issues” in som e of its newer vehicles. The

next m orning, he w oke up with pain in his back and k nees, and his right k

nee w as swollen.
Wr i g h t w a s n ot scheduled to work that weekend, but he went i n t o work a nd lef t a note t o

2r eport the injury

. W right did n o t experience any f all, accident, o r other traum atic event at work, but he assum ed that the pain and swelling were c aused by t he strain of his work. On Monday , O ctober 28, W right w ent to s ee his pain m anagem ent doctor, Dr. B rian Dix. W right had been seeing Dr. D ix f or back and knee pain three to f o ur tim es a y e a r f

or s everal y ears, and he had already scheduled an appointm ent w ith Dr. Dix f o r October 2 8 p rior to his alleged injury on October 25. 1 ¶4. Af ter seeing Dr. Dix, W right continued working at Turan Foley without restriction.
On Decem

ber 5, 2 013, W right reported that he f e l t a sharp pain in his lef

t knee a s he was sliding out f

rom underneath a car. W right did not see a doctor about his knee until his next regularly s cheduled appointm ent with Dr. Dix on J anuary 14, 2014. W right next w ent to see an orthopedist, Dr. George Salloum , in April 2014. ¶5. W r ight test i f

i e d t h a t a f

t e r t h e Decem

ber 5, 2 013 incident, his knees becam e too painf u l to continue working, and he retired on Decem ber 18, 2013, at the age of f if ty -nine.
H o w e v e r , a

n o t her em ploy ee, Ken Monroe, testif ied that W right was a l ready planning t o r e t i r e by at least Nov e mb e r . W right’s supervisor, Ken Riverbank, t estif ied that W right did not

m ention any

phy sical problem s when he told Riverbank that he was retiring. ¶6. On Septem

ber 16, 2014, W right f

iled a petition to controvert, alleging that he suf f ered

com pensable injuries to his back and lower ex t rem ities in October 2 013. Turan Foley 2

1 Wrig h t’s p etitio n to co n tro v ert alleg ed th at h is in j u ry o c c u r

red o n F rid ay , O cto b er 1 8 , b u t o th er ev id en ce in d i cated th at O c to b e r 2 5 w as th e r elev an t d a y . T h is d iscrep an cy is n o t m aterial to an y

o f th e issu es in th is ap p eal.

2 T u ran F o ley ’s in su ran ce carrier i s also a p a r ty

. We ref

er to th e em

p lo y er an d carrier co llectiv ely as T u ran F o l ey . 3denied that W right h ad s uf f ered any com

pensable injury , and the case proceeded to a hearing

on the m erits of W right’s claim , held bef o re a n Adm inistrative J udge ( AJ) on Septem ber 24,
2015. W right, Monroe, and Riverbank testif ied at t he hearing, and t he parties stipulated that
W r ight’s wif

e would corroborate his testim ony a b o u t h i s injuries and back and knee pain.
W r ight’s deposition a nd m edical records and Dr. Dix’s deposition were also adm itted into evidence. The AJ lef

t the r ecord open only f

or the deposition testim ony of Dr. Rahul Vohra, who had perf

o rm e d an em

p loy er’s m edical exam ination (EME). ¶7. Dr. Dix is board certif ied in osteopathic m edicine and anesthesiology a nd specializes in pain m a nagem ent. He has t reated W right regularly since W right cam e to him with back pain, knee pain, and leg pain (radiculopathy ) in 2002. W right w as already wearing a back brace a n d two knee braces in 2002, and Dr. Dix prescribed him me d i c a t i o n and

recom m ended epidural steroid i n j e c t i o ns f or his pain. By 2005, W right had suf f ered two herniated discs in his lower b ack, and he was o f f ered surgery but d eclined. Dr. D ix testif ied that “the natural p rogression” of W right’s injuries would be “to get p rogressively worse, irregardless of what y ou d o.” In 2008, Dr. Dix s aw W right f or additional bilateral knee pain, and he ref

erred W right to an orthopedist f or treatm e n t. Dr. Dix recomme n d e d a dif f erent,

m ore supportive ty

pe of back brace in 2009. ¶8. Dr. Dix continued treating W right f or the sam e conditions f

or the next f

ew y ears and

on October 28, 2013, he observed s welling in W r ight’s r ight knee but n o other changes to the condition of

W right’s knees or back. Dr. Dix again ref erred W right to an orthopedist. ¶9. In a written questionnaire date d M a y 12, 2015, Dr. Dix a nswered “Yes” to the

4question, “Do y ou f eel that M r . W right’s injuries and y our t reatm ent are causally related to his e m ploy m ent and w ork injury at Turan Foley Motors, Inc.? ” I n h i s d e p osition, Dr. Dix testif i ed t hat t he “ work injury ” to which his answer ref erred w as a 2003 work injury

. In the questionnaire, Dr. Dix a l s o e x p l a ined his “ Yes” answer by stating that W right’s herniated discs, which W right suf

f ered no later than 2005, “occurred m ost likely while working.” 3 ¶10. Dr. Salloum also treated W right f or k nee pain in 2011 and 2014. Dr. Salloum ’s records were adm itted into evidence, but Dr. Salloum di d n ot testif y . In a n A pril 2014
progress note, Dr. Salloum s tated that W right had “severe tricom p artm ental o steoarthritic

c h a n g e s in both knees,” and he recom m ended injections in b oth knees. Dr. Salloum a l s o stated that W right ultim a tely m i ght require a lef

t knee replacem ent. ¶11. Dr. Vohra ex a m ined W r ight in June 2015. Dr. Vohra reviewed W right’s m edical records, a 2005 MRI, a nd lum bar and knee x-ray s taken on the day of t he exam ination. Dr. Vohra’s EME report discussed W right’s signif icant history of back and knee p a i n i s sues dating back to a t le a s t 2 0 02. Dr. Vohra also noted that W right received b ilateral knee injections in 2011. ¶12. Dr. Vohra c oncluded that W right’s “ c urrent back pain com plaints are c onsistent with the ongoing back pain he has had since 2002.” Dr. Vohra f ound “no evidence that there has been any m a terial change i n [ W right’s] c linical c o n d ition.” R ather, W right “continues to have chronic m echanical back pain,” which “is a longstanding preexisting issue.”

3 A t o ral a rg u m en t in t h is C o u rt, co u n s el f o r Wrig h t co n ten d ed th at l ater in h is d ep o sitio n , in resp o n se t o a lead in g q u estio n , D r. D ix a t trib u ted Wrig h t ’s c o n d itio n to th e alleg ed O c to b e r 2 0 1 3 in

j u ry . H o w ev er, th e testim o n y cited b y c o u n sel ap p ears to ad d ress a d if f eren t ex h ib it an d is, at b est, am b ig u o u s. 5¶13. Dr. Vo hra also c oncluded, based on h is review of W r ight’s m e dical records and xray s, that W right’s knee pain was the result of “chronic degenerative changes” and not the result of “ any accident or injury at work” in 2013. Dr

. Vohra f o und that W right had “no im p airm ent or restrictions based on an alleged w ork i ncident.” Dr. Vohra agreed with Dr. Salloum that W right needed a lef t knee replacem e nt surgery , but Dr. Vohra concluded that
W r ight’s lef

t knee condition was “not related to a work issue.” ¶14. Dr. Vohra’s deposition testim ony w as c onsistent with his EME r eport. D r. Vohra testif i ed that W right’s back and knee conditions w ere degenerative and p reexisting and were
not caused or aggravated by a ny incident or injury at work i n 2013. He also t estif ied that the knee swelling t hat W right e xperienced in O c t o b er 2013 was consistent with t he arthritic condition of his knees. D r. Vohra t e s t i f ied that a strenuous day at work in October 2013

m ight have “exacerbate[ d]” W right’s condition, but it would not have “aggravate[ d] it.” Dr. Vohra explained that an “ [ e]xacerbation is a tem porary incr e a s e i n s y

m ptom s f rom an underly ing

. . . c ondition,” w hereas an “ a g g r a vation i s an event that actually changes the course of the underly ing” condition. ¶15. Prior to D r. V ohra’s deposition, W right served him with a subpoena that com m anded
him t o produce s everal categories of docum ents, prim a rily r e l a t e d t o h is com pensation f

or perf orm ing EMEs or independent m edical exam in a t i o n s ( I M Es) or testif y ing as an expert witness. Turan Foley had designated Dr. Vohra to conduct a n EM E b y a t least April 13, 2015, 4 and Dr. V ohra exam i ned W right and issued his report on June 5, 2015. Nonetheless,

4 T u ran F o ley ’ s p re-h earin g statem en t f iled o n A p ril 1 3 , 2 0 1 5 , n o ted th at D r. V o h ra’s E M E w as sch ed u led f

o r Ju n e 5 , 2 0 1 5

. 6W r ight did not serve Dr. Vohra with a subpo e n a until October 22, 2015—nearly a m onth

af ter the m erits hearing bef ore the AJ. ¶16. Dr. Vohra retained counsel who e n t e r e d a n appearance a nd f iled a m otion to quash the subpoena or f

or a protective order. Dr. Vohra a rgued t hat the subpoena sought irrelevant
inf orm ation, w as overly broad and unduly b urdensom e, and wa s i n t e n ded “to harass and intim idate [ him ] i n an a t t e mp t to discourage him f rom ” participating i n workers’

com pensation cases. T uran F oley f iled a joinder in Dr. V o h r a ’ s m otion. W right f iled a
response to Dr. Vohra’s m otion. W right also f iled a m otion to strike the entry o f a ppearance entered by Dr. Vohra’s lawy e rs, arguing that an attorney f or a nonparty is not entitled to enter an appearance in a proceeding bef ore the Com m ission. ¶17. Dr. Vohra was deposed on Novem ber 3, 2015, w hile his m o tion to quash w a s s t i l l pending. In his deposition, Dr. Vohra acknowledged that in a prior, unrelate d case he voluntarily produced a list of all IMEs and EMEs he had perf orm e d in 2012 and 2 013 with the am ount and source of his com p ensation f

or each exam ination. The list, w hich was m ade

an exhibit to Dr. Vohra’s deposition i n this case, showed t otal com pensation of $603,466 f

or the two-y ear period, all pai d b y e mploy ers or carriers. Dr. Vohra testif ied that it had been

an “[ e ] norm ous task” t o com pile the inf

o rm ation, requiring “[ d]ay s” o f work by “several people.” He testif

ied t h a t h e w as unwilling to m ake such disclosures again voluntarily , which was why he hired c ounsel to oppose the subpoena. W right’s attorney asked Dr. Vohra whether h e had ever d one any w ork f or any claim ant’s attorney , and Dr. Vohra could identif y only three. Other than conf i rm ing that the list was the s am e docum ent that he had provided

7in a p rior case, Dr. Vohra ref used, on advice of counsel, to answer any questions on subjects covered by the pending m otion to quash. Af ter Dr. Vohra’s deposition, W right f i led a m otion to exclude or strike Dr. Vohra’s deposition based on his ref usal to answer questions. ¶18. The AJ subsequently entered a f o rty -one page order deny ing W right’s claim

. The AJ
f ound that W right “f

ailed to m eet his burden of proof that he suf f ered work related injuries

to h i s b ack and/or knees.” The AJ f ound that the evidence was “clear that [ W right] had a long history of b ack a nd knee problem s and had received extensive treatm ent in t h e p ast,” and “ [ w]hile his arthritis and underly ing conditions m ay have worsened over the y ears, his d i agnosis rem ained essentially the sam e.” The AJ’s opinion also discussed Dr. Vohr a ’ s testim o ny that W r ight’s injuries were not related to his work. ¶19. The A J also e n t e r e d a n o r d e r quashing W r ight’s s ubpoena to Dr. Vohra. The AJ acknowledged that W right was “entitled to explore bias” and that Dr. Vohra’s com pensation
“m ay be relevant” to that issue. However, the AJ f ound that the issue had “been suf f iciently explored in this c ase” and t hat W right’s “oppressive p urpose in s erving the s ubpoena [ was] clear.” The AJ expressed concern that it was already dif f icult to f ind phy sicians willing to perf orm IMEs and EMEs and t hat requiring phy sicians to respond to such subpoenas would deter them f

rom partici p a t i n g i n workers’ com p ensation cases. The AJ f o und that the subpoena should be q

uashed b ecause it was “ u nreasonable and oppressive.” For the sam e
reasons, the AJ also denied W right’s m otion to exclude or strike Dr. Vohra’s deposition. Finally , the AJ denied W right’s m otion t o strike the entry of appearance b y D r . V o hra’s counsel.

8¶20. W r ight f iled a petition f

or review by the f

ull C om m ission. I n h i s p e t i t i o n, W right argued that t he AJ erred by f inding that he f

a i led to p rove a com

pensable i njury ; by quashing his subpoena to Dr. Vohra; by deny ing his m otion t o e x clude or strike Dr. Vohra’s testim ony ; and by deny ing his m o t ion to strike the entry of a ppearance b y Dr. Vohra’s counsel. Turan Foley and Dr. Vohra b o th f iled responses to W right’s petition. Dr. Vohra also requested an award of attorney ’s f

ees and expenses pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 18(g). ¶21. The C om m ission af f irm e d the AJ’s order deny ing W right’s claim

. The Com m ission reviewed the t estim ony a nd m edical evidence and agreed with the AJ that W right f ailed to

m eet his burden of proving any c o mp e nsable injury

. The Com m ission’s opinion also “af f i rm [ ed] and incorporate[ d] the f indings of

the [ A J].” ¶22. The Com m ission also a f f irm ed the AJ’s orders related to the subpoena and deposition of D r. Vohra. As to t he subpoena, the Com m ission “agree[ d] with the f indings of the [ AJ],” including that “the issue of b ias had been suf f iciency explored.” The C om m ission “f urther [ f ound] that the d iscovery sought by [ W right] f rom Dr. Vohra w as not ‘relevant or com petent evidence’ necessary f

or the resolution o f the pre s e n t claim .” ( Quoting Com m ission Procedural Rule 8(g)). As to the m otion to exclude or s trike D r . Vohr a’s deposition, the
Com m i ssion agreed with the AJ that “the f inancial inf

orm ation sought by [ W right’s] counsel was oppressive and not necessary f or resolution of the claim .” ¶23. The Com m ission also sanctioned W right’s attorney , ordering him to pay Dr. Vohra’s

attorne y ’s f

ees a nd “an additional civil penalty ” o f $5,000. The Com m ission im posed the sanctions pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 18(g) and Mississippi Code Annotated

9section 71-3-59(2) (Rev. 2011). The Com m ission reasoned t hat sanctions were appropriate

b ecause the subpoena and d e position questioning of Dr. Vohra were “unwarranted and oppressive in nature and without r easonable ground” and were directed t o “f inancial issues not related to the claim .” ¶24. W r ight f

i l e d a n o tice o f appeal f

rom the f i nal decision of the Com m ission. Both Turan Foley

and Dr. Vohra have f

iled brief s as appellees.
ANALYSIS ¶25. On appeal, W right a rgues t hat the Com m ission’s decision on t he m erits of his claim

was not supported by substantial e vidence. W right also raises m ultiple issues related to the subpoena to and deposition of Dr. Vohra. Indeed, m ost of W right’s opening brief and alm ost all of his reply brief are devoted to issues related to the subpoena or deposition. He alleges that, at m inim

um , he is entitled to a “new trial,” because the Com m ission erred by quashing his s ubpoena a nd by deny i ng his m otion to strike o r exclude D r. Vohra’s testim ony . He also
argues that the Com m ission erred by im posing sanctions on his attorney

. W e a ddress these issues in turn.
I. The Com m ission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. ¶26. In workers’ com

pensation cases, “[ t ] h i s C o u r t ’ s r e v iew is lim i ted t o determ ining whether the Com m ission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence , w as arbitrary and capricious, was bey ond the scope or power o f t he a gency to m a ke, or violated [ a party ’s] constitutional or statutory r ights

. . . . [ T]he Com m ission is the ultim ate f act-f inder and judge of the credibility of witnesses; theref ore, we m ay not reweigh the evidence t hat was bef ore

1 0t h e C o mmi s s i o n.” Pulliam v. Miss. State H udspeth Reg’l Ctr. , 147 So. 3d 864, 868 (¶1 6 ) (Miss. Ct. A p p . 2014) (citations a nd q uotation m arks om itted). “W hen the C om m ission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,

. . . it m ust b e upheld. This rem ains true even though we m ight have reached a dif f erent c o nclusion were we the trier of f a ct.” Parker v. Ashle y F u r niture Indus. , 164 So. 3d 1081, 1083-84 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2015) (quoting Smith v. Johnston T

ombigbee Furni t u r e M

f g
. C o
. , 43 So. 3 d 1159, 1164 (¶15) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2010)). On issues o f f act, “[ t]his Court will overturn a Com m ission decision only ” if the Com m ission’s f

inding is “unsupportable.” Harper ex rel. Harper v. Banks, Finley, W hite
& Co. of M

iss. P.C. , 167 So. 3d 1155, 1162 (¶18) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Taplin , 586 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1991)). ¶27. In a workers’ com pensation case, the claim ant bears the b u r d e n o f p r oving “(1) an accidental injury , ( 2) a rising o u t o f and in the course of em p loy m ent, and (3) a causal connection between the injury and

. . . claim e d disability .” Id. at (¶19). “In all but the sim ple and routine cases, it is necessary to establish m edical causation by expert testim ony . A claim of disability m

ust be supported by m edical f indings” Tate v. I

nt’l Paper Co. , 194 So. 3d 136,
139 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ( q uoting Clark v. S

pherion C

o rp. , 11 So. 3d 774, 778 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)) (alteration om itted). ¶28. Furtherm ore, “ [ w]here t here i s c o n fl i c ting m edical testim ony , the Com m ission has the responsibility to apply its e xpertise and dete rm ine which evidence is m ore credible.”
W ashington v. W

oodland Vi l l

. N

u r s ing Home , 2 5 So. 3d 341, 355 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting W

esson v. Fred’s Inc. , 811 S o. 2d 464, 469 (¶23) (Miss. C t

. A p p . 2 0 0 2)).

1 1Theref

ore, “[ w]here m edical expert testim o ny i s concerned, [ t he Suprem e] C ourt has he l d that whenev e r the expert evidence is conf licting, the Court w ill af f irm the Com m ission whether t he award is f

or or against the claim ant.” Ray t h e o n Aerospace Support Servs. v. Miller , 861 So. 2d 330, 336 (¶13) (Miss. 2003) ( quoting Kersh v. Green v i l l e S h e e t Metal
W orks , 1 92 So. 2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1966)); accord Hardaway Co. v. Bradley , 887 So. 3d 793, 796-97 (¶¶15-20) (Miss. 2004). ¶29. In the present case, there is substantial evidence to support the Com m ission’s f inding that W right f

ailed to m eet h is burden of proving that he sustained a work-related injury that aggravated a ny o f his p reexisting condi t i ons. W right acknowledges that he h as longstanding, preexisting knee a nd b a ck issues. And Dr. V ohra testif i ed that W right’s present conditions and pain are the result of those longstanding, chronic, degenerative issues—not any workrelated accident or injury

in October 2013. ¶30. Moreover, W right of f ered no substantial evidence to s u pport a f inding of c ausation.
W r ight assum es a c ausal r elationship between swelling i n his knee and his work the prior day

. W right f

u r ther assum e s t h a t t h e s w elling in his knee ref lected a n aggravation of his knee condition, rather than just tem porary swelling that was a sy

m ptom of that preexisting condition. W right also em phasizes that Dr. Salloum , who d id not testif y , recom m ended knee replacem e nt surgery in A p r i l 2 0 1 4

. Based on this, W right assum es t hat the need f or knee replacem e nt surgery

m ust be attributable to his alleged injury in October 2013. ¶31. However, there is n o m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e o r e x p ert opinion t o s upport W right’s

assum ptions a nd suppositions. D r . V o h ra t estif ied that a l though W right experienced

1 2tem

porary pain and swelling in October 2013, there was no perm anent aggravation of his underly ing conditions, which rem a ined unchanged. As noted above, Dr. Dix’s testim ony on the subject was, at best, am biguous and c ontradictory

. I n a d d ition, D r. S alloum did not testif y , and there is nothing in his records to support a f inding of causation. ¶32. Given W right’s long h istory of preexisting back and knee problem s, t his was f ar f rom

a “ s i mp l e a n d routine case[ ]” on the issue of m edical causation. Tate , 194 So. 3d at 139 (¶15). Theref

ore, W right was r equired “to establish m edical causation by e xpert testim ony .” Id. There is substantial evidence to support the Com m ission’s f inding that W right f

ailed to

m eet his b urden of p roof

. Moreover, “whenever the expert evidence is c onf licting, the Court will af f irm the Com m ission whether the award is f or or against the claim ant.” Raytheon , 861 So. 2d at 336 (¶13) (quoting Kersh , 192 So. 2d at 268). Theref ore, even if

we assum e that
W r ight pres e n t e d s o m e c om petent evidence of m edical causation, it was up to the
Com m i ssion, as the f

inder o f f a ct, to determ ine which evidence w as credible and persuasive.
II. The Com m ission did not e rr b y q uashing Wright’s subpoena t o Dr. Vohra or by deny ing W r i g h t ’ s m otion to strike or ex clude Dr. Vohra’s deposition. ¶33. In general, evidence of an expert witness’s possible f i n a n c i a l o r e c o n o m ic bias is relevant and adm issible. Theref ore, an expert witness m ay be c r o s s - e x a mi ned about how

m uch he or she has been paid in the pending case, how f requently he or s h e t e s t i f i e s a s an expert, a nd how of

ten h e or she testif

ies f or plaintif f s, def e n dants, doctors, etc. See W ells v. Tucker , 997 So. 2d 908, 916-17 (¶29) (Miss. 2008) (quoting W ells v. Tucker , 997 So. 2d 925,
940 (¶¶55-56) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (Grif f is, J., dissenting)). Our Suprem e Court has m ade

1 3clear that “ liberal cross-exam i nation regarding bias, interest, and previous experience as an

expert

. . . should be allowed.” M cCarty v
. Kellum , 667 So. 2d 1277, 1286 (Miss

. 1 9 95) (quoting Hall v. Hilbun , 466 So. 2d 856, 875 (Miss. 1985)) (alteration om itted). ¶34. However, t his appeal does not involve a s im ple dispute over the perm issible scope of

cross-exam ination o f an expert witness. There are two prim a ry rulings at i ssue in this appeal. First, the C om m ission declined to com pel Dr. Vohra to c om

ply with a subpoena duces tecum (a) t hat com m anded him to produce extensive f inancial docum ents and business records, (b) that was overly broad and unduly burdensom e on its f ace, and (c) that Wr i g h t s erved af ter the hearing on the m erits of h i s claim

. Second, t he Com m ission r uled that Dr. Vohr a ’ s ref usal to answer questions about his incom e f rom perf orm i ng E MEs a nd providing expert
t e s t i mo n y did n ot warrant the wholesale exclusion of his testim ony . For the reason s explained below, we f

ind no reversible error in either of these rulings. ¶35. At the o utset, “[ w ]e em phasize that the Com m ission is an administrative agency , not

a court. It has broad discretionary authority to establish procedures f or the a dm inistration of

com pensation claim s.” Mid-Delta Home Health Inc. v. Robertson , 749 So. 2d 379, 387 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Delta Drilling C o. v
. Cannette , 489 So. 2d 1378, 1380-81 (Miss. 1986)). T h eref

ore, “[ i]t is a rare day when we w ill r e v e r s e t he C om m ission f or an action taken in the i m

p l em entation and enf

orcem ent of its own procedural r ules.” Id. To be certain, the Com m ission m ust e nsure that it af

f ords due process to t he parties in all cases. Robinson Prop. Grp. L td. P ’ship v. Newton , 975 So. 2d 2 56, 260 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). However, the Com m i ssion h as considerable discretion, and its rulings on procedural and

1 4evidentiary issues and discovery m atters are entitled to def erence. See, e .g. , R a nkin v. Averitt Exp. I nc. , 115 So. 3d 874, 877 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2013); Robinson Prop. Grp. , 975 So. 2d at 260 (¶8); Bermond v
. Cas i n o Magic , 874 S o. 2d 480, 484-85 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Posey v. United Methodist Senior Servs. , 7 73 So. 2 d 976, 979 (¶9) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2000); Mid-Delta Home Health , 749 So. 2d at 387 (¶29). ¶36. As discussed a

bove, Turan Foley disclosed that it had retained Dr. Vohra to perf orm

an EME in this case by at least April 2015, Dr. Vohra exam ined W right and issued his report in J une 2015, and the hearing on the m erits b ef ore t he AJ was held in Septem ber 2015. The record in the case w as then cl o s ed and com plete with the exception of Dr. Vohra’s deposition. Nonetheless, W right did not serve Dr. Vorha with a subpoena until a m onth af ter the hearing bef

ore the AJ. 5 The subpoena sought the f ollowing categories of

docum ents:

C all d ocum e nts indicating an y incom e that Dr. Vohra earned f rom services r endered b y o r a t the request of Turan Foley or the law f irm representing it in the f

ive preceding y e a rs;

C copies o f any m edical m alpractice c om plaint f iled against D r. Vohra in any court;

C “[ c]opies of all 1099’s, prof it and loss statem ents, internal m em o randa or other f inancial docum ents w hich indicate, a dd r e ss or o utline the incom e [ that Dr. Vohra h ad] received f rom , ” i n t e r a l ia, f

or IMEs or

5 O n ap p eal, Wrig h t accu s e s th e C o m m issio n o f “f o rc[ in g ] t h e n atu ral p ro g r essio n o f d isco v ery an d litig atio n to b e tu rn ed o n its h ead .” R ep l y B r. at 2

. S p ecif ically , h e accu ses th e A J o f “ref

u s[ i n g ] to h ear arg u m en ts o n th e m o tio n t o q u ash b ef o re o r d u rin g t h e h earin g o n t h e m erits,” an d h e claim s th at th e A J “allo w ed th e reco rd to rem ain o p e n u n t i l th e d ep o sitio n f

o r D r. V o h r a to b e t ak en b efo re r u lin g o n w h eth e r t h e su b p o en a h ad to b e resp o n d ed to .” T h ese criticism s o f th e C o m m issio n an d th e A J are u n f o u n d ed

. Wrig h t d id n o t s e r v e th e s u b p o en a u n til af ter th e h e arin g o n th e m erits, so i t w o u ld h a v e b een im p o ssib le f

o r th e A J “to h ear arg u m en ts o n th e m o tio n to q u ash b ef o re o r d u rin g th e h earin g o n th e m e rits.” 1 5EMEs perf orm ed f or any em ploy er or carrier and “[ a]ny other pay m ents f rom liability insurance com panies f or any consultation work” in the f ive preceding y ears;

C “[ a]ll d ocum ents, inclu d i n g receipts f or pay m ent, honorarium s or reim bursem e nt f

or t ravel expenses, f

or a ny program s or c onf

erenc e s , sponsored b y any liability o r w orkers’ com p ensat ion insurance com pany or industry group where [ Dr. Vohra had] spoken or presented in the l ast f

ive (5) y e ars on any issues involving civil justice, [ IMEs or EMEs], p hy sical im

pairm ent or restrictions and/or rehabilitation of injured patients”;

C “[ a]ny and a l l printouts, reports, c a ncelled checks, draf ts, or other docum ents e videncing, relating or p e r t aining to any pay m ent of com pensation t o [ Dr. Vohra] to review m edical records and/or to render opinions and/or to testif

y as an expert w itness at any court proceeding within the past f

ive y ears”;

C Dr. Vohra’s “tim e sheets and copies of any and a l l other docum entation setting f orth the hours f

or which [ he] perf

o rm ed services of any kind in [ this] case,” as w ell as all “invoices or docum entation of and records of pay m ent received f

or services rendered in [ this] case (including those billed but not y et collected, and those expected to be billed)”;

C any learned treatises, articles, or authorities r elied on by Dr. V oh r a in rendering opinions in this case. ¶37. W e agree with the Com m ission that this com m and to Dr. Vohra to produce f ive y ears’

w o r t h of f

inancial d ocum e nts, including e v en 1099s and “ cancelled checks,” was overly burdensom e and unduly broad on its f ace. Theref

ore, we cannot say that the C om m ission’s ruling qu a s h i n g t h e s u b poena w as an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process or any other right. ¶38. In their brief

s on appeal, Dr. Vohra and W right cite several de c i s i o n s o f c o u r t s in other s tates that have addressed the discoverab i l i t y o f i nf orm ation about the incom e and

1 6sources of in c o me o f a n e xpert witness. 6 However, the cited opinions are not directly

applicable to the f

acts of this case, which do not involve a ty p ical pretrial discovery dispute.
As i t was presented to the C om m ission, the issue in this case was whether t o r e o p en the record in an otherwise-concluded workers’ com pensation proceeding to com pel Dr. Vohra

to produce volum inous inf orm a tio n and docum e n ts pertaining to his incom e as an expert witness. Moreover, the record already contained evidence that em ploy ers and carriers had paid Dr. Vohra over $600,000 f or perf o rm i ng IMEs and EMEs in t he y ears 2012 and 2013.
On these f

acts, the Com m ission, which w as also the f i nder of f act, af f irm ed the AJ’s f

inding that “the issue of

bias had been suf

f iciently explored” in this case. ¶39. W e cannot say that t he Com m ission’s ruling w as an abuse of discretion o r a denial of due process. The record in t he case was otherwise closed by the tim e the issue was raised, and the Com m i ssion, as f act-f i n d e r , h a d bef

ore it inf orm a t ion that i t reasonably deem ed suf f i cient to address the i s s u e o f b i a s. The Com m i ssion was not required to r eopen the proceeding to com

p el Dr. Vohra to com

ply , in whole or i n part, with a subpoena that was overly broad and unduly burdensom e on its f ace. ¶40. For essentially the sam e reasons, the Com m ission d id not abuse its discretion or deny due process when it af

f irm e d the denial of W right’s m o tion to s trike or exclude Dr. Vohra’s testim o ny in t o t o . The partial d issent argues that Dr. Vohra s hould have f iled a m otion to
t e rm inate or lim it the deposition pursuant to Mississippi R ule of C ivil Procedure 3 0 ( d )

6 S ee, e.g
. , P rim m v. Isa a c , 1 2 7 S .W.3 d 6 3 0 , 6 3 5 -3 7 ( K y . 2 0 0 4 ); E l kin s v
. S y ken , 6 7 2 S o . 2 d 5 1 7 , 5 2 0

- 2 2 (F la. 1 9 9 6 ); see a lso F e d

. R

. C iv

. P

. 2 6 (a)(2 )(B )(v )-(v i) (req u irin g d isclo su re o f t h e ex p e rt’s c o m p en satio n in th e p en d in g case an d a list o f all cases in w h ich th e ex p ert h as testif

ied in th e p rev io u s f

o u r y ears). 1 7instead o f sim ply ref using to answer certain questions. 7 That m ay be true, but if so, W right’s prim ary r eme d y was a m otion to com pel Dr. Vohra to answer additional questions and f or attorney ’s f

ees and expenses pursua n t t o R u l e 37(a). 8 W right n ever requested that relief bef ore the AJ or the Com m i ssion. Instead, he sought only to s trike or exclude Dr. Vohra’s testim o ny in its entirety

. 9 Neither W right nor t h e p artial d issent c ites any authority f or the

7 S ee M .R .C .P

. 3 0 (d ) (“A t an y t im e d u r in g th e tak in g o f th e d ep o sitio n , o n m o tio n o f

. . . th e d e p o n en t an d u p o n a sh o w in g th at th e ex am in atio n is b ein g co n d u cted in b ad f a ith o r in su ch m an n er as u n reaso n ab l y to an n o y , em b arrass, o r o p p r e s s t h e d e p o n en t

. . . , th e co u rt in w h i ch th e actio n is p en d i n g m a y o r d er th e o f f icer c o n d u ctin g th e ex am i n a tio n to cease f o rth w ith f ro m tak in g th e d e p o sitio n o r m ay lim i t th e s co p e an d m an n er o f th e tak i n g o f th e d ep o sitio n . . . .”); P ila te v. A m
. F ed e ra ted In s. , 8 6 5 S o . 2 d 3 8 7 , 4 0 0 ( ¶6 8 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) (“T h e d isco v ery ru les o f th e M ississip p i R u l es o f C iv il P ro ced u re a re ap p licab le to litig ated w o rk ers’ co m p en satio n claim s.”).

8 S ee M .R

. C .P

. 3 7 (a)(2 ) (“If a d ep o n en t f ails to an sw er a q u estio n . . . , th e d isco v erin g p arty m a y m o v e f o r an o rd er co m

p elli n g an an s w er . . . . Wh en tak in g a d ep o sitio n o n o ral ex am in atio n , t h e p ro p o n en t o f th e q u estio n m ay co m p lete o r ad

j o u rn th e ex am in atio n b ef

o re h e ap p lies f

o r an o rd er.”); M .R .C .P

. 3 7 (a)(4 ) (“If th e m o tio n i s g ran ted , th e co u rt sh all, af

ter o p p o rtu n ity f

o r h earin g , req u ire th e p arty o r d ep o n en t w h o se co n d u ct n ecessitated th e m o t io n o r th e p arty o r atto rn ey ad v isin g s u ch co n d u ct o r b o th o f th em to p ay to th e m o v in g p arty th e r e a s o n ab le ex p en ses i n cu rred i n o b tain in g th e o rd er, in clu d i n g atto rn ey ’s f

ees, u n l ess th e co u rt f

in d s th at th e o p p o sitio n t o th e m o tio n w as su b stan tially j u stif ied o r th at o th er c i r c u m stan ces m ak e an aw ard o f ex p en s es u n j u st.”); see a lso 8 A C h arles A lan Wrig h t, A rth u r R

. M iller et al., F ed era l P ra ctice a n d P ro ced u re § 2 1 1 6 (3 d ed

. 2 0 1 0 ) (“A n a ltern ativ e m eth o d b y w h ich a co u rt ru lin g u p o n th e p ro p riety o f th e ex am in atio n m ay b e o b tain ed is b y ref u sal o f t h e w itn ess to an sw er p articu lar q u estio n s, th u s p ro v o k in g a m o tio n u n d er R u le 3 7 (a) to co m p el an an sw er. . . . A lt h o u g h t h e r e is th u s a su b stan tial p ref

e ren ce f o r req u irin g th a t d ep o n en ts a p p ly to th e co u r

t f o r p ro tectio n rath er th an sim p ly ref u sin g to an sw er q u e stio n s, it is to b e h o p e d t h at th e co u rts w ill tak e a realistic v iew o f th e co n d u ct o f d ep o sitio n s rath er th a n f o reclo se d ep o n en ts’ o b

j ectio n s in resp o n se to m o tio n s to co m

p el an sw ers.”).

9 D u rin g D r. V o h ra’s d ep o s itio n , Wrig h t’s c o u n sel stated th at h e w o u l d f ile a m o tio n to co m p e l D r . V o h r a t o a n sw er ad d itio n al q u e stio n s an d f o r co sts an d atto rn ey ’s f ees; h o w e v e r, in h is su b seq u en t m o tio n , Wrig h t req u ested o n ly th at D r. V o h ra’s d ep o sitio n b e ex clu d e d o r strick en in its en tirety

. 1 8proposition that the only perm issible rem ed y f o r a nonparty ’s ref

usal to answer deposition questions is to strike or exclude the nonparty ’s testim ony in its entirety

. T here is no such rule of autom atic, wholesale exclusion. W right did not request the relief to which he m ight have been entitled under Rule 37(a), and we cannot say that the C om m ission abused its discretion or otherwise erred by

deny ing the extraordinary relief that W right did seek. ¶41. The p artial dissent next argues t hat the C om m ission should have e x c l u d e d D r . V ohra’s deposition based on “the f our-f actor test applicable to determ ine whether excluding evidence
f or a transgression in discovery is an appropriate sanction.” Post at ( ¶59). H o wever, W right
him self has never relied on that t est, w hich addresses the exclusion of evidence as a sanction
f or a discovery violation by a p arty

. Here, the party —Turan Foley

—did not com m it any discovery violation. D r. Vohra was a nonparty witness selected by Turan Foley to perf orm

an E ME. 10 Af

ter W right served a subpoena on Dr. Vohra personally , Dr. Vohra f iled his own

m otion to quas h t he s ubpoena, and he t hen relied on the advice of his personal c ounsel to ref use to answer questions on m atters covered by his pending m o tion. “[ E]xcluding evidence
f or a transgres s i o n in discovery is a n extrem e m easure.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin , 725 So. 2d 721, 733 (¶60) ( Miss. 1998)

. Again, there is no r ule requiring a trial judge or an adm inistrative tribunal to im pose such an “extr e me ” sanction on a party based on a nonparty

witness’s independent decision to ref use to answer deposition questions. ¶42. Finally , the partial dissent argues that the Com m ission violated its “own procedural rules” by adm itting Dr. V o h ra’s testim ony . Post at (¶61). However, n o rule of the

10 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 7 1 -3 -1 5 (1 ) (S u p p . 2 0 1 7 ); C o m m issio n G en eral R u le 9 ; B r ad ley & T h o m p so n , M ississip p i Wo rkers’ C o m

p en sa tio n L a w § 5 :7 5 (2 0 1 7 ed .). 1 9Com m i ssion required the exclusion of Dr. Vohra’s testim ony . Put sim ply , no rule, statute,

or preceden t required the C om m ission to i m p ose the “extrem e” sanction advocated by the partial dissent. W e again note that W right could have m o ved to c om pel D r. Vohra to answer

a d d i t i o n a l q uestions a nd f or attorney ’s f

ees and costs. Such a m otion w ould have directly addressed the alleged def

iciencies in Dr. Vohra’s testim ony , and som e relief m ight have been

wa r r a n ted. However, W right did not f ile such a m otion, so that issue i s not bef ore us on appeal. ¶43. W e also em

phasize that an expert witness m ay b e required to testif y about how m

uch he or she has been paid in the p ending litigation, how of t en he or she serves as an expert, and how of ten he or she testif

i es f or plaintif f s/claim ants, def

endants/em

p loy ers/carriers, doctors,

etc. See W

ells , 9 97 So. 2d at 916-17 (¶29). These are relevant and perm issible questions in

a deposition o r on cross-exam ination. H o w e v e r , this appeal does not involve a sim ple dispute o ver the perm issible scope of cross-exam ination. For the reasons discussed above,

we c annot say that t h e C om m ission com m itted r eversible error by q uashing W right’s lateserved subpoena or deny ing his m otion to exclude Dr. Vohra’s testim ony in toto. 11

11 C itin g M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated se c t io n 7 1 -3 -5 5 (2 ) (R e v . 2 0 1 1 ), Wrig h t also arg u es th at th e C o m m issio n ’ s r ul i ng o n th e su b p o en a “m

u s t b e v a cated an d ren d e red b ecau se th e C o m m issio n f

ailed to reco rd an d tran scrib e th e h earin g o n th e issu e.” S ectio n 7 1 -3 -5 5 (2 ) p ro v id es in r elev an t p art: “H e arin g s b ef o re th e [ C ] o m m issio n sh all b e o p e n to t h e p u b lic an d sh all b e sten o g rap h ically rep o r t e d o r reco r d ed an d tran s crib ed .” In th is case, th e o n ly “h earin g s” o n Wrig h t’s su b p o en a w ere a telep h o n i c c o n f eren ce w ith th e A J an d o ral arg u m e n t o n Wrig h t’s p e titio n f o r rev iew b y th e f

u ll C o m m issio n . N o t estim o n y o r o th er ev id e n c e w as receiv ed d u r in g eith er “h earin g .” We d o n o t u n d erstan d Wrig h t’s arg u m en t to b e th at eith er o f th o s e “h earin g s”— w h ich ap p aren tly co n sisted o n l y o f th e arg u m en ts o f co u n sel— sh o u ld h a v e b een reco rd ed o r tran scrib ed

. W r ig h t d id n o t raise th at issu e b ef o re th e C o m m issio n . M o r eo v er, an y law y ers’ arg u m en ts at th o se “h earin g s” w o u ld h av e n o im p act o n th is C o u rt’s d e cisio n o n ap p eal. S e e O n e 1 9 7 0 M

ercu ry C o u g a r v
. T

u n ica C ty. , 2 0III. The Com m ission erred by sanctioning Wright’s attorney .

¶44. As noted above, the Com m ission also im posed sanctions on W right’s counsel f or the subpoena that he served on Dr. V o h r a a n d h is deposition questioning of Dr. Vohra. Speci f i cally , the Com m ission ordered counsel to p ay Dr. Vohra’s a t torney ’s f ees and an “ad d i t ional civil p enalty ” of $5,000. The Com m ission cited Com m ission Procedural Rule
1 8(g) a nd Mississippi Code Annotated section 7 1-3-59(2) a s the b asis f or these sanctions.
W h ile we af

f irm the decision o f the Com m i ssion in all other respects, we conclude that the
Com m i ssion erred by

im p o sing these sanctions on W right’s attorney

. ¶45. Section 71-3-59 perm its an award of attorney ’s f ees and im

position of an additional “civil penalty ” o f up to $10,000 only if the C om m ission f inds “that proceedings in respect
t o a claim have been instituted, c ontinued o r delay ed, including by way of ap p e a l t o t h e [ C ] o m m ission, w ithout r easonable ground.” Miss. Code Ann. § 7 1-3-59(2). Com m ission Procedural Rule 18(g) sim ilarly authorizes an award of attorney ’s f ees only “upon a showing that the subpoena power is being exercised in bad f aith or in such m anner as unreasonably

to annoy , em

barrass, or oppress the party or the p erson upon whom the subpoena is served.”
In an analogous context, our Suprem e Court “has h eld that pleadings f o und to b e justiciable, viable, o r colorable are not f o r the purpose of harassm ent or delay ; t hus, sanctions are

1 1 5 S o . 3 d 7 9 2 , 7 9 6 (¶2 0 ) ( M iss

. 2 0 1 3 ) (“N o citatio n o f a u t h o rity is n ecessary f

o r th e f u n d am en tal p ro p o s itio n s t h at issu es o f f act are d ecid ed b y

th e w eig h in g o f

ev i d e n ce, an d th at th e arg u m en ts o f co u n sel are n o t ev id en ce.”). Wrig h t ’s real a rg u m en t seem s to b e t h at D r
. V o h ra f ailed “to m ak e a reco rd ” b ecau se h e f ailed to in tro d u ce su f

f icien t ev id en ce t h at co m p lian ce w ith th e su b p o en a w o u ld h av e b e e n u n d u ly b u rd e n so m e. We d isag ree. In th is case, th e b u rd en is su f

f icien tly ap p aren t f

ro m th e f ace o f t h e su b p o e n a t o s u p p o r t th e C o m m issio n ’s d ecisio n . 2 1inappropriate

. ” Estate of McLemore v. McLemore , 6 3 S o. 3d 468, 490 (¶68) (Miss. 2011)

(apply ing Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11). ¶46. W e have held that the Com m ission did not err by quashing the subpoena to Dr. Vohra

or by d e n y i n g Wr i g ht’s m otion to exclude Dr. Vohra’s testim ony . However, our holdings

on those issues a re based i n p a r t o n t h e p rocedural posture in which the issue arose in this

case and the Com m ission’s f inding that the issue of bias was “suf f i ciently e xplored” at Dr. Vohra’s subsequent deposition. A party is entitled to explore the possible f i nancial bias of

an opposing expert w itness and to exam ine, including his or her com pensation in the pending litigation a nd history of t e s t i f y i n g f or plaintif

f s, d ef endants, etc. See W

e lls , 997 So. 2d at 916-17 (¶29). These were m atters that W right’s attorney sought t o explore b y subpoena and deposition, and t he Com m ission erred to the extent that it considered these issues altogether irrelevant. ¶47. In addition, a s Dr. V ohra ack n o w l e d g e s i n his b rief on a p peal, “Mississippi courts have not directly addressed how best to strike a balanc e b e t w e e n t h e right of a party to explore an expert’s f

inancial bias and the need to avoid o verly burdensom e discovery directed at such experts.” 12 Thus, no rules or reported cases clearly prohibited the conduct
f or which the Com m issio n im posed sanctions in this case. Under these circum stances, counsel’s ef

f orts to represent his client by e xploring the issue of f inancial bias had at least

12 We also n o te t h at th e F ed eral R u les o f C iv il P ro ced u re req u ire e x p ert w i tn esses to d isclo se “a list o f a ll o th er cases in w h ich , d u rin g t h e p r e v i o u s 4 y ears, th e w itn ess h as testif i ed as an ex p ert at trial o r b y d ep o sitio n ,” an d “a statem en t o f th e co m p en satio n t o b e p aid f o r th e stu d y an d t e s t i mo n y i n th e case.” F ed

. R

. C iv

. P

. 2 6 (a)(2 )(B )(v ) -(v i). T h e M ississip p i R u les o f C iv il P ro ced u re d o n o t in clu d e a co m

p arab le req u irem en t. 2 2a “colorable” b a s i s i n the law. Estate of McLemore , 63 So. 3d at 490 (¶68). “[ T]hus,

sanctions are inappropriate” in this case. Id. 13
CONCLUSION ¶48. For the f

oregoi n g r e a s o n s , t he Com m ission’s decision deny ing W right’s claim f or benef its is af f irm ed. However , all sanctions that the Com m i ssion i m p osed on W right’s attorney are reversed and rendered. ¶49. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART. LEE, C.J., I RVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES AND GREENLEE, J J . , CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED B Y WESTBROOKS, J. F A I R AND TINDELL, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING. CARLTON, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶50. Finding that t he Com m i ssion and the A J e r r o n e o u s l y a dm itted the unresponsive def ense expert w itness d eposition testim ony of D r. Vohra in v i o l ation of its own rules, I respectf ully concur in p art and dissent in part w i t h the m ajority

. The Com m i ssion should
f o l l ow its o wn procedural rules in conducting its duties of adm inistering workers ’

com pensation claim s and should not adm it evidence in contravention to those rules when to do so thwarts due process. See Pulliam v. Miss. State Hudspeth Reg’l C tr. , 147 S o. 3d 864,

13 We cau t io n th at serv i c e o f a s u b s tan tially sim ilar su b p o en a in a f u tu re case m ay w a rran t san ctio n s. I n m o st cases, th e issu e o f f in an cial b ias can b e ex p lo red s u f f icien tly b y o ral o r w ritten d ep o sitio n . S ee E lkin s , 6 7 2 S o . 2 d at 5 2 0 -2 2 ; P rim m , 1 2 7 S .W.3 d at 6 3 5 -3 9

. P ro d u ctio n o f a n ex p ert w itn ess’s f in an cial an d b u sin ess reco rd s sh o u ld b e “o rd ered

. . . o n ly u p o n th e m o st u n u su al o r co m p ellin g circu m stan ce,” E l kin s , 6 7 2 S o . 2 d at 5 2 1 , s u ch as w h en a w itn ess is “less th an f

o rth co m in g ” in resp o n se to d e p o sitio n q u estio n s, P rim m , 1 2 7 S .W.3 d at 6 3 9

. O u r h o ld in g t h at san ctio n s are in a p p ro p riate in th is case is b ased in larg e p art o n th e lack o f p rio r M ississip p i p reced en t o n th is issu e. 2 3869-71 (¶¶18-25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (f i nding t hat an AJ e rroneously erred in the adm ission of unauthenticated me d i c a l evidence and that “due process dictates that the
Com m i ssion

. . . f

ollow its own procedural” rules). As ref l ected in the record, Dr. Vohra’s refu s a l t o r e s p ond t o deposition cross-exam ination questions r egarding his potential f inancial bias t h w a r t ed W right’s due-process rights and violated the Com m ission’s own p rocedural rules. Due to this discovery transgression, W r ight was t hereby precluded, in violation of the
Com m i ssion’s own rules, f rom discovering relevant bias im peachm ent evidence bearing on the credibility , reliability , and trustworthiness of Dr. Vohra’s expert testim ony . ¶51. In the case bef

ore us, Turan-Foley ’s 14 expert witness, Dr. Vohra, f ailed t o s u b m it a
proper b asis f

or his ref usal t o answer deposition questions posed t o him o n c r o ss-exam ination by W right’s attorney regarding D r. Vohra’s potential f i nancial bias. The procedural history
in t he record ref

lects that at the hearing on the m erits, the AJ allowed t he r ecord to be lef t
open f or thirty day s to allow T uran-Foley t o later e n ter i ts Exhibit 4—Dr. Vohra’s deposition with exhibits—into the record. The AJ acknowledged that Dr. Vohra’s deposition had not
y et been taken at the t im e of the h earing. W right f iled his s ubpoena duces tecum on October 23, 2015, requesting that Dr. Vohra produce various inf

orm ation and d ocum ents relating t o his perf orm ance of and incom e f rom sim ilar work perf

o rm ed in the last f

i ve y ears and all f

inancial docum ents r e l ated to i ndependent, [ Mississippi R ule of Civil Procedure] 3 5 , o r em ploy er-requested m edical exam inations d u r i n g t h e s a m e t i m e p e r iod, as w ell as com plaints f iled against him and treatises[ .]

14 A s ex p lain ed b y th e m aj o rity , T u ran - F o ley ’s in su r an ce c arrier is a l so a p arty

. I ref er to th e em p lo y er an d carrier co llectiv ely as T u ran -F o ley

. 2 4¶52. Dr. Voh r a ’ s d e p o s i t i o n w a s t a k e n o n N o v em ber 3, 2015. Af

ter Dr. Vohra’s deposition, W right f

iled a m o tion requesting that the AJ preclu d e D r . Vohra’s deposition transcript f

rom being entered into evidence or, i n the alternative, to strike the deposition of
Dr. Vohra f

rom the r e cord. The AJ’s order quashing W right’s subpoena duces tecum was subsequently entered Decem ber 17, 2015. In t he order quashing the subpoena d uces tecum , the AJ f ound that the s ubpoena was “unreasonable and oppressive.” However, the AJ’s order
f ailed to set f

orth any f inding that Dr. Vohra po s sessed any existing right of privilege that would allow h im to ref

use to a nswer oral d epositio n q uestions that were relevant to the claim s or def

enses raised by the parties. The A J’s order also f ailed to set f

orth any f indings

as to t he legal standard applied to the discovery transgression or to W right’s m otion to strike
Dr. Vohra’s unresponsive deposition testim ony . Dr. Vohra’s ref usal to answer a relevant deposition question is a separate and distinct m atter f rom m oving to quash and ref using to respond to the subpoena duces tecum

. ¶53. In his order deny ing W r ight’s m otion, the AJ c ite d h i s p r i o r o r d e r quashing the subpoena duces tecum issued t o Dr. Vohra and providing t hat “Dr. Vohra sh a l l not be required to answer f

u rther questions in t his c ase regarding h i s incom e earned f rom conducting [ EMEs], [ IMEs], or produce docum ents set out i n [ W right’s] [ s ]ubpoena [ d]uces [ t]ecum .” The AJ’s order ef f ectively prevented W right f rom discovering a ny f

inancial bias of Dr. V ohra without a ny determ inatio n o r l e g a l authority t o allow Dr. Vohra to ref use to

answer relevant deposition questions, in violation of the Com m ission’s r ules. Note, pursuant
to Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-15(3) (Supp. 2017), the Com m ission possesses

2 5authority to r e gulate the re a s o nableness of charges and f e e s by m edical providers f or testim o ny and f

or c om pletion of m edical r e c ords and reports. Moreover, em ploy ee claim ants

are r equired to s u

bm it to such exam inations in controverted cases o r risk s u s p e nsion of
pay m ent. See Miss. C o d e A nn. § 71-3-37 (Rev. 2011) ( establishing the C om m ission’s authority to order m edical exam inations in c ontroverted cases). Due process i s n ot served by requiring a claim ant in a controverted c a se to participate in an E ME and then prohibiting the claim ant f

rom discovering the potential b ias o f the phy sician conducting t he e xam ination and testif y ing f or the em ploy er. ¶54. As stated, this Court has held t h a t “ d u e p rocess dictates that the Com m ission is to
f ollow i t s own procedural due p rocess principles in conducting its duties of adm inistering workers’ com

pensation c laim s.” Rankin v. Averitt Express Inc ., 1 15 So. 3d 874, 877 (¶13) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2013). 15 Procedural Rule 2.9 of the Rules o f the M ississippi Wo r k e r s ’
Com pensation Com m ission provides “[ d]epositions m ay be taken and discovery h ad by any party in accordance with the Mississippi Rules o f Civil Procedure r elating to depositions and discovery (Rules 2 6 - 37).” T he Com m ission’s Procedural Rule 2.8 f urther provides that the general rules of evidence are relaxed so as t o allow introduction of any relevant and

com petent evidence. Based on the Com m ission ’ s o w n r e laxed procedural rules p roviding
f or the introduction of r el e v a n t and com petent e vidence, Dr. Vohra should have been required to answer t he r elevant deposition questions pertaining to potential f inancial bias.

15 S ee a lso M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 7 1 -3 -4 7 (R e v . 2 0 1 1 ) (p ro v i d i n g th at “ th e d e t a i ls o f p ractice an d p ro ced u r e in th e s ettlem en t an d ad j u d icatio n o f c laim s sh all b e d eterm in ed b y ru les o f th e [ C ] o m m issio n . . . .”). 2 6Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) also provides that “[ p]arties m ay o btain discovery

regarding any

m atter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claim s or def enses of any party .” W hen W right attem pted to cross-exam ine Dr. Vohra r egarding a list that Dr. Vohra had previously provided in a dif f erent case about such i ncom e in prior y ears, Turan-Foley objected, explaining tha t the list of incom e sources was m a rked f or identif ication purposes and n ot as a part of the evidence i n the record. Dr. Vohra was clearly testif y ing as a def

ense e xpert witness about the EME he conducted a t the request of TuranFoley

. Dr. Vohra adm itted t hat he kept f inancial records but he did not personally m aintain the f i n a n c i a l i n f

orm ation; rather, he had his billing staf f c om pile f inancial inf

orm ation f

or h i m. In c ontinuing the attem pted cross-exam ination, W right’s counsel a sked Dr. Vohra i f he would estim a te t hat the incom e ref lected in t he previously disclosed list would be about the sam e level with his current com e f rom his IME, E ME, and DME practice now. However, counsel f or Dr. Vohra, a nonparty witness, objected and would not let D r. Vohra answer this question as to w hether his e stim ated current i ncom e f r om his IME, DME, and EME practice

was consistent w ith that p reviously disclosed. In objecting, Dr. Vohra’s counsel provided that he did not want his client t o answer because the inf orm ation was subject to a m otion to quash. W right’s counsel then again asked Dr. Vohra if such current incom e would be about the sam e as it was back in 2012 and 2013. Again, counsel f or Dr. Vohra objected, and Dr. Vohra expressly s tated that he did not want to discuss his f inancial inf

orm ation and that he was not going to discuss it. ¶55. However, n either Turan-Foley , Dr. Vohra , n o r D r . V o h r a ’ s c o unsel raised any existing

2 7privilege that would entitle Dr. Vohra to ref use to answe r a r e l e v ant deposition question

a b o u t h i s current incom e f rom the preceding t wo y ears derived f r om E MEs, IMEs, and
DMEs. Except f

or the purpose o f preserving a p rivilege, the Mississippi Ru l e s of Civil Procedure do not provide f or counsel to instruc t a w itness not to answer a question at a deposition, even i f the question is indeed objectionable. See M.R.C.P. 30. Objections should be m ade at the tim e of the deposition and “ shall b e noted upon t he transcription or recording. Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to t he objections.” M.R.C.P. 30(c); s e e a lso
B a n k s v
. Office of the Senate Sergeant–at–Arms , 222 F .R.D. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2004); Ethico n Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp ., 160 F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 1995). ¶56. In a ddition to the f ailure to assert any existing privilege that would protect him f rom answering the deposition questions, Dr. Vohra also f ailed to f ollow procedures set f

orth in the Mississippi Rules of C ivil Procedure to l im it or term inate the deposition. See Miss. Bar

v. Land , 653 So. 2 d 899, 907 (Miss. 1994), reinstatem ent grante d , 6 8 2 S o . 2d 1049 (Miss. 1996) (quoting The Miss. B ar v. Mathis , 620 So. 2d 1213, 1221 (Miss. 1 993)) (“The proper procedure

. . . [ is] to object t o the interrogatories a nd deposition question a nd af f irm atively assert the privilege, leaving the m atter to be decided by the court.”). 1 6 ¶57. In a ddressing the i m pact of the transgressing testim ony upon due process, the record ref lects that the AJ and t he Com m i ssion relied heavily on Dr. V ohra’s expert testim ony , EME

16 S ee g en era lly I

n re S tra to sp h ere C o rp
. S

ec. L itig ., 1 8 2 F .R .D

. 6 1 4 , 6 1 7 -1 8 (D

. N ev . 1 9 9 8 ) (d iscu ssin g o b

j ectio n s d u r in g d ep o sitio n s p u rsu an t to th e F ed eral R u les o f C iv il P ro ced u re). M o reo v e r, R u le 3 0 (d ) p laces th e b u r d en o n T u ran -F o ley o r th e d ep o n en t, D r. V o h r a, to m o v e to term in a te t h e d ep o sitio n an d “[ u ] p o n d em a n d o f th e o b j ectin g p arty o r d ep o n en t, th e tak i n g o f th e d ep o s itio n sh all b e s u sp en d ed f o r th e tim e n ecessary to m ak e a m o tio n f o r an o rd er.” M .R .C

. P . 3 0 (d ). 2 8report, a nd his expert opinion f or the def ense. The record also ref

lects that D r. V ohra did not conduct a n MRI on W right, b ut nonetheless f ound that despite W right’s increased pain and swelling in his knee, a nd despite his work duties that required him to perf orm h ard labor on

a concrete f

loor, W right suf

f ered a n exacerbation, b ut not an aggravation. In contrast to the testim o ny of W r ight’s treating phy sicians, Dr. Vohra also opined that such exacerbation was
not causally related to the workplace injury asserted by W right. However, Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-3(b) (Rev. 2011) def i nes a n injury a r ising out o f and in the course of em ploy m ent as one that “ results f rom an untoward e v ent or events, i f c o ntributed to or aggravated or accelerated by e m ploy m e nt i n a signif

icant m a nner.” Jurispru d e n c e has likewise recognized com

p ensability “when a pre-existing di s e a se or inf irm ity of an em

ploy ee is aggravated, lighted u

p, or accele r a t e d by a w ork-connected injury .” Rathborne, Hair & Ridgeway Box Co. v. Green , 237 Miss. 588, 594, 115 So. 2 d 674, 676 (1959). Dr. Vohra’s potential bias, his credibility as a witness, and the credibility o f his EME and related expert opinion were certainly at i ssue bef ore the AJ and the Com m ission. 17 Clearly , Dr. Vohra’s ref usal to answer questions at the deposition regarding any potential f inancial bias def

eated
W r ight’s ability to discover relevant inf orm ation p ertaining t o Dr. Vohra’s credibility and the reliability of his expert opini o n a nd EME report. See Mueller Copper Tube Co. v. Upton , 930 So. 2d 428, 4 37 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (“The W orkers’ Com pensation Com m ission is entitled to f

avor the testim ony

of a treating phy sician over a phy sician w h o had seen the

17 S ee M .R .E

. 6 1 6 (“E v id en ce o f a w itn ess’s b ias, p rej u d ice, o r in teres t— f o r o r ag ain st an y p arty

— is ad m issib le to attack th e w i tn ess’s cred ib ility .”); S ee a lso T

e l lu s O p era tin g G rp
. L L C v T

exa s P etro leu m In v. C o
. , 1 0 5 S o . 3 d 2 7 4 , 2 8 1 (¶2 4 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 2 ).

2 9claim ant only once.”). 18 ¶58. I turn to an application of the standard of r eview and applicable law to this case. Our standard of review recognizes the trial court’s considerable discretion in discovery m atters,

a n d “ [ t]his Court will af f irm a trial court’s decision unless there is a def inite and f

irm conviction that the court below com m i tt e d a c l ear e rror of judgm ent in the conclusion it reached u pon weighing of r elevant f actors.” T.L. W

allace Constr., Inc. v. McArthur, Thames, Slay, & Dews, PLLC , N o. 2015-CA-01596-SCT, 2017 W L 2812752, at *20 (¶92) (Miss.
June 29, 2017) (internal quotation m arks om itted). “In determ ining whether a judgm ent f ell within the discretion of the trial court, we f irst ask if the trial court applied the correct legal standard.” Tucker v
. Delta Reg’l M ed. Ctr ., 189 So. 3 d 690, 692 (¶4) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotation m arks om itted) (citing City of Jackson v
. Rhaly , 95 So. 3d 6 02, 607 (¶10) (Miss. 2012)). As acknowledged by the ma j o r i t y , the questions posed by W right to Dr. Vohra at the deposition in issue constituted r elevant questions, and Dr. V ohra a sserted no rig ht or privilege that would excuse him f r om answering the deposition questions relevant

to f i nancial bias regarding his com pensation relative t o IME, D ME, a nd E M E p r a c tice. 19

18 In M u eller , 9 3 0 S o . 2 d at 4 3 7 (¶3 5 ), th e p h y sician w h o p e rf o rm ed th e IM E o n th e claim an t e v alu ated th e c laim an t o n ly o n ce. T h e claim an t’s t reatin g p h y sician , h o w e v er, “w as ab le to o b serv e f

i r s t

- h an d [ th e claim an t’s] p ro g ressiv ely w o rsen in g A ch illes ten d o n an d b ack co n d itio n th at o ccu rred o v er a f o u r an d a h alf y ear p erio d .” Id

. at (¶3 6 ).

19 S ee M .R .C

. P

. 2 6 ( b )(1 ). S ee a lso S co tt B y & T h ro u g h S co tt v
. F lyn t , 7 0 4 S o . 2 d 9 9 8 , 1 0 0 4 (M iss. 1 9 9 6 ) (citin g M .R .C .P

. 2 6 (b )(1 )) (“It is u n d ersto o d th at ev id en ce d o es n o t h av e to b e ad m i ssib le to b e d isco v erab le, o n ly relev a n t. L ik ew ise, it is also u n d ersto o d t h at th e o b j e ctio n th at ev i d en ce so u g h t w o u ld u l tim a tely b e in ad m i ssib le d o es n o t p r o h ib it its d isco v erab ility so lo n g as i t is ‘reaso n ab ly calcu lated to l ead to th e d isco v ery o f ad m issib le ev id e n c e .’”). 3 0Clearly , neither a party nor a deponent can restrict access to witnesses o r relevant

discoverable evidence at a d e p o s i tion a bsent the existence of privilege. Dr. Vohra’s deposition testim ony was adm itted and relied upon heavily without determ ining the im pact of the discovery v iolation, the violation of t he Com m ission’s o wn procedural rules, and the violation of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure u pon due process and t he rights of the parties. ¶59. Instructive to the i m pact o n due process, in Moore v. Delta Regional Medical Center , 23 So. 3d 541, 546 ( ¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), this Court acknowledged the f our-f actor test applicable to determ ine whether excluding evidence f or a t r a nsgression in discovery is an appropriate sanction. The Moore Court, citing Mississippi Power & Light Company v. Lumpkin , 725 So. 2d 721, 733-34 (¶60) (Miss. 1998), noted that the suprem e court’s fourf actor test is f

ollows: “(1 ) the explanation f or the transgression; (2) the im portance of the testim o ny ; (3) the need f

or tim e to prepare to m eet the testim ony ; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.” Id . The Moore Court explained that: The f irst c o n s i d e ration involves a determ i nation w hether the f ailure was deliberate, s eriously negligent[ ,] or a n excusable oversigh t

. The second con s ideration involves an assessm ent of harm t o the proponent of the testim ony . The third a n d f o urth considerations involve a n a ssessm ent of the prejudice to the o pponent of the evidence, the possibility of alternatives to c ure that harm and the ef

f e ct on the orderly

proceedings of

the court. Id

. (quoting Lumpkin , 725 So. 2d at 733-34 (¶60)). Again, the r e c o rd ref l ects that upon considering Dr. V ohra’s unresponsive deposition testim ony , the AJ and the C o m mission
f ailed to consider t he transgression against i ts own procedural rules f or discovery and the
im p act of the transgressing deposition testim ony upon the dem ands of

due process. W hile

3 1the Commi s s i o n i s n ot bound b y com m on law, it is bound by due process and its own

procedural rules. ¶60. The m a

jority opinion asserts that since W right did not f i le a m otion to com

pel, then
W r ight possesses n o a venue f or r elief f

or the harm resulting f rom the discovery transgressions stem m ing f rom Dr. Vohra’s ref

usal t o answer relevant deposition questions. However, in this case, W right f iled a m otion t o strike Dr. Vohra’s deposition testim ony f or his intentional ref

usal to a nswer, and the trial court possessed the a uthority t o g r a n t t h a t

m otion due to the discovery transgressions regardl e s s of w hether a m otion to com pel was f iled. 20 W right did not seek dism issal of Dr. V ohra or an entry of judgm ent against TuranFoley

. R ule 37(a) provides that a p arty “ m ay apply f o r an order com

pelling discovery ” where

“ a d e p o nent f

a ils to answer a question p ropounded” or where “an e n tity f ails t o ma k e a designation under Rules 3 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) ” o r and f or other d iscovery transgressions. 2 1 That Rule 37(a) uses the word “m ay ” plainly m eans that it does not require a party to f ile a m otion to

com pel bef ore m oving to strike the tran s g r e s s ing testim ony . Rather, as discussed, jurisprudence ref

lects that the Com m ission is required to f ollow its own procedural rules to

com ply wit h the dem ands of due process. See P ulliam, 147 So. 3d at 869 (¶18); see also Salts v. Gulf Nat. Life Ins. Co. , 872 So. 2d 667, 670, 673 (¶¶4, 12) (Miss. 2004) (Def endant

20 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 7 1 -3 -5 5 (1 ) ( R ev . 2 0 1 1 ) (“[ T ] h e [ C ] o m m issio n sh all n o t b e b o u n d b y co m m o n l aw o r s t atu to ry r u les o f ev id en ce . . . b u t m ay m ak e su ch in v estig atio n o r in q u iry o r co n d u ct su ch h earin g in su ch m an n e r a s b e s t to ascertain th e rig h ts o f th e p arties.”).

21 S ee B o w ie v. M

o n t fo rt Jo n es M

em ' l H o sp
. , 8 6 1 S o . 2 d 1 0 3 7 , 1 0 4 2 (¶1 3 ) ( M i s s. 2 0 0 3 ) (F ailu re to co m

p ly w ith tim e f

ram e w ith i n w h ich to co m p lete d isco v ery w arran ted ex clu sio n o f

p lain tif f ’s u n tim ely

d esig n ated ex p ert.).

3 2has a duty to cooperate w ith d i scovery and w here a party or persons designated “to testif y on behalf of a party f ails to obey

an order to provide or perm it discovery ,” the court can issue “such orders in regard to that f ail u r e a s a r e j ust, and am ong others[ ,]” include an order striking pleadings, or parts thereof , dism issal, or r endering by def ault against the disobedient party .). The record ref

l ects that neither the AJ n or the Com m i ssion applied the appropriate legal standard when c onsidering t he def ense’s discovery transgression or W right’s m otion to strike related thereto. ¶61. Pursuant to the Miss i s s i p p i Wo r k e r s’ Com pensation Act, t he Com m ission’s own procedural rules are relaxed to allow f o r the introduction of relevant a nd com petent e vidence, and these Com m ission rules provide that deposition testim ony shall be taken i n a ccordance

w i th Rules 2 6-37. The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the C om m ission’ s r u l e s should not be m anipulated to prevent a claim a nt f rom d iscovery of relevant imp e a c h m ent evidence and evidence of potential bias of the em ploy er’s m edical expert who conducted the
EME to which the claim a nt was required to subm it. As a cknowledged in Pulliam , 147 So. 3d at 869 (¶18), “due process dictates that the Com m ission

. . . f ol l o w its own procedural-due-proc e s s principles in conducting its duties o f adm inistering workers’

com pensation claim s.” 22 In this case, sim ilar to Pulliam , t h e A J erroneously allowed the

22 S ee U n ited S ta tes v. T

em p leto n , 6 2 4 F

. 3 d 2 1 5 , 2 2 3 ( 5 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ) (“T h e p o ten tial b ias o f a w itn ess ‘is alw ay s r elev an t as d iscred itin g th e w itn ess an d a f f e ctin g t h e w eig h t o f h is testim o n y .’”); T

h u r b er C o rp
. v. F

a irch ild M

o t o r C o rp ., 2 6 9 F .2 d 8 4 1 , 8 4 5 ( 5 th C ir. 1 9 5 9 ) (A w itn ess’s em

p l o y er m ay b e “reg ard ed as a relev an t c ircu m s tan ce to b e c o n sid ered b y th e j u r y a s sh o w in g b ias o r in terest, a n d a f o r tio ri w h ere th e w itn ess is a n em p l o y ee o f a p a r t y w h o h a s an in terest in th e reco v ery , h is em p l o y m en t m a y b e sh o w n f

o r th e sam e reaso n .”); T

h o m p so n M a ch

. C o m m erce C o r

p
. v. W a lla ce , 6 8 7 S o . 2 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 2 (M iss. 1 9 9 7 ), ab ro g ated o n o th er g ro u n d s b y U p ch u rch P lu m b in g

, In c. v
. G r e en w o o d U

tils. C o m m '

n , 9 6 4 3 3adm ission of evidence in violation of those r ules. To serve the d em ands o f due process, I would reverse and rem and this case to the Com m ission. See Vardam an S. Dunn, M ississippi
W orkers’ Compensation § 31 (3d ed. 1990). WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

S o . 2 d 1 1 0 0 , 1 1 1 8 (¶4 5 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 7 ) ) (“P arties m ay l ib era l ly c ro ss-ex am in e p ro f f ered w i tn esses reg a rd in g b ias an d in terest.” T h e su p rem e co u rt f o u n d th at ev id en ce o f a w itn ess’s sep aratio n p ack ag e “m a y h av e e ith er created an i ssu e o f b ias o r in terest o r f o rm e d a b asis o f [ th e w itn ess’s] o p in io n .”). 3 4