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*********************************************** 
JILL GILBERT CALLAHAN v. JAMES CALLAHAN

(AC 40723)

Alvord, Moll and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

resolving certain postjudgment motions that the parties had filed. The

plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted the

defendant’s motion to modify his alimony obligation and ordered that

the modification apply retroactively. The dissolution court had granted

the defendant’s motion to open the dissolution judgment and issued

substitute financial orders. This court thereafter reversed the dissolution

court’s granting of the motion to open and remanded the matter to the

trial court with direction to reinstate the original financial orders. The

plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the defendant had failed to pay her certain amounts set forth in the dissolution

court’s original financial orders. The trial court declined to find the

defendant in contempt and determined that the effective date for the

running of interest on the amounts at issue was the date on which

the parties’ appeals to this court were finally determined. The court

subsequently granted the defendant’s motion to modify alimony, and

the plaintiff appealed to this court. The trial court thereafter determined

that it lacked jurisdiction over a motion that the plaintiff had filed

requesting that the court order the defendant to endorse certain insurance checks for damage to the parties’ former marital home. The court

also denied another motion for contempt that the plaintiff filed regarding

documents necessary to transfer to the defendant the plaintiff’s interest

in certain companies that the parties owned, and the plaintiff filed an

amended appeal with this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s

motion to modify his alimony obligation and determining that the defendant had established a substantial change in circumstances due to his

lower earning capacity: that court’s finding that the defendant’s earning

capacity had decreased, which it based on the companies’ profits, was

not clearly erroneous, as the court credited testimony by the defendant’s

expert witness about the companies’ financial statements, the defendant

testified that he would not be able to obtain a job with a Wall Street

bank or hedge fund, the court found it significant that the defendant

had not worked on Wall Street in twenty years, and the transfer of the

plaintiff’s interest in the companies to the defendant, which had been

ordered by the dissolution court, had not yet occurred and prevented

the defendant from selling the companies; moreover, the court was not

required to determine the defendant’s earning capacity on the basis of

what he might theoretically earn if he were to sell the companies and

pursue employment opportunities in the marketplace, and the court

used the same formula that the dissolution court had used to determine

the defendant’s earning capacity.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the modification

of the defendant’s alimony obligation be retroactive three years and

requiring the plaintiff to repay him certain sums of alimony that she

had received; that court found it equitable and appropriate under the

circumstances to modify the defendant’s alimony obligation, pursuant

to statute (§ 46b-86 [a]), retroactive to the date that the original motion

was served on the plaintiff three years earlier because there had been

a substantial delay in hearing the motion, which was pending when the

court treated an amended motion to modify that the defendant had filed

as a continuation of his original motion to modify, until the court issued

its decision.

3. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court lacked the authority to suspend

the defendant’s alimony payments was moot; a reversal of the court’s

suspension of alimony payments would not afford the plaintiff any practical relief, as the trial court had factored the suspension of the payments

into its calculation of the defendant’s overpayment of alimony and
reduced the overpayment by the amount of alimony that accrued during

the suspension.

4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court, on remand,

improperly failed to determine that the reinstated financial orders were

effective as of the date of the dissolution judgment, which thereby

reduced the value of her property award by depriving her of accrued

interest on the defendant’s debt to her: the trial court properly interpreted this court’s remand order in determining that the judgment was

effective as of September 8, 2015, the date on which the parties’ appeals

to this court were finally determined, as the date employed in the remand

order identified which financial orders were to be reinstated, the remand

order constituted a reversal of a judgment, which commanded a new

effective date, and because the original financial orders were superseded

by those contained in the dissolution court’s intervening judgment,

which this court reversed, the judgment subsequently directed, which

mandated a reinstatement of the superseded financial orders, was not

effective retroactively; moreover, it was not reasonable to interpret the

remand order as direction to the trial court to reinstate the original

financial orders retroactive to the date of the dissolution judgment, and

if this court intended to direct the trial court to reinstate the original

financial orders retroactive to the date of the dissolution judgment,

it would have included language directing the trial court accordingly;

furthermore, because the sums set forth in the dissolution court’s financial orders were no longer payable once that court opened the dissolution

judgment, the plaintiff’s claim that she should be compensated for the

loss of the use of that money was without foundation.

5. This court found unavailing the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred

in ordering her to execute certain documents to transfer to the defendant

her interest in the companies: contrary to the plaintiff’s claim that the

court improperly required her to execute a certain complex commercial

document, the court properly credited the testimony of the defendant’s

expert witness that a transfer of the plaintiff’s interest in the companies

would require fulsome representations and warranties in order to preserve the fair market value of the companies, both parties and the

court envisaged a potential sale of the companies, as the amount of the

promissory note correlated with the value of the plaintiff’s 50 percent

interest in the companies, the inclusion of a release in the documents

did not constitute a modification of the dissolution judgment, and the

plaintiff presented no evidence to refute the testimony of the defendant’s

expert witness that such a release was customary; moreover, the plaintiff

presented no evidence to demonstrate her claimed inability to make

particular representations in the documents, and although there were

inconsistencies in the documents, for which the trial court acknowledged that amendments were required prior to the execution of the

documents, the plaintiff neither set forth the particular provisions in

her motion for contempt nor identified them to the trial court.

6. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly

concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to require that the

defendant endorse two insurance checks for postdissolution property

damage to the parties’ former marital home, which the dissolution court

had awarded to the plaintiff; the trial court lacked authority to revisit its

property distribution orders or to enter additional property distribution

orders to compensate the plaintiff for the alleged postjudgment reduction in value of the home, and, to the extent that the proceeds of the

insurance checks were viewed as a new asset that was acquired pursuant

to a contract of insurance that was in effect after the parties’ marriage

had been dissolved, such proceeds would not be marital property distributable under the statute (§ 46b-81) governing the distribution of marital property.

Argued April 18—officially released September 17, 2019

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Munro,

J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the defendant appealed to

this court; thereafter, the court, Munro, J., granted the
defendant’s motion to open the judgment and entered

certain financial orders, and the plaintiff appealed to

this court, which reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case to that court for further

proceedings; subsequently, the court, Hon. Michael E.

Shay, judge trial referee, granted the defendant’s

motion to modify alimony and rendered judgment

thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court;

thereafter, the court, Diana, J., denied the plaintiff’s

motions for contempt and for an order regarding certain

insurance checks, and the plaintiff filed an amended

appeal. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.

Laura W. Ray, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Jon T.

Kukucka and, on the brief, Johanna S. Katz, for the

appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,

the plaintiff, Jill Gilbert Callahan, appeals from the judgments of the trial court, rendered on remand from this

court, granting a motion to modify alimony filed by

the defendant, James Callahan, and issuing additional

postjudgment orders. On appeal, the plaintiff claims

that the court (1) erred in granting the defendant’s

motion to modify alimony, (2) abused its discretion in

modifying alimony retroactively, (3) lacked the legal

authority to suspend the defendant’s alimony payments

to her as a condition of granting her motion for a continuance, (4) erred in determining the effective date of

financial orders that this court mandated be reinstated,

(5) erred in ordering her to execute certain documents

to transfer her interest in the companies owned by the

parties, and (6) improperly concluded that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to require the defendant to

endorse two insurance checks. We dismiss as moot

the plaintiff’s third claim regarding the suspension of

alimony payments and affirm the judgments of the trial

court in all other respects.1

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the appeal. The parties were

married in 1987 and raised three children, all adults at

the time of the dissolution trial. In 2009, the plaintiff

filed a complaint seeking dissolution of her marriage

to the defendant. The matter was tried to the court,

Munro, J., in March, 2012. On May 8, 2012, the court

issued a memorandum of decision rendering judgment

dissolving the parties’ marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, and entering property division

and alimony orders (May, 2012 dissolution judgment).

On June 15, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to open

the judgment of dissolution and attendant financial

orders, which was granted on November 6, 2012. The

court then held an evidentiary hearing and, in a February 27, 2014 memorandum of decision, issued substitute

financial orders (February, 2014 decision).

Both parties filed appeals. This court, on May 5, 2015,

issued a decision reversing the trial court’s granting of

the motion to open the judgment and remanded the

matter with direction to reinstate the May, 2012 financial orders. Callahan v. Callahan, 157 Conn. App. 78,

101, 116 A.3d 317, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 913, 116 A.3d

812 (2015), and cert. denied, 317 Conn. 914, 116 A.3d

813 (2015).

Following this court’s resolution of the parties’ prior

appeals, the plaintiff filed, among several motions, a

motion for contempt dated July 6, 2015. In her motion,

she argued, inter alia, that the defendant had refused

to comply with the judgment in that he had failed to

pay amounts set forth in the May, 2012 financial orders,

plus interest, which she contended had begun accruing
in 2012. On May 4, 2016, the court, Hon. Michael E.

Shay, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of decision declining to find the defendant in contempt, in

which it concluded that ‘‘the effective date for the running of interest is September 8, 2015,’’ the date that,

the court determined, the defendant had exhausted all

the appellate avenues that had been available to him.

In November, 2016, the court, Hon. Michael E. Shay,

judge trial referee, began hearing evidence on a motion

to modify alimony originally filed by the defendant on

May 19, 2014, and amended on October 15, 2015. In its

memorandum of decision filed August 1, 2017, the court

found that the defendant had established a substantial

change in circumstances and granted his motion to

modify alimony. On August 7, 2017, the plaintiff filed

this appeal.

While this appeal was pending, the court, Diana, J.,

heard additional motions filed by the plaintiff. On April

3, 2018, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction

over the plaintiff’s motion requesting that the court

order the defendant to endorse two Chubb property

damage insurance checks.2 On April 10, 2018, the court

denied the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the

documents necessary to transfer the plaintiff’s interest

in companies owned by the parties and issued a remedial order. On April 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal

challenging the April 3 and 10, 2018 orders, which this

court treated as an amendment to the original appeal

filed on August 7, 2017. Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal is that the trial

court erred in finding that the defendant had established

a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification in alimony. She argues that the trial court erroneously considered evidence showing a change in the

defendant’s earnings only from the companies owned

by the parties, whereas the dissolution court based its

original alimony award on the defendant’s general earning capacity independent of his earnings from the companies. Thus, she argues that the trial court failed to

compare ‘‘apples to apples . . . .’’3 We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. In 1995, the parties established three companies together, Pentalpha Group, LLC,

Pentalpha Funding, LLC, and Pentalpha Capital, LLC.

The plaintiff owned 51 percent of each of the three

entities and the defendant owned 49 percent. In 2005,

a fourth Pentalpha entity was created, Pentalpha Surveillance, of which 100 percent was owned by the defendant (collectively, the companies). The court found that

the companies ‘‘work in various fields: as an investment

advisor, as a trading and brokerage company, as a broker dealer and as an oversight company, all ostensibly
in the loan market, particularly working with assetbacked debt.’’

In its May, 2012 dissolution judgment, the court

ordered the defendant to pay $60,000 per month in

alimony, until the death of either party, the remarriage

of the plaintiff, or as determined by the court, pursuant

to General Statutes § 46b-86 (b). In so ordering, the

court stated: ‘‘The alimony order is predicated on earnings, including member distributions to the defendant

of up to $2,000,000 per year. The court notes that the

plaintiff’s valuation expert, Barry Sziklay, concluded

that a comparable compensation for the defendant, as

a key person operating on Wall Street, would be at

least in the [$1 million to $2 million] range annually.

Ultimately, in the valuation model that he used, Sziklay

attributed 50 percent of the pretax profits to the defendant. For 2010, that resulted in adjusted compensation

of $1,976,312. As of the second quarter’s completion

for 2011, that adjusted compensation attributed to the

defendant was $684,880. The defendant provided no

contrary evidence. The court finds this approach reasonable. No evidence was adduced of any increase in

liabilities. Accordingly, finding earnings attributable to

the defendant in the amount of $2,000,000 gross is conservative, the court adopts it as a finding of fact as to the

present earning capacity of the defendant at Pentalpha.’’

On May 19, 2014, while the parties’ prior appeals

remained pending, the defendant filed a motion to modify his alimony. In that motion, he represented that the

companies were ‘‘experiencing a cash flow crisis’’ and

that the defendant’s earning capacity at the companies

was no longer $2 million. The defendant argued that

postjudgment misconduct of the plaintiff, on which the

trial court relied in opening the dissolution judgment,

had diminished the value of the companies, thereby

reducing the earnings from which he pays alimony. The

motion was not pursued while the parties’ prior appeals

were pending. On October 15, 2015, the defendant filed

an amended motion for modification of alimony, again

arguing that his income had decreased since the date

of dissolution.

The court began hearing evidence on the defendant’s

motion on November 8, 2016. The defendant testified

that, taking the four companies together, the cash collected on an annual basis had decreased substantially

since the May, 2012 dissolution judgment. As to the

potential for other employment, the defendant testified

that he did not believe it would be possible for him to

leave the companies and get a new job. Specifically, he

stated: ‘‘The market has taken an invention that I’ve

devised—this surveillance, this oversight, to investor

confidence. They’ve made me an insider on 140 deals.

I can’t go show up and work at some Wall Street bank

or some hedge fund; they would have to preclude me

from the one thing that I know about because I’m
the insider.’’

Both parties presented expert testimony. The defendant presented the testimony of Attorney Mark Harrison. Harrison testified that he used the compensation

methodology set forth in the May, 2012 dissolution judgment, pursuant to which 50 percent of the pretax profits

of three of the companies (Pentalpha Funding, LLC,

Pentalpha Group, LLC, and Pentalpha Capital, LLC) as

shown in the companies’ audited financial statements,

was attributed to the defendant as reasonable compensation. Harrison performed the same analysis for the

years 2012–2015 to arrive at reasonable compensation

attributable to the defendant in the amount of $210,000.

He also performed the same analysis including profits

from Pentalpha Surveillance, which was omitted from

the calculations in the May, 2012 dissolution judgment,

to arrive at reasonable compensation attributable to

the defendant in the amount of $370,000. The audited

financial statements for each of the four companies, on

which Harrison relied, also were entered into evidence.

Harrison testified that the defendant was not earning

sufficient money to satisfy his alimony obligations. Specifically, he testified that in order to satisfy the defendant’s obligations pursuant to the May, 2012 dissolution

judgment, he would be ‘‘not only taking the 50 percent

of income out of the company, he’s taking it all out as

well as withdrawing the excess capital that was valued

in it to get the cash flow to be able to pay his obligations

pursuant to the judgment and live his life.’’

The plaintiff presented the expert testimony of

Sziklay, whose formula attributing 50 percent of the

pretax profits of the companies to the defendant was

used by the court in the May, 2012 dissolution judgment

to reach an earning capacity of $2 million. In his testimony during the hearing on the motion for modification,

Sziklay agreed with the numbers used by Harrison to

determine 50 percent of the pretax profits of the companies. He disagreed, however, with Harrison’s conclusion

that the defendant had an earning capacity of $210,000.

According to Sziklay’s December, 2016 testimony, the

defendant’s earning capacity of $2 million, which was

found by the dissolution court in May, 2012,

remained reasonable.

In its memorandum of decision filed August 1, 2017,

the court determined that the defendant had established

a substantial change in circumstances due to his lower

earning capacity. The court credited Harrison’s testimony that the defendant had been using his personal

assets to meet his marital obligations. Finding that Harrison had ‘‘used the same basic format that . . . Sziklay

used at the time of trial,’’ the court relied on Harrison’s

calculations using the profits of all four companies. The

court found that the defendant had an earning capacity

of $370,000 per year, as of January 1, 2016, and ordered

the defendant to pay $12,000 per month in alimony
until ‘‘the death of either party or the remarriage of the

plaintiff, or the entry into a civil union by her, whichever

shall sooner occur.’’ The court found, with respect to

the period of July 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015,

that the defendant had an earning capacity of $850,000

per annum and a net income of $489,692. It determined

the alimony due for that period to be $24,000 per month.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court was

required to find the defendant’s earning capacity independent of the companies. We disagree.

‘‘We review the court’s judgment granting a motion to

modify alimony payments under an abuse of discretion

standard. An appellate court will not disturb a trial

court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the

court has abused its discretion or it is found that it

could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the

facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial

court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption

in favor of the correctness of its action.’’4

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McRae v. McRae, 139 Conn. App.

75, 80, 54 A.3d 1049 (2012). ‘‘[T]he trial court’s findings

[of fact] are binding upon this court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Steller v. Steller, 181 Conn. App. 581,

593, 187 A.3d 1184 (2018).

‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-86 governs the modification

or termination of an alimony or support order after the

date of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case,

the disputed issue is alimony . . . the applicable provision of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that

a final order for alimony may be modified by the trial

court upon a showing of a substantial change in the

circumstances of either party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification bears

the burden of demonstrating that such a change has

occurred. . . . To obtain a modification, the moving

party must demonstrate that circumstances have

changed since the last court order such that it would

be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.

Because the establishment of changed circumstances

is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent

for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new

circumstance warrants a modification of the existing

order.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Olson v. Mohammadu, 310

Conn. 665, 671–72, 81 A.3d 215 (2013). In determining

whether the moving party has established a substantial

change in circumstances, the trial court is ‘‘free to credit
or reject all or part of the testimony given . . . . On

review, we do not reexamine the court’s credibility

assessments.’’ Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167 Conn. App. 480,

489, 144 A.3d 447 (2016).

The plaintiff argues that the court erred in calculating

the defendant’s earning capacity on the basis of the

companies’ profits alone, rather than on the defendant’s

earning capacity independent of the companies.5

‘‘While

there is no fixed standard for the determination of an

individual’s earning capacity . . . it is well settled that

earning capacity is not an amount which a person can

theoretically earn, nor is it confined to actual income,

but rather it is an amount which a person can realistically be expected to earn considering such things as

his vocational skills, employability, age and health.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fritz v. Fritz, 127

Conn. App. 788, 796, 21 A.3d 466 (2011).

Bearing in mind that a party’s earning capacity is

not calculated by reference to amounts the party can

theoretically earn, nor is earning capacity fixed at any

one moment in a career, we are unpersuaded that the

court abused its discretion in grounding its finding of

the defendant’s earning capacity on the profits of the

companies. The court had before it the defendant’s testimony that he would not be able to obtain a job with a

Wall Street bank or hedge fund because the nature of

the companies’ business had made him an ‘‘insider,’’

and the court found significant that the defendant had

not worked on Wall Street in twenty years. Moreover,

the transfer of the plaintiff’s interest in the companies

to the defendant, which had been ordered by the court

in the May, 2012 dissolution judgment, had not yet

occurred, which the defendant testified prevented him

from selling the companies. Thus, the court was not

required to make its finding of the defendant’s earning

capacity on the basis of what the defendant might theoretically earn were he to sell the companies he founded

and ran for approximately twenty years to pursue limited opportunities for employment in the marketplace.

We conclude that the court’s factual finding that the

defendant’s earning capacity had decreased from $2

million at the time of dissolution to $370,000 at the time

of the modification was not clearly erroneous. The court

expressly credited Harrison’s testimony and accompanying exhibits showing 50 percent of the pretax profits

of the companies as set forth in the companies’ audited

financial statements, and the plaintiff’s expert agreed

with the numbers used in Harrison’s calculations. Moreover, the court found the defendant’s earning capacity

using the same formula that the court used in its May,

2012 dissolution judgment to calculate the defendant’s

earning capacity. The court’s findings regarding a substantial change in circumstances are supported by the

record, and, thus, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion
to modify alimony.

II

The plaintiff’s second claim is that the court abused

its discretion ‘‘when it made its alimony modification

order retroactive three years to July, 2014, and ordered

the plaintiff to repay the defendant $1.3 million in alimony already received.’’ She argues that the defendant’s

motions to modify alimony were predicated on the

court’s February, 2014 decision opening the May, 2012

dissolution judgment, which this court vacated, and,

thus, retroactivity to the date of the filing of his motion

should be barred. We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. In its August 1, 2017 memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s motion to

modify alimony, the court, citing the marshal’s return,

found that the plaintiff was served in hand with the

defendant’s motion for modification on June 9, 2014.

Noting that the defendant had filed an amended motion

for modification dated October 15, 2015, seeking identical relief, the court found that ‘‘at the time of trial, the

original motion was still pending and undecided . . . .’’

Relying on § 46b-86 (a), the court concluded that ‘‘any

retroactive relief would relate back to the date of the

service of the original motion . . . and that under all

the facts and circumstances, it is equitable and appropriate to enter an order of modification retroactive to

July 1, 2014.’’ (Citation omitted.)

The plaintiff’s claim on appeal is that retroactivity

should be barred on the ground that both the original

and amended motions to modify were predicated on

findings contained in the court’s February, 2014 judgment, which was subsequently vacated. She argues that

the defendant changed the basis of his motion late in

its pendency, and therefore retroactivity is improper

because notice, required in order to support retroactive

modification, ‘‘is not meaningful if the grounds for the

motion are changed years later.’’

The issue of whether the court properly made the

modification retroactive is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See LeSueur v. LeSueur, 172 Conn. App. 767, 783,

162 A.3d 32 (2017) (court had discretion to make child

support modification retroactive to any time between

date motion was served and date motion was decided

that was reasonably supported by record); Cannon v.

Cannon, 109 Conn. App. 844, 850, 953 A.2d 694 (2008)

(‘‘[t]he record provides support that the court acted

within its discretion when it ordered the unallocated

alimony and child support payments retroactive to the

date of service for the motion for modification’’). Therefore, we apply the same standard of review set forth

in part I of this opinion.

Pursuant to § 46b-86 (a), ‘‘[n]o order for periodic payment of permanent alimony or support may be subject
to retroactive modification, except that the court may

order modification with respect to any period during

which there is a pending motion for modification of

an alimony or support order from the date of service

of notice of such pending motion upon the opposing

party pursuant to section 52-50.’’ (Emphasis added.)

‘‘We have held previously that parties must comply

strictly with § 46b-86 (a) before a court may determine

whether to retroactively modify support orders.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LeSueur v. LeSueur,

supra, 172 Conn. App. 780.

‘‘Although there is no bright line test for determining

the date of retroactivity of child support [or alimony]

payments, this court has set forth factors that may be

considered. Specifically, in Hane [v. Hane, 158 Conn.

App. 167, 176, 118 A.3d 685 (2015)], we expressly noted

that a retroactive award may take into account the

long time period between the date of filing a motion to

modify, or . . . the contractual retroactive date, and

the date that motion is heard . . . . The court may

examine the changes in the parties’ incomes and needs

during the time the motion is pending to fashion an

equitable award based on those changes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Malpeso v. Malpeso, 189 Conn.

App. 486, 507, 207 A.3d 1085 (2019). ‘‘Moreover, § 46b86 (a) accords deference to the trial court by permitting

it to make a modification to a party’s child support

obligation retroactive to ‘any period during which there

is a pending motion for modification.’ ’’ (Emphasis in

original.) LeSueur v. LeSueur, supra, 172 Conn. App.

780.

In the present case, the defendant’s motion for modification was served on June 9, 2014, and an amended

motion was filed on October 15, 2015. In both the original and amended motions, the defendant alleged that

there had been a substantial change in circumstances,

in that the companies were ‘‘experiencing a cash flow

crisis’’ and that the defendant’s earning capacity at the

companies was no longer $2 million. In his amended

motion, he again alleged a substantial change of circumstances on the basis of the diminution of his income

since the May, 2012 dissolution judgment. Although the

defendant referenced that the plaintiff’s actions

affected the companies’ profitability, the substantial

change in circumstances alleged was that the companies were ‘‘experiencing a cash flow crisis and [the

defendant’s] earning capacity at the companies is not

$2 million.’’ Thus, the substantial change in circumstances to be established by the defendant at trial was

the cash flow crisis. Significantly, the court stated in

its memorandum of decision that it had not taken into

consideration allegations three and six of the defendant’s motion, which referenced the plaintiff’s

alleged misconduct.

The court found, under the facts and circumstances
of the present case, that it was equitable and appropriate to modify the defendant’s alimony obligations

retroactively. Those circumstances included the ‘‘substantial delay’’ in hearing the defendant’s motion, which

spanned more than three years. See Cannon v. Cannon,

supra, 109 Conn. App. 851 (modification retroactive

three years to date of service for motion not abuse of

discretion). The original motion, served on June 9, 2014,

was pending pursuant to § 46b-86 (a) until the court,

which treated the amended motion as a continuation of

the original motion, issued its memorandum of decision

filed August 1, 2017. Given the circumstances, it was

not an abuse of discretion for the court to order the

modification of the defendant’s alimony obligation retroactive to July 1, 2014.

III

The plaintiff’s third claim on appeal is that the court

lacked the legal authority to suspend the defendant’s

alimony payments as a condition of granting her motion

for a continuance. She further claims that the court

erred in refusing her request to withdraw her motion

for a continuance and allow the trial to proceed. The

defendant responds that the plaintiff’s claim is not justiciable because the plaintiff was not harmed by the

court’s decision, and there is no practical relief that

this court can afford her. We conclude that this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim on the

ground of mootness.6

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The defendant’s motion for downward modification of alimony;

see part II of this opinion; was filed on May 19, 2014,

and amended on October 15, 2015. A trial on the motion

was held over the course of approximately fifteen trial

days, from November, 2016, through final argument on

June 28, 2017. A decision on the motion was rendered

August 1, 2017, on which date the trial court issued its

memorandum of decision modifying the defendant’s

alimony obligation.

On January 31, 2017, the plaintiff’s counsel informed

the court that she was requesting a continuance because

the plaintiff’s slipped disk had worsened and she was

placed on bed rest indefinitely. The defendant’s counsel

objected to the continuance on the ground that it was

‘‘yet another in a very long list of continuance requests

in this case.’’ He further requested that the court suspend the alimony order subject to recalculation upon

the conclusion of evidence in the event the court continued the matter. The court denied the motion for a continuance. When the afternoon session commenced, the

plaintiff’s counsel objected to proceeding in the absence

of the plaintiff, and the court stated that it had looked

at the number of continuances in the case and that a

‘‘good portion of them’’ had been accorded to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel.7
During a court appearance on February 24, 2017, the

court took up the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance.

The court requested that both parties provide updated

financial affidavits and that the plaintiff’s counsel provide a medical report that would enable the court to

determine whether the plaintiff might be able to return

to court to testify or whether alternative methods would

be needed to secure her testimony. The court then

expressed concern that the defendant’s motion for modification had been pending for a long period of time.

Indicating that it was required to balance the rights of

both parties, including the plaintiff’s right to attend the

hearing and assist her counsel and the defendant’s right

to have his motion heard in a timely fashion, the court

stated that it would consider argument during the parties’ next scheduled court appearance as to whether

it should suspend prospectively and temporarily the

defendant’s alimony payment in whole or in part. The

court stated: ‘‘[T]he way I view suspension is it does not

terminate the alimony. It continues to accrue subject

to a final decision.’’ Although the court was unaware

of any precedent for suspending the alimony payment,

it indicated that it had given the matter considerable

thought and believed such an action was within the

authority of the court. It also invited the parties to

identify any relevant precedent.

On March 28, 2017, the parties appeared before the

court, and the court described the issue to be heard as

‘‘whether or not it’s appropriate under all the circumstances to suspend the alimony, and I explained what

I meant by suspend, which is not terminate, not modify,

just simply suspend payment in whole or in part until

a final decision is reached . . . .’’ Having presided over

eight days of trial and heard the testimony of both

parties’ experts and the defendant, the court stated that

it had a considerable body of evidence to assist its

consideration of a motion to suspend. Following argument, the court found that it was equitable to suspend

the full alimony payment for a period of three months.

The court considered it important that the defendant

was current on his alimony payments, which the court

found he was paying out of assets that were awarded

to him in the original dissolution judgment. The court

indicated that it would revisit the issue in three months

but invited the parties to return to court sooner in the

event that the plaintiff’s medical condition resolved in

the interim.

Following the court’s ruling, the plaintiff’s counsel

sought the opportunity to consult with the plaintiff as

to whether she wanted to allow the proceedings to

continue in her absence and continue receiving alimony

payments or whether she maintained her request for a

continuance with the knowledge that alimony payments

would be suspended. Her counsel further argued that

to the extent the court’s granting of the continuance
was conditioned on accepting a suspension of alimony,

the plaintiff should be able to decide whether to accept

the condition or withdraw the motion. The court

rejected that argument and indicated that the motion

had already been brought and decided.8

On June 28, 2017, the parties appeared for final argument on the defendant’s motion to modify alimony, and

the court heard argument as to whether the suspension

of the alimony payment should continue. The court

modified its order and required the defendant to pay

$10,000 monthly in alimony until such time as the court

rendered its decision on the defendant’s motion for

modification. Again, the court emphasized that it had

ordered a suspension. It stated: ‘‘This is . . . under no

circumstances . . . a modification. That’s to be

decided. This is a suspension. . . . The payment of [the

$60,000 per month] was suspended. But as we all know

. . . if the court modifies and goes retroactive, that

. . . ultimately becomes a matter for a . . . mathematical adjustment. So, this is in no way, shape or form a

. . . modification or prejudging of the circumstances

. . . .’’

In its August 1, 2017 memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s motion for modification, the court

reiterated that the alimony had continued to accrue

during the suspension of the defendant’s alimony obligation. After finding a substantial change of circumstances and modifying the defendant’s alimony retroactive to July 1, 2014, the court took into account the

suspension of the defendant’s alimony obligation in calculating the defendant’s overpayment in the amount

of $1,330,000.9

As a threshold matter, the defendant argues that the

plaintiff was not harmed by the court’s decision suspending the defendant’s alimony obligation and, therefore, her claim is not justiciable. ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to

adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the

action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without

jurisdiction . . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or

tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so

when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.

. . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction

cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at

any stage in the proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Kennedy v. Kennedy, 109 Conn. App. 591,

598–99, 952 A.2d 115 (2008); see also Altraide v.

Altraide, 153 Conn. App. 327, 332, 101 A.3d 317

(‘‘[m]ootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 905, 104

A.3d 759 (2014).
‘‘[T]he existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from

the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive

question is whether a successful appeal would benefit

the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zoll v. Zoll, 112 Conn. App. 290,

297–98, 962 A.2d 871 (2009). In Zoll, this court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a

claim that the trial court, on September 13, 2006, had

improperly vacated a prior order of the court staying

the defendant’s alimony obligation. Id., 298. In its subsequent memorandum of decision resolving the defendant’s motion to modify alimony, issued on March 2,

2007, the court instructed that its new alimony order

was retroactive to June 14, 2006. Id. Because the March,

2007 judgment had retroactive effect, a reversal of the

September, 2006 judgment would provide no benefit to

the defendant. Thus, the claim was rendered moot. Id.

In the present case, the court expressed on multiple

occasions that, although it was ordering a temporary

suspension of the defendant’s payment of his alimony

obligation, the alimony continued to accrue during the

suspension, and the court would employ a calculation

in its final orders reflecting the suspension. In its memorandum of decision modifying the defendant’s alimony

obligation retroactive to July 1, 2014, the court factored

the suspension of payments into its calculation of the

defendant’s overpayment.10 Thus, a reversal of the

court’s suspension of alimony payments would not

afford the plaintiff any practical relief because the

amount of the defendant’s overpayment was reduced

by the amount of alimony that accrued during the suspension. Thus, the issue on appeal is moot and, as a

result, we do not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.

See Altraide v. Altraide, supra, 153 Conn. App. 332.

IV

The plaintiff’s fourth claim on appeal is that the court,

on remand, erred in determining that the May, 2012

financial orders, which this court ordered reinstated;

see Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 101;

were effective as of September 8, 2015, the date on

which the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s appeals to the

Appellate Court were finally determined. She argues

that the financial orders were effective as of May, 2012,

and thus, the defendant is responsible for interest that

began accruing according to the payment schedule provided in the original judgment of dissolution. She contends that the court’s determination of a September,

2015 effective date ‘‘improperly reduced the value of

[the] plaintiff’s property award by: (1) three years of

accrued interest on [the defendant’s] debt from May,

2012 through September 8, 2015; and (2) the loss of
default interest on his overdue installment payments

on his remaining debt.’’ The defendant responds that

the trial court correctly determined the effective date

of the judgment. We agree with the defendant.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. As noted

previously, the court issued a memorandum of decision

dissolving the parties’ marriage on May 8, 2012. Paragraph 11 of the court’s order provides: ‘‘Within sixty

(60) days the plaintiff shall transfer to the defendant

all of her right, title and interest to the Pentalpha companies. The defendant shall, coincident therewith, sign a

promissory note secured on the stock and accounts of

the Pentalpha companies for $6,000,000 that shall be

paid at the following rate to the plaintiff: $1,000,000

per year, every year commencing with the first payment on June 1, 2012, and on every June 1 thereafter

until paid in full. Said note shall bear interest at the

rate of 5 percent per year and may be prepaid. If the

defendant is in default of any payment, the entire note

shall bear interest at the rate of 10 percent per year

until the default is cured. If any of the installments are

not timely paid, the defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s

reasonable attorney’s fees and cost[s] of collection. The

plaintiff may perfect her security interest on the stock

and the Pentalpha accounts at her cost.’’11 (Emphasis

added.). Paragraph 12 of the court’s order provides:

‘‘The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of

$600,000 as an additional property order within ninety

(90) days. If defendant fails to pay in a timely manner,

the entire sum outstanding shall bear interest at the

rate of 5 percent per annum until paid in full.’’

(Emphasis added.)

On June 15, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to

open the judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had made

certain unauthorized postjudgment withdrawals from

company accounts. He requested that the court ‘‘open

and set aside the May 8, 2012 judgment of dissolution

and attendant financial orders and . . . hold a new

trial as to all financial issues.’’ In the alternative, he

requested that the court ‘‘open its judgment and . . .

enter new financial orders that take into account the

plaintiff’s unauthorized withdrawal of funds from the

Pentalpha companies.’’

On November 6, 2012, the court opened the judgment,

ordering court-supervised appropriate discovery and a

hearing to provide evidence for the court to ‘‘find such

facts as are necessary to enter new financial orders, as

may be necessary, that take into account the plaintiff’s

unauthorized withdrawal of funds from the Pentalpha

companies.’’ After a period of discovery and a hearing,

the court issued what this court described as ‘‘substitute

financial orders’’ on February 27, 2014. Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 86. In its 2014 memorandum of decision, the trial court found that the value of
the companies had been reduced as a result of the

plaintiff’s actions from $11,747,660 in June, 2011, to

$6,336,734. Id. The court issued new orders, which were

‘‘in lieu of and replace[d] all of the orders in the original

memorandum of decision regarding ownership of Pentalpha and payment therefor.’’ The court then ordered

the defendant to execute a promissory note in the

amount of $3 million, which was one half of the sum

ordered in the original dissolution judgment.12 The court

issued a new judgment dated February 25, 2014.

Both parties filed appeals. On August 17, 2012, the

defendant filed his appeal13 (AC 34936) from the dissolution judgment and the court’s August 1, 2012 denial of

his May 29, 2012 motions to open the judgment and to

reargue. Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App.

84 n.8. On March 7, 2014, the plaintiff filed her appeal

(AC 36617) from the court’s decision opening the dissolution judgment and modifying the financial orders. Id.,

87. On April 7, 2014, the defendant amended his appeal

to include a challenge to the court’s opening of the

judgment and its modification of the financial orders.

Id. Although this court did not consolidate the appeals,

it wrote one opinion addressing the claims made in

both appeals. Id., 80 n.1.

In a decision released on May 5, 2015, this court

‘‘agree[d] with the plaintiff’s claim that the court did

not have authority to open the dissolution judgment

and, accordingly, reverse[d] the judgment entering substitute financial orders and remand[ed] the case with

direction to reinstate the May, 2012 financial orders.’’

Id., 81. This court ‘‘otherwise affirm[ed] the dissolution

judgment.’’ Id. The rescript provided: ‘‘The judgment

granting the motion to open is reversed and the case

is remanded with direction to reinstate the May, 2012

financial orders. The judgment is affirmed in all other

respects.’’ Id., 101. The defendant filed two petitions

for certification to appeal to our Supreme Court, which

denied the petitions on June 24, 2015. Callahan v. Callahan, 317 Conn. 913, 116 A.3d 812 (2015); Callahan v.

Callahan, 317 Conn. 914, 116 A.3d 813 (2015).

Following this court’s resolution of the parties’ prior

appeals, the plaintiff filed, among other motions, a

motion for contempt dated July 6, 2015. In her motion,

she argued, inter alia, that the defendant had refused

to comply with the judgment in that he had failed to

pay the amounts set forth in the financial orders, plus

interest, which she contended had begun accruing in

2012.14 The parties appeared before the court, Hon.

Michael E. Shay, judge trial referee, on this and other

motions on November 24, 2015. During that appearance,

the subject of the effective date of the judgment arose,

and the court requested briefing. The parties appeared

for argument on the issue on April 22, 2016.

On May 4, 2016, Judge Shay issued a memorandum

of decision, in which he concluded that ‘‘the effective
date for the running of interest is September 8, 2015.’’

The court set forth the sole issue of the parties as

‘‘whether 5 [percent] interest should be calculated from

June 1, 2012, as set forth in the original judgment or

from May 5, 2015, at the earliest, or at a date following

the termination of the appellate process, at the latest.’’

The court stated that counsel for the plaintiff had conceded during argument that the plaintiff’s obligation to

transfer the stock and the defendant’s obligation to

prepare the promissory note were not triggered until

the appellate process terminated in 2015. Thus, the

court found that ‘‘[i]n the absence of the obligation to

draft a promissory note until after the appellate process

was complete . . . it is only logical that interest would

start to run from the later date.’’ The court relied on

case law providing that ‘‘the granting of a motion to

open renders a trial court’s judgment nonfinal and,

therefore, ineffective pending its resolution’’; RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672,

686, 899 A.2d 586 (2006); and that ‘‘[s]etting aside or

vacating a prior order renders the situation the same

as though the order had never been made’’; State v.

Phillips, 166 Conn. 642, 646, 353 A.2d 706 (1974); and

concluded that ‘‘where the Appellate Court breathed

new life into the then defunct original judgment, its

provisions should become effective as of that date, and

in this case, when the appellate process was at an end.’’15

We begin by setting forth the standard of review

applicable to the claim that the court improperly construed this court’s remand order as to the effective date

of the judgment directed. ‘‘Determining the scope of a

remand is a matter of law because it requires the trial

court to undertake a legal interpretation of the higher

court’s mandate in light of that court’s analysis. . . .

Because a mandate defines the trial court’s authority

to proceed with the case on remand, determining the

scope of a remand is akin to determining subject matter

jurisdiction. . . . We have long held that because [a]

determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . .

‘‘At the outset, we note that, [i]f a judgment is set

aside on appeal, its effect is destroyed and the parties

are in the same condition as before it was rendered.

. . . As a result, [w]ell established principles govern

further proceedings after a remand by this court. In

carrying out a mandate of this court, the trial court

is limited to the specific direction of the mandate as

interpreted in light of the opinion. . . . This is the

guiding principle that the trial court must observe. . . .

It is the duty of the trial court on remand to comply

strictly with the mandate of the appellate court

according to its true intent and meaning. . . . The trial

court should examine the mandate and the opinion of

the reviewing court and proceed in conformity with

the views expressed therein.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 383–

84, 3 A.3d 892 (2010); see also Bruno v. Bruno, 177

Conn. App. 599, 606–607, 176 A.3d 104 (2017).

Both parties rely on the general principle that ‘‘[i]f

the trial court’s judgment is sustained, or the appeal

dismissed, the final judgment ordinarily is that of the

trial court. If, however, there is reversible error, the

final judgment is that of the appellate court.’’ Preisner

v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 415,

525 A.2d 83 (1987); see also W. Horton & K. Bartschi,

Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut Rules of

Appellate Procedure (2018–2019 Ed.) § 71-1, p. 258,

authors’ comments (‘‘[i]f the Superior Court judgment

is affirmed, the judgment is effective retroactive to the

date of its entry; if a Superior Court judgment is reversed

and a different judgment is directed by the Supreme

Court, it is effective as of the date of the appellate

judgment’’). They disagree, however, as to the proper

application of this principle. The plaintiff contends that

‘‘[t]he operative Superior Court judgment to determine

the effective date is the May, 2012 judgment, which

was affirmed, not [the February, 2014 decision], which

impermissibly opened [the May, 2012 dissolution judgment] and which this court determined was a legal

nullity.’’ According to the defendant, however, the dissolution judgment was no longer in effect as of the

court’s November 6, 2012 decision opening the judgment. See Connecticut National Bank v. Great Neck

Development Co., 215 Conn. 143, 147, 574 A.2d 1298

(1990) (‘‘[a]fter a motion for opening a judgment is

granted, the case stands as though no judgment was

rendered’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). He contends that the judgment issued on February 25, 2014,

remained in effect until this court released its decision

in May, 2015. In that decision, this court reversed the

February, 2014 judgment and, thus, he argues that the

effect of the reversal is that the judgment directed by

this court became effective upon the release of this

court’s decision.

We agree with the defendant that, under the unique

procedural posture of this case, this court’s decision

and remand order disposing of the parties’ prior appeals

constituted a reversal of a judgment, which commands

a new effective date, rather than an affirmance of a

judgment, which would operate retroactively. Because

the original financial orders were superseded by those

contained in the court’s intervening judgment, and that

intervening judgment was reversed by this court, the

judgment subsequently directed, which mandated a

reinstatement of the superseded financial orders, was

not effective retroactively.

The plaintiff argues, however, that the intervening

decision constituted ‘‘a legal nullity’’ and that ‘‘[b]ecause

the trial court lacked authority to open the judgment in
the first instance, that opened judgment cannot possibly

provide authority to the trial court . . . to change the

terms and effective date of the original May, 2012 judgment.’’16 In support of her argument, she cites RAL

Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 278

Conn. 684. In that case, our Supreme Court concluded

that the trial court improperly opened the judgment of

foreclosure and set new law days, in an action our

Supreme Court described as ‘‘either a legal nullity or

an action in contravention to the appellate stay barring

actions to carry out or to enforce the judgment pending

appeal.’’ Id., 685. Accordingly, our Supreme Court concluded that the defendants’ appeal ‘‘was not vitiated by

the opening of the judgment.’’ Id., 682. We find this

case distinguishable, in that the issue presented in RAL

Management, Inc., was whether a pending appeal

becomes moot when a trial court grants a motion to

open a judgment of foreclosure to set new law days.

Our Supreme Court recognized that the law days in

a judgment of strict foreclosure have no legal effect

pending the stay occasioned by an appeal because to

give them legal effect ‘‘would result in the extinguishment of the right of redemption pending appeal.’’ Id.,

683. Thus, the court stated that ‘‘[i]t necessarily follows

. . . that, if the law days have no legal effect and necessarily will lapse pending the appeal . . . any change

to those dates pending appeal similarly [has] no effect.’’

(Citation omitted.) Id., 684. In the present case, the

court, in opening the dissolution judgment, did not modify a provision of the judgment that already lacked legal

effect but, rather, set aside significant provisions of the

financial orders contained in the dissolution judgment.

Thus, we do not read RAL Management, Inc., as suggesting that the court’s opening of the judgment in the

present case must be viewed as a legal nullity such

that reversal of that decision would not warrant a new

effective date of the judgment directed following

reversal.

Moreover, our review of this court’s opinion and its

remand order leads us to conclude that this court did

not order the reinstatement of the original judgment

retroactive to May, 2012. See Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., supra, 298 Conn. 384 (in carrying out mandate of this court, trial court should ‘‘examine the mandate and the opinion of the reviewing court and proceed

in conformity with the views expressed therein’’

[emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]).

In this court’s opinion, which disposed of two separate

appeals, we concluded that the trial court lacked

authority to open the judgment of dissolution and enter

substitute financial orders on the basis of its finding

that the plaintiff’s postjudgment misconduct had

reduced the value of the companies. Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 91. In reciting the facts

and procedural history, this court described the relevant May, 2012 orders as follows: ‘‘The court ordered
that the plaintiff transfer to the defendant all of her

right, title, and interest to the companies within sixty

days. Coincident therewith, the court ordered the defendant to sign a promissory note secured by the stock

and accounts of the companies for $6 million payable

to the plaintiff, at the rate of $1 million per year for six

years. The order further provided that, if the defendant

elected to sell the companies within six months, then

he was to pay the plaintiff 55 percent of the sale proceeds, and the plaintiff was to receive no less than $4

million from the sale.’’17 Id., 82–83.

This court’s recitation of the orders it ultimately

directed the trial court to reinstate suggests that it did

not intend for the reinstatement to be effective as of

May, 2012. First, it referenced the amount and schedule

of the payments without reference to the dates set forth

within that provision. Moreover, it noted that the defendant’s obligation to sign the promissory note was coincident with the plaintiff’s obligation to transfer the stock

in the companies. A conclusion that the financial orders

were effective retroactively would ignore the plaintiff’s

coincident obligation, which remains outstanding. See

part V of this opinion. Last, this court referenced the

defendant’s option to sell the companies and pay the

plaintiff for her interest in an alternative manner. To

conclude that the judgment was effective retroactively

would deprive the defendant of the opportunity to take

advantage of that option and pay the plaintiff as set

forth in paragraph 11 (a) of the dissolution judgment.18

See footnote 11 of this opinion.

We also look to the rescript in this court’s opinion,

which provides: ‘‘The judgment granting the motion to

open is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to reinstate the May, 2012 financial orders. The

judgment is affirmed in all other respects.’’ Id., 101.

Construing the remand order; see Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 328 Conn. 610, 612–13, 182 A.3d

78 (2018) (appellate court has authority to interpret its

own rescript); we conclude that it is not reasonable

to interpret the direction to ‘‘reinstate’’ the May, 2012

financial orders as an instruction to the trial court to

reinstate the orders retroactively to May, 2012. See Connecticut National Bank v. Great Neck Development Co.,

supra, 215 Conn. 147 (stating, in context of determining

whether motion to set aside judgment of dismissal was

filed within four month period, that ‘‘[e]ven had the

original judgment been reinstated, its effective date

would have been November 1, 1988, and not the date

it was first rendered’’ [emphasis added]). We think that

had this court intended to direct the trial court to reinstate the May, 2012 financial orders retroactively to the

date of the original judgment of dissolution, it would

have included additional language, either in the body

of the opinion or in its remand order, directing the trial

court accordingly. See Gary Excavating Co. v. North

Haven, 163 Conn. 428, 430, 311 A.2d 90 (1972) (‘‘[n]o
judgment other than that directed or permitted by the

reviewing court may be rendered, even though it may

be one that the appellate court might have directed’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). The date May,

2012, was employed to identify which financial orders

were reinstated.

The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[l]ike other postjudgment

interest cases, the accrued interest provision in the May,

2012 orders was meant to compensate [her] for ‘the

loss of the use of the money that . . . she is awarded

from the time of the award until the award is paid in

full,’ ’’ citing a case involving the application of General

Statutes § 37-3a, DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 55, 74 A.3d 1212

(2013). ‘‘A trial court must make two determinations

when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-3a:

(1) whether the party against whom interest is sought

has wrongfully detained money due the other party;

and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention

began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 151 Conn. App. 638,

653, 97 A.3d 1 (2014); see also Sosin v. Sosin, 300 Conn.

205, 245, 14 A.3d 307 (2011) (trial court did not abuse

discretion under § 37-3a in ordering interest from September 8, 2005, and it must be assumed that trial court

determined that, until that time, plaintiff’s retention of

money was not entirely unjustified); Bruno v. Bruno,

supra, 177 Conn. App. 611, 613–14 (where 2008 dissolution judgment awarded defendant certain assets in

Charles Schwab account, and appellate court subsequently found error in trial court’s postjudgment valuation of account, trial court on remand did not abuse its

discretion in awarding postjudgment interest on

amount due from that account from September 30, 2014,

which was date on which trial court on remand established value of that account).

Although the present case does not involve statutory

interest, it is worth noting that § 37-3a ‘‘authorizes an

award of interest in civil actions . . . as damages for

the detention of money after it becomes payable.’’

(Emphasis added.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics &

Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 310 Conn. 43 n.8. In the

present case, the sums set forth in the dissolution’s

financial orders were no longer payable once the court

opened the dissolution judgment and, therefore, the

plaintiff’s argument that she should be compensated

for the loss of use of that money is without foundation.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly

interpreted this court’s mandate in determining the

effective date of the judgment.

V

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in ordering her to execute certain documents to transfer her
interest in the companies, as contemplated by the dissolution judgment. She argues broadly that the ‘‘complex

commercial document[s]’’ prepared by the defendant

were inconsistent with the dissolution judgment’s

requirement that she ‘‘transfer’’ her interest. Specifically, she argues that the defendant’s proposed documents were improper in three main respects.19 First,

she challenges the inclusion of a general release, which

she contends was not required by the May, 2012 financial orders. Second, she argues that the documents

require the plaintiff to make representations and warranties that she cannot make on the basis of her personal knowledge. Third, she emphasizes the difference

between a ‘‘transfer’’ of her interest, which the dissolution court ordered, and a ‘‘sale’’ of her interest, which

she contends was not contemplated by the dissolution

judgment. She argues that ‘‘there was no language in

the property orders that indicates the companies should

be sold at fair market value.’’ We disagree that the court

acted outside of its authority to issue postjudgment

orders effectuating the dissolution judgment.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. As noted previously, paragraph 11 of the May, 2012 dissolution judgment required

the plaintiff to transfer to the defendant ‘‘all of her right,

title and interest to the Pentalpha companies’’ within

sixty days. Coincident with the transfer, the defendant

was required to sign a promissory note secured by the

stock and accounts of the companies in the amount of

$6 million.20 See part IV of this opinion. Following this

court’s decision resolving the parties’ prior appeals, the

defendant, in October, 2015, provided the plaintiff with

a proposed document to effectuate the transfer of her

interest. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for contempt, in which she argued that the defendant had wilfully failed to provide her with the promissory note

within the time frame required and that ‘‘the defendant

has acted in bad faith by submitting an onerous document beyond the scope of the judgment.’’ Specifically,

she argued that the draft document improperly required

her to ‘‘make representations and disclosures about the

Pentalpha companies that she is [in] no position to

make since she has not been actively working at the

company since 2009.’’

The court heard the contempt motion on April 10,

2018. The plaintiff presented no witnesses, as her counsel took the position that no testimony was required.

He maintained that the court could decide the motion on

the basis of both parties’ proposed transfer documents,

which had been entered into evidence. The defendant

presented the testimony of Attorney William Perrone,

who was qualified as an expert in the area of business

transactions. Perrone testified regarding the type of

legal documents necessary to effectuate the sale of a

company. The plaintiff’s counsel objected to Perrone’s

testimony on the ground that the dissolution judgment
required a transfer of the plaintiff’s interest, not a sale.

The court overruled the objection, and Perrone testified

that the terms transfer and sale are synonymous. Specifically, he testified: ‘‘[I]n corporate parlance, transfer

and sale are used interchangeably. Quitclaim, which is

a term that is more prevalent in real estate, is also used

outside of the real estate world to denote a transaction

in which an asset is transferred but there’s no . . .

backup. It’s basically what I have—literally what I have,

you have. You have no representations. You have no

warranties. You have no indemnification, no protection.’’

Perrone testified that buyers look to representations

and warranties to determine the value of the transaction. He further opined that the sale of a business that

operates in a regulated industry, such as the present

companies, requires more fulsome representations and

warranties, which he stated ‘‘essentially make the seller

stand behind everything from compliance with laws,

to observation of rules regarding data privacy, to the

accuracy of financial statements, to whether or not

there [are] any environmental issues.’’

Perrone reviewed each party’s proposed transfer documents. The document prepared by the defendant’s

counsel, dated October 27, 2015, and titled ‘‘Agreement

Under Section 11 of Order dated May 8, 2012,’’ was

entered into evidence as the defendant’s exhibit D. Perrone opined that exhibit D contained standard representations and warranties for a transaction of this size

and that it would permit the defendant to transfer the

companies at fair market value. The documents prepared by the plaintiff’s counsel, including a promissory

note, assignment, and pledge and security agreement,

were entered into evidence as the defendant’s exhibit

E.21 Perrone testified that exhibit E contained no representations or warranties, and that the lack thereof

would adversely impact the value of the companies as

held by the defendant or to a potential third party buyer.

On cross-examination, the plaintiff’s counsel asked Perrone to identify the provision of the dissolution judgment that ensured that the defendant could sell the

companies at fair market value. Perrone responded that

the provisions setting forth the valuation of the companies and permitting the defendant to sell the companies,

when read together, implicitly contemplate that the

defendant should have the opportunity to sell the companies at fair market value.

As to the specific terms of the defendant’s proposed

transfer documents, Perrone acknowledged that certain

provisions contained in exhibit D required amendment

because they were inconsistent with the dissolution

judgment, in that they purported to transfer the plaintiff’s interest ‘‘free and clear of any pledge, security

interest, lien, charge or other encumbrance . . . .’’ Perrone testified that the document required ‘‘a carve out
. . . for the discrete lien that is called for by the order.’’

With respect to the release contained in exhibit D, Perrone testified that ‘‘[i]t’s customary when shareholders

are exiting a business that they . . . execute and

deliver a release, and the reason for that is that you

make your deal and you pay somebody for their shares;

you don’t want them coming back after the fact and

saying, well, yeah, about that dividend, about this, about

that, what about this money that I was owed. You want

a clean break when someone sells.’’ He stated that a

release is ‘‘common in this context’’ and opined that

with the same carve out for obligations that were owed

under the note, the release would be acceptable.

In closing argument, the plaintiff’s counsel asked the

court, in the event it declined to find the defendant

in contempt, to order him to execute the plaintiff’s

proposed documents, which the plaintiff contended

conformed to the dissolution judgment. In its oral ruling, the court found the relevant provisions of the judgment, namely, paragraph 11 requiring transfer of the

plaintiff’s interest and paragraph 17 requiring the execution of all documents necessary to effectuate the orders

within thirty days, to be clear and unambiguous. The

court credited Perrone’s testimony and noted that paragraph 17 contemplates other documents that would not

specifically be mentioned in the judgment. Finding a

failure to comply with the court’s order to sign a promissory note but that such failure was not wilful, the court

declined to find the defendant in contempt. The court

then issued the following remedial order: ‘‘In order to

effectuate these orders, and the court finds the word[s]

transfer and sale as defined by [Perrone] to be interchangeable, the court finds that exhibit D, with the

representations and warranties, is the normal and customary document to transfer these types of assets. However, the document as presented wasn’t perfect, and

counsel pointed out a few items regarding the security

and paragraph 4.4,22 [and] some of the language on page

thirty eight.23

‘‘So, the court finds that exhibit D is normal and

customary for these types of transactions, and is issuing

a remedial order ordering the plaintiff to execute the

documents in the line of exhibit D as amended with a

few of the items.

‘‘Now, there may be a few other items that weren’t

picked up through [Perrone’s] examination, and I don’t

expect that to be an exhaustive list of other things that

might have been just overlooked because I don’t think

the details have been strictly negotiated by the parties.

So, the court will use that as a guideline, including the

general release, all the documents as provided.

‘‘And the court’s going to reserve jurisdiction over

this. I do not believe that this is an additional order.

This is to effectuate the order of Judge Munro from

[the May, 2012 dissolution judgment].’’ (Footnotes
added.) At the parties’ request, the court ordered the

plaintiff’s counsel, within ten days, to review the documents and provide comments to the defendant’s counsel, who would then have ten days to respond, and the

parties could then return to court for resolution of any

remaining issues.

We begin by setting forth the standard governing

our review of the court’s order regarding the transfer

documents. ‘‘Although the court does not have the

authority to modify a property assignment, a court,

after distributing property, which includes assigning

the debts and liabilities of the parties, does have the

authority to issue postjudgment orders effectuating its

judgment. . . . [I]f the . . . motion . . . can fairly be

construed as seeking an effectuation of the judgment

rather than a modification of the terms of the property

settlement, this court must favor that interpretation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Halpin v. O’Halpin, 144 Conn. App. 671, 677–78, 74 A.3d 465, cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 952, 81 A.3d 1180 (2013). ‘‘A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which

introduces new elements into the details, or cancels

some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect

of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast, an order

effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to

protect the integrity of its original ruling by ensuring

the parties’ timely compliance therewith.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 677.

‘‘In order to determine the practical effect of the

court’s order on the original judgment, we must examine the terms of the original judgment as well as the

subsequent order.’’ Stechel v. Foster, 125 Conn. App.

441, 447, 8 A.3d 545 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 904,

12 A.3d 572 (2011). ‘‘Because [t]he construction of a

judgment is a question of law for the court . . . our

review of the . . . claim is plenary. As a general rule,

judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as

other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all

parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a

judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding

the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given

to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which

is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, 156 Conn. App. 587,

593, 113 A.3d 132, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 906, 114 A.3d

1220 (2015).

Before turning to the specific provisions of exhibit

D that the plaintiff finds objectionable, we first address

the plaintiff’s broader argument that the court erred

in requiring her to execute a ‘‘ ‘negotiated’ complex

commercial document.’’ In its remedial order regarding

the transfer documents, the court found that a document of the type of exhibit D, including the representa-
tions and warranties and release contained therein, was

required to transfer the plaintiff’s interest in what the

court described as ‘‘an asset that has significant value

. . . .’’ In so finding, the court credited the testimony

of Perrone, who opined that especially in the case of

a regulated industry, a transfer of the plaintiff’s interest

would require fulsome representations and warranties

in order to preserve the fair market value of the companies. Our review of the record indicates that the court’s

credibility determination was not clearly erroneous,

and we thereby defer to the court’s conclusion regarding the credibility of Perrone’s testimony. See Budrawich v. Budrawich, 156 Conn. App. 628, 646, 115 A.3d

39, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 921, 118 A.3d 63 (2015).

As to whether the original judgment should be construed to require such a transfer, the plaintiff argues

that ‘‘there was no language in the property orders that

indicates the companies should be sold at fair market

value.’’ During the dissolution trial and first appeal,

the disposition of the companies, which were valued

collectively in excess of $10 million, was a central issue.

Notably, both parties proposed that the companies be

sold. Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 98.

Despite finding that ‘‘neither party wants the Pentalpha

companies,’’ the court ordered the plaintiff to transfer

her interest in the companies to the defendant in

exchange for the defendant’s execution of a promissory

note. Although the court declined to order a sale, its

orders anticipated that the defendant might elect to

sell the companies. In the event that he did sell the

companies, the plaintiff was to receive no less than $4

million from the sale. Thus, both parties and the court

envisaged a potential sale of the companies. As to

whether the transfer documents should be drafted in

order to permit a sale at fair market value, it is significant that the amount of the promissory note correlated

with the valuation of the companies, in that the note

in the amount of $6 million was to be exchanged for the

plaintiff’s 51 percent interest in the companies valued

at $11,747,660. Accordingly, we do not find persuasive

the plaintiff’s argument premised on the absence of

language expressly contemplating a sale at fair market

value. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the distribution of the parties’ assets to allow the plaintiff to transfer

her interest by way of a document that effected a significant reduction in the value of the companies. Thus, we

construe the judgment as requiring a transfer of her

interest in a manner that preserves the fair market value

of the companies.

Having concluded generally that a document of the

type and breadth of exhibit D is required to effectively

transfer the plaintiff’s interest, we turn to the plaintiff’s

challenges to the specific provisions of that document.

She argues that a general release was not required by

the May, 2012 financial orders.24 Perrone testified that

the release provided in exhibit D was customary in the
context of a shareholder exiting a business and that

the purpose of a release in that context is to ensure

a ‘‘clean break’’ and provide assurance against future

claims alleging unpaid dividends or other sums owed.

The plaintiff presented no evidence to refute Perrone’s

testimony that such a release was customary. We conclude that the inclusion of a release in the transfer

documents did not constitute a modification of the dissolution judgment.

With respect to the plaintiff’s broadly stated concern

that she was unable to make certain representations

because she had been ‘‘absent from running the company since 2009,’’ she relied solely on the court’s finding

in the judgment of dissolution that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s full

and final resignation from actual work . . . occurred

in September, 2009.’’25 Aside from repeating that finding,

the plaintiff presented no evidence to demonstrate her

inability to make particular representations. Although

the plaintiff declined to call any witnesses during the

hearing, she had the opportunity to challenge specific

provisions through her counsel’s examination of

Perrone.

As to inconsistencies she identified during the hearing, the trial court expressly acknowledged such provisions as requiring amendment prior to execution of the

transfer documents. For example, the transcript reveals

that the plaintiff’s counsel questioned Perrone regarding paragraph 4.4, which provided: ‘‘No Undisclosed

Liabilities. The Company is not subject to any liability

(including unasserted claims, whether known or

unknown), whether absolute, contingent, accrued or

otherwise, that is not shown or that is in excess of

amounts shown or reserved for in the Financial Statements, other than liabilities of the same nature as those

set forth in the Financial Statements and reasonably

incurred in the ordinary course of business after the

Financial Statements Date, whether or not material.’’

Perrone agreed that paragraph 4.4 was not necessary,

and the court’s order expressly identified that provision

as one requiring amendment prior to the plaintiff’s execution. Although the plaintiff provides examples in her

supplemental appellate brief of representations and

warranties she finds objectionable, our review of the

record reveals that she neither set forth the particular

provisions in her motion for contempt, nor identified

these provisions to the trial court during the hearing.

Thus, we need not address these arguments. See Histen

v. Histen, 98 Conn. App. 729, 737, 911 A.2d 348 (2006)

(argument need not be addressed because plaintiff

never made it in proceedings before trial court).

‘‘[I]t is within the equitable powers of the trial court

to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the

integrity of [its original] judgment.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Fewtrell v. Fewtrell, 87 Conn. App. 526,

531 n.4, 865 A.2d 1240 (2005). We conclude that the
court’s order requiring the plaintiff to execute the defendant’s proposed transfer documents, as amended to

correct inconsistencies identified during the hearing,

effectuated rather than modified the existing judgment

of dissolution.

VI

The plaintiff’s last claim on appeal is that the court

improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to require the defendant to endorse two

insurance checks totaling $440,370.58. Specifically, she

argues that the court’s failure to issue an order compelling the defendant to endorse the checks, which were

issued following postdissolution property damage to

the former marital home, was tantamount to an impermissible modification of the original property division,

in that the plaintiff was deprived of the full value of

the home. She argues that an order requiring the defendant to endorse the checks is necessary to effectuate

and preserve the dissolution judgment.26 The defendant

responds that the court correctly determined that it

lacked authority to distribute the insurance proceeds

because the funds were acquired after the dissolution

of the marriage and ‘‘family courts do not have the

authority to make postjudgment property distribution

awards or to adjudicate postjudgment tort or contract

claims between two divorced persons relating to new

assets.’’ We conclude that the court lacked authority

to enter an order with respect to the checks.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. On March 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed

a motion requesting that the court order the defendant

to endorse two Chubb property damage insurance

checks totaling $440,370.58. In her motion, she represented the following facts. The defendant had occupied

the former marital home following the dissolution until

October 9, 2015. After he vacated the home, the insurance policy issued by Chubb remained in both his and

the plaintiff’s names, and he continued to make premium payments from October 9, 2015 through March

24, 2017. His name also remained on the mortgage for

the property. At some point after he vacated the property on October 9, 2015, the pipes burst. The plaintiff

filed an insurance claim for the resulting damage. In her

motion requesting that the court order the defendant

to endorse the checks, she stated: ‘‘Chubb appraised

the damage and issued the first set of insurance damage

checks in June, 2016 ($163,429.42 and $276,941.16). A

second replacement set of checks was issued approximately one month later to include James Callahan. The

checks are made out to [the] parties, and one check

includes Citibank Mortgage.’’ The defendant refused

to endorse the checks, preventing the plaintiff from

receiving the proceeds to repair the damage to the

home.

On March 31, 2017, the defendant filed an objection,
in which he argued that the plaintiff’s request that the

court adjudicate ownership rights to the checks issued

relating to damage that occurred following the dissolution of the parties’ marriage was improper. He contended that the court lacked authority ‘‘to adjudicate

postjudgment disputes relating to the diminished value

of property awarded to one of the spouses.’’ On March

14, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in

support of her motion. In her memorandum, she argued

that an order requiring the defendant to endorse the

checks was necessary to effectuate the provision of the

dissolution judgment that awarded the former marital

home to the plaintiff.27 She further directed the court’s

attention to paragraph 17 of the May, 2012 dissolution

judgment, which provides: ‘‘Both parties shall execute

all necessary documents for the effectuation of these

orders within thirty (30) days, unless other specific

times are already provided herein.’’

On April 3, 2018, the court, Diana, J., heard the plaintiff’s motion. After argument, the court issued an oral

ruling denying the motion. It stated: ‘‘I’ve considered

the statutory breakdown of what’s an asset, listened to

your arguments, and reviewed the motions. The court

finds this is an after-acquired asset, and it does not have

jurisdiction to address this matter under [§] 46b-81.’’28

We begin with our standard of review. The plaintiff’s

claim implicates the scope of the court’s authority to

act postdissolution with respect to the dispute over

the insurance checks. ‘‘Any determination regarding the

scope of a court’s . . . authority to act presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) McLoughlin v. McLoughlin,

157 Conn. App. 568, 578, 118 A.3d 64 (2015).

‘‘It is well settled that [c]ourts have no inherent power

to transfer property from one spouse to another;

instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute.

. . . The court’s authority to transfer property [in] a

dissolution proceeding rests on [General Statutes]

§ 46b-81. That section provides in relevant part: At the

time of entering a decree . . . dissolving a marriage

. . . the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other

. . . . Accordingly, the court’s authority to divide the

personal property of the parties, pursuant to § 46b-81,

must be exercised, if at all, at the time that it renders

judgment dissolving the marriage.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 578–79.

In support of her argument that the court had authority to order the defendant to endorse the checks as an

effectuation of the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff

cites Cifaldi v. Cifaldi, 118 Conn. App. 325, 983 A.2d 293

(2009). In that case, the parties entered into a separation

agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into

the dissolution judgment. Id., 327. Pursuant to that

agreement, the parties agreed to have qualified domes-
tic relations orders (QDROs)29 prepared to divide the

defendant’s two pensions. Id. At the time the defendant

retired, the QDROs had not yet been processed by either

pension plan administrator. Id., 328–29. The defendant

went into pay status with respect to his pensions, and

his payments included the portions of the pensions

that had been assigned to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff

sought an order of the court requiring the defendant to

reimburse her portion of his pension benefits, which

the court declined to issue. Id., 329–30. On appeal, this

court concluded that the trial court improperly declined

to issue the requested order because such order was

necessary to effectuate the judgment. Id., 330.

‘‘[W]hen a party has been denied marital property to

which the party is entitled as part of the allocation

of property pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of

marriage, and the aggrieved party seeks relief from the

court, the court is under an affirmative obligation to

issue financial orders effectuating the existing allocation of marital property to protect the integrity of the

original judgment, subject to equitable defenses. To

hold otherwise would allow a court to modify a property

distribution simply by its own silence or inaction.’’ Id.,

334. We conclude that Cifaldi is distinguishable from

the present case, in that the judgment in Cifaldi

afforded the plaintiff a property interest in portions of

the defendant’s pension benefits, and she never

received this asset. Thus, the provision of the dissolution judgment at issue had not been effectuated. In

contrast, the plaintiff in the present case received the

asset awarded to her by the dissolution provision at

issue. The plaintiff does not dispute that she both

owned, and was in possession of, the home at the time

the damage occurred and the checks were issued.

She argues, however, that the proceeds from the

insurance checks should be ‘‘used as intended, i.e., to

protect the integrity of the original judgment, including

the value of the marital home,’’ which, according to

the plaintiff, was reduced by $440,370.58 due to the

defendant’s failure to endorse the checks. The defendant responds that even if the damage was regarded

as causing a postjudgment change affecting the value

of the home, this court, in its prior decision in this

matter, rejected the argument that the court could

revisit the judgment on a similar basis. The defendant

points to this court’s recognition in the parties’ prior

appeals that ‘‘neither § 46b-81 nor any other closely

related statute vests the trial court with authority to

revisit a judgment dividing marital property where postjudgment conduct, conditions, or changes affect the

value of a marital asset.’’ Callahan v. Callahan, supra,

157 Conn. App. 92. The defendant further argues that

Buehler v. Buehler, 138 Conn. App. 63, 66, 50 A.3d 372

(2012), controls. In that case, the trial court entered

orders at the time of dissolution relating to the marital

home, including that the home be sold. Id. In postjudg-
ment orders, the court permitted the home to be rented

and awarded the defendant the rental income generated

by the home. Id., 71. On appeal, this court determined

that the court acted without authority in assigning the

rental income wholly to the defendant, as such order

constituted an improper postjudgment property assignment in violation of § 46b-86 (a). Id.

In the present case, the court in its May, 2012 dissolution judgment awarded the plaintiff the former marital

home and that distribution was effectuated when ownership vested in the plaintiff. Subsequent to the effectuation of the judgment, damage to the home caused a

change in its value. Under these circumstances, the trial

court lacked authority to revisit its property distribution

orders or enter additional property distribution orders

to compensate the plaintiff for the alleged postjudgment

reduction in value of the home. See Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 89 (stating general rule

that ‘‘[t]he court’s authority to distribute the personal

property of the parties must be exercised, if at all, at the

time that it renders judgment dissolving the marriage’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, to the

extent the proceeds of the insurance checks are viewed

not as a reflection of the reduction in value of the home

but rather as a new asset acquired pursuant to a contract

of insurance in effect after the parties’ marriage had

been dissolved, such proceeds would not be marital

property distributable under § 46b-81. See Reinke v.

Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 381 n.3, 179 A.3d 769 (2018) (‘‘[t]he

purpose of a property division pursuant to a dissolution

proceeding is to unscramble existing marital property

in order to give each spouse his or her equitable share

at the time of dissolution’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]); Wood v. Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 716, 125

A.3d 1040 (2015) (‘‘the marital estate divisible pursuant

to § 46b-81 refers to interests already acquired, not to

expected or unvested interests, or to interests that the

court has not quantified’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

We therefore conclude that the court lacked authority

under § 46b-81 to issue postjudgment orders regarding

the insurance checks.

The plaintiff’s appeal regarding the suspension of

alimony payments is dismissed as moot. The judgments

are affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 With respect to the plaintiff’s sixth claim, although the court used the

term ‘‘jurisdiction,’’ we note that the postdissolution distribution of property

does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, its

statutory authority. See Reinke v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 391–92, 179 A.3d 769

(2018) (General Statutes § 46b-86 [a] does not deprive trial court of subject

matter jurisdiction to modify property distribution order).

2 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

3

In one sentence in each of her principal and reply briefs, the plaintiff

maintains that ‘‘the trial court would not allow the plaintiff to present expert

testimony on the absence of any substantial change in the defendant’s

earning capacity independent of Pentalpha.’’ The plaintiff provides no cita-
tion to authority or analysis as to any argument that the court improperly

precluded expert testimony. Accordingly, to the extent she seeks to challenge the court’s preclusion of expert testimony, that issue is inadequately

briefed, and we decline to address it. See Gorski v. McIsaac, 156 Conn.

App. 195, 209, 112 A.3d 201 (2015) (‘‘We are not obligated to consider issues

that are not adequately briefed. . . . Whe[n] an issue is merely mentioned,

but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been

waived. . . . In addition, mere conclusory assertions regarding a claim,

with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the

record, will not suffice.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

4 The plaintiff suggests, without citation to any authority, that this claim

should be afforded plenary review. We disagree.

5 The court, in its May, 2012 dissolution judgment, stated that its ‘‘alimony

order is predicated on earnings, including member distributions to the defendant of up to $2 million per year.’’ It further stated that ‘‘[f]inding earnings

attributable to the defendant in the amount of $2 million gross is conservative, [and] the court adopts it as a finding of fact as to the present earning

capacity of the defendant at Pentalpha.’’ In support of that finding, the court

noted that ‘‘the plaintiff’s valuation expert, Barry Sziklay, concluded that a

comparable compensation for the defendant, as the key person operating

on Wall Street, would be at least in the [$1 million to 2] million range

annually.’’ On appeal, this court reiterated these findings. Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 97.

In the present appeal, the plaintiff asks this court to find error in the trial

court’s tying the defendant’s earning capacity to his full-time employment

at the companies. In making this argument, the plaintiff urges this court to

require the trial court to establish the defendant’s earning capacity on the

basis of his pre-1995 employment. We find no error in the trial court’s

decision to refrain from doing so.

6 During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel argued

that the plaintiff experienced an injury at the time of the suspension, but

recognized that were this court to uphold the alimony modification, the

plaintiff’s claim of error in the suspension of the alimony payments would

be rendered moot.

7 We note that the record reveals other occurrences on which the plaintiff’s

counsel did not attend scheduled court hearings.

8

In an ex parte emergency motion dated April 27, 2017, the plaintiff

requested immediate reinstatement of her monthly alimony payments retroactive to April 1, 2017. She represented that she was available to return to

court to attend the trial and that she had requested the earliest available

trial dates. The court denied the motion and indicated that it would address

the matter at the next scheduled hearing date. The parties appeared before

the court on May 12, 2017, on which date the plaintiff was present. The

court found that there was ‘‘nothing substantial that has changed’’ and

declined to change its order.

9 Specifically, the court found ‘‘[t]hat the orders herein have created a

substantial overpayment of periodic alimony by the defendant; that for the

period July 1, 2014 through and including August 1, 2017, the defendant has

paid the sum of $1,990,000 (33 months x $60,000 plus 1 month [at] $10,000);

that for the period April, 2017 through June, 2017, payment of the defendant’s

alimony obligation was suspended; that after taking into account the new

orders herein retroactive to July 1, 2014, the defendant’s total alimony

obligation since that date is $660,000 (18 months x $24,000 plus 19 months

x $12,000); and that the overpayment of periodic alimony amounts to

$1,330,000.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The court thereafter ordered the plaintiff

to reimburse the defendant the amount of overpayment in installments.

10 We note that the plaintiff makes no claim on appeal that the court erred

in calculating the amount of the defendant’s overpayment.

11 Paragraph 11 continues: ‘‘a. If the defendant chooses to sell 100 percent

interest in all of the Pentalpha companies within the next six months, then

the defendant shall in full satisfaction of the note here above described pay

her 55 percent of the proceeds of the sale, net of all sums necessary to pay

upon sale, except any sums payable to the defendant, or for his benefit, for

any reason. The defendant is entitled to a dollar for dollar setoff against

that payment for all payments made to the plaintiff under this numbered

order, so long as she receives no less than $4,000,000 from the sale. Otherwise, he is not entitled to any such setoff. No other terms of sale than those

described herein shall trigger this section.

‘‘b. If the plaintiff brings a civil action against the defendant and/or the

Pentalpha companies for any rights or interests she perceives have been
violated, other than those provided for in these orders, and recovers any

sums therefor, the defendant shall have a dollar for dollar right of setoff of

said sums paid to the plaintiff against his obligations in this paragraph

eleven.’’

12 The replacement orders provided: ‘‘a. The plaintiff shall immediately

(within ten [10] days) resign from all positions at the Pentalpha companies

and execute a general release in favor of the defendant for all claims she

has, or may have, for conduct arising out of the parties’ management and

ownership of the Pentalpha companies.

‘‘b. The plaintiff shall also execute an agreement to provide such documentation as required [by] Pentalpha’s attorneys from time to time, relating to

any time period that she had an ownership interest in Pentalpha or held

herself out as an officer, principal, a part of management or owner of

Pentalpha. Upon her execution of this agreement, the defendant shall execute a note payable to the [plaintiff] in the amount of $3,000,000 payable

as follows:

‘‘i. $1,000,000 upon the conclusion to final judgment or withdrawal of the

plaintiff’s lawsuit against the auditor for all claims arising out of the auditors’

work for the Pentalpha companies. The court conditions this payment upon

this inasmuch as the lawsuit is a significant impediment to the smooth

operation of the Pentalpha companies and their ability to borrow money

(e.g., the typical need for a clean audit to borrow) so that the businesses

can continue to operate with reduced income and support the ability of the

defendant to pay this obligation;

‘‘ii. $1,000,000 on the first annual anniversary of the first payment; and

‘‘iii. $1,000,000 on the second such anniversary of the first payment.

‘‘c. If the plaintiff refuses to cooperate with the signing of any document

deemed necessary by a Pentalpha attorney in response to a particular inquiry,

the defendant shall be excused from the next anniversary payment until

and unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the plaintiff

shall be excused from signing such requirement regarding the issue then at

hand. Any overdue payments to the plaintiff as a result of this circumstance

shall not accrue interest until and unless she is so excused by a final order

of the court, in which case the interest shall accrue from 30 days after that

final order.

‘‘d. If the defendant fails to make payments in a timely manner (note the

exception is subparagraph d above), they shall accrue interest, from their

due date at the rate of 5 [percent] per annum, simple interest.’’

13 Pending resolution of the defendant’s appeal, execution of the financial

orders regarding the companies was stayed. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a).

The plaintiff filed a motion for termination of the stay of execution, which

the court, Munro, J., denied. See Practice Book § 61-11 (e). Callahan v.

Callahan, supra, 157 Conn. App. 83.

14 Specifically, she argued: ‘‘1. The defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff—$4,000,000, plus interest at 5 [percent] from June 1, 2012 (per [paragraph] 11 of the judgment) or 10 [percent] interest due to his default. This

amount represents four of the six equal annual payments already due,

together with the accrued interest at 5 [percent] from June 1, 2012, to date

of payment on the total due of $6,000,000. Such accrued interest totals

$972,146.80 to June 25, 2015. As payment has not been made as per judgment,

the entire amount due of $6,000,000 and accrued interest is in default and

will accrue interest at 10 [percent] from June 26, 2015 until such amount

is paid (per [paragraph] 11 of the judgment at pages 23 and 23).

‘‘2. The defendant has failed to execute a promissory note secured on the

stock and accounts of the Pentalpha companies in the amount of the unpaid

balance of the $6,000,000, plus all accrued interest at the 5 [percent] interest

rate or default rate of 10 [percent] per year (per [paragraph] 11 of the

judgment at page 24).

‘‘3. The defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff $600,000, together with

accrued interest at 5 [percent] from August 6, 2012 (per [paragraph] 12 of

the judgment) to date of payment. Such accrued interest totals approximately

$91,552.45 as of to date.’’

15 This court granted the plaintiff’s motion for permission to file a late

second amended appeal from Judge Shay’s May 4, 2016 decision. The plaintiff

filed her amended appeal on October 5, 2018, and subsequently filed a

supplemental brief on October 19, 2018.

16 This court concluded that the trial court ‘‘exceeded the scope of its

authority by opening the judgment to modify its financial orders based on

the plaintiff’s postjudgment misconduct.’’ Callahan v. Callahan, supra, 157

Conn. App. 93.
17 Subsequently in the opinion, this court similarly described the orders

as follows: ‘‘On May 8, 2012, the court ordered that the plaintiff transfer to

the defendant all of her rights, title, and interest to the companies. In

exchange, the court ordered the defendant to sign a promissory note, secured

by the stock and accounts of the companies, requiring him to pay the plaintiff

$1 million per year for six years for her share in the companies. The order

further provided that, if the defendant elected to sell the companies within

six months from the dissolution judgment, then he was to pay the plaintiff

55 percent of the sale proceeds, and the plaintiff was to receive no less

than $4 million from the sale.’’ (Emphasis added.) Callahan v. Callahan,

supra, 157 Conn. App. 98.

18 The plaintiff argues that the court’s decision as to the effective date of

the judgment constituted an impermissible modification of the property

distribution. The defendant responds that the decision was an effectuation

of the trial court’s orders, which, aside from setting forth payments to be

made by the defendant, provided him with the option to sell or finance the

companies to pay the plaintiff for her interests.

‘‘A modification is [a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves

the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact. . . . In contrast,

an order effectuating an existing judgment allows the court to protect the

integrity of its original ruling by ensuring the parties’ timely compliance

therewith.

‘‘Although the court does not have the authority to modify a property

assignment, a court, after distributing property, which includes assigning

the debts and liabilities of the parties, does have the authority to issue

postjudgment orders effectuating its judgment. . . . [I]f the . . . motion

. . . can fairly be construed as seeking an effectuation of the judgment

rather than a modification of the terms of the property settlement, this

court must favor that interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

O’Halpin v. O’Halpin, 144 Conn. App. 671, 677–78, 74 A.3d 465, cert. denied,

310 Conn. 952, 81 A.3d 1180 (2013).

We agree with the defendant that the determination of the judgment’s

effective date was necessary in order to implement the property distribution

orders and that the court’s order protected the integrity of, rather than

modified, those orders.

19 The plaintiff also maintains that the documents are improper in a fourth

respect, in that the new promissory note delayed the accrual of interest for

three years and reset the deadlines for payments on the note. Our resolution

of the plaintiff’s fourth claim is dispositive of this argument, which requires

no further discussion here. See part IV of this opinion.

With respect to the proposed promissory note, she also argues that unlike

the May, 2012 dissolution judgment, it improperly ‘‘forbids [the] plaintiff

from transferring, bequeathing or otherwise disposing of the note in any

way.’’ Attorney William Perrone, who testified as an expert in the area of

business transactions, recognized that the dissolution judgment by its

express terms did not prohibit the plaintiff from bequeathing or transferring

the note, but testified that ‘‘I think that it’s not uncommon in a situation

like this where the note—where the paper wouldn’t be negotiable. Sometimes paper is personal because you don’t want one party to discount this

paper, sell the paper, and then have the other party be dealing with a party

that they didn’t know.’’ The plaintiff presented no evidence to the contrary

and we are not persuaded that the inclusion of a prohibition on transfer of

the note constituted a modification of the dissolution judgment.

20 We note that the court’s April 17, 2019 memorandum of decision terminating the appellate stay of the court’s April 10, 2018 decision indicated that

the defendant had made payments to the plaintiff in the amount of $4 million.

21 Perrone additionally had examined a document prepared by the plaintiff’s prior counsel to effectuate the sale and opined that it was ‘‘essentially

a quitclaim.’’ Perrone opined that use of that document, which was titled

‘‘Promissory Note’’ and dated May 8, 2012, could reduce the sale price of

the companies to a ‘‘fire sale’’ price due to the potential buyer accepting

additional risk because of sparse representations and warranties.

22 Paragraph 4.4 of exhibit D provided: ‘‘No Undisclosed Liabilities. The

Company is not subject to any liability (including unasserted claims, whether

known or unknown), whether absolute, contingent, accrued or otherwise,

that is not shown or that is in excess of amounts shown or reserved for in

the Financial Statements, other than liabilities of the same nature as those

set forth in the Financial Statements and reasonably incurred in the ordinary

course of business after the Financial Statements Date, whether or not
material.’’

The following colloquy occurred with respect to whether the plaintiff

could make the warranty provided therein:

‘‘The Court: In your opinion, can she make that even though she hasn’t

actively been involved in the business since [2009] and she’s still the majority

owner today? Does it matter?

‘‘[The Witness]: I think—well, I think I could live—if I were negotiating

this deal, right, I could live without 4.4 because 4.5 is sufficient to cover

any activity since her resignation. Right? I mean that’s the kind of thing I

was talking about earlier today, about being able to say—

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Okay. So, when you—when it was set forth in

your disclosure of expert witness that the documents presented by [the

defendant] were in conformance with the orders of Judge Munro, was it an

oversight that 4.4 was included in here?

‘‘[The Witness]: I don’t think that the—my testimony or my opinion letter

was intended to cite, to go chapter and verse, line by line with every part

of every document. Because in any document, any deal, even in this context,

ultimately there’s going to be give and take and negotiations and things like

that; the oversight regarding the no lien other than the lien that the court

ordered are going to be picked up. Right?

‘‘So, this is—this was done, you know, a while ago. I think that as a

practical matter, you—this would be negotiated, and this would come out.

But you have to look at that. So, there’s continuum from zero reps and

warranties, which is what’s being offered up, to something that is more

typical and would yield a fair result to [the defendant] being able to sell

this business and realize the best value you can and not fire sale it.’’

23 There was some discussion during the hearing as to whether certain

language contained in the document titled ‘‘Promissory Term Note and

Security Agreement,’’ on page thirty-eight of the document, required amendment to conform to the promissory note. That language provided: ‘‘The

obligations under this Note and Security Agreement are not secured by any

other assets of Jim Callahan or by any of the assets of any of the Companies

. . . .’’ Ultimately, Perrone agreed that amending the language by ‘‘adding

the word other before the words assets [of any of the companies] would

cure any perceived inconsistency.’’

24 The plaintiff further argues that the release contained in exhibit D is

not limited to claims relating solely to the companies, but rather releases

the defendant from all liability. Although the plaintiff’s counsel questioned

Perrone as to the release, she failed to raise, either through inquiry of

Perrone or the presentation of evidence on her own behalf, a challenge to

the scope of the release with respect to the type of claims released. Because

the plaintiff failed to raise the scope of the release as an issue before the

trial court, we do not address it on appeal. See Histen v. Histen, 98 Conn.

App. 729, 737, 911 A.2d 348 (2006) (‘‘[W]e will not decide an appeal on an

issue that was not raised before the trial court. . . . To review claims

articulated for the first time on appeal and not raised before the trial court

would be nothing more than a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge.’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]).

25 The court also noted, however, that she had performed work ‘‘on one

last occasion’’ in March, 2010.

26 The plaintiff also asserts in her supplemental brief that ‘‘the trial court

improperly declined to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the jurisdictional claim,’’ and states that she sought a hearing ‘‘to present testimony

regarding, among other things, the homeowner’s policy and to clarify mischaracterizations made by counsel during argument.’’ In support of this

argument, she cites Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464,

473, 10 A.3d 52 (2010), which provides generally that ‘‘[i]n almost every

setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process

requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

. . . When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court’s

jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which

an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse

witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant responds

that the plaintiff waived any claim as to the court’s failure to hold an

evidentiary hearing. On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that the plaintiff waived any claim that the court improperly declined to

hold an evidentiary hearing.

Addressing the day’s schedule at the outset of the hearing on April 3,

2018, the plaintiff’s counsel indicated, with respect to her motion for an

order, that ‘‘we’ve discussed the fact that should it become—on the Chubb
motion, we’re going to argue the legal issues first and then should the court

make certain rulings, then we would have a factual hearing, and that would

require our witness, who is coming tomorrow.’’

When the motion came up for argument, counsel for the defendant

informed the court that ‘‘there really is a preliminary legal issue as to whether

this court has the authority to grant the relief being sought in . . . the

plaintiff’s motion, and that’s the issue that we’d like to tee up for Your

Honor.’’ Presenting the motion to the court, the plaintiff’s counsel stated:

‘‘Now, the reason that we’re arguing these preliminary matters and, counsel,

correct me if I misstate this, is that we do have evidence to put on, but

counsel’s contention is that the court has no authority to hear this issue,

and that is what we’re going to argue. And then if the court decides that it

wants to hear evidence, we are able to put that on tomorrow.’’

Toward the conclusion of argument, the plaintiff’s counsel argued: ‘‘There

are factual characterizations and mischaracterizations that would benefit

from an evidentiary hearing such as the mischaracterization that [the plaintiff] refused to get new insurance, etc. That if the court deems that the court

has . . . statutory authority to hear this issue, does the court in divorce

cases construe contracts? Yes. Does the court in divorce cases construe all

sorts of wills? You have that jurisdiction and that subject matter jurisdiction

and that statutory authority. So, we are seeking an evidentiary hearing so

that we can put on our witnesses and Your Honor can make a decision.

Counsel is saying Your Honor has no authority to even have a hearing.

Thank you.’’

27 Paragraph 3 of the May, 2012 dissolution judgment provided: ‘‘The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the real property at 3 Partridge Hollow,

Greenwich, Connecticut. The defendant shall within thirty (30) days execute

a quitclaim deed provided by the plaintiff to transfer the title. Until such

time as the defendant has transferred title to said property, he shall be

solely responsible for all costs associated with the property, including but

not limited to mortgage, taxes, insurance, all upkeep and repairs in the same

condition as the premise[s] were in, or better, than [on the] day the property

was appraised by [Michael B.] Gold. The defendant shall vacate the premises

with all of his possessions therein on the date of transfer of title. After the

defendant has both vacated the premises with all of his belongings and

transferred title to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff shall be solely responsible

for all of the above referenced costs pertaining to the property and she shall

hold the defendant harmless thereon.’’

28 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

29 ‘‘A QDRO is the exclusive means by which to assign to a nonemployee

spouse all or any portion of pension benefits provided by a plan that is

governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001

et seq.’’ Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 786 n.4, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).