NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0370n.06

Case No. 22-5969

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

G.S., by and through his parents and next friends, 

Brittany and Ryan Schwaigert, et al,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

BILL LEE, Governor,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

O P I N I O N

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DAVIS and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Shelby County issued a mask mandate to protect against the 

continued spread of COVID-19 during a state-declared state of emergency stemming from the high 

rates of transmission. Days later, the Governor of Tennessee signed an executive order permitting 

students and their parents to opt out of the County’s mask mandate as applied to grade-school 

students in academic settings. Shelby County subsequently recognized the executive order as an 

exception to the mask mandate. Consequently, hundreds of grade-school students in Shelby 

County started attending schools without face coverings. Three grade-school students with 

disabilities sued the Governor and Shelby County on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly 

situated individuals to challenge the executive order and the County’s failure to enforce its mask 

mandate in academic settings. The students requested declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging 

that they faced heightened risks of death or serious injury in the event of exposure to the virus, and 
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accordingly required reasonable accommodations in the form of face coverings for other students 

in their proximity. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, but the case became moot 

before it ruled on the students’ request for a permanent injunction. It then awarded attorneys’ fees 

to the students based on their preliminary relief. The Governor appeals the fee award, contending 

that the students are not “prevailing parties” as required by the relevant fee-shifting statutes. For 

the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I.

On August 6, 2021, as the nation contemplated and navigated the transition from quarantine 

practices back to in-person interactions, the Shelby County Health Department issued Amended 

Health Order No. 24 (“AHO No. 24”). Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-2-609(4), which 

authorizes county health officials to issue general health and safety orders, AHO No. 24 purported 

to address the County’s consistently high rates of positive COVID-19 cases that constituted a 

public health emergency. The order provided guidance on several measures to protect against 

COVID-19 including universal masking for persons entering indoor areas of K–12 schools, Pre-K 

schools, and daycare facilities. 

On August 16, 2021, ten days after the county issued AHO No. 24, Bill Lee, the Governor 

of Tennessee, signed Executive Order No. 84 (“EO No. 84”) which permitted grade-school 

students and their parents to opt out of AHO No. 24’s mask mandate in academic settings. In 

response, the Shelby County Health Department issued Amended Health Order No. 25 (“AHO No. 

25”), which listed EO No. 84 as an exception to the County’s masking requirement. As a result, 

Shelby County stopped enforcing the mask-mandate at schools, and hundreds of grade-school 

students started attending schools with no face coverings. 
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On August 27, 2021, two Shelby County students with disabilities, G.S. and S.T, sued 

Governor Lee and the County in federal court on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly 

situated students, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to Shelby County’s masking 

practices. The students brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that they had medical conditions which increased

their risk of death or serious complications in the event of exposure to COVID-19. The students 

further alleged that some of the purported class members were under age 12, rendering them 

ineligible for COVID-19 vaccinations according to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 

regulations. The students sought relief, including: (1) a declaration that EO No. 84 was in violation 

of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (2) a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining 

the Governor and the State of Tennessee from permitting parents to opt out of Shelby County’s 

mask mandate; (3) preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining the same; and (4) reasonable 

attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. 

On the same day they filed suit, the students also filed a motion for a TRO and a preliminary 

injunction against the Governor and Shelby County. The district court granted the TRO first, and

a preliminary injunction shortly after, holding separate hearings for each. During the TRO hearing, 

G.S.’s mother testified that Shelby County grade schools had been enforcing the AHO No. 24 

mask mandate but stopped after the Governor issued EO No. 84. As a result, her son who needs 

to interact with neurotypical peers according to his individualized education plan was no longer 

getting those interactions. At the time of the TRO hearing, 22% of students had opted out of the 

County’s mask mandate at S.T.’s school. S.T.’s mother testified that S.T. had been excluded from 

participating in certain classes because other students were not wearing masks. Additionally, one 

of the students’ experts testified about the effectiveness of masks in reducing the risk of exposure 
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to COVID-19, especially with respect to students with disabilities who face a higher risk of death. 

The parties also briefed the TRO motion before the hearing and provided supplemental briefing 

afterwards. 

At the preliminary-injunction hearing, the students relied on the evidence and testimony 

they presented at the TRO hearing. For his part, the Governor offered Theresa Nicholls, the 

Assistant Commissioner of Special Populations at the Tennessee Department of Education, as a 

witness. The students also amended their complaint on the day of the hearing to add a third student, 

J.M., as a plaintiff. Like the other named students, J.M. has a disability that places her at a 

heightened risk of death or serious complications in the event of COVID-19 exposure. 

The district court granted the students’ request for a preliminary injunction on September 

17, 2021. In doing so, the court enjoined the Governor from enforcing EO No. 84 or otherwise 

allowing parties to opt out of the County’s mask mandate, ordered Shelby County to enforce AHO 

No. 24, and noted that the injunction would be in effect until terminated by a final order or 

otherwise dissolved by the court. Shelby County subsequently moved for judgment on the 

pleadings. The district court granted Shelby County’s motion and dismissed the County from the 

lawsuit. As for Governor Lee, he appealed the district court’s order granting a preliminary 

injunction and requested a stay pending resolution of his appeal. When the district court denied 

the Governor’s motion to stay, he requested a stay from this court. On November 12, 2021, while 

his stay motion was pending in this court, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the COVID19 Act which addressed face covering protocols for schools, including with respect to reasonable 

accommodations pursuant to the ADA. Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-2-104(d). As a result, the Governor 

terminated EO No. 84 because the COVID-19 Act “negate[d] the need” for such an order. 
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We later denied the Governor’s motion for a stay, finding that the students had provided 

ample evidence that absent reasonable accommodations to mitigate the risk of contracting COVID19, they would be denied public education due to their disabilities. G.S. by & through Schwaigert 

v. Lee, No. 21-5915, 2021 WL 5411218, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021). While the students had 

offered evidence before the district court regarding the reasonableness of a universal mask mandate 

to mitigate the spread of the virus, the Governor had not submitted evidence to the contrary. Id. 

Consequently, he had not submitted sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of success on the 

merits of his appeal. Id. at *3. We also questioned whether the enactment of the COVID-19 Act 

and termination of EO No. 84 rendered this case moot. Id. But we declined to answer because the 

district court had not had an opportunity to address the issue. Id. Pursuant to a joint motion by 

the parties, we ultimately dismissed the Governor’s appeal. 

Back in the district court, on December 23, 2021, the students moved for attorneys’ fees, 

arguing that they were “prevailing parties” under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 12205.

1

 The Governor 

moved to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, maintaining that the students’ claims 

had become moot. The students opposed the Governor’s motion and filed a motion for summary 

judgment on the merits, which also contained a request for a permanent injunction. The district 

1 The students brought claims pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, 

42 U.S.C. § 12205 (ADA) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Rehabilitation Act) govern their request for attorneys’ 

fees, not 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 lists the civil-rights actions to which it pertains and does not 

include the claims in this case. Nonetheless, our analysis regarding whether a party qualifies as a 

“prevailing party” is interchangeable under these fee-shifting statutes. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 

Inc. v. W. V. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (explaining that “prevailing party” is 

a term of art and citing § 1988 cases to analyze a request for fees pursuant to § 12205); see also Gavette v. 

Brady, 7 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1993) (table) (citing § 1988 cases to analyze the term in a case where the plaintiff 

requested fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794a). Accordingly, we review cases discussing § 1988 and other 

fee-shifting statutes to inform our analysis.
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court granted the Governor’s motion to dismiss and denied the students’ motion for summary 

judgment as moot. Regarding its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court explained:

There is no reasonable expectation that another Executive Order involving an 

opt-out masking provision will recur, and the combination of [Tennessee’s]

COVID Act, the lack of a declared state of emergency in Tennessee, and [the 

Governor’s termination of EO No. 84] have eradicated, completely and 

irrevocably, the presence and effect of the opt-out mask provision in schools.

R. 127, PageID: 1772. The district court noted that the state of emergency had expired on

November 19, 2021, and was not extended. The students subsequently renewed their request for 

attorney’s fees, which the district court granted. The court then dismissed the case with prejudice

and the Governor timely appealed, maintaining that the students were not “prevailing parties” such 

that they were entitled to a fee award.

II.

American common law does not provide a right to attorney’s fees. And pursuant to the 

“American rule” that each party is to bear his or her own costs, we do not award such fees “absent 

explicit statutory authority.” McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted); see also Miller v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2019). 

Several statutes, including the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, authorize courts to 

grant fees to the “prevailing party.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 29 U.S.C. § 794a. Whether a party has 

prevailed within the meaning of these fee-shifting statutes is a legal question that we review de 

novo. Miller, 936 F.3d at 448. 

A party who obtains preliminary injunctive relief is not ordinarily considered a prevailing 

party for purposes of attorneys’ fees. Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F.3d 

530, 538 (6th Cir. 2019). But there are “occasional exceptions.” Id. (quoting McQueary, 614 F.3d 

at 604) (quotation marks omitted). Namely, a plaintiff will be deemed the prevailing party if the 
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preliminary injunction resulted in “a court-ordered, material, enduring change in the legal 

relationship between the parties.” Miller, 936 F.3d at 448. 

The Supreme Court’s guidance in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 

Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) and Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007), and our own 

previous decisions, give shape to this inquiry. McQueary, 614 F.3d at 597–598; see also Dewine, 

931 F.3d at 541 (explaining that a combined application of these Supreme Court cases and relevant 

Sixth Circuit precedent can be used to determine whether a party prevailed). Buckhannon

emphasizes that the change in the legal relationship between the parties must be court-ordered 

rather than voluntary. 532 U.S. at 604. This means that the “plaintiff [cannot] ‘prevail’ based on 

the theory that its lawsuit catalyzed a change in the defendant’s behavior.” Dewine, 931 F.3d at 

538 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605). Sole stresses that the alteration in the legal relationship 

must be “enduring” and material. 551 U.S. at 82, 86; McQueary, 614 F.3d at 597–98. To be

considered enduring, a change must not be “reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final 

decision in the same case.” McQueary, 614 F.3d at 597 (quoting Sole, 551 U.S. at 83). To be 

material, the party must have “succeed[ed] on [a] significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] 

some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.” Dewine, 931 F.3d at 538 (second, third, 

and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). 

Finally, this circuit has underscored that the plaintiff’s success must have been “based, at least in 

part, on the merits of the claim.” Id. at 539 (citation omitted).

If “the combined application of [the cases we highlighted in McQueary] does not clearly 

dictate whether a plaintiff is prevailing, the necessary inquiry [becomes] ‘contextual and casespecific,’ and for the district court’s consideration.” Dewine, 931 F.3d at 541 (quoting McQueary, 

614 F.3d at 601, 604).
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III.

On the Merits. Here, the Governor does not argue that the preliminary injunction was not 

based on the merits; nor could he. The district court held hearings on the students’ request for a 

TRO and a preliminary injunction, both of which involved the Governor’s and the County’s 

masking requirements in grade schools. During the TRO hearing, the court considered 

declarations and heard testimony from two of the named students’ mothers and two medical 

experts on behalf of the students, all regarding the merits of the students’ claims. The court also 

heard testimony from a witness on the Governor’s behalf. Additionally, the court permitted the 

parties to submit supplemental briefing before and after the TRO hearing. With this backdrop, the 

district court issued the preliminary injunction only after it “conclude[d] that [the students had] 

not only shown that the accommodation of required indoor masking is reasonable, but also that 

[EO No. 84] rejected this accommodation in favor of more costly, inefficient alternatives.” R. 62, 

PageID: 1254. When Governor Lee appealed the preliminary-injunction ruling, we agreed with 

the district court. We found not only that the students had demonstrated a likelihood of success 

on the merits, but also that the Governor had failed to offer evidence to rebut their claims or 

otherwise show a likelihood of success as to his appeal. G.S., 2021 WL 5411218, at *2. The 

Governor cannot dispute that the district court’s preliminary-injunction order was the result of

substantive hearings and briefing as opposed to an effort to maintain the status quo in light of 

equity considerations. McQueary, 614 F.3d at 598 (“In the context of a preliminary injunction, . . 

. there is only prevailing party status if the injunction represents an unambiguous indication of 
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probable success on the merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status quo ordered because 

the balance of equities greatly favors the plaintiff.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Instead of contesting whether the preliminary relief was on the merits, Governor Lee 

contends that the students are not prevailing parties because their preliminary-injunctive relief did 

not produce an enduring change in the legal relationship between the parties. He also implies that 

the change was the result of his voluntary action as opposed to a court order.2 Neither argument 

resonates.

Enduring Relief. Governor Lee argues that the students’ relief was not sufficiently 

enduring because they did not get everything they asked for in this lawsuit, and because the 

preliminary injunction did not provide them with a one-time irrevocable opportunity. But as we 

explained in Dewine, plaintiffs are not required to get everything they asked for to enjoy 

prevailing-party status. 931 F.3d at 540–41. In that case, Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio 

Region (“Planned Parenthood”) sued Ohio’s attorney general and a county official, challenging a 

state statute. Id. at 534. The statute regulated a medical abortion drug pursuant to the FDA’s 

approval letter and final printed label. Id. at 536. But contrary to standard medical practice, the 

FDA’s guidance did not allow physicians to rely on a particular evidence-based protocol in 

prescribing the drug. Id. at 535. Planned Parenthood raised four claims, seeking declaratory relief, 

a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the statute. Id. 

Based on the likelihood of success on the merits as to one of their claims, Planned Parenthood

2 The Governor implies throughout his initial brief that the change in the parties’ legal relationship

was a result of his voluntary action but does not develop the argument. This argument fails for that reason 

alone. See United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory 

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (quoting 

McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997))). However, because the students address the 

issue and the Governor arguably responds, both in footnotes, we briefly consider voluntary cessation below.
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obtained preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining enforcement of the law in full. Id. at 

534–36. We affirmed the preliminary injunction in part on appeal, narrowing the scope to govern 

only unconstitutional applications of the statute. Id. at 536. But we ultimately vacated the 

permanent injunction. Id. at 536–537. After the preliminary injunction had been in place for 

nearly 12 years, the FDA mooted the parties’ dispute by amending its approval letter and final 

printed label for the drug to comport with the evidence-based protocol at issue. Id. at 537. As a 

result, the parties agreed to dismiss the case. Id. Planned Parenthood subsequently sought and 

obtained attorneys’ fees. Id. at 537–38. 

The state offered several arguments in Dewine to dispute prevailing-party status, including 

that Planned Parenthood did not receive “everything it asked for.” Dewine, 931 F.3d at 540

(quoting McQueary, 614 F.3d at 599). In rejecting this argument, we first clarified that “McQueary

does not require a plaintiff to achieve such comprehensive success in all instances in which cases 

are mooted prior to the issuance of a final judicial order.” Id. at 540. That language merely 

illustrated why we declined to create a per se rule on prevailing-party status in the context 

preliminary injunctions. Id. We further explained that it is not “the magnitude of a party’s relief 

[that] dictate[s] the outcome of the prevailing-party inquiry.” Id. at 541 (citing Binta B. ex rel. 

S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608, 620 (6th Cir. 2013)). Rather, the standard is a “generous” one, 

where “a plaintiff prevails ‘even if [his] limited success does not grant him the “primary relief” he 

sought.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McQueary, 614 F.3d at 603). 

Governor Lee’s arguments fail for the same reasons we outlined in Dewine. Although we 

vacated Planned Parenthood’s permanent injunction, that ruling did not disturb the preliminary 

injunction. Id. at 541. And even though three of the four claims in that case failed, one survived. 

Id. at 537. We required no more to find that Planned Parenthood had received at least some of the 
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benefit it sought in the lawsuit. See id. at 542. Likewise, the fact that the students here also 

requested permanent relief is inconsequential under this generous standard. McQueary, 614 F.3d 

at 603 (“A plaintiff crosses the threshold to ‘prevailing party’ status by succeeding on a single 

claim, even if he loses on several others and even if that limited success does not grant him the 

‘primary relief’ he sought.” (citing Texas State Tchrs. Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 

782, 790–791 (1989))). The students requested a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of 

EO No. 84 and requiring Shelby County to enforce its mask mandate in grade schools with no optout provisions pursuant to EO No. 84. That is precisely what they received. 

The Governor relies on Miller to argue that the preliminary injunction in this case did not 

provide the students with a “one-time” irrevocable opportunity. 936 F.3d at 448. But this reliance 

is misplaced. In Miller, we found the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the 

defendant from refusing to issue them marriage licenses sufficient to achieve prevailing-party 

status. Id. at 448–449. We did mention that marriage “licenses [were] one-time things for all but 

the dilatory or wishy-washy.” Id. at 448. However, our analysis there called for a “case-specific 

inquiry;” we were not establishing a bright-line rule. Id. (quoting McQueary, 614 F.3d at 601). 

Indeed, we only used the phrase “one-time” once to explain why plaintiffs were not required to 

seek relief specific to a time and place to be considered prevailing parties. Id. Notably, we have 

not imposed this one-time rule in every case. Take our decision in Tennessee State Conf. of 

NAACP v. Hargett, 53 F.4th 406 (6th Cir. 2022). In that case, we found a preliminary injunction 

against enforcement of a state statute sufficiently enduring where it allowed plaintiffs the

“unburdened” opportunity “to conduct voter-registration drives for seven months during the runup to the 2020 election” before the state legislature amended the relevant statute and mooted the 

case. Id. at 410–411. 
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Under the Governor’s proposed “one-time” blanket rule, the plaintiffs in Hargett would 

not have prevailed for purposes of attorneys’ fees because the case became moot before the 

election, so the specific time and event had not occurred. Id. at 411. And voter registrations are 

not “one-time” things; unlike marriages, they have expiration dates and require renewal. Still, as 

we explained, those plaintiffs were prevailing parties and their relief sufficiently enduring because

“[t]hose drives, and the voter registrations that resulted from them, [were] as ‘irrevocable’ as the 

marriage licenses in Miller were.” 53 F.4th at 411. So too were the abortion drugs prescribed 

pursuant to the preliminary injunction in Dewine that stood for nearly 12 years before a third 

party’s action mooted the case. 931 F.3d at 534. And the same is true for the education that the 

students received each day the preliminary injunction in this case afforded them the opportunity 

to participate in in-person learning with the mask-mandate in place during the state-declared state 

of emergency. To be sure, the district court issued the preliminary injunction on September 17, 

2021, and the state of emergency did not expire until November 19, 2021, about a week after 

Governor Lee terminated EO No. 84. 

Governor Lee argues that the preliminary injunction was only in place for two months 

before the case became moot, and the students maintain that the case survived closer to six months 

after they obtained preliminary injunctive relief. This dispute is of no consequence. The Governor 

has not cited any case requiring such a mathematical approach to determining whether relief was

sufficiently enduring. True, the preliminary injunctions in Hargett and Dewine were 7 months and 

almost 12 years, respectively, which supported a finding that those plaintiffs were entitled to 

prevailing party status. Hargett, 53 F.4th at 410; Dewine, 931 F.3d at 534. Looking at the timeline 

can be helpful, but we did not establish any specific time threshold in either case. Rather, we 

placed more weight on the question of whether the relief was irrevocable in determining whether 
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it was sufficiently enduring in Hargett, 53 F.4th at 411. And we explained that the “most 

important[]” point in Dewine was that “Planned Parenthood’s relief never expired and was not 

‘reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case.’” 931 F.3d at

539 (quoting Sole, 551 U.S. at 83). The same is true for the students’ relief in this case.

The Governor also argues that the students’ relief was not sufficiently enduring because 

they claimed below, in their response to the Governor’s motion to dismiss, that the COVID-19 Act 

violates their rights even more than EO No. 84. However, this point is of questionable relevance. 

The legality of the COVID-19 Act is not at issue in this case. We are satisfied that the students’ 

relief was sufficiently enduring in that the injunction prevented Governor Lee from restricting their 

access to in person education during the state-declared state of emergency. See Roberts v. Neace, 

65 F.4th 280, 285 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding preliminary injunction sufficiently enduring where

“congregants could attend faith-based gatherings and travel out of state, all without the threat of 

enforcement” of orders issued in response to COVID-19 prohibiting religious gatherings).

Voluntary Cessation. The Governor suggests in his reply that the students are attempting 

to invoke the “catalyst theory” that the Supreme Court rejected in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610. 

Regardless of whether the Governor waived this argument by failing to adequately develop it or 

raising it for the first time in reply,

3

the record would seem to belie this argument in any event. It 

was the Tennessee Legislature’s passage of the COVID-19 Act, along with the expired state of 

emergency that mooted this case; not Governor Lee’s subsequent termination of EO No. 84.

4

 The 

COVID-19 Act accounted for reasonable accommodations pursuant to the ADA in grade schools, 

3 See Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010).

4 Whether the Governor’s role in signing the legislation into law makes any difference to the 

analysis is an open question; one the parties’ briefing does not address or otherwise aid the court in resolving 

today.
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including mask-mandates. Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-2-104(b). EO No. 84’s opt-out provision did 

not provide for such an accommodation and was accordingly in violation of Tennessee law. 

Governor Lee’s termination of a legally invalid executive order could not have mooted this case. 

See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 (1982) (“Mere voluntary

cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled 

to leave ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United 

States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953))).

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.