United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 10-2239

BARRY NOLAN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

CN8, THE COMCAST NETWORK, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Selya, and Lipez,

Circuit Judges.

Lawrence P. Murray, with whom Laura R. Studen, Joshua N. Cook,

and Burns & Levinson LLP were on brief, for appellant.

Joshua M. Davis, with whom Evan J. Shenkman, Asha A. Santos,

and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. were on brief,

for appellees.

August 29, 2011
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Barry Nolan, a regional television

personality, was discharged from his employment with The Comcast

Network, LLC ("Comcast") after he publicly protested the selection

of political commentator Bill O'Reilly for a prestigious

broadcasting award. In response to this discharge, Nolan filed in

the Massachusetts Superior Court a claim of speech-motivated

retaliation under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"),

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. After Comcast's removal

of the case to federal court, the district court entered summary

judgment in favor of Comcast on Nolan's suit, finding no violation

of the MCRA. We affirm.

I.

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we recite

the facts of record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. E.g., Faiola v. APCO Graphics, Inc., 629 F.3d 43, 45 (1st

Cir. 2010).

In 2008, Nolan was employed by Comcast as the executive

producer and on-air host of the television program "Backstage with

Barry Nolan." The program aired on CN8, Comcast's northeast

regional cable television network, and primarily featured celebrity

interviews and local entertainment news. A written agreement set

forth the terms of Nolan's employment with Comcast. By its terms,

the employment was to run for two consecutive twelve-month periods,

from May 2007 to May 2009.

-2-
Two paragraphs of the concise, ten-page document

addressed the possibility of Nolan's premature discharge. 

Paragraph 6 set out several conditions under which Comcast was

permitted to terminate the agreement without consequence. Among

them were the following:

b. Termination by Company

I. The Company determines in its sole

and absolute discretion that Employee should

be removed from the position Employee is

presently employed under this agreement;

. . .

v. Employee engages in any other act

or omission warranting termination of

employment in accordance with Company policy,

including anything which, in the Company's

sole and absolute judgment, brings Employee or

the Company into public disrepute, contempt,

ridicule, or scandal, or which, in the

Company's sole and absolute judgment is

offensive to a substantial segment of the

viewing public or would reflect unfavorably on

the Company's interests or reputation.

Paragraph 7 of the contract, meanwhile, established Comcast's

obligations to Nolan should it elect to discharge him "for any

reason other than the reasons set forth in Paragraph's [sic] 6(a)

and 6(b) above."

In April, Nolan learned that the New England chapter of

the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences (NATAS)

intended to honor the high-profile Fox News commentator Bill

O'Reilly with the prestigious Governor's Award. The award would be

presented at NATAS's annual Emmy Awards ceremony in Boston. Nolan,

-3-
himself a New England NATAS member and 2008 Emmy Award nominee, did

not believe O'Reilly was a worthy choice for the award. On April

4, he sent a lengthy e-mail to other NATAS members in which he

sharply criticized the selection of O'Reilly. He described the

choice as, among other things, "an appalling and deeply offensive

lapse in judgment," one which he feared "would legitimize the

buffoonish excuse for journalism that Mr. O'Reilly presents on a

nightly basis." Nolan sent this missive from his Comcastaffiliated e-mail address and included his Comcast-issued work

phone number at the end of the message.

On April 8, Nolan's direct supervisor and CN8's Senior

Director of Programming, Eileen Dolente, warned Nolan that he

should "be selective about what [he] send[s] on the company

address." She also reminded him that Comcast needed to maintain a

business relationship with NATAS because CN8 held the exclusive

television broadcast rights for the Emmy Awards ceremony. Nolan

acknowledged the warning and agreed to send future e-mails from his

personal e-mail address.

Nolan continued to voice his displeasure with O'Reilly's

selection for the Governor's Award, however. The day after the

warning from Dolente, he was contacted by a reporter for the Boston

Herald to provide his comments on the subject. Upon learning of

Nolan's contact with the media, Jon Gorchow, CN8's Vice President

and General Manager, sent Nolan a sternly worded e-mail detailing

CN8's "official position" on the protest. Among other things,

-4-
Nolan was informed that CN8 had already drafted a press release

that it would issue, if necessary, to distance the network from his

personal comments. He was also instructed not to attempt to

solicit support for his "campaign" from other CN8 employees, and

was encouraged to speak to CN8's public relations department before

speaking to the press any further. The e-mail ended, "[B]y nature

of your being a public figure, and a cn8 employee, you have certain

obligations to the network that you must take into account here."

Less than an hour after receiving Gorchow's e-mail, Nolan

contacted the reporter from the Boston Herald to provide additional

material about O'Reilly. On April 11, that newspaper published an

article entitled "Barry Nolan pleads: Give Bill the boot!" In it,

Nolan was identified as "CN8's Barry Nolan" and was twice quoted

describing O'Reilly as a "mental case." That same day, Nolan sent

an e-mail from his personal e-mail address to other 2008 Emmy Award

nominees in which he urged them to join his "petition of protest"

lest their awards be "forever tarnished" by O'Reilly's receipt of

the Governor's Award.

Following the Boston Herald story, Nolan's protest was

heavily criticized in the online blog "Tabloid Baby." Over the

next few days, Nolan repeatedly defended his actions and attacked

his online critics; he submitted a rejoinder to the initial article

in "Tabloid Baby" in which he insinuated that the author had a

drinking problem, and he derided critical commenters as "O'Reilly

-5-
Fanboys." He even dared one (who, though anonymous, purported to

be an attorney) to "Sue me you dipstick."

Just days before the Emmy Awards ceremony, Dolente flew

from Philadelphia to Boston for a face-to-face meeting with Nolan. 

The purpose of the meeting was for Dolente to relay her

instructions about Nolan's behavior at the upcoming Emmy ceremony. 

According to Nolan, Dolente's message was, "Be careful. Watch what

you do. Don't make a scene. This is serious." She also clearly

implied that Nolan's continued protest could result in adverse

economic consequences for him.

Nolan arrived at the awards ceremony on May 10 with

approximately one hundred copies of a homemade pamphlet. The

pamphlet, six pages in length, detailed numerous examples of why

Nolan believed O'Reilly to be a poor choice for the Governor's

Award, including rather explicit details that had emerged from a

sexual harassment lawsuit against O'Reilly. Nolan left copies of

his pamphlet in various public areas outside the ballroom in which

the ceremony was to be held, and on the dining tables inside the

ballroom, one of which had been purchased by Comcast for Nolan and

the "Backstage" team to attend.

At the ceremony, Nolan was approached by NATAS president

Tim Eagan, who expressed his disapproval of Nolan's protest. In

addition, Nolan was confronted at his dining table by hotel

security, who informed him that he had to stop distributing the

pamphlets. When O'Reilly was formally announced as the recipient

-6-
of the Governor's Award during the ceremony, Nolan stood up and

left the room. He did not return to see his staff win Emmy Awards. 

The Senior Producer for Nolan's show said that his conduct "put a

bit of a damper on the night for the staff." She also stated that

she was approached that night by a Comcast executive who conveyed

his displeasure with Nolan's protest.

That evening, Gorchow called Mike Doyle, the President of

Comcast's Eastern Division, to apprise him of Nolan's actions. 

Later, Gorchow typed up a chronology of events and the merits of

suspending Nolan as an alternative to terminating him. Among other

things, Gorchow wrote:

Barry put his own personal point of view ahead

of the needs of the network, and did so at an

industry function where he was a

representative of the network, and presumably

where his attendance was paid for by the

network, and the result very well could have

been extremely embarrassing for the network.

On May 12, Nolan received a memorandum suspending him for

"insubordination and breach of contract." The memorandum quoted

Paragraph 6(b)(v) of the employment agreement and included claims

that Nolan had been "observed in a heated exchange" with Eagan on

the night of the awards ceremony and that "[a]fter the event there

was much discussion among the attendees of what had occurred and

the spectacle [he] created." Nolan was ordered to refrain from any

further communication with the media until his suspension was

lifted. The next day, Dolante sent an e-mail to Nolan explaining,

"[I]t's not the disagreement with the award decision that led to

-7-
the suspension, but rather the actions you took, which directly

contradict the language in your contract. That's the bottom line

here . . . ."

The same day Nolan received his suspension notice, Brian

Roberts, Chairman and CEO of Fox News, received a letter from

O'Reilly which read as follows:

We at The O'Reilly Factor have always

considered Comcast to be an excellent business

partner and I believe the same holds true for

the entire Fox News Channel. Therefore, it

was puzzling to see a Comcast employee, Barry

Nolan, use Comcast corporate assets to attack

me and FNC.

This outrageous behavior continued at The New

England Emmy Award ceremony on May 10 and,

again, Mr. Nolan was in attendance in

conjunction with Comcast. If you need

specifics, we would be glad to provide them.

All of us here hope the situation will subside

and that is why I am bringing it to your

attention. The kind of attack launched by

Nolan is uncalled for and unnecessary.

Sorry to bother you with this, but it is a

disturbing situation.

O'Reilly's letter eventually made its way to Comcast executives,

including Doyle. In an e-mail discussing how Comcast ought to

respond, Doyle stated, "I am very uncomfortable calling Bill

O'Reilly and writing him because I do not trust Barry Nolan and

have witnessed his total disregard for management decisions and his

selfish actions over the reputation of cn8." He described Nolan as

"a tough individual to defend to the folks at Fox News and the

executives at Comcast." In a related e-mail, Doyle also made clear

-8-
that Nolan's suspension was provisional. According to Doyle, the

"[b]ottom line is if he shows the right attitude toward handling

this situation he gets another chance. If he doesn't, the show

will continue with a new host."

On the very day that Doyle contacted O'Reilly to

apologize for Nolan's conduct at the Emmy Awards ceremony, a letter

from Nolan further disparaging O'Reilly appeared on the website

"tvspy.com." Comcast executives were unable to determine the

precise date that the letter had been submitted. Nolan testified

in his deposition that he sent the letter sometime in May, "around

the time all this was going on."

During his suspension, Nolan informed Dolente that he had

been approached by the television show "EXTRA," which was looking

for a local reporter and crew to cover Senator Ted Kennedy's

hospitalization in Boston. Nolan recommended that Comcast lend

some of its crew. "EXTRA" had also requested that Nolan provide an

on-camera performance the following week, and asked Dolente for

instructions about how he should respond. On May 17, Dolente

informed Nolan that she agreed that he should "assist as he

suggested." On May 18, however, she wrote Nolan and informed him

that she was waiting to hear from someone in Comcast's Human

Resources department regarding Nolan's request to do on-camera work

during his suspension. On the morning of May 19, Dolente e-mailed

Nolan stating, "The preference is that you pass on this request

until you are back on the air at CN8 next week."

-9-
According to Nolan, he had already agreed to "EXTRA"'s

request by the time he received Dolente's last e-mail, and he

lacked sufficient time to find a replacement. He also took Dolente

to have "expressed a preference - but not a demand." Thus, on May

19, Nolan appeared on air for "EXTRA." When Dolente inquired into

whether he had appeared on "EXTRA" after she had instructed him not

to, Nolan explained the situation. He then stated, "If they are

still looking for a reason to fire me - I have no doubt they can

find plenty here." Nolan followed that acknowledgment with a

lengthy critique of Comcast's actions, including his suspension. 

He stated that he felt "violated" by the process, and he

characterized Comcast's response to his protest as "punishing me

and humiliating me because I felt morally obligated to oppose an

action that brought discredit to an organization I was obligated to

belong to - and discredit to our industry."

The next day, Gorchow sent an e-mail to Doyle, which read

in relevant part as follows.

Eileen received an e-mail rant from Barry

expressing no guilt, no remorse, in fact quite

the opposite. It is clear that despite his

written acknowledgment, he is not willing to

accept or even try to understand the facts

surrounding his suspension, which he

mistakenly continues to believe is about free

speech rather than violating his contract and

completely ignoring instructions from his

supervisor.

That day, Gorchow made the decision to terminate Nolan. Nolan was

notified by phone and also given a notice of termination, which

-10-
explicitly stated that the termination was "with cause, pursuant to

Paragraph 6(b)" of his employment agreement.

II.

Nolan filed a one-count civil complaint in Massachusetts

Superior Court pursuant to the MCRA, alleging that Comcast,

Dolente, and Gorchow interfered with his right to free speech as

secured by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The

defendants removed the case to federal district court, and, in due

course, moved for summary judgment. Nolan opposed summary judgment

and moved to strike portions of the affidavits and exhibits relied

upon by the defendants.

The district court granted summary judgment for the

defendants and denied the motion to strike. Nolan v. CN8, No.

1:08-cv-12154, 2010 WL 3749466, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2010). 

According to the court, the dispositive question under

Massachusetts law was "whether Comcast had cause under the

Employment Agreement to terminate [the plaintiff] or,

alternatively, whether plaintiff was, in reality, an employee

at-will." Id. at *3. If either condition obtained, the court

reasoned, then Nolan's termination could not "interfere" with his

right to free speech. Id. The district court correctly found that

Nolan's employment was not "at-will in the traditional sense of

that term" -- that is, employment terminable without notice or

-11-
reason by either party to the agreement. Id. at *4. Nevertheless,

it concluded that the defendants' motion for summary judgment

should be granted since Paragraph 6(b)(I) of the contract permitted

Comcast to "terminate Nolan for any reason, or no reason at all,

and since, in its sole discretion, it had cause to terminate his

employment." Id.

The case is before us on Nolan's timely appeal of that

ruling.

III.

We review the district court's summary judgment ruling de

novo. Summary judgment is appropriate whenever the record, viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-movant, reveals "no genuine

dispute as to any material fact" and shows that "the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

see also Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4

(1st Cir. 2010). A dispute is "genuine" only if a reasonable

factfinder could resolve it in favor of either party. E.g.,

Borges, 605 F.3d at 4. A disputed fact is "material" only if its

existence vel non has the potential to change the outcome of the

suit. E.g., id. at 5. "Withal, we are not married to the trial

court's rationale but may uphold its ruling on any ground made

manifest by the record." Foote v. Town of Bedford, 642 F.3d 80, 82

(1st Cir. 2011).

-12-
Sitting pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction, we are

constrained to apply the substantive law of Massachusetts. Erie

R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). "In doing so, we

'look to the pronouncements of a state's highest court in order to

discern the contours of that state's law.'" Barton v. Clancy, 632

F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting González Figueroa v. J.C.

Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313, 318 (1st Cir. 2009)). Where the

highest court has not spoken directly on the question at issue, we

must predict, as best we can, that court's likely answer. Id. 

Notably, our obligation to make such an "informed prophecy" is

dampened by a concomitant duty to confine our forecast "within the

narrowest bounds sufficient to permit disposition of the actual

case in controversy." Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1112

(1st Cir. 1987). Our task is thus limited, to the extent possible,

to applying state law as it currently exists, not creating new

rules or significantly expanding existing ones. In re Citigroup,

Inc., 535 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2008). 

Here, the governing law is the Massachusetts Civil Rights

Act, a state-law analogue to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that provides a

statutory civil cause of action against those who "interfere" with

the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state

law. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11H. The MCRA differs from

§ 1983 in two significant respects. First, the MCRA is broader

than § 1983 in that it reaches private conduct. It provides for

civil claims against "any person or persons, whether or not acting

-13-
under color of law." Id.; see also Batchelder v. Allied Stores

Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Mass. 1985) (explaining that the

"Legislature intended to provide a remedy . . . co-extensive with

42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State

action whereas its State counterpart does not").

Second, the MCRA is narrower than § 1983 in that it

limits its remedy to conduct that interferes with a secured right

"by threats, intimidation or coercion." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.

12, § 11H; see also Sena v. Commonwealth, 629 N.E.2d 986, 993

(Mass. 1994). This latter requirement is of particular relevance

here. The Massachusetts legislature intended that even a direct 1

deprivation of a plaintiff's rights "would not be actionable under

the act unless it were accomplished by means of one of these three

The concurrence suggests in its introduction that addressing 1

the presence or absence of threats, intimidation, or coercion (1)

"unnecessarily reaches an issue that was neither addressed by the

district court nor substantively briefed by the appellees," and (2)

"is out of step with the logical sequence prescribed by the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court." The suggestion that the

issue is not before us is just not so. Although the district court

did not reach the issue, there is no dispute that the appellant has

argued that his termination was coercive. We are not controlled in

our analysis by the way in which the appellee chooses to respond. 

Similarly, the concurrence is wrong to suggest that the

Massachusetts courts have prescribed any particular order of

addressing the elements of an MCRA claim. The Supreme Judicial

Court frequently disposes of such claims for lack of "threats,

intimidation, or coercion" without deciding whether a plaintiff was

exercising a secured right or whether that right was interfered

with. See, e.g., Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 399,

403-12 (Mass. 2003); Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147,

1162 (Mass. 1999); Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 206

(Mass. 1994); Sena, 629 N.E.2d at 993; Layne v. Superintendent, 546

N.E.2d 166, 168 (Mass. 1989).

-14-
constraining elements." Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 783

N.E.2d 399, 409 (Mass. 2003).

Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has

explicitly endorsed the view that purely economic pressures may

constitute actionable coercion under the MCRA, see id. at 410 &

n.17, it has held that the termination, or threatened termination,

of at-will employees is not coercive in the relevant sense under

the MCRA. See Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 206

(Mass. 1994); cf. Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass.

1991) (finding "no improper interference with secured rights" where

at-will employee's speech made him ineffective advocate for

company). Accordingly, in light of the district court's conclusion

that Paragraph 6(b)(I) of the employment agreement permitted

Comcast to "terminate Nolan for any reason, or no reason at all,"

the parties have devoted considerable attention to the issue of

whether Nolan was an at-will employee, either in fact or

constructively. In particular, Nolan contends that these at-will

employment precedents are inapplicable to his claim because he was

a contract employee for a definite term who was terminated for

cause pursuant to Paragraph 6(b)(v).2

More fundamentally, Nolan contends that the district court 2

erred by looking to Paragraph 6(b)(i) of the agreement at all,

since Comcast terminated him pursuant to Paragraph 6(b)(v). This

focus on Paragraph 6(b)(v) does not help Nolan's position. See

infra.

-15-
We need not resolve the question of whether Nolan was an

at-will employee, however. Although a finding that Nolan was in

fact an at-will employee would be outcome-determinative (in that

his MCRA claim would fail for lack of coercion), a contrary finding

would not be. Nolan's right to relief turns on whether Comcast's

termination of his employment constitutes "coercion" under the

MCRA, and the Supreme Judicial Court's cases demonstrate only that

some contractual entitlement to one's position is necessary, but

not necessarily sufficient, to show that an employee's termination

is coercive in the relevant sense.

The rationale behind the court's refusal to find

actionable coercion in the termination of at-will employment

remains somewhat unclear. For instance, the analysis in Webster 3

v. Motorola, Inc., among the more fully stated on the point, is (in

full) that "because the plaintiffs were employed 'at will,' they

had no contract right to their positions." 637 N.E.2d at 206. 

Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that an employer's

refusal to renew an employee's expired year-to-year contract in

retaliation for the employee's attempt to form a union was not

coercive under the MCRA because the employer merely "exercised its

Although the concurrence criticizes our reliance on case law 3

whose reasoning is admittedly unclear, it fails to acknowledge that

the approach it advocates rests on the same handful of precedents

and fundamentally the same reasoning. The Massachusetts courts

have alternately described the lack of a contractual entitlement to

continued employment as demonstrating an absence of coercion and an

absence of interference with secured rights.

-16-
discretion under the terms of employment it chose to offer its

teachers." Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 581 N.E.2d 475,

479 (Mass. 1991). Viewing these cases, one federal court has

suggested that the Supreme Judicial Court's approach reflects its

judgment that the threatened deprivation of something to which one

has no entitlement is never coercive. See Delmonte v. Laidlaw

Envt'l Servs., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d. 89, 93 (D. Mass. 1999)

("[C]onditioning at-will employment on a restriction of the

exercise of a secured right is not an MCRA 'threat, intimidation or

coercion' because, in essence, at-will employees are not entitled

to their employment, and therefore do not, when threatened with its

loss, reasonably suffer coercion or intimidation.").

Outside of the context of at-will employees, the Supreme

Judicial Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether,

and under what circumstances, the termination of employment can be

coercive. The dearth of case law in this area reflects what we

have noted previously: "the exception for claims based on nonphysical coercion remains a narrow one." Meuser v. Fed. Express

Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 519 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Meuser v. Fed.

Express Corp., 524 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D. Mass. 2007)) (internal

quotation mark omitted). At most, the Supreme Judicial Court

suggested in Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 502

N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. 1987), that an employer's breach of contract in

response to public outrage about an employee's political opinions

-17-
might be sufficiently coercive to warrant relief under the MCRA.4

See Bally v. Ne. Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 52 (Mass. 1989) ("[I]n

Redgrave, . . . we stated that the Boston Symphony Orchestra

violated the Act because its cancellation of its contract with

Redgrave had the effect, intended or otherwise, desired or not, of

coercing Redgrave not to exercise her First Amendment rights."). 

But this is not a case in which Comcast breached its contract,

depriving Nolan of future economic gain to which he was rightfully

entitled. Cf. Acciavatti v. Prof'l Servs. Grp., Inc., 982 F. Supp.

69, 78-79 & n.7 (D. Mass. 1997) (situating the termination of

employee covered by collective bargaining agreement within

Massachusetts's economic coercion case law).

Here, Paragraph 6(b)(v) of the employment agreement

afforded Comcast unlimited discretion to terminate Nolan for his

campaign of public protest, regardless of whether the agreement was

otherwise terminable at will. There can be no genuine dispute 5

As the Supreme Judicial Court has acknowledged, the Redgrave 4

Court "merely answered two certified questions, neither of which

addressed whether the actual or threatened infliction of economic

harm could constitute 'coercion' within the meaning of the act." 

Buster, 783 N.E.2d at 410 n.17. Nevertheless, that decision "has

generally been accepted as establishing a foundation for the

proposition that actual or prospective 'breach of contract'

constitutes 'coercion' under the act." Id.

The contract is far from a model of clarity. For example, 5

Paragraph 6(b)(i) ostensibly permits Comcast to fire Nolan for any

reason at all. Yet Paragraph 7 establishes Comcast's continuing

obligations to Nolan in the event that it prematurely terminates

the contract "for any reason other than the reasons set forth" in

Paragraph 6. For the reasons articulated herein, we need not

grapple with such apparent inconsistencies.

-18-
that Comcast made the judgment that Nolan's behavior reflected

negatively on Comcast and thus warranted his termination, and there

has been no suggestion to the contrary.6

Nolan nevertheless contends that summary judgment is

inappropriate because there remain "genuine issues of material fact

as to whether [he] was insubordinate, whether he breached his

employment agreement, and whether he publicly acted contrary to

Comcast's business interest." Pursuant to the employment

agreement, the absolute right to make those determinations falls to

Comcast, and hence the issues he identifies are not material.7

Given the Supreme Judicial Court's refusal to find

actionable coercion in the termination of at-will employees under

the MCRA, we cannot see a reasonable argument for distinguishing

Comcast's exercise of its unlimited discretion in terminating

In a footnote, Nolan observes that the implied covenant of 6

good faith and fair dealing obligated Comcast to exercise its

contractual discretion in good faith, rather than as pretext. Even

if this argument were not waived, see Nat'l Foreign Trade Council

v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 60 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999) ("We have

repeatedly held that arguments raised only in a footnote or in a

perfunctory manner are waived."), the record reveals no pretext. 

Instead, it overwhelmingly demonstrates that Comcast's concerns

about Nolan's speech and its consequences was, in fact, the basis

for the termination of his employment.

For this reason, the district court also correctly denied 7

Nolan's motion to strike. To the extent that the challenged

affidavits and exhibits contain statements that would be

inadmissible hearsay if offered for their truth, they are

nonetheless admissible as evidence of Comcast's knowledge and state

of mind at the time of the termination decision. See generally

Massachusetts Guide to Evidence § 801(c) & note at 246–247 (2010

ed.).

-19-
Nolan's employment under Paragraph 6(b)(v). Nolan's employment

agreement, whether or not creating "at-will" employment under

Massachusetts law, provided Comcast with discretion to terminate

the agreement so close in substance to at-will employment that we

cannot imagine the Supreme Judicial Court finding coercion in these

circumstances. Because the record, viewed in the light most

favorable to Nolan, thus fails to show actionable "threats,

intimidation or coercion" by Comcast, Nolan's claim under the MCRA

necessarily fails.

In reaching this outcome, we have carefully avoided

making judgments about contracts that offer more protection to

their employees than the one at issue here. The same cannot be

said for the concurrence, which broadly proclaims, without

citation, that "the exercise of a legitimate cause for termination

under the terms of an employment contract . . . eliminates any

possibility of the sort of interference . . . required by the

MCRA." Infra p. 25. The concurrence extrapolates this principle

from Massachusetts case law that has not yet confronted an MCRA

claim brought by a terminated contractual employee. This approach

disregards our obligation in diversity cases to resolve state law

questions narrowly, and only as far as necessary to decide the case

before us. The concurrence's approach would curtail the

protections available to Massachusetts employees under a

Massachusetts remedial statute without meaningful indication from

either Massachusetts courts or the Massachusetts legislature that

-20-
such curtailment is appropriate. Moreover, in every case involving

the termination of employment, the question whether there was a

breach of contract would become a necessary antecedent to the

question whether an MCRA claim may lie, effectively requiring a

trial within a trial. To be sure, the circumstances of this case

required us to look to the terms of Nolan's contract, but it is the

analogy to at-will employment, and thus to the well-established

principle that the termination of an at-will employee will not give

rise to an actionable claim under the MCRA, that drives the outcome

here. Where that analogy no longer holds, nothing we have said

here should be read to preclude the possibility of relief under the

MCRA for a terminated contractual employee.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

So ordered.

-Concurring Opinion Follows-

-21-
SELYA, Circuit Judge (concurring in the judgment). I

agree with my brethren that the entry of summary judgment in this

case should be affirmed. I write separately, however, because the

majority's analytical approach is out of step with the logical

sequence prescribed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

(SJC), unnecessarily reaches an issue that was neither addressed by

the district court nor substantively briefed by the appellees, and

adds elements of confusion to what I view as a straightforward

case.

As the SJC has repeatedly stated, a plaintiff who sues

under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I, must show: (I) that he was exercising a

protected right; (ii) that the defendant interfered (or attempted

to interfere) with that right; and (iii) that the interference was

accomplished (or meant to be accomplished) by threats,

intimidation, or coercion. Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. Boylston,

646 N.E.2d 139, 148-49 (Mass. 1995); Bally v. Ne. Univ., 532 N.E.2d

49, 51-52 (Mass. 1989). In this practical progression, the 8

question of whether the case involves interference is antecedent to

the question of how any interference may have been accomplished. 

See, e.g., Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370, 372-73 (Mass.

1991); cf. Swanset Dev. Corp. v. City of Taunton, 668 N.E.2d 333,

The cases cited by the majority, see supra note 1, do not 8

support a contention that Massachusetts has departed willy-nilly

from this sequence.

-22-
337-38 (Mass. 1996) (recognizing need at least to assume

interference before reaching question of coercion).

The majority inexplicably abandons this measured

framework and jumps to the coercion question. It does so despite

the lack of any treatment of that issue by the district court and

only a passing reference to it by the prevailing parties, who

correctly state that it is unnecessary to deal with the issue. 

Ultimately, what emerges is a confused and confusing analysis

regarding the nature of coercion, in which the majority

acknowledges that the SJC's application of that term is unclear,

yet proceeds to rely on a patchwork of marginally relevant state

and federal cases to reach a conclusion that adds little clarity to

the issue. I would take a more direct approach — one that fits

comfortably with the sequence established by Massachusetts

precedent — and dispose of the plaintiff's claim at the

interference step.

The plaintiff, in denouncing O'Reilly's nomination, was

plainly exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights. The 9

logical question then is whether the defendants can be said to have

interfered with the plaintiff's exercise of those rights.

In Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888 9

(1st Cir. 1988) (en banc), we noted that there is a certain

awkwardness in applying the MCRA where free speech rights are

involved. Id. at 904. My view of the interference prong in this

case makes it unnecessary to probe the implications of this uneasy

fit.

-23-
Of course, an adverse employment action may, in certain

circumstances, constitute interference with the exercise of

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Foote v. Town of Bedford, 642

F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 29 (1st

Cir. 2011); see also Poh v. Mass. Corr. Officers Federated Union,

No. 1:03-cv-11987, 2006 WL 1877089, at *6 (D. Mass. July 7, 2006)

(making this observation under MCRA). In an effort to bring his

case within this sphere, the plaintiff tries to draw a line in the

sand between at-will employees and persons employed under

contracts. His thesis is that termination of a person within the

former group cannot amount to interference while termination of a

person within the latter group categorically amounts to

interference. That thesis is incorrect.

It is true that an at-will employee normally will be

unable to demonstrate the type of entitlement to continued

employment sufficient to support an MCRA claim. See, e.g., Webster

v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Mass. 1994); Korb, 574

N.E.2d at 372. It does not follow, however, that the mere

existence of an employment contract establishes that the firing of

the contract-holder amounts to interference. The interference

inquiry is functional, not formalistic. Termination of employment

can only interfere with the exercise of protected rights to the

extent that the plaintiff has an entitlement to ongoing employment. 

See Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 399, 410 (Mass.

-24-
2003); Korb, 574 N.E.2d at 372 n.3; see also Poh, 2006 WL 1877089,

at *6.

Different contracts have different permutations, and an

individual who is employed under a particular contract may be

unable to show interference if, say, the terms of the contract

afford the employer a valid reason for terminating the contract. 

See Willitts v. Roman Cat. Archbishop of Bos., 581 N.E.2d 475, 480

(Mass. 1991) (finding "no improper interference" where employer

"exercised its discretion" in deciding not to renew an expiring

employment contract). In other words, the exercise of a legitimate

cause for termination under the terms of an employment contract

eliminates any right to continued employment and, thus, eliminates

any possibility of the sort of interference with that right

required by the MCRA. It is hard to imagine a better illustration

of this precept than a situation in which the contract confers upon

the employer the sole discretion to terminate.10

The rest is child's play. Under Massachusetts law,

courts are charged to interpret a contract "according to its plain

The majority is concerned that the approach I take "mak[es] 10

judgments about contracts that offer more protection to their

employees than the one at issue here" and "disregards our

obligation in diversity cases to resolve state law questions

narrowly." Supra, pp. 20-21. To the contrary, my approach is

appropriate here precisely because the contract in this case

uniquely functions like an at-will contract, making the application

of Massachusetts precedent in that area compelling. Because this

approach applies state law by direct analogy, it is necessarily

narrow — much more so than the majority's speculative attempt to

unravel the meaning of coercion.

-25-
meaning." S. Union Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 941 N.E.2d 633,

640 (Mass. 2011). The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is

a matter of law for the court. Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 761

N.E.2d 946, 951 (Mass. 2002). So, too, is the determination as to

whether a contract contains an ambiguity. Bank v. Thermo Elemental

Inc., 888 N.E.2d 897, 907 (Mass. 2008). 

Gauging the existence of an ambiguity requires an

objective reading of the text of the contract; "an ambiguity is not

created simply because a controversy exists between parties, each

favoring an interpretation contrary to the other." Lumbermens Mut.

Cas. Co. v. Offices Unltd., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Mass.

1995). To be ambiguous, the language, fairly read, must be

"susceptible of more than one meaning." Id.

The key provision of the Agreement is paragraph 6(b)(v). 

With respect to that paragraph, the plaintiff asserts that there

remain "genuine issues of material fact as to whether [he] was

insubordinate, whether he breached his employment agreement, and

whether he publicly acted contrary to Comcast's business

interests." Appellant's Br. at 18. This assertion fails because

the factual disputes that the plaintiff identifies are not

material. The plain language of paragraph 6(b)(v) designates

Comcast as the sole arbiter of whether the plaintiff's actions

reflected unfavorably on Comcast's interests or reputation (and,

thus, warranted termination). The paragraph twice notes that

Comcast's "sole and absolute judgment" controls decisions of this

-26-
type. In light of that language, it is beyond peradventure that

Comcast validly invoked its authority under paragraph 6(b)(v) when

it cashiered the plaintiff.

For present purposes, the only relevant question is

whether Comcast determined that the plaintiff's conduct violated

paragraph 6(b)(v). There is no room to doubt either that Comcast

made such a determination or that it timely communicated this

determination to the plaintiff. Once Comcast ended the plaintiff's

employment in conformity with this contractual provision, his right

to continued employment was extinguished.

That effectively ends the matter. The warrantable loss

of the right to continued employment under the Agreement destroyed

the necessary predicate for maintaining an action under the MCRA. 

Simply put, there was no interference with any protected right.

There is nothing fundamentally unfair about this outcome. 

The plaintiff, a highly compensated individual in a highly visible

position, bargained for and accepted an arrangement that gave his

employer unfettered discretion in such matters. He knew from the

start that Comcast's "sole and absolute judgment" would determine

when and whether paragraph 6(b)(v) would apply.

The upshot is that, under the Agreement, Comcast was free

to discharge the plaintiff if, in its sole judgment, his conduct

impaired the company's interests. Its exercise of that prerogative

did not interfere with any right protected by the MCRA, and I would

affirm the entry of summary judgment on this ground.

-27-