SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3264-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

TODD STATHUM, 

a/k/a TODD PAESON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted November 13, 2023 – Decided December 1, 2023 

Before Judges Gilson and Berdote Byrne. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 14-07-1235.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant 

(Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney 

for respondent (Lila Bagwell Leonard, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3264-21

Defendant, Todd Stathum, appeals from an October 21, 2021 order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing the trial court 

erred in failing to provide him with an evidentiary hearing. We affirm for the 

reasons expressed in the well-reasoned, fourteen-page, written opinion of the 

Honorable Michael A. Guadagno. 

I.

In 2014, a Monmouth County grand jury indicted defendant for two counts 

first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and two counts fourthdegree possession of an imitation weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(e). The charges related to two separate armed robberies 

occurring in the City of Long Branch: one at a Monmouth gas station (the 

Monmouth Gas robbery), and another at LaCita grocery store (the LaCita 

robbery). 

When defendant was arrested, he admitted he committed both the 

Monmouth Gas and the LaCita robberies. While giving his statement 

concerning the two robberies, the police asked defendant about a recent third 

robbery, which occurred in Shrewsbury. Every time defendant was asked about 

the Shrewsbury robbery, he repeatedly denied his involvement. 
3 A-3264-21

After trial, a jury convicted defendant on one count of first-degree armed 

robbery and one count of fourth-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose relating to the LaCita robbery, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict 

on the remaining two counts relating to the Monmouth Gas robbery. Facing 

retrial, defendant instead pleaded guilty to the remaining two counts and 

received an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison, subject to the No Early 

Release Act (NERA). 1 After a direct appeal, defendant was resentenced to

virtually the same sentence on remand. He then filed a PCR petition, asserting 

numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

II. 

Defendant argues the PCR court erred in denying him an evidentiary 

hearing and improperly found he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted by Judge Guadagno, "many of 

defendant's claims do not allege ineffective assistance of counsel but rather 

challenge trial court rulings (admission of hearsay; admission of evidence that 

defendant was suspected in another robbery, used heroin, and owed court fees; 

denial of severance motion; barring testimony of witnesses; denial of motion for 

a mistrial; admission of a photo array)." We agree. Defendant fails to present 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 
4 A-3264-21

a cognizable claim for PCR relief pursuant to Rule 3:22 because he either raised 

the same claims in his previous direct appeal or could have raised them in that 

appeal. 

With respect to the remaining claims, to establish a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test: (1) 

"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment[,]" and (2) "the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 

(1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New Jersey). 

On petitions brought by a defendant who has entered a guilty plea, 

defendant satisfies the first Strickland prong if he can demonstrate counsel's 

representation fell short of the prevailing norms of the legal community. Padilla 

v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010). The defendant proves the second 

prong of Strickland by establishing "a reasonable probability" the defendant 

"would not have [pleaded] guilty," but for counsel's errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 

N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nun͂ez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). 

Even if unable to obtain immediate relief, a defendant may seek to show 

an evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection 
5 A-3264-21

with an ineffective assistance claim. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 

(1992). However, the PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only 

where: (1) a defendant is able to prove a prima facie case of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, (2) there are material issues of disputed fact that must be 

resolved with evidence outside of the record, and (3) the hearing is necessary to 

resolve the claims for relief. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462; R. 3:22-10(b); see State 

v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013). 

Pursuant to Strickland, defendant fails to satisfy his burden to show trial 

counsel's performance was deficient or he suffered prejudice. We agree with 

Judge Guadagno that trial counsel's consent to the introduction of a sanitized 

statement regarding the Shrewsbury robbery cannot provide the basis for an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because on direct appeal we found no 

abuse of discretion in the admission of the statement, and we found no 

substantive error occurred as the jury heard defendant consistently deny any 

involvement in the Shrewsbury robbery. Moreover, counsel objected to the 

evidence at trial. As noted by Judge Guadagno: 

In fact, after initially consenting to the sanitized 

version, trial counsel, apparently following defendant's 

request, objected when the prosecution attempted to

admit evidence relating to the Shrewsbury robbery. 

Even assuming counsel should not have initially urged 

consent to the sanitized version, there is no showing 
6 A-3264-21

that the outcome would have been different or that 

defendant suffered prejudice by counsel's actions.

Because defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie showing of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, Judge Guadagno properly denied defendant an 

evidentiary hearing. The judge's findings are sound, and his legal conclusions 

are correct. 

 Affirmed.