[Cite as In re S.F., 2023-Ohio-1900.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE S.F., ET AL. :

No. 112327

Minor Children :

[Appeal by C.C., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 8, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case Nos. AD21900923 and AD21900924

Appearances:

Scott J. Friedman, for appellant. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

Appellant C.C. (“Mother”) brings the instant appeal challenging the trial 

court’s decision to grant permanent custody of her two minor children, D.S. (d.o.b. 

12/4/2013) and S.F. (d.o.b. 11/30/2014) (collectively “the children”) to the 

Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the 

agency.”) After a thorough review of the law and record, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History

On February 3, 2021, the agency filed a complaint for abuse and 

dependency seeking temporary custody of the children. The complaint alleged that 

Mother “has difficulty controlling her emotions” and recently “hit D.S. with a broom 

while angry,” causing D.S. to sustain cuts, abrasions, and bruising on his face. The 

complaint further alleged that Mother (1) suffers from untreated mental health 

diagnoses; (2) does not appropriately address D.S.’s behavioral issues; (3) has had 

her parental rights terminated as to three other children; and (4) does not currently 

have stable and appropriate housing. The complaint also contained allegations 

against the respective fathers of each child. Since this appeal pertains only to 

Mother’s parental rights, the details of the fathers’ cases will not be discussed herein. 

In May 2021, the court adjudicated the children abused and dependent. 

Mother agreed to place the children in the temporary custody of the agency until 

February 2022. The agency prepared a case plan for Mother’s reunification with the 

children that included services for parenting, housing, and mental health treatment. 

Mother was also allowed weekly supervised visitation with the children. 

In November 2021, the agency filed a motion to extend temporary 

custody from February 2022 to August 2022. The motion detailed that “Mother is 

engaged in parenting classes and mental health services through counseling and 

medication. She needs to remain consistent in her engagement in those services, 

and secure housing.” 
In February 2022, the agency filed an amendment to the case plan 

terminating Mother’s visitation with the children “due to a physical abuse incident 

between [Mother] and [D.S.] on 1/26/2022.” The amendment elaborated that 

Mother “engaged in blaming, screaming, and yelling at her son for their involvement 

with [CCDCFS], and proceeded to push her son to the ground.” 

In March 2022, the agency filed a “Motion to Amend the Dispositional 

Prayer from First Extension of Temporary Custody to Permanent Custody.” The 

attached affidavit in support averred that Mother had not consistently engaged in 

mental health services, was noncompliant with her medications, engaged in but did 

not benefit from parenting services, and did not have stable housing.

Trial was initially set for September 29, 2022. On September 23, 2022, 

Mother filed a “Motion for Six Month Extension” asking the court to allow her an 

additional six months to complete her case plan, which she claimed to have already 

substantially completed. This motion was ultimately denied. On September 29, 

2022, the court called the case and briefly heard testimony from Jason Vicens, a 

supervisor at CCDCFS, who testified regarding the agency’s reasonable efforts to 

prevent removal of the children, which Mother stipulated to after the testimony 

concluded. After Vicens testified, however, the court ultimately continued the 

matter to November 9, 2022, at the request of Mother’s counsel and D.S.’s father. 

Mother’s counsel’s continuance was based on an inability to procure witnesses. 

At the commencement of the November trial, Mother’s counsel moved 

to continue the trial because Mother was incarcerated at the time and refused her 
transportation to trial. Mother’s counsel did not know why Mother refused the 

transportation, but it was revealed that Mother was incarcerated because of a 

domestic violence incident that involved Mother’s adult, pregnant daughter. The 

trial court overruled the continuance, determining that it was in the best interest of 

the children to proceed with trial that day. 

The agency’s sole witness was De’Aira Alvis (“Alvis”), a case worker at 

CCDCFS. Alvis testified regarding Mother’s progress with the case plan. Mother 

was only partially compliant with mental health services and did fully engage in 

parenting services, though the agency did not feel that she benefitted from them due 

to the physical incident with D.S. that occurred during visitation. To Alvis’s 

knowledge, before Mother was incarcerated, Mother was residing with a 

“paramour,” but did not allow the agency to view the residence and therefore, Alvis 

was unable to say whether Mother’s current housing was appropriate or not. Mother 

was charged for a domestic violence incident with her adult, pregnant daughter on 

August 26, 2022, and was incarcerated at the time of trial as a result of the incident. 

Mother’s attorney presented Mario Jones (“Jones”) as a witness, who 

identified himself as Mother’s stepbrother. He testified that Mother had resided 

with him previously, but Mother moved out and got her own housing in an attempt 

to comply with the agency’s requests. He testified that Mother’s current residence 

is a five-bedroom, one-bathroom duplex home in Cleveland and opined that it is 

suitable and well-kept. Jones, however, noted that he had not had a relationship 

with Mother’s children for about one year. He also testified that he was often present 
when Mother spoke to her doctors and counselors and took her to pick up 

medication, which he observed her taking daily. Jones also testified that Mother lost 

her job due to the recent domestic violence charges. 

The children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) testified that permanent 

custody with the agency was in the children’s best interest and that both children 

voiced their preference to remain with their grandmother. 

The resulting judgment entry issued on November 29, 2022,

terminated Mother’s parental rights as to the children. It is from this judgment that 

Mother appeals, assigning three errors for our review: 

1. The juvenile court abused its discretion when it proceeded with a 

hearing to determine permanent custody without Mother present, in 

derogation of her rights under the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions.

2. The juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied Mother’s 

request for a continuance. 

3. The juvenile court erred in permitting the case worker to testify about 

statements made by the children’s grandmother.

II. Law and Analysis

Mother’s first and second assignments of errors are related and as 

such will be addressed together. In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that 

the trial court abused its direction and violated her right to due process in 

proceeding with the permanent custody trial even though she was not present. Her 

second assignment of error suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to grant a continuance based on her absence. 
At the time of trial, Mother was incarcerated. The transcript reflects 

that Mother was incarcerated shortly before trial and that the trial court made 

arrangements to transport Mother from the jail to the court. On the date of trial, 

however, Mother refused the transportation to the surprise of her own counsel, who 

requested a continuance because counsel “[did] not know exactly why she did not 

get in the transport[.]” (Tr. 7.) The court proceeded with the trial, stating that it felt 

that proceeding was in the best interest of the children and judicial efficiency. 

The failure to raise constitutional objections at the trial level waives 

the issue on appeal absent a finding of plain error. In re H.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 90299 and 90300, 2009-Ohio-1798, ¶ 30, citing State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 

120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). Plain error exists only when it can be determined 

that the outcome of the trial would have been different. In re Z.T., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 88009, 2007-Ohio-827, ¶ 19, citing State v. Moreland, 50 Ohio St.3d 

58, 62, 552 N.E.2d 894 (1990). “A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although 

neither objected to nor affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a 

material adverse effect on the character and public confidence in judicial 

proceedings.” Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209, 436 N.E.2d 

1001 (1982).

In support of her argument, Mother cites a Tenth District case finding 

that “[n]atural parents have a constitutionally protected right to be present at a 

permanent custody hearing.” In re Sears, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-715, 2002-

Ohio-368, citing In re Vandale, 4th Dist. Washington No. 92 CA 31, 1993 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3465, 7 (June 29, 1993). However, Sears explains that this right is not 

absolute when a parent is incarcerated and that the standard for an incarcerated 

parent’s presence at a permanent custody hearing should be based on the best 

interest of the children. Id. at ¶ 12. The record reveals that Mother was provided an 

opportunity to be present and transportation; by her own actions, she did not 

exercise such right and did not provide a reason for refusing transportation, either 

at the time of trial or now, on appeal. Mother effectively waived this right despite 

the fact that the court accommodated her. Further, the trial court clearly supported 

its decision to proceed with the trial based on the bestinterests of the children, which 

we also find is aptly supported by the record before us. 

A trial court’s decision on a motion to continue is a matter that is 

entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed 

absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. In re L.S., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 95809, 2011-Ohio-3836, ¶ 21, citing State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 

67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). The term abuse of discretion implies that the court’s 

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 

2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463. We are also mindful of Juv.R. 23, providing that 

“[c]ontinuances shall be granted only when imperative to secure fair treatment for 

the parties,” and Loc.R. 35(C) of the Juvenile Division, providing that

[n]o case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good 

cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior 

to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or 
counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or 

made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as 

he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This 

rule may not be waived by consent of counsel.

Further, in evaluating a motion for a continuance, courts should note 

the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have 

been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, 

opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for 

legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; 

whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise 

to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending 

on the unique facts of each case.

Unger at 67-68. 

Here, the record indicates that Mother was aware of the trial date, 

aware of the provision of transportation, but actively refused the transportation. 

Mother’s counsel stated that she spoke to Mother about two weeks prior, and only 

recently found out that Mother was incarcerated. Mother did not contact counsel or 

the court regarding her unavailability for the date of trial on the day of, or prior. Her 

counsel did not know the reason for Mother’s refusal of transportation and therefore 

requested a continuance. On appeal, Mother does not provide any cause for her 

refusal, let alone good cause. Despite proper notice, Mother appears to have refused 

transportation of her own volition. 

On appeal, Mother appears to disagree with the trial court’s decision 

to not continue the matter based on judicial efficiency. Mother argues that the 

agency only produced one witness and the hearing lasted one hour. However, the 

journal entry issued immediately after the trial indicates that the assistant 

prosecuting attorney; counsel for CCDCFS; Alvis; a CCDCFS supervisor; the 
children’s GAL (telephonically); Mother’s counsel; Mother’s GAL; S.F.’s father’s 

counsel; D.S.’s father’s advisory counsel; and D.S.’s father’s GAL were all present for 

the hearing, along with the court staff and court reporter. Additionally, the trial was 

initially set for September 29, 2022, and convened on this date, but the trial court 

ultimately continued the matter so that Mother could properly subpoena witnesses

and because of service issues relating to one of the fathers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances present in this case, we find 

no error in the trial court’s decision to proceed without Mother’s presence and 

overrule her continuance. We therefore overrule Mother’s first and second 

assignments of error. 

In her third assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court 

erred in allowing Alvis to testify to statements made by the children’s grandmother. 

Particularly, Mother points to three instances of supposed hearsay, as follows. First, 

Alvis described grandmother’s report that some of the telephone conversations that 

the children had with Mother “would leave the children overwhelmed” and that 

grandmother felt “as though the communication with [Mother] was starting to affect 

the behavior of the children once they were finished communicating with [Mother].” 

(Tr. 23-24.) Second, Alvis testified that grandmother reported that Mother was not 

taking her medication. (Tr. 17.) Third, Alvis testified that grandmother wishes to 

adopt the children. (Tr. 28.) 

Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). Unless hearsay statements fall under a recognized 

exception, they are inadmissible. Evid.R. 802. Pursuant to Juv.R. 34(I), the Rules 

of Evidence apply to hearings on motions for permanent custody. Juvenile court 

judges are presumed to be able to disregard improper testimony. In re J.T., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 93240 and 93241, 2009-Ohio-6224, ¶ 70. Therefore, the admission 

of hearsay evidence in parental rights cases, even if error, is not considered 

prejudicial unless it is shown that the court relied on improper evidence in making 

its decision. Id., citing In re Lucas, 29 Ohio App.3d 165, 172, 504 N.E.2d 472 (3d 

Dist.1985).

Mother argues that “the juvenile court relied upon the grandmother’s 

inadmissible hearsay statements presented by Ms. Alvis when terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.” She cites the trial court’s judgment entry finding that Mother 

inconsistently engaged in mental health treatment and inappropriate interactions 

with her children. A review of the record, however, demonstrates that these are both 

supported by the record independent of the claimed hearsay statements. 

Mother’s inconsistent mental health treatment is supported by the 

record above and beyond the alleged hearsay statements. Mother’s compliance with 

medication is just one aspect of Mother’s inconsistent mental health treatment. 

Alvis testified that Mother was referred to two mental health providers. Mother was 

first referred to Ohio Guidestone, where she engaged in services sporadically and 

was then unsuccessfully discharged due to noncompliance. The records from the 
Charak Center for Health and Wellness, Mother’s provider at the time of trial, noted 

that Mother’s attendance and participation were not consistent. 

Mother’s inappropriate interactions with her children are also 

supported by the record. Alvis testified in detail about the incident during a 

visitation where Mother became physical with D.S. in the presence of a parenting 

coach. After the incident, Mother’s in-person visitation was stopped and Mother 

communicated with the children via telephone and video, though it appears that the 

children were soured by the incident since Mother had not spoken to or seen the 

children since August 2022, and both children expressed to the GAL that they would 

prefer to remain with their grandmother. Additionally, the children’s GAL 

expressed concern about Mother’s handling of the children. Particularly, the GAL 

noted,

[T]hat was one of the problems that presented during the supervised 

visitation with the visitation coach about eight months ago where I 

guess [Mother] was showing no attention at all to D.S., but had 

concentrated her focus on S.F., which the visitation coach intervened 

and tried to redirect her, but [Mother] was not going to have any of it, 

and, consequently, the visiting coach terminated the visit. 

* * * 

[T]he parenting coach and the report in that staffing indicated 

[Mother] has been observed by her parenting coach with bizarre 

behaviors, especially towards [D.S.]. She [has] not engaged in any 

interactions with him during the visits. Mother locked herself and 

[S.F.] in a bedroom to avoid — from the parenting coach.

(Tr. 47-48.) 

We also note that Mother’s noncompliance with mental health 

treatment and inappropriate interactions with the children are supported by the fact 
that Mother was incarcerated right before trial in relation to a domestic violence 

incident with another child of hers, an adult daughter. This very fact is indicative of 

a failure to benefit from mental health treatment and act appropriately with 

children, even if the victim was an adult child. 

Finally, Mother’s assertion that grandmother’s wishes to adopt the 

children constitutes inadmissible hearsay does not appear to have affected the trial 

court’s determination because the trial court did not cite this factual finding in its 

judgment entry. Nonetheless, this fact is supported independently by the affidavit 

that supported the agency’s motion asking for permanent custody of the children. 

Additionally, the fact may be inferred from the children’s communication to the GAL 

that they wish to remain with their grandmother. 

We have carefully reviewed the record and factual findings of the court 

and find that each instance of asserted hearsay is independently supported by the 

record. We therefore find that the trial court did not rely on improper hearsay 

evidence in making its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children, 

and that the trial court’s decision was based on sufficient evidence. 

III. Conclusion

The trial court did not err in proceeding to trial and overruling 

Mother’s continuance based on her absence from the trial, which the evidence 

demonstrated was of her own volition. We further find that the trial court did not 

err in admitting hearsay statements because each alleged hearsay statement was 
independently supported by evidence in the record or not relied upon by the trial 

court in making its determination. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR