2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-25-2013

Muhammad Munir v. Pottsville Area School DIstric

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 12-3008

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 12-3008

______________

MUHAMMAD MUNIR, Individually 

and as the parent of minor plaintiff, O.M.,

 Appellant

v.

POTTSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT

__________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-00855)

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

___________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 13, 2013

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and 

ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 25, 2013 )
2

Albert J. Evans

Fanelli, Evans & Patel

1 Mahantongo Street

Pottsville, PA 17901-0000

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

Kimberly A. Boyer-Cohen

John J. Hare

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin

2000 Market Street

Suite 2300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Christopher J. Conrad

Sharon M. O'Donnell

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin

4200 Crums Mill Road

Suite B

Harrisburg, PA 17112

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

___________________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case arises under the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Act (IDEA), a federal statute requiring states that 

receive federal education funding to ensure that disabled 

children receive a ―free appropriate public education‖ (FAPE). 

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The statute ―protects the rights of 
3

disabled children by mandating that public educational 

institutions identify and effectively educate those children, or 

pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized 

services that the public institution cannot provide.‖ D.K. v. 

Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 

P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 

2009)). Appellant Muhammad Munir sent his son, O.M., to a 

private residential facility and a private boarding school 

following multiple suicide attempts, and sought reimbursement 

for the cost of those placements from the Pottsville Area School 

District (Pottsville or School District). For the reasons that 

follow, we will affirm the District Court‘s order denying that 

request.

I

To comply with the IDEA, school districts must identify 

and evaluate all children who they have reason to believe are 

disabled under the statute. D.K., 696 F.3d at 244. Once a 

school district has identified a child as eligible for IDEA 

services, it must create and implement an Individualized 

Education Plan (IEP) based on the student‘s needs and areas of 

disability. P.P., 585 F.3d at 729–30. School districts are not, 

however, required to ―maximize the potential‖ of each 

handicapped student. T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 

F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick 

Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21 

(1982)). Instead, to satisfy the IDEA, the district must offer an 

IEP that is ―reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 

meaningful educational benefits in light of the student‘s 

intellectual potential.‖ P.P., 585 F.3d at 729–30 (quoting Shore 

Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 

2004)); see also Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 
4

240 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that once the school district has 

designed and administered an IEP that is reasonably calculated

to enable the receipt of meaningful educational benefits, it has 

satisfied its obligation to provide the child with a FAPE).

If parents believe that the school district is not providing 

a FAPE for their child, they may unilaterally remove him from 

the school, enroll him in a different school, and seek tuition 

reimbursement for the cost of the alternative placement. Id. at 

242 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) and Sch. Comm. of 

Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985)). 

Parents who change their child‘s placement without the consent 

of state or local officials, however, ―do so at their own financial 

risk.‖ Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373–74. A court may grant the 

family tuition reimbursement only if it finds that the school 

district failed to provide a FAPE and that the alternative private 

placement was appropriate. See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four 

v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16 (1993); Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242. 

Courts also have broad discretion to consider equitable factors 

when awarding tuition reimbursement. Florence Cnty. Sch. 

Dist., 510 U.S. at 15–16.

II

A

O.M. is a 21-year-old former Pottsville student who was 

diagnosed as suffering from emotional disturbance. He first 

required in-patient hospital treatment for making threats of 

suicide and suicidal gestures in 2005, when he was enrolled in 

middle school. At that time, the School District conducted a 

psycho-educational evaluation to determine whether O.M. 

suffered from a learning disability and would be eligible for 
5

IDEA services. It determined that O.M. was not eligible for 

learning disability services based on his cognitive and 

achievement test scores. It determined that he was not eligible 

for emotional disturbance services based on behavioral ratings 

completed by teachers and a psychiatric report. 

O.M. returned to Pottsville in the fall of 2005 and 

performed well academically for three years. He had no 

problem with attendance, expressed no concerns about school, 

and received grades in the A to C range in regular college 

preparatory courses.1 During the 2005-2006 school year, O.M. 

periodically saw the school psychologist, who observed nothing 

suggesting that an additional evaluation for IDEA services was 

necessary.

In April 2008, O.M. took an overdose of prescription 

medication and was hospitalized. Although his parents notified 

the School District about the incident, they did not provide it 

with details or medical records. O.M. also was hospitalized 

twice in the summer of 2008 for making suicidal threats and 

gestures and attempting suicide. The first hospitalization 

occurred after an incident with his high school football coach 

during a summer practice session; the second occurred during a 

family trip to the university that O.M.‘s sibling attended.

Following the very difficult summer O.M. experienced, 

in August 2008, O.M.‘s parents notified the School District that 

they were going to enroll him in the private boarding school that 

his brother had attended. The School District assisted in this 

 

1

In the 2007-2008 school year, for example, O.M. 

received two A‘s, three B‘s, and two C‘s.
6

effort by writing letters of recommendation for O.M. and 

supplying teacher evaluation forms. O.M.‘s guidance counselor, 

who submitted a very positive letter of recommendation, noted 

that O.M. was ranked 62 out of a class of 278. O.M. was 

accepted, but after his first day the boarding school notified his 

parents that he felt depressed and had thoughts of harming 

himself, and it required his parents to take him home.

After his withdrawal from boarding school, O.M. 

reenrolled at Pottsville Area High School. His behavior and 

performance at school were, for the most part, unremarkable. 

He initially decided to take honors math classes, but began 

struggling academically and dropped them. When he returned to 

regular college preparatory courses, his grades improved. On at 

least two occasions after O.M. returned, he became upset and 

spoke to the guidance counselor, and his parents were required 

to pick him up from school. Otherwise, O.M. generally attended 

and participated in his classes, and he was observed spending his

lunch and free periods socializing with students who were 

considered popular.

O.M.‘s mental health problems continued, however. In 

early September 2008, he again expressed suicidal ideation and 

had to be hospitalized. His parents notified the School District 

and requested an IEP for their son. In response, the School 

District requested and received permission from O.M.‘s parents 

to conduct an evaluation to determine whether he was a 

protected handicapped student under § 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act, and, if so, what services he needed.2 O.M. was hospitalized 

 

2

The Rehabilitation Act ―prohibits discrimination in 

federally-funded programs, including public schools, on the 
7

again in November 2008. In mid-November, the School District 

created a Rehabilitation Act § 504 plan for O.M., which O.M.‘s 

parents approved.

3

 The School District did not, however, create 

an IEP.

In January 2009, O.M. again threatened suicide and was 

hospitalized for treatment. When he was released, his parents 

enrolled him at Wediko Children‘s Services, a therapeutic 

residential treatment center in New Hampshire, for the rest of 

the school year. While there, O.M. received daily individual and 

group therapy, during which he received training in social skills, 

emotional regulation, stress management, and conflict 

resolution. Wediko also offered a full school day with a 

curriculum that met New Hampshire‘s educational standards, 

which O.M. began attending about two to three weeks after his 

enrollment. The classes were small and graded on a pass-fail 

basis, and the school day included three debriefing periods to 

assess how well O.M. was maintaining control of his thoughts, 

mood, and anxiety.

 

basis of disability.‖ Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 265 

n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794).

3 O.M.‘s § 504 plan provided for the following services 

and accommodations: positive reinforcement from teachers; 

preferential seating; directions repeated verbally; extra time to 

complete time-sensitive tasks when needed; and permission to 

take tests in a quiet setting when needed. The plan also 

provided that O.M. would ask for help from teachers and use 

available tutoring services and guidance services when 

necessary.
8

Wediko conducted an evaluation of O.M. in February 

2009. The evaluation consisted of standardized cognitive and 

academic achievement tests and measures designed to test 

social-emotional functioning. Wediko notified the School 

District of the results and recommended that the District 

consider an IEP for O.M. The District reviewed Wediko‘s 

analysis, which indicated that O.M. was in the average range of 

intellectual functioning, with average to above average scores in 

math, reading, and writing, and accepted Wediko‘s diagnosis of 

emotional disturbance.4

In May 2009, the School District offered an IEP for 

O.M., which included annual goals and provided for emotional 

support services. In September 2009, the School District added 

a cognitive-behavioral curriculum for students experiencing 

anxiety and depression. It also increased social work services 

and added psychological services. Although these proposals 

incorporated most of Wediko‘s recommendations, O.M.‘s 

parents rejected the IEP because it did not provide O.M. with 

small classes or the same types of counseling services that he 

was receiving at Wediko. O.M. completed the school year at 

Wediko.

Before the start of the 2009-2010 school year, O.M.‘s 

parents decided that his risk level had decreased to the point 

where he could function in a less intensive environment. 

Accordingly, O.M.‘s parents decided to send him to The Phelps 

School, a residential school located in Malvern, Pennsylvania, 

and licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Education.

 

4

The School District rejected Wediko‘s conclusion that 

O.M. had a non-verbal learning disability.
9

Phelps was closer to home and offered small classes and a 

supportive environment.

B

O.M.‘s parents filed a due process complaint in August 

2009 with the Office of Dispute Resolution, and a hearing was 

conducted by a Pennsylvania Special Hearing Officer. O.M.‘s 

parents alleged that the School District had failed to conduct a 

timely evaluation of O.M. and provide specialized educational 

services, in violation of the IDEA. They sought: 

(1) compensatory education for the time period between the fall

of 2007 and December 2008; and (2) reimbursement for the cost 

of O.M.‘s placements at Wediko and Phelps.

The Hearing Officer issued a written administrative 

decision and order denying relief on January 23, 2010. She 

concluded that the School District had no obligation to evaluate 

O.M. or provide him with specialized educational services 

between 2005 and spring of 2008 because, although the record 

suggested that O.M. was emotionally disturbed, there was no 

evidence that O.M.‘s condition was affecting his ability to learn 

at that time. The Hearing Officer remarked that whether the 

School District had an obligation to evaluate O.M. and provide 

him with specialized services in the fall of 2008, after it learned 

of his September and November suicide attempts, was a closer 

question. Nevertheless, she determined that even if the School 

District had committed a procedural violation of the IDEA, that 

violation had no substantive effect, as O.M. was placed at 

Wediko before the School District would have had time to 

complete an evaluation, develop an IEP, and begin to provide 

services. Because the School District‘s delay did not actually 

deprive O.M. of an educational benefit, O.M. was not entitled to 
10

an award of compensatory education for that period.

The Hearing Officer then considered whether O.M.‘s 

parents were entitled to compensation for the costs of private 

placement at Wediko or Phelps. Relying on Mary T. v. School 

District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009), she 

determined that they were not entitled to reimbursement for the 

costs of attending Wediko because the primary purpose of that 

placement was the provision of mental health treatment rather 

than provision of special education. She explained that O.M. 

was placed at Wediko because of ―a medical/mental health crisis 

that required immediate treatment.‖ App. 59. This finding was 

supported by the testimony of O.M.‘s father and witnesses from 

Wediko, who ―emphasized that Student needed to attend 

Wediko in order to keep him safe from the effects of his 

depression, which led to suicide threats and gestures when he 

was living at home.‖ App. 60. She also noted that the services 

O.M. received while at Wediko were based on a treatment plan 

designed by a clinical psychologist and were not focused 

primarily on education. 

Finally, the Hearing Officer determined that O.M.‘s 

parents were not entitled to compensation for the costs of 

attending Phelps because, at the time that O.M. went there, the 

District had proposed an IEP that met all of O.M.‘s educational 

needs. Although O.M.‘s parents opined that O.M. could benefit 

from smaller class sizes and counseling services such as those 

provided by the private schools, the Hearing Officer explained 

that, under the IDEA, O.M. ―is entitled to an appropriate 

program, not an ideal program.‖ App. 60.

On April 21, 2010, Munir appealed the Hearing Officer‘s 

decision by filing a complaint in the United States District Court 
11

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The District Court 

adopted the factual findings of the Hearing Officer, applied the 

same legal analysis, and granted summary judgment in favor of 

the School District.5 Munir filed this timely appeal, challenging 

only the District Court‘s denial of his request for tuition 

reimbursement.

III

The District Court had jurisdiction in this matter under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In deciding cases brought under the IDEA, district courts 

apply a modified version of de novo review. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. 

of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006). Although the 

District Court must make its own findings by a preponderance of

the evidence, it is also required to afford due weight to the 

factual findings of the hearing officer. Id. ―The  ̳due weight‘ 

standard requires the court to consider the factual findings from 

the administrative proceedings prima facie correct and, if the 

court fails to adopt those findings, it must explain its reasons for 

departing from them.‖ Mary T., 575 F.3d at 241 (quoting Shore, 

 

5 During the District Court proceedings, both Munir and 

the School District supplemented the administrative record with 

their own reports as to whether the IEPs offered by the School 

District were adequate. The District Court found that these 

reports ―amounted to little more than a quasi-judicial type 

review of the administrative findings,‖ and provided no ―basis to 

abrogate the findings of fact listed by ALJ Carroll in her 

Decision.‖ App. 27.
12

381 F.3d at 199) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). We exercise plenary review over the District Court‘s 

legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error. 

L.E., 435 F.3d at 389.

IV

On appeal, Munir argues that he is entitled to 

reimbursement for the costs of O.M.‘s tuition at Wediko and 

Phelps. To be entitled to reimbursement, Munir must show that 

the School District failed to provide O.M. with a FAPE and that 

the alternative private placement was appropriate. See Florence 

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 510 U.S. at 15–16; Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242. 

For placement at a residential program to be ―appropriate,‖ the 

program must itself be proper under the IDEA—that is, it must 

―provide[] significant learning and confer[] meaningful benefit.‖ 

Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242 (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 

DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007)). The court must 

also find that the residential program is the sort of program that 

the public school should have taken financial responsibility for 

in the first place. See, e.g., id. at 243–44 (considering whether 

the school district should have initially been financially 

responsible for the placement in determining whether a 

placement was ―appropriate‖ for purposes of reimbursement); 

see also Butler v. Evans, 225 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2000)

(same).

6

 

6 We have previously recognized that ―parents of a 

disabled student need not seek out the perfect private placement 

in order to satisfy IDEA.‖ Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242 (quoting 

Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 n.8 (3d Cir. 

1999)). A private placement may, for example, be ―appropriate‖ 
13

The District Court determined that Munir was not entitled 

to reimbursement for the costs of O.M.‘s attendance at Wediko 

because he could not meet the second prong of the test. That is, 

O.M.‘s placement at Wediko was not an ―appropriate‖ 

placement because he was placed at Wediko to treat his mental 

health needs, and any educational benefit that he received was 

incidental. The Court further determined that Munir was not 

entitled to reimbursement for the costs of attending Phelps 

because the first prong of the test had not been met—when O.M. 

was enrolled at Phelps, the School District had offered him an 

IEP that would meet his educational needs. Because we 

perceive no error in the Hearing Officer‘s comprehensive 

decision or in the District Court‘s thorough review of the case, 

we will affirm.

A

O.M.‘s parents enrolled him at Wediko in January 2009, 

after he received in-patient treatment following a suicide 

attempt, and O.M. stayed at Wediko through July 2009. Munir 

seeks reimbursement for the costs of this placement, which 

amounted to $68,752.61. 

 

even if the private school fails ―to provide an IEP or meet state 

educational standards.‖ Id. at 242 (citing Florence, 510 U.S. at 

14–15). But if a school district would not have been required to 

provide the child with residential treatment before the child was 

withdrawn from public school, it does not become financially 

responsible for that placement when parents make the unilateral 

decision to enroll their child at a residential facility. This is true 

even when the school district may have failed in some other 

respect to provide the child with a FAPE.
14

Munir argues that the School District violated the 

procedures set out by the IDEA when it failed to offer O.M. an 

IEP until May 2009,7and that the IEP the School District 

offered then was inadequate. He argues that, as a result of the 

School District‘s violations, O.M. was denied a FAPE during 

the 2008-2009 school year. He further claims that full-time 

residential treatment was a ―necessary ingredient to learning,‖ so 

O.M.‘s placement at Wediko from January 2009 to July 2009 

was ―appropriate.‖ Munir Br. at 52.

School districts are responsible for the costs of a 

disabled child‘s placement in a residential program when that 

placement is ―necessary to provide special education and related 

services.‖ 34 C.F.R. § 300.104. Residential placement may be 

necessary when the disabled child needs a highly structured 

environment in order to obtain any kind of educational benefit. 

For example, in Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 

642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981), we explained that the appropriate 

educational goals for a child with severe mental disabilities and 

cerebral palsy included the development of ―basic self-help and 

 

7 Munir contends that the School District should have 

identified O.M. as disabled ―as early as 2005, and no later than 

September of 2008‖ because of his hospitalizations. Munir Br. 

at 34. But Munir did not present any evidence that O.M.‘s 

condition adversely affected his educational progress during that 

time. Indeed, as the Hearing Officer noted, Munir testified that 

O.M. had no problem with attendance and did not express any 

concern about attending school during that period. Munir also 

argues that that the School District had an obligation to evaluate 

O.M. and develop an IEP at some point after September 2008,

when he requested an evaluation.
15

social skills such as toilet training.‖ Id. at 693 (quoting Battle v. 

Commonwealth of Pa., 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1980)). 

However, the child suffered from emotional problems that 

prevented him from achieving those goals; when he experienced 

stress, he would induce choking and vomiting, which 

―interfere[d] fundamentally with his ability to learn.‖ Id. at 694. 

The student needed consistency of programming and 

environment to meet his educational goals because of his 

emotional problems, and we thus found that the school district 

was responsible for the costs of the residential program. Id. at 

694, 696.8

 

8 Similarly, in Independent School District No. 284 v. 

A.C., 258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001), the Eighth Circuit found that 

residential treatment was warranted because it was necessary to 

directly address the child‘s educational problems. There, the 

child suffered from emotional and behavioral disorders that 

manifested themselves in ―classroom disruption, profanity, 

insubordination, and truancy.‖ Id. at 771. Evaluations of the 

student suggested that these disorders were interfering with her 

academic progress and that she needed a highly structured 

program in order to benefit from educational instruction. See id.

at 772. Because the child‘s emotional and behavioral disorders 

―need[ed] to be addressed in order for [her] to learn,‖ and 

because evaluations suggested that a residential program would 

be the only effective way of treating those problems, the Eighth 

Circuit concluded that residential placement was appropriate. 

Id. at 777; see also Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (residential placement appropriate in 

light of student‘s ―stalled academic performance‖ and the 

determination that the student‘s ―debilitating emotional 

problems could only be properly addressed in a highly structured 
16

School districts are not, however, financially responsible 

for the placement of students who need twenty-four-hour 

supervision for medical, social, or emotional reasons, and 

receive only an incidental educational benefit from that 

placement. See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245–46; Kruelle, 642 F.2d 

at 693 (―Analysis must focus . . . on whether full-time placement 

may be considered necessary for educational purposes, or 

whether the residential placement is a response to medical, 

social or emotional problems that are segregable from the 

learning process.‖). In determining whether schools should be 

held financially responsible for the costs of residential 

placement, courts must consider whether the service is necessary 

to ensure that the child receives some educational benefit, and 

they must assess the strength of the link between that service 

and the child‘s educational needs. Mary T., 575 F.3d at 244 

(citing Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694).

Applying this analysis in Mary T., we determined that 

there was an insufficient link between the child‘s placement in a 

long-term psychiatric facility and her educational needs. There, 

the child suffered from psychotic events, severe anger problems, 

substance abuse, and self-harming behavior. 575 F.3d at 239. 

She had previously been placed in a residential educational 

facility and a psychiatric hospital, but neither of those facilities 

was able to provide appropriate care. Id. Although the longterm psychiatric facility at which she was subsequently placed 

was an accredited rehabilitation facility, it did not have any 

 

residential setting‖); Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 632–33 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (student placed in special educational school to treat 

severe emotional disturbance that was interfering with his ability 

to learn).
17

educational accreditation, nor did it have an on-site school, 

special education teachers, or school affiliation; the child spent 

most of her time there in intensive individual and group therapy. 

Id. Although we recognized that the child may have received 

some educational benefit from her therapy sessions, those 

sessions were ―predominately designed to make her aware of her 

medical condition and how to respond to it‖; they were ―neither 

intended nor designed to be responsive to the child‘s distinct 

 ̳learning needs.‘‖ Id. at 245. Therefore, the parents were not 

eligible for reimbursement.

Other courts of appeals have reached similar results when 

the services were directed primarily at the child‘s medical or 

emotional needs, rather than the child‘s educational needs. In 

Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of 

Administrative Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990), for 

example, a student suffering from serious emotional problems 

was also placed in an acute care psychiatric hospital providing 

few educational services, and her parents sought reimbursement 

for that placement. Id. at 639. In assessing the link between the 

child‘s educational needs and the placement, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that the services provided by the hospital were not 

primarily provided to allow the student to benefit from her 

education, but instead were excludable medical expenses. Id. at 

645; see also Butler, 225 F.3d at 894–95 (finding that parents 

were not entitled to reimbursement for hospitalization because 

―education was not the purpose of her hospitalization,‖ and 

explaining that ―[u]nlike in-school nursing in Cedar Rapids, 

Niki‘s inpatient medical care was necessary in itself and was not 

a special accommodation made necessary only to allow her to 

attend school or receive education‖).

Unlike the students in Mary T. and Clovis, O.M. was 
18

placed at a facility that did offer an educational component. 

Wediko‘s residential treatment program included a full school 

day, with a curriculum that met New Hampshire‘s educational 

standards. O.M. began attending those classes about two to 

three weeks after his admission. In addition to academic 

classes, the school day included three debriefing periods for 

assessing how well O.M. was maintaining control of thoughts, 

mood, and anxiety. The District Court recognized that O.M. 

―undoubtedly benefitted‖ from this educational program. 

The relevant question, however, is whether O.M. had to 

attend a residential facility because of his educational needs—

because, for example, he would have been incapable of learning 

in a less structured environment—or rather, if he required 

residential placement to treat medical or mental health needs

segregable from his educational needs. Mary T., 575 F.3d at 

243–44 (private placement must be ―necessary for educational

purposes,‖ as opposed to ―a response to medical, social or 

emotional problems that are segregable from the learning 

process‖ (quoting Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693) (emphasis added)); 

cf. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (schools must bear the costs of 

placement in a residential program when such placement ―is 

necessary to provide special education and related services to a 

child with a disability‖). The fact that a particular residential 

facility does not even offer educational programs may be strong 

evidence that the child was placed there to meet his medical or 

emotional needs. See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245–46 (explaining 

that the facility‘s lack of educational accreditation and on-site 

educators ―further demonstrated‖ that the child‘s placement was 

not educational). Conversely, the fact that classes are offered 

may provide evidence that the purpose of the placement is, in 

fact, educational. But O.M.‘s participation in some educational 

programs at Wediko does not conclusively establish that the 
19

purpose of his placement there was educational. Other factors—

such as evaluations of the student‘s actual educational needs,9or 

evidence of a psychiatric crisis prompting the placement10—

should also be considered.

Here, O.M. was enrolled at Wediko to meet his mental 

health needs, and any educational benefit he received from the 

Wediko placement was incidental. The placement at Wediko 

was prompted by a medical emergency. His parents ―feared for 

his personal safety,‖ and they enrolled him at Wediko ―in order 

to prevent him from harming himself.‖ Munir v. Pottsville Area 

Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 2194543, at *15 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2012). 

Thus, although O.M. did attend specialized classes while at 

Wediko, services there were more medical than educational. Id. 

Indeed, O.M. was an above-average student at Pottsville, who 

 

9

See, e.g., Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (remarking that the 

student‘s program at the hospital ―was implemented not by the 

[IEP] designed by the school system, but was instead determined 

by a medical team, supervised by a licensed physician‖).

10 See, e.g., Butler, 225 F.3d at 893 (noting, in finding 

that the school district was not financially responsible for the 

student‘s placement, that the student‘s ―hospitalization was 

prompted by a psychiatric crisis‖); Taylor, 910 F.2d at 633 

(explaining, in finding that placement at a special educational 

school was appropriate, that ―[t]he placement was not ordered in 

response to any medical crisis; on the contrary, the IEP 

developed on May 9, 1988 stated that Todd was  ̳medically 

stable‘ and that a state hospital was inappropriate for him‖); 

Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (child‘s hospitalization was in response 

to a medical crisis).
20

had no serious problem with attendance and socialized well with 

other students. Because O.M.‘s parents have not shown that 

they placed O.M. at Wediko in order to meet his specialized 

educational needs, the District Court correctly determined that

they are not entitled to reimbursement.11

B

Munir also challenges the District Court‘s determination 

that he was not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of tuition 

at Phelps during the 2009-2010 school year, which amounted to 

$42,100. O.M. was placed at Phelps after his parents rejected 

the IEP proposed by the School District in May 2009. O.M.‘s 

parents also rejected a second IEP in September 2009 because it 

did not provide certain services that they believed would be 

beneficial—in particular, smaller class sizes and the type of 

counseling services that had been available at Wediko.

As noted previously, parents are only entitled to tuition 

reimbursement when the school district has failed to offer a 

FAPE. School districts are required to offer an IEP that is 

―reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful 

educational benefits in light of the student‘s intellectual 

potential.‖ P.P., 585 F.3d at 729−30 (quoting Shore Reg’l High 

Sch., 381 F.3d at 198). They are not, however, required to 

―maximize the potential‖ of each handicapped student. T.R., 

205 F.3d at 577 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21).

 

11 Because we find that the District Court did not err in 

holding that Wediko was not an ―appropriate placement,‖ we 

need not address Munir‘s claims relating to alleged procedural 

violations committed by the school district.
21

The District Court did not err in determining that the IEP 

offered by the School District in May and September 2009 

satisfied the School District‘s obligations under the IDEA. In 

designing O.M.‘s IEPs, the School District took into account 

Wediko‘s evaluation of O.M. and ―incorporated virtually all of 

the Wediko recommendations.‖ Munir, 2012 WL 2194543, at 

*9. The District Court recognized that smaller classes and more 

emotional support might ―contribute to [O.M.‘s] ability to learn 

more easily,‖ id. at *16, but it determined that neither was

necessary to ensure that O.M. received meaningful educational 

benefits. Munir has not shown that this conclusion was clearly 

erroneous.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 

District Court.