NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DAVID ELDRIDGE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0400

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-419627-001

The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Cory Engle

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. ELDRIDGE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 David Eldridge was convicted of two counts of aggravated 

assault, Class 3 dangerous felonies, arising out of a road-rage incident. For 

the reasons below, we affirm the convictions and resulting sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 While both were driving, Eldridge and another driver became 

involved in an altercation. The other driver testified Eldridge brandished a 

knife and threatened to kill him and his girlfriend, who was a passenger in 

the other driver’s car. Eventually both drivers stopped, and Eldridge 

stabbed the other driver.

¶3 The State charged Eldridge with two counts of aggravated 

assault. The first count alleged Eldridge used a knife, "a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument," to physically injure the other driver. The second 

count alleged Eldridge used a knife, "a deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument," to place the other driver "in reasonable apprehension of 

imminent physical injury." After the jury found Eldridge guilty of both 

charges, the superior court ruled both convictions necessarily included 

dangerousness findings because they both involved the use of a knife. 

Accordingly, the court denied Eldridge’s request to have the jury to decide 

the issue of dangerousness, and sentenced Eldridge to concurrent sevenyear terms of incarceration.

¶4 We have jurisdiction over Eldridge’s timely appeal pursuant 

to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2015), 13-

4031 (2015), and 13-4033(A)(1) (2015).

1

 

1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. ELDRIDGE

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶5 On appeal, Eldridge argues only that the superior court erred 

by denying his request to submit to the jury the issue of whether his two

convictions were dangerous offenses. Because the issue presented is one of 

law, our review is de novo. State v. Lizardi, 234 Ariz. 501, 504, ¶ 12 (App. 

2014).

¶6 Pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-704 (2015) and -105(13) (2015), the 

sentencing range for a repetitive offense is enhanced if the offense is 

dangerous, meaning that it involved "the discharge, use or threatening

exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." In Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 520 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther 

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Under this rule, however, 

the court may impose a sentence based on "facts reflected in the jury verdict." 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).

¶7 In State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 561, ¶ 88 (2003), the Arizona 

Supreme Court held there is no error under Apprendi/Blakely if the 

sentencing factor is implicit in the jury’s verdict of guilt. Eldridge 

acknowledges Ring, but asserts that our supreme court's decision in that 

case ignores that juries sometimes render inconsistent verdicts. He argues 

that as a consequence, the fact that a sentencing factor is implicit in a guilty 

verdict does not necessarily mean that, having reached a guilty verdict, a 

jury always would come to the same conclusion if it were asked to decide 

the issue separately for sentencing. Eldridge’s argument fails, however, 

because, as noted above, there is no error under Blakely when the factors 

necessary to establish a sentencing factor are implicit in the jury’s verdict. 

In any event, we are bound by Ring and so reject Eldridge’s argument and 

reaffirm that when a finding of dangerousness is essential to a conviction, 

the jury need not be asked separately to consider whether the crime is 

dangerous. See State v. Larin, 233 Ariz. 202, 212, ¶ 18 (App. 2013); State v. 

Gatliff, 209 Ariz. 362, 366, ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (conviction of arson of an 

occupied structure required proof that fire was dangerous).

¶8 Here, on each of the two charges, the jury was instructed that 

it could convict Eldridge only if it found, inter alia, that he "used a 

dangerous instrument or weapon." Accordingly, as the State argues, the 

jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that Eldridge used a 

dangerous instrument or weapon in committing both crimes. Because the 

jury necessarily concluded that Eldridge used a dangerous instrument or 
STATE v. ELDRIDGE

Decision of the Court

4

weapon in committing each of the two crimes, the superior court did not 

err in denying Eldridge’s request to submit the issue of dangerousness to 

the jury.

CONCLUSION

¶9 We affirm Eldridge’s convictions and resulting sentences.