*This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 27 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________________ JOHNNY L. GUYTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. OTTAWA TRUCK DIVISION, KALMAR INDUSTRIES U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-3028 (D. Kan.) (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-2488-GTV)

____________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA Chief Circuit Judge, and SEYMOURand BRORBY , Circuit Judges.

Mr. Guyton appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ottawa Truck Division of Kalmar Industries U.S.A., Inc. (“Ottawa Truck”). Mr. Guyton alleges Ottawa Truck racially discriminated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981-2-

(“Section 1981”), and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affi rm.

BACKGROUND In January 1998, Mr. Guyton began working for Ottaw a Truck as a “contract drafter.” He was the only African-Americ an employee in Ottawa Truck’s engineering department at that time. He ob tained a temporary position “with ... the possibility of being hired later if [ his] performance was okay.” As a “contract drafter,” his responsibilities included “ mak[ing] changes and produc[ing] new drawings, as necessary, to facilitate [Ottawa Truck] building trucks that pulled trailers.”

Drafters at Ottawa Truck used a computer aided desi gn system loaded with drafting software entitled “Computer Vision.” Mr. Guyton lacked experience with Computer Vision, but was familiar with compute r aided design systems. Because of Mr. Guyton’s inexperience with Computer Vision, Mr. Brown, a design engineer, trained him during his first week of work at Ottawa Truck.

On Mr. Guyton’s fourth day of work, his supervisor, Mr. Lehman, assigned him a training exercise. He completed the assignme nt and submitted it to Mr.-3-

Lehman, who testified in deposition that he viewed Mr. Guyton’s drawing as technically unsatisfactory and untimely. Mr. Lehma n never proffered his criticism to Mr. Guyton when he submitted his drawi ng; however, Mr. Guyton noticed Mr. Lehman appeared displeased with his per formance.

Mr. Halverson, the Director of Engineering at Ottaw a Truck, fired Mr. Guyton six days after he began working for the comp any. Before terminating him, Mr. Halverson spoke with Mr. Lehman and Mr. Br own about Mr. Guyton’s drafting performance. Mr. Lehman told Mr. Halverso n he was displeased with Mr. Guyton’s submitted drawing and drafting abiliti es. Mr. Brown told Mr. Halverson “there were some basic mechanical things that [Mr. Guyton] didn’t know how to draw.”

According to Mr. Guyton, Mr. Halverson told him of his termination, expressed his regrets and explained, “we’re going t o have to let you go because we don’t feel that we could bring you up to speed. We thought that your technical abilities were more than what they were, and we’re going to let you go at this point.” Mr. Guyton then retrieved his briefcase, a nd left the building.

Two or three weeks after his discharge, Mr. Guyton received a telephone1 Mr. Guyton does not appeal, and we do not address, his hostile work

environment claim. In addition, because we affirm the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Ottawa Truck, we need not discuss: (1) Mr. Guyton’s request for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; and (2) Ottawa Truck’s argument that an inference of nondiscrimination arises when the same person hires and fires the employee alleging -4- call from Mr. Vasquez, another temporary employee at Ottawa Truck. Mr. Vasquez explained he overheard Mr. King, who at the time was Chief Engineer at Ottawa Truck, remark “[w]e finally got rid of that nigger.” Mr. Guyton was surprised Mr. Vasquez called him to report the raci al slur because Mr. Guyton found the people he worked with at Ottawa Truck “ve ry nice and very polite.”

In October 1998, Mr. Guyton filed a complaint in di strict court alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and Section 1981, and seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. After the p arties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted OttawaTruck’s motion and denied Mr. Guyton’s motion. The district court held Mr. G uyton neither suffered disparate treatment nor experienced a racially host ile work environment, and was not entitled to punitive damages. Regarding Mr. Guyton’s disparate treatment allegation, the district court concluded he failed to present sufficient evidence showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons for terminating him were pretextual. On appeal, Mr. Guyton argues he proffered sufficient prima fac ie and pretext evidence to withstand summary judgment. 1discrimination. See Griffin v. Davies , 929 F.2d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We will not

undertake to decide issues that do not affect the outcome of a dispute”).

2As discussed below, Mr. Guyton claims that Ottawa Truck’s reasons for terminating him are false, he was disparately treated, and its managers harbor racial animus. Although he describes this as only a disparate treatment case, it is more accurately characterized as alleging discriminatory discharge. Accordingly, we will not limit our review exclusively to his disparate treatment allegation.

-5- “We review the district court’s grant of summary ju dgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the distri ct court.” Simms v. Oklahoma , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 815 (1999). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositi ons, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavit s, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence is merely c olorable or is not significantly probative.” Vitkus v. Beatrice Co. , 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993). “[W]e view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Simms , 165 F.3d at 1326.

DISCUSSION Mr. Guyton relies on indirect evidence to support h is claim of discriminatory discharge under Title VII and Sectio n 1981. 2 The elements of an-6-

employee’s discriminatory discharge claim are the s ame whether brought under Title VII or Section 1981, and we analyze them usin g the burden-shifting framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc. , 220 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2000). We are mindful that “[a]lthough the general rule that an employer can discharge an at-will employee for any reason or no reason is still valid, an employer can no longer terminate an at-wi ll employment relationship for a racially discriminatory reason.” Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000).

Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee “must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishin g a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1226 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Once the employee establishes a prima fa cie case, “the burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legit imate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the employer satisfies his burden of production, the employee must then show that the employer’s justification is pretextual. Id. Accordingly, “[an employee’s] prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to fi nd that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fac t to conclude that the employer-7-

unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., In c., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).

A. Prima Facie Case The district court assumed Mr. Guyton proved his pr ima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, M r. Guyton must show: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) despite his qualifications, he was discharged; and (4) the job was not eliminated after his discharge.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229. Although both the parties and the district court identified an inaccurate prima facie standard, we find it appropriate to assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that M r. Guyton established a prima facie case of discrimination and proceed directly t o the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 186 F.3d 1301, 1316 n. 11 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing it i s appropriate for this court to focus on the pretext element of a discrimination lawsuit when the district court concentrated its analysis on that element).

B. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Termination Having assumed Mr. Guyton established his prima fac ie case, the burden shifts to Ottawa Truck to provide a legitimate, non -discriminatory reason for3 In the district court, Mr. Guyton argued he was treated less favorably than Mr.

Vasquez, who, according to Mr. Guyton, was a similarly situated contract drafter. The district court held Ottawa Truck’s decision not to terminate Mr. Vasquez failed to show pretext. Mr. Guyton does not challenge the district court’s holding regarding Mr. Vasquez on appeal; thus, we deem this matter waived. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).

-8- terminating him. Ottawa Truck’s stated reasons fordischarge are: (1) he was not technically proficient at drafting parts for the tr ucking industry; and (2) it would take too long to train him on the drafting software . Accordingly, we hold Ottawa Truck articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory re asons for firing Mr. Guyton.

C. Pretext To satisfy his burden of showing pretext, Mr. Guyto n offers two arguments. First, he claims Reeves obviates an employee’s obligation to show pretext. In the alternative, Mr. Guyton argues he presented suffici ent pretext evidence demonstrating: (1) Ottawa Truck’s justifications a re false – he is, in fact, proficient and requires only minimal additional tra ining on the drafting software; (2) he was treated less favorably than a “similarly situated” white contract drafter; 3 and (3) Ottawa Truck’s managers harbor racial anim us.

Before examining his alternative argument, we brief ly express our disagreement with Mr. Guyton’s first assertion that Reeves eliminates the-9-

employee’s burden of showing pretext. In Reeves , the Supreme Court reiterates: [T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fa ct that the [employer] intentionally discriminated against the [employee] remains at all times with the [employee]. And in attempting to satisfy this burden, the [employee] – once the empl oyer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision – must be afforded the opportunity to prov e by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate r easons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 530 U.S. at 143 (quotation marks and citations omitted). It is evident Reeves rejects certain circuit courts’ attempt to require an employee to introduce sufficient evidence to find both that the employer’ s reasons are false and that the real reason is discrimination. Id. at 2104-05, 2108-09 (rejecting pretext-plus standard). However, the case does not eliminate Mr . Guyton’s obligation to establish his prima facie case and provide sufficie nt evidence to disbelieve Ottawa Truck’s legitimate, non-discriminatory expla nations for firing him. Id. at 2109 (holding “[an employee’s] prima facie case, co mbined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justi fication is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfu lly discriminated”). Based on our reading of Reeves , we hold Mr. Guyton’s first argument necessarily f ails. Therefore, we focus our attention on his alternativ e argument and examine his evidence of pretext.-10-

1. False Justification for Termination In his alternative argument, Mr. Guyton claims he p rovided sufficient evidence showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons are false. Mr. Guyton primarily argues his deposition testimony and affidavit, in which he claims he is proficient and able to draft without significant additional traini ng, creates a genuine issue of material fact that Ottawa Truck’s reasons are false . Additionally, he cites Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit and deposition testimony as sup port for his contention he is in fact proficient and requires “very little training. ” We conclude Mr. Guyton’s subjective evaluation of his own drafting aptitude and ability to work without substantial additional training, and Mr. Vasquez’s similar perspective, do not create a material fact dispute, because the relevan t inquiry is the decisionmaker’s perception of the employee’s performance. See Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc. , 188 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1318.

As this court consistently recognizes, we must “loo k at the facts as they appear to the person making the decision to terminate [the employee].” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231; see also Shorter , 188 F.3d at 1209 (recognizing “it is the manager’s perception of the employee’s performance that is relevant,” and “not [the employee’s] subjective evaluation of [his] own relative performance” in determining pretext) (quotation marks omitted). Th us, “[t]he relevant inquiry is-11-

not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those reas ons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.” Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1318.

Mr. Halverson, the Director of Engineering, made th e decision to fire Mr. Guyton because he believed Mr. Guyton lacked profic iency in drafting parts for the trucking industry and required substantial trai ning on the drafting software. Mr. Halverson solicited comments and feedback from Mr. Brown and Mr. Lehman. According to Mr. Halverson, Mr. Brown toldhim that Mr. Guyton lacked the ability to draft “basic mechanical thing s.” In addition, both parties agree Mr. Lehman, who was personally familiar with Mr. Guyton’s drawings, complained to Mr. Halverson about the quality of Mr . Guyton’s work and his lack of drafting proficiency. Accordingly, the fact that Mr. Halverson consulted with people familiar with Mr. Guyton’s work and received negative commentary, suggests Mr. Halverson honestly believed his proffe red reasons.

Mr. Guyton’s alleged aptitude simply does not show that when Mr. Halverson decided to terminate him, Mr. Halverson d id not honestly believe his proffered reasons. Similarly, even if we assume Mr . Vasquez’s affidavit and4Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit speaks to Mr. Guyton’s drafting proficiency in general,

conclusory terms. “While an affidavit is certainly an appropriate vehicle to establish a fact for summary judgment purposes, the affidavit must set forth facts, not conclusory statements.” Bancoklahoma Mortgage Corp. v. Capital Title Co. , 194 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999) (addressing the summary judgment requirement that “facts” be established by evidence that would be admissible at trial).

-12- deposition testimony are admissible, 4 the evidence attesting to Mr. Guyton’s proficiency is insufficient to create a genuine iss ue of material fact on the issue of pretext. Mr. Vasquez neither reviewed Mr. Guyton’s drafting samples nor possessed decisionmaking or supervisory authority o ver Mr. Guyton; thus, Mr. Halverson did not ask for his opinion about Mr. Guyton’s technical ability to draft parts for the trucking industry. This evidence sug gests, at most, Ottawa Truck may have unwisely discharged Mr. Guyton, but it fai ls to show Mr. Halverson dishonestly fired him. See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1318.

With this inquiry in mind, we examine Mr. Guyton’s three ancillary arguments. He claims pretext is shown by: (1) his trainer, Mr. Brown, provided him with positive feedback on his drafting; (2) he drafted “actual production work,” rather than training exercises, during his f irst week at Ottawa Truck; and (3) his mechanical drawings drafted while working f or other employers. After reviewing the record, we conclude this evidence doe s not preclude summary judgment for Ottawa Truck because it, too, fails to establish Mr. Halverson did-13-

not honestly believe his stated reasons for terminating Mr. Guyton. We address each argument in turn.

First, Mr. Guyton’s claim the trainer provided him with positive feedback fails to create a genuine issue of material fact th at Mr. Halverson’s reasons for firing him are pretextual. The record is replete w ith evidence the trainer was not “the person making the decision to terminate” Mr. G uyton. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231. According to the trainer, he did notrecommend Mr. Guyton’s termination, and was unaware of Mr. Halverson’s dec ision to do so. In fact, he was attending another meeting when Mr. Halverson an nounced his decision. Thus, we must look at the facts as they appear to M r. Halverson only, not the trainer. Id.

As noted above, Mr. Halverson did solicit the train er’s assessment of Mr. Guyton’s drafting abilities. Unlike the alleged po sitive feedback he gave to Mr. Guyton, the trainer told Mr. Halverson “there were some basic mechanical things that [Mr. Guyton] didn’t know how to draw.” In oth er words, drawing all inferences in Mr. Guyton’s favor, the trainer provi ded positive feedback to Mr. Guyton, but negative commentary to Mr. Halverson. However, the trainer’s inconsistent feedback fails to cast doubt on Mr. Ha lverson’s honest belief in his-14-

reasons for firing Mr. Guyton because Mr. Halversonis “entitled to the assumption that those people he did consult were te lling the truth.” Rand v. CF Indus., Inc. , 42 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging “[a]ny pretext determination is concerned with whether the employe r honestly believes in the reasons it offers, not whether it made a bad decisi on.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We next examine Mr. Guyton’s argument that he alleg edly handled “production work,” rather than mere training exerci ses, during his first week of work at Ottawa Truck. In essence, he suggests the trainer’s decision to assign him production work demonstrates Ottawa Truck deeme d him sufficiently proficient and capable of drafting parts for the tr ucking industry on its software without substantial additional training.

We disagree with Mr. Guyton’s contention Mr. Halver son’s reasons for terminating him are pretext simply because his trai ner assigned him production work. As previously mentioned, the trainer was notthe person who decided to terminate Mr. Guyton. Accordingly, the trainer’s d ecision to assign Mr. Guyton production work does not cast doubt on Mr. Halverso n’s belief he lacked proficiency and required substantial training. Mor eover, Mr. Guyton admits in his5At oral argument, Mr. Guyton’s counsel suggested a mechanical drawing that his

client allegedly produced while at Ottawa Truck recently surfaced and shows his technical proficiency. However, this is nothing more than a passing comment; the evidence was not before the district court, and is not before us now. See Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc. , 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 n. 5 (10th Cir.) (recognizing that raising an issue for the first time at oral argument “comes too late.”), cert. denied , 522 U.S. 1028 (1977).

-15- deposition testimony the actual production drawings were drafted by someone other than himself, and his job was simply to make “minor changes” to these drawings. He never completed these minor changes b ecause the computer network malfunctioned; therefore, his changes were never reviewed by a supervisor for “accuracy, content, completeness, cl arity and [to] make sure that [the drawing] was what it was supposed to be.” Thu s, the trainer’s decision to assign Mr. Guyton the task of drafting minor change s to pre-existing production drawings, which were never reviewed by a supervisor , fails to show Mr. Halverson did not honestly believe Mr. Guyton lacke d drafting proficiency and required substantial training.

Finally, Mr. Guyton submits three mechanical drawin gs to prove Mr. Halverson’s reasons are pretext, and that he is, in fact, a proficient drafter. 5 These drawings, too, fail to create a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Halverson’s reasons for terminating him are pretextual.-16-

The drawings lack probative value because Mr. Guyto n’s affidavit and attached resume reveal these drawings were created with the “Autocad” drafting software, not the Computer Vision drafting software required by Ottawa Truck. See Vitkus , 11 F.3d at 1539 (“Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probati ve.”). More importantly, it is apparent Mr. Guyton produced these documents for e mployers not engaged in the trucking industry, who presumably have different st andards for drafting proficiency than Ottawa Truck. A company must be a llowed to judge for itself whether an employee is proficient on its own softwa re and in its industry; this court is ill-suited to second guess such judgment b ased on three unrelated mechanical drawings. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233 (recognizing a court must not “act as a super personnel department that secon d guesses employers’ business judgments”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Different decisionmakers are entitled to be concerned about different things . Just as we will not dictate employment criteria to any company, we will not req uire separate decisionmakers for different, albeit related, companies to use the same criteria.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1031 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000). Even viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Guyton, it fails to undermine Mr. Halverson’s beliefs about Mr. Guyton’s drafting pro ficiency.-17-

2. Disparate Treatment Having concluded the deposition, affidavit, and dra fting sample evidence fail to show Ottawa Truck’s proffered explanations for terminating Mr. Guyton are false, we turn our attention to his claim he es tablished pretext by presenting evidence that he was treated less favorably than a white contract drafter.

The district court did not discuss whether the whit e employee is similarly situated to Mr. Guyton. Pursuant to our de novo re view, we conclude Mr. Guyton raised the issue of the white employee’s differenti al treatment to the district court. In Mr. Guyton’s response to Ottawa Truck’s motion f or summary judgment, he cites Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit as evidence a white d rafter was “similarly situated” to himself but treated differently. Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit states, “[s]hortly after Mr. Guyton, was terminated, Ottawa Truck hired a Ca ucasian contract drafter with no prior experience on the Computer Vision sof tware program. This Caucasian contract drafter was given much more trai ning on this program than was Mr. Guyton. The people training him included t he chief engineer, Harold King.” According to Mr. Guyton, the white drafter received preferential treatment despite the fact that he “demonstrated no aptitude on the software program” and “required significant hands-on trainin g.” However, Mr. Guyton’s assertion of disparate treatment does not create a genuine issue of material fact-18-

because he fails to present evidence that the white drafter is similarly situated to himself.

An employee may “show pretext on a theory of dispar ate treatment by providing evidence that he was treated differently from other similarly situated, non-protected employees.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232; Gossett v. Oklahoma , No. 98-5084, 2001 WL 355846, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 2001) (acknowledging “[e]vidence sufficient to raise a fact issue on whe ther an [employer’s] proffered explanation is pretextual may take a variety of for ms, including evidence that the [employer] treated the plaintiff differently from o thers who were similarly situated, which we have held is especially relevantto a showing of pretext”). We recognize “[a]n employee is similarly situated to t he plaintiff if the employee deals with the same supervisor and is subject to th e same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). When determining whether Mr. Guyton is s imilarly situated to a comparable employee, we “should also compare the re levant employment circumstances, such as work history and company pol icy.” Id . We are also mindful that “the failure of the plaintiff and affi ant to share the same supervisor does not preclude the consideration” of evidence wh en “the plaintiff contends he is the victim of the discriminatory applicationn of a facility-wide [or company--19-

wide] policy and has other evidence of that policy. ” Id. , at *3.

Mr. Guyton presented absolutely no evidence to indi cate he and the white drafter shared the same supervisor and trainers, an d possessed comparable drafting skills and proficiency in the trucking ind ustry. Nor has he alleged Ottawa Truck discriminated on the basis of race in applying a company-wide “policy,” such as allowing a probationary period fo r contract drafters. See id. , at *3 (holding plaintiff alleged the school “routinely discriminated on the basis of gender in applying its school-wide policy of allowi ng failing students to receive incomplete grades and extra time to improve their p erformance”). Therefore, we hold Mr. Guyton failed to show the white contract d rafter was “similarly situated”; the mere assertion of different treatmen t is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pret ext.

3. Circumstantial Evidence of Racial Animus Finally, we examine whether Mr. Guyton’s additional circumstantial evidence of racial animosity establishes pretext. Mr. Guyton contends racial animus is demonstrable because “on the same day [Mr . Guyton] was terminated, [Mr. King,] the chief engineer said that ‘We got ri d of the nigger.’ This sort of attitude and comment was consistent with managementphilosophy: [Mr.-20-

Guyton’s] supervisor and the Director of Engineerin g did nothing to stop, discourage or report racial discrimination in the E ngineering Department.” We disagree with Mr. Guyton’s contention that this evi dence is sufficient to suggest Ottawa Truck’s reasons are pretextual.

“Language not amounting to direct evidence, but sho wing some racial animus, may be significant evidence of pretext once [an employee] has set out the prima facie case.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1209-10 (acknowledging derogatory comments may serve as circumstantial evi dence of discrimination). After Reeves , we are mindful that these comments need not be ma de “in the direct context” of the employee’s termination. 530 U.S. at 139. Moreover, Reeves recognizes the person harboring racial animus need not be the actual decisionmaker provided that the racially hostile in dividual is “principally responsible” for the employee’s firing. 530 U.S. at 151; see also Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231 (recognizing other circuits’ caselaw t hat an employer “may be held liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employ ee’s prejudice, even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent”). With these principles in mind, we examine Mr. Guyton’s evidence of racial animus.-21-

Although the district court did not have the benefi t of Reeves , its opinion is not undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision. See 530 U.S. at 151. The district court concluded “[t]here is no evidence .. . that King had any input in [Mr. Guyton’s] termination decision or that racial motiv ation for the decision existed ... [Mr. Guyton] has produced no evidence that King was involved at all in the decision to terminate [him].” We agree with the di strict court and address the issue in light of Reeves

.

In this instance, Mr. Guyton’s circumstantial evide nce of racial animosity is insufficient to demonstrate pretext. Mr. Guyton me rely attributes the racial slur to Mr. King, notes the timing of the remark, and po ints out Mr. King’s job title as chief engineer at Ottawa Truck. Presumably, Mr. Guyton recognizes Mr. King did not actually fire Mr. Guyton, and instead is su ggesting a person’s job title alone is sufficient to establish the individual’s i nfluence in the workplace. Assuming this is Mr. Guyton’s argument, he misses the point.

A non-decisionmaking employee’s job title, without more, is insufficient to establish the individual is “principally responsibl e” for the employee’s firing. Cf. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture , 235 F.3d 219, 221, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the Director of Operations, who did no t have the authority to fire-22-

plaintiff, acted as the “de facto decisionmaker” be cause he exerted great informal influence over the actual decisionmaker when (1) he provided her with an ultimatum that he would quit if she did not fire th e plaintiff, and (2) his father was CEO of the parent corporation). In this case, there is no evidence to substantiate Mr. King was “principally responsible” for, or even involved with, the decision to fire Mr. Guyton, or that he exerted any influence over the official decisionmaker. Cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151; Russell , 235 F.3d at 227-28. After thoroughly reviewing the record and construing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Guyton, we hold Mr. Kin g’s racial slur, though clearly reprehensible, does not evidence pretext.

Having concluded Mr. King’s racial epithet fails to show Ottawa Truck’s reasons are pretextual, we now consider Mr. Guyton’ s contention that Mr. Halverson and Mr. Lehman’s tolerance of other emplo yee’s racial slurs establishes pretext. Mr. Guyton cites to both men’ s deposition testimony, where they acknowledged that the word “nigger” had been u sed in the engineering department, but did not know how often or by whom t he slur was spoken.

As we have already mentioned, the comments need notbe made “in the direct context” of the employee’s discharge. Reeves , 530 U.S. at 151 (quotation-23-

marks omitted). However, Mr. Guyton fails to estab lish any context for these remarks, and instead simply asserts these comments are typical of “management philosophy.” It is obvious from the record that th ese alleged remarks are unquantified, uttered by unknown employees, and occ urred at some point in the unspecified past. See Wixson v. Dowagiac Nursing Home , 87 F.3d 164, 171 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the discharged employees f ailed to show pretext when alleging numerous instances of disparate treatment and a hostile work environment in conclusory terms with no reference t o names, times and occasions). Therefore, we conclude this evidence s uffers fatal shortcomings, and is insufficient to create a genuine issue of materi al fact on the issue of pretext. See id.

Accordingly, we hold Mr. Guyton failed to present s ufficient evidence showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons for terminating him are pretext. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in f avor of Ottawa Truck.

Entered by the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge