A ffir med and M ajority and Dissenting Opinion s filed September 14 , 2023
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 23

- 00186

- CV NO. 14

- 23

- 00208

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.J .B., A CHILD IN THE INTEREST OF T.A.B., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 315th D istri ct Court Harris C ounty, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 2021

- 01521J , 2021

- 01521J -B



### M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

In two appeals a father challenges judgments terminating th e parent

- child relationship between the father and his sons
. The fathe r raises issu es reg ar din g the Indi an Chi ld Welfare Act and a n alleged discre pancy between docket

- sheet

re ndit i ons and the final judgment

. Concl uding that father has not shown any error that is reversible, we affirm bot h judgments

.2 I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B AC KGROUND
O n Se ptem ber 28, 2021, four

- year old , T. A. B. ( “ T homas ” ) was referred to his school nurse for a deep laceration on his right arm that had been conce aled by a makeshift bandage

. 1 T h e nurse also d iscovered other injuries includ ing a bruis e around T homa s ’ s ey e. T ho mas , hi s father ( “ Father ” ) , and his mother ( “ Mot h er ” ) reported that the arm injury, a four

- inch laceration requiring st itches, was caused by Fathe r throwing a dustpan in T homas ’ s direction which accidentally hit T homas

. No one at T homas ’ s s choo l, the h ospit al , or at the Texas Department of Family and Pr o tective Services (“Department”) b elieved this account. Th omas and his b rother s , includ in g his younger brother C. J. B. ( “ C harles ” ) , were immediately removed from their home

. T he De partment filed the u nd erlyi ng law suits on September 29, 2021, seeking emer g ency protection , conservatorship and termination of Father ’ s parental rights to his son s Charles and Thomas

. In each case, t he Miami Tribe of Oklahoma ( “ Miami Tribe ” ) appeared i n th e trial co urt , filed a mot ion to intervene, and was treated b y the tri a l court as a respondent. The Miami Trib e asserted that it is a federally recognized Indian Tribe and that C harles and Tho mas are dire ct descend ant s of an enrolled member of the Miam i Tribe and ar e eligible f or

e nrol l me nt or are enroll e d with the Mia m i Tri be. In its live pleading in each case , the Department alleged that the Mia mi Tri be ha d been joined as a party and that the child in q uestion w as an Indian child

. The two cas e s w er e tried together to the b en c h. Fath er , incarcerated duri n g the trial , was not present at trial but was represented by counsel. T h ough the Department did not specifically plead for termination under the Indian Child

1 We use pseudo nyms to refer to appellant and the chi ld r en and other family members

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.00 2(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8

.3 Welfare Act , title 25 , section 190 1 , et seq

. , of the U nited St ates C ode ( “ IC WA ” ) in its live p etitions , no party objected to the Department ’ s pleadings in th is regard or to the Department ’ s presentation of evidence at trial to support the termination of Father ’ s parental rights u nder the IC WA

. The Department d evoted a su bs tant ial
par t of its case to developing facts pertinent to the termination of Father ’ s parental rights under the ICWA

. Toni Rogers , a Departme nt caseworker , testified about the Department’s efforts to place the chi ldren with members of the Miami Tr ibe , wi th whi ch F ath er is affiliated

. According to Rogers, Father and Mo ther submitted the names of two relatives at the beginning of the case. Rogers testified that one of thos e individuals had significant history with t he Depar tme nt so that relative could not be

con side red . She said the oth er relative was the children ’s paternal aunt. Rogers testified the aunt ’ s name was resubmitted by Mother the week before her testimony. Roge rs said the other person submi tted recently by the Mot her is a family frie nd, but th at fri end dec lined placement. Rogers reported that the chi ldren’s paternal aunt told Rogers the day before her testimony that she would like to be considered. Rogers said she has not had time to submit paperwork but that the a unt will be consider ed. Roger s test ifie d t hat the Miami Tribe sub mitted preferential p lacements. Rogers said everyone on the list was considered, but that no one on the list was able to be a placement for the children.
Father ’s twenty

- one - year - ol d sister, A deline testified abo ut her r el atio nshi p

w ith the Miami T ribe. Adeline testified that s he’s a commission

- based digital artist and on

- line entertainer. She said that she made $15,000 to $20,000 as income last year and tha t she raised $800 in an o nline campa ign to take care of Thomas an d4 Charles

. S he explained that when she was contacted regarding placement she was initially unavailable because she had just moved, but that she contacted the department as soon as she was alerted. Adeline d oes not hav e any children of he r own, is not marr ie d, an d l i ve s by herself

. Howell said she lives in a two

- bedroom house with a den that is converted into a playroom. Rich England, testified as an expert witness in the area of the Department’s complianc e with the I CWA

. No party objected to his qu alific at ions to tes tify as an exp ert about the case or the subject matter of his testimony pertaining to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Miami Tribe

. England stated that t he most imp ortant issue is that the children need to be protected . He t es tified t hat , in this case , the children were not in a good, safe environment prior to removal and that situation necessitated the Department’s removal to ensure t heir safety. England said he wa s very concerned by the cuts, bruising and other physi cal ab us e,

as we ll as M other’s in ab ility to be protective. He testified that it is imperative that the children have a supportive, nurturing and loving home. England described the situation i n the home prior to removal as “very dangerous .” England found the beha vi ors of t he children to be consistent with children who have been abused or neglected. He said that the diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder in one of the boys was notable becau se that dis order is often conne cted with a di fficult ho me envir onment.
A fter his re view of the ca se and his investigation, England produced a report with his recommendations which were admitted at trial. Regarding the continuing danger to the children, En gland concl uded that the contin ued custody o f the children by M other an d Father i s l ikely to resul t in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. H e said the efforts of the Department to work with Mother
to keep t he family together were diligen t but were unsuccessful at prev enting the5 breakup of th is India n family.
R egarding pl acement, Eng land said M other has put forward an aunt who is interested in placement, which would be in line with the ICWA f or placement preferen ces. He sa id that it is in the children’s best int erest to keep the children in the curren t plac eme nt s until the aunt can be fully considered. England stated that the caregivers are continuing to work with both children’s behaviors, a nd it can be very tri cky at time s. Corinna Campbell

- Green , the Indian C hild Welfare Coordinator for the Miami T ribe , tes ti fied reg ard i n g the tribe’s perspective on the Department’s efforts and the children’s well

- being. Campbell

- Green stated that the tribal family tree referred to Fath er ’ s family because he is the family member that draws lineage from the tribe. S he sta ted th at Fathe r ’s family was not very involved with the tribe prior to the case with the Department

. Nevertheless, Campbell

- Green explained th at the Miami T rib e has been involved in this c as e since the beginning. After reviewing England’s report and hearin g hi s testimon y, s he explained that the tribe agrees with the assessment made by England. Campbell

- Green explained that, based on the acquired documentation, E ngland’s re commendations and as sessment are appropriate and in line with the tribe’s prefer ence. Camp be ll

- Green fu rther testified that the tribe’s preferential placements have been taken into conside ration. She testified that the Department worked diligent ly to try t o accommodate t he pr eferential placements. Campbell

- Green stated that none of th e pref eren ti al place men ts were appropriate so far. She said that the tribe also believes that the continued placement of the boys with their current caregivers is in their best interests.6 Acc ordin g to Campbell

- Green, the Department has made active efforts to pr event t he break dow n of this Indian family. Campbell

- Green testified that she believes the Department has gone “above and beyond” to try to accommodate a pre ferential p lacement, cont acting k inship opportunities provided by the Miami T ribe and working t h rough a f am ily tree pr ovided by the tribe. Campbell

- Green said that the Department has also provided therapeutic services to the family and made sure that the r elationship between the boys st ays intact, despite the separate placements. She said the tribe w ould like t o see a per manent placement for the boys to happen as soon as possible, preferably with the boys placed together.
Various other witnesses testified at trial in cluding C harles ’s fo ster mother, other Department caseworkers, law enforcement offic e rs, and c hi ld advoc ate representatives

. Mother also testified about her relationship with Father in the past , the current status of th at relationship, her drug usage, Fath er’s drug pro blems, Father’s mental health problems , the criminal charges bro ught ag ainst Fath er , and Th oma s ’s various injuries discovered shortly before removal.
In each of the case s , the t rial court signed a judgment terminating the parent

child relationshi p between Fat her and th e child. 2 In each judgment the trial court made various fi ndings und er the Texas Family Code, including findings of various predicate grounds u n der Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and findings that termination of th e parent

- child rel ationship bet w een Father and t he child is in the child ’ s best i nterest (“ Sectio n 161.001 Fi ndings ”)

. S ee T ex. Fam. C ode Ann. 161.001(b) (West, Westlaw through 20 23 R .S. )

. In each judgment the trial court also made findings under sub sections (d) and ( f) of sect ion 1912 of the ICWA . I n each judgment the t rial court appointed the Department as th e child’s sol e

2 Each judgment also ter minated the parent

- ch ild relationship between Mother and the chil d, b ut today’ s appeals involve only appeals by Father.7 managing conserva tor. Father has timely appealed each judgment , and in each appeal he asser ts the same three issues.
II. I SSUES AND A NALYSIS

A. Did the trial court err b y making S ection 161.001 F indings in a terminat ion case to which the IC W A applie s ? In his first issue in eac h appeal Father argu es the trial court reversibly erred by making S ection 161.001 Findin gs be cause the ICWA app l ies to this case and the se fin dings conflict with the ICWA. Father correctly states that no party a t trial disputed th at the ICWA applie s to these cases, and on appeal Father and the Department agree th at the ICWA applies. In 1978, the U nited States Congress enacted the ICWA out of concern that “ an alarmingly high percentag e of Indian families are broke n up by the remo val , often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies. ” 25 U.S.C. §1901(4)

. Congres s found that many of these children were be ing “placed in non

- Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions,” and that th e s tates had contributed to the problem by “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” 25 U.S.C. §1901(4) (5 ); Haaland v. Brackeen , 599 U.S.

— , — , 143 S. Ct. 1609, 1623,

— L. Ed.2d

— , (Jun . 15, 2023)

. This harmed not only Indian parents and children, but also Indian tribes. Haal and , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. As Congress put it, “ there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existen c e and in teg rity of Indian tribes than their children.” 25 U.S.C. §1901( 3 ); Haaland , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. The I C W A a ims to keep Indian children connected to In dian families. Haaland , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. If an Indian chi ld live s on a

re ser vation, the ICWA grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child8 custody proceedings, including adoptions and foster care proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. §19 1 1( a ); Haaland , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. For o ther Indian chi ldren, s tate and tr ibal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the state court is sometimes required to transfer the case to tr ibal court. See 25 U.S.C. §19 1 1( b ); Haaland , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. When a state court adjudicates the pro ceeding , the ICW A g overns from start to finish , regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” or “voluntary

. ” H aaland , 599 U.S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 1623

. Among the ICWA saf eguards that apply to termination of parental rights proceedings in state c ourt is the requ ire ment in section 1912(f) that “[n]o termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyon d a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, th at the c ontinued cu stody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. ” 25 U.S .C. §19 1 2 ( f ); H aaland , 599 U .S. at

— , 143 S. Ct. at 162 4

. The issue Father raises is whether a trial co urt i n a Texas t erm ination proceeding to which the I CWA applies shou l d make the finding under sect ion 1912(f) of the ICWA ( “ Section 1912(f) F inding ” ) as well as the S ection 161.001 Findings or w h ether a trial court should make only the S ection 1912(f) F ind ing. S

e e 25 U.S .C. §19 1 2 ( f ) ; T ex. Fam. C ode Ann. 161.001(b)

. This co urt addre ss ed this question in In re W.D.H. , a case o n wh ich Father relies in arguing his f irst issue. See 4 3 S.W.3d 30, 33

– 38 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, p et. denied )

. In W. D.H

. th e trial c our t terminated the father ’ s parental rights in a case to which the I C W A applied

. See id

. at 33

. The trial court did not make a S ection 1912(f) F i nding ; instead, th e trial court mad e S ection 161.001 Findings under the beyond

- a - reaso nab le

- do u bt bur d en of pr oof , rather9 than the cle ar - an d

- convincing

- evidence burden of proof that applies to t hese findings under the Family Code

. See id

. at 35. On appeal the father argued t hat the trial court erred b y not applying the standard for terminati on of p arental rights i n

s ection 1912(f) of the ICWA instead of the st andard for te r m ination of parental rights in section 161.001 (b) of the Family Code

. See id

. at 33. This co urt agreed

w ith the father that the trial court had committed this error. See id

. The W

. D

. H

. c o urt sa id th at “ the crux of the dispute is whether the respective termination provisions of the Family Code and the ICWA may be applied simultaneously

. ” I d

. at 3 5

. The court conclude d that the two statutes may not both be applied , that the ICWA pree m pted t h e Fam ily Co de, and that trial courts should not make S ection 161.001 Findings i n an I C W A termination case because section 161.001(b) conflict s with the I C W A

. See id

. Th e De partment argues on appeal that W.D.H. is not on point because the
tr ial cou rt in W

. D.H. did no t make a S ection 1912(f) F inding, whereas the trial court in today ’ s case made both a S ection 1912(f) Finding as well as S ection 161.001 Find ings

. Tho ugh the Departmen t is correct that W.D. H. ’ s procedura l b ac kground differs in this way, the W.D

. H . court sp ecifically held that trial court s i n I C W A termination case s should not make any S ection 161.001 Findings , and the
court re versed the trial court ’ s judgment and remanded for further proceed ings

c onsistent with its o pinion. See id

. at 37

– 38, 39. T hus, par t o f the W .D. H. court ’ s judg m ent was its ruling that the trial court should not make any S ection 161.001 Findings on remand. See id

. A conc urring justice in W.D.H. disagreed wi th the majority ’ s de termi nation that trial court s i n I C W A termination c ase s sho uld n ot make S ection 161.001 Finding s and though t that the two statutes could be harmonized and both could be applied to termination proceedings. See id . at 40 (Wittig, J., concurring). Since this10 court decided W.D.H. , four sister co urts of a ppeal s have al s o disagreed wi th the W.D.H. majorit y’s determination that trial court s i n ICW A termination case s should n ot make S ec tion 161.001 Fi ndings , conclud ing that trial courts in I CWA cases should make S ec tion 161.001 Fi ndings as well as a S ection 1912(f ) Finding

. S

ee In re J.L.C

. , 582 S.W.3d 4 21, 429 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 20 18 , pet. den ied); In re S.P. , No. 03

- 17

- 00698

- CV, 2018 WL 1220895, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Austin Mar. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re G.C. , No. 10 -15- 0012 8- CV, 201 5 WL 4855888 , at * 1–2 (Te x. App.

— Wac o Aug

. 13 , 201 5, no pet.) (me m. op.); In r e K.S. , 448 S.W.3 d 521, 530

– 33 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2014, pet . den ied ) . Th us, there is a 4

- to

- 1 split amo ng Texas courts of ap peals on this iss ue. The parties have not cited and research has not revealed (1) a n opinion from the Supreme Court of t he United States, the Supreme C ourt of Texas, or this court sitting en ban c that add resses this i ssue ; or (2) an intervening and material change in the statutory la w . Thus, under the doctrine of horizontal stare de ci s is , whet her or not we agree with the W .D.H

. opinion , we are bound to appl y the holdings from that precedent

. See M i tschke v. Borromeo , 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex . 2022) ; Glassman v. G oodfriend , 347 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. d enied) ( en ban c)

. Under the binding preced ent of W .D.H

. , th e trial court erred by making S ection 161.001 Findings

. See In re W.D.H. , 43 S.W.3d at 33

– 38.

B. Is the trial court ’s err or in making Section 161.001 Findings reversible ? We next determine whet h er the t ria l c ourt ’s err or in ma king S ection 161.001 Findings is reversib le

. Texas R ule of A p pellate Procedure 44 .1(a) provides that no judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals c oncludes th at the error complained of (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appel lant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals. Tex. R

.11 App. P. 44.1(a) . Father does no t explain ho w he was harmed b y t he trial court ’s S ection 161.001 Findings

. F ather has not chal le nged the suffi cien cy of the evidence to support any trial court finding. 3 Generally, if a trial court makes
unnecessary or improp er finding s , any error in making such findings woul d not probab l y c aus e the rendition of an improper judgment because appella te c ou rt s may igno re and give no effect to the erroneous findings. See Dyer v. Tex. Comm ’n on Environmental Quality , 646 S.W.3d 498, 51 4 (Tex. 2022) (stat ing that if a decision is ba s ed on suffi c ien t f indings t hat are supported by evidence , then unnecessary an d improp er findings cannot m ake the decision reversible because an improper but superfluous finding does not prejudice the appellan t) ; Poindexter v. Brown , 665 S.W.3d 842, 86 0 (T e x. App.

— Hou s ton [1 4th Dist.] 2023, pet. de n ied) ( same as Dyer ). After rev i ewi ng the record in each appeal , we conclude that the trial court ’s error in ma king S ection 161.001 Findings in e ach judgment is not

r eversible bec ause th is error (1) did not probab l y cause the ren dit ion of an improper judgment; and (2) did not probably preve nt Father from properly presenting the case to th is court

. See Tex. R . App. P. 44.1(a) ; Dyer , 646 S.W.3d at 514 ; Poindexter , 665 S.W.3d at 86 0 . Therefore, we overrule the first i s sue in each
app eal

. C
. Did the trial cou rt err in failing to make a best

- in terest finding in accordance with the ICWA?
U n der his second issu e in each appeal, Father a ssert s that althoug h the tria l court made a best

- interest finding under Family Code se c tion 161.00 1 (b) (2) , the trial court rev ersibly erred in failing to make a bes t

- interest finding under the

3 Though Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the ev idence to support an y finding made by the trial court, un der each second issue, Father asserts that the evidence is insuff icient to support a finding tha t the tri al court did no t make but th at Father claims should have been made unde r the ICWA. B ut we conclude below that the trial court was not required t o make this finding and d o not address the suffici ency of the evidence

.12 ICWA in accordance with Congress ’ s stated goal of “promot[ing] the stability and

s ecurity of In dian tribes and families .” 25 U.S.C. § 1902. Father al s o asserts t h at the trial evidence is legally and factually insufficie nt to sh ow that the children ’s best interest was taken into consideration in accordance with the ICWA , th us indicating that the trial court also sho uld have m ade a find ing on this point

. Father rel i es on title 25, section 1902 o f the Unite d St ates Co de, entitled “Con gressional declaration of policy ” in support of the proposition that the I CWA requires such fin ding s. This s tatute rea ds in its entirety as follows: The Congress hereby decla r es that it i s t he p olicy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indi an children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of mini mum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from thei r families a n d t he p lacement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the oper ation of child and family service program s. 25 U.S.C. § 1902

. Unde r its plain t ext , in this declaration of policy, Congress states that it is th e policy of the United States of A merica to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the sta bility and security of Indian tribes and families by the establish m ent of mini m um f ede r al standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes and by providing for assistance to Ind ian tribes in the operation of child and family service program s. S ee id

. Unde r it s un ambiguous language, this statute does not require a court terminating the parent al relationship between a
pare nt and an Indian child to find that (1) the termination is i n the In dian child ’s best interest or is in accordance with Congre ss ’s goal of “pr omot [ing] the stability and security of Indian tribes and fami lies ” ; or (2 ) t he Indian child ’s best interest was taken into consideration in accordance with the ICWA

. See In re E.A .C. , No.13 07

- 21

- 00145

- CV, 2021 WL 5326516, at *2 (Tex. App.

— A m arillo Nov. 16, 202 1, pet. denied ) (concl uding that n othing in the ICWA condi tions termination of parental rights upon a court fi nding that the Indian child’s bes t interest favor s that resul t ) (mem. op.). The two ICWA cases that Father cites under the sec o nd issue do no t sup p ort the proposition that there is any requ ire ment under t he ICWA that the trial court ma ke a bes t

- i nterest finding. We conclude that the trial court was not required to m ake either of the best

- interest finding s mentioned or suggested b y Father und e r h is s e cond issue, and therefore , the trial court did not err in failing to make this finding. See id

. Because the trial court was not required to make any such finding, Father may not obtain a reversal of the judgment s by showing that the ev i dence is in s uff icient to support any such finding

. We overrule the second is sue i n eac h appeal.

D
. Did the trial court err by not making the finding required by section 1912(d ) of the ICWA? In his third issue in e ach app eal Fath er complains that the tr ia l court e rre d by fail ing to make the f i n d i n g r e q u i r e d b y s ection 1912(d ) of t he ICWA

. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (d ) ( requiring that a party seeking termination “ shall satisfy the court that act ive efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilit a tive
pro gra m s d esigned to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsucc es sful ”)

. The tria l court made a section 1912( d) f inding in each of the final judgment s rendered by the trial court , and Father does not challenge t he adequac y of the se findings. Ins tead, Father contends that renditions made in the trial court docket sh eet in each case show that the final judgment incorrectly refle cts that the trial cou rt made this finding and that the trial court did not make this f i n ding. Thus , Fa ther seeks to use the se docket

- sheet renditions as proof that the trial failed to make the required finding

. W e presume without14 deciding that the docke t- sheet renditions omit any fin ding under section 1912( d)

. The Texas Family Code permits a trial c ou rt t o make pro nouncements orally , and these oral pro nouncements , known as “renditions , ” may a lso be made in writing, such as i n this case, through a docket -s heet e ntry

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.0 26 (“‘R ender ’ means the pronouncement by a j udge of the cou rt's ruling on a matter. The pronouncement may be made orally in the presence of the court reporter or in writing, including o n the c ourt ’ s docket sheet or by a separate written instrument. ”)

. But w hen there is an inconsistency between a wr i tten judgme nt a nd an oral pronouncement of judgment , the written judgment co ntr ols. See I n re K.M.B. , 148 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see also In re A.C. , No. 04

– 12

– 00679

– CV, 2013 WL 352449, at *2 (Tex. App.

— San Antoni o Jan. 30, 2 01 3, pet. denied) (affirm ing judgment termin ating parent al rights , even though the trial court ’ s oral pronounce ment did n ot include best

- interest finding s, because the trial court ’ s writt en judgment included the best

interest findings ). The par t ies have no t ci ted and research has not reve aled any

a uthority to support Fathe r’s argum ent t hat in the case of conflict between a trial
court ’s docket

- sheet rendition and th e court ’ s subsequent written fi na l judgment , the docket

- sheet rendition controls

. To the exte nt t here is any inconsistency between the docket

- sheet rendition and the f ina l judgment in each of today ’ s cases , the formal f inal judgment c ontrols

. See In Interest of L.G.R. , 498 S.W.3d 195, 206 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [14th Dist.] 2016 , pet. deni e d) ( rejecti n g p arent’s argument th at trial court ’s oral rendition made without a best

- inte rest finding resulted in err or

even though the finding was made in the final judgment )

. We th erefore ove rrule the Father ’s third issue in each appeal

. II I. C ONCL US ION Under the W .D.H

. bin ding precedent , th e trial court erred by making S ection15 161. 001 Findings , but this error is not rever sib le. T he trial court was not required to make the best

- interest finding s mentioned or suggested by F ather under his

se cond iss u e, and ther e for e , the trial court did not err in failing to make an y of these finding s
. Because the trial court was not required to make any such finding, Father may not obtain a reversal of the judgments by showing that the evid ence is insuff icient to su p port any su c h f inding

. A ny inconsistency between the docket

sheet rendition a nd the f inal judgment in each of today ’ s cases d oes n ot mean there is erro r i n the judgment because to the extent there is any such discr epa ncy , the f

inal judgment controls

. Beca u se F ather h a s n ot shown any error that is reversible, in each appeal we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment

.

/s/ Ran dy Wilson Justice
Panel con sis ts of Justi c es Jewell , Hassan , an d Wilson (Hassan, J., dissentin g )

.