NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GALINA VICTOROVNA OGEONE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

W. RUTH YANG, Dentist, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 15-15499 

15-16005 

D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00166-SOM-RLP 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Susan O. Mollway, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 23, 2017**

Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated appeals, Galina Victorovna Ogeone appeals pro se 

from the district court’s judgment following a jury trial in her action alleging 

federal and state claims arising out of her dental treatment. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a denial of a motion to remand. Hall 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-15499 

v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly denied Ogeone’s April 12, 2013 and May 2, 2013 

motions to remand because Ogeone’s claims against a federal employee certified to 

be acting within the scope of her employment must proceed in federal court under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) with the United States as the proper 

defendant. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229-32 (2007) (where the U.S. 

Attorney General certifies that a federal employee named as a defendant in a tort 

action was acting within the scope of her employment, the United States must be 

substituted as the defendant and the case must proceed in federal court under the 

FTCA); Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1995) (Attorney 

General’s certification that a federal employee was acting within the scope of 

employment must be disproved by a preponderance of the evidence). We reject as 

without merit Ogeone’s contentions that removal was untimely, that Ogeone’s state 

and federal notices of appeal before trial divested the district court of jurisdiction, 

and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Yang.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining supplemental 

jurisdiction over Ogeone’s state law claim after dismissing her FTCA claim. See 

Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting 

forth standard of review and explaining that the district court has discretion to 

retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even if federal claims are 
3 15-15499 

dismissed).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ogeone’s motion to 

continue trial because a continuance one day before trial would have seriously 

inconvenienced the court and defendant, and Ogeone failed to establish that she 

was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. See United States v. Flynt, 756 

F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1985) (setting forth standard of review and factors 

that the court should consider when reviewing the denial of a request for 

continuance). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion 

for attorney’s fees because Ogeone’s action was in the nature of assumpsit. See

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14; Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 

883-84 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that § 607-

14 provides for attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in actions in the nature of 

assumpsit, which includes all possible contract claims).

We reject as unsupported by the record Ogeone’s contentions regarding the 

district court’s violations of her due process rights.

We do not consider matters that were not properly raised before the district 

court. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

Ogeone’s motion to supplement the record and request for judicial notice 

(Docket Entry Nos. 25 and 26 in appeal No. 15-15499; Docket Entry Nos. 18 and 
4 15-15499 

19 in appeal No. 15-16005) are denied.

Ogeone’s motion to rule on pending appeal (Docket Entry No. 29 in appeal 

No. 15-15499; Docket Entry No. 21 in appeal No. 15-16005) is granted.

AFFIRMED.