IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2023 ND 8

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Shawnee Lynn Krall, Defendant and Appellee

No. 20220112

Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Stacy J. Louser, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.

Leah J. Viste, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and 

appellant.

Nicholas D. Thornton (argued), Fargo, ND, and Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand 

Forks, ND, for defendant and appellee. 

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JANUARY 20, 2023 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Krall

No. 20220112

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] The State appealed from a district court order granting a motion to

suppress evidence in a case against Shawnee Krall. We conclude the district 

court’s findings are supported by sufficient competent evidence. We also 

conclude the inventory-search exception and the inevitable-discovery doctrine 

do not apply to provide an exception to the exclusionary rule. The district court 

did not err in granting Krall’s motion to suppress. We affirm.

I

[¶2] The State charged Krall with murder and gross sexual imposition. Krall

entered a plea of not guilty.

[¶3] Krall moved to suppress evidence, arguing his Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated when officers from the Minot Police Department committed an 

illegal search of his motor vehicle, a Ford 500. Krall alleged he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the officers did not obtain a 

search warrant or his consent to search the vehicle, other individuals did not 

have authority to consent to the search, and no exceptions to the warrant 

requirement existed to validate the warrantless search.

[¶4] The State opposed Krall’s motion to suppress. The State alleged Krall’s 

roommate, Jane Doe, was reported missing; officers contacted Zachary Barnett

while searching for Jane Doe; Barnett indicated Krall left a vehicle on 

Barnett’s property; and Barnett indicated he no longer wanted the vehicle on 

his property. The State further alleged officers attempted to determine 

ownership of the vehicle but it was not registered to Krall and the individual 

it was registered to indicated it had been sold. The State claimed officers 

arranged to tow the vehicle because Barnett requested it be removed from the 

property, the officers conducted an inventory search before the vehicle was 

loaded onto the tow truck, and they found a human body in the vehicle’s trunk. 

The State argued Krall did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle; Krall did not have standing to contest any alleged trespass on the 
2

Barnett property; and multiple exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, 

including that the evidence was found during an inventory search, that the 

automobile exception applied, that there were exigent circumstances, and that

the inevitable-discovery doctrine applied.

[¶5] After a hearing, the district court granted Krall’s motion and suppressed 

all of the evidence obtained in the search of the Ford 500. To summarize, the 

court found a plain view search of the vehicle was conducted and nothing of 

interest was found, Krall’s probation officer denied a request from police 

officers to search the vehicle, the probation officer also denied the officers’ 

request to tow and impound the vehicle, and the state’s attorney’s office 

advised officers there was not enough evidence to get a search warrant for the 

vehicle. The court also found Krall had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the vehicle, he did not consent to the search, one of the officers used a “slim 

jim” to gain access into the vehicle, a search warrant had not been issued at 

the time officers entered the vehicle, and Jane Doe’s body was discovered in 

the trunk of the vehicle. The district court concluded none of the State’s 

asserted exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, including the 

exceptions for exigent circumstances, inventory search, and inevitable 

discovery.

II

[¶6] Krall argues this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. He 

contends the State did not comply with statutory requirements for appealing 

from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence.

[¶7] Under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5), the State may appeal from an order 

suppressing evidence “when accompanied by a statement of the prosecuting 

attorney asserting that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that 

the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. The 

statement must be filed with the notice of appeal.”

[¶8] The State’s notice of appeal states, “This appeal is not taken for purpose 

of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the 

proceeding.” The statement from the State’s notice of appeal merely recites the 
3

statutory language. We have said the State should do more than “parrot[ ] the 

language of N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5).” State v. Cook, 2020 ND 69, ¶ 9, 940 N.W.2d 

605 (quoting State v. Beane, 2009 ND 146, ¶ 6, 770 N.W.2d 283). However, in 

other cases in which the State merely recited the statutory language we have 

concluded the appeal was properly before us when it was clear the suppressed 

evidence was substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding because the 

district court’s order suppressed all of the State’s evidence on elements of the

crimes charged. See Cook, at ¶ 9.

[¶9] Here, Krall argues the appeal should not proceed because the State 

indicated to the district court that it had other evidence on the murder charge 

and it would proceed with the prosecution without the suppressed evidence. 

The court suppressed all of the evidence found during the search of the Ford 

500, including the body of the deceased. Even if there is other evidence from 

which the prosecution of the murder charge could proceed, Krall was also 

charged with gross sexual imposition. The State’s motion to amend the 

complaint to include the charge of gross sexual imposition states, “The State 

had not filed the charge of Gross Sexual Imposition until now because it was 

awaiting the results of the victim’s autopsy report and laboratory analysis. 

Based upon these results and the opinion of the medical examiner, the State 

believes the addition of this charge is appropriate.” The suppressed evidence 

was substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding for the gross sexual 

imposition charge. We conclude the appeal is properly before us.

III

[¶10] The State argues the district court erred in granting Krall’s motion to 

suppress. It claims the court’s findings about the inventory search are not 

supported by sufficient competent evidence. The State also asserts the doctrine 

of inevitable discovery applies and provides an exception to the exclusionary 

rule.

[¶11] In reviewing the district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we 

defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in 

favor of affirmance. State v. Mayland, 2022 ND 9, ¶ 6, 969 N.W.2d 159. We will 

affirm the decision on a motion to suppress on appeal if there is “sufficient 
4

competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the [district] court’s findings, 

and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.

(quoting State v. Pouliot, 2020 ND 144, ¶ 6, 945 N.W.2d 246). Our standard of 

review reflects the importance of the district court’s opportunity to observe 

witnesses and assess their credibility. State v. Cochran, 2021 ND 141, ¶ 8, 963 

N.W.2d 238. Questions of law are fully reviewable. Mayland, at ¶ 6. Whether 

a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law. Cochran, at ¶ 8.

[¶12] People are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures under the 

United States and North Dakota constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.D. 

Const. art. I, § 8. “When an individual reasonably expects privacy in an area, 

the government, under the Fourth Amendment, must obtain a search warrant 

unless the intrusion falls within a recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement.” State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, ¶ 23, 615 N.W.2d 515. “[E]vidence 

seized from a warrantless search, when no recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement exists, must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” State v. 

Friesz, 2017 ND 177, ¶ 15, 898 N.W.2d 688 (quoting State v. Hart, 2014 ND 4, 

¶ 13, 841 N.W.2d 735).

A

[¶13] A valid inventory search is one exception to the warrant requirement. 

State v. Ressler, 2005 ND 140, ¶ 23, 701 N.W.2d 915. We have explained:

Under the inventory search exception, “police need neither 

probable cause nor a warrant to search a vehicle.” State v. Holmes, 

569 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Minn. 1997) (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 

U.S. 640, 643 (1983)). In other words, the basis for an inventory 

search does not arise because the police suspect the vehicle 

contains contraband or evidence of crime. Rather, the basis for an 

inventory search rests on the administrative and caretaking 

functions which we identified in [State v.] Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 

[208,] 211 [(N.D. 1990)] (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 

372 (1987)). The Fourth Amendment examination of an inventory 

search, therefore, turns not on the issue of probable cause, which 

is the traditional basis for the warrantless search of vehicles, but 

on the issues of whether the vehicle was properly impounded and 

the search was carried out in accordance with standard police 
5

procedures. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d at 187; see also State v. Goff, 272 

S.E.2d 457, 459 (W. Va. 1980) (discussing the difference between 

inventory searches and the “automobile exception”).

State v. Syvertson, 1999 ND 137, ¶ 23, 597 N.W.2d 644 (quoting State v. 

Garrett, 1998 ND 173, ¶ 18 n.3, 584 N.W.2d 502). When an inventory search is 

conducted in good faith for administrative and caretaking purposes it is 

permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Ressler, at ¶ 23.

[¶14] The district court found the inventory-search exception did not apply. 

The court noted there was conflicting testimony about when Barnett requested 

the officers remove the vehicle from the property and about when the search 

began. The court explained the officers claimed a tow truck was contacted and 

officers began the inventory search after Barnett requested the vehicle be 

removed from the property, but Barnett testified he requested officers remove 

the vehicle after they opened the vehicle and started searching. The court 

found Barnett’s testimony about the officers’ entry into the vehicle was 

consistent and credible. The court further explained its decision, stating:

Notably, law enforcement only offered to tow the vehicle from 

Barnett’s property after [Krall’s probation officer] denied entry 

into the vehicle as part of a probationary search, after [the 

probation officer] denied law enforcement’s request to tow the 

vehicle and after the Ward County State’s Attorney’s [O]ffice 

informed law enforcement that a search warrant for the vehicle 

could not be obtained. [One officer] testified he had ‘a strong 

suspicion of what was in there. I would have liked to get in the car.’

Based on these facts, the Court must conclude the 

motivation behind law enforcement’s offer to tow the vehicle was 

not premised on ‘reasonable police regulations relating to 

inventory proceedings administered in good faith’ nor as routine 

caretaking procedure. Rather, the motivation for offering to tow 

the vehicle was for investigatory purposes, rendering the 

warrantless search of the Ford 500 impermissible under the 

inventory/impound search warrant exception. 

The court determined the inventory-search exception did not apply because the 

officers’ motivation for offering to tow the vehicle was for investigatory 

purposes and was not premised on reasonable police regulations relating to 
6

inventory proceedings administered in good faith or as a routine caretaking 

procedure.

[¶15] The State argues the district court’s findings about the inventory search 

are not supported by the evidence because other evidence does not support 

Barnett’s testimony that officers opened the vehicle and began searching before 

he asked them to remove the vehicle from his property. The State claims the 

officers testified that they told Barnett they were going to leave before they 

opened the vehicle and that Barnett asked them to remove the vehicle from the 

property at that time. The State asserts that when the testimony of all of the

witnesses is considered it is clear competent evidence does not support the 

court’s finding that Barnett did not ask for the vehicle to be removed until after 

officers entered the vehicle.

[¶16] Although two officers testified that they did not enter the vehicle until 

after Barnett asked them to remove it from the property Barnett’s testimony 

was conflicting. Barnett was asked, “[A]t some point in time did you ask that 

the vehicle be removed?” and he testified:

That was after they started investigating everything. And by that 

time I think there was the detective and lieutenant and then I 

think there was another officer there. But more cop cars started 

coming up and arriving and whatnot. So there was just cops 

everywhere and neighbors were coming out. And I asked the 

detective if we could get the car towed and they said, yeah, not a 

problem.

Barnett repeatedly testified that he asked the officers to remove the vehicle 

from the property after they entered the vehicle and began searching.

[¶17] We defer to the district court’s assessment of a witness’s credibility in 

reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress. Cook, 2020 ND 

69, ¶ 13. We decline the State’s request to reassess the witnesses’ credibility or 

reweigh the evidence.

[¶18] Moreover, the district court found the inventory search was not premised 

on reasonable police regulations relating to inventory proceedings 
7

administered in good faith or as a routine caretaking purpose. The court found 

the officers’ motivation for the search was for investigatory purposes. An 

inventory search is not an exception to the warrant requirement if it is carried 

out in the midst of a criminal investigation and there is no evidence the police 

were concerned with protecting or safeguarding either their interests or the 

owner’s property interests. See Ressler, 2005 ND 140, ¶ 24.

[¶19] Evidence established the officers’ request for a probation search was 

denied and the State’s Attorney’s Office informed the officers a search warrant 

could not be obtained. An officer testified, “I had a strong suspicion of what was 

in there. I would have liked to get in the car.” Evidence supports the district

court’s finding that the officers opened the vehicle and began searching before 

Barnett requested it be removed from the property. We conclude there is 

sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that

the officers’ motivation for offering to tow the vehicle was for investigatory 

purposes.

[¶20] There is sufficient competent evidence supporting the district court’s 

findings about the inventory search and its decision is not contrary to the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the inventory-search exception to 

the warrant requirement does not apply.

B

[¶21] The State argues the district court erred in determining the evidence 

was not admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine.

[¶22] “The inevitable-discovery doctrine provides that evidence obtained from 

information procured in an unlawful search or seizure is admissible under the 

fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine if the evidence would inevitably have been 

discovered without the unlawful conduct.” State v. Stewart, 2014 ND 165, ¶ 17, 

851 N.W.2d 153 (quoting State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 31, 691 N.W.2d 203). 

We have adopted a two-part test to determine when the inevitable-discovery 

doctrine applies:
8

First, use of the doctrine is permitted only when the police have 

not acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of the evidence in 

question. Second, the State must prove that the evidence would 

have been found without the unlawful activity and must show how 

the discovery of the evidence would have occurred.

Stewart, at ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980)).

[¶23] The requirement that the police did not act in bad faith to accelerate the 

discovery of the evidence is necessary because one of the purposes of the 

exclusionary rule is to prevent and deter shortcuts in law enforcement. Friesz, 

2017 ND 177, ¶ 26. We have recognized other courts have held that the 

inevitable-discovery doctrine does not apply when officers knowingly or 

intentionally violate the accused’s rights and that bad faith means something 

more than just acting unlawfully. State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 57, 833 N.W.2d 

15. The State has the burden to prove the absence of bad faith. Id. at ¶ 58.

[¶24] The State must also establish that the evidence inevitably would have 

been discovered through an independent, lawful investigative procedure. See 3 

Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.3(e) (4th ed. 2021). “‘Inevitably,’ for 

this purpose, means that the discovery definitely would have occurred, not that 

it ‘might’ or ‘could’ have occurred.” Id.; see also Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 31 (stating 

a showing the discovery might have occurred is inadequate); 1 McCormick on 

Evid. § 181 (8th ed. 2022) (stating courts generally agree the exception requires 

proof that the prosecution would, not might or could, have obtained the 

evidence in a proper manner).

[¶25] The district court concluded the inevitable-discovery doctrine did not 

apply because the State failed to establish either part of the two-part test. The 

court stated law enforcement acted in bad faith to accelerate the discovery of 

the evidence. The court also determined the State did not present any evidence 

to support its claim that Krall’s probation officer would have authorized a 

search of the vehicle upon confirmation of Krall’s possessory interest in the 

vehicle, and the State’s claim that the probation officer would have authorized 

the search was speculation.
9

[¶26] The State argues that the officers’ actions did not show bad faith and 

that the evidence would have been found without the inventory search. It 

claims officers would have been granted access to search the vehicle after 

ownership of the vehicle was determined. The State contends evidence

established Krall’s probation officer would have authorized a search and the 

evidence would have been found if the probation officer had been aware Krall 

owned the vehicle. The State claims Krall was required to inform the probation 

officer he owned the vehicle and he should not benefit from failing to provide 

the required information.

[¶27] Although the State argues it established both parts of the two-part test, 

we conclude the State failed to establish the evidence would have been found 

without the unlawful activity. Therefore, we do not need to address whether 

the State established the officers did not act in bad faith to accelerate the 

discovery of the evidence.

[¶28] The State’s argument that the evidence would have been discovered 

through a probation search is speculation. There was testimony officers 

requested Krall’s probation officer authorize a search of the vehicle before the 

officers began the search. The probation officer testified she denied the officers’

requests to tow and search the vehicle because she did not know anything 

about the vehicle, including whether it belonged to Krall.

[¶29] Although the State claims Krall had an obligation to report his 

ownership of the vehicle to his probation officer, the district court found there 

was no requirement in the ordered conditions of probation that Krall notify his 

probation officer that he had the vehicle. The probation conditions contained 

in “Appendix A” required Krall to answer all reasonable inquiries from his 

probation officer and notify his probation officer of any change in address or 

employment, but the probation conditions did not explicitly require Krall to 

notify his probation officer of his vehicle ownership. Although the probation 

officer could have asked Krall if the vehicle was his and could have potentially 

authorized a probation search, there was no evidence the probation officer 

planned or attempted to contact Krall to inquire about his ownership of the 

vehicle.
10

[¶30] The probation officer testified that she did not approve a probation 

search of any other vehicles belonging to Krall and that she declined to 

authorize the search of the Ford 500. The probation officer declined to 

authorize a search of the vehicle and there is no evidence that decision would 

have changed if the illegal search had not occurred. Under different facts, a 

probation search might have been authorized. However, that is speculation. On 

this record, there was no evidence the probation officer would have authorized

a probation search of the Ford 500 if the illegal search had not occurred and 

the investigation continued.

[¶31] The State failed to show a probation search of the vehicle would have 

been conducted if the officers had not attempted the illegal search. See State v. 

Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 838 (N.D. 1989) (holding the inevitablediscovery doctrine did not apply when the State alleged another search would 

have been conducted pursuant to a hypothetical search warrant based on 

evidence that had been subsequently discovered). We conclude the State failed 

to establish the inevitable-discovery exception applies in this case and the 

district court did not err in granting Krall’s motion to suppress.

IV

[¶32] We affirm the order suppressing evidence.

[¶33] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte