NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0690n.06 No. 08-1563 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. SCO TT A . M ASS EY , Defendant-

Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP EAL F RO M T HE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: M AR TIN , C OLE, and K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge . Scott Massey appea ls the sentence imposed by the district court a fter h e p l e a d e d

g u i l t y t o i n t e r s t a t e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y, p o s s e s s i o no f

c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y, and attempted entice ment to travel for criminal sexual activity . The district cour t upwardly

depar ted from the a dvisory

Guideline ra

ng e of 2 6 2 to 327 months for ext reme conduct unde r U.S.S.G. § 5 K2 .8 and

imp os e d a

36 0- mon th s e nte nc e . I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt re lie d o n it s
a u th o r it y u n d er Un i t ed S t a tes v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to var y from the Guide lines and imp os e th e 36 0-month s e nte nc e . M a sse y argue s th a t hi s a

bo ve -G uid e lin e -r ang e se nte nc e is pr oc e dura lly

and su bstanti ve ly

un re a so na

ble ; he a lso c ha lle ng e s th e sp e c ia l c on dit ion s o f h is supervised r elea se. B eca use Massey ’s s entenc e is proce durally and substantively

rea sonable, we AF F IRM
.No. 08-1563

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- 2 -

I. BACKG ROUND Massey pleade d g u il ty to o n e c o unt of interstate distribution of child pornog raphy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a )(1) ,(b)( 1), and 2256(8)( B) ; one count of poss ession of child pornog raphy in viola ti o no f

1 8 U
. S. C. § § 2 2 5 2 A ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) , ( b ) ( 2 ) , an d 2 2 5 6 ( 8 ) ; a

n d o n e c o u n t o f

a tt e mp te d enticeme nt to travel for

criminal sexual activity

in violation of 18 U .S.C. § 2422(a)

. The Prese ntence I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt (“ PSR” ) ca lc ulate d Mas se y ’s a dv iso ry Gu ide lin e ra ng e a t 262 to 3 27 mon ths , based on a total offe nse l evel of 39 and a criminal hi story cate g ory of I . Neither the Gover

nment nor Massey o b

je c te d to th e c a lc u lati o n s . T h e PS R a ls o r e c o mm e n d e d anu p w ar d d e p artu r e u n d er U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 for “e x treme c onduct” be cause Massey attempted to solicit a

n underc over police office r to abduc t, torture, ra pe, and mur der his eig ht-y ear -old niece

. At sentenc ing, the district court ag ree d with the P S Rand imposed a 360- month sentence

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re lie d o n tw o b a se s f

or its de c isi on . F ir st, the c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th e he ino us ne ss of Massey ’s offe nses justified an upwar d depar ture under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. T he cour t focused on the g raphic lang uag e that Masse y used to entice the under cover police off icer to harm Massey ’s niece and the de tails about her that Ma ssey share d with others online that made he r a vulne rable targ et for predators. I n the alter

native, the district court re lied on its discretionary authority under Booke r

to vary from the Guide lines. The cour t applied the fa ctors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and conc luded that Ma sse y ’s of

fe ns e s ju sti fi e d a

n u pw ard va ri anc e to 3 60 mon ths

. I n addition to the custodial sentence , the district court imposed super vised rele ase f or life under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) with special c onditions, i ncluding sex-offende r asse ssment and treatmentNo. 08-1563

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- 3 - inv olv ingple thy smo g ra

phand /or Ab e l a sse ssm e nt a

nd a re qu ir e me nt t

hat Ma sse y

re po rt a ll o f h is elec t ro n i c ad d re sses to his probation office r. At sentenc ing, Ma ssey did not object to either the
c us tod ia l se nte nc e or

to t he su pe rv ise d- re le a se c on dit ion s.

II. AN AL YSI S A. P r oc e dur al R e as ona ble ne ss Sentence s imposed under a n advisory

SentencingGuidelines re gi me ar e re viewed f or proce dural a

nd substantive rea sonablene ss. United States v. W ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 383- 85 (6th Cir. 20 05 ). We h a ve he ld t

hat w he the r a se nte nc e is pr oc e dura lly re a so na ble de pe nd s o n thre e fa c tor s: (1 ) w he the r t

he district c ourt

c or re c tly c a lc ulate d th e a

pp lic a ble Gu ide lin e s r ang e and us e d it a s a starting point for its sentence analy sis; (2) whether the par ties were g iven the opportunity to argue for se ntence s they

deeme d appropr iat e, an d wh ether the district court made an individualized sentenc ing deci s i o n b ased upon the fac ts and § 3553(a) fac tors; and (3) w hether the district court explained its reasoning with enoug h detail t o allow for me aning ful appe llate re view and to g ive the i mpression of fa ir sentenc ing. United States v. Bolds , 5 1 1 F
. 3 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 9

- 8 0 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 7 ). On the third point, a district court’s e x planation is adequate if it demonstrates that the court considere d the par ties’ ar g uments and had a rea soned basis for

its decision. Id. a t 5 8 0 (c i t i n g Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338 (2007)). 1. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8 Massey argues that his 360-month sentenc e is pr ocedur ally unrea sonable beca use the district court misapplied U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. Section 5K2.8 provide s that “[i] f the defe ndant’s conduc t was unusually heinous, crue l, brutal, or deg radingto the victim, the court may incre ase the sentenc eNo. 08-1563

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- 4 - above the g uideline ra

ng e . . . .” The guideline goe s on to cite the following e x amples: “torture of a victim, g ratuitous infliction of injury , or prolong ing of pain or h u m i l i ation.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. Massey argues that § 5K2.8 require s “phy sical harm” or “sig nificant dire ct har m,” and be cause none of his vic tim s w e re ha

rm e d, the c ourt

c ann ot u pw ard ly de pa rt
. We disag ree . As an initial matter, we note that the st atute does not require “phy sical har m,”
so Massey ’s arg ument to the contrary is not well-take n. Additionally , we r ejec t Massey ’s ar g ument that th e Go v er n ment did not establish harm. The r ecor d ref lects that Massey ’s niece ’s life ha s chang ed bec ause Ma ssey targ eted he r and disseminate d information ab o u t her. He r par ents now keep he r under

constant super

vision, no longer

allow her

to rid e h er b i cy cl e on the r oad, and no longe r allow he r to attend slee p-over s at frie nds’ houses. In additi o n , her f ather switched fr om
wo rk ingthi rd sh if

t to fi rst sh if

t to be ho me duri nge ve nin g s and nig hts , a nd he r p are nts liv e in constant fe ar be cause Massey share d detailed information about their da ug hter to pre dators online. We theref ore f ind that Massey ’s niece was suff iciently harme d to warr ant depa

rture unde r U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. Finally , we c onclude that the district c ourt ade quately justified upwardly d ep ar t i n g. See United States v. Bak

er , 339 F.3d 400, 404 ( 6th Cir. 2003 ) (“ T h i s co urt has upheld suc h upwar d de pa rt ur e s [un de r U .S. S.G . § 5K 2. 8] in a lmo st e ve ry

c a se wh e re the dis trict cou rt g a ve a sp e c if ic justification.”). At sentenc ing, the district c ourt descr ibed the deta ils that Massey provided to others
so that hi s n ie c e c ou ld b e fo un d, inc lud ing he r ho me and sc ho ol a dd

re sse s and

ph oto s o f h e r–

–b oth fully clothed photog raphs a

nd digita l l y

altere d photogr aphs with her f ace transposed on de ad or naked c hildren. The distric t co u rt also rec ited parts of the colloquy betwee n Massey

and theNo. 08-1563

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- 5 - u n d e r c o v e r

p o li c e o f f ic e r th a t d e s c r ib e d

in g r a p h ic d e ta il h o w M a s s e y

w an te d h is n ie c e a

b d u c te d, tortu re d , ra p ed , and murde red. A fter c onsidering this colloquy and other

parts of the rec ord, the
c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Ma sse y

is a da ng e r t o th e c omm

un ity and up wa rd ly de pa rt e d. F or a ll o f t

he se
re a so ns , w e c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a de qu a te ly

jus tif ie d it s d e c isi on

to d e pa rt
. 2. 18 U.S.C. § 3584 I n the alter

native, the district cour

t relied on its discretionar y authority

under Booke r

to vary fr om t he Gu ide lin e s and

imp os e c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s und e r 18 U. S.C. § 358 4. Un de r § 35 84 , if multipl e ter

ms of imprisonme n t ar e i m p o sed on a de fenda nt at the same time, the te rms may run
c on c ur re ntl y or c on se c uti ve ly . A c ourt mus t, how e ve r, c on sid e r t he statut or

y fa c tor s in 18 U. S.C. § 3553 when de termining whether to impose consecutive se ntence s. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). “The de f e r e n ti a l a b u s e - o f

- d is c r e ti o n s ta

n d ar d a p p li e s to th e r e v ie w o f a d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s im p o s ition of a
concur rent or c onsecutive te rm of imprisonment.” United States v. Mc Cree , 299 F. App’ x 481, 482- 83 (6th Cir. 2008). Moreove r, “[w]hen a district cour t ‘make s g ener ally clea r the rationale under which it h as imposed the consec utive sentenc e and se eks to ensure an appr opriate inc reme ntal penalty for the instant off

ense, it doe s not abuse its discretion.’” Id. at 4 8 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Owens , 159 F.3d 221, 230 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). He re , M a sse y

ple a de d guil ty

to o ne c ount of distr ibutio n o f p or no g ra ph y , w hic h c arr ie s a
ma ximumse nte nc e of

24 0 mo nth s; o ne c ount o f p os se ssi on of c hil d p or no g ra ph y , w hic h c arr ie s a
ma ximumse nte nc e of

12 0 mo nth s; and on e c ount o f atte mpt e d e nti c e me nt, wh ic h c arr ie s a maxi mu m s e nte n c e o f

2 4 0 mo nth s . A c c o r d in g ly , M a ssey ’s statutorily authorized maxi mum sentence was 600 months. Howeve r, as discussed above, the Guidelines ra ng e for Massey ’s offe nse wa s 262-No. 08-1563

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- 6 - 327 months. Theref

ore, we m ust decide whether the di strict court a bused its discretion by

vary ing from the Guide lines rang e and sentencingMassey to serve his sente nce on c ount three ( possession)
consec utiv el y

to his concurr ent sentenc es for counts one (distribution) and f our (attempted enticeme nt). On seve ral oc casions, we have ha ve upheld non-Guidelines conse cutive sente nces. See, e .g. , United States v. Erpe nbeck , 532 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding conse cutive sente nces of 240
mon ths and

60 mon ths , w he re Gu ide lin e s rang e wa s 188 -2 35 mon ths ); Un ite d S tat es v . W e lls , 473 F.3d 640 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (upholding c onsecutive se ntence s of 120 m o nths and 80 months, where Guidelines ra

ng e wa s 140-175 months). The touchstone of these case s is de termining whether the district c ourt adequa

tely considere d the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. See E rpenbec k , 532 F.3d at 430. Section 3553(a) instructs the court to conside r seve n fac tors: (1 ) “t h e n ature and cir cumstance s of the offe nse”; (2) “the history

and cha rac teristics of the defe ndant”; (3) the ki nds of sentenc es ava ilable; (4) the G uidelines rang e; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the SentencingCommi ssion; (6) th e n e e d to a v o id s e n te n c in g d is p ar it ie s a mo n g s im il ar ly s it u a te d d e f e n d an ts ; an d ( 7 ) th e nee d to p ro vid e re sti tut ion

to v ic tim s. We conclude that the district court ade quately applied the f

acts of this case to the § 3553( a) fac tors. First, the district court cited the statute and e x plained the pur poses of sente ncing and of the Sentencing Gui delines. Ne x t, the court re cog nized that, under Booke r , the Guidelines a re not binding on the c ourt. The court then, as descr ibed above, rec ounted some of the de tails of Massey ’s conduct. Throug hout the description, the court ex plained the mag nitude of Massey ’s offe nses andNo. 08-1563

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- 7 - why this case wa

rra nts depar ture or varia

nce. T he cour

t continued by

acknow ledg ing Ma ssey ’s (a nd his family ’s) pa in, and re cog nized that Massey will no longer b e ab l e t o see his y oung son on a regular ba sis. Bec ause of its thorough a

naly sis, we concl u d e t h at the district court made an ind ivi du a lize d s e nte nc ingde c isi on and e xpla ine d its re a so nin g wi th en ou g h de ta il to b e pr oc e dura lly
rea sonable. See B olds , 511 F.3d at 580.
B. Subst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss Procedur ally

rea sonable sente nces a

re r eviewe d for substantive r easona blenes s u n d er an abuse- of-discr etion standard, r eg ardle ss of whethe r the sentence is within or out side the Guidelines rang e. United States v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (en ba nc). U nder a

n abuse- ofdiscretion standa

rd, the district court’s substantive c onclusions about the re lative sig nificanc e of the various sentencing fac tors is bey ond the scope of appe llate re view. United States v. Sex ton , 512 F.3d 32 6, 33 2 (6t

h Cir. 20 08 ). Th e re fo re , w e wi ll n ot r e ve rs e a se nte nc e a s su

bs tanti ve ly

un re a so na

ble ba se d sim

ply on a c omp la int that a se nte nc e is too se ve re or that the dis trict cou rt in cor re c tly weig hed ce rtain fa ctors. See United States v. Houston , 529 F.3d 743, 7 5 6 (6 t h C i r. 2008). Also, wh ile se nt e n c e s w i t

h i n t h e Gu i d e l i n e s r a

n g e are pr e su me d r e a so na

ble , th e su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss of a se ntence t hat var ies outside the Guidelines ra ng e is revie wed only

for a buse of discr etion, without benef

it or burden of

a pre sumption i n its favor or to its detriment. Bolds , 511 F.3d at 579-81 (c i t i n g Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 5 86 , 5 97 (2 00 7) ); see also U nited States v. He rrera-Zuniga , 571 F.3d 568, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W] e apply a presumption of rea sonablene ss only to sentence s falling within the initi al sentenc ing r ang e re commended unde r the Guide lines.”).No. 08-1563

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- 8 - M a s s e y ma

k e s tw o ar g u me n ts th a t h is s e n te n c e is s u b s ta n ti v e ly u n r e a s o n a

b le

. F ir s t, he

argue s th a t th e c hil d- po rn og ra ph y Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s are a “ pure ly po lit ic a l pr od

uc t” and no t a product of the Sentencing Commi ssion c arr y ing out its i nstitut ional responsibilities; therefor e, the dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld no t have re lie d on the Gu ide lin e s a s the sta rt ing po int fo r i ts s e nte nc ingana ly sis

. M a s s e y ’ s argument contra dicts the Supreme Court’s dire ctive in Ga ll : “As a matter of a dminist ration and to sec ure nationwide consistency , the Guidelines should be the sta rting point and the initi al benchma rk.” 128 S. Ct. at 596. I n addition, Ma ssey misreads the case on which he r elies–– Sp e ar s v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 840 (2009). In Sp e ar s , the Sup re me Court he ld t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did not abuse its discretion by cate g orica lly reje cting the 100:1 c rac k-to-powde r ratio when se ntencing a defenda nt for conspiracy to distribute coca ine base and powder cocaine. Id. a t 84 1. B ut Sp e ar s d i d n o th o l d t h a ta d i s t r i c tc ou rt mu st d eviate from the Guidelines; the Court simply held that the dis t ri ct court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the Guide lines. Id. A c c o r d i n g l y, Ma sse y ’s argume nt t

hat th e dis tr ic t court ’s re lia nc e on the Gu ide lin e s w a s an a

bu se of dis c re tio n is
o p p o s i t e to Sp e ar

s ’ s h o ld in g , an d

th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id

n o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o nb y

u s in g the Guidelines as its starting point for its analy sis. Next, Massey

argues that his se ntence is substantively unrea sonable be cause the impositi on of the statut or

y ma ximumse nte nc es for th e dis tr ibutio n a nd e nti c e me nt c ha

rg e s le a ve s n o ma

rg in to make re asone d d i s t i n cti ons betwee n Massey ’s cr imes and more se rious offe nses. Massey ’s argument has two fatal flaws. F irst, while he re ceive d the statutory maxi mum sentenc es for two of his of fe ns e s, he wi ll s e rv e his thi rd se nte nc e (f or po sse ssi on ) c on c ur

re ntl y wi th h is o the r s e nte nc e s.No. 08-1563

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- 9 - Thus, an off

ender char g ed with the s ame three offenses as Massey could receive a sentence of 600 months––240 mont hs more than Ma ssey ’s sentenc e. Second, i t wa s within reason f or the district cour

t to conclude that Ma ssey ’s conduc t was
e g re g iou s, e ve n w he n c omp are d to the c on du c t of oth e r o ff e nd e rs . M a sse y

targ e te d h is n ie c e wi th whom he had personal contact. He transposed her fac e on imag es of naked and dea d children a nd sh are d d e tai led in for matio n a bo ut h e r w ithind ivi du a ls o ve r t he int e rn e t to e nti c e the m to a bd uc t, rape , torture, and murder her. Thus, this is not a run-of -the mill attempted- enti ce m en t offe nse. Moreove r, Massey

p o s s es s ed over

3000 imag es of c hild pornog raphy . Under the Sentencing Gu ide lines, th e of

fe ns e le ve l is inc re a se d b y fi ve le ve ls i f a

n o ff e nd e r h a s 6 00 or

mor e ima g e s, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2( b)(7) (D); Massey had five times that amount. Finally , the fore nsic examiner for this case sa id that Massey ’s collec tion of pi cture s was one of, i f not the m ost, disturbing he had eve r
seen. I n short, Massey ’s offenses are not so g arde n-var iety as t o require a g reater mar g in betwee n his se nte nc e and

oth e r o ff e nd e rs ’ s e ntences, and we c on c lud e that hi s se nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly
rea sonable. C. Supe r vis e d- Re le as e Co ndit ion s Ma sse y a lso c ha lle ng e s h is s up e rv ise d- re le a se c on dit ion s, sp e c if ic a lly taking ex c e pti on

to Special Conditions 4 and 10. Special C ondition 4 require s Massey to “par ticipate in a se x offe nder assessment and/or

other tre atment as a

pproved by the probation officer which may

include phy siologica l testing such as a poly g raph, plesthmogr aph [si c], a nd/or AB ELassessment.” Spec ial Conditi on 10 require s Massey to “re port all elec tronic addresses from which he sends or rece ives anyNo. 08-1563

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- 10 - elec tronic communications to t he Probation Off icer. T h e d efendant’s e lectronic addre sses and related ac counts will be subject to sea rch . . . .” We do not address the me rits of Massey ’s claims today , howeve r, because they are not ripe. Cf. United States v. Lee , 502 F.3d 447, 450 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) (“[W ]e hold that the condition of supervised relea se t hat [ the defendant] challeng es i s not y et ripe f or re view.”) . I n Lee , the def endant ch al l en gedh i s co n d i t i o n s o f s u p er v i s ed re l ea s e, i n cl u d i n g t h e u s e o f p en i l e p l et h y s m o grap h t es t i n g. We held that the cha lleng e wa s not ripe for two r ea s o n s. First, the c ondition im plicated only the potential use of the te sting ; t h e r e f o re, the defe ndant might ne ver be subject to penile plethy smogr aph. Id. Se c on d, the de fe nd ant wo uld no t be re le a se d f ro m pr iso n unti l 20 21 (f

ourt e e n y e ars fr om t

he date of his c halleng e). Id. at 450-51. We explained that it is too difficult to predic t whether the Probation Offic e, at that t i m e, will deter mine that penile plethy smogr aph tre atment is nece ssary , and “g iven that th e oc c a sio n ma

y ne ve r a ri se , [de fe nd ant’ s] c on te nti on that he wi ll a c tua lly be su bje c t to pe nil e plethy smogr aph is mere conjec ture.” Id. at 450. The same rea soning a

pplies here

. The use of a plethy smogr aph or an Abel assessment a re simply two options that Massey ’s probation office r m ay choose. Thus, like the defe ndant in Lee , the use of these assessments is optional. Moreover , Massey ’s sentenc e of 360 months put s his future supervised- rele ase conditions e ven far ther into the f

uture than the defe ndant’s in Lee
. I t would be

“ me re c on je c tu r e ” fo r t his Court to t ry to d e fi ne the pa

ra me te rs of Ma sse y ’s futur e su

pe rv ise d- re le a se conditions. Accor dingly , Massey ’s cha lleng es to Special Conditions 4 and 10 are not ripe for revie w.No. 08-1563

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III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM Massey ’s sentenc e.