alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

N o
. 0 9

- 2 0 4 9 5

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. R A N D O L P H , P l a i n t i f f

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v
. D I M E N S I O N F I L M S ; M I R A M A X F I L M C O R P

. ; S O N Y P I C T U R E S E N T E R T A I N M E N T , I N C

. ; B U E N A V I S T A H O M E E N T E R T A I N M E N T , I N C

. ; C O L U M B I A P I C T U R E S ; T H E W A L T D I S N E Y C O

. ; T R O U B L E M A K E R S T U D I O S ; R O B E R T R O D R I G U E Z ; R

. M

. R O D R I G U E Z , B y p a r e n t a n d n e x t f r i e n d , R o b e r t R o d r i g u e z ; E L I Z A B E T H A V E L L A N ; J O H N D O E ( S ) 1

- 9 9 9 , D e f e n d a n t s - A p p e l l e e s - C r o s s A p p e l l a n t s
J O H N D O E ( S ) 1

- 9 9 9

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r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e S o u t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f T e x a s N o
. 4 : 0 8

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B e f o r e H I G G I N B O T H A M , D A V I S , a n d B E N A V I D E S , C i r c u i t J u d g e s
. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D June 16 , 20 10 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 09-20495 Document: 00511143770 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2010N o
. 0 9

- 2 0 4 9 5

P E R C U R I A M : *
W e a f f i r m f o r e s s e n t i a l l y t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e
.

Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 , the court has det erm ined that thi s op inion s hould not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47.5 .4.
2 Case: 09-20495 Document: 00511143770 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/16/2010
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unico, Incorporated (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Ray C. Brown, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of the
          operation of the Company.


/s/ Ray C. Brown
--------------------------------
Ray C. Brown
Chief Financial Officer
January 12, 2004
#### Elmer D. SCATES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27282.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 5, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

Appellant appeals from a conviction for the offense of driving while intoxicated; his punishment was assessed, by the jury, at a fine of $50.

No statement of facts accompanies the record.

The offense was alleged to have been committed on or about November 25, 1953. The court’s charge submitted said date as being on or about November 25, 1953. The charge submitted the punishment fixed by Art. 802, Vernon’s'' Ann.P.C., prior to its amendment in 1953, and the jury assessed a fine of $50 and no jail term.

The state is not restricted to the exact date laid in the complaint or information, but may prove the offense, if it can, to have been committed at any time within the period of limitation. Randolph v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 80, 36 S.W.2d 484.

In the absence of a statement of facts, we are unable to determine that the offense was committed after the effective date of the amendment of Art. 802, Vernon’s Ann. P.C.,. which provides for a compulsory jail term.

*834On appeal the presumption obtains that the conviction was regular and that the offense charged was found to have been committed within the time prescribed by law authorizing the penalty assessed unless the contrary is made to appear. 4 Tex.Jur. 534, Sec. 379; 4 Tex.Jur. 554, Sec. 390.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Parke Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 (the “Report”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, we, Vito S. Pantilione, President and Chief Executive Officer, and F. Steven Meddick, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify,            pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)        The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated: May 4, 2009

 

 

| /s/ Vito S. Pantilione                |   | /s/ F. Steven Meddick   |
|---------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| Vito S. Pantilione                    |   | F. Steven Meddick       |
| President and Chief Executive Officer |   | Chief Financial Officer |
|                                  |   |                    |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mario Jones, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lawrence H. Bernstein, J.), rendered May 11, 1988, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 18 years to life, to run concurrently with sentences imposed under indictments Nos. 5352/86 and 4145/87, unanimously affirmed.

A witness testified at trial to seeing only defendant, whom she knew, with the victim immediately before the shooting. She and another witness also heard the shot, saw a portion of the body, and saw defendant leaving the scene. Defendant presented members of his family as alibi witnesses, who testified that he was at home at the time.

Defendant now contends that the court’s alibi charge im*183properly placed the initial burden of proof on him to establish the alibi. Because counsel failed to object in any way to the court’s charge, this contention is not preserved as a matter of law and we therefore decline to reach it (CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Holzer, 52*NY2d 947). Nor has any claim of a deprivation of defendant’s State and Federal constitutional rights been preserved *(People v Iannelli,*69 NY2d 684, *cert denied*482 US 914).

Were we to consider this argument in the interest of justice, we would nevertheless affirm, finding it to be without merit.

The test in determining the validity of a jury charge is whether the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the appropriate standards to the jury *(People v Adams,*69 NY2d 805, 806). An alibi charge must unequivocally state that the People bear the burden of disproving an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Victor,*62 NY2d 374, 378). Such instruction was given here. While defendant faults the portion of the charge referring to the alibi evidence itself creating or raising a reasonable doubt, the court specifically pointed out that defendant was under no obligation to prove his alibi, which had to be disproven by the People, and that defendant had no burden of proof whatsoever. Under these circumstances, the court’s charge, when viewed as a whole, conveyed the appropriate standard to the jury.

Further, any error must be deemed harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Ross, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION OF
 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
  In connection with the accompanying amended Yearly Report on Form 10-K/A of Aspire Japan, Inc., for the year ending January 31, 2009, I, Ken Osako, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Aspire Japan, Inc. hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:
  1. Such yearly Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ending January 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  2. The information contained in such yearly Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended January 31, 2009, fairly represents in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Aspire Japan, Inc.
  Dated: April 5, 2010
   Aspire Japan, Inc.
  By:
/s/ Ken Osako

Chief Executive Officer

Chief Financial Officer

Principal Accounting Officer
|                                                                                           
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                           
|View History:  Monthly  Annual Download Data (XLS File)                                   
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                             
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                             
|View History:                                                                              
|                                                                                           
|Lower 48 States Total Natural Gas Injections into Underground Storage  (Million Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                           
|                                                                                           
|Lower 48 States Total Natural Gas Injections into Underground Storage  (Million Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                           

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0    | Year-1    | Year-2    | Year-3    | Year-4    | Year-5    | Year-6    | Year-7    | Year-8    | Year-9   
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | --------- | ---------
|2010's                                                                                                                            |           | 3,421,813 | 2,825,427 | 3,047,153 | 3,827,150 | 3,629,179 | 2,961,990 | 3,321,680 | 3,663,923 | 4,141,567
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 3,578,854 | 3,667,048 | 3,883,178 | 3,827,353 |           |           |           |           |           |          
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
#### SPEARS v. STATE.

No. 26600.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 11, 1953.

*853Ronald Aultman, Mays & Mays and Dave Miller, Chas. Mays, 'Jr., Fort Worth, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The complaint and information upon which appellant was convicted allege that appellant did “unlawfully and wilfully injure and destroy the following: one plate glass, one plate glass mirror, three picture glass sets, one circle mirrow, in Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, said property being-then and there under the care, custody and control of Watler Rabb, the said act being then and there done without the consent of the said Walter Rabb and the said property being valued at less than $50.00.”

Art. 1350 Vernon’s Ann.P.C., § 1, under which the prosecution was instituted, reads as follows:

> “It shall be unlawful for any person to wilfully injure or destroy, or attempt to injure or destroy, any property belonging to another, of any kind whatsoever, without the consent of the owner and lienholder, if any, thereon.”

The allegation that the property was under the care, custody and control of Walter Rabb appears to have been accepted by the trial judge as a sufficient allegation of ownership, under the rule whereby one who exercises the actual care, control and custody of personal property is deemed in law to be the owner thereof.

Such allegation will not, however, suffice as an allegation that the property destroyed or injured by appellant was not his own, but belonged to another. The property described in the complaint and information might well have been owned by appellant, and yet have been under the care, custody and control of Walter Rabb.

The State concedes that the complaint and information are fatally defective because of the failure to allege that the property injured or destroyed belonged to another.

The complaint and information being fatally defective in the particular mentioned, the judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

November 6, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-61067 Summary Calendar

GILBERTO CESAR TZOC-GUTIERREZ; BLANCA MARICEL ZELAYA-ALVARADO; LUIS GILBERT TZOC-ZELAYA,

Petitioners,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of An Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA Nos. A77 799 254 A77 799 255 A77 799 256

Before GARWOOD, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gilberto Cesar Tzoc-Gutierrez (Tzoc), his wife, Blanca Maricel

Zelaya-Alvardo, and their son, Luis Gilbert Tzoc-Zelaya, petition

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to deny2

their applic ations for asylum and withholding of removal.

Petitioners contend that the BIA’s decision offered no specific

reasons for upholding the IJ’s decision and, therefore, was

insufficient to deny relief and to provide a basis for this court’s

review. We have previously held that the BIA’s summary affirmance

procedures do not deprive the court of a basis for judicial review

and do not violate due process. S oadjede v. Ashcroft
, 324 F.3d

830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the petitioner’s argument

is foreclosed.

Petitioners also contend that any mixed motivation to harm

Tzoc should have been construed in their favor and that the IJ

erred in concluding that Tzoc could have relocated within

Guatemala. These issues lack merit and in any event were not

raised before the BIA and hence have not been administratively

exhausted. S ee Wang v. Ashcroft , 260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir.

2001).

Finally, petitioners assert that the BIA’s dec ision was not

supported by substantial evidence. After reviewing the record and

t he briefs, we conclude that the decision is suppor ted by

substantial evidence and that the evidence in the record does not

compel a contrary conc lusion. S ee Mikhael v. INS , 115 F.3d 299,

302-04 (5th Cir. 1997); Chun v. INS , 40 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir.

1994); Faddoul v. INS , 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the petition for review is3 DENIED.
EXHIBIT 32.2





CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PVH Corp. (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended May 5, 2024 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Zachary Coughlin, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





(i) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











Dated:June 12, 2024By:/s/ ZACHARY COUGHLINName:Zachary CoughlinExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Page 1 of 3

Disposition Comments

Docket No: FAA-2014-0061 These comments are in

Directorate ID: 2013-NM-029-AD response to an SNPRM

Originating Office Tracking No.: 2013-0016

Next Step: FRAN SNPRM

 No Comments/Only Supportive Comments Received – If this box is checked, no signatures are 

required.

No Has the referenced service information been revised since the NPRM was issued? If yes,

list latest revision and attach a copy. Note that changes beyond the scope of the previously 

published NPRM will require a new notice. Contact the Directorate focal point for guidance.

Instructions: Summarize all comments by issue (not by commenter) and provide your recommended resolution of 

each issue. All comments relating to the same issue should be discussed together. Do not list all of the issues 

from one commenter together. If changes to the AD are required based on the comments received, explain why and 

describe in detail what change(s) you recommend. Reference FAA-IR-M-8040.1C Chapter 9.

ISSUE 1: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD: 

If NO, we don’t agree because 

ISSUE 2: Select one of the following: 

If other, explain: 

Commenter(s): 

What change to the AD action is requested? 

Why is the change requested or how is it justified? 

Do we agree? 

If YES, we agree because Make the following changes to the AD: 

If PARTIALLY AGREE, we agree with because We disagree with because 

Make the following changes to the AD:
Page 2 of 3

If NO, we don’t agree because 

For additional issues, double-click here
Page 3 of 3

Signature Section

Signature indicates concurrence with this action.

Originating Office Tracking No.: 

ASE Printed Name: Date

Branch Manager Date
STEAM ELECTRIC

C B I R E P L AC E M E NT P A G E

EPA

- HQ

- OW

- 20 09

- 0819

DCN:

________________________________________

T H E FO LL OW ING H AS BEE N R E M O V E D BE CAUSE IT

C O N T AINS C O N F ID E N T IAL B USIN E SS IN FO RMA T I O N

(C B I) P E R 4 0 C F R P ART 2

, SU B P ART B

. SE 04 331A013
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<CIK> 0001111230
<NAME> LAFAYETTE COMMUNITY BANCORP
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
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<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                  1.000
<CASH>                                           4,521
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<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                                0
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<LOANS-NON>                                          0
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</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie Brown, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Clifford Scott, J.), rendered on March 20, 1989, convicting defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of burglary in the first degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 2 to 6 years, is unanimously affirmed.

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account, "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in *213sentence. *(People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302, 305.) We also find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant youthful offender status.

Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain and within statutory guidelines. "Having received the benefit of his bargain, defendant would be bound by its terms.” *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918.) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Ross and Ellerin, JJ.