Opinion filed June 13, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

Nos. 11-24-00087-CR, 11-24-00088-CR, & 11-24-00089-CR

___________

TEREL DEVON HOUSTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 118th District Court

Howard County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 16720, 16722, & 16916

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On March 13, 2024, Appellant, Terel Devon Houston, pleaded guilty to three 

felony offenses: two possession-of-a-controlled-substance offenses and one theft-ofa-firearm offense. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (West Supp. 

2023); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(C) (West Supp. 2023). Pursuant 

to plea bargain agreements between Appellant and the State, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to ten years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice for the possession offenses and 180 days’

confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
2

for the theft-of-a-firearm offense. The trial court ordered that Appellant’s sentences 

be served concurrently. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial 

court’s judgments.

1 We dismiss the appeals. 

When these appeals were docketed, we notified Appellant in each case that 

the trial court had certified that (1) this is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has 

no right of appeal, and (2) Appellant had waived the right of appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West

2018). We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue these

appeals, but we have not received a response. 

Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment 

imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may 

appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on 

before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the 

specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); see 

also CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02. Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here. 

We further note that Rule 25.2 does not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to appeal 

matters related to the voluntariness of his plea unless the defendant has obtained the 

trial court’s permission to appeal. See Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2001); Carender v. State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no 

pet.). 

The documents on file show that, in each case, Appellant entered into a plea 

bargain agreement, his punishment was assessed by the trial court in accordance with 

the plea bargain agreement, and he waived his right of appeal. Further, in each case, 

the trial court certified that Appellant has no right of appeal and that he waived this 

right. The trial court’s certifications were signed by Appellant, Appellant’s trial 

1

We note that, while Appellant listed all three trial court cause numbers in his pro se notice of 

appeal, he only requested an appeal of the ten-year sentence he “gained through a plea bargain on March 13, 

2024.”
3

counsel, and the presiding judge of the trial court. The documents on file in this 

court support the trial court’s certifications. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 

613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we must dismiss these appeals

without further action. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 

680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

We dismiss these appeals. 

W. STACY TROTTER

 JUSTICE

June 13, 2024

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.