In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-1876

MATTHEW WHITFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:02-cv-00902-RLY-TAB — Richard L. Young, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 14, 2013 — DECIDED JUNE 6, 2014

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. This rather complex matter involves a failure to hire claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act. At the heart of this case is plaintiff-appellant Matthew Whitfield’s application for an electrician position at one of defendant-appellee Navistar’s engine 

manufacturing plants. Whitfield is African-American, and 

prior to applying with Navistar, he worked as an electrician 
2 No. 13-1876

for various employers, including four years with the U.S. 

Navy. Navistar is a manufacturer of engines, among other 

equipment, and employed a number of electricians at the 

time of Whitfield’s application.

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an open electrician position 

at Navistar’s plant in Indianapolis, Indiana (the Plant). At 

the time, Navistar had a significant need for electricians and 

hired sixteen electricians at the Plant while Whitfield’s application was pending, and eleven during the relevant limitations period. The written job description for electricians, as 

negotiated with the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the Union) required that an applicant have either eight years experience 

as an electrician or a journeyman card, which was considered 

presumptive proof of the experience requirement. The journeyman card could be issued by the Union or any other union with comparable apprenticeship standards. Navistar 

delegated the responsibility of evaluating and confirming an 

applicant’s experience to the Union. 

When Whitfield first applied for a job in 1996 he alleged 

he had approximately nine and a half years of experience as 

an electrician, including four years in the U.S. Navy. The 

Plant’s general foreman, Daniel McDonald, interviewed 

Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified 

the required eight years of experience. However, when the 

Union attempted to verify Whitfield’s numerous employers 

it was unable to determine he had the requisite eight years 

experience. Navistar asserted the difficulty in verifying 

Whitfield’s experience was due to errors on his application, 

but the Union did not consider Whitfield’s four years of experience as an electrician in the Navy, which it conceded 
No. 13-1876 3

should have been considered. Whitfield was never rejected 

by Navistar; instead he was told that the Union could not 

verify his experience. At the suggestion of Navistar’s electrical foreman, Willie Jones, Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to supplement his Navistar application with additional references.

In September 1998, Whitfield obtained his International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) card, and submitted proof of it to Navistar. At this point there is no doubt that 

Whitfield met the minimum requirements for hire. Union 

Committeeman George Bunton then cleared Whitfield for 

hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to Jones. While returning 

the file to Navistar with notice of Whitfield’s clearance, Jones 

opened Whitfield’s folder and saw that the word “black” 

was written on the application’s cover sheet. Surprised, Jones 

asked Navistar’s Human Resources manager, Jeff Thatcher, 

why the word appeared on the file. Thatcher could not explain why the cover sheet was there and said it must have 

been a mistake.

Whitfield continued his quest to gain employment at 

Navistar. In March 1999, Whitfield gave the Union an updated copy of his IBEW card and an updated application. While 

Whitfield’s resubmitted application was pending, Navistar 

hired at least five more white electricians. Whitfield was 

never formally rejected but in December 1999 Jones unofficially told Whitfield that although he wished to hire Whitfield, Navistar would not allow it. At trial Navistar asserted 

various reasons for not hiring Whitfield, including the “errors” in his resume and his purported lack of Programmable 

Logic Controller (PLC) experience, which Navistar contended was an important, but unstated, qualification for the elec-
4 No. 13-1876

tricians they hire. No final decision maker has ever been 

identified by Navistar.

In October 2001 Whitfield, along with 26 other Plaintiffs, 

sued Navistar under Title VII, alleging Navistar discriminated in hiring and maintained a racially hostile work environment in the Plant. The district court certified the other Plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the underlying case for discovery and all other pretrial proceedings, 

but separated his claim from that class action for trial. The 

hostile work environment class action went to trial in 2006 

but was settled with most of the class action members before 

conclusion of trial. 

During joint discovery for the class action and Whitfield’s 

claim, extensive amounts of evidence and testimony showing extreme racial hostility at the Plant were presented. Evidence showing racial hostility at the Plant included symbols 

of racial hatred (including nooses), photos of racially hostile 

graffiti and racially offensive slogans scrawled around the 

Plant. The evidence also showed that Navistar refused to 

discipline white employees, including supervisors, for such 

racially charged behavior. There was also evidence that the 

Plant systematically excluded blacks from the skilled trades. 

Whitfield’s claim finally proceeded to a bench trial in 

June 2012. After the first day, Whitfield filed a submission 

regarding evidence from the earlier class trial, Allen, et al. v. 

International Trucking, in an attempt to introduce 59 exhibits 

and testimony from 19 trial exhibits. Navistar objected, and 

the district court took the issue under advisement, and the 

trial proceeded until completion. On July 31, 2013, the court 

issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as 
No. 13-1876 5

an entry of final judgment. The court rejected Whitfield’s 

submission regarding evidence from the class trial, stating 

that Whitfield gave the court no authority to support admission of evidence from the class action. Further, the court 

found that Whitfield’s submission, proffered one day into 

trial, was untimely. The court then concluded that Whitfield’s evidence was insufficient to directly or indirectly 

prove discrimination. Specifically, the court determined that 

Whitfield’s evidence did not imply any discrimination, that 

Whitfield did not meet Navistar’s unstated qualifications for 

the job, and that he did not offer any compelling comparator 

evidence. Because we find the district court made several errors in analyzing Whitfield’s evidence, we now reverse.

I.

Under Title VII, employers may not “discriminate against 

any individual with respect to his ... privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Title VII claims and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims incorporate the same liability standard. Walker v. Abbott Laboratories, 

340 F.3d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 2003). Once Whitfield shows he 

was subjected to an adverse employment action, here Navistar’s failure to hire him, he can prevail on his discrimination 

claim by submitting direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). Under the relevant statutes of limitations, only Whitfield’s claims from May 16, 1998 and onward are timely.

Direct Method

We begin with the direct method of proof. In analyzing 

Whitfield’s evidence, the district court makes two significant 

errors, which ultimately doomed its analysis. The court first 
6 No. 13-1876

erred by discrediting evidence of Whitfield’s personnel file 

containing a cover page with the word “black” on it. Despite 

our skepticism concerning the district court’s negative credibility assessment1 of Jones’ testimony, we do give the court 

deference in its credibility determinations. See E.C. Styberg 

Eng’g Co. v. Eaton Corp., 492 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2007). 

However, the court did not have discretion to create an explanation out of thin air as to why the word “black” was on 

the file, nor should it have ignored substantial evidence of a 

racially hostile environment.

Despite being called the “direct method” of proof, outright admissions of discriminatory intent are rare, so plaintiffs usually use circumstantial evidence of discrimination to 

support their claims. Phelan, 463 F.3d at 779. A plaintiff may 

prevail by “constructing a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a [factfinder] to infer intentional 

discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. For this mosaic to 

be convincing, it must directly point to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action and also be directly related to 

the employment decision. Dass v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 675 

F.3d 1060, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012). It will not do for plaintiff to 

assemble an “amorphous litany of complaints about a myriad of workplace decisions.” Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 

242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2001). But, “[r]emarks and other 

evidence that reflect a propensity by the decisionmaker to 

evaluate employees based on illegal criteria will suffice as 

direct evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops 

 1 The district court determined Jones was not credible on the basis of two minor 

facts: (1) he could not remember how the cover sheet containing the word 

“black” was affixed to Whitfield’s personnel file; and (2) he could not remember 

the exact date Whitfield’s IBEW card was issued.
No. 13-1876 7

short of a virtual admission of illegality.” Miller v. Borden, 

Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting Venters v. City of 

Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted 

from original). Whitfield attempted to create this mosaic 

with evidence of his racially coded personnel file, and by 

drawing a link between that file, the Plant’s racially hostile 

environment and Navistar’s refusal to hire him.

The district court, despite having no evidence from 

Navistar for support, concluded that Whitfield’s file could 

have had “black” written on it for affirmative action purposes, reasoning that Whitefield’s file indicated his race to allow 

Navistar to comply with its affirmative action program. But 

Navistar’s own human resources manager, Jeff Thatcher, 

admitted that he did not know of any reason why “black” 

was written on Whitfield’s file and that it must have been a 

mistake. Navistar did have an affirmative action program, 

but it did not collect race information by labeling applicants’ 

files with their race. Moreover, Navistar’s diversity manager 

Roy Civils testified that it would not be proper for information regarding a candidate’s race to be sent to the Union 

for the candidate evaluation process. It is incongruous that 

someone would have labeled Whitfield’s file “black” for affirmative action or other legitimate purposes when the HR 

manager himself, who would be in the best position to know 

of any non-discriminatory explanation for the cover sheet, 

could not explain why it was on the file. Thus, the district 

court’s account of the evidence regarding its alternative explanation for the “black” cover sheet is neither plausible in 

light of the entire record nor a permissible view of the evidence. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
8 No. 13-1876

Even more troubling is the district court’s determination 

that there is no evidentiary link between the cover page and 

an intent to discriminate. First, this strikes us as evidence of 

racial coding, which strongly infers discrimination. See e.g., 

Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 642 F. Supp. 663, 687 

(M.D. Ga. 1986). Second, the district court apparently ignored rather extensive evidence of the racially hostile environment within which this cover page was attached to Whitfield’s personnel file. We will address this issue further later 

on, but for now it is important to note that the district court 

rejected Whitfield’s attempt to admit evidence from the class 

action—evidence which painted an exceptionally clear, and 

rather shocking, picture of the Plant’s racially hostile work 

environment. In determining that such evidence was inadmissible, the court said that there was plenty of other evidence establishing the Plant’s racially hostile work environment. Inexplicably, the district court makes no mention of 

this other contextual evidence in its conclusion that no evidence links Whitfield’s “black” cover page with any discriminatory intent. This is troubling. It is obvious to us that this 

contextual evidence is at least relevant, and the court’s failure to even mention this context in its conclusions regarding 

the cover page is clear error.

The district court committed a second, more egregious, 

error by giving enormous weight to the fact that Navistar 

hired Donna Jackson, an African-American electrician, 

around the time of Whitfield’s pending application. In doing 

so, the district court again shut its eyes to the entire record, 

choosing an implausible view of the evidence, and, at the 

same time, misapplied the law. 
No. 13-1876 9

Jackson had at least thirteen years of experience at the 

time she applied. Notwithstanding her clear experience, 

eleven white electricians were hired before Jackson was finally hired two years after her initial application. She was 

the first black electrician Navistar had hired in decades. 

While the district court does have some degree of discretion 

in weighing evidence, it clearly exceeded that discretion 

when it determined that Jackson’s hiring “negat[ed] any inference that Navistar failed to hire Whitfield due to his 

race.” 

By giving such substantial weight to the Jackson hire, the 

district court apparently forgot that while she was employed 

at Navistar, she was subject to a severely hostile environment at the Plant, which was primarily directed at her race. 

In fact, Jackson’s story of waiting two years, despite being 

more qualified than white applicants that were hired instead 

of her, as well as the racial hostility she was subjected to 

when she was finally hired, bolster Whitfield’s direct discrimination evidence. It is a rather persuasive piece of circumstantial evidence, which the district court erroneously 

relied upon to negate discrimination rather than to support 

it. Moreover, this singular instance of Navistar hiring a black 

electrician, does not entitle Navistar to immunity from subsequent discrimination allegations. Cf. Carson v. Bethlehem 

Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158–59 (7th Cir. 1996). Instead, the 

court should have recognized that even though a member of 

the same protected class was hired, that fact does not magically negate the inference created by the evidence of Jackson’s hiring and employment at the Plant, the evidence of 

intense racial hostility at the Plant or the cover page on 

Whitfield’s personnel file identifying him as black. We find 
10 No. 13-1876

that these clear errors led the district court to improperly 

distort Whitfield’s mosaic of circumstantial evidence.

Indirect Method

We now turn to the indirect or burden-shifting method of 

proving discrimination. Under this method, Whitfield must 

establish a prima facie case consisting of four elements: (1) he 

was a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for an open 

position for which he was qualified; (3) he did not receive 

the position; and (4) those who were hired were not in the 

protected class and had similar or lesser qualifications. See 

Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

There is no real issue as to the first and third elements—it 

is undisputed that Whitfield is a member of a protected class 

and did not receive the position he applied for. The district 

court concluded that Whitfield failed to prove the other elements.

In addressing the second element, the district court first 

determined that Whitfield applied in 1996, was rejected, and 

applied again in 1999. Because his 1996 application was before May 16, 1998, the court determined that any claim regarding his 1996 application was untimely, which effectively 

meant that the court considered only Navistar’s conduct after Whitfield’s re-application in March 1999. Oddly, the court

also concluded that Whitfield had submitted an updated resume in 1997, and even in 1998 the Union was still trying to 

verify his experience. Instead of supporting a formal rejection of Whitfield’s application, the record shows that Whitfield was informed that his application was still under consideration and that Whitfield continued to supplement his 
No. 13-1876 11

application well into 1998. The record does not support the 

district court’s determination that Whitfield was rejected after his first application. All conduct within the statutory period should be considered by the court. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–115 (2002). Thus, in 

light of Whitfield’s pending application in May 1998, we see 

no reason why the court should neglect to consider Navistar’s timely conduct that took place before Whitfield’s reapplication in 1999. In any event, even if we were to limit our 

analysis to the 1999 application, Whitfield can still satisfy 

each element of the indirect method.

More central to our analysis of the second element of the 

indirect method is the question of Whitfield’s qualifications. 

Navistar required that an electrician applicant have either 

eight years of experience as an electrician or a journeyman’s 

card. Whitfield contends that he had eight years of experience at the time of his initial application, and certainly had 

that many as he continued to supplement his application 

with his current work experience. Yet, for some reason the 

Union had trouble verifying his experience. In any case, at 

the time of his reapplication in 1999 Whitfield had obtained 

an IBEW Journeyman’s card, making him presumptively 

qualified for the position.2 Standing alone, this should have 

been enough to satisfy this element. However, instead of relying on this presumptive evidence, the district court focused on Navistar’s justifications for not hiring Whitfield, 

namely that Whitfield lacked Navistar’s “preferred,” but 

never formally stated, qualifications. The district court de-

 2 In fact, the record shows and the district court made a factual finding that Union Committeeman Bunton cleared Whitfield for hiring in September 1998 on 

the basis of both his IBEW Journeyman card and his actual experience. 
12 No. 13-1876

termined that Whitfield was not qualified for this job, and 

Navistar was justified in not hiring him, due to errors in his 

resume and his purported lack of experience with programmable logic controllers (PLC).

Whatever the reasons the district court relies upon to justify Navistar’s failure to hire, it does so in error because no 

decision maker has been identified. Navistar was never able 

to identify the individual who made the final decision to not 

hire Whitfield. Thus, it is impossible for the court to conclude 

that the reason he was not hired was due to either the errors 

in his resume or lack of PLC experience. While those may

have been reasons for not hiring Whitfield, without any 

known decisionmaker, it is mere speculation to say these 

were the actual reasons. The district court stated that “it was 

ultimately Powell’s opinion regarding Whitfield’s lack of 

PLC experience that was the driving force behind Navistar’s 

decision not to hire Whitfield.” However, Powell testified 

that he did not make the decision to not hire Whitfield, and 

could not even identify who made the decision. Therefore, it 

is patently incorrect to say that Powell’s opinion had any 

bearing on the actual basis for the hiring decision.

Making matters worse, the evidence shows that Whitfield 

had more PLC experience than many of the white electricians hired during the relevant time period. It is rather odd 

then that the district court would rely so heavily on Navistar’s desire for electricians with PLC experience when the 

record shows that several new hires had none. Navistar’s 

purported justification seemingly does more to show pretext, than it does to show Whitfield was not actually qualified. See, e.g., O’Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 

1005–06 (7th Cir. 2002)(“[plaintiffs] may establish pretext 
No. 13-1876 13

with evidence that the defendants were more likely than not 

motivated by a discriminatory reason or that their explanations are not worthy of credence, i.e., they are factually baseless, did not actually motivate the defendants, or were insufficient to motivate the adverse employment action.”).

The same can be said for the district court’s fixation on 

the errors in Whitfield’s resume. These errors may indicate 

why Whitfield’s resume could not be initially verified; however, it is undisputed that by the time of Whitfield’s reapplication in March 1999, he had a journeyman’s card—

presumptive proof of his qualification, which should render 

any errors irrelevant. In any event, without a final decision 

maker it is impossible to say that either PLC experience or 

resume errors were the sole bases for not hiring Whitfield.

This district court’s reliance on these speculative justifications was clearly erroneous.

Turning now to the fourth element, the district court also 

erred in determining that Whitfield failed to present any 

comparator evidence showing that he was at least as well 

qualified as non-protected class employees who were hired 

during the relevant period. In fact, Whitfield submitted rather compelling comparator evidence—a chart, originally 

prepared by Navistar, which detailed the experience of both 

Whitfield and Navistar’s electricians who were hired while 

Whitfield’s application was pending. As originally prepared, 

the chart shows that Navistar hired at least one electrician 

with zero PLC experience during the limitations period. 

However, Whitfield alleged that the chart’s original form 

drastically understated3 his experience and submitted an 

 3 The evidence shows that Navistar General Foreman McDonald prepared the 

EEOC chart using company files for the electricians that Navistar hired, but only 
14 No. 13-1876

updated version of the EEOC chart, which reflected his actual experience. This updated EEOC chart showed that Whitfield was more qualified than most of the electricians hired 

during the limitations period.

Despite this clear comparator evidence, the district court 

disregarded it on the basis that the chart reflected the training some of Navistar’s electricians received after being hired. 

Inexplicably, both the district court and Navistar seem to argue that the document does not reflect the experience of the 

electricians at the time they were hired, so it is irrelevant to 

Whitfield as an un-hired electrician. Apparently Navistar 

and the court did not understand that the chart reflects the 

total experience of Navistar’s electricians, thus showing that 

Whitfield was more qualified than several employees even 

after they received on-the-job training. The updated EEOC chart 

is clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more 

qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired 

during the limitations period—the district court committed 

clear error in determining that Whitfield had failed to submit any comparator evidence regarding Navistar’s preferred 

qualifications.

II.

Finally we must address the propriety of the district 

court’s exclusion of the evidence which was produced as a 

result of joint discovery with the class action involving 

Navistar. The court excluded most of this evidence on the 

basis that it found no legal support for a blanket admission 

of exhibit and testimony from a previous trial; that the sub-

 

used his own recollection to fill out the chart as it pertained to Whitfield’s experience.
No. 13-1876 15

mission was untimely; and that the evidence was either duplicative or irrelevant. We ultimately find that it was within 

the district court’s discretion to disallow the late submission 

of evidence.

Timeliness

Judges have wide discretion to make evidentiary rulings 

and manage the efficiency of a trial. See, e.g., U.S. v. Boros, 

668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012). While we think the district 

court was permitted to consider this evidence4, no precedent 

suggests it was obligated to. The record shows Whitfield’s 

counsel believed the evidence was already admitted and did 

not want to waste the time and resources by resubmitting 

this evidence. However reasonable this assumption was, 

they had no legal authority supporting this assumption. 

Even when the district court specifically asked for this authority, they could give none. It was a risk, then, to assume 

that this evidence was admitted without addressing this issue with the district court before the trial began. In this regard, the district court was within its discretion to refuse to 

admit this evidence for its form (a blanket admission of voluminous exhibits and testimony) and its timeliness (after 

trial had begun). Therefore to the extent that the district 

court exercised its authority to control the trial by excluding 

 4 In Walker v. Loop Fish & Oyster Co. the Fifth Circuit determined that where a 

case is separated and the same judge presided over both the jury and bench trial, 

the judge had the discretion to consider the evidence from the jury trial in the 

bench trial. 211 F.2d 777, 780–781 (5th Cir. 1954). Given the overlap in the two 

proceedings at hand—joint discovery, same case number and same defendants—

we think that the Fifth Circuit’s holding is applicable to this case—a court has 

discretion to consider evidence from the earlier trial if it does not result in prejudice.
16 No. 13-1876

the blanket admission, we are reluctant to disturb that discretion.

Relevance

The district court did not rely solely on the untimely nature of the evidence, but suggested it was not relevant or 

duplicative as well. Although we grant substantial deference 

to the district court’s determinations regarding relevance, the 

class action evidence Whitfield sought to have admitted 

proved racial hostility was rampant at Navistar during the 

time of his applications, which is quite relevant to this case. 

Navistar argues that the evidence was duplicative and Whitfield did not meet his burden to show it would change the 

outcome of his claim. The evidence very well could have 

changed the outcome of the case. As discussed above, the 

district court’s failure to consider the circumstantial evidence 

of rampant discrimination at the Plant affected the outcome 

of Whitfield’s case. Thus, there is a strong indication that this 

evidence is relevant. To the extent that the district court relied on reasons of irrelevance in refusing to admit this evidence, it was an abuse of discretion.

Exhibit 6

Finally, we note that the district court inconsistently 

treated the admissibility of this evidence. On the first day of 

trial, Whitfield’s counsel referred to Exhibit 6, an exhibit 

from the class trial. Navistar objected on the basis that Exhibit 6 was not evidence in this trial. The court acknowledged that Exhibit 6 was already part of the record and overruled Navistar’s objection. During the discussion of this objection, Whitfield’s counsel contended that the evidence obtained from joint discovery and admitted in the class trial 
No. 13-1876 17

was already admitted in this trial. Thus, it seems that by recognizing that Exhibit 6 was already part of the record, the 

court at least implicitly agreed with Whitfield’s argument. 

Obviously, the court changed its mind regarding the class 

evidence at some point between the time it recognized Exhibit 6 as already admitted and refusing to admit the rest of 

the class evidence. On remand, the district court should resolve its inconsistent treatment of Exhibit 6 and the rest of 

the class action evidence. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, 

and REMANDED.