UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____ _______________________________ ) KISHA SIMON , ) ) Plaintiff , ) )
v. ) Civil Action No. 17

- 2033 ( RBW ) ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIA L ) SECURIT Y , ) ) Defendant

. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

T he pl aintiff , Kisha Simon , b rings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § § 405(g)

and 1383(c) , against the defendant, the Commissioner of Social S ecurity, seeking j u dicial review

of the decision by an administrative law judge ( “ ALJ ” ) denying her application for disability

insurance benefits an d supplemental social security income

. See Complaint ( “ Compl. ” ) ¶¶ 1

– 2. Currently pending before the Court are the plainti f f

’ s motion for jud g ment of reversal, see
Motion for Jud gment of Reversal ( “ Pl

. ’ s Mot. ” ) , ECF No. 11 , and the d efendant ’ s motion for judgment of affirmance, see Defendant ’ s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance and in Opposition

to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for Judg m e n t of Reversal ( “ Def. ’ s Mot. ” ), ECF No. 12. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 1 the Court concludes for th e following reasons that it must grant the plaintiff ’ s motion, deny the defendant ’ s motion, reverse the ALJ ’ s decision, and

r e m a n d the case to the agency for f urther proceedings.

1 In addition to the f ilings alr eady identified, t he Court consid e red the foll owi ng su b miss ions in rendering it s decision: (1 ) the M emo rand um of Point s and Autho ri ties in Support o f Plai ntiff ’ s Motion for Judgment of Reversal ( “ Pl. ’ s Mem. ” ) , E CF No. 11

- 1 ; (2) the Defendant ’ s Me morandum i n Support of Her M otion for Jud gm e nt o f Affirm anc e and in O pposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion fo r Judgm ent of Reversal ( “ Def. ’ s Mem

. ” ) , ECF No. 1 3 ; ( 3) t he P laintif f ’ s Response to Motion for Judgmen t of Affirmance and Reply t o Motion for Judgment of Reversal ( “ Pl. ’ s Reply ” ) , E CF No. 14; and ( 4) t he admin ist rativ e rec ord ( “ App. ” ) , ECF No s. 9

- 1 to 9

- 12

.2 I. BACKGROUND

A. Sta tutory and Regulatory Framework

Pursuant to the So cial Security Act ( the “ Act ” ) , an individual is entitled to disability

benefits if he or s he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful a ctivity by reason of any medically de terminable phy s ical or mental imp a irment which can be expected to result in de ath or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less t ha n [twelve] months[.]

42 U.S .C. § 423(d)( 1)(A). T o determi ne whether a claimant is entitled to benefits , an ALJ

“ ga thers evidence, holds a hearing, [and] takes testimony, ” which may include testimony by a

vo cational expert

. Kim M. v. Kijakazi , Civil Action No. 20

- cv
- 2072 (GMH), 2021 WL 4033060 (D.D.C. S e pt. 3, 2021) . The ALJ then “ performs [a] five

- step, sequential inquiry of the
[ claimant ’ s] dis ability claim [,] ” a s set forth in 20 C.F.R . § 404.1520

. Id.

F irst, the claimant must show that [he or] she is not presently engaged in “substantial gainfu l a cti vit y.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, [he or] she must demonstrate that [he or ] she has a “severe impairment” that “significantly limits [ his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 4 16. 920 (c)

. Third, the claimant must show that [his
or ] h er impairments or combination of imp airments “meets or equals” one of the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 416. 920(a)(4)(iii). If they do, then the claimant is de eme d d isabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step , which requires the ALJ to determine the claimant's residual functional capacity and consider whether, in light of t hat capacity, the claimant can still perform w ork th at [he or] she has done within the past [fifteen] years (if the claimant has indeed don e such work). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.960(b)(1). Fifth, if the claimant's capacity indicates that [he or] she cannot engage in past work, then th e b urd en shifts to the [agency] to prove that the claimant's capacity, age, education, an d past work experience indicate that [he or ] s he is able to perform “other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bu tler , 353 F. 3d at 9 97

. Mi tchell v. Kijakazi , No. 19

- cv
- 2560 (DLF), 2021 WL 5310541 , at *2 ( D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2021).

“ Through th e first four steps of this inquiry, the claimant bears the burden of proof[,] ” however,3 at step five, “ the burden shifts to the [agency] to identi fy sp ecific jobs sufficiently available in the national economy that the claimant can perform. ” Callahan v. Astrue , 786 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2011)

.
B. The Plaintiff ’ s Disability Claims and Procedural History This case concerns two applicatio ns filed by th e plaintiff : (1) a n application under Title II

and Part A o f Title XVIII f or a p eriod of disability a nd disability in surance benefits , filed on
Au g u st 1 6 , 201 3, see App. at 212

– 1 5 , and (2) a n application under Title XVI a nd T itle XIX for supplem ental sec ur ity income , filed on September 24, 2013 , see id. at 21 6

– 24

. Both applications

alle ged that the plaintiff became disabled as of Sept ember 1, 2009. See i d

. at 2 12, 216. The plainti ff ’ s applications were initially denied by the defenda nt on J an uary 29, 201 4

. S ee id. at 137

– 43 (notif ying the plaintiff of the denial of her applications )

. On Febr uary 5, 2014 , the plaintiff requeste d reconsideration of the d e fendant ’ s decision , s ee id. at 148 , and o n

F ebruary 24, 20 14, the defendant deter mined that “ the p revi ous det ermination den ying [the plaintiff ’ s] claim[s ] was proper under the law[,] ” id. at 158 ; s ee id

. at 149

– 60 (notifying the plaintiff of the age n c y ’ s determination th at it s prev ious denials were proper).
On Apr il 8, 201 4, the plaintiff submitted a “ re quest f or [a] hearin g by ” an ALJ

. I d.

at 161

. In support of her applications , the plaintiff submitte d to the ALJ the medical

documentation t h a t had been previously considered by th e agency, as well as additional

documenta tio n that post

- dated the age ncy ’ s determ inations. 2

2 T his information is compil ed in the administr at ive record submitted in this case. See App. at 252

– 60 ( function report dated September 2 7, 201 3, completed by the plaint iff); id. at 2 61

– 71 (third

- party functio n re port dated September 27, 2013, com pleted by S equitta Tol liver, t he pl a intiff ’ s friend); i d. at 313

– 22 ( treatment r ecords dated July 28, 2006, to August 18, 2006, from Dr. Alfred C. Burris ); id. at 323

– 427 ( Charte r Family Health Center PC h ospital recor d s d ated March 30, 2001, to September 25, 2006 ); id. a t 428

– 41 ( disa bility consultation rec or ds dat ed Nov ember 17, 200 6 , from Dr. Elliot A leskow) ; id. at 4 42

– 51 ( Fort Washington M e dical Center emergency department re cords dated August 31, 2009 ); id. at 452

– 5 4 (Prince G eorge ’ s H ospital Center o perative report da ted August 2 5, 201 0 ); id. at 455

– 88 ( tr eatm ent records dated F ebruary 18, 2010 , to June 24, 2013, from Dr. Joel L. (continued . . .)4 On February 22, 2016, the ALJ held a hearing regarding the plai ntiff ’ s applications , s e e
id. at 41 , at whi ch the p l a intiff , see id. at 51

– 66, and a vocational expert, Dr. Ja mes M. Ryan, see
id. at 66

– 72, testified. T he pla intiff s tated that, p rior to fili ng her applications, she worked as a
cashier at a Giant Food grocery store for “ [a] l ittle over two years [

. ] ” I d. at 5 3

. While performing her cashier duties on A ug u s t 31, 2009 , see id. at 310 , her “ forearm

. . . [got] caugh t in

t he co nvey or belt [,] ” “ pinch[ing] ” her “ nerve[,] ” resulting in her going “ to the emergency room straight after work

. ” Id. at 55. The pl aintiff underwent two surgeries related to this in j u ry, resulting in ongoing p ain. S ee i d. ; see also id. at 310 (noting that the pl aintiff had “ an anterior

cer vical di scec tomy, an [] inter body fusion, and an anterior instru mentation procedur e done at

C6

– 7 . . . by Dr. Falik ” on August 25, 2010, and “ had t he C6

– 7 fusion redone by Dr. [ ] Aulisi ”

on July 3, 2014 ). The plaintiff s tated that, b ecause of the injury, she did not “ have good st rength
in [her] hand [,] ” was “ not abl e to do multiple rotations with the arm[,] ” and was “ not able to li ft

as much . . . on [her] l eft [ s ide] as [she was able to lift ] on [her] ri ght [ side]

. ” Id. at 5 6. The plaintiff also repo rted having issues with bending and squa tting be cause , while she wait ed f or her first surgery, “ the vertebra [e] of [her] spinal cord [were ] being pushed from [her] cervical . . .

di scs. ” Id. at 57. However, the pla intiff n oted th at she does not use a “ ca n e or anythi ng to get

(. . . co nti n ued) Falik); id. at 489

– 93 (medical quest ionnaire dated September 30, 2013, complete d by D r

. N ora Bammidi); id. at 494

– 501 ( cons ultative ex amination records d ated N ovember 26, 2013 , f ro m Dr . Joel Taub i n ); id. at 502

– 0 3 ( treatment records dated February 3, 201 4, from Dr. Bammidi); id. at 504

– 15 ( treatme nt records dated F e bruary 6 , 2013 , to O c tob e r 2 3, 2013, from Dr. Michael A. Frenc hetti); id. at 516

– 28 (treatme nt rec ords dated June 6, 20 1 4, to S e ptember 23, 20 15, from Dr. Edward Aulisi); id. at 529

– 76 (treatment r ecords dated July 3, 2014, to October 23, 2 015, from Dr. Lee Ann Rhodes ); id. at 57 7

– 86 ( Med s tar Washington Hospital Cent er records dat ed July 13, 2012 , to S eptember 7, 2012); id

. at 587

– 644 (Civ ist a H ospital reco rds dated January 8, 2012, to September 1, 2013); id. at 645

– 802 (U nited M edical C ente r Hospital records dated August 20, 2012, to August 11, 2 0 15); id. at 80 3

– 04 ( Med s tar Washington Hospital Ce nter r ecor ds dated Octobe r 23, 2015); id. at 805

– 9 00 ( Uni ty Health Care treatmen t records dated February 5, 2014, to January 28, 2016); id. at 901

– 0 6 (mental residual functional capacity asses sment dated F e bruary 9, 2016, by physician assistant A lexandra S cheer ) ; id. at 907

– 39 ( R ehab ilitation Center of S outhern Maryland phys ic al and occupational therapy records dated January 21, 20 11 to July 20, 20 11); id. at 940

– 42 (Georgetown University Hospi tal r a diology report dated Sept ember 3, 2013); id. at 943

– 50 (Mu l ti S p ecial ty Health C ar e re cords dated January 2 6, 2016, to February 12, 2016).5 around ” and , althoug h sh e had “ a back brace[,] ” she did not “ wear it. ” I d. The plaintiff further

stated that her “ pain [ ] get[s ] worse ” whe n she is doing ac tivi t i es like “ [h]ousehold clea ning [ or ]

la

undry ” because o f the “ constant movement ” an d “ things that consist o f [her ] movi ng that repeatedly. ” Id. at 61. However, she stated that she could walk “ with breaks ” fo r “ maybe an hour without pain[,] ” and “ cons tant [ l y] stand in one spot [ for ]ro ughl y [f ifteen or twenty]

minutes. ” Id. She also r eported that “ sitting for a pr olonge d period of time affect[e d her] pai n ”

and that she could sit for “ maybe an hour, hour and a half top s. ” I d. at 61

– 62. F i nally, the plai n t iff stated that “ maybe five, six ” da y s per month she had to “ lay down during the day ” for

app roximately two to thr ee hours “ because [her] pain ha[d] been exacerbated. ” Id. at 62

– 63. Although the plaintiff ha d looked for work as a “ reception[ist], [ in] s e curity, [ or as a] bank

teller [,] ” i d

. at 54, she represented that she had not secur ed work since her e mployment with

Giant Food ended , see id. at 53.

Re gar ding her mental health, t he plaintiff reported that she “ had trouble sleeping ”

because “ of nightmares of fearful things, v iolent thin gs [ , ] ” i d. at 59 , and was falling back into a depression “ where [she] pushed away fr iends and family, sta yed to [her]self, [and had] a lot of

i solation [ and] no outside communication of [any] kind [, ] ” id. at 63. She said that th e depression

was w orsened by he r pain , see id. at 64 ( “ On my worst days, when I ’ m in the most pai n, I sit

aro und and I cry, and I think of th ings to do ” ) , and also by the end of her employment at Giant

Food , see id. at 65, and caused her to be “ [un]abl e to focus

. . . and not being ab le to function,
[such] that [she was] not able t o do [her] daily activitie s [,] ” id. at 6 3

– 64. The plain ti ff also reported ha ving halluci nations “ at p oints[,] ” where she would “ see someone maybe standing

down the ha ll, or w alking from the room to the bathroo m or so. ” Id. at 65.6 On May 2, 2016, the ALJ issued his decision, conc luding that th e plaintiff was no t

e ntitled to benef its

. See id. at 24. Reg arding the first three steps under § 404.1520 , the ALJ

concluded that (1) the plaintiff “has not e nga g ed in substantial gainful ac tivity since

Se ptember 1, 2009,” and ( 2 ) she “ has the following seve re impairments : cervic al and lumbar d isc
disease, cervical rad iculitis, pseudoarthrosis, a chronic lumbar strain, dysfunction of a major joint (shoulder), chro n ic p ai n syndrome, asthma, a majo r depres sive dis order, an anxiety disorder [,] [ ]

an d a posttrau matic stress d isorder [ , ]” but ( 3 ) she “does not have an imp air ment o r combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the l ist ed i mpa irme nts ” in

20 C.F.R. §§ 4 04.1520(d ), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.92 5, and 416.926

. Id. at 1 3.

R egar ding the four th and fifth steps , which a ddress the plaintiff’s “residual function al capacity[,]” including both physical and mental re sidual fun ctional capacity, 3 the ALJ concluded

that t he p lai ntif f

h as the residual fu nctiona l capac ity to perform light work as defined in 20 C FR 404. 1567(b) and 416.967( b) ex cept [she] can occ asionally lift and/or carry [twenty

- five] pounds and frequently lif t and /or carry [ten] pounds. In addition, [sh e ] can sta nd or walk for a total of six ho urs in an eight

- hour workday and sit for a t otal of si x ho urs in an e ight

- hour work day. [She] can also push or pull as much as she can lift and/or carry, including the use of hand and/or foot contro ls, but can on ly o ccasionally use hand controls. Moreove r, [ sh e ] has no limits on balancing and clim bin g of ramps and stairs, but ca n nev er crawl or c limb ladders, ropes [ , ] and scaffolds. [She] can occasionally stoop, kneel, cro uch [,] and use the nondomi nan t hand for handl ing and fingering with no such limits on the dominant hand. [She] can also occasi onally u se the nondominan t arm for
re achin g in all dire ctions with no such limit on the dominant arm. [ She] can also have freque nt e x posure t o f u mes, odors, dusts, ga s s es [,] and poor ventilation. [She] c an cons tantly understand, remember[,] and carry out instructions concerning simpl e ta s ks[,] and can occasionally understand, remember[,] and

3 Becaus e the plaintiff “ does not c on test the ALJ ’ s physica l [residual functional capac ity] findings[, ] ” Pl

. ’ s Mem. at 4 n.1 , the parties and the Court focus solely on t he ALJ ’ s men tal residual fun ct i ona l capacity determin ation. See id. ; Def. ’ s Mem. at 2 n.1 (no ting that the “ [p]laintiff ’ s [residual function al capacity] argu ment focuse s only on her
m ental health ” and that the “ [d]efendant ’ s discussion of the evidence and [ resi dual f unctional capaci ty ] ar gument is tailored accordingly ” ).7 carry out instructions concerning detai led tasks. F ina l ly, [she] can constan tly make simple decisions and can occa sionall y make detailed decisions.

Id. at 16

. Alth ough the ALJ concluded th at the plaintiff “would be unable to perform her past

relev ant work[ ,] ” id. , he concluded that “[e] viden ce does exist that demonstrates that other work

exi sts in significant numbe r s in the natio nal e conomy that the [plaintiff] can do, g iven [her]

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience[,] ” id. at 23

– 24 . Therefore, he

determine d tha t the pl aintiff “failed to meet her burden of estab lis hing that she is disab led.” Id.

at 24

.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Act , a claimant may seek jud icial review of an ALJ’s decision b y a federal

district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district cour t has di scretion “to enter , up on th e pleadings and transcript of the re cord, a judgment a ffirming, modifying, o r reversing the decision

o f the Co mmissioner, wi t h or witho u t remanding the cas e for a rehearing.” F aison v. Colvin , 187 F. Supp. 3d 190, 193 (D

. D.C. 20 16) ( inte rnal quotation marks omitted)

. However, t he

“dist r ict court’s review of the [ALJ’s] findings of fact is l imited to whether those f indings are

suppor t ed by substanti al e v idence[,]” D unham v. Astrue , 603 F. S upp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) ,

me aning such relevant evidence as “a reasonable m ind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion[,] ” Butler v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D

. C. Cir. 2004)

. This standard “ requires

more than a sc intilla, but can be sati s fied by something less than a pr eponderance of evidence [,] ”

i d. ( internal quotation marks omitted) , a nd “i s highly defere ntial to the agenc y fact

- finder [,] ”

Je ffri e s v. Astrue , 723 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.D.C. 2010 ) ( internal quota tion marks omit ted)

.
How ever, the ALJ mus t “ h a [ ve ] analy zed all evidence and [ ] sufficiently expl ained the weight he [or she] has given to obvio usly probative ex hi bits

. ” Lane

- Ra uth v. Barnhart , 4 3 7 F. S upp. 2d
63, 6 5 (D .D.C. 2006 ) ( internal quotation ma rks omitted)

. The plaint iff “bears the burden of8 demonst rating that the [A LJ’s ] de cision [was] not ba sed on substantial evidence or that incorr ec t legal standards were applied. ” Cooper v. Berryhi l l , Civ. Action No. 1 6

- 1671 , 20 17 WL 4326388, a t *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017) ( interna l quo ta tion marks omitted )

.
III. A N ALYSIS

T he plainti ff argues that the Co urt should remand th i s case to th e ALJ because (1) “t he

ALJ failed to reconcile a conflict betwee n the vocational expert’s testimony and the Selected

Characteristics of Occupations[,] ” 4 a nd (2) “the ALJ’s mental [ resi dual functional capacity

determination ] was not supported by substantia l evidence.” P l.’ s Mem. at 4. In response, the defendant argues that (1) the vocational expert ’ s “ testimony was consistent with the [Di c t ionary

of Oc cupa ti onal Titles] and [ the Sele ct ed Characteristics of Occupations], ex cept regarding

whether the hypoth e tical person w ith u pper extremity limitations could perform the identified jobs, which [t he vocational expert] based on his [forty] y ears of experienc e in t he field [,] ” and (2) “ subs ta ntial evidence supported [the ALJ ’ s me ntal residual function a l capacity ]

determinatio n

. ” D ef. ’ s Mem. at 1

– 2. For the following reasons , the Court agrees with t he plaintiff that remand is required becaus e (1) the ALJ fai l ed to reconcile the conflict betwe en the

voc ational expert ’ s testimony and the Selected Chara c teristics o f Occupations , an d ( 2) the ALJ failed to pro vide a sufficient ex planation for h is reasons for disregarding mental health treatment

recor ds pro ffered by the plaintiff.

4 The Selected Characteri sti cs of Occupations is a s up plement to the Dic tionary of Occ upational Titl es , which “is a comp e ndium of ‘standard ized occupational information’ that provides a b r i ef d escrip tion of occupati on s wi thin the
na tional e conomy and lists the capabilities that ea ch occ upation requi res of a w orker.” Callahan v. Astrue , 786 F. Sup p. 2d 8 7, 90 (D.D.C. 2 011). The Sel ected Char acteristics of Occupations prov ides “a shorthand l isti ng of the functional r eq uire ment s of each job .” 2 Pa ul M . Ryther & Barbara Samuels, Soc ial Sec urity Disab ility Claims Prac tice & P roc edure § 22: 159 (2d ed. 2 021 ).9 A. The Plaintiff ’ s A r gument that the ALJ Failed to Reconc ile a Conflict Between t he Vocati o nal Expert ’ s T e st imo ny and the Se lected Characteristics of Occup ations
First, t he plaint iff argues that “the ALJ erred .

. . by failing to resolve [a] con f lict ”

between the Selected Ch aracteristics of Occupation s and the “ vocationa l expe rt ’s t e s timony th a t [the] jobs [ o f pac ker/packaging worker, grade r/sorter, and lau ndry worker] were availab le [to the plaintiff] despite [her] need to be limited to occa sion a l hand controls [] and occasio nal use of
[her] non

- dominan t arm for handling, fingering, o r re aching

. ” Pl. ’s Mem. a t 14. In response, the defendant argues that the vocational expert ’s “tes timony was properly supported by his [forty]

ye ars of professi onal experience ” and the “ ALJ elic ited a reasonable explanatio n from th e [vocational expert] f o r the con f lict [ ; ] ” “[t] h e re fo re, substantial evidence supports the ALJ ’s

d etermination that there w ere sufficient jobs in the national economy tha t [the p]lainti ff c o uld perform despite her limit ations. ” Def. ’s Mem. at 10

– 1 1. For the following reasons, the Cou rt agrees with th e pl ai ntiff that the ALJ failed t o properly resolve the conflict. 5

5 Alth ou gh th e defe ndant do es n ot dispute the existenc e of a conflict between th e voc ationa l expe rt ’ s testimony a nd the Sele cted Character istic s of Occupations, see Def. ’ s Mem. at 10 (arguing that “ the ALJ e licited a reas onable explana tion from [the vocational e xp e rt] for th e confli ct ” ) ; s ee generall y id. (providing no argument tha t a conf lict d oes no t exist), the Co ur t no tes t he conflict he re fo r cl ari ty. During th e hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to conside r a hypotheti c al individual with “ the sam e age, educat ion[,] a nd w ork experience as the [plaintiff] ” and “a high sc hool educat ion ba sed on the GED [ sh e ] o b tained. ” App. at 67

– 68. This hypothetical in dividual can occasionally li ft and[/]o r carry [twenty

- five] po un ds, fre quently li f t and[/]or carr y [ te n] pou nds[, an d c] ould stand an d[/]or walk for a t otal of six hour s in a n eig h t[

- ]ho u r workday.
[ Th e in dividual could s]it for a tot al o f six hours in an eight[

- ]hour workday [ and c ]an push
a nd[/]or pull a s much as [he or sh e] can li ft and[/]or car ry[ , ]

. . . [ which] includes the operation of hand and[/]or foot controls. B ut thi s [ ] hyp oth etica l ind iv idua l can only occasion ally use hand cont rols

. The hypothetical individual has no limits on climbin g ramp s or stairs, but can never c limb ladders,
r opes[ ,] or sc affold s. No limits on bala ncing, but only occasionally st oop, o ccasio nally kne el,
occa siona l[ ly] crouch, and can nev er crawl.

. . . Th e hy pothe tical ind ividual can occasionally use th e non
- domi nant h and for handling[ and o]cca s ionally use the non
- domina nt hand for fingering. There[ are] no such lim itations on the dom inant hand. (continued . . .)10 C onflicts between a v ocational expert ’ s testimony and th e Dictionary of Occ upational

Titles or the Select ed Characteristics of Occupa tions ar e governed by Social S e c urity

Ru l i ng 00

- 4 p ( “ SSR 0 0

- 4 p ” )

. See SSR 00

- 4 p , 2000 WL 1898704 ( Dec. 4, 2000). Under

SSR 00

- 4 p , “ [w]hen there is an apparent unresolved conflict betwee n [a vocat ional expert ’ s]

(. . . co nti n ued) Th e h ypoth etica l indi vidual can only occ asionally use the non
- dom inant arm for reaching in all directions [ but t]here [ is] no such limitation on the d o minant arm. Th e hyp otheti ca l indi vidual can have only freque nt exp osure to fumes, odors , dust, ga s es[,] an d poo r ventil at ion. This hypothetical indiv idual ret ains the ability to understand , rem ember [,] and carry out i nstructions concerning simpl e t asks on a co nstan t basis [, b u t r] etains the ability to underst and, remember[,] and carry out i nstruction s co nc e rning detailed ta sks only occas ionally.

The hypothet ical ind ividual retains the ability to make simpl e decision s constantly, and detailed de c isi ons only occ asion ally [] .

. . [and] reta ins the ability to int eract with the public occasional ly.

The re[ is ] n o lim itation on int eracti ng with super visors or co
- wo rker s.
Id. at 67

– 69 (emphasis added)

. The vocat ional expe rt testified that this hypot hetica l individ ual w ould be abl e to pe rform at least three unskille d jobs, specifically “ packer a nd pac ka gi ng wor ker [,] ” “ grading a nd s orting worker[,] ”
a nd “ la undry work er

. ” Id. at 69

– 70. The ALJ then asked the voca ti onal exp ert to consider a different hypoth etical in divid ual who cou ld
frequ en tly lift and[/]or carry [ten] po u nds[, s ]tand and[/]or walk for a tota l o f fou r hours in an eight[

- ]hour workda y[, ] [ ] sit for a t otal of six hour s in an eigh t[

- ]hour workday [,] [ ] p u sh and[/]or pul l [,] includi ng the operatio n of hand and[/]o r fo ot contr ols[,] as much as they c an lift and [/]or carry[, but]

. . . can only occ asion ally use h and controls [.] ”

Id. a t 70

– 7 1 (emphas i s ad ded). In response, the vocational expert te stified t h at the same po sitions “woul d remai n [,] ” bu t , “w ith the addi ti on al limit ation to the standing, t here would be an additional [t en] percen t eros ion in t he numbe r [of avail abl e jobs] tha t exis t in the n atio nal economy. ” Id. at 71. As the plaintiff correctl y notes, see Pl. ’s Mem. at 1 5 , ther e is “an appa rent unresol ve d conflict [,] ” SSR 00

- 4 p , 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000), between t h is te sti mony and the re quir ements of being a p acker and pack ag ing worker (DOT# : 222.6 87

- 022) , grading and sort ing work er (DOT #: 649

. 687

- 010) , and laundry worker (DOT # : 302.685

- 010 ) , a s reflec ted in the Se lected Char acteristics of Occupations

. S ee Pl. ’s M em. at 15

. Ac cording to the Selected Character istics of Occupa tion s, t he job of packer and packa ging worker re quires f re quent handling , reaching, and fing ering , see U .S. Dep’t of Labor, Dicti onary of Occupational Titles , DICOT 222.6 87

- 02 2, 1991 WL 672133 ( 4 th e d. 1991) ; the jo b of g rading and sorting wor ker requires fr equen t handling, reaching, and fingering , se e DICOT 64 9.68 7

- 010 , 1991 WL 68566 9 (4 th ed. 1991) ; a nd th e job of l aun dry worker r equires constant re a ching and handling, and oc ca s ional fingering , see DICOT 302. 685

- 01 0, 199 1 WL 672657 (4th ed . 1991)

. Howev er , as t he defendant notes, both of the ALJ ’ s hypothetica l in divid uals had “upper ext remity limi tati ons[ , ] ” see D ef. ’s Mem. at 10 , which meant that t hey c ould only occasionally u se the ir non

- dom inant arm s for handlin g, rea ching, and fingerin g, see A pp. at 6 8 , or o nly occasionally use hand contro ls, see id. at 71

. A ccordingly, because “ fre quen t ” and

“ con stant ” work r equir e more exert ion than “ occasiona l ” work, see SSR 83

- 10, 1983 WL 312 51 , at *5

– 6 (Jan . 1, 1 983) (defi n i ng “ occasionally ” as “ o ccurring from very little up to one

- third of the time ” but def ini ng “ frequent ” a s

“ oc curring f rom one
- third to t wo
- thirds of t he time ” ), the Sele c ted Characteristics of Occu pa tions ’ definition of the se t hree j ob pos itions conflict s w ith the vocational expe rt ’ s testimony that the hypothetical individuals in th e AL J ’ s que stions would be able to perfo rm these jobs.11 evidence and th e [Dictionary o f Occu pational Title s], the adj udic ator m u st eli cit a reasonab l e expl anat ion for the conflict before relying on the [vo c ational expert ’ s] evidenc e to support a

determination or decision about whether the claima nt is disabled. ” Id. at *2. “ The adjudicator
[then ] must resolve the confli ct b y dete r mi ning if the explan a t ion g iven by the [vocational
expert] is reasonable and p rovides a basis for rel yi ng on t he [vocational expert ’ s] testimon y[,]

rather tha n on the [ Dictionary of Occupational Titl es ’ ] information. ” Id

. The adjudi c ator must

“ e xpla in i n t he de t ermination or d e cis ion how he or she resolved the conflict

. ” Id. at * 4. During the hearing, th e ALJ asked the voc ational expert whether “ the testimony [ he had] given [at the hearing was] con sistent with the inform ation found in the Dictio nary of

Occ upatio nal Titles and t he comp anion publication [that the ALJ had] mentioned earlier[,] ” namely, the S elec ted Characteristics of Occupations. 6 App. at 72. In res pons e, the vocation al expert stated : [M] y testimony is con sistent with the Di ctiona ry o f Oc cup ationa l Titles. Add r e ssi ng

– with the addition s, addressing issues such as [the] use of hand control s with one or both upper limbs, and limita tions to the up per li mb s, as well as inter action with other individual[s] or the general public. Thes e it ems are not
c overed by the D i cti onar y of Occupational Titles. [ 7 ] My response is ba sed on [forty] years [ o f] experience as a vocational consultant.

6 Although the ALJ did not specifi c ally refer to t he Selected Ch aracteris tics of Occupat ions when h e asked this question, h e ea rlier refer red to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the Sel ected Cha r act eristic s of Occupation s collectively wh en askin g the vocational expert to “ adv ise ” the ALJ and the par ties “ if [he were to ] gi ve [ ] an opinion whi ch conflicts with the information i n th e Di ctionary of Occ u pational Titles, and the Selected Characterist ics of O ccup atio ns , defined in the re vi sed Dict i onary o f Occ upational Titles , ” App. at 66

– 6 7

. Therefore , the Court concludes that th e Selected Charact er istics of Occup ations is the “ c om pani on publication [,] ” i d. at 72, to which the ALJ wa s referring here

.

7 The Court notes th at the vocational expert testified that the “ issues such as [the] us e of hand controls with one or both uppe r limbs, and limitat ions to the upper limbs, as well a s inte raction with other individual[s] or the general public [,] . . . are not covered by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles[,] ” App. at 72, which suggests that the vocational expert perceive d a n omission in the Dictiona ry o f Occupational Title s that he was able to fill with his

“ [forty] y ear s [of] experience as a vocational consultant[,] ” id. , as opposed to a conflict between his opinion and the Dic tionary of Occupational T itles. However, regardless of whether the issue s identified by the vocation al expe rt in his t esti mony here are the s am e as the conflict identified by the plaintiff between the Sele cted Characteristics of Occupations and the vocational expert ’ s testimony , such a conflict does exist , see s upra n

. 5 , at 9

– 10 , and the ALJ ha d an ind epen dent duty to res ol ve the conflict eve n if the vocat ional expert d id not identify it , see Carpe nter v. Colvin , Case No. 1:13

- cv
- 01637 (CKK/GMH), 2016 WL 946975 , at * 6 (D.D.C

. Feb. 24, 20 16) ( “ SSR 00

- 4p should (continued . . .)12 Id. Th e vocational exp ert pr ovided no further e xplanat ion as to how his “[ forty] years [ of] experience as a v oc a ti o n al con sultant ” pro vide d th e basis for resolving th e incon sistencies that he

identified , i d. ; s ee also id. at 66

– 7 2 , a nd t he ALJ did not ask any clarifying questi ons , s ee

gen erally id.

D espite SS R 00

- 4 p ’ s requirement that “ [t]he adjudicator must exp lain the resol ution of

th e co nfli ct [, ] ” 2000 WL 189 8 704, at *4, th e ALJ ’ s de cision neither identifie s the existence of a conflict nor provi d es any explanation of how the conflict was resolved. See ge nerally App.

at 10

– 2 4. Ra ther, the ALJ states: [T] he [ALJ] asked the vocational expert whet her jo b s e xist in the nat ional economy for an i n dividual with the claimant’s age, ed ucation, work exper i en ce, and residual functional capacity. The vocational ex pe rt testified that[,] giv en all of these factors[ ,] the individual would be able to perform t he req u ire ment s of
re pres entative occupations s u ch as a packer/packaging worker [ ] with 48,000 jobs
na t io nally, a grader/sorter [ ] with 51,000 jobs nationally[, ] and a laundry worker [ ] w ith 36,000 job s nation ally.

Pursuant to SSR 00

- 4 p , the [ALJ] ha s d eterm i ned that th e vo cational expert’s te stimo n y is consistent with the informat ion contained in the D i ct ionary of Occupational Titles. Accordingly, the limited b urden of going forwa rd w ith the evidence that sh ifted to [the defendant] at step five of t he evalu a tio n pro ces s is satisfied. Evidenc e doe s exist that demonstrates that oth er work exists in sign i fi cant numbers in the national economy that the [plaintiff ] can do, given [her] resi dual functional capacity , age, education, and work experience[.]

The [ ALJ ] co n clud es that , considering the [p laint i ff’s] age, education, work experi enc e, residual functio n al capacity, and all the other evidence of record, includi ng the testimony of th e cl aimant and the v ocationa l expert, the claimant is capable of makin g a s ucc essf u l ad jus tmen t to other work that exis t s in significant numbers in the n ati onal economy.

(. . . co nti n ued) not be read as lim iting the ALJ ’ s duty to identif y and resolve such con flicts on ly to those conflic ts that are, in some way, made o bvious to the ALJ either by the [v ocational expert] or the claimant ’ s counsel during the adminis trative hearing ” ).13 Id. a t 23

– 24 (emphasis added)

. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded th a t “ the vocationa l expert ’ s testimony is consistent with the inform ati on contain ed i n t he D ic tiona ry o f Occupat ional
Titles[,] ” id. at 23, despite the conflict between the S el ected Characterist ics of Occupations ’

characteri zation o f the requisite level of h andling, fin geri ng, and reaching for the s e position s , and the hypo the tical indiv idua l s ’ abi lities , co mpare U.S. Dep ’ t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupat ional

Titles , DICOT 22 2

. 6 87

- 022, 1991 WL 672133 ( 4 th ed. 1991) ; DICOT 649.687

- 01 0 , 1991 WL

68566 9 (4th ed. 1991) ; DICOT 302.685

- 010, 1991 WL 672657 (4th ed. 1 99 1) , with App . at 67

–
71

. The def e ndant raise s se veral arguments in response. First, t he defenda nt urges the Court

to c on clude that “ [w]hat the ALJ wrote[ ] was that t he [vo cational exp ert ’ s] te stimo ny was

con sistent with the [Dict ionary of Occupational T itles] and that he relie d on the [ vocation al

expe rt ’ s] testimony about [the p]laintiff ’ s a bility to per form all of t he r eq uirements of the j obs, despite the [plaintiff ’ s resi dual fun ctio nal capac ity ] lim ita tion s [.] ” Def

. ’ s M e m

. at 10 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) . However, t his argument ign ores the ALJ ’ s own explanation of his

co nclusion s in his decision. As noted above, the ALJ concluded t hat “ th e vo cat ional expe rt ’ s testimony i s consi sten t with the informa tion contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

. ”
App. at 23 . T herefore, t he ALJ does not acknowledge any inconsist encies, let alone exp lain t hat ,
t o the extent any inconsistencies exist, he re co nc il ed them b y “ r el [ying] on the [vocati onal
expert ’ s] testimo ny about [the p]laintiff ’ s ability to per form all of the r equir ements of the job s[,] ”

Def

. ’ s M em

. at 10. To agre e with th e defe ndant ’ s argum ent wo uld be to e i t h e r ignore or supple ment t he AL J ’ s d e cisio n, ne ithe r of which the C ourt m ay do

. See Espin o sa v. Colvin , 953 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32

– 33 (D.D.C. 2013) ( “ [I]n rev i ew ing a social secur ity disability14 administrative decisi on, th e Court may only co nsi d er the grounds proffered by the agency in its

dec is ion [ ,] for post hoc ration ali za tions do not suffice. ” ( emphas is in or iginal ) ).

Second , the defendant argues that , even if t h e ALJ did not r esol ve the conflict, the

voc ational exper t ’ s “ testimony that a c l ai mant is capable of performing work in th e national

e co nomy i s substant ial eviden ce in sup port of an ALJ ’ s de cisi on if it is in response to a hypothetical question based on a n accurate [resi dual functional capacity ]

. ” De f. ’ s M em

. a t 10

–
11 (citing Cal la w a y v. Berryhill , 292 F. Supp. 3 d 28 9, 298 (D.D.C. 2018) ) . Al th o ugh the

defendant i s corre ct that “ [a]n ALJ may rely on [vo cational expert] testimony to determine

whether a clai mant ’ s w ork ski lls and [residual functional capacity] all ow the claimant to per f or

m
work in the national econ omy[, ] ” Cal l away , 292 F. Supp. 3d at 2 98 , this truism d oes not nullify

SSR 00

- 4 p ’ s requi rement s that “ the adjudicator must resolve [any] conflict be fo re rely ing on the [vocational expert ’ s] evidence to supp ort a dete rm ina t io n or decision that the indi vidua l is o r is

not disabled ” a nd mus t “ explain in the det er mination or decision how he or sh e resolved the

conflict [,] ” SSR 00

- 4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at * 4. Accor ding ly, the ALJ ’ s failure to provide any

e xplanat ion in his d eci s io n as to how he “ resolved th e con flict[ ,] ” id. , is an error that th e C o urt

can not igno re.
Third and finally, the defendant argues that , “ [i]f [the p]laintiff ’ s co unsel [at the hearing

befo re t he ALJ] was unsatisfied wi th ho w [the vocatio nal ex pert ] explained th e basis of hi s opinion that the h ypo thet ic al p erson could perf orm th e i d entified jobs despite the upper extrem ity limitations, counsel could have explored th is issue with the [vocatio nal expert] at the hearing. ”

Def. ’ s M em

. at 11 ( cit a ti on omitted)

. T he defendan t is correct that th e plaintiff ’ s former coun sel

d eclined to ask the voc ational expert any questions during the hearing

. See Ap p. at 7 2 (noting that, when presented with th e opportun ity to question the vocational expert, the plaint iff ’ s former15 counsel declined to do so)

. Howe ver, t he req uirement that “ the adjudicato r

. . . e xplain in the

determination or decision h ow he or she resolve d the conflict ” is not continge nt on a claimant ’ s identifying a conflict. SSR 00

- 4p , 2000 WL 189870 4, a t *4 ( “ The adjudicator must explain the

r esolution of the conf lict irrespective of how the conflict was identified. ” ) ; see also Carpenter v.

Col vin , No. 13

- cv
- 01637, 2016 WL 946975, at *5 (D.D.C

. Feb. 24 , 20 16) ( noting th at

SSR 00

- 4p “ does not place re spo n si bility for id e nti fying and resolving conflicts between
[ voca tion a l expert] and [Dictionar y of Occupational Titles] evidence on eithe r the [ vocational
expert ] or the parties to the proceeding ” ) ; Cox v. Sau l , No. 18

- cv
- 02389 , 2020 WL 9439 356,

at *21 (D .D

. C

. Sept. 1, 2020) (noting the “ ALJ ’ s indep endent duty to identi fy c onflicts ” ).

Acco rd ingly , because the ALJ “made no a ttempt to address or reconcile the con flict
between the [ vo cational ex p ert ’s] testim ony an d the information in the [Dic tionary of

Occ up a t io nal Titles ,] ” Callahan v. Astrue , 786 F . Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D. D.C. 2011), the Court

conclud es that the ALJ ’s “decisio n fails to meet the requirements of SSR 00

- 4p and must be

re versed ” and the case r eman ded to the age ncy for further proceedin gs. Id.

B. The Plaint iff ’ s A rgum ent that the ALJ ’ s Determi nation R egarding Her Mental R esid ual Functional C apacity Was Not Supported by Substantial E vidence
Second, t he plaintiff argues that “ [ r]eman d is [also] r equire d be cause the ALJ ’ s [determination of t he p laintiff ’ s ment al r es i dual functional capacity at step five ] wa s not

su pported by sub stantial evidenc e

. ” Pl. ’ s Mem. at 17

. In response, the defendant a rg ues that the

ALJ ’ s mental res idual functional c a p acity “ fi nd in g is supp orted by substantial evide nce ” because

“ the ALJ t ho roughly discu ssed the medical records , explained his weighing of opinion evidenc e,
and discussed his consideration of non

- medical ev id ence in determining [the p]laintiff ’ s mental

fu nc tional li mi ta tions

. ” Def. ’ s M em

. at 12 (c itatio n omi tted)

. The Court wi ll first discuss the

ALJ ’ s determination regarding the plaintiff ’ s mental residu al functional capacity, and then16 proceed to the parties ’ arguments regarding whether the determin ation was suppo rted by

substantial evidence. F or the following r easons, the Co urt agre es w ith the plaintiff

. 1. The ALJ ’ s Mental Residual Functional Ca pacity De termination
In de termining th e plaintiff ’ s men tal r esidual funct i onal capacity, the ALJ ci ted t he pl aintiff ’ s te stim ony that she “ does not spend t ime with others [,] ” id. at 17, “ pref e rs t o be
alone[ , ] ” i d. , and “ does not need special reminde rs to care for her personal needs[,] ” id

. a t 19

. He also c onsidered the plain ti ff ’ s fr iend ’ s , S equitt a T olliver ’ s, testimony a bout the plaintiff ’ s
mental s tate, however, only to the extent that Tolliver ’ s testimony was consistent with the objective me dical and other evi dence

. S e e i d

. The ALJ al so identified notes f rom the plaintif f

’ s physicians regardi n g her mental sta te

. See id. at 18 (an October 2014 phy sica l examination of the plaintiff by D r. Lee Ann Rhodes, whom the plaintiff saw for cervical radiculopathy , whic h “ r evealed [her] to be aler t and cooperative with a n ormal mood and affect, a norm al a t te nti on span[,] [ ] no r m al

c once ntration[,] ” and “ n o ac ute dis tress[,] ” as we ll as “ negative f or anxiety , memory loss, hallucinations, paranoi a, phobia [ , ] or confusion ” ) ; id. at 553 , 563 ( Dr. Rhod es ’ s April 2015 physical examination of the plainti ff , whic h “ reveal e d [her ] to be o rien ted wi th a normal attention span and normal co ncentration ” and at w hich “ Dr. Rhodes not ed that [she] required no help with a c tivities of dai ly living ” ); id. at 896

– 97 ( a January 2016 physical examination o f the

p l aintiff by Dr. V a ne ssa Mc Dona ld , whom the p laintiff saw for treat ment of “ sy mptomatic

uterine fibr oids[,] ” which revealed that she w as “ alert and oriented to time , p lace[,] and person

with i ntact recent and remote memor y and an appropr i ate moo d and a ffect ” )

. In addition , t he ALJ n oted that , des pi te the plaintiff ’ s hospitalization “ for approximately [five] day s in Au gus t 20 12 due to de pression and suicida l ideation, ” she “ displayed ma rked improvement over the cours e o f her adm i ssion a nd there is no e videnc e sh e has requir e d further17 inpatient hosp it al confinement for her condition since that time[

. ] ” I d. at 18

. He also cited his own observations at the hearing, concluding that t he pla intiff ’ s “ attention and concentra tion wer e not so adversely affecte d by her alleged pain / s ym ptomatolo g y that she w as una ble to foll ow t he proceedings or respond approp riately to questio ns

. ” I d. at 19. Finally, the ALJ assigned little weight to several pi eces of evidence . First, although

Dr. Joel Taubin ha d concluded in November 2013 that t he plaintiff “ sh o ul d not b e put into any anxiety [

- causing] situations d ue to psychia t ric pro blems[,] ” the ALJ concluded that his opinion should be given little weight b ecause “ Dr. Taubin is a consulting examiner [,] [ ] he failed to complete a residual functional capacity as sessment o f the claimant ’ s ability to perform wo r k

related activit ies[,] ” and his “ opinion is inconsistent with the objective evidence disc ussed ”

else where in the ALJ ’ s decision

. I d. at 20. Second, physician assistant Alexandra Scheer had

indicated in her Fe bruary 2016 question nai re that the plainti f f

’ s “ abil ity to d eal wi th work str ess,
maintain at tention/conce ntration, [ ] understand, remember [ ,] an d carry out c omple x j ob

ins t ructions and [ ] relate predi ctab ly in social sit u ations was poo r [ ; ] ” her “ ability to fu nction

woul d s ign ificantly deteriora t e if she was to r eturn to full

- tim e employment[ ; ] ” she “ would only

be abl e to satisfactorily perform wo rk tasks inv o lving three st e ps and four steps or more les s th an [seventy

- five percent] of th e time [ ; ] ” and she “ woul d be unable to wo rk in a setting in w hi ch she

was work ing on the same g e neral area as other pe ople[

. ] ” I d. at 21 ; see also id. at 902

– 06

. However, the ALJ concluded that Scheer ’ s opinion merited little weight because she “ is a non

physician ” and “ her opi nion is incon sistent with the objecti ve findi ngs[,] ” inclu din g Dr. Rhodes ’

Octob e r 2014 an d Dr. McDonald ’ s Jan uary 2016 physic al examination s

. Id. at 21. Third , the plaintiff “ received Global Assessment of Funct ioning [ ] s c ores ranging from 45 to 85[,] ” but the

ALJ concluded that the “ scores of 50 and below are af forded little weigh t s ince th ey are18 inconsistent with the objective findings s et forth above and the [pla i ntiff ’ s] course of
treatment[,] ” including the lack of “ evidence [that ] the [plaint iff] has required inpatient hos pital

confinement for her con dit ions since August 2 0 12 [,] ” as well as Dr. Rhodes ’ October 2014 and

Dr. McDonald ’ s January 2016 phy sical examinations. Id. Finally, the ALJ accepted the state agency medical consulta nts ’ deter mination that “ the [plaintiff] .

. . re tained the r esidual

f unc tional capacity to p er f orm si mple, routine ta sks on a regular basis withou t unreas onable

acc ommodations [ ,] ” id. ; see also id. at 75

– 102, but only “ to the extent [that] the [ determination
was] c onsistent with the residual funct ional capacit y ” determined by the ALJ. Id. a t 22

. The

ALJ further noted that “ the evidence rec eived into the r ecord after [the state agency medical

consultants ’ ] determinations did not provide an y new or material informat ion that would alter any findings regarding the [p laintiff ’ s ] r esidual functional c ap acity. ” Id.

In sum , wh en ma ki ng his mental res idual functi onal capacity determination , the ALJ onl y
afford ed substantial weight to the observat ions made by Dr. Rhod es a n d Dr. McDo nald during

their examinations of the plaintiff , see , e .g. , id. at 18 , and to th e opinions of the state a g ency
medical consultan t s “to the extent they are consistent with the residual functional capacity ”

deter mi nati on that the ALJ had already ma de , 8 i d. at 2 2.

I n ad dition to the evidence disc ussed above, t he plaintiff had submitt e d do cumentation of

men tal health treatment she received f rom two psy c h iatrists , Dr. Nora Bammid i and Dr. Jesselina

Grid er, and a therapis t , Mar cia C. Hinkle

. See id. a t 809

– 10 ( a Febru ary 2 6, 201 4 report from

Dr. Ba mmidi noti ng t ha t the plainti ff report ed ha l luc inations of a “ ‘ sh adow ’ of a man that she

8 The Court notes that the ALJ only accepted the state agency medical consultants ’ determination s “ to the extent t hey are consistent with the residual functional capacity ” determination that the ALJ had a lready made. Id. at 22. In add ition to this circular reason ing , the ALJ also provided no information as to which parts of the state agency medical consul tants ’ determinations were i nconsistent with his r esidual fu nctional capacity determination or the reasons for which he discounted th ose i nconsistencies. S ee generally id.19 sees sit ting o n the [b] a lcony of her room ”) ; id. at 817

– 1 8 ( an April 14, 20 14 repo rt from Dr.

Bammid i noting th at the p laintiff stat e d tha t, “when a ngry , [ s he] wants to do things to oth ers ” but
that, “ as she can not focus [fo r] to o l ong on certa in things, she just fo rgets ”) ; id. a t 830

– 31 (a
May 23, 20 14 report from Dr. Bammidi noting that the plaintiff st ate d that she wa s “ sad an d

an gry , stil l with nigh tmares and fl ashbacks[, and s]leeps durin g the day [ ] time [ for four to f ive]

hou r s ” ) ; id. at 836

– 37 (a June 23, 20 1 4 report from D r . Bammid i , noting that the plaintiff state d

that s he “ [s]t ill hea rs v oices and asking her to ge t them ” ); i d. at 832 (a M a y 21 , 201 4 report from

Hinkl e noting that the plaint iff report ed h ea ring voices and “ es cala ting anxiety , ” resulting in her

miss ing app o intments); id. at 834 (a June 11, 2014 re port from Hink le, noting that the plaintiff

r eported “ v oi ces [ that] were so l oud ” that “ she fe lt very angry ” and “ was using all he r energy to

cont ain ” ) ; id. at 853

– 5 4 ( a n O ctober 14, 2014 report from D r. Grider, no t ing that the plaintiff

state d that she “ has been having panic att a cks that are mild[ e ]veryday in the a fternoon ” and

“ [s] till hears voices ” ); i d. at 856

– 57 ( an October 30, 2014 report fro m Dr. G rider, noti n g that the plaintiff stated that , “ [u ]n less [she] ha[s doctors ’ ] ap p[ointments], she remains at home ” ).

H owever, t he ALJ did not say anything ab out these re cords as part of his m enta l residual

fu nctional capacity analysis. See generall y id. at 1 6

– 22

. 2. The Plaintiff ’ s Ar gument

T he plaintif f argues t hat the A L J ’ s men tal residual functional capacity determination is
not supp or t ed by substantial e vide nce because the dec ision “ does not dis cuss any of D r.
Bammidi ’ s , Dr. Grider ’ s , or [ ] Hinkl e ’ s treatm e nt notes. ” Pl. ’ s Mem. at 23

. In response , t he

defenda nt urge s the Court to conclude that a single sentenc e in the ALJ ’ s d ecisi on r ef lec ts th at he

consid ered the rec ords , but did not assign t hem any weight. See Def. ’ s Mem. at 15 (a rguing that

“ [t ]he ALJ sp ecifically addresse d [the p]laintiff ’ s co mplaint tha t the re c ord contained evidence received after the state agency psychologi sts ’ opinion s ” and “ explai ned th a t this later evidence20 did not p rovi de any new or material information th at would alte r [ the AL J ’ s residua l functional

capac ity] finding ” ). For the fo ll owing reasons, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the ALJ

erred i n not specifically e xplain ing hi s consideration of Dr. Bammidi ’ s , Dr . Grider ’ s, a nd

Hinkle ’ s records.

In his decision , after d i sc ussing the state agency me dical consultan t s ’ determin at ions, the

AL J states that “the evidence received into the re cord after [the state agency me dical

consul tants ’] determinations did not p rovi de any new or material informatio n th at would a lte r any fin d in gs regarding the [plaintif f

’s] re sidual f unctional ca pa city. ” App. at 22. Contrary to the

defendant ’ s argument, this si ngle sentence does not demonstr ate that “ [t]he ALJ specifically

addressed ” Dr. Bammidi ’ s , Dr. Grider ’ s, and Hinkle ’ s records

. See Def

. ’ s Mem. at 15. First,

b ecause t he ALJ do es not specify what e vidence was “ received in to the record after [the state agency medi cal consultants ’ ] determinations [ ,] ” id. , it is fa r from cle ar that this ev idence

includes Dr. Bammid i ’ s , Dr. Gr i der ’ s, and Hinkle ’ s records. However, e v en assu ming tha t Dr.

Bammidi ’ s, Dr . G rider ’ s , an d Hinkle ’ s re cords should be considered as part of the ALJ ’ s
refere nce to “ evidence rec eived into the reco rd after [t he state ag e nc y medical consultants ’ ]

dete rmination s [,] ” id. , t he ALJ has provided a single, perfunctor y s entence w ith no e xplanation

of the reasons for which Dr. Bammidi ’ s, Dr. Grider ’ s, and Hinkle ’ s reco rds are neither “ new ”

nor “ material [,] ” id. Rather, the ALJ ’ s “ conclusory r em ark[] leave[s] the [C ]o ur t unable to

deduce the ALJ ’ s reasons for discounting t he [ plaint iff ’ s ] evid ence, thu s depriv in g the [plaintiff]
of [ ] m eaningful judic ial review. ” Lan e
- Rauth , 437 F. Supp. 2d at 68 ; s ee also Simms v.

Sull ivan , 87 7 F .2d 1047, 1 0 50 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ( noting t ha t an ALJ must “ sufficiently explain[] the weig ht h e [or s he] has given to obv iously pro bative exhibits ” ); Hartline v . Astrue ,21 605 F. Su pp. 2d 194, 203 ( D.D.C. 2009) ( “ A rev iewing court should not be lef t guessi ng as to

how t h e ALJ evaluated pro bative mat er ial [. ] ” )

. Moreover, the doc umentation from Dr. B ammid i , Dr . Grider , a nd Hink le co nstitutes

evidence that the plainti ff w as c ontinuing to complain of ment al impairments, including hallucinations, depre ssion, a nxi e ty, a l ac k of focus , an d phobias

. See, e.g. , Ap p

. at 809

– 10 ( a
Februa ry 2 6, 201 4 report fro m Dr. Ba mmidi noti n g t hat the plainti ff report ed ha lluc inations of a

“ ‘shadow ’ of a man that she sees sitting o n the [b]alcony of her room ”) ; id. at 832 (a

M a y 21 , 201 4 re po rt f rom Hinkl e noting that the plaint if f reported hea ring voices and “ escala ting

an xiety , ” resulting in her miss ing appointments); id. at 853

– 54 ( a n O ctober 14, 2014 report from

D r. Grider, noting that the plaintiff state d that she “ ha s been h avi ng panic a ttac ks that are mild [ e]veryday in the aftern oon ” and “ [s] till hears voic es ” )

. It also co ntrast s with the evidence on

which the ALJ has place d great we ight , namely Dr. Rho des ’ s October 2014 and April 2015 notes

a

bou t the plainti ff ’ s n ormal af fec t and la ck of anxiety; Dr. McDonald ’ s January 2016 notes a bout the plaintiff ’ s normal d emeano r ; and the state agency medical con sultants ’ January and

Feb ruary 201 4 de terminations

. Se e id. at 18

– 22 . Accordingly, the ment al health information provided by the plaintiff is “ obviously pro bative [,] ” S im ms , 877 F.2d at 1050, regarding t he plaintiff ’ s m ental functional capacity . T hus, the ALJ was not free t o summarily disregard it

. S ee

Lomax v. Com m ’ r of Soc . Sec. , No. 2 0

- cv
- 55 , 202 1 WL 3508087, at *6 (D.D. C. A ug. 4, 2021) ( “ The ALJ ‘ must at lea st minim al ly d iscuss a claimant ’ s evi dence that contradict s the

Commissioner ’ s p osition. ’ ” (qu oting L a ne
- Rauth , 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67) )

. Althoug h the Court is not ent itle d to “ reweigh the evidence and replace t he [AL J ’ s] judgment regarding th e weight of the evi de nce with its own[,] ” P r i ce v. Berryhill , No. 16

- 2 469,
2018 WL 4381098, at *4 (D.D.C. F eb. 14, 2018 ) (internal quotation marks omitted) , “ it is22 reversible error for an ALJ to fail in his written decision to e xpla in sufficient ly the weig ht he ha s

g iven to ce r tai n probative items of evidence [,] ” Hartl ine , 6 05 F. Supp. 2d at 203

. See id. (noting

that “ an ALJ c an not merely disregar d evidence whic h doe s not support his conclusio n ” ). In light

of the apparent relevance of Dr . Ba mmidi ’ s, Dr. Grider ’ s, an d Hinkle ’ s mental h ealt h evidence regard ing the plaintiff ’ s me ntal c onditions , the ALJ ’ s cursory s tatement that this information w as
neither “ new ” no r “ material [,] ” App. at 22, does not provide a sufficient explanation for rejecting

t his evidence

. 9

“ [ W]here the ALJ ’s dec isio n leaves the review ing c ourt with reserv at io ns a s to w hether

an is sue was fully addresse d, the court should reverse

. ” Lane

- Rauth , 437 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (internal qu otation marks omitted) . Accordingly, the Court will also reverse the AL J ’s

determination as to the plaintiff ’s menta l r esidual fun ctional c apac ity , a nd remand the case to the

agency fo r further proce edings. 10

9 The d efen dant al so argues that “ the record su pports that [the ALJ ] considered these treatment notes ” because (1 ) “ [t]he ALJ reli ed on

. . . [th e] dete rmination [ by Dr. Nancy Heiser, a state agency medical consultan t] , which included consid eration of Dr. Bammidi ’ s S epte mbe r 2013 findings [,] ” Def. ’ s Mem. at 18 ( c itati on omitted), and on ot h er “ treatment no tes that po st

- date state ag en cy review [, ] ” id. at 19 ; (2) the “ [p]laintiff ’ s counsel [ ] d iscussed [ ] Dr. G r ider ’ s treatment

. . . in his ‘ T heory of the Case ’ s ect ion of a prehea ring memorandum addressed to the ALJ, which the A LJ acknowle d g ed at the hearing[, ] ” id. at 18 n.7 (citation omitted) ; (3 ) “ [t]h e ALJ referred to Dr. McDonald and [ ] S che er ’ s notes, which men tioned that Dr. G rider an d [ ] Hink l e were trea tin g [the p]lainti ff[,] ” i d.
a t 19 n.8 (cit ation omitted ) ; and ( 4 ) “ the A LJ no t ed at the hear ing that he w as waiting for mental health tr e at me nt notes before making a decision[,] ” id. a t 19 (emphasis omitted)

. There is no dispute t hat the records of Dr. Ba mmidi ’ s , Dr. Gr ider ’ s, and Hinkle ’ s examin atio ns of t he plaintiff were p art of the record be fore the AL J; rather, the relevant questio n is whe ther the ALJ proper ly ex plaine d his
cons ideration of th is eviden ce. See Hartline , 605 F. Supp. 2d a t 203 (noti ng t he AL J ’ s oblig a tion to provide a sufficien t ex planati on of “ the weight he h a s given to certa in probativ e items of evidence ” ). Where, a s here, the ALJ has not explicitly addressed th e treatment notes at is sue oth er than to cursoril y di smiss them as imm aterial, t he Cou rt declines the defendant ’ s i nvitation to speculate that the AL J pro perly considered this e vidence because it was part of the r e cord be fore him. S ee Lane

- Rau th , 437 F. Supp

. 2d at 68 ( “ [ W]here the ALJ ’s d ecision leaves the review ing court with reservations as to w hether an issue was ful ly addressed, the court should rever s e. ” )

.

10 The plaintif f al so a rgues that ( 1) the ALJ erred in re l yin g upon Dr. Heiser ’ s opinion beca use i t was “ non
examining ” a nd “ stale[, ] ” and (2) “ the o nl y evidence r elied upon by t he A LJ w ere stray observations made by physicia ns who did not even tr e at [the plaintiff] for her mental healt h problems

. ” Pl

. ’ s Mem

. at 23. B ecause the Court is remand ing to the a gency f or further p roceedings, the Court wil l n o t address at this time these alternative
a rgu ments raised by the plaintiff.23 IV. CONCLUSION

F or the f oreg oi ng reasons, the Court concludes that it must grant the pla intiff ’ s mot ion for

reversal an d d eny the defendant ’ s motion for af firmanc e.
S O ORDERED this 17 th day o f Decem ber , 20 21

. 11

REGGI E B. WALTON Un ited States District Ju dge

11 T he Court will con temporaneously issue a n Order consistent with thi s Memorandum Opinio n.