J-S06012-15

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: B.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.B., A MINOR

No. 22 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered December 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): 2013-304

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J. and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2015

Appellant, B.B., appeals from the December 12, 2013 dispositional 

order committing him to a juvenile detention facility, following the court’s 

adjudicating him delinquent of the offenses of rape, aggravated indecent 

assault, and aggravated assault. Appellant seeks to raise a multitude of 

claims on appeal. Additionally, his counsel, Timothy Peter Wile, Esq., has 

filed a petition to withdraw and brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), as elucidated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and amended in Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we agree with counsel 

that Appellant’s claims are frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s 

dispositional order and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Appellant was adjudicated delinquent of the above-stated offenses 

based on the following facts:

C.P. and [Appellant] were students at Wissahickon High 

School, Montgomery County, PA, and had been acquainted for 

approximately three or four years at the time the subject 

incident occurred. Their relationship was characterized as one of 
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friends. On the afternoon of April 29, 2013, the students were 

both in art class when [Appellant] asked C.P. if she wanted to go 

for a walk. C.P. admitted that she asked her teacher for a note 

to use the bathroom in order to leave class, and the two walked 

to the audion, a small auditorium, at the school. In the few 

minutes it took to walk from the classroom to the audion, C.P. 

testified that [Appellant’s] speech turned “mumbly” and his eyes 

were “red.” [Appellant] pushed C.P. onto the steps at the stage, 

pulled down her pants, pulled down his pants, and raped and 

sexually assaulted her. C.P. tried to get away, but [Appellant] 

held her. This incident lasted approximately five [to] six 

minutes, after which [Appellant] “ran away.” C.P. immediately 

went to the school nurse’s office, where she ultimately told the 

nurse of her rape by [Appellant].

Juvenile Court Opinion (JCO), 6/12/14, at 5 (citations to the record omitted). 

After reporting the rape to the school nurse, C.P. “was taken to a 

hospital where her injuries were determined [to be] severe, some of the 

wors[t] the hospital doctor on duty and staff had ever seen, and required an 

epidural (typically used for childbirth) so as to perform an examination.” 

JCO at 15 (citations to the record omitted). Ultimately, C.P. required 

sutures to repair the injuries to her vagina. See N.T. Adjudication Hearing, 

10/8/13, at 14.

Based on these facts, the juvenile court adjudicated Appellant 

delinquent of the above-stated offenses. Prior to Appellant’s dispositional 

hearing, he retained new counsel, Paul Tressler, Esq.1 Following that 

proceeding, a dispositional order was entered committing Appellant to the 

____________________________________________

1 The Honorable Paul Tressler is a retired judge of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County. For purposes of clarity, we will refer to him as 

Attorney Tressler herein, but note his distinction as a former trial court 

judge.
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Northwestern Academy’s Safety, Empathy, Treatment (SET) program. On 

Appellant’s behalf, Attorney Tressler filed both a timely notice of appeal, as 

well as a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal. Therein, Attorney Tressler raised 22 distinct claims. On June 12, 

2014, the juvenile court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. On July 24, 2014, 

Attorney Tressler petitioned to withdraw from representing Appellant, which 

the juvenile court granted. Attorney Wile of the Montgomery County Office 

of the Public Defender then entered his appearance for Appellant on July 17, 

2014. On October 15, 2014, Attorney Wile filed a petition to withdraw and a 

lengthy Anders brief. Attorney Wile also filed with this Court copies of 

letters he sent to both Appellant and Appellant’s mother, informing them 

that he was seeking to withdraw and advising them that Appellant could 

proceed pro se on appeal or retain private counsel. On October 24, 2014, 

Appellant’s mother and father filed a document entitled “‘Urgent’ Petition for 

Reconsideration of Additional Facts Filed by Prior Counsel.” Therein, 

Appellant’s parents asked that this Court “reconsider” the issues raised in 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and reject Attorney Wile’s petition to 

withdraw. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. 

Super. 1997)). 
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Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under 

Anders, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements 

established by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and

(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal 

is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of 

the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a 

letter that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new 

counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or 

(3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the 

court[']s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in 

the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 

353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40 

(2007).

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2014). After 

confirming that counsel has satisfied these requirements, this Court must 

then conduct its own review of the record and independently determine 

whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. 

Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Instantly, Attorney Wile’s Anders brief provides a detailed summary of 

the procedural history and facts of Appellant’s case with citations to the

record. It also includes a discussion of each of the 22 issues Appellant 

presented in his Rule 1925(b) statement, and an explanation of Attorney 
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Wile’s conclusion that an appeal on Appellant’s behalf would be wholly 

frivolous. Attorney Wile supports his rationale with citations to the record, 

as well as relevant case law. He has also certified in his petition to withdraw 

that he sent a copy of his Anders brief to Appellant, along with letters 

advising both Appellant and his mother of the rights enumerated in 

Nischan, 928 A.2d at 353. Therefore, we conclude that Attorney Wile has 

complied with the requirements for withdrawal. Accordingly, we will now 

independently review the merits of Appellant’s assertions, and also 

determine whether there are any other issues he could arguably present on 

appeal. 

In Attorney Wile’s Anders brief, he divides the 22 claims presented in 

Attorney Tressler’s Rule 1925(b) statement into the following four general 

issues:

[(I)] Is [Appellant’s] adjudication of delinquency for the offences 

[sic] of rape, aggravated indecent assault, and aggravated 

assault supported by legally sufficient evidence of record?

[(II)] Did the Commonwealth’s attorney engage in prosecutorial 

misconduct?

[(III)] Did the juvenile court’s errors deprive the juvenile of a 

fair trial?

[(IV)] Was [Appellant’s] adjudication counsel ineffective, thus 

entitling [Appellant] to a new adjudication hearing on all of the 

charges?

Anders Brief at 5. We will address each of these issues in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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After carefully reviewing the certified record, Attorney Wile’s Anders

brief,2the juvenile court’s opinion, and the applicable law, we conclude that 

the decision of the Honorable R. Stephen Barrett of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Montgomery County accurately disposes of Appellant’s challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence. See JCO at 14-17. Accordingly, we adopt 

Judge Barrett’s rationale as our own in concluding that Appellant’s challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence is frivolous.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Appellant’s general claim of prosecutorial misconduct encompasses the 

following six discrete claims:

1. The Commonwealth withheld materials related to scientific 

analysis of evidence submitted to a laboratory via a “Rape Kit, 

which, upon information and belief, was exculpatory;[”]

2. The Commonwealth provided inaccurate video representations 

of the physical actions of [Appellant] and the alleged Victim 

immediately following the alleged incident, which were 

misleading in that these representations were in “slow motion” 

and as such it was impossible to determine whether the 

person[s] depicted were engaged in normal ambulation, slow 

walking, accelerated walking, running or some combination 

thereof;

3. The Commonwealth failed to preserve and then produce the 

alleged Victim’s school “Agenda Book[,”] knowing [the] same to 

be a critical piece of potentially exculpatory evidence as to the 

alleged Victim’s departure time from a classroom immediately 

prior to the alleged incident, her reason for leaving, and her 

truthfulness. Further, knowing the existence of said Agenda 

____________________________________________

2 We note that the Commonwealth filed a letter, in lieu of a formal brief, 

notifying this Court that it agrees with Attorney Wile that Appellant’s claims 

are frivolous. 
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Book, and its import, the Commonwealth failed to take the 

necessary precautions to preserve the evidence for trial. 

Instead, critical pages were removed from the book, specific to 

the time in question. Upon discovery of the missing pages [by] 

the defence [sic], copies of the pages were obtained, however, 

the[y] were excluded as evidence at trial because the “Agenda 

Book” from which they had been torn had been returned to the 

alleged victim and has no[w] reportedly disappeared entirely;

4. The Commonwealth failed to provide notice to the defence 

[sic] of two (2) other occasions upon which the alleged Victim 

made similar accusations against other persons, which would 

have negated the imposition of the Rape Shield Act;

5. The Commonwealth prevented [Appellant] from facing his 

accuser in Court by physically restricting the view he had of the 

alleged Victim during her testimony;

6. The Commonwealth thwarted the ability of the defence [sic] 

to effectively investigate the alleged incident by advising the 

Commonwealth witnesses not to cooperate with defence [sic] 

investigator[s] and improperly and untruthfully characterising 

[sic] said investigators as “tricky and deceitful.[”]

Anders Brief at 23-24 (quoting Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/9/14, at 1-2).

Appellant’s first issue involving the Commonwealth’s purported 

withholding of the results of a ‘Rape Kit’ analysis is waived, as the record 

confirms that Appellant did not raise this allegation of prosecutorial 

misconduct below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). In any 

event, even if this claim were preserved, we would agree with Attorney Wile 

that it is frivolous. Essentially, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth 

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to turn over to 

the defense an allegedly favorable Rape Kit analysis. 

Under Brady and its progeny, the prosecution has an 

obligation to disclose exculpatory information material to the 
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guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an 

impeachment nature. To establish a Brady violation, an 

appellant must prove three elements:

(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, 

either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; 

(2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.

The burden rests with the appellant to prove, by reference 

to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the 

prosecution. The evidence at issue must have been material 

evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Favorable 

evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its 

suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 2014 WL 7392224, *12 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2014) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the 

Commonwealth possessed the results of a Rape Kit analysis. The only 

mention of such evidence came from a nurse who examined the victim at 

the hospital and testified that she collected a swab of a “brown substance” 

from the victim’s vagina, turned the swab over to the police, and “[t]hat was 

the last time [she] saw it[.]” See N.T., 10/8/13, at 44-45. There is no 

indication in the record that the swabs were then sent to a laboratory for 

analysis, or that the Commonwealth received any results of such testing. 

Based on this record, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that evidence of a 

Rape Kit analysis even exists, let alone that the results thereof were 

favorable to his defense, and that they were suppressed by the 
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Commonwealth either willfully or inadvertently. Accordingly, even had 

Appellant preserved this claim for our review, we would deem it frivolous.

Next, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth committed misconduct 

by presenting video recordings that were ‘misleading.’ Initially, as both the 

juvenile court and Attorney Wile point out, it was Appellant who sought 

admission of the challenged video recordings, marked as defense exhibits D5 through D-8. See Anders Brief at 26; JCO at 8. Moreover, when the 

recordings were admitted into evidence, the Commonwealth explained to the 

court that the videos appeared “slowed down” because the “recording 

mechanism” used by the school “only records every few seconds....” N.T., 

10/7/13, at 169. Nothing in the record indicates that the Commonwealth 

manipulated the video recordings and then presented them as evidence. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s second claim of prosecutorial misconduct is 

frivolous. 

Appellant’s third allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involves the 

victim’s ‘Agenda Book.’ As Attorney Wile explains, “each student at 

Wissahickon High School must keep an Agenda Book that records the time, 

date and location where the student is going[,] and the respective teacher 

initials the entry.” Anders Brief at 28 (citing N.T., 10/8/13, at 62). 

Appellant sought to introduce the victim’s Agenda Book “to show that she 

was excused from class to go to the nurse’s office to obtain medication[,]” 

not to go to the bathroom, as she had testified. Id. In other words, the 

Agenda Book would have impeached the victim’s testimony and challenged 
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her overall credibility. While Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement is rather 

confusing on this issue, it appears that he believes the Commonwealth failed 

to properly preserve, locate, and/or present the victim’s Agenda Book to the 

defense. 

We characterize Appellant’s claim as essentially alleging that the 

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation. However, Appellant has not 

demonstrated that the Commonwealth withheld or suppressed the victim’s 

Agenda Book. As Attorney Wile points out, Appellant did not seek the 

victim’s Agenda Book during pretrial discovery; instead, he waited until the 

first day of the adjudication hearing to request that book. See N.T., 

10/8/13, at 186. In response, the Commonwealth had the victim look for 

the book at her home, but she was unable to locate it. Id. at 183. Nothing 

in the record indicates that the Commonwealth possessed the book and 

withheld it from the defense. 

Moreover, while the Agenda Book may have been favorable to 

Appellant, in that it could have challenged the victim’s credibility, there is 

not a reasonable probability that it would have changed the result of the 

proceeding. The juvenile court states in its opinion that it found the victim 

to be an ‘incredibly credible’ witness, who maintained her 

composure in the face of extensive cross-examination, appeared 

truthful and honest, and if she thought she had said something 

differently in the past, [she] acknowledged it. The crossexamination was aggressive, with [d]efense counsel raising his 

voice and at times calling C.P. a liar. C.P. appeared anxious and 

scared but managed to answer questions promptly and rarely 

appeared uncertain, confused, or evasive. While her statements 

contained some inconsistencies, the inconsistencies did not 
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concern the rape itself as no evidence was presented which 

indicated that she stated it was consensual. As testified to by 

the hospital staff, C.P.’s injuries were consistent with the history 

she provided. The [court] believed her testimony based on her 

credibility.

JCO at 16-17. Based on the court’s discussion, it is extremely unlikely that 

the ostensible impeachment evidence in the victim’s Agenda Book would 

have changed the court’s overall assessment of the victim’s credibility. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s Brady claim is frivolous.

Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth committed 

misconduct by failing to notify the defense that the victim made sexual 

assault complaints against two other individuals. The record indicates that 

this claim was first raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement; thus, it is 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Nevertheless, we would again characterize 

Appellant’s argument as a Brady claim, and conclude that it is frivolous. As 

the juvenile court points out, “[t]here is no support in the record that the 

Commonwealth failed to notify the defense of any other accusations the 

victim made against other persons.” JCO at 10. Because Appellant has not 

even demonstrated that the Commonwealth possessed evidence or 

information that the victim made two prior assault allegations, his claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct is frivolous.

Next, Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth committed 

misconduct by positioning the victim in such a way during her testimony that 

Appellant was unable to see her. This assertion is waived, as Appellant did 
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not object to the positioning of the victim during the adjudication hearing. 

See JCO at 10; N.T., 10/7/13, at 26-27; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

In Appellant’s sixth, and final, claim of prosecutorial misconduct, he 

avers that “the Commonwealth hampered his ability to investigate the 

underlying incident [of the victim’s sexual assault] as a result of the 

Commonwealth[’s] instructing its witnesses not to speak to defence [sic] 

investigators.” Anders Brief at 35. We ascertain nothing in the record to 

support Appellant’s bald allegation; accordingly, we agree with Attorney Wile 

that this claim is frivolous.

III. Juvenile Court Errors

Appellant’s next general issue encompasses the following seven claims 

for our review:

1. The juvenile court erred by improperly allowing the 

prosecutorial misconduct detailed in Argument II, supra;

2. The juvenile court erred by allowing the Commonwealth’s 

attorney to persistently engage in speaking objections that 

equated to testimony and that provided responses from the 

alleged victim that were, in fact, crafted by the prosecuting 

attorney;

3. The juvenile court erred by regularly failing to rule upon 

objections posed by defence [sic] counsel and by instead 

directing respective counsel to reach [an] agreement amongst 

themselves;

4. The juvenile court erred by engaging in an improper ex parte

communication in chambers with the prosecuting attorney and 

Commonwealth witnesses, including but not limited to, the lead 

investigator in this matter, immediately prior to reaching a 

verdict in this matter;
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5. The juvenile court erred in adjudicating [Appellant] delinquent 

of the enumerated offenses because the Commonwealth failed to 

meet its burden of establishing [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that the evidence presented was 

insufficient to prove [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt;

6. The juvenile court erred by preventing [Appellant] from facing 

his accuser in court by physically obstructing the view he had of 

the alleged victim and the view she had of him during her 

testimony, thereby violating [Appellant’s] constitutional right to 

confront his accuser under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution, and the corresponding rights afforded by the 

Pennsylvania Constitution; and

7. The juvenile court improperly advocated for the 

Commonwealth during the trial and was impermissibly in favour 

[sic] of the Commonwealth.

Anders Brief at 37-38 (quoting Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/9/14, at 3-4).

Appellant first contends that the court erred by permitting the 

prosecutorial misconduct discussed, supra. Because we concluded that each 

of Appellant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were either waived and/or 

frivolous, his contention that the juvenile court erred in this regard is also 

waived and/or frivolous for the same reasons. 

Next, Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred by allowing 

repeated ‘speaking objections’ by the Commonwealth. Because Appellant 

did not indicate in his Rule 1925(b) statement where these ostensibly 

improper objections occurred in the record, the court found this claim 

waived as “too vague” to address. JCO at 12 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (finding the appellant’s 

issue waived where his Rule 1925(b) statement was “not specific enough for 

the trial court to identify and address the issue [the] [a]ppellant wished to 
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raise on appeal”)). The court also noted that Appellant failed to indicate 

where he challenged the Commonwealth’s ‘speaking objections’ below; thus, 

the court concluded Appellant’s claim was waived on this basis, as well. Id. 

(citing Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008) 

(considering “any issue waived where [the] [a]ppellant failed to assert a 

timely objection”)). We agree with the juvenile court’s waiver 

determination. 

Appellant also argues that the juvenile court erred by “consistently 

refus[ing] to rule upon objections interposed by his defence [sic] counsel, ... 

and instead urged respective counsel to work out their differences.” Anders 

Brief at 42-43 (citation omitted).3 The juvenile court appropriately 

concludes that this claim is waived, as defense counsel never challenged (or 

objected to) the court’s addressing objections in this manner. See JCO at 

____________________________________________

3 The juvenile court discussed one example of this type of ruling, stating:

The Court recessed for counsel to discuss Exhibit D-9, which 

contained text messages, to determine if they could reach an 

agreement on the admissibility of the testimony. The Court 

requested this discussion occur as Exhibit D-4 (also text 

messages) unnecessarily delayed the proceedings. As with 

Exhibit D-4, Exhibit D-9 contained multiple texts which 

[Appellant] did not intend to use in questioning of the witness. 

Counsel acknowledged the situation with Exhibit D-4 by 

stating[,] “I’ve numbered this time, without trying to screw this 

up again.” The Court then state[d,] “You may agree.” If counsel 

could not agree, the Court would rule on the objections. 

JCO at 13. 
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12-13. In any event, we would not deem the court’s handling of objections 

legally improper, as the court simply requested that the parties attempt to 

reconcile their disputes before it intervened to rule on the objection(s). 

Accordingly, this claim is waived and/or frivolous.

Appellant next argues that the juvenile court improperly engaged in ex 

parte communications with the Commonwealth and its witnesses just prior 

to rendering its verdict. As Attorney Wile points out, nothing in the record 

supports this claim or suggests any improper communication by the juvenile 

court. Moreover, at no point did Appellant object to these purported 

communications, or present any other evidence establishing that such ex

parte communications occurred. Consequently, this issue is frivolous.

In his fifth claim of court error, Appellant essentially challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his adjudication of delinquency. We 

addressed this claim under Appellant’s first general issue, above. 

Next, Appellant avers that the juvenile court deprived him of his right 

to confront witnesses against him by positioning the victim in such a way 

during her testimony that Appellant was unable to see her. For the reasons 

stated, supra, any challenge to the positioning of the victim on the witness 

stand was waived based on Appellant’s failure to object.

In his seventh claim of error, Appellant maintains that the juvenile 

court “improperly advocated for the Commonwealth and was biased in 

favour [sic] of the Commonwealth.” Anders Brief at 49. Nothing in the 

record supports this bald assertion; consequently, it is frivolous.
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(IV) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Appellant’s fourth general issue, he raises multiple claims of 

defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. Initially, we note that “[b]ecause of a 

juvenile’s lack of access to collateral review, we have concluded that it is 

necessary to review a juvenile’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 

direct appeal, when properly raised.” In re K.A.T., Jr., 69 A.3d 691, 697 

(Pa. Super. 2013). We also declared in K.A.T., Jr., that a juvenile appellant 

may assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims for the first time in his or 

her Rule 1925(b) statement. Id. at 698-699. Thus, it appears that 

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly preserved 

for our review. Those claims include the following:

1. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective by failing to file a Motion 

for Recusal of the [Juvenile Court] Judge and request an 

evidentiary hearing based upon indications of the prospect of a 

premature judgment and/or other irregularities that may have 

served to deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial.

2. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective in failing to raise timely 

and appropriate objections to the conduct of the prosecuting 

attorney as set forth above and herein including, but not limited 

to:

a. The failure [o]f the Commonwealth to produce the 

results of the analysis of the “Rape Kit[;”]

b. The failure of the Commonwealth to produce the 

“Agenda Book[;”]

c. The failure of the Commonwealth to produce accurate 

video representations at trial; and 

d. The improper conduct of the Commonwealth in 

preventing defence [sic] investigators from interviewing 

Commonwealth witnesses in an unimpeded fashion.
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3. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective in failing to fully and 

adequately investigate the prior conduct of the alleged Victim in 

terms of her making similar allegations against at least two (2) 

other individuals in the past.

4. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce 

any evidence of [Appellant’s] mental disabilities and cognitive 

impairments so as to potentially negate the “intent” element of 

the offences [sic] charged.

5. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective in engaging in a colloquy 

with [Appellant] regarding his right to testify in his defence [sic], 

in light of [Appellant’s] mental disabilities and cognitive 

impairments. This was compounded by the fact that the 

colloquy was conducted without [Appellant’s] parents[’] 

confirming on the record his understanding of the consequences 

of his decision not to testify.

6. Defence [sic] counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 

conduct of the trial overall which, as detai[l]ed above and 

herein, deprived [Appellant] of his constitutional right to a fair 

and objective trial and a determination by an impartial factfinder.

Anders Brief at 52-53 (quoting Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/9/14, at 4-5).

We assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the following 

standard:

With regard to ineffectiveness claims, counsel is presumed to be 

effective, and the appellant bears the burden of proving 

otherwise. In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 50 (Pa. Super. 2001). In 

reviewing ineffectiveness claims:

[W]e must first consider whether the issue underlying the 

charge of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit. If not, we 

need look no further since counsel will not be deemed 

ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. If there is 

arguable merit to the claim, we must then determine 

whether the course chosen by counsel had some 

reasonable basis aimed at promoting the client's interests. 

Further, there must be a showing that counsel's 

ineffectiveness prejudiced Appellant's case. The burden of 

producing the requisite proof lies with Appellant.
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Id. (citations omitted).

K.A.T., Jr., 69 A.3d at 699.

Appellant’s first claim of ineffectiveness, as raised in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, is too vague to demonstrate arguable merit warranting further 

examination by the juvenile court or this Court. Appellant contends that 

defense counsel should have moved for the recusal of the juvenile court 

judge, and “request[ed] an evidentiary hearing based upon indications of the 

prospect of a premature and/or other irregularities that may have served to 

deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/9/14, at 4. 

Appellant’s concise statement does not sufficiently specify what ‘indications’ 

there were of a premature judgment, or describe what ‘other irregularities’ 

occurred, that would have supported a motion for recusal (or even a hearing 

on such a motion). Furthermore, our review of the record reveals nothing 

that would support such a motion by defense counsel. Accordingly, this 

claim is frivolous.

Appellant next avers that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

“incidents of prosecutorial misconduct” by the Commonwealth. More 

specifically, he challenges counsel’s failure to object to the Commonwealth’s 

ostensible withholding of both the Rape Kit analysis, as well as evidence that 

the victim made two prior allegations of sexual assault against other 

individuals. As we discussed supra, nothing in the record supports that such 

evidence existed, that the Commonwealth possessed it, or that the 

Commonwealth withheld it from the defense. Without something 
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demonstrating these facts, we cannot conclude that defense counsel acted 

improperly regarding these bald allegations. Consequently, these assertions 

of ineffectiveness are frivolous.

Appellant also argues that defense counsel acted improperly by not 

challenging the Commonwealth’s failure to produce the victim’s school 

Agenda Book. Again, as discussed supra, the record belies Appellant’s claim 

that the Commonwealth committed objectionable misconduct regarding this 

evidence. Moreover, Attorney Wile points out that defense counsel “did 

vigorously argue this issue at the adjudication hearing and even asked [the 

court] to take an adverse inference against the Commonwealth as a result of 

its failure to produce [the victim’s] Agenda Book.” Anders Brief at 59. The 

record supports Attorney Wile’s discussion of this issue, and we agree with 

him that it would be frivolous to argue that defense counsel’s representation 

was inadequate regarding this evidence. 

Next, Appellant avers that defense counsel acted ineffectively by not 

objecting to the ostensibly inaccurate video recordings played during the 

adjudication hearing. As discussed previously, the record does not support 

Appellant’s assertion that the video recordings were inaccurate or 

misleading. Moreover, the juvenile court indicates in its opinion that it did 

not rely on the video recordings, but instead focused on the victim’s 

testimony. See JCO at 8. Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated that 

this claim has arguable merit, or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

purported error in this regard. 
J-S06012-15

- 20 -

Appellant also maintains that defense counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting to the Commonwealth’s advising its witnesses not to cooperate 

with defense investigators, which “hampered and hindered” Appellant’s 

ability to prepare a defense. Anders Brief at 60. We have already 

concluded that there is nothing in the record to support Appellant’s 

allegation that the Commonwealth acted in such a manner. Accordingly, 

Appellant has failed to prove that this assertion of ineffectiveness has 

arguable merit.

Appellant next avers that defense counsel acted improperly by “not 

adequately investigating [the victim’s] history and prior conduct and 

discovering that she had previously made rape accusations against two (2) 

individuals other than [Appellant].” Anders Brief at 61. As stated supra, 

nothing in the record evinces that the victim actually made such prior 

allegations against other individuals. Without some sort of evidence of this 

fact, we decline to deem defense counsel ineffective for failing to go on a 

fishing expedition for this purported evidence. Consequently, this 

ineffectiveness claim is frivolous.

The same is true for Appellant’s next two claims of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, which involve the impact of Appellant’s purported ‘mental 

disabilities and cognitive impairments’ on the intent element of the offenses 

for which he was convicted, and the validity of Appellant’s waiver of his right 

to testify. As Attorney Wile points out, “the record in this case reveals no 

evidence of any mental impairment or cognitive impairment suffered by 
J-S06012-15

- 21 -

[Appellant].” Anders Brief at 62. Therefore, we ascertain no arguable 

merit to Appellant’s claim that he was so mentally disabled that he could not 

form the intent to commit the crimes of which he was convicted. 

Additionally, upon reviewing the colloquy regarding Appellant’s waiver of his 

right to testify, nothing suggests that Appellant did not understand what was 

taking place or the import of the right he was waiving. See N.T., 10/8/13, 

at 155-156. Accordingly, we agree with Attorney Wile that Appellant’s claim 

of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness regarding Appellant’s ostensible mental 

deficiencies lacks arguable merit.

Finally, Appellant makes a very general allegation that defense counsel 

was ineffective for “failing to object to the conduct of the trial overall which, 

as detai[l]ed above and herein, deprived [Appellant] of his constitutional 

right to a fair and objective trial and a determination by an impartial factfinder.” Anders Brief at 53 (citation omitted). The juvenile court states in 

its opinion that it “never formed a premature judgment or was in any way 

prejudiced against Appellant. The [c]ourt conducted a fair hearing and 

decided the case upon the testimony of witnesses.” JCO at 19. Nothing in 

the record belies the juvenile court’s characterization of the fairness of the 

adjudication proceeding, or the court’s assertion that it impartially judged 

the evidence before reaching a verdict. Consequently, this claim of defense 

counsel’s ineffectiveness lacks arguable merit.

Having independently assessed each of Appellant’s numerous claims of 

insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, court error, and ineffective 
J-S06012-15

- 22 -

assistance of counsel, we agree with Attorney Wile that Appellant’s claims 

are frivolous.4 Additionally, we ascertain no other issue(s) of arguable merit 

that Appellant could present on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the 

dispositional order entered on December 12, 2013, and grant Attorney Wile’s 

petition to withdraw. 

Dispositional order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2015

____________________________________________

4 As stated supra, Appellant’s parents filed with this Court a document 

entitled “‘Urgent’ Petition for Reconsideration of Additional Facts Filed by 

Prior Counsel” in which they asked this Court to ‘reconsider’ the issues raised 

in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and reject Attorney Wile’s petition to 

withdraw. Based on our disposition herein, we deny that petition.
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

mVENILE COURT 

In the interest ofB.B. 

OPINION 

BARRETT,J. 

No. 2013-304 

. fAJUNE/2 2014 

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B.B. (hereinafter: "B.B." or "Appellant") appeals f)'om this court's adjudication Order of 

November 25,2013 adjudicating him delinquent of charges ofrape (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(I», 

aggravated indecent assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(2», and aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2702 (a)(I» and Disposition Order of December 12,2013, committing him to the N0l1hwestern 

S.E.T. Program. B.B. filed a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, raising 

three main issues with various sub-issues: 

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct: 

a) The Commonwealth withheld materials related to scientific analysis of evidence 

submitted to a laboratory via a "Rape Kit", which, upon information and belief, was exculpatory; 

b) The Commonwealth provided inaccurate video representations of the physical actions 

of the Defendant and the alleged Victim immediately following the alleged incident, which were 

misleading in that these representations were in "slow motion" and as such it was impossible to 

determine whether the persons depicted were engaged in nonnal ambulation, slow walking, 

accelerated walking, running or some combination thereof; 

c) The Commonwealth failed to preserve and then produce the alleged Victim's school 

"Agenda Book", knowing same to be a critical piece of potentially exculpatOlY evidence as to the 

alleged Victim's depa11ure time from a classroom immediately prior to the alleged incident, her 

reasons for leaving, and her truthfulness. Further, knowing of the existence of said Agenda Book, 

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and its import, the Commonwealth failed to take the necessary precautions to preserve the 

evidence for trial. Instead, critical pages were removed from the book, specific to the time in 

question. Upon discovery of the missing pages by the defense, copies of those pages were 

obtained, however, they were excluded as evidence at trial because the "Agenda Book" from 

which they had been tom, had been retumed to the alleged Victim and now has repOliedly 

disappeared entirely. 

d) The Commonwealth failed to provide notice to the defense of two (2) other occasions 

upon which the alleged Victim made similar accusations against other persons, which would 

have negated the imposition or the Rape Shield Act. 

e) The Commonwealth prevented the Defendant from facing his accuser in COUli by 

physically restricting the view he had of the alleged Victim during her testimony. 

f) The Commonwealth thwarted the ability of the defense to effectively investigate the 

alleged incident by advising Commonwealth witnesses to not cooperate with defense 

investigators and improperly and untmthfully characterizing said investigators as "tricky and 

deceitful. " 

2. Errors Committed by the Trial Court: 

a) The Trial Court ened by improperly allowing the prosecutorial misconduct detailed 

above to be committed unchecked; 

b) The Trial Court erred by allowing the Commonwealth's attorney to persistently engage 

in speaking objections which equated to testimony and which provided responses from the 

alleged Victim that were in fact crafted by the prosecuting attorney. 

c) The Trial COUli erred by regularly failing to rule upon objections posed by defense 

counsel, and by instead directing respective counsel to reach agreement among themselves. 

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d) The Trial Comi elTed by engaging in an improper ex parte communication in 

chambers with the prosecuting attorneys and Commonwealth witnesses, including but not limited 

to the lead investigator in the matter, immediately prior to rendering a verdict in this matter; 

e) The Trial Couti en·ed in adjudicating the Juvenile delinquent of the enumerated 

offenses because the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing the Juvenile's guilt 

of such offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence presented was insufficient to prove 

the Juvenile's guilt of said offenses beyond a reasonable doubt; 

f) The Trial Court erred by preventing the Defendant from facing his accuser in Comi by 

physically obstmcting the view he had of the alleged victim and the view she had of him during 

her testimony, thereby violating the Defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser 

under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the corresponding rights afforded by the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. 

g) The Trial Court improperly advocated for the Commonwealth during the trial, and was 

impermissibly biased in favor of the Commonwealth. 

The Undersigned, upon a thorough review of the record, respectfully submits that this 

claim is without merit. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 

a) Defense counsel was ineffective by failing to file a Motion for Recusal of the Trial 

Judge and request an evidentiary hearing based upon indications of the prospect ofa premature 

judgment andlor other inegularities that may have served to deprive the Defendant of a fair trial; 

b) Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to raise timely and appropriate objections to 

the conduct of the prosecuting attorney as set fotih above and herein, including, but not limited 

to: 

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i) the failure of the Commonwealth to produce the results of the analysis of the 

"Rape Kit"; 

ii) the failure ofthe Commonwealth to produce the "Agenda Book"; 

iii) the failure of the Commonwealth to provide accurate video representations at 

trial; 

iv) the improper conduct of the Commonwealth in preventing defense 

investigators from interviewing Commonwealth witnesses in an unimpeded fashion. 

c) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to fully and adequately investigate the prior 

conduct of the alleged Victim in telms of her making similar allegations against at least two (2) 

other individuals in the past; 

d) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce any evidence of Defendant's 

mental disabilities and cognitive impairments so as to potentially negate the "intent" aspect of 

the offenses charged; 

e) defense counsel was ineffective in engaging in a colloquy with the Defendant 

regarding his right to testify in his defense, in light of the Defendant's mental disabilities and 

cognitive impairments. This was compounded by the fact that the colloquy was conducted 

without the Defendant's parents confirming on the record his understanding of the consequences 

of his decision not to testify. 

f) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the conduct of the trial overall 

which, as detailed above and herein, deprived the Defendant of his constitutional right to a fair 

and objective trial and a determination by an impatiial fact-finder. 

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FACTS 

C.P. and B.B. were students at Wissahickon High School, Montgomery County, PA, and 

had been acquainted for approximately three or four years at the time the subject incident 

occurred. Their relationship was characterized as one of friends. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 28, 29). On the 

afternoon of April 29, 2013, the students were both in art class when B.B. asked C.P. ifshe 

wanted to go for a walk. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 32, 33). C.P. admitted that she asked her teacher for a 

note to use the bathroom in order to leave class, and the two walked to the audion, a small 

auditorium, at the school. (NT. 10.7.13, p. 34). In the few minutes it took to walk from the 

classroom to the audion, C.P. testified that B.B.'s speech turned "mumbly" and his eyes were 

"red." (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 38,39). B.B. pushed C.P. onto the steps at the stage, pulled down her 

pants, pulled down his pants, and raped and sexually assaulted her. C.P. tried to get away, but 

B.B. held her. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 41, 44, 45). This incident lasted approximately five-six minutes, 

after which B.B. "ran away." C.P. immediately went to the school nurse's office, where she 

ultimately told the nurse of her rape by B.B. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 47). 

A Juvenile Petition charging B.B. with rape pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1), 

involuntary deviate sexual assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1), aggravated assault 

. pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702 (a)(1), aggravated indecent assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3125(a)(2), indecent assault pursuant to § 3126(a)(2), simple assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2701 (a)(1), and recklessly endangering another person pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 was filed 

on May 1,2013. The Honorable Jolm L. Braxton, Senior Judge held Detention Proceeding on 

May 1,2013 releasing B.B. to the care of his mother and father. The Undersigned modified the 

above-mentioned Order on May 8, 2013 further clarifying the terms ofB.B.'s release to his 

parents, such as ordering him to have no contact with c.P. in person, by phone, by electronic 

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devices or a third pat1y by agreement of the pat1ies, and ftll1her ordering him to avoid 

Wissahickon High School grounds. The Undersigned issued a Plea Summons on May 15,2013. 

The Honorable S. Gerald Corso, Senior Judge Ordered B.B. to be detained at the Montgomery 

County Youth Center on June 4, 2013. The Commonwealth filed a Petition to Transfer the 

proceedings to Adult Criminal COUl1, which following a Certification Hearing on July 17, 2013, 

the Undersigned denied by Order of September 11,2013. 

The adjudication hearing was held on October 7-9, 2013. The Undersigned announced his 

decision in adjudicating B.B. delinquent ofrape, aggravated indecent assault, and aggravated 

assault on the record on October 9, 2013 (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 3,4). The Undersigned declined to 

adjudicate B.B. delinquent of the other charges brought. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 4). This decision is 

also reflected by the Undersigned's Juvenile COUl1 Order - Adjudication of October 8, 2013, and 

reflects that all other charges were dismissed. Additionally, the Undersigned declined to 

adjudicate B.B. delinquent of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. B.B. retained new counsel 

for the purposes of disposition and appeal. The Undersigned entered his Order of Disposition on 

November 25, 2013, and signed the Order of Commitment on December 12,2013, committing 

him to the NOl1hwestern S.E.T. Program. It is from these Orders that B.B. filed the instant, 

timely appeal to the Superior COUl1 of Pennsylvania on December 26, 2013. The Undersigned 

issued an Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) directing B.B. to file a Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal, which was timely and duly filed on January 9, 2014. 

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DISCUSSION 

The Undersigned will address Appellant's claims in the order presented by his Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, beginning with his allegations of Prosecutorial 

Misconduct. At the outset, the Undersigned notes that many of the issues raised by Appellant are 

not contained in the record. FUl1her, both trial counsel and disposition/Appellate counsel for B.B. 

had ample opportunity to raise these issues and/or object for the record at the close of the 

Adjudication Hearing on October 9, 2013 and at the Disposition Hearing on November 25,2013, 

yet failed to do so. 

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

a) The Commonwcalth withheld materials related to scientific analysis of evidcnce 

submitted to a laboratory via a "Rape Kit", which, upon information and belief, was 

exculpatory 

The Undersigned has no knowledge or information regarding this claim of error, and 

therefore cannot respond to this contention of error. 

In the matter sub judice, the Commonwealth did not introduce the results of the "Rape 

Kit" during the adjudication hearing and further, the Undersigned had no knowledge or 

information regarding the results. The Commonwealth witnesses from the hospital where C.P. 

was treated following the incident testified on cross-examination that they took swabs of a 

substance from C.P., but did not know anything of the result. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 45). The 

Undersigned is unaware whether the Commonwealth submitted the swabs for· scientific analysis. 

The issue was not raised before the Trial COUli and pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), carillot be 

raised for the first time on appeal. 

b) The Commonwealth provided inaccurate video representations of the physical 

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actions of the Defendant and the alleged Victim immediately following the alleged incident, 

which were misleading in that these representations were in "slow motion" and as such it 

was impossible to determine whether the persons depicted were engaged in normal 

ambulation, slow walking, accelerated walking, running or some combination thereof 

The COUli is unaware of who originally provided the video Exhibits marked D-5 through 

D-8, inclusive. The Defense marked, introduced, and sought the admission of these Exhibits. The 

Undersigned raised the issue of whether the video had been slowed (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 167) and 

Detective Fowler explained the video only records every few seconds, and consequently, appears 

slowed down. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 168). The Undersigned ultimately did not rely on the video to 

determine whether C.P. and B.B. were engaged in normal ambulation or otherwise, instead 

relying on C.P.'s testimony for this evidence. 

c) The Commonwealth failed to preserve and then produce the alleged Victim's 

school "Agenda Book", knowing same to be a critical piece of potentially exculpatory 

evidence as to the alleged Victim's departure time from a classroom immediately prior to 

the alleged incident, her reasons for leaving, and her truthfulness. Further, knowing of the 

existence of said Agenda Bool{, and its import, the Commonwealth failed to take the 

necessary precautions to preserve the evidence for trial. Instead, critical pages were 

removed from the book, specific to the time in question. UpOIl discovery of the missing 

pages by the defense, copies of those pages were obtained, however, they were excluded as 

evidence at trial because the "Agenda Bool{" from which they had been torn, had been 

returned to the alleged Victim and now has reportedly disappeared entirely. 

The Undersigned has no information or knowledge regarding missing pages from C.P.'s 

Agenda Book. The Agenda Book was a log students were required to use at Wissahickon High 

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School to sign in and out of class. (NT. 10.8.13, p. 73). 

A photocopy of pages allegedly from c.P.'s Agenda Book was made available and 

marked by the Defense as Exhibit D-I during the adjudication hearing. As noted by the 

Commonwealth's attorney during the adjudication hearing, the patties handled a Motion to 

Compel prior to trial and reached an agreement regarding all outstanding discovery; the original 

Agenda Book was not requested. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 73; Agreed Discovery Order of September II, 

2013). B.B.'s counsel requested the Agenda Book for the first time on October 7, 2013 during 

the trial. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 186). 

The Undersigned determined on the record that this Book had "obvious evidentiary 

value", and ordered the Commonwealth to produce it ijC.P. were able to find it at her house, "in 

an abundance of caution, to be fair to the juvenile [B.B.]". (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 73, 74). However, 

C.P. was unable to find the book. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 183, 186, 187; NT. 10.9.13, p. 96). B.B.'s 

counsel indicated that the principal of Wissahickon High School would authenticate the two 

pages which were illegible. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 92). The top picture ofa page from c.P.'s Agenda 

Book was admitted into evidence. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 180). The bottom two photocopied pages 

were illegible. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 92). These bottom pages were not authenticated, nor was their 

significance explained by a witness; their admission was not requested. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 180). 

The issues regarding depatiure time from the classroom immediately prior to the alleged 

incident, c.P.'s reasons for leaving, and her tmthfulness were explained thoroughly through the 

questioning of various witnesses during the adjudication. 

d) The Commonwealth failed to provide notice to the defense of two (2) other 

occasions upon which the alleged Victim made similar accusations against other persons, 

which would have negated the imposition of the Rape Shield Act. 

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The Undersigned, having no knowledge or information regarding these allegations, 

cannot respond to this claim of error. There is no suppOli in the record that the Commonwealth 

failed to notify the defense of any other accusations the victim made against other persons. 

e) The Commonwealth prevented the Defendant from facing his accuser in Court by 

physically restricting the view he had of the alleged Victim during her testimony. 

The Undersigned finds that pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), this contention of error is 

waived as no objection was raised before the trial court. The United States Constitution provides 

for the right of all accused to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine 

them, a right also recognized and protected by the Constitution of this Commonwealth. See U.S. 

Const. amend. VI; Atiicle I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; In re N c., 74 AJd 271, 

275 (Pa.Super.2013). Prior to the 2003 Amendment of Atiicle I, Section 9, the accused in a 

criminal proceeding was afforded the express right to confront a witness "face-to-face." 

However, following the 2003 Amendment, the accused now is afforded the right only "to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him." The removal of the "face-to-face" provision brought 

Section 9 into line with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 

Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A,2d 85, n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 738, 964 

A,2d I (2009). Fmiher, the PelIDsylvania Supreme Court, in detailing a United States Supreme 

Court holding on this very issue, reinforced that "while the Confrontation Clause Sixth 

Amendment reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation, face-to-face confrontation is 

neither an absolute nor an indispensable requirement." Commonwealth v. Williams, 2014 WL 

241870 (Pa. January 21, 2014). Further, the preference for face-to-face confrontation must give 

way to public policy considerations and the necessities of the case. Id. 

In criminal and juvenile proceedings, violations of this right have been found when a 

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witness is physically present but is uncooperative with his or her testimony and when video 

testimony is offered in lieu oflive testimony with the ability to cross-examine. In re N.c., 74 

A.3d 271, 275 (Pa.Super.2013). 

In the matter sub judice, the pmiies arranged for C.P. to testify in person with a physical 

view of defense counsel, but not necessarily ofB.B. Due to her trepidation around B.B., this 

arrangement proved to be the best way for C.P. to testify. During the hearing, defense counsel 

never objected to his client being unable to physically see C.P., but alelied the Undersigned and 

the Commonwealth each time C.P. was out of his own view; she shifted back to face-to-face 

view accordingly. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 25, 26, 43). C.P. was physically present, subject to extensive 

cross-examination by defense counsel face-to-face, and B.B. was present throughout c.P.'s 

testimony with the ability to hear her testify and assist his counsel throughout the examination. 

Therefore, B.B. was not deprived of his right to confront under the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions. 

f) The Commonwealth thwarted the ability of the defense to effectively investigate 

the alleged incident by advising Commonwealth witnesses to not cooperate with defense 

investigators and improperly and untruthfully characterizing said investigators as "tricky 

and deceitful." 

The Undersigned, having no knowledge or infOlmation regarding this claim, finds that 

this contention of error, in the absence of factual context, is too vague to be addressed and is 

therefore waived for the purposes of appellate review. When the trial cOUli is presented with a 

vague or undeveloped claim in a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, the cOUli 

may not make an effort to develop it to make it comprehensible. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 

A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa.Super.2001). The Trial Court would then act as an advocate for the 

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appellant over remaining impartial, intruding on the appellant's right to counsel. Commonwealth 

v. Butler, 756 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa.Super.2000). The above statement of enol' contains no reference 

to these alleged statements from the Commonwealth, no citation to the record, nor was any such 

incident developed in the record, leaving the Undersigned impermissibly forced to develop it. 

2. Errors Committed by the Trial Court: 

a) The Trial Court erred by improperly allowing the prosecutorial misconduct 

detailed above to be committed unchecl<ed 

The COUli has already addressed the contentions of prosecutorial misconduct to the extent 

the COUli has knowledge and respectfully submits its position in the previous section. 

b) The Tl'ial Court erred by allowing the Commonwealth's attorney to persistently 

engage in speaking objections which equated to testimony and which provided responses 

from the alleged Victim that were in fact crafted by the prosecuting attorney. 

This contention of error, lacking context, is too vague and the Undersigned respectfully 

suggests that it is waived for the purposes of appellate review. In the matter sub judice, this claim 

of error lacks reference to the record and the Undersigned must guess to what defense counsel 

refers, which is impermissible under the law. Dowling, supra; Butler, supra. Further, it is wellsettled in Pennsylvania that a defendant's failure to object to allegedly improper testimony at the 

proper stage results in waiver. Commonwealth v. Bauhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008). 

c) The Trial Court erred by regularly failing to rule upon objections posed by 

defense counsel, and by instead dil'ecting respective counsel to reach agreement among 

themselves. 

As above, the Undersigned strove for a just adjudication and the record contains 

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objections on both sides resolved by counselor withdrawn. FUl1her, if no timely objection is 

made on any evidentiary issue, an issue is not preserved for appeal. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 

84 A.3d 657 (Pa 2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 512, 359 A.2d 393 (1976). 

The COUl1 recessed for counsel to discuss Exhibit D-9, which contained text messages, to 

determine if they could reach an agreement on the admissibility of the testimony. The COUl1 

requested this discussion occur as Exhibit D-4 (also text messages) unnecessarily delayed the 

proceedings. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 140). As with Exhibit D-4, Exhibit D-9 contained multiple texts 

which B.B. did not intend to use in questioning of the witness. Counsel acknowledged the 

situation with Exhibit D-4 by stating "I've numbered this time, without trying to screw this up 

again." (N.T. 19.7.13,p. 177). The COUl1then states "You may agree." (N.T. 1O.7.13,p. 178). If 

counsel could not agree, the Court would rule on the objections. Therefore, the Undersigned 

respectfully suggests that any claim of error regarding the resolution of objections has been 

waived. 

d) The Trial Court erred by engaging in an improper ex parte communication in 

chambers with the prosecuting attorneys and Commonwealth witnesses, including but not 

limited to the lead investigator in the matter, immediately prior to rendering a verdict in 

this matter 

The Undersigned submits that there was no ex parte communication at any point during 

this adjudication, confirmed bya review of the transcript and record, pat1icularly regarding the 

fact that the above-mentioned claim of elTor makes no specific reference to the record. The 

record does reveal that at the close of the adjudication hearing, when asked if he had any 

questions, defense counsel stated that he had none. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 7). The same is true of the 

disposition hearing. (N.T. 11.25.13, p. 43, 44). As no objection to any alleged ex parte 

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communication was made for the record, any claim of error on this issue is thereby waived for 

appellate review pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

e) The Trial Court erred in adjudicating the Juvenile delinquent of the enumerated 

offenses because the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing the Juvenile's 

guilt of such offenses beyond a I'easonable doubt and the evidence presented was 

insufficient to prove the Juvenile's guilt of said offenses beyond a reasonable doubt 

In a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as the finder offact, and the weight of the 

testimony of the witnesses is within the exclusive province of the fact-finder. In re L.A., 853 

A.2d 388, 391 (Pa.Super.2004). A delinquent act is one that constitutes a crime under the laws of 

Pennsylvania, with exceptions not applicable to the facts of this case. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. A 

claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed 

sufficient to sUPPOtt the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. 

Widmer, 744 A,2d 745, 751 (Pa.Super.2000). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has also 

instructed in great detail that: 

In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we must determine whether the evidence admitted 

at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to supp0l1 all the elements of the offense. 

Additionally, to sustain a conviction, the facts and circumstances which the Commonwealth must 

prover ] must be such that every essential element of the crime is established beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Admittedly, guilt must be based on facts and conditions proved, and not on 

suspicion or sUlmise. Entirely circumstantial evidence is sufficient so long as the combination of 

the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The fact[ -Jfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at 

trial. 

In re KA.T, Jr., 69 AJd 691 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal denied, 81 AJd 78 (Pa. December 

18, 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 AJd 133, 136 (Pa.Super.20 11) (internal 

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citations omitted). The Commonwealth, as the verdict winner in the matter sub judice, is entitled 

to a view in the light most favorable to it. 

With regard to the charge of rape, to prove its case pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(I), 

the Commonwealth in the instant action was required to present evidence that B.B. engaged in 

sexual intercourse with C.P. "by forcible compulsion." The term "forcible compulsion" within 

the purview of the rape statute includes both physical force, as well as psychological duress, but 

was not intended by General Assembly to be extended to embrace appeals to the intellect or 

morals of the victim. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1337 (Pa. 1988). 

There was ample evidence during the hearing and in the record to supp0l1 the finding 

that B.B. committed this act beyond a reasonable doubt. C.P. testified that while she walked into 

the audion freely with B.B., B.B. then pushed her against the stairs, holding her while she 

screamed, struggled, and cried, pulled her pants down, and forcibly had sexual intercourse with 

her without her consent. She further testified that she went immediately to the school nurse's 

office and after a brief period of time, told the nurse what had happened. Additionally, she was 

taken to the hospital where her injuries were determined as severe, some of the worst the hospital 

doctor on duty and staff had ever seen, and required an epidural (typically used for chiidbiJ1h) so 

as to perform an examination. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 43-44; N.T. 10.8.13, p. 9, 13, 14, 17, 19,20,21). 

Additional witness testimony established that C.P. always maintained that she had been raped 

and that B.B. had been her rapist. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 147). Therefore, there was adequate evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to support that B.B. raped c.P. 

To prove that B.B. committed aggravated indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§3125(a)(2), the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.B. 

engaged in penetration of the genitals or anus of the complainant (C.P.) with a part ofthe 

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person's body for any purpose other than a good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement 

procedures by forcible compulsion. 

As discussed above, the record is rife with testimony and evidence regarding the severity 

of C.P.'s injuries, of which the doctor that examined her at the hospital and other hospital staff 

testified were severe and consistent with the type of assault repOlied. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 9,13,14, 

17, 19,20,21, 109, 113). C.P. also testified extensively that she felt B.B.'s penis and fingers 

penetrate her genitals. (N.T. 10.7.13, p. 45, 46). There was no evidence that this was done with 

any of the good faith purposes depicted in the applicable statute. In addition, the doctor who 

examined her after this incident testified that her injuries were consistent with the history she 

gave the hospital staff. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 109). The Comi therefore found forcible compulsion to 

adjudicate B.B. delinquent of aggravated indecent assault beyond a reasonable doubt. 

As to the charge of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(I), the 

Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.B. attempted to cause 

serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Under this 

section of the above-referenced statute, aggravated assault does not require proof that serious 

bodily injmy was inflicted but only that attempt was made to cause such injury. Commonwealth 

v. Elrod, 572 A.2d 1229 (Pa.Super.1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 629, 592 A,2d 1297 (1990). 

In the matter sub judice, the Undersigned found that B.B. attempted to cause serious 

injury in his rape and assault ofC.P. There is ample evidence in the record and cited in the 

analysis of rape and aggravated indecent assault which confinn the Commonwealth proved 

aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Ultimately, the Undersigned found c.P., a 15 year old ninth grader, to be an "incredibly 

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credible" witness, who maintained her composure in the face of extensive cross-examination, 

appeared tmthful and honest, and if she thought she had said something differently in the past, 

acknowledged it. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 6). The cross-examination was aggressive, with Defense 

counsel raising his voice and at times calling C.P. a liar. C.P. appeared anxious and scared but 

managed to answer questions promptly and rarely appeared uncertain, confused, or evasive. 

While her statements contained some inconsistencies, the inconsistencies did not concem the 

rape itself as no evidence was presented which indicated that she stated it was consensual. As 

testified to by the hospital staff, c.p.'s injuries were consistent with the history she provided. 

The Undersigned believed her testimony based on her credibility. (N.T. 10.9.13, p. 7). 

In the event B.B.'s statement raises a weight of the evidence claim, the Undersigned 

determines that Appellant's contention is too unfocused and therefore, is waived. As the Superior 

Court of Pennsylvania instmcted in Commonwealth v. Seibert, 799 A.2d 54, 62 (Pa.Super.2002), 

finding that where the appellant merely claimed that "the verdict of the jury was against the 

weight of the evidence," the claim was too vague for meaningful appellate review and was 

appropriately dismissed by the trial court. In the instant action, Appellant claims only that the 

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing the Juvenile's guilt of such offenses 

beyond a reasonable doubt and thus, it was en'or for the Undersigned to adjudicate him 

delinquent. In the absence of specific references to the evidence and record, the Undersigned 

treats this claim as waived. 

f) The Trial Court erred by preventing the Defendant from facing his accuser in 

Court by physically obstructing the view he had of thc alleged victim and the view she had 

of him during her testimony, thereby violating the Defendant's constitutional right to 

confront his accuser under the 6th Amcndment of the U.S. Constitution, and the 

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corresponding rights afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

As discussed in Section ICe) of this Opinion, no objection was made on this issue before 

this Court, and therefore, cannot be raised for the first time on appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a). 

g) The Trial Court improperly advocated for the Commonwealth during the trial, 

and was impermissibly biased in favor of the Commonwealth. 

In the absence of any factual context, this claim is too vague for the Undersigned to 

properly address and is thus, waived. Dowling, supra; Butler, supra; Seibert, supra. This COUli 

did not advocate for the Commonwealth, nor was it impermissibly biased in its favor. The Court 

conducted a fair proceeding. It should be noted that the Commonwealth filed a Petition to 

Transfer Juvenile to Adult COUli which was opposed by B.B. Following a hearing, this Court 

agreed with B.B. and denied the Commonwealth's Petition. On September 13,2013, B.B. filed a 

Petition to ModifY Conditions of Detention, which this Comi granted in pmi by Order of October 

3,2013 by personally making arrangements for B.B. and his counsel to have access to an area of 

the Montgomery County Youth Center Administrative Area to prepare his case. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 

At the outset ofthis claim, the Undersigned notes that in a criminal proceeding, an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on collateral review under the PostConviction Relief Act Statute (PCRA). Commonwealth v. Grant, 8 I 3 A.2d 726 CPa. 2002). 

However, as juveniles are not afforded relief under the PCRA statute, an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim may be raised on direct appeal. In re K.A. T., Jr., supra. 

a) Defense counsel was ineffective by failing to file a Motion for Recusal of the Trial 

Judge and request an evidentiary hearing based upon indications of the prospect of a 

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premature judgment and/ol' other irregularities that may have served to deprive the 

Defendant of a fair trial 

The Undersigned finds this claim of error to be both vague pursuant to Dowling, supra; 

But/er, supra, and waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) as there was no objection during the 

hearing to any prospect of a premature judgment, nor did defense counsel at any time during the 

adjudicative hearing file such a Motion for Recusal. Additionally, defense counsel had no basis 

upon which to file such a Motion, as the Court never formed a premature judgment or was in any 

way prejudiced against Appellant. The Court conducted a fair hearing and decided the case upon 

the testimony of witnesses. 

b) Defense counsel was ineffective in failing to raise timely and appropriate 

objections to the conduct of the prosecuting attorney as set forth above and herein, 

including, but not limited to: 

i) the failure of the Commonwealth to produce the results of the analysis of 

the "Rape Kit"; 

ii) the failure of the Commonwealth to produce the "Agenda Book"; 

iii) the failure of the Commonwealth to pl'ovide accurate video 

representations at trial; 

iv) the improper conduct of the Commonwealth in preventing defense 

investigators from interviewing Commonwealth witnesses in an unimpeded fashion. 

From a thorough review ofthe record, defense trial counsel did raise objections to the 

Agenda Book and requested an adverse inference for the Commonwealth's alleged failure to 

produce it, a request that was denied by the Undersigned. Therefore, Appellant CaiIDot now claim 

that his counsel during the hearing erred when he did object to these issues. As to the results of 

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the "Rape Kit," the Undersigned has no knowledge or information regarding this evidence. 

Further, items (iii) and (iv) have already been previously addressed in this opinion. 

c) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to fully and adequately investigate the 

prior conduct of the alleged Victim in terms of her malting similar allegations against at 

least two (2) other individuals in the past 

As discussed in detail in Section 1 (d) above, the Undersigned has no knowledge or 

information regarding these allegations. 

d) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce any evidence of Defendant's 

mental disahilities and cognitive impairments so as to potentially negate the "intcnt" aspect 

of the offenses chargcd 

The Undersigned has no knowledge or information regarding this alleged failure. 

e) defense counsel was ineffective in engaging in a colloquy with the Defendant 

regarding his right to testify in his defense, in light of the Defendant's mental disahilities 

and cognitive impairments. This was compounded by the fact that the colloquy was 

conducted without the Defendant's parents confirming on the record his understanding of 

the consequences of his decision not to testify. 

In the instant action, the colloquy conducted by defense counsel reflected an infonned, 

knowing, and voluntary decision not to testifY and that it was made by a juvenile who understood 

what was happening and the effect of his choice not to testify. (N.T. 10.8.13, p. 155,156). There 

was no evidence or testimony that he was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or 

that his decision not to testifY was made due to an inability to participate in his own defense. 

/) defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the conduct of the trial 

overall which, as detailed above and herein, deprived the Defendant of his constitutional 

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right to a fail' and objective trial and a determination by an impartial fact-finder. 

As the Undersigned has already discussed the impartiality of his ruling, the fact that the 

adjudication hearing was conducted objectively and fairly, and due to the fact that no objection 

was made regarding any perceived impartiality on the pmi of the Undersigned, this issue was 

waived pursuant to Pa.RAP. 302(a). 

CONCLUSION 

Based upon the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully submits that the adjudication of 

delinquency and dispositional order should be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT: 

R. STEPHEN BARRETT, 1. 

Copies sent to the following: 

Paul W. TresBrrer, Esquire 

Distr ct Attorney' f' e 

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