NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JARRELL SHAKIR, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0326 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2019-134662-001

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Brian Coffman

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 6-10-2021
STATE v. SHAKIR

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Jarrell Taneithius Shakir appeals his conviction of first-degree 

criminal trespass. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013). Denaya Bryson saw 

Shakir running towards her as she parked in her garage. She tried to close 

the garage, but Shakir “suddenly [popped] up under the door.” She 

continually honked her car horn and reversed out of the garage. Shakir 

approached Bryson’s driver-side door, asking why she honked the horn 

and if she was another person. Bryson told Shakir that she did not know 

him and demanded that he leave. Bryson then called the police. 

¶3 Officer Orozco responded to Bryson’s home to discuss the 

incident. Orozco left Bryson’s home and then found Shakir. Shakir 

mentioned that he approached a woman’s car, believing her to be a mutual 

friend from church. Orozco did not arrest Shakir, but continued 

investigating by seeking out a landscaper, a potential eyewitness. The 

landscaper, Nathan Evans, told Orozco that he witnessed Shakir entering 

the garage. Orozco searched the surrounding area again to relocate and 

arrest Shakir.

¶4 In August 2019, a Grand Jury indicted Shakir for one count of 

first-degree criminal trespass, a class six felony. Bryson testified that as her 

garage door closed, Shakir dove like “Indiana Jones . . . up under the door.”

She also testified that Shakir’s movements scared her, so she reversed out 

of the garage when Shakir approached her car door. Shakir moved for a 

directed verdict of acquittal, which the superior court denied. The jury 

convicted Shakir as charged. 

¶5 The superior court found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Shakir had at least two historical prior convictions. The convictions 

included: armed robbery, a class two felony committed in February 2002, 
STATE v. SHAKIR

Decision of the Court

3

leading to an 18.5-year sentence with 354 days of pre-incarceration credit; 

and theft, a class six felony committed in July 2001. The State provided 

evidence that Shakir began his prison sentence in October 2003. The State 

released Shakir, placing him on community supervision, on February 25, 

2019.

¶6 The superior court sentenced Shakir as a category three 

repetitive offender and imposed a 3.75-year prison sentence with 234 days 

of pre-incarceration credit.

¶7 Shakir first filed an untimely notice of appeal. He later 

petitioned for post-conviction relief seeking to file a delayed notice of 

appeal. The superior court granted this request and extended the filing 

deadline to June 12, 2020. Shakir timely filed the delayed notice of appeal

and we have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona 

Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and -4033(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Shakir argues the State presented insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. He also argues that his theft conviction does not 

qualify as a historical felony conviction. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶9 We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo and resolve all 

inferences against Shakir. See State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1, 20, ¶ 72 (2015). Our 

sufficiency of the evidence analysis hinges on whether substantial evidence 

supports the verdict. State v. Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 411, ¶ 6 (2005). 

Substantial evidence is evidence that “reasonable persons could accept as 

sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 411–

12, ¶ 6 (citation omitted). 

¶10 To convict Shakir, the State needed to prove he knowingly 

entered or remained unlawfully in or on a residential structure. See A.R.S. 

§ 13-1504(A)(1). The State needed to also prove that Shakir understood the 

illegality of his entry or remaining. See State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125, 130 

(1981). A person knowingly commits an act when the “person is aware or 

believes that the person’s conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance 

exists. It does not require any knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or 

omission.” A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b). “Enter or remain unlawfully” involves a 

person entering or remaining on premises when that person’s intent for 

entering or remaining is unauthorized. See A.R.S. § 13-1501(2). 
STATE v. SHAKIR

Decision of the Court

4

¶11 Shakir claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 

prove the required mental state. We disagree. Bryson began parking in her 

garage when she noticed Shakir approaching. She tried closing her garage 

door, but Shakir slid underneath it before it closed. Bryson then honked 

repeatedly and tried exiting the garage. Shakir still approached her driver 

side window. Shakir did leave after Bryson told him to, but only after 

entering Bryson’s garage without permission and despite Bryson’s 

affirmative attempt to exclude him. Shakir contends he did not know the 

illegality of his entrance because Bryson did not post any “no trespassing” 

signs and because he mistook Bryson for someone else. We decline Shakir’s 

invitation to reweigh the evidence. See State v. Dodd, 244 Ariz. 182, 185, ¶ 8 

(App. 2017). The record contains sufficient evidence from which reasonable 

jurors could conclude he knew his entry onto Bryson’s property was 

unlawful.

II. Theft Conviction

¶12 Shakir argues the superior court erred by enhancing his 

sentences with his prior theft conviction because it does not qualify as a 

historical prior felony. See A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(c). We review statutory 

interpretation issues de novo. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). 

Shakir concedes that his failure to raise this argument below precludes 

appellate relief absent fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Henderson, 

210 Ariz. 561, 607, ¶¶ 19–20 (2005). 

¶13 Shakir contends his theft conviction does not amount to a 

historical prior felony because he served a one-year prison sentence starting

in October 2003. “Historical prior felony convictions” includes Shakir’s 

theft conviction if he committed the offense within five years of the present 

offense. See A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(c). Most notably, “[a]ny time spent on 

absconder status while on probation, on escape status or incarcerated is 

excluded in calculating if the offense was committed within the preceding 

five years.” Id.

¶14 The State provided evidence that Shakir committed the theft 

offense in July 2001. The State also showed that Shakir served an 18.5-year 

prison sentence, with 354 days of pre-incarceration credit, beginning in 

October 2003. Shakir left prison and began community supervision in 

February 2019 before committing the present offense in July 2019. Because 

Shakir served 15.25 years in prison plus the 354 days of pre-incarceration 

credit, the superior court did not err in finding the theft offense occurred 

within five years of the present offense. See A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(c); see also 

State v. Jones, 246 Ariz. 452, 454, ¶ 5 (2019) (we apply the plain meaning to 
STATE v. SHAKIR

Decision of the Court

5

statutory language that is clear and unambiguous). We find no error, 

fundamental or otherwise, in Shakir’s sentence. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.