NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

PAUL DAVID DANIELS, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D14-2897 

 ) 

SORRISO DENTAL STUDIO, LLC, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed October 28, 2015. 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit 

Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit for 

Manatee County; sitting in its appellate 

capacity. 

Paul David Daniels, pro se. 

No appearance for Respondent. 

ORDER ON PETITIONER'S MOTION TO REVIEW DENIAL 

OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPELLATE COSTS

VILLANTI, Chief Judge. 

 By motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c), 

Paul David Daniels seeks review of the trial court's order that denied his motion for an 

award of appellate costs, made after this court granted Daniels' petition for writ of 
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certiorari, quashed the circuit court's order affirming the dismissal of Daniels' 

garnishment complaint, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the correct law. 

We grant the motion for review, reverse the county court's order to the extent that it 

denied Daniels' motion for appellate costs, and remand to the circuit court for further 

proceedings. 

 In earlier proceedings in this case, Daniels petitioned for a writ of secondtier certiorari to quash the circuit court's order that had affirmed the county court's 

dismissal of Daniels' garnishment action. We concluded that longstanding law dictated 

that while Daniels could no longer pursue the original judgment debtor due to her 

bankruptcy discharge, Sorriso Dental Studio, LLC, the judgment debtor's employer, was 

independently liable to Daniels for those sums that it should have garnished from the 

judgment debtor's wages between the time that the writ of garnishment was served and 

the date the judgment debtor filed for bankruptcy. See Daniels v. Sorriso Dental Studio, 

LLC, 164 So. 3d 778, 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). Hence, we concluded that the circuit 

court had applied the incorrect law in affirming the dismissal of Daniels' action, and we 

quashed the decision and remanded for reconsideration of the petition in light of the 

correct law. Id. In his petition, Daniels also sought to have us quash the circuit court's 

ruling that affirmed the county court's order that denied his motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. In our opinion, we noted that we could not conclude that that ruling 

constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law based on the record 

before us. Id. at 782. Our opinion issued on May 27, 2015, and mandate issued on 

June 15, 2015. 
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 On June 22, 2015, Daniels filed a timely motion for taxation of appellate 

costs in the circuit court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a). That 

rule provides that "[c]osts shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court 

orders otherwise." Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(a). The term "court" in this phrase refers to the 

appellate court—not the trial court. See Am. Med. Int'l, Inc. v. Scheller, 484 So. 2d 593, 

594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Further, the costs shall be taxed "by the lower tribunal." 

Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(a). The "lower tribunal" is the court "whose order is to be 

reviewed." Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(e). Hence, under rule 9.400(a), as long as the motion 

to tax appellate costs is timely filed in the lower tribunal, appellate costs must be taxed 

in favor of the party who prevailed in the appeal unless the appellate court has ordered 

otherwise. See, e.g., Dahly v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 845 So. 2d 350, 351 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Giddens v. Tlsty, 98 So. 3d 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Am. Med. 

Int'l, 484 So. 2d at 594. The "lower tribunal" does not have the discretion to refuse to 

award appellate costs when the appellate court has not so ordered, although the lower 

tribunal does have discretion in determining the amount to be allowed based on the 

evidence in the record. See Am. Med. Int'l, 484 So. 2d at 594. 

 Here, Daniels' motion for an award of appellate costs was timely filed in 

the circuit court, which was the "lower tribunal" whose decision was being reviewed by 

this court. This court did not address any award of costs in its opinion and so did not 

order any departure from the general rule that the prevailing party is entitled to an award 

of appellate costs. Thus, it would initially seem that we should simply reverse the order 

denying Daniels' motion for appellate costs. 
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 However, the record before us shows a more complicated problem 

because the circuit court—which was the lower tribunal in which Daniels properly filed 

his motion—did not rule on Daniels' motion. Instead, Daniels' motion was ruled upon by 

the county court. This was improper. As the Fourth District has explained: 

For our purposes the operative word is "court." Appellant 

contends that, in the present appellate rules, the term "court"

refers to the tribunal in which the referenced appeal is 

pending. In applying the appellate rules to a case that is 

pending in the supreme court to review a decision of a 

district court of appeal, the "court" is the supreme court and 

the district court of appeal is the "lower tribunal" or lower 

court. If a matter is pending in the district court of appeal to 

review a decision of the circuit court, the "court" is the district 

court of appeal and the "lower tribunal" is the circuit court, 

and so on down the judicial ladder. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

 Because the proceeding in this court was a second-tier certiorari 

proceeding, this court was the "court" and the "lower tribunal" was the circuit court—not 

the county court. Daniels properly filed his motion in the circuit court—not the county 

court. Nevertheless, the motion was not ruled upon by the circuit court; it was instead 

ruled upon by the county court. The county court had no authority to rule on a motion 

seeking to tax appellate costs in a proceeding from circuit court to this court. Therefore, 

to the extent that the county court ruled on that motion, its ruling is a nullity. 

Accordingly, we reverse the county court's order to the extent that it purported to rule on 

Daniels' motion for appellate costs and remand for the circuit court to rule on this 

motion. 

 Because we are remanding for the proper court to consider the motion, we 

address two arguments raised by Sorriso in the county court. First, Sorriso argued that 
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Daniels was not entitled to an award of his appellate costs because he did not prevail 

on all of the issues raised in his petition. However, the question is not whether Daniels 

prevailed on all of the issues in the petition—it is whether he prevailed on the 

"significant issues." See, e.g., Dahly, 845 So. 2d at 351; Lucas v. Barnett Bank of Lee 

Cty., 732 So. 2d 405, 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Polackwich, 

705 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Osterback v. Turner, 855 So. 2d 1237, 1238 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Here, the significant issue in the petition was whether the circuit 

court departed from the essential requirements of the law by affirming the dismissal of 

Daniels' garnishment action in light of the judgment debtor's bankruptcy. This court 

determined that the circuit court had applied the incorrect law in reaching this 

conclusion, and therefore Daniels prevailed on this issue. While Daniels also sought to 

have this court determine that the court departed from the essential requirements of the 

law by affirming the denial of his motion for entry of a judgment on the pleadings, that 

was neither his primary argument nor was it a "significant issue" in the appeal. Hence, 

although our decision may not have been all that Daniels hoped for, he did prevail on 

the significant issue in the case, i.e., the propriety of the dismissal of his action, and he 

was entitled to an award of his appellate costs on that basis. Cf. Lucas, 732 So. 2d at 

407 (noting that while the Lucases had not obtained all of the relief they sought in their 

appeal, they had prevailed on the "significant issues" in the appeal and so were entitled 

to an award of appellate costs). 

 Second, Sorriso argued that it should not be liable for an award of costs 

because it was simply an "innocent bystander" below and in the appeal and petition. 

However, the record shows that Sorriso refused to turn over the wages it allegedly 
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garnished pursuant to the writ of garnishment, thus necessitating the action in the 

county court below.1 Further, Sorriso appeared through counsel at the hearing below 

and actively and strenuously argued against Daniels' position that he was entitled to the 

garnished funds. This flatly contradicts the county court's finding that Sorriso "took no 

action to obstruct the collection of these funds." Therefore, contrary to its assertions 

now, Sorriso was not an "innocent bystander" in this action, and in light of this, an award 

of appellate costs may properly be entered against Sorriso. 

 In sum, for reasons not apparent from the record, the circuit court did not 

rule on Daniels' motion for appellate costs even though it was the "lower tribunal" 

charged with making this ruling. Instead, the county court ruled on the motion without 

the authority to do so. Therefore, we grant Daniels' motion for review, reverse the 

denial of his motion by the county court, and remand for this motion to be addressed by 

the circuit court. 

SLEET and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. 

 1It appears from the underlying record that Sorriso did not, in fact, actually 

garnish any wages from the judgment debtor. By virtue of this court's opinion and 

Sorriso's failure to comply with the writ of garnishment that had been properly served on 

it, Sorriso itself will now be independently liable to Daniels for the funds it should have 

garnished. Thus, it unquestionably has a financial interest in this litigation, making it an 

interested—rather than an innocent—party. See Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Fla. 

Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 525 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (noting that 

a party whose financial interest is affected by the litigation is an interested party, 

regardless of what entities are named in the style of the case).