NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0068n.06 Filed: January

26, 2007 No. 06-1278
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT MARY ANN K . BRUDER,

P laintif f-App ellee,
v. ERIC SMITH, Indivi dual ly, and in his capacity as Macom b Coun ty P rosec utor, an d MACOMB COUNTY, Jointly and Severally,

De fend ant s- App e lla nt s. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN

BEFORE: CLAY, ROG ERS, an d SUT TON, Circuit Judges. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. D e f e n d a nts Eric Smith and Macomb County bring this int erloc utory
a pp e a l f ro m th e g ra

nt o f a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n in

fa vo r o f Pla int if

f M aryann

K. B ru de r. Pr ior

to this li tigation, on October 27, 2005, D efe nda nts te r mi nated Plaintiff fr om her position as an Assistant Pr o s e c u ti n g A tt o r

n e y I I( “ A PA ” ) f

o r M a c o mb Co u n ty
. Pl a in ti f f f il e d th e in s ta n t l aw s u it , a ll e g ing that her te rmination was ef fec tuated in vi o l at i o n o f her r ight to due pr ocess unde r the F ifth and Four teenth Amendme nts. The dist rict court g rante d Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which had the eff

ect of reins t at i n g Plaintiff to her position as an APA, alongwith providing he r backpa y calc ulated fr om the date of her te rmination. Subsequent to th e d i s trict court’ s g rant ofNo. 06-1278

-2- injunctive relief

but prior to this appeal, De fenda nts provided Plaintiff with what no par ty disputes is a dequate due proce ss of law, and ag ain conclude d that Plaintiff’s termination was j u s t i fi ed and te rm inate d h e r. B e c a

us e the se a c tio ns have re nd e re d thi s c on tr ov e rs y moo t ins of ar a s it pe rt a ins to the pr e lim inary in

ju nct ion , w hic h is the on ly iss ue pr e se ntl y

be fo re us , w e la c k ju

ri sd ic tio n to adj u dicate this appe al. We there fore DI SM ISS the appe al as moot and REMAND to the district court for further proce eding s. I. Plaintiff beg an working at her job as an A PA in Macomb County , Michig an, on Jul y 8, 2002. She was wor

king in the domestic violence unit at the time of her te rmination. This case ste ms from
a ca se that Plaintiff was pr osecuting , People v . Baumer , th e tr ia l f or wh ic h w a s sc he du le d to
commence in the Macomb Circuit Court in September 2005. Ba um e r wa s a pr os e c uti on

fo r c hil d abuse a g ainst the child’s aunt; t he child’s mother was a key witness, but her attendanc e at the trial
was unc erta in due t o the fact that the m other was an alleg ed drugaddict. On Septembe r 13, 2005, Plaintiff sought a

nd obtai n ed the ver

bal ag ree ment of a judg e and the defe nse attorne y to issue a “mater ial witness war

rant,” which allows the c ourt to issue a war rant for a witness in a c riminal trialNo. 06-1278

See Mich. Comp. L aws § 737.35: 1 When it appear s to a court of record that a person is a mater ial witness in a cr iminal case p e n d in g in a c o u rt in th e c o u n ty an d th a t th e r e is a d an g e r o f the loss of testimony of the witness unless the witness furnishes ba il or is committ ed if he or she fa ils to fu rn ish ba il, the c ourt

sh a ll r e qu ir e the wi tne ss t o b e br ou g ht b e fo re the c ourt
. Af te r g ivi ngthe wi tne ss an op po rt un ity to be he ard , if it a

pp e ars that the wi tne ss i s a ma te ri a l wi tne ss and that the re is a da ng e r of the los s of his or he r te sti mony un le ss the witness furnishes bail or is c ommitt ed, the court may require the witness to enter into a rec og nizance with a sure ty in an amount deter

mined by th e co u rt fo r the appea ranc e of the witness at an e x amination or trial. I f the witness fa ils to recog nize, he or sh e sh a ll b e c omm itt e d to ja il by the c ourt , unti l he or

sh e do e s r e c og nize or

is dis c ha rg e d b y or de r o f t he c ourt
.

-3- when ther e is a da

ng er of the loss of the witness’ testimony
. Howeve r, the wa rra nt was neve r sig ned 1

or e xec ute d, be c a

us e Pla int if

f’ s su pe rv iso r, Jame s L ang tr

y , in str uc te d h e r n ot t o o bta in t

he wa rr a nt. During the i nvestig ation, Plaintiff had been working closely with Detec tive Serg eant John Rol lo, and

L ang tr y or de re d Pl a int if

f t o c a ll Ro llo and ins tr

uc t him not to ar

re st the wi tne ss. At

thi s point the parties’ storie s diverg e. Plaintiff claims that she c alled Rollo and specific ally instructed him no t to make the a rr e st. De fe nd ants a lle g e that, t o th e c on tr ary , Plai nti ff ins tr uc te d Ro llo to a

rr e st the witness, explaining that she w as not allowed to g et t he mater ial witness war rant, but if the wi tne ss w e re in c us tod

y , th e n th e wa

rr ant c ou ld b e iss ue d. What is not dispute d is that Ro llo assembled a

team of individuals and a rre sted the wi t n es s on the eve ning a fter Plaintiff ha d been instructed not to obtain the war rant. That night, which w as Wednesday , af t er h o u rs, Plaintiff
rec eived a

call fr om Roll o, advising her that the witness had bee n p i cked up on a misdemeanor
wa rr ant. Rol lo s ta te d th a t he wo uld no t be a ble to h old

the wi tne ss l on g , so P la int if f s ho uld expeditious ly

consult her s u

p e r v is o r s about g etting the materia l witness warr ant sig ned. Plaintiff hadNo. 06-1278

Se e Cle v e lan d B d. of E

du c . v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 470 U. S
. 5 32, 546 (1985) (p ro vid ingpu bli c 2 employ ees a

constitutional right to pre -termination due pr ocess)
. -4- rec eived a

note from L ang try

stating that he would be gone on Thursday and Friday and informing her w hom she could spea k with about the war

rant. The note also stated “ DO NOT I SSUE [ the
war rant] W/ O TAL KI

NG TO O NE OF US!” J.A. at 575. Alleg edly beca use of this note, Plaintiff approa ched one of her

other supervisors, Robert Merr elli, the following morning and inquired a bout g etting the materia l witness warr ant iss u ed
. After lunch, Merr elli told P laintiff that she c ould not use the mate rial witness wa rra nt to hold the witness. The witness was ther eaf ter re lease d. On Se pte mbe r 2 8, 20 05 , a

de te c tiv e a t the Ma c omb County She ri ff ’s Of fi c e se nt a le tte r t o Assistant Prosecutor The rese Tobin stating that Plaintiff’s actions “compromised the integ rity ” of the sherif f’s o ffice by

misinforming Rollo to the effe ct that a wa rra nt would be authorized for a materia l witness. J
. A. at 5 8 8 . Acc ording to the letter, Plaintiff “je opardized the saf ety of the office rs” by

unnece ssarily

sending them i n t o “t he undesira ble 8-Mile ar ea” of De troit, Michiga n. J .A. at 587. Plaintiff was fir s t i n fo rmed that ther e wa s a problem with the Ba um e r prosec ution on October 3, 2005. On that day , Plaintiff rec eived a letter fr om Be njamin L iston. The letter infor med Plaintiff that the co u n t y was “conducting an investig ation reg ardingalleg ations that y ou inappropriately

subjected a

witness to ar re s t
. ” J .A. at 576. The letter plac ed Plaintiff on administrative leav e starting immediately , and informe d her that the county was c onsidering disciplinary

action. I t also informed he r that a “ Lou de rm ill hear ing” was schedule d for Oc tober 6, 2005. 2No. 06-1278

-5- The “ Lou de rm ill he ari ng ” wa s hel d on Oc tob e r 5, 200 5. Th e me e tin g la ste d a pp ro xima te ly
o n e an d a h a l f h o u r s . P r i o r t o t h e m e e t i n g , P l a i n t i f f w a s i n f o r m e d t h a ti f s h e an s w e r e d

u n t r u t h f u l l y, she would be te rminated. At the me etin g, Plaintiff was aske d a ser ies of questions about her interac tions with R ollo and about how it was that the Ba um e r wi t n es s ca m e t o b e a rr es t ed
. Al t h o u gh Plaintiff was g iven the opportunity to an s we r the que stions posed to her, she wa s not provided an opportunity

to present a

ny information of he r own. F oll ow ingthe me e tin g of Oc tob e r 5 , 2 00 5, the pa

rt ie s atte mpt e d to ne g oti a te a se ttl e me nt. The ne g otiations were not f ruitful, i n p ar t b ec ause Plaintiff maintaine d that she had not a cted improperly

in connec tion with the Baumer pr os e c uti on . In c onne c tio n w iththe se ne g oti a tio ns , Plaintiff rec eived a

document entitled “Pre li mi n a r y St a te ment of Charg es” on O ctober 19, 2005. J .A. at 578. This document outlined the cha rg es ag ainst Plainti ff, a

nd proposed a

settlement. On Octobe r 27, 2005, Def endant Sm ith sent Plaintiff a letter te rminating her e mploy ment for her “ actions and ta ctics in the matter of People v . Baumer ,” which “w ere insubordinate,” “ cre ated a bre ach of

trust betwee n [Defenda

nt Smi th’s] office and law enforce ment ag encie s,” and “ interfe red with the eff

icient operation of [ Def

endant Sm ith’s] office ’s prosecutorial mission.” J .A. at 581. On the same da

y , Plaintiff’s union repre sentative sent Def endant Smit h a letter reque sting a hea ring as provided in the c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment g overningPlaintiff’s employ ment (the “ C BA”). Def endant de nied this request a s untimely on October

31, 2005, taking th e p o s i t i o n that the Preliminary

Statement of Charg es provided to Plaintiff on October 19, 2005 wa s the date by which the timeliness of a he aringreque st should be computed.No. 06-1278

-6- L itigation followe d these e vents. Plaintiff filed a c omplaint on November 29, 2005, alleg ing
a vio la tio n o f p ro c e dura l du e pr oc e ss un de r 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3, and tw o o the r c la ims re la te d to thi s alleg ed violation. On the same day , Pl ai ntiff moved for a pre liminary

injunction restraining Def endants fr om taking e ffor ts to fill P laintiff’s posi tion, orderingDef endants to re instate Plaintiff with backpay , and orde ring Def endants to comply

with the parties’ CBA. On D ece mber 22, the district court g rante d in pa rt Plaintiff’s motion for a pre liminary injunction, orderingthat Plaintiff be a llo we d to re tur

n to wo rk wi th b a c kp ay . De fe nd ants fi le d a tim e ly int e rl oc uto ry a pp e a l f ro m th is injunction on J anuar

y 23, 2006. Subsequent to these eve nts, Defe ndant Mac omb County provided Plaintiff a se cond Lou de rm ill hear ing w ith all the proce dural attributes outlined in the C BA
. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the body

conductingthe hea

ring decide d that Plaintiff’s termination was justified, and Plaintiff was ag ain terminate d. P l ai n t i ff challeng ed this proce dure by an ar bitration that she
re qu e ste d p ur su ant t o th e CB A. Th is a rb itr a tio n r e ma ins pe nd inga s o f t he tim e of this a

pp e a l. Ac c or di n g t o t h e C B A , t h e A r b i t r a t o r ’ s d i s p o s i t i o n i s f i n a l an d b i n d i n g , b u t i s l i m i t e d to “asc erta ining whe ther [Defe nda nts ’ ] d e c is io n

to d is c ip li n e w a s a

r b it r a r y , c a p r ic ious or discriminatory or ot herw ise not in acc ordanc e with the law or the provisions set forth in [the CBA].” J .A. at 42. II. B e c a us e De fe nd ants have fu lly c omp lie d w iththe pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n a

nd c e a se d th e ir eff orts to terminate Plaintiff without due proc ess of law, this case is moot insofar a s it concer ns the preliminary

injunction. The parties c annot waive the issue of mootness bec ause it is “clea r . . . that ‘mootness is a threshold jurisdictio n al i s s u e.’” Brock v . Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospac e &No. 06-1278

-7- Agric. Imple ment W

orkers of Am. , 8 8 9 F. 2 d

6 8 5 , 6 8 7 n . 1 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g W J W -T V, In c . v . Ci ty of Cleaveland , 87 8 F .2 d 90 6, 90 9 (6 th Cir
. 19 89 ) (p e r c ur iam) ); Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. He ckle r , 46 4 U .S. 67 , 70 (19 83 ) (m oo tne ss imp lic a te s Artic le I I I c a se or c on tr ov e rs y re qu ir e me nt) . “ A c a se bec o me s mo o t o n ly

w h e ns u b s e qu e n t e v e n ts ma

k e it a b s o lute ly c le ar th a t t h e a ll e g e d ly

w r o ng ful behavior cannot r easona

bly be expected to r ecur

and ‘inter im relief or

events have completely

and irrevoc ably

era dicated the eff

ects of the alleg ed violation.’” Cleveland Branc h, NAACP v

. City of Parma , 2 6 3 F. 3 d

5 1 3 , 5 3 0 -3 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Co un ty of L os An ge le s v . D av is , 4 40 U. S. 625, 631 (1979)) . Where a preliminary injunction is separ ately challeng ed, the issue of

whether a pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n is moo t is a

dis tinct is su e fro m the iss ue of wh e the r t

he c a se a s a

wh ole is moot. Univ. of Tex. v . Camenisch , 451 U. S. 3 90 , 3 93 (1 98 1) ; se e Su pe r Tir e En g’

g Co . v . M

c Cor k le , 416 U.S. 115, 121 (1974). I n this case, it is c lear that the alleg ed violation of proce dural due proce ss cannot be e x pecte d to rec ur. Since the district cour t gr anted the pr eliminary

injunction, Pl aintiff wa s provided with a he ari ngpurs ua

nt t o th e CB A. Th e CB A p ro vid e s f or a he ari ngbe fo re a

He ari ng B oa

rd that c on sis ts of seve n of Plaintiff’s fe llow prosecutor s, chosen by lot. Be fore the hea

ring , an af

fec ted prosec utor must be provided with notice c onsisting of “ a spec ific statement of the re asons for imposing the discipline an d

th e s p e c if

ic n a tu r e o f th e d is c ip li n e in te n d e d
. ” J. A
. a t 4 0
. M o r e o v e r , th e a f f ecte d APA is ensured the rig ht to testify . Whil e we express no opinion on whether these proce dures a re
ne c essa ry to comply

with Lou de rm ill , 470 U.S. at 546, we note that these proc edure s likely satisfy the re quirements of Lou de rm ill , and no pa rt y argue s oth e rw ise
. Af

te r t he he ari ng , Pl a int if

f w a s a g a in terminated, a

nd the proprie ty

of this decision has bee n submitt ed to ar bitration. I f the a

rbitrator r ulesNo. 06-1278

-8- ag ainst Plainti ff, ther e is no rea sonable possibility that Def endants c ould ag ain terminate her w ithout due proc ess. Howe ver, e ven if the a rbitrator f

inds that Defe ndants ac ted in an ar bitrary and capr icious manner, a

decision within his or her powe r under the ar bitrat i o n agr eement, Plainti ff would have still been pr ovided with the cor e Lou de rm ill due proc ess re q u i re m ents –notice of the
c ha rg e s a g a ins t he r a

nd an o pp or tun ity to e xpla in he rs e lf

–r e g ard le ss of any a c tio ns the De fe nd a nts t ak e subsequent to the arbitrator ’s dec ision. There is ther efor e no re asonable probability that the alleg ed violation of proc edura l due proc ess is likely to rec ur. Be cause the only

matter be fore this Court i s an interlocutor y appea l from a pr eliminary injunction, the case is moot unless some aspec t of the pr e lim ina ry

relief “‘w ould, if g rante d, make a differe nce to the l eg al i ntere sts of the parties.’ ” McPhe rson v. Mich. H igh Sch. Athletic Ass’n , 119 F. 3 d 4 5 3 , 4 5 9 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) ( en b an c) (q u o t i n g Crane v. Indiana High Sc h. Athletic Ass’n , 975 F.2d 1 3 1 5 , 1 3 1 8 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 92 )) ; see also Univ. of Tex . v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. at 394. Her e, the preliminary

injunction has no continuing le g al ef fec t. Plainti ff’ s motion for a pre limin a r y injunc tion, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t w a s g r an t e d , r e qu e s t e d t h a t s h e b e “ r e i n s t a t e [ d ]
. . . t o h e r p o s i t i o na s anA P A II
w i t h b a c k p ay un til De fe nd an ts p ro v idethePlain tif

f with du e pr oc e du ra l du e pr oc ess .” J.A. at 144 (e m p h asis added) . Since this condition has occur red, a ffirming or re versingthe pre liminary injunction would not affec t the leg al intere sts of the parties. Def endants a rg ue that this case should not be dis missed as m oot. First, De fenda nts arg ue that this case is not moot be cause it involves an action that is “ capa ble of repe tition y et eva ding r eview.” Bo nn e ll v . Lo re nz o , 241 F.3d 800, 808 n.4 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) (i n t ernal quotation marks omitted). Ho we ve r, th is ex ceptionto t he moo tne ss d oc tr ine on ly a pp lie s w he re the re is a

re a so na bleNo. 06-1278

-9- expectation of the rec urre nce of the wrongwith respec t to the same complaining party
. Murphy v

. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). As the merits of this c ase (which are still being litigated) raise the is s u e o f w h e th e r D e f

e n d an ts ’ o r ig in a l te r

mi n a ti o n o f Pl a in ti f

f v io late d d

u e p r o c ess, and a s Def endants have alre ady provided Plaintiff w ith due proce ss w ith r espec t to the issue addre ssed by the pre liminary

injunction, (i.e., they

complied with due proc ess in terminating Plaintiff after her
re ins ta te me nt) , th e re is n o “ de mon str a te d pr ob a bil ity” or “ re a so na

ble e xpe c ta tio n” that Pla int if f w ill ag ain be ter

minated without being aff orded the constitutional proc edure that she wa s due. See id. Def endants a lso rely

on McPhe rson , but that case is clear ly distinguishable be cause McPhe rson involved linge ring eff

ects from a preliminary

injunction. 119 F.3d at 458-59. McPhe rson conce rned a pre l i m i n ar y injunction that required that McPherson be a llowed to compete dur ing the 1995 basketba ll season. Id. at 458. Even thoug h the sea son was over at the time of the appe al, if the inj un c tio n w e re re ve rs e d, Mc Phe rs on ’s te a m c ou ld h a ve be e n f or c e d t o ret roactiv e ly

fo rf e it basketba ll ga

mes. Id. Her e, neither

party has identified a

ny leg al outcome t h at h i n g es on the preliminary

injunction, and we likewise cannot discern one. L astly , Def endants rely

on Cleveland Bran c h NA ACP , 263 F.3d at 530-31. This case is inapposite, beca use i t involved a g rant of summar y judgme nt, not a g rant of pr eliminary relief
. Id. The district cour

t’s g rant of a

preliminary

injunction, although r esting in p ar t on the likelihood of succe ss on the m erits, di d not adjudicate the m erits of thi s controver sy . See Came nisch , 451 U.S. at 394-96. Plaintiff has a continuing a ction for, int e r a lia , money damag es and attorney ’s fee s under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 for the sa me alleg ed constitutional violation that formed the ba sis of the pre liminary

in j u n ct ion. This lit igation, if pursued by the par ties, will produce a

final dec isionNo. 06-1278

De fe nd a nts c la im that it is the ir

un de rs tand ingthat “ the y

wi ll n ot b e a

ble to r a ise [the me ri ts 3 of Plaintiff’s cla im for damag es] in an appea l from a f inal judgme nt at t h e end of this case, a s the i n j u n ct i o ni s i n d ep en d en t l y ap p ea l ab l e. ” D ef

. Br
. at 4 0
. (c i t i n g Go n v . F irs t St ateIn s. , 871 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989)). This asse rtion is incorrec t. Gon c on c e rn e d th e a pp e a la bil ity of a mod if ic a tio n to a pre liminary

injunction in the eve nt that the orig inal preliminary injunction had not been a ppeale d. Id. a t 8 6 6. Nothing in Gon would preve nt a final de cision from the district cour t from being appea lable under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. -10- on the merits. These issues are very much live; the issue of pre liminary relief , howeve r, no long er 3 would “make a diffe renc e to the leg al interests of the pa rties.” McPhe rson , 119 F.3d at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted). We theref ore hold that this appea l is moot
. CO NC LU SION For the rea sons sta

ted here in, we DI SM ISS the appe al as moot, and REMAND the c a se to the district court for

further proce eding s.