In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1130 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

DARICK HUDSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:16-cr-00241-1 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 31, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 14, 2018 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Darick Hudson pleaded guilty to 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Hudson challenges two aspects 

of the written judgment entered by the district court, each 

relating to conditions of his supervised release. 

First, Hudson asserts a condition prohibiting “excessive 

use of alcohol” must be clarified, as “excessive” is not defined 
2 No. 18–1130 

and therefore vague. As a matter of common practice, the 

presentence investigation report (“PSR”) includes a number 

of potential conditions of supervised release, with radio buttons the probation officer checks to indicate those recommended to the district court at sentencing. Hudson’s PSR 

included the following proposed condition: “ (7) you shall 

refrain from  any or  excessive use of alcohol (defined as 

having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%; or 

 ).” During the sentencing hearing, the district court 

reviewed that proposed condition, and Hudson’s attorney 

confirmed he had no objection. Yet the corresponding condition in the written judgment entered two days later differed 

from the PSR, failing to check the definitional box: “During 

the period of supervised release: ...  (7) you shall refrain 

from  any or  excessive use of alcohol (defined as 

 having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08).”1 

Our precedent holds that a condition of supervised release 

prohibiting “excessive” alcohol use, without definition, is 

impermissibly vague. United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 849 

(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376 (7th 

Cir. 2015); United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 715 (7th Cir. 

2014). This case presents an obvious scrivener’s error. At the 

sentencing hearing, the district court reviewed with counsel 

the PSR’s proposed condition prohibiting “excessive use of alcohol”—defined as a blood alcohol concentration greater than 

0.08—and nothing in the record indicates the judge intended 

to deviate from that definition. In this circumstance, we 

 1 As seen in these quotations, the final judgment form used by the 

district court, unlike the PSR, includes a radio button before the phrase 

“having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08,” such that there 

is no default definition of “excessive use of alcohol.” 
No. 18–1130 3 

simply order the judgment amended, without a full resentencing. United States v. Clark, No. 18-1083, slip op. at 9 (7th 

Cir. Oct. 18, 2018) (affirming with order to correct written 

judgment to define “excessive use of alcohol”); United States 

v. Smith, No. 16-3575, slip op. at 9–10 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018) 

(same); United States v. Givens, 875 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(same). 

Next, Hudson challenges a condition restricting his travel 

during supervised release. At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated, “Once Mr. Hudson is released from custody, 

he will be directed to remain within the jurisdiction in which 

he is being supervised, unless he is granted permission to 

leave.” Hudson’s attorney requested the condition include 

Indiana because that is where Hudson’s wife lives, expressing 

some uncertainty himself about “what the districts are there.” 

In response, the district court stated this condition would 

“include the district where [Hudson’s] wife resides as well.” 

But the written judgment simply states, “(14) you shall remain 

within the jurisdiction where you are being supervised, 

unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation 

officer.” 

Hudson argues this travel restriction is impermissibly 

vague, given its use of the undefined term “jurisdiction,” and 

invalid to the extent it fails to expressly permit him to travel 

to the district in which his wife resides. With respect to vagueness, we have described this same language limiting travel to 

a “jurisdiction” as “poorly worded,” United States v. Ortiz, 817 

F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2016), and “impermissibly vague.” 

United States v. Dickson, 849 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2017) (per 

curiam). The better term to use in this standard condition is 

“judicial district,” as it denotes geographical (as opposed to 
4 No. 18–1130 

jurisdictional) boundaries. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 5D1.3(c)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N Nov. 2018) 

(“The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal judicial 

district where he or she is authorized to reside without first 

getting permission from the court or the probation officer.”). 

During the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that 

the term “jurisdiction” in the condition refers to a judicial 

district: “I directed that [Hudson] will be restricted to travel 

in the district in which he is supervised. If he is released to the 

Northern District of Illinois, that would be the Northern 

District of Illinois.” Therefore, we order the term “judicial 

district” be substituted for the word “jurisdiction” in the 

written judgment.2

As for the failure to include the district in which Hudson’s 

wife resides, this is another obvious technical oversight. The 

district court orally granted Hudson’s request on this point, 

and an oral sentence controls over a written one whenever the 

two conflict. United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702, 710–11 (7th 

Cir. 2014). The written judgment must be amended to include 

the judicial district where Hudson’s wife resides. 

Before concluding, we note two other points. First, the 

government’s argument that Hudson somehow waived his 

objections to the above conditions is without merit. Waiver 

 2 We do not, however, accept Hudson’s argument in his reply brief 

that this condition is vague simply because Hudson himself did not know 

the geographic boundaries of the Northern District of Illinois. Such 

boundaries are objectively verifiable. 28 U.S.C. § 93(a) (specifying the 

Northern District of Illinois’s two divisions and the counties comprising 

each). Arguing a defendant is personally ignorant of what a judgment 

requires is different than demonstrating the judgment is objectively 

vague. 
No. 18–1130 5 

requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and 

“we are cautious about interpreting a defendant’s behavior as 

intentional relinquishment.” United States v. Barnes, 883 F.3d 

955, 957 (7th Cir. 2018). Here, both conditions in the written 

judgment diverge from the district court’s oral sentence. 

During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reasonably 

understood the district court as incorporating the definition 

of “excessive use of alcohol” employed by the PSR. And Hudson’s lawyer objected to the travel restriction, prompting the 

district court to amend it. Due to clerical errors, neither of 

these qualifications made it into the written judgment, but 

Hudson could not have predicted that at the time of sentencing. Smith, slip op. at 8; see also R.J. Corman Derailment Servs. v. 

Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local Union 150, 335 F.3d 643, 

650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party cannot waive something that it 

does not know is at issue.”). 

Second, we remind future litigants of Rule 35(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides, “the 

court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, 

technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. 

This appeal might have been avoided had the written judgment been reviewed promptly and the inconsistencies 

brought to the district court’s attention. 

Therefore, we REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS that the written 

judgment be amended to include: (1) for purposes of discretionary condition number 7 of Hudson’s supervised release, a 

definition of “excessive use of alcohol” as having a blood 

alcohol concentration greater than 0.08, and (2) for purposes 

of discretionary condition number 14, the language, “you 

shall remain within the judicial district where you are being 

supervised and the judicial district in which your wife 
6 No. 18–1130 

resides, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a 

probation officer.” Subject to those two corrections, we 

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in all other respects.