* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that th is opinion

should not b e published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-60462

Summary Calendar

JAMES WALTER HOVER, II,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ADAM H. BRENNER; CITY OF MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI;

GREG LEWIS; JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2,

Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:97-CV-79-LN

-------------------- August 7, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

James Hover appeals a grant of summary judgment and a jury

verdict in favor of the defenda nts in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil

rights suit. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I

Hover and his cohort John McClelland participated in a driveby shooting in which McClelland allegedly fired a gun from the

window of Hover’s car in order to scare Richard Caffey. Police

later spotted the car and signaled for them to stop. Hover pulled

into a parking lot as if to stop, but decided not to stop because

McClelland had drugs on h im. Hover then led police on a 7 mileNo. 99-60462

-2-

1 It was later determined that there was no gun in the car because the

suspects had previously dropped it off at McClelland’s home.

2 chase during which the drugs were thrown out of the car. Hover

eventually stopped in a church parking lot.

Officer Brenner and Officer Thomas began to apprehend the

suspects, telling them to keep their hands in the air. Thomas

dragged McClelland out of the car. Brenner approached Hover’s side

of the car and op ened Hover’s door. According to Brenner, Hover

then made a movement with his right hand toward the space beneath

his seat w hile turning to get out of the car, and Brenner shot

Hover in the jaw.

Hover says that before he was shot, he merely turned his torso

slightly toward Brenner and asked if he could put the car in park

so that it would not move forward when he took his foot off the

brake. Hover states that he never reached down toward the console

or the seat. 1

Hover sued Brenner, as well as the city and police chief in

their official capacit ies. The district court dismissed the

municipal liability claims against the city and police chief before

trial. At trial, the jury found no liability for Hover’s claim

against Brenner for the use of excessive force.

Hover appealed the verdict and dismi ssal, arguing that the

district court improperly limited Keith Oubre’s expert testimony;

that th e district court improperly admitted evidence of Hover’s

drug use, Hover’s poor grades, and threats by Hover’s father; that

the district court improperly instructed the jury; that the jury’sNo. 99-60462

-3-

1 See United States v. Graves , 5 F.3d 1546, 1551-52 (5th Cir. 1993).

2 Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co.

, 764 F.2d 252, 262 n. 9 (5th Cir.

1985).

3 9A C HARLES A. W RIGHT & A RTHUR R. M ILLER

, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 2558 at 469

(2d ed. 1995).

4 See Fraire v. City of Arlington

, 957 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1992).

3 verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the

City of Meridian and Chief Greg Lewis.

II

Hover was free to call Oubre as a witness to testify whether

Brenner’s use of f orce was objectively reasonable. The only

limitation was that Oubre would not be allowed to testify that

Brenner violated certain police procedures and created the need to

use deadly force. Hover failed to call Oubre as a witness and did

not make an offer of proof. Thus, the district court’s limitation

of Oubre’ s testimony is subject only to plain error review. 1

Plain error review in civil cases is an extraordinary remedy for

use only in exceptional cases, 2 cases which “affect[] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the trial court’s proceedings.” 3

In this circuit, § 1983 liability cannot be premised on the

fact that an officer “creates the need” to use excessive force by

failing to follow police procedure. 4 The Second and Eighth

Circuits have further held that the failure to follow procedure

prior to the moment of seizure is therefore not relevant in

determining whe ther the officer’s use of force was objectivelyNo. 99-60462

-4-

5 See Salim v. Proulx

, 93 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996); Schulz v. Long

, 44 F.3d

643, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1995). As the Eighth Circuit has noted, police procedures

are primarily for the protection of police officers, not armed suspects. S ee

Mettler v. Whitledge , 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999).

6 See Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

, 185 F.3d 496, 506 (5th Cir.

1999) (stating that to prove plain error, a party must demonstrate error that is

“clear and obvious under current law”).

7 Arguably, even the fact that Hover stopped the car in the church parking

lot did not unequivocally indicate his submission to the police, given his recent

actions. Before leading police on a 7 mile chase, Hover pulled into a parking

lot as if to stop only to speed off again. Furthermore, when Hover stopped the

car in the church parking lot, he kept it running and in drive. The only reason

it was not moving was because his foot was on the brake. Given Hover’s previous

actions, including the chase, there exists a reasonable inference that Hover may

have intended to simply speed away again under the right circumstances, since he

could have done so even with his hands in the air.

4 reasonable during the actual seizure. 5

This circu it has not addressed the precise issue of whether

such evidence may be relevant to pro ve a theory other than a

“creatio n of the need” theory, but for the purposes of our plain

error analysis it suffices that none of our cases oppose the Second

and Eighth Circui t’s view that violations before the seizure are

irrelevant. 6

Recognizing this, Hover argues that by stopping in the church

parking lot, he submitted to police authority and that submission

constituted a seizure. Therefore, he says, violations of police

procedure after that point were rele vant to determining whether

Brenner’s use of force was objectively reasonable. However, if

Hover suddenly reached below his seat and tried to get out of the

car after being told not to move, Hover’s submission and any

related seizure, obviously ended. 7 When Brenner shot Hover, Hover

was seized again. Thus, evidence that proper police procedure was

not followed was at best only conditionally relevant: i .e.

,No. 99-60462

-5-

8 See F ED

. R. E VID

. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision

whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given

to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting

instruction .”); O ld Chief v. United States

, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (stating

that the Rule 403 balancing test involves a consideration of the marginal

probative value of evidence).

5 relevant if the jury decided that Hover had made no sudden

movements.

Of course, if a jury were to find that Hover had made no

sudden movements , Brenner’s use of deadly force would almost

certainly have been excessive. In that situation, evidence of

Brenner’s earlier failure to follow proper police procedure would

have been of little to no marginal probative value. More

importantly, if that evidence had been conditionally admitted and

the jury found that Hover had make a sudden movement, the evidence

would have been irrelevant under the view of the Second and Eighth

Circuits. If the jury went ahead and considered the evidence

despite a n y limiting instruction, Brenner would have suffered

unfair prejudice.

Under Rule 403, a district court would have the discretion to

exclude conditionally relevant evidence if its marginal probative

value was at best de minimis and substantially outweighed by the

danger that a limiting instruction regarding conditional relevance

would have been ineffecti ve. 8 This is not to say that such

evidence would necessarily have been inadmissible, but only to show

that a district court’s exclusion of this evidence would not

obviously have been an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we

canno t say that the district court’s limitation on Oubre’sNo. 99-60462

-6-

9 See Isonhood v. State , 274 So.2d 685 (Miss. 1973).

6 potential testimony created plain error.

III

Hover did not properly object to the introduction of the drug

evidence so he is limited to plain error revi ew on this issue as

well. After Hove r was shot, Hover’s blood tested positive for

cannabinoids (marijuana), and drug paraphernalia was found in his

car. At trial, Hover was questioned about this as well as past

drug use.

The blood evidenc e and drug paraphernalia was probative of

Ho ver’s drug use on the day in question, which was relevant in

assessing Hover’s ability to recall the even ts of that day, 9 and

Hover’s own counsel introduced the drug paraphernalia evidence.

Similarly, wi th respect to Hover’s use on other occasions,

Hover’s counsel initially elicited the fact of such use as well.

Hover denied smoking marijuana on the day in question, but Hover’s

counsel then asked Hover what effect marijuana had on his system.

By answering that it had a calming effect, Hover admitted to having

used marijuana at some time other than the day in question and

implied that it did not impair his senses.

Having opened the door, Hover ca nnot complain that opposing

counsel then questioned him on that issue. Furthermore, Hover

cites no controlling authority that the introduction of such

evidence was improper nor does he argue that the introduction ofNo. 99-60462

-7-

10 See Tompkins v. Cyr , 202 F.3d 770, 779 (5th Cir. 2000).

11 See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a); L & A Contracting v. Southern Concrete Servs.,

Inc. , 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994).

12 See F ED

. R. E VID . 401, 402, 403.

13 See id. ; F ED

. R. E VID

. 801.

7 the evidence affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, Hover

fails to carry his burden of demonstrating plain error. 10

IV

Hover did not properly brief the issues of the introduction of

his poor grades and his father’s threats because he did not provide

authorities in support of his claim, and the issues may be deemed

aba ndoned. 1 1 Alternatively, the introduction of his poor grades

was both relevant and admissible in order to rebut Hover’s attempt

to inflate his claim of lost future earnings by saying he intended

to go to dental school. 12

V

The evidence regarding Hover’s father’s threats against

McClelland was relevant and admissible for the purpose of

demonstr ating McClelland’s possible bias. As indicated by the

trial court’s limiting instructions, this evidence was not admitted

to prov e that Hover’s father actually threatened McClelland, but

was only offered to prove that McClelland was operating under the

belief that Hover’s father had made such a threat to McClelland’s

father. 13No. 99-60462

-8-

14 See Bender v. Brumley , 1 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 1993).

15 See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a); L & A Contracting , 17 F.3d at 113.

16 See United States ex rel. Wallace v. Flintco Inc.

, 143 F.3d 955, 960 (5th

Cir. 1998); F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 50(a).

8 VI

The allegedly erroneous jury instruction regarding qualified

immunity was not determinative of the outcome of the trial since

the jury never answered t he qualified immunity question because

they found that Brenner’s use of force was objectively reasonable

under the circumstances. Thus, the issue of qualified immunity was

irrelevant to the jury’s verdict and the instruction cannot be a

basis for reversible error. 14

VII

Hover abandoned his claim that the jury verdict was against

the overwhelming weight of the evidence because he did not properly

brief the issue by providing citations to the record or providing

authority in support of his assertions. 1 5 Alternatively, review

is limited to plain error because Hover failed to timely move for

a judgment as a matter of law before the case was submitted to the

jury, and the verdict will be upheld if some evidence supports the

verdict. 16

In addition to Officer Brenner’s testimony which, if believed,

justified the us e of deadly force, a police expert in the use of

force testified that Brenner’s u se of force was objectively

reasonable, an d a forensic scientist testified that Hover’sNo. 99-60462

-9-

17 Hover originally alleged a claim based on the hiring of Officer Brenner,

but has not specifically argued against the dismissal of that specific claim on

appeal and it may be deemed abandoned. S ee F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a); L & A

Contracting , 17 F.3d at 113 (5th Cir. 1994).

Alternatively, we would affirm dismissal on this claim for essentially the

same reasons put forward by the district court. The only evidence of a problem

in Bren ner’s background when he was hired was that he checked “yes” on his

employment application indicating that he was aware of one or more

“unsatisfactory report[s] of character or personal habits which would jeopardize

[his] ability to perform the particular class of work [he was] applying for” and

a letter of recommendation which, while positive overall, mentioned that Brenner

had “encountered a few problems during his probationary rating period.”

These “problems” were not specified, nor did Hover ever depose Brenner with

regard to the existence or contents of any “unsatisfactory reports.” As such,

the district court held and we agree that “[t]he allegations in the case at bar

related to Brenner’s background rise nowhere near the level of those” in Board

of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown

, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), where “the

Court found that the hiring procedures were adequate.”

18 See Conner v. Travis County , 209 F.3d 794, 796-97 (5th Cir. 2000).

9 bloodstain pattern indicated that Hover was getting out of the car

despite being commanded n ot to move. Thus, the verdict was

supported by some evidence.

VIII

Hover argues that the district court erred in dismissing Chief

Lewis in his official capacity and the City of Meridian on Hover’s

municipal liabil ity’s claims relating to the training and

supervision of Officer Brenner. 17

To succeed on such claims, Hover must show that the training

and supervision procedures of the municipality’s policymaker were

inadequate, that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in

adopting those procedures, and that the inadequat e procedures

directly caused the plaintiff’s injury. 18

Hover does not identify any specific defic iency in the

department’s training or supervisory procedures or any evidence ofNo. 99-60462

-10-

19 Brief of Appellant, at 28.

20 See Gabriel v. City of Plano

, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We have

consistently rejected application of the single incident exception and have noted

that ‘proof of a single violent incident ordinarily is insuffi c ient to hold a

municipality liable for inadequate training.’”) (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier

, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998)); Snyder

, 142 F.3d at 798 (“The plaintiff must

demonstrate ‘at least a pattern of similar incidents in which the citizens were

injured

... to establish the official policy requisite to municipal liability

under § 1983.’”) (quot ing R odriguez v. Avita

, 871 F.2d 552, 554-55 (5th Cir.

1989) (internal quotation and citations omitted))).

10 a policy authorizing the use of excessive force. Hover mainly

argues that Brenner failed to abide by standard police procedure.

Even if true, this does not evidence that Brenner’s training was

deficient. As even Hover concedes, Brenner may have “deliberately

ignored what traini ng he did receive,” 1 9 which would mean that

Brenner was at fa ult, not his prior training. Further, the fact

that one episode of violence did occur

– Brenner’s shooting of

Hover – is also insufficient to imply the existence of inadequate

training or supervision. 20

Hover does have evidence that approximately fo ur citizens

complained about Brenner in the past, but none of these complaints

related to the use of deadly force. Three citizens were upset that

Brenner handcuffed and arrested them for minor offenses. One of

these complaints (involving two citizens), was investigated and it

was determined that Brenner had not used excessive force or

violated procedure. With respect to the third citizen, there is no

evidence that she ever filed a formal complaint. The fourth

citizen formally compla ined that Brenner sprayed him with mace

during a n arrest and hit him in the mouth. This complaint,

however, was investigated by the police department and found to beNo. 99-60462

-11-

21 Conner

, 209 F.3d at 796 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris

, 489 U.S. 378,

390 (1989)).

22 Conner , 209 F.3d at 796 (quoting City of Canton , 489 U.S. at 390).

23 See Rhyne v. Henderson County

, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992) ("While

the municipal policy-maker’s failure to adopt a precaution can be the basis for

§ 1983 liability, such omission must amount to an intentional choice, not merely

an unintentionally negligent oversight.").

24 See Frair v. City of Arlington , 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992).

11 meritless.

Given the above, Hover has failed to generate a question of

material fact that the City or Chief Lewis was “deliberately

indifferent” to the need for greater training or supervision to

prevent the incorrect use of deadly force. Such a need must be

“obvious,” 21 and the failure to address the need must be “likely to

result in violations of constitutional rights,” 22 and amount to more

tha n mere negligence. 2 3 As such, deliberate indifference cannot

be inferred from these prior complaints or the police department’s

handling of them. The complaints demonstrated no obvious need for

greater training with respect to the use of deadly force, and the

formal complaints were investigated and found to be without merit.

Hover also attempted to demonstrate that the police department

had a policy of ratifying the actions of police officers regardless

of their legality. Hover inferred this from the fact that Brenner

was not disciplined for shooting H over after an internal police

inv estigation. Not only does this presuppose that Brenner’s

actions required some form of punishment, but also it impermissibly

attempts to prove the existence of an official city policy by the

observation of a single incident. 24No. 99-60462

-12-

12 Hover contends that such a policy may be inferred because

Brenner’s police file did not contain any of the mentioned citizen

complaints. As noted, however, the police did investigate two of

the three prior complaints and absolved Brenner on both. More

importantly, there was no competent summary judgment evidence that

any complaints were formally filed except for the one involving the

mace. In that instance, Brenner was absolved but the police

misfiled the complaint under the name of the comp lainant rather

than the officer, which does not indicate deliberate indifference.

Hover did provide the affidavit of a former police officer who

knew of Brenner but did not work with him. In that affidavit, the

officer stated that another police offic er told her that the

department had received complaints about Brenner in the past. That

statement, however, is inadmissible hearsay to show the existence

of any other complaints. Consequently, Hover has failed to create

a fact question regarding the existence of a policy of always

ratifying the actions of police officers either through failing to

punish Brenner or by turning a blind eye to citizen complaints.

In sum, Hover’s summary judgment evidence does not generate a

fact question as to whether the department had a policy that

explicitly authorized the use of excessive force, tre ated formal

complaints with deliberat e indifference, ratified the actions of

its officers regardless of the ir legality, or was deliberately

indifferent to the need for different or additional training in the

use of deadly force. For all of these reasons, there was no basisNo. 99-60462

-13-

25 Although not a basis for our decision, we note that t he plaintiff is

likely precluded from recovering damag e s from the municipality for another

reason. A jury found that Brenner’s actions created no constitutional violation.

Thus, even if d epartmental policy authorized unconstitutional conduct, no

municipal liability can attach when the plaintiff’s only theory i s that the

municipality is liable for the officer’s u nconstitutional conduct, since none

occurred. S ee Los Angeles v. Heller

, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); S aenz v.

Heldenfels Bros., Inc. , 183 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 1999).

Other circuits have held that municipal liability can survive for an

independent constitutional violation committed by the municipality that harms the

plaintiff. See, e.g.

, Grossman v. City of Portland

, 33 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir.

1994) (holding that even if police officers had probable cause to arrest a

plaintiff under a city ordinance, dismissal of the city was unwarranted because

city’s liability was based n ot on lack of probable cause, but on the

unconstitutionality of the ordinance, and “if the ordinance is unconstitutional,

[the plaintiff] suffered const itutional injury despite the ordinance’s

applicability to his conduct”).

Hover does not argue that an independent constitutional violation occurred

here. Instead, Hover simply argues that because the city ratified Brenner’s

actions and failed to properly train and supervise him, the city should be held

liable for Brenner’s unconstitutional use of excessive force.

13 for municipal liability and dismissal was proper. 25

AFFIRMED.