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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

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No. 10-4664

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

YAJAIRA NAVARRO,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey 

District Court No. 1-09-cr-00703-002

District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 12, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 12, 2012)

 

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 OPINION

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Yajaira Navarro was convicted in a jury trial of importing cocaine and 
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aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(2)(B) and 18 

U.S.C. § 2, and of conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 

952(a), 960(b)(2)(B), 963. Navarro timely appeals from the District Court‟s

judgment, claiming that the court erred: (1) by admitting expert testimony as to the 

street value of the imported drugs; (2) by instructing the jury on willful blindness; 

and (3) by denying Navarro‟s motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 

insufficiency of the Government‟s evidence.

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 We will affirm.

First, Navarro argues that the District Court should have excluded expert 

witness testimony about the street value of the imported cocaine both because the 

value of the drugs was not an element of the charged offenses, and because the 

testimony was unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review 

the decision to admit expert evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 269 (3d Cir. 2010). We also review the decision to 

deny a Rule 403 objection for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kemp, 500 

F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). 

Although the value of the imported cocaine was not an element of the crime, 

it supported the Government‟s theory of the case—that “drug suppliers might be 

unwilling to entrust such valuable cargo to an ignorant courier, fearing that she 

 

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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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might be insufficiently motivated to ensure that it safely reaches its destination.” 

United States v. Ayala-Tapia, 520 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2008). The District Court 

thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony as “evidence that 

may assist the trier of fact.” Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 

2008); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401, 702. Because of the probative value of this 

testimony, the District Court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarro‟s 

Rule 403 objection. 

Second, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by instructing the jury 

on willful blindness. We review for an abuse of discretion. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 

at 252. At trial, the Government provided evidence to support such an instruction 

by showing that Navarro‟s co-conspirator purchased an abnormal number of 

shampoo bottles on the last day of their trip, and that the bottles emitted a strong,

chemical odor (later discovered to be due to the presence of cocaine). This 

evidence could support the inference that Navarro “deliberately avoided „ask[ing] 

the natural follow-up question[s]‟ . . . despite [her] awareness of a high 

probability” that she was committing an illegal act. Id. at 259 (quoting United 

States v. Wertz-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, even if no such 

instruction was warranted, any error was harmless given that “„the instruction itself 

contained the proper legal standard,‟” and that there was evidence from which the 

jury could infer that Navarro had knowledge of the contents of the bottles. Id. at 
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260 n.26 (quoting United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 654 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Finally, Navarro argues that the District Court erred by denying her motion 

for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Navarro 

argues that the Government provided insufficient evidence to show that Navarro 

had the requisite mental state to sustain either the importation charge or the 

conspiracy charge. We “review[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government and must credit all available inferences in favor of the 

government.” United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). If a 

rational juror could have concluded that the Government proved its case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, we must sustain the verdict. United States v. Cartwright, 359 

F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).

While the record does not contain a “mountain of evidence,” as claimed by 

the Government, it contains sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a rational 

trier of fact to conclude that Navarro agreed to the conspiracy, and that she knew 

that the shampoo bottles contained cocaine. Specifically, a rational juror could 

have inferred an agreement and the requisite mental state from the Government‟s 

evidence that: (1) Navarro‟s expedited passport application was paid for by an 

unidentified third party; (2) Navarro lied on her expedited passport application 

about the purpose of her trip to Costa Rica; (3) Navarro was aware that her coconspirator purchased an abnormally large number of large shampoo bottles on the 
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last full day of a three night trip; (4) the bottles emitted a strong chemical odor and 

contained a thick, pasty substance; (5) identical bottles were found both in 

Navarro‟s luggage and in her co-conspirator‟s luggage, filled with approximately 

the same amount of cocaine; and (6) Navarro‟s demeanor instantly changed when 

Customs and Border Patrol began to inspect the bottles—her face turned pale, she 

was wringing her hands, her legs were shaking, and she looked “very worried.” 

We will affirm.