COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Seni or Judge Bumgardner

DWAYNE A. MILLER, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2331-08-3 PER CURIAM MARCH 24, 2009 HARRISONBURG-ROCKINGHAM SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY James V. Lane, Judge (Tracy J. Evans, II; Eldridge, Elle dge & Harding, PLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Rachel Errett Figura, Assist ant County Attorney; Warren A. Picciolo, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
On August 22, 2008, the trial court terminated the residual parental rights of Dwayne Miller, Jr., to his daughter, S.D. 1 The trial court found clear a nd convincing evidence proved the circumstances required for termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). On appeal, Miller contends the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm. Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), a trial cour t may terminate the righ ts of a parent to a child upon clear and convincing evidence that the parent, without good cause, failed to mainta in continuing contact with and to provide or substantially plan for the future of the child for a period of six months after the ch ild’s placement in foster care

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 The trial court also terminated the residua l parental rights of S.D.’s mother. We affirmed that decision in Doyle v. Harrisonburg-Rocki ngham Soc. Servs. Dist. , Record No. 2109-08-3 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2009).- 2 - notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or othe r rehabilitative agencies to communicate with the parent . . . an d to strengthen the parent-child relationship. Proof that the pare nt . . . ha[s] failed without good cause to communicate on a continui ng and planned basis with the child for a period of six months shall constitute prima facie evidence of this condition[.] Termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof that the parent, “without good cause, ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a re asonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in fo ster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate e fforts of service agencies. On appeal, we view the evidence in the “‘li ght most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasona ble inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). When reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we presume the circuit court “‘thoroughly weighe d all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.’” Id. at 265-66, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 1, 7, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005)). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 266, 616 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted)). “In its capacity as factfinder, therefore, the circuit court retains ‘broad di scretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to fo ster a child’s best interests.’” Id. (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)).- 3 - S.D., the biological child of Miller and Audra Doyle, was born on November 9, 2006. Doyle had been diagnosed with me ntal conditions requiring medicat ion and treatment, and she had no permanent home. After S.D.’s bi rth, the child lived with Doyle at a Salvation Army shelter. Social workers for Harrisonburg-Rockingham Social Services District (HRSSD) intervened with Doyle following reports of her engaging in be havior that put S.D.’s welfare at risk. On February 16, 2007, HRSSD advised Doyle she needed to find a relative to care for S.D. or the child would be placed in fo ster care. Doyle took the child to Miller, who was th en living with his girlfriend’s parents. S.D. remained in Miller’s care for less than a week . During that time the child lost weight. Miller later indicated he had not known how to feed or care for the child properly. On February 21, 20 07, Miller and Doyle met with HRSS D social worker s and discussed placing S.D. with relativ es. None of the relati ves identified by Miller or Doyle was capable or willing to take S.D. Therefore, S.D. was placed in foster care. Cheryl Dickensheets was the fost er care social worker assign ed to S.D. The foster care service plan required Miller to receive individual counseling, complete a ps ychological evaluation, maintain employment, and co nsistently participate in visitation with S.D. The service plan also required Miller, who had not maintained independen t housing as an adult, to obtain a suitable residence for hi mself and S.D. Miller left Dickensheets tele phone messages on March 12 an d 14, 2007. When Miller called Dickensheets on Ma rch 21, 2007, they disc ussed the requirements of the service plan, including that Miller obta in consistent empl oyment and remain in contact with HRSSD. During a telephone conversation on April 16, 2007, Dicken sheets gave Miller an upd ate regarding S.D.’s- 4 - welfare. Miller said he wa s looking for work and was movi ng in with hi s grandparents. 2 Miller stated that he agreed w ith the requirements of th e foster care service plan. In May 2007, Dr. Joa nne Grayson, a clinical psychologist, completed an evaluation of Miller with regard to hi s general functioning and parenting. Dr. Grayson conclude d Miller lacked the knowledge and insight require d for appropriate parenting. Dr. Grayson recommended Miller obtain individual instruction in pare nting and take a parenting class. In the course of Dr. Grayson’ s evaluation, Miller had one vis it with S.D. on May 8, 2007. Dickensheets advised Miller to contact her to schedul e visitation with S.D. after he completed the evaluation with Dr. Gray son, but he did not do so. Mille r initiated no furt her contact with Dickensheets other than leaving te lephone messages for her on May 22 , 2007 and July 13, 2007. 3 Although he subsequently attended court hearings regarding S.D., he did no t approach Dickensheets to discuss S.D. or the plans fo r her future. M iller completed none of the programs and services required by the foster care service plan or recommended by Dr. Grayson. Beginning in February 2008, Miller was incarcerated upon ch arges of carnal knowledge of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was convicted of th e offenses on June 11, 2008. Miller was sentenced to se ven years with five years and te n months su spended for the carnal knowledge offense, and received a twelve-month suspen ded sentence for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. At the time of the termination hearing on August 22, 20 08, S.D. was living with the same foster family with whom she was placed in February 2007. S.D. was thrivi ng in her foster home.

2 Miller’s grandfather had been convicted of a “barrier” crime that prevented the placement of a child in his household.

3 Miller claimed to have called Dickensheets a number of times when either he did not leave a message or her voicemail did not respond.- 5 - Miller remained incarcerated but expected to be re leased in February 200 9. Miller claimed he would be able to provide a home for S.D. within a few months of his release. Miller contends the evid ence did not s upport a termination of his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). However, the evidence proved Miller knew S.D. was placed in foster care in February 2007. Mille r had initial telephone c ontacts with Dickensheets and was aware of the requirement that he participate in the service plan. During th e course of his psychological evaluation, Miller visited with S.D. in May 2007. Yet, he did not contact Dickensh eets to arrange visitation thereafter . At the time of the term ination hearing, Miller had ha d no contact with S.D. for fifteen months. Miller’s claim that he beca me frustrated in attempting to reach Dickensheets by telephone did not constitute good ca use for his lack of contact with S.D. or failure to plan for her future. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, this Court has stated: a court must evaluate and consider many factors, including the age and physical and mental condition of the child or children; the age and physical and mental condition of the parents; the relationship existing between each parent and each child; the needs of the child or children; the role which each parent has played, and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child or children; and such other factors as are necessary in determining the best interests of the child or children. Barkey v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). S.D. is thriving in the foster home where sh e has lived since she was three months old. Although Miller claims he will be capable of providing a suitab le home for S.D. within a few months of his release from incarceration, he has demonstrated no ability to live independently. In this regard, Miller’s “‘past actions . . . over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Winfield v. Urquhart , 25 Va. App. 688, 696-97, 492 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997) (quoting Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 46, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)).- 6 - We recognize that “‘[t]he term ination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Richmond , 231 Va. 277, 280, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)). However, “[i]t is cl early not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a pare nt will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The record supports the trial court’s finding that the best interests of S.D. would be serv ed by terminating M iller’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). Miller also contends the trial court erred in terminating his residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Because we c onclude the trial court’s decision terminating Miller’s parental rights was warranted under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), we need not reach this issue. When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and, if we so find, need not address the other grounds. See Fields , 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at 659 (termination of parental rights upheld under one subsection of C ode § 16.1-283 forecloses need to consider termination unde r alternative subsections). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed. Affirmed.