4Hyatt v. United StatesNo. 98-4229States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997)(citingForest v. United States Postal Serv., 97 F.3d 137, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, “a statute does not operate‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arisingfrom conduct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsetsexpectations based on prior law.”Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269(citations omitted). Rather, we must determine whether theAct “attaches new legal consequences to events completedbefore its enactment.”Id.at 269-70. Although the eventsunderlying Hyatt’s conviction antedate the Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act, the application of the Act’slimitation period does not attach “new legal consequences toevents completed before its enactment.”Id.The limitationperiod applies to Hyatt’s filing of a motion under Section2255, which occurred after the enactment of the statute; as aresult, the application of the limitation period is prospectiveand not retroactive.See id.We recognize that even though the limitation period isprospective in application, it cannot be applied so as to bar amotion before the movant has had a reasonable opportunity tobring it.See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 527 n.21(1982) (quotingWilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63(1902)). For this reason, applying the literal language ofSection 2255 would be an unfair and severe instance ofretroactivity.See id.However, the one-year grace periodensures that any prisoner whose conviction became final priorto April 24, 1996 would have had an adequate opportunity tofile a motion under Section 2255. Therefore, we join themajority of other circuits and hold that prisoners whoseconvictions became final on or before April 24, 1996 haduntil April 24, 1997 to file their Section 2255 motions.Consequently, because Hyatt filed his Section 2255 motionafter April 24, 1997, we hold that the motion was time-barredand AFFIRM the decision of the district court.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0108P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0108p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________DAVIDL.HYATT,Petitioner-Appellant,v.UNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA,Respondent-Appellee.;>1No. 98-4229Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.No. 98-01042—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge.Submitted: October 26, 1999Decided and Filed: March 27, 2000Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH andSILER, Circuit Judges._________________COUNSELON BRIEF:Samuel A. Yannucci, ASSISTANT UNITEDSTATES ATTORNEY, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. David L.Hyatt, Coleman, Florida, pro se.2Hyatt v. United StatesNo. 98-42291Section 2255 now reads in pertinent part:A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under thissection. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;_________________OPINION_________________BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. David L. Hyattappeals the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his conviction and vacate hissentence. The district court held that his motion was untimelyunder the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996, Pub. L. No. 104-143, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996),which allows prisoners one year after their convictionsbecome final to file motions under Section 2255.On November 19, 1993, David L. Hyatt was convicted ofpossession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violationof 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He was sentenced to life inprison on January 26, 1994. We affirmed the judgment andsentence on September 9, 1995. On May 4, 1998, Hyatt fileda motion to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentenceunder 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On September 25, the district courtgranted the United States’ motion to dismiss and issued acertificate of appealability on the sole issue of whetherHyatt’s Section 2255 motion was timely. In reviewing adistrict court’s denial of a motion under Section 2255, weapply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings andreview its conclusions of lawde novo.See Nagi v. UnitedStates, 90 F.3d 130, 134 (6th Cir. 1996).The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Actamended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by adding a time-limit provisionfor Section 2255 motions. As amended, Section 2255precludes a prisoner from filing Section 2255 motions morethan one year after the conviction becomes final.1TheNo. 98-4229Hyatt v. United States3(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motioncreated by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws ofthe United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from makinga motion by such governmental action;(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognizedby the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by theSupreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateralreview; or(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claimspresented could have been discovered through the exercise of duediligence.Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act becameeffective on April 24, 1996. A majority of circuits haveinterpreted the Act to provide a one-year grace period forprisoners whose convictions became final prior to theeffective date of the Act.SeePaige v. United States, 171F.3d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1999);Goodman v. United States, 151F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998);Brown v. Angelone, 150F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1998);Mickens v. United States, 148F. 3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998);United States v. Flores, 135F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998);Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998);United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997);Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866(7th Cir. 1996),rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).Under this interpretation, such prisoners had until April 24,1997 to file motions under Section 2255. Hyatt’s convictionbecame final prior to the effective date of the Act. He filedhis Section 2255 motion on May 4, 1998, well after theexpiration of the one-year grace period. As a result, thedistrict court rightly concluded that his motion was timebarred.Hyatt argues that the retroactive application of the period oflimitations violates his due process, ex post facto, andSuspension Clause rights under the Constitution. Thesearguments are without merit. While statutory retroactivity has“long been disfavored,”Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511U.S. 244, 268 (1994), retroactivity concerns generally do notbar the application of a changed limitation period to a suit thatis filed after the amendment’s effective date.See United