CHRISDON DARNEL ALEXANDER,	 		                   Appellant,

THE STATE OF TEXAS,						           Appellee.

On appeal from the 351st District Court 

of Harris County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

	A jury found appellant, Chrisdon Darnel Alexander, guilty of capital murder, (1) and thetrial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment. (2)  By three issues, appellantchallenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, andhe complains the trial court erred by denying his requested instruction on the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery.  We affirm.

	Rodreka Thompson lived with her girlfriend, Clauthia Castrillon, known as "Coco,"at the Britmoore Apartments in Houston.  Appellant, known as "Chris," lived with them. Coco and appellant made money by selling marihuana.  The apartment had a "smokeroom," where they would measure and cut up the marihuana for sale.  Thompson testifiedthere were times when "Coco would leave amounts of cash laying around" the apartmentand appellant was "sometimes" "aware of where that cash was kept."  Coco did not trustappellant and "always hid her money."  Coco put her money in a "safe box," which she keptunder the bed.  Coco and appellant sold marihuana for about a year.  In late 2004, Cocotold appellant to leave the apartment.  After appellant moved out, he continued to comeby the apartment and talk to Coco.

	On the morning of February 7, 2005, Coco took Thompson to work and returned totheir apartment.  Between noon and 1:00 p.m. that day, LaQuietta Ayers, who also livedat the Britmoore Apartments, was in her apartment when she heard Crystal Mason bangingon her front door.  Mason, known as "Bird," was hysterical, bloody, and had duct tapearound her arms and neck.  She repeatedly told Ayers, "Chris did it."  Mason knewappellant as "Chris."

	When Officers Audie Cohn and Arturo Bazan arrived at Ayers's apartment, Masontold Officer Cohn, "Chris did it.  Go check on my friend, Coco, because she's in theapartment."  Officer Cohn found Coco's body in the living room of her apartment.  

	In the afternoon of February 7th, appellant called Rodreka Thompson, andafterwards he called Coco's sister, Noubia Castrillon.  Thompson testified appellant toldher that "three guys" came into the apartment where she and Coco lived

	and took him and Crystal [Mason] into the other room and took Coco intoone room and started duct taping them, like trying to hog tie them.  And hesaid that when he was in the other room, he tried to get away.  When the guywas trying to tie him up, he tried to get away.  So he so-called knocked himunconscious and jumped out the window is what he told me.

When the prosecutor asked her, "Did he tell you that there were three guys with guns thathad come into the apartment?", she replied, "Yes."  Thompson also testified appellant toldher, "'I got that bitch Bird, Dreka.'" (3)  That night, he called Thompson and asked her,"'Where's Coco at?'"  When she told him Coco was dead, he did not say anything.

	On cross-examination, Thompson stated she never saw appellant either threatenor act violent towards Coco.  She testified Coco's safe box was under the bed when themurder occurred.  The safe box was not taken during the incident, but that there is "nothingin it."  	

	When appellant called Castrillon, he told her, "'It's Coco.  It's Coco'" and said thathe had been at Coco's apartment.  He also said Bird (Crystal Mason)

	set them up.  And he left and he came back from the store and when hecame back from the store, he saw three men and a gun in his face.  He saidthat his life flashed before his eyes.  He told me that he stabbed Bird.  Hetold me he beat a guy up and knocked him unconscious and that he jumpedout the window.

	* * *

	Exactly he said that when he came over, he saw that Bird was there andthen when the guys came in, it's like she set them up I guess dealing withdrugs or whatever it had to do with it.  That she set them up and thatsomebody was there to rob them.

Noubia said appellant told her the three men were dressed in black and that the incidenthappened at Coco's apartment.  When Noubia told appellant Coco was dead, he did notsay anything.

	On cross-examination, counsel asked Noubia, "Tell the jury how Chris [appellant]described why he thought Bird, Crystal Mason, had set them up."  She replied, "He justbasically told me that Bird set him and my sister [Coco] up.  That's all he said."  WhenNoubia asked appellant what had happened to Coco, he told her he did not know.

	Shirley Cormier testified that on the date in question, she lived at the apartmentcomplex.  She testified that "a little after 1:00," as she went through the gate to enter theapartment complex, she saw "three guys" "going out the gate."  She stated that "[i]t lookedlike they was running, but I didn't pay too much attention. . . ."  When the prosecutor askedher if they were wearing "all black," she replied, "I really don't recall."  She said one of themwas wearing blue jeans, and another had a jogging suit.

	Mason testified appellant and Coco sold marihuana together and stored theirmarihuana in the smoke room.  On the morning of February 7, 2005, Mason received a callfrom Coco, stating she had taken Thompson to work and asking Mason to come to theirapartment.  Mason arrived at Coco's apartment sometime before 11:00 a.m.  Whenappellant showed up at the apartment, Coco asked him to go buy condoms and cigars. Coco gave him money from a stack of money located on a dresser inside the bedroom. When appellant returned, he sat on the couch while Coco and Mason went in the bedroom. Later, appellant knocked on the bedroom door.  Mason said that rather than getting out ofbed to unlock the door, she told him to unlock the door with a butter knife.  He came intothe bedroom and left without saying anything, re-locking the door.  Afterwards, he re-entered the room, apologized, and then left the bedroom, locking the door behind him.  Here-entered the bedroom again, this time with another man who pointed a revolver at Cocoand Mason.  Mason said that appellant, wearing gloves and wielding a knife and tape,asked, "[W]here the shit was."  Appellant pulled Mason out of the bedroom while the otherman kept his gun pointed at Coco.  Appellant took Mason into the smoke room, taped herhands together, and told her to get on her knees.  He taped her hands to her feet, grabbedher ponytail and began cutting her neck.  When she fell forward, the tape binding her feetbroke.  Appellant stabbed her in the side and left the room.  She escaped by jumping outthe window.

	Mason testified she later told the paramedic she did not know who had hurt herbecause she was scared "that they weren't going to find him and he was going to comeand kill me."  She stated she did not "set up" appellant with unknown men, and called it"stupid" and untrue for someone to claim that she set him up or that she "know [sic] wherethe thousands are at."  Mason admitted she had been convicted of theft in 2002 and thatthere was presently an open warrant for her arrest for writing a hot check.  She said thatshe had not been promised any special treatment by the D.A.'s office for her testimony.

Appellant's Statement to Detective Alan Brown

	Thompson and Castrillon spoke to Detectives Alan Brown and John Swaim aboutwhat had happened.  Afterwards, the detectives showed Mason a photo spread.  Sheidentified appellant as her attacker.  In the late evening of February 7th, they arrestedappellant for Coco's murder.  After waiving his Miranda (4) rights, he voluntarily agreed to giveDetective Brown an oral statement.  When the prosecutor asked Officer Brown, "[W]hat didthe Defendant tell you that was different than what Rodreka [Thompson] said?", he replied:

		That when he went to leave the apartment, the two masked menentered the apartment, both armed with guns, one had a shotgun, one hada pistol.  Then later in the statement he talks about how Crystal Mason andhimself are separated from Clauthia [Coco], who is deceased, and taken intothe--I think it's the west bedroom or the bedroom to the right where thewindow screen is knocked out.

		At that part when he's talking about that part, he says the twosuspects took him in there.  And I asked, "Who's with Coco," who is thenickname of the deceased female, and he says, "Well, no, no, no, just oneguy.  He gets his story back straight and he says, "No, just one guy is withme and he's got a knife."

		And I asked, "Where did the pistol go," and he doesn't know wherethe pistol went.  Then he talks about the supposed other suspects--suspectputs the knife on top of the T.V. and when he does that, that he, thedefendant, starts hitting him and beating him up.  And they start, what is hiswords, tussling all over the room.  Well, the room--the room where thisoccurred, there's pictures lined up on a windowsill across the room, there'sa futon bed, there's a table and there's a T.V. on a stand.  There wasdefinitely no fight between two men in this room because nothing is disturbedin the room except for where Crystal Mason went out the window where theblood is in front of the window and the blinds and the screen is kicked out.

		When he's talking about it, he says he has the knife in his hand--hesays the guy puts the knife on top of the T.V. and that's when he hits himand they start tussling and he says, "I hit him one last time."  And he's realdramatic, you know, he makes noises, like, (indicating) I hit him, and he saysI stunned him really hard and he dropped the knife.  

		And I said, "Well, I thought you said he put the knife on top of theT.V.," and he said, "Well, he must have grabbed it back.  Somewhere in thistussle he must have grabbed it back."

		So he says that once he stabs Crystal Mason in the side, he goes outthe window, leaving her there.  So I clarify with him that he never went backinto the apartment, he never went back into the front rooms, that after hestabbed her and went out the window, he never returned back into any ofthose rooms.  And he said no, that's because he had a cut on his hand.

		And I knew we had taken blood samples from various parts of thatroom, in the kitchen, where Ms. Castrillon's [Coco's] body was, the roomwhere this--where Ms. Mason was stabbed.  So we took all these variousblood samples from these places.  So his blood and his DNA should notshow up back in that room.  And it did.

Asked whether appellant mentioned that he had stabbed Mason because he thought shehad "set him up or something like that," he replied, "Yes," "he said he stabbed her and leftthe knife" "in that room."  The prosecutor questioned Officer Brown as follows:

	Q.  Now, looking at State's Exhibit 69, do you see on that exhibit, . . . theeast wall of the living room?

	A.  Yes, sir.

	Q.  How close is that to the Complainant's [Coco's] body?

	A.  [T]hree feet.

	Q.  And you also see a cabinet there in the kitchen there in one whatever?

	A.  Yes, sir.

	* * *

	Q.  [D]id you verify that the Defendant's blood, the Defendant's DNA waslocated on that east wall [of the living room] and in the kitchen?

	A.  Yes.

	Q.  Now, is that inconsistent--is that inconsistent, Officer Brown, with hisclaim that this tussle went on in the smoke room and that he had cut hishand fighting with this knife?

	A. Yes.

	Q.  Did he ever tell you that he had been involved in any kind of a fight orconfrontation in either of the front room, the kitchen or the dining room?

	A.  No, sir, just that one bedroom.

Appellant told Officer Brown the assailants were dressed in "all black."

The Forensic Evidence

	Officer Glenn Riddle collected blood samples and retrieved evidence from the crimescene.  He found blood on the steps leading up to Coco's apartment and on the outsidedoorknob of her apartment's front door.  Inside her apartment, he found blood on thekitchen counter, kitchen cabinet, and on the kitchen-stove knobs.  He said three or fourrags had been placed on the stove top "that would appear to be an attempt to start a fire." He found a steak knife (5) on the dining-room floor.  The blade's tip was bent, and the bladehad blood on it.  He testified, "It appeared that the knife had been used with some forceon something or somebody."  He found a small sawed-off shotgun in between the mattressand box springs of the bed in the east bedroom (Coco's bedroom).  He found a large poolof blood on the carpet next to a window in the smoke room (the west bedroom).  He founda "pattern of cast-off blood spatter" (6) towards the bottom of an open closet door.  He saidthis spatter "could be consistent with someone . . . jumping out that window" "[a]nd havinglaid on the floor there for enough of a period of time for that blood pool to collect in thecarpet."  Appellant's fingerprints were not found at the scene.  However, Officer Riddle saidthis did not mean appellant was not there.

	Jennifer Otto, a forensic DNA analyst, (7) tested the blood samples collected at thecrime scene.  She obtained "a full female DNA profile" from blood found on a step outsideof Coco's apartment.  This DNA profile matched the profile obtained from Coco.  A "fullmale profile" was obtained from blood obtained from a kitchen-cabinet door.  This DNAprofile matched appellant's DNA profile.  A blood sample taken from the east wall of theliving room matched appellant's DNA profile.  Otto found appellant's blood on cuttings fromappellant's boxer shorts and pants.  A blood sample taken from the windowsill of the westbedroom matched Mason's DNA profile.  Blood taken from the steak knife's blade matchedMason's profile.  With respect to blood taken from a roll of duct tape found at the scene,Otto said the blood had "a mixture of DNA.  The reference from Mason is consistent withthe major component" and that "[h]er profile was found on the roll of duct tape."

	On cross-examination, Otto testified that based upon how the blood samples werepackaged and stored before she received them, she could not say there was no crosscontamination of the samples.  In her opinion, Coco's blood was on a kitchen-stove knob,the kitchen counter, and on the outside doorknob of the front door to the apartment.  Ottodid not find Coco's or Mason's blood on appellant's arms.

The Autopsy Results

	Dr. Anna Lopez, a forensic pathologist at the Harris County Medical Examiner'sOffice, supervised Coco's autopsy.  She testified Coco had a total of eight cuts on her faceand neck, indicating an attempt to cut open her throat.  She also had a cut on her rightwrist, which Dr. Lopez described as a defensive wound.  Coco had two gunshot entrancewounds, one on her right cheek and the other on her forehead.  Both wounds weresurrounded by soot and strippling, indicating a close range of fire.  The bullet that hadentered the cheek had lodged inside the left parietal lobe of the brain, and the bullet thathad entered the forehead was lodged under the scalp in the back of the head.  When theprosecutor asked Dr. Lopez whether the bullets could have come from a shotgun, shereplied, "[T]hese are bullets.  And it's completely different from a shotgun injury."  Typicallyin a shotgun wound, she would find several smaller pellets as well as the shotgun wadding. Dr. Lopez explained that a shotgun wound would have produced more "distortion" to thefacial tissues and bone.

	Dr. Lopez said the cause and manner of death was a homicide caused by gunshotwounds to the head and sharp-force injuries to the head and neck.  She explained thatwhile the gunshot wounds were the "main" cause of death, the cuts to Coco's face andneck "caused significant bleeding," and thus Dr. Lopez had listed the cuts as a cause ofdeath.  Asked whether the cuts alone could have killed Coco, Dr. Lopez said that, whilenone of the major blood vessels had been cut, left untreated for long enough, the cutscould have led to death.  When the prosecutor asked her whether Coco's wounds couldhave been caused by two different people, she replied, "[I]t's possible" because there weretwo gunshot wounds and there were wounds from two different weapons.  The prosecutorthen asked whether Coco, after being shot in the face, could have been able to place herown blood on the stove or the stairs, Dr. Lopez said no.

	On cross-examination, Dr. Lopez testified she could not tell whether the gunshotwounds or stab wounds had come first, and said that it would be impossible to determinethat based on an autopsy.

	Appellant did not testify at trial and no defense testimony was offered.

1. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

	In issues one and two, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of theevidence to support his conviction for capital murder.  In reviewing the legal sufficiency ofthe evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorableto the verdict in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found theessential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.307, 319 (1979); Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  Thisstandard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in thetestimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts toultimate facts.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.  The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weightand credibility of the evidence.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979);Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  Thus, when performinga legal sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidenceand substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.  Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735,740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  We must resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favorof the judgment.  Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

	When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence ina neutral light, favoring neither party.  Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim.App. 2006); Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  We will setaside the verdict only if:  (1) the evidence supporting the conviction, although legallysufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrong andmanifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of theevidence.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim.App. 2000).  We cannot conclude a conviction is "clearly wrong" or "manifestly unjust"simply because we would have voted to acquit.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.  In otherwords, we may not simply substitute our judgment for the fact-finder's judgment.  Johnson,23 S.W.3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  To reversefor factual sufficiency, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that thegreat weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the verdict.  Watson, 204S.W.3d at 417.  In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we defer to the fact-finder'sdetermination of the credibility of the evidence.  Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97(Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

The Law of Capital Murder

	As charged in this case, a person commits capital murder if he or she commitsmurder as defined under section 19.02(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code and, inter alia, theperson intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting tocommit robbery.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  A personcommits murder if he or she "intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual." Id. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003).  A person commits robbery if, in the course of committingtheft, as defined in Chapter 31 of the Texas Penal Code, and with intent to obtain ormaintain control of property, he or she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodilyinjury to another, or intentionally or knowingly places another in fear of imminent bodilyinjury or death.  Id. § 29.02(a).  Theft is the unlawful appropriation of property with theintent to deprive the owner of the property.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp.2007).  A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his or her conduct when it ishis or her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003).

	Circumstantial evidence, by itself, may be enough to support a jury's verdict. Kutzner v. State, 994 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Smith v. State, 965S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  It is not necessary that every fact point directlyand independently to the defendant's guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted bythe combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.  Barnes v. State,876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

The Law of Parties

	The charge included an instruction on the law of parties.  "A person is criminallyresponsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by theconduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both."  Tex. Penal CodeAnn. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003).  A person is criminally responsible for an offense committedby the conduct of another if:  (2) "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission ofthe offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person tocommit the offense."  Id. § 7.02(a)(2).  "Each party to an offense may be charged withcommission of the offense."  Id. § 7.01(b).

	While the presence of an accused at the scene of an offense is not alone sufficientto support a conviction, it is a circumstance tending to prove guilt, which, combined withother facts, may suffice to show that the accused was a participant.  Beardsley v. State,738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  Further, participation in an enterprise maybe inferred from circumstances and need not be shown by direct evidence.  Id. at 684.

In this case, a rational jury could have determined the following from the evidence: (1) appellant lived in the same apartment as Coco and Thompson and moved out in late2004; (2) Coco and appellant made money selling marihuana together; (3) Coco left moneylaying around the apartment and, on the day of the murder, she gave him money to buycondoms and cigars from a stack of money on the dresser; (4) Coco kept her money in asafe box under her bed; (5) Coco stored marihuana in the smoke room; (6) while Coco andMason were in Coco's bedroom, (7) appellant entered the bedroom with another man whopointed a revolver at them; appellant asked, "Where the shit was;" (8) the safe box wasunder the bed when Coco was murdered; (9) the safe box was not taken during theincident, but after the murder, there was nothing in the safe box; (10) Coco died from twogunshot wounds to the face; (11) appellant said that he had stabbed Crystal Mason; (12)Mason denied that she had set up appellant; and (13) after the incident, appellant left thescene. 

	Controverting evidence showed that:  (1) appellant claimed Mason had set up Cocoand himself for a robbery perpetrated by either two or three male subjects; (2)  appellant'sblood was found in Coco's apartment, on his pants, and on his boxers, indicating he wasinjured during the incident; (3) no one saw who killed Coco; (4) no one saw appellant or theman with the revolver take anything from Coco's apartment; (5) appellant's fingerprintswere not found in the apartment; (6) appellant had never previously threatened Coco noracted violently towards her; and (7) three men were seen leaving the apartment complexcontemporaneous to the time of the incident. 

	The jury was entitled to disbelieve appellant's statements that Mason had set upCoco and appellant to be robbed by two or three men.  See Margraves, 34 S.W.3d at 919;see also Roy v. State, 997 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidenceis legally sufficient for a rational jury to find appellant guilty of capital murder, either as aparty or acting alone, beyond a reasonable doubt.  We also conclude that the evidencesupporting the conviction is not so weak that the fact-finder's determination is clearly wrongand manifestly unjust, or that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance ofthe evidence.  Issues one and two are overruled.

2. Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

	In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the juryon the lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery.  Whether one offense is a lesser-included offense of another is determined by application of article 37.09 of the Texas Codeof Criminal Procedure.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09.  The court of criminalappeals recently clarified the two-step analysis to be used in applying article 37.09.  Hallv. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 534-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  In the first step, the elementsof the offense as alleged in the indictment are compared to the statutory elements of thepotential lesser-included offense.  Id. at 535-36.  If the elements of the lesser offense couldbe established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish thecommission of the charged offense, then the analysis moves to the second step.  Id. at536-37.  Here, the parties agree that under the circumstances of this case, aggravatedrobbery was a lesser-included offense of capital murder.  We therefore move toconsideration of the second analytical step.

	In the second step, the evidence adduced at trial must be reviewed to determine ifthere is some evidence to support instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense.  Id. In order to support submission of the lesser-included offense, the evidence must includeproof of the lesser offense, and the evidence must show that if the defendant is guilty, heor she is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.  Id. (citing Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).  Submission of a lesser-included offense is not requiredsimply because the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense;rather, there must be some evidence directly germane to the lesser-included offensebefore an instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted.  Hampton v. State, 109S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

	Rather than pointing to evidence affirmatively demonstrating that he committed onlyaggravated robbery, appellant argues there is no evidence to show he killed Coco and thata rational jury could have had a reasonable doubt about whether he could have anticipatedthat the man with the revolver would kill Coco.  However, while this point may have causedthe jury to closely consider what appellant did know before Coco's murder (e.g., that theywere going to commit a robbery and that the other man was armed with a pistol), it doesnot constitute evidence directly germane to the lesser-included offense, which suggestsif appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.  Contrary to appellant'sassertion that this evidence shows he did not have reason to anticipate that murder mayoccur in the course of the aggravated robbery, it demonstrates instead that appellant in factknew that they were going to commit robbery armed with a deadly weapon.  See, e.g.,Love v. State, 199 S.W.3d 447, 454-55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd)(holding that defendant's participation in robbery with knowledge that co-conspirator mightuse a gun in committing the robbery was sufficient to sustain conviction for capital murderunder the law of parties). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third issue.

	We affirm the trial court's judgment.

							ROSE VELA	

							Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 12th day of June, 2008.

1. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2007).

2. See Id. §§ 12.31 (Vernon 2003), 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 2007).

3. "Dreka" is Rodreka Thompson's nickname.   

4. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5. This knife was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 203.

6. When the prosecutor asked Officer Riddle to explain what he meant by "blood spatter," he stated,"Blood that is projected or cast off of something, rather than transferred."  When the prosecutor asked him,"Would that be consistent with somebody who is moving quickly or in some form of motion trying to go fromone point to another?", he replied, "It could be, yes."

7. Jennifer Otto  worked for Identigene, a Houston-based forensic and paternity DNA testing company.