RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0313-WC

LETCHER COUNTY BOARD OF 

EDUCATION 

APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2020-CA-1404

WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 2015-01407

ROGER HALL; HONORABLE 

CHRISTINA D. HAJJAR, 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; 

DAVID NARRAMORE, DMD; 

RAWLINGS AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC; 

AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 

BOARD 

APPELLEES 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG

AFFIRMING

Roger Hall suffered a work-related injury after being exposed to asbestoscontaining material while working for the Letcher County Board of Education 

(Letcher County). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the 

Department of Workers’ Claims has jurisdiction to hear Hall’s claim, that Hall 

is permanently and totally disabled and is entitled to medical benefits. As to 

jurisdiction, the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of 

Appeals affirmed the ALJ. After careful review, we affirm.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is Letcher County’s second appeal to this Court. In Letcher County 

Board of Education v. Hall, 576 S.W.3d 123, 125-26 (Ky. 2019), we described 

the relevant underlying facts as follows: 

Hall was employed as a teacher at Letcher County High 

School beginning in 1976 until he retired in 2003. Over the course 

of his career, he physically worked in two different school 

buildings—the old high school, and the new high school. The boiler 

room located in the old high school building was used as a 

breakroom for teachers. It contained furniture and vending 

machines.

Hall was subsequently transferred to the new Letcher 

County High School, which was completed in 1992 and was 

located across the street from the old school, which then became 

the elementary school. However, he and other teachers continued 

to use the boiler room at the old high school as a 

breakroom/lunchroom. Hall remained employed at the new high 

school until his retirement in 2003. He occasionally worked as a 

substitute teacher until 2014.

Hall filed his Form 102-OD on September 4, 2015, alleging 

that he developed mesothelioma in his abdominal area after being 

exposed to asbestos over the course of his employment. Hall had 

been treated by multiple physicians across the county as a result 

of this exposure. He underwent two hernia surgeries, one cytoreductive surgery and chemotherapy.

The ALJ concluded that Hall’s mesothelioma was caused by 

his exposure to asbestos during his course of employment. 

However, the ALJ ultimately determined that Hall’s claim was 

untimely filed pursuant to [Kentucky Revised Statute] KRS 

342.316(4)(a) which provides:

The right to compensation under this chapter resulting 

from an occupational disease shall be forever barred 

unless a claim is filed with the commissioner within 

three (3) years after the last injurious exposure to the 

occupational hazard or after the employee first 

experiences a distinct manifestation of an occupational 

disease . . . .

However, the right to compensation for any 

occupational disease shall be forever barred, unless 
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a claim is filed with the commissioner within five 

(5) years from the last injurious exposure to the 

occupational hazard, except that, in cases of 

radiation disease, asbestos-related disease, or a 

type of cancer specified in KRS 61.315(11)(b), a 

claim must be filed within twenty (20) years from 

the last injurious exposure to the occupational 

hazard.

In applying this provision, the ALJ determined that although 

Hall had satisfied the three-year manifestation date, he failed to 

timely file his claim within twenty years of his last exposure to 

asbestos. The ALJ specifically found that Hall’s last injurious 

exposure to asbestos occurred in 1990, when the asbestos 

insulation was removed from the boiler room. Therefore, his 

workers' compensation benefits claim was dismissed.

The Board reversed based on testimonial evidence indicating 

that although much of the asbestos was removed from the boiler 

room in 1990, the boiler room tiles—which also contained 

asbestos—were not removed until Hall retired in 2003, or 

sometime subsequent thereto. Therefore, the Board held that the 

statute of limitations was satisfied, and that Hall’s claim could 

proceed. Letcher County appealed, and the Court of Appeals 

unanimously affirmed.

This Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the ALJ erred by 

finding that Hall’s claim was time barred under KRS 342.316(4)(a). Id. at 126. 

There was asbestos-containing tile in the school when Hall retired in 2003 and 

at the time of a maintenance supervisor’s deposition in 2016, meaning Hall was 

further exposed to asbestos while working for Letcher County as a substitute 

teacher intermittently after his 2003 retirement and until 2014. Id. at 125, 

127. The Court noted that the issue before it was “not whether Hall’s exposure 

to the tiles caused his mesothelioma. Rather, the statute requires only that 

exposure could independently cause the disease—not that it did in fact cause 

the disease.” Id. at 127. (quotation and citation omitted). Because the 
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asbestos-containing materials were “present in the school until 2003 and 

beyond[,]” and the statute requires that a claimant file a claim within twenty 

years of last injurious exposure, the ALJ’s decision was clear error. Id. This 

Court remanded the case to the ALJ for resolution of all remaining issues, 

namely whether Hall was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. 

On July 26, 2019, the ALJ concluded that Hall developed asbestosis due 

to asbestos exposure while working for Letcher County. However, the ALJ later 

sustained Letcher County’s petition for reconsideration, finding that the award 

of medical benefits was premature. During the ALJ’s initial consideration of 

Hall’s claim in February 2016, the ALJ bifurcated the claim to first determine 

whether Hall’s claim was barred by KRS 342.316(4)(a). Therefore, the ALJ 

reasoned that the parties did not have a full opportunity to submit evidence on 

all contested issues. Over Hall’s objection, the ALJ reopened proof and allowed 

the parties to submit additional evidence on the contested issues. Ultimately, 

on April 9, 2020, the ALJ concluded that Hall is permanently and totally 

disabled because of his asbestos exposure and awarded benefits and medical 

expenses. 

On remand, Letcher County also contested whether the Department of 

Workers’ Claims has jurisdiction over Hall’s claim, suggesting instead that the 

Board of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. The Board of Claims hears and 

decides negligence claims filed against any Kentucky state government agency. 

Letcher County relies on KRS 49.070(16), which provides, in relevant part, that 
5

any claim against a school district board of education for damages resulting 

from asbestos exposure shall be brought before the Board of Claims. 

Despite Letcher County’s argument, the ALJ concluded that the 

Department of Workers’ Claims has jurisdiction, reasoning that nothing 

prohibits school employees from filing a claim against his or her employer for 

work-related injuries. The ALJ relied on KRS 49.130(2) which states that any 

damage award in the Board of Claims must be reduced by payment or right to 

receive payment from workers’ compensation insurance. The ALJ determined 

that this subsection indicates that the Board of Claims is not the exclusive 

remedy for an injured employee. 

On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), the Board 

upheld the ALJ’s finding that the Department of Workers’ Claims has 

jurisdiction, concluding that nothing in KRS 49.0201 thwarts the right of an 

employee to proceed in a claim against his or her employer pursuant to the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. That statute specifically notes that the purpose of 

the Board of Claims is to consider damages sustained as a result of negligence 

on the part of the Commonwealth. The Board also emphasized the mandatory 

reduction of a Board of Claims award based on payment of workers’ 

compensation insurance. Despite Letcher County’s reliance on KRS 

1 Letcher County cites to KRS 44.070(1), which is a previous statute governing 

the Board of Claims. While the appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended 

and renumbered sections of KRS Chapter 49. KRS 44.070(1), as it existed prior to the 

amendments, contained nearly identical language that is now found in KRS 

49.070(16), which states that claims against the Commonwealth for damages 

sustained from asbestos exposure in facilities owned, leased, occupied, or operated by 

the state must be brought before the Board of Claims. 
6

49.070(16), which requires that claims against a school district board of 

education for damages resulting from asbestos exposure shall be brought 

before the Board of Claims, the Board reasoned that the subsection applied to 

third parties, not injured employees. 

The Court of Appeals likewise held that the Board of Claims does not 

have exclusive jurisdiction over Hall’s claim. His injury is work-related, and 

state agencies, including school boards, are subject to the Workers’ 

Compensation Act. State employees are not required to bring workers’ 

compensation claims against state employers in the Board of Claims and to 

require such would defeat the purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The 

Court of Appeals also noted that in 2015 a Letcher County trial court 

dismissed Hall’s civil suit against the school board, reasoning that Hall’s claim 

was work related and therefore his exclusive remedy was to file a workers’ 

compensation claim.2

ANALYSIS

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Department of 

Workers’ Claims has jurisdiction to hear Hall’s claim. Resolution of this issue 

requires statutory interpretation and therefore our review is de novo. Consol of 

Ky., Inc. v. Goodgame, 479 S.W.3d 78, 81 (Ky. 2015). When interpreting a 

statute, this Court

2 We note that the Court of Appeals also addressed other issues in its opinion, 

including whether Letcher County is liable for certain medical expenses and whether 

the Board erred in its assessment of the interest rate on any amounts due and unpaid. 

However, neither party addresses these issues in their briefs to this Court, so we 

decline to address them. 
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must look first to the plain language of a statute and, if the 

language is clear, our inquiry ends. We hold fast to the rule of 

construction that the plain meaning of the statutory language is 

presumed to be what the legislature intended, and if the meaning 

is plain, then the court cannot base its interpretation on any other 

method or source. In other words, we assume that the Legislature 

meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant.

Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017) (quotations and 

citations omitted). 

Letcher County is correct in asserting that jurisdiction must exist before 

an ALJ has authority to decide a workers’ compensation claim, but we disagree 

with its assertion that exclusive jurisdiction over Hall’s claim lies with the 

Board of Claims. Jurisdiction is a procedural threshold through which all 

cases must pass prior to having their substance examined. Wilson v. Russell, 

162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005). But contrary to Letcher County’s argument, 

we conclude that the Department of Workers’ Claims has jurisdiction over 

Hall’s claim. 

The Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act, codified as KRS Chapter 342, 

is a statutory system specifically designed to compensate an injured worker for 

economic loss sustained as a result of work-related injury or disease. As we 

explained in Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Ky. 2022):

The primary purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act is to aid 

injured or deceased workers and statutes are to be interpreted in a 

manner that is consistent with their beneficent purpose. The 

overarching purpose of the workers’ compensation chapter is to 

compensate workers who are injured in the course of their 

employment for necessary medical treatment and for a loss of 

wage-earning capacity, without regard to fault, thereby enabling 

them to meet their essential economic needs and those of their 

dependents.
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(quotations and citations omitted). Generally, workers’ compensation is an 

exclusive remedy. “If an employer secures payment of compensation as 

required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall 

be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee

. . . on account of such injury or death.” KRS 342.690(1). “Essentially, 

the exclusive remedy provision grants immunity for liability arising from 

common law and statutory claims, meaning such claims cannot be pursued in 

the courts of this Commonwealth.” Ky. Emps. Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S.W.3d 

9, 13 (Ky. 2007). 

The exclusivity provision of KRS 342.690(1) has existed since the 

Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted in 1916. Travelers Indem. Co. v. 

Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 759 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted). KRS 342.395(3) 

also provides that unless an employee “opts out” of workers’ compensation by 

filing a written notice of rejection, “the measure of liability of the employer shall 

be determined according to the compensation provisions of this chapter.” This 

Court has held that “KRS 342.690(1) and its predecessor statutes shield a 

covered employer and its insurer from any other liability to a covered employee 

for damages arising out of a work-related injury.” Travelers Indem. Co., 100 

S.W.3d at 760. 

The Office of Claims and Appeals, which is part of the Public Protection 

Cabinet, includes various administrative boards such as the Board of Claims. 

KRS 49.010(2). The Board of Claims has authority to “investigate, hear proof, 

and compensate persons for damages sustained to either person or 
9

property as a proximate result of negligence on the part of the 

Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies . . . .” 

KRS 49.020(5) (emphasis added). Additionally, KRS 49.040(1) states that 

“[r]egardless of any provision of law to the contrary, the jurisdiction of the 

Board of Claims is exclusive . . . .” (Emphasis added). The Board of Claims 

members are appointed by the Governor and must be attorneys with the same 

qualifications as a candidate for circuit judge. KRS 49.020(6)(e). Additionally, 

two members must have “a background and working knowledge in 

Kentucky tort law” and one member must have a business background. Id. 

(emphasis added). 

The General Assembly included a provision in the Board of Claims 

statutes explaining its intent: 

It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide the means to 

enable a person negligently injured by the Commonwealth, any of 

its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any of its 

officers, agents, or employees while acting within the scope of their 

employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, 

departments, bureaus, or agencies to be able to assert their just 

claims as herein provided.

KRS 49.060. Allowing negligence claims to proceed in the Board of Claims 

constitutes an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. Pursuant to KRS 

49.130(1), an award can only be made if “the Board of Claims is of the opinion 

that the damage claimed was caused by such negligence on the part of the 

Commonwealth or its agents as would entitle claimant to a judgment in an 

action at law if the state were amenable to such action.”
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KRS 49.070(16) states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny claim against. . .a 

school district board of education . . . for damages sustained as a result of 

exposure to asbestos . . . shall be brought before the Board of Claims.” While 

the Board of Claims statute refers to asbestos-related claims, this statute 

applies to anyone who sustains damages caused by exposure to asbestos, not 

merely an employee. This could include a host of people – an independent 

contractor who is performing services in a school, a visitor attending a sports 

event, or a volunteer donating their time in a classroom. KRS 49.070(16) 

clearly pertains to third parties, not claims by employees. 

Letcher County argues that KRS Chapter 49’s use of “any claim” 

necessarily includes claims by anyone on school board property, including 

employees.3 But, nevertheless, KRS 49.060 specifically involves negligence 

claims and emphasizes that the Board of Claims was created to provide a 

forum for persons negligently injured by the Commonwealth to assert their 

claims. An important distinction between a claim brought before the Board of 

Claims and a workers’ compensation claim is fault. In a negligence claim 

before the Board of Claims, a claimant must prove that one party (the state) is 

at fault for its damages. However, under our workers’ compensation system, 

“[e]very employer subject to [KRS Chapter 342] shall be liable for compensation 

3 We also note that there are numerous workers’ compensation cases 

considered by this Court involving boards of education. See e.g. Perry Cnty. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Campbell, 2023 WL 2623026, No. 2022-SC-0119-WC, at *1 (Ky. Mar. 23, 

2023); Clark Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Jacobs, 278 S.W.3d 140 (Ky. 2009); Jefferson Cnty.

Pub. Schs./Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Stephens, 208 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2006). 
11

for injury, occupational disease, or death without regard to fault as the cause 

of the injury, occupational disease, or death.” KRS 342.610(1). 

Under the facts of Hall’s case, a claim under the Workers’ Compensation 

Act and a claim under KRS Chapter 49 are two different types of claims with 

two different avenues of redressability – a claim for a work-related injury by a 

state employee against his state employer (with no regard to fault), and a claim 

by a citizen against a state entity in which the claimant must prove negligence, 

and therefore fault, on the part of the state entity. There is no basis to 

conclude that the Board of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over negligence claims 

against the Commonwealth requires Hall to bring his workers’ compensation 

claim before the Board of Claims. Simply put, Hall’s request for a workers’ 

compensation remedy requires no showing of negligence and in no way 

constitutes a claim for “damages sustained . . . as a proximate result of 

negligence on the part of the Commonwealth . . . .” KRS 49.020(5). His 

workers’ compensation claim therefore does not fall within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Board of Claims.

In General Electric Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Ky. 2007), plaintiffs 

claimed they contracted occupational diseases due to asbestos exposure while 

working for their employer on premises owned by various businesses 

(“owners”). The Court considered whether the “exclusive remedy” provision in 

KRS 342.690(1) “immunizes the owners from tort liability for the occupational 

diseases that the plaintiffs claim were caused by the owners’ respective 
12

negligent acts or omissions.” Id. In determining whether the trial court or the 

jury must decide if the owners were statutory employers, the Court stated: 

[t]he plaintiffs' tort claims are a kind of case that comes within a 

circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction. But if [Plaintiff] was 

injured while working as a premises owner's employee under KRS 

342.610(2)(b), that jurisdictional fact would deprive the circuit 

court of subject matter jurisdiction by operation 

of KRS 342.690(1).

Id. at 589.

While that case did not involve a state employer, its sound reasoning 

regarding the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act 

nevertheless applies. “The primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act 

is to aid injured or deceased workers. We are required to interpret the workers’ 

compensation statutes in a manner that is consistent with their beneficent 

purpose.” Ky. Uninsured Emps. Fund v. Hoskins, 449 S.W.3d 753, 762 (Ky. 

2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Workers’ Compensation was 

specifically designed to compensate injured employees, regardless of fault, and 

requiring an injured employee to initiate and prove a negligence claim before 

the Board of Claims directly contradicts the Act and its purpose. 

As explicitly stated in KRS 342.630(2), school boards are considered 

“employers” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Likewise, “[e]very 

person in the service of the state or any . . . county, city of any class, school 

district . . . while performing his official duties shall be considered an employee 

of the state.” KRS 342.640(3). The Workers’ Compensation Act also recognizes 

asbestos-related disease claims by stating the statute of limitations period 

applicable to such claims. KRS 342.316(4). The specific inclusion of asbestos 
13

claims in the Workers’ Compensation Act further emphasizes the validity of 

Hall’s claim and the proper jurisdiction exercised by the Department of 

Workers’ Claims. Because Hall and Letcher County are considered an 

employee and an employer, respectively, by statute, Hall is entitled to the 

benefits and protections created by the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Letcher County argues that KRS Chapter 342 is “general legislation that 

applies broadly and generally to injuries to school board employees.” It asserts 

that KRS Chapter 49 is specific legislation that only applies in limited cases 

involving claims against school boards for asbestos exposure. Conversely, it 

argues that KRS Chapter 342 applies to a smaller class of individuals than 

KRS Chapter 49 and the Board of Claims procedures. To the contrary, the 

Board of Claims hears negligence claims submitted by any citizen seeking 

compensation for damages sustained to person or property resulting from 

negligence on part of the Commonwealth or its agencies, departments, or state 

employees. A person can only file a workers’ compensation claim if they 

sustain a work-related injury “arising out of and in the course of employment 

. . . .” KRS 342.0011(1). Our rules of statutory construction provide that 

“where there is both a specific statute and a general statute seemingly 

applicable to the same subject . . . the specific statute controls.” Abel v. Austin, 

411 S.W.3d 728, 738 (Ky. 2013) (quotation and citations omitted). While both 

chapters contain provisions regarding asbestos-related claims for damages, the 

Workers’ Compensation Act is undoubtedly more specific than the Board of 

Claims statutes. As such, Letcher County’s argument fails. 
14

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Department of Workers’ 

Claims has jurisdiction over Hall’s case involving work-related asbestos 

exposure and resulting in injury. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., sitting. 

All concur. Thompson, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

W. Barry Lewis

Lewis and Lewis Law Offices

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, ROGER HALL: 

Daniel F. Dotson

The Law Office of Daniel F. Dotson

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Christina D. Hajjar

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Hon. Michael Wayne Alvey, Chairman