The c urre nt Publi c Printer is substituted as the par ty defe ndant under

Fe d. R. Civ. 1 P. 25(d). UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

____________________________________ ) KE I THB . WI L L IAM S, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civ il A c tio n N o. 08 -1 65 4 ( RWR) ) ROBERT C. TAPEL LA, Public Printer, ) United States Gover

nment Printing Off

ice, ) ) De fe nd ant. ) ____________________________________)
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiff bring s this employ ment discrimination action ag ainst the Public Printer, United 1 States Governme nt Printi ngOffic e, and de fenda nt moves to dismi ss or, in the alternative for summary judgme nt. On the basis of de fenda nt’s motion, plainti ff’ s opposition, and the entire
rec ord of this ca se, def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss will be denied, a nd his summary

judgme nt motion will be grante d. I . BA CKGROUND Plaintiff was employed as a Police Offic er w ith the Governme nt Printi ngOffic e (“ GPO”). SeeD e f
. ’ s M e m . o f

P
. & A
. i nS u

p p . o f M o t . t o D i s m i s s o r , i nth e A l t e r n at i v e , f o r S um m . J. (“D ef.’ s Mot.”), Troupe Dec l. ¶ 2. The phy sical dema nds of the position included “e x tended periods of standingand wa lking while on post or pa trol duty [and] [s] ome trave ling be tween Fe dera l ag encie s within the W ashing ton Metropolitan are a.” T roupe D ecl., Ex. 1 (September 21, 2004 letter fr om A.L . Troupe, Chief , Workers’ Compensation B ranc h, GPO), Attac h. (Position De sc ri pti on

fo r A g e nc y

Pos iti on No . 0 17 27 7) at 5. “ On

Au gus t 25 , 2 00 3, [pla int if f] i nju re d h is2

ba c k whil e on

the job
. . . a

nd ma de a c la im t o th e Of

fi c e of Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns atio n Pr ogra ms (‘OWCP’) for w ag e loss for total disability .” Id. ¶ 2. The GPO re ceive d a medica l report f rom Charles J. Az zam, M.D., a neurolog ist retained to evaluate plaintiff for pur poses of his worke rs’ c ompensation claim. Troupe Dec l., Ex . 1. Dr. Azz am’s re port indicated that plaintiff had re ache d his max imum level of improvement, that he could not return to his usual job, and that he could work a n eight-hour day

with permane nt restric tions. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dis miss or, in the Alternative, f or Summ. J ., Sup ple me nta l T ro up e De c l., Ex. 1 (Augus t 26 , 2 00 4 Wo rk Ca pa c ity Ev a luatio n) . Pl a int if

f c ou ld sit or walk for f

our hours pe r day

and stand for

two hours per

day , and it was re commended that he take a 15-minute bre ak eve ry two hours. Id. Inad d i t i o n , p l ai n t i ff wa s t o l i m i ttwi s t i n g, bending , stooping, squatting , kneeling , climbing, pushing , pulling and liftingactivities, and wa s to limi t operating a

motor vehicle at work. Id. Plaintiff was to avoid pushing , pulling or lifting objects we ighingmore than 40 pounds. Id. On the belief that plaintiff’s then- curr ent position as a Police Of

fice r met these limitations, the GPO offe red pla intiff a Police Of fice r position at the Main GPO Buildingat an a nnual salar

y of $46,300, ava ilable as of O ctober 11, 2004. Troupe Dec l., Ex . 1. On Oc tob e r 7 , 2 00 4, pla int if f r e fu se d th e Pol ic e Of

fi c e r p os iti on

on the g ro un d th at hi s doctor, Ga

ry C. Dennis, M.D., dee med him totally disabled and una

ble to perf

orm the duties of a GPO Pol ic e Of

fi c e r. Tr ou

pe De c l. ¶

4 & Ex. 2 (P os iti on

Ac c e pta nc e F or m and Di sa bil ity Certificate). On O ctober

13, 2004, OWCP resc inded its prior dec ision that the Pol ice Of fice r position was suitable for plaintiff be cause the phy sical dema nds set forth in the position descr iption ex cee ded the limitations Dr. Azz am imposed. Id. ¶ 5 & Ex . 3 (Oc tober 13, 2004 letter fr om L . Miller, Claims Ex aminer, Employ ment Standards Administration, OWCP , United State s D e pa

rtme nt o f L a

bo r) . It in str

uc te d th e GPO to m ake pla int if f “ a job of fe r . . . in“I f a c onflict exist s betwee n the medica l opinion of the employ ee’ s phy sician and 2 the medica l opinion of either a se cond opinion phy sician or a n OWCP medical a dviser or consultant, OWCP shall appoint a third phy sician to make a n examination [ ]. This is called a ref ere e examination.” 20 C.F.R. § 10.321(b). 3 acc ordanc e with [his] perma nent limitations .” Id. , Ex . 3. To this end, the GPO offe red pla intiff the position of Security

Clerk at an a

nnual salar

y of $33,253 plus 10% nig ht differ ential. Id. ¶ 8 & E x . 4 (January

10, 2005 letter fr om A.L . Troupe) . Wit h respe ct to the phy sical dema nds of the po sit ion , “ [t]he wo rk

[wa s] pr ima

ri ly se de nta ry and the inc umb e nt u se s a

c ha ir or sta nd s to perf orm the work.” Id. , Ex . 4, Attach. ( Posit ion Descr iption for Ag ency Posit ion No. 018740) at 4. A Secur ity

Clerk would “be able to move a round as ne eded be tween a seate d or standing position.” Id. , E x. 4. Th e OWCP fo un d th e Se c ur ity Cle rk po sit ion “ su ita ble in a c c or da

nc e wi th [pl aintiff’s] medical limitations provided by Dr. Azzam’s repor

t.” Id. , Ex . 5 (January

11, 2005 letter fr om L . Miller, OWCP ) at 1. The OWCP require d him to acce pt an ava ilable position not
e xce e din ghis phy sic a l li mit atio ns , Se c ur ity Cle rk , w iththe un de rs tand ingtha t he wo uld

be pa id “compe nsation based on the dif fer ence (if any

) betwe en the pa

y of the [Security

Clerk] posit ion” and that of the Police Offic er position as of the da te of his injury
. Id . The OWCP advised plaintiff that, if he r efuse d an off er of suitable employ

ment or fa iled to report f

or work a s schedule d, he would not be e ntitled to any further compensation for wag e loss. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff countere d that the Secur ity Clerk position amounted to his return to his prior Pol ic e Of fi c e r p os iti on

wi th a ne w t itl e , at r e du c e d p ay , a nd on a dif fe re nt s hif

t whic h w ou ld

“ c a us e [] str e ss a

nd wi ll c re ate a

fa mil y ha rd sh ip. ” Tr ou

pe De c l., Ex. 6 (F e br

ua ry 9, 20 05 le tte r t o L . Miller). Notingthe inconsistencies be tween the repor ts of Drs. Azzam and Dennis, plaintiff “re quest[ed] a re fer ee e x amination.” Id. In addition, plaintiff asser ted that the GPO wa s “not 2 trying to a ccommodate [hi s] l imitation,” but rather wa s “putting [him] back in the sa me job [he] perf ormed a s a Police Off

icer and all other

Police Offic ers pe rfor

m when on lig ht duty .” Id.4

Th e OWCP “ re

je c t[e d] [pl a int if

f’ s] c ha lle ng e ba se d o n ‘ the we ight o f m e dic a l e vid e nc e in [h is] file,’” id . ¶ 11 & Ex . 7 (F ebrua ry 17, 2005 letter fr om L . Miller, OWCP ), and pla intiff acc epted the Secur ity

Clerk position on March 8, 2005. Id. , Ex . 8 (Position Acceptanc e F orm). Meanwhile, on Fe bruar

y 2, 2005, plaintiff had sought counselingfrom the GPO’ s Equal Employ ment Opportunity

office . Troupe D ecl. ¶

12 . He a lleg ed discrimination on the base s of
ra c e , s e x an d p hy sic a l ha

nd ic a p d ue to h is r e tur

nin gto w or

k a s a Se c ur ity Cle rk , “ c a

us [ing ] him to lose his tit le as Police Of fice r, re ceive less pay , any future pa y raise, be nefits of a

Police Offic er a nd chang e [of] t our of duty to [ the third] shi ft.” Id. , E x. 9 ( EE O C ouns e lin gRe po rt – Individual Compl aint). He asked that he “ke ep his Police Off icer status, retain his pay

and stay on first shift.” Id. On Ap ri l 22 , 2 00 5, pla int if

f f ile d a fo rm a l c omp la int

of dis c ri min atio n a g a ins t th e GPO
on the ba se s o f h and ic a

p, ra c e , a nd se x und e r T itl e VI Iof

the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

19 64 (“ Ti tle VI I ”), a s amende d, see42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Reha

bilitation Act”), as a

mended, see29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq . T r o u p e D e c l. ¶

1 3 & E x. 10 (C omp la int

of Di sc ri min atio n in

F e de ra l G ov e rnme nt) ; seeCompl., Att ach. ( J uly 10, 2008 EE OC De c isi on ). Ac c or din gto p la int if f, the GPO dis c ri min ate d a g a ins t hi m by re fu sin gto
acc ommodate his phy sical limitations resulting from a back injury

sustained on the job. Troupe Dec l., Ex . 10, Attach. ( ty

pewr itten statement). He noted that the GPO had a ccommodate d “a F e ma le Pol ic e Of

fi c e r who ha s b e e n o n me dic a l r e str ic tio n f or the la st e le ve n ye ars or

mor e , o nly worke d 4 hours a da

y up until 2004 and now work[s] 6 hours a da y is stil l allowed to kee p her position as a Police Offic er, a nd salary y et her job responsibility

is the same.” Id. at 2. Fur ther, he a sse rt e d th at th e GPO “ ha s a lw ay s a c c omm od at[e d] th e Whit e Of fi c e rs , who [we re n’ t] a

ble to pe fo rm the ir fu ll Po lic e Dutie s, du e to t he ir me dic a l c on dit ion ,” y e t w e re no t r e mov e d f ro m th e ir positions, were not assigned to a diff ere nt shift, and who wer e not denied f ull pay
. Id. at3
. In5

c ontr a st, the GPO “ pla c e [ed ] [pla int if f] o n a sh if t he a sk [ed ] not

to b e on du e to f amil y ha rd sh ip but made up bogus rea sons to keep the [plaintiff] on the shift, while constantly moving the othe r office r[s] to acc ommodate their ne eds.” Id. An Administrative J udg e (“ AJ ”) dismissed plaintiff’s c omplaint on the gr ound that it was a collate ral attack on the OWCP’s decision. SeeCompl., Att ach. ( J uly 10, 2008 EEOC Dec ision) at 1. The G PO affir

med the AJ’s decision, and plaintiff a ppeale d to the Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”)
. Id. Wit h respe ct to plaintiff’s disability -re lated cla im, the EEOC conc luded that the AJ “incorre ctly dismiss ed [plaintiff’s] claim under the theor y of collater al estoppel.” Id. at 2. Althoug h the AJ charac terized plaintiff’s c laim “as a collater al attack on the decision made by the [OW CP] , id. at 1, plaintiff ac tually “only reque st[ ed] that the [GP O] provide him a rea sonable a ccommodation in light of his medical condition,” id. at 2. Howeve r, bec ause the GPO is not subject to the Rehabilitation Act, the EEOC had “ no jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] reasonable acc ommodation claim.” Id
. Wit h respe ct to plaintiff’s cla ims of rac e and se x discrimination, the EEOC conc luded that plaintiff fa iled to make out a pr im a fa c iecase of discrimination. Compl., Attach. at 2-3. Plaintiff had a pe rmane nt disabling c ondition unli ke the tempor ary conditions “the other individuals outsi de his protec ted classe s who rec eived a ccommodation had.” Id. at 3. F ur the rm or e , h e pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e “ sh ow ingthat he wa s tr e ate d d if fe re ntl y fr om s imi larl y situated individuals outsi de of his prote cted c lasses.” Id. Th e EE OC c on c lud e d th at th e GPO did not violate Title VI I
. Id. I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Su mm ar

yJ ud gm e nt S tan da rd Summary jud g me nt i s gra

nte d to the mov ant i f i t ha s sh own, wh e n th e fa c ts a re vie we d in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he no n- mov ant, tha

t th e re are no g e nu ine iss ue s o f m ate ri a l f a c t in6

dispute and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 47 7 U .S. 31 7 ( 19 86 ); F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). A m ate ri a l f a c t is on e “ that mi g ht a ff

e c t th e outc ome of the suit under the g overninglaw.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluatinga summary judgme nt motion, “[ c]redibility deter minations, the weig hing of the evidenc e, and the draw ing of leg itimate infere nces f

rom the fa cts arejury

functions, not those of a judg e.” Id. at 25 5; Ree ves v . Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The pa rty opposing a

motion for summary

judgme nt “may

not rest upon the mer e
a lle g atio ns or

de nia ls o f h is p le a din g , b ut . . . mus t se t f or th s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a g enuine issue f

or trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 4 77 U. S. at 24 8; se eals o Jack son v. Finnegan, He nderson, Farabow, Garrett &Dunner , 101 F.3d 145, 150 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (inter nal citations omitted). “Mer e alleg ations or denials of the adver se par ty ’s pleadingare not enough to preve nt the issuance of

summary judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Call aghan , 938 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D.D .C. 1996). Th e a dv e rs e pa

rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “ sh owthat th e re is s ome me ta phy sic a l do ub t a s to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibilit y of identifying those portions of the re c or d th at de mon str ate the a bs e nc e of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o the no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘ sp e c if

ic fa c ts s ho wi ngtha

t th e re is a

genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at 58 7 ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( e )) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . Impo rt antl y , “ [w]hi le
summa ry jud g me nt m

us t be a pp ro a c he d w ithsp e c ia l c a uti on in d isc ri min atio n c a se s, a pla int if f i s not relieve d of [his] obligation to support [ his] alleg ations by aff idavits or other c ompetent evidenc e showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Morgan v. Fe d. Home Loan Mortgage7

Corp. , 172 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.D .C. 2001) (citation omitted), aff’d , 328 F.3d 647 ( D.C. Cir.), cert. de nied, 540 U.S. 881 (2003).

B. Plaintiff

Does Not Collat erally Attack theOW CP Decision The F eder al Employ ees’ Compensation Act (“ FECA” ), 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. , provides that the dec ision of the Secre tary of L abor or

her de signe e “in a llowing or denying a

pay ment” of fe de ra l w or

ke rs ’ c omp e ns atio n b e ne fi ts i s “ (1 ) f ina l and c on c lus ive fo r a ll p ur

po se s a nd wi th respe ct to all questions of law a nd fac t; and (2) not subjec t to review by another officia l of the Un ite d St ate s o r b y

a c ourt by mand amus or

oth e rw ise .” 5 U .S. C. § 81 28 (b ). Th e GPO char acte rizes plaintiff’s claims as a challeng e to its compliance w ith OWC P’s directive to off er pla int if f a po sit ion in a c c or da

nc e wi th h is p hy sic a l li mit atio ns . D e f. ’s Mo t. at 9. Ac c or din gto the GPO, the complaint must be dismissed beca use it makes “a

n impermissible collatera l attack on OWCP ’s dec ision making a uthority” under

the FE CA. See id. at 9-11. Th e Court

c on str ue s th e a lle g atio ns of

pla int if f’ s pro s ecomplaint liberally
. See H aines v. Kerner , 4 04 U. S. 5 19 , 5 20 (1 97 2) . Pl a int if f d oe s n ot d isp ute tha

t hi s in jur y “ dis qu a lif

ie [s] [himfr om] p e rf

or m[in g ] the fu ll f

un c tio n o f [the Pol ic e Of

fi c e r] p os iti on

wi tho ut s ome lim itatio n. ” Com

pl. at 1. Rathe r, he a lle g e s th at he so ught a nd the GPO re fu se d to a c c omm od ate his lim itations by

offe ringhim light duty

work a s a Police Off

icer or otherw ise by

modifying the Police Offic er position to meet his needs. See id. ; se eals o Pl. ’s Op p’ n to De f. ’s Mo t. t o D ism iss , [or] in the Alternative, for Summ. J . (“Pl.’s Opp’n” ) at 1-2 (pag e number s desig nated by the Court ). Ins of

ar a s p la int if

f’ s c la ims c e nte r o n th e GPO ’s a lle g e d r e fu sa l to a c c omm od ate his phy sical limitations, t he cla ims have no ef fec t on the Secre tary

of L abor’ s determination of fac tual and leg al issues perta ining to plaintiff’ s FECA c laim or elig ibilit y for wor ker’ s compensation benefits. The F ECA does not bar pla intiff’s discrimination claims. See Miller v. Bolger , 802 F.2d 660, 666 ( 3d Cir. 1986) (“We r ejec t the Postm aster G ener al’s ar gument that8

allowing[pl aintiff] to pursue Title VI Ireme dies will usurp the Secre tary of L abor’ s power unde r 5 U .S. C. § 81 28 (b ) t o ma ke fi na l and

unre vie wa

ble de te rm inatio ns of

F ECAbe ne fi ts. ” ); De

Fo rd v. Sec ’y of Labor , 7 00 F .2 d 2 81 , 2 90 (6 th C ir . 1 98 3) (“Ne ith e r t he langua g e of

the statut e its e lf nor the policy

foundations under lying w orkmen’s c ompensation ac ts support a conc lusion that intentional discrimination is t o be viewe d as ca using a n ‘injury ’ subject to F ECA cover ag e.”) ; Morris v. Roche , 182 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1273-74 (W.D. Ga . 2002) (c iting ca ses) (“ The greater weight of authority , howeve r, holds that rec overy of F ECA benef

its does not bar a subse quent
c la im f or dis c ri min atio n. ” ); Johnson v. Sullivan , 7 64 F . Su pp . 1 05 3, 10 63 (D . M d. 19 91 ) ( “ Th is Court is aware of no law that prec ludes a F ECA benef iciary from re covering f

or discrimination
un de r T itl e VI Ior

the Re ha bil itatio n A c t.” ); se eals o Mee ster v. Runy an , 1 49 F .3 d 8 55 , 8 57 (8 th Cir. 1998), cert. de nied sub nom. Me ester v. H enderson , 5 26 U. S. 1 14 4 ( 19 99 ) ( re c ognizi ngthat, althoug h “a f

rustrate d FECA c laimant cannot se cure judicial revie w of a FECA c ompensation decision by

claimingthat the Rehabilitation Act entitles her to acc ommodation in performingan alternative position approved by the Depa rtment of L abor when the c laim is predicate d upon the same illness or injury

that g ave r ise to the Depa rtment of L abor’ s initi al dec ision,” FECA doe s not bar a ll discrimination claims). The F ECA does not bar pla intiff’s discrimination claims. Howe ver, to the e x tent that pla int if f b ri ng s th is a c c omm od atio n c la im und e r t he Re ha bil itatio n A c t, i t mu st f

a il. “ It is
un dis pute d th at th e Re ha

bil itatio n A c t, b y

its own te rm s, do e s n ot a pp ly to t he GPO ,” and

its employ ees ha

ve no rights under the Reha bilitation Act. Colli ns v. Jam es , 171 Fe d. Appx. 859 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (pe r cur iam), cert. de nied, 547 U.S. 1098 (2006). C. P lai nti ff F ail s to Sta tea Ti tleVI

I C lai m Ge ne ra lly , it

is “ an unla

wf ul e mpl oy

me nt p ra c tic e fo r a

n e mpl oye r . . . to f

a il o r r e fu se to hir e or to d isc ha rg e any ind ivi du a l, o r o the rw ise to d isc ri min ate a g a ins t any ind ivi du a l w ith9

re sp e c t to his c omp e ns atio n, te rm s, c on dit ion s, or privi le g e s o f e mpl oy

me nt, be c a

us e of [his ]
rac e, color , relig ion, [ or] sex [.] ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( a)( 1). B ased on this languag e, ther e ar e

“ tw o e le me nts fo r a

n e mpl oy me nt d isc ri min atio n c a se : ( i) the pla int if f s uf fe re d a n a dv e rs e employ ment action (ii) be cause of [his] rac e, color , relig ion, sex , or national orig in.” Brady v. O

ffice of the Serge ant at Arms , 5 20 F .3 d 4 90 , 4 93 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) ; see Baloc h v. Kempthorne , 550 F. 3d 1191, 1196 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Under Title VI I. . . and the Reha bilitation Act, the two e ssential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suf fer ed an adver se employ

ment action (ii) be cause of the plaintiff’ s rac e, . . ., sex, . . . or disability .”).

“ Th e D. C. C ir c uit

de fi ne s a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n a s ‘ a

signif ic ant c ha ng e in
e mpl oy me nt s tatus , s uc h a s h ir ing , f ir ing , f a ili ngto p ro mot e , r e a ssi g nme nt w ithsignif ic antl y differ ent re sponsibili ties, or a de cision causingsignific ant cha ng e in bene fits.’” Al iot ta v . B air , 5 7 6 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 1 3 , 1 2 0 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Tay lor v . S ma ll , 3 50 F .3 d 1 28 6, 12 93 (D .C. Cir. 2003)). “[C] ourts have c onsistently focuse d on ultimate employ ment decisions such a s hiring , g rantingleave , promoting a nd compensating” employ ees in this context, Dobbs v. Roc he , 32 9 F . Su pp . 2 d 3 3, 42 (D .D .C. 20 04 ), and a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns do no t in c lud e “ ‘[p ]ur e ly subjective injuries,’ suc h as dissatisfac tion with reassig nment, public humiliation, or loss of reputation.” Nic ho ls v . Trus c ott , 4 2 4 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 2 4 , 1 3 6 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Holcomb v

. Po we ll , 433 F.3d 889, 902 ( D.C. Cir. 2006)). 1. Plaintiff Does Not Establish that He Was Qua lified for a Police Offic er Position The fa miliar burden- shifting a

naly sis under McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 4 11 U. S. 792 (1973), r equire s that plaintiff make out a pr im a fa c ieca s e o f d i s cr i m i n at i o n : (1 ) h e b el o n gs to a pr ote c te d c la ss, (2 ) h e wa s q ua lif ie d f or a po sit ion fo r whic h th e e mpl oye r s ou g ht a pp lic ants , (3) he was re

jected de spite his qualifications, and (4) the position remained ope n and the employ er c ontinued to seek a pplicants with his qualifications. Id. at 80 2. De fe nd ant a rgue s th at,The Court pre sumes that the title “Pfc.” means Policeman F irst Class. SeeDef .’s 3 Mo t., Tr ou

pe De c l., Ex. 1 , A tta c h. at 1. De fe nd ant s tate s th at, u po n p la int if

f’ s r e tur n to wo rk in Marc h 2005, the GPO’s pape rwork “ initially mistakenly

ref err ed to [plainti ff] as a Police Of fice r ( h i s p r e - i n

j ur y p o s i t i o n ) , ” an

“ e r r o r [ w h i c h ] w a s u l t i m at e l y c o r r e c t e d
. ” D e f

. ’ s R e p l y, Supplemental Troupe D ecl. ¶ 4. 10 beca use “[p]l aintiff ca

nnot establish that he was qua lified for the position he claims to have bee n denied or that, in light of his own re jection of the job off

er,”he suff

ere d no adver se employ

ment action. De f.’s Mot. at 12. More than one y ear

afte r plaintiff sustained his on-the -job injury , duringwhich he
rec eived wor

ker’ s compensation bene fits, the GPO offe red pla intiff a Police Of fice r position, that is, “the same position he he ld at the time of his injury .” Troupe Dec l. ¶ 3. Plaintiff ref used the position on t he ground that he w as totally disabled and, the ref

ore, he could not perf

orm the duties of the job. The O WC P concurr ed, noting“that the phy sical dema nds outlined in the Pol ice [P osition Description] ex cee d[ed] the per manent limitations t hat Dr. A zz am has imposed as of August 26, 2004.” Id. , Ex . 3. Plaintiff counters that, e ven though he held a Security Clerk position, he perf

ormed Police Offic er duties be tween Ma rch a nd J une 2005. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. He states that he was “ place [d]

. . . b a c k in

the same de pa

rtme nt, wo rk inga lon gsid e [his ] fe llo w O ff ic e rs and a ssi g ne d to so me [of] the same duties a s a Police Off icer .” Id. at 3. Pla int if

f a lso re mark s th at ot

he rs re fe rr e d to him by title, Pfc., sugg estinghis status as a Police Off icer
. See id. at 4; se eals o id ., Ex . 7 3 (Mar ch 18, 2005 e- mail from R.C. Monroe), Ex. 9 (Marc h 4, 2005 time and attenda nce r ecor ds listi ngplaintiff as “ PFC”). In his view, the GPO “should not be a llowed to cite jurisdiction authority mainly using the Depa

rtment of L abor, f

or their a ctions to not be challeng e[d] or cited on the appointment of a

job offer .” Id. at 4. Withoutciting a uthority for this proposition, pla int if f a sse rt s th at th e GPO c ou ld h ave and sh ou ld h ave mod if

ie d th e Pol ic e Of

fi c e r p os iti on

in order to acc ommodate his phy sical limitations. Id. at 3.11

Plaintiff did not request a modification at the time the GPO offe red him a Police O ffice r position i n 2004, howeve r. Rather , he re fused to be c onsidered f or the Police Of

fice r position beca use he c laimed to be totally disabled. More over, a ssuming that plaintiff ha d been a ssigne d some Police Off

icer duties, such assignments do not rebut def endant’ s showing that he was not phy sically

capa ble of pe rfor

ming a ll of a Police Off

icer ’s duties. It cannot be sa id that defe ndant either r efuse d to offer

plaintiff a Police Of

fice r position or that its so-called re fusal to hire p l a i n t i f f a s a P o l i c e O f

f i c e r v i o l at e s T i t l e V II. This case prese nts no circumstanc es sug g estingthat the GPO’s ac tion was motivated by plaintiff’s ra ce, se x , or disability , or that its action re sulted in a signif icant cha ng e in plaintiff’s employ ment status. Here , plaintiff finds himself in the lower paid and less phy sically

demanding position of Security

Clerk due to his injuries, his own acknow ledg ment that he ca nnot perfor

m the phy sical func tions of a Police Off icer , and, par

ticularly , the OWCP ’s deter mination that plaintiff is able to work unde r the c onditions set forth in Dr. Azz am’s re port. It is through the worke r’s c ompensation proce eding s that plaintiff’s func tional capa city was de termined, a

nd the OWCP ’s finding s as to plaintiff’s phy sical limitations and suit ability of a pa rticular position
rema in unchalleng ed. Plaintiff has not shown he is qualified f or the position of GPO Police Off icer and,
acc ording ly , that he has suf fer ed an a dverse employ

ment action. See, e .g., McM anus v. W illiams , 519 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D .C. 2007) (conc luding that plaintiff suf fer ed no adve rse e mploy

ment action whe re she was not terminate d and she w as aw arde d worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits for the tim e pe ri od

re le va nt t o th e c omp la int ); Nails v. England , 311 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122-23 (D.D.C. 2004) ( concludingthat plaintiff fa iled to make out a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination based on f

ailure to promote where plaintiff was not qua lified for the promotion positi on).A par tially disabled employee is one “who c annot re turn to the position held at the 4 tim e of inj ur y (o r e arn e qu iva le nt w a g e s) du e to t he wo rk -r e late d in

jur y , b ut who is n ot t ota lly disabled for

all g ainful employ

ment.” 20 C.F.R. § 10.402. “[A] partially disabled employee who ref uses to seek suitable w ork, or r efuse s to or neg lects to work a fter suitable work is offe red to or arr ang ed for

him or her, is not entitled to compensation.” 20 C.F .R. § 10.517(a). 12 2. Plaintiff Does Not Rebut Def endant’ s L eg itimate, Non-Discr iminatory Reason for Its Decision to Rescind the Of fer of a Police O ffice r Position Def endants a rgue that, eve n if plaintiff had ma de out a pr ima fac ie ca se of discr imination, he fa ils to s ho w that th e GPO dis c ri min ate d a g a ins t hi m on the ba se s o f h is r a c e , s e x, or dis a bil ity in violation of Title VI I
. SeeDef .’s Mot. at 13-14. In deter mining whe ther a

n employ er ha s vio late d T itl e VI I , th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

Cir c uit ins tr uc ts: In a Title VI Idisparate -treatment suit wher e an employ ee ha s suffer ed an adve rse e mploy

ment action and a

n employ er ha s asserted a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for the d ec ision, the district court ne ed not – and should not – de c ide wh e the r the pla int if f a c tua lly made out a prima fac i e c as e u nder McD onnell Douglas . Rathe r, in considering a n em ploy er’ s motion for summary judgme nt . . ., the district court mu s t resolve one centr al question: Has the e mploy ee produce d suff

i cient evide nce f

or a r easona

ble jury to find that the employ er’ s asserte d non-discriminatory rea son was not the a ctual rea son and that the employer intentionally discriminated ag ainst the e mp lo y e e o nth e b a s is o f

r a c e , c o lo r , . . . [o r ] s e x[?]” Brady v. O

ffice of the Serge ant at Arms , 520 F.3d at 494 (emphasis in orig inal) (c itations omitted). The GPO a sserts its reliance on the OWCP ’s deter mination in the worker’ s compensation matter a s to the suitabilit y of a position to plaintiff’s par tially disabled condition: 4 GPO did no t make the de c isi on that [pl a int if

f] c ou ld n ot r e tur

n to his prior position as a Pol i ce Of fi cer . The de cision was made by the United States Depa

rtm ent of L abor, through OWCP , which make s fin a l d e c is io n s o na ll w o r k e r s ’ c o mp e n s ati o nc a s e s . G PO f o ll o w ed the direc tives and sui tability deter minations of OWC P in offeringjob po sit ion s to [pl ain ti ff

] fo llo wi nghis inj ur

y . G PO i s r e qu ir e d to f o ll o w th e d ire c tive s and suitability deter minations of OWC P and [t he de c lara nt] i s n ot a

wa re of any ins tanc e in whic h G PO has fai led to comply with the direc tives and suitabi l i t y deter minations of the OWCP
.13

Troupe D ecl. ¶

14. The OWCP determined that plaintiff is “disable d for the job [he] held on the date of the injury ,” yet he is “c apable of working .” Supplemental Troupe Dec l., Ex 2 (Mar ch 24, 2006 letter fr om L . Miller). F urther, it dete rmined that the Sec urity Clerk position “fairly

and
rea sonably

repr esents [his] wag e-e arningcapa city [,] ” and in light of plaintiff’s “ demonstrated . . .
a bil ity to p e rf or m th e dutie s o f t

his job
. . ., thi s p os iti on

is c on sid e re d s uit a

ble fo r [h is] p art ia lly disabled condition.” Id. Plaintiff “is . . . not questioning what the [OW CP] finds suitable or unsuitable,” Pl.’s Op p’ n at 3, and

he do e s n ot a

rgue that he is i nc a

pa ble of pe rf or min gthe dutie s o f a

Se c ur ity Cle rk . Rathe r, he a sse rt s th at th e GPO ’s re lia nc e on the OWCP is m isp la c e d b e c a us e the OWCP

“ ne ve r i nf

or me d th e [GPO ] [that] th e [Poli c e Of fi c e r] j ob of

fe re d .
. . c ou ldn ’t

be mod if ie d to
acc ommodat[ e] the Plainti ff[’s] li mitations.” Id . a t 2. Pla int if

f, the n, ins ist s th at he is e nti tle d to a modified Police Of

fice r position so that he could maintain his titl e, pay , benef its and retire ment, and wor

k a pre fer red shift, notwithstandinghis phy sical limitations. See id. at 4. OWCP de te rm inatio ns of law a nd fa c t r e g ard ingc omp e ns atio n f or fe de ra l di sa

bil ity status are not review able. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). A s long a s the OWCP deeme d plaintiff perma nently partially disabled, and de emed the Sec urity Clerk position suit able in light of pla int if f’ s li mit atio ns , th e GPO c ann ot b e he ld l ia ble un de r T itl e VI Ibe c a

us e the OWCP
resc inded its decision that the Police Off icer position was a suitable position for plaintiff. See W oods v. Runyan , No. 94-6520, 1995 U.S. App. L EXI S 24630, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug . 17, 1995) (“ [B ]ec a us e 5 U .S. C. § 81 28 (b )( 1) make s th e OWCP de te rm inatio ns c on c lus ive ‘w ithre sp e c t to all questions of law a

nd fac t,’ and be cause the OWCP found the job off er ma de to Woods valid, Woods cannot collatera lly attack the validity

of the job off

er in fe dera l court.”) , cert. de nied, 516 U. S. 1 06 0 ( 19 96 ); see also De smond v. Gobe r , N o . 0 0
- 6 2 6 1 , 2 0 0 6 W L2 0 9 6 0 6 4 , at* 6
- 7 ( D
. N
. J. J uly 27, 2006) (c oncludingthat plaintiff fa iled to make out a pr ima fac ie ca se under the14

Rehabilitation Act bec ause, e ven with re asonable acc ommodations, an OWCP -appointed psychiatrist deter

mined plaintiff would be una ble not only

to perfor m his pre-injury

job as
ceme tery car etake r but also to perf orm any occupation). I I I . CONCLUSI ON Plaintiff neither suff

ere d an adve rse e mploy

ment action bec ause of

his race , sex or phy sic a l di sa

bil ity , n or re butte d th e GPO ’s le g iti mate no n- dis c ri min ator y re a so ns fo r r e fu sin gto hire him as a Police O ffice r. Ac cording ly , the Court g rants def endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt. An Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion. Signed this 30 day

of September , 2009. th / s / RI CHARD W. R OB ERTS Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge