Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2331 | July 29, 2020 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

A. David Hutson

Hutson Legal

Jeffersonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of: 

E.G. and M.R. (Minor Children) 

and M.G. (Mother)

M.G. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

July 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-2331

Appeal from the 

Clark Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Vicki Carmichael, Judge

The Honorable

Joni Grayson, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

10C04-1906-JT-30

10C04-1906-JT-31

Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2331 | July 29, 2020 Page 2 of 14

Case Summary

[1] M.F.G. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her 

sons. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts that follow are taken primarily from the trial court’s findings of fact, 

none of which Mother challenges on appeal.1 Mother is the biological parent of 

M.R., born in 2014, and E.C.G., born in 2015 (collectively, “Children”).2

Mother has a third child, M.M. (“Sibling”), who was removed from her care at 

the same time as Children. Since then, Sibling’s father has been granted full

custody, and therefore Sibling is not a subject of this appeal. See Tr. p. 45. 

[3] In October 2015, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that 

six-month-old E.C.G. had been admitted to Kosair Children’s Hospital in 

Louisville “due to bleeding on the brain and multiple bruises on his right 

temple, left ribcage, back, and knees.”3 Ex. 4. In addition to the bruising, 

medical providers observed that E.C.G. was dirty, had severe diaper rash, and 

1 Because Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, we accept them as true. See Maldem v. 

Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).

2 E.C.G.’s father is unknown, and no one had sought to establish paternity by the time of the termination 

hearing. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. M.R.’s alleged father was served by publication but never 

appeared in the CHINS or termination proceedings, and no paternity action had been filed by the time of the 

termination hearing. See id. at 26. 

3 Kosair Children’s Hospital was renamed “Norton Children’s Hospital” in 2016.
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was malnourished. Emergency surgery was required to address E.C.G.’s brain 

injury, and doctors placed a shunt in E.C.G.’s head to relieve the pressure on 

his brain. E.C.G. would remain in the hospital for the next six months, 

recovering from his near fatal injuries. See Tr. p. 37.

[4] Family Case Manager (FCM) Lynelle Amstutz was assigned to investigate and 

spoke with Mother about E.C.G.’s injuries. Mother initially told FCM Amstutz 

that “the bruising that was on [E.C.G.’s] right temple was caused by [Sibling], 

by that child hitting [E.C.G.] with a hard, plastic toy several days earlier.” Id.

Mother then gave FCM Amstutz conflicting stories as to who had been caring 

for E.C.G. in the days leading up to his hospitalization, saying at one point 

“that she had been the only person that had been alone with [E.C.G.] for 

several days,” but at another point saying “that grandma had . . . been the only 

person with [E.C.G.] for several days.” Id. Mother later told FCM Amstutz that 

she “did not know where [E.C.G.’s] injuries or bruising had come from.” Id.

During her assessment, FCM Amstutz also learned that Sibling had been seen 

at the same hospital two weeks before E.C.G. was admitted and was observed 

as having bruising on his body. See Ex. 4. Children and Sibling were removed 

from Mother’s care on October 5, and a no-contact order was put in place 

between Mother and E.C.G. Later, a forensic medical examination concluded 

that E.C.G.’s injuries were consistent with intentional physical abuse.

[5] On October 7, DCS filed petitions alleging Children to be Children in Need of 

Services (CHINS). In December, the State charged Mother with Level 3 felony 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old, 
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Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 5 

felony battery on a person less than fourteen years old, and Level 5 felony 

neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury. She was incarcerated from 

December 2015 to January 2017. While incarcerated, Mother admitted that 

Children were CHINS and agreed to participate in services. Mother ultimately 

pled guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in 

bodily injury and was sentenced to six years, with one-and-a-half years 

executed and four-and-a-half years suspended to probation. See Ex. E.

[6] During the year following her release in January 2017, Mother was somewhat 

compliant with services. In February 2017, Mother began supervised visits with 

Children. Visits did not go well, and visitation supervisors often observed 

Mother “sitting on the couch or on her phone, rather than interacting with 

[Children] during visits.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. Eventually, visits were 

changed from supervised visitation to therapeutic visits. During therapeutic 

visits, Mother received “one-on-one direction in real time as issues would arise 

during the visits.” Id. However, Mother’s parenting skills did not improve, and 

visits were eventually suspended “[d]ue to the detrimental effect the visits were 

having on [Children].” Id. at 16.

[7] In March 2018, the trial court ordered that Children’s permanency plan be 

changed from reunification to termination and adoption. Thereafter, DCS filed 

petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children. A month later, DCS 

agreed that it would dismiss the pending termination case if Mother agreed to 

seek mental-health treatment and medication management, to follow all 
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recommendations from a psychological assessment, and to continue in all 

current therapy services. See Ex. 5. Mother agreed to those terms, and DCS 

dismissed the termination case. However, by October 2018, the trial court once 

again found that Mother was not consistently participating in services and 

ordered that Children’s permanency plan be changed from reunification to 

termination and adoption. In December 2018, DCS again filed petitions to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children. Those petitions were later 

dismissed due to statutory-timeliness issues.

[8] In June 2019, DCS filed a third set of petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to Children. A fact-finding hearing was held in August. FCM Amstutz 

testified that after serving as the assessment case manager, she continued

managing the case until September 2016. She explained that Mother was 

incarcerated the entire time that she was managing the case but was able to 

participate in some services while in jail. Specifically, Mother participated in

case management and therapy and completed a psychological evaluation.

[9] FCM Angela Johnson testified that she took over as the family’s case manager 

in February 2018. FCM Johnson said that Mother had not maintained stable 

housing and lived in at least five different places: Mother’s grandparents’ house,

Mother’s mother-in-law’s house, a mobile home, and two different hotel stays. 

Tr. p. 133. Regarding employment, FCM Johnson stated that Mother was “not 

interested in being employed right now. That she [was] going to . . . online 

classes.” Id. at 135. FCM Johnson explained that DCS had given Mother 

“every opportunity that [she felt] a mother could be given to work towards 
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reunification” and that there were not any services that DCS had at its disposal 

that were not offered to Mother. Id. at 135-36. FCM Johnson said that Children 

need a stable, appropriate, safe, nurturing, consistent, healthy living 

environment and that she did not believe Mother could provide that. See id. at 

138. FCM Johnson believed that it is in Children’s best interests for Mother’s 

parental rights to be terminated. See id. at 139.

[10] Mary Louise Watkins testified that she was referred to provide Mother with 

parenting classes in October 2018. Watkins said that Mother completed an

initial intake in November 2018 but then did not show up for her first class. See 

id. at 58-59. Watkins stated that she tried texting and calling Mother but never 

got a response. Watkins explained that after missing the first class, Mother

needed to have contacted her before the second class began in order for Mother

to stay in that parenting-class program. See id. at 60-61. Watkins said that the 

program was set up so that one class builds on the other and if Mother missed 

more than one class, she would have to wait until the next parenting-class 

program began approximately three months later. See id. Watkins testified that 

each time she started a new parenting-class program she would reach out to 

Mother and tried for three months to contact Mother but never received a 

response. See id. at 61, 67.

[11] Therapist Nina Fox testified that she was referred to provide Mother with 

home-based therapy in March 2016. Therapist Fox said that initially she met 

Mother once a week at the Clark County Jail, and once Mother was released, 

she met Mother once a week at her house. See id. at 70. Therapist Fox stated 
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that Mother “moved quite a number of times. Initially, she was staying with her 

grandparents. And then she moved from there several times.” Id. at 70. 

Therapist Fox also said that after Mother was released, “her focus changed in 

therapy. She was not as engaged. It was difficult to get her to meet [and]

towards the end[,] [i]t became more of [Therapist Fox] driving around, trying to 

find her.” Id. at 72. Therapist Fox explained, regarding Mother’s change in 

focus, that “[s]he was a little bit more interested in reconnecting with outside 

individuals, males in particular,” and that Mother’s “mind set was she was 

grown and she could do with her life what she wanted to do.” Id. at 73.

Therapist Fox said that her therapeutic relationship with Mother ended in May 

2018, after Mother missed several appointments. See id. at 73. Therapist Fox 

testified that during the two years she worked with Mother she did not make 

progress toward being a better parent. See id. at 75. 

[12] Stacey Marie Capps testified that she supervised visits for Mother and Children

for over a year. Capps said that Mother attended forty-three visits and cancelled 

six, and that most of the visits were “poor.” Id. at 80. Capps explained that 

“there was a lack of bond, parental bond, between [Mother] and [Children,] 

especially E.C.G. E.C.G. cried hysterically for the first several months each 

week at the visits. . . [M.R.] absolutely did not want to be there. There was no 

parental bond with either child. Lack of supervision. Lack of structure.” Id. at 

82. Capps stated that Mother’s discipline methods of “yelling and time out”

were not appropriate for Children, and that often “what should have been a two 

(2) or three (3) minute time out ended up stretching into fifteen (15) minutes.” 
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Id. Capps testified that her involvement ended in May 2018 when visits moved 

to a therapeutic setting. See id. at 81. Capps said that of the forty-three visits she 

supervised, “none” was a positive experience for Children. Id. at 88. Therapist 

Jerri Whitworth testified that she provided therapeutic visits for Mother and 

Children from July 2018 until April 2019. Therapist Whitworth said that 

Mother attended twenty-eight visits and “cancelled or no-showed” eighteen 

visits. Id. at 94. Therapist Whitworth stated that therapeutic visits occurred 

twice a week, one visit per child, for four hours each. See id. at 92. Therapist 

Whitworth explained that Children’s visits were separated because Mother was 

not “able to handle both Children at the same time.” Id. Therapist Whitworth

said that she would “walk [Mother] through things to do” to manage Children’s 

behaviors, but “nothing carried over to the next visit” and every visit they’d 

“just kind of start from scratch.” Id. at 93. Therapist Whitworth testified that 

based on her observations, she did not believe that Mother “has the ability to 

parent [Children] on her own.” Id. at 96. 

[13] Caseworker Gayle Bibb testified that she provided home-based case work and 

supervised visits to Mother. Bibb said that she met initially Mother in jail and 

worked with her to establish goals for when she was released. Bibb stated that 

Mother’s goals were to improve her parenting skills, gain employment, and 

maintain stable housing. See id. at 103. Bibb said that since Mother was 

released, she had not had trouble getting a job, but maintaining employment 

was an issue. See id. at 105. Bibb explained that Mother had “several” jobs in 

the two-and-a-half years, but none lasted longer than “at the very best, three (3) 
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months.” Id. Bibb stated that Mother was no longer looking for employment 

but was focusing on school and attending school online for photography. See id.

at 115. Regarding housing, Bibb said that Mother had moved “approximately 

five (5) to six (6)” times in two-and-a-half years and was currently living with 

her mother-in-law and new husband. Id. at 106. Bibb stated that she had visited

the mother-in-law’s house and saw that there were two bedrooms, but that 

Mother was sleeping on the couch. See id. Bibb testified that since she began 

working with Mother in 2016, Mother had not made any consistent progress 

toward reunification. See id. at 118. 

[14] Therapist Susan Marie Robinson testified that she provided therapy to 

Children. Therapist Robinson said that M.R. was referred for therapy in 

February 2018 for “very aggressive behavior.” Id. at 14. Regarding E.C.G., 

Therapist Robinson said that he was referred for therapy in March 2019, for 

“pretty major tantruming behavior and because of the history of traumatic brain 

injury that [she] felt like needed further evaluation.” Id. Therapist Robinson 

said that her initial therapy sessions with Children followed their supervised 

visits with Mother and that after visits Children “were usually either very, very 

quiet or what [she] would call very, very disorganized, having trouble, kind of, 

coming into the office and settling down to begin the work [they] were trying to 

do.” Id. at 18. Therapist Robinson testified that Children “voiced, on more than 

one occasion, that they didn’t want to go to the visits.” Id. at 19. Therapist 

Robinson stated that since visits with Mother were suspended, Children “have 

been happier, calmer, more peaceful, smiling, laughing more, talking about 
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things that are important in their lives right now, like school and various 

activities.” Id. at 19-20. When asked whether Children talked about Mother 

during therapy, Therapist Robinson said, “They do not talk about her at all.” 

Id. at 20. Therapist Robinson believed that it is in Children’s best interests for 

Mother’s parental rights to be terminated so that Children “can continue 

moving forward and growing into happy, health human beings.” Id. at 26. 

When asked why, Therapist Robinson said that in order to recover from their 

past trauma, Children need consistency, stability, unconditional love, 

“confidence that [their] parent is going to be there for them,” and engagement, 

and that she did not believe that Mother could provide those things for 

Children. Id. at 29. 

[15] Children’s foster mother, M.A.M., testified that Children “are the two (2) most 

important people in [her family’s] life right now.” Id. at 122. M.A.M. said that 

if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, she and her family would want to 

adopt Children. M.A.M. said that Children did not speak about Mother “unless 

something triggers their memory,” such as when M.R. asked for a soda and 

M.A.M. said no, M.R. said that “his other mommy would let him have soda.” 

Id. at 124. Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Shannon Holt testified 

that Children “have waited an extremely long time for permanency” and that 

she believed it is in Children’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated. Id. at 152. In December 2019, the trial court issued its order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

[16] Mother now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[17] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s 

order terminating her parental rights to Children. When reviewing the 

termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 

credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to 

the judgment of the trial court. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or 

judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment 

terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence 

supports the trial court’s findings and whether the findings support the 

judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016).

[18] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;
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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear 

and convincing evidence. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. If the court finds 

that the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[19] Mother first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s removal will not be 

remedied. In determining whether such a probability exists, the trial court 

engages in a two-step analysis. First, the trial court must ascertain what 

conditions led to the child’s placement and retention in foster care. In re K.T.K., 

989 N.E.2d at 1231. Second, the trial court determines whether there is a 

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.

[20] Here, Mother has not demonstrated that she is any closer to providing Children 

a safe, stable home than she was at the beginning of the CHINS case. The trial 

court’s unchallenged findings on this issue support its conclusion that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s removal and 

continued placement outside Mother’s care will not be remedied. See, e.g., In re 

E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644 (Ind. 2014) (findings regarding father’s noncompliance with services support trial court’s conclusion that there is 

reasonable probability that conditions resulting in children’s removal would not 
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be remedied). The trial court found that “DCS has provided ample 

opportunities and substantial services to [Mother], yet she still has not 

maintained a stable home where [Children] can live, and has not achieved any 

financial stability or independence.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. The trial 

court further concluded that “[Mother] has failed to maintain contact with the 

FCM; missed appointments and visits; has been unwilling or unable to deal 

with or remedy her parenting problems[; and] has been unable to ‘carry over’

the information and skills imparted to her by service providers from session to 

session.” Id. at 18-19. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it concluded 

that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.4

[21] Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in 

Children’s best interests. To determine what is in the child’s best interests, the 

trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 

1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In doing so, the trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The trial court 

need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. Id. When assessing the child’s physical, emotional, 

4 Because we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

resulting in Children’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, we need not 

address its alternate conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationships poses a threat to the well-being of Children. See In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015) (Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) is written in the disjunctive and requires the trial court to find 

only one of the two requirements of subsection (b) has been established by clear and convincing evidence), 

trans. denied.
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and mental well-being, the trial court may consider a myriad of factors. In re 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Among those factors contemplated, “permanency 

is a central consideration in determining the child’s best interests.” Id.

[22] Here, the trial court found that Mother moved several times and did not find 

permanent and stable housing. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 14. At the time of 

the termination hearing, Mother was living with her mother-in-law, sleeping on 

her couch, and there was no room for Children in the house. Additionally, the 

trial court found that Children “do not have a healthy bond to their mother,” 

that E.C.G. “continues to have special needs due to the severe injuries he 

suffered as an infant,” and that “[d]espite the one-on-one instruction by 

multiple service providers, [Mother’s] parenting skills did not improve.” Id. at 

16. The trial court concluded that the CHINS case had been pending for nearly 

four years, that Children need stability and permanency, and that it was time 

for permanency to be achieved for Children. See id. at 19. In addition to the trial 

court’s findings and conclusions, FCM Johnson, Therapist Robinson, and 

CASA Holt all testified that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in 

Children’s best interests. See Tr. pp. 26, 139, 152. As such, the totality of the

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in Children’s 

best interests.

[23] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Bailey, J., concur.