United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 2015 Decided December 11, 2015

No. 11-1297

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 11-1331

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

 for Enforcement of an Order of 

the National Labor Relations Board

James M. Walters argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs was Charles S. Caulkins.

Amy H. Ginn, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were John H.

Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy

Associate General Counsel, and Robert J. Englehart,

Supervisory Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge,

and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Nova Southeastern University

petitions for review of the decision and order of the National

Labor Relations Board, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (2011), finding

that it violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act

(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), by maintaining an overly

broad no-solicitation rule on its Fort Lauderdale campus;

enforcing that rule against an employee of its onsite contractor

and disciplining that employee through its contractor; and

making coercive statements to a laid-off employee of that

contractor who was seeking employment with Nova’s new

contractor. We deny the petition for review and grant the

Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. 

I.

 Nova Southeastern University is a private educational

institution with an approximately 300-acre campus in Fort

Lauderdale, Florida. In 2000, Nova hired UNICCO Service

Company to provide maintenance, landscaping, and janitorial

services throughout its campus. UNICCO employees worked

out of the physical plant/central services building where they

reported for their shifts. Nova’s contract required UNICCO

employees to undergo pre-employment drug testing and a

background check that included a security report from Nova’s

public safety department. The contract also required UNICCO

to enforce Nova’s policies, report policy violations to Nova, and

ensure UNICCO’s employees “abide by all rules, regulations

and policies of [Nova] . . . .” 

In 2006, UNICCO employee Steve McGonigle arrived on

campus before his shift began and distributed handbills to his

coworkers in the parking lot adjacent to the central services

building. After five or ten minutes, a Nova public safety officer
3

told him to stop, referring to Nova’s no-solicitation rule

prohibiting any solicitation on campus without prior

authorization. McGonigle stated that he had the right to handbill

during non-working hours, but complied and went into the

central services building. After telling his UNICCO coworkers

about what had just happened and Nova’s no-solicitation rule,

McGonigle went to Nova’s public safety department building to

complain that his right to handbill had been violated. There,

several Nova officials reiterated that Nova’s no-solicitation rule

prohibited him from soliciting on campus absent Nova’s

advance permission. 

Tony Todaro, who at that time was employed by UNICCO

as the Director of Physical Plant on Nova’s campus, was

informed by Nova of McGonigle’s handbilling. According to

McGonigle, whose testimony was credited by the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Todaro called McGonigle

into his office two days after the incident and issued him a

written disciplinary notice for “handing out (solicitation and

distribution) of unauthorized materials at the job location”

without prior permission from Nova and UNICCO. Progressive

Discipline Notice 1 (Aug. 24, 2006). Todaro indicated that the

practice was to stop immediately.

Nova terminated its contract with UNICCO on February 17,

2007, and replaced UNICCO with several successor contractors. 

UNICCO laid off its employees who had been working on the

Nova campus. Some, like Todaro and Thai Nguyen, another

supervisor, were hired by Nova to perform work similar to what

they had been doing as UNICCO employees.

The next working day after the layoffs, Jose Sanchez, a

former UNICCO employee who had worked at Nova’s campus,

approached Todaro on campus to seek his assistance in being

hired by one of Nova’s new contractors. According to Sanchez,
4

whose testimony the ALJ credited, Todaro, now a Nova

supervisor, asked Sanchez whether he had supported the union

and suggested that he might be able to get paid by the union for

picketing. He told Sanchez that he could not help him at that

time, but to call him in a couple of months.

Based on charges filed by the Service Employees

International Union, Local 11, the General Counsel charged, as

relevant, that Nova violated NLRA § 8(a)(1) by maintaining and

enforcing an overly broad no-solicitation rule, interfering with

the distribution of union literature by an off-duty contractor

employee in a non-working area, and issuing a disciplinary

warning to that employee. The complaint also charged that

Nova violated section 8(a)(1) by interrogating a laid off

contractor employee about his union activities and implicitly

threatening that laid off employees would not be hired for work

on campus because of their union activities. Following an

evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found Nova had violated section

8(a)(1) as alleged. Nova filed exceptions. The Board affirmed

the ALJ’s findings with respect to violations related to the offduty contractor employee’s handbilling and discipline. It

modified the ALJ’s proposed order with regard to the

interrogation of the laid off contractor employee, finding only

that Nova violated section 8(a)(1) by making coercive

statements linking the employee’s union support to his lack of

employment. The Board ordered Nova to cease and desist from

interfering with its employees’ rights under NLRA § 7 in

violation of section 8(a)(1); to rescind its no-solicitation rule;

and to remove from the handbilling contractor employee’s

personnel files any reference to the unlawful discipline, ask

UNICCO to do the same, and notify that employee in writing

that it has done so and that the discipline will not be used against

him in any way. Nova was also required to post a remedial

notice. 
5

Nova petitioned for review, the Board cross-applied for

enforcement, and the cases were consolidated. The court held

the cases in abeyance in part pending review of the Board’s

decision on remand in New York New York, LLC d/b/a New York

New York Hotel & Casino, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (2011)

(hereafter “NYNY”) and, because one Member of the Board was

a recess appointee, pending the Supreme Court’s decision in

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. __ , 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 

II.

By way of overview, we note that much of Nova’s petition

for review centers on the Board’s application of its decision in

NYNY. There, the Board balanced the employee’s rights under

section 7 and the employer’s rights to control the use of its

premises and manage its business and property, and concluded

that onsite contractor employees have the right under section 7

to distribute union-related handbills during nonwork time and in

nonwork areas, unless the property owner can demonstrate that

the handbilling significantly interferes with its use of the

property or justifies its prohibition by other legitimate business

reasons. The court approved the Board’s determination,

concluding that the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent

granted the Board discretion over how to treat onsite contractor

employees for these purposes. New York New York v. NLRB,

676 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Consequently, the Board

did not commit reversible error in deeming NYNY controlling. 

Several of Nova’s other contentions falter due to its failure 

to acknowledge the limits of this court’s jurisdiction when it did

not adhere to the requirements for filing exceptions to the ALJ’s

decision. Under NLRA § 10(e), “[n]o objection that has not

been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the

court, unless the failure . . . to urge such objection shall be

excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C.
6

§ 160(e). And it is long established that where a petitioner

objects to a finding on an issue first raised in the Board’s

decision, a petitioner must file for reconsideration to afford the

Board an opportunity to correct the error, if any. See Woelke &

Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982). The

Board’s rules require, in turn, that any objection must “set forth

specifically the questions . . . to which exception is taken[,]” 29

C.F.R. § 102.46(b)(1) (2007), and “present[ ] clearly the points

of fact and law relied on[,]” id. § 102.46(c)(3). See Spectrum

Health–Kent Cmty. Campus v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 341, 348-49

(D.C. Cir. 2011); 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b)(2). Application of

section 10(e) is mandatory. Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 147

F.3d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Finally, in urging its petition be granted, Nova does not

contest that the Board has “primary responsibility for developing

and applying national labor policy.” NLRB v. Curtin Matheson

Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990); see Beth Israel Hosp.

v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978). Nor that our review of the

Board’s decision and order is deferential. See Int’l Transp.

Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2006). To the

extent Nova challenges the Board’s factual findings, it

acknowledges that these findings are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1951); 29

U.S.C. § 160(e). Nova does, however, challenge the Board’s

extension of its precedent in finding Nova violated section

8(a)(1) as a result of coercive statements made by its employee

to a former contractor employee who was seeking employment

with Nova’s new contractor. 

A.

The Board is entitled to summary enforcement of the

uncontested portion of its order regarding the no-solicitation rule

as applied to Nova’s own employees. See N.Y. Rehab. Care
7

Mgmt. v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Nova

failed to file a proper exception to the ALJ’s finding that Nova’s

no-solicitation rule was unlawful as applied to its own

employees and it does not show that special circumstances

justify this failure. Its exceptions do no more than state a

generalized objection to the ALJ’s analysis without providing

the detail required by the Board’s rules or otherwise putting the

Board on notice of the specific grounds for its objections. 

Excepting generally is insufficient. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.46. 

Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction to review this part of the

Board’s order. NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Woelke &

Romero Framing, Inc., 456 U.S. at 665. 

B.

The Board reasonably found that Nova violated section

8(a)(1) by prohibiting McGonigle from engaging in handbilling

on a campus parking lot. Nova maintains that, under Lechmere,

Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), and NLRB v. Babcock &

Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), UNICCO onsite contractor

employees are analogous to non-employee union organizers who

are not entitled to solicit on its property. In NYNY, however, the

Board emphasized that, in view of the broad definition of

“employee” in NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), “the precise

terms of the [NLRA’s] prohibitions [in NLRA § 8(a)(1)] . . .

make clear that an employer’s action toward the employees of

other employers can constitute an unfair labor practice.” 356

N.L.R.B. No. 119 at 6. The Board rejected the view that an

onsite contractor employee’s section 7 rights depended on the

contractor having a “leasehold interest or fixed place of work

within the owner’s property,” id. at 9, referencing as an example

contractors serving as janitors throughout an office building

whose section 7 rights would otherwise be diminished. In

NYNY, as here, the expressive activity occurred at the “very

threshold of the employees’ own workplace[,]” namely at the

entrances to the casino and two onsite restaurants where the
8

contractor employees worked. Id. at 13. The Board concluded

that the section 7 rights of onsite contractor employees “are

much more closely aligned to those of NYNY’s own employees

. . . than . . . the interests of the union organizers at issue in

Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox. . . . They were not strangers

or outsiders to NYNY’s property; rather, they worked there

regularly, for an employer with a close economic relationship to

NYNY. Finally, they sought access to locations that were

uniquely suited to the effective exercise of their statutory

rights.” Id. 

So, too, McGonigle. UNICCO had a close economic

relationship with Nova during the term of their contract and its

employees were regularly employed on Nova’s campus. 

Although UNICCO did not have a leasehold interest like the

contractor in NYNY, the handbilling occurred on campus as “no

other location . . . could be more appropriately understood as

[UNICCO employees’] workplace.” 357 N.L.R.B. No. 74 at 2. 

Under NYNY, then, McGonigle’s handbilling was protected

activity under section 7 and his status was not equivalent to that

of a non-employee union organizer.

Further, the Board reasonably concluded that Nova failed to

meet its burden in attempting to show that its no-solicitation rule

was justified by legitimate business reasons. Although Nova

presented evidence of security concerns that it claimed justified

the no-solicitation rule, it never explained how its campus would

be less safe if its on-site contractor employees were permitted to

distribute handbills to their co-workers. Nova’s evidence

showed that the campus is freely accessible to both vehicles and

pedestrians; as its Vice President for Facilities Management

explained, pedestrians can “pretty much walk on campus at

will.” ALJ Hr’g Tr. 217 (Nov. 18, 2008). The Board

acknowledged both “the validity and the importance” of the

need to ensure security on Nova’s open campus, but noted that
9

its no-solicitation rule prohibited “the distribution of literature,

not trespassing or unauthorized entry[,]” and that Nova

“maintained a broad range of controls over UNICCO and its

employees” that addressed security concerns. 357 N.L.R.B. No.

74 at 3. Even before this court, Nova’s briefs fail to offer an

explanation of how its no-solicitation rule addresses its security

concerns.

To the extent Nova objects to the ALJ’s exclusion of certain

safety evidence by its Public Safety Director, it fails to show that

it suffered prejudice as a result. See Exxon Chem. Co. v. NLRB,

386 F.3d 1160, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Reno Hilton Resorts v.

NLRB, 196 F.3d 1275, 1285 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The ALJ

excluded as irrelevant evidence of events that “occurred after the

dates involved” in Nova’s enforcement of its no-solicitation rule

as to McGonigle. See ALJ Hr’g Tr. 133-34 (Nov. 17, 2008). 

On appeal, Nova maintains that this evidence would have related

to the “vulnerability of the campus,” Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t’s Br.

41-43, and “on-campus crimes . . . by Nova’s contractor[s],” 

Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t’s Reply Br. 6-7 (internal quotation omitted). 

Although Nova’s June 12, 2009 reply brief to the Board may

have sufficiently identified its objection to the ALJ’s exclusion

of this evidence, Nova failed to explain how this testimony

would show “why the campus would be any less safe if

[UNICCO employees] distributed union flyers to fellow

employees.” 357 N.L.R.B. No. 74 at 3. Nova presented

testimony about its security concerns and various incidents, and

noted in its reply brief to the Board both the “numerous incident

reports introduced by the General Counsel” and the

“corroborating testimony” by Nova’s Vice President for

Facilities Management. The Board accepted the validity of

Nova’s safety concerns and explained how it factored them into

its conclusion. See id. Under the circumstances, Nova fails to

show prejudice.
10

Nova’s other objection that it did not “prohibit” McGonigle

from handbilling, but merely required that he obtain prior

permission, fares no better. Under long-established Board

precedent, an employer may not condition the exercise of

section 7 rights upon its own authorization. J.R. Simplot Co.,

137 N.L.R.B. 1552, 1553 (1962); see Cogburn Health Ctr., Inc.

v. NLRB, 437 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Jas. H.

Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432, 440 (8th Cir. 1965). 

Nova’s attempt to distinguish this precedent on the basis that

Nova did not directly employ McGonigle is “essentially”

repeating the argument the Board rejected in NYNY that onsite

employees are not entitled to solicit because they are equivalent

to non-employee union organizers. Resp’t’s Br. 18. Nova’s

argument that it did not “exclude” McGonigle from its campus

is thus immaterial.

Nova’s suggestion that there was no record basis for

imputing section 8(a)(1) liability to it for the discipline imposed

by a UNICCO supervisor on one of its own employees for

violating Nova’s non-solicitation rule also lacks merit. 

Substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion,” Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477, supports the

Board’s finding that Todaro, while acting as Nova’s agent,

disciplined McGonigle for handbilling in violation of Nova’s

no-solicitation rule. First, the ALJ credited McGonigle’s

testimony regarding his conversation with Todaro, and Nova

fails to present grounds on which the court can reject that

determination. See Wayneview Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 664 F.3d

341, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB,

453 F.3d 538, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2006). According to McGonigle,

Todaro told him that he was being “written up” for passing out

handbills on Nova’s private property without prior authorization

contrary to Nova’s no-solicitation rule. Todaro gave McGonigle

a disciplinary notice and a copy of the rule. All this occurred in
11

Todaro’s office. Substantial evidence exists despite the absence

of Todaro’s signature on the disciplinary notice itself. 

Second, there was substantial evidence that in disciplining

McGonigle, Todaro was acting as Nova’s agent. It has long

been settled by the Board that an employer may violate the

NLRA through the conduct of its agents. E.g., Progressive

Elec., Inc., 453 F.3d at 545-46. The Board applies common law

principles of agency, construed liberally, when assigning

liability under the NLRA. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.

NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80-81 (1940); Progressive Elec., Inc., 453

F.3d at 545-46; see also Uniroyal Tech. Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.3d

993, 999-1000 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1996). Although Todaro was a

UNICCO supervisor at the time he spoke with McGonigle,

UNICCO’s contract required it to ensure that its employees

complied with Nova’s policies. Todaro wore work shirts with

the logos of both UNICCO and Nova, had a Nova e-mail

address, and was listed on Nova’s website in a manner

suggesting he was a Nova employee. In these circumstances,

Todaro’s enforcement of a Nova policy could cause an

employee to reasonably believe that Todaro was acting on

Nova’s behalf, satisfying the standard for agency. See

Progressive Elec., Inc., 453 F.3d at 545-46.

C.

Nova additionally contends that the Board misapplied

NYNY in concluding that Nova’s onsite contractor employees

were entitled to distribute union literature in Nova’s parking lot. 

In Nova’s view, the contractors’ maintenance work was not

“integral” to Nova’s business of providing a university

education and the handbilling took place in an area that was a

working area not open to the public. The court lacks jurisdiction

to consider these challenges to the Board’s application of NYNY

because Nova failed to “urge[] [them] before the Board”

pursuant to NLRA § 10(e). 
12

Before the Board, Nova filed an exception to the ALJ’s

analysis that the facts here differ significantly from those in

NYNY. Nova now seeks to challenge the Board’s adoption of

the ALJ’s finding that the parking lot where McGonigle was

handbilling was a nonworking area open to the public, pointing

to the work done there by UNICCO and to Nova’s permitting

requirements for use of the parking lot. The exceptions Nova

identifies as having previously made this objection to the Board,

however, make only general objections to the ALJ’s analysis. 

Nova never explained the grounds for these exceptions, nor

addressed these issues in its brief to the Board, nor cited any

supporting record evidence or case law. Such vague exceptions

are insufficient under section 10(e). See Parsippany Hotel

Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Nova’s attempt to challenge the Board’s finding that

McGonigle’s work was “integral” to Nova’s business of

education also fails on procedural grounds. Although this

finding was made for the first time by the Board, not the ALJ,

Nova never sought reconsideration by the Board and it offers no

extraordinary circumstances to excuse its failure. See Oldwick

Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1984)

(citing Woelke, 456 U.S. at 665, and NLRB v. Dist. 50, United

Mine Workers of Am., 355 U.S. 453, 463-64 (1958)). 

III.

Nova’s remaining challenge is that the Board had no basis

in law or fact to hold it liable under section 8(a)(1) for

supposedly “coercive” statements made by Todaro to Sanchez,

a former contractor employee seeking future employment with

a new Nova contractor. Nova maintains that the Board’s

precedent is directed at the hiring process of an employer hiring

employees. Even if it assumes Todaro was a Nova employee

during his conversation with Sanchez, Nova maintains their
13

conversation was not a job interview, because Sanchez was not

an applicant for a position with Nova, and Nova was not a

potential employer of Sanchez. Moreover, there was no

evidence that Todaro had decision-making authority or even

input into the hiring decisions of Nova contractors. 

 Under NLRA § 7 and § 8(a)(1), it is unlawful for an

employer to make threats or statements that tend to coerce

employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, including

questions about union activities in the context of an

employment interview. Mathews Readymix, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B.

1005, 1007 (1997), enforced in relevant part, 165 F.3d 74, 76-

78 (D.C. Cir. 1999); W & M Props. of Conn., Inc. v. NLRB, 514

F.3d 1341, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see NLRB v. Solboro

Knitting Mills, Inc., 572 F.2d 936, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1978). The

Board, “[w]ithout deciding whether Todaro’s statements to

Sanchez constituted an unlawful interrogation and an unlawful

implied threat,” as the ALJ had found, concluded that Todaro’s

statements were coercive “in the context of Sanchez’s request

for assistance in gaining employment” and thus violated section

8(a)(1). 357 N.L.R.B. No. 74 at 4.

Nova correctly points out that Todaro’s position as a Nova

supervisor is distinct from a position with direct hiring authority

for a Nova contractor, such as existed in the cases cited by the

Board. The Board’s decision acknowledges this reality not only

in the “cf” signal to its precedent but in limiting its decision to

the context of Sanchez’s request for assistance in gaining

employment and not deciding whether Todaro’s statements to

Sanchez constituted an unlawful interrogation and an unlawful

implied threat as might have existed had Todaro had direct

hiring authority for the job Sanchez was seeking. The principle

underlying the Board’s precedent, as stated in Mathews

Readymix, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. at 1007, is to protect section 7

rights by finding section 8(a)(1) liability where questioning
14

during a job interview about union sympathies can, “under all

the circumstances . . . reasonably tend[] to restrain or interfere

with employees in the exercise of their statutory rights”

(internal citation omitted). Although the conversation between

Sanchez and Todaro was not in the context of a job interview

for a job with Nova, the Board could reasonably conclude that

the rationale of its precedent extends to the owner-contractor

context because there can be the functional equivalent of a job

interview where the owner’s supervisory employee is in a

position to “assist” a former contractor employee in gaining

employment with one of the owner’s new contractors, even if

the supervisor does not have final hiring authority.

The record evidence underscores the real-world

appropriateness of the Board’s application of its precedent in

this context. According to Todaro, his supervisory role for

Nova was to oversee contractors, including those who work on

campus. The evidence showed that another former UNICCO

supervisory employee had assisted laid-off UNICCO employees

in obtaining employment with one of Nova’s new contractors. 

Specifically, Thai Nguyen, who, like Todaro, had been hired by

Nova, had successfully recommended that one of Nova’s new

contractors hire other laid off UNICCO employees. Regardless

of whether that assistance occurred before Nguyen was hired by

Nova, Todaro’s instruction for Sanchez to call him in a few

months conveyed that Todaro understood he was in at least a

similar position to assist Sanchez in gaining employment with

a new Nova contractor. The Board could reasonably so

conclude given that Todaro was Nova’s manager overseeing

those contractors.

Otherwise, Nova’s challenge fails because there is

substantial evidence that Todaro’s statements were “coercive.” 

Nova stipulated to the ALJ that Todaro was hired as Nova’s

Physical Plant Director on February 18, 2007. Sanchez had
15

been employed by UNICCO to do maintenance work on Nova’s

campus, but was laid off when UNICCO’s contract was

terminated. Nova terminated its contract with UNICCO on

February 17, 2007. The ALJ credited Sanchez’s testimony

about his conversation with Todaro, and, absent grounds to

overturn the ALJ’s credibility determination, see Wayneview

Care Ctr., 664 F.3d at 349, the Board’s conclusion is supported

by Sanchez’s testimony that he and Todaro spoke on campus

the following working day after Sanchez was laid off about

getting employment with one of Nova’s new contractors. 

Todaro responded by first asking whether Sanchez had

supported the union and then suggested, “sarcastically,” the

Board found, that Sanchez might be able to get paid by the

union for picketing. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 74 at 4. He also told

Sanchez that although he could not help him get a job at that

time Sanchez should call back in a couple of months. The

Board could reasonably conclude that Todaro’s statement

indicated that Todaro likewise considered himself to be in a

position to assist Sanchez in getting a job with Nova’s new

contractor and that Todaro’s questions, while at the work site, 

about Sanchez’s union activities were, under the circumstances,

impermissibly coercive.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the

cross-application for enforcement of the Board’s order.