J-A12042-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

2016 PA Super 130

LINWOOD GERBER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RALPH PIERGROSSI AND ROSANNE 

PIERGROSSI AND JANET WIELOSIK,

Appellant No. 1533 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order April 10, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 2011-35173

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 17, 2016

Appellants, Ralph Piergrossi, Rosanne Piergrossi and Janet Wielosik, 

appeal from the Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 

County by the Honorable Thomas C. Branca on April 10, 2015, granting the 

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Appellee, Linwood Gerber, in this in 

rem mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm. 

The trial court aptly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history 

herein as follows:

The instant dispute arises from a Mortgage ("the Mortgage")

securing the real property (the "Property") located at 20 Aubrey 

Court, Royersford, Pennsylvania, executed and entered into by 

[Appellants] and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 

("MERS") as Nominee for [Appellee’s] Successor in Interest, 

Infinity Home Mortgage Co., Inc. ("Infinity") on April 9, 2010, 

and recorded on May 13, 2010.1 The Mortgage secured 

[Appellants’] obligations under a Note, given to Infinity in 

consideration of a loan to [Appellants] in the amount of 
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$278,167.00, with interest thereon at 6.00 %, payable in equal 

monthly installments of $1,667.75 commencing on June 1, 

2010.2[Appellants] executed the Note, which included the 

following express language:

[T]he Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or 

anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is 

entitled to receive payment under this Note is called 

the "Note Holder."

[Am. Compl. at Ex. D, (3/22/12)]. On February I, 2011, 

[Appellants] defaulted on the Note and Mortgage by failing to 

make the previously agreed upon monthly payments. On 

October 6, 2011, the Mortgage was assigned by MERS as 

Nominee for Infinity to Infinity, which assignment was duly 

recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery 

County on October 11, 2011. The Assignment specificity 

provided:

Together with the note or obligation described in the 

Mortgage endorsed to the Assignee, ("Note") and all 

moneys due and to become due on the Note and 

Mortgage, with interest. Assignee it[s] successors, legal 

representatives and assigns shall hold all rights under 

the Note and Mortgage forever, subject however, to the 

right and equity of redemption, if any, of the maker(s) 

of the Mortgage, their heirs and assigns forever.

[Am. Compl. at Ex. B (3/22/12)]. On October 25, 2011, Infinity 

sent the required Notice of Default and Intention to Foreclose to 

Defendants at the Property via certified and regular mail.3

On December 23, 2011, Infinity instituted the instant 

mortgage foreclosure action against [Appellants]. On February 

14, 2012, [Appellants] responded with Preliminary Objections to 

Infinity's Complaint, but soon stipulated to an extension for 

Infinity to respond. Accordingly, on March 22, 2012, Infinity filed 

an Amended Complaint, the material allegations of which 

[Appellants] effectively admitted, as addressed hereinafter. 

Thereafter, [Appellants] filed Preliminary Objections to the 

Amended Complaint, which the Honorable Gary S. Silow of this 

Court overruled in their entirety by Order dated September 4, 

2012. On October 5, 2012, [Appellants] filed an Answer and New 

Matter.4 Thereafter, [Appellants] sought leave of [c]ourt to file 

an Amended Answer and New Matter. On May 23, 2013, after 

agreement by the parties via stipulation, [Appellants] filed the 

proposed Amended Answer and New Matter.5

On August 27, 2013, the Mortgage was assigned by 

Infinity to [Appellee], which assignment was duly recorded in the 
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Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery County on 

January 31, 2014. On February 12, 2014, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 

2352, [Appellee] filed a Statement of Material Fact in Support of 

Voluntary Substitution, representing as follows:

1. The above-captioned Action of Mortgage Foreclosure 

related to a property located at 20 Aubrey Court 

Royersford, PA 19468 ("Property").

2. [Appellee] holds a mortgage on the Property which 

is recorded at Mortgage Book 12835, Page 2833 in the 

Office of the Recorder of Deeds for Montgomery 

County.

3. The original Plaintiff in this action is Infinity Home 

Mortgage Co., Inc.

4. Linwood C. Gerber is the successor in interest to the 

[Appellee] by assignment of mortgage recorded in land 

records of Montgomery County on January 31, 2014 in 

Book; 13743; 1438 Instrument # 2014006546 and

is hereby voluntarily substituted as [Appellee] in the 

above-captioned matter.

Approximately one year later, on February 3, 2015, 

[Appellee] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Appellants] 

timely filed an unverified Answer to [Appellee’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Significantly, as will be discussed 

hereinafter, neither the cover sheet6of the moving party 

[(Appellee)], nor the cover sheet of the responding party 

[(Appellants)] requested discovery with regard to the underlying 

Motion. Thereafter, the Court granted [Appellee’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment by Order dated April 9, 2014.[1][Appellants] 

filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the [c]ourt denied by 

Order dated April 28, 2015. On May 7, 2015, [Appellants] timely 

filed a Notice of Appeal, and on June 2, 2015, [Appellants] 

timely filed and served upon the undersigned their Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained [o]f On Appeal[.]

_____

1

[Am. Compl. at Ex. A (the "Mortgage") (3/22/12)].

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered an in rem judgment in favor of Appellee and against 

Appellants in the amount of $342,509.69, together with interest from and 

after February 1, 2015, at a per diem rate of $45.73 plus costs and 

attorney’s fees.
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2

[Am. Compl. at Ex. D (the "Note") (3/22/12)].

3 See 41 P.S. § 403.

4While the verification by defense counsel attached to 

[Appellants’] Answer and New Matter was insufficient under Pa. 

R.C.P. 1024, [Appellee’s] failure to object thereupon effectively 

waived that shortcoming. See LaBriola v. SEPTA, 323 A.2d 9 

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).

5 This pleading was likewise not properly verified by counsel, but 

likewise not objected to by [Appellee]. See Pa. R.C.P. 1017(a), 

1019(a), 1024(a); but see LaBriota, 323 A.2d 9.

6See e.g., Montco. Local R. 1035(a)(1)(b)(1), 205.2(b), 

1035.2(a)(2)(c)(1) requiring motions and responses to be faced 

with a cover sheet, whereupon the parties may request 

additional discovery to be concluded within sixty (60) days from 

the filing of the motion. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/25/15, at 1-4. 

In their brief, Appellants present the following Statement of Question 

Involved:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion by granting [Appellee’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment despite the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact in that the Promissory Note presented by 

[Appellee] did not have an endorsement as required under the 

Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code and the Superior Court’s 

ruling in JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258,[2]

thus, [Appellee] was unable to meet its burden in showing that it 

is the legal Noteholder and real party in interest.

Brief for Appellants at vii. 

This Court’s scope and standard of review of a trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment is well-settled:

____________________________________________

2 Appellants are referring to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 

A.3d 1258 (Pa.Super. 2013). 
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In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our 

scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is the 

same as that applied by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has 

stated the applicable standard of review as follows: [A]n 

appellate court may reverse the entry of a summary judgment 

only where it finds that the lower court erred in concluding that 

the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. In making this assessment, we 

view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As our 

inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.

Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to 

determine whether the record either establishes that the 

material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of 

facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there 

is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence 

that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the 

non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied.

Harris v. NGK North American, Inc., 19 A.3d 1053, 1063 (Pa.Super. 

2011) (citation omitted). Summary judgment in mortgage foreclosure 

actions is subject to the same rules as other civil actions. See Pa.R.C.P. 

1141(b). 

Herein, Appellants assert a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether Appellee has standing to maintain the underlying foreclosure action. 

Specifically, Appellants posit the mortgage was not assigned by the actual 

mortgage holder, MERS, but rather by persons purporting to represent 

MERS, Michele M. Jaconelli and Michael J. Jaconelli and that the promissory 
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note bears neither a specific indorsement,3a blank indorsement4or an 

allonge5as is required for negotiable instruments which are governed by the 

Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code (“PUCC”).6 Appellants explain that 

the mortgage assigned by MERS to Infinity was signed by Michael Jaconelli 

and Michele Jaconelli as President and Vice President of MERS, although 

these individuals were President and Vice President of Infinity, not of MERS. 

Appellants conclude the Note was not properly negotiated and the mortgage 

is void; therefore, Appellee is unable to meet his burden of showing he is the 

legal noteholder and a real party in interest. Appellants submit J.P. Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., supra, is controlling under these facts and dictates that

Appellee lacks standing to proceed in the instant action. Brief for Appellants 

at 2-4, 7-14, 25-26. 

____________________________________________

3 While Appellants utilize the term “specific indorsement,” the PUCC defines 

a “special indorsement” as one made by the holder of an instrument that 

identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument payable. 13 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3205. A special indorsement renders the instrument payable to the 

identified person who, in turn, is the only individual who may transfer the 

note by subsequent endorsement. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 63 

A.3d at 1272 n. 5. 

4 The PUCC defines a blank indorsement as follows: “If an indorsement is 

made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special indorsement, it is 

a ‘blank indorsement.’ When indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes 

payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone 

until specially indorsed.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3205(b). 

5 An allonge is defined as “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a 

negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements 

when the original paper is filled with indorsements.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

76 (Deluxe 7th ed.). 

6 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101-9809.
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In this regard, this Court recently explained: 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2002 provides, 

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... all actions shall be 

prosecuted by and in the name of the real party in interest, 

without distinction between contracts under seal and parol 

contracts.” Pa.R.C.P.2002(a); see also J.P. Morgan Chase 

Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(finding a debtor's claim that appellee bank was not a real party 

in interest to bring foreclosure action was a challenge to 

appellee's standing). “[A] real party in interest is a [p]erson who 

will be entitled to benefits of an action if successful.... [A] party 

is a real party in interest if it has the legal right under the 

applicable substantive law to enforce the claim in question.” U.S. 

Bank, N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 993–994 (Pa.Super. 

2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted; some brackets in 

original).

In a mortgage foreclosure action, the mortgagee is the real 

party in interest. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupori, 8 

A.3d 919, 922 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 2010). This is made evident under 

our Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure governing actions in 

mortgage foreclosure that require a plaintiff in a mortgage 

foreclosure action specifically to name the parties to the 

mortgage and the fact of any assignments. Pa.R.C.P. 1147. A 

person foreclosing on a mortgage, however, also must own or

hold the note. This is so because a mortgage is only the security 

instrument that ensures repayment of the indebtedness under a 

note to real property. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 

275 (1872) (noting “all authorities agree the debt is the principal 

thing and the mortgage an accessory.”). A mortgage can have 

no separate existence. Id. When a note is paid, the mortgage 

expires. Id. On the other hand, a person may choose to proceed 

in an action only upon a note and forego an action in foreclosure 

upon the collateral pledged to secure repayment of the note. 

See Harper v. Lukens, 112 A. 636, 637 (Pa. 1921) (noting “as 

suit is expressly based upon the note, it was not necessary to 

prove the agreement as to the collateral.”). For our instant 

purposes, this is all to say that to establish standing in 

this foreclosure action, appellee had to plead ownership 

of the mortgage under [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure] 1147, and have the right to make demand 

upon the note secured by the mortgage.
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CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65, 68 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In addition, 

[t]he holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to initiate 

a foreclosure action. Additionally, the mortgage holder “is 

entitled to summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that the 

mortgage is in default, the mortgagor has failed to pay on the 

obligation, and the recorded mortgage is in the specified 

amount.” The foreclosing party can prove standing either by 

showing that it (1) originated or was assigned the mortgage, or

(2) is the holder of the note specially indorsed to it or indorsed 

in blank. 

J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1267–1268, n.6 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Based upon the record evidence produced by Appellee in support of his 

motion for summary judgment, we find Appellants’ claim that Appellee lacks 

standing to pursue the underlying mortgage foreclosure action because he 

did not establish a valid assignment of the mortgage and that the Note was 

never assigned or otherwise transferred to him lacks merit. Contrary to 

Appellants’ claims, Appellee has both averred and produced evidence that he 

is the holder of the mortgage. Specifically, Infinity alleged in its Amended 

Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure that:

2. On April 09, 2010, mortgagors made, executed and 

delivered a mortgage upon the Property hereinafter described to 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. AS 

NOMINEE FOR INFINITY HOME MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., 

which mortgage is recorded in the Office of the Recorder of 

Deeds of Montgomery County as Book 12835, Page 2833. A 

true and correct copy of the mortgage is attached hereto as 

Exhibit “A.” The mortgage has been assigned to INFINITY HOME 

MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC. by assignment of Mortgage recorded 

in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery County on 
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October 11, 2011 as Book 13162, Page 00506-00510. A true 

and correct [sic] of the recorded assignment of mortgage is 

attached hereto as Exhibit “B.” 

Amended Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure, 3/22/12 at ¶ 3. Copies of the 

original recorded mortgage and its recorded assignment to Infinity were 

produced. Id. at Exhibits A, B. Thereafter, on January 31, 2014, an 

Assignment of Mortgage was recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds 

of Montgomery County in Book 13743, Page; 1438 Instrument 

#2014006546 wherein Infinity did “convey, grant, assign, transfer and set 

over the described Mortgage [dated 4/29/2010] with all interest secured 

thereby, all liens, and any rights due or to become due thereon to Linwood 

C. Gerber, whose address is 116 New Road, Tabernacle, NJ 08088, 

(Assignee).” Also, Paragraph C of the Mortgage recorded on April 29, 2010, 

indicates “MERS is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS is a 

separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and 

Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this Security 

Instrument.” See Mortgage filed 5/13/10, at 1.7

As such, while Appellants challenge Appellee’s standing to assert rights 

under the mortgage, the uncontroverted evidence of record evinces Appellee 

properly holds the mortgage by way of assignment and is the real party in 

____________________________________________

7 When considering a petition to set aside sheriff’s sale, this Court has stated 

that a mortgage may vest MERS with the authority, as nominee, to enforce a 

loan. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Ralich, 982 

A.2d 77, 81 (Pa.Super. 2009). 
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interest in the mortgage foreclosure action. Appellants have offered no 

evidence in opposition to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact in this regard, nor do they assert 

that further discovery would uncover such facts. “Where an assignment is 

effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all 

of his rights.” Barbezat, 131 A.3d at 69. (citation omitted). 

Notwithstanding, Appellants further aver the Note does not bear an 

indorsement from Infinity to Appellee. Appellants engage in a lengthy 

argument that as a negotiable instrument governed by the PUCC, the Note 

needed to be properly indorsed and as it was not, Appellee cannot establish 

ownership thereof because it was never assigned to Appellee; therefore, he 

is not a real party in interest. Brief for Appellants at 14-20. When 

considering this claim, the trial court observed that Appellee asserted in 

paragraph three of his Motion for Summary Judgment that he is the holder 

of both the mortgage and the Note and identified the terms thereof. In 

addition, Appellee indicated Appellants had signed the Note in paragraph five 

of his motion and attached a copy of the Note to the motion. 

The trial court indicated that in their answer to the motion for 

summary judgment, Appellants generally denied the assertions in paragraph 

three and admitted that Exhibit “A” constituted a copy of the Note they had 

signed and stated that the document “speaks for itself.” Stressing that 

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a) provides that an adverse party to a motion for summary 
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judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings to 

preclude the entry of judgment, the trial court found that the record 

undisputedly reveals Appellants executed and thereby bound themselves to 

the terms of the Promissory Note of which Appellee is in possession. Trial 

Court Opinion, filed 9/25/15 at 8-10. As such, the trial court further found 

that in light of their admission Appellee is in possession of the Note, 

Appellants’ reliance upon J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, supra, is clearly 

misplaced. Id. at 10. 

Therein, a panel of this Court reversed the grant of summary 

judgment and remanded for further proceedings upon finding the parties 

disagreed as to whether J.P. Morgan Chase Bank had produced for Murray’s 

inspection the original note and whether the loose allonge also provided for 

Murray’s inspection was itself an original that purported to indorse the 

original note in blank. Holding that such discrepancy must be resolved by a 

fact-finder following the introduction of available documentary and 

testimonial evidence, we vacated the trial court’s order permitting J.P. 

Morgan to substitute itself as a party for the alleged predecessor holders of 

the mortgage and note and in doing so explained that if J.P. Morgan were 

unable to establish its possession of the Note on remand, it would need to 

establish successor status by other means. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 

N.A., at 1268-69. Therefore, a factual question was presented as to 

whether the plaintiff had standing to commence a foreclosure action. 
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Relevant to the issue presented herein, this Court stated that given our 

conclusion a material issue of fact existed as to possession of the original 

note, we would not address Murray’s remaining, standing-related 

arguments; however, we clarified that “under the PUCC these arguments are 

immaterial if Appellee holds the Note . . . .” Id. at 1269. 

To the contrary, possession or authenticity of the original Note is not 

at issue herein. Furthermore, Appellants do not contest that the Note 

produced by Appellee, dated April 9, 2010, and executed by Appellants, 

contains a provision entitled “Borrower’s Promise to Pay.” While this 

provision specifies the Lender is Infinity, it further states: “I understand 

that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes 

this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this 

Note is called the ‘Note Holder.’” In addition, in the paragraph entitled 

“Transfer of Rights in the Property” the mortgage further provides:

This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment 

of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of 

the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower’s covenants and 

agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note. For 

this purpose, Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey 

to MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors 

and assigns) and to the successors and assigns of MERS the 

following described property. . . .8 

____________________________________________

8

It is noteworthy that although Appellants argued in their Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal that the trial court had “erred 

as a matter of law and abused its discretion in granting [Appellee’s] Motion 

for Summary Judgement [sic] despite there being a genuine issue of 

material fact in that [Appellee’s] calculations of amounts claimed due were 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In their reply brief, Appellants stress that because the instant Note is 

not indorsed, “it is payable only to Infinity.” Reply Brief for Appellants at 4. 

However, Appellants do not challenge the Statement of Voluntary 

Substitution wherein Infinity indicated that Appellee is its successor in 

interest by an assignment of a duly recorded mortgage. See Statement of 

Material Facts in Support of Voluntary Substitution Under Pa.R.C.P. 2352 ¶ 

4; [Appellant’s] Answer to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 20 

(“admitting only that [Appellee]” was voluntarily substituted for Infinity”). It 

would follow then that if the Note were payable to Infinity, and Appellee is 

Infinity’s successor in interest and in possession of the Note, the Note is 

payable to Appellee regardless of whether or not it is indorsed. 

Notwithstanding, the aforementioned language evinces the subject Note is a 

“bearer note”9and such a note is payable to the bearer if it “states that is is 

payable to bearer or to the order of bearer or otherwise indicates that the 

person in possession of the promise or order is entitled to payment.” J.P.

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra at 1266. 

Also, we have determined a note secured by a mortgage is a 

negotiable instrument, as that term is defined by the PUCC, and stated that 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

incorrect[,]” they have not pursued this issue on appeal herein. See 

Defendants’ Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal” at ¶ 13. 

9 A note indorsed in blank “becomes payable to bearer and may be 

negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.” 13 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3205.
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“[p]ursuant to the PUCC, a debtor who satisfies his obligations under a 

negotiable instrument cannot be required to do so again, even if the 

recipient of the debtor's performance is not the holder of the note in 

question.” Id. at 1263, 1265 (citing 13 Pa.C.S. § 3602(a)). We further 

reasoned that under the PUCC, a borrower is not in peril of double liability or 

injury by an allegedly defective assignment, for if the assignment to the 

foreclosing party had been defective, the borrower would not have to pay on 

the note to another party. Thus, we found a borrower lacks standing to 

challenge the validity of the assignment. Id. at 1266; see also In re 

Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 285–286 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2012) (stating “If a 

borrower cannot demonstrate potential injury from the enforcement of the 

note and mortgage by a party acting under a defective assignment, the 

borrower lacks standing to raise the issue”) (citation omitted). 

As such, Appellants misconstrue this Court’s holding in J.P. Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., as standing for the proposition that “an unendorsed 

Note, not held by the original creditor, cannot result in the presenter being a 

holder [and] the holder would have no right to pursue a mortgage 

foreclosure action.” Brief for Appellants at 22. To the contrary, this Court 

stressed therein that “the chain of possession by which [a party] c[o]me[s] 

to hold the [n]ote [is] immaterial to its enforceability by [the party].” Id., 

63 A.3d at 1266. Appellee, as the holder of the Note, a negotiable 

instrument the authenticity of which is not challenged herein, is entitled to 

make demand upon and to enforce Appellants’ obligations thereunder. 
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Accordingly, given Appellee’s ownership of the mortgage and possession of 

the Note, we find he has standing as a real party in interest to pursue the 

underlying foreclosure action. See Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 

A.3d 65, 69 (Pa.Super. 2016). For these reasons, we conclude Appellants' 

issue lacks merit and the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err as a 

matter of law in awarding summary judgment in favor of Appellee. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's April 10, 2015, Order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/17/2016