J-S27018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ISAAC DICKERSON

Appellant No. 2639 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered July 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0002660-2010

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and FITZGERALD,*JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2015

Appellant, Isaac Dickerson, appeals pro se from the July 31, 2014 

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, dismissing his 

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Following review, we affirm.

On direct appeal, this Court adopted portions of the trial court’s 

comprehensive summary of evidence presented at trial in this case. 

Commonwealth v. Dickerson, I., 905 EDA 2011, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-6 (Pa. Super. filed March 23, 2012). For purposes of this 

appeal, it is sufficient to know that on January 21, 2011, a jury found 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S27018-15

- 2 -

Appellant guilty of second degree murder, robbery, burglary, theft by 

unlawful taking, and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery,[1] all stemming 

from events that occurred in the early morning hours of March 15, 2010. On 

February 23, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of life 

imprisonment without possibility of parole for the murder conviction and an 

aggregate consecutive sentence for the remaining convictions. The trial 

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on March 17, 2011. 

Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court contending the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence and alleging trial court error for denying a 

new trial based on newly discovered evidence, for failing to schedule the 

hearing of a witness, and for denying his pre-trial motion to sever his trial 

from that of his co-defendant and brother, Kyle Dickerson. This Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on March 23, 2012. Appellant 

filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on 

August 23, 2012. 

Appellant filed a timely pro se Petition for “Post Conviction Collateral 

Relief” on August 21, 2013. The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a 

Finley2 no-merit letter after reviewing the file and speaking with Appellant. 

The PCRA court scheduled an April 10, 2014 hearing, during which PCRA 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701, 3502, 3921, and 903, respectively. 

2 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S27018-15

- 3 -

counsel stated his conclusion that each of Appellant’s six issues was without 

merit. In the course of the hearing, the following exchanges occurred:

PCRA Counsel: [] I spoke with [Appellant] over at [Lehigh 

County Prison] on two different occasions after being appointed 

to review his petition, to make sure that I was addressing 

everything that he wanted to address.

I believe there were six issues. After investigating those 

six issues I came to the conclusion that they are all without 

merit.

I wrote him a Finley letter explaining the reasons that I 

believe those issues were without merit. 

If you want I can address each one or, do you have a copy 

of my letter?

The Court: I should. I do. It is not necessary that you outline 

each item.

[PCRA Counsel]: So based on the – my investigation and my 

belief that they either have been previously litigated or they lack 

merit, I filed a Motion to withdraw and I seek to be withdrawn 

from this case, Your Honor.

The Court: All right. Mr. Dickerson. . . . Do you understand 

what’s happening here?

[Appellant]: Yes, ma’am, I do.

The Court: And what is your position?

[Appellant]: I don’t have a problem with him withdrawing from 

my case but if you – if I had to go pro se, I will. But I’m just 

asking if I do go pro se, you just grant me all my, all my legal 

matters that I need to continue on with my petitions, transcripts, 

everything I need, if I have to go pro se.

The Court: Yes. I’m going to allow [PCRA counsel] to 

withdraw, which leaves you with these options.

You represent yourself. You hire private counsel or you 

withdraw it. So based on now two lawyers telling you that there 

is no merit, so what is your desire?

[Appellant]: I’m gonna pro se myself [sic].
J-S27018-15

- 4 -

* * *

The Court: [] Okay. So we need to continue the matter so that 

[Appellant] can represent himself. . . . How much time are you 

requesting to get yourself together and ready for the hearing?

[Appellant]: 90 days.

The Court: Any objection?

[District Attorney]: No.

The Court: That takes us to July. We’ll do Wednesday, July 

23rd, 9:30. 

* * *

[PCRA counsel]: Your Honor, I’ll just give him the entire file 

that I have.

The Court: Sounds good.

Notes of Testimony, PCRA Hearing, 4/10/14, at 3-6.

A July 10, 2014 docket entry reflects that Appellant filed a pro se

“Petition for Post Conviction Relief/Appointment of Counsel [and] Request for 

Evidentiary Hearing,” asserting allegations of both PCRA and trial counsel 

ineffectiveness, seeking appointment of new counsel, and requesting a new 

trial or evidentiary hearing.3 By order entered July 15, 2014, the PCRA court 

____________________________________________

3 Although the July 10, 2014 filing is entitled “petition,” it is more accurately 

characterized as an 18-page brief. In the document, Appellant argued PCRA 

and trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to request a crimen falsi 

instruction, for failing to request an “anti-corroboration” instruction, for 

failing to raise the cumulative effect of errors in the jury instructions, and for 

failing to raise an objection to the jury venire panel as not representative of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S27018-15

- 5 -

denied Appellant’s request for counsel and scheduled the evidentiary hearing 

on the “Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief” for July 23, 2014, the 

date previously fixed for the hearing at the conclusion of the April 10 

proceedings. 

Appellant appeared for the July 23, 2014 hearing. Because Appellant’s 

trial counsel was not available to testify, the PCRA court rescheduled the 

hearing for July 31, 2014 and granted Appellant’s request to remain in the 

Lehigh County Prison pending the hearing. 

The PCRA court reconvened Appellant’s evidentiary hearing on July 31, 

2014. Appellant and trial counsel appeared and Appellant was afforded the 

opportunity to examine trial counsel. However, Appellant did not have any 

paperwork with him, explaining he did not bring it with him from jail 

“because I thought we were gonna come down here and talk about the brief 

that I put in for the ineffective [appointed PCRA] counsel.” N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 7/31/14, at 5-6. When Appellant attempted to turn his questioning 

to the subject of PCRA counsel, the PCRA court stated, “We’re not here for 

that. . . . You have filed your PCRA against your trial counsel.” Id. at 12. 

Appellant explained, “I want to pursue the issue that I raised in my brief 

summary that I sent to you and to the District Attorney, not the issues I had 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the community. Appellant also alleged he was denied his rule-based right to 

effective assistance due to PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to 

review the record and raise meritorious claims. 
J-S27018-15

- 6 -

in my PCRA, because I already disclosed that.” Id. at 13. The PCRA court 

responded, “Well, it doesn’t work that way. That’s not the way the system is 

designed to work.” Id. at 13-14. Appellant confirmed he did not want to 

pursue the six issues of trial counsel ineffectiveness addressed in PCRA 

counsel’s Finley letter, but wanted instead “to pursue the issues that I have

in my brief that I sent you and the District Attorney.” Id. at 14. The PCRA 

court responded, “Then your PCRA motion is going to be dismissed. And if 

there is something that you wish to re-file and you properly do that, then 

we’ll hear it.” Id. at 14-15. The PCRA court continued, explaining:

[Appellant] has indicated on the record that he no longer wishes 

to pursue the issues that were framed in his original PCRA or 

framed in [PCRA counsel’s] Finley letter. So there is nothing to 

pursue here. 

Go back to state prison and if you wish to pursue something 

else, then file it, and we’ll see where we are.

Id. at 15. At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court entered an order 

dismissing Appellant’s “Petition for Post Conviction Collateral Relief.”

In his timely appeal from the July 31, 2014 order, Appellant raises six 

issues, five of which (Issues B through F) are the same issues Appellant 

raised in his pro se July 10, 2014 filing with the PCRA court.4 See 

____________________________________________

4 See footnote 3. The sixth issue, Issue A in Appellant’s brief, alleges PCRA 

court error for not allowing Appellant to argue the claims raised in his July 

10, 2014 filing during the hearing held on July 31.
J-S27018-15

- 7 -

Appellant’s Brief at 4; pro se Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 7/10/14, at 

7-17. 

As this Court recently explained:

In PCRA appeals, our scope of review “is limited to the findings 

of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA 

court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Sam, 597 Pa. 523, 952 

A.2d 565, 573 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). Because 

most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we employ 

a mixed standard of review. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 

1, 981 A.2d 875, 878 (2009). We defer to the PCRA court’s 

factual findings and credibility determinations supported by the 

record. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (en banc). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. Id.

 

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super. 

2015 (en banc).

At the heart of this appeal is Appellant’s attempt to obtain relief based 

on ineffective assistance of counsel claims not raised in his original PCRA 

petition or in appointed counsel’s Finley no-merit letter but raised instead in 

the “petition” he filed on July 10, 2014. It is clear from the exchange 

between Appellant and the PCRA court at the July 31 hearing that the PCRA 

court did not accept Appellant’s July 10 filing as an amendment to 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. We find no error in this regard. 

As our Supreme Court has explained:

Our criminal procedural rules reflect that the PCRA judge “may 

grant leave to amend . . . a petition for post-conviction collateral 

relief at any time,” and that amendment “shall be freely allowed 

to achieve substantial justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A); see

Commonwealth v. Williams, 573 Pa. 613, 633, 828 A.2d 981, 
J-S27018-15

- 8 -

993 (2003) (noting that the criminal procedural rules 

contemplate a “liberal amendment” policy for PCRA petitions). 

Nevertheless, it is clear from the rule’s text that leave to 

amend must be sought and obtained, and hence, 

amendments are not “self-authorizing.” Commonwealth 

v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 523, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (2012). Thus, for 

example, a petitioner may not “simply ‘amend’ a pending 

petition with a supplemental pleading.” Id. Rather, Rule 

905 “explicitly states that amendment is permitted only 

by direction or leave of the PCRA Court.” Id. at 523–24, 35 

A.3d at 12; see also Williams, (indicating that the PCRA court 

retains discretion whether or not to grant a motion to amend a 

post-conviction petition). It follows that petitioners may not 

automatically “amend” their PCRA petitions via responsive 

pleadings.

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 730 (Pa. 2014) 

(emphasis added).5

At no time did Appellant request the opportunity to amend the PCRA 

petition that was the subject of the scheduled July 31, 2014 hearing. At the 

initial evidentiary hearing on April 10, Appellant did not seek leave to 

amend. Rather, in response to the PCRA court’s inquiry as to how much 

time Appellant needed to “get [himself] together and ready for the hearing,” 

Appellant simply responded, “90 days.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/10/14, at 5. 

Id. When Appellant filed a petition on July 10 seeking appointment of 

counsel and, for the first time, raising issues of both layered ineffectiveness 

____________________________________________

5 Compare Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 817 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(by permitting appellant to file supplement to PCRA petition and then 

considering it, PCRA court effectively allowed appellant to amend his PCRA 

petition to include issues presented in supplement).
J-S27018-15

- 9 -

and PCRA counsel ineffectiveness, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s request 

for counsel and, as noted above, ordered that the evidentiary hearing on 

Appellant’s original petition seeking “Post Conviction Collateral Relief” take 

place on July 23, 2014, the date fixed for the hearing at the conclusion of 

the April 10 hearing. PCRA Court Order, 7/15/14, at 1. The PCRA court did 

not suggest it would entertain the July 10 filing as an amended PCRA 

petition. In fact, the PCRA court did not even allude to the July 10 filing 

during the July 31 hearing, referring instead to Appellant’s claims of trial 

counsel ineffectiveness and disallowing any questioning or argument from 

Appellant beyond his original pro se petition or PCRA counsel’s Finley nomerit letter.6

Our reading of the April 10 and July 31, 2014 PCRA hearing transcripts 

leads us to conclude the PCRA court never authorized Appellant to amend his 

PCRA petition, and the record does not reflect any request by Appellant for 

an opportunity to do so. However, the PCRA court did not foreclose that 

possibility, commenting at the July 31 proceeding that, “[I]f there is 

something that you wish to re-file and you properly do that, then we’ll hear 

it[,]” and “Go back to state prison and if you wish to pursue something else, 

then file it, and we’ll see where we are.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/31/14, at 15. 

____________________________________________

6 We also note the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion does not discuss 

Appellant’s July 10 filing. 
J-S27018-15

- 10 -

We recognize Appellant is proceeding pro se. However, as this Court 

has cautioned, while we are “willing to construe liberally materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an 

appellant.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citations omitted)). “Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with 

the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court.” Id. at 

252. As explained by our Supreme Court in Baumhammers, to preserve 

additional PCRA claims, a petitioner must seek leave to amend his petition. 

Appellant did not do so. Instead, he abandoned the issues raised in his 

PCRA petition, leaving the PCRA court without any ineffectiveness claims to 

consider. Because the issues Appellant asks this Court to review were not 

raised in his PCRA petition or in PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter and because 

no request was made to amend his petition to include them, Appellant’s 

claims are waived. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d at 731. Therefore, we may 

not consider them. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/26/2015