-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 22, 2018

v No. 324500

Livingston Circuit Court

LEONARD LEWIS KING, LC Nos. 13-021340-FH;

13-021416-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

ON REMAND

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant, Leonard Lewis King, was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL 

750.110a(3), attempted third-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4), possession of burglar 

tools, MCL 750.116, and receiving or concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and 

$20,000, MCL 750.535(3)(a). People v King, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 

Appeals, issued February 11, 2016 (Docket No. 324500), p 1. On October 3, 2014, defendant,

was sentenced “as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to prison terms of (1) 20 to 80 years 

for possession of burglar tools,” “(2) 10 to 15 years for attempted home invasion,” (3) “20 to 80 

years for home invasion,” and (4) “20 to 80 years for receiving or concealing stolen property. 

All four sentences are to run concurrently.” Id. 

Defendant’s convictions arose out of two separate acts that were charged in separate 

lower court cases and later joined for trial. Id. at 6-7. On February 11, 2016, this Court issued 

an opinion rejecting all of defendant’s arguments except the one pertaining to his sentence, 

which was that the trial court “erred in exceeding the sentencing guidelines when it sentenced 

him to a term of imprisonment of 20 to 80 years.” Id. at 7, 10. With respect to the sentencing 

issue, this Court relied on People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1; 880 NW2d 297 (2015) 

(“Steanhouse I”), rev’d in part, aff’d in part 500 Mich 453 (2017) (“Steanhouse II”), to conclude 
-2-

that defendant was entitled to a remand for a Crosby1 hearing. King, unpub op at 7-8. On 

November 29, 2017, our Supreme Court entered an order reversing “that part of the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing under People v 

Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015),” and remanding the case “to the Court of 

Appeals for plenary review of whether the defendant’s sentence was disproportionate under the 

standard set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).” People v 

King, 501 Mich 920 (2017). We affirm defendant’s sentence.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Defendant first broke into the home of Charles and Judy Lewis sometime between the 

hours of 11:00 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. on May 21, 2013. Defendant stole a variety of jewelry, worth 

roughly $15,000. There were no signs of forced entry at the home, and no fingerprints were 

recovered.

On May 24, 2013, Kristy Rabeau was home with two children when defendant rang her 

doorbell around 10:30 a.m. Rabeau did not answer; rather, she watched defendant try to open 

her garage door, and then ring the doorbell to her back door. Rabeau’s dogs barked at defendant. 

Rabeau took her children to a bedroom, retrieved a gun, and called 911. She then saw defendant 

looking into her bedroom window as she spoke to the 911 operator. Michigan State Trooper 

Greg Galarneau responded to the report and searched the area for defendant.

Defendant, however, had apparently moved on to a third target. Around 10:30 a.m. or 

11:00 a.m., Sarah Graham, who lived a mile away from Rabeau, heard her doorbell ring, and 

then heard a loud knocking on the door. She thought this was unusual and did not respond. A 

man appeared and attempted to open a rear door. He then peered in through a window. Graham 

was unable to see the man’s face. The man went to the front of the house and again rang the 

doorbell. Graham went upstairs, hoping to see the vehicle the man drove to the house. 

However, she saw Galarneau arrive at her front door. Galarneau had spotted a man matching the 

description given by Rabeau opening a screen door to Graham’s house, and immediately 

approached this man, defendant.

Defendant spotted Galarneau, who was in a marked police vehicle. Defendant walked 

toward a green Chevrolet Cavalier parked in Graham’s driveway. Craig Theunick was in the 

driver’s seat of this vehicle, which was in gear. Defendant got in the passenger seat, but before 

the two could escape, Galarneau approached, directed Theunick to stop the engine, and retrieved 

the keys to the vehicle from Theunick. Neither man could give a reasonable explanation for 

being at the home. Galarneau handcuffed defendant and patted him down. This search found a 

circle-shaped piece of plastic, which appeared to be a tool used to unlock a door (as one might 

use a credit card), and a glove. He also found a syringe and hypodermic needle in defendant’s 

pocket. Galarneau found diamond rings and a velvet pouch as well.

 1 United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005).
-3-

Galarneau searched the car and found an open backpack containing various pieces of 

jewelry, a crowbar, a magnet, a magnifying glass, walkie-talkies with headphones, and gloves. 

He also found a crack pipe under the front passenger seat and another syringe. Some of the 

jewelry found in the car belonged to Judy Lewis.

Defendant lived in a motel managed by his wife, and where defendant worked as a 

maintenance employee. Defendant’s wife allowed police to search their room, and this search 

led to the discovery of numerous items of jewelry and jewelry boxes. Defendant’s wife 

acknowledged that the jewelry did not belong to her. Officers were able to return some of the 

jewelry recovered to the Lewises. Defendant’s wife testified that defendant had found the 

jewelry and other items while cleaning rooms at the motel. She acknowledged that defendant 

used heroin with Theunick. She acknowledged telling officers that defendant spent $100 a day 

on heroin. While she denied it at trial, defendant’s wife had told officers that she was also

addicted to heroin.

Defendant was charged in two lower court cases. In Docket No. 13-021340-FH, 

defendant was charged with possession of burglar’s tools and attempted third-degree home 

invasion for his attempted burglary of Rabeau’s home. In Docket No. 13-021416-FH, defendant 

was charged with second-degree home invasion and receiving or concealing stolen property for 

his burglary of the Lewis’s home. The two cases were joined for trial, and as noted, defendant 

was found guilty of all charges.

The parties reconvened for sentencing on October 3, 2014. Some of the prior challenges 

to the accuracy of the PSIR were resolved by the parties. As the prosecutor explained, “The 

problem is he has so many aliases and so many Social Securit[y numbers] and so [many] dates of 

birth that it makes it kind of hard to track.” As a result, the probation department now found that 

defendant had 40 prior felonies and 14 prior misdemeanors. Defense counsel explained that his 

client still objected to the inclusion of other convictions, but that the probation department had 

been able to verify these convictions. Defendant’s listed criminal history includes arrests and 

convictions in Maine, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Idaho, South 

Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, New York, Florida, and of course, his most recent crimes 

committed in Michigan. The common themes in these convictions are theft, burglary, the use of 

illegal drugs, and defendant’s attempts to avoid or circumvent punishment. His criminal history 

begins with an arrest for attempted theft from a vehicle in 1984, when defendant was 18 years 

old. Since that time, he has committed criminal acts in more years than he has not, and it appears 

that those periods lacking criminal activity largely coincide with the periods in which he was 

incarcerated. The probation officer who prepared defendant’s PSIR thus understandably wrote 

that defendant “has the worst criminal record ever seen by this writer. Mr. King is nothing but a 

thief, and has proven time and time again that no amount of incarceration or rehabilitation will 

change his behaviors at this time.” 

The trial court stated the following when sentencing defendant:

First of all, I’d never give a penalty for somebody exercising their right to 

trial. However, when I hear things at a trial I don’t turn my ears off either. When 

the prosecutor and the defense counsel work on something and they get things 

within a range of months and I don’t know any reason to go outside of it, I follow 
-4-

sometimes their recommendations to me. However, when I am presiding over a 

trial and I hear evidence, I do not turn my ears off to that. When a jury convicts, I 

do take what they do as an obligation to impose an appropriate penalty when the 

jury’s done their duty either by acquitting and do nothing or finding a conviction 

and then I impose a sentence within the law.

I’m not unmindful that there is a – by my reckoning the 12-state crime 

spree even if you take off those ones that the probation department, Department of 

Corrections looked into there are still multi-state jurisdiction violations and it still 

comes out that there are guidelines which are substantial time and the amount of 

convictions are upwards of 40 felonies and 14 misdemeanors, 54 crimes, and 

that’s deleting some that the Department Corrections have tracked down and find 

that don’t belong to you. Half that number, a quarter of that number that remain 

is still significant. I mean if you – you take the 54 that the probation department 

has counted up and even if they miscounted some of those that they weren’t –

they didn’t belong to you [be]cause you may have been somewhere else, and I’m 

not saying that the probation department’s wrong, but even if they did and you 

knocked off 10 percent of that, that would still leave you with like 40 crimes. I’m 

just thoroughly convinced that the guidelines do not take into account the amount 

of damage that you are capable of doing to citizens in this jurisdiction as well as 

Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and wherever else you’ve been 

that have – were you’ve committed crimes. There is – the evaluation and plan, the

whole top paragraph is a litany of summary of crimes you’ve committed, and 

that’s single-spaced I might add.

There are substantial and compelling reasons to exceed the guidelines. 

The sheer number of bad acts here make[s] a[n] upward departure appropriate and 

there are substantial and compelling reasons such that the sentencing guidelines 

do not take into account the number of convictions that you’ve accumulated, and 

they don’t take into account the nature of these convictions.

I find home invasions to be very, very serious because of the fright that 

they put into the occupants. That mother who had to grab her gun to protect her 

kids is serious in the – and put those – put that mom and those kids at risk, and I 

don’t want anybody else in this jurisdiction to think that they can knock on a door 

and then push their way in and then – or attempt to, you know, when there’s 

people in there without substantial and serious penalties being levied upon them 

for such unlawful conduct. 

So for those reasons that I stated on this record, the volume of the crimes, 

the type of crimes make it clear that an upward departure is – that there are 

objectable [sic] and verifiable reasons for an upward departure.

This Court has an obligation to look at the following four criteria in the 

fashioning of a sentence: the discipline of the wrongdoer, protection of society, 

potential for reformation of the offender, and deterring others from committing 

like offenses.
-5-

It’s very clear to me the discipline of the wrongdoer is necessary in order 

to stop further bad acts and to punish the wrongdoer for breaking into people’s 

homes and stealing their property.

The protection of society, it’s clear from my previous comments is 

necessary to protect our community from further potential invasions by this 

Defendant.

With respect to the potential for reformation of the offender, although this 

Court generally tries to be optimistic about everybody, there is clear evidence 

here that this Defendant has disappointed several judges in the past in several 

different states in their quest to reform this Defendant and the potential for 

reformation is very, very slim unless this Defendant severely changes his way of 

thinking when it comes to other people’s property and the sanctity of people’s 

homes and their property taken, not taking things that don’t belong to him.

And then the last thing, of course, deterring others from committing like 

offenses, I think it’s clear that by exceeding the guidelines by a little better than 

50 percent at the top end to – take the top end of the guidelines, exceed that by a 

little better than 50 percent should be – it’s appropriate in this case, but it sets an 

appropriate example in the future that this type of crime cannot be tolerated in 

our jurisdiction and it won’t be tolerated. [Emphasis added.]

On July 24, 2017, after our prior opinion was issued, the Supreme Court decided 

Steanhouse and Masroor. Steanhouse II, 500 Mich 453; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). The Court’s 

decision had, in essence, three major holdings. First, the Court stated, “In Lockridge, we held, 

and today reaffirm, that the legislative sentencing guidelines are advisory in all applications.” 

Id. at 459. Second, the Court affirmed this Court’s decision in Steanhouse I to the extent that it 

found that “the proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether the trial 

court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ set forth in People v 

Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), ‘which requires sentences imposed by the 

trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and 

the offender.’ ” Id. at 459-460. Third, the Court rejected this Court’s opinion in Steanhouse I to 

the extent that it found that ordering a Crosby remand in every pre-Lockridge case where there 

had been an upward departure sentence was necessary. Id. at 460-461. The Court instead held 

that in such instances, “the proper approach is for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the 

trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality.” Id. 

After the decision in Steanhouse II, the Supreme Court reversed “that part of the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing under”

Lockridge, and remanded the case to this Court “for plenary review of whether the defendant’s 

sentence was disproportionate under the standard set forth” in Milbourn. King, 501 Mich 920 

(2017). The Court denied leave to appeal in all other respects, id., leaving this Court’s 

affirmance of defendant’s convictions intact. 
-6-

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s appellate brief challenged whether the reasons stated by the trial court as 

justifying the departure sentence were substantial and compelling, as was required before our 

Supreme Court’s decision in Lockridge. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391-392. However, in 

Lockridge, the Court concluded that the “substantial and compelling” framework was 

unconstitutional, and could no longer be applied. Id. The Court also held that sentences 

departing from the sentencing guidelines would thereafter be reviewed for reasonableness, 

although it did not articulate a precise standard or method of determining if a sentence was 

reasonable. Id.

That standard has since been established. As this Court recently explained in People v 

Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 331499); slip op at 16:

“A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be 

reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Lockridge, 498 

Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “[T]he standard of review to be applied 

by appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness on appeal is abuse of 

discretion.” [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 471.] In Steanhouse [II], the Michigan 

Supreme Court clarified that “the relevant question for appellate courts reviewing 

a sentence for reasonableness” is “whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

violating the principle of proportionality[.]” [Id.] The principle of proportionality 

is one in which

“a judge helps to fulfill the overall legislative scheme of criminal 

punishment by taking care to assure that the sentences imposed 

across the discretionary range are proportionate to the seriousness 

of the matters that come before the court for sentencing. In 

making this assessment, the judge, of course, must take into 

account the nature of the offense and the background of the 

offender.” [[Id. at 472, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 651].]

Under this principle, “ ‘[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to 

the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the 

guidelines recommended range.’ ” [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 472,] quoting 

Milbourn, 435 Mich at 661. [Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 16.]

The sentencing guidelines are an “aid to accomplish the purposes of proportionality[.]” 

Id. at ___; slip op at 18. As this Court recently explained:

Because the guidelines embody the principle of proportionality and trial courts 

must consult them when sentencing, it follows that they continue to serve as a 

“useful tool” or “guideposts” for effectively combating disparity in sentencing. 

Therefore, relevant factors for determining whether a departure sentence is more 

proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range continue to include (1) 

whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime, People v 

Houston, 448 Mich 312, 321-322, 532 NW2d 508 (1995), see also Milbourn, 435 
-7-

Mich at 657, (2) factors not considered by the guidelines, Houston, 448 Mich at 

322-324, see also Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660, and (3) factors considered by the 

guidelines but given inadequate weight, Houston, 448 Mich at 324-325, see also 

Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660 n 27. [Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 

18-19.]

Other factors to consider “include ‘the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, Houston, 448 

Mich at 323, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, id., and the defendant’s potential for 

rehabilitation, id.’ ” Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 19 n 9, quoting Steanhouse I, 

313 Mich App at 46. But, at the same time, both this Court and the Supreme Court have stressed 

that proportionality review “be based upon the seriousness of the offense and not a deviation 

from the guidelines . . . .” Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 22. The Steanhouse II

Court stated it this way:

The Michigan principle of proportionality, however, does not create such an 

impermissible presumption. Rather than impermissibly measuring proportionality 

by reference to deviations from the guidelines, our principle of proportionality 

requires “sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the 

seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” 

Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. [Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 474.]

Thus, “[w]hen making this determination and sentencing a defendant, a trial court must ‘ “justify 

the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” ’ Steanhouse [II], [500 Mich at 

470], quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, which ‘includes an explanation of why the sentence 

imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would 

have been,’ [People v] Smith, 482 Mich [292,] 311[; 754 NW2d 284 (2008)].” Dixon-Bey, ___ 

Mich App at ___; slip op at 19.

We conclude that the trial court’s sentence was reasonable, as the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in determining that the sentences were proportionate to the crimes. People v 

Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351; 901 NW2d 142 (2017). The record is quite clear that the trial 

court considered the “nature of the offense and the background of the offender,” Walden, 319 

Mich App at 352 (quotation marks and citation omitted), when it discussed the serious nature of 

home invasions in general, and these in particular, and when it discussed defendant’s remarkably 

poor criminal background.2 As detailed below, the trial court also discussed why some of the 

 2 In Milbourn, the Court sanctioned departure sentences when a defendant has an “extensive 

criminal record[]” because the guidelines do not take such extensive criminal records into 

account. Milbourn, 435 Mich at 657. And in Smith, the Court explained that where a 

defendant’s total OV score far exceeds the maximum score contemplated by a particular grid, a 

proportionate sentence may well depart from the guidelines because “the Legislature did not 

contemplate a defendant with such a high OV score . . . .” Smith, 482 Mich at 308-309. 

Defendant’s past criminal history clearly presents several factors either not accounted for by the 

guidelines, or that were given inadequate weight. As such, the trial court was well within its 
-8-

guidelines did not adequately address the circumstances of this case and this offender, id. at 352-

353; Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 18-19, and reviewed other factors revealing the 

circumstances of the offender and the crime, including his chance for rehabilitation. The trial 

court recognized the relevance of the guidelines, but concluded, with sufficient detail, that a 

longer sentence was more appropriate for this offender. That conclusion was not an abuse of 

discretion.

Because of when his brief was filed, defendant’s argument exclusively focuses upon 

whether his sentences were supported by substantial and compelling reasons; he contends they 

were not, because the various factors articulated by the trial court were already considered 

through various scorings under the guidelines. But the point made most recently by the 

Steanhouse II Court, and previously made by the Milbourn Court, is that although trial courts 

must still consider the guidelines when fashioning a sentence, “ ‘the key test is whether the 

sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres 

to the guidelines’ recommended range[.]’ ” Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 475, quoting Milbourn, 

435 Mich at 661 (emphasis added). Consequently, our primary concern in conducting our 

plenary review3 is whether the trial court’s sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the 

crime, which is determined in part by the factors outlined in Milbourn. This the trial court did

and, thus, the sentences were reasonable.

Finally, we point out that although the trial court never stated that the guidelines did not 

sufficiently take into consideration the seriousness of home invasions, see Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich 

App at ___; slip op at 19-20 n 10,4 it did properly take into consideration the seriousness of the 

circumstances in these particular cases. Despite this one deficiency, we are convinced that the 

trial court adequately explained the reasons for its decision, and those reasons were-perhaps save 

one-appropriate considerations in sentencing defendant for these crimes.5

 

discretion to consider defendant’s criminal history when fashioning an appropriate departure 

sentence. Dixon-Bey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 19. 

3 We agree with the Walden Court’s statement that the greater discretion given to trial courts in 

the aftermath of Lockridge necessarily “constricts an appellate court’s wherewithal to find an 

abuse of discretion.” Walden, 319 Mich App at 355. Indeed, the Steanhouse II Court pointed 

out that sentencing decisions were not constricted to consideration of only proportionality 

principles. Steanhouse II, 500 Mich at 473 n 15.

4 The Court in Dixon-Bey remanded for resentencing in part because of the lengthy sentence and 

none of the factors cited by the trial court “provided reasonable grounds for a departure.” DixonBey, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 19. To the contrary, all but one of the trial court’s reasons 

were geared towards a proper proportionality review.

5 Defendant’s appellate brief states that one of the reasons articulated by the trial court was 

defendant’s lack of remorse. However, defendant never again discusses the issue. Thus, to the 

extent defendant could be understood as challenging the trial court’s purported reliance on his 

lack of remorse, the issue is abandoned. People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552, 559-560; 830 

NW2d 800 (2013). 
-9-

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray