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Present: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, 

Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.

ROBERT CHARLES GLEASON, JR.,

a/k/a CHARLES R. FLYNN

v. Record No. 111956

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

OPINION BY

 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.

June 7, 2012

ROBERT CHARLES GLEASON, JR.,

a/k/a CHARLES R. FLYNN

v. Record No. 111957

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

John C. Kilgore, Judge

Robert Charles Gleason, Jr., received two death sentences 

following pleas of guilty to capital murder in the killings of 

Harvey Grey Watson and Aaron Cooper. Although Gleason has 

waived his appeals of right, Code § 17.1-313 mandates that we 

review the death sentences. In this review, we consider 

whether the sentences were imposed "under the influence of 

passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" and whether 

the sentences are "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 

imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 

defendant." Code § 17.1-313(C).

I. Background

On May 8, 2009, Harvey Watson was murdered at Wallens 

Ridge State Prison. His cellmate, Robert Gleason, was charged 
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with the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any 

person by a prisoner confined in a state or local correctional 

facility," a capital offense under Code § 18.2-31(3). On 

December 21, 2010, following an evaluation to confirm his 

competency, Gleason pled guilty to the murder of Watson in the 

Circuit Court of Wise County. Gleason confessed under oath, 

stating that he planned the murder to occur on the two-year 

anniversary of a previous homicide that he had committed.

Gleason admitted to binding Watson with torn bed sheets, 

beating him, taunting him about his impending death, shoving a

urine sponge in his face and a sock in his mouth, and finally

strangling him with fabric from the sheet. According to 

Gleason, he concealed the body in his cell for fifteen hours, 

making excuses for Watson's failure to emerge. Gleason further 

stated that he planned, once rigor mortis had passed, to 

dispose of the body in the garbage that was circulated to pick 

up food trays. Gleason was unsuccessful in disposing of the 

body before Watson was discovered by prison personnel.

Throughout the circuit court proceedings, Gleason 

consistently repeated that he had no remorse. Rather, knowing

that the premeditated murder of an inmate and more than one 

murder within a three-year period was punishable by the death 

penalty in Virginia, he commented to the court that he "already 
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had a few [other] inmates lined up, just in case I didn't get 

the death penalty, that I was gonna take out."

Following Watson's death, Gleason had been moved to 

solitary confinement in Virginia's "supermax" Red Onion Prison. 

On July 28, 2010, Gleason was in a solitary recreation pen that

shared a common wire fence with that of Aaron Cooper. Gleason 

asked Cooper to try on a "religious necklace" that Gleason was 

making. Gleason proceeded to strangle Cooper through the wire

fence, repeatedly choking Cooper "'til he turned purple," 

waiting "until his color came back, then [going] back again" 

until Cooper finally expired. Gleason described himself 

laughing at the reaction of the other inmates. He then watched 

and mocked the prison staff attempting to revive Cooper.

Gleason was charged in the capital murder of Cooper under 

Code § 18.2-31(8) for "[t]he willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing of more than one person within a threeyear period." On April 22, 2011, Gleason pled guilty to the 

murder of Cooper. He informed the court that he had 

deliberately targeted Cooper so as to make a point to the 

prosecutor and as a favor to another inmate who was to be

released soon, so that the inmate would owe Gleason, and 

Gleason would then have someone outside the prison to do his 

bidding.
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After accepting both guilty pleas, the court conducted a 

multi-day joint sentencing proceeding, considering evidence and 

argument by counsel and Gleason. The court also reviewed a 

pre-sentence report, Gleason having waived a post-sentence 

report. The court fixed Gleason's sentences at death, finding 

the aggravating factors of both vileness and future 

dangerousness in both cases beyond a reasonable doubt, and 

concluding that these factors were not outweighed by mitigating 

facts. Although Gleason was found competent to waive appeal

and did so, we must proceed with the required statutory review.

II. Statutory Review

A. Passion, Prejudice, or Other Arbitrary Factors

We first consider whether the death sentences were imposed 

"under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other 

arbitrary factor." Code § 17.1-313(C)(1).

We find no evidence to suggest that this was the case. 

Counsel for Gleason have conceded that they cannot point to any 

evidence in the record that would indicate that the circuit 

court was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other 

arbitrary factor. The circuit court, hearing the case without 

a jury, was meticulous in ensuring that Gleason was competent,

and the record makes clear that Gleason consistently had advice 

from stand-by counsel throughout the proceedings. The court 

took great pains to explain to Gleason the procedure, the law, 
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and his rights. Gleason was permitted to change his plea in 

the Watson case from not guilty to guilty to not guilty, and 

back again to guilty. The court granted each of Gleason's 

requests for a continuance, appointed every expert he 

requested, and granted all accommodations within its power to 

grant.

The circuit court also explicitly stated that, while 

Gleason had asked the court to consider a variety of reasons 

why Gleason should be sentenced to death on either or both 

charges, "the only things that I am allowed to consider and the 

only things that I have considered throughout this case, 

regardless of what testimony has been offered or regardless of 

what opinions have been given, are the statutory factors that a 

fact-finder in Virginia [may] appropriate[ly] consider": 

whether the Commonwealth has proved vileness or future 

dangerousness in either of the two cases beyond a reasonable 

doubt, as well as whether mitigating facts outweigh these 

proofs.

Gleason points to no portion of the record that suggests 

that the sentences were issued as a result of passion or 

prejudice, or that they were arbitrary in any way. Our review 

of the record likewise has revealed no such bias.
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B. Proportionality Review

The statutory mandate against excessive or 

disproportionate sentencing in Code § 17.1-313(C) is not to 

" '[e]nsure complete symmetry among all death penalty cases,' " 

but rather " 'to determine if a sentence of death is 

aberrant.' " Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 188-89, 721

S.E.2d 484, 507-08 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 267, 661 S.E.2d 415, 448 

(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1189 (2009)).

The two crimes share several features relevant to our 

review. The murders were both clearly premeditated and 

accomplished by means of ligature strangulation, a very 

deliberate and personal method of killing. They both involved 

taunting or torture indicative of a particularly high level of 

cruelty: Watson was tied up, beaten, taunted, given his last 

cigarette and then had a urine sponge stuffed in his face, 

while Cooper was repeatedly strangled and permitted to catch 

his breath before he was killed.

We are required by Code § 17.1-313(C) to consider not only 

the crime itself but the defendant. In both instances, Gleason 

was dispassionate after the killing: Watson's body remained in 

his cell with him for fifteen hours as he plotted attempts to 

hide the body, and Gleason mocked officers attempting to revive 

Cooper. Gleason was very clear to the court that he had "no 
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remorse for it, zero." Gleason presented witnesses testifying 

to the fact that, even from prison, he was a danger to both the 

prison population and the population at large. He has shown 

from his actions that he is capable of orchestrating a murder 

in Virginia's most secure prison. He himself stated to the 

court: "You guys can lock me 24/7, take everything out of my 

cell . . . . Sooner or later, I'm gonna be the nice little 

man, and get out there" and kill again.

In the course of this review, we have considered similar 

cases for which a death sentence was imposed involving capital 

murders committed by inmates. See, e.g., Remington v. 

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 551 S.E.2d 620 (2001), cert. denied, 

535 U.S. 1062 (2002), Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 544 

S.E.2d 299, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001), Payne v. 

Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500, cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 933 (1987). We have also considered similar cases for 

which a death sentence was imposed for more than one murder 

within three years. See, e.g., Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 

Va. 231, 699 S.E.2d 237 (2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 

S.Ct. 2999 (2011) (death penalty vacated on other grounds by 

our Court); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 619 S.E.2d 

16 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006); Walker v. 

Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999), cert. denied, 

528 U.S. 1125 (2000). We have additionally reviewed similar 
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cases in which, after a finding of both aggravating factors of 

future dangerousness and vileness, a death sentence was imposed 

for a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing by means of 

ligature strangulation. See, e.g., Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 

257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999);

Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1989), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 

Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 

(1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 

(1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Spencer v. 

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 

493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 286 

S.E.2d 172 (1982). Finally, we have reviewed capital murder 

cases in which life imprisonment was imposed rather than the 

death penalty. After reviewing these cases and Gleason's 

actions as admitted to under oath before the circuit court, we 

are convinced that Gleason's death sentences are neither 

excessive nor disproportionate.

III. Conclusion

In sum, we determine that the death sentences were not 

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other 

arbitrary factor and are not excessive or disproportionate. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

Record No. 111956 – Affirmed.

Record No. 111957 – Affirmed.