FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JONES DAY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE,

LLP; MICHAEL D. TORPEY;

MITCHELL ZUKLIE,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 21-16642

D.C. No.

4:21-mc-80181-

JST

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2022

San Francisco, California

Filed August 1, 2022

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Sandra S. Ikuta, and 

Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
2 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

SUMMARY*

Arbitration / Summonses

The panel reversed the district court’s order denying 

Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick, Herrington & 

Sutcliffe, LLP, to comply with an arbitrator’s subpoena 

requiring two Orrick partners to appear at a hearing in an 

international arbitration conducted pursuant to Chapter Two 

of the Federal Arbitration Act.

First, the panel held that the district court had subject 

matter jurisdiction over the action to enforce arbitral 

summonses issued by the arbitrator in an ongoing 

international arbitration being conducted in Washington, 

D.C., under the United Nations Convention on the 

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 

known as the New York Convention. FAA Chapter Two’s 

jurisdictional provision, 9 U.S.C. § 203, provides federal 

district courts with original jurisdiction over actions or 

proceedings falling under the New York Convention. 

Joining other circuits, the panel held that (1) if the 

underlying arbitration agreement or award falls under the 

New York Convention, and (2) the action or proceeding 

relates to that agreement or award, then the federal district 

court has jurisdiction over the action or proceeding.

The panel further held that venue was proper in the 

Northern District of California. Section 204 of the FAA 

provides that where the arbitration agreement designates a 

place of arbitration in the United States, an action or 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 3

proceeding may be brought in the district embracing the 

place of arbitration. However, where, as here, that federal 

district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the party 

against whom enforcement is sought, the action may be 

brought in any district court deemed appropriate under the 

general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because § 204 

supplements, rather than supplants, other venue rules.

The panel reversed and remanded with instructions to 

enforce Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick and its 

partners to comply with the arbitral summonses.

COUNSEL

Craig E. Stewart (argued), David C. Kiernan, and Paul C. 

Hines, Jones Day, San Francisco, California, for PetitionerAppellant.

Sarah M. Harris (argued), Michael J. Mestitz, Benjamin W. 

Graham, and Aaron Z. Roper, Williams & Connolly LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; L. Christopher Vejnoska, Orrick 

Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, San Francisco, California; for 

Respondents-Appellees.
4 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Congress enacted Chapter Two of the Federal 

Arbitration Act (“FAA”), see 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208, to 

provide for the effective and efficient resolution of 

international arbitral disputes after the United States entered 

into the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, June 

1958) (“the New York Convention” or “Convention”). This 

appeal arises from the denial of a petition to enforce a 

summons issued by an arbitrator conducting an international 

arbitration pursuant to Chapter Two of the FAA.

We first address subject matter jurisdiction. Unlike 

Chapter One of the FAA, which governs domestic arbitral 

disputes and does not include a jurisdictional provision, 

Chapter Two of the FAA includes a jurisdictional provision, 

9 U.S.C. § 203, which provides federal district courts with 

original jurisdiction over “action[s] or proceeding[s] falling 

under the Convention.” It is clear that the enforcement of an 

agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award “fall[s] under the 

Convention,” but we must decide whether an action to 

enforce an arbitral summons issued by the arbitrator in an 

ongoing international arbitration under the Convention also 

“falls under the Convention.” We join our sister circuits in 

holding that (1) if the underlying arbitration agreement or 

award falls under the Convention, and (2) the action or 

proceeding relates to that agreement or award, then the 

federal district court has jurisdiction over the action or 

proceeding.

This conclusion raises the question of in which district 

court should the enforcement action be brought? Section 

204 of the FAA provides that where the arbitration 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 5

agreement designates a “place of arbitration” in the United 

States, an action or proceeding may be brought in the district 

embracing the place of arbitration. However, where, as here, 

that federal district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the 

party against whom enforcement is sought, we hold that the 

action may be brought in any district court deemed 

appropriate under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391, because § 204 supplements, rather than supplants, 

other venue rules.

I.

At the root of the ongoing international arbitration is a 

dispute between Jones Day and one of its former partners, a 

German national who was based in its Paris office, until he 

left to join Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.1 Jones Day’s 

partnership agreement provides for mandatory arbitration of 

all disputes among partners, and that all such arbitration 

proceedings are governed by the FAA. The partnership 

dispute proceeded to arbitration in Washington D.C., the 

location designated in the arbitration agreement.

Jones Day requested that the arbitrator issue a subpoena 

to Orrick for documents it deemed material to its claims 

against its former partner. The arbitrator issued a subpoena 

and summoned Orrick to appear before him to produce the 

specified documents. When Orrick failed to comply with the 

subpoena, Jones Day sought to enforce it in the Superior 

Court of the District of Columbia. That court dismissed 

Jones Day’s petition, concluding that it lacked personal 

1 Because details of this underlying partnership dispute are 

irrelevant to the issues joined in this appeal, we have granted the parties’ 

motions to seal portions of the briefs and record that relate to that dispute. 

To the extent this opinion references information from sealed 

documents, the information is unsealed for purposes of the disposition.
6 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

jurisdiction over Orrick, whose principal place of business is 

San Francisco, and that section 7 of the FAA “requires Jones 

Day to file its action to enforce an arbitral subpoena in a 

United States district court.”

Jones Day then requested that the arbitrator sit for a 

hearing in the Northern District of California and issue a 

revised subpoena requiring two Orrick partners residing in 

the Northern District to appear at a hearing in San Jose, 

California. The arbitrator granted Jones Day’s request and 

issued the arbitral summonses. Orrick refused to comply 

with those summonses, so Jones Day filed this action to 

enforce them in the District Court for the Northern District 

of California.

The district court denied Jones Day’s petition, 

concluding that it lacked authority to compel compliance 

with the summonses under FAA § 7, which it construed as 

providing that the district where the arbitrator sits is the only 

district in which a district court may compel attendance. See 

9 U.S.C. § 7. Reasoning that “it is undisputed that 

Washington D.C. is the seat of the underlying arbitration,” 

the district court concluded it could not compel attendance 

at a hearing in San Jose, California. The district court 

rejected Jones Day’s argument that an arbitrator can “sit” in 

more than one location, and that for purposes of the hearing 

in San Jose, the arbitrator would be sitting in the Northern 

District. Because it dismissed Jones Day’s petition on venue 

grounds, the district court declined to decide whether 

Chapter Two of the FAA conferred subject matter 

jurisdiction over actions to enforce an arbitral summons to a 

third party.
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 7

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We 

review questions of statutory construction and subjectmatter jurisdiction de novo.” Lake v. Ohana Mil. Cmtys., 

LLC, 14 F.4th 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting City of 

Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020)). We 

also review the district court’s denial for improper venue de 

novo. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2018).

III.

A.

Although the district court declined to decide the issue, 

we first conclude that the district court had subject matter 

jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral summonses. Section 203 

of the FAA provides federal district courts with original 

jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, 

over “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the 

Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 203. The parties do not dispute, 

and we hold, that the petitions to compel enforcement of 

arbitral summonses constitute “actions or proceedings” 

under the statute. Rather, they differ only as to whether such 

enforcement actions “fall under the Convention.”

We begin with the text of the statute, here Chapter Two 

of the FAA, which governs arbitrations under the 

Convention. Section 203 provides that “[a]n action or 

proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to 

arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.” 

9 U.S.C. § 203. It further provides that the federal district 

courts “shall have original jurisdiction over such an action 

or proceeding . . .” Id. There is no question that the 

arbitration agreement itself falls under the Convention. 

9 U.S.C. § 202. Agreed, says Orrick, but neither the 
8 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

Convention nor Chapter Two of the FAA expressly provides 

any tool to enforce arbitral summonses. Orrick contends that 

the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 

Foreign Arbitral Awards is narrowly limited to just that—

the recognition and enforcement of completed arbitral 

awards. Moreover, it argues, actions or proceedings that 

“fall under” the Convention are limited to those set forth in 

Chapter Two of the FAA. That would confine § 203 

jurisdiction to just three types of actions or proceedings: 

orders to compel arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 206; appointments 

of arbitrators in accordance with an arbitration agreement, 

id.; or orders confirming an arbitral award, 9 U.S.C. § 207. 

Orrick reasons that because Congress “conspicuously” did 

not include a provision regarding petitions to enforce arbitral 

summonses, such a petition is not an action or a proceeding 

encompassed under § 203.

Orrick argues that to “fall under” means to be “listed or 

classified as” or “included in,” citing Webster’s New World 

Dictionary and the MacMillan Contemporary Dictionary. 

However, dictionaries from around 1970 (the year Congress 

enacted § 203, see Pub. L. 91-368 (July 31, 1970), 84 Stat. 

692) embrace a broader definition of “fall under” than what 

Orrick asserts here. See The Compact Edition of the Oxford 

English Dictionary Vol. I 955 (1971) (“To be brought under 

the operation or scope of, be subjected to”); Oxford 

Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English Vol. I 102 (1975) 

(“be classified as, be placed within a certain category”). As 

these dictionaries demonstrate, the ordinary meaning of “fall 

under” does not support Orrick’s contention that courts have 

jurisdiction under § 203 only if the action or proceeding is 

expressly listed or identified in the Convention.

In addition to the ordinary meaning of § 203’s text, the 

structure of the Convention and Chapter Two of the FAA 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 9

supports the conclusion that actions or proceedings need not 

be explicitly listed in the Convention to “fall under” the 

Convention. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that 

the New York Convention must list every “judicial tool” for 

it to “fall under the Convention.” In GE Energy Power 

Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, 

LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020), the Court determined that the 

domestic doctrine of equitable estoppel, which permits the 

enforcement of arbitration agreements against 

nonsignatories, does not conflict with the Convention, and 

so is applicable in international arbitrations. Id. at 1645 

(citing 9 U.S.C. § 208, which provides that Chapter One 

applies to actions and proceedings brought under Chapter 

Two to the extent they do not conflict with Chapter Two or 

the Convention).

The Court began by examining the text of the New York 

Convention. Arbitration agreements are discussed only in 

Article II of the Convention, and enforcement of arbitration 

agreements is limited to just a single provision, Article II(3), 

which states that “courts of a contracting state ‘shall . . . refer 

the parties to arbitration’ when the parties to an action 

entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the 

parties requests referral to arbitration.” Id. But the Court 

held that Article II(3) does not preclude application of the 

domestic doctrine of equitable estoppel because it “contains 

no exclusionary language; it does not state that arbitration 

agreements shall be enforced only in the identified 

circumstances.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court 

viewed a counter interpretation inappropriate because “the 

provisions of Article II contemplate the use of domestic 

doctrines to fill gaps in the Convention.” Id. Thus, the Court 

did not “read the nonexclusive language of [Article II(3) of 

the Convention] to set a ceiling that tacitly precludes the use 

of domestic law to enforce arbitration agreements.” Id.
10 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

So too here. Neither the Convention nor Chapter Two 

contains any language excluding the use of petitions to 

enforce arbitral summonses. There is no language in either 

that limits the tools that may be utilized in international 

arbitrations in ways domestic arbitrations are not so limited. 

The only limitation is set forth in § 208, which as the 

Supreme Court noted in GE Energy, disallows only those 

processes provided for in domestic arbitrations under 

Chapter One that conflict with Chapter Two or the 

Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 208; see also GE Energy, 140 S. Ct. 

at 1644–45. Far from conflicting with the Convention, 

judicial enforcement of an arbitrator’s summons only aids in 

the arbitration process. We therefore conclude that “Section 

7 is a nonconflicting provision in Chapter 1 that residually 

applies through Chapter[] 2.” Restatement (Third) U.S. Law 

of Int’l Comm. Arb. § 3.4(e) (Am. Law Inst., Prop. Final 

Draft (April 24, 2019)) (“Restatement Prop. Final Draft”) 

(citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 208); see also George A. 

Bermann et al., A Model Federal Arbitration Summons to 

Testify and Present Documentary Evidence at an Arbitration 

Hearing, 26 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 157, 172 (2015) (same). 

Orrick’s argument that the only permissible judicial actions 

or proceedings are those explicitly listed in Chapter Two 

thus runs afoul of Chapter Two and the Convention’s plain 

language, structure, and objectives.

As other courts have concluded, reading “falling under” 

more broadly to include proceedings necessary to complete 

the arbitration process for purposes of original jurisdiction is 

also supported by Chapter Two’s delineation of the scope of 

district courts’ removal jurisdiction. Section 205 of the FAA 

provides that “[w]here the subject matter of an action or 

proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration 

agreement or award falling under the Convention, the 

defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 11

thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district 

court of the United States for the district and division 

embracing the place where the action or proceeding is 

pending.” 9 U.S.C. § 205. If “falling under” in § 203 is not 

deemed at least co-extensive with “relates to” in § 205, then 

that would mean Congress intended the district courts to 

have a narrower scope of original jurisdiction than removal 

jurisdiction in enforcing international arbitration awards. 

Yet, the very purpose of the Convention and the Chapter 

Two implementing procedures is to encourage arbitration 

and to “authorize district courts to take actions necessary to 

ensure that the parties’ underlying controversy is 

successfully resolved through arbitration.” Maine Cmty. 

Health Options v. Albertsons Cos., Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 725 

(9th Cir. 2021) (Watford, J., concurring). The irony of 

Orrick’s contrary position is that, in this very case where it 

asserts the Northern District of California lacks original

jurisdiction, the same court would have had removal 

jurisdiction under FAA § 205 had Jones Day filed its petition 

to enforce the subpoena in San Francisco Superior Court. In 

that scenario, Orrick could have removed the enforcement 

action to the Northern District to oppose enforcement of the 

arbitral subpoena. This would be an absurd result, especially 

in light of congressional policy to enforce arbitration—not 

resist it—and the proceedings that further arbitration of 

international disputes. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207.

The Fifth Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in 

Stemcor USA Inc. v. CIA Siderurgica do Para Cosipar, 

927 F.3d 906 (5th Cir. 2019), where the court determined it 

had § 203 jurisdiction over one party’s action for an 

attachment related to an international arbitration covered by 

the New York Convention. The court reasoned that the 

meaning of § 203’s term “falling under” must be guided by 

the removal statute, § 205, because “generally, the removal 
12 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

jurisdiction of the federal district courts extends to cases 

over which they have original jurisdiction.” Id. at 909 

(cleaned up). The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the 

argument Orrick makes here—that § 203 original 

jurisdiction is limited to actions compelling arbitration and 

appointing arbitrators under § 206 and confirming 

arbitration awards under § 207. Id. at 910 n.1.

Orrick argues that Stemcor’s reliance on § 205 removal 

jurisdiction is “based on a faulty assumption that removal 

jurisdiction and original jurisdiction share the same scope.” 

Not so. Stemcor does not hold that removal jurisdiction is 

always coextensive with original jurisdiction, but more 

narrowly reasons that, in the context of Chapter Two, there 

is no reason to believe that Congress intended that original 

and removal jurisdiction would not be coextensive. See id. 

at 909. Thus, the Fifth Circuit in Stemcor considered the 

plain meaning of “relates to” in § 205 and falling under in 

§ 203 and concluded that the terms share the same meaning 

for purposes of articulating the federal courts’ original 

jurisdiction in § 203. It reasoned that “reading ‘falling 

under’ to mean ‘relates to’ makes sense grammatically,” and 

cited the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary definition 

of “fall” as “to come within the limits, scope or jurisdiction 

of something.” Stemcor, 927 F.3d at 909. The Fifth Circuit 

then held that a federal court has jurisdiction under the 

Convention if two requirements are met: “(1) there must be 

an arbitration agreement or award that falls under the 

Convention, and (2) the dispute must relate to that arbitration 

agreement.” Id.

The Second and Eleventh Circuits agree with the Fifth 

Circuit’s analysis. For example, in Scandinavian 

Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 

668 F.3d 60 (2d. Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit concluded 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 13

that the district court had jurisdiction under § 203 “to vacate 

an arbitral award,” an action not expressly authorized under 

Chapter Two. Id. at 64, 71; see also Borden, Inc. v. Meiji 

Milk Prods. Co., Ltd., 919 F.2d 822, 826 (2d. Cir. 1990) 

(finding that subject matter jurisdiction exists over an 

application for a preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration 

because it is “consistent with [the Act’s] provisions and its 

spirit”).

The Eleventh Circuit also held it had subject matter 

jurisdiction under § 203 over a party’s motion to vacate an 

arbitral award. See Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical 

INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l GmbH, 921 F.3d 1291, 

1299 (11th Cir. 2019). Like Orrick here, INPROTSA argued 

that the New York Convention and Chapter Two expressly 

provided jurisdiction only over actions to compel arbitration 

and to confirm an award. Id. at 1298. The Eleventh Circuit 

rejected that assertion, reasoning that Chapter Two “is 

merely a statute by which the Convention has been 

implemented in this country.” Id. at 1299. “The relevant 

inquiry under § 203 is not whether a particular action or 

proceeding is provided by the Convention Act; it is whether 

the ‘action or proceeding fall[s] under the Convention’ 

itself.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the court explained 

“that the Convention Act appears to expressly recognize only 

two causes of action” does not resolve whether an action 

falls under the Convention. Id. (emphasis added). The court 

further stated that, even assuming the Convention did not 

expressly authorize vacatur proceedings, INPROTSA’s 

argument failed because it was incorrect to “assume[] an 

action or proceeding cannot fall under a particular body of 

law unless the action or proceeding is provided by that body 

of law.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court explained that 

in its view, “an action or proceeding ‘fall[s] under the 

Convention,’ for purposes of § 203, when it involves subject 
14 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

matter that—at least in part—is subject to the Convention, 

such that the action or proceeding implicates interests the 

Convention seeks to protect.” Id. at 1299–1300. As a 

practical matter, “this will require that the case sufficiently 

relate to an agreement or award subject to the Convention.” 

Id. at 1300.

Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit’s 

interpretation of § 203 was “reinforced” by its understanding 

of § 205. “Section 205 demonstrates congressional intent to 

provide a federal forum for resolving issues implicating the 

Convention.” Id. “It would make little sense for Congress 

to specifically authorize removal of cases over which the 

federal courts would lack subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . It 

makes far more sense to conclude Congress intended § 203 

to be read consistently with § 205 as conferring subjectmatter jurisdiction over actions or proceedings sufficiently 

related to agreements or awards subject to the Convention.” 

Id.; see also Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 

384, 391 n.6 (2d. Cir. 2011) (“The Convention should be 

interpreted broadly to effectuate its recognition and 

enforcement purposes.” (cleaned up)).

We agree with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ expansive 

reading of § 203, and we hold that a federal court has original 

jurisdiction over an action or proceeding if two requirements 

are met: (1) there is an underlying arbitration agreement or 

award that falls under the Convention, and (2) the action or 

proceeding relates to that arbitration agreement or award. 

See Stemcor, 927 F.3d at 909. And, for purpose of the 

second requirement, we adopt the meaning of “relates to,” 

which we previously defined for purposes of § 205, as 

whether the proceeding “could conceivably affect the 

outcome of the plaintiff’s case,” Infuturia Global Ltd. v. 

Sequus Pharms., Inc., 631 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 15

(emphasis in original), citing another Fifth Circuit decision, 

Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2002).

Applying these jurisdictional requirements to the facts of 

this case is straightforward. The underlying arbitration 

agreement between Jones Day, an international law firm 

residing for jurisdictional purposes in Washington D.C., and 

its former non-U.S. citizen partner falls under the 

Convention as defined by § 202. The petition to compel 

Orrick’s compliance with the arbitral summonses relates to 

the underlying arbitration agreement, as the arbitrator 

determined that evidence adduced from the participation 

may be material to resolving the dispute.

Not only are these proceedings “related to” an arbitration 

agreement falling under the Convention, petitions to enforce 

a summons issued by the arbitrator are necessary ancillary 

proceedings that ensure the proper functioning of the 

underlying arbitration. As Judge Watford has explained, 

“[c]onsidering the structure of the FAA as a whole, it seems 

evident . . . that Congress envisioned a § 7 petition [to 

enforce an arbitral summons to a third party] not as a 

freestanding lawsuit, but as an adjunct to the ‘underlying 

substantive controversy’ between the parties in arbitration.” 

Maine Cmty. Health Options, 993 F.3d at 725 (Watford, J., 

concurring) (quoting Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 

62 (2009)).2 “[T]he enforcement of a subpoena brings 

2 9 U.S.C. § 7 provides for arbitrators to “summon in writing any 

person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper 

case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper 

which may be deemed material as evidence in the case,” and that “if any 

person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey 

said summons, upon petition the United States district court for the 

district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may 

compel the attendance of such person.” Thus, unlike Chapter Two, 
16 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

before the court one aspect of enforcing the parties’ 

agreement to arbitrate—not the right to arbitrate itself, but 

the enjoyment of a key procedural attribute of the arbitration 

the parties bargained for.” Bermann, 26 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 

at 173.

This view of what “fall[s] under” the Convention is 

consistent with the contemplation of the signatories to the 

agreement. The New York Convention has been adopted by 

nearly 200 nations worldwide because of the expanding role 

arbitration plays in resolving international commercial 

disputes. The purpose of the Convention is twofold: (1) to 

ensure that countries recognize and enforce arbitration 

agreements, and (2) to ensure that countries recognize and 

enforce foreign arbitral awards. See Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). By signing on 

to the Convention and adopting Chapter Two of the FAA, 

“the United States sought ‘to encourage the recognition and 

enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 

international contracts and to unify the standards by which 

agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are 

enforced in the signatory countries.’” Castro v. Tri Marine 

Fish Co., 921 F.3d 766, 773 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Scherk, 

417 U.S. at 520 n.15). Recognizing and enforcing 

arbitration agreements includes facilitating the arbitration 

process and providing arbitrators—in both domestic and 

international arbitrations—with access to the ancillary 

actions and proceedings necessary to arrive at an arbitration 

Chapter One of the FAA does list petitions to compel arbitral summons 

as an “action or proceeding.” Chapter One, however, “bestow[s] no 

federal jurisdiction but rather requires an independent jurisdictional 

basis.” Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 

(2008) (internal quotations omitted).
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 17

award. This includes arbitral subpoenas and their 

enforcement.

Thus, under 9 U.S.C. § 203, the district court had subject 

matter jurisdiction to enforce the petitions to comply with 

the arbitral summonses.3

B.

Section 204 of the FAA provides a specific venue 

provision for actions or proceedings authorized by § 203. 

Such actions or proceedings “may be brought in any such 

[district] court in which save for the arbitration agreement an 

action or proceeding with respect to the controversy between 

the parties could be brought, or in such court for the district 

and division which embraces the place designated in the 

agreement as the place of arbitration if such place is within 

the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 204. Jones Day asserts that 

§ 204 is a non-exclusive venue provision that supplements, 

rather than supplants, other venue rules. We agree.

We “refuse to nullify general venue laws, even in the 

face of apparently more narrow venue provisions in specific 

federal statutes.” Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 

1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989). The general federal venue 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, “shall govern the venue of all civil 

actions brought in district courts of the United States.” It 

lists the judicial districts where “[a] civil action may be 

brought,” § 1391(b), and applies “[e]xcept as otherwise 

provided by law,” § 1391(a). Section 1391 “ensures that so 

long as a federal court has personal jurisdiction over the 

3 Because we answer the jurisdictional question on this ground, we 

do not reach Jones Day’s alternative proffered bases for jurisdiction, 

9 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 208.
18 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

defendant, venue will always lie somewhere.” Atl. Marine 

Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 57 

(2013). “Congress does not in general intend to create venue 

gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has 

given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only where 

there is evidence “that Congress intended the specific venue 

provision to be exclusive or . . . restrictively applied” will 

parties be deprived of relying on the general venue statute. 

Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1409; see also Pure Oil Co. v. 

Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 205–07 (1966) (same).

Nothing in the text of § 204 indicates that Congress 

intended the FAA venue provision to be exclusive or 

restrictively applied. Section 204 is the only provision 

addressing venue in Chapter Two, and it is silent as to 

28 U.S.C. § 1391. Section 204 uses the permissive “may be 

brought” to describe the additional authorized venues. “The 

word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually implies some 

degree of discretion.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 

677, 706 (1983) (citation omitted). Orrick would have us 

read “may” as signaling “must,” but Congress did not use 

any such mandatory language in drafting the statute.

Case law interpreting venue provisions in Chapter One 

of the FAA also informs our reading of § 204. In Cortez 

Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 

(2000), the Supreme Court addressed the question whether 

the venue provisions in 9 U.S.C. § 9 (actions to confirm an 

arbitration award), § 10 (actions to vacate an arbitration 

award), and § 11 (actions to modify an arbitration award) are 

restrictive, requiring such actions to be brought in only the 

district where the award was made, or are permissive, 

“permitting such a motion either where the award was made 

or in any district proper under the general venue statute.” Id. 
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 19

at 204. Reasoning that the FAA was enacted at a time when 

the general venue statute was restrictive, allowing a civil 

action only where the defendant resided, the Court 

concluded that the venue provisions added to that location, 

rendering them permissive. See id. at 199–200. The Court 

found that “[t]he enactment of the special venue provisions 

in the FAA thus had an obviously liberalizing effect, 

undiminished by any suggestion, textual or otherwise, that 

Congress meant simultaneously to foreclose a suit where the 

defendant resided.” Id. at 200. The Court recognized that 

“[t]he most convenient forum for a defendant is normally the 

forum of residence, and it would take a very powerful reason 

ever to suggest that Congress would have meant to eliminate 

that venue for postarbitration disputes.” Id. The Court 

instead held that “the permissive view of FAA venue 

provisions [is] entitled to prevail.” Id. at 204.

We expanded on this decision in Textile Unlimited, Inc. 

v. A..BMH & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001), in 

which we held that the FAA venue provision in 9 U.S.C. § 4, 

governing actions to compel arbitration, is likewise 

permissive rather than exclusive. We concluded based on 

the Court’s reasoning in Cortez Byrd that all of the FAA’s 

venue provisions “do not supplant the general venue 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a); rather, they are 

permissive and supplement those sections.” Id. at 784. We 

understood Cortez Byrd to instruct us to “weave the various 

venue strands of the Act together into a seamless fabric 

which does not clash with other federal venue statutes.” Id. 

(citing Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 199–200). “Such an 

analysis can only lead to a more elastic and complimentary 

construction of venues available under the FAA, including 

those founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1391 alone.” Id.
20 JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE

The district court’s analysis was focused on the specific 

venue provision set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 7, the Chapter One 

provision that governs petitions to compel compliance with 

an arbitrator’s summons filed in district court. Section 7 

provides for enforcement of an arbitral summons in the 

“district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are 

sitting.” The court reasoned that because it is undisputed 

that Washington D.C. is the “seat of the underlying 

arbitration,” it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the summons. 

But the district court did not consider the specific venue 

provision applicable here, 9 U.S.C. § 204, nor did it consider 

whether that provision was exclusive or permissive.4

Orrick points to § 201, which provides that the 

“Convention . . . shall be enforced in the United States courts 

in accordance with this chapter.” 9 U.S.C. § 201. Congress’ 

use of “shall” here, Orrick argues, mandates the use of 

Chapter Two’s provisions in any proceedings under the 

chapter, including the specific venue provision in § 204. To 

support this argument, Orrick cites Johnson v. Payless Drug 

Stores Nw., Inc., 950 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1991), where we 

held in the Title VII context that the later-enacted specific 

venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) governed over the 

general venue statute. Title VII, however, expressly 

provided that the venue “provisions of section 2000e-5(f) . . .

shall govern” employment discrimination actions. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(d). And, we held, that language “is mandatory.” 

Johnson, 950 F.2d at 587 (citation omitted).

4 Because we hold that 9 U.S.C. § 204 is a non-exclusive venue 

provision that supplements, rather than supplants, other venue rules 

(including 28 U.S.C. § 1391), we need not resolve the parties’ dispute as 

to whether 9 U.S.C. § 7 provides for venue (or where).
JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 21

Unlike in Title VII, the language in 9 U.S.C. § 204, 

which provides for venue here, is not mandatory. Rather, 

§ 204 is a permissive, supplemental venue provision in 

addition to the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 

Neither party argues that the Northern District of California 

is an improper venue under § 1391. Under § 1391, the 

Northern District of California is a proper venue because it 

is Orrick’s principal place of business. Therefore, it was 

error to dismiss the petitions on venue grounds. Because the 

district court had subject matter jurisdiction and no other 

challenges were raised to the petitions, the district court 

should have granted Jones Day’s petitions to enforce the 

summonses.

IV.

For these reasons, we reverse and remand with 

instructions to enforce Jones Day’s petitions to compel 

Orrick and its partners to comply with the arbitral 

summonses.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.