IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1868

Filed May 6, 2015

JOHN EDWARD COWLES,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Myron L. Gookin, 

Judge.

An applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney 

General, Rick L. Lynch, County Attorney, and Ashley M. Leyda, Assistant County 

Attorney, for appellee State.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ. Tabor, 

J. takes no part. 
2

VOGEL, P.J.

John Cowles was originally charged with twenty counts of second-degree 

sexual abuse, four counts of third-degree sexual abuse, and one count of incest 

all arising out of his sexual abuse of his daughter over a number of years. See 

State v. Cowles, 757 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Iowa 2008). He pled guilty to one count 

of second-degree sexual abuse, four counts of third-degree sexual abuse, and 

one count of incest. Id. The plea agreement called for a joint sentencing 

recommendation of concurrent sentences for all the counts and a 70%

mandatory minimum sentence imposed on the class “B” felony, the seconddegree sexual abuse conviction. Id. at 616. The court accepted the plea 

agreement and the joint sentencing recommendation, and sentenced Cowles 

accordingly. Id. 

Cowles did not file a direct appeal, but instead, on July 7, 2006, he filed a 

motion to correct an illegal sentence asserting the imposition of the mandatory 

minimum violated the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. Id. 

He stated the mandatory-minimum-sentence statute went into effect on July 1, 

1996, but he was alleged to have committed the offense sometime between April 

9, 1996, and February 3, 1997. Because the plea colloquy did not establish he 

committed the crime after July 1, 1996, he claimed the imposition of the 

mandatory minimum sentence was illegal. Id. 

The supreme court rejected Cowles’s claim, finding: 

Under the circumstances presented in this case, we 

conclude the mandatory minimum sentence did not violate the Ex 

Post Facto clauses. At his plea and sentencing hearing, Cowles 

expressly admitted he perpetrated a sex act on a victim under 

twelve years of age between April 9, 1996 and February 2, 1997. 
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Cowles also acknowledged he wished to plead guilty after he was 

advised he would be required to serve at least seventy percent of 

the maximum sentence for the offense. Although it is true Cowles 

did not expressly admit during the plea colloquy he committed the 

offense after July 1, 1996, we find an implicit admission of such 

conduct in the full context of the hearing.

The record made by the parties on the occasion of the pleataking and sentencing hearing evidences Cowles admitted guilt for 

an act of sexual abuse that occurred after July 1, 1996. The 

mandatory minimum sentence requirement of section 902.12 

applied only to acts of sexual abuse committed after that date. As 

we have already noted, the court informed Cowles an admission of 

guilt would expose him to a mandatory minimum sentence. With 

knowledge of that prospect, and after his counsel confirmed on the 

record he had advised his client of the maximum and minimum 

penalties that could result, Cowles entered and the court accepted 

the guilty plea. We conclude the guilty plea and the resulting 

sentence conformed completely with the parties’ plea agreement.

This conclusion is supported by the fact Cowles did not challenge 

the legality of the sentence until he filed an application for 

postconviction relief more than two years later on August 4, 2005.

Under the circumstances, we conclude no violation of the Ex Post 

Facto clauses occurred here.

Id. at 617. 

Cowles filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR), as amended, 

making a number of claims all challenging the imposition of the mandatory 

minimum sentence.1The district court rejected the challenges, finding 

Although the Plaintiff has raised numerous issues in his 

application, amendments thereto, and numerous other filings, his 

complaints boil down to a rather narrow issue that can be readily 

resolved. All of Plaintiffs issues boil down to a determination of 

whether the twenty-five year sentence on his class B felony 2nd 

degree sexual abuse conviction is subject to a 70% mandatory 

minimum. 

Plaintiff claims he is not subject to the 70% mandatory 

minimum and, because he was advised by his counsel and the 

court that he was subject to such a mandatory minimum, such 

inaccurate advice infected his plea and sentencing hearing such 

that he did not make a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, his 

 

1Multiple PCR filings were made part of this record, beginning in August 2005 and 

continuing through July 2013. 
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attorneys were ineffective, there was a lack of factual basis in 

support of his guilty plea, he was denied full allocution at 

sentencing, he did not make a fully informed, knowledgeable and 

voluntary decision to waive use of a presentence investigation at 

sentencing, the court failed to recite an adequate reason for the 

sentence, and his attorney in a subsequent appeal on a motion for 

reconsideration of sentence was ineffective because he failed to 

respond to a “terrible, terrible prejudicial inaccuracy in a brief made 

by the state.” All of Plaintiff’s claims in his postconviction relief 

application depend on his assertion that he is not subject to the 

70% mandatory minimum on his 2nd degree sexual abuse 

conviction.

. . . .

This Court reaches the same conclusion [as the supreme 

court] concerning Plaintiff’s guilty plea. Plaintiff knew exactly what 

he was doing when he accepted a plea bargain that required him to 

plead guilty to one out of twenty charges of 2nd degree sexual 

abuse and receive a 70% mandatory minimum sentence thereon, 

together with other charges of 3rd degree sexual abuse and incest, 

with concurrent sentences. Any claim on his part that he did not 

know what he was doing at his guilty plea, or that he would not 

have accepted the plea bargain if he knew convictions to pre-July 

1, 1996 acts did not carry a mandatory minimum sentence, are 

simply not credible for the following reasons.

The record reveals Plaintiff did not want to drag his family 

through a trial and never intended to take any of the charges to 

trial. It further reveals the Davis County attorney would not agree to 

any kind of a plea bargain that did not require a 70% mandatory 

minimum sentence under a 2nd degree sexual abuse guilty plea. It 

is incomprehensible and unbelievable that Plaintiff would have 

rejected the plea bargain he accepted, and instead take twenty 

charges of 2nd degree sexual abuse to trial, together with the other 

3rd degree sexual abuse and incest charges, if he would have 

known about the July 1, 1996 mandatory minimum law change. 

Even if all of the 2nd degree sexual abuse charges were based on 

pre-July 1, 1996 acts, the potential sentence for convictions on all

such charges would be 500 years, if ordered to run consecutively. 

And, such 500 years of potential incarceration does not include the 

45 additional years of incarceration that could be imposed for 

possible convictions on the other four Class C (3rd degree sexual 

abuse) and one Class D (incest) felonies.

Plaintiff’s claims are directly contradicted by his interaction 

with the court at his guilty plea hearing and sentencing. See Arnold 

v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995) (holding where such 

direct contradiction occurs the applicant bears a special burden to

establish that the record is inaccurate). The transcript of his guilty 

plea and sentencing hearing clearly establishes he fully understood 
5

the plea bargain, including the nature of the crimes to which he was 

pleading and the 70% mandatory minimum sentence to which he 

would be subjected on the 2nd degree sexual abuse conviction, 

and that he understood what he was doing throughout the 

proceedings. Plaintiff has failed in his special burden of proof and 

the Court finds he was acting intelligently and voluntary at his guilty 

plea hearing and completely understood his plea agreement and 

the potential consequences. Consistent with the Iowa Supreme 

Court’s analysis, this Court finds Plaintiff knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily pled guilty to an act constituting 2nd degree sexual 

abuse that occurred on or after July 1, 1996, which provided a 

proper basis for the 70% mandatory minimum sentence imposed 

against him.

With a determination that Plaintiff made a knowing and 

intelligent guilty plea and that he was subject to the 70% mandatory 

minimum sentence on his 2nd degree sexual abuse conviction, all 

other postconviction claims by Plaintiff must fail and the Court will 

not further address such claims.

Cowles appeals the district court’s PCR ruling claiming (1) the district 

court erred in concluding his guilty plea counsel was not ineffective in failing to 

inform him of the crucial law change regarding the imposition of a mandatory 

minimum sentence for crimes committed after July 1, 1996, making his plea 

involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent, and (2) PCR counsel was ineffective in 

failing to get a ruling on the meritorious pro se issues, specifically (a) that his 

guilty plea lacked a factual basis, (b) that the plea court erred in assuming it had 

no discretion regarding the imposition of the 70% mandatory minimum, and (c) 

that the prosecutor committed misconduct by not informing the court and Cowles

of the law change regarding the mandatory minimum. In addition, Cowles filed a 

pro se brief in this PCR appeal alleging PCR counsel was ineffective in not 

seeking a ruling from the district court addressing his claim that his allocution 

was not fully informed and knowledgeable where he did not know he could ask 
6

for a sentence without the 70% mandatory minimum—a better sentence than he 

bargained for under the plea agreement. 

We agree with the district court that all of Cowles’s claims boil down to his 

claim that the 70% mandatory minimum should not be applied to him because he 

did not plead guilty to an offense occurring after July 1, 1996. This claim was 

resolved by the supreme court when it found an “implicit admission” to such 

conduct as a result of pleading guilty to the offense with full knowledge the 70% 

minimum would be applied to him under the parties’ plea agreement. Cowles, 

757 N.W.2d at 617. Because the supreme court found this implicit admission, 

the guilty plea was supported by a factual basis, the district court did not have 

discretion to forgo imposing the mandatory minimum, and the prosecutor did not 

commit misconduct in not informing Cowles or the court to the contrary. Thus, to 

the extent Cowles asserts PCR counsel was ineffective in not getting an explicit 

ruling from the PCR court on these pro se claims, his claim fails. See State v. 

Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e have held that counsel has no 

duty to raise an issue that has no merit.”). 

Cowles’s pro se claim addressing his allocution likewise fails. Cowles 

could not have asked for a sentence without the mandatory minimum as the 

guilty plea included an implicit admission to committing the offense after July 1, 

1996, the plea agreement called for a joint sentencing recommendation with the 

mandatory minimum, which would make it a breach of the plea agreement if 

Cowles requested a lighter sentence, and the district court had to impose the 

minimum as it was mandatory. Likewise, Cowles’s plea counsel was not 

ineffective in failing to inform him of the law change where the prosecutor made 
7

clear there would be no plea bargain without the mandatory minimum on the 

second-degree sexual abuse guilty plea. 

We agree with the district court’s rejection of Cowles’s PCR claims and 

affirm its decision under Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d) and (e).

AFFIRMED.