The Honor able Solomon Oliver, Jr., United St ates District Judge f or the Nor

thern * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation. Sc ott c on c e de d b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt that he r c la ims fo r d isc re te a c ts o f d isp arate 1 treatment arising prior to Novembe r 26, 1996, ar e time-ba rre d. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0207n.06 F iled: April 22, 2008 No. 05-6079 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

RO SIAL. SC OTT, Plaintif f-Appellant , v. EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMP ANY, Defendant-

Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge; MARTIN, Cir cuit Judge; and O LIVER, District Judge. * OLIVER, JR., Distric t Judge: Plaintiff-Appellant Rosia L

. Scott ( “Scott” or “Plaintiff” ) appea ls the order

of the district cour

t g ranting Def

endant- Appellee Eastman Chemica l Company ’s (“Ea stman” or “ Def

endant” ) Motion for Summary J u d gm en t on her e mploy ment discrimination cl a im s . Sc o tt a ll e g e s : ( 1 ) th a t s h e w a s d e n ie d p r o mo ti o n s b a s e d o n s e x an d in r e ta li ation for eng ag ing in pr otected a ctivity occur ring from November, 1996, throug h 2005; and (2) that she wa s 1 subjected to a

sexually hostile e nvironment from 1976 to 2005. The district c ourt dismissed Scott’s hostile environment claim and he r post -Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (“EEOC”)2

char g e fa ilure to promote cla ims other than to Team M an age r. The district court also dismissed Scott’s retaliation claims, other than those associate d with the filing of her EE OC char g e, for

failure to exhaust admini strative re medies. The c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to Eastman on Scott’s claims alleg ing f

ailure to promote to Te am Mana g er in 1997, 1998, and 1999, bec ause she did not of fe r e vid e nc e to r e bu t E a stm an’ s art ic ulate d, no n- dis c ri min a tor y re a so n that it

se le c te d th e mos t qualified c andidates f

or the jobs. The court also g rante d summary judgme nt to Defe ndant on Scott’s reta liation c laims ba sed on the filing of her EE OC char g e, for failure to establish a pr ima fa c ie case , f i n d i n g t h a ts h e p r o d

u c e d n o e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s kn e w o f h e r p r o t e c t e d

a c t i v i t y. Additionally , Scott’s Motion to Amend her Complaint to asser t a disparate impact cla im and pursue a cla ss action was de nied by t h e M agi s t ra te J udg e. F or the re asons that follow, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision in part and RE VE RSE it i n p art

. I. A. Bac kgr ound Sc ott ’s e mpl oy e r, Ea stm an, manu fa c tur e s c he mic a ls, fi be rs , and pla sti c s in T e nn e sse e . Sc ott has worke d for Ea stman since August of 1976, when she beg an as a Gene ral L abore r. In 1977, she

e nte re d E a stm an’ s a

pp re nti c e sh ip p ro g ra

m, w hic h s he c omp le te d in June , 1 98 1. Duri ngthe c ours e of this lawsuit, Scott worke d as a pipe fitter. Scott maintains that throughout her car eer at Eastman, sh e so ug ht, bu t ne ve r r e c e ive d, a pe rm ane nt p ro mot ion , th a t he r m a le c o- wo rk e rs we re pr omo te d to jo b s f o r w h ic h s h e w a s qu a li f

ie d , a n d th a t s h e e xp e r ie n c e d

w o r k p la c e ho s ti li ty

b a s e d o nh e r s e x.

I n 1995, Eastman initiated the Te am Mana g er Development Sy stem (“TMDS”) for se lecting

“ Te a m Ma

na g e rs ,” de ve lop e d w iththe a ssi sta nc e of an o uts ide c on su lta

nt. Th ro ug h T MD S,3

interested c andidates w ere evaluated by the entire manag ement tea m wi t h i n eac h division, which would make its own selec tions, based on a va riety of cr iteria. Those interested in b ei n g a Team Manag er ha d to me et minimum elig ibilit y criter ia and pass a wr itten Paper a nd Pencil Test (“ PPT”), among other thing s. When no women wer e selec ted as Team Ma nag ers in the two divisions t o which Scott appli e d d

u r in g th e 1 9 9 6 /9 7 c y c le , s h e f il e d a c h ar g e o f d is c r im in a ti o n w it h th e E E O C on September 22, 1997, a gains t Eastman. (Char g e of D iscrimination, J oint Appendix (“J.A.”) 409.) On J anuar

y 29, 2003, the EEOC issued a determination letter, finding that Scott “was not promoted based on he r sex (female ), as a lleg ed.” ( EEOC Dete rmination L etter, J.A. 466.) Sc ott ’s fa ilure to pr omo te c la ims inv olv e Te a m Ma na g e r job s and Spe c ia l Se le c tio n job s in the Pol y me rs Di vis ion

and Ce ntr a lize d M a int e na

nc e & Se rvices Divis ion (“ CM& S” ). Sc ott d e s c r ib e s Sp e c ia l S e le c ti o na s a p o li c y an d p r a c ti c e f

o r p r o mo ti n g e mp lo y e e s to jo b s , o th e r tha n Team Manag er jobs, that does not entail a uniform method of pr omotion. S cott states that jobs filled by Special Selection are rar ely posted, employ ees do not g ener ally know when S p ec i al Selection opportunities are available , what criteria are used, if any , or which employ ees are being considere d, or who make s the decision. Thus, an employ ee may never find out that a comparable employ ee w as promoted. S cott identifies three Special Selec tion promotional job opportunit ies occ urringin 1997, for whic h she maintains that she wa s interested in a nd qualified for , but not selected. B. Pr ocedural History On Aug ust 27, 2003, Scott f iled her Complaint, alleg ing se x discrimination and re taliation

u n d er T i t l e V I I

. On Fe b ru ary 2 7 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i s s u eda S ch edu l i n g Or d er s et t i n g a May 28, 2004 deadline, f

or ame nding ple ading s. On Fe bruar y 8, 2005, afte r the e x piration of the deadline f or ame nding the pleading s, Scott filed a Motion to Stay all rema ining de adlines, see king4

time to file a Mot ion to Amend. The Moti on was refe rre d to a Mag istrate Judge, w ho denied it on Fe bruar y 16, 2005. Scott f

iled no objections to tha

t O rder

. Eastman filed a Moti o n fo r S ummary J udg ment on Fe bruar

y 11, 2005. Scott filed her Response in Opposition t o Def endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment on Marc h 28, 2005. T h er ea ft er , S cott filed a Motion for L eave to File a Supplemental Br ief OpposingSummary J udg ment on May 1, 2005. The dist rict cour t denied that Motion on May

2, 2005. On May

6, 2005, Scott filed a Motion to Amend her Complaint. On J une 3, 2005, the district court g rante d Eastman’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and also de nied Scott’s Motion to Amend her Complaint as moot. Scott fil ed her Notice of Appea l on J uly

1, 2005. II. The issues pre sented on appea l are whether the district court e rre d in: (1) dismissi ng Scott’s hostile environment claim, her post-EEOC cha

rg e fa ilure to p ro m o t e cla ims other than to Team Manag er, a

nd her r etaliation claims other tha n those associated with the fil ing of her EE OC char g e; (2 ) g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt t o Ea stm an on Sco tt’ s 1 99 7, 19 98 , a nd 19 99 , f a ilure to p ro mot e to Te a m Ma na g e r c la ims ; ( 3) g ra

nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt t o E a stm an o n Sc ott ’s re ta liatio n c la im

ari sin g ou t of

the EE OC c ha

rg e ; and (4 ) d e nyingSc ott ’s Mo tio n to Am e nd he r C omp la int

. T h i s c o u r t e xe rc ise s de novo revi ew o f a di st ri ct c ou rt ’s d eci si on grant in g sum mar y jud g me nt, using the same standa

rd under Rule 56(c) used by the district court. W

ill iam s v . M

e hra , 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1999) (e n banc) (citations omitted). I n s o d oing, the court must consider the

rec ord as it stood befor e the district c ourt at the time of its ruling. Ge nera lly , this court should not consider a

rg uments not raised by

an appe llant below. En e rte c h El e c . v . M ah on ing Cou nty , 85 F.3d 25 7, 26 1 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 6) (c itatio n omi tte d)

. Sum ma ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr ia te on ly

wh e re “ the re is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter5

of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . I n d ec i d i ng a motion for summary judgme nt, we view the fac tual evidenc e and dr aw a ll reasona ble infer ence s in favor of the non-movingparty

. Me hra , 186 F. 3d at 6 8 9 (c i t i n g Nat ’l

En te rs. v . S

mi th , 114 F.3d 561, 563 ( 6th Cir. 1997)). Th is c ourt

a lso e xer c ise s de novo revie w of a dis trict court’ s decision to dismiss for lac k of subject matter jur isdiction. Di x on v . A sh c ro

ft , 3 9 2 F. 3 d 2 1 2 , 2 1 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Joelson v

. United States , 86 F.3d 1413, 1416 (6th Cir. 1996) ). Finally , decisions on motions to amend are revie wed f

or an abuse of discr etion. Ausel v. Unisy s Corp. , 1 99 7 U .S. Ap p. L EX I S 32 77 1, a t *6 (6 th C i r. No v . 1 3 , 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Miller v. Me tro. Li fe Ins. Co. , 925 F.2d 979, 982 ( 6th Cir. 1991). III . A. Exhau stion of

Adm inis trat ive Rem edies Under Title VI I of t he C ivil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful employ ment prac tice for

an employ er to disc riminate ag ainst an employ ee ba sed on sex, 42 U.S.C . §2000e-2; or be cause an employe e h as opposed unlaw ful discrimination; or beca use an e mploy ee ha s made a char g e, testified,

a s s i s t e d , o r

p art i c i p a t e d

i nan y m an n e r i nani n v e s t i g a t i o n , p r o c e e d i n g , o r h e ar i n g u n d e r

T i t l e V II. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a ). Title VI Irequires that a cha rg e of discr imination be timely filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(e )(1)

. A s a p r e r e qu is it e to b r in g in g s u it u n d e r T it le V I I , a c la im an t mu s t e xh a u s t h is or her

a d mi n is tr a ti v e r e me d ie s. W ei gel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn. , 302 F.3d 367, 379 ( 6th Cir. 2002) (c i t i n g Str ou ss v . M

ic h. De p’ t of Cor r. , 2 50 F .3 d 3 36 , 3 42 (6 th Cir

. 20 01 ))

. Th e po lic y or purp os e of the e x haust i o n re q u i rement “is to trigg er a n investigation, which g ives notice to the a lleg ed wrong doer of

its potential li ability

and ena bles the EEOC to initiate conciliation proc edure s in an attempt to a

void liti g ation.” Di

x on v . A sh c ro

ft , 392 F.3d 212, 217 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).6

Howeve r, as this court r ece ntly stated in Ra nd

olp h v . O hio De

p’ t of Y ou th S e rv s. , 453 F.3d 724, 732 (6t h C ir. 2006), the r equire ment “is not meant to be ove rly rig id, nor should it ‘result in the restric tion of subsequent complaints based on pr ocedur al technic alities or the fa ilure of the c harg es to contain the exact wording which mi g ht be required in a judicial pleading .’” Id. (q u o t i n g EEOC v. Mc Call Pri nting Co. , 633 F.2d 1232, 1235 ( 6th Cir. 1980) ). Consequently , “the EEOC complaint

s h o u l d b e l i b er al l y

co n s t ru ed t o en co mp as s al l cl ai m s ‘r ea s o n ab l y ex p ec t edt o gro w o u to f t h e c h ar ge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 675 ( 6th Cir. 1992)). Scott argues that the dist ri ct co u rt err ed in dismiss ing her hostile environment claim, her po st- EE OC c harge fa ilure to p ro mot e c la ims oth e r t ha n to Te a m Ma

na g e r, and

re ta liatio n c la ims othe r th an th o s e a s s o c iate d w it h th e f il in g o f h e r E E O C c h ar g e , f o r f a il u r e to exhaust her

a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s. Th e g e ne ra l r ule is that a

pla int if f may fi le su it on ly in re g ard to t he c la ims

a sse rt e d in

the EE OC c ha

rg e and tho se wi thi n th e sc op e of the EE OC inv e sti g a tio n r e a so na bly expected to g row out of the c harg e of discr imination. See D ixon , 39 2 F .3 d at 2 17 . Un der t his “expected sc ope of inve stigation” test, a plaintiff may fully exhaust her administrative remedie s on a cla im even if the c laim was not ac tually investigated by

the EEOC, or spe cifica l ly stated in the char g e. Id. Moreove r, “w here fac ts related w ith respec t to the char g ed clai m wo u l d p rompt the EE OC to inv e sti g a te a dif fe re nt, un c ha

rg e d c la im, the pla int if

f i s n ot p re c lud e d f

ro m br ing ingsu it on that claim.” W

eigel , 3 0 2 F. 3 d

at 3 8 0 (q u o t i n g Da v is v . S od e x ho , Cu mb e rla nd

Col l. C afe te ria , 157 F .3 d 4 60 , 4 63 (6 th C ir . 1 99 8) ). Pla int if fs are no t to be pe na lize d if the EE OC inv e sti g a tio n s ho uld have be en lar g er in scope

. Dixon , 392 F.3d at 219.7

I n th is c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld t hat: Pla int if f ha s sim ply no t se t fo rt

h any le g iti ma te ba sis to b e lie ve tha t su ff ic ie nt f a c ts wer e alleg ed to prompt the EEOC to investigate claims other tha n her f ailure to be promoted to Team Manag er in 1997, 1998, and 1999, or retaliation for the filing of her c harg e. Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co. , 2005 WL 1325014, at *3 (E.D. T enn. June 3, 2005). The district cour

t then dismiss ed Scott’s hostile environment cl ai m , her othe r post-EEOC char g e fa ilure to promote claims other than to T eam Manag er, a nd her r etaliation claims other tha n those associated with the fil ing of her EEOC char g e. The dist rict court conclude d that “the pr imary focus of [S cott’s] charg e . . . wa s her f ailure to be pro m o t ed t o t ea m manag er in 1997.” Id. at *2. Howeve r, the dist rict court judge found t hat Scott’s claim for f ailure to promote to Te am Mana g er in 1998 and 1999 wer e within the scope of her EEOC cha

rg e, as w ell as her

reta liation claim gr owing

ou t of the EE OC c ha

rg e . Sc ott argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n of the “ pr ima ry fo c us ” of her EEOC cha

rg e was in error , as the c orre ct standar d under a pplicable law

should have be en the “scope of investig ation” test.

1. Dism issal of

Scott’ s Claim for Failure t o P rom ote by Special Selection to Welding In spector in 1997 I n dismiss ing a ll of Scott’s c laims f or fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies “ other than her claim that she was denied Team Ma nag er positions in 1997, 1998, and 1999” an d S cott’s

re ta liatio n c la im “ fo r the fi lin g of a c ha rg e wi th the EE OC ,” the dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d Sc ott ’s c la im for f ailure to promote by

Special Selec tion to W elding I nspector in 1997. I n Scott’s EEOC char g e, sh e de sc ri be s th e 19 97 Wel din g I ns pe c tor pr omo tio n f

or wh ic h s he wa s n ot s e le c te d a s f oll ow s: I n June, 19 97 , a

we ldi ngins pe c tor

job wa s f

ill e d w itha

ma le e mpl oy e e wi th l e ss experience , qualifications, and service . This position was not post ed and e mploy ees wer e not c anvasse d for interest in the position. Other male employ ees are g iven8

specia l assignme nt and special training to gr oom them for promotional opportunities and women a

re not g iven the same benef its or opportunities. (Charg e of D iscrimination, J .A. 414.) Ea stman responde d to the EEOC cha rg e w i t h information about the Welding I

nspector position that was g iven to Mic hael Gass (“G ass”) as well as a bout the Special Selec tion process. On a ppeal, Ea stman ag ree s that the 1997 Welding Inspector position was identified in the EEO C charg e. B eca use Scott’s claim for

failure to promote by

Special Selec tion to Welding I nspector in 1997 wa s identified in her EE OC char g e, it was clearly within the s cope of the EE OC ’s inv e sti g a tio n. Th e re fo re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g thi s c la im f

or fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies. A ccor dingly , we co n clude that the c ase should be r ever sed and

re mand e d b a c k to the dis tr ic t c ourt fo r d e te rm inatio n o n th e me ri ts. The dissent ar g ues that, althoug h the district court e rre d in dismiss ing this claim for failure to exhaust admini strative re medies, sum mary judgme nt should be g rante d in Eastman’s fa vor on the g round that, as a

matter of law, Gass was better qualified tha n Scott because he had mor e re levant

e du c ati on andmo re ex peri ence. Th us , t he d is sen t co ncl ud es t hat Eas tm an h as ar ti cul ate d a l egit ima te non-discriminatory

rea son for sele cting Gass over Scott, and that Scott has not prese nted evidenc e that this re a so n is pre te xtua l. Ho we ve r, be c a us e of the c on fu se d sta te of the re c or d be fo re thi s c ourt , as discussed be low, we c onclude that it would be inappr o p ri ate f or this court to g rant summary jud g me nt. Scott’s EEOC char g e desc ribes a position that was not posted and for which employ ees w ere

no t c anv a sse d. She a lso state s th a t sh e ha d mor e e xpe ri e nc e tha n the pe rs on

se le c te d. I n r e sp on se to t he EE OC c ha

rg e , E a stm an s ta te s: Ms. Scott was considere d during the final sele cti on for the job a ssignment, a long with 20 other ca

ndidates, but she and 19 of the ca ndidates we re not sele cted f or the9

job. Ten ca

ndi dates we re r anked hig her tha n Ms. Scott, and ten candidates wer e ranke d the s ame a s Ms. Scott. Nine of the male c andidates w ho wer e ra nked hig her than Ms. Scott were not selecte d as the most qualified c andidate f or the job a ssi g nme nt. (J.A. 623.) I n its Moti on for Summary J udg ment at the trial leve l, Eastman identified the se lected employ ee a s Gass, and e x plained that he ha d a long er le ng th of servic e and more relevant educ ation. (G as s h ada t wo -y ea r d egr ee i nW el d i n g T ec h n o l o gy an d h ad b ee n p er fo rm i n g t h e j o b i nan “a ct i n g” capa city for se vera l months, wherea s Scott had a Welder Inspector’ s cer ti fi ca t e.) I n Scott’s Op po sit ion

to S umm ary

Judg me nt, sh e did

no t di re c tly

re sp on d to Eas tma

n’ s ide nti fi c a tio n o f G a ss, nor did she discuss the Welding I nspector positi on at all. Howeve r, i n her response to Defenda nt’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Fa cts, which the district cour t require d her to file in c onjunction wi th i ts c on sid e ratio n o f D e fe nd ant’ s Summa ry Judg me nt M oti on , Sc ott

did no t di sp ute that G a ss

wa s s e l e c t e d i n Jun e , 1 9 9 7 , b u t s h e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t Je f f E s t e p p ( “ E s t e p p ” ) w a s s e l e c te d “ in

a pp ro xima tel y 1997 -9 8; h ow e ve r, no se le c tio n f or m w a s p ro vid e d. ” (J.A . 1 74 6. ) I n a dd iti on , in

re sp on se to an int e rr og a tor y a sk ing he r t o li st e ve ry

ma le e mpl oy e e wh o w a s tr e a te d mo re fa vo ra bly tha n h e r, Sc ott

ide nti fi e d E ste pp a s b e inga pp oin te d to Wel din g I ns pe c tor wi th n o c anv a ss d e sp ite Scott’s longe r ser

vice, y et she did not identify Gass any

wh er e i n t h i s l ong list of names and complaints. Consequently , it a ppear s that Scott’s EEOC char g e may have be en re fer

ring to Estepp

rathe r t ha n G a ss. Ea stm an h a s n ot m ov e d f or su mma ry jud g me nt r e g ard ing Es te pp . As the dis tr ic t c ourt did not addre ss an y cl aim reg ardingEstepp, and a s the rec ord ra ises sufficie nt conce rns re g arding

w h e t h e r G a s s i s t h e p e r s o n w h o m S c o t t r e f e r e n c e s i n h e r

E E O C c h ar g e , w e h e r e b y RE VE RSE the10

district court’s de cision and REMAND Sc ott ’s c la im f or fa ilure to pr omo te by Spe c ia l Sele c tio n to Wel din g I ns pe c tor

in 1 99 7 b a c k to the dis tr ic t c ourt fo r c on sid e ra

tio n o n th e me ri ts. 2. Dism issal of

Scott’ s Other P ost-EEOC Charge Fa i l u re to Pro mot e b y S p ec i a l S el ec ti o n Cl a i ms B e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , and on a pp e a l, S c ott

div ide d h e r p os t- EE OC c ha rg e fa ilure to promote cla ims int o Team Ma nag er pr omotions and Special Selection promotions. The district cour t did not exercise jurisdiction ove r Scott’s post-EEOC cha rg e fa ilure to promote by

Special Selec tion claims and dismissed them for f ailure to ex haust administrative remedies. The district c ourt furthe r conclude d that Scott did ex haust her reme dies on the post-EEOC char g e Team Ma nag er pr omotions arising i n 1 9 9 8 and 1999, eve n though Scott did not file any additional EEOC cha

rg es re g arding the se c la ims

. Scott arg ues that, like t he post -EEOC charg e Team Manag er promotions in 1998 and 1999,

over w hich the district court did exercise jurisdiction, the post-EEO C charg e Specia l Selection promotions a

re rea sonably related to the pre- EEOC cha rg e Specia l Selection promotion describe d in Scott’s EEOC charg e and, thus, a re w ithin the scope of the EEOC investig ation. Scott maintains that the fa ct that the EEOC more thoroug hly investigated the Te am Mana ger promotions is not deter minative of t he jurisdi ctional i ssue reg ardingher Spec ial Selection claims. See D ixon , 392 F.3d at 217-19. I n applying the expected scope of investigation test to this case , we c onclude that the f actua l

a lle g a tio ns in S c ott ’s EE OC c ha rg e we re no t su ff

ic ie nt to put the EE OC on no tic e of Sc ott ’s po stEEO C ch arg e fa ilure to promote by Special Selec tion claims. I ndeed, Scott did not use the ter m Spe c ia l Se le c tio n in des c ri bin g he r cl a im. Th e on ly re fe re nc e in Sco tt’ s EEO C cha rg e to wh a t Sc ott11

now desc ribes as a

Special Selec tion promotion i s the 1997 Welding I nspector position. This was g ive n as an e xamp le of pr omo tio ns that occ ur re d at E a stm an w ith ou t a

pr oc e ss. I t is no t r e a so na ble to expect that the EEOC would investigate other promotional opportunities that were not put in front of them. See Ce dar v. Prem ier Indus. Corp. , 8 69 F .2 d 1 48 9 * 9 ( 6th Cir . 1 98 9) (h old ingthat ju st beca u s e s u b s e qu e n t a ll e g e d a c ts o f d is c r im in a ti o n o c c u r r e d d u r in g E E O C’ s inv e s ti g a ti o n “ is no

rea son to assume the ag ency would discover this cha

rg e”) . There fore , we AF F IRM the district

c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of

Sc ott ’s oth e r p os t- EE OC c ha rg e fa ilure to p ro mot e by

Spe c ia l Se le c tio n c la ims , as they wer e not suffic iently

descr ibed in her EEOC char g e, were not investigated by the EEOC, and

wer e not re asonably

within the expected scope of the EEO C’s investigation. 3 . Di s mi s s a l o f

S co tt ’s Po s t- E E O C C h a rg e R et a l i a ti o n Cl a i ms I nd i s m i s s i n g “a l l o t h er

cl ai m s , ” t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d i s m i s s edS co t t ’s p o s t -E E OC ch a rge reta li at i on claim that did not arise f rom the EEOC cha

rg e. Scott maintains that the write- up she

rec eived in 2001 wa s in response to her protec ted ac tivity , an interna l complaint to her Division Hea d, and that in her

EEOC cha

rg e she describe s simil ar incidents where she wa s g iven write- ups for c omplaining a

bout discrimination. Scott also arg ues that bec ause the EEOC was investig ating the Di vis ion

a t th e tim e , a

jur y c ou ld f ind that th e wr ite -u

p s he re c e ive d immed iat ely aft e r t his

m e e t i n g w a s i nr e t a l i a t i o nf o r h e r 2 0 0 1 c o mpla int and

he r 1 99 7 E EO C c ha

rg e . T he re fo re , Sc ott maintains that her retaliation claim i s exhausted beca use retaliation is fore seea

ble to defe ndants and

rea sonably

expected to g row out of a char g e.Courts have he ld that “it is unnecessa ry for a plaintiff to exhaust administ rative r emedies 2 prior to urg ing a

reta liation claim gr owing out of an e arlier char g e[] [because] the district court has anc illary

jurisdiction to hear such a claim when it g rows out of a n administrative cha

rg e that is properly

befor e the c ourt.” Ang v. Proc ter & Gamble Co. , 932 F.2d 540, 546- 47 (6th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Gu

pta v . E. Te

x as Sta te Un iv ., 65 4 F .2 d 4 11 , 4 14 (5 th C ir . 1 98 1) ). Th is i s be c a us e “ re ta liatio n c la ims , b y de fi nit ion , a

ri se a ft e r t

he fi lin g of

the EE OC c ha

rg e , [and thu s] this rule promotes ef

ficienc y by requiringonly

one filing .” Id. Scott arg ues that all of he r post-EEOC cha rg e cla ims are ba sed on re taliation, as well as 3 sex di scrimination (there fore there is more than one post-E EOC char g e re taliation claim), and that a jury

could conc lude that the motivating f actor behind any

alleg ed adve rse a ction by Eastman ( i.e. , post-EEOC cha rg e fa ilures to promote) wa s either ba sed on sex discrimination or reta liation for her

complaints of sex discrimination. To the ex tent Scott is arg uing “ reta liatory fa ilure to p ro mot e ” ba se d o n h e r p ro te c te d a c tiv ity oth e r t ha n th e fi lin g of

the EE OC c ha

rg e in 1997, those claims would not be within the expected sc ope of the EEOC cha rg e and, thus, a

re unexhausted for the sa

me re asons that her

reta liation claim based on he r 2001 interna l complaint was not within the expected scope of her EEOC cha

rg e. The district court dete rmined that any po st- EE OC c ha

rg e re ta liatio n c la ims ste mmi ngfr om a ny thi ngoth e r t

ha n th e EE OC c ha

rg e its e lf wer e unexhausted. 12 Court s h a ve he ld t

hat r e ta liatio n g ro wi ng ou t of the EE OC c ha rg e is r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble

and the re fo re a

pla int if f i s n ot r e quir ed to fi le y e t ano the r E EO C c ha rg e . Ho we ve r, Sc ott ’s po st- 2 EEOC cha

rg e re taliation c laim ste ms f rom an incident occur

ring in 2001, four y ear s afte r she f iled he r E EO C c ha

rg e . App lyingthe e xpe c te d s c op e of the inv e sti g a tio n te st, it is n ot r e a so na ble to conclude that the EEOC would have investigated Scott’s r etaliation claim based on the write- up she

rec eived in 2001. Theref ore, w e AF F IRM the district court’s dismissal of this claim, as it was not within the scope of the EEOC investigation, an d t h u s Scott failed to exhaust her administrative

re me die s o n th is c la im. 3

4. Di sm iss al o f Sco tt ’s Hos ti le Envi r onm e nt Cl aim Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

dis mis se d Sc ott ’s ho sti le e nv ir on me nt cl a im be c a us e it d e te rm ine d th a t it was not the “ focus” of her EEOC cha

rg e and be cause Scott did not allege sufficie nt fac ts to prompt the EEOC to investiga

te t he claim. The plain lang uag e of Scott’s EEOC char g e does not a lleg e that13

she wa s subjected to a hostile environment. Thoug h the captions outlining her EEOC cha

rg e ar e not dis po sit ive , the y are so me e vid e nc e of wh ic h c la ims Sc ott wa s se e kin g to p ur su e be fo re the EE OC

. Sc ott argue s th a t he r ho sti le e nv ir on me nt c la im wa s wi thi n the sc op e of he r EE OC c ha rg e be c a us e she alleg ed instance s of har assment and inappropriate conduct. Howeve r, there is no evidenc e that the EE OC vie we d Sc ott ’s c ha rg e , o r i nv e sti g a te d h e r c ha rg e , a s a lle g inga

ho sti le e nv ir on me nt c la im. Rather, he r descr iption of inappropriate conduct appea rs to be an attempt to provide bac kg round, or context, for the claims that she is pre senting . Scott’s EEOC char g e conta ins a long descr iption of complaints cover ing he r e n t i re t wenty -one y ear s of employ ment at Eastman, but the incide nts of

a lle g e d s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt t

hat Sc ott descri bed do no t sp an th e e nti re pe ri od of he r e mpl oy

me nt. I nd e e d, e ve n if

the e ve nts de sc ri be d are vie we d a s e vid e nc e of a po te nti a l ho sti le e nv ir on me nt c la im, they are sprea d out in such a matter that the last such incidents descr ibed would n o t b e w i t h i n t he statute of limitations. For these re asons, we A F F IRM the d istri c t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that Sc ott

fa ile d to e xha

us t he r h os til e e nv ir on me nt c la im, a s sh e of fe re d n o e vid e nc e that th e EE OC a c tua lly inv e sti g a te d th is claim or that such c laims could rea sonably be expected to g row out of the c harg e. B. Scott’s F ailure to P rom ote C laim s Dec ided on the Me rits

1. McDonnell Douglas F ram ework Th e d i s t r i c t c o u rt e xe r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r S c o t t ’ s c l a i m s t h a t s h e w a s n o t p r omo te d to Te a m Ma na g e r i n 199 7, 19 98 , an d 199 9, and g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f D e fe nd a nt i n respe ct to eac h such cla im. There was no dispute that Scott established a prima fac ie ca se of g ender d iscrimination under McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 4 1 1 U

. S. 7 9 2 ( 1 9 7 3 )

. O n c e a p la intiff ha s pr ov e d a

pr ima fa c ie case , the burde n then shifts to the employ er to a rticulate some le g itimate,14

non-discriminatory

rea son for plaintiff’ s rejec tion. Id. at 802. Eastman’ s articulate d rea son for not p ro m o t i ng Scott to Team Ma nag er eac h y ear from 1997 to 1999 was that she did not ra n kh i gh enoug h in the TMDS selection proc ess and thus, other c andidates w ere more qua lified. On ce a n

e mpl oy e r h a s art ic ulate d a le g iti ma te no n- dis c ri min a tor y re a so n, the burd e n s hif

ts t o th e pla int if

f t o de mon str a te tha

t th e de fe nd ant’ s e xplanatio n is a pr e te xt fo r d isc ri min a tio n. To de mon str a te pr e te xt, a plaintiff is require d to show either: “(1) that the proffere d rea sons had no basis in fac t; (2) that the pr of fe re d r e a so ns did no t a c tua lly mot ivate the de c isi on ; or (3 ) that the y we re ins uf fi c ie nt t o mo tiv a te the employ

ment decision.” Mi tc he ll v . V an de rb ilt Un iv ., 389 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir. 2004) (c iting Manzer v . Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. , 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). 2. Eastm an’s Artic ulated, Non-Discrim inatory Reason Sc ott argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ng Ea stm an su mma

ry jud g me nt be c a

us e E a s t m an ’ s n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e x p l an a t i o nl a c k s c l ar i t y an d s p e c i f i c i t y a s r e qu i r e d

b y Tex. De

p’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981). Burdine require s the defe ndant to articulate a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for its actions “which would allow t he trier of fact t o conclude that the employ

ment decision ha d n o t b ee n motivated by discriminatory

animus.” Id. a t2 5 7

. In order to sustain his burden of produc tion and rebut the presumption, “the defe ndant must clear ly set forth, throug h the introduction of admissible evidenc e, the r easons f or the plaintiff’ s rejec tion.” Rowe v. Cleveland Pne umatic Co., Numerical Control, Inc. , 690 F.2d 88, 96 ( 6th Cir. 1982) (quoting Burdine , 450 U.S. at 255). Such evide nce must be “cle ar and rea sonably specific ,” and it must be of such a char acte r as to “

justify a judgme nt f

or the de fenda

nt.” Id. (q u o t i n g Burdine , 450 U.S. at 255).15

The district court found t hat Eastman “set forth a leg itimate non-discriminatory rea son for its failure to promote the pla intiff to Team Manag er, that is, that those selected f or the Te am Mana g er position were be tter qualified tha n the plaintiff.” Sc ott , 2005 WL 1325014, at *3. Ther e is no furthe r analy sis by the district c ourt of Eastman’ s articulate d, non-discriminatory rea son for not promoting Scott. Scott argue s t h at Eastman did not offe r a c lear , rea sonably specific , or leg ally

sufficie nt

e x p l an a t i o na s r e qu i r e d

b y Burdine b eca

use the numer ic values on the sprea dsheets provide no fac tual basis to expl ain why manag ement rated S cott lower than male selectee s on cer tain subjective

c ri te ri a . T he ratin g a ssi g nme nt o n th e sp re a ds he e ts c on sis t of a 7- 9 f or ou ts tan di ng, 4 -6 fo r f

ull y

acc eptable, a

nd 1-3 for

less than ac cepta

ble. ( See Perfor

mance and Capa

bility Assessm en t, J .A. 12 45 , 1 24 7. ) I

n s up po rt of he r ar g ume nt, Sc ott c ite s Goosby v . Johnson &Johnson Me d., Inc. , 228 F.3d 313 ( 3d Cir. 2000). I n Goosby , the Third Circuit re verse d summary judgme nt for the e mploy er wher e the e mploy er pur

ported to re ly

on numerica l “Matrix” scores assig ned to subjective cr iteria. Id. a t 32 0- 21 . T he Th ir d Ci rc uit state d, “ c loa

kin g su ch cri ter ia withan a pp e ara nc e of ob je c tiv ity does not immuniz e an e mploy ment decision fr om a claim of discr imination.” Id. at 321. Eastman ar g ues that Scott did not raise this argument below and thus waived it. Howeve r, Scott did argue that the s prea dsheet scores “demonstrate e x cessive subje ctivity .” (J.A. 751-52.) The dis tr ic t cou

rt ’s op ini on state d tha t, “p la int if f atte mpt s to e qu a te su

bje c tiv ity in t he se le c tio n p ro c e ss wi th p re te xt. H ow e ve r, the pla int if f c ite s n o a

uth or ity fo r thi s pro po sit ion , nor is suc h a uth or ity lik e ly to exi st.” Sc ott , 2 00 5 WL 13 25 01 4, at *4

. Th e court ’s op ini on that no a

uth or ity lik e ly e xists reg ardingthe re levanc e of subjective criteria to provingprete x t is an issue of law r equiring no new16

fac tual deter

mination a

nd may be addre ssed on appe al. Logan v. Denny ’s Inc

. , 259 F.3d 558, 570 (6th Cir. 2001). This circ uit

an d o th e r c ir c u it s h a v e r e c o g n iz e d th e p r o b le ms w it

hs u b je c ti v e e v a lu a ti ons under Title VI I . I n Ro we , th e c ourt su mma ri zed a s f oll ow s: This Court has previously noted the proble ms inherent in selec tion procedur es which rely solely upon . . . subjective e valuations . . . . Se e, e .g ., Se nte r v . Ge ne ra l M oto rs Corp. , 532 F.2d 511, 528-29 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 429 U.S. 870, 50 L . Ed. 2d 150, 97 S. Ct . 1 82 (1 97 6) ; Sh ac k v . S ou thw or th , 521 F .2 d 51, 55 -5 6 (6t h Ci r. 19 75 ). Whil e su c h p ro c e dure s are no t per se violative of Title VI I , Hester v . Southern Railway Co. , 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5 t h C i r. 1 974), they do provide a

rea dy mecha nism for discrimination, permitting ra cial pre judice to aff

ect and often c ontrol promotion and hir ingde c isi on s. [Citatio ns om it ted.] Whil e we re c og nize that, i n s ome circ umstances, e mploy

ment decisions may

be made on the basis of such subjective c ri te ri a , a ny pr oc e dure e mpl oyingsu c h s ub je c ti ve evalua tio ns wi ll b e c are fu lly scrutin i zed in order to pre vent abuse

. Jenk ins v. Caddo-Bossier Association for Retarded Children , 570 F.2d 1227, 1229 ( 5th Cir. 1978). Ro we , 690 F.2d at 93. Moreove r, in Thu rm an v . Yellow F re igh t Sy s. , 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1996), this court stated that “[an] employ ment decision is subject to ‘particularly close scr

utiny ’ whe n it was subjective a

nd de c is io n

ma k e r s w e r e n o t m e mbers of [the] mi nority g roup.” Id. (d i s cu s s i n g Bruhwiler v. Univ. of Tenn. , 8 59 F .2 d 4 19 , 4 21 (6 th C ir . 1 98 8) ). Sc ott argue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s r e qu ir e d to

a sse ss t he le g iti ma c y

of Ea stm an’ s su

bje c tive reas ons f

or re je c tin g Sc ott

wi th “ pa rt ic ula rl y c los e scrutiny ” as all sevente en of the dec isionmakers involved in selec ting Te am Mana g ers in Poly mers and CM&S Divisions were men who sele cted only men in 1997, befor e Scott f iled her EEOC cha

rg e. Ea stm an s tat es that th e “ e va luator s” we re no t a ll m a le and , th us , c los e sc rutiny

is ina pp lic a ble . ( Ap pe lle e B r. 42 .) How eve r, it i s und isp ute d th a t a ll de c isi on ma k e rs inv olv e d in “ca librating ” score s, selec ting finalists, a nd scoring and selec ting Team Ma nag ers we re ma le. (J.A.17

845, 878.) Eastman a lso arg ues that bec ause TMD S contai n ed b o t h subjective a nd objective

co mp o n en t s , “p ar t i cu l ar l y cl o s e s cr u t i n y ” i s i n ap p l i cab l e, ci t i n g Milligan-Jense n v. Mi ch . Tech. Univ. , 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (r ever sed on other g rounds). The use of

subjective c riteria is pe rmissible in the selection of c andidate s for employ ment. Employ ers, not the courts, oug ht to be able to choose which employ ees to hire. Rather , the ultimate issue in e ach case is w hether the employ er’ s subjective criter ia wer e used to disg uise discriminatory action. Id. We n e e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r c los e sc rutiny is r e qu ir e d h e re , be c a

us e e ve n we re we to c los e ly scrutinize Eastman’s ar

ticulated, non-discr iminat o ry re as on for not promoting Scott, we find that Eastman met its burden. Eastman g ave a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for not promoting Scott and put forth evidenc e showing that others wer e promoted ahea d of her be cause they wer e more qu a lif ie d, ba se d o n c ri te ri a

wh ic h in c lud e d b oth

an o bje c tiv e a s w e ll a s a

su bje c tiv e c omp on e nt. 3. P ret ext Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t Sc ott

fa ile d to show that Eas tma n’ s ar tic ulate d, le g iti ma te non-discriminatory

rea son was pre text ual. To demonstrate pre t ex t , a p l ai ntiff is require d to show either: “ (1 ) t h at t h e proffer ed re asons had no ba sis in fact; (2) that the proff ere d rea sons did not actua lly motiva t e the dec ision; or (3) that they wer e insuffic ient to motivate the employ ment decision.” Mi tc he ll , 3 8 9 F. 3 d at 1 8 4 (c i t i n g Manzer , 29 F.3d at 1084). a. Adverse Inf

ere nce to P rove P ret ext Her e, Scott argues that she is entitled to the benef it of an adver se infere nce. Scott alleg es that Eastman illeg ally

destroy ed the pr imary d o cu m ents from whic h the numeric score s on the sprea d s h eets produced by Eastman we re g ener ated. Scott maintains that, “Ea stman destroy edSc ott po int s to 29 C.F .R. § 1 60 2. 14 (2 00 7) , w hic h s ta te s, in r e le va nt p art : 4 Any

personne l or employ

ment rec ord made or kept by an employ er (including . . . application for ms submit ted by

applicants a

nd other re cords having to do with hiring, promotion, . . . and se lection for tr aining or appre nticeship) shall be pr eser ved by the employ er f

or a pe riod of one y ear from the date of the making of the re cord or

the per sonnel ac tion involved, whicheve r occ urs later . . . .Where a char g e of discr imination has been fi le d, or an a c tio n b ro ug ht b y

the Com mis sio n o r t

he Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, ag ainst an employ er unde r title VI Ior the AD A, the re spondent employ er sh a ll p re se rv e a ll p e rs on ne l r e c or ds re le va nt t o th e c ha

rg e or a c tio n unti l final disposition of the char g e or the action. The term “pe rsonnel re cords rele vant to the cha

rg e,” f or example, would include pe rsonnel or employ ment rec ords re lating to the a g g rieve d person a nd to all other employ ees holding positions s imilar to that held or soug ht by the ag g rieve d person a

nd application for

ms or test paper s completed by an unsucce ssful applicant a

nd by all other c andidates f

or the same position as that for whic h the ag g rieve d person a pplied and wa s rejec ted. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14. 18 do c ume nts for

the 19 96 -1 99 8 s e le c tio ns to T e a m Ma na g e r, inc lud ingc and idate s’ Ap pli c a tio ns , Qu a lif y ing Te sts , PCAs [Per fo rm anc e and Ca pa bil ity As se ssm e nts ], and no te s and ra w s c or e sh e e ts for the T eam Exercise and Interview s.” (App. Br

. 37.) Eastman admits that some of the under ly ing do c ume nts , f

ro m w hic h th e sp re a ds he e ts w e re c re a te d, are mis sin g . T he dis tr ic t court did no t di sc us s Scott’s argument for a

n adver se infer ence . Scott arg ues that whe n an employer f ails to maintain documents t hat it is required by law to m a int a in, it s ho uld

no t be ne fi t f

ro m it s mi sc on du c t. E a stm an a rgue s th a t Sc ott

is n ot e nti tle d to 4

an a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e a s t he sp readsh e e t sc or e s ( c omp ute d a pp are ntl y fr om u nd e rl y ingdo c ume nts , some of which a

re missing ) ca

n be explained by

a mana g eria l employ ee w ho can te stify about the proce ss and cr iteria re flec ting the c andidates’ score s. The rules g overning spoliation of evidence are g o v e r n e d b y s t a t e l aw . InMc

Da nie l v . Tran sc e nd

e r, LLC , 119 F. App’ x 774 (6th Cir. 2005), t heSee Tuck er v. G en. Motors Corp. , 1991 U.S. App. L EXI S 23184, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 5 19 91 ) ( “ I n g e ne ra l, a

c ourt may no t a llo w a

n in fe re nc e that a

pa rt y de str oye d e vid e nc e that is in its c on tr ol, un le ss t

he pa rt y did so in b a d f

a ith .” ); Ea dy

v . Ci gn a P ro p. & Cas . Co s. , 1999 Tenn. L EXI S 687 (Tenn. De c. 27, 1999) ( “In reg ards [sic] t o neg ative infe renc es, there was no proof offe red at trial to show that the appellee purposef ully destroy ed the pr evious [oz one] testing rec ords.”) 19 plaintiff broug ht a Fair L abor St andar ds Act and a n ADEA c laim ag ainst his employ er. I n McD aniel , the cour t stated, Spoliation i s t h e i ntentional destruction of e vidence that is presumed to be unfavor able to the party responsible for the destruc tion. [ Citation om itted.] The rule s that apply

to the spoiling of e viden ce and the r ang e of a ppropriate sanctions ar e define d by

sta te law; in this case, the law of Te nnessee . Nat ion wid e Mu t. F ireIn s. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. , 174 F.3d 801, 804 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Id. a t 78 2. Un de r T e nn e sse e law, wh ic h ap pli e s in this ca se a s we ll, no a dv e rs e inf e re nc e may

a ri se absent e vidence of bad f

aith. Eastman maintains t hat S cott is not entitled to any adver se infer ence 5 as she ha s not shown that the rele vant documents we re de stroy ed intentionally , in bad fa ith or for a n improper pur

pose. Scott contends that an a dverse infere nce is warra nted under

these fa cts bec ause: (1) Ea stman had complete control over the documents; (2) the documents we re c ritical t o proving Scott’s claims; (3) litigation was rea sonably fore seea ble at the time the documents we re de stroy ed; and (4) Eastman has not off ere d any explanation as to how the documents bec ame unavailable. Howeve r, apa

rt from these g ener al claims and a rg uments, Scott has failed to point to any

re c or d e vid e nc e , suc h as de po sit ion te sti mony or an af fi davit sh ow ing that the re le va nt d oc ume nts

wer e destroy ed int entionally , in bad faith or for an im proper purpose. Thus, we do not find Scott’s argument for the be nefit of a n adver se infer ence to be meritorious. b. Th e EEOC Lette r to P rove P ret ext20

Sc ott argue s th a t th e EE OC de te rm inatio n le tte r in he r favo r de mon str a te s a g e nu ine dis pu te of ma te ri a l f

a c t su ff icien t to de fe a t summa

ry jud g me nt. I t is wi thi n th e dis c re tio n o f t he c ourt to

acc ept the EEOC’s f

inal deter mination. See W

ill iam s v . Nas hv ill e Ne two rk, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir. 1997) (“ This court has expli citly ruled that it is wit hin the [sound] discretion [of the district

c ourt ] wh e the r . . . to a c c e pt t he EE OC ’s fi na l in ve sti g a tio n r e po rt in e vid e nc e .” ) ( br a c ke ts i n

or ig ina l) (q

uo ta tio n o mit te d) ; see also He ard v. Mue ller Co. , 464 F.2d 190, 194 ( 6th Cir. 1972). Eastman ar g ues that Scott was re quired to off er a dmissibl e evidence to show prete x t, and that the EEOC dete rmination letter wa s inadmissibl e; thus, the district court wa s corr ect in dis reg arding it. Sherman v . Chrysler Corp. , 47 F. App’x 716, 722 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A n EEOC letter of violation is presump t i v el y i n admissible beca use it sugg ests that preliminarily there is reason to be lieve that a violation has take n place and theref ore r esults in unfair pre judice to def

endant.” ) (inter

nal quotations and citations omitted). Howeve r, i n this case , the di strict court’s opinion states that “ for purposes of r

uling on the motion f

o r s u m m ary

judgme nt, the court will presume that all evidenc e befor e it is admissibl e at tria l.” Sc ott , 2005 WL 1325014, at *3 n.1. The EEO C determination letter

wa s c le arl y

be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , th ou g h h e did no t di sc us s it

. Thoug h there is no basis from which we can de termine the we i ght, if any , that the district court g ave the EEOC d et er m i n at i on letter, we find that there is only information in reg ard to the 1996/97 Poly

mers Te am Manag er position which mig ht arguably be conside red in support of he r claim and that information is already ref lected in the r ecor d, as discussed be low. The EEO C de te rm inatio n le tte r no te s in re g ard to the 19 96 /97 Pol y me rs Te a m Ma

na g e r p os iti on

that: ( 1) Sc ott

re c e ive d a

hig he r s c or e on

the ob je c tiv e po rt ion s o f t

he te st tha n many of the ma le se le c te e s; (2 ) y e t, she re ceive d the lowest rating on the subje ctive portions of the te s t ; an d (3 ) the evidenc e in herScott admits t hat, during this stage , Eastman sometimes adds a dditional candidates a s 6 finalists, in the interest of diver sity . Scott herself be nefitted fr om this action in certain y ear s. Howeve r, in the 1996/97 Poly mers Division selection, her score was suff

iciently high to e arn he r a plac e as a

finalist. 21 personn e l f

il e c o n c e r

n in g h e r le a d e r s h ip s k il ls , o r a l c o mm u n ic a ti o nan d

c u s to me r

s e r v ic e was inconsistent with the low rating s she re ceive d. (EEOC Deter mination L etter, J .A. 465.) Howeve r, the re cord upon w hich the EEOC relied, pr imarily the sprea dsheets discussed be low, does not support these findings. Fur thermore , there is no substantive information in the EEOC deter mination le tte r s ho wi ngthat E ast man ’s art ic ulate d, no n- dis c ri min a tor y re a so ns fo r n ot p ro mot ingSc ott to Team Manag er in 1996/97 for the CM&S Division, 1997/98, or 1998/99 w ere prete x tual. There fore , we f ind that the EEOC deter

mination letter does not prec lude s ummary judgme nt in Eastman’s f avor

on any of Sc ott ’s fa ilure to p ro mot e to T e a m Ma na g e r c la ims

. c. Eastm an’s Sp readsheet s to P rove P ret ext Finally , Scott arg ues that Eastman’ s own sprea dsheets provide evide nce e stablishing that Eastman’s a

rticulated, non-discriminatory rea son for not promoting her to Team Manag er f or either the Poly mers Division or the CM&S Division in 1996/97 was pretextual. As discussed below, w e disag ree . Th e Te a m Ma

na g e r s e le c tio ns fo r t

he Pol y me rs Di vis ion

i n 1 9 9 6 / 9 7 w e r e m a d e us ingTM DS, a proc ess that assesse d candidates’ scor es on four differ ent components: t he objective PPT, and three subjective tests, the PCA, the Tea m Ex erc ise (“T E”), a

nd the Structured I

nter v i ew ( “SI ”). Ea ch component was evaluated by differ ent m anag ers. First, Eastman selec ted twenty -two finalists based on their scor es on the PPT a nd the PCA. The fina lists t hen complete d the TE and SI . Eac h of the

6 fo ur c omp on e nts wa s mad e up of se ve ra l sub- c omp on e nts , whi c h, in tur n, e a c h tes te d a d if

fe re nt s kil lThe EEO C determination letter r efe rs to multipl e objec tive components, and state s that 7 Scott perfor

med well on all objec tive portions and per formed poor ly on all subjective portions. Thus, it appear s that the EEOC cha rac terized the TE, on whic h Scott ranked f irst, as objective. 22 se t ( e.g. , oral com mun ic a tio n, mana g e ri a l sk ill s) . So me of the sk ill se ts w e re te ste d in mul tip le components (f

or example, oral c ommunication was tested in both the P CA and S I ). After scoring the four c omponents, Eastman then perf ormed two additional calc ulations, called Candidate Final As se sse d Va lue and Str e ng th F a c tor s, wh ic h ave ra g e d th e sc or e s o f t he pr e vio us ly

te ste d s kil l se ts. After these a dditional calculations, the finalists r ece ived Total Points and were then ra nked. F rom thi s in tr ic a te pr oc e ss, Ea stm an s e le c te d s ix Te a m Ma na g e rs ba se d on the c and idate s’ fi na l r ank ing s. Scott points to the fac t that, acc ording to the TMDS spreadshe ets for the 1996/97 Poly mers Division Team Mana g er se lection proc ess, she scor ed hig her on the objective PPT than many men who wer e promoted. H oweve r, althoug h S co t t s cored hig her tha n four of the six selec tees on the PPT, she ranked o n l y

ninth among the twenty -two finalists on this component. The skill sets that the PPT measured were Reading Comprehension, Gra phic Arithmetic, a

nd Following Policies and Procedur es. While these s kill sets are undoubtedly important, they repr esent only

a fe w of the ma

ny skills evaluated by

TMDS. T h er ef

o re , Scott’s argument that her pe rfor mance on this component sh ou ld b e re pr e se ntativ e of he r p e rf or manc e on oth e r co mpo ne nts or in the ov e ra ll se le c tio n p ro c e ss is not well-taken. Sc ott argue s th a t th e ov e rw he lmi ng ly su bje c tiv e natur e of

the te st d isc ri mi nate d a g a ins t fema le employ ees, but she ha s failed to pre sent evidenc e sug g esting any bias in the way the test was conducte d. Whil e Scott did poorly on two of the subjec tive components (scoring near the bottom on both the PCA a

nd the SI ), she did well on the other subjec tive component (sc oring first among all the finalists in the TE). As such, the f inalists’ scores on the subje ctive compon en ts do not 7Howeve r, bec ause the TE consisted of ma nag ers g radingcandidates’ per formanc es on g roup tasks, we f

ind that this component is subj ective. 23 indicate a ny manipulation o n t h e part of Eastman to disfavor fema le ca

ndidates. Scott challeng es the SIc omp on e nt i n p art ic ula r, arguingthat he r t ota l sc or e dr op pe d s ig nif ic antl y a ft e r t his component. Ag ain, we note that far ing w ell or poorly on an individual component of the TMDS does not, in its elf, indicate pre text . Fur ther m o re , we n o te that when the rawscore s for the f our components are tot aled, prior to the additi onal calculations, Scott had a “ rawscore ” of 143, w hich was the ninth hig hest raw score . Scott scored lowe r than a ll of the s ix selec tees, who ha d score s of 15 0, 15 0, 14 9, 14 7, 14 6, and 14 6. Con se qu e ntl y , the re c or d indi c a te s tha t Scott’ s sc or e wa s si mpl y not as hig h as those who we re se lected f or promotion. Ther e is a ls o n o e v id e n c e th a t th e a d d it io n a l c a lc u lati o n s ma s k e d d is c r im in a tion. F or

e xamp le , Sco tt poi nts ou t tha t sh e re c e ive d v ary ingsc or e s w ith in a

pa rt ic ula r s kil l se t; h ow e ve r, thi s is ex plained by

the fa ct that diffe rent mana g ers e valuated e ach c omponent. For the same r eason, the fa c t th a t he r s c or e s o n p art ic ula r s ub se ts c ha

ng e d f ro m y e ar t o y e ar d oe s n ot, wi tho ut m or e , in dic a te prete x t. I n addition, Scott point s out that some of the sel ec t ees’ individual sub-component score s

wer e lower

than her s, but that afte r t he “re-r anking ” these candidates wer e selected instead of her. Ho we ve r, the c ourt

no te s th a t T MD S ( in p art ic ula r, the a dd iti on a l c a lc ulatio ns ) w a s d e sig ne d to identify the ca ndidates’ average sc or e . No ne of the se fa c ts s ug g e st that E a stm an’ s se le c tio n p ro c e ss

was a disguise f or discrimination. Nor doe s the fac t that the evaluators used a Special Selec tion form to do these ca lculations indicate pre text . I n sum, Scott has not presente d evidenc e to support her contention that she wa s better qua lified than the pe ople selec ted instead of he r.24

Wit h reg ard to the 1996/97 Te am Mana g er se lection for the C M&S Divi sion, Pl aintiff ar g ues in a footnote that be cause the sprea dsheets for the 1996/97 CM&S Team Mana g er se lection wer e not in t he re c or d be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt (d ue to an o ve rs ig ht b y

De fe nd ant) , s umm ary

jud g me nt s ho uld be re ve rs e d a

nd the c a se sh ou ld b e re mand e d o n th is c la im. We dis a g re e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y found that Plaintiff had fa ile d t o ra i s e a genuine issue of materia l fac t as to pretext based on the evidenc e bef

ore it, including the lack of ad v er s e i nfer ence and the EEO C determination letter, a s dis c us se d a

bo ve . N oth ingin t

he sp re a ds he e ts w ou ld c ha ng e tha t de te rm inatio n. Th e sp re a ds he e ts ind ic a te that Sc ott

did no t sc or e hig h e no ug h o n th e fi rs t tw o c omp on e nts to e arn a sp ot a s a fi na lis t. Her score of 49 wa s much lower tha n the score s of the eig hteen f inalists, who rang ed fr om 56 to 62. (CM&S 1996 TMDS Process Data, App. B r., Adde ndum 6.) As such, Scott ha s failed to show that Eastman’s pr ocess f

or selec ting Te am Mana g ers for the Poly mers and CM&S Divisions in 1996/97

wa s e ith e r n ot c re dib le or mot ivate d b y

dis c ri min ator

y anim us . There fore , we find that Scott has failed to put forth sufficie nt eviden ce t o ra i s e a genuine issue of mater ial fac t reg ardingwhether Eastman’s a

rticulated, non- discriminat o ry rea sons were pr e te xtua l f

or the 19 96 /97 Te a m Ma

na g e r s e le c tio ns fo r t

he Pol y me rs and CM &S D ivi sio ns . Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t cou rt ’s fi nd ing that Scott fa ile d to pro ve pr e te xt on h e r c la im for discr iminatory

failure to promote to Team Ma nag er in 1996/97. F urthermor e, we AF F IRM the dist ri ct cou rt’ s f

ind ingthat Sc ott

fa ile d to pr ov e pr e te xt on h e r c la im f or dis c ri min a tor

y fa ilure to pr omo te to T e a m Ma

na g e r i n 1 99 7/9 8 a

nd 19 98 /99 be c a

us e Sc ott ha s f a ile d to c ome fo rw ard

wi th

c omp e te nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the se c la ims

. C. Scott’ s Retaliation Claim s Dec ided on the Me rits25

The district cour

t concluded in r eg ard to Scott’s re taliation claims g rowing out of her E EOC cha rge t h at S cott failed to produc e evide nce that Eastman dec isionmakers knewthat she filed a n EEOC cha

rg e in 1997. Sc ott , 2005 WL 1325014, at *4. Scott a rg ues the district c ourt err ed for two

rea sons. First, bec ause the element of employ er know ledg e is not alway s an element for e stablishing a prima f ac ie ca se of r etaliation in the Six th Circuit; som etimes it is part of the ca usal conne ction

an a ly s is

. Se c o n d , Sc o tt ar g u e s th a t s h e d id p r o d u c e e v id e n c e , e it

h e r d ir e c t o r c ir c u ms ta

n tial, from which a f actf inder c ould infer that de cisionmakers kne w of he r protec ted ac tiviti es.

1. The Elem ent of Employer K now ledge Reg ardingthe eleme nt of employ er know ledg e, the district cour t concluded, T h e u n d i s p u t ed fa ct s re fl ec t t h at t h e o n l y s u p erv i s o ry em p l o y ee wh o h adkn o wl ed ge of the plaintiff’ s char g e was Don S ander s, who t estified that he tol d no one about the c ha rg e . N o a lle g a tio n is ma de that Mr . Sa nd e rs e ng a g e d i n reta liator y c on du c t. Plaintiff has failed to establish that eac h of the de cision-maker s, as to eac h alleg ed adver se employ

ment action that she contends was in r etaliation for the filing of her char g e, had know ledg e of the char g e. B eca use t he plaintiff ha s failed to pinpoint fac ts sufficient to establish a material dispute as t o whether the dec ision-makers ha d knowledg e of he r cha

rg e, she c annot prove a pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation. Id. at *4. Sc ott argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr e ma tur e ly

te rm inate d th e ana ly sis of he r r e ta liatio n c la im

a t th e pr ima fa c ie sta g e , wh e n so me de c isi on s in thi s Cir c uit tr e a t kn ow le dg e a s a c on sid e ratio n in

a sse ssi ng a c a

us a l conne c tio n, and

no t a s a sta nd -a lon e e le me nt. I n the Six th Circuit, many case s list “employ er know ledg e” a s the second e lement of the pr ima fac ie ca se. See Caniti a v. Y ellow Fr e igh t Sy

s. , 903 F.2d 1064 , 1 0 6 6 (6 t h Cir. 1990) (listing the e lements of a pr ima fac ie ca se for

re ta liatio n a s “( 1) that he en g a g e d in an ac tiv ity pr ote c te d by Ti tle VI I ; ( 2) that th is e xer c ise of his protec ted civil rig hts was known to def endant ; (3 ) that defe ndant there afte r took an e mploy ment26

action adve rse to the plai n t i ff ; an d (4) that ther e wa s a ca usal conne ction betwee n the protec ted activity and the a dverse employ

ment action.”) . Yet in W

hite v. Burlington N. & San t a F e Ry. Co. , 364 F.3d 789, 796 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (en ba nc), the co u rt d i d n o t list knowledge as an inde pendent

e le me nt o f a

pr ima fa c ie case . [T] o support a claim for re taliation under Title VI Ia “pla intiff must establish: (1) that he e ng a g e d in a c tiv ity pr ote c te d by Ti tle VI I ; (2 ) that he wa s th e su bje c t of a dv e rs e employ ment action; and ( 3) t hat t here exis ts a ca sual [si c] link between his protec ted activity and the a dverse action of his employ er.” Id. (cit i n g Ja ckson v. RKO Bottlers of Tol edo, Inc

. , 7 43 F .2 d 3 70 , 3 75 (6 th C ir . 1 98 4) ); se e als o Y ates v. Av co Corp. , 8 19 F .2 d 6 30 , 6 38 (6 th C ir . 1 98 7) (s a me ); Ha rri s v . Me tro

. Go v ’t of N

as hv ill e , 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 ( 6th Cir. 1996) (noting that some ca s es s u b s u me the ele ment of employ er knowledg e into the ca

usal conne ction analy sis). Re g ard le ss o f w he the r e mpl oy e r k no wl e dg e is a

sta nd -a lon e e le me nt o f a

pr ima fa c ie c a se of re taliation, it is fairly

clea r fr om Six th Circuit case la w that employ er know ledg e of a plaintiff’s pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

is r e qu ir e d. As Ea stm an a sse rt s, e ve n to pr ov e a c a us a l c on ne c tio n, Sc ott

mus t establish that the dec isionmakers involved in the promotions at issue had knowledg e of the prote cted activity , as one c annot re taliate ag ainst an employ ee f or eng ag ing in protected activity unless he knew the employ ee ha d done so. 2. Direc t Evidence of Employer K now ledge or Evidence F rom Which a Ju ry Could In fer Em ployer K now ledge Knowledg e may be infe rre d from evide nce in the r ecor d. See, e .g., Proffitt v. Metro. Gov’t of N ashvi lle &Da v ids on Cou nty , 150 F. App’ x 439, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that dire ct evidenc e of knowledg e not r equire d, and a plaintiff “may survive summary

judgme nt by

producing

c ir cum st anti a l e vid e nc e to e sta bli shthi s e le me nt o f h e r c la im” ); Kirkendoll v. Mc Cullough , 200627

U.S. Dist. L EXI S 1080, at *29-30 (M.D. Te nn. J an. 3, 2006) ( “Plai n t i ff m u s t prese nt sufficient evidenc e fr om which a r easona ble fa ctfinder

could infer

that [decis i o n m aker s] knew that Plainti ff previously

had filed EE OC complaints . . . .”) Scott maintains that she pointed to evidence in the re cord showingeither dire ctly , or by infere nce, that there w as at lea st a g enuine issue of m at er i al fa ct as to whe ther de cisionmakers at Eastman had know ledg e of he r protec ted ac tiviti es. Scott has made a number o f arguments and p o i n t edt o gen er al p o l i ci es wh i ch s h e m ai n t ai n s s h o w t h at d ec i s i o n m ak er s gen er al l y h av e k n o wl ed ge of cha rg es filed by

employ ees. H oweve r, she still has not spe cified those persons re sponsible for not promoting he r, nor ha s she established t h at t h o s e persons likely had knowledg e of he r protec ted activity

. Be cause Scott has not pointed to evidence in the rec ord, either direc t or circ umstantial, from whi ch a re asonable fac tfinder c ould conclude, or infer, that those at Eastman re sponsible for not promoting Scott knewof her protec ted ac tivity , we AF F IRM the district court’s co n clusion that Scott failed to establish a prima f acie case of re taliation. D. P laintif

f’s Attem pt to Am end her Com plain t On Fe bruar

y 8, 2005, Scott filed a Motion for a Stay , reque sting that the c ourt stay the

rema ining de adlines in the Amende d Scheduling Orde r t o provide her wit h additional time in which to file a Motion to Amend the Complaint. On Fe bruar y 16, 2005, the M ag istrate Judge de nied that Motion, based primarily on the futility of Plaintiff’s potential Motion to Amend and the fa ct that the de a dli ne fo r a

me nd e d p le a din g s h a d p a sse d n ine mon ths e arl ie r w ith ou t any re qu e st t o e xten d it

. (Mag istrate Judge’ s Order , J .A. 718.) The Mag istrate Judge obse rved,28 This action was f

iled in Aug ust of 2003. . . . Whil e the EEO C charg e made ref ere nce to the f

act that the pla intiff was filing cl ai m s o f sex di scrimination on behalf of her self and a ll women simil arly situated, no class ac tion alleg ations appea r in this action, other than a line in the complaint saying the plaintiff “reser ves the rig ht to seek c lass cer

tification.” The orig inal s ch ed u l ing or der r equire d that “any motions t o amend the ple a din g s o r a dd

ne w part ie s must be fi le d by Ma y 28 , 200 4. ” Th e or ig ina l tr ia l date was January

18, 2005. T h i s case has bee n continued twice by joint mot ions. The first of these motions wa s filed on J uly 12, 2004, well af ter the Ma

y 28th deadline. Neither of the orde rs g ranting these c ontinuances e x te n d e d th e d e a d line for amending the pleading s or adding

additional parties. ( Id. at 718-19.) T he Magistrate J udg e then conclude d that there wer e no compelling circ umstances justify ing a

n amendment of

the Complaint after the deadline. Sc ott did no t ob je c t to the Ma g ist

rate Judge’s Or de r. Th e re a ft e r, on May 6, 20 05 , w hil e Ea stm an’ s Mo tio n fo r S um mary Judg me nt w a s p e nd ing , Sc ott fi le d a Mo tio n to Am e nd

/Re vis e Complaint. (ECF No. 64, 65; J .A. 9.) Scott’s Motion to Amend he r Complaint was pending when the dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d E a stm an’ s Mo tio n for Sum mary

Judg me nt a

nd dis mis se d Sc ott ’s c la ims , though in the district c ourt’s orde r g ranting summary judgme nt to Def endant, it state d: “ nor has the plaintiff soug ht to amend her complaint to pur sue a cla im for disparate impact” w hen it ignor ed her statistical evidence

. Sc ott , 2005 WL 1325014, at *3 n.2. The district c ourt denied Scott’s Motion to A me nd a s mo ot. Sc ott a rgue s th a t th e di st ri ct court e rr e d b y no t pe rm itt inghe r t o ame nd he r c omp la int

to alleg e a c lass action cla im and a dis parate i mpact claim. Scott asks thi s court to re verse and orde r the district court to per

mit her to amend he r C omplaint. Eastman argues that bec ause Scott fa iled to object to the Mag istrate Judge’ s Order , she has wa ived her rig ht to as s i gn err or to that dec ision under F ed. R. Civ. P. 72. Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 72(a ) states, in re levant par t,29

Ma g istrate Judg e s; Pr e tr ia l O rd e rs Nondispositive Matters. (a) A mag istrat e j u d ge to whom a pr etrial ma tte r n ot d isp os iti ve of

a c laim or defe nse o f a

pa rt y is r e fe rr e d to hear and dete rmine shall promptly conduc t s u ch proc eeding s as ar e require d and whe n appro p ri at e ente r into the rec ord a w ritten order setting f orth the disposition of the matter. Withi n 10 day s after being serve d with a copy

of the magistrate j udg e’s order, a party may serve and file obje ctions to the order ; a party may not therea fter a ssign a s err or a defe ct in the mag istrate judge ’s order to w hich objection wa s not timely

made. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 72(a)

. As Sco tt d id n o t o b je c t, s h e h a s w a iv e d

h e r r ig h t t o a s s ig ne r

r o r to th e M a g is tr a te Ju d g e ’s order

. Fur

thermore , decisions on motions to amend are revie wed for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Me tro. Li

fe Ins. Co. , 925 F.2d 979, 982 ( 6th Cir. 1991). Scott has n ot shown an abuse of discretion; there fore , we AF F IRM the district court’s de termination on this issue. IV. I n conclusion, for

the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to d ism iss Scott’s failure to pr omote claims other than to Te am Mana g er , wi t h t h e exception that we find Scott’s failure to promote by Special S elec tion to Welding I nspector in 1997 was not unex hausted, and, thus, we RE VE RSE the district court’s de cision and REMAND that claim for c onsideration on the merits. We AF F IRM the district court’s dismissal o f S co t t’s reta liation claims, other than those associated with the f i l i n g of her

EEOC cha

rg e, for failure to exhaust her administrative

reme dies. L ikewise, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of Sc ott ’s ho sti le e nv ir on me nt c la im for f ailure to e x haust. We AFF IRM th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s g r an ti n g o f s u mm ar y ju d g me n t t o E a s tm ano nSc o tt’s failure to promote claims for f ailure to prove prete x t, and we AF F IRM the di strict court’s g ranting30

of summary

judgme nt to Eastman reg ardingScott’s retaliation cla ims associated with the filing of her EE OC cha rg e. F inally , we AF F IRM the district court’s de termination that Scott not be pe rm itt e d to a me nd

he r C omp la int

.31

B O GGS , Ch ief Ju dge, dissentin g in p art. I w o u ld a f f ir m th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s g r a n t of summary judgme nt for Ea stman in its en t i re ty . There fore , though I ag ree with the bulk of the

ma jor ity ’s op ini on , I

dis se nt f r o m t h e m a jor ity ’s de c isi on

to r e mand

on e of Sc ott ’s fa ilure -t o- pr omo te

c la ims

. Wit h respe ct to the Welding Inspector position, discussed in Part I I I .A.1 of the ma jority ’s opinion, I ag ree with the majority that Scott ex hausted he r administrat i v e re medies and that the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s wr on g to c on c lud e oth e rw ise

. Ido no t th ink , h ow e ve r, that th is c on c lus ion sh ou ld be the e nd of our inquiry . An appellate court “may aff irm on any

g rounds supported by

the re cord even if differ ent from the r easons of the d i s t rict cour

t.” Abercrom bie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v . Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. , 280 F.3d 619, 629 ( 6th Cir. 2002) . Her e, apply ing the McD onnell Douglas burden- shifting f

rame work, Ea stman offe red a clea r non-discr iminatory

explanation for its decision not to promote Scott and Scott failed to raise a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that this ex planation

was a prete x t for sex discrimination Ea stm an’ s n on -d isc ri min a tor y e xplanatio n f

or no t g ivi ngSc ott

the Wel din g I ns pe c tor

job is sim ple : ot he rs we re mor e qu a lif

ie d, and th e ma

jor ity op ini on do e s n ot a

pp e ar t o c on tr a dic t th is. There is uncontrover

ted evidenc e that the man a war ded the job, Micha el Gass, had more experience (t hir ty y e ars of se rv ic e to S c ott ’s tw e nty -o ne ), ha d mo re re le va nt educat io n (a

tw o- y e ar d e g re e in welding technolog y

rathe r than a

weldin g i n s pector ’s ce rtificate ), and ha d been pe rfor ming the Welding Inspector job on a temporary basis for four m onths. Scott di d not present a ny competent evidenc e that she was actua lly more qualified or that Eastman’ s personne l decision was motivated by discriminatory

animus. On that basis, I would aff

irm the district court’s g rant of su m mary judgme nt for Ea stman.32

Th e ma jor ity op ini on no w c o nt e m

p la te s th a t pe rh a

ps the Wel din g I ns pe c tor

job g ive n to Ga ss was not ac tually

the subject of the char g e made by Scott. This arg ument does not seem to compor t with the record. To the ex tent that Scott’s char g e did adequately raise this incident (a

nd all three of us ag ree , contra

to the district court, that it did), th e ch ar ge wa s quite specific . At pag e 6 of the char ge t hat sh e sig ne d o n Se pte mbe r 2 2, 19 97 (JA41 4) , Sc ott sp e c if ic a lly state s “ In June1997 , a Welding Inspector job w as fi l l ed with a male e mploy ee w ith less ex perie nce, qua lifications and service .” F ace d with this allegat ion, Eastman promptly responde d, in its m otion for summary jud g me nt, wi th a

n id e nti fi c a tio n of su c h a po sit ion and the fa c t that it wa s fi lle d b y Mic ha e l G a ss. Duri ngthe EE OC pr oc e ss, Ea stm an a lso re sp on de d to thi s a lle g a tio n in its po si ti on

state me nt. Neither befor e the EEOC nor befor e the district c ourt did Scott in any way contest spec ifically

that this was the position invol ved. Only in the briefing to this court (appe llant’s brief at 14-15) doe s she

ra ise sp e c if

ic a lly the pr omo tio n o f E ste pp, whic h s he re fe rs to a s “ in a bo ut 1 99 7” and

c ite s si x scatter -shot rec ord re fer ence s, only two of which e ven mention Estepp. I n h e r d oc ume nts be low , on e of on ly tw o c omp ara

ble re fe re nc e s to Es te pp is i n r e sp on se to an interr og atory

conce rning evid en ce for he r cla ims of disparate tr eatment, in which she names at le a st 7 2 p e rs on s ( JA 11 95 -1 20 0) wh o w e re inv olv e d in on e a c tiv ity or ano the r that sh e re fe re nc e s, at least five of whom ar e refer red to as receiving positions as W elding I nspector, a nd in which Estepp is r e f e r e n c e d w it h o u t a n y d a te

. ( JA 1 1 9 6 )

. T h e o th e r p a s s in g r e f e r e n c e to E s te p p is in

th e c o n te xt of Scott’s response to “undisputed fac t No. 131” (JA 1746). After a ser ies of re sponses conc erning Gass and othe rs, there is a s t at em en t o f “a dditional material fa cts” say ing E stepp was se lected f or Welding Inspector “ in approximately 1997-98.” I

believe this wholly

insufficient to put either Eastman or the district judge on n otice that Estepp’ s promotion, rather tha n Gass’s, is the e vent33

complained of

in the char g e, as it must have be en, in order to me et the exhaustion require ment that the pa ne l ha s n owa g re e d w a s me t. I n o rd e r t o s ur viv e su mma

ry jud g me nt, a

pla int if f h a s so me obligation to indi cate with specificity i f s h e disputes the interpre tation that has bee n place d on an ambig uous complaint by

the non-moving party . A complainant c annot simply “lie in the wee ds” and contend late r that the c harg e ac tually had to do with a complete ly separ ate pr omotion. I n any event, howeve r, I

would understand the court’s r emand to apply only to consideration

o f t h i s al l ega t i o n , t h at i t wa s ac tu al l y t h e E s t ep p p ro m o t i o n t h at wa s re fe re n ce d i nt h e E E OC ch ar ge

and e xha us te d th e re by . T he EE OC de te rm inatio n le tte r i tself make s n o s pe c if ic re fe re nc e to t

his alleg ation, as it found all of the char g es other than the team lea der pr omotions t o be unfounde d or outside the period c overe d by the cha rg e.