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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 19-2769 (TSC) 

DUANE BURTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Duane Burton sued the District of Columbia Department of Corrections 

(“DOC”) under the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Am. Compl. 

at 5, ECF No. 56. Defendant now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 

dismiss the suit with prejudice, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, ECF No. 64. The court agrees that Plaintiff has not plausibly 

pled his claims, but will dismiss his Amended Complaint without prejudice to allow him the 

opportunity to remedy its defects. 

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2019, forty-eight Plaintiffs jointly filed a complaint against DOC and 

submitted a single application to proceed in forma pauperis, demanding monetary damages on 

claims arising from the conditions of their confinement. See Order at 1, ECF No. 55; Compl., 

ECF No. 1. To evaluate that application, the court directed Plaintiffs to submit a certified copy 

of their trust fund account statements for the six-month period preceding the complaint’s filing, 
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as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) requires. Order at 1. Ultimately, however, only Duane Burton 

submitted the statement, and all other plaintiffs were dismissed. Id. at 1–2. 

Burton’s Amended Complaint alleges that, when he was a pre-trial detainee at DOC, the 

temperatures in the D.C. Jail were “high” and there was “no working air conditioning that would 

help to circulate any air” in his unit—causing him physical “pain and suffering,” as well as 

“emotional and mental distress.” Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that those conditions 

violated the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Id. He also refers to

a contract between the U.S. Marshals Service and DOC that prevents pre-trial detainees from 

being housed “in any space smaller than 48 square feet where the inmate [is] waiting for a court 

date,” Am. Compl. at 5, and states that his case implicates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. Opp’n. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In Iqbal, 

the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the 

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim 

for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). A 

claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 
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1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). The court must grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all 

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 

F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 61 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 

1979)), and “consider [their] filings as a whole before dismissing a complaint,” Schnitzler v. 

United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 

545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). However, this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff 

filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what 

claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239. 

III. ANALYSIS

As currently pled, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint suffers from several fatal defects. To 

begin, it names DOC as Defendant, but “[g]overnmental agencies of the District of Columbia are 

not suable entities.” Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. 28, 33 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Fields v. D.C. 

Dep’t of Corr., 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the court “lacks jurisdiction over 

[Defendant DOC]”). Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must, therefore, be dismissed. Arnold, 980 

F. Supp. at 33. “When a plaintiff erroneously names as a defendant a District of Columbia

agency instead of the District of Columbia itself, a court may substitute the District as a 

defendant for its agency.” Sampson v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285 (D.D.C. 

2014). But even if the court did so here, Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. The two legal bases he most clearly invokes for his claims are either inapplicable in this 

context or unsupported by his allegations, and his references to a few other potential sources of 

law—even liberally construed—do not plausibly plead a claim. 

First, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails in this context because that Amendment’s 

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments only applies to “persons against whom the 
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government ‘has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.’”

Powers-Bunce v. D.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 536 n.16 (1979)). Plaintiff’s allegations appear to relate to his experience as a pre-trial 

detainee. See Am. Compl. at 5 (referring to DOC agreements regarding “pre-trial detainees” 

who “are waiting for a court date”). Rather than suing under the Eighth Amendment to protest 

the conditions of his confinement, therefore, Plaintiff must instead “rely upon the Fifth 

Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 

1991). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim without 

prejudice; he may amend his Complaint to seek relief under the Fifth Amendment.

Second, Plaintiff’s claim that he should be reimbursed for Defendant’s HRA violation

also cannot succeed. See Am. Compl. at 5. The regulation he cites allows prevailing plaintiffs to 

be reimbursed for expenses incurred from “any physiological, psychological, or emotional 

problems as a result of the violation of the [HRA].” 31 D.C. Reg. § 205.1, at 6262 (1984). But 

Plaintiff does not plead any violation of the HRA, which generally prohibits “discrimination for 

any reason other than that of individual merit,” D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.01—he does not 

allege that Defendant discriminated against him in any way or otherwise violated the HRA. As a 

result, his allegations provide no basis for seeking the HRA’s corresponding reimbursement, and 

the court will dismiss this claim without prejudice as well.

Plaintiff’s filings contain several fleeting references to other potential sources of law, but 

his allegations—even liberally construed—do not support claims arising from them. For 

instance, the Amended Complaint mentions that the U.S. Marshals Service has a contract with 

DOC that prevents pre-trial detainees from being housed “in any space smaller than 48 square 

feet where the inmate [is] waiting for a court date.” Am. Compl. at 5. But Plaintiff does not 
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allege that contract was violated or why that would allow him to sue Defendant. Likewise, in 

opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff contends that the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments are also at issue in his case. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2. But he does not 

identify—and the court is not aware of—any allegations that would support any of those 

constitutional claims. Based on the Amended Complaint as written, therefore, the court cannot 

draw the inference that the District of Columbia is liable to Plaintiff on any of these grounds. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court will GRANT in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without prejudice. A corresponding Order will 

accompany this Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: July 7, 2023 

Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge