*

  After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted May 14, 2008*

Decided June 30, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Nos. 07‐2828

MARTY MIA,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER,

Postmaster General,

Defendant‐Appellee.

      Appeal from the United States District

      Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

      Eastern Division.

      No. 06 C 1455

      Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.

No. 07‐2829

MARTY MIA,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER,

Postmaster General,

Defendant‐Appellee

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 1503

Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 07‐2828 & 07‐2829 Page 2

O R D E R

Marty Mia filed two complaints against the Postmaster General, both alleging that her

former employer, the United States Postal Service, had discriminated against her on the basis

of her disability and raising associated claims. After two settlement conferences before a

magistrate judge, the parties agreed on March 14, 2007, to settle both cases. Mia’s attorney

recited forthe record the material terms of the agreement, and Mia herself stated on the record

that she agreed to those terms. But the parties were unable to finalize the written terms of the

agreement, and a third settlement conference was held. Mia’s attorney agreed that a draft

agreement proposed at that conference was consistent with the oral agreement, but Mia still

refused to sign. As a result, the Postal Service moved in both cases to enforce the agreement.

Both judges granted the motions and dismissed Mia’s cases with prejudice. Mia now appeals,

and we affirm both judgments enforcing the settlement agreement.

We review a district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse of

discretion. Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2007); Hakim v. Payco‐Gen. Am.

Credits,Inc., 272 F.3d932, 935 (7th Cir. 2001).Where the suit alleges employmentdiscrimination

in violation of federal law, we require both that the agreement be knowing and voluntary and

that the agreement be valid under state contract law. Dillard, 483 F.3d at 507; Pierce v. Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 1995). We presume that a settlement

agreement was knowing and voluntary when the plaintiff is represented by counsel. Absent

circumstances not present in this case, a plaintiff may not overcome this presumption by

attacking counsel’s performance. See Baptist v.City ofKankakee, 481 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2007).

Under Illinois contract law, oral settlement agreements are enforceable if there is an offer,

acceptance, and a meeting of the minds on the terms of the agreement. Dillard, 483 F.3d at 507.

The terms must be “definite and certain so that a court can ascertain the parties’ agreement.”

Id. at 507 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mia first argues thatthe agreement ofMarch14 was not knowing andvoluntary because

she was coerced or under duress when she agreed to it. In support of this argument, she

attempts to attack her attorney’s performance. Even if this were a valid line of attack, cf. Baptist,

481 F.3d at 490, none of the evidence to which she has referred suggests that her attorney did

anything improper.   

Next Mia argues that there was no meeting of the minds on the material terms of the

agreement because there were significant changes between the oral and written terms. This

argument fails as well, because the oral and written contracts are substantially the same. As

relevant here, the oral agreement provided that Mia would receive a $2,500 payment, that her
Nos. 07‐2828 & 07‐2829 Page 3

personnel file would reflectthat she had resigned and not been fired, and that Mia would agree

to dismiss both her suits with prejudice. She complains that the written contract differs from

these terms in several ways.

First, she complains that the written contract specifies that the Postal Service will issue

an IRS Form 1099 forits payment to her and that she never agreed that her settlement payment

would be taxable. But whether the payment is taxable is not up to the Postal Service; if Mia

wishes to dispute its taxability, she must do so with the IRS. She also complains that the written

contract specifies that she would execute a USPS Form 2574 “Resignation from the Postal

Service,”which would be placed in her personnel file. She argues that she bargained for a Form

50, “Notification of Personnel Action.” But the oral agreement did not reflect that any specific

form was bargained for, and Mia does not explain why, when she agreed that her file would

reflect that she resigned, it would be inappropriate forit to contain a resignation form. She also

argues that the term in the written agreement releasing the Postal Service from all claims

related to her employment differs from the oral agreement because the written agreement

releases her workers’ compensation claims. But the document she contends is the final

agreement (which is the document that she included in her appendix on appeal) is a prior draft

of the written agreement. In the final version of the agreement that was enforced against her

in the district court, she releases the Postal Service only from claims related to her two cases;

her workers’ compensation claims are expressly reserved. Finally, Mia argues that the oral and

written agreements materially differed because the Postal Service tried to collect a debt from

her that was supposed to be forgiven under the settlement agreement. But even if the latter

point were true, it would not show that the contracts were different. At best, it might support

an argument that the Postal Service had breached the agreement, not that there was no

agreement on the material terms at all.

The rest of Mia’s arguments are frivolous or undeveloped. We find no abuse of

discretion by either district judge in enforcing the settlement agreement.

AFFIRMED.