alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-41486 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CARLOS MARCIAL SANCHEZ-GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. M-00-CR-407-1

___________________________________________

Septem ber 27, 2001 Before POLITZ, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Carlos Marcial Sanchez-Gonzalez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry of the United States after removal, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Sanchez-Gonzalez’s offense level was enhanced 16 levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) based on a Texas felony driving-while-intoxicated (“DWI”) conviction, which was2

characterized as an aggravated felony. The district court sentenced SanchezGonzalez to 77 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Sanchez-Gonzalez argues that the district court erred by applying the 16-level enchancement because his prior felony DWI conviction is not an aggravated felony. Because Sanchez-Gonzalez raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. United States v. Calverley , 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 730-36 (1993). A Texas felony DWI conviction is not a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 and thus is not an aggravated felony for the purpose of a § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) 16-level enhancement. United States v. Chapa-Garza , 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus the district court’s error in applying the 16-level enhancement was plain and affected Sanchez-Gonzalez’s substantial rights. Because Sanchez-Gonzalez’s sentencing range would be reduced substantially without the 16-level enchancement, we exercise our discretion to correct this error. See United States v. Miranda , 248 F.3d 434, 445 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Sanchez-Gonzalez’s sentence is VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED for resentencing.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2004 of XO Communications, Inc. (the Company), as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, William Garrahan, Senior Vice President and Acting Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company. Date: November 9, 2004 /s/ William GarrahanWilliam GarrahanSenior Vice President and Acting Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4544 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4544

 To extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain acrylic staple 
                                fibers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 24, 2012

  Mr. Jones introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the temporary suspension of duty on certain acrylic staple 
                                fibers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN ACRYLIC STAPLE FIBERS.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.40.07 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to certain acrylic staple 
fibers) is amended by striking ``12/31/2012'' and inserting ``12/31/
2015''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) apply 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7817

ANTHONY CHARLES MCGAHA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

TRACEY S. RAY, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief

District Judge. (3:05-cv-00628-JRS)

Submitted: February 15, 2007 Decided: February 23, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Charles McGaha, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Charles McGaha seeks to appeal the district

court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court

is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that McGaha has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny McGaha’s motion

for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
|                                                                           
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|                                                                           
|View History: Annual Download Data (XLS File)                             
|View History: Annual                                                       
|View History: Annual                                                       
|View History:                                                              
|                                                                           
|North Dakota Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Proved Reserves (Million Barrels)
|                                                                           
|                                                                           
|North Dakota Crude Oil + Lease Condensate Proved Reserves (Million Barrels)
|                                                                           

|Decade                                                                                                                            | Year-0 | Year-1 | Year-2 | Year-3 | Year-4 | Year-5 | Year-6 | Year-7 | Year-8 | Year-9
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------ | ------
|2000's                                                                                                                            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | 1,058 
|2010's                                                                                                                            | 1,887  | 2,658  | 3,773  | 5,683  | 6,045  | 5,207  | 5,270  | 5,474  | 5,895  | 5,899 
|2020's                                                                                                                            | 3,672  | 4,361  |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |       
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 12/30/2022                                                                                                         
|Next Release Date: 12/29/2023
#### In the Matter of Sharon Realty Company, Appellant, v Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edith Miller, J.), entered on March 27, 1990, which dismissed petitioner’s CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging a determination by respondent rejecting petitioner’s cooperative offering plan, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The Attorney-General is required to reject an offering plan if more than 10% of the apartments in the building are "long-term vacancies”, defined as apartments vacant for more than *122five months prior to the submission date of the plan (General Business Law § 352-eeee [2] [e]). Here, petitioner does not dispute that four apartments out of the 46 units in the building are long-term vacancies. The Attorney-General found that six apartments are long-term vacancies. It is undisputed that five apartments would be more than 10% of the total number of units in the building.

Competent evidence before the Attorney-General showed that one apartment was occupied by a man whose daughter, more than five months prior to the submission date, contacted the sponsor by telephone and unequivocally informed the petitioner that her father was in a nursing home and would not be returning to the apartment. Competent evidence also showed that another apartment was unoccupied for a substantial portion of the five months, and was subleased without authorization by a rent-stabilized tenant not in primary residence for the remainder of the five-month period. Accordingly, the Attorney-General had a rational basis for determining that both apartments were long-term vacancies *(Matter of Harbor Tower v Abrams,*85 AD2d 558, *affd*56 NY2d 740).

We decline to reach arguments predicated on facts presented for the first time to the article 78 court *(see, Matter of Fanelli v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd.,*90 AD2d 756, *affd*58 NY2d 952). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Rosenberger and Smith, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2



Certification of the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of BidGive International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Rebecca Richardson-Blanchard, the Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/ Rebecca Richardson-Blanchard

Interim Chief Financial Officer

Date:  August 20, 2007
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 2371** 

WILLIAM ALEXANDER CASTILLO

- BENAVIDES , Petitioner ,
v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General , Respondent
.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted : June 29, 2016 Decided: July 6, 2016

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion
.
William Alexander Castillo

- Benavides, Petitioner Pro Se
. Scott Michael Marconda , Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: William Alexander Castillo

- Benavides petitions for rev iew of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the petitioner’s informal brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Here, the Board affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal

on the ground that Castillo

- Benavides lacked credibility. In his informal brief, however , Castillo

- Benavides fails to challenge the adverse credibility determination or the agency’s denial of his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture. In failing to challenge the basis for the agency’s denial of relief, Castillo

- Benavide s has forfeited appellate review of the Board ’s order. See Suarez

- Valenzuela v. Holder , 714 F.3d 241, 248

- 49 (4th Cir. 2013) (deeming issues not raised in opening brief waived); Niang v. Gonzales , 492 F.3d 505, 510 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) (same). Even if the issue was not forfeited, however, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, and the IJ provided “specific, cogent reasons” for rejecting Castillo

Benavides’ claims. See Ilunga v. Holder , 777 F.3d 199, 206

- 07 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining credibility determinations ). T he independent evidence that Castillo

- Benavides submitted with his3 asylum application contradicted his own version of events and therefore does not overcome the adverse credibility determination
. See id. at 213. Accordingly , we deny the petition for review
. In re Castillo

Benavides (B.I.A. Oct. 5, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not ai d the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
EXHIBIT 13.1
 
 Section 1350 Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 
 In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F of Intercept Energy Services Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2012, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Randy Hayward, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 1.
the annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
 
 2.
the information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date:  May 15,  2014
 
 /s/ Randy Hayward
 Randy Hayward
 Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit
31.1**
 
 **CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO**
 **18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,**
 **AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION 302
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 I, Timothy J.
Tegeler, certify that:
 
 1. I have reviewed
this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Siboney Corporation;
 
 2. Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this report;
 
 3. Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
periods presented in this report;
 
 4. The
registrant’s other certifying officers and I
are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the
registrant and have:
 
 (a) Designed such
disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
 
 (b) Evaluated the
effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this quarterly report based on such evaluation;
and
 
 (c) Disclosed in
this report any change in the registrant’s
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant’s internal control over financial
reporting; and
 
 5. The
registrant’s other certifying officers and I
have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant’s
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):
 
 (a) All significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant’s ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and
 
 (b) Any fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrant’s
internal control over financial reporting.
 
 Date: May 16,
2005
 
 /s/ Timothy J.
Tegeler
 Timothy J. Tegeler
 Chief Executive Officer
t>OT-OSr-2.0oo-(^1'^ 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE 

GOVERNOR OF HAWAII -M-:!lVir(\iJ U LORETTA J. FUOOY, A.C.S.W., M.P.H. 

DIRECTOR OF HEALTH 

Oi/ ^N?5 PstAj e OF HAWAII 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

P. O. BOX 3378 

HONOLULU, HI 96801-3378 

January 19, 2012 

Dennis. DeVanv(a)dot.aov 

EAS@dot.aov 

In reply, plta n ratar to: 

Fila: 

Re: ANSWER TO PACIFIC WING'S PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

DOCKET DOT-OST-2000-6773 

Dear Mr. DeVany: 

In terms of median household income, Kalaupapa County is the poorest county 

in the entire United States of America, according to the 2010 U.S. Census. It is also one 

of the most isolated. There is no commercial sea transportation to Kalaupapa and the 

only ground option is by mule, which is not appropriate for many of the residents. Thus, 

air services are vitally important to this community. 

The Essential Air Services (EAS) subsidy has greatly benefited the residents of 

this low-income county. The State of Hawaii vigorously advocates for maintaining the 

EAS subsidy and affordable flights in the strongest possible way. On the other hand, 

the State has no interest in who provides the air sen/ices as long as the carrier meets 

the needs of the community. Hence, the State respectfully asks that any decision 

reached, furthers the prospects of preserving the EAS for the people of Kalaupapa. 

Sincerely, 

/ / Loretta J. Fuddy, A.C.S.W., M.P.H. 

^ ^ Director of Health 

prOfneyttn^LOfelon^Health£r WelU\e^ 

c: Communicable Disease Division
Exhibit 32.1   Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  In connection with the quarterly report of BidGive International, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), James P. Walker, Jr., the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:   (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   /s/ James P. Walker, Jr. Chief Executive Officer Date:  November 13, 2008
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-89,804-01

EX P ARTE ARMAN DO IGLESIAS, App licant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 20160D03284-384-1 IN THE 384TH DIST RICT COURT

F ROM EL P ASO COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the T ex as C o d e of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant wa s convicted of deadly wea pon in a penal instit ution and sentenc ed to forty y ear s’ imprisonment. The Eig hth Court o f Ap peals aff irmed his conviction. Iglesias v.State , 564 S.W .3d 461 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018). I n a single g round, Applicant contends that appellate counsel failed to timely advise him of his right to file a

petition for discre tionary revie w. Applicant has alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte W ilson , 956 S.W .2 d 2 5 (T ex . Crim. App. 1997). In these2

circ umstances, additional fac ts are neede d. Pursuant to Ex parte Rodriguez , 334 S.W .2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropr iate forum for finding s of fac t. T he trial court shall order appellate counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim. The trial court may use any means set out in T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07, § 3(d)

. I f t he trial court ele ct s to hold a hearing , it shall deter mine whether Applicant is indige nt. I f Applicant is indige nt and wishes to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shal l ap p oint an attorney to repre sent him at the hea ring . T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 26.04. The trial court shall make finding s of fac t an d co n cl u sions of law as to whether appellate counsel timely advised Applicant of his rig ht to file a petition for discretionar y revie w. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fac t an d co n cl u s i ons of l aw that it deems relevant and appropr iate to the disposition of Applicant’s cla im for habe as cor pus relief

. This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fac t issues. The issues shal l b e resolved within 90 day s of this order

. A supplemental transcr ipt containing all aff idavits and int err og atories or the t ransc ription of t he court repor ter’s notes from any hearing or deposition, along with the trial court’ s supplemental finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, shall be forwa rded to this Court within 120 day s of the date of this order

. Any extensions of time must be reque sted by

the trial cour

t and shall be obtaine d from this Court.

Filed: May

15, 2019 Do not publish