* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 2 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LINDA J. WEBBER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-3194 (D.C. No. 96-CV-1116-WEB)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff-appellant Linda J. Webber appeals the dis trict court’s affirmance of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Because the decision is supported by substantial ev idence, we affirm. Plaintiff alleges she has been unable to work since December 15, 1992, due to back pain, stomach problems, and asthma. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that although plaintiff couldnot perform her former work, she remained capable of performing numerous sedentary jobs which allowed her to alternate sitting and standing. The Appeals Cou ncil denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission er. The district court affirmed, and this appeal followed. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether corre ct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v . Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). We may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).-3-

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in r elying on the grids, that his hypothetical questions to the vocational e xpert did not include all of plaintiff’s impairments, and that he improperly eva luated her pain. We note first that the ALJ did not rely on the grids to find plai ntiff not disabled--he simply used them as a framework and relied on the vocation al expert’s testimony regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform a signific ant number of jobs. The record shows the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert included both plaintiff’s asthmatic condition, with a limitation on working around noxious substances, and her stomach problems. See Appellant’s App. I at 299-300. His assessment that plaintiff’s asthma would have a min imal effect on her ability to work is supported by evidence that she worked for m any years despite her condition. He was not required to include a limitation that plaintiff should avoid people with illnesses as no physician has imposed s uch a limitation. So too, the ALJ’s findings regarding plaintiff’s re sidual functional capacity and her pain are supported by substantial evidence. Although the ALJ found plaintiff “reasonably credible,” id. at 17, he found her residual functional capacity less limited than that to which she testified, base d on her daily activities, his observation of her abilities, and the medical evide nce. Plaintiff testified that she visited friends and family, cooked for her mother, performed housework, did the laundry, went grocery shopping and carried the groc eries, drove, fed the pets and-4-

took the smaller dog to the veterinarian. She test ified that she really did not know how much she could carry frequently, but guessed sh e could carry five pounds. She also estimated that she could sit for thirty mi nutes and stand for fifteen to twenty minutes, although the ALJ observed her sitti ng for approximately an hour without difficulty. The medical evidence did not d emonstrate any restrictions on her ability to sit or stand. The ALJ’s conclusion, therefore, that plaintiff could sit from thirty to sixty minutes and could lift five po unds frequently and ten pounds occasionally is supported by the evidence. Further , even accepting as true plaintiff’s testimony that she could sit only thirty minutes, the jobs identified by the vocational expert gave her the option of sittin g or standing. The medical evidence also does not show any symptom s associated with prolonged, disabling pain. In December 1992, plaintiff experienced acute lower back pain, with symptoms improving over the next tw o months. Subsequent examinations have revealed a normal range of motion , negative or almost normal straight leg raising, and no evidence of weakness o r significant sensory deficits. Plaintiff does not use any type of assistive device and does not take strong pain medications. She testified that her medications, acombination of muscle relaxants and anti-inflammatory drugs, effectively relieve her pain. Although it is clear that plaintiff’s degenerative joint disease c auses her some back pain, there is substantial evidence that such pain is not disablin g. See Gossett v. Bowen ,-5-

862 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding a claim ant’s inability to work pain-free does not require a finding of disability) . Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge