NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARSON E. BAYNESS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. MARTIN J. O ’ MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant

- Appellee. No. 23

- 35246
D.C. No. 3:22

- cv - 05227

- MAT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 5, 2024 * * Portland, Oregon Before: RAWLINSON, FORREST, and SUNG, Circuit Judges. Claimant Carson E. Bayness appeals from the district court’s ruling affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for benefits. We have jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291

. W e review the district court’s order de

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 11 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

novo and reverse only if the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was based on legal error. Larson v. Saul , 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm

. 1. Evaluation of Medical Evidence. Bayness argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion s of Doctors Wingate, Senske, and Sylwester. The ALJ must

a ssess the persuasiveness of the medical opinions and explain how she considered the supportability and consistency factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)

– (b) (effective March 27, 2017). A s to all three physicians, the ALJ sufficiently explained h er analysis and her conclusions are supported by substanti al evidence in the record. See Woods v. Kijakazi , 32 F.4th 785, 791

– 92 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ found unpersuasive Dr. Wingate’s opinion that Bayness has marked limitations because it is inconsistent with “contempora neous treatment notes” and Bayness’s “presentation at [Dr. Wingate’s] examination” and is “largely based on [Bayness’s] self

- reports” that are inconsistent with the longitudinal medical record.
Th ese are valid bas es for discounting a medical opinion and are based on a rational interpretation of the record evidence. See id. at 792

– 93 ( affirming the ALJ’s rejecti on of a medical opinion that was inconsistent with treatment notes and objective findings) ; Ghanim v. Col v in , 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing medical opinions that are based on self

- reports)

. Bayness ’s argu ment regarding Dr. Senske fail s because t he ALJ is not3

required to adopt opinions stated in vague terms that are “inadequate for determining” Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)

. Ford v. Saul , 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). Additionally, the ALJ did not err in f inding that the objective portions of Dr. Senske’s exam were largely based on Bayness’s self

- reports. See Ghanim , 763 F.3d at 1162. Finally, the ALJ did not err in reject ing Dr. Sylwester’s opinion as unsupported by a specific diagnosis or longitudinal medical evidence supporting physical limitations. See Tommasetti v. Astrue , 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Evaluation of Bayness’s Testimony
. Bayness argues that the ALJ erroneously discount ed his testimony by, among other things, fail ing to consider that his mental health symptoms wax and wane, that his limited activities are consistent with his testimony, and that he has not experienced sustained improvement in his condition

. When medical evidence is inconsistent with a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ can reject the testimony “only by offer ing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smart t v. Kija kazi , 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin , 759 F.3d 995, 1014

– 15 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, t he ALJ identified evidence that Bayness ’s condition has improv ed since he started receiving treatment and that , contrary to his described limitations, he is able to leave the house almost daily , perform errands, and engage in group counseling. We conclude that the ALJ
gave sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence to discredit Bayness’s4

subjective symptom testimony. Id. at 494

– 95

. 3. Evaluation of Lay Evidence. Bayness also argues that the ALJ

err oneously fail ed to consider the observations of agency facilit ators and
i nterviewer s , which he contends provide further support for his testimony

. A ssuming this was error, s ee 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (“We will consider all of your statements about your symptoms, such as pain, and any description your medical sources or nonmedical sources may provide

. . . .” (emphasis added) ) , it was harmless. See Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin. , 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding failure to consider lay testimony is harmless error if “a reviewing court

. . . can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability determination”)

. This lay evidence consists of check list forms with short narratives filled out by agency employees who had very limited interaction with Bay n ess
. And the observations o f these lay witnesses

— that Bayness was nervous and had some difficulties with communication and coherency

— are substantially similar to other evidence in the medical record that the
ALJ properly evaluated. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that an ALJ who credited the lay evidence would reach a different disability determination

. Cf. id. at 1056.
4. R FC and S

te p - Five Determination s . Bayness argues that the ALJ ’s
RFC d etermination was legally erroneous and u nsupported by substantial evidence.5

Specifically, Bayness contends the ALJ fail ed to include that he is unable to perform any type of full

- time competitive work on a sustained basis due to the functional effect s of his anxiety, depression, and back pain, as described by D r s
. Wingate, Senske, and Sylwester ; Bayness ; and the lay witnesses

. However, as discussed above, we conclude that the ALJ did not err in disc ounting this evidence , and the
ALJ d oes not err in omitting rejected evidence from her RFC determination

. See Kitchen v. Kijakazi , 82 F.4th 732, 740

– 42 (9th Cir. 2023)

. Accordingly , we also conclude that the ALJ did not err at Step Five by relying on her RFC determination and the vocational expert testimony based on that determination

. See id. at 742.
AFFIRMED.