IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 02-10198

__________________________

TOMMY THOMPSON, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STEPHEN GOETZMANN; ET AL.,

Defendants,

STEPHEN GOETZMANN; BERNICE LOFTIN;

ZIMMER, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

___________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northen District of Texas, Dallas

___________________________________________________ December 17, 2002 Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the United

States Department of Health & Human Services (“government”) appeals

from the district court’s dismissal of complaints against (1)

Defendant-Appellee Zimmer, Inc. (“Zimmer”), pursuant to F ED

. R. C IV

.

P. 12(b)(6), and (2) Defendant-Appellee Bernice Loftin and her

attorney, Defendant-Appellee Stephen Goetzmann, by summary judgment

in their favor. The government had filed suit against all three

Def endants-Appellees, seeking reimbursement for Medicare

expenditures related to Loftin’s medical treatment. This was the2

same treatment that was the genesis of Loftin’s retaining Goetzmann

to sue Zimmer, the manufacturer of her artificial hip prosthesis,

which suit was settled prior to trial. Concluding that the

government’s complaint is without any basis in law and that there

is no legal right of recovery against these three parties, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the government’s action.

I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS

In June 1993, Loftin underwent surgery to replace her hip

joint with a prosthesis manufactured by Zimmer. That procedure was

paid for by the governmen t through the Medicare program.

Complications arose, requiring Loftin to undergo a second surgery.

Thereafter, Loftin continued to experience medical problems related

to her hip prosthesis. Medicare paid approximately $143,881.82 for

Loftin’s two surgeries and subsequent medical treatment.

Representing Loftin, Goetzmann filed suit against Zimmer for

products liability, alleging defective design of the hip

prosthesis. Lofitn’s claims included the medical expenses paid for

by Medicare. Loftin and Zimmer settled in lieu of going to trial.

Without admitting liability, Zimmer paid Loftin the unitemized lump

sum of $256,000. Zimmer disbursed the full amount of the

settlement to Goetzmann, who, after deducting his 40% contingency

fee, distributed the balance to Loftin. The entire settlement was

paid by Zimmer; no part was paid from insurance.

In October 2000, the government filed suit against Goetzmann,

Loftin, and Zimmer under the Medicare Secondary Provider (“MSP”)1 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2002).

2 § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).

3 statute, 1 which authorizes the government to seek reimbursement

f rom entities providing primary insurance coverage for medical

services previously paid by Medicare. Among other things, the MSP

statute authorizes the government to obtain reimbursement from a

firm or entity that has a “self-insurance plan.” 2

The government alleged that Zimmer was “self-insured for its

liability to Loftin,” which, as a p utative tortfeasor settling

Loftin’s products-liability action ag ainst it, had paid Loftin a

substantial sum of money. This payment, insisted the government,

was ostensibly for Loftin’s medical expenses, which were originally

paid for by the Medicare program. Claiming entitlement to relief

under the MSP statute and its imple menting regulations, the

government sought reimbursement from Goetzmann and Loftin, and

double damages from Zimmer.

Zimmer moved to dismiss the government’s complaint against it

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on w hich relief

could be granted. Zimmer asserted that its tort settlement with

Loftin was not tantamount to maintaining a “self-insurance plan,”

as defined in the MSP statute. Zimmer argued, in the alternative,

that its inability to pay for Loftin’s medical services “promptly,”

as required by the MSP statute, precluded it from meeting the

definition of a “self-insured plan.” The district court declined4

to determine, on a motion to dismiss, whether Zimmer’s settlement

agreement with Loftin met the statutory definition of a “selfinsured plan.” The district court nonetheless ordered the

government’s complaint dismissed, holding that, as a matter of law,

Zimmer could not have paid for Loftin’s medical services

“promptly,” as required by the MSP statute.

Goetzmann and Loftin subsequently moved for summary judgment,

arguing that they were not required to reimburse Medicare because

they did not receive payment from an insurer or self-insured

entity. Agreeing with Goetzmann and Loftin that the MSP statute

predicates their re imbursement liability on their receipt of

payment from, inter alia

, a self-insurance plan that would pay

“promptly” for medical services, the district court granted summary

judgment to both Goetzmann and Loftin. The government timely filed

a notice of ap peal from the court’s dismissals of Zimmer,

Goetzmann, and Loftin.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Background.

Although the government has litigated similar cases in several

district courts around the country, we are the first appellate

court to address the issue of an alleged tortfeasor’s reimbursement

liability under the MSP statute. Notably, the government’s prior

efforts have proved uniformly feckless

—— every court that has3 Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. , 117 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.

1997).

4 Id. at 247 (citing Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank , 781 F.2d

440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986)).

5 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards , 677

F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).

5 heard its arguments on this issue, including the district court in

the instant case, has rejected the government’s expansive

interpretation of the MSP statute.

In this case, the government retreads the same unsuccessful

a rguments that it has advanced in these prior cases. As we

conclude that the statutory analyses performed by the district

courts in the prior cases are sound, that the law has not changed,

and that the government has not adduced any new facts that require

us to reconsider the meaning or scope of the MSP statute, we affirm

the district court’s decision in this case. We shall first discuss

the government’s claims against Zim mer, because the liability of

Goetzmann and Loftin is predicated on determining whether Zimmer

qualifies as having a “self-insured plan” under the MSP statute.

B. Zimmer’s Reimbursement Liability Under the MSP Statute.

1. Standard of Review.

A district court’s order dismissing a complaint under Rule

12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo

. 3 On appeal, we must liberally

construe the complaint and assume that all facts pleaded therein

are true, 4 k eeping in mind that such dismissals of complaints are

“viewed with disfavor.” 5 We must also remain mindful of the6 Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

7 § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).

8 § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).

9 Id.

6 Supreme Court’s injunction that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not

be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of fac ts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief.” 6

2. Zimmer’s Settlement Agreement with Loftin is Not a “SelfInsurance Plan” Under the MSP Statute.

The government contends that Zimmer is liable for reimbursing

the government’s Medicare expenditures by virtue of Zimmer’s having

a “s elf-insurance plan” because Zimmer was “required or

responsible” to make healthcare-related payments to Loftin, a

Medicare recipient. The government’s argument for holding Zimmer

liable under the MSP statute is relatively straightforward: (1) The

legislative history reflects that the purpose of the MSP is to

reduce Medicare expenditures, (2) the statute achieves this purpose

by requiring reimbursement of payments from any “self- insurance

plan,” 7 (3) an entity is “self-insured” i f it is “required or

responsible” for making payments to a Medicare recipient, 8 and (4)

the MSP statute provides a right of recovery to the government in

s eeking reimbursement from such “self-insurance plans” that ha v e

paid monies to Medicare recipients. 9 In this case, the “selfinsurance plan” is alleged by the government to exist by virtue of10 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)

(recognizing that the “first step in interpreting a statute is to

determine whether the language at issue has a plain and

unambiguous meaning”).

11 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. v. Shalala , 995 F.2d

70, 73 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the words of a statute

reflect the intention of Congress, and “Congress’s intention is

the law and must be followed”).

12 United States v. Osborne , 262 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir.

2001).

7 Zimmer’s payment to Medicare recipient Loftin under the terms of

their products-liability settlement agreement. Thus, the

government concludes, Zimmer (as well as Goetzmann and Loftin) must

reimburse the government for its Medicare expenditures because this

is in accord with the legislative intent underlying the MSP

statute.

In assessing whether the MSP statute applies to Zimmer’s

settlement agreement with Loftin, we must start with the actual

words of the MSP statute, 10 for it is the words of the statute that

set the metes and bounds of the authority granted by Cong ress. 1 1

Thus, we need not

—— and, indeed, should not

—— look to legislative

history when the statute is clear on its face. When “the language

of the federal statute is plain and unambiguous, it begins and ends

our enquiry.” 12

The terms and structure of the MSP statute aptly reflect its

general purpose. In enacting this law, Congress laudably sought to

reduce Medicare costs by making the government a secondary provider

of medical insurance coverage when a Medicare recipient has other13 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex. , 995 F.2d at 70-73. See

also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. , 174

F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2001) (summarizing the purpose

and structure of the MSP statute).

14 § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

8 sources of primary insurance coverage. 13 The MSP statute states,

in pertinent part, that:

Payment under [the Medicare program] ma y not be made . . .

with respect to any item or service to the extent that

(i) payment has been made, or can reasonably be

expected to be made,

. . . as required [under a

group health plan], or

(ii) payment has been made or can reasonably be expected

to be made promptly (as determined in accorda nce

with regulations) under a workmen’s compensation

law or plan of the United States or a State or

under an automobile or liability insurance policy

or plan (including a self-insurance plan) or under

no fault insurance.

In this subsection, the term “ primary plan ” means a group

health plan or large group health plan, to the extent that

clause (i) applies, and a workman’s compensation law or plan,

an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including

a self-insured plan) or no fault insurance, to the extent that

clause (ii) applies. 14

The MSP statute also authorizes the government to make conditional

healthcare payments when a Medicare recipient already has coverage

provided by a primary insurance plan; and the government has a

right of action in reimbursement to recover these conditional

healthcare payments from such primary plans:

(i) Primary Plans

Any payment under this subchapter . . . shall be conditioned

on reimbursement to the appropriate Trust Fund established by

this subchapter when notice or other information is received15 § 1395y(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

16 42 C.F.R. § 411.50(b).

9 that payment for such item or servi ce has been or could be

made under such subparagraph. . . .

(ii) Action by United States

In order to recover payment under this subchapter for such an

item or service, the United States may bring an action against

any entity which is required or respons ible (directly, as a

third-party administrator, or otherwise) to make payment with

respect so such item or service (or any portion thereof) under

a primary plan . . ., or against any other entity (including

any physician or provider) that has received payment from that

entity wi th respect to the item or service, and may join or

intervene in any action related to the events that gave rise

to the need for the item or service. . . . 15

Thus, the structure of the MSP statute is relatively simple.

If a Medicare recipient has medical insurance provided th rough a

“primary plan,” then Medicare is precluded from paying for medical

services except to provide secondary coverage. Stated differently,

Medicare serves as a back-up insurance plan to cover that which is

not paid for by a primary insurance plan.

A “primary plan” is defined as a group health insurance plan,

or as any another type of insurance plan

, such as workman’s

compensation, liability insurance, or a self-insurance plan, that

may reasonably be expected to pay for services promptly.

“Promptly” is defined by the Health Care Financing Administration

(“HCFA”) regulations as payment within 120 days after the earlier

of (1) the date the claim is filed, or (2) the date the service was

provided or the patient was discharged from the hospital. 16 If the17 A prior district court also rejected the government’s

attempt to rely upon the MSP statute’s legislative history,

noting then that the “legislative history of the MSP Statute is

cryptic and uninformative on the interpretative question now

raised.” Mason v. American Tobacco Co. , 212 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93

(E.D. N.Y. 2002).

10 Medicare program chooses to make condit ional payments when a

Medicare recipient has coverage under a primary plan, then the

government may seek reimbursement for these payments by suing the

insurance entities that provide the primary coverage.

To entice us to consider the lengthy and abstruse legislative

history of the MSP statute, the government urges us to agree with

it that the statute is ambiguous; however, we decline to find

ambiguity where none exists. 1 7 As ably pointed out by Zimmer and

amici curiae

, the term “self-insurance plan,” as used in the MSP

statute, is not only clear in its meaning; it plainly does not

apply automatically t o alleged tortfeasors, such as Zimmer, w h o

settl e with plaintiffs. Although we agree with the district

court’s determinatio n that Zimmer is not liable under the MSP

statute because it could not be reasonably ex pected to pay

“promptly” for Loftin’s medical care, we also agree with the other

district courts that have concluded that an alleged tortfeasor who

settles with a plaintiff is not, ipso facto

, a “self-insurer” under

the MSP statute. W e are compelled to draw this conclusion when we

apply several well-established canons of statutory interpretation.

First, the term “self-insurance plan” does not exist in a

vacuum within the MSP statute. Rather, it is predicated on the18 United States v. Lyckman , 235 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir.

2001).

11 term “primary plan.” As the MSP statute plainly provides, Medicare

i s a secondary provider of insurance i f and only if a Medicare

recipient has another source of medical coverage under a “primary

plan.” The term “primary plan” is pivotal to the applicability of

the MSP statute —— its reimbursement provisions are not triggered

unless a Medicare recipient’s source of recovery meets the

definition of “primary plan,” regardless of whether that source is

a group healthcare plan, workman’s compensation, liability

insurance, or a self-insurance plan.

The government asks us to accept its interpretation of “selfinsurance plan” without reference to the more fundamental

requirement of the MSP statute that this type of insurance plan

constitute a “primary plan.” To do so would violate the most basic

principle of statutory construction: Unless indicated otherwise in

a statute, its words are to be given their ordinary meaning, which

“cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the

context in which [they are] use d.” 1 8 This maxim is particularly

apposite here because the MSP statute does not define the term

“self -insurance plan”; neither does it define a “primary plan”

beyond listing some examples of various types of plans that are

deemed primary.

We must, accordingly, look to the ordinary meaning of these19 See INS v. Phinpathya , 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (noting

that “in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting

point must be the language employed by Congress, . . . and we

assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary

meaning of the words used”) (quotations and citations omitted);

White v. Black , 190 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The canons of

statutory construction dictate that when construing a statute,

the court should give words their ordinary meaning and should not

render as meaningless the language of the statute.”) (citation

omitted).

20 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 898 (MerrianWebster 1985). Dictionaries are a principal source for

ascertaining the ordinary meaning of statutory language, see

generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a

Great Oregon , 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (invoking dictionaries by both

the majority and the dissent in defining terms in the Endangered

Species Act).

21 3 C OUCH ON I NSURANCE 39:1 (3d 2002).

22 See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig. , 202

F.R.D. 154, 166 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (noting that a “‘plan’ connotes

some type of formal arrangement . . . to set aside funds to cover

potential future liabilities and a formal procedure for

processing claims made against that fund”); In re Diet Drugs

, 2001 WL 283163, at *10 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (noting that “the

existence of a primary ‘plan’ connotes some type of formal

arrangement”).

12 terms. 1 9 A “plan” denotes “a method for achieving an end” or “a

detailed formulation of a program of action.” 20 “An insurer is the

party to a contract of insurance who assumes the risk and

undertakes to indemnify the insured, or pay a certain sum on the

happening of a specifie d contingency.” 2 1 Therefore, in the sense

used in th e MSP statute, a “primary plan” of “self-insurance”

requires an entity’s ex ante adoption, for itself, of an

arrangement for (1) a source of funds and (2) procedures for

disbursing these funds when claims are made against the e ntity. 2 223 1 C OUCH ON I NSURANCE 10:1 (3d 1997). See also Alderson v.

Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 223 Cal. App. 3d 397, 407 (1990) (noting that

“[i]t is implicit in the term, ‘self-insurer,’ that such person

maintains a fund, or a reserve, to cover possible losses, from

which it pays out valid claims, and that the self-insurer have a

procedure for considering such claims and for managing that

reserve”).

24 42 C.F.R. § 411.21.

13 Recognizing that “[t]he term ‘self-insurance’ had no precise legal

meaning,” a leading insurance treatise no netheless confirms this

definition of “self-insurance,” noting that

to meet the conceptual definition of self-insurance, an entity

would have to engage in the same sorts of underwriting

procedures that insurance companies employ; estimating likely

losses during the period, setting up a mechanism for creating

sufficient reserves to meet those losses as they occur, and,

usua lly, arranging for commercial insurance for losses in

excess of some stated amount. 23

T hus, according to the ordinary meaning of the terms of th e MSP

statute, it is wrong for the government to contend that an entity’s

negotiating of a single settlement with an individual plaintiff is

sufficient, i n and of itself

, for such entity to be deemed as

having a “self-insurance plan.”

In addition, the regulations promulgated under the MSP statute

by t he HCFA reflect the ordinary meaning of a “self-insurance

plan.” The HCFA regulations define a “plan” as “any arrangement,

oral or written, by one or more entities, to provide health

benefits or medical care or assume legal liability for injury or

illness.” 24 The regulations further define a “self-insurance plan”

as “a plan under which an individual, or a private or governmental25 42 C.F.R. § 411.50(b) (emphasis added).

26 See Silicone Gel Breast Implants ,174 F. Supp. 2d at 1254

(noting that “the regulatory language defining ‘self-insured

plan’ connotes some type of formal arrangement by which funds are

set aside and accessed to cover future liabilities”).

27 73 A M

. J UR . 2d Statutes § 129 (2002).

14 entity, carries its own risk instead of taking out insurance with

a carrier.” 25 It is clear from the regulations implementing the MSP

statute that the existence of a self-insurance plan requires that

there by some form of arrangement

—— the creation ex ante of a fund

and distribution procedures —— for making potential payments to a

set of prospective claimants. The HCFA regulations even speak in

prospective terms. For example, § 411.21 defines a “plan” as an

“arrangement

. . . to provide health benefits or assume legal

liability.” Such language contemplates a pre-arrangement and makes

sense only if a self-insurer creates or maintains a fund or source

and establishes rules for making disbursements therefrom in

covering the self-insurer’s future risk, i.e., when one acts as an

insurance carrier for onself. 26

Furthermore, the well-known interpretative canon, expressio

unius est exclusio alterius

—— “the expression of one thing implies

the exclusion of another” 2 7

—— confirms that the government is

advocating an unreasonably broad interpretation of the MSP statute.

The MSP statute explicitly speaks in terms of insurance plans that

provide primary medical cov erage. Nowhere does the MSP statute

mention or even suggest that an alleged tortfeasor who settles a28 Health Ins. Ass’n v. Shalala , 23 F.3d 412, 427 n.* (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (Henderson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

29 73 A M

. J UR

. 2d Statutes § 168 (2002). We recently

recognized that “we should attempt to give horizontal coherence

to the United States Code and ensure that different statutes

interact coherently and harmoniously.” Murphy v. Penn. Higher

Educ. Assistance Agency & Educ. Mgmt. Credit Corp. , 282 F.3d 868,

872 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552,

561-63 (1988)).

30 42 U.S.C. § 2651-53 (2002).

31 § 2651(a).

15 single claim with a single plaintiff falls within the ambit of the

statute’s category of a self-insurance “plan.” The failure of

Congress to include in the MSP statute a right of action for

reimbursement of medical expenditures against tortfeasors indicates

that this statute “plainly intends to allow recovery only from an

insurer .” 28

This application of expressio unius to the MSP statute is

further supported by the canon that ins tructs courts to adopt

harmonious interpretations of statutes addressing similar

subject s. 29 In this respect, the Medical Care Recovery Act 3 0

(“MCRA”) explicitly provides for the right of action that the

government is attempting to read into the MSP statute. The MCRA

expressly arms the g overnment with a right to recover medical

payments that it has made “under circumstances creating a tort

liability upon some thi rd person.” 3 1 In such instances, the

government may “institute and prosecute legal proceedings against

the third person who is liable for the injury or disease

. . . for32 § 2651(b).

33 Cf. In re Dow Corning Corp. , 250 B.R. 298, 339 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich. 2000) (noting that the court is “dubious that the term

‘self-insured plan’ covers or was meant to cover every tortfeasor

who fails to obtain insurance”); 54 Fed. Reg. 41727 (Oct. 11,

1989) (responding to a comment that explicitly asks for

clarification on whether an alleged tortfeasor is liable under

the MSP statute as a “self-insurer,” the HFCA notes that “the

mere absence of insurance purchased from a carrier does not

necessarily constitute a ‘plan’ of self-insurance”).

34 2001 WL 283163, at *10 (citations omitted).

16 the payment or reimbursement of medical expenses or lost pay

. . .

.” 32 In express terms, then, the MCRA affords the government the

legal right of recovery that it is urging us to read into the MSP

statute, which is silent on the point. The express inclusion of

recovery from tortfeasors in the MCRA supports the conclusion that

Congress’s omission of tortfeasors from the list of those

potentially liable under the MSP statute wa s knowing and

intentional. 33

Recognizing the government’s attempt to fold the MCRA into the

MSP, the In re Diet Drugs court noted that

[u]nlike the MCRA , the MSP does not mention a right by the

Government to recover from a tortfeasor. Rather, the express

wording of the [MSP] statute creates a cause of action only

against insurers and their payees.

. . . Under the

Government’s construction of the [MSP] statute, every

tortfeasor that used its general assets to fund a tort

settlement with persons who had received federal health care

benefits would be potentially liable under the MSP. There is

simply no support for this extremely broad construction of the

[MSP] statute. 34

When faced with two statutes on similar subjects, courts must,35 United States v. Borden , 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (“When

there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give

effect to both if possible.”).

36 Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. at 135. See also

Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 165 (“Unlike the MCRA, the

MSP does not mention a right by the government to recover from a

tortfeasor.”).

37 In its discussion of the HCFA regulations later in the

complaint, the government acknowledges that a “third party payer”

must possess an “insurance policy, plan . . ., or program that is

17 whenever possible, interpret them so as to give effect to both. 3 5

Yet, if we were to adopt the broad construction of the MSP statute

urged by the government in this case, we would, in effect,

eliminate the need for the MCRA, or at least condemn some of

Congress’s language in the MCRA to the scrap heap of surplusage.

This would be unacceptable, particularly when a completely

reasonable interpretation of the MSP statute is offered by the

plain terms of the statute itself. As a district court noted in

rejecting anoth er government attempt to read MCRA authority into

the MSP statute: “[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend MSP

to be used as an across t he board procedural vehicle for suing

tortfeasors.” 36

By its plain terms, the MSP statute and the HCFA regulations

p redicate reimbursement liability on the existence of a primary

insurance plan

. In its First Amended Complaint, the government

obfuscates this fact when it cabins the MSP statute’s requirements

as applying to th ose entities that have only “primary payment

responsibility.” 37 More important, in its specific count againstprimary to Medicare” in order to be liable under the MSP statute,

citing 42 C.F.R. § 411.21. The government, however, never

indicates how this essential legal element for liability under

the MSP statute applies to Zimmer in this case.

38 United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d

131, 145 (D.D.C. 2000) (original emphasis).

39 See Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 165-66 (noting

that the “Government’s argument . . . fails to account for the

repeated use of the word ‘plan’ throughout the MSP and

regulations promulgated thereunder”).

18 Zimmer, the government never alleges that Zimmer paid Goetzmann and

Loftin according to a pre -existing p lan ; it asserts only the

conclusions that Zimmer was “responsible to pay for Defendant

Loftin’s medical expenses” and that Zimmer “was self-insured for

its liabi lity to Loftin.” As the D.C. district court noted in

granting a motion to dismiss by a similarly situated defendant

corporation in a parallel case: “In fact, the Complaint does not

even allege the existence of any elements of a ‘primary plan,’ such

as a ‘plan’ or ‘arrangement.’” 38

Even when we liberally construe the government’s complaint, as

we must, we see that the MSP statute and its implementing

regulations require a primary insurance plan

. But Zimmer has only

negotiated a discrete settlement with a single plaintiff and paid

that plaintiff accordingly. It is simply a n on sequitur for the

government to infer from “payment responsibility” in tort a preexisting primary plan of self-insurance. In considering the

government’s allegations against Zimmer under the MSP statute, we

are compelled to pose the rhetorical question, where’s the plan? 3940 “It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction

that the words of a statute must be read in their context and

with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” FDA

v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)

(quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury , 489 U.S. 803, 809

(1989)).

41 United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.

, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1,

4 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)) (emphasis

added).

19 Beyond oblique references to Zimmer’s responsibility to pay Loftin,

the existence of a “primary plan” is nowhere to be found in the

government’s complaint against Zimmer.

On appeal, the government repeatedly (but in isolation) quotes

the MSP statute’s phrase that an entity which is “required or

responsibl e ” for paying for a Medicare recipient’s healthcare

expenses is liable to reimburse the government. Ergo, the

government urges, Zimmer is arguably liable under the MSP statute,

or at least there is a basis for inferring potential liability

sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Yet,

litigants cannot cherry-pick partic ular phrases out of statutory

schemes simply to justify an exceptionally broad —— and favorable

—— interpretation of a statute. 40 As the D.C. district court held

o nly one year ago in a similar case litigated by the government

under the MSP statute, “MSP liability attaches only to an entity

that is ‘required or responsible’ to pay under a ‘primary plan .’” 41

As we already noted, nothing in the government’s pleadings can be

read to support the conclusional allegation that Zimmer maintained

such “primary plan” of self-insurance for paying claimants such as42 On appeal, the government submits a copy of a portion of

the 10-K filing by Zimmer’s parent corporation, Bristol-Myers

Squibb Company (“Bristol-Myers”), showing that Bristol-Myers has

obtained insurance coverage for a substantial number of breastimplant products-liability claims. Beyond another oblique

argument that this 10-K filing reveals that Bristol-Myers has

arranged for additional insurance coverage, the government fails

to explain how this is relevant to whether Zimmer settled

Loftin’s discrete hip-prosthesis product-liability lawsuit under

a “primary plan” of “self-insurance.”

43 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council , 467 U.S.

837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to an agency’s

“permissible construction” or “reasonable interpretation” of

ambiguous statutory terms).

20 Loftin. 42 According to the plain terms of the MSP statute and the

HCFA regulations, therefore, Zimmer can have no MSP liability.

3. No Chevron Deference for the Government’s Interpretation

of the MSP Statute.

The gov ernment further argues that the term “self-insurance

plan,” as used in the MSP statute, is ambiguous, entitling the

agency’s own interpretation to Chevron deference. 43 According to

the government, this is particularly relevant because Zimmer is a

“large a nd sophisticated manufacturer of medical devices.” As

such, Zimmer’s status as a “large corporation” permits a reasonable

inference that Zimmer “can readily be regarded as self-insured.”

The government concludes that this is a reasonable interpretation

of the MSP statute’s ambiguous terms and legislative history, to

which we must defer.

We reject this effort by the government to clothe itself in

the de ference given to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of

ambiguous statutory provisions. First, the clarity of the MSP44 Id. at 842-43. Notably, the Court recognized that the

meaning of a statute is ascertained by “employing traditional

tools of statutory construction,” such as the above-referenced

canons. Id. at 843, n.9.

21 statute’s terms rea dily discloses the statute’s plain meaning,

eschewing the label of ambiguity. Thus, there is no need even to

consider Chevron deference because the government’s argument fails

the first prong of the analysis for granting such deference

—— the

determination that a statutory grant of authority to a regulatory

agency is ambiguous. As the C hevron court recognized, “[i]f the

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the

court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.” 44

Second, even if the MSP statute were ambiguous and we were to

consider legislative hist ory and the agency’s regulations, and

conclude that the HCFA regulations would support the government’s

appellate argument that Zimmer’s settlement agreement with Loftin

constituted a primary self-insurance plan, there is simply no

statutory suppo rt for the government’s position that uninsured

“sophisticated corporations” are per se self-insurers. There is no

language in the MSP statute justifying a distinction between a

“sophisti cated corporation” and an individual or small business.

The government does not invite our attention to anything that could

serve as a statutory hook on which to hang this argument. In fact,

the government has already attempted to sell this argument to45 See Mason , 212 F. Supp. 2d at 92; Philip Morris , 156 F.

Supp. 2d at 7.

46 Silicone Gel Breast Implants , 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1249

(citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 488 U.S. 204, 211

(1988)). See also Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 164

(denying Chevron deference to the government’s interpretation of

the MSP statute and regulations).

47 See Diet Drugs , 2001 WL 283163, at 11 n.20 (discussing

how an alleged tortfeasor could not be “reasonably expected” to

pay for health care expenses “promptly,” as is required of a

“primary plan” under the MSP statute and the HCFA’s regulations);

Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 167-69 (same); Dow Corning

Corp. , 250 B.R. at 348 n.29 (same).

22 district courts in New York and D.C., but to no avail. 45 It offers

us no reason why we should reject or depart from the se previous

judicial decisions. In summary, the government’s proffered

interpretation of the MSP sta tute, as it currently stands,

constitutes nothing more than “the liti gation position of agency

counsel that is wholly unsupported by regulations, ru lings, or

administrative practice [and thus] is not entitled to deference” by

this or any court. 46

4. Zimmer Cannot Pay for Medical Services “Promptly,” and

Thereby Fails the MSP Statute’s Requirement for a “SelfInsurance Plan.”

The district court determined that Zimmer does not possess a

“self-insurance plan” because it could not reasonably be expected

to pay Loftin’s healthcare claim “promptly,” as required under the

MSP staute. 47 The MSP statute provides for reimbursement of

conditional expenditures by Medicare for medical services in which48 § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii).

49 42 C.F.R. § 411.50(b).

50 Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 167.

51 Dow Corning Corp. , 250 B.R. at 348, n.29.

52 As the Orthopedic Bone Screw court poignantly observed,

“the other types of insurance included in the definition of a

‘primary payer’ under § 1395y(b)(2)(A), i.e., workmen’s

compensation, automobile and no fault insurance, are frequently

required by the terms of the policy itself to make prompt payment

for medical expenses. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 21103 (stating

23 another primary plan is “reasonably expected” to pay “promptly.” 48

The HCFA’s regulations define a “prompt” payment as one that occurs

within 120 days of either the date the claim is filed or the date

of the medical treatment it self, whichever is earlier. 4 9 As a

district court in Pennsylvania remarked on this same issue:

Given the time delay inherent in strongly prosecuted and

defended tort litigation, the Government cannot legitimately

assert that a settlement arrived at in the heat of a hard

fought adversarial engagement for alleged tort liability from

a defective product is the type of insurance “plan” that the

Government can reasonably expect to make prompt pa yment for

medical care. 50

Similarly, a bankruptcy court observed that “[i]t would seem to be

folly for the Government to argue that, when it made the Medicare

payments in question, there was a reasonable expectation that [an

alleged tortfeasor] would promptly pay for such medical care.” 5 1

In t he instant case, the statutory requirement that a primary

insurance plan pay within 120 days of a claim for medical care

unquestionably precludes our holding Zimmer potentially liable as

a “self-insurer.” 52that ‘under automobile medical or no fault insurance, payment can

frequently be foreseen with reasonable certainty’).” 202 F.R.D.

at 168, n.14.

53 Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, n.9 (noting that the “judiciary

is the final authority on issues of statutory construction”);

Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey , 201 F.3d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 2000)

(Jones, J., concurring) (noting that the district court’s

determination of “the scope of the Act . . . remain questions of

law that the court must determine pursuant to the rules of

statutory construction”).

54 See Mason , 212 F. Supp. 2d at 91-94 (granting defendant’s

motion to dismiss the government’s complaint under the MSP

statute given its sole allegation that defendant is only a

sophisticated corporate tortfeasor); Philip Morris, Inc. , 156 F.

Supp. 2d at 7 (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the

government’s complaint given its failure to allege a “selfinsured plan”); Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d at 144-46

(granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the government’s

complaint given the government’s failure to allege that the

defendant had a “self-insured plan”).

24 We must disagree nonetheless with the distric t court’s

suggestion that it is wrong to determine, on a motion to dismiss,

whether an alleged tortfeasor who enter s into a settlement

agreement is, i pso facto

, a “self-insurer.” This is an issue of

statutory interpretation; accordingly, a court may determine, as a

matter of law, wh ether an alleged tortfeasor is a “self-insurer”

under the MSP statute. 53 Thus, the district court would have been

justified in dismissing the complaint solely on the basis of the

government’s failure to allege in its complaint the essential

statuto ry element that Zimmer actually had in place a primary

insurance plan

. 54 We have determined, on the basis of the

government’s pleadings, that Zimmer is not a “self-insurer” under

the MSP statute. Even when construed liberally in favor of the55 Cf. Conticommodity Serv., Inc. v. Ragan , 63 F.3d 438, 442

(5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the grant of summary judgment “on

grounds other than the basis of the district court’s decision”).

56 Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc. , 144 F.3d 377,

380 (5th Cir. 1998).

57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986).

58 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

59 See Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston , 185 F.3d 521, 525

(5th Cir. 1999).

25 government as plaintiff, its complaint’s allegations do not rise to

the level of showing the existence of a “primary pla n” of selfinsurance. 55 Even so, the district court was correct in holding

that the MSP statute’s requirement of “prompt” payment is a valid

basis for precluding per se liability for an alleged to rtfeasor

under the MSP statute.

C. Goetzmann and Loftin’s Reimbursement Liability Under the MSP

Statute.

1. Standard of Review.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

, applying the

same standard as the distr ict court. 5 6 A motion for summary

judgment is properly granted only if there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact. 57 A fact issue is material if its resolution

could affect the outcome of the action. 58 In deciding whether a

fact issue has been created, we view the facts and the inferences

to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. 5960 Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323.

61 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S.

133, 150 (2000).

62 Id. at 151.

63 Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.

1994) (en banc).

26 The standard for summary judgment mirrors that for judgment as

a matter of law. 60 Thus, we must review all of the evidence in the

record, but make no credi bility determinations or weigh any

evidence. 61 In reviewing all the evidence, we must disregard all

evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not

required t o believe, and should give credence to the evidence

favoring the nonmoving party as well as the evidence supporting the

moving party that is unc ontradicted and unimpeached. 6 2 The

nonmoving party, howeve r

, cannot satisfy his summary judgment

burden with conclusional allegations, unsubstantiated assertions,

or only a scintilla of evidence. 63

2. Goetzmann and Loftin ar e not Required to Reimburse the

Government Because They did Not Receive Payment from an

Insurer.

The government asserts a right of recovery against Goetzmann

and Loftin based on their receipt of monies from Zimmer pursuant to

the terms of the settlement agreement. “Under the MPSA, the United

States is limited to pursuing an independent right of recovery

against two types of entities: a ‘primary plan;’ or an entity that64 Dow Corning Corp. , 250 B.R. at 337 (citing cases). See

also Silicone Gel Breast Implants , 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1253

(noting that “[t]he express wording of the [MSP] statute creates

a cause of action against insurers and their payees”).

65 See generally Mason , 212 F. Supp. 2d at 91-93; Silicone

Gel Breast Implants , 174 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-59; Philip Morris

, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 3-8; Orthopedic Bone Screw , 202 F.R.D. at 163-

69; Diet Drugs , 2001 WL 283163, at *9-*12; Philip Morris , 116 F.

Supp. 2d at 144-46; Dow Corning Corp. , 250 B.R. at 335-42, 348.

27 has received payment from a primary plan.” 64 As neither Goetzmann

nor Loftin can be found to have received monies from an entity ——

Zimmer

—— that dist ributed funds under a “primary plan,” neither

G oetzmann nor Loftin can be required to reimburse the governm ent

under the MSP statute.

III. CONCLUSION

This case is the latest illustration of the government’s

refusal to accept the burgeoning weight of jurisprudence comprising

at least seven judicial rejections of its repeated attempts to have

the MSP statute construed beyond its plain terms. Six federal

district courts and one bankruptcy court have already rejected the

government’s interpretation of the MSP statute to include alleged

tortfeasors who settle with injured plaintiffs. 65 In this case, the

government brings nothing new to the table in support of the very

same interpretation of the MSP statute that it ha s repeatedly

advanced and had repeatedly rejected by the courts. Rather, the

government simply regurgitates yet again the same unava iling

arguments.

We appear to be the first appellate court to address this66 Dow Corning Corp. , 250 B.R. at 336 n.21.

28 issue, but we see no valid reason to depart from the numerous trial

courts’ adept analyses of the MSP statute and its implementing

regulations. Although we might applaud its motive in seeking to

recoup funds it has disbursed for Medicare treatment and services,

the government’s desire to expand the list of those responsible for

reimbursement likely should be directed to Congress rather than to

the courts, lest future repetitions be met with sanctio ns for

unnecessarily protracting baseless or even frivolous litigation.

As the In re Dow Corning Corp. court noted:

Despite the relatively simple structure of the MSP

[sta tute], it has generated considerable case law. . . .

[S]adly, a significant amount of the legal melee is the direct

result of the Government urging statutory constructions, as it

has done in this case, that are entirely unsupported by the

statute and which appear to be intended to convert the MSP

[statute] from an important and sensibly fashioned fiscal

cost-cutting measure into a mere, heavy-handed collection

tool. 66

When the instant case is reduced to basics, the government’s

allegations do not depict Zimmer as having had acted under a

primary self-insurance plan whe n it settled with Loftin. Zimmer

was simply an alleged tortfeasor

—— nothing more and nothing less.

Loftin, through her attorney, Goetzmann, was simply a plaintiff in

a products-liability lawsuit who, through Goetzma nn, agreed to

settle with the defendant rather than proceeding to trial. As

alleged, the settlement reache d between Zimmer and Loftin was a

discrete agreement, the res ult of nothing more than the parties’29

particular litigation tactics in this one case. In fact, the

government does not allege anywhere in it s complaint that Zimmer

paid Goetzmann and Loftin according to a pre-existing primary plan

of self-insurance. The conclusion is thus inescapable: These

three parties are well outside the scope of the MSP statute. For

the foregoing reasons, the district court’s dismissals of the

government’s claims against Zimmer under Rule 12(b)(6), and against

Goetzmann and Loftin via summary judgment, are, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.