UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4122

MARK ANTHONY REID,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-00-57)

Submitted: November 28, 2001

Decided: January 24, 2002

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Anthony G. Spencer, MORCHOWER, LUXTON & WHALEY,

Richmond, Virginia; Scott Brettschneider, Kew Gardens, New York,

for Appellant. Benjamin H. White, Jr., United States Attorney, Sandra

J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Mark Anthony Reid appeals from his conviction of one count of

possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack) in violation

of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999), and sentence of

228 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Reid

argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because the officers who stopped the vehicle in which he was riding

did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Reid also argues

the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his

sentence was incorrectly calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998). We affirm Reid’s conviction and sentence. 

The findings of fact from the suppression hearing are reviewed

under the clearly erroneous standard and conclusions of law are

reviewed de novo. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873

(4th Cir. 1992). On the night in question, Officer Green of the Durham police department received a report from the communications

division regarding a complaint of a burgundy Dodge Durango with

weapons located near Building 36 on Ridgeway Avenue in the

McDougal Terrace public housing development. Officer Green and

two other officers responded to the call. While on the way to Building

36, they received a report over the police radio that a vehicle matching the same description was involved in an armed robbery a couple

of days earlier. The officers located a burgundy Dodge Durango three

or four blocks from Building 36 and stopped the vehicle. After the

driver of the vehicle was arrested, Reid, a passenger, tried to flee.

Reid was arrested for obstruction and trying to leave the scene. A subsequent search found 374.8 grams of crack cocaine on Reid’s person.

Officers are permitted "to effect a limited investigatory detention

when they possess ‘a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the

person seized is engaged in criminal activity.’" United States v. King,

2 UNITED STATES v. REID
119 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.

438, 440 (1980)). The combination of the tip stating the individuals

in the vehicle had weapons and the report that a vehicle matching the

same description was involved in an armed robbery a couple of days

earlier provided reasonable suspicion for the stop of the vehicle. 

Reid argues the testimony at trial was insufficient to support his

conviction because the testimony of the officers regarding where

police found the bag of drugs was contradictory. We review the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence, taken in the

light most favorable to the Government, to support the conviction.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). When considering

the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not review the credibility of a

witness’s testimony. United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d 384, 391 n.11

(4th Cir. 1998). We have reviewed the evidence and find, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence

is sufficient to support Reid’s conviction. 

Next, Reid argues his sentence was incorrectly calculated under the

Guidelines. First, he argues the district court improperly assessed

seven criminal history points placing him in category IV. We find the

seven point criminal history assessment proper under USSG § 4A1.1.

Second, Reid argues the district court erroneously failed to make a

downward departure from the guidelines range. However, we lack

authority to review the district court’s decision not to depart downward unless the district court’s decision is based on a mistaken belief

that it lacks authority to depart. United States v. Edwards, 188 F.3d

230, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1130 (2000). Reid

does not contend the district court mistakenly believed it lacked

authority to depart; therefore, this argument is without merit. 

Finally, Reid argues he should have been given a two point reduction in his offense level pursuant to a Department of Justice policy

based on his agreement to deportation following his incarceration.

Reid, however, has provided no authority for this type of a reduction

or cited any specific policy. Therefore, we affirm Reid’s conviction

and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. REID 3