UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4880

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KRISTOPHER AARON HUFFMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00043-1)

Submitted: March 10, 2014 Decided: March 14, 2014

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. 

Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. 

Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Joseph F. Adams, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kristopher Aaron Huffman appeals the sentence of ten 

months of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation. On 

appeal, Huffman does not contest the district court’s decision 

to revoke his probation, and acknowledges that the district 

court “properly calculated both advisory Guidelines ranges and 

gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate 

sentence.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11). Huffman argues that his 

sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court 

procedurally erred by failing “to adequately explain why the 

sentence it imposed was ‘sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary’ to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 8). We affirm.

Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district 

court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any 

sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d 

505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). This court “review[s] probation 

revocation sentences, like supervised release revocation 

sentences, to determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). 

The first step in this analysis is a determination of whether 

the sentence was unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 

F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Although a district court must consider the policy 

statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along 

with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), 

“the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its 

previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-

57. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing 

a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a postconviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of 

reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 

595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “We may be hard-pressed to find any explanation for 

within-range revocation sentences insufficient given the amount 

of deference we afford district courts when imposing these 

sentences . . . .” Id. If a sentence imposed after a 

revocation is not unreasonable, this court will not proceed to 

the second prong of the analysis — whether the sentence was 

plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court provided an adequate explanation of its 

sentencing determination, and the sentence is procedurally 

reasonable. Thus, “it necessarily follows that [Huffman’s] 

sentence is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 440.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED