FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA 

MELENDRES; JESSICA QUITUGUA 

RODRIGUEZ; DAVID RODRIGUEZ;

VELIA MERAZ; MANUEL NIETO, JR.;

SOMOS AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

JOSEPH M. ARPAIO,

Defendant.

No. 16-16661

D.C. No.

2:07-cv-02513-

GMS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 15, 2018

San Francisco, California

Filed July 31, 2018
2 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Susan P. Graber,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wallace

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s second 

supplemental injunction and victim compensation order in a 

class action alleging that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 

Office racially profiled Latino drivers and passengers under 

the guise of enforcing federal and state immigration laws.

The panel noted that there have been multiple appeals in 

this case and that the district court entered its second 

supplemental injunction after discovering that the Sheriff’s 

Office had deliberately violated the court’s previous 

injunction and committed new constitutional violations. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in formulating the terms of the second 

supplemental injunction, intended to remedy defendants’

misconduct and protect plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The 

panel was satisfied that the challenged provisions flowed 

from Sheriff Office’s violations of court prior orders, 

constitutional violations, or both. The panel rejected the 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 3

County’s contention that it was not a proper party to this 

action because the Sheriff’s Office and its sheriff do not act 

on behalf of the County. The panel noted that it had 

already—thrice—rejected this argument. Finally, the panel 

rejected the County’s contention that it had no authority 

under Arizona law, Arizona Revised Statute § 11-981(A)(2), 

to fund compliance with an injunction that arises from 

willful misconduct. The panel held that even assuming, 

without deciding that the County’s interpretation of the 

Arizona statute was correct, a state statute prohibiting 

payment for valid federal court-ordered remedies does not 

excuse a defendant from complying with those remedies. In 

addition, the panel noted that the statute that the County cited 

would, at most, prevent payment from insurance or selfinsurance funds. The County failed to explain how this law 

would preclude it from using other types of funds to comply 

with the district court’s orders, such as those it uses to fund 

its normal operations.

COUNSEL

Richard Walker (argued), Walker & Peskind PLLC,

Scottsdale, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Andre Segura (argued), ACLU Foundation of Texas,

Houston, Texas; Kathleen E. Brody and Brenda Muñoz 

Furnish, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona;

Cecilia D. Wang and Katrina L. Eiland, ACLU Foundation, 

San Francisco, California; Stanley Young, Covington & 

Burling LLP, Redwood Shores, California; Anne Lai, Irving, 

California; Julia Gomez, Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund, Los Angeles, California; for 

Plaintiffs-Appellees.
4 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

John M. Gore (argued), Acting Assistant Attorney General; 

Thomas E. Chandler, Attorney; Appellate Section, Civil 

Rights Section, United States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.; for Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Maricopa County appeals from the district court’s 

second supplemental injunction and victim compensation 

order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), 

and we affirm.

I.

There have been multiple appeals in this case. Melendres 

v. Maricopa County, 815 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(Melendres III); Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (Melendres II); Melendres v. Arpaio (Melendres 

I), 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012). We recount only the facts 

necessary to dispose of this appeal.

Plaintiffs filed this class action alleging that the 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) racially profiled 

Latino drivers and passengers under the guise of enforcing 

federal and state immigration laws. Melendres III, 815 F.3d 

at 648. Following a bench trial, the district court found that 

MCSO’s conduct violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 895 (D. Ariz. 

2013). The district court entered an injunction, ordering 

MCSO to take a variety of remedial measures including 

“appointing an independent monitor to assess and report on 

MCSO’s compliance with the injunction, increasing the 

training of MCSO employees, improving traffic-stop 
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 5

documentation, and developing an early identification 

system for racial-profiling problems.” Melendres III, 

815 F.3d at 648, citing Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1267. We 

affirmed the injunction, except for “certain provisions 

dealing with internal investigations and reports of officer 

misconduct,” which we remanded for the district court to 

tailor “more precisely to the constitutional violations at 

issue.” Melendres III, 815 F.3d at 648, citing Melendres II,

784 F.3d at 1267. We also dismissed MCSO and substituted 

Maricopa County (the County) in its place. Melendres II,

784 F.3d at 1260.

The district court later discovered that MCSO had 

deliberately violated the injunction and committed new 

constitutional violations. After twenty-one days of contempt 

proceedings, the district court found that MCSO’s sheriff 

and his command staff knowingly failed to implement the 

injunction, deliberately withheld evidence in violation of 

court orders, and “manipulated all aspects” of the internal 

affairs process to minimize discipline on MCSO deputies 

and command staff. Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-

PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 3996453, at *1−2 (D. Ariz. July 26, 

2016).

For example, the district court found that MCSO 

“detained and turned over [to federal authorities] at least 

157 persons whom it could not charge for violating any state 

or federal laws” in violation of the injunction. Melendres v. 

Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 2783715, at 

¶ 157 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2016). The district court also found 

that MCSO employees had failed to produce personal 

property seized from members of the Plaintiff class in 

violation of court orders. Id. at *29. A search of a former 

MCSO officer’s garage “uncovered more than 1600 items,” 

including approximately 500 drivers’ licenses, “tons” of 
6 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

license plates, vehicle registrations, cell phones, wallets, and 

other items of personal property. Id. at ¶¶ 214, 278. MCSO 

later collected at least 1,665 more government-issued 

identification cards (IDs). Id. at ¶¶ 287–94. MCSO admitted 

that “a significant number of its deputies seized IDs and 

other personal property as ‘trophies’ and has further 

admitted that it destroyed much of that property.” Id. at 

¶ 852. The district court also inferred from the “absence of 

complaints” about the property, that “such complaints were 

not properly transmitted, processed, or investigated.” Id.

Finally, the district court found that MCSO employees 

“did not make a good faith effort to fairly and impartially 

investigate and discipline misconduct.” Id. at *1. They 

“initiated internal investigations designed only to placate 

Plaintiffs’ counsel,” “named disciplinary officers who were 

biased in their favor and had conflicts,” “promulgated 

special inequitable disciplinary policies pertaining only to 

Melendres-related internal investigations,” “delayed 

investigations so as to justify the imposition of lesser or no 

discipline,” and “asserted intentional misstatements of fact 

to their own investigators and to the court-appointed 

Monitor.” Id. The district court explained, “Ultimately, few 

persons were investigated; even fewer were disciplined. The 

discipline imposed was inadequate. The only person who 

received a suspension—for one week—was also granted a 

raise and a promotion.” Id.

The district court entered a second supplemental 

injunction to remedy the misconduct and protect Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights. Melendres, 2016 WL 3996453, at *10. 

Among other things, the injunction revised MCSO’s 

disciplinary matrix, conflict of interest and whistleblower 

policies, training requirements for internal affairs staff, and 

complaint intake and tracking procedures. Id. at ¶¶ 163–260.
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 7

The injunction also vested the independent monitor with the 

authority to supervise and direct internal investigations 

related to the Plaintiff class and to inquire and report on other 

internal investigations. Id. ¶¶ 276, 289. It ordered the 

appointment of an independent investigator with 

disciplinary authority to investigate and decide discipline for 

internal investigations deemed invalid by the court. Id.

¶¶ 296, 320. The district court also directed the County to 

implement a victim compensation program for individuals 

injured by MCSO’s violations of the first injunction. 

Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 

WL 4415038, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2016).The County 

timely appealed.

II.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear

error and its legal conclusions de novo. Melendres II, 

784 F.3d at 1260. We review the scope and terms of an 

injunction for an abuse of discretion. Id.

III.

The County argues that the district court failed to tailor 

the terms of the second supplemental injunction to remedy 

the constitutional and court order violations it found. It also 

argues that the injunction violates federalism principles, 

which we construe as a variant of the first argument. The 

County asks that we strike the second supplemental 

injunction “in its entirety.” We decline to do so.1

 1 Plaintiffs argue that the sheriff consented to certain provisions in 

the second supplemental injunction by submitting a joint proposal with 

Plaintiffs pursuant to a court order, and that the County has waived any 

challenge to those provisions on appeal. We rejected a similar argument 
8 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

“We have long held that injunctive relief ‘must be 

tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.’” Melendres II, 

784 F.3d at 1265, quoting Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain 

Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). Federalism 

principles make tailoring particularly important where, as 

here, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against a state or local 

government. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378−79 

(1976). However, a district court has broad discretion to 

fashion injunctive relief. Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1265. 

The court exceeds that discretion “only if [the injunctive 

relief] is ‘aimed at eliminating a condition that does not 

violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a 

violation.’” Id., quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 

282 (1977). Further, where the enjoined party has a “history 

of noncompliance with prior orders,” and particularly where 

the trial judge has “years of experience with the case at 

hand,” we give the court a “great deal of flexibility and 

discretion in choosing the remedy best suited to curing the 

violation.” Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1265 (citations 

omitted).

Here, the County specifically identifies only a handful of 

provisions in the second supplemental injunction as 

allegedly problematic. First, it cites the provision that 

“grant[s] the Monitor ‘full access to all MCSO internal 

affairs investigations,” which the County says “reach[es] 

beyond matters directly affecting the interests of the Plaintiff 

class.” But the County fails to cite the rest of that provision, 

 

in Melendres II, 784 F.3d at 1264, and do so now again. Although MCSO 

did not expressly reserve appeal rights in the proposal, MCSO and the 

district court understood that the proposal was not an intentional 

relinquishment of appeal rights. Further, the County stated in response 

to the district judge’s findings of fact that it intended to retain all of its 

appeal rights as to those findings and their implications.
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 9

which says that “[w]hile the Monitor can assess all [MCSO] 

internal affairs investigations . . . to evaluate their good faith 

compliance with this Order, the Monitor does not have 

authority to direct or participate in investigations of or make 

any orders as to matters that do not [involve members of the 

Plaintiff class].” Melendres, 2016 WL 3996453, ¶¶ 162, 292 

(emphasis added).

Second, the County complains that the sheriff does not 

have “any authority” over matters related to the Plaintiff 

class until the district court decides that MCSO uniformly 

investigates misconduct and imposes fair discipline at all 

levels of command. Again, the County misreads the cited 

provision. The injunction states the “Court will not return the 

final authority to the Sheriff” until such time, not that the 

sheriff has no authority. Melendres, 2016 WL 3996453, 

¶ 290 (emphasis added). The sheriff “may exercise” 

authority to direct and resolve matters related to the Plaintiff 

class, subject to override by the monitor. Melendres, 

2016 WL 3996453, ¶ 282.

Third, the County argues that the district court gave itself 

“complete editorial control” over policies related to 

misconduct investigations, employee discipline, and 

grievances, including “all misconduct investigations of 

MCSO personnel.” The cited provision, however, actually 

directs the sheriff in the first instance to review and revise 

the policies to add terms enumerated by the court. Id.

¶¶ 165−67. Only if the sheriff, the monitor, and Plaintiffs 

disagree on the sheriff’s proposal will the court resolve the 

dispute. Id. ¶¶ 165−66.

Finally, the County cites the provision that directs its 

internal affairs department to move to an office space 

separate from MCSO’s facilities. Id. ¶ 198. The district court 
10 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

explained the move would “promote independence and the 

confidentiality of investigations.” Id.

In each instance, we are satisfied that the challenged 

provisions flow from MCSO’s violations of court orders, 

constitutional violations, or both. See Melendres II, 784 F.3d 

at 1265. Each challenged provision addresses the internal 

affairs and employee discipline process, which the district 

court found based on ample evidence MCSO had 

“manipulated” to “minimize or entirely avoid imposing 

discipline on MCSO deputies and command staff.” 

Melendres, 2016 WL 3996453, at *1. The district court 

explained that it “would have entered injunctive relief much 

broader in scope” had it known about “the evidence withheld 

by the MCSO and the evidence to which it led” when 

imposing the first injunction. Id. at *2. MCSO’s repeated 

bad-faith violations of court orders and Judge Snow’s seven 

years of experience with this case at the time he issued the 

challenged orders lead us to believe that the district court 

chose the remedy best suited to cure MCSO’s violations of 

court orders and to supplement prior orders that had proven 

inadequate to protect the Plaintiff class. See Melendres II, 

784 F.3d at 1265.

The County relies on Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 

378−79, to argue that the injunction violates federalism 

principles. We reject this argument. In Rizzo, the Supreme 

Court “found no ‘pattern’ of police misconduct sufficient to 

justify the detailed affirmative injunction” against a city 

police department. LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 

n.10 (9th Cir. 1985), quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 374. By 

contrast, here the district court found “MCSO’s 

constitutional violations [were] broad in scope, involve[d] 

its highest ranking command staff, and flow[ed] into its 

management of internal affairs investigations.” Melendres, 
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 11

2016 WL 3996453, at *1. The district court properly held 

that those characteristics distinguish this case from Rizzo. Id. 

at *5–6. In addition, of the four provisions that the County 

alleges violate federalism principles, it fails to discuss any of 

them or articulate how they are overbroad. We will not 

manufacture the County’s arguments for it. Greenwood v. 

FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994).

The County also contends that the injunction constitutes 

an abuse of discretion in light of the costs of the remedies it 

imposes. We disagree. “[F]ederal courts have repeatedly 

held that financial constraints do not allow states to deprive 

persons of their constitutional rights.” Stone v. City & 

County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the “less intrusive remedies” in the first injunction 

“were not effective due to Defendants’ deliberate failures 

and manipulations.” Melendres, 2016 WL 3996453, at *6. 

Therefore, the additional costs imposed by the second 

supplemental injunction were necessary to ensure MCSO’s 

compliance with court orders.

Finally, the County argues that the election of a new 

sheriff and other MCSO personnel changes render 

unnecessary “the severe and onerous restrictions on 

managerial discretion” contained in the order. Since this 

appeal was filed, the district court has offered to modify its 

prior orders, where appropriate, to accommodate these 

changed circumstances, and has already granted some 

requests by the new sheriff to amend the original injunction. 

To the extent that additional changes are appropriate, we 

leave it to the district court, which has overseen this 

litigation for many years, to consider those changes in the 

first instance.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

formulating the terms of the second supplemental injunction.
12 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

IV.

We turn now to the County’s contention that it is not a 

proper party to this action because MCSO and its sheriff do 

not act on behalf of the County. We have already—thrice—

rejected this argument. In Melendres II, we substituted the 

County as a defendant in this action in the place of MCSO, 

relying on a state court case holding that MCSO lacked 

separate legal status from the County. Melendres II, 784 F.3d 

at 1260, citing Braillard v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 

1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). In Melendres III, we elaborated 

on the County’s liability for MCSO’s actions. We explained 

that “under the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, ‘if the sheriff’s actions constitute county 

policy, then the county is liable for them.’” 815 F.3d at 650, 

quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 783 

(1997). Applying this rule, we concluded, “Arizona state law 

makes clear” that the MCSO sheriff’s “law-enforcement 

acts” constitute County policy because he has “final 

policymaking authority.” Melendres III, 815 F.3d at 650. We 

recently revisited the issue again, holding that the sheriff acts 

as a final policymaker for the County on law-enforcement 

matters. United States v. County of Maricopa, 889 F.3d 648, 

651 (9th Cir. 2018). Our prior decisions are binding on us 

now. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc). The County is a proper party to this action.

V.

Finally, the County argues that it has no authority under 

Arizona law to fund compliance with an injunction, such as 

this one, that arises from willful misconduct. Its argument is 

premised entirely on a state law, Arizona Revised Statute 

§ 11-981(A)(2), that permits payment from insurance or 

self-insurance funds for employee conduct “within the scope 

of employment or authority.” By negative inference, the 
MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES 13

County argues the statute prohibits such payments for 

employee conduct outside the scope of employment. But 

even assuming, without deciding, that this reading were 

correct, and assuming without deciding that the acts of 

MCSO’s employees were outside the scope of employment 

or authority, this argument fails. A state statute prohibiting 

payment for valid federal court-ordered remedies does not 

excuse a defendant from complying with those remedies. 

Hook v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 107 F.3d 1397, 1402−03 (9th 

Cir. 1997). In addition, the statute that the County cites 

would, at most, prevent payment from insurance or selfinsurance funds. Nowhere does the County explain how this 

law would preclude it from using other types of funds to 

comply with the district court’s orders, such as those it uses 

to fund its normal operations.

In any case, the County previously admitted its 

responsibility to remedy harm from MCSO’s intentional 

misconduct in Melendres III. 815 F.3d at 650. There, the 

County “concede[d] that it [was] required, by Arizona state 

statute, to provide funding for the massive changes the 

district court has imposed” and “conceded that even if we 

had never substituted it in place of MCSO, it would have 

nonetheless had to bear the financial costs associated with 

complying with the district court’s injunction.” Id. It cannot 

change its position now. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & 

Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600−01 (9th Cir. 1996).

State law does not bar the County from funding the 

injunction.
14 MELENDRES V. UNITED STATES

VI.

The district court’s orders are AFFIRMED.

The County shall bear Plaintiffs’ costs of appeal. Fed. R. 

App. P. 39(a)(2).