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*********************************************** 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY v.

DAWN FRITZELL ET AL.

(AC 38555)

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property

owned by the defendant. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion

for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon.

Notice of the filing of the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict

foreclosure and the court’s judgment of strict foreclosure were sent to

an address that the defendant had provided on an appearance form he

filed with the clerk’s office. Because no party exercised its right to

redemption, title to the property subject to the foreclosure vested in

the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment and extend the law days, claiming that he did not receive notice

of the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure or of the

court’s judgment because he no longer lived at the address that he had

provided on the appearance form. The defendant did not file a new

appearance form reflecting his change of address. The trial court denied

the defendant’s motion to open, finding that the defendant received the

process he was due because the plaintiff and the court properly sent

notice to the address provided by the defendant. On the defendant’s

appeal to this court, held that because notices of the plaintiff’s motion

and the court’s judgment were sent to the address that the defendant

provided on his appearance form, the trial court properly concluded

that the defendant received the notice he was due, and, consequently,

title to the subject property vested absolutely in the plaintiff following

the passing of the law days; accordingly, the defendant’s motion to open

was moot when it was filed approximately two months after the vesting

of title, as there was no practical relief that the trial court could have

granted the defendant at that time, and, therefore, the court should have

dismissed the motion to open as moot instead of denying it.

Argued September 7—officially released November 6, 2018

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the

defendant’s real property, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New

Haven, where the court, Maronich, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability; thereafter, the court, Ecker, J., granted the plaintiff’s second

motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered

judgment thereon; subsequently, the court, Ecker, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion to open the judgment,

and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed;

judgment directed.

Clifford D. Fritzell, III, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Victoria L. Forcella, with whom, on the brief, was

S. Bruce Fair, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Clifford D. Fritzell, III,1

appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to

open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in

favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust

Company.2 On appeal, the defendant claims that the

trial court (1) erroneously denied his motion to open

(2) erred by failing to vacate its order setting the law

days for February 17 and 18, 2015 (3) improperly placed

the burden on him to demonstrate lack of notice of the

plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and

(4) erred by penalizing him for being a former attorney.

The first two claims involve the defendant’s central

argument that, contrary to the conclusion of the trial

court, notice of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of

strict foreclosure and the court’s judgment of foreclosure sent to the address the defendant had provided

on his appearance form did not sufficiently notify him

of the proceedings against him. We agree with the court

that the defendant received the notice to which he was

entitled, but conclude that because there was no practical relief available to the defendant, the court should

have dismissed the motion to open instead of denying it.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims on

appeal. In August, 2011, the plaintiff commenced the

underlying action to foreclose a mortgage on certain

real property located at 282 North High Street in East

Haven. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of strict

foreclosure on December 13, 2011, which was granted

on January 3, 2012. According to the defendant, service

of process and notice of the judgment were mistakenly

sent to the address of the defendant’s father, who shares

the same name as the defendant. The defendant represents that he subsequently learned of the foreclosure

action and judgment from his father. The defendant

filed a motion to open the judgment on February 21,

2012. This motion was heard and granted on March

12, 2012.

On March 12, 2012, the defendant filed an appearance

with the court, providing his address as 131 Mulberry

Point Road in Guilford. On March 26, the defendant

filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing that he

was not served at his address. On April 10, the plaintiff

filed an objection to the defendant’s motion to dismiss,

arguing, inter alia, that the defendant received actual

notice. On April 11, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite

in the defendant, stating that the defendant may not

have been properly served. The court granted the

motion to cite in the defendant on April 26, and the

summons and complaint were served on the defendant

at 131 Mulberry Point Road in Guilford. On April 30,

the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.3

On February 1, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment as to liability, which was granted

on April 22, 2013. On December 12, 2014, the plaintiff

filed a second motion for judgment of strict foreclosure.

On January 6, 2015, the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure,

setting the law days for February 17 and 18, 2015. On

February 19, 2015, because no party exercised its right

to redemption, title to the property subject to the foreclosure vested in the plaintiff.

Notice of both the filing of the plaintiff’s motion for

judgment of strict foreclosure and the court’s judgment

were sent to 131 Mulberry Point Road in Guilford, the

address that the defendant had provided on the appearance form he filed with the clerk of court. The defendant

represents, however, that he no longer lived at 131

Mulberry Point Road in Guilford. The defendant provided that, in August, 2013, he had moved to the property subject to the foreclosure, located at 282 North

High Street in East Haven. He did not file a new appearance form reflecting this change of address.

The defendant claims that he became aware of the

judgment of strict foreclosure in March, 2015, through

his wife, who ‘‘perus[ed] the case activity periodically.’’

On April 7, the defendant filed a motion to open the

judgment and extend the law days. On May 26, the

trial court, Ecker, J., held a hearing on the defendant’s

motion to open the judgment. During the hearing, the

defendant claimed that he did not receive notice of the

plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure or

notice of the court’s judgment of strict foreclosure. In

addition, he argued that if he had received notice, he

could have transferred the mortgage to his wife. The

plaintiff argued that its pleadings, as certified in the

certification page, and the court’s notice were sent to

the defendant’s address of record with the court at the

time. In response, the defendant argued that he had

been sending the plaintiff correspondence from an

address in Old Saybrook, and therefore, the plaintiff

knew that the defendant was living at a different address

than the address he provided on his appearance form.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an

oral ruling denying the defendant’s motion. The court

found that the defendant received the process he was

due. It explained that, because the defendant filed an

appearance with the court, providing his address as 131

Mulberry Point Road in Guilford, the plaintiff and the

court were entitled to rely on it. At the hearing, when

discussing that the defendant should have filed an

updated appearance form indicating his new address,

the court stated: ‘‘[Y]ou’re a lawyer, you should know

better.’’ The court concluded that, because notices of

the plaintiff’s motion and the court’s judgment were

sent to the address the defendant provided, the defendant received sufficient notification of the proceedings.

This appeal followed.
The plaintiff asserts that this court should dismiss

this appeal for mootness because the defendant no

longer has any legal interest in the property. The crux

of the claim is that title in the plaintiff became absolute

following the passing of the law days without redemption by any defendant, and that date having passed

before the defendant filed his motion to open, the defendant can no longer be provided with practical relief.4

Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Miller, 129

Conn. App. 429, 434–35, 21 A.3d 853 (2011) (‘‘It is a

general rule that a judgment of strict foreclosure ordinarily cannot be opened after the law day has passed

. . . . Once title has vested, no practical relief is available.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted]).

‘‘Because [m]ootness implicates [this] court’s subject

matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for

[it] to resolve . . . ordinarily, we would be required

to address that issue first, before considering the merits

of [an] appeal. This is so because [i]t is a well-settled

general rule that the existence of an actual controversy

is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is

not the province of appellate courts to decide moot

questions, disconnected from the granting of actual

relief or from the determination of which no practical

relief can follow.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas,

288 Conn. 568, 575, 953 A.2d 868 (2008).

In this case, however, as in Argent Mortgage Co.,

LLC,

5

the issue of mootness is ‘‘inextricably intertwined’’; id.; with the issue raised by the defendant

on appeal, namely, whether the trial court improperly

denied his motion to open despite his claim that he did

not receive notice of the judgment and therefore could

not exercise his right of redemption. In other words,

our determination of whether the defendant can be

granted any practical relief depends on whether the

defendant was given the notice to which he was entitled

when judgment was entered against him, or whether

the judgment violated the defendant’s right to due process. We therefore turn to that issue.

The defendant claims that the court should have

opened the judgment of strict foreclosure because he

did not receive sufficient notice of the judgment and,

therefore, could not exercise his right of redemption.6

He argues that the notice provided was insufficient to

satisfy due process. We disagree.

‘‘[D]ue process does not require that a property owner

receive actual notice’’ of an action before being

deprived of his or her property. Cornelius v. Rosario,

138 Conn. App. 1, 14, 51 A.3d 1144, cert. denied, 307

Conn. 934, 56 A.3d 713 (2012), cert. denied sub nom.

Cornelius v. Nelson, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 386, 187 L. Ed.

2d 28 (2013). ‘‘Rather, we have stated that due process

requires the government to provide notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford

them an opportunity to present their objections.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The defendant was entitled to notice of the plaintiff’s

motion for judgment of strict foreclosure as well as

notice of the court’s judgment.7 The defendant does not

challenge the fact that notices of both the motion and

judgment were sent to the address he provided on his

appearance form.8 The appearance form filed by the

defendant contained the following notice to self-represented parties: ‘‘A self-represented party is a person

who represents himself or herself. If you are a selfrepresented party and you filed an appearance before

and you have since changed your address, you must let

the court and all attorneys and self-represented parties

of record know that you have changed your address

by checking the box below . . . I am filing this appearance to let the court and all attorneys and self-represented parties of record know that I have changed my

address. My new address is below.’’ Thus, the form

explicitly informs the filer of his or her obligation to

give notice of each new address.

Sending notice to the defendant’s address as listed

on his appearance form provided the defendant with

the process that he was due. Although the defendant

claims that he did not receive actual notice of the judgment until after the passing of the law days, the notices

sent in compliance with the rules of practice reasonably

were calculated to notify the defendant of the action,

which is what due process requires. See Cornelius v.

Rosario, supra, 138 Conn. App. 14.

The defendant filed an appearance providing his

address as 131 Mulberry Point Road in Guilford, the

address to which the notice was sent.9 The defendant

himself concedes that ‘‘[t]he purpose of [the appearance

form] is to make the other parties aware of how to

contact . . . one another.’’ Here, by filing the appearance and providing 131 Mulberry Point Road in Guilford

as his address, the defendant was notifying the court

and the plaintiff that he wanted to be contacted at that

address.10 See Practice Book § 3-7 (b). Thus, notices

sent to that address reasonably were calculated to

notify the defendant of the action, and therefore the

court did not deprive the defendant of due process.

In summary, because notices of the plaintiff’s motion

and the court’s judgment were sent to the address that

the defendant provided on his appearance form, the

court properly concluded that the defendant received

the notice he was due. Consequently, title to the 282

North High Street property vested absolutely in the

plaintiff on February 19, 2015, following the passing of

the law days. In light of that fact, the defendant’s motion

to open was moot when it was filed on April 7, 2015,

approximately two months after the vesting of title,
because there was no practical relief that the trial court

could have granted the defendant at that time. See

Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, supra, 288 Conn.

581–582 (after title had vested absolutely in plaintiff,

court should have dismissed, rather than denied, late

motion to open); see also Citigroup Global Markets

Realty Corp. v. Christiansen, 163 Conn. App. 635, 640,

137 A.3d 76 (2016) (same). Accordingly, instead of denying the defendant’s motion to open, the trial court

should have dismissed it as moot.

The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment

is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to

dismiss the defendant’s motion to open the judgment

of strict foreclosure as moot.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Dawn Fritzell and Hospital of Saint Raphael were named as defendants

in this action, but they are not participating in this appeal. Therefore, all

references in this opinion to the defendant are to Clifford D. Fritzell, III.

2 The plaintiff is acting as trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan

Trust 2005-2.

3 The defendant does not challenge service of process on appeal.

4 The plaintiff claims that title to the property in question became absolute

in the plaintiff approximately two months before the defendant filed his

motion to open, which precludes resorting to General Statutes § 49-15 (a).

Section 49-15 (a) (1) provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘no [judgment of strict

foreclosure] shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any

encumbrancer . . . .’’

Section 49-15 (a) (1) also provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘[a]ny judgment

foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion

of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person

having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and

modified. . . .’’ (Emphasis added). One of the defendant’s claims on appeal

is that the court improperly placed the burden on him to demonstrate lack

of notice of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. This

claim is without merit. ‘‘Cause’’ under § 49-15 means good cause, and the

movant bears the burden of establishing it. Connecticut National Bank v.

Zuckerman, 29 Conn. App. 541, 546, 616 A.2d 814 (1992) (‘‘[i]t was the

defendants’ burden to establish the existence of good cause to be entitled

to an opening of the judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 49-15’’). Thus,

the court properly placed the burden on the defendant—the movant—to

establish the existence of good cause, namely, his claim of insufficient notice.

5 Although the defendant’s claim here involves defective notice of the

foreclosure judgment, and not defective service of process as in Argent

Mortgage Co., LLC, the rationale of that case applies by analogy to this

appeal.

6 The defendant also claims that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it identified an

appearance form on file that was clearly no longer accurate with regards

to the defendant’s address and penalized him because he was a former

attorney.’’ The defendant bases this claim on the court’s statement that

‘‘you’re a lawyer, you should know better,’’ when it told the defendant that

he should have filed an updated appearance form with his new address.

From the record, it is clear that the court did not deny the defendant’s

motion on the basis of the defendant being a former attorney. Rather, the

court found that the defendant received sufficient notice of the court’s

judgment because notice was sent to the address the defendant provided

on his appearance form. In addition, the defendant cites no authority for

the proposition that this single remark amounts to error.

7 Practice Book § 10-12 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]t is the responsibility of counsel or a self-represented party filing the same to serve on

each other party who has appeared one copy of every pleading subsequent

to the original complaint, every written motion other than one in which an

order is sought ex parte . . . .’’ Practice Book § 10-13 further provides in

relevant part that ‘‘[s]ervice upon the attorney or upon a self-represented

party . . . may be by delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last known

address of the attorney or party.’’ Regarding notice of judgment, Practice

Book § 7-5 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he clerk shall give notice, by
mail or electronic delivery, to the attorneys of record and self-represented

parties . . . of all judgments, nonsuits, defaults, decisions, orders and rulings unless made in their presence.’’ In addition, JDNO notice is used to

indicate that notice of a decision or order has been sent by the clerk’s office

to all parties of record and raises a presumption that notice was sent and

received in the absence of a finding to the contrary. McTiernan v. McTiernan, 164 Conn. App. 805, 808 n.2, 138 A.3d 935 (2016).

8 Practice Book § 3-3 (a) explains that an appearance includes the mailing

address of the party for whom the appearance is being filed. Practice Book

§ 3-7 (b), governing the consequences of filing an appearance, provides

in relevant part: ‘‘After the filing of an appearance, the attorney or selfrepresented party shall receive copies of all notices required to be given to

parties by statute or by these rules.’’

9 The defendant contends that he should have received notice at the

property subject to the foreclosure, located at 282 North High Street in East

Haven. He did not file an appearance form providing this address, however,

until April 1, 2015—almost two months after the law days passed and less

than a week before he filed his motion to open.

10 As the court pointed out at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to

open, the plaintiff and the court are not only permitted, but required to use

the address on the appearance form. In Branford v. Van Eck, 86 Conn. App.

441, 445, 861 A.2d 560 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 922, 867 A.2d 839

(2005), the defendant filed a self-represented appearance in which he gave

an address to which all pleadings were to be sent. The plaintiff in that case

failed to mail several pleadings to that address, instead sending them to the

property subject to the foreclosure and another address it found for the

defendant. Id., 444. On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court

correctly denied the plaintiff’s motion to default the defendant due to the

plaintiff’s failure to certify service to the defendant at his address of record.

Id., 445. The court further stated that it did ‘‘not condone the actions of the

plaintiff’s counsel’’ in electing to mail pleadings to the subject property and

a putative address rather than to his address of record. Id. Overall, the court

in Branford emphasizes the importance of sending notice to the address of

record in accordance with a party’s appearance form.