J-S32032-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.S.J., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.J., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 779 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2020,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000347-2019.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2020

In this matter, Appellant J.J. (Father) appeals from the order 

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his two-year-old daughter

M.S.J. (Child) pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent factual and procedural history 

in its opinion:

[Child] has been in care continuously for approximately two 

and a half years. [The Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS)] initially became involved with this family 

when Child tested positive for cocaine. An Order of 

Protective Custody (OPC) was subsequently obtained due to 

the positive drug screen and concerns regarding Mother’s 

lack of housing and [the presence of] domestic violence. In 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, and thus is not 

a party to this appeal.
J-S32032-20

- 2 -

September 2017, [Child] was adjudicated dependent and 

committed to DHS because [Child] was “without proper care 

or control, subsistence, education as required by law or

other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or 

emotional health or morals.” Based on those concerns Fred 

Anderson, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case 

manager supervisor, testified that his agency established a 

single case plan objectives for Father [to accomplish 

reunification].

On May 7, 2019, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights to [Child] pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) and to change 

[Child’s] permanency goal to adoption. [The trial court] 

conducted a combined termination and goal change hearing 

(TPR hearing) on February 19, 2020. At the hearing, Mr. 

Anderson testified that Father’s single case plan objectives 

were as follows: (1) attend Menergy, a domestic violence 

program; (2) attend ARC for housing and employment; (3) 

attend visitation. Regarding Father’s compliance with his 

objectives, Mr. Anderson testified that Father only attended 

one session of Menergy in two and a half years. 

Additionally, Father never completed housing at the ARC 

and did not have housing at the time of the TPR hearing.

Father was offered supervised visits with [Child] but 

hadn’t been consistently visiting. Lauren Wade, the 

visitation coach, testified that Father attended four of fifteen 

offered visits between November 2019 and February 2020. 

Ms. Wade testified that Father had cancelled several visits 

at the last minute or failed to attend after confirming several 

times, including the Friday prior to the TPR hearing. With 

respect to the bond between [Child] and Father, Ms. Wade 

indicated that there was very minimum contact between 

them at visits. She clarified that Father does not verbally 

engage with [Child] and she has never heard [Child] speak. 

Ms. Wade also testified that [Child] does not appear to be 

bonded with Father. Additionally, Ms. Wade testified that 

Father does not appear bonded with [Child.] Ms. Wade also 

stated that [Child] shows no emotion towards Father. The 

foster parent is the one who meets all of [Child’s] general 

and medical needs. Additionally, Child’s foster parent 

testified that [Child] calls her [“]mom[”] and has never 

asked for Father. [Child’s] foster parent also testified that 

[Child] is very talkative and animated at home.
J-S32032-20

- 3 -

Based on the foregoing testimony, [the trial court] issued 

a decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and finding, 

in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), that such 

termination best serves the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of [Child.] Father filed a timely 

notice of appeal on March 3, 2020 along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)[.]

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 4/23/20, at 1-3 (citations to the record omitted).

Father presents one issue for our review:

Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where DHS failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights best served the emotional needs and welfare 

of [Child]?

Father’s Brief at 5.

We begin our discussion mindful of our well-settled standard of review 

in termination cases:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.
J-S32032-20

- 4 -

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of 

the child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

In this case, the court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

subsections 2511(a)(1) (2), (5), (8), and (b). Father does not challenge the 

trial court’s conclusions that termination was warranted under Section 

2511(a), thereby conceding the first prong of the termination analysis. 

Rather, he focuses his appeal on the second prong under Section 2511(b). 

That section provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1) ... or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 
J-S32032-20

- 5 -

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice 

of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

In the context of the Section 2511(b) analysis, “the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). The court 

is not required to use expert testimony, and social workers and caseworkers 

may offer evaluations as well. Id. Still, the ultimate concern is the needs and 

welfare of a child.

We have explained:

Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, 

comfort, security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child 

relationship, as well as the tangible dimension. Continuity 

of the relationships is also important to a child, for whom 

severance of close parental ties is usually extremely painful. 

The trial court, in considering what situation would best 

serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the 

status of the natural parental bond to consider whether 

terminating the natural parent's rights would destroy 

something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Z.P., 994 A.2d 

at 1121).

Lastly, where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. See M.P., 204 A.3d at 984 

(citing In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)).
J-S32032-20

- 6 -

Instantly, Father’s argument on appeal pertains exclusively to the bond 

question, notwithstanding the fact that the bond issue is only one aspect of 

the Section 2511(b) analysis. See Father’s Brief at 8-9. Specifically, Father 

contends that the court erred when it determined there was no bond between 

Father and Child. The court made its determination based, in part, on the

testimony of Ms. Wade, the visitation coach tasked with supervising visits 

between Father and Child. Ms. Wade explained that while Father attended the 

visits with snacks and entertainment, he and Child often sat together in silence 

and watched videos on his phone. Father argues that the court did not give 

enough appreciation to the fact that Child was very anti-social, and needed a 

speech therapist with her social and language skills. He concludes that Child’s 

desire to sit quietly on Father’s lap while they engaged in an hour-long 

visitation is indicative of a bond.

We conclude Father’s argument lacks merit. Child spent three days in 

Father’s care before she was removed by court order. She proceeded to spend 

the following 32 months with her pre-adoptive foster parent at which point 

the court held the termination hearing. Father never obtained reunification, 

and in fact, requested a paternity test approximately a year into the 

dependency proceedings. Throughout the dependency case, Father was 

inconsistent with his visitations with Child, attending just four appointments 

of the fifteen offered in the three months prior to the termination hearing. 

Although Father was apparently very pleasant to Child, Child did not consider 

him to be a source of parental care. For instance, if Father reached down to 
J-S32032-20

- 7 -

hug Child, Child would walk off and go to Ms. Wade without acknowledging 

Father. Ms. Wade testified that she never heard Child speak a word during 

the visits. According to the foster parent, Child is actually animated and 

talkative when she is inside her comfort zone, but she shuts down and 

becomes non-communitive when she is outside of it. That Child can sit 

patiently on Father’s lap for an hour is not a testament to their bond, but to 

the efforts of the foster parent who provided her with vital developmental 

care. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, Father misses the point of 

the bonding inquiry. The question is not whether a parental bond exists, but 

whether one is worth preserving. As Father has never provided parental care 

to Child, the answer to this question is self-evident. Based on the foregoing, 

the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that no bond exists, much 

less one worth preserving.

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err or commit an abuse of 

discretion by finding involuntary termination of Father’s rights was warranted 

under Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/24/20