J-S25012-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ASHLEE DAWN DRUHOT

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1077 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 26, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-24-CR-0000136-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 12, 2018

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order 

entered in the Elk County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition 

of Appellee, Ashlee Dawn Druhot, for a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed 

the criminal complaint that charged Appellee with several offenses arising 

from the death of her minor child (“O.M.”), for the Commonwealth’s failure to 

present a prima facie case on all counts.1 We affirm. 

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. 

Procedurally, we add that the Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal 

____________________________________________

1 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the Commonwealth has certified in its notice 

of appeal that the trial court’s order substantially handicapped or terminated 

the prosecution of the Commonwealth’s case against Appellee. Accordingly, 

this appeal is properly before us for review. 
J-S25012-18

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on July 21, 2017. The court ordered the Commonwealth on July 26, 2017, to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b); the Commonwealth timely complied on August 11, 2017. 

The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY WEIGHING THE 

2009 CONVICTION OF SCOTT MURPHY ASSAULTING 

[FATHER] AS BEING “TOO REMOTE IN TIME AND FAR TOO 

ATTENUATED CIRCUMSTANTIALLY” TO EVIDENCE A 

PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE BY SCOTT MURPHY, SAID 

EVIDENCE BEING ADMITTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH AT 

[THE] TIME OF [THE] PRELIMINARY HEARING[?]

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

[APPELLEE]’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DISMISSING AS TO COUNT 1, INVOLUNTARY 

MANSLAUGHTER, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 2503(A), MISDEMEANOR 

FIRST DEGREE, OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AS THE 

COMMONWEALTH MAINTAINS THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE 

WAS PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH IN SUPPORT OF 

SAID CRIMINAL OFFENSE[?]

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

[APPELLEE]’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DISMISSING COUNT 2, ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF 

CHILDREN, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 4304(A)(1), FELONY THIRD 

DEGREE, OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AS THE 

COMMONWEALTH MAINTAINS THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE 

WAS PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH IN SUPPORT OF 

SAID CRIMINAL OFFENSE[?]

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

[APPELLEE]’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DISMISSING COUNT [4], ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF 

CHILDREN, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 4304(A)(1), FELONY THIRD 

DEGREE, OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AS THE 

COMMONWEALTH MAINTAINS THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
J-S25012-18

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WAS PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF SAID 

CRIMINAL OFFENSE[?]

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

[APPELLEE]’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DISMISSING COUNT [3], RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING 

ANOTHER PERSON, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 2705, MISDEMEANOR 

SECOND DEGREE, OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AS THE 

COMMONWEALTH MAINTAINS THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE 

WAS PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF SAID 

CRIMINAL OFFENSE[?]

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING 

[APPELLEE]’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DISMISSING COUNT 5, RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING 

ANOTHER PERSON, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 2705, MISDEMEANOR 

SECOND DEGREE, OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION AS THE 

COMMONWEALTH MAINTAINS THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE 

WAS PRESENTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF SAID 

CRIMINAL OFFENSE[?]

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4-5). 

A pre-trial habeas decision is not subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard. Commonwealth v. Karetny, 583 Pa. 514, 880 A.2d 505 (2005). 

A pre-trial habeas decision on the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a 

charged crime is a question of law subject to plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en 

banc) (citing Karetny, supra). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Richard A. 

Masson, we conclude the Commonwealth’s issues merit no relief. The trial 

court fully discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. (See
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Trial Court Opinion, filed June 26, 2017, at 1-10) (finding: (1-2)

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to establish prima facie case 

against Appellee for involuntary manslaughter; Commonwealth’s evidence 

established on or about December 31, 2015, Appellee was aware Daniel J. 

Murphy (“Father”) had delivered their two minor children (“Children”) to 

apartment of Scott and Kristy Murphy, Children’s paternal aunt and uncle; 

Appellee did not have input into Father’s decision to move Children to home 

of uncle and aunt; Appellee did not reside in Elk County and was never present 

in Scott and Kristy Murphy’s home; Father continuously assured Appellee he 

would bring Children back from Scott and Kristy Murphy’s home; in attempt 

to show Appellee was aware of Scott Murphy’s propensity for violence, 

Commonwealth presented written statement Appellee provided police in 

investigation of Scott Murphy’s 2009 simple assault against Father; during 

2009 incident, Scott Murphy was drunk and attacked his adult brother with 

knife; no children were present or harmed during 2009 incident; Scott 

Murphy’s conviction for 2009 assault of Father is too remote in time and too 

attenuated to evidence propensity for violence; 2009 incident occurred seven 

years before death of O.M.; television news interview Appellee gave after

death of O.M. did not establish Appellee knew or should have known of 

threatening conditions at Scott and Kristy Murphy’s home; Appellee inquired 

and received several reports that Children were in good health while living 

with Scott and Kristy Murphy; statements Appellee made to television news 
J-S25012-18

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reporter do not demonstrate any foreknowledge of substantial and 

unjustifiable risk to O.M. at home of Scott and Kristy Murphy; marginal 

concern Appellee expressed as to Scott and Kristy Murphy’s lack of their own 

children did not show Appellee knew of Children’s living conditions and 

circumstances; Commonwealth failed to present prima facie evidence Appellee 

consciously disregarded risk to Children; (3-4) Commonwealth failed to 

establish prima facie case for two counts of endangering welfare of children 

(“EWOC”); evidence did not show Appellee knew conditions at Scott and Kristy 

Murphy’s home put Children in danger requiring reasonable person to 

intervene; Appellee received reports from Father that Children were in good 

health; Appellee also received reports from her mother and sister, and viewed 

photographs of Children on Facebook, which corroborated Father’s reports; 

Appellee was unaware of any threatening conduct by Scott and Kristy Murphy 

that would require action to protect Children; (5-6) Commonwealth failed to 

establish prima facie case for two counts of reckless endangerment of another 

person (“REAP”); Commonwealth presented no evidence to show Appellee 

knew Children were at risk of death or great bodily harm while Children lived 

in home of Scott and Kristy Murphy). We agree. The record supports the trial 

court’s decision, and we have no reason to disturb it. See Karetny, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Order affirmed. 
J-S25012-18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/12/2018
Circulated 06/20/2018 11:03 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

VS. 

ASHLEE DAWN DRUHOT 

* CRIMINAL 

NO. CP-24-CR-136-2016 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pending before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of the 

defendant, Ashlee Dawn Druhot, on July 18, 2016. Hearing on the petition was conducted 

November 3, 2016, and legal memorandums were subsequently provided by counsel. Druhot's 

petition for writ of habeas corpus challenges the sufficiency of the evidence provided to the 

issuing authority, Magisterial District Judge James L. Martin, during the June 8, 2016 

preliminary hearing as to the charges in the criminal complaint filed against Druhot in which she 

was charged with one count of involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2504(a); two counts of 

endangering welfare of children, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); and two counts of recklessly 

endangering another person, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705. All of these charges were bound over to court 

by Magisterial District Judge Martin at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. 

1) Count 1: Involuntary Manslaughter 

In Count 1 of the criminal Information filed July 1, 2016, Druhot is charged with 

involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2504(a), incident to the death of her son, 0.31K. 

who died on or about February 3, 2016. At the time of his death, 0. M. was five years 

old," For purposes of a preliminary hearing, it is not 

necessary to establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but the Commonwealth 

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must establish at least a ma faciestase thata_crime_has been committed and" the accused is 

probably the one who committed it. Com. v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). "The 

evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be 

warrante m permt ungine Use to be decided by the Jury; tom. v. Karetny, 807c72-CDU) (Pa. 

2005). 

Involuntary manslaughter includes the prohibited act: "when as a direct result of the 

doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in 

a reckless or grossly negligent manner; he causes the death of another person." 18 Pa. C.S.A. 

§2504(a). A person acts recklessly when they "consciously disregard[] a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must 

be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and 

the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 

conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation." 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 

302(b)(3). 

Where an offense requires an act to create criminal culpability, an omission to act may 

create criminal culpability where a duty to perform is imposed by law. Corn. v. Howard, 402 

A.2d 674, 676 (Pa.Super. 1979). Such a duty is the legal duty imposed on parents to protect their 

children and the discharge of this duty requires affirmative performance. Id at 676. In Howard, 

the defendant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter as a result of her failure to protect 

her child from acts of abuse committed by her boyfriend, which occurred over several weeks. Id 

at 678. The defendant in Howard witnessed and had full knowledge of the continued pattern of 

abuse by her boyfriend, but consciously disregarded the risk to the health and safety of her child. 

Id. The Howard court reasoned that this conscious disregard by the defendant was a gross 

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deviation from the standard conduct a reasonable-parenauld-take-under the circumstances- Mr 

It was this gross deviation from the standard conduct that created the criminal culpability 

required to find the defendant in Howard guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 

n e p esen case, e ourt mi st at t o evu ence presen 

a prima facie case against Druhot for involuntary manslaughter. The Commonwealth's evidence 

established that on or about December 31, 2015, Druhot was aware that Daniel Murphy, the 

father of her children, O.M. avd K. m. 1 delivered the children to the 

apartment of Scott and Kristy Murphy, the children's paternal uncle and aunt who lived at 149 

'A Main Street, Ridgway Borough, Elk County, Pennsylvania. Druhot also was aware that the 

children remained with Scott and Kristy Murphy until the death of a IAA. on or about 

February 3, 2016. 6/8/16 P.H. Tr., pg. 103. Druhot did not have input into Daniel Murphy's 

decision to move the children to Ridgway, she did not reside in Elk County, she was never 

present in Scott and Kristy Murphy's apartment, and Daniel Murphy continuously made 

assurances to the defendant that he would bring both children back. However, the only evidence 

the Commonwealth presented in the context of this charge was a simple assault conviction for 

Scott Murphy and a statement made by Druhot during her interview on February 4, 2016, to 

Sara Small, a multimedia journalist affiliated with WJAC-TV who was covering the story about 

the death of 0,M 

( - The Commonwealth promoted that Druhot was aware of Scott Murphy's propensity for 

violence as she was present during an assault and gave a statement to the police that lead to the 

conviction of Scott Murphy for simple assault. The incident that resulted in Scott Murphy's 

simple assault conviction occurred in 2009, when he was intoxicated and attacked his brother, 

Daniel Murphy, with a knife. No children were present, let alone involved or harmed during the 

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incident and this was the only evidenQtpresented regarding any criminal convictions for Scott 

Murphy. 

The Commonwealth also asserts that the Sara Small interview of Druhot is evidence of 

Diuhui -kno ledge ofilTunsafe circumstances Cam. .4,t K. fvl. 

at Scott and Kristy Murphy's apartment. The interview occurred on February 4, 2016, the day 

after 0. fin. was found dead. 6/8/16 P.H. Tr., pgs. 45-63. During the interview, Druhot 

indicated that she believed her children were in good care because she saw recent photographs 

of the children on Facebook and received reports from her mother and Daniel Murphy, the 

children's father, during the latter part of January 2016, and from her sister, as recently as three 

days prior to o. death, all of which described both children as being fine and in 

good health. Id. at pgs. 53-55. She also indicated Scott and Kristy Murphy lived with her and 

Daniel Murphy for a short period of time, during which both Scott and Kristy Murphy showed 

love for their nephews. Id. at pgs. 52-53. However, Druhot stated: 

Scotty doesn't have any children so I've always had a concern - - not that I don't believe 

somebody that doesn't have children can't care for a child, but they weren't equipped in 

their home for children. And I always felt more comfortable sending my children 

somewhere where there has been other children. It means it's already an environment 

where children have lived and been and it's got the child feel to it. 

Id. at pg. 53. Notwithstanding that statement, when asked by Sara Small "So ... you were of the 

belief that he C o. in was in good care?", Druhot responded "Yes. Oh yes." 6/8/16 

P.H. Tr., pg. 52. 

The present case is not at all similar to the circumstances described in Howard where the 

defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustified risk, but one where Druhot was 

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not aware of the alle edl de lorable circumstances in which her children were living or any 

otherpritential-risk-otharm. Druhot neither knew of nor should have known ofthe existence of 

circumstances that threatened her children. She inquired and received several reports that a Kristy Murphy. Likewise, Scott Murphy's conviction for the 2009 assault of Daniel Murphy is 

too remote in time and far too attenuated to evidence his propensity for violence. The incident 

that gave rise to the charges occurred some seven years before the death of O. y t. and 

involved his adult brother, Daniel Murphy, as the victim, not a child. The attempt to expand one 

episode of an inebriated assault on an adult brother that occurred before the birth of -0. M. 

is inadequate as even prima facie evidence of the requisite elements of involuntary 

manslaughter. 

Moreover, the statements made by Druhot during her interview in which she expressed 

her concern for leaving the children with Scott and Kristy Murphy does not remotely 

demonstrate any foreknowledge of or any demonstration of any act perpetrated by Scott or 

Kristy Murphy which a reasonable person would identify as a substantial and unjustifiable risk 

to ' Q. M. requiring an affirmative act of intervention. This marginal concern of 

Druhot in expressing that Scott and Kristy Murphy did not have children is not the kind that 

indicates Druhot knew the circumstances in which her children were being maintained. Instead, 

these concerns echo those any parent might have when leaving a child in the care of a family 

member who may be inexperienced in childcare. Without a known risk which Druhot 

consciously disregarded or a risk that Druhot should have known and appreciated, the reckless 

element cannot be met. Therefore, this Court finds that the Commonwealth failed to establish a 

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prima facie case for involiintaquand_Druhat is entitled to dismissal of Count 1 of 

t e eiMninalinformation. 

2) Counts 2 and 3: Endangering the Welfare of Children 

counts z and S onne criminal mrormation, oruhot is charged with two counts or 

endangering welfare of children (EWOC), 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1), for O.M.4.t K. m: 

respectively. The elements of the offense of EWOC include, a "parent, guardian 

or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs 

or supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the 

child by violating a duty of care, protection or support." 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1). A defendant 

acts knowingly when, 1) "the accused is aware of his or her duty to protect the child;" 2) "is 

aware that the child is in circumstances that threaten the child's physical or psychological 

welfare;" and 3) "has either failed to act or has taken actions so lame or meager that such actions 

cannot reasonably be expected to be effective to protect the child's physical or psychological 

welfare." Corn. v. Miller, 600 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa.Super. 1992). In Miller, a mother left her child 

unattended because she believed her child's father made arrangements with a neighbor to watch 

the child while they were gone. Id. at 989. However, the child's father never made arrangements 

with the neighbor nor did the neighbor watch the child. Id. The court found the mother did not 

knowingly leave the child unattended, therefore, she did not knowingly endanger the welfare of 

her child, even if mother exercised poor judgment in believing the child's father, Id. at 991, 

reasoning that mother's gullibility in believing father's babysitting arrangement with the 

neighbor, though a possible mistake in judgment, did not rise to the level of criminal culpability 

of knowingly leaving the child unattended. Id. 

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Here, the Court finds that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficientendeactios 

establish a prima facie case for two counts of hwroc7rs Pa. C.S.A. § 4304(01). 1he first prong 

of knowingly endangering was met as Druhot was aware of her duty to protect the children, as 

-T o- To wig - I - .1 y Ii g me urp y, o c e on 

the children. However, the second prong of knowingly endangering was not met, as Druhot was 

not aware there were circumstances that may have threatened the children's physical or 

psychological welfare. As indicated above, the Commonwealth's marginal evidence was that 

from late December 2015 Druhot had knowledge her children were in the care of Scott and 

Kristy Murphy in Ridgway, Pennsylvania. In the Small interview of February 4, 2016, Druhot 

explained that she received reports from Daniel Murphy that both children were in good health. 

Druhot had no reason to disbelieve Daniel Murphy, as she also received reports from her mother 

and her sister and viewed photographs of both children on Facebook which supported the reports 

from Daniel Murphy. The confirmed information received from Druhot's mother and sister and 

the Facebook postings bolster the argument that Druhot was unaware of any threat of harm to 

014. or KM. Not only did Druhot not know of any threatening conduct by 

Scott and Kristy Murphy that would require her to act, she possessed no information that would 

have compelled a reasonable person to act so as to protect the children. 

The crime of EWOC is a specific intent crime with the intent element being a knowing 

violation of a duty of care. Corn. v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. Super. 1986); Com. v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2008). The evidence presented by the Commonwealth clearly 

did not demonstrate that Druhot had any actual notice of any risk of harm that might befall her 

children while in the care of their paternal uncle and aunt, Scott and Kristy Murphy, nor did the 

Commonwealth present prima facie evidence that Druhot should have known about some 

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appreciable risk. An assault perpetrated by Scott Murphy on his brother before the subject 

I e -re- orrotann by any reasonable exercise of extrapolation suffice as even a prima 

facie basis to establish that Druhot committed two counts of the crimes of EWOC. Druhot did 

'1 I 4 O.M. ono( IC Wt. 

case against Druhot for two counts of endangering welfare of children was not established. 

Druhot is thus entitled to the relief requested in having Counts 2 and 3 of the criminal 

Information dismissed. 

3) Counts 4 and 5: Recklessly Endangering Another Person 

In Counts 4 and 5 of the criminal Information, Druhot is charged with two counts of 

recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705, namely her two sons, 

aid K. rvi 

O. wt. 

This crime includes the following prohibited act: when "[a person] 

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or 

serious bodily injury." 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705. Specifically, this crime requires that a defendant 

have a 1.) mens rea of recklessness, 2.) engage in some conduct 3.) that places another person in 

danger, and 4.) the achievement of placing another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury. Corn. v. Trowbridge, 395 A.2d 1337, 1340 (Pa. Super. 1978). 

The mens rea element of the offense has been defined as "a conscious disregard of a 

known risk of death or great bodily harm to another person." Com. v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 

916 (Pa. Super. 2000). A conscious disregard entails awareness or mindfulness of a discernible 

recognizable risk, such as brandishing a loaded firearm in the commission of a crime. Com. v. Peer, 684 A.2d 1077, 1080-1081 (Pa. Super. 1996). The Commonwealth presented no evidence 

to demonstrate that Druhot knew that her two sons, a..01 K:ortA. , were at 

risk of death or great bodily harm by virtue of their being maintained by their paternal uncle and 

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aunt. Furthermore, Druhot's criminal culpability cannot rest on a presumption that she should 

hav en a s e o orecas arm Whiling her children, particularly when her inquires led to her 

receiving positive reports regarding her children's wellbeing. 

n es pr 

facie evidence that Druhot did something that placed the children in danger. "Danger, and not 

merely the apprehension of danger, must be created by the defendant." Com. v. Hopkins, 747 

A.2d at 916. Druhot had nothing to do with placing her sons with Scott and Kristy Murphy and 

once she determined the children's whereabouts, she asked about their conditions and was 

presented with no negative information that would cause a reasonably prudent parent to seek 

immediate intervention. 

Where an offense requires an act to create criminal culpability, an omission to act may 

create criminal culpability where a duty to perform is imposed by law as well. Corn v. Cottam, 

616 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. Super. 1992). Such a duty is the legal duty imposed on parents to protect 

their children and the discharge of this duty requires affirmative performance. Id. Unlike in 

Cottam, however, where the defendants maintained custody and control of their 14 -year -old son 

who died of starvation and their 12 year -old daughter who was severely malnourished, Druhot 

did not have any direct contact with her sons in the month or so after she learned where they 

were staying. Again, for the purpose of establishing reckless endangerment, there must be an 

actual present ability to inflict harm, not merely the apprehension of danger. Corn. v. Reynolds, 

835 A.2d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The Court finds that insufficient evidence was presented by the Commonwealth to 

establish a prima facie case against Druhot for two counts of recklessly endangering another 

person. As indicated above, the extent of evidence regarding Druhot's knowledge of the 

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condition of her children was throughiepix_Is she r 1 II I I no s- o - her sister, all of whom indicated -both children were tine and in good health. These reports were 

further verified through photographs of the children posted to Facebook. Further, Scott Murphy's 

2 soup assail t conviction isfar too remote m time to evidence Ins propensity tor violence, 

because the incident that gave rise to the charges occurred some seven years before the death of 

O. m. T. Moreover, statements made by Druhot during her interview did not express her 

knowledge of known risk but of a generic concern of having her children placed with Scott and 

Kristy Murphy, whom she viewed as inexperienced in childcare because they did not have 

children of their own. With no prospective, let alone viable, risk known to Druhot, there was 

nothing for her to consciously disregard or anything to require her to affirmatively perform. 

Therefore, a prima facie case against Druhot for two counts of recklessly endangering another 

person was not established and Counts 4 and 5 of the Information are dismissed. 

Junea6, 2017 

By the Court: 

chard Masson, President Judge 

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