alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Selective Service System

# AGENCY:

Selective Service System.

# ACTION:

Notice.

The following forms have been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for extension of clearance in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. chapter 35):

## SSS Forms 2, 3A, 3B, and 3C

*Title:*                     Selective Service System Change of Information, Correction/Change Form, and Registration Status Forms.                

*Purpose:*                     To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the Selective Service System registration data.                

*Respondents:*                     Registrants are required to report changes or corrections in data submitted on the SSS Form 1.                

*Frequency:*                     When changes in a registrant's name or address occur.                

*Burden:*                     A burden of two minutes or less on the individual respondent.                

*Change:*                     None.                

Copies of the above-identified forms can be obtained upon written request to the Selective Service System, Public & Intergovernmental Affairs Directorate, 1501 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

Written comments and recommendations for the proposed extension of clearance of the forms should be sent within 60 days of the publication of this notice to: Selective Service System, Public & Intergovernmental Affairs Directorate, 1501 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

A copy of the comments should be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer, Selective Service System, Office of Management and Budget, New Executive Office Building, Room 3235, Washington, DC 20503.

Daniel A. Lauretano, Sr.,

General Counsel.

[FR Doc. 2024-04190 Filed 2-28-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8015-01-P
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A0672. RODOLFO TARANGO v. THELMA DILLARD GRAY.

Rodolfo Tarango, while represented by the law firm of Farah and Farah, sued

Thelma Dillard Gray. Tarango voluntarily dismissed that action. Attorney Kevin

Elwell left Farah and Farah and, acting as sole counsel for Tarango, filed a renewal

action against Gray. Farah and Farah filed an attorney lien in the case for services

rendered on behalf of Tarango, and Tarango moved to cancel the attorney lien filed

by Farah and Farah. The trial court denied the motion, and Tarango filed this direct

appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

The underlying case remains pending in the trial court, and it is apparent from

the face of the order that it is not a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-

6-34 (a). Because the order is interlocutory, Tarango was required to follow the

discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Tarango’s failure to follow

these procedures deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal, which is

hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/06/2015

January 06, 2015
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 13, 2018

No. 04-16-00559-CR

Stanley Foster BAKER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15-1755-CR-A

Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Pro se’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for rehearing or En Banc 

Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Time is extended to May 5, 2018.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 13th day of April, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Stephen Clark Webb v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 14

- 00174

- CR

Trial court case number: 1389676

Trial court: 337th District Court of Harris Count y

On August 11, 2014, appellant filed his Third Agreed Motion to Extend Time to File

Brief. The motion is GRANTED, in part . Appellant’s brief is due September 8, 2014. There

will be no further extensions.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

X A cting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: August 14 , 2014
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Jason Macari, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Summer Infant, Inc.

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15e and 15d-15e) for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors:



March 25, 2009

/s/ JASON MACARI Jason Macari Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
### Todd Gatherer

2729 NW Hill ST Camas, WA 98607 (503) 250

- 2452 tgatherer11@gmail.com U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey Ave., SE Wa shington, DC 20590 Filed with www.regulations.gov Re: Request for modification of Request for Exemption, Regulatory Docket No. FAA- 2016 - 3285

. Dear Sir or Madam, I, Todd Gatherer, request a modification of the above exemption request in the respect of adding an additional UAV to the business

. The UAV is the Tri mble Navigation Ltd ZX5 which is a six rotor UAS and operates very similarly to the Phantom 3 Profession which is in the current request for exemption. The ZX5 has been approved for commercial operations in the following exemptions: Exemption No. 1111 0 (Docket FAA - 2014 - 0367) (“Trimble Exemption”); Exemption No. 11062 (Docket FAA- 2014 - 0352) (“Astraeus Exemption”); Exemption No. 11109 (Docket FAA - 2014 - 0507) . I will incorporate the ZX5 into my business using the same pilot training and rigorous inspectio n procedures outlined in the original documents submitted under the Regulatory Docket FAA2016 - 3285 , with separate serial numbers, specific checklists and maintenance records. If you have any questions, please contact me at the information above. Sincerely, Todd Gatherer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<SECURITIES>                                 2,900,123
<RECEIVABLES>                                  546,631
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,211,051
<PP&E>                                       2,945,286
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,353,202
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,332,563
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<BONDS>                                          7,955
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     13,885
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,830,786
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 925
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (6,421,742)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (6,421,742)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (6,421,742)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (2.46)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (2.46)


</TABLE>
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

November 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
130893 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 130893 COA: 264816 Oakland CC: 1994-135924-FC JASON R. GRAVES, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the March 23, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, a nd it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

s1120 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2006

Clerk
MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 3 1

, 201 4

TO: Phil Mulrine

, EPA OAQPS/SPPD/ MMG

FROM: Bradley Nelson, EC/R, Inc.

SUBJECT: Summary of the March 10, 201 4 Meeting with the Ferroalloys Production

Industry and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the teleconference was to follow

- up on the proposed opacity requirements submitted by the industry. This meeting summary will be available in the docket for this rulemaking (Docket ID No. EPA

– HQ

– OAR

– 2010

– 0895 ). The proposed rule for ferroalloys production wa s published in the Federal Register on November 23, 20 1 1 (7 6 FR 72508 ).

II. ATTENDEES

The following is a list of participants in the meeting.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Chuck French

Phil Mulrine

Colin Boswell

Steffan Johnson

Eramet Marietta Jeff McKinney, Eramet Marietta

J ohn Rego

, Jones Day

Felman Production Laura McAfee, Beverid ge and Diamond

Policy Navigation Group Troy Hillier

EC/R Incorporated Bradley NelsonIII. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

The purpose of the meeting was to follow

- up on the industry’s submittal of proposed opacity and
monitoring options for the supplemental proposal. The industry options were provided prior to
the February 26, 2014 meeting with the industry and are included as an attachment to the
meeting minutes. 1 The following is a brief summary of the major points that were discussed
during the meeting

.

NESHAP Opacity Standard

 The industry noted that the high opacity data provided to the EPA are based on non

normal operations that occur infrequently. T hey also noted that the opacity values for
these events are based on estimates and do not reflect a formal Method 9 reading during

the event.

 A suggestion was made for automated capture systems to monitor duct pressure rather
than monitoring fan amperes o r damper position which change during normal operations.

 The industry asked if any additional information was needed from them to help with
making decisions from the supplemental proposal.

Other Topics D i scussed

 The industry stated that they met with Janet McCabe to discuss the proposed NESHAP.
The discussion focused on mercury emissions from the furnaces, but opacity was also

discussed.

 The EPA stated that they were following up on some of the requests from the meeting
with Janet McCabe including;

o Hav ing the economist review CBI materials,

o Reviewing information from the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC),

o Having internal discussion with Steve Fruh and others at EPA on various aspects
of the supplemental proposal.

1 Memorandum from Bradley Nelson, EC/R to Phil Mulrine, EPA OAQPS/SPPD/MMG

, Summary of the February 26, 2014 Meeting with the Ferroalloys Production Industry and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency , March
3, 2014.
#### Sigmund H. Miller, Appellant, v Peter W. Berg et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Saxe, J.), entered on or about September 28, 1989, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and severing the counterclaims for trial, denied plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, and preliminarily enjoined plaintiff from disposing of any items of personal property, title to which is in defendants, as residuary legatees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The decedent died in 1978, bequeathing a life estate in the family residence to her husband, the plaintiff, with remainder interest to defendants, her children from a prior marriage. The will further provided that the remaindermen could sell the property with plaintiff’s consent, in which event plaintiff would be entitled to a payment from the proceeds of $5,000 per year, for the period of his life expectancy, computed from the date of closing of title. In 1984, defendants, with plaintiff’s consent, sold their remainder interest in the property for $225,000, subject to plaintiff’s life estate. The question presented is whether the sale of the remainder interest alone, as opposed to a sale of the entire fee estate, entitled plaintiff to receive a share of the proceeds under the formula set forth in the will. Although we find the will to be ambiguous in this respect, the circumstances surrounding the sale of the remain*119der interest warrant summary disposition in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff made no claim at the time of closing or during the ensuing 4 Vi years that he was entitled to remuneration. Only after defendants had embarrassed their stepfather by forcing him to retrieve personalty belonging to the residual estate which he had inadvertently given away, did he belatedly commence this action. Plaintiff to now estopped from raising his claim, in view of the prejudice suffered by the defendants, who undisputably would have realized more on the sale of the property had they not been restricted by the reservation of the life estate to plaintiff. Until the institution of this suit, no one, including plaintiff, interpreted the will as requiring payment to plaintiff for sale of the remainder interest subject to plaintiff’s life estate.

Regardless of whether plaintiff disposed of personal property inadvertently or otherwise, issuance of preliminary injunctive relief against further such conveyances will protect such property without resulting in any prejudice to plaintiff. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Rosenberger and Smith, JJ.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-76,794

EX PARTE SERENA ROJAS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 1058663D IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT #2

FROM TARRANT COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant pleaded guilty to burglary of a

habitation in exchange for deferred adjudication community supervision. Her guilt was later

adjudicated, and she was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. 

Applicant contends that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to

timely file a notice of appeal after adjudication in this case. Although Applicant expressly waived

appeal in conjunction with her original plea, that waiver is not effective as to the adjudication and

sentencing procedures. As of June 15, 2007, the determination by the court of whether it proceeds
2

with an adjudication of guilt is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation of “straight”

probation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 §5(b). Moreover, “after an adjudication of guilt, all

proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of

community supervision, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been

deferred.” Id. Therefore, counsel’s determination that no appeal could be taken in this case because

of Applicant’s waiver of appeal during the original plea was incorrect. 

We find that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal of the

judgment adjudicating guilt in Cause No. 1058663D from the Criminal District Court #2 of Tarrant

County. Applicant is ordered returned to that time at which she may give a written notice of appeal

so that she may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. Within ten days of the

issuance of this opinion, the trial court shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant

is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall immediately appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant on direct appeal. All time limits shall be calculated as if the sentence

had been imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should

Applicant desire to prosecute an appeal, she must take affirmative steps to file a written notice of

appeal in the trial court within 30 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division. 

Delivered: May 9, 2012

Do not publish
|     1. | Such      Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending September      30, 2008, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|     2. | The      information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for      the period ending September 30, 2008, fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      Segway IV Corp., Inc. |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date: November      7, 2008                                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                     |
| /s/ Donnie      Smith                                                    |
| Donnie      SmithCheif      Executive Officer and Chief FinancialOfficer |
#### BYRNES v. STATE.

No. 26578.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 4, 1953.

Enos T. Jones, Floydada, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is the unlawful transportation of whiskey in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $250.

The case was tried before the court without the intervention of a jury.

The Sheriff and his deputy testified that they apprehended the appellant and one Vernon Byrnes in an automobile; that they found lugs containing 24 fifths of whiskey on the back seat of the automobile; that the appellant was the driver thereof, who, being questioned, admitted that the lugs contained whiskey and stated that he and his brother had gone to Amarillo for it. The officers testified further that Vernon told them that the automobile and the whiskey belonged to him.

The appellant, testifying in his own behalf, stated that his brother Vernon had come to the house in Plainview where he was and asked him to “ride over here” with him; that he did not know that the whiskey was in the car until they got to Lockney; that he then noticed the packages in the back, and his brother told him that they contained whiskey; that they were arrested northwest of Floydada; and that he had not driven the automobile at any time that night.

Appellant’s wife testified that he had not gone to Amarillo on the day in question.

Appellant in his brief challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction because the State’s witnesses testified that Vernon Byrnes had admitted the ownership of the automobile and the whiskey.

The trial court had the right to accept the State’s evidence that the appellant was the driver of the automobile and had stated that he and his brother had gone to Amarillo for the whiskey and reject appellant’s testimony on these points.

In Cooper v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 483, 176 S.W.2d 578, we supported a conviction where the accused was neither the owner nor the driver of the automobile in question but had been connected with its purchase.

There are no bills of exception in the record, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
#### MAY v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 22, 1954.

C. F. See, Jr., Louisa, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Atty. Gen., William F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen.,’ W'. D. Sparks, Commonwealth Atty., Louisa, for- appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from a judgment of conviction in the Lawrence Circuit Court for a second offense of transporting intoxicating liquor in local option territory for the purpose of sale, and fixing the punishment at a.fine of $100 and confinement in the county jail for 60 days. The sole ground for reversal is appellant insists he was entitled to an affirmative instruction to the effect that if he was transporting the whiskey for his personal use he should be acquitted.

The record shows the court instructed that before the jury could convict appellant it must believe -beyond a reasonable doubt he was transporting the whiskey for the purpose of sale. The instruction is couched in such language that an ordinary man who sits on a jury can easily understand, and its negative (raised by the usual reasonable doubt instruction) completely covers the defense of the accused; in which event we have held it is not necessary to give an affirmative instruction. Reynolds v. Com., Ky., 257 S.W.2d 514; Blevins v. Com., Ky., 258 S.W.2d 501.

Finding no error in the record, the judg-. ment is affirmed.