UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MEGA LESTARI SETIYANINGSIH, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 23-8085 

(D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00198-NDF-1) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mega Setiyaningsih, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s order denying her motion to reconsider its previous denial of compassionate 

release.1

 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

Setiyaningsih failed to proffer previously unavailable evidence, we affirm. 

* After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

1

 We liberally construe Setiyaningsih’s pro se filings. See United States v. 

Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 22, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 1
2 

Background 

In June 2020, Setiyaningsih pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine 

with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. In 

accordance with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Setiyaningsih to 180 

months in prison (120 months on the drug count and 60 months on the gun count, to 

be served consecutively) and five years of supervised release. 

In October 2021, Setiyaningsih filed her first pro se motion for compassionate 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing a wide range of preexisting medical 

conditions, inadequate medical care, and the threat posed by the COVID-19 

pandemic. The district court denied the motion after determining that the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against a sentence reduction, and we affirmed. 

United States v. Setiyaningsih, No. 21-8093, 2022 WL 2160001, at *2 (10th Cir. June 

15, 2022) (unpublished). 

In August 2023, Setiyaningsih filed a second pro se motion for compassionate 

release. This time, in addition to citing her various medical conditions and the 

prison’s allegedly inadequate medical care, Setiyaningsih asked to serve the rest of 

her sentence through home confinement so that she could be reunited with her threeyear-old daughter, to whom she gave birth shortly after she was sentenced in 2020, as 

well as her 17-year-old son. Setiyaningsih also asked the court to consider her 

rehabilitative efforts, including her newfound religious faith, remorse for her crimes, 

and commitment to education. 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 2
3 

Ruling on this second motion, the district court focused on whether 

Setiyaningsih had established extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a 

sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Regarding Setiyaningsih’s family 

circumstances, the district court concluded that her separation from her children was 

the “usual product of a parent’s incarceration” and that she had not shown her 

children’s current care was inadequate. R. vol. 1, 66. In addition, the district court 

determined that Setiyaningsih’s medical records did not support her allegations about 

her medical conditions and that her allegations of inadequate medical care were 

wholly unsupported. Accordingly, the district court denied Setiyaningsih’s second 

motion for compassionate release. 

Shortly thereafter, Setiyaningsih filed a motion for reconsideration that 

attached a letter she had received from her daughter’s caregiver. The caregiver wrote 

that because she had stopped working due to her health and age, she was behind on 

her mortgage and other bills and would be unable to continue caring for 

Setiyaningsih’s daughter. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the 

caregiver’s financial difficulties did not constitute new evidence warranting 

reconsideration because Setiyaningsih failed to “explain how this information was 

previously unavailable to her.” Id. at 81. 

Setiyaningsih appeals. 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 3
4 

Analysis 

Setiyaningsih argues that the district court erred in denying her reconsideration 

motion.2

 Our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 

1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion only where it 

(1) commits legal error, (2) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, or (3) where 

no rational basis exists in the evidence to support its ruling.” United States v. Alfred, 

982 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063, 

1070 (10th Cir. 2019)). On the other hand, “[a] district court does not abuse its 

discretion if its ruling ‘falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the 

circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.’” United States v. 

Armajo, 38 F.4th 80, 84 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Gutierrez de 

Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1132 (10th Cir. 2014)). 

Setiyaningsih first contends, on a procedural note, that the district court erred 

by construing her reconsideration motion as a motion for relief from judgment under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). But we have expressly “imported the standard 

2

 For two reasons, we limit our review in this appeal to the order denying 

reconsideration and do not reach the underlying order denying compassionate release. 

First, Setiyaningsih’s notice of appeal lists only the order denying reconsideration. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (stating that notice of appeal must “designate the 

judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken”); Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 147 (2012) (“Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature.” 

(quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992))). Second, despite mentioning the 

underlying order in passing, Setiyaningsih’s appellate brief raises arguments 

exclusively directed at the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration. 

See SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) (“An issue 

or argument insufficiently raised in a party’s opening brief is deemed waived.”). 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 4
5 

from [Rule 60(b)] to decide motions for reconsideration” in criminal cases, so the 

district court did not err on this point. United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 927 

(10th Cir. 2022). Setiyaningsih also inaccurately suggests that the district court erred 

by dismissing her motion as untimely. To be sure, the district court noted that she 

filed her motion outside the 28-day deadline for reconsideration motions in civil 

cases. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). But that conclusion was irrelevant for two reasons. 

First, the civil deadline does not apply in this criminal case; instead, reconsideration 

motions in criminal cases must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal. 

See Randall, 666 F.3d at 1242. Second, the district court drew no legal conclusions 

from this passing fact and did not deny Setiyaningsih’s reconsideration motion as 

untimely. 

Turning to the merits, a district court may grant reconsideration when it “has 

misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the law.” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014)). “The specific grounds” for “granting 

such motions include ‘(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new 

evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent 

manifest injustice.’” Id. (quoting Christy, 739 F.3d at 539). 

Setiyaningsih specifically contends that the district court failed to liberally 

construe her reconsideration motion when it concluded that the letter from her 

daughter’s caregiver did not constitute previously unavailable new evidence. She is 

correct that courts should liberally construe pro se filings, but “the party requesting 

[Rule 60(b)] relief . . . bears the burden of showing that relief is warranted.” Crow 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 5
6 

Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 74 F.4th 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2023). Here, the district 

court concluded that Setiyaningsih failed to carry this burden because the caregiver’s 

“difficulties stemming from health and age in meeting financial obligations, such as 

being behind on mortgage payments, cannot be presumed to have instantaneously 

arisen in such a short time since last judgment.” R. vol. 1, 81. And the district court 

noted that although Setiyaningsih “state[d] that such information was previously 

unavailable,” she did “not explain how this information was previously unavailable 

to her.” Id. (emphases added). 

 The district court is correct that Setiyaningsih’s reconsideration motion lacks 

any explanation as to why she was previously unaware of the caregiver’s financial 

difficulties. Moreover, Setiyaningsih appears to have offered the letter to rebut the 

district court’s statement in the underlying order that there was no indication 

Setiyaningsih’s children were receiving inadequate care. And “[a] motion to 

reconsider is not a second chance for the losing party to make its strongest case or to 

dress up arguments that previously failed.” Warren, 22 F.4th at 927 (alteration in 

original) (quoting United States v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2015)). 

Further, the letter contains repeated references to video calls between 

Setiyaningsih and the caregiver, and Setiyaningsih’s appellate brief states that the 

caregiver “repeatedly informed [her] that God would provide.” Aplt. Br. 4 n.2. This 

demonstrates that Setiyaningsih was either aware of the caregiver’s financial 

difficulties when she moved for compassionate release or could have ascertained 

such information using reasonable diligence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (providing 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 6
7 

for relief from judgment based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 

diligence, could not have been discovered” any earlier); Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 

F.3d 658, 672 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) relief because 

movants “never adequately explained why they could not have discovered the 

[allegedly new] evidence . . . had they exercised due diligence”). Thus, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Setiyaningsih’s newly proffered 

evidence of the caregiver’s financial hardship did not justify reconsideration because 

the evidence was not “previously unavailable.”3 Warren, 22 F.4th at 927 (quoting 

Christy, 739 F.3d at 539). 

Conclusion

 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

evidence of the caregiver’s financial hardship was not previously unavailable, we 

affirm the order denying reconsideration. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

3

 Having concluded that the district court was under no obligation to consider 

the caregiver’s letter, we likewise reject Setiyaningsih’s additional argument that the 

district court erred by failing to determine that the letter established an extraordinary 

and compelling reason for compassionate release. 

Appellate Case: 23-8085 Document: 010111035603 Date Filed: 04/22/2024 Page: 7