Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 171 / Tuesday, September 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 52899 

The petitioner’s suggested use of 

complex thermal-hydraulic conditions 

would be counter-productive in reaction 

kinetics tests because temperature 

control is required to develop a 

consistent set of data for correlation 

development. Isothermal tests allow this 

needed temperature control. It is more 

appropriate to apply the developed 

correlations to more prototypic 

transients (including complex thermal 

hydraulic conditions) to verify that the 

proposed phenomena embodied in the 

correlations are indeed limiting. This is 

what was done by Westinghouse in 

WCAP–7665, by Cathcart and Pawel in 

NUREG–17 and by the NRC in its 

technical safety analysis of PRM–50–76. 

The NRC applied the Cathcart-Pawel 

oxygen uptake and ZrO2 thickness 

equations to the four FLECHT Zircaloy 

experiments, confirming the bestestimate behavior of the Cathcart-Pawel 

equations for large-break LOCA reflood 

transients. 

Cathcart and Pawel applied their 

oxide thickness equation, using the 

BILD5 program, to 15 of their transient 

temperature experiments as described in 

ORNL/NUREG–17. The results showed 

that the correlation, based on numerous 

isothermal experiments, was 

conservative or best-estimate when 

applied to this transient data set. 

Petitioner’s Public Comments 

The petitioner submitted two public 

comment letters in which he again 

asserted that the Baker-Just and 

Cathcart-Pawel equations are grossly 

misapplied by the NRC. The first 

comment letter basically repeated the 

arguments in the petition. No new 

technical information was supplied. The 

second comment letter introduced the 

issue of severe fouling, which was the 

subject of PRM–50–78 and addressed by 

the staff’s evaluation of that petition for 

rulemaking. Other issues addressed in 

the second letter are related to the issues 

already discussed in this document, and 

therefore, no further response is 

necessary. 

Reasons for Denial 

For the reasons cited in this 

document, the Commission is denying 

the petition for rulemaking (PRM–50–

76) submitted by Mr. Robert Leyse. The 

NRC believes that the requested 

rulemaking would not make a 

significant contribution to maintaining 

safety because current regulations and 

regulatory guidance already adequately 

address the evaluation of performance 

of the ECCS. No data or evidence was 

provided by the petitioner or found in 

NRC records to suggest that the 

research, calculation methods, or data 

used to support ECCS performance 

evaluations were sufficiently flawed so 

as to create significant safety problems. 

NRC’s technical safety analysis 

demonstrates that current procedures 

for evaluating performance of ECCS are 

based on sound science and that no 

amendments to the NRC’s regulations 

and guidance documents are necessary. 

Additionally, the petitioner has not 

shown, nor has the NRC found, the 

existence of any safety issues regarding 

calculation methods or data used to 

support ECCS performance evaluations 

that would compromise the secure use 

of licensed radioactive material. The 

proposed revisions would not improve 

efficiency, effectiveness, and realism 

because licensees and the NRC would 

be required to generate additional 

information (as part of the evaluation of 

ECCS performance) that has no safety 

value and does not significantly 

improve realism. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day 

of August, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 05–17589 Filed 9–2–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2004–18877; Directorate 

Identifier 2002–NM–340–AD; Amendment 

39–14248; AD 2005–18–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 737–100, –200, –200C, and –300 

Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 737–100, –200, –200C, 

and –300 series airplanes. This AD 

requires repetitive detailed inspections 

to detect discrepancies of the retaining 

pin lugs on the support fitting of the 

main landing gear (MLG) beam, and 

rework of the support fitting, or 

replacement of the fitting if necessary. 

This AD is prompted by reports of 

discrepancies of the lugs. We are issuing 

this AD to prevent separation of the 

support beam of the MLG from the rear 

spar, which could cause cracking of the 

MLG support fitting and a consequent 

leak in the wing fuel tank or collapse of 

the MLG. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

October 11, 2005. 

The incorporation by reference of 

certain publications listed in the AD is 

approved by the Director of the Federal 

Register as of October 11, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. 

Docket: The AD docket contains the 

proposed AD, comments, and any final 

disposition. You can examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility office between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The 

Docket Management Facility office 

(telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building at 

the U.S. Department of Transportation, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., room PL–401, 

Washington, DC. This docket number is 

FAA–2004–18877; the directorate 

identifier for this docket is 2002–NM–

340–AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert C. Hardwick, Aerospace 

Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, 

FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98055–4056; telephone 

(425) 917–6457; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with 

an AD for certain Boeing Model 737–

100, –200, –200C, and –300 series 

airplanes. That action, published in the 

Federal Register on August 17, 2004 (69 

FR 51017), proposed to require 

repetitive detailed inspections to detect 

discrepancies of the retaining pin lugs 

on the support fitting of the main 

landing gear (MLG) beam, and rework of 

the support fitting or replacement of the 

fitting if necessary. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments that have 

been submitted on the proposed AD. 

Agreement With the Proposed AD 

One commenter, the manufacturer, 

agrees with the proposed AD. 

Conditional Agreement With the 

Proposed AD 

One commenter, an operator, agrees 

with the proposed AD provided that 

there are adequate parts available if the 

discrepant condition is found. 

The FAA agrees that adequate 

availability of parts is necessary. We 

52900 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 171 / Tuesday, September 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

have received no information from the 

manufacturer concerning a possible 

delay in availability of parts. In the 

event there is a delay in the availability 

of parts, an operator may request 

approval for an alternative method of 

compliance as specified in paragraph 

(k)(1) of this AD. 

Request for Clarification of Paragraph 

(g) of the Proposed AD 

One commenter, an operator, requests 

additional information and clarification 

regarding the reference in paragraph 

(g)(2) of the proposed AD to replacing 

the fittings in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions, Part III—

Fitting Replacement, of Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–57–1216, Revision 2, dated 

May 6, 1999. The commenter notes that, 

in certain situations, those 

Accomplishment Instructions instruct 

the operator to install a self-locking nut 

to secure the support pin of the MLG 

support beam. However, the commenter 

advises that installing a self-locking nut 

would be in conflict with AD 2002–02–

08 (67 FR 6372, February 12, 2002). 

We agree that clarification of 

paragraph (g)(2) of the AD is necessary 

in order to prevent a conflict between 

the requirements of this AD and AD 

2002–02–08. Therefore, we have added 

further information to paragraph (g)(2) 

of the AD to specify that, if operators 

choose to accomplish the corrective 

action specified in paragraph (g)(2) of 

the AD, replacing the fitting in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, Part III—Fitting 

Replacement, of Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–57–1216, Revision 2, dated May 6, 

1999, must also include replacing the 

retaining bolt, self-locking nut, and 

associated hardware of the support 

beam for the MLG with a new bolt, 

castellated nut, and new hardware; in 

accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–57A1260, Revision 2, dated 

October 18, 2001. 

Request for Credit for Accomplishing 

Certain Service Bulletins 

One commenter, an operator, requests 

that the original issue, dated December 

17, 1992, and Revision 1, dated 

September 23, 1993, of Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–57–1216 be approved as 

acceptable for terminating the 

requirements of the proposed AD. The 

commenter states that the original issue 

and Revision 1 provide procedures for 

replacing the fitting that are essentially 

the same as those in Revision 2, which 

is cited as the appropriate service 

information in paragraph (g)(2) of the 

proposed AD. 

We agree with the commenter for the 

reason stated and have revised 

paragraph (g)(2) of the AD accordingly. 

Request To Clarify Paragraph (j) of the 

Proposed AD 

One commenter, an operator, requests 

that the fittings acceptable for 

installation be stated in a more definite 

manner than ‘‘a new lug.’’ The 

commenter suggests that paragraph (j) of 

the proposed AD be revised to specify 

a part number or serial number, rather 

than just ‘‘a new lug.’’ The commenter 

also requests that the inspection and 

rework instructions of paragraph (j) of 

the proposed AD be more specific. 

We agree that clarifying the intent of 

the words ‘‘new lug’’ is necessary. 

Although the inspection requirements of 

this AD are intended to detect cracking 

of ‘‘the retaining pin lugs of the support 

fitting of the MLG, or elongation of a 

bolt hole in a lug,’’ the corrective 

actions of paragraph (g) of this AD 

require reworking or replacing the 

fittings. We specify reworking or 

replacing the fittings, rather than the 

lugs, since the lugs are not available as 

individual replacement parts. The intent 

and purpose of paragraph (j) of this AD 

is to specify that any lug must be 

inspected and the fitting reworked or 

replaced, as applicable, except for those 

fittings that previously have been 

reworked or replaced, in accordance 

with paragraph (g) of this AD. We have 

revised paragraph (j) of the AD 

accordingly. We do not, however, agree 

that the inspection and rework 

instructions of paragraph (j) of the AD 

need to be more specific. The 

requirements of paragraph (j) of the AD 

indicate multiple actions that are clearly 

encompassed by stating ‘‘in accordance 

with this AD,’’ rather than to specify 

each action that has already been stated 

in previous paragraphs of the AD. 

Changes to Delegation Authority 

Boeing has received a Delegation 

Option Authorization (DOA). We have 

revised this final rule to delegate the 

authority to approve an alternative 

method of compliance for any repair 

required by this AD to the Authorized 

Representative for the Boeing DOA 

Organization rather than the Designated 

Engineering Representative (DER). 

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data, including the comments 

that have been submitted, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We have determined that these changes 

will neither increase the economic 

burden on any operator nor increase the 

scope of the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 1,670 airplanes 

worldwide of the affected design and 

668 airplanes of U.S. registry. The 

required actions take about 2 work 

hours per airplane, at an average labor 

rate of $65 per work hour. Based on 

these figures, the estimated cost of the 

required actions for U.S. operators is 

$86,840, or $130 per airplane, per 

inspection cycle. 

The rework, if accomplished, will 

take about 24 work hours per airplane 

to accomplish at an average labor rate of 

$65 per work hour. Required parts will 

cost about $1,006 per airplane. Based on 

these figures, the cost impact of the 

rework provided by this AD is estimated 

to be $2,566 per airplane. 

The replacement of the support fitting 

of the MLG beam, if accomplished, will 

take about 128 work hours per airplane 

to accomplish at an average labor rate of 

$65 per work hour. Required parts will 

cost between $4,540 and $5,271 per 

airplane. Based on these figures, the cost 

impact of the replacement provided by 

this AD is estimated to be between 

$12,860 and $13,591 per airplane. 

The replacement of the support fitting 

and installation of a special bushing of 

the MLG beam (for Group 9 and Group 

10 airplanes), if accomplished, will take 

about 144 work hours per airplane to 

accomplish at an average labor rate of 

$65 per work hour. Required parts will 

cost about $5,081 per airplane. Based on 

these figures, the cost impact of this 

replacement and installation is 

estimated to be $14,441 per airplane. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 171 / Tuesday, September 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 52901 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD. See the ADDRESSES section for 

a location to examine the regulatory 

evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2005–18–08 Boeing: Amendment 39–14248. 

Docket No. FAA–2004–18877; 

Directorate Identifier 2002–NM–340–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective October 11, 

2005. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 737–

100, –200, –200C, and –300 series airplanes, 

certificated in any category; line numbers 1 

through 1670 inclusive. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD was prompted by reports of 

discrepancies of the lugs on the support 

fitting of the main landing gear (MLG) beam. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent separation 

of the support beam of the MLG from the rear 

spar, which could cause cracking of the MLG 

support fitting and a consequent leak in the 

wing fuel tank or collapse of the MLG. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Inspection 

(f) Prior to the accumulation of 15,000 total 

flight cycles, or within 3,000 flight cycles 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Perform a detailed inspection to 

detect cracking of the retaining pin lugs of 

the support fitting of the MLG beam, or 

elongation of a bolt hole in a lug, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, Part I: Inspection, of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–57–

1267, dated August 8, 2002. If no cracked lug 

or elongated bolt hole is found, repeat the 

inspection thereafter at intervals not to 

exceed 12,000 flight cycles, until the actions 

specified in paragraph (h) of this AD are 

accomplished. 

Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a 

detailed inspection is ‘‘an intensive 

examination of a specific item, installation, 

or assembly to detect damage, failure, or 

irregularity. Available lighting is normally 

supplemented with a direct source of good 

lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. 

Inspection aids such as mirrors magnifying 

lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface 

cleaning and elaborate procedures may be 

required.’’

Corrective Action 

(g) If any cracked lug or elongated bolt hole 

is found during any inspection required by 

paragraph (f) of this AD, before further flight, 

do paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD. 

(1) Rework the fitting in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions, Part II: 

Rework, of Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 737–57–1267, dated August 8, 2002. 

(2) Replace the fitting in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions, Part III—

Fitting Replacement, of Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–57–1216, Revision 2, dated May 

6, 1999, and install a retaining bolt, 

castellated nut, and cotter pin in accordance 

with Boeing Service Bulletin 737–57A1260, 

Revision 2, dated October 18, 2001. 

Replacing the fitting in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions, Part III—

Fitting Replacement, of Boeing Service 

Bulletin 737–57–1216, dated December 17, 

1992, or Revision 1, dated September 23, 

1993; and replacing the retaining bolt, selflocking nut, and associated hardware of the 

support beam for the MLG with a new bolt, 

castellated nut, and new hardware; in 

accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–57A1260, Revision 2, dated October 18, 

2001; prior to the effective date of this AD 

are acceptable methods of compliance with 

the requirements of this paragraph. 

Optional Terminating Action 

(h) Reworking or replacing the fitting in 

accordance with paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of 

this AD constitutes terminating action for the 

inspections required by paragraph (f) of this 

AD. 

Repair 

(i) If any cracking is found during any 

inspection required by this AD, and the 

service bulletin specifies to contact Boeing 

for appropriate action: Before further flight, 

repair in accordance with a method approved 

by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO), FAA; or per data meeting the 

type certification basis of the airplane 

approved by an Authorized Representative 

(AR) for the Boeing DOA Organization who 

has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO, to make such findings. For a repair 

method to be approved, the approval must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Parts Installation 

(j) As of the effective date of this AD: With 

the exception of a new support fitting of the 

MLG; (i.e., a fitting that has been reworked 

or replaced as required by paragraph (g) of 

this AD), all retaining pin lugs of the support 

fitting, and bolt holes of the lugs must be 

inspected in accordance with this AD before 

being installed on any airplane. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, has 

the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, 

if requested in accordance with the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for corrective 

actions per data meeting the type 

certification basis of the airplane approved 

by a Boeing DOA Organization AR who has 

been authorized by the Manager, Seattle, 

ACO, to make those findings. For a repair 

method to be approved, the repair must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 737–57–1267, dated August 

8, 2002; Boeing Service Bulletin 737–57–

1216, Revision 2, dated May 6, 1999; and 

Boeing Service Bulletin 737–57A1260, 

Revision 2, dated October 18, 2001; as 

applicable, to perform the actions that are 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves the incorporation by 

reference of these documents in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To 

get copies of the service information, contact 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 

3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207. To 

view an AD docket, go to the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 

room PL–401, Nassif Building, Washington, 

DC. To review copies of the service 

information, go to the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the NARA, call (202) 741–6030, 

or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

52902 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 171 / Tuesday, September 6, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 

24, 2005. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–17461 Filed 9–2–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. 2003–NM–163–AD; Amendment 

39–14244; AD 2005–18–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a 

new airworthiness directive (AD), 

applicable to certain Bombardier Model 

CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100& 

440) airplanes, that requires performing 

an inspection of the electrical harnesses 

of the spoiler and the brake pressure 

sensor unit on both sides of the wing 

root to detect any chafing or wire 

damage, and repairing or replacing any 

damaged or chafed harness or wire with 

a new harness, as applicable. This 

action also provides/requires a 

terminating modification for the onetime inspection. The actions specified 

by this AD are intended to detect and 

correct chafing of the electrical cables of 

the spoiler and brake pressure sensor 

unit on both sides of the wing root, 

which could result in loss of the flight 

control system and consequent reduced 

controllability of the airplane. This 

action is intended to address the 

identified unsafe condition. 

DATES: Effective October 11, 2005. 

The incorporation by reference of a 

certain publication listed in the 

regulations is approved by the Director 

of the Federal Register as of October 11, 

2005. 

ADDRESSES: The service information 

referenced in this AD may be obtained 

from Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, 

Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, 

Station Centreville, Montreal, Quebec 

H3C 3G9, Canada. This information may 

be examined at the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington; or at the FAA, New York 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, 

New York 11590; or at the Office of the 

Federal Register, 800 North Capitol 

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Wing Chan, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Flight Test Branch, ANE–

172, FAA, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 

11590; telephone (516) 228–7311; fax 

(516) 794–5531. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A 

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to 

include an airworthiness directive (AD) 

that is applicable to certain Bombardier 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) airplanes was 

published as a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the 

Federal Register on June 27, 2005 (70 

FR 36862). That action proposed to 

require performing an inspection of the 

electrical harnesses of the spoiler and 

the brake pressure sensor unit on both 

sides of the wing root to detect any 

chafing or wire damage, and repairing or 

replacing any damaged or chafed 

harness or wire with a new harness, as 

applicable. The action also proposed to 

require performing a terminating 

modification for the one-time 

inspection. 

Comments 

Interested persons have been afforded 

an opportunity to participate in the 

making of this amendment. We received 

no comments on the proposed AD or on 

the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

After careful review of the available 

data, the FAA has determined that air 

safety and the public interest require the 

adoption of the rule as proposed. 

Cost Impact 

The FAA estimates that 709 airplanes 

of U.S. registry will be affected by this 

AD. 

It will take approximately 1 work 

hour per airplane to accomplish the 

required inspection, at the average labor 

rate of $65 per work hour. Based on 

these figures, the cost impact of the 

inspection required by this AD on U.S. 

operators is estimated to be $46,085, or 

$65 per airplane. 

It will take approximately 5 work 

hours per airplane to accomplish the 

required modification, at the average 

labor rate of $65 per work hour. 

Required parts will be supplied by the 

airplane manufacturer at no cost to 

operators. Based on these figures, the 

cost impact of the modification required 

by this AD on U.S. operators is 

estimated to be $230,425, or $325 per 

airplane. 

The cost impact figures discussed 

above are based on assumptions that no 

operator has yet accomplished any of 

the requirements of this AD action, and 

that no operator would accomplish 

those actions in the future if thisAD 

were not adopted. The cost impact 

figures discussed in AD rulemaking 

actions represent only the time 

necessary to perform the specific actions 

actually required by the AD. These 

figures typically do not include 

incidental costs, such as the time 

required to gain access and close up, 

planning time, or time necessitated by 

other administrative actions. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Impact 

The regulations adopted herein will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the National Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. Therefore, it is 

determined that this final rule does not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this action (1) is not a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a 

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) 

will not have a significant economic 

impact, positive or negative, on a 

substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has