### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 06 -00 314 -CV

F r anc e s E. Le r m a , A ppe lla nt

v. Em ployees Ret irem ent System of T exas, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0029 59 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant F ranc es E. L erma , proce edi n g p ro se, appeals the district c ourt’s orde r aff irming a final orde r by

the B oard of

Trustee s for the Employ ees Retire ment S y stem of Texas denying he r application for occupational disa bility benef

its. I n four points of err or, L erma contends that (1) the B oard a

pplied a diffe rent l eg al standar d reg ardingthe ca use of L erma ’s injury

than it applied in two previous ca ses; (2) t h e Bo ard’ s interpre tation of the statutory definition of occupational disabilit y

is inconsistent with t he plain lang uag e of the statute; (3) the Boa rd eng ag ed in ad hoc r

ulemaking ; and (4) the Boa rd’s order is not supported by substantial evidence . We affir m the district court’s or der.

L erma worke d as a child support office r for the Office of the Att orney Gene ral. Her pr ima ry job du ty wa s to e nf

or c e the c oll e c tio n o f c hil d s up po rt pa y me nts fr om n on -c us tod ia l pa re nts
. I n Apr il 2 00 2, L e rm a wa s mee tin g wi th a non -c us tod ia l par e nt wh e n the pa re nt be c a me e xtre me ly ang ry and, ac cording to L erma , exhibi ted threatening conduct. After this incident, L erma continuedI n its Februa ry 20, 2004 letter to L erma denying he r cla im, ERS quot ed t h e v er s i o n of 1 section 811.001(12) of t he gover nment code in eff

ect between September 1, 2001, and September 1, 2003. That version of the statute define d “occ upational disability ” as a “disability from an injury or di sease that direc tly results from a specific act or occur renc e dete rminable by

a def inite time and place , and dire ctly

results from a

risk or a hazard pe culiar to a nd inhere nt in a duty

that arises from and in the course of state employ ment.” Act of May 27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2827, 2827 (a mended 2003) (cur

rent ve rsion at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 811.001(12) ( West S upp. 2007)). Howeve r, in a subsequent letter to the C hief Admini strative L aw J udg e at the S tate Of fice of Ad min istrativ e He ari ng s dat e d Apr il 1, 200 4, ERS qu ote d the ve rs ion of the statut e that w a s in e f f e c tp r i o r t o S e p t e mb e r

1 , 2 0 0 1
. T h a tv e r s i o n o f t h e s t a tu t e d e f

i n e d “ o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s a

b i l i t y” as a “ d i s ab i l i ty

from an injury

or disease that direc tly

results from a

specific act or

occur renc e deter minable by

a def inite time and place , and dire ctly results from a

n inhere nt risk or hazard pe c uli ar t o a d

uty tha t ari se s f ro m and in t he c ours e of

state e mpl oy

me nt. ” Ac t of

Ma y 4, 19 89 , 7 1s t L eg ., R.S., ch. 179, § 1, sec. 811.001(12) , 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 589, 607, amende d by Act of Ma y 27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2827, 2827. 2 to w or k a s a c hil d s up po rt

of fi cer unti l July

20 02 , w he n s he wa s d ia g no se d w itha pe rs on a lity dis or de r a nd dis mis se d f

ro m he r e mpl oy

me nt. After her dismissal, L erma

applied for

occupat i o nal disability

benef its from the Employ ees Retire ment Sy stem, which wa s cre ated by the leg islature f

or the purpose of providing
a re tirement sy stem for a g ed and inc apac itated stat e em p l o y ee s. See Act of Ma y 27, 1947, 50th L eg ., R.S., ch. 352, 1947 Tex. Gen. L aws 697, 697 (statement of purpose). She claimed that the Ap ri l 4, 20 02 inc ide nt w iththe ang ry no n- c us tod ia l pa

re nt w a s th e pr ima

ry c a us e of he r d ia g no sis of per so nality

disorder. O n Fe bruar

y 20, 2004, ERS sent L erma a letter denying he r cla im for benef its on the gr ound that her disability did not m ee t the statutory definition of an oc cupational disability in section 811.001(12) of the g overnme nt code. I n the letter, ERS explained: 1
Th e Me dic a l B oa

rd ha s d e te rm ine d th a t th e pr ima ry c a us e of y our i nc a

pa c ity is rec urre nt, severe , major depr ession and anxiety disorder that beg an as e arly as 1988. You attribute y our major de pression and anxiety to an incre ased le vel of stre ss on theL erma attache d the appe als of Mar y L . Dea n and Franc isca G. L ink as ex hibits to her brie f 2 in the district court. The e x hibit of Dean’ s appea l contains the B oar d ’s fi n d i n gs of fa cts and conclusions of lawrepla cing in full the findings of fac t and conc lusions of law issued by the AL J and the B oa rd ’s or de r d ated M arc h 1 6, 19 94 , g ra nti ngDe an’ s a

pp lic a tio n f

or oc c up a tio na l di sa

bil ity benef its. The ex hibit of L ink’s appea l contains the AL J ’s proposal f or dec ision recommendingthat L ink be awar d ed o cc up ational disability benef its and the Boa

rd’s orde r date d Aug ust 18, 1999, g ra nti ngL ink ’s a

pp lic a tio n f

or be ne fi ts. 3 job that y ou believe be g an in J anuar y 2000. Howeve r, the medical evidenc e indicate s that th e se are c hr on ic c on dit io ns th at existe d p ri or to your e mpl oy

me nt a s a Chi ld Support Office r I I Iwith the Offic e of the Attorney Gene ral, a

nd wer e not ca

used by the job du tie s.
ERS also stated t hat L erma failed to seek reasona ble accommodation of her condition at work and that the medica l evidence i n d i cated that L erma should be able to pe rfor m her job duties or compar able wor

k. L erma appea led ERS’s denial of he r application fo r b en efits and, a fter a n administrative hea

ring , the administrative law j u d ge (AL J ) issued a pr oposal for de cision
rec ommending that L er m a’ s ap p eal be denied. On A pril 20, 2005, the ERS Boar d of Trustee s adopted the A L J ’s proposal for de cision, including the finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, a s its own. L erma soug ht judicia l reviewof the B oard’ s decision. On May 5, 2006, the district court held a he aringand issued an or der a ffirming the Board’ s final order deny ing L erma ’s application for
oc c up a tio na l di sa

bil ity be ne fi ts. I n her f irst point of error , L erm a conte nds that the Boa rd applied a

differ ent leg al standard r eg ardingthe ca use of he r injury

than it applied in two previous cas es . T h o s e previous
case s conce rned two f

ormer state employ ees, Ma ry L
. Dea n and Franc isca G. L ink, who applied for occupational disabilit y

benef its with ER S in 1994 and 1998, respe ctively
. ERS denied Dea n’s and 24

L ink’s application for benef its, and they both appea led. The Boar d g rante d both appea ls, finding that both individuals we re en titled to occupational disability benef its and that their claims we re not ba rr e d b y pr e e xistin g c on dit ion s c a us e d s ole ly

by natur a l a g ingpr oc e sse s. We reviewthe B oard’ s fi n d in g s under the substantial e vidence rule. Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 815.511(f) (West 2004), § 2001.174 (West 2000). Apply ing the substantial evidence rule,
we pr e su me that th e Board ’s find ing s are su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e , a

nd the pa rt y challeng ing the finding s has t he burde n to demonstrate other wise. Texas He alth Faciliti es Comm’n v. Charter Medic al-Dallas, Inc. , 665 S.W .2d 446, 453 (Tex. 1984).

In t h i s c a s e , E R S r e qu i r e d L e r m a t o m e e t t h e d e f

i n i t i o no f “ o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s a

b i l i t y” in s e c tio n 8 11 .0 01 (1 2) of th e gove rnme nt c od e to b e e lig ibl e fo r o c c up a tio na l di sa bil ity be ne fi ts. At the tim e sh e a

pp lie d f or be ne fi ts, se c tion 81 1.00 1( 12 ) d e fi ne d “ oc c up a tio na l di sa bil ity” a s a “disability

from an inj u ry o r disease that directly results from a

specific act or

occur renc e de te rmin abl e by a de fi nit e tim e and pla c e , a nd dir e c tly re su lts fr om a

ri sk or a ha zar d p e c uli a r t o and inher ent in a duty that arises from and in the cour se of state employ ment.” Ac t of May

27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Ge n. L aws 2827, 2827 (ame nded 2003) ( curr ent ver sion at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 811.001(12) (West Supp. 2 007)). Unde r this standard, a n employ ee seekingoccupational disa bility benef

its must prove that the at-wor k injury is the primary

cause of the disability
. Flores v. Employ ees Re t. Sys. of Tex. , 74 S.W .3d 532, 550 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)
. Where the c laimant’s pre exis ting c on d i t ion is the primary cause of disability , the disability does not direc tly

result from the injury
. Id. at 551. The ERS Medical B oard deter mined that the primary cause of L erma ’s disability was her pr eexisti ng psy cholog ical proble ms, not the i n cident that occurre d in April 2002. There was5

medical e vidence showing that L erma had been di ag nosed wit h rec urre nt, sever e, major depression and anxiety

disorder a s ear ly

as 1988. The e x ecutive director of ERS found t hat L erma ’s pre exis ting conditions were “chr onic conditions that exi sted prior to [ L erma ’s] employ ment as a Child Support Offic er I I Iwith the Offic e of the Attorney Gene ral, and were not cause d by [L erma ’s] job dut ies.” The medic al evidenc e re lating to L erma ’s pre exis ting psy cholog ical conditions was include d in the
a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d a

nd c on sti tut e s su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e to su

pp or t the B oa rd ’s fi nd ingtha

t L e rm a failed to satisfy

the def inition of occupational disability in section 811.001(12). I n additio n , w e a

r e n o t p e r s u a d e d

b y L erma ’s ar g ument that her pr eexisti ng conditions
wer e ca used by the natura l ag ing pr ocess a nd, there fore , E R S wa s re q u i red to follow its prior decisions in Dean and Link . I n thos e ca s es, ERS ex pressly deter mined that the pre exis ting
c on dit ion s o f De an and L ink we re no t the pr ima ry c a us e of the ir inj ur ie s. I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, ERS de te rm ine d a

nd the B oa rd fo un d th a t L e rm a ’s pr e e xistin g c on dit ion s were the primary cause of her injury . The Dean and Link decisions ar e not applica ble. The B oard did not apply a diffe rent leg al sta nd ard fr om i ts p ri or

de c isi on s in

de te rm ini ngL e rm a ’s e lig ibi lity fo r b e ne fi ts. I n her se cond point of er

ror, L erma

contends that the Boa

rd’s interpre tation of section 811.001(12) is inconsistent wi th the plain lang uag e of the statute. An administrative a g ency ’s
c on str uc tio n o r i nte rp re ta tio n o f a statut e , whi c h the a g e nc y is c ha rg e d w ithe nf

or c ing , is e nti tle d to serious consider ation by

revie wing courts, so long as that construc tion is reason ab l e and does not c ontradict the plain lang uag e of the statute. Strayhorn v. W illow Creek R es., Inc

. , 161 S.W .3d 7 1 6 , 7 2 0 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 5 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Employe es Ret. Sy s. of Tex
. v. Jone

s , 58 S.W .3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.)).L erma quotes the ver sion of section 811.001(12) in e ffe ct prior to September 1, 2001. The 3 rec ord re flect s t h at t h e AL J also quoted this version of sec tion 811.001(12) in his proposal fo r d e c isi on . T he Se pte mbe r 1 , 2 00 1 ame ndme nt c ha ng e d th e wo rd ingof

th e ph ra se “ dir e c tly re su lts fr om a

n inhe re nt r isk

or ha zar d pe c uli ar to a duty” to “ dir e c tly re su lts fr om a risk or a hazard peculiar to and inherent in a duty .” See Act of Ma y 27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2827, 2827 (ame nded 2003) (empha sis a dded to re flec t chang es). This Court has noted that the September 1 , 2 0 0 1 am endment to s ection 811.001(12) had no substantive ef fec t on the def

inition. See F

lores v. Emp l o

ye es R et
. Sys. of Tex ., 74 S.W .3d 532, 537 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). 6

L erma argues that the B oard misinterpre t ed the second prongof the statutory de fi nit ion of “ oc c up a tio na l di sa

bil ity” re qu ir ing a dis a

bil ity fr om a

n in jur y or dis e a se that “ dir e c tly
re su lts fr om a

n inhe re nt r isk

or ha zar d p e c uli ar to a duty that ar ise s fr om an d in the c ours e of state employ ment.” Act of May 4, 1989, 71st L eg ., R.S., ch. 179, § 1, sec. 811.001(12) , 1989 Tex. Gen. L aws 589, 607, amende d by Act of Ma y 27, 200 1 , 7 7 t h L eg., R .S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2827, 2827. Acc ording to L erma , the B oard e rre d b y re q u i ri n g both the “risk” a nd the 3

“ ha z ard” to be bo th “ inh e re nt” and “ pe c uli ar t o a

du ty that ari se s f

ro m and in t he c ours e of

state employ ment.” She conte nds that the terms in the phrase must be rea d in the disjunctive, arguing that

“ inh e re nt” mod if

ie s o nly “ ri sk ” and

tha t “ pe c uli ar t o a

du ty tha t ari se s f ro m and in the c ours e of

state
e mpl oy me nt” mod if

ie s o nly “ ha zar d. ” Ac c or din g to L e rm a , th e B oa rd ’s int e rp re ta tio n of

the statut e rende rs either the word “ risk” or “ hazard” superf luous. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W .3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003) (“It is an elementa ry rule of construction that, when possible to do so, eff ect must be g iven to ever y sentenc e, cla

use, and w ord of a s t at u t e so that no part ther eof be rende red supe rfluous.”)
.

Although the pos t -S eptember 1, 2001 version of se ction 811.001(12) actua lly applies to this case, L erma ’s arg ument fails under both the pre-September 1, 2001 and theOur c onclusion is the same re g ardle ss of which ve rsion of section 811.001(12) the B oard 4 actua lly applied—the ve rsion in effe ct prior to S ep t em ber 1, 2001, or the ver sion in effe ct af

ter September 1, 2001. The AL J made a finding of fa ct that the Ap ri l 2002 incident “wa s not shown to be associated with a risk or hazard peculiar [t o] the duties of a child support enfor ceme nt office r.” Un de r e ith e r v e rs ion

of t he st a tut e , th e AL J’s f ind ingthat L e rm a ’s dis a

bil ity did no t r e su lt f

ro m a hazard or r isk that was “pe culiar to” a duty that arises f

rom and in the cour se of state employ ment wa s su ff ic ie nt t o d e ny

he r c la im. 7 post-September 1, 2001 ve rsion s of the statute. This Court has pre viously upheld the B oard’ s construction of the version of se ction 811.001(12) in eff ect pr ior to September 1, 2001, a s requiring both the “risk” a

nd the “hazard” to be both “inher ent” a nd “pec uliar to a duty

that arises f

rom and in the course of state employ ment.” See B ond v. Employ ees Re t. Sys. of Tex ., 825 S.W .2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Au s t i n1 9 9 2 , wr i td en i ed ). T h e s t atu t e’ s am en d m en ti n2 0 0 1 cl ar i fi edt h i s co n s t ru ct i o n, providing that an occ upational disabi l i t y “directly results from a

risk or a ha zard pec uliar to and inhere nt in a duty

that arises f

rom and in the course of state employ ment.” See Act of Ma

y 27, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1231, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2827, 2827 (ame nded 2003). Thus, unde r either version of the statute, an applicant must show that the alleg ed disability results from e ither a r isk or
a ha zar d th a t is bo th “p e c uli ar to” and “ inh e re nt in” a du ty that ar ise s fr om an d in the c ours e of

state employ ment. There fore , assuming that the Boa rd interpr eted the se co n d p ro n g of the statutory definition of “oc cupational disability ” in the manne r sug g ested by L erma , we c onclude that suc h a construction is rea sonable a nd does not contra dict the plain lang uag e of the statute. 4 I n her third point of err or, L erma contends that the Boa rd eng ag ed i n ad hoc rulemakingby

applying a

n interpre tation of “occupational disability ” set for th in a resolution dated Dec ember

8, 1999, that was c ontrary to the Boa

rd’s d ec i s i o n in the appea ls of Dea n and L ink discussed above . Ad hoc r ulemaking o ccur s when the a g ency makes a deter mination that has8

implications bey ond the i nstant parties, but pre fer s not to make a for mal rule be cause the ag ency may not have ha d sufficie nt experience with a particular problem to support making a rule or because the problem is so specialized and var y ing in nature a s to be impossibl e of c apture within the boundarie s of a g ener al rule. CenterPoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Comm’n , 213 S.W .3d 364, 369 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (c i t i n g City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm’n , 883 S.W .2d 179, 188-89 (Te x . 1994)). The resolution, which L erma attache d to her brief in this Court, was a dopted by the B oa rd a t it s D e c e mbe r 8 , 1 99 9 me e tin g . I t st a te s: [T] he Boa

rd of Trustee s of the Employ ees Retirement Sy stem of Texas here by clar ifies that Tex . Gov’t Code Ann. § 811.001( 12) (Ve rnon 1994) should be c o n s i s t e n t l y an d c o r

r e c t l y i n t e r

p r e t e d t o m e an t h a ta

d i s a b i l i t y p r i m ar i l y c a

u s e d b y a pr e -e xistin g me nta l or

ph y sic a l c on dit ion , in c lud ing , b ut n ot nece ssa ri ly lim ite d to deg ener ation whether

or not due to the natural ag ing pr o ce s s , does not constitute a specific act or

occur renc e dete rminable by

a def inite time and place
. There is no evidence in the rec ord that the B oard a pplied this resolution to L erma ’s application for be ne fi ts. As dis c us se d a

bo ve , the B oa

rd did no t c on sid e r w he the r L e rm a ’s ps y c ho log ic a l pr ob le ms
wer e ca used by a natur al ag ing proce ss. Fur thermore , the resolution was adopted in 1999, more than four y ear s befor e the administrative hearing to deter mine L erma ’s elig ibilit y

for be nefits. Ther efor e, even if the B oard ha d ap plied the re solution t o L erma ’s application for bene fits, it was not announcingand apply

ing a n ad hoc r

ule to her c ase. Se e Ma dd e n v . Te x as Bd . o f Chi ro pr acti c Ex am ’r s , 663 S.W .2d 622, 625 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) (holding that an ag ency violated proc edura l due proc ess righ t s o f a pa rty by failing to give him notice of newstatutory interpre tation that ag ency applied for

the first time in the course of cla imant’s hear ing)
.9 I n her f ourth point of err or, L erma contends that the Board’ s order is contrar y to the
me dic a l e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d. Th e Ad

min istra tiv e Pr oc e dure Ac t autho ri zes a re vie wi ng c ourt to test an ag e n c y ’ s f

in d in g s , in f

e r e n c e s , c o n c lu s io n s , an d d e c is io n s to d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r

th e y are
re a so na bly su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e con si der ingthe re lia ble and pr ob a tiv e e vid e nc e in the re cord a s a whole. Gr a f f C h evrolet Co. v. Texas Motor VehicleBd. , 60 S.W .3d 154, 159 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) ; see Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 2001.174(2)( E). The e vidence in t he re c or d ma

y pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e de c isi on of the a g e nc y

and ne ve rt he less a mou

nt t o substantial evidence
. Graff , 60 S.W .3d at 159. The true test is not whether the ag ency

rea ched the
corr ect c onclusion but whether some rea sonable ba sis ex ists in t he re cord f or the a gency ’s ac tion. Id. The finding s, infere nces, c onclusions, and dec isions of an administrative ag ency are presumed to be supported by

substantial evidence , and the bur den is on the conte stant to prove other wise. Sta te v. Public Util. Comm’n , 883 S.W .2d 190, 204 (Tex. 1994).

I n th is c a se , th e AL J’s p ro po sa l f or de c isi on , w hic h w a s a do pte d b y the B oa r d , r e f l e c ts that L e rm a

ha d b e e n d ia g no se d w ith de pr e ssi on , a nxie ty dis or de r, and

pe rs on a lity

dis or de rs pr ior

to the Ap ri l 20 02 inc ide nt. Spe cif ica lly , th e AL J found

tha t L e rm a wa s r e pe a te dly

dia g no se d w ith major, re curr ent, seve re de pression beg inning in 1988 and chronic, gene ralized anxiety disorder a nd pe rs on a lity

dis or de r b e g inn ingin 1 98 9. Th e AL J fou nd that L e rm a

wa s d ia g no se d w itha

pe rs on a lity disorder “ involving inher ent coping -skill difficulties” in J uly 2 0 0 2 , but concluded that L erma ’s int e ra c tio n w iththe ang ry no n- c us tod ia l pa

re nt i n Apr il 200 2 wa s not the c a us e of that pe rs on a lity disorder. O n this recor d, we c onclude that the B o ar d’s orde r deny ing L erma ’s application for occupational disabilit y

benef its is s upported by

substantial evidence
.10 L e rm a argue s tha t eve n if the B oa rd ’s or de r i s su

pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e , it is arbitrar y and ca pricious. I nstance s may arise in whic h the age n cy ’s action is supported by substantial evidence , but is arbitrary and ca pricious nonethele ss. Charter Me dical-Dallas , 665 S.W .2d at 454. One suc h instance is w hen a denial of due proce ss ha s resulted in the pre judice of substantial rig hts of a litiga nt. Id. Arbitrar

y and capr icious ag ency

action also may

be found w hen an ag ency improperly

bases its dec ision on non-statutory criter ia. Id. As discussed above, the B oard did no t ann ounc e and a

pp ly an ad ho c ru le to L e rm a ’s c a se re su lti ngin a de nia l of he r d ue pr oc e ss rig hts. The B oard a lso did not base its de cision on non-statutory criter ia. Rather, the B oard de nied L erma ’s claim for

benef its because her psycholog ical proble ms did not m eet the de fini t i o n o f an “occ upational disability ” conta ined in section 811.001(12) of t he gover nment code. On this recor d,
we c on c lud e that th e B oa rd ’s or de r i s n ot a

rb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s. L a stl y , L e rm a

c on te nd s th a t th e B oa

rd did no t f ile the “ a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g ency c a se fi le ” wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. Ho we ve r, the re c or d re fl e c ts that the a dmi nis tr a tiv e re c or d w a s f ile d in the dis tr ic t c ourt on Marc h 3, 200 6, a pp ro xima te ly tw o mont

hs be fo re the Ma

y 5, 20 06 he ari ng . T his
c on te nti on

is w ith ou t me ri t. Affir med.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: May

1, 2008