alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
      32.2




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarerly Report on Form 10-QSB of Deep Down, Inc. (the
      “Company”) for the quarter ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned,
      Robert E. Chamberlain, Jr., Chairman, and Acting Chief Financial Officer of
      the
      Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1) The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




By: /s/
      ROBERT E. CHAMBERLAIN, JR.


Robert
      E.
      Chamberlain, Jr.


Chairman
      and Acting Chief Financial Officer


May
      18,
      2007
Exhibit 5.1   PHILLIPS-VANHEUSENCORPORATION  200 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10016-3903  (212) 381-3500  MARK D. FISCHER
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GENERAL COUNSEL
AND SECRETARYDID:  (212) 381-3509
FAX:  (212) 381-3970
E-mail:  markfischer@pvh.com  June 20, 2007   Securities and Exchange Commission Judiciary Plaza 450 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC  20549 Gentlemen: I refer to the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (the "Registration Statement") filed by Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation (the "Company"), a Delaware corporation, with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of up to an aggregate of 3,991,167 shares of the companys common stock, par value $1.00 per share (the "Common Stock"), to be issued upon the exercise of awards granted under the Companys 2006 Stock Incentive Plan (the "Plan"). I have made such examination as I have deemed necessary for the purpose of this opinion.  Based upon such examination, it is my opinion, that, when the Registration Statement has become effective under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and when the shares of Common Stock to be issued are sold and paid for in the manner described in the Plan, the Common Stock so issued will have been validly issued, fully paid and non-assessable. My opinion is limited to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.  This opinion is given as of the date hereof and I assume no obligation to advise you of changes that may hereafter be brought to my attention. I hereby consent to the use of this opinion as an exhibit to the Registration Statement. Very truly yours,  /s/ Mark D. Fischer  Mark D. Fischer
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2149 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2149

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 4354 Pahoa Avenue in Honolulu, Hawaii, as the ``Cecil L. Heftel Post 
                           Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 13, 2011

 Ms. Hanabusa introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 4354 Pahoa Avenue in Honolulu, Hawaii, as the ``Cecil L. Heftel Post 
                           Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CECIL L. HEFTEL POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 4354 Pahoa Avenue in Honolulu, Hawaii, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Cecil L. Heftel Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Cecil L. 
Heftel Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

335
KA 08-01689

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DERYL BROWN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY F. DUGUAY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY A. GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R. Schwartz, A.J.), rendered June 16, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [1]). Defendant contends in each appeal that County Court erred in refusing to suppress physical evidence based on its determination following a Darden hearing with respect to the confidential informant relied upon by the police. We reject that contention ( see generally People v Edwards , 95 NY2d 486, 493-494; People v Darden , 34 NY2d 177, 181-182, rearg denied 34 NY2d 995). We have reviewed the sealed transcript of the Darden hearing, as well as the court’s requisite “summary report as to the existence of the informer and with respect to the communications made by the informer to the police to which the police testify” made available to defendant and the People ( Darden , 34 NY2d at 181). Based on those documents, we conclude that the court properly determined that the confidential informant existed and that he provided the information to the police concerning defendant’s possession of the handgun at the location where defendant was stopped by the police and subsequently arrested.

Entered: March 16, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS
EASTLAND , TEXAS
JUDGMENT

Texas Water Development Board

, * From the 126th District Court of Travis County, Trial Court No. D

- GN

- 11

- 000121

.

Vs. No. 11

- 12

- 00030

- CV * May 23, 2013

Ward Timber, Ltd.; Ward Timber * Opinion by McCall, J

. Holdings; Shirley Shumake; (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Gary Cheatwood; Richard McCall, J., and Willson , J.) Letourneau; and Pat Donelson,

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is n o error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed. The costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed against the Texas Water Development Board.
## Docket No.: FAA

- 2016

- 0466

Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization Person Contacted Date Response

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti 9/15114

Regional Airline Association

9 115/14

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 9/15/14

Airlines for America Robert Ireland 9/15/14
Exhibit 32.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                                       OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                  In connection with the quarterly report of I-trax, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Frank A. Martin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.


/s/ Frank A. Martin
-----------------------
Frank A. Martin
Chief Executive Officer

November 10, 2004


                                       38
<PAGE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                      9
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         2,130,111
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         10,729
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               3,070,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    1,519,114
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         2,401,359
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           0
<LOANS>                                        53,750,607
<ALLOWANCE>                                    538,282
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 66,032,422
<DEPOSITS>                                     0
<SHORT-TERM>                                   0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            233,919
<LONG-TERM>                                    50,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       9,482,364
<OTHER-SE>                                     (153,683)
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 66,032,422
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                2,450,947
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              96,950
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               95,521
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               2,643,418
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             1,138,744
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,138,744
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          1,504,674
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  141,019
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                1,261,380
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                302,387
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     302,387
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   302,387
<EPS-BASIC>                                    .32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .32
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 5.58
<LOANS-NON>                                    0
<LOANS-PAST>                                   0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               397,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  0
<RECOVERIES>                                   0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              538,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           538,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        0


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

July 26, 2010 

s0719 

Order 

 

July 26, 2010 

141063 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141063 

 COA: 284159 

Macomb CC: 2006-004764-FH 

GLORIA RENEE CURRIE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 23, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### CITY OF SAN ANTONIO et al. v. CRANE.

No. 12661.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Feb. 10, 1954.

Jack Davis, C. J. Matthews, San Antonio, for appellants.

A. F. Montemayor, Dan Henke, Glenn B. Lacy, San Antonio, for appellee.

NORVELL, Justice.'

This is the .second.appeal .in this case.. Our former opinion is reported in, Allen v. Crane, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 357. We held that, the Firemen!s and Policemen’s Civil -Service Commission of -the City of San Antonio had not rendered a final order from which an appeal .could be taken to the district court. Despite Crane.’s contention that the Commission was without authority to correct or complete its order, we suggested that Crane “take steps to procure a final appealable order from the Commission.” . Upon rehearing,. Crane urged that we erred in holding that .the Civil Service Commission had authority and jurisdiction to take further action in the matter as the thirty day period prescribed for action by the Commission had expired. This motion w.as overruled. The provision of Article 1269m, § 16, Vernon’s - Ann.Tex. Stats., that the :“Commission shall, hold a hearing and render a decision in writing within thirty (30) days after it receives said notice of appeal”, is not. a limitation upon the Commission’s- jurisdiction, but prescribed a-time within which it must act *125or will be required to act by mandamus or other appropriate legal proceedings.

However, upon remand, the contention was urged that the subsequent action of the Commission taken on July 13, 1953, permanently dismissing Crane from the Police Department of the City of San Antonio was invalid because not taken within the thirty day period.. It is apparent from the face of the order that this, action On the part of the Commission was taken in pursuance of this Court’s suggestion that the order of August 7, 1952, be made complete and final.

The trial court sustained this contention and erred in so doing. It appears that no evidence was' heard as tó the merits of the case and, accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, ,in order that it may be determined whether or not the order of the Commission is reasonably súpported by substantial evidence. Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424; City of Waco v. Akard, Tex.Civ.App., 252 S.W.2d 496.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Susie TURNER, Administratrix of the Estate of Eugene Turner, Appellant, v. Walter LEWIS and Bradley Baker, a Partnership, d/b/a Baker Coal Company, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 30, 1955.

W.'.M. Melton, Hazard, for appellant.

A. E. Cornett, Hyden, for appellee.

CAMMACK, Judge.

The appellant, Mrs. Susie Turner, ad-ministratrix of the estate of her husband, Eugene Turner, instituted this action to recover $35,000 damages for his death which occurred while he was working in a coal . mine. The suit was instituted against Walter Lewis and Bradley Baker,' a partnership doing business as Baker Coal Company. Bradley Baker owned the mine, and Walter Lewis, who was a brother-in-law of Baker, was operating it; Baker and Lewis were operating under an oral agreement. They drew up a writing three days after Turner’s death. ■

During the. course of the trial the appellant’s motion to dismiss the case as to Lewis was sustained. At the conclusion of the evidence the court directed a verdict in favor of. Baker on the theory that Lewis was an independent contractor, thus relieving Baker of liability for injuries suffered by the mine workers.

On this appeal Mrs. Turner contends that Lewis was only an employee, or servant, *625of Baker. Her contention is based primarily upon the fact that Lewis was paid a set price of $2.40 for each ton of coal taken from the mine.

We have held consistently that the right of control of the work, and the methods of its performance, are determinative on the question of whether one is a servant or an independent contractor. If the employer retains the right to control the work and the manner in which it is done, those doing the work are servants. On the other hand, if an employee has the right to control the manner of work and the right to determine the means by which results are accomplished) ■ he is deemed an independent contractor and the employer is not responsible for his negligence. Blair v. Boggs, Ky., 265 S.W.2d 795; Eutsler v. Huff, 222 Ky. 48, 299 S.W. 1070; Glover’s Adm’r v. James, 217 Ky. 572, 290 S.W. 344; Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Spradlin, 176 Ky. 405, 195 S.W. 781. In each of these cases it was pointed out that the lessor of a coal -mine was not responsible for the negligent- acts of his lessee' Whére the latter had control of the mine.

In the case before us Lewis had complete charge of the mining operations.’ He was a licensed mine foreman;' and, insofar as the record shows, operated the mine as he saw fit. The machinery and- equipment, like the mine, were owned by Baker though they were used by Lewis. ■ Lewis received $2.40 for each ton of coal which he placed in the tipple. The selling of the coal was handled exclusively by Baker. Lewis hired and fired his own employees, ■ including Eugene Turner. ■ All of the mining wórk was done under his - supervision.

We are unable to escape the conclusion that Lewis was an independent contractor and not a servant of Baker.’ Therefore, the lessor, Baker, was not liable for injuries occurring because of the negligence of Lewis.

Judgment affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT


I, Hector A. Veron,  President of Royal Holiday Mobile Estates ( the "Company"),
certify,  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

(1) the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB/A of the Company for the quarter ended
September  30,2002  (the " Report")  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of
Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.C. 78m
or 78o (d); and

(2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated:    September 22, 2003





                         /s/ Hector A. Veron
                         ----------------------------
                         Hector A. Veron, President/Director
Exhibit  99.1      Certification


Certification of Chief Executive Officer of UCELLIT.COM INC. pursuant to Section
906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  1992  and  Section  1350 of 18 U.S.C. 63.

I,  Mark  Epstein,  Esq.,  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  of UCELLIT.COM  INC.,
hereby  certify  that UCELLIT.COM  INC.'s periodic report on Form 10-QSB and the
financial  statements  contained therein, of which this certification is Exhibit
Number  99.1,  fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934  (15  U.S.C.  78m  or  78o(d)) and that
information  contained  in  the periodic report on Form 10-QSB and the financial
statements  contained  therein  fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial  condition  and  results  of  the  operations  of  UCELLIT.COM  INC..



                                     (signed) ______________________________
Date:  August 15, 2002               /s/  Mark  Epstein,  Esq.
                                     Mark  Epstein,  Esq.
                                     Chief Executive Officer of UCELLIT.COM INC.
                                     --------------------------



Certification  of  Chief  Financial  Officer  of  UCELLIT.COM  INC.  pursuant to
Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 1992 and Section 1350 of 18 U.S.C. 63.

I,  Mark  Epstein,  Esq.,  the  Chief  Financial  Officer  of UCELLIT.COM  INC.,
hereby  certify  that UCELLIT.COM  INC.'s periodic report on Form 10-QSB and the
financial  statements  contained therein, of which this certification is Exhibit
Number  99.1,  fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934  (15  U.S.C.  78m  or  78o(d)) and that
information  contained  in  the periodic report on Form 10-QSB and the financial
statements  contained  therein  fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial  condition  and  results  of  the  operations  of  UCELLIT.COM  INC..



                                     (signed) ______________________________
Date:  August 15, 2002               /s/  Mark  Epstein,  Esq.
                                     Mark  Epstein,  Esq.
                                     Chief Executive Officer of UCELLIT.COM INC.
                                     --------------------------


<PAGE>
#### Ex parte Ray DAVIS.

No. 26629.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 14, 1953.

Thomas, Thomas & Jones, Big Spring, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

This case is, in all legal aspects, similar to and is controlled by the disposition made of the companion case against relator, Tex.Cr.App., 261 S.W.2d 322.

For the. reasons there stated, the judg ment is affirmed.

Opinion approved’ by the court".
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CELESTIAL
SEASONINGS INC.'S FORM 10-K FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                             637
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,612
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (727)
<INVENTORY>                                     10,721
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                34,796
<PP&E>                                          37,042
<DEPRECIATION>                                (13,502)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  80,847
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,904
<BONDS>                                         10,455
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            84
<OTHER-SE>                                      54,404
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    80,847
<SALES>                                        114,949
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               109,851
<CGS>                                           42,915
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   46,922
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                59,159
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 746
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,024
<INCOME-TAX>                                       537
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,487
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,487
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.28


</TABLE>