Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 8, 2021.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00447-CV

MARCUS A. TOWNLEY AND ERIN M. MCCAIN, Appellants

V.

LINDA A. LANIER, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1077886

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighboring property owners over 

the cost to reconstruct a shared residential fence. Appellee Linda A. Lanier paid to 

rebuild the fence and sought payment from her neighbors, appellants Marcus A. 

Townley and Erin M. McCain, believing they agreed to bear some of the cost. 

Appellants refused to contribute, Lanier sued, and the case proceeded to jury trial 

on breach of contract and quantum meruit claims. The jury found in Lanier’s
2

favor, and the court signed a judgment awarding $780 in damages, plus attorneys’

fees. 

Appellants raise seventeen numbered issues on appeal. After reviewing the 

briefs and the record, we conclude that appellants have not demonstrated reversible 

error, and we affirm the judgment.

Background

In 2014, Lanier’s property abutted property owned by Townley and McCain, 

and a fence divided the two lots.1 Constructed in 1993 or 1994, the original wood 

fence deteriorated over time. According to Lanier, she “was having a great deal of 

trouble keeping the fence boards up.” Additionally, the parties’ multiple dogs

“would bicker between the fences.” 

One day in 2014, Lanier said, Townley “climbed up on the fence and he 

explained to [Lanier] that he and his wife were doing a lot of remodeling with the 

house and that they had recently replaced the fence that was common between he 

and [another neighbor] and would [Lanier] be interested in sharing the cost of the 

fence that was common between their two yards.” Lanier ultimately agreed and 

hired a contractor to do the work. She gave Townley a copy of the bid and told 

him that she would “only charge him half” of the price per square foot that 

Townley had paid to replace his side fence, which would have amounted to $785.

The contractor Lanier hired did not perform adequately, which Townley 

brought to Lanier’s attention. In the evenings, Townley, who was at home during 

the day, shared his observations with Lanier:

[A]t one point he told me the workmanship was not good, that the

fence wasn’t straight, that they weren’t building the corners correctly 

and at the far corner where his fence would adjoin mine, or the 

1 By the time of trial in 2019, Lanier had sold her property and moved.
3

common fence anyway, he wasn’t going to be able to adjoin it

because they weren’t building it in the right place and at one other 

occasion they told me they found the contractors drinking on the job 

when I wasn’t there.

As a result, Lanier terminated that contractor. Based on Townley’s 

recommendation, Lanier hired the contractor Townley had used to replace the 

fence on the other side of his property. The second contractor completed the fence, 

giving Townley and McCain the “good” side or the “pretty” side—i.e., the side 

with flush planks that did not show framing.

When Lanier asked for payment, Townley refused. His last comments to 

Lanier were “I’m not paying you anything. The fence looks great.”

Lanier sued, alleging that “[i]t was fully understood between [Lanier] and 

[Townley and McCain] that said fence was a mutual obligation with mutual 

benefits.” She asserted claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud, and 

fraudulent misrepresentation. The contract and quantum meruit claims were tried 

to a jury, which found in Lanier’s favor. Specifically, the jury found that:

• Townley and McCain agreed to have Lanier authorize the 

building of a replacement fence between their two properties.

• Townley and McCain failed to comply with the agreement to 

pay for part of the fence.

• Townley and McCain failed to comply with the agreement first.

• Services/materials were provided to Townley and McCain.

• Townley and McCain accepted the services or materials.

• Townley and McCain had reasonable notice that Lanier 

expected compensation for the payment of services or 

materials.

• $780 would fairly and reasonably compensate Lanier for her 

damages that resulted from or because of Townley’s and 

McCain’s failure to comply.
4

In accordance with the jury’s verdict, the trial court signed a judgment that 

Lanier recover from Townley and McCain $780 in damages and $1,320 in 

attorney’s fees, as well as conditional appellate fees, costs, and pre- and postjudgment interest.

Townley and McCain appeal.

Analysis

Appellants present seventeen issues for our review. Most of them, however, 

lack citation to the record or to legal authority. Under our rules of appellate 

procedure, briefs must contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions 

made with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 

38.1(i). Although we must construe briefs liberally to avoid disposing of issues 

without reaching the merits when possible, see Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 

587 (Tex. 2008), the complete dearth of applicable argument, legal authority, or 

record support for several issues, discussed below, compels us to conclude that 

appellants have waived them due to inadequate briefing. See In re R.H.W. III, 542 

S.W.3d 724, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); San Saba 

Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2005, no pet.).

As we are able, we will address those arguments we find sufficiently briefed

in support of appellants’ stated issues, see @.C.T.S. @dvanced Computer Tech. 

Servs., LLC v. Lexington Auto Repair, Inc., No. 14-16-00497-CV, 2017 WL 

3662465, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 24, 2017, no pet.) (mem. 

op.), while avoiding the role of advocate for any party. Joseph v. Woodgrove 

Condo. Ass’n, No. 14-10-00273-CV, 2011 WL 2149409, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] May 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Evans v. Duncan, No. 05-
5

04-00761-CV, 2005 WL 1926324, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 12, 2005, no 

pet.); see also In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d at 742.

We first consider several procedural issues, followed by issues challenging 

the evidentiary support for the jury’s verdict, before finally turning to appellants’

remaining complaints. The bolded headings are appellants’ issues, re-printed 

verbatim.

A. Procedural Complaints

Issue 1: The trial court abused its discretion by holding an off-record 

pre-trial hearing without a court reporter present, despite Appellants’ 

objections, on February 20, 2019.

Appellants contend that the trial court held a pre-trial hearing, that they 

requested a court reporter to transcribe the hearing, that no reporter was made 

available, that appellants objected to the reporter’s absence, and that the trial court 

conducted the unrecorded hearing over their objection. Appellants argue that the 

lack of reporter’s record prevents them from complaining “of certain error and 

other post-judgment and appellate procedural remedies.” 

Not only do appellants fail to support their argument with legal authority, 

but we see no indication on the docket sheet that the trial court conducted a hearing

as claimed by appellants. Further, although appellants assert that they “filled out a 

court reporter request form, requested a transcript be taken of all proceedings that 

day for this case, and submitted the request form to the court clerks,” they do not 

direct us to where we may find such a request in the record.

In the absence of legal or record citation, we overrule appellants’ first issue. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); In re R.H.W. III, 542 S.W.3d at 742.

Issue 2: The trial court abused its discretion, and violated Appellants’ 

due process rights, by denying the Defendants’ third motion for 
6

continuance, and by denying the Defendants’ amended motion to 

compel disclosure and production of documents.

Appellants assert that, while preparing for trial, they discovered that Lanier

sold and vacated her residential property several months before trial began. 

Appellants moved for a trial continuance, as well as to compel certain discovery.

Appellants contend that the trial court orally denied their motions at a 

hearing, but we have no record of the hearing. We also see no written order ruling 

on the motions. Appellants’ failure to obtain a ruling on either motion, or to object 

to the court’s lack of ruling, renders their complaint unpreserved for appeal. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Jackson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 02-07-

00246-CV, 2008 WL 1867931, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 24, 2008, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (motion for continuance); Copenhaver v. Medina, No. 08-02-

00136-CV, 2003 WL 22215152, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 25, 2003, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (motion to compel). We overrule appellants’ second issue.

Issue 3: The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to 

submit jury instructions, definitions, and questions as to the fact 

elements of the Appellants’ defenses.

Appellants argue that the trial court’s “sweeping rejection” of appellants’

proposed jury instructions, definitions, and questions was erroneous because none 

of the factual questions on appellants’ pleaded defenses or affirmative defenses 

was submitted to the jury for a finding. Appellants contend that they introduced 

evidence and testimony at trial supporting some of their affirmative defenses,

including failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, and waiver; although

they cite no passage in the reporter’s record supporting their assertion.

To preserve error in the omission of a party’s own question, the party must 

have objected to the omission, tendered the question in substantially correct form, 

and obtained a ruling from the trial court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274, 276, 278; Sears,
7

Roebuck & Co. v. Abell, 157 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. 

denied). We do not see in the record that the trial court ruled on appellants’

proposed questions. Appellants’ proposed jury charge is unmarked and does not 

bear any indication that the court “refused” to submit the questions, and, if the 

court orally ruled on the proposal, we were not provided with the reporter’s record 

documenting the ruling. In the absence of any evidence in the record that the trial 

court considered and refused appellants’ questions on defenses, we find that 

appellants did not preserve error based on these questions. Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax 

& Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, 

no pet.). We overrule appellants’ third issue.

Issue 4: The trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence at trial 

demonstrating that Plaintiff alienated her ownership interest in her 

fence.

During trial, appellants attempted to introduce a printout from an internet 

website showing Lanier’s house for sale and a list of upgrades to the property, 

including the new fence. The trial court excluded the evidence. Appellants argue 

that this evidence would have shown that Lanier clearly claimed the fence as her 

own property, intended to sell the new fence together with her land and buildings,

and then alienated her ownership interest in the fence when Lanier sold the

property. This evidence, they contend, would have supported their defenses of 

failure of consideration and waiver. 

Given that the jury was not charged with any affirmative defense issues, 

appellants’ argument is unpersuasive. They also cite no legal authority to support 

their argument. In the absence of any persuasive explanation how the trial court’s 

ruling probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment,

2

and in the absence

2 Appellants’ argument would fail for another reason. In their brief, appellants concede 

that Lanier testified that she sold the fence along with her house. Accordingly, the excluded 
8

of citation to relevant case law, we overrule appellants’ fourth issue for inadequate 

briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Duruji v. Duruji, No. 14-05-01185-CV, 2007 

WL 582282, at *8 n.16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2007, no pet.).

Issue 12: The trial court erred by submitting improper and/or defective 

instructions, definitions, and questions to the jury at trial, and/or by 

entering judgment on a verdict, that completely omitted designated 

responsible third parties.

Prior to trial, the trial court designated certain third parties—other neighbors 

whose properties also abutted the fence at issue—as responsible third parties. 

However, the trial court did not include the responsible third parties in the jury 

charge. Appellants complain that this omission prevented the jury from 

determining the liability and proportionate responsibility of the designated

responsible third parties.

Appellants do not cite any portion of the trial record regarding contributory 

conduct of the responsible third parties, and thus we cannot conclude that the trial 

court erred as alleged. See Gardner Oil, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 12-10-00274-CV, 

2012 WL 1623420, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“The trial court should not allow the submission of a question to the jury 

regarding conduct of a responsible third party where there is not sufficient 

evidence to support the submission.”). We overrule appellants’ twelfth issue.

B. Merits Complaints

The parties agree that Lanier submitted her case to the jury on two issues: 

breach of contract and quantum meruit. The jury found in Lanier’s favor on both 

evidence would have been cumulative of admitted testimony, and thus the exclusion would not 

be reversible error. State v. Cent. Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009) 

(exclusion of cumulative evidence is harmless).
9

claims, and the judgment granted Lanier recovery without specifying the theory on

which liability is based. 

In six issues, appellants challenge the submission of, or the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting, Lanier’s breach of contract claim. Appellants also 

challenge the charge language accompanying Lanier’s quantum meruit claim, but 

with one exception, they do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s findings on that claim. If we conclude that the judgment may 

be upheld on either one of the independent theories of recovery, we need not 

address any alleged error pertaining to the other claim. See, e.g., Boatland of 

Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. 1980) (alleged error in the 

submission of an issue is harmless when the findings of the jury in answer to other 

issues are sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment).

Issue 9: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on 

March 6, 2019 against Appellants because the jury’s verdict does not 

reflect all elements of Plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim.

To recover under quantum meruit a claimant must prove that: (1) valuable 

services were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be 

charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be 

charged, used, and enjoyed by him; and (4) under such circumstances as

reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing

such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. 

Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985).

The court’s charge submitted the quantum meruit theory to the jury in a 

series of questions, as opposed to a single question. The relevant inquiries are:

Question No. 4

Were the services/materials provided to the Defendants?
10

Question No. 5

Did the Defendants accept the services or materials?

Question No. 6

Did Defendants have reasonable notice that Plaintiff expected compensation 

for the payment of services or materials?

Question No. 8

Did Plaintiff provide valuable services or materials?

The jury answered all these questions affirmatively.

Appellants advance two separate, but related, arguments under their ninth 

issue. First, they contend the judgment cannot stand on a quantum meruit theory 

because the charge omitted one required element necessary to support quantum 

meruit recovery, and thus “the jury’s verdict lacks findings sufficient to establish 

all of the necessary elements of the Appellee’s quantum meruit cause of action.” 

The missing element, appellants say, is whether they “used and enjoyed” the fence.

Although Question No. 5 asked whether appellants accepted the services or 

materials, appellants are correct that the charge did not ask whether appellants 

“used and enjoyed” them. Appellants, however, did not object to that omission. In 

the absence of objection, and when as here the trial court does not make written 

findings on omitted elements, they are deemed found in a manner supporting the 

judgment if the deemed findings are supported by evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 

279; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 262-63 (Tex. 2002); Clouse v. Levin, 339 

S.W.3d 766, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

Which brings us to appellants’ second argument under their ninth issue, 

namely that “insufficient credible evidence” exists to support a finding that they 

used and enjoyed the fence. There is some evidence from which a reasonable jury 
11

rationally could have inferred that appellants accepted, used, and enjoyed the 

services or materials provided by Lanier. Lanier testified: that it was Townley’s 

idea to replace the fence; that Lanier had conversations with both Townley and 

McCain about the fence; that Townley and McCain got the “good” or “pretty” side 

of the fence; that McCain never said she would not pay for the fence; and that 

Townley was concerned about the first contractor’s work because Townley wanted 

to be sure that the new fence would join with the side fence appellants had already 

replaced. The jury may have inferred that the completed fence met with 

Townley’s approval in that regard. Appellants disputed Lanier’s version of events

and denied using, enjoying, or benefitting from the new fence in any way. 

However, the jury is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

to give to their testimony. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 

757, 761 (Tex. 2003). Lanier’s testimony, which the jury reasonably could have

believed, is legally and factually sufficient evidence that Townley and McCain 

used and enjoyed the materials or services provided. See, e.g., RC Mgmt., Inc. v. 

Tex. Waste Sys., Inc., No. 04-02-00488-CV, 2003 WL 1712535, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio Apr. 2, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence that appellant did 

not refuse delivery of trash containers or contact trash company to, at the very 

least, complain of the delivery of the containers was sufficient to support jury’s 

determination that appellant accepted, used, and enjoyed the benefits of trash 

company’s services).

Because there is some evidence that appellants used and enjoyed the fence, 

that omitted element is deemed found in support of the judgment. See In re J.F.C., 

96 S.W.3d at 262-63; Clouse, 339 S.W.3d at 770. Thus, the judgment is supported 

by all findings and elements necessary to support recovery under a quantum meruit 

theory.
12

Appellants do not challenge the other findings on quantum meruit, nor do 

they make any other argument against the claim. Accordingly, those unchallenged 

findings are binding. Rayner v. Dillon, 501 S.W.3d 143, 158 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, pet. dism’d) (when a party fails to “challenge in the court of 

appeals the factual or legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting” the jury’s 

answer, the answer is established as to the theory alleged). We overrule 

appellants’ ninth issue.

Furthermore, because the jury’s quantum meruit findings are sufficient to 

support the trial court’s judgment, any alleged errors regarding Lanier’s breach of 

contract claim are harmless, and we need not address the merits of those issues. 

For this reason, we also overrule appellants’ seventh, eighth, thirteenth, fifteenth, 

sixteenth, and seventeenth issues.3 Boatland of Houston, 609 S.W.2d at 750.

3 Appellants’ issues relating to breach of contract are as follows:

Issue 7: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on March 6, 

2019 against Appellant Erin McCain because there is insufficient evidence of the 

existence of a contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant McCain.

Issue 8: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on March 6, 

2019 against Appellants because the Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof 

that a valuable consideration was exchanged.

Issue 13: The trial court erred by submitting an improper instruction on

ratification to the jury.

Issue 15: The trial court erred by submitting question No. 2 to the jury, and/or 

erred by entering judgment on the verdict, because question No. 2 presumes 

existince [sic] of an essential but unestablished fact-element [existence of a 

contract].

Issue 16: The trial court erred by submitting question No. 3 [who breached 

agreement first] to the jury, and/or erred by entering judgment on the verdict, 

because question No. 3 is irrelevant and could have confused the jury.

Issue 17: The trial court erred by submitting question No. 7 [damages] to the jury, 

and/or erred by entering judgment on the verdict, because question No. 7 asks for

a conclusion founded on a false premise [existence of a contract].
13

Issue 5: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment of 

joint and several liability, on March 6, 2019, because there is insufficient 

evidence of joint liability, and/or because the judgment does not 

conform to the Appellee’s pleadings in that respect.

Issue 11: The trial court erred by submitting improper and/or defective 

instructions, definitions, and questions to the jury at trial, and/or by 

entering judgment on a verdict, that prevented the jury from 

apportioning responsibility between the two Defendants.

In two issues, appellants complain that the judgment erroneously imposes 

joint and several liability against Townley and McCain. 

Joint and several liability arises in contract and, by extension, in quantum 

meruit, based upon the relationship between the parties and the existence of what 

amounts to joint promises. K-Bar Servs., Inc. v. English, No. 03-05-00076-CV, 

2006 WL 903735, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

The quantum meruit questions did not ask about Townley’s and McCain’s 

actions individually. However, we see no indication in the record that appellants 

made the trial court aware of their complaint. See Bluestar Energy, Inc. v. Murphy, 

205 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (rejecting appellant’s 

argument that joint and several liability was inappropriate when jury was asked to 

determine whether both appellants jointly breached the agreement and complaining

appellant did not object to inclusion in the question); cf. W&F Transp., Inc. v.

Wilhelm, 208 S.W.3d 32, 45 n.12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(appellants did not waive complaint that charge failed to ask about individual

defendant’s liability, when the specific issue was discussed at the charge 

conference). Appellants assert that they raised the issue in their proposed jury 

charge, but as we determined above, there is no indication that the trial court 

considered or ruled on appellants’ proposal.
14

Further, appellants’ reference to “proportionate responsibility” is misplaced. 

The proportionate-responsibility statute does not apply to contract or quasi-contract 

claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.002; In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 

S.W.3d 781, 787 n.2 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding); GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union 

Gas Operating Co., 527 S.W.3d 563, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, 

pet. denied).

We overrule appellants’ fifth and eleventh issues.

Issue 6: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on 

March 6, 2019 that awards attorney’s fees to the Appellee because 

Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees were not properly proven up at trial.

In their sixth issue, appellants argue that Lanier failed to prove the 

reasonableness of her attorney’s fees. 

The factfinder’s starting point for calculating an attorney’s fee award is 

determining the reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, 

and the fee claimant bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both 

counts. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 

498 (Tex. 2019); El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012). 

Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services 

performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services 

were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the 

services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such 

services. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 498.

Here, Lanier’s attorney, Richard Martini, briefly testified at trial and also 

introduced several pages of invoices, which included billing details. After 

reviewing this evidence, we conclude that Lanier’s evidence sufficiently addressed 

the Rohrmoos Venture factors. Martini testified, “I’ve been an attorney for 33 
15

years. The fees that I’ve charged are custom and regular in the industry for cases

such as this. They were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution of this claim.”

Martini charged Lanier $250 per hour but testified on cross-examination that he 

had seen billing rates “as low as 150 or 175 . . . [or] as high as 300 or 350. And, 

again, that’s just for a standard contract case. No bells and whistles.”

Martini substantiated the hours worked with invoices that contained billing 

details. The invoices were itemized by task and by date and were calculated by 

Martini’s billing rate multiplied by the amount of time worked, which was timed in 

six-minute increments. 

Martini sought over $10,000 in attorney’s fees, and the jury awarded him 

$1,320 (and conditional appellate fees of $3,000). We hold that there is legally 

sufficient evidence to support the reasonable attorney’s fees awarded by the trial 

court and overrule appellants’ sixth issue. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 498.

C. Remaining Complaints

Issue 10: The trial court erred by signing and entering a judgment on 

March 6, 2019 against Appellants because the Plaintiff’s claims were 

compromised by the sale of her property.

Appellants contend that Lanier should be estopped from recovering damages 

from appellants because she “sold the fence to another buyer.” Appellants’

argument is as follows:

Effectively Appellee, according to her allegations, entered into a

contract with Appellants for the sale of the fence, but then sometime 

later sold the fence to another buyer. Appellee is, or ought to be, 

estopped, under an equitable theory, from recovery for breach of a

contract and quantum meruit claims while at the same time 

exchanging the same underlying consideration [the fence] in another 

contract with another party.
16

There is no evidence that Lanier entered into a contract with Townley and 

McCain to sell appellants the fence. Rather, Lanier’s theory was that the parties 

agreed that each property owner would pay a share of the cost to build the new 

fence. Again, appellants cite no portion of the record to support their assertion that

Lanier contracted to sell appellants the fence, nor do they cite legal authority to 

support their argument. We overrule appellants’ tenth issue.

Issue 14: The trial court erred by submitting question No. 1 to the jury, 

and/or erred by entering judgment on the verdict, because question No. 

1 is an irrelevant finding.

In the charge, the jury was asked, “Did Defendants agree to have Plaintiff 

authorize the building of a replacement fence between their two properties?” 

Appellants argue that this question failed to put the fact elements of Lanier’s 

pleaded causes of action—breach of contract or quantum meruit—to the jury.

We agree that this question does not pertain to either of Lanier’s tried 

claims. However, appellants do not explain how the submission of the question 

probably led to the rendition of an improper judgment. Crowson v. Bowen, 320 

S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (“To obtain a reversal 

based on the trial court’s error, however, [appellant] must show that the error 

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented him 

from properly presenting his case to this court.”) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); 

Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 225 (Tex. 2005)). 

In the absence of any argument or legal authority to show why the trial 

court’s submission of the question amounts to reversible error, we overrule 

appellants’ fourteenth issue.
17

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Kevin Jewell

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Hassan.