Filed 7/21/22 In re N.H. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re N.H., A Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

B312543

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

21CCJP00453C)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Martha A. Matthews, Judge. Dismissed.

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

V.H. (Mother) has three children: fifteen-year-old Nathan, 

fourteen-year-old N.H., and seven-year-old Nash.1 Nathan and 

N.H. lived with Mother, Nash, and Nash’s father, R.H. (Father).2 

The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over all three children, 

finding they were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical 

harm because Father sexually and physically abused N.H. The 

court removed Nash from Father’s custody, and only that order 

(removing Nash) is challenged in this appeal. While the appeal 

has been pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over 

Nash with an order granting Mother and Father joint legal and 

physical custody. We consider whether the appeal is accordingly 

moot.

I. BACKGROUND

In late December 2020, the Department received a referral 

alleging N.H. had been sexually abused by Father. N.H.

disclosed Father sexually abused her from the time she was nine 

years old until she was twelve.

The following month, the Department filed a six-count 

dependency petition alleging N.H., Nathan, and Nash were 

dependent children. Counts a-1, b-2, and j-2 alleged Father

physically abused N.H. by striking her with a belt. Counts b-1, d1, and j-1 alleged Father sexually abused N.H. All six counts 

alleged Mother failed to protect the children by allowing Father

to live in the home and have unlimited access to N.H. All six 

1 These were the children’s ages at the time dependency 

proceedings commenced.

2 Nathan and N.H.’s father was another man.
3

counts also alleged the abuse of N.H. placed Nathan and Nash at 

risk of serious harm.

At an adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile 

court sustained the Department’s petition in part. The court 

sustained the allegations that Father sexually abused N.H.

(counts b-1, d-1, and j-1).3 The court also sustained the allegation 

in count j-2 that Father physically abused N.H. and that abuse 

placed all three children at risk of harm. The court dismissed 

counts a-1 and b-2.

The juvenile court removed Nash from Father’s custody 

and ordered him to remain with Mother.4 The court ordered 

monitored visitation for Father and ordered him to participate in 

a parenting course, sex abuse counseling for perpetrators, and 

individual counseling to address case issues.

Father appealed the juvenile court’s order removing Nash

from his custody. While the appeal has been pending, the 

juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Nash, awarded 

Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody, and specified

Nash’s primary residence would be with Mother.5

3 The court amended count d-1 by interlineation to remove 

references to Nathan and Nash.

4 N.H. and Nathan were declared dependents of the juvenile 

court, but they were not removed from either parent.

5 This court granted the Department’s request to take 

judicial notice of the order terminating dependency jurisdiction 

and the subsequent custody order. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d), 

459.)
4

II. DISCUSSION

“‘An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the 

respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for 

the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 

1489, 1498.) “As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile 

court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the 

dependency proceedings moot.” (In re C.C. (2009) 172 

Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) “[D]ismissal for mootness in such 

circumstances is not automatic, [however,] but ‘must be decided 

on a case-by-case basis.’” (Ibid.; see also In re N.S. (2016) 245 

Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a 

dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can 

provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”] (N.S.).)

When the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, the 

Department’s supervision of the family also terminated and Nash 

was returned to Father’s custody (jointly with Mother). The sole 

basis for the appeal, the challenge to the order removing Nash 

from Father’s custody, has accordingly been rendered moot.

Father offers no persuasive argument to the contrary. He 

concedes “the precise nature of [his] future harm cannot be 

definitely determined,” but he contends the appeal is not moot 

because he believes the removal findings and order could have 

“‘unfavorable consequences’” in the future. The contention is 

speculative and insufficient to defeat application of settled 

mootness doctrine. (See, e.g., N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at 62-

63 [“We see no reason to review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings here on the basis of such speculation or 

caution. . . . [¶] . . . [And w]e are unconvinced . . . that any ruling 

we could issue here would have any practical effect on future 
5

dependency proceedings”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 

1494-1495.) Father also states, in one sentence, that the juvenile 

court’s removal findings were partly the basis for the court’s 

orders making Mother’s home Nash’s primary residence and 

“‘restricting’ [F]ather’s contact with Nash to three visits per 

week.” The statement, however, is inconsequential; Father does 

not challenge the sustained jurisdiction findings, nor does he 

challenge the terms of the joint custody order.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.