Filed 7/21/22 In re N.H. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re N.H.

, A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B 312543

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R

. H

. ,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00453C)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
Coun ty, Martha A. Matthews

, Judge

. Dismissed. Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant

. Rodrigo A. Castro

- Silva , County Counsel, K im Nemoy

, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds

, Principal Deputy County C ounsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 V.H. (Mother) has three children : fifteen

- year

- old Nathan,
fourteen

- year

- old N.H. , and seven

- year

- old Nash. 1 Nathan and
N.H. lived with Mother, Nash, and Nash’s father, R.H. (Father). 2 The juvenile court assumed ju risdiction over all three children, finding they were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical
harm because Father sexually and physically abused N.H. The

court removed Nash from Father ’s custody , and o nly that order ( removing Nash ) is challenged in this appeal . W hile the appeal has been pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Nash with an order granting Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody. We consider whether the appeal is accordingly

moot.

I. BACKGROUND
In la te December 2020, the Department received a referral alleging N.H. had been sexually abused by Father. N.H.
disclosed Father sexually abused her from the time she was nine years old until she was twelve. The following month, the Department filed a six

- co unt dependency petition alleging N.H. , Nathan, and Nash were dependent children . Counts a

- 1, b

- 2, and j

- 2 alleged Father physically abused N.H. by striking her with a belt. Counts b

- 1, d

1, and j

- 1 alleged Father sexually abused N.H. All six counts
alle ged Mother failed to protect the children by allowing Father
to live in the home and have unlimited access to N.H. A ll six

1 These were the children’s ages at the time dependency proceedings commenced.

2 Nathan and N.H.’s father was another man.3

counts also alleged the abuse of N.H. placed Nathan and Nash at
risk of serious harm. At an adjudication and disposition hearing, t he juvenile court sustained the Department’s petition in part. The court sustained the allegations that Father sexually abused N.H. (counts b

- 1, d

- 1, and j

- 1). 3 The court also sustained the allegation in count j

- 2 that Father physically abused N.H. and t hat abuse placed all three children at risk of harm . The court dismissed

counts a

- 1 and b

- 2. The juvenile court removed Nash from Father ’s custody
and ordered him to remain with Mother. 4 The court ordered
monitored visitation for Father and ordered him to participate in a parenting course, sex abuse counseling for perpetrators, and individual counseling to address case issues.
Father appealed the juvenile court’s order removing Nash from his custody . While the appeal has been pending, the juvenile cour t terminated jurisdiction over Nash

, awarded
Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody , and specified Nash’s primary residence would be with Mother. 5

3 The court amended count d

- 1 by interlineation to remove references to Nathan and Nash.

4 N.H. and Nathan were declared dependents of the juvenile court, but they were not removed from either parent.

5 This court granted the Department’s request to take judicial notice of the order terminating dependency jurisdiction

an d the subsequent custody order. ( Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (d)

, 459 .)4 II. DISCUSSION

“‘ An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrenc e of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498.) “As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction rend ers an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot.” ( In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) “[D]ismissal for mootness in such circumstances is not automatic, [however,] but ‘must be decided

on a case

- by

- case basis.’ ” ( Ibid. ; see also In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”] ( N.S. ) .) When the juvenile court te rminated jurisdiction, the Department’s supervision of the family also terminated and Nash
was returned to Father ’s custody (jointly with M other). T he sole basis for the appeal, the challenge to the order removing Nash
from Father ’s custody

, has according ly been rendered moot. Father offers no persuasive argument to the contrary. He concedes “the precise nature of [his] future harm cannot be definitely determined,” but he contends the appeal is not moot because he believes the removal findings and order could have “‘unfavorable consequences’” in the future. The contention is speculative and insufficient to defeat application of settled mootness doctrine. (See, e.g., N.S

., supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at 62

- 63 [“We see no reason to review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings here on the basis of such speculation or
caution.

. . . [¶]

. 

### . . [And w]e are unconvinced

. 

### . . that any ruling we could issue here would have any practical effect on future5

dependency proceedings”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4 th 1484,
1494

- 1495.) Father also states, in one sentence, that the juvenile court’s removal findings were partly the basis for the court’s orders making Mother’s home Nash’s primary residence and “‘restricting’ [F]ather’s contact with Nash to three visits per week.” The statement, however, is inconsequential; Father does not challenge the sustained jurisdiction findings, nor does he challenge the terms of the joint custody order.

DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

KIM, J.