A more de tailed history of the d i s p u t e b et wee n these c ompanies is set out in a previous 1 o p i n i o n b y this Court i n a re lated ca use. See F

ord Motor Co. v. Motor VehicleBd. , 2 1 S.W .3d 74 4, 748-5 4 (Tex . App .— Au sti n 2 00 0, pe t. d e nie d) . O the r a sp e c ts o f t he ov e ra ll d isp ute are a lso set out in separate opinions issued along with this one. Se e Ste rli ng Tru c k Cor p. v . M oto r V e hic le Bd. , No. 03-05-00288- CV (Tex. App.—Austin May 1, 2008) ( Metro V ); Freightliner Corp. v. Motor VehicleBd. , 03-05-00289- CV (Tex. App.—Austin May 1, 2008) (

Metro I ). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 290 -CV

F or d M ot orCo m pany , A ppe lla nt

v. M ot or Ve hic le Boa r d of t he Te xa s D e par tm e ntof Tr ans por ta ti on a nd

Met ro F ord Truck Sal es, Inc. , Appellees

DIRECT APP EAL FRO M TH E MO TOR VEH ICLE B OARD OF T HE T E X A S D E PA R T ME N T OF T R A N S POR T A T ION

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

For d Motor Company

appea ls from the o rd er by the Motor Vehic le B oard of the Texas Depar

tment of Tra

nsportation fining For d $10,000 for improperly resistingthe transf er of the For d truck sale s fra

nchise a ssigne d to Metro For d Truck Sale s, I nc. W e conc lude that the B oard’ s

or de r m us t be re ve rs e d b e c a

us e of the B oa rd ’s fa ilure to g ive pr op e r e ff e c t to a pr e vio us de c isi on

in

a re lated ca se by

this Court. According ly , we r ever se the B oard’ s order and rema nd this cause f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.

This cause is part of a

lo n g-r u nning dispute be tween F ord and Me tro, a F ord fra nchisee

. I n 1995, For d attempted to terminate Metro’s f ranc hise. Metro prote sted, prompting 12

a pr oc e e din g be fo re the B oa rd to d e te rm ine wh e the r F or d h a d g oo d c a us e to t e rm inate the fr anc his e ( Me t r o I ). See T e x. O c c . Co d e A n n . § 2 3 0 1

. 4 5 3 ( We s t 2 0 0 4 )

. T h a t p r o te s t tr ig g e r e d entry of a statut or y sta y tha t pr e ve nte d th e pa

rt ie s f ro m c omm itt ingany

a c t or omi ssi on that w ou ld a ff

e c t a leg al rig ht, duty , or privileg e of any party befor e the Boa rd. Id. § 2301.803 (West 2004). In 1998, the B oard f

ound that For d had g ood cause to terminate the f ranc hise, but imposed conditions on the termination—in cl u d i n g that For d allow Metro to sell the fr anchise . The district cour t aff irmed the go o d cause finding , reve rsed the imposition of conditions on the termination as unlawf

ul, and re manded f

or fur ther proc eeding s. This Cour t af fi rm ed the district cour

t’s judgme nt. Ford Motor Co. v

. Motor VehicleBd. , 21 S.W .3d 744, 748-54 (Te x . App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) . The supre me cour t denied re view on Apr il 5, 2001. Also in 2001, Metro proposed selling its fra nchise to the C ox Group. F ord opposed the sa le —in

pa rt be c a us e of the jud ic ia lly

a ff ir me d f ind ingthat F or d h a d g oo d c a us e to t e rm inate the fra nchise a nd in part bec ause of

alleg ed def

iciencie s in bo t h the transf er a pplication and the Cox G ro up ’s qu a lif

ic a tio ns . Amot or

ve hic le manu fa c tur e r m ay no t unre a so na

bly pr oh ibi t th e sa le of a fr anc his e . T e x. Oc c . Co de Ann. § 2 30 1. 35 9( e ) ( Wes t 20 04 ); see also id. § 2301.458 (Wes t 2 0 0 4 )

. T h e ma

nu f a c tu r e r mu s t s tate in w r it in g it s r e a s o n s f o r o p p o s in g th e tr an s f

er. Id. § 2301.359(d). A dealer whose transfe r i s reje cted may file a protest wit h the B oard. Id. § 2301.360 (West 2004). The manuf act u rer must then establish that the proposed tra nsfer ee is not qualified. Id. I f the B oard f

inds that the proposed tra nsferee i s q u al i fied, the tra nsfer is effe cted by

law.The rec ord contains re fer ence s to other disputes (e.g ., Metro II and Metro II

I ) not befor e 2 this Court t hat the par

ties prese nted to the B oard. 3 Id. § 2301.360(c) . After

For d reje cted the pr oposed transf er, Me tro filed a pr otest with the Boa rd on J uly 20, 2001. That protest is this cause ( Metro IV ). 2 For d asked the Boa

rd to resolve Metro I

befor e conside ring this cause. When the B oa rd re fu se d, F or d f

ile d a pe tit ion fo r wri t of

mand a mus wi th t hi s Co ur t, s e e kin g to s tay

thi s proce eding and ther eby

compel the B oard to g ive pre cede nce to Metro I

. Thi s C o u rt d enied the petition. See In re Ford Motor Co. , No. 02-03-00314- CV (Tex. A pp.—Austin Ma

y 31, 2002, orig . proce eding ). After l ear ning that Metro no long er w anted to sell the fr anchise to the Cox Group, but instead wante d to sell it t o Stanley Gra ff, F ord soug ht dismi ssal of this cause as moot. The B oard decli ne d to dis mis s. F or d’ s o pp os iti on to t he sa le to G ra ff

pr omp te d M e tr o to fi le a pr ote st w ith the B oa rd . T hat c a

us e is Metro V

an d i s t h e s ubject of a

separ ate pr ocee ding that is decided by this Court contemporaneously with this opi n i on. Sterling Truck Corp. v. Motor VehicleBd. , No. 03-05-00288- CV (Tex. App.—Austin May 1, 2008). On Fe bruar

y 3, 2005, the B oard de cided a ll t h re e ca u s es. I n its reconsider ation of Metro I , the Board withdrew i ts g ood cause deter mination and concluded ins tead that Ford did not h av e go o d ca use to terminate Me tro’s fr anchise . I n this cause, Metro IV , th e B o ar d

a d o p te d the proposal for

decision of the a dminist rative la w j udg e (“ AL J ”). The Boa rd conc luded that For d’s require ments for the Cox Group were unrea sonable and contra ry to applicable statutes. The B oard assessed a $10,000 civil penalty ag ainst For d for violating t he st atutes by unrea sonably

opposing the sale. The Boa

rd asse ssed the fine despite the Cox Group’s withdrawa l, rea soning t h at Ford’s4

statutory violations were complete when For d wrong ly opposed the sale and did not be come moot when the Cox Group decide d not to buy the pr o p er t y . Be ca u s e the Cox Group was “no long er a viable purc haser ,” the B oard de termined that the statutory transfe r to the Co x Gr o u p wa s not require d. I n Metro V

, the B oard f

ound that proposed tra

nsfer ee G raf

f wa s qualified, fine d For d for

re sis tin g the t rans fer of th e fr anc his e to G ra ff , a nd or de re d th e fr anc his e tr ans fe rr e d p ur su ant t o statut e . F or d h a s a

pp e a le d a ll thr e e or de rs . F or d rai ses se ve ra l is su e s in thi s d ir e c t a

pp e a l c ha lle ng ingthe B oa rd ’s de c isi on

in Metro IV

. For d argues that the order in this ca use violated the statutory

stay imposed by

the filing of M e tr o I. Fo rd

c on te nd s th a t th e or de r i s v oid be c a us e Me tr o n e ve r p ro pe rl y inv ok e d th e sa le approva l proce ss that led t o this protest and order . For d also asser ts that this cause wa s moot when filed, ar g uing that the aff irmance of the g ood cause deter min at i o n re n dere d a for ced sa le to the Cox G ro up imp os sib le

. F or d als o co nte nd s that the Cox G ro up ’s wi thd ra wa l of its of fe r t o p ur c ha se the prope rty

mooted the controve rsy and stripped Me tro of its standing to pur sue this cause to force a sale to the Cox Group. F ord ar g ues that, i n light of the judicially aff irmed findingthat For d had g ood cause to term i n ate Me tro’s fr anchise and the Cox Group’s withdrawa l of its offer , For d could not approve a tra

nsfer of Metro’ s dealers hip, Metro did not have the a bility to propose a tr ans fe r, and

the B oa rd did no t ha ve the a uth or ity to p e na lize F or d f

or fa ili ng to all ow Met ro to transfe r the fr anchise

.

We reviewthe B oard’ s order under the substantial evidence rule. Tex . Occ

. Code Ann. § 2301.751 (West 2004). Unde r that standar d of re view,5

a cour t may not substit ute its jud gm en t for the judg ment of the state a g ency on the we ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e on

qu e sti on s c omm itt e d to a g e nc y dis c re tio n b ut: (1) may aff irm the ag ency

decision in whole or in pa rt; and (2) shall reve rse or

rema nd the ca se for

further pro cee dings if substantial rig hts of the appellant have been prejudice d beca use th e adminis trative finding s, infere nces, c onclusions, or dec isions are: (A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; ( B ) i ne x c e s s o f

t h e a g e n c y’ s s t a t

u t o r y a u t h o r i t y; (C) made throug h unlawful proc edure ; (D) aff ecte d by other e rror

of law; (E) not r easona

bly supported by

substantial evidence considering the re liable and pr obative evide nce in the r ecor d as a whole; or (F ) arbitra

ry or ca pricious or c hara cter ized by abuse of discretion or cle arly unwar rante d exercise of

discretion. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174 (West 2000).

For d argues that the B oard’ s order in M e tro IV v i olated the statutory stay implemented by

the filing of Metro I

. T he statut e c re a tin g the sta y pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: (a) On the initiation of a boar d proce eding , wh et her by complaint, protest, or otherwise, a

perso n wh o rec eives notice from the boa rd of a statutory stay imposed by

this chapter ma

y not allow or commit any

act or omission t hat would: (1) violate this cha

pter or a ny rule, orde r, or de cision of the boar d; (2) a ffe ct a leg al rig ht, duty , or privileg e of a ny party befor e the boa

rd; or (3 ) t en d t o re n d er i n ef fe ct u al a b o ar d

o rd er i na p en d i n g p ro ce ed i n g.Th e oc c up a tio ns c od e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: 3 (a ) A d e a le r m

us t no tif y the manu fa c tur e r o r d ist ri butor of a ve hic le th e de a le r i s fra nchised to sell of the de aler ’s dec ision to assig n, sell, or ot herw ise transfe r a fra nchise or a

controlling interest in the dealership to another person. The notice is the application by

the dea ler for

approva l by

the manufa cture r or distributor of the transf er. (b ) No tic e un de r S ub se c tio n ( a ) m us t: (1) be in writing and include the prospec tive transfe ree ’s name, a d d r e s s , financ ial qualifications, and business experience ; and (2) be sent by

cer tified mail, return r ece ipt requested.

6 (b ) A s tatut or

y sta y imp os e d b y

thi s c ha pte r r e ma ins in e ff

e c t until va c a te d o r u

nti l the proc eedingis concluded by a fina l order or

decision. (c) A per son aff

ecte d by a statutory

stay imposed by

this chapter ma

y initiate a proce eding befor e the boa rd to modify , vacate, or c larify the ex t ent and a p p l i c a t i o no f

t h e s t a tu t o r

y s t ay.

Tex. Oc c. Code Ann. § 2301.803. This statute bars various ty pes of actions by “a person who

rec eives notice from the boa rd of a statutory stay .” Id. I t does not preve nt the Boa rd fr om taking a

ny

a c t i o nd u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e s t ay. T h e B o ar d i s e x p r e s s l y e mp o w e r e d

t o v a c a t e i t s o w ns t ay. Id. I n a dd iti on , th e sta

y la sts on ly

un til fi na l or de r o r d e c isi on , a nd the fi na l or de r a ft e r re mand in Metro I occur

red essentially simult aneously with the final orde r in this cause. Id. We conclude that the B oard’ s order

in this cause did not violate its stay in Metro I

. We next examine whether Metro g av e s u f

f ic ient notice and inf

ormation to Ford a

bout the proposed sa le to allow Metro to invoke the B oard’ s jurisdict i o n t o re v i ew a prote st of For d’s reje ction. The process for approva l or di sapprova l of t he tra nsfer of a f ranc hise involves a ser ies of notices and r esponses be tween ma nufac turer a

nd fra nchisee

. SeeTex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.359. 3( c ) T h e n o t i c e m u s tb e a c c o mp an i e d b y: (1) a copy o f p er t i nent ag ree ments reg ardingthe proposed a ssignment, sa le, or transfe r; (2) completed a

pplication forms and r elated i n fo rm ation g ener ally used by the manufa cture r or distributor in revie wing prospec tive deale rs, if the for ms are on file with the boar d; and (3 ) the pr os pe c tiv e tr ans fe re e ’s wr itt e n a g re e me nt t o c omp ly wi th t he fr anc his e to the extent that the franc hise is not in conflict with this chapter. (d) Not l at er than the 60th day afte r the date of re ceipt of a notice and a

pplication under this sec tion, a manufa cture r or distributor shall deter mi n e whe ther a deale r’s prospe ctive tra

nsfer ee is qua li fi ed and shall send a letter by cer tified ma il , r e tu

r nr e c e ip t r e qu e s te d , in f

o r mi n g th e d e a le r

o f th e a p p r o v a l o r

the unacc eptability

of the prospec tive transfe ree . I f the prospe ctive tra nsfer ee is not a c c e pta ble , th e manu fa c tur e r or dis tr ibutor sh a ll i nc lud e a

state me nt s e tti ngfo rt

h the mater ial rea sons for the r ejec tion. (e) A manufa cture r or distributor may not unrea sonably

withhold ap p ro v al of an application filed unde r S ubsection (a). I t is unrea sonable for a manuf actur er or distributor to reject a

prospec tive transfe ree who is of g ood moral cha rac ter a nd who meets the w ritten, rea sonable, a nd u n iformly

applied standa

rds or qualifications, if any , of the manuf actur er or distribut o r

r e la ti n g to the prospec tive tr ans fe re e ’s bu sin e ss e xpe ri e nc e and fi na nc ia l qu a lif

ic a tio ns . ( f ) An ap p li c a ti o n f

il e d u n d e r th is s e c ti o n is a p p r o v e d u n le s s r e

je c te d b y the manufa cture r or distributor in the manne r provided by this section. Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.359 ( West 2004). 7 The c ode provide s that “[a] dea ler whose application is r ejec ted under Section 2301.359 may file a protest with the boar d.” Id. § 2301.360(a)

.

For d contends that the B oard ha d no power to hear this cause beca use Metro’ s notice to For d of t he sale was insufficient to start the manuf actur er’ s sale re view proc ess that pre cede s the Boa rd’s re view of a

protest. For d complains that someone other than the seller sent the initial letter8

informing For d about the propose d sale, that the initial letter was not cer tified, that it did not include require d information (such a s th e p ro posed buy er’ s name a nd addre ss), and that it did not include a complete d application fr om the proposed tra nsfer ee or a copy of the final ag ree ment showing that Metro had de cided to tra

nsfer the fra nchise. See id. § 2301.359(b), ( c). F ord conte nds that Metro’s subsequent letter

to F ord did not fill in all the g aps left by the Cox Group’s e arlier letter. Metr o’s le tt e r a ls o w a s n o t s e n t b y

c e rti f ie d ma il an d in c lu d e d a n o n - b in d in g le tt e r

o f inte n t t o s e ll , w h ic h For d argues did not notify For d of a final decision to se ll a nd, there fore , was not the pertinent a nd require d sales agr eeme nt. Accor ding to F ord, these de ficienc ies preve nted Metro f rom invoking the Boa rd’s jurisdiction and re ndere d the B oard’ s subsequent orde r void.

We conclude that the alleg ed defic iencies in notice and materia l supplied by Metro to Ford did not depr ive the B oard of jurisdic t i o n t o h ea r Metro’ s protest. The B oard’ s review proce ss i s t rig g ere d by

a prote st filed by

a dea ler whose proposed sa le has be en re jected by the manufa cture r under section 2301.359. SeeTex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.360( a). Reg ardle ss of any ina de qu a c ie s in

mate ri a ls s e nt t o F or d a

bo ut t he sa le , F or d’ s le tte r rej ect ingthe pr op os e d s a le is a “stateme nt setting for

th the materia l r easons for the reje ction” as descr ibed by the occ upations code (althoug h it, too, allege dly was not se n t b y ce rt i fi ed mail as re quired). See id. § 2301.359(d). Metro’s pr otest of that re jection invoked the B oard’ s jurisdiction. See id. § 2301.360(a)

. I nadequa cies in a notice of a pr oposed sale an d s u p p o rt ing materials sent to a ma nufac turer ma

y make r ejec tion of the sale more rea sonable a nd, thus, may

aff ect the a ssessment of the merits of a protest of the r ejec tion, but we are not persuaded that such inade quacie s deprive the Boa rd of the9

po we r to co ns ide r the pr ote st. Th e B oa rd ’s or de r i s n ot v oid

fo r w ant o f j ur isd ic tio n b a se d o n th e se

re po rt e d n oti c e de fi c ie nc ie s.

For d also contends that the withdrawa l of the Cox Group’s of fer rende red this entire pr oc e e din g moo t. F or d a

rgue s tha t the B oa

rd la c ke d the a

bil ity to r e vie w F or d’ s r e

je c tio n o f t

he sa le beca use the B oard c ould not mandate the tra nsfer of the fr anchise . This argument is not supported by the e na bli ngstatut e s. Th e B oa

rd ha s th e po we r t o a sse ss a c ivi l pe na lty

fo r s tatut or

y vio latio ns . Id. § 2301.801. The B oard c oncluded that F ord vi o l ated the statute by unrea sonably

reje cting the proposed sale of the fra

nchise to a qua lified buy er. See id. § 2301.359(e) . Whether the Cox Group

wa s a qualified buy er w hen F ord re jected the proposed sa le was f ix ed at the time of

the re jection. Any imp ro pr ie ty

in t hat r e je c tio n d id n ot d isa

pp e ar w iththe wi thd

ra wa l of the of fe r. Th is c a

us e is not a tort or bre ach of contra ct case wher e har m could be avoide d or bene fit of the bar g ain might be ach ie v e d an d th e d ama g e s c o mp le te ly mi ti g a te d

. T h is is an a s s e s s me n t o f a c iv il p e n alty for violations of s tatutory

duties. The B oard r etained jur isdiction over the issue of whether For d violated the law at the time it rejecte d Metro’s pr oposed sale of the fra nchise to the Cox Group. Fo rd contends that this C ourt’s re jection of the f

orce d sale in Metro I m a ke s th is proce eding

—revie wing the propriety of For d’s reje ction of a pr oposed sale—a n improper c ollatera l attack on the dec ision in Metro I

. Se e Fo rd , 21 S.W.3 d at 7 66 . “ A c oll a te ra l atta c k is an atte mpt to

av o i d t h e b i n d i n g fo rc e o f a j u d gm en t i n a p ro ce ed i n g n o t i n s t i tu t ed fo r t h e p u rp o s e o f c o rr ec t i n g, modify ing, or

vacating the judg ment, but in order to obtain some spec ific re lief which the judgme nt

curr ently stands as a ba

r ag ainst.” Browning v. Prostok , 165 S.W .3d 336, 346 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ). Al tho ug h Met

ro may have pr op os e d th e Cox G ro up sa le to a ve rt the ult imate pr a c tic a l e

ffe c t of thi sI n the conc lusion of the 2000 opinion in Metro I , this Court wrote, “We affirm the 4 termination of the Me tro fra nchise for g ood cause . . . .” Fo rd , 21 S.W .3d at 767. However, a s set out e arlier in that opinion, this Court aff irmed the finding of go od c au seto terminate the f

ranc hise, n o t an a c tu a l te r

mi n a ti o n. S

ee id. at 766 (“ there is substantial evidence to support the Boa rd’s fi n d i n g of good cause to terminate Metr o” (e mphasis added) ). The B oard is author ized in transfer pr oc e e di n g s t o r e v i e w w h e t h e r a m anu f a c tu r e r h a s g o o d

c a u s e t o t e r m i n a t e a f r an c h i s e , n o tto order the termination. SeeT ex . Occ . Code Ann. §§ 2301.453, .455 (West 2004). The 2000 judgme nt of this Court merely aff irmed dec isions by

the trial cour

t and the B oard which, as d i s cussed in our contemporane ous opinion in Metro I , a f f ir me d th e f

in d in g o f g o o d cause

. Freightliner , 03-05-00289- CV, slip op. at 19-20. 10 Court’s previous decision in Metro I , this procee ding doe s not attack the binding force of that judgme nt. T his Court’s opinion i n Metro I did no t te rm inate Me tr o’ s f

ra nc his e . Rathe r, it m e re ly aff irmed the B oard’ s decision that Fo rd had g ood cause to terminate the f ranc hise. This Court’s

4 deter mination that the Boa

rd lac ked the au t h o ri ty

to force a sale is lim ited to the context of a proce eding to determine w hether a manufa cture r has g ood cause to terminate a fra nchise. Se e Fo rd , 21 S.W .3d at 764-66. Unlike the statutes definingthe g ood-ca use dete rmination, the st atutory scheme for r eviewingprotests of re jected sa les expressly

empower s the Boa

rd t o require a manuf actur er to pe rmit a s al e t o a q u al ified buy er. Compare Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.453 (g ood cause ), with i d. § 2301.360(c) (re jected sa le). In Metro I

, th is C ourt

did no t a dd re ss a pa ra lle l, statutorily authorized protest of a

manufa cture r’s re

jection of a

prop o s ed s al e. The prote st of the reje ction of the propose d sale in Metro IV is not a collatera l attack on the holding s in Metro I

. For d argues that this p ro cee ding is ba rre d by the doctrine s of collater al estoppel and res judicata. Collateral estoppel bars the relitig ation of issues resolved in a previous s u i t i f: (1 ) t he fa c ts s ou g ht t o b e lit ig a te d w e re fu lly and fa ir ly lit ig a te d in th e pr e vio us su it, (2 ) t ho se fa c ts

we re e sse nti a l t o t h e j u d g m e n ti nt h a ts u i t , an d ( 3 ) t h e p art i e s w e r e a dv e r s ar i e s i nt h a ts u i t.11

HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel , 9 82 S.W. 2d 88 1, 89 0 n.2 (T e x. 19 98 ). Th e do c tr ine of re s ju dic a ta

“ pr e ve nts a

pla int if f f ro m a ba nd on ingc la ims and

su bs e qu e ntl y

a sse rt ingthe m w he n th e c la ims c ou ld have be en litigat ed i n t he prior suit. F or re s judicata to apply , there must be: (1) a pr ior final jud g me nt o n th e me ri ts b y a c ourt of c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n; ( 2) ide nti ty of pa rt ie s or tho se in p ri vit

y with them; and (3 ) a sec ond action base d on the same c laims that were raised or could have been raised in the f

irst action.” Citi

zens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dac cach , 217 S.W .3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007) (citations omitted). The iss ues of whe ther Metr o’s fra nchise should be ter

minated and whe ther the Boa rd could forc e a sa le in a g ood-ca use proc eedingwer e litigated in Metro I , but those issues are not present in this proc eeding . The issues ce ntral to this procee ding—whether the Cox Group wa s qualified to be a

fra nchisee and whe ther F ord re asonably reje cted the pr o p o s ed sale —wer e not litigated in Metro I

. We are not persuade d t h at fac t questions and claims relating to the pr oposed Cox Group sale should have been broug ht in a proc eedingfocuse d on whether Metro had g iven For d g ood cause to terminate its fra nchise. The previous judgme nt in Metro I tha t F or d h a d g oo d c a

us e to te rminate Metro’s f

ranc hise did not bar Metro f rom protesting in this cause F ord’s re jection of the pr op os e d s a le to t

he Cox G ro up un de r t

he do c tr ine s o f r e s ju dic a ta or c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l. Although our prior judgme nt i n Metro I did not bar this cause , the B oard’ s misapplication of our holding in M e tro I fu n d am en tally

undermines its order

in this cause. F ord argued to th e Bo ar d, as it does in this appeal, that the a ffirma nce of the g ood cause deter

mination meant that Metro ha d n o fr an ch i s e to sell or that permitting a sale wa s inconsistent with the occupations co d e. The AL J found these a rguments “unper suasive” be cause they oversimplified “av ery co mp l ex s et o f d ec i s i o n s ” a n d co mp l et e l y i g n o r edt h e c o n t ex to f t h e o t h er fi n d i n gsTh e le g isl a tur e did no t ma ke te rm ination autom a tic up on the fi nd ingof

g oo d c a us e to 5 terminate. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2 301.453(g ) (“ After a hea ring , the boar d shall determine whether the par ty seekingthe termination or discontinuanc e has e stablished by a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e tha

t th e re is g oo d c a

us e fo r t he pr op os e d te rm inatio n o r d isc on tin ua nce.”). Th is contra sts sharply

with the statute g overningrevie ws of prote sts of rejec ted sales, whic h provides for a uto matic tr ans fe r of the fr anc his e wh e n the B oa rd fi nd s that the re

je c te d p ro sp e c tiv e tr ans fe re e is qualified. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.360( c) ( West 2004). 12 and co n cl u s ions reg ardingFor d’s culpability for e vents leadingto the g ood cause deter mination. Tex. Motor Veh. Bd., Metro Ford Truck Sal es, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , D oc ke t N o. 01 -0 04 0 L I C, at 29-30 (Jul y

16, 2004) (PFD ). The AL J corr ectly stated that Metro held the f ranc hise eve n afte r the re mand

and that th e g oo d c a

us e fi nd ing did “ no t fo rc e Me tr o to imm e diate ly and un c on dit ion a lly g ive up its franc hise.” Id. at 30. Howeve r, the B oard w en t fu rt h er in its reconsideration of 5 Metro I , believing that the good cause dete rmination itself was within the scope of the re mand. As we discuss at gr eate r leng th in our opinion on the concur rent a ppeal in Metro I

, howeve r, the g ood

cause deter

mination was a ffirme d and not re manded. See Freightliner Corp. v . Motor VehicleBd. , 03-05-00289- CV, slip op. at 19-20 (Tex. A pp.—Austin Ma

y 1, 2008). Thus, the Boa rd asse ssed a penalty ag ainst Ford in this case while under a key misapprehe nsion reg arding the contex t of For d’s resistanc e to the propose d transfe r. This err or of law in the related case conc erningthe sec urity of Metro’s hold on its fra

nchise plainly

aff ecte d the B oard’ s decision in this case. We cannot g aug e, howe ver, the extent to which the misapprehe nsion reg ardingthe g ood cause deter

mination affe cted the B oard’ s decision in this case. Nor can w e disce rn the e x tent to which the Boa

rd’s mistaken belief that the g ood cause deter mination was rema

nded af fec ted the de te rm inatio n th a t F or d im pr op e rl y re je c te d th e sa le and

that a fi ne wa s a

pp ro pr iate

. I t is p os sib le that the B oard’ s order

may have been based on the merits of the Cox Group’s application irre spectiveThe leg islature has g iven the B oard’ s former responsibilities to the Director of the Motor 6 Vehicle Division of the T ex as Department of Tra nsportation. SeeTex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.005(a) (West Supp. 2007). 13 of the status of Me t ro ’s fr anchise. I ndeed, the Boa rd found violations and imposed a f ine eve n though the Cox Group a ctually withdrew its offe r t o p u rc hase a nd one investor in the pr ospective purcha sing g roup wa s later revea led t o be morally unfit. On t he other hand, it is more likely that the Boa rd’s a ssessment of F ord’s re sistance to the sa le would hav e b ee n d i fferent ha d the B oard understood that the good cause dete rmination in Metro I wa s no t re mand e d and wa s no t su bje c t to being revisited by

the B oard. Sup p o rt i n g t h i s view is the AL J ’s re mark—pa rt of the pr oposal for decision adopte d by

the B oard—on the impo rt an ce o f t he conte x t of the complex set of dec isions made concer

ning the dispute betwee n these parties. Assessing For d’s opposition to t he sale in the proper context, th e Di rec tor of the Motor Ve hicle Division of the Te x as De partment of Transpor tation may

well conclude t hat no violation occur red or that any violations are less serious 6 and wa rra nt a lesser

fine. The Boa

rd’s e rror of law and the uncer

tainty it eng ender s reg ardingthe violations found and the fine imposed require that we r ever se th e Bo ar d ’s order in this cause and

re mand fo r r e c on sid e ratio n a

nd fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s. Hav in g d e te r

mi n e d to r e ma n d th is c a u s e b a s e d

o nth e e r

r o r o f la w r e g ar d ing the det er m i n at i o n that For d had g ood cause to terminate Metr o’s fra nchise, we will not review For d’s re maining issues on a ppeal rega rd i n g t he support for the finding s of violations and the assessment of

a fine . Although For d reque sts that we re ject the B oard’ s holdings supporting the assessment of

the fine a nd rende r judg ment in Ford’ s favor , we a re not authorized in this t y pe of ca se to rende r a judg ment t h at we b elieve the ag ency should have re ndere d if, by doing so, w e14

would usurp the ag ency ’s authority

. SeeT e x. G o v ’ tC o d e A n n . § 20 01 .1 74 ; F o r d Motor Co.

v . B utn ar u , 1 57 S.W. 3d 142, 14 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 05 , n o p e t.) ; Pantera Energy Co. v. Railroad Comm’n , 1 50 S.W. 3d 46 6, 47 4 n .9 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus ti n 2 00 4, no pe t.) ; Pu bli c Ut il. Comm’n v. G TE-SW

, 833 S.W .2d 153, 175 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992), aff ’d in p ar t, r e v ’d

in p ar t on other grounds , 9 01 S.W. 2d 40 1 ( Te x. 19 95 ); Consumer s W a ter, Inc. v . Public Util. Comm’n , 77 4 S. W.2 d 7 19 , 72 2 (Tex . App .— Au sti n 1 98 9, no wr it) ; se e als o Marrs v. Railroad Comm’n , 177 S.W .2d 941, 950 (Tex. 1944). On the re c or d pr e se nte d, we be lie ve that r e nd e ri ngjud g me nt i n favor of F ord would be a

n unwar rante d intrusion on the Boa rd’s a u t h ority . Be cause resolution of these re maining issues w ould not alter our d i s p o s i t i o n o f this cause , consideration of them is not

nece ssary to the final dispositi on of this a ppeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. For the same re ason, we do no t ad d re s s M et ro’s a ssertion that For d waived the rig ht to complain about one of the Boa rd’s fi nd ing s. We reve rse the Boa rd’s order assessing a fine a g ainst Ford in this ca use and r emand the ca use to the Direc tor of the Motor Ve hicle Division of the Te x as De partment of T ranspor tation for r econside ration in light of a corr ect a ppli ca tion of this C ourt’s holding s in Metro I and fur ther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

1, 2008