alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ANDCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Gerald J.Burnett, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the QuarterlyReport of Avistar Communications Corporation on Form 10-Q for the fiscalquarter ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thatinformation contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents inall material respects the financial condition and results of operations ofAvistar Communications Corporation.

 
|   | By:    | /s/ GERALD J. BURNETT    |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  | Gerald  J. Burnett       |
|   | Title: | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

 

I, Robert J.Habig, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Reportof Avistar Communications Corporation on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter endedJune 30, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information containedin such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respectsthe financial condition and results of operations of Avistar CommunicationsCorporation.

 
|   | By:    | /s/ ROBERT J. HABIG      |   |
|--------|--------|--------------------------|--------|
|   | Name:  | Robert  J. Habig         |
|   | Title: | Chief  Financial Officer |

 

----
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41672

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR CARRILLO-MENDOZA,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CR-172-11

Before JONES, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Salvador Carrillo-Mendoza appeals the 121-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to 

manufacture and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 846, 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A). The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal

based on the appeal waiver in Carrillo-Mendoza’s plea agreement or, in the 

alternative, for an extension of time to file a brief.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 24, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-41672 Document: 00514208656 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/24/2017
No. 16-41672

2

The validity of an appeal waiver is a question of law that this court 

reviews de novo. United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2005). 

During his plea colloquy, Carrillo-Mendoza confirmed that he had read the 

plea agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and understood its terms. He

confirmed that he understood the appeal waiver provision and its exceptions 

and assured the court that he was voluntarily waiving his right to appeal. 

Based on our review of the record, Carrillo-Mendoza’s appeal waiver was 

knowing and voluntary and, therefore, is enforceable. See United States v. 

Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 736-37 (5th Cir. 2014); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).

Carrillo-Mendoza waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence 

“on all grounds,” except that he retained the right to challenge any sentence in 

excess of the statutory maximum and the right to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. His current challenge to the substantive reasonableness 

of his below-guideline sentence does not fall within either of the limited 

exceptions to the appeal waiver.

Accordingly, the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is 

GRANTED, and its alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is 

DENIED. Counsel for Carrillo-Mendoza is CAUTIONED that pursuing an 

appeal contrary to a valid waiver without responding to the Government’s 

invocation of the waiver is a needless waste of judicial resources that could 

result in sanctions. See United States v. Gaitan, 171 F.3d 222, 223-24 (5th Cir. 

1999).

 Case: 16-41672 Document: 00514208656 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/24/2017
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
**1400 CAF 12-00012**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF RONALD DAVID RAGIN, III, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER V
HERMAN DORSEY, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. (APPEAL NO. 3.)

ALAN BIRNHOLZ, EAST AMHERST, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
DAVID A. SHAPIRO, BUFFALO, FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.
MARY ANNE CONNELL, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, BUFFALO, FOR AALIYAH R.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Rosalie Bailey, J.), entered October 24, 2011. The order dismissed the petition. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Same Memorandum as in Matter of Ragin v Dorsey ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d ___ [Dec. 28, 2012]).

Entered: December 28, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### DAVIS v. STATE.

No. 23454.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 30, 1946.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*109BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction of an assault to rape with a penalty of two years in the penitentiary.

The proceedings appear to be regular. We find no objections to the court’s charge. There is a motion for a new trial which complains of the introduction of certain evidence and of arguments made by the prosecuting attorney. These matters are not brought forward by bills of exception and we cannot, under the rule, consider them for any purpose.

The statement of facts is in question and answer form which under Article 760, Section 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be considered by us. Amended 1931, 42d Leg., 1st C. S., p. 75, ch. 34, § 7. Newsom v. State, 145 Tex.Crim.R. 473, 169 S.W.2d 195; Williams v. State, 145 Tex.Crim.R. 634, 170 S.W.2d 735; Edwards v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 185 S.W.2d 111.

In the state of the record as it appears before us nothing is presented for our consideration. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
#### Andrew J. HARDESTY, Appellant, v. Irvin SPARROW and Owen Medford, Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 11, 1955.

*588Anderson & Anderson, E. B. Anderson and John B. Anderson, Owensboro, for appellant.

Wilson & Wilson, George S. Wilson and William L. Wilson, Owensboro, for appellees.

STEWART, Chief Justice.

Appellee, Irvin Sparrow, sued appellant, Andrew J. Hardesty, for $1,140 damages which he alleged occurred to his car in an automobile collision with appellant, and the latter counterclaimed for $11,075, of which $10,500 was for personal injuries he averred he received and $575 was for damages he claimed resulted to his car. He made one Owen Medford a party defendant. The jury returned a verdict in appellant’s favor for $250 as to his car, but denied him any damages for personal injuries. He contends on this appeal: (1) The jury’s verdict is less than the car damage he insists he proved and is, therefore, inadequate as a matter of law; (2) incompetent evidence was introduced in connection with certain X-ray pictures; and (3) appellees’ counsel made an improper argument to the jury.

Appellant’s first contention is controlled by Keller v. Morehead, Ky., 247 S.W.2d 218, 221, a case strikingly similar to the one at bar, where this Court, quoting from 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, section 1208, page 1061, said: “‘“Opinion testimony as to value is not conclusive; when uncontradicted, it may be regarded as sufficient proof, but even in such case the jury may exercise their independent judgment.” ’ ” Appellant introduced only opinion evidence as to the value of his car immediately before and after the accident, and the Morehead case plainly declares that this type of proof is not absolute on a question of damages such as that involved in this instance.

It is true, as next insisted, that the testimony as to the X-ray findings was incompetent because the prints were not properly identified by the radiologist who took them. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Nolan, 161 Ky. 205, 170 S.W. 650; Powell v. Galloway, 229 Ky. 37, 16 S.W.2d 489. However, this evidence was not prejudicial under the circumstances. The X-ray proof concerned appellant’s shoulder or clavicle and showed it was not broken. Appellant’s own doctor testified that his examination revealed no broken bones in appellant’s shoulder; accordingly, there was no issue on this point. The admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial where, as here, it is related to a fact about which there is no dispute. Steele v. Faris, 25 K.L.R. 1749, 78 S.W. 868; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Roberts, 187 Ky. 192, 218 S.W. 713, 9 A.L.R. 94.

In our opinion the so-called improper argument complained of does not constitute a reversible error. We believe, as did the lower court, that the statement made by appellees’ counsel did not convey to the minds of the jury the implication that appellant attributes to it.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 6 A0 38 4 . ROSAMUND P. BRAUNROT v . RONALD G. KOVACS.

Ro s am u nd Brau nro t an d Ro n al d Ko v acs were d i v o rce d in 2014. Su b s eq u en t l y

,

Brau n ro t fi l ed a p et i t i o n ag ai n s t Ko v acs

, s eek i ng a d ecl arat o ry ju d g m en t co n cern i n g

t h e p ort i o n o f Ko v acs ’ s ret i rem en t acco u n t s t o wh i ch sh e was en t i tl ed u n d er t h e

p art i es ’ s et t l em en t ag reem en t

. Th e t ri al co u rt ru led i n Ko v acs ’ s fav o r, an d Brau n ro t

ap p eal ed t h erefro m

. W e, h o w ev er, l ack ju ri sd i ct i o n

.

Th e G eo rg i a Su p rem e Co urt h as ju ri s d i ct i o n o v er al l d i v or c e a n d a l i m o ny

cas es

, i n cl u d i n g t h os e cas es an ci l l a ry to t h e d i vo rce p ro ceed i n g s. See Ga. Co ns t

.

1 9 8 3

, Art

. V I, Sec. VI, Par. III (6 ); M o r ri s v. S ur g es

, 28 4 G a. 74 8

, 7 5 0 (2 ) (6 7 0 SE2 d

8 4 ) (2 0 08 ). As t h e s u bject m at t er o f t h is ap peal rel at es t o t h e eq u i t ab l e d i v i s i o n o f

m ari t al p ro p ert y, t h i s a p p eal i s h ereb y TRANSFERRED t o t h e Su p rem e Co u rt fo r

d i s p o s i t i on

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 11/23/2015 November 23, 2015
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Mary M. Rawls v. Jeffrey Clark Rawls

Appellate case number: 01

- 13

- 00568

- CV

Trial court case number: 2007

- 61678

Trial court: 246 th District Court of Harris County

On February 24, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Disposition of Appeal by

Settlement . As noted in our order dated February 27, 2014, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit us to order a new trial on the agreement of the parties absen t reversible error, or to vacate a judgment absent reversible error or a settlement. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1 & cmt. We denied the motion without prejudice to refiling to describe the basis for the parties’ contention

that the trial court committed rever sible error. However, the parties failed to refile the motion. The joint motion states that Jeffrey Clark Rawls concedes that issues in Appellant’s brief have

merit. The Court ORDERS Jeffrey Rawls to file a brief describing with particularity the issue in Appellant’s brief, if any, that he believes constitutes reversible error.

The brief should be filed within 2 0 days of the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

__

/s/ Rebeca Huddle

__  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: October 31, 2014
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MARV A. HUBBARD, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee.

No. 4D 1 8

- 1 753

[ August 30, 2018 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.85 0 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Seven teenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Paul L. Backman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 05

- 00 9350

- CF

- 10 A

.

Marv A. Hubbard

, Live Oak , pro se

.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

W ARNER
, C ONNER and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Network Engines, Inc. (the Company) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Douglas G. Bryant, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated:  August 14, 2003



LOGODouglas G. BryantChief Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

-- -- -- --

NO. 16-0333

CHARLES L. HARRELL AND

HOLLIS R. HARRELL

v.

PETER J. DRAGON

§

§

§

§

§

§

Karnes County,

4th District.

July 22, 2016

Petitioners' petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case,

having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denied.



I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify

that the above and attached is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of

Texas in the case numbered and styled as above, as the same appear of record in the minutes of

said Court under the date shown.

It is further ordered that petitioners, CHARLES L. HARRELL AND HOLLIS R.

HARRELL, pay all costs incurred on this petition.

WITNESS my hand and seal of the Supreme Court of Texas, at the City of Austin, this

the 1st day of September, 2016.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

By Monica Zamarripa, Deputy Clerk

FILE COPY
#### Dora STEPP, Appellant, v. Eunice Nunnery LESLIE et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 4, 1955.

V. R. Bentley, Pikeville, for appellant.

E. J. Picklesimer, Kelsey Friend, Pike-ville, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

On a former appeal, this action was reversed for a determination to be made of the amount contributed by appellant, Dora Stepp, on the improvements on the lands owned by appellees. Ky., 263 S.W.2d 122.

Appellant moved for an appeal because of the inadequacy of the judgment. The lower court adjudged her entitled to recover $383.72, and we find no error.

Motion for appeal is overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
(November 8, 1990)

#### In the Matter of Harold Wapnick, Appellant. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 13, 1986, which, *inter alia,*assessed Harold Wapnick for unemployment insurance contributions.

Since Harold Wapnick offered essentially nothing more than a self-serving statement that he had no employees, it was not unreasonable for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to determine that, based on the evidence it had, Wapnick exercised sufficient direction and control over three other people performing services at his office as to establish their status as employees *(see, Matter of Cohen [Blinder, Robinson & Co.—Roberts],*67 NY2d 683). Likewise, in the absence of the production of any records or reports by Wapnick, the Board properly concluded that the Commissioner of Labor was justified in issuing an estimated assessment based on the evidence he had *(see,*Labor Law § 571). Finally, under these circumstances, the Board’s determination that Wapnick’s actions were willful was proper *(see,*Labor Law § 570 [4]).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Mercure, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99.3


                        ANNUAL STATEMENT AS TO COMPLIANCE

                          GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-2
                    Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-2

      I, Kevin Cloyd, hereby certify that I am a duly appointed Executive Vice
President of New Century Mortgage Corporation (the " Servicer" ), and further
certify as follows:

      1. This certification is being made pursuant to the terms of the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement, dated as of January 1, 2005 (the "Agreement"), among GS
Mortgage Securities Corp. as depositor (the "Depositor"), Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP as servicer, the Servicer, NC Capital Corporation as responsible
party and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as trustee (the "Trustee").

      2. I have reviewed the activities of the Servicer during the preceding
year and the Servicer's performance under the Agreement and to the best of my
knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its
obligations under the Agreement throughout the year.

      Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings set forth
in the Agreement.


Dated: March 15, 2006

<PAGE>

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of
March 15, 2006.

                                    By:/s/ Kevin Cloyd
                                       ---------------------------------
                                       Name: Kevin Cloyd
                                       Title: Executive Vice President

      I, Joseph Tortorelli, an Assistant Secretary of the Company, hereby
certify that Kevin Cloyd is a duly elected, qualified, and acting Executive Vice
President of the Company and that the signature appearing above is his genuine
signature.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of
March 15, 2006.

                                    By: /s/ Joseph Tortorelli
                                        -----------------------------------
                                        Name: Joseph Tortorelli
                                        Title: Assistant Secretary
Exhibit 10.12
 PIKE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Restricted Share Award Agreement
for [2008 / 2005] Omnibus Incentive Compensation Plan
 Award Agreement [Date] Company [Employee] Recipient [2005 / 2008] Plan
 Statement of Purpose
 Relationship Shares
  Grant of Restricted Shares [Number] Restricted Shares
 Definitions
 Business Day
 Cause




---



##### 



Disability
 Retirement 1 2
 Vesting Date
 Vesting and Delivery of Shares
 Vesting
 Number of RestrictedPercentage of Award
    
    
    Shares Vesting onVested on Vesting Date
    
    
    Vesting DateVesting Date
    
    (%)
    
    
    (#)Grant Date
    
    
    0
    
    
    
    0First Anniversary of Grant Date
    
    
    33.33
    
    
    [Number]Second Anniversary of Grant Date
    
    
    33.33
    
    
    [Number]Third Anniversary of Grant Date
    
    
    33.33
    
    
    [Number]
  2




---



##### 



Delivery of Shares
 Termination of Relationship provided however
 No Rights as a Stockholder
 Non-Transferability of Restricted Shares
 Withholding, Consents and Legends
 Withholding
 Consents
  3




---



##### 



Legends
 Successors and Assigns of the Company
 Committee Discretion
 Dispute Resolution
 Jurisdiction and Venue
 Waiver of Jury Trial
 Confidentiality
  4




---



##### 



Notice
 Written Notices
 If to the Company:
    
    Pike Electric Corporation100 Pike WayMt. Airy, NC 27030Attn: General CounselIf to Recipient:
  Electronic Notices
 Headings
 No Employment
 Beneficiary Designation
  5




---



##### 



Amendment of this Award Agreement provided however
 Severability
 Counterparts
   6




---



##### 



RECIPIENT:Name: PIKE ELECTRIC CORPORATIONBy:Name:
    
    J. Eric PikeTitle:
    
    Chairman, CEO & President
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20172

Conference Calendar

 

LELAND BRADLEY FOUSE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; EARL FOX,

Defendant-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-94-CV-4216

- - - - - - - - - -

April 10, 1998

Before JOLLY, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Leland Bradley Fouse, TDCJ-ID # 629726, appeals

the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants in his

civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 

argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to

continue his trial. 

 An appellant, even one pro se, who wishes to challenge

findings or conclusions that are based on proceedings at a

hearing has the responsibility to order a transcript. Fed. R. 
No. 97-20172

-2-

App. P. 10(b); Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 26 (5th Cir.

1992). This court does not consider the merits of an issue when

an appellant fails in that responsibility. Powell, 959 F.2d at

26. 

 Fouse has not provided a trial transcript. We thus decline

to consider his contentions on appeal. See Alizadeh v. Safeway

Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1990). 

 Because there is no issue of arguable merit, the appeal is

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Therefore, it is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
CERTIFICATION OF
          PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Segway
III Corp. for the quarter ended September 30, 2003, I, Richard I. Anslow,
Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of Segway III Corp.
hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, that:

     1.   Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September
          30, 2003, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for
          the period ended September 30, 2003, fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Segway
          III Corp.

Dated:  October 23, 2003

Segway III Corp.


By: /s/ Richard I. Anslow
-------------------------------------
Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer