J-S14002-18  

____________________________________ 

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37  

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.D.N.T.R., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: R.R., MOTHER 

: : 

: : 

: : 

: : 

: 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF            PENNSYLVANIA 

  No. 3185 EDA 2017  

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County  

Family Court at No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000753-2017  

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.R., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: R.R., MOTHER 

: : 

: : 

: : 

: : 

: 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF            PENNSYLVANIA 

  No. 3186 EDA 2017  

Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County  

Family Court at No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000754-2017  

 BEFORE:  OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2018 

 R.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on August 15, 2017, involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her son, T.D.N.T.R., born in February of 

2015, and her daughter, L.M.R., born in April of 2011 (collectively, “Children”).  

Mother’s court-appointed counsel has filed a petition for leave to withdraw as 

J-S14002-18 

- 2 - 

counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  

We grant counsel’s petition and affirm the decrees. 

 In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court set forth the 

factual and procedural history of this case, which the testimonial evidence 

supports.  As such, we adopt it herein.  See Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, at 

2-17. 

By way of background, on April 17, 2015, the Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) became involved with Mother, E.B. (“Father”), and the 

Children upon receiving a report alleging that T.D.N.T.R. had fallen in the 

home and sustained nearly fatal injuries.  Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, at 2-

3, 5.  Mother’s explanation of the incident was “while she and Father were 

arguing, Father raised his hand as if to strike her while she was holding the 

[c]hild and she dropped the [c]hild on a mattress to protect him[.]”  Id. at 3.  

On April 20, 2015, DHS met with Mother who stated, “Mother and Father 

argued and Father physically assaulted her while she was holding T.D.N.T.R.; 

that she dropped him onto a mattress during the incident and later fell on top 

of him as Father continued to assault her[.] . . .”  Id. at 4. 

T.D.N.T.R.’s diagnosis was “acute or chronic bilateral subdural 

hemorrhages, multilayer retinal hemorrhages in both eyes, a closed right rib 

fracture, and a cervical spine injury, most likely due to abusive head trauma 

in the absence of accidental trauma to account for the injuries.”  Id. at 6.  On 

April 21, 2015, DHS received a supplemental report alleging that, “the [c]hild 

J-S14002-18 

- 3 - 

was in critical condition based on suspected abuse; that he had internal 

bleeding from old and new injuries; and that it was not known at that time if 

the [c]hild would survive.”  Id. at 5.  The report alleged that Mother’s 

explanation did not match T.D.N.T.R.’s injuries.  Id. at 3.  Rather, the report 

alleged that, due to his injuries, T.D.N.T.R. “would had to have fallen from a 

waist-high height onto a hard surface.”  Id. 

With respect to the older female child, L.M.R., who was nearly four years 

old at the time of the incident involving T.D.N.T.R., DHS learned from hospital 

staff on April 18, 2015, that she did not appear to have any injuries.  Id. at 

3.  However, she “appeared to have some developmental delays and suffered 

from non-verbal autism[.]”  Id. at 3-4.  

The Children were placed in protective custody on April 22, 2015.  

T.D.N.T.R. was discharged from the hospital on April 28, 2015, and he was 

placed in a foster home separate from his sister, L.M.R.  The Children were 

adjudicated dependent on May 13, 2015.  On November 10, 2015, the trial 

court found that aggravating circumstances existed as to Mother and Father.  

The Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), Northeast Treatment Center 

(“NET”), developed the following Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives for 

Mother: attend the Children’s medical appointments; participate in the 

supervised visitation schedule; schedule an assessment with the Behavioral 

Health System (“BHS”); participate in a domestic violence program; 

participate in and completing parenting classes; and comply with all court 

J-S14002-18 

- 4 - 

orders and recommended programs.  Id. at 8.  The CUA subsequently 

specified that Mother explore services for L.M.R. at Children’s Crisis Treatment 

Center (“CCTC”) and participate in a domestic violence program at Women in 

Transition.  Id. at 9-10.   

Commencing in October of 2015, permanency review hearings occurred 

approximately every three months.1  At the permanency review hearing in 

May of 2016, the trial court found that T.D.N.T.R. received early intervention 

services, occupational therapy, and physical therapy.  Id. at 13.  Further, 

L.M.R. received occupational therapy, physical therapy, and trauma therapy.  

Id. at 12-13.  At the next hearing in August of 2016, the court found that 

“L.M.R. receives special education.”  Id. at 13. 

On April 4, 2017, DHS received another supplemental report alleging 

that Father “had made a written statement that day stating that on 

4/17/2015, while engaging in an incident of domestic violence with Mother, 

T.D.N.T.R. was thrown from Mother’s arms and hit his head on a piece of 

furniture and then the floor.”  Id. at 16 (citation to record omitted). 

On July 27, 2017, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).  A hearing occurred on the petition 

____________________________________________ 

1 The Honorable Allan L. Tereshko presided over the underlying dependency 

matter and the subject involuntary termination proceeding.  

J-S14002-18 

- 5 - 

regarding Mother on August 15, 2017,2 during which the Children were 

represented by a Child Advocate and a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”).3  DHS 

presented the testimony of Erica Williams, Psy.D., the director of Forensic 

Mental Health Services, who performed a parenting capacity evaluation of 

Mother on February 23, 2017; and Beverly Ford-Green, the CUA case 

manager.  Mother testified on her own behalf.  In addition, Mother was 

represented by Anthony J. Voci, Jr., Esquire, whom she privately retained.  

Dr. Williams testified that, in conducting the parenting capacity 

evaluation, she learned that Mother had participated in two different 

interviews during the investigation of T.D.N.T.R.’s nearly fatal injuries, and 

that she “was adamant that it was an accident.”  N.T., 8/15/17, at 32.  She 

testified that at the time of the parenting capacity evaluation on February 23, 

2017, Mother “was able to identify [the cause of the incident] [as] active 

aggression [on Father’s] part, but she still is not able to fully explain the 

process of events.  And when she discusses it, she limits her memory of it.  

She doesn’t respond to follow-up questions.  She’s not able to plan differently, 

____________________________________________ 

2 At the commencement of the proceedings, Father’s counsel requested to withdraw his representation, which the trial court granted.  Therefore, the 

court re-scheduled the hearing on the petition with respect to Father for January 30, 2018.  Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, at 2.  The record certified for 

this appeal does not reveal the court’s disposition of that petition.  3 The Child Advocate and the GAL argued in support of the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children during the hearing.  

Neither has filed a brief in these appeals. 

J-S14002-18 

- 6 - 

just to assert that she’s learned her lesson and she would do it differently, but 

she can’t explain beyond that.”  Id. at 36-37. 

 Dr. Williams opined that Mother “did not have the capacity for safety 

and permanency at the time of the evaluation, particularly due to the ongoing 

safety concerns.”  Id. at 47. She summarized as follows. 

[P]rior to the precipitating event [on April 17, 2015,] [T.D.N.T.R.] somehow suffered injuries that were healing and nobody was able 

to identify how those injuries occurred, neither [Mother] nor [Father].  Then the events occurred, even though she was aware 

of his violent temper, they continued to reside together.  He, I 

later found out from him, swung at her in a smacking motion and that’s what knocked [T.D.N.T.R.] out of her arms.  She provided 

misinformation at the time of medical intervention, which immediately places the child at risk for her not to provide the true 

sequence of events, particularly when you’re providing emergency care.  So that judgment to not provide the accurate information is 

a concern.  And then moving on from there, she continues to minimize the events and not see [Father] as capable of violence 

going forward.  She was unable to recall things that happened, was able to say that she had a role, but couldn’t identify the role 

of what she could do differently.  She was comfortable with the [C]hildren going back with [Father] and she was not able to even 

identify any of the concerns raised by CUA regarding her behaviors that placed the [C]hildren[] . . . at ongoing risk. 

 Id. at 64-65.   

 Further, with respect to L.M.R., Dr. Williams testified that, while in the 

care of Mother, she presented with “gross developmental delays.  However, 

outside of the care of . . . [M]other, she has thrived and those delays have all 

but disappeared.”  Id. at 41.  

 To assist her in developing the capacity to parent, Dr. Williams made 

the following recommendations, in part. 

J-S14002-18 

- 7 - 

1. [Mother] continue in individual therapy.  It is recommended this treatment occur with a licensed individual with training and 

experience in working with individuals involved in the physical abuse of a child.  In addition to identification and addressing of 

mental health needs, it is important focus include supporting [Mother] in developing an accurate narrative of the events leading 

to her son’s near fatal injuries as well as when he obtained his prior injuries.  Once events are identified it is imperative therapy 

focus on exploring the behavior cycles related to the events, identification of role in the events and plan to recognize, manage 

and prevent future behaviors.  

2. If reunification remains the goal, it is important [Mother] increase her engagement in [L.M.R.]’s medical and mental health 

appointments. 

  Parenting Capacity Evaluation, 2/23/17, at 15 (DHS Exhibit 6). 

By decrees entered on August 15, 2017, the trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b).  On September 14, 2017, Mother, acting pro se, timely 

filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b),4 which this Court 

consolidated sua sponte.   

____________________________________________ 

4 Mother asserted the following errors in her concise statement. 

 1. The Trial Court (Family Division) erred and abused its discretion 

in denying my 6th Amendment right when I requested a continuance in order to have representation from another 

Attorney.  This was requested so that I would have the opportunity to be represented by an Attorney who would 

represent my family’s best interests.  The attorney, Anthony Voci, who represented me at the hearing, never communicated 

with me in the four months preceding my hearing; furthermore, he was tardy (by 2 hours) and initially reluctant 

J-S14002-18 

- 8 - 

On October 12, 2017, this Court granted the motion to withdraw as 

counsel filed by Mother’s trial attorney, Attorney Voci, and directed the trial 

court to appoint substitute counsel within ten days.  By order dated October 

17, 2017, the trial court appointed Michael Graves, Jr., Esquire, as Mother’s 

appellate counsel.  The trial court filed its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) on November 9, 2017. 

On January 21, 2018, Attorney Graves filed a petition for leave to 

withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief, which we must address before 

____________________________________________ 

to represent me as he expressed this to me outside the courtroom.  Therefore this already demonstrated a conflict of 

interest.  Nevertheless, the court ignored my request to fair representation and proceeded with the hearing with the above 

attorney, who had not prepared to represent me for my . . . hearing on August 15, 2017.  

 2. The Trial Court (Family Division) erred in finding that DHS, NET 

CUA 1 (Beverly Ford-Green), Support Center for Child Advocates, (Guardian Ad Litem Jerry Desiderato, Attorney 

Irene Levy), City Solicitor (Megan Fitzpatrick), ATA (Evaluator 

Erica Williams) met their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that terminating my parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8).  

3. The Trial Court (Family Division) erred in finding that DHS, NET CUA 1 (Beverly Ford-Green), Support Center for Child 

Advocates, (Guardian Ad Litem Jerry Desiderato, Attorney Irene Levy), City Solicitor (Megan Fitzpatrick), ATA (Evaluator 

- Erica Williams) met their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that terminating my parental rights would 

best meet to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of [the Children] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b).  

Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement, 9/14/17. 

J-S14002-18 

- 9 - 

reviewing the merits of this appeal.  Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 

638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 

1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)).   

In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court extended the 

Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights. In 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court 

explained, “the major thrust of Anders . . . is to assure that counsel 

undertakes a careful assessment of any available claim that an indigent 

appellant might have.”  Id. at 358.  The Court stated that this “is achieved by 

requiring counsel to conduct an exhaustive examination of the record and by 

also placing the responsibility on the reviewing court to make an independent 

determination of the merits of the appeal.”  Id.   

In order to be permitted to withdraw, counsel must meet three 

procedural requirements: 1) petition for leave to withdraw and state that, 

after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal is frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the Anders brief 

to the appellant; and 3) advise the appellant that he or she has the right to 

retain private counsel or raise, pro se, additional arguments that the appellant 

deems worthy of the court’s attention.  See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 

83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).  With 

respect to the third requirement, this Court has held that counsel must “attach 

to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising 

J-S14002-18 

- 10 - 

him or her of their rights.”  Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 

(Pa. Super. 2005). 

Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following 

requirements: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; 

 (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;  

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

 (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous.  Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.  

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.  

Instantly, Mother’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw which complies 

with the foregoing procedural requirements.  In addition, counsel filed a brief, 

which includes a summary of the history and facts of the case, potential issues 

that could be raised by Mother, and his assessment of why those issues are 

meritless, with citations to relevant legal authority.  Therefore, Mother’s 

counsel has satisfied the requirements of Anders and Santiago.   

We next proceed to review the issue outlined in the Anders brief.  In 

addition, we must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if 

there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.”  

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(footnote omitted).   

J-S14002-18 

- 11 - 

In the Anders brief, counsel raises the issue of whether DHS satisfied 

its burden of proof to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).5  Specifically, counsel states that 

Mother complied with some of her SCP objectives. 

We review this issue according to the following standard. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.  If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion.  A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.  The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result.  We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.  

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).  

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.  

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.  The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

____________________________________________ 

5 To the extent that the Anders brief raises an issue concerning the permanency review orders changing the Children’s goals to adoption, we 

conclude that it is waived because Mother did not file a notice of appeal from 

those orders, and she did not assert any errors regarding them in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.  See Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 

A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that when an appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, any issues not raised in that statement are waived on 

appeal). 

J-S14002-18 

- 12 - 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a).  Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.  One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.  

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).  In 

addition, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm.  See In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).   

In this case, the record evidence supports the court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the following statutory 

provisions: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

 . . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

 . . . 

 (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.  The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

J-S14002-18 

- 13 - 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.  With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).6 

This Court has explained that the moving party must produce clear and 

convincing evidence with respect to the following elements to terminate 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2): (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.  See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003).   

Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), parents are required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities.  In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002).  A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous.  Id.  Further, the grounds for termination of parental rights 

____________________________________________ 

6 Based on this disposition, we need not review the decrees pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). 

J-S14002-18 

- 14 - 

under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.  Id. at 

337.   

 With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”  In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).  Further, the trial court “must also 

discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.”  Id. (citation 

omitted).  However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.  

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.”  In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).   

In this case, the trial court stated on the record in open court at the 

conclusion of the testimonial evidence, as follows. 

[T]he issue of credibility looms very large since we have conflicting versions of what has happened over the last 28 months. 

 [A]lthough counsel says that [M]other admits that she didn’t tell 

the truth in the beginning, it was no such admission, because she still maintained the narrative that she fell on the child while the 

child was in the bed.  And she now describes it as backed up on the child.  Her earlier description was fell on the child. 

J-S14002-18 

- 15 - 

That’s disturbing to the [c]ourt, because it supports a person who has not acknowledged the reality of what occurred and until today, 

although she voices a certain narrative, the narrative hasn’t changed.  That presents an issue for the [c]ourt in everything else 

that [M]other says.  

And after having listened to [M]other and having had jurisdiction over this case from the beginning, I believe, I conducted the 

aggravated circumstances hearing, heard the testimony from the expert witnesses.  And this child was not a child who fell onto a 

bed and parent toppled over onto the child.  This child has been the victim of a consistent pattern of abuse and violence.  No one’s 

addressed the prior issue of the healing injuries of the child, other than [M]other’s not credible attempt to explain that it occurred 

during an incident with the car seat. 

 It’s a continued narrative, which [M]other refuses to accept the 

reality of the brutality that was inflicted upon this child while in her care in the care of the father.  While she may not have been 

the perpetrator of the actual violence, she stood by and watched it occur[], knew it occurred, when it was occurring.  And even 

today, attempts to paint a different picture, paint a picture of a man who has been found to have been abusive to a completely 

helpless infant, suggesting that he may be an appropriate caregiver for the child. 

 It engages the question whether [M]other has the ability to 

perceive the reality of threats to her children.  And being unable to perceive the reality of threats to her children, she certainly 

could never be in a position of being charged with the safety of 

her children.  

As to the evidence of her addressing some of the goals, while [M]other testified that she has been receiving this domestic 

violence [program], other than her testimony, I have no evidence of it.  Today’s the day when you bring in your evidence.  Today’s 

the day of your hearing.  Today is the day you get to present all you have to make your case.  And other than . . . what could be 

considered as self-serving testimony, I [have] seen or heard nothing independent of that to substantiate it. 

 But it goes to the issue of her treatment for her issues, the 

domestic violence.  There is no evidence that she completed the child abuse training.  There is no evidence that she ever engaged 

J-S14002-18 

- 16 - 

in therapy which would allow her to acknowledge the child abuse that brought this case in and is now one of the central reasons 

why the child[ren] remain in care.  

The evidence is clear and convincing that she has not remedied the issues that brought these children into care.  The limited 

attempt at securing some domestic violence goes to the [M]other’s issues that brought the children into care.  It doesn’t 

go to the issue of her putting herself in a position to care for these children or provide safety, well-being for these children going 

forward.  

The evidence is clear and convincing that she has no ability to remedy the issues that brought the children into care going 

forward.  The inability to remedy the issue is premised on the fact 

that she fails to recognize what issues actually brought these children into care. 

 . . . 

 She continued to hold out a narrative that the . . . perpetrator of 

the abuse to [T.D.N.T.R.] is now potentially able to care for these children and keep these children safe.  That suggests a certain 

disconnect from reality. . . .  The disconnect from reality in suggesting that as of today, even knowing that the father at some 

point admitted that the story they told originally about the child falling on the bed was a complete lie. 

 . . . 

N.T., 8/15/17, at 124-128.   Mother’s testimony supports the court’s findings.  Mother acknowledged 

that she did not previously provide full, complete, accurate, and truthful 

information regarding how T.D.N.T.R. was injured in April 2015 because she 

“was scared.”  N.T., 8/15/17, at 102.  She testified on direct examination, 

Q. What were you scared of?  

A. [B]ecause my son had injuries and I knew in my heart that it was an accident. 

J-S14002-18 

- 17 - 

 . . . 

 A. I knew that when he went to get medical attention . . . [h]e 

was well-taken care of and . . . they figured it out, you know, what his injuries were and he was able to make medical progress. 

 Id. at 102-103.   

With respect to how T.D.N.T.R.’s injuries occurred, she testified as 

follows on direct examination: 

Q. [Y]ou said that an argument took place between you and 

[Father], correct? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. And you said in the past that he became aggressive towards 

you, correct?  

A. Yes.  

Q. What happened after [Father] became aggressive towards you while you were holding [T.D.N.T.R.]?  What happened to your son? 

 A. I remember placing him on the bed and [Father], at that time, 

. . . he wasn’t near me at the time, but at some point, I accidentally moved back on my son.  And that’s how he got 

injured. 

  THE COURT: I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying.  

You moved back on your son, what does that mean?  

         [A.] That means that I had rolled back on my son in the bed, just perceived trying to – 

          THE COURT: It’s the same story you told the [c]ourt, you 

fell on top of the child when the child was in the bed, correct?   

[A.] I wouldn’t say I fell, but I moved back on him.  

Id. at 105-106. 

J-S14002-18 

- 18 - 

 In her cross-examination by the GAL, Mother testified regarding 

T.D.N.T.R.’s injuries before April 17, 2015, as follows. 

Q. [T.D.N.T.R.] had injuries prior to this incident, is that correct?  

A. Yes.  

Q. Where did they come from?  

A. There was an issue with his car seat. I took him to CHOP [Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia] and I remember trying to take 

him out of his car seat and I didn’t realize the restraints were on and he fell back.  But CHOP examined him and saw that there 

were no injuries. 

 Q. Was he injured as a result of [F]ather’s abuse prior to this 

incident?  

A. No.  

Id. at 109-110. 

 In addition, Mother testified that Father should have a relationship with 

the Children, and that they may be safe in his care, as follows. 

Because he is a good father and he advocates for his children.  He loves his children and he always makes them a priority.  And 

despite what happened between myself . . . and him, that we no 

longer have a romantic relationship.  We -- when I say working relationship, we work together for the interest of the children.  And 

working relationship means co-parenting.   

Q. You believe the [C]hildren would be safe in [F]ather’s care?  

A. They have been.  I understand he’s been in unsupervised visitation for four months with no issue.  He’s had them for entire 

weekends almost with no issue.  

J-S14002-18 

- 19 - 

Id. at 112.7   

Ms. Ford-Green’s testimony likewise supports the trial court’s findings 

regarding Mother’s failure to complete her domestic violence and child abuse 

SCP goals.  Ms. Ford-Green testified that Mother completed the parenting 

program at ARC, and that she was consistent with her weekly two-hour 

supervised visits at the agency.  Id. at 77, 79.  However, Mother did not 

permit Ms. Ford-Green to assess her home.  Id. at 85.  In addition, although 

Mother attended a domestic violence program at Temple University, Ms. Ford-

Green testified that Mother refused to tell her whether she was consulting with 

a licensed therapist as recommended by Dr. Williams.  Id. at 90-91, 93.  

Therefore, Ms. Ford-Green testified that Mother did not comply with obtaining 

domestic violence and child abuse services.  Id. at 77, 85.   

Mother testified that, for the past two years, she has attended the 

requisite domestic violence program at Women in Transition.  Id. at 99.  On 

cross-examination by DHS, Mother acknowledged that Dr. Williams reviewed 

documentation from Women in Transition in conducting the parenting capacity 

evaluation.  Id. at 108.  Mother testified that she is “not sure” if she provided 

____________________________________________ 

7 Ms. Ford-Green, the CUA caseworker, testified that Father never had unsupervised visits with the Children.  N.T., 8/15/17, at 115.  She explained 

that the visits were supervised at his sister’s house.  However, since April 2017, Father’s supervised visits have occurred at the agency because, as 

discussed above, he “finally confessed” that he “hit [Mother] and that [T.D.N.T.R.] fell from her hand and on a hard surface.”  Id. at 115-116. 

J-S14002-18 

- 20 - 

Ms. Ford-Green with the information she requested regarding her domestic 

violence therapy.  Id. at 110-111.   

In addition, Mother acknowledged that she has not complied with her 

SCP objective to attend the Children’s medical appointments.  Id. at 111, 114.  

Specifically, Mother testified on cross-examination by the Child Advocate:  

Q. Have you ever attended any of [T.D.N.T.R.’s] medical appointments? 

 A. I have in the past when my work schedule allowed.  Just 

because of my schedule, I pretty much allow his father to take 

over, because he has more flexible time.  

Id. at 114.  In addition, Mother testified on cross-examination by the GAL: 

Q. Did you attend any of [L.M.R.’s] medical appointments?  

A. No, I couldn’t make it because of my work schedule.  

Q. Did you attend any of her educational appointments?  

A. Because of my work schedule, I couldn’t make it, but I did speak with the teacher or the counselor afterwards. 

 Id. at 111-112. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the testimonial evidence 

supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2).  The record demonstrates that the repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, and/or refusal of Mother to (1) reveal the full truth about 

the manner in which T.D.N.T.R. sustained his nearly fatal injuries; (2) 

acknowledge Father’s risk to the safety of the Children; and (3) obtain 

J-S14002-18 

- 21 - 

domestic violence and child abuse counseling from a licensed therapist, have 

caused the Children to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.  Further, with 

respect to L.M.R., in light of her gross developmental delays while in Mother’s 

custody and her significant improvement while in foster care, Mother’s 

repeated and continued incapacity and/or refusal to attend any of L.M.R.’s 

medical or educational appointments has caused her to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-

being.  Finally, the causes of Mother’s incapacity, abuse, and/or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied insofar as the Children have been in placement since 

April of 2015, and Mother’s parental incapacity continued to persist up through 

and including the termination hearing 28 months later. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), we are governed by the following 

settled principles. 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008).  The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights.  See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental 

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of child).  Rather, the 

orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship.”  In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003).  As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 

473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),  

J-S14002-18 

- 22 - 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent.  Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child. 

 In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).   

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense 

dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the 

children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their 

foster parents.”  In re T.S.M., supra at 268.  The Court directed that, in 

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must 

keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.”  Id. at 269.  The T.S.M. 

Court observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and 

we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.  When 

courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted 

children.”  Id.  

At the time of the subject proceedings, the Children were two and a half 

and six years old, respectively.  As best we can discern, they were in separate 

foster homes.  The testimony of Ms. Ford-Green supports the following 

findings by the trial court. 

This [c]ourt heard credible evidence by CUA [c]ase [m]anager, 

Ms. Ford-Green, who testified that the Children were positively bonded to the Foster Parents.  They both look to their foster 

parents for safety and to meet their needs.  She also observed that a bond exists between Mother and [L.M.R.], but it is not a 

J-S14002-18 

- 23 - 

parental bond, [and] instead resembles a bond with an aunt who visits and brings food and gifts.  She opined that Mother is not 

bonded to [T.D.N.T.R.], at all.  She has also observed Mother’s interaction with the Children at the supervised visits, noting that 

Mother would pay more attention to her daughter than her son, and she had to be prompted to attend to the Children.  Ms. Ford-

Green noted that the Children need the safety and security that Mother cannot provide, and they would not suffer irreparable 

harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. . . .   

The [c]ourt found credible the evidence that the Children were not bonded to Mother and do not ask to be reunited with her.  

Therefore, this [c]ourt reasoned that the Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. . . . 

 Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, at 33-34.  Accordingly, we discern no abuse of 

discretion pursuant to Section 2511(b).   

 Finally, we observe that Mother alleged in her concise statement that 

the trial court violated her rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution by denying her request for a continuance on the day of 

the hearing for the purpose of retaining another attorney.  We review the trial 

court’s denial of Mother’s request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion.  

See Commonwealth v. Boxley, 948 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 2008).  

 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court properly stated, 

“Constitutional rights in proceeding[s] to terminate parental rights derive from 

[the] due process clause of [the] Fourteenth Amendment, rather than from 

[the] Sixth Amendment.”  Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, at 28 (citations 

omitted).  We have explained, “Due process requires nothing more than 

adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself 

http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=98938a91f19a19d2c9ff2faa96f1eda2&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b2012%20PA%20Super%20220%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=32&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b596%20Pa.%20620%2c%20628%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=3&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzB-zSkAA&_md5=fa1117c4f5b3a900752168364cca1f50

J-S14002-18 

- 24 - 

in an impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.”  In re J.N.F., 887 

A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

 The trial court aptly explained that, at the beginning of the subject 

proceedings, Mother sought to replace Attorney Voci, “stating she had not 

been able to reach him by telephone and he had not responded to her last 

text to him in April, so she fired him that morning.”  Trial Court Opinion, 

11/9/17, at 29.  In response, Attorney Voci stated to the court, “When I 

arrived this morning, I greeted her and she indicated that she no longer 

wished me to represent her in this case.  As an officer of this [c]ourt, I can 

also tell the [c]ourt that I have not been paid in full, but I’m ready, willing and 

able to proceed if the [c]ourt wishes to today.”  Id. (citing N.T., 8/15/17, at 

19-20).  We further observe that Attorney Voci stated to the court, “At the 

last listing of this case . . ., we met in the room and [I] made very clear [to 

Mother] as to what was being proposed in terms of the termination of parental 

rights.  I also made it clear what I believed was the proper course of action.  

My client [has] had no contact with me whatsoever since the last listing of the 

case. . . .”  N.T., 8/15/17, at 19. 

The court found on the record in open court that Mother’s request was 

an “unmasked attempt[] to delay and obfuscate these proceedings.  There 

was a representation at the last listing that there would be certain witnesses, 

certain documents [presented at the hearing]. . . .  [W]e’re now four months 

out from the original listing and there was enough time and enough 

J-S14002-18 

- 25 - 

consideration to allow this case to be prepared for trial.  The [C]hildren have 

been in placement for 28 months.  The matter will proceed.”8  N.T., 8/15/17, 

at 24-25.  Upon careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion. 

 Based upon our independent review of Mother’s claims in light of the 

record evidence, we conclude that she is not entitled to relief.  Moreover, the 

record does not reveal any non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.  See 

Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250.  Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw, and we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights. 

Motion to withdraw granted.  Decrees affirmed.    

 Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum. 

 Judge Ransom concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/5/18 

____________________________________________ 

8 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court further emphasized that, “during the entire term of this dependency case regarding her Children, Mother was 

represented by three attorneys,” including Attorney Voci, and that she was represented in a competent manner by them.  Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/17, 

at 29. 

Received 1/23/2018 8:54:50 ANZliS:tigialAidff561.1W ..1$.1 ai :If 8:BatR "I 

Filed 1/23/2018 8:54:50 AM Superior Court Eastern Distric 3185 EDA 201 

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA COUNTY IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

IN THE INTEREST OF: : FAMILY COURT DIVISION : JUVENILE BRANCH -DEPENDENCY 

L.M.R., a Minor : CP-51-AP-0000754-2017/CP-51-DP-0001030-2015 d/o/b: 04/28/2011 

T.D.N.T.R., a Minor : CP-51-AP-0000753-2017/CP-51-DP-0001031-2015 d/o/b: 02/12/2015 

Appeal of: R.E.R., Mother 

: Superior Court Nos. 3185 EDA 2017, : 3186 EDA 2017- Consolidated' 

ca. OPINION 

c 

i72 a- R.E.R. ("Mother"), Appeals from the Decrees and Orders entered by this Court on 

"" c4 C 'l.:Alt/list 15, 2017, granting the Petitions to Involuntarily Terminate Mother's Parental 

``'Rights to her two minor children: a female, L.M.R., (d/o/b April 38, 2011), and a male, 

T.D.N.T.R., (d/o/b February 12, 2015), and changing the Children's Permanency Goal to 

Adoption, filed by the Department of Human Services ("DHS") on July 27, 2017, and 

served on all parties. 

After the Termination/Goal Change Hearing on August 15, 2017, this Court found 

that clear and convincing evidence was presented to terminate the parental rights of 

Mother as to both Children. In response to the Order of August 15, 2017, terminating her 

parental rights, Mother, filed appeals on September 14, 2017. 

1 10/10/2017 -Consolidated Sua Sponte-Comment: Review of these matters indicates that these appeals 

involve related parties and issues. Accordingly, the appeals at Nos. 3185 and 3186 EDA 2017 are hereby CONSOLIDATED. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

1