J-S75028-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHARIEF SALEEM

Appellant No. 1081 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 27, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006898-2007 

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 24, 2014

Sharief Saleem appeals pro se from the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition filed under the 

Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. After our 

review, we affirm.

On November 5, 2008, a jury convicted Saleem of Possession with 

Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance,1Possession of an Instrument of 

Crime,2 Carrying a Firearm Without a License,3and Carrying Firearms on 

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1 35 P.S. §§ 780–113(a)(30).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). 

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.
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Public Streets or Public Property in Philadelphia.4 On February 5, 2009, the 

court sentenced Saleem to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 81⁄2 to 17 

years. Saleem did not file a direct appeal. 

On November 18, 2011, Saleem filed a pro se petition for relief under 

the PCRA, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the 

length of his sentence. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and counsel 

entered her appearance on January 26, 2012. Thereafter, Saleem filed two 

amended pro se petitions, one on February 21, 2012, and another on August 

7, 2012.5 Although these filings were docketed, the PCRA court does not 

reference these amended pro se petitions in its opinion. It does not appear 

that appointed counsel ever filed an amended PCRA petition on behalf of 

Saleem. Instead, on March 5, 2013, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and 

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4 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.

5

 In Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme 

Court reiterated its “long-standing policy that precludes hybrid 

representation.” Id. at 1036. While Jette involved a counseled appellant 

attempting to proceed pro se on appeal, our Supreme Court has also 

declared that “there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation . . . 

at trial,” Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1993), or during 

PCRA proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 302 

(Pa. 1999) (applying Ellis rationale prohibiting hybrid representation to 

PCRA proceedings, stating “[w]e will not require courts considering PCRA 

petitions to struggle through the pro se filings of defendants when qualified 

counsel represents those defendants”). Cf. Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 

A.3d 393 (Pa. Super. 2011) (PCRA court accepted defendant’s pro se PCRA 

petition despite fact that defendant was represented by counsel; this Court 

concluded PCRA court erred in permitting such dual representation during 

disposition of defendant’s PCRA petition).
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a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(en banc). 

In her no-merit letter, counsel stated that Saleem’s petition was 

untimely under the PCRA, and that Saleem did not meet any of the 

exceptions to the one-year time requirement.6 See No-Merit Letter, 

3/5/2013, at 2-4. On April 19, 2013, Saleem filed a response to counsel’s 

no-merit letter, stating that he was denied his constitutional right to appeal 

and “denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel by 

direct appeal counsel.” Reply to No-Merit Letter, 4/19/13, at 2. The PCRA 

court filed Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Saleem did not respond to this notice, and the PCRA 

court dismissed Saleem’s PCRA petition and granted counsel leave to 

withdraw.7 This pro se appeal followed.

When examining a post-conviction court’s grant or denial of relief, we

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6 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Saleem’s judgment of sentence 

became final on March 7, 2009, the date on which his appeal period expired. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Saleem had one year, or until March 7, 2010, to file a 

PCRA petition. His petition was filed on November 18, 2011, over one year 

and eight months after his judgment of sentence became final.

7 See Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.2d 270, 271 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(PCRA court may not grant counsel’s request to withdraw from 

representation or dismiss PCRA petition sooner than twenty days before 

petitioner receives counsel’s official request for withdrawal).
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are limited to determining whether that court’s findings are supported by the

record and whether the court’s order is free of legal error. Commonwealth 

v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Stark, 658 

A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 1995). We review an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the 

PCRA level. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 

2010).

“[Our] scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA 

court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court level.” 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d 121, 131 

(2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on 

this Court.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d 

244, 259 (2011) (citation omitted). “However, this Court applies 

a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(en banc).

The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for post-conviction 

counsel to withdraw from representation, mandating independent review of 

the record by competent counsel before a PCRA court or appellate court can 

authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. The necessary independent review 

requires counsel to file a “no-merit” letter detailing the nature and extent of 

his review and list each issue the petitioner wishes to have examined, 

explaining why those issues are meritless. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 

A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Pitts,
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981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009). The PCRA court, or an appellate court if the nomerit letter is filed before it, then must conduct its own independent 

evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that the petition is without 

merit. See Turner, supra,

Here, counsel has complied with the directives of Turner/Finley. 

Counsel listed the issues Saleem sought to raise (ineffectiveness of counsel 

and legality of sentence), and after independent review determined that 

Saleem’s petition was untimely and that he did not meet any of the three 

exceptions to the time bar. No-Merit Letter, supra at 2. Our Supreme 

Court has ruled unequivocally that when a PCRA petition is untimely on its 

face and does not qualify for any of the exceptions to the timing 

requirements of the PCRA, the petition must be dismissed without 

addressing the merits of any claims raised therein. See Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 

581, 587 (Pa. 1999). 

After our review, we find no error. Saleem claims direct appeal 

counsel, James F. Egan, Esq., was retained on February 9, 2009 to file an 

appeal, and he avers that counsel “passed away without filing a direct 

appeal[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 7. Saleem includes an obituary for Attorney 

Egan, indicating his death occurred on April 23, 2012. Attorney Egan’s 

death, however, occurred after the filing of Saleem’s PCRA petition, and his 

attempt to bring this within the after-discovered evidence exception fails. 

Further, counsel’s failure to file an appeal is not a defense where the 
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petitioner could have determined through reasonable means whether an 

appeal was filed. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (trial counsel's failure to file direct appeal was discoverable with due 

diligence during petitioner's one-year period to file timely PCRA petition; 

after-discovered evidence exception to PCRA timeliness requirements did not 

apply). 

Counsel explained in her no-merit letter the reasons why Saleem did 

not qualify for any of the exceptions to the time requirement. The PCRA 

court certified in both its Rule 907 notice and its final order that it reviewed 

the record and agreed with counsel's no-merit letter. This complies with the 

directives of Finley. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 1/29/14; Order, 

2/27/14. 

We agree with the PCRA court that Saleem’s petition is facially 

untimely and it does not fall within any of the exceptions to the time bar. 

We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Saleem’s petition 

and granting counsel’s request to withdraw.8 

Order affirmed. 

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8 We grant Saleem’s Application for Post-Submission Communication filed 

December 12, 2014, and strike the Commonwealth’s brief as untimely filed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/24/2014