Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter

Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1040

FREIGHTLINER LLC,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

PUERTO RICO TRUCK SALES, INC./FREIGHTLINER DE PUERTO RICO,

d/b/a Freightliner Truck Sales and Services; UNITED

CAPITAL & LEASING OF PUERTO RICO; LUIS CARRERAS; JANE DOE;

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP L. CARRERAS/DOE; JOSE TORRES; JANE

ROE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP TORRES/ROE; MANUEL CARRERAS;

MARY DOE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP M. CARRERAS/DOE,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Howard, Circuit Judge,

Baldock and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges. *

Javier López-Pérez and Ramon E. Dapena on the briefs,

for Appellants.

Richard Graffam and Roberto Abesada-Agüet on the brief

for Appellee.

November 21, 2006
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BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendants appeal

the district court’s denial of their motion for preliminary

injunction and several evidentiary rulings made during the

course of the preliminary injunction hearing. We have

jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292. Because the district court subsequently dismissed

Defendants’ counterclaim due to discovery violations, we

dismiss Defendants’ interlocutory appeal as moot.

I.

Plaintiff Freightliner manufactures and sells

trucks worldwide. In 1996, Plaintiff and Defendant Puerto

Rico Truck Sales, Inc., executed an agreement (“Agreement”)

for the distribution of Freightliner products in Puerto

Rico. Defendant Freightliner Truck Sales and Services

(“FTSS”) later assumed Puerto Rico Truck Sales position in

the Agreement.

On September 10, 2004, Plaintiff terminated the

Agreement with FTSS and on September 13, 2004, it filed a

complaint against Defendants for damages and collection of

monies. Plaintiff based its termination of the Agreement on

FTSS’s alleged lack of payment of substantial overdue

amounts and FTSS’s alleged illegal or wrongful shipment and

importation of 18 Freightliner trucks into Puerto Rico. In
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addition to damages, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment

on the validity of its termination of the Agreement.

Defendants counterclaimed seeking damages and

alleging Plaintiff’s cancellation of the Agreement violated

their rights under Puerto Rico Law 75, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

10, § 278 (“Law 75”), a statute prohibiting a principal from

terminating without just cause a distribution agreement with

its dealer. In connection with their counterclaim and

pursuant to Law 75, Defendants filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a motion for a

preliminary injunction. Defendants requested the court

dissolve Plaintiff’s cancellation of the Agreement and

enjoin Plaintiff from entering into a distribution agreement

with another Puerto Rican distributor. The district court

denied the motion for TRO and referred the motion for

preliminary injunction to the magistrate judge for a report

and recommendation (R&R). After a lengthy hearing, the

magistrate judge issued a R&R recommending denial of

Defendants’ motion for preliminary injunction, concluding

Defendants failed to establish the prerequisites for

preliminary injunctive relief under Law 75.

Defendants timely objected to the R&R. The

district court overruled the objections and adopted the R&R.

In a separate order, the court dismissed Defendants’
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counterclaims with prejudice due to discovery violations,

and entered a partial judgment as to those claims. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Defendants sought certification to

appeal the district court’s partial judgment pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court denied

Defendants’ request, finding the partial judgment did not

meet the criteria for immediate appealability set forth in

Spiegel v. The Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43

(1st Cir. 1988). Defendants filed a notice of appeal

seeking review of the district court’s denial of their

motion for preliminary injunction and the court’s dismissal

of their counterclaims.

II.

Plaintiff argues Defendants’ appeal is moot because

the district court dismissed Defendants’ counterclaim

pursuant to Law 75. We agree. Defendants’ request for a

preliminary injunction was specifically grounded in its

counterclaim pursuant to Law 75. Because Defendants’

counterclaim no longer exists, they would have no recourse

in the district court even if we reverse its denial of their

motion for preliminary injunction. Chaparro-Febus v.

International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d

325, 331 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting “preliminary

injunctions, which are interlocutory in nature, cannot
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survive a final order of dismissal”). Thus, Defendants’

appeal of the district court’s denial of their motion for

preliminary injunction is moot. Id. (“Because the district

court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was merged in

the final judgment dismissing the case, plaintiffs’

complaints regarding the preliminary injunction are moot.”)

(citations and quotations omitted).

In their reply brief, Defendants maintain this

court can entertain their interlocutory appeal because the

notice of appeal seeks review of the district court’s

partial judgment disposing of their counterclaim. We find

Defendants waived any arguments related to the district

court’s dismissal of their counterclaim in this

interlocutory appeal. “[W]e have steadfastly deemed waived

issues raised on appeal in a perfunctory manner, not

accompanied by developed argumentation.” Massachusetts Sch.

of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation

omitted). Defendants make no mention of the issue in their

opening brief and only briefly address the issue in their

reply brief without explaining how the district court erred

in dismissing their counterclaim or in denying their motion

for a Rule 54(b) certificate of appealability.
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III.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ appeal,

Defendants’ Motion to Supplement the Record with New

Evidence, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike are DISMISSED as

moot. We make no comment as to the remaining matters before

the district court.