alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                             144
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   144
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     144
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              175
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           500
<OTHER-SE>                                       (531)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       144
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   531
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (531)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (531)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (531)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)


</TABLE>
#### Asher GUESS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Dorothy Payne Guess GLENN, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 26, 1956.

Rodes K. Myers, Bowling Green, for appellants.

G. D. Milliken,.Jr., Rowling Green, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

This controversy involves the Custody of a girl child 41⁄2 years of age. The Chancellor ordered- the custody divided for six month periods between the child’s paternal grandparents and her mother. The grandparents appeal' ‘ on- ‘ the ground the mother should’not be alidwed'the custody-of the child for any ..period becau'se she is unable to’offer her1’an adequate home and is an unfit person.

The father is in the Army. The mother has been working in Indianapolis and at the time of the hearing did not appear to have an adequate home for the child. For this latter reason, and in order to retain jurisdiction over the child, the Chancellor directed that she be maintained and supported in ’the possession of her maternal great aunt and uncle who live in Bowling Green-

Appellants contend that the home of the great aunt and uncle is not a satisfactory one and perhaps the proof does show that 'the grandparents are in a better position to care for the child. However, the Chancellor made a finding that the great aunt and uncle were good Christian people, and were able to provide a respectable home. There was substantial evidence to support this finding.

Appellants at great length argue that the mpther has been guilty of immoral acts; that she has not exhibited the proper love and affection for this child' and her other children; and that she is somewhat unstable in her domestic, relations. While the' record indicates that her manner of living has not been ideal, the Chancellor found’that “the proof heard does not convince me the mother is immoral or that shé should be deprived wholly of the custody of the child”. We agree with this finding.

This record does not convince us that the mother is an unsatisfactory person or that *941the child’s best interests would be ■ served by being taken from the mother or from the mother’s relatives with whom the child will live half of each year. In a very thoughtful opinion the Chancellor carefully considered the controlling factors involved in a case such as this, and we believe the judgment entered is consonant with those equitable principles that govern the proper solution of such unfortunate controversies.

Appellants also object to that part of the order which directs the grandparents to pay into the hands of a designated friend of the court, during the periód of the mother’s custody, a governmental allowance being received for the support of the child, which sum shall be used for her maintenance. Appellants fail to point out any valid reason why this order was not a proper one under the circumstances.

The judgment is'affirmed. .
# **Exhibit 23.2**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDACCOUNTING FIRM**

Wehereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statementson Form S-8 (Registration Nos. 333-125990, 333-128841, 333-130946, 333-136906and 333-133907) of ev3 Inc. of our report dated March 3, 2006, relating to theconsolidated financial statements at December 31, 2005, and for each of the twoyears in the period ended December 31, 2005, and the financial statementschedule for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 2005, whichappears in this Form 10-K.
| /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP |   |
|--------------------------------|--------|
|                           |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     |
| Minneapolis, Minnesota         |
| March 12, 2007                 |

 

----
#### AJAX DISTRIBUTING CO., appellant, v. Boone ROSE, appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 19, 1954.

Mooney & Turley, Lexington, for appellant.

Sam P. Strother, and Kermin Fleming, Lexington, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court, Joseph J. Bradley, Judge, in which appellee recovered judgment for $1,200 on rescission of a purchase contract.

The motion for an appeal is overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
#### Joseph ASBERRY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27596.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 11, 1955.

*868No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon. Douglas; State’s Atty., Austin, -for the State, ■ ■

PER CURIAM.

The offense .is transporting liquor in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $250.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bills of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular and nothing is presented for review. The judgment is affirmed
RE: 

Andrew Parks to: Flajole, Andy 08/02/2012 01:36 PM

Andy, after looking closer at our guidance and talking with our department, it appears I gave incorrect 

information regarding the completeness date. EPA will deem the application complete when all required 

information is received, and that date will not revert to the May 31 response to comments letter that you 

sent to us. As it stands, the items standing in the way of this are the BA, the details of the archeological 

assessment, and the "neg." values in the proposed permit limits. The latter 2 are smaller items, and it 

looks as if the archeological issues I relayed are sufficient. Therefore the BA determination will be the 

deciding factor. We will use Audra's determination as guidance. Worst case scenario, she would make 

an adverse impact determination and the BA would need to go to formal consult and BO. However this 

would go into public notice/comment and would not affect our timeline for completeness determination. 

In general, it looks as though once we receive the BA determination from NMFS, and assuming the other 

items are received, we will then deem the application complete, at which point we would send a 

completeness letter which would start the 1 year clock.

Andrew B. Parks, P.E.

Environmental Engineer

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Region IV

61 Forsyth Street, SW

Atlanta, GA 30303

Phone: 404-562-8122

Fax: 404-562-9019

"Flajole, Andy" Yes, sorry for my confusion earlier Andrew. We'... 08/02/2012 12:47:15 PM

From: "Flajole, Andy" <Andy.Flajole@fpl.com>

To: Andrew Parks/R4/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 08/02/2012 12:47 PM

Subject: RE:

Yes, sorry for my confusion earlier Andrew.  We’re on for 8/13 at 10 am.

Thank You,

Andy Flajole

Environmental Services

(561) 691‐2766

From: Andrew Parks [mailto:Parks.Andrew@epamail.epa.gov] 

Sent: Thursday, August 02, 2012 12:46 PM

To: Flajole, Andy

Subject:
Andy, I have on my calendar a call we scheduled for August 13. Do you have that as well?

Andrew B. Parks, P.E.

Environmental Engineer

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Region IV

61 Forsyth Street, SW

Atlanta, GA 30303

Phone: 404-562-8122

Fax: 404-562-9019
### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE August 14, 2001 Sessi

on STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ERNEST E DWARD WILSON Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

N O . 98-D-2474

N O . M2000-01997-CCA-R3-CD - F ILED O CTOBER 17, 2001

James Cur wood Witt , Jr., J. , concurrin g and dissen ting.

Although I agree with Judge Welles that it is problematic to use voluntary manslaughter as the intermediate offense for the purposes of applying the Williams harmless error rule, I concur with Judge Riley in affirming the conviction, based on the facts of the present case and the defendant’s use of those facts in formulating a theory of de fense. Given the facts, the defendant’s theory of defense, a nd the jury’s v erdict of se cond-degr ee murder, I conclude that the

failure to charge the included offenses lesser than voluntary manslaughter was harmless error.

___________________________________ James Cur wood Witt , Jr., Ju dge
OTHA L. ABNEY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

___________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-4645

Opinion filed November 13, 2014.

Petition for Writ of Prohibition -- Original Jurisdiction.

Otha L. Abney, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied on the merits.

BENTON, ROBERTS, and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.
|   | (i) | the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ending April 2, 2011 (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:  June 13, 2011 |   |   /s/                                          | PHILLIP A. KAGEL |
|---------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------|
|                            |   | Phillip A. Kagel                                    |
|                            |   | Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer |
|                            |   | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)        |

| The material contained in this Exhibit 32.2 is not deemed “filed” with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
December 14, 1977

77-69 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

DIRECTOR OF THE NAVAL PETROLEUM

AND OIL SHALE RESERVES, DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY

Presidential Approval of Naval Petroleum Reserve

Contract NOd 4219-2664

This is in response to your request that this Office reconsider the 

Attorney General’s statement, drafted by this Office, that Presidential 

approval of Naval Petroleum Reserve Contract NOd 4219-2664 was 

required by 10 U.S.C. §7431(a) (Supp. 1976). That statement reads as 

follows:

[w]e are of the opinion that the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to enter into Contract NOd 4219-2664, subject to consultation 

with Congress and the approval of the President, as required by 10 

U.S.C. § 7431(a) (Supp. 1976).

You have evidently understood this to mean that the statute required 

Presidential approval of the contract in question.

Section 7431(a) enumerates a number of types of contracts that require the approval of the President after consultation with Congress. 

The common element of these transactions is that they involve the 

possible diminution of the rights of the United States with respect to 

ownership of the reserves, production, or sale of petroleum from the 

reserves, or receipt of moneys due to the United States on account of 

the reserves. Contract NOd 4219-2664 gives the consent of the United 

States to the transfer of certain rights and liabilities under previous 

contracts with Standard Oil Company of California (“Socal”) to a 

wholly owned subsidiary. Socal guarantees the payment of all future 

liabilities of the subisidiary, the subsidiary assumes all of the existing 

liabilities of Socal, and both agree that the United States is not liable 

for any new costs, taxes, or expenses arising from the agreement. 

Accordingly, the contract does not fall within the categories enumerated by § 7431(a).

278
The statement meant the contract was authorized by law but that 

Congress should be consulted and Presidential approval obtained to the 

extent required by 10 U.S.C. § 7431(a) (Supp. 1976). Because this contract is not within § 7431(a), the reference to action required by that 

statute should be disregarded.

L e o n U l m a n

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

279
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER UNDER 18 U.S.C. §1350

I, Salomon Sredni, Chief Executive Officer of TradeStation Group, Inc., hereby certify, to my knowledge, that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of TradeStation Group, Inc. for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 (the Report) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of TradeStation Group, Inc.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350
and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.



|               |  |                        
|-------------- |  | -----------------------
|August 5, 2010 |  | /s/ Salomon Sredni     
|Date           |  | Salomon Sredni         
|               |  | Chief Executive Officer
The State



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 15, 2014

N o. 04

- 14

- 00177

- CR

Alejandro Leal PENA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, A tascosa County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12

- 090168

- CRA Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant’s brief was originally due to be filed on August 11 , 201 4 . Appellant’s first motion requesting an extension of time to file the brief was granted, extending the deadline for filing the brief to September 10 , 201 4 . The brief has not been filed. Appellant’s attorney is ORDERED to respond to this court in writing within ten days of the date of this order. The response should state a reasonable explanation for failing to timely file the brief and demonstrate

the st eps being taken to remedy the deficiency. If appellant’s attorney fails to file an adequate response within ten days, this appeal will be abated to the trial court for an abandonment hearing,

and the trial court will be asked to consider whether sanctions are appropriate. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(b)(2).

_________________________________ Catherin e Stone, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 15th day of September, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
Exhibit 10-31
 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
BY AND BETWEEN
TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC. AND THOMAS M. BRANDT, JR.
 WHEREAS Company Employee Employment Agreement
 WHEREAS
 WHEREAS
 NOW THEREFORE
 1.
    
    Section 3.3(a) is amended in its entirety to read as follows:
 (a)
    
    In any given calendar year, Executive shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of a number of shares of common stock of the Company
acquired under Incentive Stock Awards in excess of the greater of:
 (i)
    
    40,000 shares (as adjusted to reflect any stock
dividend, stock split or reverse stock split, of the Class A
common stock of the Company); or(ii)
    
    the product of (A) ten percent (10%) times
(B) the sum of (I) the number of shares of common stock of the
Company to which Executive holds title, determined as of the
date immediately before the proposed sale or disposition date,
that were issued pursuant to an Incentive Stock Award, plus
(II) seventy percent (70%) of the number of shares of common
stock of the Company for which Incentive Stock Awards are
exercisable determined as of the date immediately before the
proposed sale or disposition date.
 2.
    
    Section 3.3(b) is amended in its entirety to read as follows:
 (b)
    
    In any given calendar quarter, Executive shall not sell or
otherwise dispose of a number of shares of common stock of the Company
acquired under Incentive Stock Awards in excess of the greater of:




---



##### 



(i)
    
    10,000 shares (as adjusted to reflect any stock
dividend, stock split or reverse stock split, of the Class A
common stock of the Company); or(ii)
    
    the product of (A) two and one-half percent
(2.5%) times (B) the sum of (I) the number of shares of common
stock of the Company to which Executive holds title, determined
as of the date immediately before the proposed sale or
disposition date, that were issued pursuant to an Incentive
Stock Award, plus (II) seventy percent (70%) of the number of
shares of common stock of the Company for which Incentive Stock
Awards are exercisable determined as of the date immediately
before the proposed sale or disposition date.
 3.
    
    Section 5.1.2 is amended by changing 30 days to be 90 days where used therein.4.
    
    Section 5.2.2 is amended by changing 30 days to be 90 days where used therein.5.
    
    In all other respects, the Employment Agreement is hereby ratified and confirmed.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 WITNESS/ATTEST
    
    
    
    TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC./s/ Bruce A. White
    
    
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Richard A. YoungTitle:
    
    Exec. VP & COODate:
    
    05/03/2010EMPLOYEE/s/ Bruce A. White
    
    
    
    /s/ Thomas M. Brandt, Jr.Date:
    
    05/03/2010
December 13, 2012

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

EX PARTE TUAN DINH PHAN

NO. 14-11-00766-CR 

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having 

considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the judgment. The Court 

orders the judgment AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
#### Willie EVANS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27696.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 19, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The information charged three separate sales of whiskey in a dry area. The jury found the appellant guilty on each count and assessed his punishment at 30 days in jail and a fine of $100 for each count. The judgment cumulates these findings and assesses the punishment at 90 days in jail and a fine of $300.

There is no statement of facts or bills of exception in the record, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
MARC POPE

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5845

_____________________________/

Opinion filed October 9, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. James O. Shelfer , Judge

.

Jeffrey E. Lewis, Regional Conflict Counsel, and Michael Jerome Titus, Assistant

Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, C.J., MARSTILLER and MAKAR, JJ., CO NCUR.
Exhibit 31.2
CERTIFICATIONS
I, Marvin G. Kiser, Sr., certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of McRae Industries, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and
c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: June 24, 2005   /s/ Marvin G. Kiser, Sr.     Marvin G. Kiser, Sr.  Vice President of Finance  
43