Cite as 23 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2005) Interim Decision # 3521 

In re Anthony E. RAMOS, Attorney 

File D2003-016 

Decided as amended November 15, 20051 

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

(1) Under the attorney discipline regulations, a disbarment order issued against a practitioner 

by the highest court of a State creates a rebuttable presumption that disciplinary sanctions 

should follow, which can only be rebutted upon a showing that the underlying disciplinary 

proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was an infirmity of proof 

establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result in injustice. 

(2) A practitioner who has been expelled may petition the Board of Immigration Appeals 

for reinstatement after 1 year, but such reinstatement is not automatic and the practitioner 

must qualify as an attorney or representative under the regulations. 

(3) The Government is not required to show that an attorney has “appeared” before it, 

because any attorney is a “practitioner” and is therefore subject to sanctions under the 

attorney discipline regulations following disbarment. 

(4) Where the respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court of Florida as a result of his 

extensive unethical conduct, expulsion from practice before the Board, the Immigration 

Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security is an appropriate sanction. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se 

FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF GENERAL 

COUNSEL: Jennifer J. Barnes, Esquire, Falls Church, Virginia 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Rachel A. McCarthy, 

Associate Ethics Officer 

BEFORE: Board Panel: OSUNA, Acting Vice Chairman; HOLMES and HURWITZ, 

Board Members. 

1 On our own motion, we amend the July 25, 2005, order in this case. The amended order 

makes editorial changes consistent with our designation of the case as a precedent. 

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OSUNA, Acting Vice Chairman: 

On March 17, 2005, an Immigration Judge, acting as the adjudicating official 

in this case, ordered the respondent expelled from practice before the 

Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Department of 

Homeland Security (the “DHS,” formerly the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service). The respondent has filed an appeal with the Board. The appeal will be 

dismissed. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent was disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court 

of Florida on December 18, 1997, based on the court’s approval of the 

November 12, 1997, report of a referee. The referee noted that the respondent 

was given numerous opportunities to respond to the Florida Bar’s complaint but 

chose not to do so. According to the referee, the respondent also failed to 

appear at a hearing concerning the proper sanction in the case. 

After reviewing the respondent’s numerous disciplinary violations, the 

referee concluded that “reduced to its bare essence, this is a theft case. For a 

period of six (6) years, respondent did not have sufficient funds in his trust 

account to cover all client liabilities. At its zenith, there was a total trust 

account shortage of $396,765.02.” In addition to the misappropriation of client 

funds, the respondent forged his clients’ signatures on settlement drafts. In that 

regard the referee stated, “As with misuse of client funds, the Supreme Court of 

Florida takes a very dim view of forgery.” 

The referee also found that the respondent had failed to obey a court order 

and deliberately lied to a tribunal. Furthermore, the referee noted that the 

respondent “has engaged in a myriad of other unethical conduct . . . which would 

warrant disbarment several times over.” Such unethical conduct included 

misrepresentation to successor counsel, collecting excessive fees, and 

representing a client without authority, among many other things. According to 

the referee, the “respondent has brought into play almost every aggravating 

factor in The Florida Standards.” The referee therefore found it appropriate to 

recommend that the respondent receive “enhanced disbarment,” meaning that he 

cannot apply for reinstatement in Florida for 20 years. 

Consequently, on October 21, 2004, the DHS initiated disciplinary 

proceedings against the respondent with the issuance of a Notice of Intent to 

Discipline and petitioned for the respondent’s immediate suspension from 

practice before the DHS on October 25, 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3 (2004). 

On November 4, 2004, the Office of General Counsel for the Executive Office 

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for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) asked that the respondent be similarly 

suspended from practice before the EOIR, including the Board and the 

Immigration Courts. On December 6, 2004, we granted the Government’s 

petition for immediate suspension. 

As the respondent requested a hearing on the charges in the Notice of Intent 

to Discipline, the record was forwarded to the Office of the Chief Immigration 

Judge under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106 (2005), which states that in attorney discipline 

cases, that office shall appoint an adjudicating official (an Immigration Judge) 

when an answer is filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(f) (2005); see also Matter of 

Gadda, 23 I&N Dec. 645, 647 (BIA 2003), aff’d, Gadda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 

934 (9th Cir. 2004). 

On March 17, 2005, the Immigration Judge expelled the respondent from 

practice before the Immigration Courts, the Board, and the DHS. The 

Immigration Judge determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary, as 

the respondent contested only jurisdiction, which had been established. The 

Immigration Judge issued another order on March 29, 2005, in which he 

declined to reconsider his final order. The respondent filed a timely appeal with 

the Board on April 14, 2005, and subsequently the parties submitted briefs. See 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(c) (providing that the Board has jurisdiction to review the 

decision of the adjudicating official and conducts a de novo review of the 

record); 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(f); see also Matter of Gadda, supra, at 647. 

II. ANALYSIS 

As alleged by the DHS in its Notice of Intent to Discipline, the respondent 

has been disbarred in the State of Florida. We therefore find that there are 

grounds for discipline. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.102(e)(1), 1292.3(b) (2005). 

The regulations provide for summary disciplinary proceedings against a 

practitioner who, like the respondent, has been disbarred by the highest court of 

a State. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(c). Where the DHS brings proceedings based on a 

final order of disbarment, such an order creates a rebuttable presumption that 

disciplinary sanctions should follow. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(c)(3)(ii). Such a 

presumption can only be rebutted upon a showing that the underlying 

disciplinary proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was 

an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result 

in injustice. Id.; see also Matter of Gadda, supra, at 648. 

The DHS correctly notes in its brief that the respondent set forth seven issues 

for review in his Notice of Appeal, which were restructured into several issues 

in the respondent’s brief. We also note that the respondent filed a “Reply Brief” 

on June 10, 2005. We agree with the DHS that the issues raised by the 

respondent lack merit. 

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First, the respondent argues that the disciplinary proceedings are unwarranted, 

because he was disbarred in 1997 and he could have been reinstated by 1998 had 

the DHS initiated these proceedings in 1997. The respondent refers to 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.107 (2005), which allows for reinstatement to practice before the 

Board, the Immigration Courts, and the DHS. See also 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(f). 

A practitioner who has been expelled may petition the Board for reinstatement 

after 1 year. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b). 

As the DHS points out, however, reinstatement is not automatic, simply upon 

the passage of time. Even had the respondent been expelled from practice 

before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the DHS at an earlier date, he 

would not be eligible for reinstatement because he could not qualify as an 

attorney under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f) (2005), or as a representative under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1001.1(j). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b). As a result of the respondent’s 

egregious violations of the Florida Rules, he cannot be reinstated to practice law 

in Florida for 20 years, and he makes no claim that he has been readmitted to 

practice law in that State. Moreover, he does not meet the definition of a 

“representative” under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(j), as he is not an accredited 

representative under 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(4) (2005) and does not otherwise 

show that he is “entitled to represent others.” 

The respondent also argues that the penalty imposed on him by the 

Immigration Judge, i.e., expulsion, was unfair, because other attorneys have not 

faced such a severe sanction. The regulations provide that expulsion is one 

sanction that may be applied against an attorney. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101(a)(1) 

(2005). We agree with the Immigration Judge that expulsion is an appropriate 

sanction in this case. As noted above, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted 

a referee’s report, which found that the respondent had misused client funds, 

forged client signatures, charged excessive fees, and lied to a tribunal. As a 

result, the respondent received “enhanced disbarment,” which precludes 

reinstatement to the Florida Bar for 20 years. Given the Supreme Court of 

Florida’s endorsement of the referee’s report finding extensive unethical 

conduct committed by the respondent, it is more than appropriate that the 

respondent be expelled from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, 

and the DHS. See Matter of Gadda, supra, at 649 (finding expulsion from 

practice appropriate where the respondent had engaged in “egregious and 

repeated acts of professional misconduct” that resulted in expulsion by the 

Supreme Court of California). 

The respondent also contends that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed 

against him because he is no longer an attorney as a result of his disbarment. 

The DHS counters that the respondent “seeks to render a nullity one of the most 

commonly charged grounds upon which disciplinary sanctions are imposed by 

adjudicating officials and the Board.” The regulations provide that disciplinary 

sanctions may be applied against an attorney who has been disbarred. 

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8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.102(e)(1), 1292.3(b); see also Matter of Gadda, supra, at 

649. Clearly, therefore, the respondent is subject to expulsion as a disbarred 

attorney. 

To the extent that the respondent claims that he is not subject to sanctions 

because he did not “practice” before the DHS, his argument fails, as we earlier 

found in issuing an immediate suspension order on December 6, 2004. The 

regulations make clear that any “practitioner” is subject to sanctions under the 

attorney discipline regulation, and that any practitioner who has been disbarred 

by the highest court in a State can be immediately suspended from practice. See 

8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.3(a)(2), (c). A “practitioner” includes any attorney, as defined 

at 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(f). See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(a)(2). Therefore, because the 

respondent is an attorney, he is subject to sanctions as a “practitioner,” and the 

Government is not required to show that he has “appeared” before it. 

In any event, as we stated in our December 6, 2004, order, the DHS showed 

that the respondent is the executive director of “All American Immigration 

Association” and had submitted numerous G-28 forms (Notice of Entry of 

Appearance as Attorney or Representative), in which he claimed to be an “agent” 

for the party appearing before the DHS. Given this, the respondent clearly 

“practiced” before the DHS. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(i) (defining “practice” as the 

“act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in person or through the 

preparation or filing of any brief or other document, paper, application, or 

petition on behalf of another person or client before or with the [DHS], or any 

officer of the [DHS], or the Board”). 

The respondent asserts that the Immigration Judge did not give him sufficient 

time to prepare his case. He also makes accusations that the Government 

defrauded the Immigration Judge and Board. His arguments are without merit, 

and his accusations are unfounded. On January 11, 2005, the Immigration Judge 

issued an order directing the parties to present a “statement of issues to be 

decided at hearing, a detailed description of any evidence that they intend to 

present (including names of any witnesses and copies of any documents), and 

a statement clearly establishing the relevance of each item of evidence to an 

issue to be decided at hearing.” The DHS presented evidence that the 

respondent has been disbarred, as well as evidence that the respondent had 

practiced before the DHS after being disbarred, including appearance forms and 

other documents filed by the respondent with the DHS. The respondent fails to 

show that he was denied adequate time to respond to the documents filed by the 

DHS, which clearly show that he “practiced” before the DHS. 

Additionally, to the extent that the respondent attempts to rebut the 

presumption of professional misconduct established by his disbarment in 

Florida, we note that the presumption can be rebutted only by demonstrating by 

clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the underlying disciplinary 

proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was an infirmity 

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of proof establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result in injustice. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(c)(3)(ii); see also Matter of Gadda, supra, at 648. As 

we found in our December 6, 2004, immediate suspension order, the respondent 

was given notice of the Florida proceedings, but he chose not to answer the 

Bar’s complaint, and he later elected not to appear at a hearing concerning the 

sanction. The referee’s report clearly detailed the respondent’s misconduct 

leading to his disbarment. The respondent made no showing that the 

proceedings in Florida were unfair, or that he required additional time to dispute 

the presumption that disciplinary sanctions based on his disbarment should 

follow. 

Finally, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred by issuing his 

decision without a hearing. The Immigration Judge correctly decided that the 

respondent’s prehearing statement failed to establish that a hearing was 

necessary. There are no issues of material fact that would require a hearing in 

this case. As noted, a final order of disbarment creates a rebuttable presumption 

of professional misconduct, which results in disciplinary sanctions unless the 

presumption is rebutted. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.3(c)(3)(ii). The respondent offered 

nothing to suggest that the Florida proceedings were unfair and has identified no 

issues that would require an evidentiary hearing. See Matter of Gadda, supra, 

at 648. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In sum, with agree with the DHS that clear, unequivocal, and convincing 

evidence establishes that it is in the public interest to discipline the respondent, 

based on the final order of disbarment issued by the Supreme Court of Florida 

on December 18, 1997. We further conclude that expulsion is the appropriate 

sanction. 

ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed, and he is expelled from 

practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the DHS. 

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