1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O . 09
- 19
- 00455
- CV

__________________
IN THE INTEREST OF C.D.W.

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 12
- 08
- 08916
- CV

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION In this post

- divorce modification suit affecting the parent

- child relationship, appellant, the m other of the minor child C.D.W. (hereinafter “Mother”) , 1 raises three is sues challenging the trial court’s o rder imposi ng a geographic restriction on the child’s primary residence and requiring her to travel to Father’ s home each month between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. to provide him with C.D.W.’s medication for the

1 To preserve the parties’ privacy, we refer to the parties by their relationship to the child , and we refer to the child using his initials

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d)

.2 following mo nth, a s well as the trial court’s refusal to modify child support to the maximum allowable amount for one child

. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PERTINENT BACKGROUND Mother and Father divorced in 2014. In the F inal D ecree O f D ivorce, the trial
court appointed Mother and Father joint managing conservator s of C.D.W. and gave Mother the exclusive right to designate C.D.W.’s primary residence within Montgomery County, Texas. Father subsequently filed a P etition T o M odify The
Pa rent

- C hild R elationship, in which he requested that the trial court appoint him the person with the exclusive right to designate C.D.W.’s primary residence and, among other things, asked that child support payments previously ordered be terminated if he were granted the exclusive right to determine C.D.W.’s primary residence and that Mother be ordered to pay child support. Mother filed an E mergency C ounterpetition to M odify T he P arent

- C hild
R elationship, in which she requested that Father be removed as joint managing conservator and that she be appointed sole managing conservator “with the exclusive rights as set forth in the Texas Family Code § 153.132. ” Mother asserted that Father had “engaged in a histo ry or pattern of emotional abuse and alienating behavior” toward her and asked the trial court to consider said alleged conduct in appointing her sole managing conservator. In addition, Mother asked the trial court to order that Father’s periods of possess ion be supervised

. Mother pleaded that child support3 payments should be increased by $100 per month “in accordance with the guidelines in chapter 154 of the Texas Family Code.”
A ttached to Mother’s counterpetition was a supporting affidavit, in which she asserted that C.D.W. was taking multiple ADHD medications, as well as an anti

anxiety medication, and had been under the care of a psychotherapist for several
years. According to Mother’s affidavit, Father had convinced C.D.W.’s psychiatrist to take C.D.W. off his anti

- anxiety medications , and Mother averred that she feared C.D.W. would suffer “severe trauma and worsening anxiety” if he had prolonged exposure to Father without anti

- anxiety medication and ongoing psychotherapy. Mother further averred that Fa ther’s behavior would significantly impair C.D.W.’s emotional wellbeing, “resulting in a potentially traumatic and devastating outcome.” Before trial, the trial judge signed an A greed O rder O n D iscovery R esponses, which stated that “[e]ach party agrees to the following trial stipulation [:] that at the time of this order both parties would be subject to child support being assessed at the maximum guideline amount for one child.” At trial, the only questions submitted to the jury pertained to the i ssue of whether the terms of conservatorship should be modified to make Mother the sole managing conservator of C.D.W. and, if the jury found conservatorship should not be modified, whether Father should instead be appointed the conservator with the exclus ive right to determine C.D.W.’s primary residence. Specifically, q uestion one4 of the two

- question charge asked, “Should the joint managing conservatorship be modified to appoint [Mother] as the sole managing conservator of [C.D.W.]?” The jury answered “yes ” to question one. The charge instructed the jury not to answer question two unless it answered “no” to question one, so the jury did not answer question two , which asked whether Father should be designated the conservator with the exclusive right to deter mine C.D.W.’s primary residence

. The trial judge signed a letter ruling rendering on the non

- jury issues from the trial. In the letter ruling, the trial judge stated as follows, in pertinent part: I would like to impose a geographical restriction on [Moth er ]’s right to establish the primary residence of the child[,] but I am not sure that I am able to do so given the procedural posture of the case. If both counsel agree that the court may impose a geographical restriction, then I impose a geographical rest riction to Montgomery County, Texas and counties contiguous thereto. If both counsel agree that I cannot, then of course the order should give [Mother] the exclusive right to establish the child’s primary residence, along with all other 153. 1 32 rights, exc lusively. If counsel are in disagreement on the point, then I request points and authorities on the issue be filed prior to entry. I do not need extensive briefing, merely a cover sheet listing the authoritative citations is sufficient. The trial court a lso denied Mother’s request to modify Father’s child support obligation. Father filed a legal memorandum, in which he asserted that section 153.132 of the Texas Family Code and case law support the trial court ’s imposition of a geographic restriction on a parent appointed sole managing conservator. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.132 (providing that a parent appointed sole managing5 conservator has the right to designate the child’s primary residence unless limited by court order ). Father also filed a First Amended M otion To Enter F inal O rder , in which he stated that the parties had not resolved the ir differences regarding Mother’s proposed order and asked the trial judge to enter an order “in the form attached” to Father’s motion as an exhibit. According to Father, the trial court should retain the geographic restriction provisions , and he requested the addition of language regarding the parties’ exchange of C.D.W.’s medication. Mother also filed a legal memorandum, in which she asserted that section 105.002 of the Texas Family Code provides that a trial court may not contravene a jury verdict on the issue s of appointment of a sole managing c onservator or the determination of whether to impose a restriction on the geographic area within which a joint managing conservator may designate the child’s primary residence

. See id . § 105.002. Mother also argued in her memorandum that the court could not submit to the jury questions on the issues of support, specific terms or conditions of p ossession or access, or any right or duty of a conservator , other than the determination of which joint managing conservator has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child

. According to Mother, “[o]nce a jury awards a party sole

ma naging conservatorship, a geographic restriction cannot be imposed by either a jury or a court.” Mother maintained that the cases cited by Father involved “bench trials and therefore do not apply.”6 The trial judge signed an Ord er I n S uit T o M odify P arent

- C hild R elationship, in which she removed Father as a managing conservator , appointed Mother sole managing conservator , and awarded Mother the exclusive right to designate C.D.W.’s primary residence. The order also required Mother to provide Father “o nce each calendar month sufficient quantity of the child’s prescribed medication(s), if any, for the child’s estimated dosage needs for the following calendar month [ , ] ” and ordered Mother to deliver the medication to Father’s residence between 6:00 p.m.

an d 7:00 p.m., and to provide Father at least twenty

- four hours’ advance notice , “via text message, of the date and time in which she will deliver the medication[.]” In the order, the trial judge also denied Mother’s request to modify Father’s child support obligation. After the trial court signed the order, Father filed a M otion T o M odify,
C orrect, O r R eform J udgment, in which he argued that entry of an order that does not impose a geographic restriction on the child’s residence was improper. Father argued that section 153.132 of the Texas Family Code unequivocally states that a sole managing conservator has the right to designate the child’s primary residence unless said right is limited by court order. Father pleaded that “[o]rdering a geographic restricti on does not unlawfully circumvent the sole managing conservator’s exclusive right to determine the child’s residence because it is clearly allowed by the plain language of the statute.” In addition, Father argued that the trial7 court is not prohibited from imposing a geographic restriction on a sole managing conservator merely “because the conservatorship issue was determined by a jury instead of the Court.” Father maintained that although section 105.002 of the Texas Family Code allows a party to demand a jury trial, the issue of whether a geogr aphic restriction is in C.D.W.’s best interest “was not given to the jury as a jury issue [,] ” and therefore, the trial court’s imposition of a geographic restriction did not contravene the jury’s determination. Furthermore, Father argued that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that a geographic restriction is in C.D.W.’s best interest. The trial judge signed an order granting Father’s M otion T o M odify, C orrect, O r R eform J udgment and stated that its order “should include a geographic restrict ion of Montgomery County, Texas.” Subsequently, the trial judge signed a reformed order , which provided as follows, in pertinent part: IT IS ORDERED that the primary residence of the child shall be within Montgomery County, Texas, and the parties shall not remove the child from Montgomery County, Texas, for the purpose of changing the primary residence of the child until this geographic restriction is modified by further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or by a written agreement that is signed by the parties and filed with that court. Mother filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s reformed order, as well as the trial court’s previous order in the suit to modify the parent

- child relationship.8 ISSUE ONE In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the ge ographic restriction because the trial court lacked authority to “modify the jury’s verdict” appointing Mother sole managing conservator or restrict her rights a s such. As an alternative argument in her discussion of issue one, Mother argues that the trial judge modified her statutory rights “ as sole managing conservator without issuing a sufficient written finding of fact that the geographic restriction is in the best interest of [C.D.W.] as required by Texas Family Code [ § ]
153.072.” We review a trial court’s decision in a case concerning a modification of conservatorship under an abuse of discret ion standard. Gillespie v. Gillespie , 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In the Interest of M.A.M. , 346 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child.” Gillespie , 644 S.W.2d at 451. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W. 2 d 238, 241

- 42 (Tex. 1985); In the Interest of M.A.M. , 346 S.W.3d at 13

. We will not find an abuse of discretion if the trial court’s decision is supported by some substantive and probative evidence. Echols v. Olivarez , 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2002, no pet.).9 Section 153.132 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows, in pertinent part: “ Unless limited by court order , a parent appointed as sole managing conservator of a child has . . . the following exclusive rights: (1) the right to designate the primary residence of the child[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.13 2(1) (emphasis added)

. S ection 153.132 provide s that the trial court may exercise discretion to limit the rights otherwise granted under the statute

. Id

. As discussed above, Mother asserts that section 105.002 of the Texas Family Code prohibits a trial court from
contraven ing a jury verdict on the issues of appointment of a sole managing conservator or the determination of whether to impose a restriction on the geographic

area within which a joint managing conservator may designate the child’s primary residence. See id . § 105.002 (c ). The trial court’s order appointing Mother sole managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine C.D.W.’s primary residence within Montgo mery County, Texas, did not contravene the jury’s determination that Mother should be appointed sole managing conservator of C.D.W. No other issues, including the issue of whether a geographical restriction should be imposed, were presented to the jury. On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a geographical restriction. See
Downer , 701 S.W. 2 d at 241

- 42; Gillespie , 644 S.W.2d at 451; In the Interest of
M.A.M. , 346 S.W.3d at 13

.10 We turn now to Mother’s alter native issue one argument that the trial court modified her statutory rights as sole managing conservator without a sufficient written finding of fact that the geographic restriction is in C.D.W.’s best interest. See
Texas Fam

. Code Ann. § 153.072 (providing that “[t]he court may limit the rights and duties of a parent appointed as a conservator if the court makes a written finding that the limitation is in the best interest of the child []”)

. A finding in a modification order that the tri al court’s orders are in the best interests of the child generally satisfies the requirements of section 153.072. See In the Interest of J.C. R. , No. 13

- 18

- 00491

- CV, 2020 WL 339660 3 , at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi June 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Am ir

- Sharif v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 05

- 13

- 00958

- CV, 2015 WL 4967239, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Aug. 20, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In the Interest of C.A. , No. 09

- 03

- 576

- CV, 2004 WL 1699875, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont July 29, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Under a section entitled “ Findings [,]” the trial court’s reformed order recites that “the requested modification as set forth herein is in the best interest of the child.” In addition, under the section entitled “ Conservatorship [, ]” the trial court’s order stated that removing Mother and Father as managing conservators and appointing Mother sole managing conservator is in the best interest of C.D.W. Within the

“ Conservatorship ” section of its order, the trial court ordered that Mot her, as sole managing conservator, ha s “the exclusive right to designate the primary residence11 of the child within Montgomery County, Texas[.]” We conclude that the trial court’s written findings in its reformed order were sufficient to satisfy the require ments of section 153.072. See In the Interest of J.C.R. , 2020 WL 339660 3 , at *5 n.4; Amir

Sharif , 2015 WL 4967239, at *5; In the Interest of C.A. , 2004 WL 1699875, at *1. Having found each of Mother’s issue one arguments to be without merit, we overrule issue one.
ISSUE TWO In her second issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred by failing to honor what Mother asserts is a binding stipulation in the parties’ agreed order on discovery
responses. Mother asserts that the order required the trial judge to assess child support at the maximum set by the Legislature in section 154.125 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125. Mother maintains that the doctrine s of res judicata or collateral estoppel required the trial court to set Father’s child support obligation at the maximum. As discussed above, the trial court ’s A greed O rder O n D iscovery R esponses stated that “[e]ach party agrees to the following trial sti pulation [:] that at the time of this order both parties would be subject to child support being assessed at the maximum guideline amount for one child.” The agreed order, as its title suggests, pertained to the parties’ discovery responses , documents to be produced, and depositions that would be taken

. With the exception of the sentence to which Mother12 points, nothing in the agreed order mentioned the upcoming trial. In addition, the agreed order did not contain clear and unequivocal language of finality. See Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (holding that when there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is final if it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or clearly and unequivocally
state s that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties) ; In the Interest of M.B.D. , No. 09

- 18

- 00278

- CV, 2020 WL 1879474, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont Apr. 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Res judicata , also known as claim preclusion , prevents reli t i g ation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated , and collateral estoppel , also known as issue preclusion , prevent s reli tigation of issues that were already resolved in a prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Tr ust Corp. , 837 S.W.2d 627, 628, 631 (Tex . 1992). The child support stipulation language in the agreed order is expressly limited to circumstances existing “ at the time of” the order , and it merely states that both parties would be “subject to” a finding of maximum support by the trial court. We conclude that the agreed order did not constitute a binding stipulation on the trial court’s exercise of its discretion, an d we further conclude that because the agreed order was not final, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies.
See Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 205; Barr , 837 S.W.2d at 628, 631. For all these reasons, we overrule issue two.13 ISSUE THREE In her third issue, Mother co ntends t hat the tri al court abused its discretion b y requiring her to travel to Father’s home each month between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. to provide Father with C.D.W.’s medication for the following month. Mother erroneously asserts in her brief that neither party requested the pr ovision regarding providing C.D.W.’s medication. As discussed above, the record indicates that Father requested the inclusion of language regarding exchange of C.D.W.’s medication in his First A mended M otion To Enter F inal O rder. Father attached a supporting affidavit to his motion, in which he averred that C.D.W.’s new school does not allow medication to be dropped off with the campus nurse for exchange, and because Mother no longer permitted Father to visit her home and he and Mo ther live thirty minutes apart , there is a need for the inclusion of language regarding the exchange of medication

. Father also stated as follows in his affidavit : “I am requesting that [Mother] drop the medication off at my house at her convenience once a month as I believe that is the least disruptive way to handle the exchange of medication.” The trial court included the provision regarding the exchange of C.D.W.’s medication in both its original order and its reformed order. Although Mother filed

a M ot ion T o M odify, C orrect, O r Re form T he J udgment, her complaints in said motion were limited to the trial court’s inclusion of a geographic restriction. The appellate record does not reflect that Mother responded to Father’s pleadings14 requesting the inclusion of the provision about the exchange of medication or otherwise made the trial court aware that she had any objection to the inclusion of such a provision. Because Mother did not make a timely and specific objection, in which she made the trial court aware of her complaint regarding the provision about the exchange of C.D.W.’s medication, we conclude that Mother has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Moreover, even if Mother had properly preserved the issue for review, on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Mother to deliver C.D.W.’s medications once monthly between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on a day of her choice. See Downer , 701 S.W. 2 d at 241

- 42; Gillespie , 644 S.W.2d at 451; In the Interest of M.A.M. , 346 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, we overrule issue three. Having overruled each of Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

. AFFIRMED.

_________________________ W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice

S ubmitted on April 30, 2021 Opinion Delivered September 9, 2021 Before Golemon , C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.