UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Criminal Nos. 11-129-1, 2, 11 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(November 13, 2012) 

 After the trial commenced, including over seven days of testimony, Defendant Edwards 

again moved to suppress the wiretap at issue in this case on November 7, 2012. The Defendant’s 

[548] Pro Se Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to 

Suppress Evidence Obtained From Interception of Wire Communication in Light of New 

Evidence (“Defendant’s Motion”) represents the Defendant’s second pro se motion, and fourth 

motion overall on this subject. As with the Defendant’s prior motions, the Defendant fails 

establish any legal basis for suppressing the wiretap. Therefore, for the reasons stated below, the 

Defendant’s motion is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The Court exhaustively outlined the factual and procedural background of this in its prior 

opinions, which the Court incorporates in full herein. See generally 7/26/12 Mem. Opin., ECF 

No. [354]; 9/16/12 Mem. Opin., ECF No. [432]; 10/23/12 Mem. Opin., ECF No. [524]. Briefly, 

Defendant Gezo Edwards is charged by superseding indictment with one count of conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and one count 

of carrying a firearm during and in relation to or possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 v. 

GEZO GOEONG EDWARDS, et al., 

 Defendants. 
2 

trafficking offense. Superseding Indictment, ECF No. [28], at 2-3, 6.1

 Throughout the course of 

its investigation, the Government obtained wiretaps on three cellular telephones associated with 

Defendant William Bowman. The Defendant’s motion focuses on the affidavits filed in support 

of the wiretap authorization on one of those cellular telephones---“TT2.” The Government 

obtained the relevant authorizations for TT2 on January 13, February 11, March 11, and April 8, 

2011. 7/26/12 Mem. Opin. at 3-5. The affidavit filed in support of the applications for wire 

interceptions of TT2, signed by FBI Special Agent Timothy S. Pak, did not disclose Defendant 

Edwards as a possible target of the interception until the April 8, 2011 application. Id. at 5. 

The Government first obtained a wiretap authorization for TT3 on March 19, 2011, and 

Defendant Edwards was disclosed as a possible target of the TT3 interception in the supporting 

affidavit. Id. at 5. Agent Pak’s affidavit indicated that pen register information obtained from 

TT3 reflected 939 attempted and completed calls between Defendant Edwards and TT3 between 

January 27, 2010 and March 11, 2011. 

The orders authorizing the wiretaps on TT2 and TT3 permitted the Government to 

“intercept wire communications to and from the [target telephones], including any background 

conversation intercepted in the vicinity of the [the target telephone] while the telephone is off the 

hook or otherwise in use.” Gov’t Ex. A (1/13/11 Order re TT2), ECF No. [290-1], at 3; accord

Gov’t Ex. B (2/14/11 Order re TT2), ECF No. [290-2] at 4; Gov’t Ex. C (3/11/11 Order re TT2), 

ECF No. [290-3], at 4; Gov’t Ex. D (4/8/11 Order re TT2), ECF No. [290-4], at 5; Gov’t Ex. E 

(3/19/11 Order re TT3), ECF No. [290-5]. 

 1

 Counts Nine and Ten of the Superseding Indictment charge the Defendant with 

separate violations of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The Government has conceded that it can only pursue a 

single count against Defendant Edwards in light of the single predicate offense. 
3 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et 

seq., provides that a district court may authorize an application for interception of certain wire, 

oral, and/or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2518. Defendant Edwards, as an “aggrieved 

person,” see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11), once again moves to suppress the contents of the 

interceptions on the basis that the communications were “unlawfully intercepted.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2518(10)(a). Section 2518(1) sets forth the requirements for applications seeking Title III 

authorizations, and provides that applications must include, among other information: 

[A] full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the 

applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including . . . (iv) the 

identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose 

communications are to be intercepted[.] 

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (“Subsection b”). Subsection b requires the Government to name an 

individual as a possible target of a wiretap if the Government (1) “has probable cause to believe 

that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation”; and (2) “expects to 

intercept the individual’s conversations over the target telephone.” United States v. Donovan, 

429 U.S. 413, 428 (1977). Section 2518(1)(e) further provides that the application must contain: 

a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications 

known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any 

judge for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, oral, 

or electronic communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or 

places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each such 

application[.] 

III. DISCUSSION 

Styled as a motion to reconsider, the Defendant’s motion simply re-argues his previous 

pro se motion in response to Court’s findings in its October 23, 2012 Memorandum Opinion. 

The Defendant argues that the Government should have disclosed him as a possible target of the 
4 

interception insofar as it had probable cause to believe Defendant’s conversations would be 

recorded as part of “background conversations” of activations intercepted as part of the wiretap 

of TT2.2 

 As a threshold issue, the Defendant acknowledges that the Supreme Court held in 

Donovan that a violation of subsection b is not a basis for suppressing a wiretap. Def.’s Mot. at 

17. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439-440; 10/23/12 Mem. Opin. at 10. To avoid this issue, the 

Defendant incorporates an argument made by counsel in the second motion regarding the 

wiretap: that, even if a violation of subsection b itself is not a basis for suppressing the wiretap, 

the Court may suppress the wiretap on the basis that the Government also violated subsection e 

by not disclosing information known regarding Defendant Edwards. However, as the Court 

noted when it initially rejected this argument, the Defendant must first show that he should have 

been disclosed as a target pursuant to subsection b before the Government has any obligation to 

disclose information regarding Edwards pursuant to subsection e. 9/16/12 Mem. Opin. at 7-8. 

As set forth below, the Defendant once again fails to make the threshold showing; accordingly 

the Court does not reach the issue of whether or not a violation of subsection e would justify 

suppressing the wiretap. 

 In terms of the merits of his motion, the Defendant first argues that it is natural to assume 

Defendant Bowman and Defendant Edwards met in person. Even if the Court credits this 

assumption, the relevant question under Donovan is not whether Bowman and Edwards ever met 

in person, or even did so on a routine basis. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Bowman and 

 2

 For purposes of this motion, the Court once again assumes without deciding, that the 

Government had probable cause to believe Edwards was engaged in the criminal activity under 

investigation and that the Government had an obligation to disclose possible targets that would 

be intercepted only as part of background conversations. 
5 

Edwards met often enough under circumstances that made it probable that Edwards’ 

conversations would be intercepted in the background activations over one (TT2) of the three 

cellphones associated with Defendant Bowman. 

 The Defendant’s second argument addresses the Government’s claim, in opposition to his 

prior pro se motion, that prior to March 11, 2011 the Government had not intercepted Edwards’ 

voice in the background of any activations of TT2. As the Court noted in its October 23, 2012 

Memorandum Opinion, the fact that over the course of the first two authorizations to intercept 

wire communications with TT2, the Government did not intercept Edwards over TT2 strongly 

supported the Government’s claim that as of March 11, 2011, it lacked probable cause to believe 

it would intercept Edwards over TT2 going forward. 10/23/12 Mem. Opin. at 9. The Defendant 

now argues that the Government could not recognize Edwards’ voice as of March 11, 2011, and 

thus the fact they could not identify his voice on any interceptions prior to that date was 

irrelevant to their probable cause determination. Def.s Mot. at 4-5. Setting aside the fact the 

Government did not intercept any communications involving Edwards during the first two 

authorizations with respect to TT2, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Defendant, the record still fails to show the Government had probable cause to believe Edwards’ 

conversations would be intercepted over TT2 as of March 11, 2011. 

The Defendant devotes much of his motion to establishing a “pattern”---after Defendant 

Bowman received a shipment of cocaine, he and Defendant Edwards would meet in person 

before Defendant Bowman began distributing the drugs to his (Bowman’s) customers. Def.’s 

Mot. at 13. According to the Defendant: “the FBI knew it was highly probable Edwards would 

meet Bowman face-to-face while Bowman [told his customers] ‘aint nothing...soon though,’” 

but before Bowman informed his customers “‘got word for you.’” Id. at 14. On this basis, the 
6 

Defendant argues the Government had probable cause to believe Edwards’ conversations would 

be intercepted over TT2 by at least the February 2011 affidavit, and certainly the March 2011 

affidavit. 

 There are a number of issues with the conclusion the Defendant urges the Court to draw 

from these “facts.” The evidence cited in the record indicates that the first evidence of this so 

called pattern was discovered in February; the Government could not have discerned it was a 

pattern the Defendants would repeat until after it had occurred more than once. The second 

occurrence did not take place until less than one week before the Government submitted the 

March 11 application to renew the wiretap on TT2. With the benefit of hindsight bias, the 

Defendant now points to a “pattern,” which, as of March 2011, may reasonably have been 

viewed as nothing more than a coincidence. Second, at best, this “pattern” reflects what the GPS 

data cited in the Defendant’s previous motion demonstrates: on two occasions in early February 

and March 2011, Defendants Edwards and Bowman met in person while Defendant Bowman 

was in possession of TT2. Third, assuming for the sake of argument that the Government 

recognized this supposed pattern and could predict with absolute certainty that Bowman and 

Edwards would meet in person following the next shipment, this still fails to show probable 

cause. See 10/23/12 Mem. Opin. at 7. The Defendants meeting once or twice per month while 

Bowman carries TT2 in his pocket does not create a reasonable likelihood that the Government 

would intercept Edwards’ conversations over TT2. 

In the Defendant’s view, having explained away the lack of interceptions involving 

Edwards during the first two authorizations with respect to TT2, three pieces of evidence are 

key: (1) records indicate over 7,000 activations over TT2 during the course of the wiretap 

authorizations; (2) records indicate Defendant Bowman carried TT2 on his person daily; and (3) 
7 

the “natural assumption” that, given their relationship, Bowman and Edwards met in person on a 

regular basis. The Defendant contends that, in combination, this evidence demonstrates that the 

Government had probable cause to believe it would intercept Edwards’ conversations over TT2 

as of March 11, 2011. Assuming each of these assertions is true—and the Court is forced to 

make that assumption because the Defendant does not cite evidence in the record3

 for these 

contentions—other evidence in the record demonstrates why the Government lacked probable 

cause. Despite routinely carrying TT2 and making or receiving thousands of phone calls with 

TT2, Defendant Bowman only carried the phone to in person meetings with Defendant Edwards 

on two occasions prior to March 11, 2011: February 8 and March 9. In other words, over the 

course of nearly sixty days, there were only two days on which Defendant Edwards’ was in the 

vicinity of TT2. On this basis, the Government did not have probable cause to believe it would 

intercept Edwards’ conversations over TT2 going forward. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Defendant’s present motion is nothing more than a re-hash of his prior motion, only with 

weaker evidence than previously presented. The “natural assumptions” the Defendant would 

have the Court (and the Government) make, in combination with the actual evidence of 

Defendant Edwards’ interactions with Defendant Bowman, confirm the conclusion the Court has 

reached on two prior occasions: as of March 11, 2011, the Government did not have probable 

cause to believe that it would intercept Defendant Edwards’ conversations over interceptions of 

TT2. Accordingly, Defendant Edwards’ [548] Pro Se Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to 

Reconsider Denial of Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained From Interception of Wire 

 3

 Instead, the Defendant attaches what appears to be pen register data for TT3 (Def.’s Ex. 

1), and line sheet summaries of interceptions over TT2 between February 2 and 4, 2011 (Def.’s 

Ex. 2). 
8 

Communication in Light of New Evidence is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

 COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE