### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 40509 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. MICHAEL WARREN COX, JR. , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:13

- CR

- 266

- 2

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Michael Warren Cox, Jr. , was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to
possess , with intent to manufacture and distribute , methamphetamine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and sentenced , inter alia , to life imprisonment . He raises numerous issues on appeal.

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 13, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-40509 Document: 00513835170 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/13/2017No. 16

- 40509

2 Cox first claims the ev idence was insufficient to support his conviction

. Bec ause he preserved this issue in district court, review is de novo

. E.g. , United States v. Alaniz , 726 F.3d 586, 600 (5th Cir. 2013). W hen viewed in the requisite light most favorable to the Government , with all reasonable inferences made in support of the jury’s verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support Cox’s conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Romans , 823 F.3d 299 , 311 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 195 (2016)

. Contrary to his contention , the evidence was suffici ent to establish more than a single agreement to buy or sell drugs. See United States v. Delgado , 672 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) . The evidence established he purchased methamphetamine from two indi viduals and distributed it with McKenzie ; Cox sold methamphetamine to numerous people ; and buyers participated in the conspiracy by helping to store, repackage, and distribute the methamphetamine. The jury could reasonably infer the existence of an
agreem ent between Cox and McKenzie based on the circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Zamora , 661 F.3d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 2011). And, t he

e vidence shows a reasonable trier of fact could conclude , beyond a reasonable doubt , that Cox agreed with McKenzie to violate the narcotics law by distributing methamphetamine; Cox ha d knowl edge of the agreement; and he voluntarily participated in it

. See Romans , 823 F.3d at 311

. Next, Cox contends the Government made various improper r emarks during closing argument , constitut ing prosecutorial misconduct. Cox did not object to the r emarks in district court , however; therefore, review is limited to plain error. E.g. , United States v Rashad , 687 F.3d 637, 643 (5th Cir. 2012). T he remark s concerning why McKenzie did not testify at trial were not improper because they were made in response to defense counsel’s closing argument , and they were based on the evidence presented at trial. The Case: 16-40509 Document: 00513835170 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/13/2017No. 16

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3 remarks point ing out factual error s made by defense counsel in closing argument were not improper because the Government did not personally attack or denigrate defense counsel. And, th e remark that Cox had equal power to subpoena witnesses was not improper : it did not implicate Cox’s right not to testify, and i t did not suggest or imply the Government’s counsel personally made the decision to charge Cox with conspiracy

. See United States v. Wall , 389 F.3d 457, 474 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Palmer , 37 F.3d 1080, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, e v en if any of the Government ’s remarks were improper, Cox has not shown they had a strong prejudicial effect. Further, the court gave a general instruction that the arguments made by counsel were not evidence. Because jurors are presumed to follow their i nstructions, the court’s instructions were likely sufficient to cure any prejudicial effect. See United States v. Anderson , 755 F.3d 782, 798 (5th Cir. 2014). In view of the strong evidence against him, Cox has not shown that any of the remarks “cast ser ious doubt on the co rrectness of the jury’s verdict ”

. See United States v. Reagan , 725 F.3d 471, 492 (5th Cir. 2013). Therefore, he has not shown any of the claimed improper remarks constituted plain (clear or obvious) error or affected his substantial r ights

. See Rashad , 687 F.3d at 643. For his third claim, C ox maintains the oral and written judgments conflict because, at sentencing, the court referred to a list of special conditions of supervi sed release in the presentence investigation r eport (PSR) , rather than pronouncing each special condition in its oral judgment. The record shows the PSR , which was provided to the parties , included the recommendation of mandatory and special conditions of supervised release. Because Cox was aware of the recomm ended special conditions and bypassed his opportunity to object at sentencing , the plain error standard of review again Case: 16-40509 Document: 00513835170 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/13/2017No. 16

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4 applies. See United States v. Rouland , 726 F.3d 728, 730

– 34 (5th Cir. 2013). There is no conflict between the oral and written judgmen ts because the court referred to the special conditions recommended in the PSR, and the written judgment imposed the same recommendations

. Cox was aware of the recommended special conditions and had opportunity to object

. He has not shown reversible plai n error. See id. at 730

– 34. Finally , Cox contends the special conditions of supervised release requiring him to give the probation officer access to his financial information and requiring him to obtain a g eneral e ducation d evelopment ( GED ) certificate are substantively unreasonable. ( The Government contends this issue is not ripe for review because Cox was sentenced to life imprisonment and may never be released from prison and placed on supervised release . As shown infra , we need not reach that issu e
. ) Because Cox did not object to these special condi tions in district court, review is limited again to plain error. See United States v. Weatherton , 567 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). Although the court did not give specific reasons for imposing the special conditions of supervised release at issu e, the record indicates there is a reasonable relationship between the m and the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Caravayo , 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5 th Cir. 2015)

. The special conditi on requiring Cox to provide his financial information to the probation officer is reasonably related to the requirement that he pay for drug treatment and testing , and mental health treatment. The special condition requiring Cox to obtain a GED is reasona bly related to his need for educational and vocation training. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). See Weatherton , 567 F.3d at 152. AFFIRMED. Case: 16-40509 Document: 00513835170 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/13/2017