Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

Order 

June 4, 2010 

137451 

MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 137451 

 COA: 280792 

Ingham CC: 06-001537-AA 

SECRETARY OF STATE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On November 5, 2009, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave 

to appeal the August 28, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, 

the application is again considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall include 

among the issues to be briefed the effect, if any, of Citizens United v Federal Election 

Commission, 558 US ___; 130 S Ct 876; 175 L Ed 2d 753 (2010), on this case. 

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 

 I would not grant leave to appeal, and I therefore dissent. To the best of my 

recollection, this is the first occasion on which I have ever dissented to an order to grant 

leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals issued its decision in this case on August 28, 

2008, this Court entered an order scheduling oral argument on the application on May 8, 

2009, and oral arguments were heard on November 5, 2009. Now 6 1⁄2 months after 

hearing oral arguments on the application, the majority grants leave to appeal. The only 

fig leaf of an excuse for doing this is a request that the parties should now brief the 

impact of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US ___; 130 S Ct 876; 

175 L Ed 2d 753 (2010), a case decided by the United States Supreme Court more than 

four months ago and bearing no discernible connection to the instant case. 

 Unlike Citizens United, the issues in this case have nothing to do with corporate 

free speech, nothing to do with labor union free speech, nothing to do with the Federal 

Election Campaign Act, nothing to do with Federal Election Commission rules or 

regulations, and indeed nothing to do with campaign speech or the First Amendment. In 

short, it has nothing to do with anything involved in Citizens United. Instead, it involves 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

June 4, 2010 

p0601 

 

2

only whether § 57 of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act bars a school district from 

administering a payroll deduction plan for a political action committee. 

 Indeed, neither party itself has suggested that this case is affected in any way by 

Citizens United, nor sought any opportunity to file a supplemental brief. Yet suddenly it 

is necessary that this Court delay resolution of this case for what will be a minimum of 

seven or eight additional months, on top of the six or seven months that have already 

passed since oral argument. I am aware of no previous instance in which this Court has 

held arguments on an application, taken no action in response to such arguments for more 

than six months, and then granted leave to appeal late during that term, ensuring that such 

case will not be further considered during that term and that a decision will not be 

forthcoming until, at the earliest, the beginning of the second calendar year, 2011, after 

arguments were initially heard. This, with regard to a case that may affect the 

administrative processes of every school district across this state. 

 This Court has been presented with substantial briefs from each party. Each party 

has filed an original and supplemental brief, four amicus briefs have been filed, and oral 

argument has taken place that lasted well beyond the normal time allotted for such 

argument. We have heard from the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the 

Michigan AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, the Michigan State Employee’s 

Association, and the Mackinac Center, with a supplemental brief filed by the AFL-CIO 

and two supplemental briefs filed by the Chamber of Commerce. This case involves a 

straightforward matter of statutory interpretation, and no justice has identified to any of 

the parties at oral argument, or at any later juncture, any aspect of this case that has not 

been thoroughly addressed. 

 To grant leave to appeal under these circumstances constitutes an utter waste of 

judicial resources, imposes an altogether unnecessary expense upon the parties, and 

unconscionably delays resolution of an important dispute of statewide importance for no 

proper reason. What accounts for, and justifies, this delay? What is taking place here is 

an abuse of the judicial process, and the majority owes considerably more explanation for 

its actions than it has given. 

CORRIGAN AND YOUNG, JJ., join the statement of MARKMAN, J.