alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Willard BARKER, Appellant, v. EBLEN COAL COMPANY et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 11, 1955.

W. M. Melton, T. E. Moore, Jr., Hazard, for appellant.

J. W. Craft, Jr., Hazard, for appellees.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

Willard Barker, a mine foreman for the Eblen Coal Company, was injured when an automobile;, in which he had ridden from the foot of the mountain to the mine entrance about a quarter of a mile up the mountain, went backwards over an embankment in the process of being parked. Barker’s claim for workmen’s compensation was denied by the Workmen’s Compensation Board on the ground that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. On appeal to the circuit court the board was upheld. Barker now is appealing from the judgment of the circuit court.

Barker resided in a company house at the foot of the mountain. He was called by the mine superintendent to serve an extra shift as foreman, in the mine up the mountain. His duties would commence at the mine entrance, about one-half hour before the miners started their shift. He had two ways of getting up the mountain; one by riding a mine cable car up an incline, and the other by walking or riding in a private automobile up a road maintained by the company.

As Barker left his house, a fellow employe came by in an automobile, and asked Barker if he would like a ride. Barker accepted, and they drove up the road. After reaching the top, the driver attempted to park the car, and in so doing the motor stalled. The car started to roll backward, and because of defective brakes the driver was unable to prevent it from rolling over an embankment.

The Workmen’s Compensation Board found as a fact that the accident was due to the defective brakes on the car, and was not caused by any defect in the road.

The board, in denying compensation, relied upon Harlan Collieries Co. v. Shell, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 923, in which the employe was injured when a truck, carrying him and other employes home after work, ran off a road on the employer’s premises because of a defect in the steering gear.

We agree with the board that the Shell case is controlling. The only distinction is that here the accident occurred while the employe was going to work, while in the Shell case it occurred when the em*449ploye was going home after work. This distinction is immaterial.

In the consideration of the case of Harlan-Wallins Coal Corporation v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912, this Court thoroughly reviewed and reexamined the question of compensation for injuries received upon the employer’s premises while going to or from work. As indicated in the opinion in the Stewart case, the majority of the Court adheres to the principle laid down in the Shell case, which is that in order to be com-pensable the accident must have some relation to an industrial hazard. See also United States Steel Co. v. Isbell, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 917.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.2

RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION

                                 CERTIFICATIONS
                                 --------------
           (Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
                             15 U.S.C. Section 78m)

I, Deborah F. McLeod, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Chestatee
Bancshares, Inc., certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-QSB of Chestatee Bancshares,
Inc. for the quarter ended June 30, 2006.

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
         a.  designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;
         b.  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based upon
such evaluation; and
         c.  disclosed in this report any changes in our internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, our internal
controls over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the our
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors:
         a.  all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and
         b.  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in our internal control over
financial reporting.


Date: May 11, 2006              BY: /s/ Deborah F. McLeod
      ------------                  --------------------------------------------
                                    Deborah F. McLeod, CFO and Treasurer
                                    (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)

                                       25
| Delaware                                             | 001-07572                | 13-1166910                        |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation)  | (Commission File Number) | (IRS Employer Identification No.) |
| 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York               | 10016                    |
| (Address of Principal Executive Offices)             |  (Zip Code)         |

----

----

| By:                 |    /s/ Mark D. Fischer  |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                | Mark D. Fischer, Senior Vice President |
|                |                                   |   |
| Date: March 3, 2011 |                                   |   |

----

| 99.1 | Press Release, dated March 2, 2011 |
|------|------------------------------------|
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1497 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1497

   To direct the Secretary of Defense to take whatever steps may be 
   necessary to exhume and transfer the remains of certain deceased 
  members of the Armed Forces buried in Tripoli, Libya, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 12, 2011

 Mr. Rogers of Michigan (for himself and Mr. LoBiondo) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
  Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To direct the Secretary of Defense to take whatever steps may be 
   necessary to exhume and transfer the remains of certain deceased 
  members of the Armed Forces buried in Tripoli, Libya, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXHUMATION AND TRANSFER OF REMAINS OF DECEASED MEMBERS OF 
              THE ARMED FORCES BURIED IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Secretary of Defense shall take whatever steps may be necessary to--
            (1) exhume the remains of any deceased members of the Armed 
        Forces of the United States buried at a burial site described 
        in subsection (b);
            (2) transfer such remains to an appropriate forensics 
        laboratory to be identified;
            (3) in the case of any remains that are identified, 
        transport the remains to a veterans cemetery located in 
        proximity, as determined by the Secretary, to the closest 
        living family member of the deceased individual or at another 
        cemetery as determined by the Secretary;
            (4) for any member of the Armed Forces whose remains are 
        identified, provide a military funeral and burial; and
            (5) in the case of any remains that are unable to be 
        identified, transport the remains to Arlington National 
        Cemetery for interment at the Tomb of the Unknowns.
    (b) Burial Sites Described.--The burial sites described in this 
subsection are the following:
            (1) The mass burial site containing the remains of five 
        United States sailors located in Protestant Cemetery in 
        Tripoli, Libya.
            (2) The mass burial site containing the remains of eight 
        United States sailors located near the walls of the Tripoli 
        Castle in Tripoli, Libya.
                                 <all>
```
vnce-ex1029_259.htm



Exhibit 10.29



 

July 11, 2017

 

Marie Fogel

[Home Address]

 

Dear Marie,

 

Congratulations! The Vince leadership team has identified you as key talent that will help drive our company’s success. Therefore, I am pleased to confirm your promotion with Vince! 

 

Following are the terms associated with your new position:

 


		
	
Effective Date:
	
June 25th, 2017 

	
 
	
 

	
Title:  
	
Senior Vice President, Merchandising and Product Development

	
 
	
 

	
Reports To:
	
Chief Executive Officer

	
 
	
 

	
Base Compensation:  
	
Your annual base salary will be $400,000. You will be paid on a bi-weekly basis (26 pay periods per year). This position is classified as exempt. As such, you are/are not eligible for overtime pay for hours worked over 40 hours in one week.




 

We are confident that you will continue to make significant contributions at Vince and we look forward to your future success! 

 

All other terms and conditions of your employment apply, as stated in your original offer letter. The employment relationship remains at-will, meaning both you and the Company have the right to terminate your employment at any time, for any reason, with or without cause, and without prior notice.  

 

If you agree to the employment terms listed, please sign this letter and return it via email to HR at hr@vince.com. 

 

Sincerely,

 


			
	
/s/ Melissa Walalce
	
 
	
July 11, 2017

	
Melissa Wallace
	
 
	
Date

	
SVP, Human Resources
	
 
	
 




 

 

Agreed & Acknowledged

 

 


			
	
/s/ Marie Fogel
	
 
	
July 11, 2017

	
Marie Fogel
	
 
	
Date
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 212 (Friday, November 1, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 65554]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: C1-2013-24712]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 34 and 45

[Docket No.: FAA-2012-1333; Amendment No. 34-5A]
RIN 2120-AK15

Exhaust Emission Standards for New Aircraft Turbine Engines and 
Identification Plate for Aircraft Engines

Correction

    In rule document 2013-24712, appearing on pages 63015-63017 in the 
issue of Wednesday, October 23, 2013, make the following correction:

Sec.  34.23  [Corrected]

0
On page 63017, in the Table titled ``Tier 6 Oxides of Nitrogen Emission 
Standards for Subsonic Engines'', in the third column, in the last row, 
the entry ``rO > 26.7'' is corrected to read ``rO = 26.7''.

[FR Doc. C1-2013-24712 Filed 10-31-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
```
Exhibit 23.1
 
 
 
 
 
 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
 
 We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-125694) pertaining to the PVH Associates Investment
        Plan for Residents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of our report dated June 24, 2019, with respect to the financial statements of the PVH Associates Investment Plan for Residents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico included in this Annual Report
        (Form 11-K) for the year ended December 31, 2018.
 
 
 /s/ SPIELMAN KOENIGSBERG & PARKER, LLP
 
 SPIELMAN KOENIGSBERG & PARKER, LLP
 
 
 June 24, 2019
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1786 

To provide for the application of sections 552, 552a, and 552b of title 

5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act), and the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act (5 U.S.C. App.) to the Smithsonian Institution, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 5, 2011 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on House Administration 

A BILL 

To provide for the application of sections 552, 552a, and 

552b of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred 

to as the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy 

Act), and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 

App.) to the Smithsonian Institution, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Open and Transparent 

5 Smithsonian Act of 2011’’. 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1786 IH

1 SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF OPEN GOVERNMENT STATUTES 

2 TO THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The following provisions shall 

4 apply to the Smithsonian Institution: 

5 (1) Section 552 of title 5, United States Code 

6 (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Informa7 tion Act). 

8 (2) Sections 552a of title 5, United States Code 

9 (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act). 

10 (3) Sections 552b of title 5, United States Code 

11 (relating to open meetings). 

12 (4) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 

13 U.S.C. App.). 

14 (b) AGENCY.—For purposes of each provision of law 

15 under subsection (b)— 

16 (1) the Smithsonian Institution shall be an 

17 agency; and 

18 (2) the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution 

19 shall be the head of the agency. 

20 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.— 

21 (1) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take 

22 effect on the date of enactment of this Act. 

23 (2) APPLICATION.—This section shall apply 

24 to— 

25 (A) all actions taken by the Board of Re26 gents of the Smithsonian Institution or any ofVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:33 May 11, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1786.IH H1786

jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1786 IH

1 ficer or employee of the Smithsonian Institution 

2 before, on, or after the date of enactment of 

3 this Act; 

4 (B) any record created before, on, or after 

5 that date; and 

6 (C) any meeting held before, on, or after 

7 that date. 

Æ 


jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
Exhibit
10.1


 


AMENDMENT
#2


 


TO
THE $550,000 PROMISSORY NOTE DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2018


 


The
parties agree that the $550,000 Fixed Convertible Promissory Note (the “Note”) by and between Indoor Harvest Corp.
(the “Borrower”) and Tangiers Global, LLC (the “Lender”) is hereby amended as follows:


 


	1.	Payment.
    The Lender shall make a payment to the Borrower $100,000 of Consideration, plus $10,000 in an OID, for a total additional
    principal sum of $110,000 under the Note on or before April 2, 2019. 
	 	 
	2.	Use
    of Proceeds. The Company covenants that it will within, one month(s) of the Effective Date of this Consideration, it shall
    use approximately $100,000 of the proceeds in the manner set forth below (the “Use of Proceeds”):
	 	 
	3.	Independent
    Transactions. The Borrower understands and agrees that the Note sets forth the terms for a series of independent transactions
    in which the Lender may elect to make a payment of Consideration to the Borrower with each payment of Consideration creating
    a separate obligation of the Borrower to the Lender with the terms set forth in the Note. Accordingly, the Maturity Date of
    each payment of Consideration, and the repayment terms for each payment of Consideration, are as set forth in the Note.
	 	 
	4.	The
    Borrower confirms that it has not undertaken any capital raise, whether through debt or equity, with any other party since
    the Effective Date of the Note.


 


ALL
OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE NOTE REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.


 


Please
indicate acceptance and approval of this amendment dated April 2, 2019 by signing below:


 


	/s/
    Daniel Weadock	 	/s/
    Justin Ederle
	Indoor
    Harvest Corp. 	 	Tangiers
    Global, LLC
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
    	Daniel
    Weadock	 	By:	Justin
    Ederle
	Its:
    	CEO	 	Its:
    	Managing
    Member
#### Ex parte FREEMAN.

No. A-719.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 29, 1945.

*7Milton K. Norton, Carl ,E. Broyles, and J. E. McLemore, Jr., all of Dallas, for relator David Freeman.

Earl McAlester, of Dallas, for Thelma C. Freeman.

SIMPSON, Justice.

David Freeman, the relator here, contends that he is illegally restrained under a contempt order of one of the district courts of Dallas County, Texas. The record shows that his divorced wife, Thelma Freeman, filed a motion in which she alleged the entry of an order against Freeman directing him to pay into the registry of the court a certain sum weekly for the support of their two minor children. She alleged further that Freeman had willfully and without excuse failed to make these payments, and prayed that he be held in contempt and imprisoned until he complied with the order. Mrs. Freeman undertook to verify this motion by an affidavit made before a notary public who was also one of her attorneys of record. On the basis of the facts averred in the motion, and after a hearing, the district court found Freeman guilty of contempt, assessed a fine of $100 against him, and ordered him confined for three days and until he had purged himself of contempt by making the payments as to which he was in default.

Freeman urges here that because of the relation of attorney and client existing between the notary public and Mrs. Freeman, the former was incompetent to take her affidavit, and, consequently, that no duly verified information or complaint, informing Freeman of the particulars of the accusation against him, had ever been filed. He contends further that without the lodging of such an information or complaint, the court was without jurisdiction to proceed.

The contention thus presented by the relator must be sustained. Precisely such a situation obtained in Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306, 311, where it was held that a complaint sworn to before the complainant’s attorney charging a defendant with contempt “was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.” We feel bound by that decision and the authorities it follows and adhere to the holding there announced.

 Since the jurisdiction of the trial court was not effectively invoked in this proceeding, its order adjudging the relator in contempt was void and may be collaterally questioned by this original application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 186 S.W.2d 225, and cases there cited.

We conclude the writ will properly lie. Accordingly, the relator is ordered released.
#### Nathaniel CLOUGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27598.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 11, 1955.

John W. L. Hicks, Houston, for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Thomas D. White, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Under an indictment charging murder with malice, appellant was convicted of murder without malice and his punishment *848assessed, at confinement in. the penitentiary for five years.

The appellant, twenty years of age, and the deceased and others all of teen-age went to a party. Appellant, not invited to the party, went along with Berryman, who was.

A dispute arose between Bracken, nephew of appellant, and James Coleman, the deceased.

The state’s testimony shows that appellant shot - the deceased through the head with a small-caliber pistol which Bracken handed to him while the dispute or trouble was in progress..

Appellant admitted having fired the shot but contended that he did so only to scare the deceased, with no intent to kill, and because the deceased and others who had joined the group were advancing upon him.

.The issues arising under the facts touching . a killing in . self-defense were pertinently submitted by the trial court to the 'jury. ■ : =

We are in accord with the contention of the state that the facts warrant the jury’s conclusion of guilt. Appellant’s contention to the contrary is overruled.

After his arrest, appellant was interrogated by the officers, during which interrogation and conversation he told them where the pistol with which the killing had been committed might be found. Appellant objected to this testimony because it was made while he was under arrest and without compliance with the provisions of Art. *727,*C.C.P.

We note that appellant testified that he delivered to the officers the gun with which he admitted having shot the deceased.

Having, testified to facts to which he was objecting, appellant cannot be heard to complain. Johnson v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 293, 42 S.W.2d 421.

Complaint is made of the action of the court in permitting the state to call in' rebuttal a witness to the killing, over appellant’s objection that the witness should have been called to testify upon the presentation of the state’s case in chief.

This was a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Gallegos v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 508, 215 S.W.2d 344; 42 Tex.Jur. 98, Sec. *72.*No abuse of that discretion1 is here shown.

Inasmuch as appellant preserved no exceptions or objections to the charge of the court, we are not authorized to consider his contention that a charge of specific intent to kill should have been given.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
#### Bernard N. BAILEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Nos. 27462-27468.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 23, 1955.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Dan E. Walton, Dist. Atty., Eugene Brady, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has filed his affidavit stating that he desires to' have his appeal in each of the above cases dismissed.

Accordingly, the appeal in each of these cases is dismissed.