IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

PIMPAKTRA A. RUST, individually

and in her capacity as a co-manager of

Goodenow LLC,

 Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

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v.

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)

C.A. No. 2020-0762-SG

VINA ELISE RUST and CHAKDHARI 

ANISSA RUST, individually and in their 

capacity as co-managers of Goodenow, 

LLC,

 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: January 25, 2023

Date Decided: April 27, 2023

Sean J. Bellew of BELLEW LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Pimpaktra A. Rust.

Kenneth J. Nachbar, Lauren K. Neal, and Michael J. Slobom, Jr. of MORRIS, 

NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for 

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs Vina Elise Rust and Chakdhari Anissa Rust.

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
1

Before me is a motion to enforce a contract. The contract in question 

purports to settle all issues among sisters in litigation over their father’s estate, 

which includes, in part, real property held in trust. The disputes among the parties

have occupied the attention of multiple courts in multiple jurisdictions. The 

contract is embodied in a document denominated “Memorandum of Settlement.” 

That document provides that it represents a final settlement of all issues. The 

parties explicitly agree that their contract can be enforced by a court. It leaves the 

parties to agree to a more formal settlement document, which would embody a 

mutual release of claims and resolve some issues not provided for in the 

Memorandum of Settlement. According to the Plaintiff, try as she might, she has 

been unable to resolve these remaining issues. Accordingly, and notwithstanding 

the explicit contractual language, she contends that there was no meeting of the 

minds, and thus the settlement contract is unenforceable. The Defendants, her 

sisters, characterize this as an attempt to rely on certain non-material remaining 

issues as a tool to leverage release from the settlement; an attempt reflecting not 

unresolved material issues, but instead accommodation of the Plaintiff’s case of 

settler’s remorse.

Because I find from the plain language of the contract that all material issues

were compromised and settled, the motion to enforce must be granted; with that 
2

outcome in mind, the parties should negotiate any remaining, non-material issues 

in good faith. My reasoning is below.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Pimpaktra Rust (“Pim”) and the Defendants Vina Rust (“Vina”) and 

Chakdhari Rust (“Anissa”) are the daughters of Richard Rust (“Richard”).1 Philip 

Rust (“Philip”), Richard’s brother, created a revokable trust (the “Trust”), which he 

funded with real property and other valuables.2 The terms of the Trust granted 

Richard a lifetime interest in certain properties.

3

 The terms of the Trust also 

provided that, unless Richard directed otherwise, upon Richard’s death the property

in the Trust was to pass to Richard’s daughters in equal shares.4

Philip, the Trust’s settlor, died in 2010.

5

 At that time, Wilmington Trust 

Company (“Wilmington”) served as the Trust’s trustee.6 At Wilmington’s

insistence, Richard authorized Wilmington to organize a Delaware limited liability 

company to house the Trust’s real estate assets.7 In response, Goodenow LLC, a 

1 Pl.’s Verified Am. and Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 10–12, 51, Dkt. No. 47. For the sake of clarity, I follow 

the parties’ practice regarding names. No disrespect is intended. 

2

Id. at ¶¶ 3, 17–18, 20–21, 27.

3

Id. at ¶ 21.

4

Id. at ¶ 24.

5

Id. at ¶ 18.

6

Id. at ¶ 17.

7

Id. at ¶¶ 27–28; Pl. Pimpaktra A. Rust’s Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 113. 
3

Delaware limited liability company was organized.

8

 Wilmington transferred the 

Trust’s property to Goodenow and was originally the LLC’s sole member.9 On June

17, 2016, Bryn Mawr Trust Company of Delaware (“Bryn Mawr” or the “Trustee”), 

a Delaware limited purpose trust company, replaced Wilmington as trustee and sole 

member of the LLC.

10

 Richard passed away on September 23, 2019, without 

appointing beneficiaries to receive the corpus, which accordingly was to pass to his 

daughters.

11 Much litigation has followed the bestowing of this and other bounty

from Richard to these sisters.

Pim filed this action (the “Delaware Action”) on September 4, 2020, “seeking 

the dissolution of Goodenow, and alleging, inter alia, that the transfer of 

membership interests in Goodenow to Plaintiff, in lieu of an actual distribution of 

the real estate interests currently titled in the name of Goodenow, would yield an 

inequitable result, and would violate both the Trust Agreement, and the testamentary 

intent of Philip and Richard.”

12

 Pim brought her action against Vina and Anissa in 

their individual capacities and as managers of Goodenow, and against Bryn Mawr 

as trustee.13

8 Am. and Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 28.

9 Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 6.

10 Am. and Suppl. Compl. ¶ 49. 

11 Id. at ¶¶ 25, 50.

12 See Verified Compl. for Breach of Contract, Dkt. No. 1; Pl.’s Answer to Defs.’ Opening Br.

Supp. Mot. Enforce Settlement 8, Dkt. No. 145 (citing Am. and Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 86–87, 96–97).

13 Compl. 1 (Preliminary Statement).
4

On September 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a partition action in Jackson County 

North Carolina (the “North Carolina Action”).14 Among other causes of action, the 

North Carolina Action sought partition of estate property not held by Goodenow.15 

On July 26, 2021, Pim filed an amended complaint in this Court.16 The 

amended complaint named Vina, Anissa, and Bryn Mawr as defendants.17

Pim filed a third action in the Superior Court of Thomas County Georgia on 

July 1, 2021, which was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle 

district of Georgia on October 19, 2021 (the “Georgia Action”).

18 The Georgia 

action sought a declaratory judgment regarding Pim’s ownership and rights in Trust 

property located in Georgia.19 

On August 17, 2021, the court in the North Carolina Action ordered the parties 

to engage in mediation pursuant to North Carolina General Statute § 7A-38-3B.20 

The ordered mediation took place on January 4, 2022.

21 Frank Goldsmith, a member 

of the North Carolina State Bar, served as the mediator for the session which was

14 Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 18.

15 Id.

16 See Am. and Suppl. Compl.

17 Id. at 1 (Preliminary Statement). 

18 Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 19; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 9. These two 

sources provide different dates for the initiation of the Georgia Action, July 1, 2021 and August 

11, 2021 respectively. 

19 Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 19; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 9; see Am. and 

Suppl. Compl. ¶ 56.

20 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 10.

21 Am. Counterclaims Against Pimpaktra A. Rust Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 109.
5

conducted by video conference.22 At the conclusion of mediation, the parties signed 

the Memorandum of Settlement (the “MOS”).23 

On its face, the MOS resolved the issues among the parties.24 Its first line 

reads “The parties agree that all issues between them are resolved on the following 

terms.”

25 The parties to the MOS stipulated therein that “a Court may enforce this 

agreement by entering judgment based upon [its] terms.”26 The MOS embodied

compromises from both sides in the litigation. Among the MOS’s terms, Pim was 

slated to receive properties in New Hampshire,

27 North Carolina28 and Georgia,29

certain tangible personal property,30 a 1/3rd share of certain bullion and silver bars,31

$4,000,000 cash,32 and an easement to use an existing driveway on a particular 

parcel.33 Pim was to enter into a lease with the caretaker of one of the New 

Hampshire properties and convey three lots of her choosing to him.34 All property, 

real or otherwise, that was not to be conveyed to Pim under the agreement was to go 

22 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 11.

23 Am. Counterclaims Ex. 1.

24 Id. at Ex.1, at 1.

25 Id. 

26 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 16.

27 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 1.

28 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 2.

29 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 3.

30 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 4.

31 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 5.

32 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 8.

33 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 14.

34 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 6.
6

to Vina, Anissa, and Goodenow.35 Upon the resolution of other litigation involving 

a party not present here, Pim was also to resign as co-executrix of Richard’s estate 

and trustee of a certain trust.36 The parties were to work together to resolve that 

other litigation,37 to close Richard’s estate,38 and to execute a “mutually acceptable 

formal final settlement, including a mutual release of all claims, and such other 

documents, not inconsistent with the terms of” the MOS.39

The parties jointly requested a stay of the Georgia Action on January 11, 

2022.

40

 That joint motion stated that they “participated in mediation in a separate 

case in North Carolina and reached a tentative settlement agreement, but several 

issues remain to be worked out.”41 

On January 28, 2022, in response to an inquiry from this Court, Pim’s counsel 

stated that a “settlement in principle” had been reached and that the parties were 

35 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 5, 7.

36 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 8.

37 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 12.

38 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 9.

39 Id. at Ex. 1, at ¶ 10.

40 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 27. 

41 Id. at Ex. F.
7

“working to finalize the settlement.”42 Plaintiff further requested that pending 

motions be held in abeyance.43

Following the execution of the MOS, the parties tried to produce a formal 

settlement. Vina and Anissa’s counsel sent a draft formal settlement to Pim’s 

counsel in late January 2022.

44

 Pim’s counsel marked up that draft and returned it 

in February 2022.45

The court in the Georgia Action required a joint status report on March 1, 

2022, and the parties duly complied.46 It reads, “While the case has been stayed, the 

parties have continued settlement negotiations but have not reached an agreement to 

fully settle and resolve this litigation. The parties are still in the midst of settlement 

discussions and hope to reach a resolution soon.”47

42 Am. Counterclaims ¶ 26; Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 26. In pertinent part, the email 

reads “The plaintiff has reached a settlement in principle with defendants Vina and Anissa Rust 

and the parties are working to finalize the settlement. I don’t expect we will need argument on 

either motion. Could the parties let you know if that changes, but otherwise hold those motions in 

abeyance?” Def.’s Opening Br. Supp. Mot. to Enforce Settlement 6, Dkt. No. 121.

43 See Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 26 (“The allegation in Paragraph 26 purports to 

characterize a January 28, 2022 email, a document that speaks for itself, to which Plaintiff refers 

for its true and correct contents.”).

44 Am. Counterclaims ¶ 27; Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 27; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce 

Settlement 13, Ex. D.

45 Am. Counterclaims ¶ 28; Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 28; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce 

Settlement 13, Ex. D.

46 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. G.

47 Id.
8

Vina and Anissa’s counsel completed further markups and returned the 

proposed formal settlement to Pim’s counsel in March 2022.48 Negotiations stalled, 

and no further drafts were exchanged. On March 25, 2022, in a joint status report to 

the court in the Georgia Action, the parties stated that they had been “unable to agree 

to the material terms of a settlement agreement. In a final good faith effort to resolve 

their disputes and seek to reach a resolution, the parties intend to reconvene before 

the mediator.”49 

On April 4, 2022, the parties did reconvene with the mediator.50 That 

mediation concluded with several issues still outstanding.51 The mediator sent a

“brief summary of the points discussed,” but noted that the summary was imperfect 

and the parties were free to supplement it.52 Pim’s counsel took the opportunity to 

do so by email.

53

 Among the issues discussed in mediation were access to real 

property for the purposes of appraisal, a date certain for title opinions, the New 

Hampshire caretaker’s lease, the trustee’s attorney’s fees, the level of the trustee’s 

involvement in any conveyances that were to take place, and the language of the 

release.

54

48 Am. Counterclaims ¶ 28; Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 28; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce 

Settlement 13, Ex. D.

49 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. H.

50 Id. at 16.

51 Id. at 29; Opening Br. Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. 2. 

52 Opening Br. Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. 2; See Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 29.

53 Opening Br. Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. 2; See Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 29.

54 Opening Br. Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. 2.
9

Pim engaged new counsel and further discussions ensued. However, these 

discussions proved fruitless, and on August 23, 2022, Pim wrote,

Obviously, we do not have a settlement. I have put suggestions in 

writing to you four times, to no avail. If you want to put something in 

writing that you think is reasonable, I’d be more than happy to review 

it.55 

Bryn Mawr moved to dismiss,56 and on September 7, 2022, the parties 

stipulated to Bryn Mawr’s dismissal without prejudice from this action.57 I granted 

Bryn Mawr’s dismissal without prejudice on September 8, 2022.58

Vina and Anissa filed their Amended Counterclaims on September 30, 2022.59 

On November 11, 2022, Vina and Anissa filed their Motion to Enforce Settlement

and their opening brief in support thereof.60 That same day, Pim filed her Motion 

for Leave to File Second Verified Amended and Supplemented Complaint, which 

purported to add Bryn Mawr as a defendant.

61

 Bryn Mawr opposed Pim’s motion

and joined Defendants’ motion and briefing thereon.

62

55 Am. Counterclaims ¶ 33, Ex. 2; Reply to Defs.’ Am. Counterclaims ¶ 33.

56 BMTDE’s Mot. to be Removed and for J. on the Pleadings Pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 

12(c), Dkt. No. 75. 

57 Stip. and Prop. Order Re. Status of Bryn Mawr Trust Co. of Del., Dkt. No. 99.

58 Order Granting Stip. Re. Status of Bryn Mawr Trust Co. of Del, Dkt. No. 101.

59 See Amended Counterclaims.

60 See Mot. Enforce Settlement; see Opening Br. Mot. Enforce Settlement.

61 Pl’s Mot. for Leave to File Ver. Second Am. and Supplemented Compl., Dkt. No. 122. 

62 Bryn Mawr Trust Company of Delaware’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Leave to File Second Verified 

Am. and Supplemented Compl., Dkt. No. 144; Bryn Mawr Trust Company of Delaware’s Joinder 

to Mot. to Enforce Settlement, Dkt. No. 138.
10

Briefing on both the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ motions concluded 

January 13, 2023.63 I held oral argument on both motions on January 25, 2023, and

I consider the matter fully submitted as of that date.64

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

By seeking to enforce the settlement agreement, Defendants’ motion sought 

the final relief requested in their amended counterclaims.65 The procedural posture 

of the Defendants’ motion was that of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

Because the matter involves what I find to be unambiguous contractual language, 

that standard is appropriate.66 

In support of their positions on the Defendants’ motion, however, both parties 

submitted matters outside the pleadings. Plaintiffs, in opposition to the Defendants’ 

motion, submitted several exhibits.67 Defendants, in support of their motion and 

63 See Pl’s Reply Further Supp. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Verified Am. and 

Supplemental Compl., Dkt. No. 147; see Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Enforce Settlement, Dkt. 

No. 148.

64 See Judicial Action Form, Dkt. No. 156.

65 See Am. Counterclaims 19 (Prayer for Relief). 

66 See Lillis v. AT & T Corp., 904 A.2d 325, 329–30 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“As this court has noted 

previously, judgment on the pleadings . . . is a proper framework for enforcing unambiguous 

contracts because there is no need to resolve material disputes of fact.”) (internal quotations 

omitted).

67 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. A–J. 
11

their reply brief, submitted the affidavit of Robert Piliero.68 In accordance with Rule 

12(c), I am excluding such evidence in consideration of the contractual issues before 

me.

69

“This Court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when there are 

no material issues of fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

70

 

I view the facts pled and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party.71

B. Estoppel/Waiver 

Before turning to an examination of the contract under the standard set out 

above, I first address a matter that does require examination of submissions outside 

the pleadings. The Plaintiff points to various submissions of counsel in the several 

actions involved, in an attempt to establish that the Defendants are estopped from 

maintaining that the MOS is enforceable. I find this assertion unsupported by the 

record that the Plaintiff has provided. 

68 Aff. Robert Piliero Supp. Defs.’ Reply Br. Supp. Their Mot. Enforce Settlement, Dkt. No. 149.

69 Ct. Ch. R. 12(c) (“If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings 

are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 

judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 

opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”).

70 ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds Am., Inc., 2017 WL 5903355, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017).

71 Examen, Inc. v. VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996, 873 A.2d 318, 321–22 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 

871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
12

The gravamen of Pim’s submissions is that her sisters represented to various 

courts that a final settlement had not been reached, and thus that they waived the 

right to enforce the MOS or are judicially estopped from pursuit of rights under the 

MOS. In Georgia, counsel related that they were still pursuing settlement but had 

not reached such; other submissions were similar. Other counsel for the same parties 

stated to other courts that they had a settlement in principle. This was sloppy 

shorthand, not a knowing waiver of rights or statement to a court that warrants an 

estoppel.72 Accordingly, this matter will turn on contract principals, based on the 

language of the parties’ agreement in the MOS.

72 “‘[J]udicial estoppel operates only where the litigant’s [present position] contradicts another 

position that the litigant previously took and that the Court was successfully induced to adopt in a 

judicial ruling.’” Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859–60 (Del. 2008) (emphasis 

in original) (quoting Siegman v. Palomar Med. Techs., Inc., 1998 WL 409352, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 

13, 1998)). “Although not a formulaic exercise, a court, in applying the principles of judicial 

estoppel, should consider, among other possible factors, the following: First, a party’s later 

position must be clear and inconsistent with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire 

whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so 

that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the 

perception that either the first or the second court was misled . . . . A third consideration is whether 

the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an 

unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Capaldi v. Richards, 2006 WL 3742603, 

at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2006) (internal quotation omitted). 

“Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” AeroGlobal Capital 

Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 

“A contractual requirement or condition may be waived where (1) there is a requirement or 

condition to be waived, (2) the waiving party must know of the requirement or condition, and (3) 

the waiving party must intend to waive that requirement or condition.” AeroGlobal, 871 A.2d at 

444.
13

C. The Settlement is Enforceable Under Either Delaware or North Carolina 

Law

Delaware follows the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship test 

when analyzing choice of law in contract disputes.73 Under that test, this Court must 

ask three preliminary questions i) did the parties make an effective choice of law in 

their contract, ii) if not, is there an actual conflict between the laws of the different 

states that each party favors, and iii) if so, which state has the most significant 

relationship.74

Here, the MOS lacks a choice of law provision.75 Plaintiff favors the law of 

North Carolina, under which she claims there was no binding agreement.76 

Defendant favors the law of Delaware but argues that under either state’s law the 

MOS is enforceable.77 Under the laws of both states, settlement agreements, such 

as the MOS, are interpreted using the general principles of contract law.

78

 These 

principles require a meeting of the minds for a valid contract to have been formed.79 

73 Deuley v. DynCorp Intern., Inc., 8 A.3d 1156, 1160 (Del. 2010).

74 Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Chemtura Corp., 160 A.3d 457, 464 (Del. 2017).

75 See Am. Counterclaims Ex. 1.

76 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 17–34.

77 Defs.’ Reply Mot. Enforce Settlement 15–33.

78 Compare Schwartz v. Chase, 2010 WL 2601608, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2010) (“Settlement 

Agreements are contracts and Delaware courts examine them under well-established law 

surrounding contract interpretation”) with Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001) 

(“This Court has previously stated that compromise agreements, such as the mediated settlement 

agreement reached by the parties in this case, are governed by general principles of contract law.”).

79 Compare Kotler v. Shipman Associates, LLC, 2019 WL 4025634, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 

2019), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. 2019) (“To form an enforceable contract, the parties must have 

a meeting of the minds on all essential terms.”) with Chappell, 548 S.E.2d at 500 (“For an 
14

Intent is objectively, not subjectively, determined based upon the parties’ actions at 

the time of the alleged contracting.80 In both jurisdictions, where the facts show no 

agreement on a material term, there is no contract.81 In other words, I do not need 

to make a choice of law, because the laws of these jurisdictions are not in conflict.

Plaintiff contends that the MOS is unenforceable because it lacked material 

terms.82 Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the parties left the release language to 

be provided later, and that the failure to agree to the explicit language for the release

renders the MOS unenforceable.

83 In support of that proposition, the Plaintiff cites 

to Chappell v. Roth.

84

 According to the Plaintiff, under North Carolina law as 

elucidated by its Supreme Court in Chappell, unless a final form of release is agreed 

to in a settlement agreement, it is, per se, unenforceable. This is not the law in 

agreement to constitute a valid contract, the parties’ minds must meet as to all the terms.”) (internal 

quotation omitted).

80 Compare Black Horse Capital, LP v. Xstelos Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL 5025926, at *2 (Del. Ch. 

Sept. 30, 2014) (“Whether both of the parties manifested an intent to be bound is to be determined 

objectively based upon their expressed words and deeds as manifested at the time rather than by 

their after-the-fact professed subjective intent.”) (internal quotation omitted) with Se. Caissons, 

LLC v. Choate Const. Co., 784 S.E.2d 650, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“If mutual assent is 

purportedly manifested in a written instrument but a question arises as to whether there was a 

genuine meeting of the minds, the court must first examine the written instrument to ascertain the 

parties’ true intentions.”) (internal quotation omitted).

81 Compare Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1230 (Del. 2018) (“[A]ll 

essential or material terms must be agreed upon before a court can find that the parties intended to 

be bound by it and, thus, enforce an agreement as a binding contract.”) with Creech v. Melnik, 495 

S.E.2d 907, 912 (N.C. 1998) (“When there has been no meeting of the minds on the essentials of 

an agreement, no contract results.”).

82 Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 22–24.

83 Id. at 23.

84 548 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2001).
15

Delaware; “[a] settlement agreement is enforceable if it contains all essential terms, 

even though it expressly leaves other matters for future negotiation.”85 On review 

of Chappell, I cannot read it as broadly as does the Plaintiff, and I conclude it does 

not conflict with Delaware law.

In Chappell, a plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident, had 

participated in a court-ordered mediation with the defendant driver and his insurance 

carrier.

86

 The outcome of that mediation was a settlement agreement with the 

following terms and only the following terms: “‘Defendant will pay $20,000 within 

[two] weeks of date of settlement in exchange for voluntary dismissal (with 

prejudice) and full and complete release, mutually agreeable to both parties.’”87 The 

parties were ultimately unable to agree on the terms of the release, and the plaintiff 

sought to enforce the settlement.88 In affirming the trial court, the North Carolina 

Supreme Court stated that the parties had not reached an enforceable settlement 

because the release was material as a part of the consideration, “the parties failed to 

agree as to the terms of the release, and the settlement agreement did not establish a 

method by which to settle the terms of the release.”89

85 Loppert v. WindsorTech, Inc., 865 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 867 A.2d 903 (Del. 

2005).

86 548 S.E.2d at 499.

87 Id. at 499–500.

88 Id. at 500.

89 Id.
16

The Chappell Court begins its analysis by noting that contract principles apply 

to settlement agreements, and that no contract “results ‘[w]hen there has been no 

meeting of the minds on the essentials of an agreement.’”90 Chappell then goes on 

to determine that in the settlement agreement under review, the dispute over the 

terms of the release was material. Chappell turns on the arcana of Tarheel insurance 

law.91 The settlement agreement there had a single provision, which formed the 

entirety of the consideration to be exchanged.92 The “get” by the plaintiff was cash, 

the “give” was the solely the release. The reasoning in Chappell is not explicit, and 

understanding the case, I find, involves a close review of the majority and dissenting 

opinions.93 At issue, as I understand, was whether the release should include a “holdharmless” provision protecting the tortfeasor’s insurer from liens potentially 

assertable by those who provided healthcare to the plaintiff.94 If the release included 

a hold-harmless provision, presumably, the plaintiff would be subject to claw-back 

rights to the extent liens were imposed on the defendant insurer. Accordingly, the 

value of plaintiff’s cash “get” would be reduced. Without the hold-harmless 

provision, conversely, the value of the “give”—the release—was materially 

90 Id. at 500 (quoting Creech v. Melnik, 495 S.E. 2d 907, 912 (1998)) (emphasis added).

91 See Charlotte Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. First of Georgia Insurance Co., 455 S.E. 2d 

655 (finding that holder of lien from victim of accident may enforce the lien against tortfeasor’s 

insurer).

92 See Shallotte Partners, LLC v. Berkadia Commercial Mortgage, LLC, 821 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 2018) (examining Chappell, 548 S.E.2d at 499–500).

93 See Chappell, 548 S.E.2d at 501 (Edmunds, J., dissenting).

94 See id. 
17

diminished to the insurer defendant. Thus, the issue was material to the settlement, 

and absent agreement to this essential term, the settlement was unenforceable.

Here, by contrast, the “give” and the “get” were the method of division of the 

properties held in trust among all the parties, as well as other issues involving 

Richard’s bounty to his children. The release of claims ran in both directions and 

formed only a portion of the consideration to be exchanged.95 The parties agreed to 

“execute a mutually acceptable formal final settlement agreement, including a 

mutual release of all claims, and such other documents, not inconsistent with the 

terms of this Memorandum, as shall be necessary or convenient to furthering the 

purposes of the settlement, including releases, deeds, tax filings, contracts, or other 

documents.”96 The wording of that final settlement was yet to be drafted, but the 

contents of the document were sufficiently definite to be enforceable. “[A] mutual 

release of all claims” releases all claims held by the parties against one another.97 

No claim, known or unknown, would survive beyond the release98 and no further 

95 See Shallotte Partners, 821 S.E.2d at *4 (distinguishing Chappell on the same grounds).

96 Am. Counterclaims Ex. 1, at ¶ 10.

97 Compare Hob Tea Room v. Miller, 89 A.2d 851, 856 (Del. 1952) with Financial Services of 

Raleigh, Inc. v. Barefoot, 594 S.E.2d 37, 43 (N.C. App. 2004).

98 Compare Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Stone Eng’g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 336–37 (Del. 2012) 

(finding “merit to the contention that parties entering into a general release are chargeable with 

notice that any uncertainty with respect to the contours of the dispute . . . is resolved through the 

release.”) (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Florida Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457, 

460–61 (Del. 1999)) with Fin. Servs. of Raleigh, Inc. v. Barefoot, 594 S.E.2d 37, 43 (N.C. Ct. App. 

2004) (“As a result, when the parties stated that they were releasing “all claims of any kind,” we 

must construe the release to mean precisely that: an intent to release all claims of any kind in 

existence.”).
18

negotiation of material terms was required because all claims were to be released. 

Here, by contrast to Chappell, the Plaintiff has been unable to point to a material 

disagreement about the terms of the release; the parties’ disagreement is limited to 

whether the appropriate term was a release of claims “known and unknown” (per 

Defendants) or a release of claims which “any Party had or now has” (per Plaintiff),

99

which is not a material disagreement in light of the settlement.100

In short, I conclude that the law of Delaware and North Carolina is the same. 

If the terms of a release have not been agreed to, and those terms are material to the 

agreement, the agreement as a matter of contract law is unenforceable.101 This was 

the case in Chappell; it is not the case here. The fact that an otherwise complete 

settlement agreement contemplates the formal drafting of a customary release clause 

does not allow a party to walk away from the agreement by refusing to agree to a 

release. Where any dispute over the form of release is not material, that dispute is 

not a magic wand to accommodate settler’s remorse.

99 Oral Arg. Def.’ Mot. Enforce Settlement Agreement and Pl.’s Mot. Amend 30:13–23, 68:2–

69:21, Dkt. No. 159; Pl.’s Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement Ex. D, at 6, 15, 26 (pages numbered 

sequentially).

100 To the extent the Plaintiff argues that her language does not embody “unknown” claims, a 

release of claims a party “had or now has” does not exclude unknown claims; in any event, the 

language in the MOS—agreeing to release “all claims,” likewise encompasses unknown claims.

101 This is consistent with how the lower courts in North Carolina have applied Chappell. See e.g.

Smith v. Young Moving & Storage, Inc., 606 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (enforcing an a 

settlement despite the absence of a mutual release because there was a meeting of the minds as to 

all of the settlement’s material terms); DeCristoforo v. Givens, 2015 WL 3472999, at *2 (N.C. 

Super. May 29, 2015) (holding that a settlement agreement was sufficiently definite because the 

parties reached “‘a full and final agreement on all issues’” and the agreement was not conditioned 

on the language of the release).
19

Plaintiff makes similar, albeit cursory, “meeting of the minds” arguments for 

other provisions within the MOS. Specifically, she touches upon the agreement to 

cooperate in the closure of Richard Rust’s estate, the agreement to cooperate in good 

faith towards the resolution of the Amy Chase litigation102 and preservation of trust 

assets, the distribution of property, and the required cooperation of Bryn Mawr. 

None of these supposed lacunae in the contract embody issues material to the parties’ 

settlement. That conclusion is evidenced by the MOS’s provision that it resolves 

“all issues” and is specifically enforceable. 

Though the Plaintiff would have me examine the parties’ post contracting 

conduct, I need not do so because the MOS is not ambiguous.103 Based on the plain 

language of the MOS, it is enforceable. The parties explicitly agreed that they had 

settled all issues, and that specific enforcement by a court was agreed to. The nonmaterial issues remaining are best addressed by the parties by negotiation or 

mediation. If that is unavailing, non-material terms may be supplied by this Court.104

102 The Amy Chase litigation is tangential to this action and involves the sisters’ stepmother. Pl.’s 

Answer Mot. Enforce Settlement 12.

103 Compare GMG Capital Investments, LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 

780 (Del. 2012) with Marina Food Associates, Inc. v. Marina Rest., Inc., 394 S.E.2d 824, 830 

(N.C. Ct. App. 1990).

104 See Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005) (“This Court has 

recognized ‘the occasional necessity’ of implying contract terms to ensure the parties’ ‘reasonable 

expectations’ are fulfilled.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (“When the parties 

to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is 

essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the 

circumstances is supplied by the court”).
20

D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Her Complaint

Bryn Mawr opposes the Plaintiff’s motion to amend on the grounds that the 

amendment would prejudice Bryn Mawr and would be futile.

105

 Bryn Mawr argues 

that prejudice arises from delay and the fact that Bryn Mawr was dismissed from the 

litigation without prejudice.

106

Amendments to pleadings are liberally granted and delay alone is an 

insufficient ground to deny amendment.107 Bryn Mawr states that prejudice arises 

from the need to participate in “[full] discovery” after amendment.108 I fail to see 

the prejudice here given that Bryn Mawr agreed to participate in discovery after its 

dismissal.109 Bryn Mawr makes other arguments, as well.

However, it is unclear to me whether, in light of my decision that the 

Memorandum of Settlement is enforceable, the request to amend is still before me. 

The Plaintiff should inform me if she wishes to proceed, and I will issue a decision 

promptly.

105 Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. 8–9.

106 Id. at 10–13.

107 Wolf v. Magness Const. Co., 1996 WL 361502, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1996).

108 Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl. 13.

109 Order Regarding Status of Bryn Mawr Trust Company of Delaware ¶ 4 (“Bryn Mawr shall 

participate in discovery to the same extent as a party to this action, including with respect to 

responding to interrogatories or other forms of discovery only available as to parties.”).
21

III. CONCLUSION

The Defendants’ Motion to Enforce is granted, subject to the provision of nonmaterial terms by the parties or the Court. The Motion to Amend is deferred 

consonant with my decision, above. The parties should provide an appropriate form 

of order.