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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ERNEST FRANCIS

(SC 20353)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted of murder, appealed to the Appellate

Court from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal

sentence. Prior to sentencing, the sentencing court was provided with

a criminal history report and a presentence investigation report, which

included a summary of the defendant’s prior convictions of assault and

drug offenses. In his motion to correct, the defendant claimed that the

sentencing court relied on materially inaccurate information concerning

his criminal history and the circumstances of the underlying offense.

Specifically, the defendant claimed that the presentence investigation

report incorrectly indicated that he had been convicted of conspiracy

to sell cocaine, rather than conspiracy to possess cocaine, and that he

was convicted of assault in the second degree of an elderly person,

rather than assault in the third degree. The defendant also claimed that

the sentencing court mistakenly believed that he ‘‘grazed’’ the victim

before stabbing him. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion,

concluding that there was no evidence that the sentencing court relied

on inaccurate information, that the court’s statement that the defendant

‘‘grazed’’ the victim was supported by the record, and that, even if that

statement was inaccurate, the court did not rely on the inaccuracy. The

Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct,

and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this

court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial

court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion

to correct an illegal sentence:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the sentencing court

had substantially relied on inaccurate information when imposing his

sentence: the defendant’s claim was belied by the record because, prior

to sentencing, the prosecutor informed the sentencing court of the error

in the presentence investigation report, the court correctly noted that

the defendant’s assault conviction was for assault in the third degree,

and nothing in the record suggested that the court gave explicit attention

to the inaccurate characterization of the defendant’s assault conviction

or that it considered the notation in the criminal history report incorrectly identifying the assault victim as elderly; moreover, although the

sentencing court incorrectly referred to the defendant’s conspiracy conviction as a conviction for conspiracy to sell cocaine, the court did not

substantially rely on the precise nature of the conspiracy charge when

imposing the defendant’s sentence, as the court’s recitation of the defendant’s criminal history was used only to support the observation that

the defendant had been convicted of three felony offenses before he

had reached the age of nineteen.

2. There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the sentencing court

substantially relied on a false recollection of how the victim died when

imposing the defendant’s sentence: the court’s statement that the defendant had ‘‘grazed’’ the victim was not materially inaccurate because,

although a medical examiner testified that he observed a single stab

wound on the victim’s chest, eyewitnesses testified that the defendant

had made several stabbing motions toward the victim before inflicting

the fatal blow; moreover, the court’s primary focus was on the severity

and location of the fatal wound rather than the exact number of times

the defendant stabbed the victim.

Argued October 15, 2020—officially released April 16, 2021*

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury
before Miano, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from

which the defendant appealed to this court, which

affirmed the trial court’s judgment; thereafter, the court,

Dewey, J., denied the defendant’s motion to correct

an illegal sentence, and the defendant appealed to the

Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Conway, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s decision; subsequently, the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Robert L. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on

the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel,

for the appellant (defendant).

Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, former state’s

attorney, Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, and Elizabeth S. Tanaka, former assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KAHN, J. The defendant, Ernest Francis, appeals

from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which

affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct

an illegal sentence. See State v. Francis, 191 Conn. App.

101, 110, 213 A.3d 536 (2019). In the present appeal,

the defendant claims that the trial court improperly

denied that motion because the sentencing court substantially relied on materially inaccurate information.1

Specifically, the defendant claims that his sentence was

based on inaccurate information concerning both (1)

his criminal history, and (2) the particular manner in

which he committed the underlying criminal offense.

We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of

the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Following a jury trial, the defendant

was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-54a (a). Id., 103. Prior to the defendant’s sentencing, the sentencing court was provided with a criminal

history report2 and a presentence investigation report

(PSI report). The PSI report indicated that the defendant had convictions arising out of three separate cases:

(1) possession of narcotics with an offense date of June

29, 1989, (2) conspiracy to sell cocaine with an offense

date of August 9, 1989,3 and (3) assault in the second

degree with an offense date of September 25, 1989.4

The PSI report included a brief summary of the underlying facts related to the defendant’s prior convictions of

possession of narcotics and assault. A notation in the

criminal history report indicated that the victim of the

assault was over the age of sixty.

At sentencing, the prosecutor noted that there were

some discrepancies between the defendant’s prior criminal history and the information contained in the PSI

report. Regarding the defendant’s apparent conviction

for conspiracy to sell cocaine, the prosecutor stated

that the case involved ‘‘an undercover buy in which the

defendant was the driver of a vehicle out of which the

seller exited . . . .’’ The prosecutor stated that,

although the defendant was charged with ‘‘conspiracy

to commit sale of narcotics,’’ there was ‘‘some question

about what [crimes the defendant] was actually convicted of . . . [because] [t]he docket numbers and the

statute numbers differ from the name of the charge.’’5

The prosecutor went on to state that the ‘‘gravamen of

the [underlying] offense was that [the defendant] was

involved in a sale situation.’’

The prosecutor also informed the sentencing court

that the defendant had been convicted of assault in the

third degree, not assault in the second degree, as the

PSI report indicated. The sentencing court asked the

prosecutor if the assault conviction ‘‘concern[ed] hitting

another person with a lead pipe,’’ as the PSI report
suggested. The prosecutor responded in the affirmative.

Explaining the discrepancy between the PSI report and

the defendant’s actual record, the prosecutor stated

that ‘‘it wasn’t a serious injury, and I think that’s part

of the reason that the case was later reduced to [an]

assault in the third degree.’’

After hearing from, among others, the defendant’s

fiance ́e and brother, the sentencing court discussed the

reasoning for its sentence. The sentencing court began

by noting that ‘‘[t]here are several areas of inquiry the

court must scrutinize in order to impose what it perceives to be a just sentence; the first is the nature of

the offense; the second is the record, if any, of the

defendant; the third is the background of the defendant;

and the fourth is the impact on the victim’s family.’’

As for the nature of the offense, the sentencing court

recounted the events leading up to the defendant’s murder of the victim. While summarizing the relevant facts,

the sentencing court remarked that, prior to inflicting

the fatal knife wound, ‘‘the defendant raised his right

hand with the knife and with a downward thrust apparently grazed the victim.’’ The sentencing court also

noted that the victim’s death was a tragedy for his

family, and remarked that ‘‘the value of human life is

immeasurable . . . .’’

Regarding the defendant’s criminal record, the sentencing court stated: ‘‘Here is a young man that at age

sixteen was convicted of possession of narcotics; at

age seventeen was convicted of conspiracy to sell

cocaine; at age seventeen, assault in the third degree;

and now murder, and he’s only nineteen years old. Three

felony convictions at age nineteen.’’ After discussing

positive aspects of the defendant’s background, including the defendant’s family and employment history, the

sentencing court made the following statement: ‘‘The

purposes of sentencing are punishment, deterrence,

rehabilitation. Deterrence may be illusory. I don’t know

if this case will be reported or be in the print media or

not. I don’t know. I think that the media should have

more of a civic responsibility. This is an aside. Oftentimes, we’re quick to print articles critical of the courts,

quick to print articles concerning tragedies that occur

on the streets, but yet not so quick to report dispositions

in the courts. And I think that’s important, not for Mr.

Francis or the Mr. Francises to come, but the young

people that are on the street that see the young men

like Mr. Francis that appear macho, that are involved

in drugs, that have cars, attractive new cars, that have

jewelry, that have money, that have attractive ladies.

And that’s impressionable on young people. And when

these people are involved in the criminal milieu, it’s

unfortunate that these young, impressionable people

don’t see where they end up. Because only if these

cases I think every week or every month, the more

serious narcotic cases and violent crimes cases of convictions, the pictures and articles should be put in the
paper in a special section for all to see. Otherwise, to

say there’s deterrence is, as I said, illusory.’’ Shortly

after making these remarks, the sentencing court sentenced the defendant to fifty years of incarceration.6

On December 30, 2016, the defendant filed the present

motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the

sentencing court substantially relied on materially inaccurate information concerning his prior criminal history

and the circumstances of the underlying offense when

imposing the sentence.7 See State v. Francis, supra, 191

Conn. App. 104–105. Specifically, the defendant claimed

that the sentencing court substantially relied on the

inaccurate information contained in the PSI report,

which incorrectly indicated that he had been convicted

of conspiracy to sell cocaine, and erroneously listed his

prior assault conviction as a conviction for assault in

the second degree. Additionally, the defendant claimed

that the sentencing court relied on an inaccurate interpretation of the evidence presented at trial and mistakenly believed that he ‘‘grazed’’ the victim before fatally

stabbing the victim in the chest. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) The defendant claimed that the record

of the sentencing hearing established that the sentencing court substantially relied on these material inaccuracies when imposing the sentence.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, concluding that there was no evidence that the sentencing

court substantially relied on materially inaccurate information. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court reasoned that, although the PSI report contained errors

regarding the defendant’s prior criminal history, the

record of the sentencing hearing did not demonstrate

that the sentencing court substantially relied on those

errors when arriving at its sentence. As for the defendant’s claims concerning the facts of the underlying

offense, the trial court concluded that the sentencing

court’s statement that the defendant ‘‘grazed’’ the victim

was supported by the trial record and, even if the statement was materially inaccurate, the sentencing court

did not substantially rely on the alleged inaccuracy.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendant thereafter appealed to the Appellate

Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied

his motion. See State v. Francis, supra, 191 Conn. App.

103. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the

trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the sentencing court did

not substantially rely on materially inaccurate information concerning the defendant’s prior criminal history

and the circumstances of the underlying offense. See

id., 108–10. This certified appeal followed.8

We begin our analysis by noting both the applicable

standard of review and the legal principles relevant to

our consideration of the present appeal. Practice Book

§ 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time
correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition,

or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.’’

As this court has previously stated, ‘‘[a] claim that the

trial court improperly denied a defendant’s motion to

correct an illegal sentence is [typically] reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.’’9

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Adams, 308 Conn. 263,

269, 63 A.3d 934 (2013); accord State v. Tabone, 279

Conn. 527, 534, 902 A.2d 1058 (2006). ‘‘When reviewing

claims under an abuse of discretion standard . . .

great weight is due to the action of the trial court and

every reasonable presumption should be given in favor

of its correctness . . . . In determining whether there

has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is

whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 313

Conn. 325, 336, 96 A.3d 1238 (2014); see also State v.

Bozelko, 175 Conn. App. 599, 609, 167 A.3d 1128, cert.

denied, 327 Conn. 973, 174 A.3d 194 (2017).

A sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when it

is ‘‘imposed in a way [that] violates [a] defendant’s right

. . . to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate

information or considerations solely in the record

. . . .’’10 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 839, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010). This

principle emanates from the defendant’s constitutional

right to due process. See id., 843. ‘‘To prevail on such

a claim as it relates to a [PSI] report, [a] defendant

[cannot] . . . merely alleg[e] that his . . . report contained factual inaccuracies or inappropriate information.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Specifically, a defendant must show ‘‘(1) that the information

was materially false or unreliable; and (2) that the

trial court substantially relied on the information in

determining the sentence.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.

Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 321, 507 A.2d 99 (1986). ‘‘A

sentencing court demonstrates actual reliance on misinformation when the court gives explicit attention to it,

[bases] its sentence at least in part on it, or gives specific

consideration to the information before imposing [the]

sentence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Parker, supra, 843 n.12.

In the present appeal, the defendant claims that the

Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion

to correct an illegal sentence. Specifically, the defendant claims that his fifty year sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner because the sentencing court

improperly relied on (1) inaccurate information in both

the criminal history report and PSI report, and (2) an

incorrect belief that he ‘‘grazed’’ the victim before fatally

stabbing him in the chest. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) We address these claims in turn.

I
The defendant first claims that the sentencing court

substantially relied on inaccurate information in the

criminal history report and the PSI report when imposing the sentence. Specifically, the defendant alleges that

the information in those reports incorrectly indicated

that he had been convicted of assault in the second

degree of an elderly person, when in fact he had been

convicted of assault in the third degree, and that he

had been convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine, when

he had instead been convicted of conspiracy to possess

cocaine. The defendant argues that the sentencing

court’s remarks demonstrate that it substantially relied

on those inaccuracies when imposing his sentence. In

response, the state argues that the trial court correctly

concluded that the record of the sentencing hearing

does not support the defendant’s claim. Having

reviewed the record, we agree with the state and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that the sentencing court did not substantially rely on inaccurate information concerning the

defendant’s criminal history.

Regarding his prior assault conviction, the defendant

contends that the PSI report incorrectly stated that the

conviction was for assault in the second degree and

that the criminal history report erroneously identified

the victim of the assault as a person over the age of

sixty. The defendant argues that the sentencing court’s

use of the word ‘‘macho’’ to describe ‘‘young men like

[the defendant]’’ demonstrates that the sentencing court

substantially relied on the inaccurate description of his

prior assault conviction and, as a result, viewed him

as a ‘‘violent predator attacking the weak and infirm.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant’s

claim is belied by the record.

Prior to the imposition of the defendant’s sentence,

the prosecutor informed the sentencing court of the

error in the PSI report and explained that the defendant

had been convicted of assault in the third degree.11

When summarizing the defendant’s prior criminal history, the sentencing court correctly noted that the

defendant’s prior assault conviction was for an assault

in the third degree. Nothing in the record suggests that

the sentencing court gave explicit attention to the PSI

report’s inaccurate characterization of the defendant’s

assault conviction or that it considered the notation in

the defendant’s criminal history report that incorrectly

identified the victim as elderly. Because the defendant

has failed to establish that the sentencing court substantially relied on the inaccurate information concerning

his prior assault conviction, we conclude that the trial

court correctly determined that, ‘‘as to the assault

charge, the [sentencing] court clearly did not sentence

the defendant on the basis of any misinformation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The defendant’s

claim relating to his prior assault conviction, there-
fore, fails.12

The defendant next argues that the sentencing court

substantially relied on the inaccurate description of his

prior conspiracy conviction in the PSI report and, as a

result, erroneously believed that he was a convicted

drug dealer. In support of his claim, the defendant

points to the sentencing court’s specific reference to

his prior conviction for ‘‘conspiracy to sell cocaine’’

and its general statement that ‘‘young men like [the

defendant] . . . are involved in drugs,’’ and have ‘‘new

cars,’’ ‘‘jewelry,’’ ‘‘money,’’ and ‘‘attractive ladies.’’ The

defendant argues that these remarks demonstrate that

the sentencing court relied on the false belief that he

had been convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine when

imposing the sentence.

Although we agree with the defendant that the sentencing court incorrectly referred to his prior conspiracy conviction as a conviction for conspiracy to sell

cocaine, the sentencing court did not substantially rely

on the precise nature of the conspiracy charge when

imposing the sentence. The sentencing court’s recitation of the defendant’s criminal history was used to

support only a single observation: that the defendant

had been convicted of three felony offenses before the

age of nineteen. As the trial court aptly noted, ‘‘[t]he

disputed narcotics conviction, regardless of its precise

nature, was a felony offense—one of the two [previous]

felonies that were contained in the defendant’s criminal

history.’’13 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We agree

with the trial court that the context in which the sentencing court incorrectly referred to the defendant’s

prior conspiracy conviction demonstrates that the sentencing court’s focus was on the fact that the prior

conviction was a felony and not whether it was a conviction for conspiracy to sell or possess cocaine.14 The

defendant’s claim relating to the sentencing court’s mischaracterization of his prior conspiracy conviction is,

therefore, unavailing.

Likewise, the sentencing court’s more generalized

statement that ‘‘young men like [the defendant] . . .

are involved in drugs’’ does not demonstrate that the

court substantially relied on the PSI report’s mischaracterization of his prior conspiracy conviction. The sentencing court had before it adequate evidence to support its general conclusion that the defendant was

‘‘involved in drugs’’ or the sale of drugs. As we previously noted, the prosecutor explained during the sentencing hearing that the defendant’s prior conviction for

conspiracy to possess cocaine involved ‘‘an undercover

buy in which the defendant was the driver of a vehicle

out of which the seller exited . . . .’’ Additionally, the

defendant’s PSI report indicated that, during the presentence investigation, the defendant himself admitted to

having previously sold drugs.15 At sentencing, defense

counsel, in fact, expressly argued that the defendant’s
honesty concerning his prior involvement in the sale

of drugs should weigh in favor of leniency. Notwithstanding the PSI report’s incorrect recitation of one of

his prior drug convictions, the sentencing court could

have reasonably concluded, based on the record before

it, that the defendant had been ‘‘involved in drugs’’ or

had sold drugs.

Although we conclude that the trial court correctly

determined that the sentencing court’s statements do

not evince a reliance on materially inaccurate information, we recognize that some of those statements were

inappropriate.16 The trial court’s statements, if taken

literally, were not directed at the defendant but, rather,

expressed the court’s views concerning the perception

that ‘‘young people’’ have of individuals involved in the

‘‘criminal milieu,’’ the failure of the media to adequately

cover the disposition of criminal cases involving illegal

drug activity, and the resulting impact on the efficacy

of general deterrence. Comments such as those made

by the sentencing court during its self-described ‘‘aside’’

can, however, undermine the public’s trust in the administration of justice. Generalizations, especially those

that are based in pernicious stereotypes, have no place

in our judicial system. Judges must be cognizant of the

fact that all persons, no matter their lived experience,

harbor implicit biases. Judges, therefore, have a responsibility to identify biases, both explicit and implicit, and

to proactively guard against even the appearance that

those biases might play any role whatsoever in the

sentencing process.

II

In his final claim, the defendant contends that the

sentencing court substantially relied ‘‘on a demonstratively false recollection of how [the victim] died’’ when

imposing the sentence. Specifically, the defendant

argues that the evidence submitted at trial established

that the victim was stabbed only once, and that the

sentencing court’s statement that the defendant had

‘‘grazed’’ the victim demonstrates that it misunderstood

that evidence, and, as a result, incorrectly viewed the

incident as a ‘‘prolonged, vicious attack’’ demonstrating

a ‘‘clear and consistent intent to kill.’’ In response, the

state argues that the trial court correctly concluded

that the sentencing court’s statement was not materially

inaccurate and that the sentencing court, when imposing the sentence, did not substantially rely on the number of times that the defendant stabbed the victim.

We do not agree with the defendant that the trial

court’s statement was materially inaccurate. During the

trial, H. Wayne Carver II, the medical examiner who

performed the autopsy of the victim, testified that he

observed a single stab wound on the victim’s chest

while conducting the autopsy. Multiple eyewitnesses,

however, also testified that the defendant made several

stabbing motions toward the victim before inflicting
the fatal blow. One witness, Jennifer Green, testified

that the defendant ‘‘brushed [the victim] with the knife

on the shoulder’’ and ‘‘grazed’’ him before stabbing him

in the chest. Another witness, Victor Lowe, testified

that the defendant swung the knife toward the victim

twice and that the first swing cut in half an ice pop that

the victim was holding in his hand. Indeed, in our prior

decision upholding the defendant’s conviction, we

noted that the defendant made ‘‘stabbing motions at

the victim’’ after pulling the knife from behind his back.

(Emphasis added.) State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 121,

635 A.2d 762 (1993). On the basis of the record before

us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by concluding that the sentencing court’s

statement that the defendant ‘‘grazed’’ the victim ‘‘was

not materially false or inaccurate.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

The trial court also correctly determined that ‘‘[t]here

[was] no indication in the record that the [sentencing]

court [in sentencing the defendant] relied minimally,

let alone substantially, on the number of times the

defendant thrust the knife at the victim . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) The transcript of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the sentencing court’s

primary focus was the severity of the four inch knife

wound that killed the victim. When describing the fatal

wound, the sentencing court stated: ‘‘That blow, that

large blade, as was testified to, apparently went four

inches into the chest. . . . Carver testified that the

aorta and the pulmonary arteries were severed or, if not

severed completely, severed to a degree that medical

intervention if on the scene immediately would have

been futile.’’ Conversely, the sentencing court’s statement that the defendant ‘‘grazed’’ the victim was made

in passing and was not repeated. In light of the sentencing court’s particular focus on the severity and location

of the fatal wound, as opposed to the exact number of

times that the defendant stabbed the victim, we agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that the sentencing

court, when imposing the sentence, did not substantially rely on the belief that the defendant apparently

‘‘grazed’’ the victim. Because the sentencing court did

not substantially rely on that observation, and because

that observation was reasonably based in the record,

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in relation to this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

motion to correct an illegal sentence. We conclude that,

although the defendant’s criminal record and the PSI

report contained inaccurate information concerning his

prior criminal history, the trial court correctly determined that the defendant failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating that the sentencing court substantially

relied on inaccurate information when imposing the
sentence. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that the sentencing court’s statement that the defendant ‘‘grazed’’

the victim was not materially inaccurate and that, even

if it were, the record does not support the defendant’s

claim that the sentencing court substantially relied on

that alleged inaccuracy when imposing the sentence.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* April 16, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The sentence at issue in the present appeal was imposed by the court,

Miano, J., whereas the subsequent motion to correct an illegal sentence

was decided by the court, Dewey, J. Unless otherwise noted, all references

hereinafter to the sentencing court are to Judge Miano, and all references

to the trial court are to Judge Dewey.

2 This single page document contains a list of the defendant’s prior convictions. According to a notation at the top of the document, the list was

generated on February 18, 1992. We note that the defendant’s brief refers

to this document as the ‘‘1992 criminal history . . . .’’

3 The PSI report indicated that the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy

to sell cocaine resulted in a $380 fine.

4 Although the defendant’s convictions for possession of narcotics and

assault arose from two separate incidents, the defendant was convicted and

sentenced for both charges on the same day. There is some ambiguity in

the record as to the specific sentences imposed in connection with these

charges; however, the record is clear that the defendant ultimately received

a total effective sentence of four years of incarceration, execution suspended, and four years of probation.

5 During the course of the underlying trial, the prosecutor summarized

this same discrepancy to the court as follows: ‘‘[T]he [s]tatute number that

the defendant apparently pleaded to is possession with intent to sell. And

what they did on the docket, is when he entered his plea, they changed the

word[s] ‘conspiracy to sell’ to ‘conspiracy to possess cocaine,’ but they did

not change the [s]tatutory reference, so I don’t know if it’s conspiracy to

simply possess cocaine, or if it’s a conspiracy to possess cocaine with the

intent to sell.’’

6 This court upheld the defendant’s murder conviction in State v. Francis,

228 Conn. 118, 120, 136, 635 A.2d 762 (1993).

7 This motion is the defendant’s fourth motion to correct and is based on

the same claims that the defendant, previously self-represented, raised in

a prior motion filed in 2010. In State v. Francis, 322 Conn. 247, 140 A.3d

927 (2016), we concluded that the trial court, Gold, J., ‘‘improperly failed

to appoint counsel to assist the defendant in determining whether there

was a sound basis for him to file such a motion;’’ id., 251; and remanded

the case for further proceedings. Id., 270.

8 This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal,

limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude

that the sentencing [court] did not substantially rely on materially inaccurate

information about the defendant?’’ State v. Francis, 333 Conn. 912, 215 A.3d

733 (2019).

We note that the precise question now under review is whether the Appellate Court properly reviewed the reasonableness of the actions of the trial

court. As both parties acknowledge in their briefs, the certified question

could be understood to suggest that the focus of our inquiry is the conduct

of the sentencing court. We, therefore, reformulate the certified question

as follows: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the sentencing court did not

substantially rely on materially inaccurate information about the defendant?’’

See, e.g., State v. Skipwith, 326 Conn. 512, 516 n.4, 165 A.3d 1211 (2017)

(court may reformulate certified question to conform to issue actually presented and to be decided on appeal). We note that both the state and the

defendant have addressed this question in their respective briefs.

9

In his brief, the defendant argues that the sentencing court’s factual

findings call for the application of a clearly erroneous standard of review.

We reiterate that the proper focus of the inquiry presently before us is

whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence. See footnote 8 of this opinion; see

also, e.g., State v. Charles F., 133 Conn. App. 698, 704–706, 36 A.3d 731,

cert. denied, 304 Conn. 929, 42 A.3d 390 (2012).

10 As this court has previously recognized, reliance on inaccurate information is only one example of how a sentencing court can impose a defendant’s

sentence in an illegal manner. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 839,

992 A.2d 1103 (2010) (noting that sentence is imposed in illegal manner

when it is ‘‘imposed in a way [that] violates [a] defendant’s right . . . to

be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11 Although the prosecutor did not specifically draw the sentencing court’s

attention to the inaccurate description of the victim contained in the criminal

history report, the prosecutor provided the sentencing court with a detailed

description of the crime, which made clear that the victim was not over the

age of sixty and that the incident did not involve serious injury.

12 The defendant also claims that the PSI report inaccurately indicated that

his sentence for assault in the third degree was four years of incarceration,

execution suspended, and four years of probation. The defendant argues

that, because such a sentence would have exceeded the statutory limits for

the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree, the sentencing court’s reliance on the fact that he was on probation at the time of the murder amounts

to reliance on inaccurate information. We are unconvinced by the defendant’s claim and agree with the Appellate Court that, ‘‘[r]egardless of the

merits of the defendant’s argument that his sentence for his conviction of

assault in the third degree was illegal, the defendant does not dispute that

he was on probation when he committed this murder; accordingly, this fact

was not materially inaccurate when it was relied on by the sentencing court.’’

State v. Francis, supra, 191 Conn. App. 108 n.4.

13 When reviewing the defendant’s criminal history, the sentencing court

stated: ‘‘Here is a young man that at age sixteen was convicted of possession

of narcotics; at age seventeen was convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine

. . . and now murder, and he’s only nineteen years old.’’

14 We reiterate that, during both the trial and sentencing hearing, the

prosecutor informed the sentencing court that there was uncertainty in the

record as to the actual charge that the defendant plead guilty to in relation

to this narcotics offense. See footnote 5 of this opinion. The sentencing

court was also reminded by defense counsel that the defendant’s prior

narcotics and assault convictions did not result in a sentence of incarceration.

15 The PSI report also included the following description of the circumstances of the defendant’s prior conviction for possession of narcotics:

‘‘This offense involved police officers observing the [defendant] while he

approached motor vehicles and made exchanges. Upon his arrest, the [defendant] was found to be in possession of cocaine, marijuana, and $135 in cash.’’

16 We refer, in particular, to the statement in which the sentencing court

observed: ‘‘And I think that’s important, not for Mr. Francis or the Mr.

Francises to come, but the young people that are on the street that see the

young men like Mr. Francis that appear macho, that are involved in drugs,

that have cars, attractive new cars, that have jewelry, that have money, that

have attractive ladies. And that’s impressionable on young people.’’