Filed 9/14/23 Ramy & Associates v. Snyder CA2/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

RAMY & ASSOCIATES, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DARRYL SNYDER,

Defendant and Respondent.

B310502

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

BC556689)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed.

Mac E. Nehoray for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Donald R. Davidson III for Defendant and Respondent.

______________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

This appeal stems from a contentious partition and sale of 

commercial property in Simi Valley. Plaintiff and appellant 

Ramy & Associates (Ramy) at one time leased a car dealership on 

the property, then acquired an ownership stake in the land. 

After years of squabbling, the owners—primarily heirs of the 

original purchasers—agreed to the appointment of a referee to 

sell the property and to the trial court deciding all remaining 

issues. 

On appeal, Ramy contends the court erred in how it 

apportioned the sale proceeds and referee fees. Because Ramy 

has both provided an inadequate appellate record and failed to 

cite any legal authority in support of its claims, Ramy has not 

met its burden of establishing error. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Edward Caraccia Sr. (father) and Lillie Fay Caraccia

(mother) created a joint trust to hold assets as part of their estate 

plan.1 When mother died in 2002, the joint trust was divided into 

a survivor’s trust (hereafter father trust) and a marital trust 

(hereafter mother trust). Each trust was funded with the 

parent’s respective separate property and one-half of their

community property. The community property included 2350–

1 The record does not contain any of the trust documents.

The Caraccias, both of whom are now deceased, are not parties to 

this appeal.
3

2380 First Street in Simi Valley, a car dealership that Hormorz 

Ramy and/or his company had leased for decades.

2

Thus, upon mother’s death, a one-half interest in the Simi 

Valley property flowed from the joint trust to father trust, and 

the other half to mother trust. Father was sole trustee of both 

trusts. His children, Edward V. Caraccia II (Eddie) and Denise 

Economou (Denise), were joint beneficiaries of mother trust. As 

best we can tell from the sparse record, father trust was, at this 

point, revocable with father the primary beneficiary and his 

children contingent beneficiaries.

Several years later, the family became embroiled in five 

internecine lawsuits. 

Lawsuit No. 1. In 2009, Denise and Eddie sued their 

father, alleging he was mismanaging the trusts and requesting 

an accounting and other relief. In response, father resigned as 

trustee of both trusts. He appointed Darryl Snyder (an 

accountant, and the respondent in this appeal) as successor 

trustee of father trust; Denise and Eddie eventually became joint 

successor trustees of mother trust. As part of the settlement of 

the children’s lawsuit, Snyder, as trustee, transferred a 

25 percent interest in the Simi Valley property—half of father 

trust’s ownership share—from father trust to mother trust. At 

the close of litigation, the respective interests in the property 

2 Hormorz Ramy is a managing partner of Ramy & 

Associates. To distinguish the person from the business, we refer 

to Hormorz Ramy as Mr. Ramy and to Ramy & Associates as 

Ramy. Although the record indicates Mr. Ramy and/or his 

company had leased the property for many years, it is not clear 

exactly who leased it, when, or how any arrangement ended.
4

were father trust–25 percent; mother trust–75 percent. As Eddie 

and Denise were the sole and equal beneficiaries of mother trust, 

as a practical matter, each of them owned 37.5 percent of the 

Simi Valley property.

As the children’s lawsuit against father trust was reaching 

an end, three more lawsuits arose. 

Lawsuit No. 2. In 2010, father trust (but not mother 

trust) brought an unlawful detainer action against Mr. Ramy, as 

an individual, and a man by the name of Salem Arnout.

3 After a 

court trial, judgment for $205,757 was entered in favor of father 

trust and against Mr. Ramy and Arnout. The judgment was for 

past-due rent, plus costs. 

Lawsuit Nos. 3 and 4. A year later, Ramy sued father 

trust, alleging causes of action for recission and unjust 

enrichment based on overpayment of rent.

4 Then, a year after 

that, Snyder, on behalf of father trust, filed an action seeking 

3 Because the only document we have been provided from 

that lawsuit is the two-page judgment, the circumstances and 

issues involved are unclear. In particular, we do not know who 

Arnout is, why he was a defendant in the lawsuit, whether he is 

(or was) part of Ramy & Associates, or how he was involved with

the various individuals in either the family dispute or the car 

dealership itself. He is not mentioned again in the record.

4 Although both lawsuits involved the same property, the 

record does not reveal how it could be that Mr. Ramy was the 

individual who owed rent in Lawsuit No. 2 but Ramy the 

company allegedly overpaid rent in Lawsuit No. 3.

Mother trust was originally a co-defendant in Lawsuit

No. 3, but Mr. Ramy dismissed the trust from the case at Eddie’s 

request. Eddie and Mr. Ramy had been close friends for decades.
5

removal of Eddie and Denise as trustees of mother trust and 

requesting an accounting and appointment of successor trustees.

Meanwhile—though again, the record does not reveal the 

details—father married Patricia Caraccia (Patricia), and, in 2012, 

made her the sole beneficiary of father trust.

In late 2012 and early 2013, father trust settled both 

outstanding lawsuits (Lawsuits Nos. 3 and 4). 

Lawsuit No. 3 Settlement. In settlement of Ramy’s suit

against father trust, father trust executed a $100,000 promissory 

note in favor of Ramy, secured by a deed of trust on the Simi 

Valley property. The note (and accrued interest) would be due 

upon the earliest of: the sale of the Simi Valley property, or one 

year after father’s death, or three years after the date of the 

settlement. The present appeal—part of the fifth piece of 

litigation among the parties—deals with who owes what to whom 

under the note that was signed in settlement of Lawsuit No. 3.

Lawsuit No. 4 Settlement. Father died in 2013, and 

father trust’s suit against Denise and Eddie was settled five 

months later, soon after Eddie and Denise first learned that 

Patricia was the sole beneficiary of father trust. (Patricia had no 

interest in mother trust.) 

In the agreement, Eddie, Denise, trustee Snyder, and 

Patricia—in their individual capacities and as beneficiaries 

and/or successor trustees of their respective trusts—agreed the 

Simi Valley property would be sold. Upon the sale, mother trust 

would reimburse father trust $36,501.57 in unpaid rent.5 Mother 

5 Father trust and mother trust were owed rent in proportion 

to each trust’s ownership stake in the property—eventually 25 
6

trust also agreed to pay “fifty percent (50%) up to the sum of 

$50,000” of the amount owed on the promissory note executed as 

part of the 2012 settlement of Lawsuit No. 3 between father trust 

and Ramy. Father trust agreed to pay the accrued interest on 

the note.

6 The parties’ agreement notwithstanding, mother trust 

refused to sell the property. 

Lawsuit No. 5. The present lawsuit followed in 2014.

7 

During the pendency of the litigation, mother trust sold half of its 

percent and 75 percent, respectively. Though the record is 

opaque on the point, it appears mother trust was supposed to 

collect the full rent from the tenant—whomever that was—then 

pay 25 percent of the rent to father trust. When father trust sued 

mother trust, however, mother trust started deducting its legal 

expenses from father trust’s share of the rent before remitting the 

balance. The $36,501.57 was for past-due rent that mother trust 

had wrongfully withheld during the suit. 

6 Although the 2012 settlement between father trust and 

Ramy referenced this agreement (between father trust and 

mother trust) by providing that “[a]s a material inducement for 

[father trust] to enter into this Agreement,” mother trust would 

pay “up to” $50,000 towards the note, neither mother trust nor 

Eddie and Denise were parties to father trust’s agreement with 

Ramy. It is also not clear from the record how the exact amount 

“up to $50,000” was to be calculated.

7 The suit apparently involved a complaint and a crosscomplaint, but neither is part of the appellate record. It appears 

plaintiffs and cross-defendants were Ramy, and Eddie and 

Denise, individually and on behalf of mother trust. Snyder is the 

defendant and cross-complainant, individually and on behalf of 

father trust. We have not been able to discern a basis for the suit 

against Snyder as an individual. As such, we refer to him only in 
7

75 percent ownership interest in the Simi Valley property to 

Ramy. Mother trust distributed to Denise the proceeds of the 

sale and retained ownership of the remaining 37.5 percent. The 

effect of this transaction was that Eddie became the sole trustee 

and beneficiary of mother trust.

8 The parties executed a

settlement agreement in 2016, but that agreement was later 

rescinded, and the property was not sold. 

So, in 2018, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a 

referee to sell the property. The parties also agreed that the 

court would adjudicate all remaining issues after a post-sale trial.

Later in 2018, father trust sold its 25 percent interest in 

the Simi Valley property to Ramy. Ramy then owned

62.5 percent of the property. Mother trust owned the remaining 

37.5 percent. As part of the sale, father trust agreed to deduct 

$50,000 from the Ramy sale proceeds to repay its half of the 

principal owed under the earlier promissory note. 

his capacity as trustee. The court ultimately concluded neither 

side had proven any of their causes of action. The parties do not 

directly challenge this decision on appeal.

8 The mechanics of the sale and changes to the trust are not 

apparent from the record, and even the parties can’t seem to 

agree on what happened. Ramy insists, without citation, that the 

proceeds from the sale were paid directly to Denise rather than to 

the trust. Whatever happened, at the end of the process, Ramy 

owned 37.5 percent of the property, mother trust (to wit: Eddie) 

owned 37.5 percent of the property, and Denise was no longer a 

beneficiary or trustee of mother trust. Father trust, which was 

not involved with this transaction, still owned the remaining 25 

percent of the property.
8

The court entered an order confirming the sale. Although 

the proposed order had provided that the referee’s costs and fees 

would be split evenly between the two sides, it was modified to 

state that costs and fees would be split “75/25 between the parties 

(75% by Plaintiff [Ramy, Eddie, and mother trust] and 25% by 

Defendant [Snyder and father trust])” with the referee to 

calculate the precise amounts due.

After a bench trial on the remaining issues, the court found 

father trust liable for half of the amount due on the promissory 

note, which it had already paid, plus half of the interest, which 

the court calculated to be $21,000. The court concluded Eddie 

owed Ramy the balance of the principal and interest on the note.

9 

The court also concluded father trust was owed $36,501.57 from 

the sale proceeds. This amount is not included in the judgment,

but the parties do not challenge that part of the court’s decision. 

The court subsequently entered judgment, and Ramy filed 

a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Ramy contends father trust—and not mother trust—owes it 

the remaining $50,000 plus interest due on the 2013 promissory 

note. It also argues the court incorrectly allocated the referee 

fees. Taken together, Ramy seeks $96,408.68. Because Ramy

neither provides legal analysis and citation to authority to 

support these arguments nor affords us a record sufficient to 

evaluate them, Ramy has forfeited its claims.

9 In support of its decision, the court relied in part on the 

2016 settlement agreement; the court did not mention that the 

agreement had eventually been rescinded.
9

“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed 

correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to 

support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error 

must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle 

of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional 

doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 

2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “It is not this court’s role to construct 

arguments that would undermine the lower court’s judgment and 

defeat the presumption of correctness.” (Needelman v. DeWolf 

Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762.) 

It is the appellant’s “responsibility . . . to support claims of 

error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.” 

(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Our role, by contrast, is to 

evaluate “legal argument with citation of authorities on the 

points made.” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) 

“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to 

support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we 

treat the point as waived.” (Badie v. Bank of Am. (1998) 

67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.) We are not required to examine 

undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants. 

(Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984–985.)

In its opening brief, Ramy cites one statute (to establish 

appealability) and one appellate opinion (for the standard of 

review). Although the errors asserted on appeal appear to 

involve interlocking issues of contract interpretation, property 

law, trusts, law of the case, civil procedure, and the impact of 

prior judgments, Ramy does not discuss—or cite to authority that 

discusses—any of these topics. We decline to do so on Ramy’s 

behalf. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 
10

30 Cal.App.4th 539, 546 [it is not the court’s function to serve as 

the appellant’s backup counsel].)

Appellants not only bear the burden of proof on appeal but 

also bear the burden of providing us with a record that allows us 

to resolve the issues they raise. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 

43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296.) The record before us does not paint 

a full picture of what happened in this case, much less assist us 

in resolving Ramy’s claims of error. 

For example, Ramy claims the court misallocated the 

referee fees between the parties. The court entered the order 

confirming sale on January 11, 2019, after the referee filed an 

application to confirm sale and Snyder filed a response. The 

record does not contain either the application or the response. 

Nor does the record contain a minute order or reporter’s 

transcript of the status conference the court held on the issue. 

From this record, we cannot discern how the order came to be 

modified from 50/50 to 75/25 or why. We cannot tell whether 

Ramy objected to this modification. All we know is that a 

proposed order was filed and was changed. This is insufficient to 

establish reversible error. (Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 

73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 [“Without the proper record, we 

cannot evaluate issues requiring a factual analysis.”].)10

10 As we decide the case for the reasons stated in the opinion, 

we need not address respondent’s argument that the judgment 

should be affirmed because the trial court’s orders were 

consistent with the equitable powers the parties had bestowed on 

him. 
11

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Darryl Snyder shall

recover his costs on appeal.

RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, J. KIM. J.