J-S28022-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INT. OF: L.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.P., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 314 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered January 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): 2019-00451, 

CP-36-DP-0000224-2017

IN RE: L.A.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.P., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 330 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2019-00451

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Appellant, A.P. (hereinafter “Father”), appeals from the decree entered 

on January 29, 2020, which granted the petition filed by the Lancaster County 

Children and Youth Social Service Agency (hereinafter “the Agency”) to 
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terminate Father’s parental rights to his minor child, L.P. a/k/a L.A.P. (a male 

born in October 2017) (hereinafter “Child”).

1

 We affirm.

In October 2017, Child was born premature at Reading Hospital, in Berks 

County, Pennsylvania; Child was born addicted to opiates and suffering from 

neonatal abstinence syndrome. See Petition for Temporary Custody, 

10/13/17, at 1. As a result, on October 13, 2017, the Agency filed a petition 

for temporary custody and, on October 31, 2017, the trial court adjudicated

Child dependent, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6302(1) (defining “dependent child” as “a child who . . . is without proper 

parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other 

care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or 

morals”).

On June 4, 2019, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother and 

Father’s parental rights to Child. As the trial court explained: 

The [trial court] held a hearing on the Agency's termination 

of parental rights petition on October 24, 2019. At that time, 

Father, by counsel, presented [a] motion to dismiss [the 

dependency and termination of parental rights actions for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction]. . . . [Father electronically 

filed the motion to dismiss] the next day (October 25, 2019) 

with the clerk of courts. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/20, at 2 (some capitalization omitted).

____________________________________________

1 Also on January 29, 2020, the trial court terminated the parental rights of 

L.I.L. (hereinafter “Mother”) to Child. Mother did not file a notice of appeal 

from this decree and she is not a party to this appeal.
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Within Father’s motion to dismiss, Father claimed that the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lancaster County did not possess subject matter jurisdiction 

over the dependency or the termination of parental rights action because 

Mother and Father live in Berks County, Pennsylvania and Child was born in 

Berks County. See Father’s Motion to Dismiss, 10/25/19, at 1-5. Father 

requested that the trial court enter an order dismissing both actions for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 5.

The Agency opposed Father’s motion to dismiss and argued that: the 

Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County possesses subject matter 

jurisdiction over the actions because the courts of common pleas have 

unlimited original jurisdiction over all proceedings in this Commonwealth, 

unless otherwise provided by law; Father was confusing subject matter 

jurisdiction with venue; and, “[a]ny objection to venue was waived long ago 

because it was not raised prior to the adjudication as required under the 

Juvenile Rules of Procedure.” The Agency’s Brief in Opposition, 11/19/19, at 

4-10.

Following the Agency’s brief in opposition, Father filed a reply brief and 

specifically argued: “[Father’s counsel] does not recall ever bringing the issue 

of venue before th[e trial] court (it would be moot to do so as venue was 

waived after the adjudicatory hearing was held October 24, 2017). [Father’s 

counsel is] limiting [Father’s] argument to that of jurisdiction.” Father’s Reply 

Brief, 12/4/19, at 2.
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On January 24, 2020, the trial court denied Father’s motion to dismiss. 

Trial Court Order, 1/24/20, at 1. After a termination of parental rights 

hearing, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

1. [Child] was born on October 3, 2017. . . . [Child] was 

placed in the Agency’s temporary custody by order signed 

and filed on October 13, 2017.

2. [Child] was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome 

at birth. [Child] was treated in the neonatal intensive care 

unit following his birth and before he was discharged directly 

into the Agency’s custody. [Child] continued to suffer from 

difficulty with breathing and cardiac irregularities for at least 

the first [three-and-a-half] months of his life.

. . .

10. Father was incarcerated at Berks County Prison two 

weeks after [Child] was born. Father was consistently 

incarcerated from that time forward.

11. Father was incarcerated at the Berks County Prison 

because the Lancaster County Office of Adult Probation had 

issued a warrant for Father’s arrest for non-compliance. 

Father had been on the run from Lancaster County 

authorities.

12. Father remained at the Berks County Prison until 

November 18, 2018, at which time he was transferred to 

[State Correctional Institution (“SCI”)] Phoenix. Father 

remained at SCI-Phoenix until January 22, 2019, when 

Father was transferred to SCI-Houtzdale.

13. Before Father’s transfer to SCI-Phoenix, Father 

completed drug and alcohol programs at Berks County Prison. 

The Agency accepted Father’s completion of these programs 

in satisfaction of Father’s drug and alcohol objective, 

rendering that objective ongoing as opposed to incomplete.
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14. At the time of the August 1, 2019[] hearing, Father was 

in “parole pending” status, meaning that Father was waiting 

upon final state parole board action.

15. Father was originally paroled on March 9, 2015.

16. Presently, Father’s re-computed parole violator maximum 

date is March 20, 2027.

17. While incarcerated, Father completed a Core Skills 

program. The objective of this program was to learn how to 

think first before acting.

18. Father participated in the Read to Your Child program 

[while] in prison. In this program, a parent records a video 

of the parent reading a book[,] which is then sent to the 

parent’s child.

19. Father sent [Child] a book and a CD with a video 

recording of Father reading the book aloud. [Child] enjoy[ed] 

Father’s video.

20. Father completed a violence prevention program in 

prison.

21. Father has three other children, A.P.1 [(born in July 

2001)], A.P.2 [(born in November 1999)], and A.P.3 [(born 

in April 1996)].

22. The mother of A.P.1 is [S.P. S.P.] is also the mother of 

the Mother of [Child].

23. The Agency was previously involved with one of Father’s 

other children, A.P.2, in August [] 2016.

24. Father had been estranged from A.P.2 until A.P.2 was 

three years old and then in 2015, A.P.2 came to the United 

States to become acquainted with Father.

25. Father requested genetic testing to determine if [he 

were] the biological father of A.P.2, which resulted in a court 

granting sole custody to A.P.2’s mother pending the results 

of the genetic testing.
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26. The report that the Agency received regarding A.P.2 was 

that A.P.2 was involved in a sexual relationship with one of 

A.P.2’s aunts.

27. At the time of the report, Father was in a relationship with 

Mother.

28. At the time of the report, A.P.2 was in Father’s custody. 

Other members of Father’s household included Mother and 

an aunt, [C.T.]

29. The report stated that A.P.2 was engaged in sexual 

relations with Mother.

30. Subsequently, the Agency was able to confirm with A.P.2 

that A.P.2 was having sexual relations with both [C.T.] and 

Mother while A.P.2 and both women were living in Father’s 

household.

31. The Agency’s investigation led to the indication of both 

[C.T.] and Mother as perpetrators of sexual abuse against 

A.P.2.

32. A.P.2 had been under house arrest with Juvenile 

Probation at the time these relationships were transpiring but 

A.P.2 had cut off his ankle bracelet monitor.

33. When Father caught A.P.2 having sex with Mother, Father 

turned A.P.2 into Juvenile Probation.

34. Ultimately, A.P.2 was released to the custody of his 

mother[,] who resided in Trinidad and Tobago.

. . .

36. The first report the Agency received regarding A.P.1 was 

on March 22, 2016.

37. The report stated concerns for truancy and neglect of 

A.P.1 and that A.P.1’s parents, Father and [S.P.], were in and 

out of jail.
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38. The Agency recently received a report regarding A.P.1, 

who was with Mother when Mother was charged with retail 

theft.

39. Father did not raise his son A.P.2 or his daughter A.P.1.

40. Father never lived with his daughter A.P.1.

41. Father maintains written correspondence with [Child’s] 

resource mother.

42. Father claims to have a residence that he can move to 

upon his release from prison.

43. As of the time of the final hearing on the Agency’s 

termination of parental rights petition, Father desired that 

[Child] live with [C.H.], who Father says is a cousin of his 

living in Philadelphia.

. . .

47. Father came to Lancaster in 1998 for the purpose of 

selling illegal drugs.

48. As matters stand now, Father will owe $35,521.13 in fines 

and costs when Father is released from prison.

49. Father now concedes that he hurt his back at work 

sometime in 2015 and was prescribed Percocet which Father 

was taking while at work which affected his job performance.

50. Father’s addiction to Percocet set Father back resulting in 

his latest spurt of criminal activity.

51. Father now claims that if Father’s wife [were] cheating on 

him, Father would not turn to marijuana for the emotional 

pain as he did in the past.

52. Father claims he knows what it takes to be a good parent, 

but Father also acknowledges that he lacks parenting skills 

and that the classes he took are insufficient.
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53. Father claims he is now a “new creation by the grace of 

God, the lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, and has been reborn 

by the blood.”

54. Father believes that [Child] will not be hurt by being 

removed from [Child’s] resource family – the only family 

[Child] has known – because [Child] is young.

55. Father knows that this is his last chance to try to be a 

father to [Child].

56. Assuming that Father would be granted parole by the 

state parole board, Father has at least another six months to 

serve on an open sentence he received in Berks County.

57. As of the final hearing date, when Father is released, 

Father will need to complete a mental health evaluation, a 

drug and alcohol evaluation, must remain crime-free, must 

compete a parenting class, must become financially stable, 

must have appropriate housing for himself and [Child], and

must demonstrate ongoing commitment to [Child] in order to 

complete the objectives of the applicable child’s permanency 

plan. Father would also need to be assigned and work with 

a personal parent trainer, remain compliant with his terms of 

probation, and his housing would have to be assessed.

58. [Child’s] resource parents, with whom [Child] has lived 

since he was discharged from the hospital [23] days after his 

birth, are a potentially permanent resource for [Child] and 

are interested in adopting him.

59. [Child] refers to the resource parents as “Mom and Dad.” 

[Child] looks to the resource parents for comfort.

60. The resource parents’ home also includes two older girls 

who are in foster care. [Child] is beneficially bonded to these 

two girls.

. . .

62. As of the time of the final hearing on the Agency’s 

termination of parental rights petition . . . , [Child] had been 

in the Agency’s legal and physical custody consistently for 

more than [24] months.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/20, at 5-15 (citations and some capitalization 

omitted).

The trial court concluded that the Agency proved, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Father’s parental rights to Child should be 

terminated under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). The trial court thus

granted the Agency’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child on 

January 29, 2020. Trial Court Order, 1/29/20, at 1.

2

Father filed timely notices of appeal. He raises two claims to this Court:

[1.] Whether the [trial] court erred in its order dated January 

24, 2020, that denied [Father’s] motion to dismiss the 

dependency action, and by extension, the termination of 

parental rights regarding [Child] due to lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and/or venue[?]

[2.] Whether the Orphan’s Court erred in its decree dated 

January 23, 2020, that the Lancaster County Children and 

Youth Social Services Agency had met its burden in proving 

that Father’s parental rights should be terminated when there 

was evidence he was working on and completing his goals on 

his child permanency plan throughout his incarceration and 

would be released soon[?]

Father’s First Brief at 14 (some capitalization omitted); Father’s Second Brief 

at 8 (some capitalization omitted).

3

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2 The trial court appointed Attorney Gina M. Carnes as guardian ad litem for 

Child. Attorney Carnes filed a brief in this case in which she asserts that 

termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Child. Thus, 

she asks this Court to affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s 

parental rights. Brief of Appellee, Guardian Ad Litem, 5/27/20, at 20.

3 We initially filed our memorandum in this case on July 8, 2020. However, 

after we filed our memorandum, Father filed an application for reargument 
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and complained that our memorandum dealt exclusively with the issue Father

briefed at docket number 314 MDA 2020, regarding the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas. According to Father, our 

memorandum mistakenly failed to address the issue he raised in a separate 

and consolidated brief – concerning docket number 330 MDA 2020 – where 

he claimed that the trial court erred “in deciding the Agency had met its burden 

and that [Father’s] parental rights should be terminated when he was making 

substantial progress.” See Father’s Application for Reconsideration, 7/15/20, 

at 1-3.

We searched our appellate docket and again saw that Father filed multiple 

copies of a single brief in this matter. Further, we observed that all copies of 

Father’s brief simply raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, 

we granted panel reconsideration to apprise Father of the fact that we found 

only one set of briefs and that we discovered no separate brief that dealt with 

any claim that the trial court erred “in deciding the Agency had met its burden 

and that [Father’s] parental rights should be terminated when he was making 

substantial progress.” See id.

Father then filed another application for reargument and informed this Court 

that he electronically filed both appellate briefs in one single, long document. 

See Appellant’s Second Application for Reargument, 8/12/20, at 4. Thus, 

Father’s “first” brief (dealing with the subject matter jurisdiction issue) was 

found at pages 1-44 of the filing and Father’s “second” brief (dealing with the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination) was found at pages 45-94 

of the document. Father claimed that, since he actually filed both briefs in 

this case, we should address the claim raised in his “second” brief. Id.

We instruct Father that filing two briefs in one document violates our Rules of 

Appellate Procedure in multiple ways. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (specifying 

the requirements for an appellant’s brief); see also Pa.R.A.P. 125 (declaring 

that “[e]lectronic filing of documents shall be governed by Administrative 

Orders of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania”); In re: Electronic Filing 

System in the Appellate Courts, 418 J.A. Docket, at II(A) (Pa. 2014)

(“Electronic filings may be submitted at the UJS web portal: 

http://ujsportal.pacourts.us . . . , in accordance with the filing 

instructions available at that site”) (emphasis added). Further, it is not 

this Court’s responsibility to discover briefs that are improperly contained

within or after another brief. Thus, we are empowered to hold that Father 

waived any claim contained in his “second” brief – as that “brief” violates 

multiple Rules of Appellate Procedure, the brief was not separately filed, no 
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First, Father claims that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss 

the dependency action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This claim fails.

At the outset, we note that in his appellate brief, Father argues that the 

trial court erred when it failed to transfer the case to Berks County, on the 

basis of improper venue. See id. at 14 and 19. This claim of error is waived, 

as Father did not raise the claim in his concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal and, at the trial level, Father expressly disclaimed any objection 

to venue. See Father’s Concise Statement, 2/20/20, at 1 (limiting his 

challenge to that of subject matter jurisdiction); Father’s Reply Brief, 12/4/19, 

at 2 (“[Father’s counsel] does not recall ever bringing the issue of venue 

before th[e trial] court (it would be moot to do so as venue was waived after 

the adjudicatory hearing was held October 24, 2017). [Father’s counsel is] 

limiting [Father’s] argument to that of jurisdiction”). Any claim on appeal 

relating to venue is thus waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.”); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 

____________________________________________

separate filing fee could have been paid for this brief, and the brief is, 

essentially, an appendix to Father’s “first” brief.

Nevertheless, we note that Father is proceeding on appeal in forma pauperis

– and, thus, was not required to pay filing fees for his briefs. We further note 

that Father has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in this 

termination of parental rights proceeding, but that “claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must be raised on direct appeal.” In re J.T., 983 A.2d 

771, 774-775 (Pa. Super. 2009). Therefore, we granted Father’s second 

application for panel reargument and will now address the claim contained in 

Father’s “second” brief.
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465-466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (in a termination of parental rights case, holding 

that the mother had waived her appellate claims because they were not 

included in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and were

not adequately developed in her appellate brief). Therefore, our review in this 

case is limited to Father’s claim that the trial court did not possess subject 

matter jurisdiction over the action. See Father’s Brief at 14.

Father’s challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a pure 

question of law. S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 94 A.3d 402, 406 (Pa. Super. 2014). As 

such, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Stapas v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 198 A.3d 1033, 1037 (Pa. 2018).

As our Supreme Court has explained, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction 

concerns the competency of the court to determine controversies of the 

general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs.” In 

re Nomination Petition of deYoung, 903 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. 2006) 

(quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). It is uncontested 

that jurisdiction to hear and determine dependency and termination of 

parental rights actions is vested in the courts of common pleas. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (providing that, except where otherwise specified by 

statute or rule, “the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original 

jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings”); In re N.W., 859 A.2d 501 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (discussing the fact that the courts of common pleas possess 

original jurisdiction over dependency and termination of parental rights 

actions). 
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In this case, the dependency and termination of parental rights actions 

were brought and decided in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, 

which was competent to determine controversies in these general classes. As 

such, the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas had subject matter 

jurisdiction over these actions and Fathers’ claim on appeal thus fails.4

Next, Father claims that the evidence was insufficient to terminate his

parental rights to Child. 

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition

for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, 

our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept 

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial 

court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has 

been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for 

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Father claims that the Lancaster County Court of Common 

Pleas did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action because the 

Agency did not have standing to initiate the dependency or termination of 

parental rights actions, Fathers’ claim fails. See In re Nomination Petition 

of deYoung, 903 A.2d at 1168 (“[s]ubject matter jurisdiction concerns the 

competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to 

which the case presented for its consideration belongs. . . . Whether a party 

has standing to maintain an action is not a jurisdictional question”) (quotations 

and citations omitted); In re Adoption of Z.S.H.G., 34 A.3d 1283 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (applying deYoung in the context of a challenge to termination of 

parental rights and adoption decrees).
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an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are clear 

reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of 

review in these cases. [The Supreme Court] observed that, 

unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make 

the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the 

trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant 

hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings 

regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. 

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite 

result, as is often the case in dependency and termination 

cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second 

guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the 

trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by 

the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result 

of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). As we 

have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of 

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

“Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 

914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019). We have explained:
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Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the 

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to 

terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the 

conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's 

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines 

that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of 

the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and 

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing any such bond.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (2). This Court may affirm the trial court’s 

decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one 

subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). In this appeal, we concentrate our analysis on 

Section 2511(a)(2).

In relevant part, Section 2511 declares:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 
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conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely 

on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if 

found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to 

remedy the conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

Thus, to satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving 

party must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted). 

“The grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, 

but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.” Id. “[A] parent’s 

incarceration is relevant to [a] [S]ection [2511](a)(2) analysis and, depending 

on the circumstances of the case, it may be dispositive of a parent’s ability to 

provide the ‘essential parental care, control, or subsistence’ that the section 
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contemplates.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Further, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stressed:

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon 

parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 

1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable 

of performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one 

who refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (quotations and citations omitted).

We additionally note that this Court has long recognized a parent is 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as 

untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.

As the trial court explained, the Agency proved, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Father’s parental rights should be terminated under Section 

2511(a)(2):

Father has been incarcerated the entire time that [Child] has 

been in the care of the Agency. Father’s decisions and 

actions resulted in Father’s lengthy and continuous 

incarceration and have caused Father to be unavailable to 

parent [Child] for virtually the entirety of [Child’s] life. While 

Father has undergone some counseling and programming 

during his incarceration, there is little evidence that Father is 

capable of parenting [Child]. Father as much as admitted 

that he is incapable as a parent despite his participation in 

such programming. Father has demonstrated lack of 
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capacity and a disturbing lack of interest in the past in respect 

to his older children, whom he never actively parented. 

Father’s engagement in a self-centered criminal lifestyle is 

the hallmark of his adulthood. Historically, in the context of 

his older children, Father forfeited every opportunity to 

perform parental duties, and even went so far as to deny 

paternity of one of his children (whom he now acknowledges) 

when custody litigation in respect to that child was well 

underway. In the instant case, Father and Mother dodged 

Father’s identification as the biological father of [Child] for 

months after [Child] was taken into the care of the Agency. 

[The trial] court must consider that past behavior is often the 

best predictor of future behavior. In such light, Father’s 

claims that he is now a “new creation by the grace of God, 

the lord and savior, Jesus Christ, and has been reborn by the 

blood” are disingenuous, are not credible, and are not 

persuasive.

Father’s affirmative steps in participating in programming 

during Father’s incarceration are laudable, but nevertheless 

are nominal. Such steps are wholly insufficient when 

considered in the context of all that remains to be done 

before Father could even possibly be in a position to provide

[Child] with timely permanency during [Child’s] formative 

years. Father, in essence, would need to pursue from scratch 

every objective contained in [Child’s] permanency plan [the 

trial] court awarded him almost two years ago. In the best 

possible scenario (from Father’s perspective) wherein he is 

paroled by the state parole board at the first opportunity and 

then he serves the approximately six months’ time remaining 

on his yet to be satisfied Berks County sentence, he could not 

even begin that process until [Child] is three and a half years 

old. Father displayed a profound lack of understanding of 

child development and lack of empathy for [Child] when he 

expressed a belief that [Child] would suffer no trauma if 

[Child] is removed from the only home he has ever known to 

be placed in Father’s care.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/20, at 18-20 (citations omitted).
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We conclude that the trial court was well-within its discretion when it 

concluded that Father met the conditions for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a)(2). Father’s claim to the contrary fails.

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under 

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under 

section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are 

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and 

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re 

E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning 

the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental 

bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and 

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where 
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direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis: 

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were 

the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis 

would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare 

child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able 

to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely 

disavow a parent . . . Nor are we of the opinion that the 

biological connection between [the parent] and the children 

is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in connection with 

a child’s feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto

beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of 

parenthood is more important in terms of the development 

of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional health than 

the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs of the 

child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary termination 

of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with 

mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). 

Our Supreme Court has stated that the mere existence of a bond or 

attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a 

termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often 

harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” See In re: 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 
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535 (Pa. Super. 2008)). The Supreme Court stated, “[t]he continued 

attachment to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through 

abuse and neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders 

which are harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” See In 

re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re Involuntary Termination of 

C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 410, 418 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)). 

While Father may claim to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We stated in In re Z.P., 

a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will 

summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. 

Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his 

child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in 

a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004).

Here, the trial court explained, termination of Father’s parental rights 

would be in the best interests of Child:

While Father sought visitation with [Child] at the state 

correctional institution where he was housed (and [the trial 

court] sought and eventually ordered an appropriate 

mechanism for such visitation to occur), the reality is that 

Father is not known to [Child] and [Child] could not have a 

bond of any sort with Father. Based upon the totality of the 

circumstances, [Child] will suffer no measurable negative 

consequence stemming from the termination of Father’s 
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parental rights. Rather, [Child] has been in the capable 

hands of his resource parents who have supplied his 

emotional and physical needs and who have nursed him back 

from the prenatal injuries inflicted upon him through his 

biological parents’ drug-saturated lifestyle. [Child] deserves 

proper parenting and the fulfillment of [Child’s] potential in a 

permanent, healthy, and safe environment. 

[Child] must remain in the nurturing, loving, and stable home 

of his resource family. It is in [Child’s] best interest that 

Father’s parental rights [be] terminated.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/20, at 23.

Our review of the record demonstrates that there is sufficient, 

competent evidence in the record that supports the trial court’s factual and 

legal determinations. Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision. In 

re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s decree terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.

Decrees affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2020