## F I LED United States C ourt of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 18,200 6 Elisab eth A. Shumaker C l erk of C ourt PU BL I SH UNI TED S TATES COURT OF APP EALS

TENTH C IR C U IT B O V Y H E M, P eti ti o n er, v. D O U G L A S S M A U R E R , In ter im F ield D i r ect or , U ni t ed St at es I m m i gr at i on a n d Cus t o ms En fo r c e me n t , UN I TED S T AT E S I M M I GR AT I ON AND CU STOM S ENFORC EM ENT, R espon den t s. N o. 05- 9555

P et i t i on for R evi ew ( B I A N o. A 25 172 699) O n T ran sfer of a P eti ti on for a W ri t ofH ab eas C orp u s

from t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t ri ct C ourt for t he D i s t r i c t of

C ol or ado ( D . C . N o. 04- M K - 2467) L au ra L . L ichter, L ichter & A sso ciates, D en v er, C o lorad o , fo r th e P eti ti o n er. D o n a ld E . K e e n e r, D e p u tyD ire c to r, U n ited S tate s D e p a rtm e n t o f Ju stic e , C iv il D i vi s i on, O ffi ce of

I m m i gr at i on L i t i gat i on ( A l i s on M ar i e I goe, Seni orL i t i gat i on C ou nsel , w i th h i m on the b ri ef), W ashi ng t on , D . C . , for the R espon den t s. B efor e HENR Y , HOLL OW AY , and LU CE RO , C i rcui tJudg es. LU CE RO , C i r cui tJ udge.- 2-

B ovyH em fi r s tent er ed thi s countryas a C ambodi an r efuge e i n 1981 and has been a l egal r es i dentevers i nce. I n 1990, H em w as i nvol ved i n a ca racc i dent w hi ch l efthi m a par apl egi c. Foury ear s l at er , he w as convi ct ed of a s s aul t i ng a p o li ce o fficer w h en h e re fu sed to let go o f a tr affic sign an d g rab b ed the o fficer’s s hi r t , t ear i ng i tas he fe l l fr om hi s w heel chai rt o the gr ound. I n 1999, the I m m i gr at i on and N atur al i zat i on Ser vi ce ( “I N S”) began r emoval pr ocee di ngs agai ns thi m . H em prot es t ed hi s r emoval and s oughtr el i ef unde r§ 212( c) of the Im m igrati o n an d N ati o n ali tyA ct (“IN A ”). 8 U . S . C . 1 1 8 2 (c). S ec ti o n 2 1 2 (c), w hi ch has s i nce be en r epea l ed, gr ant ed the A tt or neyG ener al di s cr et i on t o s t ay deport at i on pr ocee di ngs br oughtt o r emove an al i en w ho has been c onvi ct ed of a n “aggr avat ed fe l ony . ” A n I m m i gr at i on J udge ( “I J ”) gr ant ed H em a w ai verof i nadmi s s i bi l i tyunder§ 212( c) , butw as s ubs equent l yr ever s ed bythe B oar d of Im m igrati o n A p p ea ls ( “B IA ”). In the int eri m of H em ’s con vict i on and the rem ov al proceed i ng s, C on gress pas s ed the I l l egal I m m i gr antR eform and I m m i gr antR es pons i bi l i tyA ctof 1996 (“ II R IR A ” ). S e c tio n 3 0 4 (b ) o f II R IR A re p e a le d § 2 1 2 (c ) d is c re tio n a ry re lie f. S h o rtlyth e re a f

ter , the A tto rn e yG e n e ra l in terp re ted § 3 0 4 (b ) to a p p ly retroact i vely , and authori zed the IN S t o inst i tute r em ov al proceed i ng s agai nst ali en s li k e H em , w h o se a g g rav ated assa u ltco n v ict ion s p re-d ated IIR IR A ’s- 3-

e ffe c tiv e d a te. T h is w a s fo llo w e d b yI.N .S . v . S t. C yr, 5 3 3 U .S . 2 8 9 (2 0 0 1 ), in w hi ch the Supr eme C our thel d thatappl i cat i on of I I R I R A § 304( b) w oul d be i m perm i s s i bl yr etr oact i ve t o al i ens w hos e aggr avat ed fe l onyconvi ct i ons fol l ow ed f ro m g u ilty p le a s . S t. C yr le f

t u n a n sw e re d a k e yq u e stio n : is § 3 0 4 (b ) im p e rm iss ib ly retroac ti v e to a li en s w h o se a g g rav ated fe lon yco n v ict ion s fo ll o w ed fro m jury tri al s? T his i ssue has no w been add res sed bynu m erous l ow er court s. T hese court s have di ver ged on w hether , and t o w hatext ent , l i t i gant s m us ts how they r el i ed on pr e- I I R I R A l aw t o s us t ai n an I I R I R A r etr oact i vi tycl ai m . T he Thi r d, Four th, and Si xth C i r cui t s r equi r e thata r eas onabl e l i t i gantcoul d have

“ o bjec tiv e lyre lied ” o n th e a v a ilab ili tyo f § 2 1 2 (c ) in a g iv e n situ a tio n . T h e F irst, S e c o n d , an d E lev e n th C irc u its d e m a n d th a t li tig a n ts d e m o n stra te th e ya c tu a lly r el i ed on the ava i l abi l i tyof s uch r el i ef. B eca us e the form eri nt erpr et at i on i s a fa r m or e per s uas i ve r eadi ng of the Supr eme C our t ’ s r etr oact i vi tycas es , w e conc l ude thatan obj ect i ve s how i ng of r el i ance i s the appr opr i at e rul e. A ppl y i ng thatrul e, w e di s agr ee w i th the maj or i tyof ci r cui t s thathave c oncl uded thatl i t i gant s w ho pr ocee d t o t r i al have nots uffe r ed r etr oact i ve effec t s underI I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) . I ns t ead, w e conc l ude thata defendantw ho pr ocee ds t o tr i al butfor goes hi s r i ghtt o appea l w hen § 212( c) r el i ef w as pot ent i al l yavai l abl e has s uffe r ed r etr oact i ve effec t s underI I R I R A . W e ther efor e R EV ER SE the B IA ’sS. D . C odi fi ed Law s § 22- 18- 1. 1( 3) t hen pr ovi ded: 1 A nyper s on w ho . . . [a] t t empt s t o caus e orknow i ngl ycaus es any bodi l yi nj uryt o a l aw enfor cementoffi cerorotherpubl i c off i cer engage d i n t he per form ance of the off i cer ’ s dut i es . . . i s gui l tyof a g g ra v a te d a s s a u lt. A g g ra v a te d a s s a u lt is a C la s s 3 fe lo n y .

- 4- d e ter m in a tio n th a t S t. C yr is in a p p lica b le to H e m b e c a u se h e d id n o t p lea d g u ilty and RE M AND . I H e m is a n a tiv e o f C a m b o d ia w h o w a s a d m itt e d to th e U .S . as a re fu g e e in 1 9 8 1 w h e n h e w a s s e v e n y e a rs o ld a n d th e re a ft e r b e c a m e a p e rm a n e n t r e s id e n t. O n A pr i l 26, 1994, H em , a par apl egi c, w as appr oache d by a pol i ce offi ceras he w as “hor s i ng ar ound” w i t h a tr affi c s i gn. A ft erbei ng t ol d t hathe w oul d be t i cket ed i fhe di d notl etgo oft he tr affi c s i gn, H em w heel ed aw ay fr om t he o ffic e r, b u t th e o ffic e r c h a se d H e m a n d p u lled h im fro m h is w h e e l ch a ir. W h ile H em w as bei ng pul l ed fr om hi s chai r , he gr abbed the offi cer ’ s s hi r tt o s t eady h i ms e l f , r i p p i n g h i s u n i fo r m i n t h e p r o c e s s . He wa s t h e r e a ft e ri n d i c t e d o n t wo count s ofaggr avat ed as s aul ti n Sout h D akot a. E ach c ountcarr i ed a m axi m um se n ten c e o f fifte e n y e a rs. S .D . C o d ified L a w s § 2 2 -6 -1 . F o llo w in g a ju ry trial, He m wa s c o n v i c t e d o fo n e c o u n to fa g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l ti n v i o l a t i o n o fS . D. C odi fi ed Law s § 22- 18- 1. 1( 3) . H e r ece i ved a s us pended s ent ence oft hr ee 1 y e a rs, b u t v io late d th e c o n d iti o n s o f su sp e n sio n , an d se rv e d a lm o st th re e y e a rs in pr i s on. H ad H em been c onvi ct ed on ei t hercount , he face d a m axi m um s ent enceSect i on 212( c) w as r epea l ed byI I R I R A § 304( b) , and w as r epl ace d w i t h a 2 n e w fo rm o f

d isc re tio n a ryre lief

c a lled c a n c e llatio n o f re m o v a l, co d ified a t 8 U . S. C . § 1229b.

- 5- o f fifte e n y e a rs . H e m d id n o t a p p e a l h is c o n v ic tio n . On S e p t e mb e r2 2 , 1 9 9 9 , t h e I NS b e g a n r e mo v a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s tHe m, char gi ng hi m as bei ng s ubj ectt o r em oval under8 U . S. C . § 1227( a) ( 2) ( i i i ) , w hi ch m andat ed r em oval ofal i ens w ho have be en convi ct ed ofan “a ggr avat ed fel ony” (a “ crim e o f vio lenc e” for w h ich th e term o f i m p ri so n m en t w as a t l ea st on e y ea r). H e m a p p e a re d b e fo re a n im m ig ra tio n ju d g e a n d c o n c e d e d th a t h is aggr avat ed as s aul t convi ct i on qual i fi ed hi m for r em oval . H e s oughtr el i efon s e v e ra l g ro u n d s : w ith h o ld in g o f ( n o w “ re s tr ic tio n o n ” ) r e m o v a l u n d e r 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 3 1 (b)(3 ); reli ef from rem o v al un d er the C o n v en ti o n ag ains t T o rt u re (“C A T ”); and a “ § 2 1 2 (c ) w a iv e r” o f i n a d m is s a b ility u n d e r 8 U .S .C . § 1 1 8 2 (c). 2 T he I J r ul ed thatH em ’ s offens e di d noti nvol ve a c r i m e w hi ch w as “p arti cu larl y seriou s, ” thu s estab li sh ing H em ’s eli g ibil it y for § 1231( b) ( 3) w i t hhol di ng, and r el i effr om r em oval underC A T . I n denyi ng t he appl i cat i on for w ith h o lding o f rem o v al un d er § 1231( b) ( 3) , t he I J found t hatt he har m H em s uffer ed di d notr i s e t o t he l evel ofper s ecut i on. H em ’ s appl i cat i on forr el i effr om r em oval underC A T w as al s o deni ed by the I J on t he bas i s t hatH em had not sh o w n th a t itw a s m o re lik e ly th a n n o t h e w o u ld b e to rtu re d if re tu rn e d to C a m b o d ia .- 6-

I n addr es s i ng t he § 2 1 2 ( c ) wa i v e r , wh i c h wa s a v a i l a b l e t o He m a tt h e t i me h e wa s c o n v i c t e d , t h e I J n o t e d t h a ta l t h o u g h s u c h r e l i e fwa s e l i mi n a t e d b y I I RI RA i n 1996, t he Supr em e C our thad hel d t hatappl i cat i on ofI I R I R A t o defeatan al i en’ s pr eexi s t i ng el i gi bi l i t y fora § 2 1 2 (c ) w a iv e r w o u ld b e im p e rm iss ib ly r etr oact i ve undert he pr i nci pl es ofL andgr afv. U SI Fi l m Pr oduct s , 511 U . S. 244 ( 1994) , and i t s pr ogeny. See I . N . S. v. St . C yr , 533 U . S. 289 ( 2001) . C r edi t i ng t hat St . C yr i nv olved an al i en w ho had pled t o the und erl ying rem ov able offense ra th e r th a n b e in g fo u n d g u ilt y a t trial (a s H e m w a s), th e IJ n e v e rth e les s re fu se d to r ul e the di s t i nct i on di s pos i t i ve due t o cons t i t ut i onal m i s gi vi ngs aboutm aki ng u n fa v o ra b le d is tin c tio n s b a s e d o n a d e fe n d a n t’ s e x e rc is e o f h is ri g h t to ju ry tr ia l. A fte r c o n sid e rin g H e m ’s e x ten siv e fa m ily ties to th e U .S ., h is lo n g re sid e n c e in t he countr y, and hi s phys i cal ci r cum s t ance s , t he I J gr ant ed the § 2 1 2 (c) w aive r, a llo w in g H e m to s ta y in th e U .S . O n appea l oft he § 212( c) det er m i nat i on t o t he B I A , t he I N S ar gued that b e c a u se th e u n d e rly in g c o n v ictio n w a s o b tain e d b y trial ra th e r th a n b y p lea , S t. C y r w a s in a p p lic a b le , a n d th u s th a t H e m ’s c a s e ra is e d n o re tr o a c tiv ity c o n c e rn s . T h e B IA ag ree d , rev erse d the IJ’s g ran t of § 212( c) r el i ef , and or der ed H em r em oved t o C am bodi a. H em s oughtr evi ew oft he B I A ’ s deci s i on by w ay ofa 28 U . S. C . § 2241 pet i t i on fi l ed i n di s tr i ctcour t . T hatcour t , how ever , di d notr ul e on t he pet i t i on. I ns t ead, i ttr ans ferr ed the pet i t i on t o t hi s cour ti n acc or d w i t h t he r ece ntR E A L I D A ctam endm ent s el i m i nat i ng habea s r evi ew ofB I A r em ovalT he R E A L I D A ct , i nt eral i a, s hi ft ed ce r t ai n i m m i gr at i on di s put es 3 form er l yr ai s ed thr ough habea s corpus i n the di s tr i ctcourt s t o the court s of appea l s and conve r t ed them i nt o pet i t i ons forr evi ew . Pub. L . N o. 109- 13, 119 S ta t. 2 3 1 (2 0 0 5 ). C o n g re s s a d d e d a n e w p ro v is io n c o d ifie d a t 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (a) (5) . S ub sect i on (a) (5) , enti t l ed “E xclusi ve M eans of R eview , ” provides: N o tw ith stan d ing an yo ther p rov isi o n o f law (st atuto ryo r no n statu tory ), i ncl udi ng s ect i on 2241 of t i t l e 28, U ni t ed St at es C ode, oranyotherhabea s corpus pr ovi s i on, and s ect i ons 1361 and 1651 of s uch t i t l e, a pet i t i on for re v iew filed w ith a n a p p ro p ria te c o u rt o f a p p e a ls in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th is s ect i on s hal l be the s ol e and e xcl us i ve means forj udi ci al r evi ew of an or der of r emoval ent er ed ori s s ued underanypr ovi s i on of thi s chapt er , exce ptas pr ovi ded i n s ubs ect i on ( e) of thi s s ect i on. T hus , thi s s ect i on m akes a pet i t i on forr evi ew t o an appe l l at e courtt he s ol e means of r evi ew of an or derof r emoval i s s ued undert he I N A , and s peci fi cal l yexcl udes r evi ew underthe habe as s t atut es . T he A ctappl i es t o “ca s es i n w hi ch the fi nal admi ni s tr at i ve or derof r emoval , depor t at i on, orexcl us i on w as i s s ued befor e, on, oraft erthe dat e of the ena ctm entof thi s di vi s i on. ” 8 U . S. C . § 1252.

- 7- decis i on s. 3 I n h i s h a b e a s p e t i t i o n b e fo r e t h e d i s tr i c tc o u r t , H e m a r g u e d t h a tS t . C yr contr ol s hi s cas e, and thus , he i s ent i t l ed t o s eek § 2 1 2 (c) reli ef. U n d er fo rm er § 212( c) of the I N A , deport abl e al i ens w ho had ac crued s even y ear s of l aw ful perm anentr es i dence i n t he U ni t ed St at es coul d r eques tdi s cr et i onaryr el i ef f r om deport at i on byar gui ng thatthe equi t i es w ei ghed i n favorof thei rr emai ni ng i n t he U ni t ed St at es . E ven an a l i en deport abl e bec aus e he ha d been c onvi ct ed of a n a g g ra v a ted fe lo n y , se e 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 2 7 (a )(2 )(A )(iii), w a s e lig ib le fo r th is di s cr et i onaryr el i ef i f he s erved a t erm of i m pr i s onm entl es s t han fi ve y ear s . See 8 U . S. C . § 1182( c) . T her e w as al s o a s tr ong l i kel i hood t hatt hi s r el i ef w oul d be- 8-

gr ant ed; i ndeed, the A t t orneyG ener al gr ant ed i ti n overhal f of a l l cas es i n w hi ch i tw as s ought . See St . C yr , 533 U . S. at296 & n. 5. Fact or s deemed favor abl e for gr ant i ng r el i ef i ncl ude fa m i l yt i es w i thi n the U ni t ed St at es , r es i dence of l ong d u ra tio n in th is c o u n try , ev id e n c e o f h a rd sh ip to th e im m ig ra n t’s fa m ilya s a re su lt o f d ep o rt ati o n , an d a stab le historyo f e m p loym en t. S ee In re M arin, 16 I & N D ec . 5 8 1 , 5 8 4 -85 (B IA 1 9 7 8 ). S e c tio n 3 0 4 (b ) o f

IIR IR A re p e a led § 2 1 2 (c ) re lief e n tirely , rep lac in g it w ith a p ro c e d u re c a lled “ c a n c e llatio n o f re m o v a l.” S e e 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 2 9 b . T h is narr ow erform of r el i ef i s notavai l abl e t o an al i en convi ct ed of a nyaggr avat ed fe l o n y. I I R I R A a l s o r e tr o a c t i v e l y e x p a n d e d th e d e fi n i t i o n o f “ a g g r a v a t e d fe l o n y” t o i ncl ude doze ns m or e offens es , i ncl udi ng m i s demeanorand l ow - l evel fel ony o ffe n s e s . S e e 8 U .S .C . § 1 1 0 1 (a )( 4 3 ). I n i t s oppos i t i on t o H em’s pet i t i on forr el i ef unde r§ 212( c) , the governm entar gues thatSt . C yr ’ s baragai ns tr etr oact i ve appl i cat i on of § 304( b) of IIR IR A d o es n o t app lyto p eti ti o n ers w h o , li k e H em , h ad b ee n co n v ict ed in a ju ry tr i al and notpur s uantt o a gui l typl ea. W e or der ed s uppl ement al br i efi ng on t he ro le o f re lian c e o n p rio r la w in th e L a n d g ra f re tro a c tiv itya n a ly sis . In h is s uppl ement al br i ef, H em urge s t hatw e fol l ow the Four th C i r cui ti n O l atunj i v. A s hcr oft , 387 F. 3d 383 ( 4th C i r . 2004) , and conc l ude thatno r el i ance on pr i orl aw i s nece s s aryfora s t atut e t o have a n i m perm i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effec t . H em ar gues- 9-

a ltern a tiv e lyth a t w e sh o u ld fo llo w th e T h ird C irc u it i n P o n n a p u la v . A sh c ro f t, 3 7 3 F .3 d 4 8 0 (3 rd C ir. 2 0 0 4 ), to c o n c lu d e th a t o n lyo bjec tiv e lyre a so n a b le r el i ance on pr i orl aw i s nece s s aryt o as s er ta r etr oact i vi tycl ai m . T he G overnm ent as ks us t o fol l ow t he maj or i tyof otherci r cui t s thathave c oncl uded St . C yrdoes n o t app lyto d efen d an ts w h o se “ ag g rav ated fe lon y ” c o n v ict ion s resu lt ed fro m jury tr ia ls a n d n o t g u ilty p le a s . H em al s o ar gues thatthe I J i ncorr ect l yfai l ed t o appl ya pr es um pt i on t hat hi s l i fe a nd l i bertyw oul d be thr eat ened upon hi s r etur n beca us e he s uffe r ed “p erse cu ti o n ” in th e p ast. 8 C . F . R . § 2 0 8 . 1 6 (b)(1 )(I ). W e conc l ude thatL andgr af, St . C yr , and the Supr eme C our t ’ s other r etr oact i vi tycas es r equi r e onl yobj ect i ve, and nots ubj ect i ve, r el i ance t o s us t ai n a r etr oact i vi tycl ai m , and thatl i t i gant s w ho pr ocee d t o tr i al butabandon thei rr i ght t o a p p e a l wh e n § 2 1 2 ( c ) r e l i e f i s a v a i l a b l e h a v e o bj e c t i v e l yr e l i e d o n p r e - I I RI RA l aw . W e do notr eac h the othergr ounds on appea l beca us e ournot ed r ever s al re in s ta te s th e IJ ’s g ra n t o f § 2 1 2 (c ) r e lie f.

II W h en a statute is am b igu o u s, w e d efer to a n ag en cy ’s st atuto ry i nt erpr et at i on. C hevr on U . S. A . v. N atur al R es . D ef. C ounci l , 467 U . S. 837, 843 ( 1984) . W hen det erm i ni ng ques t i ons of r etr oact i vi ty , how ever , ourr evi ew i s de n o v o . S t. C yr, 5 3 3 U .S . at 3 2 0 n .4 5 . “B e c a u se a sta tu te th a t is a m b ig u o u s w ith- 10-

r es pectt o r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on i s cons trued underourpr ece dentt o be unambi guous l ypr os pect i ve, ther e i s , forC hevr on purpos es , no ambi gui tyi n s uch a statute fo r an ag en cyto reso lve.” Id . (cit ati o n s an d q u o tat ion s m ark s o m itted); s ee a l s o A r eval o v. A s hcr oft , 344 F. 3d 1, 10 ( 1s tC i r . 2003) ( expl ai ni ng that

“ c o u rts, ra th e r th a n a g e n c ies , are b e st e q u ip p e d to m a k e th e c o n stitu tio n a lly tin g e d ju d g m e n t ca lls in h e re n t in re tro a c tiv ityd e ter m in a tio n s” ); S a rm ien to C i s ner os v. U ni t ed St at es A t t orneyG ener al , 381 F. 3d 1277, 1280 ( 11th C i r . 2004) ( s ame) ; Oj eda- T err aza s v. A s hcr oft , 290 F. 3d 292, 300 n. 53 ( 5th C i r . 2002) (sam e). A A s J us t i ce St oryobs erved, t he Supr eme C our thas l ong di s favor ed re tro a c tiv e sta tu tes b e c a u se “ [ r]e tro sp e c tiv e law s a re , ind e e d , g e n e ra llyu nju st; and, as has been for ci bl ys ai d, nei theracc or d w i th s ound l egi s l at i on norw i th t he fundament al pr i nci pl es of the s oci al compact . ” East ern E nt erpr i s es v. A pfel , 524 U . S. 498, 533 ( 1998) ( quot i ng 2 J . St or y , C om m ent ar i es on the C ons t i tut i on § 13 98 (5th ed . 18 91 )) . R et roact i ve legi sl at i on “present s probl em s of un fai rness thatar e more s er i ous than thos e pos ed bypr os pect i ve l egi s l at i on, beca us e i tcan depr i ve ci t i zens of l egi t i m at e expe ct at i ons and ups ets et t l ed tr ans act i ons . ” G eneral M otor s C orp. v. R om ei n, 50 3 U . S . 18 1, 19 1 (199 2). T hu s, du e process “pr ot ect s the i nt er es t s i n fai rnot i ce a nd r epos e thatm aybe compr om i s ed by- 11-

re tro a c tiv e leg isla tio n .” L a n d g ra f, 5 1 1 U .S . at 2 6 6 . R e tro a c tiv ityis s u fficie n tly d isfav o red in the law that “a justi fica ti o n su ffici en t t o v ali d ate a statu te’s pr os pect i ve appl i cat i on undert he [D ue Pr oces s ] C l aus e maynots uffi ce t o w arr ant its re tr o a c tiv e a p p lic a tio n .” Id . (i n te rn a l q u o ta tio n a n d c ita tio n o m itte d ). L a n d g ra f

e sta b lish e d a tw o p a rt tes t fo r d e ter m in in g w h e th e r a sta tu te appl i es r etr oact i vel y . Fi r s t , w e as k “w hetherC ongr es s has expr es s l ypr es cr i bed the s t atut e’ s pr oper[t empora l ] r eac h. ” I d. at280. Second, i f the courtcannot as cert ai n congr es s i onal i nt ent , w e cons i derw hetherthe s t atut e has a r etr oact i ve effect . I d. I f a r etr oact i ve effec texi s t s , “ourtr adi t i onal pr es um pt i on t eac hes t hat it d o e s n o t g o v e rn a b s e n t c le a r c o n g re s s io n a l in te n t fa v o ri n g s u c h a re s u lt.” Id . U n d e r L a n d g ra f, a p ro v isio n h a s a re tro a c tiv e e ffe c t if it “ w o u ld im p a ir ri gh t s a partypo sses sed w hen he acted, i ncrease a party ’s l i abil i tyfor past conduct , ori m pos e new dut i es w i th r es pectt o tr ans act i ons al r eadycompl et ed. ” I d. ; s ee a l s o H ughes A i r cr aftC o. v. U ni t ed St at es ex. r el . Schum er , 520 U . S. 939, 9 4 7 (1 9 9 7 ) ( s ta tin g th a t th e a b o v e lis t is illu s tr a tiv e b u t n o t e x h a u s tiv e ). H o w e v e r, “[ a ] sta tu te d o e s n o t o p e ra te ‘ re tro sp e c tiv e ly ’ m e re lyb e c a u se it i s a p p lied in a c a se a risin g f ro m c o n d u c t an ted a tin g th e sta tu te’ s e n a c tm e n t o r u p se ts expec t at i ons . R ather , the courtm us tdet erm i ne w hetherthe new pr ovi s i on att ache s new l egal cons equenc es t o event s compl et ed befor e i t s enac t m ent . ” L a n d g ra f, 5 1 1 U .S . at 2 6 9 -7 0 (in ter n a l cita tio n s o m itt e d ). In m a k in g th is- 12-

det erm i nat i on, court s s houl d be gui ded by“fa m i l i arcons i der at i ons of fa i rnot i ce, r eas onabl e r el i ance , and s ett l ed expe ct at i ons . ” Landgr af, 511 U . S. at270. In IN S v . S t. C yr, th e C o u rt a p p lied L a n d g ra f ’s tw o p a rt re tro a c tiv ity a n a lysis to II R IR A ’s § 3 0 4 (b ), t h e s e c tio n th a t r e p e a le d fo rm e r I N A § 2 1 2 (c ). A d d ressing the fir st st ep o f L an d g raf, the C o u rtco n clud ed sec ti o n § 3 0 4 (b) – w h ich sim p lysta tes th a t “S e c tio n 2 1 2 (c ) (8 U .S .C . § 1 1 8 2 (c )) is r e p e a led ” – d id nots how C ongr es s ’ s unequi vocal i nt entt o appl ythe r epea l r etr oact i vel yt o al i ens l i ke St . C yrw ho had pl eade d gui l tybefor e the r epea l of § 212( c) . St . C yr , 533 U . S. at320. Pr ocee di ng t o the s econd s t ep, the C our tdet erm i ned thatr etr oact i ve appl i cat i on of § 304( b) w oul d have a n “i m perm i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effec tforal i ens w ho, l i ke [St . C yr ] , w er e convi ct ed pur s uantt o a pl ea a gr eementata t i m e w hen th e irp le a w o u ld n o t h a v e re n d e re d th e m in e lig ib le fo r § 2 1 2 (c ) r e lie f.” Id . Speci fi cal l y , the C our thel d: IIR IR A ’s e lim in a tio n o f a n yp o ss ib ili tyo f

§ 2 1 2 (c ) re lief

fo r p e o p le w ho ent er ed i nt o pl ea a gr eement s w i th the expe ct at i on t hatthey w o u ld b e e lig ib le fo r su c h re lief c lea rly“ a ttac h e s a n e w d isa b ili ty , in r es pectt o tr ans act i ons orcons i der at i ons al r eadypas t . ” Landgr af, 511 U . S. at269. Pl ea a gr eement s i nvol ve a qui d pr o quo betw een a c r i mi n a l d e fe n d a n ta n d t h e g o v e rn me n t . I n e x c h a n g e fo rs o me per cei ved bene fi t , defe ndant s w ai ve s ever al of thei rcons t i tut i onal r i ght s ( i ncl udi ng t he r i ghtt o a tr i al ) and gr antthe governm ent num er ous t angi bl e bene fi t s , s uch as pr om pt l yi m pos ed puni s hm ent w i thoutthe expe ndi tur e of pr os ecut or i al r es our ces . T her e ca n be l i t t l e doubtthat , as a gene r al m at t er , al i en defendant s cons i der i ng w hethert o ent eri nt o a pl ea a gr eementar e ac ut el yaw ar e of the im m ig ra tio n c o n s e q u e n c e s o f th e irc o n v ic tio n s .- 13-

Id. at 32 1 -22 (som e intern al qu o tat ion m ark s an d cit ati o n s o m itted). B S in c e S t. C yr, lo w e r c o u rts h a v e sp lito v e r tw o q u e stio n s e ss e n tial to th is cas e: w hetherr el i ance m us tbe es t abl i s hed obj ect i vel y , s ubj ect i vel y , oreven a t a ll, a n d w h e th e r p e tit io n e rs w h o p ro c e e d to trial h a v e su ffe re d re tro a c tiv e e ffe c ts u n d e r§ 3 0 4 ( b ) o f

I I RI RA . F o l l o wi n g t h e T h i r d , F o u r th , a n d S i x th Ci r c u i t s , we c o n c lu d e th a t o n lyo bjec tiv e lyre a so n a b le r e lian c e o n p rio r la w is n e c e ss a ryto s us t ai n a r etr oact i vi tychal l enge. Fort hatr eas on, on the s econd i s s ue w e di s agr ee w i th the maj or i tyof ci r cui t s thathave c oncl uded St . C yrdoes notappl yt o al i ens w h o c h a llen g e d th e ir a g g ra v a ted fe lo n yc o n v ictio n s b ye x e rc isin g th e ir rig h t to j urytr i al . W e conc l ude thatj us tas for egoi ng orexer ci s i ng a r i ghtt o j uryt r i al can de m ons tr at e obj ect i vel yr eas onabl e r el i ance , t hos e w ho pr ocee d t o tr i al but for go t hei rr i ghtt o appea l have s uffe r ed i m perm i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effec t s under IIR IR A § 3 0 4 (b). Fol l ow i ng the Supr eme C our t ’ s anal y s i s i n St . C yr , t he Thi r d, Four th, and S ix th C irc u its h a v e h e ld th a t d e ter m in in g w h e th e r a sta tu te h a s re tro a c tiv e e ffe c ts d o e s n o te n t a i l a n i n q u i r yi n t o l i t i g a n t s ’ a c tu a l s u bj e c t i v e r e l i a n c e o n p r i o rl a w, butr ather , a r evi ew of w hatr eas onabl e l i t i gant s w oul d cons i deri n a gi ven situ ati o n . S ee , e.g., O latu nji , 3 8 7 F . 3 d at 39 6 (ho lding in the co n text o f a n o n - § 2 1 2 (c ) IIR IR A re tro a c tiv ityc h a llen g e th a t, i f re lian c e w e re re q u ire d , “w e w o u ld- 14-

insistat m o st up o n o bjecti v elyrea so n ab le reli an ce [a n d n o t] su bjecti v e re li an ce ”); T h a q i v . Je n ife r, 3 7 7 F .3 d 5 0 0 , 5 0 4 n .2 (6 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) (“ n o t[ in g ] th a t, un d e r S t. C yr, th e [ a lien ] n e e d n o t d e m o n stra te a c tu a l re lian c e u p o n th e im m ig ra tio n law s in o rd e r to d e m o n stra te a n im p e rm iss ib le r e tro a c tiv e e ffe c t”) ; P o n n a p u la v . A sh c ro f t, 373 F. 3d 480, 493 ( 3d C i r . 2004) ( “the Supr eme C our thas avoi ded an ‘ actual re lian c e ’ fo rm u latio n in fa v o r o f a ‘re a so n a b le r e lian c e ’ fo rm u latio n in its r etr oact i vi tyanal y s i s ”) ; s ee a l s o G ar ci a- R ami r ez v. G onzal es , 423 F. 3d 935, 943- 44 ( 9th C i r . 2005) ( tw o-j udge conc ur r ence i n panel deci s i on di s pos ed of on other gr ound; hol di ng i n the cont extof a non- § 212( c) I I R I R A r etr oact i vi tychal l enge that obj ect i velyreas on able r el i ance o n p ri or l aw i s suffi ci ent) . F or these ci rcui t s, re tro a c tiv itya n a ly sis c e n ter s o n w h e th e r th e re lev a n t circ u m sta n c e s g a v e rise to in ter e sts u p o n w h ich it w o u ld h a v e b e e n o bjec tiv e lyre a so n a b le to re lyo n th e sta te of pr i orl aw , and noton w hetheractual r el i ance on pr i orl aw has been demonstr at ed. T hi s anal y s i s “tur n[s ] on the s t at e of the l aw ” and noton “s ubj ect i ve expe ct at i ons . ” G ar ci a- R ami r ez, 423 F. 3d at944 n. 1. A bandoni ng the Supr eme C our t ’ s cons i s t entus e of obj ect i ve r el i ance i n t he c o n tex t o f

re tro a c tiv itya n a ly sis , the F irst, S e c o n d , an d E lev e n th C i r cui t s have r equi r ed thatthe pet i t i onerdemonstr at e hi s ow n, i ndi vi dual r el i ance on the avai l abi l i tyof § 212( c) r el i ef. See Sw abyv. A s hcr oft , 357 F. 3d 156, 161- 62 ( 2d C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) (h o ld in g th a t IIR IR A ’s r e p e a l o f IN A § 2 1 2 (c ) w a s n o t im p e rm iss ib ly- 15-

r etr oact i ve bec aus e, unl i ke St . C yr , the pet i t i onerchos e t o pr ocee d t o tr i al i ns t ead o f a g re e in g to a p lea a n d th e re fo re d id n o t “d e trim e n tallyre lyo n th e a v a ilab ili ty o f § 2 1 2 (c) reli ef”); R an k ine v . R en o , 3 1 9 F . 3 d 9 3 , 1 0 0 (2d C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) (sam e); D i as v. I N S, 311 F. 3d 456, 458 ( 1s tC i r . 2002) ( hol di ng thatI I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) w as noti m perm i s s i bl yr etr oact i ve t o pet i t i oner s w ho di d notr el yon pr e- I I R I R A l aw beca us e the “r etr oact i vi tyanal y s i s m us ti ncl ude an e xami nat i on of rel i ance” ) ( ci t i ng M at t i s v. R eno , 21 2 F . 3d 31 , 38 (1stC i r. 20 00 ) ( A l i en m ust have “ actual l yand r eas onabl yr el i ed” on a vai l abi l i tyof r el i ef forI I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) t o have r etr oact i ve effec t ) ; B r ooks v. A s hcr oft , 283 F. 3d 1268, 1274 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 2 ) (h o ld in g th a t th e re p e a l o f § 2 1 2 (c ) w a s n o t im p e rm iss ib ly r etr oact i ve bec aus e, unl i ke St . C yr , pet i t i oner“di d nots o choos e t o r el yupon t he a g r e e d u p o n t e r ms o f

a p l e a ” a n d b e c a u s e h i s c a s e d i d n o tp r e s e n t“ th e s a me conce rns of qui d pr o quo, benef i tforan exc hange, betw een a defe ndantand the governm ent ”) . A s di s cus s ed i n Sect i on I I . C bel ow , a r equi r ementthata pet i t i oner demonstr at e thathe ac tual l yr el i ed on § 212( c) tur ns the hi s t or i c pr es um pt i on a g a in s t r e tr o a c tiv e a p p lic a tio n o f s ta tu te s o n its h e a d . T he Four th and Seventh C i r cui t s have a l s o r ej ect ed r etr oact i vi tychal l enges t o I I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) , buthave done s o byel evat i ng the qui d pr o quo of the pl ea ba r gai n i nt o a pr er equi s i t e t o an I I R I R A r etr oact i vi tychal l enge. SeeW e r ecogni ze thatther e i s t ens i on betw een O l atunj i and C hamber s , but 4 o b serv e tha t th eyco n stru e d iffe ren t pro v isi o n s o f th e IN A . A s d iscu ssed m o re f u llyb e lo w , C h a m b e rs c o n c lu d e d th a t IIR IR A § 3 0 4 (b ) – th e p ro v isio n a t issu e in thi s cas e – i s noti m perm i s s i bl yr etr oact i ve t o al i ens w hos e aggr avat ed fe l ony c o n v ictio n s fo llo w e d ju rytrials a n d n o t g u iltyp lea s. 3 0 7 F .3 d a t 2 9 0 . O latu nji, deci ded tw o y ear s l at er , concl uded thatI I R I R A ’ s r edef i ni t i on of “a dm i s s i on” underI N A §101( a) ( 13) , w as i m perm i s s i bl yr etr oact i ve w i th r egar d t o al i ens , l i ke O l atunj i , w ho had pr evi ous l ypl ed gui l tyw i th the expe ct at i on thatt hei rgui l typl ea wo u l d n o tp r e v e n tth e m f r o m t a k i n g b r i e f

t r i p s a b r o a d . 3 8 7 F . 3 d a t3 9 7 . As d isc u ss e d b e lo w , O latu nji so c o n c lu d e d b yc o n stru in g L a n d g ra f a n d its p ro g e n yto im p o se n o re lian c e re q u ire m e n t w h a tso e v e r. T h is b ro a d re p u d iatio n o f re lian c e is pot ent i al l yi n confl i ctw i th t he r eas oni ng of C hamber s , w hi ch gi ves r el i ance a c e n tra l ro le in its a n a ly sis o f IIR IR A § 3 0 4 (b ). H o w e v e r, b e c a u se w e d o n o t re ly on the law of the F ou rth C i rcui tas pers uasi ve au tho ri ty , bu tm erel yci t e t hese cas es as i l l us tr at i ve of di ffe r entappr oache s t o r el i ance and r etr oact i vi ty , w e do n o t pu rsue the m att er f u rth er.

- 16- Ch a mb e r s v . Re n o , 3 0 7 F . 3 d 2 8 4 ( 4 th Ci r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( d i s c u s s e d i n f r a i n P a r tI I . D) ; 4 M o n ten e g ro v . A sh c ro f t, 35 5 F .3 d 1 0 3 5 , 1 0 3 7 (7 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ) (p e r c u ria m ). T h is anal y s i s t oo, i s over l ycons tr ai ned, i gnor i ng L andgr af’ s di r ect i on thatw e cons i der w hethera new s t atut e “w oul d i m pai rr i ght s a partypos s es s ed w hen he a ct ed, in c re a se a p a rty ’s lia b ili tyfo r p a st c o n d u c t, or im p o se n e w d u ties w ith re sp e c t to tr a n s a c tio n s a lr e a d yc o m p le te d .” L a n d g ra f, 5 1 1 U .S . a t 2 8 0 . C T h e fac ts of

L an d g raf

it self b eli e a n yn o ti o n that the S u p rem e C o u rt re q u ire s a sh o w in g o f a c tu a l re lian c e a s a p re re q u isite to su sta in a re tro a c tiv ity chal l enge. L andgr af c oncerned the pot ent i al r etr oact i vi tyof the C i vi l R i ght s A ct of 1991. 511 U . S. at247. L andgr af, t he pl ai nt i ff, s ued herform erempl oy erfor- 17-

cons truct i ve di s char ge, ar gui ng t hats exual har as s m entagai ns thercr eat ed a h o stile w o rk e n v iro n m e n t. Id . at 2 4 8 . H e r su it w a s d ism iss e d b e c a u se , d e sp ite the di s tr i ctcourt ’ s fi ndi ng t hatL andgr af de m ons tr at ed s exual har as s m ent , that har as s m entdi d notr es ul ti n anyconcr et e effec ton herempl oym ents t atus . I d. at 254. T he C i vi l R i ght s A ctof 1991 ca m e i nt o effectw hi l e Landgr af’ s appea l w as pendi ng i n the Fi fth C i r cui t . I d. at249. Sect i on 102 of the 1991 A ctcr eat ed a r i ghtt o r ecove rcompensa t oryand puni t i ve damages fori nt ent i onal di s cr i m i nat i on vi ol at i ve of Ti t l e V I I . I d. at253. T hi s new l egi s l at i on al s o perm i t t ed a pl ai nt i ff t o recov er dam ages w here there had been un l aw ful di scr i m i nati on i n the “‘ t erm s, condi t i ons , orpr i vi l eges of empl oym ent , ’ even though the di s cr i m i nat i on di d not in v o lv e a d isc h a rg e o r a lo ss o f p a y .” Id . at 2 5 5 . O n a p p e a l, L a n d g ra f so u g h t to h av e h er c ase rem an d ed fo r a d eterm ination o f c o m p en sato ryd am ag es u n d er § 102 of the 1991 A ct . T he Fi fth C i r cui tr ej ect ed Landgr af’ s ar gum entand the Supr eme C our taff

i r m ed, fi ndi ng the 1991 A ctdi d notappl yr etr oact i vel y . I d. at 249. B efor e appl y i ng the now - fami l i artw o par tt es t , the C our tnot ed that r etr oact i vi tyanal y s i s m us tal w ay s be i nform ed bya pr es um pt i on agai ns tgi vi ng sta tu tes re tro a c tiv e e ffe c t: [ P ]ro sp e c tiv ityre m a in s th e a p p ro p ria te d e fa u lt ru le. B e c a u se it a c c o rd s w ith w id e lyh e ld in tu iti o n s a b o u t h o w sta tu tes o rd in a rily oper at e, a pr es um pt i on agai ns tr etr oact i vi tyw i l l gener al l ycoi nci de w i th l egi s l at i ve and publ i c expe ct at i ons . R equi r i ng cl eari nt ent- 18-

as s ur es thatC ongr es s i t s el f has aff i r m at i vel ycons i der ed the pot ent i al unfai r nes s of r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on and det erm i ned thati ti s an acc ept abl e pr i ce t o payforthe count ervai l i ng benef i t s . Such a r equi r emental l ocat es t o C ongr es s r es pons i bi l i tyforfundament al po l i cyj ud gm ents con cerni ng the p roper t em po ral reach of st atutes , a n d h a s th e a d d iti o n a l v irtu e o f g iv in g leg isla to rs a p re d icta b le backgr ound rul e aga i ns tw hi ch t o l egi s l at e. I d. at272- 73. B eca us e C ongr es s di d notexpl i ci t l ypr ovi de forthe t empora l r eac h of the r el evantpor t i ons of the 1991 A ct , the C our tpr ocee ded t o the s econd s t ep of Landgr af. A ppl i cat i on of the 1991 A ctt o pr e- 1991 behavi orw oul d have i m perm i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effec t , the C our tconcl uded, beca us e r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on of the new compensa t or ydamage pr ovi s i ons w oul d “att ach a n im p o rt a n t n e w le g a l b u rd e n ” to T itle V II d e fe n d a n ts . Id . a t 2 8 3 . I n i t s s i ngl e r efe r ence t o the defendant ’ s pos s i bl e r el i ance upon pr e- 1991 law , the C o u rto b serv ed that “[ t] h e introd u cti o n o f a ri g h t t o co m p en sato ry d a m a g e s is a lso th e typ e o f leg a l ch a n g e th a t w o u ld h a v e a n im p a c t o n p riv a te p a rties ’ p lan n in g .” Id . at 2 8 2 . Y e t, i n a fo o tn o te im m e d iate lyfo llo w in g th is s ent ence , t he C our tw as car eful t o obs erve that“conc erns of unfa i rs urpr i s e and ups ett i ng expec t at i ons ar e att enuat ed i n the ca s e of i nt ent i onal empl oym ent di s cr i m i nat i on, w hi ch has been unl aw ful form or e than a ge ner at i on. ” I d. at282 n. 35 ( emphasi s added) . T he “a t t enuat ed” r ol e r el i ance pl ay ed i n L andgr af c an thus notbe pl aus i bl yr ead t o er ecta r el i ance pr er equi s i t e t o s us t ai ni ng a r e tr o a c t i v i tyc l a i m.- 19-

H ughes A i r cr aftC o. v. U ni t ed St at es ex r el . Schum er , the C our t ’ s next m aj orci vi l r etr oact i vi tydeci s i on, s i m i l ar l yfai l ed t o i m pos e anyr el i ance req u ir em en t on retroac ti v itych all en g es. 52 0 U . S . 9 3 9 (19 9 7 ). T h ere , the C o u rt cons i der ed w hetherthe el i m i nat i on of ce r t ai n defe ns es t o qui t am sui t s underthe F a ls e C la im s A c t ( “ F C A ” ) c o u ld b e a p p lie d re tr o a c tiv e ly to H u g h e s A ir c ra f t. Pr i ort o 1986, a qui t am sui tw as barr ed i f the i nform at i on upon w hi ch i tw as bas ed w as al r eadyi n the governm ent ’ s pos s es s i on. I d. at945. T hatbarw as part i al l yr emoved bythe 1986 FC A amendm entw hi ch now perm i t t ed “qui t am su its b a se d o n in fo rm a tio n in th e G o v e rn m e n t’s p o ss e ss io n , ex c e p t w h e re th e su it w as bas ed on i nform at i on thathad bee n publ i cl ydi s cl os ed and w as notbr oughtby a n o ri g in a l s o u rc e o f

th e in fo rm a tio n .” Id . (c itin g 3 1 U .S .C . § 3 7 3 0 (e )( 4 )( A )) . Schum er , a qui t am re l at or , fi l ed s ui ti n 1989 agai ns tH ughes A i r cr aftcl ai m i ng thatthe defens e companyhad mi s l ed the governm entw i th cert ai n acc ount i ng pr act i ces . I d. at943. H ughes w on di s m i s s al on s um m aryj udgm entbyper s uadi ng the di s tr i ctcourtt hatt he 1986 FC A amendm entw as notr etr oact i ve and thati thad ful l ydi s cl os ed i t s acc ount i ng pr act i ces t o the governm ent . I d. at943- 44. A ft er th e Ni n th Ci r c u i tr e v e r s e d th e d i s tr i c tc o u r t ’ s r e tr o a c t i v i tyh o l d i n g , th e S u p r e me C o u rt g ra n te d c e rt io ra ri a n d re v e rs e d th e N in th C ir c u it. I d . a t 9 4 5 . A ppl y i ng the fi r s ts t ep of the Landgr af t es t , the C our tobs erved thatthe s t atut e di d notr evea l a cl earC ongr es s i onal i nt entt o appl ythe 1986 amendm ent- 20-

r etr oact i vel y . I d. at946. A ppl y i ng the s econd s t ep, the C our tconcl uded thatt he s t atut e had r etr oact i ve effec tbeca us e pr i ort o the 1986 amendm ent , anyqui t am act i on w oul d have be en barr ed byH ughes ’ di s cl os ur es t o the governm entabout the cl ai m s ubm i s s i ons . “The 1986 am endmentw oul d r evi ve thatact i on, s u bje c tin g H u g h e s to p re v io u s ly fo re c lo s e d q u i ta m litig a tio n .” Id . a t 9 5 0 . A ppl i cat i on of the 1986 amendm entt o pr e- 1986 conductthus s at i s fi ed J us t i ce St ory ’ s defi ni t i on of r etr oact i ve effec tbeca us e i t“w oul d al t erthe s ubs t ant i ve r i ght s of a pa r tyand i ncr eas e a pa r ty ’ s l i abi l i ty . ” I d. ( quot i ng C henaul tv. U ni t ed S tate s P o sta l S e rv ice , 3 7 F .3 d 5 3 5 , 5 3 7 , 5 3 9 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 4 )). It is c ritica l to not e, as the Four th C i r cui tobs erved i n O l atunj i , thatthe C our t“s o hel d w i thout even a s i ngl e w or d of di s cus s i on as t o w hetherH ughes A i r cr aft– or , forthat m att er , s i m i l ar l ys i tuat ed governm entcontr act or s – had r el i ed on the el i m i nat ed defe ns e t o i t s detr i m ent . ” 387 F. 3d at391. A l though r el i ance pl ay ed a c entr al r ol e i n M ar t i n v. H adi x – the nextm aj or re tro a c tiv ityc a se d e c id e d b yth e C o u rt – M a rtin n e v e rth e les s fa iled to e lev a te a c tua l r e l i a nc e i nt o a pr e r e qu i s i t e t o s us t a i n a r e tr oa c t i vi tyc ha l l e ng e . 52 7 U. S. 343 ( 1999) . M art i n fol l ow ed tw o s ucce s s ful cl as s act i on s ui t s br oughtby pr i s oner s under42 U . S. C . § 1983 chal l engi ng the condi t i ons i n the M i chi gan p riso n sy ste m in 1 9 7 7 a n d 1 9 8 0 . Id . at 3 4 7 . T h e p riso n e rs w e re su c c e ss f u l in both act i ons , and the fe der al t r i al cour tor der ed the s emi - annual paym entof- 21-

att orney s ’ fee s , atthe pr evai l i ng m arketr at e, forpos t -j udgm entm oni t or i ng of compl i ance w i th the court ’ s decr ees i n both cas es . I d. at348. B y1998, the pr evai l i ng m arketr at e foratt orney s w as $150 perhour . I d. Fees pai d t o the pr i s oner s ’ att orney s w as cal l ed i nt o ques t i on bythe ena ctm entof the Pr i s on L itig a tio n R e fo rm A c t o f 1 9 9 5 (“ P L R A ” ), P u b . L . N o . 1 0 4 -1 3 4 , 1 1 0 S ta t. 1 3 2 1 . S e c tio n 8 0 3 (d )(3 ) o f

th e P L R A c a p p e d a tto rn e y s’ fe e s in p riso n lit ig a tio n su its to no gr eat ert han 150% of the hour l yr at e perm i t t ed underfede r al l aw for co u rt -ap p o inted co u n sel. B ec au se c o u rt -ap p o inted att o rne y s in the E astern D i s tr i ctof M i chi gan w er e pai d a maxi m um of $75 an hour , the PL R A perm i t t ed p a ym e n t o f

n o m o re th a n $ 1 1 2 .5 0 fo r a tto rn e y s’ fe e s in p riso n lit ig a tio n su its in thatdi s tr i ct . M art i n, 527 U . S. at350. A ft erconcl udi ng thatthe s t atut e di d notexpr es s l yauthor i ze r etr oact i ve a p p l i c a t i o n o f

t h e n e w fe e s tru c tu r e , th e Co u r tc o n s i d e r e d wh e th e rth e P LRA w ou l d h ave retroact i ve effect . Id. at35 3. T he C ou rtob served that the p ri soners’ att o rne y s “h ad a re aso n ab le ex p ec tat ion that w o rk th eyp erfo rm ed b efo re en ac tm en t of

the P L R A in m o n it o ri n g p eti ti o n ers’ co m p li an ce w ith the c o u rt or der s w oul d be compens at ed atthe pr e- PL R A r at es as pr ovi ded i n the s t i pul at ed or der . ” I d. at358 ( emphasi s added) . T hi s r eas onabl e expe ct at i on w oul d be ups et byapp l i cat i on of the P L R A t o “w ork perform ed b efore i t s effect i ve d at e [be cause i t ] w oul d al t ert he fe e arr angementpos thoc byr educi ng t he r at e of- 22-

compensa t i on. ” I d. T hus , appl y i ng the PL R A aft erthe fa ctw oul d have r etr oact i ve effec tby“att ach[ i ng] new l egal cons equenc es t o compl et ed conduc t . ” Id . (c ita tio n o m itte d ). M art i n does notfocus on w hetherthe pr i s oner s ’ att orney s actual l yr el i ed upon pr e- PL R A r at es ; r ather , i tcons i der s w hetherr el i ance bys i m i l ar l ys i tuat ed l aw y er s on pr e- PL R A r at es w oul d have be en r eas onabl e. T hi s focus on

“ re a so n a b le r e lian c e ” p e rsis ted in th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s n e x t m ajo r c iv il re tr o a c tiv ity c a s e , S t. C yr i ts e lf. In S t. C yr, the C o u rtco n side red w h ethe r “the restri cti o n s o n d iscreti o n ary r el i ef f r om deport at i on cont ai ned i n [A E D PA and I I R I R A ] . . . appl yt o r emoval p roc ee d ing s b rou g h t aga inst an ali en w h o p led g u il tyto a d ep o rt ab le crim e b efo re their en ac tm en t. ” 5 3 3 U . S . at 29 3 . T h e C o u rtap p li ed L an d g raf ’s tw o p art r e tr o a c t i v i tya n a l y s i s t o I I RI RA ’ s § 3 0 4 ( b ) , th e s e c t i o n th a tr e p e a l e d fo r me rI NA § 2 1 2 (c), co n clud ing firstthat b ec au se § 3 0 4 (b) sim p lystat es “ S ec ti o n 2 1 2 (c) (8 U .S .C . § 1 1 8 2 (c )) is r e p e a led ,” C o n g re ss d id n o t sh o w its u n e q u iv o c a l in ten t to ap p lythe re p ea l r etroa cti v elyto aliens li k e S t. C yr w h o h ad p lead ed g u il tyb efo re th e re p e a l o f

§ 2 1 2 (c ). H a v in g d e c id e d th a t C o n g re ss d id n o t u n a m b ig u o u slysta te i t s i nt ent i on t o m ake the r epea l of § 212( c) r etr oact i ve, the C our tw enton t o the se c o n d ste p o f

d e ter m in in g w h e th e r th e ru le w o u ld h a v e a n “ im p e rm iss ib le r etr oact i ve effec tforal i ens w ho, l i ke [St . C yr ] , w er e convi ct ed pur s uantt o a pl ea- 23-

ag ree m en t ata ti m e w h en their plea w o u ld n o t hav e re n d ere d them ineligible fo r § 2 1 2 (c ) r e lie f.” Id . a t 3 2 0 . St . C yrl eave s l i t t l e doubtthatthe Supr eme C our thas neveri ns i s t ed upon actual r el i ance as a pr er equi s i t e t o s us t ai ni ng a r etr oact i vi tycl ai m . I n di s cus s i ng the r el i ance i nt er es tfrus tr at ed byI I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) t o pet i t i oner s w ho too k g u il typ leas, th e C o u rto b serv ed : “[P ]reserv ing the p o ssibil ityo f [ § 2 1 2 (c)] re lief w o u ld h a v e b e e n o n e o f th e p rin c ip a l b e n e fits so u g h t b yd e fe n d a n ts d e c id in g w h e th e r to a c c e p t a p lea o ffe r . . . .” S t. C yr, 5 3 3 U .S . at 3 2 3 (e m p h a sis added) . T he C our t ’ s i nqui r yi nt o the pos s i bl e mot i ves fac ed bya cl as s of pet i t i oner s s i m i l ar l ys i tuat ed t o E nr i co St . C yrcont i nued: “R el y i ng upon s et t l ed pr act i ce, t he advi ce of couns el , and perhaps even a s s ur ance s i n open courtthatt he e n tryo f a p lea w o u ld n o t fo re c lo se § 2 1 2 (c ) re lief, a g re a t n u m b e r o f d e fe n d a n ts in Je d e o n w o ’s a n d S t. C yr’s p o sitio n a g re e d to p lea d g u ilty .” Id . (em p h a sis a d d e d ). T h is la n g u a g e , as th e T h ird C irc u it o b se rv e d , “d o e s n o t re q u ire c o n c re te cert ai ntyaboutthe exa cthi s t or i cal m ot i ves and ac tual r el i ance and expe ct at i ons o f e a c h a l i e n w h o p l e d g u i l ty. ” P o n n a p u l a , 3 7 3 F . 3 d a t4 9 2 . F a rf r o m i t , S t . C yr expl i ci t l yr efe r s t o the cl as s of pot ent i al defe ndant s affect ed bythe el i m i nat i on of § 212( c) . See St . C yr , 533 U . S. at321, 323 ( “I I R I R A ’ s el i m i nat i on of any pos s i bi l i tyof § 212( c) r el i ef forpeopl e w ho ent er ed i nt o pl ea a gr eement s ”, “The p o ten tial fo r u n fa irn e ss in th e re tro a c tiv e a p p lica tio n o f IIR IR A § 3 0 4 (b ) to- 24-

peopl e l i ke J i deeonw o and St . C yri s s i gni fi cantand mani fes t . ”) B ot h Ponnapul a and O l atunj i pr ovi de an e xt ens i ve di s cus s i on oft he obj ect i ve ana l ys i s i n t he cont extofI I R I R A ’ s r epea l of§ 212( c) . B ot h em phas i ze t hat“[ t ] he Supr em e C our thas neverr equi r ed ac t ual r el i ance orevi dence t her eof i n t he Landgr afl i ne ofcas es , and has i n factas s i duous l y es chew ed an a ctual r el i ance r equi r em ent . ” Ponnapul a, 373 F. 3d at491; s ee a l s o O l atunj i , 387 F. 3d at 3 9 1 (“ n e ith e r L a n d g ra f’s h o ld in g n o r su b se q u e n t S u p re m e C o u rt a u th o rity s uppor t s a s ubj ect i ve r el i ance r equi r em ent ”) . L anguage us ed thr oughoutSt . C yr r efl ect s cons i der at i on oft he r eas onabl enes s and l i kel i hood ofr el i ance on pr i or l aw , buti tnow her e r equi r es al i ens t o es t abl i s h “conc r et e ce r t ai nt y aboutt he exa ct hi s t or i cal m ot i ves and ac t ual r el i ance and expe ct at i ons ofeac h al i en w ho pl ed g u ilty .” P o n n a p u la , 3 7 3 F .3 d a t 4 9 2 & n .1 0 (c itin g s e v e ra l p a s s a g e s fr o m S t.C y r) . A gai n, t hi s fol l ow s fr om t he bas i c thr us tofr etr oact i vi t y anal ys i s : “W hethert he par t i cul arpet i t i onerdi d ordi d nots ubj ect i vel y r el y upon t he pr i ors t atut e or s chem e has not hi ng w hat evert o do w i t h C ongr es s ’ i nt ent– t he ver y bas i s fort he p resu m p ti o n ag ains t st atuto ry re tr o ac ti v it y . ” O lat u nji , 3 8 7 F . 3 d at 39 4 . In c o n tra st, a m o re g e n e ra lize d c o n c e rn fo r o bjec tiv e re lian c e in ter e sts lik e ly a ffe c ted b y a n e w law is s o m e th in g a p tly a ttribu ted to C o n g re ss w h e n it d e c id e s to m ake a s t atut e ( non- ) r etr oact i ve. See gene r al l y St . C yr , 533 U . S. at316 ( des cr i bi ng C ongr es s ’ deci s i on t o m ake c hange i n l aw r etr oact i ve as pr oces s of “cons i der [ i ng] t he pot ent i al unfai r nes s ofr etr oact i ve appl i cat i on and- 25-

deter m i n[i ng ] that i ti s an accep t able pr i ce t o p ay for the co un t ervai l i ng ben efi t s” (q u o tin g L a n d g ra f, 5 1 1 U .S . a t 2 7 2 -7 3 )) .D I n l i ghtof ourr evi ew of the C our t ’ s r etr oact i vi tycas es , w e ca nnotfol l ow o u r s is te r c ir c u its th a t im p o s e a re q u ir e m e n t o f s u bje c tiv e /a c tu a l r e lia n c e . R anki ne v. R eno, 319 F. 3d 93 ( 2d C i r . 2003) i s i l l us tr at i ve of the s ubj ect i ve r el i ance cas es . T he courtr ej ect ed a r etr oact i vi tychal l enge t o I I R I R A ’ s r epea l of § 212( c) beca us e “pe t i t i oner s di d notdetr i m ent al l yr el yon the ava i l abi l i tyof d iscreti o n aryreli ef

w h en ex erc isi n g their ri g h t t o tr ial . ” B ec au se p eti ti o n ers c h o se to g o to trial, th e c o u rt d istin g u ish e d th e m f ro m p e tit io n e rs w h o to o k g u ilty pleas i n tw o respect s: F irst, n o n e o f

th e se p e tit io n e rs d e trim e n tallyc h a n g e d h is p o sitio n in r el i ance on cont i nued el i gi bi l i tyfor§ 212( c) r el i ef. U nl i ke al i ens w ho ent er ed pl eas , the pet i t i oner s m ade no de ci s i on t o abandon a ny r i ght s and admi tgui l t– ther ebyi m m edi at el yr ender i ng themsel ves deport abl e – i n r el i ance on the ava i l abi l i tyof the r el i ef offer ed pr i or t o I I R I R A . . . . T he cl ai m t hat[al i ens choos i ng t o go t o tr i al ] r el i ed o n th e a v a ilab ili tyo f

§ 2 1 2 (c ) re lief

in m a k in g th e d e c isio n to g o to trial is th e re fo re so m e w h a t h o llo w : in fa c t, th e yd e c id e d to g o to tr i al t o chal l enge the under l y i ng cr i m e thatcoul d r endert hem deport abl e and, had theys ucce eded, § 212( c) r el i ef w oul d be irre lev a n t. Second, the pet i t i oner s have poi nt ed t o no conducton thei rpartt hat reflects an inten ti o n to p rese rve their eli g ibil ityfo r reli ef u n d er § 212( c) bygoi ng t o t r i al . . . . H er e, pet i t i oner s nei therdi d anythi ng n o r su rre n d e re d a n yrig h ts th a t w o u ld g iv e rise to a c o m p a ra b le re lia n c e in te re s t.- 26-

R a n k in e , 3 1 9 F .3 d a t 9 9 -1 0 0 (c ita tio n o m itte d ). T h e T h ird C irc u it m a d e th re e o b se rv a tio n s c o n c e rn in g th e se p a ss a g e s w ith w hi ch w e agr ee. See Ponnapul a, 373 F. 3d at489- 90. Fi r s t , w i th the exc ept i on of a s i ngl e pas s i ng r efe r ence t o anothercas e, R anki ne neve ronce ment i ons the p re su m p tio n a g a in st re tro a c tiv ity . A s th e C o u rt m a d e c lea r in L a n d g ra f a n d its p ro g e n y , h o w e v e r, t h is p re s u m p tio n in fo rm s e v e ry st e p o f th e L a n d g ra f

in q u ir y . Second, the part i cul ars tr at egi c dec i s i ons of the i ndi vi dual pet i t i oner s ar e gi ven di s pos i t i ve w ei ghti n the r etr oact i vi tyanal y s i s , notw hetherthey , as a cl as s , fac ed “new l egal cons equenc es t o [thei r ] compl et ed conduc t , ” M ar t i n v. H adi x, 523 U . S . at35 3. F i nall y , R ank i ne ap pears t o turn the presum pti on against r etr oact i vi tyon i t s head bydemandi ng t hatpet i t i oner s “poi nt [] t o . . . conducton their pa rtthat reflects an inten ti o n to p rese rve their eli g ibil ityfo r reli ef u n d er § 212( c) bygoi ng t o tr i al . ” R anki ne, 319 F. 3d at100. N orcan w e agr ee w i th thos e ci r cui t s fol l ow i ng C hamber s v. R eno, 307 F. 3d 284 ( 4th C i r . 2002) , w hi ch s eem t o el evat e the di s t i nct i ve qui d pr o quo of the pl ea b arg ain in to the sine q u a n o n o f a n IIR IR A retroac ti v itych all en g e. C h am b ers h eld th at pe ti ti o n ers w h o ch all en g e the iru n d erly ing co n v ict ion s thro u g h jury tr i al s fai l t o pos s es s t he “r el i ance i nt er es t[pr es ent ] i n pl eadi ng gui l ty[w hi ch] ar i s es beca us e of the qui d pr o quo excha nge thatchar act er i zes a pl ea a gr eement b u tn o ttr i a l . ” I d . a t2 9 0 . Th i s t e r s e a p p l i c a t i o n o f La n d g r a f

t o th e I I RI RA- 27-

r etr oact i vi tycont exts uffe r s fr om m anyof the s ame fl aw s thataff l i ctR anki ne and i t s progen y . A s w i th R ank i ne, C ham bers m enti on s the p res um pti on against r etr oact i vi tyonl yonce. Si m i l ar l y , the part i cul ars tr at egi c dec i s i ons of the p e tit io n e r a re g iv e n d isp o sitiv e w e ig h t: In fa c t, by ro lli n g th e d ice a n d g o in g to trial, C h a m b e rs a c tu a lly e n su re d th a t h is e lig ib ili tyfo r d isc re tio n a ryre lief w o u ld re m a in uncert ai n. C har ged w i th an offens e ca rry i ng a maxi m um pr i s on s ent ence of 20 y ear s , C hamber s w as offe r ed a pl ea a gr eement wh e r e b yh e wo u l d r e c e i v e a s e n t e n c e o f fo u ry e a r s , wh i c h a tth e t i me w o u ld h a v e k e p t h im e lig ib le fo r d isc re tio n a ryre lief. B yg o in g to tr i al , C hamber s r ej ect ed the ce r t ai ntyof el i gi bi l i tybyr i s ki ng a se n ten c e o f

m o re th a n fiv e y e a rs in th e e v e n t h e w a s u n a b le to s ucce s s ful l ydefe nd agai ns tthe under l y i ng char ge. T he fa ctthat C hamber s ended up w i th a s hor t erpr i s on t erm than thatoffe r ed by th e g o v e rn m e n t – o n e th a t w a s s a fe lyb e lo w th e fiv e -y e a r e lig ib ili ty thr es hol d for§ 212( c) r el i ef a tthe t i m e of s ent enci ng – does not change the fa ctthatC hamber s pr ocee ded t o tr i al ful l yaw ar e of the r i s k t hathe w oul d be convi ct ed and s ent ence d t o a pr i s on t erm that w o u ld d isqu ali fyh im u n d er IN A § 2 1 2 (c). I d. at291 ( ci t at i on om i t t ed) . N ow her e i n thi s anal y s i s does anycons i der at i on a p a r tf r o m d e tr i me n t a l r e l i a n c e e x e r ti n fl u e n c e o n th e r e tr o a c t i v i tya n a l y s i s . As w e di s cus s ed above , i n none of the r ece ntr etr oact i vi tycas es – nei therL andgr af, H ughes A i r cr aft , norM art i n – di d the Supr eme C our tconfe rdi s pos i t i ve w ei ght upon the pet i t i oner ’ s actual s tr at egi c dec i s i ons . A nd, al though St . C yrgi ves re lian c e a c e n tra l ro le in its re tro a c tiv itya n a ly sis , the C o u rt th e re c o n sp icu o u sly appl i es i t s hol di ng t o al l pet i t i oner s w ho t ook gui l typl eas befor e the effec t i ve dat e of I I R I R A – i r r es pect i ve of a nys how i ng t hatSt . C yrhi m s el f ac tual l yr el i ed- 28-

o n th e a v a ilab ili tyo f

§ 2 1 2 (c ) re lief. A s J u d g e G o o d w in e x p lain e d in h is C hamber s di s s ent : “D etr i m ent al r el i ance i s s i m pl yone mani fes t at i on of the un fai rness t hat can res ultfrom i nst abil i tyi n the l aw . B ut the p res um pti on against retroact i vityi s ground ed in broader and m ore fun dam ental con cerns. ” C ham bers, 307 F. 3d at295- 96. W e now hol d, fort hr ee r eas ons , t hatobj ect i vel y r eas onabl e r el i ance on p ri o r l aw is suffi cien t t o su stai n a re tr o ac ti v it y claim . F ir st, this rule is m o re d ire c tly tied to th e b a sic a im o f re tro a c tiv ity a n a ly sis : in d e ter m in in g w h e th e r it is a p p ro p ria te to p re su m e C o n g re ss c o n c lu d e d th a t th e b e n e fits o f a n e w law d id n o t w a rra n t d istu rb a n c e o f in ter e sts e x istin g u n d e r p rio r la w , itm a k e s s e n se to l ook att he obj ect i ve gr oup- bas ed i nt er es t s t hatC ongr es s coul d pr act i cal l y have asse ssed ex an te. S ec o n d , this rule is co n sist en t w ith the S u p rem e C o u rt ’s a n a ly s e s in L a n d g ra f a n d its p ro g e n y , n o n e o f w h ic h re q u ir e d a c tu a l r e lia n c e . T hi r d, and m os ti m m edi at el y per t i nenther e, t he obj ect i ve appr oach i s cons i s t ent w i t h t he ac t ual hol di ng i n St . C yr– t he C our t ’ s m os tr el i ance - focus ed dec i s i on – w hi ch pr ecl uded r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on ofI I R I R A ’ s el i m i nat i on of§ 212( c) el i gi bi l i t y t o al l al i ens w ho r eas onabl y coul d have r el i ed on pr i orl aw w hen pl eadi ng gui l t y, r athert han t o j us tt hos e al i ens w ho actual l y di d s o r el y. T he Supr eme C our t ’ s m os tr ece ntdi s cus s i ons of Landgr af c onfi r m t hatt he o bje c tiv e re lia n c e v ie w re s ts o n a s o u n d re a d in g o f its re tr o a c tiv ity ju ri s p ru d e n c e . I n R epubl i c of A us tr al i a v. A l t m ann, 541 U . S. 677 ( 2004) , t he C our tcons i der ed- 29-

w hetherpet i t i oner s coul d us e the For ei gn Sover ei gn I m m uni t i es A ctof 1976 ( “FSI A ”) t o r ecove rpai nt i ngs al l egedl yt aken bythe N azi s and hel d bythe A us tr i an governm ents i nce 1948. L andgr af di d notdi r ect l yappl y , the C our thel d, beca us e the pr eambl e t o the FSI A cl ear l yexpr es s ed C ongr es s ’ i nt entthatthe A ct w oul d appl yt o “al l pos t enac t m entcl ai m s of s over ei gn i m m uni ty . ” A l t m ann, 541 U . S. at697. G i ven thatA us tr i a’ s cl ai m of s over ei gn i m m uni typos t - dat ed the FSIA , ther e w as no r etr oact i vi typr obl em. A l t m ann di d br i efl ydi s cus s L andgr af, ho w ever, and al tho ug h itexp l ai ned the p urpose o f t he p res um pti on against re tro a c tiv e a p p lica tio n b ysp e a k in g o f re lian c e – th e “ a im o f th e p re su m p tio n is to a v o id u n n e c e ss a ryp o st h o c c h a n g e s to leg a l ru les o n w h ich p a rties re lied in sh a p in g th e ir p rim a ryc o n d u c t,” A ltm a n n , 5 4 1 U .S . at 6 9 6 , itn e v e rth e les s s tu c k to the hi s t or i c form ul at i ons of the “Landgr af de faul trul e”: W hen, how ever , the s t atut e cont ai ns no s uch expr es s comm and the courtm us tdet erm i ne w hetherthe new s t atut e w oul d have r etr oact i ve effect , i . e. , w hetheri tw oul d i m pai rr i ght s a partypos s es s ed w hen he act ed, i ncr eas e a pa r ty ’ s l i abi l i tyforpas tconduct , ori m pos e new d u ties w ith re sp e c t to tra n sa c tio n s a lre a d yc o m p lete d . If th e sta tu te w oul d oper at e r etr oact i vel y , ourtr adi t i onal pr es um pt i on t eac hes that i tdoes notgovern abs entcl earcongr es s i onal i nt entfavor i ng s uch a re su lt. A l t m ann, 541 U . S. at694 ( quot i ng L andgr af, 511 U . S. at280) . “R el i ance , ” l et al one anynot i on of ac tual r el i ance , i s cons pi cuous l yabs entfr om thi s 2004 art i cul at i on of the Landgr af de faul trul e. M o st r ec en tl y , in F ern an d ez -V arg as v . G o n za les, 1 2 6 S . C t. 2 4 2 2 (20 0 6 ),- 30-

the C our tcons i der ed w hetherI I R I R A § 241( a) ( 5) – w hi ch enl ar ged the cl as s of i l l egal r eentr ant s w hos e or der s m aybe r ei ns t at ed and l i m i t ed the pos s i bl e r el i ef fr om a r emoval or deravai l abl e t o them – coul d be r etr oact i vel yappl i ed t o a pet i t i onerw ho unl aw ful l yr eent er ed pr i ort o I I R I R A ’ s effect i ve dat e. I n 1982, H um bert o Fer nandez - V ar gas , a M exi can c i t i zen, unl aw ful l yr eent er ed the U ni t ed St at es . I d. at2427. A ft err emai ni ng undi s cover ed forovertw o deca des , he a p p lied to c h a n g e h is s tatu s to th a t o f a law f u l p e rm a n e n t re sid e n t. Id . T h is ap p li ca ti o n led th e G o v ern m en t t o reinstate h is 19 8 1 d ep o rt ati o n o rde r un d er § 2 4 1 (a )(5 ). Id . F e rn a n d e z -V a rg a s a p p e a led th e d e p o rta tio n o rd e r to th e T e n th C i r cui t , ar gui ng t hatappl y i ng § 241( a) ( 5) t o conductoccurr i ng befor e i t s effect i ve d a te, v iz., h is u n law f

u l re e n try , w o u ld b e im p e rm iss ib lyre tro a c tiv e . Id . T h is courtr ej ect ed thatar gum ent , and the Supr eme C our taff i r m ed. T h e p ro b lem w ith F e rn a n d e z -V a rg a s’ L a n d g ra f a rg u m e n t, th e m ajo rity rea so n ed , w as th at § 2 4 1 (a)(5) d id n o t affec t his pa st co n d u ct. S p ec ifi ca ll y , “[ i] t i s . . . the al i en’ s choi ce t o cont i nue hi s i l l egal pr es ence , aft eri l l egal r eentryand aft er the effect i ve d at e of the new l aw , that s ubj ect s hi m t o the new and l ess gener ous l egal r egi m e, nota pas tactthathe i s hel pl es s t o undo up t o the mom ent the G overnm entfi nds hi m out . ” Fernandez - V ar gas , 126 S. C t . at2432. C ons i s t ent w i th ourr eadi ng of the Landgr af c as es , the C our tneverconvert s “detr i m ent al re lia n c e ” o n p ri o r l a w in to a p re re q u is ite fo r s u s ta in in g a re tr o a c tiv ity c la im .- 31-

R a th e r, th e re tro a c tiv ityin q u iryre m a in s th e tw o p a rt in q u irye sta b lish e d in L andgr af, t ogetherw i th a s tr ong pr es um pt i on agai ns tr etr oact i ve appl i cat i on, s ee Fernandez - V ar gas , 126 S. C t . at2428, w i th no di s cus s i on of r el i ance even appea r i ng unt i l t he C our ts um m ar i zes the pert i nentfac t s of St . C yr . G i ven the C o u rt’s lo n g h isto ryo f u sin g th e o bjec tiv e re lian c e a p p ro a c h to re tro a c tiv ity anal y s i s , w e ar e conf

i dentthatfol l ow i ng thatappr oach i n det erm i ni ng w hether th e re p e a l o f

§ 2 1 2 (c ) h a s re tr o a c tiv e e ffe c ts is th e c o rr e c t o n e . III D et erm i ni ng thatan obj ect i ve appr oach t o r el i ance i s appr opr i at e does not end ouri nqui r y ; w e mustal s o i dent i fyt he cl as s of per s ons w hos e obj ect i ve r e l i a n c e i n t e r e s t s p r i o rt o th e r e p e a l o f § 2 1 2 ( c ) s h o u l d b e a n a l yz e d . S t . C yr addr es s ed the ques t i on of r etr oact i vi tyas appl i ed onl yt o thos e i n s i tuat i ons s i m i l art o St . C yrhi m s el f – al i ens w ho have pl ed gui l tyt o cr i m es w ho w er e l at er m ade de por t abl e byI I R I R A . St . C yr , 533 U . S. at321, 324. A s not ed, byt aki ng thi s appr oach, the C our tes t abl i s hed an obj ect i ve, cat egor i cal s cheme for d eterm ining if a statute h as im p erm issi b le retr o ac ti v e e ffec ts. T h e C o u rt g e n e ra lize d to a c a teg o ryo f a ffe c ted a lien s f

ro m th e fa c ts o f

th e c a se b e fo re it, as ki ng w hetherthe r epea l of § 212( c) w oul d have a n “i m perm i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effectforal i ens w ho, l i ke [St . C yr ] , w er e convi ct ed pur s uantt o a pl ea a gr eement ata t i m e w hen thei rpl ea w oul d nothave r ender ed them i nel i gi bl e for§ 212( c)- 32-

r e l i e f. ” S t . Cyr , 5 3 3 U. S . a t3 2 0 . Th e Th i r d Ci r c u i td e s c r i b e s th e S u p r e me C our t ’ s cat egor i cal appr oach a s r equi r i ng “court s . . . t o conce ntr at e on the gr oup t o w hos e conduc tt he s t atut e i s addr es s ed . . . w i th a vi ew t o det erm i ni ng w hether r el i ance w as r eas onabl e. ” Ponnapul a, 373 F. 3d at493 (n o tin g th a t “in L a n d g ra f it w as em pl oyer s s ubj ectt o T i t l e V I I ; i n H ughes A i r cr afti tw as gover nm ent contr act or s ; ” and “ i n St . C yri tw as al i ens w ho acc ept ed a pl ea a gr eem ent ”) ; s ee a ls o T h a q i, 3 7 7 F .3 d a t 5 0 4 n .2 . A ppl yi ng St . C yr ’ s obj ect i ve appr oach, w e m us tnow gener al i ze a cl as s of per s ons s i m i l art o H em , and det er m i ne w hetherappl i cat i on ofI I R I R A § 304( b) w oul d have i m per m i s s i bl e r etr oact i ve effect s . A s w e des cr i bed above , H em pr ocee ded t o tr i al on t w o count s ofaggr avat ed as s aul t , w as convi ct ed ofone of th o s e c o u n ts , a n d re c e iv e d a s u s p e n d e d s e n te n c e o f t h re e y e a rs ’ i n c a rc e ra tio n . H em ’ s r ecor d does noti ndi cat e w hetherhe, l i ke Ponnapul a, w as offer ed a pl ea a g re e m e n t p rio r to d e c id in g to e x e rc ise h is rig h t to trial; th e re c o rd d o e s re v e a l, h o w e v e r, th a t H e m d e c id e d n o t to a p p e a l h is s in g le c o n v ictio n . W h y h e w o u ld c h o o se n o t to d o so fro m th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f a law fu l p e rm a n e n t re sid e n t is c lea r: i fH em appea l ed s ucce s s ful l y, he w oul d have be en atr i s k ofbei ng s ent ence d t o a sen tenc e lon g er tha n 5 y ea rs (i n d ee d , u p to 1 5 y ea rs) m ak ing h im ineligible fo r § 212( c) r el i ef . See, e. g. , N or t h C ar ol i na v. Pear ce, 395 U . S. 711, 719 ( 1969) ( “the guar ant ee a gai ns tdoubl e j eopar dy i m pos es no r es tr i ct i ons upon t he l ength of a s ent ence i m pos ed upon r econvi ct i on. ”) ; St at e v. G r ey O w l , 316 N . W . 2d 801,- 33-

8 0 3 -0 4 (S .D . 1 9 8 2 ) ( s a m e ). H e m ’s fa ilu re to c h a llen g e h is a g g ra v a ted a ss a u lt convi ct i on coul d thus have r eas onabl ybeen mot i vat ed bythe ava i l abi l i tyof § 2 1 2 (c) reli ef. A bs tr act i ng the s al i entfea tur es fr om thes e fa ct s forthe purpos es of r etr oact i vi tyanal y s i s y i el ds t he fol l ow i ng cl as s : A l i ens w ho gave up thei rr i ght t o appea l thei raggr avat ed fe l onyconvi ct i on w hen a s ucce s s ful appea l coul d have depr i ved them of § 2 1 2 (c) e l i g i b i l i ty. W e m u st n o w d e ter m in e w h e th e r th is c las s o f p e rso n s s u ffe rs im p e rm iss ib le r e tr o a c t i v e e ffe c t s u n d e rI I RI RA § 304( b) . A s di s cus s ed above , L andgr af p ro v id e s th a t a s tatu te h a s a re tro a c tiv e e ffe c t if, a m o n g o th e r p o ss ib ili ties , it “w o u ld im p air ri g h ts a p arty p o sses sed w h en h e a cted . ” 5 1 1 U . S . at 28 0 . T h ere is n o d o u b t th a t th e rig h t o f a p p e a l H e m p o ss e ss e d w h e n h e e lec ted n o t to chal l enge hi s aggr avat ed as s aul tconvi ct i on has been i m pai r ed r etr oact i vel y by I I R I R A § 304( b) : W hen a de fendant , l i ke H em , pr ocee ds t o tr i al , i s convi ct ed, ch o o ses n o t t o p u rsue an ap p ea l w h en that ap p ea l cou ld resu ltin the loss o f § 212( c) r el i ef , and s ubs equent l y l os es t he ava i l abi l i t y of§ 212( c) r el i effol l ow i ng t h e At t o r n e y Ge n e r a l ’ s d e c i s i o n t o a p p l y I I RI RA § 304( b) r etr oact i vel y, hi s r i ght to a p p e a l h a s b e e n re tr o a c tiv e ly im p a ir e d . A ppl yi ng “fa m i l i arcons i der at i ons of fa i rnot i ce, r eas onabl e r el i ance , and s e ttle d e x p e c ta tio n s ,” L a n d g ra f, 5 1 1 U .S . a t 2 7 0 , o n ly s tr e n g th e n s th is c o n c lu s io n . Fi r s t , H em , and other s s i m i l ar l y s i t uat ed, had no not i ce oft he com i ng el i m i nat i on- 34-

o f § 2 1 2 (c) reli ef. Se co n d , su ch p erso n s rea so n ab ly reli ed o n the a v ail ab il it y o f § 212( c) r el i efw hen they el ect ed nott o chal l enge thei raggr avat ed fel ony convi ct i ons . G i ven the hea vy w ei ghtofi m m i gr at i on cons equenc es i n t he m i nds ofal i en defendant s , a dec i s i on nott o pur s ue s uch an a ppeal ver y l i kel y r es t s on t he pot ent i al r i s k t o § 212( c) r el i ef . See St . C yr , 533 U . S. at323 ( “Pr es er vi ng t he cl i ent ’ s r i ghtt o r em ai n i n t he U ni t ed St at es m ay be m or e i m por t antt o t he cl i ent th a n a n y p o te n tia l ja il s e n te n c e ” ) ( q u o ta tio n a n d c ita tio n o m itte d ). T hi s concl us i on i s cons i s t entw i t h l anguage fr om t he m aj or i t y cas es ci t ed above. I n M ont enegr o v. A s hcr oft , 355 F. 3d 1035, 1037 ( 7th C i r . 2004) ( per cur i am ) , t he Seventh C i r cui thel d t hatI I R I R A ’ s r epea l ofI N A § 212( c) r el i efw as noti m per m i s s i bl y r etr oact i ve as appl i ed t o al i ens w ho “di d notabandon r i ght s or adm i tgu i l ti n rel i ance o n co nti nu ed eli gibi l i t y for § 21 2(c) rel i ef. ” S ee al so R anki ne, 319 F. 3d at99. W e agr ee thatal i ens w ho have c hos en t o go t o tr i al but for ego ne thei r r i gh t s t o ap peal, hav e i n factaban do ned i m po rt ant r i gh t s. W e al so a g r e e wi t h t h e S e c o n d C i r c u i ti n R a n k i n e t h a ti ti s t h e c o n v i c t i o n – n o tt h e c r i me

– th a t m a k e s th e a lien e lig ib le fo r d e p o rta tio n . Id . at 1 0 1 . Y e t, th is o n ly s tr engthens ouranal ys i s gi ven thatt he convi ct i on i t s el fi s notfi nal unt i l an appe al has been r es ol ved ort he t i m e forfi l i ng an appe al has pas s ed. U ni t ed St at es v. Pr ow s , 448 F. 3d 1223 ( 10th C i r . 2006) ; U ni t ed St at es v. Shor t , 947 F. 2d 1445,W e a lso resp ec tfu ll y d isag ree w ith P o n n ap u la’s ske p ti cism that there 5 m igh t be a reli an ce interest for tho se w h o co n ti n u ed to tr ial in the ab sen ce o f a pl ea a gr eem ent . See Ponnapul a, 373 F. 3d at494 ( “B eca us e al i ens i n t he l at t er c a teg o ry h a d n o o p p o rtu n ity to a lter th e ir c o u rse in th e c rim in a l ju stic e sy ste m in r el i ance on t he ava i l abi l i t y of§ 212( c) r el i ef , w e hi ghl y doubt( though do not expl i ci t l y hol d, fort he i s s ue i s notbefor e us ) t hats uch al i ens have a r el i ance i nt er es tt hatr ender s I I R I R A ’ s r epea l offor m er§ 212( c) i m per m i s s i bl y r etr oact i ve as t o t hem . ”) W hatt he Thi r d C i r cui tfai l ed t o cons i deri s t he pos s i bi l i t y ofgi vi ng up r i ght s i n r el i ance on § 212( c) aft ertr i al has been c om pl et ed – thati s , gi vi ng up th e rig h t to a p p e a l b e c a u se o f th e p o ss ib ili ty th a t an a p p e a l m ig h t lea d to convi ct i on on addi t i onal count s ora hi ghers ent ence and r ender§ 212( c) r el i ef unavai l abl e. T her e i s no bas i s fordi s t i ngui s hi ng bet w een a deci s i on t o gi ve up a rig h t to trial in fa v o r o f th e p o ss ib ili ty o f im m ig ra tio n re lief a n d a d e c isio n to fo re g o th e ri g h t to a p p e a l in fa v o r o f s u c h a p o s s ib ility .

- 35- 1 4 6 0 (10 th C ir . 1 9 9 1 ). 5 IV L a n d g ra f, H u g h e s A irc ra ft, M a rtin , an d S t. C y r c lar ify th a t th e a p p ro p ria te focus i n r etr oact i vi t y anal ys i s i s on w hethert he cl as s ofper s ons affect ed by r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on ofa s t atut e had a n obj ect i vel y r eas onabl e i nt er es ti n t he pr evi ous s t at e oft he l aw . A l i ens , l i ke H em , w ho w er e i n a pos i t i on i n w hi ch the av ail ab il ity o f § 212( c) r el i ef w oul d r eas onabl y i nfor m t hei rdeci s i on t o for ego a cons t i t ut i onal r i ght , w oul d s uffer“new l egal cons equenc es t o event s com pl et ed b e fo r e [ t h e s t a t u t e ’ s ] e n a c t me n t , ” L a n d g r a f , 5 1 1 U. S . a t2 6 9 - 7 0 , u n d e rI I RI RA § 3 0 4 (b ). T h a t s e c tio n is th u s im p e rm is s ib ly re tr o a c tiv e to a lie n s lik e H e m . T he B I A ’ s cat egor i cal det er m i nat i on t hatSt . C yrdoes notappl y t o al i ens w ho c o n tes ted th e ir p re v io u s “ a g g ra v a ted fe lo n y ” c o n v ictio n s a t trial isI n i t s r eturn t o H em’s habea s corpus pet i t i on, t he G overnm entas ked that 6 the pet i t i on be di s m i s s ed bec aus e onl yH em’s couns el s i gned the pet i t i on. See 28 U . S. C . § 2242 ( an appl i cat i on fora w r i tof habe as corpus “s hal l be i n w r i t i ng s i gned and ve r i fi ed bythe per s on forw hos e r el i ef i ti s i nt ended orbys om eone act i ng i n hi s behal f”) . W e ar e notobl i gat ed, how ever , t o di s m i s s t he pet i t i on, and decl i ne t o do s o. See H endr i cks v. V as quez, 908 F. 2d 490, 491 ( 9th C i r . 1990) ( “the defect[of a n unver i fi ed pet i t i on] i s one thatt he di s tr i ctcourtm ay , i f i ts ees fit, d is re g a rd .” ).

- 36- REVERSED . W e RE M AND forpr ocee di ngs cons i s t entw i th thi s opi ni on. 6 B eca us e ourr ever s al of the B I A r ei ns t at es t he I J ’ s gr antof § 212( c) r el i ef, w e do n o t re a c h th e o th e r g ro u n d s o n a p p e a l.