NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LARRY D. ERVIN,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-7075

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-1923, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: February 23, 2015

______________________ 

 KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, for claimant-appellant.

VERONICA NICOLE ONYEMA, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR; MEGHAN ALPHONSO, DAVID J.

BARRANS, LARA EILHARDT, Office of the General Counsel, 
2 ERVIN v. MCDONALD

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Larry Ervin appeals this judgment of the Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming 

the decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals (“Board”) 

that there was no service connection for Ervin’s alleged 

psychiatric disabilities. Because we find that Ervin’s 

appeal improperly requests that we reweigh the facts at 

issue in his case, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ervin served on active duty in the Navy from April 

1970 to December 1970. In his separation examination, 

he was evaluated as psychiatrically normal. In 1972, he 

applied for compensation benefits for an injury to his 

middle figure of his right hand, but did not allege any 

psychiatric disabilities. Twenty years later, in June 1992, 

Ervin first filed a claim for compensation for psychiatric 

disabilities. This claim has been continuously prosecuted 

since that time, including multiple remands from the 

Veterans Court. During that time, Ervin supported his 

claim with evidence based on his lay testimony. 

Relevant to this appeal, on March 2, 2012, the Board 

denied Ervin’s claims for service connection for his alleged 

psychiatric disabilities. The Board “considered all lay and 

medical evidence as it pertains to the issues,” but found 

no basis for a service connection, explaining that Ervin’s 

assertions regarding his psychiatric manifestations were 

not credible, and more reliable evidence weighed against 

service connection. On November 13, 2013, the Veterans 

Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that Ervin 

merely challenged the Board’s weighing of the evidence. 
ERVIN v. MCDONALD 3

The Veterans Court explained that the Board properly 

considered all of Ervin’s favorable evidence and made a 

credibility assessment based on other evidence in the 

record, properly applying 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Ervin 

timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction over the decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 

1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), 

we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied 

to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)

(2012). 

Ervin argues that the Board relied on a misinterpretation of the term “pertinent evidence” in 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.303(a) because it did not consider relevant lay evidence on the record. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), the 

Board must consider “the entire evidence of record,” 

including “medical records and all pertinent medical and 

lay testimony.” In this case, however, there is nothing in 

the record to suggest that the Board failed to consider any 

of Ervin’s proffered evidence. Indeed, the Board considered all of Ervin’s lay evidence, but concluded that, because multiple parts of the record conflicted with Ervin’s 

lay evidence, the more credible evidence weighed against

finding a service connection. Ervin’s arguments, therefore, entirely turn on the Board’s credibility findings, 

which we do not have jurisdiction to address. See 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this case for 

lack of jurisdiction

DISMISSED