IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 05-70028 and 09-70018

FELIX ROCHA, 

Petitioner – Appellant

v.

RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Correctional Institutions Division, 

Respondent – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 09/15/10, 5th Cir., 619 F.3d 387) 

(Panel Rehearing Denied 11/17/10)

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The court having been polled at the request of one of the members of the

court and a majority of the judges who are in regular active service and not

disqualified not having voted in favor (FED. R. APP. P. AND 5TH CIR. R. 35), the

Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

Voting against en banc rehearing were: Chief Judge Edith H. Jones,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 17, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
*

In 2009, the court decided to begin identifying the judges voting for or against en banc

rehearing where a poll is taken and the request for en banc rehearing is denied.

2

Judge Carolyn Dineen King, Judge E. Grady Jolly, Judge W. Eugene Davis,

Judge Jerry E. Smith, Judge Emilio M. Garza, Judge Carl E. Stewart, Judge

Edith B. Clement, Judge Edward C. Prado, Judge Priscilla R. Owen, and Judge

Leslie H. Southwick.

Voting for en banc rehearing were: Judge Fortunato P. Benavides, Judge

James L. Dennis, Judge Jennifer W. Elrod, and Judge Catharina Haynes.*

Upon the filing of this order, the clerk shall issue the mandate forthwith.

See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b).

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

_________________________

Patrick E. Higginbotham

United States Circuit Judge
1Unless otherwise indicated, “Balentine” refers to the substituted panel opinion in that

case and “Rocha” refers to the panel’s opinion denying panel rehearing.

3

DENNIS, Circuit Judge, joined by BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge, dissenting from

the denial of rehearing en banc.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s refusal to grant rehearing en

banc in Balentine v. Thaler, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 4630829 (5th Cir. Nov. 17,

2010), and Rocha v. Thaler, --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 4630794 (5th Cir. Nov. 17,

2010).1

The Supreme Courtin Michigan v.Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), announced

the standard for determining “whether various forms of references to state law

[by state courts] constitute adequate and independent state grounds.” 463 U.S.

at 1038. That standard is: “[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when

the adequacy and independence of any possible state ground is not clear from the

face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the

state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law

required it do so.” Id. at 1041. 

The Balentine and Rocha panel opinions do not adhere to and faithfully

apply theLong standard. Instead, they engage in the “process of examining [and

unauthorized-Erie guessing at] state law,” which the Court in Long found to be

“unsatisfactory because it requires [federal judges] to interpret state laws with

which we are generally unfamiliar, and which often, as in this case, have not

been discussed at length by the parties.” Id. at 1039. Further, the panel

opinions, in effect, adopt the practice of denying federal court review “if the

ground of the [state court] decision was at all unclear,” which the Long Court

expressly disapproved. See id. at 1038 (rejecting Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S.
4

52 (1934), which the Court characterized as “tak[ing] the strict view that if the

ground of decision was at all unclear, we would dismiss the case”). The Court

in Long rejected “outright dismissal of [such] cases [because] there is an

important need for uniformity in federal law, and . . . this need goes unsatisfied

when we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds and

where the independence of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four

corners of the opinion.” Id. at 1039. 

In Balentine and Rocha,the panels’ authors, after initially adhering to the

Long standard, make volte-face and examine ambiguous and obscure state court

data to guess that the unexplained dismissals of state habeas claims by the

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) are based on an independent and

adequate state ground. I respectfully but strenuously disagree because these

opinions seriously undermine the Long standard in our jurisdiction and

retrogress into the ad hoc method of dealing with cases involving possible

independent and adequate state grounds that the Supreme Court expressly

disapproved as “antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when

sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved.” Id. at 1039. For these

reasons, I dissent from the very serious step the panel authors undertake, viz.,

departing from a full and faithful adherence to the Long standard, which the

Court adopted in 1983 and has continuously adhered to in numerous decisions

until the present day.

The Court’s adherence to the full Long standard was demonstrated as

recently as February 23, 2010, in Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).

There, the question presented was whether advice that a suspect has “the right

to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the law enforcement officers’]

questions,” and that he can invoke this right “at any time . . . during th[e]
5

interview,” satisfies Miranda. Id. at 1199-1200. The Court held that it does. Id.

Before fully addressing the issue, however, the Court addressed Powell’s

contention that the Florida Supreme Court, by relying not only on Miranda but

also on the Florida Constitution, rested its decision on an independent and

adequate state ground. See id. at 1201 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729 (1991) (“This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by

a state court if the decision . . . rests on a state law ground that is independent

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”)). “‘It is

fundamental,’” the Court stated,“‘that state courts be leftfree and unfettered by

us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that

ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to

a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of

state action.’” Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))

“To that end,” the Court recalled, “we announced, in [Long] the following

presumption”:

“[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on

federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the

adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not

clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most

reasonable explanation thatthe state court decided the case the way

it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.”

Id. at 1201-02 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41). “At the same time,” the

Court further recalled, “we adopted a plain-statement rule to avoid the

presumption: ‘If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it

is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds,

we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.’” Id. at 1202 (quoting

Long, 463 U.S. at 1041).

Ultimately, the Court in Florida v. Powell concluded that “[u]nder the
6

Long presumption, we have jurisdiction to entertain this case. Although

invoking Florida’s Constitution and precedent in addition to this Court’s

decisions, the Florida Supreme Court treated state and federal law as

interchangeable and interwoven; the court at no point expressly asserted that

state-law sources gave Powell rights distinct from, or broader than, those

delineated in Miranda.” Id. at 1202 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1044). This

decision shows that Long is alive and well in the Supreme Court and must be

adhered to by this Court of Appeals.

Contrary to the Balentine and Rocha writers’ apparent impressions, the

Supreme Court has not changed or weakened the Long standard’s requirement

that when a state court decision fairly appears “to be interwoven with . . . federal

law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground

is not clear from the face of the opinion” we must assume that the state court

decided as it did on the belief that federal law required it to do so. The Court’s

recent decision in Florida v. Powell emphasizes and turns on this very same

provision. Nor, contrary to the panel authors’ inference, has the Court treated

its decision in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991), as changing the

Long standard in any way. This is evidenced by Florida v. Powell’s citation of

Coleman only for the proposition that federal courts will not disturb state court

decisions resting on state law grounds independent of federal questions and

adequate to support the judgment. Id. at 1201.

Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Arizona v. Evans,

514 U.S. 1 (1995), emphatically refused to alter or overrule the Long standard,

agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that “‘[s]ince Long, we repeatedly have followed

[its] “plain statement” requirement.’” Id. at 8 n.2 (quoting id. at 33 (Ginsburg,

J., dissenting), in turn quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261 n.7 (1989)
7

(opinion of Blackmun, J.)) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182 (1990)

(opinion of Scalia, J.); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588 n.4 (1990)

(opinion of Brennan, J.); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 83-84 n. 4 (1987)

(opinion of Stevens, J.); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1985)

(opinion of Marshall, J.); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389 n.1 (1985)

(opinion of Burger, C.J.); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497 n.7 (1984) (opinion

of Rehnquist, J.); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 n.5 (1984) (opinion

of Powell, J.)). The Court in Arizona v. Evans also cited its decision in Coleman,

written by Justice O’Connor, not as changing Long but merely as “declining to

expand the Long and Harris presumption to instances ‘where the relevant state

court decision does not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be

interwoven with such law.’” Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 740).

Thus, the Court has consistently applied the Long standard as originally

formulated to “obviate in most instances the need to examine state law in order

to decide the nature of the state court decision, and . . . at the same time avoid

the danger of our rendering advisory opinions.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. And in

determining whether a federal court can review a case that is alleged to rest on

adequate and independent state grounds, the Court has “assume[d] that there

are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state

court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly

appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law [or that

the decision is interwoven with federal law].” Id. at 1042.

The panel opinions in Balentine and Rocha represent major erroneous

departures from the Supreme Court’s consistent decisions applying the Long

standard, and, under the Long presumption, have erroneously barred federal

court review of petitioners’ federal constitutional claims.
2The operative part of the CCA order stated: 

Applicant presents two allegations in his application. In the first allegation,

applicant asserts that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment rightto effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate,

develop, and present mitigation evidence in the punishment phase of the trial.

In his second allegation, applicant asserts that the prosecution

unconstitutionally exercised peremptory challenges on two venire persons in

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We have reviewed the

application and find that his allegations fail to satisfy the requirements of

Article 11.071 § 5. Accordingly, applicant’s application is dismissed, and his

motion to stay his execution is denied.Likewise, applicant’s motion to vacate the

judgment rendered in his initial state writ application is denied, and the Court

otherwise declines to reconsider that case.

Ex parte Balentine, 2009 WL 3042425, at *1.

8

In Balentine, the CCA acknowledged that Balentine presented two

allegations based on federal law: “In the first allegation, applicant asserts that

he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial

counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate, develop, and present

mitigation evidence in the punishment phase of the trial. In his second

allegation, applicant asserts that the prosecution unconstitutionally exercised

peremptory challenges on two venire persons in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986).” Ex parte Balentine, Nos. WR-54071-01, WR-54071-02, 2009

WL3042425, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2009) (unpublished). However, the

CCA failed to make clear what part, if any, federal law played in its disposition

of the case. Instead, it created ambiguity by dismissing Balentine’s application

after stating only that his allegations fail “to satisfy the requirements of [Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 11.071 § 5.”2 Because the CCA has

interpreted an operative provision of the pertinent procedural rule, § 5(a)(1) of

article 11.071, to include a requirement that an applicant must allege a prima

facie claim based on federal constitutional law, the CCA’s disposition is unclear

as to whether it applied state or federal law, or both, in reaching its decision.

Thus the CCA decision in Balentine fairly appears to be interwoven with
9

federal law principles and the adequacy and independence of any possible state

law ground is not clear from the face of the CCA’s decision. Moreover, the CCA’s

decision does not in any way indicate clearly and expressly that it is

alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds.

Therefore, under the Long presumption, the Balentine panel’s holding that

federal habeas review is barred is clearly contrary to that presumption and the

Supreme Court’s decisions. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203 (“We

therefore cannot identify, ‘from the face of the opinion,’ a clear statement that

the decision rested on a state ground separate from [the federal law principles

of] Miranda.” (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (the state court “need only make

clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are

being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the

result that the court has reached”)). “[B]ecause the [CCA]’s decision does not

‘indicate clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide

separate, adequate, and independent state grounds,’” federal habeas review is

not barred. Id. at 1203 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1041) (brackets omitted).

Accordingly, the Balentine decision should have been reconsidered en banc

because it is based on a significant error of law affecting our habeas review of

this and other Texas capital punishment cases.

The Rocha panel decision also should have been reconsidered en banc

because it similarly fails to correctly apply the Long standard. Another

operative provision of Texas Code of CriminalProcedure article 11.071, § 5(a)(3),

on its face incorporates federal constitutional standards, and the CCA’s judicial

gloss on §5(a)(3) that left open the possibility that § 5(a)(3) encompasses federal

claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of

death penalty trials, which Rocha raised. In Rocha itself, however, the CCA did

not make clear whether its decision was based on state procedural default or on
3Texas calls its successive state habeas petitions “subsequent application[s] for a writ

of habeas corpus.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5.

4That statute provides, in relevant part:

(a) If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing

an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant

relief based on the subsequent application unless the application

contains sufficient specific facts establishing that:

(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have

been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a

10

the merits ofthe petitioner’s underlying claim based on federal law, or both. The

operative part of the CCA’s order provided only: “We have reviewed the

application and find that the allegations do not satisfy the requirements of

Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3). Therefore, we dismiss this application as an

abuse of the writ.” Ex parte Rocha, No. WR-52515-04, 2008 WL 5245553, at *1

(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2008) (unpublished). Thus, for reasons similar to those

in Balentine, because § 5(a)(3) incorporates federal-law standards and the CCA’s

previous interpretation is ambiguous about whether § 5(a)(3) encompasses

Rocha’s federal-law claim, the CCA’s Rocha decision fairly appears to be

interwoven with federal law; the adequacy and independence of any possible

state law ground is not clear from the face of the CCA’s decision; and the CCA’s

decision does not in any way indicate clearly and expressly that it is

alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state

grounds. 

FURTHER DISCUSSION

I. Background

A. Texas’ subsequent habeas statute3

These cases involve decisions by the CCA applying § 5 of article 11.071 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,4 which governs subsequent state habeas
previously considered application filed under this article or Article

11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was

unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous

application;

(2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the

United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the

applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or

(3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation ofthe United

States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the

state’s favor one or more ofthe special issues that were submitted

to the jury in the applicant’s trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711,

or 37.072.

. . . .

(c) On receipt of the copies of the documents from the clerk, the court of

criminal appeals shall determine whether the requirements of

Subsection (a) have been satisfied. The convicting court may not take

further action on the application before the court of criminal appeals

issues an order finding that the requirements have been satisfied. If the

court of criminal appeals determines that the requirements have not

been satisfied, the court shall issue an order dismissing the application

as an abuse of the writ under this section.

11

applications. Section 5 allows a subsequent habeas application that satisfies any

one of the three requirements of § 5(a) by presenting a claim based on: (1) a

previously unavailable factual or legal basis (the “unavailability requirement”);

(2) a constitutional error that affected the guilt/innocence phase of the trial; or

(3) a constitutional error that affected the sentencing phase of the trial. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(c). In order to dismiss such an application, § 5

requires the CCA to determine thatthe application has failed to satisfy all ofthe

requirements of § 5(a), including § 5(a)(1). Id.

In 2005, the CCA added a judicial gloss, holding that to satisfy the

requirements of § 5(a)(1), an applicant must also make a prima facie showing of

a federal constitutional claim that requires relief from the conviction or sentence

(the “prima facie showing requirement”). See Ex Parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d
5The CCA did not always read § 5(a)(1)to include the prima facie showing requirement.

That court adopted the requirement following the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in order to prevent a flood of potentially meritless Atkins claims

raised in subsequent habeas applications brought pursuant to § 5(a)(1) from inundating Texas

courts. See Ex parte Williams, No. 43,907-02, 2003 WL 1787634, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb.

26, 2003) (Cochran, J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham first noted that the prima facie

showing requirement “render[ed] dismissal of [Atkins] claims under article 11.071 [§] (5)(a) a

decision on the merits.” Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 500 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005) (Higginbotham,

J., concurring). Later, in Rivera v. Quarterman, this court held that “a decision that an Atkins

petition does not make a prima facie showing—and is, therefore, an abuse of the writ—is not

an independent state law ground.” 505 F.3d 349, 359 (5th Cir. 2007). The CCA later imported

the prima facie showing requirement to all other types of claims brought under § 5(a)(1). See

Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d at 63, 66 (“We need not . . . decide whether applicant’s claim was

legally available at the time he filed his original writ because we conclude that his application

does not ‘contain sufficient specific facts establishing that’ his claim is cognizable even if Penry

II, Tennard, and Smith created a new and previously unavailable legal claim.”); see also Ex

parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 421 (citing Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d at 64) (applying the

prima facie requirement for § 5(a)(1) for claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)).

12

418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d 56, 66 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005) (per curiam).5 There is no dispute that the prima facie showing

requirement is not independent of federal law. See, e.g., Rivera v. Quarterman,

505 F.3d 349, 359 (5th Cir. 2007).

B. The state court proceedings in Balentine and Rocha

Balentine presented two claims in his subsequent habeas application: He

claimed that “he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate,

develop, and present mitigation evidence in the punishment phase of the trial,”

a claim under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); and he presented a claim

under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See Ex parte Balentine, Nos. WR54071-01, -02, 2009 WL 3042425, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2009)

(unpublished). The CCA dismissed Balentine’s subsequent habeas application

because it found that “his allegations fail to satisfy the requirements of Article
13

11.071 § 5,” without specifying a particular part of § 5(a). (I refer to CCA

dismissals of this sort as “unexplained CCA dismissals.”)

In Rocha, the petitioner “present[ed] a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to investigate, discover, and present significant mitigation

evidence at his trial[] . . . [and] assert[ed] that the application meets the

requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3).” Ex parte Rocha, No.

WR-52515-04, 2008 WL 5245553 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2008) (unpublished).

The CCA dismissed the petitioner’s subsequent state habeas application because

it found “that the allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071,

Section 5(a)(3).” Id. at *1. Therefore, the question we must answer is whether

the unexplained CCA dismissal in Balentine, which necessarily includes a

determination that the § 5(a)(1) requirements were not met, and the CCA

dismissal in Rocha, based on a determination that the requirements of § 5(a)(3)

were not satisfied, rest on independent and adequate state grounds.

II. Independent and adequate state grounds

Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state

court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent

of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). Before its decision in Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court had struggled to adopt a consistent

and workable standard for determining whether a state court decision rests on

independent and adequate state grounds. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732-33. 

Among the Court’s prior methods of analysis that it found “unsatisfactory” in

Long was “[t]he process of examining state law . . . because it requires us to

interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar.” 463 U.S. at 1039.
14

In Long,the Court resolved to provide a solution that would “minimize the

costs associated with resolving ambiguities in state court decisions while still

fulfilling [the] obligation to determine ifthere was an independent and adequate

state ground for the decision.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733.

[In Long, the Supreme Court] established a conclusive

presumption[:] . . . “[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears

to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal

law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state

law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept

as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the

case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it

to do so.”

Id. at 733 (quoting Long, 436 U.S. at 1040-41)). “After Long, a state court that

wishes to look to federal law for guidance or as an alternative holding while still

relying on an independent and adequate state ground can avoid the presumption

by stating ‘clearly and expressly that its decision is based on bona fide separate,

adequate, and independent grounds.’” Id. (quoting Long, 436 U.S. at 1041)

(brackets and ellipsis omitted).

The Court later applied the Long presumption to habeas review cases in

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). In Harris, the state court had said that the

petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim “could have been raised on

direct appeal,” which, under state law, would mean the claim was waived, but

nonetheless,the state court considered and rejected the merits of the claim. 489

U.S. at 258, 266 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals had found that the state court decision was

“ambiguous” about whether it rested on procedural default under state law or

on the merits of the petitioner’s federal constitutional claims. Id.

“[N]onetheless[,] [the Seventh Circuit] asserted that a reviewing court should try

to assess the state court’s intention to the extent that this is possible.” Id.
15

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court reversed,

holding that “[t]he adequate and independent state ground doctrine, and the

problem of ambiguity resolved by Long, is of concern not only in cases on direct

review . . . , but also in federal habeas corpus.” Id. at 262.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that “the mere fact that

a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not, in and of

itself, prevent [federal courts] from reaching the federal claim: The state court

must actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its

disposition of the case. Furthermore, ambiguities in that regard must be

resolved by application ofthe Long standard.” Id.(internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). The Court explained that the contrary presumption—that “if

a state-court decision is ambiguous as to whether the judgment rests on a

procedural bar, the federal court should presume that it does,” id. at 263-

64—“would impose substantial burdens on the federal courts. . . . [T]he federal

habeas court would be forced to examine the state-court record to determine

whether procedural default was argued to the state court, or would be required

to undertake an extensive analysis of state law to determine whether a

procedural bar was potentially applicable to the particular case. Much time

would be lost in reviewing legal and factual issues that the state court, familiar

with state law and the record before it, is better suited to address expeditiously.

The ‘plain statement’ requirement achieves the important objective of permitting

the federal court rapidly to identify whether federal issues are properly

presented before it.” Id. at 264-65.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), similarly affirmed the Long

standard. The case involved a summary order of the Virginia Supreme Court,

which, the United States Supreme Court noted, “stated plainly that it was

granting the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition for appeal. That
6

In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected Coleman’s argument that in order to

dismiss his petition for appeal as untimely, the state court necessarily had to decide that he

was not entitled to an extension, which involved an antecedent decision about federal law. 501

U.S. at 742. The Court found that the Virginia Supreme Court’s extension rule did not apply

to Coleman’s case because (1) the exception was applied only where the denial of the extension

itself would cause the abridgment of a constitutional right (such as the right to counsel on

appeal), which was not Coleman’s claim; and (2)the rule was limited only to extensions oftime

for “filing a petition” and it was Coleman’s notice of appeal that was filed late, not his petition.

Id. at 741. The Court did not undertake an extrapolation of state law to decide whether the

Virginia Supreme Court’s perfunctory decision rested on either a federal-law or state-law

ground. Instead, the Court simply determined that in Coleman’s case there was clearly no

federal-law issue interwoven with the state’s procedural default rule; the state court had only

dismissed Coleman’s petition for appeal because his notice of appeal was filed late and

therefore procedurally defaulted. Thus, the Court held that the state court decisions “‘fairly

appear[ed]’ to rest primarily on state law.” Id. at 740.

7See also Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (opinion of Ginsburg, J.); Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

740 (1991) (opinion of O’Connor, J.)); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182 (1990) (opinion

of Scalia, J.); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 588 n.4 (1990) (opinion of Brennan, J.);

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 83-84 n.4 (1987) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Caldwell v.

16

motion was based solely on Coleman’s failure to meet the [Virginia] Supreme

Court’s time requirements. There is no mention of federal law in the Virginia

Supreme Court’s three-sentence dismissal order. It ‘fairly appears’ to rest

primarily on state law.” Id. at 740. Therefore, the Court held that the Long

presumption did not apply because the state court decision was unequivocally

based only on state law.6 The Coleman Court was clear that it was faithfully

applying the Long presumption, not modifying it, id. at 733, and nothing in the

Coleman decision suggests that it meant to alter or abrogate the Long

presumption by requiring federal courts to attempt to discern the possible

decisional basis of an ambiguous state court decision.

In fact, since Long and Harris, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly

followed its ‘plain statement’ requirement.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 n.2

(1995) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 261 n.7 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)).7 And the Court on
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1985) (opinion of Marshall, J.); California v. Carney, 471

U.S. 386, 389 n.1 (1985) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497 n.7

(1984) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175 n.5 (1984) (opinion

of Powell, J.).

17

several occasions has expressly refused to reconsider or overrule the Long

presumption and plain statement requirement. For example, Chief Justice

Rehnquist, in Arizona v. Evans, explained the Court’s reasons for adhering to

the Long standard as follows:

“[A]mbiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts [should] not

stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity

under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise

of our appellate powers [and habeas review by the federal courts]

compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and

ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. . . . For no other course

assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued

here, will reach this Courtfor adjudication;that state courts will not

be the final arbiters of important issues under the federal

constitution; and that we will not encroach on the constitutional

jurisdiction of the states.” [] We therefore adhere to the standard

adopted in Michigan v. Long . . . .

514 U.S. at 8-9 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S.

at 557). Therefore, the Supreme Court has clearly and continuously reaffirmed

the Long presumption, and instructed the federal courts to follow its mandate.

III. The Supreme Court’s precedents dictate that the unexplained

CCA dismissal in Balentine and the CCA dismissal citing § 5(a)(3)

in Rocha do not rest on independent and adequate state grounds

The foregoing established principles make clear that the CCA’s

unexplained dismissal in Balentine and the CCA’s dismissal in Rocha must be

presumed to not rest on independent and adequate state grounds. In Balentine,

the CCA’s unexplained dismissal is ambiguous as to whether it was based on a

determination that Balentine’s application did not satisfy the unavailability
18

prong or the prima facie showing requirement of § 5(a)(1), or both. Because the

prima facie showing requirement of § 5(a)(1) is a determination based on federal

law, the CCA’s unexplained determination that Balentine’s application did not

satisfy § 5, and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of § 5(a)(1), is a

decision interwoven with federal law. It does not clearly and explicitly state that

the CCA only decided that Balentine’s application did not satisfy the state-law

unavailability prong of § 5(a)(1).

Likewise, Rocha’s claims were brought in a subsequent application

pursuant to § 5(a)(3), which, on its face, allows claims that show a federal

constitutional error. The CCA’s perfunctory dismissal of Rocha’s application is

interwoven with federal law because it decided that his claims did not meet the

requirements of § 5(a)(3), which are based on federal constitutional standards,

and it did not clearly base its dismissal on a purely state-law procedural default

rule. Therefore, under the Long standard,the CCA’s decisions are presumed not

to rest on independent and adequate state grounds and a federal court can

review the merits of Balentine’s and Rocha’s constitutional claims on a habeas

petition.

Contrary to what the panel opinions in Balentine and Rocha contend,

Coleman dictates the same result. There, the state court merely granted the

state’s motion to dismiss Coleman’s petition for appeal based on the state’s

procedural bar, which did not involve a federal-law issue; nor was there any

relevant exception to the state procedural bar that could have involved a federal

law determination. Therefore, the Coleman Court concluded thatthe state court

decision fairly appeared to rest primarily on state law where there was no

possible federal-law issue interwoven in the state’s procedural rule, nor in the

state court’s application of that rule. 501 U.S. at 739. By contrast, the CCA’s

unexplained dismissal in Balentine necessitated a decision regarding the state’s
8Although the CCA’s dismissal in Rocha referred specifically to § 5(a)(3), the Rocha

panel examines unexplained CCA dismissals like that in Balentine and reaches the same

conclusions as the Balentine panel. Therefore, I will discuss the opinions together.

19

procedural bar, which is interwoven with federal law. And the CCA’s dismissal

in Rocha involved a state procedural rule that on its face depends on federal

constitutional standards. Thus, there is “good reason to question whether” the

CCA’s dismissals in Balentine and Rocha rested primarily on independent state

grounds, and therefore, Coleman dictates that the Long presumption applies to

these state court decisions. See id.

IV. The panel decisions in Balentine and Rocha

A. Balentine and Rocha misapply the Long presumption

Balentine and Rocha conclude that, although “an unexplained denial of a

subsequent application may have been based on a federal merits ground,” that

is not enough to trigger the Long presumption. Balentine, 2010 WL 4630829, at

*11-12; Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794, at *12.8 According to those opinions, “[t]here

must be more than silence. In some form, the state court has to make a fair

indication that the merits of the claims were reached.” Balentine, 2010 WL

4630829, at *12; see Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794, at *12. They conclude that

“[w]hen the CCA dismisses a successive habeas application on the ground that

it does not satisfy § 5(a)(1),” Coleman, requires the court to “read [the CCA’s]

order of dismissal to determine which of the two elements of § 5(a)(1) was the

basis of the court’s dismissal.” Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794, at *12 (“A boilerplate

dismissal might be ambiguous on this point, but finding clarity in ambiguity is

the bread-and-butter work of a federal court of appeals.”); Balentine, 2010 WL

4630829, at *12-14. And they endeavor to discover the hidden basis of the CCA’s

unexplained dismissal by making an assumption about the CCA’s decisional
20

process for all § 5 applications, and presuming that the CCA’s decision was

based on the unavailability prong of § 5(a)(1) because Balentine’s application did

not show that his claim was previously unavailable. Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794,

at *10, *12; Balentine, 2010 WL 4630829, at *12-14.

Balentine and Rocha short circuit the Long presumption by contending

that a federal court should attempt to determine whether an ambiguous state

court decision applying the state’s procedural rule, which includes a federal-law

component, rests on independent and adequate state grounds. However, the

Long standard, also applied in Harris and Coleman, is that a state court

decision, which fairly appears to be interwoven with federal law, and which does

not clearly rest on independent and adequate state-law grounds, is presumed to

be a decision dependent on federal law. Long specifically rejected “[t]he process

of examining state law” in order to determine the basis of an ambiguous state

court decision. 463 U.S. at 1039. And Harris reversed a court of appeals

decision that had “asserted that a reviewing court ‘should try to assess the state

court’s intention to the extent that this is possible,’” when confronted with an

ambiguous state court decision. 489 U.S. at 258, 266. Long also recognized that

federal courts “may review a state case decided on a federal ground even if it is

clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state

court could properly have relied.” 463 U.S. at 1039 n.4.

Coleman does not sweep away the Long presumption by requiring courts

to guess at the grounds of an ambiguous state court decision, and Balentine and

Rocha accordingly undertake a misguided examination of Texas law. In

Coleman, the Virginia Supreme Court’s order only granted the state’s motion to

dismiss Coleman’s petition for appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely,

which involved no antecedent or concurrent question of federal law. Coleman

does not stand for the proposition that when faced with a state court decision
21

interwoven with federal law, a federal court should examine the state’s

procedural law and guess as to the decisional basis for the state court’s decision.

Indeed Coleman never purported to upset the fundamental premise of the Long

presumption.

By expounding on state law and the unspoken decisional processes of state

courts in order to unearth the possible grounds for an ambiguous state court

decision, the Balentine and Rocha panel opinions undermine the Long

presumption and return the independent-and-adequate-state-grounds inquiry

to where it was before Long. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 (“The process of

examining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state

laws with which we are generally unfamiliar . . . .”). Only in the limited subset

of cases where the state court decision “fairly appears to rest primarily on state

law” does Coleman hold thatthe Long presumption should not be applied. Here,

the CCA’s unexplained dismissal does notfairly appear to rest primarily on state

law because such dismissal could have rested on the failure to satisfy the prima

facie showing requirement of § 5(a)(1). By contrast, in Coleman there was no

federal law issue interwoven with the state’s procedural default rule or the state

court’s decision to grant the state’s motion to dismiss the petition for appeal

because Coleman’s notice of appeal was untimely. Therefore, Coleman does not

limit the application of the Long presumption to the CCA’s unexplained

dismissals.

Finally, Balentine concludes that because “Balentine’s subsequent

application made no effort to show that the facts or law underlying his . . . claim

were unavailable to him at the time of his first state application,” the CCA must

have decided only that Balentine failed to satisfy the unavailability requirement

of § 5(a)(1) and necessarily did not decide that he failed to satisfy the prima facie

showing requirement as well. 2010 WL 4630829, at *14. However, Balentine’s
22

subsequent habeas application to the CCA specifically alleged that the factual

basis for his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing

to investigate for mitigating evidence was previously unavailable, because the

attorney on his first state habeas application, who was provided to him under

Texas law, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 2, was similarly ineffective by

also failing to investigate mitigating evidence. Subsequent Application at 4, 6-

16, 37, Ex parte Balentine, 2009 WL 3042425 (Nos. WR-54071-01, WR-54071-02).

Balentine alleged that the first time any of his attorneys investigated and

located substantial mitigating evidence was after his first state habeas

application, during his federal habeas proceedings. Id. at 6. Therefore, it is not

clear that the CCA found Balentine’s claim to have been previously available. 

Furthermore, it simply does not follow that because one of two essential

requirements appears not to be met that a state court necessarily did not base

its decision on the failure of the other requirement. Cf., e.g., Harris, 489 U.S. at

258 (reviewing a state court decision that had explicitly found the petitioner’s

claim waived but still considered and rejected the merits of the claim). And

Coleman recognized that “[a]fter Long, a state court that wishes to look to

federal law for guidance or as an alternative holding while still relying on an

independent and adequate state ground can avoid the presumption by stating

clearly and expressly that its decision is based on bona fide separate, adequate,

and independent grounds.” 501 U.S. at 733 (internal quotation marks, brackets,

and ellipsis omitted) (emphasis added); see also Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 n.4

(recognizing that federal courts “may review a state case decided on a federal

ground even if it is clear that there was an available state ground for decision on

which the state court could properly have relied”). Therefore, we cannot

presume that the CCA’s silence means that it did not base its decision on the

alternative, federal-law requirement of § 5(a)(1).
9 Balentine and Rocha rest this conclusion on a line in the CCA’s decision in Ex parte

Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), which refers to the prima facie prong of

§ 5(a)(1) as “‘the rest ofthe section 5(a)(1) bar.’” Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794, at *10 n.96 (quoting

Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 422) (emphasis added in Rocha). Rocha concludes that

because in Ex parte Campbell the CCA determined first that the applicant’s claim was

previously unavailable, and then determined that the applicant had failed to make the

necessary prima facie showing, therefore all CCA decisions under § 5(a) must proceed in that

order. Id. at *10. However, there is nothing in the CCA’s decision in Ex parte Campbell that

says these two components are necessarily decided in that order in every case.

Rocha also relies on Ex parte Hood, 211 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), which,

according to the Rocha panel, “conclud[ed] that § 5(a)(1) did not authorize the CCA to consider

the merits of a claim presented ina successive habeas application ‘because the legal bases upon

which applicant relies were available at the time he filed his second application’ and

undert[ook] no discussion of the prima facie merits of the applicant’s claim.” Rocha, 2010 WL

4630794, at *10 n.97 (quoting Ex parte Hood, 211 S.W.3d at 770). However, Ex parte Hood

involves nothing more than an example of a decision by the CCA that fairly appears to rest

primarily on state law, viz., the unavailability component of § 5(a)(1). Under Coleman, the

Long presumption is not needed to resolve ambiguity in such CCA dismissals. Ex parte Hood

does not support the conclusion that § 5(a)(1) requires the CCA to consider the two

requirements of § 5(a)(1) in any particular order.

23

B. The Balentine and Rocha opinions’ interpretation of the CCA’s

decisional process conflicts with CCA decisions

Balentine and Rocha also mistakenly conclude that we can discern the

uncertain decisional basis in an unexplained CCA dismissals because “[t]he CCA

first examines whether the factual or legal basis of the claim was unavailable at

the time of the original application[,] [and] [o]nly if the applicant can surmount

the unavailability hurdle does the CCA proceed to ask whether the application

makes out a claim that is prima facie meritorious.” Rocha, 2010 WL 4630794,

at *10.9 However, it is practical that if the CCA confronted a subsequent habeas

application that it concluded failed to make the necessary prima facie showing,

it would not need to determine whether the application satisfied the

unavailability prong in order to dismiss the application. Cf. Pearson v.

Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (“[T]he rigid Saucier procedure comes with

a price. The procedure sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce

judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the
10To illustrate the practical sense ofthe CCA dismissing a subsequent application based

only on a determination that the application failed to make the necessary prima facie showing

and without reaching the unavailability prong of § 5(a)(1), as it did in Ex parte Reed, No.

WR-50961-06, 2009 WL 1900364 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2009) (unpublished), which involved

a Brady claim: Assume there is a factual dispute about when the Brady material was first

discoverable, e.g., the applicant asserts that he discovered the material after he filed his first

state habeas application and the state contends thatthe material was reasonably discoverable

by the applicant before he filed his first application for state habeas relief. If the Rocha panel

is correct, then a laborious, fact-intensive inquiry would be required in order for the CCA to

determine ifthe application satisfied the requirements of § 5(a)(1). If, however, the CCA could

more easily determine that the application did not show a prima facie Brady violation—e.g.,

the CCA determined that Brady did not require that the disputed materials be disclosed—then

there would be no efficient reason to first expend time and effortto make factual findings about

the availability vel non of the material.

24

case. There are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly

established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.”). That

the CCA would first reach the more easily decided of two possibly dispositive

issues is not a novel proposition.10 Indeed, decisions of the CCA confirm that the

CCA does just that in many cases. 

In Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (per curiam),the

first CCA decision to judicially engraft the prima facie showing requirement for

§ 5(a)(1) to a non-Atkins claim, the CCA said:

We need not, however, decide whether applicant’s claim was legally

available at the time he filed his original writ because we conclude

that his application does not “contain sufficient specific facts

establishing that” his claim is cognizable even if Penry II, Tennard,

and Smith created a new and previously unavailable legal claim. 

Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d at 63. Similarly, in Ex parte Reed, No.

WR-50961-06, 2009 WL 1900364 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2009) (unpublished),

the CCA dismissed the applicant’s subsequent habeas application because it

“fail[ed]to show a Brady violation” without discussing whether the factual basis

for the claim was previously unavailable to the applicant. Id. at *1-2. Likewise,

in Ex parte Johnson, No. WR-56947-02, 2009 WL 1165502 (Tex. Crim. App.
11Moreover, the dissenting opinion in Ex parte Johnson characterized the majority

opinion as “reject[ing] [the defendant’s] application, not because he fails to invoke new law

under Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1), but because he does not make out a prima facie case for

mental retardation.” 2009 WL 1165502, at *1 (Price, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

25

Apr. 29, 2009) (unpublished), the CCA found “that [the] applicant . . . failed to

make a prima facie case of mental retardation” without discussing whether the

factual or legal basis of the claim was previously unavailable. Id. at *1.11 And

in Ex parte Jackson, No. WR-60,124-02, 2010 WL 2843945 (Tex. Crim. App.

July 19, 2010) (unpublished) the CCA dismissed the application in a summary

order that said, in pertinent part: “Applicant presents two allegations in his

application. In the first, he asserts that the State failed to disclose material,

exculpatory evidence, and in the second, he asserts that his execution would

violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he is mentally

retarded. We have reviewed the application and find that applicant has failed

to make a prima facie showing of either claim.” Id. at *1. In short, the CCA does

not always first decide the unavailability prong of § 5(a)(1) before considering the

prima facie showing component.

C. Contrary to the Balentine and Rocha panel opinions, the plain

text and the CCA’s own interpretation of § 5(a)(3) permit

adjudication of federal claims that do not meet the Sawyer

standard in subsequent habeas proceedings

In his subsequent habeas application, Rocha raised for the first time a

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present

mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of his trial, a claim explained in

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Rocha asserted that his subsequent
26

application met the requirements of § 5(a)(3), because it provides an avenue for

claims asserting that “but for a violation of the United States Constitution no

rational juror would have answered in the state’s favor one or more ofthe special

issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial under Article

37.071”; and § 2(e)(1) of article 37.071 requires the jury to consider mitigating

evidence when deciding whether to impose the death penalty, see Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1). Therefore, Rocha argued, his constitutionally

ineffective representation caused the jury to not consider mitigating evidence,

which, if the jury had received it, would have caused them not to impose the

death penalty; and this constituted a claim under § 5(a)(3). The CCA dismissed

Rocha’s application because it found “that the allegations do not satisfy the

requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3).” Ex parte Rocha, 2008 WL

5245553, at *1. Balentine had similarly presented a claim in his subsequent

habeas application that his trial counsel and first state habeas counsel had been

ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence in mitigation of the

death penalty. Because the CCA dismissed Balentine’s application due to its

failure “to satisfy the requirements of . . . § 5,” the CCA apparently decided that

it also failed to satisfy the requirement of § 5(a)(3). Ex parte Balentine, 2009 WL

3042425, at *1.

On its face, § 5(a)(3) is interwoven with federal constitutional law: An

application must show “by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of

the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the

state’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury.”

Therefore, for the CCA to decide that an application does not satisfy the

requirements of § 5(a)(3),the CCA must necessarily decide that the claims raised

by the applicant do not show a federal constitutional violation that affected the

jury’s decision to impose the death penalty. Accordingly, a decision by the CCA
12Sawyer establishes a gateway for a federal habeas petitioner to have his otherwise

unexhausted constitutional claims considered: Where the petitioner can show by clear and

convincing evidence that he is actually innocent of the death penalty, a federal court can

review the merits of his constitutional claim. Sawyer is not a freestanding claim for relief, but

a gateway that allows a habeas petitioner to have his defaulted constitutional claims reviewed.

27

thatthe requirements of § 5(a)(3) have not been met, without explanation, fairly

appears to rest on federal law, and without a plain statement that the CCA did

not reach the merits of the applicant’s constitutional claims, we must presume

that the CCA dismissed the application based on a decision about the merits of

the applicant’s federal constitutional claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,

75 (1985) (where “the federal-law holding is integral to the state court’s

disposition of the matter,” the state court’s decision “depends on the court’s

federal-law ruling and consequently does not present an independent state

ground for the decision rendered”).

The Balentine and Rocha panel opinions, however, conclude that the CCA

did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ federal Wiggins claims because

§ 5(a)(3) allows only claims that satisfy the actual-innocence-of-the-deathpenalty standard announced in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).12

Therefore, the panels reason that when the CCA determined without

explanation that Balentine’s and Rocha’s subsequent habeas applications failed

to satisfy the requirements of § 5(a)(3), the CCA only determined that the

applicants did not meet the Sawyer actual-innocence-of-the-death-penalty

threshold, i.e., that the applicants did not show that they were constitutionally

ineligible for the death penalty, and did not reach the merits of their Wiggins

claims.

The Rocha and Balentine opinions are mistaken in their assessment that

§ 5(a)(3) is limited only to claims that can satisfy theSawyer actual-innocence-ofthe-death-penalty showing. The panels’ conclusion conflicts with the plain
28

language of § 5(a)(3) and the CCA’s precedent. Section 5(a)(3) provides an

avenue for asserting a claim that “but for a violation of the United States

Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state’s favor one or

more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial

under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072.” One of the “special issues” that a jury

must decided pursuant to article 37.071 is “[w]hether, taking into consideration

all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's

character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant,

there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that

a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence be

imposed.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1). Accordingly, Balentine’s

and Rocha’s Wiggins claims assert that but for their constitutionally ineffective

representation, the jury would not have imposed the death penalty after

considering the mitigating evidence, which their attorneys had failed to

investigate and present. The plain text of § 5(a)(3), therefore, encompasses the

petitioners’ Wiggins claims, as Judge Haynes’ concurring opinion in Rocha

astutely notes. 2010 WL 4630794, at *16.

Furthermore,the CCA’s explanation ofthe scope of § 5(a)(3) in the seminal

case, Ex Parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), acknowledges this

straightforward interpretation of the claims that are cognizable under § 5(a)(3).

In describing the scope of § 5(a)(3) in Ex parte Blue, the CCA expressly left open

the possibility that § 5(a)(3) was broader than Sawyer:

We hesitate to declare that Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3) wholly

codifies the Supreme Court’s doctrine of “actual innocence of the

death penalty,” even inasmuch as it has tied the exception to the bar

on subsequent writs to the statutory criteria for the death penalty

under Article 37.071. Since 1991, one of the special issues that

determine whether capital punishment will be imposed is the

so-called “mitigation” special issue, embodied in Article 37.071,
29

Section 2(e). Article 11.071 was originally promulgated in 1995,

after this amendment to Article 37.071. Therefore it is arguable

that, in theory at least, a subsequent habeas applicant could

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that, but for some

constitutional error, no rational juror would have answered the

mitigation special issue in the State’s favor. On its face this would

seem to meet the criteria of Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3). But it

would also permit a subsequent state habeas applicant to proceed

under circumstances that would not excuse a federal petitioner

under Sawyer v. Whitley. We need express no ultimate opinion on

this question here.

Id. at 161 n.42 (citations omitted). Judge Haynes has also noted the significance

of this footnote, see 2010 WL 4630794, at *16, while the Balentine and Rocha

panel opinions give it too little consideration or weight. Furthermore, while the

Balentine and Rocha opinions contend that Ex parte Blue limited § 5(a)(3) to

claims that satisfy the Sawyer standard, the CCA in fact carefully avoided this

result, instead saying: “Section 5(a)(3) . . . represents the Legislature’s attempt

to codify something very much like this federal doctrine of ‘actual innocence of

the death penalty,’” “the Legislature apparently intended to codify, more or less,

the doctrine found in Sawyer v. Whitley,” and “[t]his reading of the exception

seems to limit its applicability.” 230 S.W.3d at 160-61 (emphasis added). Thus,

the CCA’s equivocal language reflects a clear intentto avoid saying that § 5(a)(3)

is defined by the same standard as that announced in Sawyer.

Therefore, it is not clear that § 5(a)(3) does not encompass Balentine’s and

Rocha’s Wiggins claims even if they did not first meet the Sawyer standard.

According to the principles of Long, this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of

federal review. Therefore, because it fairly appears that the CCA’s decision was

interwoven with federal law, and no possible independent and adequate state

ground was clearly announced or established, the Long presumption prescribes

the same rule here: we must presume that the CCA dismissal was based on
30

federal law. If the CCA had made a clear and express statement that it had not

decided the merits of the petitioners’ Wiggins claims—for instance, by stating

that the claims failed to satisfy § 5(a)(3) because they did not meet the Sawyer

showing—then federal habeas review might be similarly limited to the

petitioners’ claims that satisfied the Sawyer showing. However, the CCA did not

make this plain statement, and therefore, federal review of the petitioners’

Wiggins claims is not barred. In concluding to the contrary, the Balentine and

Rocha panels disregard the mandate of the Long rule.

V. The controlling circuit precedent of this Court holds that

unexplained CCA dismissals do not rest on independent and

adequate state grounds, and subsequent conflicting panel

opinions are not precedential 

In Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2007), this court held that

an unexplained CCA dismissal substantially similar to that in Balentine did not

rest on independent and adequate state grounds. Ruiz involved a decision from

the CCA that read in pertinent part: “We have reviewed these claims and find

that they do not meet the requirements for consideration of subsequent claims

under Article 11 .071, Section 5. This application is dismissed as an abuse of the

writ . . . .” Ex parte Ruiz, No. WR-27328-03, 2007 WL 2011023 (Tex. Crim. App.

July 6, 2007). Ruiz held that this order did not rest on an independent and

adequate state ground: “The boilerplate dismissal by the CCA of an application

for abuse of the writ is itself uncertain on this point, being unclear whether the

CCA decision was based on the first element, a state-law question, or on the

second element, a question of federal constitutional law.” 504 F.3d at 527

(footnote omitted). In reaching this decision, the court relied simply on the

Supreme Court’s independent-and-adequate-state-ground doctrine and the

rationale animating that doctrine:
31

In deciding whether the CCA refused relief upon an

independent state-law ground or upon the merits of Ruiz’s petition

we are aided by the bright light of Michigan v. Long[.] . . . This

settled principle gives to state courts control over the federal review

of their opinions. It has become a rote rule at the fingertips of every

writing member of state courts of last resort—where studied

ambiguity or clarity in the decisional footing is an art form and an

absence of clarity in an opinion is seldom inadvertent. Calibrated

uncertainty can play a mediating role in garnering support for an

outcome. To the point, that the CCA did not make clear that its

decision rested on an independent state ground opens the merits of

Ruiz’s Wiggins claim to federal review. At best, the CCA did not

make clear whether it relied on state or federal law in dismissing

Ruiz’s application. As the CCA is keenly aware, its choice of

language was made against a background legal standard—which

directs the CCA in either granting an application for consideration

of subsequent claims or dismissing that application as an abuse of

the writ—that is interwoven with federal law.

504 F.3d at 527 (footnote omitted) (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41; Coleman,

501 U.S. 722). Therefore, the panel decided that an unexplained CCA dismissal

did not rest on an independent and adequate state ground.

Balentine and Rocha contend that Ruiz can be limited to its facts by

arguing that Ruiz depended only on the fact that the CCA’s summary order did

not acquire a majority of the votes of the CCA judges. It is true that in Ruiz, the

court said that“[i]n any event[,]the decisional basis here is uncertain[]” because

only four judges joined the CCA’s summary order and the necessary fifth vote for

a decision by the en banc CCA came in a separate concurrence that explicitly

reached the merits of Ruiz’s application. Id. Therefore, there was no controlling

five-vote opinion that rested explicitly on an independent and adequate state

ground. However, this alternative holding does not affect Ruiz’s principal

rationale. The panel clearly read the unexplained CCA dismissal order alone as

not clearly resting on independent and adequate state grounds, without regard
32

to the number of votes it garnered. This is made clear in the following lines:

In sum, the three opinions from the seven judges together do not

clearly rest on an independent and adequate state ground. Even if

the order ofthe four-Judge plurality alone left the decisional footing

certain, and it did not, Judge Womack’s opinion, necessary to the

court’s judgment, pushes the court toward a clear merit ruling, and

in any event deprives the plurality of a fifth vote on an independent

and adequate state ground. This leaves the decisional path far

short of the clarity insisted upon by Michigan v. Long, . . . of which

the CCA is acutely aware.

Id. at 528 (emphasis added). Thus, the panel was clear that the vote-counting

portion of its decision did not impact its decision that the summary order of the

CCA did not rest on independent and adequate state grounds. It also reflects the

panel’s correct understanding of the “clarity insisted upon by Michigan v. Long”

as being the certainty that the decision rested on independent and adequate

state grounds, and not clarity that the decision rested on federal grounds.

The rationale underlying Ruiz underscores this point: The independent

and adequate state ground doctrine is meant to ensure that federal courts

provide the requisite respect to state court determinations and to allow state

courts to insulate their decisions from federal court review. The CCA has

available at its fingertips “rote rule[s]” for dismissing subsequent state habeas

applications on grounds that are certainly independent and adequate—by

making clear that its dismissal is dependent only on a finding that the factual

and legal bases for the applicant’s claim were previously available. Therefore,

because the CCA chose not to make a plain statement that its decisions rested

on independent state grounds, there is no valid rationale by which the Rocha

and Balentine panels can interpret the unexplained, obscure, and ambiguous

CCA decisions as not having been interwoven with federal law and clearly based

only on state law principles.
33

In place of Ruiz,the panel opinions in Balentine and Rocha rely on Hughes

v. Quarterman, which held that an unexplained CCA dismissal rested on

independent and adequate state grounds. 530 F.3d 336, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-32, 735); see Ex parte Hughes, No. 45-876-02

(Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2001) (unpublished), quoted in Balentine v. Thaler, 609

F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2010). However, Hughes was decided after the circuit

precedent in Ruiz, without citing or distinguishing Ruiz. Ruiz is, in fact,

indistinguishable from Hughes. Because a decision by one panel of this court

cannot overrule an earlier panel decision, see United States v. Castro-Guevarra,

575 F.3d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 2009), Hughes must give way to the clear

precedential authority of Ruiz. More importantly, however, for all of the reasons

discussed, Hughes is not a valid precedent because it is as inconsistent with the

Supreme Court’s precedents in Long and its progeny, as are Balentine and

Rocha.

CONCLUSION

The unexplained CCA dismissal in Balentine required a determination by

the CCA thatthe application failed to satisfy the requirements of § 5(a)(1), which

the CCA had interpreted to include a component that incorporates federal law,

and the Balentine dismissal does not clearly and expressly state that it rested

on an independent and adequate state ground. Therefore, because it is a

determination interwoven with federal law,the Long presumption applies to the

CCA’s dismissal in Balentine. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739 (where an uncertain

state court decision gives “good reason to question whether there is an

independent and adequate state ground for the decision,” the Long presumption

applies). Without a clear statement that the CCA decision rests on independent
34

and adequate state grounds, such as that it was decided only on the

unavailability prong of § 5(a)(1), the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that

such a decision must be presumed not to rest on independent and adequate state

grounds. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 n.4 (federal courts “may review a state case

decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an available state

ground for decision on which the state court could properly have relied”).

Indeed, this court held exactly that in Ruiz.

Furthermore,the CCA dismissals in Balentine and Rocha invoke § 5(a)(3),

which, on its face is interwoven with federal constitutional principles, and from

a plain reading of § 5(a)(3), appears to encompass Wiggins claims. The CCA in

Ex parte Blue specifically left open this obvious interpretation of § 5(a)(3) that

is broader than the state-law interpretation reached by the Balentine and Rocha

panels. The CCA’s unexplained and ambiguous dismissals in Balentine and in

Rocha, which only stated thatthe applications failed to satisfy the requirements

of § 5(a)(3), accordingly, fairly appear to be interwoven with federal law.

Without a plain statement that the applications were dismissed based on a

procedural default dependent only on state law, the decisions must be presumed

notto rest on independent and adequate state grounds. Therefore, federal court

review of Balentine’s and Rocha’s Wiggins claims is not barred.

Thus, it is clear that the Balentine and Rocha opinions conflict with the

Supreme Court’s precedents, the CCA’s precedents, and our own controlling

circuit precedent. Most important, however, the panel opinions seriously

undermine the Long standard and retrogress into unauthorized Erie-type

guessing as to the nature of unexplained state court death penalty subsequent

habeas decisions in our circuit.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to

deny an en banc rehearing in these cases.
35
Nos. 05-70028 & 09-70018

36

HAYNES, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

Judge Dennis’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc gives a

scholarly analysis of the substantive reasons that the panel opinions in Rocha

and Balentine are incorrect. I write to express the view that these cases merit

en banc reconsideration because they involve a question “of exceptional

importance.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2), (b)(1)(B). Further, the decisions in

question “conflict[] with a decision ofthe United States Supreme Court” (namely,

Long and its progeny). FED.R.APP.P. 35(b)(1)(A). Congress has limited, but not

eliminated, the role of federal courts in the process of state habeas review. See

generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254. The contours of that line are exceptionally

important in any case, but are particularly so here where the death penalty is

involved. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the court’s declination to

rehear these cases en banc.