Present: All the Justices 

CITY OF WINCHESTER 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 950013 November 3, 1995 

AMERICAN WOODMARK CORPORATION 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WINCHESTER 

John E. Wetsel, Jr., Judge 

 I. 

 In this appeal, we consider whether Code §§ 58.1-1100 

and -1101 authorize a city to tax certain personal property 

owned by a manufacturer. 

 II. 

 Relying upon the provisions of Code §§ 58.1-1100 and 

-1101(A), American Woodmark Corporation filed a pleading 

referred to as an "Application to Correct Erroneous 

Assessments of Local Taxes and Claim for Tortious Violation 

of Constitutional Rights" against the City of Winchester. 

American Woodmark sought a refund of $464,637 for taxes it 

had paid during the years 1989 through 1992. 

 Code § 58.1-1100 states in pertinent part: 

 Intangible personal property, including 

capital of a trade or business of any person, firm 

or corporation, . . . is hereby segregated for 

state taxation only. 

Code § 58.1-1101(A) states in pertinent part: 

 A. The subjects of taxation classified by 

this section are hereby defined as intangible 

personal property [taxable by the state]: 

. . . . 

 2. Capital which is personal property, 

tangible in fact, used in manufacturing . . . 

businesses. Machinery and tools, motor vehicles 

and delivery equipment of such businesses shall 

not be defined as intangible personal property for 

purposes of this chapter and shall be taxed 

locally as tangible personal property according to 
the applicable provisions of law relative to such 

property. 

 American Woodmark alleged that its personal property is 

used in its manufacturing business and, therefore, is 

classified as intangible personal property under the 

provisions of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2), not subject to local 

taxation under the provisions of Code § 58.1-3500. In 

response, the City asserted that American Woodmark's 

furniture, fixtures, office equipment, and computer 

equipment located in Winchester, are not used directly in a 

manufacturing facility in Winchester and, therefore, cannot 

be classified as intangible personal property. Accordingly, 

the City claimed that such property is subject to local 

taxation. 

 The trial court held that the personal property in 

question was classified as intangible personal property 

pursuant to Code §§ 58.1-1100 and -1101 and, therefore, was 

not subject to local taxation. The trial court entered a 

judgment including postjudgment interest in favor of 

American Woodmark. We awarded the City an appeal. 

 III. 

 The litigants have stipulated the relevant facts. 

American Woodmark, a Virginia corporation, maintains its 

corporate headquarters in Winchester. American Woodmark's 

executive officers, accounting personnel, credit management 

personnel, computer systems managers and operators, senior 

sales marketing personnel, operations and customer service 

personnel, and senior manufacturing officers work at the 

headquarters. "Functions performed at the corporate 
headquarters . . . include establishing and monitoring 

overall corporate direction and strategy, overall management 

of American Woodmark's business, consolidated reporting of 

its financial information, approving extensions of credit to 

prospective customers, selling and marketing of cabinets and 

vanities produced by other American Woodmark facilities, 

invoicing sales, collecting accounts receivable, paying 

purchase invoices, maintaining a company wide computer 

network, and fulfilling the accounting, tax and regulatory 

compliance functions required to manage and operate the 

company's business activities." 

 American Woodmark purchases green lumber, other raw 

materials, and component parts and uses these items to 

manufacture kitchen cabinets and bathroom vanities at 

certain manufacturing facilities located in several states. 

 American Woodmark does not manufacture any kitchen cabinets 

or bathroom vanities either at its corporate headquarters or 

at any other location in Winchester. 

 American Woodmark has distribution facilities, 

warehouses, service centers, and sales offices throughout 

the United States. These facilities are part of "a computer 

network which is controlled by and operates through a large 

mainframe computer located at American Woodmark's corporate 

headquarters in . . . Winchester. . . . The computer system 

is used to provide data and information to the appropriate 

company personnel to enable . . . them to make informed 

decisions and to manage their areas of responsibility." 

This computer system is an integral part of American 
Woodmark's corporate operations and is used for such vital 

purposes as: the acquisition of raw materials and 

components; distribution and sales of cabinets and vanities; 

inventory control; and billing and accounts receivables. 

The computer system is not directly used in product design 

or research and development. 

 IV. 

 A. 

 The City argues that American Woodmark's personal 

property located at its corporate office is subject to local 

taxation because American Woodmark's headquarters is not a 

manufacturing business under the provisions of Code § 58.1-

1101(A), and the personal property in issue is not "used in" 

that business. Alternatively, the City contends that if the 

property is used in a manufacturing business within the 

City, it is a part of the "machinery and tools of" that 

manufacturing business and thus taxable under the provisions 

of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2). 

 To buttress its position, the City asserts that the 

intangible property located in American Woodmark's corporate 

headquarters cannot be deemed capital used in a 

manufacturing business because American Woodmark does not 

manufacture any products within Winchester's geographical 

boundaries. The City further argues that Code §§ 58.1-1100 

and -1101 are tax exemptions and must be strictly construed 

against the taxpayer. 

 American Woodmark contends that it is a manufacturing 

business within the plain meaning of Code §§ 58.1-1100 and 
-1101 and that the furniture, fixtures, office equipment, 

and computer equipment in its corporate headquarters are 

"used in" its manufacturing business even though no products 

are specifically manufactured in Winchester. We agree with 

American Woodmark. 

 We first determine whether Code §§ 58.1-1100 and 

-1101(A)(2) are tax exemptions, construed against American 

Woodmark, or limitations on the City's power to tax personal 

property, construed against the City. In another context, 

we have broadly defined "exemption" as "[f]reedom from a 

general duty or service; immunity from a general burden, 

tax, or charge." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Catlett 

Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 241 Va. 402, 410, 404 S.E.2d 216, 

220 (1991) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary at 571). Another 

authority defines "exemption" as "freedom from any charge or 

obligation to which others are subject." Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary 795 (1986 ed.). 

 Code §§ 58.1-1100 and -1101(A)(2) do not provide 

freedom from the City's personal property tax to which other 

entities are subject, but rather classify certain personal 

property, tangible in fact, as intangible personal property 

and segregate that property for state taxation only. See

City of Roanoke v. Michael's Bakery Corp., 180 Va. 132, 143-

54, 21 S.E.2d 788, 793-98 (1942) (discussing history of 

segregation and classification of personal property for 

taxation). These statutes also prohibit the City from 

assessing a personal property tax upon property within this 

classification. 
 And, it is well established in Virginia that a 

municipal corporation, such as the City, can only derive its 

taxing power through positive grants of authority from the 

General Assembly. Whiting v. Town of West Point, 89 Va. 

741, 743, 17 S.E. 1, 2 (1893). Therefore, we hold that Code 

§§ 58.1-1100 and -1101(A)(2) reflect the General Assembly's 

decision not to grant a specific taxing power to the City, 

and these statutes must be treated as general tax statutes. 

 Thus, the following principle is applicable here: 

 [S]tatutes imposing taxes are to be construed most 

strongly against the government, and in favor of 

the citizen, and are not to be extended by 

implication beyond the clear import of the 

language used. Whenever there is a just doubt, 

'that doubt should absolve the taxpayer from his 

burden.' 

Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 219 

Va. 529, 537-38, 248 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1978); accord, 

Commonwealth v. P. Lorillard Co., 129 Va. 74, 81-82, 105 

S.E. 683, 685 (1921). 

 We also observe that when we interpret unambiguous 

statutes, such as Code §§ 58.1-1100 and -1101(A)(2), we 

apply the plain meaning rule. 

 While in the construction of statutes the 

constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain 

and give effect to the intention of the 

legislature, that intention must be gathered from 

the words used, unless a literal construction 

would involve a manifest absurdity. Where the 

legislature has used words of a plain and definite 

import the courts cannot put upon them a 

construction which amounts to holding the 

legislature did not mean what it has actually 

expressed. 

City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enterprises, Inc., 243 Va. 

149, 152-53, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992). 
 Applying these principles, we hold that American 

Woodmark's personal property in question constitutes capital 

used in manufacturing businesses that is not subject to 

taxation by the City. We find no language in Code §§ 58.1-

1100 or -1101(A)(2) which requires that capital be used in a 

manufacturing facility physically located within the 

geographical boundaries of Winchester. Accordingly, we 

decline the City's invitation to construe Code § 58.1-

1101(A)(2) as requiring that a manufacturer maintain a 

manufacturing facility within the City's geographical 

boundaries or that the manufacturer's capital, which is 

personal property, tangible in fact, be used "directly" in 

the manufacturing process. These limitations simply do not 

appear in Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2). And, as we recently said, 

"[w]hen the General Assembly 'has spoken plainly' on a 

subject, we must not 'change or amend its enactments under 

the guise of construing them.'" City of Martinsville v. 

Tultex Corp., 238 Va. 59, 63, 381 S.E.2d 6, 8 (1989). 

 B. 

 Alternatively, the City argues that even if "American 

Woodmark's personal property is 'used in' a manufacturing 

business, its computer system and office equipment are 

'machinery and tools . . . of such business' and not exempt 

from personal property tax." The City relies upon the 

following portion of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2) which states 

that "[m]achinery and tools . . . of [manufacturing] 

businesses shall not be defined as intangible personal 

property for purposes of this chapter and shall be taxed 
locally as tangible personal property according to the 

applicable provisions of law relative to such property." 

American Woodmark argues, and the trial court held, that 

American Woodmark's computer system and office equipment in 

its headquarters are not "machinery and tools" within the 

meaning of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2). 

 Since 1950, Virginia's tax commissioner has opined that 

the phrase "machinery and tools" contained in Code § 58.1-

1101(A)(2) and its precursors means machinery used in the 

actual process of manufacturing. See Commonwealth v. 

Carter, 198 Va. 141, 146-47, 92 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1956) 

(construction of taxation statute by tax commissioner 

charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight); 

accord, Commonwealth v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 228 Va. 149, 

154, 320 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1984). Likewise, the Attorney 

General has consistently opined that "'machinery and tools 

used in a particular manufacturing business' are the 

machinery and tools which are necessary in the particular 

manufacturing business and which are used in connection with 

the operation of machinery which is actually and directly 

used in the manufacturing process." 1985-1986 Att'y Gen. 

Ann. Rep. 316 at 317; see also 1987-1988 Att'y Gen. Ann. 

Rep. 590. 

 Even though the General Assembly has been aware of the 

Attorney General's interpretation of the phrase "machinery 

and tools" as used in Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2), the General 

Assembly has taken no action to modify that definition. 

And, we have repeatedly held that the General Assembly is 
presumed to have knowledge of the Attorney General's 

interpretation of statutes, and the General Assembly's 

failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative 

acquiescence in the Attorney General's interpretation. 

Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62, 

300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983); Richard L. Deal and Assoc. v. 

Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 622, 299 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1983); 

Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 762, 214 S.E.2d 

146, 150 (1975). Therefore, we hold that American 

Woodmark's furniture, fixtures, office equipment, and 

computer equipment are not "machinery and tools" within the 

meaning of Code § 58.1-1101(A)(2) because these items are 

not used in connection with the operation of machinery which 

is actually and directly used in the manufacturing process. 

 V. 

 The City argues that the trial court erred by awarding 

 postjudgment interest against it. The City contends that 

judgment interest may only be awarded on a refund of local 

taxes if provision for the payment of interest is contained 

in an ordinance adopted by the affected local government in 

accordance with Code § 58.1-3991. The City observes that it 

has adopted no such ordinance. American Woodmark argues 

that it is entitled to judgment interest as permitted by 

Code § 8.01-382. We agree with the City. 

 Code § 58.1-3987 states in relevant part: 

 If the court is satisfied from the evidence 

that the assessment is erroneous . . . the court 

may order that the assessment be corrected . . . . 

If the tax has been paid, the court shall order 

that it be refunded to the taxpayer, with interest 

if authorized pursuant to § 58.1-3991. 
Code § 58.1-3991 states: 

 The governing body of any county, city or 

town may provide by ordinance that all erroneously 

assessed taxes refunded under the provisions of 

this article be repaid with interest at a rate not 

to exceed the rate imposed by such locality for 

delinquent taxes. Such interest shall run from 

the date such taxes were required to be paid or 

were paid, whichever is later. 

Code § 8.01-382 states in relevant part: 

 Except as otherwise provided in § 8.3-122, in 

any action at law or suit in equity, . . . the 

judgment or decree of the court, may provide for 

interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part 

thereof, and fix the period at which the interest 

shall commence. The judgment or decree entered 

shall provide for such interest until such 

principal sum be paid. If a judgment or decree be 

rendered which does not provide for interest, the 

judgment or decree awarded shall bear interest 

from its date of entry, at the rate as provided in 

§ 6.1-330.54, and judgment or decree entered 

accordingly. 

 Contrary to American Woodmark's assertion, we must 

apply Code §§ 58.1-3987 and -3991 in this appeal because 

these are statutes of specific application which take 

precedence over Code § 8.01-382, a statute of general 

application. "[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a 

general way and another deals with a part of the same 

subject in a more specific manner, . . . where they 

conflict, the latter prevails." Dodson v. Potomac Mack 

Sales & Service, 241 Va. 89, 94-95, 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 

(1991) (quoting Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 

340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)). The plain and unambiguous 

language in Code § 58.1-3987 permits a trial court to order 

interest only if such interest is authorized pursuant to 

Code § 58.1-3991. The City, however, did not enact an 

ordinance pursuant to Code § 58.1-3991 which would permit an 
award of interest against it. Therefore, the trial court 

erred by awarding interest on the "assessed taxes refunded" 

against the City. 

 VI. 

 In view of our disposition of this appeal, we need not 

consider the City's remaining arguments. Additionally, we 

do not consider the City's constitutional arguments because 

they are not the subject of an assignment of error. Rule 

5:17. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be 

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and we will enter final 

judgment here. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and final judgment.