J-S76018-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALBERT THEODORE GREELEY, III

Appellant No. 835 WDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000133-2009

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015

Appellant, Albert Theodore Greeley, III, appeals from the order 

entered by the Honorable Joseph M. George, Jr., Court of Common Pleas of 

Fayette County, that denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”). After careful review, we affirm.

According to Greeley, the underlying factual predicate of this appeal is 

undisputed. See Appellant’s Brief, at 3. 

On October 30, 2008, Trooper James Pierce observed Greeley 

operating a vehicle he later confirmed to be a vehicle owned by 

another [person.] Pierce testified he initially approached Greeley 

“because he knew” Greeley did not possess a valid driver’s 

license.

Upon stopping behind Greeley’s vehicle to purportedly 

investigate why Greeley was operating a vehicle without a 

driver’s license and also to determine who was the owner of the 

vehicle, Greeley identified to the trooper that the vehicle was 

owned by James Silbaugh. The trooper requested proof of 
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ownership and Greeley opened the passenger side of the vehicle 

whereupon Trooper Pierce smelled burnt marijuana emanating 

from inside the vehicle.

Trooper Pierce was given permission by Greeley to conduct a 

pat-down search of his person, wherein, Pierce discovered a 

small quantity of marijuana inside Greeley’s pants pocket. 

Almost immediately thereafter, Greeley’s mother-in-law and 

father-in-law, Darnice and Dennis Sykes, arrived at the scene. 

Greeley’s mother-in-law walked over to Greeley and gave him a 

hug.

Pierce “pulled Greeley away from Mrs. Sykes” and noticed he 

was “holding a wad of cash in his left hand.” ... After separating 

Greeley away from Mrs. Sykes, another vehicle arrived at the 

scene and Mrs. Sherry Silbaugh (the wife of the putative owner 

of the vehicle) was approached by the trooper to obtain consent 

to search the vehicle Greeley had been operating.

As a result of the vehicle search, Pierce recovered from the 

enclosed vehicle console a plastic baggie containing a white 

powder later confirmed to be cocaine. The seized vegetable 

matter recovered from the Greeley’s pants pocket was also 

confirmed to be marijuana.

At trial, Corporal Dennis Ulery of the Pennsylvania State Police 

was qualified as an expert witness. Corporal Ulery provided his 

opinion that the cocaine was possessed by Mr. Greeley, ... with 

the intent to deliver for sale. ... Based upon the Corporal’s 

experience in narcotics investigations, the cash “possessed by 

Greeley was indicative of a drug dealer’s ‘stack.’” Corporal Ulery 

cogently testified that he was not aware that when Trooper 

Pierce initially patted down Greeley, Pierce did not “feel” the wad 

or stack of cash. Corporal Ulery also testified he was not aware 

of where the cocaine was located, once discovered, by Trooper 

Pierce.

During the course of the trial, the Commonwealth failed to 

produce the actual funds or wad of cash attributed to Greeley

and attributed by Ulery as what “drug dealers” possess incident 

to distribution activity. Instead, the Commonwealth produced 

photographs of the cash.
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During the trial, Trooper Morrison was allowed to testify 

regarding the cash allegedly obtained from Greeley, in response 

to whether any DNA evidence was obtained from the cash, that 

the cash “went to forfeiture.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-5 (citations omitted). Despite a previous mistrial in 

this matter due to testimony that the cash had gone to forfeiture, defense 

counsel did not request a mistrial, and instead requested a curative 

instruction to the jury.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Greeley guilty of 

possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine with the intent to 

deliver. This Court subsequently affirmed the judgment of sentence, 

concluding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain both 

convictions, and that Greeley’s request for a new trial due to the testimony 

that the money had gone to forfeiture was waived. 

Shortly thereafter, Greeley filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, and an amended PCRA petition was filed. After 

holding hearings on the amended petition, the PCRA court denied Greeley’s 

petition. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Greeley purports to raise only two issues, the 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel and the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. 

However, each of these issues is actually merely an umbrella statement for a 

myriad of ineffectiveness claims for each counsel.
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“Our standard of review of a trial court order granting or denying relief 

under the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the 

PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings 

will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Id. (citation omitted). The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations are binding on this Court, where there is record support for 

those determinations. See Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769 

(Pa. Super. 2013). 

To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, “a PCRA petitioner must show 

the underlying claim has arguable merit, counsel's actions lacked any 

reasonable basis, and counsel's actions prejudiced the petitioner.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 71 A.3d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 84 A.3d 1062 (Pa. 2014). Moreover, “[w]e 

presume counsel is effective and place upon Appellant the burden of proving 

otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1266-1268 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Regarding the second requirement, if a 

reasonable basis exists for the particular course chosen by counsel, the 

inquiry ends and counsel’s performance is deemed constitutionally effective. 

See Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. Super. 2003).

“Prejudice means that, absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable 

probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. 
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(citation omitted). Failure to satisfy any prong of the test requires that the 

claim be dismissed. See Commonwealth v. O’Bidos, 849 A.2d 243, 249 

(Pa. Super. 2004).

With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the appellate briefs 

and certified record on appeal and conclude that the well-written opinion of 

Judge George thoroughly and adequately addresses the issues raised by 

Greeley in this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/14, at 7-18. We 

therefore affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

PJE Ford Elliott joins in the memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/11/2015