### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 30 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 02- 1664 0

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 0- 01 33 4- MD-FAM LEONARD J. KLAY, M.D., PRIC E PLAINTIFFS, Pr ic e, S es sa , K at z, & Y ing lin g, SANDRA JOHNSON, PATRICI A FREYRE, REGINA JOI PR ICE, etal., P la int if fs -Appe lle es , ve rs us UNITED HE ALTHGROUP, INC., UNITED HE ALTHCARE, PACIF ICARE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., D ef en dants -Appe llants .

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (J un e 30, 200 4)Ho no ra ble Al fr e d T . G oo dw in, Un ite d St ate s Ci rc uit Judg e fo r t

he Ni nth Cir c uit , * sitti ngby desig nation. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c e rt if ie d a c la ss i n a n o rd e r whic h is c ur

re ntl y on a pp e a l be fo re thi s 1 court, see Klay

v. Humana, I

nc., No. 02- 16333. We presently express no opinion as to the district court’s c lass cer

tification dec ision, whether the pla intiffs have a dequate ly stated any c la ims , o r t

he me ri ts o f t

ho se c la ims An important point is that, as used both in this opinion and the district court’s or der, the 2 t e r m“ n o n ar b i tr a b l e ” s i mp l y

r e f e r s t o a c l a i mth ata

p l a i n t i f f c an n o tb e c o mp e l l e d

t o ar b i tr at e . It do e s n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly me an th at arb itr atio n o f s uc h a c la im i s p ro hib ite d o r i lle g a l. A s d isc us se d in Part IV, a pa

rty may attempt to arbitrate a nonar bitrable c laim, but if this i s done without the other pa rty ’s conse nt, the result is a leg al nullity . The fir st modification was in response to an inconsistency in its original opinion that 3 the def endants pointed out. The se cond modification was made due to the subsequent history of 2 Be fo re T JO FL A T , BI RC H and G O O D W IN , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: In th i s p u t at i v e c l as s ac t i o n , p h ysi ci an s ar e s u i n g m an y o f t h i s co u n t ry’s 1 larg es t H MO s, a lle gin g th at the se or ganiz at ion s c onsp ir ed to sy ste m at ic al ly unde rp ay the m f or the ir m ed ic al se rv ic es . T he de fe ndant H MO s im m ed ia te ly m ove d th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o st ay the pr oc ee din gs and c om pe l the nam ed

pla int if fs to ar bitrate the ir

c la im s. T he c ourt he ld that c er ta in c la im s w er e ar

bitra ble , and oth er s no narb itr ab le . S ee I n r e Mana ge d C ar e L iti ga tio n, 132 F . S upp. 2d 9 89 2 (S . D . F la . 200 0) [ he re ina ft er , the 200 0 A rb itr at ionO rd er ] . T his or de r w as sli ght ly m odi fi ed in Inr e Mana ge d C ar e L iti g. , 143 F . S upp. 2d 1 371 (S . D . F la . 200 1) , and ag ai n inI n r e Mana ge d C ar e L iti g. , MD L N o. 133 4, 200 3 U . S. D ist . L E X IS 230 35 (S . D . F la . S ep t. 15, 200 3) . T he de ta ils of the se r uli ngs an d th e w ind ing 3th e ar

b i tr at i o no r d e r . A l th o u g hw e a f f i r m e d th e d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s o r i g i n a l ar b i tr at i o no r d e r , s e e In re H umana, Inc. Mana g ed Care L itig., 285 F .3d 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2002), re h’d en ba nc denie d, 45 F e d. Ap px. 8 80 (1 1th

Cir . 2 00 2) , th e Sup re me Court re ve rs e d it

in p art , s e e Pa c if

iCa re He a lth Sy s. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 155 L . Ed. 2d 578 (2003). The Court remande d the case to us, and we in turn r emande d it to the dist rict cour t for re consideration in li g ht of PacifiCare . See In re H umana Inc. Mana g ed Care L itig., 333 F .3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003). The district court issued a modified or der in re sponse, see In re Ma nag ed Care L itig., MDL

No. 1334, 2003 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 23035 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2003). The substance of these a rbitration order s is not currently

befor e us on appe al. For purposes of this opinion, the only important fac t about the ar

bitration order s is that they desig nated some c laims as arbitra ble, and other s as nonarbitra ble; the spec ific cla ims that were put into ea ch categ ory are not presently

important. We note that the def

endants in this case seem to be unc erta in about the spec ific orde r they are a pp e a lin g . T he Re c or d E xce rp ts the y pr e pa re d f or thi s a pp e a l are qu ite mis le a din g , a nd c la im that this appeal is beingtaken f rom still another district court orde r, In re Ma nag ed Care L itig., 23 6 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 33 6 ( S.D . F la . 2 00 2) , whic h h a s n oth ingto d o w iththe iss ue s r a ise d in the ir a pp e a l. 3 pr oc edur al hi st ory

lea di ng up to th em

are n ot imm ed ia te ly relev an t t o t hi s ap pe al . These arbitration orders, though im portant to th is appeal, are not being challenged he re. Purs uant t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or igi na l arb itr at ionor de r, tw o of the defendants, U nited and PacifiCar e, initiated arbitration. In re spon se, the plaintiffs filed a m otion with the district court purporting to dism iss the claim s that the court ha d r ule d arb itr ab le , and s ough t an in j unc tio n pr ev en tin g th e de fe ndants f ro m proceeding with arbitration of any claim s. T he plaintiffs contended th at, since they volun tarily

dism issed their arbitrable claim s, the only claim s rem aining were tho se the c ourt ha d r

ule d no n- ar

bitra ble , w hic h th e de fe ndants ha d no r igh t t o br in g b efo re an arb it rat or .4

The di st ric t co ur t ag reed th atth e d efen da nt s wer e try in g t o a rb it rat e two se parate ty

pe s of c la im s—those that ha d pr ev iou sly be enr ule d arb itr ab le by

the co urt, and those that ha d be enr ule d no narb itr ab le . R eg ar din g th e ar bitra ble claim s, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs, concluding that since the plaintiffs ha d di sm iss ed

tho se c la im s, the re w as no l onge r a liv e ca se or c ontro ve rs y

to re sol ve and s o arb itr at ionof tho se c la im s c oul d be e nj oin ed . T he c ourt l ike w ise ruled in favor of the plaintiffs regar ding the nonarbitrable claim s, holding that an inj unc tio n a ga ins t arb itr at ionw as ne ce ssary to pr ote ct

it s j ur isd ic tio n ov er

tho se cl ai m s. S ee O rd er

G ranti ng P la int if

fs ’ Mo tio n to E nj oinA rb itr at ion( N ov. 6, 2002 ) [h er ei na ft er , 200 2 I nj unc tio n O rd er ] . B othinj unc tio ns w er e iss ue d purs uant to th e co ur t’s au th or it y

un de r th e All Writ s Act , 28 U.S.C. § 1 65 1( a). Be ca use it is pe rt ine nt t o bo th s et s of r uli ngs, w e be ginin Part

I by se tti ng forth the standard of review , then procee d in Part II to discus sing th e general standard s f

or iss uin g in

j unc tio ns unde r the A ll Wri ts A ct . I n P ar t I II w e fo cu s on the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r es olu tio n of the arb itr ab le c la im s, w hil e Part I V dis cu sse s th e no na rb it rab le cla im s. Par t V b rie fly con cl ud es . I. In review ing th e district court’ s decision to grant an injunction, including an injunction un der the A ll Writs Ac t, w e apply an abuse-of-discre tion st andard. SeeAs discussed later , the distinction between pr eliminary and fina l injunctions i s not 4 materia l to this appea l, see infr a, Part I I . 5 W inkler v. E li Lilly

& Co. , 101 F. 3d 11 96, 1203 (7th Cir. 1996 ). “ A district court abuses its di scretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows im proper pr oc ed ur es in m ak ing the de te rm inatio n, or m ak es f ind ing s of

f ac t tha t are c le ar ly er ro ne ous. ” Mart in v . A uto m obi li L am bor ghi ni E xc lus ive , I nc . , 307 F . 3d 1 332, 1336 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . Adis tr ic t c ourt m ay a lso abuse it s di sc re tio n by appl y ing th e la w in an un reas on ab le or i nc orrect m an ne r. See Woo da rdv. Fa nb oy, L .L.C., 298 F.3d 126 1, 1268 n.14 (11th Cir. 2002 ) (holding th at, “ in [the] prelim inary inj unc tio n c ont ex t, adis tr ic t c ourt a buse s it s di sc re tio n w he re the de ci sio n r es ts upona‘ m isa

ppl ic at ionof

the lawto the f

ac ts’ ” (quot ing Marc o v. A cc en t Pu bli shi ng C o. , 969 F . 2d 1 547, 154 8 ( 3d C ir . 199 2) ); se e, e . g. , Mc Mahon v. T oto , 4 256 F.3d 112 0, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001 ) (“ The a buse of discretion st andard of review recognizes that for the m atter in question th ere is a range of c hoice for the district co ur t an d s o l on g a s i ts de ci si on do es no t am ou nt to a cl ear e rro r of jud gm en t we will not reverse . . . .” ). Finally , an abuse of discretion occurs if the district court im pose s so m e harm , dis advanta ge , or r es tr ic tio n up on s om eo ne that i s unne ce ssari ly

br oa d or doe s no t r es ult

in an y of fs ettin g ga in t o any one e lse or soc ie ty a t l ar ge . S ee , e . g. , K ee ne r v. Co nve rg y s C or p. , 342 F . 3d 1 264, 127 0- 716

(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that, beca use an injunction lacked “ a re asonable scope” w he n th e co urt m ad e it ap ply na tio nw ide r athe r than so le ly w ith in the state of Ge orgia, it “ shou ld be m odified to preclude [the appellee] from enforcing [a part ic ular ag re em en t] in G eo rg iaonl y . . . . [ T ] he br ea dthof the inj unc tio n, w ith out such lim itation . . . c onsti tutes an abuse of discretion . . . .” ); Piaz za v. Ebsco In dus. , 273 F . 3d 1 341, 135 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( hol din g th at w he re the de fe ndants

“ ide nti fi ed

pot en tia l pr ej udi ce ari sin g f ro m c er tif ic at ionof the [ pla int if

f’ s] c la im unde r Ru le 23( b) (3 ) . . . [ an d th e pla int if f] ha s id en tif

ie d no ba sis f

or pr ef er ri ng certific ation of this claim under Rule 23(b)(3) to cer tification und er R

ule 23(b)(1), it w as an a

buse of dis cr et ionto ce rt if

y the [ pla int if

f’ s] c la im und er Ru le 23 (b )(3 ).”). In m aking th ese assessm ents, w e re view the district court’ s factual de te rm inatio ns f

or c le ar e rr or , se e John son & J ohns on V isi on C ar e, I nc . v. 1- 800 Contacts, Inc. , 299 F. 3d 12 42, 1246 (11t h Cir. 2002 ) (holding, in the prelim inary inj unc tio n c ont ex t, “ [w ] e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s of

f ac t un de r the clear ly err oneous standard”), and its purely legal determ ination s de novo . See Ma j or L ea gue Ba se ba ll v. Cr ist , 331 F . 3d 1 177, 118 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( hol din g that, w he n r ev ie w ing adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to gr an t or de ny an in j unc tio n,

“ [u ]nde rlyin g q ue st io ns of l aw . . . are rev ie wedde no vo ”).Of c ours e , to ob ta in i nju

nc tiv e re lie f f

or vio latio n o f a

statut or y ri g ht, the statut e in 5 qu e sti on mus t, at th e ve ry

le a st, e xplic itl y

or imp lic itl y

c re ate a c a us e of a c tio n. As thi s dis c us sio n d e mon str ate s, a pa rt y may no t ob ta in a

“ tr a dit ion a l” inj un c tio n if he la c ks a cog nizable, meritorious claim. The plaintiffs inexplicably ref er to these as the “ Rule 65 fac tors,” despite the fac t that 6 Rule 65 does not mention them. 7 II. Ther e ar e at lea st three differ ent ty pes of injunctions a federa l court m ay issue. T he first is a “ traditional” injunction, which m ay be issued as either an int er im or pe rm an en t r em edy

f or c er ta in b re ac he s of

c om m on l aw , statut or

y , or 5 co nst itu tio na l r igh ts. G ranti ng s uc h in j unc tio ns f

al l w ith in the lon g- re co gni ze d, inh er en t e qui ta

ble pow er s of

the c ourt. S ee I T T Co m m . D ev el . Co rp . v. Bart on, 5 6 9 F . 2 d1 3 5 1 , 1 3 5 9 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) ( “[A ] f e d e r a l c o u rt , s i t t i n g i n e qu i t y, poss es se s a ll of

the c om m on l awe qui ty

too ls o f a Ch an ce ry

Co urt ( subj ec t, of co ur se , to co ngr es sio na l l im itatio ns) to pr oc es s li tig at ionto a j ust and e qui ta

ble co nc lus ion . ”) . T he r equir em en ts f or atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n are w el l- known: A dis tr ic t c ourt m ay

gr an t i nj unc tiv e re lie f onl y if the m ovi ng p ar

ty show s th at : ( 1) it

ha s asub stanti al li ke lih ood of suc ce ss o n th e m er its ; (2 ) ir re para ble inj ur y w ill be suf

fe re d un le ss the inj unc tio n is sue s; ( 3) the thr eate ne d in

j ur y to the m ovant o utw ei ghs w ha te ve r da m ag e the pr opos ed inj unc tio n m ay

c au se the opp osi ng p ar

ty ; and ( 4) if

iss ue d, the inj unc tio n w oul d no t be a dve rs e to the pub lic int er es t. Siegel v. Le pore, 234 F. 3d 11 63, 1176 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (e n banc) (per curiam ). 6 T he f ac tor s c ite d a

bove are the e le m en ts f

or r ec ei vin g apr el im inary

inj unc tio n8

“ The standard f

or a perm anent injunction is essenti ally the sam e as for

a pr el im inary

inj unc tio n e xc ep t tha t the pla int if f m ust sho wa ct ua l su cc es s onthe m erits instead of a likelihood of success.” Id. at 1213 (Carnes, J., dissenti ng), ci tin g A m oc o P ro d. Co . v. V ill . of G am be ll, 480 U . S. 531 , 546 n. 12, 107 S . Ct . 1396 , 140 4 n. 12, 94 L . E d. 2d 5 42 ( 1987 ). I n a ddi tio n, m ost c ourts d o no t co nsi de r the pub lic int er es t e le m en t i n de ci din g w he the r to i ssu e a pe rm an en t inj unc tio n, tho ugh the T hir d C ir cu it ha s he ld o the rw ise , se e Sh ie lds v. Z uc cari ni, 25 4 F .3d47 6, 4 82 (3d Cir . 20 01 ). A s th e fi rs t f

ac tor m ak es c le ar , any

m oti on o r sui t f

or atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n m ust be pr ed ic at ed

upo n ac au se of

a ct ion , suc h a s nu isanc e, tr es pa ss, the F ir st A m en dm en t, e tc . , r eg ar din g w hic h apla int if f m ust sho wali ke lih ood or

a ct ua lity of success on the m erits. Ther e is no such th ing as a suit for a traditional inj unc tio n inthe abstra ct . F or atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n to be e ve n th eo re tic al ly av ai la ble , apla int if

f m ust be able to ar

tic ulate aba sis f

or r el ie f that w oul d withstand scrutinyunder Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6) (fa ilure to state a claim). See , e. g. , P ai sle y

v. V ita le , 807 F . 2d 8 89, 892 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) ( “ [T ] he dis tr ic t c ourt di d not e rr in de ny ing [ the pla int if

f’ s] m oti on f

or apr el im inary

inj unc tio n and dism issin g the injunctive count of [the plaintiff’ s] com plaint because [the plaintiff] ha s fa il edto st at e a cl ai m forrel ie f . . . .”).9

Co nsi de ri ng the iss ue f

ro m anothe r pe rs pe ct ive , atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n is a r e me dy p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l ab l e o n l y a f t e r ap l a i n t i f f c a n ma k e as h o w i n g th a ts o me independ ent legal right is being infringed—if the plaintiff’ s rights have no t been vio la te d, he is not

e nti tle d to any

r el ie f, inj unc tiv e or

oth er w ise . O f co ur se , e ve n if his comm on law, statutory , or constitu tional right s have been violated, the plaintiff m ust also m eet the other re quirem ents for obtainin g an injunction to sh ow that an in jun ct io n i s t he pro pe r rem ed y forsu ch vi ol at io n. T he inj unc tio n inthi s c as e w as not atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n, and c oul d no t be j ust if ie d a s su ch , be ca

use the pla int if

fs ha d no c au se of

a ct iona ga ins t the defendants upo n which the injunction was based. T he injunction the plaint iffs so ug ht pre ve nt edth e d efen da nt s fr om arb it rat in g c ert ai n c la im s ag ai ns t t he m .

“ Wrongful arbitration,” however , is not a ca use of action for w hich a party m ay sue. E ven regarding the claim s the district court had ruled no narbitrable, all that order m eant wa s that the plainti ffs could not be com pelled to arbitrate them . In ini tiatin g an arb itr at ionany w ay on those c la im s, the de fe ndants sim ply did not vio la te any

of the pla int if

fs ’ le ga lly

c ogni za ble r igh ts, and c er

ta inl y did not vio la te th e co ur t’s 2 00 0 Arb it rat io n Ord er d eem in g t ho se cla im s n on arb it rab le . Co nse que ntl y , the 200 2 I nj unc tio n O rd er is not c ogni za ble or de fe nsi ble a s a

“ tra di ti on al ” in

jun ct io n.In B onne r v . Ci ty of Pr ic ha rd , 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 1) (e n b anc ), thi s 7 c ourt a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 10 The sec on d t y

pe of i nju nc ti on a co ur t m ay is su e is a “ st atut ory

in jun ct io n,” wher e a statute bans certain condu ct or establishes certain rights, then specifies that a court m ay

grant an injunction to enforce the statute. Bec ause Congress has the pow er to de te rm ine the sc ope of statut or y r igh ts, the pr ope r re m ed ie s f or statut or y vio la tio ns, and the c ir cum stanc es und er w hic h th ose r em ed ie s sh oul d be available, the standards for granting st atutorily -authorized injunctions are ne ce ssari ly

c ontro lle d by

the statut e its el f. S ee Bart on, 569 F . 2d at 13 59 ( not ing th ata fed eral co ur t’s eq ui ty powe rs are “ su bjec t . . . to co ng res si on al li m it at io n” ). Fo r ex am pl e, in SEC v . Bla tt , 58 3 F .2d13 25 , 13 34 & n .29 (5t h C ir. 1 97 8) , we 7 uphe ld the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e nj oinde fe ndants f ro m f uture vio la tio ns o f SE C R ule 10( b) -5 , ba se d onavari ety of f ac tor s be ar ing li ttl e re la tio nshi p to the t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s f

o r an i n ju n c t i o n , an dn o t a

b l y o mi t t i n g an “ i rr e p a r ab l e i n ju ry” re qui re m en t. S ee a lso D el taA ir L ine s, I nc . v. A ir

L ine P ilo ts A ss’ n, I nt’ l, 238 F. 3d 13 00, 1305 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) (noting that, under the Railway La bor Act, “ [a] fa ilure by e ith er sid e to m ai nta in the status quo dur ing the barg ai nin g and m ediation process m ay

give rise to injunctive relief , e ven without th e custom ary sh owi ng of i rrep arab le in jury”).9 U .S. C. § 4 p e rm its a fe de ra l c ourt

to c omp e l arb itr atio n b a se d o n a n a rb itr atio n c la

us e 8 in a written c ontrac t, but does not permit a cour t to enjoin arbitration base d on an issue’s nonarbitra

bility . 11 N ev er the le ss, se ve ra l of

our c as es a lso sug ge st tha t, w he n C ongr es s au tho ri ze s in

j unc tiv e re lie f, it

im pli ci tly r equir es that the tr ad iti ona l r equir em en ts fo r aninj unc tio n be m et

in ad dit ionto an y

e le m en ts e xpl ic itl y

spe ci fi ed in the statute. Se e U nited States v. E rnst & Whinn ey , 735 F. 2d 12 96, 1301 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (“ [T ] he de ci sio n to iss ue an in j unc tio n un de r § 74 02( a) is gove rn ed by the tr ad iti ona l f

ac tor s sh ap ing the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s us e of the e qui ta

ble r em edy . ”) . T he Su pr em e Co urt stro ngl y

e ndor se d th is l atte r ap pr oa chin H ec ht C o. v. Bo w le s, ru lin g, [I ] f Co ngr es s de sir ed to m ak e suc h an a

br upt de part ur e fr om tr ad iti ona l e qui ty

pr ac tic e as is sugg es te d, it w oul d have m ad e its de sir e pla in. H en ce w e re sol ve the a m big uit ie s of

[ 50 U . S. C. app. §§ 9 01, 925 ] in favor

of that i nte rp re ta tio n w hic h a ff or ds a f ull oppo rtunity

for equity

courts to treat enforc em ent proceedings un der this em ergency

legislation in accordance with their tra ditio nal pr ac tic es , a s c ondi tio ne d by the ne ce ssi tie s of

the pub lic int er es t w hic h C ongr es s ha s so ught to pr ote ct . 321 U . S. 321 , 330 , 64 S . Ct . 587 , 592 , 88 L . E d. 754 ( 1944 ). S uf fi ce to say

that no ove ra rc hin g ge ne ra l pr inc ipl es are r ea dil y appare nt, and w e ne ed

not de te rm ine whether these cases ar e in conflict, or resolve any potential di spute here. Ne ither p a rt y c o n t e n d s th a tth e i n ju n c t i o n i n th i s c a s e wa s e x p r e s s l y au t h o r i z e db y a part ic ular statut e de al ing w itharb itr at ion . 8See Mitsubishi I nt’l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, 14 F.3d 1507, 1518 (11th Cir. 9 1994) (f inding that injunction was not wa rra nted under

the All Writs Act because “the a ctions t ak en b y th e d i s tri ctco urtwe re n o ti n d i s p en s ab l e t o re ac h i n g a d i s p o s i t i o no f t h e [ p en d i n g] case ”); B arton, 569 F .2d at 1359-60 (notingthat the All Writs Act permits a district court to issue any or de r “ ne c e ssa

ry to e na ble the c ourt

to t ry the iss ue s [in

a pe nd ingc a se ] to f

ina l ju dg me nt” and “de velop the mater ial issues and to bringthem to a complete r esolution”). 12 T he f ina l ty pe of inj unc tio n is an in

j unc tio n un de r 28 U . S. C. § 16 51( a) , the All Writs Ac t, which states, “ The S uprem e Court and all courts established by Ac t of Co ngr es s m ay

iss ue a ll w ri ts n ec es sary

or appr opr ia te in ai d of

the ir r es pe ct ive j ur isd ic tio ns and a gr ee ab le to the usa ge s and p ri nc ipl es of law . ” T he A ct

doe s no t cr eate any

sub stanti ve f

ed er al j ur isd ic tio n. S ee Br itt ing ha m v. Co m m ’ r, 451 F . 2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971 ) (“ It is settled that . . . the All Writs Ac t, by itself, creates no j ur isd ic tio n inthe dis tr ic t c ourts. I t e m pow er s th em

onl y to iss ue w ri ts i n a id o f j ur isd ic tio n pr ev iou sly

a cquir ed on s om e oth er

ind ep en de nt g ro und. ”) . I nst ea d, it is a c odi fi catio n of

the f ed er al c ourts’ tr ad iti ona l, inh er en t po w er to pr ote ct

the j ur isd ic tio n th ey

a lr ea dy have , de ri ve d f

ro m som e oth er

sourc e. S ee P ro cu

p v. Stri ck land, 792 F . 2d 1 069, 107 4 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) ( enbanc ) (“ Fe de ra l c ourts h av e both th e inh er en t po w er

and the c onst itu tio na l ob lig at ionto pr ote ct the ir j urisdictio n from

conduct which im

pairs their ability

to carr y out Article I II functions .” ). In allowing courts to protect their “ respective j urisdictio ns,” the A ct allows them

to safeguard not onlyongo ing proceeding s, but po tential future 9See He ckler v. Redbud Hosp. Dist., 473 U.S. 1308, 1313, 106 S. C t. 1, 4, 87 L . Ed. 2d 10 677 (1985) ( holding that a court may

issue an injunction under the All Writ s Act to “pre serve the status quo while administrative proc eeding s are in prog ress . . . to pre vent impairment of the eff ective e x erc ise of appe llate jurisdiction” (c iting F TC v. Dean F oods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603- 04, 86 S. Ct . 1738, 1742, 16 L . Ed. 2d 802 (1966)) ; Ba rton, 569 F.2d at 1359 n.19 (“When po te nti a l juri sd ic tio n e xists , a fe de ra l c ourt

may iss ue status qu o o rd e rs to e ns ur e that on c e its jurisdiction is shown to ex ist, the court will be in a position to ex erc ise it.”). S e e U n i t e d

S t at e s v . N e wY o r

k T e l . C o . , 4 3 4 U . S . 1 5 9 , 1 7 1 , 9 8 S . C t . 3 6 4 , 3 7 2 , 5 4 L. 11 Ed. 2d 376 (1977) ( noting that the Court ha s “re peate dly rec og nized the power of

a fe dera l court to i ssu e su c h c omm and s und e r t he Al l Wr its Ac t a s ma

y be ne c e ssa

ry or a pp ro pr iate to e ff

e c tuate and pre vent the fr

ustration of orde rs it has previously issued in its ex erc ise of jurisdiction otherwise obta ined”) . 13 pr oc ee din gs, a s w el l a s a lr ea dy -i ssu ed or de rs and j udgm en ts. S ee W es chv. 10 11 Fo lso n, 6 F . 3d 1 465, 147 0 ( 11th C ir . 199 3) ( “ Ina ddi tio n, c ourts h old that de spi te its express langu age re ferr ing to ‘ aid . . . of j urisdictio n,’ the All-W rits Ac t em pow er s f ed er al c ourts t o is sue inj unc tio ns t o pr ote ct or e ff ec tuate the ir jud gm en ts .”). A c ourt m ay

gr an t a w ri t un de r thi s a ct

w he ne ve r it is “ ca lc ulate d in[ the co urt’ s] sound j udgm en t t o a ch ie ve the e nds of j ust ic e en tr

ust ed to it, ” an d no t onl y w he n it is “ ‘ ne ce ssary ’ in the se nse that the c ourt c oul d no t othe rw ise phy sic al ly

dis ch ar ge it s . . . dut ie s. ” A da m s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 317 U . S. 269 , 273 , 63 S . Ct . 236 , 239 , 87 L . E d. 268 ( 1942 ). S uc h w ri ts m ay be dir ec te d to w ar d no t onl y the im m ed ia te part ie s to apr oc ee din g, but to “ pe rs ons w ho, tho ugh not part ie s to the or igi na l a ct ionor e nga ge d inw ro ngdo ing , are in a posi tio n to fr ustrate the im

ple m en ta tio n of

ac ourt or de r or

the pr ope r adm ini str at ionof14

j ust ic e, and e nc om

pa sse s e ve n th ose w ho h av e not take n any

a ff irm at ive a ct ionto hin de r j ust ic e. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. N ewY ork T el . Co . , 434 U . S. 159 , 174 , 98 S . Ct . 364, 54 L . E d. 2d 3 76 ( 1977 ). I t sh oul d be not ed , how ev er , that “ [t ] he A ll Wri ts Ac t is a residual source of authority to issu e w rits that are not otherwise covered by statut e. Whe re astatut e spe ci fi ca lly a ddr es se s th e part ic ular iss ue a t hand, it is that authority , and no t the All Writs Ac t, that is controlling .” Pennsy lvania Bureau of Co rr . v. U nit ed

S ta te s M ar sha l S er

v. , 474 U . S. 34, 43, 106 S . Ct . 355 , 361 , 88 L . E d. 2d 1 89 ( 1985 ); se e al so C lin tonv. G old sm ith , 526 U . S. 529 , 537 , 119 S . Ct . 1538 , 154 3, 143 L . E d. 2d 7 20 ( 1999 ) (h old ing that an in j unc tio n un de r the A ll Wri ts A ct is ane xtr ao rd inary

r em edy that “ inv es ts a

c ourt w ithapow er

that i s es se nti al ly

e qui ta ble and, a s su ch , not

ge ne ra lly a va ila ble to pr ovi de a lte rn at ive s to ot he r, ad eq ua te rem ed ie s at law” ). Whe re as tr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio ns are pr ed ic at ed upo n so m e ca

use of a ct ion , anA ll Wri ts A ct

inj unc tio n is pr ed ic at ed

upo n so m e oth er

m atte r uponw hic h a dis tr ic t c ourt ha s j ur isd ic tio n. T hus, w hil e a party m ust “ state ac la im ” to o bta in a

“ traditional” injunction, there is no such requirem ent to obt ain an All Writs Ac t injunction—it m

ust sim ply point to som e ongoin g proceeding, or som e past order or j udgm ent, the integrity of w hich is being threatened by som e action or behavior. T he r equir em en ts f

or atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n do not appl y to inj unc tio ns unde r theIn a for mer F ifth Circuit case f

rom 1971, Br ittingham v. Comm’r, 451 F .2d 315, 318 12 (5 th C ir . 1 97 1) , w e c ame to t he op po sit e c on c lus ion , h old ingthat an in jun c tio n und e r t

he Al l Wri ts A c t “ sh ou ld b e g ra

nte d o nly up on a sh ow ingof

ir re pa ra ble ha rm and la c k o f a n a de qu ate reme dy at law.” Virtually

none of the case s we c ited, howeve r, involved injunctions issued under the Al l Wr its Ac t; the inj un c tio ns tho se c a se s d id d isc us s w e re pr ima ri ly “ tr a dit ion a l” inj un c tio ns , p re dic ate d u

po n c a us e s o f a c tio n r athe r t

ha n thre ats t o a

c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n. Th is ho ldi ng , mo re ov e r, wa s p ur e dic ta , a s w e ha d p re vio us ly c on c lud e d th at w e la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n in the matter; it was a lso the third in a series of in-the-a lternative holding s on the same que stion. Se e id. at 31 7 ( “ [E]ve n if

we c ou ld f

ind so me ba sis fo r i nd e pe nd e nt j ur isd ic tio n u po n whic h to po sit an o rd e r u

nd e r t he Al l Wr its Ac t, t

he re are thr e e so un d r e a so ns fo r t he de nia l of

re lie f i n th is case , wholly

apar t from any

consideration of the merits of the matter .”). Conseque ntly , we a re not bound to adhere to it. S ee T ag le v. Reg an, 643 F .2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1981) (“ [T] he prior panel r ule does not extend to dicta . . . .”). We also came to the opposite conclusion in Weaver v. Florida

Power & L ight Co., 172 F.3d 771 ( 11th Cir. 1999), where we ove rturned a district court’s de cision to enjoin arbitration proce eding s that involved matters the c ourt had pre viously settled bec ause the plaintiff had f ailed to satisfy the re quirements for

obtaining a

“tra ditional” injunction. Specifically , we noted that th e p l ai n t i ff

d i d n o ts h o w h o w s h e w o u l d s u ff er i rr ep ar ab l e i n

j ury i f t h e a rb i tra t i o np ro ce ed i n gs wer e per mitted to procee d. I d. at 773. As discussed late r, this opinion is square ly in conflict with our ea

rlier holdingto the contra ry in Kelly v. Merr ill L y

nch, Pierc e, F enner

& Smith, 985 F.2d 1067 ( 11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), rev’ d in part on other grounds, Howsam v. Dean Witter Rey nolds, 537 U.S. 79, 123 S . Ct. 588, 154 L . Ed. 2d 491 (2002), in whic h we a ffirme d the g rant of an injunction under

the All Writs Act without any consideration whatsoever of the require ments for a

traditional injunction. As such, under our prior pane l rule we are not bound by Wea ve r. Se e Gi ns bu

rg , 3 62 F .3 d at 12 98 (“ Whe re pr ior pa ne ls c on fl ic t, w e fo llo w the fi rs t one re lease d . . . .”). Finally , V.N.A. of

Gre ater Tift County , Inc. v. He ckler , 711 F.2d 1020 ( 11th Cir. 1983), can a lso be rea d as inconsistent with this propositi on. Hec kler ne ver squa rely addre ssed whethe r the fo ur “ tr a dit ion a l” inj un c tio n f a c tor s a pp lie d to inj un c tio ns un de r t he Al l Wr its Ac t, b ut s imp ly se e me d to a ssume that th e y did . We be lie ve He c kle r s ho uld be re a d a s c los e ly

c on fi ne d to its specific fac ts. See, e.g ., United States v. Morado, 454 F .2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1972) (“ Our re vie w o f t

he c a se s si nc e B lum e nth a l and Ko tte ako s c onvin c e s u s th at K ott e ako s h a s b e e n c los e ly restric ted to its particular f acts . . . .” ). This rea soning c alls to mind J ustice Scalia’ s eloquent descr iption of a judg e eng ag ing in the pr ocess of common-law a djudication: “distinguishingone prior ca se on the lef

t, straig ht-arminganother one on the r ight, hig h-steppingawa y from anothe r prec edent a

bout to tackle him from the r ear , until (bravo!) he re ache s the g oal—g ood law.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpre tation 9 (1997).

15 All Writs Ac t because the historical scope of a court’ s traditional po we r to protect its j ur isd ic tio n, c odi fi ed

by the A ct , is gr ound ed

in en tir el y

se parate c onc er

ns. 12We note, howeve r, that a district c ourt may not evade the traditional re quirements of 13 an in jun c tio n b y

purp or tin gto i ssu e wh at is , in

e ff e c t, a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n und e r t

he Al l Wri ts A c t. S e e F lor ida

Me d. As s’ n v . U .S. De p’ t of He a lth , E du c . & Wel fa

re , 6 01 F .2 d 1 99 (5 th Cir. 1979). In that case , the plaintiffs we re a class of doc tors seekingto enjoin the fede ral 16 See Un it edSta te s v . New YorkTel. Co ., 43 4 U.S. 1 59 , 17 4, 9 8 S . Ct. 3 64 , 54 L. E d. 2d 3 76 ( 1977 ) (a ff

irm ing gr an t of

inj unc tio n un de r the A ll Wri ts A ct w ith out re gard to tr ad iti ona l f

our f ac tor s) ; D e Be er s C onso l. Mi ne s, L td. v. U nit ed S ta te s, 325 U . S. 212 , 219 , 65 S . Ct . 113 0, 157 3, 89 L . E d. 156 6 ( 1945 ) (s ta tin g, in re vie w ing alow er

c ourt’ s r uli ng c onc er

nin g an in j unc tio n un de r the A ll Wri ts A ct , that i t i s ne ce ssary

to as ce rt ai n “ w ha t i s th e usa ge , and wha t are the pr inc ipl es of equity appl ic ab le in [this ] c as e, ” w ith out m en tio nin g th e tr ad iti ona l f our inj unc tio n re qui re m en ts) ; se e al so K el ly v. Me rr ill L ync h, P ie rc e, F en ne r & S m ith , 985 F . 2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993) (af firm ing grant of injunction u nder the All Writs Ac t without regard to traditional four factors), rev’ d in part on oth er grounds Howsam v. D ean W itter Rey

nold s, 537 U. S. 79, 123 S. C t. 588, 154 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002); K ei shi anv. Bu ck le y , 752 F . 2d 1 513 (1 1thCi r. 198 4) ( sa m e) ; I n r e Ma co n Uplands V en tur e, 624 F . 2d 2 6, 28 ( 5thCi r. 198 0) ( sa m e) ; T ea s v. T w en tie th C en tur y F ox Fi lm Co rp . , 413 F . 2d 1 263, 126 6- 67 ( 5thCi r. 196 9) ( sa m e) ; se e es pe ci al ly Bart on, 569 F.2d at 1359 (setting forth the circum stances which an A ll Writs Ac t injunction m ay

be issued without m entioni ng the tradition al criter ia for issuing an injunction). 13g overnme nt from re leasinga list of the names of all doctors who r ece ived money from Medic are and how much the y

wer e paid unde r that program. The district court issued an “ ancillar y writ of injunction” under the All Writ s Act prohibiting the rele ase of that list unt il the court re ache d a fi na l r uli ngon the matte r. I t c onte nd e d th at th e inj un c tio n w a s n e c e ssa ry to p re se rv e its jurisdiction over the c ase be cause once the list was relea sed, the c ase w ould be moot. The wr it issued in Florida Medica l Association was pe rhaps the te x tbook definition of a pr e lim ina ry inj un c tio n— it w a s is su e d to pr e se rv e the status qu o a nd pr e ve nt a lle g e dly

ir re pa ra ble injury until the court had the oppor tunity to decide upon issuinga per manent injunction. I d. at 202 (notingthat the injunction issued under the A ll W rits Act “c onfer s the same leg al rig hts upon plaintiffs and imposes the same leg al duties upon defe ndants as would a pr eliminary injunction”). At most, Florida Medic al Association stands for the proposition that a cour t may not issue an order under the All Writ s Act, circ umventing the traditional requir ements for a injunction, when a par ty is in reality

seekinga “tr aditional” injunction. I d. (holdingthat wher e an injunction purportedly

issued under the All Writ s Act wa s, in reality , a pre liminary injunction, “[i t] must be the produc t of rea soned application of the four f actor s held to be nec essar y prer equisites befor e a preliminary

injunction may

be obtained” ). F lorida Medica l Association does not purport to make the tr a dit ion a l r e qu ir e me nts fo r a n in jun c tio n a

pp lic a ble to a ll i nju

nc tio ns un de r t

he Al l Wr its Act. Oc c a sio na lly , p art ie s h ave so ught “ sta y s” pe nd inga

pp e a l or c e rt ior ari of

Ac ts o f C on g re ss under the All Writ s Act whe re a lower c ourt dec lined to enter a “tra ditional” preliminary injunction. Such applications are invariably denied be cause they

are ty pically not “nec essar

y or a pp ro pr iate in a id o f [a

c ourt ’s ] jur isd ic tio n. ” Se e , e .g ., Turn e r B ro a d. Sy s. v. F CC, 50 7 U .S. 1301, 1303, 113 S. Ct . 1806, 1807, 123 L . Ed. 2d 642 (1993) ( Rehnquist, C.J ., in chamber s), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) . In such situations, the Court has also requir ed that the r ight to have the ac t stay ed be “ indisputably clea r.” I d., quoting Communist P arty of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235, 93 S. C t. 16, 34 L . Ed. 2d 40 (1972) ( Rehnquist, J ., in chamber s). We have f ound no other c ases involvinginjunctions under the All Writs Act where this requireme nt, conce rning the “ ind isp uta

bly c le ar” natur e of

the ri g ht, is a

pp lie d ( and

we ha ste n to a dd

that it is s imi larl y ina pp lic a ble wh e re a

pa rt y se e ks a “ tr a dit ion a l” inj un c tio n, rathe r t ha n a sta y ba se d o n th e Al l Writs Act, ag ainst an ac t of Congr ess). 17 I nde ed , in a good

num be r of c as es in w hic h w e ha ve appr ove d th e gr an t of w ri ts unde r the A ct , it

is unc le ar

howtho se tr ad iti ona l st an dard s w oul d e ve n be ap pli ca ble . S ee , e . g. , Ri cc ar d v. P ru de nti al I ns. Co . of A m . , 307 F . 3d 1 277, 129 5 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002) (enj oinin g, under the A ll Writs Ac t, a party who had filed m ult ipl e an d ve xa tio us c om pla int s a ga ins t the sam e de fe ndant b ef or e vari ousThroug hout this opi nion, when we ref er to a fede ral c ourt “e njoining state c ourt 14 proce eding s,” this should be understood as shortha nd for e njoining a pa

rty or par ties from pursuingparticula

r cla ims in st ate c ourt, rathe r than e njoining a state cour t or state judg e fr om proce edingwith a ca se. 18 courts, attorney

disciplin ary

bodies, and state agencies fr om filing any

m ore co m pla int s w ith out

the le av e of

the c ourt) ; H en son v. Ci ba -G ei gy Co rp . , 261 F . 3d 1065 , 107 0- 71 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( ove rt ur nin g an in j unc tio n is sue d un de r the A ll Writs Ac t that rem oved to federal court a state- court action that had been settled thr oughase ttl em en t a gr ee m en t i n apr ior f ed er al c as e, w ith out

m en tio nin g th e traditional stand ards for granting injunctions). Regarding pendin g proceedings, a court m ay enj oin alm ost any

conduct

“ w hic h, le ft

unc he ck ed , w oul d have . . . the pr ac tic al e ff ec t of dim ini shi ng the court’ s power to bring the litigatio n to a natural conclusion .” Bar ton, 569 F.2d at 1359 . I t m ay

a lso c om pe l a ct s “ ne ce ssary

to pr om ote the r es olu tio n of iss ue s ina ca se pr ope rl y

be fo re it . . . [ or ] f ac ili ta t[ e] . . . the c ourt’ s e ff ort t o m an ag e the c as e to jud gm en t,” s uc h a s “ is su [in g] ord ers to aid in co nd uc ti ng fact ua l i nq ui rie s . . . [o r] pe rm it[ ing ] the use of int er ro ga tor ie s inha

be as c or pus pr oc ee din gs. ” I d. (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . O ne of the m ai n e xc ep tio ns t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s othe rw ise br oa d po w er to protect its jurisdiction is that, in general, it m ay not enjoin state court pr oc ee din gs to pr ote ct

it s a bil ity to re nde r j udgm en t i n on goi ng i n 14InW es ch v . Fo l s o m , we h el d , “[ A] fe d er al co urti n j un ct i o no f s t at e c o urtp ro ce ed i n gs 15 is nece ssary

in aid of jurisdiction when ne cessa ry ‘to preve nt a state c ourt from so interf ering with a fe dera l court’s c onsideration or disposition of a ca se as to ser iously impair the fe dera l c ourt ’s fl e xibil ity

and a uth or ity to d e c ide that c a se .’ ” 6 F .3 d at 14 70 (q uo tin gAt lanti c Coa st L ine R.R., 398 U.S. at 295, 90 S. C t. at 1747). Read a t fac e value , this seems to contradict our holding a bove, that fe dera l courts may not enjoin para llel concur rent state c ourt proce eding s. As discussed above , Atlantic Coast L ine, upon which Wesch r ests, expressly prohibits a district c ourt fr om i nte rf

e ri ng , in mos t c a se s, wi th s tate c ourt pr oc e e din g s si mpl y

to p ro te c t it s a

bil ity to rende r a judg ment in a pendingcase fre e of pote ntial res judicata or collate ral e stoppel eff ects. Mo re ov e r, a

c los e e xami natio n o f t

he fa c ts o f We sc h r e ve a ls that th is q uo te wa s im

pli c itl y limit ed to a state court’s inter fer ence with a fe dera l court’s pa st consideration or disposit ion of a matter a s embodied in an orde r or judg ment, and did not extend to all ongoingmatters. Con se qu e ntl y , th is i so late d q uo te sh ou ld n ot b e take n at f a c e va lue , b ut c on sid e re d in the fu ll context of the fac ts of the ca se, the pre cede nt cited, and the g ener al body of law discusse d above that g overns this statute. In Wesch, a fe dera l district court had e ntere d an orde r in a c lass-ac tion suitrequiringthe State of Alaba

ma to redr aw the lines of

its cong ressional districts and manda ted that upcoming cong ressional e lections be he ld based on bounda ries spec ified in a pa

rticular, inter im redistricting plan, which c reated one major ity -Afr ican- Americ an district. An Af rica n-Amer ican voter

then filed a c lass action suit in state court, re questingthat the cour t mandate a

plan containingtwo majority -Afr ican- Americ an districts. The named plaintiff in the orig inal fede ral c lass action asked the fede ral district cour t to enjoin the state court pr ocee dings. We a ffirme d the cour t’s g rant of a n injunction under the All Writs Act, ruling that the state-c ourt plaintiff “c lass broug ht suit in st ate c ourt asser

ting c laims substantially

simil ar to those a lrea dy

decide d by

the final judgme nt of the three -judg e district cour t in [ the prior f

eder al class a ction].” I d. at 1471. The district court wa s empower ed to enjoin the state c ourt proce eding s beca use if the state court we re permitted to issue its own contradic tory order , it would “eff

ectively strip all fede ral c ourts of the a bil ity to m e anin g fu lly

re dis tr ic t.” I d. Thus , th e fe de ra l c ourt ’s po we r t o e njo in t he state pr oc e e din g s w a s b a se d o n it s n e e d to pr ote c t it s ju dg me nt, no t to pr os pe c tiv e ly pr ote c t it s a

bil ity to rule in ong oing litig ation. 19 personam proceedings. T he sim

ple fact that litigation inv olvin g the sam e issues 15 is o cc ur ri ng c onc ur

re ntl y in an oth er

f or um doe s no t su ff

ic ie ntl y thr eate n th e co ur t’s jur is di ct io n a s t o warran t an in jun ct io n u nd er t hi s ac t. Inin pe rs onam

a ct ion s, f ed er al c ourts m ay

not e nj oinpe ndi ng s ta te pr oc ee din gs o ve r the sam e subj ec t m atte r. I n f ac t, e ve n if

the re is a dange r that the state c ourt m igh t de ci de f ir st and the re by

de pr ive the federa l j udiciary

from resolving th e m atter bec ause of re s judicata,T h e A n t i -Inj un ct i o nAc tex p re s s l y p ro h i b i t s fe d er al co urt s fr o men j o i n i n g p ro ce ed i n gs 16 in state court, but conta ins an exception for injunctions that are nece ssary to protect a

fede ral court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U .S.C. § 2283 (“A cour t of the United States may not gr ant an inj un c tio n to sta

y pr oc e e din g s in

a State c ourt

e xce pt a s e xpre ssl y

a uth or ize d b y

Ac t of Con g re ss, or wh e re ne c e ssa

ry in a id o f i ts j ur isd ic tio n, or to p ro te c t or

e ff e c tuate its jud g me nts .” ) ( e mph a sis added) . Consequently , the question of whe ther proc eeding s in a state cour t threate n a district court’s jurisdiction over

concur rently ong oing pr ocee dings a

rises under

both the All Writ s Act and Anti-Injunction Act, and the a nswer is ne cessa

rily the same f

or both. 20 in jun ct io ns of s ta te co ur t ac ti on s s ti ll are n ot all owe d. Er win Chem erinsky , F ederal Jurisdiction § 14 .2, at 842-43 (4th ed. 2003 ); see 16 al so A tlanti c C. L . R. Co . v. Br oth er hood of L oc om oti ve E ngi ne er s, 398 U . S. 281 , 295, 90 S . Ct . 173 9, 174 7, 26 L . E d. 2d 2 34 ( 1970 ) (w here “ state and federa l co urts h a[ ve ] c onc ur

re nt j ur isd ic tio n . . . ne ith er [ i] s f re e to p re ve nt e ith er

party from sim ultaneous ly

pursuin g claim s in bot h courts”); K el ly , 985 F . 2d at 10 69 (holdin g that the desire to “ prevent[] the piecem eal litigation th at occurs w hen part ie s si m

ult an eo usl y

a sse rt c la im s inse ve ra l f

or um s” is ins uf

fi ci en t t o w ar

rant an in jun ct io n u nd er t he All Writ s Act ). When particular property is before the district court, in contrast, such as when it is the subjec t of an in rem proceeding or in the custod y of a bankruptcy tr ust ee , the c ourt m ay

ge ne ra lly e nj oinpr oc ee din gs i n any oth er c ourt r eg ar din g that pr ope rty . S ee Ma co n Uplands V en tur e, 624 F . 2d at 28 ( not ing that, und er the A ll Wri ts A ct , the dis tr ic t c ourt “ ha d th e pow er , in ai d of it s j ur isd ic tio n, to en

j oin the de bto r fr om

f ili ng f urthe r ac tio ns tha t t ouc he d onthe sub j ec t of the r es dur ing21

th e p en de nc y

of t he Ch ap te r XII ap pe al ”). Si m ilarl y , thi s pr ohi bit iona ga ins t e nj oin ing state c ourts d oe s no t a ppl y w he re adis tr ic t c ourt i s se ek ing to pr ote ct the int eg ri ty

or e nf or ce ab ili ty

of ex ist ing j udgm en ts o r or de rs , r athe r than it s a bil ity to pr ospe ct ive ly

iss ue one in a pe ndi ng c as e. P ro ce ed ing s inoth er c ourts tha t i nvol ve the sam e fa ct s a s a lr ea dy iss ue d j udgm en ts and o rd er s, or that c oul d r es ult

in the iss uanc e of

an in co nsi ste nt j udgm ent, threaten the j urisdictio n of the district court enoug h to warr ant an inj unc tio n. S ee , e . g. , T ea s, 413 F . 2d at 12 66- 67 ( “ W e cannot pe rm it the pr ior [f ed er al c ourt] j udgm en t t o be r en de re d nu ll an d vo id t hr oughthe ing en iou s expe die nt o f a de cl ar at or

y j udgm en t [ ac tio n instate c ourt] c onc er nin g adif fe re nt term of the sam e contract. ”). W e have ruled, for exam ple, that a district court m ay issue an injunction u nder the All Writs Ac t to prevent prosecutio n of a state court ac tio n th at

ha d a lr ea dy

be ense ttl ed

und er the te rm s of

af ed er al se ttl em en t ag re em en t. H en son, 261 F . 3d at 10 71 ( “ T he dis tr ic t c ourt . . . ha d th e re ady re m edy of an in j unc tio n a ga ins t pr ose cu tio n of the a ct ion[ in s ta te c ourt] , pr ope rl y is su edun de r th e All Writ s Act .”). Ke ishian, 752 F.2d at 1513, is an exam ple of enj oinin g state court proceedings to p rotect the integrity of a f ederal j udgm ent. Afeder al district court aw ar de d th e pla int if

f ap pr oxi m at el y

$50 , 000, and the pla int if f “ le v[ ie d] ” the22

de fe ndant’ s M er ce de z- Be nz c ar w iththe c ourt. I d. a t 15 15. T he de fe ndant s ough t aninj unc tio n f

ro m aG eo rg iastate c ourt, c la im ing that the c ar w as e xe m

pt f ro m le vy und er state law . T he dis tr ic t c ourt e nj oin ed f urthe r pr oc ee din gs c onc er nin g the state court’ s injunction, and we aff irm ed. W e ruled that “ [t] he state court pr oc ee din g w as anc ill ar

y to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r al low ing ale vy on [ the defendant’ s] autom obile. . . . T he district court’ s issuance of a tem porary res tra in in g o rd er was ne ces sa ry to effe ctua te it s ju ris di ct io n . . . .” Id. If the inj unc tio n inthi s c as e is t o be uph el d, it m ust be und er the A ll Wri ts A ct . H av ing se t f

orth the ge ne ra l pr inc ipl es gov er nin g in j unc tio ns unde r the A ct , we no w tu rn to each of t he two types of a rb it rat io ns th e d is tri ctco ur t en joi ne d. III. W e begin by

focusing on the court’ s ruling con cerning the claim s it had pr ev iou sly

r ule d to be arb itr ab le . I t he ld: T h e r e i s n o a c tu a l , j u s t i c i ab l e c o n t r o v e r s y f o r th e d e c l a r a t o ry c l a i ms [that had previousl y

been ruled arbitrable] . Plaintiffs have m ade clear to this Co urt, and the D ef en dants , that the y

do n ot w ishto pur sue any cl ai m s th is C ourt ha s de em ed arb itr ab le . T hus, the re is no l onge r an y co ntr ove rs y

r eg ar din g th ose c la im s. T he onl y j ust ic ia ble c ontro ve rs y that e xis ts b etw ee n th e part ie s r el at es to the P la int if fs ’ non ar bitra ble cl ai m s. . . . Be ca

use the c la im s have be endis m iss ed , how ev er , the re is no controv ersy

for the ar bitration panel to resolve. Thus, an in jun ct io n i s warran te d. T he re are six m ai n pr obl em s w iththi s r el at ive ly te rs e ru lin g. F ir st, it23

as sum es w ith out

dis cu ssi on tha t the pla int if fs ’ a tte m pt t o di sm iss the ir

arb itr ab le cl ai m s un de r Ru le 41( a) w as , in fa ct , le ga lly e ff ec tiv e. T he pla int if

fs f ile d a

“N oti ce of

D ism iss al of

A rb itr ab le Cl ai m s, ” statin g [T ] he P la int if

fs have c hose n no t t o purs ue the se c la im s inarb itr at ion be ca use the bur de n of

c ondu ct ing num er ous ar

bitratio ns whil e lit igatin g th is c la ss a ct ionw oul d c ri ppl e the ir abil ity to pr ose cu te thi s ac tio n and r es ult

in D ef en dants a tte m

pti ng t o ob ta in r

uli ngs fr om

the v a r i o u s ar b i t r a t o r s w h i c h D e f

e n d a n t s w o u l dar g u e h a v e s o me preclusive effe ct in this proceeding . . . . Ac cordingly , P laintiffs notice dism issal of these claim s to put to rest D efendants’ repeated ar gum en t tha t P la int if

fs have not

r ea lly abandon ed

the se c la im s. T his dis m iss al is not

an a dm iss iona s to the m er its of the c la im s, nor s h o u l di tb e c o n s t r

u e dt o h a v e an y p r e c l u s i v e e f f e c ta s t o th e c l a i ms re m ai nin g be fo re thi s c ourt. . . . [ T ] he y are be ing dis m iss ed

w ith out pr ejud ic e . . . . N oti ce of D ism iss al of

A rb itr ab le Cl ai m s, a t 2 & n . 2. N ei the r the N oti ce of Dism issal nor the Suppl em ental Notice of Dism issal which the plaintiffs subs equently

filed ref erre d to any

Feder al Rule of Civil Pr ocedure. T he rule that co m es c los es t t o po te nti al ly auth or iz ing suc h anot ic e is R ule 41, w hic h f

or the reas on s d es cri be d h erei n i s i napp li cab le . Ru le 41( a) state s inr el ev an t part : (1 ) [A ] n a ct ionm ay

be dis m iss ed

by the pla int if

f w ith out or de r of co urt ( i) by

f ili ng a not ic e of dis m iss al a t any

ti m e be fo re se rv ic e by the a dve rs e party

of an answ er

or of am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipu lation of dis m issal sig ne d by a ll part ie s w ho h av e ap pe ar ed in the a ct ion . U nle ss otherwise stated in the notice of dism issal or stipu lation, the dism issal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dism issal operates as an24

adj udication upon the m erits w hen filed by a plaintiff w ho has on ce dis m iss ed in an y c ourt of the U nit ed

S ta te s or of any state an a ct ion b a s e do n o r

i n c l u d i n g th e s a me c l a i m. (2 ) By O rd er of Co urt. E xc ep t a s pr ovi de d inpara gr ap h ( 1) of thi s subd ivi sio n of

thi s r ule , an a ct ionsha ll not

be dis m iss ed

a t the p l a i n t i f f ' s i n s t a n c e s a v e up o n o r d e r o f th e c o u rt an dup o n s u c h t e rms an d c ondi tio ns a s th e co urt de em s pr ope r. . . . U nle ss o the rw ise spe ci fi ed in the or de r, adis m iss al und er thi s para gr ap h is w ith out prej udice. Rule 41(a)(1) (i) is inapplicable because the defe ndants h ad alrea dy filed an answe r by the tim e the plaintiffs filed their N otice of D ism issal of Ar bitrable Claim s. S ee Pl ai ns Growe rs , Inc . by Fl or is ts ’ Mu t. In s. Co . v. Ick es -Bra un Glas sh ou se s, In c., 474 F. 2d 2 50, 255 ( 5thCi r. 197 3) ( “ [R ] ea din g th e ru le s go ve rn ing dis m iss al by not ic e an d di sm iss al by

m oti on t oge the r, w e co nc lud e that i t w as int en de d by the rule-m akers to perm it dism issal against su ch of the defendants as have not served anansw er

or m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t . . . . ”) . S im ilarl y , Ru le 41( a) (1 )( ii) is in ap po si te be cau se th e n ot ic e was no t s ig ne d b y an y of t he de fen da nt s. Consequent ly , R

ule 41(a)(2), governing dism issal by court order, is the onlyway this no tice could have been legally operative. How ever, because the plaintiffs filed a “ notice of dism issal” rather than a m otion for dism issal with the court, there wa s noth ing up on which the court wa s asked to rule, and it never f orm ally issued anor de r dis m iss ing any

c la im s. T hus, non e of

Ru le 41’ s pr ovi sio ns w oul d have pe rm it te d t he co ur t t o c on cl ud e th atan y cla im s h adbe en di sm is se d.25

T he c ourt’ s 20 02 I nj unc tio n O rd er gr an tin g th e pla int if

fs ’ m oti on t o e nj oin ar bitratio n r ef

er s ba ck to the N oti ce of

D ism iss al , de cl ar ing that be ca use

“ Pl ai nti ff s have m ad e cl ear to this Co urt, and t o th e D ef en dants , that the y

do n ot w ishto pur sue any

c la im s th is C ourt ha s de em ed arb itr ab le [, ] . . . th er e is n o long er any

controversy

regar ding those claim s.” This language, construed br oa dly , c oul d be und er sto od a s an im pli ci t di sm iss al of

tho se c la im s, or

a t l ea st a reco gn it io n o f th ei r di sm is sa l. Eve n re ad in g t he op in io n i n t ha t m an ne r, itlea ds to a se co nd de fic ie nc y .

“ [T ] he Ru le spe ak s of

vol unt ar y dis m iss al of

‘ ana ct ion , ’ not

ac la im . ” St at e T re as ur er v. Barr y , 168 F . 3d 8 , 19 n . 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) . P ut s im ply , R ule 41 al low s apla int if

f to d ism iss a ll of

his c la im s a ga ins t a

part ic ular de fe ndant; it s te xt d o e s n o tp e rmi tp l a i n t i f

f s t o p i c kan dc h o o s e , d i s mi s s i n g o n l y p a rt i c u l a r c l a i ms w ith in an a ct ion . “ A pla int if f w ish ing to el im inate part ic ular cl ai m s or iss ue s f ro m the action sho uld am end the com plaint un der Rule 15(a) rather than dism iss un der Rule 41(a). ” 8 Moore’ s Federa l Prac tice § 41.21[2] , at 41-32; Barry , 168 F. 3d at 19 n . 9 ( “ Mos t l ike ly , the pr ope r w ay to dr op a c la im w ith out pr ej udi ce is to am en d the c om pla int und er Ru le 15( a) . ”) ; R

y anv. O cc ide nta l P etro le um Co rp . , 577 F . 2d 298, 302 n. 2 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) ( “ Ru le 41( a) spe ak s of dis m iss al of

an a ct ion , and the pla int if f’ s e lim inatio n of

af ra gm en t of

an a ct ion. . . is m or e ap pr opr ia te lyWe understand this may no longe r be a

conce rn bec ause the plaintiffs have since filed 17 a super cedingcomplaint omitti ngthese c laims. 26 c o n s i d e r e dt o b e an a men d men tt o th e c o mp l a i n tu n d e r R u l e 1 5 . ” ) . C o n s e qu e n t l y, ev enc onstru ing the pla ini tf fs ’ not ic e of

dis m iss al a s am oti on f

or dis m iss al , and the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s 20 02 I nj unc tio n O rd er a s so m eh owim

pli ci tly gr an tin g it , the co urt w as not

e m pow er ed to dis m iss onl y

c er ta in c la im s un de r Ru le 41. 17 W e could overlookthis flaw and const rue both the no tice and the order a s being brou ght un der Rule 15 rather than Rule 41, w hich states that plain tiffs m ay am end their pleadings by leave of c ourt, “ and leave shall be fre ely given when j ustice so requires.” W e could further assum e that, under this rule, the court w as co rr ec t i n a llo w ing the pla int if fs to am en d th ei r co m

pla int so a s to r em ove the arbitrable cla im s. A t this po int, the district court’ s order runs into its third critical de fi ci en cy

—i t e nj oin ed

arb itr at ionof

the arb itr ab le c la im s be ca use the re w as no

“ jus ti ci ab le co nt ro ve rs y ” fo r th e arb it rat io n p an el to res ol ve . T his hol din g is ba se d onaf undam en ta l m isunde rs tandi ng o f the c as e or co ntr ove rs y

r equir em en t. “ A rt ic le I II of the Co nst itu tio n li m its the j ur isd ic tio n of fe de ra l c ourts t o ‘ ca se s’ and ‘ co ntr ove rs ie s. ’ ” Co ra l S pr ing s S t. S y s. v. Ci ty of Sunr ise , N o. 03- 1149 7, 200 4 U . S. App. L E X IS 111 10, a t *1 2 ( 11th C ir . Jun e 7, 2004 ). P ri va te arb itr at ionpane ls are obv iou sly not f ed er al c ourts. S ee Mc D ona ld27

v. Ci ty of W es t B ranc h, 466 U . S. 284 , 288 , 104 S . Ct . 179 9, 180 2, 80 L . E d. 2d 302 (1 984) ( “ A rb itr at ionis not a‘ j udi ci al pr oc ee din g[ . ] ’ ”) ; S ix C lin ic s H old ing Co rp . , I I v. Ca fc om

p S y s. , 119 F . 3d 3 93, 398 ( 2d C ir . 199 7) ( “ A rb itr at ionis a private dispu te resolution m echanism institu ted pursuant to an agree m ent betwee n the parties. It occurs predom inantlyoutsid e, and in lieu of, court procee ding s.”) ; se e al so R

ush Pr ude nti al H MO , I nc . v. Mo ran, 536 U . S. 355 , 395 , 122 S . Ct . 215 1, 2175 , 153 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2002) (“ Ther e is no questi on that arbitration cons titutes ana lte rn at ive r em edy

to lit igatio n. ”) , ove rr

ule d inpart

on o the r gr ound s by K en tuc ky A ss’ n of H ea lthP lans, I nc . v. Mi lle r, 538 U . S. 329 , 123 S . Ct . 147 1, 155 L . E d. 2d 4 68 ( 2003 ). T he re w oul d be nothin g im pr ope r or il le ga l ( an d c er

ta inl y not unc onst itu tio na l) about

an arb itr at ionpane l r es olv ing adis put e that w oul d ha ve to be dis m iss ed

f ro m f ed er al c ourt be ca

use it did not c onst itu te ac as e or controversy . Consequent ly , w ithou t further e xplanatio n, this reason does not s eem to be a le gi ti m at e, m

uc h l es s s uf

fic ie nt , bas is foren

joi ni ng arb it rat io n. E ve n if w e as sum e that this r equir em en t di d a ppl y to ar bitratio n—p er

ha ps b as ed o n th e a rb i t ra t i o n p an el ’s v o l u n t ar i l y ad o p t ed ru l es —t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s or de r runs i nto it s f

ourth p ro ble m . T he c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat the arb itr ab le claim s no lon ger presented a live c ase or controversy because the plaintiffs co nstru ct ive ly

dr oppe d th em

f ro m the ir c om pla int is le ga lly w ro ng. U nle ss the28

plaintiff’ s m otion or the district court’ s order stipulates oth erw ise, a claim dropped thr oughaRu le 15 am en dm en t— or , f or that m atte r, an a ct iondr oppe d purs uant t o Ru le 41( a) —i s di sm iss ed w ith out pr ej udi ce . S ee Barr

y , 168 F . 3d at 19 ( “ Mos t lik el y , the pr ope r w ay

to dis m iss ac la im

w ith out pr ej udi ce is to am en d th e co m pla int und er Ru le 15( a) . ”) ; 8 Moo re ’ s F ed er al P ra ct ic e § 41 . 40[ 5] [c ] , a t 41 - 138 (“ O ne of

the c en tr al pur

pose s of Ru le 41( a) is to p er

m it the pla int if

f to d ism iss an action and start over again.” ). Indeed, the plaintiffs’ notice of dism issal expr es sly de cl ar ed that i t w as “ w ith out

pr ej udi ce . ” Co nse que ntl y , notw ith standi ng the pla int if

fs dis m iss al , the y

c oul d have r ef

ile d su it— in s ta te or

f ed er al c ourt, po te nt ia ll y

in a m yria d o f juri sd ic ti on s—

ba se d o n t ho se cla im s at an y ti m e. As suc h, w e cannot

c onc lud e that the de fe ndants , in se ek ing de cl ar at or y r el ie f thr ough arbitration, w ere not pu rsuing a live case or controversy . Particular ly given that the pla int if

fs a cknow le dge d th at

adis put e ove r the ir

r ei m bur se m en ts f

ro m the de fe ndants c ont inu ed

to ex ist , the de fe ndants c er ta inl y ha d th e ri ght

to inv oke arb it rat io n fo r de cl arat ory rel ie f to set tl e it . N ev er the le ss, e ve n gi vin g th e dis tr ic t c ourt the f ull be ne fi t of

the doubt and as sum ing that j ust ic ia

bil ity c onc er ns s om eh owdid

a ff ec t the arb itr ab ili ty

of the cl ai m s, the f

ac t r em ai ns tha t the j ust ic ia bil ity iss ue w as f

or the arb itr at or s, and n ot the c ourt, to re sol ve . I n H ow sam v. D ean W itt er

Re ynol ds, 537 U . S. 79, 123 S . Ct .29

588, 154 L . E d. 2d 4 91 ( 2002 ), the S upr em e Co urt l ai d ou t the r es pe ct ive res po ns ib il it ie s o f co ur ts an d a rb it rat or s, ab se nt an ag reem en t t o t he co nt rary. A dopt ing the appr oa che m bodi ed in the Re vis ed

U nif orm A rb itr at ionA ct

of 200 0, the Co urt he ld: [P ] ro ce dur al que sti ons w hic h gr owout of the dis put e an d be ar

on i ts final dispo sition are presum ptivelynot for the j udge, but for an ar bitrator , to de ci de . S o, too , the pr es um pti on i s th at

the arb itr at or shou ld d ec ide a lle ga tio ns o f w ai ve r, de lay , or ali ke de fe nse to a r b i t r ab i l i t y. . . . [ I ]nth e ab s e n c e o f an a g r e e men tt o th e c o n t r a ry, iss ue s of sub stanti ve arb itr ab ili ty

. . . are f or ac ourt t o de ci de and issues of procedural arbitrability , i. e. , whether prere quisi tes such as tim e lim its , not ic e, la ch es , e sto ppe l, and o the r co ndi tio ns p re ce de nt t o anobl igatio n to arb itr at e ha ve be enm et , are f or the arb itr at or s to decide. Id . at 8 4- 85 , 12 3 S . Ct. at 59 2 (q uo ta ti on m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) . W e be lie ve H ow sam , r athe r than our earl ie r ca se s onthi s is sue , is co ntr oll ing . I n 19 93, w e de ci de d K el ly v. Me rr ill L ync h, P ie rc e, F en ne r & S m ith , 985 F. 2d 1 067 (1 1thCi r. 199 3) ( pe r curi am). T he pla int if f ha d su ed

the de fe ndant in federal c ourt for violating various SEC rules. She dism issed som e of her cl ai m s, and the c ourt gr an te d th e de fe ndant s um m ar y j udgm en t onthe r es t. S he the n in iti at ed

an arb itr at ionf

or state lawc la im s ari sin g ou t of the sam e fa ct s a s th e federa l suit. T he defendant m oved the dis trict court in which the fe deral suit had be enf ile d to e nj ointhe arb itr at ionon r es j udi catagr ound s. W e he ld tha t the A ll Writ s Act “ gi ve s fe de ral co ur ts bro adin jun ct iv e p owe rs to pro te ctth ei r own30

j udgm en ts, ” id. a t 10 69, and tha t r es j udi cataw as an a ppr opr ia te r ea son fo r the co ur t t o e njo in th e arb it rat io n, s ee i d. (“ [C]ou rts can de ci de res jud ic at a . . . [because] [t] he issue is no t j ust on e of preventing the piecem eal litigation th at oc curs w he n part ie s si m

ult an eo usl y

a sse rt c la im s inse ve ra l f

or um s, but of pr ote ct ing pr ior

j udgm en ts. ”) . T hus, in K el ly , w e al low ed adis tr ic t j udge to m ak e a determ ination concerning the procedural arbitrability issue of “ res j udicata” de spi te the f

ac t tha t the c la im s w er e subs tanti ve ly arb itr ab le ( that i s, c ove re d by the parties’ arbitration clause), and enj oin th e ar bitration based o n that de te rm inatio n. W e ci te d K el ly appr ovi ngl y

in a fo otn ote in In dustri al Ri sk In sur er s v. M. A . N . G ute hof fnungs hut te G m

bH , 141 F . 3d 1 434, 144 9 n. 23 ( 11th Ci r. 199 8) ( T

j of la t, J. ), and l at er

r ei te rate d it s ho ldi ng i n R ic card v. P ru de nti al I ns. Co . of A m . , statin g: T he c ourt’ s po w er

to pr ote ct

it s j ur isd ic tio n in cl ude s th e pow er to en j oinadis sa tis fi ed

party be nt o n r e- lit igatin g c la im s th at w er e (o r co uld have be en ) pr ev iou sly

li tig at ed be fo re the c ourt f

ro m f ili ng i n both j udicial and no n-j udicial forum s, as long as the injunction does no t co m pl et el y for ecl os e a l it ig an t fr om

an y acce ss to th e co ur ts . . . . 30 7 F .3d12 77 , 12 95 n.1 5 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 2) (em ph as is ad de d) . T he ne xt y ear, in W eave r v. F lor ida P ow er & L igh t C o. , 172 F . 3d 7 71 ( 11th Ci r. 199 9) ( T

j of la t, J. ), thi s c ourt i na dve rt en tly r ea ch ed the opp osi te r es ult

on a virtua lly ind ist ing uis hable se t of

f ac ts. T he pla int if

f ha d su ed

he r em plo y er in31

state court, c laim ing th at her ter m ination violated state and federal antidiscrim ination law s. T he em ploy er r em oved the action to feder al court based on federal question jurisdiction. T he court dism issed certain claim s and granted th e em pl oyer su m

m ary jud gm en t o n t he res t. Before the court handed down its verdict, the plaintiff also initiated an arbitration alleging th at the behavior at issue in the federal c ase violated her co lle ct ive barg ai nin g a gr ee m en t. O nc e the c ourt i ssu ed it s r uli ngs ef fe ct ive ly en din g th e pla int if

f’ s c as e, the e m

plo y er m ove d th e co urt t o e nj ointhe arb itr at ion on res j udicata ground s. “ The district court, concludin g that an injunction was ne ce ssary to pr ote ct

the int eg ri ty

of it s j udgm en t, e nj oin ed

[ pla int if f] . . . f ro m proceeding with the arbitration . . . . [ T] he district court found it s authorityto enter th e in jun ct io n i n t he All Writ s Act .” Id . at 7 73 & n .3. Ig nor ing K el ly , a s w el l a s th e pr inc ipl e dis cu sse d a bove that an in

j unc tio n unde r the A ll Wri ts A ct

ne ed not m ee t the r equir em en ts o f “ tr ad iti ona l” inj unc tio ns, w e he ld tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt “ ab use d it s di sc re tio n by e nj oin ing the ar bitratio n pr oc ee din gs. ” I d. a t 77 3. W e expla ine d, “ A n in j unc tio n is an e qui ta

ble rem edy , available onlywhen there is no adequate rem edy at law . [ The e m

ploy er] has an adequate rem edy

at law —it can raise the issues of re s judicata and waiver in the arb itr at ionpr oc ee din g and, if it s arg um en ts are va lid , have the arb itr at ionThis holding, of c ourse, ove rlooks the fa ct that the par ties had alre ady

spent time and 18 money fully litigatingthe matter in fe dera l court. We also note that the opinion re ads, “We see no rea son why

proce eding s befor e a district c ourt would be more costly than proc eeding s befor e a boar d of ar

bitrators.” Weaver, 172 F .3d at 774. This statement appe ars to have been inadver tently transposed; it likely

should read “ We see no re ason why proce eding s befor e a boa rd of ar bitrators would be more costly than proc eeding s befor e a district c ourt.” Give n the re spect we a ccor d our prior judg ments, we a re ne cessa

rily retice nt to eng ag e in subsequent r ewr iting of jud ic ia l op ini on s to c or

re c t su pp os e d e rr or s, e ve n s uc h “ pla in” e rr or s. Sin c e , in any e ve nt, Weaver is not bindi ngbeca

use it square ly

conflicts with our prior

panel opinion in Kelly , we need not r esolve this question today . 32 di sm is se d.” Id. T he e m plo y er c ont en de d th at

r ai sin g th e re s j udi catade fe nse be fo re the ar bitrator s w as not

an a de qua te r em edy

a t l awbe ca

use it w ill “ fo rc e it to unde rg o expe nsi ve and t im e- co nsum ing a dve rs ar ia l pr oc ee din gs tha t c oul d be a voi de d by the issuance of an injunction.” I d. at 774. W e re j ected this argum ent, stating that the re w as no r ea son to b el ie ve that havin g th e ar bitratio n di sm iss ed

by the ar bitrator s th em se lve s w oul d be m or e co stl y or inc onve nie nt than havin g it en j oin ed by af ed er al c ourt. W e furthe r not ed , “ If , f or som e re as on, the 18 ar bitrator s w er e to i gnor e FP L ' s de fe nse s, F PL w oul d st ill have an a de qua te re m edy a t l aw , be ca

use und er tho se c ir cum stanc es adis tr ic t c ourt c oul d va cate the ar bitratio n aw ar d ( or

r ef use to en fo rc e it) ba se d onthe arb itr at or s’ ‘ m an if es t dis re gard ’ of

the law . ” I d. at 77 4 n. 9. F or the se r ea sons , w e va cate d th e in jun ct io n a ga in st arb it rat io n. Ke lly and W eaver invo lve virtually indist ingu ishable m aterial f acts, y et33

ar ri ve a t di am etri ca lly

opp ose d r es ult s. I n si tuatio ns s uc h a s th is, w e w oul d nor m al ly be bound t o f

oll owK el ly , our

e ar lie r ru lin g. S E C v . G ins bur g, 362 F . 3d 1292 , 129 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( “ Whe re pr ior pane l de ci sio ns c onf

lic t, w e fo llo wthe fi rs t on e re le as ed . ”) . H ow ev er , to the de gr ee K el ly is inc onsi ste nt w iththe Suprem e Court’ s intervening ruling in Howsam , w e m ust adhere to How sam . See United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336 , 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (“ W e ar e authorized to depart from

a prior panel decision based upo n an intervening Suprem e Court de ci sio n on ly

if that de ci sio n a ct

ua lly ove rr ule d or c onf lic te d w ithit . ” (quot at ion m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) ). U nde r the appr oa chtake n inthe S upr em e Co urt’ s su bse que nt d ec isi on i n H ow sam , both th e K el ly

and W eave r co urts e rr ed in co nsi de ri ng the r es j udi cata is su e. Hows am

st at es th at , un le ss an arb it rat io n a gr eem en t o th erwi se st ip ul at es , a court is em

powere d only

to determ ine the “ subs tantive” issue of arbitrability —that is, w he the r a part ic ular dis put e fa lls w ith in the sc ope of an arb itr at ionc lause —and the necessary

threshold q uestion of w hether that clause is enforce able. See id. at 83- 84, 123 S . Ct . a t 59 2 ( “ T he que sti on whe the r the part ie s have sub m itt ed a part ic ular dis put e to arb itr at ion , i. e. , the que sti on o f ar bitra bil ity , is aniss ue f

or j udi ci al de te rm inatio n un le ss the part ie s c le ar ly and unm ist ak ab ly

pr ovi de oth er w ise . ” (quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed )) ; se e al so G re enT re e Fi n.34

Co rp . v. Ba zz le , 539 U . S. 444 , 123 S . Ct . 240 2, 240 7, 156 L . E d. 2d 4 14 ( 2003 ) (h old ing that, unl es s an arb itr at iona gr ee m en t st ipu la te s othe rw ise , ac ourt’ s r ole is al m ost e xc lus ive ly

to ad j udi cate “ the va lid ity

of the arb itr at ionc lause [ an d] it s applicabilityto the und erly ing di spute between the parties”) . Gateway ar bitra bil ity iss ue s othe r than th es e (whic h th e H ow sa m Co urt se em s to have designated “ procedural” ar bitrabilityissues) are gener ally for the ar bitrators the m se lve s to r es olv e. G en er al ly spe ak ing , c ourts are e m

pow er ed to re sol ve dispu tes that solely

invol ve whether

a particular

claim shoul d be resolved in court or arb itr at ion . S ee Mu sni ck v. K ing Mo tor

Co . O f Ft . L au de rd al e, 325 F . 3d 1 255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that courts shou ld “ decide only such issu es as ar e es se nt ia l t o d efi ni ng th e n atur e o f th e fo ru m in whi ch a di sp ut e wil l b e d eci de d” ). A rb itr at or s, are the oth er

hand, are e m

pow er ed , abse nt an a gr ee m en t t o th e co ntr ar y , to re sol ve dis put es ove r w he the r a part ic ular cl ai m m ay be suc ce ssf

ull y lit igate d any

w he re a t a ll (d

ue to co nc er

ns s uc h a s st at

ute of li m itatio ns, la ch es , ju s t i c i ab i l i t y, e t c . ) , o r

h a s an y s ub s t a n t i v e mer i twh a t s o e v e r . C o n s e qu e n t l y, neither the Ke lly

nor W eaver courts had the power to enj oin arbitration on res j udi catagr ound s be ca

use r es j udi cataw as f

or the arb itr at or

to de ci de in the f

ir st in st an ce. Inthi s P ar

t, w e ar e ad dr es sin g c la im s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d pr ev iou slyOf c ourse, if a party makes a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4, a district 19 court must deter

mine if there exis ts a ca se or c ontroversy in order f or it to ex erc ise its jurisdiction ov e r t hat mo tio n to c omp e l. Wh ile the a bs e nc e of a c a se or c ontr ov e rs y

re qu ir e s a

c ourt to abstain fr om mandatingarbitration, this does not g ive it the rig ht to enjoin arbitration. 35 ru le d arb itr ab le pur suant t o va lid arb itr at ionc lause s; h av ing m ad e the se thr es hol d subs tanti ve arb itr ab ili ty

de te rm inatio ns, the c ourt’ s on ly r em ai nin g du ty

w as to stay f ed er al c ourt pr oc ee din gs r eg ar din g th ose c la im s or a llo wthe pla int if

fs to am en d th ei r co m

pla int to re m ove tho se c la im s. I t di d no t have the r igh t t o m ak e fu rth er d et erm in at io ns co nc ern in g a rb it rab il it y , in cl ud in g ru li ng s o n ju st ic iabi li ty. O nc e the iss ue s w er e de em ed to be w ith in the sc ope of the arb itr at ionc lause , a ll fu rth er d et erm in at io ns co nc ern in g t he ir a rb it rab il it y were fo r th e arb it rat or s. Co ns eq ue nt ly, th e co ur t erredin pre ve nt in g t he cas e fro m reac hi ng th em . Thi s i s s im il ar t o Al um in um , Bri ck& Gla ss W or ke rs Int ’l Uni on v. AAA Plum bing Pottery

Corp., 991 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1993), in which we held that ar bitrator s, r athe r than adis tr ic t c ourt, sho uld r es olv e standi ng que sti ons, notw ith standi ng the f

ac t tha t st an din g is aj ust ic ia bil ity iss ue . W e se e no r ea son to treat any differ ently

a dispute over the existence of a “ case or c ontroversy ,” which is a lso aj ust ic ia

bil ity iss ue , se e D O C v . U nit ed S ta te s H ouse of

Re pr es en ta tiv es , 525 U . S. 316 , 329 , 119 S . Ct . 765 , 772 , 142 L . E d. 2d 7 97 ( 1999 ) (“ T hus, the onl y ope n j ust ic ia

bil ity iss ue in thi s c as e is whe the r ap pe lle es sa tis fy the r equir em en ts of Ar ticle III standing .” ). 1936

Fi na lly , if w e as sum e that the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d be enc or re ct both in determ ining the j usticiabili ty of the arbitra

ble claim s and in deem ing th em nonj ust ic ia

ble due to the la ck

of c as e or c ontro ve rs y , the dis tr ic t c ourt st ill e rr ed in en j oin ing arb itr at ionund er

the A ll Wri ts A ct . A s di sc uss ed in the pr ev iou s part , the Act allows district courts to issu e inj unction s only“ in aid of their j urisdictio n.” T he c ourt’ s br ie f dis cu ssi on c onc er nin g th e ar

bitra ble c la im s di d no t e ve n be ginto explain ho w a llowing an arbitration concerning arbitrable issues to proceed—even if tho se c la im s w er e nonj ust ic ia ble —thr eate ne d or

und er m ine d e ith er

it s j ur isd ic tio n ov er

ape ndi ng m atte r (the r em ai nin g no narb itr ab le c la im s) , or any pr ev io us ord ers iten te red . It c oul d be arg ue d th at

the c ourt w as pr ote ct ing it s j ur isd ic tio n ov er the nonarbitrable claim s by

enj oinin g arbitration of the arbitrable cla im s because such arbitration could have a collateral estoppel im pact on the ong oing feder al lit igatio n. H ow ev er , thi s is f ar f ro m c le ar . S ee D ean W itt er , 470 U . S. a t 22 3, 105 S. Ct . a t 12 43 ( “ [A ] rb itr at ionpr oc ee din gs w ill not ne ce ssari ly

have apr ec lus ive effe ct on subs equent federal- court proceedings.”); G reenblatt v. D rexel Burnham Lam bert, Inc. , 763 F. 2d 13 52, 1361 (11t h Cir. 1985 ) (“ [A ] t least with re spect to an im portant, non ar

bitra ble f ed er al c la im , af

ed er al c ourt sh oul d be he sit an t t o37

pr ec lud e the li tig at ionof

the f ed er al c la im

ba se d onthe c oll at er al e sto ppe l e ff ec ts of apr ior arb itr at ionaw ar d. [ Pr ec ed en t] ind ic at e[ s] ac as e- by -c as e ap pr oa chto de te rm in in g t he co ll at eral est op pe l ef fect s o f arb it rat io n o n fe de ral cla im s . . . .”). Mor eo ve r, it

w oul d se em

odd ( tho ugh not

im poss ibl e) to co nc lud e that a dis tr ic t c ourt c oul d e nj oinarb itr at ion s ou t of f ear of pos sib le r es j udi catae ff

ec ts, bu t n ot in pe rs on am

st at e co ur t p ro ceed in gs , as d is cu ss edab ov e, se e su pr a Par t II . As discussed earlier, the All Writs Ac t and Anti-Inj unction Ac t allow fe deral courts to enjoin state court proceedings when necessary to protect the federa l court’ s jur isdictio n. H owever , the universal interpretation o f these statutes is that a fe de ra l c ourt m ay

not e nj oinstate c ourt pr oc ee din gs s im ply be ca use para lle l i n pe rs onam pr oc ee din gs are be ing pur sue d c onc ur re ntl y in fe de ra l c ourt. T his re str ic tio n m

ust be ba se d onthe pr em ise that st at e co urt pr oc ee din gs ari sin g f ro m the sam e fa ct s or

c la im s a s pe ndi ng i n pe rs onam f ed er al pr oc ee din gs d o no t threaten the fe deral court’ s jur isdictio n over its case, despite the threat of re s j udi cataor

c oll at er al e sto ppe l f

ro m the state c ourt c as e. G ive n th at para lle l st at e co urt pr oc ee din gs m ay

pe ac ef ull y c o- ex ist w ithin pe rs onam

f ed er al pr oc ee din gs, it is d if fi cu lt to unde rs tand why

apara lle l arb itr at ionc oul d no t. C onse que ntl y , it w oul d se em

that the pot en tia l r es j udi catae ff ec t tha t the arb itr at ionof

arb itr ab le cl ai m s c oul d have on a

pe ndi ng i n pe rs onam

f ed er al c as e doe s no t i n it se lf pe rm it38

a fed eral co ur t t o e njo in su ch arb it rat io n. Fo r the se r ea sons , w e ar e fo rc ed to ove rt ur n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in

j unc tio n ag ai ns t arbi tra ti on of t he arb it rab le cla im s. IV. Turning to the non arbitrable r uling s, w e sim ilarly

find that the dist rict court ab us edit s d is cret io n i n g ran ti ng an in jun ct io n b arri ng arb it rat io n o f su ch cla im s. A t f ir st g lanc e, it

is unc le ar

howthe de fe ndants —the part ie s e nj oin ed —c oul d poss ibly be harm ed from

arbitrating claim s that the court had expressly ruled we re nonarb itr ab le . B as ed

on this pr es um

pti on, the dis tr ic t c ourt a

ppl ie d th e fo ur tr ad iti ona l c ri te ri a fo r aw ar din g pr el im inary inj unc tiv e re lie f an d f

ound that the pla int if f ha d m et it s burd en : Fi rs t, the re is a subs tanti al li ke lih ood of suc ce ss o n th e m er its . T his Co ur t h as alr ead y

de em edth os e cl ai m s t ha t re m ai n n on -arb it rab le . T hus, P la int if

fs ’ suc ce ss o n th e m er its is guarante ed . S ec ond, Pl ai nti ff s w oul d su ff

er ir re para ble harm by be ing f or ce d to arb itr at e non- ar bitra ble iss ue s. T hir d, the ba lanc ing w ei ght s he av ily in favor of P la int if fs be ca use of the ir guarante ed

suc ce ss. F ina lly , a lth ough the Co urt r ec ogni ze s th e str ong publ ic int er es t i n f av or of arb itr at ion , thi s C ourt ha s a lso a lr ea dy c onsi de re d th ose f

ac tor s and m ad e the de te rm inatio n th at

the se c la im s c annot

be arb itr at ed . I t i s th er ef or e in the pub lic int er es t t o avoi d ne ed le ss l iti ga tio n and e xpe nse of arb it rat io n p ro ceed in gs an d m ov e th e cas e fo rward . T h i s r e a d s a s i f

th e c o u rtw e r e g r a n t i n g ap r e l i mi n a ry i n j u n c t i o n i n s o me39

ongo ing case. While m

uch of what the district court w rote sound s reasonable, uponf urthe r re fl ec tio n it

doe s no t m ak e m

uc h se nse . T he c ourt r ef

er re d to the pla int if fs ’ li ke lih ood of

suc ce ss o n th e m er its , w hic h r ai se s th e que sti on, the m er its of w ha t? T he pla int if

fs ha d no t i nst itu te d an in de pe nde nt l aw sui t se ek ing pe rm an en t i nj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst the de fe ndants f

ro m arb itr at ing any

c la im s; the plaintiffs’ underly ing claim s in the m ain lawsuit in which this injunction was iss ue d c onc er

ne d th e de fe ndants ’ sy ste m f or r ei m bur sin g th em

f or the ir professional services. T he m erits of those claim s—that is, whether the plaintiffs ar e en tit le d to r ec ei ve m one tary dam ag es in fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt be ca use the de fe ndants ha d no t r ei m

bur se d th em

e noug h—h av e nothin g to do w ithw he the r the pla int if fs c ane nj ointhe de fe ndants f ro m e nga gin g inale ga lly

nul l and v oid arb it rat io n c on cern in g t ho se cla im s. T he onl y ne w“ cl ai m ” the pla int if

fs m ad e in the ir

m oti on f or an in j unc tio n was th atso m e o f th e cl ai m s t he de fen da nt s s ou gh t t o a rb it rat e were n on arb it rab le . A s no te d e ar lie r, how ev er , “ w ro ngf ul arb itr at ion ” is n ot a

c au se of a ct ion . T hus, even if the plaintiffs we re c orrect in stating that the claim s at issue wer e nonarbitrable, there is still n o cause of ac tion for which they would have a lik el iho od o f suc ce ss. P ut anothe r w ay , the pla int if fs ha d no t st at ed

any le ga lly co gni za ble c la im upo n w hic h th ey

c oul d have any

li ke lih ood of

suc ce ss o n th eWe also note that the district court’ s conclusion re g ardingirrepa rable injury

was 20 pate ntl y wr on g . E ve n if

the de fe nd ants we re pe rm itt e d to pr oc e e d w itharb itr atin gno na rb itr a ble claims, it is unclear howthe plaintiffs would suffe r any injury at all, much less irre para ble injury . Th e pla int if

fs wo uld no t ha ve to p art ic ipate in t

he de fe nd ants ’ a

rb itr atio n p ro c e e din g s. Ev e n if the def endants obtaine d a def

ault verdic t ag ainst them, they would be unable to have it enf orce d in a district court be cause a district cour t is empowere d to vacate ar bitral awa rds wher e the “ar bitrators excee ded their pow ers.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) . I f a dispute is nonar bitrable, then a

n arb itr ator ne c e ssa ri ly e xce e ds his po we rs in a dju dic atin git. Con se qu e ntl y , whil e the de fe nd ant i s fre e to initiate whateve r private arbitration procee dings he wishes, a plaintiff ne ed not be trouble d by them beca

use they are essentially

leg al nullities from the start. Ev e n if a pla int if f d oe s d e c ide to r a ise the jus tic ia bil ity iss ue be fo re the arb itr atio n p ane l, the time and expense he incurs in doingso simply does not constitute irrepa rable injury . “Mer e injuries, howeve r substantial, in terms on money , time and ene rg y nece ssarily

expended in the absenc e of a

stay , are not enoug h.” Sampson v. Murra y , 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S. C t. 937, 953, 39 L . Ed. 2d 166 (1974) ( quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Conseque ntly , not only was the district court wrongin applying the traditional fac tors to what could only be under stood as an injunction under the All Writs Act, but it applied at least two of those f our fa ctors—likelihood of succe ss on the merits and irre para ble injury —incorre ctly . 40 m erits at all. T hus, even viewing this ruling on its own term s, the court m isapplied the “ likeliho od of success” prong for granting in j unctive relief. 20 T his poi nt i s c los el y

int er w ove n w iththe m or e fundam en ta l sh ortc om ing in the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s 20 02 I nj unc tio n O rd er ; i t a ppl ie d th e tr ad iti ona l st an dard s f or gr an tin g an in

j unc tio n to w ha t c oul d on ly be r ea sona

bly und er sto od a s am oti on for an inj unction under the All Writs Ac t. T he conceptual difficulty of even atte m pti ng t o a ppl y the li ke lih ood of

suc ce ss f ac tor to thi s m oti on r ei nf

or ce s our earl ie r poi nt a

bout howthe f

ac tor s f or gr an tin g atr ad iti ona l i nj unc tio n do not apply to grants of injunctive relief under the Ac t, where w e consider only whether the inj unc tio n w as iss ue d “ in a id o f [the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s] j ur isd ic tio n[ ] and41

ag reeabl e to th e u sa ge s an d p rin ci pl es of l aw.” 28 U.S.C. § 1 65 1( a). T he pla int if

fs c ont en d th at

the inj unc tio n a ga ins t arb itr at ionof the nonarbitrable claim s was nec essary to protect the integrity

of both the dis trict co urt’ s pa st r

uli ng tha t the c la im s w er e nonarb itr ab le , a s w el l a s th e pe ndi ng di st ric t co ur t p ro ceed in gs on th os e cl ai m s. Nei th er ar gu m en t i s p ers ua si ve . The district court’ s 2000 Ar bitration Order, in design ating certain claim s as nonarb itr ab le , sim

ply he ld tha t the pla int if

fs c oul d no t be c om

pe lle d to arb itr at e the m . T his or de r did

not pur port t o pr ohi bit

arb itr at ionof

tho se c la im s; i nst ea d, it m erely rendere d any

such arbitration a legal nullity . By purporting to proceed w iththe arb itr at ionof

non ar bitra ble c la im s any

w ay , the de fe ndants w er e not in an y w ay und er m ini ng, c ir cum

ve nti ng, or

nul lif y ing the c ourt’ s 20 00 A rb itr at ion Ord er; th ey

were i ns te adm erel y

en ga gi ng in a po in tl es s, frui tl es s ex erci se . Sim ilarly , if

an issue is non arbitrable, the arbitrators lac k jurisdiction over it. S ee I nt’ l A ss’ n of

Ma ch ini sts & A er ospa ce W orke rs v. T ex as S te el Co . , 639 F. 3d 2 79, 281 ( 5thCi r. 198 1) ( “ ‘ A rb itr ab ili ty ’ is sa id t o in vol ve the j ur isd ic tio n of the arb itr at ionpane l . . . . ”) . C onse que ntl y , e ve n if the arb itr at ionc onc lud ed f ir st, an d it w er e poss ibl e fo r anarb itr at ionto ha ve ac oll at er al e sto ppe l e ff ec t on pe ndi ng f ed er al pr oc ee din gs— aniss ue w e ne ed not r ea chhe re tod ay

—this particular ar

bitration would n ot affec t the ongo ing federal cla ss action. Collatera l42

estoppel canno t apply

unless th e panel that issued the earlier dec ision had j ur isd ic tio n to a dj udi cate that i ssu e. S ee Mo ntanav. U nit ed S ta te s, 440 U . S. 147 , 153, 99 S . Ct . 970 , 59 L . E d. 2d 2 10 ( 1979 ) (“ [A ] r igh t, que sti on o r fa ct dis tin ct ly pu t i n i ss ue an d d ire ct ly det erm in edby a cou rt o f co m pe te nt juri sd ic ti on . . . cannot be disp uted in a subs equent suit betwee n the sam e parties or their privies.”) (e m pha sis a dde d) . Mo re ove r, a s di sc uss ed e ar lie r, e ve n if

the de fe ndants w er e to obt ai n an aw ar d f

ro m the arb itr at or s, the y

w oul d be una

ble to en fo rc e it in any federa l court. S ee 9 U .S .C. § 10(a)(4) ( notin g that a feder al district court m ay va cate an arb itr at ionaw ar d “ w he re the arb itr at or s e xc ee de d th ei r pow er s” ). I t i s precisely because ar

bitrating no narbitrable claim s is such a poin tless endeavor that it doe s no t thr eate n or

und er m ine e ith er

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xis tin g or de r or it s j urisdictio n over the pendin g cases. Consequentl y , the c ourt was not em powere d to e nj oinarb itr at ionof

the non ar

bitra ble c la im s un de r the A ll Wri ts A ct . T he de fe ndants r em ai n f

re e to arb itr at e the non ar

bitra ble c la im s inw ha t w ill be nothin g m or e th an a m oo t co ur t s es si on . V. Fo r the se r ea sons , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in j unc tio n, in its e nti re ty , is REVERSED.