NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0793-13T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DONNA JONES,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

Submitted April 1, 2014 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Koblitz.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 

12-06-1643.

Warren W. Faulk, Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for appellant (Linda A. Shashoua, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Law Offices of Michael W. Kahn, P.C., and 

Brenner Brenner & Spiller, attorneys for 

respondent (Michael W. Kahn and Fletcher C. 

Duddy, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ESPINOSA, J.A.D.

In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 

L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), a warrantless blood test was administered 

to a driver arrested for driving while intoxicated after a 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

July 29, 2014

APPELLATE DIVISION

July 29, 2014
2 A-0793-13T1

routine traffic stop. There being no other facts to suggest an 

emergency existed, the United States Supreme Court was asked to 

decide the broad question "whether the natural metabolization of 

alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that 

justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 

requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving 

cases." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1556, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702

(emphasis added). Concluding that fact alone did not present a 

"per se exigency," the Supreme Court held, "consistent with 

general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this 

context must be determined case by case based on the totality of 

the circumstances." Ibid. 

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, defendant caused a 

multiple vehicle accident, resulting in personal injury to 

herself and another that required each of them to be transported

to a hospital. It took emergency personnel approximately thirty 

minutes to extricate the unconscious defendant from her vehicle. 

The police investigation of the accident scene at a heavily 

traveled intersection took several hours. Relying on McNeely, 

the trial court suppressed a blood alcohol content (BAC) reading 

of .345, the result of a blood test administered without a 

warrant. We granted leave to the State to appeal from this 

order and, for the reasons that follow, we reverse.
3 A-0793-13T1

I

Defendant was indicted on one count of fourth-degree 

assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2), and was issued related 

summonses for reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, and driving 

while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. She filed a motion to 

suppress the results of the blood sample.

Two witnesses testified at the suppression hearing, 

Officers James Watts and Anthony Sorrentino of the Cherry Hill 

Police Department. The facts elicited at the suppression 

hearing can be summarized as follows:

It was dusk at approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 28, 

2011, when a three-vehicle crash occurred at the intersection of 

Kings Highway, a State highway, and Church Road, a county road

in Cherry Hill. Traffic at this location is heavy during rush 

hour conditions. Two automobiles were stopped at a red light on 

Kings Highway. Defendant drove her vehicle into the second car 

stopped at the light, propelling it into the automobile ahead of 

it. Defendant's vehicle continued to strike the second vehicle 

before "careening off" across the intersection, where it wedged 

up against a cemetery archway. Because the accident involved 

injuries, it was a "Code 2" crash in which available police 

units are dispatched to the scene. In addition to the eleven 

officers who responded, there were at least two Emergency 
4 A-0793-13T1

Medical Service (EMS) vehicles and four EMS personnel, two fire 

trucks and an unknown number of firefighters at the accident 

scene.

Officer Sorrentino was one of the first officers on the 

scene, which he described as "very chaotic." Officers Watts and 

Sorrentino described the officers' tasks at the scene. Officer 

Sorrentino stated,

[W]hen we first responded we had to set up 

traffic directions so we had to block off 

the vehicles that were damaged. And we had 

to set up a system for directing traffic 

around the damaged vehicles as well as the 

emergency vehicles. Someone had to attend 

to the victims in each car and other units 

would have attended to any witnesses or 

tried to locate any witnesses at the scene.

Several officers were needed to assess the traffic 

conditions, the occupants of the three vehicles, and the 

situation involving defendant's car. There was a concern that 

the building defendant had struck might collapse. Watts 

described the officers' objective as "to make sure . . . that 

there's nothing else going to happen to make the scene worse."

Defendant was found inside her vehicle, unconscious and 

bleeding from her face. The fire department and Emergency 

Medical Technicians (EMTs) had to extricate her from her heavily 

damaged car, a process that took approximately one-half hour.

As defendant was being removed from the vehicle and placed in 
5 A-0793-13T1

the ambulance, the EMTs told Officer Sorrentino that there was 

an odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Because defendant

remained unconscious, no sobriety tests were administered at the 

scene. Defendant was taken to the hospital along with an 

occupant of one of the other cars who was also injured in the 

accident.

Officer Watts, a traffic safety officer, testified that his 

assignment is to investigate what are deemed to be potentially 

serious or fatal accidents. He was called to investigate the 

scene approximately forty-five minutes to one hour after the 

accident was reported, arriving after defendant had been taken 

to the hospital. He testified it took several hours for the 

investigation at the scene to be completed. 

Officer Sorrentino went to the hospital to follow up on the 

injuries of defendant and the occupant of the other vehicle, 

which proved not to be serious. Once defendant regained 

consciousness, Officer Sorrentino asked her if she had anything 

to drink and she responded that she had at least one beverage. 

The record does not reveal for how long defendant was 

unconscious. Officer Sorrentino described defendant's speech as 

"very slurred." She was unable to answer his questions when he 

asked for her address or for a phone contact for a relative.
6 A-0793-13T1

At Officer Sorrentino's request, a nurse drew defendant's 

blood at approximately 8:15 p.m. The blood test revealed a BAC 

reading of .345.

1 Thus, the blood was drawn approximately one 

hour and fifteen minutes after police responded to the 

automobile accident.

Officer Sorrentino testified that, pursuant to standard

operating procedures at the time, he was not required to obtain 

a search warrant. He testified further that he did not receive 

his first training in securing telephone warrants until after 

the accident. Both Watts and Sorrentino testified that, to 

their knowledge, telephone warrants were not available in their 

jurisdiction in December 2011.2 As of the time of the 

suppression hearing, neither had obtained a telephone warrant.

The suppression hearing in this case was conducted 

approximately four months after McNeely was decided. Citing our 

Supreme Court's decision in State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 

411-12 (2012), the motion judge observed that McNeely applied to 

all cases that were not yet final because the decision 

 

1 The penalties for driving while intoxicated apply to persons 

who operate a motor vehicle with a BAC of 0.08% or higher. 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant's BAC was more than four times this

amount.

2 On cross-examination, Watts stated he was referring to his own 

understanding that a telephone warrant was not needed "for blood 

samples at a crash scene."
7 A-0793-13T1

implicated rights guaranteed under the federal Constitution. 

The motion judge described the applicable rule as requiring a 

warrant for a blood sample unless an exception to the warrant 

requirement, such as an exigency, applies. He stated,

[T]he rule in both McNeely and Schmerber [v. 

California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72, 86 S. Ct.

1826, 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 920 (1966)] is 

that a warrantless blood draw may be taken 

from drunk driving suspects based on the 

exigency of the dissipation of blood alcohol 

evidence where the totality of the 

circumstances indicates that the officer did 

not have time to obtain a warrant. The 

Court in Schmerber found an exigency to 

exist while the Court in McNeely affirmed 

the Missouri Supreme Court decision finding 

none.

The motion judge found both Sorrentino and the other police 

witness to be "genuinely credible," and "acted probably in good 

faith," which included "ask[ing] the hospital personnel to use a 

kit to do a blood draw of the suspect" instead of seeking a 

search warrant. He also recognized that while telephonic 

warrants were available, it was not the general practice to use 

them.

The motion judge found that the officers had a sufficient 

legal basis to seek a search warrant when the EMT alerted them 

to the odor of alcohol on defendant in light of the 

circumstances of the accident. The judge acknowledged eleven 

police officers were required in addition to the emergency 
8 A-0793-13T1

personnel at the accident scene and that the officers had 

"duties to attend to of great importance at the scene and were 

attending to them." However, the motion judge concluded that 

the State had not established that 

under all the circumstances of this case, 

this three-car accident with one serious 

injury and one minor injury, was such that 

all the attention of all the police officers 

the entire time they were all there was 

required to attend to duties at the scene 

such that it would have been impossible for 

any one of them to have had the time to call 

for a search warrant telephonically.

[Emphasis added.]

The motion judge also stated that, although McNeely and the 

caselaw generally discuss the natural metabolization of alcohol 

in the bloodstream, he had no evidence before him that showed

in any kind of detail as to precisely what 

that problem is, precisely how quickly 

alcohol tends to metabolize, what the time 

frame is within which the alcohol test must 

have been conducted relative to the last 

time the person ingested alcohol for some 

sort of reasonably fair reading to be 

obtained.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress was granted. 

In this appeal, the State argues that the motion judge 

erred in applying McNeely "retroactively" and in failing to find 

an exigency in the circumstances here. Defendant does not 

dispute that the procedure here would have passed muster under 

the applicable New Jersey precedents. Instead, she contends 
9 A-0793-13T1

that New Jersey precedent constituted "bad law," premised upon a 

misreading of Schmerber. She submits that the motion judge was 

correct in applying McNeely to this case and in concluding there 

was no exigency to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court 

"must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision so long as" there is sufficient and credible support in 

the record. State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007). The 

trial court's legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to 

the same deference — "appellate review of legal determinations 

is plenary." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011).

In this case, the motion judge concluded that the blood 

test results had to be suppressed because the State failed to 

show "it would have been impossible" to obtain a warrant. In 

addition, he criticized the lack of precise information 

regarding the elimination rate for defendant's BAC and 

questioned the allocation of police resources at the scene of 

the accident. We conclude that the judge erred in his 

application of the standard required by McNeely and Schmerber

and that the blood test results should not have been suppressed.

II

In 2011, New Jersey law permitted the police to obtain a 

blood sample without first obtaining a warrant, so long as they 
10 A-0793-13T1

had probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated 

and the sample was taken "in a medically acceptable manner at a 

hospital or other suitable health care facility," State v. Dyal, 

97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984) (citing Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at

771-72, 86 S. Ct. at 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920), and without the 

use of excessive force. State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 231-33 

(2001); see also State v. Adkins, 433 N.J. Super. 479, 482-84

(App. Div. 2013), certif. granted, 217 N.J. 588 (2014). 

The following passage in Schmerber provided guidance for 

our decisions: 

[T]he questions we must decide in this case 

are whether the police were justified in 

requiring petitioner to submit to the blood 

test, and whether the means and procedures 

employed in taking his blood respected 

relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 

reasonableness.

In this case, as will often be true when 

charges of driving under the influence of 

alcohol are pressed, these questions arise 

in the context of an arrest made by an 

officer without a warrant. Here, there was 

plainly probable cause for the officer to 

arrest petitioner and charge him with 

driving an automobile while under the 

influence of intoxicating liquor. The 

police officer who arrived at the scene 

shortly after the accident smelled liquor on 

petitioner's breath, and testified that 

petitioner's eyes were "bloodshot, watery, 

sort of a glassy appearance." The officer 

saw petitioner again at the hospital, within 

two hours of the accident. . . .

. . . .
11 A-0793-13T1

Although the facts which established 

probable cause to arrest in this case also 

suggested the required relevance and likely 

success of a test of petitioner's blood for 

alcohol, the question remains whether the 

arresting officer was permitted to draw 

these inferences himself, or was required 

instead to procure a warrant before 

proceeding with the test. Search warrants 

are ordinarily required for searches of 

dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less 

could be required where intrusions into the 

human body are concerned. . . .

The officer in the present case, however, 

might reasonably have believed that he was 

confronted with an emergency, in which the 

delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under

the circumstances, threatened "the 

destruction of evidence[.]" We are told 

that the percentage of alcohol in the blood 

begins to diminish shortly after drinking 

stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 

from the system. Particularly in a case 

such as this, where time had to be taken to 

bring the accused to a hospital and to 

investigate the scene of the accident, there 

was no time to seek out a magistrate and 

secure a warrant. Given these special 

facts, we conclude that the attempt to 

secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in 

this case was an appropriate incident to 

petitioner's arrest. 

[Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 768-771, 86 

S. Ct. at 1834-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918-20

(emphasis added) (internal citations 

omitted).]

In Dyal, supra, our Supreme Court described the "crucial 

consideration" in this reasoning:

[T]he body eliminates alcohol at a rapid 

rate. The evidence is evanescent and may 
12 A-0793-13T1

disappear in a few hours. Investigating 

police, while coping with an emergency, 

should not be obliged to obtain a search 

warrant before seeking an involuntary blood 

test of a suspected drunken driver. 

[97 N.J. at 239-40 (citing Schmerber, 384 

U.S. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1836, 16 L. Ed.

2d at 919-20).]

Our courts did not stand alone in this interpretation of 

Schmerber. The Supreme Court noted that it was deciding McNeely

to resolve a split in federal authority on this issue. Id. at 

___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 703; see also 3 Wayne 

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth 

Amendment, §5.4(b) (5th ed. 2012) and cases cited therein.

It is an ineluctable conclusion that, at the time Officer 

Sorrentino requested a blood sample, he had probable cause to 

believe that defendant had been driving while intoxicated. The 

parties stipulated that the blood sample was obtained in a 

medically acceptable manner. It would therefore appear that the 

blood sample procedure here complied with New Jersey law at the 

time of the accident and defendant has not argued to the 

contrary.

We note further that, if the ruling in McNeely had come 

from our Supreme Court based upon the protections afforded by 

the New Jersey Constitution, the ruling would have marked a 

clear departure from New Jersey precedent that would have been 
13 A-0793-13T1

limited to prospective application. See State v. Cummings, 184 

N.J. 84, 96-99 (2005); see also Adkins, supra, 433 N.J. Super.

at 486.

III

Since McNeely is rooted in the Supreme Court's 

interpretation of federal constitutional law, its application 

here is governed by the well-established principle that "a new 

rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 

retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 

review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which 

the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."

Wessells, supra, 209 N.J. at 412 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 

479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661 

(1987)). Citing Wessells, defendant argues and the motion judge

found that McNeely must be given "retroactive" application,

3 a 

 

3 In Wessells, our Supreme Court addressed the question whether 

a defendant's statement to police following his arrest should be 

suppressed because the questioning violated a new bright-line 

rule subsequently announced by the United States Supreme Court 

in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed.

2d 1045 (2010). Wessells, supra, 209 N.J. at 397. In that 

case, the United States Supreme Court established fourteen days 

as "a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to 

dissipate its coercive effects" for renewed interrogation of a 

suspect who initially requested counsel. Shatzer, supra, 559 

U.S. at 109, 130 S. Ct. at 1222, 175 L. Ed. 2d at 1056. After 

reviewing the history of pertinent precedent, the Court observed 

that Shatzer represented a "rejection of a totality of the 

circumstances approach in favor of a single time period," and 

(continued)
14 A-0793-13T1

conclusion rejected by another part of this court.4 For the 

purposes of our analysis here, however, we need not determine 

whether McNeely should be applied retroactively because we 

conclude that the application of McNeely to the facts of this 

case does not require the suppression of the results of 

defendant's blood test.

The fact that the Supreme Court rejected a per se exigency 

rule in McNeely should not be misinterpreted as a retreat from 

its recognition that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood 

merits considerable weight in a totality of the circumstances 

analysis. It must be emphasized that both the Missouri Supreme 

 

(continued)

that the United States Supreme Court's "language of certainty" 

was intended to "avoid debate" by creating a bright line rule. 

Wessells supra, 209 N.J. at 410. In contrast to Shatzer, 

McNeely did not establish a bright line rule but rather, adhered 

to a totality of the circumstances approach to the resolution of 

challenges to warrantless blood samples taken from suspected 

drunk drivers. See McNeely, supra, ___ U.S. at _____, ____, 133 

S. Ct. at 1559, 1563-64, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 705, 709-10. 

4 In Adkins, we observed that "the United States Supreme Court 

will not apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy where the 

police conducted a search in good faith reliance on binding 

legal precedent in the jurisdiction where the search occurred," 

and that the Court had clarified that retroactive application is 

not mandated by a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law. 

Id. at 484-85 ("[T]he retroactive application of a new rule of 

substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question whether a 

suppression remedy applies; it does not answer that question.") 

(quoting Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct.

2419, 2431, 180 L.Ed. 2d 285, 298-99 (2011)).
15 A-0793-13T1

Court and the United States Supreme Court described the facts in 

McNeely as "'unquestionably a routine DWI case' in which no 

factors other than the natural dissipation of blood-alcohol 

suggested that there was an emergency." McNeely, supra, ___

U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1557, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 703 (quoting 

State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Mo. 2012)). There was no 

accident; no injured defendant who needed to be extricated from 

her heavily damaged car; no other injured person who had to be 

transported to the hospital; no concentration of disabled cars 

and emergency vehicles at a busy intersection; and no police 

investigation beyond the DWI arrest. 

Still, the Supreme Court accepted as "true" the immutable 

fact that the alcohol level in one's bloodstream begins to 

dissipate from the time "the alcohol is fully absorbed and 

continues to decline until the alcohol is eliminated." Id. at 

____, 133 S. Ct. at 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 706. It is through 

this lens that the Supreme Court assessed the totality of the 

circumstances.

The Supreme Court discounted the significance of the "exact 

elimination rate," finding it "sufficient" to note that "because 

an individual’s alcohol level gradually declines soon after he 

stops drinking, a significant delay in testing will negatively 

affect the probative value of the results." Id. at ___, 133 S. 
16 A-0793-13T1

Ct. at 1560-61, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 707 (emphasis added).

5 The 

Court emphasized this point, stating,

This fact was essential to our holding in 

Schmerber, as we recognized that, under the 

circumstances, further delay in order to 

secure a warrant after the time spent 

investigating the scene of the accident and 

transporting the injured suspect to the 

hospital to receive treatment would have 

threatened the destruction of evidence.

[Id. at ____, 133 S. Ct. at 1561, 185 L. Ed.

2d at 707 (emphasis added).]

The salient points to be made here are that the dissipation 

of blood alcohol continues to be an "essential" factor in 

analyzing the totality of the circumstances; that time spent 

investigating an accident and transporting an injured suspect to 

the hospital causes delay; that obtaining a warrant will result 

in further delay;

6 and that such additional delay will "threaten" 

 

5 The Court observed, "More precise calculations of the rate at 

which alcohol dissipates depend on various individual 

characteristics (such as weight, gender, and alcohol tolerance) 

and the circumstances in which the alcohol was consumed." Id.

at ____, 133 S. Ct. at 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 707 (citing

Stripp, Forensic and Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analysis, in 

Forensic Chemistry Handbook 437-41 (L. Kobilinsky ed. 2012)). 

Since many of these facts, as well as the time a suspect ceased 

drinking alcohol, are unlikely to be known to officers arriving 

at an accident scene, the Court's dismissal of any need to prove 

an "exact elimination rate" is a practical approach to the 

analysis.

6 Recognizing that some delay is inevitable, even in a telephone 

warrant situation, the Court stated, "We by no means claim that 

telecommunications innovations have, will, or should eliminate 

(continued)
17 A-0793-13T1

the destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court did not require 

the State to show that the "further delay" would substantially 

impair the probative value of a blood sample drawn after a 

warrant was obtained or that it was impossible to obtain a 

warrant before the evidence was dissipated. In short, the Court 

did not require proof that evidence would be destroyed; it was 

sufficient to show that delays "threatened" its destruction.

It is therefore clear that the motion judge applied a more 

stringent test than that required by McNeely. The judge 

interpreted McNeely to mean that an exigency is limited to 

circumstances where there is no time to obtain a warrant. This 

very standard was advocated by Chief Justice Roberts in his 

partial dissent. He would have established the following rule:

If there is time to secure a warrant before 

blood can be drawn, the police must seek 

one. If an officer could reasonably 

conclude that there is not sufficient time 

to seek and receive a warrant, or he applies 

for one but does not receive a response 

before blood can be drawn, a warrantless 

blood draw may ensue. 

[McNeely, supra, ____ U.S. at _____, 133 S. 

Ct. at 1573, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 752 (Roberts, 

C.J., concurring and dissenting).]

 

(continued)

all delay from the warrant-application process." Id. at ___, 

133 S. Ct. at 1562, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 709. 
18 A-0793-13T1

The Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt the Chief 

Justice's "modified per se rule," favoring instead the

"traditional totality of the circumstances analysis." Id. at 

_____, 133 S. Ct. at 1563, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 710. Of particular 

importance to an analysis of the facts here, McNeely described 

the special facts considered in the Schmerber Court's analysis

which, the Court agreed, were sufficient to support a 

warrantless blood test:

[T]he petitioner had suffered injuries in an 

automobile accident and was taken to the 

hospital. While he was there receiving 

treatment, a police officer arrested the 

petitioner for driving while under the 

influence of alcohol and ordered a blood 

test over his objection. . . . [W]e 

concluded that the warrantless blood test 

"in the present case" was nonetheless 

permissible because the officer "might 

reasonably have believed that he was 

confronted with an emergency, in which the 

delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under 

the circumstances, threatened ‘the 

destruction of evidence.'"

In support of that conclusion, we observed 

that evidence could have been lost because 

"the percentage of alcohol in the blood 

begins to diminish shortly after drinking 

stops, as the body functions to eliminate it 

from the system." We added that 

"[p]articularly in a case such as this, 

where time had to be taken to bring the 

accused to a hospital and to investigate the 

scene of the accident, there was no time to 

seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant."

"Given these special facts," we found that 

it was appropriate for the police to act 

without a warrant. 
19 A-0793-13T1

[McNeely, supra, ___ U.S. at ____, 133 S. Ct.

at 1559-60, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 705-06 (emphasis

added) (internal citations omitted).] 

The Court described the analysis in Schmerber as "fit[ting] 

comfortably within our case law applying the exigent 

circumstances exception." Id. at ____, 133 S. Ct. at 1560, 185 

L. Ed. 2d at 706. Notably, the Court did not dissect precisely 

how much time was used to take the accused to the hospital or 

required to investigate the scene of the accident, and it did 

not evaluate in hindsight whether the officers on the scene 

allocated their resources efficiently.

In sum, the "special facts" that supported a warrantless 

blood sample in Schmerber and were absent in McNeely, were 

present in this case: an accident, injuries requiring 

hospitalization, and an hours-long police investigation. 

Therefore, it was not necessary for the officers to shoulder the 

further delay entailed in securing a warrant that would have 

threatened the destruction of the blood alcohol evidence. 

Defendant's suppression motion should have been denied.

Reversed.