IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

JOSE SEGURA and TABETHA GONZALEZ, ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) ) ROGACIANO and RAQUEL CABRERA, ) ) Respondents. ) No. 90088-4

EnBanc
Filed: 

### OCT 29 2015

MADSEN, C.J.-RCW 59.18.085 ofthe Residential Landlord-TenantAct of 1973 (RLTA), which is intended to provide relocation assistance to tenants, does not allow recovery for emotional distress. The statute's plain language and its statedpurpose compel this result. The trial court and the Court ofAppeals were correct in so determining. We affirm. FACTS Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrerabought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rentthe house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments.No. 90088-4 On July 3**~** 2011, the Cabreras leased the basementto Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year's term. Segurapaid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city ofPasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had convertedthe single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basementunit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segurato vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. On July 14, Segura gave the Cabreras a written demand for refund ofprepaid deposits and rent and for monetary relocation assistance, as provided by RCW 59.18.085(3). The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. Mr.:Cabrera later stated in a deposition thathe ignored it because an attorney told him "there was no problem." 1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 115-16. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 20 11. Segura claimedthat after sendingthe demand letterbutbefore this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera enteredthe unitwithout notice, changedthe locks, removed some of Segura'spersonal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from theproperty. Segura suedthe Cabreras on July 26 for damages underthe RLTA. The Cabreras filed an answer, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." CP at 199.

1The Cabreras have appeared prosethroughoutthe proceedings. They have, however, submitted no responsive briefing in the Court ofAppeals or in this court. The Rental Housing Association ofWashington submitted an amicus briefsupporting the Cabreras. 2No. 90088-4 OnJune 22, 2012, Segura moved for summaryjudgment, seeking $1,200.00 for the first month's prepaidrent and the security deposit, $150.00 for the utility deposit, $2,000.00 inrelocation assistance, $200.00 in gas expenses related to moving into a new home, $1,000.00 inemotional distress damages,2 and $5,209.55 in attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summaryjudgmentbutrejectedthe request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were notrecoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The court denied Segura's motion for reconsideration, reasoning, "Therelationship ofthe parties arises from a contractto lease real property. The misconduct on the part ofthe landlord was intentional but itis not anintentional tort. The damages are limitedto those identifiedinthe statute RCW 59.18.[0]85(3)." CP at 12. The Court ofAppeals affirmedthe denial ofemotional distress damages in a published, split decision. Segura v. Cabrera, 179 Wn. App. 630, 319 P.3d 98, review granted, 181 Wn.2d 1006, 332 P.3d 985 (2014). Relying on this court's opinion in White RiverEstates, the majority inthe Court ofAppeals heldthat emotional distress damages
were notrecoverable because a landlord could violate RCW 59.18.085(3)(a) '"by conductnot amounting to an intentional tort."' !d. at 637 (quoting White RiverEstates v. Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d 761, 769, 953 P.2d796 (1998)). The Court ofAppeals also

2 Segura described these damages as "representing additional damages for the anxiety, worry, inconvenience, and upheaval inflictedupontheplaintiffs and their children from being forced to vacate theirhome on a few days' notice shortly after signing a year's lease [and] the harassment and illegal lock-out suffered at the defendants' hands, includingmissingproperty." CP at 64. 3No. 90088-4 reasoned that the language ofRCW 59.18.085(3)(e) "implies out ofpocket or financial damages incurred by relocation
.... This interpretation better suits the statute's purpose, which suggests the 'actual damages' provided in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) are limited to reasonable moving expenses." Id. This court granted Segura'spetition for review. ANALYSIS Statutory interpretation resolves whether the RLTA allows displaced tenants to
recover emotional distress damages. See White RiverEstates, 134 Wn.2d at 765. The purpose ofstatutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent and to apply it. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192,298 P.3d 724 (2013). Whenpossible, we derive the legislature's intent solely from the statute'splain language, considering the text ofthe provision at issue, the context ofthe statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme
as a whole. Id. "Whether emotional distress damages are available following a statutory violation will depend on the language ofthe particular statute at issue." Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d at 765. Reading RCW 59.18.085'sprovisions together reveals thatthe statute'spurpose is to provide assistance to relocate displaced tenants, make the landlord responsible for such assistance, authorize the city to step in as needed to facilitate such relocation, and provide
a means for the City to seek reimbursement from the landlord where the city has stepped in to provide such assistance.

4No. 90088-4 Here, RCW 59.18.085 provides that a landlord shall not rent a unit that does not meet applicable codes. RCW 59.18.085(1). Ifthe landlord knowingly does so, the tenant shall recover the greater ofthree months' rent ortreble the actual damages sustained as a result ofthe violation. RCW 59.18.085(2). Ifthe appropriate government agency requires that the tenant vacate the premises, the tenant shall also recover any prepaid deposit and rent.. !d. Additionally, the tenantmay be entitled to relocation assistance as follows: Ifa governmental agency responsible for the enforcement ofa building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling will be condemned or will be unlawful to occupy due to the existence of conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations, a landlord, who knew or should have known ofthe existence ofthese conditions, shall berequired to pay relocation assistance to the displaced tenants. RCW 59.18.085(3)(a). The statute sets the amount ofrelocation assistance ($2,000 or three times the monthly rent, whichever is greater), notes other damages the tenant is entitled to from the landlord, specifies how paymentto the tenant is to be made, sets a time frame for such payments, and authorizes the governmental entity to step in anq advance the relocation assistance to the displaced tenant ifthe landlord fails to meetthe statutory time schedule for such payments. 3 The statute also provides atime limit in

3 Subsections (3)(b) and (c) provide: (b) Relocation assistance providedto displaced tenants under this subsection shall bethe greater amount oftwo thousand dollars per dwelling unit orthree times the monthly rent. In additionto relocation assistance, the landlord shall be required to payto the displaced tenants the entire amount ofany deposit prepaid bythe tenant and all prepaid rent. (c) The landlord shallpayrelocation assistance and any prepaid deposit andprepaid rent to displacedtenants within seven days ofthe governmental 5No. 90088-4 whichthe landlord mustreimburse the city for any relocation assistance advancements thatthe city has paidthe tenant; civil penalties and interest for the landlord's noncompliance with the stated time limits; and attorney fees and costs to the city ifit mustpursue legal action againstthe landlordto receive suchreimbursements, penalties, and interest. See RCW 59.18.085(3)(£)-(h). Notably, subsection (3)(e) sets the parameters ofthe damages available to atenant under the statute. Displacedtenants shall be entitled to recover any relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaidrent required by (b) ofthis subsection. In addition, displaced tenants shall be entitledto recover any actual damages sustainedby them as a result ofthe condemnation, eviction, or displacement that exceedthe amount of relocation assistance that is payable. In any action broughtby displaced tenants to recover any payments or damages required or authorized by this subsection (3)(e) or (c) ofthis subsection that are notpaid by the landlord or advanced by the city, town, county, or municipal corporation, the displaced tenants shall also be entitled to recover their costs ofsuit or arbitration and reasonable attorneys' fees. RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). In giving effect to the legislature's intent, we lookto the statute'splain and ordinary meaning, reading the enactment as a whole, harmonizing its provisions by reading them in context with related provisions. Quadrant

agency set:J.ding notice ofthe condemnation, eviction, or displacement order to the landlord. The landlord shall pay relocation assistance and any prepaid deposit and prepaid rent eitherby making individual payments by certified checkto displaced tenants or by providing a certified checkto the governmental agency ordering condemnation, eviction, or displacement, for distribution to the displaced tenants. Ifthe landlord fails to complete payment ofrelocation assistance withinthe period required under this subsection, the city, town, county, or municipal corporation may advance the cost ofthe relocation assistance payments to the displaced tenants. RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (c). 6No. 90088-4 Corp. v. Cent. PugetSound GrowthMgmt. Hr 'gs Bd., 154 Wn.2d224, 239-40, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005). Reading the provisions ofthe statute together, the plainlanguageprovides that the tenantis entitledto receive the relocation assistance amounts as calculatedin subsection (3)(b) butmayalso seek, via legal action against the landlord, the tenant's actual costs ofrelocationthat exceedthe relocation assistance amount as calculated in subsection (3)(b). The statuteprovides relocation assistance; it simply does not address
or encompass emotional distress damages. Further, ifthere were any doubt as to the statute'spurpose, the legislature expressly spelledit out. The statute's statedpurpose is twofold: First, "to establish a process bywhich displacedtenants wouldreceive fimdsfor relocation from landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitaryhousing after due notice ofbuilding code orhealth codeviolations." 

### LAws OF 2005, ch. 364, § 1 (emphasis added). And second, "to provide enforcement mechanisms to cities, towns, counties, ormunicipal corporations including the abilityto advance relocation funds to tenants who are displaced as a result ofa landlord's failure to remedybuilding code orhealth code violations and laterto collectthe full amounts oftheserelocation funds, along withinterest andpenalties, from landlords." 

### Id. The statute's plain language and the legislature's express provision of "funds for relocation" cannot legitimatelybe stretchedto include emotional distress damages. Segura cites Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976), and Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 971 P.2d45 (1999), for the propositionthat actual

7No. 90088-4 damages includes damages for emotional distress. ButRasor concerned damages available underthe Fair CreditReporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, whose purpose is '"to protect an individual from inaccurate or arbitrary information about himselfin a consumerreportthat is being used as a factor in determining the individual's eligibility for credit, insurance or employment."' Rasor, 87 Wn.2d at 520 (quoting Porter v. TalbotPerkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). Martini addressed claims ofdiscrimination under Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) (chapter 49.60 RCW). See Martini, 137 Wn.2d at 366-68. The purpose ofWLAD is to protectthe "public welfare, health, andpeace ofthe people" because "discriminationthreatens [their] rights andproperprivileges." RCW 49.60.010. Boththe FCRA and WLAD guard against harm to the person. The inclusion of emotional distress damages in those cases is not surprising, as suchprovision comports with the purpose andprotections affordedby the statutes in question. Butno similar purpose is present in this case. Here, the text ofthe statute, as discussed above, attests thatthe legislature is concerned only withreturn ofa tenant's money and assisting the tenant in getting relocated, not inproviding redress for a personal injury orprotecting against harm to the person. There is no similarity to the types ofsituations presented in Rasor andMartini, which involved different statutes with different language and different purposes. Forthe samereason, Segura's citationto Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wn. App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978), and Conradv. A/derwoodManor, 119 Wn. App. 275,

8No. 90088-4 78 P.3d 177 (2003), as support is also unavailing. Ellingson addressed claims of discrimination under the WLAD, and Conrad addressed claims under the abuse of · vulnerable adults statute (chapter 74.34 RCW). See Ellingson, 19 Wn. App. at 54; Conrad, 119 Wn. App. at 280. These cases too are distinguishable, as they addressed statutes and circumstances that are not presenthere. We have never adopted a single definition ofthe term "actual damages." Indeed, in the appropriate case, we have limited "actual damages" to include only recovery for pecuniary harm. For example, the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) allows a personharmed under the statute "torecover the actual damages sustained by him orher

... together with the costs ofthe suit, including areasonable attorney's fee." RCW 19.86.090. As in this case, the statute included language allowing recovery for "actual damages." Nevertheless, after analyzing the language in context, we held thatthe CPA does not allow recovery for emotional distress. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'nv. Fisons Corp, 122 Wn.2d 299,318, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). We examinedthe purpose ofthe statute at issue, reasoning thatthe CPA concerns injuries to "'business or property,"' notpersonal injuries. Id. Therefore, "actual damages" did not include emotional distress. Id. Similarly, as the Supreme Courtrecently observed, "actual damages" has a "chameleon-like quality" because "theprecise meaning ofthe term 'changes with the specific statute in which it is found."' Fed. AviationAdmin. v. Cooper, _U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 1449, 182 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2012) (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Aviation

9No. 90088-4 

### Admin., 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding "actual damages" does 

### not include emotional distress damages as used inthe PrivacyAct of 1974, codifiedinpart at 5 U.S.C. § 552a)). As the Courtnoted, sometimes the term includes emotional distress damages, while in other contexts it includes onlypecuniaryharm. 

### !d. at 1449. As discussed, inthis case, the statuteprovides for the recovery offinancial losses causedby displacement; it simply does not address orreasonably encompass emotional distress damages. CONCLUSION We holdthatRCW 59.18.085 ofthe RLTAprovides relocation assistanceto tenants. Recovery for emotional distress damages is not available underthis statute. We affirm.

10No. 90088-4

11Segura v. Cabrera, 

### No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., 

### Concurring in Result)

No. 90088-4 GORDONMcCLOUD, J. (concurring inresult)-The Residential LandlordTenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, entitles displaced tenants to recover, "[i]n addition to" "any relocation assistance," "any actual damages sustained by them
. . . that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). The majority holds that the plain language and stated purpose ofthis statute 

### compel limiting a displaced tenant's recovery to financial losses only. 1 

### Majority at 10. But the legislature's use ofthe broad, inclusive adjective "any" to modify "actual damages," along withits specificationthat suchdamages are recoverable "in addition" to relocation costs, compels the opposite conclusion. In addition, we presume that the legislature, when it enacted the RL TA, was aware ofour decisions in

### Rasorv. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d516,529,554P.2d 1041 (1976), and

### Martini

1 

### Emotional distress damages are a type of noneconomic damages. RCW 4.56.250(l)(b) defines "noneconomic damages" as "subjective, nonmonetary losses, including, but not limited to pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by the injured party, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss ofconsortium, injury to reputation and humiliation, and destruction ofthe parent-childrelationship." 1Segura v. Cabrera, No. 

### 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)



### v. Boeing Co., 

### 137 Wn.2d 357,368,370,971 P.2d45 (1999), recognizing that actual damages include emotional distress damages. Itherefore respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusionthatthe RLTA bars displaced tenants from recovering emotional distress damages. ButI concur in the majority's result that Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) cannotrecoveremotional distress damages here. The statute allowsrecovery ofsuch actual damages only when they exceedthe statutory $2,000 ofrelocation assistance. RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). Segura's request for $1,200 in actual damages does not exceed that $2,000 amount. Therefore, the RLTA prohibits them from recovering actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

### We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. 

### O.S. T 

### v. Regence BlueShield, 

### 181 Wn.2d 691, 696, 335 P.3d 416 (2014). We begin with the statute's plain language, considering the text of the provision in question, the statute's context, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Evans, 

### 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). Our objective is to determine and to apply the legislature's intent. 

### O.S. T, 

### 181 Wn.2d at 696.

2Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)



### II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE 

### This case requires us to construe the statutory term "actual damages" as used in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) and to decide ifthe rightto recover such "actual damages" includes a right to recover emotional distress damages. RCW 59.18.085 states, in relevant part, (3)(a) Ifa governmental agency responsible for the enforcement of a building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling will be condemned or will be unlawful to occupy due to the existence ofconditions thatviolate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations, a landlord, 

### who knew or should have known ofthe existence ofthese conditions, shall be required to pay relocation assistance to the displaced tenants....
(e) Displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent required by (b) ofthis subsection. 

### In addition, displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover 

### any actual damages sustainedbythem as a result ofthe condemnation, eviction, or displacement that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable
.... (Emphasis added.) As the majority notes, the RLT A contains no definition of "actual damages," so whether the RLT A authorizes displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages sustained as aresult oftheir displacement is a matter of statutory interpretation.

3Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)



### III. THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED THAT TENANTS CAN RECOVER "ANY ACTUAL DAMAGES" "[I]N ADDITION" TO THE LISTED AMOUNTS; THIS LANGUAGE

### Is BROAD AND UNAMBIGUOUS 

### A. TheMajority's Holding Conflicts withthe Statute'sPlainLanguage Theplain statutorylanguage ofthe RLTA gives displaced tenants the right to
recover 

### "any actualdamages sustainedbythem as a result ofthe
... displacement," 

### "[i]n addition" to economic damages specifically enumerated in the statute ("relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, andprepaid rent"). RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). Bylimiting the recoveryunderthis statute to economic damages only, and by further limiting these damages to "relocation assistance," majority at 10, the majority's holding conflicts with both statutory phrases italicized immediately above. First, the statutoryword "any" is abroadmodifier. 

### See State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 880-82, 204 P.3d 916 (2009); 

### State v. Westling, 145 Wn.2d 607, 611- 12, 40 P.3d 669 (2002). This broad language supports an expansive reading ofthe statute. Second, wemust give full effect to the language "in addition" to. The statute specifies that "any" actual damages are available not as part of, but "in addition" to the enumerated damages, including damages that "exceedthe amount ofrelocation assistance that is payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(e). Thus, the statute's context, in 4Segura v. Cabrera, 

### No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., 

### Concurring in Result)

addition to its express language, reveals the legislature's intent to permit the recovery ofemotional distress damages; a contrary interpretation would render the legislature's use ofthis broad language meaningless.2 

### The majority relies on an argument that no party has made: that the language "that exceed the amount ofrelocation assistance that is payable" shows an intent to limit the amount ofavailable damages to relocation damages only. Majority at 6-7. Butthis interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, it treats the concluding language as a limit on both the amount and the nature ofdamages that a displaced tenant is entitledto recover. The statute'splainlanguage defies such areading. The statute says "that exceed," which refers to an amount, not a type of damages. Second, this interpretation treats the language "that is payable" as a limit on "actual damages" when, grammatically, it can be read only as modifying the immediately preceding phrase "relocation assistance." B. The Majority's Holding Conflicts with This Court's Decisions Interpreting the Term "Actual Damages" in Other Statutes In addition to failing to recognize the broad nature ofthe statutory language, the majority rejects the definition of "actual damages" established by our prior

2 See Cornu-Labat v. Hasp. Dist. No. 2, 

### 177 Wn.2d 221, 231, 298 P.3d 741 (2013) ("We interpret statutes to give effectto all the language used so that no portion is rendered meaningless or unnecessary." (citing State v. JP., 

### 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003))). 5Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 

### (Gordon McCloud, J., 

### Concurring in Result)

decisions. Majority at 7-8. In

### Rasor, we interpreted the term "actual damages" as used in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. 87 Wn.2d at 529. This statute permits a plaintiffto recover "an amount equal to ... any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result ofthe failure" ofa credit reporting agency to comply with the statutory requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. Theplaintiffin

### Rasor allegedthata creditreport stating she had a reputation ofliving with more than one man out ofwedlock "damaged her personally and in her business reputation in the small community, and that she suffered emotionally from the experience." 87 Wn.2d at 531. We explained that Congress's intent in enacting "this remedial legislation" was "'to protect the reputation ofa consumer"' from the improperpreparationanduseofinaccurateorarbitraryinformationincredit reports, includingprotectionfrom false rumors. 

### !d. at 529, 520-21 (quoting

### Ackerley
v. Credit Bureau ofSheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974)). Comparing the plaintiff's injury to the actual injury suffered in a defamation action,
we recognized in

### Rasorthe "generally accepted legal meaning" of"actual damages" for defamatory falsehood: In reference to the type of harm suffered, the term "actual damages" has a generally accepted legal meaning. Althoughit declined to define "actual injury," the United States Supreme Court recently noted the variety ofharm which may result when damage is actually sustained. 6Segura v. Cabrera, 

### No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., 

### Concurring in Result)

Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types ofactual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment ofreputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. 

### !d. at 529 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d789 (1974)). Notingthat "actual damages" denotes both the type ofdamage award and the nature ofinjury for which a plaintiffmay
recover damages, we also stated in Rasor, "In this sense, the term has a second, consonant and established meaning. '"actual" damages are synonymous with compensatory damages'. Thus, actual damages, flowing from injury in fact, are to be distinguished from damages which are 'nominal,' 'exemplary' or 'punitive."' 

### !d. at 530 n.3 (citations omitted) (quoting Werder v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437, 445 (M.D. Pa. 1965)). We therefore held that "actual damages" under the FCRA includes all ofthe elements ofcompensatory awards generally, including harm to business reputation and emotional suffering. 

### !d. at 530. In Martini, we again construed the term "actual damages" and reached the
same conclusion. 137 Wn.2d at 364. Martini discussed "actual damages" as used in Washington's LawAgainst Discrimination (WLAD), chapter49.60 RCW, which 7

### Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)



### mandates "liberal construction." 137 Wn.2d at 364; RCW 49.60.020. The plaintiff alleged disability discrimination and soughtfront andbackpay. Martini, 

### 137 Wn.2d at 361. The WLAD permits the recovery of"the actual damages sustained by the person" but contains no definition of the term "actual damages." RCW 49.60.030(2). Although emotional distress damages were not directly at issue in Martini, 

### we cited Rasor 

### and concluded that RCW 49.60.030(2) authorizes the recovery offull compensatory damages, including "damages for emotional distress," and excluded only nominal, exemplary, or punitive damages. Martini, 

### 137 Wn.2d at 370, 367-68. Since 1976, we have consistently stated thatthis is the established meaning of "actual damages." Rasor, 

### 87 Wn.2d at 530 n.3. We presume that the legislature knewthe controlling law in the area in which it was legislating when itpassedRCW 59.18.085 in 2005. Wynn v. Earin, 

### 163 Wn.2d 361, 371, 181 P.3d 806 (2008) (citing Price v. Kitsap Transit, 

### 125 Wn.2d 456, 463, 886 P.2d 556 (1994)). 3 

### Although the

3The Court ofAppeals relied in largepart on 

### White RiverEstates v. Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d 761, 953 P.2d 796 (1998). In that case, however, we held that when a statute is 

### silent about the damages available for its violation, emotional distress damages are available only ifthe statutory violation requires conduct amounting to an intentional tort, as opposed to mere negligence. 

### !d. at 766. 

### White River Estates' intentional-versusnegligent test does not apply to the RLTA, which explicitly describes the damages recoverable for a landlord's violation. 

### See RCW 59.18.085(3)(e). 

### 8

### Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring inResult)


### majority dismisses these cases as "involv[ing] different statutes with different languageanddifferentpurposes,"majorityat 8, nothinginRasor

### orMartini 

### suggests that their discussions of "actual damages" were limited to the statutes at issue in those cases.4 

### The majority argues that under FederalAviationAdministration v. Cooper, 

### _U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 182 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2012), '"theprecise meaning of the term ["actual damages"] "changes with the specific statute in which it is found."' Majority at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cooper, 

### 132 S. Ct. at 1449). But that case does not control here. The issue presented in Cooper 

### was-seemingly-whether the term "actual damages" in the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act of 1974 includes compensation for mental and emotional harm. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Butbecause the PrivacyAct of 1974 applied to

4 The majority asserts that we said the opposite in 

### Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & 

### Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). Majority at 9. It is true that in 

### Fisons we disallowed recovery of emotional distress damages under the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, which affords "actual damages." 

### Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318. Butthat was notjustbecause ofRCW 19.86.090's language allowing an individual "to recover ... 

### actual damages sustained." (Emphasis added.) In fact, we explainedthatthere was no right to emotional distress damages inthat contextbecause the statute limitedthe rightto sue to a "personwho is injured 

### in his orher business orproperty by a violation of [the act]." RCW 19.86.090 (emphasis added). In 

### Fisons, we ruled, "'Thephrase "business or property" also retains restrictive significance. It would, for example, exclude personal injuries suffered."' 

### Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 318 (quoting 

### Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1979)). The statute at issue in this case, incontrast, contains no suchlimiting language. 9Segura v. Cabrera, 

### No. 90088-4 (GordonMcCloud, J., Concurring inResult)


### damages from the government, the question was actually narrower: "because the PrivacyAct waives the Federal Government's sovereign immunity, the question we must address is whether it is

### plausible to read the statute, as the Government does, to authorize onlydamages for economicloss." 

### Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1453 (emphasis added). Giventhat narrow issue, that Court enteredthenarrowholdingthatthe civil remedies provision did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to such recovery. 

### Id. The Court explained, "When waiving the Government's sovereign immunity, Congress must speakunequivocally. Here, we conclude that it did not. As a consequence, we adopt an interpretation of 'actual damages' limitedto provenpecuniaryoreconomicharm." 

### Id. This case, in contrast, does not involve the scope ofsovereign immunity. In addition, this case deals with the interpretation ofa Washington, not a federal, statute; the answerto our question is controlledby state, not federal, law. IV. SEGURACANNOTRECOVEREMOTIONALDISTRESS DAMAGES HERE 

### Although the RLTA permits displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages as actual damages, I agree with the majority that Segura is entitled to no actual damages in this case. RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) states that displaced tenants can
recover "any actual damages sustained by them
. . . 

### that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable." (Emphasis added.) The "relocation 10Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)



### assistance that is payable" to displaced tenants is "the greater amount of two thousand dollars per dwelling unit or three times the monthly rent." RCW 59.18.085(3)(b). Here, Segura is entitled only to actual damages that exceed $2,000 because this amount is greater than three times Segura's monthly rent of $600. Segura requested $1,000 for emotional distress and $200 for gasoline expenses-both components of"actual damages." Butthe $1,200 total that Segura claims as actual damages does not exceed the $2,000 payable to Segura as relocation assistance. Therefore, Segura can recover no actual damages under the RLTA. CONCLUSION The legislature detennined that a displaced tenant could recover "actual damages." It 

### placed no limit on these "actual damages." In fact, RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) authorizes "any" such "actual damages." The statute'splain, broad language, as well as controlling Washington case law interpretingthe legal meaning ofthis term, thus authorize displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages for a landlord's violation ofthe RLTA. In this case, however, Segura's requested actual damages do not exceed $2,000. For that reason, Segura may not recover actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case. I therefore concur in the result. 11Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)

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