[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 12201 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 4:17

- cv
- 00046

- HNJ

KAREN HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONE R,
Defendant

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

_______________________ _ (Februa ry 6, 2019) Before TJOFLAT , JORDAN, and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 1 of 62 Karen Hernandez appeals the district court’s order affirming the administrative law judge’s decision to deny her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)

. Specifically, Hernandez contends that the ALJ erred by (1) affording no weight to the medical opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Johnston , and (2) affording little weight to the medical opinion of a one
- time examin er, Dr. Randolph. In a social security appeal , we review an agency ’ s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence. Ingram v. Comm ’ r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). In reviewing for substantial evidence we do not reweigh the evidence or
substitute our own judgment for the agency’s , rather , we simply ask whether there
is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusion. Miles v. Chater , 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996)

. Relevant to this case, S ocial Security regulations reserve to the
Commissioner the ultimate opinion as to whether a claimant is “disabled

. ” 1 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (1)

. To make this determination, the Commissioner follows a
five

- step evaluation process , considering : (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe

1 Hernandez does not argue on appeal that the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of no disability , accordingly, she has abandoned that issue. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines , Co. , 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).

Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 2 of 63 impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Lis ting of Impairments; (4) whether, based on a residual functioning capacity (RFC) assessment

— that is, a n evidentiary assessment of a claimant ’ s ability to work despite her impairments

— the claimant can perform any of her past relevant work; and (5) whether , given her RFC, age, education, and work experience , there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Phillips v. Barnhart , 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004 ) ; 20 C.F.R. ' ' 404.1520(a)(4)(i)

– (v), 416.920(a) (4)(i)

– (v). In conducting this evaluation, a n ALJ must state with particularity the weight given different medical opinions and the accompanying reasons. Sharfarz
v. Bowen , 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)

. T he ALJ should consider, among other things, the examining and treatment relationship between the claimant and doctor, the length of the treatment , the supportability and consistency of the evidence, and the specialization of the doctor. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). M ore weight is generally given to opinions that are more consistent
with the record as a whole. Id. § 404.1527(c)(4).
While a treating physic ian’s opinion is generally entitled to weight, a one
time examiner’s opinion is not. See McSwain v. Bowen , 81 4 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)

. E ven the opinion of a treating physician , however,

Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 3 of 64 need not be given weight when there is “good cause”

— for instance, when a treating physician’s opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with his own records. Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1240

– 41. We will not second guess an ALJ’s decision to reject a medical opinion for “good cause” so long as the ALJ articulate s a specific justification for his decision

. Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 808 F.3d 818, 823 (11th Cir. 2015).
S ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give no weight to Dr. Johnston’s opinion here . First, the ALJ correctly concluded that he was not required to consider Dr. Johnston’s opi nion that Hernandez’s conditions prevented her from being able to work, as regulations reserve that decision to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (1)

. Second, although Dr. Johnston
treated Hernandez for more than three years, the limitation s that Dr. Johnston alleged in his 2013 opinion were inconsistent with ( 1) his own treatment notes over the years

— the majority of which stated that Hernandez’s conditions were successfully treated by her prescribed medication s

— a nd (2) Dr. Hunt ’s and Dr. Gomez’s records, which show ed that Hernandez was engaged in effective
treatment for her conditions. Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1240

– 41

. S ubstantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to
Dr. Randolph’s opinion . First, Dr. Randolph’s opinion that Hernandez’s significant social limitations would prevent her from returning to work addressed

Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 4 of 65 an ultimate issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
Second , Dr. Randolph examined H ernandez only once and did not treat her , so the ALJ was not required to give his opinion deference

. McSwain , 814 F.2d at 619.
Third , Dr. Randolph’s opinion was inconsistent with other record evidence , including : (1) Dr. Johnston’s treatment records, which showed that Hernandez ’s anxiety had been effectively treated with a medication regimen; (2) Dr. Gomez’s treatment records, which showed that Hernandez was not suffering from acute distress and appeared well oriented; and (3) Dr. Estock’s opi nion that, while
Hernandez had generalized anxiety, she appeared stable such that any mental
health issues caused only moderate limitations in her ability to work. Finally , Dr. Randolph’s evaluation records reveal that Hernandez failed to report to him that she had cared for her stepfather and grandmother, had volunteered with her local fire department, and had in fact worked

— albeit , sporadically

— since her alleged disability onset date. As such, the ALJ reasonably concluded that, to the extent that Dr. Randolph’s opinion was based on Hernandez’s subjective complaints, his opinion was entitled to less weight. Phillips , 357 F.3d at 1240

– 41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). 2

2 Hernandez also contends that the district court erred by issuing a lengthy post hoc explanation as to why the ALJ afforded Dr. Johnston’s opinion no weight . O ur precedent makes clear , however, that in social security appeals we review the ALJ’s findings to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Ingram , 496 F.3d at 1260. Thus, t he district court’s reasoning concerning th ose findings is irrelevant here

.

Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 5 of 66 Finding no error, we affirm the district cour t’s order

. AFFIRMED. Case: 18-12201 Date Filed: 02/06/2019 Page: 6 of 6