alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Elhannon JOHNSON, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 18, 1953.

H. R. Wilhoit, Grayson, Joe R. Massey, Jr., Ashland, for movant.

J. D. Buckman, Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Harlan Circuit Court. Judgment of conviction for having in unlawful possession whiskey for the purpose of sale in local option territory. $50 fine and 30 days in jail. The facts, questions raised, authorities cited and applicable law have beeen carefully considered by the Court.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 40 (Wednesday, February 28, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 14671]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-04111]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute on Aging; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 1009 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute on Aging Special Emphasis 
Panel; State Dementia Care Research Center.
    Date: March 25, 2024.
    Time: 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institute on Aging, Gateway Building, 7201 
Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Virtual Meeting).
    Contact Person: Sandhya Sanghi, Ph.D., Scientific Research 
Officer, Scientific Review Branch, National Institute on Aging, 7201 
Wisconsin Avenue, Gateway Bldg., Suite 2N230, (301) 496-2879, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bdcedcd3d9d5c4dc93cedcd3dad5d4fdd3d4d593dad2cb"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="83f0e2ede7ebfae2adf0e2ede4ebeac3edeaebade4ecf5">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.866, Aging 
Research, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: February 22, 2024.
Miguelina Perez,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2024-04111 Filed 2-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
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Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2011-0041

Directorate Identifier: 2010NM227AD

747-25A3588 --- 7/19/10

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
# Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed August 27, 2014.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D13-2027

Lower Tribunal No. 13-8132

________________



### Jason Robert Konoski

, Appellant,

vs.



### Dariush Shekarkhar, etc.

,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria Espinosa

Dennis

, Judge.

Roberto D. Stanziale (Fort Lauderdale), for appellant.

Silvia Perez

, for appellee.

Before LAGOA, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.

EMAS, J.Jason Konoski appeals from the trial court’s entry of a final judgment of

injunction for protection against domestic violence. He contends that 1) the final

judgment is not supported by competent substantial evidence, and 2) the trial court

erred in excluding testimony Appellant attempted to elicit from Appellee during

cross-examination.

Our review of the record reveals competent substantial evidence to support

the trial court’s entry of the final judgment of injunction. As to the evidentiary

issue, we hold that Appellant failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal. See

Frances v. State

, 970 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2007); Greenwald v. Eisinger, Brown, Lewis

& Frankel, P.A.

, 118 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); A. McD. v. State

, 422 So. 2d

336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

Finally, and although having no effect on our ultimate determination, we

note with substantial concern the actions of Appellee’s appellate counsel in filing

an appendix containing documents outside the record which were never presented

to, or considered by, the trial court. In fact, the documents contained in the

appendix were generated, and pertain to events occurring, after the filing of the

notice of appeal in this case. Appellee never sought leave before filing these extrarecord documents, and it appears there would have been be no proper basis for

granting leave had it been sought. It is axiomatic that appellate review must be

limited to the record made before the trial court and it is “entirely inappropriate

2and subjects the movant to possible sanctions to inject matters in the appellate

proceedings which were not before the trial court.” Rosenberg v. Rosenberg

, 511

So. 2d 593, 595 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As our sister court has noted:

When a party includes in an appendix material or matters outside the

record, or refers to such material or matters in its brief, it is proper for

the court to strike the same. That an appellate court may not consider

matters outside the record is so elemental that there is no excuse for

any attorney to attempt to bring such matters before the court.

Altchiler v. State

, 442 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (internal

citations omitted).

We strike Appellee’s appendix to the answer brief and admonish counsel for

her conduct in filing it.

Affirmed.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF, AND THE STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995
INCLUDED IN REGISTRANT'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF INCOME AND THE NOTES THERETO.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                             501
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,083
<ALLOWANCES>                                       937
<INVENTORY>                                     48,225
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                63,473
<PP&E>                                           6,133
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  92,136
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,469
<BONDS>                                         38,376
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              584
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        19,155
<OTHER-SE>                                      20,162
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    92,136
<SALES>                                        169,559
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               169,559
<CGS>                                          138,806
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  161,066
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,067
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,249
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,426
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,082
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,344
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,344
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .65<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .64
<FN>
<F1>FOR PURPOSES OF THIS EXHIBIT, PRIMARY MEANS BASIC.
</FN>


</TABLE>
**Example	of	an	Accessible	Sleeper	C ompartment**  **– VIA	Rail	Canada	Inc.**  **By	Uwe	Rutenberg (Drawings	and	pictures	used	with	permission	of	VIA	Rail	Canada	Inc.		These** 

**images	are	not	available	for	commercial	use.)**

Fig. 1 Entrance , toilet	and	shower

 Entrance door:	power	sliding	with	touch	control,	both	sides,	with	override	by VIA	personnel	in	case	of	emergency  Toilet	height	18”  Grab	bars	at	toilet	and	in	shower  Pivoting	armrest	in	shower  Flip	up/down	seat	in	shower  Hand	held	shower	head	with	timer  Shower	curta in	around	shower	stall  Emergency	call	button	at	vanity	at	12”	from	floorFig.	2	Entrance	door	to	sleeper	compartment;	touch	button	for	power	sliding	doorsFig.	3 Toilet ,	18”	high Fig.	4 Shower	seat	and	support	bar

Fig. 5 Vanity	wi th	horizontal	grab	bar Fig. 6 Soap	dispenserFig.	7 Large	t ouch	button	door	controls	on	both	sides	to	open/close	sliding	dividing

door	between	toilet/shower	and	sleeper	compartment

Fig.	8 Clear	60”	maneuvering	cir cle	in Fig.	9 Bed	height	same as front	of	bed wheelchair	seat:	18”

Fig.	10 Adjustable	table	at	sofa/bed Fig.	11 Table	near	windowFig.	12 Call	control	panel	near	bed/sofa Fig .	13 Dual	audio	and	visual

In Braille alarm	in	sleeper	and	restroom s ection for	passengers	who	are blind	and	hearing	impaired
#### ROSS v. STATE.

No. 26519.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 7, 1953.

*322Curtis E. Hill, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Crim. Dist. Atty., George P. Blackburn, Bill Alexander, Charles S. Potts, Asst. Crim. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty and assessed 30 days in jail and a fine of $500 upon complaint and information the charging parts of which read as follows:

> “That one Doris Ethyl Ross, hereinafter styled Defendant, heretofore on or about the 1st day of June, A.D., 1952, in the County of Dallas and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully and wilfully promise to pay to Stanley J. Majeski, a person not then and there licensed as a Real Estate Dealer or Real Estate Salesman, a share of commissions or compensation accruing from real estate transactions to her, the said Doris Ethyl Ross, a person licensed as a Real Estate Dealer of the State of Texas.”

The statute under which the prosecution was instituted is Art. 6573a, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St., Section 20 thereof reading as follows :

> “It shall be unlawful for any real estate dealer or real estate salesman to offer, promise, allow, give, or pay directly or indirectly any part or share of his commission or compensation arising or accruing from any real estate transaction to any person who is not a licensed dealer or salesman in consideration of service performed or to be performed by such unlicensed person, and no real estate salesman shall be employed by or accept compensation from any person other than the dealer under whom he is at the time licensed, and it shall be unlawful for any licensed real estate salesman to pay a commission to any person except through the dealer under whom he is at the time licensed.”

The criminal offense defined in this statute is not complete unless the promise of payment of a share of the commission is “in consideration of service performed or to be performed by such unlicensed person”.

In the absence of such an allegation the complaint and information charge no offense.

The question decided has not previously been before this court. Our holding, however, is in harmony with the decisions of our civil courts construing the statute. See Bell v. Stephenson, Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W.2d 153; Means v. Porter, Tex.Civ.App., 216 S.W.2d 269.

The judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
EXHIBIT 23.1

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report on Form
10-K/A of QMed, Inc. and Subsidiaries of our report dated January 25, 2005
relating to the condensed consolidated financial statements, management's
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, included in the
2004 Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended November 30, 2004.

/s/ Amper, Politziner & Mattia, P.C.

Edison, New Jersey
March 30, 2005
Exhibit 31
                                                                    ----------


                                 CERTIFICATION
                                 -------------


             I, Steve Bailey, certify that:

             1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all
             reports on Form 8-K containing distribution and servicing reports
             filed in respect of periods included in the year covered by this
             annual report, of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
             2005-2;

             2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken
             as a whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material
             fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
             statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
             statements were made, not misleading as of the last day of the
             period covered by this annual report;

             3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing
             information required to be provided to the trustee by the master
             servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement,
             for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;

             4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
             master servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar,
             agreement and based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance
             review required under that agreement, and except as disclosed in
             the reports, the master servicer has fulfilled its obligations
             under that agreement; and

             5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to
             the master servicer's compliance with the minimum servicing
             standards based upon the report provided by an independent public
             accountant, after conducting a review in compliance with the
             Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or
             similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling and servicing, or
             similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.

             In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
             information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
             The Bank of New York, as Trustee.


             Date: March 24, 2006


                                               /s/ Steve Bailey
                                               ------------------------
                                               Steve Bailey
                                               Senior Managing Director
Exhibit 99.01 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE/ CHIEF FINANCAL OFFICERS -SECTION 906

I, Raj Kalra, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of DICUT, INC. (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

1. The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and 

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. 

 

Dated: November 17 , 2003

/s/Raj Kalra

------------------------

Raj Kalra, 

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

 

CERTIFICATION

I, Pierre Quilliam, Chief Financial Officer of DICUT, INC. (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

1  .the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Registrant, to which this certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of section   13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and 

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. 

 

Dated: November 17 , 2003

/s/ Pierre Quilliam,

-----------------

Pierre Quilliam

Chief Financial Officer
#### Golie DICKEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27772.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 2, 1955.

R. E. Murphey, Coleman, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 30 days in jail and a fine of $50.

Appellant’s confession recited that she! drove an automobile belonging to one Wilson to Eden in Concho County and thdre bought a case of wine, one-half case of whiskey, and a pint of gin; that on her way, back to Coleman she had drunk some of the gin; that a tire had blown out and the automobile overturned.

A deputy sheriff, an inspector of the Liquor Control Board, and a highway patrolman saw the accused while she was in an ambulance shortly after the accident and testified that they smelled intoxicants and expressed the opinion that the appellant was intoxicated.

Appellant, testifying in her own behalf, denied that portion of the confession in which she said, “I had been drinking gin since we left the liquor store up until the accident,” but did admit that she had taken three sips of the gin and that there was about an inch gone out of the bottle.

Dr. Young testified that he examined' the accused at the hospital after the arrival of the ambulance, denied that he smelled intoxicants, and expressed the opinion that the appellant was not intoxicated.

The jury resolved the disputed issue of the appellant’s intoxication against her, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

Appellant contends that the State failed to prove venue. No issue was raised in the trial cqurt, and hence we are to presume that venue was proven. Article 847, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Laird v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 268 S.W.2d 158.

Bill of exception No. 1 complains of the overruling of his objection to the introduction of the confession on the grounds that the appellant was not in possession of, her mental faculties when it was taken because the doctor had administered drugs to her on the preceding night.

The trial court in his charge told the jury not to consider the confession of the appellant if they found that she was not in *902in full use of her mental faculties at the time it was made. No error is reflected by the bill.

Finding no reversible error, 'the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
#### Johnnie Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 28057.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 15, 1956.

No appearance for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

This purports to be an appeal from a conviction for burglary, with punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

As required by Art. 827, C.C.P., the record does not reflect that a notice of appeal was given and entered of record.

In the absence thereof, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.
#### WESTERN COTTONOIL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Louis ADKISSON et ux., Appellees.

No. 3149.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Feb. 25, 1955.

McMahon, Springer, Smart & Walter, Abilene, Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Houston, for appellant.

Bryan Bradbury, Abilene, for appellees.

COLL'INGS, Justice.

Suit was brought by Louis Adkisson and wife against Western Cottonoil Company for damages. It was alleged that such damages were caused and resulted from odors from soap stock stored by Western Cottonoil Company in an earthen pit near the home of plaintiffs. The trial was before a jury which found that the storing of the soap stock constituted a nuisance and plaintiffs were awarded judgment for damages. Western Cottonoil Company has appealed.

During the trial of the case the court admitted in evidence over appellant’s objections, plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1 which was a jar containing soap stock from appellant’s earthen pit. In the only point présented by appellant it is contended that such action of the court was reversible error.

The witness Patterson testified' that he went to the pit during the time complained of, and put some of the soap stock from appellant’s earthen pit in jars; that plaintiffs’ exhibit No. 1 was one of the jars and that it contained soap stock taken from the pit; that he smelled the odor from the pit and it was an awful odor; that he had never in his life smelled anything that compared with it. He testified that the odor from the jar which was introduced in evidence was the same odor as that which came from the pit except that the odor from the jar was not as strong as that from the pit because there was not as much of it.

*412The admission of real or demonstrative evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial court. 17 Tex.Jur. 466; 32 C.J.S.,' Evidence, § 602, p. 454, and Ervay-Canton Apartments, Inc., v. Hatterick, Tex. Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 150 (Ref.N.R.E.).

The soap stock in the jar in question was identified as a sample taken from appellant’s earthen pit during the period of time complained of. The purpose of the evidence was to show the odor which ap-pellees claimed to have come from appellant’s pit. The sample was shown to have been in the continuous custody and possession of the witness, to be in the same condition as when taken from the pit and to have the same odor as that which came from the pit. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibit in evidence.

The judgment of the trial ■ court is affirmed.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-11-0000413

13-FEB-2014

09:45 AM