J-S71032-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JOHN ANTHONY CREACH 

 Appellant No. 707 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 1, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0001317-2010 

CP-04-CR-0001465-2010 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 11, 2015 

 John Anthony Creach appeals from the order entered on April 1, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, denying him relief on his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9541 et seq. In this timely appeal, Creach claims the PCRA court erred: (1) 

in denying his petition on the basis he did not demonstrate prejudice, and 

(2) in denying his petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the 

submissions by the parties, the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm. 

 The underlying facts of this matter arose from a negotiated guilty plea 

to two separate crimes. We recite the facts and procedural history from the 

PCRA court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

 

In Case Number 1317 of 2010, [Creach] shot and killed Aaron 

Masters in New Brighton, Pennsylvania on December 1, 2007. 

By Criminal Information dated August 2, 2010, he was charged 
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with Criminal Homicide, Robbery, Conspiracy to commit Robbery 

and lesser offenses. In Case Number 1465 of 2010, on April 4, 

2010, [Creach] shot Essex Law five times in New Brighton, 

Pennsylvania. By Criminal Information dated August 23, 2010, 

he was charged with Aggravated Assault, Attempted Homicide, 

and lesser offenses. 

In Case Number 1317 of 2010, two co-defendants were also 

charged with homicide regarding the death of Aaron Masters; 

Nikia Boyd in Case Number 1315 of 2010 and Travon Cleckly[1] 

in Case Number 1316 of 2010. The co-defendants reached plea 

agreements whereby each would cooperate with the 

Commonwealth in the case against [Creach]. Each co-defendant 

pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and was 

sentenced to incarceration for a term of five to ten years. 

 

[Creach’s] jury trial in Case Number 1317 of 2010 was scheduled 

to begin on May 4, 2011. While in the process of selecting the 

jury, the Court was advised that [Creach] and the 

Commonwealth had reached a plea agreement. [Creach] 

entered pleas in both cases; in Case Number 1317 of 2010 

[Creach] pleaded guilty to Third Degree Murder and in Case 

Number 1465 of 2010 [Creach] pleaded guilty to Aggravated 

Assault. On May 5, 2011, pursuant to the terms of the plea 

agreement, [Creach] was sentenced to an aggregate term of 

211⁄2 to 43 years of incarceration; 20 to 40 years of incarceration 

for the charge of Third Degree Murder and one and one half to 

three years of incarceration for the charge of Aggravated 

Assault, to be served consecutively. [Creach] did not file postsentence motions or a direct appeal in either case.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/2014, at 1-2. 

 Creach filed a timely, pro se, PCRA petition. He was appointed counsel 

and on May 12, 2014, counsel filed the instant second amended petition on 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Cleckley’s name is spelled “Cleckly” and “Cleckley” throughout the certified 

record. However, “Cleckley” is the spelling found in the captions of the bills 

of information. Therefore, we will use that spelling. 
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Creach’s behalf. In that petition, Creach claimed plea counsel was 

ineffective for failing to obtain and/or inform him of the details of codefendant Cleckley’s plea agreement regarding a separate crime.2

 Creach 

argued, had he been aware of the lenient nature of Cleckley’s sentence, he 

would have been able to impeach Cleckley’s trial testimony, thereby 

escaping conviction. Accordingly, he would not have pled guilty and, 

therefore, his guilty plea was involuntary. Following proper Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 notice, Creach’s petition was dismissed without a hearing. This timely 

appeal followed. 

When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying 

PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether the 

evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA court 

and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 

Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). Great deference is granted to the 

findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be 

disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 

2003), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 712, 839 A.2d 352 (2003). 

Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Further, we note the PCRA court correctly stated: 

“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or 

unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Cleckley was charged with a variety of crimes regarding the home invasion 

of Rhonda Harper (“the other crime”). Charges included aggravated assault, 

robbery, and conspiracy. However, there is no indication Creach was one of 

those conspirators. 
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141 (Pa. Super. 2002). “To succeed in showing prejudice, the 

defendant must show that it is reasonably probable that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have gone to trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 889 A.2d 365, 

369-70 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

 

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will 

closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts 

reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions 

obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged 

error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover 

potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination

whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing 

him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on 

the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have 

led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. 

This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a 

prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed 

the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error 

of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential 

affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of 

the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the 

affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. 

Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)). 

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/2014, at 5. 

 In his first argument, Creach claims had he known the lenient nature 

of co-defendant Cleckley’s entire plea agreement, he would not have pled 

guilty because Cleckley’s testimony would have been impeachable and 

suspect to the point Creach would have been acquitted. The relevant terms 

of the agreement were that Cleckley would plead guilty to conspiracy to 

commit robbery in the instant matter and be sentenced to a term of 5-10 

years’ incarceration. For the other crime, he would plead guilty to reckless 

endangerment and simple assault and receive a 1-2 year sentence of 

incarceration to be served concurrently with the 5-10 year sentence. Creach 
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argues while he was aware of the terms of Cleckley’s agreement as it applied 

to their case, he was unaware of the details of the plea for the other crime. 

 In denying this claim, the PCRA court noted that prior to pleading 

guilty, Creach was aware that Cleckley had reached his own plea agreement 

and would testify against him. Assuming the truth of his claim, that counsel 

either did not discover the details of Cleckley’s plea agreement regarding the 

other crime or did not inform him of those details, the PCRA court 

nevertheless concluded Creach could not demonstrate prejudice.3 The PCRA 

court reasoned that at the time he entered into his plea agreement, Creach 

knew that Cleckley’s testimony was subject to impeachment because of 

Cleckley’s plea agreement. In fact, Creach knew Cleckley had avoided a 

potential life sentence in agreeing to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit 

robbery. However, Creach failed to show, or even argue, how his defense 

would have been altered knowing the details of Cleckley’s other plea 

agreement. We agree. Acknowledging that Cleckley obtained a favorable 

sentence in exchange for agreeing to testify against Creach, Creach makes 

no attempt to demonstrate how knowledge of the second aspect of the 

Cleckely’s plea agreement would or could have substantially benefitted him 

or how his defense strategy would have been altered in any way. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The Commonwealth asserted it had turned over the details of Cleckley’s 

plea agreement with other discovery. The PCRA court did not make a 

finding regarding this assertion, having decided the issue on other grounds. 
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Additionally, Creach’s bald assertion had he known the full details of 

Cleckley’s plea agreement, he would have opted to go to trial, ignores the 

potential evidence against him. See Criminal Complaint/Affidavit of 

Probable Cause, 5/10/2010. Absent the plea agreement, we note that 

Creach faced the possibility of a life sentence for second-degree murder4 as 

well as substantial incarceration for a variety of other charges, including the 

aggravated assault and attempted murder of Essex Law.5 Accordingly, we 

find no error in the PCRA court’s conclusion that Creach suffered no 

prejudice from not knowing the extent of Cleckley’s plea agreement. 

Because we find no error in the PCRA court’s substantive analysis and 

denial of Creach’s argument, we find no error in the failure to hold a hearing 

on the same. Accordingly, Creach is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Both Creach and Cleckley were charged with homicide generally. Because 

the killing allegedly took place during the commission of a robbery, both 

men faced possible conviction for second-degree murder. 

5

 We again note that as part of his plea agreement, Creach received a total 

of 11⁄2 to 3 years’ incarceration for shooting Law five times with a 9 mm 

handgun. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/11/2015