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### October 2012 

# Illegal Trade in Environmentally Sensitive Goods

Executive Summary

Key messages

 The illegal trade of goods such as wildlife and timber is a serious economic and environmental problem that can disrupt whole economies and ecosystems, undermine environmentally sustainable activities

, and reduce future options for the use of resources. Although hard to quantify, the global value of this i nternational environmental crime is estimated to be around USD 30

- 70 billion a year

.

 The drivers of illegal tra de are primarily economic , where the expected returns exceed the expected costs . More generally , illegal trade may also take place if the demand exceeds the supply of legal products . S tro ng demand from specific consumer countries may be a significant drive r in some cases.

 The environmental and economic impacts of i llegal trade vary from country to country and for different types of goods. Trade in natural resources ( timber and fish ) may have the most significant economic impacts, while illegal dumping of ha zardous waste may have the great est health impacts, and poaching may have the greatest impact on species survival. Illegal trade in ozone

depleting substances has slowed the resolution of a s ignificant global concern. There can also be spillover eff ects . F or instance, in fragile states illegal trade can undermine the rule of law and can fuel armed conflict.

 By its very nature, the size of illegal trade in environmentally sensitive goods is difficult to quantify and further efforts are required to address th e data problem. Data comparisons between impo rt and export statistics and licensing systems can be enhanced by further elaboration of the Harmonized System codes

. I nadequate taxonomic information has been recogni s ed as a problem, and the Global Taxonomy In itiative can help to overcome this barrier to conservation

.

 Licensing schemes can be an important tool in helping to detect and regulate illegal flows of environmental good s . Examples include the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of W ild Flora and Fauna

, and the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governa nce and Trade Initiative . While the schemes reviewed in t h is report have helped to address the problem of illegal trade, none work perfectly . A systematic analysis of their operation and succ esses and failures would be a useful measure , and t here is also scope for improving the process for sharing information between the schemes, instituting independent verification of licensing, and exploring possible economies of scope

.

 N ational environmenta l policy regimes can have a significant impact on illegal trade . The greater use of economic incentives can complement traditional command and control approaches to regulation , and may help to reduce illegal trade flows. The use of revenues can reinforce

e nforcement capacity and improve the incen t ives for longer

- term management of the resource base. However, such mechanisms only work in a framework of good governance and law enforcement, and as part of a package of measures to address the full range of caus es of illegal trade.

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### Over the past three decades, the national and international framework for the protection of the natural environment has evolved rapidly. As legislation expands, however, so too have the incentives and opportunities for individuals an d companies to evade restrictions on the exploitation or trade of environmental goods such as wildlife and timber. Deliberate evasion of environmental laws and regulations by individuals and companies in the pursuit of financial benefit can have serious
tr ansboundary and global impacts. Such international environmental crime is a major issue and presents significant challenges for national and international efforts to control the trade.
Five areas are generally considered to be of major importance: illegal trade in wildlife; illegal logging and its associated timber trade; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; illegal trade in controlled chemicals (particularly in ozone

- depleting substances); and illegal disposal of hazardous waste. There are

o f course no accurate figures on the extent of these activities, but best guesses put their combined global value at about USD 30

- 70 billion a year, equivalent to perhaps 10

- 20% of the value of the illegal trade in narcotics or 15

- 30 % of the value of the t rade in counterfeit goods. This illegal trade in environmentally sensitive goods often leads to environmental damage. Other commodities such as oil, diamonds and coltan are also the subject of illegal trade and while the scale is considered to be less sign ificant, the environmental (and social) impacts can be significant.

T his publication reviews the evidence on the key drivers of illegal trade in env ironmentally sensitive goods . It also provides an overview of the main economic, social and environmental im pacts. The report reviews the data collected by customs and licensing schemes for selected environmentally sensitive goods, including wildlife, fish, timber, ozone

- depleting substan ces (ODS) and hazardous waste , and examines the extent to which this inform ation can be used to identify and measure illegal trade. The role of national and international policy mechanisms to reduce illegal trade flows is also assessed, with a focus

on international licensing schemes (and associated trade restrictions) . In additi on, the role of national environmental policy measures on illegal trade is discussed , focus sing on property rights

- based systems and economic incentives.



### Drivers and Impacts of Illegal Trade

It is important to understand what drives illegal trade and th e circumstances that cause it to thrive, so that effective policies can be developed to counter it. As this publication shows, the key drivers may vary over time and from one location or sector to another.
Any form of trade (legal or illegal) arises when there are profits to be made for those involved. But illegal trade arises particularly when the expected returns are greater than for trade carried out within the law. For example, compliance with regulations concerning reforestation, waste disposal or the use of chemical products might incur costs that can be avoided by illegal trade. © Shutterstock 

### Even if the legal alternative is no t more costly, illega l trade might emerge when demand exceeds the supply of legal products. This is oft en the case for timber. It would, of course, also arise if demand exists for completely banned products and no legal alternatives exist. This is common in wildlife crime, where major sources of demand include the exotic pet and flower trade. Often, the tra de in environmentally sensitive goods is driven by changes in consumption. I n the illegal wildlife trade , poverty has been found to be rela tively unimportant, whereas strong demand from cons umer countries may be

.

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### The impacts of illegal trade can be wide

- ra nging. These will, of course, vary from country to country and locality to locality, and the precise impacts will vary with the sector. Illegal trade in natural resources

— timber and fish

— may have the most significant economic impacts, while illegal dum ping of hazardous waste may have the biggest health impacts, and poaching may have the greatest impact on species survival. Illegal trade in ozone

- depleting substances has slowed the resolution of a significant global environmental concern.

The economic a nd environmental impacts of illegal trade can be sufficiently important to disrupt whole economies and ecosystems, undermining environmentally sustainable activities and reducing future options for the use of resources. There can be spillover effects, with indirect consequences. For instance, in fragile states illegal trade can undermine the rule of law and can fuel armed conflict. Any serious attempt to tackle illegal trade in the sectors examined here would benefit from a systematic evaluation of the impa cts.



### Evidence of Illegal Trade

It should in principle be possible to identify illegal trade in some environmentally sensitive products by examining import and export data and analysing discrepancies between the two sources. Wide variations between differe nt countries’ statistics may indicate illegal trade in some form. However, such an approach is imperfect, and there is great uncertainty about the scale of illegal trade in all areas. Such discrepancies may merely be a reflection of differing measurement m ethods, data inputting or conversion errors and inconsistencies.

In this publication three sets of data comparisons are undertaken:

 Between customs data and data recorded by licensing systems.

 Between customs data from importing and exporting countries.

 Be tween licensing

- system data from importing and exporting countries.
Different methods need to be used for different sectors and products, depending on the nature of the goods concerned, the associated control mechanisms in place, and on the extent to which customs records distinguish controlled goods from uncontroll ed goods. In the case of timber and fish, for instance, no international control system exists, so the analysis is normally confined to customs data. For threatened wildlife products listed on CI TES appendices, licensing data for both exports and imports are sometimes available, but customs data are rarely sufficiently precise to be of use. For ozone

- depleting substances (ODS), some licensing system data are available and some customs codes are su fficiently correlated to provide useful information. For hazardous waste, data are available on ‘movement documents’ issued by governments, and useable customs data are also available for certain categories of
waste. The general conclusion is that while mo re data could be analysed in some of these areas, it is by no means a straightforward tas k. The further elaboration of the Harmonized System codes would p rove of use in many cases. In the area of biodiversity, inadequate taxonomic information has been reco gnised as a problem, and the Global Taxonomy Initiative has been launched to overcome this barrier to conservation ( http://www.cbd.int/gti/ ). More generally, t here is an ongoing dialogue between different internatio nal bodies such as the Secretariats of different Multilateral Environmental Agreements, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Customs Organisation, and specialized bodies such as the International Tropical Timber Organisation. The benefits can b e considerable, and examples in which this has been the case (e.g. Tanzanian timber) are p rovided.

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### Table 1. Types of impacts examined

IMPACT SECTOR EXAMPLES Economic impacts National level Loss of government revenue, natural resource base, and value o f goods traded IUU fishing Worldwide economic losses in 2003 estimated at
USD 10

- 23.5 billion Total value of IUU fishing in sub

- Saharan Africa estimated to be USD 0.9 billion per year
Timber Global annual loss of USD 5 billion in government revenues

Ta nzania: government losing up to USD 58 million per year in revenues (2007) Indonesian government estimated in 2003 to be losing USD 3.7 billion per year
Wildlife Caspian Sea range state governments estimated to be losing

USD60 million due to the illeg al trade in caviar in 2001 Undermining legitimate industry Timber Global annual loss of over USD 10 billion in market value of timber due to illegal trade Depression of global prices of timber due to illegal trade
estimated at 7

– 16 %, costing US firms U SD 460 million in foregone exports Honduras: illegal felling of mahogany jeopardising the commercial viability of community forests
ODS Reduced incentives for industry to introduce substitutes and

replacement technologies
Hazardous waste Undermining th e legitimate waste treatment and disposal

industries Loss of income and employment in related industries and activities IUU fishing Illegal fish catches from Liberia being imported to Côte d’Ivoire for sale and processing



### Local level
Provision of incom e for rural communities Wildlife Vietnam

– income from the wildlife trade for rural communities

Low income for producers Timber Nicaragua

– forest owners and local cooperatives receive 5

– 10% of timber’s value
Indonesia

– rural communities receive less than 10% of export
value of merbau Low profitability of illegal production Timber Cameroon

– outlawing of small

- scale logging in 1999 increased informal taxes and reduced market prices Unsustainable profits Wildlife Vietnam, Pu Mat National Park

– decl ine in hunters following crash in wildlife populations (in 1990s) Undermining local / subsistence livelihoods Wildlife Mongolia

– illegal trade in animals has undermined subsistence hunting and impacted local economy Loss of future opportunities Wildlif e Poaching undermining potential for wildlife tourism

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### Environmental impacts Loss of biodiversity IUU fishing Depletion of fish stocks and reduction in biodiversity due to poor fishing practices, e.g. use of small mesh

- size, longlines, destructive fishing practices (e.g. explosives), fishing in protected areas and over quota, etc.
Wildlife Decline in populations of rhino, elephant, etc. from poaching Damaged ecosystems Timber Degraded forests are less productive, and so less effective at carbon storage; they are also more vulnerable to other factors ( e.g. pests; invasive species; fire) Deforestation results in carbon emissions, and loss of habitats and biodiversity. Pollution ODS Damage to the ozone layer

– increased UV radiation damages organisms and affects ecosystem productivity
Hazardous waste Soil and water contamination from hazardous waste can damage

ecosystems 

### Social impacts Corruption Timber Honduras, Nicaragua

– collapse in civil governance associated with illegal logging Organised crime Wildlife Use of the same smuggling networks for smuggling arms, drugs and wildlife; laundering of drug money through the wildlife trade; growing involvement of organised crime syndicates in ivory trade
Hazardous waste Involvement of crime syndicates in t rafficking hazardous waste

from Italy to eastern Europe and west Africa IUU Fishing Russian crime syndicates earn as much as USD 4 billion a year

from the illegal export of seafood South Africa: illegal fishing of abalone has strong links with illicit

tr ade networks, drug trafficking and money laundering Conflict Timber Illegal trade of timber provided a source of funds for Khmer Rouge, Cambodia Unregulated timber trade financed the Liberian civil war and
rebels in Sierra Leone Livelihoods Timber Tanza nia: small

- scale traders of illegal timber bearing the brunt of
enforcement efforts Clashes between local communities and illegal loggers IUU fishing Loss of livelihoods, particularly in coastal small

- scale fisheries,

clashes between artisanal fishers an d illegal fishers, e.g. coastal
areas of Africa Health IUU fishing Abuse of crew and bad working conditions in illegal vessels
Wildlife Risk to poachers of being shot or imprisoned

Spread of diseases carried by smuggled animals
Hazardous waste Harmful effects of electronic waste

– e.g. lung and kidney disease,

lead poisoning, cancer Case of Trafigura

– illegal dumping of chemical waste in 2006 in
Côte d’Ivoire
ODS Higher levels of radiation linked with suppression of the immune

system, increased inc idences of skin cancer and eye disease

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### International Licensing Schemes and Trade Restrictions

The growth both in the volume of international trade and in the practice of containerisation renders it increasingly more difficult to detect illegal trade. Li censing schemes can be an important tool in helping to detect and regulate flows. They have become increasingly common in recent years and can be regarded as an attempt to regulate particularly problematic trading sectors in a world where trade barriers ar e steadily being removed. They can also have important ancillary benefits, such as improving levels of governance and domestic policy

.

In the publication six licensing agreements are reviewed: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Initiative (FLEGT), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Rotterdam Convention on chemicals, the Montreal Protocol on ozone

- depleting substances, and the Basel Convention on hazardous waste. © iStock photo 

### None of the schemes reviewed have worked perfectly, although all can claim some measure of success. It will be interesting to see how the FLEGT licensing scheme performs, as t o a certain extent it has been designed with an eye to overcoming some of the other schemes’ weaknesses. The following measures would be helpful in improving licensing schemes further:

 A systematic analysis of their operation and successes and failures; al though in general most of the systems seem to be working, there are relatively few comprehensive data.

 A process for sharing information among those responsible for operating the systems, perhaps via the Green Customs Initiative, the UN Environment Program me (UNEP), or the G20. This could be of particular value to those systems new or just coming into existence (e.g., the Rotterdam Convention, FLEGT).

 Independent verification of the issuance of licenses, increased cross

- checking of licenses, and a switch fr om paper

- based electronic systems could increase the effectiveness of the majority of licensing systems studied. More resources could usefully be targeted at these functions.

 There may also be some potential for the realisation of economies of scope, with some organisations carry ing out the same functions for more than one agreement (e.g., the WCMC could play a central mon itoring role for CITES ).



### Implications of National Policy Measures for Illegal Trade

Policies introduced at the national level can have i mplications for illegal trade in environmentally sensitive goods. The effects of national environmental policy regimes on illegal trade depend largely upon the incentives for sustainable (or unsustainable) management of the resource or pollutant generated by the policy. A regulatory system which imposes costs on those exploiting the resource or emitting the pollutant will generate price differentials, which can provide incentives for non

- compliance, with some of

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### the output entering into international trade flows. This is, of course, a function of national enforcement capacity, supported in some cases by the international licensing schemes discussed above.

In recent years increased interest has been expressed in using economic incentives in the pursuit of

env ironmental objectives, for example, to reduce pollution, protect biodiversity and habitats
, and promote the sustainable use of natural resources. Such an approach is in contrast to, or complementary with, more traditional command

- and

- control regulatory app roaches. In this publication the focus is on the effect of such measures on illegal trade.

While the evidence is partial there is some reason to suppose that the use of economic incentives at the national level may reduce illegal trade flows. On the one ha nd, some of the revenue generated by economic instruments (i.e. environmental taxes) can be used to reinforce enforcement capacity. On the other, the ‘formalisation’ of property rights implicit with the use of economic instruments can provide incentives fo r a longer

- term view of resource management, and can even provide incentives for self

enforcement among those exploiting the resource.

However, the use of economic incentives is not a panacea and in order to ensure that their implementation does not lead to illegal trade it is important to note that:

 Economic incentives can only work fully in a framework of good governance and law enforcement. Otherwise they risk exacerbating illegal activity, creating new opportunities for it, or shifting it to other r egions or countries.

 As well as general good standards of governance, new governance structures can prove effective

— e.g. community

- based natural resource management, where local communities are given incentives to protect and manage the resource. Securit y of tenure or other forms of resource ownership will be an important factor.

 Economic incentives will be more effective when they form part of a co

- ordinated range of interventions

— e.g., where alternatives to illegal behaviour are provided ( e.g. legal a lternatives to poaching, or legal means to dispose of waste).

 Where international trade is a factor, co

- ordination with other countries is an important means of ensuring the effectiveness of economic incentives, either to avoid displacement of illegal acti vities or to facilitate the creation of new incentives.

In general, when designing national environmental policy measures it is imperative that the potential for encouraging illegal behaviour (including trade) is considered, so that the consequences can be assessed and considered ( e.g. whether ivory sales are likely to lead to increased poaching) and enforcement activities and other possible interventions can be better targeted.

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### Illegal Trade in Environmentally Sensitive Goods is availab le at http://www.oecdbookshop.org

For further information, please contact:

Nick Johnstone Anthony Cox
O ECD Environment Directorate OECD Environment Directorate Tel.: +33 (0)1 45 24 79 22 Tel.: +33 (0)1 45 24 9 8 70 Email:Nick.Johnstone@oecd.org Email: Anthony.Cox@oecd.org