2023 UT App 131

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JAMES ANDREW NARANJO,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20210865-CA

Filed November 2, 2023

First District Court, Brigham City Department

The Honorable Spencer D. Walsh

No. 201100285

Benjamin Miller, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Marian Decker,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Perhaps to pass the time while waiting in a state park’s

parking lot at the crack of dawn, James Andrew Naranjo used 

various sticky implements to steal fee envelopes his fellow 

citizens had placed into a self-pay box. His actions were observed 

by an angler, who called the police. An officer arrived to find 

Naranjo joined by two others in an apparent drug transaction. A 

circus of sorts ensued, involving an extremely low-speed pursuit 

attended by evidence of the recent envelope thefts and drugs 

being tossed from a vehicle. Charges and a trial followed, and 

Naranjo was convicted of several offenses, including failure to 

respond to an officer’s signal to stop and possession of a 
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controlled substance. Naranjo appeals on various grounds,

including ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Around 5:00 a.m. on a July 2020 morning, an angler, who 

was fishing at Willard Bay State Park, noticed Naranjo sitting 

inside a maroon-colored car in the marina parking lot. The angler

reported that he saw a pile of manila-colored envelopes, 

apparently those used to pay the day-use fee for the marina, 

inside the car. He believed that Naranjo had torn open the 

envelopes and was removing the cash from them. The angler 

called the police, and the dispatcher asked the angler to get the 

car’s license plate number. On his way back to get the number, the 

angler saw a black car pull into the lot. A man and a woman got 

out and started talking to Naranjo, who was still seated in the 

maroon car. The angler reported the maroon car’s plate number

to the dispatcher.

¶3 A uniformed police officer (Officer) arrived around 6:00 

a.m., driving a patrol truck with police logos and a lightbar, which 

was not turned on at the time. Officer saw three people inside the 

maroon car on his arrival: Naranjo in the driver seat, a man in the 

passenger seat, and a woman in the back passenger seat. As 

Officer pulled near the maroon car, the woman got out and went 

to a nearby restroom. Officer parked his truck facing the maroon 

car. Officer got out of the patrol truck and began to walk toward 

the car, at which point Naranjo started to drive away.

¶4 Officer put up his hands, “palms out in halting fashion,” 

and verbally ordered Naranjo to “[s]top.” Officer acknowledged 

that Naranjo’s windows were rolled up when he gave the 

direction to stop. As Naranjo drove past, Officer returned to his 

patrol truck and activated the lightbar. Naranjo did not stop but 

drove “erratically” around the parking lot, making a U-turn and 
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several “quick braking movements” and twice trying to pull into 

marked parking spots. Officer said that he “made eye contact” 

with Naranjo and “tried to signal [him to] slow down or stop.” 

Naranjo stopped in a third marked parking spot, and Officer 

opened the driver-side door of his patrol truck, apparently to 

approach Naranjo’s car. But when Naranjo saw this, he put his car 

“back into drive and continued to drive around the parking lot.” 

¶5 Believing that Naranjo “was not going to stop,” Officer 

drove toward the exit, using his truck to block the lone point of 

egress.

¶6 Meanwhile, the woman got behind the wheel of the black 

car. The man had gotten out of Naranjo’s car and into the black 

car at some point after Officer had left to block the gate. Officer 

then saw the black car driving toward him at the exit. The woman 

and the man “gestured” to Officer that they wanted him “to move 

out of the way and threw their arms up in the air.” Officer 

apparently did not respond as they wanted, so they attempted to 

go around the patrol truck. Officer then hit the black car with his 

truck, pinning the fleeing car against a fence post. The couple then 

got out and began to flee on foot. The pair was apprehended by 

another officer. 

¶7 Naranjo, who had by this point backed into a berm and 

wooden fence surrounding the parking lot, continued his efforts 

“to drive away,” according to Officer. Officer got out of his truck, 

drew his firearm, and commanded Naranjo to stop. Naranjo 

stopped, rolled down his window, and “started throwing items 

out,” including “small plastic baggies and pieces” of the fee 

envelopes, insisting that “they weren’t his.” Officer told Naranjo 

to turn off the car “at least five” times, but Naranjo never 

complied.

¶8 Officer ordered Naranjo “not to move.” Naranjo 

responded that he was “scared” and “did not want to go to jail.” 
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20210865-CA 4 2023 UT App 131

During this time, Officer reported that Naranjo “continued 

reaching around in the compartments in the vehicle, underneath 

the seat, [and] around the seat [to] whatever was within arm’s 

reach of him.”

¶9 Officer ordered Naranjo to open the driver-side door, but 

he did not, so Officer walked to the car, opened the door, and 

ordered Naranjo to get out. Naranjo was then taken into custody.

¶10 A search of Naranjo yielded some one-dollar bills. In the 

search of his car, police found “burglary tools,” including gloves 

with sticky residue, sticky mouse traps, and wire strippers with 

sticky residue on them. Police also found fee envelopes with 

sticky residue on them and some small bills (fives and ones) in the 

car, along with drug paraphernalia (namely, small plastic baggies, 

lighters, a scale, needles, and a spoon) and yellow pills inside a 

black carrying case that had been on the driver-side back seat. 

Notably, Naranjo’s identification card was also in the black 

carrying case.1 A zippered bag in the black case contained more 

1. After oral argument, Naranjo’s appellate counsel submitted a 

letter challenging an assertion made by the State during oral 

argument that the identification card was found in the black case. 

See Utah R. App. P. 24(j) (“When authority of central importance 

to an issue comes to the attention of a party after briefing or oral 

argument but before decision, that party may file a notice of 

supplemental authority setting forth: (1) the citation to the 

authority; (2) a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point 

argued orally to which the authority applies; and (3) relevance of 

the authority.”). The State responded, stating that “it is not clear 

that [Naranjo’s] identification was in fact found inside the black 

case.” 

But our review of the trial transcript shows that the jury 

heard that Naranjo’s identification card was found inside the 

black case. One of the police sergeants, in his testimony before the 

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20210865-CA 5 2023 UT App 131

small plastic baggies, including one with a heart-stamp design.

Additionally, officers found dirt and other debris lodged in the 

exhaust pipes of Naranjo’s car, apparently acquired when he 

backed into the berm supporting the fence around the parking lot.

Officers also found gouges in the berm caused by the exhaust 

pipes of Naranjo’s car backing into it.

¶11 In the other car—the black one driven by the couple—

police found narcotic-contaminated foil and drug paraphernalia, 

including spoons, needles, and baggies featuring heart stamps.

¶12 Officer advised other officers assisting in the search of the 

lot that “the suspects were seen throwing some things out the 

window of their vehicle” and “that items were being thrown out 

of the vehicles as they attempted to run.” 

¶13 One investigator found a metal rod with sticky residue,

which police suspected Naranjo had used to retrieve the 

envelopes from the drop box. The rod was found near where 

Naranjo had backed into the fence and did not appear to have 

been there long because the residue was still tacky.

¶14 Police found other items near where Naranjo had stopped 

his car in the parking lot, including drug paraphernalia, baggies, 

jury, identified the black case in a photo exhibit. He testified that 

he found that case on the driver-side back seat of Naranjo’s car. 

The prosecutor asked him, “And did you have a chance to see the 

contents of that?” The sergeant responded that he did. Then the 

sergeant was shown the photo exhibits of the contents—including

the identification card—of the black case. The prosecutor asked 

him if the photos displayed “the contents of that box that [he] 

found in the [maroon] car.” The sergeant said that they did. See 

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (“On appeal, we 

review the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury’s 

verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” (cleaned up)).
State v. Naranjo

20210865-CA 6 2023 UT App 131

foil, torn cash, and fee envelopes. One of those baggies had the 

heart-stamp design and contained “a crystal-like substance” that 

was later identified as methamphetamine.

¶15 Naranjo was charged with failure to respond to an officer’s

signal to stop and possession of a controlled substance.2

¶16 Naranjo was tried before a jury. At the close of the State’s 

case, Naranjo moved for a directed verdict. With regard to the 

failure to stop, Naranjo argued that “[t]here was not evidence that 

would lead . . . a reasonable trier of fact to determine . . . that event 

happened.” The State responded by arguing that Officer had 

provided a “detailed account of what happened,” including that 

he had “not only given visual signals with his hands to stop” but 

also activated “the lights on his truck trying to get him to stop” 

and “finally drew his weapon” to get Naranjo “to stop.” 

¶17 For the possession count, Naranjo argued that the evidence 

did not show he possessed the methamphetamine because the 

“substances were found outside the vehicle.” The State contended 

that “just as with all the other evidence that was tossed out the 

window, there’s no reason to suggest that the methamphetamine 

wasn’t also from” Naranjo. 

¶18 The court denied the directed verdict motion, concluding 

that “some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 

find . . . that the elements of the crime have been proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” 

¶19 Regarding the failure to stop, the court stated that “we 

have the testimony of Officer[,] . . . who indicate[d] that he saw 

2. Naranjo was also charged with and convicted of theft, 

interference with an arresting officer, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and possession of burglary tools. He does not 

challenge these convictions on appeal.
State v. Naranjo

20210865-CA 7 2023 UT App 131

[Naranjo] operating the vehicle,” “that he indicated to . . . Naranjo 

by raising his hands that he was to stop,” and that he “turned on 

his overhead” lightbar. And even after these efforts, Officer 

testified that Naranjo still “attempted to flee or [elude] him.” The 

court noted that there was “some corroboration” of Officer’s 

account through the testimony of the angler, “who testified that 

he saw the maroon vehicle attempting to leave and he saw the 

lights flashing.” And concerning the possession charge, the court 

noted that Officer testified that he saw “Naranjo attempting to 

throw items out of the vehicle. And in that same vicinity, 

according to the testimony of several witnesses, a [baggie] of . . . 

methamphetamine was found.” 

¶20 As relevant here, on the failure-to-stop count, the jury was 

instructed it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Naranjo “did knowingly receive a visual or audible signal from a 

law enforcement officer to bring a vehicle to a stop” and “did 

intentionally . . . attempt to flee or elude a law enforcement officer 

by vehicle or other means.”

¶21 The jury convicted Naranjo of all charges. Naranjo appeals. 

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Naranjo raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that 

the evidence was insufficient to support his “convictions for 

failure to respond to a police officer’s signal to stop and for 

possession of a controlled substance.”3 “In assessing a claim of 

3. The State contends the sufficiency challenge was not preserved 

in Naranjo’s motion for a directed verdict. While the motion was 

rather spartan, the record makes clear that the court understood

and ruled on the issue it raised. And “an issue is preserved for 

appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a 

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insufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence and all 

inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 

most favorable to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 

10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645 (cleaned up). “And we will not reverse a 

jury verdict if we conclude that some evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Holsomback, 2022 UT 

App 72, ¶ 18, 513 P.3d 82 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). 

¶23 Second, Naranjo claims that he received ineffective 

assistance because his trial counsel did not request a “unanimity 

jury instruction for failure to respond to an officer’s command to 

stop.” “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised 

for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review 

and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the 

effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Alarid, 

2022 UT App 84, ¶ 24, 514 P.3d 610 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 525 

P.3d 1261 (Utah 2022). 

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶24 “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an 

appellate court gives substantial deference to the jury.” State v. 

Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 21, 513 P.3d 82 (cleaned up). “And 

a jury is not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to 

the defendant, nor does the existence of contradictory evidence or 

of conflicting inferences warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict on 

appeal.” State v. Granados, 2019 UT App 158, ¶ 28, 451 P.3d 289 

(cleaned up), cert. denied, 462 P.3d 800 (Utah 2020). “Thus, we will 

way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it.” State v. Suhail, 

2023 UT App 15, ¶ 89, 525 P.3d 550 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531 

P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). 
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reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence,” when viewed “in 

the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury,” “is sufficiently 

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 

must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.” State v.

Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 302, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up).

¶25 Considering this standard, we conclude the State 

presented “some evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

find beyond a reasonable doubt” that Naranjo failed to respond 

to an officer’s signal to stop and possessed a controlled substance. 

Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

A. Failure to Stop

¶26 Naranjo argues that the “evidence was insufficient to 

support [his] conviction for failure to stop at a police command.” 

We disagree.

¶27 The State needed to show that Naranjo knowingly received 

Officer’s “visual or audible signal” to stop and intentionally 

attempted “to flee or elude” Officer. See Utah Code § 41-6a210(1)(a); see also State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1141 

(explaining the requirement of knowing and intentional mental 

states for failure to stop). The State presented much more than 

“some evidence” of these elements on which the jury could 

convict Naranjo, Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up), 

demonstrating that the jury’s verdict was not based on 

speculation or gaps in the evidence as Naranjo contends.

¶28 First, the State presented evidence of Naranjo’s initial 

response to Officer’s signal to stop. Officer arrived, uniformed 

and in a marked patrol truck, in the marina parking lot and then 

parked facing Naranjo’s car. As Officer walked toward Naranjo’s 

car, Naranjo began driving away. At this point, Officer put up his 

hands and verbally told Naranjo to stop. But Naranjo continued 
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20210865-CA 10 2023 UT App 131

to drive past Officer. Even if Naranjo’s windows were rolled up, 

interfering with his ability to hear, the jury could have reasonably 

concluded that it was light enough on a July morning for Naranjo 

to have seen Officer’s hand signal to stop. And given the small

number of cars present at that hour and Officer’s proximity to 

Naranjo’s car, the jury could have reasonably concluded that 

Naranjo should have known that Officer was signaling him to 

stop.

¶29 Second, the State presented evidence of Naranjo 

continuing to disregard Officer’s signals to stop. Even if Naranjo 

had failed to notice Officer’s initial verbal command and hand 

signal, the jury could have reasonably concluded that when 

Officer then turned on the patrol truck’s flashing red-and-blues, it

would have been hard to go unseen or misunderstood. Instead of 

stopping, Naranjo continued to drive “erratically” around the 

parking lot, making a U-turn and two attempts to park in marked 

stalls. Naranjo continued driving, despite Officer making eye 

contact with him and signaling him to “slow down or stop.” And 

after Naranjo pulled into a third stall and apparently stopped, he 

again began driving around the parking lot as soon as Officer got 

out of his patrol truck. The jury could have reasonably concluded 

from this behavior that Naranjo was engaging in cat-and-mouse 

maneuvering as he either weighed his options to find a viable 

escape route or bought time to rid himself of contraband in his 

possession.

¶30 Third, the State presented evidence that Naranjo attempted 

to flee from the parking lot after receiving several signals to stop. 

When Officer was occupied with blocking the entrance and 

dealing with the other two suspects, Naranjo backed into a fence 

surrounding the parking lot. The State presented evidence of the 

damaged fence and gouges in the berm, along with dirt and other 

debris that accumulated in the tailpipes of Naranjo’s car when he 

backed into the berm. From this evidence, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that Naranjo, seeing that Officer was 
State v. Naranjo

20210865-CA 11 2023 UT App 131

occupied with the other suspects, made an ill-advised attempt to 

break through the fence to access the road.

¶31 Fourth, the State presented evidence that Naranjo 

continued to disregard Officer’s signal to stop even after Officer 

had pinned the black car against the fence and had turned his 

attention back to Naranjo. Officer testified that he observed 

Naranjo “still in his vehicle and still driving around in the parking 

lot.” He got out of his patrol truck, drawing his firearm and 

commanding Naranjo to stop. But even then, Naranjo only 

partially complied. While he did stop driving, he did not turn off 

his car—despite being told to do so at least five times—and he 

engaged in a frantic effort to throw various incriminating items 

out his window. From this, the jury could have reasonably 

concluded that Naranjo intended to continue his efforts to flee or 

elude Officer, at least until Officer opened the driver-side door 

and took him into custody. 

¶32 Naranjo also argues that an officer’s signal to stop must “be 

given before the driver begins to drive away from the officer.” 

Thus, he reasons that none of Officer’s commands to stop 

establish that Naranjo knowingly received the signal to stop. 

Naranjo appears to assert there was not enough evidence to 

support that he saw Officer’s signal as he drove away. We are 

unpersuaded. Naranjo’s reading of the failure-to-stop statute is at 

clear variance with the text, which states that “[a]n operator who 

receives a visual or audible signal from a law enforcement officer 

to bring the vehicle to a stop may not . . . attempt to flee or elude 

a law enforcement officer by vehicle or other means.” Utah Code 

§ 41-6a-210(1)(a). The phrase “bring the vehicle to a stop” clearly 

anticipates that a vehicle is moving when the command to stop is 

given. One cannot logically “bring” a vehicle “to a stop” if that 

vehicle is not moving in the first place. Moreover, the evidence 

presented to the jury clearly indicates that Naranjo was aware of 

Officer. Not only did Officer say he made eye contact with 

Naranjo, but there is evidence that Naranjo’s evasive maneuvers 
State v. Naranjo

20210865-CA 12 2023 UT App 131

were made in direct response to Officer’s actions, such as when 

Naranjo began driving again as soon as he noticed Officer exiting 

his patrol truck. 

¶33 Naranjo further argues that he never showed an intent to 

flee or elude because he drove only slowly around the parking lot, 

stopped occasionally, and did not drive toward the exit.4 The 

problem with this argument is that it ignores alternative 

inferences that the jury likely drew in support of the intent to flee

or elude Officer, such as that Naranjo drove slowly and stopped 

occasionally because he was looking for another exit or to buy 

time to rid himself of contraband. And the jury could have 

concluded that Naranjo feared that heading for the exit would 

have resulted in his immediate apprehension or triggered a more 

aggressive pursuit, depriving him of the opportunity to jettison 

the contraband. That Naranjo’s efforts in fleeing or eluding 

Officer were obtuse and poorly thought out is without import. 

The fact remains that the jury received abundant evidence that 

Naranjo repeatedly tried to flee or elude Officer, albeit 

ineffectively and incompetently.

¶34 Thus, we conclude that any of Officer’s signals to get 

Naranjo to stop would have provided “some evidence” from 

which the “jury could find that the elements of the crime”—that 

Naranjo knowingly received Officer’s signal or command to stop 

and intentionally continued in his effort to flee or elude Officer—

“had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Maestas, 2012 

UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up).

4. Even a slow-speed chase in a parking lot carries some risk of 

harm to pedestrians and property. And, as is evident here, such 

behavior is, at the very least, distracting to law enforcement 

officers as they deal with other suspects. Thus, far from being 

benign, Naranjo’s behavior was potentially harmful to others and 

interfered with Officer’s attempts to investigate the scene.
State v. Naranjo

20210865-CA 13 2023 UT App 131

B. Drug Possession

¶35 Naranjo argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction of possession of the controlled substance 

that was found in the parking lot, specifically because he “neither 

had special control of the area where the drugs were found nor 

was he in possession of similar contraband.”

¶36 Along with what we have already explained about our 

review of sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, see supra ¶ 24, we 

note that “[d]irect evidence is not required” for a jury to reach a 

conviction, see State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 47, 326 P.3d 645. In 

fact, “[s]ustainable verdicts are entered every day on the sole basis 

of circumstantial evidence.” Id.; see also State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 

5, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 (“Inferences may reasonably be drawn from 

circumstantial evidence.”). And “the idea that circumstantial 

evidence is necessarily less convincing and of less value than 

direct evidence is a misstatement of the law. On the contrary, 

circumstantial evidence may even be more convincing than direct 

testimony.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 57, 397 P.3d 626

(cleaned up).

¶37 The State had to show that Naranjo “knowingly and 

intentionally” possessed the methamphetamine found in the 

parking lot, see Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a), which the State 

presented as constructive possession. Constructive possession is 

a theory under which a jury is “asked to draw an inference based 

on circumstantial evidence connecting [a defendant] with the 

contraband.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 10. “To find that a defendant 

had constructive possession of a drug or other contraband, it is 

necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the 

accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had 

both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control 

over the drug.” State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); accord 

Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19.
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20210865-CA 14 2023 UT App 131

¶38 Our caselaw has “identified some relevant considerations” 

a jury may take into account to establish possession, including

“ownership and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle, 

presence of the defendant when the contraband is discovered, the 

defendant’s proximity to the contraband, . . . incriminating 

statements or behavior, and presence of contraband in a specific 

area where the defendant had control.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19.

In light of these considerations, there is no question that the State 

presented more than “some evidence,” see Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 

¶ 177 (cleaned up), to establish that Naranjo constructively 

possessed the methamphetamine found in the parking lot.

¶39 First, Naranjo exhibited incriminating behavior in the 

parking lot. Most notably, Officer observed Naranjo throwing 

“small plastic baggies” from his car and announcing that “they 

weren’t his.” And when the parking lot was searched after 

Naranjo’s arrest, a small plastic heart-stamped baggie containing 

methamphetamine was found a few spaces away from where 

Naranjo ultimately stopped his car. A jury could reasonably 

conclude that this methamphetamine baggie was discarded by 

Naranjo when Officer saw him throwing items from his car. 

Alternatively, the jury could have just as reasonably concluded 

that Naranjo had thrown the methamphetamine baggie out of his 

car earlier when Officer was occupied with blocking the entrance

or during Naranjo’s tour of the lot. 

¶40 Second, Naranjo’s identification card being found in the 

black carrying case provided evidence from which the jury could 

have inferred Naranjo possessed the contraband. Finding his 

identification card in the same black case that also contained a

heart-stamped baggie provided a strong link between Naranjo 

and the methamphetamine baggie found in the parking lot. That 

the black case was found on the back seat is of little significance 

in refuting this link for several reasons. For one thing, Naranjo’s 

identification card was found in the black case, providing robust 

evidence that the case and its contents belonged to him. Moreover, 
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20210865-CA 15 2023 UT App 131

Officer testified that he saw Naranjo moving items about the 

interior of the car during the parking lot pursuit, so Naranjo had 

ample opportunity to create a little distance between the 

incriminating evidence and his physical reach by tossing it in the 

back seat.

¶41 Third, a jury could have reasonably inferred from 

Naranjo’s statements that the items he was throwing from the car 

“weren’t his” and that he “did not want to go to jail” that Naranjo 

knew the tossed items contained evidence that indicated he was 

in possession of a controlled substance and that he was trying to 

distance himself from them as much as possible. 

¶42 Fourth, the jury could have reasonably concluded that 

Naranjo and the other two suspects were involved in a drug deal 

in Naranjo’s car and that they jointly possessed the 

methamphetamine because the methamphetamine baggie found 

in the parking lot featured the same heart-stamp design as the 

baggie found in Naranjo’s car and the baggies found in the black 

car. See State v. Nihells, 2019 UT App 210, ¶ 13, 457 P.3d 1121 

(“[C]ontraband may be possessed either individually or jointly 

with others.”); see also Utah Code § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (“For a person to 

be a possessor . . . of a controlled substance, it is not required that 

the person be shown to have individually possessed . . . the 

substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 

participated with one or more persons in the . . . possession . . . of 

any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring 

. . . .”).

¶43 Fifth, from the sticky metal rod found near where Naranjo 

backed into the fence and the torn fee envelopes and cash, the jury 

could have reasonably concluded that Naranjo was the one most 

likely to be throwing items out of his car, including the baggie 

with methamphetamine. While it is true that other responding 

officers were told that the “suspects” generally “were seen 

throwing some things out of the window of their vehicle,” it is 
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20210865-CA 16 2023 UT App 131

also true that much of what was found in the parking lot was 

directly linked to Naranjo, providing the jury reason to conclude 

that the methamphetamine baggie, which was found close to 

where Naranjo finally stopped, most likely came from Naranjo.

After all, only Naranjo was specifically reported to have been seen 

throwing baggies out of his car. And only Naranjo was reported to 

have been driving around the parking lot, while the evidence 

suggests that the other suspects made a beeline for the exit upon 

seeing Officer executing his blocking maneuver. 

¶44 These circumstances, when taken together, provided

“some evidence,” see Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up), of a 

“sufficient nexus between [Naranjo] and the [methamphetamine] 

to permit an inference that [Naranjo] had both the power and the 

intent to exercise dominion and control over” the drugs found in 

the parking lot, see Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19. And while the 

evidence might have given rise to other reasonable inferences, 

Naranjo does not enjoy the presumption that those inferences 

should be given more weight simply because they present an 

alternative explanation favorable to him. See id. ¶ 27 (“The 

question presented [in a sufficiency of the evidence analysis] is 

not whether some other (innocent) inference might have been 

reasonable. It is simply whether the inference adopted by the jury 

was sustainable.”); accord State v. Darnstaedt, 2021 UT App 19, ¶ 35 

n.6, 483 P.3d 71, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 716 (Utah 2021).

¶45 In sum, we conclude that “some evidence” existed for the 

jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Naranjo failed to 

respond to an officer’s signal to stop and possessed a controlled 

substance. See Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶46 Naranjo argues that the jury instruction for failing to stop 

was insufficient because it did not require the jury to be 

unanimous in two respects: (1) it left open which specific act of 
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20210865-CA 17 2023 UT App 131

Officer constituted the signal to stop and (2) it did not ask the jury 

to agree on which of Naranjo’s acts constituted failure to respond. 

For the signal to stop, Naranjo argues that the jury could have 

identified four different actions: (a) Officer approaching the car 

with hands out, (b) Officer activating the lightbar, (c) Officer 

approaching the car the second time, and (d) Officer approaching 

with gun drawn. And for failing to respond, Naranjo again 

identifies four different actions that could have divided the jury: 

(a) Naranjo driving away when Officer first approached on foot, 

(b) Naranjo continuing to drive after Officer activated the lightbar, 

(c) Naranjo driving again after temporarily parking, and (d) 

Naranjo still driving after Officer returned from dealing with the 

other two suspects at the gate. Given these possibilities, Naranjo 

argues that his trial counsel (Counsel) rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to “ensure that the jury was properly 

instructed that they must unanimously agree on which act 

constituted the offense.” 

¶47 “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the defendant must show that (1) . . . counsel’s performance was 

deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” State v. Wright, 2021 UT App 7, ¶ 52, 481 P.3d 479 

(cleaned up), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 2021). “However, 

there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 

claim to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 

makes an insufficient showing on one.” State v. Collier, 2020 UT 

App 165, ¶ 12, 479 P.3d 351 (cleaned up). Because we conclude 

that Naranjo was not prejudiced by this alleged deficiency, we 

limit our analysis to the second prong. “An error by counsel, even 

if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the 

judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 

judgment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). “The 

burden is on the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of his or her case would have been 
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20210865-CA 18 2023 UT App 131

different absent counsel’s error. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of 

the proceeding.” State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 43, 462 P.3d 350 

(cleaned up).

¶48 Here, even if Counsel had requested a specific unanimity 

instruction as to which action or actions constituted Officer’s 

signal to stop and which act or acts constituted Naranjo’s failure 

to respond, we see no reasonable probability that this would have 

had an effect on the outcome.

¶49 Regarding the signal to stop, the activation of the lightbar 

was the most distinct and obvious signal. We see no reasonable 

probability that the members of the jury would have failed to

agree that Naranjo knowingly received the signal to stop when 

Officer turned on the lightbar. It was a mostly empty parking lot,

and Officer had already parked his patrol truck right in front of 

Naranjo. Even if Naranjo had not heard Officer’s voice command 

or seen his initial hand signal, there is no chance that he would 

have missed the flashing lightbar. After all, lightbars are designed 

to be highly visible from a significant distance. That’s why 

emergency vehicles have them. So even if jury members might 

have disagreed about whether Naranjo somehow missed all the 

other signals, we have no doubt that they would have agreed that 

Naranjo received at least this most obvious signal. There is no 

unanimity problem here because the lightbar—being the most 

conspicuous signal—subsumed all the less obvious signals that 

some members of the jury may have found sufficient. In other 

words, those jurors who were convinced that the more subtle 

signals were enough would, a fortiori, agree that the flashing 

lightbar constituted a signal to stop. 

¶50 The same reasoning applies to Naranjo’s failure to 

respond. The failure-to-stop statute simply requires that a driver 

who “receives a visual or audible signal from a law enforcement 

officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not . . . attempt to flee or 
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20210865-CA 19 2023 UT App 131

elude a law enforcement officer by vehicle or other means.” Utah 

Code § 41-6a-210(1)(a)(ii). Here, as we have just explained, there 

can be no unanimity problem on the signal to stop because the 

jurors would have agreed that the activation of the lightbar was 

sufficient. And yet, even after receiving this most obvious—

indeed, almost impossible-to-miss—signal, Naranjo proceeded to 

drive away from Officer in an attempt to flee or elude him. We see 

no reasonable possibility that the jurors would have disagreed on 

this point.

¶51 Accordingly, Naranjo has failed to show prejudice by the 

lack of a specific unanimity instruction.

CONCLUSION

¶52 Naranjo’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges fail

because there was evidence to support his convictions for failure 

to stop and possession of a controlled substance. His claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice. 

¶53 Affirmed.