NO. 957-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(a)

ORIGINAL

LEROY FLORES ALANIZ,

Appellant SEP 25 2015

FILED IN

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Sc? 2 5 2315

Abel Acosta, Cierk

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

On Petition for Discretionary Review

Ffrom the Eleventh Court of Appeals

in No.. 11-12-00352-CR Affirming the Conviction

in No. D-37,9 21 from the

358th Judicial District Court

of Ector County, Texas

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Leroy Flores Alaniz

TDCJ No. 1826767

French M. Robertson Unit

12071 FM 3522

Abilene, Texas 79601

Appellant, pro se
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT:

APPELLEE:

Leroy Flores Alaniz

State of Texas

COUNSEL OF RECORD ON APPEAL:

FOR APPELLANT:

FOR APPELLEE:

E. Jason Leach

Law Office of E. Jason Leach

3800 E. 42nd, Suite 605

Odessa, Texas 79762

SBN: 00796938

Mr. R.N. (Bobby) Bland, District Attorney

Ector County District Attorney

300 N. Grant, Rm. 305

Odessa, Texas 79761

SBN: 00790319

COUNSEL OF RECORD AT TRIAL:

FOR DEFENDANT:

STATE OF TEXAS

JUDGE PRESIDING;

E. Jason Leach

Law Office of E. Jason Leach

3800 E. 42nd, Suite 605

Odessa, Texas 79762

SBN: 00796938

Greg Connor

Asst. Ector County District Attorney

300 N. Grant, Rm. 305

Odessa, Texas 79761

SBN: 24054878

Lee McClendon

Asst. Ector County District Attorney

300 N. Grant, Rm. 305

Odessa, Texas 79761

SBN: 13408640

Honorable Bill McCoy

Judge, 338th Judicial District Court

Ector County, Texas
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Judge i

Table of Contents ii

Index of Authorities iii

Statement Regarding Oral Argument 1

Statement of the Case 2

Statement of Procedural History 3

Ground for Review 1 4

Did the court of appeals err by concluding that the critical

portions of the hearsay statement admitted at trial as im

peachment evidence were admissible under the exception pro

vided by Tex. R. Evid. 803(24)?

Reason for Review 5

Statement of Facts , 6-7

Argument 8-13

Prayer 13

Unsworn Declaration 14

Certificate of Service 15

Certificate of Compliance 15

Appendix " I6

ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Blake v. State,

971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) 12

Hughes v. State,

4 S.W.3d 1 (1999) 8

STATUTES

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 8

Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(f) 5

Tex. R. Evid. 803(24) 4, 7, 9, 13

in
II. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Because Appellant is proceeding pro se as an incarcerated

prisoner, oral argument is not requested.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Alaniz was charged in a two-count indictment with the offens

es of capital murder and murder (I C.R. at 6-7). He proceeded

to trial and a jury convicted him of the offense of capital

murder (I C.R. at 123). He was sentenced to life imprisonment

in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (I C.R. at 133-134).
VI. STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Eleventh Court

of Appeals in an opinion delivered July 9, 2015. No motrion

for rehearing was filed.
GROUND FOR REVIEW 1

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR BY CONCLUDING THAT THE CRITICAL

PORTIONS OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENT ADMITTED AT TRIAL AS IMPEACH

MENT EVIDENCE WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EXCEPTION PROVIDED BY

TEX. R. EVID. 803(24)?
REASON FOR REVIEW

The court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted

and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned

such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise

of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision. Tex:.

R. App. P. 66.3(f).
Statement of Facts: ^

Alaniz contends that the trial court abused its discretion

when it allowed the State to place otherwise inadmissible evidence

(in the form of Sonny Alaniz's testimony and prior statement)

before the jury. Sonny Alaniz's ("Alaniz") typewritten statement

was introduced into evidence and used.as substantive evidence

by the State of Texas in its final argument.

Sonny Alaniz, the nephew of Appellant, Leroy Alaniz, was

called to testify on behalf of the State of Texas (VI R.R. at

23). A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to

determine the voluntariness of the statement he had given as

a 17-year-old (VI R.R. at 24). During this hearing it was disco

vered he would deny any memory of his prior statements.

He consistently stated "I don't remember" when asked about

a prior statement he had given (VI R.R. at 26). When asked about

a robbery he stated "I don't remember", when asked about a gun

he stated "I don't remember" (VI R.R. at 26). When he was asked

about a robbery he had allegedly done with his uncle Leroy he

stated "I don't remember" (VI R.R. at 27). Eventually, he stated

that he had no memory of giving any statement to the police

(VI R.R. at 28).

Counsel objected, pursuant to Rule 403 of the Texas Rules

of Evidence, to the State calling Sonny Alaniz simply to place

into evidence a statement that he was going to deny having any

memory of (VI R.R. at 32-36). The trial court overruled the

6
objection but granted a running objection to counsel so he would

not be required to object after every single question by the

State (VI R.R. at 42).

Even though the prosecution and trial court knew, before

the jury was ever brought back into the courtroom that Sonny

Alaniz would deny any memory of the statement, questioning on

this topic was nevertheless permitted.

The court of appeals overruled the issue without considering

whether the hearsay statement of Sonny Alaniz constituted impro

per impeachment evidence based on its determination that the

critical portions of Sonny Alaniz's written statement were admis

sible in their own right as substantive evidence under Tex.

Rule of Evidence 803(24) (Memo. Op. at 2-12).
Argument

The court of appeals' disposition so far departs from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far

sanctions such a departure by the lower trial court, as to call

for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' supervisory

power.

First, the rules of appellate procedure require the court

of appeals to decide the issue as briefed by the parties in

accordance with Rule 38.1, with which the parties in this case

have complied. The parties briefed this case on whether or not

Sonny Alaniz's ("Alaniz") prior written statement, admitted

into evidence in this case on an impeachment theory, was proper

impeachment evidence. However, the court of appeals did not

reach this issue. Instead, it disposed of the case based on

erroneous conclusion that the trial court would not have abused

its discretion had it permitted admission of Alaniz's statement

under the hearsay exception provided by Rule of Evidence 803(24)

(Memo. Op. at 10-11).

Second, the Court's decision in Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d

1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), requires the trial court, upon a proper

Rule 403 objection, to conduct an "improper impeachment" analysis

whenever a party attempts to admit a prior inconsistent statement

under the guise of impeachment when the party's primary intent

in calling the witness is to introduce inadmissible hearsay.

The trial court did not comply with the mandates of Hughes,
but instead, permitted the State to offer Alaniz's written state

ment into evidence in absence of anything within the record

that the State had any other purpose for presenting Alaniz's

statement other than to place before the jury evidence which

was otherwise inadmissible. Because the court of appeals did

not consider whether the written statement constituted improper

impeachment evidence, the issue raised by Appellant has yet

to be decided.

Court of appeals' conclusion that critical portions of statement

were admissible was erroneous.

In disposing of the case, the court of appeals concluded

that the critical portions of Alaniz's written statement were

admissible under the hearsay exception provided by Rule of Evi

dence 803(24). This conclusion is not fairly supported by the

record and thus constitutes reversible error.

In pertinent part, Rule 803(24) permits the admission of

a statement that a reasonable person in the declarant's position

would have made only if the person believed it to be true because,

when made, it had so great a tendency to expose the declarant

to criminal liability, and is supported by corroborating circum

stances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is

offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the de

clarant to criminal liability. TEX. R. EVID. 803(24) (Vernon's

2015).

Here, the critical portions of Alaniz's written statement
do not have any great tendency to expose him to criminal lia

bility.

The court of appeals opined that Alaniz stated that he drove

Appellant to the Diamond Shamrock station, waited on him, and

then drove him away from that station, and that this account

by Alaniz would have subjected him to criminal liability. However,

there's no evidence in the record, save Alaniz's hearsay state

ment, that a robbery or attempted robbery of the Diamond Shamrock

station on South Crane Street, had actually occurred on or around

November 9, 1991. No police report of any such robbery or at

tempted robbery was presented by the State,t and no other witness

testimony was put forth corroborating Alaniz's statement that

such a robbery/attempted roobery had occurred. There was no

evidence put forth of any witness having seen Appellant in,

at, or around the said Diamond Shamrock station as alleged by

Alaniz. Nor was there any evidence put on that a sawed-off .22

rifle had been reportedly found in the vicinity of the said

station, nor any evidence coming from any witness having seen

the stolen truck, alleged by Alaniz to have been his and Appel

lant's mode of transportation during the alleged Diamond Shamrock

robbery, in the vicinity of the said station around the date

in question. No evidence exists in the record that a followup investigation by police based on Alaniz's written statement

had produced any tangible evidence corroborating his assertions

that he and Appellant had committed a robbery/attempted robbery

of the said station, finally, the detective who went to question

Alaniz at the Ector County Youth Center was not there to question

10
him about the robbery/attempted robbery alleged in..theostatement.

In short, there's absolutely no evidence in the record from

any source which corroborates the critical portions of Alaniz's

hearsay statement. In absence of any such corroborating evidence,

Alaniz's statement did not and does not expose him to criminal

liability, as evidenced by the fact that he nor anyone else

was ever charged with the alleged robbery/attempted robbery.

Three portions of Alaniz's statement should have provided

the court of appeals with significant indication that the state

ment is not trustworthy: (1) Alaniz's averment that the detect

ive had indicated that Alaniz was suspected by authorities as

being involved in the Party House Lounge robbery; (2) Alaniz

averring that the detective had just revealed to him the details

of the Party House Lounge robbery, including that Appellant

and Paul (Escandon) allegedly had been involved, that a person

had died from injuries received during that robbery, and that

a sawed-off .22 rifle had been used; and (3) Alaniz averring

that when he and Appellant allegedly had went to rob the Diamond

Shamrock, Appellant supposedly told him that he did not rob

or attempt to rob the station.

The detective revealing to Alaniz that he was suspected

by authorities of being an accomplice to a robbery/homicide

gives rise to Alaniz's statement being viewed with caution where

Texas law has long recognized that accomplices often have incent

ive to lie, such as to avoid punishment or to shift blame onto

11
someone else. See Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.Crim.

App. 1998) (accomplice witness rule reflects legislative deter

mination that accomplice testimony implicating another person

should be viewed with measure of caution, because accomplices

often have incentive to lie, such as to avoid punishment or

shift blame to another person). Being as he was already aware

of specific details of the Party House Lounge robbery, due to

Detective Thomas' revelations, Alaniz could have easily fabri

cated the storyy of a purported robbery of a Diamond Shamrock

to appease Det. Thomas by appearing to "cooperatively" provide

information useful to Det. Thomas' investigation while also

directing any suspicion away from himself by bolstering the

detective's purported belief that Alaniz was not actually involv

ed in the Party House Lounge robbery.

Moreover, Alaniz stating that Appellant told him that he

did not "do" the Diamond Shamrock robbery upon Alaniz supposedly

picking him back up away from the station could have easily

been an attempt by Alaniz to make his Diamond Shamrock story

appear more credible to the detective where occurrence of such

a robbery/attempted robbery of the specified Diamond Shamrock

could easily be dispelled simply by the detective reviewing

police records and/or the detective interviewing the owner and

employees of the specified Diamond Shamrock.

Certainly, these aspects of Alaniz's statement raise signifi

cant question as to the trustworthiness of the statement, and,

at a minimum, remove any "clear" indication that the statement

12
is trustworthy. See Rule 803(24)(B).

It could easily have been that Alaniz was well aware that

his story of he and Appellant robbing the said Diamond Shamrock

was a fabrication that did not in any significant way expose

him to criminal liability where it could not be corroborated

by any tangible evidence of the station being robbed as he pur

ported because it simply never occurred.

For these reasons, the trial court would have abused its

discretion had it determined that the critical portions of the

hearsay statement of Alaniz were admissible under the Rule 803

(24) exception. For the same reasons, the court of appeals abused

its discretion in determining that the critical portions of

Alaniz's hearsay statement were admissible in their own right

as substantive' evidence, and in concluding that it need not

.consider whether paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Alaniz's statement

constituted improper impeachment evidence (Memo. Op. at 11).

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that the

Honorable Court grant discretionary review in this case. Appel

lant prays for general relief.

13
Respectfully submitted,

(^?\4aF>u <^5\.fca$J>

Leroy rov "Flores ^lc Alaniz

TDCJ No. 1826767

French M. Robertson Unit

12071 FM 3522

Abilene, TX 79601

Appellant, pro se

UNSWORN DECLARATION

I, Leroy Flores Alaniz, TDCJ No. 1826767, being presently

incarcerated at the French M. Robertson Unit of the Texas Depart

ment of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division,

located in Jones County, Texas, hereby declare under penalty

of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and placed

in the .„ outgoing prison mailbox on this (J>. j day of September,

2015, to be mailed U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, ad

dressed to:

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

P.O. Box 12308, Capitol Station

Austin, TX 78711-2308

Executed on this the oL D day of September, 2015.

^TTT^'l ^yyii^ (S!Ulv.-

Leroy Flores Alaniz

14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore

going petition for discretionary review has been duly served

upon counsel for the opposing party to this case by placing

same in the outgoing prison mailbox on the ^/yO day of Septem

ber, 2015, to be mailed first-class postage prepaid addressed

to:

Michael Bloch

Assistant District Attorney

Ector County Courthouse

300 N. Grant, Room 305

Odessa, TX 79761

^^^py-jC^n &\&s>

Leroy Frores Alaniz

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing pleading consists of

less than 1,300 lines of monospaced typeface at 10 charaters

per inch.

15
APPENDIX

Memorandum Opinion

Leroy Flores Alaniz vs. The State of Texas

Eleventh Court of Appeals

No. 11-12-00352-CR

(July 9, 2015)

16
Opinion filed July 9, 2015

In The

Client!) Court of gppeate

No. 11-12-00352-CR

LEROY FLORES ALANIZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 358th District Court

Ector County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-37,921

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Thejury found Leroy Flores Alaniz, Appellant, guilty of capital murder for a

murder that occurred over twenty years prior to the date of trial. Because the State

did not seek the deathpenalty, punishment was assessed at a mandatory term of life

imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the admission of a written

statement given by his nephew to the police. We affirm.
Background Facts

Appellant was indicted in 2010 for the capital murder and murder of Larry

Alan Willsey, which occurred in 1991. The State alleged that Appellant went to the

Party House Lounge in Odessa accompanied by another Hispanic male. One carried

a bat, while the other carried a sawed-off gun. The two men instructed the bartender

to give them all of the money in the cash register. The men also instructed the

patrons ofthe bar to get on the floor. Willsey apparently moved too slowly getting

down on the floor to satisfy the men. In response, the man with the bat struck

Willsey with the bat and knocked him to the floor. Both men repeatedly struck and

kicked Willsey while he was on the floor. The men eventually left the bar with the

money from the cash register and money from a football pool being conducted at the

bar. Willsey subsequently died from his injuries.

At the trial, which occurred more than twenty years later, the State called the

responding and investigating officers to testify, as well as a criminalist to compare

the DNA from Appellant with a ski mask worn by one of the men. The bartender

on duty that night and the owner of the Party House Lounge also testified.

The State called Sonny Alaniz as its last witness. Alaniz1 is the nephew of

Appellant. In January 1992, a police officer spoke withAlanizaboutthe robbery at

the PartyHouseLounge. Alaniz executed a notarized witness statement wherein he

stated, among otherthings, thatAppellant possessed a .22 caliber sawed-offrifleand

that Alaniz participated in another robbery with Appellant at a Diamond Shamrock

station.

Analysis

In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the admission of Alaniz's witness

statement because "both the State and the [trial] court had prior knowledge that the

'Forthe sake of clarity, wewill refer to Appellant as "Appellant," and we will refer to his nephew

as "Alaniz."
witness would not recall the statement." Appellant argues that the State used the

prior witness statement "under the guise ofimpeachment for the primary purpose of

placing substantive evidence before the jury which is not otherwise admissible."

Appellant cites Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), in support

ofthis proposition. We review a trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence for

an abuse of discretion. See Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). We will uphold the trial court's decision unless it lies outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Salazarv. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153-54 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001).

The court in Hughes addressed those situations wherein a party attempts to

admit a prior inconsistent statement under the guise of impeachment when the

party's primary intent in calling the witness is to introduce inadmissible hearsay.

Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 4. The court concluded that the proper objection in this

circumstance is an objection underRule 403 fqr the trial courtto conducta balancing

test under the rule. Id. at 4-5; see Tex. R. Evid. 403. "[A] trial court abuses its

discretion under Rule 403 when it allows the State to admit impeachment evidence

for the primary purpose of placing evidence before the jury that was otherwise

inadmissible." Id. at 5. Factors to consider in the analysis include whether the State

was aware its witness wouldtestify unfavorably, whetherthe State was able to elicit

any favorable testimony from the witness, and whether the State had a legitimate

purpose for eliciting the prior inconsistent statement. See id. at4-7;see also Kelly v.

State, 60 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).

Onthemorning ofthe lastdayoftrial, theproceedings began with Appellant's

trial counsel informing the court that he believed that the State intended to call

Alanizas a witness. Counsel stated thatthe prosecutors "knownow ... that [Alaniz]

is going to deny his statement that he gave." Counsel further stated, "I have a

[R]ule 403 objection to them calling him when they know specifically that they want

3
to impeach him with a statement that would otherwise be inadmissible that

implicates my client." See Tex. R. Evid. 403. One ofthe prosecutors responded by

informing the trial court that he had no information or indication that Alaniz would

deny his statement. The prosecutor further asserted that he had no intention of

impeaching Alaniz with the written statement and that he had "every reason to

believe" that Alaniz would acknowledge making the statement. The trial court ruled

that the State would be permitted to call Alaniz as a witness based upon the

prosecutor's representations. Accordingly, Appellant seemingly made the correct

objection pursuantto Hughes, and the trial court made an appropriate determination

under Rule 403 that the State did not intend to call Alaniz for an improper purpose.

At the conclusion of the Rule 403 determination, the trial court granted the

prosecutor's request for a briefrecess. After the recess andpriorto the beginning of

witness testimony, Appellant's trial counsel raised the matter of the voluntariness of

Alaniz's statement. In response, the trial court advised the parties that it would

conduct a hearing on the voluntariness of Alaniz's statement prior to his trial

testimony.

After the State offered the brief testimony of another witness, the trial court

recessed thejury and conducted a hearing concerning the voluntariness of Alaniz's

statement. The hearing on the voluntariness of Alaniz's statement began with the

prosecutor asking Alaniz about thedetails ofhim giving thestatement. Those details

included that the statement was taken two days after Alaniz's seventeenth birthday

while he was incarcerated at a youth center. Alaniz testified that he did not

remember giving a statement to a police officer. However, he recalled a police

officer coming topick him up atthe youth center. Alaniz also recalled that the police

officer showed him pictures of an autopsy and that the officer accused Appellant of

"being a murderer." Alaniz did not deny giving the police a statement. He
additionally identified the signature appearing on the statement as his own signature.

However, Alaniz testified that he could not recall what he said to the police.

After Alaniz testified at the voluntariness hearing, Appellant's trial counsel

re-urged his prior complaint that the State intended to call Alaniz for the sole purpose

ofimpeaching him with his statement and thereby use it as substantive evidence. At

the conclusion ofthe hearing, the trial court stated as follows:

All right. We began this hearing with ~ the purpose was to

determine the voluntariness ofthe statement. I have heard no evidence

that it was not voluntary. So, therefore, I find that it was a voluntary

statement.

Now, to talk about the impeachment, I mean, you may call the

witness but I am of the opinion you may not put him on and impeach

him knowing that he is not going to recognize the statement. I mean,

what else? What other purpose could you have?

The prosecutor responded to the trial court's inquiry by stating that Alaniz's

testimony "aboutthe gunandaboutthe photographs" should bepresented to thejury.

The prosecutor additionally asserted that the statement was not hearsay because it

was a "notarized statement."2 The hearing concluded with the trial court ruling that

the State would be permitted to call Alaniz as a witness but that it would only be

permitted to impeach him with the statement rather than the statement itselfbeing

admitted. The trial court additionally granted the defense's request for a running

objection as to hearsay and its contention under Rule 403 regarding the State's use

ofthe witness statement.

In histestimony to the jury, Alaniz testified that an officer contacted him in

1992 while he was living in a youth center. The officer questioned him about a

2We disagree with the prosecutor's assertion that the statement was not hearsay because it was

notarized. See Contreras v. State, 766 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no pet.) (A

notary's oath does not take a prior inconsistent statement out ofthe realm ofhearsay. Under TEX. R. Evid.

801(e)(1)(A), "statements are non-hearsay only ifthey were made under oath 'at a trial, hearing, or other

proceeding except a grand jury proceeding, or in a deposition.'").
crime. Alaniz remembered the officer showing him autopsy photos. He also

testified that the signature on the witness statement was his signature. However, he

did not recall giving a statement to the police. Alaniz stated that "[i]t has been so

far back, I don't recall." Alaniz also testified that he remembered the police officer

accusing Appellant of committing the robbery that occurred at the Party House

Lounge. However, Alaniz did not remember anything else contained in the

statement. The prosecutor explored Alaniz's recollection of making the statement

by essentially goingthroughthe statement sentence by sentence and askinghim, "Do

you remember telling the officer that . . . ?" At the conclusion of these questions,

the trial court allowed the State to offer Alaniz's written statement into evidence.

Alaniz's written statement provided as follows:

[l]3 My name is James Sonny Alaniz. I go by Sonny. I am 17 years

old, and I have lived in Odessa all my life. I am currently a sophomore

in High School, and I am attending classes at the Ector County Youth

Center until 01-16-92. I will then return to Permian High School where

I ampermanently enrolled. I do read, write, and understand theEnglish

Language.

[2] Today, Detective Corporal H. Q.Thomas came to the EctorCounty

Youth Center to see me. He asked if I would come to the Police

Department and talk to him about a case he was working. I told him

that I would. He drove me to the Police Department.

[3] At the Police Department, Detective Thomas showed me three

photos. I knew the persons in all three photos. One of them is my

uncle, Leroy Alaniz, one of them is a guy I know as Paul something;

Paul's last name starts with an "E". The third photo was of a female.

Her name is Gloria. Her last name also starts with an "E". Gloria is

Paul's sister. Gloria is also common-law married to my uncle, Leroy

Alaniz.

[4] Detective Thomas told me about a Robbery that occurred at the

Party House Lounge on West County Road. He told me that two

3We have numbered the paragraphs ofAlaniz's written statement for later reference.

6
[H]ispanic males entered the lounge on 10-08-91 at about 9:20 p.m. and

robbed it. He told me that when they did the robbery, one of the

[H]ispanic males had a sawed-off gun believed to be a .22 cal[.] and the

other guy had a baseball bat. He also told me that the guy with the

baseball bat hit one ofthe men in the lounge several times in the head,

and he later died. He told me that he had gotten information that I was

involved in this robbery. He told me that he believed that my uncle,

Leroy Alaniz, and the guy I know as Paul are the ones who actually did

the robbery. He also told me that he believed that Leroy was the one

with the gun and Paul was the one with the baseball bat.

[5] I do not know anything about the robbery at the Party House

Lounge. I do know that my uncle, Leroy, does have a gun. The reason

I knowthat Leroyhas a gun is because on about 11-09-91 a weekbefore

I was picked up on the auto theft and robbery with Paul, Leroy and I

went to do a Robbery at the Diamond ShamrockStationon South Crane

Street. I was driving a dark blue Chevrolet pick-up that I had stolen

about a week before. I have already told Detective Larry Torres about

the stolen pick-up, but I did not tell him about the robbery at the

Diamond Shamrock. It was about 11:00 p.m. I parked the pick-up

down the street, and Leroy got out and walked up to the station. Leroy

had a gun. All I could see was that Leroy walked down to the side of

the station. I could see him leaning against the building watching. The

lady who worked there was outside washing down the front lot with a

water hose. Leroy went on around the corner out of my sight. He was

outofmy sight for a couple minutes. Several cars passing bythestation

honked, while Leroy was up there. Leroy came jogging across the

streetby a house and down an open lot. Thenhe turned down the alley.

I drove to where he was headed and picked him up. Leroy told me that

the gun back-fired. Leroy told me that hethrew the gun down bya trash

can. I asked him if he got any money, and he told me that he didn't that

he didn't do it. I then drove the pick-up to my Grandmother's House

at 1450 S. Sam Houston.

WITNESS STATEMENT IS CONTINUED ON EXHIBIT "A"

ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE

INCORPORATED HEREIN FOR ALL PURPOSES.
EXHIBIT "A"

[Redacted Portion]4

[6] Detective Thomas asked me to describe the gun that Leroy had and

ifI knew where the gun was now. The gun that Leroy had is a .22 cal[.]

saw-off [sic] rifle. The wooden part on the back ofthe rifle is broken

off. The wood part next [sic] the barrel ofthe rifle is taped on with two

separate wraps of black tape. Leroy showed me how to load the rifle

one time. The bullets push down inside the rifle on top of each other.

Leroy commented to me one time that the rifle was a 9 shooter.

[7] As far as where the rifle is, Leroy told me, about a week after the

Diamond Shamrock Station, he had gone back and gotten the rifle. I

do not know where the rifle is now. I got out of the Youth Center on

01-07-92. When I got home to my grandmother's house, I asked where

Leroy was. They told me that he had gone to El Paso, Texas. Leroy

may have taken the rifle with him. I just don't know. I did hear

yesterday that Leroy may be back to Odessa today.

[8] Detective Thomas asked me if Leroy or Paul ever told me anything

about the Party House Robbery. I would like to say that neither ofthem

ever told me anything about it. The first I heard of this robbery was

today, when Detective Thomas told me about it.

[9] All ofwhat I have said is true and correct to the best ofmy memory.

[10] I have read the 2 page(s) of this statement, and the facts contained

herein are true and correct. This statement was started at 9:55 AM and

was finished at 11:21AM, on this date, by Detective Corporal H. Q.

Thomas.

As we noted previously, the analysis required by Hughes under Rule 403 is

required when a party seeks to introduce inadmissible hearsay under the guise of

impeachment. Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 4. Alaniz's written statement was admitted into

evidence in this case on an impeachment theory, and the parties have briefed this

4The record indicates that a portion of Alaniz's written statement was redacted because it was not

discussed with him during his testimony.

8
case on whether or not the statement was proper impeachment evidence. However,

an appellate court must uphold the trial court's decision if it was correct under any

theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court did not purport to rely on

that theory or the prevailing party did not present that theory to the trial court. See

State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Vennus v. State, 282

S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998); Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

Alaniz's statement contained two critical pieces of information: (1) that

Appellant possessed a .22 caliber sawed-off rifle within approximately one month

after the commission of the charged offense and (2) that Alaniz participated in

another robbery with Appellant at a Diamond Shamrock station using this rifle.5

This information is set out in the fifth, sixth, and seventh paragraphs of Alaniz's

statement. We conclude that these three paragraphs were admissible under an

exception to the hearsay rule for statements against interest. See Tex. R.

Evid. 803(24).6

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

attrial, thatis offered to prove thetruth ofthematter asserted. Tex.R. Evid. 801(d);

see Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As a general rule,

hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one ofthe many exceptions.

See Tex. R. Evid. 802; Willover, 70 S.W.3d at 845. The fifth, sixth, and seventh

paragraphs detail Alaniz's account of committing a robbery with Appellant and

Appellant's use ofa sawed-off .22 caliber rifle to do so. Rule 803(24) provides an

5On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the admission ofevidence ofthe other robbery under

TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).

Presiding Judge Keller recognized in her dissenting opinion in Hughes that the "improper

impeachment" analysis under Rule 403 would not be required if the statements did not constitute

inadmissible hearsay. Hughes, 4 S.W.3d at 7 (Keller, J., dissenting).
exception to the hearsay rule for the admission of statements made against the

declarant's interest. This exception permits the admission of:

A statement that:

(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made

only ifthe person believed it to be true because, when made, it was

so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or

had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against

someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability

or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace;

and

(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate

its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that

tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.

The rationale behind admitting these types of statements "stems from the

commonsense notion that people ordinarily do not say things that are damaging to

themselves unless they believe they are true." Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883, 890

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). "[A] reasonable person would not normally claim that he

committed a crime, unless it were true." Id. Rule 803(24) sets out a two-step

foundation requirement for admissibility of hearsay statements. Id. The trial court

must first determine whether the statement, considering all of the circumstances,

subjects the declarant to criminal liability and whether the declarant realized this

when he made the statement. Id. at 890-91. The trial court must then determine

whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist that clearly indicate the

trustworthiness ofthe statement. Id. at 891.

We conclude that the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it

determined thatthis portion ofAlaniz's statement was a statement against his interest

under Rule 803(24). The fifth paragraph expressly states, "[Appellant] and I went

to do a Robbery at the Diamond Shamrock Station on South Crane Street." Alaniz

then detailed both his conduct and the conduct of Appellant during the robbery.

10
Alaniz stated that he drove Appellant to the station, waited on him, and then drove

him away from the station. This account would have subjected Alaniz to criminal

liability, and Alaniz, in all likelihood, would have realized this fact given that he was

making the statement to a police officer while in custody for another offense. There

are also significant factors suggesting that the statement was trustworthy given the

proximity in time to the event described in the statement, the nature ofthe account,

Alaniz's testimony that it bore his signature, and the fact that the statement was

notarized. Furthermore, the notarization of Alaniz's written statement made it selfauthenticated. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(8).

Having determined that the critical portions of Alaniz's written statement did

not constitute inadmissible hearsay, we need not consider whether these portions

constituted improper impeachment evidence. These portions of the statement were

admissible in their own right as substantive evidence.

The remaining portions of Alaniz's statement were inconsequential. The first

paragraph only contained biographical information about Alaniz. The second

paragraph detailed that Alaniz agreed to accompany the police officer to visit about

the case. The third paragraph detailed Alaniz's identification of three people in

photographs presented to him by the police officer for identification. The fourth

paragraph consisted ofthe police officer's description ofthe robbery that occurred

attheParty House Lounge. Assuch, itwas cumulative oftheother evidence offered

in the case. The eighth paragraph consisted of a denial of any knowledge by Alaniz

about the robbery at the Party House Lounge. In summary, the admission of the

other portions ofAlaniz's statement did not result in reversible error. Inthis regard,

the violation of an evidentiary rule that results in the erroneous admission of

evidence constitutes nonconstitutional error. Geuder v. State, 142 S.W.3d 372, 376

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref d). As nonconstitutional error, we

must review the erroneous admission under Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of

ii
Appellate Procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); see Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768,

779 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref d) (the erroneous admission of a

hearsay statement constitutes nonconstitutional error). When an appellate court

applies Rule 44.2(b), it must disregard nonconstitutional error unless it affects the

appellant's substantial rights. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91,93 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). An appellate court should not overturn a criminal conviction for

nonconstitutional error "ifthe appellate court, after examining the record as a whole,

has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or influenced the jury only

slightly." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotingSchutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001)) (internal quotation mark omitted). We have fair assurance that

the other portions of Alaniz's written statement did not influence the jury. We

overrule Appellant's sole issue on appeal.

This Court's Ruling

We affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

July 9, 2015

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.

12

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE