FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL D. BROWN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 

REVENUE, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 22-70001

Tax Court. No. 

18104-17L

OPINION

Appeal from a Decision of the 

United States Tax Court

Argued and Submitted November 10, 2022 

Pasadena, California

Filed January 24, 2023

Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Barrington D. 

Parker,* and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Parker

* The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, United States Circuit Judge for 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
2 BROWN V. CIR

SUMMARY**

Tax 

The panel affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in an action 

seeking a refund of a payment made in connection with a 

rejected offer in compromise to settle a tax liability.

Taxpayer made an offer in compromise (OIC) to settle 

his outstanding tax liability. Under the Tax Increase 

Prevention and Reconciliation Act (TIPRA), taxpayer 

submitted a payment of twenty percent of the value of his 

OIC, acknowledging that this TIPRA payment would not be 

refunded if the OIC was not accepted. The Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue did not accept the OIC because the 

Commissioner concluded that ongoing audits of taxpayer’s 

businesses made the overall amount of his tax liability 

uncertain. Taxpayer then sought a refund of his TIPRA 

payment. 

In a previous appeal, this court held that the Internal 

Revenue Service did not abuse its discretion by returning the 

OIC, but vacated the Tax Court’s determination that the IRS 

had not abused its discretion in refusing to return the TIPRA 

payment. This court remanded for the Tax Court to consider 

its refund jurisdiction in the first instance. On remand, the 

Tax Court held that it did not have jurisdiction. 

The panel affirmed the Tax Court decision, because there 

is no specific statutory grant conferring jurisdiction to refund 

TIPRA payments. The panel explained that, as the Tax Court 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
BROWN V. CIR 3 

correctly noted, it is a court of limited jurisdiction, 

specifically granted by statute, with no authority to expand 

upon that statutory grant. 

COUNSEL

Steve R. Mather (argued), Mather Anderson, Los Angeles, 

California, for Petitioner Appellant.

Matthew S. Johnshoy (argued), Trial Attorney; Joan I. 

Oppenheimer Trial Attorney, Co-Counsel; Regina S. 

Moriarty, Trial Attorney, Lead Counsel; David A. Hubbert, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General; United States 

Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, D.C.; 

William M. Paul, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent-Appellee.
4 BROWN V. CIR

OPINION

PARKER, Circuit Judge: 

Michael D. Brown owes approximately $50,000,000 in 

unpaid federal taxes for various years between 2001 and

2011. In 2016, after the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

placed two tax liens on his property, Brown submitted an 

offer in compromise (“OIC”) to the Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue. An OIC allows a taxpayer to settle his 

outstanding tax liabilities for less than their total value if the 

IRS determines there are doubts as to collectability or that

full payment would be inequitable or cause unusual 

economic hardship. IRM 33.3.2 (Aug. 6, 2019) (Offers in 

Compromise); IRS Form 656 (Offer in Compromise) at 3.

Brown’s OIC offered to settle his $50,000,000 outstanding 

tax liability for a payment of $400,000, claiming that there 

were doubts as to collectability. 

The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 

2005 (“TIPRA”), Pub. L. 109–222, requires a taxpayer who 

makes an OIC to submit a payment of twenty percent of the 

value of the OIC, in Brown’s case $80,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 

7122(c)(1)(A)(i). As part of the OIC process, the taxpayer 

must acknowledge that he understands that the TIPRA 

payment will not be refunded if the OIC is not accepted. 

Brown acknowledged the following on his signed OIC 

submission form: “I voluntarily submit the payments made 

on this offer and understand that they will not be returned 

even if I withdraw the offer or the IRS rejects or returns the 

Offer.” IRS Form 656 (Offer in Compromise) at 5. The 

Commissioner returned Brown’s OIC after concluding that 

it was inappropriate to compromise his tax liability at that 

time because the existence of ongoing audits of Brown’s 
BROWN V. CIR 5

businesses made the overall amount of his tax liability 

uncertain. The IRS, in accordance with the terms of the OIC,

did not return Brown’s $80,000 TIPRA payment. This 

litigation is Brown’s attempt to retrieve that money.

In a previous appeal, we held that the IRS’s decision to 

return Brown’s OIC was proper but remanded to allow the 

Tax Court to determine if it had jurisdiction to refund 

Brown’s $80,000 TIPRA payment. Brown v. Comm’r, 826 

F. App’x 673, 674 (9th Cir. 2020). On remand, the Tax Court 

held that it did not have jurisdiction to refund the payment 

because the power to do so had not been specifically granted 

to it by any statute. Brown v. Comm’r, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 

199, at *7 (2021). We agree and therefore we affirm. 

I.

This litigation began in 2015 when the IRS filed the first 

of two notices of federal tax lien (“NFTLs”) against Brown’s 

property as a consequence of Brown’s unpaid taxes. In 

response to the NFTLs, Brown requested a Collection Due 

Process (“CDP”) hearing and indicated that he intended to 

make an OIC. At that time, there were multiple ongoing 

audits of Brown’s businesses.

In November 2016, Brown submitted his OIC. As noted,

his OIC offered to settle his $50,000,000 tax liability for 

$400,000 and included the required twenty percent

($80,000) TIPRA payment. The law is clear that TIPRA 

payments are not refundable deposits but rather are nonrefundable payments of tax. See Isley v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 

349, 372 (2013) (“[T]he [TIPRA] payment constitutes a 

nonrefundable, partial payment of the taxpayer’s liability . . 

.”) (citing H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 109–455, at 234 (2006)); see 

also 26 U.S.C. § 7122(c)(2)(A)–(C) (establishing that any 

TIPRA payment goes to the taxpayer’s liabilities). The IRS 
6 BROWN V. CIR

accepted Brown’s OIC for processing but decided that it 

should be returned because of the ongoing audits. After the 

OIC was returned, Brown received a Notice of 

Determination (“NOD”) which permitted him to appeal to 

the Tax Court to contest the liens and the return of his OIC.

See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1).

Brown appealed to the Tax Court and lost. The Tax 

Court held that the liens were appropriate and that the IRS 

did not abuse its discretion by declining to refund Brown’s 

TIPRA payment. See Brown v. Comm’r, 118 T.C.M. (CCH) 

260 (2019). Brown then appealed to this Court. We affirmed 

in part and vacated in part. Brown, 826 F. App’x at 673. We 

held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion by returning 

Brown’s OIC but vacated the Tax Court’s determination that 

the IRS had not abused its discretion in refusing to return 

Brown’s TIPRA payment. Because the Commissioner 

argued to us that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to order a 

refund of the TIPRA payment, but that issue had not been 

fully briefed, we remanded to the Tax Court to consider its 

refund jurisdiction in the first instance. Id. at 674.

On remand, the Tax Court held that it did not have 

jurisdiction to refund Brown’s TIPRA payment. The court 

emphasized that it is “a court of limited jurisdiction and has 

only such jurisdiction as is granted it by the [Internal 

Revenue] Code.” Brown, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) at *5. The court 

reasoned that although it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal 

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320(c) and 6330(d)(1), it had no 

jurisdiction under these or any other Code provisions to pay

Brown the refund he was seeking. Id. at *6–7. It therefore 

granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. Id. at *8. This appeal followed.
BROWN V. CIR 7

II.

We review the Tax Court’s interpretation of federal 

statutes and its determinations of its own jurisdiction de 

novo. Meruelo v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2012), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc 

(Nov. 14, 2012).

As the Tax Court correctly noted, it is a court of limited 

jurisdiction and possesses no general equitable powers. See

Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987). In other words, it

has only the jurisdiction specifically granted by statute and 

lacks the authority to expand upon that statutory grant. Id.; 

see 26 U.S.C. § 7442. We have been clear that “[t]he Tax 

Court’s jurisdiction is defined and limited by Title 26 and it 

may not use general equitable powers to expand its 

jurisdictional grant beyond this limited Congressional 

authorization. It may exercise its authority only within its 

statutorily defined sphere.” Est. of Branson v. Comm’r, 264 

F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Brown argues that 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320 and 6330 give the 

Tax Court jurisdiction to refund his TIPRA payment. This is 

not so. Section 6320 merely requires that taxpayers be given 

notice and an opportunity for a hearing when a tax lien is 

filed. And section 6330 deals with procedures governing 

levies on property and administrative reviews of both liens 

and levies. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320(c) (explaining that 

provisions of § 6330 shall apply to the review of tax-lien 

hearings). Nothing in either section grants the Tax Court the 

power to refund TIPRA payments.

1

1 Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b)(1) (giving the Tax Court, in its deficiency 

jurisdiction, the power to determine an overpayment and refund such 

overpayment to the taxpayer). 
8 BROWN V. CIR

In Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1, 8 

(2006), the Tax Court held that “section 6330 does not 

expressly give [the Tax Court] jurisdiction to determine an 

overpayment or to order a refund or credit of taxes paid.” 

The Tax Court went on to state “we do not believe we should 

assume, without explicit statutory authority, jurisdiction 

either to determine an overpayment or to order a refund or 

credit of taxes paid in a section 6330 collection proceeding.” 

Greene-Thapedi, 126 T.C. at 11. 

Thus, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to refund TIPRA 

payments because there is no specific statutory grant 

conferring jurisdiction to do so. We have considered 

Brown’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. 

III.

The judgment of the Tax Court is AFFIRMED.