NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DANIEL WAMPLER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50127

D.C. No. 

8:20-cr-00142-SB-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 5, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, M. SMITH, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

After police seized illegal narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and firearms during 

a search of his person and vehicle, Daniel Wampler was indicted for drug- and 

firearm-related offenses. The district court denied Wampler’s motion to suppress. 

He then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. On appeal, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 7 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

the parties dispute whether the protective search and emergency aid doctrines

permitted the responding officer to open the passenger’s side door of Wampler’s 

vehicle. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Shortly after a 911 caller reported that an unidentified man wasslumped over 

in the driver’s seat of a white Mustang parked in the garage of an apartment complex, 

Anaheim Police Officer Scott Eden responded to the scene. The 911 caller reported 

a “red dot scope” box lying next to the car, but a police dispatcher told Eden only 

that the box was “next to” Wampler. Except for the box’s location, the dispatcher’s 

notes accurately summarized the 911 caller’s report.

When Eden approached the vehicle, he saw no red dot scope box lying outside 

the vehicle, but the scene was otherwise as described by the 911 caller and the

dispatcher. The driver’s side door was open, but the vehicle’s windowswere tinted, 

preventing Eden from seeing inside the car. When Eden opened the passenger’s side 

doorto assess the situation further and put space between himself and Wampler, he 

saw two handguns in the center console. Wampler awoke quickly after Eden opened 

the door, and police officers subsequently conducted a search of his person and his 

vehicle.

1

1 Wampler’s motion to suppress challenged only the initial decision to open the 

passenger’s side door. The parties appear to agree that if opening the door was 

justified, the handguns created probable cause for the subsequent search.
3 

This court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress evidence de novo and 

the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th 

842, 846 (9th Cir. 2022). Where, as here, the parties do not dispute the relevant

facts, the only question is whether Officer Eden’s decision to open the passenger’s 

side door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The government contends

that it wasjustified both as a protective search and under the emergency aid doctrine. 

Because we conclude that Eden’s decision was a reasonable protective search, we 

need not consider whether it was also justified under the emergency aid doctrine.

An officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle if the officer 

possesses “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 

inferences from those facts,” warrant a conclusion that a suspect is dangerous or may 

gain immediate access to weapons. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The officer needs only reasonable 

suspicion, not probable cause. United States v. I.E.V., 705 F.3d 430, 434–35 (9th 

Cir. 2012). The reasonable suspicion standard is “an objective one,” United States 

v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016), focusing on “the facts 

known ...at the time of the stop.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020).

But “[e]ven where certain facts might support reasonable suspicion,” a search 

“is not justified when additional or subsequent facts dispel or negate the suspicion.” 

Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2016). Citing Dillard, Wampler 
4 

arguesthat any reasonable suspicion was dispelled because the scope box—the only

“specific and articulable fact[]” supporting reasonable suspicion—was not visible as

Eden approached the car and was in fact never found.

2

Wampler’s reliance on the scope box’s absence is misplaced. At the time he 

opened the door, Officer Eden did not know—as he later would—that the red dot 

scope box would not be found. Nor did the fact that the box was not immediately 

visible to Eden as he approached the car dispel his reasonable suspicion. When Eden 

arrived in the garage, he was relying on the dispatcher’s notes, which stated only 

that the box was “next to” Wampler, not that it was outside the car. From Eden’s 

perspective, the box could have just as easily been “next to” Wampler inside the car 

as it could have been “next to” him outside it.

Wampler contends we should charge Eden with the entirety of the dispatcher’s 

knowledge of the situation, including the reported location of the box outside the 

car. See United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even assuming it would be appropriate to charge Eden with such constructive 

knowledge, it still would not dispel his reasonable suspicion. While the box’s 

absence may reasonably support an inference that the report was wrong in the first 

2 Wampler also contends that the box was insufficient in any event to support 

reasonable suspicion. It is undoubtedly true that the presence of a scope box does 

not guarantee the presence of a scope. Nor does the presence of a scope guarantee 

the presence of a gun. But certainty is not the standard, and it is not unreasonable to 

suspect that where firearm attachments may be, firearms may be also.
5 

place, it just as reasonably would support an inference that the box had been moved 

inside the vehicle after the call was made or an inference that the 911 caller took the 

box with him. Equivocal facts do not dispel reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Glover, 

140 S. Ct. at 1191 (holding stop was justified by initial impression where deputy 

“possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient information to rebut the 

reasonable inference”).

The cases Wampler cites in support are each readily distinguishable. In 

Dillard, for example, reports of domestic violence were clearly contradicted by the 

facts on the scene, where the reported victim “vehemently and repeatedly denied” 

any abuse. 818 F.3d at 883. And in United States v. Thomas, an officer investigating 

a report of counterfeiting had “a clear view” of the defendant and “could see that 

[he] did not match the description of either of the suspects” provided to him by a 

police dispatcher. 863 F.2d 622, 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1988). In each of these cases, 

the facts on the ground left no room to reasonably rely on the details of the initial 

report. Eden encountered no such contradictory facts.3

Because Eden’s warrantless search was justified as a protective search, it was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court properly denied 

Wampler’s motion to suppress.

3 Because Eden reasonably relied on the dispatcher’s report at all times leading up 

to the search, the panel does not reach the government’s alternate argument that the 

search was justified even in the absence of any report of a red dot scope box.
6 

AFFIRMED.