J-S17016-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.G., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 574 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001757-2012 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R.G., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 575 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000174-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.P., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 576 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000589-2020 
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IN THE INTEREST OF: J.P., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 577 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000175-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.P., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 578 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000590-2020 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.P., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 579 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000176-2023 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2024
J-S17016-24 

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 Appellant, J.G. (“Mother”), appeals from the orders entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying her petitions to appeal 

nunc pro tunc from the orders involuntarily terminating her parental rights 

and changing the permanency goals to adoption regarding her minor children, 

A.G. (born in January 2011), Jo.P. (born in May 2014), and Ja.P. (born in May 

2014)1 (“Children”). We vacate and remand for further proceedings. 

The underlying facts leading to the goal change/termination orders are 

not germane to this appeal. In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant 

procedural history of this case as follows. 

On November 2, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the 

Petitions to Terminate the Parental Rights of [Mother to 

Children]. The trial court found clear and convincing 

evidence to involuntarily terminate [Mother’s] parental 

rights and to change the goal of the Children to adoption 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).[2] Mother failed to appear for the 

hearing but was represented by counsel for its entirety. On 

[December 14, 2023 and January 25, 2024], counsel for 

Mother filed a “Petition to Leave to File Appeal Nunc Pro 

Tunc.”[3] This court issued...Order[s] denying the Petition 

[on January 25, 2024]. The Notices of Appeal alleging that 

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1

 Jo.P. and Ja.P. are twins. 

2

 The court issued three orders concerning each child on November 2, 2023: 

an order terminating Mother’s parental rights; a permanency review order; 

and an amended permanency review order clarifying that the court was 

changing the goal for each child to adoption. 

3

 Mother filed separate petitions seeking nunc pro tunc relief relating to the 

goal change orders for each child on December 14, 2023, and separate 

petitions seeking nunc pro tunc relief relating to the termination orders for 

each child on January 25, 2024. The petitions for nunc pro tunc relief related 

to the goal change and termination orders are substantively the same. 
J-S17016-24 

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this court improperly denied Mother’s “Petition to [A]ppeal 

Nunc Pro Tunc” were filed by Mother on February 21, 2024. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed March 22, 2024, at 1).4

 Mother raises one issue for our review: 

Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by 

denying a petition for leave to file appeal nunc pro tunc? 

(Mother’s Brief at 4). 

 Mother argues that she did not live at the address listed on the Parent 

Locator Service report (“PLS”), where notice of the termination/goal change 

orders was sent. Mother avers that she broke her hand in 2023 and was 

recuperating at a different residence. Mother contends that she only heard 

about the termination/goal change orders after speaking to the twins’ father,5

after which Mother contacted her attorney. Mother emphasizes that she was 

not present at the termination/goal change hearing. Mother maintains that 

she did not even receive the termination/goal change petitions. Mother 

highlights testimony at the termination hearing from case manager Silvine 

Belzince, who stated that Mother had told her that Mother did not have a place 

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4

 Mother filed separate notices of appeal from each of the court’s orders 

denying her petitions seeking nunc pro tunc relief. This Court consolidated 

Mother’s appeals sua sponte. Mother also filed concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal, along with her notices of appeal, per Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). 

5

 A.G. has a different father than the twins. On November 2, 2023, the court 

also entered goal change/termination orders concerning the twins’ father, and 

he has appeals pending before this Court docketed at 3017 EDA 2023, 3018 

EDA 2024, 3019 EDA 2023, and 3020 EDA 2023. 
J-S17016-24 

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to live. Mother claims that her failure to file timely notices of appeal from the 

termination/goal change orders was non-negligent. Mother insists the court 

erred by declining to hold a hearing to receive evidence and testimony as to 

the averments made in Mother’s petitions seeking nunc pro tunc relief. 

 Mother further emphasizes that she contacted her attorney two days 

after the appeal deadline. Counsel filed petitions seeking nunc pro tunc relief 

shortly thereafter. Mother highlights that the twins’ father timely filed notices 

of appeal on November 30, 2023, from the termination orders affecting his 

children, so the transcripts were already being ordered and the trial court was 

already preparing an opinion concerning those appeals. Mother insists there 

is no prejudice to the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) in allowing 

Mother to appeal nunc pro tunc. Mother concludes the court erred by denying 

her petitions to appeal nunc pro tunc from the termination/goal change orders 

concerning Children, and this Court must grant relief. For the following 

reasons, we agree relief is due. 

 “The question of timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional in nature. 

Failure to file a timely notice of appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction.” In 

re J.M.P., 863 A.2d 17, 19 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 690, 

878 A.2d 864 (2005) (internal citation omitted). “The 30-day period [under 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a)] must be construed strictly. This Court has no jurisdiction 

to excuse a failure to file a timely notice [of appeal].” In re Greist, 636 A.2d 

193, 195 (Pa.Super. 1994) (internal citation omitted). 
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Allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc lies at the sound 

discretion of the Trial Judge. More is required before such 

an appeal will be permitted than the mere hardship imposed 

upon the appellant if the request is denied. As a general 

matter, a Trial Court may grant an appeal nunc pro tunc

when a delay in filing [an appeal] is caused by extraordinary 

circumstances involving fraud or some breakdown in the 

court’s operation through a default of its officers. Where an 

appeal is not timely because of non-negligent 

circumstances, either as they relate to appellant or [her] 

counsel, and the appeal is filed within a short time after the 

appellant or [her] counsel learns of and has an opportunity 

to address the untimeliness, and the time period which 

elapses is of very short duration, and appellee is not 

prejudiced by the delay, the court may allow an appeal nunc 

pro tunc. 

In re Adoption of W.R., 823 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal 

citation omitted). 

 Significantly, we further observe that our Rules of Appellate Procedure 

designate the date of entry of an order as “the day on which the clerk makes 

the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as 

required by [Pa.R.C.P. 236(b)].” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b). 

Our Supreme Court has held that “an order is not appealable 

until it is entered on the docket with the required 

notation that appropriate notice has been given.” 

Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 557 Pa. 618, 621, 735 

A.2d 113, 115 (1999) (emphasis added). Where there is no 

indication on the docket that Rule 236(b) notice has been 

given, then the appeal period has not started to run. Id. at 

621-22, 735 A.2d at 115. Our Supreme Court has expressly 

held that this is a bright-line rule, to be interpreted strictly. 

That the appealing party did indeed receive notice does not 

alter the rule that the 30–day appeal period is not triggered 

until the clerk makes a notation on the docket that notice of 

entry of the order has been given. Id.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa.Super. 2007) (emphasis in original). 
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“Because the appellate clock starts running once the prothonotary records the 

giving of the Rule 236 notice in the docket, appellate courts need to have a 

clear, verifiable way to determine that Rule 236 notice was indeed provided.” 

Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa.Super. 

2021). This Court has explained: 

A prothonotary should make a notation that specifically 

states, for example, “Rule 236 notice provided on” followed 

by the date the notice was given, in order to comply with 

the notification mandate and procedural requirement of Rule 

236. Anything short of such a notation constitutes a 

failure by the prothonotary to comply with the 

notification mandate and procedural requirement of 

Rule 236, and is a breakdown in court operations. 

Carr v. Michuck, 234 A.3d 797, 805-06 (Pa.Super. 2020) (emphasis added). 

See also Pa.O.C.R. 4.6(a) (requiring Orphans’ Court clerk to give immediate 

notice of order terminating parental rights to counsel for parties or to 

unrepresented parties directly; mandating that clerk note in docket date when 

it provided such notice); In re Adoption of K.A.F., 273 A.3d 1036 (Pa.Super. 

filed Feb. 8, 2022) (unpublished memorandum)6 (holding that Pa.O.C.R. 

4.6(b) is akin to Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) such that order pursuant to Orphans’ Court 

jurisdiction is entered, for purposes of Rule 903(a), once court official complies 

with Rule 4.6). “[A] prothonotary’s failure to comply with Rule 236, governing 

notice, means that the filing period for a responsive motion was never 

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6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that we may rely on unpublished decisions of 

this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value). 
J-S17016-24 

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triggered, and, therefore, a subsequent motion and order denying that motion 

are legal nullities.” Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. as 

Trustee for First Alliance Mortgage Loan Trust 1997-3, Mortgage Loan 

Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1997-3 v. Limberis, 301 A.3d 902, 

2023 WL 3966560 at *2 (Pa.Super. filed June 13, 2023) (unpublished 

memorandum). 

Instantly, Mother’s petition seeking nunc pro tunc relief alleged that she 

contacted her attorney on December 6, 2023, after more than 30 days had 

elapsed from the court’s November 2, 2023 orders, and she asked counsel to 

file a notice of appeal on her behalf. During that conversation, counsel 

informed Mother that following the termination hearing, a letter advising 

Mother of her appellate rights was sent to the address listed on the PLS. 

Mother denied receipt of that letter. Mother informed counsel at that time 

that she was residing at 4233 Bennington Street in Philadelphia.7 Mother told 

counsel that she had never received the termination/goal change petition, and 

only learned of the order terminating her parental rights via Father. Mother 

indicated that she broke her hand in the fall of 2023 and had been 

recuperating at the Bennington Street address. (See Petition to Leave to File 

Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, filed 12/14/23, at 2). 

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7

 This address is not the address listed in the PLS and is not the same as an 

alternate address at which DHS had attempted to serve Mother with the 

termination petition and notice regarding the termination hearing. 
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The trial court denied nunc pro tunc relief, reasoning: 

Mother’s Petition to Leave to File Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc

alleges that Mother was unable to appeal this court’s Order 

terminating her parental rights [and changing the 

permanency goals] within the prescribed thirty-day period 

as she was unaware that her parental rights were 

terminated. This court found that [DHS] properly 

served the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights to 

Mother. (N.T. November 2, 2023, Page 8). 

Mother has been in frequent contact with her assigned 

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) Case Manager, Silvine 

Belzince, and was well-aware of the ongoing dependency 

proceedings concerning the children. Ms. Belzince testified 

that she had spoken to Mother just two weeks prior to the 

hearing at which her parental rights were terminated. She 

stated that Mother contacts her approximately two times 

per month and it is usually regarding visitation. ([Id.], Page 

15 to 16). 

Ms. Belzince testified that Mother has a history of failing to 

appear for scheduled events concerning these dependency 

matters. Specifically, she informed the court that there 

have been multiple meetings regarding the establishment 

and modification of Mother’s single case plan (SCP) 

objectives. SCP objectives are goals that a parent must 

progress toward to achieve reunification with her children. 

Ms. Belzince testified that Mother was notified of these 

scheduled SCP meetings and failed to attend a single one. 

([Id.], Page 16). Additionally, Mother had been ordered by 

the court to attend the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for an 

assessment and that Mother failed to appear for each of the 

appointments. ([Id.], Page 17). Ms. Belzince also noted 

that Mother had not attended a single visit with the children 

for the eight months preceding the termination of her 

parental rights. ([Id.], Page 22). 

Allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc lies at the sound 

discretion of the trial court. More is required before such an 

appeal will be permitted than the mere hardship imposed 

upon the appellant if the request is denied. ... 

This court believes that Mother was served notice of 
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these proceedings in accordance with the procedural 

rules governing notice and due process. Mother was 

fully aware of the ongoing dependency proceedings 

concerning the children and failed to appear at the hearing 

concerning the termination of her parental rights. Ms. 

Belzince’s testimony that Mother has consistently been 

absent from important events and appointments directly 

related to achieving reunification with the children despite 

having actual notice of them was considered by this court 

when deciding whether to grant Mother’s Petition to Leave 

to Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc. Denying Mother’s Petition was not 

something this court did mechanically and without genuine 

thought and consideration. Mother’s failure to timely notify 

her counsel to file an appeal is yet another example of her 

not according these proceedings the significant weight that 

they merit. Accordingly, this court exercised its discretion 

and denied Mother’s petition. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 2-4) (emphasis added). 

Notwithstanding the court’s analysis that DHS properly served Mother 

with the petitions seeking to change the goal to adoption and terminate her 

parental rights to Children, our review of the docket entries reveals a 

breakdown in the operations of the court concerning entry of the termination 

and goal changes orders. The docket entries show that the court entered 

three orders concerning each child on November 2, 2023: the termination 

order, a permanency review order, and an amended permanency review order 

that clarified the goal change to adoption. However, none of the docket 

entries concerning those orders expressly states the words, “Rule 236 notice 

provided.” See Carr, supra. Complicating matters further, the purported 

date of service listed in the dockets for the amended permanency review 

orders differs for Children. The dependency docket entries pertaining to A.G. 
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and Jo.P. suggest that notice of the amended permanency review order was 

sent to Mother’s counsel on November 8, 2023. However, the dependency 

docket concerning Ja.P. (docketed in this Court at 578 EDA 2024) indicates 

that the amended order was not sent to Mother’s counsel until December 1, 

2023, which would have rendered Mother’s December 14, 2023 petition 

seeking nunc pro tunc relief timely filed within 30 days of that date. Under 

these circumstances, and mindful of the significant rights at stake, we 

conclude that a breakdown in the operations of the court occurred such that 

Mother’s appeal period has not yet been triggered, and the court’s orders 

denying Mother nunc pro tunc relief were legal nullities. See In re L.M., 

supra. See also Bank of New York, supra. 

Therefore, we vacate the orders denying Mother’s petitions for nunc pro 

tunc relief and remand for further proceedings. Upon remand, we instruct 

Mother’s counsel to update Mother’s current address with the court. We 

further direct the clerk of courts to re-enter the termination/goal change 

orders with appropriate notice per Rule 236 upon remittal of the record, after 

which Mother may file notices of appeal and Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statements 

within 30 days. See Carr, supra (providing similar instructions upon 

remand). Thereafter, the court shall issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion responding 

to all properly preserved issues raised in Mother’s concise statements. 

 Orders vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is 

relinquished. 
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Date: 6/18/2024