2024 IL App (1st) 220583-U

No. 1-22-0583 

Second Division

April 30, 2024 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

____________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 

 v. 

LAWRENCE DEL RUSSO, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

) Cook County.

) 

) 

) No. 13 CR 10266

) 

) 

) Honorable 

) Michele M. Pitman, 

) Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant’s convictions where the trial court did not err neither in 

denying his motion for a mistrial nor in admitting certain photographs into evidence

at trial.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant Lawrence Del Russo was found guilty of first 

degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to an aggregate 40 years in prison. Defendant 

appeals therefrom, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in denying defendant’s motion for a 
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mistrial, (2) in admitting other crimes evidence, (3) in admitting photographs of unrelated knives, 

and (4) in instructing the jury on accountability. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged by indictment with five counts of first degree murder for stabbing 

and killing Calvin Jefferson with a knife on May 4, 2013. He was also charged with one count of 

armed robbery, alleging that he used a dangerous weapon to rob Jefferson of cocaine.

¶ 5 On July 18, 2019, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that the State be barred 

from presenting any evidence regarding the existence of unrelated knives seized from defendant’s 

home. Before the court, defense counsel added that any and all pictures of knives that were taken 

from defendant’s home also be barred. The State responded, stating that it wanted to present 

evidence that the police found a cabinet in defendant’s home containing several knives and that 

there appeared to be a space where a knife was missing from the cabinet. The trial court granted 

in part and denied in part defendant’s motion. In particular, the trial court agreed that the State 

would be barred from asserting that any of the knives recovered from defendant’s home were the 

murder weapon but the State would be permitted to present crime scene photographs of the knife 

collection along with an alleged “empty space” from which the State hypothesized was the original 

location of the murder weapon.

¶ 6 The trial began on January 25, 2022, at which the following evidence was presented.

¶ 7 On the afternoon of May 5, 2013, Damu Patel, the manager of the HiWay Motel in 

Markam, Cook County, Illinois, went to Room 24, where Jefferson had been living, and she found 

the door unlocked, blood on the floor, and Jefferson unresponsive. Patel called the police, who 

determined that Jefferson was deceased and had been stabbed repeatedly. Patel allowed the police 

access to the motel’s surveillance footage. The footage showed a white truck parked outside the 
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motel. On the recording, two individuals exit the passenger’s side of the truck and walk out of 

view, in the direction of Room 24, which was not visible on the footage. The camera was motion 

activated. At 11:53 p.m., the same two individuals return to the truck and the truck drives away 

from the motel. The police recovered a white truck from Harmail Lal that matched the truck in the 

surveillance footage. After speaking with Lal, the police identified Kimberly Balog, Aaron 

Krysowaty, and defendant as persons of interest. Later, search warrants were prepared for 

defendant’s home, as well as Balog’s. There were also warrants for fingerprints, photographs, and 

DNA samples of defendant and Krysowaty.

¶ 8 Harmail Lal testified that he has known defendant for several years, and he met Balog and 

Krysowaty through defendant. He testified that, in 2013, he owned a white pickup truck. He then 

testified repeatedly that he could not remember the events of May 4, 2013, or the details of his 

written statement or grand jury testimony. The State introduced Lal’s statement and grand jury 

testimony into evidence as prior inconsistent statements and testimony.

¶ 9 In his statement, Lal related that, on the afternoon of May 4, 2013, he drove defendant and 

Krysowaty to the HiWay Motel to buy crack cocaine from defendant’s drug dealer. The three 

smoked the cocaine in defendant’s garage and Lal returned home. Later that day, Lal realized he 

had some money left and called defendant to ask if he could buy more crack cocaine. Lal informed 

defendant that he did not want Krysowaty involved because he did not want to split the drugs three 

ways, and defendant responded, “[D]on’t worry, me and [Krysowaty] got to do business with the 

guy.” Lal picked up defendant and Krysowaty from Balog’s residence and defendant asked him to 

make a stop at his home, where he briefly entered the house and returned to the truck. Upon 

arriving at the motel, Lal offered defendant $7 but defendant responded that he did not need it. 

Defendant and Krysowaty exited the truck and “talked and whispered” before disappearing around 
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the side of the motel. Lal stayed in the truck the entire time. When the two returned a few minutes 

later, defendant had blood on his hand, a “possessed look” on his face, and a “Rambo style” knife

in his hand. He heard defendant ask, “Did you get it?” and Krysowaty, who was holding a rock of 

crack cocaine, answered, “Yes.” On the drive back to Balog’s residence, defendant stated, “I got 

him a couple times, I really got his neck.” Once they arrived at Balog’s, Krysowaty gave Lal a 

small piece of the crack cocaine and Lal drove away. 

¶ 10 Lal’s grand jury testimony was largely the same, but he also testified to the following. On 

the following day, defendant called Lal and stated, “I don’t want you saying nothing to no one.” 

In a later conversation, defendant stated, “By the way, what happened the other day, don’t worry 

about that. That dude is gone. He’s gone. He’s gone.” 

¶ 11 Kimberly Balog testified that, in May 2013 she was dating Aaron Krysowaty. On May 4, 

2013, she was at home with Krysowaty when defendant arrived. That night, defendant and 

Krysowaty left together. She did not know where they were going or what they were doing. Around 

11 p.m., they returned and defendant appeared distraught. She overheard defendant state to 

Krysowaty that he wanted to hurt somebody and Krysowaty agreed to accompany him. She 

testified that she did not recall anything else from that night. At this point, the State was allowed 

to refresh her memory with her statement to police. She testified that she heard defendant say that 

he needed a knife and she heard him rummaging through a drawer. She walked into the room and 

informed defendant that he would not be getting a knife from her home. The two men left together. 

They returned about an hour or two later, and she observed defendant standing outside with a 

bloody “Rambo knife” in his hand. She testified that the knife was about 10 to 12 inches in length. 

She heard defendant state that he “stabbed him.” Defendant came inside, washed his hands, and 

threw the knife in the garbage can. She testified that Krysowaty took the garbage bag to a dumpster 
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behind her building. All three individuals then smoked the crack cocaine that Krysowaty had 

returned with. On cross-examination, she confirmed that she did not know who defendant wanted 

to hurt and she did not know why. She also confirmed that she did not see defendant with a knife 

when he left her house. She testified that Krysowaty had blood on his pants and his shoes when 

they returned. 

¶ 12 Aaron Krysowaty first testified that he is currently in custody of the Illinois Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a plea of guilty to first degree murder of Jefferson. During the afternoon 

of May 4, 2013, defendant came over to Balog’s apartment and the three of them drank alcohol 

and smoked crack cocaine. Krysowaty and defendant later went to defendant’s house, where they 

continued to smoke crack cocaine. Eventually, they ran out of drugs and they discussed how they 

were going to acquire more. Defendant suggested robbing his drug dealer, Jefferson, and 

Krysowaty agreed to go with him. Defendant called Lal to pick them up in his truck. They first 

stopped at Balog’s home, where defendant was speaking on the phone with his drug dealer and 

searching Balog’s kitchen drawers for a knife. Balog stopped defendant and stated, “No you’re not 

grabbing one of these.” 

¶ 13 They then drove to the HiWay Motel. When they arrived at the motel, Krysowaty followed 

about thirty seconds behind defendant to his drug dealer’s room. By the time Krysowaty entered 

the room, defendant was on top of Jefferson, who was on the ground, and was stabbing him with 

an 8 to 10 inch-long knife. Krysowaty heard Jefferson “begging for his life,” stating “No, don’t 

kill me.” Defendant directed Krysowaty to grab the drugs that were on the dresser. He did so and 

went back to the truck. When he left, defendant was still stabbing Jefferson. Defendant returned 

to the truck and Krysowaty observed that he was “covered in blood.” Krysowaty gave a piece of 

crack cocaine to Lal and they took the rest back to Balog’s apartment. While they were in the truck, 
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defendant stated, “I got him good” and “I think I killed him.” At Balog’s, defendant washed his 

hands and threw the knife in the garbage can. Krysowaty took the garbage bag and placed it in the 

hallway of Balog’s building. They then smoked the crack cocaine and defendant left. While 

defendant was there, Krysowaty heard him say, “I think I killed my drug dealer.” 

¶ 14 On cross-examination, he clarified that they also stopped at defendant’s house before going 

to the motel because “[defendant] had to grab something from his house.” He did not see what 

defendant took from his house. He testified repeatedly that he did not know Jefferson and he did 

not stab Jefferson. He confirmed that there was some blood on his shoes and pants but not much. 

He confirmed that when he first spoke with police, he denied knowing anything about Jefferson’s 

murder. On redirect examination, he testified that he initially denied knowing anything about 

Jefferson’s murder because he did not want to get himself or anyone else in trouble with the police.

¶ 15 Officer Harlan Lewis, a law enforcement officer with the Markham Police Department, 

testified that, on May 5, 2013, around 2 p.m., he was called to the HiWay Motel. He was directed 

to Room 24, and upon entering that room, he observed the victim on the ground with multiple stab 

wounds. He then secured the scene. On cross-examination, he testified that he observed blood on 

the doorknob on the outside of the door to the room.

¶ 16 Lieutenant Heather Hansen, a patrol lieutenant with the Illinois State Police, testified that 

she was working as a crime scene investigator on May 5, 2013. She went to the HiWay Motel on 

that day and, inside Room 24, she observed red unknown stains on the tile floor and the deceased 

victim behind the door to the room. She also observed “quite a few *** blood patterns” on the 

floor, on the victim, on the wall, and on the inside of the door, and on the interior doorknob. She 

identified photographs she took of the crime scene. The photographs showed red stains on the 

victim’s clothing and drug paraphernalia on top of a table, which included multiple lighters, a piece 
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of foil, and small plastic baggies. On the victim’s person, she found $374. She later received from 

other law enforcement officers three packages, containing two pairs of blue jeans and two white 

tennis shoes. She observed red stains on the clothing items and they were sent to the lab for testing.

¶ 17 During a break in the trial, defense counsel raised an issue with the court regarding 

photographs that the State intended to admit into evidence which show an “empty space” in a 

cabinet in defendant’s bedroom. Defense counsel reminded the court of its prior ruling on the 

motion in limine. Following argument, the court reversed its prior ruling on the photographs of the 

knives in defendant’s home because “there is nothing that ties any knife collection that’s found at 

the defendant’s residence to this crime.” The court stated that the evidence was prejudicial and 

ruled that the photographs would not be admitted. The court then ruled that the State’s witness 

would be allowed to testify that knives were found in defendant’s home and there was an empty 

space but the witness could not use the word “void.” 

¶ 18 Sergeant Dashun Walker, a police officer for the Village of Markham Police Department, 

was assigned to investigate the crime scene. He testified that, when he arrived at Room 24, he 

observed that the door was partially open and there was a “red blood-like substance in that area on 

the door handle” and “on the ground in front of the door [were] foot impressions that had red 

blood-like stains on them.” He was unable to open the door because it was blocked by an object 

on the other side. Eventually, he squeezed through the opening and he observed the victim’s body 

behind the door in a fetal position. While in the room, he recovered a cell phone and an Illinois 

identification card identifying the victim as Jefferson. 

¶ 19 At this point, a sidebar conference was held to, once again, discuss the admissibility of 

photographs of knives found in defendant’s room. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court 

ruled that the photographs were admissible and were based on a reasonable inference. The court 
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expressly stated that it would not limit defense counsel’s argument in response to the 

circumstantial evidence related to the “empty space.”

¶ 20 Sergeant Walker testified that he executed a search warrant on defendant’s home where he 

lived with his mother. In defendant’s bedroom, he saw three knives displayed in a cabinet with 

glass doors. Photographs of this cabinet were admitted into evidence. He explained that there was 

an “[e]mpty space” next to the knives that appeared to have been “recently emptied” because 

“everything in the cabinet was covered in dust except for that one spot where the missing item 

was.” One photograph showed that the empty space was about 13 inches in length. Sergeant 

Walker also testified that when collecting a buccal sample from defendant he observed a laceration 

to his right index finger.

¶ 21 On cross-examination, he testified that he did not recall seeing any drugs in the motel room 

and no drugs were seized from the room. He confirmed that he could not discern the physical 

characteristics of the individuals seen in the surveillance footage from the motel. He confirmed 

that he never saw the driver of the truck in the footage. He further testified that the search of 

defendant’s home did not reveal any clothes with blood on them. He stated that he did not know 

what had previously been in that space in the cabinet but that it had been recently emptied because 

everything in the cabinet was covered in dust except for the empty space. He confirmed that, 

throughout this investigation, he never recovered a knife with Jefferson’s blood on it, and none of 

the knives in defendant’s bedroom had blood on them. He testified that he went to Balog’s 

residence and nothing was recovered from the dumpsters outside her building and nothing was 

recovered from her residence.

¶ 22 Through the testimony of four forensic scientists (Brent Cutro, Heather Wright, Terrence 

Grom, and Christopher Webb), the State introduced evidence that showed that the interior 
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doorknob to Room 24 had both defendant’s thumbprint and Jefferson’s blood on it. Specifically, 

the evidence showed that: (1) there was a red-brown substance with some visible fingerprint ridge 

detail on the interior doorknob; (2) the doorknob was swapped and a latent print was found and 

preserved for analysis; (3) the DNA samples taken from the doorknob could not exclude Jefferson 

but defendant and Krysowaty were excluded; (4) the latent print on the doorknob matched 

defendant’s left thumb print. 

¶ 23 Finally, a medical examiner testified that Jefferson’s autopsy revealed 23 stab wounds, 11 

incise wounds, and some defensive wounds and bruises, several of the stab wounds were fatal 

injuries, and the manner of death was homicide. On cross-examination, she testified that, in her 

opinion, the wounds were caused by a knife. 

¶ 24 During closing argument, the State argued as follows:

“So through these four scientists it is determined that the defendant has the victim’s 

blood on his hands, the defendant left a fingerprint in the victim’s blood on the doorknob. 

That is what is established through those four scientists. 

So I submit that as the defendant is stabbing [Jefferson] to death [Jefferson’s] blood 

got on the defendant’s thumb, got on his hands, and when he touched the doorknob to 

leave, he transferred [Jefferson’s] blood to that doorknob, leaving behind his thumbprint 

in the blood.”

The State also displayed a slide on its PowerPoint presentation that included the forensic 

scientists’ names and a similar statement, to wit: “The defendant has the victim’s blood on his 

hands. The defendant left a fingerprint in the victim’s blood on the interior doorknob.” 

¶ 25 After the State concluded its argument, defense counsel requested a sidebar, during which 

he objected to the statement that the evidence showed that defendant had the victim’s blood on his 
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hands. Specifically, he argued that the State posed the statement as though it was scientific 

evidence, which was a misrepresentation. The State contended that the statement merely reflected 

a reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence of the victim’s blood and defendant’s 

thumbprint on the doorknob. The trial court sustained the objection because of the way the 

statement was framed because there was no scientific evidence that defendant “had [Jefferson’s] 

blood on his hand” and directed the State to remove the statement from the slide as well. 

¶ 26 Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial based on the statement as it was presented as 

scientific evidence. The State argued that it was harmless error and that curative instruction from 

the court would be sufficient to resolve the issue. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, finding 

that it was not an intentional error on the State’s part and the statement was based on a reasonable 

inference from the evidence presented.

¶ 27 The court allowed defense counsel to make his objection to the statement in the presence 

of the jury and the court sustained the objection. The court then stated to the jury: 

“[Y]ou are to disregard that statement. *** I have already informed you what the 

attorneys say is not evidence, but the attorneys are allowed to argue the actual evidence, 

any reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. So I’m going to sustain the 

objection and ask that you disregard that statement.”

¶ 28 In closing argument for the defense, counsel argued that there was “no evidence in this 

case about any blood from the person of *** Jefferson on [defendant].” 

¶ 29 In rebuttal, the State responded that “it is a reasonable inference as it relates to this 

defendant’s contact with the victim’s blood and that doorknob.”
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¶ 30 The court instructed the jury once again that “[n]either opening statements nor closing 

arguments are evidence. And any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based 

on the evidence should be disregarded.” 

¶ 31 Subsequently, the jury found defendant guilty of three counts of first degree murder and 

one count of armed robbery. 

¶ 32 On February 25, 2022, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding 

the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. Therein, defendant argued, inter alia, that 

the court erred in ultimately allowing testimony regarding a missing knife in defendant’s cabinet 

and that the State’s reference to the victim’s blood on defendant’s hand during closing arguments 

was improper. Before the court, defense counsel argued that the State should not have been 

permitted to “produce evidence before the jury which indicated that there was a missing space in 

this collection of knives[.]” On March 10, 2022, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the 

evidence regarding the empty space in the cabinet was proper and relevant and the closing 

argument was supported by the evidence and did not mislead the jury and any error was cured 

through jury instruction. 

¶ 33 Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 34 years on count 1 

for first degree murder and a consecutive sentence of six years on count 6 for armed robbery. 

¶ 34 This appeal followed.

¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 36 On appeal, defendant lists the following as the “Issues Presented for Review”: (1) whether 

the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial; (2) whether the trial court erred 

by admitting other crimes evidence over defense objection; (3) whether the trial court erred by 

admitting photographs of unrelated knives over defense objection; and (4) whether the trial court 
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erred by including an instruction on the law of accountability over defense objection. Initially, 

however, we note that defendant provides no argument in his brief for the other crimes evidence 

issue and the jury instruction issue. As such, these issues are forfeited and will not be considered 

in this appeal. See People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 420 (2007) (a point raised in a brief but not 

supported by argument and relevant legal authority is forfeited). 

¶ 37 A. Motion for Mistrial

¶ 38 Defendant argues that his motion for a mistrial should have been granted due to the State’s 

inappropriate and inflammatory comments during closing argument. Specifically, during its 

closing the State stated, “Through these four scientists it is determined that the defendant has the 

victim’s blood on his hands, the defendant left a fingerprint in the victim’s blood on the interior 

doorknob.” A similar statement was included on a slide in the State’s PowerPoint presentation. 

Defendant contends that there was no testimony to support the statement, it was being argued as 

scientific fact, and it was improperly included in the State’s PowerPoint presentation. In response, 

the State argues that its argument was proper and any possible error did not warrant a mistrial.

¶ 39 “A trial court has broad discretion to determine the propriety of declaring a mistrial.” 

People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 341 (2000). A mistrial should be granted where a grave error has 

occurred, such that defendant would be denied fundamental fairness. People v. Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d 

386, 435 (2009). “To prevail on appeal, [the] defendant must establish that there was a manifest 

necessity for the mistrial or that the ends of justice would be defeated by continuance of the trial; 

that is, that the jury was so influenced and prejudiced that it would not, or could not, be fair and 

impartial, and the damaging effect of the evidence could not be remedied by admonitions or 

instructions.” People v. Wills, 153 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339-40 (1987). A trial court’s denial of a 
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motion for a mistrial will not be disturbed on review unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 

Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d at 435.

¶ 40 During closing arguments, a prosecutor is given wide latitude, and even improper 

comments do not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant. People 

v. Burman, 2013 IL App (2d) 110807, ¶ 25. Further, the prosecutor has the right to comment on 

the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence, even if they are unfavorable to 

the defendant. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 396 (2000). “[C]losing arguments must be viewed 

in their entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context.” Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 

122. 

¶ 41 Here, defense counsel objected to the statement at issue, and the trial court sustained the 

objection and instructed the State to remove the statement from its PowerPoint presentation.

Defense counsel then made a motion for a mistrial. The trial court ruled that the error was not 

intentional and opted to provide a curative instruction to the jury. The court expressly instructed 

the jury to disregard the State’s statement regarding the victim’s blood on defendant’s hands and 

repeatedly instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence.

¶ 42 Clear from the record, the court recognized that the State poorly framed its reasonable 

inference from the scientific evidence such that it could have been misconstrued by the jury as 

conclusive scientific evidence itself. The court sought to mitigate any improper consideration of 

the statement, first, by sustaining defendant’s objection before the jury, admonishing the jury to 

disregard the statement, directing the State to remove the statement from the slide, and instructing 

the jury, a second time, that closing arguments are not evidence. We believe that the court’s ruling 

and subsequent admonishments were sufficient to cure any potential prejudice resulting from this 

single statement. See Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 128 (the act of sustaining an objection and properly 
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admonishing the jury is generally viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice engendered by 

improper closing argument); see also People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 40 (jurors are presumed 

to have followed the court’s instructions).

¶ 43 Notably, defense counsel argued in closing that there was “no evidence in this case about 

any blood from the person of *** Jefferson on [defendant].” Clearly, counsel’s uninterrupted 

argument, heard by the jury and coupled with the court’s earlier admonishments, stood to rebut 

the State’s earlier misstatement of the “scientific evidence.” People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 

670, 689 (1993) (any improper comment was sufficiently cured where the jury was properly 

instructed and defendant “had the opportunity to respond to the prosecutor’s statement during his 

closing argument”).

¶ 44 Further, we find defendant’s characterization of the error as “blatant unsworn expert 

testimony” exaggerated. Just after the statement, the State continued: “I submit that as the 

defendant is stabbing [Jefferson] to death [Jefferson’s] blood got on the defendant’s thumb, got on 

his hands, and when he touched the doorknob to leave, he transferred [Jefferson’s] blood to that 

doorknob, leaving behind his thumbprint in the blood.” (Emphasis added.) We view the State’s 

statement as an inartful attempt to draw an inference from the forensic evidence and as 

hypothecation of what that evidence could mean, as opposed to characterizing it as scientific fact. 

Thus, taken in context, we agree with the trial court that the error was not intentional and the State 

failed to appropriately couch the statement as a reasonable inference from the expert testimony. 

¶ 45 Defendant also asserts that the evidence in the case was “closely balanced,” suggesting that 

the improper argument had some potential of tipping the balance in the State’s favor. We must 

disagree. In fact, we find that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Three witnesses 

gave corroborative accounts of the events of May 4, 2013, that strongly implicated defendant as 
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the individual who stabbed and killed Jefferson. Their accounts also aligned with the surveillance 

footage from the motel and the forensic evidence found at the crime scene. Moreover, the 

circumstantial evidence of the empty space near a collection of three knives in defendant’s 

bedroom, as well as the testimony that defendant did not get a knife from Balog’s apartment and 

went into his residence prior to going to the motel, leads to an inference that defendant had access 

to a knife similar to the one that the witnesses described and that could have been used to kill 

Jefferson. In sum, we find it unlikely that the error in the State’s closing argument, which the court

sufficiently remedied, was a material factor in defendant’s conviction. See People v. Middleton, 

2018 IL App (1st) 152040, ¶ 29 (where a motion for a mistrial has been denied, in addition to 

establishing prejudice, an appellant must also demonstrate that court admonishments and curative 

instructions could not remedy the damage from the improper comments); see also People v. 

Pinkett, 2023 IL 127223, ¶ 33 (mistrial proper only where the defendant demonstrates actual 

prejudice). 

¶ 46 Finally, we disagree with defendant’s contention that this case is similar to People v. 

Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22 (1991). In Linscott, our supreme court reversed the defendant’s murder 

conviction based on improper prosecutorial comments that misrepresented the State’s evidence. 

Id. at 28. In particular, the prosecutor in closing argument commented that the defendant’s hair 

had been found at the crime scene; however, the evidence merely showed that the defendant was 

in a class of possible donors of the hair. Id. at 30-31. The court concluded that the comment 

amounted to plain error because the evidence was closely balanced where the forensic evidence 

was crucial to identifying the murderer and there was no witness connecting the defendant to the 

murder or the murder weapon. Id. at 33-34; People v. Linscott, 159 Ill. App. 3d 71, 73-74 (1987), 

vacated on other grounds, 142 Ill. 2d 22 (1991). 
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¶ 47 Unlike in Linscott, the evidence in this case is not closely balanced, as we have explained. 

Additionally, we would not consider the State’s comments here to be similarly egregious as those 

in Linscott. Here, the State unintentionally conveyed a reasonable inference from the testimony as 

scientific fact; however, the reasonable inference itself was appropriate, particularly where there 

was no dispute that the blood was Jefferson’s and the fingerprint was defendant’s. This is not the 

same as conclusively stating that a hair belonged to a person when the testimony was only that it 

was possible that it could belong to that person. For these reasons, we find Linscott inapposite. 

¶ 48 We also reject defendant’s citation to People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (1st) 173008-U, as 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) does not permit the citation to nonprecedential orders entered 

prior to January 1, 2021, except in limited circumstances not applicable here. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) 

(eff. Feb. 1, 2023). 

¶ 49 Having reviewed the closing arguments of both parties in their entirety and considering the 

trial court’s response to defendant’s objection and admonishments to the jury, we reject 

defendant’s argument that this isolated statement prejudiced defendant to the point of warranting 

a mistrial. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a 

mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 50 B. Evidence of Knives

¶ 51 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view photographs 

of knives in defendant’s home that were “not connected” to the crime. In response, the State asserts 

that this issue is forfeited because defendant did not object to the admission of the photographs 

during the trial and the issue was not included in his posttrial motion. In his reply brief, defendant 

requests plain error review in the event that this court finds the alleged error was not preserved. 

We first address the issue of forfeiture.
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¶ 52 It is well established that a “defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the 

specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged error for review.” People v. 

Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005). Based on our review of the record, we find that the error was 

sufficiently preserved for review. Defendant filed a motion in limine regarding this evidence which 

was argued at length before the trial court prior to trial. During the trial, two separate discussions 

were had over the admissibility of the testimony and photographs regarding the “empty space” in 

the cabinet, wherein defense counsel repeatedly noted his objection. Finally, in the posttrial 

motion, defendant argued that the court erred in allowing testimony regarding a missing knife in 

defendant’s cabinet and, before the court, defense counsel argued that the State should not have 

been permitted to “produce evidence before the jury which indicated that there was a missing space 

in this collection of knives[.]” From this, we find it clear that defendant objected to the admission 

of any evidence regarding the empty space in defendant’s cabinet where knives were found, and 

he raised this issue before, during, and after the trial. See People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (2008) 

(declining to tailor the forfeiture rule to require that the defendant make identical arguments at trial 

and in his posttrial motion and finding that the defendant’s arguments were close enough to avoid 

forfeiture); see also People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 347 (2007) (finding that the defendant 

adequately preserved the issue even though the specific statements were not precisely the same 

statements as those mentioned in the defendant’s posttrial motion). Thus, we deem the issue

properly preserved and we need not resort to plain error review. 

¶ 53 Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent an abuse 

of that discretion, reversal is not warranted. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). “An abuse 

of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, 

or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.

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¶ 54 Generally, evidence must be relevant to be admitted at trial. People v. Williams, 384 Ill. 

App. 3d 327, 333 (2008). “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence.’ ” People v. Tatum, 2019 IL App (1st) 162403, ¶ 111 

(quoting Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). In particular, a weapon “is relevant if there is 

evidence to connect it with the defendant and with the crime.” People v. Jones, 22 Ill. 2d 592, 599 

(1961). Even if a party establishes the relevance of the evidence, the trial court may still exclude 

the evidence on the basis that it creates an unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its 

probative value. Tatum, 2019 IL App (1st) 162403, ¶ 111.

¶ 55 In the instant case, the police searched defendant’s home and discovered a number of 

knives in a cabinet. None of those knives were connected to the murder. The State sought to admit 

the photographs of the knives because they showed an “empty space” where a knife could have 

been, raising an inference that the murder weapon was taken from defendant’s bedroom. The trial 

court allowed Sergeant Walker to testify as to what he observed in defendant’s bedroom and, based 

on that testimony, the photographs of the cabinet and its contents were admitted.

¶ 56 Defendant contends that the trial court erred because there was still no evidence that 

connected to the crime charged and the photographs were highly prejudicial and “served little 

purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury.” In response, the State rejects defendant’s 

assertion that the State was using the photographs to suggest that the knives shown in the photos 

were used in the commission of the murder. Rather, the State asserts that it was using the apparent 

absence of a knife as circumstantial evidence that defendant took a knife from his house when they 

stopped there prior to the motel and discarded it after the murder. 

¶ 57 For the reasons that follow, we agree with the State. 
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¶ 58 We first find that the photographs of the empty space in the cabinet were relevant. The 

medical examiner testified that a knife was used in the commission of the murder. The photographs 

showed the contents of a cabinet in defendant’s bedroom during the execution of a search warrant. 

Those contents included three knives, and as Sergeant Walker unambiguously testified, none of 

those knives were the murder weapon. There was, however, an empty space next to the knives that 

was surrounded by dust, suggesting that an item had been in that space recently. The empty space 

was approximately 13 inches in length, as shown in one of the photographs, and the witnesses’ 

testified that the knife they saw in defendant’s hand was approximately 8 to 12 inches long. 

Krysowaty and Lal also testified that defendant was not seen with a knife when they left Balog’s 

apartment, but they stopped at defendant’s home before going to the motel and defendant was seen 

after leaving the motel room with a knife in his hand. The photographs of the empty space, 

therefore, served as circumstantial evidence that defendant possibly removed an item from his 

bedroom before going to the motel that could have been used to kill Jefferson. Thus, a plausible 

connection was demonstrated and, thus, the evidence was relevant. See People v. Lee, 242 Ill. 

App. 3d 40, 43 (1993) (“A doubt whether the weapon was connected to the crime or to the 

defendant does not prevent the weapon’s admission, so long as a reasonable jury could find a 

connection.”). We now turn to whether the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its 

probative value. 

¶ 59 We first note that “all evidence offered at trial is prejudicial in that it is introduced for the 

purpose of proving the proponent’s case or undermining the opponent’s case; if it were not 

prejudicial, it would not be relevant.” (Emphasis original.) People v. Zimmerman, 2018 IL App 

(4th) 170695, ¶ 120. Our rules of evidence only prohibit unfairly prejudicial evidence. Ill. R. Evid. 

403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 
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¶ 60 Here, the admission of this photographic evidence would be unfairly prejudicial had it been 

presented to suggest that, because defendant owned knives, he was more likely to be a dangerous 

person or to be Jefferson’s murderer. However, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the photographs 

were not admitted to show the other knives defendant owned. Rather, the purpose of the evidence 

was to show the space where another knife could have been, and, based on the other evidence

presented during the trial, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant took a knife from 

his bedroom that night and that knife was never found. As such, we believe the photographs were

properly admitted circumstantial evidence that showed defendant potentially had access to a knife 

similar to the one used in the commission of the crime and that such a knife was missing from 

defendant’s bedroom. See People v. Hoffstetter, 203 Ill. App. 3d 755, 772-73 (1990) (finding that 

circumstantial evidence that the defendant had access to a weapon similar to the one that must 

have been used but was never found was properly admitted). 

¶ 61 Moreover, the jury was not left to wonder whether any of the other knives in defendant’s 

cabinet could have been used in the crime. Sergeant Walker admitted that none of the other knives 

were connected to the murder. Additionally, defense counsel was able to argue this point, as well 

as any other weakness in the evidence’s probative value. See People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 416-

17 (1983) (cautioning against confusing admissibility with probative value as the defendant may 

argue to the jury that the lack of probative value of certain evidence but cannot bar its admission). 

¶ 62 We perceive no unfair prejudice in the admission of the photographic evidence. Even

accepting that there was any, such prejudice was minimized through cross-examination and closing 

arguments. Moreover, as we have already explained above, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was 

overwhelming, and as such, any potential prejudice caused by the admission of the photographs 

was harmless. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. 
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¶ 63 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 64 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 65 Affirmed.