IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-CA-00383-COA MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES APPELLANT

v. BEN PORTER APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/29/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GEORGE W ARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JEFFERSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LEW IS CLARK HUNTER DEANNA LYNNE GRAVES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: PAUL ANDERSON KOERBER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: ESTABLISHED PATERNITY AND DENIED REQUEST FOR CHILD SUPPORT DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/27/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES, CARLTON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ. BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The Jef

f erson C ounty Chancery Court f ound that Ben Porter, a Mississippi resident,

was not obligated to pay child support f or his daughter, a n Illinois resident, because she had reached the age of m ajority under Illinois law. However, under the choice-of -law provisions of the Unif

orm I nterstate Fam i ly Support Act (UIFSA), Mississippi law applies to this childsupport action, a s the Mississippi court was the f irst court t o issue a s u p p o r t order. At the tim e t his action was com m enced, Porter’s daughter was t wenty y ears old—a m inor under Mississippi law. B ecause the chan c e llor erred in apply ing Illinois’s age of m ajority(nineteen) rather t han applicable Mississippi law, we r everse a nd r em and f or the im position of Mississippi law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. S.M. 1 w as born in April 1995 t o Gail Morris in Chicago, Illinois. No f ather is nam ed

on S.M.’s birth certif

icate. In October 1995, the State of Illinois brought a p aternity action

to establish Porter as S.M.’s f ather. Due to inactivity in t he case and other def iciencies, the

case was d ism issed on April 5, 2006. Som etim e prior to Decem ber 2011, Porter m oved to Jef f erson County , Mississippi. Morris and S.M. rem ained in Chicago. ¶3. In Decem

b er 2011, the Illinois Departm ent o f Heal t h c a r e a n d F a mi l y S e r v i c e s (IDHFS) requested the Mississippi Departm ent of Hum an Services (MDHS) t o p etition the
J e f f erson County Chancery Court to establish paternity of S.M. I DHFS requested t h a t MDHS seek an o r der of ongoing child support and r etroactive support. P orter subm itted to genetic testing, which indicated a greater than 99.9% probabi l i ty that Porter was S.M.’s f ather. ¶4. On April 17, 2012, MDHS f iled a petition f

o r child support in the Jef f erson County Chancery Court. A Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81 sum m ons and a com plaint were served on Porter on April 30, 2012. Porter f iled his answer and d ef

enses on June 11, 2012.
A hearing was initially scheduled f or June 26, 2012, but was continued m ultiple tim es. On the s cheduled O c t o b e r 2 3 , 2012 hearing date, Porter’s attorney m oved t o withdraw as counsel. The m otion was granted, but no continuance w as ordered. Process was lost. See

1 In itials a re su b stitu t ed f o r th e c h ild ’s n am e in acco rd an c e w i th sectio n 6 (A )(2 ) o f M ississip p i’s A p p ellate E -F ilin g A d m in istrativ e P r o ced u r es. 2M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5).

¶5. M D H S r e f

i l e d i ts com

plaint on April 6, 2015. A R ule 81 sum m ons w as issued f o r Porter to appear on June 23, 2015. Porter appeared o n that d ate, and a judgm e n t of paternity

was ent e r e d

. The June 23, 2015 judgm ent ordered Porter to pay $252 per m onth in child support until S.M. t

urned twenty -one—a total o f t en m onths of child support—unless S.M.

was em ancipated b ef

ore turning twenty -one. Specif ically , the j u d g ment states: “The Def endant is required to pay $252.00 beginning 7/1/2015 f or the support of the m inor child,

a n d s h a l l c o ntinue each m onth thereaf ter until the child reaches the a ge of 21, m arries, or otherwise becom es em ancipated.” Por t e r mo v e d to set aside the judgm ent, arguing that
I llinois’s age of m ajority (nineteen) applied, rather than Mississippi’s age of m ajorit y (twenty -one), and that he had no obligation to support S .M. since she w as no longer a m inor under Illinois law. Af

ter a hearing, the chancellor agreed t hat Illinois’s age of m ajority applied. On February 2 9, 2016, the chancellor o rdered that the J une 2 3, 2015 child-support order be set aside. Porter was not ordered to pay any support. ¶6. MDHS appeals, arguing that under the choice-of

- law provisions of the U I F SA, the chancellor was required to apply Mississippi l aw, including Mississippi’s twenty

- one-y ear
age o f m ajority

. Porter asserts the Jef f erson C ounty Chancery C ourt lacked jurisdiction over this m a tter entirely , and, alternatively , that the chancellor’s decision apply ing Illinois’s age of m ajority was correct. DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancery court had subject-m atter jurisdiction.

3¶7. W h ile Porter alternatively argues that the c h ancellor’s decision should be af f irm ed, he f irst asserts the chancellor lacked subject

- m atter jurisdiction over MDHS’s c om plaint.
As Porter’s argum ent regarding lack of subject-m atter j u r i sdiction, if correct, would be dispositive of

this appeal, we address it f irst. ¶8. “Jurisdiction is a question of law, which [ we] review d e novo.” Derr Plantation Inc. v. Swarek , 14 S o. 3d 711, 715 (¶8) (Miss. 2009). “[ T]he f actual f indings underpinning the jurisdiction question a re revie w e d under t he f am iliar substantial-evidence and abuse-of

- discretion standards.” H amilton v. Y

oung , 213 S o. 3d 69, 74 (¶11) (Miss. 2017).
“A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes def endants to the State’s coercive power, and i s theref

ore subject to review f

or com patibility w ith the Fourteenth Am endm ent’s Due
Process C lause.” G oodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011) (citing Int’l S

hoe Co. v. W

ashington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 ( 1945)). Personal jurisdiction is not disputed, as Porter lived in Jef f erson County and was served with process there. Int’l Shoe , 326 U.S. a t 316. R ather, Porter ch a l l e n g es the chancery court’s subject-m atter jurisdiction. The issue of subject-m atter juri s d i c tion c an be raised at any tim e in the proceedings, even on appeal. Pierce v. Pierce , 132 So. 3d 553, 560 (¶14) (Miss. 2014). ¶9. “To determ ine whether a court has subject[ -]m atter jurisdiction, we look to the f ace of the com

plaint, exam i ning the nature of the controversy a nd the relief sought.” R a m-Kabir of America LLC v. S

. C

. A nderson Grp. Int’l , 199 S o. 3d 1240, 1241 (¶4) (Miss. 2016) (quoting RAS Fami l

y P a r t n e r

s v. Onnam B iloxi LLC , 968 S o. 2 d 926, 928 (¶11) (Miss. 2007)). “Jurisdiction is decided based on the existing f acts at the time the action is

4com m enced.” Id. (quoting Bronk v. Hobson , 152 So. 3d 1130, 1132 (¶3) (Miss. 2014)).

¶10. W h en parties to a c hild-suppo r t a c t i o n reside in dif f erent states, the jurisdictional provision s o f UIFSA c ontrol. 2 Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 18.08 (2005). Both Mississippi and Illinois have adopted substantively identical f o rm s of UIFSA.
See Miss. Code Ann. § § 9 3-25-101 to -903 (Supp. 2016); 3 750 I l l

. C o m p. Stat. 22/100- 22/ 9 9 9

. “ The p urpose of the U IFSA is to unif y state laws governing the establishm ent, enf orcem ent, and m odif

ication of child[ -]support orders.” Gowdey v. G owdey , 825 So. 2d 67, 70 (¶11) ( Miss. C t. A pp. 2002) ( c i t i n g 23 Am

. J ur. 2d D esertion & Nonsupport § 73 (2002)). “The UIFSA does not create a d u t y o f s u pport; it does, however, provide the procedural f

ram ework f

or enf orcing one state’s s upport o rd e r i n a n o t her jurisdiction.” Id. ( c i t i n g T h r i f t v. Thrift , 760 So. 2d 732 (¶15) (Miss. 2000)). It “was created t o ensure th e unif orm ity of decisions concerning the issue of child support.” Id. ¶11. U I F S A’s purpose is explained in Bell on Mississippi Family Law , s ection 18.08, as f ollows:

2 A ll states h av e e n a c t e d U IF S A , as its en actm e n t “w as [ f ed erally ] m an d ated as a co n d itio n o f state elig i b ility f o r th e f ed eral f u n d in g o f ch ild [ -] su p p o r

t en f o r cem e n t an d

. . . to c o n tin u ed receip t o f s u b sid ies f o r T A N F (T em

p o r ary A ssistan c e f

o r N eed y F am ilies).” Jo h n J. S am so n & B a rry J. B ro o k s, In teg ra t in g U IF S A ( 2 0 0 8 ) w ith th e H

a g u e C o n victio n o f 2 3 N o v em b e r 2 0 0 7 o n th e In tern a tio n a l R eco very o f C h ild S u p p o rt a n d O t

h er F o rm s o f F a m ily M a in ten a n ce , 4 9 F am . L .Q . 1 7 9 , 1 8 7 (2 0 1 5 ).

3 M issi s s i p p i’s cu rren t v ersio n o f U IF S A w as en acted d u rin g th e 2 0 1 5 M ississip p i leg islativ e sessio n th ro u g h S e n a t e B ill 2 3 0 1 , C h ap ter 3 6 7

. U IF S A w as f irst en acted in M ississip p i in 1 9 9 7 an d co d if ied in M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n s 9 3 -2 5

- 1 th ro u g h -1 1 7

. S ectio n s 9 3 -2 5

- 1 th ro u g h -1 1 7 w ere r ep ealed an d rep laced b y sectio n s 9 3 -2 5 -1 0 1 th ro u g h -9 0 3 , ef

f e ctiv e Ju ly 1 , 2 0 1 5

. T h e p ro v isio n s relev an t to th is m atter a r e s u b stan tiv ely th e sam e u n d er b o th v ersio n s. 5[ UIFSA] provides jurisdictional and procedural rules governing a c t ions to

recover spousal or child support. These rules apply whether support is sought in a s uit f or divorce, an independent action f or child support, o r a p a t e r n i ty action. The Act governs initial orde r s f or support as well as petitions to m odif y support. UIFSA was designed to f acilitate interstate establishm ent and enf orcem ent of support and paternity orders. The Act c reates a two-state pro c edure that allows a petitioner to proceed in another s tate by f iling a petition in his or her hom e state. In addition, the Act sets out the procedure f or registering an order in another s tate. To reduce interstate conf licts over m odif ication jurisdiction, the Act creates a unif orm sy stem f or m o dif ication, recognizing continuing exclusive jurisdiction in t he i ssuing court whil e any party or child rem ains in the issuing state. ¶12. In apply ing UIFSA’s provisions to this m atter, we m ust f irst understand certain term s def ined by its provisions. First, a “ tribunal” under UIFSA is “a court, adm inistrative agency

or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establis h , enf orce or m odif

y support orders or to determ ine parentage of a child.” Miss. Code A nn. § 93-25-102(29). “The chancery courts, circuit and county courts, a nd tribal courts are the tribunals o f t his state.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-103(a). The “ responding tribunal” is “the authorized tribunal in a responding state

or f o reign country .” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-102(24). The “responding state” is the “state in which a com

plaint or com

parable pleading f

or support or to determ i ne parentage of a child is f iled or to which a com

plaint o r com

p arable pleading is f

orwarded f

or f iling f r om another

state o r f o reign country .” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-102(23). The “issuing tribunal” is “the tribunal of

a state or f

oreign country that issues a support order o r a judgm ent determ ining parentage of a child.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-102(14). Here, IDHFS, Division of Child Supp o r t, c ontacted MDHS and requested that it f ile a com plaint against Porter. Thus, Mississippi is the responding s tate, and the re s p o n d i n g t ribunal i s the Jef f erson County Chancery Court. The Jef

f erson County Chancery Court is also t he issuing t ribunal, as it was

6the f

irst to issue a support order or determ ination of paternity

. ¶13. W i th the understandi n g t h a t M i s sissippi is the responding s t ate and t he Jef f erson County Chancery C ourt is the responding tribunal, we look t o section 9 3-25-303 to determ ine whether the Jef

f e rson County C hancery Court had s u b j e c t

- m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n . S e c t ion 93-25-
303 states that the “responding tribunal” has the authority to “exercise all powers and provide all rem edies available” and “[ d]eterm ine the d uty of support and the am ount pay able[ .]” On its f a ce, t he com

plaint sought an initial determ i nation of child support, which i s a subject

m atter encom

passed by UIFSA. Thus, the c hancery court was an appropriate tribunal under UIFSA, and the chancery court had subject-m a t ter jurisdiction over this m atter. 1. Lack of Prior Support Order ¶14. Porter argues that the Jef f erson County C h a n c e r y C o u r t cannot be a “responding tribunal” u nder s e ctio n 93-25-303, because there i s n o “initiating tribunal” or enf orceable
sup p o r t o r der i ssued by a nother state. A n “ initiating tribunal” is “the tribunal of a state or f oreign country f

rom which a com

plaint or c om

parable pleading i s f

orwarded or i n which a

com plaint or com

parable pleading is f

iled f or f orwarding to another state o r f oreign country .” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-102(11). ¶15. UIFSA does not requir e t h e existence of an initiating tribunal or registered support

o r d e r t o b r ing an a ction under its provisions. As s tated by the National Conf erence o f
Com m i ssioners on Unif

orm State Laws, which prom ulgated UIFSA, in the of

f icial com m ent
to s ection 307(a): “The f

ocus . . . i s on providing s ervices to a petitioner. Either the obligee

or the o bligor m ay reques t services, and that request m ay be in the context of the

7establishment of an i nitial child-support o r d e r . . . .” (Em

phasis added). 4 Further, the of f icial com m ent to section 102, UIFSA’s def inition section, provides: The def initions in subsections (23) “responding state,” and (24) “responding tribunal,” accom m odate t he direct f iling of a petition under UIFSA without the intervention of an initiating tribu n a l

. B o th def initions acknowledge the possibility that there m ay be a responding s tate and a r esponding tribunal in a situation where there is no initiating tribunal. Under current practice, the initial applicati o n f

o r s e rvices m ost of

ten will be generated by a support enf orcem ent a gency . . . a nd sent to the appropriate support enf orcem ent agency in the responding state. (Em phasis added). Also, the of f i cial com m ent to section 301 5 states: Although the f

iling of a petition in an initiating tribunal to be f o rwarded to a responding tribunal is still rec o g n i z e d as an available procedure, the direct f iling procedure has proven to be one of the m ost signif icant i m p rovem ents in ef f icient interstate case m anagem ent. The p rom ulgation a n d u s e of the f edera l l y m a

n d a t e d , o r s u

b s t a n t i a l l y c o n fo rm ing, f

orm s, Section 311(b), f

urther serves to eliminate any role for the initiating tribunal. (Em phasis added). ¶16. S e c t i o n 9 3

- 2 5

- 4 0 1 ( a ) (1) specif ically provides f

o r the e s tablishm ent of an initial support order by t he r esponding tribunal. This section s tates: “If a support order entitled to recognition under this act has not been issued, a r e s p onding tribunal of this state with

4 M ississip p i’s co rresp o n d in g statu to ry en actm en t o f sectio n 3 0 7 (a) states: “(a) In a p ro ceed i n g u n d er th is ch ap ter, a su p p o rt en f o rcem en t ag en cy o f th is state, u p o n req u est[ , ]

. . . [ s] h all p ro v id e serv ices to a co m p lain an t resid in g in a state[ .] ” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3

- 2 5 -3 0 7 (a)(1 ).

5 S ectio n 9 3 -2 5 -3 0 1 (b ) states:
A n in d i v id u a l co m

p lain an t o r a su p p o rt en f o r cem en t ag en cy m ay i n i tiate a p ro ceed in g au t h o rized u n d er th is ch ap t er b y f ilin g a co m

p lain t in an in i tiatin g trib u n al f o r f o rw ard i n g to a resp o n d in g trib u n a l o r b y f i lin g a co m

p l ain t o r a co m p arab le p lead in g d irectly in a trib u n al o f an o th e r state o r a f o reig n co u n try w h ich h as o r

can o b tain p erso n al j u risd ictio n o v e r th e d ef en d an t. 8personal jurisdiction over the p a rties m ay issue a support order if

. . . the individual seeking

the o rder resides outside thi s s t a t e [

. ]” Further, section 93-25-402 p rovides f or the determ ination of p arentage i n the responding tribunal: “A tribunal of this state authorized

to d eterm ine parentage of a child m ay serve as a responding tribunal i n a p r o c e eding to determ ine par e n t a g e o f a child brought under this act or a l aw or procedure substantially sim ilar to this act.” Section 93-25-305(b)(1) also gives a responding tribunal of this state the authority t o “[ e ]stablish . . . a support order[ .]” Thus, Porter’s argum ent that there m ust be an order of

support f rom an initiating tribunal in another state is without m erit. ¶17. Porter also asserts t he initial Illi n o i s a c t ion was d ism issed “with prejudice,” which would p reclude f

urther action to establish child support, and that Illinois retains jurisdiction because t he initial action w as f iled there. The record of t he Illinois proceedings i nitiated in
1995 is not part of the record in this appeal. In s upport of the assertion t h a t t h e 1995 case

was dism issed with prejudice, Porter cites a June 1, 2012 letter f rom an Illinois attorney written t o the MDHS attorney , w hich states that “[ t]he case was ultim ately dism issed ‘with prejudice[ .]’” The letter goes on to state that the dism issal “with prejudice,” which m eans the case “can n o t be reinstated and it cannot be re-f iled,” “as it applies t o parentage and child[ -]support cases[ ,] m a y be against the public policy of the State of Illinois[ .]” ¶18. The letter stating t he I llinois action was dism issed with p rejudice is hearsay , and there is nothing in the record supporting the assertion that the case was dism issed w ith prejudice. The Cook County , Illinois Circuit Clerk’s docket ref lects that on Apri l 5 , 2006, the entire

case was dism i ssed. I t d oes not specif y whether the dism issal was with or without prejudice.

9T h e r e c o rd indicates elsewhere that the dism issal w as without prejudice. O n a docum e n t

f iled i n Illinois i n August 2 0 15, there is a handwritten note that states: “Respondent voluntarily withdraws his m oti o n [ f o r D NA testing f

iled 6/15/15,] since t his case was dism issed without prejudice per 4/5/06 order.” Regardless, Porter did not assert res judicata

as an af f i rm ative def

ense, and t his issue is n ow p rocedurally barred. “[ R]es judicata is an af f irm ative d ef

ense that m ay be w a ived.” Hinton v. Rolison , 175 So. 3d 1 252, 1258 (¶22) (Miss. 2015). ¶19. Further, Porter’s assertion that Illinois retained continuing jurisdiction o ver the childsupport action because the action was i nitially f iled there i s without m erit. Porter is correct
t h a t “ the issuing state [ retains] continuing, exclusive jurisdiction u ntil another stat e (registering state) acquires jurisdiction. The continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the issuing

state rem a ins in ef

f ect as long as o n e o f the parents or t he child still r esides in the issuing state, unless the parties agree to t he c ontrary .” H a m i l t o n , 2 13 So. 3d at 75 (¶12) (quoting
Grumme v. Grumme , 871 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (¶6) (Miss. 2004)); see also M iss. Code Ann. §§ 9 3 -25-609 &

- 6 1 1 ( a)(2). However, no s upport o rder was issued in Illinois. Since no support order was issued in Illinois, there was nothing requiring any f urther action in Illinois, and the dism issal order did not c onvey j urisdiction on the I llinois court over any f uture requests f or support. See In r e M.I.M. , 3 70 S.W

. 3d 94, 98 (Tex. App. 2 012). 6 Also, because

6 In M

. I.M

. , th e ap p ellan t arg u e d t h e 2 1 9 th D istrict C o u rt in C o llin C o u n ty , T ex as, lack ed su b

j ect-m a tter j u r isd ictio n b ecau se th e ch ild -su p p o rt actio n h ad i n i tially b een f i led in t h e 2 9 6 th D istrict C o u rt o f C o llin C o u n ty , T ex as. M .I.M

. , 3 7 0 S .W. 3 d at 9 8

. T h e in itial p ro ceed i n g in th e 2 9 6 th d istrict w as d ism issed f o r w a n t o f p ro secu tio n , a n d a f in al su p p o rt o rd er w as n ev er p u rsu ed

. Id

. O n ap p eal, th e T ex as C o u rt o f A p p eals, D allas, a p p lied th e p ro v isio n s o f t h e U IF S A a n d f o u n d t h at th e “f

a i lu re to p u r su e a f

in al o rd er in th e [ in itial] 1 0no judgm e nt was entered in Illinois, there was no support order to r egister i n Mississippi, and

there was no need f

o r consent o f the parties t o e n f o rce t he judgm ent in Mississippi. See Hamilton , 213 So. 3d at 75 ( ¶12); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-25-609 &

- 611(a)(2). Rather, since

no prio r s u p p o r t order had been entered prior to the Jef f erson County Chancery Court’s support order , t h e J e f

f erson County Chancery Court, a s the f irst c ourt to issue a support order, becam e the issuing tribunal, and M ississippi becam e the i s s u i n g state. Thus, jurisdiction to establish a support order was proper in Mississippi.

2. Lack of P ay m ent of Public A ssistance by Mississippi ¶20. Porter argues that MDHS m ust prove i t provided p ublic assistance to Morris or S.M. f or i t to bring a claim under UIFSA in Mississippi. Porter a r gues that because neither Morris

n or S .M. lived in Mississippi, and that because no public assistance f rom the s t a t e o f Mississippi had been paid, MDHS had no interest in this m a tter. 7 ¶21. Porter cites Department o f Healthcare & Family Services v
. Arevalo , 68 N.E.3d 552,
560 (¶23) (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Department of Human Services v. Shelnut , 772 So. 2d
1041 (Miss. 2000)), f

or the a rgum ent that bec a u se UIFSA creates no d uty of support, “the

p ro ceed i n g n eg at e [ d ] th e ex isten ce o f c o n tin u in g , e x clu siv e j u r isd ictio n in th e [ in itial] [ d ] istrict [ c] o u rt.” Id

.

7 M D H S ’ s co m

p lain t f iled o n A p ril 1 7 , 2 0 1 2 , in c o rrectly stated t h a t M o rris an d S .W. w e re M i ssissip p i resid en ts. H o w e v er, th i s w as c o rrected in M D H S ’s s eco n d co m p l ain t f i led o n A p ril 6 , 2 0 1 5 , w h i ch stated th at M o rris an d S .W. w ere Illin o is resid en ts. Wh ile P o rter arg u es M D H S f

iled th e seco n d co m

p lain t w i th o u t leav e, th is issu e w as n o t raised b elo w an d is p ro ced u rally b arred o n a p p eal. It i s u n d isp u t ed th at n eith er M o rris n o r S .W. h av e liv ed in M ississip p i , n o r is th ere a n y in d icatio n th ey h av e ev er v isited o r recei v e d s u p p o r t f ro m t h i s s t a t e . T h e ch an cello r’s Ju n e 2 3 , 2 0 1 5 o rd er also i n c o r rectly states th at M o rris is a resid en t o f J ef

f erso n C o u n ty

. T h e o rd e r settin g asid e th e Ju n e 2 3 su p p o rt o rd e r co rrectly states M o rris an d S .W. are Illin o i s resid en ts. 1 1only basis then f or the creation or generation of a claim to be asserted by MDHS under the
UIFSA is f

or it t o show and prove that it p rovided public a s sistance” to Morris o r S .M. However, Arevalo goes o n to cite, c o r r e c t l y , the p rovision of U IFSA s tating that since no support duty i s created by UIFSA, courts m ust look to “the substantive and procedural law of the f o rum state” t o determ ine whether a duty exists. Id. (citing 7 50 Ill. C om p. Stat. 22/303 (W est 2014)). ¶22. O u r l a w s t a t e s t h a t M D H S i s a u t h o r i z e d “ [ t ] o a c c e p t a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r

c h i l d [- ] support[

- ]enf

o rcem ent services to establish paternity , secure a nd collect suppo r t fr o m

a n y p r oper party or person as def ined by Title IV-D of the f e deral Social Security A c t notwithstanding the f

act that the child or c h ildren do not currently receive or have never received public assistance.” Miss. Code Ann. § 49-19-31(d) (Rev. 2012). It is undisputed that Morris f

ell under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Further, UIFSA requires MDHS

to provide services t o any one residing in any state, who is entitled t o s upport. Section 93-25- 307(a)(1) states: “In a proceeding under this chapter, a support[ -]enf orcem ent agency of this state, upon request[ , ]

. . . [ s] hall provide services t o a com plainant r esiding in a state

. . . .” (Em phasis added). Also, the unof f icial annotation to section 203 8 provides t hat “[ a]lthough the tribunal is em

powered t o initiate a request f or a support order, it is a lm ost alway s the case that it i s the support[ -]enf orcem e nt agency that initiates a proceeding to a nother state by sending the docum ents to the su p p ort[ -]enf orcem ent agency in t

hat state .” (Em

phasis

8 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3 -2 5 -2 0 3 ( “U n d er th is ch ap ter, a trib u n al o f th is state m ay serv e as an in itiatin g trib u n a l to f o rw ard p ro ceed in g s to a trib u n al o f an o th er state an d a s a resp o n d in g trib u n al f

o r p ro ceed in g s in itiated in an o th er state . . . .”).

1 2added). As there was no requirem ent that Morris o r S.M. r e s ide in Mississippi or receive

support f rom this state to convey

jurisdiction in Mississippi, this issue is without m erit.
II. Whether Mississippi’s or Illinois’s age of m ajority applies. ¶23. H a v i n g e s t a b l i s h e d that j urisdiction was p roper in the chancery c o u r t , w e n o w determ ine whether Mississippi’s or Illinois’s age of m ajority applies under UIFSA. ¶24. UIFSA contains the f ollowing choice-of

-law provision: Except as otherwise provided in t his chapter, a responding tribunal of this state shall: (1) Apply the p rocedural and substa n t i v e law generally applicable to sim i lar proceedings originati n g in this state and m a y exercise all powers and p rovide a ll rem edies av a i l a b l e in those proceedings; and (2) Determ ine the duty of s u p p ort and the am ount pay able in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-25-303. The Jef f erson C o u n t y C h a ncery Court was the responding tribunal, as it was the authorized court in the responding state ( Mississippi). Section 93-25-
303 is clear that the resp o n d i n g t r ibunal—the Jef f erson C ounty Chancery Court—is to determ ine child support “in a ccordance with the law

. . . of this state .” (Em phasis added). Thus, this state’s law applies. ¶25. Under Mississippi s tatutory law, a “ m inor” is “any person . . . under twenty -one y ears of a ge.” Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-27 (Rev. 2014). At the tim e of this action, S.W

. was twenty
y ears old—a m inor under our law. Mississippi Code A nnotated section 93-11-65(8)(a) (Rev. 2013) states that unless otherwise ordered in t he underly i ng child-support ju d g me nt,

em ancipation shall occur when the chi l d (1) turns t wenty -one, ( 2) m arries, (3) joins the

1 3mi l i t a r y and s e rves on a f u ll-tim e basis, or (4) is convicted of a f elony and is sentenced to incarceration of two or m ore y ears f or com m i tting such f

elony

. As set f

o rth in section 93-11- 65(8)(a), applicable Mississi p p i law provides that the duty to p rovide child support ends upon

em ancipation. ¶26. As jurisdiction was proper in the J ef f erson County Chancery Court and Mississippi law applies, the d

u ty of support d id not term inate until S.M. reached twenty -one, unless S.M.

was em ancipated prior to turning twenty -one. Theref ore, the c hancellor erred in setting aside the initial child-support order, which required Porter to p ay child support until S.M. reached twenty

- one o r was otherwise em ancipated. T he chancellor’s f i nal judgm ent setting aside the child-support award is reversed, and t h i s m atter is rem anded f or reinstatem ent of the chancellor’s June 23, 2015 order apply ing Mississippi law. ¶27. THE JUDGMENT OF THE J EFFERSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED, AND THIS C ASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT W I T H THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE. LEE, C . J., IRVING, P.J., ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WE S TBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

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