This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-1274

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs.

Maurice Dwayne Copeland,

Respondent.

Filed March 11, 2024

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Halbrooks, Judge*

Otter Tail County District Court

File No. 56-CR-22-2884

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Kathleen J. Schur, Assistant County 

Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant)

Isaiah P. Volk, Thorwaldsen & Malmstrom, PLLP, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for 

respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and 

Halbrooks, Judge. 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant State of Minnesota argues that the district court erred by granting 

respondent Maurice Dwayne Copeland’s motion to suppress evidence and dismiss this 

matter. The state contendsthat evidence of a controlled substance was admissible because 

it was abandoned by Copeland. The state also argues that evidence of Copeland’s 

intoxication would have inevitably been discovered even if Copeland had not been arrested 

for possessing a controlled substance. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

FACTS

On December 15, 2022, at approximately 6:50 p.m., an Otter Tail County sheriff’s 

deputy saw Copeland’s truck in the ditch on the side of the road facing the wrong direction.

Due to the vehicle’s position and the wintry conditions, the deputy called for a tow. But

because the deputy’s shift was ending, he alerted Sergeant Allen Mekash.

Once Sergeant Mekash arrived, he talked with Copeland through the passenger 

window of the truck, as Copeland was still inside. Sergeant Mekash “observed 

[Copeland’s] eyes were bloodshot and watery” but did not detect any odor of alcohol. 

Sergeant Mekash asked Copeland about where he was driving from and his intended 

destination before running Copeland’s driver’s license information through his patrol 

vehicle computer. Copeland’s driver’s license showed that he was a valid driver, without 

any warrants, and that he had a prior “drug related” offense. 

While Sergeant Mekash was checking Copeland’s information, the tow truck began 

to pull the truck out of the ditch while Copeland remained in the vehicle. Once it was back 
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on the road, the tow truck driver advised Copeland and Sergeant Mekash that the vehicle 

was inoperable. The three began to talk about where the truck should be towed and where 

Copeland would like to go. Copeland had four alternatives. The tow truck driver offered 

to give Copeland a ride home or to the repair shop in New York Mills. Sergeant Mekash 

told Copeland that he could either give Copeland a ride home or Copeland could call 

someone to pick him up. Copeland opted for the ride home with Sergeant Mekash.

As Copeland stepped out of the vehicle, a small black plastic box fell out of the open 

door onto the ground. Sergeant Mekash walked over to the box and picked it up. He later 

testified the box appeared to be “[a] magnetic key box” that was not transparent or open 

when he picked it up. Sergeant Mekash said, “Think you dropped your key box, here.” 

Copeland replied, “Key box, what’s that?” Sergeant Mekash stated, “That’s what it looks 

like, it’s what you’d put a spare key in, but.” Sergeant Mekash then turned the plastic box 

over in his hands and opened it. 

Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white powder which field tested positive 

for cocaine. Sergeant Mekash placed Copeland under arrest for possession of a controlled 

substance. Copeland said, “I didn’t have that on me” to which Sergeant Mekash replied, 

“It just fell out of your truck, man.” Sergeant Mekash handcuffed Copeland and searched 

him while standing at the hood of his patrol vehicle. After placing Copeland in the back 

of his patrol vehicle, Sergeant Mekash asked Copeland, “You haven’t had anything to drink 

today, Maurice, have you?” Copeland admitted to having a beer and a shot earlier. 

Sergeant Mekash said, “I didn’t smell it when I was talking to you earlier, I smell it now, 

okay?” Copeland admitted that a glass in his vehicle contained beer. 
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Sergeant Mekash transported Copeland to the Otter Tail Operations Center and 

administered a field sobriety test and a preliminary breath test to Copeland. Copeland’s 

preliminary breath test showed a breath alcohol content of approximately 0.22.

The state charged Copeland with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, 

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and operating a motor 

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more 

within two hours. Copeland moved to suppress the evidence of the controlled substance 

and his intoxication, arguing that the key box had been searched illegally and that the 

resulting driving-while-impaired (DWI) evidence must also be suppressed as fruit of the 

poisonous tree. 

The district court heard testimony from the sergeant and received in evidence the 

video from the sergeant’s patrol vehicle. The sergeant testified that at all times he believed 

the key box belonged to Copeland. The sergeant also testified that he placed Copeland in 

the back passenger seat of the vehicle, which wasthe same place that Copeland would have 

been for the ride home even if he was not under arrest. In addition, the sergeant testified 

that the smell of alcohol from Copeland grew stronger over time. 

The district court granted Copeland’s motion suppressing the evidence and 

dismissing the charges. It found that the sergeant had not seized Copeland within the 

context of the Fourth Amendment. But the district court also found that Copeland’s 

statement, “Key box, what’s that?” could be interpreted as property abandonment. As a 

result, the district court ruled that Copeland abandoned the key box “in response to an 
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impermissible police intrusion.” The district court also determined that the sergeant would 

not have inevitably pursued a DWI investigation if the key box had not been opened. 

This appeal follows.

DECISION

We will only reverse a pretrial order that the state appeals if the state “clearly and 

equivocally” shows the order will have a “critical impact” on the case and was erroneous. 

State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotations omitted). A “critical 

impact” includes when a district court suppresses evidence that “significantly reduces the 

likelihood of a successful prosecution.” State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 

(Minn. 1987). The district court’s suppression of both the controlled-substance evidence 

and the evidence of Copeland’s intoxication certainly reduced the chances of a successful 

prosecution for possession of a controlled substance and driving while intoxicated. The 

critical impact standard is met here, so we next consider whether the district court’s order 

was erroneous.

We review a district court’s legal determinations for a pretrial suppression motion

de novo and the factual findings for clear error. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 

(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). The state 

argues that the district court erred by suppressing the evidence because the sergeant was 

permitted to search the key box without a warrant because it had been abandoned by 

Copeland and that the sergeant would have inevitably discovered Copeland’s intoxication. 
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I.

The district court found that Copeland had abandoned the key box in response to an 

illegal police intrusion. But not every encounter with police is a stop or seizure. 

State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). A seizure occurs when a reasonable 

person would not have felt free to disregard police questions or leave. Id. A police officer 

approaching a person and asking questions absent additional actions does not generally 

constitute a seizure. Id. Here, Copeland was given four choices. The sergeant told 

Copeland that he could call someone or that the sergeant would give him a ride home. The 

tow truck driver offered to take Copeland home or to his repair shop in New York Mills. 

The sergeant did not force Copeland to accept a ride from him or force Copeland into his 

patrol vehicle until after he opened the key box. On this record, we conclude that the 

sergeant did not illegally stop or seize Copeland. Therefore, the box was not abandoned in 

response to an illegal police intrusion.

A person has the right to be free from unreasonable searches of property where that 

person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 860 (Minn. 

2006). But a person no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in property that is 

abandoned. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004). “Abandonment is 

primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, 

and other objective facts.” City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Minn. 1975) 

(quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973)). “The issue is not 

abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person prejudiced by the 
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search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the 

property in question. . . .” Id.

The state argues that Copeland abandoned the key box by “den[ying] that it 

belonged to him” when the sergeant asked him about it. Our review of the record does not 

comport with that timeline. In the sergeant’s patrol-vehicle video, the sergeant 

immediately picked the key box up after it fell out of Copeland’s vehicle. The sergeant

stated to Copeland, “Think you dropped your key box here,” to which Copeland replied,

“Key box, what’s that?” Copeland did not deny the key box was his until after the sergeant

had searched it. As a result, we conclude that the argument that Copeland abandoned the 

key box prior to the search lacks merit. 

Further, the sergeant did not have a legal justification to search the key box. A 

search of a person’s property when that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 

must be either completed pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. 

Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Gail, 713 N.W.2d at 860. Here, the sergeant testified 

that he did not suspect Copeland of a crime at the time he opened the key box, that he did 

not have Copeland’s consent to search it, and that he did not have a warrant. The state 

makes no arguments other than abandonment as an exception to the warrant requirement 

to justify the warrantless search. Therefore, we conclude that the sergeant’s search of the 

key box was illegal and that the evidence found inside it must be suppressed under the 

exclusionary rule. 
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II.

The state next argues that, even if the sergeant had not searched the key box, he 

would have inevitably detected the odor of alcohol on Copeland and, therefore, the 

subsequent evidence of intoxication is admissible under the inevitable-discovery rule. If a 

police officer obtains evidence through an illegal search but the state can show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the officer would have inevitably discovered the 

evidence “through lawful means,” the evidence may be admitted. See State v. Licari, 659 

N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 476 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). To 

meet this burden the state must show the discovery “involves no speculative elements but 

focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.”

Id. (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444-45, n.5).

Here, the sergeant testified that he could smell alcohol when handcuffing Copeland 

and placing him in the patrol vehicle and that the smell grew stronger as time went on. 

Given that Copeland would have been in the same seat in the squad car whether he was 

arrested or just getting a ride home and that the smell of alcohol intensified in the confined 

space of a vehicle, we conclude that the state met its burden to show that the sergeant would 

have inevitably discovered evidence of Copeland’s intoxication. We therefore reverse the 

district court’s suppression of the DWI evidence and remand for trial on the DWI charges. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.