UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-1753

JOSE MANUEL VALLE AMAYA,

 Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: January 28, 2022 Decided: March 3, 2022

Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition for review denied by unpublished opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Agee and Judge Floyd joined.

ON BRIEF: John E. Gallagher, Catonsville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Timothy G. Hayes, Senior Litigation Counsel, Sunah 

Lee, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Jose Manuel Valle Amaya, a citizen of Honduras, applied for protection under the 

Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration 

Appeals both denied his application, and Valle now petitions for review. Because 

substantial evidence supports the decisions below, we deny Valle’s petition.

I.

A.

Valle entered the United States unlawfully in 2006. In July 2015, the Department of 

Homeland Security charged him with removability as a noncitizen present in the United 

States without being admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Valle then 

conceded removability through counsel. To avoid removal, Valle initially applied for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

(CAT). He later acknowledged that he was only applying for CAT protection.

1

Valle testified in support of his application at an April 2018 hearing. While in 

Honduras, Valle worked in construction supervising between fifteen and twenty workers

and making a good living. For several years (and until 2004), gang members robbed him 

once or twice each month while he was walking home from work. Valle reported these 

robberies to the police, who would come and ask for details about what happened and who 

the gang members were. 

1 In this appeal, Valle likewise only challenges the denial of relief under the CAT.
3

Because Valle oversaw payroll for his team, it was his responsibility to go to the 

bank and then pay each worker at the construction site. The robberies almost always

happened after Valle had already paid the other workers. But on one occasion in 2005, 

several armed gang members came to a construction site and took the entire payroll. The 

gang members approached Valle and asked, “Where is Jose Manuel?”—without realizing

that they were asking Valle about himself. During this robbery, one of the gang members 

hit Valle in the face with a pistol. Valle called the police, who came to help but did not 

arrive until after the gang members had left.

At some point, Valle transferred to work in other Honduran provinces to avoid the 

gang members. While he was away, gang members would sometimes come to Valle’s 

house, saying that he had “accounts pending” with the gang. A.R. 70. Valle only returned

home once a month to see his family, and when he did so he would stay inside to prevent 

gang members from noticing that he was home. Though Valle wanted to move, he didn’t 

“think about pick[ing] up everything and just mov[ing] to another place” because no one 

would buy his house and he “had everything already established” in his hometown. A.R. 

77. However, in December 2005, gang members came to Valle’s house and said that they 

would kill him unless he paid them 20,000 Lempiras within one week. Almost immediately 

thereafter, Valle fled Honduras. 

Valle left his wife and three children in Honduras. When asked whether his family 

had problems since he left, Valle said that gang members once threatened to steal his son’s 

shoes but that his family had “never been robbed.” A.R. 78. An affidavit from Valle’s wife 
4

recounted that people who she does not know have visited the house since Valle has left 

the country, and sometimes those people have hit or pointed guns at her or the children.

While Valle testified that he thought gang members would kill him upon his return 

to Honduras, he did not point to a specific gang or gang member. Valle also conceded that 

what happened to him could happen to anyone in Honduras.

B.

Three months after Valle’s hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) issued a decision 

denying Valle relief under the CAT. That decision began with a thorough discussion of 

Valle’s testimony, which the IJ found to be credible overall. On Valle’s CAT claim, the IJ 

found that Valle did not meet his burden to establish that he would more likely than not 

suffer torture with the acquiescence of government officials. As to the likelihood of torture, 

the IJ noted that Valle’s family had lived safely in Honduras since 2005, that Valle only 

noted one instance of gang members making threats to his family, and that the vague and 

unsupported assertions of Valle’s wife were insufficient. As to acquiescence, the IJ noted 

that the police “promptly responded and recorded the incidents” that Valle reported and

that “vague accusations of police inaction and inadequacy do not show that Honduran 

authorities would approve or willfully accept the actions of the gang members.” A.R. 50. 

She also recognized the “substantial effort” by the Honduran government to combat gang 

violence, which indicated that it “does not condone or acquiesce to gang misconduct.” A.R. 

50.

On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals first saw no legal or clear factual error 

in the IJ’s conclusion as to the likelihood of torture. Next, the Board recognized that the 
5

acquiescence issue should be analyzed under a willful blindness standard as opposed to 

one of willful acceptance. Despite the IJ’s use of the words “willfully accept,” the Board 

found that her decision did not require actual knowledge and thus “in substance 

conform[ed] to the ‘willful blindness’ standard.” A.R. 4. Because the IJ considered both 

general country conditions and specific claims by Valle and correctly found that mere 

inability to protect does not establish government acquiescence, the Board upheld the IJ’s 

decision.

Valle then timely petitioned this court for review.

II.

The governing law is clear. An applicant seeking CAT protection “must prove, first, 

that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 

removal and, second, that this torture will occur at the hands of government or with the 

consent or acquiescence of government.” Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 913 (4th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2012)); see also 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1208.16(c)(2). Torture is “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 

or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the 

consent or acquiescence of, a public official . . . or other person acting in an official 

capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). And acquiescence requires that “the public official, prior to 

the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his 

or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(7) (2018).

Our standard of review is likewise well-defined. When the Board “affirms the IJ’s 

opinion with an opinion of its own, we review both decisions.” Ortez-Cruz v. Barr, 951 
6

F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 456 (4th 

Cir. 2018)). Valle’s failure to meet his burden on his CAT claim is a factual finding which 

we review for substantial evidence. Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 

2019). That “highly deferential” standard, Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020), 

dictates that such “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Temu v. 

Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 891 (4th Cir. 2014) (“We uphold factual findings unless no rational 

factfinder could agree with the [Board’s] position.”). So we can reverse the Board’s 

decision only if the evidence “was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail 

to find” the requisite likelihood of torture and government acquiescence. SuarezValenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (denial of relief “shall be 

conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion”). The Board’s 

decision “must remain undisturbed” if “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 

evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Tang v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 

2016) (quoting Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011)).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of relief here. 

Valle did not establish that all reasonable adjudicators must conclude it was more likely 

than not that he would be tortured if returned to Honduras. Nor does Valle’s evidence 

compel us to conclude that the Honduran government would acquiesce in any such torture.

As a result, we deny Valle’s petition for review.
7

A.

First, Valle must prove that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 

conclude that “it is more likely than not” he “would be tortured if removed” to Honduras. 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). He cannot do so here. 

Valle argues that because he was robbed on a monthly basis for several years and 

threatened with death, it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to 

Honduras. As an initial matter, Valle must show that he “will be tortured, not merely 

threatened.” Ortez-Cruz, 951 F.3d at 202 (emphasis in original). Not every instance of 

violence amounts to torture. Del Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 218 

(4th Cir. 2020). Under the CAT, torture is “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman 

treatment.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (emphasis added). While facing multiple robberies is 

something no one would wish to endure, reasonable adjudicators could disagree as to 

whether that amounts to torture under the CAT. 

In stark contrast to the CAT’s careful definition of torture, Valle’s approach lacks 

almost any limiting principle. When Valle was asked whether what happened to him could 

happen to any Honduran citizen, he replied, “Of course.” A.R. 78. This failure “to establish 

he would be targeted by gangs more than any other citizens” decreases the likelihood that 

he will be tortured. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 449 (4th Cir. 2011). If pointing to 

commonplace violence suffices, then proving torture begins to look more like vaulting a

low hurdle rather than clearing the CAT’s “high bar.” Amaya-De Sicaran, 979 F.3d at 218.

Relatedly, evidence of past torture “does not create a presumption that an applicant 

will be tortured in the future” under the CAT. Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245. Instead, 
8

we must consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(3). Several strands of evidence diminish the likelihood of future torture in 

Valle’s case.

First, as the IJ and the Board recognized, Valle’s “wife and children have lived 

safely in Honduras since 2005.” A.R. 50. Valle testified that his family “ha[s] never been 

robbed” since he left, A.R. 78, and he recounted only one instance of a threat (to steal his 

son’s shoes) being issued in over a decade. This evidence decreases the likelihood that 

Valle will be tortured. See Ascencio v. Garland, 2022 WL 112071, at *7 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 

2022) (affirming denial of CAT relief in part because family members remained in El 

Salvador unharmed).

Second, by the time of Valle’s hearing, he had not been harassed by gang members 

for around thirteen years. This considerable length of time makes it less likely that Valle 

will be tortured if removed. See Ortez-Cruz, 951 F.3d at 203 (suggesting that a fifteen-year 

gap decreased the likelihood of torture); Monterroso-Ovalle v. Wilkinson, 836 F. App’x 

186, 187 (4th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that the amount of time since an abuser’s last contact 

with applicant is a relevant factor in a CAT claim). 

Third, when Valle was asked who specifically would kill him if he returned to 

Honduras, he replied, “I have been a target of the gangs.” A.R. 78. Valle thus resorted to a 

vague and amorphous category—“the gangs”—as opposed to a particular group or 

individual. An inability to point with some level of specificity to who will torture him

decreases the likelihood that Valle will in fact be tortured. See Lukunku-Tshibangu v. 

Lynch, 652 F. App’x 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2016) (petitioner’s failure to “specifically identify” 
9

those “who would want to harm him” weighed against his contentions that he was likely to 

be tortured). 

Finally, this likelihood further diminishes when Valle’s own testimony established

that the gang members who previously robbed him either “never knew” his name or knew 

his name but “didn’t recognize me because they asked myself about me.” A.R. 73, 80. If 

Valle’s identity remains unknown to the gang members (and nothing in the record indicates 

otherwise), it is difficult to conclude that they would torture him upon his return. See 

Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2014) (lack of evidence that the potential 

torturer knew applicant’s identity was relevant to a CAT claim). 

We must also consider “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the 

country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). CAT applicants like Valle “bear the burden of presenting evidence to 

show that relocation within the country of removal is not possible.” Suarez-Valenzuela, 

714 F.3d at 249. Here, the record demonstrates that Valle transferred to other provinces for 

work in response to the robberies. While Valle testified that the gang members would come 

to his house during this time, he did not suggest that they followed him to those other 

provinces. And he admitted that it was his own “ignorance,” A.R. 77, combined with a 

desire to avoid uprooting his family, that meant he did not relocate. This further undercuts 

Valle’s arguments about torture: he could relocate, even if he didn’t want to do so.

Examining the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

determination on this issue. Valle defines torture in a way that dilutes its seriousness, 

admits that his family has remained unharmed in Honduras, ignores the substantial passage 
10

of time, avoids specifying who will torture him, confesses that the gangs do not know his 

identity, and discounts the possibility of relocation within Honduras. Reasonable 

adjudicators thus are not compelled to find it more likely than not that Valle would be 

tortured if returned to Honduras.

B.

While Valle’s failure to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of torture defeats his 

claim, the IJ and the Board also found that Valle did not establish that the Honduran 

government would acquiesce in his torture. Valle must therefore prove that the evidence 

compels all reasonable adjudicators to conclude otherwise. In his attempt to do so, he 

argues that the IJ both applied an incorrect legal standard and made erroneous factual 

findings. Valle is wrong on both counts. Yet again, he cannot show that every rational 

factfinder would disagree with the Board’s position. See Temu, 740 F.3d at 891.

1.

Valle first claims that in assessing government acquiescence, the IJ used a willful 

acceptance standard rather than the proper willful blindness standard. Not so. Though the 

IJ referenced the incorrect standard in passing, she applied the correct standard in 

substance. We thus have no need to remand to the Board in this instance. SuarezValenzuela, 714 F.3d at 247.

We have previously noted that willful acceptance requires “actual knowledge” of 

torture, while willful blindness is a lower bar that can manifest either in actual knowledge 

or in “turn[ing] a blind eye.” Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245. And we have held that 

willful blindness can satisfy the CAT’s acquiescence requirement. Id. at 246. Because the 
11

IJ mentioned that accusations of police inaction did not show that Honduras would 

“willfully accept” the gang members’ actions, A.R. 50, we must “determine whether [she] 

actually applied the willful acceptance standard”—that is, whether she required actual 

knowledge for government acquiescence, Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 246.

The Board concluded that she did not; it instead found that “the Immigration Judge’s

decision in substance conforms to the ‘willful blindness’ standard.” A.R. 4 (citing SuarezValenzuela, 714 F.3d at 247). We agree. As the Board pointed out, the IJ considered both 

general country conditions and Valle’s specific claims. Nowhere did she explicitly require 

actual knowledge. And nothing in her analysis implicitly depended on the difference 

between actual knowledge and turning a blind eye: she focused on actions that pass muster 

under either standard, such as the police “promptly respond[ing] and record[ing] the 

incidents” Valle reported and the Honduran government “making a substantial effort” to 

combat gang violence. A.R. 50. Her “decision therefore conforms to the willful blindness 

standard.” Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 247. In such circumstances, “we need not 

remand the case.” Id.

2.

Having found no legal error, we turn to the Board’s factual findings. We conclude 

that substantial evidence in the record supports the Board’s finding that Valle did not meet 

his burden of establishing government acquiescence. Evidence both in Valle’s specific case 

and in Honduras generally shows that the government does not condone torture.

Begin with Valle’s testimony. He testified that whenever he would call the police 

to report a robbery, “they would come and say what happened to you, who robbed you.” 
12

A.R. 72. And after the robbery of the entire payroll, the police “came to help” once they 

were aware of the gang activity. A.R. 69. The IJ therefore correctly noted that “the local 

authorities promptly responded and recorded the incidents reported” by Valle. A.R. 50.

In response Valle does not allege that, say, the police laughed in his face, or told 

him they could not help for fear of gang retaliation, or actively colluded with the gang. See

Cabrera Vasquez, 919 F.3d at 220 (laughter); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 167 (4th 

Cir. 2012) (fear); Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 256 (4th Cir. 2019) (collusion).

Instead, Valle contends that the police were ineffective in investigating the robberies—that 

they did not apprehend the gang members involved or call him to follow up. But that the 

police have difficulty solving crimes does not mean that they condone or turn a blind eye 

to criminal activity. Amaya-De Sicaran, 979 F.3d at 219 (“[T]he government’s difficulty 

in eliminating this scourge does not equate to condoning it.”); Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 

828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general ineffectiveness on the government’s part 

to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.”).

Even in our own country, the violent-crime clearance rate leaves much to be desired.

In 2019, for example, only 30.5% of reported robberies were cleared. See Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2019 at 2 (2020), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/clearances.pdf. But this does not indicate

that the police condone crime or acquiesce to it. So we likewise decline to disparage the 

Honduran police simply for failing to solve every crime. 

Turn finally to the country conditions in the record. The IJ acknowledged that while 

“there is room for improvement” when it comes to gang violence and police ineffectiveness 
13

in Honduras, the government “is making a substantial effort” to combat these problems. 

A.R. 50. Among other things, the Honduran government has enacted a law that punishes 

gang membership; has deployed its military to help combat gangs; has taken steps to 

prosecute police officers and other government employees who have abused their 

authority; and has offered rehabilitation programs for former gang members. See A.R. 95, 

163–64, 166. Rather than turning a blind eye, Honduras is making an effort to ameliorate 

the problem. 

III.

All told, Valle failed to establish both that he is more likely than not to be tortured 

if removed to Honduras and that any such torture would occur with the acquiescence of the 

Honduran government. Having reviewed the record, we find that substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s denial of CAT relief. We thus deny Valle’s petition for review.

DENIED