Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1516 | December 6, 2019 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nicholas J. Hursh

Shambaugh, Kast, Beck &

Williams, LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Justin R. Wall

Wall Legal Services

Huntington, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Terry Honeycutt,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Ashten Harmon,

Appellee-Petitioner

December 6, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JP-1516

Appeal from the Wabash Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Robert R. 

McCallen, III, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

85C01-1608-JP-55

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1516 | December 6, 2019 Page 2 of 12

[1] Terry Honeycutt (Father) appeals the trial court’s order granting Ashten 

Harmon’s (Mother) request to relocate A.H. (Child) to Florida, arguing that (1) 

the relocation was not made in good faith and there were no legitimate reasons 

supporting the relocation; and (2) relocation was not in Child’s best interests. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

Facts

[2] Child was born to Father and Mother, who have never married, on October 16, 

2007. Mother has since married her current husband (Mother’s Husband). Nine 

years later, on December 16, 2016, Father and Mother filed a stipulation order 

establishing paternity, support, payment of uninsured medical expenses, 

visitations, and custody of Child, which was later approved by the trial court. 

Pursuant to that stipulation order, Father and Mother agreed that Father and 

Mother would retain joint legal custody of Child; Father would have Sunday, 

Tuesday, and Thursday overnights with Child; Father and Mother would 

coordinate transportation and care for Child; and Father would not pay child 

support. See generally Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10-11.

[3] On January 4, 2019, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate to Fort Myers, 

Florida—roughly 1,200 miles away—by January 21, 2019. The notice stated 

that Child would relocate with Mother to Florida in June 2019 after Child 

completed the spring semester at his current school. Additionally, Mother 

proffered the following reasons why they would be relocating and why she filed 

with such short notice: 
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a. [Mother’s Husband] was offered a partnership opportunity at a 

land surveying company based out of Bonita Springs, FL; 

b. [Mother’s Husband] was provided with a formal, written offer 

of employment, and accepted same, on January 3, 2019; 

c. [Mother’s Husband’s] offer requires him to begin employment 

on February 4, 2019; 

d. That the contract on [Mother’s] home is ending on January 31, 

2019 and [Mother] is unable to remain in the home and will be 

required to move her residence; 

e. That [Mother] and [Mother’s Husband] do not have the 

financial means to support the expenses of maintaining two 

different residences, even on a temporary basis; and

f. That [Mother’s Husband] is the primary source of income and 

[Mother] will need to relocate with her husband. 

Id. at 15-16. On January 9, 2019, Father filed an objection to the notice of 

relocation, a request for an emergency temporary order restraining Mother from 

relocating Child, and a motion to modify custody. The trial court summarily 

denied Father’s request for an emergency temporary order because Child would 

not be relocated until June 2019.

[4] On April 10 and May 23, 2019, the trial court held a bifurcated evidentiary 

hearing on all pending motions, at which multiple individuals—including 

Mother, Father, and Mother’s Husband—testified. After Mother and Father 

tendered final written arguments, on June 11, 2019, the trial court issued an 

order granting Mother’s request to relocate Child to Florida and denying 

Father’s motion to modify custody. The trial court found and held, in pertinent 

part, as follows:
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RELOCATION

[Mother] has to prove that the proposed relocation is made in 

good faith and for a legitimate reason. Despite the distance 

involved, [Mother] has met that burden.[fn3]

-fn3—While the decision to move to Florida was made 

quickly, that does not dictate that it was not for a legitimate 

reason or done in bad faith. Further [Mother and Mother’s 

Husband] had been thinking about such a move for some 

time. 

[Mother’s Husband] was offered a better job, with better benefits, a 

potential partnership and a work schedule that would allow him 

more time to spend with his family. However, he had to accept 

that job quickly. Additionally, [Mother] has obtained a better job 

with a work schedule that will likewise allow her to spend more 

time with [Mother’s Husband] and her children. The Court thinks 

the financial circumstances of [Mother and Mother’s Husband] are 

better in Florida, despite the debt they have taken on. 

In addition, [Mother and Mother’s Husband] were buying a home 

on contract in Indiana. Due to title problems, that deal collapsed. 

As a result, they had to find another home. 

Further, [Mother’s] future career plans are better accommodated 

living in Florida.[fn4] Clearly, [Mother and Mother’s Husband] 

want to provide the best possible life for themselves and their 

children. 

-fn4—While she initially testified she wants to go to law 

school, she is now pursuing a paralegal certification. Both 

goals reflect that she is thinking about her future and the 

future of her family by pursuing opportunities to improve 

herself.

[CHILD’S] BEST INTERESTS

Having found that [Mother] met her burden of proof, the burden 

shifts to [Father] to show that the proposed relocation is not in the 

best interests of [Child].
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It is important to the Court that while [Child] is 11, paternity was 

not established until 2016. The issue of [Father’s] role in [Child’s] 

life, before paternity was established, is disputed. The Court 

believes [Mother] has been [Child’s] primary caregiver (both 

emotionally and financially) for the majority of [Child’s] life. 

[Father] has certainly been involved, but not so much in a parental 

role. The Court finds his involvement prior to the establishment of 

paternity was more of a caretaker/daycare provider, than father. 

After paternity was established, [Father’s] involvement with 

[Child] improved. However, his involvement has still not been 

substantial and he has not even exercised all of the parenting time 

the parties agreed to.[fn5] Further, while he and [Mother] agreed he 

would not pay child support, he has done little, financially, to 

assist [Mother] in raising [Child].

-fn5—[Mother] and [Father] agreed to a parenting time plan 

for [Father] that gave him more time with [Child] than 

would have occurred under the Indiana Parenting Time 

Guidelines. That agreement was made an Order of the 

Court. That reflects that [Mother] recognized the important 

role [Father] should play in [Child’s] life as his father.

The Court recognizes that [Father’s] contact with [Child] will be 

diminished by the relocation because they see each other 

frequently. However, the Court believes that [Mother and 

Mother’s Husband] will do their best to minimize that by frequent 

trips back to Wabash. Additionally, in this day and age, the ability 

for communication and even face to face contact between [Father] 

and [Child] can likewise lessen the blow. As addressed below, the 

Court will deviate from the child support guidelines to provide 

[Father] more income to engage in parenting where distance is a 

factor. 

The Court also has serious reservations about what type of 

relationship [Father] would accommodate between [Child], 

[Mother], and [Mother’s] extended family if he had primary 

physical custody. That does not seem to be a priority of [Father’s]; 

whereas, [Mother’s] actions reflect a willingness and desire to 

facilitate contact between [Child], [Father], and [Father’s] 

extended family. 

***
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1516 | December 6, 2019 Page 6 of 12

Undoubtedly, [Father], his mother, and their extended family are 

important to [Child] and vice versa. However, separating [Child] 

from his mother is not in [Child’s] best interests.[fn6]

-fn6—The Court is troubled that [Mother] testified she is 

relocating to Florida regardless of the Court’s decision. 

However, the Court believes she never imagined the Court 

would deny her relocation or not allow [Child] to move 

with her. While that was risky, in the end, her belief was 

right. It would not be appropriate for the Court to “punish” 

her arrogance by making a decision that would not be in 

[Child’s] best interest.

The Court believes [Mother] will do all that she can to promote 

[Child’s] contact with all of his family, on both sides. 

[Mother] desires to improve her lot in life and take advantage of 

opportunities available to her. While her plans may change from 

time to time, the reasons for those changes are thoughtful and 

reasonable. She will take full advantage of any new opportunities 

to enrich [Child’s] life. [Mother and Mother’s Husband] are good 

role models for [Child]. They have researched the schools [Child] . 

. . will attend and they sincerely believe they are good.

[Father] does not appear motivated to achieve his full potential. 

Instead, he is content living with his mother, in her house. 

[Father] has not met his burden of proof. [Mother’s] request to 

relocate with [Child] to Florida is granted. 

Id. at 23-26 (footnotes in original). Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision 

[5] On appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred when it granted Mother’s 

request to relocate with Child to Florida, contending that (1) the relocation was 
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not made in good faith and there were no legitimate reasons supporting the 

relocation; and (2) relocation was not in Child’s best interests.

Standard of Review

[6] Our standard of review for these cases is well settled: 

[W]hen reviewing the specific findings and conclusions thereon, 

we must first determine whether the record supports the factual 

findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. On 

appeal, we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they 

are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. We therefore consider only the evidence favorable to 

the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, and 

we will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. 

A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to 

support the findings, the findings do not support the judgment, or 

the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found 

facts. 

M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 281-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted); see also Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).

[7] Furthermore: 

[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting 

latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In 

re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1993). Appellate 

courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the 

record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, 

observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it 

came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the 

significance of the evidence.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 

(Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickely v. Brickely, 247 Ind. 201, 204, 210 

N.E.2d 850, 852 (1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the 

evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must 
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positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before 

there is a basis for reversal.” Id. “Appellate judges are not to 

reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the 

evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best 

v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).

Good Faith and Legitimate Reasons

[8] After a relocating parent files a notice of relocation, the nonrelocating parent 

may object and the trial court shall hold an evidentiary hearing to rule on that 

objection. Ind. Code § 31-17-2.2-5(a)-(b).

1 First, “[t]he relocating individual has 

the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a 

legitimate reason.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(c). The trial court concluded that Mother 

had met that burden by showing that her and her family’s financial 

circumstances would be improved by moving to Florida. Father disputes these 

findings and argues that Mother’s contradictory testimony demonstrates that 

her reasons for relocating were not legitimate and the relocation was not made 

in good faith. 

[9] In defining potential “good faith and legitimate reasons” for a parent and child 

to relocate, this Court has held that “it is common in our society that people 

move to live near family members, for financial reasons, or to obtain or 

 

1 Throughout this opinion, we are citing the version of the relocation statute that was in effect at the time 

Mother first filed the notice of relocation. This statute has since been amended, and the latest version went 

into effect on July 1, 2019.
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maintain employment.” T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 787-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2011). And so, “[w]e infer that these and similar reasons . . . are what the 

legislature intended in requiring that relocation be for ‘legitimate’ and ‘good 

faith’ reasons.” Id. at 788. 

[10] Here, the trial court concluded that Mother and Mother’s Husband were 

attempting to better their lives and economic situation by relocating to Florida. 

Mother’s Husband attained a more secure job with greater pay and benefits, 

and Mother was seeking to further her education through either a part-time law 

school program or a paralegal certification program. Furthermore, their housing 

contract for a property in Wabash had fallen through, but they were able to 

obtain housing in Florida if they immediately relocated. In other words, the 

trial court found that Mother was relocating with Child to obtain better 

employment, to increase her income, and to keep her immediate family 

together. 

[11] We hold that the trial court did not err in making these findings and then 

concluding that these were legitimate reasons and the relocation was made in 

good faith. Even if Mother contradicted herself at the evidentiary hearing, it 

was ultimately the trial court’s decision to weigh her evidence against Father’s 

and to determine whether Mother’s statements were credible. Most of Father’s 

argument is comprised of a request that we reweigh the evidence in his favor, 

which we may not do. As previously stated, we defer heavily to the trial court’s 

findings and conclusions in matters of custody, relocation, divorce, and other 

family law disputes because the trial court gets to examine the witnesses and all 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1516 | December 6, 2019 Page 10 of 12

the evidence firsthand. Nothing in this record leads us to second-guess the trial 

court’s findings and conclusions.

[12] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Mother’s 

financial circumstances and her desire to obtain better housing and to live with 

her husband and Child in one location were legitimate reasons causing a good 

faith relocation. Thus, Mother has met her burden of proof.

Child’s Best Interests

[13] Next, “[i]f the relocating individual meets the burden of proof under subsection 

(c), the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent to show that the proposed 

relocation is not in the best interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(d).

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2.2-1(b),

2

trial courts shall take the 

following into consideration when determining whether relocation is in the

child’s best interests: 

(1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence. 

(2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating 

individual to exercise parenting time or grandparent visitation. 

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting 

time and grandparent visitation arrangements, including 

consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties. 

 

2

Similar to our explanation in footnote 5, we are citing the version of this statute that was in effect at the 

time Mother filed the notice of relocation.
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(4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the 

relocating individual, including actions by the relocating 

individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating individual’s 

contact with the child. 

(5) The reasons provided by the: 

(A) relocating individual seeking relocation; and

(B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the 

child.

(6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

[15] In its order, the trial court focused primarily on the role that Father played in 

Child’s life. The trial court found that Mother has been “[Child’s] primary 

caregiver (both emotionally and financially) for the majority of [Child’s] life.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 24. Additionally, the trial court found that Father 

has not been nearly as involved, serving less in a parental role and more in the 

role of “caretaker/daycare provider[.]” Id. Further, Father neglected to establish 

paternity of Child until 2016 (after Child was already nine years old), did not 

pay much, if anything, in the way of child support, and did not take advantage 

of the full range of parenting time he was allotted pursuant to the trial court’s 

December 16, 2016, stipulation order.

[16] Every step of the way, Mother has been loving and caring towards Child and 

accommodating to Father’s desires to be a present parent. Even after Mother 

decided to relocate to Florida with Mother’s Husband to get better housing, 

education, and employment, the trial court still found that “[Mother’s] actions 

reflect a willingness and desire to facilitate contact between [Child], [Father], 
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and [Father’s] extended family.” Id. at 25. In other words, the trial court 

concluded that given Mother’s greater maturity, willingness to comprise, and 

overall responsibility as primary caregiver to Child, it is in Child’s best interests

to relocate with Mother and Mother’s Husband to Florida. 

[17] Based on the evidence in the record and the trial court’s findings, we hold that 

the trial court did not err in concluding that Mother’s decision to relocate Child 

to Florida was in Child’s best interests. Once again, any argument by Father 

that we reconsider witnesses, financial figures, aspects of his emotional 

relationship with Child, or other evidence amounts to a request that we reweigh 

the evidence, which we may not do. Though we do not dispute the earnestness 

of Father’s attempts to maintain closer physical proximity to Child, we are not

free to second-guess the trial court’s judgment based on disputed evidence that 

it has already thoughtfully reviewed and weighed.

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.