IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 23–0099

Submitted September 13, 2023—Filed December 8, 2023

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Appellee,

vs.

DAVID L. LEITNER,

Appellant.

On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission.

In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission recommends 

revocation of an attorney’s license for violations of ethical rules. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for appellant.

Tara van Brederode and Alexis W. Grove, Des Moines, for appellee.
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MAY, Justice. 

David Leitner has held a license to practice law in Iowa since 1979. In 

2022, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board) filed a fivecount complaint against Leitner. The complaint charged Leitner with numerous

violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Leitner did not file an 

answer. Because Leitner did not answer, the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission (commission) deemed the allegations of the complaint to be 

admitted. Based on those admissions and some additional evidence presented 

at a hearing, the commission concluded that Leitner had violated several rules. 

As a sanction for those violations, the commission recommends that we should 

revoke Leitner’s license.

We have carefully reviewed the commission’s recommendation and the 

record as a whole. Following our review, we conclude that the Board proved that 

Leitner violated numerous rules. In light of those violations, as well as the 

aggravating and mitigating factors shown in the record, we conclude that the 

proper sanction is a suspension of Leitner’s license for two years. This 

suspension will commence ten days from the date of this opinion. Iowa Ct. R. 

34.23(1).

I. Our Review.

We review de novo the record made before the commission. Iowa Sup. Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Iowa 2023). Through 

that review, we must determine whether the Board has proven each “alleged 

violation[] . . . by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d 119, 125 (Iowa 2022)). We 

make this determination even where—as here—the responding attorney has 

essentially admitted the Board’s allegations through the attorney’s failure to 
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answer. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. O’Brien, 971 N.W.2d 584, 589 

(Iowa 2022).

With that said, because Leitner did not answer the complaint, “we deem 

the factual allegations . . . in . . . the complaint admitted” for purposes of our 

review. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen, 706 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Iowa 

2005) (emphasis added). In light of those admissions, we find the facts alleged in 

the complaint are established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.

But we do not necessarily adopt legal conclusions stated in the complaint.

II. Merits.

A. Mitchell and Foodprairie (Count I).

1. Background. In count I of the complaint, the Board alleges that Leitner 

violated two of our rules through his involvement with a client named Marvin 

Mitchell and an entity known as Foodprairie, L.L.C. Specifically, the Board 

claims that Leitner violated rules 32:1.2(d), which prohibits lawyers from 

“counsel[ing] a client to engage, or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer 

knows is criminal or fraudulent,” and 32:8.4(c), which prohibits lawyers from 

“engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”

Iowa Rs. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(d), 32:8.4(c). As support for these charges, the 

Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we deem to be admitted: 

3. Leitner has long served as the attorney for an individual 

named Marvin Mitchell, representing him in various matters since 

at least 2004.

4. Mitchell has been involved in the farming industry for 

several decades. Mitchell’s business has involved the sale and 

distribution of seed.

5. In or around 2007, Mitchell was indicted for bankruptcy 

fraud in federal court and was subsequently sentenced to 18 months 

in prison. Mitchell pled guilty to concealing assets by creating 

various business entities and then transferring funds, land, 
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equipment, and other assets to those entities prior to declaring 

bankruptcy.

6. Mitchell owes substantial sums of money to the federal 

government and, as a consequence, any income he receives is 

potentially subject to garnishment by federal authorities. Mitchell 

owes approximately $71,000.00 to the United States Department of 

Agriculture and also has several federal tax liens against his home.

7. On or about March 27, 2013, Leitner filed a certificate of 

organization with the Iowa Secretary of State creating a limited 

liability company known as Foodprairie, L.L.C. (“Foodpra[i]rie”).

8. In subsequent biennial reports filed by Leitner, he describes 

himself as the “managing member” of Foodprairie.

9. Foodprairie was created by Leitner as part of a deliberate 

scheme to hide Mitchell’s funds from creditors, including the federal 

government.

10. On or about November 28, 2016, Leitner opened a bank 

account for Foodprairie at Central Bank in Iowa. In the account 

agreement Leitner signed when opening the account, he described 

Foodprairie as a “single-member LLC.” Leitner further certified that 

he was the “manager or designated member” of Foodprairie.

11. Upon information and belief, Mitchell has continued to 

work in the farming industry since his criminal conviction and has 

received income from that work. At least part of that income has 

been concealed using the Foodprairie business entity and bank 

account established by Leitner.

12. Mitchell’s work in the farming industry since his 

conviction has included the sale of seed. In or around March of 

2017, Mitchell entered into a contract to become a dealer of Pfister 

Seed[s] (“Pfister”) products. Eric Schweinefus, a Pfister employee at 

that time, knew Mitchell from previous business dealings and 

approached Mitchell about becoming a Pfister dealer.

13. Mitchell told Schweinefus that he wanted to become a 

Pfister dealer but said that he did not want his own name associated 

with the Pfister dealership. Mitchell told Schweinefus that his 

lawyer, Leitner, could help establish the Pfister dealership without 

using Mitchell’s name.

14. Schweinefus provided Mitchell with a copy of Pfister’s 

standard dealership agreement.
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15. The dealership agreement was later signed by Leitner. The 

completed dealership form listed Foodprairie as the dealer and 

Leitner as Foodprairie’s “sole member.” Mitchell’s name does not 

appear on the form. The completed dealership agreement form was 

subsequently sent to Jim Riefenrath, an Assistant General Manager 

for Pfister.

16. Upon receiving the dealership agreement, Riefenrath was 

initially confused, as he had previously been told by Schwein[e]fus 

that the dealership agreement would be between Pfister and 

Mitchell.

17. Riefenrath subsequently participated in a telephone 

conference call with both Mitchell and Leitner. During the call[,] 

Leitner indicated that Foodprairie was his company. Leitner and 

Mitchell both agreed that Mitchell’s dealership agreement with 

Pfister should be in Foodprairie’s name.

18. After executing the dealership agreement, Mitchell began 

selling Pfister products and earning commissions and fees for his 

sales.

19. Some or all of the funds owed to Mitchell under the terms 

of the dealership agreement were wired to the Foodprairie account 

at Central Bank.

20. While working as a dealer of Pfister products, Mitchell 

earned substantial sums of money from Pfister, but the funds were 

always cloaked in the Foodprairie name.

21. Creating Foodprairie, opening a bank account in its name, 

and entering into the contract with Pfister under the name of 

Foodprairie were all an artifice developed with Leitner’s assistance 

to provide Mitchell with a means of receiving funds without detection 

by creditors, including the federal government.

22. Leitner allowed Mitchell to use an LLC that Leitner 

created—Foodprairie—to help Mitchell conceal income from his 

creditors, including the federal government.

23. Leitner opened a bank account in Foodprairie’s name and 

allowed Mitchell to use the account to receive money surreptitiously.

24. Leitner facilitated the contract between Mitchell and 

Pfister and executed the dealership agreement with Pfister in the 

name of Foodprairie so that Mitchell could do business without 

detection or garnishment of funds earned.
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(Footnote omitted.)1

2. Analysis.

a. Rule 32:8.4(c): conduct involving dishonesty. With these facts in mind, 

we now consider the Board’s allegation that Leitner’s involvement with Mitchell 

and Foodprairie violated rule 32:8.4(c). Rule 32:8.4(c) states: “It is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). “To find a 

violation of rule 32:8.4(c), we must find that the attorney acted with ‘some level 

of scienter’ rather than mere negligence.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Green, 888 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2015)). We have found violations 

when an attorney has acted with a purpose to deceive. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Sup. Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 531 (Iowa 2011). But even 

“[a]n attorney’s ‘casual, reckless disregard for the truth’ ” can be sufficient to 

show a violation. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Heggen, 981 N.W.2d 701, 

708 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Muhammad, 935 

N.W.2d 24, 38 (Iowa 2019)).

Viewing the record as a whole and considering the admitted allegations in 

the complaint, we conclude that Mitchell and Leitner used Foodprairie in an

attempt to deceive Mitchell’s creditors. Although Mitchell was dealing seed for 

Pfister and receiving money for that work, Mitchell and Leitner tried to create a 

false impression that only Leitner—and not Mitchell—was involved with Pfister. 

This conduct violated rule 32:8.4(c).

1Footnote 1 to the complaint adds: “Pfister Seed[s] subsequently merged with NuTech 

Seed, which is a subsidiary of Corteva, Inc.”
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b. Rule 32:1.2(d): involvement with client in fraud. We next consider the 

Board’s allegation that Leitner’s involvement with Mitchell and Foodprairie 

violated rule 32:1.2(d). Rule 32:1.2(d) states in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer 

shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is . . . fraudulent.” 

Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.2(d). As explained, though, we have already found 

that Leitner’s conduct with Mitchell violated rule 32:8.4(c), our general rule 

against “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Id.

r. 32:8.4(c). So we need not determine whether the same conduct also violated

rule 32:1.2(d), which deals with similar concepts.

3. Conclusions as to count I. As to count I, we conclude Leitner violated 

rule 32:8.4(c) by assisting Mitchell’s efforts to mislead his creditors.

B. Fries and Barney (Count II).

1. Background. We now turn to count II of the complaint. There, the Board 

charges Leitner with violating three of our rules through his representation of 

Brooks Barney in a dissolution case. Specifically, the Board claims Leitner 

violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1), which prohibits false statements to tribunals; rule 

32:8.4(c), which prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation”; and rule 32:8.4(d), which prohibits “conduct . . . prejudicial 

to the administration of justice.” Id. rs. 32:3.3(a)(1), 32:8.4(c)–(d). As support for 

these charges, the Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we 

deem to be admitted: 

26. On April 14, 2020, Leitner filed an appearance on behalf 

of Brooks Barney in Polk County District Court Case No. 

DRCV060024—a dissolution-of-marriage . . . action filed by Barney’s 

then-spouse, Deena Fries.

27. Leitner had previously represented Barney in a criminal 

case in which Barney was charged with assaulting Fries (State v. 

Barney, Polk County District Court Case No. FECR336891).
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28. The parties participated in a successful mediation 

regarding the dissolution of marriage action and signed a mediated 

agreement on July 21, 2020.

29. Based upon the mediation agreement, Fries’s counsel, 

Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson, prepared a stipulation comprised of the 

agreed-upon terms and emailed it, in a PDF format, to Leitner on 

August 3, 2020.

30. Leitner returned what appeared to be the same PDF, 

signed by himself and Barney, to Kellner-Nelson by email on or 

about August 21, 2020.

31. Unbeknownst to Kellner-Nelson, Leitner had modified the 

PDF document containing the stipulation, adding a significant 

provision regarding custody of the parties’ minor child.

32. Paragraph 3 of the original PDF Kellner-Nelson sent to 

Leitner states:

Visitation. Unless otherwise agreed, Brooks will 

be entitled to time with B.S.B. every other weekend from 

Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. and 

every Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:00 

a.m.

33. Leitner modified the PDF to state:

Visitation. Unless otherwise agreed, Brooks will 

be entitled to time with B.S.B. every other weekend from 

Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. and 

every Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:00 

a.m. Respondent sha [sic] first right of refusal to have 

B.S.B. whenever Petitioner is otherwise unable to care for 

him.

(Emphasis added).

34. At no point did Leitner notify Kellner-Nelson that he had 

modified the PDF document to add the “right-of-first-refusal 

provision.”

35. The right-of-first-refusal provision was also not part of the 

parties’ mediation agreement. Moreover, neither the parties nor their 

respective counsel had ever previously discussed a right-of-firstrefusal provision. Rather, Leitner unilaterally inserted the provision 

without notifying or consulting with Kellner-Nelson.
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36. Because the stipulation had been sent and returned as a 

PDF document, and because Leitner did not notify her of the 

modification to paragraph 3, Kellner-Nelson reasonably believed the 

PDF document Leitner returned to her was the same as the one she 

had sent to him, changed only to add the signature of his client.

37. Kellner-Nelson had reviewed the stipulation with Fries 

before sending it to Leitner. After Leitner returned the stipulation 

that he surreptitiously modified, Fries signed it, reasonably believing 

it to be the stipulation she had previously reviewed with her 

attorney.

38. The stipulation was filed with the district court on 

August 25, 2020.

39. In January of 2021, Barney—who at the time was subject 

to both a criminal and a civil no-contact order in which Fries was 

the protected party—notified Fries of his right of first refusal based 

upon the modified stipulation.

40. On January 25, 2021, Kellner-Nelson filed a motion to 

vacate the order approving the parties’ stipulation.

41. On March 29, 2021, Leitner filed an application to initiate 

contempt proceedings based in part on the allegation that Fries had 

failed to honor the right-of-first-refusal provision Leitner had 

furtively added to the stipulation.

42. On June 29, 2021, a hearing was held on Fries’s motion 

to vacate the stipulation agreement and Barney’s application to 

initiate contempt proceedings.

43. Following the hearing, the district court entered an order 

granting Fries’s motion to vacate the order approving the stipulation. 

The court found Leitner and his client engaged in fraud when 

modifying the stipulation to include the right-of-first-refusal 

provision.

44. The court found that Leitner and his client intentionally 

deceived Fries and Kellner-Nelson. The court found “an intent to 

deceive based on the manner in which the provision was inserted 

and returned without any suggestion that a revision had been 

made.”

45. The court further noted that Fries was damaged by the 

fraudulent insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision. The court 

explained:
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Fries is currently protected by a five-year criminal 

No Contact Order after Barney plead[ed] guilty to 

domestic abuse assault by impeding breathing without 

injury. Barney’s interpretation of the right of first 

refusal would require Fries to alert him anytime she 

decided to leave the minor child in someone else’s care 

(such as at home with her older children), even if it was 

only for an hour to go to the gym or the grocery store. 

Essentially Fries would have to disclose far greater 

information about her daily life to someone against 

whom she is protected by a No Contact Order.

The testimony in this case demonstrates the 

problematic nature of Barney’s claims. Barney called 

two different witnesses to report that Fries had been 

seen at a bar on a weekend night and a Prairie Meadows 

on New Year’s Eve. He messaged Fries while she was at 

the grocery store to ask where the child was if he wasn’t 

with her. Clearly, Barney is keeping tabs on Fries’[s] 

whereabouts, despite the existence of a No Contact 

Order.

(Footnote omitted).

46. The court also denied Barney’s application to initiate 

contempt proceedings.

47. Leitner’s covert modification of the stipulation was not 

Leitner’s only dishonest act while representing Barney.

48. On December 2, 2020, Kellner-Nelson filed an application 

to initiate contempt proceedings based on Barney’s failure to pay 

either child support or his required $200 monthly car payment to 

Fries.

49. In response, [Leitner] filed a motion to dismiss the 

contempt application in which he falsely stated that Barney had 

“brought his child support current,” Barney had paid the $200 

monthly car payment, and the contempt application was “frivolous.”

50. On January 14, 2021, the district court entered an order 

holding Barney in contempt. The court found that Barney had 

willfully failed to pay child support and the car payment.

51. On February 25, 2021, Kellner-Nelson filed a motion to 

waive a mediation that had been ordered in response to her 

application to vacate the parties’ stipulation. On March 3, 2021, 

Leitner filed a resistance to the motion in which he falsely claimed 
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that he had “tried, without success, to get opposing counsel to set 

up the mediation or at least provide alternative dates.” Leitner had 

made no effort to contact Kellner-Nelson about mediation.

52. A hearing was scheduled for July 8, 2021, to determine if 

Barney had complied with the contempt order. Neither Leitner nor 

Barney appeared for the hearing. The presiding judge contacted 

Leitner by phone to inquire why he and his client had not appeared 

for the hearing. Leitner stated that he believed the hearing was by 

phone and that he had told his client he did not need to participate 

in the hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for July 19, 2021.

53. At the July 19 hearing, Barney testified that Leitner had 

not notified him of the July 8 compliance hearing, and he was not 

told of any hearing until July 16.

(First alteration in original.)

2. Analysis.

a. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1): false statements to tribunals. We now consider whether 

Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) through his misrepresentations to the district 

court in the Fries and Barney dissolution case. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1) states, “A lawyer 

shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail 

to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal 

by the lawyer . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). The requirement of a 

“statement” can be met through oral or written statements. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 953 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Iowa 2021). The “knowingly” 

requirement means actual knowledge. Id. at 163–64. Actual knowledge can be 

inferred from circumstances. Id. But we don’t infer that “an attorney made a 

misrepresentation knowingly simply because the misrepresentation occurred.” 

Id. at 164 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 

466, 486 (Iowa 2014)).

Applying these principles here, we conclude that Leitner violated rule 

32:3.3(a)(1) on two occasions during the Fries and Barney dissolution case. First, 

Leitner violated 32:3.3(a)(1) through a written filing in which Leitner falsely 
12

represented that he had tried to set up mediation. Leitner would have known 

that this representation was false because it involved Leitner’s own behavior, 

namely, his own failure to try to set up mediation. So we infer that this 

misrepresentation was made knowingly and, therefore, in violation of rule 

32:3.3(a)(1).

Second, and likewise, Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) by falsely 

representing to the court that Leitner had notified his client of a hearing. Again, 

this misrepresentation was about a matter within Leitner’s personal knowledge. 

This conduct violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1).

b. Rule 32:8.4(c): conduct involving dishonesty. We now consider whether 

Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c). As previously discussed, rule 32:8.4(c) prohibits

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of 

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). From a strictly factual perspective, Leitner ran afoul of 

rule 32:8.4(c) through the misconduct just discussed, that is, his false 

representations to the court. But “[w]hen we find conduct violates a specific 

provision” of our rules that “involv[es] dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation, we will not find the same conduct violates rule 32:8.4(c).” 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 885 N.W.2d 408, 422 (Iowa 2016) 

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa 

2011)). That is the case here: we have already found that Leitner’s 

misrepresentations to the court violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1). So we do not find that 

these misrepresentations also violate rule 32:8.4(c).

This does not, however, end our discussion of rule 32:8.4(c). Count II also 

describes additional dishonest conduct by Leitner, namely, Leitner’s fraudulent 

insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision in a dissolution decree. See Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kallsen, 814 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Iowa 2012) 

(finding “dishonesty” which separately “goes beyond [a] specific rule violation” 
13

can still violate rule 32:8.4(c)). We have no doubt that this behavior was designed 

to mislead—and did mislead—both Fries and Fries’s counsel. This conduct

violated rule 32:8.4(c).

c. Rule 32:8.4(d): conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We now 

consider whether Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d), which states, “It is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). “An attorney’s 

conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice when it violates the ‘wellunderstood norms and conventions of the practice of law’ ” and thus “hampers 

‘the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon 

which the courts rely.’ ” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 128 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 2013)). “We have 

consistently held an attorney violates rule 32:8.4(d) when the ‘misconduct 

results in additional court proceedings or causes court proceedings to be delayed 

or dismissed.’ ” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 204 (Iowa 2019)).

Here we conclude that Leitner’s behavior violated rule 32:8.4(d) in two 

ways. First, Leitner’s fraudulent insertion of the right-of-first-refusal provision 

was a radical violation of the “well-understood norms and conventions of the 

practice of law.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Mbanza, 996 N.W.2d 711, 

721 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Palmer, 825 

N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2013)). This fraudulent conduct required additional court 

proceedings to vacate the tainted stipulation. This conduct violated rule 

32:8.4(d). 

Second, Leitner doubled down on his initial fraud by bringing a contempt 

action to enforce the fraudulently added right-of-first-refusal provision. Through 

this contempt action, Leitner again disregarded the “well-understood norms and 
14

conventions of the practice of law.” Id. at 721 (quoting Palmer, 825 N.W.2d at 

325). And, again, Leitner’s actions required additional court proceedings to 

dispose of the contempt action. This conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d).

3. Conclusions as to count II. As to count II, we find Leitner violated rule

32:3.3(a)(1) twice by lying to the court about two different topics. We also find 

Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) through his fraudulent insertion of the right-offirst-refusal provision. And we find that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) twice by 

fraudulently inserting the right-of-first-refusal provision and then filing a 

contempt action to enforce the fraudulent provision.

C. Jamison and Lu-Jen (Count III).

1. Background. We now turn to count III of the complaint, in which the 

Board charges Leitner with violating three of our conflict-of-interest rules 

through his representation of clients with adverse interests. Specifically, count 

III charges violations of rules 32:1.7(a)(2), 32:1.9(a), and 32:1.9(c). As support for 

these charges, the Board alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we 

deem to be admitted:

55. On April 16, 2020, Leitner filed an answer on behalf of LuJen Farms, Inc. and Cliff Bowie (“Lu-Jen”) in Cedar County District 

Court Case No. LACV036444.

56. The suit was initiated by the James D. Jamison 

Irrevocable Trust (“Jamison”) against Lu-Jen and alleged breach of 

contract, among other claims. The petition alleged the parties 

entered into a contract in which Lu-Jen agreed to purchase all of its 

corn and soybean crop from Jamison, but Lu-Jen had failed to make 

payment to Jamison as required by the contract.

57. Leitner previously represented Jamison; Leitner drafted 

the contract in question on behalf of Jamison.

58. Although he himself drafted the contract, in the answer 

he filed on behalf of Lu-Jen, [Leitner] stated, “the alleged contract is 

unconscionable and void as against public policy.”
15

59. [Leitner] also stated in the answer that Jamison, his 

former client, “is not and was not at the time claimed a licensed 

dealer of agricultural seed.”

60. On April 23, 2020, Jamison’s counsel, Daniel Rockhold, 

sent Leitner a letter asking Leitner to withdraw from representing 

Lu-Jen because of the conflict of interest. Rockhold also notified 

Leitner that he would likely be a witness in the case, as Leitner had 

firsthand knowledge regarding the formation and execution of the 

contract.

61. Leitner replied to Rockhold by letter dated April 30, 2020. 

In the letter, Leitner acknowledged the conflict of interest, stating, 

“[U]pon further reflection, I do agree that I may have a conflict of 

interest.” Leitner indicated that he would be withdrawing because of 

the conflict of interest.

62. Leitner did not withdraw his representation of Lu-Jen.

63. On July 15, 2020, Rockhold filed a motion to disqualify 

Leitner, as Leitner had not voluntarily withdrawn. On August 3, 

2020, the district court entered an order disqualifying Leitner.

64. Following Leitner’s disqualification, Jamison filed an 

amended petition on September 28, 2020. On October 20, 2020, 

Jamison served Lu-Jen with notice of intent to file an application for 

default judgment, as Lu-Jen had not filed an answer to the amended 

petition.

65. On October 29, 2020, Leitner filed an answer to the 

amended petition on behalf of Lu-Jen. The answer was signed by 

Cliff Bowie, a representative of and co-defendant with Lu-Jen. 

However, the answer was filed by Leitner through his electronic 

document management system account.

(Alteration in original) (footnote omitted.)2

2. Analysis.

a. Rule 32:1.9(a): conflict with former client. We now consider the Board’s 

allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:1.9(a) through his representation of LuJen and Jamison. Rule 32:1.9(a) states, “A lawyer who has formerly represented 

2Footnote 2 to the complaint adds: “Leitner drafted the contract for Jamison and Sons, a 

predecessor entity to the Jamison Irrevocable Trust.”
16

a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or 

a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially 

adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives 

informed consent, confirmed in writing.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a). So 

where (as here) there is no client consent, this rule is violated when three 

conditions are met: (1) there are consecutive representations of two or more 

different clients, (2) the representations involve “the same or a substantially 

related matter,” and (3) the new client’s interests are “materially adverse” to those 

of the former client. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 

532, 539 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a)).

We believe all three conditions are met through Leitner’s involvement with 

Jamison and Lu-Jen. First, the consecutive-representation condition is met 

because Leitner represented Jamison and then represented Lu-Jen. Second, 

these consecutive representations both involved “the same or a substantially 

related matter” because (1) Leitner’s representation of Jamison involved drafting 

a contract between Jamison and Lu-Jen, and (2) Leitner’s representation of LuJen involved litigation against Jamison over the very contract that Leitner had 

drafted for Jamison. Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.9(a). Third, and finally, LuJen’s interests were “materially adverse” to Jamison’s interests because Jamison 

was suing Lu-Jen. Id. And so Leitner’s representation of Lu-Jen violated rule 

32:1.9(a).

This conclusion draws added support from the comments to rule 32:1.9.

Comment [1] states, in part, “Under this rule, for example, a lawyer could not 

properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of 

the former client.” Id. r. 32:1.9 cmt. [1]. This is exactly what Leitner did. First, 

Leitner drafted the contract for Jamison. And then, when Leitner represented 

Lu-Jen, Leitner filed a pleading in which Leitner claimed that the very contract 
17

Leitner had drafted was both “unconscionable” and “void as against public 

policy.” This conduct violated rule 32:1.9(a).

b. Rule 32:1.7(a): concurrent conflict. Next we consider the Board’s 

allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2) through his representation of a 

new client, Lu-Jen, against a former client, Jamison. Rule 32:1.7(a)(2) prohibits 

lawyers from “represent[ing] a client if the representation involves a concurrent 

conflict of interest.” Id. r. 32:1.7(a). For purposes of 32:1.7(a)(2), “[a] concurrent 

conflict of interest exists if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation 

of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 

another client, a former client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the 

lawyer.” Id. r. 32:1.7(a)(2). An attorney’s representation is materially limited 

when the attorney’s “ ‘ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an 

appropriate course of action’ is restricted due to the attorney’s ‘other 

responsibilities or interests.’ ” State v. Mulatillo, 907 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Iowa 

2018) (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7 cmt. [8]).

We conclude that Leitner violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2) by representing Lu-Jen. 

As just explained, because Leitner drafted the contract on behalf of Jamison, 

Leitner was ethically prohibited from trying to rescind the same contract on 

behalf of Lu-Jen. In other words, Leitner’s preexisting duties to Jamison 

prohibited Leitner from pursuing an appropriate defense strategy on behalf of 

Lu-Jen. In the words of rule 32:1.7(a)(2), Leitner’s duties to his “former client,” 

Jamison, “materially limited” Leitner’s representation of Lu-Jen. Iowa R. of Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.7(a)(2). This conduct violated rule 32:1.7(a)(2).

c. Rule 32:1.9(c): using information related to former representation. Next 

we consider whether Leitner violated rule 32:1.9(c) by improperly using 

information about his former client Jamison during Leitner’s representation of 

Lu-Jen. Rule 32:1.9(c) places limits on when attorneys can “use” or “reveal” 
18

information “relating to the representation” of former clients. Id. r. 32:1.9(c). Rule 

32:1.9(c)(1) generally prohibits attorneys from using that “information . . . to the 

disadvantage of the former client.” Id. r. 32:1.9(c)(1). But there are exceptions. 

See id. The prohibition does not apply “when the information has become 

generally known” or when the rules otherwise “would permit or require [use of 

the information] with respect to a client.” Id.

Applying rule 32:1.9(c) here, we do not conclude that the Board has shown 

a violation. The complaint does not specify what representation-related 

information Leitner used to Jamison’s disadvantage. Nor does the complaint

explain whether that (unspecified) information was fair game because it was 

“generally known” or because other rules “permit[ted] or require[d]” Leitner to 

use it. Id. Nor do we find these details elsewhere in the record. So we are unable 

to conclude that the Board established a violation of rule 32:1.9(c) “by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 406 (quoting 

Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 125).

3. Conclusions as to count III. As to count III, we conclude Leitner violated 

rules 32:1.7(a) and 32:1.9(a).

D. Elizabeth and Timothy John (Count IV).

1. Background. We now turn to count IV of the complaint, in which the 

Board charges Leitner with violating three rules in connection with his 

representation of Elizabeth John and her son, Timothy. Specifically, count IV 

charges Leitner with violating rule 32:1.7(a), which prohibits certain conflicts of 

interest; rule 32:3.1, which prohibits certain frivolous filings; and rule 32:8.4(d), 

which prohibits conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa Rs. 

of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.7, 32:3.1, 32:8.4. As support for these charges, the Board 

alleges in its complaint the following facts, which we deem admitted:
19

67. On April 2, 2019, Leitner filed an appearance on behalf of 

Elizabeth John (“Elizabeth”) in Polk County District Court Case Nos. 

TRPR074630 and TRPR074636. The cases were initiated by 

Elizabeth’s daughter, Kimberly Milliken, and related to two trusts 

for which Elizabeth was the designated trustee.

68. The petitions filed by Milliken alleged Elizabeth had been 

deemed by a medical professional incapable of making financial 

decisions and sought to have Elizabeth replaced as trustee.

69. After the cases were initiated, Elizabeth met with her 

longtime attorney, Richard Howes, and informed him she wanted 

him to represent her in the trust cases. Howes contacted Leitner and 

informed him that he would be taking over representation of 

Elizabeth. On July 11, 2019, Howes filed an appearance in the trust 

cases on behalf of Elizabeth.

70. On July 12, 2019, Leitner filed a withdrawal of his 

appearance on behalf of Elizabeth.

71. On August 1, 2019, Milliken and Elizabeth filed a joint 

stipulation. In the stipulation, Milliken and Elizabeth agreed that an 

amendment to the two trusts at issue should be revoked. The 

amendment had been prepared by Leitner on or around March 28, 

2019. The stipulation was signed by Elizabeth, Howes, and 

Milliken’s counsel.

72. The March 28 amendment made several changes to the 

trusts, including eliminating or significantly reducing Milliken’s 

interests in two properties, and granted those properties to 

Elizabeth’s son, Timothy John (“Timothy”).

73. Although he had withdrawn from the trust cases, Leitner 

filed an objection on behalf of Timothy to the stipulation on August 

2, 2019.

74. In the objection, Leitner stated:

The undersigned [Leitner] can attest to the fact 

that that amendment was executed by Betsey John at a 

time when she was fully competent and had total 

testamentary capacity as defined in Iowa law. She 

insisted that that amendment be drafted, and it was. 

She signed of her own free will fully understanding its 

terms and its import. 
20

75. On August 8, 2019, the court entered an order approving 

Milliken and Elizabeth’s stipulation and revoking the March 28 

amendment to the trusts.

76. On October 15, 2019, Milliken filed a petition to appoint a 

guardian and conservator in which Elizabeth was the proposed 

protected person. The petition was based on the same grounds as 

the trust cases and alleged that Elizabeth’s decision-making 

capacity was significantly impaired.

77. On October 16, the court entered an order appointing 

Richard Howes as counsel for Elizabeth. The order also appointed 

Kim Walker of Transitional Life Consulting, LLC as Guardian ad 

Litem for Elizabeth and Milliken as temporary guardian.

78. Following the court’s October 16 order, Timothy brought 

Elizabeth to meet with Leitner at Leitner’s office to discuss the 

pending cases. Leitner did not notify Howes, Walker, or Milliken of 

the meeting.

79. Howes later learned of the meeting and thus contacted 

Leitner to inform him that he did not have permission to 

communicate with Howes’s client Elizabeth.

80. On October 23, 2019, Howes sent the following email to 

Leitner:

David,

You may know that Kim has been appointed as 

Bets[e]y’s temporary guardian. If not, I am, as a 

courtesy, attaching a copy of the order and affidavit of 

mailing.

As Bets[e]y is my client at this time as stated in 

the court order[,] you do not have permission to 

communicate with her either alone or with anyone else.

Please respect that request.

Richard.

81. On October 24, 2019, Howes sent the following email to 

Leitner:
21

David,

I understand Tim may be planning to bring 

Bets[e]y to meet with you. I am requesting again you do 

not meet with her or otherwise communicate with her 

as she is my client[,] per court order[,] and is under a 

guardianship and conservatorship and does not have 

the ability to make decisions for herself at this time.

Please take notice and govern yourself 

accordingly.

Richard[.]

82. Despite Howes’s emails, Leitner met with Elizabeth at his 

office. Thereafter, Howes received a typewritten letter dated October 

24, 2019, purportedly signed by Elizabeth, stating that she wished 

to terminate Howes as her attorney and retain Leitner.

83. On October 29, 2019, Howes sent the following email to 

Leitner:

David,

I am following up [on] my previous emails to you 

regarding your contact with my client, Elizabeth John. 

Subsequent to my last email to you, I received in the 

mail a typewritten note purportedly signed by my client 

advising me that she is discharging me and engaging 

your services. To the extent you had contact with her 

and had any part in this communication[,] you have 

violated my admonition to not contact her and have 

crossed an ethical line.

Elizabeth is under a court[-]ordered guardianship 

and conservatorship and at this time does not have the 

ability to engage or discharge attorneys on her own. 

That matter would have to be done under the auspices 

of the court.

Again[,] I am admonishing you not to have contact 

with my client, Elizabeth John. As her court[-]appointed 

attorney[,] I am obligated to so advise you and warn you 

that further contact will not only again cross an ethical 

line but potentially violate a court order.

Richard[.]
22

84. On October 29, 2019, Milliken, through counsel, filed a 

motion to disqualify Leitner from the guardianship case. The motion 

also sought an order preventing Timothy from having further contact 

with Elizabeth.

85. The motion alleged Timothy, aided by Leitner, unduly 

influenced Elizabeth and interfered with her well[-]being and assets. 

The motion further alleged that Leitner’s attempts to represent 

Elizabeth created a conflict of interest due to his previous joint 

representation of Timothy and Elizabeth. The motion also noted that 

Leitner had met with Elizabeth while she was represented by Howes.

86. On November 20, 2019, the district court entered an order 

prohibiting Leitner from having any further contact with Elizabeth 

without express permission from Howes.

87. On March 6, 2020, Leitner filed a new petition in the Polk 

County District Court on behalf of Elizabeth and Timothy. The 

petition purported to be signed by Elizabeth.

88. The petition named Milliken and Howes as defendants, 

among others. Leitner did not have permission from the court or 

Howes to communicate with Elizabeth about the petition or to file 

the petition on her behalf.

89. The petition was not well-grounded in law or fact. Leitner 

alleged the defendants had violated Elizabeth and Timothy’s 

constitutional rights and sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C[.] 

§§ 1983 and 1985. The petition also sought to have the guardianship 

and conservatorship invalidated.

90. The defendants moved to dismiss Leitner’s petition; on 

April 16, 2020, the district court dismissed the petition. The court 

also sanctioned Leitner for filing the petition. In the order 

sanctioning Leitner, the court noted that Leitner had been 

prohibited from having any contact with Elizabeth but nevertheless 

filed the petition on her behalf. The court further found that Leitner’s 

petition amounted to a collateral attack on the probate and 

guardianship cases.

(First and ninth alterations in original.) 

2. Analysis. We now consider whether these facts establish the violations 

alleged by the Board in count IV. As a preliminary matter, we note that during 

the proceedings before the commission, the Board withdrew its allegation that 
23

Leitner’s conduct violated rule 32:1.7(a), which prohibits certain conflicts of 

interest. So we do not consider that issue further. We also note that the 

commission did not find a violation of rule 32:3.1, which prohibits certain 

frivolous filings, and the Board has not asked us to consider that issue further. 

So we turn instead to the Board’s allegation that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d).

As explained, rule 32:8.4(d) prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). This rule is 

“violate[d] . . . when the ‘misconduct results in additional court proceedings or 

causes court proceedings to be delayed or dismissed.’ ” Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at

413 (quoting Noel, 933 N.W.2d at 204).

We conclude that Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) in at least two ways. First, 

Leitner’s repeated contact with a represented party led to a motion to prohibit

further contact and, ultimately, an order granting that motion. Then Leitner 

violated that order by contacting the represented party and filing a petition on 

her behalf. This required additional court action to dismiss the petition and 

sanction Leitner for his violation of the prior order. This conduct violated rule 

32:8.4(d).

3. Conclusions as to count IV. As to count IV, we find that Leitner violated 

rule 32:8.4(d) twice.

E. CSA Audit (Count V).

1. Background. In count V of the complaint, the Board charges Leitner with 

violating several rules governing lawyers’ handling of client funds. The Board 

also charges Leitner with violating rule 32:8.4(c), the general rule that prohibits 

“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. of 

Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). As support for these charges, the Board alleges in its 

complaint the following facts, which we deem admitted:
24

92. In July of 2020, the Iowa Supreme Court Client Security 

Commission (“CSC”) initiated an audit of Leitner’s client trust 

account (“CTA”). The audit revealed Leitner failed to comply with 

chapter 45 of the Iowa Rules of Court when handling money 

entrusted to him by clients.

93. The audit revealed Leitner had negative sub-account 

balances in his CTA totaling $5,153.16.

94. Leitner did not perform timely monthly triple 

reconciliations.

95. In his 2020 Combined Statements and Questionnaire 

[(CSQ)], Leitner answered “yes” to the following question: “Are 

reconciliations of your trust account balances with bank statement 

balances and individual client ledger balances performed monthly?”

96. Leitner knowingly provided a false answer to that 

question.

97. The audit further revealed that Leitner received $1000.00 

from a client on May 22, 2020, as an advanced payment of fees but 

failed to deposit those funds in his CTA.

98. The audit also showed that Leitner failed to provide clients 

contemporaneous written notice of withdrawals from his client trust 

account, nor did he provide clients an accounting of the funds he 

held from them in his trust account.

99. The audit also revealed client trust ledger activity that was 

not reflected in the CTA records, meaning there were expenses paid 

with respect to a client from the operating account instead of from 

the CTA.

2. Analysis and conclusion. We conclude Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c), 

which prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation,” by knowingly providing a false answer on his 2020 CSQ. 

Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). Leitner also violated all of these trust fund 

rules: rule 32.1.15(a) (requiring attorneys to keep others’ property separate from 

their own property), rule 32:1.15(c) (requiring attorneys to deposit advance fees 

into a CTA), rule 45.1 (mandating “identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts” 
25

for third-party funds), rule 45.2(3)(a)(9) (establishing requirements for proper 

record keeping for CTAs), rule 45.7(3) (forbidding attorneys from withdrawing 

advance payments from a CTA before they are earned), and rule 45.7(4)

(requiring attorneys to notify clients about withdrawals and balances). Iowa Rs. 

of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a), 32:1.15(c); Iowa Ct. Rs. 45.1, 45.2(3)(a)(9), 45.7(3), 

45.7(4).

III. Sanctions.

Because we have found that Leitner violated several of our rules, we now 

address the question of sanctions. Our harshest sanction—revocation—has been 

recommended by the commission. “We give the commission’s recommendation 

respectful consideration, but may impose a greater or lesser sanction.” Iowa Sup. 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ranniger, 981 N.W.2d 9, 18 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 143 (Iowa 2016)). 

Sanctions should reflect our goals of protecting “society from those unfit to 

practice law, . . . uphold[ing] public confidence in the justice system,” deterring 

future misconduct, and “maintain[ing] . . . the reputation of the bar as a whole.” 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008)

(per curiam). When deciding what sanction is appropriate in a particular case, 

we put special emphasis on “the nature, number, and seriousness of the 

[attorney’s] violations.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 908 N.W.2d 

217, 233 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Hansel, 558 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 1997)). We also consider our history of 

sanctioning similar misconduct, any special mitigating factors that apply to the 

particular case, and any special aggravating factors. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Noyes, 936 N.W.2d 440, 448–50 (Iowa 2019). 
26

A. Leitner’s Violations. We start by reviewing Leitner’s misconduct. As 

explained, Leitner has committed numerous violations, some of which are 

extremely serious. In brief summary:

• Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) by assisting a client’s effort to mislead the 

client’s creditors.

• Leitner violated rule 32:3.3(a)(1) by lying to the district court about two 

different topics.

• Leitner violated rules 32:8.4(c) and 32:8.4(d) by fraudulently inserting a 

right-of-first-refusal provision in a dissolution decree. 

• Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by filing a contempt action to enforce the 

fraudulently inserted right-of-first-refusal provision.

• Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by repeatedly contacting a represented 

party.

• Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(d) by violating a court order that required

Leitner to refrain from contacting a represented party.

• Leitner violated rules 32:1.7(a) and 32:1.9(a) by drafting a contract for a

client and then switching sides to litigate against his prior client in a suit 

about the very contract that Leitner drafted.

• Leitner violated rule 32:8.4(c) by knowingly providing a false answer on his 

2020 CSQ.

• Leitner also violated several other trust fund rules.

B. Historical Sanctions. Now we consider the kinds of sanctions we have 

given to attorneys whose misconduct is comparable to Leitner’s. Attorneys who 

engage in dishonesty in violation of rule 32:8.4(c) have received “sanctions 

ranging from reprimand to license revocation.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 338 

(Iowa 2015)). Attorneys who actively disregard their obligation of candor toward 
27

the tribunal have received “substantial sanctions ranging from permanent 

disbarment to six-month license suspensions.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Kieffer-Garrison, 951 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Kallsen, 814 

N.W.2d at 239). Attorneys who engage in conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice have received suspensions ranging from sixty days to 

eighteen months when, as here, the conduct is “compounded by additional 

violations.” Aeilts, 974 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 153 (Iowa 2018)). Attorneys who violate our 

conflict-of-interest rules have received sanctions ranging from a public 

reprimand to revocation. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 

N.W.2d 647, 657 (Iowa 2017); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 901 

N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 2017). “Sanctions for trust account and accounting 

violations span from ‘a public reprimand when the attorney, in an isolated 

instance, failed to deposit funds into his trust account because he believed the 

fees to be earned’ to ‘suspensions of several months where the violations were 

compounded by severe neglect, misrepresentation, or failure to cooperate.’ ” Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 225 (Iowa 2015) (quoting 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012)).

C. Potential Mitigating Factors. We next consider whether the record 

shows any mitigating factors. Specifically, we consider whether mitigation 

should be found because of (1) Leitner’s pro bono work, (2) Leitner’s service to 

an underserved community, (3) Leitner’s poor health, or (4) Leitner’s limited

disciplinary history. 

1. Pro bono work. Mitigation has been found when an attorney performs 

pro bono and reduced-fee work. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 

884 N.W.2d 772, 781 (Iowa 2016). We find that Leitner has performed some of 

this work. This is mitigating.
28

2. Underserved community. Mitigation has also been found when an 

attorney “provides legal services to an underserved community.” Iowa Sup. Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 2015). Leitner has 

accepted appointments for indigent criminal defendants, an underserved 

community. This is mitigating.

3. Poor health. Mitigation is sometimes found when an attorney struggles 

with physical and mental health issues. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 873, 881 (Iowa 2012). Like the commission, though, we see 

no causal relationship between Leitner’s poor health and his failure to comply 

with the rules. So we do not consider his health issues to be mitigating.

4. Disciplinary history. Mitigation is often found when an attorney has no 

prior disciplinary history. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bieber, 824 

N.W.2d 514, 527–28 (Iowa 2012). Leitner’s lack of prior discipline is mitigating.

D. Potential Aggravating Factors. We next consider whether the record 

shows aggravating factors. Specifically, we consider whether Leitner’s 

misconduct is aggravated by (1) his substantial experience, (2) his failure to take 

responsibility, or (3) his behavior in the grievance process.

1. Substantial experience. Aggravation is often found when an offending 

lawyer has substantial experience. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2018) (“Jacobsma’s twenty years of 

experience are substantial[,] and we view them as an aggravating factor.”).

Leitner has been in practice since 1979. His extensive experience is an 

aggravating factor. 

Leitner claims his experience should be viewed as mitigating because his 

career has been distinguished. We find no basis in the record to characterize 

Leitner’s career in this way. For instance, this is not a case in which the record 

contains supportive letters from judges or lawyers.
29

2. Failure to take responsibility. Aggravation is also found when attorneys 

“minimiz[e] or fail[] to take responsibility for [their] misconduct.” Iowa Sup. Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Iowa 2012). This applies to 

Leitner. At the disciplinary hearing, “Leitner categorically denied the charges that 

were alleged against him.” In his appellate brief, Leitner repeated this denial. 

Although Leitner has acknowledged the trust account issues discovered in the 

audit, he has steadfastly denied his most serious violations. He takes no 

responsibility for his worst behavior. This is aggravating.

3. Failure to cooperate in the process. Aggravation is also found when 

attorneys fail to cooperate with the disciplinary process. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007) (finding failure 

to cooperate “is an independent act of misconduct”). But Leitner claims his 

cooperation has been so exemplary that we should view it as mitigating. We take 

the opposite view. Leitner failed to cooperate in two significant ways. First, 

although rule 36.7 required Leitner to answer the Board’s complaint, Leitner 

never did. Iowa Ct. R. 36.7. This is aggravating. See Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d at 

380–81 (finding failure to answer board’s complaint violated rules DR 1–102(A)(5) 

and DR 1–102(A)(6), predecessors to the current rules).

Second, Leitner tried to mislead the commission about an alleged 

settlement with the Board. During the hearing before the commission, Leitner 

submitted emails and testimony suggesting that he had reached an agreement 

with the Board for a particular term of suspension. But then the Board presented 

an email from Leitner. That email showed that, in fact, Leitner had not accepted 

the offer. Instead, the email showed, Leitner had rejected the offer and made a 

counteroffer. Even so, Leitner testified that he actually accepted the Board’s 

offer. The commission did not find that testimony credible. On our de novo 
30

review, we agree. We conclude Leitner tried to mislead the commission. This is 

seriously aggravating.

E. The Proper Sanction Here. We now consider the proper sanction for 

Leitner. We have said that “[w]hat should dictate the sanction . . . is the nature, 

number, and seriousness of the [attorney’s] violations.” Barry, 908 N.W.2d at

233 (first alteration in original) (quoting Hansel, 558 N.W.2d at 192). When 

considering Leitner’s violations, we bear in mind that “[f]undamental honesty is 

the [baseline] and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession.” 

Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 418 (quoting Barry, 908 N.W.2d at 233). And Leitner 

has repeatedly breached his duty of honesty by assisting his client’s efforts to 

mislead creditors, making false statements to the court, defrauding opposing 

counsel in a dissolution matter, knowingly providing a false answer on his CSQ, 

and trying to mislead the commission. This “pattern of deceit” raises an inference 

that Leitner is “unfit to practice law.” Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d at 382. This 

inference is made much stronger by Leitner’s failure to acknowledge—much less 

repent from—his pattern of deceit.

At the same time, we acknowledge that there are some mitigating factors 

here. The most important mitigating factor is Leitner’s lack of prior disciplinary 

history. Even so, given “the nature, number, and seriousness of” Leitner’s 

violations, we think a two-year suspension is appropriate. Barry, 908 N.W.2d at 

233 (quoting Hansel, 558 N.W.2d at 192). “This will serve to deter similar 

conduct and preserve the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.”

Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 820–22 

(Iowa 2004) (imposing a two-year suspension against an attorney who engaged 

in serious ethical breaches—including multiple acts of misrepresentation—

across multiple matters but who did not have a prior disciplinary history).
31

We have considered the Board’s argument that Leitner’s involvement with 

Mitchell and Foodprairie justifies revocation. As support, the Board relies on

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Engelmann, 840 N.W.2d 156 

(Iowa 2013), and Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Nelsen, 807 

N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2011). In those cases, we found that revocation was justified 

by an attorney’s involvement with a client’s fraudulent scheme. Engelmann, 840 

N.W.2d at 166–67; Nelsen, 807 N.W.2d at 267–68. But we believe both cases are 

distinguishable. In Engelmann, the record showed that an attorney assisted in 

fraudulent transactions that resulted in “losses of $392,937.73” for certain 

lenders. Engelmann, 840 N.W.2d at 157–58. In Nelsen, the record showed that 

an attorney had assisted clients to convert “at least $141,335.34 . . . from . . .

[a] court-appointed receiver” who was legally entitled to the funds. Nelsen, 807 

N.W.2d at 261. But the record here does not show any comparable harm. For 

starters, the record does not show that the federal government or any other 

creditor had any lien or other possessory interest in Mitchell’s receivables. So, 

as the Board concedes, neither Leitner nor Mitchell converted any funds from 

anyone. Moreover, the record does not show that the federal government or any 

other creditor was actually trying to collect Mitchell’s receivables. And so the 

record does not show that the federal government or any other creditor was 

actually deceived or otherwise hampered in its efforts to collect. At most, the 

record shows that Mitchell and Leitner hoped to deceive any creditors who might

try to collect from Mitchell. This theoretical effect is substantially different from 

the actual harm documented in Nelsen and Engelmann.

IV. Conclusion.

We hereby suspend Leitner’s license to practice law in Iowa indefinitely, 

with no possibility of reinstatement for two years. This suspension will 

commence ten days from the date of this opinion. Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(1). This 
32

suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Id. r. 34.23(3). We further 

direct Leitner to comply with the requirements set forth in Iowa Court Rule 34.24 

and assess the costs of the instant disciplinary action to him, Iowa Ct. R. 

36.24(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.