UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 8/16/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

BECK’S OFFICE FURNITURE AND

SUPPLIES, INC., a Utah corporation;

JAMES F. BECK and CAROLINE

BECK,

Plaintiffs-counter-defendants -

Appellees,

v.

HAWORTH, INC., a Michigan

corporation,

Defendant-counter-claimant -

Appellant.

No. 95-4018

(D.C. No. 90-CV-472)

(District of Utah)

BECK’S OFFICE FURNITURE AND

SUPPLIES, INC., a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff-counter-defendant -

Appellant,

and

JAMES F. BECK and CAROLINE

BECK,

Plaintiffs-counter-defendants,

v.

No. 95-4029

(D.C. No. 90-CV-472)

(District of Utah)
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

- 2 -

HAWORTH, INC., a Michigan

corporation,

Defendant-counter-claimant -

Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ALARCÓN** and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

Haworth, Inc., an office furniture manufacturer, appeals from a jury verdict in

favor of one of its terminated dealers, Beck’s Office Furniture, Inc. (“Becks”). Becks,

which was awarded $625,000 by the trial court, cross-appeals the district court’s refusal

to award prejudgment interest and issues relating to its refusal to allow the jury to

consider a punitive damages award against Haworth.

BACKGROUND

Becks began selling Haworth systems furniture in 1981. “Systems furniture” is

modular panel furniture and structures used to partition open rooms into

compartmentalized working areas. The parties’ relationship is governed by a Dealer
- 3 -

Agreement, executed in 1983 and terminable at-will by either party. The Dealer

Agreement specifically allowed Haworth to sell systems furniture directly to a customer,

although it also promised to “whenever possible include dealer participation as a

servicing dealer on these projects.” The servicing dealer would be entitled to a

commission on these sales, referred to as a “dealer service fee.” The dealer agreement

also included a listing of services dealers could use, stating that “[i]n addition to our

product line, we provide many services and aids to our dealers. Our policy is to make

readily available to you the tools that will help you be successful.” Becks alleged that

Haworth representatives promised, in what it describes as a “gentlemen’s agreement,” to

prefer authorized dealers in a territory for purposes of being named servicing dealer on a

project. It also alleged that the agreement was further modified to establish that

authorized dealers who made initial contact with customers were entitled to be named the

servicing dealer if the customer was later sold systems furniture directly by Haworth. The

jury found that both these terms modified the Dealer Agreement though a course of

performance by the parties.

Sometime around 1987, Becks and Haworth began having difficulties with one

another. Haworth allowed another office furniture dealer, Commercial Contract Group

(“CCG”), to act as servicing dealer on a number of large projects, even though CCG was

not then an authorized dealer. It also allegedly began undercutting Becks’s ability to bid

on a number of these projects, preferring CCG. In 1990, Haworth terminated Becks as a
- 4 -

dealer, Becks folded its business and brought this suit, claiming breach of contract, as

well as other tort and antitrust claims, and asked for compensatory and punitive damages.

At the close of Becks’s case-in-chief, Haworth requested a judgment as a matter of

law, the request was granted on a number of Becks’s claims, including the claim for

punitive damages and infliction of emotional distress, but denied as to the breach of

contract and tortious interference claims. At the end of its case, Haworth did not renew

its motion, but apparently, in a conference on jury instructions, did challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence and request that Becks’s claims not go to the jury. The trial

court allowed the breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective economic

relations to go to the jury, instructing however that if the jury found breach of contract it

need not decide the tortious interference claim. On a special verdict form, the jury found

for Becks on breach of contract, and for Haworth on wrongful termination. It awarded

damages of $625,000, representing the lost value of Becks as a business. Subsumed

within this award was a finding of $500,000 in lost profits. The lost profits involved

dealer service fees that Haworth paid to CCG, which Becks claimed should have been

awarded to it based on its authorized dealer relationship with Haworth. After the verdict

was returned, Haworth requested a JMOL, a new trial, and a remittitur, all of which were

denied by the district court.

On appeal, Haworth raises six issues. First, the terms in the dealer agreement

allegedly breached were too indefinite to create an obligation on Haworth’s part. Second,
- 5 -

Becks failed to prove that Haworth’s actions caused Becks damages because it presented

no evidence that it would have made the sales and, in any event, Becks would have gone

out of business even if it had received the $500,000 in fees. Third, the jury improperly

awarded damages based on gross, not net profits. Fourth, $500,000 exceeds even the

gross profits allegedly lost by Becks. Fifth, the $625,000 award, representing the value of

Becks business before Haworth’s alleged breach, is unsupported by any competent

evidence. Sixth, Haworth is entitled to a new trial because of the trial judge’s improper

behavior during Haworth’s cross-examination of Becks’s principal witness.

In its cross-appeal, Becks raises three issues. First, it appeals the trial court’s

denial of prejudgment interest on its damages award. Second, it argues that the district

court improperly directed verdict against it on its punitive damages claim. Finally, it

asserts that the trial court erred in excluding a number of its witnesses, former dealers of

Haworth who would have testified about the manufacturer’s past practices.

DISCUSSION 

I. HAWORTH’S CLAIMS ON APPEAL

As a threshold matter, Becks raises a procedural defense to many of Haworth’s

issues on appeal. It argues that because Haworth failed to renew its motion for judgment

as a matter of law (JMOL) at the close of all the evidence, it waived its right to appeal the

jury findings on these issues. The 1991 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, allowing 

parties to move for judgment as a matter of law, replaces the earlier terminology of
- 6 -

directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. A JMOL motion “may be

made at any time before submission of the case to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). A

renewed JMOL can be made after a jury verdict if the earlier JMOL was denied. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50(b). Only questions raised before the verdict may be pursued after the verdict,

and claims waived will not be entertained on appeal. Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide

Co., Inc., 897 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1990) (using old terminology). Although the

general rule is that a JMOL motion denied before the close of evidence must be renewed

at the end of the evidence or is waived--even if the trial court erred initially in denying the

motion, see 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §

2534 (1995), the harsh results of such a waiver counsel that “technical precision” in

complying with the rule is unnecessary. Anderson v. United Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 1500,

1503 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991). As long as the trial court was aware

of the movant’s position at the end of presentation of evidence, we liberally construe the

JMOL for purposes of renewing it after a verdict has been returned. Aguinaga v. United

Food & Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1072 (1994). 

In this case, while Haworth did not formally renew its JMOL motion at the

conclusion of the evidence, it made the court aware that it did not believe the evidence

was sufficient to send the case to the jury because of the indefiniteness of the contract, the

lack of proof of causation, and lack of proof of damages. The JMOL and motion for a
- 7 -

new trial also were based on these theories. Haworth adequately preserved its claims that

it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A. LIABILITY

1. Whether the Dealer Agreement between Becks and

Haworth was too Indefinite to Constitute a Binding Obligation that

Haworth Could Breach? 

We review the denial of a JMOL motion de novo, applying the same standard as

the district court. Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). Under this standard we find error in denial of such motion

“only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences

supporting the party opposing the motion.’” FDIC v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 20 F.3d

1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Ralston Dev. Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 510,

512 (10th Cir. 1991)).

Haworth’s claim is that its obligations under the Dealer Agreement were too vague

to support an enforceable obligation to provide Becks specific services or to choose it as

“servicing dealer” on projects in which Haworth sells directly to the customer. The

meaning and effect of a written instrument is a question of law which is reviewed for

correctness. Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766,

770 (Utah 1995). When, however, contract provisions are uncertain, extrinsic evidence is

admissible to explain the parties’ intent. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293

(Utah 1983). Indeed, the Dealer Agreement is written in very vague terms, incorporating
1

 The Dealer Agreement contained an integration clause, stating, “This is our

complete agreement. Any changes or additions must be in writing and signed by

Haworth.” Nevertheless, the court allowed the question of additional terms go to the jury,

presumably under the exception to integration clauses allowing consistent additional

terms to modify the contract, and to allow course of performance and course of dealing to

explain or supplement the writing. Procon Corp. v. Utah Dep’t of Trans., 876 P.2d 890,

894 (Utah App. 1994). Cf. U.C.C. § 2-208. 

- 8 -

obligations such as “our policy is to make readily available to you the tools that will help

you be successful,” and “[w]e will whenever possible include dealer participation as a

servicing dealer on [projects Haworth sells products directly to the end customer].” In

fact, the Dealer Agreement only purports to be a “document [that] sets forth the major

guidelines of the working relationship between Haworth and our dealers.” Under Utah

law, “[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting

of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with

sufficient definiteness to be enforced.” Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, 558 P.2d

1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63 (1961)). On the

other hand, the jury found that the Dealer Agreement’s vague provisions were fleshed out

through a several-year course of performance between Becks and Haworth, giving rise to

the aforementioned “Gentleman’s Agreement.” [see special interrogatories Nos. 36, 46,

56] Moreover, the jury found Haworth liable for breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing in the Dealer Agreement.1

Utah recognizes that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, and that a party can breach the covenant by wrongfully exercising the
- 9 -

discretion given it by the contract. Olympus Hills Shopping Center v. Smith’s Food &

Drug Center, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450 & n.4 (Utah App. 1994), cert. denied, 899 P.2d

1231 (Utah 1995). The question of whether a party has breached the covenant is a

question of fact. Beck v. Farmer Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Essentially,

the covenant protects parties’ reasonable expectations in the contract. Olympus Hills, 889

P.2d at 450-51. Utah, however, has declined to extend the covenant to at-will

employment contracts, reasoning that an implied covenant cannot be used to alter the

rights agreed upon by the parties. Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 335 (Utah

1992). Still, the right to terminate the contract at-will does not vitiate a party’s

expectations while the contract remains in force. See Big Horn Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 1988) (although one party

might have the unfettered right to terminate the contract and needs no reason to invoke

the provision, all discretionary provisions generally are subject to good faith obligations). 

While the terms in the written dealer agreement themselves may not have given

rise to enforceable obligations with regard to Haworth’s duty to help Becks win project

sales in its territory, or to prefer it to nondealers, or to award it dealer service fees, the

jury was entitled to find consistent implied terms creating these obligations. Kent Poole,

Haworth’s Salt Lake City market manager, created policies for Haworth dealers in his

territory. Poole allegedly led Becks to understand that Haworth would support the sales

effort of the dealer who first contacted a new account or project, and protect that dealer
- 10 -

from encroachment by other Haworth dealers. In connection with this practice, Haworth

dealers in Poole’s territory would be required to “register” accounts they initially

contacted. Poole also represented that Haworth would always support an authorized

dealer over one who had a more limited “buy-sell” relationship with Haworth. 

Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that through a course of performance this

“Gentleman’s Agreement” became part of the Dealer Agreement between Haworth and

Becks. [Becks App. 15-18, 24-27, 132-32 138, 180, 185-92, 207-210, 345-46, 364] 

Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that Haworth breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the manner it preferred CCG, a

nondealer, to Becks, and in the manner it failed to support Becks’s efforts to win the

projects on which it claims lost profits. [Becks App. 40-59, 139-45, 169, 171-176, 220-

54, 362-70] Even if the at-will exception to enforcing the implied covenant extends

beyond employment contracts, it is still inapplicable in this context, where the claimed

breach is not Becks’s termination, but actions Haworth took before it terminated Becks. 

Becks argues that Haworth undermined Becks’s ability to receive servicing dealer

fees on five separate projects that Haworth sold directly, or otherwise failed in its

commitments to Becks with respect to these projects. On the 3M project, Becks argues

that Haworth failed to support it as the first dealer to register 3M as a customer and failed

to assist it in Becks’s attempt to bid the project. On the Novell project, Haworth also

failed to assist Becks and, particularly, failed to communicate information critical to
- 11 -

Becks’s ability to secure the bid. On the Hill Air Force Base project, Haworth failed to

use Becks, the first dealer with respect to the customer, as the servicing dealer on the

project. On the West Valley City project, Haworth again allegedly breached the

Gentleman’s Agreement by favoring CCG over Becks, despite Becks’s status as the

authorized dealer. On the Dugway project, Becks presented evidence that Haworth

breached its commitment to prefer authorized dealers over those merely in a buy/sell

arrangement. Not surprisingly, Haworth disputes that its action constituted breaches with

respect to any of the project. Reviewing the record and reasonable inferences therefrom

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, sufficient evidence exists to support the

conclusion that Haworth breached its obligations to Becks. 

2. Whether Becks Presented Sufficient Evidence That

Haworth’s Breach Caused Becks’s Damages, Including

Damages Stemming From the Lost Value of Becks

Business?

Haworth next argues that even if the Dealer Agreement was definite enough to

enforce, and even if Haworth did breach its duties or covenant under the contract, its

breach was not the cause of Becks’s losses because Becks did not present evidence that it

would have won the contested projects even had Haworth complied. Haworth further

argues that even if Becks had been awarded all of the dealer service fees it claims, Becks

was in such bad financial condition its insolvency was inevitable. The actual cause of

Becks’s demise, Haworth argues, was its bank’s withdrawing its line of credit, and that

would have occurred even had Becks been awarded the dealer service fees. On this latter
- 12 -

point, Haworth emphasizes that it was contractually entitled to terminate Becks and this

termination caused the bank to cut off Becks’s financing.

a. Whether Haworth’s Breaches Caused Becks to

Lose Dealer Fees?

 At trial, Becks presented evidence that projects that should have gone to Becks

went instead to CCG as a result of Haworth’s breaches of the Dealer Agreement. Dealer

servicing fees that Haworth paid to CCG were rightfully Becks’s, according to this theory

of the case. These diverted dealer fees represented lost profits. Becks presented evidence

of these fees through its expert Christopherson. The special interrogatories answered by

the jury did not ascribe damages directly from fees arising out of lost projects, however. 

Instead, the jury found that Becks suffered $150,000 in damages from breach of

Haworth’s obligation to provide “field or corporate sales support and assistance”

(Interrogatory #4); $75,000 from breach of its obligation to “include [Becks] as a

servicing dealer” (Interrogatory # 10); $75,000 from Haworth’s failure to honor the

“Gentleman’s Agreement” of recognizing Becks’s right to pursue customers it first

contacted and discouraging other dealers from pursuing those customers (Interrogatory #

43); $50,000 from Haworth’s breach of its obligation not to misuse confidential

information regarding potential customers (Interrogatory # 63); and, $150,000 for the

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Interrogatory # 79).

Haworth contends that at three of the five lost projects (Novell, 3M, West Valley

City Project), its breaches of the Dealer Agreement were not the cause of Becks’ failing
- 13 -

to secure the dealer fees that represent the starting point for calculating lost profits. After

reviewing the record as a whole, we disagree. The jury could have reasonably found that

had Haworth not breached the Dealer Agreement, the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, and the additional terms created by a course of performance between the parties,

Becks would have won the disputed projects and been entitled to the dealer fees. [Becks

App. 53-59, 78-80, 134-35, 168-74 234-36, 244-47, 286-311, 362-63, 368-70] If we can

conform the jury’s answers to special interrogatories to the evidence presented at trial, we

will uphold the verdict. Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1545 (10th

Cir. 1987). Here, substantial evidence produced at trial supports finding that Haworth’s

breaches caused Becks to lose the servicing dealer fees. Although the jury verdict does

not demonstrate the liability in the most artful manner, it supports some amount of

damages for the loss of each of the five projects lost because of Haworth’s breaches. 

b. Whether Haworth’s Breaches Caused Becks

to Fail?

Becks was awarded $625,000 for the diminution of its business rather than an

amount of lost profits. The jury specifically found that the combined effect of damages in

lost profits caused by Haworth’s breaches made Becks’s business fail. Interrogatory # 82. 

Haworth argues that even given the alleged lost profits, its breaches did not cause Becks

to go out of business. Rather, it argues that the cause of Becks’s business failure was its

bank withdrawing Becks’s line of credit, which was caused not by the lost profits Becks

suffered, but by Haworth terminating Becks as a dealer.
- 14 -

Considerable evidence supports Haworth’s theory. On the other hand, we must

uphold the verdict unless “the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no

reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion.” United Pacific, 20 F.3d

at 1079. Christopherson, Becks’s expert witness, testified that he believed the business

would have survived if it had received an additional $388,000 from the five diverted

projects. [Haw. App. A629-630, 636; Becks App. 316, 334-343, 375-77] Christopherson

was qualified to opine on this subject, and it was not an abuse of discretion to admit

Christopherson’s opinion. It is not our role to second-guess the jury’s determination of

the facts when admissible evidence exists to support it. We conclude that given the

amount of lost profits supported by the evidence, see infra section I.B.2, the jury could

make an inference that an infusion of more than $360,000 would have allowed Becks to

remain in business.

B. DAMAGES

1. Is the Award of $625,000 for Diminution in the Value of

Becks Business Supported by the Evidence? 

The jury found that before Haworth’s breach Becks was worth $625,000, and after

the last of the breaches it had no value, and also that the combined effect of damages

from Haworth’s breaches caused Becks to fail. Because the trial court awarded the

diminution of value in the business as damages, it never awarded lost profits separately,

finding them subsumed within the diminution of value award. Haworth argues that the

jury finding of $500,000 for lost profits far exceeds what the evidence presented would
- 15 -

allow, and that if we find the lost profit assessment unsupported we must likewise find

the diminution calculation unsupported, or at least reduce the damage award to the

amount supportable. Becks argues that if there is a way to make the special

interrogatories consistent we should adopt that view and uphold the jury verdict. Furr,

824 F.2d at 1545. We conclude that no competent evidence supports the figure of

$625,000 in diminution of value.

The value of Becks before the breaches was based entirely on expert witness

testimony by Christopherson and lay testimony by James Beck. Haworth argues that the

$625,000 remains unsupportable because the only evidence Becks presented was that of

Christopherson and James Beck, the principal of the company, and that both of their

opinions relied exclusively on unsigned reports by the Geneva Group, a business broker,

the author of which never testified. Both Beck and Christopherson valued the company

in the range of $900,000-$1.1 million. Haworth argues that the Geneva report was itself

speculative and that neither Christopherson nor Beck ever tested the report’s assumptions. 

Under Fed. R. Evid. 703, an expert may rely on “facts or data . . . perceived by or made

known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by

experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts

or data need not be admissible in evidence.” In this case, the trial court apparently found

that a CPA could reasonably rely upon the Geneva report in forming his opinions. 
2

 In response to the question of whether the Geneva reports were of the type

reasonably relied on by experts in valuation, Christopherson replied: “When you say

relied upon, it is used as a basis, yes, but in and of themselves, no, because you have to do 

a certain amount of your own work. That’s why I said this was never a formal evaluation

that we did with regard to Beck’s. Because it wasn’t -- we probably relied more on what

they did, although we did go into the theory.” Haw. App. A604 (emphasis added).

- 16 -

This court reviews the trial court’s determination of whether expert testimony

should be admitted under the abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d

843, 847 (10th Cir. 1995). An expert opinion must be based on facts that enable the

expert to “express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to conjecture or

speculation but absolute certainty is not required.” Kieffer v. Weston Land, Inc., No. 95-

8046, 1996 WL 411664 at *2 (10th Cir. July 23, 1996) (quotation and brackets omitted). 

Experts are allowed to rely on hearsay, and even on the opinions of others if proper

foundation was laid that others in the field would likewise rely on them, but may not

merely parrot the opinions of other experts whose conclusions are not themselves in the

record. Tk-7 Corp.v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 732-33 (10th Cir. 1993)

(excluding expert opinion relying on another expert’s report because witness failed to

demonstrate a basis for concluding the report was reliable and showed no familiarity with

methods and reasons underlying the hearsay report). 

In this case, Christopherson admitted that the Geneva reports were unreliable to

determine the value of the business2 and that without the reports he would have been

unable to give any figure for the value of the business. [Haw. App. A 606-09] The
3

 While the trial court extensively examined Christopherson in order to help lay a

foundation for his opinion on the value of the company, Christopherson’s candid answers

demonstrate that he had no opinion of Becks apart from the Geneva report. [Haw. App.

618-25] Moreover, we note that the trial court appeared to advocate Becks’s position far

better than the party’s lawyers, an odd role for a neutral adjudicator.

- 17 -

numbers underlying Christopherson’s opinion were merely an averaging of the two

Geneva reports, reports that were prepared by business brokers. [Haw. App. A626] The

question of this case is not whether Christopherson was entitled to rely on the Geneva

reports in order to formulate his own opinion; Christopherson simply did not provide an

independent opinion of the value of the business. It was an abuse of discretion for the

district court to allow Christopherson testify to his opinion of the value of Becks.3

Likewise, James Beck was allowed to testify as to the value of his business. The

trial court correctly noted that an owner of a business may testify as to its value. Shane v.

Shane, 891 F.2d 976, 982 (1st Cir. 1989). In this case, however, Mr. Beck candidly

admitted that his opinion of the business was based entirely on the Geneva reports. The

court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony.

Without the testimony of Christopherson and James Beck regarding their opinion

of the business, no evidence supports a finding that Becks had any value as a business

above that of their hard assets, which Christopherson testified had a value of about

$220,000. The Geneva reports were never admitted into evidence, and Haworth’s expert,

Dr. Randle, testified that as of the date of the first breach Becks had no value. Thus the

jury finding that Becks had a fair market value of $625,000 in early 1988, Interrogatory #
4

 Christopherson calculated Becks’ lost gross profits from credit invoices CCG

claimed from the disputed projects. These invoices were admitted into evidence. In its

opening brief, Haworth pointed out that Christopherson’s figure overstated by $95,586

the amount of credit invoices from the disputed projects. In its response brief, Becks does

not contend that Christopherson had not made the claimed arithmetic errors; rather, it

argues that Haworth did not adequately explain the shortcomings to the jury. It thus

appears that Becks concedes Christopherson was mistaken in adding up the relevant

credit invoices. Awarding them as lost profits would provide Becks a windfall to which it

is not entitled.

- 18 -

84, is not supported by any competent evidence and may not stand. Nevertheless, the jury

also awarded Becks a total of $500,000 in lost profits, and the trial court specifically

found that this award was supported by sufficient evidence. 

2. Whether the Jury Mistakenly Awarded $500,000 in Lost Profits 

Based on Gross Rather than Net Profits?

The jury found that Becks’s total lost profits from Haworth’s breach of the Dealer

Agreement amounted to $500,000. The evidence admitted tended to show that the gross

servicing dealer fees Haworth paid CCG on the disputed projects at most only amounted

to $408,904, although through arithmetic and logical miscalculations not contested on

appeal by Becks, Becks argues that lost profits for the five disputed projects amounted to

$504,489.30.4 The bulk of Becks’s lost profits evidence came from its expert,

Christopherson, who took the gross fees paid to CCG and subtracted 10% as expense and

overhead, a figure Haworth contends is arbitrary and unsupportable. Becks argues that

the 10% figure is justifiable considering that most of the relevant expenses and overhead

had already been expended. Becks defends the award in excess of the amount its expert
- 19 -

calculated by arguing that it presented evidence of lost profits from fees improperly paid

to CCG, but that it was unable to quantify the losses because Haworth failed to turn over

documents for Christopherson to analyze.

Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty, though not necessarily by a

precise estimate. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. And Tel. Co., 709 P.2d

330, 336 (Utah 1985). Under Utah law, a party is only entitled to recover lost net profits-

-that is, lost gross profits minus expenses associated with acquiring such profits. Sawyers

v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). A mere showing of lost gross

profits does not afford a jury the basis to award lost profits with reasonable certainty. 

First Sec. Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1982). 

Haworth challenges the lost profit findings on the basis of Christopherson’s

testimony and on the deviance of the award even from his opinion. In challenging the

10% discount, Haworth argues that Christopherson had no basis to come to this figure,

and that all of the evidence in the record contradicts his conclusion. See SCFC ILC, Inc.

v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 968-69 (10th Cir. 1994) (“‘When an expert opinion is not

supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable

record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a

jury’s verdict.’”) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995). Visa USA and Brooke

Group, both of which are antitrust cases involving determinations of the relevant market,
5

 Haworth contends the evidence constitutes inadmissable out of court statements

that Christopherson could not reasonably rely on. Unlike his reliance on the Geneva

report, the reliance on hearsay in this instance was permissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 703.

- 20 -

cannot easily be extended to this context. Reasonable certainty requires some supporting

evidence of overhead expense or other costs from which a net figure can be derived. 

Sawyers, 722 P.2d at 774 (upholding directed verdict for defendant where plaintiff

presented only evidence of gross profits); Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414

(Utah 1989)(amount of lost profits are too speculative where no contracts were entered

into and expert witness calculated lost profits based on hypothetical number of

customers). Here, it appears that Becks did present some evidence from which the jury

could have supported the 10% deduction, including reviewing Becks’s past financial data,

and interviews with James Beck and other employees of the business.5

 [Haw. App. A

680-82] Christopherson explained that reducing the gross profits by ten percent was a

reasonable approach in this case because most of the overhead costs of handling the

projects had already been expended, including draws against salary by Becks salespeople. 

Moreover, Becks’s figures used by Christopherson in reaching his opinion derive from

actual payments made by Haworth to CCG on the disputed projects. Sufficient evidence

supports Christopherson’s opinion that a ten percent deduction from lost gross profits

would properly determine net lost profits.

The only evidence to support the $500,000 figure involves speculation that the jury

considered earlier lost profits that were not quantified and extrapolated the same ten
- 21 -

percent overhead deduction, as well as crediting Christopherson’s improper figures of lost

gross profits. The lost net profits supported by Christopherson’s testimony only amounts

to approximately $450,000. Becks argues that once plaintiff presents evidence of

damages, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut, citing Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117

(Utah App. 1987). In Ault, however, the burden shifted once the plaintiff presented

evidence that reasonably supported its claim. Id. at 1121. Here, no competent evidence

supports finding more than $408,904 in gross lost profits. This amount must be reduced

by ten percent to determine net lost profits. This totals $368,014.

After the jury verdict, Haworth moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, a

remittitur, both of which were denied by the district court. In this case, where the

evidence does support some amount of damages but not the amount the jury awarded,

remittitur is proper. See Thompson v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 875 F.2d 1460, 1463 (10th Cir.

1989); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int’l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 1985). 

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Haworth’s motion for a

remittitur. When the jury’s award exceeds the amount established by the evidence, the

appropriate remedy is to reduce the award “‘to the outer limit of the proof.’” K-B

Trucking, 763 F.2d at 1163 (quoting Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus. Inc., 758 F.2d 1435,

1448 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985)). 

In this case, it is proper for us to remand to the district court with directions to

enter an order offering Becks a judgment reducing the damage award against Haworth to
6

 As a final issue in its appeal, Haworth contends that the trial judge improperly

interfered with its cross-examination of plaintiff’s main witness, James Beck. 

Apparently, the judge mistakenly believed that counsel had on cross examination already

inquired into matters raised on direct examination and that the cross-exam had become

repetitive. In his admonitions to counsel, the judge made some sharp references to

Haworth counsel’s behavior. The next day, the judge learned of his error, gave a

corrective instruction to the jury, and allowed Haworth’s counsel to engage in as much

cross-exam of Beck as it desired. While it can be reversible error for the trial court to

abuse its discretion and preclude entirely cross-examination of a witness, see SEC v.

Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir. 1992), in this case the court’s actions fell short of

denying meaningful cross-examination and, in any event, the trial court adequately cured

its error.

- 22 -

$368,014. Should Becks not accept the modified damage award, the court should order a

new trial on the issue of damages. Should Becks seek damages for diminution of the

value of its business--rather than damages from lost profits--it in addition must present

evidence that the lost profits, properly calculated, caused the loss in the value of its

business.6

II. BECKS’S CROSS-APPEAL

A. Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion to Deny Prejudgment

Interest?

The district court denied Becks prejudgment interest on its award, finding that

under Utah law the damages could not be calculated with mathematical certainty. 

Judgment at 3. We review the denial of prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion. 

U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1255 n.43 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Because any damage award will be ascertained on remand and are awarded within the
7

 Even if Becks accepts the remittitur, it will be the district court’s decision

whether to allow prejudgment interest on the modified damages award. Until the district

court decides whether or not to award prejudgment interest any decision by us would be

premature.

- 23 -

discretion of the trial court, we do not now reach this issue. Instead, we leave it to the

trial court to determine whether such damages are appropriate given the nature of proof

Becks presents.7

B. Did the District Court Err in Directing a Verdict Against Becks on its

Punitive Damages Claim?

Becks argues that the district court should not have granted Haworth’s JMOL

motion on its punitive damages claim because there was sufficient evidence of Haworth’s

misconduct to send the case to the jury. As noted above we consider motions for JMOL

under the same standard as the trial court. The court analyzes a JMOL motion under the

same standard as a motion for summary judgment, granting the motion only if there is no

genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Pendlton v. Conoco, 23 F.3d 281, 286 (10th Cir. 1994). In considering the

motion, we are guided by the subsidiary evidentiary standard the nonmoving party must

meet to prevail on its claim. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 254-55

(1986).

Punitive damages are made available by statute under Utah law, and may be

awarded “only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by

clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
- 24 -

willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a

knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.” Utah

Code Ann. § 78-18-1(a) (1953) (emphasis added). Under Utah law, punitive damages

should be awarded infrequently. Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 749 P.2d

660, 670 (Utah App. 1988). By the terms of the statute and under Utah case law,

punitive damages must be predicated upon tortious conduct. Canyon Country Store, 781

P.2d at 423. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in

contract not tort. Id. Here, the only tort on which a punitive damages claim could have

been predicated was interference with prospective business advantage. In fact, even this

conduct might not be a predicate to punitive damages. See Jorgensen v. John Clay and

Co., 660 P.2d 229, 232-33 (Utah 1983) (even a malicious or willful breach of contract

cannot allow for a punitive damages award unless an independent tort is proved). It is not

clear in this case whether the jury might have found a tort because it did not have to

decide the issue once finding that damages from Haworth’s breaches caused Becks to fail. 

[Haw. App. C848]

The trial court’s conclusion that none of Haworth’s actions could rise to the level

of malicious or knowing indifference towards Becks’s rights is not contradicted by the

clear and convincing evidence in the record. First, almost no evidence was presented to

demonstrate that Haworth believed it was interfering with project contracts it knew Becks

was to receive. Second, the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be proven by
- 25 -

clear and convincing evidence. Even if Becks can argue that the jury might have

reasonably inferred that Haworth acted maliciously and with knowing indifference to

Becks’s prospective business advantage, these inferences could not lead a reasonable jury

to find the evidence was clear and convincing, particularly in light of the plausible

legitimate reasons Haworth gave for abandoning Becks in favor of CCG. 

C. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Excluding Testimony of Ex-Haworth

Dealers? 

Finally, Becks contends that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of

former Haworth dealers. These dealers would have testified on Haworth’s prior bad acts,

apparently in support of Becks’s punitive damages and tort claims. We review a district

court’s exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion, and do not disturb its

determination “absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of

fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” Cartier v.

Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995).

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides in part: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is

not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident . . . .” In this case, Becks asserts that this testimony properly goes to Haworth’s

state of mind in its actions against Becks. The Supreme Court has fashioned four

requirements before Rule 404(b) evidence may be admitted: (1) the evidence must be
- 26 -

offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must meet the relevancy requirement of

Rule 402; (3) the trial court must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is

substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) the

trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be

considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Huddleston v. United

States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988). The trial court apparently found the risk of

prejudice to Haworth substantially outweighed its probative value to Becks, and that to

allow the ex-dealers testify would require a mini-trial to allow Haworth the opportunity to

explain its reasons for terminating each dealership and its successful relations with other

dealers. The district court properly followed Huddleston and its decision did not

“manifest a clear error in judgment.” See Coast-to-Coast Stores, Inc. v. WomackBowers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1398, 1403-04 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s exclusion

of testimony by nonparty former franchisees in franchise termination case based on

potential prejudice and immateriality).

CONCLUSION

With respect to Haworth’s appeal we AFFIRM the jury verdict on the liability of

Haworth for breach of contract. We REVERSE AND REMAND the jury verdict on the

issue of damages and order the district court to grant Haworth’s motion for remittitur in

the amount above stated. Should Becks refuse the remittitur and seek damages from

diminution of value of its business, rather than damages from the lost profits themselves,
- 27 -

it must, in addition to proving lost profits, prove that the lost profits caused by Haworth’s

breach caused the value of its business to diminish, specifically, that the lost profits drove

it out of business.

With respect to Becks’s cross-appeal, we AFFIRM the district court in all respects.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero

Circuit Judge