[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-14594

Non-Argument Calendar

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RUTH FALLS-MILLER, 

DR. HOWARD J. MILLER, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SAVANNAH-CHATHAM COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL BOARD, 

THOMAS B. LOCKAMY, JR., 

In his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14594

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00085-JRH-CLR

____________________

Before JORDAN, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ruth Falls-Miller and Dr. Howard J. Miller appeal pro se the 

district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their complaint, which alleged due process and First Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. 

section 1983 and violations of Georgia tort and contract law against 

the Savannah-Chatham County Public School Board and 

Dr. Thomas B. Lockamy, Jr. The Millers argue that the district 

court erred in (1) dismissing their complaint as time barred; (2) concluding that the School Board was immune from suit; (3) finding 

that their Section 1983 claim was filed in bad faith, was frivolous, 

and failed to state a claim; and (4) ignoring their due process and 

free speech claims. 

Falls-Miller was terminated from her teaching position with 

the School Board at the suggestion of its superintendent, Lockamy. 

The Millers alleged constitutional violations beginning on January 

4, 2013, when Falls-Miller received Lockamy’s written notice of termination recommendation to the School Board. According to the 

Millers, the alleged violations continued until her termination 

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20-14594 Opinion of the Court 3

hearing on January 28, 2013. They filed their complaint on April 24, 

2020. A magistrate judge screened the complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2) and issued a report and recommendation 

that the complaint be dismissed as untimely. The district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation over the Millers’ 

objection, explaining that constitutional claims under Section 1983 

are tort actions subject to Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations. 

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal 

under 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e)(2)(B) of an in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). We review 

de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hall v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans’ Affairs, 85 F.3d 

532, 533 (11th Cir. 1996). We may affirm on any ground supported 

by the record. Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 535 F.3d 1286, 1291 

(11th Cir. 2008). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

A district court may properly dismiss a complaint for failure 

to state a claim if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that 

the applicable statute of limitations bars the claim. United States v. 

Henco Holding Corp., 985 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021). Constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 are tort actions and are subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state in which the federal court sits. 

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Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2011). A cause 

of action under Section 1983 accrues, and thereby sets the limitations clock running, when the plaintiff knows or should know 

(1) that she has suffered the injury that forms the basis of her complaint and (2) who has inflicted the injury. Chappell v. Rich, 340 

F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). The governing statute of limitations in Georgia is two years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. The statute of limitations for actions involving written contracts is six years.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. An untimely complaint will not succeed on the 

merits. Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 

1280 (11th Cir. 2015). 

District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions 

arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States and 

have supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so 

related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction.” 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a). A district court may decline supplemental 

jurisdiction over a state law claim if: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State 

law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 

claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in 

exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 

Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4)). The decision to exercise 

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supplemental jurisdiction rests within the discretion of the district 

court. Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). 

On appeal, the Millers contend that the district court erred 

in applying the two-year statute of limitations for tort actions instead of the six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions. The complaint asserted a “42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against [the 

Board] for violation [Fall-Miller’s] due process rights” and 

“den[ying] her of the property rights to her contracted teaching position.” The Board argues that the Millers failed to state a claim for 

breach of contract, and, in any event, the claim would be untimely.

We conclude that the district court correctly determined 

that the Millers’ Section 1983 action was a tort action subject to 

Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. 

Accordingly, it properly dismissed the complaint for being untimely by over five years. To the extent that the complaint raised 

other claims under contract law, which has a six-year statute of limitations, the complaint still was untimely filed by more than one 

year. Further, because the district court properly dismissed the 

only federal claim, it also did not err by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Because we concluded that the district court properly dismissed the action as untimely, we need not reach the remaining arguments that the Millers raise on appeal. 

AFFIRMED.

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