1

 

APHIS Evaluation of the Foot and Mouth 

Disease Status of Japan 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Veterinary Services

April 1, 2011
2

Contents

Abbreviations................................................................................................................................................3

Executive summary.......................................................................................................................................4

Hazard identification.....................................................................................................................................5

Release assessment ......................................................................................................................................6

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................6

2. Disease history ..................................................................................................................................7

3. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services............................................9

4. Livestock demographics and marketing practices..........................................................................15

5. Emergency preparedness and response.........................................................................................17

6. Diagnostic laboratory capability .....................................................................................................25

7. Surveillance.....................................................................................................................................26

8. Vaccination practices......................................................................................................................31

9. Epidemiological separation from potential sources of infection....................................................32

10. Conclusions .....................................................................................................................................34

Risk estimate...............................................................................................................................................36

References ..................................................................................................................................................37

Annex: Outbreak chronology .....................................................................................................................39
3

Abbreviations

AIDPL Animal Infectious Disease Prevention Law

AQS Animal Quarantine Service

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FMD Foot and mouth disease

GFMD Guidelines for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease

LBPE Liquid-phase blocking ELISA

LHSC Livestock Hygiene Service Center

MAA Mutual Aid Association

MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

MRZ Movement restriction zone

NIAH National Institute of Animal Health

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

RT-PCR Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction

SLCFMD Special Law for Countermeasures against Foot and Mouth Disease

SRZ Shipment restriction zone

Kawaminami area: Area consisting of Kawaminami-cho, Tsuno-cho, Takanabe-cho, Shintomi-cho, and 

parts of Hyuga city, Kijo-cho, Saito city, and Miyazaki city; became the vaccination area.
4

Executive summary

On 20 April 2010, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food (MAFF) reported an outbreak of 

FMD in Miyazaki prefecture. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) immediately 

implemented an administrative ban on importation of commodities from Japan that could harbor FMD 

virus. APHIS later supported this action by issuing an interim rule that removed Japan from the list of 

regions considered free of FMD in title 9, Code of Federal Regulation, section 94.1. Over the course of 11 

weeks, MAFF reported infection on a total of 292 farms within the prefecture, resulting in the 

depopulation and burial of 211,608 infected and susceptible animals. The last affected farm was 

depopulated on July 5; on October 6, MAFF requested that APHIS reinstate Japan to the list of FMD-free 

regions. This assessment examines the current status of Japan with regard FMD, including the measures 

taken to control and eradicate the disease.

Japan’s official veterinary services addressed the FMD outbreak through a stamping out policy that 

involved movement restrictions, culling, active surveillance, and ultimately vaccination. Several factors 

contributed to the duration and extent of the outbreak, including delayed detection of the first case and 

delayed depopulation of affected farms due to difficulties identifying suitable burial sites. The latter led 

to the decision to vaccinate and destroy all susceptible animals within a target area; however, 

implementation was hindered by the need for special legislation to allow the official veterinary services 

to conduct precautionary culling of apparently healthy animals. Vaccination ultimately occurred from 

May 22 to 26 and all vaccinated animals were depopulated and buried by June 30. 

The official veterinary services conducted active surveillance for detection of FMD-infected animals and 

to reestablish FMD freedom, both in Miyazaki prefecture and throughout the country. Surveillance 

consisting of both clinical inspections and serologic testing was conducted prior to lifting movement 

restrictions on affected areas and also to reestablish disease freedom in Miyazaki prefecture. Sentinel 

animals placed on 175 farms in the affected area were monitored and tested, with negative results. No 

evidence to suggest continued circulation of FMD virus was detected. 

The source of the virus has not been definitively identified; however, MAFF suspects that it was 

introduced through contaminated people or personal goods from a nearby affected country. The agency 

has taken steps to increase biosecurity and inspection measures for travelers and luggage arriving from 

affected regions, as well as biosecurity at the farm level.

APHIS concludes from this assessment that Japan successfully eradicated FMD virus introduced in 2010. 

The recent outbreak considerably heightened public awareness, which increases the likelihood of early 

detection in the event of a future FMD outbreak, and MAFF is taking actions to address the logistical 

difficulties that extended the course of the 2010 outbreak.
5

Hazard identification

The hazard under consideration in this assessment is FMD virus. FMD is a contagious and economically 

damaging disease of cloven-hoofed animals, including domestic ruminants and pigs, as well as over 70 

wildlife species [1]. The disease is endemic in large areas of Africa, Asia, and South America, and 

outbreaks are not uncommon in previously free areas throughout the world [2]. The FMD virus belongs 

to the family Picornaviridae, genus Apthovirus, and 7 distinct serotypes with indistinguishable clinical 

effects have been identified: O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia1 [3]. FMD virus is stable under cold 

conditions [4, 5].

The incubation period for FMD is 2-14 days [6]. The virus initially multiplies in the pharyngeal area and is 

then carried to the regional lymph nodes and the bloodstream for distribution throughout the body [2, 

7]. Subsequent viral amplification occurs within the cornified stratified epithelium of the skin, 

particularly on the feet, mammary gland, and tongue, as well as in the myocardium of young animals. 

Saliva, feces, urine, and breath are sources of the virus, and virus may be present in milk and semen up 

to 4 days before clinical signs appear [6]. 

Other sources of viable virus are meat and meat products in which the pH has remained above 6.0, as 

well as convalescent animals, exposed vaccinates, and carrier animals, particularly cattle and water 

buffalo. The FMD virus survives in lymph nodes and bone marrow at neutral pH, but is destroyed in 

muscle when the pH is less than 6.0 [6]. Pig meat does not consistently reach as low an ultimate pH 

during carcass maturation as beef, so the inactivation of FMD virus in pig meat may not be as complete 

as that occurring in beef [8]. Virus inactivation has not been examined in detail in small ruminant meat 

[2]. The virus can persist in contaminated fodder and the environment for up to 1 month, depending on 

the temperature and pH conditions. 

Susceptible livestock may be infected with FMD virus as a result of direct or indirect contact with 

infected animals or an infected environment [2]. Indirect transmission may occur via movement of 

people, wild or domestic animals, or inanimate objects (vehicles, farm implements, clothing), and longrange airborne transmission is also possible. Transmission of FMD virus via meat or meat products is 

well documented. For example, a review of 627 known sources of FMD outbreaks throughout the world 

from 1870-1993 found that 411 of the outbreaks (66%) were attributable to infected meat, meat 

products, or garbage [9].

Laboratory confirmation is essential during outbreak situations, since FMD cannot be distinguished from 

other vesicular disease such as SVD, vesicular stomatitis, and vesicular exanthema of swine on the basis 

of clinical findings [2]. The classical form is characterized by fever and vesicles with subsequent erosions 

in the mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats. However, serological field surveys and experimental 

investigations have shown that FMD in small ruminants may be clinically inapparent in a significant 

proportion of animals [10, 11], and certain strains of the virus may be of low virulence in some species 

[12]. FMD generally causes low mortality in adult animals but mortality may be high in young animals 

due to myocarditis.
6

Release assessment

1. Introduction

Japan is an archipelago of 6,852 islands [13]. The four largest islands, from north to south, are Hokkaido, 

Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu; these islands account for 97 percent of Japan’s land area. Roughly 70 to 

80 percent of Japan is forested, mountainous, and unsuitable for agricultural, industrial, or residential 

use due to steep elevations, climate, and risk of landslides [13]. As a result, the habitable zones—located 

mainly in coastal areas—have extremely high population densities. 

Japan is divided into 47 prefectures, each overseen by an elected governor, legislature, and 

administrative bureaucracy (see Figure 1.1). The prefectures are further divided into cities, towns, and 

villages (collectively called municipalities). Although Japan is a constitutional monarchy, the power of 

the Emperor is very limited; rather, the Prime Minister is the head of the national government [13]. 

Japan’s legislative organ is the National Diet, a bicameral parliament with a popularly-elected House of 

Representatives and House of Councilors.

Figure 1.1: Administrative divisions of Japan
7

2. Disease history 

On 20 April 2010, Japan reported an outbreak of FMD in Miyazaki prefecture, located on the eastern 

coast of Kyushu Island (see Figure 1.1, no. 45); this was the first FMD outbreak in Japan since 2000 [14]. 

A detailed chronology of events is provided in the Annex.

The initial detection occurred on a farm with 16 beef cattle (case: Tsuno-cho 2); however, the Ministry 

of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) estimates that animals on at least 10 other farms were 

infected by April 20 [15, 16]. Between April 20 and 26, infection was confirmed on 6 additional farms 

within the 10 kilometer movement restriction zone (MRZ) around the first farm. An epidemiological 

investigation identified the presumed index case, a farm with 42 buffalo and 2 pigs (case: Tsuno-cho 1).

MAFF estimates that the virus was introduced onto this farm around March 19. 

The first affected swine farm was confirmed on April 28 (case: Kawaminami-cho 6), the same day that 

officials confirmed the first affected farm outside of the initial MRZ (case: Ebino city 1). The incidence of 

new case farms increased rapidly from that point, climbing to 15 cases in a single day on May 17 (see 

Figure 2.1) [16]. The official veterinary services conducted emergency vaccination against FMD from 

May 22 to 26 in the Kawaminami area.

1

The number of outbreaks subsequently took a downward turn, 

with the last affected farm detected on 4 July 2010 and depopulated the following day (case: Miyazaki 

city 3). 

Figure 2.1: Chronology of the outbreak

 

1

Kawaminami area: Area consisting of Kawaminami-cho, Tsuno-cho, Takanabe-cho, Shintomi-cho, and parts of 

Hyuga city, Kijo-cho, Saito city, and Miyazaki city; became the vaccination area.

Formatted: Font: (Default) +Body, 11 pt, Font

color: Auto
8

Ninety-four percent of the affected farms were located in Kawaminami-cho (197) and the adjacent 

towns of Tsuno-cho (30), Kijo-cho (5), Takanabe-cho (25), and Shintomi-cho (17) (see Figure 2.2) [14, 

16]. Cases also occurred in neighboring Hyuga city (1), Kunitomi town (1), Miyazaki city (3), Saito city (8), 

and the more distant Ebino city (4) and Miyakonojo city (1).

Figure 2.2: Distribution of FMD outbreaks

The official veterinary services adopted a policy of stamping out through movement controls, culling, 

active surveillance, and ultimately vaccination (see Section 5) [15, 16]. Prefectural officials established 

MRZs and shipment restriction zones (SRZs) that extended 10 and 20 kilometers around affected farms, 

respectively. When infection was confirmed outside of an existing MRZ, a new MRZ and SRZ were 

established. 

All told, FMD infection was confirmed on 292 farms over a period of 11 weeks; all 211,608 infected and 

susceptible animals residing on those farms were depopulated [16]. All vaccinated animals were also 

depopulated (see Section 8). The primary species affected in the 2010 outbreak were cattle and swine, 

with minor involvement of sheep (8), goats (14), and water buffalo (42) [14, 16]. 

The official veterinary services conducted active surveillance for detection of FMD-infected animals, 

both in Miyazaki prefecture and throughout the country (see Section 7) [15, 16]. Veterinarians also 

conducted active clinical and serological surveillance to reestablish freedom from FMD around affected 
9

farms—prior to lifting movement restrictions—and throughout Miyazaki prefecture, as well as targeted 

wildlife surveillance.

The National Institute for Animal Health (NIAH) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) World

Reference Laboratory for FMD determined that the circulating virus was serotype O [14, 16]. The most 

closely related reference strain was O/MYA/7/98, similar to recent serotype isolations from Hong Kong, 

Republic of Korea (Korea), and Russia (see Section 6). An epidemiological study conducted by the NIAH 

estimated that the virus entered into Japan in mid-March, most likely via contaminated people or 

personal goods from a nearby affected country, although no source of the virus has been definitively 

identified.

Prefectural officials lifted the movement restrictions around the last affected farm (case: Miyazaki city 3) 

on July 27 [14, 16]. On 6 October 2010, MAFF declared Japan once again free of FMD. On 4 February 

2011, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) reinstated Japan to the list of countries free of 

FMD without vaccination [17].

3. Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services

3.1 Organization

3.1.1 National level

The national veterinary authority in Japan is MAFF, specifically the Animal Health Division [16, 18]. MAFF 

has headquarters in Tokyo and 7 regional offices, as well as branch offices in each prefecture that gather 

statistics, organize subsidies, and provide support to farmers and to the local veterinary services. MAFF 

develops animal health plans and emergency response policies in conjunction with consultative 

committees. MAFF also provides assistance to the prefectural governments for improvement and 

maintenance of veterinary facilities and organizes training for local veterinary officers. Within MAFF, the 

Animal Quarantine Service (AQS) administer import and export functions (see Section 9). 

During the 2010 FMD outbreaks, the national government implemented 3 emergency management 

groups [15]. The first, established at MAFF headquarters on April 20 with the Minister of MAFF directing, 

provided guidance to the prefectures regarding onsite control measures. The second, directed by the 

Prime Minister, served to coordinate other national and prefectural agencies involved in the response. 

The third, consisting of representatives from the national office gathered at the prefectural level with 

the Vice-Minister of MAFF directing, focused primarily on financial support.

3.1.2 Prefectural level

The prefectural governments establish Livestock Hygiene Service Centers (LHSCs) as the front line in 

livestock health protection efforts and implement specific measures for animal health protection [15, 

19]. As of 31 March 2009, there were 172 LHSCs established in the Japan’s 47 prefectures, employing a 

total of 2,147 local veterinary officers (see Figure 3.1). 

The Miyazaki LHSC serves the central Koyu area of Miyazaki prefecture (see Figure 3.2), where most of 

the outbreaks occurred, as well as the Chuba and Minaminaka areas to the south [20]. The Miyakonojo 

and Nobeoka LHSCs serve the remainder of the prefecture. Each LHSC has 3 divisions—management and 
10

feed safety, animal health, and disease diagnostics—and consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, local 

veterinary officers, technicians, and administrative staff. The Miyazaki LHSC has an onsite laboratory 

with BSL-2 capability.

Figure 3.1: Location of animal health facilities [19]

Figure 3.2: Detail of Miyazaki prefecture and Koyu area (in orange)
11

During the FMD outbreak, Miyazaki prefecture established emergency operation centers at the Miyazaki 

LHSC and the prefectural veterinary service headquarters in Miyazaki city [15]. The Miyazaki LHSC 

served as a local headquarters for the response effort. Secondary headquarters in Kawaminami-cho and 

Shintomi-cho served as the frontline for response actions. Each municipality—cities, towns, and 

villages—established their own centers that operated under instructions from the prefectural veterinary 

service. Response measures were primarily enacted by the prefecture, with national support. 

3.1.3 Municipal level

Each municipality has a voluntary self-defense promotion committee consisting of designated 

veterinarians (200 in Miyazaki Prefecture) who have received special training at a prefectural LHSC, as 

well as representatives of the local livestock industries [15]. These committees aid in emergency 

response through communications and logistics.

3.2 Authority

The primary legal act concerning animal health is the Animal Infectious Disease Prevention Law (AIDPL)

[21]. The AIDPL grants prefectural governors the primary authority and responsibility for animal health 

issues, including emergency response during foreign animal disease outbreaks. Prefectural governors 

typically delegate such authority to the Directors of the LHSCs (Article 61). MAFF retains the authority to

instruct any prefecture to take critical response or prevention actions if deemed necessary (Article 47). 

The AIDPL also requires animal owners, caretakers, and veterinarians to immediately report a suspect or 

confirmed case of a foreign animal disease—including FMD—to the prefectural authorities (Articles 4 

and 13). Prefectural authorities must then notify MAFF and the mayors of affected and neighboring 

municipalities.

Under the AIDPL, prefectural governments have the legal authority to enact or require disease control 

measures such as quarantine of affected farms, movement restrictions and traffic control in affected 

areas, depopulation and disposal of infected and susceptible animals on affected farms, and cleaning 

and disinfection (Chapters II and III) [21]. Prefectural governors are obligated to loan local veterinary

officers to an affected prefecture for emergency response, upon request (Article 48-2). A prefectural 

governor may also request that MAFF AQS officers temporarily assume the duties of local veterinary

officers (Article 48). 

The AIDPL carries a penalty of up to 3 years in prison or 1 million Yen (12 thousand USD) for failure to 

report a suspect FMD case [21]. The penalty for noncompliance with movement restrictions during an 

outbreak is up to 1 year in prison or 500 thousand Yen (6 thousand USD). 

Based on the AIDPL, MAFF develops guidelines that function as standard protocols for the prefectural 

veterinary services to follow with regard to routine and emergency animal health measures [16, 19]. 

Specific animal infectious disease control guidelines—such as the Guidelines for the Progressive Control 

of Animal Infectious Diseases (GAID) and the Guidelines for Control of FMD (GFMD)—are developed by 

the national government, the prefectural governments, research institutions, and other entities in a 

collaborative framework. 

The GAID describes the basic measures to be taken by MAFF and the governments of prefectures, cities, 

towns, and villages to prevent and control animal infectious diseases [16]. The GFMD outlines critical 
12

control measures in the event of an FMD outbreak based on a stamping-out policy. Specifically, the 

GFMD describes the measures to be adopted at first notification of a suspect case, when the case is 

confirmed, and at the place(s) of the outbreaks, as well as procedures for tracing susceptible animals, 

controlling animal movements, and conducting epidemiological surveys. The GFMD also describes a 

basic communication plan to allow information sharing among domestic stakeholders and promote 

public awareness of the disease outbreak. 

The GFMD contains general provision for vaccination against FMD, stipulating that vaccination will be 

considered when (1) it may be difficult to control FMD with only movement restrictions and culling of 

infected and susceptible animals, and (2) vaccination is a vital tool to attain early establishment of FMD 

freedom [19]. However, neither the GFMD nor the AIDPL provide the legal authority for the official 

veterinary services to conduct precautionary depopulation of apparently healthy animals, vaccinated or 

otherwise. 

On 4 June 2010, the Diet enacted a new law—the Special Law for Countermeasures against FMD

(SLCFMD)—to allow for precautionary depopulation of susceptible animals in a specific area designated 

by the MAFF Minister [16]. Under the SLCFMD and upon request by the Governor of Miyazaki, the 

MAFF Minister designated the Kawaminami area as a vaccination practicing zone. The legislation also 

included funding for compensation of affected farmers. MAFF subsequently published the 

Implementation Manual for Control of FMD to strengthen the control measures in place and to 

implement certain provisions of the SLCFMD [16, 19]. 

3.3 Infrastructure

3.3.1 Human and material resources

Personnel

According to the Japan Veterinary Medical Association, there are about 36,000 active veterinarians in 

Japan [22, 23]. Approximately 9,100 veterinarians (25 percent) work as public officials with the national 

government, prefectural governments, or municipal governments (see Table 3.1). Another 6,700 work 

for private organizations and approximately 15 thousand are private practitioners. The number of 

veterinarians working with food animals is gradually declining; however, the percentage on Kyushu 

Island (20.7 percent) is almost double the national average (11.7 percent) [23].

Table 3.1: Number of veterinarians employed in the public sector [22]

Field National 

level

Prefectural 

level

Municipal 

level

Agriculture 277 3,160 142

Public health 151 3,784 923

Other 36 357 273

Total 464 7,301 1,338

A total of 7,618 veterinarians participated in the outbreak response, organized into separate teams for 

surveillance, epidemiology, vaccination, and depopulation [15]. The Miyazaki prefectural government 

requested official veterinarians from other prefectures as allowed under the AIDPL and also recruited 
13

veterinarians in private practice and at universities. MAFF detailed AQS officers to the response effort as 

well. The Miyazaki LHSC informed the prefectural government of the specific staffing needs for the next 

day and the government requested the appropriate number of veterinarians. The Governor of Miyazaki 

also requested Japan Self Defense (military) forces on May 1. These persons assisted with excavation of 

burial sites, carrying out cleaning and disinfection, and manning disinfection points.

Education and training

Sixteen colleges and universities in Japan offer a veterinary medicine curriculum [22]. The curriculum 

spans 6 years with students entering directly from high school. Graduates must pass a national exam 

administered by MAFF for licensure. Completion of the 6-year curriculum and passing the national exam 

confers a master’s degree. Approximately 1,000 graduates become newly licensed veterinarian each 

year, half of which are female. 

Local veterinary officers participate in foreign animal disease simulations and training organized by

MAFF and the NIAH [15]. MAFF conducted quality control exercises with all prefectures in late 2010, 

after the FMD outbreak, and also in February 2011. The purpose is to verify details of the emergency 

response plans and address any weaknesses detected.

Financial resources

The cost of the 2010 outbreak response was largely assumed by the Miyazaki prefectural government, 

with assistance from the national government [15]. The outbreak resulted in estimated losses of 235 

billion Yen (2.8 billion USD) to Miyazaki prefecture—including the economic impact on related 

industries—and 60 billion Yen (724 million USD) to the national government.

Communications

The official veterinary services have full access to telephone, internet, and email for communication 

purposes [15]. During the 2010 outbreak, MAFF and Miyazaki prefecture followed a basic 

communication plan developed after the 2000 outbreak. The prefectural government supplied 

information to the municipalities, who then conveyed it to individual farmers. When new zones were 

established, the LHSCs notified affected farmers by telephone and requested compliance, which is 

considered legally binding under the AIDPL. The prefecture posted changes to the restricted areas on 

their internet homepage and issued media releases every day for 70 days. These releases described 

confirmed cases and changes to the movement and shipment restriction zones, and referred people to 

the prefectural website for up-to-date information. 

Monitoring and audit programs

The Japanese government established an Independent Committee for Verification of the Containment 

and Eradication of FMD in Miyazaki Prefecture [15]. The Independent Committee consisted of 

researchers, consumer organizations, mass media representatives, and others; MAFF and Miyazaki 

prefecture were not represented. The Chairman of the Japanese Veterinary Medical Association 

moderated the discussions. 

The recommendations of the Independent Committee focused on prevention of FMD introduction, 

ensuring early detection and reporting, and effective initial response [24]. Among other things, the 
14

Independent Committee noted that biosecurity measures in place at ports and on farms prior to the 

outbreak were not sufficient to prevent FMD introduction, and that such measures should be 

strengthened. The Independent Committee also noted that the roles of the national government, 

prefectures, and municipalities during an outbreak response should be defined more specifically, with 

the national government taking a greater role in both preparedness and response. 

In addition, the Independent Committee emphasized the high cost of the delays in detecting FMD, 

depopulating and disposing of affected animals, and implementing vaccination [24]. The Independent 

Committee made several recommendations for improving passive surveillance and emergency 

preparedness, as well as changes to the AIDPL—including a permanent provision to allow for preventive 

vaccination and/or culling of healthy animals—that MAFF and the Diet are considering [15]. MAFF is also 

considering changes to the AIDPL that would require each farmer to identify a viable burial site to use in 

the event of an outbreak. 

3.4 Discussion

The official veterinary services of Japan are hierarchically organized, with considerable autonomy at the 

prefectural level. The AIDPL allots primary responsibility for emergency response to the prefectural 

governors, with MAFF providing guidance and support. However, it appears that the practical roles and 

responsibilities of MAFF and the prefectures were not clearly defined prior to the 2010 outbreak, which 

caused some confusion in the initial stages. Earlier and more cohesive involvement of MAFF at the 

prefectural level—including teams with expertise in epidemiology, biosecurity, and other disease control 

measures—could promote a more effective initial response. 

The official veterinary services have sufficient legal authority to conduct routine animal health activities 

and most emergency response measures. However, the AIDPL does not include provisions for certain 

actions that may be required to control a disease outbreak, including precautionary culling of apparently 

healthy animals. The Diet therefore had to enact additional legislation—the SLCFMD—to provide the 

legal authority for the official veterinary services to depopulate susceptible animals in the vaccination 

zone, which delayed the outbreak response. Revising the AIDPL and dependent guidelines to include 

comprehensive provisions for emergency response could aid in avoiding such delays in the future.

The infrastructure of the official veterinary services appears sufficient to carry out routine activities, 

although it is concerning that Miyazaki prefecture—where both the 2000 and 2010 FMD outbreaks 

occurred—has the lowest ratios of official veterinarians to animals and to farms among the prefectures. 

The 2010 outbreak placed considerable strain on the resources of the official veterinary services, 

particularly regarding personnel, suggesting that these resources could be overwhelmed in a larger 

outbreak. Although MAFF officials declined an offer by the FAO to send a specialist team to Miyazaki 

prefecture to help contain the virus, and expressed hesitance to recruit foreign veterinarians due to the 

language barrier, it would appear prudent to investigate these resources further. 

APHIS concludes that the authority, organization, and infrastructure of Japan’s veterinary services were 

sufficient to address the 2010 FMD outbreak, although opportunities for improvement exist.
15

4. Livestock demographics and marketing practices

Miyazaki prefecture is a major agricultural area, ranked fourth in Japan in gross agricultural output [16]. 

It is Japan’s 2nd largest pig-farming region and 3rd largest producer of beef cattle. Prior to the outbreak, 

livestock production accounted for 58 percent of gross agricultural output of the prefecture. 

4.1 Livestock population of Japan

As of February 2009, there were approximately 4.42 million cattle, 9.9 million swine, and 26 thousand 

small ruminants in Japan (see Table 4.1) [16]. The majority of dairy cattle are located in the northern 

Hokkaido prefecture, as are many of the large beef operations. However, the majority of beef cattle are 

located on smaller farms on the southern island of Kyushu, particularly in Miyazaki and Kagoshima 

prefectures. 

Table 4.1: Livestock demographics in Japan and Miyazaki prefecture [16]

Species Japan Miyazaki

Farms Animals Farms Animals 

Cattle

Total 100,400 4,423,000 10,734 297,000

Dairy 23,100 1,500,000 434 19,000

Beef 77,300 2,923,000 10,300 278,000

Swine 6,890 9,899,000 650 901,000

Swine are farmed primarily in the Kanto area located east of Tokyo, as well as southern Kyushu Island, 

including Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures [16]. Sheep and goats are raised on a few commercial 

farms in Hokkaido and on small-scale farms scattered throughout Japan. 

Japan has actively followed policies designed to increase herd size in recent years, in order to improve 

productivity and strengthen competitiveness in international trade [24].

4.2 Livestock population of Miyazaki prefecture

As of February 2009, there were approximately 297 thousand cattle on 10,734 farms in Miyazaki 

prefecture (see Table 4.1 above) [16]. There were also over 900 thousand swine on 650 farms. 

Kawaminami-cho—in which the majority of the FMD outbreaks occurred—was one of the most densely 

inhabited areas of swine production prior to the outbreak, with over 141.5 thousand swine. The average 

distance between livestock farms in some areas is less than 500 meters.

4.3 Marketing practices

Beef in Japan is produced from 3 primary types of cattle: purebred Wagyu (39 percent), Wagyu hybrid 

bred from a Wagyu male and a dairy female (24 percent), and dairy (37 percent) [25]. Wagyu breeding 

cattle are typically kept on small farms averaging 10 animals; in 2008, there were approximately 667 

thousand Wagyu breeding cattle on 64 thousand farms. Wagyu feedlots purchase feeder cattle at 8 to 9 

months of age and sell them directly to an abattoir at 29 to 30 months (around 700 kilograms) [15]. 

Feedlots average 100-200 animals. 
16

Wagyu hybrid cattle and male dairy cattle may be raised on a rearing operation then sold to a fattening 

operation [25]. Alternatively, some farms both rear and fatten Wagyu hybrid cattle and/or male dairy 

cattle. Aged Wagyu and dairy cows are also sold for beef production. 

Prefectures are divided into regions served by a particular livestock market [15]. Although not legally 

required, most farmers sell their animals through the market that serves their region; buyers come from 

throughout Japan. The Koyu Livestock Market services the Koyu area in which the majority of the FMD 

outbreaks occur. Most farmers also buy their feed through the local branch of a national agricultural 

cooperative that services their region.

4.4 Animal identification and traceability

Japan has had a mandatory animal identification program for cattle in place since December 2003 [19]. 

All domestic and imported cattle receive a tag in each ear that bears a unique 10-figure individual 

identification number and barcode. The identification numbers are recorded in a central database. 

Producers are required to notify MAFF when animals are added to or removed from their herd. 

Producers must keep a record of births, deaths, purchases, and sales, including the premises number of 

the seller or buyer. Slaughter plants must provide the identification numbers of slaughtered cattle to 

MAFF and keep a record of all cattle slaughtered. The animal identification number stays with the

carcass throughout slaughter and processing, and is displayed on the product label. Using this number, 

consumers can access an animal’s entire production history. 

To date, there is no standard identification system for swine in Japan that would allow tracing of 

individual animals [15]. However, each prefecture maintains a database of the location and type of 

livestock premises, as well as the number of animals on each farm. Swine moving across prefectural 

boundaries must be accompanied by a certificate attesting to the status of the herd and animal(s) for 

Aujeszky’s disease. MAFF regional officials conduct annual on-farm inspections to audit animal 

identification and movement records. 

4.5 Biosecurity

The report of the Independent Committee suggests that farmers in Miyazaki prefecture did not follow 

sound biosecurity practices, thereby facilitating virus spread [24]. During the outbreak, local veterinary 

officers throughout Japan worked with farmers to increase on-farm biosecurity measures, as observed 

by the APHIS site visit team [15]. The Independent Committee recommended that farmers, 

veterinarians, and others in the livestock industries be held to more stringent biosecurity standards in 

the future.

4.6 Discussion

The large number of susceptible animals in close proximity in Miyazaki prefecture, particularly swine, 

likely facilitated virus spread. Conversely, the localized marketing and feed supply practices may have 

helped to limit the geographic extent of the outbreak to within Miyazaki prefecture, and largely within 

the Koyu region. As a result of the 2010 outbreak, livestock farmers throughout Japan are currently 

implementing on-farm biosecurity measures that may aid in preventing or limiting future outbreaks. 
17

Herd registration systems are in place at the prefectural level, although such records may not have been 

scrupulously maintained in Miyazaki prefecture [24]. Japan’s cattle identification system ensures 

adequate trace-back capability in the event of an animal disease outbreak. No standardized system is in 

place to efficiently track swine movements or the number of swine on each holding; however, current 

practices ultimately appeared sufficient for traceback during the 2010 outbreak. 

5. Emergency preparedness and response

Control measures during the 2010 FMD outbreak were directed towards stamping out the virus. This 

section addresses factors critical to an effective response, including quarantine and movement control, 

epidemiology, biosecurity measures, depopulation and euthanasia, appraisal and compensation, 

disposal, and cleaning and disinfection. Surveillance and vaccination are described in Section 6 and 7, 

respectively.

5.1 Epidemiology

The 2010 FMD outbreak lasted approximately 11 weeks from the time the first case was confirmed 

(April 20) to depopulation of the last known affected farm (July 5) [16, 19]. MAFF estimates that at least 

10 farms were infected by April 20. The number of confirmed infected farms increased gradually during 

Weeks 1 and 2 (April 20 to May 3), then exponentially starting in Week 3 (see Figure 5.1). Week 4 saw 

the greatest number of new case farms in a single day on May 17 (15 cases) whereas the weekly 

incidence peaked in Week 5. The number of newly confirmed cases declined progressively starting in 

Week 6. The last outbreaks were detected in Miyazaki city on June 18 and July 4.

Figure 5.1: Cumulative weekly incidence of affected farms

5.1.1 Investigation of affected farms

Once infection was confirmed on a farm, prefectural officials commenced trace-in and trace-out 

investigations to determine the source and potential spread of infection [15]. Investigators assumed an 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+

Number of new cases

Outbreak time (weeks) 
18

average incubation period of 10 days for swine and 7 days for cattle, with a maximum of 14 days for 

both species. However, each epidemiological investigation traced animal movements onto and off of the 

farm for 21 days prior to detection of infection.

An epidemiologically-related farm was one which received animals from the affected farm in the 21 days 

prior to detection of infection, was visited by persons who had been on the affected farm in the past 7 

days, or which received any goods derived from the affected farm [19, 26].

5.1.2 Investigation of source of infection

MAFF conducted an epidemiological investigation to determine the source of the virus; however, at the 

time this report was written, the source and mode of introduction remain unknown [15, 16]. The 

working theory is that the virus was brought into Japan from another Asian country through the 

movement of people or goods. This is supported by the fact that the causative virus strain is closely 

related to strains isolated from Korea, Hong Kong, and Russia earlier in 2010 (homology of 99.22, 98.59, 

and 98.9 percent, respectively). NIAH confirmed that cases distant from the main focus of infection in 

Miyazaki prefecture (e.g., in Ebino city and Miyakonojo city) were caused by the same strain as was 

isolated from the first case. 

5.1.3 Analysis of causes of spread

A major cause of virus spread was delayed detection [15, 16, 19]. A MAFF report estimates that the virus 

was introduced into Japan in mid-March, about 4 weeks before the first detection of an infected animal. 

The delay in detection was compounded by the high density of cattle and swine farms in the area, which 

facilitated dissemination to other farms [15, 16]. MAFF officials suspect that spread between farms was 

caused by movement of contaminated people, vehicles, animals, manure, and feed. The virus may also 

have traveled short distances as droplet nuclei, although limited air sampling detected no virus. 

The MAFF report found an epidemiological link between affected farms in the Kawaminami area and 

some of the outbreaks in outlying areas (cases: Ebino city 1, Saito city 6, and Hyuga city 1), namely 

movement of people and vehicles belonging to a feed transport company [15, 16]. MAFF also indicated 

that outbreaks on farms in Saito city and Miyazaki city may have been caused by movement of people 

and vehicles from the Kawaminami area.

A second significant cause of virus spread was delayed destruction of infected animals, which allowed 

continued discharge of the virus into the environment [15, 16]. MAFF officials suspect that the affected 

area of Kawaminami-cho was contaminated with large quantities of virus due to this delay. MAFF 

considers it unlikely that wildlife played an important role in spreading the infection, since wildlife 

density in the affected area is low, many farmers use barrier fencing, and surveillance did not detect 

infection in wildlife (see Section 7). 

5.2 Quarantine of individual farms

Suspect and affected farms were quarantined in accordance with the AIDPL and GFMD [15, 16]. 

Prefectural officials may issue legally-binding quarantines by telephone upon notification of a suspected 

infected animal, prior to visiting the farm. Movement of animals, carcasses, milk, bedding, feed, genetic 
19

products, and animal waste from quarantined farms is prohibited. Movement of people and other goods 

onto and off of the farm is restricted.

5.3 Movement controls

5.3.1 Establishment

Prefectural officials established an MRZ and an SRZ around the first affected farm on 20 April 2010 (case: 

Tsuno-cho 2) [15, 16]. National guidelines allow for variation in size of these zones between 5 and 30 

kilometers; based on known livestock movement patterns, MAFF and Miyazaki prefectural officials 

decided on an MRZ encompassing a 10 kilometer radius around the affected farm and an SRZ extending

another 10 kilometers beyond the boundary of the MRZ. As additional cases occurred within the first 

MRZ, the perimeter of both the MRZ and SRZ were expanded to maintain the set radii [15, 16]. For 

example, the initial MRZ in Tsuno-cho progressively expanded as new cases occurred until it 

encompassed the entirety of the Kawaminami area, which ultimately became the vaccination area (see 

Section 8). Prefectural officials placed a new MRZ and SRZ around each case that occurred outside of an 

existing MRZ. 

Figure 5.2: Movement control areas [27]

Movement of susceptible animals, carcasses, genetic material, bedding or manure within an MRZ is 

prohibited by law [16]. Movement of milk from affected farms and high-risk neighboring farms is also 

prohibited. In addition, slaughter plants and livestock markets are closed, livestock events are canceled, 

and farmers may not share livestock pasturage.
20

Movement of susceptible live animals out of an SRZ is also prohibited [16]. Auctions and other livestock 

events are suspended, although prefectural officials may allow slaughter plants to operate for welfare 

purposes. Only people working or conducting business should enter farms with susceptible animals, with 

standard disinfection measures at entry and exit.

By the end of the outbreak, prefectural officials had established 9 primary MRZs (see Figure 5.2) [16]. 

The MRZs involved 16 municipalities in Miyazaki prefecture, as well as 2 municipalities in Kagoshima 

prefecture and 1 in Kumamoto prefecture. The SRZs covered 20 municipalities in Miyazaki prefecture, 5 

in Kagoshima prefecture, and 4 in Kumamoto prefecture.

5.3.2 Release

With one exception, the prefectural government released movement restrictions a minimum of 21 days 

after the last affected and/or vaccinated farm was depopulated (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2), after 

surveillance as described in Section 7. Movement controls remained in place in areas that overlapped 

with other restricted areas.

Table 5.1: Removal of movement controls [16]

No. Location Date last 

depopulation

Date MRZ 

released

1 Ebino city May 13 June 4

2 Saito city 1 May 22 June 13

3 Miyakonojo city June 10 July 2

4 Hyuga city June 11 July 3

5 Saito city 2 June 14 July 6

6 Kunitomi-cho June 16 July 8

7 Kawaminami area June 21 July 16

8 Takanabe-cho* July 17 July 18

9 Miyazaki city July 5 July 27

*See explanation in text.

One farmer in Takanabe-cho, part of the Kawaminami area, refused to allow vaccination and 

depopulation of 6 high-value bulls [19]. Depopulation of the last case farm in the Kawaminami area

occurred on June 21 and all vaccinated animals were depopulated by June 30. Movement restrictions on 

the Kawaminami area were lifted on July 16, except around the hold-out farm in Takanabe-cho; 

prefectural officials established a new 10-kilometer MRZ around this farm. The 6 bulls were depopulated 

and buried on July 17 under the provisions of the SLCFMD. Since no susceptible animals remained in the 

area, the movement restrictions were lifted on July 18. 

5.3.3 The Miyazaki Livestock Improvement Association bulls 

The Miyazaki Livestock Improvement Association (MLIA), a semen collection center in the Kawaminami 

area MRZ, was pivotal in the production of Miyazaki Wagyu beef. The MLIA was home to 254 cattle, 

including 6 bulls that together accounted for 90 percent of the semen supplied to Miyazaki producers. 

The herd also included 49 younger bulls undergoing progeny testing.
21

During the outbreak, the Governor of Miyazaki requested permission from MAFF to move the 6 highvalue bulls to a vacant premises in Saito City, located in an existing SRZ [15, 16, 19, 26]. No other 

livestock farms existed within 5 kilometers of the proposed destination premises and only 2 were 

located within 10 kilometers. MAFF agreed on the conditions that (1) the bulls tested negative prior to 

movement; (2) the movement occurred under strict biosecurity conditions; and (3) farmers around the 

destination farm agreed. The bulls were moved on May 13 and from that point forward were kept 

separate from one another, with different caretakers, feed, bedding, and equipment for each.

FMD infection was confirmed at the MLIA on May 16 (case: Takanabe-cho 4), three days after the 6 bulls 

were moved to Saito City [15, 16, 19, 26]. Over 6,000 local farmers signed a petition opposing 

depopulation of the 49 junior bulls on the grounds that it would cripple the Wagyu breeding industry in 

Miyazaki prefecture. The bulls were ultimately destroyed on June 7. 

Samples were taken from the 6 MLIA bulls on the Saito city premises on May 15, 17, 19, and 20 [15, 16, 

19, 26]. One bull was positive on samples taken on May 19 and 20 (case: Saito city 2); this bull was 

destroyed on May 22 and buried on the premises. The remaining MLIA bulls underwent daily RT-PCR 

testing for 14 days after the infected bull was destroyed, with negative results. Serum samples were 

collected for LPBE at 14 days and 21 days after May 22, again with negative results. The bulls tested 

negative one more time on September 4, when two were moved to Takabaru-cho.

Prefectural officials established an MRZ around the affected Saito city farm but no SRZ, since the route 

of infection was clearly established, the bulls had been moved under strict biosecurity, and the affected 

farm was located in a secluded mountain area with little vehicle traffic [15]. 

5.4 Biosecurity

In addition to the movement controls described above, Miyazaki and the neighboring prefectures 

established disinfection stations on the major roads in and around the MRZs [15, 16]. Over 450 separate 

disinfection stations were established, including 403 in Miyazaki prefecture and 58 in adjacent 

prefectures (on major arterial roads). Livestock-industry related vehicles, including milk and feed 

transport trucks, were disinfected when they passed the stations. Disinfection of other vehicles was 

initially voluntary but became mandatory when the SLCFMD was enacted [16, 19]. In addition, sprinkler 

trucks sprayed arterial roads in Miyazaki prefecture with disinfectant.

Milk from farms in the SRZs and from unaffected, unvaccinated farms in the MRZs was processed at 

plants within the same restricted zone [15]. Collection routes were designed to start away from affected 

farms and move closer. Milk trucks were accompanied by a disinfection truck for spraying the tires and 

drivers were required to change clothes between farms. Disposition of milk from affected and 

vaccinated farms is discussed in Section 5.7.

Local veterinary officers throughout Japan notified farmers with susceptible animals about the outbreak 

in Miyazaki prefecture, by telephone or letter or both [15]. In addition to requesting that farmers report 

specific symptoms such as drooling and lameness, local veterinary officers asked the farmers to lay 

down slaked lime at the entrances to farms and increase biosecurity precautions such as restricting 

visitors and requiring disinfection foot baths.
22

5.5 Depopulation and euthanasia

All FMD cases and susceptible animals kept in the same and epidemiologically-related farms were

depopulated, amounting to 211,608 animals in total (see Table 5.2) [15, 16]. In addition, all susceptible 

animals on unaffected, vaccinated farms—76,872 animals in total—were depopulated. Animals on 

affected farms were destroyed on the farm. Animals on unaffected, vaccinated farms that could not be 

buried onsite underwent a visual inspection and were sprayed with disinfectant prior to transportation 

to a nearby burial site, where they were euthanized. The transportation trucks were disinfected 

between loads.

Table 5.2: Depopulated animals from affected farms [15, 16]

Species No. animals

Cattle 37,412

Swine 174,132

Water buffalo 42

Goats 14

Sheep 8

Total 211,608

During the first 2 weeks of the outbreak (April 20 to May 3), infection was confirmed on 17 farms and 

the median time from confirmation to depopulation was 2 days (range: 0-6 days) (see Figure 5.3) [16, 

19]. However, the pace of the outbreaks rapidly exceeded that of depopulation, due in part to difficulty 

in identifying and obtaining access to acceptable burial sites. By the fifth week (ending May 24)—in 

which there were 73 new case farms confirmed—the median time to depopulation had increased to 12 

days (range: 1-28 days) and the number of animals targeted for depopulation reached 76,756. The 

incidence of new cases declined progressively from the sixth week onward, as did the time between 

confirmation of infection and depopulations. Overall, the median time to depopulation was 9 days 

(range: 0-30 days).
23

Figure 5.3: Time between confirmation of infection and depopulation [19]

5.6 Appraisal and compensation

Owners of animals on affected farms—including affected, vaccinated farms—were compensated by the 

national government for 80 percent of the market value of the animals killed; the prefectural 

government supplied the remaining 20 percent [15]. In addition, many farms were insured through the 

Mutual Aid Association (MAA), which was created by federal law in 1947 and has branches in each 

prefecture. The MAA provides public insurance to farmers, with 50% of the premiums subsidized by the 

government. There are different insurance options but all cover natural disasters, fire, and infectious 

disease. Farmers may choose to have their veterinary services provided through the MAA as well. 

If an affected farm was insured through the MAA, the farmer received compensation for depopulated

animals at market value from the MAA in addition to the compensation paid by the government [15]. 

Owners of unaffected, vaccinated farms received 100 percent compensation through the prefecture—

actually money allocated to the prefecture by the national government for this purpose—but did not 

receive insurance money.

5.7 Disposal

Since no large-scale incineration or rendering facilities were available, carcasses of animals from 

affected and vaccinated farms were disposed of by burial within the MRZs [15, 19]. In most cases, 

carcasses from affected farms were disposed of onsite; however, some carcasses were wrapped in tarps 

and transported short distances to a common disposal site. The transportation vehicles were disinfected 

between loads. 

The prefecture experienced some difficulty identifying acceptable disposal sites, primarily due to lack of 

land, opposition by local communities, and unsuitable terrain (rocks, groundwater) [15]. This is reflected 

in the fact that the number of new case farms peaked on May 17 but the highest prevalence of affected 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+

Median time to depopulation (days)

Outbreak time (weeks)
24

herds was seen the following week. At the height of the outbreak, the average period between 

confirmation and burial was over 10 days.

Each burial pit was lined with slaked lime and tarps; carcasses were placed in the bottom and covered 

with at least 1 meter of soil [28]. The top of the burial mound was covered with more slaked lime. There 

are 134 burial sites in total, which cannot be disturbed for 3 years [21]. No official environmental 

analysis was conducted for the burial sites but the prefectural government is monitoring the quality of 

well water in the area [15].

Contaminated solid waste—primarily manure and bedding—was either buried with the carcasses or 

composted for a minimum of 40 days on affected farms [15, 16]. Local veterinary officials confirmed an 

internal temperature of at least 60oC; composted waste that met the time and temperature 

requirements is being used on fields. Liquid waste and milk from affected farms was treated with citric

acid to lower the pH below 5.9 and thereby inactivate the FMD virus. Milk from unaffected, vaccinated 

farms was similarly treated and then disposed of at industrial waste treatment plants. 

5.8 Cleaning and disinfection

Affected farms were cleaned and disinfected with either sodium carbonate or slaked lime, with a target 

pH of < 5.9 or > 11, respectively [15, 16]. Official crews conducted the initial cleaning and disinfection

then farmers were required to conduct 3 additional disinfections at 1 week intervals. An LHSC official 

checked the farm after the final disinfection.

5.9 Recovery

As discussed above, prefectural officials released movement restrictions a minimum of 21 days after the 

last affected farm in the zone was depopulated [15, 16]. The last remaining MRZ and SRZ (around 

Miyazaki city) were lifted on 27 July 2010. Sentinel cattle were reintroduced onto affected farms starting 

August 31, which were subsequently negative on serological and clinical examination (see Section 7). 

After a 3-month waiting period, MAFF declared Japan once again free of FMD. 

The 2010 FMD outbreak resulted in depopulation of approximately 22 percent of the cattle and 24 

percent of the swine in Miyazaki prefecture, including all but 1,400 animals in the Koyu region [15, 29]. 

As of 20 January 2011, only about 30 percent of the affected farms had started repopulating. 

5.10 Compliance

Japanese officials reported very few issues with compliance during the outbreak response [15]. 

Prefectural officials enlisted the help of police and the municipal self-defense promotion committees in 

enforcing movement control measures. Several farmers initially refused to allow vaccination and 

depopulation of their apparently healthy animals; however, veterinary officials either persuaded them 

to cooperate or seized their animals under the provisions of the SLCFMD.

5.11 Discussion

Once the initial case farm was detected, the official veterinary services implemented disease 

containment and stamping out measures in accordance with international standards. Initial tracing of 

epidemiologically-related farms occurred quickly and movement controls were implemented in a timely 
25

manner. Cultural norms, involvement of the local voluntary defense organizations, and police 

enforcement contributed to high compliance with movement restrictions.

Within 2 weeks, however, the pace of the outbreaks exceeded the pace of depopulation, primarily due 

to difficulties obtaining access to suitable burial sites. Since Miyazaki prefecture does not contain largescale rendering or incineration facilities, burial became the preferred option for carcass disposal. The 

resulting delay in depopulation of affected farms, particularly swine farms, contributed to continuation 

of the outbreak. Timely application of protective measures such as vaccination and preventive culling 

was hindered by the absence of legal authority for such actions. Similarly, farmers and the public were 

not prepared to accept the concept of vaccination-to-kill or the need for scarce land resources—in some 

cases public land—to be converted to burial sites. 

Although the official veterinary services ultimately gained control over the outbreak, comprehensive 

revision of the AIDPL and GFMD to address the above issues—and hands-on exercises to facilitate 

implementation—would promote a more effective response in the event of a future outbreak. The 

special exemption for the MLIA bulls—although perhaps justifiable from the perspective of preserving 

rare genetics—also created considerable turmoil at the time. Future plans for prefectures to diversify 

the risk to rare Wagyu genetics—for example, by keeping valuable bulls at several geographically 

separate sites—would be appropriate. 

6. Diagnostic laboratory capability

The animal health laboratory system in Japan consists of the national reference laboratory—the NIAH—

and prefectural livestock health laboratories associated with the LHSCs [15, 16]. Prefectural laboratories 

perform diagnostic tests for common livestock and poultry diseases and typically have facilities for 

virology (with BSL-2 capability), bacteriology, biochemistry, and pathology. All laboratory tests for FMD 

diagnosis are carried out in BSL-3 facilities at the NIAH. The laboratory is located in a suburban area 

outside of Tokyo, with few (if any) livestock in the surrounding neighborhoods. 

During the outbreak, local veterinary officers collected samples for FMD testing in accordance with OIE 

standards and delivered them to the prefectural laboratory [15, 16]. The prefectural laboratories packed 

the samples, which were then transported by air to the NIAH. 

The NIAH supplemented their staff of 8 with 12 staff from the prefectural laboratories during the 

Miyazaki FMD outbreak but otherwise reported no issues handling the volume of samples. [15]

6.1 Identification of agent

The NIAH tested for FMD virus using reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), antigen 

detection enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), and virus isolation, and used antibody detection 

ELISA and virus neutralization for identification of antibody [15, 16, 27]. The NIAH used RT-PCR for early 

confirmation of suspect cases, since the test takes only 2.5-6 hours [15]. The RT-PCR targeted the 3D 

region and was carried out using swabs and/or suspensions of the lesions [16]. The laboratory 

conducted direct gene sequencing targeting the VP1 gene to analyze homologues. Virus isolation was 

performed by inoculating swabs and/or suspension of the lesions and/or vesicular fluid into both 
26

primary calf kidney cells and established swine cell lines. The serotype of the isolated viruses was 

identified using the ELISA Kit for Antigen Detection of FMDV/SVDV.2 

The FMD virus isolated from the Miyazaki outbreak was serotype O, topotype SEA (South East Asia), and 

genotype Mya-98 [16, 27]. The base sequence of the VP1 gene was highly related to that of the strains 

isolated in Hong Kong, Korea, and Russia between February and July 2010.

6.2 Identification of antibody

Once the disease agent was confirmed, liquid phase blocking ELISA (LPBE)—specifically, the ELISA Kit for 

Serology of FMDV Type O3—was used for detection of antibody against FMD [16, 27]. Antibody titers 

were expressed as the dilution at which the reaction of the test sera results in an optical density equal to 

50 percent inhibition of the median optical density of the reaction control well. A titer of less than 1/32 

was considered negative, titers greater than 1/90 were positive, and titers in between were nonspecific. 

The NIAH used the virus neutralization test to elucidate nonspecific results.

The sensitivity of the LPBE is reported to be approximately 99 percent and the specificity 96 percent [19, 

26]. The number of nonspecific results requiring further testing was quite low (5 out of 6,006). In each 

case, the animals were retested after 1 week. Two animals were confirmed negative and 3 others, from 

a single farm (case: Miyazaki city 3), were confirmed positive via the antigen detection ELISA on the 

second set of samples. 

6.3 Discussion

The NIAH is modern and well-equipped, with well-trained scientific, technical, and administrative staff. 

Samples in the laboratory can be easily tracked from receipt to final diagnosis and reporting. Biosecurity 

is good and there is little likelihood that FMD virus could be accidentally carried out of the laboratory. 

No other laboratory in Japan is approved to work with FMD virus. Tests have been validated and include 

well-regarded commercial tests kits used in many countries. No tests for non-structural virus proteins 

were used for diagnosis of cases during the outbreak; however, there was no need to differentiate 

between field and vaccination strain. Good quality control and assurance programs are in place. 

7. Surveillance

7.1 Prior to the 2010 outbreak

Prior to confirmation of the first FMD case on 20 April 2010, Japan relied on passive surveillance for 

detection and reporting of suspect FMD cases [16]. Unfortunately, it appears that the level of FMD 

awareness—a key factor in passive surveillance—was low. A private veterinarian reported a cow with 

erosions in the oral cavity to the Miyazaki LHSC on 9 April 2010 (case: Tsuno-cho 2) and the responding 

local veterinary officer found clinical signs compatible with FMD, but no samples were taken to test for 

FMD until April 19 [16]. In the meantime, 2 other cows showed the same clinical signs and the local 

veterinary officer submitted samples to test for a variety of other diseases. It was only when these tests 

came back negative that samples were submitted to NIAH for FMD testing.

 

2

Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK.

3

Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK.
27

Similarly, buffalo on the presumed index farm (case: Tsuno-cho 1) showed fever, decreased milk 

production, scars on the udders, and oral erosions by 1 April 2010 [19]. However, local veterinary 

officials did not test this farm for FMD until April 22, after it was epidemiologically-linked to the first 

confirmed case farm (case: Tsuno-cho 2).

7.2 During the 2010 outbreak

Veterinary officials conducted active surveillance for detection of FMD-infected animals during the 2010 

outbreak, both in Miyazaki prefecture and throughout the country. Japan also conducted active clinical 

and serological surveillance to reestablish freedom from FMD around affected farms (prior to lifting

movement restrictions) and throughout Miyazaki prefecture. Finally, Japan conducted antibody testing 

of sentinel animals on previously affected farms and targeted surveillance of wildlife in the FMDaffected areas.

7.2.1 Disease detection

Within Miyazaki prefecture

After the first case was confirmed on 20 April 2010, local veterinary officers conducted telephone 

interviews of farmers within 3.5 kilometers around the affected farm to ascertain whether their animals 

were showing clinical signs of FMD [16]. Shortly thereafter, they extended the survey to all farms in the 

prefecture. Local veterinary officers visited the farms where farmers or veterinarians reported clinically 

abnormal animals to conduct clinical inspections and collect samples for analysis, which were sent to 

NIAH. If the samples were confirmed positive, the source farm was recognized as a case and an 

epidemiological investigation was conducted. Veterinarians also conducted clinical inspections on all 

farms with susceptible animals in each newly-established MRZ [19].

As the outbreak progressed, veterinary officials noted that the correlation between typical clinical signs 

of FMD and positive RT-PCR results was very high [16]. Consequently, as of 2 June 2010, suspect animals 

within the Kawaminami area that showed typical clinical signs of FMD were recognized as cases without 

laboratory diagnosis. When local veterinary officials found clinical signs compatible with FMD, they took 

several pictures of the affected parts and sent them to the prefectural veterinary authority and the 

NIAH, along with a description of the clinical findings and pertinent epidemiological information. If visual 

confirmation of infection was not possible, samples were taken for diagnostic testing. Laboratory testing 

confirmed infection in animals on 260 of 292 affected farms in total; conversely, diagnostic testing ruled 

out FMD infection in suspect animals on 64 of 141 farms. Outside of the Kawaminami area, all suspect 

animals were subject to laboratory testing.

No additional clinical inspections or serological testing were performed on affected farms once the 

presence of infection was confirmed; consequently, little data is available to estimate within-herd attack 

rates on affected farms [15]. 

Outside of Miyazaki prefecture

On 20 April 2010, MAFF instructed the veterinary authority of each prefectural government to conduct 

clinical inspections on all farms with susceptible animals and to take actions to enhance passive 

surveillance for FMD [16]. Such actions included providing information to farmers and others in the 
28

livestock industry regarding the disease and the Miyazaki outbreak, and requesting that they notify 

veterinary authorities if animals showed compatible clinical signs. Between 20 April and 3 May, 

prefectural authorities visited and/or interviewed by telephone farmers with susceptible animals to 

check for signs of FMD. 

These initial surveys resulted in 12 suspect cases, each of which was ruled out on clinical inspection by 

local veterinary officers [16]. After 4 May, the NIAH received multiple samples from prefectures other 

than Miyazaki that were tested using RT-PCR (39) and or LPBE (49), with negative results. This rate of 

sample submission from suspect cases was considerable higher than in 2009 (1), 2008 (1), and 2007 (0) 

[15, 27].

7.2.2 Reestablishing FMD freedom

Around affected farms

Prior to lifting the restrictions during the 2010 outbreak, prefectural authorities conducted clinical 

inspections of all susceptible animals in the MRZ [15, 16]. In addition, all remaining farms with 

susceptible animals located within a 3 kilometers radius from an affected farm were subject to 

serological testing using LPBE (see Table 7.1). Serological testing started approximately 10 days after the 

last affected farm was depopulated. Surveillance was not conducted in the zone where vaccination was 

practiced, since all susceptible animals within the zone were depopulated [16].

Table 7.1: Surveillance around affected farms* [16]

Surveillance Type Cattle Swine Other

Farms Animals Farms Animals Farms Animals

Serological (3 km) 535 (1) 5,417 (3) 21 (0) 624 (0) 2 (0) 32 (0)

Clinical (10 km) 2,918 (1) 99,997 (1) 207 (0) 299,570 (0) 22 (0) 185 (0)

*Numbers in () indicate positive results; see explanation in text.

Per MAFF officials, random sampling of the animals on each farm was conducted at a level designed to 

detect 1 infected animal if the within-herd prevalence was at least 10 percent, with 95 percent 

confidence [16, 19, 26]. This equated to sampling of all animals on farms with ≤ 15 animals, 21 samples 

on farms with ≤ 40 animals, and so on, up to 30 samples on farms with more than 100 animals. 

While conducting clinical inspections for release of the Miyazaki city MRZ, veterinary officials detected a 

single cow with clinical signs of FMD [16]. Serologic testing confirmed infection in 3 animals on the 

farm—the last case farm of the 2010 outbreak (Miyazaki city 3). The Miyazaki city MRZ was ultimately 

lifted on July 27.

Miyazaki prefecture

Clinical surveillance—Between July 22 and August 9, Miyazaki prefecture conducted clinical surveillance 

targeting all cattle and swine kept in the prefecture [16]. A total of 946,424 animals on 8,076 farms were 

surveyed: 229,935 cattle on 7,608 farms and 716,489 swine on 468 farms. No evidence of clinical signs 

typical of FMD was detected.

Serological surveillance—From September 6 to 13, veterinary authorities conducted a final surveillance 

to reestablish FMD freedom, targeting Miyazaki prefecture as the high-risk area [16, 26]. Surveillance 
29

was conducted on a random sample of 150 cattle farms within the prefecture, at a level designed to 

detect 1 infected herd if the herd prevalence was at least 2 percent, with 95 percent confidence. 

Sampling of cattle within each herd followed the protocol as described above. A total of 2,124 samples 

were tested by LPBE with negative results (see Table 7.2). 

Table 7.2: Final surveillance within Miyazaki prefecture [16]

Location No. 

Farms

No. 

Animals

Aya town 5 125

Ebino city 10 171

Gokase town 2 23

Hinokage town 2 22

Hyuga city 5 43

Kobayashi city 20 178

Kunitomi town 2 31

Kushima city 6 116

Mimata town 10 152

Misato town 5 56

Miyakonojo city 30 588

Miyazaki city 10 62

Nichinan city 10 206

Nishimera village 3 9

Nobeoka town 10 76

Saito city 4 87

Takachiho town 6 52

Takahara town 10 127

Total 150 2,124

7.2.3 Antibody testing of sentinel animals

Between August 31 and October 22, sentinel cattle were introduced onto 175 previously-affected farms 

[26]. Farmers were required to conduct daily clinical observations of the cattle and local veterinary 

officers conducted clinical inspections 3 to 4 weeks after introduction. Serum samples collected on the 

day of introduction and 3 to 4 weeks after were subject to LPBE testing, with negative results.

7.2.4 Wildlife surveillance

Wildlife populations

The FMD-susceptible wildlife species in Japan are sika deer (Cervus nippon), wild boar (Sus scrofa) and 

the Japanese serow (Capriconis crispus) [16]. Sika deer are distributed throughout Japan, including in the 

area of the FMD outbreaks. Wild boar are found on Kyushu Island and other areas of Japan. Japanese 

serows inhabit a mountainous region in the central part of Kyushu Island but are rarely seen in Miyazaki 

prefecture. Farmers in the prefecture have traditionally erected fencing to limit contact between 

domestic livestock and wild animals.
30

A survey by the Japanese National Institute of Forestry found that the range of movement of sika deer

on Kyushu Island is no more than 8 kilometers [16]. Similarly, a MAFF survey found that movements of 

wild boar in Japan are limited to a fairly narrow range.

Surveillance

Considering the distribution of the FMD outbreaks and the limited range of susceptible wildlife species, 

surveillance targeting wildlife was restricted in Miyazaki prefecture [16]. Hunting of wildlife is prohibited 

in Japan except for restrictive measures to cull nuisance species, including sika deer and wild boar. 

Hunting of Japanese serows, which is a protected species, is prohibited. 

Between August 20 and October 25, 145 samples were collected from wildlife hunted as nuisance 

species, including sika deer (46) and wild boar (99); 63 samples (43 percent) came from animals hunted 

in municipalities where FMD had occurred in domestic livestock [16, 30]. The samples were tested by 

the NIAH using LPBE, with negative results. 

In addition, the carcasses of dead and injured susceptible wildlife found throughout Miyazaki prefecture 

were collected and tested for FMD [16]. Fourteen samples were tested by the NIAH—5 sika deer, 7 wild 

boar, and 2 Japanese serows—using RT-PCR, with negative results. All samples came from animals found 

in cities and towns where FMD had occurred in domestic livestock.

7.3 Discussion

Failure of passive surveillance to quickly detect FMD contributed substantially to the extent of the 2010 

outbreak. While atypical clinical signs of FMD in water buffalo may have contributed to the delay in 

detection, a low index of suspicion among both farmers and local veterinary officers was likely also a 

factor. As a result of the outbreak, however, the level of awareness among farmers and veterinarians 

throughout Japan is now quite high.

All reports indicate that the outbreak virus strain caused overt clinical signs of FMD infection in cattle 

and swine, lending confidence to the results of clinical surveillance during the 2010 outbreak. 

Photographing suspect lesions for diagnostic purposes was an innovative solution that likely saved 

considerable time and resources, considering the high correlation between clinical signs and positive 

test results. Active clinical and serological surveillance within the restricted zones proved sufficient for 

detection of additional case farms within Miyazaki prefecture. 

Surveillance for lifting restriction zones included serological testing on all farms within a 3-kilometer 

radius and clinical surveillance of all farms within a 10-kilometer radius. The sampling scheme used for 

serological surveillance was statistically sufficient to allow 95 percent confidence of detecting FMD 

infection at the given prevalence level. 

Targeting Miyazaki prefecture for final surveillance to reestablish disease freedom was appropriate, 

considering that 95.5 percent of the outbreaks occurred in the Kawaminami area, which is located more 

than 20 kilometers away from the prefectural borders. Similarly, targeting wildlife in close proximity to 

human settlements—and therefore presumably at greatest risk for contracting FMD—was a reasonable 

decision.
31

APHIS concludes that Japanese officials carried out comprehensive surveillance for detection of infection 

and for reestablishment of FMD freedom in the high-risk area. Based on the surveillance results, there is 

no evidence to suggest that FMD virus continues to circulate in Japan.

8. Vaccination practices

The Japanese government commenced emergency vaccination on May 22, representing the first time 

animals in Japan were vaccinated against FMD [15, 16]. At the time, the number of outbreaks in the 

Kawaminami area was increasing rapidly and there was a substantial delay in depopulation and disposal 

of animals on affected farms, increasing the risk of infection spreading to other municipalities. 

8.1 Vaccine strain

A panel of Japanese experts selected an oil-adjuvant, inactivated vaccine against FMD Type O (O1-

Manisa) for use in cattle, swine, water buffalo, and small ruminants [16].

4

The correlation between the 

vaccine strain and the closely-related Hong Kong strain was considered high enough to elicit an effective 

response (r = 0.5 by the cross-neutralization test). The label potency was at least 6 PD50 per dose. MAFF 

routinely stockpiles various FMD vaccines and had 40 thousand doses on hand. Additional vaccine was 

obtained from the manufacturer.

8.2 Vaccination program

The vaccination program was designed by MAFF experts and prefectural authorities [16]. The target area 

consisted of the MRZ around affected farms in the Kawaminami area (see Figures 2.2 and 5.2). All 

susceptible animals within this area—except animals less than 14 days of age—were targeted for 

vaccination, with swine receiving higher priority than cattle. Vaccination was conducted from the rim to 

the center of the area. 

Vaccination was carried out by designated teams of local veterinary officers, AQS officers, and other 

veterinarians under official supervision [16]. Each animal was examined for clinical signs of FMD prior to 

vaccination; if clinical signs were detected, no vaccination occurred and the entire team was transferred 

to depopulation duties. Each animal was vaccinated only once since they were to be destroyed promptly 

after vaccination. Vaccination was carried out between May 22 and 26, at which point over 99 percent 

of the target animals had been vaccinated. 

8.3 Management of vaccinated animals

Vaccinated animals were maintained on their respective farms until depopulation [16]. The eartag 

numbers of vaccinated cattle were recorded and movement of vaccinated animals was prohibited. 

Depopulation of vaccinated animals started on 5 June 2010, after the SLCFMD was enacted. 

Depopulation and burial of animals on vaccinated farms was completed on June 30.

A total of 125,668 animals on 1,066 farms—including 45,944 cattle, 79,606 swine, and 118 other 

animals—were vaccinated [16]. However, FMD was confirmed on 68 farms after vaccination, accounting 

for 48,796 animals: 15,090 cattle, 33,704 swine, and 2 goats. 

 

4

Aptopor by Merial Animal Health Ltd.
32

8.4 Surveillance of vaccinated animals

MAFF conducted limited surveillance of vaccinated animals, evaluating seroconversion in 10 animals 

from 6 vaccinated farms (2 beef cattle, 2 dairy cattle, and 2 swine) using LPBE [15]. Samples were taken 

8 to 10 days after vaccination. Approximately 50 percent of the vaccinated animals showed a negative 

(titer ≤ 32) or indeterminate (titer > 32 but ≤ 90) response. 

8.5 Discussion

Considering the logistical issues with regard to disposal and the large number of animals on affected 

farms awaiting depopulation, the decision to vaccinate to control the spread of FMD and limit virus 

shedding was appropriate. Infection was detected as soon as 1 day after vaccination, raising concerns 

that the vaccination teams may have transmitted the virus to other farms. Conversely, infection was 

detected as late as 19 days after vaccination, with no apparent diminution of clinical signs, raising 

concerns about the degree of protection conveyed by single vaccination. Nonetheless, the incidence of 

new cases declined in the sixth week of the outbreak, after vaccination.

9. Epidemiological separation from potential sources of infection

9.1 Disease status of adjacent regions

Japan is an island nation, with no shared land borders. However, there is considerable movement of 

people and personal goods between Japan and other Asian countries, including Korea and the People’s 

Republic of China (China). 

9.1.1 Korea

Korea reported outbreaks in January 2010 of FMD serotype A involving 7 farms; this was the first report 

of FMD since 2002 [14]. Korea also reported 2 outbreaks of serotype O in April 2010, collectively 

involving 13 farms. It appeared that Korea quickly resolved both the January and April outbreaks; 

however, FMD serotype O reoccurred in November 2010 and quickly spread throughout the country. In 

January 2011, Korea began a nationwide vaccination campaign as part of the FMD control efforts. 

9.1.2 China

FMD appears to be endemic in China, with multiple outbreaks occurring each year. In 2010, China

reported 18 farms distributed throughout the country affected with serotype O and a single farm 

affected with serotype A [14]. Outbreaks involving serotype Asia 1 have also occurred in recent years. 

9.1.3 Other countries

Russia reported outbreaks of FMD serotype O in July and September 2010, each involving a single farm 

[14]. There are also reports of FMD outbreaks in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea beginning in 

2007 [14].

9.2 Import practices and trading partners

MAFF conducts evaluations of the disease status of foreign regions through risk assessment, including a 

site visit, and decides on any mitigation measures needed and commodity-specific import requirements 

[15]. MAFF prohibits importation of live susceptible animals and derived products from countries with 
33

rinderpest, FMD, classical swine fever, and other such diseases unless the products are heat treated 

according to set protocols. Live animals, plants, and associated products must be accompanied by a 

health document certified by the veterinary authority of the exporting region.

AQS is responsible for import/export inspection, including certificates of export inspection and carries 

out the pertinent provisions of the AIDPL and other laws [15, 31]. AQS consists of a headquarters office 

in Yokohama (near Tokyo), 7 branch offices, and 16 sub-branches. As of December 2010 there were 369 

AQS officers employed. Each is a licensed veterinarian who has undergone on-the-job training. 

9.2.1 Animals and animal products

Japan is a net importer of live animals and animal products [32]. From 2006 to 2010, Japan averaged 21 

thousand cattle per year, all from Australia and New Zealand, but exported only 12 cattle. The number 

of imported swine has remained around 400 per year, from Canada, the United States, and various 

European Union (EU) Member States. Japan exports less than 30 swine per year. 

Japan imports a considerable amount of fresh beef per year, averaging 215 million kilograms [32]. In 

2010, Australia and the United States provided approximately 74 and 20 percent of the imported beef, 

respectively, with the remainder supplied by New Zealand, Canada, and Mexico. Japan exports around 

210 thousand kilograms of fresh beef per year, primarily to Hong Kong and the United States.

Japan is also a net importer of fresh pork, averaging over 770 thousand kilograms per year [32]. In 2001, 

the United States provided approximately 40 percent of the imported pork, with Canada and Denmark 

contributing 24 and 18 percent, respectively. The remainder was supplied by Mexico, Chile, and various 

EU Member States. Japan exported 153.6 thousand kilograms of fresh pork in 2010, primarily to Hong 

Kong.

Although not reflected in recent transactions, Japan also allows importation of live cloven-hoofed 

animals, genetic materials, and/or meat from several regions that APHIS does not consider free of FMD, 

namely Singapore, Romania, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Northern Mariana, and Vanuatu [31]. 

9.2.2 Animal feed

Contaminated wheat straw was implicated in the 2000 FMD outbreak in Japan and Japan currently 

allows importation of grain straw and hay for animal feed from regions that APHIS does not consider 

free of FMD [15, 31]. Most notably, Japan imports substantial amounts of rice straw from China each 

year, since there is not enough arable land to grow sufficient forage for livestock in Japan. Rice straw 

from China is processed in dedicated plants with a Japanese inspector onsite to check the core 

temperature of each lot. The straw is shipped to Japan in sealed containers and tested upon arrival. The 

failure rate on import testing in 2010 was 0.15 percent, due to a missing seal on one container. Over the 

past 3 years, no shipment has been refused due to insufficient heat treatment.

9.2.3 Inspection practices

Animals and animal products presented for import must be accompanies by a certificate of inspection 

issued by the veterinary authority of the exporting country [21]. Live animals undergo inspection by AQS 

veterinarians and embarkation quarantine, during which time the animals undergo clinical inspection 

and diagnostic testing [15, 31]. AQS also informs the prefectural veterinary officials for the farm of 
34

destination, who are responsible for follow-up inspections. Live animals denied entry may be reshipped 

or destroyed with pathological examination.

For meat and meat products, an AQS officer checks the documents and the container seal, selects a 

pallet to bring to the inspection room, and randomly selects which boxes to open [15, 31]. Heat-treated 

meat products have a tracer tag that corresponds to a specific MAFF-approved heat-treatment plant in 

the exporting country. The AQS officer checks the contents and that the company name matches the 

documentation, and takes a sample to the office to defrost. Heat treatment is tested by cutting the 

meat and looking for color. If improper heat treatment is suspected, AQS takes samples for testing. 

Meat and meat products that are denied entry may be reshipped or incinerated.

Consignments of rice straw undergo document inspection and physical inspection by both animal and 

plant quarantine officers [15]. All consignments are inspected. The officers check the seal on the 

container, open the container and take a 1 percent sample, check that it really is rice straw and heat 

treated, and look for plant pests. The officers also verify the tracer tag. 

9.3 Foreign travelers

Multiple ports throughout Japan receive travelers from FMD-infected countries, including Korea, China, 

other parts of Asia, and Russia [15]. MAFF officials consider this to be a primary risk route for 

introduction of FMD virus into Japan. Consequently, MAFF and AQS have implemented biosecurity 

measures at airports for all persons arriving from international destinations, from aggressive public 

awareness campaigns to announcements on inbound flights to floor mats soaked in disinfectant that 

travelers must cross. AQS also uses trained dogs to detect animal products in hand luggage. 

Although the current customs declaration form does not ask about time spent on farms or with 

livestock, AQS announcements in the baggage claim area request that persons who have been on a farm 

or have soiled shoes (golf shoes) self-identify and present their shoes for cleaning and disinfection at 

designated stations [15]. Garbage produced on-flight is either retained on the aircraft and returned or 

incinerated at designated facilities.

9.4 Discussion

Japan has taken additional precautions since the introduction of FMD virus via wheat straw in 2000 and 

it appears unlikely that imported straw was again the source. Similarly, although Japan is a net importer 

of cattle, swine, and derived products, imports in recent years have only originated from regions that 

APHIS considers free of FMD. However, there is considerable movement of persons and personal goods

into Japan daily from regions that are currently experiencing FMD outbreaks, including China and Korea. 

MAFF and AQS are implementing comprehensive controls and a public education campaign to address 

the risk of introducing FMD virus via this route. 

10. Conclusions

APHIS concludes that the authority, organization, and infrastructure of Japan’s official veterinary 

services were sufficient to control and eradicate the 2010 FMD outbreak. Delay in detection of the first 

cases allowed considerable virus spread and contamination of the affected area, contributing to the 

scope of the outbreak. Logistical difficulties regarding carcass disposal and lack of legal authority for 
35

precautionary culling complicated the outbreak response. However, the official veterinary services 

ultimately overcame these issues and proceeded to stamp out the FMD virus.

The level of surveillance conducted within Miyazaki prefecture prior to 6 October 2010 was sufficient to 

allow over 95 percent confidence of detecting FMD virus, if present. The fact that no additional cases 

have been reported in the interim lends confidence to the conclusion that FMD virus is no longer 

circulating. Clinical inspections and diagnostic testing of suspect cases throughout the rest of Japan 

found no evidence of FMD infection outside of Miyazaki prefecture.

Once the authority for precautionary culling was obtained, the official veterinary services were able to 

effectively use vaccination to limit virus production and spread. Since all vaccinated animals were 

subsequently depopulated, APHIS concludes that Japan is free of FMD without vaccination.

Note: In keeping with OIE guidelines for risk analysis, since the release assessment has demonstrated no 

significant risk, the APHIS analysis of Japan’s FMD status does not extend to exposure and consequence 

assessments. See the following page for the risk estimate.
36

Risk estimate

APHIS concludes from this assessment that Japan is free of FMD without vaccination. Japan has also 

implemented comprehensive controls to address the risk of FMD virus introduction from affected 

countries. Should such introduction occur, the high level of public awareness generated by the 2010 

FMD outbreak would facilitate rapid detection and response. Consequently, there is no risk barrier to 

reinstating Japan to the list of regions considered free of FMD in title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 94.1 (9 CFR 94.1). Live ruminants and swine from Japan would remain prohibited due to Japan’s 

status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, classical swine fever, and swine vesicular disease. 

Ruminant meat and fresh pork would also remain prohibited, except for boneless cuts of fresh beef 

(Wagyu beef) imported in accordance with 9 CFR 94.27.
37

References

1. Coetzer J.A.W., G.R. Thomsen et al. 1994. Foot-and-mouth disease. In: Infectious Diseases of 

Livestock with Special Reference to Southern Africa. Coetzer, J.A.W., G.R. Thomsen et al. (Eds). 

Cape Town, Oxford University Press: 825-852.

2. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, et al. 2003. The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth 

disease. J Comp Pathol 129(1): 1-36.

3. Belsham, G. J. 1993. Distinctive features of foot-and-mouth disease virus, a member of the 

picornavirus family; aspects of virus protein synthesis, protein processing and structure. Prog 

Biophys Mol Biol 60(3): 241-60.

4. Bachrach, H. L., S. S. Breese et al. 1957. Inactivation of foot-and-mouth disease virus by pH and 

temperature changes and by formaldehyde. Proc Soc Exper Bio Med 95: 147-52.

5. Cottral, G. E. 1969. Persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in animals, their products and 

the environment. Bulletin OIE 70: 549-68.

6. OIE. 2011. Technical disease card for FMD. World Organization for Animal Health. Available on 

the internet at: http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/technical-disease-cards/.

7. Burrows, R., J. A. Mann, et al. 1981. The pathogenesis of natural and simulated natural foot-andmouth disease infection in cattle. J Comp Pathol 91(4): 599-609.

8. Farez, S. and R. S. Morley. 1997. Potential animal health hazards of pork and pork products. Rev 

Sci Tech OIE 16: 65-78.

9. APHIS. 1994. Foot-and-mouth disease: Sources of outbreaks and hazard categorization of modes 

of virus transmission. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.

10. Barnett, P. V. and S. J. Cox. 1999. The role of small ruminants in the epidemiology and 

transmission of foot-and-mouth disease. Vet J 158(1): 6-13.

11. Donaldson, A. I. and R. F. Sellers. 2000. Foot-and-mouth disease. In: Diseases of Sheep, 3rd 

edition. W. B. Martin and I. D. Aitken (Eds), Blackwell Science, Oxford: 254-258.

12. Donaldson, A. I. 1998. Experimental and natural adaptation of strains of foot-and-mouth disease 

virus to different species. Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, 

European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease: 18-22.

13. CIA. 2011. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, VA. Available on the 

internet at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.

14. OIE. 2011. World Animal Health Information Database. World Organization for Animal Health. 

Available on the internet at: http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=home.

15. APHIS. 2011. APHIS site visit report - Japan FMD: January 17-21, 2011. Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Regionalization Evaluation Staff.

16. MAFF. 2010. Recovery of FMD country free status: Japan's report to the World Organization for 

Animal Health (OIE) to recover country freedom from FMD without vaccination. Ministry of 

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Dated 

October 6, 2010.

17. OIE. 2011. Official disease status: FMD. World Organization for Animal Health. Available at: 

http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/official-diseasestatus/fmd/lossreinstatement-of-status/.

18. MAFF. 2011. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries webpage. Available on the internet 

at: http://www.maff.go.jp/e/index.html.

19. MAFF. 2011. Answers to the questions of the USDA. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 

Fisheries, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Received January 17, 2011.
38

20. Miyazaki LHSC. 2011. Miyazaki Livestock Hygiene Service Centers handout. Document provided 

to the site visit team on January 19, 2011.

21. Government of Japan. 1951. Domestic Animal Infectious Disease Control Act (Act No. 166) (as 

amended).

22. JVMA. 2010. Overview of veterinary medicine in Japan. Japan Veterinary Medical Association. 

Available on the internet at: http://nichiju.lin.gr.jp/international/docment/2009.pdf.

23. Sugiura, K., S. Shinkawa, and J. Mago. 2008. Current supply and demand of veterinarians in 

Japan. Veterinaria Italiana 44(2): 297-304.

24. Anon. 2011. Report of the Independent Committee for Verification of the Containment and 

Eradication of FMD in Miyazaki Prefecture (Executive Summary). Document provided to the 

APHIS site visit team on January 21, 2011.

25. MAFF. 2011. Beef production in Japan. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Food 

Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Received January 17, 2011.

26. MAFF. 2011. Answers to the questions of the CFIA. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 

Fisheries, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Received January 17, 2011.

27. Sakamoto, K. 2011. 2010 FMD outbreak in Japan. Presentation provided to the APHIS site visit 

team at the National Institute for Animal Health on January 21, 2011.

28. Miyazaki Agriculture and Fisheries Department. 2010. Operational manual for the burial of 

culled FMD animals. Document provided to the APHIS site visit team on January 20, 2011.

29. Miyazaki Agriculture and Fisheries Department. 2011. The impact of FMD. Document provided 

to the APHIS site visit team on January 19, 2011.

30. MAFF. 2011. Additional wildlife surveillance data. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 

Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Received January 21, 2011.

31. AQS. 2011. The outline of the Animal Quarantine Service. Presentation provided to the APHIS 

site visit team on January 17, 2011.

32. GTA. 2011. Global Trade Atlas. Global Trade Information Service, Inc. Available on the internet 

at: http://www.gtis.com/english/.
39

Annex: Outbreak chronology

March 19—Estimated date of introduction of FMD virus.

March 31—First symptoms reported on index farm in Tsuno-cho—A farmer in Tsuno-cho reported 

diarrhea and fever in 1 of his 42 water buffalo to the Miyazaki Livestock Hygiene Service Center (case: 

Tsuno-cho 1). Two swine also lived on the farm. 

April 9—First suspect FMD case reported to prefectural veterinary services—A private veterinarian 

reported a possible case of FMD in cattle on a farm in Tsuno-cho to the prefectural veterinary services 

(case: Tsuno-cho 2). A prefectural veterinarian visited the farm and observed that the cow had fever, 

anorexia, salivation, and erosions in the oral cavity but that other animals exhibited no clinical signs. No 

further action was taken at the time.

April 16—Two more animals on the Tsuno-cho 2 farm exhibited the same clinical signs. The prefectural 

veterinary services submitted laboratory samples to test for bluetongue, bovine viral diarrhea, infectious 

bovine rhinotracheitis, and Ibaraki disease.

April 19—First samples for FMD testing submitted to laboratory—Negative laboratory results were 

returned for the above diseases. The prefectural veterinary services submitted samples to the National 

Institute for Animal Health (NIAH) to test for FMD. 

April 20—Laboratory confirmation of FMD infection—The NIAH confirmed FMD virus in the samples 

from the Tsuno-cho 2 farm, using RT-PCR. The prefectural veterinary services implemented a movement 

restriction zone (MRZ) around the affected farm, started an epidemiological investigation, depopulated 

and buried all susceptible animals on the farm (16 head of cattle), began cleaning and disinfection 

procedures. 

Also on April 20—First involvement of national veterinary services—MAFF set up an FMD Control and 

Prevention Department in Tokyo to direct the eradication efforts. MAFF also notified the OIE of the 

outbreak and suspended all export certificates for ruminants and derived products. 

April 21-23—MAFF reported 4 case farms in Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 1-4) and 1 in 

Tsuno-cho (case: Tsuno-cho 1); all cases occurred within the established MRZ. The NIAH later confirmed 

FMD virus antigen in a sample taken from the sick water buffalo on the Tsuno-cho 1 farm on March 31. 

Depopulation and burial of susceptible animals on these farms occurred April 22-25.

April 22—Virus serotype identified—The NIAH confirmed FMD virus serotype O from the first reported 

case (case: Tsuno-cho 2), using antigen detection ELISA. 

April 24-28—MAFF reported 3 case farms in Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 5-7) and 1 in 

Ebino city (case: Ebino city 1), which is located some 60 kilometers west. The prefectural government 

placed an MRZ around the Ebino city 1 farm, which affected parts of neighboring Kumamoto and 

Kagoshima prefectures. All susceptible livestock on the affected farms were depopulated and buried 

April 28 to May 4.
40

April 26—First laboratory-confirmed case in swine—One of the newly-detected Kawaminami-cho farms 

(case: Kawaminami-cho 6) housed 486 swine, five of which were confirmed infected on April 26; all of 

the animals were destroyed on April 28. 

April 29-May 5—MAFF reported a second case farm in Ebino city (case: Ebino city 2) and 12 additional 

cases in Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 8-19). All affected farms were located in one of the 

previously established MRZs. Depopulation and burial of susceptible animals occurred between April 30 

and May 13.

May 1—The Japanese government dispatched a contingent of the Japan Self Defense Force Miyazaki 

prefecture to help with FMD control measures. 

May 6-12—MAFF reported 53 additional cases in Ebino city (case: Ebino city 3), Tsuno-cho (cases: 

Tsuno-cho 3 and 4), and Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 20-69), bringing the total number of 

case farms to 76. All affected farms were located within the existing MRZs. Depopulation of susceptible 

animals occurred May 8 to June 5. 

May 13-19—MAFF reported 55 more cases, primarily in Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 70-

116). However, infected animals were also found on farms in Shintomi-cho (cases: Shintomi-cho 1 and 

2), Takanabe-cho (cases: Takanabe-cho 1-4), Tsuno-cho (case: Tsuno-cho 5), and Ebino city (case: Ebino 

city 4). All affected farms were located within the established MRZs. Depopulation occurred from May 

16 to June 16.

May 13—Evacuation of MLIA bulls—With special clearance from MAFF, six valuable Wagyu breeding 

bulls were moved from the Miyazaki Livestock Improvement Association (MLIA) farm in Takanabe-cho to 

a vacant farm in Saito city; the bulls tested negative just before departure. 

May 16—FMD was diagnosed at the MLIA farm in Takanabe-cho (Takanabe-cho 4); the 6 bulls evacuated 

to Saito city remained under observation. 

May 17—The Japanese government assigned 20 officials to the task force at the prefectural office, 

including a MAFF deputy minister and an assistant to the Prime Minister; their primary duties were 

providing financial support to farmers and making arrangements with related ministries.

May 18—The Governor of Miyazaki Prefecture declared a state of emergency.

May 19—Culling of susceptible animals on affected farms had stalled at approximately 67 percent. 

May 20-26—MAFF reported 87 more cases, bringing the total number to 218. The majority of cases 

occurred in Kawaminami-cho (cases: Kawaminami-cho 117-169), Tsuno-cho (cases: Tsuno-cho 6-13), 

Takanabe-cho (cases: Takanabe-cho 5-16), and Shintomi-cho (cases: Shintomi-cho 3-12). However, 

affected farms were also detected in neighboring Kijo-cho (cases: Kijo-cho 1-3) and Saito city (cases: 

Saito city 1-3). Three of the outbreaks occurred on vaccinated farms. The elapsed time between 

vaccination and clinical signs of infection ranged from 1 to 3 days. Depopulation of susceptible animals 

on affected farms occurred from May 21 to June 23. 

May 21—FMD confirmed in evacuated MLIA bull in Saito city—One of the 6 breeding bulls evacuated 

from the MLIA farm in Takanabe-cho to Saito city was confirmed infected with FMD virus (case: Saito 
41

city 2). The infected bull was destroyed on May 22, but the other 5 breeding bulls were spared. 

Veterinary officials considered these bulls to have a different epidemiologic status because they were 

kept strictly separated on the Saito city farm. 

Also on May 21—Only laboratory-confirmed case in goats—One of 2 pet goats on a farm in 

Kawaminami-cho (case: Kawaminami-cho 147) exhibited clinical signs of FMD and tested positive using 

RT-PCR. Both goats were destroyed on May 26; there were no other susceptible animals on the farm.

May 22—Vaccination against FMD begun—The official veterinary services started emergency 

vaccination against FMD, targeting all domestic susceptible animals on unaffected farms within the 

Kawaminami area. Vaccination outside of this area remained prohibited. Vaccination occurred from the 

perimeter of the MRZ towards the center, with higher priority for given to swine than cattle. 

Also on May 22—Only involvement of sheep in 2010 outbreak—FMD infection was detected cattle on a 

farm in Saito city that also had 8 sheep (case: Saito city 3). None of the sheep showed clinical signs and 

all were depopulated without laboratory testing.

May 24—Surveillance testing started to confirm FMD-free status of the MRZ around Ebino city. 

As of May 25, approximately 120,000 animals had been vaccinated in 2 cities and 5 towns (95 percent of 

target). Some farmers had not yet agreed to vaccination.

May 27-June 2—MAFF reported 35 additional cases (cases: Kawaminami-cho 170-183; Tsuno-cho 14-24; 

Takanabe-cho 17-22; Shintom-cho 13 and 14; and Saito city 4 and 5); all case farms were located within 

the existing MRZs. Vaccination of swine was completed with 79,603 animals vaccinated; the number of 

vaccinated cattle reached 45,612. Thirty-three of the new case occurred on farms that had been 

vaccinated. The elapsed time between vaccination and clinical signs of infection ranged from 2 to 7 days. 

All susceptible livestock on the affected farm were depopulated between May 29 and June 24.

June 2—The prefectural veterinary authorities started classifying animals showing typical clinical signs of 

FMD on farms located in the MRZ around Kawaminami-cho as FMD cases without PCR testing, based on 

previously high correlation between clinical signs of FMD and positive PCR results. PCR testing of 

suspicious animals without clinical signs or kept in other areas continued.

June 3-10—MAFF reported 26 more cases (cases: Kawaminami-cho 184-196; Tsuno-cho 25-30; 

Takanabe-cho 23-25; Shintomi-cho 15-17; Kijo-cho 4). All were on vaccinated farms; the elapsed time 

between vaccination and clinical signs of infection ranged from 4 to 15 days. Depopulation and burial of 

susceptible animals on affected farms occurred June 5-21.

June 4—The MRZ around Ebino city 1-4 was lifted, following active clinical and serological surveillance of 

all susceptible domestic animals in the area.

June 5—Destruction of vaccinated animals begun.

June 11-15—MAFF reported 7 additional cases within existing MRZs (cases: Kawaminami-cho 197 and 

198; Saito city 6-8; Kijo-cho 5; and Shintomi-cho 18). Five were vaccinated farms. Elapsed time between 

vaccination and detection exceeded 14 days on 4 of the 5 farms (range 16 to 19 days). MAFF also 

reported single cases in the new areas of Hyuga city, Miyakonojo city, and Miyazaki city. The official 
42

veterinary services established MRZs around the each of the new areas. Depopulation of susceptible 

animals on affected farms occurred June 10-20; depopulation of vaccinated, presumably uninfected 

animals was ongoing.

June 13—Quarantine released on MLIA bulls—The MRZ around the case farm in Saito city where the 

remaining MLIA bulls resided (case: Saito city 2), 21 days after the outbreak occurred. Laboratory testing 

found no evidence of FMD virus in the 5 remaining bulls on the premises; susceptible animals on 2 farms 

within 10km of the affected farm were also checked. 

June 16-23—MAFF reported 2 more case farms, 1 in Miyazaki city (case: Miyazaki city 2) and the other 

in the new area of Kunitomi-cho (case: Kunitomi-cho 1); neither farm had been vaccinated. 

June 30—Destruction of vaccinated animals completed—Destruction of all susceptible animals in the 

vaccination area was completed. 

July 2—The MRZ around the Miyakonojo city case (case: Miyakonojo city 1) was lifted. The absence of 

infection was demonstrated by serological surveillance targeted at all susceptible animals kept within 3 

kilometers around infected farms and on epidemiologically-related farms, as well as by clinical 

surveillance targeted at all susceptible animals in the area. 

July 3— The MRZ around the Hyuga city case (case: Hyuga city 1) was lifted; same surveillance plan as 

above. 

July 6—The MRZ around the other Saito city cases was lifted; same surveillance plan as above.

July 4—One new outbreak was detected on an unvaccinated farm in Miyazaki city (case: Miyazaki-3), 

within the MRZ around Miyazaki city. The farm was located approximately 800 meters from the last case 

detected June 18. All susceptible animals on the farm were destroyed on July 5. 

July 8—The MRZ around the Kunitomi-cho case farm (case: Kunitomi-cho 1) was lifted after serological 

surveillance targeted at all susceptible animals within a 3-kilometer radius and in epidemiologicallyrelated farms, as well as clinical surveillance targeted at all susceptible animals in the area.

July 16—The MRZ around the Kawaminami area was lifted except for 1 unaffected farm in Takanabecho, which had refused vaccination and depopulation; same surveillance plan as above.

July 17—The hold-out farm in Takanabe-cho was depopulated.

July 18—The MRZ around the hold-out farm in Takanabe-cho was lifted; no additional surveillance since 

there were no susceptible animals remaining in the area.

July 22-August 9—Clinical inspections of 946,424 livestock on 8, 076 farms in the prefecture for FMD.

July 27—Last MRZ lifted—The MRZ around Miyazaki city was lifted; same surveillance plan as above. 

August 20-October 25—Targeted serologic testing of wildlife in Miyazaki prefecture.

August 26—All affected farms completed cleaning and disinfection procedures.

August 31-October 22—Sentinel cattle introduced onto 175 previously affected and depopulated farms; 

serum samples collected 3-4 weeks after introduction were negative for FMD.
43

September 6-13—Random sample of 150 farms within Miyazaki prefecture were surveyed at a level 

sufficient to detect 2 percent affected farms with at least 95 percent confidence. 

October 6—MAFF declared Japan free of FMD.

February 4, 2011—The OIE reinstates Japan’s status as FMD free without vaccination.

References

MAFF. 2010. Recovery of FMD country free status: Japan's report to the World Organization for Animal 

Health (OIE) to recover country freedom from FMD without vaccination. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 

and Fisheries, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau; Tokyo. Dated October 6, 2010.

OIE. 2011. World Animal Health Information Database: Japan foot and mouth disease—immediate 

notification and follow-up reports 1-16. World Organization for Animal Health. Available at: 

http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=home.

International Society for Infectious Diseases. 2011. ProMED reports: Foot and mouth disease—Japan 

(01-39). Available at: http://www.promedmail.com/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1000.