alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31



                                 CERTIFICATION


             I, Steve Bailey, certify that:

             1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all
             reports on Form 8-K containing distribution and servicing reports
             filed in respect of periods included in the year covered by this
             annual report, of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust
             2005-HYB1;

             2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken
             as a whole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material
             fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
             statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
             statements were made, not misleading as of the last day of the
             period covered by this annual report;

             3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing
             information required to be provided to the trustee by the master
             servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreement,
             for inclusion in these reports is included in these reports;

             4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
             master servicer under the pooling and servicing, or similar,
             agreement and based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance
             review required under that agreement, and except as disclosed in
             the reports, the master servicer has fulfilled its obligations
             under that agreement; and

             5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to
             the master servicer's compliance with the minimum servicing
             standards based upon the report provided by an independent public
             accountant, after conducting a review in compliance with the
             Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers or
             similar procedure, as set forth in the pooling and servicing, or
             similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.

             In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
             information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
             The Bank of New York, as Trustee and National City Mortgage
             Company.


             Date: March 24, 2006

                                 /s/ Steve Bailey
                                 ----------------
                                 Steve Bailey
                                 Senior Managing Director
UAS Phantom/Inspire/Yuneec Checklist

Preflight:

WX conditions and Wind limits checked to be within tolerance (do not attempt to fly in winds

exceeding 20km/hr)

Propellers securely installed, undamaged and not excessively bent (unbend by hand if

necessary)

Camera lens cap and gimbal clamp removed

SD card installed

Fully charged battery installed and secure

Place UAS on level surface away from nearby obstacles, into the wind and facing away

from operator

Power-up:

Power on WiFi extender

Transmitter switches S1 & S2 in the UP position

Power on transmitter

Check transmitter battery level (solid green light)

Power on UAS

Perform a compass calibration if your location has changed significantly (see manual)

Confirm WiFi extender has a flashing green system light

Open Wifi settings on your Android or Apple device and connect UAS

Open the DJI Vision app and click CAMERA.

Before takeoff:

Confirm satellite lock and return-to-home point is loaded (rapidly flashing green LED followed by

steady flashing)

Point aircraft into the wind

Confirm camera control and FPV by briefly tilting camera up and down

If recording video, push RECORD

Observers warned that UAS is taking off

Takeoff:

Climb away from obstacles, into the wind and above head height

Establish a hover and confirm UAS will hold position with GPS

Confirm FPV is streaming and adjust view angle as necessary

Note battery level and takeoff time

Mission:

Note time enroute and establish a “bingo time” when you must return home to have adequate

battery to get home 

CAUTION: Winds will affect this greatly, allow extra time to return if return will be into the

wind
Maintain radio and visual line-of-sight

Utilize a spotter to maintain visual contact when available

Always verify recording status during the mission

Recovery:

Preferred recovery is by hand, especially on uneven terrain or with tall vegetation

Safety glasses or glasses offering ballistic protection shall be utilized

Establish a hover above head height and a safe distance away then move towards the UAS

and grab the landing gear

Once the UAS is securely held above head level, hold the throttle stick to the down position

for three seconds

Do not move the UAS to below head level until the blades have stopped completely

Postflight:

Power off the UAS, transmitter and Wifi extender

Remove the SD card and secure

Any visible moisture present on the system shall be wiped off prior to storage

If moisture was present during the flight, do not seal the UAS in the case for a prolonged

period until it can be aired out in a dry environment for a minimum of eight hours

Charge the Wifi extender, UAS batteries and ensure extra transmitter batteries are available

for the next mission

Download the contents of the SD card, delete from the SD card and re-install into the UAS
#### W. W. LONG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27331.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 19, 1955.

No attorney on appeal.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted for murder without malice under art. 802c, Vernon’s *552
      *Ann.P.C.;*the punishment, two years in the penitentiary.

' It was shown by the state’s testimony that appellant,' while intoxicated and driving his automobile upon a public highway, turned to his left-hand side of the highway and struck George Hampton’s automobile approaching from the opposite direction, which collision caused the death of Patricia Nell Wilson, a passenger in Hampton’s automobile.

Appellant, while testifying, admitted that he was driving his automobile upon a public highway at the time it collided with George Hampton’s automobile. He further testified that immediately before the collision there was moisture on the windshield of his automobile which blurred his vision and, as he drove over the crest of a hill, lights flashed up in front of him and, it appearing to him that there would be a collision, he swerved to his left and the collision occurred. Appellant testified that he had been drinking beer, but that he was not intoxicated.

The jury resolved the issues of fact against appellant and we find the evidence sufficient to sustain their verdict.

Appellant complains of a question asked him by the state while he was testifying on cross-examination, to-wit: “Do you recall telling that group of people there, ‘Goddamn her, I have insurance to cover this ?’ ” to which question appellant objected and the court instructed the jury to disregard the question as improper. Appellant then moved the court to grant a mistrial because said question was so prejudicial that an instruction could not remove it from the minds of the jury and, upon the court’s refusal, appellant excepted.

The court qualified the bill by certifying that at the time the question was asked he voluntarily and quickly instructed the jury not to consider the question and rebuked the prosecution for asking the question. The bill does not show any facts which would make the testimony called for by the question inadmissible. This question was not answered and the bill does not show that it was asked for the purpose of prejudicing the minds of the jury or that there was no basis for asking the question. No reversible error is here shown. ,

Appellant’s specially requested charges, which were refused by the trial court, are shown to have been submitted in the court’s main charge, substantially as requested, therefore no error is shown.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
Exhibit 99.3 - Trustee Compensation Report



                                 LAW DEBENTURE
                                 -------------
                    LAW DEBENTURE TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK
                767 Third Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017
                 Telephone: (212) 750-6474  Fax: (212) 750-1361
                           Email: new.york@lawdeb.com

June 30, 2005



   Hartford Life Global Funding Trust 2005-010 - Trustee Compensation Report



During the period concluded on June 15, 2005, the total amount of fees received
by the Indenture Trustee was as follows:

        1. An annual administration fee of $1,000 paid by Hartford Life
               Insurance Company under its expense and indemnity agreement with
               respect to the above trust.


        2. No compensation, fees or other payments were received from any trust.


LAW DEBENTURE TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK
767 Third Avenue - 31st Floor
New York, NY 10017

/s/ Adam Berman

Name: Adam Berman
Title: Vice President
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed February 16, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-0611

Lower Tribunal No. 20-8083

________________

Aliner J. Harris,

Appellant,

vs.

HGA-Land Holdings, LLC,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Oscar 

Rodriguez-Fonts, Judge.

Aliner J. Harris, in proper person.

Tepps Treco and William A. Treco (Plantation), for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Upon our de novo review, we affirm the trial court’s entry of final 
2

summary judgment quieting title and partitioning property pursuant to 

sections 733.105(3), 64.051, and 64.071, Florida Statutes (2021). The 

partial record before us lacks a transcript of the hearing and does not reflect 

the filing of any response or affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment 

motion below. “It is the responsibility of the appellant to ensure that a record 

adequate to permit resolution of the issues raised on appeal is prepared and 

transmitted to the appellate court.” Morgan v. Pake, 611 So. 2d 1315, 1316 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(e)); see Applegate v. 

Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (explaining 

that “[i]n appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the 

presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to 

demonstrate error,” so “the lack of a trial transcript or a proper substitute” 

results in record that is “inadequate to demonstrate reversible error” and 

requires affirmance); Butler v. Metropolitan Dade County, 298 So. 2d 552, 

552-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (affirming final summary judgment because 

material portions of record upon which trial court based its findings were

omitted on appeal); see also Kidwell v. Kidwell, 181 So. 3d 1190, 1190 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2015) (“Notwithstanding the fundamental principle of allowing pro 

se litigants procedural latitude, a practice effected to ensure access to the 

courts for all citizens, pro se litigants are not immune from the rules of 
3

procedure.” (quoting Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1999))).

Affirmed.
IB 

Union Calendar No. 420 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2154 

[Report No. 112–580] 

To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources 

System Gasparilla Island Unit FL–70P. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 13, 2011 

Mr. MACK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Natural Resources 

JULY 9, 2012 

Additional sponsors: Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee and Mr. SHERMAN

JULY 9, 2012 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June 13, 2011] 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2154 RH

A BILL 

To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee Coastal 

Barrier Resources System Gasparilla Island Unit FL–70P. 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2154 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPLACEMENT OF JOHN H. CHAFEE COASTAL 

4 BARRIER RESOURCES SYSTEM MAP. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The map subtitled ‘‘Gasparilla Is6 land Unit FL-70P’’ included in the set of maps entitled 

7 ‘‘Coastal Barrier Resources System’’ referred to in section 

8 4(a) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 

9 3503(a)) and relating to the Gasparilla Island Unit in 

10 Florida is hereby replaced by another map relating to the 

11 same unit entitled ‘‘John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Re12 sources System Corrected Gasparilla Unit FL–70P’’ and 

13 dated July 8, 2011. 

14 (b) AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary of the Interior shall 

15 keep the replacement map referred to in subsection (a) on 

16 file and available for inspection in accordance with the sec17 tion 4(b) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 

18 3503(b)). 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 420 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2154 

[Report No. 112–580] 

A BILL 

To correct the boundaries of the John H. Chafee 

land Unit FL–70P. Coastal Barrier Resources System Gasparilla IsJULY 9, 2012 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Pete ENCINAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27508.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 30, 1955.

*818No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Leon Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

The conviction is for a' second offense of driving an automobile upon a public highway while intoxicated; the punishment, 2 years in the penitentiary.

The evidence, viewed from ■ the standpoint of'the State, shows that appellant was riding in his automobile upon the highway named in the indictment, the other occupant of the car being his wife.

State Highway Patrolman Joe T. Kulp, while driving on this highway, met appellant’s car which, at the time, crossed the center line of the highway and forced the car Kulp was driving off the pavement.

Kulp immediately turned his car around and pursued appellant’s car, blinking his lights and sounding his horn until the pursued car pulled off the highway and stopped.

Appellant was identified by Kulp as the driver of the car, and the evidence shows without question that appellant was drunk. Kulp drove appellant’s car and took appellant to the county jail.

Mrs. Encinas testified that she was driving the car until it pulled off the highway and that appellant slid under the wheel after the car stopped and immediately before the officer drove up behind them.

The jury accepted the State’s version and -the testimony sustains their finding that appellant was driving the car.

A judgment was offered in evidence showing the conviction of Pete Encimas for “driving a motor vehicle on the highway while intoxicated”, in the court and cause number set out in the indictment, and the complaint and information were also offered.

Objection was urged because the information did not show the name of the county attorney signed thereto or the name of the county following the place for signature, and because of the difference -in spelling of the' name of the defendant therein and the name of appellant.

Appellant was identified as the person charged and convicted in the former cause described in the indictment and shown in the evidence, and the variance in the name was immaterial.

The absence of the signature of the county attorney on the information is a matter of form and does not vitiate the information purporting on its face to be presented by a proper officer. Art. 512, C.C.P.; Hill v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 299, 207 S.W.2d 413.

Appellant filed a motion for continuance because of the absence of a witness, which was overruled, and appellant excepted.

The motion for new trial complains that the motion was not granted, but we *819find no affidavit from the witness as to what he would have testified, had he been present. In the absence of such showing, the trial judge was not without authority to conclude that had the witness been present he would not have testified as alleged in the motion for continuance. See Morris v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 251 S.W.2d 731.

The remaining bills of exception have been considered and we find no reversible error in the record.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Jaclyn McCarthy, an Infant, by Her Mother and Natural Guardian, Mary McCarthy, et al., Appellants v State of New York, Respondent.

In a claim to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the claimant appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.), entered January 11, 1989, which, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the claim on the merits.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The infant claimant was injured in a playground when she fell to the ground from a horizontal ladder. The claim based upon negligence in maintenance and/or design of the ladder was dismissed after a nonjury trial, and we affirm. The claim*517ant adduced no competent proof (1) that the height of the horizontal ladder was unsuitable for children of the infant claimant’s age, or (2) that the surface upon which she fell constituted an unsafe and dangerous condition for which the State should be held liable *(see, McGill v 39 Casino St. Corp.,*16 AD2d 832; *Stewart v New York City Hous. Auth.,*33 AD2d 901). The claimant’s expert testimony was clearly inadequate in that guidelines promulgated by the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, upon which he relied, were not mandatory or meant to be the exclusive standards for playground safety. Furthermore, the expert’s testimony failed to establish the condition of the surface cover beneath the horizontal ladder at the time of the accident. His inspection took place some *2Vz*months after the accident, and his description of the surface condition was at odds with that of the infant claimant’s mother, who described wood chips beneath the horizontal ladder at the time of the accident. The claimant’s expert witness also opined that the horizontal ladder was too high. This conclusory opinion, without more, was insufficient to make out a case for the claimant. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-17-00392-CR

DAMIEN TERRELL GARDINER 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the

252nd District Court of Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 09-07806

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

July 12, 2018
Exhibit 99.2

                             FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP
              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection  with the Annual Report of First  Financial  Bancorp (the
"Company")  on Form 10-K for the period ended  December 31, 2002,  as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Allen R. Christenson,  Chief Financial  Officer of the Company,  hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

/s/ Allen R. Christenson
------------------------
Allen R. Christenson
Chief Financial Officer
March 21, 2003

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to First  Financial  Bancorp  and will be  retained by First  Financial
Bancorp and  furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission or its staff
upon request.
#### Ralph MEADOWS, movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 6, 1953.

Robert M. Stephenson, Ashland, for appellant.

J. D. Buckman, Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Boyd Circuit Court by Ralph Meadows from a judgment convicting him of the second offense of possessing liquor in local option territory for the purpose of sale, and fixing his punishment at a fine of $200 and confinement in the county jail for 120 days.

We have carefully considered the facts shown in the record, and the law applicable thereto. Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-546
In Re: NATHANIEL HOOVER, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-95-337-3-MU) Submitted: November 7, 1996 Decided: November 18, 1996 Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Nathaniel Hoover, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Nathaniel Hoover filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the district court unduly delayed acting on his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Our review of the record reveals that the delay in Hoover'saction is attributable in part to Hoover's filing of an interlocutory appeal, and in part to a pending action for which Hoover's § 2255 has been stayed. The delay in the district court is not unreasonable under these circumstances. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny mandamus relief.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED