IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jane C. Collaso, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1118 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: February 19, 2016

Bureau of Professional and :

Occupational Affairs, State :

Board of Social Workers, :

Marriage and Family Therapists :

and Professional Counselors, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: July 1, 2016 

Petitioner Jane C. Collaso (Collaso) petitions for review of an order of 

the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Social 

Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors (Board), 

revoking Collaso’s license to practice clinical social work. We affirm the Board’s 

order.

By way of background, on July 13, 2010, Collaso pleaded guilty to 

two counts of simple assault, which is a grade 2 misdemeanor. The criminal 

charges against Collaso arose as a consequence of Collaso’s assault of a former 

client (K) and the client’s husband (T). The criminal complaint alleged that 

Collaso had engaged in an affair with the former client and that she went to the 
2

former client’s home, where she attacked K and T. According to the Board’s 

brief,1on May 3, 2011, as a result of the convictions, the Board, in a separate 

proceeding, issued an Immediate Temporary Suspension order (ITS). Ultimately, 

Collaso and the Board agreed to a resolution of Collaso’s challenge to the ITS, 

resulting in a 180-day temporary suspension of Collaso’s license. 

During that period of temporary suspension, on July 12, 2011, the 

Pennsylvania Department of State (Department) issued an Order Compelling the 

Mental and Physical Examination of Collaso. Although Collaso attended two 

examinations, the examiner concluded that he could not render an opinion 

regarding Collaso’s mental or physical condition, because Collaso had not 

provided all requested records and responses to direct questions. Based upon the 

examiner’s conclusion, on September 13, 2011, the Department filed a motion to 

deem facts admitted and for entry of default. The Department’s motion also 

sought an order of the Board suspending Collaso’s license until such time that she 

complied with the July 12, 2011 order to submit to the mental and physical 

examination. On October 20, 2011, the Board issued a final memorandum order: 

(1) granting the Department’s motion to the extent it sought to deem facts admitted 

and entry of default; but (2) dismissing without prejudice the Department’s motion 

to the extent it sought to compel Collaso to submit to a mental and physical 

examination. (R.R. at 51a.) 

The Board’s October 20, 2011 order deemed facts admitted indicating 

that Collaso failed to comply with the July 2011 order directing her to submit to an 

evaluation. Included in those facts deemed admitted were: (1) Collaso failed to 

 

1 Respondent’s Brief at 10 n.14.
3

provide the examiner with her medical records; (2) Collaso failed to provide the 

examiner with a copy of her curriculum vitae in advance of the examination; 

(3) during the examiner’s interview of Collaso, she refused to discuss the incident 

involving her former patient and the patient’s husband; and (4) upon the second 

examination, Collaso again refused to provide the examiner with her medical 

records and refused to discuss the triggering patient incident. The Board accepted 

as a fact that, because Collaso did not cooperate with the examinations, the 

examiner was unable to provide an opinion regarding Collaso’s emotional state or 

psychiatric condition. (R.R. at 49a-50a.)

Despite those findings and the Board’s conclusion that Collaso was in 

default for failing to submit to the examination, the Board elected not to exercise 

its authority to suspend indefinitely Collaso’s license until she complied with the 

provisions of the initial examination order. (R.R. at 50a-51a.) The Board reasoned

that the Department’s request for an order compelling Collaso to submit to another 

exam did not specify whether the Respondent was seeking an examination 

regarding potential drug addiction or for mental incompetence. On 

November 1, 2011, the Board issued an order reinstating Collaso’s license. 

Although Collaso’s participation in/or submissions to the mental and physical 

examinations are pertinent to the petition for review, the proceedings involving the 

ITS are not at issue in this matter.

On November 11, 2011, a prosecutor with the Department issued a 

notice to Collaso advising her that the Department had initiated formal disciplinary 

proceedings against her and informing her of her rights to respond to and defend 

against the proceedings. The Department initiated the proceedings in an order 

directed to Collaso to show cause (Order to Show Cause) why the Board should 
4

not impose a disciplinary sanction against her based upon her actions leading up to 

her two criminal convictions. The Order to Show Cause identified Collaso’s 

alleged violations of the Social Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and 

Professional Counselors Act (Social Workers Act)2and the Criminal History 

Records Information Act (CHRIA)3as grounds for the potential imposition of 

sanctions.

The Order to Show Cause referred to the criminal complaint upon 

which Collaso’s two criminal convictions were based, which, as indicated above,

described Collaso’s forcible entry in the home of K and T, her actions that night, 

and her guilty pleas to two counts of simple assault. The Department claimed that 

it was empowered to suspend, revoke, or restrict Collaso’s license under the 

following:

 Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act,

4

63 P.S. § 1911(a)(1), based 

upon Collaso’s misdemeanor assault convictions. (Count One)

 Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA,518 Pa. C.S. § 9124(c)(2), based upon 

Collaso’s guilty plea to the two assault charges. (Count Two)

 Section 11(a)(2) of the Social Workers Act,

6

63 P.S. § 1911(a)(2), for 

alleged violations of:

 

2 Act of July 9, 1987, P.L. 220, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 1901-1922.

3 Act of July 16, 1979, P.L. 116, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 9101-9183.

4

Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he board 

may . . . suspend, revoke, limit or restrict a license . . . for any of the following: (1) Being 

convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude in any state . . . court.”

5

Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA provides, in pertinent part, that “[b]oards, 

commissions or departments of the Commonwealth authorized to license, certify, register or 

permit the practice of . . . professions may . . . suspend or revoke any license . . . ‘[w]here the 

applicant has been convicted of a misdemeanor which relates to the . . . profession for which the 

license . . . is sought.’”
5

(a) Section 1.01 of the National Association of Social 

Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics (Code), which 

provides that social workers have a primary 

responsibility to promote the wellbeing of clients. 

(Count Three)

(b) Section 1.06(c) of the NASW Code, which prohibits 

social workers from engaging in dual relationships with 

clients or former clients when such a relationship poses a 

risk of exploitation or harm to a client. (Count Four)

(c) Section 1.10 of the NASW Code, which prohibits 

social workers from engaging in physical contact with 

clients when there is a possibility of psychological harm 

to the client as a result of such contact. (Count Five)

(d) Section 4.05(a) of the NASW Code, which prohibits 

social workers from allowing personal problems and 

psychosocial distress, inter alia, to interfere with 

professional judgments and performance or to jeopardize 

the best interests of people to whom they have a duty of 

professional responsibility. (Count Six)7

 Section 11(a)(7) of the Social Workers Act,

8

63 P.S. § 1911(a)(7), for failure 

to obey the Board’s order directing her to submit to a mental and physical 

examination and to submit medical and mental health records to the 

examining physician. (Count Seven).

 

(continued...)

6

Section 11(a)(2) of the Social Workers Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he board 

may refuse, suspend, revoke . . . or restrict a license . . . for . . . [b]eing found guilty of immoral 

or unprofessional conduct.” Section 11(a)(2) defines the term “unprofessional conduct” to 

“include any departure from or failure to conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing 

practice.” In proceeding under this provision, the Department need not establish that a licensee 

caused actual injury to a client. Id.

7 Count Six of the Rule to Show Cause was mistakenly numbered as Count Five.

8

Section 11(a)(7) of the Social Workers Act provides that the Board may revoke or 

suspend a license for “violat[ion of] an order of the board previously entered in a disciplinary 

proceeding.”
6

The Department also asserted that it was empowered to impose a civil penalty for 

any of these alleged violations pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Social Workers 

Act, 63 P.S. § 1917(b), or Section 5(b)(4) of the law commonly referred to as the 

Licensing Boards and Commissions Law (Act 48),963 P.S. § 2205(b)(4), and that 

it had the power to impose costs of investigation upon Collaso under 

Section 5(b)(5) of Act 48, 63 P.S. § 2205(b)(5). 

On February 12, 2013, the Board conducted a formal hearing on the 

Order to Show Cause. During the hearing, the Department presented the testimony 

of one of the officers called to the house where Collaso assaulted K and T. The 

Department also presented the testimony of Vincent J. Gioe, Ph.D., a licensed 

clinical psychologist and licensed marriage and family therapist, who the Board 

qualified as an expert regarding the ethical standards set forth in the NASW.

Collaso testified on her own behalf. She refuted the description of the 

conduct that gave rise to the criminal charges. Collaso testified that K came to 

counseling on her own, without her husband; that K called her the night of the 

altercation; that she, Collaso, went to the home and entered without conflict; that 

she did not strike T or K; that although K had been her client, a personal 

relationship did not arise until after she referred K to other therapists; and that she 

had not engaged in a sexual relationship, but rather that “feelings” existed between 

K and herself. The Board concluded that Collaso’s attempt to re-characterize the 

scenario that was described in the criminal complaint constituted an impermissible 

collateral attack on her convictions.

 

9 Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 345, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 2201-2207.
7

On May 8, 2015, the Board issued a final adjudication and order. The 

Board rendered the following pertinent factual findings:

8. [Collaso] pled guilty to two (2) counts of Simple 

Assault, Grade two misdemeanor offenses, in violation of 

18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

10. The incident that resulted in [Collaso]’s guilty plea 

involved [Collaso] forcibly entering the home of a former 

client/patient, K, and the client’s husband, T, and 

physically assaulting K and T causing injury.

13. As a result of [an altercation between Collaso and K 

and T at K and T’s home] K’s face was red and irritated 

with small scratches on her lips. T also had a scratch by 

his left eye.

14. T and K had gone to [Collaso] for marital counseling. 

After one session together, [Collaso] asked to see K 

alone.

15. [Collaso] and K began seeing each other outside of 

counseling and began a personal/sexual relationship.

16. After two or three counseling sessions with K alone, 

[Collaso] referred her to other therapists for therapy.

17. K ended the relationship with [Collaso] when she 

deciding to work on her marriage.

20. The mental and physical examination was conducted 

on August 7, 2011.

22. [Collaso] refused to answer questions from Dr. 

Voskanian relative to the criminal complaint of 

February 15, 2010.

23. Because [Collaso] refused to comply fully with the 

Board’s order, Dr. Voskanian was unable to formulate an 

opinion as to [Collaso]’s emotional state or psychiatric 

condition.

24. After being informed of Dr. Voskanian’s inability to 

render an opinion on her fitness to practice social work, 

[Collaso] attended a re-examination with Dr. Voskanian 

on September 2, 2011.

25. [Collaso] again failed to provide Dr. Voskanian with 

her medical records as required by the Board’s Order.
8

26. During the September 2, 2011, examination, [Collaso]

again refused to discuss the incident which led to the 

Criminal Complaint of February 15, 2010.

27. Because [Collaso] refused to comply fully with the 

Board’s Order, Dr. Voskanian was unable to offer an 

opinion as to [Collaso]’s emotional state or psychiatric 

condition.

The Board concluded that Collaso’s guilty pleas established: (1) the commission 

of crimes of moral turpitude for the purpose of Section 11(a)(1) of the Social 

Workers Act; (2) the commission of crimes relating to Collaso’s profession for the 

purpose of Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA; (3) violations of Section 11(a)(2) of 

the Social Workers Act based upon the provisions of the NASW Code cited in the 

Order to Show Cause; and (4) Collaso’s violation of Section 11(a)(7) of the Social 

Workers Act, based upon her failure to submit as ordered to a physical and mental 

examination.

Collaso, pro se, petitions for review of the Board’s order,10 raising the 

following issues in her brief:11 (1) Whether substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s findings pertinent to the legal question of whether the Board erred with 

regard to its conclusion that Collaso engaged in unprofessional or immoral conduct 

where, she claims: (a) the evidence does not indicate that she failed to promote a 

client’s well-being; (b) the Board erroneously referred to other initial charges that 

 

10 Our review in this matter is limited to considering whether necessary factual findings 

are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the Board erred as a matter of law, and, if 

properly raised, whether any constitutional rights were violated. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.

11 Collaso raises the following questions in her statement of questions involved: 

(1) whether the Board issued a well-reasoned decision revoking Collaso’s license; and 

(2) whether the Board erred in its assessment of the evidence, such that the sanction the Board 

imposed was harsh. As described below, Collaso raises more specific questions in the discussion 

section of her brief, and we glean the pertinent issues therefrom.
9

the prosecutor eventually dropped; and (c) the Board did not consider whether the 

assaults were remote in time to her treatment of K; (2) whether the Board’s notice 

failed to provide sufficient notice of the nature of the charges and, thereby, violated 

Collaso’s due process rights; (3) whether the Board erred in concluding that the 

grade two misdemeanor simple assault convictions constitute crimes of dishonesty 

or moral turpitude; (4) whether the sanction the Board imposed is 

unconstitutionally harsh; and (5) whether collateral estoppel applies to preclude the 

Department’s prosecution as set forth in the Order to Show Cause based upon the 

earlier temporary license suspension proceeding. Because Collaso sometimes 

addresses these arguments in a somewhat random manner and because some of 

these arguments are addressed only to certain of the Counts in the Order to Show 

Cause, we will first address Collaso’s arguments regarding specific Counts and 

address common arguments thereafter.

COUNT I

Crime of Moral Turpitude

With regard to Count I, which asserts that Collaso’s license is subject 

to revocation based upon conviction for a crime of moral turpitude under 

Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act, the Board considered whether the

misdemeanor simple assault convictions constituted crimes of moral turpitude. 

Citing Foose v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and 

Salespersons, 578 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), the Board opined that this Court 

defined crimes of moral turpitude as “anything done knowingly contrary to justice 

or good morals,” Foose, 578 A.2d at 1357, and that Collaso’s assault convictions 

fell within that definition because assaults “are inconsistent with the definition of 

good moral character [and they] involve a reprehensible state of mind.” (Board 
10

Opinion at 15.) The Board wrote that “the reprehensible state of mind” at issue 

with the misdemeanors of which Collaso was convicted “is the knowing or 

reckless attempt to cause or causing bodily injury to another, or engaging in 

conduct which constitutes a physical menace intended to put another in fear of 

serious bodily injury.” Id. The Board distinguished third-degree misdemeanor 

simple assault, which involves conduct that may be lacking in a “reprehensible 

state of mind” that could arise in a situation such as “a fight or flight scuffle by 

mutual consent.” Id. The Board was persuaded that Collaso’s intentional 

appearance at the home of K and T and her assault constituted a crime of moral 

turpitude.

We conclude that the Board did not err in concluding that Collaso’s 

two assault convictions constitute crimes of moral turpitude for the purpose of 

Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act. In Bowalick v. Department of 

Education, 840 A.2d 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), this Court, in considering whether 

the Pennsylvania Department of Education had sufficient grounds to revoke a 

teaching certificate, addressed the question of whether the crime of simple assault 

always constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. In Bowalick, a teacher was arrested, 

convicted, and sentenced on a simple assault charge involving his wife. The 

Department of Education sent him a notification that it was seeking to revoke his 

certificate based upon its belief that simple assault is a crime of moral turpitude. 

We noted in Bowalick that the governing regulations in that case provided that the 

only relevant inquiry when questioning whether a crime is one of moral turpitude 

relates to the particular elements of the crime committed, not to the facts 

underlying the particular commission of the crime. The regulatory provision at 

issue, 22 Pa. Code § 237.9(a), provided guidance, defining “moral turpitude” as 
11

including “reckless conduct causing bodily injury to another.” Although the 

definition in the regulation also included “conduct done knowingly contrary to 

justice, honesty or good morals,” we opined that the term “moral turpitude” as 

defined in the regulation, as well as the definitions arising in other statutory 

contexts

requires a reprehensible state of mind or mens rea. Thus, 

it may be an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity, 

contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty 

between two human beings.” Such an act requires at 

least knowledge of private impropriety or the potential 

for social disruption. Also an act of moral turpitude may 

consist of intentional, knowing or reckless conduct.

Bowalick, 840 A.2d at 523-24 (internal citations omitted).

The Court considered the elements of the crime “simple assault,” but 

noted that the crime of simple assault “can lack a reprehensible state of mind when 

arising in the context of a fight or scuffle by mutual consent.” Id. at 524. The 

Court concluded that, because the possibility existed that the teacher and his wife 

entered into the altercation under such “mutual consent,” the Professional 

Standards and Practices Commission,

12 was required to conduct a hearing to 

determine whether the teacher had pleaded guilty to facts involving moral 

turpitude, i.e., facts indicating that the “mutual consent” type of assault was not at 

issue. That rationale is consistent with this Court’s decisions holding that the 

question of whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude depends on 

 

12 The Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) was established 

by the Educator Discipline Act, Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S. 

§§ 2070.1-.18c, which authorizes the Commission, in part, to direct the Department of Education 

to discipline any educator in accordance with the act, including revoking an educator’s teaching 

certificate. 
12

the elements of the crime rather than an independent examination of the details of 

the behavior underlying the crime. See Startzel v. Dep’t of Educ., 562 A.2d 1005, 

1007 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 76 (Pa. 1990). In this matter, 

the convictions were graded as misdemeanors of the second degree. Assaults that 

arise from a fight involving mutual consent are graded lower than second degree 

misdemeanors. 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701. It appears, therefore, that Collaso’s 

convictions, which were graded more severely than those that might arise from 

“mutual consent,” fall within this Court’s holdings regarding crimes of moral 

turpitude. Consequently, we conclude that the Board did not err in concluding that 

Collaso’s simple assault convictions are for crimes of moral turpitude.

Sufficiency of Notice

Collaso asserts that the Board’s notice was insufficient and violated 

her due process rights. This argument appears to relate to the charges contained in 

Count One. In her brief, Collaso asserts that the Department charged her vaguely 

with “lacking good moral character.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 19.) Collaso, however, 

does not reference the particular charge in which the Department used the phrase 

“moral character.” Our review of the Order to Show Cause, however, indicates 

that the Department alleged that Collaso’s convictions constituted crimes of moral 

turpitude, which under Section 11(a) of the Social Workers Act provides grounds 

for revocation of a license. Thus, the precise challenge Collaso is seeking to raise

is unclear, because the charges do not use the phrase “moral character.” Even if 

Collaso had more clearly articulated the question, she did not raise before the 

Board a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice. Thus, we believe 

that this issue has been waived. McGrath v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 632 A.2d 1027, 
13

1031 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (constitutional challenge to agency proceedings generally 

must be timely raised and preserved for purposes of appellate review).

COUNTS THREE AND FIVE

Violations of NASW Code Sections 1.01 and 1.10

Collaso contends there is a lack of evidence to support the Board’s 

findings regarding the alleged violations of Sections 1.01 and 1.10 of the NASW 

Code. Section 1.01 provides that a social worker’s primary responsibility is the 

well-being of a client. Section 1.10 provides that social workers should not engage 

in physical contact with a client if such contact has the potential to cause 

psychological harm to a client. Collaso claims that there is insufficient evidence to 

support a finding that she failed to promote the well-being of a client. Collaso also 

asserts that the Board improperly referred to certain charges (presumably in the 

criminal complaint) against her that were eventually dropped. Collaso does not 

specify which particular factual findings are not supported by evidence. It would 

appear that Collaso intended to argue that the findings do not support the Board’s 

legal conclusions that Collaso violated the NASW Code-based charges against her. 

Collaso has presented no legal arguments or provided any pertinent legal citations 

in support of her claim that the factual findings do not support the Board’s legal 

conclusions. Accordingly, we conclude that Collaso has waived this issue by 

failing to brief the issue adequately.13 In re: Condemnation of Land for S.E. Cent. 

 

13 Collaso follows this argument with a reference to Blake v. State Board of Funeral 

Directors, 770 A.2d 380 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 786 A.2d 990 (Pa. 2001), but Collaso has 

not explained how our holding in that decision bears upon this matter. Additionally, Collaso 

asserts that a reasonable mind could view the evidence in this case as sufficient to support a 

finding that she is capable of engaging in her profession. Without any sufficient argument in 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
14

Bus. Dist. Redevelopment Area #1: (405 Madison St., City of Chester), 946 A.2d 

1154, 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 968 A.2d 233 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 

556 U.S. 1208 (2009) (“[a]rguments not properly developed in a brief will be 

deemed waived”). 

COUNT SEVEN

Collaso also asserts that the Board erred in determining that she failed 

to provide requested medical documentation to the examiner, arguing that the 

Board failed to consider that she attended two examinations, that she sat in an 

examination room for four hours, and that she orally provided information to the 

examiner regarding her history and credentials. (Petitioner’s Brief at 8-10.) 

Collaso further relies upon the fact that the Board, in its October 20, 2011 order

resolving the Department’s motion to the extent it sought to deem facts admitted 

and for a default judgment, concluded that it did not “believe that the facts as 

alleged in the [motion] rise to the level of establishing that a medical condition 

may exist that would render [Collaso] unable to practice with reasonable skill and 

safety.” (R.R. at 50a.) As we noted above, when the Board expressed that 

opinion, it did so based upon its view that the portion of the motion seeking to 

compel an indefinite suspension of Collaso’s license due to her failure to comply 

was insufficient, because that motion did not specifically indicate whether the 

examination would address potential drug addiction or mental incompetence. 

Although the Board’s order appears inconsistent in some respects, the Board did 

 

(continued...)

support of her imprecise challenge to factual findings and legal conclusions, we are bound by the 

Board’s factual findings.
15

affirmatively find that Collaso failed to comply with the initial July 2011 order, 

directing her to submit her medical records to the examiner.

Although Collaso does assert that the Board’s comment supports her 

claim that she complied with the initial July 2011 order to submit to an 

examination, the thrust of Collaso’s argument is that she complied with the 

direction in part, by attending the examinations. Collaso, however, does not 

contest that she failed to provide the examiner with her medical records as required 

by the July 2011 order. The July 2011 order also directed Collaso to answer 

questions the examiner posed to her. (R.R. at 34a.) Collaso makes no claim that 

she did answer all of the examiner’s questions. Thus, the record appears to contain 

substantial evidence that supports the Board’s findings that Collaso did not comply 

with the July 2011 order to submit to a mental and physical examination. 

 Based upon the Board’s findings regarding Collaso’s noncompliance, 

we conclude that the factual findings support the Board’s conclusion that Collaso 

failed to comply with the Board’s order, because her refusal to provide the records 

rendered the examiner’s task of producing an accurate evaluation impossible.

REMAINING ARGUMENTS

Abuse of Discretion in Revoking Collaso’s License

Collaso asserts generally throughout her brief that the Board abused 

its discretion in imposing the sanction of license revocation. Collaso contends that 

the penalty is too harsh for the conduct at issue. As the Department notes, 

however, the Board may impose sanctions to the extent authorized by the 

applicable law. Slawek v. State Bd. of Med. Educ. and Licensure, 586 A.2d 362, 

365 (Pa. 1991). Collaso, relying upon our decision in Ake v. State Board of 

Accountancy, 974 A.2d 514 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 162 (Pa. 
16

2009), argues that the Board’s revocation constitutes an abuse of discretion. In 

Ake, we concluded that the Board of Accountancy abused its discretion in revoking 

a certified public accountant’s license, based upon a conviction for harassment in a 

different state. We reversed the Board’s sanction, concluding “that where prior 

convictions do not in any way reflect upon the [licensee]’s present ability to 

properly discharge the responsibilities required by the position, the convictions 

cannot provide a basis for the revocation of a . . . license.” Ake, 974 A.2d at 520. 

Rather, licensing agencies must consider “the nature of the offending conduct and 

its remoteness in time must be considered where an agency seeks to revoke a 

professional license on the basis of a conviction.” Id. We conclude that Ake is 

distinguishable from this matter, because the Board correctly determined that 

Collaso’s convictions reflected upon her ability to discharge the responsibilities of 

a social worker and the timing of convictions, as compared to our holding in Ake,

is not remote to the Board’s revocation action.

Collateral Estoppel

Collaso also argues that the Board was collaterally estopped from 

considering the charges in the Order to Show Cause based upon the earlier 

proceeding involving the ITS. The Department contends that Collaso waived this 

issue by failing to present it in her petition for review. Our Supreme Court 

amended Pa. R.A.P. 1513(d) to provide that, when a party fails to raise an issue in 

a petition for review, but presents sufficient argument in a brief to enable this 

Court to address the issue, such an omission is not grounds to find waiver. 

Winchilla v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nexstar Broad.), 126 A.3d 364, 368 (Pa. 

Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 130 A.3d 1293 (Pa. 2015). The Department is correct, 

however, in relying upon waiver, because it appears that Collaso did not raise the 
17

issue before the Board. Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a); Laundry Owners Mut. Liab. Ins. 

Assn. v. Ins. Comm’r of Pennsylvania, 91 A.3d 747, 753 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (issue 

waived where party fails to raise it before governmental unit). Therefore, we agree 

with the Department that Collaso waived this issue.

Accordingly, we conclude that Collaso has not established any 

grounds for reversal of the Board’s decision, and, therefore, we will affirm the 

Board’s order.14

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

14 Collaso mentions CHRIA, which was the basis of Count Two of the Order to Show 

Cause, only in passing. Although we note the Court’s recent holdings that suggest that CHRIA 

may only be applicable in the context of a licensee’s criminal conviction and professional 

disciplinary proceedings where a licensing board’s statutory provisions are silent as to the 

authority of a board to impose a sanction for a criminal conviction, see Garner v. State Board of 

Optometry, 97 A.3d 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), appeal denied, 112 A.3d 655 (Pa. 2015), Collaso 

has not adequately challenged the Board’s conclusion that CHRIA provides sufficient legal 

grounds independently to impose a sanction based upon her convictions. Consequently, we will 

not proceed to consider whether the Board erred in concluding it could do so.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jane C. Collaso, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1118 C.D. 2015

:

Bureau of Professional and :

Occupational Affairs, State :

Board of Social Workers, :

Marriage and Family Therapists :

and Professional Counselors, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1st day of July, 2016, the order of the Bureau of 

Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Social Workers, Marriage 

and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge