alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1431 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1431

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to grant releases to terms 
   and conditions contained in a deed under which the United States 
   conveyed certain land to Dona Ana County, New Mexico, for airport 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 7, 2011

  Mr. Pearce introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to grant releases to terms 
   and conditions contained in a deed under which the United States 
   conveyed certain land to Dona Ana County, New Mexico, for airport 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DONA ANA COUNTY, NEW MEXICO.

    (a) Release From Restrictions.--Notwithstanding section 16 of the 
Federal Airport Act (as in effect on August 4, 1982) or sections 47125 
and 47153 of title 49, United States Code, the Secretary of 
Transportation is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to grant 
releases from any of the terms, conditions, reservations, and 
restrictions contained in the deed of conveyance numbered 30-82-0048 
and dated August 4, 1982, under which the United States conveyed 
certain land to Dona Ana County, New Mexico, for airport purposes.
    (b) Conditions.--Any release granted by the Secretary under 
subsection (a) shall be subject to the following conditions:
            (1) The County shall agree that in conveying any interest 
        in the land that the United States conveyed to the County by 
        the deed described in subsection (a), the County shall receive 
        an amount for the interest that is equal to the fair market 
        value.
            (2) Any amount received by the County for the conveyance 
        shall be used by the County for the development, improvement, 
        operation, or maintenance of the airport.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit32.1**

**Certification of Chief ExecutiveOfficer**

**Pursuantto 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to**

**Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created bySection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersignedofficer of Eschelon Telecom, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies, tosuch officer’s knowledge, that:

(i)            theaccompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for thequarterly period ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii)           the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.
| Sign:                                 | /S/ Richard A.  Smith |   |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Richard A. Smith                      |
| President and Chief Executive Officer |
| August 7, 2007                        |

 

The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of this Report or asa separate disclosure document.  A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided tothe Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JULY 28, 2005

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 04-15112

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-00077-CR-T-26-MSS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

JUAN PABLO FERRIN GARCES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

 (July 28, 2005)

Before BIRCH, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

Scott M. McCluskey, counsel for Juan Pablo Ferrin Garces, has moved to
2

withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our

independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the

relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the

entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is

GRANTED, and Garces’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
#### GRAHAM v. STATE.

No. 26485.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 1953.

*888Sam B. Spence, Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

The offense charged in the first count of the information is the unlawful transportation of whisky in a wet area without a permit.

In connection therewith and for the purpose of enhancing the punishment under Art. 61, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., it is alleged that appellant had been, prior thereto, convicted of transporting liquor in a dry area.

The jury expressly found appellant guilty under both counts and assessed his punishment at *a*fine of $300 and 60 days in jail.

It is insisted by the appellant that the unlawful transportation of whisky in a dry area is not the same offense or an offense of the same or similar character as that of the unlawful transportation of whisky in a wet area without a permit, and could not therefore be utilized to enhance the punishment in this case.

In determining the question thus presented, two statutes must be examined:

By Art. 666-4(a), V.A.P.C., it is unlawful to transport whisky in a wet area without a permit of the class required for such privilege. The offense thereby created rests not in the transportation of the whis-ky but in the fact that the transportation is without a permit. The absence of the permit, then, is an essential element of that offense, without which there is no offense under the statute.

By Art. 666-4(1⁄8), V.A.P.C., it is unlawful to transport whisky in a dry area. The essential element of such offense lies in the fact of transportation in the particular area mentioned.

It is apparent, therefore, that the first offense is one arising out of and in the nature of a regulation or regulatory measure, while the other offense is entirely prohibitory. Therein lies the distinction between the two offenses. One is regulatory; the other, prohibitory.

The case of Andrews v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 392, 228 S.W.2d 173, appears to be in point and here controlling.

In that case the issue was whether the selling of beer on Sunday between the prohibited hours, Art. 667-10(a) (1), V.A.P.C., was an offense of like character to that of possessing liquor for the purpose of sale in a dry area, Art. 666-4(b), V.A.P.C. The conclusion that the offenses were not the same or of like character was founded primarily upon the proposition that one was regulatory and the other was prohibitory. See, also, Lenore v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 417, 129 S.W.2d 657.

From what has been said, it is apparent that appellant’s contention is well taken and that the two offenses named in the information were not offenses of the same nature, within the meaning of Art. 61, V.A.P. C.

Other matters appearing in the record will not likely arise upon another trial, and for that reason are not discussed.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is. remanded.

Opinion approved by the court.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S. **

District Court for Eastern New York, Brooklyn, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PARSHUTNAM SINGH SANDHU,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-71036

Agency No. A077-818-586

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 11, 2011

Seattle, Washington

Before: CLIFTON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, Senior

District Judge.** 

Parshutnam Singh Sandhu petitions for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his applications for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

FILED

JUL 18 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial

evidence, I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), and we deny the petition

for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Sandhu has not

demonstrated past persecution on account of a protected ground, for two reasons.

First, Sandhu fails to show that the record compels the conclusion that his arrest

was not in relation to a criminal investigation. See Dinu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 1041,

1044 (9th Cir. 2004). Second, Sandhu fails to demonstrate that the record compels

the conclusion that the Punjab police persecuted him based on imputed political

opinion. The record does not even show that the Punjab police were aware of the

political opinions of the terrorists whose opinions Sandhu seeks to have imputed to

him.

Sandhu has also failed to demonstrate an objectively well-founded fear of

future persecution with direct and specific evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b); Prasad

v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1995). In the context of the change in India’s

political climate for Sikhs since 1994, Sandhu’s testimony and supporting

affidavits are not sufficiently direct or specific to compel a finding that Sandhu

maintains an objectively well-founded fear of future persecution based on either

held or imputed political opinion. 
3

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal

under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. The record does not compel a

conclusion that it is more likely than not that Sandhu would be tortured upon return

to India. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009).

PETITION DENIED.
EXHIBIT 23.1

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(2-93572, 33-45809, 33-53462, 333-65627 and 333-89376) on Forms S-8 of Bel Fuse
Inc. of our report dated March 18, 2003 (March 21, 2003 as to Notes 11 and 12)
(which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory
paragraph relating to the Company's change in method of accounting for goodwill
and other intangible assets to conform to Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards Board No. 142), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Bel
Fuse Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2002.


Deloitte & Touche LLP

March 24, 2003
New York, New York
#### The BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 4172.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

June 14, 1937.

For opinion of court below, see 16 F.Supp. 647.

Charles R. Webber and John J. Fitzpatrick, both of Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

Arthur W. Machen and H. Vernon Eney, *both*of Baltimore, Md., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Case dismissed under rule 20 in accordance with agreement of counsel.
H. R. 2076 

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve 

An Act 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the statutory authority for the 

longstanding practice of the Department of Justice of providing investigatory 

assistance on request of State and local authorities with respect to certain serious 

violent crimes, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investigative Assistance for 

Violent Crimes Act of 2012’’. 

SEC. 2. INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN VIOLENT ACTS, SHOOTINGS, AND 

MASS KILLINGS. 

(a) ATTORNEY GENERAL.—Title 28, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(1) in section 530C(b)(1)(L)(i), by striking ‘‘$2,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$3,000,000’’; and 

(2) in section 530C(b)(1), by adding at the end the following— 

‘‘(M)(i) At the request of an appropriate law enforcement official of a State or political subdivision, the Attorney 

General may assist in the investigation of violent acts 

and shootings occurring in a place of public use and in 

the investigation of mass killings and attempted mass 

killings. Any assistance provided under this subparagraph 

shall be presumed to be within the scope of Federal office 

or employment. 

‘‘(i) For purposes of this subparagraph— 

‘‘(I) the term ‘mass killings’ means 3 or more 

killings in a single incident; and 

‘‘(II) the term ‘place of public use’ has the meaning 

given that term under section 2332f(e)(6) of title 18, 

United States Code.’’. 

(b) SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY.—Section 875 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 455) is amended by 

adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(d) INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN VIOLENT ACTS, SHOOTINGS, AND

MASS KILLINGS.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—At the request of an appropriate law 

enforcement official of a State or political subdivision, the Secretary, through deployment of the Secret Service or United 

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, may assist in 

the investigation of violent acts and shootings occurring in 

a place of public use, and in the investigation of mass killings 
H. R. 2076—2 

and attempted mass killings. Any assistance provided by the 

Secretary under this subsection shall be presumed to be within 

the scope of Federal office or employment. 

‘‘(2) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this subsection— 

‘‘(A) the term ‘mass killings’ means 3 or more killings 

in a single incident; and 

‘‘(B) the term ‘place of public use’ has the meaning 

given that term under section 2332f(e)(6) of title 18, United 

States Code.’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### Ivan F. ROBBINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27229.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 8, 1954.

Ray Stevens, Austin, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

This is a conviction for the unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, to-wit, morphine; the punishment, eight years in the penitentiary. A former conviction for said offense was reversed by this court in Robbins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 265 S.W.2d 108.

Milton S. Hooper, Federal Narcotics Officer, testified that on June 16, 1953, he contacted appellant about the purchase of some morphine; that immediately thereafter, appellant delivered to him a tube which bore a label with morphine sulphate written on it and which contained one tablet, stating that he had sixty tablets; and that appellant later delivered to him sixty tablets for sixty dollars.

It was further shown by a chemist that these sixty tablets in question contained morphine sulphate.

Appellant, while testifying in his own behalf, denied having possession of morphine sulphate at any time and further stated that if a sale was made to Officer Hooper, it was consummated with another person before he appeared.

The jury resolved the issues of fact against appellant and we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.

Appellant, in his motion for a new trial, contends that the court erred in failing to charge the jury that the evidence of extraneous offenses and convictions of the appellant could be considered by them only for the purpose of impeachment.

No objections were made to the charge before it was read to the jury, .and the first complaint about the charge was made upon motion for a new trial.

The defendant is required to present his objections to the charge in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection, before it is read to the jury, and having here failed to do so his right to object is waived. Art. 658, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P.; May v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 272 S.W.2d 886.

*692Appellant complains of a question directed to him by the district attorney while he was testifying relative to a shooting that occurred about November 9, 1953, on the ground that no offense was involved and it was asked for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the jurors.

The record reveals that the event inquired about was for the purpose of fixing the date on which appellant made a statement to the officers concerning the charge in this case, and it further shows that appellant explained to the jury the shooting which did not incriminate him. We perceive no error in this complaint.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
Exhibit 23.2  Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm  We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement pertaining to the Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation Associates Investment Plan for Salaried Associates of our report dated June 23, 2008, except for Note 8, as to which date is September 23, 2008, with respect to the financial statements of the Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation Associates Investment Plan for Salaried Associates included in the Annual Report (Form 11-K) for the year ended December 31, 2007.  /s/ SPIELMAN KOENIGSBERG & PARKER, LLP  March 23, 2009
#### GUILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 26499.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 21, 1953.

Dewey C. Cox, Ji-., Ranger, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

This is a conviction under the so-called habitual criminal statute, Art. 63, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., which provides that a third conviction for an ordinary felony carry a punishment of life in the penitentiary.

The instant indictment does not allege that the second prior conviction relied upon was for an offense committed subsequent to the first prior conviction alleged.

The absence of such allegation is fatal to this conviction, for, to invoke the provisions of Art. 63, P.C., it is necessary that each succeeding conviction be subsequent to the previous conviction both in point of time of the commission of the offense and the conviction therefor. Gammill v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 52, 117 S.W.2d 790; Childress v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 504, 116 S.W.2d 396; Mullins v. State, 140 Tex. Cr.R. 261, 144 S.W.2d 565; Square v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 493, 154 S.W.2d 852; Harrison v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 386, 168 S.W.2d 243.

The state’s attorney before this court confesses that the indictment is insufficient in the particular pointed out.

For the error discussed, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the Court.
Ex
      - 22.1Subsidiaries
      of the RegistrantJurisdiction
      ofName
    
    IncorporationBel
      Fuse California Inc.
    
    CaliforniaBel
      Fuse America Inc.
    
    DelawareBel
      Fuse Delaware Inc.
    
    DelawareBel
      Ventures Inc.
    
    DelawareBel
      Power Products Inc.
    
    DelawareBel
      Transformer Inc.
    
    DelawareBel
      Connector Inc.
    
    DelawareSignal
      Dominicana, S.A.
    
    Dominican
      RepublicStewart
      Connector Systems de Mexico,
      S.A. de C.V.
    
    MexicoBel
      Stewart Gmbh
    
    GermanyBel
      Fuse Europe Ltd.
    
    United
      KingdomBel
      Fuse Limited
    
    Hong
      KongBel
      Power (Hangzhou) Co. Ltd.
    
    ChinaBel
      Components Ltd.
    
    Hong
      KongTop
      East Corporation Limited
    
    Hong
      KongBel
      Stewart Limited
    
    Hong
      KongBel
      Fuse Macau LDA
    
    MacauGalaxy
      Power Inc.
    
    Massachusetts
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  H AYAT M AHMOUD O MAR , Petitioner,

v. No. 03-1188



# 
J OHN A SHCROFT , Attorney General, Respondent. 

# 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A78-355-535) Submitted: October 8, 2003 Decided: October 23, 2003 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER,

Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Hayat Mahmoud Omar, Petitioner Pro Se. Emily Anne Radford, Joshua Eric Terrence Braunstein, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION
PER CURIAM: Hayat Mahmoud Omar, a native and citizen of Eritrea, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On appeal, Omar first raises challenges to the immigration judge’s determination that she failed to establish her eligibility for asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility for relief, an alien "must show that the evidence [s]he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution." INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Omar fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that Omar seeks.Omar also contends that the Board failed to provide a comprehensible reason for its decision in affirming the decision of the immigration judge without opinion, after review by a single Board member, in accordance with the procedure set out at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2003). We find that by explicitly adopting the immigration judge’s decision as the agency’s final determination, the Board has fulfilled the requirement of providing a reasoned basis for its decision. Cf. Gandarilla-Zambrana v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals , 44 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Board’s practice of adopting, without further explanation, the reasoning of the immigration judge and stating that the immigration judge’s decision then becomes the sole basis for this court’s review). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED 2 O MAR v. A SHCROFT