[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12201

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00046-HNJ

KAREN HERNANDEZ, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(February 6, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Karen Hernandez appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

administrative law judge’s decision to deny her disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). 

Specifically, Hernandez contends that the ALJ erred by (1) affording no weight to 

the medical opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Johnston, and (2) affording little 

weight to the medical opinion of a one-time examiner, Dr. Randolph. 

In a social security appeal, we review an agency’s legal conclusions de novo

and its factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial 

evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 

2007). In reviewing for substantial evidence we do not reweigh the evidence or 

substitute our own judgment for the agency’s, rather, we simply ask whether there 

is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support 

the agency’s conclusion. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

Relevant to this case, Social Security regulations reserve to the 

Commissioner the ultimate opinion as to whether a claimant is “disabled.”1 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). To make this determination, the Commissioner follows a

five-step evaluation process, considering: (1) whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe 

 1 Hernandez does not argue on appeal that the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of no 

disability, accordingly, she has abandoned that issue. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest 

Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004).

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impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or 

equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) 

whether, based on a residual functioning capacity (RFC) assessment—that is, an

evidentiary assessment of a claimant’s ability to work despite her impairments—

the claimant can perform any of her past relevant work; and (5) whether, given her

RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are significant numbers of jobs in 

the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 

F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 

416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v). 

In conducting this evaluation, an ALJ must state with particularity the 

weight given different medical opinions and the accompanying reasons. Sharfarz 

v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). The ALJ should 

consider, among other things, the examining and treatment relationship between 

the claimant and doctor, the length of the treatment, the supportability and 

consistency of the evidence, and the specialization of the doctor. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c). More weight is generally given to opinions that are more consistent 

with the record as a whole. Id. § 404.1527(c)(4). 

While a treating physician’s opinion is generally entitled to weight, a onetime examiner’s opinion is not. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th 

Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Even the opinion of a treating physician, however,

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need not be given weight when there is “good cause”—for instance, when a

treating physician’s opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with his own records. 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41. We will not second guess an ALJ’s decision to 

reject a medical opinion for “good cause” so long as the ALJ articulates a specific 

justification for his decision. Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 808 F.3d 818, 

823 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give no weight to Dr. 

Johnston’s opinion here. First, the ALJ correctly concluded that he was not 

required to consider Dr. Johnston’s opinion that Hernandez’s conditions prevented 

her from being able to work, as regulations reserve that decision to the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). Second, although Dr. Johnston 

treated Hernandez for more than three years, the limitations that Dr. Johnston

alleged in his 2013 opinion were inconsistent with (1) his own treatment notes over 

the years—the majority of which stated that Hernandez’s conditions were 

successfully treated by her prescribed medications—and (2) Dr. Hunt’s and Dr. 

Gomez’s records, which showed that Hernandez was engaged in effective 

treatment for her conditions. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41.

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to

Dr. Randolph’s opinion. First, Dr. Randolph’s opinion that Hernandez’s 

significant social limitations would prevent her from returning to work addressed

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an ultimate issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

Second, Dr. Randolph examined Hernandez only once and did not treat her, so the 

ALJ was not required to give his opinion deference. McSwain, 814 F.2d at 619. 

Third, Dr. Randolph’s opinion was inconsistent with other record evidence, 

including: (1) Dr. Johnston’s treatment records, which showed that Hernandez’s 

anxiety had been effectively treated with a medication regimen; (2) Dr. Gomez’s 

treatment records, which showed that Hernandez was not suffering from acute 

distress and appeared well oriented; and (3) Dr. Estock’s opinion that, while 

Hernandez had generalized anxiety, she appeared stable such that any mental 

health issues caused only moderate limitations in her ability to work. 

Finally, Dr. Randolph’s evaluation records reveal that Hernandez failed to 

report to him that she had cared for her stepfather and grandmother, had 

volunteered with her local fire department, and had in fact worked—albeit,

sporadically—since her alleged disability onset date. As such, the ALJ reasonably

concluded that, to the extent that Dr. Randolph’s opinion was based on 

Hernandez’s subjective complaints, his opinion was entitled to less weight. 

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240–41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4).2

 

 2

 Hernandez also contends that the district court erred by issuing a lengthy post hoc explanation 

as to why the ALJ afforded Dr. Johnston’s opinion no weight. Our precedent makes clear, 

however, that in social security appeals we review the ALJ’s findings to see if they are supported 

by substantial evidence. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260. Thus, the district court’s reasoning 

concerning those findings is irrelevant here. 

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Finding no error, we affirm the district court’s order. 

AFFIRMED.

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