IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-796

Filed 05 July 2023

Guilford County, Nos. 21 JA 4–5

IN THE MATTER OF:

N.B., N.W.

Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 1 July 2022 by Judge Angela 

C. Foster in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June

2023.

Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health 

and Human Services.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by GAL Appellate Counsel Matthew D. 

Wunsche, for guardian ad litem.

Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant mother.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Respondent-Mother appeals from the trial court’s order adjudicating her child 

“Nancy”1 to be a neglected and dependent juvenile, and her child “Nell” to be an 

abused and neglected juvenile, and maintaining the children’s placement in the 

custody of the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). 

She argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these 

1 Consistent with the parties’ stipulation, we use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the 

juveniles in accordance with N.C.R. App. P. 42(b).
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proceedings. After careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

In 2020, Respondent-Mother lived in Tacoma, Washington, with her four 

children and her husband, who is the legal father of Nancy, her youngest daughter.2

In or around October 2020, Respondent-Mother separated from her husband, and 

shortly afterward began the process of relocating with her children to North Carolina. 

At the end of October, Nell’s aunt traveled to Tacoma to pick up Nell and one of 

Respondent-Mother’s older children, and returned to High Point with them. 

On 10 December 2020, DHHS received a report that Nell had disclosed to her 

aunt that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, Respondent-Mother’s 

husband. In January 2021, Respondent-Mother brought Nancy and another of her 

older children to live with relatives in Winston-Salem. DHHS contacted RespondentMother on 7 January and informed her of Nell’s disclosure, but Respondent-Mother 

told the social worker that Nell had lied before and that she did not trust Nell’s aunt. 

Respondent-Mother refused to complete a safety assessment with DHHS, and DHHS 

was unable to complete a child and family team meeting with Respondent-Mother. 

After the family moved to North Carolina, Respondent-Mother’s two older 

children relocated to Pennsylvania to live with their father. Respondent-Mother also 

2 As the trial court found as fact, the paternity of Nancy “ha[d] not been established through 

DNA paternity testing” as of the adjudication and disposition hearing; however, Respondent-Mother’s 

husband is listed as Nancy’s father on her birth certificate. 
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traveled to Pennsylvania with Nancy. 

On 19 January 2021, DHHS filed juvenile petitions regarding all four of 

Respondent-Mother’s children. DHHS alleged that Nell was an abused, neglected, 

and dependent juvenile; the other children were alleged to be neglected and 

dependent juveniles. By order entered that day, the trial court granted DHHS 

nonsecure custody of Nancy and Nell, but not the older children.3 Nell was placed 

with her aunt, but DHHS was unable to take custody of Nancy, as she was in 

Pennsylvania with Respondent-Mother when DHHS filed the juvenile petitions. 

Respondent-Mother and Nancy returned to North Carolina and appeared 

before the trial court on 4 February 2021, at which point DHHS took custody of Nancy 

and placed her with Nell’s aunt as well. In its initial orders regarding the need for 

continued nonsecure custody of Nancy and Nell, the trial court indicated that it 

possessed temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204 

(2021). 

On 31 March 2022, the matter came on for adjudication and disposition 

hearings in Guilford County District Court. By then, Respondent-Mother had 

relocated to Charlotte and obtained housing through an organization assisting 

victims of domestic violence. She also completed the public housing application 

3 DHHS ultimately filed a voluntary dismissal of the juvenile petitions regarding the older 

children, after it determined “that there were no safety concerns with the [Pennsylvania] home or with

the[ir] father[.]”
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process and was placed on the waiting list for public housing in High Point. Nell’s 

father was incarcerated in Pennsylvania and participated in the hearings by 

teleconference. However, Nancy’s father did not participate in the hearings; he had 

not yet been served with the juvenile petitions, as his whereabouts were unknown. 

On 6 July 2022, the trial court filed its adjudication and disposition order. As

regards its jurisdiction over the matter, the trial court concluded:

At the time of the filing of the juvenile petition[s], [DHHS] 

was acting under Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction 

pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-500 and [N.C. Gen. 

Stat.] § 50A-204. However, at the time of the Adjudication 

Hearing, North Carolina had obtained Home State 

Jurisdiction pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 50A-102(7) in 

that both juveniles and [Respondent-M]other had lived in 

the State of North Carolina without interruption for a 

period exceeding six months and there was no existing 

Custody Order from any other State. 

The trial court adjudicated Nancy as a neglected and dependent juvenile, and

Nell as a neglected and abused juvenile. The trial court continued DHHS’s custody of 

Nancy and Nell, suspended Respondent-Mother’s visitation with them, and relieved 

DHHS of its obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify them with RespondentMother. Respondent-Mother timely filed notice of appeal. 

II. Discussion

Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court erred by entering the 

adjudication and initial disposition order because “North Carolina did not have 

jurisdiction to enter non-temporary, non-emergency orders under” the Uniform Child 
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Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). For the reasons that follow, 

we disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Subject-matter jurisdiction is “the power of the court to deal with the kind of 

action in question[,]” In re N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. 722, 724, 760 S.E.2d 49, 52 (citation 

omitted), disc. review denied, 367 N.C. 826, 763 S.E.2d 517 (2014), and, as a result, is

“a threshold requirement for a court to hear and adjudicate a controversy brought 

before it,” In re M.B., 179 N.C. App. 572, 574, 635 S.E.2d 8, 10 (2006). Whether a 

court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which this Court 

reviews de novo on appeal. N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. at 724, 760 S.E.2d at 52.

When conducting de novo review, “this Court considers the matter anew and 

freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” In re T.N.G., 244 N.C. 

App. 398, 402, 781 S.E.2d 93, 97 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). However, unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal. N.T.U., 234 

N.C. App. at 733, 760 S.E.2d at 57.

B. Analysis

On appeal, Respondent-Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s 

findings of fact, nor does she challenge the trial court’s adjudications of Nancy as a 

neglected and dependent juvenile and Nell as an abused and neglected juvenile. 

Rather, her arguments are entirely concerned with the trial court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction over these proceedings.
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Respondent-Mother contends that (1) the trial court erred by concluding that 

it had obtained home-state jurisdiction because North Carolina was not the home 

state at the inception of these proceedings, and (2) the trial court could not “create 

‘home[-]state’ jurisdiction for the adjudication simply by passage of time.” She also 

asserts that the trial court erred by failing “to consult with the Washington courts, 

obtain an order [from Washington] declining jurisdiction, and make appropriate 

findings to support its order” in which the court exercises jurisdiction “beyond 

temporary emergency jurisdiction[.]” This appeal thus raises the question of whether 

(and under what conditions) temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA 

may eventually ripen into home-state jurisdiction.

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and the UCCJEA 

Subject-matter jurisdiction “is conferred upon the courts by either the North 

Carolina Constitution or by statute.” M.B., 179 N.C. App. at 574, 635 S.E.2d at 10 

(citation omitted). Our Juvenile Code provides that the trial court “has exclusive, 

original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, 

neglected, or dependent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a).

Additionally, “the jurisdictional requirements of the [UCCJEA] must be 

satisfied for a court to have authority to adjudicate petitions filed pursuant to our 

Juvenile Code, even though the Juvenile Code provides that the district courts of 

North Carolina have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a 

juvenile.” M.B., 179 N.C. App. at 574, 635 S.E.2d at 10 (citation omitted). “The 
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UCCJEA, which is designed to provide a uniform set of jurisdictional rules and 

guidelines for the national enforcement of child custody orders, is codified in Chapter 

50A of the North Carolina General Statutes.” Id. at 574–75, 635 S.E.2d at 10 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the UCCJEA,

a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial 

child-custody determination only if:

(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date 

of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the 

home state of the child within six months before 

the commencement of the proceeding, and the child 

is absent from this State but a parent or person 

acting as a parent continues to live in this State;

(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction 

under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state 

of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on 

the ground that this State is the more appropriate 

forum under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50A-207 or [§] 50A208, and:

a. The child and the child’s parents, or the child 

and at least one parent or a person acting as 

a parent, have a significant connection with 

this State other than mere physical presence; 

and

b. Substantial evidence is available in this State 

concerning the child’s care, protection, 

training, and personal relationships;

(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) 

or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 

ground that a court of this State is the more 

appropriate forum to determine the custody of the 

child under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50A-207 or [§] 50A-
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208; or

(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction 

under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), 

or (3).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a).

For the purposes of the UCCJEA, a “child-custody determination” is “a 

judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical 

custody, or visitation with respect to a child” and “includes a permanent, temporary, 

initial, and modification order.” Id. § 50A-102(3). “ ‘Initial determination’ means the 

first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.” Id. § 50A-102(8). 

A child’s “home state” under the UCCJEA is “the state in which [the] child 

lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months 

immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding[,]” including a 

proceeding on abuse, neglect, or dependency allegations. Id. § 50A-102(4), (7). A 

proceeding commences with “the filing of the first pleading[.]” Id. § 50A-102(5); see, 

e.g., T.N.G., 244 N.C. App. at 403, 781 S.E.2d at 97.

In this case, it is uncontested that the trial court did not have “home-state”

jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a) at the commencement of the 

present proceedings, as neither juvenile had lived in North Carolina for six months 

prior to the filing of the petitions in this matter.

However, the UCCJEA also provides that the courts of this State may exercise 

“temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this State and the child 
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has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because 

the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with 

mistreatment or abuse.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204(a). It is similarly uncontested that 

the trial court in this case properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction at the 

initiation of these proceedings. Accordingly, we must address the transition from 

temporary emergency jurisdiction to home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

2. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction and Home-State Jurisdiction

Respondent-Mother first argues that “at the time of the petition, North 

Carolina did not have jurisdiction to make an initial custody decision” because it was 

not the children’s home state pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201. Implicit in this 

argument is the proposition that a trial court cannot enter an initial child-custody 

determination while exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to § 50A204. This proposition is not supported by the text of the UCCJEA.

Section 50A-204(b) provides, in pertinent part:

If a child-custody proceeding has not been or is not 

commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under 

[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 50A-201 through [§] 50A-203, a childcustody determination made under this section becomes a 

final determination if it so provides, and this State becomes 

the home state of the child.

Id. § 50A-204(b). The plain language of this section thus contemplates that a court 

exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction may enter an initial child-custody 

determination, which “includes a . . . temporary . . . order.” Id. § 50A-102(3). The trial 
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court thus had jurisdiction to enter the initial, temporary nonsecure custody orders. 

However, Respondent-Mother proceeds to argue that “North Carolina courts 

do not have jurisdiction to enter an adjudication order while exercising temporary 

emergency jurisdiction.” The key issue, then, is under what conditions North Carolina 

“becomes the home state of the child” in order for a temporary child-custody 

determination to “become[ ] a final determination if it so provides[.]” Id. § 50A-204(b).

Respondent-Mother asserts that the trial court could not “create ‘home[-]state’ 

jurisdiction for the adjudication simply by passage of time.” However, this Court has 

previously concluded otherwise.

Respondent-Mother acknowledges two cases in which this Court determined 

that a trial court possessed home-state jurisdiction over termination-of-parentalrights proceedings after initially exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction over 

child-custody proceedings. See N.T.U., 234 N.C. App. at 728, 760 S.E.2d at 54; In re 

E.X.J., 191 N.C. App. 34, 43–44, 662 S.E.2d 24, 29–30 (2008), aff’d per curiam, 363 

N.C. 9, 672 S.E.2d 19 (2009).

In N.T.U., this Court “determined that the trial court properly exercised 

temporary emergency jurisdiction over the custody of [the juvenile] initially,” before

noting that the juvenile had “lived in North Carolina with his foster parents” for over 

a year and a half without “any custody proceedings instituted, or custody orders 

entered, in any state other than North Carolina.” 234 N.C. App. at 728, 760 S.E.2d at 

54. Accordingly, this Court “conclude[d] that North Carolina became [the juvenile]’s
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home state such that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to terminate [the 

r]espondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a).” Id.

Similarly, in E.X.J., this Court held that “the trial court had emergency 

jurisdiction to enter the initial nonsecure custody orders[,]” then recognized that, 

“[b]y the time of the filing of the petition and motion for termination of parental 

rights, [the children] and [the] respondent mother had been physically present in 

North Carolina for two years.” 191 N.C. App. at 43, 662 S.E.2d at 29. Accordingly, 

“[g]iven the children’s residency and the lack of any other custody proceedings or 

orders in other states, ‘North Carolina became the home state wherein the trial court 

had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter orders’ terminating [the] respondents’ 

parental rights.” Id. at 44, 662 S.E.2d at 29–30 (quoting M.B., 179 N.C. App. at 576, 

635 S.E.2d at 11).

Respondent-Mother maintains that N.T.U. and E.X.J. do not control the case 

before us because “those cases involved [termination] petitions for which the 

respective departments of social services established standing by way of properly 

entered nonsecure custody orders.” Yet both N.T.U. and E.X.J. relied upon our 

precedent in M.B., which Respondent-Mother cannot successfully distinguish from 

the present case.

Unlike N.T.U. and E.X.J., but like the present case, M.B. did not concern a 

termination-of-parental-rights proceeding commenced after a prior child-custody 

determination. Instead, M.B. concerned the trial court’s authority to enter an initial 
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child-custody determination while exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, then 

to recognize that North Carolina had become the child’s home state and order that 

the child-custody determination become a final order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 50A-204(b). 179 N.C. App. at 576, 635 S.E.2d at 11.

In M.B., the child and both parents moved from New York to North Carolina 

between February and March of 2005, and in April of that year, DSS filed a juvenile 

petition alleging that the child was neglected. Id. at 572–73, 635 S.E.2d at 9. In June

2005, the trial court entered an order finding temporary emergency jurisdiction, 

adjudicating the child as neglected, and placing the child in the temporary custody of 

DSS. Id. at 573, 635 S.E.2d at 9. The trial court also ordered the parents and DSS to 

“provide any and all information and paperwork in relation to an alleged New York 

court proceeding concerning M.B., as such a proceeding may impact the trial court’s 

subject[-]matter jurisdiction.” Id.

During the process of appealing the trial court’s temporary custody order, “DSS 

received a letter from Westchester County, New York, stating that there [we]re no 

pending matters or any orders regarding M.B.” Id. at 574, 635 S.E.2d at 10.

Accordingly, in October 2005, while the appeal was pending before this Court, the 

trial court entered an order “providing that (1) North Carolina [wa]s now the home 

state of M.B. because M.B. ha[d] been in North Carolina for over six months; and (2) 

the temporary child custody determination entered on 17 June 2005 [wa]s now the 

final order of custody.” Id.
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On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s initial invocation of temporary 

emergency jurisdiction. Id. at 576, 635 S.E.2d at 11. Furthermore, this Court 

determined that “any issue of temporary jurisdiction [wa]s now moot” and specifically 

cited the October 2005 order—as well as the fact that “M.B., M.B.’s mother, and 

[M.B.’s] father ha[d] been physically present in North Carolina for more than six 

months”—to support its conclusion that “North Carolina [wa]s now the home state 

under the UCCJEA[.]” Id. Although this Court in M.B. did not specifically refer to 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204(b), it is apparent that the trial court’s October 2005 order 

conformed with the provisions of that statute for the purposes of assuming homestate jurisdiction. Id.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-204(b).

DHHS contends on appeal that “[t]he relevant facts of In re M.B. are nearly 

identical to those in this case.” We agree. As the trial court concluded—and as is 

supported by unchallenged (and therefore, binding) findings of fact, N.T.U., 234 N.C. 

App. at 733, 760 S.E.2d at 57—“both juveniles and [Respondent-M]other had lived in 

the State of North Carolina without interruption for a period exceeding six months 

and there was no existing Custody Order from any other State” at the time the trial 

court entered the adjudication and disposition order. As such, and as the trial court 

declared in its order, “North Carolina . . . obtained Home State Jurisdiction” under 

the UCCJEA. 
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Lastly, DHHS advances a pair of unpublished opinions4 as persuasive 

authority for the application of the holding in M.B. to this case. Indeed, in In re K.M., 

this Court “conclude[d] that North Carolina became the home state wherein the trial 

court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter orders adjudicating the juveniles 

abused, neglected, and dependent” where the trial court made unchallenged findings 

of fact concerning “the court’s exercise of emergency jurisdiction, the juveniles’ 

residency in North Carolina for over six months, and the lack of any other custody 

proceedings or orders in any other state[.]” 228 N.C. App. 281, 748 S.E.2d 773, 2013 

WL 3356835, at *3 (2013) (unpublished). And in In re L.C.D., this Court concluded 

that “North Carolina became [the child]’s home state after six months” of her 

continuous residence in nonsecure custody in the state and “[i]n the interim, no 

custody proceedings were instituted or custody orders entered in another state.” 253 

N.C. App. 840, 800 S.E.2d 137, 2017 WL 2437033, at *3 (2017) (unpublished).

In the case at bar, the trial court properly concluded that it had home-state 

jurisdiction at the time of the adjudication and disposition order. In that RespondentMother does not otherwise challenge the trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions of 

law, the trial court’s order is properly affirmed.

III. Conclusion

4 Although unpublished opinions do not have precedential value, “an unpublished opinion may 

be used as persuasive authority at the appellate level if the case is properly submitted and discussed 

and there is no published case on point.” Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 234, 763 S.E.2d 755, 

764 (2014).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ARROWOOD and GRIFFIN concur.