In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00027-CR

ZIMBABWE RAYMOND JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 21M0630-CCL

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Stevens
2

O P I N I O N

While driving in Bowie County, Zimbabwe Raymond Johnson collided with a Southwest 

Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) utility pole and an antique truck. Johnson was charged 

with the misdemeanor offenses of failing to perform his statutory duty on striking a structure, 

fixture, or highway landscaping involving damages greater than or equal to $200.001and failure 

to perform his statutory duty when being involved in an accident involving more than $200.00 in 

damages to a vehicle.2 The jury found Johnson guilty of attempted failure to perform his 

statutory duty on striking a structure and attempted failure to perform his statutory duty when 

being involved in an accident involving damage to a vehicle3. The jury assessed a $200.00 fine 

in each case. In addition to the fines, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $200.00

for damage to the pole and $10,000.00 for damage to the truck. 

Johnson appeals from his conviction for attempted failure to perform his statutory duty 

on striking a structure.4Johnson contends that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to prove 

the value of the utility pole, (2) the trial court erred in ordering restitution because the damage to 

the utility pole was not a direct result of the crime for which he was convicted, and (3) the trial 

court erred by assessing a $200.00 concurrent fine.

1TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025(b)(2)

2TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.022(c)(2).

3TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 542.303(a) (“A person who attempts to commit or conspires to commit an act declared 

by this subtitle to be an offense is guilty of the offense.”).

4

Johnson appeals from his conviction for attempted accident involving a vehicle in our cause number 06-22-00028-

CR.
3

Because we find that the offense for which Johnson was convicted was not the proximate 

and “but for” cause of the damage to the utility pole, we modify the trial court’s judgment by 

deleting the award of $200.00 in restitution. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment 

because (1) there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the utility pole 

suffered $200.00 or more in damages, and (2) the trial court did not err in assessing a $200.00

concurrent fine.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 1, 2021, Tabitha Ray was in her backyard when she heard a “big crash.” She 

went into her front yard and saw that a maroon car had collided with her husband, Tommy’s,

truck. The truck was an antique, yellow, 1954 Chevrolet in “very rare” condition; that was her 

husband’s “baby.” The car backed up, “trying to navigate around” the truck, but one of the front 

wheels was damaged, “so [the driver] couldn’t steer it very well” and the car hit the truck again. 

She testified that the car then drove down the street, and she thought the car was trying to leave 

the scene, but it finally came to a stop. The driver of the car got out, started speaking with some 

of Ray’s neighbors, and remained on the scene until the police arrived. Ray called law 

enforcement and took photographs of the car and the utility pole. The photographs were 

admitted into evidence and published to the jury. Ray testified that the driver, later identified as 

Johnson, never tried to speak to her about the collision or provide her with his insurance 

information. 

Alana Dixon, one of Ray’s neighbors, testified that, on April 1, 2021, the lights in her 

home went off, and her daughter told her that a “man hit the pole.” Dixon then went outside to 
4

see what had happened. When she got outside, she saw a “young man in a car, and he was trying 

to leave the scene.” She saw a “telephone pole in half across the street.” She identified Johnson 

as the young man she saw “hit a car and a telephone pole in front of the Rays’ house.” Dixon 

testified that Johnson “just drove off” to the end of the street where he stopped at the stop sign. 

Johnson was having trouble controlling the car because “[o]ne of his tires was not moving.” 

Although she admitted that Johnson was still at the end of the road when the police arrived, she 

believed that Johnson was trying to leave the scene and that the only reason Johnson did not 

actually leave the area was because his car was too badly damaged. 

Carmine Smith was at the home of Ray’s neighbor at the time of the collision. Smith 

testified that he was inside when he heard a sound “like a transformer had exploded.” Dixon’s 

daughter came inside and said that “someone just hit the pole,” and Smith ran outside “to see if

someone was okay.” He saw Johnson trying to move the car away from the yellow truck, but it 

was moving slowly because “only one wheel was moving.” After he had hit the telephone pole 

and the truck, Johnson was “trying to drive off,” but he stopped the car down the street.

Rusty Hill, a police officer with the New Boston Police Department, was called to the 

scene of the collision. When he arrived, he saw Johnson’s maroon car “halfway in the road at an 

intersection with ball joints broken in the front and a telephone pole that had been hit.” The car 

was stopped “[o]ver a thousand feet” from the scene of the collision. Hill did not take 

photographs of the vehicles or the accident scene, but a recording from Hill’s body camera was 

admitted into evidence and played for the jury. Hill spoke with Johnson, who informed him that 

he had been “involved in a wreck.” Hill testified that, from the position of Johnson’s car in 
5

relation to the damaged pole, “[y]ou could tell he was trying to leave the scene.” Hill observed 

that Johnson was “on the phone with somebody trying to get out of there.” Johnson had not 

spoken to Ray or left his insurance information. 

By two separate informations, Johnson was charged with failing to perform his statutory 

duty (1) on striking structure, fixture, or highway landscaping (duty on striking structure) and (2) 

after an accident involving damage to a vehicle. The first charge alleged that Johnson did then 

and there:

having been the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in 

damage of $200 or more to a structure adjacent to a highway or a fixture legally

on or adjacent to a highway, to wit: A Swepco electric pole, intentionally or 

knowingly fail to take reasonable steps to locate or notify the owner or person in 

charge of the property of the accident or the defendant’s name or address or the 

registration number of the vehicle the defendant was driving.

The second charge alleged that Johnson did then and there:

intentionally and knowingly drive a vehicle that became involved in an accident 

resulting in damage to a vehicle, and the defendant did thereafter, knowing the 

accident had occurred, intentionally or knowingly fail to give his name or address 

or registration number of the vehicle the defendant was driving or the name of the 

defendant’s motor vehicle liability insurer to Tommy Ray, who was the driver of 

or an occupant of or a person attending the vehicle collided with, and the damage 

to the vehicle collided with resulted in a pecuniary loss of $200 or more.

The jury found Johnson not guilty of failing to perform his statutory duty on striking a

structure and failing to perform his statutory duty when being involved in an accident with more 

than $200.00 in damages to a vehicle. Instead, the jury found him guilty of attempted failure to 

perform his statutory duty on striking a fixture and attempted failure to perform his statutory 

duty when being involved in an accident involving more than $200.00 in damages to a vehicle. 

Both the State and Johnson rested without presenting evidence in the sentencing phase of the 
6

trial. The jury assessed Johnson a $200.00 fine in each case. After discharging the jury, the 

court, in addition to the fines assessed by the jury, imposed restitution in the amount of $200.00

payable to SWEPCO. Johnson filed a motion for a new trial on punishment, requesting that the 

court remove the restitution to SWEPCO, but the trial court denied the motion. 

II. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supported the Conviction

In his first point of error, Johnson argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict because there was no evidence to prove damages of $200.00 or more to

the pole.

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.

State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal 

sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 

S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction 

of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve 

conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007)).
7

“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined 

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets 

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of 

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the 

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

Section 550.025(a) requires motorists:

involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a structure . . . or a fixture or 

landscaping legally on or adjacent to a highway shall:

(1) take reasonable steps to locate and notify the owner or person in 

charge of the property of the accident and of the operator’s name and address and 

the registration number of the vehicle the operator was driving; and

(2) if requested and available, show the operator’s driver’s license to 

the owner or person in charge of the property.

TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025(a). If the damage to all structures is $200.00 or more, a 

violation of Section 550.025 is a Class B misdemeanor, but if the damage is less than $200.00, 

failure to fulfill one’s reporting duties is a Class C misdemeanor. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 550.025(b). The amount of damages involved forms the basis of punishment assessed. 

Elomary v. State, 796 S.W.2d 191, 192–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Jones v. State, 377 S.W.2d 

205, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); In re M.C.L., 110 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, 
8

no pet.). Here, Johnson was charged with a Class B misdemeanor violation and was found guilty 

of attempting to commit that Class B violation.5 

There is no direct evidence in the record that there were damages of $200.00 or more to 

the pole. Even so, there is authority indicating that, under certain circumstances, a jury can use 

its common knowledge to determine whether the amount of damages meets or exceeds a certain 

threshold. In Nixon v. State, Nixon crashed his truck into his estranged wife’s house and was 

convicted of criminal mischief causing more than $750.00 in damages. Nixon v. State, 937

S.W.2d 610, 612–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (en banc). The State 

introduced numerous photographs showing the truck inside the den, large pieces of sheet rock 

ripped from the walls, damaged furniture and accessories, as well as damage to the kitchen and 

bathroom. Id. at 612–13. Several officers testified that the amount of damage caused by the 

defendant was extensive. Id. at 613. Even though expert testimony is ordinarily necessary to 

establish the pecuniary loss to damaged property,6the court of appeals concluded that the 

testimony about the extensive nature of the damage to the house coupled with the photographs 

provided sufficient evidence from which the jurors could find, based on “common knowledge,”

that the amount of pecuniary loss was more than $750.00. Id. at 612.

In Edwards v. State, Edwards was convicted of Class B criminal mischief after he kicked 

down Crenshaw’s door. Edwards v. State, No. 01-20-00064-CR, 2020 WL 6435769, at *1 (Tex.

5A person is guilty of criminal attempt if, “with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to 

more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 15.01. 

6Elomary v. State, 796 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
9

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

7

 

The evidence regarding the pecuniary loss consisted of testimony that the damage was 

“significant” and “numerous photographs” showing “the space where the front door used to be

with the hinges ripped from the wall, the door frame bent and pulled several inches away from 

the wall, and the wall inside the apartment cracked along the doorframe.” Id. at *5. On appeal, 

Edwards argued that there was legally insufficient evidence that he caused more than $100.00 in 

damages. The court of appeals, citing Nixon, upheld Edwards’s conviction finding that the 

photographs, combined with the testimony, were sufficient evidence for jurors to determine, 

“based on their common knowledge,” that it would cost more than $100.00 to repair the door. 

Id. at *5–6. 

The state of the evidence in this case is similar to that of Nixon and Edwards. Although

there was no evidence regarding the cost to repair or replace the pole, photographs of the broken 

pole were admitted into evidence. Ray also testified that the pole was “completely separated,”

broken “in half,” leaving the “top part . . . just kind of hanging from the wires.” As in Nixon and 

Edwards, this was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could employ its common 

knowledge to reasonably conclude that there was damage of $200.00 or more to the pole.

Accordingly, we overrule Johnson’s first point of error. 

7Although unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them “as an aid in developing 

reasoning that may be employed.” Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).
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III. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Restitution

In his second point of error, Johnson argues that the trial court erred in ordering 

restitution because the State failed to show that the damage to the pole was a direct result of the 

crime for which he was convicted.

8

“We review challenges to restitution orders under an abuse of discretion standard.” 

O’Neal v. State, 426 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.); Cartwright v. 

State, 605 S.W.2d 287, 288–89 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or acts arbitrarily or 

unreasonably, or when its decision is so clearly wrong that it lies outside the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. See Gonzalez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “An abuse

of discretion by the trial court in setting the amount of restitution will implicate due-process 

considerations.” Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Restitution is a form of punishment, but it is also a crime victim’s statutory right. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037 (Supp.). “A broad interpretation of the restitution statutes 

provides judges with ‘greater discretion in effectuating opportunities for rehabilitating criminals, 

deterring future harms, and efficiently compensating victims.’” Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 

45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d) (quoting Neil D. Okazkai, Note & Comment,

People v. Sexton: Insuring an Absurd Result Through Inflexible Interpretation–The Court of 

Appeal Denies Criminal Restitution To a Victim’s Insurance Company, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.

8The State contends that Johnson failed to preserve this issue because he failed to raise it at trial. “Challenges to 

restitution orders must be raised in the trial court to preserve them for appellate review,” Garcia v. State, No. PD0025-21, 2022 WL 610983, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2022), when there is an opportunity to do so, such as 

when a trial court “order[s] restitution at the sentencing hearing,” id. at *3. Johnson preserved this issue for our 

review because he raised it in his motion for a new trial on punishment. 
11

297, 321 (1997)). That said, the amount of restitution must be just, it must have a factual basis in 

the record, and it may be ordered only to a victim of an offense for which the defendant is 

charged. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d at 696–97. Moreover, as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has 

consistently held, “there must be a causal connection between the criminal offense and the

recipient of restitution.” Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

Here, Johnson was convicted of attempting to leave the scene of an accident without 

fulfilling his statutory duties to report it. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025(a). Thus, the 

issue is whether that offense caused the property damage to the utility pole. 

For the same reasons stated in our opinion in cause number 06-22-00028-CR, we find 

that the State failed to show in this case that Johnson’s offense, attempting to leave the scene of 

the collision without fulfilling his statutory duties after having been involved in a vehicle 

collision, caused the damage to the utility pole. As a result, we sustain Johnson’s second point of 

error, reverse the trial court’s order of restitution, and delete the assessment of $200.00 in 

restitution from the judgment. 

IV. We May Not Delete the Concurrent Fines from the Judgment

The jury assessed a $200.00 fine for each of Johnson’s two convictions. Accordingly, the 

judgment in this case assessed a $200.00 fine, as does the judgment for attempted accident 

involving damage to a vehicle. The judgments note that the sentences assessed are to be served 

concurrently, but the trial court did not specifically order the fines in each case to run 

concurrently. In his final point of error, Johnson argues that this Court should delete one of the 

two $200.00 fines because the fines are be served concurrently. 
12

The Texas Penal Code requires sentences for offenses arising out of the same criminal 

episode that are prosecuted in a single criminal action to be served concurrently. TEX. PENAL 

CODE. ANN. § 3.03(a) (Supp.). The concurrent sentence provision in Section 3.03 applies to the

entire sentence, including fines. See State v. Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008). Where multiple fines are assessed in a same-criminal-episode prosecution and they are 

ordered to be discharged concurrently, they discharge in the same manner as concurrent terms of 

confinement—the defendant pays the greatest amount of the fine but receives credit for 

satisfying all of the multiple concurrent fines. See id. However, each judgment must include the 

fine actually imposed, and the courts of appeals may not delete a lawfully assessed concurrent 

fine from a trial court’s judgment in order to protect against possible improper stacking of fines.9 

Ansastassov v. State, No. PD-0848-20, 2022 WL 5054846, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2022) 

(abrogating cases deleting concurrent fines). Therefore, we overrule Johnson’s third point of 

error. 

9

“If defendants are being improperly subjected to consecutive fines in conflict with the trial court’s judgments in a 

given case, the proper course is to pursue relief through a writ of habeas corpus.” Anastassov v. State, 2022 WL 

5054846, at *6. 
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V. Conclusion

We modify the judgment by deleting the award of $200.00 in restitution. As modified, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens

Justice

Date Submitted: November 9, 2022

Date Decided: December 22, 2022

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