## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Pachec o , 2013 IL App (4th) 110409

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. MARI A S. PACHECO, Defenda nt-Appellant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-11-0409

Filed J une 24, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Def endant minor’s convictions for multipl e counts of first deg ree murder arising from the death of her uncle at the hands of defe ndant’s boy friend in the course of a robber y wer e upheld ov er h er co ntentions that the automatic transfe r provi sions of the J uvenile Court Act violated the proportionate penalties clause
, the prohibition ag ainst crue l and unusual punishment, and a juvenile’s due proce ss rig hts, and that her counsel was ineffe ctive in failing to understand the felony murder rule, failing to impeach her boy friend, failing to object to the leading questions posed to him, and failingto tender se parate instructions for e ach mur der c ount.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Clark County
, No. 10-CF- 63; the Hon. Trac y W. R esch, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med as modified; ca

use re manded with dire ctions.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pell et i er, Kare n Munoz, and J acque line L

. Bullar d (ar g ued), all of State Appe llate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Springf ield, for a ppellant.

Dennis E. Simont on, State’s Attorney
, of Marsha ll (P atrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman, and Anastac ia R. Br ooks (ar gued), all o f State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor’s O ffice , of counse l), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE POPE delivered the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustice Holder

Whit e conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice Appleton dissented, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 On J anuar

y 14, 2011, a jury fo u n d defe ndant, Maria S. Pachec o (born J une 26, 1994),
guilty of robber

y (ac countability), unlawful possession of a stolen vehic le, and f irst deg ree murder (a ccountability). The trial court sentenc ed her to 30 y ear s in prison for murder pursuant to section 5-130(1) (c)(i ) o f t h e J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 I L CS 405/ 5-130(1) (c) (i) (West 2008) ). Def endant a ppeals, a rguing the following : (1) the trial court err ed in ref

using to tender separ ate jury instructions for eac h charg ed count of murder; (2) trial counsel provided ineffe ctive assistance of counsel by (a) conce ding her g uilt of felony murder based on his misapprehe nsion of the felony murder rule, (b) failing to impeach the State’s star witness with text messag es he sent to other women, and (c) failing
to object to the State improperly leading its star witness with questions about text messag es betwee n the witness and defe ndant; (3) the automat i c ex clus ion of 15- and 16-y ear -olds char g ed with felony murder or murder by acc ountability from juvenile court, there by requiring the automatic application of an adult sentenc ing rang e, violates due proce ss, the eig hth amendment to the United States Constit ution, and the proportionate penalties clause of the I llinois Constit ution; (4) the mandatory application of truth in sentenc ing to minors convicted of murder by acc ountability or felony murder violates the eig hth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause ; and (5) defe ndant is entitled to additional sentenc e cre dit. We aff irm defe ndant’s conviction but rema nd for the trial court to g rant defe ndant additional
sentenc ing c redit.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On J uly 15, 2010, the State char g ed defe ndant as an adult with three counts of first deg ree murder based on her acc ountability for the death of her uncle, Arnulfo Pachec o. These three
counts wer e base d on defe ndant’s intent to kill (720 I L CS 5/ 9-1(a )(1) (West 2008)) (c ount

-2-I ), knowledg e the acts would result in the victim’s death (720 I L CS 5/9-1(a) (1) (West 2008))

(cou n t I I ), and knowledg e the acts would cre ate a strong probability of the victim’s death (720 I L CS 5/ 9-1(a )(2) (West 2008)) (c ount I I I ), re spectively

. ¶ 4 On Dec ember 3, 2010, the State added a fourth count alleg ing first deg ree murder ba sed

on acc ountability (720 I L CS 5/9-1(a) (3) (West 2008 )) (c o u nt I V), alleg ing defe ndant’s

acc omplice, J arr od Riley , intentionally struck Ar nulfo Pache co in the hea d with a hammer causinghis death while de fenda nt and Riley

wer e committing a

robber y

. ¶ 5 O n D e c e mb er 30, 2010, the State char g ed defe ndant with robber y based on acc ounta

b il it y (720 I L CS 5/18-1 (West 2008)) (count V), alleg ing she knowing ly took $500 from the victim by the use of force

. The S tate also char g ed defenda nt with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle ( 625 I L CS 5/ 4-103(a )(1) (West 2008)) (c ount VI ). ¶ 6 On J anuar

y 11, 2011, defe ndant’s trial commence d. After the State laid out its case in its openingargument, defe nse counse l made his openingstatement, statingin part:
“We believe the evidenc e will show that all this y oung g irl wanted was to run awa y with her fianc é. She did not intend to have her uncle killed. She did not know he would be killed. In fac t, did not know he was ki l l ed until afte r she came downstairs. Arnulfo Pachec o was killed only beca use J arr od Riley lost control in his jealous ra ge and she wasn’t pr esent. We think the evidenc e will show she may be guilty of some ot h er things, such as Possession of the Stolen Vehicle
, but the evidenc e will not show that she’s guilty in any way of Murde r, and w e would ask you to find her not guilty of that off

ense.” ¶ 7 The State’s first witness was Dr. Roland Kohr. Dr. Kohr tes t i fi ed h e p er fo rm ed an autopsy on the body of Arnulfo P ac h ec o an d found the cause of death was “[b] lunt forc e injuries to the head combined with sharp forc ed injury to the neck and head, with extenuating hemorrha g e.” ¶ 8 I llinois State Police cr i m e s ce n e i n v es t i gator Daniel Glover testified he collecte d a hammer a nd a piec e of g lass with sharp edg es fr om the house where Arnulfo P ache co wa s found. Investig ator Glover also testified he collecte d a broken videoca ssette rec order (VCR) located ne ar the victim’s body

. ¶ 9 Investig ator Alex L atimer o f t h e C amden police depar tment in Camden, Tenne ssee, testified he rec eived information from the I l l i n o i s S t ate Police on J uly 16, 2010, a couple

wa n t ed fo r murder might be in his are a. L atimer was g iven the names and phy sical descr iption of the couple and a vehicle descr iption for a 2005 Chevy Avalanc he with I llinois
reg istration. L atimer testified he l o ca t ed the vehicle at approximately 4 p.m. L atimer then took defe ndant and Riley into custody

. ¶ 10 I llinois State Police special ag ent Holl y Stroud-Finney testified s he was the l ead a g ent in the i nvestig ation in this case

. She trave led t o T en n es s ee after defe ndant and Riley wer e

arr ested and interviewe d both of them. Be fore the interviews, she had obtained from Ver izon
text messag es defe ndant and Riley sent eac h other betwee n J uly 5, 2010, and J uly 13, 2010. As the l ead ag ent i n the i nvestig ation, Stroud-Finney knew h o w t h e victim died and knew duct t ape had been wra

pped around the vi ctim’s fac e and neck and bl eac h had b ee n found
at the residenc e. Information contained in the text messag es matched evidenc e found at the

-3-crime scene

. On cross-e x amination, Stroud-Finney acknow l ed g ed the information she

rec eived from Ver izon only disclosed the phone numbers from which the text messag es wer e sent and not who a ctually sent the messag es. ¶ 11 J arr od Riley was then called f or t he li mited purpose of establishing the contents of the
text messag es the investigators had rec eived from Ver izon. Riley testified he and defe ndant

comm unicated via text messag e. Riley testified People’s exhibi t No. 410A-R acc uratel y contained the text messag es exchang ed betwee n him and defen d an t du ri ng the seven- day period in question. Riley testified he sent the text messag es from his phone. He also testified defe ndant was pr otective of her phone so that no one else c ould use it. ¶ 12 Def

ense counsel challeng ed t h e ad m i s s i o n o f the text messag es, arguing ina dequate foundation and the messag es constituted hear say

. The court admitted the text messag es into evidenc e, finding t hey wer e “sufficiently authentica ted by circ umstantial evidenc e such as appea ranc e, contents, substance, internal patterns and other distinctive char acte ristics.” The court tol d the j urors they

wer e not to assume the text messag e conversations were actually conducte d by d ef

en d an t and Riley
, but they should make their own deter mination who authore d the messag es. ¶ 13 Riley testified he and defe ndant started dating in the spring of 2010 and beg an having a sexual rela

tionship. He was 20, and defe ndant was 15. He stated defe ndant was the first g irl he lo v ed. In J une 2010, defe ndant had her six teenth birthday

. Def endant told Riley she thought her uncle, Arnulfo, was g oing to g et her a car for her birthday
, but thi s d i d n o t happen. Riley testified d ef en d ant was not happy at home. She told him she alway s foug ht with her pare nts and hated her uncle. She said her fath er h i t her and her mother. Riley testified def

endant wa

nted to run aw ay

and he w anted to help he r. ¶ 14 Riley testifi ed h e an d d efe ndant t alked and text ed about using bleach to knock out her uncle so they could t ake his car

. He sent her a text messag e a s k i n g i f s h e h ad rope or duct tape. She responde d she thought there was some in the g ara g e. Def endant later text ed Riley
to say they wer e out of duct tape, but she would buy s o me and keep looking for rope. Def endant sug g ested takingher f ather ’s che ckbook with them to pay for thing s. ¶ 15 Riley text ed defe ndant on J uly 10, 2010, and told her he wanted to leave on Monday

. The
text s showed the plan was for him to get to def endant’ s house, wait for

her unc le to arr ive, knock him out, tie him up, and take his car befor e he woke up. Def endant responde d the plan sounded g ood. She said she would need to make sure she was home alone. Riley sent her another text and said she neede d to soa k a ra gin bleach f

or Monday

. Def

endant confirme d she rec eived the text messag e. Riley testified the rag and bleac h wer e ultimately g oing to be used on Arnulf

o. ¶ 16 R i l ey text ed defe ndant and said he was g oing to take a cab to Marsha ll o n M o n d ay

. Def endant replied her uncle would leave for work at 10 or 11 so Rile y wo u l d n ee d to g et there ear lier than that. Riley sent her a text messag e asking how they would g et Arnulfo into her house. Riley testified he se nt defe ndant another messag e telling her not to stop him no matter what he did to her unc le. She re sponded she would not stop him. ¶ 17 Acc ording to Riley ’s testimony
, their plan later chang ed to killing Arnulfo and takinghis truck. Riley testified on J uly 11, 2010, he s en t d efe ndant a text messag e stating they wer e

-4-g oing to st ea l h er u n cl e’s “shit” afte r “i do what im doing to y our uncle.” He then sent

defe ndant a text messag e which ask ed i f d ef en dant had any sharp knives at her house. Def endant responde d shortly there afte r asking what Riley was planning to do. Riley sent her

a text , stating he was g oing to “ ‘F ’ him up but if he fig hts back well y ou understand, rig h.” Def endant responded a sking what Riley meant by “ ‘F’ him up.” S he also said she di d not think they neede d to be “killing a

ny one yet.” ¶ 18 Riley sent defe ndant a text messag e direc ting her to tell her uncle something was wrong with their toilet as a ruse to lure him into the house. He asked what time her uncle would be
at her house. Def

endant responde d her uncle would be there around 10 a.m. befor e leaving for work. Riley sent defe ndant a text which said, “The n lets do this and be fre e and do unto ppl that has been done unto us.” Riley said his intent was to kill defe ndant’s uncle. Def endant
respo n d ed t ex t ing “y es l ets.” Ri ley sent another text to defe ndant, which rea d, “I love y ou more than a

ny thing you might see a side of me t omorrow very fewppl see don’t be scar ed

cuz i would never hurt y ou.” R iley sent defe ndant a messag e, tex ting, “I am al re ady know what i am doing don’t stop me soon y ou will have to be cold.” Def endant responde d, text ing, “Huh.” Riley text ed her the following messag e, “Don’ t stop me no matter how it turns out.” ¶ 19 Shortly there afte r, Riley asked defe ndant if she found bleac h and a rag

. Def endant replied she had. Riley also text ed defe ndant aski n g whether she found a g ood strong knife. Def endant r esponded the knives she found w ere not that sharp or strong

. ¶ 20 Acc ording to Riley
, defe ndant told him her uncle inappropriately touched her by rubbing her inner thigh and l o wer back and kissing her on the chee k. Riley sent defe ndant a text , which rea d, “Was just g oing to knock him out but he is touching littl e g irls and tried to touch
my fianc é it e nds tomorrow.” Def endant replied, text ing, “yea thats wat i thought y ou wer e planingto do.” ¶ 21 Riley sent defe ndant another text , stating, “L ol i love y ou y ou are starting to sound a nd
act like me thats g ood.” Def endant responde d, text ing, “L ol I can be evil bad crue l sometimes lol.” Riley rep l i ed
, t ex t i n g, “B e it more often just not to me ok baby it will help us in the future a lot.” Riley sent defe ndant another messag e, text ing, “Tomorr ow we kill a bad man then we start our lives over just y ou and me.” Def

endant r esponded, te x ting, “Ye s just you and me.” ¶ 22 Riley later asked defe ndant if she had a baseba ll bat. De fe n d an t s ai d s h e d id not. Def endant sent Riley a messag e, stating, “Ha ve bunch of metal ro d s i n g ara g e tho.” They
text ed about the siz e and st rength of the rods. Riley sent defe ndant a messag e, text ing, “I don’t want them to brea

k i want them t o b e s t ro n g im thinking just cutting his throat.” Def endant responde d, “The y wont brea k. Do wat y ou need to do. All i ask is that i see none of it if possible.” Def

endant later text ed Riley her uncle deser ved “it,” but she did not want to see “ it.” ¶ 23 Riley testified he text ed defe ndant shortly afte r midnight on J uly 12, 2010, “B e happy are y ou sure y ou want this to still happen.” He wa s talking a bout killing her uncle and running

awa y . Def endant r esponded, “ Iam happy . Yes i’m sure that i want to do this.” ¶ 24 Riley sent defe ndant a text the morning of J uly 12, 2010, asking if she was “re ady for this baby .” Def

endant responde d she was. As he was trave ling to Marsha ll, Riley and defe ndant

-5-exchang ed text messag es about her family ’s wher eabouts. Riley went to de fenda nt’s house afte r her family left. Def endant g ot the bleac h, and they mo v ed a couch in front of the entry way to the kitchen. Riley

put the bleac h in a bowl and soaked the r ag

. ¶ 25 When defe nd an t s aw her uncle outside the house, she called to him from the kitchen window and said something was wrong with the bathroom. Def endant did not tell her uncle Riley was in the house. After Arnulfo chec ked on the bathro o m , d ef endant pushed him at Riley

. Acc ording to Riley
, defe ndant told him to reme mber what her uncle had done to her. Riley g rabbe d Arnulfo by the throat and cover ed his mouth with t h e bleac h-soake d rag

. Although he could not see defe ndant at that time, he testified he could “tell she was there .” ¶ 26 Riley testified t he bleach did not knock Arnulfo out like he expected. Instead, Arnulfo tried t o hit Riley

with a hammer . Riley

took the hammer f

rom Arnulfo a

nd hit him wit h it. The strug g le betwee n Riley and Arnulfo went from the foyer to the dining room of the home. Riley testified he did not know how many times he hit the victim with the hammer. Arnulfo was still strugg ling, a

nd Riley hit him over the hea d with a VCR and t hen sm ashed a g lass tabletop over his head. The g lass tabletop broke, and Riley g rabbe d a piece of the g lass and stabbed Arnulfo twice in his neck. Arnulfo stopped strug g ling at that point. Riley then taped the bleac h-soake d rag over the victim’s mouth with the duct tape defe ndant had broug ht into the house. ¶ 27 Riley testified Arnulfo was scre aming defe ndant’s name during the strug g le, but she did nothing to aid him. After Riley taped the rag over Arnulfo’ s mouth, he saw defe ndant in the foy er, shaking. Riley

asked if she was okay
, and she said yes. De fenda nt went upstairs and
g rabbe d her clothes and other things, which wer e alre ady packe d. She and Riley then started loading the victim’s truck. They left t h e h o u s e within 5 to 10 minutes afte r Arnulfo was killed. After they g ot in Arnulfo’ s truck, defenda nt ask ed R i l ey if he got Arnulfo’s wallet. He told her he did not. He testified defe ndant “g ave me a look,” and he went back in and g ot the wallet. ¶ 28 Riley testified defe ndant never tried to g et awa y from him or call the police. They wer e

arr ested in Cam d e n , T e n

n e s s e e

. A c c ording to Riley ’s testimony
, while he and defe ndant wer e driving throug h Indiana, defe ndant told him she thought they should live a life of crime like Bonnie and Cly de, robbingand killing pe ople. ¶ 29 On cross-e x amination, Riley testified he pled guilty to one count of first degree murder, one count of

robber y , and one c ount of possession of a stolen ve hicle. He had not y et bee n sentenc ed. Riley testified he did not have an ag ree ment with the State’s Attorney to rec eive
any thing for his t es t i mony

. Howeve r, Riley said his testimony could benef it him during
sentenc ing. Riley acknow ledg ed what he told investigators afte r his arr est differ ed from his testimony

. ¶ 30 After his arr est, Riley told investigators his plan was to knock out or tie up Arnulfo a nd
t ak e his car

. Riley admitted telling investigators he killed Arnulfo in a bli nd rag e a ft er t h e

v ictim smiled at him. Riley also told investiga tors he was just joking around i n t h e t ex t messag es bef

ore the murder. He admitted he did not orig inally tell investigators defe ndant pushed her uncle into him. Riley also acknow ledg ed he did not g et a knife or any other kind of wea pon from the kitchen or any wher e else to use on Arnulfo, even though he testified his

-6-intent befor e the attack was to kill the victim. The only thing Riley had when he g rabbe d

Arnulfo wa s the ragsoaked in blea ch and the duct tape. ¶ 31 After Riley ’s t estimony
, the S tate reca lled specia l ag ent S troud-F inney . S t roud-F inney testified she trave led to Tenne ssee afte r defe ndant’s arr est

. That night, Stroud-Finney interviewe d defe ndant at the Camden p o l i ce depar tment in Camden, Tenne ssee. The interview w as video re corde d. The video of the interviewwas played for the jury

. ¶ 32 During the interview, defe ndant said she told Arnulfo som et h i ng was wrong with the bathroom sink when he came to the house to return some dishes. She also admitted she was prese nt when Riley initially g rabbe d Arnulfo and put the bleac h-soake d rag over his mouth. She then ran outside, went around the house to the front door, ree ntere d the home, saw Riley strug g ling with h er u n cl e, an d went upstairs to her bedroom. She could hear her uncle

scre aming at Riley and for the neig hbors. She said she also hear d Arnu l fo s cre aming her

name a nd hear d things be ing thr own and br eaking

. ¶ 33 The strug g le between Ar n u l fo an d Riley lasted about five minutes. When she ca me downstairs and asked Riley what happene d, Riley told her Arnulfo was dead. Acc ording to h er interview, the orig inal plan was not for Riley to kill her uncle, but only take his k ey s

. Howeve r, during the strug g le, Arnulfo asked Riley why he was doing this. Riley told Arnulfo he knew Arnulfo mol est ed defe ndant, and Riley was g oing to take defe ndant awa y from Arnulfo. Arnulfo alleg edly responde d he could still m o l est defe ndant’s sisters. This made Riley mad, and Riley

killed Arnulfo. ¶ 34 Def

endant admitted Riley told her prior to the day o f t h e attack he might kill Arnulfo. She told the office rs she was not afr aid of Riley and went along with his plan willingly

. She just did not want to see the actua l murder. She told the office rs she thought Arnulfo deser ved what happened to him beca use he was a “bad person.” When the officers as k ed d efe ndant
to descr ibe the alleg ed molestation, defe ndant said Arnulfo rubbed her b ac k o n t o p of her clothes and tried t o kiss her on the chee k. She also said Arnulfo ne ver trie d to do any thing sexual or inappropriate to her. Acc ording to her statement, they would not have had to hur t Arnulfo if he had g iven her a ca r for her sixteenth birthday

. ¶ 35 Def

endant testified on her own behalf

. She was 15 when she met Riley
, who was 20, in the spring of 2010. The relationship beca me serious over the s u m mer. At one point, she ref err ed t o h im as her fianc é. R iley was her first boy friend. She expressed frustration over her home life to Riley . In J une 2010, Riley had to move from wher e he was living. A t that time, he beg an talking about running awa y with d ef

en d ant. When Arnulfo failed to g ive defe ndant a car for her birthday
, Riley sug g ested they take her uncle’ s car

. Riley told her he would use a bleac h-soake d rag to make her uncle unconscious so they could take his car key s without hurting him. Def

endant was scar ed beca

use she did not know what Riley would do to he r and her sisters if he was willing to do that to he r uncle. She did not think any one but Riley car ed for her at that time. ¶ 36 Def

endant admitted she made ar range ments to g et duct tape to use on her uncle. She testified Riley told her many times he had ever y thing figured out and asked her to trust him. Def endant testified she did trust him. She thought the plan was just to run awa y

. Acc ording
to defe ndant, she thought Riley might beat up her uncle, not kill him. Wit h re gard to her

-7-response s to Riley ’s text messag es about killing her uncle, defe ndant testified both she was

not responding to Riley ’s comments about killing her uncle and she was just joking around. She testified she did not think Riley was serious about killing her uncle. When Riley g rabbe d her uncle, she ran out the back door and then back in the front door. She saw Riley leading her uncle into the dining ro o m

. She went upstairs to her bedroom and hear d a strug g le downstairs. I t eventua lly beca me quiet in the house. She came downstairs and saw blood in the hallway and dining room. Riley told h er not to come any closer and to g et her stuff toge ther a nd put it in t he truc k, which she did. ¶ 37 Def

endant de nied sendingRiley back into the house to g et her uncle’ s wallet. She also denied pushing her uncle into Riley or telling him to reme mber what her uncle had done to her. She also denied telling Riley they should live a life of crime. Acc ording to her testimony
, defe ndant thoug ht the plan was only to tie Arnulfo up and take his vehicle

. ¶ 38 On cross-e x amination, defe ndant admitted helping steal her uncle’ s truck, althoug h she said it wa s Riley ’s plan. She also a dmitted letting Riley into the house, buy ing duct tape to be used to tape he r u n cl e t o a chair, and tricking her uncle i nto coming into the hous e. On redire ct, defe ndant testified she thought Riley was just g oing to make her uncle unconscious and then take his stuff. ¶ 39 At the end of hi s closing argument on defe ndant’s behal f, co u n s el m ade the following plea f or the jury

to take pity

on defe ndant: “Well, what we have here with [defe ndant] is a y oung , quiet g irl. A y oung g irl who
t h o u gh t s he was in love and she made bad decisions. She trusted and relied on J arr o d Riley

. She believed his promises and the things that he wa s telling her t hat were going
to happen. She continued to believe the plan was g oing to g et car ried out just as they had set forth to beg in with, which was a plan to restra in Arnulfo and to take his truck. There was no intent to kill by her or by either of them at the start of the day on J uly 12th. There was no intent to kill by her. There was n o ex pectation or anticipation of killing by her. I t was anticipated he would be secured. She’s guilty of som e thi ng s, we acknow ledg e that, she’s guilty of possession of the stolen v eh i cl e, perha ps she’s even guilty of robbe ry , but she’s not guilty of murder

. We’re asking y ou not to compound this trag edy to the Pachec o family by finding her
guilty of a crime she did not commit. We’re asking y ou to find her not guilty of murder. Thank you.” The ju ry found defe ndant guilty of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, robber y (ac countability), and f

irst deg ree murder ( acc ountability). ¶ 40 On Marc h 8, 2 0 1 1
, defe ndant filed a motion for a new trial, contending the trial court

err ed in allowing text messag es to be prese nted t o t h e jury beca use the messag es wer e hear say and wer e not proper ly authenticated; the court err ed by allowing the use of a g ener al verdic t fo rm ra t h er than separ ate verdic t forms for eac h alleg ed count of murder; and the State did not prese nt sufficie nt evidenc e to prove defe ndant guilty of first deg ree murder. The court de nied the motion. ¶ 41 On Marc h 22, 2011, the trial court sentenc ed defe ndant to 30 y ear s in prison with 3 y ear s of m an d at o ry s upervised rele ase (MSR) and cre dit for 239 day s serve d. In sentenc ing

-8-defe ndant, t h e co u rt t o ok into acc ount her ag e and stated the evidenc e would sug g est her

potential for reha

bilitation is g reater than that of most juveniles who might find themselves in simi lar c ircumstance s. The cour t noted defe ndant would serve 100% of the se ntence

. ¶ 42 The trial court stated the text messag es and defe ndant’s conduct left no rea sonable doubt defe ndant knowing ly planned, aided, and abetted in the murder of Arnulfo. Acc ording to the
court: “On the day of the crime she laid the g roundwork for the murder, first by inviting and

encour ag ing J arr od Riley to come to Marsha ll b y cab from Terre Haute, and secondly
, by asking Arnulfo Pachec o into her family ’s home on the prete x t of a plumbing problem. Her invitation set him up for Jarrod Riley ’s attac k.” The court found nothing in the circ umstances of the offe nse sug g ested defe ndant had second thoughts or attempted to withdraw fr om the planned murde r. The c ourt stated: “Althoug h Maria Pachec o is guilty by rea son of acc ountability only
, nonetheless, it must be observe d that she was deeply and actively involved in the murder. She was persona lly
prese nt during the commission of the murder, which was preme ditated and planned. The victim was the Def

endant’ s uncle and the murd er was committed so the codef endants might take the victim’s vehicle a nd proper ty .” The c ourt also noted def

endant supplied Riley

with implements to use in the attack a nd by

encour ag ing Riley

to attack he r uncle . The c ourt stated:
“She actively further ed the murder. Her participation was essential to the commission of the murder, and the murder would not have occur red but for her encour ag ement of J arr od Riley and her participation in it s planningand execution.”
On April 4, 2011, defe ndant filed a motion to rec onsider sentenc e, which was later denied. ¶ 43 This appea l followed.

¶ 44 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 45 We choose not to addre ss defe ndant’s arguments in the order in which they are raised in her appellate brief. Instead, we will first addre ss the constitutional ar gu m ents she raises. Second, we will addre ss her arguments reg arding the eff ectivene ss of her trial counsel. Then,

we will addre ss defe ndant’s arg ument reg arding the verdic t forms. Finally
, we will addre ss her a rgument she wa s not provided all the sente ncingcre dit she deser ved.

¶ 46 A. Constitut ional Arguments ¶ 47 Section 5-130(1) (a) (i) of the J uvenile Court Act (705 I L C S 4 0 5 / 5-130(1) (a) (i) (West 2008)) (automatic transfe r statute), provides “[t] he definitio n o f delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offe nse was at least 15 y ea rs o f ag e and who is char g ed with *** first deg ree murder.” Def endant was tried as an adult pursuant to this s ec t i o n o f the J uvenile Court Act. Pursuant to section 5- 130(1)( c)( i) of the J uvenile Court Act (705 I L CS 405/5-130(1)( c)( i) (West 2008) ), the trial court had “ava ilable any or all dispositi ons presc ribed for that o ff en s e under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Correc tions [(Unified Code)].” Section 5-4.5-20( a) of the Unified Code

-9-(730 I L CS 5/5-4.5-20(a ) (West 2008)) provides the sentenc ing rang e for murder is 20 to 60

y ear s of impr i s o nment. As a result, defe ndant was subject to a minimum 20-year prison
sentenc e without the trial court being able to consider defe ndant’s ag e or culpability

. Fur ther, section 3-6-3( a)( 2)(i) of the Unified Code (730 I L CS 5/3-6-3(a )(2) (i) (West 2008)) provides such a s en t en ce may not be reduc ed throug h g ood-conduc t cre dit. Def endant argues these
statutes both individuall y an d when applied toge ther are unconstitutional for a varie ty of

rea sons. ¶ 48 We presume statutes are constitutional. People v. Miller
, 202 I ll. 2d 328, 335, 781 N.E.2d 300, 305 (2002). As a result, a defe ndant challeng ing the constitutionalit y of a statute must establish its constitutional invalidity

. Miller
, 202 I ll. 2d at 335, 781 N.E.2d at 305. In Miller
, our supre me cour

t noted:
“We have repeat edly rec og nized that the leg islature has discretion to presc ribe penalties for define d offe nses. [C itation.] Th e le g is la tu r e ’ s d is c r e ti o n n e c e s s a

r il y inc ludes the power to prescr ibe mandatory sentenc es, even if these mandatory sentenc es re strict the judiciary ’s discretion in imposing sen t en ce s

. [C itation.] Howeve r, the power to i m pose sentenc es is not without limit ation; the penalty must satisfy constit u t i o n al constrictions.” Miller , 202 I ll. 2d at 336, 781 N.E.2d at 306. ¶ 49 Def

endant’s argument is primarily based on three rec ent Unit ed S tates S upreme Court decisions. See Roper v. Simmons
, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida
, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Miller v. Alabama
, 567 U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). In Roper
, the Supreme Court he ld the eig hth amendment bar s capital punishment for juvenile offe nders. Roper
, 5 4 3 U. S

. at 568. Acc ording to the Court, “[b] eca use the death penalty is the most

sever e punishment, the Eig hth Amendment applies to it with specia l forc e.” Roper
, 543 U.S.
at 568. In Graham
, the Court held a sentenc e of life without the possibili ty of parole violates the eig hth amendment when imposed on juvenile offe nders for crimes other than homicide. Gr a h a m , 5 60 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. The Court stated althoug h “[t] he E i gh t h Amendment does not fore close the possibili ty that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed be fore adulthood will rema in behind bars for life,” “[i] t does forbid States from makingthe judg ment at the outset that those offe nders never will be fit to reente r society .” Graham
, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. In Miller
, the Court held the eig hth amendment prohibits “a sentenc ing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibili ty of parole for juvenile offe nders,” even those convicted of homicide offe nses. Miller
, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Acc ording to the Court, “[b] y making y outh (and all that acc ompanies it) irrele vant to imposit ion of that harshe st prison sentenc e, such a scheme poses too g reat a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Miller , 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct . at 2469. ¶ 50 These three decisions dealt with the two most sever e forms of punishment allowed under the United States Constit ution, i.e.
, the death penalty and lif e imprisonment without the possibili ty of parole

. Howeve r, defe ndant argues the rea soning behind these three opinions should not be limit ed to sentenc es of death and life without the possibili ty of parole

. Relying

on the following quote from Graham
, “[a]n offe nder’ s ag e is re l ev an t t o the Eig hth Amendment, and criminal proce dure laws that fa i l to take defe ndants’ youthfulness into

acc ount at all wo uld be flawed” ( Graham
, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2031), defe ndant essentially argues any jurisdictional or sentenc ing statute that automatically treats a juvenile

-10-the same as an adult is unconstitutional. Wit h reg ard to this particula r case , defe ndant argues the automatic transfe r of juveniles is unconstitutional, the automatic imposit ion of an adult
sentenc e on these juveniles is u n co n stitut ional, and the juveniles’ automatic inability to

rec eive g ood-conduc t cre dit is also unconstitutional. ¶ 51 We d i s agr ee wi t h defe ndant’s expansive rea ding of this single sentenc e. As we state d

ear lier, the Supreme Court in Roper
, Graham
, and Miller was only conce rned with the death penalty and life without the possibili ty of parole
, which are the two most sever e punishments allowed under the United States Constit ution. We ag ree with the State “[i] t would be a g reat stretch to say that Graham meant to require leg islatures and courts to treat y ouths and adults differ ently in ever

y respe ct and ever

y step of the criminal proce ss.” As we have cover ed this topic in a broa d manner , we now look at defe ndant’s spec ific arguments.

¶ 52 1. Eighth Amendme nt and Proportionat e Pe nalties Claus e ¶ 53 a. Automatic Tr ansfe r Statute ¶ 54 De fe n d ant first argues section 5-130 of the J uvenile Court Act (705 I L CS 40 5 / 5 -1 3 0 (West 2008)) violates the eig hth amendment of the United States Constit ution and the proportionate penalties clause of the I llinois Constit ution be cause it automatically require s the transfe r of cer

tain juvenile defe ndants into adult court. The eight h am endment to the United States Constit ution (U.S. Const., amend. VI I I ) prohibits the imposit ion of crue l and unusual punishment. The proportionate penalties clause of the I llinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be deter mined both acc ording to the seriousness of the offe nse and with the objective of restoring the offe nder to useful ci t i z en s h ip.” I ll. Const. 1970, art. I
, § 11. The proportionate penalties clause has been rea d as co ex t en s i v e with the eig hth amendment. In re Rodne

y H. , 223 I ll. 2d 510, 518, 861 N.E.2d 623, 628 (2006). ¶ 55 We do not find the automatic transfe r statute violates either the eig hth amendment or the proportionate pe nalties clause of the I llinois Constitution. I n People v. Salas
, 2011 I LApp (1st) 091880, ¶ 66, 961 N.E.2d 831, the First District found the automati c transfe r statute “does not impose any punishment on the juvenile defe ndant, but rathe r it only provi des a mecha nism for deter

mining wher e defe ndant’s case is to be tried.” Since the statute does not impose any punishment, the First District found it was not subject to the eig hth amendment. Salas
, 2011 I L App (1st) 091880, ¶ 66, 961 N.E.2d 831; see also People v. Jack son , 2012 I L App (1st) 100398, ¶¶ 23-24, 965 N.E.2d 623. We a g ree with the First District’s r easoning

.

¶ 56 b. Automatic Impositi on of Adult Sentence ¶ 57 Def

endant next argues the automatic imp o s i t i o n o f an y adult sentenc e on a juvenile defe ndant as a result of the automatic transfe r statute violates the eig hth amendment and the proportionate penalt i es clause

. As stated ear lier, when taken to its logic al extreme, defe ndant’s argument would make any statute unconstitutional which imposes on a juvenile transfe rre d to adult court the same mandatory minimum sentenc e applicable to an adult for the same of

fense . We disag ree

. ¶ 58 Def

endant rea d s R o

p er , Graham
, and Miller too broadly

. The Supreme Court did not

-11-hold in Roper
, Graham
, or Miller the eig hth amendment prohibits a juvenile defe ndant from

being subject t o the s ame mandatory minimum sentenc e as a n adult, unless the m andator y minimum sentenc e was death or life i n prison without the possibilit y of parole. Defenda nt was sente nced to neither of these. The minimum 20-y ear term def endant f ace d in this case does not compar e wit h the death penalty or a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibili t y o f p ar o l e. The sentenc ing rang e applicable to defe ndant in this case is not unconstitutional pursuant to R o p e r , Gr a h a m , a n d Miller
, and the sentenc e defe ndant rec eived violated neither

the eig hth amendment nor the proportionate pe nalties clause

.

¶ 59 c. Truth in Sentenc ing ¶ 60 Def

endant next argues “[w]hether considere d alone or in combination with the excluded ju r is d ic ti o n s c heme ***, the automatic application of truth-in-sentenc ing to mino r s c o nv ic te d of murder by acc ountability or felony murder by ac co u n t abil ity violates the eig hth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the I ll i n o i s Constit ution.” For the s am e re asons we do not find the automatic exclusion statute or the imposit ion of the sentenc ing rang es applicable to adults violates either the eig hth ame ndment

o r the proportionate penalties clause
, we do not find the application of the truth-in-sentenc ing statute unconstitutional in thi s case

.

¶ 61 2. Due Proc ess Clauses ¶ 62 Def

endant conten d s I l l i n o i s ’s ex cluded jurisdiction scheme violates the due proc ess clause s of both the United States Constit ution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV) and the I llinois Constit ution (I ll. Const. 1970, art. I
, § 2) beca use a trial court cannot make an individualiz ed deter mination whether a minor should be transfe rre d to criminal court and subject to adult

s entencing require ments. The due proce ss clause s contained in both the United St at es an d I llinois Constitutions prohibit the g overnme nt from depriving any individual of “life, liberty

or proper ty , without due proce ss of law.” U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; I ll. Const. 1970, art. I , § 2. ¶ 63 I llinois courts have found the au t o m at i c t ra n s fe r s t at ute does not violate a juvenile offe nder’ s substantive and proce dural due proce ss rig hts. See People v. J.S.
, 103 I ll. 2d 395, 402-05, 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1094-95 (1984); People v

. Patterson
, 2012 I L App (1st) 101573, ¶ 27, 975 N.E.2d 1127; People v . Croom , 2012 I L App (4th) 100932, ¶¶ 13- 18, 975 N.E.2d 1107; Jacks o n , 2 0 1 2 I L App (1st) 100398, ¶¶ 13-17, 965 N.E.2d 623; Salas
, 2011 I L App (1st) 091880, ¶¶

75-79, 961 N.E.2d 831; People v. Ree d
, 125 I ll. App. 3d 319, 322-25, 465 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-44 (1984). In Croom
, 2012 I L App (4th) 100932, ¶ 16, 975 N.E.2d 1107, this court noted Roper and Graham did not consider due proce ss arguments and found those

case s distinguishable beca use eac h “applied (1) a differ ent analy sis (2) under a differ ent test for (3) an alleg ed violation of a differ ent constitutional provision reg arding sever e sentenc ing sanctions—not the automatic transfe r to a dult c ourt at issue here .” Miller does not require a differ ent re sult because it only dealt with e ighth- amendment arguments and not substantive and proc edura l due proc ess. ¶ 64 I n ad d i t i o n , we note the trial court here took into acc ount defe ndant’s y outh. The c ourt

-12-also consid er ed the extent of defe ndant’s participation in aiding and abetting Arnulfo’ s

murder, noting he woul d not have been killed but for defe ndant’s complicity in the crime. Moreove r, the court imposed a 30-y ear sentenc e, 10 y ear s more than the minimum available
sentenc e, afte r considering the nature of the crime and the fac tors in mitigation. This is clea rly
not a ca se wher e the trial judge felt unduly constraine d by the options available to him with
respe ct to the sentenc ing minimums. ¶ 65 As our supreme court’s opinion in J.S. rema ins g ood law and defe ndant fails to pe rsuade the eig hth amendment analy sis in Miller should be applied to her due proce ss arguments, her claim the automatic tr ansfe r statute is unconstitutional is wit hout merit.

¶ 66 3. Policy ¶ 67 We ag ree with the dissent’s observation not all juvenile offe nders are the same. We a lso
ag ree with the dissent the blanket transfe r to adult criminal court of all juveniles of a cer tain
ag e char g ed with cer

tain offe nses may not be g ood policy

. Howeve r, we cannot find a statute unconstitutional sim ply

beca use we believe it cr eate s bad policy . “In relation to the judicial branc h, the Genera l Assembly
, which speaks throug h the passage of l eg islation
, occupie s a superior positi on in determiningpublic policy .” Ree d v. Farme rs Insurance G roup , 188 I ll. 2d 168, 175, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1999)

. ¶ 68 I t is clea r t he United States Supreme Court in Roper
, Graham
, and Miller has provided juveniles with more constitutional protec tio n t h an adults. Howeve r, we disag ree these decisions make the statutes previously discussed unconstitutional. Fur ther, we rec og nize our supreme court in Miller stated it has never define d what kind of punishment constitutes crue l

or deg rading punishment or is so disproportionate to the offe nse that it shocks the moral sense of the community

. Miller
, 202 I ll. 2d at 339, 781 N.E.2d at 307-08. Our supreme court noted “[t] his is so beca

use, as our society evolves, so too do our conce pts of elementa l dece ncy and fairne ss which shape the ‘moral sen s e’ o f the community .” Miller
, 202 I ll. 2d at 339, 781 N.E.2d at 308. I t may b e t i m e for our supreme court to consider this important issue. Howeve r, based on the arg uments made by defe ndant and the prior prec edent of both t h i s court and, more importantly
, our supreme court, defe ndant has failed to overc ome the strong presumption the statutes at issue in this case a re c onstitut ional.

¶ 69 B. Ef fec tiveness of Tr ial Counsel ¶ 70 We next addre ss defe nd an t ’s ar gu m en t h er t ri al at t o rn ey ’s re p re s en t ation was

co nstitut ionally defic ient beca use he conce ded her guilt of felony murder based on his misapprehe nsion of the felony murder rule. Def endant argu es t rial counsel was also ineffe ctive by failing (1) to impeach Riley with available text messag e rec ords wher e he was communicating with other wom en and (2) to object to the State’s improper use of leading questions duringits ex amination of Riley

. ¶ 71 To hold an attorney ’s repr esentation constitutionally ineffe ctive, we must first deter mine

an attorney made err ors so serious he was not functioning as counsel guara nteed by the six th amendment to the United States Constit ution. We must then also conc l u de defe ndant was preju d i ce d by those err ors. Strickland v. W ashington
, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The

-13-attorney ’s actions must be judge d in the contex t o f t h e entire trial. A defe ndant must

over come the presumption the actions criticized could be considere d sound trial strateg ies under the circ umstances of the ca se. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689.

¶ 72 1. Attorney’s Conce ssions ¶ 73 We first addre ss defe ndant’s argument her t ri al counsel was ineffe ctive beca use of the

conce ssions he made with reg ard to he r guilt for possession of a stolen vehicle and robber y

. Acc ording to defe ndant, beca use the murder was committed during the course of the robber y , her attorney , by conce ding s h e wa s probably guilty of robber y , also conce ded her g uilt of felony murder be cause of his “funda mental misunderstanding ” of the felony murder r ule. ¶ 74 She argues when a defe ndant exercises her cons t i t u tional right to plead not guilty and chooses to have a jury trial, her attorney is oblige d to develop a trial strategy consistent with her plea, holding the State to its heavy burden of proof. People v. Chandler
, 129 I ll. 2d 233, 244-45, 543 N.E.2d 1290
, 1 2 9 4 -9 5 (1989). In Chandler
, our supreme court stated a defe ndant’s trial counsel cannot con ce d e a cl ient’s guilt to the jury unless the rec ord aff irmatively shows the attorney did so based on a leg itimate trial strategy and with the client’s knowing consent. Chandler
, 129 I ll. 2d at 244-45, 543 N.E.2d at 1294-95. Further, the s upreme court stated it is not a legitimate t ri al s trategy to conce de a client’s guilt based

on a hope the jury will ignore t h e j u ry instructions it has sworn to follow and acquit a defe ndant out of sy

mpathy

. Chandler , 129 I ll. 2d at 248, 543 N.E.2d at 1296. ¶ 75 We do not find the rec ord supports defe ndant’s arg ument her counsel did not understand the fe l o ny murder rule. In addition, based on the overwhelming evidenc e in this case , it is difficult t o conceive of a leg itimate trial strategy counsel could have implemented on defe ndant’s beha lf other than the one he attempted. ¶ 76 The evidenc e ag ainst defe ndant wa s o v er wh el m i n g. T h e S t at e had numerous text messag es from defe ndant to Riley detailing what they wer e g oing to do to Arnulfo, how they

we re go i ng to do it, and what they wer e g oing to do afte rwa rd. The State also had Riley ’s
cooper ation. Riley had enter ed a guilty plea an d wa s a witness for the State. Riley detailed defe ndant’s invol vement in the pl anning and commis sion of the crimes in question and her actions afte r Arnulfo’ s death. In addition, the State had a videotaped interview of defe ndant confe ssing he r involvement in the cr imes. ¶ 77 W e al s o fi n d d ef en d ant’s relianc e on Chandler is misplaced. Unlike in Chandl er , defe ndant in the case sub

judice decide d to testify on her own behalf

. She essentially conce ded her guilt to robber

y and possession of a stolen vehicle in fr ont of the jury . We are not going
to reve rse a defe ndant’s convi ct i o n b as ed on a conce ssion made by her attorney when she essentially

made the sa

me conc essions in her own testimony

. ¶ 78 I t appea

rs def ense c ounsel’s strate g y

was simple—try

to keep de fenda

nt’s incar cer ation
to a min i m u m

. C o nsidering the State’s evidenc e and his own client’s testimony
, it appea rs defe nse counsel deter

mined the best chanc e of acc omplishi ng this strategy was to conce de the obvious in the hopes the jury would believe defe ndant did not know R i l ey intended to kill Arnulfo. Reg ardle ss of the leg al validity of the argument, this was defe ndant’s best chanc e at acquittal on the murde r cha rg es.

-14-¶ 79 Unlike Chandler
, the situation in this case is closer to that fac ed by our supreme court in

People v. Shatner
, 174 I ll. 2d 133, 673 N. E

. 2 d 2 5 8 (1996). In Shatner
, the supreme court distinguished its decision in Chandler
, stating claims of ineffe ctive as s i s t an ce must be revie wed on a case -by -ca se basis and decide d on the rea sonablene ss of counsel’s conduct based on the fac ts of the par ticular c ase at the time of the conduct in question. Shatner , 174 I ll. 2d at 147, 673 N.E.2d at 264. Our supreme court noted the findi ng of i neff ectivene ss in Chandler was not based solely on the defen dant’s alleg ed failure to develop a theory of innocenc e. Shatner
, 174 I ll. 2d at 147, 673 N.E.2d at 264. The court pointed out in Chandler it “obser ved that the defe nse counsel’s perf ormanc e was defic ient beca use he failed to crossexamine sever al ke y p r o s e c uti o n w it n e s s e s ; c r o s s-examined others in an extremely conclusory

manner ; and called no witnesses to testify
, incl uding defe ndant, even though counsel had

asser ted t hat defendant would do so during openingargument.” Shatner
, 174 I ll. 2d at 147, 673 N.E.2d at 264. ¶ 80 The supreme court contra sted the actions of th e d ef en s e at t o rn ey in Shatner , finding

c ounsel “ag g ressively cross-e x amined” near ly ever y prosec ution witness and called witn e s s e s

on defe ndant’s behalf t o attempt to discredit the State’s witnesses and bolster defe ndant’s

cre dibilit y . The c ourt noted: “Ultimately
, it was the defe ndant’s own statements, b oth to the FB I and on the witness stand, and not the actions or strategy of his counsel
, wh ich undermined any claim of innocenc e that defe ndant may have had. I f a defe ndant enter s a not-guilty plea in the fac e of overwhelming evidenc e of his guil t , we are unwilling to find that his counsel was ineffe ctive simply beca

use he failed to contrive a leak- proof theory o f i n n o cence on defe ndant’s behalf

. To do so would eff

ectively require d ef

ense attorney s to eng ag e in fabr ication or subter fug e.” Shatner , 174 I ll. 2d at 148, 673 N.E.2d at 264. The court noted defense counsel tried t o minimi ze his cli en t ’s admitted involvement in the robber y scheme and shift the blame for both the murder and robber y onto another person who voluntarily acc ompanied the defe ndan t t o t he crime scene

. Def ense counsel “ag g ressively attacke d the cre dibilit y of [t his other person] and portrayed her as a calc ulating coca ine addict who seduce d defe ndan t i nto assisting her in a robber y during which she killed the victim.” Shatner , 174 I ll. 2d at 148, 673 N.E.2d at 265. The c ourt stated:
“It is appar ent that defe nse counsel soug ht to convince the jury that defe ndant’s minimal involvement in the scheme war rante d either a finding of i n nocenc e or a conviction for robber y only

. Whil e this strateg y was risky
, it wa s strategy nonetheless, and perha ps the only strategy which could have been seriously pursued g iven defe ndant’s admissible incriminating statements and t h e o verwhelming evidenc e of his guilt. Def endant now contends that his trial counsel sho u l d h av e prese nted a rea sonable doubt theory
, i.e.
, defe ndant pl ayed no role whatsoever in the crime which [ the ot her p er s o n] perpe trated. Howeve r, it i s ar gu able that that strategy would have been even less cre dible and less likely to succe ed than the one his attorney actua lly pursued. Under the circ umstances of this case , defe nse counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s not deficient with respect to his proff ere d defe nse theory .” Shatner , 174 I ll. 2d at 148, 673 N.E.2d at 265. ¶ 81 The same rea soning applies to the fac ts in this case

. Whil e defe nse counsel’s strategy was

-15-risky and ult imately failed, it was sti ll strategy

. Def ense counsel di d his b es t t o p rocur e the jury ’s sy mpathy for defe ndant. In so doing, he vigor ously cross-e x amined Riley in an attempt to show defe ndant did not know Riley planned to m u rder Arnulfo. Given defe ndant’s testimony
, it was the only rea sonable strategy defe nse counsel could have seriously pursued.

¶ 82 2. Impe achme nt W ith Text Messages ¶ 83 Riley testified he initially lied to investigators to protec t defe ndant beca use he loved her

. Def endant contends her coun s el was ineffe ctive for failing to impeach Riley with text messag es he sent other women. Howeve r, defe ndant was not pre j udiced by her attorney ’s omissio n. The evidenc e ag ainst defe ndant was overwhelming. Def ense counsel thoroug hly

cross-e x amined Riley reg arding the discrepa ncies betwee n his initial statement to the police and his trial testimony

. The text messag es Riley sent to other women simply would not have aff ecte d the jury ’s ver dict. ¶ 84 Def

endant also argues counsel was ineffec tive by failing to object to the l ea d i n g nature of the State’s direc t examination of Riley with reg ard to the text messag es. Over 2,000 pag es of t ext messag es we re se nt betwee n Riley and def endant. Riley ’s testimony was used to lay the foundation for their admission. By objecting to the leading nature of the State’s questions, defe nse counsel would run the risk of appea ring obstructionist to the jury
, espec ially here wher e it was a cer

tainty the text messag es wer e g oing to be admitted. Fa ilure to object to the leading nature of t he questions const i t u t es t ri al s trategy , which is g ener ally not subject t o a claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. People v. Pec oraro , 144 I ll. 2d 1, 13, 578 N.E.2d 942, 947 (1991). Moreove r, beca use of the overwhelming evidenc e ag ai n st defe ndant, including her own test i m o n y , defe ndant cannot establish she was prejudice d when counsel failed to object to these leading questions. Had defe nse counsel objected, the State would have simply rephr ased the questions. Def endant fails to show the jury would not have lear ned the substance of

the text m essag es.

¶ 85 C. Verdict F orms ¶ 86 We next addre ss defe ndant’s argument the trial court err ed in ref using to tender

separ ate jury instructions for ea ch count of murder as char g ed. According to defe ndant, her attorney reque sted separ ate verdic t forms for eac h theory of murder ( i.e.
, knowing
, intentional, strong probability
, and felony murder)
, in case a question arose on appea l as to the counts on which the j ury had found defe ndant guilty

. In the t rial court, the S tate argued the jury s h o u l d only

rec eive a g ener al verdic t form. The trial court ag ree d. The trial court later denied defe ndant’s motion for a new

trial based on the lack of separ ate ve rdict for

ms. ¶ 87 Def

endant cites People v. Smith
, 233 I ll. 2d 1, 15, 906 N.E.2d 529, 5 3 7 (2 0 0 9 ), for the proposition a trial court ha s no discretion to deny a re quest for se para

te ver dict forms whe n

a defe ndant is char g ed with knowing
, intentional, strong probability
, and felony murder based

on the alleg ed murde r of a single person whe n one of the counts could have more favor able
conseque nces for the defe ndant. Acc ording to defe ndant, if the tri al court ref uses such a reque st, the gene ral verdict form on appeal m u s t b e trea ted as a verdict on the count which most benefits defe ndant. See Smith , 233 I ll. 2d at 28, 906 N.E.2d at 544-45.

-16-¶ 88 Def endant argues she was prejudice d by the trial court’s err or beca use “the question of whether the jury would have found her guilty of felony murder alone aff ects three arguments on appea l.” Acc ordingto defe ndant’s brie f:
“Ar gument IV asser

ts that the automatic application of truth-in-sentenc ing to minors who

ar e convicted of felony murder by acc ountability violates the eig hth amendment, and Argument I I Iasser

ts that the automatic application of an adult sentenc ing r ang e to such minors is unconstitutional. Prevailing on eith er o f these arg uments could subject [defendant] to less onerous sentencing provisions. The denial of separat e v er d i ct forms also undermines [defendant’ s] ability t o establish prejudice from trial counsel’s

conce ssion of guilt on the felony murder count, as set forth in Arg ument I I

. Having foug ht the tender ing of separ ate verdic t forms below, the State should not be allowed to benef it from the uncer

tainty cre ated by their position on appea l. Thus, this cour t should assume for purposes of [ d ef

endant’ s] arguments on appea l that the j ury verdic t in this case was for f elony murder.”
See Smith
, 233 I ll. 2d at 9, 25, 906 N.E.2d at 534, 542-43. Reg ardle ss of whether the trial
court err ed on this issue, based on our holdings on the other issues, defe ndant cannot establish she wa s prejudice d by

the ver dict form used in this case

.

¶ 89 D. Sentence Credit ¶ 90 Def

endant also argues she should have rec eived an additional six day s of sentenc ing c redit for time spent in custody in Tenne ssee betwee n J uly 16 and 21, 2010. See 730 I L CS 5/5-4.5- 100(b) (West 2010). The trial court only g ave defe ndant cre dit for the period betwee n J uly 22, 2 0 10, and Marc h 17, 2011. The State conce des defe ndant is entitled to cre dit fo r t h es e s i x day s. The State points out an arr est war rant was issued i n I l l inois on J uly 15, 2010, for the offe nse of f

irst deg ree murder. We a cce pt the State’s conce ssion. De tention in another state is to be cre dited ag ainst a defe ndant’s sentenc e if the detention in the other state is a result of the offe nse for which the defe ndant is sentenc ed. People v. Elder
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 133, 138, 910 N.E.2d 202, 206 (2009)

.

¶ 91 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 92 For the reasons stated, we aff irm the t rial court’s judgme nt as m odified: the s entenc e is
to be modified to g ive defe ndant prese ntence custody cre dit from J uly 16, 2010, to Marc h 17, 2 0 1 1. Otherw ise, the sentenc e rema ins unaltere d. We direc t the trial court to am en d t h e sentenc ing or der a ccor dingly . As part of our j udg ment, we a

war d the State its $75 statutory assessment ag ainst defe ndant as c osts of this appeal.

¶ 93 Affir

med as modified; ca

use re manded with dire ctions.

¶ 94 J USTI CE APPL ETON, dissenting

. ¶ 95 I respe ctfully dissent from the majority ’s decision. Whil e the majority dispositi on is w ell

rea soned and consistent with exis ting statutory provisions, I find the mandatory transfe r of 15-

-17-and 16-y ear -old juveniles to adu l t court is violative of the analy sis set forth in Miller v.

Alabama
, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). I ag ree that many juveniles in the 15- to 16-
y ear -old ag e g roup char g ed with a felony offe n s e rig htly deser ve to have their crimes adjudicate d as if they wer e, chronolog ically
, adults. Howeve r, it is beyond pera dventure that
not all juveniles are the same. Eac h 15- or 1 6 -y ea r- o l d evince s a maturity based, not on chronolog ical ag e, but rathe r on his or her y oung life experience s, development, and familial influence s. ¶ 96 In Miller
, the Supreme Court looked to two of its decisions: Roper v. Simmons
, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), a

nd Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. C t. 2011 (2010), which conclude d that the eig hth amendment for bade the imposit ion of a death sentenc e on a juvenile ( Roper
, 543 U.S. at 57 4 ) an d
, subsequently
, a sentenc e of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile who had not c ommitt ed homicide ( Graham , 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct . at 2034). ¶ 97 The Supreme Court said in Miller , 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct . at 2458:

“Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminis h the penolog ical justifications for imposing the harshe st sentenc es on juvenile offe nders, even when they

commit terrible cr imes. ***

* * *
*** [Any life-without-pa

role sentenc e imposed on a juvenile] contravenes Graham ’s (and also Roper ’s) foundational principle: that imposit ion of a State’s most sever e penalties on juvenile of

fende rs ca

nnot proce ed as though they wer e not childre n.” ¶ 98 I find that these case s pose serious constitutional risks t o t h e v i ab i l i t y o f I llinois ’s mandatory transfe r of juvenile offe nders to adult court and, conseque ntly
, t o adult prison
sentenc es. Whil e t here are juvenile offe nders who may , based on the totality of the circ umstances, be elig ible for adult prosec ution, an automatic transfe r provision based on ag e and offe nse alone, without consideration of the wide varia nce in the maturity
, sophistication, intelligenc e, and social adjustment of any particula r juvenile offe n der, cannot pass constitutional muster. I would argue that the circ umstances of the case befor e us stand as an example of the fallac y of the mandatory transfe r of all juveniles ag ed 15 and 16 to adult court, which under

the re asoningof Roper

and Miller

cannot stand. ¶ 99 To be sure, our leg islature rec og nized the incre ase in violent, homicidal crime committed by juvenile offe nders a

nd soug ht to addre ss that problem. I believe it is the blanket transfe r based on ag e that is the flaw in the leg islature’s response

. Such decisions are better made on the circ umstances of the offe nder as well as the offe nse. In that sense, we should look to both the cr ime and the nature of the criminal. ¶ 100 Maria Pachec o was a g ood student working at her family ’s restaur ant until, at ag e 15, she
met and fell in what she believed was love with the 20-year -old codef endant, Riley

. I t would
appea r that her nuclea

r family was a close one. R i l ey ’s p ro venanc e is unknown, but we do know he had left sever al foster homes and was living in some sort of a g roup h o m e. Riley
eng ag ed in a sexual re lationship with Maria (a crime in a nd of itself). Maria was appar ently

so smitt en that she was willing to leave her family and run awa y with Riley

. In order to g arne r the funds nece ssary for their elopement, an ag ree ment was made to rob Maria’ s uncle. Whil e there was some evidenc e that Maria was disturbed by the uncle’ s touchi n g her and her

-18-y oung er sister, the deg ree of that unwa nted contac t is unknown. ¶ 101 To be sure, Maria helped plan the assault, obtained the nece ssary blunt instruments for the assault on the victim, and eng ineer ed Riley ’s entra nce into the house. Be cause of that participation, there is no doubt that Maria is guilty of felony murder. Howeve r, it is no stretch
to compar e the service as a lookout on the part of Kuntrell J ackson in the compar ison case of Miller to the assistance rende red by defe ndant here

. The only other evidenc e of Maria’ s actual participatio n i n t h e as sault on the victim was Riley ’s testimony that he “sense d” Maria’ s prese nce during the assault. Maria denied being prese nt in the ro o m wher e the assault

occur red. ¶ 102 I find that, under the rea soning of Miller and Graham
, the mandatory transfe r of 15- and 16-y ear-old juveniles to adult court is constitutionally prohibited. I would reve rse the conviction of defenda

nt and require the trial court to make an individualiz ed assessment of defe ndant’s capa city and culpability with reg ard to the g enesis, planning
, and commission of the instant offe nse.

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