IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

BART M. SHEA, ET AL., 

Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

v. 

MARICOPA COUNTY, ET AL.,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-22-0187-PR

Filed May 3, 2023 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Sally Schneider Duncan, Judge (Retired)

The Honorable Lisa Daniel Flores, Judge (Retired)

No. CV2018-053565 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

253 Ariz. 286 (App. 2022) 

OPINION VACATED

COUNSEL: 

Christopher H. Bayley, Andrew M. Jacobs (argued), Emily Gildar Yaron, 

James G. Florentine, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, Attorneys for Bart and 

Cheryl Shea

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Joseph J. Branco (argued), 

Wayne J. Peck, Deputy County Attorneys, Phoenix, Attorneys for Maricopa 

County, Maricopa County Board of Adjustments, and Maricopa County 

Planning and Development Department
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 2 

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF

JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BEENE and KING joined. JUSTICE

BOLICK dissented. *

JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider the statutory jurisdictional requirements for 

judicial review of an administrative decision. We hold that A.R.S. 

§ 12-904(A) does not preclude jurisdiction where a timely filing’s substance

(1) provides notice of the appeal; (2) identifies the decision being appealed; 

and (3) states the issues presented on appeal. Although the statute’s 

requirements turn on substance, not form, to facilitate efficient handling of 

appeals and to provide notice to interested parties, we urge parties 

appealing administrative decisions to avoid potential jurisdictional pitfalls 

by following this Court’s clear instructions in the Arizona Rules of 

Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions (“JRAD”) 

Rule 4(c) and JRAD Form 1. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2017, Maricopa County’s Planning and Development 

Department (the “Department”) initiated proceedings against homeowners 

Bart and Cheryl Shea, alleging violations of several sections of the Maricopa 

County Zoning Ordinance for building certain structures on their property 

without proper permits. On December 12, 2017, the Department’s hearing 

officer fined the Sheas, who timely appealed to the Department’s Board of 

Adjustment (the “Board”). In February 2018, the Board affirmed the fine.

* Chief Justice Brutinel and Justice Montgomery have recused 

themselves from this case.
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 3 

¶3 On March 14, 2018, the Sheas filed a “Verified Complaint for 

Special Action” (the “complaint”) in superior court, naming Maricopa 

County, the Board, and the Department (collectively, the “County”) as 

defendants. In its factual and procedural background, the complaint

alleged that “[o]n or about January 10, 2018, [the Sheas] appealed the 

hearing officer’s decision to the [Board]” who “denied [their] appeal. 

Having been aggrieved by a decision made by the Board, [the Sheas] file 

this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-816(D).” Also, the complaint’s 

background referenced “Departmental Report DR# V201601264,” which is 

a code the Department used to label, identify, and locate all its documents

arising from the Sheas’ case, including emails, notices, hearing officer 

decisions, and Board meeting notes.

¶4 Count I of the complaint requested declaratory relief that “the 

Department’s finding and ruling was not supported by fact or law,” that 

“they owe no fines or penalties as set forth in the Department’s 

December 12, 2017 [judgment],” and that “the Department’s and County 

Attorney’s actions were the result of improper retaliation.” Counts II and 

III alleged procedural and substantive due process violations, respectively, 

and the complaint’s prayer for relief also requested the court to grant 

declaratory relief and dismiss the citation or, alternatively, grant another 

hearing.

¶5 The complaint made several notable omissions. First, it did 

not state the date of the Board’s decision affirming the hearing officer’s 

judgment. Second, although a copy of the hearing officer’s decision was 

attached to the complaint, a copy of the Board’s decision was not. Third, 

the complaint was not titled as a “notice of appeal” and failed to cite A.R.S. 

§ 11-816(B)(3), which permits judicial review of Board decisions according 

to Arizona’s Administrative Review Act (the “Act”). 

¶6 Emphasizing these omissions and the complaint’s excessive 

length, the County moved to dismiss the Sheas’ complaint, arguing that the 

court lacked jurisdiction under two sections of the Act. See § 12-904(A) 

(requiring the filing of a “notice of appeal” that “identif[ies] the final 

administrative decision sought to be reviewed and include[s] a statement 

of the issues presented for review”); A.R.S. § 12-902(B) (barring judicial 

review of agency decisions “[u]nless review is sought . . . within the time 

and in the manner provided in [the Act]”). However, on August 2, 2018, 

the trial court denied the County’s motion and granted leave for the Sheas 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 4 

to file an amended complaint, reasoning that erroneous citations and 

mistitling alone are not of jurisdictional consequence. 

¶7 On August 22, 2018, the Sheas filed their “First Amended 

Verified Complaint for Appeal of Administrative Action.” On 

September 14, 2018, the County filed an answer, alleging that the court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Sheas’ complaint “violate[d] 

the requirements of . . . § 12-904, mandating dismissal pursuant 

to . . . § 12-902.” The County also asserted a counterclaim, seeking to 

enforce the fine imposed at the initial hearing.

¶8 On August 27, 2019, after a judicial reassignment, the trial 

court sua sponte ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court 

reasoned that the Sheas’ complaint failed to comply with § 12-904(A); thus, 

the Sheas failed to file a timely “notice of appeal.” Ultimately, on March 31, 

2021, the court entered final judgment on the County’s counterclaim. 

¶9 In a split opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 

court’s dismissal and counterclaim judgment. Shea v. Maricopa Cnty., 

253 Ariz. 286, 287 ¶ 1, 289–90 ¶ 14 (App. 2022). The majority reasoned that 

because the Sheas’ complaint erroneously cited § 11-816(D) for jurisdiction, 

only vaguely referenced the Board decision, and did not clearly identify the 

issues, the Sheas’ complaint failed § 12-904(A)’s requirements, invoking 

§ 12-902(B)’s jurisdictional bar. Id.

¶10 We accepted review to settle a recurring issue of statewide 

importance: whether § 12-904(A) precludes jurisdiction for judicial review 

of a final administrative decision if a timely filing substantively, but not 

formally, (1) provides notice of the appeal; (2) identifies the decision being 

appealed; and (3) states the issues argued on appeal. We have jurisdiction

under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 “Determining the procedure for review of administrative 

decisions involves the interpretation of rules and statutes, which [this 

Court] review[s] de novo.” Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 

212 Ariz. 407, 412 ¶ 18 (2006); see Bolser Enters., Inc. v. Ariz. Registrar of 

Contractors, 213 Ariz. 110, 112 ¶ 12 (App. 2006) (applying de novo review in 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 5 

deciding whether the superior court properly dismissed a complaint for 

judicial review based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

I.

¶12 Section 11-816(B)(3) authorizes Board review of decisions 

made by hearing officers and directs that “[j]udicial review of the final 

decision by the [Board] shall be pursuant to [the Act].” Under the Act, 

because the statute is the sole source of jurisdiction, compliance with its 

strictures is mandatory. Ariz. Comm’n of Agric. & Horticulture v. Jones, 

91 Ariz. 183, 187 (1962) (“We said of [the Act] that the right of appeal ‘exists 

only by force of statute, and this right is limited by the terms of the statute.’” 

(quoting Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 159 (1959))). Compliance with court

rules, however, including JRAD, is not determinative of jurisdiction. See id.

¶13 Section 12-902(B), which falls under the Act, limits judicial 

review of administrative decisions as follows:

Unless review is sought of an administrative decision within 

the time and in the manner provided in this article, the 

parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency 

shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the 

decision. 

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, according to the statute’s terms, both the Act’s 

“time” and “manner” requirements have jurisdictional import. Id.

¶14 Section 12-904(A) of the Act imposes the following “manner” 

requirements:

An action to review a final administrative decision shall be 

commenced by filing a notice of appeal within thirty-five 

days from the date when a copy of the decision sought to be 

reviewed is served upon the party affected . . . . The notice of 

appeal shall identify the final administrative decision 

sought to be reviewed and include a statement of the issues 

presented for review.

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, § 12-904(A) sets forth three 

jurisdictional requirements for judicial review of an administrative 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 6 

decision: (1) the notice of appeal must be timely filed; (2) the notice of 

appeal must “identify the final administrative decision sought to be 

reviewed”; and (3) the notice of appeal must “include a statement of the 

issues presented for review.”

II.

¶15 Having established § 12-904(A)’s three jurisdictional 

requirements, we now consider whether the Sheas’ complaint complied 

with the Act. We need not consider the Sheas’ amended complaint, which 

was untimely as beyond the thirty-five-day deadline, because we conclude 

that the complaint satisfies § 12-904(A) requirements.

A.

¶16 Our jurisprudence interpreting procedural rules, although 

not dispositive, informs our analysis. We have long held that, where no 

party is misled or prejudiced, non-statutory defects in a timely notice of 

appeal do not preclude jurisdiction. Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 193 Ariz. 47, 

50 ¶ 11 (1998) (“[E]ven if defective, a notice of appeal is sufficient if it is 

neither misleading nor prejudicial.”); Hanen v. Willis, 102 Ariz. 6, 9 (1967) 

(“[W]hen adequate notice to appeal has been given to the other party, no 

mere technical error should prevent the appellate court from reaching the 

merits of the appeal.”); Sheppard v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 111 Ariz. 

587, 588 (1975) (“[T]his Court will consider any application ‘which states 

sufficient facts to justify relief irrespective of its technical denomination.’” 

(quoting State v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 208, 210 (1968))). The policy 

animating this substance-over-form approach is our preference for 

decisions on the merits. Hanen, 102 Ariz. at 9; see Webb v. State ex rel. Ariz. 

Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 194 Ariz. 117, 122 ¶ 25 (App. 1999) (noting the policy to 

interpret ambiguities regarding timing “in favor of preserving the right to 

appeal and against the forfeiture of that right upon a technicality”).

¶17 Courts have also applied this harmless error standard to 

timely notice of claims containing technical defects under agency 

regulations. Epperson v. Indus. Comm’n, 26 Ariz. App. 467, 472 (1976) 

(holding that despite “insufficient service under Rule 58, Rules of 

Procedure of the Industrial Commission of Arizona[,]” the court would

“decline to attach any legal significance to the omission” given the lack of 

“any prejudice . . . as a result of this faulty service”).
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 7 

¶18 In sum, when applying our rules, we favor decisions on the 

merits and treat non-prejudicial, non-misleading defects in a timely notice 

of appeal as not jurisdictional unless the plain meaning of a statute bars 

jurisdiction. We see no reason not to apply this policy in the administrative 

appeal context. Accordingly, we now determine whether the plain 

meaning of § 12-904(A) bars jurisdiction here. 

B. 

¶19 We first interpret § 12-904(A)’s requirement of filing a “notice 

of appeal.” In interpreting statutes, we turn first to the text because 

unambiguous text is dispositive. State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Phx., 

249 Ariz. 239, 244 ¶ 21 (2020). However, where more than one reasonable 

interpretation is possible, “we consider secondary interpretation methods, 

including consideration of the statute’s ‘subject matter, its historical 

background, its effect[s] and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’” 

State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 147 ¶ 7 (2017) (quoting State ex rel. Polk v. 

Campbell, 239 Ariz. 405, 406 ¶ 5 (2016)). 

¶20 The County asserts that the Sheas’ complaint titled “Verified 

Complaint for Special Action” is not a “notice of appeal” under § 12-902(A)

because the legislature intended “notice of appeal” to be a term of art 

confined to a conventional standard form notice of appeal. We are 

unpersuaded. As the County effectively conceded at oral argument, the Act

does not define “notice of appeal,” and the term’s plain meaning broadly 

encompasses any “document filed with a court and served on the other 

parties” that “stat[es] an intention to appeal a trial court’s judgment or 

order.” Notice of Appeal, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Special 

formatting, titling, and citations are not required. See id.; see also State v. 

Good, 9 Ariz. App. 388, 392 (1969) (“The object of a notice of appeal is to 

advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific 

judgment in a specific case.”). This meaning aligns with our preference to 

“look to substance rather than to form” when interpreting procedural 

devices. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Williams, 104 Ariz. 280, 283 (1969). Applying 

the plain meaning of “notice of appeal” is also consistent with A.R.S. 

§ 1-211(B)’s directive that “[s]tatutes shall be liberally construed to effect 

their objects and to promote justice.”
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 8 

¶21 Because § 12-904(A)’s plain meaning is clear, the statute is 

unambiguous; however, even if § 12-904(A) is ambiguous, the following 

secondary interpretive devices affirm the interpretation set forth above. 

First, legislative history, as evinced by the evolution of the statutory 

language, also supports this meaning of “notice of appeal.” In 2012, the 

legislature amended § 12-904, replacing “complaint” with “notice of 

appeal” as the pleading commencing a statutory appeal. 2012 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws ch. 322, § 3 (2d Reg. Sess.). The amendment’s purpose in substituting 

“notice of appeal” for “complaint” was to change the procedural nature of 

the review process from complaint to appeal—not to implement a 

heightened jurisdictional hurdle through technical formatting 

requirements. See id. On this point, the court of appeals’ majority and 

dissent agreed that mistitling alone “does not necessarily create a 

jurisdictional bar.” Shea, 253 Ariz. at 290 ¶ 17, 293 ¶ 28. If the legislature 

intended to incorporate a more restrictive term of art for “notice of appeal,” 

it would have done so. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 19-201.01 (expressly mandating 

“strict compliance” in the election recall context to preclude lenient court 

interpretation). Indeed, the legislature has mandated a specific form for 

referenda, see A.R.S. § 19-101(A), but it imposed no such form requirement 

for “notice of appeal.” 

¶22 Our procedural rules governing administrative appeals 

further support an expansive meaning of “notice of appeal.” Under JRAD

Rule 4(c), the “[c]ontent of the Notice of Appeal” must include the 

following: (1) “the caption of the case and the administrative agency case 

number”; (2) the appealing party’s identity; (3) “the final administrative 

decision from which the party is appealing, including the date of that 

decision”; (4) “the findings and decision or part of the findings and decision 

sought to be reviewed”; and (5) “the issues presented for review.” JRAD 

Rule 4(c)(1)–(5). These requirements are plainly intended to provide 

adequate notice of the intent to appeal and to identify the decision to be 

appealed, the very purpose embodied in the plain meaning of “notice of 

appeal.” 

¶23 The County warns that construing the Sheas’ misstyled 

complaint as a notice of appeal would license the trial court to adjudicate 

the administrative appeal under different procedural rules. The County

exaggerates this risk. We are unpersuaded that a mislabeled filing initiating 

an appeal of an administrative decision would prompt a court to overlook 

the substance of the matter and forego applying the requisite JRAD
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 9 

procedures. In fact, the County conceded in the court of appeals and at oral 

argument here that it was not misled by the Sheas’ mistitled filing. Even if 

a trial court were to make this unlikely procedural faux pas, we are confident 

that the state party would call the court’s attention to the JRAD procedures. 

C. 

¶24 Given our construction of § 12-904(A), we conclude that the

Sheas’ complaint constitutes a “notice of appeal” because it comports with 

the plain meaning of the term—it is a “document” that “[gave notice of] an 

intention to appeal” and was “filed with [the appellate] court and served 

on the [opposing] part[y].” Notice of Appeal, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 

ed. 2019). The “complaint” effected notice by listing the agency case 

number, identifying the parties, and stating that the Sheas filed their appeal 

“[h]aving been aggrieved by a decision made by the Board.” Although the

deficiencies in the “complaint” exceed those in many cases that leniently 

interpreted court rules governing jurisdiction, see, e.g., Boydston, 193 Ariz. 

at 50 ¶ 14 (holding as curable a non-lawyer’s signature on a corporation’s

notice of appeal), the flaws here are mere technicalities given that the 

“complaint” included nearly all of JRAD Rule 4(c)’s required content and 

effected non-prejudicial, non-misleading notice to the County. 

¶25 We reject the County’s assertion that it was “prejudiced” by 

the excessive length and inartful wording of the “complaint.” Mere 

inconvenience in reviewing the Sheas’ “complaint” does not warrant 

dismissal of the appeal because the filing did not mislead or otherwise 

compromise the County’s litigation position. Cf. Hill v. City of Phx., 

193 Ariz. 570, 573 ¶ 14 (1999) (finding no prejudice where the notice of 

appeal omitted certain defendant names but all defendants “received the 

notice and . . . knowingly participated in . . . proceedings pertaining 

directly to the appeal”).

D. 

¶26 We next interpret § 12-904(A)’s second requirement to 

“identify the final administrative decision sought to be reviewed.” The 

statute does not define “identify.” In the legal context, “identify” means 

“[t]o prove the identity of (a person or thing).” Identify, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The plain meaning of “identify” aligns with its 

legal definition. Common synonyms of “identify” include to “distinguish,” 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 10 

to “pinpoint,” and to “single (out).” Identify, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identify (last visited 

Apr. 26, 2023). 

¶27 Here, the “complaint” sufficiently identified the final 

administrative decision being appealed by pinpointing—albeit indirectly—

the Board’s decision. The “complaint” attributed the Sheas’ “grievance” to 

the Board’s decision, provided the agency’s internal case number 

identifying all the Department’s documents pertaining to the case, 

including the Board’s decision, and noted the case’s procedural history. 

The Sheas’ “complaint,” construed as a notice of appeal, also met this 

requirement.

E. 

¶28 Last, we turn to § 12-904(A)’s command to “include a 

statement of the issues.” The statute does not define “statement of the 

issues.” However, § 12-904(A)’s last sentence explains that “[t]he statement 

of an issue presented for review is deemed to include every subsidiary issue 

fairly comprised in the statement,” suggesting a broad construction of the 

“statement of the issues.”

¶29 Here, the Sheas’ “complaint” included a statement of the 

issues by alleging an inadequate factual basis for the hearing officer’s 

judgment and procedural and substantive due process violations. 

Although the Sheas did not list these claims under a “statement of issues” 

heading, the statute does not mandate a specific format. This requirement 

too is satisfied.

III. 

¶30 The dissent contends that the statute compels the “harsh 

result” of dismissing the Sheas’ appeal because they commenced their 

appellate review of the Board’s decision by filing a document titled 

“complaint” rather than a “notice of appeal” even though the Board 

received notice of the appeal. Infra ¶¶ 32, 39. We disagree. The Sheas’ 

“complaint,” which we construe as a “notice of appeal” for the reasons 

discussed, Part II ¶¶ 19–23, contains the statutorily required elements in 

every respect but its title. Because the Sheas’ mistitling of their filing did

not transform the nature of the judicial review of their administrative 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

Opinion of the Court

 11 

appeal from an appellate to special action proceeding, and because the 

Sheas’ “complaint” merely served to notify the Board of the Sheas’ intent to 

appeal, the statute does not require what the dissent characterizes as a 

“harsh result.”

CONCLUSION

¶31 We hold that A.R.S. § 12-904(A) does not preclude jurisdiction 

where a timely filing’s substance (1) provides notice of the appeal; 

(2) identifies the decision being appealed; and (3) states the issues argued 

on appeal. Because the Sheas’ “complaint” complies with these statutory 

requirements, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate the court of 

appeals’ opinion, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

JUSTICE BOLICK, Dissenting

 12 

BOLICK, J., dissenting:

¶32 I agree with my colleagues that the Sheas placed the Board on 

notice that they were appealing its determinations. However, I agree with 

the court of appeals majority that in creating an opportunity for appeal, the 

legislature decreed the basic manner by which such appeals would take 

place, and the Sheas failed to comply. Although in a case like this I would 

prefer to emphasize substance over form, I conclude the legislature limited 

our authority to do so.

¶33 “Appeal being a statutory privilege, jurisdictional 

requirements prescribed by statute must be strictly complied with to 

achieve entrance to appellate review.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Holland,

120 Ariz. 371, 373 (App. 1978). The opening sentence of A.R.S. § 12-902(B) 

is both categorical and unquestionably jurisdictional: “Unless review is 

sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner 

provided in this article, the parties to the proceeding before the 

administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the 

decision.” § 12-902(B). So, the case comes down to what the term “manner” 

means in this context.

¶34 In general use, “manner” encompasses “a characteristic or 

customary mode of acting” or “a mode of procedure.” Manner, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manner (last 

visited Apr. 26, 2023). The legislature prescribed the manner of filing an 

appeal in A.R.S. § 12-904(A), which begins with the command: “An action 

to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by filing a 

notice of appeal . . . .” We have consistently held that the word “shall” is 

mandatory. See Garcia v. Butler in & for Pima Cnty., 251 Ariz. 191, 195 ¶ 15 

(2021); State ex rel. Brnovich v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 250 Ariz. 127, 132 ¶ 19 

(2020). 

¶35 The Section then goes on to specify the contents of the “notice 

of appeal.” § 12-904(B)(1)–(5). My colleagues focus on the fact that, over 

two tries, the Sheas mostly satisfied those content requirements, at least 

sufficiently enough to accomplish their obvious purpose of placing the 

Board on notice of the action. Supra ¶ 24. But the Sheas did not comply with 

the threshold requirement of § 12-904(A) by “filing a notice of appeal,” and 

instead filed a “complaint for special action.” As we have held, substantial 

compliance with content requirements does not excuse noncompliance 
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

JUSTICE BOLICK, Dissenting

 13 

with time and substance requirements. See, e.g., Legacy Found. Action Fund 

v. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 243 Ariz. 404, 406 ¶ 8 (2018) (holding that 

failure to fulfill the § 12-904(A) requirements “deprives the court of 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal”); Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa Cnty., 

213 Ariz. 525, 527 ¶ 10 (2006) (“If a notice of claim is not properly filed 

within the statutory time limit, a plaintiff’s claim is barred by statute. 

Actual notice and substantial compliance do not excuse failure to comply 

with the statutory requirements . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 

¶36 Here, the statutory history strongly indicates that the 

legislature was not simply describing a generic legal pleading when it 

specified a notice of appeal. Prior to 2013, § 12-904 provided that an action 

to review a final administrative decision “shall be commenced by filing a 

complaint.” 2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 322, § 3 (2dReg. Sess.). That year, the 

term complaint was substituted with “notice of appeal” in subsections A, 

B, and B(5), id.; and indeed, the term is now used four times in the statute.1 

When the legislature amends a statute, we must treat the change as 

meaningful. See, e.g., Pinal Vista Props., LLC v. Turnbull, 208 Ariz. 188, 190 

¶ 10 (App. 2004) (noting that “each word or phrase of a statute must be 

given meaning so that no part is rendered void, superfluous, contradictory 

or insignificant.”); State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 407 ¶ 19 (App. 2015) (stating 

that “when the legislature chooses different words within a statutory 

scheme, we presume those distinctions are meaningful and evidence an 

intent to give a different meaning and consequence to the alternate 

language.”); see also Shea v. Maricopa Cnty., 253 Ariz. 286, 231¶ 18 (App. 

2022). 

¶37 Whatever the law means by a notice of appeal, and whatever 

is necessary or sufficient by way of its contents, a complaint for special 

action is not an appeal. The two actions are conceptually distinct, and each 

has its own procedural rules and requirements. Compare Ariz. R.P. Spec. 

Act. 4., with § 12-904(A); see also Arizonans for Second Chances v. Hobbs,

249 Ariz. 396, 426–27 ¶¶ 120–22 (2020) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (setting forth 

the requirements for a special action). Indeed, our rules provide that special 

action will not lie where there is an equally plain, speedy, and adequate 

1

 That same year, the legislature amended § 12-914(A) to provide that JRAD 

shall apply to claims made under the article. The term “notice of appeal” 

appears in the headings of literally all six subsections of the pertinent rule, 

JRAD Rule 4.
SHEA ET AL. V. MARICOPA COUNTY ET AL. 

JUSTICE BOLICK, Dissenting

 14 

remedy by appeal, Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), so it would be highly 

anomalous to allow a special action to substitute for an appeal that is 

prescribed by law. Given that the differences between appeals and special 

actions preexisted the statutory change, we must credit the legislature’s act 

in choosing one over the other.

¶38 I agree with my colleagues that this legislative choice can 

make administrative appeals difficult for the unwary. Likely that is why 

our rules provide a handy template for properly filing an appeal, titled 

“Notice of Appeal of Administrative Decision.” JRAD Rule 4; JRAD

Form 1. Even without the template, the statutes spell out what is required

and point to our rules, which could not be clearer that a notice of appeal is 

required.

¶39 And dismissal of the appeal (or, in this case, the special action) 

is certainly a harsh result. But so long as the legislature acts within its 

constitutional authority and complies with due process requirements, it

gets to mandate harsh results if it chooses. The legislature could not have 

tailored harsh-consequences language more plainly than when it decreed 

that “[u]nless review is sought . . . in the manner provided . . . , the 

parties . . . shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the decision.” 

§ 12-902(B). Whatever misgivings we may have, our job is to apply that 

statutory dictate.

¶40 For the foregoing reasons, and with great respect to my 

colleagues, I dissent.