*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50131

Summary Calendar

 

Delia Ramirez,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

State of Texas,

Dept. of Mental Health &

Mental Retardation, and

San Antonio State School

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Western District of Texas

 (SA-95-CV-1029) 

 

September 4, 1997

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Delia Ramirez appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment for the Appellees. We affirm.

I.

Appellees moved for summary judgment in accordance with Rule

56(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Attached to the Appellees’ summary
2

judgment motion were affidavits and documents showing that they had

a non-discriminatory reason for dismissing Ms. Ramirez. The

Appellees’ motion and supporting materials complied with Rule

56(e), including the documents from Ms. Ramirez’s personnel file

which the records custodian at the San Antonio State School

certified as business records. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); See Fed. R.

Evid. 803(6). Contrary to Ms. Ramirez’s assertions, there is no

question about the admissibility of Appellees’ supporting

materials.

After Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment with

supporting affidavits, Ms. Ramirez’s job was to “set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e). In completing this task, Ms. Ramirez could not

simply restate the allegations in her pleadings. Rather, she was

required to respond with affidavits and other materials which

evidenced a triable issue of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Topalian v. Ehrman,

954 F.2d 1125, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 961 F.2d 215

(5th Cir. 1992), and cert. denied 506 U.S. 825 (1992).

Ms. Ramirez did not do so. In response to Appellees’ motion,

Ms. Ramirez only offered her subjective opinion that she was

subjected to increased scrutiny at work and eventual termination

because of her engagement in protected activities. She offered no

evidence of any kind which provided a factual basis for her belief.

On the other hand, Appellees presented a great deal of evidence
3

which indicated that the reason for the close supervision and

eventual termination of Ms. Ramirez was her continually poor work

performance. “It is more than well-settled that an employee’s

subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as

a result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive

a summary judgment motion, in the face of proof showing an adequate

non-discriminatory reason.” Douglass v. United Services Automobile

Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Ms. Ramirez’s

challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment against

her must fail since she failed to come forward with any evidence

establishing an essential element of a Title VII claim for unlawful

retaliation viz., a causal link between her filing discrimination

complaints against her employers and the termination of her

employment. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.

1996).

II.

Ms. Ramirez also complains that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment because pending at the time of entry of

the summary judgment order was her motion to compel production of

discovery requests. She claims that the records she sought from

Appellees at this time were “tremendously relevant to the [sic] her

obtaining evidence concerning Defendants’ retaliatory actions.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 22.) We find her challenge to the district

court’s judgment on this ground to be frivolous. If Ms. Ramirez

needed more discovery to defeat summary judgment, then it was up to
4

her to move for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(f); Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 887 (5th

Cir. 1996). “Because she did not, she is now foreclosed from

arguing that she did not have adequate time for discovery.”

Potter, 98 F.3d at 887.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.