National Preparedness 

Report 

March 30, 2012

National Preparedness Report

 i 

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Nation has made measurable strides toward improving preparedness for the full range of hazards at 

all levels of government and across all segments of society. National preparedness has improved not only 

for the countless threats posed by those who wish to bring harm to the American homeland but also for 

the many natural and technological hazards that face the Nation’s communities.

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) describes the Nation’s approach to 

preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. The 

Directive requires a National Preparedness Report (NPR), an annual report summarizing the progress 

made toward building, sustaining, and delivering the 31 core capabilities described in the National 

Preparedness Goal (the Goal). 

As the NPR coordinator, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) worked with the full range of whole community partners—including all 

levels of government, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, communities, and 

individuals—to develop the NPR. Specifically, FEMA collaborated with federal interagency partners to 

identify quantitative and qualitative performance and assessment data for each of the 31 core capabilities. 

In addition, FEMA integrated data from the 2011 State Preparedness Reports (SPRs), statewide selfassessments of core capability levels submitted by all 56 U.S. states and territories through a standardized 

survey. Finally, FEMA conducted research to identify recent, independent evaluations, surveys, and other 

supporting data related to core capabilities. 

FEMA synthesized, reviewed, and analyzed all of these data sources in order to derive key findings that 

offer insight on critical issues in preparedness, including areas where the Nation has made progress and 

where areas of improvement remain. During the development of specific core capability key findings, 

eight broader trends in national preparedness emerged. As shown below, these overarching key findings 

synthesize information from across multiple core capabilities and mission areas and reflect national-level 

results on preparedness progress and gaps.

With the September 2011 release of the Goal, the Nation is transitioning to a new set of core capabilities. 

As a result, whole community partners are updating their efforts to collect, analyze, and report 

preparedness progress according to the Goal’s core capabilities and preliminary targets. The 2012 NPR 

therefore relies on a range of existing assessment approaches and associated quantitative and qualitative 

data to present the Nation’s preparedness progress and to report key findings. Assessment processes, 

methodologies, and data will evolve in future years to align more directly with the Goal and its 

capabilities. Efforts are already underway to refine the Goal’s capabilities and preliminary targets; future 

efforts will focus on developing agreed-upon measures and assessment methodologies that will guide the 

annual development of the NPR.

Overarching Key Findings in National Preparedness

Key finding: The Nation has developed areas of national strength in several core capabilities, 

particularly in cross-cutting, common capabilities and those that support responses to disasters.

The Nation has a portfolio of preparedness capabilities that have improved significantly since 2001, as a 

result of dedicated funding and concerted attention through planning, organization, equipment, training, 

and exercises. Some areas of strength pre-date the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, while 

others have developed and matured in the years since then. Areas of overall national strength as identified 

in the NPR include:

 Planning: The Nation has established the foundation for an integrated, all-hazards planning 

architecture that considers routine emergencies and catastrophic events and increasingly integrates 

whole community perspectives; 
National Preparedness Report

ii 

 Operational Coordination: The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a common 

doctrine for incident management, allowing the whole community to use shared language and 

principles;

 Intelligence and Information Sharing: A national network of fusion centers and Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces (JTTFs) brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement, Intelligence 

Community resources, and other public safety officials and private sector partners;

 Environmental Response/Health and Safety: A diverse set of federal, state, and local assets have

the capabilities to address a wide range of routine and large-scale hazardous material (hazmat) and 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents;

 Mass Search and Rescue Operations: Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial resources comprise 

a mature search and rescue capability across the Nation;

 Operational Communications: Government 

partners around the country have established 

flexible and interoperable communications 

capabilities built on sound plans and tested 

through exercises and real-world events; and

 Public Health and Medical Services: A wide 

range of partners contribute to a highly 

responsive public health and medical 

capability. 

These areas of national strength align closely with 

the Goal’s cross-cutting, common capabilities and 

those capabilities from the Goal’s Response 

mission area. SPR data from the 56 states and 

territories substantiate these accomplishments. 

Figure 1 illustrates the range of average SPR 

results, showing the areas of greatest self-assessed 

capability levels among state and territorial 

partners. All of the areas of national strength 

identified above, except Intelligence and 

Information Sharing, appear in the top 10 SPRassessed capabilities. More generally, eight of the 

top 10 SPR-assessed capabilities are among the 

Goal’s common or response-focused core 

capabilities.

These strengths involve contributions from across 

the whole community. State, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners have built a network of multidisciplinary capabilities that they use to manage 

the vast majority of emergencies. When disasters 

strike, federal partners, the private and nonprofit 

sectors, faith-based organizations, and the public 

stand ready to augment existing state, local, tribal, 

and territorial response capabilities and to help provide many of the essential services outlined in the core 

capabilities.

Key finding: Cybersecurity and recovery-focused core capabilities are national areas for improvement.

Despite significant efforts across all of the core capabilities, this NPR finds areas where national 

capability gaps remain.

Figure 1: SPR results show average state/territory 

self-assessed capability levels for the 31 core 

capabilities (100% would mean that all states and 

territories attained their desired capability levels).
National Preparedness Report

iii

 Cybersecurity: The number of cyber attacks—including attempts to gain unauthorized access to 

information or attempts to compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of information 

systems—has increased significantly in recent years, triggering an expansion of cybersecurity 

initiatives in the government and the private sector. The Nation is highly reliant upon interdependent 

cyber systems, yet stakeholders have an incomplete understanding of cyber risk and inconsistent 

public and private participation in cybersecurity partnerships. Trends also point to cyber criminals’ 

continued focus on stealing customer records, including personally identifiable information, payment 

card data, email addresses, and other customer data. States indicated through the SPR that 

Cybersecurity was the core capability with the lowest average self-assessed capability level. The Goal 

identified Cybersecurity as a discrete preparedness core capability for the first time, unifying the wide 

range of Cybersecurity efforts under a common definition. 

 Recovery Mission Area: The Recovery mission area core capabilities center on helping disasteraffected communities rebuild infrastructure, provide adequate long-term housing, preserve 

community services, restore health and social services, promote economic development, and restore

natural and cultural resources. Until recently, the Recovery mission area lacked the national structure 

and cohesive planning approaches employed across other mission areas, such as Protection and 

Response. As seen in the summary of SPR results (Figure 1), three of the four lowest-assessed 

capabilities fall within the Recovery mission area—Economic Recovery, Natural and Cultural 

Resources, and Housing. States indicated that they were less than halfway to achieving their desired 

capability levels in these three critical recovery functions. The recent release of the National Disaster 

Recovery Framework (NDRF) is an important milestone in enhancing the national approach to longterm recovery. The NDRF defines how federal agencies will more effectively organize and operate to 

promote effective recovery and support states, tribes, and other jurisdictions affected by a disaster.

Key finding: Federal preparedness assistance programs have helped build and enhance state, local, 

tribal, and territorial capabilities through multi-year investments across mission areas.

Federal preparedness assistance has clearly contributed to the capability gains achieved since 9/11. Before 

release of the Goal, grant investments typically aligned with target capabilities (from the Target 

Capabilities List) or National Priorities (identified in the National Preparedness Guidelines); with the 

release of the Goal, the core capabilities are the focus. Whole community partners have used federal 

preparedness grants to build core capabilities. Together, DHS and HHS administer the largest federal

preparedness grant programs. A 2009 report by FEMA noted that DHS and HHS grants represented well 

over 90 percent of federal 

preparedness grant funds for Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2007 and FY 2008. 

Figure 2 shows $17.2 billion in nondisaster preparedness grant 

investments through DHS programs 

from FY 2006 through FY 2010. 

DHS grants include general 

preparedness programs, such as the 

State Homeland Security Program 

(SHSP) and the Urban Areas 

Security Initiative (UASI); 

infrastructure protection programs, 

such as the Transit Security Grant 

Program, the Port Security Grant 

Program, and the Buffer Zone 

Protection Program; and hazard 

mitigation grants. In some cases, grant investments focused on one core capability. For example, port and 

transit security investments center on Physical Protective Measures. Similarly, hazard mitigation grants 

Figure 2: DHS grant-funded investments in the top five core 

capabilities total over $12.4 billion and account for nearly 72 

percent of DHS’s non-disaster federal preparedness assistance.
National Preparedness Report

iv 

are concentrated in the Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction capability. Programs such as SHSP and UASI 

support a wider range of capabilities across all mission areas, spreading these substantial investments 

more broadly. 

HHS preparedness grant programs include the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 

Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) through the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). From FY 2006 through FY 2010, HPP and PHEP 

invested more than $2 billion and $4 billion, respectively, to help 62 state, local, and territorial 

jurisdictions improve public health and healthcare preparedness. Beginning in July 2012, HPP and PHEP 

will function under the same administrative structure. In March 2011, CDC released Public Health 

Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning, identifying 15 priority 

capabilities such as community preparedness and recovery, medical countermeasures dispensing, public 

health laboratory testing, and surveillance. In January 2012, HPP released Healthcare Preparedness 

Capabilities: National Guidance for Healthcare System Preparedness, outlining eight priority capabilities 

including healthcare system preparedness and recovery, medical surge, fatality management, and 

volunteer management. Together, these public health and healthcare system preparedness capabilities 

outline investment priorities moving forward and support the Public Health and Medical Services and 

other core capabilities outlined in the Goal. 

Areas of national strength align with investments made by whole community partners through these 

assistance programs. Significant investments in Public Health and Medical Services, Operational 

Communications, and Planning capabilities are a substantial contributor to progress achieved nationally. 

For example, since FY 2006, whole community partners have applied more than $7.3 billion in 

preparedness assistance from DHS to support the core capabilities identified as national strengths.

Conversely, core capabilities identified as areas for national improvement have not historically received 

significant investments via preparedness grants. For example, while federal grant programs have 

increasingly sought to emphasize the importance of cyber preparedness, grant-funded investments aligned 

with the Cybersecurity core capability have been minimal. Similarly, less than one percent of DHS nondisaster preparedness assistance from FY 2006 to FY 2010 has supported recovery-focused core 

capabilities.

To improve overall coordination of preparedness assistance, DHS, HHS, and U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) components signed a two-year memorandum of understanding in July 2011 and 

established an interagency process for ensuring consistent guidance for homeland security, public health, 

and healthcare system preparedness grants.

Key Finding: States generally reported the most progress in capabilities that they identified as high 

priorities.

In the 2011 SPR, states rated each core capability as a high, medium, or low priority. Table 1 lists the five 

capabilities cited most frequently as a high priority, as well as those identified most frequently as a low 

priority. These results provide further context for the areas of national strength and areas for improvement 

identified above. Notably, four of the top five high-priority capabilities align to national strengths and are 

areas in which states reported relatively more progress toward achieving preparedness goals.

Similarly, two of the lowest priority capabilities identified within the SPR (Health and Social Services 

and Natural and Cultural Resources) fall within the Recovery mission area, identified above as a national 

area for improvement and as an area in which states reported less progress toward achieving preparedness 

goals. For other low-priority core capabilities—such as Forensics and Attribution and Screening, Search, 

and Detection—the Federal Government tends to play a more prominent role than states and territories. 

Although approximately two-thirds of states identified Housing, Economic Recovery, and Cybersecurity 

as high-priority capabilities, these capabilities were among the lowest in SPR-reported preparedness 

levels. These results further highlight that Cybersecurity and the recovery-focused core capabilities may 

be areas for future emphasis to improve national preparedness.
National Preparedness Report

 v 

Table 1: States’ core capability priorities in the 2011 SPR align with areas of national strength. 

Capability % States Reporting 

Capabilities Most Frequently Identified as “High Priority”

Operational Communications 91%

Mass Care Services 89%

Operational Coordination 87%

Public Health and Medical Services 87%

Planning 84%

Capabilities Most Frequently Identified as “Low Priority”

Natural and Cultural Resources 33%

Health and Social Services 17%

Forensics and Attribution 16%

Screening, Search, and Detection 14%

Fatality Management Services 11%

Key finding: The Nation has made demonstrable progress addressing areas for improvement identified 

after events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.

The 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina highlighted gaps in preparedness activities nationwide and served 

as catalysts for change. Investigations such as the final report of the 9/11 Commission and the White 

House after-action review of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina identified dozens of 

recommendations. Table 2 highlights a handful of the key areas for improvement, as well as 

representative progress achieved through whole community efforts. 

Table 2: Efforts to address identified preparedness gaps have yielded meaningful outcomes. 

Areas for Improvement Representative Progress Achieved

The 9/11 attacks identified challenges in 

conducting multi-disciplinary operational 

coordination on-site at incidents and among 

operations centers. 

Nationwide adoption of NIMS as the common doctrine 

for incident management. More than four million whole 

community partners receive some form of NIMS training. 

Hurricane Katrina revealed significant 

weaknesses in catastrophic emergency 

planning. 

Development of national planning-related guidance and 

prioritized funding. Nationwide Plan Reviews 

demonstrate significant improvements in state and 

urban area confidence in their catastrophic plans. 

The 9/11 attacks revealed limited information 

sharing of actionable intelligence across the 

government and with the private sector.

Development of a national network of fusion centers, 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and standardized policies 

and processes for sharing suspicious activity reports 

across the whole community.

The 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina 

identified challenges in communications 

interoperability within and across jurisdictions. 

Demonstrated capability to provide response-level 

operational communications within one hour of an 

incident in high-risk urban areas. 

Key Finding: Efforts to integrate people with disabilities and other access and functional needs, 

children, pregnant women, older adults, and people with chronic medical conditions into preparedness 

activities require attention across all mission areas.

More than 55 million Americans have disabilities; moreover, infants and children make up nearly onequarter of the Nation’s population; nearly one in eight Americans are over the age of 65; and 

approximately one-quarter of Americans have multiple, chronic medical conditions. Better integrating 

these populations across all mission areas is an essential element of improving preparedness.
National Preparedness Report

vi 

Whole community partners offer several successful examples of efforts to integrate the full range of 

community members into preparedness activities. For example, FEMA has located Regional Disability 

Integration Specialists in all 10 FEMA regions and has issued national guidance on how to integrate 

functional needs support services into mass care shelters. Many states and communities around the Nation 

have established innovative programs for integrating people with disabilities and access and functional 

needs into disaster preparedness. In addition, informed by findings from the National Commission on 

Children and Disasters, FEMA established a Children’s Working Group to coordinate its efforts—in 

collaboration with federal partners—to better address children’s needs in disasters. FEMA’s 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101) provides guidance to state, local, tribal, and 

territorial emergency managers on developing a unified emergency operations plan that addresses all 

community members. Similarly, HHS has developed toolkits to guide emergency preparedness activities 

that integrate persons with disabilities, aging adults, children, pregnant women, and persons with chronic 

medical conditions. The U.S. Department of Education also offers training and technical assistance in 

readiness and emergency management planning to help schools provide for individuals with access and 

functional needs. Finally, the U.S. Department of Justice’s ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and 

Local Governments provides guidance for emergency managers on requirements under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act of 1990.

However, these efforts have not yet taken hold across all whole community partners and mission areas. 

For example, despite CPG 101’s guidance on unified emergency plans, many states and localities still 

include separate annexes or appendices focused on planning for populations characterized as “special 

needs,” “vulnerable,” or “at-risk.” Some plans do not address the needs of children, the challenges of 

reuniting unaccompanied minors separated from their families as a result of disaster, the needs of older 

adults, or the needs of those with chronic medical conditions. 

Key finding: Decision-makers in the public and private sectors increasingly are using risk analysis to 

shape and prioritize preparedness activities across mission areas.

PPD-8 and the Goal emphasize the important role that risk—defined simply as the potential for an 

unwanted outcome—plays in informing preparedness activities. Faced with a range of threats and hazards 

and constrained by available resources, whole community partners are increasingly using risk analyses to 

inform policy and programmatic decisions across all five preparedness mission areas. For example:

 Federal interagency partners conducted a Strategic National Risk Assessment to help identify 

potential incidents that pose the greatest threat to the Nation and to inform the development of core 

capabilities and targets in the Goal;

 DHS developed an annual National Risk Profile for the Nation’s critical infrastructure, describing 

risks facing the Nation’s infrastructure sectors and supporting public and private sector risk 

management decisions;

 Traditional mitigation planning has broadened to include both natural hazards and terrorist threats in 

order to identify a comprehensive suite of potential mitigation actions; 

 States are required to conduct threat and hazard identification and risk assessments as a condition for 

receiving most preparedness grant funding and set hazard-based targets as the context for their SPR 

capability assessments;

 State and local public health departments are required to use jurisdictional risk assessments to 

prioritize capability enhancements through preparedness assistance from HHS ASPR and CDC;

 Risk analysis informs eligibility criteria for preparedness assistance, including the State Homeland 

Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, Transit Security 

Grant Program, and the CDC PHEP, as well as the vision for the FY 2013 National Preparedness 

Grant Program; and 

 Ongoing efforts to implement the National Preparedness System, as called for in PPD-8, further 

emphasize the importance of risk analyses in driving preparedness activities. The components of the 
National Preparedness Report

vii

National Preparedness System emphasize the need to identify and assess risks in order to guide efforts 

to develop, maintain, and assess core capabilities.

Key finding: Many programs exist to build and sustain capabilities across all mission areas, but 

challenges remain in measuring progress from year to year.

Whole community partners offer programs and initiatives that contribute to the core capabilities outlined 

in the Goal. However, in many cases, measures and metrics do not yet exist to gauge performance, either 

quantitatively or qualitatively, over time. Thus, while programs may exist to address a specific challenge, 

the Nation has little way of knowing whether and to what extent those programs have been successful. 

PPD-8 envisions a National Preparedness System that includes a comprehensive approach to assessments 

using clear, objective, and quantifiable performance measures.

Conclusion

This NPR represents a step forward in efforts to assess overall national preparedness. Informed by inputs 

from across the whole community, the 2012 NPR serves as a baseline evaluation of the progress made 

toward building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the Goal. Building on these 

efforts, the vision for future NPRs is to establish a routine, repeatable process that engages whole 

community partners throughout.

To achieve the Goal, the Nation will need to build on the significant progress to date and address 

identified areas for improvement. The complex set of threats and hazards facing the Nation and the 

underlying interdependencies within critical infrastructure and supply chains require integrated 

preparedness efforts to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities. The components of the National 

Preparedness System will provide a consistent and reliable approach to support decision-making, resource 

allocation, and ongoing performance assessment. Equally important, the National Preparedness System 

will engage the whole community to strengthen national preparedness.
National Preparedness Report

viii 

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ....................................................................................................... i

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1

Common Core Capabilities .......................................................................................... 5

Planning............................................................................................................................... 5

Public Information and Warning ........................................................................................ 8

Operational Coordination ................................................................................................... 9

Prevention Core Capabilities ..................................................................................... 11

Forensics and Attribution................................................................................................. 11

Prevention/Protection Core Capabilities................................................................... 12

Intelligence and Information Sharing...............................................................................12

Interdiction and Disruption...............................................................................................15

Screening, Search, and Detection....................................................................................17

Protection Core Capabilities ...................................................................................... 19

Access Control and Identity Verification.........................................................................19

Cybersecurity ....................................................................................................................20

Physical Protective Measures ..........................................................................................22

Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities ............................................23

Supply Chain Integrity and Security ................................................................................24

Mitigation Core Capabilities ....................................................................................... 26

Community Resilience......................................................................................................26

Long-term Vulnerability Reduction..................................................................................27

Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment......................................................................29

Threats and Hazard Identification....................................................................................30

Response Core Capabilities....................................................................................... 32

Critical Transportation......................................................................................................32

Environmental Response/Health and Safety...................................................................33

Fatality Management Services .........................................................................................35

Mass Care Services...........................................................................................................36

Mass Search and Rescue Operations..............................................................................38
National Preparedness Report

 ix 

On-scene Security and Protection...................................................................................40

Operational Communications ..........................................................................................41

Public and Private Services and Resources ...................................................................43

Public Health and Medical Services.................................................................................45

Situational Assessment....................................................................................................48

Response/Recovery Core Capabilities...................................................................... 51

Infrastructure Systems .....................................................................................................51

Recovery Core Capabilities........................................................................................ 53

Economic Recovery..........................................................................................................53

Health and Social Services...............................................................................................55

Housing..............................................................................................................................57

Natural and Cultural Resources.......................................................................................59

Future National Preparedness Reports..................................................................... 60

Conclusion................................................................................................................... 60

Acronym List ............................................................................................................... 62

Endnotes...................................................................................................................... 65

National Preparedness Report

1

 

Introduction

National Preparedness: An Overview

The Nation has made measurable strides toward improving preparedness for the full range of hazards at 

all levels of government and across all segments of society. The Nation has increased its collective 

preparedness not only for the countless threats posed by those who wish to bring harm to the American 

homeland but also for the many natural and technological hazards that face the Nation’s communities.

Efforts to improve national preparedness have incorporated the whole community, which includes 

individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and federal, state, 

local, tribal, and territorial governments. This whole community approach to preparedness recognizes that 

disasters affect all segments of society. While the Federal Government plays a critical role in coordinating 

national-level efforts, it is communities and individuals who lead efforts to implement preparedness 

initiatives throughout the Nation. Accordingly, federal partners have worked with state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments, as well as with a range of civic groups and intergovernmental coalitions to build 

national preparedness. 

Preparedness efforts extend beyond governments. Experience has shown that community members often 

serve as first responders, such as by checking others’ homes after a disaster or by reporting suspicious 

activity. Faith-based and voluntary organizations, furthermore, have demonstrated remarkable speed and 

capacity to establish operations to care for those in need after a disaster. Similarly, the private sector plays 

a critical role in preparedness, operating most of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and possessing the 

presence, agility, and logistical reach to provide commodities and services on a national scale.

Of course, preparedness is not a new concept. This Nation has undertaken preparedness efforts for as long 

as it has existed. What is new is the unity of effort that whole community partners are bringing to the 

challenge, as well as the recognition that preparedness does not just involve spending resources—it 

involves changing mindsets and behaviors. To be sure, some national preparedness investments have 

provided more return than others. Nevertheless, the results of preparedness improvements are evident 

throughout all of the Nation’s communities.

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) presents whole community partners an 

opportunity to reflect on the progress in building national preparedness. Using the lens of the new 

National Preparedness Goal, the 2012 National Preparedness Report (NPR) identifies those areas where 

the Nation has achieved preparedness progress, acknowledges where work remains to be done, and 

reinforces the important principles of national preparedness. 

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness

PPD-8 describes the Nation’s approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk 

to the security of the United States. The approach to national preparedness outlined in PPD-8 includes 

four overarching elements:

 National Preparedness Goal (the Goal), which describes the Nation’s 31 core capabilities across 

five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery (see page 4 for a full 

list of the core capabilities). The Goal emphasizes that national preparedness is the shared 

responsibility of the whole community. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released 

the first edition of the Goal in September 2011. The Goal is a living document that will be reviewed 

regularly to ensure alignment with policies and evolving conditions. 

 National Preparedness System, which outlines the methodology the whole community will employ 

to build, sustain, and deliver core capabilities in order to achieve the goal of a secure and resilient 

Nation. DHS published the National Preparedness System Description in November 2011, and efforts 

to develop associated plans, guidance, programs, and processes are ongoing. Specifically, five 
National Preparedness Report

2

 

National Frameworks—due by June 30, 2012—will describe whole community roles and 

responsibilities for each mission area and define how whole community partners work together to 

deliver core capabilities.

 Campaign for Building and Sustaining Preparedness, which will provide an integrating structure 

for new and existing community-based, nonprofit, and private sector preparedness programs, research 

and development activities, and preparedness assistance.

 National Preparedness Report, an annual report summarizing the progress made toward building, 

sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the Goal. Listed on page 4, the 31 core 

capabilities are distinct critical elements across all five mission areas necessary to achieve the Goal.

The 2012 NPR will serve as a baseline against which to regularly assess progress in preparedness across 

the Nation. In addition to addressing PPD-8’s requirements, the NPR addresses several reporting 

requirements from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, including components 

of the Federal Preparedness Report and State Preparedness Reports.

Methodology for Developing the NPR

As NPR coordinator, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within DHS took the lead in 

developing the Report, acting on the all-of-Nation principles called for in PPD-8. The information and 

data in the NPR reflect input from the full range of whole community partners. Specifically, DHS’s 

approach to developing the NPR included the following activities:

 Collaborating with federal interagency partners to identify quantitative and qualitative performance 

and assessment data for each of the 31 core capabilities from the Goal, including sources such as 

DHS’s National Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Annual Report, National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) compliance reporting, FEMA’s Nationwide Plan Reviews, and annual 

reports from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on public health 

preparedness activities;

 Reviewing 2011 State Preparedness Report (SPR) data, including statewide self-assessments of core 

capability levels submitted to FEMA by all 56 U.S. states and territories through a standardized 

survey;

 Engaging with relevant preparedness-related professional organizations, associations, and private 

sector stakeholders to understand preparedness priorities and progress from a multi-disciplinary 

perspective;

 Soliciting ideas and views regarding national preparedness from the public and other whole 

community stakeholders through an online collaborative forum;1

 Conducting research to identify recent, independent evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data 

related to specific core capabilities; and

 Evaluating trends and progress within and across core capabilities and sharing those findings, as 

appropriate, with whole community partners for review, comment, and update. 

FEMA reviewed and analyzed all of these sources in order to derive key findings for each core capability. 

FEMA evaluated trends and progress within and across core capabilities, sharing findings, as appropriate, 

for review and comment by whole community partners. In this way, the NPR’s key findings are based on 

a comprehensive review of hundreds of sources, rather than any single overarching national assessment. 

Detailed analyses on specific topics related to the core capabilities and their supporting targets served as 

inputs to the broader, strategic view ultimately reflected in the NPR. Taken comprehensively, the result is 

an NPR that identifies overarching trends in preparedness progress.
National Preparedness Report

3

 

The NPR includes SPR data summarized at the national level for each core capability, providing context 

on state and territory views of their current capabilities. All states and territories receiving federal 

preparedness assistance from DHS must submit to FEMA an annual report on their preparedness. In the 

2011 SPR, state and territory emergency management and homeland security personnel led statewide 

efforts to self-assess current levels of preparedness for each core capability relative to desired levels of 

performance. FEMA encouraged states and territories to take a multi-disciplinary approach to completing 

the 2011 SPR, soliciting input from subject-matter experts across different disciplines to develop as 

complete and accurate a snapshot of state preparedness as possible. Although SPR results are not 

independently validated, these self-assessments provide a valuable view of state and territory 

preparedness.

With the September 2011 release of the Goal, the Nation is transitioning to a new set of core capabilities

and supporting targets. Many of the assessments and data used in this NPR pre-date the Goal; 

nevertheless, these assessments provide meaningful quantitative and qualitative data to measure progress 

and report key findings. Assessment processes, methodologies, and data will continue to evolve to align 

more directly with the Goal, the core capabilities, and emerging performance measures. 

Report Organization

In total, the NPR identifies 70 overall key findings. Eight of these key findings focus on overarching 

national trends and are highlighted in the Executive Summary. The remaining sections of the NPR present

62 key findings which relate to the 31 core capabilities from the Goal across all five mission areas. Each 

core capability has a set of common elements, illustrated in Figure 3, providing consistency throughout 

the document. 

1. Each core capability section begins with the core 

capability name and the associated description

provided in the Goal.

2. A box summarizes national-level SPR data for that 

core capability. In the SPR, states and territories 

conducted self-assessments of their overall capability 

levels. States and territories assessed each core 

capability across five areas—Planning, Organization, 

Equipment, Training, and Exercises. SPR results 

appear at the beginning of each core capability 

narrative simply to provide context and are one of 

many inputs that inform key findings for each 

capability.

3. The main text for each core capability includes key 

findings, supported by a discussion of related 

qualitative and quantitative information. 

4. As available, core capability sections include maps, 

charts, and graphs showing progress. 

5. As available, core capability sections include 

preparedness case studies, which highlight examples 

of how whole community partners have worked 

together to achieve outcomes.

In the Goal, several core capabilities span mission areas. 

There are three common core capabilities (Planning; Public 

Information and Warning; and Operational Coordination) that span all five mission areas; three 

capabilities (Intelligence and Information Sharing; Interdiction and Disruption; and Screening, Search, 

Figure 3: Core capability narratives in the 

NPR share a common layout, including SPR 

data, key findings, and other supporting 

inputs.
National Preparedness Report

4

 

and Detection) that span the Prevent and Protect mission areas; and one capability (Infrastructure 

Systems) that spans the Response and Recovery mission areas. For these core capabilities, the NPR 

integrates the key findings and associated data and information into one unified section. Accordingly, 

Table 3 shows the order in which the NPR presents the core capabilities.

Table 3: The NPR addresses all 31 core capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal.

Common Core Capabilities

 Planning 

 Public Information and Warning 

 Operational Coordination

Prevention Core Capability 

 Forensics and Attribution 

Prevention/Protection Core Capabilities

 Intelligence and Information Sharing 

 Interdiction and Disruption

 Screening, Search, and Detection 

Protection Core Capabilities

 Access Control and Identity Verification

 Cybersecurity

 Physical Protective Measures

 Risk Management for Protection Programs 

and Activities

 Supply Chain Integrity and Security 

Mitigation Core Capabilities

 Community Resilience

 Long-term Vulnerability Reduction 

 Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

 Threats and Hazard Identification

Response Core Capabilities

 Critical Transportation

 Environmental Response/Health and Safety

 Fatality Management Services

 Mass Care Services

 Mass Search and Rescue Operations

 On-scene Security and Protection

 Operational Communications 

 Public and Private Services and Resources

 Public Health and Medical Services

 Situational Assessment

Response/Recovery Core Capability

 Infrastructure Systems

Recovery Core Capabilities 

 Economic Recovery

 Health and Social Services

 Housing 

 Natural and Cultural Resources 
National Preparedness Report

5

 

Common Core Capabilities

Planning

Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community as appropriate in the development of 

executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives. 

Key Finding: The Nation has significantly 

improved the adequacy, feasibility, and 

completeness of plans for catastrophic events.

Catastrophic planning remains a top national 

priority.

The 2010 Nationwide Plan Review showed 

significant increases from 2006 in the number of 

jurisdictions confident in their plans for 

catastrophic events (see Figure 4). In 2006, less 

than 40 percent of states and urban areas were 

confident that their overall basic emergency 

operations plans (EOPs) were well-suited to meet 

the challenges of a large-scale catastrophic event. 

By 2010, those numbers had increased to more than 75 percent of 

states and more than 80 percent of urban areas. Additionally, both 

states and urban areas show high degrees of confidence in 

functional planning appendices and hazard-specific planning 

annexes, with even higher degrees of confidence where they have 

more experience (e.g., flooding, tornadoes). More than 80 percent 

of states and more than 75 percent of urban areas had updated 

their plans since 2006 and nearly 95 percent of states and urban 

areas had tested them in exercises. The 2011 SPR survey data 

show that 84 percent of states consider planning to be a high 

priority, the fifth-highest of all 31 capabilities. Moreover, across 

all capabilities, states reported significant capability levels in 

planning activities.

Federal partners have also made important contributions to 

improving catastrophic planning, including Executive Branch 

contingency and continuity planning efforts for catastrophic 

incidents. For example, FEMA and its federal partners developed 

and published a Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National 

Response Framework (NRF) in 2008. This annex establishes the context and overarching strategy for 

implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident. The 

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also routinely updates its all-hazards plans; chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident plans; and pandemic influenza plans that support catastrophic 

incident response. 

Catastrophic planning remains a top priority for the Nation. FEMA leads planning initiatives in different 

geographic areas that consider catastrophic earthquakes, hurricanes, dam failures, improvised nuclear 

device detonation, evacuation and sheltering, and other major events. FEMA also applies a catastrophic 

planning framework known as “Maximum of Maximums,” which centers on collaborative, whole 

community planning for worst-case scenarios that exceed government capabilities. This approach sets 

ambitious outcomes for whole community partners to achieve after a catastrophic event. Examples 

include: treating, stabilizing, and caring for 265,000 casualties; meeting the supply and materiel needs of 

1.5 million disaster survivors within 72 hours; restoring basic services for an affected area of seven 

2011 SPR Results: Planning

Figure 4: Confidence in basic 

emergency plans for catastrophic 

events improved significantly 

from 2006 to 2010.
National Preparedness Report

6

 

million people within 60 days; and recovering communities of 1.5 million disaster survivors within five 

years. 

Key Finding: Emergency planning efforts increasingly adhere to standardized development and 

maintenance processes, reflecting FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101) and new 

requirements from PPD-8.

First issued in March 2009, CPG 101 has become the standard for developing and maintaining state, 

local, tribal, and territorial EOPs throughout the Nation, outlining the fundamentals of sound planning for 

emergency and homeland security managers. In 2010, 100 percent of states and 96 percent of urban areas 

indicated that their basic EOPs fully or partially incorporated applicable components of CPG 101. 

Accordingly, whole community stakeholders are applying the CPG 101 core planning principles. For 

example, CPG 101 emphasizes the importance of integrating community stakeholders into the planning 

process. In 2011, 760 local Citizen Corps Councils (70 percent) reported that they had participated in the 

review of key local plans.

PPD-8 calls for further efforts to standardize and integrate plans nationally. Federal partners are working 

with whole community stakeholders to develop National Frameworks that describe roles and 

responsibilities across all five mission areas and define how whole community partners work together to 

deliver core capabilities. In addition, PPD-8 calls for Federal Interagency Operational Plans to address the 

critical tasks; responsibilities; and requirements for resourcing, personnel, and sourcing for the core 

capabilities.

Key Finding: Mitigation planning is an area of national strength.

All 56 states and territories have completed or are on target to complete approved mitigation plans. 

Ninety-five percent of these plans address 

inclusion of populations with disabilities and other 

access and functional needs in some way, and all 

state hazard mitigation plans provide opportunities 

for public review and comment prior to plan 

approval. Over 18,000 communities have FEMAapproved local mitigation plans (see Figure 5). The 

percentage of the Nation’s population covered by 

these approved local mitigation plans has steadily 

increased and now stands at nearly 69 percent, up 

from approximately 57 percent in 2007. In 

addition, FEMA has issued and regularly updates 

multi-hazard mitigation planning guidance for both 

states and local jurisdictions, which requires 

natural hazard analysis and encourages 

consideration of other threats.

Key Finding: Private sector critical infrastructure stakeholders have embraced preparedness planning.

Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partnership model, planning-focused 

coordinating structures now exist throughout the 18 critical infrastructure sectors. Sector Coordinating 

Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs) for each sector provide ongoing 

coordination and planning for private sector and government partners. Dating back to 2004, these SCCs 

are self-organized planning and policy bodies that include broad representation from within the 18 

sectors, including owners, operators, associations, and other relevant partners. For each sector, GCCs are 

the public sector counterpart to SCCs, with federal, state, and local government members. Through these 

Figure 5: The growth in local hazard mitigation 

planning since 2007 translates into an additional 

30 million individuals covered by these plans.
National Preparedness Report

7

 

coordinating bodies, the sectors have established sector-specific plans, which describe how each sector is 

identifying and implementing risk management actions to enhance infrastructure protection.

Key Finding: Government partners have worked to address weaknesses in contingency and continuity 

planning across all levels of government. 

The 2006 Nationwide Plan Review identified continuity planning as a significant weakness, with less than 

50 percent of states and urban areas rating continuity-related plans as sufficient for a catastrophic event. 

Since then, FEMA has released comprehensive continuity planning guidance for non-federal 

governments. From 2006 to 2010, the number of states and urban areas requesting continuity of 

operations (COOP) technical assistance from FEMA increased more than eight-fold over the previous 

four years. In addition, as of January 2012, over 340,000 individuals had completed COOP training 

through the Emergency Management Institute, including over 244,000 in basic COOP awareness training.

At the federal level, FEMA released Federal Continuity Directives 1 and 2 in 2008, providing guidance to 

federal agencies on developing continuity plans and programs and identifying essential functions. 

Key Finding: Recent progress has occurred in recovery planning with the release of new doctrine and 

guidance, yet recovery planning is an area for improvement for all whole community partners.

The release of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) marks an important milestone in 

recovery planning. The NDRF articulates roles and responsibilities for long-term recovery and outlines 

how whole community partners can engage cooperatively in implementing the six Recovery Support 

Functions (RSFs). Emergency Support Function (ESF) #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery)

representatives have worked with 180 communities across 23 states on recovery planning since 2004, 

deploying approximately 60 teams to support state, local, tribal, and territorial recovery after disasters and 

helping to develop 90 community recovery plans. This long-term recovery function continues under the 

Community Planning and Capacity Building RSF from the NDRF. Similarly, CDC recently developed 15 

public health preparedness capabilities to serve as national standards to support state and local public 

health planning. Community Recovery is one capability addressed in that guidance, outlining 

considerations for rebuilding public health, medical, and mental/behavioral health systems following 

disasters. HHS ASPR also published eight capabilities focused on healthcare system preparedness, 

including healthcare system recovery. Recovery-focused planning is an area for sustained focus in future 

years.
National Preparedness Report

8

 

Public Information and Warning

Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the 

use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively 

relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance 

being made available, as appropriate. 

Key Finding: State and urban area confidence in 

public information and warning plans has 

increased significantly since 2006.

The 2010 Nationwide Plan Review indicated that 

more than 73 percent of states and urban areas 

were confident in their public information and 

warning plans for a catastrophic event, up from 

less than 45 percent in 2006 (see Figure 6). As 

part of these planning improvements, 31 states and 

territories have established state-level public 

information procedures that mirror the Federal 

Government’s, and an additional 14 states and 

territories have published public information 

doctrine. In addition, there has been a proliferation 

of mass notification systems that allow 

officials to warn community members who are 

in harm’s way and provide them with critical 

emergency information. These mass 

notification systems, combined with social 

media, have dramatically increased the breadth 

and speed of information dissemination during 

emergencies. Many of these mass notification 

systems integrate weather warnings from the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), which has worked to 

increase the timeliness and accuracy of its 

warning data. In FY 2011, NOAA issued 

severe weather warnings for tornadoes with an 

accuracy rate of 76 percent, providing an 

average lead time of 15 minutes. Both of these 

results exceeded NOAA’s targets and 

demonstrated year-over-year improvements from FY 2010. 

Key Finding: A large and growing portion of the Nation is covered by the Integrated Public Alert and 

Warning System (IPAWS), but technical deficiencies still exist.

IPAWS is an integrated set of services and capabilities that enable local, state, and federal authorities to 

alert and warn their communities of a hazard. As of 2011, commercial radio broadcast stations partnering 

with FEMA on public information and warning serve 84 percent of the U.S. population, up from 

approximately 67 percent in 2009. As part of the IPAWS programs, these broadcast stations are equipped 

with backup communications equipment and power generators to continue to support broadcasting prior 

to, during, and after an event.

In November 2011, the United States conducted its first-ever nationwide test of the Emergency Alert 

System (EAS), a national public warning system. The purpose of the test was to assess the readiness and 

2011 SPR Results: Public Information and 

Warning

Figure 6: State and urban area confidence in public 

information and warning plans more than doubled 

from 2006 to 2010.
National Preparedness Report

9

 

effectiveness of the system for the President to address the public during times of extreme national 

emergency. Radio and television broadcasters and cable, satellite, and wireline providers across the 

country participated in the test. Although millions of Americans heard and saw the message, the test 

revealed technical areas for improvement, including audio quality and configuration of EAS devices. 

Initial test findings indicated that approximately 80 percent of EAS participants nationwide could receive 

and relay the test message.

Operational Coordination

Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately 

integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities. 

Key Finding: The National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) now serves as common incident 

management doctrine for the whole community.

Prior to the introduction of NIMS in 2004, no 

single, official incident command system existed 

for the Nation. By 2011, approximately 4.2 

million homeland security stakeholders from 

across the Nation had successfully completed the 

FEMA-sponsored Independent Study (IS)-100 

course (“Introduction to the Incident Command 

System [ICS]”). Nearly 3.9 million had gone on to 

complete IS-700 (“NIMS: An Introduction”), and 

1.7 million had completed IS-200 (“ICS for Single 

Resources and Initial Action Incidents”). The homeland security community has supported a nationwide 

transformation through NIMS/ICS training as seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8, which show national pre9/11 and post-9/11 web-based ICS course completions by ZIP code. In addition, most states have 

successfully achieved the 2009 state-level NIMS implementation objectives, which cover issues such as 

NIMS adoption; integration of NIMS into planning, training, and exercise activities; and resource 

management. Fifty-five states, territories, and the District of Columbia reported on NIMS 

implementation. Forty-seven of those 55 respondents achieved all 28 NIMS objectives. The remaining 

respondents achieved 99 percent of the objectives they reported. The Federal Government has also 

achieved progress in adopting and implementing NIMS, with 13 agencies reporting 100 percent 

completion of NIMS objectives.

2011 SPR Results: Operational Coordination

Figure 7: Prior to 9/11, many state, local, tribal 

and territorial jurisdictions did not train to use 

ICS.

Figure 8: Today, NIMS is the nationwide 

standard for incident management.
National Preparedness Report

10

 

Key Finding: Operational coordination structures exist for all five mission areas. However, the 

Response mission area has the most metrics that can demonstrate improvements over time.

Each mission area has an established set of operational coordination structures that integrate key 

stakeholders into critical functions. As an example, in the Prevention mission area, a network of national 

coordinating structures exists to counter imminent terrorism threats, including, but not limited to, national 

operations and coordination centers, the Terrorist Screening Center, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

(JTTFs). 

Similarly, critical infrastructure stakeholders have established SCCs and GCCs, which facilitate the

development of sector-specific plans. An area of increasing focus is coordination to address 

interdependencies across infrastructure sectors through entities such as the Critical Infrastructure CrossSector Council, the Regional Consortium Coordinating Council, and the Critical Infrastructure 

Partnership Advisory Council. In the maritime domain, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has established

Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs) at key ports around the country to coordinate port security 

activities with federal, state, local, and private sector maritime partners. Supporting these IOCs is the 

DHS Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, which formalized coordination, planning, information 

sharing, and intelligence integration for maritime operations among the USCG, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). From a long-term recovery 

perspective, the NDRF establishes Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator positions and recommends that 

state, local, tribal, and territorial leaders appoint Disaster Recovery Coordinators to provide a central 

focus for organizing, coordinating, and advancing disaster recovery operations. 

Key operational coordination metrics showing 

progress are largely concentrated in the Response 

mission area. There are currently 16 federal Incident 

Management Assistance Teams and 128 state and 

local teams that can work with state, local, tribal, 

and territorial emergency operations centers (EOCs) 

during disasters to reinforce and expand ICS (see

Figure 9). Similarly, FEMA tracks how quickly 

essential incident command functions are established 

following disasters. In 2011, FEMA had a 100-

percent success rate in supporting state, local, tribal, 

and territorial stakeholders to establish essential 

incident command functions within 12 hours. FEMA 

has also developed additional doctrine and guidance 

to support NIMS implementation, such as the 2011 

FEMA National Incident Support Manual, which 

describes how FEMA national staff support incident 

Preparedness Case Study: Tampa Police Shooting

On June 29, 2010, two officers from the Tampa Police Department (TPD) were shot and killed during 

a traffic stop. TPD arrived on scene after the suspect fled on foot and immediately implemented ICS. 

The response transitioned seamlessly to a Unified Command when Hillsborough County Sheriff’s 

Office assets arrived. As the investigation expanded, ICS enabled a broader command structure that 

efficiently integrated investigatory, analytical, surveillance, and tactical operations assets. The 

manhunt grew to involve 22 law enforcement agencies and more than 1,000 personnel. TPD arrested 

the suspect after a 96-hour manhunt. ICS ensured clear span of control despite a rapid influx of

officers and resources from multiple jurisdictions and levels of government. ICS was also effective in 

blending special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units from various agencies to ensure that functions 

were sustainable after the first high-intensity searches.2

Figure 9: Federal, state, and local incident 

management teams support operational coordination

activities nationwide.
National Preparedness Report

11

 

operations. PPD-8 requires the development of National Frameworks for planning built on “scalable, 

flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures.” These planning structures will support future initiatives

to develop and report on coordination-related metrics across all five mission areas.

Prevention Core Capabilities

Forensics and Attribution

Conduct forensic analysis and attribute terrorist acts (including the means and methods of terrorism) to 

their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and for the preparation for 

an attack in an effort to prevent initial or follow-on acts and/or swiftly develop counter-options. 

Key Finding: Prevention-focused forensics and 

attribution capabilities reside almost entirely with 

federal agencies, with specialized forensics 

capabilities that serve the Nation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) 

network of 56 field offices, 399 domestic satellite 

offices, and 63 international legal attaché offices

has expanded upon traditional criminal forensic 

capabilities to support counterterrorism efforts. 

Example programs include the following FBI 

units and teams: 

 The Counterterrorism and Forensic Science 

Research Unit, which develops and validates 

new forensic technologies and techniques that support FBI and state, local, tribal, and territorial law 

enforcement needs;

 The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Sciences Unit, which has conducted and 

directed forensic examinations of hazardous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials 

since 2002; 

 Evidence Response Teams, which have a total of 1,200 personnel across all 56 FBI field offices 

trained to identify, document, collect, and preserve evidence for court cases;

 Cyber Action Teams, which are small cadres of technical experts that can deploy within 72 hours to 

investigate cybercrimes and conduct forensic analysis; and 

 The Criminal Justice Information Services Division’s Global Initiatives Unit, which collects and 

shares fingerprint and biometric information for suspected terrorists and international criminals with 

international law enforcement and Intelligence Community partners.

Other resources include the Technical Explosives Device Analytic Center, which is managed by the FBI 

in partnership with DOD and provides forensic and technical analysis of improvised explosive devices. 

Using advanced forensic techniques, the center studies terrorist methods and tactics, provides actionable 

intelligence to military and law enforcement partners, and forecasts explosives-related threats globally. 

Additionally, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center within the DHS Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO) provides centralized planning, integration, assessment, and stewardship of the 

Nation’s nuclear forensics capabilities, and leads efforts to advance capabilities to conduct nuclear 

forensics on illicitly trafficked radiological or nuclear materials or those extracted from an interdicted 

weapon. Nuclear forensics is the collection, analysis, and evaluation of pre- and post-detonation 

radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris, as well as the analysis of the immediate effects 

created by a nuclear detonation. Combined with law enforcement and intelligence information, nuclear 

2011 SPR Results: Forensics and Attribution
National Preparedness Report

12

 

forensics findings can help identify the nature, source, pathway, and perpetrators of an attempted or actual 

attack. 

In the computer forensics domain, the U.S. Secret Service, DHS, and the State of Alabama have partnered 

to establish the National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI). NCFI’s goal is to provide a national 

standard of training for a variety of electronic crimes investigations. NCFI offers state and local law 

enforcement officers the training necessary to conduct computer forensics examinations, respond to 

network intrusion incidents, and conduct basic electronic crimes investigations. Since opening in 2008, 

the NCFI has allowed the Secret Service to train 1,324 state and local law enforcement officials, 

prosecutors, and judges representing over 300 agencies from all 50 states and 3 U.S. territories. 

Data on state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism forensics and attribution capabilities are limited 

and anecdotal. Furthermore, only 42 percent of states indicated in their 2011 SPR survey that Forensics 

and Attribution was a high-priority capability; it tied for the lowest total for any of the 31 capabilities. 

This prioritization likely reflects the fact that the Federal Government plays a more prominent role in this 

capability than states, allowing states to focus preparedness resources on other priority areas.

Prevention/Protection Core Capabilities

Intelligence and Information Sharing

Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, 

exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available 

information concerning threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, 

proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security by 

Federal, state, local, and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, 

information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local, or private sector entities, as appropriate. 

Key Finding: A network of state and major urban 

area fusion centers and JTTFs has significantly 

improved analytical and information sharing 

capabilities among law enforcement, homeland 

security, and Intelligence Community entities at 

all levels of government.

Consistent with the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing, fusion centers function as 

focal points within the state and local environment 

for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of 

threat-related information between federal, state, 

and local governments and private sector partners. 

Fusion centers position law enforcement, public 

safety, emergency management, fire service, 

public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local 

implications of national intelligence. As of February 2012, 77 designated state and major urban area 

fusion centers exist nationally, as shown in Figure 10. A 2009 survey by the National Governors 

Association revealed that fusion centers were a top priority for states, a trend confirmed by the 2011 SPR. 

In October 2011, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)—in collaboration with interagency 

partners—concluded an assessment of the National Network of Fusion Centers to evaluate the maturity of 

their capabilities. The assessment showed that:

2011 SPR Results: Intelligence and 

Information Sharing
National Preparedness Report

13

 

 79.2 percent have approved plans, policies, 

or standard operating procedures (SOPs) 

for receiving federally generated threat 

information;

 76.4 percent have approved plans, policies, 

or SOPs for assessing the local implications 

of time-sensitive and emerging threat 

information;

 79.2 percent have approved plans, policies, 

or SOPs governing the timely 

dissemination of products to customers 

within their area of responsibility; 

 80.6 percent have documented plans, 

policies, or SOPs for gathering locally 

generated information or have a Nationwide

Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) site plan; and

 100 percent have developed plans, policies, or SOPs for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. 

Working with other federal partners, DHS coordinates a variety of resources to support fusion centers, 

including deployed personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, 

connectivity to federal systems, technology, and grant funding. For example, there are now 93 DHS I&A 

personnel deployed in support of fusion centers throughout the country. These intelligence personnel 

coordinate with DHS Component intelligence and law enforcement personnel who support fusion centers 

in various capacities. Additionally, in FY 2011, DHS provided training to nearly 1,500 state, local, tribal, 

and territorial analysts on analytic techniques and methodologies and supported the NSI in providing 

training to over 200,000 law enforcement officers on indicators of suspicious activity. Additionally, in 

2010, DHS and DOJ jointly issued guidance to strengthen ties between fusion centers and EOCs, 

including steps to help them routinely share information. The DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) 

also provides programs, training, funding, operational coordination, and system deployment that support 

the DHS efforts to mature the National Network 

of Fusion Centers. 

JTTFs are FBI-led multi-jurisdictional task 

forces established to conduct terrorism-related 

investigations. JTTFs focus primarily on 

terrorism-related issues, with specific regard to 

terrorism investigations with local, regional, 

national, and international implications. 

Investigations conducted by JTTFs focus on 

known threat actors or identified individuals 

who meet the thresholds established in 

accordance with the Attorney General 

Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations to 

initiate assessments or investigations. Using 

information derived from FBI Field Office Field 

Intelligence Groups, JTTF operations, and other 

federal partners, the FBI develops intelligence 

products on significant developments or trends 

related to terrorism. State, local, and private sector partners can use these intelligence products to support 

law enforcement and homeland security activities, such as intelligence-led policing efforts, implementing 

protective measures, or other target hardening initiatives.

Figure 10: The National Network of Fusion Centers as of 

February 2012

Figure 11: Over 100 FBI JTTFs exist nationally as of 2011, 

focusing primarily on terrorism-related issues.
National Preparedness Report

14

 

The number of JTTFs has grown from 35 in 2001 to 103 in 2012 (see Figure 11), ultimately including 

over 4,400 members globally from 57 federal and 540 state and local law enforcement agencies. The FBI 

has 104 personnel assigned to 55 fusion centers, 16 of which are co-located within the FBI’s JTTFs or 

Field Intelligence Groups. FBI and other federal partners—including ODNI, DOD, and DHS—also share 

threat information through the JTTFs. DOD has approximately 90 detailees that support 56 FBI JTTFs 

throughout the United States. In August 2011, DOD and DOJ adopted an overarching memorandum of 

understanding to promote standardized and controlled information sharing. This collaboration plays an 

important role in protecting U.S. military communities.

More broadly, intelligence analysts from over 30 departments and agencies work inside the ODNI-led 

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which facilitates information sharing between the Intelligence 

Community and state, local, tribal, and private partners in coordination with DHS, FBI, and other 

interagency partners. NCTC serves as the Federal Government’s central and shared knowledge repository 

on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. 

Key Finding: Prevention and protection public information campaigns have resulted in high-profile 

criminal or terrorist indictments and convictions.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a collaborative effort led by the 

DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance in partnership with DHS, FBI, and state, local, tribal, and territorial law 

enforcement partners. NSI provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other 

related criminal activity by creating a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, 

analyzing, and sharing SAR information. The NSI establishes a standardized process to identify and 

report suspicious activity in jurisdictions across the country and serves as the unified focal point for 

sharing SAR information. There are multiple options for entry of the SAR data, to include the Shared 

Space and eGuardian, which allow FBI JTTFs and fusion centers to seamlessly access and share SAR 

information. As of January 2012, 53 fusion centers have implemented NSI policies, processes, and 

standards; another 18 fusion centers can submit SAR information via eGuardian or the Shared Space. The 

NSI also includes comprehensive training on identifying and reporting pre-incident terrorism indicators 

while ensuring protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. The behaviors outlined in this 

training were identified through the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT), a BJA program 

that was started in 1996 focused on recognizing and preventing terrorist attacks and is provided to 

thousands of law enforcement officers each year.

NSI is a critical aspect of DHS’s “If You See Something, Say SomethingTM” campaign, which is a simple 

and effective program to raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, and 

to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper local law enforcement 

authorities. Both the “If You See Something, Say SomethingTM” campaign and the NSI underscore the 

concept that homeland security begins with hometown security, where an alert public plays a critical role 

in keeping our nation safe. In addition, since 2005 the USCG has operated the America’s Waterway 

Watch program, which enables reporting of suspicious activity in and around maritime environments to 

appropriate authorities. Together, these efforts have helped raise awareness about suspicious behavior and 

have resulted in high-profile criminal or terrorist indictments and convictions. 
National Preparedness Report

15

 

Interdiction and Disruption

Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards. 

Key finding: Layered defenses in the air, land, 

and maritime domains have enhanced protection 

against terrorist plots. 

Federal agencies have built new programs and 

increased staffing to strengthen capabilities to 

detect and disrupt potential terrorist attacks in the 

air, along land borders, and at sea. Across all these 

domains, approximately 700 FBI agents serve as 

air, maritime, and rail liaisons. In November 2010, 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

completed implementation of a 9/11 Commission 

recommendation to improve air passenger 

screening. Through the Secure Flight program, 

TSA checks all passengers boarding flights within or bound for the United States against consolidated 

terrorist watch lists. TSA electronically screens millions of bags for explosives each day at over 450 

airports nationwide. TSA also screens all air cargo transported via commercial passenger flights 

originating domestically. TSA works daily with international partners to screen 100 percent of high-risk 

inbound cargo on passenger planes and is making significant progress toward screening all international 

inbound cargo on passenger planes. In addition, interagency partners established an Air Domain 

Awareness Board in 2011 to synchronize and deconflict air domain awareness efforts across the Federal 

Government. 

Federal agencies have also significantly increased the number of personnel supporting border security and 

developed multi-agency teams to disrupt criminal enterprises along the border. Annual performance 

measures indicate that these and other investments are paying off. Nationwide, Border Patrol 

apprehensions of illegal aliens decreased from nearly 724,000 in FY 2008 to approximately 340,000 in 

FY 2011, a 53-percent reduction, indicating that fewer people are attempting to illegally cross the border. 

In the maritime domain, the FBI maintains an active maritime response capability that works closely with 

local partners. Twenty-five of the FBI’s 56 SWAT teams are designated, trained, and equipped for 

maritime operations. In addition, the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team maintains an advanced interdiction 

capability with helicopter and high-speed intercept vessels to support this mission. The FBI’s maritime 

tactical response incorporates these resources and local agency partners to disrupt or interdict criminal or 

terrorist threats. USCG interdiction forces include major cutters in U.S. waters and on the high seas, 

patrol boats, and shore-based small boats. USCG deployable specialized forces—including the Maritime 

Security Response Team and 11 Maritime Safety and Security Teams—conduct advanced interdiction 

2011 SPR Results: Interdiction and Disruption

Preparedness Case Study: Reporting Suspicious Activities

On January 27, 2011, three alert workers identified a suspicious backpack placed along the planned 

route of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Day Unity March in Spokane, Washington. The workers 

established a perimeter around the backpack and promptly alerted police who diverted the march. 

Upon investigation, law enforcement authorities determined that the backpack contained an 

improvised explosive device. After a multi-week investigation conducted by the Inland Northwest 

JTTF—comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies—the FBI arrested Kevin 

William Harpham and charged him with two crimes related to the planned bombing. Harpham pleaded 

guilty in September 2011 and was sentenced to 32 years in prison.
National Preparedness Report

16

 

operations, high-speed intercepts, and maritime radiation detection, as well as respond to criminal or 

terrorist actions. DOD and DHS have established procedures that provide for rapid transfer of DOD 

forces to support USCG maritime homeland security operations, and for the USCG to transfer forces to 

Combatant Commanders to support maritime homeland defense operations. More broadly, DOD employs 

an active, layered defense to seamlessly integrate U.S. capabilities in forward regions around the world, 

as well as space, cyberspace, and domestically. The USCG interdicted almost 2,500 undocumented 

migrants attempting to enter the United States via maritime routes in FY 2011. 

Key finding: States and local jurisdictions have used their own resources in combination with federal 

assistance to enhance interdiction and disruption capabilities since 9/11 by building specialized fire and 

law enforcement teams. Highly specialized FBI resources are capable of immediately initiating 

operations to interdict or disrupt threats and are supported by additional federal agencies. 

Federal, state, and local organizations have built a national inventory of specialized teams that can 

conduct operations to render safe explosive devices and dispose of hazardous materials. Approximately 

1,100 hazardous materials (hazmat) teams, 5,400 SWAT teams (see Figure 12), and 469 FBI-trained and -

accredited bomb squads exist at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. Federal grant funding has 

contributed to these capability enhancements largely through training and equipment support. For 

example, jurisdictions implemented more than 250 projects to acquire new and improved robots to 

support bomb squad render safe operations, using over $49 million from FEMA preparedness grants from 

FY 2004 to FY 2010. 

The FBI maintains unique assets to support 

interdiction and disruption activities. For example, 

the FBI operates the Critical Incident Response 

Group, which can deploy subject-matter experts in 

crisis management, tactical operations, crisis 

negotiation, hostage rescue, hazardous device 

mitigation, and behavioral assessment. In addition, 

the FBI maintains and, when required, deploys 

investigative and technical resources to assess and 

respond to WMD threats and incidents. FBI 

resources also include the Hazardous Materials 

Response Unit, which responds to criminal acts and 

incidents that involve hazardous materials, and 28 

Hazardous Materials Response Teams, which 

support evidence collection in hazardous 

environments. DOE’s National Nuclear Security

Administration supports render safe operations to 

recover and secure a radiological device or a lost or 

stolen U.S. nuclear weapon in support of federal, state, and local authorities.

Figure 12: Law enforcement agencies around the 

country have developed SWAT teams capable of 

supporting interdiction and disruptions efforts.
National Preparedness Report

17

 

Screening, Search, and Detection

Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards through active and passive surveillance and search 

procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, sensor technologies, 

or physical investigation and intelligence. 

Key Finding: Chemical and biological agent 

detection, confirmation, and characterization 

capabilities have improved in key laboratories 

across the Nation, contributing to improved 

biosurveillance capabilities.

The CDC Laboratory Response Network (LRN) 

includes federal, state, and local facilities that can 

confirm detection of, characterize, and 

communicate information on confirmed chemical 

and biological threats. Of these LRN laboratories, 

142 can test for biological agents, while 47 can 

test for chemical agents. The total number of LRN 

labs has decreased since 2007, although lab 

performance has trended upward. For example, in 

2010, 95 percent of LRN biological labs passed proficiency tests, up slightly from 2008. In exercises, 96 

percent of LRN biological labs showed they could contact the CDC EOC within two hours. Laboratories 

have cut the average time needed to process and report on large volumes of chemical agent samples by 

over 40 percent, dropping from 98 hours in 2009 to 56 hours in 2010. Moreover, sophisticated LRN 

chemical labs demonstrated proficiency in using more testing methods to detect and measure chemical 

agents, growing from an average of 6.7 methods per lab in 2009 to 8.9 in 2010. Laboratories are 

distributed across the country, ensuring that approximately 90 percent of the U.S. population lives within 

100 miles of an LRN facility (see Figure 13). 

The CDC LRN is only one component of an integrated set of laboratory networks around the country. 

Additional laboratory networks, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Environmental 

Response Laboratory Network (ERLN), and the USDA and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food 

Emergency Response Network (FERN), provide laboratory screening capabilities for a range of natural 

and other hazards.

2011 SPR Results: Screening, Search, and 

Detection

Preparedness Case Study: Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series

The Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS) brings together stakeholders 

from law enforcement, incident management, and the private sector in cities across the country to 

engage in scenario-based reviews of their terrorism prevention and response capabilities. Jointly 

sponsored by the National Counterterrorism Center, DHS, and the FBI, the workshops revolve around 

a 24-hour scenario in which multiple, coordinated assaults occur, resembling the November 2008 

terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. During the workshops, participants jointly evaluate whether the 

city’s existing plans, procedures, and capabilities are adequate to manage a coordinated, multi-site 

terrorist attack and to identify existing programs or resources that they can use to close any gaps.

Since 2009, 6 JCTAWS workshops have occurred throughout the country.
National Preparedness Report

18

 

These labs are part of a broader effort to 

develop biosurveillance capabilities nationwide. 

Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and 

hospital partners have developed a broad array 

of surveillance systems to detect outbreaks and 

other public health events of consequence. In 

2010, CDC developed a National 

Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health, 

which identifies priorities, goals, and objectives 

for a national enterprise of complementary 

biosurveillance systems that provides relevant, 

accurate, and timely information for 

government, healthcare, business, and personal 

decision-making for planning and responding to 

population health emergencies. 

The DHS-managed BioWatch program provides 

biological agent monitoring and detection 

capabilities for targeted high-risk urban areas 

across the country. BioWatch is the Nation’s federally managed and locally operated biomonitoring and 

detection system designed to detect intentional release of aerosolized biological agents. Since 2003, 

BioWatch has expanded coverage to more than 30 metropolitan areas. Fourteen BioWatch coordinators in 

the field work closely with local, state, and regional planning teams to advise public health, emergency 

management, and other local officials on BioWatch operations. Similarly, EPA maintains RadNet, a 

national network of monitoring stations in each state that regularly collect air, precipitation, drinking 

water, and milk samples for analysis of radioactivity.

In addition, CDC has several biosurveillance initiatives, programs, and systems in place. For example, the 

National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance is a computerized public health 

surveillance system that provides CDC with weekly data regarding cases of certain diseases. At the state 

level, assessments conducted by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists have revealed 

progress in state biosurveillance efforts. In 2010, 47 states (94 percent) had established fully operational 

state electronic disease surveillance systems, up from 40 (80 percent) in 2007. More broadly, the National 

Biosurveillance Integration Center, managed by DHS, plays a key role in integrating biosurveillance 

activities to quickly and effectively monitor, detect, and respond to biological events of national concern.

Key finding: Federal agencies scan most of the cargo entering the United States through land borders 

and seaports for radiological and nuclear threats. State and local partners have also enhanced 

capabilities by building preventive radiological and nuclear detection networks and training thousands of 

first responders.

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and 

personnel with a mission to protect against terrorist attacks using nuclear and radiological materials. A 

key focus of this worldwide architecture is the detection of radiological and nuclear material at U.S. ports 

of entry. DHS’s DNDO and CBP have partnered to submit most containerized cargo coming into the 

United States through land borders and seaports to screening using radiation portal monitors. In FY 2011, 

DHS met annual performance targets for using radiation detection systems to scan cargo entering the 

United States via land borders, as well as international rail and sea ports of entry. In addition, all USCG 

boarding and inspection teams are equipped with radiation detection and identification capabilities to stop 

radiological threats far away from U.S. ports. Finally, the FBI coordinates and oversees search and 

response operations for identified radiological and nuclear threats, providing a command and control 

structure, offering guidance on prioritizing critical resources, incorporating intelligence and investigative 

information, and consolidating activities of participating incident response organizations. 

Figure 13: As of 2010, most of the Nation’s 

population centers are within 100 miles of an LRN 

public health laboratory.
National Preparedness Report

19

 

At the same time, state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies are also enhancing their radiological/nuclear 

detection capabilities. Through the Securing the Cities program and other state and local programs, more 

than 100,000 responders have received training in radiological/nuclear incident awareness and prevention 

via the Nevada Test Site’s Counter Terrorism Operations Support (CTOS) program, and more than $2.1 

billion in investments have enabled states and major urban areas to develop preventive 

radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) programs. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

Radiological Assistance Program also delivers training and technical assistance support to federal, state, 

and local partners in order to help to evaluate, identify, search for, and mitigate nuclear or radiological 

hazards. 

Protection Core Capabilities

Access Control and Identity Verification

Apply a broad range of physical, technological, and cyber measures to control admittance to critical 

locations and systems, limiting access to authorized individuals to carry out legitimate activities. 

Key finding: Owners and operators of highpriority infrastructure assets are strengthening 

access controls as part of risk-based priority 

security enhancements.

Critical infrastructure owners and operators 

participating in the Enhanced Critical 

Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) security survey 

reported that their use of background checks 

increased from 88 percent in 2009 to 95 percent in 

2010. Critical infrastructure sectors have 

implemented credentialing programs to control 

access to privately owned facilities. For example, 

the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC) program provides credentials 

for transportation workers at regulated maritime port facilities. In FY 2011, DHS reported a 100-percent 

TWIC compliance rate at regulated facilities. Similarly, the Hazardous Materials Endorsement Threat 

Assessment Program conducts terrorist, immigration, and criminal background checks on commercial 

drivers applying to obtain, renew, or transfer a hazmat endorsement on a commercial driver’s license. In

FY 2009 alone, the program evaluated over 297,000 applicants. 

Key finding: Federal agencies have made some progress in recent years in strengthening access control 

and identity verification procedures.

Issued in 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) ordered the establishment of a 

government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for employees and contractors 

accessing federally controlled facilities and networks. The General Services Administration (GSA) 

manages the government-wide acquisition of information technology for implementing access card 

services compliant with HSPD-12. In October 2011, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 

evaluated federal progress in implementing HSPD-12 requirements between 2008 and 2011. The GAO 

concluded that agencies had made:

 Substantial progress in conducting background investigations and in issuing Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) cards (see Figure 14); 

 Fair progress in using electronic capabilities of the PIV cards for access to federal facilities;

2011 SPR Results: Access Control and 

Identity Verification
National Preparedness Report

20

 

 Limited progress in using the electronic 

capabilities of the cards for access to federal 

information systems; and

 Minimal progress in accepting and 

electronically authenticating cards from other 

agencies.

As of September 1, 2011, agencies reported that 

they had issued more than five million credentials to 

the federal workforce (89 percent of the total 

number of people requiring credentials, including 

both government employees and contractors), up

from 4.5 million the previous year. Agencies had 

also completed almost five million background 

investigations (86 percent of the total number 

required) in accordance with HSPD-12. 

Federal agencies have also taken additional steps to 

control access to chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials. For 

example, the FBI conducts a security risk assessment on all persons requiring access to dangerous 

biological agents and toxins—referred to as select agents—that have the potential to pose a severe threat 

to human, animal, or plant health. 

Cybersecurity

Protect against damage to, the unauthorized use of, and/or the exploitation of (and, if needed, the 

restoration of) electronic communications systems and services (and the information contained therein).

Key Finding: Cyber attacks have increased 

significantly in number and sophistication in 

recent years, resulting in the Federal Government 

and private sector partners expanding their 

cybersecurity efforts.

The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

(US-CERT) reported an over 650-percent increase 

in the number of cyber incidents reported by 

federal agencies over a five-year period, from 

5,503 in FY 2006, to 41,776 in FY 2010. Almost 

two-thirds of U.S. firms report that they have been 

the victim of cybersecurity incidents or 

information breaches. Moreover, this serious 

problem may be subject to underreporting: only 50 percent of owners and operators at high-priority 

facilities participating in the ECIP security survey said that they report cyber incidents to external parties. 

DHS’s Strategic National Risk Assessment notes that cyber attacks can have catastrophic consequences 

and trigger cascading effects across critical infrastructure sectors.

To counter these and related threats, federal and private sector partners have accelerated initiatives to 

enhance data collection, detect events, raise awareness, and respond to cyber incidents. In fact, most 

infrastructure protection stakeholders now identify cybersecurity as a priority issue for their programs. At 

least 10 different critical infrastructure sectors have established joint public-private working groups 

through the SCCs and GCCs focused on cyber issues. In FY 2011, facility owners and operators from all 

2011 SPR Results: Cybersecurity

Figure 14: In just three years, federal agencies 

rapidly increased the percentage of the federal 

workforce with PIV cards.
National Preparedness Report

21

 

18 critical infrastructure sectors conducted assessments using the DHS Cyber Security Evaluation Tool. 

This free software helps users assess their systems and networks through a series of guided questions. In 

addition, DHS and DOD are jointly undertaking a proof-of-concept called the Joint Cybersecurity 

Services Pilot. The purpose of this pilot program is to enhance the cybersecurity of participating Defense 

Industrial Base (DIB) critical infrastructure entities and to protect sensitive DOD information and DIB 

intellectual property that directly supports DOD missions or the development of DOD capabilities from 

unauthorized access, exfiltration, and exploitation. By the end of FY 2011, the National Cybersecurity 

Protection System was monitoring cyber intrusions with advanced technology for 37 of 116 federal 

agencies (32 percent), exceeding the proposed target of 28 percent. DHS’s National Cyber Security 

Division (NCSD) and Science and Technology Directorate also contribute to the development of 

international cybersecurity standards by participating in standards bodies such as the International 

Telecommunication Union, the International Organization for Standardization, and the Internet 

Engineering Task Force. 

DHS operates the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, a 24-hour center 

responsible for coordinating cyber and communications warning information across federal, state, and 

local governments, intelligence and law enforcement communities, and the private sector. DHS has also 

established the Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP), a systematic 

approach to cyber information sharing and cooperation with critical infrastructure owners and operators. 

The program incorporates government participants, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),

and other critical infrastructure owners and operators, and facilitates the fusion of data through 

collaboration among CISCP entities to develop and share cross-sector information products through a 

secure portal. In addition, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) facilitates federal 

interagency collaboration and serves as a central point of entry for coordinating, integrating, and sharing 

pertinent information related to cyber-threat investigations. The FBI oversees the NCIJTF, which includes 

representation from 18 partner agencies from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The FBI 

also runs 65 cyber task forces across the country that integrate federal, state, and local assets. At the state, 

local, tribal, and territorial levels, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center is a 

cybersecurity focal point, including a cybersecurity operations center that provides real-time network 

monitoring, early cyber threat warnings and advisories, vulnerability identification and mitigation, and 

incident response.

The Secret Service has successfully dismantled some of the largest known cybercriminal organizations by 

working through the agency’s established network of 31 Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs). With 

the recent addition of two international ECTFs in Rome, Italy, and London, England, local law 

enforcement can leverage ECTF participation in Europe, a hub of cybercriminal activity. 

Despite progress achieved through these efforts, the SPR survey shows that cyber capabilities are lagging 

at the state level. Results indicated that Cybersecurity was the single core capability where states had 

made the least amount of overall progress, with an average capability level of 42 percent. In addition, 

DHS’s 2011 Nationwide Cybersecurity Review highlighted gaps in cyber-related preparedness among 

162 state and local entities. For example, though 81 percent of respondents had adopted cybersecurity 

control frameworks and/or methodologies, 45 percent stated they had not implemented a formal risk 

management program. Moreover, approximately two-thirds of respondents had not updated information 

security or disaster recovery plans in at least two years. The challenges identified in these reviews likely 

apply across sectors.
National Preparedness Report

22

 

Physical Protective Measures

Reduce or mitigate risks, including actions targeted at threats, vulnerabilities, and/or consequences, by 

controlling movement and protecting borders, critical infrastructure, and the homeland. 

Key Finding: The Nation’s critical infrastructure

facilities are actively taking steps to improve 

physical protection capabilities.

The ECIP initiative enables DHS to collect data 

on vulnerability and protective measures in a 

standardized format from the most critical 

facilities across the country. Through this 

program, DHS Protective Security Advisors meet 

with critical infrastructure facility owners and 

operators to build relationships, raise awareness 

about available resources, and conduct ECIP 

security surveys at a subset of key facilities 

nationally. The ECIP surveys help establish a 

baseline for measuring future progress in physical protection and risk reduction. This voluntary 

assessment is one resource available to help critical infrastructure facilities better understand their 

security needs.

Figure 15 summarizes results from 427 ECIP surveys 

in 2009 and 763 in 2010, showing growth in 

protective actions that critical infrastructure facilities

have implemented. DHS also conducted follow-up 

interviews with officials at 473 sites six months after 

the initial surveys. In these selected interviews, 49 

percent of facilities reported that they had 

implemented protective improvements since the 

survey’s completion, including enhancements to 

physical security and security forces. In a sectorspecific example, over 65 percent of the Nation’s 

most critical transit infrastructure has enhanced 

physical protection capabilities through the Transit 

Security Grant Program. These results highlight the 

value of assessment programs such as ECIP in 

shaping security-related investment decisions to 

reduce risk to critical infrastructure assets. 

2011 SPR Results: Physical Protective Measures

Preparedness Case Study: Cybersecurity and the Postal and Shipping Sector

The Postal and Shipping Sector owns the third-largest information technology structure in the world, 

facing thousands of malicious network attacks every day. Over the past year, the sector has 

partnered with the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), a not-for-profit group, to 

research effective ways to manage cyber attacks. The sector and NCFTA used a malicious software

analysis program to help limit the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) risk to information technology

infrastructure by identifying emerging cyber threats and providing timely analysis to postal executives 

and the USPS Computer Incident Response Team. Inspectors also reverse-engineered malicious 

code, leading to the identification of a Romanian organized crime network targeting U.S. businesses 

and the public via malicious software.

Figure 15: Results from ECIP surveys show growth in 

protective actions at critical infrastructure facilities.
National Preparedness Report

23

 

Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities

Identify, assess, and prioritize risks to inform Protection activities and investments.

Key finding: Public and private sector 

stakeholders are increasingly using risk to shape 

the protection policies and programs they 

implement. 

Nationally, critical infrastructure facilities are 

identifying potential security enhancements based 

on an understanding of the risks they face. Results 

from the ECIP security survey, conducted by 

DHS in cooperation with 111 critical 

infrastructure facilities between May 2010 and 

April 2011, showed that facility owners and 

operators used risk to inform the creation of 

emergency action plans and standard operating 

procedures. Similarly, most of the Sector-Specific 

Agencies representing the 18 critical infrastructure sectors indicated that risk analysis results shape how 

they prioritize and resource protection programs, as shown in Figure 16. Many agencies report that they 

base these decisions on their own risk analyses rather than on the findings from the National Risk Profile 

developed by DHS. 

Key Finding: Whole community partners have 

established a set of common objectives for risk 

management activities focused on enhancing 

measurement, reporting, and resource allocation and 

helping address identified areas for improvement. 

DHS launched the Critical Infrastructure Risk 

Management Enhancement Initiative (CIRMEI) in 2010 

to track implementation of NIPP requirements and 

ensure that risk management efforts directly inform 

program and budget planning. A key component of 

CIRMEI is the National Critical Infrastructure 

Protection and Resilience Annual Report (NAR), which 

pre-dates CIRMEI but changed significantly in 2011 to 

better measure progress of whole community protection 

efforts. In spring 2011, federal, state, local, and private sector representatives adopted a common set of 12

2011 SPR Results: Risk Management for 

Protection Programs and Activities

Preparedness Case Study: Partnering Through InfraGard

Established in 1996, InfraGard is a partnership program between the FBI and the private sector that 

focuses on sharing information in the service of protection efforts. After the 9/11 attacks, InfraGard 

expanded its efforts to focus on critical infrastructure protection from both physical and cyber threats. 

Since 2001, InfraGard’s membership has grown from 1,910 members to more than 45,000 

nationwide. InfraGard chapters are starting to place liaisons within fusion centers. These liaisons help 

InfraGard’s private sector members better understand evolving threats and adopt appropriate physical 

protection measures.

Figure 16: Risk analysis shapes 

infrastructure protection decisions.
National Preparedness Report

24

 

outcome statements to describe the desired end-state for national critical infrastructure protection and 

resilience. Annual performance measurement in the NAR now focuses on these outcomes. Example 

observations from the 2011 report include the following: 

 Stakeholders made progress in identifying critical assets, systems, and clusters and the risks posed to 

those infrastructure assets.

 Defensible methodology and documentation of risk processes either do not exist or are difficult for 

the stakeholders to articulate.

 Stakeholders have a wide range of risk analysis capabilities; thus a national-level determination of 

these capabilities is difficult. 

Supply Chain Integrity and Security

Strengthen the security and resilience of the supply chain.

Key Finding: Government programs to build 

global networks among public and private 

partners have bolstered supply chain security.

CBP leads both the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the Container 

Security Initiative (CSI), two programs that are 

critical to maintaining the integrity of the global 

supply chain. C-TPAT is a voluntary publicprivate sector program that works with 

international supply chain stakeholders—such as 

importers, carriers, consolidators, licensed 

customs brokers, and manufacturers—to ensure 

the highest possible levels of cargo security. 

C-TPAT has over 10,000 members worldwide and 

has conducted over 19,300 site validations of manufacturing and logistics facilities in 97 countries. 

Similarly, CSI extends to over 58 ports around the world (as shown in Figure 17), enabling prescreening 

of over 80 percent of all maritime cargo prior to its import into the United States.

C-TPAT and CSI implementation partners have seen benefits from both of these programs. For example, 

almost 88 percent of the nearly 4,000 companies that participated in a 2010 C-TPAT Partner Survey 

agreed or somewhat agreed that C-TPAT had strengthened their businesses’ ability to assess and manage 

supply chain risk.3

 FY 2011 results show that agencies and their partners are making notable progress in 

achieving their targets. In FY 2011, CBP reported a 95-percent compliance rate with established C-TPAT 

security guidelines among C-TPAT members. Under CSI, in FY 2011, CBP partners conducted 96 

percent of requested cargo examinations at foreign ports of origin in cooperation with host nations. 

Additionally, the USCG leads the International Port Security (IPS) Program, which assesses the 

effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports. From 2009 to 2011, the program conducted 

assessments at over 500 ports and facilities in approximately 150 countries involved in maritime trade 

with the United States. Vessels arriving from ports that are not compliant with IPS Program requirements 

must take additional security precautions and submit to boarding by USCG personnel before receiving 

permission to enter U.S. seaports. The USCG also leads a nationwide maritime security program that 

coordinates with public and private sector partners and stakeholders to protect the marine transportation 

system and domestic supply chain. In 2011, 43 Area Maritime Security Plans were in force covering all 

coastal ports and navigable river systems. These plans include community-oriented procedures for 

deterrence, security response, and system restoration functions to support commerce. 

2011 SPR Results: Supply Chain 

Integrity and Security
National Preparedness Report

25

 

In the area of food supply chain 

integrity and security, HHS, DHS, 

and USDA collaborate with whole 

community stakeholders to ensure 

an integrated national food safety 

system. For example, HHS’s FDA, 

CDC, USDA, and DHS held a 

workshop in 2010 that brought 

together more than 267 food safety 

officials from all 50 states, five 

territories, and multiple federal 

agencies. Workshop participants 

with expertise in food, feed, 

epidemiology, laboratory processes, 

animal health, and environmental 

and public health identified and 

developed a series of 

recommendations to further the 

development and implementation of 

an integrated food safety system. In 

addition, the National Center for 

Food Protection and Defense—a 

DHS center of excellence—is 

analyzing major food product types to assess vulnerabilities to intentional contamination from various 

threat agents. USDA contributions include the Food Safety and Inspection Service, which ensures the 

safety of the Nation’s supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Nutrition 

Service, which administers USDA nutrition assistance programs and provides children and needy families 

with improved access to healthy and safe food. 

In the area of information and communications technology, DHS NCSD is collaborating with federal 

partners, private sector critical infrastructure stakeholders, and national and international standards bodies 

to address risks to information and communications technology supply chains. Outcomes from these 

collaborations include methods and guidelines for preventing counterfeit and malware-containing 

information technology products from entering the supply chain and for finding and isolating counterfeit 

and malicious products that do enter the supply chain. Looking beyond information and communications 

technology, the Federal Government continues to focus on demonstrating quantifiable increases in supply 

chain risk management for government purchases. To this end, GSA has co-developed and implemented 

multiple instances of Federal Acquisition Regulation-compliant contract clauses, supply chain risk 

management standards, product tests, supplier reviews, and interagency knowledge shares to increase 

global assurance in the integrity of government purchases. Efforts actively seek to eliminate potentially 

malevolent actors present both knowingly and unknowingly through tiered design, manufacture, 

transportation, and operation and maintenance supply chains. Quantifiable increases in supply chain risk 

management—particularly for cyber-related product and service acquisitions—remain a preeminent focus 

of GSA.

In January 2012, the White House released the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, 

which sets forth an integrated U.S. Government policy to promote security and efficiency in the supply 

chain system; foster a resilient system that can absorb shocks and recover rapidly from disruptions; and 

endorse a risk-based approach that involves integrating efforts to manage risk, leverage a layered defense, 

and identify and resolve threats as early as possible.

Figure 17: Supply chain security is an effort that stretches well 

beyond U.S. borders and requires collaboration between public 

and private entities.
National Preparedness Report

26

 

Mitigation Core Capabilities

Community Resilience

Lead the integrated effort to recognize, understand, communicate, plan, and address risks so that the 

community can develop a set of actions to accomplish Mitigation and improve resilience. 

Key finding: State, local, tribal, and territorial

governments are increasingly engaging with 

whole community partners to develop localized, 

risk-informed mitigation plans and to strengthen 

community preparedness.

Public review and comment opportunities ensure 

that community members are engaged in state, 

local, tribal, and territorial mitigation planning and 

resultant efforts. Additional mitigation initiatives

that emphasize community engagement are 

StormReady and TsunamiReady programs 

sponsored by NOAA. Over 1,950 communities 

voluntarily committed to additional mitigation 

efforts under these programs, which emphasize community engagement, redundant alert and notification 

functions, and hazardous weather planning. Similarly, in 2009 and 2010, DOE provided grants to state 

and local governments to develop and expand energy assurance plans. These energy assurance plans 

focus on helping communities to prepare for and lessen the potential impacts of energy supply disruption 

risks.

Citizen Corps Councils, Community

Emergency Response Team (CERT) 

Programs, and the Ready Campaign 

contribute to resilience by engaging 

communities in preparedness activities.

More than 1,100 local, county, and tribal 

Citizen Corps Councils exist nationwide 

(see Figure 18). These Councils represent 

over 178 million people, or approximately 

58 percent of the U.S. population. Citizen 

Corps Councils and CERT Programs also 

deliver training to community members in 

emergency response; 93 percent of 

Councils support programs that train 

volunteers for disaster response and 

recovery roles, and 76 percent have used 

their trained volunteers for local response. 

Since their inception, nearly 2,000 

registered CERT Programs have trained 

over 428,500 individuals in activities that directly support community resilience: 66 percent of CERT 

Programs participate in emergency preparedness, 51 percent in emergency planning, 31 percent in fire 

safety, and 20 percent in mitigation. CERT Programs have had tangible impact in communities across the 

country, including cleaning up Florida beaches after the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, rescuing 

individuals from burning residences, and supporting local response operations to wildfires, landslides, and 

floods. Meanwhile, approximately four million individuals use the Ready Campaign annually as a 

reference for emergency preparedness information and resources. The Ready Campaign has emphasized 

2011 SPR Results: Community Resilience

Figure 18: As of September 2011, over 1,100 Citizen Corps 

Councils exist nationwide, supporting whole community 

planning, preparing the public, and building volunteer 

preparedness and response capabilities.
National Preparedness Report

27

 

the importance of preparedness plans and kits that enable individuals to be self-sufficient for at least 72 

hours following a disaster. 

FEMA’s 2011 Household Preparedness Survey indicated that households with children who brought 

home preparedness materials were significantly more likely to be prepared than other households. For 

example, 70 percent of households with children bringing home preparedness materials said they have an 

emergency plan that family members have discussed, compared to about 40 percent of other households. 

Free disaster preparedness education programs available to schools nationwide can help build 

preparedness habits early. For example, the Student Tools for Emergency Planning (STEP) program has 

reached over 30,000 fourth- and fifth-graders through a one-hour curriculum that helps children 

understand what to do in an emergency. Citizen Corps Councils and CERT Programs have increasingly 

emphasized youth preparedness. As of 2011, Citizens Corps Councils indicate that 87 percent of Councils 

focus on youth preparedness by including representatives from youth-focused organizations, targeting 

youths with preparedness materials, or providing training. About 44 percent of CERT Programs now 

provide training delivered specifically for youths. In addition, the U.S. Department of Education provides 

training and technical assistance resources to build school emergency management capacity for PreK-12 

schools and institutions of higher education. These resources include training materials on emergency 

management basics as well as threat-specific topics and emerging issues. 

Long-term Vulnerability Reduction

Build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines so 

as to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused incidents by lessening the 

likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences related to these incidents. 

Key finding: Enhanced building codes and 

floodplain management have reduced 

vulnerability and saved billions of dollars in 

disaster damage nationwide.

Significant national progress has occurred in 

efforts to enhance building codes that reduce 

vulnerabilities. As of 2011, 48 percent of 

communities in areas prone to earthquakes, floods, 

and high wind had adopted building codes with 

disaster-resistant provisions, exceeding FEMA’s 

target of 45 percent. Moreover, 27 percent of 

households that FEMA surveyed indicated that 

they had taken steps to mitigate property damage 

and protect themselves in the event of a disaster. 

This result fell short of FEMA’s target of 35 percent, but it provides a baseline for measuring future 

progress.

The International Building Code (IBC) is an international standard that has undergone progressive 

updates to improve fire, wind, and seismic safety. As seen in Figure 19, a majority of states have adopted 

one of the two most recent IBC versions—2012 IBC or 2009 IBC. In one example of enhanced building 

codes, Oklahoma provided financial incentives to install residential safe rooms, specially hardened rooms 

that protect occupants from wind and windborne debris. Residents built more than 6,000 safe rooms 

statewide. Eleven other states also had safe room initiatives in place as of August 2010. Similarly, a 2011 

FEMA national survey of 2,759 representative households found that 28 percent of surveyed households 

had built a space in their home specifically to provide shelter in an emergency. As of March 2012, FEMA 

had received 245 applications from 14 states to build 2,228 residential safe rooms and 138 community 

safe rooms using mitigation grant funding. 

2011 SPR Results: Long-term 

Vulnerability Reduction
National Preparedness Report

28

 

Real-world events also demonstrate the value of building code enhancements. For example, updated 

building codes in San Diego, California, have helped decrease community losses from wildfires. The 

2003 Cedar Fire in San Diego damaged or destroyed 17 percent of the structures within the fire perimeter 

(280,278 acres burned). In 2004, San Diego County enacted more stringent fire-related building codes. 

The next major wildfire, which hit in 2007, destroyed only 13 percent of structures within the fire 

perimeter (197,990 acres burned). More impressively, the fire damaged or destroyed just two percent of 

those structures built to the enhanced 2004 codes.4 Across the United States, communities are 

implementing building code enhancements to protect against wildland-urban interface fires. Data 

collection and analysis by whole community partners will document the effectiveness of these 

enhancements in actual fires and inform efforts to further improve building codes moving forward. 

Similar progress has occurred nationally in 

floodplain management. The National Flood 

Insurance Program (NFIP) is a federal program 

enabling property owners in participating 

communities to purchase flood insurance, while 

requiring governments to adopt and enforce 

floodplain management regulations (such as 

ensuring that new buildings in flood-prone areas 

are protected from flood damage). From 2000 to 

2010, the number of NFIP policies increased by 

29 percent, and total policy coverage increased by 

119 percent to $1.2 billion. In FY 2010 alone, 

NFIP added more than 47,000 policyholders to its 

rolls and prevented some $1.6 billion in potential 

flooding losses to communities nationally. 

The Community Rating System (CRS) is a 

voluntary program that encourages mitigation 

actions by offering flood insurance discounts for 

communities that exceed standard NFIP requirements, for example by offering property owners technical 

advice on how to protect their buildings from flooding. The CRS Program began in 1991 and has grown 

more than fourfold over the past 20 years, expanding from 254 participating communities to more than 

1,100. Nevertheless, significant portions of the Nation’s population are vulnerable to flooding. FEMA 

estimates that approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population lives in high-risk flooding areas. From 

1964 to 2011, about 64 percent of the population experienced a flood-related disaster declaration.

Figure 19: Adopting up-to-date building code

standards state-wide helps to reduce vulnerabilities 

from fire, earthquakes, and severe winds.
National Preparedness Report

29

 

Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment

Assess risk and disaster resilience so that decision makers, responders, and community members can take 

informed action to reduce their entity’s risk and increase their resilience.

Key Finding: Hazard identification and risk 

assessment (HIRA) processes are well-established 

among states and territories. Efforts are underway 

to consistently integrate both natural hazards and 

other threats into HIRAs and to broaden HIRA 

development processes to urban areas.

All 56 states and territories have HIRAs in place 

as required components of mitigation plans. 

Original mitigation planning guidance centered on 

natural hazards, but more recent approaches have 

expanded in order to encourage states to consider 

other threats in their HIRA processes. Similarly, 

the Emergency Management Accreditation 

Program (EMAP) Standard explicitly requires 

emergency management programs to account for both natural hazards and other threats that may affect 

them.5 Figure 20 highlights EMAP-accredited states and local jurisdictions.

In FY 2011, the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative included new 

provisions requiring states to develop and maintain threat and hazard identification and risk assessments 

(THIRAs) that are coordinated with their major metropolitan areas. All states achieved that goal. The FY 

2012 program guidance continued the requirement, noting that THIRA findings should inform state and 

urban area strategies, plans, and investments. FEMA is developing guidance for state, local, tribal, and 

territorial partners on implementing a THIRA process. 

DHS has published guidance and developed training 

courses to educate stakeholders on widely accepted 

principles in risk analysis and risk management. For 

example, in April 2011, DHS published Risk 

Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk 

Management Doctrine, which outlines key risk 

management principles, including risk assessment and 

analysis. In addition, DHS sponsors training related to 

risk assessment, including courses on HAZUS, a free 

software tool that allows communities to develop 

empirical risk assessments using nationally accepted 

methodologies. More than 30 self-organized HAZUS

user groups have emerged throughout the Nation, 

serving as outlets for whole community HAZUS users 

to share risk and disaster resilience assessment best 

practices. Other federal agencies have also developed 

tools to support risk and resilience analysis, such as the 

NOAA-sponsored Coastal Community Resilience online planning community geared toward enhancing 

community resilience to climate and natural hazard risks. 

2011 SPR Results: Risk and Disaster 

Resilience Assessment

Figure 20: Voluntary accreditation by EMAP 

demonstrates a commitment to national standards 

in hazard identification and risk assessment.
National Preparedness Report

30

 

Threats and Hazard Identification

Identify the threats and hazards that occur in the geographic area; determine the frequency and 

magnitude; and incorporate this into analysis and planning processes so as to clearly understand the 

needs of a community or entity. 

Key finding: Whole community partners are 

increasingly using threat and hazard 

identification as a building block for risk-based 

planning. 

Threat and hazard identification is a critical first 

step for public and private sector entities in 

developing plans that are informed by an 

understanding of the risks they face. The planning 

process outlined in CPG 101 exemplifies that 

approach, urging threat and hazard identification 

as an early component of collaborative, risk-based 

planning. Notably, in the 2010 Nationwide Plan 

Review, 100 percent of states and 96 percent of 

urban areas indicated that their basic plans were 

either completely or partially consistent with CPG 101. FEMA is developing additional guidance as part 

of the CPG to support THIRA implementation. At state, local, tribal, and territorial levels, hazard 

mitigation planning begins with identifying hazards, and then determining historical frequency and 

severity in order to drive selection of specific mitigation actions. Hazard data on flooding, coastal issues, 

earthquakes, and fires are available from FEMA, NOAA, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Forest 

Service, respectively.

2011 SPR Results: Threats and Hazard 

Identification

Preparedness Case Study: California, Arizona, and Nevada State Hazard Viewer

Using funding from the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the California Emergency 

Management Agency and the California Natural Resources Agency produced MyPlan, a web-based 

risk assessment application (see Figure 21). MyPlan integrates geographic information systems (GIS) 

information on natural hazards in California and is designed to assist local jurisdictions in preparing, 

upgrading, and reviewing mitigation plans. Building on this innovative program, the Nevada 

Department of Public Safety and the Arizona Division of Emergency Management are cooperating 

with California to bring customized versions of MyPlan to their states, using common data standards.

Figure 21: MyPlan uses GIS data on floods, fires, landslides, and earthquakes to inform 

mitigation planning.
National Preparedness Report

31

 

Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) 

are one example of whole community partners 

working to use threat and hazard information to 

inform planning. Required by law, LEPCs work 

within local communities to identify chemical 

hazards and develop emergency plans in case of 

accidental release. A 2008 survey of LEPCs by the 

EPA indicated that nearly 85 percent of LEPCs 

incorporated natural hazards into their emergency 

planning efforts. Moreover, the 2008 survey 

highlighted that LEPCs incorporate a diverse range 

of whole community perspectives into risk-based 

planning efforts (see Figure 22).

Threat and hazard identification also informs 

planning efforts at the national level. The Strategic 

National Risk Assessment conducted as part of 

PPD-8 implementation identified potential incidents that pose the greatest threat to homeland security and 

informed the development of core capabilities and targets in the Goal. Similarly, DHS and interagency 

partners developed a National Risk Profile to support infrastructure protection planning, identifying 

intentional and unintentional threats and natural hazards, and analyzing the risk they present to critical 

infrastructure sectors. Through the SCCs, critical infrastructure owners and operators in the private sector 

also conduct threat and hazard identification to support implementation of the NIPP’s risk management 

framework. Annual reports for each sector outline the relationships between identified threats and 

hazards, risk, and mitigation actions. 

Key Finding: States most frequently reported that earthquakes, 

hurricanes, and cyber attacks would significantly stress their 

capabilities. 

Through the 2011 SPR, states and territories identified a 

specific threat or hazard for each of the 31 core capabilities that 

would most stress their existing capabilities and demand 

maximum capacity to manage. The results of this threat and 

hazard identification process do not mean that these threats and 

hazards are more likely to actually occur. However, the national 

totals shed light on the types of events that states and territories 

believe would put the most stress on the capabilities they have 

in place. For natural hazards, earthquakes and hurricanes were 

the most frequently cited events, while cyber attacks and 

radiological dispersion device/nuclear attacks topped the list of 

threats, as illustrated in Figure 23. The “Other” category in 

Figure 23 combines 19 hazards ranging from avalanches to 

space weather. These findings align with DHS’s Strategic 

National Risk Assessment which highlighted the national-level 

risks from natural hazards (including earthquakes, hurricanes, 

and floods), pandemic influenzas, terrorist use of WMD, and cascading effects from cyber attacks. 

Figure 22: Whole community partners, including 

private industry, community groups, and the 

general public, participate in LEPCs.

Figure 23: Through the SPR, states 

prioritized which threats and hazards 

would most stress existing capabilities.
National Preparedness Report

32

 

Response Core Capabilities

Critical Transportation

Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for 

response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital 

response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Key finding: Confidence in evacuation plans 

among states and urban areas has increased 

significantly since 2006.

The 2006 Nationwide Plan Review identified 

evacuation planning as an area in need of 

significant improvement nationwide. At that time, 

less than 11 percent of states and urban areas 

indicated confidence in the adequacy of their 

public protection and evacuation plans for a 

catastrophic event. By 2010, confidence in these 

plans had increased more than six-fold (see Figure 

24). In addition, initiatives such as the Regional 

Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program have 

encouraged large-scale evacuation planning in large metropolitan areas that may not have traditionally 

focused on that issue.

A range of whole community collaborative efforts have informed evacuation and transportation planning 

improvements. For example, between 2007 and 2008, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA) conducted four, multi-state workshops on transportation evacuation 

preparedness and response. One outcome of the workshops was a summary of good practices in 

transportation evacuation. In FY 2010, the FHWA assessed mass evacuation plans for 26 of the Nation’s 

highest risk urban areas. This assessment identified and prioritized challenges that could impede effective 

evacuations, such as day-to-day congestion, infrastructure constraints, and communications. DOT also 

developed primers on evacuation planning, use of highways for evacuation, evacuation of persons with 

disabilities and other access and functional needs, and 

evacuation of pedestrians. In addition, between 2008 and 2010, 

FEMA worked with more than 35 states and territories to 

improve evacuation planning. From FY 2006 to FY 2010, states 

and local jurisdictions dedicated $50.6 million in FEMA 

preparedness grant funds to build evacuation and shelter-in-place 

capabilities. More recently, in June 2011, FEMA conducted 

three no-notice discussion-based exercises in FEMA Regions to 

test hurricane response plans, which enhanced the agency’s realworld response to Hurricane Irene.

Key finding: Federal partners have met targets for delivering 

life-sustaining commodities and key operational resources on 

time during disasters.

In FY 2010 and FY 2011, FEMA’s Logistics Management 

Directorate exceeded its targets for delivering life-sustaining 

commodities and operational resources within agreed-upon 

timeframes during disasters. In FY 2011, FEMA delivered 615 

2011 SPR Results: Critical Transportation

Figure 24: Whole community planning 

efforts supported by DOT and FEMA 

have supported improvements to public 

protection and evacuation plans.
National Preparedness Report

33

 

of 659 (93.3 percent) of these priority orders on time, significantly exceeding its target of 85 percent.

To support these efforts, FEMA established a number of pre-scripted mission assignments with federal 

partners, including DOD and its components such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). These 

pre-scripted mission assignments use standardized language, allowing FEMA to request key resources 

rapidly. Also, as part of its Advance Contracting Initiative, the USACE has pre-awarded contracts for 

major emergency response missions. For example, the USACE pre-awarded 28 debris removal contracts 

in six different regions, allowing for immediate activation of contract support that can support road 

clearing during the response phase or debris removal during long-term recovery.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, 

acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected 

communities. 

Key Finding: The Nation has developed a mature 

set of assets for addressing hazardous materials 

incidents.

There are over 1,100 state and local hazmat 

response teams positioned throughout the country, 

as shown in Figure 25. Together, these teams 

provide hazmat response coverage to over 76 

percent of the Nation’s population. 

The National Response System (NRS) routinely 

and effectively responds to a wide range of oil and 

hazardous substance releases. The NRS includes 

individuals and teams representing all levels of 

government that share expertise and resources to 

control oil spills and conduct cleanup activities. 

Within the NRS, the National Response Team 

(NRT) consists of 15 federal agencies 

responsible for coordinating emergency 

preparedness and response to oil and hazardous 

substance pollution incidents.

As chair of the NRT, EPA brings a wide range 

of resources to oil and hazmat response. For 

example, EPA currently has 260 On-Scene 

Coordinators with the training, expertise, and 

regulatory authority to direct all actions at a 

hazmat spill. EPA also has over 2,000 

Response Support Corps members, 14 

equipment warehouses, technical and heavy 

equipment support contracts in each EPA 

Region, response teams with diverse technical 

specialties, and the capability to establish over 

30 Incident Management Teams. Each of the 

10 EPA Regions maintains a cadre of on-call, 

On-Scene Coordinators for immediate deployment to an actual or potential release of oil or hazardous 

substances. As Vice-Chair of the NRT, the USCG provides 41 pre-designated On-Scene Coordinators 

located at Coast Guard Sectors and select sub-units across the country to direct and coordinate responses 

2011 SPR Results: Environmental 

Response/Health and Safety

Figure 25: Local hazmat teams are the first line of 

defense in a multi-layered environmental response/health 

safety capability.
National Preparedness Report

34

 

to oil discharges and hazardous substance 

releases along 95,000 miles of coastline and 

offshore navigable waterways. These 

personnel respond to nearly 4,000 oil and 

hazardous substance spills annually.

EPA and USCG co-chair thirteen Regional 

Response Teams that include regional 

representation from 15 federal agencies and 

state personnel. These teams provide policy 

coordination support and technical advice to 

the designated On-Scene Coordinator during 

an event. On-Scene Coordinators from both 

EPA and USCG have access to specialized, 

deployable response assets for hazmat events 

and oil spills. For example, EPA maintains 

three Environmental Response Teams, two 

Radiological Emergency Response Teams, and 

one National Decontamination Team. 

Similarly, the USCG oversees the National 

Strike Force, which includes three National Strike Force Teams and a Public Information Assist Team. As 

shown in Figure 26, approximately 98 percent of the U.S. population is within a 12-hour drive of one of 

these joint assets; these teams can also deploy via air and water routes, enhancing national coverage.

Key Finding: The Federal Government has hazardous materials response resources that can supplement 

state, local, tribal, and territorial assets in addressing large-scale disasters, including CBRNE incidents.

Federal departments and agencies—including the FBI, EPA, and National Nuclear Security 

Administration—maintain numerous assets to support responses to large, complex disasters. For example, 

the FBI has primary jurisdiction for all criminal or terrorist CBRNE events launched domestically or 

against U.S. interests overseas. To support domestic CBRNE incident investigations and evidence 

collection operations, the FBI maintains 28 Hazardous Materials Response Teams across the country, as 

well as a specialized fly-away response capability 

at the FBI laboratory in Quantico, Virginia. 

In addition, under the DOD CBRN Response 

Enterprise, DOD maintains a range of assets, 

including: one Defense CBRN Response Force 

(DCRF); two Command and Control CBRN 

Response Elements (C2CRE); a National Guard 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team

(WMD-CST) positioned in every state; 17 

National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response 

Force Packages (CERFPs); and five National 

Guard Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) across 

the United States. The DOD CBRN Response 

Enterprise assets improve the ability to operate in 

hazardous environments and provide a nationwide 

capability to support civil authorities following a 

CBRNE incident. Figure 27 shows the location of 

these teams across the country. EPA and USCG can also provide surge capacity for environmental 

remediation activities. 

Figure 26: Nine specialized EPA and USCG hazmat and oil 

spill response assets are located across the country, 

ensuring that 98 percent of the Nation’s population is 

within a 12-hour drive of one of these teams.

Figure 27: National Guard CBRN response assets 

deliver specialized capability nationally.
National Preparedness Report

35

 

Fatality Management Services

Provide fatality management services, including body recovery and victim identification, working with 

state and local authorities to provide temporary mortuary solutions, sharing information with mass care 

services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and 

providing counseling to the bereaved.

Key finding: All states have developed fatality 

management plans, but more work remains.

In 2007, only 64 percent of states had established 

fatality management plans. By 2009, that number 

had increased to 96 percent. However, 

assessments of these fatality management plans 

indicated that some are not yet adequate or 

actionable. For example, a 2009 joint DHS-HHS 

assessment of state operating plans for pandemic 

influenza rated 41 out of 56 plans as having major 

gaps with respect to fatality management, 

requiring engagement with a broader set of 

partners. 

Key finding: States and local jurisdictions will rely heavily on federal fatality management assets during 

disasters.

In state, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions, medical examiners and coroners typically oversee 

fatality management services. In many disasters—including the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornado—the 

number of deaths overwhelms limited state, local, tribal, and territorial capabilities, necessitating federal 

assistance. The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) includes 12 mortuary teams that can deploy 

within 24 hours of an event. HHS also maintains three Disaster Portable Morgue Units, which include 

prepackaged supplies for rapid deployment in support of morgue operations. Moreover, DOD maintains 

Fatality Search and Recovery Teams, which provide fatality recovery and transport capabilities from 

hazardous environments. 

Federal fatality management planning assumptions focus on events that result in fewer than 5,000 

fatalities. The Goal notes that a virulent strain of pandemic influenza could result in hundreds of 

thousands of deaths nationwide over an extended period and that a WMD attack or industrial accident 

might cause extensive fatalities. Moreover, many of these fatalities could be contaminated. Standard 

regional mortuary response teams are not equipped or trained to process chemically or radiologically 

contaminated human remains.

2011 SPR Results: Fatality Management Services
National Preparedness Report

36

 

Mass Care Services

Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding, and 

sheltering to those who have the most need, as well as support for reunifying families.

Key Finding: Public and private partners 

providing mass care have the resources to support 

feeding and hydration needs of survivors 

following a catastrophic event, but distribution of 

these resources presents challenges.

Nationwide, whole community stakeholders have 

the capacity to acquire and initially provide over 

45 million shelf-stable meals, produce over 3.5 

million hot meals per day, and distribute more 

than 5.2 million liters of water per day. In 

addition, USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service, 

within its statutory authorities, works with whole 

community partners to determine nutrition 

assistance needs, obtain appropriate food, and arrange for delivery of food supplies to support mass care 

services. Community partners tested components of this national mass care capacity during the 2011 

National Level Exercise, evaluating whether partners could feed and hydrate two million survivors in 72 

hours. The sheer magnitude of this requirement made it difficult to validate whole community mass care 

capacity in its entirety through an exercise simulation. However, participation in that national exercise 

helped federal, state, regional, local, and private sector personnel respond effectively to the May 2011 

Joplin tornado that occurred just days after the exercise ended. 

Enormous mass care capacity exists, but challenges remain in the efficient movement and coordination of 

these resources. A catastrophic event would likely disrupt existing transportation infrastructure and 

distribution networks, complicating acquisition and movement of life-sustaining supplies. Delays in mass 

care resources might be particularly acute for survivors with medical conditions, disabilities, or other 

access and functional needs, and for infants, children, and pets. 

Key Finding: The Nation has the capacity to provide mass care sheltering for more than 900,000 

individuals near an area affected by a catastrophic event.

Whole community partners—including the American Red Cross, voluntary organizations, government 

agencies, and the private sector—can shelter approximately 500,000 survivors in existing facilities

located near an area affected by a catastrophic event. In addition, FEMA can provide 405,000 temporary 

shelter spaces. To support mass care sheltering operations, FEMA, federal partners, and voluntary 

organizations have over 560,000 cots and 750,000 blankets available. Moreover, voluntary organizations, 

the private sector, and federal agencies can provide sheltering, transportation, feeding, hydration, and 

veterinary care for 135,000 household pets. FEMA also released Guidance on Planning for Integration of 

Access and Functional Needs Support Services in General Population Shelters, which provides guidance 

and resources to ensure that children and adults with access and functional needs can benefit from and 

participate in sheltering programs. The National Mass Care Council—led jointly by FEMA, American 

Red Cross, and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster—is developing a National Mass 

Care Strategy to provide a unified approach to delivering mass care services. Due in July 2012, the 

strategy will establish common mass care goals and support whole community partner efforts to estimate 

current capabilities and determine capacity needed to respond to catastrophic events.

FEMA has developed a variety of programs to shift survivors from congregate to non-congregate care and 

works with interagency partners, state, local, and tribal governments, voluntary agencies, faith-based 

organizations, and the private sector to support implementation efforts. For example, in order to allow 

2011 SPR Results: Mass Care Services
National Preparedness Report

37

 

survivors to stay at their residences, FEMA can provide tarps and plastic sheeting, and coordinate with 

other partners to assist survivors in establishing safe and secure spaces in their damaged dwellings. 

Alternatively, FEMA can provide tents, campers, or similar emergency sheltering structures to allow 

disaster survivors to stay with their damaged property. FEMA maintains an inventory of approximately 

2,500 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-certified manufactured homes. 

Furthermore, FEMA has improved its contracting capabilities to ensure timely production of additional 

manufactured homes. Finally, FEMA also provides rental assistance through programs such as the 

Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program.

Key finding: Planning and technological gaps present challenges to post-disaster family reunification.

Large disasters can separate family members from one another, complicating parents’ ability to pick up 

their children from school or day care, especially when evacuations are required. In a 2010 report, the 

National Commission on Children and Disasters observed that 67 million children are in school or day 

care on any weekday, but that only a few states require school evacuation and family reunification plans. 

Another assessment of child protection efforts in disasters found that fewer than half of states require 

licensed child care facilities to have family reunification plans. Although various online reunification 

tools and call centers allow the public to search and upload information about displaced adults and 

children, no single, comprehensive source for this information exists. Example resources include the 

American Red Cross’ “Safe and Well” website, FEMA’s National Emergency Family Registry and

Locator System and National Emergency Child Locator Center, the National Library of Medicine’s 

People Locator, and social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter. 

Preparedness Case Study: Mass Care Support Following Hurricane Irene

In late August 2011, Hurricane Irene made landfall along the East Coast of the United States. 

Ultimately, the storm resulted in major disaster declarations in Connecticut, Delaware, the District of 

Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 

Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia.

As a result of the storm, more than 27,000 people found shelter in approximately 500 locations 

opened by states, localities, and the American Red Cross. Working with its mass care partners, the 

American Red Cross supplied 1.8 million meals and snacks, provided 22,000 health and mental 

health consultations, and distributed nearly 127,000 relief items by September 7, 2011, just 11 days 

after the storm’s landfall. In Pennsylvania alone, numerous organizations supported the relief effort:

 The Southern Baptist Convention helped set up two mobile kitchens;

 County mental health agencies deployed volunteers to emergency aid stations; 

 The American Humane Association established pet shelters; 

 Mennonite Disaster Services helped clean out homes; 

 The Teamsters assisted in transporting supplies; 

 The Boy Scouts of America helped assemble hundreds of coolers packed with food, supplies, 

and information; and

 Local organizations donated over $400,000 worth of in-kind supplies and materials. 
National Preparedness Report

38

 

Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, 

and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the 

shortest time possible.

Key Finding: The Nation has a highly mature 

structural collapse search and rescue capability, 

due in large part to the build-up of state and local 

search and rescue assets.

Mass search and rescue focuses on delivering 

immediate response to large numbers of distressed 

people. Under the NRF, federal search and rescue 

activities occur across three operational 

environments: structural collapse or urban search 

and rescue (US&R), led by FEMA; 

maritime/coastal/waterborne search and rescue, 

led by USCG; and land search and rescue, led by 

the National Park Service (NPS) within the U.S. 

Department of the Interior and DOD. 

Today, the Nation possesses significantly more capability in the US&R environment than it did 10 years 

ago. Ninety-seven percent of the U.S. population lives within a four-hour drive of a structural collapse 

team (see Figure 28). A recent FEMA tally identified nearly 300 structural collapse/US&R teams; only 55 

percent of these teams existed prior to 2001. The national expansion of state and local US&R teams is a 

direct product of FEMA contributions in funding and training. From FY 2006 to FY 2010, state, local, 

tribal, and territorial grantees allocated approximately $158 million in preparedness assistance to build 

and maintain US&R capabilities, which can be deployed to support operations nationally. Meanwhile, in

this same period, students completed nearly 33,000 search and rescue-related courses. Across the country, 

local governments are further increasing 

capability by integrating the public into 

search and rescue activities. A 2011 survey of 

1,774 CERT Programs indicated that 320 

CERT Programs (18 percent) had supported 

basic search and rescue activities during an 

emergency.

Supplementing state, local, tribal, and 

territorial assets is a mature, mission-ready 

federal capability in the form of 28 FEMA 

US&R Task Forces. Since FEMA established 

its National US&R Response System in 1989, 

no disaster has overwhelmed its operational 

capacity. For FY 2011, FEMA’s US&R Task 

Forces met their requirement to arrive on 

scene within 12 hours of deployment 

notification. These capabilities have 

contributed directly to saved lives during 

previous disasters, most recently following 

the 2010 Haiti earthquake, in which three

US&R Task Forces were responsible for 47 live rescues, the greatest number of lives saved in a collapse 

rescue environment in the history of the FEMA US&R program. 

2011 SPR Results: Mass Search and 

Rescue Operations

Figure 28: Prior to 9/11, significant population centers 

throughout the Nation lacked search and rescue coverage, 

but today, 97 percent of the Nation’s population is within a 

four-hour drive of a US&R team.
National Preparedness Report

39

 

Key Finding: Existing search and rescue capabilities in inland and maritime domains are available to 

support mass search and rescue operations following large-scale disasters.

Each year, federal, state, local, and volunteer resources conduct thousands of search and rescue missions 

to address situations such as missing persons and aircraft and watercraft in distress. In 2010, as the U.S. 

inland search and rescue coordinator, the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) under U.S. 

Northern Command initiated 1,004 missions, resulting in 561 lives saved. Civil Air Patrol routinely 

carries out 90 percent of AFRCC missions;

8

 other DOD capabilities, USCG, state police, and local rescue 

services address the remainder. The NPS conducts over 5,000 land-based search and rescue missions 

annually on and off public lands. NPS operations occur in diverse settings ranging from sea-level 

environments to mountainous terrain. In the maritime domain, USCG assets provide both airborne and 

waterborne search and rescue capabilities. In FY 2011, the USCG addressed 20,517 cases, saving 3,793 

lives. These capabilities can support mass search and rescue operations; the most notable example 

occurred following Hurricane Katrina, when USCG personnel saved more than 33,500 people. DOD is 

working with interagency partners to establish airspace management protocols to ensure safe and efficient 

aerial delivery of support within 72 hours following a large-scale disaster.

Preparedness Case Study: Mobilizing State and Local 

Search and Rescue Mutual Aid Support

After the April 2011 outbreak of deadly tornadoes in the Southeast, Alabama elected to mobilize state 

and local teams to support search and rescue operations in Marion, Jefferson, Franklin, and 

Tuscaloosa Counties rather than request assistance from federal US&R Task Forces. In addition to 

Alabama’s own state US&R team (Alabama Task Force 1), Louisiana mobilized all three of its 

regional Task Forces under the Southeast region mutual aid agreement. Alabama Task Force 1 also 

received additional K-9 support from Tennessee Task Force 1 through the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact.6 In addition, Alabama Task Force 1 coordinated with the Alabama National 

Guard to obtain air support for reconnaissance and team transport. These specialized teams provided 

critical relief to local fire and law enforcement personnel who were overwhelmed by the magnitude of 

the damage. Teams searched more than 205 square miles and helped account for over 100,000 

individuals.7 The availability of these assets is attributable to efforts in the past decade to develop 

local search and rescue assets and use mutual aid to supplement local capability (Alabama Task 

Force 1 and Louisiana Task Force 1 were founded after 9/11).
National Preparedness Report

40

 

On-scene Security and Protection

Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection 

operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and 

atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations. 

Key finding: Approximately one-quarter of state 

and local law enforcement officers work through 

departments that are accredited to national, 

voluntary standards, providing capability to 

address security and protection needs in routine 

events.

The Commission on Accreditation for Law 

Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) developed a set 

of voluntary standards for law enforcement 

agencies and began accrediting them in 1984. 

CALEA accreditation requires an established 

preparedness program—including all-hazards 

planning for critical incident response that follows 

ICS principles—to ensure that law enforcement 

agencies are ready to address natural disasters

or other threats. Several CALEA standards 

address specific elements of on-scene security 

and protection, including direction and control 

procedures. Despite being an entirely 

voluntary accreditation body, CALEA 

currently lists over 700 accredited law 

enforcement agencies nationwide, representing 

more than 250,000 law enforcement 

professionals (approximately 25 percent of the 

Nation’s full-time law enforcement personnel). 

As shown in Figure 29, more than 100 of these 

accredited law enforcement agencies have a 

staff size greater than 500, including some of 

the largest law enforcement agencies in the 

country such as the California Highway Patrol 

(which has over 7,500 sworn officers).9

Key finding: State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies can draw on mutual aid 

resources and federal assets to address large-scale, complex disasters.

State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement professionals provide on-scene security and protection 

for routine events. For emergencies of greater size and complexity, law enforcement can draw on 

extensive mutual aid resources. For example, in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact—a nationwide mutual aid compact involving numerous 

disaster response disciplines—supported the deployment of more than 6,800 law enforcement responders 

from 35 states to augment law enforcement capabilities in Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, the 

Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) serves as a model state-based law enforcement mutual 

aid system. Formed in 2002, ILEAS is a consortium of more than 900 local governments in Illinois, 

representing over 95 percent of Illinois officers and deputies. In addition to supporting intrastate mutual 

aid within Illinois, ILEAS has supported out-of-state deployments of law enforcement officers in support 

2011 SPR Results: On-scene Security and 

Protection

Figure 29: CALEA accreditation requires an established 

preparedness program to address all hazards.
National Preparedness Report

41

 

of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in Louisiana; the 2008 Republican National Convention in St. Paul, 

Minnesota; and the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.10 Nationwide, FY 2012 preparedness 

grant programs continue to encourage mutual aid relationships and require that new capabilities built 

through grant investments be deployable to support regional and national efforts.

Moreover, the National Guard has established a tiered set of assets to support on-scene security and 

protection missions. For example, National Guard Reaction Forces (NGRFs) provide states with a rapidly 

deployable unit of 75-125 personnel within eight hours of a request from a Governor or the President. 

NGRFs are self-sufficient for up to 72 hours. 

State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies can also request federal assets to support law 

enforcement in large-scale, complex disasters. ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security) is responsible for 

coordinating responses from the federal law enforcement community to such requests to support state, 

local, tribal, and territorial needs, and to provide security.

Operational Communications

Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and 

operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area 

and all response forces. 

Key Finding: Federal, state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments have increased 

cooperation to improve strategic-level and 

tactical-level communications planning

significantly. 

In 2006, DHS supported high-risk urban areas in 

assessing their tactical interoperable 

communications capabilities. The results were 

varied—while all urban areas had established 

some form of interoperability, 58 percent had no 

strategic plan in place to guide interoperability 

efforts. Informed by these results, DHS released 

the National Emergency Communications Plan 

(NECP) in 2008, which outlines the Nation’s strategic approach to improving interoperability, operability, 

and continuity of communications. Building on the NECP, all states have developed DHS-approved 

Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans and participate in ongoing planning workshops to 

continue to address emergency communications priorities. Moreover, 42 of 56 states and territories have 

developed State Emergency Communications Plans, with eight more expected by the end of FY 2012. 

FEMA’s Nationwide Plan Review showed that, by 2010, more than 70 percent of states and urban areas 

2011 SPR Results: Operational Communications

Preparedness Case Study: ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security) Support in Aftermath 

of Dakota Flooding

When major floods occurred in North and South Dakota in spring and summer 2011, ESF #13 

representatives partnered with local police and sheriffs’ departments to support flood-relief efforts. 

Federal personnel and equipment support from DOJ, DHS, and the U.S. Department of the Interior 

supplemented traditional police functions, including patrol, traffic control, and entry and exit point 

maintenance in neighborhoods to protect vacant properties. The deployment through ESF #13 

included approximately 135 federal law enforcement personnel working in concert with local officials.
National Preparedness Report

42

 

expressed confidence in their communications plans for a catastrophic event, more than doubling the 

results from 2006 (see Figure 30). 

Key Finding: High-risk urban areas have established capabilities 

to provide response-level operational communications within one 

hour of an incident. 

In accordance with the goals laid out in the NECP, 100 percent of 

60 high-risk urban areas successfully demonstrated through realworld events their ability to provide response-level 

communications within one hour of routine events involving 

multiple jurisdictions and agencies. Urban area communications 

successes have led to a focus on capabilities in counties and 

county-level equivalents across the Nation. Evaluating existing 

capabilities informs DHS technical assistance and improvement 

planning support. Significant federal financial support has helped 

state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to prioritize 

communications-related improvements. In 2007, DHS—in 

partnership with the U.S. Department of Commerce—awarded 

nearly $1 billion in Public Safety Interoperable Communications 

(PSIC) grants, focused largely on the acquisition and deployment 

of advanced communications. As of September 2011, states had 

expended more than $690 million of PSIC grant funds. More 

recently, the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant 

Program provided additional communications-related grant funding from FY 2008 to FY 2010. Overall, 

state, local, tribal, and territorial partners made over $3 billion in operational communications investments 

supported through federal grant funds from FY 2006 to FY 2010. 

Key Finding: Federal and private sector assets have the capability to rapidly restore communications 

infrastructure following a disaster, but technologies enabling priority use of telecommunications during 

emergencies have had mixed results. 

FEMA maintains six Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments, which can provide 

communications support following a disaster. In FY 2011, MERS units conducted 110 separate 

deployments, establishing critical communications in each deployment within 12 hours. Private sector 

communications firms field their own emergency response teams and can provide deployable 

communications assets to provide temporary network capacity in affected areas.

Whole community partners—including public and private sector personnel responsible for national 

security, public safety, and public welfare during emergencies—also have access to the Government 

Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS) programs, which 

enable priority use of telecommunications during emergencies and other periods of high use. The number 

Preparedness Case Study: Operational Communications during Hurricane Irene

All six of FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments mobilized for the response to 

Hurricane Irene/Tropical Storm Lee, providing emergency communications services to more than 

2,600 emergency responders in 12 states and territories. Private sector firms pre-positioned 

communications equipment to support response and recovery efforts. They also provided temporary 

mobile cellular sites and generators to support responders in Vermont, Pennsylvania, New York, and 

North Carolina.

Figure 30: Significant federal 

preparedness assistance has supported 

improvements to operational 

communications planning.
National Preparedness Report

43

 

of state, tribal, local, and industry partners using these programs increased dramatically between 2005 and 

2011 (see Figure 31). Stakeholders tested these programs’ capabilities during the 2009 Presidential 

Inauguration, when hundreds of thousands of people flooded the National Mall with their cell phones. 

GETS data for that day reported a 99 percent call completion rate while WPS reported only a 65 percent 

call completion rate, pointing to the need for continued technological improvements in WPS. In August 

2011, timely connectivity to WPS also proved challenging in the Washington, D.C., area following a 5.8-

magnitude earthquake that caused a tremendous traffic surge on wireless networks. However, WPS 

technological improvements are well underway. In December 2011, a major wireless provider 

implemented a WPS enhanced overload performance feature. Enhancement work will continue through 

2013. Additionally, a second carrier plans system enhancements into 2013. Other WPS providers appear 

unaffected by the issue.

Figure 31: Private sector participation in GETS and WPS now 

outpaces state/tribal and local participation.

Public and Private Services and Resources

Provide essential public and private services and resources to the affected population and surrounding 

communities, to include emergency power to critical facilities, fuel support for emergency responders, 

and access to community staples (e.g., grocery stores, pharmacies, and banks) and fire and other first 

response services.

Key finding: Whole community stakeholders have 

demonstrated the capacity to provide primary 

commodity support for 1.5 million survivors 

following a disaster.

Within the NRF, ESF #7 (Logistics Management 

and Resource Support) provides primary 

commodity support following disasters. Primary 

commodity support includes items such as meals, 

water, generators, blankets, cots, durable medical 

equipment, and medications and supplies. ESF 

#7’s planning efforts have included:

 Federal interagency stakeholders; 

 State, local, tribal, and territorial 

governments;

2011 SPR Results: Public and Private 

Services and Resources
National Preparedness Report

44

 

 Voluntary organizations active in disasters;

 Faith-based organizations;

 Non-governmental organizations, such as the American Red Cross; and 

 Private sector partners and retail associations.

Together, these partners are capable of providing primary commodity support for 1.5 million survivors 

following a disaster. ESF #7 tested this capability during National Level Exercise 2011, which simulated 

a catastrophic earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. During the exercise, ESF #7 stakeholders 

procured 21 million liters of water—nearly one-third of the amount needed—from private sector partners 

to help close significant post-disaster water shortages. However, the exercise also identified a need for 

federal and state governments to further integrate private sector resource providers into response planning 

and operations. Donated commodities from private sector partners after disasters also help meet resource 

needs. In addition, financial contributions to volunteer organizations from private individuals and 

companies offer an efficient mechanism to target resources to communities in need—cash donations spent 

by volunteer organizations in affected communities inject funds into the local economy and avoid timeconsuming processes for collecting, sorting, transporting, and distributing donated items. 

A private sector representative is now embedded in FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center, the 

monitoring and operations center used to coordinate emergency response efforts during a disaster. This 

rotating liaison enhances coordination with the private sector before, during, and after emergencies.

Key finding: Fire service capabilities are mature, bringing together whole community partners to 

implement fire safety, fire prevention, and firefighting activities.

The Nation possesses mature firefighting capabilities that integrate whole community partners. Local fire 

departments—professional and volunteer—provide initial fire services, with additional assistance 

progressively provided via neighboring fire departments, intra-state mutual aid, and inter-state mutual aid. 

The national wildland fire mobilization system can move firefighting resources anywhere in the Nation 

within 24 to 48 hours. Community members and organizations also support fire services. A 2011 survey

of CERT Programs reported that 153 programs (8.6 percent) supported wildland/urban interface firerelated responses. Similarly, a 2010 independent evaluation of the Fire Corps program found that over 

12,000 volunteers had participated in Fire Corps activities during the previous year, including youth 

programs and fire safety education.11 Data from the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) show an overall 

downward trend in fire deaths per million people. In 2010, USFA reported 10.1 deaths per million people, 

compared to 13.6 deaths per million people in 2004. 

Preparedness Case Study: Missouri Business Emergency Operations Center

Through a public-private partnership, Missouri has established a Business Emergency Operations 

Center (BEOC) co-located with Missouri’s State Emergency Management Agency. The Missouri 

BEOC embeds private sector personnel in the state emergency operations center to help coordinate 

response and recovery logistics and resource management.

The BEOC played a critical role after the 2011 Joplin tornado. The BEOC coordinated with state and 

local responders and over 25 companies to acquire and deliver first responder equipment and 

services, including food, water, generators, fuel, and medical supplies.
National Preparedness Report

45

 

Public Health and Medical Services

Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid 

additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all 

people in need within the affected area.

Key finding: Federal coordination of medical 

countermeasure efforts across agencies—from 

research and development through utilization—

has greatly improved since 2001.

In 2001, limited investment existed in developing, 

procuring, and stockpiling medical 

countermeasures to treat the effects of CBRN 

agents and emerging infectious diseases, 

including pandemic influenza. In July 2006, HHS 

established the Public Health Emergency Medical 

Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) to 

coordinate medical countermeasure-related 

efforts, carried out across HHS organizations in 

cooperation with other federal departments, 

including DOD. The PHEMCE provides coordinated, strategic direction and policy oversight for HHS 

medical countermeasure preparedness activities—from requirements generation, research, early- and latestage product development, and procurement to utilization planning activities—for threats that have the 

capacity to affect national health security. Figure 32 depicts the increase of aggregate awards and 

proposals for medical countermeasures.

In 2007, a PHEMCE Strategy and Implementation Plan for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 

Nuclear Threats was released which laid out HHS’s medical countermeasure priorities, in particular in the 

areas of advanced development and acquisition. 

Also established in 2006, the HHS ASPR Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, 

has awarded more than 70 contracts and grants for the advanced development of medical 

countermeasures. Further, Congress established the Project BioShield Special Reserve Fund for 

countermeasures acquisition; nearly $4.1 billion in expenditures from this fund have occurred from FY 

2004 through FY 2011. Today, vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and diagnostic devices are in place for 

2011 SPR Results: Public Health and 

Medical Services

Preparedness Case Study: Community Ideas for Enhancing Preparedness

In December 2011, FEMA launched an online collaboration community to solicit ideas from the public 

on national preparedness assessment and reporting. Among the several dozen comments submitted 

were the following proposals for enhancing national preparedness in the future:

 Create an Emergency Management Reserve Corps, comprising current and former emergency 

management professionals who would volunteer their time and expertise during emergencies.

 Include Citizen Corps Councils in developing pre-disaster maps that highlight not only physical 

and geographic features of the community (e.g., evacuation routes, hazard zones) but also 

social and economic features. These maps could inform disaster mitigation, response, and 

recovery efforts.

 Educate the general public on effective donation practices in order to raise awareness about the 

kinds of donations that are most beneficial to survivors and avoid overwhelming communities 

after disasters with impractical individual donations.
National Preparedness Report

46

 

bioterror threats (e.g., anthrax or smallpox) as well as 

naturally occurring infectious diseases (e.g., pandemic 

influenza), and a strong product pipeline exists for 

these and other threats. In addition, while only one 

vaccine manufacturing site existed in the United States 

during the influenza vaccine shortage of 2004, three 

sites now exist with more in development. In 2010, 

HHS conducted a comprehensive review of the medical 

countermeasures landscape and articulated a long-term 

vision for future efforts—the Nation must have the 

nimble, flexible capacity to produce medical 

countermeasures rapidly in the face of any attack or 

threat.

The CDC has been working with states and urban areas 

to improve plans for receiving and distributing medical 

assets from the CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile 

(SNS). Since 2007, the CDC has conducted annual 

technical assistance reviews to assess state and local 

plans to receive, stage, store, distribute, and dispense 

SNS assets during a public health emergency. These 

reviews assess plans on a scale of 0 to 100; as shown in 

Figure 33, scores have increased steadily for both states 

and urban areas since 2007, signifying year-over-year 

improvements in preparedness for public health 

emergencies due in part to over $8 billion in funding 

support from the CDC since 2001. 

In addition, FDA has established the FDA Medical 

Countermeasures Initiative to facilitate development 

and availability of medical countermeasures for use in 

public health emergencies. FDA has issued an 

Emergency Use Authorization allowing local 

responders to begin immediate mass dispensing of the 

antibiotic doxycycline after an anthrax attack. Another 

authorization covers antibiotics prepositioned in the 

homes of postal worker volunteers, who would help 

deliver medical countermeasures to residences through 

the National Postal Model.

Key finding: A focus on hospital medical surge planning and capabilities has improved hospital 

preparedness nationwide. Greater emphasis is being placed on community approaches that involve 

healthcare coalitions, which include a variety of healthcare organizations, public health, mental and 

behavioral health, and emergency management to enhance medical surge.

The HHS Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) has awarded approximately $4 billion to states, 

territories, and large metropolitan areas since 2002 to improve preparedness of healthcare systems 

nationwide. This program improved the resilience of U.S. healthcare organizations and increased their 

capacity to respond to disasters of any type. In 2009, more than 76 percent of participating hospitals met 

at least 90 percent of HPP’s all-hazards preparedness program measures. Figure 34 illustrates progress 

from 2009 to 2011 through HPP in healthcare system preparedness, including communications, medical 

evacuation, and fatality management. 

Figure 32: Total awards and proposals for medical 

countermeasures increased significantly since the 

2006 creation of the PHEMCE.

Figure 33: CDC grants have supported continuous 

improvements to state and urban area plans for 

receiving and distributing CDC medical assets.
National Preparedness Report

47

 

Currently, a focus area for HPP is the development of community- and regionally based healthcare 

coalitions. These coalitions bring together healthcare organizations, public health, and emergency 

management to conduct joint planning, build structures to efficiently share resources, and better 

collaborate to strengthen the overall community health 

system resilience. Strong and resilient healthcare 

coalitions are the key to an effective state and local 

public health and medical response. 

Despite these gains, Institute of Medicine reports 

highlight that hospitals and emergency departments in 

the United States are struggling to manage the current 

volume of patients who present for care in day-to-day, 

non-emergency situations. These challenges are the 

result of structural problems within the healthcare 

delivery system that have resulted in fewer hospitals 

with emergency departments, increases in nonemergency patient visits to emergency departments, 

diversion of emergency medical services, 

regionalization of surgical care, and healthcare worker 

shortages that have led to unprecedented crowding in 

emergency departments.

Key finding: The Nation has built a highly responsive public health capability for managing incidents, 

but recent reductions in public health funding and personnel have impacted these capabilities.

CDC data from 2009 indicate that designated state public health personnel with lead incident management 

roles needed only 66 minutes to report for immediate duty in response to a no-notice public health 

emergency. Moreover, 47 states reported having sufficient staffing capacity to work five, 12-hour days 

for six to eight weeks in response to an infectious disease outbreak.12 While these metrics highlight the 

Nation’s responsive public health capabilities, the Nation has experienced a reduction in local public 

health jobs. From 2008 to 2010, states reduced their public health workforces by 14 percent and localities 

cut 20 percent.

Key finding: Emergency Medical Services (EMS) capabilities are critical to managing medical 

emergencies. Continuing to integrate EMS into planning and preparedness initiatives is an area of 

national focus.

EMS is the practice of medicine involving the triage, treatment, and transport of patients with acute 

traumatic and medical conditions in a pre-hospital environment. In 2011, the Federal Interagency 

Committee for Emergency Medical Services released the first comprehensive description of EMS, EMS 

emergency preparedness, and 9-1-1 systems. The national EMS survey noted that nearly 20,000 

credentialed EMS agencies exist in the United States, with more than 826,000 credentialed personnel at 

the Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)-Basic, EMT-Intermediate, and EMT-Paramedic levels. These 

entities conducted nearly 37 million responses in 2009, with over 28 million transports. According to the 

survey, 87 percent of responding state EMS offices indicated that they actively participated in the HPP, 

enhancing coverage of pre-hospital treatment and transport issues in hospital preparedness. In 2010, 47 

percent of state EMS offices participated in at least one CBRNE mass casualty exercise. The survey also 

indicated that the economic downturn has negatively affected available budgets for state EMS offices. 

This comprehensive national EMS survey provides a baseline against which to measure future progress in 

strengthening EMS capacity.

In a catastrophic event, patient treatment and medical evacuation needs will exceed state, local, tribal, and 

territorial capabilities, particularly when coupled with damaged vehicles, roadways, airfields, and bridges. 

Figure 34: HPP funding has strengthened healthcare 

system disaster response capacity and overall 

resilience.
National Preparedness Report

48

 

To support EMS transport capabilities, FEMA’s national ambulance contract delivers large patientmovement capacity, providing 1,200 ambulances, 100 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and 14,000 paratransit seats, evenly split over four zones across the country.

Key finding: The Nation has developed an array of federal and volunteer medical assets to supplement 

state, local, tribal, and territorial capabilities. 

Federal agencies have established a variety of teams and volunteer resources to supplement state, local, 

tribal, and territorial public health and medical capabilities. For example, the NDMS is a partnership 

among HHS, DOD, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and DHS that provides medical response 

surge during emergencies through on-scene medical care, patient transport, and definitive care in 

participating NDMS hospitals. NDMS response assets consist of 70 medical teams, 12 mortuary teams, 

and 5 veterinary teams that can deploy and provide care within 24 hours of an event. Teams use medical 

equipment and supplies that are stored at regional warehouses and transported to meet them. NDMS also 

coordinates patient movement from the disaster area to available beds in 1,600 participating hospitals. In 

addition to NDMS resources, the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Readiness and Response Program 

maintains 41 response teams including Rapid Deployment Forces, Applied Public Health Teams, Mental 

Health Teams, Services Access Teams, and Incident Support Teams. Established in 2006, each team 

includes trained responders from the USPHS Commissioned Corps who can deploy within 12 hours of 

activation to provide medical, public health, mental health, veterinary, and incident support services. 

An important tool for coordinating volunteer response is the Emergency System for Advance Registration 

of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP), which helps pre-register volunteer health professionals 

and verify their credentials and qualifications in advance of an emergency. All 50 states have operational 

ESAR-VHP systems with registered volunteers across 20 health professions and can generate a verified 

list of volunteer health professionals available for deployment within 24 hours. Another volunteer 

resource is the Medical Reserve Corps, established by the Office of the Surgeon General to bring together 

public health and medical volunteers around the Nation to strengthen public health, emergency response 

capacity, and community resiliency. As of December 2011, over 200,000 Medical Reserve Corps 

volunteers exist in nearly 1,000 units across all 50 states. In FY 2011, Medical Reserve Corps units 

reported participation in approximately 10,000 local activities. Together, these units provide volunteer 

public health and medical capability coverage to 91 percent of the U.S. population. 

Situational Assessment

Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the 

hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response. 

Key finding: Social media are emerging as a key 

situational awareness tool in disasters. Whole 

community partners are increasingly using social 

media to share situational awareness information, 

but governments have been slower to embrace 

ways to receive situational awareness information 

from the public.

A 2011 survey found that 65 percent of adult 

Internet users report using a social networking site 

like MySpace, Facebook or LinkedIn, more than 

double the 29 percent reported in 2008.13 In 

particular, social media have played an increasing 

role during emergencies and disasters over the 

past several years. A 2011 American Red Cross survey indicated that one in seven respondents had 

2011 SPR Results: Situational Assessment
National Preparedness Report

49

 

experienced or witnessed an emergency and posted information about that event to a social media site.14

Seventy percent of survey respondents also expected that local emergency response organizations would 

monitor social media for emergency requests.15 Eighty percent of survey respondents expect national 

emergency response organizations to monitor social media.16 Researchers studying the use of Twitter 

during the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami found that survivors with Twitter accounts 

tweeted for assistance when they could not place a telephone call. 

Emergency response organizations are increasingly using social media to transmit information to the 

public through resources such as Facebook pages and Twitter accounts. The International Association of 

Chiefs of Police counts over 2,000 law enforcement agencies around the Nation that use some form of 

social media.17 FEMA alone uses 16 Twitter accounts to reach over 100,000 people and actively posts 

information to Facebook and YouTube. In 2010, FEMA launched a mobile website, followed by a mobile 

app in 2010, both of which allow the public to access resources directly on their smartphones. Many other 

agencies maintain similar social media presences. For example, FEMA worked with the Tennessee 

Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) in the aftermath of the 2009 flooding to set up a joint 

Facebook page that provided the public with the latest information about ongoing disaster response and 

recovery efforts. Now that the main recovery phase has concluded, TEMA uses the Facebook page to 

share general preparedness and disaster-related information 

(see Figure 35).

Emergency response organizations have been slower to adopt 

ways to receive situational awareness information from 

community members. From a policy perspective, some 

emergency response organizations have strict security 

policies that prohibit use of social media for operational 

purposes. In other cases, agencies are overwhelmed by the 

sheer volume of situational awareness data shared before, 

during, and after emergencies. The Alabama State EOC

recently countered this challenge by relying on online 

volunteers to help manage the large amount of social media 

information generated following an outbreak of tornadoes in 

April 2011.18 Similarly, the American Red Cross used trained 

digital volunteers to monitor updates on Hurricane Irene in 

August 2011 via a variety of social media channels.19

Key finding: Whole community partners are increasingly 

using geographic information systems (GIS) tools to provide 

situational assessment capabilities.

GIS tools enhance situational understanding for decision-makers and the general public by enabling 

whole community stakeholders to display disaster response and recovery information through maps. 

Using GIS tools to inform situational assessment has become so prevalent that the overwhelming majority 

of states and high-risk urban areas have incorporated GIS capabilities. Non-governmental organizations 

are also increasingly using GIS tools to support disaster response. For example, the Red Cross uses a GISbased tool that displays the addresses and populations of open shelters via the Red Cross website and 

through a smartphone application. 

Federal agencies use powerful GIS platforms for integrating and visualizing data from multiple streams. 

FEMA’s Situational Awareness Viewer for Emergency Response & Recovery (SAVER2

) and HHS’s 

MedMap programs are two of many federal GIS tools that provide federal and non-federal stakeholders

with situational assessment data before, during, and after disasters. DHS recently issued the Federal 

Interagency Geospatial Concept of Operations, which identifies and aligns federal geospatial resources 

for use pre- and post-disaster, and ensures timely and accurate sharing of geospatial data. FEMA GIS 

capabilities help provide situational awareness to responders and policy makers using software tools such 

Figure 35: More than two years after the 2009 

floods, TEMA continues to use its Facebook 

page to provide preparedness information to 

the general public.
National Preparedness Report

50

 

as HURREVAC and HAZUS for predictive modeling and impact analysis. FEMA also maps important 

disaster response data in real-time, including road conditions, debris locations, points of distribution for 

emergency relief items, and disaster recovery centers. The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric 

Assessment Center distributes map products and GIS data files to enable Federal partners to incorporate 

consensus atmospheric dispersion modeling into their situational assessment tools. Similarly, the Federal 

Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center aggregates all federal radiological environmental 

monitoring data and makes them available to stakeholders. In addition, DOE has developed an in-house 

monitoring and mapping GIS tool called EAGLE-i, which provides near real-time information regarding 

energy grids and networks and can map components of the Nation’s energy infrastructure along with realtime weather hazards. Federal GIS stakeholders also collaborated to develop GIS smartphone-capable 

applications for search and rescue teams, allowing them to push on-scene data and images to decisionmakers. Search and rescue teams successfully deployed these new mobile applications during the 

response to Hurricane Irene in 2011. 

Preparedness Case Study: Virtual Alabama

In 2005, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security initiated development of Virtual Alabama, a 

GIS tool that overlays operational data from emergencies on three-dimensional maps (see Figure 36). 

Virtual Alabama transforms massive amounts of geo-referenced data into useful information for 

technical and non-technical users. Virtual Alabama supports situational assessment activities such as 

critical infrastructure mapping, plume modeling, and damage assessments. By 2010, Virtual Alabama 

had provided over 28,000 people from more than 1,500 agencies throughout the state, region, and 

Nation with access to a robust set of data made available by each of the state’s 67 counties.

Figure 36: Virtual Alabama includes plume modeling capabilities to 

inform decision-making related to situational assessment.
National Preparedness Report

51

 

Response/Recovery Core Capabilities

Infrastructure Systems

Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and 

revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.

Key finding: Utilities and other critical 

infrastructure partners have long-standing and 

proven mutual aid networks to promptly stabilize 

and restore infrastructure systems following 

disasters. Public works responders are also 

increasingly participating in mutual aid networks. 

However, sustained loss of electrical power 

following a catastrophic disaster could have 

significant effects on response and recovery 

activities.

To varying degrees of maturity, utilities and other 

critical infrastructure partners have established 

mutual aid networks to increase disaster response 

capabilities. These mutual aid networks enable the sharing of personnel, equipment, and other resources 

to support disaster response and recovery efforts. Examples include the following: 

 The American Gas Association has developed a mutual assistance program that governs the provision 

of mutual assistance during disasters among nearly 100 utilities and product/service providers 

nationwide.20

 In a 2009 survey of 610 water/wastewater utilities, nearly all respondents reported that they had 

established or were in the process of establishing written agreements for mutual aid.21 Forty-eight

Water/Wastewater Agency Response Networks exist nationwide, serving as intrastate mutual and 

assistance agreements.

 More than half of respondents to a 2011 American Public Works Association survey indicated that 

they belong to some sort of formal or informal mutual aid program.22

 The Edison Electric Institute, which serves 95 percent of the customers in the shareholder-owned 

segment of the U.S. electric power industry and represents approximately 70 percent of the industry 

overall, has a long-standing Mutual Assistance Program in place.23 Moreover, over the past decade, 

more than 815 utilities have signed the American Public Power Association’s disaster response 

mutual aid agreement. 

Similarly, public works responders are increasingly participating in mutual aid networks, including statewide initiatives such as the New Hampshire Public Works Mutual Aid program, the Illinois Public Works 

Mutual Aid Network, and Washington’s Public Works Emergency Response Mutual Aid Agreement. 

Together, these mutual aid networks ensure that utilities and critical infrastructure partners are able to 

promptly surge resources following a disaster to stabilize and restore infrastructure systems. The electric 

industry relied heavily on its mutual aid agreements during the response to Hurricane Irene which, at its 

peak, disrupted power for nearly six million customers along the East Coast. Utilities and critical 

infrastructure partners restored power to approximately 90 percent of customers in less than five days (see 

Figure 37).

2011 SPR Results: Infrastructure Systems
National Preparedness Report

52

 

While electric utilities are accustomed to 

rapidly restoring electricity following 

disasters, a catastrophic disaster would

likely result in sustained power outages. 

Sustained power outages would present 

significant challenges to other response 

and recovery capabilities due to identified 

gaps in emergency power. For example, 

only 12 percent of the mass care shelters 

listed in the American Red Cross and 

FEMA National Shelter Systems are 

equipped with on-site generators, and 

only six percent have self-sufficient 

power. Private sector contracts would be 

critical because federal generator 

inventories are unlikely to be sufficient. 

To support this identified gap, federal 

agencies can contract for resources and 

deploy teams to support response efforts. 

For instance, USACE within DOD 

maintains a $450 million contract for 

generator rentals that can potentially 

access almost every rental generator in the country. USACE can also deploy the 249th Engineer Battalion 

(Prime Power) to support disaster response efforts. The 249th can assess critical electricity needs and 

manage generator installation to provide power to critical community facilities—including hospitals, 

water and sewer treatment plants, and law enforcement facilities—until power companies can restore the 

commercial power distribution network. To address the challenges of prolonged power outages, Florida 

passed a law in 2006 requiring gas stations that meet certain criteria to be able to quickly deploy backup 

generators that would allow fuel to be pumped during power outages. More broadly, the Federal 

Government and private sector stakeholders have partnered to invest in smart grid technologies which 

enable more rapid restoration of electric service following major disruptions.

Key finding: Long-term infrastructure recovery capabilities are in the early stages of development.

While federal agencies such as the DOD USACE have experience working with states to support longterm infrastructure recovery, overall coordination processes for infrastructure recovery are still in 

development. FEMA, in partnership with other federal agencies and whole community stakeholders, only 

recently published the NDRF (September 2011). The NDRF’s Infrastructure Systems RSF annex and a 

supporting Federal Interagency Operational Plan called for in PPD-8 will guide future development of 

long-term infrastructure recovery capabilities.

Figure 37: After peaking on August 28 at nearly six million, 

the number of households without power following Hurricane 

Irene steadily trended downward.
National Preparedness Report

53

 

Recovery Core Capabilities

Economic Recovery

Return economic and business activities (including food and agriculture) to a healthy state and develop 

new business and employment opportunities that result in a sustainable and economically viable 

community. 

Key Finding: More than half of all states have 

assumed significant roles in long-term economic 

recovery through programs to provide financial 

recovery assistance to individuals and businesses.

At least 28 states have established assistance 

programs to help both businesses and individuals

rebound after disasters that do not meet the 

threshold for Presidential disaster declarations.25

States pay for these assistance programs through 

emergency management operating budgets, 

general state appropriations, emergency disaster 

relief funds, or contingency funds. Usually, a 

separate state disaster fund exists with funding 

appropriated regularly to ensure the availability of sufficient resources during crises. In addition to 

financial assistance, some recovery planning activities are also under way. Ten states have approved 

enhanced mitigation plans that address economic revitalization. In addition, 28 states have met the 

requirements of the EMAP accreditation process to develop recovery plans or strategies, considering both 

short- and long-term needs for restoring critical functions, services, vital resources, facilities, programs, 

2011 SPR Results: Economic Recovery

Whole Community Accomplishment: Restoring Transportation After Hurricane Irene

Tropical Storm Irene struck Vermont on August 28, 2011, damaging more than 500 miles of state 

highways and closing 34 state bridges. The resulting damage isolated 13 communities, forcing 

Vermont’s National Guard to airlift food and water. By August 31, crews had restored emergency 

access to all isolated communities. Within 30 days, 98 percent of the roads were reopened. Four 

months later, Vermont officials celebrated the final repair of Route 107, the last state highway to 

reopen after sustaining severe flood damage. In the three-mile section of Route 107 hit the hardest, a 

strip of road about 4,000 feet long was completely missing (see Figure 38). However, a repair project 

that would normally take two years took only 119 days. The new roadway can withstand another 

“Irene, plus two feet.”

24 More than 46 companies worked with the Vermont Agency of Transportation,

National Guard units, and law enforcement to complete repairs.

Figure 38: Washed-out roadways in Vermont following Hurricane Irene 

were restored rapidly to “better than new” condition despite considerable damage.
National Preparedness Report

54

 

and infrastructure to the affected area. The planning and coordination functions established under the 

NDRF will continue to advance recovery planning efforts by state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.

Key finding: Many private sector firms have developed disaster recovery plans that address information 

technology issues. Emerging voluntary accreditation programs for private sector entities will encourage 

more comprehensive preparedness and recovery planning.

Pre-event business continuity and disaster recovery 

planning can help private firms return to normal 

operations more quickly after a disaster. A 2010 

survey of 200 companies of various sizes found 

that approximately 79 percent had disaster 

recovery plans in place. However, funding to 

support plan updates had dropped since 2007, 

affected by the recent economic downturn. In 

2007, 58 percent of surveyed firms reported 

updating disaster recovery plans twice a year or 

more, but that number dropped to 42 percent in 

2010. Similarly, in 2007, 82 percent of surveyed 

firms reported testing disaster recovery plans once 

a year or more, but that number declined slightly 

to 78 percent in 2010 (see Figure 39).26

The Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness 

Accreditation and Certification Program (PS-Prep) 

broadens private sector recovery planning from information technology issues to a more holistic view of 

disaster management, emergency management, and business continuity. PS-Prep is a voluntary third-party 

accreditation and certification initiative for private sector entities, established to encourage preparedness 

and to help businesses recover and reopen quickly following disasters. The program is based on three 

preparedness and business continuity standards developed by the National Fire Protection Association, 

the British Standards Institution, and ASIS International and adopted by DHS in 2010 as part of PS-Prep.

Alternatively, smaller businesses can use the Ready RatingTM program from the American Red Cross, 

which is a free, self-paced program designed to help businesses, organizations, and schools better prepare

for emergencies. Simple steps to enhance basic disaster preparedness can yield benefits in economic and 

community resilience.

Figure 39: The economic downturn has 

challenged private sector efforts to prepare for 

recovery activities.
National Preparedness Report

55

 

Health and Social Services

Restore and improve health and social services networks to promote the resilience, independence, health 

(including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.

Key finding: Whole community partners have 

established standards and plans to support shortterm health recovery. Integrating social service 

and behavioral health into recovery activities and 

assessing long-term health and social services 

recovery are areas for future improvement.

Health and medical facilities have significantly 

improved in the area of short-term health 

recovery. In 2007, the Business Continuity 

Planning Workgroup for Healthcare Organizations 

surveyed more than 1,000 healthcare facilities and 

found that fewer than half (45 percent) had a 

business continuity plan in place to guide disaster 

recovery efforts.27 In 2008, recognizing the importance of short-term disaster recovery, the Joint 

Commission instituted a new requirement that hospitals assess their readiness for operating without 

community support for 96 hours and establish plans accordingly. This standard applies to the more than 

4,100 hospitals (approximately 82 percent of hospitals nationwide) that the Joint Commission accredits. 

Data from HHS’s Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) further emphasize progress made. Based on 

2009 data, more than 76 percent of hospitals participating in the HPP met 90 percent or more of the 

program’s metrics for all-hazards preparedness, which promotes overall hospital resilience to disasters. 

Integrating social services and behavioral health into recovery activities presents unique challenges. First, 

in many states and localities, social service and behavioral health programs face significant resource 

constraints, limiting their ability to prepare for disasters. In addition, privately owned facilities deliver 

2011 SPR Results: Health and Social Services

Preparedness Case Study: ResilientSF

In 2008 the San Francisco City Administrator’s Office and the Department of Emergency 

Management of San Francisco partnered with Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 

Government to initiate a planning process to expedite recovery from a major incident. This effort grew 

into the ResilientSF initiative, launched in December 2010 to advance San Francisco’s overall 

resilience by providing a framework and road map that coordinates plans, programs, resources, and 

relationships to boost individual, organizational, and community capacity to collectively solve 

problems. From the beginning, ResilientSF has emphasized inclusivity, helping stakeholders identify 

natural entry points in the planning process by breaking down resilience into eight distinct categories, 

such as environmental, economic, and health issues. ResilientSF initiatives have included:

 Framing the long-term discussion of resilience and recovery by engaging government, non-profit, 

and private sector partners in traditional and non-traditional opportunities;

 Building an SF Lifelines Council, which is the first locally managed workgroup of agencies and 

businesses that provide communities with critical services such as power, telecommunications, 

water, and transportation on a daily basis;

 Developing ONESF, which is a 10-year capital plan that takes a long-term approach to 

advancing the San Francisco physical infrastructure; and

 Creating SF Heroes, which is a smartphone application that invites users to engage in activities 

that increase their resilience and challenge their friends to do the same.
National Preparedness Report

56

 

many of these services, rather than state, local, tribal, and territorial public health personnel. Moreover, 

many personnel who support social services and behavioral health have not received appropriate disasterrelated training. Accordingly, whole community partners, such as the American Red Cross and faithbased organizations, often take lead roles in social services and behavioral health recovery. For example, 

the American Red Cross’ Mental Health Services team has 4,000 mental health professionals who can

assess and tend to emotional needs during and after a disaster and connect people with local professionals 

to address long-term needs.28 Similarly, Lutheran Social Services of the South, a faith-based organization 

in Texas, has a dedicated disaster response and recovery operation. Following Hurricane Ike in 2008, the 

organization led a three-year effort to provide post-disaster case management for over 8,100 households 

affected by the hurricane.29

Measuring the effectiveness of long-term recovery in health and social services is challenging because it 

requires community-level analysis over an extended period of time. One way to evaluate progress of longterm recovery in health and social services is to identify case studies and track them for a sustained 

period, comparing metrics from year to year and applying those lessons to future long-term recovery 

efforts. The recently published NDRF will guide collaboration efforts by whole community partners to 

support recovery in health and social services.

Preparedness Case Study: Health Care in New Orleans Since Hurricane Katrina

Six years after Hurricane Katrina, a new clinic network provides improved primary care for city 

residents, reaching minority and uninsured residents in particular. This network of over 90 clinics 

replaces Charity Hospital, a major provider of medical care for New Orleans’ poor and uninsured 

populations prior to its closure post-Katrina. The New Orleans medical community began planning 

after the storm for a new cost-effective network of clinics to provide neighborhood-based healthcare 

access. Due in part to these clinics, 55 percent of over 1,500 residents surveyed in 2010 reported 

that their healthcare needs were being met “very well,” up from 36 percent in 2006. However, 77 

percent still reported a shortfall in overall healthcare service availability; 84 percent pointed to 

insufficient services for low-income residents and those without insurance coverage.30

Preparedness Case Study: Faith-based and Community Organization 

Activities in Miami-Dade County, Florida

In March 2011, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 

partnered with FEMA to launch the Communities Organized to Respond in Emergencies (CORE) 

program, which engages faith-based and community organizations in planning for, responding to, 

and recovering from disasters. CORE works to ensure that post-disaster assistance is available 

throughout the county, including in traditionally underserved areas. Since its inception, CORE has 

actively recruited faith-based and community organizations, working with them to assess the types of 

services and resources they could provide after a disaster and tracking that information in a 

database. As of June 2011, the CORE program had assessed 103 organizations and created ties 

with 25 affiliates, over 55 percent of which are faith-based organizations. CORE affiliates support the 

Miami-Dade County OEM by serving as temporary shelters and distribution points for emergency 

supplies, managing donation drives, offering translation services for non-English speaking residents, 

and assisting with volunteer coordination, emotional and spiritual care, and other recovery activities.
National Preparedness Report

57

 

Housing

Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to 

its sustainability and resilience. 

Key Finding: Federal agencies join with state, 

local, tribal, and territorial partners to provide 

housing assistance rapidly after disasters and to 

support long-term housing recovery. 

A key federal post-disaster responsibility is to 

provide housing assistance to eligible survivors 

whose primary residence is uninhabitable or who 

are displaced by disaster. Pursuant to the Stafford 

Act, FEMA is responsible for temporary housing 

up to 18 months; HUD is responsible for longterm housing support. In most cases, FEMA 

provides temporary housing, and most individuals 

are able to return home or relocate to rental 

properties quickly. FEMA temporary housing assistance includes transitional sheltering assistance 

(hotel/motel), rental assistance, repair and replacement assistance, or direct housing (temporary housing 

units). In FY 2011, FEMA placed eligible applicants in temporary housing within 60 days 99 percent of 

the time. Since 2005, FEMA has also more than doubled its capacity to conduct housing inspections, 

speeding eligibility determination for post-disaster aid to an average of three days. In addition, FEMA and 

HUD partner to provide temporary housing rental assistance and housing counseling services to eligible 

individuals and households through the Disaster Housing Assistance Program. 

HUD provides longer-term housing assistance after disasters through Community Development Block 

Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Assistance, which has delivered nearly $30 billion in aid to 27 states 

and territories since 2001. Congress appropriates this funding only in extraordinary circumstances 

following disasters when standing federal disaster recovery programs are not adequate to meet existing 

needs. The program supports a range of recovery activities, including relocation payments for displaced 

residents, rehabilitation of damaged homes and buildings, homeownership support, repair and 

reconstruction of affordable rental housing, and buyouts of flood-damaged properties. Generally, at least 

50 percent of the funds must support activities that principally benefit individuals with low or moderate 

incomes. Results from CDBG Disaster Recovery Assistance are evident along the Gulf Coast, which 

received $19.7 billion following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. For example, properties receiving 

CDBG assistance were nearly twice as likely to be rebuilt as properties that did not receive funding. More 

than $11 billion has helped over 157,000 homeowners in Louisiana and Mississippi rebuild their homes. 

In addition, communities spent over $1.1 billion to deliver affordable rental housing through CDBG 

Disaster Recovery Assistance following disasters in 2005 and 2008. These resources supported more than 

16,000 affordable rental housing units throughout Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas 

following the 2005 hurricane season. 

State and federal agencies demonstrated their ability to deliver housing support rapidly in response to the 

May 2011 Joplin, Missouri, tornado, which destroyed or damaged 7,500 housing units and displaced 

9,000 people. By October 2011, FEMA had provided housing assistance to over 2,900 families. In 

addition, the number of households in temporary housing peaked at 586 in October 2011 and has declined 

steadily since then as households have found permanent housing solutions in and around Joplin. One of 

Joplin’s priorities was to reopen its schools on time in fall 2011. At the request of the state-led housing 

task force, FEMA helped to place families with school-aged children in mobile home parks first, 

ultimately housing all identified families before the start of the school year. In addition, USDA exercised 

its statutory authority to provide homeownership loan guarantees to the Joplin community through the 

USDA Rural Housing Service. 

2011 SPR Results: Housing
National Preparedness Report

58

 

Key Finding: New doctrine on disaster housing outlines roles and responsibilities for whole community 

partners to deliver sheltering, interim housing, and permanent housing. Measuring progress in long-term 

housing recovery is an area for improvement.

Following Hurricane Katrina, the government, businesses, and nonprofit organizations collaborated to 

create national guidance on disaster housing. This national guidance includes the National Disaster 

Housing Strategy (NDHS) (January 2009), the NDHS Implementation Plan (March 2010), and the 

Housing RSF of the NDRF (September 2011). HUD leads the Housing RSF, with support from FEMA, 

DOJ, USDA, and other organizations. Together, this doctrine outlines roles and responsibilities for whole 

community partners in delivering housing assistance; however, performance measures for long-term 

housing recovery are needed in order to track annual progress.

Preparedness Case Study: A Faith-Based Organization 

Supports Housing Recovery Initiatives

The North Carolina Baptist Men’s Disaster Relief Ministry repaired homes after the April 2011 

tornadoes affected 30 counties across the state. Initially, the Baptist Men concentrated on 

temporarily replacing damaged roofs with tarps and clearing debris. Five weeks after the storms, 

teams had provided 11,400 volunteer days of support to communities across the state. But the group 

did not just assist with initial response—three months later, relief efforts continued, focusing on 

reconstruction and repair of houses and mobile homes. Most of the Baptist Men’s disaster relief work 

ended in September, after nearly five months of aid.32

Preparedness Case Study: Recovering After the Joplin, Missouri Tornado

The May 2011 tornado in Joplin, Missouri, damaged the community’s social services infrastructure, 

creating new needs for many community residents, particularly among at-risk populations of older 

adults and children. Partnerships among community residents, community-based organizations, and 

agencies at all levels of government have proven integral to successful social services recovery. For

example, State and local Aging Networks partnered with the HHS Administration on Aging to help 

older residents who lost their homes obtain relocation assistance. Similarly, an innovative Child Care 

Task Force—coordinated by the HHS Administration of Children and Families and implemented in 

partnership with federal, state, local, and nonprofit stakeholders—harnessed resources to meet 

Joplin’s emergency child care needs after the tornado destroyed or damaged 27 child care facilities.

When the tornado demolished six school buildings, the Joplin School District relocated classes to 

alternate facilities, including empty retail space at a local mall. Public-private collaboration allowed 

schools to open on time in August 2011.31
National Preparedness Report

59

 

Natural and Cultural Resources

Protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties through appropriate planning, mitigation, 

response, and recovery actions to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore them consistent with postdisaster community priorities and best practices and in compliance with appropriate environmental and 

historical preservation laws and executive orders.

Key Finding: Many state archivists have plans in 

place to safeguard important records, but review 

and validation of those plans may not occur 

regularly. Federal partners have technical 

expertise that can support recovery functions for 

records.

Safeguarding important digital and paper records 

is critical to a community’s ability to recover from 

disasters. Medical records, maps of utility lines 

and of gas mains, building layouts, important 

contracts, and property ownership documentation 

are just a few examples of information that 

communities must protect in order to safeguard 

lives and property. A 2006 evaluation of records 

management functions at the state level by the Council of State Archivists found that two-thirds of states 

met only some or few of the 38 records-related preparedness assessment criteria. For example, although 

most state archivists had emergency preparedness and recovery plans in place, planners did not update the 

plans or test them through exercises as frequently as needed. In addition, few states had up-to-date 

information about significant non-governmental record repositories, such as businesses, museums, or 

historical societies. 

Federal agencies share guidance and resources with their federal, state, and local counterparts on sound 

records management practices for disaster preparedness and recovery. The U.S. Department of the 

Interior (DOI) leads these efforts, as the coordinator for the Natural and Cultural Resources RSF under 

the NDRF, and as a co-primary support agency with USDA for ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural 

Resources) under the NRF. DOI also works closely with FEMA’s Environmental Planning and Historic 

Preservation Program to provide environmental and historic preservation technical assistance to whole 

community stakeholders. DOI’s support to whole community partners includes deployments of subjectmatter experts to support damage assessments and to provide guidance for natural and cultural resources 

and historical properties. DOI also hosts a website of relevant planning resources, technical guidance, and 

links (http://www.doi.gov/ProtectNCH).

2011 SPR Results: Natural and Cultural 

Resources

Preparedness Case Study: Deepwater Horizon Response and Recovery Efforts

The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S. history. 

The spill discharged an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil and affected over 600 miles of shoreline 

along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Response efforts were federally coordinated (with USCG leading) and 

reimbursed largely by BP. At their peak, response efforts included more than 48,000 responders and 

9,700 vessels. Response efforts included resources from federal, state, and local government 

agencies and the private sector. Thousands of volunteers also supported the response. As of May 31, 

2011, BP has paid $712 million of federal and state government costs for oil spill cleanup and $4.2 

billion for individual and business claims. Cleanup and long-term recovery efforts continue, guided by 

a Long-Term Recovery Plan and a Regional Ecosystem Restoration Strategy.
National Preparedness Report

60

 

Future National Preparedness Reports

This National Preparedness Report (NPR) represents a step forward in efforts to assess overall national 

preparedness. Informed by inputs from across the whole community, the 2012 NPR serves as a baseline 

evaluation of the progress made to date toward building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities 

described in the Goal. Taken together, progress across the 31 core capabilities highlights trends in 

national preparedness, emphasizing where the Nation has developed significant strengths and 

underscoring areas to improve. 

As PPD-8 implementation matures, so, too, will the NPR. Ongoing National Preparedness System 

implementation will integrate current preparedness efforts. Specifically, the National Frameworks will 

describe whole community roles and responsibilities across all five mission areas and define how whole 

community partners work together to deliver core capabilities. Exercises, a remedial action management 

program, and a comprehensive assessment system will be synchronized to evaluate and validate current 

capability levels and monitor progress on building, sustaining, and delivering capabilities. 

Building on these efforts, the vision for future NPRs is to establish a routine, repeatable process that 

engages whole community partners throughout. Future NPR development will focus on establishing and 

refining core metrics and measures across each of the 31 core capabilities. This, in turn, will enable whole 

community partners to provide meaningful, consistent NPR inputs and will allow future NPRs to show 

annual progress and trends. Future NPRs will also work to integrate more data from exercises and realworld operations to validate information collected through self-assessments such as the SPR.

Conclusion

This NPR demonstrates the progress made toward building a secure and resilient Nation while 

acknowledging that key areas for improvement remain. Key national findings from the NPR include: 

 The Nation has developed areas of national strength in several core capabilities, particularly in crosscutting, common capabilities and those capabilities that support incident response and information 

sharing across all levels of government; 

 Cybersecurity and recovery-focused core capabilities are important—though not the only—areas for 

improvement nationwide; 

 Whole community partners have used significant federal grant investments to support areas of 

national strength; 

 Through the SPR self-assessment survey, states generally reported the highest capability levels in the 

core capabilities that they identified as high priorities;

 Efforts to address identified preparedness gaps from real-world incidents—such as the 9/11 attacks 

and Hurricane Katrina—have yielded meaningful improvements; 

 Despite some progress, integrating people with disabilities and other access and functional needs, 

children, pregnant women, older adults, and people with chronic medical conditions into preparedness 

activities requires more national attention across all mission areas;

 Whole community partners are increasingly using risk analyses to inform policy and programmatic 

decision-making across all mission areas; and

 While whole community partners have established many programs that support national 

preparedness, measures and metrics often do not exist to gauge performance and progress over time.

The Nation has achieved significant progress to date in enhancing national preparedness by investing 

federal, state, and local funding in building core capabilities across all mission areas. Moving forward, 

whole community partners across the Nation must share the responsibility for implementing a balanced 
National Preparedness Report

61

 

approach to preparedness investment—making sure to sustain areas of strength built through years of 

program implementation while also continuing to dedicate resources to ongoing areas of need. The vision 

for future preparedness assistance is to build and sustain capabilities that create national capacity based on 

cross-jurisdictional and readily deployable state, local, tribal, and territorial assets.

To achieve the National Preparedness Goal, the Nation will need to build on the significant progress to 

date and address identified areas for improvement. The complex set of threats and hazards facing the 

Nation and the underlying interdependencies within critical infrastructure and supply chains require 

integrated preparedness efforts to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities. Achieving the Goal will 

ultimately require sustained attention to PPD-8 implementation. The components of the National 

Preparedness System will provide a consistent and reliable approach to support decision-making, resource 

allocation, and ongoing performance assessment. Equally important, the National Preparedness System 

will engage the whole community of individuals, families, communities, private and nonprofit sectors, 

faith-based organizations, and all levels of government to contribute to strengthening national 

preparedness.
National Preparedness Report

62

 

Acronym List

AFRCC Air Force Rescue Coordination Center 

BEOC Business Emergency Operations Center 

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

CALEA Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive

CDBG Community Development Block Grant

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CERFP CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 

CERT Community Emergency Response Team 

CIRMEI Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Enhancement Initiative 

CISCP Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Collaboration Program

C2CRE Command and Control CBRN Response Elements

COOP Continuity of Operations

CORE Communities Organized to Respond in Emergencies 

CPG Comprehensive Preparedness Guide

CRS Community Rating System

CSI Container Security Initiative

CST Civil Support Team

CTOS Counter Terrorism Operations Support 

C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 

DCRF Defense CBRN Response Force

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DIB Defense Industrial Base

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOI U.S. Department of the Interior

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

EAS Emergency Alert System

ECIP Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection 

EMAP Emergency Management Accreditation Program

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EMT Emergency Medical Technician

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOP Emergency Operations Plan

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ERLN Environmental Response Laboratory Network

ESAR-VHP Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals

ESF Emergency Support Function

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERN Food Emergency Response Network

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

FY Fiscal Year
National Preparedness Report

63

 

GAO Government Accountability Office

GCC Government Coordinating Council

GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service

GIS Geographic Information Systems

GSA General Services Administration

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

HPP Hospital Preparedness Program

HRF Homeland Response Force

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IBC International Building Code

ICE U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement

ICS Incident Command System

ILEAS Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System 

IOC Interagency Operations Center

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

IPS International Port Security 

IS-RSF Infrastructure Systems Recovery Support Function 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center

JCTAWS Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committees 

LRN Laboratory Response Network

MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support 

NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NAR National Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Annual Report 

NCFI National Computer Forensics Institute

NCFTA National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance 

NCIJTF National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force

NCSD National Cyber Security Division

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NDHS National Disaster Housing Strategy 

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

NDRF National Disaster Recovery Framework

NECP National Emergency Communications Plan

NFIP National Flood Insurance Program 

NGRF National Guard Reaction Force

NIMS National Incident Management System

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NPR National Preparedness Report

NPS National Park Service

NRCC National Response Coordination Center 

NRF National Response Framework

NRS National Response System

NRT National Response Team

NSI Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OEM Office of Emergency Management

PHEMCE Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise 
National Preparedness Report

64

 

PHEP Public Health Emergency Preparedness

PIV Personal Identity Verification 

PPD Presidential Policy Directive

PRND Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection 

PS-Prep Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness Accreditation and Certification Program 

RSF Recovery Support Function

SAR Suspicious Activity Reporting 

SAVER2 Situational Awareness Viewer for Emergency Response and Recovery 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council

SHSP State Homeland Security Program

SLATT State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training

SNS Strategic National Stockpile

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SPR State Preparedness Report

STEP Student Tools for Emergency Planning 

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency

THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

TPD Tampa Police Department

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative

US&R Urban Search and Rescue

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

US-CERT U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

USCG United States Coast Guard

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFA U.S. Fire Administration 

USPHS U.S. Public Health Service 

USPS United States Postal Service

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WPS Wireless Priority Service 
National Preparedness Report

65

 

Endnotes

1 FEMA has established an online collaboration forum (http://fema.ideascale.com/) where the public is encouraged 

to contribute to and comment on different topics related to preparedness and emergency management. The site 

includes the FEMA Think Tank and information on PPD-8 and FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative. 2 James K. Stewart, Denise Rodriguez King, and Ron Lafond, “Tampa Bay Manhunt After Action Report: Lessons 

Learned in Community Police Partnerships and Incident Command System,” CNA, April 2011.

3 Center for Survey Research, “Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: 2010 Partner Survey,” 2010, p. 49. 4 Institute for Business and Home Safety, “MEGA FIRES: The Case for Mitigation,” 2008, p. 14. 5 Emergency Management Accreditation Program, “Emergency Management Standard by EMAP,” 2010, p. 5. 6 International Association of Fire Chiefs, “Responding to Tennessee Floods and Storms,” 2011, http://www.iafc.org

/MemberCenter/OnSceneArticle.cfm?ItemNumber=4894. 7 Alabama Task Force 1, “2011 Alabama Tornado Outbreak,” 2012, http://www.alabamataskforce1.com/

GetNews2011_1.event. 8 Civil Air Patrol, “Civil Air Patrol: 2009 Financial Report,” 2009, p. 10. 9 Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., “The Commission,” CALEA®, 2012, 

http://www.calea.org/content/calea-client-database. 10 Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System, “About ILEAS,” 2012, http://www.ileas.org/main/about-ileas. 11 James Bell, “Evaluation of the Fire Corps Program,” for the National Volunteer Fire Council, 2010, p. 7. 12 Trust for America’s Health, “Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and 

Bioterrorism,” 2010, p. 26. 13 Mary Madden and Kathryn Zickuhr, “65% of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites,” Pew Research Center, 

August 26, 2011.

14 American Red Cross, “Social Media in Disasters and Emergencies,” 2011, p. 10, http://www.redcross.org/wwwfiles/Documents/pdf/SocialMediainDisasters.pdf. 15 Ibid., p. 16. 16 Ibid., p. 17. 17 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Center for Social Media, “Directory of Law Enforcement Agencies 

Using Social Media,” 2011, http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Directory.aspx. 18 Clarence Wardell III and Yee San Su, “2011 Social Media + Emergency Management Camp,” CNA, September 

2011, p. 9, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/SMEM_Report.pdf. 19 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, “Red Cross Gets Twitter Badges for Hurricane Irene,” August 29, 2011, 

http://blog.rwjf.org/publichealth/2011/08/29/red-cross-gets-twitter-badges-for-hurricane-irene/. 20 American Gas Association, “Mutual Aid Database,” 2012, http://www.aga.org/Kc/OperationsEngineering/

ngmarc/mutualaiddatabase/Pages/old-search-age.aspx. 21 Ross & Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd., “2009 Water Sector Measures Analysis,” 2009. 22 Emergency Management Think Tank, “Report of the Emergency Management Think Tank,” American Public 

Works Association, 2011. 23 Edison Electric Institute, “Powering Change Respond and Restore,” 2012, http://www.eei.org/whoweare/

ourmembers/Pages/default.aspx. 24 Wilson Ring, “Vermont set to reopen last highway destroyed by Irene,” Associated Press, December 29, 2011. 25 National Emergency Management Association, “NEMA 2010 Biennial Report,” 2010. 26 Rachel Dines, “The State of Disaster Recovery Preparedness,” Disaster Recovery Journal (Winter 2011), pp. 2-4. 27 Ric Skinner, Jennifer Davey, and Angela Devlen, “Are We Ready? The BCPWHO Survey on Disaster 

Preparedness of US Healthcare Facilities,” presented at the National Emergency Management Summit, February 3-

5, 2008, p. 36.

28 American Red Cross, “Delivering Relief, Inspiring Hope 2010 Disaster Relief Program Executive Summary,” 

2011, p. 4.

29 Lutheran Social Services, “LSS Disaster Response: Texas Wildfires,” 2011, p. 5, http://www.lsss.org/disasterresponse. 30 Kaiser Family Foundation, “New Orleans Five Years After The Storm: A New Disaster Amid Recovery,” August 

2010, pp. 23, 29. 31 Roger McKinney, “JHS juniors, seniors to attend classes at Northpark Mall,” Joplin Globe, June 9, 2011. 32 North Carolina Baptist Men, “Baptists on Mission: September 6, 2011–Tornado Update,” September 6, 2011, 

http://www.baptistsonmission.org/Projects/North-Carolina/Tornado/Update.