Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 157 / Thursday, August 14, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 47553 

In addition, the Committee’s meeting 

was widely publicized throughout the 

Texas citrus industry and all interested 

persons were invited to attend the 

meeting and participate in Committee 

deliberations on all issues. Like all 

Committee meetings, the June 5, 2014, 

meeting was a public meeting and all 

entities, both large and small, were able 

to express views on this issue. Finally, 

interested persons are invited to submit 

comments on this interim rule, 

including the regulatory and 

informational impacts of this action on 

small businesses. 

In accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995, (44 U.S.C. 

Chapter 35), the order’s information 

collection requirements have been 

previously approved by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) and 

assigned OMB No. 0581–0189 Generic 

Fruit Crops. No changes in those 

requirements as a result of this action 

are necessary. Should any changes 

become necessary, they would be 

submitted to OMB for approval. 

This action imposes no additional 

reporting or recordkeeping requirements 

on either small or large Texas orange 

and grapefruit handlers. As with all 

Federal marketing order programs, 

reports and forms are periodically 

reviewed to reduce information 

requirements and duplication by 

industry and public sector agencies. 

AMS is committed to complying with 

the E-Government Act, to promote the 

use of the internet and other 

information technologies to provide 

increased opportunities for citizen 

access to Government information and 

services, and for other purposes. 

USDA has not identified any relevant 

Federal rules that duplicate, overlap, or 

conflict with this rule. 

A small business guide on complying 

with fruit, vegetable, and specialty crop 

marketing agreements and orders may 

be viewed at: http://www.ams.usda.gov/ 

MarketingOrdersSmallBusinessGuide. 

Any questions about the compliance 

guide should be sent to Jeffrey Smutny 

at the previously mentioned address in 

the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. 

After consideration of all relevant 

material presented, including the 

information and recommendation 

submitted by the Committee and other 

available information, it is hereby found 

that this rule, as hereinafter set forth, 

will tend to effectuate the declared 

policy of the Act. 

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553, it is also 

found and determined upon good cause 

that it is impracticable, unnecessary, 

and contrary to the public interest to 

give preliminary notice prior to putting 

this rule into effect, and that good cause 

exists for not postponing the effective 

date of this rule until 30 days after 

publication in the Federal Register 

because: (1) The 2014–15 fiscal period 

begins on August 1, 2014, and the 

marketing order requires that the rate of 

assessment for each fiscal period apply 

to all assessable oranges and grapefruit 

handled during such fiscal period; (2) 

this action decreases the assessment rate 

for assessable oranges and grapefruit 

grown in Texas beginning with the 

2014–15 fiscal period; (3) handlers are 

aware of this action which was 

recommended by the Committee at a 

public meeting and is similar to other 

assessment rate actions issued in past 

years; and (4) this interim rule provides 

a 60-day comment period, and all 

comments timely received will be 

considered prior to finalization of this 

rule. 

List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 906 

Grapefruit, Marketing agreements, 

Oranges, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, 7 CFR part 906 is amended as 

follows: 

PART 906—ORANGES AND 

GRAPEFRUIT GROWN IN LOWER RIO 

GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS 

■ 1. The authority citation for 7 CFR 

part 906 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–674. 

■ 2. Section 906.235 is revised to read 

as follows: 

§ 906.235 Assessment rate. 

On and after August 1, 2014, an 

assessment rate of $0.11 per 7/10-bushel 

carton or equivalent is established for 

oranges and grapefruit grown in the 

Lower Rio Grande Valley in Texas. 

Dated: August 11, 2014. 

Rex A. Barnes, 

Associate Administrator, Agricultural 

Marketing Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19306 Filed 8–13–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0560; Special 

Conditions No. 27–033–SC] 

Special Conditions: Robinson Model 

R44 and R44 II Helicopters, Installation 

of HeliSAS Autopilot and Stabilization 

Augmentation System (AP/SAS) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; request 

for comments. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the modification of the 

Robinson Helicopter Company Model 

R44 and R44 II helicopters. These model 

helicopters will have a novel or unusual 

design feature after installation of the 

HeliSAS helicopter autopilot/ 

stabilization augmentation system (AP/ 

SAS) that has potential failure 

conditions with more severe adverse 

consequences than those envisioned by 

the existing applicable airworthiness 

regulations. These special conditions 

contain the added safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

ensure the failures and their effects are 

sufficiently analyzed and contained. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is August 4, 2014. We 

must receive your comments on or 

before September 29, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2014–0560] 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver 

comments to the Docket Operations, in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 


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47554 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 157 / Thursday, August 14, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

docket or go to the Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark Wiley, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations 

and Policy Group (ASW–111), 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5134; 

facsimile (817) 222–5961; or email to 

mark.wiley@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Reason for No Prior Notice and 

Comment Before Adoption 

The FAA has determined that notice 

and opportunity for public comment are 

unnecessary because the substance of 

these special conditions has been 

subjected to the notice and comment 

period previously and has been derived 

without substantive change from those 

previously issued. As it is unlikely that 

we will receive new comments, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists for making 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Comments Invited 

While we did not precede this with a 

notice of proposed special conditions, 

we invite interested people to take part 

in this action by sending written 

comments, data, or views. The most 

helpful comments reference a specific 

portion of the special conditions, 

explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive by the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want us to let you know we 

received your mailed comments on 

these special conditions, send us a preaddressed, stamped postcard on which 

the docket number appears. We will 

stamp the date on the postcard and mail 

it back to you. 

Background 

On November 1, 2006, the Robinson 

Helicopter Company applied to amend 

type certificate (TC) Number H11NM to 

install a HeliSAS AP/SAS on the 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R44 and R44 II helicopters. The 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R44 and R44 II helicopters are 14 CFR 

part 27 normal category, single 

reciprocating engine, conventional 

helicopters designed for civil operation. 

These helicopter models are capable of 

carrying up to four passengers with one 

pilot, and have a maximum gross weight 

of up to 2,500 pounds, depending on the 

model configuration. The major design 

features include a 2-blade, fully 

articulated main rotor, an anti-torque 

tail rotor system, a skid landing gear, 

and a visual flight rule basic avionics 

configuration. Robinson Helicopter 

Company proposes to modify these 

model helicopters by installing a twoaxis HeliSAS AP/SAS. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under 14 CFR 21.101, Robinson 

Helicopter Company must show that the 

model R44 and R44 II helicopters, as 

modified by the installed HeliSAS AP/ 

SAS, continue to meet the applicable 

regulations in effect on the date of 

application for the change to the type 

certificate. The baseline of the 

certification basis for the unmodified 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R44 and R44 II helicopters is listed in 

TC Number H11NM. Additionally, 

compliance must be shown to any 

applicable equivalent level of safety 

findings, exemptions, and special 

conditions prescribed by the 

Administrator as part of the certification 

basis. 

The Administrator has determined the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(that is, 14 CFR part 27), as they pertain 

to this amended TC, do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Robinson Helicopter Company 

model R44 and R44 II helicopters 

because of a novel or unusual design 

feature. Therefore, special conditions 

are prescribed under § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Robinson Helicopter 

Company must show compliance of the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS amended TC altered 

model R44 and R44 II helicopters with 

the noise certification requirements of 

14 CFR part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.101(d). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS incorporates 

novel or unusual design features for 

installation in a Robinson Helicopter 

Company model R44 and R44 II 

helicopter, TC Number H11NM. This 

HeliSAS AP/SAS performs non-critical 

control functions, since these model 

helicopters have been certificated to 

meet the applicable requirements 

independent of this system. However, 

the possible failure conditions for this 

system, and their effect on the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

helicopters, are more severe than those 

envisioned by the present rules. 

Discussion 

The effect on safety is not adequately 

covered under § 27.1309 for the 

application of new technology and new 

application of standard technology. 

Specifically, the present provisions of 

§ 27.1309(c) do not adequately address 

the safety requirements for systems 

whose failures could result in 

catastrophic or hazardous/severe-major 

failure conditions, or for complex 

systems whose failures could result in 

major failure conditions. The current 

regulations are inadequate because 

when § 27.1309(c) were promulgated, it 

was not envisioned that this type of 

rotorcraft would use systems that are 

complex or whose failure could result in 

‘‘catastrophic’’ or ‘‘hazardous/severemajor’’ effects on the rotorcraft. This is 

particularly true with the application of 

new technology, new application of 

standard technology, or other 

applications not envisioned by the rule 

that affect safety. 

To comply with the provisions of the 

special conditions, we require that 

Robinson Helicopter Company provide 

the FAA with a systems safety 

assessment (SSA) for the final HeliSAS 

AP/SAS installation configuration that 

will adequately address the safety 

objectives established by a functional 

hazard assessment (FHA) and a 

preliminary system safety assessment 

(PSSA), including the fault tree analysis 

(FTA). This will ensure that all failure 

conditions and their resulting effects are 

adequately addressed for the installed 

HeliSAS AP/SAS. The SSA process, 

FHA, PSSA, and FTA are all parts of the 

overall safety assessment process 

discussed in FAA Advisory Circular 27– 

1B (Certification of Normal Category 

Rotorcraft) and Society of Automotive 

Engineers document Aerospace 

Recommended Practice 4761 

(Guidelines and Methods for 

Conducting the Safety Assessment 

Process on Civil Airborne Systems and 

Equipment). 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 157 / Thursday, August 14, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 47555 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS installed on 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R44 and R44 II helicopter meet the 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design integrity 

requirements. 

Failure Condition Categories. Failure 

conditions are classified, according to 

the severity of their effects on the 

rotorcraft, into one of the following 

categories: 

1. No Effect. Failure conditions that 

would have no effect on safety. For 

example, failure conditions that would 

not affect the operational capability of 

the rotorcraft or increase crew workload; 

however, could result in an 

inconvenience to the occupants, 

excluding the flight crew. 

2. Minor. Failure conditions which 

would not significantly reduce rotorcraft 

safety, and which would involve crew 

actions that are well within their 

capabilities. Minor failure conditions 

would include, for example, a slight 

reduction in safety margins or 

functional capabilities, a slight increase 

in crew workload such as routine flight 

plan changes or result in some physical 

discomfort to occupants. 

3. Major. Failure conditions which 

would reduce the capability of the 

rotorcraft or the ability of the crew to 

cope with adverse operating conditions 

to the extent that there would be, for 

example, a significant reduction in 

safety margins or functional capabilities, 

a significant increase in crew workload 

or result in impairing crew efficiency, 

physical distress to occupants, 

including injuries, or physical 

discomfort to the flight crew. 

4. Hazardous/Severe-Major. 

a. Failure conditions which would 

reduce the capability of the rotorcraft or 

the ability of the crew to cope with 

adverse operating conditions to the 

extent that there would be: 

(1) A large reduction in safety margins 

or functional capabilities; 

(2) physical distress or excessive 

workload that would impair the flight 

crew’s ability to the extent that they 

could not be relied on to perform their 

tasks accurately or completely; or 

(3) possible serious or fatal injury to 

a passenger or a cabin crewmember, 

excluding the flight crew. 

b. ‘‘Hazardous/severe-major’’ failure 

conditions can include events that are 

manageable by the crew by the use of 

proper procedures, which, if not 

implemented correctly or in a timely 

manner, may result in a catastrophic 

event. 

5. Catastrophic—Failure conditions 

which would result in multiple fatalities 

to occupants, fatalities or incapacitation 

to the flight crew, or result in loss of the 

rotorcraft. 

Radio Technical Commission for 

Aeronautics, Inc. (RTCA) Document 

DO–178C (Software Considerations in 

Airborne Systems And Equipment 

Certification) provides software design 

assurance levels most commonly used 

for the major, hazardous/severe-major, 

and catastrophic failure condition 

categories. The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified for the 

expected installation environment. The 

test procedures prescribed in RTCA 

Document DO–160G (Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment) are recognized by 

the FAA as acceptable methodologies 

for finding compliance with the 

environmental requirements. Equivalent 

environment test standards may also be 

acceptable. This is to show that the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system performs its 

intended function under any foreseeable 

operating condition, which includes the 

expected environment in which the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended to operate. 

Some of the main considerations for 

environmental concerns are installation 

locations and the resulting exposure to 

environmental conditions for the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS system equipment, 

including considerations for other 

equipment that may be affected 

environmentally by the HeliSAS AP/ 

SAS equipment installation. The level 

of environmental qualification must be 

related to the severity of the considered 

failure conditions and effects on the 

rotorcraft. 

Applicability 

These special conditions are 

applicable to the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installed as an amended TC approval in 

Robinson Helicopter Company model 

R44 and R44 II helicopters, TC Number 

H11NM. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features for a HeliSAS 

AP/SAS amended TC installed on two 

model helicopters. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 

106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 

44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the 

Robinson Helicopter Company amended 

type certificate basis for the installation 

of a HeliSAS helicopter autopilot/ 

stabilization augmentation system (AP/ 

SAS) on model R44 and R44 II 

helicopters, Type Certificate Number 

H11NM. In addition to the requirements 

of § 27.1309(c), HeliSAS AP/SAS 

installations on Robinson Helicopter 

company model R44 and R44 II 

helicopters must be designed and 

installed so that the failure conditions 

identified in the functional hazard 

assessment (FHA) and verified by the 

system safety assessment (SSA), after 

design completion, are adequately 

addressed in accordance with the 

following requirements. 

Requirements 

The Robinson Helicopter Company 

must comply with the existing 

requirements of § 27.1309 for all 

applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of ‘‘no 

effect,’’ and ‘‘minor,’’ and for noncomplex systems whose failure 

condition category is classified as 

‘‘major.’’ The Robinson Helicopter 

Company must comply with the 

requirements of these special conditions 

for all applicable design and operational 

aspects of the HeliSAS AP/SAS with the 

failure condition categories of 

‘‘catastrophic’’ and ‘‘hazardous severe/ 

major,’’ and for complex systems whose 

failure condition category is classified 

as ‘‘major.’’ A complex system is a 

system whose operations, failure 

conditions, or failure effects are difficult 

to comprehend without the aid of 

analytical methods (for example, FTA, 

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, 

FHA). 

System Design Integrity Requirements 

Each of the failure condition 

categories defined in these special 

conditions relate to the corresponding 

aircraft system integrity requirements. 

The system design integrity 

requirements for the HeliSAS AP/SAS, 

as they relate to the allowed probability 

of occurrence for each failure condition 

category and the proposed software 

design assurance level, are as follows: 

1. ‘‘Major’’—For systems with 

‘‘major’’ failure conditions, failures 

resulting in these major effects must be 

shown to be remote, a probability of 

occurrence on the order of between 1 × 

10¥5 to 1 × 10¥7 failures/hour, and 


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47556 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 157 / Thursday, August 14, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

associated software must be developed, 

at a minimum, to the Level C software 

design assurance level. 

2. ‘‘Hazardous/Severe-Major’’—For 

systems with ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions, failures resulting in 

these hazardous/severe-major effects 

must be shown to be extremely remote, 

a probability of occurrence on the order 

of between 1 × 10¥7 to 1 × 10¥9 failures/ 

hour, and associated software must be 

developed, at a minimum, to the Level 

B software design assurance level. 

3. ‘‘Catastrophic’’—For systems with 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions, 

failures resulting in these catastrophic 

effects must be shown to be extremely 

improbable, a probability of occurrence 

on the order of 1 × 10¥9 failures/hour 

or less, and associated software must be 

developed, at a minimum, to the Level 

A design assurance level. 

System Design Environmental 

Requirements 

The HeliSAS AP/SAS system 

equipment must be qualified to the 

appropriate environmental level for all 

relevant aspects to show that it performs 

its intended function under any 

foreseeable operating condition, 

including the expected environment in 

which the HeliSAS AP/SAS is intended 

to operate. Some of the main 

considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the HeliSAS AP/SAS 

system equipment, including 

considerations for other equipment that 

may be affected environmentally by the 

HeliSAS AP/SAS equipment 

installation. The level of environmental 

qualification must be related to the 

severity of the considered failure 

conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. 

Test & Analysis Requirements 

Compliance with the requirements of 

these special conditions may be shown 

by a variety of methods, which typically 

consist of analysis, flight tests, ground 

tests, and simulation, as a minimum. 

Compliance methodology is related to 

the associated failure condition 

category. If the HeliSAS AP/SAS is a 

complex system, compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘major’’ may be shown by 

analysis, in combination with 

appropriate testing to validate the 

analysis. Compliance with the 

requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

may be shown by flight-testing in 

combination with analysis and 

simulation, and the appropriate testing 

to validate the analysis. Flight tests may 

be limited for ‘‘hazardous/severe-major’’ 

failure conditions and effects due to 

safety considerations. Compliance with 

the requirements for failure conditions 

classified as ‘‘catastrophic’’ may be 

shown by analysis, and appropriate 

testing in combination with simulation 

to validate the analysis. Very limited 

flight tests in combination with 

simulation are used as a part of a 

showing of compliance for 

‘‘catastrophic’’ failure conditions. Flight 

tests are performed only in 

circumstances that use operational 

variations, or extrapolations from other 

flight performance aspects to address 

flight safety. 

These special conditions require that 

the HeliSAS AP/SAS system installed 

on a Robinson Helicopter Company 

model R44 or R44 II helicopter, Type 

Certificate Number H11NM, meet these 

requirements to adequately address the 

failure effects identified by the FHA, 

and subsequently verified by the SSA, 

within the defined design system 

integrity requirements. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on August 4, 

2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–19211 Filed 8–13–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0104; Airspace 

Docket No. 13–AEA–4] 

RIN 2120–AA66 

Amendment and Revocation of Jet 

Routes; Northeast United States 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action modifies jet routes 

J–64 and J–80, and removes jet route J– 

77, in the northeastern United States. 

The FAA is taking this action to remove 

segments that are receiving minimal to 

no usage due to other more efficient 

routes in the area. This action 

eliminates the unneeded route 

segments, reduces aeronautical chart 

clutter and improves chart readability. 

DATES: Effective date 0901 UTC, 

September 18, 2014. The Director of the 

Federal Register approves this 

incorporation by reference action under 

1 CFR part 51, subject to the annual 

revision of FAA Order 7400.9 and 

publication of conforming amendments. 

ADDRESSES: FAA Order 7400.9X, 

Airspace Designations and Reporting 

Points, and subsequent amendments can 

be viewed online at http://www.faa.gov/ 

air_traffic/publications/. The Order is 

also available for inspection at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, 

or go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal_register/code_of_federalregulations/ibr_locations.html. 

FAA Order 7400.9, Airspace 

Designations and Reporting Points, is 

published yearly and effective on 

September 15. For further information, 

you can contact the Airspace Policy and 

ATC Procedures Group, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC, 20591; telephone: 202– 

267–8783. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul 

Gallant, Airspace Policy and 

Regulations Group, Office of Airspace 

Services, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–8783. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

History 

The FAA published in the Federal 

Register a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend jet routes 

J–64 and J–80, and cancel jet route J–77, 

in the northeastern United States (79 FR 

13948, March 12, 2014). Interested 

parties were invited to participate in 

this rulemaking effort by submitting 

written comments on the proposal. One 

comment was received expressing 

support for the proposal. 

The Rule 

This action amends Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 71 by 

modifying two jet routes and cancelling 

one jet route in the northeastern United 

States to remove inefficient or 

minimally used route segments. This 

action makes the following 

modifications to the routes: 

J–64: J–64 extends between Los 

Angeles, CA, and Robbinsville, NJ. This 

route now terminates at the intersection 

of the Ravine, PA, 102° radial and the 

Lancaster, PA, 044° radial, instead of 

Robbinsville, NJ. This new termination 

point is the charted SARAA fix, which 

is approximately 65 nautical miles 

northwest of Robbinsville, NJ. 

J–77: J–77 is removed. Numerous 

other routes are available for navigation 

between the Baltimore, MD, area and 

Boston, MA. 

J–80: J–80 extends between Oakland, 

CA, and Bangor, ME. This route now 


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