FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MARCH 4, 2010

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-11905

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 04-00681-CV-WS-C

JASON O. WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus

RICHARD F. ALLEN, 

Commissioner, Alabama 

Department of Corrections, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

_________________________

(March 4, 2010)

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Jason Oric Williams, an Alabama death row inmate, appeals from the

district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus (“petition”), filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) on the sole issue of whether Williams’ counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by: (1) presenting an invalid defense under Alabama law; (2)

failing to sufficiently argue a voluntary intoxication defense to negate intent to

murder; and (3) failing to object to jury instructions. After review of the record

and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Williams’ petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

Williams was adopted by his aunt and uncle at infancy. His aunt and uncle

did not disclose to Williams that they were not his biological parents. Williams

grew up in poverty, performed poorly academically, and felt he was snubbed by

his family and peers. When Williams turned seventeen years old, he attempted to

obtain identification documents so that he could work. During this process,

Williams learned that he was adopted. This news devastated Williams, and he

2
began experimenting with alcohol and drugs such as LSD, crack, marijuana,

ecstacy, and prescription medications. 

In 1990, Williams married Sandra Ellzey. Williams and Ellzey remained

married for about ten months, divorcing in 1991. On a few occasions, Williams

slapped Ellzey in the face, pulled her hair, and broke her glasses. Williams,

however, continued to live with Ellzey after they were divorced. In January 1992,

Ellzey discovered needles for drug use in her home, and learned that Williams had

been taking her tranquilizers. Ellzey then asked Williams to leave. 

When Ellzey forced Williams to move out, Gerald and Clara (“Clair”)

Paravicini, who had known Williams for about eight years, allowed Williams to

move into their home with them and Clair’s minor son, Jeffery Carr. Williams

resided in the Paravicini home for approximately two weeks.

Shortly after moving in with the Paravicinis, Ellzey and Williams agreed to

re-unite and move in together. On February 14, 1992, they arranged a date. The

couple went to a club and had a few drinks. Afterwards, they bought sandwiches

at a deli. By 11:00 p.m., Ellzey was ready to return home. However, Williams

was not, and he asked Ellzey to drop him off at another club. Ellzey advised

Williams to call her when he was ready to leave the club so that she could give

him a ride home. At the club, Williams purchased LSD, and prescription drugs,

3
and he drank a large amount of liquor. The record is clear that Williams ingested

1

drugs and alcohol throughout the night. Rather than call Ellzey to pick him up as

they had agreed, Williams met with some friends, and they drove to a drug-house

to smoke crack cocaine together all night. Early the next morning, Williams’

friend dropped him off at a corner store. Williams then walked about a half-mile

back to the Paravicinis’ trailer home. 

On February 15, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Williams arrived at the

Paravicinis’ home, and he knocked, either on Jeffery’s window or on the side of

the trailer that corresponded with Jeffery’s room. Jeffery let him in and asked him

about his plans for the day. Williams told Jeffery that he had a “side job” to do. 

Jeffery thought that Williams seemed normal and did not appear to be drunk

because he was neither tilting his head nor slurring his speech. Williams then

called Ellzey on a cordless telephone. Ellzey was upset with Williams because she

had wanted him to return to her house and because they had planned for her to

come and pick him up from the bar. Ellzey, who had observed Williams

inebriated many times in the past, did not believe that Williams was intoxicated. 

 According to Williams’ statement to law enforcement officials on February 16, 1992, 1

the day after the murders, he had a few drinks with Ellzey and then drank liquor all night at the

club. While at the club, he bought two round, yellow pills from someone named Teddy. He did

not know whether the pills were ecstacy or LSD, but believed that they were LSD. On February

15, he believes that he took the pills between 3:00 and 5:00 a.m.

4
Jeffery watched Williams pacing while he talked to Ellzey. While still on

the phone with Ellzey, Williams walked into the Paravicinis’ bedroom, where

Clair was in bed, and retrieved a .22-caliber automatic rifle. While still on the

phone with Ellzey, Williams shot Jeffery in the face and in the hand. When

Gerald came to Jeffery’s aid, Williams shot Gerald in the base of the left neck and

in the upper left chest area. Jeffery ran to a neighbor’s house to get help. Gerald

also ran out of the home. 

Clair came out of the bedroom when she heard the second gunshot. She saw

Jeffery running away and Gerald in the yard. Her husband told her to get help. 

Clair ran to George Evans’ house next door. She then ran back to her husband,

who fell by the road. 

Evans followed Clair, holding a shotgun. He looked to his right and saw

Williams standing in the doorway of the trailer, with no more than 100 feet of

open ground between them, with the rifle in his hand. Evans brought up his

shotgun and aimed at Williams, warning Williams not to shoot. Williams ducked

back into the trailer, and Evans ran back to his trailer. Meanwhile, Ellzey

remained on the telephone. She heard two cracking, popping noises. When

Williams picked the phone back up again, she started to say his name. Williams

dropped the phone without saying anything. 

5
Clair found that she could not get Gerald to stand. She went back into the

trailer to find something to stop Gerald’s bleeding and for her car keys. There, she

found Williams, who waived the rifle at her and told her to get back and leave him

alone, or else he intended to kill her. Clair replied that Gerald was hurt. She

asked Williams to please help her with him. Williams then struck her in the face

with the rifle, breaking her jaw. He left with the rifle and her purse, which

contained her credit cards, a checkbook, and over $500 cash. 

Meanwhile, Buford Billedeaua was driving a truck past the Paravicinis’

trailer. He saw Jeffery and Gerald run out of the trailer. He then saw Williams

follow them, holding a large black purse. When Williams took a shot at Gerald,

Billedeaua stopped his truck. Williams then approached Billedeaua, telling him

that he needed the truck because he had an emergency. Billedeaua noted that

Williams looked as though he had been taking dope. Billedeaua got out of the

truck with his keys and began to run into the woods. Williams then began

shooting at Billedeaua, who avoided being shot.

Unable to flee in Billedeaua’s truck without the keys, Williams turned and

walked 100 yards up the road to the home of Linda and Freddie Barber. Williams

was barely acquainted with the Barbers, having only played basketball with their

sons, Brad and Bryan, at their church on a couple of occasions. Williams

6
attempted to enter the Barbers’ home. Linda answered the front door. Williams

inflicted gunshot wounds to her head. Williams then went into the kitchen and

also shot Freddie in the head. Next, Williams shot their son, Bryan, who was

asleep in his bed. It was later discovered that Bryan had multiple gunshot wounds,

at least two of which were found in his head. Each victim was shot at close range.

Brad was asleep in the back bedroom. He awoke to the sound of gunshots

and screaming. Brad got up and opened his door. Williams then proceeded down

the hall to Brad’s room. Brad closed and locked his door, but Williams kicked it

in. When Brad grabbed the barrel of the gun, Williams shot him in the left hand. 

The two struggled, but Brad managed to escape through the backdoor, and ran

through the woods to his sister’s house. 

Williams took the Barbers’ keys and took their van. On the afternoon of

February 16, he reached the Mississippi-Louisiana border and called Ellzey, who

advised him to surrender. When Williams was apprehended, he told the law

enforcement officers that he had thrown the rifle off an unknown bridge into the

water. He had also disposed of Freddie Barber’s wallet, after taking all the money

it contained. Williams spent the money he stole from the Barbers and Clair

Paravicini on crack cocaine after leaving the crime scene. 

7
B. The Trial and Expert Testimony

On April 12, 1992, Williams was indicted on two counts of capital murder.2

During the trial on November 10, 1992, Williams testified that he did not

remember all the events of February 14 and 15, 1992. Williams testified that he

had a few beers with Ellzey, and then drank a “pretty good bit” of beer after she

dropped him off at another club. At the club, he purchased three hits of LSD for

seven dollars ($7) each from someone he did not know and remembered taking

two of them. Williams testified that he did not remember killing anyone. He only

recalls that he went into the bathroom, and that he began to feel very scared. He

said that he saw the walls move, and he saw a larger-than-life apparition walking

towards him that made him fear for his life. Regarding the day of the killings,

Williams further testified that he began flipping out even before he called Ellzey,

and that he tried to disguise his drug use from her to keep her from getting angry

with him. He testified that he did not remember anything that occurred between

the time that he dialed her number and when he found himself driving a van in

Mississippi a day later. However, Williams did not mention seeing the apparition

to the Mississippi or Alabama law enforcement officers with whom he spoke on

 Williams was also charged with and convicted of attempted murder on the lives of 2

Clair Paravicini and Brad Barber.

8
February 16. Williams did tell the officers that he did not remember killing

anyone the night before. Williams said that he remembered seeing blood on his

pants and throwing the rifle in the water near the bridge. 

Dr. Claude L. Brown, a psychiatrist, met with Williams in August 1992. At

trial, Dr. Brown testified for the defense. His testimony was based on his meetings

with Williams. He diagnosed Williams with borderline personality disorder

(“BPD”), which he testified is a mental disorder characterized by inner emptiness,

dissatisfaction, and impulsive actions undertaken in an effort to feel better, such as

suicide attempts. Persons with BPD have limited, but intense, fluctuating

relationships. He testified that individuals with BPD can be thrown into psychotic

behavior by increases in anxiety from any source. Dr. Brown testified that

Williams’ BPD dated to his childhood and was unrelated to his use of drugs before

the murders.

Dr. Brown also testified that LSD is, per weight, the most psychogenic drug

in the world. He testified that LSD causes frightening distortions and detachment

from reality—i.e., psychosis. Furthermore, using alcohol and cocaine with LSD

exaggerates these responses. Dr. Brown opined that Williams was psychotic at the

time of the killings. He further opined that Williams was suffering from a mental

disease or defect that rendered him unable to appreciate the nature and quality or

9
wrongfulness of his acts. He opined that this destructive psychosis resulted from a

combination of his preexisting personality structure acted upon by the heavy

overload of drugs that he had been taking all night. Lastly, he opined that

Williams’ BPD in and of itself probably did not trigger his conduct and that, had

Williams been sober, the murders probably would not have occurred. 

Dr. Harry McClaren, a psychologist, testified for the State. He also

diagnosed Williams with BPD, as well as with anti-social personality disorder and

substance abuse. Dr. McClaren testified that, given Williams’ account of his drug

and alcohol ingestion, he was very intoxicated at the time of the killings. He

testified that psychosis resulting from LSD can last from eight to twelve hours and

that Williams’ amnesia was probably chemically induced. He also testified that

when some individuals are highly intoxicated from hallucinogenic drugs, they may

display some symptoms of psychosis.

Dr. McClaren testified to meeting Williams in August and September 1992. 

During those sessions, Williams recounted the events of the night before the

killings. Dr. McClaren testified that Williams told him that he had a few drinks

with Ellzey. After she dropped him off at the club, he bought three hits of LSD. 

He also ingested a long, purple tablet, and drank whiskey over the course of the

evening. He also told Dr. McClaren that he went to a house on Dixon’s Corner

10
where, in two trips, he bought crack. He remembered arguing with Ellzey on the

3

phone and that he then began to flip out and feel frightened. He claimed that he

heard someone holler his name and felt like everyone was against him. He told

Dr. McClaren that he thought the only way out was to shoot his way out. Williams

claimed again that he had no other memories before he found himself driving the

van in Mississippi. Dr. McClaren testified that when someone has taken LSD, he

or she may see distortions of things that are there.

In contrast to Dr. Brown, Dr. McClaren opined that, because Williams

deliberately shot each victim twice in or near the head, Williams was able to

appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. Dr. McClaren further opined that, because

Williams had no significant psychiatric history other than attempted suicide, he

knew the wrongfulness of his acts. Dr. McClaren testified that since the drugs and

alcohol exacerbated Williams’ BPD, without the intoxication, Williams probably

would not have killed Gerald Paravicini or Linda, Freddie, and Bryan Barber.

 At trial, other witnesses testified that they thought Williams had taken drugs. Gregory

3

Rockwell testified that he worked the door at the club. He saw Williams arrive at around 11:30

p.m. and leave around 1:00 a.m. Williams returned within an hour appearing disheveled,

sweating profusely, jumping, and dancing around. Rockwell thought that Williams appeared as

though he were tripping on LSD. Kelso Stewart testified that Williams asked him if he knew

where some LSD or crack cocaine could be located. Stewart left the bar between 3:00 a.m. and

4:00 a.m., and when he returned, he found Williams disheveled, sweaty, and hyper. 

11
On November 11, 1992, the jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of

intentional murder during the course of a robbery for the deaths of Freddie Barber

and Linda Barber pursuant to Code of Alabama § 13A-5-40(a)(2). The jury also

4

returned a guilty verdict for the capital offense of intentional murder for the deaths

of Gerald Paravicini, Freddie Barber, Linda Barber, and Bryan Barber pursuant to

Code of Alabama § 13A-5-40(a)(10). The jury recommended, by a 10–2 vote,

5

that a death sentence be imposed for the murder convictions. On December 1,

1992, the State trial court sentenced Williams to a punishment of death. 

C. Direct and Collateral Appeals

On August 23, 1996, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Williams’ convictions and death sentence. On October 3, 1997, the Supreme

6

Court of Alabama affirmed the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal

 The Alabama Code states that “[m]urder by the defendant during a robbery in the first 4

degree or an attempt thereof” is a capital offense. Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2). 

 The Alabama Code states that “[m]urder wherein two or more persons are murdered by 5

the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct” is a capital offense. 

Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(10). 

 Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). 6

12
Appeals. On June 15, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Williams’ petition

7

for a writ of certiorari. 

8

In 1999, Williams filed a state habeas petition (“Rule 32 petition”) in State

court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to Alabama Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32. On August 17, 2000, the trial court held an evidentiary 9

hearing. On October 9, 2001, the trial court denied Williams’ Rule 32 petition. 

On November 14, 2003, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s denial of Williams’ Rule 32 petition. On May 14, 2004, the State court

10

denied his application for a rehearing. On October 1, 2004, the Alabama Supreme

Court denied Williams’ petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Williams then timely filed a petition for writ of federal habeas corpus in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. On April 11, 2007, the district court denied his federal habeas

 Ex parte Williams, 710 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1997). 7

 Williams v. Alabama, 524 U.S. 929, 118 S. Ct. 2325 (1998). 8

 Rule 32.1 explicates the scope of permissible claims. Post-conviction, a defendant may 9

bring the following challenges: (a) the constitution of the United States or of the State of

Alabama requires a new trial, (b) the court was without jurisdiction to render judgment or to

impose sentence, (c) the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law or is

otherwise not authorized by law, (d) the petitioner is being held in custody after the petitioner’s

sentence has expired, or (e) newly discovered material facts exist which require that the

conviction or sentence be vacated by the court.

 Williams v. State, No. CR–01–0463 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2003), mem. op. 10

13
corpus petition, and on April 28, 2008, the district court issued a COA restricting

issues on appeal to determine: “(1) whether trial counsel were ineffective in

presenting an invalid insanity defense; (2) whether trial counsel were ineffective in

failing to present a challenge to intent based on intoxication; (3) whether the jury

charges unconstitutionally shifted to him the burden of proof on intent, and

whether counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge them on that basis.” 

Doc. 49. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Williams filed his federal habeas petition after 1996. Therefore, review of

Williams’ § 2254 petition falls within the scope of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Pursuant to AEDPA, we employ a 11

“highly deferential standard for reviewing State court judgments.” McNair v.

Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Only where the State court has adjudicated the merits of Williams’

ineffective assistance of counsel claims do we apply AEDPA’s deferential

standard of review. Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam). 

 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 11

14
Given the confines of AEDPA, we permit relief to a petitioner held in state

custody only where the State court’s decision was “‘(1) contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.’” Campbell, 416 F.3d at 1297 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2)). 

“The district court’s factual findings underlying the claim are reviewed for

clear error, while mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.” 

Campbell, 416 at 1297 (citation omitted). “It is the petitioner’s burden to establish

his right to habeas relief[,] and he must prove all facts necessary to show a

constitutional violation.” Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct. The [petitioner has] the burden of rebutting

the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). “Thus, [o]ur review of findings of fact by the [S]tate court is even

more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of review.” Wood v.

Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). 

15
We review de novo ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which present

mixed questions of law and fact. Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1270. “We review de

novo a district court’s grant or denial of a habeas corpus petition.” Campbell, 416

F.3d at 1297 (citation omitted). “We review de novo the district court’s decision

about whether the [S]tate court acted contrary to clearly established federal law, or

unreasonably applied federal law, or made an unreasonable determination of fact.” 

Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Hall

v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 690 (11th Cir. 2002)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Strickland Governs Claims of Ineffective Assistance

In Strickland v Washington, the United States Supreme Court established

the federal law governing the evaluation of all ineffective assistance of counsel

claims. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “The

Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of

counsel, since the purpose of the right to counsel more generally is to ensure a fair

trial.” Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1272 (emphasis in original) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2063–64). A petitioner’s claim that the assistance

rendered by his counsel is “so defective as to require reversal of a . . . death

sentence has two components.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. 

16
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth

Amendment, “[a] petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,

and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,

521, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). 

To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, “a petitioner must

show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has “emphasized

that [t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness

under prevailing professional norms.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at

2535 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

To establish prejudice, the petitioner is required to prove “that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct.

at 2068. That is, “a petitioner must show only a reasonable probability that the

outcome would have been different; he ‘need not show that counsel’s deficient

conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.’” Brownlee v.

Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1059–60 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

17
693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068). “When evaluating this probability, ‘a court hearing an

ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or

jury.’” Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1060 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.

Ct. at 2069). “The petitioner bears the burden of poof on the performance prong

as well as the prejudice prong of a Strickland claim, and both prongs must be

proved to prevail.” Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1176 (citation and quotation marks

omitted). “Courts must ‘indulge [the] strong presumption’ that counsel’s

performance was reasonable and that counsel ‘made all significant decisions in the

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” Chandler v. United States, 218

F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065–66).

When assessing Williams’ claim that counsel were ineffective, it is

important to keep in mind that “[i]n addition to the deference to counsel’s

performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of

deference—this one to a [S]tate court’s decision—when we are considering

whether to grant federal habeas relief from a [S]tate court’s decision.” Rutherford

v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus,

Williams not only has to satisfy the elements of the Strickland standard, but he

must also show that the State “court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in

18
an objectively unreasonable manner.” Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis

in original) (quoting Rutherford, 385 F.3d at 1309). 

In light of these principles, we will consider each of Williams’ ineffective

assistance of counsel challenges. Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel

argument is three-fold. He complains that counsel were ineffective because

counsel: (1) presented an invalid defense under Alabama law; (2) failed to

properly argue a voluntary intoxication defense to negate an intent to murder; and

(3) failed to object to jury instructions. Williams therefore asserts that the State

court unreasonably applied Strickland. 

B. Counsel Did Not Ineffectively Present An Insanity Defense

1. Alabama Law on Insanity and Voluntary Intoxication

Alabama law provides that insanity is an affirmative defense that the

defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence. Ala. Code § 13A-3-1(a),

(c). The affirmative defense of insanity requires proof that “at the time of the

commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe

mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or

wrongfulness of his acts.” Ala. Code § 13A-3-1(a). Thus, in order to establish the

affirmative defense of insanity, the defendant must establish that he suffered from

a mental disease. 

19
On the other hand, voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to

capital murder in Alabama. Evidence that a defendant was voluntarily intoxicated

is, however, admissible “whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the

offense charged,” such as intent to murder. Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(a). Importantly,

it must be emphasized that “[i]ntoxication in itself does not constitute mental

disease or defect within the meaning of Section 13-3A-1.” Ala. Code § 13A-3-

2(d) (emphasis added). Pursuant to Alabama law, “[t]he degree of intoxication

required to establish that a defendant was incapable of forming an intent to kill is a

degree so extreme as to render it impossible for the defendant to form the intent to

kill.” Flowers v. State, 922 So. 2d 938, 955 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (emphasis

added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In short, the level of intoxication

needed to negate intent must rise “to the level of statutory insanity.” Ware v.

State, 584 So. 2d 939, 946 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). 

2. Deficient Performance

Williams argues that his counsel performed deficiently because there was no

legal or factual basis for his attorney to assert an insanity defense based on a

mental disease. Williams asserts that the facts of his case only supported a

voluntary intoxication defense for purposes of negating intent, and that his counsel

20
should not have conflated the requirements of asserting a voluntary intoxication

defense with an insanity defense. Williams argues that the record is devoid of any

expert testimony from a psychiatrist that would support a plausible claim of

insanity under Alabama law. He therefore contends that his counsel’s

performance was deficient and unreasonable by professional standards because an

insanity defense based on intoxication was precluded by Alabama law. We find

no merit to this argument. 

To overcome the strong presumption “in favor of competence, Williams

must bear the heavy burden “that no competent counsel would have taken the

action that his counsel did take.” Haliburton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 342 F.3d

1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We have

said before that “[c]ounsel must be permitted to weed out some arguments to stress

others and advocate effectively.” Gaskin v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 997,

1003 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Although Williams argues that counsel only mentioned the defense of voluntary

intoxication once, “abandoning one defense in favor of another that counsel

reasonably perceives to be more meritorious is not deficient performance.” 

Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Review

of the record shows that the defense of insanity based on a mental disease was a

21
sound strategy employed by Williams’ counsel, which we are not inclined to

second-guess. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104, S. Ct. at 2065. The record

illustrates several reasons why a reasonable defense counsel would pursue an

insanity defense based on a mental disease, exclusive of voluntary intoxication. 

First, contrary to Williams’ suggestion, the record indicates that there was

some legal and factual basis for counsel to pursue the insanity defense. Two

expert witnesses testified that Williams suffered from a “mental disease.” Vol. II,

P–1 at R-363–64, 516. At trial, Dr. Brown, a psychiatrist, presented evidence

regarding Williams’ mental state. Dr. Brown opined that Williams was “crazy at

the time” of the killings, “crazy from a combination of his preexisting personality

structure acted upon by the heavy overload of drugs” that Williams had been

taking all night long. Vol. II, P–1 at R-363. Dr. Brown also testified that on the

morning of February 15, Williams suffered a “mental disease or defect” called

BPD. Vol. II, P–1 at R-363–364. Although Dr. Brown explained that the

petitioner’s intoxication did exacerbate his BPD, simply discussing intoxication

does not undermine the fact that counsel appropriately presented evidence that

Williams suffered from a mental disease. 

Dr. McClaren, a psychologist who met with Williams on three different

occasions, also testified about Williams’ mental state. Dr. McClaren testified that

22
in September 1992, Williams had two previous suicide attempts. After 12

consultation with Williams, Dr. McClaren opined that Williams suffered from a

“mental disease or defect” called BPD and an anti-social disorder coupled with

several substance abuse diagnoses. Vol. II, P–1 at R-516. Because both expert

witnesses diagnosed Williams with a mental disease or defect, it was not

unreasonable for counsel to offer a defense based on insanity. 

Second, the record contains contradictory testimony from witnesses

commenting on whether they believed Williams appeared to be inebriated or high

on drugs during the killings. On May 18, 1992, Sandra Ellzey testified to a grand

jury in Mobile County that when she spoke to Williams on the phone just before

the killings, Williams sounded normal, his speech was not slurred, and he was

soft-spoken and calm. Ellzey testified that she had been with Williams long

enough to know when he was high or when he had been drinking. According to

her, Williams sounded as if he was sober. At trial, Ellzey testified that Williams

was “very calm and he was quiet[, and] [h]e just appeared to be normal” as they

spoke on the telephone the during the killings. Vol. II, P–1 at R-466. Ellzey’s

 In May 1990, Williams shot himself in the chest. In February 1991, he attempted 12

suicide by intentionally overdosing on cocaine. 

23
testimony to the grand jury and at the trial undermines the argument that Williams

was intoxicated to the degree of insanity. 

Additionally, Clair testified that on the morning Williams killed her

husband Gerald, Williams did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs,

and that “he acted normal.” Vol. II, P–1 at R-244–45. This evidence suggests that

on the morning of the shootings, Williams may not have been so intoxicated that it

was “impossible” for him to form an intent to kill. Thus, counsel’s decision to

offer the insanity defense independent of intoxication was not only sound, but this

strategy was to Williams’ benefit. Therefore, it was reasonable for defense

counsel to pursue a legal theory of insanity based on a mental disease, independent

of intoxication.

Third, counsel’s strategy was sound because Williams did not consistently

report facts suggesting that his intoxication was so excessive that it amounted to

insanity. For example, Williams recalls that on the morning after the shootings,

his clothes were covered in blood. After Williams was taken into custody by law

enforcement, he did not mention that he was scared, or that he thought he was

shooting at an apparition he believed chased him. Vol. II, P–1 at R-502. In his

statement to the police, Williams simply says that he did not remember shooting

anyone. The first time Williams mentioned that he thought an apparition was

24
coming after him, and that the only option was to shoot his way out, was after he

was evaluated by Dr. McClaren in August and September 1992. Vol. II, P–1 at R511. A jury may have considered these inconsistencies as damaging to Williams’

intoxication defense. Furthermore, Williams testified that he was hallucinating

while he spoke with Ellzey on the phone. He further testified that the walls were

moving. Vol. II, P–1 at R-493. However, on the night of the murders, Williams

did not mention any of these hallucinations to her as he shot Jeffery and killed

Gerald. 

In light of this evidence, we cannot say that “no competent counsel would

have taken the action that his counsel did take.” See Haliburton, 342 F.3d at 1243

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Williams has not proffered any evidence

to show otherwise. We agree with the district court that because the jury must

consider intent as an element of capital murder, the jury is free to accept or reject

the truthfulness of Williams’ assertion that he was so intoxicated that he did not

have intent to murder. See Justo v. State, 568 So. 2d 312, 314 (Ala. Crim. App.

1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (explaining that when the defense of

voluntary intoxication is raised, the jury can reject the truthfulness of the

defendant’s assertion that he took drugs). Counsel’s presentation of an insanity

defense based on a mental disease did not detract or weaken the inference that

25
Williams was on drugs. As explained in Strickland, counsel’s performance is

entitled to a high level of deference. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 

Williams has not offered evidence which would appropriately overcome the strong

presumption that counsel’s assistance was competent. 

Williams’ trial attorney’s presentation of an insanity defense as a mental

disease or defect pursuant to Alabama law was not unreasonable. We agree with

the State court, which decided that counsel’s election to present the insanity

defense was a sound strategic decision, and that counsel were not ineffective. 

Williams v. State of Alabama, No. CR–01–0463 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2003),

mem. op. at 17. Williams has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland

test, that counsel’s performance in asserting the affirmative defense of insanity fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

3. Prejudice

Even if counsel were deficient, Williams is unable to satisfy the prejudice

prong of Strickland. After the reviewing counsel’s insanity strategy, Williams has

not established that, but for counsel’s professional errors the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different. The record contains testimony from

witnesses who called into question the degree of intoxication Williams

experienced. Given the contradictory accounts regarding the degree of Williams’

26
intoxication, it is unlikely that these inconsistencies would have changed the

outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find that the State court’s

determination was a reasonable application of Strickland. 

C. The Voluntary Intoxication Defense was Not Improperly Argued

Williams argues that counsel were deficient in presenting a proper voluntary

intoxication defense during the guilt/innocence phase. In support of this

contention, Williams argues that counsel did not thoroughly investigate and

present an additional expert witness such as a psychopharmacologist. Williams

explains that a psychopharmacologist would have testified about the effects LSD,

alcohol, and cocaine have on the brain. He speculates that this additional

testimony would have negated the intent required for a capital murder offense. He

therefore argues that, but for the deficiency of defense counsel, he would not have

been eligible for the death penalty. We find no merit to this argument. 

Counsel has a constitutional, independent duty to investigate and prepare a

defense strategy prior to trial. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 618 (11th Cir.

1984); see also Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 2001). However,

this duty does not necessarily require counsel to investigate each and every

evidentiary lead. Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763 (11th Cir. 1989). Yet, the

decision to restrict or limit an investigation “must flow from an informed

27
judgment.” Id. “‘[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation

are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments

support the limitations on investigation.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at

2535 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at

2066). That is, counsel has a duty to make a “reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. “‘In any ineffectiveness case, a

particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness

in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.’” Id. at 521–22, 123 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). 

Therefore, “[i]n assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation,

. . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to

counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to

investigate further.” Id. at 527, 123 S. Ct. at 2538. As we explained in Chandler,

“[i]nvestigation (even a nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required

for counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense thoroughly.” 218

F.3d at 1318 (citing Strickland, 466 F.3d at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). 

In Grayson v. Thompson, the petitioner advanced an argument substantially

similar to the one Williams makes in this case. 257 F.3d 1194, 1218–19 (11th Cir.

28
2001). Grayson argued that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to develop

and present additional evidence regarding his chronic alcoholism and intoxication

at the time of the offense to negate the intent required for a capital murder offense. 

In response to this argument, we advised that “[a]lthough [P]etitioner’s claim is

that his trial counsel should have done something more, we first look at what the

lawyer did in fact.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at

1320). “‘Our court’s proper inquiry is limited to whether th[e] course of action

[followed by defense counsel] might have been a reasonable one.’” Id. (alteration

in original) (quoting Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1319). 

1. Deficient Performance 

We must first examine what counsel did in fact. At trial, defense counsel’s

theory was, in part, that Williams lacked the specific intent to be guilty of capital

murder. At trial, neither the defense nor the State offered a motive for Williams’

violent crimes, other than a drug-induced psychosis. The record shows counsel

presented evidence that Williams was intoxicated and had consumed large

amounts of drugs. Counsel put Williams on the stand to testify about the large

amounts of drugs and alcohol he consumed the night before, and the morning of,

the killings. Counsel emphasized Williams’ repeated purchase of LSD or ecstasy,

prescription drugs, and alcohol. Vol. II, P–1 at R-299–301. Counsel also read

29
aloud in court John Funderburg’s statement to the police that reported that when

he was with Williams the night before and into the morning of the killings,

Williams bought and consumed LSD, or dope. Vol. II, P–1 at R-313. Consistent

with his intoxication claims, Williams continually testified that he could not

remember the specifics of the crimes other than consuming drugs. Additionally,

on direct examination, Dr. Brown testified that the combination of drugs and BPD

rendered Williams so intoxicated and psychotic that he was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his acts. This testimony speaks to the state of mind Williams

had on the morning of the killings. Based on these examples, it is clear that

counsel adequately emphasized that Williams engaged in excessive alcohol and

drug consumption prior to the crimes, and Williams has not demonstrated that

counsel needed to argue further. Presentation of this evidence supports Williams’

contention that he did not possess the requisite intent to kill. Accordingly,

counsel’s presentation did not fall below the objective reasonableness standard of

professional performance. 

Despite these efforts, Williams argues that if his counsel had enlisted

testimony from a psychopharmacologist, such testimony would have bolstered his

voluntary intoxication defense and provided a clearer demonstration of his

argument to the jury. Williams made a similar argument during his Rule 32 post30
conviction evidentiary hearing, but the State court found it unpersuasive. 

Williams v. Alabama, CR-01-0463 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2003), mem. op. at

19. Counsel placed Dr. Brown on the stand to testify to the effects that the

combination of LSD, crack, and alcohol would have had on Williams’ behavior,

which is relevant information for the defense. Williams only assumes that a

psychopharmacologist could fill in additional testimony where Dr. Brown’s was

allegedly insufficient. Thus, Williams has not demonstrated what kind and how

much investigation a reasonable lawyer would have made under the circumstances

in this case. See Horsley v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1495 (11th Cir. 1995)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, Williams did not call his trial counsel to testify at the Rule 32

post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Thus, we have no evidence as to whether

trial counsel investigated additional experts, or why trial counsel chose not to offer

additional experts. “An ambiguous or silent record is not sufficient to disprove the

strong and continuing presumption of counsel’s competency. Therefore, where

the record is incomplete or unclear about [counsel]’s actions, we will presume that

he did what he should have done, and that he exercised reasonable professional

judgment.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 n.15 (alteration in original) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). Because Williams has offered no evidence to support a

31
conclusion that trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation into additional

experts, we presume Williams’ trial counsel exercised reasonable, professional

judgment.

2. Prejudice

Alternatively, even if Williams had demonstrated counsel’s performance

was deficient, the performance was not prejudicial. In an attempt to establish

prejudice, Williams reiterates that a sufficient voluntary intoxication defense

would have negated the element of intent which, in turn, would have taken the

death penalty off of the table. We are not persuaded by this argument.

Pursuant to Strickland, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show “that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,

104 S. Ct. at 2068; Lynd v. Terry, 470 F.3d 1308, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2006). That

is, but for counsel’s errors, it is reasonably probable that testimony from a

psychopharmacologist would have affected the sentence eventually imposed. 

Under this standard, Williams has not shown a reasonable probability that

presenting a stronger voluntary intoxication defense would have resulted in a life

sentence rather than the death penalty. 

32
Dr. McClaren testified that Williams’ actions during the killings would not

negate an intent to commit capital murder. In this respect, Dr. McClaren offered

the most compelling opinion refuting Williams’ speculation that voluntary

intoxication was the strongest theory. Given his testimony, the jury may have

recommended the death penalty regardless of whether a psychopharmacologist had

testified. For example, Dr. McClaren testified that, because the victims sustained,

not one, but multiple gunshot wounds to the head, throat or upper chest area,

Williams’ actions were purposeful. Vol II, Tab P–1 at R-519–20. Dr. McClaren

further opined that the crimes were

an ongoing series of events starting at one home and taking

with him from one home a purse or money, attempting to

commandeer a car; not being successful in that, continuing

on to another home which [he] invaded. Again, the victims

at that home were killed in the manner I described [as] being

shot in the head twice. Then [for Williams] to take the keys,

to be able to get into a car, to drive away, to flee the scene. 

These things suggest to me that despite being intoxicated

that Jason Williams knew what he was doing at the time. 

Vol II, Tab P–1 at R-520 (emphasis added).

Given Dr. McClaren’s testimony regarding Williams’ actions, and the

manner in which the killings transpired, we cannot say that he has “met the burden

of showing that the decision reached [by the jury] would reasonably likely have

been different absent the errors.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. 

33
Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence that the jury could have found

that Williams’ actions were deliberate and purposeful, rather than finding in favor

of his voluntary intoxication defense. It is also unlikely that testimony from a

psychopharmacologist would have changed the outcome of this case. To this

extent, we find that the State court made a reasonable application of federal law,

and the district court committed no error in its decision.

D. The Jury Instructions

Lastly, Williams contends that counsel rendered deficient performance for

failure to object to the jury instructions. He also argues that the jury instructions

on insanity and voluntary intoxication were confusing and contradictory. 

Appellant Br. 57. We decline to entertain the merits of the latter argument, as our

review is restricted to the issues specified in the certificate of appealability. 

McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Murray v. United

States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)); Newland v. Hall,

527 F.3d 1162, 1166 n.4 (11th Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (explaining

that the COA must specifically indicate the issues for review). The district court’s

order granting the COA was limited to the specific issue of “whether the jury

instructions unconstitutionally shifted to him the burden of proof on intent.” Doc.

49 at 1. We therefore find that, to the extent that Williams argues counsel were

34
ineffective for failure to object to confusing or contradictory jury instructions, he

has not raised a cognizable claim within the scope of the limited review specified

in the COA. 

13

Williams contends that counsel were ineffective for failure to object to the

following jury instructions that he claims, when read together as a whole, 

unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving intent during the guilt phase: (1)

that every person over the age of fourteen is presumed to have sufficient mental

capacity to appreciate certain kinds of conduct are criminal acts; (2) that Williams

had the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) that

voluntary intoxication cannot negate intent unless it amounts to insanity. 

Appellant Br. 56–57, 60. 

1. AEDPA Deference for State Habeas Court

As an initial matter, a question presented is whether the district court erred

when it afforded no AEDPA deference to the State court’s adjudication of

 We also decline to consider the merits of this claim because it is not certain that 13

Williams clearly presented this argument to the district court as a specific, enumerated claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). 

The argument that the jury instructions were confusing was mentioned within the statement of

the case, but it was not argued or mentioned again in the amended habeas petition. Doc. 11 at 18,

65–66. Additionally, the district court’s order on the petition made no ruling on this issue. “As a

general rule, we will not address issues or arguments on appeal that were not fairly presented to

the district court.” Jones, 436 F.3d at 1304. (citing Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th

Cir. 1991)).

35
Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the issue of whether the jury

instructions shifted the burden to prove intent. To reiterate, AEDPA affords a

high level of deference when the State court adjudicates a constitutional claim on

the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, if the State court adjudicated

the merits of Williams’ claim that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted

the burden to prove intent, the State court is entitled to deference where principles

of federal law are not violated. However, the district court reviewed this claim de

novo.

After review, we find that the district erroneously reviewed Williams’

burden-shifting portion of his claim under a de novo standard. Doc. 21 at 34–35. 

The district court presented a concise reason for applying the de novo standard,

explaining that the “State court was unaware that a constitutional, burden-shifting

claim had also been asserted.” See id. at 34. However, we are reluctant to agree.

The record indicates that the State court was aware of Williams’ challenge

to the jury instructions, which he alleged shifted the burden of proving intent to

him. In his Rule 32 petition as amended, Williams raised the claim that counsel

were ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions that shifted the burden to

prove that he had the requisite mental state of intent to kill. Vol. VIII, Tab P–13,

at 17–19. In support of his Rule 32 amended petition, Williams also filed a post36
hearing brief with the State court. Vol. XI, Tab P–36 at R–346. As the district

court notes, Williams argued that a jury charge invoking the presumption of intent

may unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Vol. XI, Tab

P–36 at R–368. Williams’ argument, however, conflates the requirements of

asserting the affirmative defense of insanity, the defense of voluntary intoxication,

the presumption of sanity, and the burden the State must carry in order to prove

intent to commit capital murder, into one burden, which he says shifted to him in

an unconstitutional manner. Vol. XI, Tab P–36 at R–346. Albeit confusing, this

argument was before the State court. Because both the Rule 32 petition and the

post-conviction hearing brief present this argument, we are unable to agree with

the district court that the State was unaware of the burden-shifting argument.

The question now becomes whether the State court’s decision on Williams’

Rule 32 petition regarding the burden to prove intent constituted an adjudication

on the merits. After reviewing the State court’s order of the Rule 32 petition, the

record indicates that the State court did in fact adjudicate on the merits Williams’

burden-shifting claim. 

“A decision that does not rest on procedural grounds alone is an

adjudication on the merits, regardless of the form in which it is expressed.”

Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1271 n.4 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

37
Furthermore, § 2254(d)(1) requires only an adjudication on the merits in State

court proceedings. Wright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.

2002). “The chief responsibility of judges is to decide the case before them. They

may, or may not, attempt to explain the decision in an opinion.” Id. at 1255. That

is, “[t]he statutory language focuses on the result, not on the reasoning that led to

the result.” Id. Thus, a State court is not required to list an entire rationale as to

why it rejects the merits of a claim properly before it. See id. 

After review of the record, we find that the State court adjudicated the

merits of Williams’ claim that counsel were ineffective for failure to object to

certain jury instructions that shifted the burden to prove intent. In its October 2,

2009 order, the State court made the following statement regarding the Rule 32

petition:

The Court has reviewed the evidence contained in the record of the

original proceedings, the evidence presented at the Rule 32 evidentiary

hearing, the pleadings and arguments of counsel for the State and

Petitioner, and has reviewed the relevant law. This Court finds that

Williams’ trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance during

Williams’ guilt phase trial. 

Vol. VIII, Tab P–17 at 22. This statement constitutes an adjudication on the

merits. Having already met the requirements of adjudication under § 2254(d)(1),

the State court engaged in analysis and explained that the defendant had the

38
consistent “burden of proving insanity.” Vol. VIII, Tab P–17 at 28. The State

court also clarified Williams’ misreading of the law, and explained that voluntary

intoxication is a defense that the defendant also had the burden to “prove during a

trial.” Vol. VIII, Tab P–17 at 28. The State court reasoned that jury instructions

that note correct statements of law are not erroneous. Vol. VIII, Tab P–17 at 28. 

The State court then concluded that “trial counsel were not ineffective for failing

to object to such instructions.” Vol. VIII, P–17 at 28. Indeed, we read these

statements to mean that the State court adjudicated the merit of Williams’

challenge to the jury instructions; it properly determined that the charge did not

inappropriately shift the burdens between the parties. 

14

 The State court explained its determination by clarifying the differences between the 14

burden placed on the defendant when asserting affirmative defenses, and the State’s burden to

prove the requisite mental state of intent. In the jury instructions section, the State court made

the following clarifications:

The [c]ourt concludes that insanity is an affirmative defense that

must be pleaded and proved by the defendant to the reasonable

satisfaction of the jury, and that the burden of proving insanity

remains on the defendant throughout a trial. Ala. Code. § 13A-3-

1(c); Dunaway v. State, 746 So. 2d 1021, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App.

1998). Intoxication, likewise, is an affirmative defense that the

defendant must prove during a trial. Roy, 680 So. 2d at 941. 

Jury instructions that note the above correct statements of law are

not erroneous and Williams’ trial counsel were not ineffective for

failing to object to such instructions. 

Vol. VIII, P–17 at 27–28 (emphasis added). 

39
Accordingly, the district court erroneously applied a de novo review, and

should have afforded AEDPA deference to the State court’s adjudication of

Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to the jury

instructions. However, this error is harmless because the district court correctly

applied the principles of Strickland, and it found that the counsel’s performance

was not ineffective. See Blankenship, 542 F.3d at 1272 (affirming the district

court’s denial of a federal habeas petition after the district court “erroneously

afforded no AEDPA deference to the state court’s adjudication of Blankenship’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim”). With the proper principles of deference

in place, we next determine whether the State court’s application of federal law is

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

2. Deficient Performance

a. The Instructions on Intent to Commit Capital Murder Did Not Shift the Burden

of Proving Intent

On the issue of whether the jury instructions relieved the prosecution’s

burden of proving intent to commit capital murder, we find that the jury

instructions did not shift this evidentiary requirement to Williams. Therefore, the

performance was not deficient for counsel’s failure to object. Contrary to

Williams’ assertion, the record shows that the trial court explicitly charged the jury

40
with the following instructions about the State’s responsibility, or burden, to prove

intent: 

In order to prove the elements of the capital offense the

State must prove the intentional murder by the defendant

of Linda Barber and Freddie Barber . . . . [I]t must be

proved that during the course of that robbery the defendant

intentionally murdered Freddie Barber and Linda Barber. .

. . So it is required that the State prove that the defendant

shot Linda Barber and Freddie Barber with a gun, that in

so doing he killed them, and that in so doing he acted with

the intent to cause their death. . . . [T]he State [has] the

burden of proving all of the elements of these offenses

beyond a reasonable doubt

Vol. II, Tab P–1 at R-588–90. 

With regard to the deaths of Gerald and Bryan, the trial court charged the

prosecution with the burden to prove that Williams intended to cause their deaths. 

Vol. II, Tab P–1 at R-593–94. We agree with the district court that Williams’

contention that the State did not have to prove the requisite mental state is

meritless. The jury instructions explicitly assigned the burden of proving intent as

an element of the crime for capital murder to the State. We find no error with this

charge, and the State committed no unreasonable application of federal law when

it concluded that counsel were not ineffective for failure to object to these

instructions.

b. The Instructions on the Presumption and Insanity

41
Williams also takes issue with the following instructions on the

presumption:

By law every person over the age of fourteen is presumed

to be responsible for his or her acts. That is to say that

every person over that age is presumed to have sufficient

mental capacity to appreciate that certain types of conduct

are criminal or are acts which are against the law. Thus

this presumption is a fact in the case which must be

considered by the jury along with other evidence. In

applying these propositions you must consider all the

evidence in determining the question of insanity at the

time of the commission of the alleged crimes. In making

your determination you may reject any or all expert

testimony even though it is without conflict. 

Vol. III, Tab P–1 at R-603–04. The relevant instructions on insanity are follows:

It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime

that at the time of the commission of the acts constituting

the offense the defendant as a result of severe mental

disease or defect was unable to appreciate the nature and

quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or

defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. Severe

mental disease or defect does not include an abnormality

manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise

antisocial conduct. The defendant has the burden of

proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing

evidence. 

Vol. III, Tab P–1 at R-602–03. 

Williams argues that these instructions suggested to the jury that because he

is over the age of fourteen, it should presumed that he intended to commit capital

42
murder. Williams further argues that because the jury instructions also required

him to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is insane, the defense of

insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of intent. He therefore, argues that

the presumption unconstitutionally shifted the burden to prove intent to him. After

review of these instructions, we find this argument unpersuasive. 

Williams cites to Sandstrom v. Montana as an example of a proscribed

presumption. See 442 U.S. 510, 521, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2458. In Sandstrom, the

Supreme Court held that a defendant’s state of mind or intent that is an element of

a crime “cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal

presumption of wrongful intent.” 442 U.S. at 522, 99 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing United

States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. (1978)) (emphasis

omitted). A jury instruction which creates a burden-shifting presumption or a

“conclusive presumption” is unconstitutional. Id. at 523–24, 99 S. Ct. at 2459

(citation omitted). Further, an instruction must not relieve the government of its

burden of proving each and every element of the crime. Id. at 523 (citation

omitted); accord Parker v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 776 (11th Cir.

2003) (“[I]t is a commonplace of criminal law that a conviction violates due

process if the jury did not have to find the elements necessary for a guilty verdict

beyond a reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct 1068,

43
1073 (1970) (holding that due process requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt

of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). After

reviewing the challenged presumption, we find that the principles set forth in

Sandstrom were not violated for two reasons. 

First, in Sandstrom, the Supreme Court rejected “conclusive presumptions”

that relieved the State of its burden to prove intent. 442 U.S. at 523–24, 99 S. Ct.

at 2459 (citation omitted). In this case, however, Williams’ argument is

misplaced. We agree with the district court that the challenged presumption

invokes a presumption of sanity, and not a presumption of intent as Williams

suggests. The ultimate decision on the issue of intent was left to the trier of fact

alone, and the trial court’s simple mention of the presumption of sanity (not intent)

did not invade the jury’s fact-finding function. See Sandstrom 442 U.S. at 523, 99

S. Ct. at 2459. Indeed, the instruction that a person is presumed to possess

sufficient mental capacity to appreciate that his conduct is wrongful is a

presumption of sanity. See Vol. III, Tab P–1 at R-603–04. Alabama law has long

recognized the presumption of sanity, and we agree with the district court that

Williams has failed to show that the presumption of sanity is unconstitutional. 

15

 The U.S. Supreme Court said that a State may “place the burden of persuasion on a 15

defendant to prove insanity as the applicable law defines it, whether by a preponderance of the

evidence or to some more convincing degree.” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 739, 126 S. Ct.

44
Second, we reject Williams’ contention that the presumption of sanity shifts

the burden to prove intent to him. He argues that when read together, asserting an

affirmative defense of insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity

because he has to prove that he is insane by clear and convincing evidence. 

Williams asserts that if we examine the jury instructions in this manner, the charge

violates principles of Sandstrom. Williams’ argument is not only extraneous, but

also it is a misunderstanding of Alabama law, and we find it groundless. 

In Archie v. State, Alabama summarized its principles on the issue of sanity

as the following:

1. [b]y statute, there is a presumption of sanity extending to all

persons over the age of 14.

2. The defense of insanity is an affirmative defense. The

burden of proving this defense rests upon the defendant and

never shifts to the State. 

3. The burden upon the defendant is to establish the issue of

legal insanity by [clear and convincing evidence] and to the

reasonable satisfaction of the jury. 

2709, 2714 (2006). Each state has the “authority to define its presumption of sanity (or capacity

or responsibility) by choosing an insanity definition . . . and placing the burden of persuasion on

defendants claiming incapacity as an excuse” from customary criminal responsibility. See id. at

771, 126 S. Ct. at 2732. In Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court substantially left insanity rules open

to the states. Id. 

45
875 So. 2d 336, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (alterations in original) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). After review of the jury instructions and in light of 16

Alabama law, we find that the presumption of sanity does not shift the burden of

proving intent to Williams, nor do we find that asserting the affirmative defense of

insanity acts as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity. Rather, Alabama law

allows the defendant to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was

incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit capital murder. This is an

opportunity for the defendant to explain why and how a mental disease could

render him unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts

even though his actions may appear to be deliberate and purposeful. See Ala.

Code § 13A-3-1(a). Indeed, the burden to prove this by clear and convincing

evidence is on the defendant. However, when asserting the affirmative defense,

the burden remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams

intended to commit capital murder. The two burdens are not mutually exclusive,

and both parties have to carry their burden irrespective of the other. Because we

find that neither the presumption of sanity nor the affirmative defense of insanity

shifted the burden to prove intent, counsel were not ineffective for failure to object

 See also Knight v. State, 907 So. 2d 470, 479–80 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (explaining 16

that Ala. Code § 13A-3-1 provides that insanity is an “affirmative defense which the defendant

must prove by clear and convincing evidence”). 

46
to these instructions. Accordingly, the State court did not apply Strickland in a

manner that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

c. The Instructions on Voluntary Intoxication

Williams argues that counsel were ineffective for failure to object to the

instruction that voluntary intoxication cannot negate intent unless it amounts to

insanity. Appellant Br. 56–57. Williams argues that because the defense of

voluntary intoxication requires such a high degree of intoxication, the jury

instructions ultimately required that he prove that he is insane in order to negate

intent. Therefore, Williams argues that because asserting the defense of voluntary

intoxication requires a showing that he is insane, the defense acts as a mechanism

that requires him to rebut the presumption of sanity. He argues that this amounts

to an unconstitutional burden-shift. After careful review of the jury instructions

on voluntary intoxication and insanity, we find no merit to Williams’ contention. 

Therefore, counsel were not deficient for failing to object.

Concerning counsel’s argument on voluntary intoxication, the trial judge

stated:

This contention is separate from the defendant’s plea that he is

not guilty by reason of a mental disease or defect. In the— the

situation concerning voluntary intoxication deals with the

contention that the defendant could not form an intent to

commit murder or an intent to engage in a course of conduct on

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account of his alleged voluntary intoxication. This differs from

the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect . .

. . To expand on that somewhat, I charge you that insanity is a

complete defense to a crime. Voluntary intoxication is not a

defense, but may in extreme cases negate the requisite intent to

commit a specific crime and therefore reduce the grade of the

offense. 

Vol. II, Tab P–1 at R-595–96 (emphasis added). The trial court went on to explain

that “[t]he degree of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent[,] and thus

reduce the charge must amount to insanity.” Vol. II, Tab P–1 at R–597. The trial

court further emphasized that “intoxication must be so excessive as to paralyze the

mental facilities and render the accused incapable of forming or entertaining the

required intent.” Vol. II, Tab P–1 at R–599. 

We agree with the State court that the jury instructions were not improper

because they are a correct statement of Alabama law. Although Williams asks us

to read all of the burdens together in an amalgamated manner, the jury instructions

do not translate to a shift of the burden to prove intent. As mentioned before, the

burden to prove intent for capital murder rests with the State and does not change

throughout the course of the trial. As the State court rightly concluded, insanity is

an affirmative defense that must be proven by the defendant. Vol. VIII, Tab P–1,

at 27–28; see Ala. Code § 13A-3-1(c). Indeed, asserting a defense such as

voluntary intoxication is an opportunity for the defendant to counter the

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prosecution’s case that he intended to commit the crime of murder. The defense of

voluntary intoxication is therefore, available to the defendant to negate intent and

does not act as a rebuttal to the presumption of sanity. The defense creates a

favorable circumstance for the defendant to explain to the judge and jury that his

voluntary intoxication, whether through drugs or alcohol, became so great that it

rendered him mentally incapable to form an intent to commit murder. Thus, like

the affirmative defense of insanity, voluntary intoxication does not shift the

burden to prove intent from the State to the defendant, as Williams’ conflated

argument suggests. The State court therefore, correctly found that counsel were

not ineffective. Affording deference to the State on this issue, we find no contrary

or unreasonable application of federal law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by denying Williams’ federal habeas corpus

relief as to his claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the

reasons stated above, Williams has not proved that counsel performed in an

objectively unreasonable manner based on professional standards, and that he

suffered prejudice. Williams has also failed to show the State court’s decision is

contrary to, or resulted in an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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federal law in Strickland. We therefore, affirm the district court’s denial of his

habeas petition.

AFFIRMED. 

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