18-437
In re: Andre Everton Grant

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32 .1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRON IC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the Unite d States Court of Appeals for th e Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the
4 th day of October, two thousand nineteen.

Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________________________

IN RE ANDRE EVERTON GRANT,

Debtor.

_____________________________________________________

ANDRE EVERTON GRANT,

Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v. 18-437-bk

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Defendant-Appellee

.

_____________________________________________________
Appearing for Appellant: Andre Grant, pro se, Stamford, CT.

Appearing for Appellee: Lauren M. Nash, Marc H. Silverman, Assistant United States Attorneys, for John H. Durham, United States Attorney, District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.2 Appeal from the United States District Cour t for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J. ).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of said Dist rict Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED

.

Andre Grant, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment affirming a bankruptcy court decision denying his motion for sanctions and da mages against the Department of Defense (“DOD”). We assume th e parties’ familiarity with th e underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“A district court’s order in a bankruptcy case is subject to plenary review, meaning that this Court undertakes an indepe ndent examination of the factua l findings and legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court.” In re Cacioli , 463 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a bankruptcy cour t’s sanctions order fo r abuse of discretion. In re. Kalikow , 602 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2010). We review c onclusions of law de novo, and findings of
fact for clear error. Id.

While this Court “liberally construe[s] pleadi ngs and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest ar guments they suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind , 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (interna l quotation marks omitted), pro se appellants must still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), which “requires appellants in their briefs to pr ovide the court with a clear stat ement of the issues on appeal,” Moates v. Barkley , 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998). Acco rdingly, the Court “normally will not[] decide issues that a party fails to raise in hi s or her appellate brief.” Id.

Here, the only argument se t forth in Grant’s appellate brief is that his debt was dischargeable in bankruptcy, and that the DOD vi olated the discharge injunction by withholding
his tax refund in an effort to collect it. Grant id entifies two other potential issues in his brief, but does not make any arguments with respect to them. These issues are waived. See Norton v.
Sam’s Club , 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not su fficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addr essed on appeal,” and “stating an issue without advancing an argument” does not suff ice to raise that issue for appe llate review). Further, there is no risk of “manifest injustice” here, since the district court’s d ecision gave Grant notice that he was required to present arguments with respec t to each issue for which he sought appellate review, and that merely identifying them as issues was insufficient. See Shakur v. Selsky , 391 F.3d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It is well establishe d that an argument not raised on appeal is deemed abandoned and lost, and that a court of appeals will not consider the argument unless it
has reason to believe that manife st injustice would result otherw ise.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the bankruptcy court provided thre e independent alternativ e bases for its decision, two of which are not challeng ed in this appeal, Grant’ s appeal necessarily fails.3 We have considered the remainder of Gran t’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk