In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1515

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DENNIS JAMISON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:09-CR-00054—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2010—DECIDED MARCH 18, 2011

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Dennis Jamison (“Jamison”)

was convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5845(a). During his

trial, the district court permitted the government to

elicit testimony from Jamison’s wife, Michaell Jamison

(“Mrs. Jamison”), on cross-examination regarding

Jamison’s aggressiveness. Jamison appeals his conviction,

arguing that the question and Mrs. Jamison’s response
2 No. 10-1515

were irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, unduly cumulative,

and lacked foundation. The government claims that the

evidence demonstrated Mrs. Jamison’s bias and motive

to lie. We affirm.

I. Background

Jamison and his wife had a series of domestic disputes

during the week of February 23, 2009. Jamison left their

shared residence on February 23 to stay with his parents.

He returned on February 24 to pick up clothes and other

essentials, taking his double-barreled shotgun and a .22

caliber handgun, but leaving the sawed-off shotgun at

issue in this case (“the shotgun”). Shortly after he left,

Mrs. Jamison took the shotgun to the sheriff’s department and turned it in, saying that it belonged to Jamison

and that she did not want it in her home. Jamison came

to the residence again on February 25 to pick up more of

his things. Officer Travis Shively was called to the

scene. Jamison concedes in briefing that Mrs. Jamison

told Officer Shively that Jamison was there for the shotgun. At some point during Officer Shively’s visit, Jamison

indicated that the barrel may have been too short.

On March 10, 2009, Federal Agents with the ATF Project

Disarm Task Force, James Dean Vance and Bayne

Bennett, arrived at Jamison’s parents’ home, where

Jamison was at the time, to interview him about the

shotgun. During the interview, Jamison admitted that

he purchased the shotgun eighteen or nineteen years

prior from a private individual at a gun show in Indiana.

A fair reading of the record indicates that he admitted
No. 10-1515 3

that he knew the shotgun was illegal when he purchased

it because it was too short and also that he fired the

shotgun at his parents’ property.

Title 26, Section 5861(d) prohibits possessing an unregistered “firearm.” “Firearm” includes “a weapon made

from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an

overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels

of less than 18 inches in length.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). The

firearm at issue was made from a shotgun. It is only 14

and 1/2 inches long and its barrel 8 and 1/16 inches

long. Jamison never registered the shotgun.

Jamison was indicted on May 14, 2009, on one count

of possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26

U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5845(a). He was also indicted for

being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3),

but this count was dismissed at the beginning of trial.

Jamison had a two-day jury trial. The government’s casein-chief included testimony from nine witnesses.

Among them, Officer David Curtis testified about

Mrs. Jamison’s visit to the police station on February 24,

2009. The government introduced the shotgun into evidence through Officer Curtis. Jamison’s parents testified

about the occasion on which Jamison fired the shotgun

at their home. Officer Shively discussed his February 25

visit to Jamison’s residence. Finally, Agents Vance and

Bennett testified about their March 10 interview with

Jamison.

Jamison called Mrs. Jamison as his first witness. She

testified that she turned the shotgun into police on Feb-
4 No. 10-1515

ruary 24. She also claimed, among other things, that she

inherited the shotgun from her grandfather in the 1980s

and that it belonged to her, not Jamison.

On cross-examination, the government established

that the couple had been separated in February and

March 2009, but that they had since reconciled and were

living together at the time of the trial. Mrs. Jamison

testified that she provided a sworn, taped statement to

law enforcement officers on February 26, 2009. The government played portions of her statement at trial demonstrating that she told police that the shotgun belonged

to Jamison. She also testified that she told law enforcement that Jamison owned the shotgun on March 10, 2009.

The government asked whether Mrs. Jamison had

previously told the police that Jamison “raised his hand

to you to intimidate you.” She admitted making the

statement and said that her husband was “an aggressive

person,” but claimed that Jamison had never actually

raised his hand to her and that her contrary statement

to police was a lie. The government then asked the question that lead to this appeal: “Could you tell us why

you think that . . . Jamison is aggressive?” Jamison’s

counsel objected. The government argued, and the

district court agreed, that the question was relevant to

prove bias and a motive to lie. Mrs. Jamison answered

by claiming that her belief was “just based on a knowledge of a person’s character,” not on any specific incidents.

Jamison was convicted and sentenced to thirty-six

months of imprisonment and two years of supervised

release. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred
No. 10-1515 5

in permitting the government to ask Mrs. Jamison about

her opinion that Jamison was aggressive.

II. Analysis

A. Mrs. Jamison’s Testimony

Jamison appeals the district court’s decision to permit

the government to cross-examine Mrs. Jamison about

why she thought Jamison was aggressive. We conclude

that the district court did not err.

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that “[a]ll

relevant evidence is admissible,” and that “[e]vidence

which is not relevant is not admissible.” FED. R. EVID. 402.

They define “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Evidence revealing a

witness’s bias or motive to lie is relevant and generally

admissible under Rule 402. See, e.g., United States v. Abel,

469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Bias may be induced by a witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness’ selfinterest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because

the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility,

has historically been entitled to assess all evidence

which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’

testimony.”); United States v. Thompson, 359 F.3d 470, 475-

480 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 777

(7th Cir. 1999). We review a district court’s decision to
6 No. 10-1515

The government argues that we should review Jamison’s 1

Rule 403 argument for plain error because he failed to object

on Rule 403 grounds at trial. Jamison claims that he did object

on Rule 403 grounds at trial. Since Jamison’s arguments fail

under either standard, we decline to resolve the disagreement.

admit evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. 1

Anifowoshe, 307 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002).

The question at issue—regarding why Mrs. Jamison

thought Jamison was aggressive—was probative of

Mrs. Jamison’s bias. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in permitting it. See Thompson, 359 F.3d at

479 (“Questioning a witness’ motives for testifying is

precisely the type of inquiry permissible on cross-examination. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that the evidence of threats and

recent violence were probative of Shinnamon’s credibility

and bias. When admitted on cross-examination, this

evidence of recent threats and violence was relevant

and probative to demonstrate that Shinnamon, a witness

who changed her pretrial testimony, was biased and

therefore likely to slant or even fabricate her testimony

in the defendant’s favor.”).

Jamison appeals under Rule 403, arguing that merely

asking the question at issue prejudiced him. His argument lacks merit. Mrs. Jamison’s testimony about

whether she or Jamison owned the shotgun contradicted her pre-trial statements. The threat evidence

was relevant to her credibility and offered a potential

explanation for her inconsistent statements. See id. at 477-
No. 10-1515 7

79. It may have prejudiced Jamison to some extent, but not

unfairly so. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Thompson, 359 F.3d at

479 (“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to

the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,

provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause

a jury to base its decision on something other than the

established propositions in the case.” (quoting United

States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1294 (7th Cir. 1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States

v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1990)).

Jamison also argues that we should vacate his conviction based on our opinion in Dudley v. Duckworth, 854

F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988). In Dudley, we held that the government’s elicitation of threat evidence from a witness

on direct examination was so prejudicial that its admission violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a

fair trial. Id. at 972. We suggested that the government

elicited the threat evidence as pretext, intending “more

to prejudice the defendants . . . than to explain away

any nervousness of the witness.” Id. Jamison’s argument

is unpersuasive.

We find more similarities between this case and Thompson, in which we distinguished Dudley. 359 F.3d at 476

n.7, 477. In Thompson, the defendant’s romantic partner

made inconsistent statements—one in an initial meeting

with police before trial, the other at trial—about the defendant’s ownership of ammunition. Id. at 473-74. On crossexamination, the district court permitted the government to elicit testimony that the defendant threatened

and physically abused the witness. Id. at 474. Moving for
8 No. 10-1515

a new trial, the defendant argued that the district court

erred by permitting the threat evidence. Id. The district court denied the motion, finding the evidence probative of the witness’s bias and credibility and that it potentially explained the witness’s inconsistent statements. Id. at 474-75. We affirmed and held that the evidence was relevant to prove bias and a motive to lie,

and that it was not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 477-80. In

reaching our holding, we distinguished eliciting threat

evidence on direct examination, as was done in Dudley,

from eliciting it on cross-examination, which occurred in

Jamison’s trial:

Evidence of threats on direct examination, admitted

even though the witness shows no indication of intimidation, is not only of extremely weak probative

value, but it also could constitute a prejudicial attack

on the opposing party. Such evidence can be highly

prejudicial.

The situation is very different when the purpose of

introducing evidence of a threat is to demonstrate

bias on the cross-examination of a witness. In such a

context, the probative value of such evidence is far

more evident. For instance, evidence of bias, including evidence of a threat, to challenge the credibility of a witness who has made an inconsistent

statement simply does not raise the same concerns

as evidence of a threat offered, in the absence of a

testimonial inconsistency, simply to “boost” a witness’

testimony. 

Id. at 476-77.
No. 10-1515 9

Similar to the witness in Thompson, Mrs. Jamison made

contradictory statements—one before trial, the other

during trial—regarding whether she or Jamison owned

the gun. In light of Thompson, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by permitting the government to ask

Mrs. Jamison why she thought Jamison was aggressive.

See id. at 475-80.

Next, Jamison argues that the threat evidence was

unduly cumulative because the government previously

established Mrs. Jamison’s bias and motive to lie when

it elicited testimony that she and Jamison were married

and living together at the time of the trial. Jamison cites

no relevant legal authority to support his argument. To

the extent that he is relying on Rule 403, his argument

is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the evidence was

probative; it demonstrated that Mrs. Jamison may have

been motivated to lie. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52; Thompson,

359 F.3d at 478 n.13, 479. Jamison simply fails to demonstrate that the probative value of the evidence at issue

was “substantially outweighed by the . . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence” and that the district

court abused its discretion in permitting it. FED. R.

EVID. 403.

Finally, Jamison argues that the government did not

lay adequate foundation to ask Mrs. Jamison about her

opinion that Jamison was aggressive because there was

no evidence that he physically abused her during the

week of February 23, 2009. We disagree. There was undoubtedly sufficient foundation: She voluntarily admitted that Jamison was “an aggressive person” in re-
10 No. 10-1515

She also testified that her statement to police was a lie and

2

attempted to explain the discrepancy by claiming that she was

off her medication for depression and anxiety when she

spoke with police. But neither she nor Jamison established that

failing to take her medicine indicated that her statement

to police was false and her testimony true.

sponse to an earlier question by the government, she

acknowledged that she made a sworn statement to

police that Jamison had raised his hand to her to

intimidate her, and she explained that she and Jamison 2

had been married for fifteen years at the time of the trial

and that they dated for over three years before marrying.

See FED. R. EVID. 602, 701.

Further, we have “explained that there is no special

foundational requirement for bias evidence and the

party attempting to demonstrate bias should be able to

prove any fact logically relevant to bias.” Thompson, 359

F.3d at 478 n.12 (construing Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). A

party eliciting bias evidence based on fear need not “ask

explicitly whether the witness was ‘presently afraid’ or

whether the witness felt ‘pressured to testify a certain

way.’ ” Id. (quoting Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). We have

mentioned that defendants seeking to elicit such

evidence must inquire into the “who, what, why, where,

and when of the specific incidents he claims give rise

to bias.” Id. (quoting Manske, 186 F.3d at 779). But such

questions were unnecessary in this situation. Here, the

government asked merely why Mrs. Jamison thought

Jamison was aggressive. It did not seek testimony

about specific incidents and Mrs. Jamison did not
No. 10-1515 11

discuss any. In response, Mrs. Jamison explained that her

belief was “based on a knowledge of a person’s character”

and that Jamison had not physically harmed her in

any way. The district court did not err in permitting

the government to elicit testimony regarding why

Mrs. Jamison thought Jamison was aggressive.

B. Harmless Error

Assuming arguendo that the district court erred in its

evidentiary ruling, the error was harmless. See FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(a); United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 590

(7th Cir. 2010). To convict Jamison under 26 U.S.C.

§§ 5861(d) and 5845(a), the government needed to

prove three elements: (1) that Jamison “consciously

possessed what he knew to be a firearm,” United States

v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 700 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting

United States v. Jones, 222 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2000));

(2) that he “was aware of the . . . features that brought his

gun within the realm of regulation,” United States v.

Edwards, 90 F.3d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United

States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994); Sanders, 520

F.3d at 700 (“[T]he government had to prove that

Sanders . . . knew that the shotgun had an overall length

of less than 26 inches or a barrel length of less than

18 inches.”); Jones, 222 F.3d at 352; and (3) that the firearm was unregistered, although it was not required to

prove that Jamison knew the firearm was unregistered,

see 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601,

607-09 (1971) (holding that the government need not

prove knowledge that a firearm is unregistered); see also
12 No. 10-1515

Staples, 511 U.S. at 609 (“In Freed, we decided only that

§ 5861(d) does not require proof of knowledge that a

firearm is unregistered.”); Edwards, 90 F.3d at 202 (discussing Freed).

The government indisputably established the first and

third elements. Jamison concedes in briefing that the

evidence established that he possessed the firearm.

Also, undisputed evidence demonstrated that the shotgun was never registered.

Jamison argues that the government failed to sufficiently prove the second element to render the alleged

error harmless. This argument is meritless: The government proved the second element with overwhelming

evidence. First, Agents Vance and Bennett testified that

Jamison admitted to them on March 10, 2009, that he

knew the shotgun was illegal when he purchased it

because it was too short. Second, Officer Shively and

Mrs. Jamison testified that Jamison told Officer Shively

on February 25 that the barrel might be too short.

Finally, the shotgun and its barrel were significantly

shorter than § 5845(a) permits: While § 5845(a) prohibits

a shotgun from being shorter than 26 inches long and

its barrel from being shorter than 18 inches long, the

shotgun was merely 14 and 1/2 inches long and the

barrel only 8 and 1/16 inches long. The fact that a

shotgun or its barrel are obviously too short is “not a

substitute” for proving that Jamison knew the shotgun

had characteristics that subjected it to registration,

Edwards, 90 F.3d at 205, but it is “a means of proving

knowledge,” id., and we have explained that, coupled
No. 10-1515 13

with evidence that the defendant handled the gun, a

shotgun or barrel that is obviously too short permits an

inference that the defendant knew of its features that

subjected it to the statute, see Sanders, 520 F.3d at 700-

01 (finding that the jury could have inferred the

requisite knowledge because there was evidence that

the defendant possessed the firearm and the firearm’s

barrel was only 11 and 7/16 inches long, significantly

shorter than the 18-inch minimum length).

Jamison makes two final arguments, both unpersuasive.

First, he points out that he testified that some people

told him that the gun was antique, and, thus, not illegal.

But his admissions to Agent Vance, Agent Bennett, and

Officer Shively, in addition to the fact that the shotgun

and its barrel were significantly shorter than § 5485(a)

permits, demonstrate that the jury would have convicted Jamison without the challenged evidence. He

also claims that he never told law enforcement officers

that he knew the shotgun needed to be registered. But a

conviction requires proving that Jamison knew of the

characteristics that subjected the firearm to the registration requirement—i.e., that the shotgun was shorter than

26 inches or that its barrel was shorter than 18

inches—not that he knew the firearm must actually be

registered because of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5845(a)—

i.e., not that he had knowledge of the statute at issue or

its specific prohibitions. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 619;

Sanders, 520 F.3d at 700; Jones, 222 F.3d at 352; Edwards,

90 F.3d at 201-02, 204-05. Accordingly, even if the

district court erred by admitting Mrs. Jamison’s testimony, the error was harmless.
14 No. 10-1515

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

3-18-11