Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed March 20, 2023 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00827-CR 

No. 05-21-00828-CR 

PRESTON OLIN BURKLEY, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. F-2040748-P and F-20-40749-P 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Nowell, Smith, and Miskel1

Opinion by Justice Miskel 

Preston Olin Burkley appeals the trial court’s judgments convicting him of 

two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of 

age. Burkley pleaded no contest to the offenses and the trial court assessed his 

punishment at seventeen years of imprisonment for each offense. In one issue, 

Burkley argues the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his defense counsel’s motion 

1

 Justice Leslie Osborne was a member of the panel for this appeal but, after the case was submitted, 

she resigned from this Court. Justice Osborne did not participate in the decision of this case. TEX. R. APP.

P. 41.1(b). Justice Emily Miskel succeeded Justice Osborne. She has read the briefs and the record before 

the Court. 
 –2– 

to require COVID testing; and (2) overruled his objection to appearing virtually at 

his plea hearing. Based on the recent opinion by the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals in Lira v. State, PD-0212-21, 2023 WL 151372 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 

2023), we conclude the trial court erred. The trial court’s judgments are reversed 

and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Burkley was indicted for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child 

younger than fourteen years of age. On September 15, 2021, on her own behalf, 

defense counsel filed a motion2

 requesting the trial court to require that Burkley be 

tested for COVID each morning of his plea hearing3

 in appellate cause no. 05-21-

00827-CR (trial court cause no. F-20-40748-P).4

 She argued Burkley had a high risk 

of contracting and transmitting COVID-19 because the Dallas County Jail was 

currently experiencing an outbreak of the virus, she had the right to a safe work 

environment, she had children too young to be vaccinated, Burkley deserved an 

2

 The motion for COVID testing begins, “COMES NOW [name of defense counsel], [a]ttorney of 

record for Defendant, Preston Burkley, and moves this honorable [trial] [c]ourt to order the Sheriff to test 

[Burkley] for COVID-19 each morning of trial and report the results of said testing to the [trial] [c]ourt 

each morning of trial.” However, the prayer states the motion is made by “[d]efense [c]ounsel, on behalf 

of herself and [Burkley].” 

3

 The State argues that the first paragraph of defense counsel’s motion for COVID testing asked 

the trial court “to test [Burkley] for COVID-19 each morning of trial and report the results of said testing 

to the [trial court] each morning of trial” but there is nothing in the record showing Burkley’s case was set 

for trial. Instead, it was set for a plea hearing. However, we note that the motion also states, “The case is 

to begin an open plea on September 17, 2021,” and prays that “the [trial court] grant this motion and order 

the Sheriff to test [Burkley] for COVID-19 each morning of the hearing.” 

4

 The record does not contain a motion for COVID testing in appellate cause no. 05-21-00828-CR 

(trial court cause no. F-20-40749-P). 
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attorney who was not physically distant or apprehensive, and testing was minimally 

invasive. On September 16, 2021, the trial judge signed an order denying defense 

counsel’s motion. 

On September 17, 2021, Burkley entered a plea of no contest in each case and 

signed written plea agreements without the benefit of plea bargains–open pleas5

–

that, among other things, waived his constitutional rights, including the rights to a 

jury trial as to both guilt and punishment, remain silent, confront and cross-examine 

the witnesses against him, and an appeal. Burkley also signed a written judicial 

confession. 

At the beginning of Burkley’s plea hearing, defense counsel noted that her 

motion for COVID testing had been denied and Burkley was inside of an adjacent 

holdover room, appearing by Zoom videoconferencing. On behalf of Burkley, 

defense counsel objected to this arrangement. The trial judge noted “that if persons 

do not feel comfortable coming into the [courtroom] . . . [there] is always the 

availability to do things remote[ly] and/or virtual[ly.” The trial judge also stated 

that, during discussions off the record before the plea hearing, “it was [d]efense 

[c]ounsel’s suggestion and idea that [] Burkley be placed in the holdover and a laptop 

be provided to Burkley, which [d]efense [c]ounsel did provide and the [trial] [c]ourt 

allowed.” The trial court also noted that “the arrangement that we have today was 

5 See Hodge v. State, No. 05-18-00549-CR, 2019 WL 3212150, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 

2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (discussing different types of “open pleas”). 
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not of the [trial] [c]ourt’s own doing, but it was . . . at the suggestion and carried out 

by [d]efense [c]ounsel in agreement with the [trial] [c]ourt and with the State.” 

After witness testimony and prior to his sentencing, defense counsel again 

objected on Burkley’s behalf to his sentencing via videoconference. The trial court 

implicitly sustained the objection when it required the appearance of Burkley in open 

court, ordering the deputy to open the door so Burkley could stand at the door of the 

courtroom for his sentencing. And the reporter’s record reflects that “[Burkley] 

entered the courtroom.” At that point, the trial court assessed Burkley’s punishment 

at seventeen years of imprisonment for each offense. Even though the written plea 

agreements contain Burkley’s waiver of his right to appeal and the State’s waiver of 

its right to a jury trial, Burkley notified the trial court that he wished to appeal, and 

the trial court certified that these were not plea-bargain cases and Burkley had the 

right to appeal. 

II. JURISDICTION 

As a preliminary matter, we must address this Court’s jurisdiction. The record 

shows that the written, open plea agreements waived Burkley’s right to appeal and 

the State’s right to a jury trial, but the trial court’s certifications of appeal state that 

“[these are] not [] plea-bargain case[s], [Burkley] has the right to appeal.” Although 

the parties do not address the issue of jurisdiction, this Court must independently 

satisfy itself that jurisdiction exists. 
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A. Applicable Law 

Jurisdiction concerns the power of a court to hear and determine a case; it is 

fundamental and cannot be ignored by a court. See State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 

410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 

894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A court is obligated to consider sua sponte whether it 

has jurisdiction. See Roberts, 940 S.W.2d at 657. 

Jurisdiction must be vested in a court by constitution or statute. See id. Stated 

another way, in criminal cases, the standard for determining jurisdiction is not 

whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law. 

Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Article V, § 6 of 

the Texas Constitution provides that a court of appeals shall “have original or 

appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed 

by law.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6. Generally speaking, a criminal defendant has a 

statutory right to appeal. Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018). Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02 provides as follows: 

A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal . . . provided, 

however, before the defendant who has been convicted upon either his 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere before the court and the court, upon 

the election of the defendant, assesses punishment and the punishment 

does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and 

agreed to by the defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, 

he must have permission of the trial court, except on those matters 

which have been raised by written motion filed prior to trial. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 
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A defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to appeal as part 

of a plea on a finding of: (1) a bargain between the State and the defendant; or (2) the 

defendant’s knowledge of the consequences. See Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 494–95 

(declining the State’s request to abandon these requirements). If a defendant validly 

waives his right to appeal but nonetheless appeals, an appellate court must dismiss 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). A valid waiver of appeal—one made voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently—prevents a defendant from appealing without the trial court’s consent. 

See Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 492–93. 

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Burkley’s Appeal 

Burkley signed plea agreements6

 stating he agreed to plead nolo contendere. 

The “open plea” admonished, “If the punishment assessed does not exceed the 

agreement between you and the prosecutor, the [trial court] must give its permission 

to you before you may appeal on any matter in this case except for those matters 

raised by written motions prior to trial.” Under the heading “Defendant’s Waiver of 

Rights and Judicial Confession,” Burkley agreed to “[w]aive[] the right to appeal to 

the Court of Appeals.” The written plea agreements bear the signatures of Burkley, 

defense counsel, the State, and the trial court. And under the heading “State’s 

Approval,” it states as follows: 

6

 We note that handwritten in large letters on the first page of the written plea agreement was the 

word “Open.” 
 –7– 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, by and through its Criminal District 

Attorney, upon the acceptance and approval of [Burkley’s] waivers and 

stipulations of fact herein, waives its right to a trial by jury. 

The agreement also contains findings by the trial court that Burkley’s waivers and 

agreements were made knowingly and intelligently. 

However, at the conclusion of Burkley’s plea hearing, the following exchange 

occurred: 

Defense Counsel: [Burkley], tell [the trial judge] you want to appeal. 

That’s what—that’s what—is something you can 

say right now. 

Trial Court: What your lawyer has advised you, [] Burkley, is 

that because this was an open plea, you have the 

right to appeal the case. 

 Are you telling your lawyer at this time that you 

want to appeal the case? 

Burkley: Yes. 

Trial Court: Okay. 

Defense Counsel: I will submit Notice[s] of Appeal and ask the [trial 

court] to appoint you Appellate Counsel. 

The State did not object. Further, the trial court’s judgments state that the terms of 

the plea bargains were “open plea,” Burkley waived his right to a jury trial, and he 

made the pleas “freely and voluntarily, and was aware of the consequences of the 

plea[s].” The judgments do not mention any waiver of the right to appeal. And the 

trial court’s certifications of appeal state that “[these are] not [] plea-bargain case[s], 

[Burkley] has the right to appeal.” 
 –8– 

After reviewing the entire record, the reporter’s record demonstrates that 

Burkley wanted to appeal and was orally advised by defense counsel and the trial 

judge that he had the right to appeal, without objection by the State. The trial court 

consented and certified his right to appeal. Accordingly, we conclude this Court has 

jurisdiction over this appeal. See Thomas v. State, 615 S.W.3d 552, 565–66 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). 

III. VIRTUAL APPEARANCE AT PUNISHMENT HEARING 

In issue one, Burkley argues the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion 

to require COVID testing; and (2) overruled his objection to appearing virtually at 

his punishment hearing. He contends that by denying defense counsel’s motion for 

COVID testing, the trial court forced defense counsel to either put her health and 

safety at risk or proceed without Burkley physically present in the courtroom. Also, 

he argues that when the trial court overruled his objection to appearing at his plea 

hearing by videoconference, it violated his fundamental right to be present in person 

in open court and to the effective assistance of counsel. The State responds that 

Burkley concedes that defense counsel’s performance was not deficient, and the 

record shows he was not denied his confrontation rights or harmed by the unique 

circumstances of the case. 

A. Applicable Law 

A defendant’s in-person appearance in open court for a guilty plea hearing is 

both a substantive statutory right and a procedural requirement. Lira, 2023 WL 
 –9– 

151372, at *10 (discussing Texas Constitution art. I, § 15 and Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure arts. 1.12, 1.13, 1.15, 27.13, 33.03). A trial court simply lacks 

authority to enter a felony conviction unless a defendant appears in person and 

waives his rights in full compliance with the statutes that set out the conditions for a 

valid waiver. Id. at *10. As a result, a defendant’s lack of in-person presence 

deprives a trial court of authority to accept the defendant’s jury waiver and guilty 

pleas at all. See id. at *13. However, a defendant can affirmatively waive the right 

to participate in person after he pleads to the indictment or information. Id. at *10. 

Article 27.19(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides two 

methods of waiving the right to a jury trial and entering a plea of guilty or no contest 

for an incarcerated defendant who is not present in person in open court: (1) a plea 

in accordance with article 27.18; or (2) a plea in absentia precipitated by a 

defendant’s written waiver of his rights after sufficient notice of those rights. Article 

27.18 provides, in part, as follows: 

(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this code requiring that a plea 

or a waiver of a defendant’s right be made in open court, a court may 

accept the plea or waiver by videoconference to the court if: 

(1) the defendant and the attorney representing the state file 

with the court written consent to the use of videoconference; 

(2) the videoconference provides for a simultaneous, 

compressed full motion video, and interactive communication of 

image and sound between the judge, the attorney representing the 

state, the defendant, and the defendant’s attorney; and 

(3) on request of the defendant, the defendant and the 

defendant’s attorney are able to communicate privately without 
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being recorded or heard by the judge or the attorney representing 

the state. 

(b) On motion of the defendant or the attorney representing the state 

or in the court’s discretion, the court may terminate an appearance by 

videoconference at any time during the appearance and require an 

appearance by the defendant in open court. 

CRIM. PROC. art. 27.18; see also Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at *11–12 (quoting an 

earlier version of the article referencing “closed circuit video teleconferencing”). As 

a result, a trial court has no authority to hold a videoconferenced plea hearing when 

the defendant has not consented. Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at *15; cf. King v. State, 

PD-1003-20, 2023 WL 2146402, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 2023) (holding no 

due process violation because defendant’s presence did not bear reasonably 

substantial relationship to defending pretrial hearing and violation of article 28.01 

was harmless because defendant’s absence did not substantially affect jury’s 

decision). 

Under Lira, the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency order cannot suspend 

these requirements or give a court authority to proceed without a jury. Lira, 2023 

WL 151372, at *12. An emergency order cannot abrogate a defendant’s substantive 

statutory right to be present in person in open court. Id. The failure to secure a 

defendant’s written consent to waive that right results in the abrogation of that right. 

Id. However, this does not prohibit the participants to a criminal proceeding from 

negotiating a waiver of the right to be present as part of a plea agreement. Id.
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B. Defendant Had the Right to Be Present In Person In Open Court at the Plea 

Hearing 

We begin by reviewing the second part of Burkley’s only issue on appeal—

the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to appearing virtually at his 

punishment hearing. After the parties filed their briefs in this appeal, the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals handed down its opinion in Lira, which held that “a trial 

court has no authority to hold a videoconferenced plea hearing when the defendant 

has not consented.” 2023 WL 151372, at *15. Lira is dispositive of this appeal. 

In this case, Burkley did not file with the trial court his written consent to the 

use of videoconferencing. See CRIM. PROC. art. 27.18; Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at 

*11–12. Also, Burkley’s signed written plea agreements did not contain a negotiated 

waiver of his right to be present at the plea hearing. See Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at 

*15. Even though the statute requires a written waiver, Lira would also allow a 

waiver to be made in person. See Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at *10 (“the trial court 

had no authority to preside over a videoconferenced plea hearing where the 

Appellants had not waived in person or in writing their right to be present.”). In this 

case, the reporter’s record does not reflect that Burkley waived in person his right to 

be present. 

Accordingly, we conclude the record does not show that Burkley consented 

to a videoconferenced plea hearing. Therefore, under Lira, the trial court did not 

have any authority to hold the hearing or enter the conviction without the defendant’s 

in-person participation. 
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C. Burkley is not Estopped from Raising this Error 

We note that this case presents an unusual set of circumstances because it was 

defense counsel’s request that her client not participate in person. A party can be 

estopped from seeking appellate relief based on error that it induced. Woodall v. 

State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Lira suggests that a defendant’s 

entitlement to an in-person appearance is a waivable-only right not subject to 

procedural preservation rules or a harm analysis. However, the invited-error 

doctrine prevents a party from taking advantage of an error that it invited or caused, 

even if that error is fundamental and involves an absolute or waivable-only right. 

See Parnell v. State, No. 02-19-00070-CR, 2020 WL 5666565, at *5 (Tex. App—

Fort Worth Sept. 24, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); 

Deen v. State, 509 S.W.3d 345, 348 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Woodall, 336 

S.W.3d at 644–46; Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

In this case, after the trial court denied her motion for daily COVID testing 

and before the plea hearing began, defense counsel requested that the defendant 

remain in the adjacent holdover cell and participate by videoconference. However, 

her motion for daily COVID testing stressed the importance of the defendant’s inperson participation. As the plea hearing began, defense counsel objected to the 

defendant appearing by videoconference. After testimony and before sentencing, 

defense counsel again objected to the defendant’s participation by video. Because 

the defense explicitly raised the issue to the trial court and asserted the importance 
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of in-person participation, we do not consider Burkley to be estopped from raising 

this complaint on appeal. 

D. Burkley’s Plea is Voidable 

We conclude the trial court erred when it overruled Burkley’s objection to 

appearing virtually at his punishment hearing. See Lira, 2023 WL 151372, at *7–

15. Because the trial court was not authorized to accept Burkley’s pleas by 

videoconference, his pleas are voidable. Id. at 15 (noting court of appeals correctly 

concluded pleas were voidable). The second part of issue one is decided in Burkley’s 

favor. 

Based on our resolution of the second part of Burkley’s issue, we need not 

address the first part of his issue which argues the trial court erred when it denied 

defense counsel’s motion to require COVID testing. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Also, we conclude 

the trial court erred when it overruled Burkley’s objection to appearing virtually at 

his punishment hearing. Burkley’s pleas are voidable. 

 
 –14– 

The trial court’s judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

210827F.U05 

 

/Emily a. Miskel/

EMILY A. MISKEL 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

PRESTON OLIN BURKLEY, 

Appellant 

No. 05-21-00827-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-2040748-P. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel. 

Justices Nowell and Smith 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

Judgment entered March 20, 2023 

 
 –16– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

PRESTON OLIN BURKLEY, 

Appellant 

No. 05-21-00828-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-2040749-P. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel. 

Justices Nowell and Smith 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

Judgment entered March 20, 2023