UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVI SI ON GORMAN COMPANY, L L C, et al., Plaintiffs, V. UNI TED STATES ENVI RONMENTAL PROTECTI ON AGENCY, et al., Def endants, and KENTUCKYCOALASSOCI ATI ON, et a l., V. UNI TED STATES ENVI RONMENTAL PROTECTI ON AGENCY, et al., Def endants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) L ondon Civil No. 6:10-228-GF VT Pikeville Ci vil No. 7:10-125-GF VT

MEMORAN DUM OP INION & ORDER

*** *** *** *** These matters ar e bef

ore the Court on the Motion to Transfer [R . 5] filed by

Def endants the United States Environmenta l Protection Ag ency (“EPA” ) and the United States Army Corps of Eng ineer s (“Corps) ( collectively , the “United States” ) in the Gorman action, and the Motion to Transf er or , in the Alternative, to Reassig n [R . 15] filed by the Def endants in the Kentucky

Coal Association (“K CA”) a ction. I n both, the movants seek tra nsfer to the United States District Court for the District of

Columbi a so that the c ases may be consolidate d with a re lated ca se pendingin that jurisdiction, National Mining Ass’n v. J

ackson , Civ. No. 1:10-cv-01220-RB W (D. D.C.). In the KCA action, the De fenda nts alternatively

seek c onsolidation with Gorman in the Easter n District of Ke ntucky

.The Court hea rd ora l arguments on the motions to t ransf er dur ing a

joint telephonic confe renc e held De cembe r 7, 2010. Ther eaf ter, the Court e ntere d Orde rs [10-228, R. 18; 10-125, R. 36] stay

ing both c ases pe nding the District of Columbia court’s rulingon a motion to dism iss pendingin the National

Mining Association (“N MA”) c ase. I n stay ing Gorman and Kentucky Coal Association , this Court not ed that the D.C. c ourt could g rant the motion to dismis s on g rounds applica

ble to the NMA that would not apply to the Plaintiffs in the Kentucky case s. There fore , it made sense to r eser ve fully considering

and rulingon the motions to t ransf er until the motion to dis miss had been r esolved. On J anuar

y 14, 2011, United States District J udg e for the District of Columbia Reg g ie B

. Walton is sued his opinion denying the motion to di smiss filed by the Def endants in the NMA action. See National Mining Ass’n v. Jac kson , 2011 WL 124194, at *16 (D. D .C. J an. 14, 2011). In the same opinion, Judge Walton resolved the Plaintiff’s motion for a pre liminary injunction. Id. at 8-16. Althoug h he found that the Plaintiff had demonstrate d a likelihood of succ ess on the merits, he ultimately

denied the motion on the g round that the Plaintiff had not de monstrated irrepa rable harm. See id. FollowingJ udg e Walton’s decision, a motion was f iled in the Gorman and KCA case s to advanc e the status conf

ere nce pr eviously

schedule d for Ma

rch 16, 2011; a ll parties conse nted to the motion. [ 10-228, R. 19; 10-125, R. 27.] Acc ording ly , the Court conducte d a telephonic status confe renc e on F ebrua ry 16, 2011. Duringthe hea ring , the g overnme nt defe ndants rene wed their motions to transfer. T he Plaintiffs in both cases state d that they continue to oppose tra

nsfer

. After hear ing f inal arguments from both parties on the issue, the Court took the matter unde r advisement. F or the re asons that follow, the Court g rants the motions and transf ers both Gorman

2and KCA to the District of Columbia. I.

Plaintiffs Gorman Company , L L C, Ky cog a Company , L L C, Blac k Gold Sales, Inc., Kentucky Union Company , and Ha zard Coal Corporation filed suit seekingdecla ratory and injunctive relief

on August 10, 2010. [ 10-228, R. 1.] Accordingto the Plaintiffs, they own land containingsignific ant coa l reser ves that they

lease to mining oper ators, and the y have inc urre d and stand to fur

ther incur signific ant and irr ever sible harm as a result of the EPA’ s J une 11, 2009 issuance of

Enhanc ed Coordination Proce ss (“EC Proce ss”) memora nda and A

pril 1, 2010 issuance of

a memora

ndum entitled “Deta iled Guidance : I mproving EPA Review of A ppalac hian Surfac e Coal Mining O perations Under the Clea n Water Ac t, National Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Just ice Executive Or der” (“D etailed Guida nce” ). [ Id. at ¶¶ 1- 2.] Specifica lly , the Plaintiffs challeng e a se ries of EPA a nd Corps actions that they contend “ have unlawfully

obstructed Clea

n Water Ac t permitting proc esses for coal mining ,” name ly

the proce sses for obta ining Sec tion 402 permits, which g overn pollutants that ar e assimilated by

rec eiving water s, and Section 404 per mits, which authorize the discharg e of material that fills or displaces r ece iving waters. [ Id. at ¶¶ 2, 19.] The Plaintiffs alleg e that these actions “ha ve imposed insurmountable technic al and e conomic burde ns on the coa l mining industry , eff ectively shutting down surf

ace coal mining (and possibly signific ant under g round coa l mining) throug hout much of Centra l Appalac hia, including the ar eas in whic h Plaintiffs own mineral interests.” [Id. at ¶ 1.] The Plaintiffs bringtheir cla ims pursuant to Section 702 of the Administrative Proce dure Act (“ APA”). [Id. at ¶ 1.] Their Complaint contains eleve n counts. [ See id. at ¶¶ 95- 145.]

3Among these c ounts are c laims that the Detailed Guidance and the EC Proce ss constitute

leg islative rules that we re not prope rly promulg ated unde r the APA [ id. at ¶¶ 95- 97, 101-103] and cla ims that the Detailed Guida nce violate s the Clean Water A ct (“ CW A”) , the National Environmental Policy

Act (“NEPA”), a

nd the Surfac e Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) [ id. at ¶¶ 113- 122, 129-141]. The Plaintiffs seek re lief, includingan injunction restra ining the D efe ndants from implementing , applying, or enfor cingthe EC Process a nd the Detailed Guidance . [ Id. at 41-42.] Be fore the Gorman case was filed, on July 20, 2010, the National Mining Association filed its lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. [10-228, R. 1, Attach. 2.] The NMA’ s complaint and the Complaint in the case at bar name the sa

me defe ndants and c halleng e the same re g ulatory actions. [ See id. , Attach. 2.] I ndeed, the eleve n counts containe d in the NMA’s c omplaint and the Complaint in t he instant ac tion are ide ntical, and the same re lief is soug ht. [ Compare 10- 228, R. 1 with R. 1, Att ach. 2.] On Octobe r 18, 2010, Plaintiff Kentuc ky Coal Association also filed suit seeking decla ratory and injunctive re lief. [10-125, R. 1.] L ike the Plaintiffs in Gorman and National 1 Mining Association , the KCA cha lleng es the EPA’s use of the De tailed Guidanc e. [ Id. ] The KCA’s Complaint, however , is much narr ower . [ See id. ] I t specifica lly challeng es only

the EPA’s use of the Detailed Guidance in its oversight of the Commonwealth of Kentuc ky ’s issuance of

National Pollutant Discharg e Elimination Sy stem (“NPDES”) permits under Sec tion 402 of the Clean Water

Act. [ Id. ] Further, the KCA’s complaint conta ins only two counts. [ See

The Commonwealth of K entucky and the City

of Pikeville have inter

vened a s Plainti ffs 1 in the KCA suit. 4id. ] I n its first count, the KCA claims in part that the D etailed Guida nce a mounts to a leg islative rule that the EPA ha s adopted in violation of the Administrative Proce dure A ct, as the EPA f ailed to subject the De tailed Guidanc e to the proc edura l require ments of public notice a nd comment rulemaking . [ Id. at ¶ 60.] In its second count, the KCA a sks the Court to enjoin and restra in the EPA “fr om utili zing the De tailed Guidanc e in its oversig ht of Section 402 KPDES permit decisions, and f

rom implementing the signific ant cha ng es to the Section 402 KPDES prog ram discussed in the De tailed Guidanc e unless and until it complies with feder al law a nd/or public notice and c omment rulemaking .” [ Id. at ¶ 64.] These c laims, of course , are simil ar to c laims raised by the Plaintiffs in Gorman and National Mining Association

. II. A. The Gorm an Case Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “ [f] or the c onvenienc e of pa rties and witnesse s, in the interest of justice, a district c ourt may transfe r any

civil action to any

other district or division where it might have been br oug ht.” I n revie wing motions m ade pur suant to § 1404(a) , courts conside r a 2 number of f

actor s, including ( 1) conve nience of the pa rties and the w itnesses, (2) a cce ssibili ty of source s of proof, ( 3) the c osts of secur ing te stimony from witnesses, ( 4) pra ctical problems associated with trying the case in the least expensive and most expeditious fashion, and ( 5) the intere sts of justice. Other f actor s include (1) the relative cong estion in the courts of the two f orums, (2) the public’ s interest in havinglocal contr oversies a djudicated loca lly , (3) the r elative f amiliarity of the two courts with the applica ble law, ( 4) the plaintiff’ s orig inal choice of for um, and (5) whe ther the pa

rties have ag ree d to a forum se lection clause

. Kentucky Speedway

, LLC v. National Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. , 406 F. Supp. 2d 751,

The Plaintiffs in Gorman and Kentucky Coal Association do not dispute that this l awsuit 2 could have been br oug ht in the District of Columbia. 5755 (E.D. Ky . 2005) (c itations and internal citations omitted). Thus, § 1404(a ) “‘ place [s]

discretion in the district cour t to adjudicate motions for tra nsfer acc ording to an individualiz ed

case -by -ca se consider ation of conve nience and fa irness.’” Id. at 754 (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). F urther, the burden of showing the desirability

of transf er is g ener ally

place d on the moving pa rty
. See M

ead Data Central, Inc. v

. W est Publishing Company , 679 F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Cowden v. Parke r & Associates, Inc

. , 2010 WL715850, at *2 (E.D. K y . Fe b. 22, 2010) (c itation omit ted). The Gorman Plaintiffs emphasize the weig ht give n to their choice of for um. [ R. 9 at 5- 7. ] They corr ectly note that “a

plaintiff’s choic e of f

orum is ordinarily

entitled to considera

ble 3 weig ht.” Cowden , 2010 WL715850, at *2. And “[a]s a result, ‘[u]nl ess the bala nce is strong ly in favor of

the def endant, the pla intiff’s choice of for um should rare ly

be disturbed.’ ” Id. (quoting Nicol v. Koscinski , 188 F.2d 537 ( 6 Cir. 1951)). B ut the case s cited by the Plaintiffs t h that g ive controllingweight to the plaintiffs’ choice of for um do not involve a duplicative or related ca se filed f

irst in the proposed tra

nsfer ee jur isdiction; rather, tra nsfer was sought on such g rounds as forum non conve niens

. See Sun O il Co. v. Lederle , 199 F.2d 423 ( 6 Cir. 1952); 4 t h

Citations t o the re cord in this section re fer ence Civil Case No. 6:10-c v-228. 3 In United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc

. , 66 F. Supp. 2d 881, 885-86 (N .D. Ohio 1999), 4 there wer e two ong oing la wsuits involvi ng the same pa rties, but the cour

t determined that those lawsuits were not duplicative bef ore de clining tr ansfe r. I

n the proposed tr ansfe ree district, Cinemark filed suit ag ainst the Depa rtment of Just ice ( DOJ) and others, ar guing that the DOJ’s “promulation of a

chang e in the law w ithout prior notice, and its attempt to enfor ce its new rule retroa ctively , [were] violations of the APA, the ADA, a nd the Constitut ion.” Id. at 885. In the case befor e the Nor

thern District of O hio, on the other ha nd, the United States filed suit ag ainst Cinemark, alleg ing that Cinemark had “ violated the ADAby desig ning, c onstructing , and/or operating movie theaters in Ohio and throughout the United States that deny acc ess to persons with disabilit ies who use whe elcha irs.” Id. at 886. Thus, there wer e no common issues of law and fa ct betwe en the two c ases. In contra st, here the Gorman and NMA suits raise the same 6Nicol v. Koscinski , 188 F.2d 537 ( 6 Cir. 1951); Int’l Union Elec . Radio & Mach. W orkers, CIO t h v. Un. Ele c. Radio &Mach. W orkers of Am. , 192 F.2d 847 ( 6 Cir. 1951); Rutherford v. t h Goodye ar Tire and Rubber Co. , 943 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky . 1996); Blane v. Am . Inve ntors Corp. , 934 F. Supp. 903, 907 (M.D. Te nn. 1996); Hanning v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 710 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Capital Consultant

s Corp. v. Charles W

illiams Real Estate Inv. Corp. , 352 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. T enn. 1972); Crawf ord Transport

Co. v. Chrysler Corp. , 191 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. K

y . 1961). Her e, the Court is persua ded that the inter ests of justice re quire tra nsfer . A lawsuit naming identical def

endants a nd asser ting identica l claims was filed in the D istrict of Columbia befor e the instant lawsuit commenc ed. In Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL-585 , 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960), the Supre me Court stated that “[t] o permit a situation in which two ca ses involving prec isely the same issues a

re simultaneously

pendingin differ ent District Courts leads to the wastef ulness of time, ene rg y , and money that § 1404(a) was de signe d to preve nt.” Fur ther,

acc ordingto the Six th Circuit, “‘[a]s between fe dera l district courts, . . . though no pr ecise rule has evolve d, the g ener al principle is to avoid duplicative litig ation.’” Smith v. S.E.C. , 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6 Cir. 1997) (quoting Colorado River W ater Conservation Dist. v. United States , 424 t h U.S. 800, 817 (6 Cir. 1997)). When pre sented with a duplica tive suit, feder al “c ourts often t h proce ed . . . under

the rule of

thumb that the entire a ction should be dec ided by the cour t in which

an ac tion was first filed.” Id. (citation omitted). This “first-to- file” r ule “is a ‘ well-e stablished doctrine that encour ag es comity amongfede ral c ourts of equa l rank.’” Ables &Hall Builders v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 2008 WL2168890, at *1 (W.D. Ky . May 23, 2008) (quoting AmSouth Bank v

.
issues and make the same c laims. 7Dale , 386 F.3d 763, 791 n. 8 ( 6 Cir. 2004)). t h The Plaintiffs contend that the first-to-file r ule only applies whe n two or more suits contain identical

parties. [R. 9 at 16.] Even the c ase c ited by the Plaintiffs in support of this contention, howeve r, states that the r ule applies “ when suits involving substantial ly the same issues and parties are filed in courts of c oncurr ent jurisdiction . . . .” Burrows v. Fed. Ins. Co. , 2005 WL1705751, at *2 (E.D K y . J uly 21, 2005) (e mphasis added) . I f both the instant lawsuit and the D.C. a ction are permitted to proce ed in diffe rent c ourts, “[t] wo fe dera l district courts would be conside ringidentical issues, thus wasting the time of lawyers a nd judge s [and] risking inconsistent results and conf using r emedies . . . .” Ables &Hall Builders , 2008 WL 2168890, at *2. In g ener al, the first-to- file rule a ppear s to be a fa ir way

to avoid these a dverse conseque nces of duplicative litig ation. Citi ng Mead D ata Central, Inc. v. W est Publishing Co. , 679 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D. Ohio 1987), the Plaintiffs ar g ue that “the mere specte r of potentiallyinconsistent verdicts is of little-tono conseque nce in de ciding to disturb a plaintiff’s for um selection by

transfe rringthe ca se to another forum.” [R. 9 at 11.] Mead D ata Central was a n antitrust action filed a g ainst West Publis hing Company

(“West”) in the Southern District of Ohio. 679 F . Supp. at 1456. West soug ht transfe r of the a ction to the District of Minnesota, whe re two “ arguably related ac tions”

wer e pending

. Id. I n the first Minnesota a ction, West sought a de clar atory judgme nt preve nting Mead D ata Centra l (“MDC”) from infring ing upon c erta in copy rig hts alleg edly

held by West. Id. The Ohio c ourt, consider ing the motion to t ransf er, note d that “[i] t is true that MDC asks this Court to declar e that West’s copy rig ht claims to judicial opinions are invalid and that West asks the Minnesota Court to decla re that West’s copy

rig ht claims to judicial opinions are valid.” Id. at

81464. The c ourt found, howe ver, tha t beca use the pa rties in both case s were identical and thus collater al estoppel wa s available , conflictingresults wer e “impossible as a leg al matter.” Id. The court ther efor e conc luded that the possibility of conf licting r esults did not compel transfe r. Id. In the sec ond Minnesota ac tion, Banc roft-Whitney Company

soug ht a dec laration that West’s copy

rig hts in it s annotated c ompilation of Texas statutes were inva lid. Id. at 1456. The Ohio court found that beca use the B ancr oft-Whitney action wa s “extremely

narr ow in its scope” raisingquestions of law, fa ct, and e vidence dissimi lar fr om the antitrust action bef ore it, it could not “conc lude that judicial ec onomy and ef ficienc y would best be ser

ved by requiringthat the two case s be hea

rd within the same c ourt.” Id. at 1464. Additionally , the Court noted that it could not “conc lude that the spec ter of inc onsistent results is dis positive with reg ard to the issue of transf er.” Id. Clearly , the transf

er issue in the c ase at bar is ver y differ ent from the tr ansfe r issue fa ced by the Southern District of Ohio in Mead D ata Central . Be cause the Plaintiffs in the instant suit and the D.C. a ction are not the same, inconsistent re sults are not a le g al impossibil ity . Fur ther, the instant suit does not raise questions of law, f act, a nd evidenc e dissimilar from the D.C. action. Ac cording ly , the Court does not find any languag e in Mead D ata Central about the mer e “spec ter of inc onsistent results” persua sive. The Plaintiffs ar g ue that the EPA re gulations at issue in this case will have no e ffe ct on the citizens of the District of Columbia, but will have “dire conseque nces” for the pe ople who live in this Dist rict and throughout the Commonwealth. [R . 9 at 9-10.] The Plaintiffs claim that numerous fe dera l courts have either tra nsfer red ve nue or de nied the tra nsfer of venue based upon the public’s intere st in “havingcontrove rsies that have local conse quence s decide d in those local

9communities.” [ Id. at 10.] I n the ca ses cited by the Plaintiffs in support of their ar g ument, howeve r, the c ourts deciding the issue of tra

nsfer did not have to take into conside ration a duplicative lawsuit pendingin another jurisdiction. See Cowden , 2010 WL 715850; Nat. W ildlif e Fede ration v. Harvey , 437 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. D .C. 2006); Sierra Club v. Flowers , 276 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. D.C. 2003); Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp , 523 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. D .C. 2007). Additionally , in Nat. W

ildlif e Fe deration , the plaintiffs alleg ed that the Corps violated the Endang ere d Species Ac t throug h its water mana g ement sche dule for L ake O keec hobee in southern F lorida, 437 F . Supp. 2d at 44, and in Flowers , the Plaintiffs alleg ed that the Corps a nd the Fish a nd Wil dlife Service violated “se vera l fede ral e nvironmental statutes by issuing mining permits for c erta in Everg lades we tlands in southern Florida ,” 276 F . Supp. 2d at 63. Thus, in these c ases, the impac t of the suit was purelylocal. He re, on the other ha nd, the Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that the actions of the De fenda nts affe ct per

mits “associated w ith coal mining projec ts proposed within six states: Ohio, Pennsylvania, Te nnessee , Virg inia, Kentucky , and West Virginia.” [R . 1 at ¶ 68.] As for the fac tors such as the c onvenienc e of pa rties and witnesse s, acc essibility of

source s of proof, a

nd the costs of sec uringtestimony from witnesses, the Court ag ree s with District J udg e John T. C openhave r, Jr., in t he Southern District of West Virg inia that these fac tors are “nea

r neutra l,” as “ the judicial inquiry in these ca ses” is likely

to “be ba sed exclusively

on the administrative re cord.” Huffman v. United States Env ironmental Protection 5 Agenc y , 2011 WL322661, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 31, 2011). J udg e Copenhaver tra nsfer red a

As for the relative cong estion in the courts of the two f orums, the Court finds that this 5 fac tor is a nonissue. Matters that have a risen in Gorman , KCA , and National Mining Association have be en re solved expeditiousl y by both this C ourt and the D .C. court.

10case challeng ing the Detailed Guidance to the District of Columbia for its consolidation with the

NMA ca se on January

31, 2011. See id. at *1. L ike the Court does he re, Judge Copenhave r

6 found that the de fenda

nts in his case met their bur den of pr oving the desirability of transf er, a s the sig nificanc e of the plaintiffs’ choic e of f orum was outwe ighe d by

the intere sts of justice. Id. at *7. I t is particularly

worth noting J udg e Copenhaver’ s comments reg ardingthe diffe rent interests and diff

ere nt liti g ation strateg ies that may be pursue d by

the plaintiffs in the NMA c ase, the Plaintiffs in the Gorman and Kentucky Coal Association actions, and the plaintiffs in the ca se befor e him: Reg ardingthe integ rity

of the judicial proc ess, one would e x pect the de fenda nts in the three differ ent districts to pursue a unifie d approa ch. The same is not as ea sily said for the ir plaintiff counte rpar ts. There is no overlap among the respe cted counsel on the pla intiffs’ side, eve n in the Gorman and KCA actions in Kentuc ky

. I t seems ce rtain then that a ll of these diffe rent lawy ers may pursue diff

ering litigation strateg ies, perha ps resulting in arguments and authorities be ing prese nted to one or some of the district judge s but not their judicial counterpa rt(s). I f those var iance s end up impactingthe dec isional law, both the judicial proce ss and settled notions of fa irness will suffer . That outcome . . . c an ea sily be avoide d by transfe r. Id. at *6. Her e, duringthe Fe bruar y teleconf ere nce, the Plaintiffs ex plained that they oppose transfe r in part be cause they have inter ests differ ent from the N MA. L ike J udg e Copenhaver, howeve r, this Court finds that the Plainti ffs’ va rying inter ests and litigation strateg ies are fac tors that weig h in favor of

transfe r, not ag ainst it. I f one c ourt has the be nefit of he aringall the 7
At the telephonic status confer ence held on Fe bruar y 16, 2011, the Def

endants made the 6 Court awar e that the D.C. c ourt had g rante d their motion to have the Huffman case consolidated with the NMA ac tion. Whil e the Court g ener ally ag ree s with J udg e Copenhaver’ s analy sis, it m ust respec tfully 7 disag ree with the sug g estion that the District of Columbia courts have a “pe culiar e x pertise in 11arguments, it will be better able to make a fully

informed de cision. Thus, the Court will transfer the Gorman action to the District of Columbia. B. Th e KCA Case As noted pre viously , the KCA case is not identical to Gorman . I ts focus is narr ower , and the Commonwealth of Ke ntucky and the City

of Pikeville have inter

vened a s parties. Nota

bly , the Commonwealth’s Interve ning Complaint alleg es that the EPA’s objec tion to Kentucky ’s NPDES permits on the basis of the De tailed Guidanc e violates the Te nth Amendment rights of the Commonwealth. [ See10-125, R. 10 at 28.] Ulti mately , howeve r, the Court finds that KCA ’s differ ence s do not chang e the a naly sis made above . In the end, like the NMA and Gorman actions, KCA targ ets the validity of the De tailed Guidanc e. Thus, “[i]rrespec tive of . . . the particula r ef fec ts that defenda

nts’ policies have had in” the Commonwea lth, if the Detailed Guidance is declar ed invalid, “be it in the D.C. District Court, t his court, or some other ,” its eff ects on Ke ntucky ’s “water qua lity and surf ace mining policies a

re pr actica lly

at an e nd absent

a succ essful appe al.” See H uffman , 2011 WL322661, at *6. Thus, in the interests of judicial 8 integ rity and avoidinginconsistent results, it makes sense f or one c ourt to resolve the issue. Moreove r, althoug h a Ke ntucky fede ral c ourt is more familiar and better able to handle issues of Kentuc ky

law than is a D istrict of Columbia feder al cour t, see W est Americ an Ins. Co. v. Miller , 2010 WL1369079, at *4 (E.D. K y . Mar. 31, 2010) , the Court finds that it is unl ikely

administrative law” that may make them be tter suited to hear these c ases. Huffman , 2011 WL 322661, at *7, n. 8. In Huffman , the Plaintiff is Randy C. Huffman, in his offic ial capa city as Cabinet 8 Secre tary of the West Virg inia Depa rtment of Environmenta l Protection, acting on behalf of the State of W

est Virginia . 2011 WL322661. 12that the D.C. court will nee d to decide issues of Kentucky

law in the KCA case , and, if it does, any such issues would be minimal. Wit h the interve ntion of the Commonwealth and the City of Pikeville, the Plaintiffs in KCA perha

ps have a strong er a

rgument reg ardingthe localized intere st repre sented by the controve rsy . Ag ain, howeve r, the Court notes that the main c ase c ited by the Plaintiffs in support of that ar g ument, Kentucky Speedway

, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc

. , 406 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Ky . 2005), involved a motion to transfe r on the ba sis of a for um selection clause , not on the basis of a r elated c ase pe nding in the pr oposed transf ere e jurisdiction. There fore , the Court will transfer the KCA case to the District of Columbia as well.

III. Acc ording , for the r easons state d above, it is here by ORDERED as follows: 1. The Motion to Transfe r [R. 5] filed in Gorman Company, LLC, et al. v. United States Environmental Protec tion Agency , et al. , Civil Case No. 6:10-228- GFV T, is GR ANTED , and that ac tion is t ransf

err ed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for all further proce eding s; and 2. The Motion to Transfe r [R. 15] filed in Kentucky Coal Association, et al. v. United States Environme ntal Protection Agency , et al. , Civil Case No. 7:10-125- GFV T, is GR ANTED , and that ac tion is t ransf err ed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbi a for

all further

proce eding s. This the 24 day

of F ebrua

ry , 2011. t h

1314