alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Attendee Report GoToWebinar

Webinar Name Webinar ID

Test Procedure NOPR for Electric Motors: 

Public Meeting & Webinar

594266136

Actual Start Date/Time Actual Duration (minutes) 

Jul 16, 2013 08:26 AM EDT 254

Total Attended

12

Session Details

First Name Last Name Email Country Address City State Organization Zip Code

Timothy Ballo tballo@earthjustice.org US 1625 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Ste. 

702

Washington DC Earthjustice 20036

austin Bonnett austin.bonnett@nidec-motor.com US 25341 july ave Gallatin MO austin bonnett engineering llc 64640

Michael Bruin michael.bruin@ge.com US 3400 e. Coliseum Blvd Fort Wayne IN General Electric 46805

Derek Greenauer derek.greenauer@ul.com US 1850 M Street, Suite 1000 Washington DC UL 20036

Robert Hart rhart@cee1.org US 98 N Washington St. Suite 101 Boston MA Consortium for Energy Efficiency 02114

Vijeta Jangra vijeta.jangra@navigant.com US 1200 19th St Washington DC DC Navigant Consulting 20036

Howard Jordan hjordan99@att.net US 329 Explorer Lakeway TX Howard E. Jordan Consultant 78734

Al Padilla al.padilla@ul.com US 333 Pfingsten Rd Northbrook IL UL LLC 60062

Jim Raba jim.raba@ee.doe.gov US 1000 independence Ave Washington DC U. S. Department of Energy 20585

Steve Ruffing steve.ruffing@nidec-motor.com US 2426 Addison Lane Alpharetta GA Nidec Motor Corporation 30005

Linda Wilson linda.wilson@ag.ny.gov US 120 Broadway New York NY 10271

Michael Woodford mwoodford@ahrinet.org US 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite # 500 Arlington VA AHRI 22201

General Information
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 9, 2009 

1215 

Order 

 

January 9, 2009 

137471 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137471 

 COA: 285294 

Saginaw CC: 98-015912-FC 

KYALL WILLIAM ALDRICH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 28, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

 HATHAWAY, J., not participating.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                           1,752
<SECURITIES>                                     6,829
<RECEIVABLES>                                       27
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (10)
<INVENTORY>                                      5,628
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,563
<PP&E>                                           9,478
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (8,570)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,250
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,348
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        78,467
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,250
<SALES>                                            168
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   733
<CGS>                                            2,565
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,677
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,523
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 788
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (15,566)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (15,566)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (15,566)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.39)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Alex MERSON et al., Appellants, v. Peter MUIR, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Nov. 18, 1955.

S.Arnold Lynch, Robert W. Zollinger, Louisville, for appellants.

C. Hayden Edwards, Louisville, for ap-pellee.

MONTGOMERY, Judge.

Alex Merson and Gordon Long appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying the remedy of mandamus against Peter Muir, police court judge, City of Louisville. Previously, appellants were *812denied the same relief in an original proceeding in this Court. Merson v. Muir, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 272.

The question is whether appellants are entitled to an order of mandamus against a police court judge of a first-class city, requiring him to redocket two cases for trial when appellants failed to make a motion for a new trial in due time after nonap-pealable fines had been adjudged against them.

Appellants were arrested on November 16, 1953, on charges of disorderly conduct and violating a city ordinance. In a proceeding on that same day before the police court judge, they were fined $15 each upon a plea of not guilty to the disorderly conduct charges. The other charges were filed away. No sworn testimony was offered; no jury was impaneled. Neither appellant was represented by counsel, nor does the record show that either requested any counsel.

On December 1, 1953, each appellant filed a motion asking that his case be docketed for trial and for correction of clerical mis-prisions. Essentially, the motions sought new trials. These motions were overruled. Since more than ten days had elapsed following the entry of judgment, the police court no longer had any control over, or jurisdiction in, the matter. KRS 26.070(3). Appellants’ unsuccessful effort in this ■Court then followed.

Generally, there is no provision for .an appeal in criminal cases to the circuit court from the judgment of an inferior court where the fine is less than $20. ■Criminal Code of Practice, Section 362; KRS 26.080(1). The failure, or refusal, of the Legislature to provide for such an appeal is within its power and discretion. Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S.W. 632; Walters v. Fowler, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 523.

An order or judgment of a police court in a first-class city may be modified, set aside, or annulled on motion within three days from the date of entry of the order or judgment. KRS 26.070(1). This remedy was available to the appellants, but they made no use of it. No excuse for this failure is given except to say that it would have been futile. The failure to avail oneself of the remedy provided against adverse decisions of the lower tribunal within the proper period cannot be excused by the contention that such remedy would have been fruitless anyway; and mandamus will not lie to relieve the applicant of the consequences of his neglect in such a case. 145 A.L.R., at page 1055.

By failure to make use of the available statutory remedy, appellants waived such rights. When a party has lost the remedy available to him through his own neglect or failure to act, mandamus will not lie to restore it. McFarland v. Gilbert, 276 Ky. 423, 124 S.W.2d 473. See 145 A.L.R., at page 1046.

Judgment affirmed.
##### 



EXHIBIT 99.2

AT ROAD, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Amendment #1 to Quarterly Report of At Road, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Thomas C. Hoster,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Thomas C. Hoster
Thomas C. Hoster
Chief Financial Officer
July 29, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
Article 5 Fin. Data Schedule for fiscal ended DEC-31-96
</LEGEND>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   	          12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>			                    JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                 DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             78970
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1195281
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                       2135231
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4099404
<PP&E>                                           1255268
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1072273
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   4826457
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2808043
<BONDS>                                                0
<COMMON>                                           43540
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                       1792241
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     4826457
<SALES>                                          8689068
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8689068
<CGS>                                           5216018
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5216018
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                162848
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    911686
<INCOME-TAX>                                           141929
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                769757
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                       769757
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        .018
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        .018


</TABLE>
* The Honorable Karl S. Forester, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. 1 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 06a0152n.06 Filed: February 22, 2006 No. 04-1852 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA SEIDEN Plaintiff-Appellant,

V. JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN AT DETROIT

Before: ROGERS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, District Judge. * FORESTER, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Barbara Seiden (“Seiden”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claims for failure to properly and timely exhaust her administrative remedies. In May of 2001, Seiden was employed by the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) as ZIP codes operator when her position was abolished and she was returned to a position of CFS clerk. Believing that this change was a discriminatory demotion, she sought pre-complaint counseling with a USPS equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) offi cer, but did not do so within the 45-day time2 frame specified in the applicable regulations. Rather, she made her first contact on August 2, 2001, later explaining that the reason for her delay was that she was “waiting for an accommodation.” The USPS issued a final decision on May 20, 2002, finding that Seiden did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of the challenged employment action, as required by the regulations. This final decision also notified Seiden that she had 30 days to appeal the decision through the Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”). Ther eafter, Seiden, through counsel, filed an appeal not with the OFO as directed, but instead filed a requestfor a hearing with an AL J in the Detroit District EEO Commission on June 19, 2002. On Octobe r 18, 2002, the OFO issued a final decision dismissing Seiden’s appeal as untimely. After Seiden filed a complaint with the district court, the defendant moved to dismiss her claims for failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies. The district court granted the defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss, finding th at Seiden had not initially contacted a USPS EEO officer until 71 days after the effective date of the challenged personnel action, well outside of the 45-day regulatory deadline. The district court al so found that Seiden had failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies in connection with her appeal to the OFO. It also found that equitable tolling did not apply to Seiden’s situation. In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, this court reviews legal issues de novo

. Merriweather v. City of Memphis , 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997). Having carefully considered the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we agree that Seiden failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies. Because the issuance of a full opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose and would be duplicative, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of the3 motion to dismiss of the defendant-appellee on th e basis of the district court’s well-reasoned opinion.
### -84 -82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72

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# Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 31 May 07

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.48 N 77.37 WMeters AGL 

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## ★ ● ● ● ●
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-6443

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

LEROY ALONZO MCELVEEN, a/k/a Deekie, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:03-cr-00651-TLW-2; 4:07-cv-70056-TLW) 

Submitted: September 10, 2009 Decided: September 14, 2009 

Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Leroy Alonzo McElveen, Appellant Pro Se. Arthur Bradley Parham, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Leroy Alonzo McElveen seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2009) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that McElveen has 

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                               ARTICLES OF MERGER
                                     BETWEEN
                           XRG ACQUSITION SUB I, INC.
                            (A TENNESSEE CORPORATION)
                                       AND
                          EXPRESS FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.
                            (A TENNESSEE CORPORATION)

      Pursuant to Section 48-21-107 and 48-21-109 of the Tennessee Business
Corporation Act, XRG Acquisition Sub I, Inc., a Tennessee corporation ("Sub")
and Express Freight Systems, Inc., a Tennessee corporation (the "Company"),
hereby adopt the following Articles of Merger:

      1.    The attached Plan of Merger between Sub and the Company, which is
incorporated hereby by reference, has been approved and adopted by each of the
corporations in accordance with the provisions of Sections 48-21-104, 48-21-107,
and 48-21-109 of the Tennessee Business Corporation Act provisions of the
Florida Business Corporation Act.

      2.    The Plan of Merger was adopted by the Board of Directors of Sub on
April ___, 2004 and duly approved by the affirmative vote of the required
percentage of all of the votes entitled to be cast by the shareholders of Sub on
April ___, 2004, in accordance with the laws of the State of Tennessee; was duly
approved by the Board of Directors of the Company on April ___, 2004, and was
duly approved on April ___, 2004, by a majority of all of the vote entitled to
be cast on the Plan of Merger by the shareholders of the Company entitled to
vote thereon in accordance with the laws of the State of Tennessee.

      3.    The Plan of Merger and the performance of the transactions
contemplated thereby were duly authorized by all action required by the laws of
Tennessee and by the Company's Articles of Incorporation.

      4.    The Plan of Merger shall be effective upon filing of these Articles
of Merger with the Secretary of state of the State of Tennessee.

      5.    On the date of filing of these Articles of Merger, the Sub shall
cease to exist as a separate corporation.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned corporations has duly caused
these Articles of Merger to be executed by their respective duly authorized
officers as of this ___ day of April, 2004.

                                    XRG ACQUISITION SUB I, INC.

                                    By:
                                       _________________________________________
                                    Title:
                                          ______________________________________

                                    EXPRESS FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC.

                                    By:
                                       _________________________________________
                                    Title:
                                           _____________________________________
Exhibit 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                                       OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

        In connection with the Quarterly Report of I-trax, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank
A. Martin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Frank A. Martin
-------------------
Frank A. Martin
Chief Executive Officer
November 14, 2002
June 1, 2015

Mr. Blaine Jonathan Advanced Photography Specialists

9703 Oxford Street Naples, FL 34109

Dear Mr. Jonathan:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We entered your April 29, 2015, exemption request on behalf into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-1338), but we are unable to pr ocess your request any further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brenda Robeson Program Analyst, Airmen and Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
EXHIBIT 32

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 32

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Global Assets and Services, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"). I, Bertram
Cutler, CEO and Chief Financial Officer of the company,  certify, pursuant to 18
USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act
of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief.

        (1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
                or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
                material respects, the financial condition and results of
                operations of the Company.


                                                /s/ Bertram Cutler
                                                --------------------------------
                                                Bertram Cutler, CEO & CFO

Dated:  9/20/04