2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-18-2011

Wagdy Ibrahim v. Atty Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1713

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Recommended Citation

"Wagdy Ibrahim v. Atty Gen USA" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1643.

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IMG-057 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-1713

___________

WAGDY ZARIF IBRAHIM,

a/k/a Magdy Ibrahim,

a/k/a Ibraham Wadgyu,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A045-067-329)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Susan Roy

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 10, 2011

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH AND GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed March 18, 2011 )

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Wagdy Ibrahim, a native and citizen of Egypt, petitions for review of an order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from the Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for relief from removal. For the reasons 
2

that follow, we will deny the petition for review.

1

Ibrahim came to the United States in 1995 at the age of 15 as a lawful permanent 

resident. The Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear in 2008

charging that Ibrahim was subject to removal from the United States because he had been 

convicted of violating a law related to a controlled substance. The IJ found Ibrahim

removable as charged. Through counsel, Ibrahim applied for cancellation of removal, 

which was denied. 

During his hearing before the IJ, Ibrahim raised the possibility of persecution in 

Egypt on account of his Coptic Christian religion. Ibrahim had not applied for asylum or 

withholding of removal, but the IJ stated that if Ibrahim filed a timely motion to reopen 

with an asylum application, he would reopen the proceedings. Ibrahim did so, but the IJ

denied reopening. On appeal, the BIA reopened the proceedings and remanded the 

record for a hearing on Ibrahim’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. 

On remand,2the IJ precluded Ibrahim from pursuing an additional ground for 

asylum based on his alleged membership in a particular social group of persons who had 

controlled substance convictions. Because Ibrahim presented his claim on the day of his 

 

1

 We recognize that there have been significant changes in the Egyptian 

government since this matter was before the BIA and IJ. Our review, however, is limited 

to the administrative record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 

733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005). 

2

 The matter was before Judge Susan Roy on remand due to the retirement of 

Judge Henry Dogin, who had presided over the case.
3

merits hearing, the IJ did not allow him to pursue relief on this basis. 

Regarding Ibrahim’s religious persecution claim, the IJ decided that Ibrahim had 

testified credibly but he did not establish past persecution on account of his Coptic 

Christian religion. The IJ noted that Ibrahim only testified to discrimination when he 

lived in Egypt. The IJ also decided that Ibrahim did not establish a well-founded fear of 

persecution. The IJ believed that Ibrahim had a subjective fear of persecution and stated 

that the background evidence indicated that a possibility of persecution exists. The IJ 

explained, however, that Ibrahim’s expert, Dr. Paul Marshall, testified that Coptic 

Christians generally suffer governmental and societal discrimination and harassment by 

Islamic extremists. The IJ recognized that Marshall testified that authorities would 

question Ibrahim upon his return to Egypt because he would not have a passport or 

identity document, but the IJ stated that Marshall could not say with any specificity what 

would happen to Ibrahim. 

In concluding that Ibrahim failed to produce sufficient objective evidence showing 

a reasonable possibility that he would suffer religious persecution, the IJ noted Marshall’s 

testimony that, if Ibrahim was detained and government officials discovered that he was a 

Coptic Christian, his religion in and of itself would not give rise to any significant harm. 

The IJ also noted Marshall’s statements that Ibrahim’s religion would be an “aggravating 

factor” along with his United States military service and his criminal record, and that, if 

these facts were discovered, Ibrahim would likely be detained overnight, interrogated, 

verbally accosted, and perhaps hit. Although the IJ noted that Marshall testified
4

that Ibrahim could be detained for a longer period and perhaps suffer additional physical 

mistreatment if he remained of interest to security officials, the IJ stated Marshall did not 

testify that Ibrahim would be tortured and emphasized that Marshall did not know of 

anyone who had returned to Egypt and had been detained, with the exception of persons 

who had converted from Islam to Christianity. Even if Ibrahim was detained as Marshall 

predicted, the IJ concluded Ibrahim had not shown that his treatment would rise to the 

level of persecution. 

In addition to concluding that Ibrahim failed to meet his burden of proof for 

asylum and withholding of removal, the IJ decided Ibrahim did not satisfy his burden of 

proof for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ recognized 

that the background evidence indicated that the government engages in torture, but she 

stated that there was no evidence showing that Ibrahim would be of interest to authorities 

or that authorities would have the specific intent to torture him. The IJ reiterated that

Marshall was unable to provide an example of someone similarly situated to Ibrahim who 

had been harmed upon his return to Egypt. 

The BIA dismissed Ibrahim’s appeal. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Ibrahim 

failed to establish past persecution on account of his religion and noted that Ibrahim did 

not challenge that ruling on appeal. The BIA also rejected Ibrahim’s argument that the IJ 

erred in refusing to allow him to submit evidence showing that his drug conviction would 

subject him to increased scrutiny upon entering Egypt, which would increase the 

likelihood that he would be identified as a Coptic Christian and persecuted. The BIA 
5

found it was not improper for the IJ to reject Ibrahim’s last-minute attempt to amend his 

claim at his hearing to include a fear of persecution on account of his status as a criminal 

deportee. The BIA also noted that the IJ assessed Ibrahim’s religious persecution claim 

in conjunction with his experiences in the United States, including the fact that he has a 

criminal conviction. 

The BIA also found an unpublished decision relied upon by Ibrahim, in which the 

BIA granted an Egyptian criminal deportee deferral of removal, distinguishable because 

the experts in that case had testified that there was a high likelihood of torture, an opinion 

not provided in Ibrahim’s case. Noting that Marshall found the probability of harm to 

Ibrahim unclear, the BIA found no error in the IJ’s decision that Ibrahim did not meet his 

burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA also found 

that Ibrahim did not establish that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if 

removed to Egypt. This petition for review followed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because Ibrahim is 

removable for violating a law related to a controlled substance, our jurisdiction is limited 

to reviewing constitutional claims and questions of law, which include questions of the

application of law to fact, where the facts are undisputed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); 

Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Ibrahim argues that he satisfied his burden of proof to establish that he has a well-
6

founded fear of persecution on account of his religion if removed to Egypt.3 We review 

the BIA’s conclusion that Ibrahim failed to satisfy his burden of proof under the 

substantial evidence standard of review, which requires that we uphold the decision of the 

BIA unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 

477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).

Ibrahim contends that he satisfied his burden of proof with a “plethora of articles 

and country reports,” Pet’r’s Br. at 23, but he has not discussed any specific evidence 

from the background materials supporting his claim. Ibrahim has set forth in his brief the

testimony of his expert stating that he is likely to be detained if removed to Egypt due to 

his lack of identification, that security officials will question him, and that persons who 

are detained typically suffer abuse, including insults and physical abuse, with a lesser 

likelihood of torture. Although Marshall further stated that Egyptian officials would 

view negatively Ibrahim’s Coptic Christian religion, his criminal conviction, and his 

service in the United States military, the BIA correctly stated that Marshall did not testify 

to the probability of harm. Ibrahim was required to show that harm rising to the level of 

persecution is a reasonable possibility should he be removed. Abdille, 242 F.3d at 496. 

Ibrahim has not shown that the record compels this conclusion. 

 

3

 Contrary to the Government’s argument, we have jurisdiction to review this 

question, which requires the application of law to fact. See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 

F.3d 372, 384-87 (3d Cir. 2010) (addressing well-founded fear inquiry and explaining 

that whether a reasonable person would fear persecution presents a legal question). 

Ibrahim argues that the evidence submitted established a well-founded fear of 

persecution; he does not dispute the facts related to his claim.
7

Ibrahim also argues that the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s decision to exclude

testimony about how his criminal history will affect his treatment by Egyptian officials. 

Ibrahim asserts that the IJ committed “reversible legal error,” Pet’r’s Br. at 24, stating

that his evidence was relevant to establish an increased likelihood that he would be 

subjected to heightened scrutiny, resulting in the discovery of his religion and 

persecution. Ibrahim states that he was not offering his evidence to establish that he 

would be persecuted on account of his criminal conviction.

The record reflects that the IJ precluded Ibrahim from asking Marshall questions 

related to his criminal convictions. The BIA correctly stated that Ibrahim was granted 

reopening to pursue his claim of religious persecution. Although Ibrahim argues that he 

was precluded from showing that he would be subject to heightened scrutiny, Marshall 

had already testified that authorities would question Ibrahim about his religion, why he is 

returning to Egypt, and his history in the United States. See A.R. at 164-65. Ibrahim 

does not explain what further testimony would have been provided. He has not shown 

any prejudice or that the IJ erred as a matter of law. 

Ibrahim also argues in his brief that the background evidence and testimony 

establish that he will more likely than not be tortured if removed to Egypt. Ibrahim, 

however, does not point to any specific evidence supporting his CAT claim. Marshall did 

not testify that Ibrahim would more likely than not be tortured if removed. Ibrahim has 

not shown that the evidence compels the conclusion that he met his burden of proof for 
8

protection under the CAT.

4

 

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 

 

4

 To the extent Ibrahim also contends that the IJ erred in failing to give weight to 

an unpublished decision by the BIA, that decision, which involved an Egyptian alien 

who claimed he would be tortured if removed because of his criminal conviction, is 

distinguishable for the reasons stated by the BIA. See A.R. at 206-07.