alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT  32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                    RULE 13a-14(b) AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In  connection with the Quarterly Report of Huayang International Holdings, Inc.
(the  "Company")  on  Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, as filed
with  the  Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Gao Wanjun, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Rule
13a-14(b)  and  18  U.S.C.  Sec.  1350,  that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date:                                        /s/  Gao  Wanjun
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Gao  Wanjun
                                             Chief  Executive  Officer


<PAGE>
#### Kenneth Eugene POTTS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27895.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 7, 1955.

■No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Dan Walton, Dist. Atty., Houston, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Aitty.j Austin, for the State. .. • ,

PER CURIAM.

The offense is felony theft; the punishment, two years.

The record on appeal contains no statement of facts or bill's of exception. All proceedings appear to be regular, and nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-11-00901-CR

Gabriel Pena HILBURN,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011-CR-0905

Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 7, 2012

DISMISSED

On January 6, 2012, this court issued an order stating this appeal would be dismissed 

pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) unless an amended trial court certification that shows appellant has the 

right of appeal was made part of the appellate record within thirty days. See TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(d), 37.1; see also Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174, 175-76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, 

order). Appellant did not file an amended certification. The clerk’s record does not contain a 

certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal; to the contrary, the trial court 
04-11-00901-CR

- 2 -

certification in the record states “this criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has 

NO right of appeal.” The clerk’s record contains a written plea bargain, and the punishment 

assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the 

defendant; therefore, the clerk’s record supports the trial court’s certification that defendant has 

no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

SENECA INSURANCE CO., INC.,

DBA EYDIE’S BAIL BONDS,

THROUGH VICTOR BURGESS,

AGENT,

Appellant,

v.

KALVIN DAVON ROSS,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 14

- 00101

- CV

Appeal from

431st District Court

of Denton County, Texas

(TC # 14

- 01058

- 431)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee

recover from Appellant and its sureties, if any, see T EX .R.A PP .P. 43.5 , on the judgment and all

costs, both in this Court and the court below for which let execution issue. This decision shall be

certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 15 TH DAY OF DECEMB E R

, 2015.

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 4 , 2020

Order 

Clerk

March 4, 2020

160514(30)

JOHN DOES 11-18, JANE DOE 1, and all

others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, SC: 160514

v COA: 349073

Washtenaw CC: 13-001196-CZ

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

GOVERNOR, FORMER DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FORMER

DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS FACILITIES

ADMINISTRATION, FORMER CHIEF DEPUTY

DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS FACILITIES

ADMINISTRATION, FORMER WARDEN OF

CHARLES EGELER RECEPTION AND

GUIDANCE CENTER, FORMER WARDEN OF

EARNEST C. BROOKS CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, FORMER WARDEN OF RICHARD

A. HANDLON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

FORMER WARDEN OF RICHARD A.

HANDLON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

FORMER WARDEN OF OAKS

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, FORMER

WARDEN OF THUMB CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, FORMER WARDEN OF

CHIPPEWA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

WARDEN OF KINROSS CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY, FORMER WARDEN OF

NEWBERRY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, and

FORMER WARDEN OF MICHIGAN

REFORMATORY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the defendants-appellants to hold the 

application for leave to appeal in abeyance for 100 days is GRANTED. The proceedings 

in this Court will be held in abeyance until June 19, 2020.
Exhibit 23.1 -- Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-3 no. 33-57116) pertaining to 1,083,333 shares of common stock and
50,000 shares of common stock issuable upon exercise of warrants, (Form S-3 No.
33-45536) pertaining to 1,810,000 shares of common stock, (Form S-8 No.
33-63047) pertaining to the 1991 Stock Option Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-45523)
pertaining to the 1991 Stock Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-36385) pertaining to the
1990 Restricted Stock Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-22052) pertaining to the 1988
Employee Incentive Stock Plan and (Form S-8 No. 2-93693-C) pertaining to the
1983 Employee Stock Option Plan of GV Medical, Inc., of our report dated January
19, 1996, with respect to the financial statements of SpectraScience (formerly
GV Medical, Inc.) included in this Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year
ended December 31, 1995.


                                             Ernst & Young LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota
February 22, 1996
Exhibit 10.25

    

     

    

    
      [Advance Biofactures Corporation Letterhead]

       

      

      March 4, 2019

       

        

      Dr. Ronald E. Law

       

        

      Re:  Amendment to Offer Letter

       

        

      Dear Ron:

       

          

      This letter amends your employment offer letter from Advance Biofactures Corporation ("Advance Biofactures") dated November 15, 2018 (the "Offer Letter") in
          only two respects: the portion of your full working time that you are spending working for Advance Biofactures and your compensation. This letter confirms that commencing January 24, 2019, you are spending 100% of your full working time working
          for Advance Biofactures, and your twice monthly compensation has increased proportionately, effective January 24, 2019, to $15,000.00, which equates to an annual salary of $360,000.00. In all other respects the offer letter remains unchanged.

       

        

      To indicate your agreement to this amendment to the Offer Letter please sign and date this letter in the space provide below and return it to me. A
          duplicate original is enclosed for your convenience.

       

        

      Sincerely,

      

      

      	
              /s/ Thomas Wegman

            	 
	 	 
	
              I understand and agree to the foregoing amendment.

            
	 	 
	
              /s/ Ronald E. Law

            	 
	
              Dr. Ronald E. Law

            	 
	 	 
	
              March 6, 2019

            	 
	
              Date
**Exhibit 32.1****SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION**In connection with this annual report on Form 10-K of Thor Industries, Inc. for the periodended July 31, 2006, I, Wade F. B. Thompson, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer ofThor Industries, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:1. this Form 10-K for the period ended July 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2. the information contained in this Form 10-K for the period ended July 31, 2006 fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of ThorIndustries, Inc.Date: September 28, 2006       /S/ WADE F. B. THOMPSON     Wade F. B. Thompson
#### Camille DE WINNE and wife, Appellants, v. William ALLEN, By and Through His Guardian Ad Litem, Appellee.

No. 12947.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Dec. 28, 1955.

*896Baskin, Casseb & Casseb, John Gilliland, San Antonio, for appellants. '

Emmett Shelton, Fred B. Werkenthin, W. O. Bowers, III, Austin, for. appellee.

NORVELL, Justice.

We reversed the judgment and remanded this case to the trial court with instructions to render judgment on the verdict of the jury and permit appellants to file a motion for new trial on grounds of jury misconduct, should they so desire. Allen v. De Winne, Tex.Civ.App., 268 S.W.2d 677. Our judgment was modified by the • Supreme Court and appellants were permitted to include in a motion for new trial the contention that the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 17 and 18 were contrary to the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, it being the view of the Supreme Court that the wording of Rule 324, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize this Court to consider the factual contention of “overwhelming preponderance of the evidence,” absent a ruling: thereon by the trial court, which could only be presented by motion for new trial. De Winne v. Allen, Tex., 277 S.W.2d 95.

After remand, De Winnie and wife, app'elleés in this Court upon the former appeal, filed a motion for new trial, which stated no grounds of jury misconduct but presented' the' contention that the jury’s answers to the issues mentioned weré against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. This motion was overruled by the trial court. By their answers to Special Issues Nos. 17 and 18, the jury found that Mr. De Winne failed to keep a proper lookout, and that such failure was á proximate cause of the collision which gave rise to this lawsuit. The evidence relating to these, findings has been detailed in the opinions of the Supreme Court and this Court, heretofore cited. A repetition therefore would serve no useful purpose. We have again reviewed the evidence and have concluded that the trial court correctly overruled the motion for new trial. We hold that the jury’s answers to Special Issues Nos. 17'and 18 are not against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. King v. King, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W,2d 660.

The judgment is affirmed.''
#### Norris FINLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 29647.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 9, 1958.

Louis W. Woosley, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Ben F. Ellis and John Orvis, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Leon B. Douglas, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The offense is driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated; the punishment, sixty days in jail and a fine of $250.

Their attention being called to an automobile running a flashing red light, Police Officers Fowler and Hudson pursued it east on Jefferson Blvd. and finally stopped it. Appellant was identified as the driver and sole occupant of the automobile, and the officers as well as Police Sergeant Hunter, who responded to the call, described his appearance, speech and breath odor and based upon such, and their experience in such matters, expressed the opinion that appellant was intoxicated.

Appellant testified, as did his witnesses, that he had consumed three mixed drinks containing some three ounces of whiskey, the last at about 3 a. m., some hour before his arrest. He and his witnesses denied that he was intoxicated.

*957The jury resolved the issue of appellant’s intoxication against him and the evidence is sufficient to sustain their finding.

Complaint is made by several informal bills of various rulings of the court relating to evidence admitted and excluded, among them being:

The introduction of two traffic tickets issued to appellant after he was stopped by the officers.

The court admitted as evidence only the signature of appellant, one signed "Norris Finley” and the other “Finley Norris.”

The testimony of the officers showed that appellant committed the offenses for which the traffic tickets were issued while they were following him and just prior to their overtaking him and finding that he was intoxicated. We see no error.

Officer Fowler testified that when they got appellant to jail they were told to take him over to the doctor in the basement. This, appellant contends, left the impression with the jury that he was offered an alcoholic test and was prejudicial.

The objection that the testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial was made after it had been given and the court was not asked to withdraw it or to declare a mistrial. We do not agree that the statement was prejudicial, or that the error, if any, would be ground for reversal,

The statement attributed to appellant at the time he was arrested, to the effect that he had drunk “a hell of a lot of whiskey” and the testimony showing that he “used very bad profanity” directed toward the officers, was admissible as res gestae.

The evidence shows that appellant was driving the automobile on Jefferson when the officers were following him; “Jefferson Avenue in the City and County of Dallas, State of Texas — a boulevard.”

We overrule the contention that there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant drove an automobile on a public street and highway in Dallas County.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1718 

To provide that service of the members of the organization known as the 

United States Cadet Nurse Corps during World War II constituted 

active military service for purposes of laws administered by the Secretary 

of Veterans Affairs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 4, 2011 

Mrs. LOWEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed 

Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide that service of the members of the organization 

known as the United States Cadet Nurse Corps during 

World War II constituted active military service for purposes of laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States Cadet 

5 Nurse Corps Equity Act’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1718 IH

1 SEC. 2. SERVICE DEEMED TO BE ACTIVE MILITARY SERV2 ICE. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 

4 401(a)(1)(A) of the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 (38 

5 U.S.C. 106 note), the Secretary of Defense is deemed to 

6 have determined that qualified service of a person con7 stituted active military service. 

8 (b) DETERMINATION OF DISCHARGE STATUS.—The 

9 Secretary of Defense shall issue an honorable discharge 

10 under section 401(a)(1)(B) of the GI Bill Improvement 

11 Act of 1977 to each person whose qualified service war12 rants an honorable discharge. Such discharge shall be 

13 issued before the end of the one-year period beginning on 

14 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

15 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF RETROACTIVE BENEFITS. 

16 No benefits may be paid to any person as a result 

17 of the enactment of this Act for any period before the date 

18 of the enactment of this Act. 

19 SEC. 4. DEFINITION. 

20 For purposes of this Act, the term ‘‘qualified service’’ 

21 means service of a person as a member of the organization 

22 known as the United States Cadet Nurse Corps during 

23 the period beginning on July 1, 1943, and ending on De24 cember 15, 1945. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
October 19, 2015

Mr. Brendan Turner

The Aerial Advantage Iowa

1508 East 5th Street

Vinton, IA 52349

Dear Mr. Turner :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can No t Process Your Request

We entered your exemption request , posted to the public docket on July 22, 2015, on behalf of

The Aerial Advantage Iowa filed in D ocket No

. FAA− 20 15

− 3089 , but we are unable to

process your request any further. Your petition does no t comply with the requirements of

§ 11.81 (copy enclosed) . For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of

the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief and the extent of

the relief you seek.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you

seek an exempti on.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html . This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal

Aviation A dministration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any

questions you may have.2

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption

at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267

- 2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Div ision

Enclosure s34
#### HARROD v. LADY et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 3, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1953.

Otis Harrod, pro se.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Jo Ferguson, Ass’t. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

WADDILL, Commissioner.

This is another attempt by the appellant, Otis Harrod, an inmate of the reformatory at LaGrange, to obtain his release from prison by a writ of habeas corpus. The issuance of the writ was denied by an order of a Judge of the Criminal Branch, Second Division, of the Jefferson Circuit Court. His appeal is now before us.

Appellant was convicted of storehouse breaking in violation of KRS 433.190. Upon allegations and proof of three previous convictions of felonies, his punishment was fixed by a jury at life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. KRS 431.190. Numerous reviews of his present conviction denying him relief are reported in Harrod v. Commonwealth, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 574; Harrod v. Whaley, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 750; Harrod v. Whaley, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 480; Harrod v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 810, 226 S.W.2d 4, certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 915, 70 S.Ct. 562, 946 L.Ed. 1341.

Appellant claims that his detention is illegal as being violative of the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The gist of his argument in support thereof is that there appears on the judgment of the court by which he was sentenced to prison the potation, “Storehouse Breaking and Habitual Criminal,” which shows that he was sentenced for the commission of two crimes.

The fallacy of this argument is apparent. The indictment and the instructions may be considered in construing the judgment and sentence to determine the offense of which appellant was convicted. The record reveals that appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of storehouse breaking. The indictment also charged the accused of having been convicted of previous felonies which permitted the Commonwealth to> prove these allegations which was successfully done. The court was then authorized to submit to the jury, under proper instructions the question of appellant’s guilt on the charge of storehouse breaking and, in the event the jury found appellant guilty, the jury was further authorized under the instructions to fix appellant’s punishment under the provisions of KRS 431.190, which the jury did. We find no error in this respect. See, McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 149, 156 S.W. 1058, wherein an extensive review of the validity of KRS 431.190 and other related questions may be found.

In Harrod v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 810, 226 S.W.2d 4, we reviewed appellant’s conviction and found no error.

Considering appellant’s contentions and argument in their most favorable light, *471the most that can he said in his behalf is fchat the notation on the judgment-sentence is an irregularity, and it is clear that such irregularity may be reformed on appeal or by a nunc pro tunc entry. Therefore, the judgment is not void and may not be collaterally attacked by habeas corpus,

The judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.

47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 22, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 04-10821

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 Plaintiff - Appellee

 v.

CLINTON JENNINGS also known as, Gato also known as, Blacc 

Gato

 Defendant - Appellant

---------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Dallas

---------------------

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the appellee’s unopposed motion to vacate

sentence and remand for resentencing is granted.