United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 30, 2023 Decided August 9, 2024

No. 21-5243

GIORGI RTSKHILADZE,

APPELLANT

v.

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR THE 

INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 22-3037

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:20-cv-01591)

(No. 1:21-gj-00048)

Jerome A. Madden argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Sean R. Janda, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 
2

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, and Michael S. Raab, Attorney.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WALKER and PAN, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALKER.

WALKER, Circuit Judge: In 2017, Special Counsel Robert 

S. Mueller III began investigating allegations of Russian 

government interference in the previous year’s presidential 

election. To that end he empaneled a grand jury. One of the 

witnesses who testified before it was Giorgi Rtskhiladze.1 

When the Department of Justice released a redacted 

version of Mueller’s final report, it included information that 

allegedly injured Rtskhiladze. So he sued, seeking both 

equitable and monetary relief. He also filed a separate 

application to obtain a copy of the transcript of his grand jury 

testimony. 

The district court decided that Rtskhiladze lacked standing 

to bring his equitable claims; that he failed to state a claim for 

damages; and that he was not entitled to obtain a copy of the 

transcript.

2

We hold that Rtskhiladze has standing to bring all his 

claims. So we remand for the district court to consider the 

1 Rtskhiladze is pronounced “Ske-LAHD-zuh” in the audio version 

of his memoir. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJd9eWU8qgk.

2 Rtskhiladze brought a separate damages claim against DOJ and 

Special Counsel Mueller personally. But the district court held that 

Rtskhiladze abandoned this claim before appeal, and in any event, he 

forfeited all arguments about this claim in his appellate brief. 
3

merits of the equitable claims that it dismissed for lack of 

standing. However, we agree with the district court that 

Rtskhiladze has failed to state a claim for damages. We also 

agree with the decision to deny Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain

a copy of the transcript of his grand jury testimony. 

I. Background

Giorgi Rtskhiladze was born in the Republic of Georgia, 

which was then part of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, he 

moved to the United States and later became an American 

citizen. 

In 2016, rumors surfaced of “tapes” in Russia that might 

create difficulties for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. 

JA 51. That year, Rtskhiladze sent a text message to Michael 

Cohen, an attorney for candidate Trump. The text said 

Rtskhiladze had: “Stopped flow of some tapes from Russia.” 

JA 50 ¶ 31. 

After President Trump’s election, DOJ appointed Special 

Counsel Robert S. Mueller III to investigate allegations that 

Russia had interfered in the election. Mueller empaneled a 

grand jury and called Rtskhiladze as a witness. He then wrote 

a report to DOJ about his findings. DOJ released a version of 

the report to the public, which redacted (among other things)

references to grand jury materials. 

The public report discusses Rtskhiladze in several places, 

including footnote 112. See Special Counsel Robert S. 

Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian 

Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, Volume II at 27 

n.112 (March 2019), https://perma.cc/LBG3-8CHQ (“Mueller 

Report”). That footnote contained several inaccuracies. 
4

First, it falsely called Rtskhiladze “Russian” when he is a 

Georgian-American. Id. Second, it inaccurately quoted the

text that Rtskhiladze sent to Michael Cohen.

3

 Third, 

Rtskhiladze says the footnote was vaguely drafted and created 

false insinuations about his conduct.4 

3 Compare Mueller Report, Volume II at 27 n.112, with JA 50 ¶ 31 

(emphases added to illustrate discrepancy).

Inaccurate: “Stopped flow of 

tapes from Russia but not sure 

if there’s anything else. Just so 

you know . . . .”

Accurate: “Stopped flow of 

some tapes from Russia but not 

sure if there’s anything else. 

Just so u know . . .”

4 The footnote reads: 

Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2; Comey 11/15/17 302, 

at 3. Comey’s briefing included the Steele reporting’s 

unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising 

tapes of the President involving conduct when he was a 

private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss 

Universe Pageant. During the 2016 presidential campaign, 

a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On 

October 30, 2016, Michael Cohen received a text from 

Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, 

“Stopped flow of tapes from Russia but not sure if there’s 

anything else. Just so you know . . . .” 10/30/16 Text 

Message, Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtskhiladze said “tapes” 

referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be

held by persons associated with the Russian real estate 

conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host the 

2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia. Rtskhiladze 4/4/18

302, at 12. Cohen said he spoke to Trump about the issue 

after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze. Cohen 9/12/18 

302, at 13. Rtskhiladze said he was told the tapes were 

fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen. 

Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 7. 

Mueller Report, Volume II at 27 n.112. 
5

According to Rtskhiladze, the Mueller Report’s 

deficiencies harmed his reputation and cost him several 

business deals — not the least because footnote 112 garnered 

widespread media attention. He also alleges the deficiencies 

altered the Georgian government’s plans to name Rtskhiladze 

an “Honorary Consul,” which fell through after the report’s 

release. JA 85. 

Rtskhiladze later sued Mueller and DOJ. Invoking the 

Administrative Procedure Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 

and the Privacy Act, Rtskhiladze sought equitable relief: 

specifically, a declaration that footnote 112 was inaccurate and 

an order requiring DOJ to amend it. He also sought damages 

under the Privacy Act.

While the suit was pending, the United States Senate 

issued its own report about whether Russia interfered in the 

2016 presidential election. The Senate Report included new

details about Rtskhiladze, correctly identified him as a 

Georgian-American, and properly quoted the relevant text 

message. See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th 

Cong., Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference 

in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume V at 658-660 (November

2020), https://perma.cc/M4FL-75QV. 

Reasoning that the Senate Report “is an independent and 

unchallenged source of” the Mueller Report’s “facts and 

implications,” the district court dismissed Rtskhiladze’s 

equitable claims for lack of standing. JA 108. For the same 

reason, the district court held that Rtskhiladze lacked standing 

to seek damages for harms inflicted after the Senate Report’s 

publication. As for damages before that point, the district court 

held that Rtskhiladze had failed to state a claim. 

Rtskhiladze appealed those decisions.
6

To prepare for his appeal, Rtskhiladze started a second 

action. He asked the district court for permission to review a

transcript of his grand jury testimony, take notes about it, and 

prepare a declaration summarizing it for the court in his first 

action. The district court granted each of those requests, which 

are not in dispute. 

Rtskhiladze also sought to obtain a copy of the transcript 

of his grand jury testimony. His plan was to share that copy 

with the public. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 6, 9-10. The district court 

denied his request. 

Rtskhiladze appealed that decision as well. 

II. Analysis

We consider three issues: (1) Rtskhiladze’s equitable 

claims; (2) his damages claim; and (3) his alleged right to

obtain a copy of the transcript of his grand jury testimony. 

A. Equitable Claims

Rtskhiladze has standing to bring his equitable claims. See 

U.S. Const. art. III.5 

To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate he has

“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 

Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 

5 Our review is de novo. Center for Law & Education v. Department 

of Education, 396 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
7

DOJ does little to dispute that Rtskhiladze has alleged an 

injury caused by the Mueller Report. More saliently, DOJ says 

that the court cannot equitably redress any such injury. 

According to DOJ, the (accurate) Senate Report eliminated the 

ongoing effects of the (inaccurate) Mueller Report. 

We disagree. A government report (like the Senate 

Report) does not extinguish the harm from an earlier 

government report (like the Mueller Report) “where 

reputational injury derives directly from an unexpired and 

unretracted government action.” Foretich v. United States, 351 

F.3d 1198, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “Case law is clear” in other 

contexts that such an “injury satisfies the requirements of 

Article III standing to challenge that action” — and the same is 

true here in the Privacy Act context. Id.; cf. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(d)(2)(B)(i), (g)(2)(A). 

The Mueller Report remains “unexpired and unretracted.” 

Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1213. That’s because the Senate cannot 

retract a report issued by DOJ, nor did the Senate Report 

purport to do so. So the Mueller Report could continue to harm 

Rtskhiladze in at least two ways. First, someone may find the 

Mueller Report but not the Senate Report — in which case the 

Mueller Report would still cause Rtskhiladze’s alleged injury. 

Alternatively, readers of both reports may continue to believe 

Mueller. After all, Congress neither speaks for DOJ, nor 

speaks infallibly. Either way, a court could redress the ongoing 

injury by ordering DOJ to correct the Mueller Report. 

Such readers are not hypothetical here: Rtskhiladze 

presented evidence that one of his reputational harms could be 

solved by a “retraction” issued “from the Attorney General.” 

See JA 120 n.2 (cleaned up). In other words, the alleged and 

ongoing injury is traceable to DOJ’s Mueller Report, and it 

could still be redressed by an order to correct it. 
8

DOJ argues that Rtskhiladze has no right to a full 

retraction of the Mueller Report’s references to him because 

some are accurate, and it’s the accurate information that’s

harming Rtskhiladze’s reputation. Perhaps. But in a 

defamation suit, truth is a defense — not an impediment to 

standing. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 

512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And though this is not a defamation 

suit, the same logic applies. The (partial) truth of the Mueller 

Report is a defense for DOJ — not a barrier to stop Rtskhiladze 

from bringing his equitable claims. 

We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to 

dismiss Rtskhiladze’s equitable claims for lack of standing and 

remand to the district court to address DOJ’s motion to dismiss 

them for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).6 

B. Damages Claim

Like the district court, we hold that Rtskhiladze has 

standing to seek damages for injuries that DOJ allegedly 

inflicted before the Senate Report’s release. Unlike the district 

court, we hold that Rtskhiladze also has standing to seek 

damages for injuries inflicted after that point. 

As we explained above, the Mueller Report could still 

harm Rtskhiladze regardless of what is in the Senate Report. 

So for the same reasons Rtskhiladze has standing to seek 

6 The district court did not consider the merits of Rtskhiladze’s

equitable claims (unlike his damages claim). Though DOJ briefed 

merits arguments about why the equitable claims fail, we see no 

reason to deviate from our “general practice” of remanding for the 

district court to address those arguments in the first instance. See

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
9

equitable relief to redress ongoing injuries, he has standing to 

seek monetary relief for those injuries.

7

 

That said, Rtskhiladze has failed to plausibly state a claim 

for monetary relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).8

Recall that he sued for damages under the Privacy Act. 

That Act requires plaintiffs seeking damages to show (among 

other things) that a federal agency’s conduct was “intentional 

or willful.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). The conduct “must be so 

patently egregious and unlawful that anyone undertaking the 

conduct should have known it unlawful.” Laningham v. United 

States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (cleaned 

up). 

On appeal, Rtskhiladze has forfeited any argument that he 

plausibly alleged “intentional or willful” conduct by DOJ. 

Instead, he cites common-law defamation precedents. But this 

is not a defamation suit, and the Privacy Act’s explicit text 

requires Rtskhiladze to allege “intentional or willful” conduct. 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). So here, common law cases are not on

point.

7 On appeal, DOJ tries to rebut the district court’s analysis by offering 

an alternative source of Rtskhiladze’s alleged injury — an August 

2017 New Yorker article discussing Rtskhiladze’s connection to 

President Trump. But that argument is belied by the facts. The 

Georgian government began the process of appointing Rtskhiladze 

as an “Honorary Consul” in the “summer and fall of 2017,” and 

terminated his candidacy once the Mueller Report was released 

almost two years later. JA 45, 85. The district court was right to 

conclude that, given this timeline, Rtskhiladze plausibly alleged that 

the Mueller Report (and not the article) harmed him. 

8 Our review is de novo. See Momenian v. Davidson, 878 F.3d 381, 

387 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
10

Because Rtskhiladze has not even attempted to meet the 

Privacy Act’s requirements, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of his damages claim. 

C. Obtaining the Grand Jury Transcript

The district court did not err by denying Rtskhiladze’s 

request to obtain a copy of the transcript of his grand jury 

testimony. By “obtain,” we mean gaining control of a 

transcript copy rather than accessing one already in the 

government’s control. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(1). And by 

“copy,” we mean a transcript not prepared by a witness (or his 

attorneys) taking notes while he accesses the transcript of his 

testimony.

1. Burden of Proof

Before assessing the district court’s decision, we must 

resolve a threshold dispute. DOJ says Rtskhiladze bears the 

burden of demonstrating a need to obtain a copy of the 

transcript of his grand jury testimony. But Rtskhiladze says the 

burden is on DOJ to establish why his request should be denied. 

Rtskhiladze’s argument relies on two of our cases. But 

neither provides the support he needs. 

The first is In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 

1989). There, we held that “a grand jury ‘witness’ in an 

independent counsel proceeding” was “entitled to a copy of his 

testimony” when “no indictment was returned and the Final 

Report ha[d] been filed.” Id. at 1368. But that case was unique

because the Independent Counsel Act was “sui generis.” Id. at 

1369. 
11

Students of the 1980s and ‘90s may remember that the Act 

provided for an independent counsel with special powers 

insulating him from executive-branch control, including 

removal protections. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a). “Because of an 

independent counsel’s special powers, Congress provided 

special procedures . . . to ensure fairness to the targets of such 

investigations and to those touched by investigations.” In re 

Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1369-70 (emphasis added). And

those procedures implied an exception to “the general rule of 

grand jury secrecy.” Id. at 1370. 

Because the Independent Counsel Act expired long ago, In 

re Sealed Motion does not control here. Though Mueller was 

a special counsel, he was not an independent counsel. He 

lacked some of the “special powers” enjoyed by the

independent counsels of the ‘80s and ‘90s — including 

statutory protections against at-will removal. Id. at 1369; see 

also 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). 

Outside of the independent counsel process, proceedings 

are governed by “the general rule of grand jury secrecy” 

in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). See In re Sealed 

Motion, 880 F.2d at 1370; Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (“Unless 

these rules provide otherwise,” grand jurors, government 

attorneys, and other specified personnel “must not disclose a 

matter occurring before the grand jury . . . .”). Thus Rule 

6(e) — and not the special procedure outlined in the 

Independent Counsel Act — governs here.

Rtskhiladze relies on a second case: In re Grand Jury, 490 

F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It held that grand jury “secrecy 

rules” — the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

6(e) — “are no justification for denying witnesses access to 

their own transcripts.” Id. at 989 (emphasis added in part). 
12

But on appeal, Rtskhiladze does not seek “access” to his 

transcript — he already got that. And In re Grand Jury limited

its holding to “access” — not to obtaining a copy of the 

transcript, which Rtskhiladze could keep as a record and 

release to the public. See 490 F.3d at 987 (noting 

commentators’ failure to “distinguish[ ] between having access 

and obtaining a copy”); see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 6, 9-10. In 

fact, In re Grand Jury expressly left open the question of what 

factors “would justify denying copies of transcripts.” 490 F.3d

at 989-90. 

To answer that open question, we apply the same 

framework used in In re Grand Jury. We “weigh the 

competing interests of the Government and grand jury 

witnesses” given “the open-ended text of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) and 

the general analytical approach of the cases.” Id. at 987; see 

also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E) (“The court may authorize 

disclosure — at a time, in a manner, and subject to any other 

conditions that it directs — of a grand-jury matter:

(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 

proceeding . . . .”).9 

First consider a witness’s interest in obtaining a copy of 

his grand testimony. It is minimal — at least when, as here, he 

has already received access to the transcript and has been 

afforded a discretionary opportunity to take notes. See In re 

Grand Jury, 490 F.3d at 990 (“We leave to the sound discretion 

of the district court whether . . . to allow the witnesses or their 

9 Rtskhiladze notes that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 

imposes secrecy requirements on the government, but not on 

witnesses who testify before the grand jury. See In re Grand Jury, 

490 F.3d at 989. True enough. But that does not mean we can ignore 

Rule 6(e) in this case, or abandon the interest-balancing approach we 

have developed when applying the Rule. See id. at 980, 987-88. 
13

attorneys to take notes.”). Unless the district court says 

otherwise, such a witness could even write out his own version

of the transcript in his notes. He could take this self-made 

transcript, walk outside, and “stand on the courthouse steps [to] 

tell the public everything the witness was asked and answered.” 

Id. at 989. That kind of witness can, in other words, do just 

about everything that he might want to do by obtaining a copy. 

Now consider the relevant interest of DOJ. That interest 

is primarily in limiting “the possibility of witness intimidation”

to encourage honest testimony. Id. When it comes to a witness 

obtaining a transcript of grand jury testimony, that interest is 

significant. “[I]f a witness could routinely obtain a copy of the 

grand jury transcript,” a third party could “pressure the witness 

to obtain the transcript and to give it to that third party.” Id. 

And the “fear of being forced to disclose the transcript to a 

threatening third party could deter witnesses from testifying 

freely and candidly in the first place.” Id. 

DOJ’s interest is far less significant when the issue is

transcript access (what Rtskhiladze was granted) rather than

obtaining a copy of the transcript (what Rtskhiladze was 

denied). Witnesses with access remain free to protect 

themselves by misleading any third parties who threaten them. 

Consider that someone like a court reporter preparing a 

transcript copy has every incentive to be complete and 

accurate. Conversely, if a witness transcribes the transcript in 

his notes, he could alter or omit details if needed to protect 

himself. So “denying witnesses access to their own transcripts 

to help prevent witnesses from talking to others makes little 

sense.” Id.; see also id. at 990 (“Grand jury witnesses are not 

substantially more likely to face pressure to divulge 

information about their grand jury testimony if they can review 

their transcript in private than if they have to recall their 

testimony from memory.”). 
14

That difference — between DOJ’s interest in blocking 

transcript access (In re Grand Jury) and its interest in blocking

a witness from obtaining a copy of the transcript (this 

case) — explains why the interest balancing is not identical in 

the two cases. 

To sum up, the district court should weigh the interests of 

the government against those of the witness when deciding 

whether a witness can obtain a copy of his grand jury 

transcript. So the district court was correct when it refused to 

create a rule automatically permitting witnesses to obtain a

copy of their grand jury transcripts. The burden is on the 

witness to provide an interest of his own for the district court 

to consider. And when the district court weighs that interest 

against the government’s, we will review its decision for an 

abuse of discretion. See id. at 990.

2. Review of the District Court’s Exercise of Discretion

Applying abuse-of-discretion review, we have little 

trouble affirming the decision of the district court. 

Rtskhiladze’s interest in obtaining a copy of his transcript 

is minimal. He fails to convincingly explain what he would 

gain by obtaining a copy of a transcript he has already accessed 

and could have transcribed. While we do not rule out the 

possibility that some future witness might provide a convincing 

reason for obtaining a copy of the transcript of his grand jury 

testimony, Rtskhiladze has provided none here. In contrast, 
15

DOJ has a significant interest in not chilling the testimony of 

future grand jury witnesses.10 

We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain a

copy of his grand jury transcript. 

III. Conclusion

The district court held that Rtskhiladze lacked standing to 

bring his equitable claims. We reverse that decision and 

remand those claims. 

We agree with the district court that Rtskhiladze has

standing to bring his damages claim for alleged injuries 

suffered before the Senate Report’s release. But unlike the 

district court, we conclude that Rtskhiladze also has standing 

to sue for damages for alleged harms after the Senate Report’s 

release. 

Though Rtskhiladze has standing to sue for damages, he 

has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. So 

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim.

10 Rtskhiladze says he should be allowed to publish a copy to 

counteract DOJ’s alleged publication of other parts of his testimony 

that portray him a negative light. But he never identifies where DOJ

made those disclosures. None of footnote 112 was redacted to block 

grand jury information — though much of the Mueller Report is 

redacted for that reason — and the footnote does not cite grand jury 

testimony at any point. And the footnote contains citations to other 

sources that Rtskhiladze does not challenge. 
16

Finally, the district court concluded that Rtskhiladze is not 

entitled to obtain a copy of his grand jury transcript. That 

decision was not an abuse of discretion, so we affirm.

So ordered.