UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

THOMAS BALDWIN,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:08-cr-00315-TDS-1)

Submitted: September 28, 2010 Decided: October 8, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, 

Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Thomas Baldwin appeals the 262-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent 

to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010), and one count 

of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 2000 

& Supp. 2010). On appeal, Baldwin contends that the district 

court erred in declining to depart downward to account for the 

period of imprisonment he had already served on an undischarged 

state sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review a sentence imposed by a district court under 

a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007); see United States v. Lynn, 592 

F.3d 572, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard 

of review applicable when defendant properly preserves a claim 

of sentencing error in district court “[b]y drawing arguments 

from § 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately 

imposed”). We begin by reviewing the sentence for significant 

procedural error, including such errors as “failing to calculate 

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
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sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no significant 

procedural errors, we then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 

473 (4th Cir. 2007). We presume reasonable a sentence imposed 

within the properly calculated Guidelines range. United States 

v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Even if 

we would have reached a different result, this fact alone is 

insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. Pauley, 

511 F.3d at 474. 

“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must 

make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a 

sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to 

the particular facts presented and must “state in open court” 

the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence, showing 

that it has a reasoned basis for its decision and has considered 

the parties’ arguments. Id. A sentencing court need not, 

however, “robotically tick through” otherwise irrelevant 

subsections of § 3553(a). See United States v. Johnson, 445 

F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Baldwin challenges the district court’s decision 

not to depart downward to account for the time he had already 
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served on an undischarged state sentence. Under U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(c) (2009), in a case involving an 

undischarged term of imprisonment that does not fit within 

subsections (a) and (b), a downward departure is authorized only 

under extraordinary circumstances. See USSG § 5G1.3 cmt. 

n.3(E). A downward departure is warranted only if it is 

necessary to “ensure that the combined punishment is not 

increased unduly by the fortuity and timing of separate 

prosecutions and sentencings.” Id. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that Baldwin was not entitled to a 

downward departure. As it stands, Baldwin’s sentence is at the 

lowest end of the applicable Guidelines range. See USSG

§ 4B1.1(c)(3). The vast majority of the sentencing hearing was 

devoted to the issue of downward departure. In making its 

decision, the district court determined the correct advisory 

Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors and its 

authority to depart downward, and explained its decision to the 

parties. Its determination was individualized, taking into 

account the unique treatment of Baldwin’s state and federal 

charges, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and 

Baldwin’s history. Reflecting upon those factors, the court 

determined that the circumstances were not sufficiently 

extraordinary to warrant a downward departure in light of 
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Baldwin’s extensive criminal history. See USSG § 5G1.3 cmt. 

n.3(E).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED