COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Agee 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

SHARIF RANI McCOY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1475-01-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 JULY 30, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge 

 Patricia B. Dickey for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Sharif Rani McCoy appeals the revocation of his probation for 

his January 13, 2000 conviction for possession of cocaine and the 

resulting sentence imposed by the trial court. Specifically, 

McCoy contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

sentencing him to a sentence in excess of that ordered by the 

trial court on the underlying conviction. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

 On March 20, 2001, the trial court issued a show cause order 

to McCoy, directing him to show cause why his two-year suspended 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. Further, because this memorandum 

opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts 

necessary to our holding. 
sentence and probation for a January 16, 2001 conviction for 

possession of cocaine should not be revoked. After a hearing 

conducted on May 4, 2001, the trial court found McCoy had violated 

the terms of his probation. The court then revoked his probation 

and sentenced him to serve his suspended prison term of two years 

and to be "subject to a period of post-release supervision for a 

period of [one] year."1 McCoy raised no objection to the trial 

court's findings, nor to the imposed sentence. 

 

 

1 See Code § 19.2-295.2(A), which provides in pertinent 

part: 

At the time the court imposes sentence upon 

a conviction for any felony offense 

committed (i) on or after January 1, 1995, 

the court may, and (ii) on or after July 1, 

2000, shall, in addition to any other 

punishment imposed if such other punishment 

includes an active term of incarceration in 

a state or local correctional facility, 

except in cases in which the court orders a 

suspended term of confinement of at least 

six months, impose a term of postrelease 

supervision of not less than six months nor 

more than three years, as the court may 

determine. Such additional term shall be 

suspended and the defendant placed under 

postrelease supervision upon release from 

the active term of incarceration. The 

period of supervision shall be established 

by the court; however, such period shall not 

be less than six months nor more than three 

years. 

See also Allard v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 57, 67, 480 S.E.2d 

139, 144 (1997) ("Code § 19.2-295.2 applies to both bench and 

jury trials. The language is expansive and inclusive, not 

limiting and exclusive."). 

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 On appeal, McCoy contends that the trial court's imposition 

of the one-year period of post-release supervision was improper as 

it exceeded the terms of his original sentence. However, as noted 

above, McCoy failed to raise such an objection during the 

proceedings before the trial court. Further, he raised no 

objection by subsequent motion. Accordingly, his appellate 

contention is procedurally barred, as we find no basis to invoke 

the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.2 Thus, the judgment 

of the trial court is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

 

2 See Rule 5A:18. 

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